Title: The Prince
Author: Machiavelli, Niccolò
Language: English
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The Prince

by Nicolo Machiavelli

Translated by W. K. Marriott


Contents

 INTRODUCTION
 YOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94
 OFFICE Æt. 25-43—1494-1512
 LITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58—1512-27
 THE MAN AND HIS WORKS
 DEDICATION

 THE PRINCE
 CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED
 CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES
 CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES
 CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH
 CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED
 CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY
 CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE
 CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS
 CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY
 CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED
 CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES
 CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES
 CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN
 CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR
 CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED
 CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS
 CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED
 CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH
 CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED
 CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?
 CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN
 CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES
 CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
 CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES
 CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER
 CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

 DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI

 THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA



_ Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to
1512 held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic
missions to various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512;
later exiled and returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd
June 1527._



INTRODUCTION


Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the
second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute,
and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were
members of the old Florentine nobility.

His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly
enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of
Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an
Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico.
The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year
Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career
Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted
until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his
office. The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they
were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s
literary activity and increasing influence; but he died, within a few
weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his
fifty-eighth year, without having regained office.



YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94


Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the
Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of
this representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been
described as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by
the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving
Lorenzo. Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have
been slight, for although at one time he wielded immense power over the
fortunes of Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a
gibe in _The Prince_, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed
prophet who came to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean
rule during the life of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli
strongly, for he frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to
Lorenzo’s grandson that he dedicates _The Prince_.

Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the
young men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer
than their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other
kinds of excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming,
and women; their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with
wit and acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly
was thought the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli
shows why youth should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and
leads us to infer that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes:
“I have received your letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure,
especially because you tell me you are quite restored in health, than
which I could have no better news; for if God grant life to you, and to
me, I hope to make a good man of you if you are willing to do your
share.” Then, writing of a new patron, he continues: “This will turn
out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since, then,
you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters
and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I
have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success
and honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help
you if you help yourself.”



OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512


The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the
free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the
expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After
serving four years in one of the public offices he was appointed
Chancellor and Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and
Peace. Here we are on firm ground when dealing with the events of
Machiavelli’s life, for during this time he took a leading part in the
affairs of the Republic, and we have its decrees, records, and
dispatches to guide us, as well as his own writings. A mere
recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the statesmen and
soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities, and
supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters
which illustrate _The Prince_.

His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli”
of _The Prince_, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it
is far better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on
fortresses. This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is
urged by him in many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes.

In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for
continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct
of affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft
summarized in _The Prince_, and was consequently driven out. He, also,
it was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support
to Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge
that such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the
faith of princes.

Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out
of the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the
Duke Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of _The
Prince_. Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke
for the benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have
seized; he can, indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the
pattern of Cesare Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed
by some critics as the “hero” of _The Prince_. Yet in _The Prince_ the
duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on the
fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes every course that
might be expected from a prudent man but the course which will save
him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which happens;
and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims
that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen
fatality.

On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to
watch the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia
cheated into allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano
delle Rovere (Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most
reason to fear the duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election,
says that he who thinks new favours will cause great personages to
forget old injuries deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had
ruined Cesare.

It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that
pontiff was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought
to a successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing
chiefly to his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius
that Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and
women, and concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man
that will win and hold them both.

It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian
states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany,
with results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those
events, and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they
impinge on the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with
Louis XII of France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has
already been alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as
the man who accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but
who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who,
had he allowed himself to be influenced by such motives, would have
been ruined. The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men
of the age, and his character has been drawn by many hands; but
Machiavelli, who was an envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the
secret of his many failures when he describes him as a secretive man,
without force of character—ignoring the human agencies necessary to
carry his schemes into effect, and never insisting on the fulfilment of
his wishes.

The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with
events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the
three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the
object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in
the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won
in eight hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during
these events, complicated as they were by the feud which broke out
between the pope and the French, because friendship with France had
dictated the entire policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II
finally formed the Holy League against France, and with the assistance
of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy
of the Pope, and had to submit to his terms, one of which was that the
Medici should be restored. The return of the Medici to Florence on 1st
September 1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic, was the signal
for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his friends, and thus put an end
to his public career, for, as we have seen, he died without regaining
office.



LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27


On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had
vainly hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence,
was dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he
was accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici,
imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope,
Leo X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at
San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In
a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a
very interesting description of his life at this period, which
elucidates his methods and his motives in writing _The Prince_. After
describing his daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he
writes: “The evening being come, I return home and go to my study; at
the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt,
and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass
into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly
received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I
do not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their
actions, and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I
feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay,
death does not terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men.
And because Dante says:

Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,
Unfruitful else,

I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have
composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as
fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a
principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how
they can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever
pleased you, this ought not to displease you: and to a prince,
especially to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it
to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will
be able to tell you what is in it, and of the discourses I have had
with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and polishing it.”

The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form
in which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work
during its composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some
unknown reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although
Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or
presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo
ever received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any
employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime,
_The Prince_ was never published by him, and its text is still
disputable.

Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this
little thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that
during the fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have
neither slept nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by
one who has reaped experience at the expense of others. And of my
loyalty none could doubt, because having always kept faith I could not
now learn how to break it; for he who has been faithful and honest, as
I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my
honesty.”

Before Machiavelli had got _The Prince_ off his hands he commenced his
“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read
concurrently with _The Prince_. These and several minor works occupied
him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look
after the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the
Medicean rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her
citizens, and Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new
constitution under which the Great Council was to be restored; but on
one pretext or another it was not promulgated.

In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to
settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly
remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he
was much sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.”
It was in the same year that he received a commission at the instance
of Cardinal de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which
occupied him until 1525. His return to popular favour may have
determined the Medici to give him this employment, for an old writer
observes that “an able statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will
endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play
with.”

When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to
Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in
the meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is
somewhat remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written _The
Prince_ for the instruction of the Medici after they had just regained
power in Florence, so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence”
to the head of the family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year
the battle of Pavia destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left
Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles V. This
was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of which the popular
party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who were once more
banished.

Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his
return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of
Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached
Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527.



THE MAN AND HIS WORKS


No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence
has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her
most famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have
found in his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the
germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle
to protest against the world-wide and evil signification of his name,
it may be pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which
this sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that
the researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more
reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy
necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade.

Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and
industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and
with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced
retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he
depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the
successful statesman and author, for he appears to have been only
moderately prosperous in his several embassies and political
employments. He was misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII,
overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren
of results; his attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery
that he raised astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct
of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear
by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of
compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to
suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when
he set him to write the “History of Florence,” rather than employ him
in the state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and
there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure.

Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on _The
Prince_, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they
are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as
they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet
they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of
Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical
incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses which
Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and
conduct.

Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish
some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, _The
Prince_ is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men
are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the
days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices
which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon.
Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them
to be—and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses;
prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to
a higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an
empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the
arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to
fight.

It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government
should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the
people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of
society; to this “high argument” _The Prince_ contributes but little.
Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments
otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and
insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests _The
Prince_ with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the
incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which
still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other
and their neighbours.

In translating _The Prince_ my aim has been to achieve at all costs an
exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent
paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression.
Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he
wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his
substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. _Quis eo fuit
unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?_
In _The Prince_, it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not
only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an
Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise was
in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius
of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to
the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example:
the word _intrattenere_, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy
adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would
by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every
contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that
“Rome _entertained_ the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting
their power.” But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and
ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that “_Rome
maintained friendly relations with the Ætolians_,” etc., using four
words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity
of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to
the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can only hope that
the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s meaning, may
overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it.

