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Title: Roman Stoicism - being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire
Author: Arnold, E. Vernon
Language: English
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ROMAN STOICISM



                       CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

                        London: FETTER LANE, E.C.

                           C. F. CLAY, MANAGER

                             [Illustration]

                     Edinburgh: 100, PRINCES STREET
                        Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO.
                        Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS
                      New York: G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS
               Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd

                          _All rights reserved_



                             ROMAN STOICISM

                  BEING LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF THE
                      STOIC PHILOSOPHY WITH SPECIAL
                      REFERENCE TO ITS DEVELOPMENT
                         WITHIN THE ROMAN EMPIRE

                                   BY
                        E. VERNON ARNOLD, LITT.D.

       PROFESSOR OF LATIN IN THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES
            AND FORMERLY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

                               Cambridge:
                         at the University Press
                                  1911

                               Cambridge:

                       PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.
                        AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.



HENRICO JACKSON, LITT.D.

DILECTISSIMO PRAECEPTORI



PREFACE


This book is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered by me in
successive years to Latin Honours students in accordance with the
regulations of the University of Wales. It is therefore primarily
intended for the assistance of classical students; but it may perhaps
appeal in its present form to a somewhat wider circle.

At the time that the book was begun the best systematic exposition of
the Stoic philosophy available for English readers was to be found in
Prof. E. ZELLER’S _Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics_, translated by O. J.
REICHEL (Longmans, 1892). This work, admirable in detail, is nevertheless
somewhat inadequate to the subject, which appeared to its learned author
as a mere sequel to the much more important philosophical systems of
Plato and Aristotle. Since its first appearance many qualified writers
have been inclined to assign a higher rank to Stoicism, amongst whom L.
STEIN, A. SCHMEKEL, and HANS von ARNIM in the German-speaking countries,
and A. C. PEARSON, G. H. RENDALL, and R. D. HICKS in our own, are perhaps
most conspicuous.

The view taken in this book corresponds generally to that taken by the
writers named. Shortly expressed, it regards Stoicism as the bridge
between ancient and modern philosophical thought; a position which
appears to be accepted by W. L. DAVIDSON writing on behalf of students
of modern philosophy. Mr Hicks and Mr Davidson have recently published
works dealing with the Stoic philosophy as a whole; but as neither of
these quite covers the ground marked out for this book, I believe that
room will be found for a further presentation of the subject.

To the writers named and to many others, my obligations are great, and
their extent is generally indicated in the Index. I owe a more intimate
debt to Mr A. C. PEARSON and Prof. ALFRED CALDECOTT, who have given me
ungrudgingly of their knowledge and counsel during the whole period of
the preparation of this book.

The appearance of H. von Arnim’s ‘Stoicorum veterum fragmenta’ made
available to me a mass of material from Greek sources, and has (I
hope) made this book less imperfect on the side of Greek than it would
otherwise have been. For the quotations in the notes from the Greek and
the less-known Latin authors I have generally given references to von
Arnim’s collections, which will doubtless be more accessible to most of
my readers than the original writers. These references include those to
the fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, for which von Arnim is in the main
indebted to the earlier work of Pearson.

So general a treatment of the subject as is here presented must
necessarily leave room for correction and amplification in its various
branches, and I trust that I am pointing out to younger students a
field in which a rich harvest may yet be gleaned. To such students the
appended Bibliography, though necessarily incomplete, may be of use as an
introduction to the considerable literature which is available to them.

The concluding chapter makes its appeal not so much to classical
students, as such, as to those who are interested in the problem of
Christian origins; the further problems of the influence of Stoicism
on modern literature and philosophy, though at first included in my
programme, I have not ventured to enter upon. But I hope that at least I
have been able to show that the interest of classical studies, even as
regards Hellenistic philosophy, does not lie wholly in the past.

My sincere thanks are due to the Council of the University College of
North Wales for granting me special assistance in my College duties
during the Spring term of 1910, in order that I might give more time
to this book; to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for
undertaking its publication; and to Mr Clay and his expert staff for the
admirable execution of the printing.

                                                         E. VERNON ARNOLD

_25 January 1911_



CORRIGENDA ET NOTANDA


In the text the accentuation of Greek words should be corrected as
follows:

  P. 117, l. 10, χρεῖαι. P. 239, l. 6, μέρων. P. 423, l. 16, ἀγάπη.

(Transcriber’s Note: These have been corrected.)

For the quotations in the notes from Greek writers, more precise
references will usually be found in the sections named of von Arnim’s
_Stoicorum veterum fragmenta_. In addition the following amplifications
or corrections are needed:

  P. 105, n. 44; Clem. _Strom._ ii 21, 129. P. 133, n. 38; Nem.
  _nat. hom._ vi 13. P. 142, n. 86; Sext. _math._ vii 184. P. 158,
  n. 17; Simp. _Arist. cat._ p. 269, 14 K; Cens. fr. 1, 1. P. 159,
  n. 20; Simp. _Arist. cat._ p. 350, 16 K. P. 160, n. 30; for τόνος
  the word λόγος is now read, making the quotation inapplicable. P.
  161, n. 133; add the words τοὺς ἐν ἑαυτῷ λόγους. The reference
  is to Simpl. _Arist. cat._ p. 306, 23 K. P. 164, n. 45; Simp.
  _Arist. cat._ p. 66, 32 K; n. 47, _ib._ p. 165, 32 K. P. 166, n.
  60; _ib._ p. 269, 14 K. P. 168, n. 75; _ib._ p. 165, 32 K. P.
  173, n. 110; Galen _const. art. med._ p. 253 K; n. 111, _meth.
  med._ i 2 p. 16 K. P. 185, n. 79; for ἀπὸ read ὑπὸ. P. 187, n.
  86; Sext. _math._ viii 271. P. 193, n. 130; Nemes. _nat. hom._
  xxxviii 95. P. 196, n. 145; Galen _de temp._ p. 617 K. P. 222,
  n. 33; Corn. _N. D._ ii. P. 224, n. 47; Sext. _math._ vii 93. P.
  251, n. 76; Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ p. 242 K. P. 255, n. 86;
  for μῖγμα read μίγμα. P. 264, n. 139; to the quotation from Comm.
  _in Luc._ ix 6 add ‘et esse sic immortales ut non moriantur sed
  resolvantur.’ P. 298, n. 184; Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 28, p. 199, 18
  B.



CONTENTS


  CHAP.                                                 PAGE

     I. The World-Religions                                1

    II. Heraclitus and Socrates                           29

   III. The Academy and the Porch                         53

    IV. The Preaching of Stoicism                         78

     V. The Stoic Sect in Rome                            99

    VI. Of Reason and Speech                             128

   VII. The Foundations of Physics                       155

  VIII. The Universe                                     175

    IX. The Supreme Problems                             198

     X. Religion                                         216

    XI. The Kingdom of the Soul                          238

   XII. The Law for Humanity                             273

  XIII. Daily Duties                                     301

   XIV. Sin and Weakness                                 330

    XV. Counsels of Perfection                           357

   XVI. Stoicism in Roman History and Literature         380

  XVII. The Stoic Strain in Christianity                 408

        BIBLIOGRAPHY:

             I. Ancient Writers and Philosophers         437

            II. Modern Writers                           445

        GENERAL INDEX                                    451

        GREEK INDEX                                      466



CHAPTER I.

THE WORLD-RELIGIONS.


[Sidenote: Roman literature.]

=1.= The present work treats of a subject of outstanding interest in
the literature which is associated with the history of the Roman State,
and which is expressed partly in Hellenistic Greek, partly in Latin.
In the generations preceding our own, classical study has, to a large
extent, attended to form rather than to matter, to expression rather
than to content. To-day it is beginning to take a wider outlook. We are
learning to look on literature as an unveiling of the human mind in
its various stages of development, and as a key to the true meaning of
history. The literature of Greece proper does not cease to attract us by
its originality, charm, and variety; but the new interest may yet find
its fullest satisfaction in Roman literature; for of all ancient peoples
the Romans achieved most, and their achievements have been the most
enduring. It was the Roman who joined the ends of the world by his roads
and his bridges, poured into crowded towns unfailing supplies of corn and
perennial streams of pure water, cleared the countryside of highwaymen,
converted enemies into neighbours, created ideals of brotherhood under
which the nations were united by common laws and unfettered marriage
relations, and so shaped a new religion that if it shattered an empire
it yet became the mother of many nations. We are the inheritors of Roman
civilization; and if we have far surpassed it in scientific knowledge
and material plenty, we are not equally confident that we possess better
mental balance, or more complete social harmony. In this direction the
problems of Roman life are the problems of Western life to-day; and
the methods by which they were approached in the Roman world deserve
more than ever to be studied by us. Such a study, if it is to be in
any true sense historical, must break through the convention by which
ancient Greece and Rome have come to be treated as a world apart; it must
seek its starting point in the distant past, and count that of chief
importance which will bear fruit in the ages that follow.


[Sidenote: Beliefs of the Romans.]

=2.= Great achievements are born of strong convictions; and Roman
statesmen, jurists, soldiers, and engineers did not learn to ‘scorn
delights and live laborious days’ without some strong impulse from
within. These inner convictions do not come to the surface everywhere in
the Latin literature with which we are most familiar. The Roman orator
or poet is generally content to express a conventional view of religion
and morals, whilst he conceals his real thoughts in a spirit of reticence
and almost of shame. Yet here and there every attentive reader will catch
the accent of sincerity, sometimes in the less restrained conversation
of the lower classes, sometimes in flights of poetic imagination, or
again in instruction designed for the young. In this way we learn that
the Romans of the last century of the republic and of the first century
of the principate were profoundly concerned, not so much with questions
connected with the safety of their empire or the justice of their form
of government, as with problems in which all mankind has a common
interest. What is truth, and how can it be ascertained? What is this
universe in which we dwell, and by whom and how was it made? What are the
beings called gods, and do they concern themselves with the affairs of
men? What is man’s nature, his duty, and his destiny? These the Romans
called the problems of philosophy, and they eagerly sought for definite
and practical solutions to them[1]. Such solutions when embodied in
theoretical systems we still call ‘philosophies’; but when such systems
are developed in a practical form and claim the obedience of large
bodies of men they become religions. Stoicism is in the first instance
a philosophy, and amongst its many competitors that one which appealed
most successfully to the judgment of men who played a leading part in the
Roman world; but as its acceptance becomes more general, it begins to
assume all the features of a religion. All Latin literature is thickly
strewn with allusions to Stoicism and the systems which were its rivals,
and thus bears witness to the widespread interest which they excited.


[Sidenote: Origin of Philosophy.]

=3.= The Romans learnt philosophy from Greek teachers; and they were not
free from a sense of shame in thus sitting at the feet of the children of
a conquered race. But they acknowledged their obligations in a generous
spirit; and from Roman literature an impression has arisen, which is
still widespread, that Greece was the birthplace of philosophy, and
that its triumphs must be placed to the credit of Hellenic culture. But
to the Hellenes themselves philosophy equally appeared as a foreign
fashion, assailing their national beliefs and dangerous to their
established morality; and of its teachers many of the most distinguished
were immigrants from Asia Minor. Thus Greece itself appears only as a
halting-place in the movement of philosophy; and we are carried more
and more to the East as we seek to discover its origin. Yet at the time
with which we are concerned it had also spread to the extreme West. ‘The
Magi,’ says Aristotle, ‘taught the Persians philosophy; the Chaldaeans
taught it to the Babylonians and Assyrians; the Gymnosophists to the
Indians; the Druids and Semnothei to the Gauls and Celts[2].’ It was
a world-wide stirring of the human intellect, and we must attempt to
outline its meaning more completely.


[Sidenote: National and World-Religions.]

=4.= Philosophy, in the sense in which Aristotle uses the term, appears
to be a general name for a great change in man’s intellectual attitude
towards his environment, corresponding to a definite era in the history
of civilization. Before philosophy came nationalism, the habit of
thinking according to clan and race; and nationalism remains on record
for us in the numerous national religions in which each people does
reverence to the deity which lives within its borders and goes forth to
fight with its armies. Philosophy is at once broader in its outlook
and more intimate in its appeal. It breaks down the barriers of race,
and includes the whole world in its survey; but on the other hand it
justifies the individual in asserting his own thoughts and choosing
his own way of life. Thus philosophy on its arrival appears in each
particular country as a disintegrating force; it strikes at the roots of
patriotism and piety, and challenges equally the authority of king and of
priest. But everywhere in turn philosophy, as it gains ground, begins to
construct a new patriotism and a new piety, and gradually takes concrete
shape as a new religion. To us, as we look backwards to the past, the
track of philosophy is recorded by a series of religions, all alike
marked with the note of world-wide outlook, reverence for reason, and
the sentiment of human sympathy. The era of philosophy is the era of the
world-religions. It belongs to that millennium when from China to Ireland
men of good will and bold spirit realized that they all looked up toward
one sky, breathed one air, and travelled on one all-encircling sea; when
they dreamed that before long all men should be united in one kingdom,
converse in one language, and obey the one unchanging law of reason.


[Sidenote: Spread of the World-Religions.]

=5.= The general importance and direction of this movement will
best be seen if we select for consideration a certain number of the
world-religions in which it was from time to time embodied. Aristotle has
already called our attention to the ‘philosophies’ of the Chaldaeans,
the Persians, and the Indians; amongst these last Buddhism at least was
a movement which had shaken off limitations of race and class. To these
he has added the Druids, whom we may well keep in mind if only because
they are representatives of Western Europe. Stoicism best represents the
part played by the Greco-Roman world, and Judaism and Christianity come
under consideration as forces with which Stoicism in the course of its
history came into close contact. The Greeks little realized that they
were being carried along in so mighty a stream. Regarding themselves as
isolated and elevated, the sole pioneers of civilization in a ‘barbarian’
world, the beliefs of neighbouring peoples seemed to them beneath their
notice. To this prejudice they clung in spite of the protests of their
own men of learning[3]; the Romans inherited it from them; and though
the Europe of the Middle Ages and of to-day professes an Oriental faith,
its religious survey is still limited and its critical power impaired by
the same assumption of superior wisdom. Our information is however wider
than that of the ancient world, and our sympathies are beginning to be
quickened; and we are thus in a position to trace generally the history
of these seven religions. In this work we shall use, as far as possible,
the classical authorities, supplementing them (where deficient) from
other sources.


[Sidenote: Chaldaism.]

=6.= The oldest of these philosophical or religious systems is that of
the Chaldaeans, as the Romans termed a pastoral, star-gazing folk[4]
presumably identical with the people which, in or about the year 2800
B.C.[5], mapped out the constellations as we now know them, traced the
orbits of the planets[6], and predicted their future movements. This
work was not carried out entirely in the spirit of modern science;
it was further stimulated by the belief that the skies displayed a
written message to mankind. But the nature of that message, of which
fragments are possibly embodied in the names of the constellations,
was not preserved to the Romans by any tradition. Two principles seem
to have survived, those of the inexorable tie between cause and effect
called ‘fate[7],’ and of the interdependence of events in heaven and on
earth[8]. Hence arose the hope of prophetic insight into the future;
and the people of Babylon, under Chaldaean influence, are said to have
spent four hundred and seventy years in collecting observations of
the history of boys born under particular combinations of the heavenly
bodies[9]. We are not acquainted with the results of these observations;
but undoubtedly they established a profession of astrologers, whose
craft it was to observe the position of sun, moon and stars at a man’s
birth or at some other critical hour, and thence to deduce his future
character or career. These wanderers, called by the Romans ‘Chaldaei’ or
‘Mathematici,’ spread over all Europe, and founded a lucrative trade on
men’s fears and ambitions. Philosophers studied their methods, and did
not always entirely deny their validity[10]. In society the astrologer
is a common figure[11]; he found his way to the chambers of princes[12],
and was regularly consulted by conspirators. The dramatic scene in Walter
Scott’s _Betrothed_ is as true in character to Roman times as to the
Middle Ages. Roman literature is full of allusions to the horoscope[13].
But whether we attribute these practices to fraud or to self-deception,
there is every reason to believe that they only form a diseased outgrowth
from a system which at an earlier time was of much wider import.


[Sidenote: Persism.]

=7.= The popular expression ‘magic’ still recalls to us the system of
which the Magi of Persia were the professed exponents, and of which the
Romans had a knowledge which is to a large extent confirmed from other
sources. This system we shall here call ‘Persism,’ in order to free
ourselves of the popular associations still connected with such terms as
Magism, Parsee-ism, and so forth; meaning by ‘Persism’ the teaching of
Zarathustra (the Latin Zoroastres) as it affected the Greek and Latin
world. Persism has its roots in the older nationalism, inasmuch as its
deity is one who takes sides with his believer and brings him victory
in war; but on the other hand it grows into a world-religion because
that which begins as a conflict between races gradually changes into
a struggle between right and wrong. It is based also on the Chaldaean
system, in so far as it looks up to the heaven as the object of human
reverence and to the sun, moon and planets as at least the symbols of
human destiny; but here again the outlook is transformed, for in the
place of impersonal and inexorable forces we find a company of celestial
beings, intimately concerned in the affairs of men, and engaged in an
ardent struggle for the victory of the better side. The meaning of
Persism and its immense influence on the Greco-Roman world are still so
little realized that it is necessary here to deal with the subject with
some fulness.


[Sidenote: Zarathustra.]

=8.= The Greeks and Romans refer to the teachings of Zarathustra as of
immemorial antiquity[14]; whilst on the other hand the direct Persian
tradition (existing in a written form from about the year 800 A.D.)
ascribes them to a date 258 years before the era of Alexander’s invasion
of Persia[15]. The best modern authorities incline to the Persian view,
thus giving the date of about 600 B.C. to Zarathustra, and making
him roughly a contemporary of the Buddha and Confucius[16]. On the
other hand considerations, partly of the general history of religion,
partly of the linguistic and metrical character of such fragments of
Zarathustra’s writings as still remain, indicate a date earlier than
this by many hundred years[17]. Zarathustra belonged to the tribe of the
Magi, who maintained religious practices of which the nature can only
be inferred from such of them as survived the prophet’s reforms[18];
in their general character they cannot have differed widely from those
recorded in the Rigveda. In the midst of this system Zarathustra came
forward as a reformer. He was deeply learned in the doctrines of the
Chaldaeans[19], and was an ardent student of astronomy[20]. In a period
of solitary contemplation in the desert[21], it was revealed to him that
a great and wise being, named Ahura Mazdā, was the creator and ruler of
heaven and earth[22]. Upon him attend Angels who do him service; whilst
the spirit of Mischief and his attendants ceaselessly work to oppose his
purposes. Ahura is the light, his enemy is the darkness[23]. The struggle
between them is that between right and wrong, and in it every man must
take one or the other side. His soul will survive what men call death,
and receive an everlasting reward according to his deeds. After quitting
the mortal body, the soul will pass over the Bridge of Judgment, and
will there be turned aside to the right or to the left; if it has been
virtuous, to enter Paradise, but if vicious, the House of Falsehood. Full
of this doctrine, Zarathustra enters the court of King Vishtāspa, and
converts him and his court. The monarch in turn sets out to convert the
unbelieving world by the sword, and the War of Religion begins.


[Sidenote: Spread of Persism.]

=9.= We cannot trace the long history of the War of Religion through
its whole course, but in the end we find that the Religion has welded
together the great kingdom of Persia, and its warlike zeal is directed
towards establishing throughout the world the worship of the ‘God of
heaven,’ and the destruction of all images, whether in the shape of
men or of beasts, as dishonouring to the divine nature. In the sixth
century B.C. Babylon opposed the Religion in the east, and Lydia in
the west; both fell before Cyrus the Great. The fall of Babylon set
free the Jews, who accepted the king’s commission to establish the
Religion in Jerusalem[24], and (at a rather later date) in Egypt[25];
on the other hand that of Lydia exposed the Hellenes, a people devoted
to idol-worship, to the fury of the image-breakers[26]. The battles of
Marathon and Salamis checked the warlike advance of Persism, and the
victories of Alexander suppressed its outward observance and destroyed
its literature and its priesthood. But in this period of apparent
depression some at least of its doctrines were winning still wider
acceptance than before.


[Sidenote: Persism invades Greece.]

=10.= The departure of the Persians from Europe was the signal for an
outburst of enthusiasm in Greece for the old gods and their worship
with the aid of images. Yet, unfavourable as the time might seem, a
monotheistic sentiment developed apace in Hellas, which we shall follow
more closely in the next chapter[27]. Even Herodotus, writing as a
fair-minded historian, no longer regards the Persians as impious, but
realizes that they are actuated by conviction[28]. Socrates was an
outspoken defender of all the main articles of the Religion, to the
horror of nationalists like Aristophanes, who not unjustly accused him
of corrupting the loyalty of the youth of Athens to the institutions
of their mother city. Xenophon, the most intimate of his disciples,
translated this bias into action, and joined with the 10,000 Greeks in
a vain effort to re-establish the strength of Persia: he did not even
hesitate to engage in war against his native land. To him Cyrus the
Persian was a greater hero than any Homeric warrior or Greek sage; and
from Cyrus he drew the belief in the immortality of the soul which from
this time on is one of the chief subjects of philosophic speculation.


[Sidenote: Persism welcomed in Rome.]

=11.= The Romans had not the same national motives as the Greeks to feel
an antipathy to Persism. For the doctrine of monotheism they had probably
been prepared by their Etruscan sovereigns, and the temple of Capitoline
Jove kept before their eyes a symbol of this sentiment. But in the Roman
period Persian sovereignty had receded to the far distance, and the
doctrines of Persism only reached Rome through the Greek language and in
Greek form. Thus of the doctrines of the Evil Spirit, the war between
Good and Evil, and the future punishment of the wicked, only faint echoes
ever reached the Roman ear. On the other hand the doctrines of the divine
government of the world and of the immortality of the soul made a deep
impression; and Cicero in a well-known passage repeats and amplifies the
account Xenophon gives in his _Cyropaedia_ of the dying words of Cyrus,
which is doubtless to some extent coloured by recollections of the death
of Socrates:

  ‘We read in Xenophon that Cyrus the elder on his death-bed spoke
  as follows—“Do not think, my very dear children, that when I quit
  you I shall no longer be in existence. So long as I was with you,
  you never saw my soul, but you realized from my actions that it
  dwelt in this my body. Believe then that it will still exist,
  even if you see nothing of it. Honours would not continue to be
  paid to great men after death, did not their souls assist us
  to maintain their memory in freshness. I have never been able
  to persuade myself that souls live whilst they are enclosed in
  mortal bodies, and die when they issue from them; nor that the
  soul becomes dull at the moment it leaves this dull body; I
  believe that when it has freed itself from all contact with the
  body and has begun to exist in purity and perfection, then it
  becomes wise. Further, when the framework of humanity is broken
  up in death, we see clearly whither each of its parts speeds
  away, for all go to the elements from which they have sprung; the
  soul alone is not seen by us either whilst it is with us or when
  it departs. Lastly nothing resembles death so closely as sleep.
  But men’s souls, whilst they themselves sleep, most clearly
  reveal their divine nature; for then, being set free from their
  prison house, they often foresee things to come. From this we
  may gather what their properties will be, when they have utterly
  freed themselves from the fetters of the body. If then this is
  so, do reverence to me as a god; but if the soul is destined to
  perish with the body, still do reverence to the gods, who guard
  and rule all this beauteous world, and while so doing keep up the
  memory of me in loyal and unalterable affection.” So spoke Cyrus
  on his death-bed[29].’


[Sidenote: The manifold deity.]

=12.= The Persian doctrine of the ‘Angels’ seems to have been very
little understood either in Greece or at Rome, but, as we shall see
in the course of this book, it profoundly influenced the course of
religious history. The ‘Angels’ or good Spirits of Persism are, from one
point of view, identical with the Creator himself, forms under which he
manifests himself to men. Their names are all those of abstractions:
the Good Mind, the Best Reason, the Desired Kingdom, Holy Humility,
Salvation, and Immortality[30]. On the other hand, they gradually assume
to the worshipper who contemplates them the appearance of separate
personalities, dwelling, like the Creator himself, in an atmosphere of
heavenly Glory. Thus a system which is in principle strictly monotheistic
gradually developes into one in which the deity is sevenfold, as in the
following hymn from the later part of the Avesta:

  ‘We praise the heavenly Glory.
  The mighty, the god-given,
  The praiseworthy, the life-giving,
  Healing, strengthening, watching
  High above the other creatures.

      The Glory that belongs to the Immortal Spirits,
      The rulers, that act by a look alone,
      The lofty, all-powerful ones,
      The strong servants of the All-wise,
  That live for ever, and work justice.

      All seven have the same Thought,
      All seven have the same Word,
      All seven have the same Deed.
  One Thought, one Word, one Deed, one Father and Master
      The All-wise, the Creator[31].’

Of these ‘Angels’ one was destined to play a considerable part in several
of the world-religions; namely that which the Persians called the ‘Best
Reason,’ and which the Greeks knew as Wisdom (σοφία) or the Word (λόγος).
Sometimes an aspect of the Deity, sometimes an emanation from him, and
then again a distinguishable personality, this figure is again and again
presented to our consideration. The personification of abstractions
appealed with special force to the Romans, for from the earliest periods
of their history they had raised temples to Faith (_fides_), Concord
(_concordia_), and other deified virtues; and its character can perhaps
best be appreciated by reference to the personification of Light in
Christian hymnology, both ancient and modern:

  ‘Hail, gladdening Light, of his pure glory poured
  Who is the immortal Father, heavenly, blest[32]!’

  ‘Lead, kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom
      Lead thou me on[33].’


[Sidenote: Sanctity of the elements.]

=13.= Amongst the subsidiary, but still important, doctrines of Persism,
is that of the sanctity of the four elements. Earth, air, fire and water
are alike holy. Hence the dead must not be buried, for that would be to
defile the earth; nor burned, for that would be to defile fire[34]; nor
may any impurity be thrown into the water. This respect for the elements
often appeared to strangers as worship of them[35]. Between the elements
they sometimes discriminated, considering earth and water as more akin
to darkness and the evil spirit, but fire and air to light and the good
spirit[36]. The element of fire they held in special reverence, so that
at all times they have been called fire-worshippers[37]. More careful
observers have always recognised them as monotheists, distinguished by a
certain rapturous language in their description of the deity which they
refused to picture in any concrete shape[38]. They were also zealous
that their teaching should find its expression in a healthy social and
political life[39]. In the education of the young they laid a special
stress on speaking the truth[40].


[Sidenote: Alexander in the East.]

=14.= ‘The Gymnosophists taught philosophy to the people of India[41].’
Who are the teachers thus indicated? An answer may be found, though of
a later date, in Plutarch’s ‘Life of Alexander,’ where he describes the
meeting of Alexander with some eminent gymnosophists, who had stirred up
opposition to his rule:—

  ‘[Alexander] captured ten of the Indian philosophers called
  Gymnosophistae[42]; who had been instrumental in causing Sabbas
  to revolt, and had done much mischief to the Macedonians. These
  men are renowned for their short, pithy answers, and Alexander
  put difficult questions to all of them, telling them that he
  would first put to death the man who answered him worst, and so
  the rest in order.

  The first was asked whether he thought the living or the dead to
  be the more numerous. He answered “The living, for the dead are
  not.”

  The second was asked, “Which breeds the largest animals, the sea
  or the land?” He answered “The land, for the sea is only a part
  of it.”

  The third was asked, “Which is the cleverest of beasts?” He
  answered “That which man has not yet discovered.”

  The fourth was asked why he made Sabbas rebel. He answered
  “Because I wished him either to live or to die with honour.”

  The fifth was asked, which he thought was first, the day or the
  night. He answered “The day was first, by one day.” As he saw
  that the king was surprised by this answer, he added “Impossible
  questions require impossible answers.”

  Alexander now asked the sixth how a man could make himself most
  beloved. He answered “By being very powerful, and yet not feared
  by his subjects.”

  Of the remaining three, the first was asked how a man could
  become a god. He answered “By doing that which it is impossible
  for a man to do.”

  The next was asked which was the stronger, life or death. He
  answered “Life, because it endures such terrible suffering.”

  The last, being asked how long it was honourable for a man to
  live, answered “As long as he thinks it better for him to live
  than to die.”

  The king loaded them with presents, and dismissed them[43].’


[Sidenote: Were the Gymnosophists Buddhists?]

=15.= In these ‘gymnosophists’ it is easy to recognise a type familiar
to Indian antiquity. These men, who have almost dispensed with clothing
and know nothing of the luxuries or even the conveniences of life, are
nevertheless influential leaders of the people. They, like the Persians,
have broken away from the old religions; they talk lightly of the gods,
and do not guide their actions by any decrees supposed divine. The sight
of human sorrow fills them with sympathy for the ills of life, and makes
them doubt whether death is not the better choice. Their ethical standard
is high, and includes both courage and gentleness. That they are Buddhist
monks is probable enough, but not certain, because India contained at
this time many sects professing similar principles. But the teaching
of Gautama, the Buddha or ‘enlightened,’ represents to us in the most
definite form the nature of this propaganda. It implies a revolt against
national rivalries, ritualist observances, and polytheistic beliefs; it
is severely practical, and inculcates obedience to reason and universal
benevolence; and it is spread from East to West by devoted bands of
ascetic missionaries.


[Sidenote: Buddhist teaching.]

=16.= The fundamental teachings of Buddhism appear clearly in the
traditional account of the _Sermon of Benares_:

  This is the holy truth of Sorrow; birth is Sorrow, age is Sorrow,
  disease is Sorrow, death is Sorrow; to be joined with the unloved
  is Sorrow, to be parted from the loved is Sorrow; to lose one’s
  desire is Sorrow; shortly, the five-fold clinging to existence is
  Sorrow.

  ‘This is the holy truth of the Origin of Sorrow; it is the thirst
  to be, leading from birth to birth, finding its pleasure here and
  there; the thirst for pleasure, the thirst to be, the thirst to
  be prosperous.

  This is the holy truth of the Removing of Sorrow; the removal of
  the thirst by destroying desire, by letting it go, by cutting
  oneself off from it, separating from it, giving it no place.

  This is the holy truth of the Path to the Removing of Sorrow; it
  is the holy Path of eight branches, which is called Right Belief,
  Right Aspiration, Right Word, Right Act, Right Life, Right
  Effort, Right Meditation, Right Annihilation of Self[44].’

Specially characteristic of Buddhism is that gentleness of temper,
instinctively opposed to all anger and cruelty, which no provocation can
turn aside. We read in the Dhammapada:

  ‘Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by
  love; this is an old rule. Let a man overcome anger by love,
  let him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by
  liberality, the liar by truth[45].’


[Sidenote: Buddhists and Cynics.]

=17.= The doctrines of Buddhism were not inculcated in India alone. From
the first it was a missionary religion; and its emissaries must often
have appeared in the Hellenistic world, promising ‘to seekers after God
eternal communion with his very essence, to the weary pessimist eternal
forgetfulness[46].’ From contemporary Indian inscriptions we learn of
missionaries sent out by Açoka, the first great Buddhist king of India,
‘with healing herbs and yet more healing doctrine’[47] to Ptolemy II
king of Egypt, Antiochus of Syria, and others, before the year 250 B.C.;
and this mission can have been but one out of many. It thus appears very
remarkable that we have no record of Buddhist communities established in
the Greco-Roman world. But if the name of Gautama remained unknown to the
West, and his community had no formal adherents, the manner of life of
his apostles did not lack imitators. In the Cynic preacher the Buddhist
monk reappears. In Greek literature he is usually an object of ridicule;
his uncouth appearance, his pitiable poverty, and his unconventional
speech give constant opportunity for the wit of his critics. But the
Cynics carried with them not only the outward garb of the Buddhist monks,
but also their lofty ethical standard, their keen sympathy with human
troubles, and their indifference to purely speculative problems[48]. In
spite of the contempt heaped upon them (or perhaps in consequence of it)
they gradually won respect and admiration as the sincere friends and
helpers of the poor. Thus Buddhism at its best is pictured for us in the
sketches drawn by Epictetus of Diogenes and the Cynic preachers of his
own day, of which the following are examples:

  ‘Did Diogenes love nobody, who was so kind and so much a lover
  of all that for mankind in general he willingly undertook so
  much labour and bodily suffering? He did love mankind, but how?
  As became a minister of God, at the same time caring for men,
  and being also subject to God. For this reason all the earth was
  his country, and not one particular place; and when he was taken
  prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates and friends
  there, but even he became familiar with the pirates and tried to
  improve them; and being sold afterwards he lived in Corinth as
  before at Athens. Thus is freedom acquired[49].’

  ‘And how is it possible that a man who has nothing, who is naked,
  houseless, without a hearth, squalid, without a slave, without a
  city, can pass a life that flows easily? See, God has sent you
  a man to shew you it is possible. Look at me, who am without a
  city, without a house, without possessions, without a slave; I
  sleep on the ground; I have no wife, no children, no praetorium,
  but only the earth and heavens, and one poor cloak. And what do
  I want? Am I not without sorrow? Am I not without fear? Am I not
  free? When did any of you see me failing in the object of my
  desire, or ever falling into that which I would avoid? did I ever
  blame God or man? did I ever accuse any man? did any of you ever
  see me with sorrowful countenance?

  This is the language of the Cynics, this their character, this
  their purpose[50].’

Except that a simple form of theism has replaced the Buddhist atheism,
there is hardly a word here that we might not expect from a Buddhist monk.


[Sidenote: Stoicism.]

=18.= The Stoic philosophy was founded by Zeno of Citium (350-260 B.C.).
Although he lived and taught at Athens, his youth was spent in a city
that was half Phoenician, and many of his most distinguished followers
had a like association with the Eastern world. The system deals with
all the great themes touched upon by Chaldaism, Persism, and Buddhism.
Like the first, it insists that there exists an unchanging Destiny,
according to which events throughout the universe are predetermined from
all eternity. Like the second, it sets up as claiming the worship and
allegiance of men a Supreme Deity, who governs the world with boundless
power and benevolent will, and is manifested to men as the Logos or
‘divine Word.’ In its interpretation of the physical universe it accepts
as a first principle a living and creative fire, ultimately identical
with the deity, and containing the germs of the whole creation. It
sees in the will of man an independent and divine power, subject to no
compulsion from without, but attaining its highest and best by willing
submission to the Supreme Being. In its practical ethics, though it
does not advocate the suppression of all desires, it so far agrees with
Buddhism as to hold that happiness is only found in the subordination of
individual claims to the voice of universal reason. Finally, its teachers
are actively engaged in propagating its doctrines and guiding its
disciples. Stoicism has, in short, the inward and outward characteristics
of the other great movements we have described, and may claim without
presumption to be reckoned amongst the world-religions[51].


[Sidenote: Comprehensiveness of the Stoic view.]

=19.= If however we reckon Stoicism amongst the world-religions, we must
not forget that of all of them it is the most philosophical, and this in
a double sense. In the first place the founders of Stoicism are conscious
of the problems to which preceding schools of thought have endeavoured
to find answers, and attempt to reconcile or at any rate to bring into
relation the answers which their predecessors have found. Secondly
they are greatly occupied with intellectual problems, and clearness of
thought is to them almost equally important with rightness of thought.
The theory of Fate which we have attributed to the Chaldaeans is to the
plain man irreconcileable with the doctrine of the government of the
world by a Supreme Deity; yet the Stoics hold both dogmas. The theory of
the freedom of the human will is a limitation equally of the dominion
of Fate and of that of the Deity: the Stoics maintain the freedom of
the human will and refuse to admit the limitation of either power. The
Persians maintained that the power of the principle of Good was balanced
by that of the principle of Evil; and from this they drew what seemed
to be the legitimate conclusion that man may choose to obey the one or
the other, to do good or to do evil. The Stoics omitted the principle
of Evil altogether from their scheme, and yet maintained the theory of
the moral choice. To understand the Stoic system it is necessary to know
exactly in what balance its different elements were maintained, and to
avoid identifying it with other systems, ancient or modern, which are
more sharply cut. Thus when it is commonly asserted that Stoicism on its
religious side is Pantheism, the very brevity of this summary must create
suspicion. Certainly the Stoics frequently speak of the universe as
divine; but they hold with equal firmness the doctrines that the universe
is governed by Providence, and that human perversity may thwart the
divine purpose, both being doctrines which in ancient as in modern times
are associated with Theism, and held to be inconsistent with pantheistic
views.


[Sidenote: God and the ‘Word.’]

=20.= A similar difficulty confronts us when we ask whether the deity
of the Stoics is to be considered as personal. All the terms commonly
used in association with a personal deity are adopted by the Stoics:
their god is Lord and Father. But then they use with equal freedom terms
commonly associated with materialism: for the Supreme Being is to them
body or stuff, a primitive fire which converts itself by natural laws
into every form of being. For this reason the Stoics are commonly called
materialists, and yet the main body of their teaching is contrary to that
usually associated with materialism[52]. Further, beside the personal
and the material conceptions of the Deity, they adopted and developed
a conception which exercised an extraordinary influence over other
systems, when they attributed the exercise of all the powers of deity
to the divine Word, which from one point of view is the deity himself,
and from another is something which emanates from him and is in some way
distinct. Thus the term ‘God,’ which to children and child-like religions
appears so simple, is in the Stoic system extraordinarily complex; and
its full content cannot be grasped without a willingness to revise the
meaning of many conceptions which seem firmly established, such as those
of personality, material, and quality. If we are to suppose that the
Stoic conception of the Word arose ultimately from similar conceptions in
Hebraism or Persism, by which the voice of a personal God attained to a
quasi-independent personality, we must allow that the Stoics made use of
this term with a boldness and consistency which from the time of their
appearance brought it into the forefront of religious and metaphysical
controversy. Through the Stoics the doctrine of the Word passed into the
systems of Judaism and Christianity, to perform in each the like service
by reconciling doctrines apparently contradictory. Of all the systems
we may perhaps say that Stoicism makes the fewest new assertions or
negations, but introduces the most numerous interpretations.


[Sidenote: Influence of Stoicism.]

=21.= We have comparatively little means of judging of the influence of
Stoicism in the world of Asia Minor, but incidentally we may infer that
it was very considerable. In Athens the moral earnestness of its teachers
found little response in public feeling, whilst it laid the exponents
of its tenets open to many a sharp thrust from keen critics whose
constructive powers were after all inferior. In Rome itself Stoicism took
root rapidly. The brilliant circle that gathered round Scipio Africanus
the younger was imbued with its ideals; Cato, the leading republican of
the first century B.C., was a living representative of its principles;
and Cicero and Brutus, with many others less known to fame, were greatly
influenced by it. In the first century of the principate Stoicism
imparted a halo of heroism to a political and social opposition which
otherwise would evoke little sympathy[53]; in the second century A.D. its
influence was thrown on the side of the government; the civilized world
was ruled under its flag, and its principles were embodied in successive
codes of law which are not yet extinct. Its direct supremacy was not
long-lived; for at the very time when a Stoic philosopher sits in the
seat of the Caesars its followers seem to be losing their hold on its
most important doctrines. It came into sharp conflict with Christianity
on matters of outward observance; but in the cores of the two systems
there was much likeness[54], and from Stoic homes were drawn the most
intelligent advocates of the newer faith.


[Sidenote: Judaism.]

=22.= By Judaism we mean here the way of thinking which was prevalent in
the Jewish world from the date of the return from Babylon to that of the
destruction of Jerusalem. Judaism was of course by no means restricted
to the soil of Palestine; it was carried by the diffusion of the Jewish
race to all the coasts of the Mediterranean; besides its national centre
at Jerusalem, it included a great centre of learning at Alexandria, and
its branches, as we have seen[55], extended to the south of Egypt. The
chief external impulse which affected it was the spread of Persism. The
two systems agreed in their belief in a God of heaven, and in their
dislike to idol-worship; and it can be no matter of wonder if one party
at least among the Jews readily accepted the more strictly Persian
doctrines of the ministry of angels, the struggle between good and evil,
the immortality of the soul, and the reward after death, as well as
such observances as the washing of hands[56]. Strong Persian influence
has been traced in the book of Daniel[57], and as Jewish speculation
developed at Alexandria, it took up the use of the Greek language,
and so came into touch with the influences that were moulding thought
throughout Asia Minor[58]. The most interesting and elevated production
of Alexandrine Judaism is the book known as the _Wisdom of Solomon_,
probably composed in the first century B.C.[59]


[Sidenote: ‘The Wisdom of Solomon.’]

=23.= The author of this book, whilst himself a firm adherent of
monotheism, shews a not altogether intolerant appreciation of those
systems in which either the heavenly bodies or the elements seem to
occupy the most important place:—

  1.

  For verily all men by nature were but vain who had no perception of God,
      And from the good things that are seen they gained not power to know
        him that is,
      Neither by giving heed to the works did they recognise the artificer;

  2.

  But either fire, or wind, or swift air,
      Or circling stars, or raging water, or the luminaries of heaven,
      They thought to be gods that rule the world.

  3.

  And if it was through delight in their beauty that they took them to be
        the gods,
      Let them know how much better than these is their sovereign Lord:
      For the first author of beauty created them:

  4.

  But if it was through astonishment at their power and influence,
      Let them understand from them how much more powerful is he that
        formed them:

  5.

  For from the greatness of the beauty even of created things
      In like proportion does man form the image of their first maker.

  6.

  But yet for these men there is but small blame,
      For they too peradventure do but go astray
      While they are seeking God and desiring to find him.

                                           _Wisdom of Solomon_, xiii 1-6.

The same author rises to still greater heights when he personifies Wisdom
or Philosophy as a Spirit attendant upon, and almost identified with the
deity. Here his language resembles that of the Avestic hymns, describing
the angels attendant upon Ahura Mazdā[60]:—

  22.

  For there is in Wisdom a spirit quick of understanding, holy,
      Alone in kind, manifold,
      Subtil, freely moving,
      Clear in utterance, unpolluted,
      Distinct, unharmed,
      Loving what is good, keen, unhindered,

  23.

  Beneficent, loving toward man,
      Stedfast, sure, free from care.
      All-powerful, all-surveying,
      And penetrating through all spirits
      That are quick of understanding, pure, most subtil:

  24.

  For wisdom is more mobile than any motion:
      Yea, she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her
        pureness.

  25.

  For she is a breath of the power of God,
      And a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty:
      Therefore can nothing defiled find entrance into her.

  26.

  For she is an effulgence from everlasting light,
      And an unspotted mirror of the working of God,
      And an image of his goodness.

  27.

  And she, being one, hath power to do all things:
      And remaining in herself, reneweth all things,
      And from generation to generation passing into holy souls
      She maketh men friends of God, and prophets;

  29.

  For she is fairer than the sun,
      And above all the constellations of the stars.

                                          _Wisdom of Solomon_, vii 22-29.


[Sidenote: Philo the Jew.]

=24.= The fusion of Greek and Judaic modes of thought is most complete
in the works of Philo the Jew (c. 20 B.C.-54 A.D.). This writer in
commenting upon the books of the Old Testament, finds himself able by
way of interpretation to introduce large parts of Greek philosophies.
The place of Wisdom in the writer last named is taken in his works
by the Logos or ‘Word[61]’; and the ‘Word’ is many times described
as an emanation of the deity, after the Persian fashion[62]. Without
anticipating the further discussion of this philosophical conception,
we may well notice here how characteristic it is of an age which paid
boundless homage to reason, and how it supplies a counterpoise to
conceptions of the deity which are rigidly personal. But Philo is of
still more direct service to the study of Stoicism, because he had so
completely absorbed the system that, where other authorities fail us,
we may often trust to his expositions for a knowledge of details of the
Stoic system.

Another work of about the same period is the _Fourth book of the
Maccabees_, in which Stoic ethics, only slightly disguised, are
illustrated from Jewish history. In this fusion of Hebraic and
Hellenistic thought, unfortunately interrupted by political convulsions,
eminent modern Jews have recognised the natural development of the
teaching of the Hebrew prophets[63].


[Sidenote: Christianity.]

=25.= The foregoing discussions will already have suggested that
Christianity is bound by intimate ties to the other world-religions;
though it is beyond our present purpose to examine the precise nature
of those ties. It is pre-eminently concerned with the breaking down
of Jewish nationalism, and its constant appeal to ‘the truth’ is
essentially the same as the appeal of kindred systems to ‘wisdom’ or
‘philosophy.’ The Lord’s Prayer, addressed to the ‘Father in heaven,’ and
with its further references to ‘The Name,’ ‘The Kingdom,’ ‘The Will,’
‘temptation,’ and ‘the Evil One,’ reflects the principal conceptions
of Persism, of which we are again reminded in the Apocalypse by the
reference to the ‘seven spirits of God[64].’ The Sermon on the Mount has
been, not without reason, compared to the Buddhist sermon of Benares.
With Stoicism Christianity has special ties, both direct and indirect.
Its chief apostle was Paul of Tarsus, who was brought up in a city from
which more than one eminent Stoic teacher had proceeded[65], and whose
ways of thinking are penetrated by Stoic conceptions. The most profound
exponent of its theology (the author of the _Gospel according to John_)
placed in the forefront of his system the doctrine of the ‘Word’ which
directly or (more probably) indirectly he derived from Stoic sources.
The early church writers felt the kinship of thought without perceiving
the historical relation. To them Cicero in his Stoic works was ‘anima
naturaliter Christiana’; and they could only explain the lofty teachings
of Seneca by the belief that he was a secret convert of the apostle
Paul[66]. Parallelism between Stoic and Christian phraseology is indeed
so frequently traced that it may be well to emphasize the need of
caution. It is not by single phrases, often reflecting only the general
temper of the times, that we can judge the relation of the two systems;
it is necessary also to take into account the general framework and the
fundamental principles of each.


[Sidenote: Druidism.]

=26.= Of the systems named by Aristotle far the least known to us is
Druidism. It appeared to Caesar and other Romans to be the national
religion of the Gauls and Britons, exactly as Magism appeared to the
Greeks to be the national religion of the Persians. But other evidence
indicates that Druidism was a reformed religion or philosophy, not unlike
Persism in its principles. The training of Druidical students was long
and arduous; it claimed to introduce them to a knowledge of heavenly
deities denied to the rest of the world, and to reveal to them the
immortality of the soul. Our best authority is the Latin poet Lucan:—

  ‘To you alone it has been granted to know the gods and the powers
  of heaven; or (it may be) to you alone to know them wrongly. You
  dwell in deep forests and far-away groves: according to your
  teaching the shades do not make their way to the still regions
  of Erebus or the grey realm of Dis below; the same spirit guides
  a new body in another world; if you know well what you say,
  then death is but an interlude in life. If not, at least the
  peoples, on whom the northern star gazes directly, are happy in
  their illusion; for the greatest of terrors, the fear of death,
  is nothing to them. Hence it comes that their warriors’ hearts
  are ready to meet the sword, and their souls have a welcome for
  death, and they scorn to be thrifty with life, in which they can
  claim a second share[67].’

Druidism, like Stoicism, seems to have prepared its adherents for a
specially ready acceptance of Christianity.


[Sidenote: The goal not reached yet.]

=27.= The story of the world-religions, with their countless prophets,
teachers, confessors and martyrs, has its tragic side. We ask what was
attained by so much study and self-denial, such courageous defiance
of custom and prejudice, such bold strivings after the unattainable,
so many hardly spent lives and premature deaths, and feel puzzled to
find a reply. To the problems proposed the world-religions gave in turn
every possible answer. Some found life sweet, others bitter; some bowed
before the inexorable rule of destiny, others believed in a personal and
benevolent government of the universe; some looked forward to a life
after death, others hoped for annihilation. Their theories crystallized
into dogmas, and as such became the banners under which national hatreds
once more sought outlet in bloodshed. Their adherents sacrificed
everything in the hope of reaching certain and scientific truth, and,
at the end of all, religion still appears the whole world over to be
in conflict with science, and the thousand years during which Wisdom
was counted more precious than riches are often looked back upon as a
time of human aberration and childishness. It is not to be denied that
thousands of noble spirits set out during this period for a goal that
they never reached; and those who are inclined to destructive criticism
may plausibly characterise their enterprise as vanity.


[Sidenote: The path still onward.]

=28.= It is the task of literary research to pierce through this limited
view, and to trace the real effect of philosophical effort on the life
of individuals and nations. All over the civilized world it raised a
race of heroes, struggling not for power or splendour as in the epoch
of barbarism, but for the good of their fellow-men. It gave a new value
to life, and trampled under foot the fear of death. It united the
nations, and spread the reign of law and justice. Where its influence
has weakened, the world has not changed for the better; so that the
very failures of the world-religions most attest their value. India has
relapsed from Buddhism, its own noblest work, to its earlier creeds, and
they still bar its path against social progress. Europe, no longer united
by the sentiment of a catholic religion, and increasingly indifferent
to literary sympathies, is falling back into the slough of frontier
impediments and racial hatreds. From all this there is no way out except
in the old-fashioned quest of truth and good will.


[Sidenote: Estimates of Stoicism.]

=29.= Both in ancient and in modern times the importance of Stoicism
has been very variously estimated, according as the critic has set
up a purely literary standard, or has taken into account historical
influence. To those who look upon philosophy as it is embodied in books,
and forms a subject for mental contemplation and aesthetic enjoyment,
the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle have always seemed of far
higher rank. As contributions to the progress of humanity, in politics
and law, in social order and in the inventive adaptation of material
surroundings, they can hardly claim to approach any one of the systems
discussed in this chapter. But it is with no wish to depreciate the great
masterpieces of Hellenic culture that we now set against the criticisms
of some of its ardent advocates the maturer judgment of writers who have
approached with greater sympathy the study of the Hellenistic and Roman
worlds. ‘In Plato and Aristotle,’ says Zeller, ‘Greek philosophy reached
its greatest perfection[68].’ ‘Its bloom was short-lived[69].’ ‘Greece
was brought into contact with the Eastern nations, whereby it became
subject to a back-current of Oriental thought[70].’ ‘With the decline of
political independence the mental powers of the nation were broken past
remedy[71].’ ‘What could be expected in such an age, but that philosophy
would become practical, if indeed it were studied at all[72]?’ To minds
of another temper it does not seem so fatal that ‘philosophy should
become practical.’ ‘It should be insisted,’ says Prof. Mahaffy, ‘that the
greatest practical inheritance the Greeks left in philosophy was not the
splendour of Plato, or the vast erudition of Aristotle, but the practical
systems of Zeno and Epicurus, and the scepticism of Pyrrho. In our own
day every man is either a Stoic, an Epicurean, or a Sceptic[73].’ The
greatness of Stoicism in particular was eloquently recognised by a French
writer of the eighteenth century: ‘elle seule savait faire les citoyens,
elle seule faisait les grands hommes, elle seule faisait les grands
empereurs[74]!’ With these tributes may be compared that paid by a writer
who approaches the subject from the standpoint of modern philosophy
and theology. ‘[Stoicism] has perennial fascination; and there are not
wanting signs that it appeals with special attractiveness to cultured
minds at the present day. It has both speculative and practical value;
its analysis of human nature and its theory of knowledge, no less than
its ethical teaching, giving insight into the problems of the universe
and the right mode of guiding life. As an important stage in the march
of philosophical thought, and as a luminous chapter in the history of
natural theology, it solicits our attention and will repay our study[75].’


[Sidenote: Interpretative Stoicism.]

=30.= Judgments so contradictory reveal the fact that ancient
divergencies of philosophic sympathies have their counterparts to-day;
and perhaps in studying and judging the systems of antiquity a little
more is needed of the sympathy and interpretative elasticity which every
man unconsciously uses in maintaining the political, philosophic and
religious views to which he is attracted by inheritance or personal
conviction. Thus to understand Stoicism fully a man must himself become
for the time being a Stoic. As such he will no longer bind himself by
the letter of the school authorities. In many a phrase they use he will
recognise an obsolete habit of thought, an exaggerated opposition, a
weak compliance in the face of dominant opinions, or a mistaken reliance
upon what once seemed logical conclusions. At other points he will see
difficulties felt to which an answer can now easily be supplied. At each
step he will ask, not so much what the Stoics thought, but what a Stoic
must necessarily think. Whilst constantly referring to the original
authorities, he will allow much to be forgotten, and in other cases he
will draw out more meaning than the writers themselves set in their
words. If he can walk, boldly but not without caution, on this path, he
will assuredly find that Stoicism throws light on all the great questions
to which men still seek answers, and that to some at least it still holds
out a beckoning hand.


FOOTNOTES

[1] See below, § 441.

[2] Diog. L. Prooem. 1.

[3] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii p. 161; and below, § 94.

[4] ‘principes Chaldaei, qui in patentibus campis colebant, stellarum
motus et vias et coetus intuentes, quid ex his efficeretur observaverunt’
Gellius, _N. A._ xiv 1, 8.

[5] Sir E. Walter Maunder, in the _Nineteenth Century_ for September 1900.

[6] ‘quinque stellarum potestates Chaldaeorum observatio excepit’ Seneca,
_N. Q._ ii 32, 6.

[7] This is well described by Cicero, translating from a Stoic source:
‘cum fato omnia fiant, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui colligationem
causarum omnium perspiciat animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. qui enim
teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem necesse est omnia teneat quae
futura sint’ _Div._ i 56, 127. It seems reasonable to suppose that this
general conception of ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’ is deduced from the unchanging
movements of the heavenly bodies.

[8] ‘videbis quinque sidera diversas agentia vias; ex horum levissimis
motibus fortunae populorum dependent’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 18, 3.

[9] ‘aiunt quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum in periclitandis
experiundisque pueris, quicunque essent nati, Babylonios posuisse’ Cic.
_Div._ ii 46, 97. I assume that the original tradition named the smaller
number suggested above.

[10] ‘duo apud Chaldaeos studuisse se dicunt, Epigenes et Apollonius
Myndius’ Sen. _N. Q._ vii 4, 1; ‘Diogenes Stoicus [Chaldaeis] concedit,
aliquid ut praedicere possint’ Cic. _Div._ ii 43, 90. Seneca concludes
against their authority, observing (i) that a proper horoscope should
include all the stars in the heaven at the moment of birth, and (ii) that
twins should always have the same fortune, which is obviously untrue; see
_N. Q._ ii 32, 6 to 8, _Ben._ vii 1, 5.

[11] ‘tu ne quaesieris (scire nefas), quem mihi, quem tibi | finem di
dederint, Leuconoe, nec Babylonios | temptaris numeros’ Hor. _C._ i 11,
1-3.

[12] See the interesting tale of Thrasyllus and Tiberius in Tac. _Ann._
vi 21, to which the author affects to give some credit.

[13] e.g., ‘seu Libra seu me Scorpios adspicit | formidulosus, pars
violentior | natalis horae, seu tyrannus | Hesperiae Capricornus undae,
| utrumque nostrum incredibili modo | consentit astrum’ Hor. _C._ ii 17,
17-22.

[14] ‘Eudoxus, qui inter sapientiae sectas clarissimam utilissimamque
[artem magicam] intellegi voluit, Zoroastrem hunc sex millibus annorum
ante Platonis mortem fuisse prodidit: sic et Aristoteles’ Pliny, _N. H._
xxx 2, 1; cf. Diog. L. Prooem. 2 and 8.

[15] Williams-Jackson, _Zoroaster_, p. 161.

[16] _ib._ p. 174.

[17] K. Geldner, _Encycl. Brit._ ed. x, article ‘Zoroaster.’

[18] Williams-Jackson, p. 7.

[19] ‘Magiam ... cuius scientiae saeculis priscis multa ex Chaldaeorum
arcanis Bactrianus addidit Zoroastres’ Amm. Marc. xxiii 6, 32.

[20] [Zoroastres] ‘primus dicitur mundi principia siderumque
motus diligentissime spectasse’ Justinus, _Hist. Phil._ i 1, 9
(Williams-Jackson, p. 237): ‘astris multum et frequenter intentus’ Clem.
Rom. _Recogn._ iv 27.

[21] ‘tradunt Zoroastrem in desertis caseo vixisse’ Pliny, _N. H._ xi 97.

[22] ‘[Ahura Mazdā] created the paths of the sun and the stars; he made
the moon to wax and wane’ (_Yasna_ 43, 3); ‘he made the light and the
darkness’ (_ib._ 5); ‘he is the father of the good’ (_ib._ 46, 2).

[23] ‘Ζωροάστρης ὁ μάγος ... προσαπεφαίνετο, τὸν μὲν ἑοικέναι φωτὶ
μάλιστα τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τὸν δ’ ἔμπαλιν σκότῳ καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ’ Plut. _Isid. et
Osir._ 46.

[24] ‘Thus saith Cyrus, king of Persia:—all the kingdoms of the earth
hath the Lord, the God of heaven, given me; and he hath charged me to
build him an house in Jerusalem’ Ezra i 2.

[25] See the interesting papyri records recently discovered in
Elephantine, and published by Dr Sachau of Berlin. A general account of
them is given by Prof. Driver in the London _Guardian_ for Nov. 6, 1907.

[26] Cicero rightly appreciated the religious character of the Persian
invasions: ‘delubra humanis consecrata simulacris Persae nefaria
putaverunt; eamque unam ob causam Xerxes inflammari Atheniensium fana
iussisse dicitur, quod deos, quorum domus esset omnis hic mundus,
inclusos parietibus contineri nefas esse duceret’ _Rep._ iii 9, 14. So
Themistocles as represented by Herodotus: ‘the gods and heroes grudged
that one man should become king both of Asia and of Europe, and he a man
unholy and presumptuous, one who made no difference between things sacred
and things profane, burning and casting down the images of the gods’
_History_ viii 109 (Macaulay’s translation).

[27] See below, § 41.

[28] ‘Images and temples and altars they do not account it lawful to
erect, nay, they even charge with folly those who do these things; and
this, as it seems to me, because they do not account the gods to be in
the likeness of men, as do the Hellenes. But it is their wont to perform
sacrifices to Zeus, going up to the most lofty of the mountains, and the
whole circle of the heavens they call Zeus: and they sacrifice to the
Sun and the Moon and the Earth, to Fire and to Water and to the Winds;
these are the only gods to whom they have sacrificed ever from the first’
_History_ i 131 (Macaulay’s translation).

[29] Cic. _Sen._ 22, 79 to 81, after Xen. _Cyr._ viii 7.

[30] In the hymns of Zarathustra we can only trace the beginnings of this
system, as in the following: ‘All-wise Lord, all-powerful one, and thou
Piety, and Righteousness, Good Mind and the Kingdom, listen ye to me and
prosper my every beginning’ _Yasna_ 33, 11.

[31] _Yasht_ xix 15, 16. The translation follows Geldner, _Drei Yasht aus
dem Zendavesta_, p. 15.

[32] Ancient Greek hymn, φῶς ἱλαρὸν ἁγίας δόξης, translated by J. Keble.

[33] J. H. Newman.

[34] ‘Zoroaster taught the Persians neither to burn their dead, nor
otherwise to defile fire.’ Xanthos (B.C. 465-425), as quoted by Nicolaus
of Damascus (1st century B.C.).

[35] See § 10, note 28; Strabo xv 3, 16.

[36] ‘Zarathustra said:—the earthly demon is water derived from earth;
the heavenly demon is fire mixed with air’ Origen, _contra haereses_, i
col. 3025.

[37] ‘The Persians first worshipped fire as a god in heaven’ Clemens
Romanus, _Hom._ ix 4 f.

[38] ‘Zoroaster the Magian says:—God is the primal, the incorruptible,
the eternal, the unbegotten, the indivisible, the incomparable, the
charioteer of all good, he that cannot be bribed, the best of the good,
the wisest of the wise; he is also the father of good laws and justice,
the self-taught, the natural, perfect, and wise, the only discoverer of
the sacred and natural’ Euseb. _Praep. ev._ i 10.

[39] ‘From the writings of Zoroaster it is inferred that he divided
philosophy into three parts, physics, economics, and politics’ Schol. on
_First Alcibiades_, p. 122 A (Williams-Jackson, p. 231).

[40] ‘They educate their children, beginning at five years old and going
on till twenty, in three things only; in riding, in shooting, and in
speaking the truth’ Herod. i 136.

[41] See above, § 3.

[42] Alexander had reached the river Hyphasis, the modern Bias.

[43] Plutarch’s _Life of Alexander_, ch. lxiv (translation by Aubrey
Stewart and George Long, London, 1892).

[44] Mahāvagga i 6, 19 to 22, after H. Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 139, and
the translation in _S. B. E._ xiii pp. 95, 96.

[45] Dhammapada i 5 and xvii 123 (_S. B. E._ x pp. 5, 58).

[46] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 164. These alternative
interpretations of the doctrine of _Nirvana_ must not be accepted as
uncontroversial.

[47] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 163; V. A. Smith, _Açoka_, p.
174.

[48] See Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii pp. 155-162, and below, § 52.

[49] Epict. _Disc._ iii 24, 64 to 66 (Long’s translation).

[50] _ib._ iii 22, 45 to 50.

[51] ‘The system that stood to Pagan Rome more nearly than anything else
in the place of a religion’ Crossley, _M. Aurelius_, iv Pref. p. xii.
‘Its history resembles that of a religion rather than a speculative
system’ Rendall, _M. Aurelius_, Pref. p. xv.

[52] See below, § 173.

[53] ‘Patricians, as we call them, only too often fail in natural
affection’ M. Aurel. _To himself_, i 12 (Rendall’s translation). See also
below, §§ 442, 443.

[54] ‘Dying, [Stoicism] bequeathed no small part of its disciplines,
its dogmas, and its phraseology to the Christianity by which it
was ingathered’ Rendall, _M. Aurelius_, Pref. p. xv. ‘The basis of
Christian society is not Christian, but Roman and Stoical’ Hatch,
_Hibbert Lectures_, p. 170. ‘[The post-Aristotelian period] supplied the
scientific mould into which Christianity in the early years of its growth
was cast, and bearing the shape of which it has come down to us’ O. J.
Reichel in his Preface to the translation of Zeller’s _Stoics_, etc.

[55] See above, § 9.

[56] It is not admitted by the best authorities that the term ‘Pharisee’
is in any way connected with the name of ‘Persian’ or its modern
equivalent ‘Parsee.’ But the resemblance in beliefs and habits is very
striking, especially if we contrast the Pharisees with their Sadducee
opponents. ‘The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither
angel, nor spirit; but the Pharisees confess both’ Acts xxiii 8.

[57] D. A. Bertholet, ‘The value of the history of religions,’ _Homiletic
Review_, Nov. 1908.

[58] See Fairweather, _Background of the Gospels_, ch. vii (on ‘the
apocalyptic movement and literature’).

[59] _ib._ p. 337.

[60] See above, § 12.

[61] Heinze, _Lehre vom Logos_, pp. 251, 252.

[62] ‘The Logos is related to God as Wisdom, and is the full expression
of the Divine mind. He is the sheckinah or glory of God, the first-born
Son of God, the second God’ Fairweather, _Background of the Gospels_, p.
358.

[63] Friedländer, _Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judaïsmus_,
1905.

[64] ‘There were seven lamps of fire burning before the throne, which are
the seven Spirits of God’ Revelation iv 5.

[65] Of these Antipater of Tarsus is the best known, for whom see § 110;
others are Heraclides, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Nestor, Athenodorus,
etc., for whom see Index of Proper Names.

[66] Winckler, _Der Stoicismus_, p. 2; Lightfoot, _Philippians_, pp. 270,
271.

[67] Lucan, _Phars._ i 452-462.

[68] _Stoics_, etc., p. 1.

[69] _ib._ p. 10.

[70] _ib._ pp. 13, 14.

[71] _ib._ p. 15.

[72] _ib._ p. 16.

[73] _Greek Life and Thought_, Introd., pp. xxxvii, xxxviii.

[74] Montesquieu, _Esprit des lois_, ii 24.

[75] W. L. Davidson, _The Stoic Creed_, p. v.



CHAPTER II.

HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES.


[Sidenote: Greek thought.]

=31.= We have seen already that the great problems of which Stoicism
propounds one solution were agitated during the millennium which
preceded the Christian era alike in India, Persia and Asia Minor on the
one hand, and in Greece, Italy and the Celtic countries on the other.
To the beginnings of this movement we are unable to assign a date;
but the current of thought appears on the whole to have moved from
East to West. But just at the same time the influence of Greek art and
literature spreads from West to East; and it is to the crossing and
interweaving of these two movements that we owe almost all the light
thrown on this part of the history of human thought. The early history
of Stoicism has reached us entirely through the Greek language, and is
bound up with the history of Greek literature and philosophy[1]. But
long before Stoicism came into existence other movements similar in
kind had reached Greece; and the whole of early Greek literature, and
especially its poetry, is rich in contributions to the discussion of the
physical and ethical problems to which Stoicism addressed itself. From
the storehouse of this earlier literature the Stoics drew many of their
arguments and illustrations; the speculations of Heraclitus and the life
of Socrates were especially rich in suggestions to them. The study of
Greek literature and philosophy as a whole is therefore indispensable for
a full appreciation of Stoicism; and the way has been made easier of
late by excellent treatises, happily available in the English language,
dealing with the general development of philosophic and religious thought
in Greece[2]. Here it is only possible to refer quite shortly to those
writers and teachers to whom Stoicism is most directly indebted.


[Sidenote: Homer.]

=32.= Although the HOMERIC POEMS include representations of gods and men
corresponding to the epoch of national gods and to other still earlier
stages of human thought, nevertheless they are pervaded by at least
the dawning light of the period of the world-religions. Tales of the
gods that are bloodthirsty or coarse are kept in the background; and
though heroes like Agamemnon, Achilles, and Ajax move in an atmosphere
of greed, bloodshed, and revenge, yet all of them are restrained both
in word and in act by a strong feeling of self-respect, the αἰδώς or
shamefastness which entirely differentiates them from the heroes of
folk-lore; in particular, the typical vices of gluttony, drunkenness,
and sexual unrestraint are amongst the things of which it is a shame to
speak without reserve. The gods are many, and in human shape; yet they
are somewhat fairer than men, and something of the heavenly brilliance
in which the Persian archangels are wrapped seems to encircle also the
heights where the gods dwell on mount Olympus[3]. Gradually too there
comes to light amidst the picture of the many gods something resembling
a supreme power, sometimes impersonally conceived as Fate (αἶσα,
μοῖρα), sometimes more personally as the Fate of Zeus, most commonly
of all as Zeus himself, elevated in rank above all other gods[4]. Thus
Zeus is not only king, but also father of gods and men[5]; he is the
dispenser of happiness to men, ‘to the good and the evil, to each one
as he will[6],’ and the distributor of gracious gifts[7], unbounded
in power[8] and in knowledge[9]. The gods again, in spite of the many
tales of violence attached to their names, exercise a moral governance
over the world. ‘They love not froward deeds, but they reverence justice
and the righteous acts of men[10]’; ‘in the likeness of strangers from
far countries, they put on all manner of shapes, and wander through the
cities, beholding the violence and the righteousness of men[11].’

Whilst therefore the philosophers of later times could rightly object to
Homer that he told of the gods tales neither true nor worthy of their
nature, there was on the other hand much in the _Iliad_ and _Odyssey_,
and particularly in the latter, which was in harmony with philosophical
conceptions. It was not without reason that the Stoics themselves made
of Ulysses, who in Homer plays but little part in fighting, an example
of the man of wisdom and patience, who knows men and cities, and who
through self-restraint and singleness of purpose at last wins his way
to the goal[12]. From this starting-point the whole of the _Odyssey_ is
converted into a ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’; the enchantress Circe represents
the temptations of gluttony, which turns men into swine[13]; the chant of
the Sirens is an allegory of the enticements of sensual pleasure.


[Sidenote: Hesiod.]

=33.= In HESIOD (8th century B.C.) we find the first attempt to construct
a history of the universe; his _Theogony_ is the forerunner of the
Cosmology which later on is a recognised part of philosophy. Here in the
company of the personal gods we find not only the personified lights of
heaven, Sun and Moon, but also such figures as those of Earth and Ocean,
Night and Day, Heaven and Hell, Fate, Sleep, and Death, all bearing
witness to the emergence of the spirit of speculation. In Hesiod again we
first find the description of the ‘watchmen of Jove,’ who are no longer
the gods themselves as in Homer, but an intermediate class of beings,
corresponding to the Persian angels and the δαίμονες of later Greek.

  ‘Thrice ten thousand are the servants of Zeus, immortal, watchmen
  over mortal men; these watch deeds of justice and of wickedness,
  walking all ways up and down the earth, clothed in the mist[14].’

But it is in his ethical standards that Hesiod is more directly a
forerunner of the Stoic school: for neither the warlike valour nor the
graceful self-control of the hero appeals to him, but the stern sense of
justice and the downright hard work of the plain man.

  ‘Full across the way of Virtue the immortal gods have set the
  sweat of the brow; long and steep is the path that reaches to
  her, and rough at the beginning; but when you reach the highest
  point, hard though it is, in the end it becomes easy[15].’


[Sidenote: The Orphic poems.]

=34.= Between Epic and Attic literature stands the poetry of the ‘Orphic’
movement, belonging to the sixth century B.C., and exercising a wide
influence over various schools of philosophy in the succeeding centuries.
For an account of this movement the reader must look elsewhere[16]; here
we can only notice that it continued the cosmological speculations of
Hesiod’s _Theogony_, and in particular developed a strain of pantheism
which is echoed in the Stoic poets. According to an Orphic poet

  ‘Zeus is the first and the last, the head and the foot, the
  male and the female, Earth and Heaven, Night and Day; he is the
  one force, the one great deity, the creator, the alluring power
  of love; for all these things are immanent in the person of
  Zeus[17].’

Here amidst the fusion of poetry and theology we first see the budding
principle of philosophic monism, the reaching after a unity which will
comprehend all things. To the same school is attributed the doctrine that
‘the human soul is originally and essentially divine[18].’

[Sidenote: The Hylozoists.]

=35.= To the sixth century B.C. belong also the earliest Greek
philosophers who are known to us by name. In all of these the early
polytheism is either abandoned or becomes so dim in its outlines that
the origin and governing force of the universe is sought in quite other
directions. The philosophers of Ionia busied themselves with the problem
of the elements. THALES of Miletus was a man of many attainments; he
had travelled both in Egypt and in Babylon, and was an active political
reformer. To him water was the primary substance, from which all others
proceeded and to which they returned[19]. ANAXIMANDER of the same town
was the first who undertook to give the Greeks a map of the whole known
world. To him it seemed that the primary matter could not be the same as
any visible substance, but must be a protoplasm of undefined character
(ἄπειρον), capable of assuming in turn all shapes[20]. ANAXIMENES (once
more of Miletus) assumed air as the first principle, and derived the
other elements from it by processes of condensation (πύκνωσις) and
rarefaction[21]. But on one point all the Ionian philosophers were
agreed: the primary substance was the cause of its own motion; they were
‘hylozoists,’ since they hold that matter (ὕλη) is a living thing (ζῷον).
They are from the standpoint of physics ‘monists,’ as opposed to those
who hold matter and life, or matter and force, to be two things eternally
distinct, and are therefore ‘dualists’ in their theory[22].


[Sidenote: Pythagoras.]

=36.= To the same sixth century belong two other notable philosophers.
PYTHAGORAS, born in Samos about 575 B.C., and like Thales, one who had
travelled widely, left his native land rather than submit to the rule of
a tyrant, and founded in Croton in Lower Italy a community half religious
and half political, which in its original form was not long-lived. But a
widespread tradition remained as to his doctrines, in which the theory
of Numbers held a leading position. Pythagoras appears to have been a
good mathematician and astronomer, and followers of his school were at an
early date led to the doctrines of the rotation of the earth on its axis
and the central position of the sun in the planetary system[23]. His name
is also connected with the theory of the transmigration of souls, which
we may suppose him to have derived ultimately from some Indian source;
and to the same country we must look as having suggested to him and his
followers the practice of abstaining from animal food[24].


[Sidenote: Xenophanes.]

=37.= If we looked merely to the theories of the philosophers, it might
seem as if the old mythologies and theogonies were already dead. But in
fact the battle was yet to come. XENOPHANES of Colophon (born circ. 580
B.C.) witnessed in his youth the fall of Ionia before the conquering
progress of Cyrus king of Persia. Rather than submit to the power of the
invader he adopted the life of a wandering minstrel, and finally settled
in Elea, in Lower Italy, where he became the founder of the Eleatic
school. But in his religious convictions he was whole-heartedly on the
Persian side. ‘There is one God, greatest amongst gods[25] and men,
not like mortal men in bodily shape or in mind[26].’ Thus the worship
of many gods and that of images of the deity are alike condemned; and
it is probable that in this false worship he found the cause of his
country’s fall. With the lack of historic sense which is characteristic
of the zealous reformer, he condemned Homer and Hesiod as teachers of
immorality, since they ‘ascribed to the gods theft, adultery, and deceit,
and all acts that are counted shame and blame amongst men[27].’ With
keen criticism he pointed out that myths as to the birth of the gods
dishonoured them just as much as if they related their deaths; for on
either supposition there is a time when the gods do not exist[28]. The
conception of the deity formed by Xenophanes seems to approach Pantheism
or Nature-worship, and so far to foreshadow the Stoic deity; but the
fragments that survive of his works are insufficient to make this point
clear[29]. The successors of Xenophanes did not inherit his religious
zeal, but they emphasized all the more the philosophic principle of an
ultimate Unity in all things.


[Sidenote: Heraclitus.]

=38.= With the opening of the fifth century B.C. we reach HERACLITUS
of Ephesus, a philosopher of the highest importance to us, since the
Stoics afterwards accepted his teaching as the foundation of their own
system of physics. The varied speculations of the sixth century were all
examined by Heraclitus, and all found wanting by him; his own solutions
of the problems of the world are set forth in a prophetic strain,
impressive by its dignity, obscure in its form, and lending itself to
much variety of interpretation. For the opinions of the crowd, who are
misled by their senses, he had no respect[30]; but even learning does
not ensure intelligence[31], unless men are willing to be guided by the
‘Word,’ the universal reason[32]. The senses shew us in the universe
a perpetual flowing: fire changes to water (sky to cloud), water to
earth (in rainfall), which is the downward path; earth changes to water
(rising mist), and water to fire, which is the upward path[33]. Behind
these changes the Word points to that which is one and unchanging[34].
Anaximander did well when he pointed to the unlimited as the primary
stuff, but it is better to describe it as an ‘ever-living fire[35].’ Out
of this fire all things come, and into it they shall all be resolved[36].
Of this ever-living fire a spark is buried in each man’s body; whilst
the body lives, this spark, the soul, may be said to be dead[37]; but
when the body dies it escapes from its prison, and enters again on its
proper life. The ‘Word’ is from everlasting[38]; through the Word all
things happen[39]; it is the universal Law which holds good equally in
the physical world and in the soul of man. For man’s soul there is a
moral law, which can be reached only by studying the plan of the world in
which we live[40]. But of this law men are continually forgetful; they
live as in a dream, unconscious of it; it calls to them once and again,
but they do not hear it[41]. Most of all it is needed in the government
of the state; for ‘he who speaks with understanding must take his
foothold on what is common to all; for all human laws are nourished by
the one divine law[42].’


[Sidenote: The Word.]

=39.= The general import of the physical teaching of Heraclitus, and the
indebtedness of the Stoics to it, have long been recognised: the bearing
of this teaching upon religion, ethics and politics is a more disputable
matter. Does Heraclitus by the ‘Logos’ which he so often names mean
merely his own reasoning and message? is he speaking of the common reason
of mankind? or does the term suggest to him a metaphysical abstraction,
a divine power through which the world is created and governed? For
the fuller meaning we have analogies in the beliefs of Persism before
Heraclitus, and of Stoics, Judaists, and Christians afterwards. The
latest commentator, adopting this explanation, sums it up in three
propositions: first, the ‘Logos’ is eternal, being both pre-existent and
everlasting, like the world-god of Xenophanes; secondly, all things both
in the material and in the spiritual world happen through the ‘Logos’; it
is a cosmic principle, ‘common’ or ‘universal’; and in the third place,
it is the duty of man to obey this ‘Logos,’ and so to place himself in
harmony with the rest of nature. And accordingly, in agreement with many
recent writers, he adopts the translation ‘the Word’ as on the whole
the most adequate[43]. Even the Romans found it impossible to translate
λόγος by any single word, and they therefore adopted the phrase _ratio
et oratio_ (reason and speech); in modern language it seems clearly to
include also the broad notion of ‘Universal Law’ or the ‘Laws of Nature.’
If we can rightly attribute to Heraclitus all that is thus included in
the interpretation of this one word, he certainly stands out as a great
creative power in Greek philosophy, harmonizing by bold generalizations
such diverse provinces as those of physics, religion, and ethics; ‘he
was the first [in Greece, we must understand] to build bridges, which
have never since been destroyed, between the natural and the spiritual
life[44].’ It is to the Stoics almost alone that we owe it that teaching
so suggestive and so practical was converted into a powerful social and
intellectual force.


[Sidenote: Zarathustra and Heraclitus.]

=40.= The prominence given to fire in the system of Heraclitus has
very naturally suggested that his doctrine is borrowed from that of
Zarathustra[45]. The historical circumstances are not unfavourable to
this suggestion. Ionia was conquered in turn by Cyrus and Darius, and
definitely annexed by Persia about 496 B.C., that is, at the very time
at which Heraclitus taught. Moreover the Persian invasion was akin to a
religious crusade, and had for a principal aim the stamping out of the
idle and superstitious habit of worshipping images, by which (according
to the Persians) the true God was dishonoured. The elevated character of
the Persian religion could hardly fail to attract learned Greeks, already
dissatisfied with the crude mythology of their own people. Further, the
resemblance between the teaching of Zarathustra and that of Heraclitus
is not restricted to the language used of the divine fire; the doctrines
of an all-creating, all-pervading Wisdom, the λόγος or Word, and of
the distinction between the immortal soul and the corruptible body, are
common to both. But the differences between the two systems are almost
equally striking. Heraclitus is a monist; according to him all existences
are ultimately one. Zarathustra taught a principle of Evil, everywhere
opposed to the Good Spirit, and almost equally powerful; his system is
dualist[45a]. Zarathustra is not free from nationalism, Heraclitus is
cosmopolitan. In the Ephesian system we find no trace of the belief in
Judgment after death, in Heaven, or in Hell. We may in fact well believe
that Heraclitus was acquainted with Zoroastrianism and influenced by it,
but we have not the means to determine what the extent of that influence
was. It is related of him that he received (but declined) an invitation
to the court of Darius; and that his dead body was given up to be torn to
pieces by dogs in the Persian fashion[45b].


[Sidenote: The tragedians.]

=41.= The development of philosophic thought at Athens was, as we have
noticed, much complicated by the political relations of Greece to
Persia. Although the Persian empire had absorbed Asia Minor, it was
decisively repulsed in its attacks on Greece proper. Athens was the
centre of the resistance to it, and the chief glory of the victories of
Marathon (490 B.C.) and Salamis (480 B.C.) fell to Athenian statesmen
and warriors. By these successes the Hellenes not only maintained
their political independence, but saved the images of their gods from
imminent destruction. A revival of polytheistic zeal took place, as might
have been expected. The wealth and skill of Greece were ungrudgingly
expended in the achievement of masterpieces of the sculptor’s art, and
their housing in magnificent temples. But even so religious doctrines
strikingly similar to those of the Persians gained ground. The same
Aeschylus who (in his _Persae_) celebrates the defeat of the national
enemy, a few years later (in his _Agamemnon_) questions whether the
Supreme Ruler be really pleased with the Greek title of Zeus, and the
Greek method of worshipping him[46]. His more conservative successor
Sophocles was contented, in the spirit of the Homeric bards, to eliminate
from the old myths all that seemed unworthy of the divine nature.
Euripides adopts a bolder tone. Reproducing the old mythology with exact
fidelity, he ‘assails the resulting picture of the gods with scathing
censure and flat contradiction[47].’ With equal vigour he attacks the
privileges of noble birth, and defends the rights of the slave; he has
a keen sympathy for all the misfortunes that dog man’s life; but his
ethical teaching in no way derives its sanction from any theology. The
Hellenes have lost confidence in their inherited outlook on the world.


[Sidenote: The Sophists.]

=42.= The same problems which the poets discussed in the city theatre
were during the fifth century B.C. the themes of a class of men now
becoming so numerous as to form the nucleus of a new profession. These
were the ‘sophists,’ who combined the functions now performed partly by
the university professor, partly by the public journalist[48]. Dependent
for their livelihood upon the fees of such pupils as they could attract,
and therefore sensitive enough to the applause of the moment, they were
distinguished from the philosophers by a closer touch with the public
opinion of the day, and a keener desire for immediate results. Their
contribution to philosophic progress was considerable. Cultivating
with particular care the art of words, they created a medium by which
philosophic thought could reach the crowd of men of average education;
eager advocates of virtue and political progress, they gave new hopes
to a people which, in spite of its material successes, was beginning to
despair because of the decay of its old moral and civic principles. In
PRODICUS of Ceos we find a forerunner of the popular Stoic teachers of
the period of the principate[49]:

  ‘A profound emotion shook the ranks of his audience when they
  heard his deep voice, that came with so strange a sound from the
  frail body that contained it. Now he would describe the hardships
  of human existence; now he would recount all the ages of man,
  beginning with the new-born child, who greets his new home with
  wailing, and tracing his course to the second childhood and
  the gray hairs of old age. Again he would rail at death as a
  stony-hearted creditor, wringing his pledges one by one from his
  tardy debtor, first his hearing, then his sight, next the free
  movement of his limbs. At another time, anticipating Epicurus,
  he sought to arm his disciples against the horrors of death by
  explaining that death concerned neither the living nor the dead.
  As long as we live, death does not exist; as soon as we die, we
  ourselves exist no longer[50].’

To Prodicus we owe the well-known tale of Hercules at the parting of
the ways, when Virtue on the one hand, and Pleasure on the other, each
invite him to join company with her[51]. This tale we shall find to be
a favourite with the Roman philosophers. The same Prodicus introduced a
doctrine afterwards taken up by the Cynics and the Stoics in succession,
that of the ‘indifference’ of external advantages as distinct from
the use to which they are applied. He also propounded theories as
to the origin of the gods of mythology, explaining some of them as
personifications of the powers of nature, others as deified benefactors
of the human race[52]; theories which later on were adopted with zeal
by the Stoic Persaeus[53]. To another sophist, HIPPIAS of Elis, we owe
the doctrine of the ‘self-sufficiency’ of virtue, again adopted both
by Cynics and Stoics[54]. ANTIPHON was not only the writer of an ‘Art
of Consolation,’ but also of a treatise of extraordinary eloquence
on political concord and the importance of education. ‘If a noble
disposition be planted in a young mind, it will engender a flower that
will endure to the end, and that no rain will destroy, nor will it be
withered by drought[55].’


[Sidenote: The Materialists.]