The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli:

Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di
trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto
dal duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da
Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502;
Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’
Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di
Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols.,
1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence,
1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in
verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose,
1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d’oro (poem in
terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il
riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta di
Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie
fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525.

Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti
carnascialeschi.

Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence,
6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols.,
1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7.

Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E.
Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G.
Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri
intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D.
Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929.



DEDICATION


To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici

Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed
to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in
which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses,
arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented
to princes, worthy of their greatness.

Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some
testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my
possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as,
the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience
in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which,
having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now
send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.

And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance,
nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable,
seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to
offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all
that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and
dangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnificent
words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic
allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed
to embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour
should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the
weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable.

Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low
and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of
princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves
below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of
lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves
upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it
needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be
of the people.

Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I
send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you
will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness
which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your
Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your
eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a
great and continued malignity of fortune.



THE PRINCE



CHAPTER I.
HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE
ACQUIRED


All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been
and are either republics or principalities.

Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long
established; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or
they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the
prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of
the King of Spain.

Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a
prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of
the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.



CHAPTER II.
CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES


I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another
place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to
principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above,
and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary
states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than
new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of
his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise,
for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless
he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if
he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to
the usurper, he will regain it.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have
withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius
in ’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the
hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it
happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices
cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects
will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and
duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are
lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.



CHAPTER III.
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES


But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be
not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken
collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from
an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for
men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and
this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein
they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have
gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common
necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have
submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships
which he must put upon his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends
who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the
way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,
feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed
forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill
of the natives.

For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied
Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it
only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the
gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future
benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is
very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,
they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with
little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the
delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in
the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time
it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the
borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to
bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be
defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above
mentioned.

 [1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who
 married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and
 died in 1510.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second
time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains
to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and
what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself
more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an
ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country
and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold
them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government;
and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of
the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in
other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will
live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony,
and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,
although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the
customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst
themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has
only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of
their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws
nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will
become entirely one body with the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,
customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great
energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real
helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside
there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has
made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other
measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled
there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the
spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy
them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are
great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the
country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied
by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have
more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He
who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost
caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested
from him with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do
this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A
prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense
he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority
only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them
to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and
scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being
uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not
to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have
been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not
costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as
has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one
has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,
because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious
ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man
ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much
more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state,
so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting
of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and
all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their
own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a
footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be
introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of
ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were
brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where
they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And
the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner
enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the
hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to
those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over
to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he
has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold
of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces,
and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of
them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does
not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired,
and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and
troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these
measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2]
the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the
greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.
Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and
Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was
humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and
Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor
did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends
without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make
them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because
the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,
who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for
which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it
is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the
medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable;
for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic
fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but
difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either
detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but
difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the
evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise
man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not
having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that
every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the
Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to
avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war
is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of
others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in
Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided
both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which
is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the
benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and
prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring
with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

 [2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.”

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as
the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held
possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he
has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain
a state composed of divers elements.

 [3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462,
 died 1515.

 [4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who
desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I
will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a
foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every
door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to
accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have
succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not
made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,
regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;
the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of
Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of
Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,
the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then
could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,
which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made
the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could
have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above
laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although
they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the
Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been
forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have
made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no
sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to
occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was
weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had
thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by
adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater
authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to
follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of
Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was
himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,
divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter
in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country
and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and
whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he
drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out
in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always
do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but
when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is
folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with
her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she
ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with
the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she
got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had
not the excuse of that necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,
he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he
brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did
not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to
injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from
the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought
Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to
humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have
consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have
kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would
never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also
because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order
to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not
have had the courage.

And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander
and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given
above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,
because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your
disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king
had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in
exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to
Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the
faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

 [5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and
 married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to
 retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.

 [6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a
 cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and
wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that
is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes
with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope
Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal
Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I
replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning
that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the
Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin
may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which
never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming
powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about
either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him
who has been raised to power.



CHAPTER IV.
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL
AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH


Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly
acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great
became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was
scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole
empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained
themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose
among themselves from their own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to
be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of
servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his
favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity
by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons
have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and
hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a
prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration,
because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as
superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as
to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular
affection.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the
King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one
lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into
sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and
changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the
midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,
and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king
take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both
of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state
of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The
causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that
the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can
he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the
lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his
ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with
great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when
they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them,
for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in
mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his
own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has
been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot
replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this
prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the
others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not
rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because
one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,
for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men,
for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the
victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with
infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from
those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated
the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves
the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either
to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings
the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of
Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and
therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him
in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which
victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander,
for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would
have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults
raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted
like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the
Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities
there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them
endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the
power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed
away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting
afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself
his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed
there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other
than the Romans were acknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with
which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which
others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;
this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the
conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.



CHAPTER V.
CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER
THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED


Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been
accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three
courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the
next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live
under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an
oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a
government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand
without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support
him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will
hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other
way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held
Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they
lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as
the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did
not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities
in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them
otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city
accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be
destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of
liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither
time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do
or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges
unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they
immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been
held in bondage by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and
his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to
obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in
making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern
themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a
prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But
in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire
for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of
their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them
or to reside there.



CHAPTER VI.
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND
ABILITY


Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities
as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of
state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others,
and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely
to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A
wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to
imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not
equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the
clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far
distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow
attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their
strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of
so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a
new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,
accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired
the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station
presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of
these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.
Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the
strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no
other state, is compelled to reside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,
have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus,
and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not
discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet
he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy
to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have
acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their
particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be
found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor.
And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed
anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material
to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that
opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and
without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of
Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that
they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of
bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and
that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should
become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary
that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of
the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace.
Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians
dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate,
and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity
whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a
principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The
difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules
and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their
government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there
is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or
more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the
introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for
enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and
lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This
coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on
their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily
believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.
Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the
opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others
defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along
with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter
thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves
or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate
their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In
the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass
anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they
are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have
conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the
reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it
is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that
persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when
they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by
force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not
have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to
Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things
immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no
means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the
unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties
in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the
ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are
overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated,
they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards
powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some
resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like
kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man rose from a private
station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to
fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him
for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their
prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one
who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king.
This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old
alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on
such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had
endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.

 [1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.



CHAPTER VII.
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF
OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE


Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private
citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they
have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they
have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state
is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as
happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the
Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might
hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those
emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens
came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the
fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable
things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;
because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not
reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having
always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it
because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature
which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and
correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not
overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become
princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be
prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps,
and that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became
princes, they must lay _afterwards_.

 [1] “Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and
 correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of
 “correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth and seventeenth
 centuries.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or
fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and
these are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper
means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be
Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties
he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called
by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy
of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he
had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise
and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and
fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

 [2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria
 Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan,
 on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli
 was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia
 (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations
 of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to
 his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years
 before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his
 “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare
 Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended to the
 present work.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations
may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be
laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,
therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be
seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not
consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what
better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;
and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but
the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had
many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see
his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the
Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke
of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini
were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he
saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been
assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope,
namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved
him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers,
so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was
easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other
reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not
only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving
the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy
with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He
was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the
attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the
king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the
Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was
hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to
him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that
the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him,
that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might
themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the
same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and
attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And
as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the
Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from
that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the
arms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in
Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,
making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to
their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that
in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned
entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the
Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came
to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length
that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them,
called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the
rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless
dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the
French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by
trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse
to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the
mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with
all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the
Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his
power at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned
their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good
foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of
Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he
gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice,
and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.