=43.= Amongst the sophists of Athens was counted ANAXAGORAS, born
at Clazomenae about 500 B.C., and a diligent student of the Ionic
philosophers. But in his explanation of nature he broke away from
‘hylozoism’ and introduced a dualism of mind and matter. ‘From eternity
all things were together, but Mind stirred and ordered them[56].’ More
famous was his contemporary EMPEDOCLES of Agrigentum, whose name is still
held in honour by the citizens of that town. In him we first find the
list of elements reaching to four, earth, air, fire, and water; and the
doctrine that visible objects consist of combinations of the elements in
varying proportions, first brought together by Love, then separated by
Hatred. Just in so far as Empedocles abandoned the quest after a single
origin for all things, his conceptions became fruitful as the basis of
the more limited study now known as Chemistry. His work was carried
further by LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS, both of Abdera, who for the four
elements substituted invisible atoms, of countless variety, moving by
reason of their own weight in an empty space. This simple and powerful
analysis is capable of dealing effectively with many natural phenomena,
and with comparatively slight alterations is still held to be valid in
chemical analysis, and exercises a wide influence over the neighbouring
sciences of physics and botany. When however (as has frequently been the
case both in ancient and modern times) the attempt is made to build upon
it a general philosophical system, its failure to explain the cohesion
of matter in masses, the growth of plants and animals, and the phenomena
of mind, become painfully apparent. Such attempts roughly correspond
to the attitude of mind now called _materialism_, because in them the
atoms, endowed with the material properties of solidity, shape, and
weight alone, are conceived to be the only true existences, all others
being secondary and derivative. This materialism (with some significant
qualifications) was a century later the central doctrine of Epicurus, and
is of importance to us by reason of its sharp contrast with the Stoic
system of physics.


[Sidenote: Socrates.]

=44.= The value of these scientific speculations was not for the time
being fully recognised at Athens. It was in the atmosphere of sophistic
discussion, not free from intellectual mists, but bracing to the exercise
of civic and even of martial virtue that SOCRATES of Athens (circ.
469-399 B.C.) grew to maturity. He set to his fellow-citizens an example
of the vigorous performance of duty. As a soldier he was brave almost to
rashness, and took an active part in three campaigns. As a magistrate
he discharged his duty unflinchingly. After the battle of Arginusae the
ten Athenian generals were said to have neglected the duty of succouring
certain disabled ships and the people loudly demanded that all should be
condemned to death by a single vote. Socrates was one of the presiding
senators, and he absolutely refused to concur in any such illegal
procedure[56a]. Again, when Athens was under the rule of the Thirty,
Socrates firmly refused to obey their unjust orders[57]. But when himself
condemned to death, he refused to seize an opportunity for flight which
was given him; for this, he said, would be to disobey the laws of his
country[58].

His private life was marked by a firm self-control. Athens was now
wealthy, and its leading citizens frequently gathered together for
festive purposes. Socrates joined them, but showed the greatest
moderation in eating and drinking: such a course, he said, was the
better for health and also produced more real pleasure. Over the grosser
temptations of the senses he had won a complete victory[59]. His temper
was calm and even; he was not put out by the violences of his wife, nor
did he allow himself to break out into rage with his slaves. His personal
habits, though simple, were careful: he did not approve any neglect
either of bodily cleanliness or of neatness in dress.

Thus Socrates gave an example of a life of activity and self-control
(ἰσχὺς καὶ κράτος); and by his character, even more than by his
speculation, exercised an influence which extended widely over many
centuries.


[Sidenote: His teaching.]

=45.= The teaching of Socrates is not easily reduced to the set formulae
of a philosophic school. But clearly it was focussed upon the life of men
in the city and in the home, and was no longer chiefly concerned with the
phenomena of the sky or the history of the creation of the universe. So
Cicero well says of him that ‘Socrates called philosophy down from the
heavens to earth, and introduced it into the houses and cities of men,
compelling men to enquire concerning life and morals and things good
and evil[60]’; and Seneca that he ‘recalled the whole of philosophy to
moral questions, and said that the supreme wisdom was to distinguish
between good and evil[61].’ He had no higher object than to send out
young men, of whose good disposition he was assured, to take an active
part in the affairs of the community, and to this course he urged them
individually and insistently[62]. But it must not be supposed that he put
on one side problems concerned with the acquirement of truth, or with the
constitution and government of the universe. His views on these points
carried perhaps all the more weight because they were stated by him not
as personal opinions, but as points upon which he desired to share the
convictions of his neighbours, if only they could assure him that reason
was on their side.


[Sidenote: Reason the guide.]

=46.= Socrates more than any other man possessed the art of persuasive
reasoning, thereby making his companions wiser and better men. First he
asked that terms should be carefully defined, so that each man should
know what the nature is of each thing that exists[63], and should examine
himself and know well of what he speaks. Next he introduced the practice
of induction (ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι), by which men make larger the outlook of
their minds, understand one thing by comparison with another, and arrange
the matter of their thought by classes[64]. By induction we arrive at
general truths: not however by any mechanical or mathematical process,
but (at least in the higher matters) by the use of Divination, that is,
by a kind of divine enlightenment[65]. He who has accustomed himself to
think with deliberation, to look on the little in its relation to the
great, and to attune himself to the divine will, goes out into the world
strengthened in self-restraint, in argumentative power, and in active
goodwill to his fellow-men.

Most directly this method appeals to the future statesman. Of those
who seek the society of Socrates many intend to become generals or
magistrates. Let them consider well what these words mean. Is not a pilot
one who knows how to steer a ship? a cook one who knows how to prepare
food? must we not then say that a statesman is one who knows how to guide
the state? And how can he know this but by study and training? Must we
not then say generally that all arts depend on knowledge, and knowledge
on study? Do we not reach the general truths that ‘virtue is knowledge’
and that ‘virtue can be taught’? We may hesitate as to how to apply these
principles to our individual actions, and Socrates will accuse none on
this point; but for himself he has a divine monitor which never fails
to warn him when his mind is turned towards a course which the gods
disapprove.


[Sidenote: His dualism in physics.]

=47.= In the speculations of the Ionian philosophers Socrates could
find no satisfaction. But one day he discovered with pleasure the words
of Anaxagoras: ‘it is mind that orders the world and is cause of all
things[66].’ Thus he was attracted to a dualistic view of the universe,
in which matter and mind are in fundamental contrast. In the beginning
there existed a chaos of unordered dead meaningless matter, and also
mind, the principle of life, meaning, and order. Mind touched matter,
and the universe sprang into being. Mind controls matter, and thus the
universe continues to exist. The proof is found in the providential
adaptation of the world for the life and comfort of mankind: for it is
only consistent to suppose that things that exist for use are the work
of mind[67]. He that made man gave him eyes to see with, ears to hear
with, and a mouth conveniently placed near to the organs of sight and
smell; he implanted in him a love of his offspring, and in the offspring
a love of its parents; and lastly endowed him with a soul capable of
understanding and worshipping his maker. For the divine power Socrates
uses quite indifferently the words ‘god’ and ‘gods’: but his belief is
essentially monotheistic. In the gods of the city of Athens he has
ceased to believe, although he still makes sacrifices upon their altars
in good-humoured conformity with the law, and even adopts the popular
term ‘divination[68],’ though in a sense very different to that in which
the official priesthood used it.

In the analysis of human nature Socrates adopts a similar dualism. Man
consists of body and soul: the soul is lord and king over the body, and
indeed may rightly be called divine, if anything that has touch with
humanity is such[69].


[Sidenote: His pietism.]

=48.= The practical teaching of Socrates was entirely dominated by his
religious principles. The gods, he held, know all things, our words, our
deeds, and the secrets of our hearts: they are everywhere present and
give counsel to men concerning the whole of life[70]. The first duty of
man is therefore to enter into communion with the gods by prayer, asking
them to give us the good and deliver us from the evil, but not qualifying
the prayer by any instruction to the gods as to what is good or evil; for
this the gods themselves know best[71]. In these words then we may pray:
‘Zeus our king, give us what is good for us whether we ask for it or not;
what is evil, even though we ask for it in prayer, keep far from us[72].’

In this spirit of what we should to-day call ‘pietism’ we must interpret
his principle that ‘virtue is knowledge[73].’ This not only asserts that
no one can rightly practise any art unless he has studied and understands
it, but also that no one can rightly understand an art without practising
it. We say that there are men who know what is good and right, but do not
perform it; but this is not so; for such men in truth think that some
other course is good for them. Only the wise and pious man has a right
understanding; others cannot do good even if they try[74]; and when they
do evil, even that they do without willing it[75].

In its application to politics the teaching of Socrates came into
collision with the democratic sentiments prevalent at Athens. To say
the least, Socrates had no prejudice against the rule of kings. He
distinguished sharply between kingship and tyranny, saying that the rule
of one man with the assent of his subjects and in accordance with the
laws was kingship, but without such assent and according to the man’s
arbitrary will was tyranny. But under whatever constitutional form
government was carried on, Socrates asserted that those who knew the
business of government were alone the true rulers, and that the will of
the crowd, if conflicting with that of the wise, was both foolish and
impious[76].


[Sidenote: Why Socrates was condemned.]

=49.= So teaching and influencing men Socrates lived in Athens till
his seventieth year was past, and then died by the hands of the public
executioner. This fate he might so easily have avoided that it seemed
almost to be self-chosen. His disciple Xenophon expresses amazement that
the jurors should have condemned a man so modest and so wise, and so
practical a benefactor of the Athenian people[77]. Modern historians,
with a wider knowledge of human nature, wonder rather that Socrates
was allowed to live so long[78]. The accusers complained that Socrates
offended by disbelieving in the gods of the city, introducing new
deities, and corrupting the youth of Athens. From the point of view
of conservatively-minded Athenians, the charges were amply justified.
Clearly Socrates disbelieved, not merely in the official gods of the
city, but also in the deities it worshipped most earnestly, democracy
and empire. Not only did he introduce new deities, but it might fairly
be argued that he was introducing the most essential parts of the
religion of the national enemy, Persia. Daily inculcating these heretical
doctrines upon young men of the highest families in Athens, he might well
be the cause that the Athenian state was less unquestioningly served
than before. That the heresies of Socrates were soundly founded on wide
observation and general truths could not be considered to make them less
dangerous. Athens had already passed the time when its political power
could be of service to its neighbours; it had not reached that when it
could be content with intellectual influence; Socrates, just because he
was in harmony with the future of Athens, was a discordant element in its
present.


[Sidenote: The companions of Socrates.]

=50.= It is with difficulty, and not without the risk of error, that
we trace even in outline the positive teaching of Socrates. The severe
self-repression with which he controlled his senses was exercised by
him no less over his intelligence. In his expositions it took the shape
of irony (εἰρωνεία), that is, the continual withholding of his personal
convictions, and obstetrics (μαιευτική), the readiness to assist others
in bringing their speculations to the birth. Thus he was a great educator
rather than a great teacher. For whilst he held that virtue alone was
worthy of investigation, and that virtue was essentially wisdom, he
professed to be entirely at a loss where to find this wisdom for himself;
he left it to his pupils to go out and discover the precious cup. Thus
whilst men of all classes and with every variety of mental bias listened
to his teaching, not one was content with his negative attitude. Of the
various suggestions which Socrates threw out, without committing himself
to any one, his pupils took up each in turn and endeavoured to construct
out of it a system[79]. These systems were in the sharpest possible
contrast one with another, but they have certain points in common. All
the teachers retained a strong personal affection and loyalty towards
their common master; each was convinced that he alone possessed the
secret of his real convictions. All of them held aloof from the physical
speculations of which the ripe fruit was already being gathered in by
the Atomists. The portal of knowledge was to all of them the right use
of the reasoning power; the shrine itself was the discipline of virtue,
the attainment of happiness, the perfect ordering of social life. Such
were the Socratic schools, in which philosophy was now somewhat sharply
divided into the two branches of dialectics and ethics. Another century
had yet to elapse before the rejected discipline of physics again
established its importance.


[Sidenote: The Cynics.]

=51.= Of the Socratic schools three contributed directly to the Stoic
system. Of these the Cynic school, founded by ANTISTHENES of Athens
(circ. 440-365 B.C.) and developed by DIOGENES of Sinope, is its
immediate precursor. The Cynic masters inherited most completely the
moral earnestness[80] and the direct pietistic teaching of Socrates; and
for this reason Antisthenes appears to have been the master’s favourite
pupil. The lives both of these men and of their successors were marked
by simplicity and self-abnegation, and they devoted themselves with true
missionary zeal to the reformation of moral outcasts. The caricature of
the figure of Diogenes which was promulgated by his opponents and still
lives in literary tradition needs constantly to be corrected by the
picture which Epictetus gives of him, and which (though not without an
element of idealization and hero-worship) shews us the man as he appeared
to his own disciples.

The breach with the state-religion which was latent in Socrates was
displayed without disguise by the Cynics. Antisthenes, following in the
track of the ardent Xenophanes, declared that the popular gods were many,
but the god of nature was one[81]; he denounced the use of images[82];
and he and his followers naturally acquired the reproach of atheism[83].
Equally offensive to the Athenians was their cosmopolitanism[84], which
treated the pride of Hellenic birth as vain, and poured contempt on the
glorious victories of Marathon and Salamis. Nor did the Cynics consider
the civilization of their times as merely indifferent; they treated it
as the source of all social evils, and looked for a remedy in the return
to a ‘natural’ life, to the supposed simplicity and virtue of the savage
unspoilt by education. Thus they formulated a doctrine which especially
appealed to those who felt themselves simple and oppressed, and which has
been well described as ‘the philosophy of the proletariate of the Greek
world[85].’


[Sidenote: Cynic intuitionism.]

=52.= The destructive criticism of the Cynics did not stop with its
attack upon Greek institutions; it assailed the citadel of reason itself.
Socrates had renounced physics; the Cynics considered that dialectic was
equally unnecessary[86]. For the doctrine of general concepts and the
exercise of classification they saw no use; they were strict Nominalists;
horses they could see, but not ‘horsiness.’ In their ethics they held
to the chief doctrines of Socrates, that ‘virtue is knowledge,’ ‘virtue
can be taught’ and ‘no one willingly sins’; and they laid special
stress on the ‘sufficiency’ (αὐτάρκεια) of virtue, which to produce
happiness needs (according to them) nothing in addition to itself except
a Socratic strength of character (Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς)[87]. But in reality
they identified virtue with this will-power, and entirely dispensed with
knowledge; virtue was to them a matter of instinct, not of scientific
investigation. They appear therefore as the real founders of that ethical
school which bases knowledge of the good on intuition, and which is at
the present time, under ever-varying titles, the most influential of all.
In practice, the virtue which specially appealed to the Cynics was that
of ‘liberty,’ the claim of each man at every moment to do and say that
which seems to him right, without regard to the will of sovereigns, the
conventions of society, or the feelings of his neighbour; the claim made
at all times by the governed against their rulers, whether these are just
or unjust, reckless or farseeing.


[Sidenote: Limits of Cynism.]

=53.= Cynism is in morals what Atomism is in physics; a doctrine which
exercises a widespread influence because of its extreme simplicity,
which is extraordinarily effective within the range of ideas to which
it is appropriate, and fatally mischievous outside that range. Nothing
is more alien from Cynism than what we now call cynicism; the Cynics
were virtuous, warm-hearted, good-humoured, and pious. In their willing
self-abnegation they equalled or surpassed the example set by Buddhist
monks, but they were probably much inferior to them in the appreciation
of natural beauty and the simple pleasures of life. As compared with
their master Socrates, they lacked his genial presence, literary taste,
and kindly tolerance; and they were intensely antipathetic to men of the
type of Plato and Aristotle, whose whole life was bound up with pride in
their country, their birth, and their literary studies[88].


[Sidenote: Xenophon.]

=54.= The Cynics themselves seem to have made no effective use of
literature to disseminate their views; but in the works of XENOPHON of
Athens (440-circ. 350 B.C.) we have a picture of Socrates drawn almost
exactly from the Cynic standpoint. Xenophon was a close personal friend
of Antisthenes, and thoroughly shared his dislike for intellectual
subtleties. He was possessed of a taste for military adventure, and his
interpretation of Socratic teaching entirely relieved him of any scruples
which patriotism might have imposed upon him in this direction, leaving
him free at one time to support the Persian prince Cyrus, and at another
to join with the Spartan king Agesilaus against his own countrymen.
From adventure he advanced to romance-writing, and his sketches of the
expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks (in which he took part in person)
and of the life of Cyrus the Great have an interest which in no way
depends upon their accuracy. The account which he gives of Socrates in
his _Memorabilia_ (ἀπομνημονεύματα) is not always to be depended upon; it
is at the best a revelation of one side only of the historic philosopher;
but it is to a large extent confirmed by what we learn from other
sources, and is of special interest to us because of the great influence
it exercised over Latin literature.


[Sidenote: The Cyrenaics.]

=55.= In the opposite direction ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene shared the
sympathetic tone of Socrates, but could not adopt his moral earnestness
or his zeal for the good of others. He refused altogether the earnest
appeal of Socrates that he should take part in politics. ‘It seems to
me,’ he says, ‘to show much folly that a man who has quite enough to do
to find the necessities of life for himself, should not be satisfied with
this, but should take upon himself to provide his fellow-citizens with
all that they want, and to answer for his action in the courts if he is
not successful.’ Aristippus revolted altogether from the ascetic form in
which the Cynics represented his master’s teaching, and held that the
wise man, by self-restraint and liberal training, attained to the truest
pleasure, and that such pleasure was the end of life. The Cyrenaics (as
his followers were called) were the precursors in ethics of the school of
Epicurus; and the bitter opposition which was later on to rage between
Stoics and Epicureans was anticipated by the conflict between the Cynics
and the Cyrenaics.


[Sidenote: The Megarians.]

=56.= The school of EUCLIDES of Megara swerved suddenly from these
ethical interests and devoted itself mainly to the problems of dialectic.
From the Socratic practice of classification it arrived at the doctrine
of the One being, which alone it held to be truly existent, and which it
identified with the One God proclaimed by Xenophanes and his followers
of the Eleatic school. To the Megaric school we are therefore chiefly
indebted for the assertion of the philosophical principle of monism; the
same school drew the necessary logical consequence, that evil is not in
any real sense existent. From the Eleatics the Megarians further derived
an interest in logical speculation of all kinds, and they were greatly
occupied with the solution of fallacies: amongst the followers of this
school we first meet with the puzzles of ‘the heap’ (_Sorites_), ‘the
liar’ (_Pseudomenos_), and others upon which in later times Chrysippus
and other Stoics sharpened their wits[89]. DIODORUS the Megarian set out
certain propositions with regard to the relation of the possible and the
necessary which are of critical importance in connexion with the problem
of free-will[90]. Finally STILPO, who taught in Athens about 320 B.C.,
and who made a violent attack upon Plato’s theory of ideas, adopted
an ethical standpoint not unlike that of the Cynics[91], and counted
amongst his pupils the future founder of Stoicism. Stilpo enjoyed amongst
his contemporaries a boundless reputation; princes and peoples vied in
doing him honour[92]; but we have scarcely any record of his teaching,
and know him almost exclusively as one who contributed to form the mind
of Zeno.


[Sidenote: Advance of Philosophy.]

=57.= With the school founded by Phaedo of Elis we are not concerned;
the consideration of Plato and Aristotle and their respective followers
we must leave to another chapter. We have already seen philosophy grow
from being the interest of isolated theorists into a force which is
gathering men in groups, and loosening the inherited bonds of city and
class. So far its course has violently oscillated, both as regards its
subject-matter and its principles. But its range is now becoming better
defined, and in the period that is approaching we shall find determined
attempts to reach a comprehensive solution of the problems presented to
enquiring minds.


FOOTNOTES

[1] ‘Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the
religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the
West’ Lightfoot, _Philippians_, p. 274.

[2] Amongst the most important of these are Th. Gomperz’ _Greek Thinkers_
(transl. by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, London, 1901-5), and J. Adam’s
_Religious teachers of Greece_ (Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1908).

[3] ‘Most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light
floats over it’ Hom. _Od._ 6, 46 (Butcher and Lang’s transl.). See also
Adam, _Religious Teachers_, p. 31.

[4] ‘It is not possible for another god to go beyond, or make void, the
purpose of Zeus’ _Od._ 5, 103.

[5] _Il._ 24, 308; _Od._ 14, 404.

[6] _ib._ 6, 188.

[7] _Od._ 8, 170.

[8] _ib._ 4, 237.

[9] _ib._ 20, 75.

[10] _ib._ 14, 84.

[11] _ib._ 17, 485.

[12] See below, § 325.

[13] So already Socrates understood it; Xen. _Mem._ i 3, 7.

[14] Hesiod, _Works and Days_, 252-255; and see below, § 254.

[15] _ib._ 289-292, quoted Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 20.

[16] For instance, to Adam, _Religious Teachers_, Lect. V; Gomperz,
_Greek Thinkers_, bk. i, ch. ii.

[17] Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel).

[18] Adam, p. 114.

[19] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, i pp. 46-48.

[20] _ib._ 48-56.

[21] _ib._ 56-59.

[22] The terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ have recently become the watchwords
of opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In
this book they stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are
not necessarily irreconcileable. For without such contrasts as life and
matter, universe and individual, right and wrong, thought is impossible;
so far we are all ‘dualists.’ Yet as soon as we fix our attention on
these contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some
kind of ultimate reconciliation; and to this extent all diligent thinkers
tend to become ‘monists.’ Similarly the broad monistic principle ‘all
things are one’ is meaningless apart from some kind of interpretation in
dualistic language.

[23] See below, §§ 71, 195.

[24] Gomperz, i 127.

[25] This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p.
204.

[26] Xen. apud Euseb. _Praep. ev._ xiii 13.

[27] Xenophanes apud Sext. _math._ ix 193.

[28] Id. apud Arist. _Rhet._ ii 23.

[29] On Xenophanes see Gomperz, i pp. 155-164; Adam, pp. 198-211.

[30] ‘Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, unless their souls have
wit’ Heracl. _Fr._ 4 (Bywater), 107 (Diels).

[31] ‘Much learning does not teach sense, else it had taught Hesiod and
Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus’ _Fr._ 16 B, 40 D.

[32] ‘The Word is common, yet most men live as if they owned a private
understanding’ _Fr._ 92 B, 2 D.

[33] ‘All things move and nothing remains’ Plato _Crat._ 402 A.

[34] ‘Listening not to me but to the Word it is reasonable to confess
that all things are one’ _Fr._ 1 B, 50 D.

[35] ‘All things change with fire and fire with all things, as gold with
goods and goods with gold’ _Fr._ 22 B, 90 D; ‘neither God nor man created
this World-order (κόσμος), which is the same for all beings: but it has
been and shall be an ever-living fire’ _Fr._ 20 B, 30 D.

[36] ‘The fire shall one day come, judge all things and condemn them’
_Fr._ 26 B, 66 D.

[37] ‘Whilst we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we
die, our souls revive and live’ Sext. _Pyrrh. inst._, iii 230 (_Fr._ 78
B, 88 D).

[38] ‘This Word is always existent’ _Fr._ 2 B, 1 D.

[39] _ib._

[40] ‘There is but one wisdom, to understand the judgment by which all
things are steered through all’ _Fr._ 19 B, 41 D.

[41] ‘Men fail in comprehension before they have heard the Word and at
first even after they have heard it.... Other men do not observe what
they do when they are awake, just as they forget what they do when
asleep’ _Fr._ 2 B, 1 D.

[42] _Fr._ 91 B, 114 D.

[43] Adam, pp. 217-222.

[44] Gomperz, i p. 63.

[45] See Gladisch, _Herakleitos und Zoroaster_; Ueberweg, _Grundriss_, p.
39; above, § 13.

[45a] Gladisch traces this dualism in Heraclitus under the names of Zeus
and Hades (see his p. 26, note 39).

[45b] Clem. _Strom._ i 14; Suidas, s. v. Herakleitos. (Gladisch, pp. 65,
75).

[46] _Agam._ 155-161, 167-171.

[47] Gomperz, ii p. 13.

[48] ‘Half professor and half journalist—this is the best formula that we
can devise to characterise the sophist of the 5th century B.C.’ Gomperz,
i p. 414.

[49] See below, §§ 124, 130, and 131.

[50] Gomperz, i p. 428.

[51] Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 21 to 34.

[52] Gomperz, i p. 430.

[53] See below, § 89.

[54] Gomperz, i p. 433.

[55] _ib._ p. 437.

[56] Arist. _Phys._ viii 1; and see below, § 173.

[56a] Xen. _Mem._ i 1, 18.

[57] Plato, _Apol._ p. 32.

[58] Plato, _Crito_, p. 44 sqq.

[59] Gomperz, ii p. 48.

[60] Cic. _Ac._ i 4, 15; _Tusc. disp._ v 4, 10.

[61] Sen. _Ep._ 71, 7.

[62] Xen. _Mem._ iii 7.

[63] Xen. _Mem._ iv 6, 1; Epict. _Disc._ i 7, 11.

[64] Xen. _Mem._ iv 5, 12; Arist. _Met._ xiii 4.

[65] Xen. _Mem._ iv 7, 10. The Socratic μαντική must not be taken too
seriously; it is only one of many tentative suggestions for explaining
the process of reasoning, akin to our modern use of the term ‘genius’ in
connexion with achievements in poetry and art.

[66] Plato, _Phaedo_, p. 97 c. The passage gives the impression of a
real reminiscence; at the same time its recognition as such implies that
Socrates was not consistent in disregarding all physical speculations.

[67] Xen. _Mem._ i 4, 4.

[68] _ib._ i 4, 2.

[69] _ib._ i 4, 9, and iv 3, 14; Cic. _N. D._ ii 6, 18.

[70] _ib._ i 1, 19.

[71] _ib._

[72] Plato, _Alc._ ii 143 A.

[73] Xen. _Mem._ iii 9, 4 and 5.

[74] _ib._

[75] οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει; see Plato _Prot._ p. 345 D, _Apol._ p. 25,
Xen. _Mem._ iv 2, 20. No one is willingly ignorant, and no one does evil
for any other reason than that he is ignorant of the good.

[76] In accepting generally the statements of Xenophon as to the
religious and practical teaching of Socrates I am glad to find myself
in agreement with Adam; Gomperz on the other hand is more sceptical.
It should however always be realized that Socrates himself veiled his
positive opinions under the form of suggestions and working hypotheses or
‘divinations.’

[77] _Mem._ i 1, 1.

[78] Grote, _History of Greece_, ch. lxviii. Gomperz gives a very
dramatic representation of the attitude of an Athenian of the old school;
_Greek Thinkers_, ii pp. 94-97.

[79] ‘ex illius [Socratis] variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis
disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat’ Cic. _de Orat._ iii 16, 61.

[80] παρὰ [Σωκράτους] τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας Diog. L.
vi 2.

[81] ‘Antisthenes ... populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens’
Cic. _N. D._ i 13, 32.

[82] οὐδεὶς [θεὸν] εἰδέναι ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται Clem. Alex. _Protrept._ p.
46 C.

[83] Epict. _Disc._ iii 22, 91.

[84] See below, § 303.

[85] Gomperz, ii p. 148, referring to Göttling’s book, _Diogenes der
Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats_ (Halle 1851).

[86] ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν Diog. L.
vi 103.

[87] _ib._ vi 11.

[88] See Plato, _Theaet._ 155 E, _Soph._ 251 B; Aristotle, _Met._ vii 3,
7.

[89] See below, § 163.

[90] See below, §§ 220 and 221.

[91] ‘hoc inter nos et illos [Stilbonem etc.] interest; noster sapiens
vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem’ Sen.
_Ep._ 9, 3.

[92] Gomperz, ii p. 196.



CHAPTER III.

THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH.


[Sidenote: Political changes of the 4th century.]

=58.= Before a hundred years had passed since the death of Socrates,
the face of the Greek world had been completely changed. Athens,
Lacedaemon, Corinth, Thebes, which had been great powers, had sunk into
comparative insignificance; their preeminence was gone, and even of
their independence but little remained. Throughout Greece proper the
Macedonian was master. But if the old-fashioned politician suffered a
bitter disappointment, and the adherents of the old polytheism despaired
of the future, there was rich compensation for the young and the hopeful.
Petty wars between neighbouring cities, with their wearisome refrain
‘and the men they killed, and the women and children they enslaved[1],’
began to be less common; internal and still more murderous strife between
bigoted oligarchs or democrats began to be checked from without. For
the enlightened Greek a new world of enterprise had been opened up in
the East. Alexander the Great had not only conquered Asia Minor, and
established everywhere the Greek language and a Greek bureaucracy; he
had opened the way to the far East, and pointed out India and even China
as fields for the merchant and the colonizer. His work had been partly
frustrated by the disorders that followed his death; but if achievement
was thus hindered, hopes were not so quickly extinguished. These new
hopes were not likely to be accompanied by any lasting regrets for the
disappearance of ancient systems of government now regarded as effete
or ridiculous, or of inherited mythologies which were at every point in
conflict with the moral sense[2].


[Sidenote: East and West.]

=59.= The same historic events which opened the East to Hellenic
adventurers also made the way into Europe easy for the Oriental. As
the soldier and the administrator travelled eastward, so the merchant
and the philosopher pushed his way to the West. Not merely in Persia
had ancient superstitions been swept away by reforming zeal; the Jews
were now spreading from town to town the enthusiasm of a universalized
religion which was ridding itself of bloody sacrifices; and, for the time
at least, the humane philosophy of the Buddha was dominant in India, was
being preached far and wide by self-sacrificing monks, and was inspiring
the policy of great monarchies. We find it hard to picture the clashing
of ideals, enthusiasms, and ambitions which was at this time taking place
in all the great cities of the old world; but it is certain that in the
universal excitement the old distinctions of Greek and barbarian, Jew and
Gentile, rich and poor, free and slave, man and woman were everywhere
becoming weakened, and community of thought and temperament were
beginning to reunite on a new basis individuals who had broken loose from
the ties of ancient society.


[Sidenote: New schools of philosophy.]

=60.= During this fourth century B.C. the foundations were laid of the
four philosophical schools which were destined to vie one with another
for the allegiance of the Roman world. The Socratic schools which we have
already mentioned, those of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, did not perhaps
altogether die out; in particular the Cynic missionaries appear to have
been a social force until the second century B.C. But their intellectual
basis was too narrow to admit of their effective transplantation to
new soil. At the end of the century each gave place to a new school,
which preserved the central doctrines of its predecessor. The Socratic
paradoxes were handed on from the Cynics to the Stoics; the doctrine that
pleasure is the good was accepted by Epicurus. Stoics and Epicureans
disputed with a bitterness as yet unequalled, finding themselves just
as much opposed upon the subjects of logic and physics, which they
introduced anew into popular philosophy, as upon the questions of ethics
on which their antipathies were inherited. Between them stood two schools
which had meanwhile established themselves. Plato, himself a companion of
Socrates, founded the Academy at Athens about 380 B.C.; and if he did not
impress his own teaching upon it with absolute fixity, still the school
flourished under a succession of leaders, always proud of the fame of
its founder, and rendering him at least a nominal allegiance. From the
Academy branched off the school of the Peripatetics, founded by Plato’s
pupil Aristotle about 350 B.C. After Aristotle’s death this school
gravitated towards the Academics, and in later centuries there seemed
little difference, if any, between the two. If Stoicism may be called
the child of Cynism, it largely drew nourishment from these two schools
and their founders. Some account of the teaching of Plato and Aristotle
is therefore needed here, partly because of the great importance of both
in the general history of philosophy, partly because of their direct
influence upon the subject of this book. On account of the much greater
prominence of the Academy in the later history we shall often use this
term to refer to the general teaching of the two allied schools.


[Sidenote: Plato.]

=61.= Of all the companions of Socrates far the most famous is PLATO of
Athens (427-347 B.C.), the founder of the philosophical association known
as the ‘Academy.’ In the general judgment of lovers of Greek letters he
stands out not merely as a great master of Attic prose style, but also
as the ablest exponent of the true mind of Socrates[3], and the most
brilliant light of Greek philosophy[4]. On the first point this judgment
stands unchallenged; for delicate and good-natured wit, felicity of
illustration and suggestiveness of thought the Platonic dialogues are
unrivalled. But it is only in his earlier writings that we can accept
Plato as a representative of Socrates; after the death of his master he
travelled for many years in Egypt, Lower Italy, and Sicily, and absorbed
in particular much of the teaching of the Pythagoreans. The theory
of ‘ideas,’ the special characteristic of Plato’s later work, is not
strictly Socratic. Neither, we must add, is it of first-rate importance
in the history of human thought; from our point of view it lies apart
from the main current both of speculation and of practice. It was a
still-born theory, not accepted even by Plato’s successors in the control
of the Academy[5]. We are therefore very little concerned with the direct
teaching of Plato; but all the more readily it should be acknowledged
that the Stoics were often indebted to him for help in the treatment of
important details, and that the Platonic attitude remained for them a
factor of which they needed continuously to take account.


[Sidenote: Plato’s realism.]

=62.= A striking feature of the Platonic dialogues is that their results
are usually negative. First the opinions of the crowd, then those of
Socrates’ contemporaries the ‘sophists’ and of the other Socratic schools
are subjected to a cross-examination, under which they are one and
all shewn to be unreasonable. This cross-examination is quite in the
Socratic spirit, and is before all things a mental gymnastic, training
the dialectician to observe with keener eye and to discuss with apter
tongue than his fellows. Gradually there emerges from a mass of doubts
something like a positive theory that Plato is prepared to adopt. The
true reasoning is that of induction from the particular to the general,
from the individual to the class. In the class name we come upon the true
being of the individual, and by a right definition of it we discern what
each thing really is. The ‘idea,’ which corresponds to the class name,
is alone really existent; the individual is a more or less imperfect
imitation of it (μίμησις). In this way Plato found what seemed to him a
solution of a difficulty which Socrates hardly felt, that of explaining
the participation (μέθεξις) of the particular in the general (ὑπόθεσις
or ἰδέα). Thus where ordinary men see ‘horses,’ and Antisthenes holds
that they are right, Plato sees ‘horsiness,’ or the idea of ‘horse.’ In
the language of medieval philosophy Plato is a _realist_, that is, one
who holds that our Ideas are more than what men mean when they say ‘mere
ideas’; that they are Realities, and have their being in a truly existing
world; and that in knowing them we know what _is_. But just as Plato
holds that general conceptions are alone true and real, so he necessarily
maintains that objects perceivable by the senses are only half-real, and
that the ordinary man lives in a world of illusions. Thus the thoughts
of the philosopher are separated by an abyss from the world in which men
live and die.


[Sidenote: God and the soul.]

=63.= Upon the basis of the individual ‘ideas’ Plato builds up by a
process of classification and induction higher and smaller classes of
ideas, until we begin to see the vision of a single idea, a class which
includes all classes, a supreme ‘being’ from which all being is derived.
This highest idea is variously suggested by the names ‘the Good,’ ‘the
Beautiful,’ ‘the One.’ By a sudden transformation it becomes the Creator
(δημιουργός) of the universe. Containing in itself all being, it needs
for its operation some kind of formless and inert matter; for this the
name ἄπειρον, ‘the unlimited,’ is taken from Anaximander. The whole
created universe may be considered as the joint production of the ‘idea’
and the ‘unlimited’; and the cosmology of Anaxagoras, ‘all things were
together, and mind came and ordered them,’ is substantially justified.
The world thus created is both good and beautiful, for it is made by a
good Creator on the best of patterns.

The human soul is of triple nature. The highest part, the rational soul
(τὸ λογιστικόν), is seated in the head; the emotional soul (τὸ θυμοειδές)
in the heart; the appetitive soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) in the belly. Over
these two lower souls the reasoning part should hold control, as a driver
over two unruly steeds[6]. The rational soul has existed before birth,
and may hope for immortality, for it is knit up with the idea of ‘being.’
Ultimately it may even attain to perfection, if it is purified as by
fire from baser elements that have attached themselves to it.


[Sidenote: Ethics and Politics.]

=64.= Plato himself does not formulate an ethical ideal of the same
precision that his successors used, but we infer from his works a goal
towards which he points. Thus the ethical end for each man is the
greatest possible participation in the idea of the good, the closest
attainable imitation of the deity. The virtue of each part of the
human soul lies in the fit performance of its proper work; that of
the reasoning soul is Wisdom (σοφία); of the emotional soul Courage
(ἀνδρεία); of the appetitive soul Soberness (σοφροσύνη). Over all (it
is hinted rather than stated) rules the supreme virtue of Justice
(δικαιοσύνη), assigning to each part its proper function. Thus the
four cardinal virtues are deduced as a practical application from the
Platonic psychology. The high position assigned to Justice leads up to
the practical doctrine of Moderation (μετριότης); even the virtues are
restricted both in their intensity and in their spheres of work, and if
any virtue passes its proper limit it becomes changed into the vice that
borders on it. Thus the ideal of practical life is the ‘moderate man,’
calm, considerate, and self-respecting, touched with a warm flow of
feeling, but never carried away into excitement; and even this ideal is
strictly subordinate to that of the life of philosophic contemplation.

The ideal State is modelled on the individual man. To the three parts of
the soul correspond three classes of citizens; the rulers, whose virtue
is Wisdom; the guardians, on whom Courage is incumbent; the labourers and
tradesmen, who owe the State Soberness and obedience. Thus the political
system to which Plato leans is that of an Aristocracy; for the middle
class in his state has only an executive part in the government, and the
lower orders are entirely excluded from it.


[Sidenote: Aristotle.]

=65.= By far the greatest of Plato’s pupils was ARISTOTLE of Stagira
(384-322 B.C.), who introduced into philosophy, now convulsed by the
disputes of the disciples of Socrates, a spirit of reconciliation. From
his point of view the various contentions are not so much erroneous as
defective. To attain the truth we need first to collect the various
opinions that are commonly held, and then to seek the reconciling formula
of which each one is a partial statement.


[Sidenote: The ten categories.]

=66.= In his investigation Aristotle did not altogether break with
Plato’s theory of ideas, but brought them from a transcendental world
into touch with common life. He held fast to the method of induction
(ἐπαγωγή) from the particular to the general, and agreed that we
reach the true nature of each thing when we have determined the
class-conception. But the class-conception or idea (ἰδέα), though the
most real existence, does not exist independently, but only in and
through the particulars, which compose the class. Having thus come to
see that there are gradations of existence, we need to inquire what
these are; and to classify the various kinds of judgment with regard to
which we inquire whether they are true or false. Now by observation we
find that judgments or predications have ten different shapes, to which
therefore there must correspond ten kinds of existence. These are the
well-known ‘categories’ of Aristotle, and are as follows:

     (i) ‘substance,’ as when we say ‘this is a man,’ ‘a horse’;
    (ii) ‘quantity,’ as that he is ‘six feet high’;
   (iii) ‘quality,’ as ‘a grammarian’;
    (iv) ‘relation,’ as ‘twice as much’;
     (v) ‘place,’ as ‘at Athens’;
    (vi) ‘time,’ as ‘last year’;
   (vii) ‘position,’ as ‘lying down’;
  (viii) ‘possession,’ as ‘with a sword’;
    (ix) ‘action,’ as ‘cuts’; and
     (x) ‘passion,’ as ‘is cut’ or ‘is burned.’

Aristotle thus reinstates the credit of the common man; he it is who
possesses the substance of truth and gives it habitual expression by
speech, even roughly indicating the various kinds of existence by
different forms of words. It is now indicated that a study of grammar is
required as the foundation of logic.

Aristotle also greatly advanced the study of that kind of reasoning which
proceeds from the general to the particular, and which is best expressed
in terms of the ‘syllogism’ (συλλογισμός), of which he defined the
various forms.


[Sidenote: The four causes.]

=67.= In the study of physics Aristotle picks up the thread which
Socrates had dropped deliberately, that is, the teaching of the Ionic
philosophers. Either directly from Empedocles, or from a _consensus_ of
opinion now fairly established, he accepted the doctrine of the four
elements (στοιχεῖα), earth, water, air, and fire; but to these he added a
fifth (πεμπτὸν στοιχεῖον, _quinta essentia_), the aether, which fills the
celestial spaces. Behind this analysis lies the more important problem
of cosmology, the question how this world comes to be. Collecting once
more the opinions commonly held, Aristotle concludes that four questions
are usually asked, and that in them the search is being made for four
‘causes,’ which will solve the respective questions. The four causes are:

    (i) the Creator, or ‘efficient cause,’ answering the question;—Who
          made the world?
   (ii) the Substance, or ‘material cause’;—of what did he make it?
  (iii) the Plan, or ‘modal cause’;—according to what design?
   (iv) the End, or ‘final cause’;—for what purpose?[7]

Reviewing these ‘causes’ Aristotle concludes that the first, third, and
fourth are ultimately one, the Creator containing in his own nature
both the plan and the purpose of his work[8]. The solution is therefore
dualistic, and agrees substantially with that of Plato; the ultimate
existences are (i) an informing power, and (ii) matter that has the
potentiality of accepting form.

In consequence of this dualism of Aristotle the term ‘matter’ (ὕλη,
_materia_) has ever since possessed associations which did not belong to
it in the time of the hylozoists. Matter now begins to suggest something
lifeless, inert, and unintelligent; and to be sharply contrasted not
only with such conceptions as ‘God’ and ‘mind,’ but also with motion and
force. For this reason the Stoics in reintroducing monism preferred a new
term, as we shall see below[9].


[Sidenote: The microcosm.]

=68.= What God is to the universe, that the soul is to the body, which
is a ‘little universe[10].’ But the reasoning part of the soul only is
entirely distinct; this is of divine nature, and has entered the body
from without; it is at once its formative principle, its plan, and its
end. The lower parts of the soul are knit up with the body, and must
perish with it. So far Aristotle’s teaching differs little from that of
Plato; but a new point of view is introduced when he speaks of the soul
as subject to ‘diseases’ (παθήματα), and thus assigns to the practical
philosopher a social function as the comrade of the physician. Amongst
the diseases he specially names Pity and Fear, which assail the emotional
part of the soul. Their cure is found in ‘purging’ (κάθαρσις), that
is to say in their complete expulsion from the soul, as reason and
circumstances may require; but Aristotle by no means considers that the
analogy between body and soul is complete, or that the emotions should
always be regarded as injurious[11].


[Sidenote: Ethics and Politics.]

=69.= In setting forth an ideal for human activity Aristotle conceives
that other philosophers have differed more in words than in substance,
and he hopes to reconcile them through the new term ‘blessedness’
(εὐδαιμονία). This blessedness is attained when the soul is actively
employed in a virtuous way, and when it is so circumstanced that it
commands the instruments of such action, that is, in a life which is
adequately furnished. On such activity pleasure must assuredly attend,
and it is therefore needless to seek it of set purpose. Further, virtue
appears personified in the ‘true gentleman’ (καλὸς κἀγαθός), who ever
avoids vicious extremes, and finds his highest satisfaction in pure
contemplation, just as the Creator himself lives to contemplate the world
he has produced[12].

In politics Aristotle can find ground for approving in turn of monarchy,
oligarchy, and democracy, according to the circumstances of each state.
We cannot however but feel that his sympathies point most towards
monarchy, and that his personal association with Alexander the Great was
in full harmony with his inmost convictions. As a means of government he
advocates before all things the education of the young.


[Sidenote: Social prepossessions.]

=70.= The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, comprehensive in their
range, brilliant and varied in their colouring, nevertheless appeal
effectively only to a limited circle. Socrates had been the companion
of rich and poor alike; Plato and Aristotle addressed themselves to
men of wealth, position, and taste. Their sympathies appear clearly in
their political systems, in which the sovereign or the aristocracy is
considered fit to play a part, whilst the many are practically excluded
from the commonwealth, sometimes as a harmless flock which needs kindly
shepherding, and at other times as a dangerous crowd which must be
deceived or enslaved for its own good. These prepossessions, which we
shall find reappearing within the Stoic system, appear to weaken the
practical forcefulness of both philosophies. In the ideal character
the Socratic ‘force’ has disappeared, and ‘self-restraint’ alone is
the standard of virtue; the just man moves quietly and conventionally
through life, perhaps escaping blame, but hardly achieving distinction.
In resuming the study of ontology, which Socrates had treated as a ‘mist
from Ionia,’ bright fancies had been elaborated rather than dominating
conceptions; the deity of Aristotle seems but a faint reflex of the
god of Socrates and the Cynics, and neither the ‘idea’ of Plato or the
‘matter’ of Aristotle is so well fitted for the world’s hard work as the
atoms of Leucippus and Democritus. The teachers who succeeded to the
control of the two schools inclined more and more to engross themselves
in special studies, and to leave on one side the great controversial
problems.


[Sidenote: The Academics.]

=71.= The followers of Plato were known as the ‘Academics’: amongst them
we must distinguish between the members of the ‘old Academy,’ as Cicero
terms them[13], and those who followed the innovations of Arcesilaus.
The old Academy chiefly developed the ethical side of Plato’s teaching,
finding that the path of virtue is indicated by the natural capacities
of the individual. Thus XENOCRATES of Chalcedon (396-314 B.C.) taught
that each man’s happiness resulted from the virtue proper to him (οἰκεία
ἀρετή)[14]; whilst POLEMO of Athens (head of the school 314-270 B.C.)
is said by Cicero to have defined it as consisting in ‘virtuous living,
aided by those advantages to which nature first draws us,’ thereby
practically adopting the standard of Aristotle[15]. The teaching of
Polemo had a direct influence upon that of Zeno the founder of Stoicism.

But with the first successes of Stoicism the Academy revived its
dialectical position, in strong opposition to the dogmatism of the
new school. ARCESILAUS of Pitane in Aeolia (315-240 B.C.) revived the
Socratic cross-examination, always opposing himself to any theory that
might be propounded to him, and drawing the conclusion that truth
could never be certainly known[16]. Life must therefore be guided by
considerations of probability, and the ethical standard is that ‘of
which a reasonable defence may be made[17].’ This sceptical attitude
was carried still further by CARNEADES of Cyrene (214-129 B.C.), whose
acute criticism told upon the Stoic leaders of his time, and forced them
to abandon some of their most important positions. From this time a
reconciliation between the two schools set in[18].


[Sidenote: The Peripatetics.]

=72.= The members of the Peripatetic school founded by Aristotle are of
less importance to us. The Romans found little difference between their
teaching and that of the earlier Academy. Cicero mentions that the
Stoic Panaetius was a keen student of two of the pupils of Aristotle,
THEOPHRASTUS (his successor as head of the Peripatetic school) and
DICAEARCHUS[19]; amongst later teachers in whose views he is interested
he names HIERONYMUS, who held that the supreme good was freedom from
pain[20]; CALLIPHO, who combined virtue with pleasure, and DIODORUS who
combined it with freedom from pain[21]; and amongst his contemporaries
STASEAS of Naples, who stated the same doctrines in a slightly different
form[22], and CRATIPPUS, whom he selected as a teacher for his own
son[23]. It was a common complaint of these teachers that the Stoics
had stolen their doctrines wholesale, and (as is the way with thieves)
had altered the names only[24]. All these writers however agree in
denying the doctrine which Zeno accepted from the Cynics that ‘virtue is
sufficient for happiness,’ and lay stress upon the supply of external
goods (χορηγία) as needed to admit of the active exercise of virtue. They
were diligent students of the written works of their founder, and thus
opened the way for the work of erudition and interpretation which found
its centre in Alexandria in a later period.


[Sidenote: Zeno.]

=73.= Amidst the conflict of these schools ZENO grew up. Born in Citium
on the island of Cyprus in 336 B.C., in the same year in which Alexander
became king of Macedon, he heard as a boy of the Greek conquest of
the East, and was only 13 years of age when its course was checked by
the death of Alexander. Of the town of Citium the inhabitants were
partly Greek, partly Phoenician; and Zeno, whether or not he was of
Phoenician blood, certainly derived from his environment something of
the character of the enterprising and much-travelled Phoenician nation,
and imparted this trait to the school which he founded. He was nicknamed
by his contemporaries ‘the Phoenician,’ and the title clung to his
followers[25]. His father was a merchant of purple, and often travelled
in the one direction to Tyre and Sidon, in the other as far as Athens,
whence he brought back a number of ‘Socratic books,’ which were eagerly
read by the young Zeno, and in time attracted him to the famous Greek
city[26]. We may presume that when he first came to Athens he intended
to carry further his studies without abandoning his calling; but when
news reached him of the wreck of the ship which carried all his goods,
he welcomed it as a call to devote himself entirely to philosophy[27].
His first step in Athens was to seek out the man who best represented the
character of Socrates, as represented in Xenophon’s Memoirs; and it is
said that a bookseller accordingly pointed him to CRATES of Thebes[28],
the pupil and (it would seem) the successor of Diogenes as acknowledged
head of the Cynic school.


[Sidenote: Zeno joins the Cynics.]

=74.= Our authorities busy themselves chiefly with narrating the
eccentricities of Crates, who wore warm clothing in summer and rags in
winter, entered the theatre as the audience were coming out, and drank
water instead of wine. But doubtless, like his predecessors in the Cynic
school, he was a man of the true Socratic character, who had trained
himself to bear hunger and thirst, heat and cold, flattery and abuse.
His life and wisdom won him the love of the high-born Hipparchia, who
turned from her wealthy and noble suitors, choosing instead the poverty
of Crates, who had abandoned all his possessions. In his company she went
from house to house, knocking at all doors in turn, sometimes admonishing
the inmates of their sins, sometimes sharing with them their meals[29].
In such a life Zeno recognised the forcefulness of Socrates, and in the
dogmas of the Cynic school he reached the foundation on which that life
was built. From that foundation neither Zeno nor his true followers ever
departed, and thus Stoicism embodied and spread the fundamental dogmas of
Cynism, that the individual alone is really existent, that virtue is the
supreme good, and that the wise man, though a beggar, is truly a king.


[Sidenote: Zeno’s Republic.]

=75.= Whilst still an adherent of the Cynic school[30], Zeno wrote his
Πολιτεία or _Republic_, which is evidently an attack on Plato’s work
with the same title[31]. If this work does not reveal to us the fully
developed philosopher, it at least shews us better than any other
evidence what the man Zeno was. His ideal was the establishment of a
perfect State, a completion of the work in which Alexander had failed;
and he found a starting-point in a treatise by Antisthenes on the same
subject. The ideal State must embrace the whole world, so that a man no
longer says, ‘I am of Athens,’ or ‘of Sidon,’ but ‘I am a citizen of the
world[32].’ Its laws must be those which are prescribed by nature, not
by convention. It will have no images or temples, for these are unworthy
of the nature of the deity; no sacrifices, because he cannot be pleased
by costly gifts; no law-courts, for its citizens will do one another
no harm; no statues, for the virtues of its inhabitants will be its
adornment[33]; no gymnasia, for its youth must not waste their time in
idle exercises[34].

The people will not be divided into classes (and here Plato’s _Republic_
is contradicted), for all alike will be wise men[35]; nor will men and
women be clothed differently, or shamefacedly hide any part of their
bodies[36]. No man will speak of a woman as his property, for women will
belong to the community only[37]. As for the dead, men will not trouble
whether they bury them (as the Greeks), burn them (as the Indians), or
give them to the birds (as the Persians); for it matters not at all what
happens to men’s dead bodies[38], but whether their souls shall reach
the abodes of the blest, or need hereafter to be purged by fire from
the foulness they have contracted through contact with the body[39]. To
conclude, Love shall be master throughout the State, being as it were a
God cooperating for the good of the whole[40]; and the wise man shall be
a citizen in it, not a missionary, and shall be surrounded with wife and
children[41].


[Sidenote: Zeno seeks knowledge.]

=76.= Zeno, after writing his _Republic_, took up a position more
independent of the Cynics. He could not, perhaps, avoid noticing that
the coming of his model Kingdom was hindered by the narrowmindedness of
the philosophers, their disagreement one with another, and their lack
of clear proofs for their dogmas. He began to realize that the study of
dialectics and physics was of more importance than his Cynic teachers
would allow; and he seems to have conceived the idea of uniting the
Socratic schools. He became eager to learn from all sources, and turned
first to Stilpo, who then represented the Megarian school[42]. Crates,
we are told, tried to drag him back from Stilpo by force; to which Zeno
retorted that argument would be more to the point[43]. From this time he
no longer restricted his outlook to force of character, but sought also
for argumentative power and well ascertained knowledge. The foundations
of his state must be surely laid, not upon the changing tide of opinion,
but on the rock of knowledge. That a wise man should hesitate, change his
views, withdraw his advice, he felt would be a bitter reproach[44]. If
indeed virtue, the supreme good, is knowledge, must it not follow that
knowledge is within the reach of man?


[Sidenote: Zeno’s theory of knowledge.]

=77.= The chief cause of error, Zeno found, lay in hasty assertion; and
this he held was a fault not so much of the intellect as of the will. In
the simplest case the senses present to the mind a ‘picture’ (φαντασία,
_visum_), carrying with it the suggestion of a statement (e.g. ‘that is a
horse’). But it is for the man to consider well whether this suggestion
is true, and only to give his ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις, _adsensus_) when
he is so assured. Assent is an act of the will, and therefore in our
power. Of a picture to which he has given his assent the wise man should
retain a firm hold; it then becomes an item of ‘comprehension’ (φαντασία
καταληπτική, _comprehensio_), and may be stored in the memory, thus
preparing the way for further acquisitions of knowledge, which in the end
combine in ‘scientific knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη, _scientia_).

This theory is little more than an exhortation against the prevailing
error of hasty thought (δόξα, _opinio_); but it made a very deep
impression, especially as enforced by Zeno’s gestures. He stretched out
his fingers and shewed the open palm, saying ‘Such is a picture.’ He
partially contracted his fingers, and said ‘This is assent.’ Making a
closed fist, he said ‘This is comprehension.’ Then closing in the left
hand over the right he pressed his fist tight, and said ‘This is science,
and only the wise man can attain to it[45].’

We have no reason to suppose that this theory was in any way suggested
by Stilpo, from whom however Zeno probably learnt to attach importance
to the formal part of reasoning, such as ‘definition’ and the use of the
syllogism. With Stilpo he shared an aversion to the Platonic theory of
ideas, maintaining that ideas are by no means realities but have only
a ‘kind of existence’ in our minds, or (as we should call it to-day) a
‘subjective existence[46].’


[Sidenote: Zeno studies under Polemo.]

=78.= In becoming in turn a listener to Polemo, Zeno, we may imagine,
entered a new world. He left behind the rough manners, the stinging
retorts, and the narrow culture of the Cynics and Eristics[47], to sit
with other intelligent students[48] at the feet of a man of cultured
manners[49] and wide reading, who to a love for Homer and Sophocles[50]
had, we must suppose, added an intimate knowledge of the works of Plato
and Aristotle, was himself a great writer[51], and yet consistently
taught that not learning, but a natural and healthy life was the end to
be attained. That Zeno profited much from his studies under Polemo we may
conjecture from Polemo’s good-natured complaint, ‘I see well what you are
after: you break down my garden wall and steal my teaching, which you
dress in Phoenician clothes[52].’ From this time it became a conventional
complaint that Stoic doctrine was stolen from that of the Academics: yet
the sharp conflict between the two schools shews that this cannot apply
to essentials. But in two important matters at least Zeno must have been
indebted to Academic teaching. This school had elaborated the doctrine
of Anaxagoras, which so attracted Socrates, that the world began with
the working of mind upon unordered matter. So too, according to all our
authorities, Zeno taught that there are two beginnings, the active which
is identified with the deity or Logos, and the passive which is inert
matter, or substance without quality[53]. This doctrine appears to pledge
Zeno to a dualistic view of the universe.


[Sidenote: ‘Soul is body.’]

=79.= On the other hand the Platonic teaching on the soul was reversed
by Zeno. He denied the opposition between soul and body. ‘Soul is
Breath[54],’ he taught, and ‘soul is body[55].’ With Plato’s threefold
division of the soul he would have nothing to do; rather he maintained
that the soul has eight parts[56], each displaying itself in a distinct
power or capacity, whilst all of them are qualities or operations of
one soul in various relations[57]. In this part of his philosophy Zeno
appears as a strong monist, and his debt to the Platonists is necessarily
restricted to details.


[Sidenote: Zeno studies Heraclitus.]

=80.= It would seem then that Zeno after seeking for philosophic safety
for some twenty years in one harbour after another had so far made
shipwreck. But from this shipwreck of his intellectual hopes he could
afterwards count the beginning of a fair voyage[58]. As he eagerly
discussed with his younger fellow-student Arcesilaus the teaching of
their master Polemon, he took courage to point out its weak points[59],
and began to quote in his own defence not only his previous teachers
Crates and Stilpo, but also the works of Heraclitus[60]. He thus
broke down the barrier which Socrates had set up against the Ionic
philosophers. From Heraclitus Zeno drew two doctrines of first-rate
importance; the first, that of the eternal fire[61] and its mutation into
the elements in turn[62]; the second (already referred to) that of the
_Logos_[63]. It is evident that the Heraclitean doctrine of fire breaks
down the distinction between God and the world, active and passive, soul
and body; and is therefore inconsistent with the dualism which Zeno had
partly borrowed from Plato. It is not clear whether Zeno attained to
clearness on this point; but in the general teaching of the Stoics the
monistic doctrine prevailed[64]. Hence God is not separate from body,
but is himself body in its purest form[65]. The _Logos_ or divine reason
is the power which pervades and gives shape to the universe[66]; and
this Logos is identical with the deity, that is with the primitive and
creative Fire[67]. The Logos (ὀρθὸς λόγος, _vera ratio_) brings into
harmony the parts of philosophy; for it is also on the one hand the guide
to right reasoning[68]; on the other hand the law which prescribes what
is right for the State and for the individual[69].


[Sidenote: Zeno opens his school.]

=81.= When Zeno definitely accepted the teaching of Heraclitus, he felt
bound to break finally with the school of Polemo, and he founded soon
after 300 B.C. a school of his own, which was rapidly crowded. His
followers were at first called Zenonians, but afterwards Stoics, from the
‘picture porch’ (so called because it was decorated with paintings by
Polygnotus) in which he delivered his lectures. He now applied himself
afresh to the problem of ethics. Whilst still adhering to the Cynic views
that ‘virtue is the only good,’ and that ‘example is more potent than
precept,’ he entirely rejected the intuitional basis which the Cynics
had accepted, deciding in favour of the claims of reason. He found his
ideal in ‘consistency’ (ὁμολογία, _convenientia_)[70]; as the Logos or
Word rules in the universe, so should it also in the individual. Those
who live by a single and harmonious principle possess divine favour and
an even flow of life[71]; those that follow conflicting practices are
ill-starred[72]. In this consistency there is found virtue, and (here
again he follows the Cynics) virtue is sufficient for happiness[73], and
has no need of any external support.


[Sidenote: His theory of virtue.]

=82.= But whilst the virtue of the Cynics is something detached and
self-contained, and is ‘natural’ only in the sense that it is not
determined by custom or authority, that of Zeno is bound up with the
whole scheme of the universe. For the universe puts before men certain
things, which though rightly named ‘indifferent’ by the Cynics, and
wrongly named ‘good’ by the Academics, have yet a certain value (ἀξία,
_aestimatio_), and are a natural goal for men’s actions[74]. Such are
health, prosperity, good name, and other things which the Academics named
‘things according to nature’ (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν). These Zeno took over, not
as a part of his theory of virtue, but as the basis of it[75]; and for
things having value introduced the term ‘of high degree’ (προηγμένα),
and for their opposites the term ‘of low degree’ (ἀποπροηγμένα), these
terms being borrowed from court life. Thus virtue alone is queen, and
all things naturally desired are subject to her command[76]. The end of
life is therefore to live consistently, keeping in view the aims set
before us by nature, or shortly, to live ‘consistently with nature.’ Our
authorities do not agree as to whether Zeno or Cleanthes was the first
to use this phrase[77]; but there can be no doubt that the doctrine is
that of Zeno, that it is a fundamental part of the Stoic system, and that
it was maintained unaltered by all orthodox Stoics. On the other hand
the Academics and Peripatetics ridiculed these new and barbarous terms
προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα, and their view has generally been supported
both in ancient and modern times[78]. We cannot however question the
right of Zeno to reserve a special term for that which is morally good;
he was in fact feeling his way towards the position, still imperfectly
recognized, that the language of common life is inadequate to the exact
expression of philosophic principles[79].


[Sidenote: Zeno’s syllogisms.]

=83.= In expounding his system Zeno made much use of the syllogism,
thereby laying the foundations of a new style of oratory, consisting
of short and pointed clauses, which became a characteristic of his
school[80]. He no doubt regarded this form as a sure method of attaining
truth; but even at the present day the principle that truth can only
be reached from facts and not from words is not everywhere admitted.
The syllogisms of Zeno have all their weak points, and as a rule the
term which is common to the major and minor premisses suffers a shift
of meaning. These syllogisms can no longer convince us, and even in
antiquity they were severely criticized. But they are excellent aids
to the memory, and so serve the same end as the catechisms of the
Reformation period. Amongst the syllogisms attributed to Zeno are
these: ‘That which has reason is better than that which has not reason;
but nothing is better than the universe; therefore the universe has
reason[81].’ ‘No one trusts a secret to a drunken man; but one trusts
a secret to a good man; therefore a good man will not be drunken[82].’
‘No evil is accompanied by glory; but death is accompanied by glory;
therefore death is no evil[83].’ Such syllogisms were embedded in the
numerous works of Zeno, of which many were certainly extant as late as
the time of Epictetus[84].


[Sidenote: Epicurus and Arcesilaus.]

=84.= At the very time when Zeno was elaborating the doctrines of the
Porch, another school of equal eminence was established at Athens by
EPICURUS (341-270 B.C.) in his Gardens. Epicurus combined the ethical
principle of the Cyrenaics, that pleasure is the end of life, with the
atomistic philosophy of Democritus; he had no respect for the study of
dialectic, but placed the criterion of truth in the observations of the
senses, leaving little room for the participation of mind or will. Thus
in every part of philosophy his teaching was opposed to that of Zeno,
and the two schools during their whole existence were in the sharpest
conflict. We may nevertheless notice some points of contact between them.
Both founded, or conceived that they founded their ethical doctrine upon
physical proofs; that is, both maintained that the end of life which they
put forward was that prescribed by natural law. As a consequence, they
agreed in removing the barrier which Socrates had set up against the
pursuit of natural science. Both again were positive teachers, or (in the
language of the ancients) propounders of dogmas; and here they came into
conflict with the Academic school, which maintained, and was soon about
to emphasize, the critical spirit of Socrates and Plato. For in the last
years of Zeno’s life his old fellow-pupil Arcesilaus became head of the
Academic school (270 B.C.), and at once directed his teaching against
Zeno’s theory of knowledge[85]. Following the practice of Socrates and
of Plato’s dialogues, he argued against every point of view presented,
and concluded that certain truth could not be known by man[86]. He
pressed Zeno closely as to his definition of ‘comprehension,’ and induced
him to add a clause which, in the opinion of his opponent, shewed the
worthlessness of the whole doctrine[87]. Thus was raised the question
of the κριτήριον or test of truth, which for at least a century to come
sharply divided the schools[88].


[Sidenote: Zeno at Athens.]

=85.= The conflict between these three schools, which from this time
on greatly surpassed all others in importance, did not embitter the
political life of Athens. The citizens watched with amusement the
competition of the schools for numbers and influence, and drew their
profit from the crowds of foreigners who were drawn to Athens by its
growing fame as a centre of adult education. To the heads of the schools
they were ready to pay every mark of respect. With Zeno they deposited
the keys of their gates, and they awarded him during his lifetime a gold
crown and a bronze statue. His fame spread abroad, and those of his
fellow-citizens of Citium who were then resident at Sidon claimed a share
in it. In his old age the high-minded Antigonus Gonatas (who occupied the
throne of Macedonia with varying fortune from 278 to 239 B.C.) looked to
him for advice and help. But no offers of public employment could draw
Zeno himself from his simple life and the young companions who surrounded
him: like Socrates, he thought that he could best serve the State by
sending out others to take part in its duties[89]. He died in the year
264 B.C.[90], having been engaged in teaching for more than 30 years from
the time when he ‘discovered the truth[91].’


[Sidenote: Honours paid to him.]

=86.= The vote which the Athenians passed in honour of Zeno, shortly
before his death, deserves record by its contrast with that by which
their predecessors had condemned Socrates. It ran somewhat as follows:

  ‘Whereas Zeno the son of Mnaseas from Citium has spent many
  years in this city in the pursuit of philosophy; and has been
  throughout a good man in all respects; and has encouraged the
  young men who resorted to him in virtue and temperance, and has
  sped them on the right path; and has made his own life an example
  to all men, for it has been consistent with the teaching he has
  set forth;

  Now it seems good to the people of Athens to commend Zeno the
  son of Mnaseas from Citium, and to crown him with a golden crown
  (in accordance with the law) for his virtue and temperance, and
  to build him a tomb on the Ceramicus at the public expense. And
  the people shall elect five Athenian citizens to provide for the
  making of the crown and the building of the tomb. And the town
  clerk shall engrave this vote on two pillars, and shall set up
  one in the Academy, and one in the Lyceum. And the treasurer
  shall make due allotment of the expense, that all men may see
  that the people of Athens honours good men both in their life
  time and after their death[92].’

We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of this tribute. It is true
that all the charges brought against Socrates hold even more forcibly
as against Zeno. But the spirit of political and religious independence
was now dead, and the advantage of the philosophical schools to the fame
and business interests of the city had become clearer; so that nothing
prevented any longer the open recognition of Zeno’s virtues and eminence.
Who will may also read in the decree a belated mark of respect to the
memory of Socrates.


[Sidenote: Zeno’s breadth of view.]

=87.= In this sketch of the life of Zeno no attempt has been made to
give a complete view of his philosophy; but a few landmarks have been
indicated, by which it may be possible to distinguish which parts of
it were his own, which were taken over from others, and how all were
gradually combined in one whole. Zeno had not the kind of originality
which begins by assuming a general principle, and then explains all
things human and divine by deductions from it. Instead of this he
gathered together (as Aristotle had done before, but with a very
different bias) what seemed most sound and illuminating in the teaching
of all the schools which surrounded him. He did this in a positive
spirit, feeling assured that truth exists and is discernible, and must be
consistent in all its parts. We seem unable to say that in his writings
he attained to this consistency, but at least he worked steadily towards
it. The effort for consistency led him in the direction of monistic
principle, though his points of departure both in physics and in ethics
are dualistic. But the teaching of Zeno does not lend itself to that kind
of study which assigns all new facts to compartments of thought ready
labelled in advance, nor can it be summarized by any of the technical
terms which are in use in modern philosophical thought. Enough has
perhaps been said to shew that, great as was the debt of Zeno to his
predecessors, he was no mere imitator or plagiarist; the history of the
following centuries will shew that he had in some sense touched the
pulses of human life more truly than any of his contemporaries.


FOOTNOTES

[1] Thucydides, _passim_.

[2] Mahaffy, _Greek Life and Thought_, ch. 1.

[3] ‘Plato combined the various elements, the, so to speak, prismatically
broken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, and richer unity’
Ueberweg, Eng. transl. i p. 89.

[4] ‘The philosophy of Greece reached its highest point in Plato and
Aristotle’ Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 11. ‘The bloom of Greek philosophy
was short lived’ _ib._ p. 10.

[5] The phrases ‘cum Platone errare,’ ‘amicus Plato, magis amica veritas’
agree in expressing the general incredulity with which Platonism was
received in the ancient world. In our own days an ill-balanced sympathy
for Platonic dogma is often a serious hindrance to philosophic progress.

[6] See further, § 284.

[7] See below, § 179.

[8] Aristotle, _Physics_, ii 7.

[9] See below, § 173.

[10] εἰ δ’ ἐν ζῴῳ τοῦτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, τί κωλύει τὸ αὐτὸ συμβῆναι καὶ
κατὰ τὸ πᾶν; εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ar. _Phys._
viii 2, 252 b.

[11] See Ueberweg’s note, i (Eng. trans., pp. 178-180; tenth German
edition, pp. 238-240), and below, § 362.

[12] ‘vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis [Peripateticis]
placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum; quae quia
deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima’ Cic. _Fin._ v
4, 11.

[13] See note 15, below.

[14] Clem. _Strom._ ii p. 419 a.

[15] ‘honeste autem vivere, fruentem rebus eis, quas primas homini natura
conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit (ut indicant scripta Polemonis), et
Aristoteles eiusque amici huc proxime videntur accedere’ Cic. _Ac._ ii
42, 131. Here Prof. J. S. Reid suggests that Polemo may merely have used
the phrase κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, as opposed to κατὰ θέσιν (conventionally).

[16] ‘quem [_sc._ Arcesilan] ferunt ... primum instituisse, non quid ipse
sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset,
disputare’ Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 67. ‘Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam
quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset’
_Ac._ i 12, 45.

[17] ‘[cuius] ratio probabilis possit reddi’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 17, 58. See
further below, §§ 105, 332.

[18] See especially §§ 113 and 123.

[19] Cic. _Fin._ iv 28, 79.

[20] ‘non dolere ... Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit’ _ib._ v 25, 73.

[21] ‘at vero Callipho, et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem
adamavisset, alter vacuitatem doloris: neuter honestate carere potuit,
quae est a nostris laudata maxime’ _ib._

[22] _ib._ 25, 75.

[23] _Off._ i 1, 1.

[24] ‘[Stoici] quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram a nobis, sed totam ad
se nostram philosophiam transtulerunt. atque, ut reliqui fures, earum
rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris
pro suis uterentur, nomina, tanquam rerum notas, mutaverunt’ _Fin._ v 25,
74.

[25] Ζήνωνα τὸν Φοίνικα, Athen. _Deipnos._ xiii 2; ‘tuus ille Poenulus,’
‘e Phoenicia profecti’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 20, 56.

[26] Diog. L. vii 31 and 32.

[27] ‘nuntiato naufragio Zeno noster, cum omnia sua audiret submersa:
iubet, inquit, me fortuna expeditius philosophari’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 14, 3.

[28] Diog. L. vii 3.

[29] Diog. L. vi 96 and 97.

[30] _ib._ vii 4.

[31] ἀντέγραψε πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν Plut. _Sto. rep._ 8, 2 (Arnim
i 260).

[32] This doctrine can be traced back to Diogenes and even to Socrates:
see below, § 303.

[33] τὰς πόλεις κοσμεῖν οὐκ ἀναθήμασιν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς τῶν οἰκούντων ἀρεταῖς
Stob. iv 1, 88.

[34] See below, § 305.

[35] παριστάντα πολίτας τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον Diog. L. vii 33.

[36] See below, § 318.

[37] § 306.

[38] § 307.

[39] §§ 296, 297.

[40] § 304.

[41] § 315.

[42] See above, § 56.

[43] He said ‘O Crates, the best handle of philosophers is that by the
ear; persuade me if you can, and lead me that way; if you use violence,
my body will stay with you, but my soul will be with Stilpo’ Diog. L. vii
24.

[44] ‘errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et
suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et constantis
adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque [Zeno] removebat’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 42.

[45] ‘hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. nam cum extensis digitis
adversam manum ostenderat, ‘visum,’ inquiebat, ‘huiusmodi est.’ deinde
cum paulum digitos contraxerat, ‘adsensus huiusmodi.’ tum cum plane
compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat;
cum autem laevam manum admoverat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque
compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat: cuius compotem nisi sapientem
esse neminem’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 145.

[46] See below, § 188.

[47] So the Megarians were commonly called on account of their
disputatious methods.

[48] As for instance Arcesilaus; Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, Ζήνωνος
τοῦ Κιτιέως συσχολαστὴς παρὰ Πολέμωνι Strabo xiii p. 614 (Arnim i 10).

[49] Diog. L. iv 18.

[50] _ib._ 20.

[51] _ib._

[52] Diog. L. vii 25.

[53] See below, § 189.

[54] See § 268, note 2.

[55] οἵ γε ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφοι καὶ πάντες ὅσοι σῶμα τὴν
ψυχὴν νοοῦσι Iamb. _de an._ (Stob. i 49, 33).

[56] Ζήνων ὁ Στωϊκὸς ὀκταμερῆ φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν Nemes. _nat. hom._ p.
96 (Arnim i 143).

[57] οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ὀκταμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν διαδοξάζουσι, περὶ [ἣν] τὰς
δυνάμεις εἶναι πλείονας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονίκῳ ἐνυπαρχουσῶν φαντασίας
συγκαταθέσεως ὁρμῆς λόγου Iamb. _de an._ (Arnim i 143). See below, § 270.

[58] τῶν προειρημένων ἤκουσεν ἕως ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν· ἵνα καί φασιν αὐτὸν
εἰπεῖν· νῦν εὐπλόηκα, ὅτε νεναυάγηκα Diog. L. vii 4. It must not however
be assumed that Zeno himself used the phrase in this sense: see the other
references in Arnim i 277.

[59] ‘iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas. Sed Zeno cum
Arcesilam anteiret aetate, valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute
moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam’ Cic. _Ac._ i 9, 34 and 35.

[60] ἐπεὶ συμφοιτῶντες παρὰ Πολέμωνι ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν ἀλλήλοις,
συμπαρέλαβον εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μάχην ὁ μὲν Ἡράκλειτον καὶ Στίλπωνα
ἅμα καὶ Κράτητα Euseb. _Praep. ev._ xiv 5, 11 (quoting Numenius) (Arnim i
11).

[61] Zeno often calls it _aether_: ‘Zenon ... aethera ... interim
vult omnium esse principium’ Min. Felix xix p. 58: Cleanthes calls it
_spirit_, see below, § 100. ‘The fire of Heraclitus becomes aether or πῦρ
τεχνικόν—for this distinction is unknown to the Ephesian—and is thereby
spiritualised and rarefied’ Pearson, _Fragments_, Intr. pp. 22, 23.

[62] See below, § 196.

[63] See above, § 39.

[64] Stein, _Psychologie_, i 62 sqq.

[65] Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων ὑπέθεντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων,
σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον Hippolyt. _Philos._ 21, 1 (Arnim i 153).

[66] ‘rationem quandam per naturam omnem rerum pertinentem vi divina esse
affectam putat’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.

[67] ‘Zeno [deum nuncupat] naturalem divinamque legem’ Lact. _Div. inst._
i 5, 20.

[68] ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωϊκῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον
ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου φησί Diog. L. vii 54
(quoting Diocles Magnes). It is much disputed who the authorities are to
which Posidonius here refers.

[69] ‘Zeno naturalem legem divinam esse censet eamque vim obtinere recta
imperantem prohibentemque contraria’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.

[70] τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε, τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν·
τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων
κακοδαιμονούντων Stob. ii 7, 6 a. ‘summum bonum, quod cum positum sit in
eo, quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam’ Cic. _Fin._ iii
6, 21.

[71] εὐδαιμονία δ’ ἐστὶν εὔροια βίου Stob. ii 7, 6 e.

[72] See note 70 above.

[73] See below, § 322.

[74] For a fuller treatment see below, §§ 319-321.

[75] οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτοις (sc. Peripateticis) ἠκολούθησεν ὑποτιθέμενοις
στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; Plut. _comm. not._
23, 1; ‘[a Polemone] quae essent principia naturae acceperat’ Cic. _Fin._
iv 16, 45.

[76] τὰ μὲν [οὖν] πολλὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν προηγμένα λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πολλὴν
ἀπαξίαν ἀποπροηγμένα, Ζήνωνος ταύτας τὰς ὀνομασίας θεμένου πρώτου τοῖς
πράγμασι Stob. ii 7, 7 g; see also below, § 320.

[77] Diogenes Laertius says distinctly that Zeno used the phrase, and
names the book in which he found it; Diog. L. vii 87. On the other hand
Stobaeus (ii 7, 6 a) attributes it to Cleanthes.

[78] ‘Zeno Citieus, advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex’ Cic.
_Tusc._ v 12, 34.

[79] See below, § 165.

[80] ‘illa vetus Zenonis brevis, et ut tibi videbatur, acuta conclusio’
Cic. _N. D._ iii 9, 22.

[81] τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου
κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος Sext. _math._ ix 104 (Arnim i 111);
see also below, § 202.

[82] ‘ebrio secretum sermonem nemo committit; viro autem bono committit;
ergo vir bonus ebrius non erit’ Sen. _Ep._ 83, 9; for the original see
Arnim i 229.

[83] ‘nullum malum gloriosum est; mors autem gloriosa est; mors ergo non
est malum’ Sen. _Ep._ 82, 9.

[84] ‘If you would know, read Zeno’s writings, and you will see’ Epict.
_Disc._ i 20, 14.

[85] ‘cum Zenone, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit’
Cic. _Ac._ i 12, 44.

[86] ‘Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque
Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut
animo percipi possit’ Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 67.

[87] ‘hic Zenonem vidisse acute, nullum esse visum quod percipi posset,
si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non est,
posset esse. recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum [sc.
quale non possit esse a falso]. incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut
doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso
posset esse’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 24, 77.

[88] See below, § 157.

[89] ‘compositus sequor Zenona Cleanthen Chrysippum, quorum tamen nemo ad
rempublicam accessit, et nemo non misit’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 1, 10; see also
viii 6, 4.

[90] Pearson, _Introd._ p. 1.

[91] προσεμαρτύρησ[εν ἑαυτῷ] τὴν εὕρεσιν τῆς ἀληθείας Sext. _math._ vii
321. Pearson, _Introd._ p. 4.

[92] Diog. L. vii 10 and 11.



CHAPTER IV.

THE PREACHING OF STOICISM.


[Sidenote: The companions of Zeno.]

=88.= During the later years of his life Zeno gathered round him a number
of men of practical and speculative capacity, not unworthy of comparison
with the companions of Socrates. His death dissolved the immediate
tie between them. Some took an active part in the work of government;
others followed their teacher’s example, and became the founders of
independent schools of thought; a few devoted themselves to strengthening
and extending Zeno’s system; and many were doubtless engaged in useful
employment of which no record has reached us. Zeno’s work had not yet
been exposed to the test of time, and another century was to pass before
it could be seen that the Stoic school was to be of permanent importance.
Towards the schools of the Cynics, the Megarians, and the Academics,
from which its principles were so largely derived, the attitude of
the hearers of Zeno was that of a friendly interchange of opinions,
in which sharp controversy stopped short of enmity; the followers of
Aristotle (the Peripatetics) continued to be but slightly distinguished
from the Academics. But all these schools appear to have united in
opposition to the Cyrenaics and Epicureans; the champions of virtue
could hold no communings with the advocates of pleasure. Individual
teachers who practically reverted to Cynic or Academic teaching still
called themselves Stoics: but the only one of Zeno’s hearers who adopted
Cyrenaic views was contemptuously branded as ‘the deserter[1].’


[Sidenote: Persaeus.]

=89.= The most intimate companion[2] of Zeno was PERSAEUS of Citium
(circ. 300-243 B.C.). He was the fellow-townsman of Zeno, and, as good
authorities assert, at first his personal servant (οἰκέτης)[3] and
afterwards his fellow-lodger. On the recommendation of Zeno he took
service, together with Aratus the poet, with Antigonus Gonatas, king of
Macedonia[4]. Here he was often twitted as to the Stoic paradoxes. King
Antigonus sent him messengers announcing the loss of his wife, child,
and property, and found that he was not entirely indifferent to external
circumstances[5]. He adapted himself easily to court life, and is said to
have written a treatise on the theory of the banquet, in which he did not
rise above the moral standard of his neighbours[6]. Nor did he disdain
to hoax Aristo of Chius, who held strongly to the paradox that ‘the wise
man never opines’; he first sent him money by one of two twins, and
then sent another to demand it back[7]. Another Socratic paradox, that
‘the wise man is sure to be a good general,’ he endeavoured to maintain
by his personal example[8]. Antigonus placed him in command of the
acropolis at Corinth, which was nevertheless taken by Aratus of Sicyon in
243 B.C. According to one account, Persaeus was wounded in the attack,
and afterwards put to death by the conqueror[9]; others relate that he
escaped to Cenchreae[10]. As a philosopher he is of little importance;
but Cicero mentions that he not only maintained that amongst the gods
were men raised to the sky for their services to mankind (which was an
accepted Stoic doctrine), but also that objects useful to man had been
deified[11].


[Sidenote: Aratus.]

=90.= Two other companions of Zeno also took service under Antigonus,
apparently at the same time. Of these PHILONIDES of Thebes[12] is
otherwise unknown to us. The other was ARATUS of Soli in Cilicia, author
of the well-known poem _The Phaenomena_, an astronomical treatise
afterwards translated into Latin by Cicero, and largely used by Virgil
in his _Georgics_. The poems of Aratus had a wide influence, and were
probably the source from which so many Stoic conceptions reached Virgil.
The most interesting part for us is the Introduction, in which he
interprets Zeus in Stoic fashion as the deity who dwells in sea and land,
in markets and streets: whose family is mankind; and whose providence has
set the stars in the heaven to regulate the seasons of the year and to
be a guide to the farmer and the sailor[13]. The spirit of this poem is
closely akin to that of the hymn of Cleanthes.


[Sidenote: Sphaerus.]

=91.= Still another hearer of Zeno took a prominent part in political
life. SPHAERUS from the Bosphorus (circ. 250 B.C.) was attracted to
Cleomenes III, king of Sparta, who under his influence reintroduced the
laws of Lycurgus in his city, and particularly those which referred to
the education of the youth and the taking of meals in common[14]. With
these he combined the plan of a monarchy after the Stoic model, in which
the sovereign was to side with the poor against the rich[15]. But in 221
B.C. Cleomenes suffered a crushing defeat, and was compelled to take
refuge with Ptolemy III (Euergetes), king of Egypt. Sphaerus found his
way to the same court. The death of Ptolemy III left Cleomenes in the
position of a disregarded suppliant[16]; but Sphaerus appears to have
found a congenial home in Alexandria, now the centre of Hellenistic
learning, and doubtless introduced the Stoic philosophy in the circle
that gathered round the Museum[17]. He gained a special reputation by the
excellence of his definitions[18]. From an anecdote related of him we
must infer that whilst adhering to Zeno’s doctrine that the wise man will
not opine, he accepted reasonable assurance (τὸ εὔλογον) as a sufficient
guide in daily life[19]. He appears to have laid special stress upon
the unity of virtue, maintaining that the separate virtues are but
appearances of virtue or knowledge in different spheres of action[20].


[Sidenote: Herillus.]

=92.= HERILLUS of Carthage (circ. 250 B.C.) is frequently referred to
by Cicero as teaching doctrines hardly distinguishable from those of
the Academy, in that he made knowledge the highest good[21], and taught
that separate from it, yet with claims of their own, there existed
inferior ends of action (ὑποτελίδες)[22]. It does not, however, appear
clearly that he differed much from Zeno. Sphaerus, as we have seen, had
defined the virtues as being ‘knowledge displayed in different spheres of
action,’ and the aim of Herillus, ‘to live according to the standard of
life accompanied by knowledge[23],’ points in the direction of practical
rather than of speculative wisdom. His ‘subordinate aims’ appear also
to correspond with Zeno’s ‘things of high degree’ (προηγμένα), and are
defined as being the first states to which an animal is attracted upon
birth, as food, life, strength (πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν)[24]; they serve only
for ‘ends’ (τέλη) for men who have not yet attained to wisdom[25]. This
doctrine corresponds closely to the Stoic doctrine as developed somewhat
later[26].


[Sidenote: Aristo.]

=93.= ARISTO of Chios (circ. 250 B.C.) departed more decidedly from
Zeno’s teaching, falling back generally on Cynic views. He was no
favourite of Zeno, who called him a chatterbox[27]: and in later life
he was accused of becoming a flatterer of Persaeus when the latter was
in power[28], and of luxury in his personal habits[29]. But his success
as a teacher was great, and he formed a body of followers who called
themselves Aristonians.