 [3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak
masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave
them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was
full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing
to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it
necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer
Ramiro d’Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest
power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the
greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not
advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but
that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the
country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their
advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some
hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the
people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if
any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in
the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took
Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the
piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The
barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied
and dismayed.

 [4] Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding
himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate
dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great
measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if
he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,
for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would
not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and
to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards
the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta.
It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would
have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future
he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church
might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which
Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by
exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as
to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to
himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope
with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the
college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before
the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first
shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had
accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords
as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the
Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And
as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany,
for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his
protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French
were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and
in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down
upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through
hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines
would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was
prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much
power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer
have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his
own power and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He
left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the
rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick
unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and
he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the
foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not
had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he
would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his
foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a
month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst
the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they
could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope
him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not
have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of
Alexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day
that Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought
of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had
provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that,
when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.

 [5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.

 [6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad
 Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to
blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to
offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of
others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and
far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and
only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness
frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to
secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome
either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the
people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate
those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of
things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to
destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship
with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal
and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the
actions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he
made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope
to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected
Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any
cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they
became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom
he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,
San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear
him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their
relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the
kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above
everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,
failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad
Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages
to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his
choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

 [7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.



CHAPTER VIII.
CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS


Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither
of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is
manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be
more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are
when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the
principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private
person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first
method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other
modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these
two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian,[1] became King of Syracuse not only from a
private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a
potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous
life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of
mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession,
he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established
in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself
prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that
which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding
for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army,
was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the
senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating
to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the
senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held
the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he
was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not
only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for
its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time
raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme
necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and,
leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.

 [1] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will
see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as
he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any
one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were
gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly
held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent
to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith,
without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not
glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and
extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his
greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be
seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain.
Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite
wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent
men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da
Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by
his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his
youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his
discipline, he might attain some high position in the military
profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,
and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body
and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing a
paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some
citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than
its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So
he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many
years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look
upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire
anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he
had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would
be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and
he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably
by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also
to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,
and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he
lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having
arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a
solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of
Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual
in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave
discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son
Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and
others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to
be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a
chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after
him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places
and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto,
mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief
magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to
obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the
prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and
strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a
way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only
was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all
his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as
that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by
Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia,
as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this
parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made
his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after
infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his
country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be
conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by
means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold
the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this
follows from severities[2] being badly or properly used. Those may be
called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are
applied at one blow and are necessary to one’s security, and that are
not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage
of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding
they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than
decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God
or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is
impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.

 [2] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern
 equivalent of Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than
 the more obvious “cruelties.”

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought
to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for
him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to
repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to
reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does
otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to
keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor
can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and
repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so
that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given
little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such
a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall
make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled
times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help
you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be
under any obligation to you for them.



CHAPTER IX.
CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY


But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the
prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,
but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil
principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain
to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a
principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the
favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties
are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be
ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and
oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in
cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or
anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,
accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the
nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the
reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that
under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,
finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of
one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his
authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles
maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the
aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around
him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can
neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches
sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around
him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,
satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is
more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,
while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added
also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people,
because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure
himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect
from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile
nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will
rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and
astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain
favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is
compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well
without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and
to give or take away authority when it pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to
be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape
their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or
they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought
to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt
with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a
natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,
especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in
prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.
But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it
is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,
and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they
were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only
ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the
people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above
everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may
easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they
receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more
closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more
devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their
favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as
these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules,
so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the
people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.

Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,
and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his
country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was
only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this
would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not
let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who
builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a
private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that
the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the
magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as
happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in
Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above,
who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who
does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and
energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find
himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his
foundations well.

 [1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus
 in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.

 [2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s
 “Florentine History,” Book III.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from
the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either
rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their
government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on
the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and
who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with
great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not
the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the
citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates,
are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will
always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For
such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when
citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with
him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to
die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its
citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this
experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore
a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will
always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state
and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.



CHAPTER X.
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO
BE MEASURED


It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of
these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in
case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether
he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite
clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by
their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise
a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack
them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot
show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to
defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been
discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second
case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision
and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country.
And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the
other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often
repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are
always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it
will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town
well fortified, and is not hated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country
around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits
them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them,
because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the
taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they
have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they
always keep in public depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking,
and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss
to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the
community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city,
and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold
military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to
uphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself
odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only
be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this
world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a
whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever
should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it
burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and
self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that
a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by
giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for
long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving
himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin
the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot
and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the
prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the
damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer
any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with
their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that
their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his
defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they
confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is
well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the
minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not
fail to support and defend them.



CHAPTER XI.
CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES


It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching
which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they
are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held
without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of
religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the
principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live.
These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have
subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are
not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care,
and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate
themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being
upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak
no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would
be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church
has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from
Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have
been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)
have valued the temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France
trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and
to ruin the Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not
appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[1] this country was
under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the
Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal
anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms;
the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those
about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians.
To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as
it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made
use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini
and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with
arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate
weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a
courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could
rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a
cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a
pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to
speak, one people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would
arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet
would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the
temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy.

 [1] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.

Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have
ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to
prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by
reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things
which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although
his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,
nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church,
which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all
his labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all
the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the
chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the
way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been
practised before Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only
followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin
the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these
enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit,
inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any
private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within
the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them
some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm:
the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and
the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused
the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their
cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster
the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to
support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders
and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope
Leo[2] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that,
if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more
venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.

 [2] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici.



CHAPTER XII.
HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES


Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such
principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having
considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and
having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and
to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of
offence and defence which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his
foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to
ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or
composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good
laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are
well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the
discussion and shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state
are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds
his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for
they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful,
valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the
fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so
long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war
by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for
keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to
make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your
soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take
themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble
to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by
resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they
formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet
when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that
Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in
hand;[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the
truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have
related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who
have also suffered the penalty.

 [1] “With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the _bons mots_
 of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII seized
 Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his
 quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the
 country. _Cf_. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King
 Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a
 kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy
 without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont
 to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands,
 to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.”

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The
mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are,
you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own
greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others
contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are
ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,
whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted
to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in
person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its
citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it
ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so
that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes
and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and
mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to
bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its
citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and
Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely
armed and quite free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who
were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the
Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.
After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of
their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their
liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against
the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,[2]
allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His
father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[3] of Naples, left
her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms
of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the
Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these
arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have
defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been
favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have
stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and
others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer
was Giovanni Acuto,[4] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot
be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the
Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the
Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco
turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the
kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while
ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most
prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest
renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have
been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became
the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if
they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their
achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and
gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed
gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned
to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they
forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the
beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much
territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to
fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under
Carmignuola,[5] they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him
a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership),
and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they
feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they
were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to
lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order
to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their
captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of
Pitigliano,[6] and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not
gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,[7] where in one battle they lost
that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much
trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed
and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

 [2] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.