He appears to have supported Zeno vigorously as to the doctrine of
‘comprehension’; and if on this subject he was worsted for the moment
by Persaeus[30], he retaliated on some Academic by asking: ‘do you see
who is sitting next you?’ The Academic replied ‘I do not.’ ‘Are you
blind, then,’ said Aristo; ‘where are your eyes[31]?’ Still he considered
any systematic study of dialectics to be a mere waste of time; like
spiders’ webs, which seem to display much skill, but are of no use[32].
With regard to physics he was openly agnostic[33]; of the nature of the
gods he thought we could know nothing, not even whether the deity were
animate or no[34]. Ethics alone remained; but this part of philosophy he
reduced by omitting all practical precepts, as introducing the element
of uncertainty[35]. In ethics proper he rejects the theory of ‘things of
high degree’ (προηγμένα), observing that this term does not harmonize
with the treatment of advantages as ‘indifferent,’ but comes dangerously
near to calling them ‘good[36].’ Virtue, or rather knowledge, is, as he
maintains, the only good; and all that lies between good and evil is
alike indifferent[37]. The highest good may therefore be defined as a
state of indifference (ἀδιαφορία) towards all such things[38].

Aristo was however once more in agreement with Stoic doctrine when he
maintained the unity of virtue. ‘The soul,’ he said, ‘has one power only,
that of reasoning; one virtue only, the knowledge of good and evil. When
we need to choose the good and avoid the evil, we call this knowledge
Soberness; when we need to do good and not evil, we call it Wisdom;
Courage, when it is bold and cautious at the right moments; and when it
gives every man his due, Justice[39].’ But in deciding his action the
wise man will be bound by no theories: he can do whatever comes into
his head, provided only he keep himself free from distress, fear and
greed[40].

The popularity of these views was repressed by the activity of
Chrysippus; in Cicero’s time they were, in cultivated society,
extinct[41]. But from the numerous references to Aristo in literature
it is clear that his teaching was by no means forgotten; and when there
took place the revival of the Cynic tone which we see illustrated in the
writings of Epictetus and M. Aurelius, Aristo is again treated with high
respect[42].


[Sidenote: Eratosthenes.]

=94.= An eminent pupil of Aristo was ERATOSTHENES of Cyrene, the
grammarian, whom he won over from the Cyrenaic school. Eratosthenes
undoubtedly represented the spirit of his teacher and of the Cynic
school towards which he inclined, when he vehemently repudiated the
prejudice which then divided mankind into Hellenes and barbarians[43].
He was invited by Ptolemy III (Euergetes) to be chief librarian of the
Museum at Alexandria, and tutor to the crown-prince, and has left us an
epigram in honour of this great patron of learning and philosophy[44].
Amongst other followers of Aristo we hear specially of APOLLOPHANES of
Antiochia[45].


[Sidenote: Dionysius.]

=95.= Alone amongst the hearers of Zeno DIONYSIUS of Heraclea abandoned
his principles, and went over from the camp of virtue to that of
pleasure. A painful disease of the eyes had made him abandon the doctrine
that ‘pain is no evil[46].’ His secession was used by Antiochus as an
argument against the doctrine of comprehension or certain knowledge[47].
That his life after he became a Cyrenaic was openly scandalous[48]
we need not too readily believe: such accusations may easily be mere
deductions from his supposed philosophic principles. Dionysius appears to
have been a particular friend and admirer of the poet Aratus[49].

Of the less important hearers of Zeno we have the names of, amongst
others, ATHENODORUS of Soli[50], CALLIPPUS of Corinth[50], POSIDONIUS
of Alexandria[50], and ZENO of Sidon[50]. The last, if he existed, must
be kept distinct from other Zenos, such as Zeno of Tarsus the pupil of
Chrysippus, and Zeno of Sidon the Epicurean philosopher.


[Sidenote: Cleanthes.]

=96.= We come last amongst Zeno’s hearers to CLEANTHES of Assos in Asia
Minor (331-232 B.C.), who succeeded Zeno as head of the school when
already advanced in years, and presided over it for a whole generation.
In personal character he was a worthy successor of Socrates, Diogenes,
and Zeno. He was trained in hardship and willing endurance[51]; and if he
did not quickly understand, yet all he learnt was deeply impressed upon
him[52]. He studied Zeno’s life even more attentively than his doctrines;
lived with him, watched his hours of retirement, inquired whether his
actions corresponded to his teaching[53]. Himself a man of the people, he
ardently desired to spread his convictions amongst the many, and chose
verse as the best means to express clearly his meaning and win access
to men’s ears[54]. He remained constant to Zeno’s teaching[55], but he
inspired it with a fresh enthusiasm and developed it in more consistent
detail. He is before all things the theologian of Stoicism. The belief
in the deity, which in the fragments of Zeno’s teaching appears merely
formal and argumentative, becomes in the verse of Cleanthes ardent and
dominating. God is the creator and the director of the world; his Logos
gives it order and harmony. In God’s designs it is the privilege and duty
of man to cooperate; but since he is possessed of free will, it is also
within his power to make a futile opposition. In this way the good and
the bad stand in definite contrast. Finally, right knowledge and right
action are only possible by association with the deity through praise and
prayer.


[Sidenote: His poetry.]

=97.= It is our good fortune to possess several complete poems of
Cleanthes, which are of more value to us towards appreciating his
standpoint than a hundred detached sentences would be. The _hymn to
Zeus_[56] is the most important, and its likeness to the opening of
Aratus’ _Phaenomena_[57] will not escape notice.

  _Hymn to Zeus._

  Supreme of gods, by titles manifold
  Invoked, o thou who over all dost hold
    Eternal dominance, Nature’s author, Zeus,
  Guiding a universe by Law controlled;                         2

  Hail! for ’tis meet that men should call on thee
  Whose seed we are; and ours the destiny
    Alone of all that lives and moves on earth,
  A mirror of thy deity[58] to be.                              5

  Therefore I hymn thee and thy power I praise;
  For at thy word, on their appointed ways
    The orbs of heaven in circuit round the earth
  Move, and submissive each thy rule obeys,                     8

  Who holdest in thy hands invincible
  So dread a minister to work thy will—
    The eternal bolt of fire, two-edged, whose blast
  Thro’ all the powers of nature strikes a chill[59]—          11

  Whereby thou guid’st the universal force,
  Reason, through all things interfused, whose course
    Commingles with the great and lesser[60] lights—
  Thyself of all the sovran and the source:                    14

  For nought is done on earth apart from thee,
  Nor in thy vault of heaven, nor in the sea;
    Save for the reckless deeds of sinful men
  Whose own hearts lead them to perversity.                    17

  But skill to make the crookèd straight is thine,
  To turn disorder to a fair design;
    Ungracious things are gracious in thy sight,
  For ill and good thy power doth so combine                   20

  That out of all appears in unity
  Eternal Reason, which the wicked flee
    And disregard, who long for happiness,
  Yet God’s great Law can neither hear nor see;                24

  Ill-fated folk! for would they but obey
  With understanding heart, from day to day
    Their life were full of blessing, but they turn
  Each to his sin, by folly led astray.                        26

  Glory would some thro’ bitter strife attain
  And some are eager after lawless gain;
    Some lust for sensual delights, but each
  Finds that too soon his pleasure turns to pain.              31

  But, Zeus all-bountiful! the thunder-flame
  And the dark cloud thy majesty proclaim:
    From ignorance deliver us, that leads
  The sons of men to sorrow and to shame.                      33

  Wherefore dispel it, Father, from the soul
  And grant that Wisdom may our life control,
    Wisdom which teaches thee to guide the world
  Upon the path of justice to its goal.                        35

  So winning honour thee shall we requite
  With honour, lauding still thy works of might;
    Since gods nor men find worthier meed than this—
  The universal Law to praise aright.                          39

                                            _Translated by W. H. Porter._


=98.= Another short poem of Cleanthes identifies Zeus with fate, and
points the same moral as to human duty:

  Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny,
  What way soe’er ye have appointed me!
  I follow unafraid: yea, though the will
  Turn recreant, I needs must follow still[61].

In other poems characteristic Stoic doctrines are set forth with
clearness and emphasis:

  ‘Look not at common opinion, and be not eager to be wise of a
  sudden; fear not the chatter of the many, in which there is no
  judgment and no modesty; for the crowd does not possess shrewd
  just and fair judgment, but amongst the few you may perchance
  find this[62].’

  ‘Do you ask me of what kind the good is? Listen then. It is
  orderly, just, innocent, pious, self-controlled, useful, fair,
  necessary, severe, upright, always of advantage; fearless,
  painless, profitable, without smart; helpful, pleasing, sure,
  friendly, honourable, consistent; noble, not puffed up,
  painstaking, comforting, full of energy, biding its time,
  blameless, unchanging[63].’

  ‘He who abstains from some disgraceful action yet all the
  while has desire for it, will some day do it, when he gets
  opportunity[64].’

In the last of the passages we are introduced to an ethical paradox of
the highest importance to Stoicism: that good and evil are set in the
will and the intention, and are not dependent upon the action[65].


[Sidenote: Originality of Cleanthes.]

=99.= To the ancients Cleanthes was the faithful disciple of Zeno.
Persaeus, Aratus, and others had turned aside from the direct pursuit
of philosophy, and their contact with science and politics might easily
sully the purity of their philosophic creed. Herillus had adopted
Academic doctrine, Aristo had fallen back into Cynism, Dionysius
had actually seceded to the party of pleasure. It might seem that
the far-reaching sweep of Zeno’s intellect had no real hold on his
companions. But Cleanthes at least stood firm by the old landmarks. We
must not suppose from this that he was a man of no originality[66]; his
language and his style at least are his own. Nor on the other hand can we
go all the way with some recent writers, who attribute to him exclusively
large parts of the Stoic system[67]. Our authorities commonly refer
either to Zeno alone, or to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus jointly,
as vouching for accepted Stoic doctrine; and we are hardly entitled
to lay great stress on the comparatively few fragments of which the
authorship is assigned exclusively to Cleanthes, as evidence for the
independence of his teaching; especially as we can in many instances
see that our authorities delight in attributing a difference of meaning
to the Stoic masters, when in reality there is nothing more to be found
than a difference of phrasing[68]. It is however clear that Stoicism did
not assume its complete form in the hands of its first propagator; and
to a limited extent we can see the directions in which his teaching was
amplified by his successors.


[Sidenote: Physics of Cleanthes.]

=100.= Cleanthes took a special interest in the physical speculations
of Heraclitus, on whose writings he composed four books[69], and in
particular in the bearing of his speculations upon the nature of the
deity. The belief in the dualism of God and matter, of the Word and the
world, is attributed to Cleanthes as distinctly as to Zeno[70]; but
on the other hand the conception of an overruling unity is much more
pronounced in the later writer[71]. Hence from the first Cleanthes
endeavours to give a wider meaning to the primary fire of Heraclitus, the
creative fire of Zeno. For this fire he proposed the new term ‘flame’
(φλόξ)[72]; at other times he identified it with the sky[73], with the
sun[74], and with the principle of heat[75]; and finally adopted the
term ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα, _spiritus_), which has ever since held its place
in the discussion of natural theology. This term appears to have been at
first intended to combine the conceptions of the creative fire and of
the Logos[76], but it gradually came to have distinctive associations
of its own. Like fire, ‘spirit’ is to the Stoics a substance, stuff,
or body akin to the element of air, but associated with warmth and
elasticity; it is conceived as immanent in the universe and penetrating
it as the deity; immanent in the human body and penetrating it as the
soul[77]. The elasticity of spirit is measured by its ‘tension’ (τόνος,
_intentio_), by means of which its creative power pushes forward from the
centre to the circumference: as for instance in the human body walking is
effected by ‘spirit exercising tension towards the feet[78].’ The theory
of ‘tension’ has an immediate application to ethics. When the soul has
sufficient tension to perform its proper work, it operates according to
the virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness; but when the
tension is relaxed, the soul becomes disordered and is seized upon by the
emotions[79].


[Sidenote: Theology of Cleanthes.]

=101.= To Cleanthes also it fell to explain more fully the government
both of the universe and of the individual. Zeno indeed is said to have
used the term ἡγεμονικόν (_principale_, _principatus_)[80], which we
may translate by ‘ruling power,’ or shortly (following the Latin) by
‘principate[81],’ for the highest power of the human soul; Cleanthes
sought a similar principle in the universe also, and is said to have
found it in the sun[82]. By thus using the term in a double sense
he implies the analogy which is expressed by the correlative terms
‘macrocosm’ and ‘microcosm,’ and which leads up to the definition of
God as the ‘soul of the universe[83].’ Cleanthes further speaks of the
universe itself as god[84]; but before describing him as a pantheist it
is well to consider that this is only one form out of many in which he
expresses his creed. He was also the first to give the four proofs of the
existence of the deity upon which all discussions of the ‘evidences of
Natural Religion’ have been based down to the present day, and which we
shall further discuss in a later chapter[85].

The pious zeal of Cleanthes was not without a touch of bigotry, destined
to have serious consequences in the final developments of Stoicism, and
to reappear in the history of the middle ages with distressing intensity;
he was bitterly opposed to the novel heliocentric theory of the universe
as an impiety[86].


[Sidenote: Weakness of Stoicism.]

=102.= Thus even though we can no longer discriminate sharply between the
teaching of Zeno and that of Cleanthes, we have every reason to suppose
that the latter was possessed of originality of thought and vigour and
copiousness of expression. We cannot easily believe that a man of such
powers failed to attract hearers or to retain a hold upon them. But in
his extreme old age it seems that the majority were drawn aside either
to the ingenious arguments of Arcesilaus the Academic, or to the more
independent teaching of Aristo of Chios. The continued existence of
Stoicism seemed threatened; its critics were not to be contented with
rhetoric or poetry, but insistently demanded proofs. In this crisis it
was saved and established by a younger man, CHRYSIPPUS of Soli (280-206
B.C.), who was far inferior in original power, but equally zealous and
more in harmony with the tastes and demands of the younger generation.


[Sidenote: Chrysippus.]

=103.= Chrysippus was a fellow-townsman of Aratus of Soli, and his
appearance is doubtless a sign of the active interest in philosophy which
for some centuries marks the neighbourhood of the important town of
Tarsus. Born in 280 B.C. he found in his early manhood three prominent
teachers at Athens, Arcesilaus, Aristo, and Cleanthes. Of these Aristo
seems to have been the most popular, and surprise was expressed that
Chrysippus did not join his school. ‘Had I followed the many,’ he
replied, ‘I should not have become a philosopher[87].’ His convictions
drew him to Cleanthes, but he felt much impatience with his methods.
This state of mind he must have expressed freely, for in after life
he reproached himself that he had not behaved more kindly towards his
teacher in his old age[88]. Confident in his own powers, he desired to
relieve Cleanthes of the burden of replying to the many attacks made
upon his doctrines, especially as to dialectics[89]. It is well known
that he asked his master to supply him with his dogmas only, saying that
he himself would find the proofs[90]. Chrysippus probably outlived his
opponents, and during the time when he was head of the school (232-206
B.C.) only found himself opposed by men of mediocre talents. He devoted
his whole energies to strengthening and systematizing Stoic doctrine.
He not only gave its proofs, but used every art of the dialectician to
recommend it to his hearers[91]. From his facile pen there poured an
endless stream of writings, not remarkable either for originality or for
style, but of the highest importance as fixing definitely the standard
of Stoic orthodoxy. He gathered numerous hearers round him, and before
his death it could truly be said that he had saved the Stoa[92].


[Sidenote: Dialectic of Chrysippus.]

=104.= In his method of exposition Chrysippus made great use of the
syllogism, thus reverting to the practice of Zeno as opposed to the
more poetical style of Cleanthes. As to the value of this syllogistic
reasoning very contrary opinions were expressed in antiquity. By
his contemporaries he was greatly admired, so that it was said that
‘if the gods had needed a dialectic, they would have taken that of
Chrysippus[93].’ On the other hand members of his own school complained
that he often stated his opponents’ case more forcibly than his own[94].
The Romans mix their praise with censure, and find that he sometimes
entangles himself in the threads of his own argument[95]; and we
ourselves cannot fail to notice that when his major and minor premisses
are compared, the meaning of the common term has usually shifted[96].
But if Chrysippus did not provide a final solution to great problems,
he at least adapted the Stoic system to the taste of his age, alike by
his use of syllogisms and by the attention he paid to the solution of
fallacies[97].


[Sidenote: Opposition of the Academy.]

=105.= Whilst the works of Chrysippus cover the whole range of the
Stoic philosophy, their special colour is largely due to the interests
of his own time. The stress laid by Zeno on the certainty of knowledge
had produced a reaction in the Academic school. Arcesilaus, who had
succeeded Polemo as its leader, leaving on one side the positive teaching
of Plato’s later years, reverted to the sceptical attitude which had
been one characteristic of Socrates, and which is so prominent in most
of the Platonic dialogues[98]. He attacked with the utmost vigour Zeno’s
doctrine of ‘comprehension’; and further argued that certain knowledge
is unnecessary for practical life, of which probability, that is, such
action as can find reasonable justification, is the sufficient guide[99].
Chrysippus defended with the utmost energy the dogma of the certainty of
knowledge, based upon the perspicuity of true mind pictures[100]; but the
teaching of Arcesilaus obtained a hold upon him, and (as we shall see)
was ultimately allowed by him a place within the Stoic system.


[Sidenote: Spread of Epicureanism.]

=106.= Chrysippus meanwhile had a more dangerous enemy to meet than
the Academy. During the weakness which befel the Stoic school in the
middle of the third century B.C., the rival school of Epicurus had won
an enormous popularity. Yet its ethical standard, which it had inherited
from the Cyrenaics, offended not only the followers of Zeno but all
sober-minded philosophers. For Epicurus had set up Pleasure as the queen
of life, and had converted the virtues into her handmaidens[101]; and
so far was he from taking interest in model states, that he advised his
hearers to hold aloof altogether from public life. Worst of all, his
followers only smiled at the reproofs that were showered upon them.
They formed among themselves a cheerful, affectionate, and united
society; their simple pleasures created no public scandal, though their
entertainments were often enlivened by tales of the moral lapses of their
self-righteous rivals. The bracing morality of Cynism seemed to be quite
gone out of fashion, and even the Aristonians had ceased to exist.


[Sidenote: Alliance of the three schools.]

=107.= Under these circumstances the remaining schools began to look one
to another for support, and were even brought into a kind of alliance.
The adherents of the Academy and the Porch, in particular, began to meet
in friendly discussion, and sometimes defined anew their doctrines so as
to minimize points of difference, sometimes directly modified them by way
of concession to opposed arguments. This process resulted in a toning
down of Stoicism in every part of its system. The Stoic teachers began
to disregard or push into the background those characteristic doctrines
which had been embodied in the Socratic paradoxes and enforced by the
Cynic propaganda. Thus their teaching gave less offence to the lax crowd,
and at the same time (it must be admitted) less support to the striving
few; but its tone was now so modest that men of gentle and judicious
temperament were attracted to Stoicism for the first time. Stoicism
began now to shew itself receptive of literary influences, especially
as regards the works of Plato and Aristotle, and even appreciative of
artistic ideals. Such was the tendency of the system during both the
second and the first centuries B.C.; but it is more difficult to estimate
the extent of the deviation. Terms like εὐκρασία ‘well proportioned
mixture[102],’ εὔροια ‘even flow[103],’ εὐτονία ‘due tone[104],’ συμφωνία
‘harmony[105],’ are attributed even to the earliest masters: whilst it
is abundantly clear that the Socratic and Cynic paradoxes formed at all
times part of the generally accepted view of Stoic doctrine.


[Sidenote: Chrysippus inclines to the Academy.]

=108.= It is an interesting question, which perhaps needs further
investigation, to what extent this approximation between the doctrines of
the Academy and the Porch can be traced in the writings of Chrysippus.
On the one hand we must remember that Chrysippus was a man of distinctly
orthodox temperament; he firmly opposed the Cynizing heresies of
Aristo, and strongly defended the Stoic theory of knowledge against the
Academy. But our knowledge of the teaching of Chrysippus, abundant in
volume, is lacking in precision. Our authorities, as we have seen, very
imperfectly distinguish, and very inadequately record, the teaching of
the two earlier masters; and the doctrines which are regarded as common
to all Stoics must be assumed to be generally stated in the language of
Chrysippus, whose works remained for centuries the recognised standard
of orthodoxy. Even so there are few distinctive doctrines of Chrysippus
which do not seem to be foreshadowed in expressions attributed to some
earlier teacher. Yet we may fairly assume that in his ethical teaching
there was a substantial sacrifice of the forcefulness of the Socratic
character, and a corresponding approach to Academic views. This appears
when he defines the supreme good as ‘a life according to nature, that is,
both general nature and our individual human nature[106],’ and adds, ‘for
our individual natures are parts of the nature of the all[107].’ This
approaches the doctrine of ‘virtue appropriate to the individual’ (οἰκεία
ἀρετή), as taught by the Academics[108]. A still more striking concession
is his permission to men engaged in practical life to describe advantages
as ‘good things,’ provided they are carefully distinguished from the
supreme good[109].


[Sidenote: Successors of Chrysippus.]

=109.= The weakening hold of the Stoics upon the principles of their
founder first becomes evident in the department of physics. Thus it is an
essential part of the theory which the Stoics borrowed from Heraclitus,
that as the whole universe has proceeded from the all-creative fire, so
it must in due course be re-absorbed in it, this periodical re-absorption
being technically known as the ‘conflagration’ (ἐκπύρωσις). On the other
hand the followers of Aristotle, following dualistic principles, placed
God and the universe in eternal contrast, and held both to be immortal.
Ingenious controversialists now pressed the Stoics to explain how their
deity exercised his providence during the periodic intervals in which
the universe had no separate existence. This and like arguments had
an immediate effect. BOËTHUS of Sidon, a contemporary of Chrysippus,
abandoned altogether the Stoic theory on this subject[110]; ZENO of
Tarsus, who had been with his father DIOSCORIDES a pupil of Chrysippus,
and who succeeded him as head of the school, discreetly ‘suspended
his judgment’ upon the point[111]. But whatever its theoretical
embarrassments, the Stoic school continued to prosper. Zeno of Tarsus
wrote but few books, but had more disciples than any other[112];
he was succeeded by SELEUCUS of the Tigris[113], and he in turn by
Diogenes[114], Antipater, and Panaetius. The last of these maintained
Zeno’s ‘suspense of judgment[115]’ on the question of the conflagration;
but after his death the Stoics quietly returned to the older opinion.


[Sidenote: Diogenes and Antipater.]

=110.= DIOGENES of Seleucia (circ. 238-150 B.C.; often called ‘of
Babylon,’ or simply _Diogenes Stoicus_), and ANTIPATER of Tarsus (circ.
200-129 B.C.), were both men of eminence in the history of Stoicism[116],
but they were unequally matched against Carneades (218-128 B.C.), who
was head of the Academic school about the same time, and who proclaimed
the doctrine of a universal suspension of judgment. The many volumes
of Chrysippus gave Carneades ample opportunities for the exercise of
his critical powers; and Antipater, unable or unwilling to meet him in
open argument, fell himself into the evil habit of book-writing[117].
Both these teachers specially interested themselves in questions of
casuistry. Diogenes, who defined the good as ‘reasonableness in the
choice of natural ends[118],’ adopted practically that interpretation
of ‘reasonableness’ in which divine reason has the least part, and
human plausibility the freest play[119]. Thus he discusses the problems
whether the seller of a house ought to inform the purchaser of its
defects, and whether a man upon whom false coins have been passed may
transfer them to his neighbour[120]. Exactly as Carneades[121], he finds
‘reasonable excuse’ for the less scrupulous course. Antipater on the
other hand holds that a man’s duty to his neighbour requires perfect
frankness[122]; yet he is said to have abandoned the Socratic doctrine of
the self-sufficiency of virtue, and to have held that external goods are
a part (though only a small part) of the supreme good[123].


[Sidenote: Lesser Stoics.]

=111.= We may now shortly mention some less important Stoic teachers,
chiefly of the early part of the second century B.C., since their number
alone is an indication of the wide influence of the sect. ARISTOCREON,
said to have been the nephew of Chrysippus, set up a statue in his
honour, as the man who could cut his way through the knots tied by the
Academics[124]. ZENODOTUS was a pupil of Diogenes, and wrote an epigram
on Zeno: he at least defended the ‘manly doctrine’ of the founder, and
recalled the principle of the sufficiency of virtue[125]. APOLLODORUS of
Seleucia on the Tigris[126] (sometimes called Ephillus[127]), another
pupil of Diogenes, leant towards Cynic views; for he declared that ‘the
wise man will be a Cynic, for this is a short cut to virtue[128]’; an
opinion afterwards adopted by the Stoics generally[129]. He also wrote
on physics. A third pupil of Diogenes was APOLLODORUS of Athens[130].
Closely associated with Antipater is ARCHEDEMUS of Tarsus; like his
fellow-townsman, he was greatly devoted to dialectics[131]; in ethics
he appears to have inclined strongly to Academic views, holding that
the end of life was the regular performance of daily duties[132]. Just
about the time we have now reached (the middle of the second century
B.C.) Eumenes II founded the great library at Pergamus, intended to
rival that of Alexandria. As librarian he installed a Stoic philosopher,
CRATES of Mallos, who devoted much of his time to grammatical inquiries,
and endeavoured to bring Homer into accord with the Stoic views on
geography[133]; he is the first Stoic of whom we hear at Rome, which
he visited about 159 B.C. Being detained there by an accident, he
employed his time in giving lectures on literature[134]; and his pupil
Panaetius was destined to introduce Stoicism to Roman society. Lastly
we may mention HERACLIDES of Tarsus, a pupil of Antipater, said to have
broken away from the teaching of the school by denying that all sins
are equal[135]. Athenodorus of Tarsus, who held the same view, belongs
to a later generation[136]. Of uncertain date are BASILIDES, who pushed
his monism so far as to declare that all things, even statements, are
bodies[137]; EUDROMUS, who wrote on the elements of ethics[138]; and
CRINIS, who interested himself in logic[139].


FOOTNOTES

[1] See below, § 95.

[2] μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τῶν μαθητῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ἠγαπᾶτο ὁ Περσαῖος Ind.
Sto. Herc. col. xii 3 (Arnim i 437).

[3] ‘Zenonis Stoici servus, qui Persaeus vocatus est’ A. Gellius _N. A._
ii 18, 8. ἦν γὰρ ὄντως οἰκέτης γεγονὼς τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ὡς Νικίας ὁ Νικαεὺς
ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἱστορίᾳ καὶ Σωτίων ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς ἐν ταῖς
Διαδοχαῖς Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 452). On the other hand ‘nullum [servum
fuisse] Zenoni ... satis constat’ Sen. _Dial._ xii 12, 4.

[4] Arnim i 439, 440.

[5] _ib._ 449.

[6] Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 452).

[7] Diog. L. vii 162.

[8] Athen. as above.

[9] Paus. ii 8, 4; vii 8, 3 (Arnim i 442).

[10] Plut. _Arat._ 23, 3. According to Plutarch he afterwards admitted
that he had been wrongly taught as to the ‘good general.’

[11] ‘Persaeus eos dicit esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad
vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse
vocabulis nuncupatas’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 38. Persaeus derived the theory
from Prodicus; Philod. _de piet._ 9 (Arnim i 448), and above, § 42.

[12] Diog. L. vii 9.

[13] ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ’ ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν | ἄῤῥητον· μεσταὶ δὲ
Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί, | πᾶσαι δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα |
καὶ λιμένες· πάντῃ δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες. | τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν·
ὁ δ’ ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισιν | δεξιὰ σημαίνει, λαοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει |
μιμνῄσκων βιότοιο: Aratus, _Phaen._ Pref.

[14] Plut. _Cleo._ 11, 2.

[15] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 222.

[16] _ib._ p. 245.

[17] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 44.

[18] ‘Sphaeri, hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoici’ Cic.
_Tusc. disp._ iv 24, 53.

[19] See below, § 332.

[20] ‘fortitudo est ... conservatio stabilis iudici in iis rebus, quae
formidolosae videntur ... [haec definitio erat] Sphaeri’ Cic. as above.
The principle was accepted by all Stoics, see below, § 323.

[21] ‘omitto ... Erillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum
ponit; qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et
quam non multum a Platone’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 42, 129. See also _Fin._ iv 14,
36.

[22] ‘sin ea [quae virtus leget quaeque reiciet] non neglegemus neque
tamen ad finem summi boni referemus, non multum ab Erilli levitate
aberrabimus; facit enim ille duo seiuncta ultima bonorum’ _Fin._ iv 15,
40.

[23] ζῆν ἀεὶ πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ζῆν Diog. L. vii 165.

[24] ὑποτελὶς δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον τοῦ ζῴου πάθος, ἀφ’ οὗ κατήρξατο
συναισθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον τῆς συστασέως αὑτοῦ, οὔπω λογικὸν [ὂν] ἀλλ’ ἄλογον
Stob. ii 7, 3 c.

[25] διαφέρειν δὲ τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα· τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς
στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνον τὸν σοφόν Diog. L. vii 165.

[26] The best discussion is by Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_, ii 46 sqq. He
considers the teaching of Herillus to have inclined to Cynism rather
than to Platonism, and to have been substantially identical with that of
Aristo.

[27] λάλον ἐπέκαλει Diog. L. vii 18.

[28] Athen. vi 58 (Arnim i 342).

[29] _ib._ vii 14 (Arnim i 341).

[30] See above, § 89.

[31] Diog. L. vii 163.

[32] _ib._ vii 161.

[33] ‘nihil istorum [physicorum] sciri putat posse’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123.

[34] ‘qui neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat, neque in dis sensum
esse dicat; dubitetque omnino deus animans necne sit’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14,
37.

[35] ‘Aristo moralem quoque ... quam solam reliquerat, circumcidit’ Sen.
_Ep._ 89, 13. ‘hanc partem [quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta]
levem existimat, et quae non descendat in pectus usque’ _ib._ 94, 2: in
this letter the whole subject is very fully discussed.

[36] ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τὸ προηγμένον αὐτὴν λέγειν ἀδιάφορον τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῦν,
καὶ σχεδὸν ὀνόματι μόνον διαφέρον Sext. _math._ xi 64 (Arnim i 361).

[37] ‘Aristonis ... sententia, non esse res ullas praeter virtutes et
vitia, inter quas quicquam omnino interesset’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 17, 47.

[38] ‘huic [sc. Aristoni] summum bonum est, in his rebus neutram in
partem moveri, quae ἀδιαφορία ab ipso dicitur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 42, 130.

[39] Galen, _Hipp. et Plat._ vii 2 (Arnim i 374). Chrysippus is said to
have complained that he made the various virtues σχέσεις or variations of
a single virtue (Plut. _Sto. rep._ vii 3); nevertheless the same doctrine
frequently reappears in Stoic writers.

[40] ‘vives, inquit Aristo, magnifice atque praeclare, quod erit cunque
visum, ages: nunquam angere, nunquam cupies, nunquam timebis’ Cic. _Fin._
iv 25, 69.

[41] ‘Aristonis ... iampridem explosa sententia est’ _Off._ i 2, 6; cf.
_Fin._ iv 17, 47.

[42] N. Saal, p. 37 sqq. For fuller discussions of Aristo see Hirzel,
_Untersuchungen_, ii p. 44, and Dyroff, _Ethik_, pp. 43 sqq., 356 sqq.

[43] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii p. 161.

[44] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 207.

[45] Athen. vii 14 (Arnim i 408).

[46] ‘nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a
Stoicis propter oculorum dolorem; quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non
dolere, cum doleret! illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non
esse, quia turpe non esset’ Cic. _Fin._ v 31, 94; τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἡδονὴν
διὰ περίστασιν ὀφθαλμίας Diog. L. vii 166.

[47] ‘[quaerebat Antiochus], Dionysius ille Heracleotes utrum
comprehendisset, ... honestum quod esset, id solum bonum esse, an ...
honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 22,
71.

[48] Diog. L. vii 167; Athen. x 50 (Arnim i 428).

[49] Diog. L. vii 167.

[50] Diog. L. vii 38.

[51] He drew water by night that he might study philosophy by day,
according to Diog. L. vii 168. ‘Cleanthes aquam traxit et rigando horto
locavit manus’ Sen. _Ep._ 44, 3.

[52] Diog. L. vii 37.

[53] ‘Zenonem Cleanthes non expressisset, si tantummodo audisset: vitae
enim eius interfuit, secreta perspexit, observavit illum, an ex formula
sua viveret’ Sen. _Ep._ 6, 6.

[54] ‘sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit’ Sen.
_Ep._ 108, 10.

[55] ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔμεινε δογμάτων Diog. L. vii 168.

[56] Stob. i 1, 12 (Arnim i 537).

[57] See above, § 90.

[58] I follow the reading γενόμεσθα, θεοῦ. The words γένος ἐσμέν in the
text are surely a reminiscence of Aratus, _Phaen._ 5 (so Pearson, p.
276), and θεοῦ μίμημα is confirmed by Musonius ap. Stob. _Flor._ 117, 8
(see below, § 419). Mr Pearson now suggests to me that the MS reading
ἤχου may represent the correction of a pious scribe, Ι̅Ϲ̅ Χ̅Υ̅, i.e.
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ for θεοῦ. See below, § 244.

[59] The translation follows Pearson’s ἐρρίγασιν. Arnim reads ἔργα
τελεῖται. Even the meaning is quite uncertain here.

[60] μεγάλῳ μικροῖς τε (Diels) seems the nearest reading to the MS, so
that the word ‘great’ above refers to the sun only.

[61] ἄγου δέ μ’, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ’ πεπρωμένη, | ὅποι ποθ’ ὑμῖν εἰμὶ
διατεταγμένος. | ὡς ἕψομαι γ’ ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω | κακὸς γενόμενος,
οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι Epict. _Manual_ 53; ‘duc, o parens celsique dominator
poli, | quocunque placuit; nulla parendi mora est. | adsum impiger.
fac nolle, comitabor gemens, | malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.
| ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 107, 11. The
translation given above is by G. H. Rendall (_M. Aurel._ Introd. p.
lxvii).

[62] Clem. _Strom._ v 3, 17 (Arnim i 559).

[63] Clem. _Protrept._ vi 72 (Arnim i 557).

[64] Stob. iii 6, 3 (Arnim i 573).

[65] See below, § 317.

[66] As, for instance, Zeller does when he writes ‘Cleanthes was adapted
to uphold his master’s teaching, but he was incapable of expanding it
more completely, or of establishing it on a wider basis’ _Stoics_, p. 41.

[67] Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_, ii pp. 134 sqq.; Stein, _Psychologie der
Stoa_, i 65-72, 162-171, ii 316-332.

[68] Sen. _Ep._ 113, 23.

[69] Diog. L. vii 174.

[70] _ib._ 134.

[71] ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum ... deum dicit esse’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 37.

[72] Arnim i 497, 511.

[73] ‘ultimum et altissimum et omnia complexum ardorem, qui aether
nominetur’ Cic. as in note 71.

[74] Cic. _N. D._ ii 15, 41.

[75] ‘sic res se habet, ut omnia, quae alantur et quae crescant,
contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent neque crescere’
_ib._ 9, 23.

[76] ‘haec (quae Zeno dixit λόγον esse) Cleanthes in spiritum congerit
quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat’ Tert. _Apol._ 21 (Arnim i 533).

[77] The substance of this doctrine is attributed to Zeno also: Ζήνων ...
πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν Diog. L. vii 157.

[78] See below, § 277.

[79] Pearson, _Introd._ p. 45; below, § 362.

[80] Arnim i 143.

[81] There is a slight inconvenience, but also a real advantage, in using
this term both in its philosophic sense for the governing part of the
soul, and historically for the system of government founded by Augustus.
There is a genuine analogy between the two, though it is not developed by
the Latin writers. Seneca uses _principale_ only.

[82] ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι Euseb.
_pr. ev._ xv 15, 7 (Arnim i 499); and see below, § 201.

[83] Κλεάνθης [τὸν θεὸν] τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν Aët. i 7, 17 (Arnim i 532);
‘totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen [dei]’ Cic. _N. D._ i
14, 37.

[84] ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse’ _ib._

[85] Cic. _N. D._ ii 5, 13-15; and see below, ch. x.

[86] See below, § 195.

[87] εἰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἶπε, προσεῖχον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφιλοσόφησα Diog. L. vii
182.

[88] ἐγὼ δὲ τἄλλα μακάριος πέφυκ’ ἀνὴρ | πλὴν εἰς Κλεάνθην· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ
εὐδαιμονῶ Diog. L. vii 179.

[89] _ib._ 182.

[90] _ib._ 179.

[91] ‘num contentus est [Chrysippus] docere, rem ostendere, definire,
explorare? non est contentus: verum auget in quantum potest, exaggerat,
praemunit, iterat, differt, recurrit, interrogat, describit, dividit,
personas fingit, orationem suam alii accommodat’ Fronto, _ep. ad Ant._ p.
146 (Arnim ii 27).

[92] ὅθεν φασὶν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ λεχθῆναι, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν
στοά Diog. L. vii 183.

[93] Diog. L. vii 180.

[94] ‘de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose omnia conquisierit contra
sensus et perspicuitatem ... ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem fuisse;
itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneaden’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 27, 87; cf. Plut.
_Sto. rep._ x 3 and 4.

[95] ‘ab Chrysippo nihil magnum nec magnificum desideravi, qui suo quodam
more loquitur, ut omnia verborum momentis, non rerum ponderibus examinet’
Cic. _Rep._ iii 8, 12; ‘ad Chrysippi laqueos revertamur’ _de Fato_ 4, 7;
‘Chrysippus, penes quem subtile illud acumen est et in imam penetrans
veritatem, qui rei agendae causa loquitur et verbis non ultra quam ad
intellectum satis est utitur, totum librum his ineptiis replet’ Sen.
_Ben._ i 3, 8; ‘magnum mehercule virum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius acumen
nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur’ _ib._ 4, 1.

[96] ‘quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne
est honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 8, 27.

[97] See below, §§ 162, 163.

[98] ‘Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque
Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut
animo percipi possit’ Cic. _de Orat._ iii 18, 67. See above, § 71.

[99] ὁ προσέχων τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει Sext. _math._ vii
158.

[100] ‘cum Chrysippus, Academicos refellens, permulto clariora et
certiora esse dicat, quae vigilantibus videantur, quam quae somniantibus’
Cic. _Div._ ii 61, 126; see further, § 147.

[101] See below, § 346.

[102] See Pearson, _Cle._ fr. 42.

[103] According to Stob. ii 7, 6 e this term was used by all the Stoic
teachers.

[104] Used by Chrysippus, see Arnim iii 473.

[105] Diog. L. vii 88.

[106] φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ᾗ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν
καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην _ib._ vii 89.

[107] μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου _ib._ 87.

[108] See above, § 71.

[109] δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθά Plut. _Sto. rep._
30, 4.

[110] Philo, _inc. mund._ 15, p. 248 (Arnim iii Boëth. 7).

[111] τὸν μὲν γὰρ τούτου [sc. Chrysippi] μαθητὴν καὶ διάδοχον τῆς σχολῆς
Ζήνωνά φασιν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels
(Arnim iii Z. T. 5).

[112] Diog. L. vii 35.

[113] Ind. Sto. Herc. col. 48 (Arnim iii Z. T. 2).

[114] See Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 50.

[115] See below, § 115.

[116] ‘aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud
Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo’ Cic. _Off._ iii 12, 51;
‘Antipater inter magnos [Stoicae] sectae auctores’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 5.

[117] Plut. _de garr._ 23.

[118] τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ Diog. L. vii 88; for the
Academic view see § 71 above.

[119] See below, §§ 159, 332.

[120] Cic. _Off._ iii 13, 54; 23, 91.

[121] _Rep._ iii 20, 30.

[122] ‘tu cum hominibus consulere debeas, ... celabis homines’ _Off._ iii
13, 52.

[123] ‘Antipater ... aliquid se tribuere dicit externis, sed exiguum
admodum’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 5.

[124] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 2, 5.

[125] Diog. L. vii 30.

[126] Arnim iii p. 259; see also Pauly-Wissowa _sub voce_.

[127] So Diog. L. vii 39, where however others read Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ
Σύλλος.

[128] Diog. L. vii 121.

[129] _ib._ vi 104.

[130] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 53: also a pupil of Antipater; to be
distinguished from an Apollodorus of Athens who was an Epicurean; Diog.
L. vii 181.

[131] ‘duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archedemus,
opiniosissimi homines’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 143.

[132] πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντα ζῆν Diog. L. vii 88.

[133] Sandys, _Classical Scholarship_, i pp. 155, 156.

[134] _ib._ p. 157.

[135] Diog. L. vii 121.

[136] See below, §§ 122, 123.

[137] Arnim iii p. 268.

[138] Diog. L. vii 39.

[139] _ib._ 76.



CHAPTER V.

THE STOIC SECT IN ROME.


[Sidenote: Growth of the Stoic ‘sect.’]

=112.= In the third century B.C. Stoicism won adherents slowly and one
by one, as individuals were convinced by reasoning and example. In the
second century its progress became more rapid, for it was reinforced
by inheritance and social influence. Fathers handed down its doctrine
to their sons, and teachers to their pupils. Groups of men united by
a common respect for the school and its founders began to associate
together, not only at Athens, but also (as we may well infer from the
list of names given at the end of the last chapter) at such centres as
Pergamus, Babylon, Seleucia, Tarsus, Sidon, and even Alexandria[1].
Thus out of the school there grew up the ‘sect’ (_secta_); that is, a
society of men drawn from different nations and ranks, but sharing the
same convictions, united by a bond of brotherhood, and feeling their
way towards mutual consolation and support; a company going through
life on the same path, and prepared to submit to a common authority[2].
The spread of the sect was rapid though quiet; and as we cannot expect
to trace its history from place to place, we are unable to say when
first it found adherents at Rome. But early in the second century B.C.
Rome entered into close political relations with two of the most highly
civilized states of Asia Minor, Pergamus and Rhodes; and through the men
of learning and taste who were associated with these communities Stoicism
was introduced to the ruling class at the centre of the new empire,
to win there an easy conquest which proved no slight compensation for
the political subordination of the states from which its emissaries had
sprung.


[Sidenote: Panaetius.]

=113.= We have already noticed[3] that the Stoic Crates, the head of
the library established at Pergamus, visited Rome in 159 B.C. and there
gave lectures on literature, in which he may perhaps have taken occasion
to expound at least the chief doctrines of the Stoic school. Only a few
years later, in 155 B.C., the celebrated embassy from Athens, which
included the heads of three of the chief philosophical schools at that
time, arrived in Rome. Diogenes of Seleucia represented the Stoics,
Critolaus the Peripatetics, and Carneades the Academic school; and all
three expounded their respective theories before enormous audiences. We
are told that Diogenes made a good impression by his sober and temperate
style[4]. Thus the way was prepared for the more permanent influence
of PANAETIUS of Rhodes (circ. 189-109 B.C.)[5]. He was a gentleman of
position in the wealthy and well-governed island state, and in early
youth pursued his studies at Pergamus, so that he was probably attracted
to the school by Crates[6]. From Pergamus he passed to Athens, where he
found established the three teachers already named, and attached himself
to Diogenes[7], and after his death to his successor Antipater[8].
His writings shew that he was also much influenced by the teaching
of Carneades. But more than any of his predecessors he appreciated
philosophy in its literary form. Plato, the ‘Homer of philosophers,’
he held in veneration[9]; from Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus
and Dicaearchus he constantly quoted[10]. His admiration for these
philosophers greatly influenced his style, and caused him to reject the
stiff and paradoxical form used by his predecessors[11]; it also led to
the surrender of some characteristic Stoic doctrines in favour of the
teaching of Plato and Aristotle[12]. His studies extended to every branch
of philosophy, including astronomy[13] and politics[14]. The latter
interest brought him into association with Polybius the historian, with
whom he held frequent discussions as to the best form of government; the
two learned and experienced Greeks agreed in their admiration for the
constitution of Rome[15]. Panaetius visited Rome, and there became the
intimate friend of Scipio Africanus minor: this friendship must have
begun before the year 140 B.C., when Panaetius accompanied Scipio on a
mission to settle the affairs of the East[16]; it lasted till the death
of Scipio in 129 B.C. Round Scipio and his Greek friends Polybius and
Panaetius there gathered a society of the noblest and most intelligent
men of Rome; and in this circle the Latin language as well as Greek
philosophy found a new birth. At the time of Scipio’s death Panaetius
became the head of the Stoic school at Athens, and held this position
till his own death twenty years later[17]. Amongst his friends and pupils
were men who took a leading part in the government of their native
cities[18].


[Sidenote: His ethical teaching.]

=114.= Panaetius may well be regarded as the founder of Roman Stoicism,
and is of special interest to us as the writer of the treatise (περὶ
καθήκοντος) which Cicero has freely translated in his _de Officiis_. He
sets before us Stoicism as the school which will train the scholar,
the gentleman, and the statesman, whilst he shrinks from those bolder
doctrines, borrowed from the Cynic school, which conflict with that
which is conventional, or, as their opponents say, with that which is
becoming. The central doctrine that virtue is knowledge, and is the sole
and sufficient good, he accepts as the plain teaching of nature; and with
it the paradox that the wise man never errs[19]. Yet even these maxims
are somewhat toned down as he expresses them; and external advantages
appear to him worthy of pursuit, not only as giving a meaning to virtue
and providing a field for its exercise, but also for their own sake, so
long as they do not conflict with virtue[20]; and he perhaps hesitated
to assert positively that ‘pain is no evil[21].’ In his treatises the
figure of the wise man is withdrawn to the background; he is practically
concerned only with the ‘probationer’ (ὁ προκόπτων), who is making some
advance in the direction of wisdom. This advance is not made by acts of
perfect virtue, but by regular performance of ‘services’ (καθήκοντα,
_officia_), the simple and daily duties which come in the way of the good
citizen[22]. Further, scientific investigation must not become the main
end of life, as perhaps it seemed to Aristotle; it is permitted only as
a recreation in the well-earned intervals between the calls of active
life[23].


[Sidenote: His views on physics.]

=115.= It does not appear that Panaetius devoted much attention to
logic[24]; on the other hand he was much occupied with that part of
philosophy which deals with the history of the universe and its
government by divine providence[25]. The Heraclitean theory he appears
to have left altogether on one side; for he rejected the theory of
the conflagration[26], as Boethus had done before him, accepting the
objection of Carneades that ‘if everything turned into fire, the fire
would go out for lack of fuel[27].’ He therefore joined the Peripatetics
in holding that the universe is immortal[28]; but since again Carneades
has shown that ‘no living thing is immortal,’ it follows that the world
is not an animal, nor is the deity its soul[29]. Upon all these subjects
Panaetius ceased to maintain Stoic doctrines; and, alone amongst Stoic
teachers, he ‘suspended his judgment’ as to the reality of divination[30].


[Sidenote: Concession in ethics.]

=116.= Similar concessions to his opponents mark his treatment in detail
of ethics. Thus he takes from Aristotle the view that ‘virtue is a
mean between two vices’; and this doctrine, so alien from true Stoic
principle, forms the basis of the treatment which we find adopted in
the _de Officiis_. The theory of the four ‘cardinal virtues,’ Wisdom,
Justice, Courage, and Soberness, was probably common property at
this time; but whereas in Cynism Courage and in the earlier Stoicism
Wisdom are the dominant virtues, in the theory of Panaetius Soberness,
identified with decorum, far exceeds the rest in practical importance.
Thus the triumph won by Panaetius for the name of Stoicism was purchased
by the sacrifice not only of its physics, but very largely of its ethics
also; and the success of the new system might not unfairly be described
as a victory of literature over logic, of reasonableness over reason,
and of compromise over consistency. However this may be, Panaetius
undoubtedly succeeded in presenting Greek philosophy to his Roman
friends in a form in which it recommended itself alike to their reasoning
powers and to their moral sense.


[Sidenote: Posidonius.]

=117.= The virtual, though not the nominal, successor of Panaetius was
POSIDONIUS of Rhodes[31] (circ. 135-51 B.C.[32]), who after studying
under Panaetius at Athens travelled widely, finally settling at Rhodes,
and there took an active part in political life. Like his master, he was
a devoted student of Plato, and he wrote a commentary on the _Timaeus_.
In this commentary he developes a new theory of the universe, which he
asserts to be that which Plato had learnt from the Pythagoreans, and to
be at root the same as that taught by the Stoics. The starting-point is
the μονάς or unit; from this are evolved the numbers and the elements
by a principle of flux, as in the system of Heraclitus[33]. The unity
and the first of the numbers, the two, differ as force and matter; so
that the dualism of Aristotle is here definitely subordinated to a
supreme monism. This study of Posidonius is therefore incidentally of
high importance as a side-light on Stoic metaphysics and cosmology. In
addition he wrote on almost all the principal divisions of philosophy,
thus acquiring a brilliant reputation, particularly in the eyes of the
philosophic nobles of Rome. Cicero made his acquaintance at Rhodes in
78 B.C., and refers to him more often in his works than to any other of
his instructors[34]. Pompey, in the midst of his eastern campaigns, put
himself to much trouble to visit him[35]. Amongst his Roman visitors and
admirers were also Velleius, Cotta, and Lucilius[36]. A century later,
Seneca looked back to him as one of those who had made the largest
contribution to philosophy[37].


[Sidenote: His teaching.]

=118.= As compared with the more scientific Panaetius, Posidonius marks
a reaction in favour of the religious side of Stoicism[38]. Thus it
comes about that Cicero bases on his work ‘on gods’ (περὶ θεῶν) his own
statement of the Stoic theology in the second book of his _de Natura
deorum_[39]. Posidonius restores the theory of Divination, as to which
Panaetius had held the gravest doubts[40]. He strongly asserts the divine
origin of the soul, and accepts the Persian view that in this life it is
imprisoned in the body[41]. He affirmed the future conflagration[42], and
found this theory not inconsistent with a belief in the pre-existence and
the immortality of the individual soul.

In physics and logic alike Posidonius upholds the doctrine of the Logos,
and it appears that it passed directly from him to Philo of Alexandria,
and so into Judaeo-Christian speculation. In ethics he maintained the
sufficiency of virtue[43], and re-defined it in the spirit of Cleanthes
rather than of Chrysippus[44]. In the practical application of such
doctrines to cases of conscience he disliked the lax views of Diogenes,
and sided rather with Antipater and Panaetius[45]. Finally he held that
the ideal Republic had already been achieved in the golden age, when the
wise had ruled for the protection and happiness of their subjects[46].


[Sidenote: Hecato.]

=119.= HECATO of Rhodes was also a pupil of Panaetius: he wrote books on
ethics and casuistry which were largely used by Cicero and by Seneca,
both of whom frequently refer to him by name. In laying the foundations
of his ethics he distinguishes between the ‘theoretic virtues,’ such
as Wisdom, Justice, Courage and Soberness, which call for the assent
of the individual, and are possessed only by the wise man, and the
corresponding ‘non-theoretic virtues,’ which are dispositions of body
found also amongst the unwise; as health which corresponds to temperance,
and so forth[47]. By this extension of the conception of virtue the
doctrine of its sufficiency is rendered easy of acceptance[48]. In the
practical application of his theory he laid great stress on the doctrine
of ‘relations’ (σχέσεις), that is on duties towards parent, wife, child,
slave, country, and so forth[49]. In order to be in a position to perform
these duties a man is entitled to care for his own life and property[50].
He need not be too careful to provide for his slaves if provisions are
dear[51]; nor should he too hastily give up for another his chance of
escape from a shipwreck[52]. Hecato therefore seems rather to side with
Diogenes in questions of casuistry, taking a lax view where Antipater and
Panaetius would be inclined to a more altruistic standpoint.


[Sidenote: The unsectarian philosopher.]

=120.= The three teachers of Rhodes appear to us as men of great learning
and of wide interests, and not without original force; on the other hand
we cannot say that they made any very large contributions towards the
discussion of the great problems of philosophy. Apart from them we find
little trace of creative ability in the school during the first century
B.C. There were however numerous teachers occupied in expounding and
defending the doctrines of the school, and their special interest lay in
the controversies between the Porch and the Academy. From these there
resulted a temporary fusion of the two schools. Their respective names
and dogmas remained unaltered; but attention was no longer given to the
great differences of principle which divided them. Learning, politics,
and social influences alike were at work, not to solve the great
controversies, but to throw a mist over them. From these circumstances
there emerged the type which we now call the ‘eclectic,’ but which
the Romans called simply the ‘philosopher’; that is, the man who drew
practical wisdom from all sources alike, binding himself to the dogmas of
no school, but winning his way by aptness of discourse and sympathy of
manner to social importance[53]. We have but a limited interest at the
present day in these ephemeral reputations; the type is still with us,
both in the preacher whose sympathies are given with equal readiness to
half-a-dozen warring denominations, and in the politician who emphasizes
his connexion by birth with three or four nationalities and as many
grades of society. Nor are we called upon to question the usefulness of
this blurring of differences. We must however remark that so far as our
immediate subject is concerned, the fusion was equivalent to a defeat
of Stoicism by the Academy. That nothing can be definitely proved; that
a man may choose his principles at the bidding of his fancy; that an
argument may be sufficiently sound for practical purposes even when there
exists a counter-argument of almost equal strength; that the problems of
dialectics, physics, and ethics may be discussed separately, instead of
being treated as parts of one whole; all these are the points for which
the Academic contended with as much consistency as his system allowed,
and which every philosopher, whether or not he called himself a Stoic,
conceded when he began to combine the teachings of diverse systems.


[Sidenote: Lesser Stoics.]

=121.= After the death of Panaetius the school at Athens appears to have
been conducted by DARDANUS and MNESARCHUS, both of Athens, jointly[54];
later we find at its head DIONYSIUS of Cyrene, who enjoyed a great
reputation as a mathematician, and was a vigorous opponent of Demetrius
the Epicurean[55]. About the same time[56] ATHENODORUS the elder of
Tarsus (circ. 130-60 B.C.) became librarian at Pergamus; he made use of
his position to erase from Zeno’s works those passages (probably from the
_Republic_) which were repugnant to the Stoic teaching of his own time;
he was however detected and the passages in question were restored[57].
It appears also that he counselled withdrawal from the vexations of
public life, a policy by no means consistent with the teaching of Zeno,
and for which he is rebuked by Seneca[58]. From him we first hear the
practical precept which both Seneca and Juvenal echo, to ask nothing of
the gods that you cannot ask openly[59]. In his old age he left Pergamus
and came to reside at Rome with M. Porcius Cato in B.C. 70. Amongst the
younger friends of Cato were ANTIPATER of Tyre, who wrote on practical
ethics, and died at Athens about 45 B.C.[60]; and APOLLONIDES, with whom
he conversed on the subject of suicide shortly before his death[61]. From
DIODOTUS Cicero received instruction in Stoicism before 88 B.C.[62];
he conceived a great affection for him, and invited him to live in his
house[63]: he remained there till his death in 59 B.C., when he left
Cicero a considerable property[64]. In his old age he was blind, but
he continued his studies, and in particular that of mathematics, as
ardently as ever[65]. APOLLONIUS of Tyre wrote a biography of Zeno,
from which Diogenes Laertius often quotes[66]. To this period perhaps
belongs HIEROCLES, who was bitterly opposed to Epicurus on account of his
choosing pleasure as the end of life, and still more for his denial of
providence[67].


[Sidenote: Cicero.]

=122.= We have little reason to regret that only fragments at most remain
to us of the works of these philosophers, since CICERO presents to us a
comprehensive view not only of the doctrines they professed, but also
of the criticisms which their opponents passed upon them, and again of
the replies they made to these criticisms. In carrying out this work for
Stoicism and its rival systems Cicero not only created the philosophic
terminology of the future by his translations of technical terms from
Greek into Latin, but also established a new style of philosophic
discussion. By the friendly tone of his dialogues, placed in the mouths
of men whose common interest in Greek studies made the divergencies of
the schools to which they belonged a secondary matter; by the amplitude
of his style, which gives itself time and space to approach a difficult
conception from many points of view; and by the simplicity of his
language and illustrations, which assumes that every philosophical
contention can be plainly and forcibly put before the average man of
letters, he has set an example of the art of exposition which has perhaps
not been surpassed since[68]. His most systematic expositions of Stoic
doctrine are as follows. In the _Academica_ a general view of Zeno’s
teaching is given by M. Varro (i 10, 35 to 11, 42), and the Stoic logic,
as accepted by Antiochus[69], is defended by L. Licinius Lucullus (ii
1, 1 to 19, 63). In the _de Natura deorum_ (bk ii) the Stoic physics
is explained by Q. Lucilius Balbus; in the _de Finibus_ (bk iii) the
Stoic ethics by M. Porcius Cato, as the most distinguished Roman who has
adopted them as a standard of life. In the _de Officiis_ Cicero adopts
the form of a letter addressed to his son when studying at Athens, and
avowedly adapts the substance of the work of Panaetius already mentioned,
supplementing it from a memorandum of the teaching of Posidonius which
was specially prepared for him by ATHENODORUS CALVUS[70]; this book
deals with ethics mainly in its practical applications. In many of
his other works, such as the _de Amicitia_, _de Senectute_, _Tusculan
disputations_, _de Fato_, _de Divinatione_, and _Paradoxa_, Cicero makes
use of Stoic material without giving professedly an exposition of the
Stoic system.


[Sidenote: Areius Didymus.]

=123.= The school to which Cicero finally attached himself was that
founded by ANTIOCHUS of Ascalon (circ. 125-50 B.C.)[71], who under
the name of the ‘old Academy’ taught doctrines which were practically
indistinguishable from those of the diluted Stoicism which now
prevailed, avoiding only the dogmatic temper and a few of the paradoxes
of the Stoics[72]. This appears to have been the prevailing tone of
philosophical discussion from the fall of the Republic to the death
of Augustus. Brutus (the ‘tyrannicide’), though family and political
associations have linked his name with that of Cato, was in his
philosophical opinions a follower of Antiochus[73]. Not very different
were probably the views of two teachers, nominally Stoics, who held
high positions in the household of Augustus. ATHENODORUS the younger of
Tarsus (possibly the same as the Athenodorus Calvus mentioned in the last
section) was a pupil of Posidonius, and whilst teaching at Apollonia
counted amongst his pupils Julius Caesar’s great-nephew Octavius, who
was afterwards to become the emperor Augustus. Octavius took his teacher
with him to Rome, and he had the credit of exercising a restraining
influence on his patron. In B.C. 30 he was sent in his old age to reform
the government of his native city Tarsus. He appears to have written
chiefly on popular moral subjects[74]. AREIUS DIDYMUS of Alexandria[75],
who was for a longer period installed in the household of Augustus[76],
is of interest to us as the first of those who made excerpts from the
works of earlier writers, and to him we owe most of the Stoic fragments
found in the work of Stobaeus. He probably depended in the first instance
on the writings of Antiochus of Ascalon. He was instrumental in saving
his native town Alexandria when taken by Augustus in B.C. 30. It is
probable enough that his ‘Epitome’ was prepared for the use of Augustus,
and provided the material for philosophical discussions at the banquet,
such as those to which Horace so often refers[77]. Seneca tells us that
he was acquainted with the inmost thoughts of the family of Augustus, and
reports the language in which he consoled Livia upon the death of her
son Drusus[78] (B.C. 9). He was succeeded by THEON of Alexandria, also a
Stoic, who took a special interest in physiology.


[Sidenote: Attalus.]

=124.= We know from Horace that in the time of Augustus Stoic
philosophers were found not only at the court, but also in the public
lecture-room, and at the street-corners. Such were Stertinius[79],
of whom the commentators say that he was the author of 120 books on
Stoicism[80]; Crispinus[81], said to have been a bad poet[82]; and
Damasippus[83]. In Horace’s amusing sketches we find the Stoic as he
appeared to the unconverted. He has sore eyes, or else a troublesome
cough[84]; he presses his teaching upon his hearers unreasonably and
unseasonably. But in the reign of Tiberius we find these popular
lecturers held in very high esteem. One of the most eminent was ATTALUS,
of whom Seneca the philosopher gives us a glowing account. Seneca was
the first each day to besiege the door of his school, and the last to
leave through it. This philosopher must have exercised an extraordinary
influence over the young men of his time. In his mouth the paradox ‘the
wise man is a king’ seemed a modest statement; his pupils were half
disposed to regard him as a god[85]. When he declaimed on the misery of
human life, a deep pity for their fellow-men fell upon them; when he
extolled poverty, they felt disposed to renounce their wealth; when he
recommended the simple life, they readily abandoned the use of meat and
wine, of unguents and of warm baths[86]. Seneca quotes from him in full
an address on the vanity of wealth, which shews his teaching to be very
similar to that of the more famous Musonius[87]. He attached a special
value to the discipline which hardships bring with them[88]. He incurred
the dislike of Seianus, who defrauded him of his property and reduced him
to the position of a peasant[89].


[Sidenote: Cornutus.]

=125.= Our attention is next attracted by L. ANNAEUS CORNUTUS (circ.
20-66 A.D.), who was born in Africa, and entered the house of the Annaei,
presumably as a slave. There he received his freedom, and became the
teacher of the two poets Persius and Lucan; of these the former has left
us an attractive account of his personality[90]. He wrote in Greek, and
one of his works, ‘On the Nature of the Gods,’ is still extant. This book
is a development of the system which we see followed by Cicero in the
_de Natura deorum_ (based upon Posidonius), by which a reconciliation is
effected between the Stoic physics and the popular mythology. By means of
etymology and allegory, all that is incredible or offensive in the old
legends of the gods is metamorphosed into a rationalistic explanation of
the phenomena of the universe. Thus Zeus is the soul of the universe,
because he is the cause of life in all living things, Zeus being derived
from ζῆν ‘live.’ Apollo is the sun, and Artemis the moon: Prometheus
the providence that rules in the universe. Pan is the universe. Cronos
consumes all his offspring except Zeus, for time consumes all except
what is eternal. Hera, the air (Ἥρα from ἀήρ) is sister and wife of
Zeus, because the elements of fire and air are intimately associated.
The popularity of such a treatise goes far to explain to us the close
connexion now becoming established between the Stoic philosophy and the
practices of Roman religion.


[Sidenote: Seneca.]

=126.= Roughly contemporary with Annaeus Cornutus, but perhaps rather
older, was the famous Latin writer L. ANNAEUS SENECA (circ. 4 B.C.-65
A.D.). Born in Corduba in Spain, he may have inherited simple tastes
from his provincial origin; but it was the eloquence of Attalus which
moved him to a deliberate choice of the philosophic life[91]. Under
this influence he was at one time tempted to throw away his wealth;
whilst the Pythagorean philosopher Sotion induced him to become for a
time a vegetarian[92]. To the end of his days he adhered to the ‘simple
life’; he felt an aversion to wine, oysters, and all luxurious food; he
discarded hot baths and soft chairs as debilitating; and of perfumes he
would have only the best, that is, none at all[93]. He was an ardent
lover of books, and appears to us as the last Roman who made a systematic
study of Stoicism in the original authorities, and thus grasped the
system in its full extent. He did not however claim, like his teacher
Attalus, to be a wise man; far from that, he laments that he is still in
the deep waters of wickedness[94]. In an age when a governmental career
was freely open to talent, Seneca’s powers and industry carried him to
high political station, and greatly increased his inherited wealth. He
played a part in the court of Claudius, and in time became the tutor,
and ultimately the minister, of Nero. He did not possess the zeal of a
reformer, and doubtless tolerated many an abuse, and often bowed his head
before power even when linked with tyranny[95]. But if he did not imitate
the unbending stiffness of Cato, we have still no reason to credit the
personal calumnies that pursued him at court. Had his career as a whole
been a discredit to his philosophical profession, we may feel sure that
Juvenal would never have overlooked so sensational a contrast. For the
last few years of his life he resigned political power, that he might
devote himself to what he deemed a more important task, the exposition
of the practical teaching of Stoicism[96]. Finally he was, or appeared
to be, drawn into a plot against the emperor, and was called upon in
consequence to put an end to his life.


[Sidenote: His style.]

=127.= The literary style of Seneca was severely criticized by critics
almost contemporary with him. Gellius tells us that in his time it was
by many not thought worth while to read his writings, because the style
was found to be vulgar, the matter characteristic of half-educated men,
the argument petty and exaggerated[97]. Quintilian finds that much of
his work is admirable, but much also is tainted by a striving for cheap
effect and a want of solid knowledge[98]; and he thinks him in no way
comparable to Cicero[99]. This judgment is generally maintained in the
world of modern scholarship, with the result that Seneca’s works are
not read in our schools and universities, and are little known even to
professional scholars. On the other side we may set the extraordinary
popularity of Seneca both in his own times[100] and in those of the
Renascence. It is possible to argue that his style represents the true
tendency of the Latin language in his day, and that it is in the direct
line towards the modern style of French prose, generally considered the
best in the world. As regards his matter it is not possible to deny
that he repeats the same moral teaching many times in slightly altered
form[101], and that he seldom gives us a continuous or thorough treatment
of any important subject[102]. His writings may well be compared with
articles in our periodical literature and the hebdomadal productions
of our pulpits; they aim at immediate effect rather than at the slow
building up of ordered knowledge. Just for that reason they admirably
illustrate for us Stoicism in its practical application to daily life;
and the extraordinary popularity which they enjoyed for many centuries
seems to shew that they are in touch with deeply-rooted instincts of
humanity.


[Sidenote: His independence.]

=128.= Seneca claims to be an independent thinker, only adopting the
views of Stoic masters because their arguments convince him[103]. Still
he does not use the liberty he claims to assert any new principles, but
only to deviate occasionally in the direction of popular views. Thus he
frequently adopts some dogma of Epicurus or some Cynic paradox to point a
moral, and appears unconscious of the deep-lying differences which keep
these schools apart from Stoicism; and only in reply to some challenge
does he state with any care the Stoic position. This is particularly
the case with the problem of wealth, which both Epicurean and Cynic
disparage, but the true Stoic is called upon to defend as a ‘thing of
high degree.’ Yet when Seneca is called upon to defend his own possession
of wealth he states his case with admirable clearness.


[Sidenote: Weakening of Stoicism.]

=129.= It is perhaps partly due to his style that it appears at times
as if Seneca’s hold on Stoic doctrine was often weak. He has no real
belief in conviction and scientific knowledge: ‘if we try to be exact
everywhere, we shall need to keep silence; for there is something to be
said against most statements[104].’ For the detailed Stoic system of
logic he feels only contempt[105]. In physics however his interest is
keen, probably under the influence of his favourite Posidonius: he sets
forth with great clearness the theory of tone (τόνος, _intentio_)[106]:
he eloquently maintains the existence of gods, abandoning the
traditional proofs, and basing his conviction upon the moral sense in
man[107]: he holds firmly to the doctrine of the conflagration[108].
Still we have constant reason to doubt whether these beliefs are linked
together in his mind by any consistent principle. His ethics are marked
by a similar weakness: the Socratic ‘strength and force’ is wanting,
and is replaced by a spirit of quietism and resignation. The important
position which he has filled in Roman politics awakens no enthusiasm
in himself, nor does the greatness of the Roman empire excite his
admiration. His heart is in his books; to them he gives up entirely
his closing years. His wise man will not go out of the way to mix in
politics; rather he will carefully consider how he may avoid the dangers
of social strife[109]. This enfeebled moral teaching is found also in
the successors of Seneca, and in modern literature is constantly quoted
as true Stoic doctrine. But though Seneca’s philosophy finds him many an
excuse for his retirement, he would have been a more faithful disciple of
Zeno and Cleanthes if he had borne the burden of public life to the end.


[Sidenote: Musonius.]

=130.= To the same period as Seneca belongs C. MUSONIUS RUFUS, in whom
however we observe distinctly, what we may conjecture had also been
the case with Attalus, that ethical teaching is becoming divorced from
philosophical theory, and so the Cynic standpoint approached. Musonius
was a preacher with a singular impressiveness of address. Speaking
from the heart on matters of direct moral import, he won respect even
from those who were least willing to be guided by him. He disdained
the applause of his hearers, desiring instead to see each one tremble,
blush, exult, or stand bewildered according as the address affected
him[110]. ‘If you have leisure to praise me,’ he said to his pupils, ‘I
am speaking to no purpose.’ ‘Accordingly,’ said one of them, ‘he used to
speak in such a way that every one who was sitting there supposed that
some one had accused him before Rufus: he so touched on what was doing,
he so placed before the eyes every man’s faults[111].’ Amongst his pupils
were Aulus Gellius the antiquarian, Epictetus, and a certain Pollio who
made a collection of his sayings (ἀπομνημονεύματα Μουσωνίου), of which
extracts have been preserved for us by Stobaeus. They consist of moral
maxims (χρεῖαι) such as ‘Live each day as if your last[112],’ ‘Nothing
is more pleasurable than temperance[113],’ and discourses or ‘diatribes’
(διατριβαί) dealing with subjects such as discipline, endurance,
marriage, obedience to parents, and so forth[114]. In elevation of
standard these writings stand higher than those of the early Stoics; and
the influence of Musonius was so great that we may almost regard him as a
third founder of the philosophy.


[Sidenote: His part in politics.]

=131.= In public life Musonius played a conspicuous part; he was the Cato
of his generation, trusted by all parties for his absolute rectitude
of character, and respected for his fearlessness; but he was much less
out of touch with the real conditions of the Roman world. When in A.D.
62 Rubellius Plautus found himself unable to quiet Nero’s suspicions of
his loyalty, it was believed that Musonius encouraged him to await his
end calmly, rather than attempt rebellion[115]. After the conspiracy of
Piso, Musonius was banished from Rome by Nero, together with most of the
eminent personalities of the capital[116]. On Nero’s death he returned
to Rome, and when the armies of Vespasian and Vitellius were fighting in
the suburbs of the city, the senate sent delegates to propose terms of
peace. Musonius joined them, and ventured to address the common soldiers,
expatiating on the blessings of peace, and sternly reproving them for
carrying arms. He was roughly handled and forced to desist. Tacitus
speaks severely of this unseasonable display of philosophy[117]; and
certainly Rome would not have been the gainer if the issue had remained
undecided[118]. But that such an attempt was possible in defiance of all
military discipline speaks much both for the courage of the speaker and
for the respect in which his profession was held. Musonius continued to
play an honourable part in public life during the reign of Vespasian, and
retained the confidence of the emperor even at a time when his advisers
secured his assent to a measure for expelling other philosophers from the
capital[119].


[Sidenote: Euphrates and Dio.]

=132.= In the reigns of Titus and his successors pupils and converts
of Musonius played not inconspicuous parts in public life. Amongst
them was one EUPHRATES, of Tyre or Epiphania (circ. 35-118 A.D.),
who in his day won all hearts and convinced all judgments. ‘Some
persons,’ says Epictetus, one of his fellow-pupils, ‘having seen a
philosopher, and having heard one speak like Euphrates—and yet who can
speak like him?—wish to be philosophers themselves[120].’ Pliny made
his acquaintance in his native land, and was filled with affection for
the man. He found his style dignified and sublime; but especially he
noticed its sweetness, which attracted even his opponents. His personal
appearance was even more charming; he was tall, handsome, and the
proprietor of a long and venerable beard. His private life was beyond
reproach, and he was devoted to the education of his family of two
sons and one daughter[121]. He appears to have completely achieved the
reconciliation of philosophy with worldly success.

More ascetic in temper was DIO of Prusa (circ. 40-117 A.D.), who was
first an opponent but afterwards a follower of Musonius[122]. A Stoic in
theory, a Cynic in practice, he assumed the shabby cloak, and wandered
as a physician of souls. His eloquence succeeded in calming a mutiny of
soldiers which followed on the death of Domitian, and won for him from
a following generation the title of the ‘golden-mouthed.’ He was held in
high honour both by Nerva and by Trajan. A large number of his harangues
are still extant.[123]


[Sidenote: Epictetus.]

=133.= The influence of such teachers was at any rate widespread, and if
we suspect that Stoicism was already losing its intensive force as it
extended the sphere of its influence, in this it did but obey what we
shall see to be its own law of creative activity[124]. We still have to
consider the two teachers who are of all the most famous and the most
familiar; not however because they most truly express the substance of
Stoicism, but because they have most deeply touched the feelings of
humanity. These are EPICTETUS of Hierapolis (circ. 50-130 A.D.) and
Marcus Aurelius, who later succeeded to the principate. The contrast
between their positions has often excited comment, since Epictetus was
born a slave, and only obtained his freedom in mature years, that is,
after the death of Nero in 68 A.D. In reality it is characteristic of
the times that so many men of foreign and even servile origin rose to
positions of eminence and became the associates and teachers of men
of high official rank. In the great slave households, in particular,
of imperial Rome unequalled opportunities lay open to talent; the
‘educational ladder’ was everywhere set up to encourage the youth to make
the best of his gifts. Further, just as young nobles were frequently
enamoured of slave girls, so far superior to the ladies of their own
class in wit, gentleness of manners, and loyalty in the face of all
terrors and temptations[125]; so their elders found a delight in the
company of the thoughtful and intellectual men who came to the front
through the competition of the slave schools. Thus the emperor Claudius
chose his ministers amongst his freedmen, provoking thereby the sneers
of the Roman aristocracy, but greatly advancing the good government of
the Roman empire; and it was Epaphroditus, himself a freedman of Nero,
who sent the young Epictetus to study at the feet of Musonius Rufus.
Epictetus was a man of warm feelings and clear head; his addresses,
recorded for us by his hearer Arrian, serve admirably to stimulate
the domestic virtues and to keep alive the religious spirit; but his
teaching lacks the force which befits the training of a statesman or a
king. In logic he inclines too much to suspense of judgment, in ethics
to resignation. But he did not altogether miss the Socratic force: in
his youth he had gone about inquiring of his neighbours if their souls
were in good health, and even when they replied ‘What is this to you, my
good man? Who are you?’ he had persisted in giving trouble. Only when
they raised their hands and gave him blows had he recognised that there
was something wanting in his method[126]. Other young philosophers, he
felt, lacked this energy, and were men of words, not deeds[127]. Like
other philosophers, he was expelled from Rome by Domitian in A.D. 89,
when he retired to Nicopolis; there he gave lectures till the time of his
death[128].


[Sidenote: His Cynism.]

=134.= Epictetus was a vigorous opponent of the group of young
philosophers who delighted to display their talent upon the intricacies
of the Stoic logic, and in his early youth he was taken to task by
his teacher Musonius for underrating this part of philosophy[129]. He
came however to see the great importance of a thorough training in the
methods of reasoning, so that in practical life a man should distinguish
the false from the true, as he distinguishes good coins from bad. In
physics he lays stress chiefly on theology, and the ‘will of God’ fills
a large place in his conception of the government of the world. In his
treatment of practical ethics he makes free use of illustrations from
the social life of his own day: he finds examples of Socratic strength
in the athlete and the gladiator; and he makes it clear that the true
philosopher is not (as many believe the Stoics to hold) a man devoid
of natural feeling, but on the contrary affectionate and considerate
in all the relations of life. He has a special respect for the Cynic,
who appears in his lectures not as the representative of a differing
philosophical system, but as philanthropist, teacher, comforter, and
missionary. There is indeed in the addresses of Epictetus a complete
fusion of Stoicism with Cynism; and we trace in them pictures not only
of the Cynic system as a whole, but also of individual teachers like
Antisthenes and Diogenes, profoundly different from and much more human
than the representations of them familiar through other literature; they
are in fact pictures of Cynic teachers passed down or idealized by the
members of their own sect. By their side stand the pictures of Ulysses
the sage and Heracles the purger of the world, as they must have been
described from generation to generation by Cynic orators to their hearers
amongst the poor and the unhappy.


[Sidenote: Arrian.]

=135.= In the second century A.D. the professed teachers of Stoicism
must have been very numerous; with the death of Domitian persecution had
passed away. The philosophers were everywhere held in high esteem, and
in turn their whole influence was used in support of the existing state
of society and the official religion. In the early part of the century
FLAVIUS ARRIANUS (circ. 90-175 A.D.) is the most eminent of Stoics; and
it was noted that his relation to his teacher Epictetus much resembled
that of Xenophon to Socrates. To him we owe the publication of the
‘discourses’ (διατριβαί) which he heard Epictetus deliver. In A.D. 124,
when lecturing at Athens, he won the favour of the emperor Hadrian, and
was appointed by him to high public offices, in which he shewed himself
a wise administrator and a skilful general; in A.D. 130 he received the
consulship; and later he withdrew to his native town of Nicomedia in
Bithynia, where he filled a local priesthood and devoted himself to the
production of works on history and military tactics. To Stoic doctrine he
made no direct contribution.

[Sidenote: Rusticus.]

After Arrian had given up the teaching of philosophy for public life
Q. JUNIUS RUSTICUS succeeded to the position he left vacant. To him,
amongst other teachers belonging to various philosophical schools, was
entrusted the education of the future emperor M. Aurelius, who gives us
the following picture of the teaching he received:

  ‘From Rusticus, I first conceived the need of moral correction
  and amendment; renounced sophistic ambitions and essays
  on philosophy, discourses provocative to virtue, or fancy
  portraitures of the sage or the philanthropist; learned to
  eschew rhetoric and poetry and fine language; not to wear full
  dress about the house, or other affectations of the kind; in my
  letters to keep to the simplicity of his own, from Sinuessa, to
  my mother; to be encouraging and conciliatory towards any one who
  was offended or out of temper, at the first offer of advances
  upon their side. He taught me to read accurately, and not to
  be satisfied with vague general apprehension; and not to give
  hasty assent to chatterers. He introduced me to the memoirs of
  Epictetus, presenting me with a copy from his own stores[130].’

In Rusticus we may confidently trace a successor of the school of
Musonius and Epictetus.


[Sidenote: Marcus Aurelius.]

=136.= M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS PIUS (121-180 A.D.) is commonly spoken
of as ‘the philosopher upon the throne,’ but this description may
be misleading. Aurelius was in the first instance a Roman prince;
to the institutions of Rome and to his own position as their chief
representative he owed his chief allegiance. He was undoubtedly an
apt pupil of the courtly philosophers by whom he was surrounded; he
deliberately chose philosophy in preference to rhetoric, and of the
various schools of philosophy his judgment ranked Stoicism highest. He
was fairly well instructed, but by no means learned, in its doctrines; he
adhered with sincerity, but without ardour, to its practical precepts. In
the leisure hours of a busy life it was his comfort and his relaxation
to express his musings in the form of philosophic reflections. But his
attitude towards Stoicism is always that of a judge rather than that of
an advocate; and much that the school received as convincing reasoning he
rejected as ingenious pleading. Hence a large part of Stoic doctrine, and
almost the whole of its detailed instruction, disappears from his view;
but we have the advantage that the last of the Stoic writers brings out
into clearer relief those features of this philosophy which could still
rivet attention in his own time, and which therefore form part of the
last message of the ancient world to the coming generations.


[Sidenote: His belief in the cosmos.]

=137.= It follows at once from the judicial attitude of Marcus Aurelius
that he cannot countenance the Stoic claim to certainty of knowledge. The
objection of opponents that the wise man, who alone (according to Stoic
theory) possesses such knowledge, is nowhere to be found, is sustained:

  ‘Things are so wrapped in veils, that to gifted philosophers
  not a few all certitude seems unattainable. Nay to the Stoics
  themselves such attainment seems precarious; and every act of
  intellectual assent is fallible; for where is the infallible
  man[131]?’

Yet Aurelius does not relapse into scepticism. One doctrine at least
is so convincing that he cannot for a moment doubt it; it does after
all shine forth as true by its own light. It is that all things are
ultimately one, and that man lives not in a chaos, but in a cosmos:

  ‘All things intertwine one with another, in a holy bond; scarce
  one thing is disconnected from another. In due coordination they
  combine for one and the same order. For the world-order is one
  made out of all things, and god is one pervading all, and being
  is one, and law is one, even the common reason of all beings
  possessed of mind, and truth is one: seeing that truth is the
  one perfecting of beings one in kind and endowed with the same
  reason[132].’

From the belief in a cosmos he is led on to a trust in Providence;
theoretically, because the doctrine of the chance clashing of atoms is
out of harmony with the belief in ultimate unity; practically, because
in such a conviction only man can find a starting-point for his own
activity. The choice is to him all-important; either Fortune or Reason is
king, and claims allegiance from all.

  ‘Is it the portion assigned to you in the universe, at which
  you chafe? Recall to mind the alternative—either a foreseeing
  providence, or blind atoms—and all the abounding proofs that the
  world is as it were a city[133].’

  ‘The world is either a welter of alternate combination and
  dispersion, or a unity of order and providence. If the former,
  why crave to linger on in such a random medley and confusion? why
  take thought for anything except the eventual “dust to dust”?
  why vex myself? do what I will, dispersion will overtake me. But
  on the other alternative I reverence, I stand steadfast, I find
  heart in the power that disposes all[134].’


[Sidenote: His piety.]

=138.= Aurelius makes full use of the Stoic proofs of the existence
of the gods, but it soon appears to us that his attachment to the
established religion was not in any way founded upon philosophical
arguments. In discussing this point he displays a certain heat which we
have not yet had occasion to notice:

  ‘If indeed they [the gods] take no thought for anything at all—an
  impious creed—then let us have done with sacrifice and prayer and
  oaths, and all other observances by which we own the presence and
  the nearness of the gods[135].’

Finally, he breaks away altogether from philosophy and rests his
convictions on personal experience:

  ‘To those who press the question, “Where have you seen the gods,
  whence your conviction of their existence, that you worship them
  as you do?” I reply—first, they are visible even to the bodily
  eye; secondly, neither have I set eyes upon my soul, and yet
  I do it reverence. So it is with the gods; from my continual
  experience of their power, I have the conviction that they exist,
  and yield respect[136].’

One further argument he held in reserve; the sword, the cross, and the
stake for the ‘atheists’ who refused to be convinced. He was, after all,
a king[137].


[Sidenote: Ethics.]

=139.= In ethics, Aurelius states the main principles of Stoicism with
clearness; but he altogether ignores the Stoic paradoxes, and does not
trouble himself with any detailed theory of the virtues and vices.
Firmness of character is to him the supreme good.

  ‘Be like the headland, on which the billows dash themselves
  continually; but it stands fast, till about its base the boiling
  breakers are lulled to rest. Say you, “How unfortunate for me
  that this should have happened”? Nay rather, “How fortunate,
  that in spite of this, I own no pang, uncrushed by the present,
  unterrified at the future!” The thing might have happened to any
  one, but not every one could have endured it without a pang[138].’

But in spite of these doctrines, we trace throughout his pages a tinge
of melancholy. Too apt a pupil of Epictetus, he had learnt from him the
principles of submission and resignation, but he had not acquired the
joyous confidence of an older period, through which the wise man, even
if a slave, felt himself a king. Rather, though a king, he felt himself
in truth a slave and a subject to the universe that was his master. He
would not go against the universal order, but he hardly felt the delight
of active cooperation. In this sense he represents to us the decadence
of Stoicism, or (to put it more correctly) Stoicism coloured by the
decadence of Rome.


[Sidenote: Absorption of the soul.]

=140.= On the question of continued existence after death Aurelius takes
up and emphasizes the teaching of Epictetus, ignoring the fact that other
Stoic teachers, from Zeno to Seneca, had taken larger views or at least
allowed themselves an ampler language. There had been, indeed, a change
in the point of view. The early Stoics, occupied with the question of
physics, had insisted upon the indestructibility of substance, and the
reuniting of the ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα) with the all-pervading spirit from
which it came at the beginning. The Roman school concerned itself more
with the question of individuality and personality. Accepting fully the
principle that that which is born must die, it comes to the definite
conclusion that that which we trace from the mother’s womb through
infancy and youth, through success and failure in life, through marriage
and the family ties onwards to weakness and dotage, must reach its end
in death. The ‘I’ cannot survive the body. The future existence of the
soul, if such there be, is no longer (as with Seneca) a matter of joyful
expectation, but of complete indifference.

Epictetus had expressed this with sufficient clearness:

  ‘Death is a change, not from the state which now is to that which
  is not, but to that which is not now. Shall I then no longer
  exist? You will not exist, but you will be something else, of
  which the world now has need; for you also came into existence,
  not when you chose, but when the world had need of you[139].’

Aurelius constantly repeats the doctrine in varied forms:

  ‘You exist but as a part inherent in a greater whole. You will
  vanish into that which gave you being; or rather, you will be
  re-transmuted into the seminal and universal reason[140].’

  ‘Death put Alexander of Macedon and his stable boy on a par.
  Either they were received into the seminal principles of the
  universe, or were alike dispersed into atoms[141].’


[Sidenote: Preparation for death.]

=141.= The saddened outlook of Marcus Aurelius upon life harmonizes
well with the resignation with which he contemplates a death, which for
himself individually will be the end. Hence it is that his reflections so
often make the thought of death a guiding principle of ethics; he who has
learnt to look forward calmly to his last act has learnt thereby to abide
patiently all the troubles which postpone it. Thus the last message of
the princely philosopher, as of his predecessor, is that men should ‘bear
and forbear’:

  ‘Contemn not death, but give it welcome; is not death too a part
  of nature’s will? As youth and age, as growth and prime, as
  the coming of teeth and beard and grey hairs, as begetting and
  pregnancy and the bearing of children, as all other operations
  of nature, even such is dissolution. Therefore the rational man
  should not treat death with impatience or repugnance or disdain,
  but wait for it as one of nature’s operations[142].’

  ‘O for the soul ready, when the hour of dissolution comes, for
  extinction or dispersion or survival! But such readiness must
  proceed from inward conviction[143].’

  ‘Serenely you await the end, be it extinction or transmutation.
  While the hour yet tarries, what help is there? what, but to
  reverence and bless the gods, to do good to men, “to endure and
  to refrain”? and of all that lies outside the bounds of flesh and
  breath, to remember that it is not yours, nor in your power[144].’


[Sidenote: His yearnings.]

=142.= Aurelius was no teacher of Stoicism in his time: his thoughts
are addressed to himself alone[145]. But the happy accident that has
preserved this work, which for nine centuries was lost to sight[146],
enables us to obtain a view of this philosophy from which otherwise we
should have been shut out. We do not go to Aurelius to learn what Stoic
doctrine was; this is taken for granted throughout the book; but we can
see here how it affected a man in whom the intellectual outlook was
after all foreshortened by sympathies and yearnings which had grown up
in his nature. The traditional criticism of the school as being harsh,
unsympathetic, unfeeling, breaks to pieces as we read these ‘thoughts’;
rather we find an excess of emotion, a surrender to human weakness. A
study of Stoicism based on the works of Aurelius alone would indeed
give us but a one-sided picture; but a study in which they were omitted
would certainly lack completeness. He is also our last authority. In the
centuries which succeeded, other waves of philosophic thought washed
over Stoicism, and contended in turn with more than one religion which
pressed in from the East. Yet for a long time to come Stoic principles
were faithfully inculcated in thousands of Roman homes, and young men
taught in childhood to model their behaviour upon the example of Zeno,
Cleanthes, and Epictetus formed the salt of the Roman world. If in riper
years they joined, in ever increasing numbers, the Christian church, they
brought with them something which the world could not afford to lose.


FOOTNOTES

[1] Dill, _Roman Society_, p. 340.

[2] ‘omnis natura habet quasi viam quandam et sectam quam sequatur’
Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 57. ‘est tuae prudentiae sequi eius auctoritatem,
cuius sectam atque imperium secutus es’ _ad Fam._ xiii 4, 2. ‘The sense
of the word has been obscured by a false popular etymology which has
connected the word with the Latin _secare_ ‘to cut,’ Skeat, _Etymological
Dictionary_, p. 537.

[3] See above, § 111.

[4] ‘dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria’ A. Gellius _N. A._ vi (vii) 14,
10.

[5] For a full account of his life and teaching see Schmekel,
_Philosophie der mittleren Stoa_, pp. 1-9.

[6] Strabo xiv 5, 16.

[7] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 51.

[8] ‘discipulus Antipatri Panaetius’ Cic. _Div._ i 3, 6.

[9] ‘credamus igitur Panaetio a Platone suo dissentienti? quem omnibus
locis divinum, quem sapientissimum, quem sanctissimum, quem Homerum
philosophorum appellat’ _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79.

[10] _Fin._ iv 28, 79.

[11] ‘tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem
sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit’ _ib._

[12] ἦν γὰρ ἰσχυρῶς φιλοπλάτων καὶ φιλοαριστοτέλης, ἀ[λλὰ κ]αὶ
παρ[ενέδ]ωκε τῶν Ζηνων[είω]ν τι δι[ὰ τὴ]ν Ἀκαδημίαν καὶ [τὸν Περίπ]ατον.
Ind. Herc. col. 61, quoted by Schmekel, p. 379.

[13] ‘quam vellem Panaetium nostrum nobiscum haberemus! qui cum cetera,
tum haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere’ Cic. _Rep._ i 10, 15.

[14] ‘ain’ tandem? etiam a Stoicis ista [de optima republica] tractata
sunt? non sane, nisi a [Diogene Stoico] et postea a Panaetio’ _Leg._ iii
6, 14.

[15] See below, § 310, note 52.

[16] ‘[accepi] Publi Africani in legatione illa nobili Panaetium unum
omnino comitem fuisse’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 2, 5.

[17] This date is determined on circumstantial evidence by Schmekel, pp.
2, 3.

[18] ‘Scylax Halicarnasseus, familiaris Panaeti, excellens in astrologia,
idemque in regenda sua civitate princeps’ Cic. _Div._ ii 42, 88.

[19] ‘omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae
cupidinem; in qua excellere pulchrum putamus; labi autem, errare,
nescire, decipi, et malum et turpe ducimus’ _Off._ i 6, 18; ‘cum sit is
[Panaetius], qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod honestum sit, quae autem
huic repugnent specie quadam utilitatis, eorum neque accessione meliorem
vitam fieri, neque decessione peiorem’ _ib._ iii 3, 12.

[20] ‘quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, id habet hanc, ut opinor,
sententiam, cum virtute congruere semper, cetera autem, quae secundum
naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent’ _Off._ iii 3,
13.

[21] ‘Panaetius, cum ad Q. Tuberonem de dolore patiendo scriberet ...
nusquam posuit non esse malum dolorem’ _Fin._ iv 9, 23; see however
below, § 322, note 132.

[22] See below, ch. xiii.

[23] ‘cuius [veri investigationis] studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra
officium est. virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit; a qua tamen
fit intermissio saepe, multique dantur ad studia reditus’ Cic. _Off._ i
6, 19.

[24] He was however a skilled grammarian; see Schmekel, p. 207.

[25] He wrote a book ‘on providence’; how far he or Posidonius is
Cicero’s authority for the treatment of the subject in _Nat. de._ ii has
been much disputed; on this point see Schmekel, p. 8, n. 4.

[26] ‘id de quo Panaetium addubitare dicebant, ut ad extremum omnis
mundus ignesceret’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 46, 118.

[27] Schmekel, p. 309, and below, § 211.

[28] Παναίτιος πιθανωτέραν εἶναι νομίζει καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρέσκουσαν αὑτῷ τὴν
ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τὴν τῶν ὅλων εἰς πῦρ μεταβολήν Ar. Did. fr. 36
(Diels).

[29] Schmekel, p. 309.

[30] ‘vim esse divinandi [Panaetius] dubitare se dixit’ Cic. _Div._ i 3,
6.

[31] He came from Apamea in Syria, but is often described as ‘of Rhodes,’
as the latter part of his life was spent there.

[32] Schmekel, pp. 9, 10.

[33] _ib._ p. 428.

[34] Reid, _Cic. Acad._ Introd. p. 5.

[35] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ ii 25, 61.

[36] _N. D._ i 44, 123; ii 34, 88.

[37] ‘ecce Posidonius, ut mea fert opinio, ex his qui plurimum
philosophiae contulerunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 90, 20.

[38] See below, § 195.

[39] Also the _de Divinatione_ and the first half of _Tusc. disp._ i;
Schmekel, p. 98, etc.

[40] ‘de divinatione libros edidit ... quinque noster Posidonius’ Cic.
_Div._ i 3, 6.

[41] ‘animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt, disiunguntque se a societate
divina, vinclis corporis impediti’ _ib._ 49, 110.

[42] ‘deflagrationem futuram aliquando caeli atque terrarum’ _ib._ 49,
111.

[43] See § 322, note 132.

[44] ὁ Ποσειδώνιος [τὸ τέλος εἶναι εἶπε] τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων
ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν Clem. _Strom._ ii p. 416 B (Schmekel, p. 270); see
also below, § 321, note 125.

[45] Schmekel, p. 62.

[46] See below, § 214.

[47] Diog. L. vii 90; Schmekel, pp. 291, 292.

[48] Diog. L. vii 127.

[49] Schmekel, p. 294.

[50] See below, § 352.

[51] ‘plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium quaestionum;
sitne boni viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non alere? in
utramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad extremum utilitate officium
dirigit magis quam humanitate’ Cic. _Off._ iii 23, 89.

[52] _ib._ 23, 90.

[53] ‘nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri, | quo me cunque rapit
tempestas, deferor hospes’ Hor. _Ep._ i 1, 14 and 15.

[54] ‘qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 22, 69;
cf. _de Or._ i 11, 45.

[55] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 52 (Schmekel, p. 16); but see Pauly-Wissowa
s. v.

[56] i.e. the earlier part of the first century B.C.

[57] Diog. L. vii 34.

[58] ‘mihi nimis videtur submisisse temporibus se Athenodorus, nimis cito
refugisse’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 4, i.

[59] ‘apud Athenodorum inveni:—tunc scito esse te omnibus cupiditatibus
solutum cum eo perveneris, ut nihil deum roges, nisi quod rogare possis
palam’ _Ep._ 10, 5. But it is possible that the quotations are from the
younger Athenodorus.

[60] Cic. _Off._ ii 24, 86; but some think that Cato’s friend was an
earlier Antipater.

[61] Plutarch, _Cato minor_ 65-67 and 69.

[62] Reid, _Academics_, p. 2.

[63] ‘Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi, qui mecum vivit
tot annos, qui habitat apud me, quem et admiror et diligo?’ Cic. _Ac._ ii
36, 115.

[64] _ad Att._ ii 20, 6.

[65] _Tusc. disp._ v 39, 113.

[66] vii 1, 2, 24 and 28.

[67] ‘verba haec Hieroclis Stoici, viri sancti et gravis: ἡδονὴ τέλος,
πόρνης δόγμα· οὐκ ἔστιν πρόνοια, οὐδὲ πόρνης δόγμα’ A. Gellius, _N. A._
ix 5, 8.

[68] For a fair-minded estimate of Cicero’s services to philosophy see
Reid, _Academics of Cicero_, pp. 10-28.

[69] See next section.

[70] ‘de tertio [cum utile et honestum inter se pugnare videantur] nihil
scripsit [Panaetius]. eum locum Posidonius persecutus. ego autem et eius
librum arcessivi, et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi, ut ad me τὰ κεφάλαια
mitteret’ Cic. _ad Att._ xvi 11, 4. ‘Athenodorum nihil est quod hortere;
misit enim satis bellum ὑπόμνημα’ _ib._ 14, 4.

[71] He was head of the Academy at Athens, where Cicero heard him in the
year 79-78 B.C., and was patronized by Lucullus.

[72] ‘eadem dicit quae Stoici’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 22, 69. ‘erat, si perpauca
mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus’ _ib._ 42, 132. See further J. S. Reid,
_Academics of Cicero_, Introd. pp. 15-19, and notes to _Ac._ ii 39, 123
and 40, 126.

[73] ‘Brutus tuus, auctore Aristo et Antiocho, non sentit hoc [sc. nihil
esse, nisi virtutem, bonum]’ _Tusc. disp._ v 8, 21. ‘si addubitas, ad
Brutum transeamus, est enim is quoque Antiochius’ _ad Att._ xiii 25, 3.
See also below, § 432.

[74] ‘tu nihil errabis, si paulo diligentius (ut quid sit εὐγένεια, quid
ἐξοχή intelligas), Athenodorus Sandonis filius quid de his rebus dicat,
attenderis’ _ad Fam._ iii 7, 5.

[75] For the identification of the writer Didymus with Areius the
‘philosophus’ of Augustus, see Diels, _Proleg._ pp. 80-88.

[76] ‘[Augustus] eruditione etiam varia repletus per Arei philosophi
filiorumque eius Dionysi et Nicanoris contubernium’ Suet. _Aug._ 89.

[77] _Sat._ ii 6, 73-76.

[78] Sen. _Dial._ vi 4 and 5; see below, § 377.

[79] ‘Empedocles, an Stertinium deliret acumen’ Hor. _Ep._ i 12, 20;
‘insanis et tu, stultique prope omnes, | si quid Stertinius veri crepat’
_Sat._ ii 3, 32 and 33.

[80] Teuffel, _Röm. Lit._ 250, 4.

[81] ‘ne me Crispini scrinia lippi | compilasse putes’ Hor. _Sat._ i 1,
120 and 121.

[82] Teuffel, as above, 3.

[83] Hor. _Sat._ ii 3.

[84] Hor. _Ep._ i 1, 108.

[85] ‘sublimem altioremque humano fastigio [Attalum] credidi’ Sen. _Ep._
108, 13.

[86] Sen. _Ep._ 108, 14-16.

[87] _ib._ 110, 14-20.

[88] ‘Attalus Stoicus dicere solebat; malo me fortuna in castris suis
quam in deliciis habeat’ _ib._ 67, 15.

[89] Sen. Rhet. _Suas._ 2, 12.

[90] ‘teneros tu suscipis annos | Socratico, Cornute, sinu ... tecum
etenim longos memini consumere soles, | et tecum primas epulis decerpere
noctes. | unum opus et requiem pariter disponimus ambo, | atque verecunda
laxamus seria mensa. | ... nescio quod certe est, quod me tibi temperat,
astrum’ Pers. _Sat._ v 36-51.

[91] See above, § 124.

[92] Sen. _Ep._ 108, 17.

[93] _ib._ 13-23.

[94] ‘sapientem esse me dico? minime’ _Dial._ xii 5, 2; ‘multum ab homine
tolerabili, nedum a perfecto, absum’ _Ep._ 57, 3; ‘ego in alto vitiorum
omnium sum’ _Dial._ vii 17, 4.

[95] ‘si respublica corruptior est quam ut adiuvari possit, ... non
nitetur sapiens in supervacuum’ _ib._ viii 3, 3.

[96] ‘in hoc me recondidi et fores clusi, ut prodesse pluribus possem.
posterorum negotium ago. illis aliqua, quae possint prodesse, conscribo.
salutares admonitiones litteris mando, esse illas efficaces in meis
ulceribus expertus. rectum iter, quod sero cognovi et lassus errando,
aliis monstro’ _Ep._ 8, 1 to 3.

[97] ‘cuius libros adtingere nullum pretium operae sit, quod oratio eius
vulgaria videatur et protrita, res atque sententiae aut inepto inanique
impetu sint aut levi et causidicali argutia, eruditio autem vernacula et
plebeia’ A. Gellius, _N. A._ xii 2, 1.

[98] Quint. _Inst. Orat._ x 1, 125-158.

[99] ‘potioribus praeferri non sinebam’ _ib._ 126.

[100] ‘tum autem hic solus fere in manibus adulescentium fuit’ _ib._ 125.

[101] ‘eandem sententiam miliens alio atque alio amictu indutam referunt’
Fronto, p. 157.

[102] How capable Seneca was of continuous exposition we may gather from
his excellent discussion of the ‘causes’ of Aristotle and Plato, in
_Epistle_ 65: see below.

[103] ‘non quia mihi legem dixerim nihil contra dictum Zenonis
Chrysippive committere, sed quia res ipsa patitur me ire in illorum
sententiam’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 3, 1; ‘nostram [opinionem] accipe. nostram
autem cum dico, non adligo me ad unum aliquem ex Stoicis proceribus. est
et mihi censendi ius’ _ib._ vii 3, 2.

[104] ‘si omnia argumenta ad obrussam coeperimus exigere, silentium
indicetur; pauca enim admodum sunt sine adversario’ Sen. _N. Q._ iv 5, 1.

[105] ‘non tempero mihi, quominus omnes nostrorum ineptias proferam’
_ib._ iv 6, 1.

[106] See the notes to § 177.

[107] ‘si hominem videris interritum periculis, intactum cupiditatibus,
inter adversa felicem, in mediis tempestatibus placidum, ex superiore
loco homines videntem, ex aequo deos, non subibit te eius veneratio? ...
non potest res tanta sine adminiculo numinis stare’ _Ep._ 41, 4 and 5.

[108] See below, § 209, note 112.

[109] ‘idem facit sapiens; nocituram potentiam vitat, hoc primum cavens,
ne cavere videatur’ _Ep._ 14, 8; ‘circumspiciendum ergo nobis est,
quomodo a vulgo tuti esse possimus’ _ib._ 9.

[110] A. Gellius, _N. A._ v 1, 3 and 4.

[111] Epict. _Disc._ iii 23, 29.

[112] Stob. iii 1, 48.

[113] _ib._ 5, 21.

[114] Specimens are given below, especially in ch. xv.

[115] Tac. _Ann._ xiv 59; Henderson, _Nero_, p. 143.

[116] Tac. _Ann._ xv 71.

[117] _Hist._ iii 81.

[118] ‘reipublicae haud dubie intererat Vitellium vinci’ _ib._ 86.

[119] See below, § 447.

[120] _Disc._ iii 15, 8; _Manual_ 29.

[121] Pliny, _Ep._ i 10.

[122] ‘quid nostra memoria Euphrates, Dio, Timocrates, Athenodotus? quid
horum magister Musonius? nonne summa facundia praediti, neque minus
sapientiae quam eloquentiae gloria incluti extiterunt?’ Fronto, _Ep. ad
Aur._ i 1 (Naber, p. 115).

[123] See _Leben und Werke Dion’s von Prusa_, by H. von Arnim. Berlin,
1898.

[124] See below, § 216.

[125] See the story of Epicharis in connexion with the conspiracy of
Piso, in Tac. _Ann._ xv 57.

[126] Epict. _Disc._ ii 12, 17 to 25.

[127] ‘plerosque istos, qui philosophari viderentur, philosophos esse
eiuscemodi “ἄνευ τοῦ πράττειν, μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν”; id significat “factis
procul, verbis tenus” A. Gellius, _N. A._ xvii 19, 1.

[128] _ib._ xv 11, 4 and 5.

[129] Epict. _Disc._ i 7, 32 and 33.

[130] M. Aurelius, _To himself_, i 7 (Rendall’s translation).

[131] _To himself_, v 10.

[132] _ib._ vii 9.

[133] _ib._ iv 3.

[134] M. Aurelius, _To himself_, vi 10.

[135] _ib._ vi 44.

[136] See further, §§ 457 and 458.

[137] M. Aurelius, _To himself_, xii 28.

[138] _ib._ iv 49.

[139] Epict. _Disc._ iii 24, 93 and 94.

[140] M. Aurelius, _To himself_, iv 14.

[141] _ib._ vi 24.

[142] _ib._ ix 3.

[143] _ib._ xi 3.

[144] _ib._ v 33.

[145] Rendall, _M. Aurelius_, Introd. p. cxii.

[146] _ib._ cxv.



CHAPTER VI.

OF REASON AND SPEECH.


[Sidenote: Parts of philosophy.]

=143.= The history of Greek philosophy, even before the time of Zeno,
leads naturally to its division into the three parts of logic, physics,
and ethics[1]. The Ionic philosophers had chiefly occupied themselves
with the nature and history of the universe, that is, with the problems
of physics. The sophists were greatly concerned with questions as to the
validity of human knowledge, that is, with logic. Socrates shared this
interest, but attached greater importance to the discussion of moral
activities, that is, to ethics. It is however not clear when a formal
division into these three parts was first made. Cicero attributes it to
the immediate followers of Plato in the Academic school; others assign it
definitely to Xenocrates[2]. The Peripatetics and Stoics both adopted the
division, but whereas the former assigned to Logic an inferior position,
making it an introduction to philosophy, the Stoics insist that it is
a part of philosophy itself[3]; and that of the three parts it comes
first in the order of study, ‘as in the measuring of corn we place first
the examination of the measure[4].’ It must not however be thought that
the three parts of philosophy can be separately treated, for they are
intertwined[5]; so that in treating of Logic we shall constantly have
need to assume a general knowledge of Stoic views both on physics and
ethics. Logic is subdivided into ‘dialectic,’ which deals with reasoning,
and ‘rhetoric,’ the art of speech. The relation between reason and speech
was in ancient times, as now, a matter of perplexity; but it may be taken
as a fundamental position of Stoicism that the two should always be in
agreement.


[Sidenote: Knowledge is attainable.]

=144.= Stoicism, as one of the positive and dogmatic schools, assumes
that knowledge is attainable. Since this is the very point on which
Socrates never reached assurance, except on the one particular that
he himself knew nothing, it was a matter of primary importance to the
Stoics to make good this position; more especially since they held (this
time in agreement with Socrates) that virtue is but another form of
knowledge. Yet the Stoics could not agree with the Cynics, that true
knowledge can be imparted without a study of its method[6]. Knowledge
is, in their view, a high privilege derived by man from his divine
ancestry, and shared by him with the deity alone; and the whole duty of
man may be summed up by saying that he should keep upright his reason[7].
They therefore devoted themselves with special zeal to this part of
philosophy[8], and were accordingly nicknamed ‘the dialecticians[9].’
Their aim in this was solely the ascertainment and imparting of truth;
but the common view that their style was in consequence harsh and
repellent will be found to need considerable qualification[10].


[Sidenote: Are the senses true?]

=145.= The chief argument for the certainty of knowledge is that we
assume as much in the practical affairs of life[11]; and (as we have
already seen) Aristo found it ridiculous that his Academic neighbour
should not even know who he was[12]. Against it is the fact that men
frequently disagree even as to what they see, and commonly distinguish
between what is known to them and what ‘seems’ to be this or that. Hence
Epictetus well defines the function of dialectic as

  ‘a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an
  inquiry into the cause of this disagreement; a condemnation and
  distrust of that which only seems, and some kind of investigation
  of that which seems, as to whether it rightly seems: and the
  discovery of some rule (κανών)[13].’

Of all kinds of knowledge that which comes through the senses appears to
the ordinary man most worthy of confidence, and of the five senses that
of sight seems to the philosopher the most divine[14]. In consequence,
the whole controversy hinges on the question whether the eyes can be
trusted. The positivist argues that the evidence of sight is so plain and
unmistakeable that man, if he had the choice, could wish for no better
informant. The sceptic replies that nevertheless, if a straight oar be
placed partly in the water, it appears to the eyes to be bent; and that
the feathers on a dove’s neck, though really alike, appear to the eyes as
many-coloured[15]. To deal with such questions we must examine closely
the nature of sensation.


[Sidenote: Process of sensation.]

=146.= The Stoics fancifully derive the word αἴσθησις (‘sensation’) from
εἴσθεσις (‘storage’); it is therefore, strictly speaking, the process
by which the mind is stored[16]; but it is also, from an opposite point
of view, the process by which the mind reaches out towards an external
object[17]. From the object (αἰσθητόν) proceed waves which strike upon
the sense-organ (αἰσθητήριον); this impact is called a ‘sensation’
in a narrower sense. At the same time there proceeds from the mind
(which is the ruling part or ‘principate’ of the soul), a ‘spirit’ or
thrill which goes out to meet this impact; and this spirit and its
operation are also called ‘sensation[18].’ As a result of the contact
of these two waves, and simultaneously with it, there is produced in
the soul an effect like the imprint of a seal[19], and this imprint is
the φαντασία or ‘mind-picture.’ That the process may be sound, it is
necessary that the intellect be in a healthy state, and further that
the organ of sense be healthy, the object really there, and the place
and the manner in accord[20]. But we must carefully distinguish between
the single sensation and the mind-picture. A flash of light, a cry, a
touch, a smell, a thrill of pleasure or pain, is always that which the
senses declare it to be[21]; here there is no possibility of error; so
understood ‘the sensations are always true[22].’ But if we go in each
case a step further; if we say ‘that is white,’ ‘this is sweet,’ ‘this is
musical,’ ‘this is fragrant,’ ‘that is rough,’ we are now dealing with
mind-pictures, not with ‘sensations’ in the strict sense[23]. And as to
the mind-pictures we agree with the Academics that things are not always
what they seem; ‘of the mind-pictures some are true, some are false[24].’


[Sidenote: The criterion of clearness.]

=147.= In order then that we may distinguish the true mind-picture from
the false, we have need of a ‘rule’ (κανών) or ‘criterion’ (κριτήριον).
The true mind-picture is a stirring of the soul, which reveals both
what is taking place in the soul and the object which has caused this:
just as light reveals both itself and the objects that lie within
its range[25]. On the other hand the false mind-picture is an empty
twitching of a soul which is not in a healthy condition[26]; no real
object corresponds to it, but to that which appears to be an object
corresponding to it we give the name ‘phantasm[27].’ When Orestes
thinks he sees the Furies leaping upon him, though his sister assures
him that in real truth he sees nothing, the vision of the Furies is a
phantasm. The appearances of dreams are equally phantasms[28]. Now a
true mind-picture differs from that of a phantasm by being clearer;
or, in other words, the distinctive note of a true mind-picture is its
‘clearness’ (ἐνάργεια, _perspicuitas_)[29]. Clearness then is a quality
which attaches itself to a true vision in a way in which it can never
attach itself to a work of phantasy[30]. To this clearness the mind
cannot but bow[31]; it is therefore (so far as our study has proceeded)
the criterion of truth[32].


[Sidenote: Assent.]

=148.= The mind-picture as such is not within a man’s control; but
it rests with him to decide whether he will give it his ‘assent’
(συγκατάθεσις, _adsensio_ or _adsensus_)[33]. This assent is therefore
an act of the soul, in its capacity as will; and can only be rightly
exercised by a soul properly strung, that is, possessed of due tension.
Assent wrongly given leads to ‘opinion’ (δόξα, _opinio_), and all wrong
assent is error or ‘sin’ (ἁμαρτία, _peccatum_). This error may take place
in two directions, either by a hasty movement of the will (προπίπτειν),
giving assent to a picture which is not really clear; or by feebleness of
will, which leads to assent in a false direction (διαψεύδεσθαι)[34]. Even
haste however is a form of weakness, so that we may say that all opining
is a weak form of assent[35]. To ensure a right assent due attention
should be given to each of its parts; it includes (i) the intention of
mastering the object (πρόθεσις); (ii) careful attention directed to the
object, or ‘application’ (ἐπιβολή); and (iii) assent in the narrower
sense[36]. Apart from assent, three courses remain open: these are (i)
‘quiescence’ (ἡσυχάζειν, _quiescere_): (ii) ‘suspense of judgment’
(ἐπέχειν, _adsensum sustinere)_, which is a settled quiescence; and (iii)
negation[37].


[Sidenote: Comprehension.]

=149.= Close upon assent follows ‘comprehension’ (κατάληψις,
_comprehensio_): this is the ratification of the assent given, the
fixing irrevocably in the mind of the picture approved. This picture now
becomes a ‘comprehension-picture’ (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία), and as such a
unit of knowledge. We may understand thereby that the mind has grasped
the external object[38], and this is the plain meaning of Zeno’s simile;
or we may say that the object has gained a hold upon the mind, and has
left its stamp upon it. Both interpretations are consistent with Stoic
doctrine: but the former view, which represents the soul as active and
masterful, undoubtedly expresses the more adequately the meaning of the
school[39]. From this mutual grasp there follows an important physical
deduction. Since only like can grasp like, the soul must be like the
object, and the popular dualism of mind and matter is (to this extent)
at an end[40]. Still this likeness is not complete; and the soul in
sensation does not grasp the object from every point of view, but only
so far as its own nature permits in each case[41]. For this reason the
trained observer and the artist grasp far more of the object than the
ordinary man[42].


[Sidenote: From sensation to reason.]

=150.= The soul, having grasped single mind-pictures, retains its
hold upon them by memory[43]; the frequent exercise of which keeps
each picture fresh and complete[44]. As the air, when an orchestra is
performing, receives the impression of many sounds at the same time, and
yet retains the distinctive tone of each[45], so the soul by concurrent
alterations of its texture preserves its hold on the separate pictures
it has once grasped. Fresh operations of soul now supervene. First, from
the comparison of many like pictures, comes ‘experience’ (ἐμπειρία,
_experientia_)[46]; out of other comparisons, ‘similitude’ (ὁμοιότης),
as ‘Socrates’ from his portrait; and ‘analogy’ (ἀναλογία, _proportio_),
as ‘the centre of the earth’ from that of other spheres; ‘transference’
(μετάθεσις, _translatio_), as ‘eyes in the heart’; ‘composition’
(σύνθεσις, _compositio_), as ‘a Hippocentaur’; ‘opposition’ (ἐναντίωσις,
_transitio_), as ‘death’ from life; ‘deprivation’ (κατὰ στέρησιν),
as ‘a cripple[47].’ All these are based on the general principle of
likeness and unlikeness, and may be summed up under the general heading
of ‘reason’s work of comparison’ (_collatio rationis_)[48], or shortly,
of reason (λόγος)[49]. Sensation shews us the present only; but reason
brings the past and the future within our view, and points out to us the
workings of cause and effect[50].


[Sidenote: Perceptions and Conceptions.]

=151.= With the mind-pictures (φαντασίαι, _visa_) which are derived from
sensation we may now contrast the ‘notions’ (ἔννοιαι, _notiones_ or
_intellegentiae_) which are derived from the combination of sensation and
reasoning; the former correspond generally to ‘perceptions,’ the latter
to ‘conceptions’ in the language of modern philosophy[51]. But each of
the Stoic terms is also used in a wider sense which includes the other.
The sensory pictures are inscribed upon the mind as upon a blank sheet
from birth upwards; in this sense they may well be called ‘entries on
the mind’ (ἔννοια from ἐν νῷ)[52]. On the other hand the conceptions may
be called ‘rational mind-pictures’[53]; quite as much as the sensory
mind-pictures they need the prudent assent of the will before they become
‘comprehensions,’ when they are once more units capable of entering
into further combinations and becoming part of scientific knowledge.
If then for the sake of clearness we use the modern terms, we may say
that perceptions correspond generally to individual objects which have
a real existence, whilst conceptions correspond to classes of things,
which (according to the Stoics) have no real existence in themselves, but
only a sort of existence in our minds. Thus the ‘ideas’ of Plato are all
conceptions, subjectively but not objectively existent[54]. So far as our
study has gone, all conceptions are based on perceptions: therefore all
the elements of knowledge either come from sense and experience solely,
or from sense and experience combined with reasoning[55]; and the most
important reasoning process is that comparison of like perceptions which
in this philosophy takes the place of induction[56].


[Sidenote: Preconceptions.]

=152.= But even if all ‘conceptions’ are ultimately derived from
‘perceptions,’ it does not follow that in each particular case the mind
commences _de novo_ to collect and shape its material. On the contrary,
it is clear that not only all practical life, but also all philosophy,
takes for granted a great many matters which are either allowed by
general consent, or at least assumed by the thinker; and these matters
are mostly of the nature of class-conceptions. If it is stated that
‘the consul entered Rome in a chariot drawn by four horses,’ we assume
that the ideas expressed by ‘consul,’ ‘chariot,’ ‘four,’ ‘horses,’ are
matters of general consent, and we may go on to assume that the person
of the consul and the locality called ‘Rome’ are also already known to
the speaker and his hearers. The general term in the post-Aristotelian
writers for such legitimate assumptions is ‘preconception’ (πρόληψις,
_anticipatio_ or _praesumptio_). The precise meaning of this term (of
which the invention is ascribed to Epicurus[57]) appears not to be
always the same. Most commonly the ‘preconception’ is a general term
or conception, and therefore to the Stoics it is one variety of the
ἔννοια; it is ‘a mental shaping, in accordance with man’s nature, of
things general’[58]. All such preconceptions are foreshadowings of
truth, especially in so far as they correspond to the common judgment of
mankind[59]; and the art of life consists in correctly applying these
presumptions to the particular circumstances with which each individual
man has to deal[60]. If the preconceptions are rightly applied, they
become clearer by use, and thus attain the rank of true knowledge by a
process of development or ‘unravelling’ (_enodatio_)[61].

As to the nature of a preconception, there is a great difference
between Epicurus and the Stoics. Epicurus identifies all the terms
‘preconception,’ ‘comprehension,’ ‘right opinion,’ ‘conception,’ and
‘general notion,’ and maintains that each of these is nothing but memory
of a sensation frequently repeated[62]; the Stoics however hold that
preconceptions are established by the mind[63], and (so far as they
are common to all men) by the universal reason. This difference is
fundamental. Epicurus, as a materialist in the modern sense, explains
perception as a bodily function, and ‘conceptions’ of every kind as mere
echoes of such bodily functions. The Stoics on the other hand recognise
at each stage the activity of mind, and this in increasing degree as we
proceed to the higher levels of thought.


[Sidenote: Notions of inner growth.]

=153.= We now approach the most critical point in the Stoic theory of
knowledge. Is it possible for man to possess knowledge which is not
derived, either directly or indirectly, through the organs of sense?
Such a question cannot be answered by any appeal to single Stoic texts;
it needs an appreciation of the whole philosophic outlook, and upon
it depend the most vital principles of the system. Let us then first
consider, on the supposition that such knowledge exists, what its nature
is, what its content, and how it is attained by individual men. Knowledge
cut off from the sense-organs is cut off from all human individuality;
it is therefore the expression of the common reason (κοινὸς λόγος), and
its parts are ‘common notions’ (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι or προλήψεις), shared
by gods and men, but by men only so far as they are partakers of the
divine nature. The principal content of such knowledge is also clear;
it includes the conception of what is morally good, and the beliefs
that gods exist and that the world is governed by their providence[64].
Lastly, as of all general conceptions, the rudiments or rough outlines
only of these beliefs are inborn in men, by virtue of their divine
ancestry; whence they are called ‘innate notions’ (ἔμφυτοι ἔννοιαι,
_insitae notiones_)[65]. These notions in their full development are not
attainable by children at all, nor by men till they attain to reason,
that is, till they become wise men[66].


[Sidenote: ‘Proofs’ of inborn notions.]

=154.= The Stoics are naturally reluctant to admit that doctrines which
it is impious to deny are nevertheless unattainable except by perfect
wisdom; but their whole system points inevitably to this conclusion. But
there are intermediate stages between the rough inborn outlines of these
truths and their ripe completeness. As man grows in reason, he becomes
increasingly able to appreciate contributory truths, derived from the
combination of perception and reasoning, that is, by processes such as
‘analogy’ and ‘comparison,’ which point in the direction of the supreme
beliefs. In this sense, and (it is here suggested) in this sense only,
can there be ‘proofs’ (ἀποδείξεις) of these[67]. Only in the crowning
moment of that probation which is described later on, at the moment
of conversion, these truths finally flash forth, stirred up indeed by
secondary evidence, but really rooted in the man’s deepest nature[68];
they then reveal themselves to the soul with an illuminating power which
is all their own, but which carries with it the most complete conviction.
Ordinary men must meanwhile somehow make shift with reflections or pale
copies of this knowledge, to which however the name of common or inborn
notions can also be applied.


[Sidenote: The inward touch.]

=155.= The list of ‘common notions’ is doubtless not limited to the
high philosophical principles which we have mentioned; for instance it
must include such mathematical principles as ‘two and two make four,’
‘a straight line is the shortest distance between two points,’ ‘a
three-sided figure has three angles,’ and so forth. With these however
we have little direct concern. Of more interest to us is another kind of
perception[69] recognised by the Stoics as well as by other schools of
philosophy, that called the ‘inward touch’ (ἐντὸς ἁφή)[70]. By this the
soul becomes aware of its own workings, most obviously of its pleasure
and pain. The doctrine of the ‘inward touch’ is of great philosophical
importance, for it breaks down the dualism of subject and object, the
barrier between the knowing and the known. Since these are the same
in the specific cases named, the door is open to the conclusion that
everywhere there is a kinship between the two, and that without this
knowledge would be without firm foundation. By this kinship we may also
explain the fact that direct communications are made by the deity to man,
as by dreams, oracles and augury[71].


[Sidenote: Knowledge; the parts and the whole.]

=156.= Thus it appears that the elements of knowledge, according to the
Stoics, are sensations, perceptions, conceptions or notions, and general
or inborn notions. As in the other parts of the Stoic philosophy, we
shall regard this fourfold division as indicating generally the ground
covered, and not as setting up definite lines of demarcation. The same
material may be analyzed from other points of view, as for instance in
the study of words, in which we shall find a division into objects,
statements, conditional statements, and syllogisms. The elements may
also be combined in various ways. A combination or ‘system’ (σύστημα)
which is directed towards a useful or pleasurable object, such as
music or grammar, is called an ‘art’ (τέχνη, _ars_)[72]; and arts are
attainable by ordinary men. The wise man, on the other hand, is not
necessarily acquainted with the several arts; his practice is to ‘keep
quiet’ when matters are discussed which require such special knowledge.
The combination of all knowledge in one all-embracing system is
‘science’ (ἐπιστήμη, _scientia_); the only science in the full sense is
philosophy[73]; and in this system no part can be at variance with any
other part[74]. The elements of knowledge also acquire the character of
science, when they are found to be parts of this compacted system, and
therefore incapable of coming into conflict with any other part[75]; and
in particular we find the term ‘science’ predicated of comprehensions
which are firmly established and cannot be refuted by any argument[76].
In the language of Zeno’s simile, over the closed fist that grasps the
object is placed the other hand, keeping it with firmness and assurance
in its place[77]; or, to use a comparison first suggested in ridicule of
Stoicism, but which by the progress of architectural skill has since then
been made less damaging, science is like a firm and immoveable building
constructed upon a shifting foundation[78]. Finally ordinary men can
reach comprehension, but only the wise man can attain to science[79].


[Sidenote: The criterion reviewed.]

=157.= We revert to the difficult problem of the criterion of truth, that
is, the discovery of a rule by which the true can separated from the
false. Our authorities differ greatly as to what the Stoic criterion is;
and this vacillation must have placed the Stoics at a great disadvantage
in their controversy with the Academics, who maintain that there is
no criterion. The most usual statement is that the ‘comprehensive
mind-picture’ (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) is the criterion; this view is
expressly attributed to Chrysippus, Antipater, and Apollodorus[80]. As
we have seen, the meaning of this is that a true mind-picture can be
distinguished from one that is false by the note of clearness, and this
general doctrine can be traced back to Zeno[81]. It appears at first
sight to provide a criterion which can be applied by the percipient at
the moment when it is needed, and it was doubtless intended to be a
practical tool in this sense; but under the pressure of criticism the
Stoics were frequently compelled to modify it. They could not but admit
that in the case of dreams and drunken visions it is only at a later
moment that the lack of clearness can be appreciated[82]; whereas on the
other hand a picture may be perfectly clear, and yet the percipient,
because of some prepossession, may not realize this. Such was the case
when Hercules brought Alcestis from the world below; her husband Admetus
received a true mind-picture of her, but put no confidence in it, because
he knew her to be dead. It follows that no mind-picture can be implicitly
trusted for itself; for our sense organs may be clouded, or our previous
experience in conflict with it. If the Academics urged that the sure note
of clearness is not to be found in the senses[83], the Stoics admitted
as much when they now said that a true comprehensive picture must come
from a real object[84], when they added the words that ‘no objection must
arise[85]’; thus really admitting that it must be not only persuasive,
but also such as no reasoning process can shake, and such as has been
examined from all sides[86]. Thus they shifted the centre of certainty
from the single comprehension to the general field of science; they still
held to it in theory, but no longer maintained its practical application.
For this too they had the authority of the older masters. For we learn on
the authority of Posidonius that ‘some of the older Stoics’ held the true
criterion to be ‘right reason’ (ὀρθὸς λόγος)[87], and this is equivalent
to saying that only the deity and the wise man possess the secret[88]. In
a loose sense any important part of the Stoic theory of reason may be
said to be a criterion; thus Chrysippus again said that ‘the criteria are
sensation and preconception,’ and Boethus set up many criteria, as mind,
sense, science, and (in practical matters) appetite[89].


[Sidenote: General consent.]

=158.= Seeing that the full assurance of truth is not at every moment
attainable, it is necessary to be contented from time to time with
something less complete. Amongst such tests the ‘general consent of
mankind’ plays an important part, especially in connexion with the dogma
‘that gods exist.’ We may indeed well believe that this criterion was
not originally suggested by revolutionary philosophers, but rather by
conservative advocates of an established religion; and therefore we are
not surprised to see it emphasized first by Posidonius and afterwards by
Seneca[90]. General consent is however by itself no proof of truth, but
at most an indication of the presence of a ‘common notion’ in its rough
shape. If however we see that the ‘common notion’ grows stronger and more
clear every day, and if it is the more firmly held as men approach the
standard of wisdom, it becomes a strong support[91].


[Sidenote: Probability the guide of life.]

=159.= From a very early period, as we have already indicated, Stoic
teachers accepted probability as the guide of life in its details, being
perhaps aided by the happy ambiguity of the expression ‘reasonableness’
(τὸ εὔλογον), which suggests formally the pursuit of reason, but in
practice is a justification of every course of which a plausible defence
can be brought forward. Ptolemy Philopator, we are told, jestingly put
wax fruit before Sphaerus at his table, and when Sphaerus tried to eat
it cried out that he was giving his assent to a false mind-picture.
Sphaerus replied that he had not assented to the picture ‘this is
fruit,’ but only to the picture ‘this is probably fruit[92].’ Antipater
of Tarsus, when he explained that the very essence of virtue lay in
the choice of natural ends upon probable grounds[93], was felt to be
giving way to Carneades[94]. Panaetius justified the maintaining of that
which is plausible by the advocate, and Cicero, whose own conscience was
not at ease in the matter, was glad enough to quote so respectable an
authority on his own behalf[95]. In the Roman imperial period a growing
spirit of humility and pessimism led to a general disparagement of human
knowledge, centring in attacks on the trustworthiness of the senses.
So Seneca speaks of the ‘usual weakness’ of the sense of sight[96],
and Marcus Aurelius feels that ‘the organs of sense are dim and easily
imposed upon[97].’ The older Stoics had admitted the frequent errors of
the senses[98], but they had been confident they could surmount this
difficulty. Their latest disciples had lost the courage to do this, and
in consequence the practice of ‘suspension of judgment,’ which before
had been the exception[99], became with them the rule. Nevertheless
Epictetus, who alone amongst these later Stoics was an ardent student of
dialectics, held fast to the main principle that certainty is attainable.
‘How indeed’ he said ‘perception is effected, whether through the whole
body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain, for both opinions perplex me.
But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty[100].’


[Sidenote: Grammar.]

=160.= Having now dealt with the theory of knowledge, we may consider
briefly the subordinate sciences (or rather ‘arts’) of Grammar, Logic (in
the narrower sense), and Style. Here we may leave the technical divisions
and subdivisions of the Stoics; for these matters are substantially
independent of the main lines upon which the ancient philosophies
parted company, and have for us only a secondary and historical
interest. The Stoics distinguish five parts of speech: ‘name’ (ὄνομα,
_nomen_), as ‘Diogenes’; ‘class-name’ (προσηγορία, _appellatio_), as
‘man, horse’[101]; ‘verb’ (ῥῆμα, _verbum_); ‘conjunction’ (σύνδεσμος,
_coniunctio_); and ‘article’ (ἄρθρον, _articulus_). The last they define
naïvely as a little word which is all ending, and serves to distinguish
the cases and numbers[102]. To the list of the parts of speech Antipater
added the ‘mixed part’ or participle (μεσότης). The noun has four
cases (πτώσεις), the ‘upright case’ (πτῶσις εὐθεῖα, _casus rectus_;
this is of course a contradiction in terms); and the ‘oblique’ cases
(πλάγιαι), that is the ‘class’ case (γενική), the ‘dative’ (δοτική), and
the ‘effect’ case (αἰτιατική). The ῥῆμα or verb is identical with the
κατηγόρημα or ‘predicate,’ and may take the ‘active’ form (ὀρθά), the
‘passive’ (ὕπτια), or the ‘neuter’ (οὐδέτερα); some verbs also express
action and reaction, and are called ‘reflexive’ (ἀντιπεπονθότα). The
Stoics also distinguished the tenses. Time (χρόνος) being of three
kinds, past (παρῳχημένος), present (ἐνεστώς), and future (μέλλων),
we have the following tenses which are ‘definite’ (ὡρισμένοι): the
‘present imperfect’ (ἐνεστὼς ἀτελής), the ‘past imperfect’ (παρῳχημένος
ἀτελής), the ‘present perfect’ (ἐνεστὼς τέλειος), and the ‘past perfect’
(παρῳχημένος τέλειος); in addition to these we have the ‘indefinite’
tenses, the future (μέλλων), and the past indefinite, called simply
indefinite (ἀόριστος)[103].


[Sidenote: Theories of speech.]

=161.= So far we find in the Stoic system the general framework of
the grammar of the period, much of it adapted with modifications
from Aristotle. In some other details points of real grammatical or
philosophical interest are raised. Such is the controversy between
‘anomaly,’ the recognition of the individuality of each word in its
flexion, and ‘analogy,’ in which the validity of the rules of declension
and conjugation is insisted upon. Two Stoic masters, Chrysippus and
Crates of Mallos, took up the cause of ‘anomaly[104].’ Further the Stoics
held that all correct language exists by nature (φύσει), and not by
convention (θέσει), as Aristotle had maintained; the elements of language
being imitations of natural sounds[105]. Further, they held that the
natural relation between ‘things’ (σημαινόμενα, _significata_) and the
words that express them (σημαίνοντα, _significantia_) can frequently be
determined by etymology; for instance φωνή ‘voice’ is φῶς νοῦ ‘the mind’s
lamp,’ αἰών ‘age’ is ἀεὶ ὄν ‘enduring for ever[106].’ Like Heraclitus and
Aristotle, the Stoics distinguished between ‘thought’ (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος,
_ratio_) and ‘speech’ (λόγος προφορικός, _oratio_), which the Greek
word λόγος tends to confuse[107]; thought is immaterial, but speech, as
consisting of air in motion, is body[108]. Young children and animals do
not possess real speech, but only ‘a sort of speech[109].’


[Sidenote: Propositions and Syllogisms.]

=162.= Words in combination form statements, questions, wishes,
syllogisms, and so forth[110]; there is therefore no clear line drawn
between what we call syntax and logic respectively. Whenever we have
a complete combination of words expressing that which must either be
false or true, as ‘Hannibal was a Carthaginian,’ ‘Scipio destroyed
Numantia,’ we call it a ‘statement’ or ‘proposition’ (ἀξίωμα)[111]; for
phrases of all kinds we have the more general term ‘phrase’ (λεκτόν, _id
quod dicitur_)[112]. Of special interest is the conditional sentence
(συνημμένον), which has two parts, the conditional clause (ἡγούμενον) and
the contingent clause (λῆγον). The conditional or leading clause always
contains a sign (σημεῖον), by means of which we reach proof: thus in
saying ‘if it is day, it is light’ we mean that ‘day’ is a sign of light.
Proof is ‘speech on every subject gathering what is less clear from that
which is more clear[113].’ Its most important form is the syllogism, of
which Chrysippus recognises five forms:

    (i) if A, then B; but A, therefore B.
   (ii) if A, then B; but not B, therefore not A.
  (iii) not A and B together; but A, therefore not B.
   (iv) either A or B; but A, therefore not B.
    (v) either A or B; but not A, therefore B[114].

All these matters admit of endless qualifications, subdivisions, and
developments, and were therefore serviceable to those Stoics who were
before all things makers of books[115]. Examples of Stoic syllogisms have
been given above[116].


[Sidenote: Fallacies.]

=163.= Closely connected with the theory of the syllogism is the enticing
subject of the ‘resolution of fallacies’ (σοφισμάτων λύσις), which the
Megarians had brought within the range of philosophy. To this subject
the Stoics gave much attention[117]. The most famous fallacy is that
of the ‘heap’ (σωρίτης, _acervus_); ‘if two are few, so are three; if
three, then four; and so forth.’ In this Chrysippus took a special
interest[118]; his reply was to keep still[119]. Another is the ‘liar’
(ψευδόμενος, _mentiens_); ‘when a man says “I lie,” does he lie or not?
if he lies, he speaks the truth; if he speaks the truth, he lies[120].’
On this subject Chrysippus wrote a treatise, which Epictetus thought not
worth reading[121]. Seneca gives us examples of other fallacies, which
also are verbal quibbles[122]. Of an altogether different kind are those
problems in which the question of determinism as opposed to moral choice
is involved. Such is the ‘reaper,’ which maintains ‘either you will reap
or you will not reap; it is not correct to say “perhaps you will reap.”’
Such again is the ‘master-argument’ of Diodorus the Megarian, directly
aimed against every moral philosophy[123]. These difficulties we shall
discuss later as touching the supreme problems which are presented to the
human reason[124].


[Sidenote: Definition.]

=164.= The scientific study of syllogisms and fallacies promises at
first sight to be a guide to truth and a way of escape from error,
but experience shews it nevertheless to be barren. It has however an
advantage in securing a careful statement of teaching, and for this
purpose was much used by Zeno and Chrysippus. The later members of the
school realized that this advantage could be more simply gained by the
practice of careful definition (ὅρος, _definitio_). Antipater thus
defined definition itself: ‘definition is an expression which elaborates
in detail without falling short or going too far[125].’ He and all other
Stoics of his time gave numerous definitions of the most important terms
used in the system, such as God, fate, providence, the supreme good,
virtue, and so forth; and these are of great value in giving precision to
their doctrine.


[Sidenote: Style.]

=165.= In considering Style we first notice the distinction between
dialectic in the narrower sense, in which statements are made in the
shortest and most precise form, and rhetoric, in which they are expanded
at length[126]. Zeno compared one to the closed fist, the other to the
open palm[127]. Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus wrote upon rhetoric,
and it appears to have become a tradition to ridicule their teaching,
chiefly on the ground of the novel terms which the Stoics introduced,
as προηγμένα, κοσμόπολις[128]. But it is exactly in these new-fangled
words that we observe one of the chief aims of the Stoic theory of style,
namely the use of words which precisely and exclusively correspond
to the objects described (κυριολογία, _proprietas verborum_), and
which therefore lead up to transparent clearness of speech (σαφήνεια,
_pellucida oratio_)[129]. To this clearness the study of grammar is
contributory; ‘barbarisms’ (faults in spelling and pronunciation) must be
avoided, with proper help from the doctrines of ‘anomaly’ and ‘analogy’;
for the Stoics learnt in time that neither of these is exclusively true.
Equally important is the avoidance of ‘solecisms,’ or faults in syntax.
In this way a pure use of language (Ἑλληνισμός, _Latinitas_) is attained;
this is largely based upon the example of older writers, such as Homer in
Greek, and Cato the elder in Latin[130], but not to such an extent as to
employ words not commonly intelligible. But little more is needed; the
Stoic will say what he has to say with ‘brevity’ (συντομία, _brevitas_);
the graces of style will be represented by ‘becomingness’ (πρέπον,
_decorum_) and ‘neatness’ (κατασκευή), the latter including euphony.
These virtues of speech are sufficient for speaking well, which is
neither more nor less than speaking truthfully[131]; for the Stoic needs
only to instruct his hearer, and will not lower himself either to amuse
him or to excite his emotions[132]. Style has three varieties, according
as it is employed in the council, in the law-courts, or in praise of
goodness and good men[133]; in the last there was no doubt greater room
allowed for that expansiveness of speech which the Stoics specially
designated as ‘rhetoric.’


[Sidenote: The Stoic orator.]

=166.= The ‘Stoic style’ was a severe intellectual and moral discipline.
The speaker was called upon under all circumstances to speak the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. He could hold back nothing
from his audience, even though his words might be offensive to their
religious opinions, their patriotic feelings, or their sense of decency;
he could add no word which would touch their sympathies or kindle their
indignation in the direction he himself might wish. He had always before
his eyes the example of Socrates’ defence before the Athenian jury and
its result. The Stoic appeared before his audience as a brave, sane, and
rather rugged speaker, painfully ill-equipped in all those arts which the
circumstances demanded[134]. Even the Stoics of the transition period,
in spite of their Academic leanings and their literary acquirements,
made this impression at Rome. Diogenes, who had himself done much to
elaborate the theory of style, was noted as a quiet and self-restrained
speaker[135]. The influence of Panaetius may be traced in his friend
Lucilius, who in his book on style is never tired of ridiculing the
artifices of rhetoricians. Then followed a succession of these reserved
speakers, which we shall trace in another chapter, leading up to Cato of
Utica, by far the best-known and the most ridiculed of them all[136].

It is not easy to form a fair judgment of the merits of the Stoic style.
It must be admitted that the works of Chrysippus are not readable; but
on the other hand Antipater, Panaetius, Posidonius, Musonius Rufus, and
Epictetus were all writers or speakers of great attractiveness[137].


[Sidenote: Paradox.]

=167.= In connexion with style we may call attention to the important
function of paradoxes (παράδοξα, _inopinata_), that is, propositions
contrary to common opinion. Since all philosophies conflict with common
opinion, they must necessarily include many paradoxes[138]. The chief
Stoic paradoxes are those which were borrowed directly from the Cynic
school, and indirectly from the teaching of Socrates[139]: and Cicero
devotes a special work to their defence. He includes the following: (i)
that only what is honourable is good; (ii) that virtue is sufficient
for happiness; (iii) that right actions and offences are equal; (iv)
that all foolish men are mad; (v) that the wise man alone is free and
every foolish man a slave; (vi) that the wise man alone is rich. These
of course include the very pith and marrow of Stoic ethics; and the form
is calculated to arrest the attention of the crowd and to challenge
defiantly its cherished opinions. The Stoics of literary taste and social
position usually shew some distaste for paradoxes, and prefer to state
their teaching in ways more obviously reasonable. But it should hardly
be necessary to explain that no paradox is complete in itself, but each
needs to be interpreted according to the principles of the school which
propounds it. In proportion as the doctrines of any school win general
recognition, its paradoxes tend to find ready acceptance, and may
ultimately become truisms[140].

The treatment of myths as allegories[141] may also be considered as
the use of a kind of paradox; this we shall find it most convenient to
discuss in connexion with Stoic views upon the nature of the gods.


[Sidenote: Dangers of logic.]

=168.= The study of logic is at first sight dismal and repulsive; when
progress has been made in it, it seems illuminating; in the end it
becomes so alluring, that the would-be philosopher may easily be lost
for ever in its mazes[142]. The early Stoics had pressed this discipline
upon their pupils; those of the Roman period, themselves (with the
exception of Epictetus) weak dialecticians, never cease to warn their
hearers against its fascinations. So Seneca tells us that many logical
inquiries have nothing to do with real life[143]; and that the older
Stoics had wasted much time over them[144]; Epictetus complains that
his hearers never get beyond the resolving of syllogisms[145], and M.
Aurelius thanks the gods that he never wasted his time in this way[146].


[Sidenote: Stoic and Academic logic.]

=169.= It was a favourite contention of Cicero, adopted from his teacher
Antiochus, that the Stoic dialectic was no original system, but only a
modification of the views of the old Academy[147]. Such a conclusion
seems partly due to the fact that the Stoics of his own time had
largely borrowed from the Academic system in detail; and partly to the
overlooking by Antiochus of an essential difference of spirit between
the two schools. Plato is speculative, Zeno positive; Plato plays
with a dozen theories, Zeno consistently adheres to one. Plato ranks
the mind high, Zeno the will; Plato bases his system on the general
concept, Zeno on the individual person or object. It would seem that
no contrast could be more complete. Nor does Zeno’s theory agree with
that of Epicurus. Both indeed are positive teachers, and hold that the
senses are messengers of truth. But here Epicurus stops, whilst Zeno
goes on. We have to understand rightly the functions and limitations of
the senses, or we shall quickly glide into error; we have also to learn
that the senses are but servants, and that the mind rules them as a
monarch by divine right, coordinating the messages they bring, shaping
them according to its own creative capacity, even adding to them from
the material it has derived from its source. The Stoic theory is in
fact a bold survey of the results of the reflection of the human mind
upon its own operations; it has, as we might expect, many gaps, a good
deal of overlapping description, and some inconsistencies. To sceptical
objections it is of course unable to give answers which are logically
satisfactory; but its general position proved acceptable to men who
sought in philosophy a guide to practical life.


[Sidenote: Questions of temperament.]

=170.= In the approximation between Stoicism and the Academy which
characterizes the first century B.C., the Stoic logic obtained in the
end the upper hand; and the logic of the so-called ‘old Academy’ founded
by Antiochus is in all essentials that of the Stoics. Nevertheless the
objections urged against it by Cicero represent not only his reason
but also his sentiments. The positive system appears at its best in
the education of children; and even at the present day the theory of
knowledge which is tacitly adopted in schools is substantially that
of the Stoics. It leads to careful observation, earnest inquiry, and
resolute choice; and thus lays the foundation of solidity of character.
But it must be admitted that it also works in the direction of a certain
roughness and harshness of disposition. Not only is the Stoically-minded
man lacking in sympathy for beliefs different from his own, which he
is bound to regard as both foolish and wicked; but he is also blind to
that whole side of the universe which cannot be reduced to syllogistic
shape. Thus we may account for the indifference or hostility with which
most Stoics regarded both literature and art[148]. The Academic, on the
other hand, even if he lacked moral firmness and saw too clearly both
sides of every question, was saved by his critical powers from extreme
assertions and harsh personal judgments, and had a delicate appreciation
of the finer shadings of life. Thus behind the formal differences of
the two schools there lies a difference of character. We have long
since learnt that the fundamental questions between the two schools are
incapable of solution by the human mind, and we can therefore appreciate
the one without condemning the other. In practical life each theory has
its appropriate sphere; but the Romans were hardly in the wrong when in
matters of doubt they leaned towards the Stoic side.


FOOTNOTES

[1] ‘[veteres illi Platonis auditores] totam philosophiam tres in partes
diviserunt; quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus’ Cic. _Fin._
iv 2, 4.

[2] Sext. _math._ vii 16 (Arnim ii 38).

[3] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἄντικρυς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀπεφαίνοντο Philopon. _ad Anal._ pr.
f. 4a; Stein, _Psychologie_ ii 93. See also Arnim ii 49 and 49a.

[4] Epict. _Disc._ i 17, 6.

[5] Diog. L. vii 40.

[6] ἀρέσκει οὖν [τοῖς Κυνικοῖς] τὸν λογικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν ... καὶ τὴν
ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι Diog. L. vi 103 and 105.

[7] τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος· τί τέλος; μή
τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον Epict. _Disc._ iv 8,
12.

[8] ‘Stoici ... cum vehementer amaverint artem disputandi’ Aug. _Civ. De._
viii 7.

[9] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 66.

[10] See below, §§ 164, 165.

[11] ‘hi, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi ... totam vitam evertunt
funditus’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 10, 31.

[12] See above, § 93.

[13] Epict. _Disc._ ii 11, 13.

[14] ‘Stoici deum visum vocantes, quod optimum putabant’ Chalc. _in Tim._
266 (Arnim ii 863).

[15] Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.

[16] Arnim ii 458.

[17] ‘mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est,
naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii
10, 30. On the other hand the Epicureans treat the senses as bodily, and
sensation as automatic.

[18] αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς τό τε ἀφ’ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα
ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον, καὶ ἡ δι’ αὐτῶν κατάληψις ... καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ
αἴσθησις καλεῖται Diog. L. vii 52.

[19] Cleanthes called it ‘imprint’ (τύπωσις); Chrysippus, lest the word
imprint should be interpreted too mechanically, called it ‘alteration’
(ἀλλοίωσις) Sext. _math._ vii 227, 372 (Arnim ii 56); ‘visum objectum
imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem’ Cic. _de
Fato_ 19, 43.

[20] Sext. _math._ vii 424 (Arnim ii 68); ‘ita est maxima in sensibus
veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes, et omnia removentur quae obstant et
impediunt’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.

[21] ‘idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui
in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acrius’ _ib._

[22] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς Aët. _plac._ iv 9, 4;
‘[sensuum] clara iudicia et certa sunt’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 19.

[23] ‘sequuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam
modo sensibus, ut haec: “illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,
hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.” animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non
sensibus’ _ib._ 7, 21.

[24] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν
ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς Aët. _plac._ iv 9, 4 (Arnim ii 78); ‘Zeno
nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia [dixit]’ Cic. _N. D._ i 25, 70.

[25] φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἐν
αὑτῷ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· ... καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὑτὸ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ φαντασία δείκνυσιν ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς
αὐτήν Aët. _plac._ iv 12, 1 (Arnim ii 54). The object which causes the
φαντασία is technically called the φανταστόν, but also ὑπάρχον Sext.
_math._ vii 426.

[26] διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς Aëtius _plac._ iv 12, 4.

[27] _ib._ 12, 5.

[28] φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας, οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους
Diog. L. vii 50.

[29] ‘visis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum quae
propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur’ Cic.
_Ac._ i 11, 41; cf. § 105.

[30] On this point the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno hinged;
see above, § 84.

[31] ‘necesse est animum perspicuis cedere’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 12, 38.

[32] ‘perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim ut ipsa per
sese ea quae sint nobis, ita ut sunt, indicet’ _ib._ 14, 45.

[33] ‘adsensio nostra erit in potestate’ Cic. _Fat._ 19, 43; ‘adsensio
non [potest] fieri nisi commota viso; tamen id visum proximam causam
[habet], non principalem’ _ib._ 18, 42; ‘[Zeno] adsensionem adiungit
animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam’ Cic. _Ac._ i
11, 40.

[34] διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσον, τὴν δὲ
ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ Stob. ii 7, 11 m (Pearson, Z. fr. 15): cf. Plut. _Sto.
rep._ 47, 10.

[35] ‘opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam adsensionem’ Cic. _Tusc.
disp._ iv 7, 15; ‘opinio quae [est] imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque
communis’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 41; so Sext. _math._ vii 151 (Arnim ii 90).

[36] Epict. _Disc._ i 21, 2.

[37] _ib._ i 18, 1; Sext. _math._ vii 416.

[38] ἔστι δὲ αἴσθησις ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν Nem. _nat. hom._ vii p. 175
M (Stein, _Psych._ ii 135).

[39] Cicero’s point of view appears to be that the mind-picture grasps
the object: ‘[visum] cum acceptum iam et adprobatum esset, [Zeno]
comprehensionem appellabat, similem eis rebus quae manu prehenderentur’
Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 41. See further Stein, _Psych._ ii 174, and R. D. Hicks,
_Stoic and Epicurean_, p. 71.

[40] This view is expressed by Posidonius, who bases it on Plato’s
_Timaeus_: ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ
φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτως ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς
ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου Sext. Emp. _math._ vii 93. See also
below, § 266.

[41] ‘comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse [Zenoni] et fidelis
videbatur; non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia
nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 42.

[42] Diog. L. vii 51; ‘quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in
eminentia, quae nos non videmus!’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 20.

[43] μνήμη θησαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν Sext. _math._ vii 373 (Arnim i 64);
‘[mens] alia visa sic arripit, ut his statim utatur; alia quasi recondit,
e quibus memoria oritur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 10, 30.

[44] ‘quicquid frequens cogitatio exercet et renovat, memoriae nunquam
subducitur; quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit’ Sen.
_Ben._ iii 2, 3.

[45] So substantially Chrysippus argued. See Sext. _math._ vii 231.

[46] ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνῆμαι γένωνται, τότε φαμὲν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν
Aët. _plac._ iv 11, 2.

[47] Diog. L. vii 52.

[48] The details of this list are variously given: e.g. ‘cum rerum
notiones in animo fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit, aut
coniunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis’ Cic. _Fin._ iii
10, 33.

[49] Diog. L. vii 52.

[50] ‘homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia
cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones
non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit atque
adnectit futuras; facile totius vitae cursum videt’ Cic. _Off._ i 4, 11.

[51] So Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 79.

[52] ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ
χάρτην· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται Aët. _plac._ iv
11, 1. The metaphor of the _tabula rasa_ can be traced back to Plato and
Aristotle, but in this application was first used by Cleanthes. Locke
presumably borrowed it from the Stoics. It must not be thought that this
metaphor implies passivity on the part of the soul; as the Stoics use
it, the soul is from the beginning actively cooperating in obtaining
impressions. See Stein, _Psych._ ii pp. 112 sqq., note 230.

[53] τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν ... οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, καθάπερ αἱ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων Diog. L. vii 51.

[54] οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν Aët.
_plac._ i 10, 5 (Arnim i 65); cf. Diog. L. vii 61.

[55] πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ
ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως Sext. _math._ viii 56 (Arnim ii
88); cf. Diog. L. vii 52 and 53.

[56] ‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 10,
30.

[57] Cic. _N. D._ i 17, 44.

[58] ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου Diog. L. vii 54;
‘notionem appello quam Graeci tum ἔννοιαν tum πρόληψιν; ea est insita et
praecepta cuiusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens’ Cic. _Top._ 7,
31; ‘nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam
nec quaeri disputarive potest’ _Ac._ ii 7, 21. See also Aët. _plac._ iv
11, 3. If the concept can only be reached by special training, it must
not be called πρόληψις.

[59] ‘There are certain things which men who are not altogether perverted
see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the
mind is named common sense (κοινὸς νοῦς)’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 6, 8. See
also below, § 158.

[60] ‘We need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the
preconception of what is reasonable or unreasonable to the several things
conformably with nature’ Epict. _Disc._ i 2, 6.

[61] See Cic. _Top._ above, note 58.

[62] Diog. L. x 33.

[63] ‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit; ex quibus
efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας tum προλήψεις vocant’
Cic. _Ac._ ii 10, 30. As to the possibility of distinguishing the two
terms see Prof. Reid’s note.

[64] See notes to the next section.

[65] ‘rerum plurimarum obscuras necessarias intelligentias enudavit
[qu. incohavit?], quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae’ Cic. _Leg._ i
9, 26; ‘quae in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, incohatae
intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur’ _ib._ i 10, 30; ‘As to
good and evil, beautiful and ugly ... and what we ought to do and what we
ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate
idea of them?’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 11, 3.

[66] ὁ δὲ λόγος ... ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν
πρώτην ἑβδομάδα Aët. _plac._ iv 11, 4; περὶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα
ἔννοια γίνεται καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ _ib._ v 23, 1.

[67] ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται ... λόγῳ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων,
ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους Diog. L. vii 52; ‘collatione
rationis boni notio facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum
naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni
pervenit’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 33; ‘nobis videtur observatio collegisse et
rerum saepe factarum inter se collatio: per analogian nostri intellectum
et honestum et bonum iudicant. noveramus corporis sanitatem; ex hac
cogitavimus esse aliquam et animi. noveramus corporis vires; ex his
collegimus esse et animi robur’ Sen. _Ep._ 120, 4; ‘de bonis ac malis
sensus non iudicat; quid utile sit, quid inutile, ignorat. non potest
ferre sententiam, nisi in rem praesentem perductus est; ratio ergo
arbitra est bonorum ac malorum’ _ib._ 66, 35.

[68] φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν Diog. L. vii 53.

[69] For the classification as a sensation see above, § 146.

[70] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τήνδε (sc. Aristotelis) τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ‘ἐντὸς ἁφὴν’
προσαγορεύουσι, καθ’ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα Aët. _plac._ iv
8, 7; ‘quid de tactu, et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut
doloris aut voluptatis?’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7, 20. This feeling, if mistaken
for the perception of an external object, is an ‘empty twitching’:
φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν· ὃ δὴ κυριώτερον διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς παρ’ αὐτοῖς
καλεῖται Sext. _math._ vii 241 (Arnim ii 64). See further Hicks, _Stoic
and Epicurean_, p. 110.

[71] ‘visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur,
quaeque oraculis auspiciis extis declarentur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 15, 47.

[72] Arnim ii 93 and 95; ‘ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una
aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 7,
22; ‘ex quibus [perceptis] collatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque
efficimus, partim ad usum vitae, partim ad oblectationem necessariis’ _N.
D._ ii 59, 148.

[73] Arnim ii 95.

[74] πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται Epict. _Disc._ i 22, 1.

[75] εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου·
ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων Stob. ii 7, 5 l (see
also Wachsmuth’s crit. note).

[76] ‘scientiam ... quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam
stabilem quoque atque immutabilem esse censemus’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 8,
23; ‘quod erat sensu comprehensum ... si ita erat comprehensum ut
convelli ratione non posset, scientiam [Zeno] nominabat’ _ib._ i 11,
41; ‘quamcunque vero sententiam probaverit [sapiens], eam sic animo
comprensam habebit, ut ea quae sensibus’ _ib._ ii 37, 119.

[77] See above, § 77.

[78] Plut. _comm. not._ 47, 4.

[79] Sext. _math._ vii 151 (Arnim ii 90); ‘scientiam, cuius compotem nisi
sapientem esse neminem’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 145.

[80] Diog. L. vii 54, as in note 84 below.

[81] See especially Pearson, Zeno fr. 11; and above, § 84.

[82] ‘omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa
cogitatione informantur, ... sive in quiete, sive per vinum, sive per
insaniam. nam ab omnibus eiusmodi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus
tenere debemus, abesse dicemus.... itaque, _simul ut experrecti_ sumus
[ex somno], visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus, ut ea quae in foro
gessimus’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 17, 51.

[83] ‘[ab Academia disputatum est], non inesse [in sensibus] propriam,
quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam’ _ib._ ii 32, 103; ‘dicunt
[Academici] hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non
eodem modo falsum etiam possit videri’ _ib._ 11, 33.

[84] κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι
τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος
Diog. L. vii 54. This view is attributed to Zeno himself: ‘visum [Zeno
ita definiit] ex eo, _quod esset_, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et
effictum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 24, 77.

[85] οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα Sext.
_math._ vii 253.

[86] φαντασία πιθανὴ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ περιωδευμένη Sext. _math._ vii
181. Such was the definition of Carneades (Schmekel, p. 344).

[87] Diog. L. vii 54 (see § 80, note 68).

[88] ‘posse eum [sapientem] falsa a veris distinguere’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 21,
67.

[89] Diog. L. vii 54. See on this point Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, p.
70.

[90] ‘multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apud nos
veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam deos esse _inter
alia_ hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est ... neminem
invenies, qui non putet et sapientiam bonum et sapere bonum’ Sen. _Ep._
117, 6.

[91] ‘opinionum commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat’ Cic. _N.
D._ ii 2, 5.

[92] Diog. L. vii 177.

[93] οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν Plut.
_comm. not._ 27, 9.

[94] ἐκεῖνον [τὸν Ἀντίπατρον] ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον, εἰς ταύτας
καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὑρεσιλογίας _ib._ 27, 15.

[95] ‘iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi; patroni nonnunquam
verisimile, etiam si minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere ... non
auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio’ Cic. _Off._ ii
14, 51.

[96] ‘visus noster solita imbecillitate deceptus’ Sen. _N. Q._ i 2, 3.

[97] _To himself_, v 33.

[98] See above, §§ 146, 147.

[99] ‘sapientem aliquando sustinere adsensionem’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 17, 53.

[100] Epict. _Disc._ i 27, 17.

[101] The distinction between ‘name’ and ‘class-name’ was due to
Chrysippus: see Sandys, _Classical Scholarship_, i p. 144.

[102] Diog. L. vii 58.

[103] For these and further particulars see Sandys, _Classical
Scholarship_, i ch. ix; R. Schmidt, _Stoicorum Grammatica_, pp. 18 sqq.

[104] ‘Crates, nobilis grammaticus, fretus Chrysippo, homine acutissimo,
qui reliquit περὶ ἀνωμαλίας III libros, contra analogiam atque
Aristarchum est nixus’ Varro _L. L._ ix 1 (Arnim ii 151).

[105] Orig. _cont. Celsum_ i 24 (Arnim ii 146).

[106] Varr. _L. L._ vi 11 (Arnim ii 163).

[107] See Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 73, n. 2; Aristotle’s distinction is
between τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγον and τὸν ἔξω λόγον.

[108] ‘vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt eamque esse dicunt ictum aera’
A. Gellius, _N. A._ v 15, 6.

[109] ‘hunc [qui primo dicitur iam fari] Chrysippus negat loqui, sed ut
loqui; ... sic in corvis, cornicibus, pueris primitus incipientibus fari,
verba non esse verba’ Varro _L. L._ vi 56 (Arnim ii 143).

[110] Diog. L. vii 63 to 78.

[111] Varro translates this by ‘proloquium’ (Gell. _N. A._ xvi 8, 8),
Cicero provisionally by ‘pronuntiatum’ (_Tusc. disp._ i 7, 14).

[112] A statement or proposition is therefore a phrase ‘complete in
itself’ (λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές) A. Gellius _N. A._ xvi 8, 4.

[113] Diog. L. vii 45.

[114] _ib._ 80 and 81.

[115] ‘ex iis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur’ Cic. _Top._ 14,
57.

[116] § 83.

[117] ἔλυε δὲ [Ζήνων] σοφίσματα, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικήν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν
δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς Plut. _Sto. rep._ 8, 2.

[118] ‘inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi’ Pers. _Sat._ vi 80.

[119] ‘placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, tria pauca sint
anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere’ Cic.
_Ac._ ii 29, 93. Cf. Sext. _math._ vii 416.

[120] ‘si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris an verum dicis?’
Cic. _Ac._ ii 29, 95.

[121] Epict. _Disc._ ii 17, 34.

[122] ‘mus syllaba est. mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit
... o pueriles ineptias!’ Sen. _Ep._ 48, 6 and 7; ‘quod non perdidisti,
habes; cornua autem non perdidisti; cornua ergo habes’ _ib._ 49, 8.

[123] Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 1 sqq.

[124] See below, §§ 220, 221.

[125] Diog. L. vii 60.

[126] ‘omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et
interrogantem discissa; hanc διαλεκτικήν, illam ῥητορικήν placuit vocari’
Sen. _Ep._ 89, 17.

[127] Cic. _Orator_ 32, 113.

[128] ‘scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes. Chrysippus etiam; sed sic, ut
si quis obmutescere cupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides quo
modo loquantur; nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 3, 7.

[129] Diog. L. vii 59.

[130] ‘uni M. Porcio me dedicavi atque despondi atque delegavi’ Front. et
Aur. _Ep._ ii 13.

[131] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν Anon. _ad Herm.
Rhet. Gr._ vii 8. Hence speech was a virtue; ‘[Stoicis] hanc habeo
gratiam, quod soli ex omnibus eloquentiam virtutem ac sapientiam esse
dixerunt’ Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 65.

[132] ‘fuerunt et clari quidam auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris
officium docere; namque et effectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant,
primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem
a veritate pelli misericordia gratia similibusque non oporteret, et
voluptatem audientium petere ... vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur’
Quint. _Inst. or._ v Prooem.

[133] Diog. L. vii 42.

[134] ‘orationis genus habent [Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum;
sed, ut in oratore, exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi,
obscurum, inane, ieiunum, attamen eiusmodi quo uti ad vulgus nullo modo
possit’ Cic. _de Or._ iii 18, 66.

[135] ‘dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria’ A. Gellius, _N. A._ vi 14, 10.

[136] See below, chap. xvi.

[137] See Smiley, _Latinitas_ and Ἑλληνισμός.

[138] ‘Philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion, as
Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason’ Epict. _Disc._ iv
1, 173; ‘where is the wonder if in philosophy many things which are true
appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?’ _ib._ i 25, 33.

[139] ‘ista παράδοξα quae appellant, maxime videntur esse Socratica’ Cic.
_Parad._ Prooem. 4.

[140] ‘nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile’ Cic.
_Parad._ Prooem. 3; ‘Stoica paradoxa, quorum nullum esse falsum nec tam
mirabile quam prima facie videtur, adprobabo’ Sen. _Ep._ 87, 1.

[141] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., pp. 354-370.

[142] A. Gellius, _N. A._ xvi 8, 16 and 17.

[143] ‘quaedam exercendi tantum ingenii causa quaeruntur, et semper extra
vitam iacent’ Sen. _Ben._ vi 1, 1.

[144] ‘multum illis temporis verborum cavillatio eripuit et captiosae
disputationes, quae acumen inritum exercent’ _Ep._ 45, 5.

[145] ‘We terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able
to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the
hypothetical syllogism’ Epict. _Disc._ iv 4, 14.

[146] ‘Thanks [to the gods] too that, in spite of my ardour for
philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, or sit poring
over essays or syllogisms, or become engrossed in scientific speculation’
M. Aurelius _To himself_ i 17.

[147] ‘verum esse arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat,
correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam
putandam [Stoicorum rationem]’ Cic. _Ac._ i 12, 43.

[148] ‘tunc intellegere nobis licebit, quam contemnenda miremur,
simillimi pueris, quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est. quid ergo inter
nos et illos interest, ut Ariston ait, nisi quod nos circa tabulas et
statuas insanimus, carius inepti? illos reperti in litore calculi leves
delectant, nos ingentium maculae columnarum’ Sen. _Ep._ 115, 8. This tone
is clearly derived from Cynism, as the reference to Aristo indicates.
A modern Cynic is still more sweeping in his condemnation: ‘all the
nastiness and stupidity which you call science and art’ (Count Leo
Tolstoy in the _Westminster Gazette_, Sept. 3, 1910).



CHAPTER VII.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS.


[Sidenote: Physics.]

=171.= Under the general heading of Physics the ancients included a
number of subjects which in modern times form independent branches
of philosophy. Cleanthes subdivided the subject into Physics proper
and Theology[1]. Here it will be convenient to make a larger number
of subdivisions, so as to treat separately of (i) the Foundations of
Physics, generally called (after Aristotle’s treatise) ‘Metaphysics’;
(ii) Physics proper, that is, the account of the Universe and its
history; (iii) the final problems involved in the history of the
Universe, such as its government by Divine Providence, the Existence
of Evil, Free-will, and Chance; (iv) the problems of Religion, such as
the existence of gods, their number, character, and claims on mankind;
and (v) the nature of Man, including the modern subjects of Psychology
and Physiology, and to some extent of Anthropology also, treated by the
Stoics as a Kingdom governed by the Soul. According to Stoic principles
these subjects cannot be separated one from the other, or from the other
parts of philosophy; and therefore in treating each one we shall, as
before, assume a general knowledge of all the others. The Stoics laid
great stress upon the study of Physics, as the only sound basis for
a scientific rule of human conduct; and some of them (beginning with
Chrysippus), having especial regard to the elevated dignity of the study
of Theology, were disposed to rank this branch of philosophy as the
highest and last of its three principal divisions[2]. We shall however,
in accordance with a view more generally held, reserve the last place for
Ethics[3].


[Sidenote: Fundamental Conceptions.]

=172.= To the earlier Greek philosophers, as we have already seen, it
appeared that a single bold intuition was enough, or almost enough, to
discover a sufficient foundation upon which to construct a reasoned
account of all things. Thus the Ionic philosophers took up as such a
foundation one or more of the elements of air, fire, and water. But as
soon as these three, together with earth, were recognized as ‘elements’
existing side by side, it became necessary to dig deeper, so as to
secure a foundation for these as well. Thus Democritus resolved all
four into ‘atoms’ and ‘void’; his theory was taken over by Epicurus,
and remains to this day not only the most popular solution of the
problem, but also that which (till quite recently) was tacitly assumed
as the basis of all scientific investigation. Anaxagoras, working on
different lines, began his account of the universe with ‘mind’ on the
one hand and a primal conglomerate ‘matter’ on the other; a doctrine
evidently based upon the popular dualism of soul and body, and still
the basis of all transcendental philosophy and established religious
conceptions. This Aristotle varied by assuming rather an ‘active’ and a
‘passive’ principle, force which works and matter upon which it works.
Besides these conceptions many others need to be considered, which if
not absolutely fundamental, are nevertheless matters of discussion in
all philosophical schools, as those of motion, space, time, soul, body,
God, the universe, cause, effect, will and necessity. In this way the
original inquiry into the foundation of the universe developes into a
general study of fundamental conceptions; and it is at this stage that it
is taken over and dealt with by Stoicism, which adds to the list certain
conceptions on which it lays a special stress and to which it gives a
characteristic colour; such are those of ‘body,’ ‘spirit,’ and ‘tone.’


[Sidenote: The Stoic monism.]

=173.= The fact that the Stoics use from time to time the language of
other schools or of popular speculation does not necessarily imply
that this language is an adequate statement of their doctrine; and we
frequently[4] find that the discussion of particular problems seems
to be based on dualisms, though these are in the end subordinated
to monistic statements. Thus in logic we have already noticed the
sharp contrast between the perceiving mind and the external object
of perception (αἰσθητόν, ὑπάρχον); nevertheless mind and object are
ultimately declared to be akin[5]. So in particular the popular dualism
of ‘soul’ and ‘body’ is often accepted by the Stoics, and yet as steadily
superseded by the paradox that ‘soul is body.’ The reason given for
this is that ‘body is that which acts and is acted upon[6]’; and this
statement in the end overrides the Aristotelian distinction of force and
matter, active principle and passive principle. ‘Body,’ as conceived by
the Stoics, is the one ultimate element, the foundation and beginning
of the universe; it contains within itself the capacity of action, and
nothing but ‘body’ has this capacity. Body, and nothing but body, exists
in the true sense; that certain other things have a quasi-existence (as
we shall see later in this chapter) is an embarrassment which only brings
into clearer relief this distinctive feature of the system. The Stoic
‘body,’ though it is also called ‘matter’ (ὕλη, _materia_), must not
be confused with the ‘matter’ of modern philosophy, which has derived
from Aristotle the implication of passivity[7]; much more closely it
corresponds with the ‘stuff’ by which modern monistic philosophers denote
the substratum of mind and body alike. To call the Stoics ‘materialists’
will generally prove misleading; it is the Epicurean system, to which the
Stoics were sharply opposed, which (as we have seen)[8] corresponds to
modern materialism.


[Sidenote: The nature of ‘body.’]

=174.= The conception of ‘body’ therefore replaces in the Stoic system
the various elements which the Ionic philosophers assumed as the basis
of the universe, and combines both parts of such dualistic elements
as were assumed by Democritus, Anaxagoras and Aristotle. Since it is
the foundation of all things it must be capable of taking very various
shapes. In logic we have met with it under the name of the ‘substratum’
(τὸ ὑπάρχον, _id quod est_)[9], but it none the less includes the
‘subject’ or feeling and reasoning mind. In the universe as a whole it
is ‘essence’ (οὐσία, _essentia_); in its parts it is ‘matter’ (ὕλη,
_silva_)[10]; but it also appears, possessed of intelligence, as the
deity[11], and again is identified with ‘breath’ or ‘spirit[12],’ and
through this with the human soul[13]. Even in ethics it has its place;
for all causes are bodily, and not least ‘the good’ and the respective
virtues, all of which are bodies, for they act upon body[14]; similarly
the emotions such as anger and melancholy, are of the nature of body[15].