 [3] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.

 [4] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John
 Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was knighted by
 Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into
 Italy. These became the famous “White Company.” He took part in many
 wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible
 Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of
 Bernabo Visconti.

 [5] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390,
 executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.

 [6] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San
 Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria,
 in 1487. “Primo capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano;
 Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.

 [7] Battle of Vaila in 1509.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled
for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,
in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better
prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has
recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired
more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more
states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms
against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were
oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain
authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became
princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the
hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of
priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both
commenced to enlist foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[8]
the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others,
Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After
these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms
of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been
overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted
by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to
lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own.
They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory,
they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not
give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a
moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs
were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand
soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They
had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to
themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking
prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at
night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night;
they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did
they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their
military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both
fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and
contempt.

 [8] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in
 Romagna. He was the leader of the famous “Company of St George,”
 composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.



CHAPTER XIII.
CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN


Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a
prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by
Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise
against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to
auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[1] for his
assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in
themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always
disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their
captive.

 [1] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples),
 surnamed “The Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish
to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which
cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw
himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune
brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his
rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the
Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all
expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not
become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his
auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand
Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other
time of their troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople,[2] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten
thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to
the infidels.

 [2] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,
for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them
the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to
others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and
better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one
community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you
have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough
authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most
dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has
always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing
rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming
that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke
entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French
soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,
such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,
discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;
whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and
dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference
between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one
considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when
he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he
relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and
found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when
every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am
unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I
have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by
the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted
like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him
that he could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut to
pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with
aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament
applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with
Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed
him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them
on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to
meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of
others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind
you fast.

Charles the Seventh,[3] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[4]
having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English,
recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he
established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and
infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and
began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as
is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised
the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of
his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his
men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so
accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they
can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot
stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come
off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become
mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms
together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone,
but much inferior to one’s own forces. And this example proves it, for
the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of
Charles had been enlarged or maintained.

 [3] Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died
 1461.

 [4] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks
well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I
have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a
principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not
truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster
to the Roman Empire[5] should be examined, it will be found to have
commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time
the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour
which had raised it passed away to others.

 [5] “Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the
 reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of
 the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence.
 When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank
 under the weight of its military obligations, he said that this was
 ‘wholly unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power
 was at its zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to
 fight for the State, but that it began to decline as soon as this
 obligation was no longer recognised.”—_Pall Mall Gazette_, 15th May
 1906.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having
its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good
fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And
it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing
can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own
strength. And one’s own forces are those which are composed either of
subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or
auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one’s own forces will be easily
found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one
will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many
republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which
rules I entirely commit myself.



CHAPTER XIV.
THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR


A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything
else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is
the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force
that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often
enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the
contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than
of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing
it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is
to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from
a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding
the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons.
For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to
be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince
ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing
proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not
reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him
who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed
servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other
suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And
therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and
above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by
his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to
have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should
addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two
ways, the one by action, the other by study.

As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well
organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he
accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of
localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the
valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of
rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which
knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his
country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by
means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands
with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study
hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and
marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance
to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of
one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the
prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable
that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his
enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to
besiege towns to advantage.

Philopoemen,[1] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which
writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he
never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in
the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: “If
the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here
with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best
advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat,
how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went,
all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their
opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these
continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any
unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with.

 [1] Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183
 B.C.

But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and
study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne
themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat,
so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as
an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been
praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he
always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated
Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of
Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of
Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity,
affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things
which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to
observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but
increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be
available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find
him prepared to resist her blows.



CHAPTER XV.
CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR
BLAMED


It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a
prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have
written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in
mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from
the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a
thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me
more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the
imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities
which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is
so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is
done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his
preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his
professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much
that is evil.

Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how
to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.
Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince,
and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are
spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are
remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or
praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly,
using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our language is
still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly
who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed
generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless,
another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave;
one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one
sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another
frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know
that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a
prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but
because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human
conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently
prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which
would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible,
from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he
may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need
not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without
which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is
considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like
virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which
looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.



CHAPTER XVI.
CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS


Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I
say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless,
liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation
for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should
be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the
reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among
men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of
magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts
all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to
maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax
them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him
odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by
any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded
few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by
whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing
to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being
miserly.

Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of
liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if
he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in
time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that
with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself
against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without
burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises
liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless,
and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.

We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have
been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was
assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he
did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King
of France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax
on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his
long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken
or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A
prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that
he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he
is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a
reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will
enable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and
many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,
and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact,
or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is
dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal;
and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome;
but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his
expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if any one should
reply: Many have been princes, and have done great things with armies,
who have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends
that which is his own or his subjects’ or else that of others. In the
first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to
neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who goes
forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion,
handling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary,
otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is
neither yours nor your subjects’ you can be a ready giver, as were
Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not take away your
reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only
squandering your own that injures you.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst
you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor
or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a
prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised
and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to
have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred,
than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to
incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.



CHAPTER XVII.
CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED
THAN FEARED


Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every
prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.
Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare
Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled
the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if
this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more
merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for
cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[1] Therefore a prince, so
long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the
reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more
merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to
arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to
injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a
prince offend the individual only.

 [1] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi
 factions in 1502 and 1503.

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the
imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence
Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign
owing to its being new, saying:

“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”[2]

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he
himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and
humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and
too much distrust render him intolerable.

 [2] . . . against my will, my fate
A throne unsettled, and an infant state,
Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs,
And guard with these severities my shores.

Christopher Pitt.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than
feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to
be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it
is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be
dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that
they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as
you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood,
property, life, and children, as is said above, when the need is far
distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince
who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other
precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by
payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be
earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied
upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than
one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation
which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for
their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which
never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he
does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well
being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he
abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their
women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of
someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause,
but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others,
because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss
of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are
never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always
find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for
taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner
lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and has under control a
multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard
the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army
united or disposed to its duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that
having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to
fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or
against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This
arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his
boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his
soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not
sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire his
deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal
cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been
sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most
excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man,
against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from
nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more
license than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was
upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of
the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio,
yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate
punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in
the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew
much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This
disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have
destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the
control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed
itself, but contributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the
conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing
according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself
on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must
endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.



CHAPTER XVIII.[1]
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH


 [1] “The present chapter has given greater offence than any other
 portion of Machiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297.

Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and
to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience
has been that those princes who have done great things have held good
faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect
of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on
their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting,[2] the one
by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the
second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient,
it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is
necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast
and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient
writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were
given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his
discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who
was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know
how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not
durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the
beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot
defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against
wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares
and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do
not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor
ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him,
and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If
men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they
are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to
observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince
legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless
modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and
engagements have been made void and of no effect through the
faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the
fox has succeeded best.

 [2] “Contesting,” _i.e_. “striving for mastery.” Mr Burd points out
 that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s “De Officiis”:
 “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum
 per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum
 est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.”

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic,
and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and
so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will
always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent
example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing
else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he
always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power
in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would
observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to
his wishes,[3] because he well understood this side of mankind.

 [3] “Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” The
 words “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.

Alexander never did what he said,
Cesare never said what he did.

Italian Proverb.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities
I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And
I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe
them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear
merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with
a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able
and know how to change to the opposite.

And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one,
cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often
forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,[4]
friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him
to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and
variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to
diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then
to know how to set about it.

 [4] “Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla fede,” and “tutto
 fede,” “altogether faithful,” in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy
 that these two phrases, “contro alla fede” and “tutto fede,” were
 omitted in the Testina edition, which was published with the sanction
 of the papal authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the
 word “fede” was “the faith,” _i.e_. the Catholic creed, and not as
 rendered here “fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word
 “religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being
 used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “the
 religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot
 heresy. South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this
 passage as follows: “That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe,
 Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political
 scheme: ‘That the show of religion was helpful to the politician, but
 the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.’”

For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything
slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five
qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether
merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing
more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as
men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it
belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you.
Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and
those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who
have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all
men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge,
one judges by the result.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding
his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be
praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a
thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are
only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have
no ground to rest on.

One prince[5] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never
preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most
hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of
reputation and kingdom many a time.

 [5] Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing _The Prince_ it
 would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here
 without giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308.



CHAPTER XIX.
THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED


Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I
have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss
briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has
been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him
hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will
have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other
reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious,
and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from
both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor
their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has
only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease
in many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,
effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince
should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in
his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his
private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are
irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can
hope either to deceive him or to get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself,
and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for,
provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by
his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a
prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his
subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From
the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,
and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will
always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they
should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should
affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations
and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will
resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has
only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can
easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by
keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for
him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most
efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not
to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a
prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the
conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have
the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a
conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the
conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires
cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he
believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to
a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content
himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so
that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the
other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare
friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith
with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side
of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of
punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the
majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and
the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the
popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to
conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the
execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to
the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and
thus cannot hope for any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content
with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer
Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the
present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had
conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer
Giovanni,[1] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination
the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the
popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in
Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after
the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese,
having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in
Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a
blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of
their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due
course to the government.

 [1] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He
 ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of
 conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience
 (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured for his
 alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies
of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is
hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear
everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have
taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep
the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most
important objects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France,
and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty
and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its
authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of
the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths
would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the
hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to
protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care
of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be
liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people
for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who
could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the
king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or
a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can
draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs
of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in
their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish
the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths
of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to
my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great
qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have
been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing,
therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of
some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were
not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only
submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who
studies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to
the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were
Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son
Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the
ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be
contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to
put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so
beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard
thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the
people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring
prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold,
cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should
exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give
vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors
were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great
authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the
principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours,
were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about
injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes
cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to
avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they
ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the
most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had
need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the
people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not,
accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being
all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane,
and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died
honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title,
and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards,
being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always
kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated
nor despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,
who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not
endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus,
having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt
for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his
administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as
much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a
prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for
when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain
yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you
have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works
will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness,
that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in
the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by
him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who
allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the
army conspired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus
Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and
rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to
commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except
Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour
that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed
by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much
admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were
kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and
satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were
great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the
fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a
prince to imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in
Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to
Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the
praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to
aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy
before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the
Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this
there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the
whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the
Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in
the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he
considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided
to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that,
being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that
dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that
the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted
by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger,
and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the
Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had
received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this
ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him
out in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will,
therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a
most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and
respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be
wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well,
because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which
the people might have conceived against him for his violence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent
qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and
acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of
fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which
caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and
cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single
murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those
of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by
those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the
midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that
such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and
desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who
does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the
less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do
any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the
service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had
contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily
threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was
a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to
hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and
he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his
people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave
himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he
might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not
maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete
with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the
imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being
hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against
and was killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike
man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander,
of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the
throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated
and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought
him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great
indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to
his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the
imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity
by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire,
practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at
the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa
rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy
conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter,
besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were
disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so
many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being
thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this
discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this
difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far
less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some
indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that
are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were
the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary
to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more
necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy
the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more
powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him
twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend
the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,
putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them
his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in
the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the
people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state
of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that
it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an
hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old
prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by
those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this
being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality,
because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in
new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state
is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its
hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will
consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been
fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how
it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in
another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to
unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for
Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was
heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly
destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated
Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in
his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot
imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow
those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which
are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are
proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and
firm.



CHAPTER XX.
ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT,
ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?


1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their
subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;
others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid
themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning
of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown
and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on
all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those
states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as
comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.

2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by
arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted
become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your
subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be
armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be
handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they
quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter,
considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and
service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm
them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either
for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions
breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it
follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character
already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient
to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects.
Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has
always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a
prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old
one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those
who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time
and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters
should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state
shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.

3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed
to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by
fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their
tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This
may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way
balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for
to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;
rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided
cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always
assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The
Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the
Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although
they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these
disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their
differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not
afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one
party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,
therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be
permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the
more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but
if war comes this policy proves fallacious.

4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the
difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore
fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who
has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes
enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may
have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher,
as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many
consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with
craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed
it, his renown may rise higher.

5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and
assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were
distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo
Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been
distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak
generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say
this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been
hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support
themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they
will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as
they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad
impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always
extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too
much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands
it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours
has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which
induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural
affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then
he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for
it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons
for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern
affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends
of those men who were contented under the former government, and are
therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it,
were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.

6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states
more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit
to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of
refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been
made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in
our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello
so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on
returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia,
razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and
considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the
Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses,
therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you
good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be
reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than
from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear
from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The
castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make,
more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the
state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not to be hated by
the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they
will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be
wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you.
It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use
to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli,[1] when the Count
Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to
withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and
thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that
time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses
were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her,
and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore,
it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have
been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these
things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as
well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them,
cares little about being hated by the people.

 [1] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia
 Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that
 Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the
 countess announces the appointment: “I have been with the signori,”
 wrote Fortunati, “to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me
 that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary
 to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me at once.” _Cf_. “Catherine
 Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.



CHAPTER XXI.
HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN


Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and
setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the
present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he
has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be
the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds
you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the
beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the
foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without
any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile
occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations;
thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power
and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and
of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the
foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him.
Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater
schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and
clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable
example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa,
he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his
achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the
minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the
issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of
the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against
him.

Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal
affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da
Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life
doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some
method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about.
And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action
to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a
downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he
declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course
will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two
of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character
that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In
either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare
yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if
you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the
conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been
conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to
protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want
doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who
loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in
hand, court his fate.

Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out
the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the
Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the
Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed
in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged
them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that
which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your
state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous;
because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or
consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror.” Thus it will always
happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality,
whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with
arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally
follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a prince
declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with
whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful
and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is
established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to
become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all
are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard,
especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you
may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you
become companions on a fortune that may rise again.

In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that
you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it
greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of
one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved
him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with
your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be
noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with
one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others,
unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers
you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as
possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with
France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their
ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as
happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to
attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince
ought to favour one of the parties.

Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe
courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,
because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid
one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in
knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to
take the lesser evil.

A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour
the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his
citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and
agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not
be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken
away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but
the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things
and designs in any way to honour his city or state.

Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles
at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into
guilds or into societies,[1] he ought to hold such bodies in esteem,
and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of
courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty
of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.