[Sidenote: Motion, space and time.]

=175.= The Stoic ‘body’ in all its transformations is active and alert.
It contains in itself the principle or power of movement; for though we
observe that one body is set in motion by another, yet this could not be
the case unless in the beginning there had been a body which had movement
of itself[16]. As to the nature of the primal movement, the Stoics
agree with Anaximenes that it may be described as alternate rarefaction
and condensation. Rarefaction is a wave or ‘spirit’ spreading from the
centre to the extremities; condensation is a contrary movement from the
extremities to the centre[17]. The extension of body is ‘space,’ which
therefore does not exist of itself, but only as a function of body[18].
Where there is no body (and body is limited), there is no space, but only
the ‘boundless void’ beyond the universe[19]; of this we cannot say that
it ‘exists’; rather it ‘not exists.’ Time also does not exist of itself,
but only in the movement of body[20]. Neither space nor time existed
before the universe, but have been all along bound up with it[21].


[Sidenote: Body comprises life and thought.]

=176.= In almost every particular we find a sharp contrast between
the Stoic conception of ‘body’ and the Epicurean ‘atom.’ The atom is
extremely small and entirely unchangeable; ‘body’ is immensely large
and in a high degree plastic. Atoms alternate with void; but ‘body’
spreads continuously throughout the entire universe; it can never be
torn apart or show a gap[22]. Atoms move downwards in parallel straight
lines; ‘body’ moves from the centre to the circumference, and thence
returns to the centre. Two atoms can never occupy the same space; but
‘body’ everywhere moves through body, penetrating it and combining with
it throughout its whole extent[23]. The atom is a convenient hypothesis
within the range of modern physical and chemical science; the conception
of ‘body’ gains force as we enter the region of biology. For life also
is a movement which proceeds from a warm centre (and warmth is body
rarefied), and extends towards a circumference which is in comparison
gross and cold[24]. Going further, we find that ‘body’ and its functions
are so interpreted as to provide a key to the activities of the human
reason and will.


[Sidenote: Tone or tension.]

=177.= To the central conception of body are attached in the Stoic
system various supplementary conceptions, which serve to bring into
clearer view its nature and powers. Of these the most characteristic
is that of ‘tone’ or ‘strain’ (τόνος, _intentio_). This term appears
originally to have expressed muscular activity[25], and was next used
by the Cynics to denote that active condition of the soul which is the
true end of life; ‘no labour,’ said Diogenes, ‘is noble, unless its end
is tone of soul[26].’ Although we cannot trace the term ‘tone’ directly
to Zeno, we find that he explains sleep as a relaxation of the soul,
substantially agreeing with later writers who call it a ‘relaxation of
the sensory tone around the soul[27].’ With Cleanthes the word becomes
fairly common, first in the ethical application, in which ‘tone’ is ‘a
shock of fire, which if it be strong enough to stir the soul to fulfil
its duties is called strength and force[28],’ and then in physics to
explain the unceasing activity of the universe[29], personified by
Hercules in Stoic allegorical theology[30]. In later writers tone becomes
constantly associated with the ‘spirit’ or ‘thrill’ which explains both
the unity and the movement of all things[31], so that ‘tone of spirit’ or
‘thrill-tone’ (πνευματικὸς τόνος, _intentio spiritus_) explains to us
the operations of body and mind alike[32].


[Sidenote: The seed power.]

=178.= Body however is not only active but creative; there is inherent
in it a power, which is that of the ‘seed’ (σπέρμα, _semen_), and which
is most conspicuously illustrated in the seed of animals and plants. It
is the characteristic of seed that from a small beginning it developes a
great plan, and that this plan never changes[33]. This plan or purpose
is named by the Stoics its ‘reason’ or ‘word’ (λόγος), and at this point
Stoicism incorporates the doctrine of the ‘Word’ or universal reason with
which it became acquainted through Heraclitus. The ‘Word’ or ‘seed-power’
(λόγος σπερματικός) of the universe is one; it is the primal fire in
its work of creation; it is Zeus the Creator who moulds gross matter
into the things that are to be[34]; it is wisdom which plies matter
as it will[35]. But there are also in individual objects, animate and
inanimate, indestructible seed-powers, countless in number, displayed
alike in growth, procreation, and purpose[36]; these seed-powers are, as
it were, spirits or deities, spread throughout the universe, everywhere
shaping, peopling, designing, multiplying; they are activities of fiery
spirit working through tension[37] in its highest development. But the
seed-power of the universe comprehends in itself all the individual
seed-powers; they are begotten of it, and shall in the end return to it.
Thus in the whole work of creation and re-absorption[38] we see the work
of one Zeus, one divine Word, one all-pervading spirit[39].


[Sidenote: Cause.]

=179.= Closely akin to the theory of ‘seed-powers’ and the Word is that
of ‘cause’ (αἰτία, _causa_). Aristotle had already explained this term
in connexion with cosmogony, laying down that, in order that a universe
may come into being, three ‘causes’ are required; matter, without which
nothing can be made; a workman, to make things; and the form or shape,
which is imposed on every work as on a statue. To these may be added a
fourth cause, the purpose of the work. Thus to produce a statue we need
the bronze, the artist, the design, and the fee. Grammatically these
causes may be expressed by the help of prepositions, as the _ex quo_, _a
quo_, _in quo_ and _propter quod_[40]. To this theory of multiple causes
the Stoics oppose the doctrine of a single ‘first cause,’ the maker of
the universe. This first cause can be none other than the primal creative
fire in a new aspect; equally it is the creative Word.

It seems well to translate here in full the argument of Seneca on
this point, for it stands almost alone as an example of his powers in
continuous exposition:

  The Stoic dogma is that there is one cause only, the maker.
  Aristotle holds that cause is threefold. ‘The first cause,’ he
  says, ‘is the material itself, for without it nothing can be
  made. The second cause is the maker. The third is the design,
  which is impressed on every single work as on a statue;’ this
  Aristotle calls the εἶδος. I will now explain what he means.

  The bronze is the first cause of a statue; for it could never
  have been made, had there not been stuff to be cast or wrought
  into shape. The second cause is the sculptor; for the bronze
  could never have been brought into the shape of a statue without
  the artist’s touch. The third cause is the design; for the
  statue would not be called the ‘javelin-man’ or the ‘crowned
  king’ had not such a design been impressed upon it.

  There is besides a fourth cause, the purpose. What is purpose?
  It is that which induced the sculptor to undertake the work, the
  aim that he had in view. It may have been money, if he intended
  to sell it; or glory, if he wished to make himself a name; or
  religious feeling, if he proposed to present it to a temple. That
  for the sake of which a thing is done is therefore also a cause;
  for you cannot think it right in making up a list of causes to
  omit something, apart from which the thing would never have been
  made.

  Thus Aristotle postulates a multiplicity of causes; but we
  maintain that the list is either too long or too short.

  If we hold that everything, apart from which the thing would
  never have been made, is a cause of its making, then the list is
  too short. We ought to reckon time as a cause, for nothing can be
  made without time. We ought to reckon space as a cause; for if
  there is no room for a thing to be made, it will certainly not
  be made. Movement too should be placed in the list; for without
  movement nothing can be produced or destroyed; without movement
  there can be neither art nor change.

  We Stoics look for a first and general cause. Such a cause must
  be single, for the stuff of the universe is single. We ask what
  that cause is, and reply that it is the creative reason, the
  deity. The various causes in the list that has been made are
  not a series of independent causes, but are all variations of a
  single cause, namely ‘the maker[41].’


[Sidenote: Causation and free-will.]

=180.= Although the ‘first cause’ and the ‘Word’ are thus formally
identified, their associations in connexion with cosmogony are very
different. For whereas the ‘Word’ suggests reason and purpose, and leads
up to the dogma that the universe is governed by divine providence, the
term ‘cause’ suggests the linking of cause and effect by an unending
chain, the inevitable sequence of events which leaves no room for effort
or hope. These terms therefore point to the supreme problems of Fate and
divine Purpose, Determinism and Free-will, and as such will be discussed
in a later chapter[42]. Here it is sufficient to note that the Stoics
not only accept, but insist upon the use of terms suggesting both points
of view, and look therefore beyond their immediate opposition to an
ultimate reconciliation; and that the importance attached to the doctrine
of a ‘single and general cause’ by no means excludes a multiplicity of
individual causes depending upon it, and capable of classification
according to their relative importance[43].


[Sidenote: The categories.]

=181.= Thus the conception of ‘body,’ so simple to the plain man,
becomes to the philosopher manifold and intricate. Its interpretation
is to some extent brought into harmony with common speech through the
doctrine of the ‘categories’ based upon Aristotle’s teaching[44].
But whereas Aristotle endeavoured in his categories to classify the
various but independent classes of existences, the Stoics considered
the different aspects in which the one primary body might be studied.
The first two categories, those of ‘substance’ (ὑποκείμενον) and of
‘quality’ (ποιόν), agree with those of Aristotle[45], and clearly
correspond to the grammatical categories of noun and adjective. The
third category is that of ‘disposition’ (πὼς ἔχον), as ‘lying down’
or ‘standing[46].’ The fourth is that of ‘relative position’ (πρός τί
πως ἔχον), as ‘right’ and ‘left,’ ‘son’ and ‘father[47].’ Some of the
categories are further subdivided[48]; but enough is here stated to shew
the object of the analysis, which in practice may have been useful in
securing some completeness in the discussion of particular conceptions.
Of ‘substances’ the Stoics, like others, say that they ‘exist,’ and are
‘bodies’; of qualities they boldly say the same[49]. But they do not
consistently apply the same terms to disposition and relative position;
in this direction they are at last led, like other philosophers, to speak
of things which ‘do not exist.’ They could not take the modern view that
all such discussions are verbal entanglements, of which no solution is
possible, because they believed that there was a natural harmony between
words and things. We on the other hand shall be little inclined to follow
their analysis into its manifold details[50].


[Sidenote: Substance.]

=182.= The analysis of the first two categories, those of Substance and
Quality, leads us at once to the profoundest problems of Metaphysics;
and even if we allow that the difficulty is primarily grammatical, and
resolves itself into a discussion of the functions of Substantive and
Adjective, it is none the less inextricably interwoven with all our
habits of thought. It would be unreasonable to expect from the Stoics
perfectly clear and consistent language on this point; they absorb into
their system much from popular philosophy, and much from the teaching
of Aristotle in particular. The view which is distinctively Stoic is
that Substance and Quality are both body[51], but in two different
aspects. The terms ‘body’ and ‘substance’ refer to the same reality,
but do not describe it with the same fulness. Yet because the very word
‘substance’ (οὐσία) suggests existence, the Stoics are drawn also to
speak of ‘substance without quality’ (ἄποιος οὐσία), and seem to identify
it with a dead ‘matter’ (ὕλη), or ‘substratum’ (ὑποκείμενον), as though
life must be introduced into it from without[52]. This is practically
the view of Aristotle, embodied in the phrase ‘matter without quality
is potentially body’[53]; but just so far as terms of this kind imply a
dualistic explanation of the universe, they are not really reconcileable
with the fundamental principles of Stoicism, and they must therefore be
understood with reservations. It may often seem that the three terms
‘body,’ ‘substance,’ ‘matter,’ are practically interchangeable, but they
are of different rank. For body exists eternally of itself; whereas
substance and matter, except when loosely used as equivalents of body,
do not exist of themselves, but substance always in association with
quality[54], and matter always in association with force. Further we may
distinguish between ‘substance’ in general, or ‘first matter,’ which
is a ‘substratum’ (ὑποκείμενον) to the universe, and the ‘matter’ of
particular things[55]. The former never grows greater or less, the latter
may alter in either direction[56].


[Sidenote: Quality.]

=183.= Quality (ποιότης, τὸ ποιόν, _qualitas_) constitutes the second
category. It is defined by the Stoics as a difference in a substance
which cannot be detached from that substance, but makes it ‘such and
such,’ as for instance ‘sweet,’ ‘round,’ ‘red,’ ‘hot[57].’ Qualities, say
the Stoics, are bodies[58]. This paradoxical statement may be understood
in two ways; first, in that qualities do not exist independently,
but are aspects of ‘body’ which possesses quality; secondly, in that
qualities are bodies in a secondary sense. We may consider it evidence
of the second point of view that language describes the qualities by
nouns, as ‘sweetness,’ ‘rotundity,’ ‘redness,’ ‘heat’; and indeed it
is not so long since our own chemists described heat as a ‘substance’
under the name of ‘caloric.’ This point of view is carried to an extreme
when the Stoics say ‘qualities are substances,’ thus throwing the first
two categories into one[59]. Much stronger is the tendency towards
Aristotle’s views, so that as substance becomes identified with dead
matter, quality is explained as the movement, tension, or current which
endows it with life. Hence the Stoics say ‘the movement of rarefaction is
the cause of quality[60]’; ‘matter is a dull substratum, qualities are
spirits and air-like tensions[61]’; ‘quality is a spirit in a certain
disposition[62]’; ‘the air-current which keeps each thing together is
the cause of its quality[63].’ All these expressions must however be
interpreted in the light of the Stoic theory as a whole. Finally we
notice that, corresponding to the two kinds of substance, general and
particular, there are two kinds of quality, as shewn in the ‘generically
qualified’ (κοινῶς ποιόν) and the ‘individually qualified’ (ἰδίως ποιόν);
for instance, heat in the universe and heat in particular objects[64].


[Sidenote: Disposition.]

=184.= The third category is that of ‘disposition’ (πὼς ἔχοντα, _res
quodammodo se habens_). It differs from quality in its variableness;
for a brave man is always brave, and fire is always hot; but a man
is sometimes standing, sometimes lying; fire is sometimes lambent,
sometimes still. Qualities therefore appear to correspond generally to
the συμβεβηκότα (_coniuncta_) of Epicurus, in that they can never be
separated from a body[65]; and dispositions rather with the συμπτώματα
(_eventa_), which come and go[66]. The third category appears to be used
by the Stoics in a very wide sense, and to correspond to several of
the categories of Aristotle[67]. Disposition is attached to quality as
quality is attached to substance[68]; and though dispositions are not
expressly termed bodies, yet we must consider them to be, as the terms in
the Greek and Latin sufficiently indicate, bodies in particular aspects.

In the further applications of Stoic theory disposition as defined above
appears to be replaced in Greek by the term ἕξις. But this term is
used in two different senses. In the first place it is the movement of
rarefaction and condensation, by which a spirit or thrill passes from the
centre of an object to the extremities, and returns from the extremities
to the centre[69]; in this sense it is translated in Latin by _unitas_,
and takes bodily form as an air-current[70]. This force, when it requires
a further motive power in the direction of development, becomes the
principle of growth (φύσις, _natura_), and is displayed not only in the
vegetable world, but also in animals, as in particular in the hair and
nails[71]. Growth when it takes to itself the further powers of sensation
and impulse becomes soul (ψυχή, _anima_), and is the distinctive mark of
the animal world[72].

In a rather different sense ἕξις or temporary condition is contrasted
with διάθεσις or ‘permanent disposition.’ In this sense the virtues are
permanent dispositions of the soul, because virtue is unchanging; the
arts are temporary conditions. The virtues belong to the wise man only,
the arts to the ordinary man. This distinction however does not hold its
ground in the Roman period, the word _habitus_ (representing ἕξις), our
‘habit,’ being used in both senses[73]. The virtues are bodies, being
dispositions of the soul which is bodily[74].


[Sidenote: Relative position.]

=185.= The fourth category, that of ‘relative position’ (πρός τί
πως ἔχον) appears to be of less importance than the others[75]. Its
characteristic is that it may disappear without altering that to which
it belongs. Thus that which is on the right hand may cease to be so by
the disappearance of that which was on its left; a father may cease to
be such on the death of his son[76]. It seems difficult to describe
the fourth category as one consisting of ‘body,’ but at least it is a
function of body. Also it does not appear that ‘relative position’ can
be predicated of the universe as a whole; it is peculiar to individual
objects, but works towards their combination in a larger whole. The
fourth category has an important application in practical ethics in
the doctrine of daily duties, for these are largely determined by the
relative positions (σχέσεις) of the parties concerned: such are the
duties of a king to his people, a father to his son, a slave to his
master[77].


[Sidenote: Combination.]

=186.= Having fully considered bodies and their relationships, we
proceed to consider their combination. In ordinary experience we meet
with three kinds of combination; juxtaposition (παράθεσις), as in a
mixture of various kinds of grain; mixture (μῖξις), when solid bodies
are interfused, as fire and heat, or fusion (κρᾶσις), when fluids are
interfused, as wine poured into the sea; chemical mixture (σύγχυσις),
when each of the two bodies fused disappears[78]. Of these the second
in its most completed form (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων, _universa fusio_) is
of high importance. For in this way we find that soul is fused with
body[79], quality with substance[80], light with air[81], God with
the universe[82]. Aristotle admits that there is this mixture between
substance and qualities; but as both of these are to the Stoics bodies,
and so too are the members of the other pairs quoted, the Stoic doctrine
must be summed up in the paradox ‘body moves through body[83].’ This
also follows from the Stoic doctrine that there is no void in the
universe. Correspondingly the sum total of body in its various aspects
and mixtures completes the whole (ὅλον), which is identical with
the ‘world-order’ or ‘universe’ (κόσμος)[84]. It seems likely that
this important conception had been reached in very early times by the
Chaldaean astronomers; it was definitely propounded by Pythagoras[85],
had been taken up by Socrates[86] and the Sophists[87], and was in Stoic
times generally accepted both in popular philosophy and in scientific
investigation.


[Sidenote: Quiddities.]

=187.= Up to this point the Stoic system has been guided by a determined
monism. Body is; that which is not body is not. Yet in the end the Stoics
feel compelled to speak of certain things which are not body (ἀσώματα,
_incorporalia_). In the first instance there is the void beyond the
universe[88]. It is possible to dispute as to whether void may more
correctly be said to exist or not to exist; but at least it is a part
of nature[89], and we need some term like ‘the all’ (τὸ πᾶν) to include
both the universe and the void beyond[90]. Next we have to deal with
statements (λεκτά), and mental conceptions of every kind, which stand
as a class in contrast with the real objects to which they may or may
not respectively correspond[91]. Lastly, the Stoics included space and
time, which they had previously explained as functions of body, in the
list of things not bodily[92]. Having thus reached the two main classes
of ‘bodies,’ and ‘things not bodily,’ the monistic principle can only
be saved by creating a supreme class to include both. Let this then be
called the existent (τὸ ὄν, _quod est_)[93], or, if it be objected that
things incorporeal do not exist[94], we may use the name ‘quiddities’
(τινά, _quid_)[95]. In this way the monistic theory, though a little
damaged in vitality, is again set on its feet so far as the ingenious use
of words can help.


[Sidenote: Statements.]

=188.= The language of the Stoics with regard to the phenomena of speech
and thought is not always easy to follow, and perhaps not altogether
consistent. On the one hand, attaching high importance to the reasoning
power, they desire to include its operations in that which is real and
bodily. Thus the ‘mind-pictures’ and indeed all mental conceptions are
bodily and even ‘animal,’ in the sense that they are operations of
body[96]; and truthfulness, ignorance, science and art are all bodies in
the sense that they are dispositions of the soul, which is bodily[97].
But ‘phrases’ (λεκτά) are definitely incorporeal, and with them appear to
be ranked all mental conceptions and general ideas; about these there is
a question, not merely whether they exist or not, but whether they may
even be classed in the most general class of all as ‘quiddities[98].’
Nor can we call general conceptions true or false[99]; though of some
of them, as of Centaurs, giants, and the like, we may say that they are
formed by false mental processes[100]. Finally statements are either
true or false, but are not to be called existent. The whole discussion
therefore ends with the broad distinction between the object, which may
be real or ‘existent,’ and the predication which may be ‘true’; and the
attempt to unite these two conceptions is not persisted in[101].


[Sidenote: Force and matter.]

=189.= Although the Stoics aim consistently at the monistic standard,
they make frequent use of dualistic statements, some of which we have
already noticed. The Latin writers often contrast soul and body from
the standpoint of ethics[102]; and we meet in all the Stoic writers,
and often in unguarded language, the favourite Aristotelian dualism
of force and matter, or (what comes to the same thing) the active and
passive principles. ‘Zeno’ (we are told) ‘laid down that there are two
principles in the universe, the active and the passive. The passive is
matter, or essence without quality; the active is the Logos or deity
within it[103].’ So also Cleanthes and Chrysippus taught[104]; and in the
Roman period Seneca regarded this as a well-understood dogma of the whole
school[105]. But even if direct evidence were lacking, the whole bearing
of the philosophy would shew that this dualism is also surmounted by an
ultimate monism. God and matter are alike body; they cannot exist the one
apart from the other[106]. Of this Cicero, speaking for the Stoics, gives
a proof; matter could never have held together, without some force to
bind it; nor force without matter[107]. We must not therefore be led by
the term ‘principles’ (ἀρχαί, _principia_) to think of force and matter
in any other way than as two aspects of primary body, separable as mental
conceptions, inseparable as physical realities. The interpretation is
essentially the same, whether the Stoics speak of God and the universe,
matter and cause, body and tension, or substance and quality, and has
been already discussed with some fulness under these separate headings.


[Sidenote: The elements.]

=190.= The position of the four ‘elements’ (στοιχεῖα, _elementa_) is
similar; these are in the Stoic philosophy subdivisions of the two
principles just discussed. For fire and air are of the nature of cause
and movement; water and earth of receptivity and passivity[108]. Body
is therefore made up of the four elements mixed[109], or perhaps rather
of the elementary qualities of heat and cold, dry and wet, which they
represent[110]. The doctrine of primary or elemental qualities had been
taught before, first by Anaximenes, then by Hippocrates the physician,
and by Aristotle[111]; the list of the four elements is traced back to
Empedocles. For Aristotle’s ‘fifth element’ Zeno found no use[112].


[Sidenote: Conclusion.]

=191.= Such are the fundamental conceptions or postulates with which
the Stoics approach the problems of physics. It is not necessary for
our purpose to compare their merit with those of Aristotle, or to set a
value on the debt that Zeno and his successors owed to the founder of
the Peripatetic school. Still less do we suggest that the Stoics have
perfectly analyzed the contents of the universe, or have even produced an
orderly and rounded scheme. But at least it seems clear that their work
shews intellectual power, and that speculation is not necessarily less
profound because it is pursued with a practical aim[113]. The founders
of the Stoic philosophy had a wide reach; they took all knowledge to be
their province; and they worked persistently towards the harmonization of
all its parts.


FOOTNOTES

[1] Diog. L. vii 41.

[2] Arnim ii 42 and 44.

[3] Diog. L. vii 40.

[4] Perhaps necessarily: on the definition of monism, see above, § 35,
note 22.

[5] See above, §§ 149, 153.

[6] ‘[Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea [natura],
quae expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut
quod efficeretur, posse esse non corpus’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 39; ‘cui tanta
vis est, ut inpellat et cogat et retineat et iubeat, corpus est’ Sen.
_Ep._ 106, 9.

[7] See above, § 67.

[8] § 43.

[9] See above, § 157, note 84.

[10] ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι Clem. Alex. _Strom._ ii p. 436
(Arnim ii 359); διδόασι δὲ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῇ [τῇ ὕλῃ] Plot. _Enn._ ii 4, 1
(Arnim ii 320). οὐσία in this sense is also called πρώτη ὕλη, see § 182,
note 52.

[11] τὸν θεὸν ... σῶμα νοερὸν ... ποιοῦντες Plut. _comm. not._ 48, 2.

[12] ‘vides autem tanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia,
quanto tenuior est’ Sen. _Ep._ 50, 6.

[13] ‘et hoc [animus] corpus est’ _ib._ 106, 4.

[14] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ Aët. _plac._ i
11, 5; ‘placet nostris quod bonum est, corpus esse’ Sen. _Ep._ 117, 2;
‘quaeris, bonum an corpus sit. bonum facit, prodest enim. quod facit,
corpus est’ _ib._ 106, 4.

[15] ‘non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint, tanquam ira,
amor, tristitia. si dubitas, vide an voltum nobis mutent, an frontem
adstringant, an faciem diffundant, an ruborem evocent, an fugent
sanguinem. quid ergo? tam manifestas notas corpori credis imprimi nisi a
corpore?’ _ib._ 106, 5.

[16] ‘dicimus non posse quicquam ab alio moveri, nisi aliquid fuerit
mobile ex semet’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 8; ‘is ardor, qui est mundi, non
agitatus ab alio, neque externo pulsu, sed per se ipse ac sua sponte
[movetur]’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 11, 31.

[17] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ ... κίνησιν τὴν μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν τίθενται, τὴν
μὲν (sc. πυκνωτικὴν) ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω Simpl. _Arist. cat._
p. 74; ‘tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem
concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium’ Censorinus _de die nat._
p. 75 (Zeller, p. 128).

[18] τόπον δ’ εἶναι ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀπεφαίνετο τὸ κατεχόμενον δι’ ὅλου ὑπὸ
ὄντος Ar. Did. fr. 25 Diels (Arnim ii 503).

[19] κενὸν μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸ οἷόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι, μὴ κατεχόμενον
δὲ Sext. _math._ x. 3 (Arnim ii 505); τὸ μὲν οὖν κενὸν ἄπειρον
εἶναι λέγεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦτ’ εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τόπον
πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σῶμα ἄπειρον εἶναι Ar. Did. (as note 18).

[20] Χρύσιππος διάστημα [τὸν χρόνον εἶπε] τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως Simpl.
_Arist. cat._ p. 88 l (Arnim ii 510); οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωϊκῶν [χρόνου
οὐσίαν] αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν Aët. _plac._ i 22, 7.

[21] χρόνος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου ἀλλ’ ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ γέγονεν ἢ μετ’ αὐτόν
Philo _de mundi op._ § 26 (Arnim ii 511).

[22] The question is thus stated by Seneca: ‘[quaeramus] continua sit
omnis et plena materia ... an diducta, et solidis inane permixtum sit’
Sen. _Dial._ viii 4, 2; and answered as follows ‘nihil usquam inane est’
_N. Q._ iii 16, 5. Cf. Arnim i 95 and ii 425.

[23] σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο καὶ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν Hipp. _Phil._
21 (Arnim ii 469).

[24] ‘animus ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri video
Panaetio’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42. The principle is however not
carried out in the Stoic universe, in which the heat resides in the
periphery, and the central earth is cold.

[25] νέων τι δρᾶν μὲν εὐτονώτεραι χέρες Eur. fr. 291 quoted by Corn. 31
(Arnim i 514); ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν
νευροῖς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστί Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.

[26] Epict. _Fr._ 57.

[27] See below, § 290.

[28] ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ... εἰπὼν ὅτι πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, κἂν ἱκανὸς
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ
κράτος Plut. _Sto. rep._ 7, 4.

[29] Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησι ... τὸν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία τόνον μὴ
παύεσθαι Stob. i 17, 3.

[30] Ἡρακλῆς δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις τόνος, καθ’ ὃν ἡ φύσις ἰσχυρὰ καὶ
κραταιά ἐστι Cornutus 31.

[31] ‘quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem
quam spiritus?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 8.

[32] ‘quid est illi [animo] motus nisi intentio?’ _ib._ ii 6, 6; ‘quid
cursus et motus omnis, nonne intenti spiritus operae sunt? hic facit vim
nervis, velocitatem currentibus’ _ib._ ii 6, 4.

[33] καταβληθὲν τὸ σπέρμα ἀναπληροῖ τοὺς οἰκείους λόγους καὶ ἐπισπᾶται
τὴν παρακειμένην ὕλην καὶ διαμορφοῖ Simpl. _Ar. cat._ Ο γ β.

[34] οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον [τὸν Δία] σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου ...
εὐεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν Diog. L. vii
136; τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν _ib._ 134.

[35] ‘ratio materiam format et quocunque vult versat’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 2.
Cf. Tert. _Apol._ 21.

[36] ἀφθάρτους [τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους] ἐποίησαν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς
Proclus _in Parm._ iv 135. See further Stein, _Psychologie der Stoa_, i
p. 49; Heinze, _Lehre vom Logos_, pp. 107-127.

[37] ‘The original impulse of providence gave the origin and first
momentum to the cosmic ordering of things, by selecting certain germs
of future existences, and assigning to them productive capacities of
realisation, change, and phenomenal succession.’ M. Aurelius, _To
himself_ ix 1.

[38] ‘ad initia deinde rerum redit [sapientia] aeternamque rationem [sc.
τὸν λόγον] toti inditam, et vim omnium seminum [sc. τῶν σπερματικῶν
λόγων] singula proprie figurantem’ Sen. _Ep._ 90, 29. See also the
interpretation of the picture of Samos, § 254, note 83.

[39] ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βάδιζον ἐπὶ γενέσεις κόσμου
ἐμπεριειληφὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διήκει
δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου Athen. _Supp._ 6, 7 B (Pearson Z. 45).

[40] See above, § 67.

[41] Sen. _Ep._ 65, 4 to 6, 11 and 12.

[42] See below, ch. ix.

[43] ‘causarum enim,’ inquit [Chrysippus], ‘aliae sunt perfectae et
principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae’ Cic. _de Fato_ 18, 41.

[44] See above, § 66.

[45] οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ ... ποιοῦνται τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα
καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα Simpl. _Arist. cat._ f 16
Δ (Arnim ii 369).

[46] Plotinus _Ennead._ vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).

[47] Simpl. _Arist. cat._ f 42 Ε (Arnim ii 403).

[48] For a fuller statement see Zeller, pp. 97-100.

[49] See § 183.

[50] For the position of ‘things not existent’ in the Stoic system see
further below, § 187.

[51] σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία Diog. L. vii 150; ἔφησε δὲ ὁ
Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι Stob. i
11, 5 c.

[52] οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην· ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ
ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται Diog. L. vii 150; ὕλην, σῶμα ὥς φασιν οὖσαν Plot.
_Enn._ ii p. 114 (Arnim ii 375).

[53] ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη, ἣν δυνάμει σῶμα Ἀριστοτέλης φησί Dexipp. _Arist. cat._
p. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).

[54] See Plutarch, _comm. not._ 50, 6.

[55] ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον πᾶσιν ἡ πρώτη ὕλη, τισὶ δὲ ὑποκείμενον
γιγνομένοις ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατηγορουμένοις ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης
Dexippus _Arist. cat._ p. 23, 25 (Arnim ii 374).

[56] Diog. L. vii 150.

[57] Simplic. _Arist. cat._ p. 57 Ε (Arnim ii 378).

[58] ὁ περὶ τῶν ποιοτήτων λόγος καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἁπάντων, ἅ φασιν
εἶναι Στωϊκῶν παῖδες σώματα Galen _qual. incorp._ 1 xix, p. 463 K (Arnim
ii 377).

[59] τὰς δὲ ποιότητας αὖ πάλιν οὐσίας καὶ σώματα ποιοῦσι Plut. _comm.
not._ 50, 1.

[60] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ κίνησιν [τὴν μανωτικήν see above, note 17] τοῦ ποιὸν
εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν Simpl. _Arist. cat._ p. 68 Ε (Arnim ii 452).

[61] τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν
ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις
εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα Plut. _Sto. rep._ 43, 4.

[62] ἀναιροῖτο ἂν τὸ τὴν ποιότητα εἶναι πνεῦμά πως ἔχον Alex. Aph.
_Arist. Top._ iv p. 181 (Arnim ii 379).

[63] τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστι Plut. _Sto. rep._
43, 2.

[64] Zeller, pp. 103-107.

[65] ‘pondus uti saxi, calor ignis, liquor aquaï, | tactus corporibus
cunctis’ Lucr. _R. N._ i 454, 455.

[66] ‘servitium contra, paupertas, divitiaeque, | ... cetera quorum |
adventu manet incolumis natura abituque, | haec soliti sumus, ut par est,
eventa vocare’ _ib._ 456-9.

[67] εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ
οἱ Στωϊκοί Dexipp. _Arist. cat._ p. 34, 19 (Arnim ii 399).

[68] τὰ μὲν ποιὰ περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα, τὰ ἰδίως δὲ πὼς ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ
ποιὰ Plot. _Enn._ vi 1, 30 (Arnim ii 400).

[69] ἡ δὲ [ἕξις] ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ἀναστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό Philo _quod deus_, § 35
(Arnim ii 458).

[70] οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναι [Χρύσιππός] φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων
γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα Plut. _Sto. rep._ 43, 2; ‘esse autem unitatem in
aere vel ex hoc intellegi potest, quod corpora nostra inter se cohaerent.
quid est enim aliud quod teneret illa, quam spiritus?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6,
6.

[71] ἡ δὲ φύσις διατείνει καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτά. καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν δέ ἐστιν ἐοικότα
φυτοῖς, ὄνυχές τε καὶ τρίχες· ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ φύσις ἕξις ἤδη κινουμένη Philo
_Leg. Alleg._ ii § 22 (Arnim ii 458).

[72] ψυχὴ δέ ἐστι φύσις προσειληφυῖα φαντασίαν καὶ ὁρμήν. αὔτη κοινὴ καὶ
τῶν ἀλόγων ἐστίν _ib._

[73] ‘voluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit; habitus
porro animi non erit in optimo, nisi totius vitae leges perceperit’ Sen.
_Ep._ 95, 57.

[74] ‘virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens’
_ib._ 113, 2.

[75] ‘Relative position’ must be distinguished from ‘correlation’ (πρός
τι). Such terms as ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter,’ ‘living’ and ‘dead’ are said to
be correlated. Simpl. _Arist. cat._ p. 42 Ε (Arnim ii 403).

[76] Simpl. as in last note.

[77] See below, § 337.

[78] So Ar. Did. fr. 28, and, more exactly, Alex. Aph. _de mixt._ p. 216,
14 Br. (Arnim ii 473). Another division is as follows: ‘quaedam continua
esse corpora, ut hominem; quaedam esse composita, ut navem; quaedam ex
distantibus, tanquam exercitus, populus, senatus’ Sen. _Ep._ 102, 6.

[79] οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ... διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας, ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι συνεχώρουν σῶμα διὰ σώματος
χωρεῖν Simpl. _Arist. phys._ p. 530, 9 (Arnim ii 467).

[80] Arnim ii 411 and 467.

[81] τὸ φῶς δὲ τῷ ἀέρι ὁ Χρύσιππος κιρνᾶσθαι λέγει Alex. Aph. _de mixt._
p. 216, 14 (Arnim ii 473).

[82] ‘Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel
per favos’ Tertull. _adv. Hermog._ 44; and see below, § 207.

[83] Note 2 above.

[84] ὅλον μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον Achill. _Is._ 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii
523).

[85] See Rendall, _M. Aurelius_ Introd. p. xxix.

[86] ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων Xen. _Mem._ iv 3, 13.

[87] _ib._ i 1, 11.

[88] See below, § 193.

[89] ‘in rerum, inquiunt, natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt; et haec
autem, quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur’ Sen. _Ep._ 58, 15.

[90] ὅλον μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον· πᾶν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ κενοῦ Achill.
_Isag._ 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii 523).

[91] Sen. as above.

[92] τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων τέσσαρα εἴδη καταριθμοῦνται, ὡς λεκτὸν καὶ κενὸν καὶ
τόπον καὶ χρόνον Sext. _math._ x 218 (Arnim ii 331).

[93] ‘etiam nunc est aliquid superius quam corpus. dicimus enim quaedam
corporalia esse, quaedam incorporalia, quid ergo erit ex quo haec
deducantur? illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium imposuimus, “quod est”’
Sen. _Ep._ 58, 11.

[94] οἱ Στωϊκοί, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι
ἀσώματον Sext. _math._ viii 258.

[95] ἐκεῖνοι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] νομοθετήσαντες αὑτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων
λέγεσθαι ... τὸ τὶ γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασιν εἶναι, κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ
σωμάτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ἀσωμάτων Alex. Aphr. _Arist. Top._ iv p.
155 (Arnim ii 329); ‘primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur “quid”’ Sen.
_Ep._ 58, 15.

[96] ‘animalia sunt omnia, quae cogitamus quaeque mente complectimur;
sequitur ut multa milia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris,
et singuli multa simus animalia. non sunt, inquit, multa, quia ex uno
religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 3 and 9
(Seneca himself does not agree with this way of speaking).

[97] ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστιν παρ’ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ
δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικόν ... τὸ δὲ
ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχε Sext. _math._ vii 38 (Zeller, p. 129).

[98] τὰ ἐννοήματά φασι μήτε τινὰ εἶναι μήτε ποιά, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ
ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς Ar. Did. fr. 40 (Diels).

[99] οὔτε ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαὶ [φαντασίαι] Sext. _math._
vii 246.

[100] ‘haec ... quae animo succurrunt, tanquam Centauri, gigantes, et
quicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit,
quamvis non habeat substantiam’ Sen. _Ep._ 58, 15.

[101] οὐδὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν τὸν χρόνον, τὸ κατηγόρημα, τὸ ἀξίωμα, τὸ
συνημμένον, τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον· οἷς χρῶνται μὲν μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων,
ὄντα δὲ οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι Plut. _comm. not._ 30, 12.

[102] See below, § 287.

[103] δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον,
κ.τ.λ. Diog. L. vii 134.

[104] _ib._; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ἄποιον ὕλην
Sext. _math._ ix 11 (Arnim ii 301).

[105] ‘dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex
quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. materia iacet iners, res ad
omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat; causa autem, id est ratio,
materiam format et quocunque vult versat’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 2; ‘universa ex
materia et ex deo constant. deus ista temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem
sequuntur. potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus,
quam materia patiens dei’ _ib._ 23.

[106] ἄλλων δὲ καὶ ποιητικὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἀπολειπόντων, ἀχώριστον δὲ ταύτην
τῆς ὕλης, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοί Syrianus _Arist. met._ (Arnim ii 308).
‘Stoici naturam in duas partes dividunt, unam quae efficiat, alteram quae
se ad faciendum tractabilem praebeat. in illa prima esse vim sentiendi,
in hac materiam; nec alterum sine altero [esse] posse’ Lact. _Div. inst._
vii 3.

[107] ‘neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi
contineretur, neque vim sine ulla materia’ Cic. _Ac._ i 6, 24.

[108] Arnim ii 418; ‘e quibus [elementis] aer et ignis movendi vim habent
et efficiendi; reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico
et terram’ Cic. _Ac._ i 7, 26.

[109] κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκούς, ἐκ τῆς τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κράσεως γινομένου
τοῦ σώματος Justin _de res._ 6 (Arnim ii 414).

[110] ὅσα τοίνυν σώματα πρῶτον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχει ποιότητας, ἐκεῖνα
στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς σαρκός· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ
καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ Galen _const. art. med._ i p. 251 K (Arnim ii 405).

[111] Galen _meth. med._ i 2, X p. 15 K (Arnim ii 411).

[112] See below, § 196.

[113] Cf. Mahaffy’s _Greek Life and Thought_; ‘it is quite wrong to
suppose that these thinkers [Zeno and Epicurus], busy as they were with
practical life, despised or avoided speculation. Their philosophical
theories demand hard reading and hard thinking’ p. 137.



CHAPTER VIII.

THE UNIVERSE.


[Sidenote: Study of the heavens.]

=192.= In including in their system the study of the physical universe
the Stoics broke daringly with Socrates and his faithful followers the
Cynics. These had joined with the ignorant and the prejudiced[1] in
ridiculing those whose eyes were always turned up towards the sky, whilst
they saw nothing of things that were nearer at hand and concerned them
more closely. But it was not for nothing that the most highly civilised
nations of antiquity, Egyptians, Chaldaeans, and Babylonians, had studied
the starry heavens, mapped out the constellations, measured the paths of
the wandering stars, predicted eclipses, reckoned with the tides, the
seasons, and the winds; with the result that their successors defied
the common opinion by declaring the earth to be a sphere, and to hold
inhabitants whom they called Antipodes, because they walk with their feet
turned up towards ours[2]. All this body of knowledge, called generically
the knowledge of the sky (though it included the whole physical geography
of the earth), had impressed and fascinated the Eastern world. It seemed
that as the eyes were raised to the sky, so the mind of man was elevated
and made ampler and nobler[3], leaving behind it the petty contentions
and rivalries of common life; and further that true knowledge had surely
been reached, when the positions of the heavenly bodies and the eclipses
of sun and moon could be predicted so long before with unfailing
accuracy. These feelings are now commonplaces of literature, and were
fully shared by the Stoics. ‘Is not the sun,’ says Seneca, ‘worthy of our
gaze, the moon of our regard? When the sky displays its fires at night,
and countless stars flash forth, who is not absorbed in contemplation of
them? They glide past in their company, concealing swift motion under the
outward appearance of immobility. We comprehend the movements of a few of
them, but the greater number are beyond our ken. Their dignity fills all
our thoughts[4].’ In the golden age which preceded our iron civilisation
‘men lay at nights in the open fields, and watched the glorious spectacle
of the heavens. It was their delight to note the stars that sank in one
quarter and rose in another. The universe swept round them, performing
its magnificent task in silence[5].’ ‘Their order never changes, spring
and autumn, winter and summer succeed according to fixed laws[6].’ And in
the same tone writes the Stoic poet: ‘unshaken the lights of heaven ever
move onwards in their proper orbit[7].’ The emotion roused in the Stoic
by the contemplation of the sky was thus identical with that expressed in
Judaic poetry by the ‘Song of the Three Holy Children[8],’ and in more
modern times by Addison’s famous hymn[9].


[Sidenote: The world-order.]

=193.= The phenomena of earth and heaven combined, in the general
opinion of intelligent men, to show the existence of a ‘world-order’ or
‘universe[10].’ The Stoics accepted this conception in their physics
from Heraclitus, who had declared that ‘neither god nor man created
this world-order,’ as in their ethics from Diogenes, the ‘citizen of
the universe[11].’ They therefore needed only to adjust an established
notion to their own physical postulates. We observe at once that the
very conception of an ordered whole differentiates that whole from the
absolute totality of all things. The universe is indeed on the one hand
identified with the substance of all things (οὐσία τῶν ὅλων), but only as
a thing made individual by the possession of quality (ἰδίως ποιόν)[12],
and necessarily one[13]. It is self-created; and it may therefore be
identified with its creator, the deity[14]; it also includes all that
is bodily[15]; but outside there remains the boundless void[16]. It is
therefore defined by Chrysippus as ‘the combination of heaven and earth
and all natures that are in them,’ or alternatively as ‘the combination
of gods and men and all that is created for their sake[17].’


[Sidenote: Its position.]

=194.= The Stoic conception of the universe is therefore that of a
continuous body, having a definite outline, and stationed in the
boundless void. That the universe has shape the Stoics deduce from its
having ‘nature’ (φύσις), that is, the principle of growth, displayed in
the symmetry of its parts[18]; and its shape is the perfect shape of a
sphere[19]. Within this sphere all things tend towards the middle[20];
and we use the terms ‘down’ meaning ‘towards the middle,’ and ‘up’
meaning thereby from the middle[21]. The Peripatetics are therefore
needlessly alarmed, when they tell us that our universe will fall down,
if it stands in the void; for, first, there is no ‘up’ or ‘down’ outside
the universe; and, secondly, the universe possesses ‘unity’ (ἕξις)[22]
which keeps it together[23]. And here we see the folly of Epicurus, who
says that the atoms move downwards from eternity in the boundless void;
for there is no such thing as ‘downwards’ in that which is unlimited[24].
Further, the universe is divided into two parts, the earth (with the
water and the air surrounding it) which is stable in the middle, and the
sky or aether which revolves around it[25].


[Sidenote: The heliocentric theory.]

=195.= Thus early in their theory the Stoics were led to make two
assertions on questions of scientific fact, in which they opposed the
best scientific opinion of their own time. For many authorities held
that the earth revolved on its axis, and that the revolution of the sky
was only apparent. Such were HICETAS of Syracuse[26], a Pythagorean
philosopher, whose views were quoted with approval by Theophrastus, and
later ECPHANTUS the Pythagorean, and HERACLIDES of Pontus[27]. From the
point of view of astronomical science this view seemed well worthy of
consideration, as Seneca in particular emphasizes[28]. Other astronomers
had gone further, declaring that the sun lay in the centre, and that
the earth and other planets revolved round it. Theophrastus stated that
Plato himself in his old age had felt regret that he had wrongly placed
the earth in the centre of the universe; and the heliocentric view was
put forward tentatively by ARISTARCHUS of Samos, and positively by
the astronomer SELEUCUS, in connexion with the theory of the earth’s
rotation[29]. For this Cleanthes had said that the Greeks should have
put Aristarchus on trial for impiety, as one who proposed to disturb
‘the hearth of the universe[30].’ This outburst of persecuting zeal,
anticipating so remarkably the persecution of Galileo, was effective
in preventing the spread of the novel doctrine. Posidonius was a great
astronomer, and recognised the heliocentric doctrine as theoretically
possible[31]; indeed, as one who had himself constructed an orrery,
shewing the motion of all the planets[32], he must have been aware of its
superior simplicity. Nevertheless he opposed it vigorously on theological
grounds, and perhaps more than any other man was responsible for its
being pushed aside for some 1500 years[33]. The precise ground of the
objection is not made very clear to us, and probably it was instinctive
rather than reasoned. It could hardly be deemed impious to place the sun,
whom the Stoics acknowledged as a deity, in the centre of the universe;
but that the earth should be reckoned merely as one of his attendant
planets was humiliating to human self-esteem, and jeopardised the
doctrine of Providence, in accordance with which the universe was created
for the happiness of gods and men only.


[Sidenote: The elements.]

=196.= Having determined that the earth is the centre of the universe,
and the sun above it, the way is clear to incorporate in the system the
doctrine of the four elements (στοιχεῖα, _naturae_)[34], which probably
had its origin in a cruder form of physical speculation than the
doctrine of the heavenly bodies. As we have seen above[35], the elements
are not first principles of the Stoic physics, but hold an intermediate
position between the two principles of the active and the passive on the
one hand, and the organic and inorganic world on the other. Earth is
the lowest of the elements, and also the grossest; above it is placed
water, then air, then fire; and these are in constant interchange, earth
turning to water, this into air, and this into aether, and so again in
return. By this interchange the unity of the universe is maintained[36].
The transition from one element to the next is not abrupt, but gradual;
the lowest part of the aether is akin to air[37]; it is therefore of no
great importance whether we speak with Heraclitus of three elements, or
with Empedocles of four. The two grosser elements, earth and water, tend
by nature downwards and are passive; air and fire tend upwards and are
active[38]. Zeno did not think it necessary to postulate a fifth element
as the substance of soul, for he held that fire was its substance[39].


[Sidenote: Fire and breath.]

=197.= Fire, heat, and motion are ultimately identical, and are the
source of all life[40]. Thus the elemental and primary fire stands
in contrast with the fire of domestic use; the one creates and
nourishes, the other destroys[41]. It follows that fire, though it
is one of the four elements, has from its divine nature a primacy
amongst the elements[42], which corresponds to its lofty position in
the universe[43]; and the other elements in turn all contain some
proportion of fire. Thus although air has cold and darkness as primary
and essential qualities[44], nevertheless it cannot exist without some
share of warmth[45]. Hence air also may be associated with life, and it
is possible to retain the popular term ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα, _spiritus_)
for the principle of life. In the development of the Stoic philosophy
we seldom hear again of air in connexion with coldness; and between the
‘warm breath’ (_anima inflammata_) and the primary fire there is hardly
a distinction; we may even say that ‘spirit’ has the highest possible
tension[46].


[Sidenote: God in the stone.]

=198.= Air on its downward path changes to water. This change is
described as due to loss of heat[47], and yet water too has some heat
and vitality[48]. Even earth, the lowest and grossest of the elements,
contains a share of the divine heat; otherwise it could not feed living
plants and animals, much less send up exhalations with which to feed
the sun and stars[49]. Thus we may say even of a stone that it has a
part of the divinity in it[50]. Here then we see the reverse side of the
so-called Stoic materialism. If it is true that God is body, and that
the soul is body, it is equally true that even water, the damp and cold
element, and earth, the dry and cold element, are both penetrated by the
divinity, by the creative fire without the operation of which both would
fall in an instant into nothingness[51].


[Sidenote: The heavenly bodies.]

=199.= We return to the consideration of the heavenly bodies. These are
set in spheres of various diameter, all alike revolving around the earth.
The succession we find described in Plato’s _Timaeus_[52]; the moon is
nearest to the earth, then comes the sun, then in order Venus, Mercury,
Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. This theory was taken up by Aristotle and
after him by Eudoxus, from whom it passed to Aratus and Chrysippus[53].
A tradition derived from Chaldaean sources gave a different order,
setting Venus and Mercury nearer to the earth than the sun; and this
order was accepted by the middle Stoics, that is to say by Panaetius and
Posidonius, the latter placing Venus nearer to the earth, and therefore
further from the sun, than Mercury[54]. The moon, like the earth, obtains
her light from the sun, being crescent-shaped when nearest to him,
full-orbed when furthest away. Her distance from the earth is two million
stadia (250,000 miles); when she lies between the earth and the sun she
eclipses his light, but when she is on the side of the earth directly
away from the sun she is herself eclipsed[55]. Her phases are explained
by her position relative to the sun[56]. The sun is 60 millions of miles
from the earth[57]; his diameter is 37½ times as large as that of the
earth[58]; he appears larger when on the horizon because his rays are
refracted through the thick atmosphere[59]. The planets, whether they
revolve round the earth or the sun, are falsely called ‘wandering stars,’
since their orbits have been fixed from all eternity[60]. The fixed stars
revolve round the earth at such a distance that the earth, when compared
with it, is merely the central point[61]. All the heavenly bodies are,
like the earth, of spherical form[62]. Finally Seneca, in advance of
the school, declared the comets to be a regular part of the celestial
world[62a].


[Sidenote: Cruder theories.]

=200.= Whilst the Stoics generally were in sympathy with the best
astronomical teaching of their time, they combined with it many views
based on much cruder forms of observation. Even Seneca thinks it bold to
suggest that the sun is not a little larger than the whole earth[63];
and it is commonly held that not only the sun and moon, but also
the heavenly bodies generally, feed upon moist exhalations from the
Ocean[64]. Cleanthes in particular seems to have viewed the astronomers
with suspicion. He alone regarded the moon not as a sphere, but as
a hemisphere with the flat side turned towards us[65]; the stars he
considered to be conical[66]. These views, very probably derived from
Heraclitus, seem to point to the conception of the sky or aether as a
single fixed fiery sphere, in which the heavenly bodies only differ from
the surrounding element by containing more closely packed masses of fiery
matter[67]; a conception which harmonizes far more closely with the Stoic
theory of the elements than the doctrines which are astronomically more
correct. Cleanthes also explained that the sun could not venture to
travel beyond his solstitial positions, lest he should be out of reach of
his terrestrial food[68]. And Cleanthes and Posidonius agree that the sun
keeps within the ‘torrid zone’ of the sky, because beneath it flows the
Ocean, from which the sun sucks up his nutriment[69].


[Sidenote: Deity of the stars.]

=201.= From the relation of the heavenly bodies to the element of fire
the Stoics draw the conclusion that they are animated, reasoning,
self-determined, and divine; in short, that they are gods[70]. This
godhead pertains particularly to the sun[71]. Of this doctrine Cleanthes
is especially the upholder[72], deeming that the sun is the ruling power
in the universe, as reason in man[73]. It is not clear whether the Stoics
derived their theory of the divinity of the heavenly bodies from logical
deduction, or whether they were here incorporating some Eastern worship.
In favour of the latter point of view is the consideration that at this
time the association of Mithra with the sun was probably making some
progress in the Persian religion, and that the popular names of the seven
days of the week, following the names of the sun, moon, and five planets,
must have been already current.


[Sidenote: Deity of the universe.]

=202.= But in the Stoic system this doctrine is overshadowed by the
paradox that the universe itself is a rational animal, possessed of
free-will and divine. This is the teaching of all the masters of the
school, beginning with Zeno himself. It appeared to him to follow
logically from two principles, the first that the universe possesses
a unity, the second that the whole is greater than its parts. ‘There
cannot be a sentient part of a non-sentient whole. But the parts of the
universe are sentient; therefore the universe is sentient[74].’ ‘The
rational is better than the non-rational. But nothing is better than
the universe; therefore the universe is rational[75].’ ‘The universe is
one[76]’; we must not therefore think of it as of an army or a family,
which comes into a kind of existence merely through the juxtaposition of
its members. By the same reasoning the universe possesses divinity[77].
Upon this favourite Stoic text is based the frequent assertion of modern
commentators that the philosophy is pantheistic[78]; but the more central
position of Stoicism is that the deity bears the same relation to the
universe as a man’s soul to his body[79], and the universe is therefore
no more all divine than a man is all soul. This view is expressed with
great clearness by Varro, who says: ‘As a man is called wise, being wise
in mind, though he consists of mind and body; so the world is called God
from its soul, though it consists of soul and body[80].’ The Stoics are
however in strong conflict with the Epicureans and all philosophers who
hold that the world is fundamentally all matter, and that soul and mind
are developments from matter. ‘Nothing that is without mind can generate
that which possesses mind,’ says Cicero’s Stoic[81], in full opposition
to modern popular theories of evolution. Further, just as it may be
questioned in the case of man whether the soul is situated in the head
or in the heart, so in the case of the universe we may doubt whether its
soul, or rather its ‘principate,’ is in the sun, as Cleanthes held[82],
or in the sky generally, as Chrysippus and Posidonius maintain[83], or in
the aether, as Antipater of Tyre taught[84].


[Sidenote: The earth’s inhabitants.]

=203.= In the study of the universe we are not called upon merely to
consider the earth as a member of the celestial company; we have to
contemplate it as the home of beings of various ranks, which also display
to us the principle of orderly arrangement. Preëminent amongst the
inhabitants of the earth stands man, who is distinguished by being the
sole possessor of the faculty of reason, and in addition owns all those
capacities which are shewn in beings of lower rank. The nature of man
constitutes so large a part of philosophy that we must reserve its full
consideration for a special chapter[85]; and must restrict ourselves
here to treating of lower beings, which fall into the three orders of
animals, plants, and inanimate beings. But since each of the higher
orders possesses all the properties of every order that stands lower, the
study of the orders inferior to man is also the study of a large part of
human nature. The number and classification of these orders are not to
be treated mechanically. From one point of view gods and men form one
class, the rational, as opposed to every kind of non-rational being. On
the other hand, from the standpoint with which we are rather concerned
at this moment, gods, men, and animals are subdivisions of the order of
animate beings, below which stand the plants, and lower still things
without life. Animals, as the name indicates, possess life or soul; the
two lower orders possess something corresponding to soul, but lower in
degree. The general term which includes soul in the animal and that
which corresponds to it in the plants and in lifeless bodies is ‘spirit’
(πνεῦμα); soul therefore is the highest type of ‘spirit.’


[Sidenote: The animals have not reason]

=204.= To the dumb animals the Stoics consistently deny the faculty of
reason; and this position must have seemed to them self-evident, since
the same word Logos expresses in the Greek both reason and speech. In
the Latin the point was no longer so clear; still the words ‘ratio’
and ‘oratio,’ if not identical, appeared to be connected by a natural
association. Since the animals then are necessarily unreasoning, those
acts of animals which appear to show reason must be explained in some
other way. A dog pursues a wild animal by its scent; it must therefore be
admitted that in a way the dog recognises that ‘this scent is the sign
of the wild animal[86]’; still he is incapable of expressing this belief
in the form of a correct syllogism. The industry of the ant is disposed
of in a more summary way; this animal shows a ‘restless helplessness,’
climbing up and down straws in meaningless industry; many men however are
no wiser[87]. For their young the animals have a certain feeling, yet
their grief at losing them is comparatively short-lived[88]. In spite,
however, of these limitations the animal world is one part of the wonders
of nature, and is deserving of our admiration; all animals have strong
affection for their young so long as these need their protection[89], and
the dog deserves special recognition both for his keen intelligence and
for his loyalty towards his master[90].


[Sidenote: but a sort of reason.]

=205.= To define more accurately the nature of animals we must to some
extent anticipate the discussion of human nature in a later chapter,
which follows the same general lines: for in every point the animals
are like men, but inferior. They possess soul, but without reason[91];
by soul we here mean the twin powers of observation and of independent
movement[92]. In a rough way the animals also possess a ruling part[93].
Their power of observation enables them to distinguish what is healthful
to them from that which is injurious; their power of movement shapes
itself into pursuit of the healthful and avoidance of the injurious[94].
They possess also properties which resemble the human feelings, such as
anger, confidence, hope, fear; but they do not in a strict sense possess
the same feelings as men[95]. As they cannot attain to virtue, neither
can they fall into vice[96].


[Sidenote: Plant life.]

=206.= From the animals we pass to the plants. These seem to have soul,
because they live and die[97]; yet they have not soul in any strict sense
of the word. It will therefore be better not to use this word, but to
speak of the ‘growth-power’ (φύσις)[98]. The governing part is situated
in the root[99]. The growth of plants both in size and in strength is
very remarkable, inasmuch as little seeds, which at first find themselves
place in crevices, attain such power that they split huge rocks and
destroy noble monuments, thus illustrating what is meant by tone or
tension; for it is a spirit which starts from the governing part (the
root) and spreads to the trunk and branches, conveying a force equally
strong to construct and to destroy[100]. From another point of view we
may say that the seed contains the Logos or law of the fully developed
plant, for under no possible circumstances can any other plant grow from
that seed except the plant of its kind[101].


[Sidenote: Cohesion.]

=207.= Lowest in the scale come inanimate objects, such as stones[102].
Yet even these have a property which corresponds to soul, and which keeps
them together in a particular outward form or shape; this property we
call ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις, _unitas_)[103]; like soul itself, it is a spirit
pervading the whole[104], and again it is the Logos of the whole. An
external force cannot impart this unity: so that the water contained in
a glass is not an ‘inanimate object’ in this sense[105]. In this lowest
grade of ‘spirit’ we read in Stoicism the antithesis of the materialism
of Epicurus, who postulates for his ‘atoms’ the fundamental property of
indivisibility, and can only account for the coherence of the bodies
formed from them by supplying them with an elaborate system of ‘hooks and
eyes,’ which was a frequent subject of derision to his critics. Epicurus
makes the indivisibility of the smallest thing his starting-point, and
from it constructs by degrees a compacted universe by arithmetical
combination; the Stoics start from the indivisibility of the great
whole, and working downwards explain its parts by a gradual shedding of
primitive force. God is in fact in the stone by virtue of his power of
universal penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων)[106].


[Sidenote: Gradations of spirit.]

=208.= No existing thing can possess one of the higher grades of spirit
without also possessing all the lower. Stones therefore have cohesion,
plants growth and cohesion, animals soul growth and cohesion; for these
are not different qualities which can be combined by addition, but
appearances of the same fundamental quality in varying intensity. Man
clearly possesses cohesion, for he has an outward shape; there does not
however seem to be any part of him which has merely cohesion. But in
the bones, the nails, and the hair are found growth and cohesion only,
and these parts grow as the plants do. In the eyes, ears and nose, are
sensation, as well as growth and cohesion; that is, there is soul in the
sense in which the animals possess soul. It is the intelligence only
which in man possesses soul in the highest grade[107].


[Sidenote: The conflagration.]

=209.= This universe, in spite of its majesty, beauty and adaptation,
in spite of its apparent equipoise and its essential divinity, is
destined to perish. ‘Where the parts are perishable, so is the whole;
but the parts of the universe are perishable, for they change one into
another; therefore the universe is perishable[108].’ Possibly this
syllogism would not have appeared so cogent to the Stoics, had they not
long before adopted from Heraclitus the impressive belief in the final
conflagration, familiar to us from its description in the ‘second epistle
of Peter[109].’ According to this theory, the interchange of the elements
already described[110] is not evenly balanced, but the upward movement is
slightly in excess. In the course of long ages, therefore, all the water
will have been converted into air and fire, and the universe will become
hot with flame[111]. Then the earth and all upon it will become exhausted
for want of moisture, and the heavenly bodies themselves will lose their
vitality for want of the exhalations on which they feed. Rivers will
cease to flow, the earth will quake, great cities will be swallowed up,
star will collide with star. All living things will die, and even the
souls of the blest and the gods themselves will once more be absorbed in
the fire, which will thus regain its primitive and essential unity[112].
Yet we may not say that the universe dies, for it does not suffer the
separation of soul from body[113].


[Sidenote: Is the universe perishable?]

=210.= In connexion with the doctrine of the conflagration the Stoics
were called upon to take sides upon the favourite philosophic problem
whether the universe is perishable, as Democritus and Epicurus hold,
or imperishable, as the Peripatetics say[114]. In replying to this
question, as in the theory as a whole, they relied on the authority
of Heraclitus[115]. The word universe is used in two senses: there is
an eternal universe (namely that already described as the universal
substance made individual by the possession of quality[116]),
which persists throughout an unending series of creations and
conflagrations[117]. In another sense the universe, considered in
relation to its present ordering, is perishable[118]. Just in the same
way the word ‘city’ is used in two senses; and that which is a community
of citizens may endure, even though the collection of temples and houses
also called the ‘city’ is destroyed by fire[119].


[Sidenote: Dissentient Stoics.]

=211.= The doctrine of the conflagration was not maintained by all Stoic
teachers with equal conviction. Zeno treated it with fulness in his book
‘on the universe[120]’; and Cleanthes and Chrysippus both assert that
the whole universe is destined to change into fire, returning to that
from which, as from a seed, it has sprung[121]. In the transition period,
owing to the positive influence of Plato and Aristotle, and the critical
acumen of Carneades, many leading Stoics abandoned the theory[122].
Posidonius however, though a pupil of Panaetius (the most conspicuous of
the doubters[123]), was quite orthodox on this subject; though he pays
to his master the tribute of asserting that the universe is the most
permanent being imaginable[124], and that its existence will continue
through an immense and _almost_ unlimited period of time[125]. In the
Roman period the conflagration is not only an accepted dogma, but one
that makes a strong appeal to the feelings. For with the conflagration
there comes to an end the struggle of the evil against the good; and
the Deity may at last claim for himself a period of rest, during which
he will contemplate with calmness the history of the universe that has
passed away[126], and plan for himself a better one to follow[127].


[Sidenote: The reconstruction.]

=212.= Upon the conflagration will follow the reconstruction of the world
(παλιγγενεσία, _renovatio_), which will lead again to a conflagration;
the period between one conflagration and the next being termed a ‘great
year’ (περίοδος, _magnus annus_). The conception of the ‘great year’ was
borrowed by the Stoics from the Pythagoreans[128], and leads us back
ultimately to astronomical calculations; for a great year is the period
at the end of which sun, moon and planets all return to their original
stations[129]. The phenomena of the sky recur in each new period in the
same way as before; and hence we readily infer that all the phenomena
of the universe, including the lives of individuals, will recur and
take their course again. Although this doctrine appears only slightly
connected with the general Stoic system, it was an accepted part of it:
and Seneca expresses an instinctive and probably universal feeling when
he says that few would willingly repeat their past histories, if they
knew they were so doing[130].


[Sidenote: Creation.]

=213.= We have put off till the end of this chapter the discussion of
the Stoic theory of Creation, because it is in fact one of the least
defined parts of the system. According to the theory of the great year
creation is not a single work, but a recurring event; and therefore in
one sense the history of the universe has neither beginning nor end.
It would however be a mistake to suppose that this point of view was
always present to the minds of Stoic teachers. The question of the
beginning of things is of primary importance to every philosophy, and
the Stoics approached it from many points of view, popular, scientific,
mythological and theological, and gave a number of answers accordingly.
To the orthodox Stoic all these answers are ultimately one, though the
language in which they are expressed differs greatly; whilst the critic
of Stoicism would assert that they are derived from different sources and
are fundamentally irreconcileable. Seneca suggests four answers to the
question ‘Who made the universe?’ It may be an omnipotent deity; or the
impersonal Logos; or the divine Spirit working in all things by tension;
or (lastly) destiny, that is, the unalterable succession of cause and
result[131]. These answers we may examine in order.


[Sidenote: The golden age.]

=214.= The view that ‘God made the world’ is that of the theology which
was now everywhere becoming popular; and it is usually associated,
even when expounded by Stoic teachers, with dualistic views. Before
the creation there existed a chaos, matter without shape, dark and
damp[132]; the Deity formed a plan, and brought life order and light into
the mass: from ‘chaos’ it became ‘cosmos’[133]. This deity is the same
that is commonly named Ζεύς[134] or Jove, and is called the ‘father of
gods and men.’ The universe so created was at first happy and innocent,
as is expressed in the tradition of the Golden Age. Men lived together
in societies, willingly obeying the wisest and strongest of their
number[135]; none were tempted to wrong their neighbours. They dwelt
in natural grottos or in the stems of trees, and obtained nourishment
from tame animals and wild fruits. Little by little they made progress
in the arts, and learnt to build, to bake, and to make use of metals.
These views were especially developed by Posidonius, who believed that in
the Mysians of his day, who lived on milk and honey, and abstained from
flesh-meat, he could still trace the manners of this happy epoch[136].
It seems probable that it was from Posidonius, rather than from the
Pythagoreans, that Varro derived his picture of the Golden Age, which has
become familiar to us in turn through the version given by Ovid in his
_Metamorphoses_[137].


[Sidenote: Older stoic theory.]

=215.= These conceptions however are only familiar in the later forms
of Stoicism. The teaching of the founders of Stoicism is on this matter
monistic, and is based upon the teaching of Heraclitus that the world
was in the beginning a creative fire, which was alike the creator and
the material of creation. The process of creation (διακόσμησις) may be
regarded as identical with that of the mutation of the elements on the
downward path[138]; with the special note that when the stage of water is
reached[139] the deity assumes the shape of the seed Logos (σπερματικὸς
λόγος)[140], and begets in the first instance the four elements[141];
then, from a combination of these, trees and animals and all other
things after their kind[142]. Yet even this statement is simplified if
we regard the original fire as itself containing the seed Logoi of all
things that are to be created[143]. To this is to be added that all this
is well ordered, as in a duly constituted state[144]. From this point
of view the Cosmos is a Cosmopolis, and we reach the border of the
investigations which deal with the moral government of the universe, and
the political organization of mankind.


[Sidenote: Summary.]

=216.= We may sum up the history of the universe according to the Stoics
somewhat in the following way. Body is neither burden on the soul nor its
instrument, but all body is of itself instinct with motion, warmth, and
life, which are essentially the same. This motion is not entirely that of
contraction, or immobility would result; nor entirely that of expansion,
else the universe would be scattered into the far distance[145]. One of
these motions constantly succeeds the other, as Heraclitus says ‘becoming
extinguished by measure, and catching light by measure[146]’; as when a
swimmer with all his strength can just hold his own against the force of
the stream, or a bird straining its pinions appears to rest suspended
in the air[147]. At the beginning of each world-period expansion or
tension is supreme, and only the world-soul exists. Next the fiery breath
begins to cool, the opposing principle of contraction asserts itself,
the universe settles down and shrinks; the aether passes into air, and
air in its turn to water. All this while tension is slackening, first
in the centre, lastly even in the circumference; yet the vital force
is not entirely quenched; beneath the covering of the waters lurks the
promise of a new world. The fire still unextinguished within works upon
the watery mass or chaos until it evolves from it the four elements as
we know them. On its outer edge where it meets the expansive aether, the
water rarefies until the belt of air is formed. All the while the outward
and inward movements persist; particles of fire still pass into air, and
thence into water and earth. Earth still in turn yields to water, water
to air, and air to fire (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω). Thus by the interaction of
conflicting tendencies an equilibrium (ἰσονομία) is established, and the
result is the apparent permanence of the phenomenal world[148]. Finally
the upward movement becomes slightly preponderant, water becomes absorbed
in air and air transformed into fire, once more the conflagration results
and all the world passes into the fiery breath from which it came[149].


FOOTNOTES

[1] As, for instance, Aristophanes in the _Clouds_.

[2] ‘vos etiam dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae,
qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos Antipodas
vocatis’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123.

[3] ‘cum tu, inter scabiem tantam et contagia lucri, | nil parvum sapias
et adhuc sublimia cures; | quae mare compescant causae; quid temperet
annum; | stellae sponte sua iussaene vagentur et errent’ Hor. _Ep._ i 12,
14-17.

[4] Sen. _Ben._ iv 23, 2 to 4.

[5] ‘in aperto iacentes sidera superlabebantur et insigne spectaculum
noctium. mundus in praeceps agebatur silentio tantum opus ducens
... libebat intueri signa ex media caeli parte vergentia, rursus ex
occulto alia surgentia’ _Ep._ 90, 42.

[6] ‘[vides] ordinem rerum et naturam per constituta procedere. hiems
nunquam aberravit. aestas suo tempore incaluit. autumni verisque, ut
solet, facta mutatio est. tam solstitium quam aequinoctium suos dies
rettulit’ _N. Q._ iii 16, 3.

[7] ‘caelestia semper | inconcussa suo volvuntur sidera lapsu’ Lucan
_Phars._ ii 267, 8.

[8] ‘O all ye Works of the Lord, bless ye the Lord; praise and exalt him
above all for ever’ Daniel iii 57 to 82.

[9] ‘The spacious firmament on high, | with all the blue ethereal sky, |
and spangled heavens, a shining frame, | their great Original proclaim,’
etc. J. Addison (1728).

[10] See above, § 186.

[11] See below, § 303.

[12] καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας Diog. L. vii 138.

[13] ὅτι θ’ εἷς ἐστιν [ὁ κόσμος] Ζήνων τέ φησιν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ
Χρύσιππος _ib._ 143.

[14] λέγεται δὲ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεός Stob. i 21, 5.

[15] οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἕνα κόσμον ἀπεφήναντο, ὃν δὴ τὸ πᾶν ἔφασαν εἶναι
καὶ τὸ σωματικόν Aët. _plac._ i 5, 1.

[16] See § 187, note 90; Seneca however thinks there may be more outside
the universe than void; ‘illud scrutor, quod ultra mundum iacet, utrumne
profunda vastitas sit an et hoc ipsum terminis suis cludatur; qualis sit
habitus exclusis’ _Dial._ viii 5, 6.

[17] Ar. Did. fr. 31.

[18] Arnim ii 534.

[19] Arnim ii 547.

[20] μέρη δέ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ γῆ, ὕδωρ, ἀήρ, πῦρ, ἃ πάντα νεύει ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον
Achilles _Isag._ 9 (Arnim ii 554). But according to another view only
earth and water, being naturally heavy, tend towards the middle; whereas
air and fire, being naturally light, tend from it; _ib._ 4 (Arnim ii
555). See § 196.

[21] Arnim ii 557.

[22] See above, § 184.

[23] Arnim ii 540. The universe, being ‘body,’ possesses ‘up’ and ‘down,’
‘front’ and ‘back,’ and all the other relations, according to the fourth
category.

[24] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 44, 1.

[25] Ar. Did. fr. 31, quoting from Chrysippus. So Cornutus 1; ὁ οὐρανὸς
περιέχει κύκλῳ τὴν γῆν.

[26] ‘Hicetas Syracosius caelum solem lunam stellas supera denique omnia
stare censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri, quae cum
circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici
omnia, quae si stante terra caelum moveretur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123, on
which see Prof. Reid’s note.

[27] Plut. _plac. phil._ iii 13, 3. The question of priority in the
statement of this theory has been much discussed in recent years; and
it is contended that Hicetas and Ecphantus never existed except as
characters in dialogues composed by Heraclides of Pontus, the true
discoverer. See H. Steigmüller, _Archiv der Geschichte der Philosophie_,
Berlin 1892; Otto Voss, _de Heraclidis Pontici vita et scriptis_,
Rostock, 1896; Tannery, _Pseudonymes antiques_ (Revue des études
grecques, 1897).

[28] ‘pertinebit hoc excussisse, ut sciamus utrum mundus terra stante
circumeat an mundo stante terra vertatur. fuerunt enim qui dicerent nos
esse, quos rerum natura nescientes ferat’ Sen. _N. Q._ vii 2, 3. Seneca
however appears for himself to reject the doctrine: ‘scimus praeter
terram nihil stare, cetera continua velocitate decurrere’ _Ep._ 93, 9.

[29] Plut. _qu. Plat._ viii 1, 2 and 3; Aët. _plac._ ii 24, 8 and iii 17,
9.

[30] Plut. _fac. lun._ 6, 3.

[31] Simplic. _Arist. phys._ p. 64.

[32] ‘si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc,
quam nuper familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae
conversiones idem efficiunt in sole et in luna et in quinque stellis
errantibus, quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus’ Cic. _N.
D._ ii 34, 88.

[33] Schmekel, p. 465.

[34] ‘in rerum natura elementa sunt quattuor’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii 12, 3.

[35] See above, § 190.

[36] ‘ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aer, ex aere aether; deinde retrorsum
vicissim ex aethere aer, ex aere aqua, ex aqua terra infima. sic naturis
his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum deorsum ultro citro commeantibus,
mundi partium coniunctio continetur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 32, 84.

[37] ‘necesse est ut et imus aether habeat aliquid aeri simile, et summus
aer non sit dissimilis imo aetheri, quia non fit statim in diversum
ex diverso transitus; paulatim ista in confinio vim suam miscent, ut
dubitare possis an aer an hic iam aether sit’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 14, 2; cf.
iv 10.

[38] Arnim ii 555. But see above, § 194, note 20.

[39] ‘de naturis autem sic [Zeno] sentiebat, ut in quattuor initiis rerum
illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensum et mentem effici
rebantur, non adhiberet: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae
quidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque sensus.’ Cic. _Ac._ i 11, 39; cf.
_Fin._ iv 5, 12.

[40] ‘sic enim se res habet, ut omnia quae alantur et crescant,
contineant in se vim caloris: sine qua neque ali possent neque crescere.’
_N. D._ ii 9, 23 and 24; ‘caloris [natura] vim [habet] in se vitalem, per
omnem mundum pertinentem’ _ib._

[41] ‘hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et
consumptor omnium; contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia
conservat alit auget sustinet sensuque afficit’ _ib._ ii 15, 41. Cicero
is quoting from Cleanthes (fr. 30 P); the teaching of Zeno was the same
(fr. 71 B).

[42] τὸ δὲ [πῦρ καὶ] κατ’ ἐξοχὴν στοιχεῖον λέγεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
πρώτου τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολήν Ar. Did. fr. 21; ‘Stoici
ignem, ... unum ex his quattuor elementis, et viventem et sapientem et
ipsius mundi fabricatorem ..., eumque omnino ignem deum esse putaverunt’
Aug. _Civ. De._ viii 5.

[43] ‘[ignem] natura sursum vocat; in illo igne purissimo nihil est quod
deprimatur’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 13, 1 and 2.

[44] οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ τῷ ἀέρι τὸ πρώτως ψυχρὸν ἀποδιδόντες Plut. _prim.
frig._ 9, 1; ‘aer frigidus per se et obscurus’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 10.

[45] ‘ipse vero aer, qui natura est maxime frigidus, minime est expers
caloris’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 10, 26; ‘aer nunquam sine igne est. detrahe illi
calorem; rigescet, stabit, durabitur’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii 10, 4.

[46] ‘quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem
quam spiritus?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 8. Aristotle held that air was warm
(Arnim ii 431).

[47] ‘detrahe [aeri] calorem; transiet in humorem’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii 10, 4.

[48] ‘est aliquid in aqua vitale’ _ib._ v 5, 2.

[49] ‘non esse terram sine spiritu palam est ... illo dico vitali et
vegeto et alente omnia. hunc nisi haberet, quomodo tot arbustis spiritum
infunderet non aliunde viventibus, et tot satis?... totum hoc caelum,
... omnes hae stellae ..., hic tam prope a nobis agens cursum sol ...
alimentum ex terra trahunt’ _ib._ vi 16, 1 and 2.

[50] Philod. _de ira_ p. 77 Gomp.

[51] ‘ex quo concluditur, calidum illud atque igneum in omni fusum esse
natura’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 10, 28.

[52] cap. xi, p. 38 D.

[53] Schmekel, pp. 463, 4.

[54] _ib._ p. 464.

[55] Diog. L. vii 145 and 146; Posidonius is his general authority, but
the theory of the solar eclipse he refers to Zeno.

[56] ‘[lunae] tenuissimum lumen facit proximus accessus ad solem,
digressus autem longissimus quisque plenissimum’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 19, 50.

[57] Pliny, _Nat. hist._ ii 21.

[58] Such was the calculation of Posidonius; see Mayor’s note on Cic.
_N. D._ ii 36, 92. The sun’s diameter is in fact three times as large as
Posidonius thought.

[59] This explanation has so plausible a sound that it may not be
superfluous to remark that it is scientifically valueless.

[60] Cic. _N. D._ ii 20, 51.

[61] ‘persuadent enim mathematici terram in medio mundo sitam ad universi
caeli complexum quasi puncti instar obtinere, quod κέντρον illi vocant.’
_Tusc. disp._ i 17, 40.

[62] Diog. L. vii 144 and 145.

[62a] ‘ego nostris non adsentior; non enim existimo cometen subitaneum
ignem sed inter aeterna opera naturae’ _N. Q._ vii 21, 1.

[63] ‘omni terrarum ambitu non semel maior’ Sen. _N. Q._ vi 16, 2.

[64] Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρέφεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἐκ τῆς ἐπιγείου
ἀναθυμιάσεως Aët. _plac._ ii 17, 4; ‘[sidera] marinis terrenisque
umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis [aluntur]’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 16, 43;
‘totum hoc caelum ... halitu terrarum [sustinetur]’ Sen. _N. Q._ vi 16, 2.

[65] Ar. Did. fr. 34; for the text and interpretation see Hirzel, pp.
121, 122.

[66] Aët. _plac._ ii 14, 1 and 2.

[67] ‘solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quae
oriantur in ardore caelesti, qui aether vel caelum nominatur’ Cic. _N.
D._ ii 15, 41.

[68] Cic. _N. D._ iii 14, 37.

[69] ‘ideo enim, sicut et Posidonius et Cleanthes adfirmant, solis meatus
a plaga, quae usta dicitur, non recedit, quia sub ipsa currit Oceanus’
Macrob. _Sat._ i 23, 2.

[70] ‘hac mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem
divinitas, quae ex mobilissima purissimaque aetheris parte gignuntur; ...
totaque sunt calida atque perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime animantia
esse et sentire atque intellegere dicantur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 15, 39.

[71] Sen. _Ben._ vii 31, 3.

[72] ‘Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat’ Cic. _Ac._ ii
41, 126.

[73] Diog. L. vii 139.

[74] ‘idemque [Zeno] hoc modo: “nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest
esse sentiens. mundi autem partes sentientes sunt: non igitur caret sensu
mundus”’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 8, 22.

[75] ‘quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non
utitur. nihil autem mundo melius: ratione igitur mundus utitur’ _ib._ 8,
21; see also § 83.

[76] Diog. L. vii 143; ‘haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus
mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato
spiritu continerentur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 7, 19. This unity of the universe
is technically termed συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων, ‘consentiens conspirans
continuata cognatio rerum’ (Cic. as above). It was denied by Panaetius
(Schmekel, pp. 191, 192).

[77] ‘est ergo in eo virtus: sapiens est igitur et propterea deus’ Cic.
_N. D._ ii 14, 39; ‘quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini
aliquid existere, qui dei pars est? totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum
est et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 30.

[78] ‘From what has been said it follows that the Stoics admitted
no essential difference between God and the world. Their system was
therefore strictly pantheistic’ Zeller, p. 156.

[79] ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει
τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτόν, καὶ αὔτη καλεῖται Ζεύς Cornutus 2.

[80] Varro Fr. i 27 b (Aug. _Civ. De._ vii 6).

[81] ‘nihil quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se
potest animantem compotemque rationis’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 8, 22.

[82] See above, § 101.

[83] Diog. L. vii 139.

[84] _ib._

[85] See below, chap. xi.

[86] Sext. _math._ viii 270 (Arnim ii 727).

[87] ‘inconsultus illis vanusque cursus est, qualis formicis per arbusta
repentibus, quae in summum cacumen, deinde in imum inanes aguntur.
his plerique similem vitam agunt, quorum non immerito quis “inquietam
inertiam” dixerit’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 12, 3.

[88] _ib._ vi 7, 2.

[89] ‘quid dicam, quantus amor bestiarum sit in educandis custodiendisque
eis, quae procreaverunt, usque ad eum finem, dum possint se ipsa
defendere?’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 51, 129.

[90] ‘canum vero tam fida custodia, ... quid significat?’ _ib._ 63, 158.

[91] δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἕξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ Plut.
_virt. mor._ 12.

[92] τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεώς τε καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινήσεως [αἰτίαν ὀνομάζομεν]
ψυχήν Galen _adv. Iul._ v (Arnim ii 718).

[93] ‘omnem naturam necesse est ... habere aliquem in se principatum, ut
in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 11,
29; ‘ipsum principale parum subtile, parum exactum. capit ergo visus
speciesque rerum quibus ad impetus evocetur, sed turbidas et confusas’
Sen. _Dial._ iii 3, 7 and 8.

[94] ‘bestiis [natura] et sensum et motum dedit, et cum quodam appetitu
accessum ad res salutares, a pestiferis recessum’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 12, 34;
and so again, _ib._ 47, 122.

[95] ‘irasci quidem non magis sciunt quam ignoscere; muta animalia
humanis adfectibus carent, habent autem similes illis quosdam impetus’
Sen. _Dial._ iii 3, 5 and 6.

[96] ‘[ira], cum sit inimica rationi, nusquam nascitur, nisi ubi rationi
locus est’ _ib._ 3, 4.

[97] ‘sunt quaedam quae animam habent nec sunt animalia. placet enim
satis et arbustis animam inesse; itaque et vivere illa et mori dicimus’
Sen. _Ep._ 58, 10; cf. _N. Q._ vi 16, 1.

[98] οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὐδὲ ψυχὴν ὅλως ὀνομάζουσι τὴν τὰ φυτὰ διοικοῦσαν,
ἀλλὰ φύσιν Galen _de Hipp. et Plut._ vi. 561 K (Arnim ii 710). Aristotle
had used the term θρεπτικὴ ψυχή in the same sense. So too Cicero: ‘iis
quae [gignuntur] e terra natura nihil tribuit amplius quam ut ea alendo
atque augendo tueretur’ _N. D._ ii 12, 33.

[99] _ib._ ii 11, 29.

[100] ‘parvula admodum semina ... in tantum convalescunt ut ingentia saxa
disturbent et monumenta dissolvant. hoc quid est aliud quam intentio
spiritus?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6, 5; and again ‘quid aliud producit fruges et
segetem imbecillam ac virentes exigit umbras ac distendit in ramos quam
spiritus intentio et unitas?’ _ib._ ii 6, 6. See also Cic. _N. D._ ii 32,
81.

[101] Arnim ii 713.

[102] ‘quaedam anima carent, ut saxa; itaque erit aliquid animantibus
antiquius, corpus scilicet’ Sen. _Ep._ 58, 10.

[103] This use of ἕξις must be kept distinct from that which is
contrasted with διάθεσις, as _habitus_ from _dispositio_: see above, §
184.

[104] ἑκτικὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστι πνεῦμα τὸ συνέχον τοὺς λίθους Galen _introd.
s. med._ xiv p. 726 K (Arnim ii 716).

[105] ‘[unitas corporum] ad naturam corporis [refert], nulla ope externa,
sed unitate sua cohaerentis’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 2, 4.

[106] Alex. _de mixt._ p. 226, 24-30 Bruns (Arnim ii 1048); Lucian
_Hermot._ 81. See above, § 186.

[107] This gradation of soul-power is most clearly explained by Varro;
‘idem Varro tres esse adfirmat animae gradus in omni universaque natura;
unum qui omnes partes corporis, quae vivunt, transit et non habet sensum
sed tantum ad vivendum valetudinem; hanc vim in nostro corpore permanare
dicit in ossa ungues capillos, sicut in mundo arbores sine sensu ...
crescunt et modo quodam suo vivunt; secundum gradum animae, in quo sensus
est; hanc vim pervenire in oculos aures nares os tactum; tertium gradum
esse animae summum, quod vocatur animus, in quo intellegentia praeminet;
hoc praeter hominem omnes carere mortales’ Aug. _Civ. De._ vii 23.

[108] Diog. L. vii 141.

[109] ‘The heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements
shall be dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that
are therein shall be burned up.’ 2 Peter iii 10.

[110] See above, § 196.

[111] The theory of the conflagration appears to have been attached to
the Stoic system from without, and the logical contention is obviously
weak. For if the upward movement is in excess, the earth should disappear
before the water. It should also always be remembered that the fire that
finally remains is not the destructive, but a constructive element.

[112] ‘ex quo eventurum nostri putant id, ... ut ad extremum omnis mundus
ignesceret, cum humore consumpto neque terra ali posset neque remearet
aer; cuius ortus, aqua omni exhausta, esse non posset: ita relinqui nihil
praeter ignem, a quo rursum animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret, atque
idem ornatus oriretur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 46, 118. ‘cum tempus advenerit,
quo se mundus renovaturus extinguat, viribus ista se suis caedent et
sidera sideribus incurrent et omni flagrante materia uno igne quicquid
nunc ex disposito lucet ardebit. nos quoque felices animae atque aeterna
sortitae, parva ruinae ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur’
Sen. _Dial._ vi 26, 6.

[113] οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνῄσκειν τὸν κόσμον Plut. _Sto. rep._ 39, 2.

[114] ‘[quaeramus] immortalis sit mundus, an inter caduca et ad tempus
nata numerandus’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 4, 31.

[115] ‘Heraclitus after all his speculations on the conflagration of the
universe’ _To himself_ (Rendall’s transl.), iii 3. Aristotle interpreted
Heraclitus in the same way; thus he paraphrases fr. 26 (B), 66 (D); πάντα
τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινέει καὶ καταλήψεται as follows: Ἡράκλειτός φησιν
ἅπαντα γίγνεσθαί ποτε πῦρ _Met._ xi 10.

[116] See above, § 193.

[117] Clem. Al. _Strom._ v 14 (Arnim ii 590) relying on fr. 20 (B), 30
(D). Philo _inc. mund._ p. 222, 2 (Arnim ii 620).

[118] Clem. Al. as before, relying on fr. 21 (B), 31a (D); φθαρτὸς μέν [ὁ
κόσμος] ὀ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν, Philo as above.

[119] Ar. Did. fr. 29.

[120] Diog. L. vii 142.

[121] Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν
οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ Ar. Did. fr. 36.

[122] See above, § 109.

[123] See above, § 115. For a full discussion of the motives of this
change see Schmekel, pp. 304-318.

[124] ‘ita stabilis mundus est atque ita cohaeret ad permanendum, ut
nihil ne excogitari quidem possit aptius’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 45, 115.

[125] ‘[mundi partium coniunctio] certe perdiuturna [est,] permanens ad
longinquum et immensum paene tempus’ _ib._ 33, 85.

[126] ‘[Iuppiter,] resoluto mundo et dis in unum confusis paulisper
cessante natura adquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus’ Sen. _Ep._
9, 16. On the relation of Ζεύς to the ἐκπύρωσις see Alex. _de mixt._ p.
226, 16 B; Philo _inc. mund._ c. 14, 15.

[127] ‘[conflagratio] fit, cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri’
_N. Q._ iii 28, 7.

[128] Zeller, p. 166.

[129] Cic. _N. D._ ii 20, 51: see also Schmekel, p. 241.

[130] ‘veniet iterum, qui nos in lucem reponat dies; quem multi
recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret’ Sen. _Ep._ 36, 10. Socrates and Plato
will live again, their friends and fellow citizens will be the same, and
they will be again treated as before; Nemes. _nat. hom._ p. 277 (Arnim
ii 625). This theory is plainly not reconcileable with Seneca’s hope of
better things (see note 127). See also Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, pp.
33 sqq.

[131] ‘quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille deus est potens omnium,
sive incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus
per omnia maxima et minima aequali intentione diffusus, sive fatum et
immutabilis causarum inter se cohaerentium series’ Sen. _Dial._ xii 8, 3.

[132] This chaos the Stoics identified with the watery stage which
preceded the creation of earth in the history of the elements: see
Pearson on Zeno fr. 112, 113.

[133] Seneca’s writings are penetrated with this conception: ‘hoc
universum ... dies aliquis dissipabit et in confusionem veterem
tenebrasque demerget’ _Dial._ xi 1, 2; cf. _Ep._ 65, 19.

[134] Δία δ’ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν, ὅτι δι’ αὐτὸν γίνεται καὶ σώζεται τὰ πάντα
Cornutus 2.

[135] ‘illo ergo saeculo, quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse
regnum Posidonius iudicat’ Sen. _Ep._ 90, 5.

[136] Strabo vii 296. See generally Schmekel, pp. 288-290.

[137] Ov. _Met._ xv 96-142; Schmekel p. 288.

[138] κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεὸν] τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν
οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ Diog. L. vii 136.

[139] This stage, at which the whole universe is water, even though the
four elements have not yet been created, reflects the popular tradition
as to Chaos as in the last section: see Pearson p. 102. For the process
of creation as described by Cleanthes see Pearson p. 252.

[140] See above, § 178.

[141] καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὔτω καὶ τοῦτον,
σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου ... ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα
στοιχεῖα Diog. L. vii 136.

[142] εἶτα κατὰ μῖξιν τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη _ib._ 142.

[143] τὸ μέντοι πρῶτον πῦρ εἶναι καθαπερεί τι σπέρμα, τῶν ἁπάντων ἔχον
τοὺς λόγους Arist. apud Euseb. _praep. ev._ xv (Arnim i 98).

[144] ταύτῃ δὲ πάντα διοικεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ὑπέρευ, καθάπερ ἐν
εὐνομωτάτῃ τινὶ πολιτείᾳ _ib._

[145] Galen _de trem._ 6 VII, p. 616 K (Arnim ii 446).

[146] ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα Heracl. Fr. 20 (B), 30 (D).

[147] Galen _de musc._ i 7 and 8 (Arnim ii 450).

[148] ἐκπύρωσιν μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δυναστείαν τῶν ἄλλων
ἐπικρατήσαντος, διακόσμησιν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἰσονομίαν
ἣν ἀντιδιδόασιν ἀλλήλοις Philo _an. sac._ II 242 M (Arnim ii 616).

[149] This concluding section is based upon a note, which was prepared by
Mr A. C. Pearson for an edition of Chrysippus now abandoned, and which
has been kindly placed by him at my disposal.



CHAPTER IX.

THE SUPREME PROBLEMS.


[Sidenote: The ‘mauvais pas.’]

=217.= In the preceding chapter we have discussed the universe from the
scientific standpoint. ‘Such,’ say the Stoics, ‘we find that the universe
is; such and such it was in the beginning, and such it will be to the
end.’ Their conclusions are reached by observation, classification,
and analysis; and yet not entirely by these, for we must admit that
there is also employed that power of scientific imagination which
the ancients call ‘divination.’ Still on the whole the investigation
has been that of the student, and the method that of speculation or
contemplation dissociated from any consideration of the usefulness of
the results attained. In the study we now undertake all this is changed.
Our philosophy proceeds to assert that the universe is good, that it is
directed by wise purpose, and that it claims the reverence and obedience
of mankind. It calls upon its adherents to view the world with moral
approval, and to find in it an ethical standard. Such conclusions
cannot be reached by purely discursive reason; but they are such as are
everywhere sought by practical men. They appeal to a side of human nature
different from that which passes judgment on the conclusions previously
reached. From the first position ‘the universe is’ to the second ‘the
universe is good’ the step is slippery. We are on the dizzy heights of
philosophical speculation, where the most experienced climbers find their
way they know not how, and can hardly hold out a hand to help those who
are in distress. The Stoic teachers did not perhaps always follow the
same track, and now and again they stumbled on the way. Reasoning often
proved a weak support, but resolution carried them through somehow to the
refuges on which their eyes were all along set.


[Sidenote: Fate, providence, and fortune.]

=218.= To the problem of the meaning and government of the universe three
answers were current in the epoch with which we are dealing. Either all
things take place by fate; or the world is ruled by a divine providence;
or else fortune is supreme[1]. These three terms are not always mutually
exclusive: Virgil speaks commonly of the ‘fates of the gods[2]’; and
‘fortune’ is frequently personified, not only in common speech, as
when the Romans spoke of the ‘fortune of the city,’ but even by a
philosopher like Lucretius, who speaks of ‘Fortune the pilot[3],’ with a
half-humorous abandonment of exactitude. The Stoics have the merit of not
only recognising fully these three powers, but also of using the terms
with relative consistency. By fate then we mean an abstract necessity,
an impersonal tendency, according to which events flow; by providence
a personal will; by fortune the absence of both tendency and purpose,
which results in a constant shifting to and fro, as when a man stands
upon a ball, and is carried this way and that[4]. All explanations, both
of general tendencies and of particular events, must ultimately resolve
themselves into one or other of these three; every constructive system
must necessarily aim at shewing that the three ultimately coincide, and
that philosophy is the guardian and guide of mankind in the understanding
of their relations one to another[5].


[Sidenote: Fate.]

=219.= The Stoics hold that ‘all things happen by fate[6].’ To this
conclusion they are brought by the same reasoning that moved the
Chaldaeans. The visible universe is, and has motion. The heavenly bodies
move incessantly in their orbits; there is no force either within or
without them that can turn them aside a hair’s breadth, or make their
pace quicker or slower. No prayers of men, no prerogatives of gods can
make them change[7]. Without cause there is no effect; and each effect
is in its turn a new cause. Thus is constructed an endless chain, in
which all things living and inanimate are alike bound. If a man knew
all the causes that exist, he could trace out all the consequences.
What will be, will be; what will not be, cannot be. This first Stoic
interpretation of the universe is that of Determinism; it reiterates and
drives home the principle that is here our starting-point, ‘the universe
is.’ ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Zeno say that all things take place
according to fate; and fate is the linked cause of things that are, or
the system by which the universe is conducted[8].’ This ‘fate’ is only
another name for ‘necessity[9]’; fates cannot be changed[10].


[Sidenote: The ‘fallacies’ of determinism.]

=220.= The doctrine of fate appears to contradict directly the belief in
human free will, and to lead up to the practical doctrine of laziness
(ἀργὸς λόγος, _ignava ratio_). Once we allow it to be true that ‘what
will be, will be,’ it becomes useless to make any effort. As at the
present time, this argument was familiar in cases of sickness. One says
to the sick person, ‘if it is your fate to recover, then you will recover
whether you call in the physician or not; and if it is your fate not to
recover, then you will not recover in either case. But it is your fate
either to recover or not to recover; therefore it will be useless to
call in the physician.’ To which another will reply: ‘you may as well
argue that if it is your fate to beget a son, you will beget one equally
whether you consort with your wife or not; therefore it will be useless
to consort with your wife[11].’ With such verbal disputes Chrysippus
delighted to deal; his reply to the ‘lazy argument’ was that certain
things go together by fate (_iuncta fato, confatalia_)[12]. Thus in the
above cases it may be determined by fate that you should both call in a
physician and recover, both consort with your wife and beget a son.

So once more when Nestor says to the watchmen by his ships:

  Keep watch, my lads: let sleep seize no man’s eyes,
  Lest foes, loud laughing, take us by surprize[13].

Some one then replies, ‘No, they will not, even if we sleep, if it is
predestined that the dock be not seized.’ To such an objection any one
can give the right answer: ‘all these things are equally predestined, and
go together by fate. There is no such thing as a watch kept by sleepers,
a victory won by runaways, or a harvest reaped except after sowing good
clean soil[14].’


[Sidenote: Logic of possibility.]

=221.= The doctrine of fate also seems to conflict with some of the
commonest forms of speech. For if it is correct to say ‘Either this
will happen, or it will not happen,’ it seems incorrect to say ‘it may
happen’; and still more of the past, since we must admit of any event
that ‘it has happened’ or ‘it has not happened,’ there seems no room for
the statement ‘it might have happened.’ Chrysippus however maintains
that the words ‘may’ and ‘might’ are correctly used, or (in other words)
that we may assert that it is or was ‘possible’ for things to happen,
whether or not they will happen or have happened. For example, the pearl
here is breakable, and may be broken, though fate has ordained that it
never will be broken. Cypselus might not have been tyrant of Corinth,
though the oracle at Delphi declared a thousand years before the time
that he would be[15]. This view had been sharply contested by Diodorus
the Megarian; and the controversy was summed up in the ‘master argument.’
This is stated as follows: there are three propositions in conflict
with one another in the sense that if any two of them are true, the
third is false. They are these: (i) every past event is necessary; (ii)
the impossible cannot follow on the possible; (iii) there are things
possible that neither are nor will be true. Diodorus accepted the first
two; he therefore drew the conclusion that there is nothing possible
except that which is or will be true; or in other words he denied the
existence of any category of ‘things possible’ distinct from that of
facts past or future. Cleanthes and Antipater accepted the second and
third propositions: Chrysippus accepted the first and third, but denied
the second[16]; that is he admitted that the possible thing (e.g. the
breaking of the pearl) might become the impossible because fate had
decided to the contrary. The choice intimates much; it shows that the
Stoics, however strongly they assert the rule of fate or necessity,
intend so to interpret these terms as to reconcile them with the common
use of words, that is, with the inherited belief in divine and human
will, breaking through the chain of unending cause and effect[17].


[Sidenote: Definitions of fate.]

=222.= The next step is professedly taken by way of definition of the
word ‘fate’ (εἱμαρμένη, _fatum_). Exactly as the stuff of the universe,
fire, has been explained to be no mere passive or destructive element,
but one possessed of creative force and reason, so is fate declared to
be no blind or helpless sequence of events, but an active and wise power
which regulates the universe. Fate is in fact but another name for the
Logos or World-reason. On this point all Stoic teachers are in the main
agreed. ‘Fate,’ said Zeno, ‘is a power which stirs matter by the same
laws and in the same way; it may equally well be called providence or
nature[18].’ Chrysippus gives us several alternative definitions: ‘the
essence of fate is a spiritual force, duly ordering the universe[19]’; it
is ‘the Logos of the universe[20],’ or ‘the law of events providentially
ordered in the universe[21]’; or, ‘the law by which things that have
been have been, that are are, that will be will be[22].’ But an important
difference appears between the views of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. They
are agreed that all that happens by providence also happens by fate.
But Cleanthes will not allow, as Chrysippus is prepared to do, that all
things that happen by fate happen providentially[23]. With Cleanthes the
conception of fate is wider than that of providence, just as in Virgil
the fates are more powerful than Jove. Cleanthes, being deeply conscious
of the evil existing in the universe, refused to hold providence
responsible for it. Chrysippus on the other hand identifies fate with the
deity[24].


[Sidenote: Providence.]

=223.= Providence (πρόνοια, _providentia_) differs from fate, if at
all, by including an element of personality. It is a principal dogma
of the Stoics that ‘the universe is ruled by providence.’ Cicero
indeed assures us that the word ‘providence’ is merely an abbreviation
for ‘the providence of the gods,’ and that the dogma really asserts
that ‘the universe is ruled by the gods with foresight’; and Balbus,
the Stoic advocate, in his treatise, rebukes his opponent Cotta for
having travestied the Stoic doctrine by speaking of providence as ‘a
fortune-telling hag,’ as though she were some kind of goddess governing
the world[25]. But the travesty is at least as instructive as the
exposition. If ‘providence’ is on the one hand interpreted as God’s
providence[26], it is on the other hand equivalent to Nature[27], and
again to the Mind of the universe; it is the Logos, the universal Law,
the creative force[28]; not merely an attribute, but a manifestation and
bodily presentment of deity. After the final conflagration three joining
in one will be left, Zeus, providence, and the creative fire[29]. Lastly,
if we consider the process of logical demonstration, it is from the
reality of providence that the Stoics deduce the existence of the gods;
only from the standpoint of dogmatic instruction is the order reversed.


[Sidenote: Beauty of the universe.]

=224.= The work and functions of Providence are open to our view, for
it has an aim and pathway of its own[30]. Its first aim is to create a
universe capable of enduring; next, it makes that universe complete;
thirdly, it endows it with every beauty and excellence[31]. The beauty
of the world is a favourite theme upon which Stoic orators discourse at
length; this is, in their view, the best world that could possibly have
been created[32]. This sense of beauty appears to be derived from two
sources, the admiration and awe felt in contemplating the sky, the sun
moon and stars moving in it, lofty mountains, rushing rivers, and deep
caves[33]; and the gentler delight stirred by the sight of the fertile
field, the vine-clad hill, the river-pathway, the flocks and herds,
which all subserve the convenience of man. Thus from beauty we pass to
usefulness, and the Stoics now maintain that the world has been created
and is maintained for the use of man[34]. In strict language, however,
we must say that the universe is made for the use of rational beings,
that is, for gods and men[35], that it is a home or city in which
gods and men alike have a share[36]. From the protection of providence
the animals, according to the Stoic view, are in principle entirely
excluded. Yet it did not escape notice that nature has often provided
for their comfort in particulars, giving them instincts that enable them
to maintain life, and an outward shape conformable to the conditions
of their existence[37]. And Seneca especially found that man was apt
to swell himself too greatly, as if that world were made for him, of
which only a small part is adapted for him to dwell in, and where day
and night, summer and winter would continue of themselves, even if no
man observed them[38]. On the other hand zealots like Chrysippus worked
out the detailed application of this theory in a way that provoked the
amusement of their critics[39].


[Sidenote: Particular providence.]

=225.= Providence cares for mankind in general, and therefore for the
parts of mankind, the various continents, nations, and cities. The
Stoics are also inclined to hold that it cares for the individual[40].
The difficulty of this belief is great. Busy cities are overthrown by
the earthquake; the crops of the careful farmer are blasted by the
hailstorm; Socrates is condemned to death by the Athenians; Pythagoras,
Zeno and Antiphon meet with violent ends. Yet we may not think that in
any of these cases the sufferers were hated or neglected by the gods; it
is rather an inevitable necessity that has worked their ruin. The gods
who have great things in their charge, must sometimes overlook small
matters; they must save the community by sacrificing the individual[41].
The storm may rage in the valley, yet there is peace on the mountain
heights[42]. The philosopher who is absorbed in contemplating the great
whole cannot even see the flaws in its details. ‘If the gods care for
all men,’ says Cicero’s authority, ‘it follows logically that they care
for each single man[43].’ ‘Nothing occurs on earth, nor in the heaven
above, nor in the sea, apart from thee, O God,’ sings Cleanthes[44]. ‘It
is impossible,’ says Chrysippus, ‘that even the least of particulars can
fall out otherwise than in accordance with the will of God, with his
Word, with law, with justice, and with providence[45].’


[Sidenote: Existence of evil.]

=226.= The doctrine of providence, carried to a logical extreme, leads
to the denial of the existence of evil. But the Stoics did not draw this
conclusion; had they done so, their whole treatment of ethics would have
become futile. We have therefore to scrutinize carefully the language
that they employ. If we meet with the paradox that ‘this is the best
of all possible worlds,’ we must remember that all paradoxes need for
their interpretation some sense of humour, and that the ‘best possible’
is not the same as the ‘best imaginable.’ Somewhere or other there
is, in a sense, a limitation to the sphere of providence. If again in
poetical passages we learn that ‘nothing occurs without God,’ we must
not forget the doctrine that good and evil are alike brought in the end
into harmony with the divine nature. The most exact statement of Stoic
doctrine would seem to be that evil exists indeed, but is not the equal
of the good either in intensity or in duration; it is an incident, not a
first principle of the universe[46]. From this point of view it becomes
possible to ‘plead the cause of the gods,’ to defend providence from the
heavy accusations men bring forward against it[47]. Thus the Stoics set
about to prove that, in spite of the existence of evil, the universe is
ruled by the foresight of a beneficent deity.


[Sidenote: Logical solutions.]

=227.= The first argument for the defence is logical, and is pressed
by Chrysippus. Good implies its opposite, evil. ‘There could be no
justice, unless there were also injustice; no courage, unless there were
cowardice; no truth, unless there were falsehood[48].’ Just in the same
way we find coarse wit in a comedy, which is objectionable in itself,
and yet somehow contributes to the charm of the poem as a whole[49]. The
second argument is based upon the doctrine of ‘necessary consequence’
(παρακολούθησις). The general design of the human head required that
it should be compacted of small and delicate bones, accompanying which
is the inevitable disadvantage that the head may easily be injured by
blows[50]. War is an evil, but it turns to good by ridding the world of
superfluous population[51].

In many other cases there may be explanations that are beyond our present
knowledge, just as there are many kinds of animals of which we do not yet
know the use[52].


[Sidenote: Moral solutions.]

=228.= More important are those arguments which introduce moral
considerations. In the first place the generous intentions of providence
are often thwarted by the perverseness of wicked men[53], just as many
a son uses his inheritance ill, and yet his father in bequeathing it
to him did him a service[54]. The Deity treats good men as a Roman
father his children, giving them a stern training, that they may grow
in virtue[55]; those that he loves, he hardens[56]. Earthquakes and
conflagrations may occur on earth, and perhaps similar catastrophes in
the sky, because the world needs to be purified from the wickedness that
abounds[57]. The punishment of the wicked, for instance by pestilence
and famine, stands for an example to other men, that they may learn to
avoid a like disaster[58]. Often, if the wicked have gone unpunished,
the penalty descends on their children, their grandchildren, and their
descendants[59].


[Sidenote: Divine power limited.]

=229.= The very multiplicity of these explanations or excuses betrays the
weakness of the case, and the Stoics are in the last resort driven to
admit that the Deity is neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, and that
the sphere of providence is limited by an all-encircling necessity. Thus
Chrysippus explains blunders in divination by saying that ‘the Deity
cannot know everything[60],’ and though he ascribes to the Deity all
power, yet when hard pressed he admits that he cannot do everything, and
that ‘there is a good deal of necessity in the matter[61].’ In this way
he is forced back to the position which the shrewder Cleanthes had taken
from the first[62]. After we have taken away from fate all that has life
or meaning, there remains a residuum, which we can but vaguely assign to
some ‘natural necessity[63].’ This point once granted, we realize that it
includes many of the detailed explanations previously given. Thus it is
by ‘natural necessity’ that good cannot exist without evil; that the past
cannot be altered; that the one must suffer for the many[64]; that the
good cannot always be separated from the bad[65]; that character grows
by the defiance of pain; that the individual is everywhere exposed to
disaster from tyranny, war, pestilence, famine, and earthquake.


[Sidenote: God and men allied.]

=230.= The recognition of the limitations of divine power creates a new
tie between gods and men. Men are no longer the mere instruments of
providence, they are its fellow-workers; we may even go further, and
boldly call them its fellow-sufferers[66]. God has given man what he
could, not what he would[67]; he could not change the stuff on which
he had to work[68]; if anything has not been granted to us, it could
not have been granted[69]. Under such circumstances a sensible man will
not find fault with the gods, who have done their best[70]; nor will he
make appeals to them to which they cannot respond[71]. Even less will he
quarrel with a destiny that is both blind and deaf[72].


[Sidenote: Fortune.]

=231.= In the Stoic explanation of the universe fortune plays no part; it
has no existence in the absolute sense of the term[73]. But in practical
life, and from the limited point of view of the individuals concerned,
fortune is everywhere met with. Her actions are the same as we have just
seen to be ascribed to ‘natural necessity’; storms, shipwrecks, plagues,
wars, and tyranny[74]. Fortune therefore by no means excludes causality,
but includes all events which are without meaning from the point of view
of the individual[75]; all advantages or disadvantages which he has
not personally merited, and which are not designed for his individual
discipline. So great is the sphere of Fortune, that it appears at first
that she is mistress of human life; and we may picture her as a tyrant,
mocking and merciless, without principle and without policy[76]. The
further consideration of Fortune belongs to the department of Ethics.


[Sidenote: Has God or man free will?]

=232.= The supreme problems of philosophy, in their relation to gods and
men, the fellow-citizens of this universe, centre in the question of free
will. If we grant that the divine power is to some extent less in range
than the power of necessity, does it still remain open to us to attribute
to it within that range some real choice between alternatives, something
of that individual power which common opinion attributes to kings? or
must we on the other hand regard the divinity as a mere symbol of an
unchanging law, girt with the trappings of a royalty from which all real
share in government has been withdrawn? Is man again a mere puppet under
the control either of fate or of fortune, or has he too some share in
creating the destiny to which he must submit? Supposing him to have this
power of will, is it bound up with his privilege of reason, or do the
animals also possess it?


[Sidenote: The Stoics incline towards free will.]

=233.= To such questions the Stoics do not give the direct answer ‘Yes’
or ‘No.’ The critics who wish to tie them down to one or other of the
opposing views complain that they wriggle and grow flushed and excited
about their answer[77]. They accept apparently both views as dogmas,
asserting that ‘all things take place by destiny’ and that ‘something
rests with us[78].’ To the first dogma the whole of their treatment of
physics points; but the second is required as a postulate for any science
of ethics[78a]. The Stoics were in no way disposed to cut the knot by
sacrificing one or the other of the principal parts of their philosophy.
They go back upon the terms in which the questions are propounded, and
endeavour by fresh investigation and more precise definition to do away
with the obvious contradiction. In this work they were observed to have
a bias in favour of free will[79]. The first sign of this bias we have
already noticed in the vindication of the word ‘possible[80].’ If our
eyes are fixed merely on the movement of the heavenly bodies, we shall
hardly need a term which prints on future events a character which it
denies to those that are past. The astronomer can describe to us with
equal precision an eclipse taking place a thousand years before the
battle of Salamis or a thousand years after. But the word ‘possible’
opens the door to the emotions of hope and fear, to the sense of right
and wrong, with regard to the whole range of future events. However
delicately the doctrine may be shaded, the main issue is determined when
we say of gods and men that they ‘can[81].’


[Sidenote: Proximate and principal causes.]

=234.= In order to reconcile the doctrines of causality and possibility,
we must first distinguish between outer and inner compulsion, between
‘proximate’ and ‘principal’ causes. If a boy starts a cylinder rolling
down hill, he gives it an opportunity without which it could not have
rolled; this is the proximate cause (προκαταρκτική, _proxima_). But
the cylinder would not continue rolling except by an inner compulsion,
a law within itself, by which it is the nature of cylinders to roll
downwards[82]. This is the leading or principal cause (προηγουμένη,
_antecedens_ or _principalis_). So neither in thought nor in action can
a man form a judgment, unless there be a picture (φαντασία, _visum_)
presented to his mind. The picture is a proximate cause[83]. But assent
to the picture rests with the man himself; the man himself, his reason,
his will, is the principal cause. Here we touch on the dogma which is
the foundation of ethics: ‘assent is in our power.’ Upon this rests the
right of the philosopher to praise or blame, the right of the lawgiver to
reward and punish.


[Sidenote: The divine nature immutable.]

=235.= We have to investigate further the inner compulsion, the principal
cause. With regard to the gods their own disposition is a law to them,
their character holds them to their purpose, their majesty makes their
decrees immutable[84]. This is the final answer of philosophy, even
though men cannot content themselves with it. Even amongst those most
disposed to accept Stoic principles, there is a wish that the gods
should be allowed a little _play_, a choice at any rate in small matters
not hampered by considerations of destiny and morality[85]; and upon
this issue the poet may deviate a little from the sterner creed of the
philosopher[86]. Nor must we so interpret the wisdom and benevolence of
the gods as to deny the efficacy of prayer[87].


[Sidenote: Man’s wickedness.]

=236.= In the case of men free will comes accompanied by a heavy burden
of responsibility; for by its exercise men have defied the gods and
brought evil into the world. In vain they accuse the gods and destiny,
when their own perverseness has exaggerated their destiny, as Homer bears
witness:

  ‘Lo you now, how vainly mortal men do blame the gods! For of us
  they say comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through the
  blindness of their own hearts, have sorrows beyond that which is
  ordained[88].’

  ‘Through the blindness of their own hearts they perished,
  fools[89].’

Equally in vain it is that they protest against the penalties prescribed
by the lawgiver for acts to which they allege fate has drawn them[90].
Of their wrongdoing the ‘principal cause’ lies in their own natures; if
these are from the first wholesome, the blows of fate are deadened; if
they are boorish and undisciplined, they rush of themselves into sin and
error[91]. Into the further question, whether a man is responsible for
his own nature, our authorities do not enter. It is sufficient that in
ethics a way will be pointed out, by which all men, if only they consent
to undergo the necessary training, may bring their wills into harmony
with the will of the universe. As to the animals, they act upon impulse,
but cannot be said in a strict sense to possess will, nor are they proper
subjects for praise and blame.


[Sidenote: No result without cause.]

=237.= Thus free will, which at first sight appears equivalent to the
negation of cause, is by the Stoics identified with the highest type of
cause. Action without cause (τὸ ἀναίτιον), effect which is self-caused
(τὸ αὐτόματον), are totally denied[92]. Even if a man be given the
choice between two actions which appear exactly equivalent, as when he
must begin walking either with the right or with the left foot, there is
always a cause which determines between them, though (as in all cases
of ‘chance’) it is not discernible by human reasoning[93]. In this way
destiny, cause, will are all brought into harmony; the dualism (which
after all cannot be entirely avoided) is thrust out of sight. ‘All
things take place according to destiny, but not all things according to
necessity[94]’; thus is saved the principle of free choice (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν).
In other words, the Stoic fixes his attention on the pulsating, living,
willing powers of the universe, and refuses to dwell upon any blind
non-moral unbending ‘necessity’ of things, even whilst he admits that
such necessity is there.


[Sidenote: Pons Stoicus.]

=238.= Now that the various steps have been decided upon, by which our
philosophy progresses from physics to ethics, it remains to connect them
by a pathway in the form of a chain of reasoning. We cannot affirm that
the steps have been reached by any logical process, or that the show of
reasoning makes them any safer to tread in. But the logical form is a
convenient method of impressing dogmatic instruction on the memory, and
if it cannot remove difficulties inherent in the subject-matter, it at
least so distributes them that they may be overlooked by the zealous and
defied by the adventurous. Thus then the argument runs:—

  ‘If all things are determined by fate, then the ordering of the
  universe must be smooth and unhindered; if this is so, there
  must be an ordered universe; and if so, there must be gods. Now
  if there are gods, the gods are good; and if they are good,
  goodness exists; and if goodness exists, so also does wisdom.
  And goodness and wisdom are the same for gods and for men[95].
  If this is so, there must be a science of things to be done and
  to be avoided, that is of right actions and of sins. But right
  actions are praiseworthy, and sins blameable. Things praiseworthy
  deserve reward, and things blameable deserve punishment.

  Therefore if all things are determined by fate, there must be
  rewards and punishments[96].’

All this chain of argument is convincing to the man who is already a
Stoic; to his opponent it seems to display its weakness at every joint.


FOOTNOTES

[1] The three explanations are very clearly stated by Seneca; ‘dicet
aliquis—quid mihi prodest philosophia, si fatum est? quid prodest, si
deus rector est? quid prodest, si casus imperat?... quicquid est ex
his, Lucili, _vel si omnia haec sunt_, philosophandum est; sive nos
inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta
disponit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine impellit et iactat,
philosophia nos tueri debet’ Sen. _Ep._ 16, 4 and 5.

[2] e.g. _Aen._ vi 376.

[3] ‘quod procul a nobis flectat Fortuna gubernans’ _R. N._ v 108.

[4] ‘vaga volubilisque Fortuna’ Cic. _Milo_ 26, 69; ‘fortuna ... amica
varietati constantiam respuit’ _N. D._ ii 16, 43.

[5] Seneca as in note 1.

[6] Diog. L. vii 149; ‘[Stoici] omnia fato fieri dicunt’ Cic. _de Fato_
15, 33.

[7] ‘et hoc secundum Stoicos, qui omnia dicunt fato regi et semel
constituta nec a numinibus posse mutari’ Comment. in Lucan. ii 306 (Arnim
ii 924).

[8] So Diog. L. vii 149. Cicero and Seneca describe with admirable
clearness the conception of fate: ‘fieri omnia fato ratio cogit fateri.
fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἱμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque
causarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex se gignat’ Cic. _Div._ i 55,
125; ‘quid enim intellegis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium
actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 36; cf. _Ep._ 19, 6
and _N. Q._ ii 35, 2.

[9] Χρύσιππος μὴ διαφέρειν [εἶπε] τοῦ εἱμαρμένου τὸ κατηναγκασμένον Aët.
_plac._ i 27, 2.

[10] ‘Stoicorum dogma [Vergilius] ostendit, nulla ratione posse fata
mutari’ Serv. _ad Verg. Aen._ i 257 (Arnim ii 923).

[11] Orig. _cont. Cels._ ii 20 (Arnim ii 957).

[12] Cic. _de Fato_ 12, 28 to 13, 30.

[13] Hom. _Il._ xi 192 and 193.

[14] Plut. fr. 15, 3 (Stob. ii 8, 25).

[15] Cic. _de Fato_ 7, 13.

[16] Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 1 sqq.

[17] Cicero gives a humorous comment on this contention: ‘περὶ δυνατῶν
me scito κατὰ Διόδωρον κρίνειν; quapropter si venturus es, scito necesse
esse te venire: sin autem non es, τῶν ἀδυνάτων est te venire. nunc
vide, utra te κρίσις magis delectet, Χρυσιππείαne, an haec, quam noster
Diodotus non concoquebat. sed de his etiam rebus, otiosi cum erimus,
loquemur; hoc etiam κατὰ Χρύσιππον δυνατόν est’ _ad Fam._ ix 4.

[18] Aët. _plac._ i 27, 5.

[19] _ib._ i 28, 3.

[20] εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος _ib._

[21] ἤ, λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων Aët. _plac._ i 28, 3.

[22] ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ
δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται _ib._

[23] ‘ex quo fieri, ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia
sint, eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut putat
Chrysippus. alii vero, quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter
quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes’
Chalc. _in Timaeum_ 144 (Arnim ii 933).

[24] ‘Chrysippus ... deum dicit esse ... fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum
futurarum’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39.

[25] ‘a te dictum est anum fatidicam πρόνοιαν a Stoicis induci, id est
providentiam. quod eo errore dixisti, quod existimas ab his providentiam
fingi quasi quandam deam singularem, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat.
plene autem et perfecte sic dici existimato, providentia deorum mundum
administrari’ _ib._ ii 29, 73 and 74.

[26] Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων ὑπέθεντο ... διὰ πάντων διήκειν τήν πρόνοιαν
αὐτοῦ Hippolyt. _Philos._ 21, 1 (Arnim i 153).

[27] ἥντινα [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν καλεῖν Aët.
_plac._ i 27, 5.

[28] ‘talis igitur mens mundi cum sit, ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel
providentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim πρόνοια dicitur) ...’
Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 58. The term ‘nature’ is used in the same sense by
Epicurus also, though it does not harmonize very well with his theory;
‘natura gubernans’ _R. N._ v 78.

[29] ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν
ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος
οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους Plut. _comm. not._ 36, 5.

[30] ‘habet quasi viam quandam et sectam, quam sequatur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii
22, 57.

[31] _ib._ 22, 58.

[32] ‘[mundi] quidem administratio nihil habet in se, quod reprehendi
possit; ex iis enim naturis, quae erant, quod effici optimum potuit,
effectum est’ _ib._ 34, 86.

[33] _ib._ 39, 98.

[34] ‘omnia hominum causa facta esse et parata’ _ib._ ii 61, 154.

[35] ‘deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum’ _ib._ 53, 133.

[36] ‘est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut
urbs utrorumque’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 62, 154; ‘intraturus es urbem dis
hominibusque communem’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 18, 1.

[37] Cic. _N. D._ ii 47, 122.

[38] ‘neque enim omnia deus homini fecit. quota pars operis tanti nobis
committitur?’ Sen. _N. Q._ vii 30, 3; ‘nimis nos suspicimus, si digni
nobis videmur propter quos tanta moveantur’ _Dial._ iv 27, 2.

[39] Thus ‘horses assist men in fighting, dogs in hunting: lions and
leopards provide a discipline in courage: the sow is convenient for
sacrifices to the gods, who have given her a soul to serve as salt, and
keep the flesh from rotting. The peacock is created for his tail, and the
peahen accompanies him for symmetry’s sake. The flea is useful to wake us
out of sleep, and the mouse to prevent us from being careless in leaving
the cheese about.’ All these particulars are attributed to Chrysippus
(Arnim ii 1152, 1163).

[40] ‘etiam singulis a dis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet’ Cic.
_N. D._ ii 65, 164.

[41] ‘nec vero si segetibus aut vinetis cuiuspiam tempestas nocuerit,
... eum, cui quid horum acciderit, aut invisum deo aut neglectum a deo
[iudicabimus]. magna di curant, parva neglegunt’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 66, 167;
‘[universorum] maior dis cura quam singulorum est’ Sen. _Dial._ i 3, 1.
See also note 64.

[42] ‘lege deum minimas rerum discordia turbat, | pacem magna tenent’
Lucan _Phars._ ii 273.

[43] ‘licet contrahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradatim ad
pauciores, postremo deducere ad singulos’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 65, 164.

[44] _Hymn_, vv. 15, 16.

[45] Plut. _comm. not._ 34, 5; _Sto. rep._ 34, 10.

[46] This appears to be the correct interpretation of the saying of
Epictetus—‘as a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so
neither does the nature of evil exist in the world’ _Manual_ 27 (Long’s
transl. ii p. 269, where see his note).

[47] ‘faciam rem non difficilem, causam deorum agam’ Sen. _Dial._ i 1, 1.

[48] Gell. _N. A._ vii 1, 4 and 5; ‘nulli vitium est, nisi cui virtus
potest esse’ Sen. _Ep._ 124, 19.

[49] Plut. _comm. not._ 14, 1; M. Ant. vi 42.

[50] A. Gellius, _N. A._ vii 1, 9 to 11.

[51] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 32, 2.

[52] Lactantius _de ira_ 13 (Arnim ii 1172).

[53] πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις Cleanthes _Hymn_ 18.

[54] Cic. _N. D._ iii 28, 70.

[55] ‘patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum et illos fortiter
amat; operibus, inquit, doloribus, damnis exagitentur, ut verum colligant
robur’ Sen. _Dial._ i 2, 6.

[56] ‘deus quos probat, quos amat, indurat, recognoscit, exercet’
_ib._ 4, 7; ‘when a difficulty falls upon you, remember that God, like
a trainer of wrestlers, has matched you with rough young men’ Epict.
_Disc._ i 24, 1.

[57] This view of Origen is conjecturally assigned to a Stoic source
(Arnim ii 1174). See also Philo ap. Euseb. _praep. ev._ viii 13.

[58] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 15, 2.

[59] Cic. _N. D._ iii 38, 90; Sen. _Ben._ iv 32, 1.

[60] Arnim ii 1183.

[61] φησὶ δὲ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι Plut. _Sto. rep._ 37, 2.

[62] See above, § 222.

[63] Seneca uses the term ‘law of mortality’: ‘minime dis [irascamur]:
non enim illorum, sed lege mortalitatis patimur quicquid incommodi
accidit’ _Dial._ iv 28, 4.

[64] ‘sciat illa ipsa, quibus laedi videtur, ad conservationem universi
pertinere, et ex iis esse, quae cursum mundi officiumque consummant’
_Ep._ 74, 20.

[65] ‘di multa ingratis tribuunt. sed illa bonis paraverunt: contingunt
etiam malis, quia separari non possunt. excerpere singulos non potuerunt’
_Ben._ iv 28, 1.

[66] ‘quicquid est quod nos sic vivere sic mori iussit, eadem necessitate
et deos adligat’ _Dial._ i 5, 8.

[67] ‘[God] has given me the things which are in the power of the will.
How was he able to make the earthly body free from hindrance? [He could
not], and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole
possessions, household things, house, children, wife’ Epict. _Disc._ iv
1, 100. ‘What says Zeus? since I was not able to do for you what I have
mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us’ _ib._ i 1, 10-12.

[68] ‘non potest artifex mutare materiam’ Sen. _Dial._ i 5, 9; see also
Plut. _comm. not._ 34, and Mayor on Cic. _N. D._ ii 34, 86. In technical
language, the gods cannot control the ἐπακολουθήματα and συναπτόμενα.

[69] ‘quicquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit’ Sen. _Ben._ ii 29, 3.

[70] ‘dementes itaque et ignari veritatis illis imputant saevitiam maris,
immodicos imbres, pertinaciam hiemis’ _Dial._ iv 27, 2.

[71] ‘frustra vota ac studia sunt; habebit quisque quantum illi dies
primus adscripsit’ _ib._ vi 21, 6.

[72] ‘accusare fata possumus, mutare non possumus: stant dura et
inexorabilia’ _ib._ xi 4, 1.

[73] See above, § 226, note 46. Fortune only has ultimate existence
if identified with fate or providence; ‘sic nunc naturam voca, fatum,
fortunam; omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate’
_Ben._ iv 8, 3.

[74] ‘fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, primum ab inanimis procellas,
tempestates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia; deinde a bestiis ictus, morsus,
impetus, etc.’ Cic. _Off._ ii 6, 19; ‘saepe ... optimorum virorum segetem
grando percussit. fert sortem suam quisque’ Sen. _Ben._ ii 28, 3.

[75] So Fortune is technically defined as ‘a cause not discerned by
human reason’; οἱ Στωϊκοὶ [τὴν τύχην] αἰτίαν ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ Aët.
_plac._ i 29, 7.

[76] ‘in regnum Fortunae et quidem durum atque invictum pervenimus,
illius arbitrio digna atque indigna passuri’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 10, 6; ‘hanc
imaginem animo tuo propone, ludos facere fortunam’ _Ep._ 74, 7.

[77] ‘Chrysippus aestuans laboransque quonam pacto explicet et fato omnia
fieri et esse aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo’ Gellius _N. A._ vii
2, 15.

[78] ἐκεῖνο γὰρ δὴ τὸ καταγελαστότατον ἁπάντων, τὸ μίγμα καὶ ἡ σύνοδος
τοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τι εἶναι, καὶ εἱρμὸν (seriem causarum) οὐδὲν
ἧττον εἶναι Oenom. apud Euseb. _pr. ev._ vi p. 258 (Arnim ii 978);
‘manente fato aliquid est in hominis arbitrio’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 38, 3.

[78a] ‘ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in nobis ipsis?’ Cic. _Ac._
ii 12, 39.

[79] ‘mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum
philosophorum, una eorum qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri ut id fatum
vim necessitatis adferret ... altera eorum quibus viderentur sine
ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tanquam arbiter
honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adplicat se ad eos potius, qui
necessitate motus animorum liberatos volunt’ Cic. _de Fato_ 17, 39.

[80] See above, § 221.

[81] It seems clear that so far as human thought goes ‘possibility’
is only an abstraction from that which ‘a man can do,’ reached by
widening the subject ‘man’ so as to include both superhuman powers and
half-personified unseen forces. In other words δυνατόν is derived from
δύναται, _possibilitas_ from _potest_. Such a combination as _fortuna
potest_, though quite common, is really a contradiction in terms.

[82] ‘qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis,
volubilitatem autem non dedit’ Cic. _de Fato_ 19, 43.

[83] ‘quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen id
visum proximam causam [habet], non principalem’ _ib._ 18, 42.

[84] ‘non externa cogunt deos, sed sua illis in legem aeterna voluntas
est. statuerunt quae non mutarent, ... nec unquam primi consilii deos
paenitet. vis sua illos in proposito tenet’ Sen. _Ben._ vi 23, 1 and 2;
‘[deus] scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. semper paret, semel iussit’
_Dial._ i 5, 8. So Lucan: ‘qua cuncta coercet se quoque lege tenens’
_Phars._ ii 9, 10.

[85] ‘disco ... liceat illi [sc. deo] hodieque decernere et ex lege
fatorum aliquid derogare, an maiestatis diminutio sit et confessio
erroris mutanda fecisse?’ Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 3.

[86] ‘illud te, nulla fati quod lege tenetur, | pro Latio obtestor’ Verg.
_Aen._ xii 819, 820.

[87] ‘nos quoque existimamus vota proficere, salva vi ac potestate
fatorum’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 37, 2; ‘deos quorum notitiam nulla res effugit,
rogamus; et illos vota non exorant, sed admonent’ _Ben._ v 25, 4.

[88] Hom. _Od._ i 32-34 (Butcher and Lang’s translation).

[89] _ib._ 7.

[90] ‘propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines
ad maleficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur’ A. Gellius _N. A._
vii 2, 5.

[91] ‘contra ea Chrysippus argute disserit: ingenia, inquit, ipsa proinde
sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. nam si sunt
per naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque ficta, omnem illam vim quae
de fato extrinsecus ingruit, inoffensius tractabiliusque transmittunt.
sin vero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia ... sua scaevitate et voluntario
impetu in assidua delicta et in errores se ruunt’ A. Gellius _N. A._ vii
2, 6 to 8.

[92] πρὸς τούτους ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀντιλέγων ... [εἶπε] τὸ ἀναίτιον ὅλως
ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον Plut. _Sto. rep._ 23, 2 and 3.

[93] τί γὰρ ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον ὁριζόμενοι αἰτίαν
ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ; Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 8 (Arnim ii 970).

[94] _ib._ 10 (Arnim ii 960).

[95] ὁ ἐκ τῆς ποικίλης χορός, οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ
ἀλήθειαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ θεοῦ Them. _Or._ ii p. 27 c (Arnim iii 251).

[96] Alex. Aphrod. _de fato_ 37 (Arnim ii 1005).



CHAPTER X.

RELIGION.


[Sidenote: Philosophy crystallized.]

=239.= We now turn from the supreme problems of philosophy to the
formulation of religious belief and practice. A complete change comes
over the spirit of our study. Until now we have been reaching out to
observe, to define in words, to coordinate in a monistic system every
object, every statement, every generalisation of which the human mind
can rightly take account. We have kept eyes and ears open to learn from
the East and from the West, from the idealist and the materialist, from
the poet and from the critic. At last we have reached our highest point
in the dogmas of the providential ordering of the universe and the moral
obligation of the individual man; dogmas which, as we have seen, are
expounded in logical form, but are essentially such as logic can neither
establish nor refute. Stoicism, having once breathed in the mountain air
of supreme principles, now begins to descend to the plains of common
life, and to find the due application of its theories in the ordering
of practical affairs. The theory of religion is treated as the first
stage in this downward path; it is the adaptation of philosophy to the
language of social life and individual aspiration. By ‘religion’ we mean
here the theory of the existence and character of the gods; the practice
of ceremonies in their honour and of prayers for their favour; and
further, the theory and practice of divination. Upon all these questions
philosophy sits as the supreme judge: external authority, embodied in the
traditions of Greece and Rome respectively, may claim consideration, but
not submission, from the intellect.


[Sidenote: Historical changes of view.]

=240.= In this attitude of the Stoics towards religion we can easily
distinguish certain historical changes. Zeno represents in the main the
critical temper; his tone is revolutionary and atheistic; he contemplates
the entire subversion of existing religious practices to make room for
a purer system. The principles of Cleanthes are the same, but finer
expression in a more cheerful spirit; he has no bitterness as to the
present, and much confidence in the future. With Chrysippus there sets in
a tide of reconciliation; the ingenuities of etymology and allegorical
interpretation are set to work to prove that the old religion contains,
at least in germ, the substance of the new. The practical dangers of
this method are obvious, and have not escaped the notice of the critics
of Stoicism. It may be well to smoothe the path of the convert by
allowing him to use old formulas and practices with a new meaning; it
is not so easy to excuse the acceptance of a purely formal conversion,
by which philosophy enrols as its nominal adherents men who give it no
real submission, and increases its numbers at the cost of its sincerity.
Posidonius stands out as the type of this weakness; with him begins
the subordination of philosophic principle to religious sentiment. In
the first period of Roman Stoicism the struggle was acute; many of
the Stoics had the courage to defy the inherited prejudices of their
fellow-countrymen, others bowed before the storm. Those who condemn the
Stoics in a body as having sacrificed their convictions, in order that
they might hold the honoured and lucrative positions of defenders of
the national religion[1], show a lack both of sympathy and of critical
discernment. All through the Roman period the Stoics held in theory
a definite and consistent position, which will be expounded in this
chapter; in the application of their principles to practical problems
they showed that variation of standard and temperament which history has
always to record even of societies of honourable and intelligent men.
But it must be admitted that as the Stoics increase in numbers, their
devotion to vital principles grows weaker, till at last we recognise in
Marcus Aurelius both the most critical of Stoic thinkers, and the man in
whom the powers of thought are most definitely subjected to the play of
old associations and prejudices.


[Sidenote: Dogmas of natural religion.]

=241.= The theoretic teaching of the Stoics upon theology follows a very
definite programme. Four dogmas need to be established: (i) that gods
exist; (ii) that they are living, benevolent, and immortal; (iii) that
they govern the universe; and (iv) that they seek the good of men. To
each of these dogmas is attached a series of ‘proofs,’ such as are still
in vogue as ‘evidences of natural religion[2].’ The whole of this body
of teaching may be treated by us as an exposition in popular language
of the central dogma that ‘the universe is ordered by providence.’ We
have therefore first to consider whether the language used is really
appropriate to the philosophic position, or whether it concedes too much
to accepted beliefs. Secondly we have to consider whether the ‘proofs’
employed really correspond to the monistic point of view as understood
by the Stoics, or whether dualisms abandoned in principle are regaining
their old position in connexion with practical problems. Now the third
and fourth dogmas, so far as they add to the first two, import nothing
more than the general doctrine of providence. The first two dogmas,
taken together, substitute for the abstract term ‘providence’ the more
concrete, and (as we should phrase it) the more personal conception of a
‘god’ or ‘gods.’ The supreme question of the Stoic religion is therefore
whether these terms are rightly used; and it falls into two parts, the
use of the singular ‘god,’ carrying with it associations derived from
Persism and Judaism; and the use of the plural ‘gods,’ which carries
with it a qualified approval of the polytheism of the Greek and Roman
pantheons. In accordance with the general principles of our philosophy,
the wider question must be first determined.


[Sidenote: The ‘nature’ of gods.]

=242.= The ‘gods,’ according to the Stoics, form a ‘natura,’ a department
of the universe, a category including one or more individuals. Hence
the title of Cicero’s work, ‘de natura deorum’; that is, ‘of the class
of beings called gods.’ Each department of philosophy, according to the
Stoic interpretation, brings us in the end into touch with this world of
deities. In dialectics we are led up to the supreme Reason, the Logos
or Word, whose divine being permeates the universe[3]. Metaphysics point
us to Body in the purest form[4]; to Spirit which reaches from end to
end of the universe[5]; to a first Cause, a Cause of causes, the initial
link in the unending chain of events[6]. If we look to the elements in
their unceasing interchange, we find deity in all things that shift
and suffer metamorphosis, in water, in earth, and in air[7]; how much
more then in fire, which in one aspect is the purest of the elements,
and in another is the creative rational substance from which the whole
universe issues[8]? God is indeed the universe, and all that is in it,
though not in the pantheistic sense that he is evenly diffused throughout
all things[9]. Look towards this earth, which lies at the centre of
the world-order; even in its most repulsive contents, in its grossest
matter, there is deity[10]. Lift up your eyes to the heavens; God is
the all-encircling sea of fire called Aether[11]; he is sun[12] and
stars[13]. Consider the universe in its history; God is its creator[14],
its ruler, its upholder[15]. Analyze it; he is its soul[16], its
mind[17]. Strain your sight to perceive the meaning of all things: he is
fate[18]; he is nature[19]; he is providence; he is necessity[20]. And if
we look forward to the problems of politics and ethics, we must say that
God is the Universal Law that calls for the reverence of gods and men
as a community[21], and equally demands, under the name of conscience,
the unhesitating obedience of the individual[22]. Lastly, in the history
of mankind, in its great men and useful discoveries, the Stoic masters
recognised the element of divinity[23]. In the language of to-day, God is
the pole in which all the parallels of human inquiry merge, the _x_ of
the problem of the universe, the unknown that is known in his works.


[Sidenote: Unity of God.]

=243.= That God is one is a doctrine which the Stoics take over from
the Cynics[24] (who therein follow Socrates), and from the general
opinion; without making this a formal dogma, they constantly assume it
tacitly by using the term ‘God’ (ὁ θεός, _deus_). With equal readiness
they accept in use plural and abstract nouns for the same conception,
as _di immortales_, _vis divina_. The interpretation of this apparent
conflict of language must be found in the general principles of the Stoic
monism. Just as the elements are four, and yet are all the creative fire
in its changing shapes: just as the virtues are many, and yet there is
but one Virtue appearing under different circumstances: so there is but
one Deity, appearing under many names[25]. This view the assailants of
Stoicism reduce to the absurdity that some Stoic gods are created and
mortal, whilst others are uncreated[26]; and again that Zeus is worse
than a Proteus, for the latter changed into a few shapes only and those
seemly, whilst Zeus has a thousand metamorphoses, and there is nothing so
foul that he does not in turn become[27]. No one however who is familiar
with the many points of view from which Greek philosophers approach the
problem of ‘the one and the many’ will be readily disturbed by this
rather superficial criticism.


[Sidenote: Zeus.]

=244.= In its practical application the belief in the one-ness of God
assimilated itself to the worship of the Greek Ζεύς and the Latin Jove or
Juppiter. It would be impossible within the limits of this work to trace
the growth of monotheistic feeling in the Greco-Roman world in connexion
with the names of these two deities, which in the mythologies are members
of societies. We have already suggested that the most direct impulse came
from Persism: but in connexion with Roman history it is important to
notice that a similar impulse arrived through the Tuscan religion[28].
The nature of the Stoic worship of Zeus is abundantly illustrated by the
_Hymn_ of Cleanthes[29]; the intimate sense of companionship between
Zeus and his worshipper comes to light, perhaps with a tinge of Cynic
sentiment, in all the discourses of Epictetus. A special emphasis is laid
on the fatherhood of Zeus. This attribute could be traced back to the
poems of Homer, and is prominent throughout Virgil’s _Aeneid_[30]. It can
be explained in connexion with the growth of all living substances[31],
but has a more lofty meaning in that man alone shares with the gods the
inheritance of reason[32]. But the Homeric association of Zeus with
mount Olympus entirely disappears in Stoicism in favour of the Persian
conception of a god dwelling in heaven[33]. Further the Stoics agree with
the Persians that this god must not be thought of as having the form of
any animal or man[34]; he is without form[35], but capable of assuming
all forms[36].


[Sidenote: Definition of ‘god.’]

=245.= In the Stoic system the conception of godhead as one and supreme
much exceeds in importance the conception of a multiplicity of gods.
We may therefore reasonably consider at this point the four dogmas of
the Stoic theology. The first point to be examined is the definition of
the word ‘god.’ As adopted by the Stoic school generally it runs thus:
‘a rational and fiery spirit, having no shape, but changing to what it
wills and made like to all things[37].’ This definition corresponds
satisfactorily to the Stoic system of physics; but even so we must notice
that the statement ‘God is necessity[38]’ is an exaggeration, since
‘necessity’ is entirely devoid of the qualities of reasonableness and
plasticity. We find a different definition in Antipater of Tarsus, which
is emphasized by the Stoics of the transition period generally:—‘God is
a living being, blessed, imperishable, the benefactor of mankind[39].’
This definition points clearly the way to the Stoic system of religion.
The difference between the two definitions marks then the step that
has here to be taken. There is an accentuation of the property of
personality; we pass from a ‘rational spirit’ to a ‘living being.’ There
is the addition of a moral quality; we pass from a plastic substance to
a beneficent will. The existence of deity in the first sense has been
displayed to us by our whole analysis of the universe; it is with regard
to the existence of deity in the second sense that we need the constant
support of the dogma of providence, expounded in the technical proofs
which we now proceed to examine.


[Sidenote: Gods exist: the proof from consent.]

=246.= The first Stoic dogma is ‘that gods exist’; and of this the first
and most familiar ‘proof’ is that which depends upon common consent.
Amongst all men and in all nations there is a fixed conviction that gods
exist; the conception is inborn, indeed we may say graven on the minds
of all men[40]. To this proof the Stoics attach the highest possible
importance; but its justification, as we have seen, presents great
difficulties[41]. Cleanthes, the most religiously minded of the early
Stoics, had not troubled to conceal his contempt for the opinions of the
crowd[42]; and the ridiculous belief in Tartarus[43] is as widespread as
that in the gods. Here then we must distinguish; it is not sufficient
that a conception should be universal, if it appeals most to foolish
folk, and even so is decaying[44]. We must not however at this moment
inquire into the causes of this belief[45]; for this is to pass from
the question at issue to other proofs of the dogma. It seems clear that
the value of this particular proof depends upon the Stoic doctrine of
‘inborn conceptions,’ which we have already discussed[46]. Without
going over the whole ground again, the substance of the argument as
applied to the present question may be thus stated. The mind of each
individual man is by descent akin to the universal reason (κοινὸς λόγος,
_universa ratio_)[47]. Therefore all men carry with them from their
birth predispositions in favour of certain preconceptions; and the
fact that these preconceptions are common to all is evidence of their
divine origin. These predispositions by the growth and training of the
individual on the one hand, by his contact with the outer world on the
other hand through the organs of sense, ripen into reason. Now all men
are born with a predisposition to explain what is beyond their own
reasoning powers by the hypothesis of a living and reasoning agent. The
belief in gods is therefore a ‘preconception’; and if it is confirmed
by growth and experience, it must be of divine origin and therefore
self-proving. In the language of our own times, the belief in deity
cannot be dispensed with as a working hypothesis; its omission lames
human reason.


[Sidenote: The proof of the ‘higher Being.’]

=247.= The second proof ‘that gods exist’ is particularly associated
with the name of Chrysippus; it may be summed up by saying ‘there must
be a Being higher than man.’ We begin by assuming that reason is the
highest power in the universe[48]; an axiom which is always subject to
limitation on account of the existence of ‘natural necessity.’ According
to the Stoics, reason is common to gods and men; if, for the sake of
argument, this is denied, then reason is possessed by men alone, for
we can certainly find no better name than ‘god’ for higher reasoning
beings[49]. If then there exists something greater than human reason can
produce, it must be the work of some reasoning being greater than man,
that is, it must be the work of the gods. But the heavenly constellations
are such a work; therefore they are the work of the gods, and therefore
gods exist[50]. To this argument two others are supplementary. First,
human reason itself must be derived from some source, and what other can
we name but the deity[51]? Secondly, if there are no gods, man must be
the supreme being; but such a claim is an arrogant infatuation[52]. The
same arguments are attributed in substance to Zeno[53]; nay, so cogent
are they that they are in part accepted even by Epicurus[54].


[Sidenote: The proofs from the elements and the universe.]

=248.= There follow two proofs connected with gradations in the scale
of being. Earth and water are the two lower and grosser elements; and
since temperament depends greatly upon climate, we find that men and the
animals are all of somewhat heavy character. Air and fire are the higher
and more refined elements; how then can we think otherwise than that they
are the home of more lofty beings[55]? Then again the universe is either
a simple or a composite body. That it is not composite is shown by the
harmony (συμπάθεια, _concentus_) of its parts; it is therefore simple. A
simple body must be held together by spirit in some one of its grades,
either as unity, growth, or soul. Bodies held together merely by unity,
like stones or logs, admit of very simple changes only; but the universe
admits of every kind of change and development, and yet keeps together;
it must therefore be held together by spirit in its highest grade, that
is by soul and by reason. Being a whole, it must be greater than its
parts, and include all that its parts possess. But a nature greater than
man, and possessing soul and reason, is god[56].


[Sidenote: The proof from providence.]

=249.= The proof from the good gifts of providence has been already
given in substance; we may however notice the sharp reply given to
Epicurus, who maintains that the wondrous contrivances of the Creator
for the benefit of man result from the chance clashings of particles.
‘As well contend,’ replies the Stoic, ‘that words and verses come from
the chance shifting of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet, and that
the poems of Ennius could be produced by shaking together a sufficient
quantity of these in a box, and then pouring them out on the ground!
Chance would hardly produce a single verse[57].’ The terrors of the
universe, its storms, earthquakes, deluges, pestilences and wars, which
seem to militate against this proof, are themselves turned into a fourth
proof[58]. A further proof, which depends on the contemplation of the
movements of the heavenly bodies[59], we have sufficiently considered in
connexion with the influence of Chaldaean and Persian thought.


[Sidenote: The proof from worship.]

=250.= There remain two proofs, which at first sight may appear
singular, but are nevertheless very strongly urged, the proofs from
worship and divination; which according to the Stoics are practices
that must be justified, but cannot be justified without the postulate
of the existence of gods. The proof from worship is best known in the
paradoxical form, ‘if there are altars, there are gods,’ which is
attributed to Chrysippus[60]. This proof is fused by Seneca with the
proof from general consent[61]; but its true character seems to be
different. ‘Without gods there can be no piety, for piety is the right
worship of the gods. Without gods there can be no holiness, for holiness
is a right attitude towards the gods. Without gods there can be no
wisdom, for wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine[62]. But
without piety, holiness, and wisdom a reasonable philosophy cannot be
constructed. Therefore gods exist.’ The argument in its simplest form is
attributed to Zeno himself. ‘It is reasonable to honour the gods. But it
is not reasonable to honour the non-existent. Therefore gods exist[63].’


[Sidenote: The proof from divination.]

=251.= The final argument is that from divination; which is remarkable
in view of the close association between divination and astrology,
and the derivation of the latter from a scientific system which finds
no place for divine interpositions. But both in Greece and Rome the
forecasting of the future had long been reconciled with theology, upon
the hypothesis that the gods warn men for their good of coming events. In
accepting the truth of divination the Stoics were following the Socratic
tradition[64]. This belief was accepted by all the great Stoic masters,
and was a ‘citadel’ of their philosophy[65]. It is true that on this
point Panaetius exercised the privilege of a suspense of judgment[66];
but all the more did his pupil, the pious Posidonius, lay stress upon
the subject, on which he composed five books[66], of which the spirit
is preserved to us in Cicero’s books _de Divinatione_[67]. To Roman
writers their inherited State practice of augury, with its elaborate
though half-forgotten science, was long a motive for maintaining
this belief[68]; but the ancient reputation of the oracle at Delphi
maintained its hold still more persistently, and was abandoned with
even greater reluctance[69]. Nevertheless the whole group of beliefs
was quietly pushed aside by the Romans of the times of the empire, if
we may judge from the words of Epictetus—‘what need have I to consult
the viscera of victims and the flight of birds, and why do I submit when
he (the diviner) says “it is for your interest?” Have I not within me a
diviner[70]?’


[Sidenote: Divine qualities.]

=252.= Our next enquiry is ‘of what kind are the gods?’ ‘what are
their qualities?’ Here the Stoics break more decidedly with tradition.
Antipater of Tarsus, as we have seen, defined the deity as ‘a living
being, happy, immortal and benevolent towards men[71].’ It is clear
that this description can only be applied in its fulness to the supreme
deity, for all other gods are destined to pass away in the general
conflagration[72]. That the supreme deity is possessed of life and of
reason has already been assumed in the proofs of his existence; but
we have here a reaffirmation of Stoic doctrine as against those that
hold that the world is governed by blind destiny and chance. In stating
that the gods are happy the Stoics agree with Epicurus; but according
to them this happiness consists not in rest, but in activity. In this
distinction the whole difference between the Stoic and Epicurean ideals
of happiness, that is, between their ethical ends, comes into sight.
The Stoics affirm that the gods are occupied, and that with matters
of the greatest concern: and that any other conception is unworthy of
them[73]. That the activity of the gods has for its aim the happiness
of men is plainly the doctrine of providence; and in making benevolence
an attribute of deity[74] the Stoics turn their backs for ever upon the
belief in gods that are greedy, jealous, mischievous, and haughty; that
is, not merely on such deities as were still a part of the creed of the
rustic[75], but also such as had provided the problems of the whole of
Greek tragedy, and given the opportunity for the stinging attacks of
Epicurus on religion[76]. In examining these attributes of the gods we
have anticipated the enquiries which belong to the third and fourth
categories; namely as to the disposition and the relativity of the gods.
Incidentally we have obtained an excellent illustration of the logical
importance of definition and the four categories. Definition implies in
advance what is contained in each of the categories, and each category
contains implicitly what is contained in the other three; but the logical
mechanism enables us so to express the doctrine that it is for ever fixed
on the memory. Nor can we easily imagine that the world will ever forget
this conception of a Supreme God, in his essence a living all-wise Being;
in his attributes immortal, immutable[77], active and benevolent; in his
disposition occupied in contemplating and controlling his great work the
universe, and in his relation to his creatures constantly concerned for
their comfort and happiness.


[Sidenote: Stoicism and the old mythology.]

=253.= It must by this time be plain that the whole atmosphere of Stoic
religion was alien to that in which the gods of the Greek and Roman
mythology had taken root. The nominal absorption of these gods in the
Stoic system has therefore no theoretical importance; it was a work of
political adaptation. The Stoics themselves doubtless believed that
they were restoring the original meaning of the pantheon, and freeing
it from corruptions for which the poets were responsible. The original
meaning was also, in their judgment, the true meaning. Public opinion
was already in revolt against the old theology, both on scientific and
on moral grounds. The current tales of the gods were both incredible and
revolting[78]; the worship of them too often an attempt to silence the
voice of conscience[79]. The Stoics proposed to make the myths symbols of
scientific truths, and the ritual an incentive to honest living. Their
interpretation was in the main physical; the gods represent respectively
the heavenly bodies, the elements, the plants; the amours of the gods
represent the continuous work of the great creative forces of nature. To
a lesser extent explanations are found in society and in history. These
interpretations are greatly assisted by etymologies, according to the
doctrine of dialectics that wisdom lies hid in words. The whole process
may seem to the modern critic puerile, because the practical occasion for
it has passed away; but there are still to be found thinkers who hold
that by such processes alone it is possible for human thought to progress
without civil society being disrupted.


[Sidenote: The Stoic metamorphoses.]

=254.= According to this system Juppiter becomes the fiery heaven, the
chief of the elements, the source of all life[80]; Juno is the softer
air, into which the fire enters to become the germinating seed[81].
Thus she is called sister as a fellow-element[82], and wife as an
instrument in the creative process. From a slightly different point of
view Chrysippus interpreted Zeus as God, and Hera as matter; and their
union as the commencement of the Creation, when God spread throughout
matter the seed Logoi[83]. So again Hephaestus (Vulcan) represents fire;
Poseidon (Neptune) is the sea; Dis (Pluto) and Rhea alike stand for the
earth[84]. Demeter (Ceres) again is the corn-land[85], and Persephone
(Proserpine) the growing crop; as such she is lost to her mother and
lamented by her for six months in every year[86]. Apollo is the sun,
Luna or Diana the moon[87]; Cronus, son of Earth and Heaven, is Chronos
(χρόνος) or Time, and he is said to devour his children, because all that
is begotten of time is in turn consumed by time[88]. Athene or Minerva
is the daughter of Zeus, to whom he has given birth without a partner,
because she is the divine Reason by which he made the universe[89].
Chrysippus wrote at length on the allegorical interpretation of the three
Graces[90]; and the work of Cornutus entirely consists of expositions of
this system.

Other gods are recognised by the Stoics as personifications of actions
or feelings; Eros (Cupid), Aphrodite (Venus) and Pothos (regret) of
feelings; Hope (Ἐλπίς, _Spes_), Justice (Δίκη, _Iustitia_) and Wise Law
(Εὐνομία) of actions[91]. So in particular Ares (Mars) stands for war, or
the setting of array against array.


[Sidenote: Minor deities.]

=255.= We have already noticed that the gods that are borrowed from the
popular mythology do not possess the divine attribute of immortality;
and in some of them the attribute of benevolence is not prominent.
There was thus a constant tendency to assign them to an order of nature
of lower rank than the deity. Such an order was already constituted by
the popular belief, adopted by the Stoics, that the whole universe is
full of spirits or daemons, some kindly, others mischievous. Highest in
the former class stand the divine messengers, who everywhere throughout
the universe keep watch over the affairs of men and bring report thereof
to God[92]. This was a widespread belief, most in harmony with the
principles of Persism, but also met with in the Rigveda[93] and in the
poems of Hesiod[94]. These watchmen are however not the spies of a cruel
tyrant, but the officers of a benevolent sovereign; we find them early in
Roman literature identified with the stars[95], and this may account for
the special recognition of the twins Castor and Pollux, as kindly daemons
that protect sailors from shipwreck[96]. There are also spirits which
are careless, idle, or mischievous[97]; these the deity may employ as
his executioners[98]. A daemon which is solely the embodiment of an evil
or mischievous principle, such as the Druh of Persism or the Satan of
Judaism, is however not to be found in the Stoic system. Amongst daemons
are also to be recognised the souls of men parted from their bodies,
some good and some evil[99]. All beliefs of this kind are specially
characteristic of the type of Stoicism introduced by Posidonius[100].
We may specially note the belief in the Genius which accompanies each
man from his birth to his death, (and which closely corresponds to the
guardian angel of Persism,) because of the special vogue it obtained in
the Roman world[101].


[Sidenote: Deified men.]

=256.= The Stoics never failed to close their list of deities with
the recognition of men raised to the sky for their services to their
fellow-men. Such were Hercules, who rid the earth of monsters; Castor and
Pollux; Aesculapius the inventor of medicine; Liber the first cultivator
of the vine, and (amongst the Romans) Romulus the founder of the city.
These are deities established by the laws of each city[102]. The Stoics
do not raise their own leaders to this position, but (as we shall see in
dealing with the question of the ‘wise man’) they assign to them almost
equal honours. This part of their theory appears to open the door to
great practical abuses, since it might be used to justify the claims of
the sovereigns of Egypt to be honoured as gods during their lifetime, and
those of the Roman emperors that their predecessors should be worshipped
as such after their death. But it does not seem that such an abuse
actually occurred; and this part of the theory of gods always seems to
have been regarded by the Stoics rather as an explanation of historical
facts than as a principle of civic submission.


[Sidenote: Worship.]

=257.= Questions as to the worship of the gods belong strictly to the
department of politics, so far as public worship is concerned, and of
ethics, so far as individuals are concerned. It may however be convenient
to anticipate the discussion of them, since we cannot properly appreciate
the Stoic views of religion apart from their practical application. We
must therefore notice that Stoicism in its beginnings, in accordance with
its Cynic origin, was revolutionary, unorthodox, in the popular language
atheistic. Not only did it follow the principles of Persism in condemning
altogether the worship of images, but it also poured scorn upon the
building of temples and the offering of sacrifices. Thus Zeno in his book
on ‘the State’ forbids the making of temples and images, because they are
unworthy of the deity[103]; an idea which the Romans recognised as not
altogether strange to their own history, seeing that for a hundred and
seventy years (presumably during the Etruscan supremacy) no images had
been known at Rome[104]. The Stoic condemnation of sacrifice is mostly
expressed by silence, but it finds words in Seneca[105]. Although they
thus denounced in principle the whole existing system of public worship,
the Stoics did not feel themselves prevented from taking part in it as a
seemly and ancient custom[106]; and the Roman Stoics took a special pride
in the reputation of the city for attention to ‘religion,’ that is to
say, to the ritual observances due to the gods[107].


[Sidenote: Stoic hymnology.]

=258.= Meanwhile the Stoics actively developed their own ideal of
worship, namely the rendering of praise and honour to the gods by means
of hymns. ‘It is reasonable,’ said Zeno, ‘to honour the gods[108].’
The hymn of Cleanthes shows the form in which this honour could find
expression, and though in the main it is an outburst of individual
conviction, yet it contains the germ of public hymnology[109]. The value
of music in public worship was recognised by Diogenes of Babylon[110].
Posidonius laid it down that the best and most pious worship of the
gods is to honour them with pure mind and voice[111]. Epictetus speaks
continually in this spirit, and gives us examples of prose hymnology:
‘great is God, who has given us implements with which we shall cultivate
the earth[112]’; ‘I give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me
to join in this thy assemblage of men, and to see thy works, and to
comprehend this thy administration[113].’ Thus ought we ‘to sing hymns to
the deity, and bless him, and tell of his benefits[114].’


[Sidenote: Prayer.]

=259.= Prayer to the gods may be taken as more characteristic of private
and individual worship, though the paradox is worthy of attention that
men should ask nothing of the gods that they cannot ask publicly[115].
The whole problem of prayer is so fully and admirably treated upon Stoic
lines by Juvenal in his Tenth Satire, that nothing can be added to his
exposition but the evidence that his teaching is in fact Stoic. Let
us then enter the temples and listen to men’s prayers. First they beg
the doorkeeper for admission, though the deity is equally near to them
outside; then they raise their hands to the sky, or press their mouths
close to the ear of an image[116]. To the unlistening deity they pour
out wishes so shameful that they could not let a fellow-man share their
secret[117]. Decrepit old men babble prayers for long life, and make
themselves out younger than they are[118]. Another prays for riches[119],
or for some other thing that will do him harm[120]. Undertakers pray
for a busy season[121]. Parents and nurses (and these are the nearest
to innocence) pray for the success of their children in life[122]. They
may be excused, but the thoughtful man should know that the advantages
for which friends have prayed have often in the end proved a man’s
destruction[123]. He should examine his own heart, and recognise that
his prayers till now have been unworthy and foolish[124]. Since the gods
wish us well, let us leave it to them to choose what is best for us[125].
‘Look up to God, and say:—deal with me for the future as thou wilt: I am
of the same mind as thou art. I am thine, I refuse nothing that pleases
thee[126].’ ‘Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you
wish; but wish the things that happen to be as they are: and you will
have a tranquil flow of life[127].’


[Sidenote: Self-examination.]

=260.= Prayer so regarded becomes not merely an act of resignation, in
which a man ceases to battle against a destiny that is too strong for
him; it is a daily examination of his soul, to know whether it is in
tune with the purposes of the universe. This examination is a religious
exercise, never to be omitted before sleep. It is inculcated both by
Seneca and Epictetus. ‘How beautiful’ says Seneca, ‘is this custom of
reviewing the whole day! how quiet a sleep follows on self-examination!
The mind takes its place on the judgment-seat, investigates its own
actions, and awards praise or blame according as they are deserved[128].’
And Epictetus adopts the verses ascribed to Pythagoras:

  ‘Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes
  Before each daily action thou hast scanned;
  What’s done amiss, what done, what left undone;
  From first to last examine all, and then
  Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice[129].’


[Sidenote: Religious duty.]

=261.= We are now in a position to sum up in technical language[130] the
obligations of religion freed from superstition[131]. Our duty towards
the gods is rightly to believe in them, to acknowledge their greatness
and benevolence, to submit to them as the creators and rulers of the
universe[132]. We may not light lamps in their honour on sabbath-days,
nor crowd round their temples in the early hours of the morning; we may
not offer Jove a towel nor Juno a mirror[133]. Our service to them is to
make ourselves like to them; he who would win their favour, must be a
good man[134]. Wheresoever they call us, we must follow with gladness,
for they are wiser than we[135]. Without God we must attempt nothing,
but we must always reflect, examine ourselves, and seek to learn the
divine will[136]. We came here when it pleased God, and we must depart
when he shall please[137]. ‘So live,’ says the Stoic teacher, ‘with your
fellow-men, as believing that God sees you: so hold converse with God, as
to be willing that all men should hear you[138].’


FOOTNOTES

[1] e.g. Theodor Mommsen, _Roman History_ iii 432 (Dickson’s translation).

[2] ‘omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis immortalibus quaestionem
in partes quattuor. primum docent esse deos; deinde quales sint; tum,
mundum ab iis administrari; postremo, consulere eos rebus humanis’ Cic.
_N. D._ ii 1, 3.

[3] ‘λόγον, quem deum [Zeno] nuncupat’ Lact. _ver. sap._ 9 (Arnim i 160);
‘rationem deum vocat Zeno’ Min. Felix 19, 10 (_ib._); ‘[Zeno] rationem
quandam, per omnem naturam rerum pertinentem, vi divina esse adfectam
putat’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.

[4] ἀρχὴν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον, ὑπέθεντο ὅ τε
Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων Hippol. _Phil._ 21 (Arnim ii 1029).

[5] τὸ δι’ ὅλου κεχωρηκὸς πνεῦμα θεὸν δογματίζουσιν Theoph. _Autol._ i 4
(Arnim ii 1033).

[6] ‘ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent’ Sen. _Ben._ iv
7, 2; ‘hic est causa causarum’ _N. Q._ ii 45, 2.

[7] ‘[Chrysippus ait] ea quae natura fluerent et manarent [divina esse],
ut aquam et terram et aera’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39.

[8] ‘[Chrysippus] deum ait ignem praeterea esse’ _ib._; ‘et deum ipsum
ignem putavit [Zeno]’ August. _adv. Ac._ iii 17, 38 (Arnim i 157); τὸν
θεὸν πῦρ νοερὸν εἰπόντες Euseb. _pr. ev._ 15 (Arnim ii 1050).

[9] οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν Diog.
L. vii 148; ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14,
37; ‘vis illum vocare mundum? non falleris’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 45, 3; ‘quid
est deus? quod vides totum et quod non vides totum; solus est omnia’
_ib._ i Prol. 13; ‘Iuppiter est quodcunque vides quocunque moveris’ Lucan
_Phars._ ix 580.

[10] Arnim ii 1037 and 1039.

[11] ‘Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus’ Cic.
_Ac._ ii 41, 126.

[12] ‘Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat’ _ib._

[13] ‘[Zeno] astris idem [sc. vim divinam] tribuit’ _N. D._ i 14, 36;
‘[Cleanthes] divinitatem omnem tribuit astris’ _ib._ 14, 37.

[14] ‘tibi licet hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare’ Sen. _Ben._ iv
7, 1.

[15] ‘rectorem custodemque universi’ _N. Q._ ii 45, 1; ‘stant beneficio
eius omnia’ _Ben._ iv 7, 1.

[16] Arnim i 532.

[17] ‘[Chrysippus] ait vim divinam esse positam in universae naturae
animo atque mente’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39; ‘quid est deus? mens universi’
Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 13; cf. Arnim i 157.

[18] Arnim iii Ant. 35; ‘hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris, non mentieris’
Sen. _Ben._ iv 7, 2.

[19] ‘quid aliud est natura quam deus?’ _ib._ 1.

[20] ‘[Chrysippus] deum dicit esse necessitatem rerum futurarum’ Cic. _N.
D._ i 15, 39; cf. Arnim ii 1076.

[21] οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον | οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον
ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν Cleanthes _Hymn_ 38, 39; ‘naturalem legem [Zeno] divinam
esse censet’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36.

[22] ‘[Chrysippus] legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae
atque magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse’ _ib._ 15, 40.

[23] ‘[Chrysippus] homines etiam eos, qui immortalitatem essent consecuti
[deos dicit esse]’ _ib._ 15, 39; ‘Persaeus ... inventa ipsa divina dicit’
_ib._ 15, 38.

[24] ‘Antisthenes populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse [dicit]’
_ib._ i 13, 32.

[25] κύδιστ’ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε ... Ζεῦ Cleanthes _Hymn_ 1 and 2;
‘Stoici dicunt non esse nisi unum deum et unam eandemque potestatem, quae
pro ratione officiorum variis nominibus appellatur’ Servius _ad Verg.
Georg._ i 5 (Arnim ii 1070).

[26] οἱ μὲν γενητοὶ εἶναι καὶ φθαρτοὶ [λέγονται], οἱ δ’ ἀγένητοι Plut.
_Sto. rep._ 38, 5 (quoting from Chrysippus).

[27] Galen _qual. inc._ 6 (Arnim ii 1056).

[28] ‘ne hoc quidem [illi altissimi viri] crediderunt, Iovem, qualem
in Capitolio et in ceteris aedibus colimus, mittere manu fulmina, sed
eundem quem nos Iovem intellegunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum
ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne
convenit ... idem Etruscis visum est’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 45, 1 and 3.

[29] See above, § 97.

[30] ‘hominum sator atque deorum’ _Aen._ i 254, and so _passim_.

[31] ‘tum pater omnipotens fecundis imbribus Aether | coniugis in gremium
laetae descendit, et omnes | magnus alit, magno commixtus corpore, fetus’
Virgil _Georg._ ii 335-327.

[32] This seems undoubtedly to be the meaning underlying the corrupt text
of Cleanthes _Hymn_ 4; Pearson well compares κοινωνίαν δ’ ὑπάρχειν πρὸς
ἀλλήλους (scil. θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων) διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν Euseb. _praep.
ev._ xv 15. See above, § 97.

[33] οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον
Diog. L. vii 138; ..., ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου
ψυχῆς Corn. _N. D._ 8.

[34] [Χρύσιππός φησι] παιδαριωδῶς λέγεσθαι καὶ γράφεσθαι καὶ πλάττεσθαι
θεοὺς ἀνθρωποειδεῖς, ὃν τρόπον καὶ πόλεις καὶ ποταμούς Philod. _de piet._
11 (Arnim ii 1076); ‘est aliquid in illo Stoici dei, iam video; nec cor
nec caput habet’ Sen. _Apoc._ 8, 1.

[35] ‘Stoici negant habere ullam formam deum’ Lact. _de ira_ 18 (Arnim ii
1057).

[36] In connexion with the association of God with the universe we may
say (but only in a secondary sense) that God has spherical form; ἰδίαν
ἔχει μορφὴν τὸ σφαιροειδές Frag. Herc. p. 250 (Arnim ii 1060); ‘quae vero
vita tribuitur isti rotundo deo?’ Cic. _N. D._ i 10, 24.

[37] πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν, μεταβάλλον δ’ εἰς ὃ
βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν Aët. _plac._ i 6, 1.

[38] See above, § 242, note 20.

[39] θεὸν νοοῦμεν ζῷον μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ εὐποιητικὸν ἀνθρώπων
Plut. _Sto. rep._ 38, 3. A similar definition is given in Diog. L. vii
147 as indicating the view of the Stoics generally.

[40] ‘inter omnes omnium gentium sententia constat; omnibus enim innatum
est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 4, 12; ‘nec
ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos
deos credat’ Sen. _Ep._ 117, 6.

[41] See above, § 158.

[42] οὐ γὰρ πλῆθος ἔχει συνετὴν κρίσιν οὔτε δικαίαν | οὔτε καλήν
Cleanthes apud Clem. Al. _Strom._ v 3 (Arnim i 559).