 [1] “Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” “Arti” were craft or
 trade guilds, _cf_. Florio: “Arte . . . a whole company of any trade
 in any city or corporation town.” The guilds of Florence are most
 admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject
 (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called
 “artel,” exist in Russia to-day, _cf_. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s
 “Russia,” ed. 1905: “The sons . . . were always during the working
 season members of an artel. In some of the larger towns there are
 artels of a much more complex kind— permanent associations, possessing
 large capital, and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the
 individual members.” The word “artel,” despite its apparent
 similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with “ars”
 or “arte.” Its root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by
 an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of
 “rota,” which now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the
 underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu”
 were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included
 individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or
 “clans” would be most appropriate.



CHAPTER XXII.
CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES


The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they
are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the
first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is
by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and
faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to
recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are
otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error
which he made was in choosing them.

There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to
be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there
are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;
another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which
neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first
is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.
Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the
first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know
good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have
the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his
servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the
servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.

But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his
own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in
everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you
ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in
his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince,
and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not
concerned.

On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study
him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with
him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he
cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,
many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him
dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants,
are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise,
the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.



CHAPTER XXIII.
HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED


I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it
is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless
they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of
whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own
affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with
difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they
run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way
of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that
to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell
you the truth, respect for you abates.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the
wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking
the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,
and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and
listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With
these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry
himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more
freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of
these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be
steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either
overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions
that he falls into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of
affairs to Maximilian,[1] the present emperor, speaking of his majesty,
said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything.
This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the
above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his
designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in
carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at
once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being
pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he
does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he
wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.

 [1] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman
 Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after
 her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian
 politics.

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he
wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every
one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to
be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning
the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any
consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be
felt.

And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression
of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good
advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived,
because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not
wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has
yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very
prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would
not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take
away his state from him.

But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more
than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to
unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests,
and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through
them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always
prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint.
Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they
come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the
prince from good counsels.



CHAPTER XXIV.
WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES


The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince
to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and
fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the
actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an
hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men
and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more
by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good
they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost
defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will
be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and
adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and
with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a
prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.

And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in
Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and
others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in
regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in
the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the
people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known
how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that
have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who
was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the
greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a
warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles,
he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the
end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the
kingdom.

Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their
principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own
sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a
change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the
calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they
thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that
the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would
recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very
bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would
never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later
on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does,
it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no
avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable,
certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.



CHAPTER XXV.
WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER


It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the
opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by
fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and
that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us
believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let
chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times
because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may
still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes
pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.
Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true
that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[1] but that she
still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.

 [1] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the
 more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does
 three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s
 “Eastern Question.”

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood
overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away
the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to
its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,
though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when
the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences
and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass
away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so
dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour
has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where
she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain
her.

And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and
which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open
country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been
defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either
this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it
would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say
concerning resistance to fortune in general.

But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be
seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change
of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from
causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the
prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I
believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions
according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not
accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in
affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely,
glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution,
another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience,
another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by
a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain
his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different
observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other
impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they
conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from
what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same
effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the
other does not.

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs
himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a
way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if
times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course
of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to
know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot
deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having
always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it
is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time
to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined;
but had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have
changed.

Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and
found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of
action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise
against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The
Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he
had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France;
nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his
accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the
Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the
former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand,
he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having
observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as
to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore
Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff
with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome
until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed,
as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded.
Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the
others would have raised a thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they
all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience
the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go
cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have
deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.

I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind
steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are
successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider
that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a
woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and
ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by
the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She
is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they
are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.



CHAPTER XXVI.
AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS


Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and
wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a
new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an
opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of
things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this
country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new
prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.

And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be
captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians
should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the
soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate
the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to
discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy
should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should
be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians,
more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,
despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.

Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us
think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was
afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected
him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet
heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of
Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany,
and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she
entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs
and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and
willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope
than in your illustrious house,[1] with its valour and fortune,
favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and
which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be
difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the
men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet
they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the
present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier
than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.

 [1] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X.
 In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII.

With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is
necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in
them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness
is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those
men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how
extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example:
the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth
water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your
greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do
everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory
which belongs to us.

And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians
have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious
house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many
campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted,
this has happened because the old order of things was not good, and
none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man
more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was
newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will
make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting
opportunities to bring such into use in every form.

Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.
Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how
superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But
when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs
entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are
capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there
having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by
valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for
so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years,
whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a
poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro,
afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[2]

 [2] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501;
 Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.

If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable
men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things,
as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own
forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better
soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will be
much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince,
honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is
necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended
against foreigners by Italian valour.

And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very
formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which
a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be
relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry,
and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in
close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the
Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are
overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this
latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at
the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by
German battalions, who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the
Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in
under the pikes of the Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack,
while the Germans stood helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed
up, all would have been over with them. It is possible, therefore,
knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one,
which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need not
create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are
the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new
prince.

This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for
letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the
love with which he would be received in all those provinces which have
suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for
revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears.
What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him?
What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To
all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your
illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with
which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard
our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be
verified that saying of Petrarch:

Virtu contro al Furore
    Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto:
Che l’antico valore
    Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.

Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,
    And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight:
For the old Roman valour is not dead,
    Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished.

Edward Dacre, 1640.



DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING
VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE
DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI

BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI


The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to
clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been
raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of
Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola,
whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against
Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring
that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his
Romagnian duchy.

These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and
their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too
powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek
to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon
this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to
which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini,
Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the
tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo
Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and
courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which
might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they
decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the
Florentines; and they sent their men to one place and another,
promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to unite
with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once reported
throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under the duke,
among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting a
revolution.

Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by
certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held
for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The
castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there;
so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being
carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from
being drawn up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping
upon the bridge and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being
effected, the whole state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being
encouraged in this, not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the
Diet at Magione, from whom they expected to get assistance.

Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose
the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any
town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and
they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in
destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and
that they ought not to wait for another opportunity.

But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli
and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo
Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the
duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola,
because, against everybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone
over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his door.
But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he decided
to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that remained to
him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to get assistance.
This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the King of France
for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he turned into
cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money.

Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached
Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the
aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the
duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with
offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did
not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he
wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough
for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have the
principality.

And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to
him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a
standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every
care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such
preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in
separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there
came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found
himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open
war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to
outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of
reconciliation.

And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in
which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand
ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed
an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come
personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the
other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and
other places seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and
not to make war against or ally themselves with any one without his
permission.

This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino,
again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his
state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the
fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by
the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends.
But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed
his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of
November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to
Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the
Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of
Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but
nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that
if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were
ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To
this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with
Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was
very willing to proceed against Sinigalia.

It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the
fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give
it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to
come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being
invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no
suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French
men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred
lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena
about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the utmost
cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for
him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of compliance
would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the
reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the
arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very
stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not
offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by
Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he
agreed to wait.

Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on
30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most
trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor
d’Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as
Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should
arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting
certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they
reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they
came to the duke’s quarters, where they should be seized.

The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which
there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to
assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from
Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day
of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of
about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the
infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms.

Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of
the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who
goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases
of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia
is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot
and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs
a little river which bathes that part of the walls looking towards
Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes
for a good space by road along the mountains, and reaches the river
which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left hand along the bank
of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge
which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of the gate that
leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely. Before
this gate there stands a collection of houses with a square to which
the bank of the river forms one side.

The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and
to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant
from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men
of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band,
which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty
horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters
having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and
when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass
over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards the river and
the other towards the country, and a way was left in the middle through
which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the town.

Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a
few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a
cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his
approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the
man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that
when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet
the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He
recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his
nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of
their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came
before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were received by him
with goodwill; they were at once placed between those who were
commissioned to look after them.

But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band
in Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square
before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and
drilling them—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care
of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that
Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined
Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of
their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke;
and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come
himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice,
came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and
Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others.

So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s
quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made
them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that
the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms.
Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of
the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment
of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves,
and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and
Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of the
country and saved themselves.

But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men
of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not
repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have
completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced,
the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a
room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in
keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of
the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the
blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the
Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome
that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of
Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th
January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the
same way.



THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA

WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI

CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328


It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who
have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them,
who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in
their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and
obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way.
They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have
had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given themselves out to
be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be wearisome to relate
who these persons may have been because they are well known to
everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly edifying to
those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that these lowly
beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous of showing to
the world that such men owe much to her and little to wisdom, because
she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take no part in
their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. Castruccio
Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, if he is
measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he was
born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distinguished
in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It appeared to
be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in him such
indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great exemplar
to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his
actions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds.

The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families
of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in
estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a
son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca,
and for this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He
had an only sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but
Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again
went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the
house where he resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens,
any person could have access to it without difficulty. One morning,
shortly after sunrise, Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio
was called, had occasion to go into the vineyard as usual to gather
herbs for seasoning the dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the
leaves of a vine she turned her eyes in that direction, and heard
something resembling the cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards
it, and saw the hands and face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the
leaves and who seemed to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and
partly fearing, yet full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it
to the house, where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is
customary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When
he heard what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised
or compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves
what should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no
children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for
it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They
baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As
the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of
wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those
lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended
to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his
canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with
this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio
was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached
the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of
Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left
off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms,
delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in
running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he
far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at
any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of
wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with
vexation and sorrow.

There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family,
named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches,
bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had
often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a
Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman
resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others most
mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the
top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he
had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of the street
in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far
excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to exercise a royal
authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him, Messer
Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being
informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt
a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one
day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of
a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in
the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and the
services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased
Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he
stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer
Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable,
nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly studies and
take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and
in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was
driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear
that he would not be able to hold him much longer.

Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to
the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was
astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that
virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true
gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and
could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and
tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all others,
and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity. But what
enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the delightful
modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or word to
others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with his
equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved,
not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When Castruccio
had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were driven from Pavia
by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the Visconti to assist
the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge of his forces.
Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in this
expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and
his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all
Lombardy.

Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he
left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many
friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary
for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son
thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to
be his son’s tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died
Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that
goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to
the son the gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the
father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and
tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power and position, and
created a certain amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the
former universal goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring
tyrannical intentions. Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli
Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of
Messer Francesco to become the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him
that Castruccio, with the great abilities which he already showed, and
holding the position of governor, deprived him of his opportunity;
therefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of
his eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but
afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able
to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples
and have him driven out of Lucca.

The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo,
who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became
their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca,
with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting
their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought
into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of
the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio
cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies
and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a siege for a few
days in case of need. When the night came which had been agreed upon
with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between the mountains and
Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and without being observed
Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and set fire to the
portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city, calling
the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. Uguccione
entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer
Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The
governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the
wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found
that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those
who fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the
headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most
hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese.

As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party
that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they
determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a
large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence
they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into
Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and
with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved
against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the
enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between
Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to
Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight
skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence.
Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed
coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing
worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the army
in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of the
Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its captain
had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed this, and
allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief; he also
showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions of the
camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more insolent the
more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they drew out in
the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. Presently,
deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered
their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he spoke a
few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to them the
certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. Castruccio
had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the centre
of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of the
army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant
men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he
moved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his
lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had
come in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre
squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the
wings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings
of the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained
out of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were
separated from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach
each other. By this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men
were opposed to the weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most
efficient men of the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines
were unable to fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or
to give any assistance to their own flanks. So, without much
difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the
centre battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to
attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat
was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than ten
thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph party
in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them, among whom
were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his nephew, and
Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio the loss did
not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was Francesco,
the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed in the
first onset.

This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that
Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it
appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of
power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only
waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the
death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in
Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge.
On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were
driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming
to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him
a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his
son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take
Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio,
fearing no evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was
entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing
to put him to death lest the people should be incensed, kept him alive,
in order to hear further from his father concerning his intentions.
Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once
set out from Pisa to Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the
business in his own way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the
Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo
della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard
of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn
back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them should
close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of what
had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to demand
the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had
arrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private
circles, afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised
a tumult, and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded
that Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse
might happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered
his friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked
Uguccione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away
with his friends to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in
poverty.

But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca,
and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people
that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having
obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the
recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of
Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded
a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed
a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course
of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the reputation gained
at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a
short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the
pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and
wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the
lord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca, and was welcomed
by the whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any
longer to defer making himself a prince, got himself created the lord
of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico,
Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had
corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected
prince by the people. At this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of
the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and
Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met him at
the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in
Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because of the
people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received in
great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him,
and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time
the Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had
driven out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick.
Frederick created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread
of the Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were
constrained to accept him as their lord.

Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian
affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian
Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio
for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his
country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among these
exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi,
and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines.
Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all
Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to
gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer
Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces
of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he
divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied
with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he
could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without
those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he
surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer
Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven
out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the
King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the
Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at home,
they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to
defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized
Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country.
Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely
reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other necessities to
return to Lucca.

There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so
powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance
him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not
received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited
other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They
found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set
upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and
killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano
di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion,
intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms;
and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him
what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater
intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the
news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in
command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set out for home.
Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end, yet he
posted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city. As
it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to
him, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf,
for he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to
pardon the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their
former friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to
their house. To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged
Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure
to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to
hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to
him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of
showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and
Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown
into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered
San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace,
as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to
leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce,
which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and
desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded
with them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the
conquests they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble,
turned his attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should
not again be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he,
under various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by
their ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of
them, but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had
in his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that
none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he
raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom
he had killed or hunted out of the state.

Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his
position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of
increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he
could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence,
which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends
with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both
parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it
always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the
Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each
of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each
desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many
threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the
Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city;
both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they
believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than
the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave
promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and
to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the
appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself
direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and
both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a
signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other
Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans
of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the
hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the
palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them
many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to
the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and
quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great
valour.

About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness
of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon.
The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders
and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put
an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should
call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of
the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he
could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not
only to give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome.
Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the
emperor this service, because he believed that he himself would not be
safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo
Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six
hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with the greatest
distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio obtained such
respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or violence, good order
was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio having sent by sea from
the country round Pisa large quantities of corn, and thus removed the
source of the trouble. When he had chastised some of the Roman leaders,
and admonished others, voluntary obedience was rendered to Enrico.
Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman senator. This
dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in
a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on its
front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God desires
shall be.”

During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio
should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could
tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be
difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were
Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face
danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia,
and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by night, and
after driving out some of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and
killing others, they restored the city to its freedom. The news of this
greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on
in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines heard of his return,
knowing that he would lose no time, they decided to intercept him with
their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the belief that by doing so
they would cut off his road to Pistoia. Assembling a great army of the
supporters of the Guelph cause, the Florentines entered the Pistoian
territories. On the other hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his
army; and having heard where the Florentines’ lay, he decided not to
encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of
Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the
Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he succeeded in this design,
victory was assured, although he was informed that the Florentines had
thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he
had every confidence in his own abilities and the valour of his troops,
yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open lest he should be
overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and
Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the
exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places
narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still
narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that
twenty men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was
Manfred, a German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had
been allowed to remain in possession of the castle, it being common to
the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them
wishing to displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of
neutrality, and came under obligations to no one. For these reasons,
and also because the castle was well fortified, he had always been able
to maintain his position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to
fall upon his enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and
there was no fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force
before they became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this
trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which
possession of this castle would give him, and having an intimate
friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with
him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle
the night before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put
to death.

Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the
Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away
from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his
army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they
reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill
on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the
castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching
from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of
Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the
hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his
infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a
path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four
hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never
expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they
aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the
Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by surprise
when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close were they
upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It was a case
of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were assailed
with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own,
although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting
reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The
cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were
unable to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the
narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought
to be done or what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were
engaged with the enemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without
having made any effective defence because of their unfortunate
position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a stout
resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on both
flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their
friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a
decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand
infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred
horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole
force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried
out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack,
but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conquered more by their
unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the
rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each man
seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very
sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini
dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all
Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on
the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the
Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out
the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not
content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both
sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola,
about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the
spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding
horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals in
commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to
corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city
gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the
participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci
and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great
anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys
to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and
he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph
cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to
receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and
he sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen.

Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the
pressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave
his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a
conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi,
one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland
should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this
conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of
Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy
paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few
are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy
Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio.
This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio
Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering
their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put
him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove their
families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and
Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought and
energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines
their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of
Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided
to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty
thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry—having called to their aid
every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should
attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be better to
march on the latter—a course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more
likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them, because they believed
that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa.

In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army
and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from
thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army
which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree
alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would
deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to
think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects
of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand
foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to
Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand
infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than any other town in the
Pisan district, owing to its situation between the rivers Arno and
Gusciana and its slight elevation above the surrounding plain.
Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being victualled unless they
divided their forces, nor could they approach it either from the
direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to Pisa, or
attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they
would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his
own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they
would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy,
an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to
take this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of
the river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide
expanse of land between them and the river.

The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to
decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,
having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the
latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet
the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the
saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the
Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of
cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was
fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the Florentines
with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen, not allowing
them to issue from the river before he charged them; he also sent one
thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same number down the
Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much impeded by their
arms and the water that they were not able to mount the banks of the
river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the river more
difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had crossed having
broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep with mud, many of
the horses rolled over with their riders and many of them had stuck so
fast that they could not move. When the Florentine captains saw the
difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them and moved
higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less treacherous and
the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at the bank by
the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, being light
armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with
tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses,
alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and
trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of
Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp
and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither
would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back
into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land
in order to make room for the others pressing forward, who if they
could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and in this
obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. Castruccio
shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom they had
before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines reproached each
other that the many should be overcome by the few. At length
Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that both his
men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had many
killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take up
a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded
these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and
one part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This
cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and
thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these
tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s
reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell back into
the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained any
decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his
inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the
defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that
when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work
of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the
Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the remainder
of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with
lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the
enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The Florentine
captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had met with in
crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry cross lower
down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s army. But
here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of
Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines
were so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them
escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains
were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with
Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine
commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter
was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a battle. Of the
Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men,
whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and seventy men.

But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his
life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus
ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry
into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but
death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle
the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued
and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on
their return from victory and personally thank them. He was also on the
watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day;
he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be
the first man in the saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio
stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on the banks of the
Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of
which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it
was the cause of his death. On the following night he was attacked with
high fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it must
prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and
addressed him as follows:

“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the
midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my
successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left
thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils,
because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and
Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the
Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these
peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least
more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller, but
one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who
insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me
with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the first, nor the time
to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have
never concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father whilst yet a
boy—a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous soul should
feel—and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I had been
born of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be valiant and
capable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been
witness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all
his possessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love,
and increased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And
in order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy
father left, but also that which my fortune and abilities have gained,
I have never married, so that the love of children should never deflect
my mind from that gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father.
Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I am well content, but I am
deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure.
Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest
contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are
of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be
sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under
a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with
factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs
recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended
Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly
destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than
they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the
princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far
distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou
hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory
of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has brought
thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist
thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering
under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to thee. And
whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I believed that
war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast every
inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance will bring
thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest important in this
world that a man should know himself, and the measure of his own
strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for
fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. And it will be
well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this
way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this
thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what I
have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that
I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.”

After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia,
and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending
Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his
successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him,
and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he
was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he
was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to
Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the
abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa,
and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This
latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the
great-grandson of Pagolo.

From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a
man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time,
but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the
ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious
presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke
with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red,
and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or
snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends,
but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false
with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he
desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory
that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was
bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He
was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear
nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees
that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully
sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look
for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was not
angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that
he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on
the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a
partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom
Castruccio had said: “You would not have given more than a penny.”
“That is true,” answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A
ducat is much less to me.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had
spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman
are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in order that
they may take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by
spittle that I may catch a whale”; and this was not only heard by
Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest that it
was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be
a vice then you should not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our
saints.” Passing through a street he saw a young man as he came out of
a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to him:
“Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out, but when thou goest
into such places.” A friend gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo
and was told: “Fool, do you think that I wish to untie a thing which
gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castruccio said to one who professed
to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs who always run after those
who will give them the best to eat,” and was answered: “We are rather
like the doctors who go to the houses of those who have the greatest
need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much
disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for
cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did not fear
anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since
every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one
what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to a
banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon
another.” To a person who was boasting that he had read many things,
Castruccio said: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many
things.” Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming
intoxicated. Castruccio replied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was
acquainted with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being
blamed by a friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be
taken in by a woman, he said: “She has not taken me in, I have taken
her.” Being also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered:
“Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” and being told that it was true,
he continued: “Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous.”
Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of
Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a
chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers
and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some
saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much
disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where to spit in order to
offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said: “God willing I
will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one of his
gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of
his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was
usual in one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by
day will not be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a
favour of Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea
threw himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by
Castruccio, said: “Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast
thy ears in thy feet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had
asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one,
seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled
blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous
words, he said to him: “When you have another request to make, send
someone else to make it.” Having been wearied by a similar man with a
long oration who wound up by saying: “Perhaps I have fatigued you by
speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You have not, because I have not
listened to a word you said.” He used to say of one who had been a
beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was
dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he
took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he
said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or because another is
unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco
Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I give you if
you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: “A
helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been
instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done
wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived
themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly
those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying
that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused
when the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise
that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first
to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with
only looking at her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to
be buried when he died, and answered: “With the face turned downwards,
for I know when I am gone this country will be turned upside down.” On
being asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a friar in order
to save his soul, he answered that it had not, because it appeared
strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione
della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat
to preserve his health, and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat
when he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his
gentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: “I
pray God that you will let him feed you also.” Seeing that someone had
written upon his house in Latin the words: “May God preserve this house
from the wicked,” he said, “The owner must never go in.” Passing
through one of the streets he saw a small house with a very large door,
and remarked: “That house will fly through the door.” He was having a
discussion with the ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the
property of some banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them,
and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the king. “Is this
king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio, and was told
that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should you suggest that
I should be afraid of a good man?”

I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and
weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his
high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a
prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune,
so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune;
therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be
seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they
were placed by him to testify forever to his days of adversity. As in
his life he was inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of
Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the same year of his
age as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both of them had
Fortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia
or Rome.





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