[43] See below, § 294.

[44] ‘videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate
extabuisse ... quae [enim] anus tam excors inveniri potest, quae illa
quae quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta, extimescat? opinionum
enim commenta delet dies’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 2, 5.

[45] As for instance Cicero does (following Posidonius) _N. D._ ii 5, 13.

[46] See above, § 158.

[47] ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου
Sext. _math._ ix 93, see § 149.

[48] See the next note.

[49] ‘si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in
eo enim solo ratio est, qua nihil potest esse praestantius’ Cic. _N. D._
ii 6, 16.

[50] ‘si enim’ inquit [Chrysippus] ‘est aliquid in rerum natura, quod
potestas humana efficere non possit; est certe id, quod illud efficit,
homine melius. atqui res caelestes ab homine confici non possunt. est
igitur id, quo illa conficiuntur, homine melius. id autem quid potius
dixeris quam deum?’ _ib._

[51] ‘et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam [mundi] mentem, et
eam quidem acriorem et divinam, existimare debemus. unde enim haec homo
arripuit? ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates’ _ib._ 18.

[52] ‘esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se
putet, insipientis arrogantiae est’ _ib._ 16.

[53] See above, § 83.

[54] ‘placet enim illi [sc. Epicuro] esse deos, quia necesse sit
praestantem esse aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius’ Cic. _N. D._ ii
17, 46. See however Mayor’s note.

[55] ‘tantum vero ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque
rerum caelestium ... si non deorum immortalium domicilium putes, nonne
plane desipere videare? an ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse
meliora, terram autem esse infimam, quam crassissimus circumfundat aer?’
etc. Cic. _N. D._ ii 6, 17. For the original argument of Chrysippus see
Sext. _math._ ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014).

[56] ‘haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus
profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu
continerentur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 7, 19. Here cf. Sext. _math._ ix 78 to 85
(Arnim ii 1013).

[57] Cic. _N. D._ ii 37, 93.

[58] The third in the exposition of Cleanthes: ‘tertiam [causam
dixit Cleanthes esse], quae terreret animos fulminibus tempestatibus
... pestilentia terrae motibus’ _ib._ 5, 14.

[59] ‘quartam causam esse, eamque vel maximam, conversionem caeli’ _ib._
5, 15.

[60] Arnim ii 1019.

[61] ‘[non] in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent adloquendi surda
numina et inefficaces deos, nisi nossemus illorum beneficia’ Sen. _Ben._
iv 4, 2.

[62] Sext. _math._ ix 123 (Arnim ii 1017).

[63] _ib._ 133 (Arnim i 152). Pearson (Z. 108) describes the argument as
a ‘transparent sophistry’; but at the present time there is a widespread
tendency towards its revival; see Höffding, _Philosophy of Religion_, ch.
iii.

[64] Xen. _Mem._ i 1, 2.

[65] Cic. _Div._ i 5, 9 and 6, 10.

[66] _ib._ 3, 6; Diog. L. vii 149.

[67] Divination is based upon the συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων (_continuatio
coniunctioque naturae_), Cic. _Div._ ii 69, 142. See also Epict. _Disc._
i 14, and above, § 248.

[68] ‘[Tuscis] summa est fulgurum persequendorum scientia’ Sen. _N. Q._
ii 32, 2.

[69] ‘non ullo saecula dono | nostra carent maiore deum, quam Delphica
sedes | quod siluit’ Lucan _Phars._ v 111-113; cf. 86-96.

[70] Epict. _Disc._ ii 7, 3 and 4. The Stoic belief in divination is very
severely criticized by Zeller: ‘these vagaries show in Stoicism practical
interests preponderating over science’ _Stoics_, etc. p. 280. But the
belief in μαντική is traced back to Zeno and Cleanthes, who were hardly
‘practical’ men in the sense in which Zeller seems to use the word.

[71] See above, § 245.

[72] See above, § 209.

[73] Cic. _N. D._ ii 30, 77.

[74] ‘[di immortales] nec volunt obesse nec possunt. natura enim illis
mitis et placida est’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 27, 1; ‘di aequali tenore bona sua
per gentes populosque distribuunt, unam potentiam sortiti, prodesse’
_Ben._ vii 31, 4.

[75] ‘Faune, Nympharum fugientum amator, | per meos fines et aprica rura
| lenis incedas, abeasque parvis | aequus alumnis’ Hor. _C._ iii 18, 1-4.

[76] ‘tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum’ Lucr. _R. N._ i 102.

[77] ‘Does the Zeus at Olympia lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed
as becomes him who is ready to say—Irrevocable is my word and shall not
fail’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 26 (quoting from Hom. _Il._ i 526).

[78] ‘sic vestras hallucinationes fero quemadmodum Iuppiter ineptias
poetarum, quorum alius illi alas imposuit, alius cornua; alius adulterum
illum induxit et abnoctantem, alius saevum in deos, alius iniquum in
homines, alius parricidam et regni alieni paternique expugnatorem’ Sen.
_Dial._ vii 26, 6.

[79] This feeling finds expression at Rome as far back as the times of
Hannibal; ‘hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum, | Iovem se placare
posse donis, hostiis; | et operam et sumptum perdunt’ Plaut. _Rud._ 22 to
24.

[80] ‘[Chrysippus] disputat aethera esse eum, quem homines Iovem
appellarent’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 40.

[81] ‘aer autem, ut Stoici disputant, Iunonis nomine consecratur ...
effeminarunt autem eum Iunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo mollius’
_ib._ ii 26, 66.

[82] ‘quoniam tenuitate haec elementa paria sunt, dixerunt esse germana’
Serv. _ad Verg. Aen._ i 47 (Arnim ii 1066).

[83] Rival philosophers in the earlier times, and the church fathers
later, concurred in reviling Chrysippus because he extended this
principle of interpretation to a ‘disgraceful’ representation found in
Argos or Samos, in which Hera receives the divine seed in her mouth;
yet Christian antiquity was about to absorb the similar notion of
the conception of the Virgin Mary through the ear (‘quae per aurem
concepisti’ in an old Latin hymn). Chrysippus of course rightly estimated
the absurdity of criticising cosmic processes as if they were breaches of
social decency, and by so doing relieved the pious souls of his own day
from a real source of distress. See Arnim ii 1071-1074.

[84] Cic. _N. D._ ii 26, 66.

[85] _ib._ i 15, 40 and ii 26, 66.

[86] ‘Proserpinam, quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a
matre fingunt’ _ib._

[87] _ib._ 27, 68.

[88] καὶ ὁ χρόνος δὲ τοιοῦτόν τί ἐστι· δαπανᾶται γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ
γινόμενα ἐν αὐτῷ Cornutus _N. D._ 6. The castration of Uranus by Cronus
is thus explained by the Stoics: ‘caelestem naturam, id est igneam,
quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis, quae
coniunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 24, 64.

[89] Justin _Apol._ i 64 (Arnim ii 1096).

[90] Sen. _Ben._ i 3, 9.

[91] Aët. _plac._ i 6, 13.

[92] φασὶ δὲ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας,
ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων Diog. L. vii 151.

[93] ‘ásya [váruṇasya] spáśo ná ní miṣanti bhūrṇayaḥ’ Rigv. ix 73, 4.

[94] τρὶς γὰρ μυρίοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ | ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς
φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων Hes. _Op. et Di._ 252, 253; see also § 33.

[95] ‘et alia signa de caelo ad terram accidunt; | qui’st imperator divum
atque hominum Iuppiter, | is nos per gentis hic alium alia disparat, |
hominum qui facta mores pietatem et fidem | noscamus’ Plaut. _Rud._ 8-12.

[96] καὶ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ τὸ τοὺς Διοσκούρους ἀγαθούς τινας εἶναι δαίμονας
“σωτῆρας εὐσέλμων νεῶν” Sext. _math._ ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014); ‘clarum
Tyndaridae sidus ab infimis | quassas eripiunt aequoribus rates’ Hor.
_C._ iv 8, 31 and 32.

[97] φαύλους δαίμονας ἀπέλιπε Χρύσιππος Plut. _def. orac._ 17.

[98] καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οἴονται φιλόσοφοι φαῦλα δαιμόνια
περινοστεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίοις χρῶνται κολασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ
ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους _qu. Rom._ 51.

[99] Arnim ii 1101.

[100] ‘Posidonius censet homines somniare, quod plenus aer sit
immortalium animorum’ Cic. _Div._ i 30, 64.

[101] ‘Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum | naturae deus humanae,
mortalis in unum | quodque caput’ Hor. _Ep._ ii 2, 187-189; ‘sepone in
praesentia, quae quibusdam placent, uni cuique nostrum paedagogum dari
deum, ex eorum numero quos Ovidius ait “de plebe deos”’ Sen. _Ep._ 110,
1; ‘Zeus has placed by every man a guardian, every man’s daemon, to whom
he has committed the care of the man; a guardian who never sleeps, is
never deceived’ Epict. _Disc._ i 14, 12. M. Aurelius identifies this
daemon with the principate (_To himself_ v 27).

[102] Aët. _plac._ i 6, 9 and 15; Cic. _N. D._ ii 24, 62.

[103] Arnim i 264. The feeling is reflected by Lucan: ‘estne dei sedes,
nisi terra et pontus et aër, | et caelum et virtus? superos quid
quaerimus ultra?’ _Phars._ ix 578-9.

[104] ‘Varro dicit antiquos Romanos plus annos centum et septuaginta
deos sine simulacro coluisse: “quod si adhuc mansisset, castius di
observarentur”’ August. _Civ. De._ iv 31.

[105] ‘ne in victimis quidem deorum est honor’ Sen. _Ben._ i 6, 3.

[106] ‘To make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits
according to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor
scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do’
Epict. _Manual_ 31, 5.

[107] ‘si conferre volumus nostra cum externis; ceteris rebus aut pares
aut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione, id est cultu deorum, multum
superiores’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 3, 8.

[108] See above, § 250.

[109] ὄφρ’ ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ, | ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα
διηνεκές, ὡς ἐπέοικε _Hymn_ 36, 37.

[110] περὶ τοίνυν τῆς διὰ τ(ῶν μου)σικῶν (τ)οῦ θείου τει(μῆς εἴρη)ται μὲν
αὐτάρκως καὶ πρότερον Philod. _mus._ iv 66 (Arnim iii Diog. 64).

[111] ‘cultus autem deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque
sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra
incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 28, 71.

[112] Epict. _Disc._ i 16, 17.

[113] _ib._ iii 5, 10.

[114] _ib._ i 16, 15.

[115] See above, § 121.

[116] ‘non sunt ad caelum elevandae manus, nec exorandus aedituus, ut nos
ad aurem simulacri admittat; prope est a te deus’ Sen. _Ep._ 41, 1.

[117] ‘turpissima vota dis insusurrant; si quis admoverit aurem,
conticescent’ _ib._ 10, 5.

[118] Sen. _Dial._ x 11, 1.

[119] _ib._ xi 4, 2.

[120] _Ben._ ii 14, 5.

[121] _ib._ vi 38, 1.

[122] _Ep._ 32, 4.

[123] ‘etiamnunc optas, quod tibi optavit nutrix tua aut paedagogus aut
mater? o quam inimica nobis sunt vota nostrorum!’ Sen. _Ep._ 60, 1.

[124] ‘se quisque consulat et in secretum pectoris sui redeat et
inspiciat, quid tacitus optaverit. quam multa sunt vota, quae etiam sibi
fateri pudet! quam pauca, quae facere coram teste possimus!’ _Ben._ vi
38, 5.

[125] This sentiment we can trace back to the time of Plautus: ‘stulti
hau scimus frustra ut simus, quom quid cupienter dari | petimus nobis:
quasi quid in rem sit possimus noscere’ Plautus _Pseud._ 683-5.

[126] Epict. _Disc._ ii 16, 42.

[127] _Manual_ 8.

[128] Sen. _Dial._ v 36, 2. He describes his practice with naïve detail:
‘cum sublatum e conspectu lumen est et _conticuit uxor_ moris mei iam
conscia, totum diem meum scrutor’ _ib._ 3.

[129] Epict. _Disc._ iii 10, 2 and 3 (Long’s transl.).

[130] ‘quomodo sint di colendi, solet praecipi’ Sen. _Ep._ 95, 47.

[131] ‘non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam maiores nostri
superstitionem a religione separaverunt’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 28, 71.

[132] ‘primus est deorum cultus deos credere, deinde reddere illis
maiestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, sine qua nulla maiestas est; scire
illos esse, qui praesident mundo’ Sen. _Ep._ 95, 50.

[133] _ib._ 95, 47.

[134] ‘vis deos propitiare? bonus esto. satis illos coluit, quisquis
imitatus est’ _ib._ 95, 50.

[135] ‘You must believe that you have been placed in the world to obey
them, and to yield to them in everything which happens, and voluntarily
to follow it as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence’ Epict.
_Manual_ 31, 1.

[136] _Disc._ iii 22, 53 (compare Long’s transl. ii p. 83).

[137] _ib._ iii 26, 30.

[138] ‘sic vive cum hominibus, tanquam deus videat; sic loquere cum deo,
tanquam homines audiant’ Sen. _Ep._ 10, 5.



CHAPTER XI.

THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL.


[Sidenote: Man a part of the universe.]

=262.= From the contemplation of the universe as a whole, both from the
purely scientific standpoint in the study of physics, and from the more
imaginative point of view in the dogmas of religion, we now pass on to
the more intimate study of the individual man, consisting of body and
soul. In its main outlines the Stoic theory has already been sketched.
Thus it follows from the monistic standpoint that man is not ultimately
an ‘individual’ or unit of the universe; for the universe itself is
the only true unit, and a man is a part of it which cannot even for a
moment break itself off completely from the whole. It is therefore only
in a secondary and subordinate sense, and with special reference to the
inculcation of ethics, that we can treat Zeno or Lucilius as separate
and independent beings. Again, when we say that man ‘consists of body
and soul,’ we are merely adopting popular language; for body and soul
are ultimately one, and differ only in the gradation of spirit or tone
which informs them. Then we have already learnt in dialectics that
the highest power of man is that of ‘assent’ or free choice, which is
displayed in every exercise of reason; and the same power, though in a
different aspect, is at work in every moral act. The doctrine of the
universe is based upon the postulate that it is a living rational being
on the largest scale; and it follows, that each man is a ‘microcosm,’
and contains in himself a complete representation of the universe in
miniature. Lastly, we see that man takes his place in the universe, a
little lower than gods and daemons, and as greatly higher than animals
as these in their turn surpass plants and inanimate objects; and that his
nature, considered as composite, includes all the varying gradations of
spirit to which these orders correspond within the universe. In all his
parts alike the divine element is immanent and it binds them together in
a coherent unity (συμπάθεια τῶν μέρων). It remains for us to put together
from these and like points of departure a complete picture of human
nature.


[Sidenote: The soul’s kingdom.]

=263.= To indicate the general trend of Stoic thought on this subject
we propose the title ‘the kingdom of soul.’ Starting with the popular
distinction between body and soul, we find that the biologist and the
physician alike are preoccupied with the study of the body, that is,
of physiology. Only as an afterthought and supplement to their work
are the functions of soul considered; and they are treated as far as
possible by the methods suggested by the study of the body. All this is
reversed in the Stoic philosophy. The study of the soul stands in the
front, and is treated by methods directly suggested by observation of the
soul’s functions. The body is not entirely ignored, but is considered of
comparatively small importance. Further, the soul itself is manifold,
and is likened to a State, in which all is well if the governing part
have wisdom and benevolence proportionate to its power, and if the lower
parts are content to fulfil their respective duties; but if the balance
of the State is upset, all becomes disorder and misery[1]. Lastly, this
kingdom is itself a part of a greater whole, namely of the Cosmopolis or
universal State. By the comparison with a kingdom we are also directed
towards right moral principle. For as the citizen of Corinth or Sparta
ought not to repine because his city is of less grandeur than Athens, so
no man should be anxious because his external opportunities are limited.
He has a kingdom in his own mind and soul and heart. Let him be content
to find his happiness in rightly administering it.


[Sidenote: Man a picture of the universe.]

=264.= The doctrine that man is a representation or reflection of the
universe is of unknown antiquity. It seems to be clearly implied by
the teaching of Heraclitus, in so far as he lays it down that both
the universe and man are vivified and controlled by the Logos[2]. The
technical terms ‘macrocosm’ (μέγας κόσμος) and ‘microcosm’ (μικρὸς
κόσμος), are, as we have seen, employed by Aristotle[3]. But even if we
suppose that this conception is a commonplace of Greek philosophy, it
is in Stoicism alone that it is of fundamental importance, and knit up
with the whole framework of the system. And accordingly we find that all
the Stoic masters laid stress upon this principle. The words of Zeno
suggest to Cicero that ‘the universe displays all impulses of will and
all corresponding actions just like ourselves when we are stirred through
the mind and the senses[4].’ Cleanthes used the dogma of the soul of the
universe to explain the existence of the human soul as a part of it[5].
Chrysippus found a foundation for ethics in the doctrine that man should
study and imitate the universe[6]. Diogenes of Babylon says boldly that
God penetrates the universe, as soul the man[7]; and Seneca that the
relation of God to matter is the same as that of the soul to the body[8].
It is little wonder therefore if by Philo’s time the analogy had become a
commonplace, and philosophers of more than one school were accustomed to
say that ‘man is a little universe, and the universe a big man[9].’ God
is therefore the soul of the universe[10]; on the other hand the soul is
God within the human body[11], a self-moving force encased in relatively
inert matter, providence at work within the limitations of natural
necessity.


[Sidenote: Soul and body.]

=265.= The dualism of body and soul appears in a sharply defined shape
in Persism, and upon it depends the popular dogma of the immortality of
the soul, which (as we have already noticed) reached the Greco-Roman
world from a Persian source[12]. It appears to be rooted in the more
primitive ways of thinking termed ‘Animism’ and ‘Spiritism,’ in which
men felt the presence both in natural objects and within themselves of
forces which they conceived as distinct beings. According to this system
a man’s soul often assumes bodily shape, and quits his body even during
life, either in sleep or during a swoon; sometimes indeed it may be seen
to run away and return in the shape of a mouse or a hare. At death it is
seen to leave the man as a breath of air, and to enter the atmosphere.
But besides his soul a man possesses a shadow, a likeness, a double,
a ghost, a name; and all these in varying degrees contribute to form
what we should call his personality. In the animistic system the soul
survives the man, and why not? But this survival is vaguely conceived,
and only credited so far as the evidence of the senses supports it. Its
formulation in the doctrine of immortality belongs to a more advanced
stage of human thought[13].


[Sidenote: Soul and body are one.]

=266.= This dualistic conception could be and was incorporated in the
Stoic system to the same extent as the dualism of God and matter, but no
further. Ultimately, as we have already learnt, soul and body are one;
or, in the language of paradox, ‘soul is body[14].’ This follows not only
from the general principles of our philosophy, but also specifically
from observation of the facts of human life. ‘The incorporeal,’ argued
Cleanthes, ‘cannot be affected by the corporeal, nor the corporeal by
the incorporeal, but only the corporeal by the corporeal. But the soul
is affected by the body in disease and in mutilation, and the body by
the soul, for it reddens in shame and becomes pale in fear: therefore
the soul is body[15].’ And similarly Chrysippus argues: ‘death is the
separation of soul from body. Now the incorporeal neither joins with
nor is separated from body, but the soul does both. The soul therefore
is body[16].’ This doctrine is commonly adduced as evidence of the
‘materialism’ of the Stoics: yet the Stoics do not say that ‘soul is
matter,’ and (as we shall see) they explain its workings upon principles
quite different to the laws of physics or chemistry. The essential unity
of body and soul follows also from the way in which we acquire knowledge
of them. For we perceive body by the touch; and we learn the workings of
the soul by a kind of touch, called the inward touch (ἐντὸς ἁφή)[17].


[Sidenote: Mind, soul and body.]

=267.= Having realised that the division of man into soul and body is not
ultimate, we may more easily prepare ourselves to make other divisions. A
division into three parts, (i) body, (ii) soul or life (ψυχή, _anima_),
and (iii) mind (νοῦς, _animus_), was widely accepted in Stoic times, and
in particular by the school of Epicurus; the mind being that which man
has, and the animals have not[18]. The Stoics develope this division by
the principle of the microcosm. Mind is that which man has in common with
the deity; life that which he has in common with the animals; growth
(φύσις, _natura_), that which he has in common with the plants, as for
instance is shown in the hair and nails[19]. Man also possesses cohesion
(ἕξις, _unitas_) but never apart from higher powers. Further these four,
mind, soul, growth, and cohesion, are not different in kind, but all are
spirits (πνεύματα) which by their varying degrees of tension (τόνος,
_intentio_) are, to a less or greater extent, removed from the divine
being, the primal stuff. In this sense man is not one, nor two, but
multiple, as the deity is multiple[20].


[Sidenote: The soul is fire and air.]

=268.= The soul in its substance or stuff is fire, identical with the
creative fire which is the primal stuff of the universe[21]. But the
popular conception, according to which the soul is air or breath, and is
seen to leave the body at death, is also not without truth[22]. There is
a very general opinion that the soul is a mixture of fire and air, or is
hot air[23]. By this a Stoic would not mean that the soul was a compound
of two different elements, but that it was a variety of fire in the first
stage of the downward path, beginning to form air by relaxation of its
tension: but even so this form of the doctrine was steadily subordinated
to the older doctrine of Heraclitus, that the soul is identical with
the divine fire. Formally the soul is defined, like the deity himself,
as a ‘fiery intelligent spirit[24]’; and in this definition it would
seem that we have no right to emphasize the connexion between the word
‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα) and its original meaning ‘breath,’ since the word has
in our philosophy many other associations. It is further a Stoic paradox
that ‘the soul is an animal,’ just as God is an animal. But the soul and
the man are not on that account two animals; all that is meant is that
men and the brutes, by reason of their being endowed with soul, become
animals[25].


[Sidenote: The temperaments.]

=269.= According to another theory, which is probably not specifically
Stoic, but derived from the Greek physicians, the soul is compounded of
all four elements in varying proportion, and the character of each soul
(subject, in the Stoic theory, to the supreme control of reason[26]) is
determined by the proportion or ‘temperament’ (κρᾶσις, _temperatura_) of
the four elements. There are accordingly four temperaments, the fervid,
the frigid, the dry, and the moist, according to the preponderance of
fire, air, earth, and water respectively[27]. Dull and sleepy natures
are those in which there is an excess of the gross elements of earth and
water[28]; whilst an excess of cold air makes a man timorous, and an
excess of fire makes him passionate[29]. These characters are impressed
upon a man from birth and by his bodily conditions, and within the limits
indicated above are unalterable[30]. The ‘temperaments’ have always been
a favourite subject of discussion in popular philosophy[31].


[Sidenote: The soul’s parts.]

=270.= The characteristic attribute of the soul is that it is self-moved
(αὐτοκίνητον)[32]. Although in this point the Stoics agree with Plato,
they do not go on to name life as another attribute, for they do not
agree with the argument of the _Phaedo_ that the soul, having life
as an inseparable attribute, is incapable of mortality. We pass on
to the dispositions of the soul, which correspond to its ‘parts’ in
other philosophies, and are indeed often called its parts. But the
soul has not in the strict sense parts[33]; what are so called are its
activities[34], which are usually reckoned as eight in number, though
the precise reckoning is of no importance[35]. The eight parts of the
soul are the ruling part or ‘principate[36],’ the five senses, and the
powers of speech and generation. The seven parts or powers other than the
principate are subject to it and do its bidding, so that the soul is, as
we have called it, a kingdom in itself. These seven parts are associated
each with a separate bodily organ, but at the same time each is connected
with the principate. They may therefore be identified with ‘spirits
which extend from the principate to the organs, like the arms of an
octopus[37],’ where by a ‘spirit’ we mean a pulsation or thrill, implying
incessant motion and tension. The principate itself, that is the mind,
is also a spirit possessed of a still higher tension; and the general
agreement of the Stoics places its throne conveniently at the heart and
in the centre of the body[38]. Accordingly Posidonius defined the soul’s
parts as ‘powers of one substance seated at the heart[39].’


[Sidenote: Aspects of the principate.]

=271.= If we now fix our attention on the principate itself, we find it
no more simple than the universe, the deity, the man, or the soul. In
particular it resembles the deity in that, although essentially one, it
is called by many names. It is the soul in its reasoning aspect, the
reason, the intellect (λογικὴ ψυχή, νοῦς, διάνοια)[40]; it is also the
‘ego,’ that is, the will, the energy, the capacity for action[41]. It is
in one aspect the divinity in us, world-wide, universal; in another the
individual man with his special bent and character; so that we may even
be said to have two souls in us, the world-soul and each man’s particular
soul[42]. The principate becomes also in turn each of the other functions
or parts of the soul, for each of them is an aspect of the principate
(ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον)[43]. In addition the principate has many titles
of honour, as when Marcus Aurelius terms it the Pilot[44], the King and
Lawgiver[45], the Controller and Governor[46], the God within[47].


[Sidenote: The principate as reason.]

=272.= Although for the purpose of discussion we may distinguish between
reason and will, they are in fact everywhere intermingled. Thus the
principate as the reasoning part of the soul includes the powers of
perception, assent, comprehension, and of reason in the narrower sense,
that is, the power of combining the various conceptions of the mind, so
as ultimately to form a consistent system[48]. But amongst these powers
assent is equally an act of the will; and on the other hand the judgments
formed by the reasoning mind are not purely speculative, but lead up to
action; so that it is the reasoning power which must be kept pure, in
order that it may duly control the soul’s inclinations and aversions,
its aims and shrinkings, its plans, interests and assents[49]. If in
the Stoic theory the greater emphasis always appears to be laid on the
reason, it is the more necessary in interpreting it to bear in mind that
we are speaking of the reason of an active and social being.


[Sidenote: The principate as will.]

=273.= The maintenance of the principate as will in a right condition
is the problem of ethics; and it is important to understand what this
right condition is. The answer is to be found in a series of analogies,
drawn from all departments of philosophy. Thus from the standpoint of
physics the right condition is a proper strain or tension, as opposed to
slackness or unsteadiness[50]. In theology it is the agreement of the
particular will with the divine or universal will[51]. From the point of
view of the will itself it is the strength and force (ἰσχὺς καὶ κράτος)
of the will, the attitude that makes a man say ‘I can[52].’ Again it
is that state of the soul which corresponds to health in the body[53];
and in a quiet mood the Stoic may describe it as a restful and calm
condition[54]. Finally, if the soul as a whole is compared to a State,
the principate in its function as the will may at its best be compared to
a just and kind sovereign; but if this aim is missed, it may turn into a
greedy and ungovernable tyrant[55].


[Sidenote: The principate, divine and human.]

=274.= The principate, as it is of divine origin[56], and destined, as
we shall see, to be re-absorbed in the deity, may rightly be called god:
it is a god making its settlement and home in a human body[57]: it keeps
watch within over the moral principle[58]. In the language of paradox we
may say to each man, ‘You are a god[59].’ Of this principle we see the
proof in that man interests himself in things divine[60], and in it we
find the first incentive to a lofty morality[61]. As however the deity
is not conceived in human form, and is not subject to human weaknesses,
there comes a point at which, in the study of the human principate,
we part company with the divine; and this point we reach both when
we consider the principate with regard to its seven distinctly human
manifestations, and when we consider its possible degradation from the
standard of health and virtue. We now turn to the seven parts or powers
of the human soul which are subordinate to the reasoning faculty.


[Sidenote: Powers of the principate.]

=275.= The first five powers of the principate are those which are
recognised in popular philosophy as the ‘five senses.’ To materialistic
philosophers nothing is plainer than that these are functions of the
body; is it not the eye which sees, and the ear which hears[62]? This
the Stoic denies. The eye does not see, but the soul sees through the
eye as through an open door. The ear does not hear, but the soul hears
through the ear. Sensation therefore is an activity of the principate,
acting in the manner already described in the chapter on ‘Reason and
Speech[63].’ The soul is actively engaged, and sends forth its powers
as water from a fountain; the sense-organs are passively affected by
the objects perceived[64]. Subject to this general principle, sensation
(αἴσθησις, _sensus_) may be variously defined. It is ‘a spirit which
penetrates from the principate to the sensory processes’; it includes
alike the mind-picture (φαντασία, _visum_), that is, the first rough
sketch which the mind shapes when stimulated by the sense-organ; the
assent (συγκατάθεσις, _adsensus_), which the mind gives or refuses
to this sketch; and the final act of comprehension (κατάληψις,
_comprehensio_) by which this assent is sealed or ratified[65]. Of these
the middle stage is the most important, so that we may say paradoxically
‘sense is assent[66].’ Only in a secondary and popular way can we use the
word sensation to denote the physical apparatus of the sensory organs
(αἰσθητήρια), as when we say of a blind man ‘he has lost the sense of
sight[67].’


[Sidenote: The five senses.]

=276.= The nature of sensation is more particularly described in the
case of sight and hearing. In the first case there proceed from the
eyes rays, which cause tension in the air, reaching towards the object
seen[68]; this tension is cone-shaped, and as the distance from the
pupil of the eye increases, the base of the cone is increased in size,
whilst the vigour of the sight diminishes. This human activity effects
vision of itself in one case; for we say ‘darkness is visible,’ when
the eye shoots forth light at it, and correctly recognises that it is
darkness[69]. But in complete vision there is an opposing wave-motion
coming from the object, and the two waves become mutually absorbed:
hence Posidonius called sight ‘absorption’ (σύμφυσις)[70]. Similarly,
in the case of hearing, the pulsation (which, as we have seen, comes
in the first instance from the principate) spreads from the ear to the
speaker, and (as is now more distinctly specified) from the speaker to
the hearer; this reverse pulsation being circular in shape, like the
waves excited on the surface of a lake by throwing a stone into the
water[71]. Of the sensations of smell, taste and touch we only hear that
they are respectively (i) a spirit extending from the principate to the
nostrils, (ii) a spirit extending from the principate to the tongue, and
(iii) a spirit extending to the surface of the body and resulting in the
easily-appreciated touch of an object[72].


[Sidenote: Other activities.]

=277.= The Stoic account of the functions of the soul displayed in the
ordinary activities of life is either defective or mutilated; for even a
slight outline of the subject should surely include at least breathing,
eating (with drinking), speech, walking, and lifting. We need not
however doubt that these, equally with the five senses, are all ‘spirits
stretching from the principate’ to the bodily organs. This is expressly
stated of walking[73]. Of all such activities we must consider voice to
be typical, when it is described as the sixth function of the soul. Voice
is described as ‘pulsating air[74],’ set in motion by the tongue[75];
but we can trace it back through the throat to some source below, which
we can without difficulty identify with the heart, the seat of the
principate[76]. The voice is indeed in a special relationship to the
principate, since the spoken word is but another aspect of the thought
which is expressed by it[77].


[Sidenote: Procreation.]

=278.= The seventh and last of the subordinate powers of the soul,
according to the Stoics, is that of procreation. This part of their
system is of great importance, not only for the study of human nature,
but even in a higher degree for its indirect bearing upon the question
of the development of the universe through ‘procreative principles’
(σπερματικοὶ λόγοι), or, as we have termed them above, ‘seed powers[78].’
That all things grow after their kind is of course matter of common
knowledge; no combination of circumstances, no scientific arrangement
of sustenance can make of an acorn anything but an oak, or of a hen’s
egg anything but a chicken. But in the common view this is, at least
primarily, a corporeal or material process; whereas the Stoics assert
that it is not only a property of the soul, but one so primary and
fundamental that it must be also assumed as a first principle of physical
science. Before approaching the subject from the Stoic standpoint, it may
be well to see how far materialistic theories, ancient and modern, can
carry us.


[Sidenote: Heredity.]

=279.= Lucretius finds this a very simple matter:

  ‘Children often resemble not only their parents, but also their
  grandparents and more remote ancestors. The explanation is that
  the parents contain in their bodies a large number of atoms,
  which they have received from their ancestors and pass on to
  their descendants. In the chance clashing of atoms in procreation
  Venus produces all kinds of effects, bringing about resemblances
  between children and their forebears, not only in the face and
  person, but also in the look, the voice, and the hair[79].’

This account has a generally plausible sound until we bear in mind that
it is the fundamental property of atoms that, though their own variety
is limited, they can form things in infinite variety by changes in their
combination and arrangement. They are like the letters out of which
words, sentences, and poems are made up; and we can hardly expect to
reproduce the voice or the spirit of an Aeschylus by a fresh shuffling of
the letters contained in the _Agamemnon_. On the contrary, seeing that
the atoms contained in the bodies of parents have largely been drawn
from plants and animals, we could confidently reckon upon finding the
complete fauna and flora of the neighbourhood amongst their offspring.
Lucretius in effect postulates in his theory that particular atoms have
a representative and creative character, passing from father to child in
inseparable association with the marks of the human race, and endowed
with a special capacity of combining with other like atoms to form the
substratum of specifically human features. In giving his atoms these
properties he is insensibly approximating to the Stoic standpoint.


[Sidenote: Modern theories.]

=280.= Modern biologists deal with this subject with the minuteness of
detail of which the microscope is the instrument, and with the wealth of
illustration which results from the incessant accumulation of ascertained
facts. But they are perhaps open to the criticism that where they reach
the borders of their own science, they are apt to introduce references
to the sciences of chemistry and physics as explaining all difficulties,
even in regions to which these sciences do not apply. The following
account is taken from one of the most eminent of them:

  ‘Hertwig discovered that the one essential occurrence in
  impregnation is the coalescence of the two sexual cells and
  their nuclei. Of the millions of male spermatozoa which swarm
  round a female egg-cell, only one forces its way into its
  plasmic substance. The nuclei of the two cells are drawn
  together by a mysterious force which we conceive as a _chemical
  sense-activity akin to smell_, approach each other and melt
  into one. So there arises through the sensitiveness of the two
  sexual nuclei, _as a result of erotic chemotropism_, a new cell
  which unites the inherited capacities of both parents; the
  spermatozoon contributes the paternal, the egg-cell the maternal
  characteristics to the primary-cell, from which the child is
  developed[80].’

In another passage the same author sums up his results in bold language
from which all qualifications and admissions of imperfect knowledge have
disappeared:

  ‘Physiology has proved that all _the phenomena of life may be
  reduced to chemical and physical processes_. The cell-theory
  has shown us that all the complicated phenomena of the life of
  the higher plants and animals may be deduced from the simple
  physico-chemical processes in the elementary organism of the
  microscopic cells, and the material basis of them is the plasma
  of the cell-body[81].’


[Sidenote: Their inadequacy.]

=281.= These utterances may be considered typical of modern materialistic
philosophy in its extreme form. We may nevertheless infer from the
references to a ‘mysterious force,’ ‘chemical sense-activity akin to
smell,’ and ‘erotic chemotropism,’ that the analogies to biological
facts which the writer finds in chemical science stand in need of
further elucidation. We may notice further that the ‘atom’ has entirely
disappeared from the discussion, and that the ‘material basis’ of the
facts is a ‘plasma’ or ‘plasmic substance,’ something in fact which
stands related to a ‘protoplasm’ of which the chemical and physical
sciences know nothing, but which distinctly resembles the ‘fiery creative
body’ which is the foundation of the Stoic physics. Further we must
notice that the old problem of ‘the one and the many’ reappears in this
modern description; for the cell and its nucleus are neither exactly one
nor exactly two, but something which passes from two to one and from
one to two; further the nuclei of the two cells, being drawn together,
coalesce, and from their union is developed a ‘new cell’ which unites
the capacities of its ‘parents.’ Modern science, therefore, although it
has apparently simplified the history of generation by reducing it to
the combination of two units out of many millions that are incessantly
being produced by parent organisms, has left the philosophical problem of
the manner of their combination entirely unchanged. In these microscopic
cells is latent the whole physical and spiritual inheritance of the
parents, whether men, animals or plants, from which they are derived;
just as the atoms of Epicurus possess the germ of free will[82], so the
cells of Haeckel smell and love, struggle for marriage union, melt away
in each other’s embrace, and lose their own individuality at the moment
that a new being enters the universe.


[Sidenote: Creation and procreation.]

=282.= If then the phenomena of reproduction are essentially the same,
whether we consider the relations of two human beings or those of
infinitesimal elements which seem to belong to another order of being,
we are already prepared for the Stoic principle that the creation of
the universe is repeated in miniature in the bringing into life of each
individual amongst the millions of millions of organic beings which
people it. From this standpoint we gain fresh light upon the Stoic theory
of creation, and particularly of the relation of the eternal Logos to
the infinite multitude of procreative principles or ‘seed-powers.’
Again, it is with the general theory of creation in our minds that we
must revert to the Stoic explanation of ordinary generation. This is to
him no humble or unclean function of the members of the body; it is the
whole man, in his divine and human nature, that is concerned[83]. The
‘procreative principle’ in each man is a part of his soul[84]; ‘the seed
is a spirit’ (or pulsation) ‘extending from the principate to the parts
of generation[85].’ It is an emanation from the individual in which one
becomes two, and two become one. Just as the human soul is a ‘fragment’
of the divine, so is the seed a fragment torn away, as it were, from the
souls of parents and ancestors[86].


[Sidenote: Motherhood.]

=283.= In the seed is contained the whole build of the man that is
to be[87]. It is therefore important to know whether the procreative
principle in the embryo is derived from one or both parents, and if the
latter, whether in equal proportion. The Stoics do not appear to have
kept entirely free from the common prepossession, embodied in the law of
paternal descent, according to which the male element is alone active
in the development of the organism; and so they allege that the female
seed is lacking in tone and generative power[88]. On the other hand
observation appeared to them to show that children inherit the psychical
and bodily qualities of both parents, and the general tendency of their
philosophy was towards the equalization of the sexes. On the whole the
latter considerations prevailed, so that the doctrine of Stoicism, as of
modern times, was that qualities, both of body and soul, are inherited
from the seed of both parents[89]; wherein the possibility remains open,
that in particular cases the debt to one parent may be greater than to
the other[90].


[Sidenote: Impulses.]

=284.= The Stoic psychology is in its fundamental principles wholly
distinct from that of Plato; which does not at all prevent its exponents,
and least of all those like Panaetius and Posidonius who were admirers of
Plato, from making use of his system as an auxiliary to their own. Plato
divided the soul into three parts; the rational part, the emotional (and
volitional) part, and the appetitive[91]. Both the two latter parts need
the control of the reason, but the emotional part inclines to virtue,
the appetitive to vice[92]. The rational part, as with the Stoics, is
peculiar to man; the other two are also possessed by the animals, and
the appetitive soul even by plants. The Stoics do not however seriously
allow any kinship between virtue and the emotions, and they deal with
this part of the subject as follows. Nature has implanted in all living
things certain impulses which are directed towards some object. An
impulse towards an object is called ‘appetite’ (ὁρμή, _appetitus_ or
_impetus_); an impulse to avoid an object is called ‘aversion’ (ἀφορμή,
_alienatio_)[93]. In man appetite should be governed by reason; if
this is so, it becomes ‘reasonable desire’ (ὄρεξις εὔλογος, _recta
appetitio_)[94]; if otherwise, it becomes ‘unreasonable desire’ (ὄρεξις
ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ) or ‘concupiscence’ (ἐπιθυμία, _libido_). To living things
lower in the scale than man terms that are related to reason can of
course not apply.


[Sidenote: Will and responsibility.]

=285.= Practical choice is, according to the Stoics, exactly analogous
to intellectual decision. Just as the powers of sensation never deceive
us[95], so also the impulses are never in themselves irrational[96].
An impulse is an adumbration of a course of action as proper to be
pursued[97]; to this the will gives or refuses its assent[98]. It is the
will, and the will only, which is liable to error, and this through want
of proper tone and self-control. If there is this want, it appears in a
false judgment, a weak assent, an exaggerated impulse; and this is what
we call in ethics a perturbation[99]. A healthy assent leads up to a
right action: a false assent to a blunder or sin. Hence we hold to the
Socratic paradox that ‘no one sins willingly’ (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει);
for the true and natural will cannot sin; it must first be warped to a
false judgment and weakened by slackness of tone. We can equally use the
paradox that ‘every voluntary action is a judgment of the intellect,’
or (in few words) that ‘virtue is wisdom’ (φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή). In such
views we find a starting-point for dealing with the problems of ethics,
including those of the ethical ideal or supreme good, its application to
daily duties, and its failure through ignorance or weakness of soul.


[Sidenote: The body.]

=286.= We pass on to consider the body, but at no great length; partly
because many functions often considered as bodily are by the Stoics
treated as belonging to the soul (as sensations and impulses), partly
because the study of the body is rather the task of the physician than
of the philosopher. In the body we may notice separately (i) the bones,
sinews, and joints, constituting the framework on which the whole is
built up; (ii) the surface, including beauty of outline and features, and
(iii) the complexion, which suffuses a glow over the surface and most
attracts the attention[100]. No absolute distinction can be made between
body and soul. Generally speaking, we may say that body is composed of
the two grosser elements, earth and water, whilst soul (as we have seen)
rests on the two higher elements of air and fire[101]; of the gradations
of spirit body possesses distinctively (but not exclusively) that of
coherence (ἕξις), whilst it shares with the soul the principle of growth
(φύσις)[102]. Yet these contrasts are after all only secondary. As surely
as soul is body so body is soul, and divinity penetrates into its
humblest parts. In its practical applications Stoicism dwells so little
on the body that the wise man seems hardly conscious of its existence.


[Sidenote: ‘The flesh.’]

=287.= Side by side with the strictly Stoic view of the body we find
in all the Roman literature another conception which is strongly
dualistic, and which we cannot but think to be drawn from some non-Stoic
source[103]. According to this view the body, often called the ‘flesh,’
is essentially evil[104]; it is the prison-house of the soul[105],
the source of corruption of the will[106], the hindrance to a clear
insight of the intelligence. In the language picturesquely adopted in
the _Pilgrim’s Progress_ (after St Paul), it is a burden which the
enlightened man longs to shake off[107]. For the body so understood we
find abusive names; it is the husk in which the grain is concealed[108],
the ass from which the owner should be ready to part at any moment[109].
This language tends to be exaggerated and morbid, and leads in practice
to asceticism[110]. It appealed in ancient as in modern times to a
widespread sentiment, but is not reconcileable with the main teaching of
the Stoic philosophy.


[Sidenote: Dignity of the body.]

=288.= According to the true Stoic view, the body is a dwelling-place
or temple inhabited for a time by the principate, its divinity[111].
Therefore the body as such is deserving of respect, even of
veneration[112]. In particular the erect form of the human body is a
mark of divine favour, by which it is hinted that man is fitted to
contemplate the operations of the heavens[113]. The whole framework of
the body, from the organs of sensation to those by which we breathe,
swallow, and digest, is a masterpiece of divine skill, and an evidence of
the care of providence for man[114]. And even as an architect provides
that those parts of the house which are offensive to sight and smell
should be out of sight, so has nature hidden away those parts of the
body which are necessarily offensive, at a distance from the organs of
sense[115]. The Stoic conception of the dignity of the body is symbolized
in practical ethics by the culture of the beard, in which is latent the
broad principle of attention to the cleanliness and healthy development
of every part of the body.

It is a mark of the Oriental associations of Stoicism that this respect
for the body is never associated with the Hellenic cult of the body as
displayed in art and gymnastics.


[Sidenote: Junction of soul and body.]

=289.= Having now studied man in all his parts, it is time to consider
how those parts are compacted together, how man grows and decays, and
what varieties of mankind exist. First then the principate is combined
with the lower functions of the soul, and every part of the soul, by the
process of interpenetration (σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖ)[116]; or (from a
slightly different point of view) upon body which has cohesion (ἕξις)
is overlaid growth, on growth soul, and on soul reason; so that the
higher tension presupposes the lower, but not _vice versa_. In the act
of generation the soul loses its higher tensions; and consequently the
embryo possesses neither human nor animal soul, but only the principles
of cohesion and growth. It is in fact a vegetable[117], but necessarily
differs from other vegetables in having the potentiality of rising to
a higher grade of spirit[118]. At the moment of birth its growth-power
(φύσις) is brought into contact with the cold air, and through this
chill it rises to the grade of animal life, and becomes soul (ψυχή from
ψῦξις)[119]. This etymological theory provokes the ridicule of opponents,
who do not fail to point out that soul, standing nearer to the divine
fire than growth, ought to be produced by warmth rather than by coolness;
but the Stoics probably had in mind that contact with either of the two
higher elements must raise the gradation of spirit. The infant, according
to this theory, is an animal, but not yet a man; it has not the gift of
reason[120]. To attain this higher stage there is need both of growth
from within, and of association with reasonable beings without; in
these ways reason may be developed in or about the seventh year[121].
In the whole of its growth the soul needs continually to be refreshed
by the inbreathing of air, and to be sustained by exhalations from the
blood[122]. Here we touch upon one of those fundamental doctrines of the
system, derived by Zeno from Heraclitus[123], which bind together the
great and the little world. Just as the heavenly bodies are maintained by
exhalations from the Ocean[124], so the soul is dependent upon the body
for its daily food. Hence follows the important consequence that weakness
and disease of the body react upon the soul; the philosopher must keep
his body in health for the soul’s good, if for no other reason[125]. If
the Stoics in discussing problems of ethics constantly maintain that the
health of the soul is independent of that of the body, such statements
are paradoxical and need qualification[126].


[Sidenote: Sleep and death.]

=290.= The mutual action of body and soul is most readily illustrated by
sleep. The Stoics do not hold, as the Animists do, that the soul quits
the body in sleep; nor do they agree with another popular view, that the
soul then quits the extremities of the body and concentrates itself at
the heart[127]. Sleep is due to a relaxation, contraction, or weakening
of the spirit[128]; a lowering of its grade, which nevertheless is
clearly no sign of ill health. In old age there is often an imperfection
of the reason, and this is also seen in the sick, the tired, and the
anaemic[129]. In death there is a complete relaxation of tone in the
breath that we can feel, that is, in such spirit as belongs to the
body[130]; there follows the separation of soul from body.


[Sidenote: The beyond.]

=291.= We are thus brought to the critically important question of the
existence of the soul after death. On this point we shall not expect to
find that all Stoic teachers agree in their language. In Zeno himself we
shall be sure to find that variety of suggestion which is accounted for
by his eagerness to learn from all sources; and later writers will also
differ according to their respective inclinations either to draw strictly
logical conclusions from the Stoic physics, or to respect the common
opinion of mankind and to draw from it conclusions which may be a support
to morality[131]. These variations need not discourage us from the
attempt to trace in general outline the common teaching of the school.
We have already seen that the various parts of the Stoic system are not
bound together by strictly logical processes; where two conclusions
appear contradictory, and yet both recommend themselves to the judgment,
the Stoics are not prepared to sacrifice either the one or the other, but
always seek to lessen, if they cannot altogether remove, the difficulties
which stand in the way of accepting both. On the other hand, we need
not too readily admit the charge of insincerity, whether it is found in
the candid admission of its temptations by Stoic teachers[132], or in
the less sympathetic criticisms of ancient or modern exponents of the
system[133].


[Sidenote: The Stoic standpoint.]

=292.= On certain points all Stoic teachers seem to be agreed; first
that the soul is, as regards its substance, imperishable; secondly,
that the individual soul cannot survive the general conflagration[134];
lastly, that it does not of necessity perish with the body[135]. The
first two dogmas follow immediately from the fundamental principles of
the Stoic physics, and point out that every soul will find its last home
by being absorbed in the divine being. The third dogma leaves play for
ethical principles; subject to the monistic principle of an ultimate
reconciliation, there is room for some sharp distinction between the
destiny of good and bad souls, such as stands out in the Persian doctrine
of rewards and punishments after death. And so we find it generally held
that the souls of the good survive till the conflagration, whilst those
of the wicked have but a short separate existence, and those of the
lower and non-rational animals perish with their bodies[136]. If this
difference in duration will satisfy the moral sense, the nature of the
further existence of the soul may be determined on physical principles.


[Sidenote: The released soul.]

=293.= In the living man the soul, as we have already seen reason to
suppose, derives its cohesion (ἕξις) and shape from its association with
the body. Separated from the body, it must assume a new shape, and what
should that be but the perfect shape of a sphere[137]? Again, the soul
being compounded of the elements of air and fire must by its own nature,
when freed from the body, pierce through this murky atmosphere, and rise
to a brighter region above, let us say to that sphere which is just below
the moon[138]. Here then souls dwell like the stars, finding like them
their food in exhalations from the earth[139]. Here they take rank as
daemons or heroes (of such the air is full), and as such are joined in
the fulfilment of the purposes of divine providence[140]. Yet it must
be admitted that this bright destiny, if substantiated by the laws of
physics, is also subject to physical difficulties. Suppose for instance
that a man is crushed by the fall of a heavy rock; his soul will not be
able to escape in any direction, but will be at once squeezed out of
existence[141]. To fancies of this kind, whether attractive or grotesque,
we shall not be inclined to pay serious attention.


[Sidenote: Tartarus.]

=294.= In this general theory hope is perhaps held out before the eyes
of good souls, but there is little to terrify the wicked, even if it be
supposed that their souls neither survive so long, nor soar so high, as
those of the good[142]. As against it we are told by a Church Father that
Zeno accepted the Persian doctrine of future rewards and punishments, and
with it the primitive belief in an Inferno in its crudest form[143]. We
must agree with the first English editor of the fragments of Zeno that
‘it is hardly credible that Zeno can have attached any philosophical
importance to a theory stated in these terms[144]’; they can at the
best only have occurred in some narration in the style of the Platonic
myths, intended to illustrate a principle but not to convey a literal
truth[145]. For just as the whole Hellenistic world, including the
Stoics, stood aloof from the Persian doctrine of a spirit of evil, so
it firmly rejected the dogma of a hell. Lucretius makes it a principal
argument in favour of the philosophy of Epicurus that it drives out of
men’s hearts the fear of Tartarus[146]; but writers partly or wholly
Stoic are not less emphatic. ‘Ignorance of philosophy,’ says Cicero, ‘has
produced the belief in hell and its terrors[147].’ In the mouth of the
representative of Stoicism he places the words ‘Where can we find any
old woman so silly as to believe the old stories of the horrors of the
world below?[148]’ ‘Those tales’ says Seneca ‘which make the world below
terrible to us, are poetic fictions. There is no black darkness awaiting
the dead, no prison-house, no lake of fire or river of forgetfulness, no
judgment-seat, no renewal of the rule of tyrants[149].’


[Sidenote: Purgatory of Virgil.]

=295.= Of far more importance to us is the theory of purgatory familiar
through the description in Virgil’s _Aeneid_:

  ‘In the beginning the earth and the sky, and the spaces of night,
  Also the shining moon, and the sun Titanic and bright
  Feed on an inward life, and, with all things mingled, a mind
  Moves universal matter, with Nature’s frame is combined.
  Thence man’s race, and the beast, and the feathered creature that
    flies,                                                               5
  All wild shapes that are hidden the gleaming waters beneath.
  Each elemental seed has a fiery force from the skies,
  Each its heavenly being, that no dull clay can disguise,
  Bodies of earth ne’er deaden, nor limbs long destined to death.
  Hence their fears and desires, their sorrows and joys; for their
    sight,                                                              10
  Blind with the gloom of a prison, discerns not the heavenly light.
  Nor, when life at last leaves them, do all sad ills, that belong
  Unto the sinful body, depart; still many survive
  Lingering within them, alas! for it needs must be that the long
  Growth should in wondrous fashion at full completion arrive.          15
  So due vengeance racks them, for deeds of an earlier day
  Suffering penance; and some to the winds hang viewless and thin,
  Searched by the breezes; from others the deep infection of sin
  Swirling water washes, or bright fire purges, away.
  Each in his own sad ghost we endure; then, chastened aright,          20
  Into Elysium pass. Few reach to the fields of delight
  Till great time, when the cycles have run their courses on high,
  Takes the inbred pollution, and leaves to us only the bright
  Sense of the heaven’s own ether, and fire from the springs of the
    sky[150].’

Although we cannot accept Virgil as a scientific exponent of Stoic
teaching, yet there is much reason to suppose that he is here setting
forth a belief which met with very general acceptance in our school,
and of which the principle is that the sufferings of the disembodied
are not a punishment for past offences, but the necessary means for the
purification of the soul from a taint due to its long contact with the
body.


[Sidenote: Probable Stoic origin.]

=296.= The language in which Virgil first describes the creation and
life of the universe closely resembles that of Stoicism; the phrases
‘elemental seed,’ ‘fiery force,’ ‘heavenly being’ might be used by any
Stoic teacher. The conception of the body as a ‘prison-house,’ even
though it does not express the most scientific aspect of Stoic physics,
was nevertheless, as we have seen, familiar to Stoics of the later
centuries. The ethical conception, again, of the doctrine of purgatory is
exactly that of which the Stoics felt a need in order to reconcile the
dualism of good and evil souls with the ultimate prevalence of the divine
will. Again, we can have no difficulty in supposing that Virgil drew his
material from Stoic sources, seeing that he was characteristically a
learned poet, and reflects Stoic sentiment in many other passages of his
works[151]. We have also more direct evidence. The Church Father whom we
have already quoted not only ascribes to the Stoics in another passage
the doctrine of purgatory, but expressly quotes this passage from Virgil
as an exposition of Stoic teaching. And here he is supported to some
extent by Tertullian, who says that the Stoics held that the souls of the
foolish after death receive instruction from the souls of the good[152].
Finally, we have the doctrine definitely accepted by Seneca[153].


[Sidenote: Views of Greek Stoics.]

=297.= We may now consider more particularly the views and feelings of
individual Stoic teachers. It appears to us accordingly that Zeno left
his followers room for considerable diversity of opinion, and quoted
the Persian doctrine because of its suggestiveness rather than for its
literal truth. Of Cleanthes we are told that he held that all souls
survived till the conflagration, whilst Chrysippus believed this only
of the souls of the wise[154]. Panaetius, although a great admirer of
Plato, is nevertheless so strongly impressed by the scientific principle
that ‘all which is born must die,’ that he is here again inclined to
break away from Stoicism, and to suspend his judgment altogether as to
the future existence of the soul[155]; the belief in a limited future
existence was meaningless to a philosopher who disbelieved in the
conflagration. Of the views of Posidonius we have the definite hint,
that he taught that the ‘air is full of immortal souls[156]’; and
this is in such harmony with the devout temper of this teacher that we
may readily believe that he enriched the somewhat bare speculations of
his predecessors by the help of an Oriental imagination, and that he
introduced into Stoicism not only the doctrine of daemons but also that
of purgatory, holding that souls were both pre-existent and post-existent.


[Sidenote: View of Seneca.]

=298.= In the period of the Roman principate the question of the
future existence of the soul acquires special prominence. Seneca is
criticized on the ground that he affects at times a belief which he
does not sincerely entertain, partly in order to make his teaching
more popular, partly to console his friends in times of mourning. The
facts stand otherwise. At no time does Seneca exceed the limits of the
accepted Stoic creed; he bids his friends look forward to the period of
purgation[157], the life of pure souls in the regions of the aether, and
the final union with the divine being. It is after purgation that the
soul by the refinement of the elements of which it is built forces its
way to higher regions[158]; it finds a quiet and peaceful home in the
clear bright aether[159]; it has cast off the burden of the flesh[160];
it is parted by no mountains or seas from other happy souls[161]; it
daily enjoys free converse with the great ones of the past[162]; it
gazes on the human world below, and on the sublime company of the stars
in its own neighbourhood[163]. At a later epoch all blessed souls will
be re-absorbed in the primal elements[164], suffering change but not
forfeiting their immortal nature[165]. The somewhat exuberant language
of Seneca has frequently been adopted by Christian writers, to express a
belief which is not necessarily identical[166]; but for the associations
thus created Seneca must not be held responsible.


[Sidenote: Personality cannot survive.]

=299.= With the decay of interest in the Stoic physics there begins a
tendency to overlook the intermediate stage of the soul’s life, and to
dwell solely on its final absorption; whilst at the same time it is urged
from the ethical standpoint that no possible opinion as to the soul’s
future should disturb the calm of the virtuous mind. On one further, but
important, point the Stoic teaching becomes clearer. In no case is the
soul that survives death to be identified with the man that once lived.
Cut off from all human relations, from the body and its organs, and from
its own subordinate powers[167], it is no longer ‘you,’ but is something
else that takes your place in the due order of the universe. In all
this the Stoic doctrine remains formally unchanged; but its expression
is now so chastened that it seems only to give a negative reply to the
inherited hope, and the chief comfort it offers is that ‘death is the
end of all troubles.’ This change of tone begins in Seneca himself; it
is he who says to the mourner ‘your loved one has entered upon a great
and never-ending rest[168]’; ‘death is release from all pain and its
end[169]’; ‘death is not to be. I know all its meaning. As things were
before I was born, so they will be after I am gone[170].’ ‘If we perish
in death, nothing remains[171].’ In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius this
new tone rings out much more clearly; if we like so to speak, more
unrelentingly. To the characteristic passages from these writers which
are quoted above[172] may be added the following, perhaps the most
precise of all:

  ‘If souls survive death, how can the air hold them from all
  eternity? How, we reply, does earth hold the bodies of generation
  after generation committed to the grave? Just as on earth, after
  a certain term of survival, change and dissolution of substance
  makes room for other dead bodies, so too the souls transmuted
  into air, after a period of survival, change by processes of
  diffusion and of ignition, and are resumed into the seminal
  principle of the universe, and in this way make room for others
  to take up their habitation in their stead. Such is the natural
  answer, assuming the survival of souls[173].’

Such are the last words of Stoicism, not wholly satisfying either to
knowledge or to aspiration, but assuredly based on a wide outlook and a
keen discrimination.


[Sidenote: Men and women.]

=300.= The whole nature of man, as discussed up to this point, is
common to every individual born into the world, with some exceptions
dependent on age or temperament which have been explained incidentally.
It remains to discuss shortly the important differences which result
from sex, nationality, and location. There seems every reason to believe
that the equality of men and women, though at the time seemingly
paradoxical, was generally accepted by the earlier Stoics, and adopted
as a practical principle in Stoic homes. The whole treatment of human
nature by the Stoics applies equally to man and woman, and points to
the conclusion that as moral agents they have the same capacities and
the same responsibilities[174]. Seneca in writing to a great lady of
philosophical sympathies states this as his firm conviction[175], and
the lives of many Stoic wives and daughters (to whom we shall refer
in a later chapter)[176] showed it to have a firm basis in fact. We
need attach no great importance to those more distinctively masculine
views which Seneca occasionally expresses, to the effect that woman is
hot-tempered, thoughtless, and lacking in self-control[177], or to the
Peripatetic doctrine that man is born to rule, women to obey[178]; for
these sentiments, however welcome to his individual correspondents, were
not rooted in Stoic theory nor exemplified in the Roman society of his
own days.


[Sidenote: Class and race.]

=301.= It follows with equal certainty from the early history of
Stoicism, and in particular from the doctrine of the Cosmopolis, that
differences of class and race were hardly perceived by its founders. For
this there was further historical cause in the spread of Hellenistic
civilisation, which was of an entirely catholic spirit and welcomed
disciples from all nationalities[179]. The doctrine of Aristotle, that
some nations are by nature fitted only for slavery, finds no echo in
the Stoic world[180]. There we look in vain for any trace of that
instinctive feeling of national difference, that sensitiveness to race
and colour, which can easily be recognised in the early history of
Greece and Rome, and which has become so acute in the development of
modern world-politics. The Roman Stoics, as we shall see later, might
individually be proud of advantages of birth, but they never associated
this feeling with their philosophy. Here and there, however, we find
signs of a scientific interest in the question of differences of national
character, which are generally ascribed to the influences of climate.
Seneca, for instance, remarks that the inhabitants of northern climates
have characters as rude as their sky; hence they make good fighters, but
poor rulers[181]. Yet when he contemplates the northern barbarians, his
mind is mainly occupied by admiration; and, like other pro-Germans of the
period, he foresees with prophetic clearness a danger threatening the
Roman empire. ‘Should the Germans once lay aside their fierce domestic
quarrels, and add to their courage reason and discipline, Rome will
indeed have cause to resume the virtues of its early history[182].’
The roots of true greatness of soul, then, lie deeper than in literary
culture or philosophic insight. It is a part of the irony of history
that Stoicism, which aimed above all things at being practical, should
diagnose so correctly the growing weakness of the Roman world, and yet
fail to suggest any remedy other than a reversion to an epoch in which
philosophy was unknown.


FOOTNOTES

[1] ‘rex noster est animus: hoc incolumi cetera manent in officio,
parent, obtemperant; cum ille paullum vacillavit, simul dubitant. ubi
vero impotens, cupidus, delicatus est, fit tyrannus; tunc eum excipiunt
adfectus impotentes’ Sen. _Ep._ 114, 24.

[2] See L. Stein _Psych._ i p. 206.

[3] See above, § 68.

[4] ‘natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et
appetitiones, quas ὁρμάς Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic
adhibet ut nosmetipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus’ Cic. _N. D._ ii
22, 58.

[5] τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου διήκειν, ἧς μέρος μετέχοντας ἡμᾶς
ἐμψυχοῦσθαι Hermias _irris. gent. phil._ 7 (Arnim i 495).

[6] ‘ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum’ Cic.
_N. D._ ii 14, 37.

[7] τὸν κόσμον περιέχειν τὸν Δία καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ψυχήν Philod. _piet._
15 (Arnim iii _Diog._ 33).

[8] ‘quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod
est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 24.

[9] Philo _rer. div._ i 494 M (Stein _Psych._ i 207).

[10] See above, § 242.

[11] See below, § 274.

[12] See above, § 11.

[13] On the whole subject see Tylor, _Anthropology_, ch. xvi; _Primitive
Culture_, chs. xi-xvii; Jevons, _Introd. to the history of Religion_, ch.
v.

[14] See above, § 174.

[15] Nemes. _nat. hom._ ii 85 and 86 (Arnim i 518).

[16] _ib._ 99 (Arnim ii 790).

[17] Here we come into close touch with modern ways of thinking. The soul
is the self as known subjectively and from within, as appealed to in the
argument of Descartes ‘cogito, ergo sum.’ The body is the self as known
objectively and from without, first in our neighbours who obstruct our
efforts (‘officium quod corporis exstat, | officere atque obstare’ Lucr.
_R. N._ i 337, 8), and then by analogy in ourselves. The Stoic theory
then asserts that subjective and objective knowledge are ultimately the
same, both being activities of the same Logos. See above, § 149.

[18] The distinction is most clearly made by Juvenal: ‘sensum a caelesti
demissum traximus arce, | cuius egent prona et terram spectantia. mundi |
principio indulsit communis conditor illis | tantum animas, nobis animum
quoque, mutuus ut nos | adfectus petere auxilium et praestare iuberet’
_Sat._ xv 146-150.

[19] See above, § 206.

[20] See above, § 203.

[21] ‘Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 10, 19.

[22] ‘spiritum quippe animam esse Zenon quaerit hactenus; quo recedente
a corpore moritur animal, hoc certe anima est. naturali porro spiritu
recedente moritur animal; naturalis igitur spiritus anima est’ Chalc. _in
Tim._ 220 (Arnim i 138).

[23] ‘probabilius enim videtur, tale quiddam esse animum, ut sit ex
igni atque anima temperatum’ Cic. _N. D._ iii 14, 36; cf. Arnim ii 786.
This view was accepted by Panaetius: ‘is animus ... ex inflammata anima
constat, ut potissimum videri video Panaetio’ _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42.
The ‘fire’ and ‘air’ here referred to are not the ordinary elements:
οὐ γὰρ πᾶν πῦρ οὐδὲ πᾶν πνεῦμα ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. μετά τινος οὖν
ἔσται εἴδους ἰδίου καὶ λόγου καὶ δυνάμεως καί, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, τόνου
Alex. Aphr. _de anima_ p. 115, 6 (Arnim ii 785). See further Stein
_Psychologie_ i pp. 101 to 103.

[24] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πνεῦμα νοερὸν θερμόν [τὴν ψυχήν] Aët. _plac._ iv 3, 3.

[25] ‘animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat, ut simus animalia;
et cum ab illo animalia hoc nomen traxerint’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 2; ‘et
animus meus animal est et ego animal sum; duo tamen non sumus. quare?
quia animus mei pars est’ _ib._ 5.

[26] Tertullian deals with this point as against Valentinian heretics;
_de an._ 21.

[27] ‘cum elementa sint quattuor, ignis aquae aeris terrae, potestates
pares his sunt, fervida frigida arida atque umida; eadem animalium
hominumque discrimina sunt’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 19, 1 and 2; ‘cuius [in
homine] elementi portio praevalebit, inde mores erunt’ _ib._ 2.

[28] ‘languida ingenia et in somnum itura inertibus nectuntur elementis’
_ib._ i 5, 9.

[29] ‘iracundos fervida animi natura faciet; frigidi mixtura timidos
facit’ _ib._ iv 19, 2.

[30] ‘quaecunque adtribuit condicio nascendi et corporis temperatura,
haerebunt’ _Ep._ 11, 6.

[31] For a treatment of the subject on modern lines see Ribot, _The
emotions_, chs. xii and xiii; and the works of Fouillée, Paulhan, and
other French writers. For the earlier history see Summers on Sen. _Ep._
11, 3, and Stein _Psych._ i p. 175.

[32] ψυχή ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς σῶμα λεπτομερὲς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον
κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους Galen _def. med._ 29 (Arnim ii 780); ‘nosmetipsi
qui animis movemur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 58; ‘humanus animus agilis est et
pronus ad motus’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 11.

[33] μία ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, ὡς τὴν αὐτήν πως ἔχουσαν ποτὲ μὲν
διανοεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ὀργίζεσθαι [qu. ὀρέγεσθαι?] ποτὲ δ’ ἐπιθυμεῖν παρὰ
μέρος Alex. Aph. _de anima_ p. 118 (Arnim ii 823).

[34] ‘huiusmodi autem non tam partes animae habebuntur quam vires et
efficaciae et operae’ Tert. _de an._ 14. They may also be called the
soul’s qualities: οἱ ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφοι τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις
ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας συμβιβάζουσι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὡς οὐσίαν
προϋποκειμένην ταῖς δυνάμεσι τιθέασι Stob. i 49, 33.

[35] See above, § 79; for other divisions Tert. _de an._ 14 (Arnim i
144), Cic. _Off._ i 28, 101, and generally Stein, _Psych._ i p. 123.

[36] On this translation see § 101, note 81.

[37] [ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ] ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέταται διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων
προσφερῶς ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις Aët. _plac._ iv 4, 4.

[38] Arnim ii 838. Since many philosophers think the mind seated in the
head, Chrysippus collects many arguments to the contrary; for instance
that women say, when they don’t agree with a statement, ‘it won’t go
down,’ pointing all the while to the heart, Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._
iii 5, p. 323 K (Arnim ii 892). Further that καρδία is derived from
κράτησις, the heart being the seat of government _ib._ (Arnim ii 896).
He could support his view by thousands of quotations from the poets. On
the other hand we find the suggestion that the principate resides in our
spherical heads, as in a universe (Aët. _plac._ iv 21, 4). This latter
view may be due to Academic influence (Schmekel, p. 259).

[39] δυνάμεις μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁρμωμένης Galen _plac. Hipp. et
Plat._ p. 51 K.

[40] τὸ λογιστικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὃ καὶ ἰδίως ἡγεμονικὸν καλεῖται
Alex. Aphr. _de an._ p. 98, 24 (Arnim ii 839). In this direction
Epictetus defines the rational faculty as ‘that which contemplates both
itself and all other things’ _Disc._ i 1, 4.

[41] τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο [τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν] δεικνύντες Galen _plac.
Hipp. et Plat._ ii 2 p. 215 K.

[42] ‘intellegendum est etiam, duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse
personis, quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus
rationis; altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa’ Cic. _Off._ i
30, 107.

[43] Arnim ii 823.

[44] _To himself_ vii 64.

[45] _ib._ iv 12.

[46] _ib._ v 27.

[47] _ib._ iii 5, v 10, xii 1; so too Epictetus ‘God is within, and your
daemon is within’ _Disc._ i 14, 14.

[48] See above, §§ 146-156.

[49] ἔργα δὲ ψυχῆς ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, παρασκευάζεσθαι,
ἐπιβάλλεσθαι, συγκατατίθεσθαι. τί ποτ’ οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις
ῥυπαρὰν παρέχον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὰ μοχθηρὰ κρίματα
αὐτῆς Epict. _Disc._ iv 11, 6 and 7.

[50] ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν ἢ μή
Stob. ii 7 5b 4; ‘quaerimus quomodo animus semper secundo cursu eat’ Sen.
_Dial._ ix 2, 4; ‘quidam se domi contrahunt, dilatant foris ac extendunt;
vitium est haec diversitas et signum vacillantis animi ac nondum habentis
tenorem suum’ _Ep._ 20, 3.

[51] See above, § 96.

[52] ‘satis natura homini dedit roboris, si illo utamur; nolle in causa
est, non posse praetenditur’ Sen. _Ep._ 116, 8.

[53] ‘animi motus eos putemus sanissimos validissimosque, qui nostro
arbitrio ibunt, non suo ferentur’ _Dial._ iv 35, 2.

[54] ‘hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci εὐθυμίαν vocant, ego
tranquillitatem voco’ _ib._ ix 2, 3.

[55] _Ep._ 114, 24 (see above, § 263, note 1).

[56] ‘non est [mens] ex terreno et gravi concreta corpore, ex illo
caelesti spiritu descendit’ _Dial._ xii 7, 7; ‘ratio nihil aliud est quam
in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa’ _Ep._ 66, 12.

[57] ‘animus, sed hic rectus bonus magnus ... quid aliud voces hunc quam
deum in corpore humano hospitantem?’ _ib._ 31, 11.

[58] ‘sacer inter nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum
observator [et] custos’ _ib._ 41, 2.

[59] ‘deum te igitur scito esse: si quidem deus est qui viget, qui
sentit, qui meminit’ Cic. _Rep._ vi (_Somn. Scip._) 24, 26.

[60] Physics, and in particular astronomy, is meant: ‘[animus] hoc habet
argumentum divinitatis suae, quod illum divina delectant; nec ut alienis
sed ut suis interest’ Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 12; cf. Horace _Ep._ i 12,
14-19.

[61] ‘When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising
yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are
nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying
about a god with you, and you know it not.’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 12.

[62] ‘dicere porro, oculos nullam rem cernere posse, | sed per eos animum
ut foribus spectare reclusis, | difficile est’ Lucr. _N. D._ iii 360-362;
cf. Arnim ii 862. See also Cic. _N. D._ iii 4, 9, and Mayor’s valuable
note. Modern psychologists side with the Stoics.

[63] See above, § 146, note 18.

[64] τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἐν τῷ
ἡγεμονικῷ Aët. _plac._ iv 23, 1.

[65] See above, § 146, note 18.

[66] αἰσθητικῇ γὰρ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσίς ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις Porph. _de
anima_ (Arnim ii 74); ‘dicunt Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus esse’ Cic.
_Ac._ ii 33, 108.

[67] αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται ... καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ’ ἥν
τινες πηροὶ γίνονται Diog. L. vii 52.

[68] ‘Stoici causas esse videndi dicunt radiorum ex oculis in ea, quae
videri queunt, emissionem aerisque simul intentionem’ Gell. _N. A._ v
16, 2; ‘Stoici videndi causam in nativi spiritus intentione constituunt,
cuius effigiem coni similem volunt’ Chalc. _Tim._ 237 (Arnim ii 863).

[69] Arnim ii 869.

[70] Ποσειδώνιος γοῦν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ὄψιν) σύμφυσιν ὀνομάζει Aët. _plac._
iv 13, 3.

[71] Diog. L. vii 158.

[72] Arnim ii 836.

[73] ‘Cleanthes [ambulationem] ait spiritum esse a principali usque in
pedes permissum’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 23.

[74] ‘vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt, eamque esse dicunt ictum aera’
Gellius _N. A._ v 15, 6.

[75] ‘quid enim est vox nisi intentio aeris, ut audiatur, linguae formata
percussu?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6, 3.

[76] ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖθεν ἐκπέμπεται, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ φωνή. ἡ δὲ φωνὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν
κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν τόπων ἐκπέμπεται, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς ἐκ κάτωθεν μᾶλλον Galen.
_plac. Hipp. et Plat._ ii 5 p. 205 Müller.

[77] See above, § 161.

[78] See above, § 178.

[79] Lucr. _R. N._ iv 1214-1220.

[80] E. Haeckel, _Welträthsel_ (Volksausg.) p. 30. The italics are those
of the author of this book.

[81] _ib._ _Anmerkungen_, p. 158.

[82] Though Lucretius laughs at the idea of attributing laughter and
tears to the elements (‘hac ratione tibi pereunt primordia rerum: | fiet,
uti risu tremulo concussa cachinnent, | et lacrumis salsis umectent ora
genasque’ _R. N._ i 917-919), yet he attributes to them the essential
power of free-will: ‘si ... nec declinando faciunt primordia motus |
principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, | unde est haec, inquam,
fatis avolsa voluntas?’ _R. N._ ii 253-257.

[83] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ὅλου καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς φέρεσθαι τὰ σπέρματα
Aët. _plac._ v. 11, 3; ‘When you consort with your wife ... you are
carrying about a god with you’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 12.

[84] μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ... τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς λόγους Diog. L.
vii 157.

[85] τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς] τὸ μὲν λέγεται σπέρμα, ὅπερ καὶ
αὐτὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῶν παραστατῶν Aët.
_plac._ iv 21, 4; cf. Diog. L. vii 159.

[86] τὸ δὲ σπέρμα φησὶν ὁ Ζήνων εἶναι ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ _ἀπόσπασμα_ καὶ
τοῦ σπέρματος τοῦ τῶν προγόνων κέρασμα καὶ μῖγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν
συνεληλυθός Euseb. _pr. ev._ xv 20, 1 (Arnim i 128). That the separation
or ‘tearing away’ (ἀπόσπασμα) is not complete or absolute seems to follow
from the general principles of Stoic physics: see above § 262.

[87] ‘in semine omnis futuri hominis ratio comprehensa est’ Sen. _N. Q._
iii 29, 3.

[88] ‘utrum ex patris tantummodo semine partus nascatur, ut ... Stoici
scripserunt’ Censor. _di. nat._ 5; cf. Diog. L. vii 159, Aët. _plac._ v
5, 2.

[89] The evidence for this is mainly indirect. [ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης] οὐ
μόνον, φησίν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν
ψυχήν Nemes. _nat. hom._ ii 85 and 86 (Arnim i 518); ‘quod declaret
eorum similitudo, qui procreentur; quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in
corporibus appareat’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79.

[90] προΐεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα σπέρμα· κἂν μὲν ἐπικρατήσῃ τὸ τῆς
γυναικός, ὅμοιον εἶναι τὸ γεννώμενον τῇ μητρί, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρός, τῷ
πατρί Aët. _plac._ v 11, 4.

[91] See above, § 63.

[92] ‘inrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam
ambitiosam impotentem positam in adfectionibus, alteram humilem languidam
voluptatibus deditam’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 8.

[93] ‘appetitio (eam enim esse volumus ὁρμήν), qua ad agendum impellimur,
et id appetimus quod est visum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 8, 24.

[94] This is termed by Panaetius ὄρεξις simply; the term ἐπιβολή is also
used: see § 272, note 49.

[95] See above, § 146.

[96] Zeller (_Stoics_, p. 243) states that man has irrational as well as
rational impulses. This seems to be incorrectly expressed.

[97] φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθήκοντος Stob. ii 7, 9.

[98] ‘omne rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei
inritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc
impetum. quid sit adsensio dicam. oportet me ambulare: tunc demum ambulo,
cum hoc mihi dixi et adprobavi hanc opinionem meam’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 18.

[99] δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος Diog.
L. vii III; ‘omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione’
Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 7, 14; ἀσθενῆ δὲ λέγουσι συγκατάθεσιν, ὅταν μηδέπω
πεπεικότες ὦμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς Galen _de peccatis_ ii 1 p. 59 K (Arnim iii
172); ἔστι δ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ... ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα Diog. L. vii
110.

[100] ‘in corpore nostro ossa nervique et articuli, firmamenta totius et
vitalia, minime speciosa visu, prius ordinantur; deinde haec, ex quibus
omnis in faciem adspectumque decor est. post haec omnia qui maxime oculos
rapit, color, ultimus perfecto iam corpore adfunditur’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 1,
2.

[101] See above, § 268.

[102] ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ iii 1
p. 251 M, quoting Chrysippus (Arnim ii 885).

[103] Schmekel traces the introduction of this doctrine to Posidonius,
and finds in it the starting-point of the later mysticism, _Philos. d.
mittl. Stoa_, pp. 400 sqq. See also L. Stein, _Psych._ i 194.

[104] ‘nos corpus tam putre sortiti’ Sen. _Ep._ 120, 17; ‘inutilis caro
et fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis, ut ait Posidonius’ _ib._ 92,
10.

[105] ‘haec quae vides ossa circumiecta nobis, nervos et obductam cutem,
voltumque et ministras manus, et cetera quibus involuti sumus, vincula
animorum tenebraeque sunt. obruitur his animus, effocatur, inficitur,
arcetur a veris et suis in falsa coniectus. omne illi cum hac carne
grave certamen est’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 24, 5; ‘corpusculum hoc, custodia et
vinculum animi’ _ib._ xii 11, 7.

[106] ‘What am I? a poor miserable man with my wretched bit of flesh.
Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us become like wolves’
Epict. _Disc._ i 3, 5 and 7.

[107] ‘corpus hoc animi pondus et poena est’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 16; ‘quantum
per moras membrorum et hanc circumfusam gravem sarcinam licet’ _Dial._
xii 11, 6; ‘corporis velut oneris necessarii non amator sed procurator
est’ _Ep._ 92, 33.

[108] ‘Epicurus placed the good in the husk’ Epict. _Disc._ i 23, 1.

[109] ‘You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded. When
the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass,
pack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder’ _ib._ iv 1, 79 and 80.

[110] In particular to the practice of self-mutilation, with which Seneca
is disgusted: ‘cottidie comminiscimur, per quae virilitati fiat iniuria
... alius genitalia excidit’ Sen. _N. Q._ vii 31, 3.

[111] ‘nec domum esse hoc corpus, sed hospitium et quidem breve
hospitium’ Sen. _Ep._ 120, 14; ‘hoc [corpus] natura ut quandam vestem
animo circumdedit’ _ib._ 92, 13.

[112] ‘inter me teque conveniet corpus in honorem animi coli’ _ib._ 92,
1. In the same spirit Seneca writes in condemnation of the gladiatorial
conflicts ‘homo sacra res homini’ _ib._ 95, 33.

[113] ‘[natura] voltus nostros erexit ad caelum’ _ib._ 94, 56; ‘[natura]
... ut ab ortu sidera in occasum labentia prosequi posset, sublime fecit
[homini] caput et collo flexili imposuit’ _Dial._ viii 5, 4. See also
Mayor on Juv. _Sat._ xv 147.

[114] Cic. _N. D._ ii 54 to 58.

[115] ‘quae partes corporis, ad naturae necessitatem datae, adspectum
essent deformem habiturae atque turpem, eas [natura] contexit atque
abdidit’ _Off._ i 35, 127.

[116] In the Epicurean system atoms of soul are dispersed amongst atoms
of body, there being a mixture of the two, which however does not go
beyond juxtaposition; in the Stoic system soul permeates body. The Stoic
explanation is frequently referred to by opponents as a _reductio ad
absurdum_: τῷ λέγοντι τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα ἕπεται τὸ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν
Alex. Aphr. _Arist. Top._ ii 93 (Arnim ii 798). The relation of the
principate to the man as a whole is also called σύστασις (_constitutio_);
‘constitutio est principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus’ Sen.
_Ep._ 121, 10.

[117] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ μέρος αὐτὸ [τὸ ἔμβρυον] τῆς γαστρός, οὐ ζῷον Aët.
_plac._ v 14, 2; τὸ βρέφος ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ φύσει τρέφεσθαι [Χρύσιππος]
νομίζει καθάπερ φυτόν Plut. _Sto. rep._ 41, 1.

[118] Stein, _Psych._ i p. 115.

[119] ὅταν δὲ τεχθῇ, ψυχούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλειν καὶ
γίνεσθαι ζῷον Plut. as above.

[120] ‘infans nondum rationalis [est]’ Sen. _Ep._ 121, 14; ‘tu me
expertem rationis genuisti, onus alienum’ _Ben._ iii 31, 2.

[121] See above, § 153, note 66.

[122] διασῴζεσθαι λέγουσιν αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν ψυχὴν] ἔκ τε τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως
τοῦ αἵματος καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰσπνοὴν ἑλκομένου [ἀέρος] Galen _comm.
Hipp._ 6 (Arnim ii 782); τρέφεσθαι ἐξ αἵματος τὴν ψυχήν, οὐσίαν δ’ αὐτῆς
ὑπάρχειν τὸ πνεῦμα _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ ii 8 (Arnim i 140); ‘poor soul
itself mere exhalation of the blood’ M. Aurel. _To himself_ v 33.

[123] Ζήνων τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος·
... ‘καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται.’ ἀναθυμίασιν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως
τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων Ar. Did. fr. 39, 2 and 3 (Diels); the
reference to Heraclitus is not necessarily an exact quotation by Zeno,
see Bywater’s critical note on fr. 42; on the other side Diels’ note on
fr. 12. L. Stein is of opinion that the Stoics missed the meaning of
Heraclitus whilst accepting his terminology; see _Psych._ i, note 182.

[124] See above, § 200.

[125] See § 316, note 100.

[126] καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] ἔφασαν μηδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἢ
ὠφελεῖσθαι ἢ βλάπτεσθαι Theod. _Gr. aff. cur._ 11; see generally the
discussion by Stein, _Psych._ i pp. 139, 140.

[127] Plut. fr. (_de an._) 6, 3.

[128] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸν μὲν ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἀνέσει τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος
Aët. _plac._ v 23, 4, cf. Plut. _Qu. conv._ IV ii 4, 6; ‘contrahi autem
animum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere, et id ipsum esse
dormire’ Cic. _Div._ ii 58, 119. See also above, § 177.

[129] ‘senes difficiles et queruli sunt, ut aegri et convalescentes, et
quorum aut lassitudine aut detractione sanguinis exhaustus est calor’
Sen. _Dial._ iv 19, 4.

[130] ὅταν δὲ παντελὴς γένηται ἡ ἄνεσις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος, τότε
γίγνεσθαι θάνατον Aët. _plac._ v 23, 4.

[131] ‘cum animarum aeternitatem disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos
habet consensus hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium’ Sen. _Ep._
117, 6.

[132] ‘iuvabat de aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo mehercules credere.
credebam enim me facile opinionibus magnorum virorum rem gratissimam
promittentium magis quam probantium’ Sen. _Ep._ 102, 2; cf. Cic. _Tusc.
disp._ i 11, 24.

[133] So especially L. Stein: ‘um nun ihre Philosophie populär und
mundgerecht zu machen, liessen sich die Stoiker zuweilen zu Äusserungen
herbei, die dazu angethan waren, ihr ganzes philosophisches System
umzustossen’ _Psych._ i 149. Further their Scottish critic: ‘thus did
the later Stoicism try to meet the claims of the human heart, which the
earlier Stoicism had to a large extent ignored’ W. L. Davidson, _The
Stoic creed_, p. 98; again ‘die Lehre von der Fortdauer der Seele ... war
nur für die grosse Menge berechnet’ H. A. Winckler, _Stoicismus_, p. 50.
Zeller is much more judicial, _Stoics_, pp. 217-222.

[134] ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ὅλου [ψυχὴν] ἀΐδιον, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς
συμμίγνυσθαι ἐπὶ τελεύτῃ εἰς ἐκείνην Ar. Did. fr. 39, 5.

[135] τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γενητήν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν· οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ
σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ’ ἑαυτήν
ib. 6; ‘Stoici ... diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant’ Cic. _Tusc.
disp._ i 31, 77.

[136] τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων [ψυχὴν διαμένειν] μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως
τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσούς τινας χρόνους· ... τὰς δὲ τῶν
ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῷων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασι Ar. Did. fr. 39,
6 and 7.

[137] Arnim ii 815.

[138] [αἱ ψυχαὶ] λεπτομερεῖς οὖσαι καὶ οὐχ ἧττον πυρώδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις
εἰς τοὺς ἄνω μᾶλλον τόπους κουφοφοροῦσι ... τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην οἰκοῦσι
τόπον Sext. _math._ ix 71 to 73 (Arnim ii 812); Ar. Did. fr. 39, 4; ‘si
[animae] permanent et conservant habitum suum, ... necesse est ferantur
ad caelum et ab his perrumpatur et dividatur crassus hic et concretus
aer; calidior enim est vel potius ardentior animus, quam est hic aer’
Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42; ‘itaque sublimantur animae sapientes ...
apud Stoicos sub lunam’ Tert. _de an._ 54 (Arnim ii 814).

[139] τροφῇ τε χρῶνται οἰκείᾳ τῇ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσει ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
ἄστρα Sext. _math._ ix 73; ‘fortium animas existimant in modum siderum
vagari in aere’ Comm. _in Lucan._ ix 6 (Arnim ii 817).

[140] εἰ οὖν διαμένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, δαίμοσιν αἱ αὐταὶ γίγνονται Sext.
as in note 138; φασὶ δὲ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας καὶ ἤρωας, τὰς
ὑπολελειμμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχάς Diog. L. vii 151; ‘plenus [est] aer
immortalium animorum’ Cic. _Div._ i 30, 64, quoting from Posidonius.

[141] ‘[Stoici] existimant animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere
non posse et statim spargi’ Sen. _Ep._ 57, 7; Seneca himself rejects this
opinion.

[142] Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πάσας [τὰς ψυχὰς] ἐπιδιαμένειν μέχρι τῆς
ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνον Diog. L. vii 157.

[143] ‘esse inferos Zenon docuit et sedes piorum ab impiis esse
discretas; et illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones,
hos vero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis atque in caeni voraginibus
horrendis’ Lactant. _Div. inst._ vii 7, 13 (Arnim i 147); ‘reliquas
animas ad inferos deiciunt’ Tert. _de an._ 54. Cf. Cic. fr. 240, 6.

[144] Pearson, _Fragments_, p. 146.

[145] So Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_ ii p. 29 note.

[146] ‘et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, | funditus
humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo, | omnia suffuscans mortis nigrore, neque
ullam | esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit’ _R. N._ iii 37-40.

[147] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 16, 36.

[148] _N. D._ ii 2, 5.

[149] ‘cogita illa, quae nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, fabulam esse;
nullas imminere mortuis tenebras nec carcerem nec flumina igne flagrantia
nec oblivionis amnem nec tribunalia ... [nec] ullos iterum tyrannos.
luserunt ista poetae et vanis nos agitavere terroribus’ Sen. _Dial._ vi
19, 4. Here we have the opposite extreme to the statement in note 131.

[150] Virgil _Aen._ vi 724-747 (transl. by Lord Bowen). For the
corresponding description of Paradise, see _ib._ 638-644. The
substance of this discussion is drawn from Hirzel’s full note in his
_Untersuchungen_ ii pp. 25-31.

[151] For instance _Georg._ iv 221 sqq. See also below, §§ 434, 435.

[152] ‘impias vero [animas Stoici dicunt] ... habere aliquid
imbecillitatis ex contagione carnis, cuius desideriis ac libidinibus
addictae ineluibilem quendam fucum trahant labemque terrenam, quae cum
temporis diuturnitate penitus inhaeserit, eius naturae reddi animas, ut
... cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, quae peccatis inusta sensum
doloris attribuit. quam sententiam poeta sic explicavit—“quin et supremo
etc.”’ Lact. _Div. inst._ vii 20, 9 and 10 (Arnim ii 813); ‘[Stoicos]
miror, quod † imprudentes animas circa terram prosternant, cum illas
a sapientibus multo superioribus erudiri adfirment’ Tert. _de an._ 54
(Arnim i 147, reading ‘prudentes’ on his own conjecture). On the other
hand Augustine (_Civ. De._ xxi 13) ascribes the doctrine to ‘Platonici
quidam’ and Comm. Luc. ix 9 (p. 291 Us.) to Pythagoras. See Schmekel, p.
105.

[153] ‘facillimum ad superos iter est animis cito ab humana conversatione
dimissis. facilius quicquid est illud obsoleti inlitique eluunt’ Sen.
_Dial._ vi 23, 1; ‘[filius tuus] paulum supra nos commoratus, dum
expurgatur et inhaerentia vitia situmque omnem mortalis aevi excutit’
_ib._ 25, 1.

[154] Diog. L. vii 157.

[155] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79.

[156] See above, §§ 254, 293; for the teaching of Posidonius as to the
pre-existence of the soul, see Schmekel, p. 250.

[157] See above, § 296.

[158] ‘animus beneficio subtilitatis suae erumpit’ Sen. _Ep._ 57, 8.

[159] ‘ibi illum aeterna requies manet e confusis crassisque pura et
liquida visentem’ _Dial._ vi 24, 5.

[160] ‘emissis [animis] meliora restant onere detracto’ _Ep._ 24, 18.
So in the Burial Service ‘the souls of the faithful, after they are
delivered from the burden of the flesh, are in joy and felicity.’

[161] ‘non illos interfusa maria discludunt nec altitudo montium;
tramites omnium plani’ _Dial._ vi 25, 3.

[162] ‘ad excelsa sublatus inter felices currit animas, Scipiones
Catonesque, interque contemptores vitae et mortis beneficio liberos’
_ib._ 1.

[163] ‘rerum naturae spectaculo fruitur et humana omnia ex superiore loco
despicit, divina vero propius intuetur’ _ib._ xi 9, 3.

[164] ‘nos quoque, felices animae atque aeterna sortitae, parva ruinae
ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur’ _ib._ vi 26, 7.

[165] ‘[animus], si superstes est corpori, nullo genere [perire potest],
quoniam nulla immortalitas cum exceptione est’ _Ep._ 57, 9.

[166] See Winckler, _Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums_, p. 52.

[167] ‘haec sunt ignorantis, cum de aeternitate animorum dicatur, de
mente dici, non de partibus iis, in quibus aegritudines irae libidinesque
versentur’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 33, 80.

[168] ‘excepit illum magna et aeterna pax’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 19, 6.

[169] ‘mors dolorum omnium exsolutio est et finis’ _ib._ 19, 5.

[170] ‘mors est non esse. id quale sit, iam scio. hoc erit post me, quod
ante me fuit’ _Ep._ 54, 4.

[171] ‘mors nos aut consumit aut exuit; ... consumptis nihil restat’ _ib._
24, 18.

[172] See above, §§ 140 and 141.

[173] M. Aurel. _To himself_ iv 21.

[174] See below, § 306. Cleanthes wrote a book to show that ‘virtue is
the same in men and women’; see Diog. L. vii 103.

[175] ‘quis dixit naturam maligne cum muliebribus ingeniis egisse, et
virtutem illarum in artum retraxisse? par illis, mihi crede, vigor,
par ad honesta, libeat, facultas est; dolorem laboremque ex aequo, si
consuevere, patiuntur’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 16, 1.

[176] See below, §§ 431, 439, 444, 446.

[177] ‘muliebre est furere in ira’ Sen. _Clem._ i 5, 5; ‘[mulier]
aeque imprudens [atque] animal est, et nisi scientia accessit et multa
eruditio, ferum, cupiditatum incontinens’ _Dial._ ii 14, 1.

[178] ‘utraque turba [_i.e._ sexus] ad vitae societatem tantundem
[confert], sed altera pars ad obsequendum, altera imperio nata [est]’
_ib._ 1, 1.

[179] See below, § 303.

[180] See below, § 309.

[181] ‘fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos, qui mitiore caelo
utuntur. in frigora septentrionemque vergentibus immansueta ingenia sunt’
Sen. _Dial._ iv 15, 5. So too Lucan: ‘omnis in Arctois populus quicunque
pruinis | nascitur, indomitus bellis et mortis amator’ _Phars._ viii
363-6.

[182] ‘agedum illis corporibus illis animis luxum opes ignorantibus da
rationem, da disciplinam: ut nihil amplius dicam, necesse erit certe
nobis mores Romanos repetere’ Sen. _Dial._ iii II, 4.



CHAPTER XII.

THE LAW FOR HUMANITY.


[Sidenote: The Right Law.]

=302.= The department of Ethics contains two divisions: ethics (in the
stricter sense) which is concerned with the action of the individual;
and politics, which has to do with the order of the State. It has been
maintained that in Stoicism the latter is altogether subordinated, and
that the central aim of this philosophy is to erect a shelter for the
individual[1]. The truth of this view is more than doubtful. Stoic ethics
are not based on the needs of the individual, but on the demands of the
supreme Law. ‘If there is a universe, then there is a universal law,
bidding us do this and refrain from that.’ ‘If there are gods, there
is virtue[2].’ We have already noticed that Zeno’s earliest work was
‘on the State[3],’ and that it is an attempt to show how a state can
be ordered by wise laws. The whole theory of the Logos leads up to the
same point. The same eternal Wisdom through which the primal stuff took
shape is, in another function, the Right Rule (ὀρθὸς λόγος, _vera ratio_)
which commands and forbids[4]. Right Rule and Common Law (κοινὸς νόμος,
_lex communis_) are terms of identical meaning, by which a standard of
supreme authority is set up[5]; State law and conventional morality,
though always of narrower range, and often of inferior purity, are yet
a reflection of universal Law. The moral law must therefore first be
studied in its bearings on man as a political and social animal.


[Sidenote: The Cosmopolis.]

=303.= The root-principle of the Stoic State is that it is world-wide, a
cosmopolis. This title arose from the practice, attributed to Socrates
and Diogenes (as well as others), of replying to the current question ‘Of
what city are you?’ by the answer ‘Of the universe[6].’ We must therefore
regard ourselves as members not of a clan or city, but of a world-wide
society[7]. In this society all distinctions of race, caste and class
are to be subordinated to the sense of kinship and brotherhood[8]. This
principle is equally opposed to the nationalist prejudices which rank
Hellene above barbarian, to philosophical theories (such as that of
Aristotle) which distinguish intelligent peoples fitted by nature to
rule and others only fitted to obey[9], and to ideal states (such as
that of Plato) in which a ruling class is to be developed by artifice
and schooling. Only the brute animals are excluded from this community,
for they are not possessed of reason; they have therefore no rights,
but exist for the service of men[10]. All human beings are capable
of attaining to virtue, and as such are natural-born citizens of the
Cosmopolis[11]. Loyalty to this state, however, in no wise hinders a due
loyalty to existing states which may be regarded as partial realizations
of it. Socrates submitted to the laws of Athens even when they bade him
die; Zeno and Cleanthes declined the citizenship of that famous city,
lest they should be thought to hold cheap the places of their birth[12];
and amongst the Romans Seneca frequently insists that every man is born
into two communities, the Cosmopolis and his native city[13].


[Sidenote: The law of nature.]

=304.= The world-state is not held together either by force or by
state-craft, but by goodwill. We must be able say ‘Love is god there,
and is a helpmate to make the city secure[14].’ This feeling of love and
friendship grows up naturally between wise men, because they partake
in the reason of the universe; so that we may equally well say that
the bond of the state is the Logos (_ratio atque oratio_)[15]. Since
reason and the universal law exist in the community from the beginning,
law does not need to be created; it exists of itself, and by natural
growth (φύσει)[16]. The writing down of laws is only a stage in their
development[17].


[Sidenote: Zeno’s revolutionary views.]

=305.= The theory of the world-state, as first sketched by Zeno, found no
place for any of the cherished institutions of the Athens in which it was
preached. In the heavenly city must be neither temples nor images[18];
so far the aims of the Persian invader are to be carried out. The reason
given is far from flattering to the artistic pride of the Athenians, for
they are told that their magnificent buildings and statues of world-wide
renown are only the work of common builders and workmen[19]. Nor must
there be law-courts[20] or gymnasia. The practice of hearing both sides
in a law-court is unreasonable, because if the plaintiff has proved his
case it is useless to hear the defendant, and if he has not proved it,
it is superfluous[21]. The training of the youth in grammar, music, and
gymnastic is worthless[22], for the true education is in virtue. Coined
money, as in modern communistic Utopias, should not be required either
for commerce or for travel[23].


[Sidenote: Women to be in common.]

=306.= With regard to the position of women Zeno, agreeing to some extent
with Plato, asserted the startling doctrine that ‘women should be in
common, and men should mate with them as they pleased[24].’ That Zeno
was suggesting, even for an imaginary state, any sort of loose living,
need not for a moment be supposed; his continence was notable[25]; he
expressly approves of marriage[26]; and the members of his school were
honourably known by their aversion to adultery[27]. But Zeno could not
base his theory of the relation of the sexes merely upon established
practice. We may assume that he observed that in the world of animals and
of birds mating was free[28], whereas in human society it was encumbered
by national prejudices, class privilege, and personal jealousy; and
in particular that woman was regarded as a chattel, contrary to the
fundamental principle of his state[29]. By his doctrine of ‘free mating’
he aimed at the root of these evils. The gradual abolition at Rome of the
restrictions on ‘connubium’ illustrates the application of his principle,
just as the prohibition of ‘miscegenation’ in modern America illustrates
its denial. Zeno may well have perceived how deeply the potentiality
of marriage affects all social relations, and it is probable that the
progress of Stoicism did much to break down the racial barriers that
existed in Zeno’s time, but which had almost completely disappeared five
centuries later throughout the civilized world. Another application of
his doctrine is found in the life of Cato of Utica[30]. But its general
meaning is clear: marriage exists not by nature, but by institution
(θέσει); its law is human and mutable, but nevertheless within proper
limits is one that may not be transgressed. By the side of the text of
Zeno we still have the authorized comment of Epictetus[31].


[Sidenote: Incest no abomination.]

=307.= The Stoics did not shrink from insisting upon the abstract
principle of the community of women even in an extreme case in which
their doctrine encountered a violent prejudice. No natural law, they
maintained, prohibits marriage relationship between near relatives[32].
The tale of Oedipus and Jocasta, which is so prominent a theme in the
great Athenian tragedies, appears to Zeno to be a matter about which too
much ado has been made[33]. For suppose the case that all the world
were destroyed by flood except one man and his daughter; would it not be
better that he should beget children by her, and that the whole human
race should not perish[34]? In this reference to the traditional flood we
may readily trace one reason why the Stoics insisted on their principle.
For at the beginning of human history we are compelled to postulate
an Adam and an Eve, a human pair related in their birth and at the
same time united as parents of the race[35]. Go back to the beginnings
of the universe; there too we must postulate the same combination of
relationships, and so only can we understand the poets when they speak of
Hera as ‘wife and sister of Zeus[36].’


[Sidenote: Burial a convention.]

=308.= Perhaps even more shocking to Hellenic feeling was Zeno’s
indifference to the treatment of the dead, Burial was to him no sacred
duty to the departed one; it was equally right to throw the body to
the fire, as the Indians, or to the vultures, as the Persians[37]. Nor
is there any need to condemn those nations amongst which the dead are
eaten by their own relatives[38], for all these things are matters not
of principle but of convenience, and to eat human flesh may still be
desirable if circumstances require it[39], as for instance in shipwreck,
or if a limb is amputated[40]. The problem of the disposal of the dead
became a favourite subject of discussion in Stoic circles. Chrysippus
wrote at length on the subject, comparing the customs of various nations
as well as the habits of animals, in order to ascertain the law of
nature. He reaches the conclusion that dead bodies should be disposed of
in the simplest possible way, not being regarded as of more importance
than the hair or nail-parings from which we part in life[41]. Cicero
shortly sums up this discussion in the _Tusculan disputations_, and draws
the conclusion that whilst the living must consider what it is fitting
for them to do, to the dead man it is a matter totally indifferent[42].
In the imperial period this consideration is of importance as showing
that the tyrant has no power after death[43].


[Sidenote: Slavery.]

=309.= The Stoic view of slavery can readily be inferred. Without
proposing the immediate abolition of this social institution, the Stoics
treated it as essentially contrary to nature[44]. The earliest teachers
seem to have passed over the subject in silence; Panaetius (as might be
expected from his social position), justified slavery by the arguments
of Plato and Aristotle in exceptional cases: ‘all those who through the
infirmity of their nature are unfit to govern themselves, are rightly
made slaves’[45]. According to this theory we may speak of a ‘natural
slave’ (φύσει δοῦλος), who as such can no more have rights in the
community than the lower animals. The true Stoic theory appears however
to be formulated by a definition of Chrysippus, who says that a slave
is a ‘labourer hired for life[46].’ This definition makes of slavery a
contract, to which there are two parties; and Seneca rightly uses this
definition to argue that the relations of master to slave are those of
man to man, and that as the master may wrong his slave, so the slave may
do a service to his master[47]. All this is really implied in the dogma
that ‘women and slaves may become philosophers,’ as is realized by the
Church Father Lactantius[48].


[Sidenote: Constitutions.]

=310.= The Stoic principles of politics may be realized under any form
of government, and the theory of Constitutions, like that of grammar,
belongs to a neutral ground on which philosophers of different schools
may work in harmony. The Peripatetics appear first to have taken up this
study; of the Stoics Diogenes of Babylon[49], who himself acted as a
political representative of Athens, is stated to have shown interest in
this subject; and after him Panaetius developed a complete theory, of
which the substance is preserved for us in Cicero’s _de Re publica_[50].
According to this theory, which Cicero puts in the mouth of Scipio
Africanus, surrounded by Roman Stoics of distinction such as Laelius,
Tubero, and Furius Philo, the best constitution is one in which the
elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are combined, though
a bias remains in favour of monarchy[51]. This mixed constitution,
according to the teaching of Panaetius and his pupil Polybius, is best
illustrated in the Roman state[52]; whereas tyranny, the perversion
of monarchy, is the worst of all governments. By such reasoning the
Roman nobles of the first century B.C. and the first century A.D. alike
persuaded themselves easily that Stoic teaching supported the position
of the republican party. But in fact they were maintaining Peripatetic
theories of government, and the real Stoic theory was far more in accord
with that practice of the principate, according to which all citizens
are treated with respect, and the government of them is placed in the
hands of men selected for their personal merit. We shall discuss the
whole question of the relation of Stoicism to Roman politics in a later
chapter[53]; but we may notice here that those Stoics practically
abandoned the theory of providence who looked into the history of their
own times with the intention of seeing nowhere the ‘king,’ and everywhere
the ‘tyrant.’ On the other hand the practical statesmen who set about
to re-create Roman law on the principle of substituting everywhere human
rights for class privileges were men thoroughly imbued with the Stoic
spirit, whether or not they were avowed disciples of this philosophy.


[Sidenote: The citizen.]

=311.= We must therefore maintain that the true Stoic state, whether it
be called monarchy or democracy, calls for a revolt against nationalism,
antiquity, custom, pride, and prejudice; and a new construction based
upon universal reason and individual liberty. For the realization of this
state it is first necessary to build up the individual, to fill his mind
with the conception of reason and love, to strengthen his will to a true
independence: for it is not buying or selling that makes the slave, but
the will within[54]. All are in truth slaves except the wise man; for
freedom is the power of directing one’s own actions[55]. Here then we
pass from the community to the individual, from politics to ethics in the
narrower sense.


[Sidenote: The supreme good.]

=312.= For the individual man the ethical problem is to bring himself, a
part of nature, into harmony with the whole. Whether we think of destiny,
of providence, of the gods, or of the state, success for the individual
is to agree and to cooperate; to struggle and to rebel is to fail.
This success is the end (τέλος) for which man exists, the supreme good
(_summum bonum_), the ultimate good (_ultimum bonorum_), that towards
which all other right action works, whilst it works itself for no other
end[56]. Its name in the individual is virtue (ἀρετή, _virtus_), and
it is an active and firmly-established disposition of the soul[57]. It
follows from the monistic principle that the end for man is one, and that
virtue is one; but nevertheless each is capable of being regarded in many
aspects. The harmony of the ethical end with other parts of the Stoic
philosophy is marked by such phrases as ‘life according to nature[58],’
the rule ‘keep company with God[59],’ and the identification of virtue
and reason[60].


[Sidenote: Consistency with nature.]

=313.= Because virtue is one thing and not many, it makes a man’s life
one consistent whole, and stands in sharp contrast to the changing and
undecided ways of the crowd. Virtue is therefore frequently defined
as consistency in life[61], an even steady course of action[62],
self-consistency[63], a principle in agreement with its applications[64].
The opposite of virtue is the unending restlessness and indecision of
the man in the crowd[65]. Accordingly we are told that the earliest
Stoics thought it a sufficient definition of wisdom or virtue that it
was something simple[66]; and similarly Zeno said that the end of life
was ‘to live consistently[67].’ To this short definition the words ‘with
nature’ were soon added[68], whereby the distinctiveness of the original
definition was diminished: for all the philosophical schools are agreed
that the right life must be guided by nature (φύσει), not by convention
(θέσει). From the time of Chrysippus the relation of right living to
nature was further analyzed. Chrysippus defined the ‘nature’ referred
to as ‘universal and human nature[69],’ thereby further approximating
to the teaching of rival schools; but on the other hand he gave this
new and more characteristic explanation ‘to live virtuously is to live
according to scientific knowledge of the phenomena of nature, doing
nothing which the Universal Law forbids, which is the Right Reason which
pervades all things, and is the same as Zeus, the Lord of the ordering
of this world[70].’ Diogenes of Babylon introduced the words ‘to take
a reasonable course in choosing or refusing things in accordance with
nature[71].’ Antipater’s definition is ‘to live with preference for what
is natural, and aversion to what is against nature[72],’ thus throwing
the stress on the doctrine of the ‘things of high degree[73].’ Panaetius
made a distinct step forward when he admitted the claims of universal
nature to be supreme, but (subject to them) held that each man should
follow the pointings of his individual nature[74]; this teaching however
comes rather near to naming a twofold end. Cicero follows Panaetius in
his _de Officiis_[75], but in the _de Finibus_ adheres more closely to
Chrysippus[76], and Seneca agrees with him in laying stress on the need
of scientific knowledge of natural events[77]. In the main therefore
‘life according to nature’ means to the Stoics life in accordance with
the general movement of the universe, to which the particular strivings
of the individual must be subordinated.


[Sidenote: Obedience to God.]

=314.= From the religious standpoint virtue is willing cooperation with
the deity, in preference to that unwilling cooperation to which even
evil-doers are forced. This conception, first set forth by Cleanthes in a
poem that we have quoted above[78], is enforced by Seneca and Epictetus
also in varying phrases. ‘I do not obey God,’ says Seneca, ‘I agree with
him. I go with him heart and soul, and not because I must[79].’ With a
slight change of language this leads us to the paradox that ‘obedience
to God is liberty[80].’ ‘I have placed my impulses,’ says Epictetus,
‘in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is
my will too. Is it his will that I should obtain anything? It is my
wish also. Does he not wish it? I do not wish it[81].’ The personal
bent of Epictetus leads him to develope this idea in the direction of
suffering rather than of acting. ‘If the good man had foreknowledge of
what would happen, he would cooperate towards his own sickness and death
and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him
in accordance with the universal arrangement[82].’ The proof that this
must be so rests on the unity of the Divine and individual purposes:
‘Good cannot be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted
another thing[83].’


[Sidenote: Social duty.]

=315.= It is not perhaps quite so clearly stated that the virtue of the
individual is that disposition which will make him the best possible
member of society, that is, the best possible citizen of the Cosmopolis.
Yet this is everywhere implied. In the first place the wise man will
take part in the life of the community[84], he will marry and bring up
children[85]. In the second place the virtue of man differs first from
the corresponding quality in the animals in that man is formed by nature
for social union; hence his reason only comes into play simultaneously
with the recognition that he is a member of a community, and as such
bound to prefer the good of the whole to that of a part. ‘Nature,’ says
Panaetius, ‘through reason unites man to man, so that they have a common
bond in conversation and life; it induces men to approve and take part
in public gatherings and festivals, and to collect the materials for a
social and cultivated life for themselves, their children, and all whom
they hold dear[86].’


[Sidenote: Health of soul.]

=316.= Virtue, as a disposition of the soul[87], reflects all the aspects
in which the soul itself is regarded. Since the principate is both wisdom
and will, so virtue is wisdom, according to the paradox of Socrates
and the Cynics[88]. Because virtue is wisdom, it can be taught[89]; in
fact, it can only be acquired by teaching; and equally evil-doing can be
cured by teaching[90]. But no less virtue is will. Cleanthes emphasized
this aspect, and identified virtue both with the Socratic ‘strength
of character’ and with the Stoic ‘tone[91].’ In so far as virtue is
will, it is to be acquired by constant practice[92]. A true judgment is
endangered by hasty assent; a healthy will by slackness of the soul’s
sinews. In the Stoic system vigour and strength of mind is everywhere
identified with the ‘true tone’ (εὐτονία)[93]; the possibility of
overstrain is not considered. But in the development of the ideal we have
two varying aspects of virtue presented to us. At one moment we see the
man of action, engaged in the thick of the battle, sun-browned, dusty,
horny-handed[94]; with this model before him we find Musonius objecting
altogether to relaxation of moral tone as being equivalent to its
loss[95]. At another moment we see the man of quiet conviction, who goes
his way unmoved in the face of the howls of the mob or the threats of
the tyrant[96]; he is distinguished by a mental calm[97] which no storms
can shake. Any discrepancy between these views is finally reconciled by
introducing a comparison between the soul and the body. The philosophers
had at all times been greatly influenced by the theories and practice
of the physicians; and they were proud to call themselves physicians of
the soul.’ Chrysippus spent much time in comparing diseases of the soul
to those of the body[98]. Equally there must be a healthy state of the
soul corresponding to that of the body, in which all its parts are in
harmony[99]. Hence in the Stoic prayer health of soul is asked for, side
by side with health of body[100]; and Seneca bases a singularly complete
statement of the Stoic conception of happiness upon a permanently healthy
condition of the mind[101].


[Sidenote: Virtue lies in intention.]

=317.= Virtue is a state of the mind, a disposition of the soul; it
is not an act. Hence the bent of the mind (_inclinatio_), its aim
(_intentio_), its desire (βούλησις, _voluntas_) is everything; the
performance through the organs of the body is nothing[102]. This Stoic
dogma is to-day so familiar in divinity, law, and society that it is
not easy to realize how paradoxical it seemed when first stated. By its
proclamation the Stoics defied the whole system of _tabu_ by which the
ancient world prohibited certain acts as in themselves dangerous and
detestable; a system still in force in many departments of life and
theoretically defended by the ‘intuitive system of morals.’ The defenders
of _tabu_ were bitterly affronted, and indignantly asked questions which
mostly concerned the sexual relations, with regard to which _tabu_
appears to have been at the time most vigorous. ‘Is there nothing wrong
in cannibalism? in foul language? in incest? in the accursed relations
with boy favourites (παιδικά)?’ To these questions firm-minded Stoics
were bound to give a negative answer, thereby laying themselves open
to the charge of being defenders of immorality. This charge however is
never to be taken seriously; the high practical morality of the Stoics
placed them beyond reproach. But it was also easy to raise a laugh by
quotations from these austere moralists which sounded like a defence
of licentiousness. The solution of the difficulty in each individual
case follows exactly the same lines as in politics; and there is the
same divergence of method between the early Stoics, who assert their
principles at all costs, and those of the transition period, who are
intent upon adapting them to the existing conditions of society. Here we
need only discuss the questions of principle, as we deal with questions
affecting practical life in another chapter[103].


[Sidenote: Tabus.]

=318.= The principal _tabus_ affecting the individual have to do with
cannibalism, the sexual relations, nudity, and obscenity. Of the first we
have already spoken; the other three appeared to the Stoics partly due
to inherited prejudices, partly to the theory that the body is in itself
vile and corrupt. Of neither point of view could the Stoics approve.
Hence their repeated assertions that no sexual act, whether commonly
described as natural or as unnatural, is _in itself_ to be condemned,
but only according as it is seemly or unseemly for the individual[104].
It was perhaps unnecessary to explain to Greeks that the naked body is
in itself no offensive sight, but doubtless the Stoics had to make this
clear to their Oriental pupils; Zeno at any rate laid down the principle
when he said that men and women should wear the same clothes (meaning
such as nature requires for warmth and not such as fashion prescribes),
and hide no part of the body[105]. As to decency of language, it did
not occur to the Stoics to discuss this question in connexion with the
history of literature. Since truth is always good, and the very purpose
of language is to express truth, a wise man will always say straight out
what he needs to say[106].


[Sidenote: Virtue in its applications.]

=319.= Up to this point we find a broad resemblance between the ethical
principles of the Stoics and the Cynics. Both assert the sole supremacy
of virtue, ridicule traditional prejudices, and bid defiance to external
circumstances. But there is at the same time divergence. To the Cynics
virtue stands out as alone, needing no theory, and by itself in the
universe. To the Stoics virtue is but one expression of that universal
reason which is equally at work in the universe and in the human mind.
The Stoics are therefore under the obligation of bringing virtue into
touch with circumstances, the soul into harmony with the body. From this
arises their doctrine that virtue is bound up with the study both of
universal and of individual nature, and that amongst things indifferent
there are some that the good man must seek, and others that he must
avoid. The critics of Stoicism, both ancient and modern, regard this
doctrine as an afterthought[107], suggested by practical difficulties,
and alien from the original teaching of Zeno. This seems to be a
misapprehension. Undoubtedly Zeno had said: ‘some things are good,
some are evil, some indifferent. Good are wisdom, temperance, justice,
fortitude, everything that is virtue or an aspect of virtue; evil are
folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, everything that is vice or an
aspect of vice. Indifferent are life and death, glory and disgrace, pain
and pleasure, riches and wealth, disease, health, and so forth[108].’ But
there is a difference between a principle and its application; and this
very list of things indifferent indicates by its contrasts an underlying
difference, though it is not the difference between good and evil. Zeno
was therefore quite consistent in proceeding to examine the nature of
this difference.


[Sidenote: Worth and Unworth.]

=320.= This secondary difference is termed by the Stoics a difference
of worth (ἀξία, _aestimatio_)[109]. Health, life, riches, have positive
worth in greater or less degree; disease, death, poverty, have negative
worth (ἀπαξία, _inaestimabile_)[110]. Between these lie things that are
absolutely indifferent, as, for example, whether the number of hairs on
one’s head is odd or even[111], or whether we take up one or the other of
two coins that have the same general appearance and the same stamp[112].
Even here a slight distinction has to be made; as to whether the hairs
on the head are odd or even in number we have not the slightest concern;
but in the matter of the coins we must make a choice, and that quickly.
Let us then settle the matter anyhow, by chance as common folk say; ‘for
a reason that is not clear to us,’ as the Stoics say, not willing to
admit an effect without a cause, and yet leaving the matter much where it
was[113]. And now as to the things that have ‘worth’; it is clear that
in some sense they are ‘according to nature,’ and in the same sense
those things that have ‘negative worth’ are opposed to nature[114]; and
the former in some way approximate to the character of the good[115]. It
is then necessary to describe them by some term other than ‘good.’ Zeno
selected the term προηγμένον ‘of high degree,’ which Cicero translates
variously by _producta_, _promota_, _praecipua_, _praelata_, and
_praeposita_. This term, we are told, Zeno borrowed from court life: ‘for
no one would think of calling a king “of high degree,” but only those
who are of a rank next to his, though far below[116].’ The opposites
were described as ἀποπροηγμένα (_remota_, _reiecta_) ‘things of low
degree[117].’ Seneca, who states the theory with great clearness[118],
commonly uses the handier terms _commoda_ (‘advantages’) and _incommoda_
(‘disadvantages’)[119]. In their treatment of the separate matters which
fall under these divisions the Stoics were in close agreement with the
Peripatetic theory of natural ends (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν)[120]: but their
loyalty to their own school came into question, if they actually termed
them ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ as Chrysippus thought permissible if sufficient
precautions were taken[121], and as Seneca often describes them in his
less careful moods[122].


[Sidenote: The aim of virtue.]

=321.= The advocates of Stoicism maintain that the theory of
‘advantages’ is essential to their system, because without it virtue
has no meaning, and practical life no guide[123]; whereas as soon as
this theory is established, we can assign to virtue the permanent
and distinctive character, that it aims at securing ‘advantages’ and
avoiding ‘disadvantages[124].’ Now we are able to enlarge, though we do
not alter, our definition of the supreme good; the ‘consistent life,’
the ‘life consistent with nature,’ is the ‘life which is accompanied by
a true knowledge of the things that happen by nature’; to which words
we now add ‘choosing those things which are in accordance with nature,
and avoiding those things which are against nature[125].’ Nevertheless,
virtue consists wholly in the aiming at the mark, and not at all in the
hitting it. As the true sportsman finds all his pleasure in throwing
his quoit according to the rules of the game, and in aiming his arrow
at the centre of the target, but cares not in the least (so it would
seem) whether he succeeds[126]; so the wise man, even though (by those
circumstances which he cannot control, and which in this connexion we
call ‘the play of fortune’) he gain no ‘advantage’ at all, but suffer
dishonour, captivity, mutilation, and death, still possesses the supreme
good, still is as completely happy as though he enjoyed all things. This
is the Stoic doctrine of the ‘sufficiency of virtue,’ expressed in the
language of paradox, but nevertheless the central point of their whole
ethical system; and its force is really intensified by the doctrine of
‘advantages,’ which to a superficial critic appears to relax it.


[Sidenote: Sufficiency of virtue.]

=322.= The doctrine of the sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια, _sufficientia_) of
virtue was consistently taught by the Stoics of all periods, though
in ever-varying phraseology. Zeno adopted the Cynic phrase ‘virtue is
sufficient for happiness,’ or in other words ‘virtue needs but herself
for a happy life[127].’ Chrysippus maintains that there are only three
logical views as to the supreme good, that it is virtue or pleasure or
both[128], and for himself he chooses the first. Happiness therefore is
not made greater if advantages are added to virtue; or rather, virtue
does not permit addition (_accessio_)[129]. In the transition period
Antipater of Tarsus is said to have faltered, and to have attributed a
little importance, though very little, to external advantages[130]; but,
as we have seen above[131], his definition of the supreme good is in full
accord with the general teaching of the school. Panaetius and Posidonius
held to the orthodox doctrine both in word and deed, if we may trust
the direct statements of Cicero[132]; nevertheless they were so anxious
to assimilate their expressions to those of ordinary life, that the
conclusion could easily be drawn that in their hearts they too attached
importance to external goods[133]. One authority indeed states that
they held health, strength, and estate to be ‘needful’ for happiness,
thus abandoning the sufficiency of virtue[134]; but in the absence of
direct quotation we shall hardly be willing to accept this statement as
implying anything different from the distinction of Chrysippus, viz. that
‘the wise man _needs_ nothing, but _has use_ for everything[135].’ But
any faltering shown by the transition writers was more than made good
by the zeal of the teachers under the principate. Seneca enforces the
paradox in a score of phrases; in the form of a proverb ‘virtue is its
own reward[136]’; in rhetorical exuberance ‘virtue can defy death, ill
fortune, and tyranny[137]’; it is ‘independent even of the deity[138]’;
and ‘no circumstances can increase or impair its perfection[139].’
Epictetus often dwells on the same theme[140], and the whole work of
Marcus Aurelius is a meditation upon it[141]. Nor is the dogma merely
scholastic; the teachers of the Roman period lay special emphasis on the
practical importance of upholding the ideal of virtue, as alike single
and complete in itself[142].


[Sidenote: Virtue and the virtues.]

=323.= But virtue, though single in its essence, is manifold in its
applications; though it can only be possessed as a whole, it is attained
by stages. By this amplification of the Stoic doctrine the way is
prepared for that adaptation of ethical doctrine to varieties of
circumstance which will be the special subject of our next chapter. By
the side of virtue stand ‘the virtues,’ sometimes conceived as virtue
herself endowed with various qualities[143], more often as virtue at
work in different spheres of action. In this way virtue assumes in turn
the shape of each one of the four virtues as commonly understood, namely
Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness[144]; we may, if we please,
reckon with a smaller or greater number[145]; yet we must always remember
that the virtues are so knit together, that he who truly possesses one,
possesses all[146]. Virtue again is displayed in single acts, each of
which (whatever its sphere) is a ‘right action’ (κατόρθωμα, _recte
factum_)[147]. In proportion as virtue is displayed in its various
qualities and spheres, and in successive right actions, it gains itself
a larger field; it cannot be said to increase, but it is in a way spread
out and broadened[148].


[Sidenote: How virtue is won.]

=324.= Virtue, as it is displayed in individual men, has also a history.
This follows clearly from Stoic principles, since virtue is an aspect of
reason, and children are not possessed of reason[149]. Virtue therefore
comes by training, not by birth[150]; by art, not by nature[151]. In
the period that precedes the attainment of virtue, there exist states
of the soul which are the semblances and the forerunners of virtue; and
he who is on his way towards wisdom, and whom we call ‘the probationer’
(προκόπτων, _proficiens_[152]), by learning and practice comes daily
nearer to his goal, till in the crowning moment he wins it as a whole;
for virtue is no sum of lesser dispositions reached by a gradual
addition of item to item, but a thing complete in itself[153]. Can
virtue thus won be lost at a later time? Virtue, it may seem, is not
really such, unless it is indestructible; and the Cynics and the earlier
Stoics taught accordingly that virtue cannot be lost[154], that it is a
‘possession for ever.’ In this point, as in so many others, Chrysippus
yielded to criticism, and admitted that virtue might be lost through
intoxication or indigestion[155], to which causes might well be added the
failure of the reason through insanity or old age[156]. But in spite of
these difficulties the general feeling of the Stoic school held firmly to
the doctrine that virtue once acquired is acquired for ever[157].


[Sidenote: Wise men.]

=325.= Virtue and vice are not mere theories of the philosopher; they
exist and can be studied in human shape, in the wise and foolish men of
myth, history, and society. The lesson of virtue in particular can best
be learnt by considering virtuous men[158]. Here the Stoics followed
closely the teaching of their predecessors the Cynics[159]. As the best
of models they accepted Hercules, the man rightly deemed a god[160],
who travelled over all the world, purging it of every lawlessness, and
bringing with him justice, holiness, and peace[161]. Next comes Ulysses,
who like Hercules was untiring in his labours, triumphant over pain,
and a conqueror throughout all the world[162]; an example to all men
of endurance and vigour[163]. To barbarians Cyrus, king of Persia, was
a like example to prove that suffering is a good[164]. Many such are
counted amongst the philosophers; first Heraclitus, not for his insight
into nature, but for his control over his passions[165]; then Socrates,
who in life and death was equally a model as a man and as a citizen[166].
Diogenes the Cynic is worthy of special honour, for he was so filled
with love for mankind and obedience to God, that he willingly undertook
a life of labour and bodily suffering, and thus won himself the true
freedom[167], and became truly happy, truly divine[168]. Zeno the most
temperate of philosophers[169], and Cleanthes[170] the most enduring,
were men of like type within the Stoic school itself.


[Sidenote: Wise Romans.]

=326.= To the list of wise men recognised by the Greeks the Romans were
proud to add other names from their own history, thereby associating
their philosophic principles with patriotic pride. From their mythology
Aeneas was selected, the man who crushes his desires that he may loyally
cooperate with the destiny of his people; from the times of the republic
Scipio Africanus minor and his gentle companion Laelius[171]; whilst
in Publius Rutilius Rufus a Roman could be found who, like Socrates,
would not when on his trial consent to any other defence than a plain
statement of the facts, in which he neither exaggerated his own merits
nor made any plea for mercy[172]. But amongst all Romans Cato of Utica
was pre-eminent[173]. If Cicero, as a contemporary and a colleague in
political life, was little liable to illusions as to his character and
success, his testimony to Cato’s sincerity is all the more valuable[174];
nor can we believe that Cato’s voluntary death would so soon and so
greatly have stirred Roman feeling, had it not come as the climax of a
life worthily spent[175]. The period of the principate brought to the
front both men and women whose fearless lives and quiet self-approved
deaths proved them to be worthy successors to the heroes of the past; and
at the same time we notice a disposition to find some at least of the
elements of the heroic character in simple uneducated folk, as in the
soldier, the athlete, and the gladiator, so that these too serve in their
degree as models for those that seek wisdom[176].


[Sidenote: Wise men are few.]

=327.= The founders of Stoicism never doubted that wise men had existed
and did exist; they looked forward to a time not far distant when
there should be a Cosmopolis in which every citizen should be wise.
This robust belief was not maintained by their successors. According
to Chrysippus, only one or two wise men have ever existed[177]; and he
expressly denies that he himself or any of his acquaintance are amongst
the number[178]. The Stoics of the transition period avoided the topic
as troublesome[179]; and their opponents naturally pressed it on them
all the more. Zeno had said ‘It is reasonable to honour the gods: it is
not reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore the gods exist.’
This was now parodied: ‘It is reasonable to honour wise men: it is not
reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore wise men exist.’ If
this argument was unsatisfactory, as we are told[180], to the Stoics,
because they had not yet discovered their wise man anywhere, we are not
surprised to find that sometimes they refer him to the golden age[181],
at other times convert him into an ideal[182]. The Stoics under the Roman
principate re-affirmed vigorously the existence of the wise man[183].
Seneca however admits that his appearance is as rare as that of the
phoenix[184], and altogether disclaims any such character for himself
individually[185]. Epictetus is far more true to the spirit of the old
doctrine, when he not only abstains from any morbid depreciation of his
own character, but also urges his pupils never to give up the hope of
reaching perfection[186].


[Sidenote: The glory of virtue.]

=328.= Thus the Stoics founded their moral ideal on the triple basis of
the good citizen, the healthily-disposed soul, and the examples of wise
men. In impressing this part of their system on their pupils, they made
little use of definitions or syllogisms, but all the more they resorted
to rhetorical description. As in their physics the Logos became almost
a person, so here the picture of Virtue is drawn, as by Prodicus in the
old allegory of the choice of Hercules, drawing men to her not by the
pleasures she offers but by her majesty and beauty[187]. Cleanthes in
particular heaps epithets of praise on virtue[188]; more usually it is
sufficient to insist that virtue is good, praiseworthy, and expedient.
That ‘the wise man is a king[189]’ almost ceases to be a paradox, since
the soul is rightly compared to a kingdom; that he is rich, handsome,
free, and invincible can equally be argued on Stoic principles[190]. To
carry such statements further seems to savour of pedantry, to ridicule
them at any stage is easy. Yet the statement that seems the boldest of
all, that ‘the wise man is happy even on the rack[191],’ was many a time
verified by the experience of individual Stoics[192]. That the wise man
is a god, though subject to the limitations of mortality, is maintained
without hesitation[193].


[Sidenote: Stoic ethics.]

=329.= The Stoic morality differs not only in form and in its reasoned
basis, but in substance, both from the popular morality of the time and
the ideals of rival philosophical schools. The Stoic heroes differ from
those of Homer by a world-age; they possess what the Romans called
_humanitas_, powers of reasoning and of sympathizing unknown to an age of
warriors. The Epicurean sage was not, as popular criticism and that of
many Stoics unjustly described him, a man of gross tastes and reckless
selfishness; but he was essentially easy-going and a quietist, little
inclined to risk his peace of mind by meddling with the troubles of
others. To the Cynics the Stoics owed much in their principles, to the
Academics (as we shall see) much in their application of them; they stood
between the two, more reasonable and judicious than the former, firmer
in principle than the latter, possessed of a breadth of outlook which
neither of these schools could claim.


FOOTNOTES

[1] e.g. Zeller, _Stoics_ etc. pp. 16, 17; Stein _Psych._ ii p. 141.

[2] See Alex. Aph. _de fato_, chs. 35 and 37 (Arnim ii 1003 and 1005).

[3] See above, § 75.

[4] λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ
ποιητέον Alex. Aph. 35, p. 207, 8 B; cf. Diog. L. vii 88.

[5] ‘Chrysippus sic incipit: ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ
ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν ... κανόνα εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων’
Marcianus i p. 11, 25 (Arnim iii 314); ‘lex est ratio summa, insita in
natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria’ Cic.
_Leg._ i 6, 18.

[6] ‘Socrates cum rogaretur cuiatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit.
totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ v
37, 108; [Διογένης] ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη “κοσμοπολίτης” ἔφη Diog. L. vi
63; so Epict. _Disc._ i 9, 1.

[7] Arnim i 262; ‘patriam meam esse mundum sciam’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 20, 5.

[8] ‘membra sumus corporis magni; natura nos cognatos edidit’ _Ep._ 95,
52.

[9] ‘quaecunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. quod argumenti
satis est, nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere’ Cic. _Leg._ i 10, 29
and 30.

[10] ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα διὰ τὴν
ἀνομοιότητα Diog. L. vii 129; ‘quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse
vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis’ Cic. _Fin._
iii 20, 67. The honour of being the first to recognise the principle of
consideration for our dumb partners belongs to the Hindus.

[11] ‘nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus ad
virtutem pervenire non possit’ Cic. _Leg._ i 10, 31; ‘if the mind-element
is common to us all, so likewise is that reason which makes us rational;
and therefore too that reason which bids us do or leave undone; and
therefore the world-law; therefore we are fellow-citizens and share a
common citizenship’ M. Aurel. _To himself_ iv 4.

[12] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 4, i.

[13] ‘duas respublicas animo conplectamur, alteram magnam et vere
publicam, qua di atque homines continentur; ... alteram, cui nos
adscripsit condicio nascendi’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 4, 1. So too Epictetus:
‘What is a man? a part of a state, of that first which consists of gods
and men; then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image
of the universal state’ _Disc._ ii 5, 26.

[14] ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἔφη [ὁ Ζήνων] τὸν Ἔρωτα θεὸν εἶναι, συνεργὸν
ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν Athen. xiii 12 (Arnim i 263);
‘salva autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest’
Sen. _Dial._ iv 31, 7.

[15] ‘eius [societatis humanae] vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae
conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate’ Cic.
_Off._ i 16, 50.

[16] φύσει τε τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει, ὡς καὶ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν
ὀρθὸν λόγον, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος Diog. L. vii 128; ‘ius esse natura
[Stoici censent]’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 21, 71.

[17] ‘non tum denique lex incipit esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta
est’ Cic. _Leg._ ii 5, 10.

[18] ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἱκοδομεῖν Plut. _Sto. rep._ 6, 1; ἀπαγορεύει ἀγάλματα
τεκταίνειν Theod. _Aff._ iii 74 (Arnim i 264).

[19] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 6, 1.

[20] Diog. L. vii 33.

[21] Plutarch, in quoting this argument, makes the telling rejoinder that
upon the same principle Zeno need not have published an answer to Plato’s
Republic; _Sto. rep._ 8, 1.

[22] Diog. L. vii 32. This particular condemnation was not uncongenial
to the Stoics of the principate, and may partly account for the decay
of literature in imperial Rome. But Chrysippus had meanwhile supplied
the needed qualification that these studies are useful as a training
preliminary to virtue; see Diog. L. vii 129, and cf. § 336.

[23] Diog. L. vii 33. Probably usury was also condemned by Zeno, as it
was by Seneca: ‘quid computationes et venale tempus et sanguinolentae
centesimae?’ Sen. _Ben._ vii 10, 4.

[24] Diog. L. vii 131.

[25] ‘More continent than Zeno’ became a proverb at Athens; _ib._ 27.

[26] _ib._ 121.

[27] ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ τοῦ Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες Origen
_cont. Celsum_, vii 63 (Arnim iii 729).

[28] This principle is stated by Chrysippus: πρὸς τὰ θηρία φησὶ δεῖν
ἀποβλέπειν Plut. _Sto. rep._ 22, 1.

[29] The essential equality of the sexes in Stoic theory is illustrated
in the development of Roman law: ‘led by their theory of natural law, the
[Roman] jurisconsults had evidently ... assumed the equality of the sexes
as a principle of their code of equity’ Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 154. Cf.
on the whole subject Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, bk v ch. 13: e.g. ‘to the
common Greek sentiment exclusive personal appropriation [of women] and
the resulting inequality in ownership was as yet very far from seeming so
much of a law of nature, or meeting with such unconditional acceptance as
... in modern times’ (vol. iii p. 119).

[30] See § 431.

[31] ‘What then, are not women common by nature? So I say also. Is not
the theatre common to the citizens? When then they have taken their
seats, come (if you think proper) and eject one of them!’ Epict. _Disc._
ii 4, 8.

[32] καὶ μητράσι [Χρύσιππος] λέγει συνέρχεσθαι καὶ θυγατράσι καὶ υἱοῖς
Diog. L. vii 188. A Church Father has caught the point better; εἶπον ὅτι
τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς
καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν Origen _cont. Cels._ iv 45
(Arnim iii 743). For the Persian view see Diog. L. Prol. 8.

[33] Arnim i 256.

[34] Origen, as above.

[35] See below, § 478.

[36] See above, § 254.

[37] Arnim i 253.

[38] _ib._ i 254.

[39] Diog. L. vii 121.

[40] Arnim iii 748.

[41] Arnim iii 752. For the same view in earlier times see Gomperz,
_Greek Thinkers_, i p. 403.

[42] i 45, 108.

[43] ‘ille divinus animus egressurus hominem, quo receptaculum suum
conferatur, ignis illud exurat an terra contegat, an ferae distrahant,
non magis ad se iudicat pertinere quam secundas ad editum infantem’ Sen.
_Ep._ 92, 34; ‘But you will be cast out unburied ... If the corpse is I,
I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more
properly’ Epict. _Disc._ iv 7, 31.

[44] For a plain statement to this effect we have to look to Philo:
ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως δοῦλος οὐδείς _Sept. et fest. di._ p. 283 M (Arnim
iii 352).

[45] ‘est genus iniustae servitutis, cum hi sunt alterius, qui sui
possunt esse’ Cic. _Rep._ iii 25, 37.

[46] ‘servus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercennarius est’ Sen.
_Ben._ iii 22, 1; ‘non male praecipiunt, qui [servis] ita iubent uti, ut
mercennariis: operam exigendam, iusta praebenda’ Cic. _Off._ i 13, 41.

[47] ‘potest [servus] dare beneficium domino, si a domino iniuriam
accipere’ Sen. _Ben._ iii 22, 3.

[48] ‘quod si natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices
et rusticos et mulieres doceri, ut sapiant: populumque [sapientium] ex
omni lingua et condicione et sexu et aetate conflari. senserunt hoc adeo
Stoici, qui et servis et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt’ Lact.
_Div. inst._ iii 25 (Arnim iii 253).

[49] See above, § 110.

[50] Schmekel, _Phil. d. mittleren Stoa_, pp. 63, 69.

[51] ‘eorum nullum ipsum per se separatum probo; anteponoque singulis
illud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus. sed si unum ac simplex probandum
sit, regium probem atque inprimis laudem’ Cic. _Rep._ i 35, 54; ‘optimus
civitatis status sub rege iusto est’ Sen. _Ben._ ii 20, 2.

[52] ‘memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio
... optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum, quem maiores nostri nobis
reliquissent’ Cic. _Rep._ i 21, 34.

[53] See below, ch. xvi.

[54] Arnim iii 354.

[55] Diog. L. vii 121.

[56] τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται καθηκόντως, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται
οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα Stob. ii 7, 3 b.

[57] ‘virtus nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens’ Sen. _Ep._
113, 2; ‘virtus est adfectio animi constans conveniensque’ Cic. _Tusc.
disp._ iv 15, 34.

[58] In numerous variations: for the present it is sufficient to quote
Cicero’s phrase ‘convenienter naturae vivere’ _Fin._ iii 9, 31, etc., and
from Seneca ‘virtus secundum naturam est; vitia inimica et infesta sunt’
_Ep._ 50, 8. Cf. also ‘we ought to go to be instructed, in order that we
may maintain our minds in harmony with the things that happen’ Epict.
_Disc._ i 12, 17.

[59] ‘[virtus] habebit illud in animo vetus praeceptum: deum sequere’
Sen. _Dial._ vii 15, 5.

[60] ‘ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._
iv 15, 34.

[61] ‘virtutis definitio est—habitus consentiens vitae’ Comm. _in Lucan._
ii 380 (Arnim iii 199).

[62] ‘perfecta virtus aequalitas [est] ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans
sibi’ Sen. _Ep._ 31, 8.

[63] ‘ante omnia hoc cura, ut constes tibi’ _ib._ 35, 4.

[64] ‘virtus convenientia constat: omnia opera eius cum ipsa concordant
et congruunt’ _ib._ 74, 30.

[65] ‘[stultitia] semper incipit vivere: quam foeda [est] hominum
levitas cottidie nova vitae fundamenta ponentium, novas spes in exitu
incohantium! quid est turpius quam senex vivere incipiens?’ _ib._ 13, 16
and 17.

[66] ‘Zeno is erat qui ... id appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex
quoddam et solum et unum bonum’ Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 36. So Seneca: ‘quid est
sapientia? semper idem velle atque idem nolle’ Sen. _Ep._ 20, 5.

[67] See above, § 81.

[68] Whether by Zeno (Diog. L. vii 87), or by Cleanthes (Stob. ii 7, 6 a:
Arnim i 552) is a matter of no importance.

[69] See above, § 108. The emphasis on individual nature is sometimes
still greater; ἡ ἀρετὴ τελειότης ἐστὶ τῆς ἑκάστου φύσεως Galen _plac.
Hipp. et Plat._ v 5, p. 468 K (from Chrysippus).

[70] Diog. L. vii 87 and 88.

[71] Stob. ii 7, 6 a. See also above, § 258.

[72] Stob. ii 7, 6 a.

[73] See below, § 320.

[74] Παναίτιος τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμὰς τέλος
ἀπεφήνατο Clem. Al. _Strom._ ii 21, 129.

[75] ‘sic est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus;
ea tamen conservata, propriam naturam sequamur’ _Off._ i 31, 110.

[76] ‘vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent’
_Fin._ iv 6, 14.

[77] ‘huc et illud accedit, ut perfecta virtus sit aequalitas ac tenor
vitae per omnia consonans sibi, quod non potest esse nisi rerum scientia
contingit et ars, per quam humana ac divina noscantur; hoc est summum
bonum’ Sen. _Ep._ 31, 8.

[78] See above, § 98.

[79] ‘non pareo deo, sed adsentior. ex animo illum, non quia necesse est,
sequor’ Sen. _Ep._ 96, 2.

[80] ‘deo parere libertas est’ _Dial._ vii 15, 7.

[81] Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 89 and 90.

[82] _ib._ ii 10, 5.

[83] _ib._ iii 7, 7.

[84] ‘Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam sapiens, nisi si quid impedierit’
Sen. _Dial._ viii 3, 2; πολιτεύσεσθαί φασι τὸν σοφόν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος
Diog. L. vii 121.

[85] See § 306, note 26.

[86] Cic. _Off._ i 4, 12.

[87] τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναί φασι ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὑτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν
βίον Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.

[88] [ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη] πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι Xen. _Mem._ iii 9, 5; see
also above, §§ 48, 52.

[89] διδακτήν τε εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ
Ποσειδώνιος Diog. L. vii 91.

[90] ‘They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by
thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Show them
their errors, and you will see how they desist from their errors’ Epict.
_Disc._ i 18, 3 and 4.

[91] See above, § 177, note 28.

[92] ‘If you would be a good reader, read; if a writer, write. Generally,
if you would make anything a habit, do it; if you would not make it a
habit, do not do it’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 18, 2 and 4; ‘nihil est quod non
humana mens vincat, et in familiaritatem adducat adsidua meditatio’ Sen.
_Dial._ iv 12, 3.

[93] ὧν κατορθοῦσιν [ἄνθρωποι], ἡ ὀρθὴ κρίσις ἐξηγεῖται μετὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν
ψυχὴν εὐτονίας Chrys. ap. Galen _plac. H. et Plat._ iv 6, p. 403 K (Arnim
iii 473).

[94] ‘virtutem convenies ... pro muris stantem, pulverulentam, coloratam,
callosas habentem manus’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 7, 3.

[95] ‘Saturnalia Athenis agitabamus hilare prorsum et modeste, non (ut
dicitur) “remittentes animum,” nam “remittere” inquit Musonius “animum
quasi amittere est”’ Gellius, _N. A._ xviii 2, 1.

[96] ‘iustum ac tenacem propositi virum | non civium ardor prava
iubentium, | non vultus instantis tyranni | mente quatit solida’ Hor.
_C._ iii 3, 1-4.

[97] ‘hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci εὐθυμίαν vocant; ego
tranquillitatem voco’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 3.

[98] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 10, 23.

[99] ‘ut enim corporis temperatio, cum ea congruunt inter se ex quibus
constamus, sanitas, sic animi dicitur, cum eius iudicia opinionesque
concordant, eaque animi est virtus’ _ib._ 13, 30.

[100] ‘roga bonam mentem, bonam valetudinem animi, deinde tunc corporis’
Sen. _Ep._ 10, 4; ‘orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano’ Juv.
_Sat._ x 356.

[101] ‘beata est vita conveniens naturae suae, quae non aliter contingere
potest, quam si primum sana mens est et in perpetua possessione sanitatis
suae, deinde fortis et vehemens, tum pulcherrima ac patiens, apta
temporibus, corporis sui pertinentiumque ad id curiosa non anxie’ Sen.
_Dial._ vii 3, 3.

[102] ‘actio recta non erit, nisi fuerit recta voluntas’ Sen. _Ep._ 95,
57; ‘gratus potest esse homo voluntate’ _Ben._ ii 31, 1; ‘sic timere,
sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est, etiam sine effectu’
Cic. _Fin._ iii 9, 32; ‘The being of the good is a certain kind of will
(προαίρεσις); the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What then
are externals? Material for the will’ Epict. _Disc._ i 29, 1 and 2.

[103] See below, § 383.

[104] Arnim i 250.

[105] Diog. L. vii 33.

[106] ‘placet Stoicis, suo quamque rem nomine appellare. sic enim
disserunt, nihil esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu’ Cic. _Fam._ ix 22, 1.
See further below, § 344.

[107] ‘postea tuus ille Poenulus, causam non obtinens repugnante natura,
verba versare coepit et primum rebus iis, quas non bonas dicimus,
concessit ut haberentur † aestimabiles, et ad naturam accommodatae’
_Fin._ iv 20, 56; ‘the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by
the admission of προηγμένα’ Zeller, _Stoics_, p. 290. The true note is
struck by Rendall, _Introd._ p. xlv: ‘the course of Stoic ethics is, in
fact, the progressive enlargement and clarification of the Cynic ideal
of conduct, under the stress of that larger conception of “nature” which
was inherent in Stoic monism. The full content and interpretation of the
formula was only gradually realised. Its deeper implications unfolded
themselves through life even more than through thought, and find their
fullest exposition in the pages of the Roman Stoics.’

[108] Stob. ii 7, 5 a.

[109] ‘aestimatio, quae ἀξία dicitur’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 34. Posidonius
seems to have practically substituted ἀξίαν ἔχοντα for προηγμένα, but in
strict usage the latter term is narrower, and includes only such things
as have measurable worth.

[110] ‘inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum,
aliquid tamen quo differrent esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia
aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum’ _ib._ 15, 50; τῶν δὲ ἀξίαν
ἐχόντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν, τὰ δὲ βραχεῖαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν
ἀπαξίαν ἐχόντων ἃ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἃ δὲ βραχεῖαν Stob. ii 7, 7
g; ‘quae essent sumenda ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris’
Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 37.

[111] Stob. ii 7, 7.

[112] Arnim iii 122.

[113] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 23, 6.

[114] ‘cetera autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum
naturam dicebat [Zeno], alia naturae esse contraria. his ipsis alia
interiecta et media numerabat’ Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 36.

[115] τὸ προηγμένον συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει Stob. ii 7, 7 g.

[116] ‘[hoc] Zeno προηγμένον nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa
factis tamen nominibus ac novis. “ut enim,” inquit, “nemo dicit in regia
regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id enim est προηγμένον),
sed eos qui in aliquo honore sint, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut
secundus sit, ad regium principatum”’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 15, 51.

[117] ‘quae pluris, ea praeposita appellabat; reiecta autem, quae
minoris’ _Ac._ i 10, 37; ‘quae appellemus vel promota et remota, vel, ut
dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta’ _Fin._ iii 16,
52.

[118] ‘quis porro sapientum, nostrorum dico, quibus unum est bonum
virtus, negat etiam haec, quae indifferentia vocamus, habere in se
aliquid pretii et alia aliis esse potiora? quibusdam ex iis tribuitur
aliquid honoris, quibusdam multum’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 22, 4.

[119] ‘itaque commoda vocentur, et ut nostra lingua loquar, producta’
_Ep._ 74, 17.

[120] See above, § 82.

[121] ‘bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est; quod contra, malum;
nec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis’
Cic. _Fin._ v 29, 89; cf. Arnim iii 137.

[122] ‘sunt animi bona, sunt corporis, sunt fortunae; illa animi bona a
stulto ac malo submoventur’ Sen. _Ben._ v 13, 1.

[123] ‘deinceps explicatur differentia rerum; quam si non ullam esse
diceremus, et confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone; neque ullum
sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur; cum inter res eas quae ad vitam
degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum delectum
haberi oporteret’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 15, 50.

[124] ‘virtutis hoc proprium [est], earum rerum quae secundum naturam
sint, habere delectum’ _ib._ 4, 12.

[125] ‘relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum
rerum quae natura eveniant, selegentem quae secundum naturam, et si quae
contra naturam sunt, reicientem; id est, convenienter congruenterque
naturae vivere’ _ib._ 9, 31 (after Posidonius).

[126] ‘ut si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere
talum, ut rectus assistat; qui ita talis erit iactus, ut cadat rectus,
praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem; qui aliter, contra. neque tamen
illa praepositio ad eum quem dixi finem pertinebit: sic ea, quae sunt
praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque
nihil pertinent’ _ib._ 16, 54; compare also 6, 22; ‘non est turpe non
consequi, dummodo sequaris’ Sen. _Ben._ v 5, 3.

[127] αὐτάρκη τε εἶναι αὐτὴν [τὴν ἀρετὴν] πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν Diog. L.
vii 127; ‘a Zenone hoc magnifice tanquam ex oraculo editur: virtus ad
bene vivendum se ipsa contenta est’ Cic. _Fin._ v 27, 79; cf. Pearson,
_Fragments_, p. 19.

[128] ‘testatur saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae
defendi possint, de finibus bonorum; aut enim honestatem esse finem aut
voluptatem aut utrumque’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 45, 138.

[129] ‘crescere bonorum finem non putamus’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 14, 48;
‘honestum nullam accessionem recipit’ Sen. _Ep._ 66, 9; ‘summum bonum
nec infringitur nec augetur; in suo modo permanet, utcunque se fortuna
gessit. utrum maiorem an minorem circulum scribas, ad spatium eius
pertinet, non ad formam’ _ib._ 74, 26 and 27.

[130] See above, § 110.

[131] See above, § 313.

[132] ‘cum [Panaetius] sit is, qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod
honestum sit’ Cic. _Off._ iii 3, 12; ‘solebat narrare Pompeius se, cum
Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, audire voluisse Posidonium; sed
cum audivisset eum graviter esse aegrum, quod vehementer eius artus
laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere ... itaque eum
graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum
esset, cubantem disputavisse: cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur,
saepe dixisse: “nihil agis, dolor: quamvis sis molestus, nunquam te esse
confitebor malum”’ _Tusc. disp._ ii 25, 61; cf. Sen. _Ep._ 87, 35.

[133] See above, § 114.

[134] Diog. L. vii 128.

[135] ‘sapientem nulla re egere, et tamen multis ei rebus opus esse’ Sen.
_Ep._ 9, 14.

[136] ‘[virtus] ipsa pretium sui’ _Dial._ vii 9, 4; ‘recte factorum verus
fructus [est] fecisse’ _Clem._ i 1, 1; ‘virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis
est’ _Ep._ 81, 20.

[137] ‘sapienti non nocetur a paupertate, non a dolore, non ab aliis
tempestatibus vitae; ipse semper in actu est; in effectu tunc maximus,
cum illi fortuna se obposuit’ _ib._ 85, 37.

[138] ‘virtutem nemo unquam deo acceptam rettulit ... iudicium hoc
omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse
sapientiam’ Cic. _N. D._ iii 36, 86 and 88; ‘aequum mi animum ipse
parabo’ Hor. _Ep._ i 18, 112; ‘monstro, quod ipse tibi possis dare’ Juv.
_Sat._ x 363.

[139] See note 129.

[140] ‘Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is
good and just? Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be
good and happy?’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 24, 51 and 52.

[141] ‘What does not make the man himself worse, does not make his life
worse either, nor injure him, without or within’ _To himself_ iv 8.

[142] ‘nec summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se
viderit dissimile meliori’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 15, 1; ‘No man is able to
make progress when he is wavering between opposite things; but if you
have preferred this (one thing) to all things, if you choose to attend to
this only, to work out this only, give up everything else’ Epict. _Disc._
iv 2, 4.

[143] Chrysippus wrote a book περὶ τοῦ ποιὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς; see Arnim
iii 256.

[144] See below, §§ 335-350.

[145] Diog. L. vii 92.

[146] τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα
πάσας ἔχειν Diog. L. vii 125; ‘quicquid honeste fit, una virtus facit,
sed ex consilii sententia’ Sen. _Ep._ 67, 10; ‘virtutibus inter se
concordia [est]’ _Clem._ i 5, 3.

[147] ‘videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus; id autem est
perfectum officium’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 18, 59; ‘rectum, quod κατόρθωμα
dicebas’ _ib._ iv 6, 15.

[148] ‘quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere; attamen utrumque
eorum fundi quodammodo et quasi dilatari putant’ _ib._ iii 15, 48.

[149] See above, § 153, note 66.

[150] ‘scit [sapiens] neminem nasci sapientem sed fieri’ Sen. _Dial._ iv
10, 6.

[151] ‘non dat natura virtutem; ars est bonum fieri’ _Ep._ 90, 44.

[152] Zeno probably took over the term προκοπή from the Peripatetics, see
Diog. L. vii 127; its implications he adapted to Stoic principles. See
Plut. _prof. virt._ 12.

[153] ‘hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum
ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum’
Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 34.

[154] Stob. ii 7, 11 g; Diog. L. vii 127.

[155] τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος ἀποβλητήν ... διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν _ib._

[156] See above, § 289.

[157] ‘semel traditi nobis boni perpetua possessio est; non dediscitur
virtus. contraria enim mala in alieno haerent, ideo depelli et exturbari
possunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 50, 8. Just in the same spirit we say that a new
language or (say) the art of swimming, if once learnt, is learnt ‘for
good.’

[158] ‘aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est, ac semper ante oculos
habendus, ut sic tanquam illo spectante vivamus, et omnia tanquam illo
vidente faciamus’ Sen. _Ep._ 11, 8, quoting however from Epicurus.

[159] ‘Heracles was the model whom [Antisthenes] and the other Cynics
held up for imitation, the patron saint, so to speak, of the school.
Antisthenes wrote a dialogue entitled “Heracles” and, with this for
guidance, his followers delighted to tell again the story of the hero’s
laborious and militant life, identifying, by ingenious allegories, the
foul monsters which he vanquished with the vices and lusts that beset the
souls of men’ Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii p. 151; ‘the more generous
Cynics aver that the great Heracles also, as he became the author of
other blessings, so also left to mankind the chief pattern of this
(Cynic) life’ Julian, _Or._ vi p. 187, 3 (Mayor on Juv. _Sat._ x 361). So
also in Buddhism: ‘besides the ideal King, the personification of Power
and Justice, another ideal has played an important part in the formation
of early Buddhist ideas regarding their master. It was the ideal of a
perfectly Wise Man, the personification of Wisdom, the Buddha’ Rhys
Davids, _Hibbert Lectures_, p. 141.

[160] ‘Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio
caelestium collocavit’ Cic. _Off._ iii 5, 25.

[161] ‘Hercules nihil sibi vicit: orbem terrarum transiit non
concupiscendo sed vindicando, quid vinceret; malorum hostis, bonorum
vindex, terrarum marisque pacator’ Sen. _Ben._ i 13, 3. See also the
brilliant descriptions in Epict. _Disc._ iii 24.

[162] ‘Ulixen et Herculem ... Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt,
invictos laboribus, contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrarum’
Sen. _Dial._ ii 2, 1. Yet there is something to be said on the other
side: ‘Ulysses felt a desire for his wife, and wept as he sat on a
rock.... If Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man’ Epict.
_Disc._ iii 24, 18.

[163] So Horace, quite in the Stoic spirit: ‘rursus quid virtus et quid
patientia possit, | utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen’ Hor. _Ep._ i
2, 17 and 18.

[164] Diog. L. vi 1, 2.

[165] ‘By acting thus Heraclitus and those like him were deservedly
divine, and were so called’ Epict. _Manual_ 15.

[166] ‘praeclara est aequabilitas in omni vita, et idem semper vultus
eademque frons, ut de Socrate accepimus’ Cic. _Off._ i 26, 90; ‘Socrates
... violated nothing which was becoming to a good man, neither in making
his defence nor by fixing a penalty on himself; nor even in the former
part of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier’ Epict.
_Disc._ iii 24, 61.

[167] See above, § 17.

[168] ‘si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de
deorum immortalium statu’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 8, 5; ‘By acting thus Diogenes
... was deservedly divine, and was so called’ Epict. _Manual_ 15.

[169] See above, § 306, note 25.

[170] δεύτερος Ἡρακλῆς ὁ Κλεάνθης ἐκαλεῖτο Diog. L. vii 170; ‘Learn how
those live who are genuine philosophers: how Socrates lived, who had a
wife and children; how Diogenes lived, and how Cleanthes, who attended to
the school and drew water’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 26, 23.

[171] ‘aut Cato ille sit aut Scipio aut Laelius’ Sen. _Ep._ 25, 6; ‘elige
remissioris animi virum Laelium’ _ib._ 11, 10.

[172] ‘nam cum esset ille vir [P. Rutilius Rufus] exemplum, ut scitis,
innocentiae, cumque illo nemo neque integrior esset in civitate neque
sanctior, non modo supplex iudicibus esse noluit, sed ne ornatius quidem
aut liberius causam dici suam, quam simplex ratio veritatis ferebat’ Cic.
_de Or._ i 53, 229; cf. Sen. _Dial._ i 3, 4 and 7; and see further, § 430.

[173] ‘Catonem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortales
dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus saeculis’ Sen. _Dial._ ii 2, 1.

[174] ‘ego te [Cato] verissime dixerim peccare nihil’ Cic. _Mur._ 29, 60.

[175] ‘Catonis nobile letum’ Hor. _C._ i 12, 35 and 36; and see below, §
430.

[176] ‘nobis quoque militandum est’ Sen. _Ep._ 51, 6; ‘This is the true
athlete. Great is the combat, divine is the work’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 18,
28. See also below, § 402.

[177] Euseb. _pr. ev._ vi 8, 13; Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 28, p. 199, 16 B.

[178] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 31, 5.

[179] ‘qui sapiens sit aut fuerit, ne ipsi quidem solent dicere’ Cic.
_Ac._ ii 47, 145. Thus Panaetius made no reference to the wise man;
whilst Posidonius only defended his possible existence in the future
(Schmekel, pp. 213, 278).

[180] Sext. _math._ ix 133.

[181] See above, § 214.

[182] Even if Cicero is not the creator of the conception of an ‘ideal
character,’ nowhere else can we find its meaning so clearly expressed.
So of the wise man; ‘iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere
fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus,
quem quaerimus certe, et confidere sibi debet, et suae vitae et actae et
consequenti, et bene de se iudicare’ _Fin._ iii 8, 29.

[183] ‘non est quod dicas hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri’ Sen.
_Dial._ ii 7, 1.

[184] ‘ille alter [sapiens primae notae] fortasse tanquam phoenix semel
anno quingentesimo nascitur’ _Ep._ 42, 1, cf. Alex. Aphr. p. 34, n. 2;
‘scit [sapiens] paucissimos omni aevo sapientes evadere’ Sen. _Dial._ iv
10, 6.

[185] See above, § 126.

[186] ‘Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improving
himself, attending to nothing except to reason. But you, though you are
not yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates’
Epict. _Manual_ 50. Epictetus did not however ignore failures: ‘we
[Stoics] say one thing, but we do another; we talk of the things which
are beautiful, but we do what is base’ _Disc._ iii 7, 18.

[187] See above, § 42.

[188] See above, § 98.

[189] This is again a Socratic paradox: βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς
τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν Xen. _Mem._
iii 9, 10.

[190] Cic. _Fin._ iii 22, 75 and 76.

[191] ‘eorum, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit, uti
in omnibus tormentis conservetur beata vita sapienti’ _ib._ iii 13, 42;
Arnim iii 585, 586; ‘shew me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and
happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Shew him; I desire, by
the gods, to see a Stoic’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 24.

[192] See below, §§ 431, 439.

[193] ‘bonus tempore tantum a deo differt’ Sen. _Dial._ i 1, 5; ‘sapiens
excepta mortalitate similis deo’ _ib._ ii 8, 2; and see above, § 274.



CHAPTER XIII.

DAILY DUTIES.


[Sidenote: From principles to practice.]

=330.= As in our study of the Stoic philosophy we turn aside from the
supreme problems of the universe, such as gather round the questions
of the divine purpose, the existence of evil, and unfettered choice,
our way becomes easier. Our new problems, dealing with the constitution
of the human soul, and the ideals of human life in the state and in
the individual, are perhaps not simpler in themselves, but they are of
narrower range, and in finding our way over the first rough ground we
learn to tread with some assurance, so that we now feel ourselves, as it
were, on a downward path. For all that, the problems of the universal
law and the perfect man must still be compared to mountain tops, if not
to the highest peaks of all. But from this point on we steadily descend
towards the plains, to that common and practical life by which the worth
of philosophy is tested. We no longer gaze on the same bright sunlight or
breathe the same invigorating air; philosophy enters a region of mists
and shadows, and even learns to adapt her language to new neighbours. But
her meaning is the same as before, and the pathway to the heights is not
closed behind her.


[Sidenote: The daily round.]

=331.= The region we have now reached is that of ‘daily duties,’ by
which phrase we propose to translate here the Greek καθήκοντα and the
Latin _officia_[1]. This word is defined by Zeno as meaning ‘that which
it comes in one’s way to do[2],’ and its quiet sound at once brings
it into contrast with the proud claims of Virtue. The contrast is in
fact great. Virtue, displaying itself in Right Action, is only possible
for reasoning beings, that is, for gods and men; and within our view
it is only attained, if at all, by the wise man. But daily duty is
common to the wise and the unwise[3]; it not only extends to children,
but also to the unreasoning animals[4] and to plants[5]. Virtue always
contemplates the Universal law; for daily duty it is sufficient to follow
the individual nature[6]. Virtue cannot even be understood except by the
trained philosopher, whilst the principles of daily duty may be explained
to the simple. To use a comparison from mathematics, daily duty is the
projection of virtue upon the plane of ordinary life. Between the two
there always remains an assured correspondence. Each Right Action which
Virtue achieves is at the same time the performance of a daily duty, and
that in the most complete manner[7]; each daily duty performed by the
unwise is a step by which he may in the end climb to Wisdom[8].


[Sidenote: First laws of nature.]

=332.= The subject of ‘daily duties’ was treated both by Zeno[9] and
by Cleanthes[10], and is implied in the theory of Stoic ethics as a
whole; it has also a special relation to the doctrine of advantages
and disadvantages. Nevertheless the Stoics do not directly say that
daily duty consists in the seeking of advantages, but that it is based
upon primary ends which nature sets up (πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, _principia
naturae_)[11]. This phrase indicates the source of this part of the
Stoic philosophy; it marks teaching common to the Peripatetic school
and the Academy, and accepted by Zeno from his teacher Polemo[12]. We
are not informed how Zeno and Cleanthes elaborated this subject; and
when we find it taken up in earnest, the spirit of the Academy is firmly
established. Thus the Stoic demand for certain knowledge is here set
aside; and we are told that the standard of daily duty is ‘that which
when done can reasonably be defended[13]’; which definition closely
corresponds with the definition of the supreme good by Diogenes of
Babylon ‘to take a reasonable course in the choice of things according
to nature[14].’ Thus strong will and assured conviction are no longer
required; the door is thrown open for convention, opportunism, and
respectability. The daring moral theories and bold paradoxes of the
founders of Stoicism tend to disappear from sight, and are replaced
by shrewd good sense and worldly wisdom: in short, by the doctrine of
‘making the best of both worlds.’ The subject was therefore congenial
to Panaetius, who was both a practical statesman and an admirer of
Plato and Aristotle; and it was from this standpoint that Stoicism so
rapidly won its way with the Roman nobility of the last century of the
republic. Panaetius’ book περὶ καθηκόντων was the basis of Cicero’s work
_de Officiis_, which is the only systematic treatise which we possess
on Stoic ethics, and therefore generally the most convenient source of
information. As however this work leans very strongly towards Peripatetic
views, it will frequently be necessary to refer to other authorities,
amongst which Cicero’s _de Finibus_ best represents the older Stoics, and
Seneca and Epictetus the Stoics of the Roman principate.


[Sidenote: From the animals to man.]

=333.= It is no departure from the fundamental principles of Stoicism
when we learn that the ‘first lessons of nature’ are those which are
imprinted upon every animal at its birth[15]; Zeno himself had sought
for the natural law of marriage by a like method[16]. The first natural
lesson is that each animal seeks, not indeed pleasure as the Epicureans
hold, but its own preservation and the maintenance of its life in its
completeness[17]. At a later stage is imparted the desire of sexual union
for procreation’s sake, and with it some kind of affection for each
one’s offspring[18]. But nature’s best lessons are reserved for man; as
to look into the future, and regard life as a whole[19]; to interest
himself in his fellows, to attend public festivities, and to procure
the amenities of a civilized life for himself and those dependent upon
him[20]; in spare hours, to acquire information on points of historical
or philosophical interest[21]; in riper life to claim freedom, and to
refuse to submit to any arbitrary commands[22]; and finally, to perceive
in all things harmony and beauty, and to avoid any disturbance of it by
wilful action[23]. ‘Such,’ says Cicero, ‘is the picture of a beautiful
life; and could we see it with our eyes (as Plato says), great would be
our desire to possess Wisdom for a bride[24].’


[Sidenote: Wavering as to the standard.]

=334.= In this general sketch we miss a clear ethical standard. The
first lessons of nature may easily be perverted, so far as they are
common to men and animals, for they point towards the acts of eating,
drinking, and sexual union, all of which are associated by the ordinary
man with pleasure in a vicious sense. Hence arises a danger (from which
many Stoics do not keep clear), that we may fall into the terrible error
of the Epicureans, and hold that pleasure itself is a first law of
nature[25]. It is therefore necessary to lay it down that man should aim
specially at those results which are characteristic of human nature, that
is at the development of powers which he does not share with the lower
animals. So far the Academy and the Porch might travel together. But
the only, higher capacities recognised by the Stoics are reason and the
political sense, which is an aspect of the universal reason; such matters
as antiquarian interests and the appreciation of beauty could only be
introduced under Academic influence. The last, however, as we shall see,
is to become with Panaetius the predominant consideration[26].


[Sidenote: The four virtues.]

=335.= From the enunciation of general principles we pass on to the
separate virtues. Virtue in the strict sense can only be possessed by
the wise man; he therefore alone can practise the virtues; nevertheless
we may use this and like terms in a secondary sense to describe those
adumbrations or reflections of virtue which fall within the reach
of the ordinary man[27]. The classification of the virtues varies.
Panaetius divided virtue into two parts, theoretical and practical, and
Seneca follows him on this point[28]. It was perhaps Chrysippus who
distinguished between virtues that are ‘arts’ (τέχναι) and which are
based on theoretical principles, and those which are ‘acquirements’
(δυνάμεις), being attained by practice[29]. But generally speaking the
division of Virtue into the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Justice,
Courage, and Soberness is accepted as sufficient; by subdivision the
number of virtues may be increased to any extent; and in scholastic
classifications of virtue we find lists which have multiplicity for their
direct aim[30].


[Sidenote: Wisdom.]

=336.= Wisdom (φρόνησις, _prudentia_) is considered by Zeno not only
as the first of the virtues, but as the foundation of all; so that
Courage is wisdom in suffering, Justice is wisdom in distribution, and
Soberness is wisdom in enjoyment[31]. His successors treated Science
(ἐπιστήμη, _scientia_) as the parent virtue[32], thus placing Wisdom
side by side with the other cardinal virtues, yet losing the point
of Zeno’s genealogy. The writers of the later periods desired to
recognise separately contemplative wisdom, and therefore introduced
as a subdivision of the first cardinal virtue ‘Speculation’ (σοφία,
_sapientia_)[33]. But the Stoics generally held that all wisdom must
justify itself by practical results. The study of the so-called
‘liberal arts’ has a value for children, for it prepares the way for
virtuous training[34]. Logic is needed to protect us against fallacious
reasoning[35], and physics that we may rightly understand the universe
and its providential government, upon which the conception of duty
depends[36]; in this sense we may speak of logic and physics as virtues,
that is, as subdivisions of the virtue of wisdom[37]. The study of
physics is also admirable because it elevates the soul[38]. Geometry,
law, and astrology are useful in the several professions[39]. But study
when carried to excess, as by antiquarians, bookworms, and other learned
time-wasters, is nothing but folly[40].


[Sidenote: Justice.]

=337.= The second cardinal virtue is Justice (δικαιοσύνη, _iustitia_), of
which Chrysippus drew a striking allegorical picture. ‘She is of virgin
form, to show that she is incorruptible and does not give way to bad
men; ... of firm and fierce aspect, ... inspiring fear in the wicked,
confidence in the good; her eyes are keen-sighted, her bearing is at
once sad and awe-inspiring[41].’ Cicero distinguishes Justice in the
narrower sense from ‘Beneficence.’ Justice proper is a political virtue,
and consists in respect for the rights and property of individuals.
By nature indeed all things are common; but since they have become
private property by occupation, conquest, law, contract, and so forth,
individuals may keep their own, provided they do not forget that they
have always the duty of contributing to the common good[42], and that
even slaves have reasonable claims upon them[43]. Beneficence needs
the guidance of principle, and must be determined by considerations of
person and occasion. The claims of persons upon us depend on propinquity;
country, parents, wife and children must be first considered, then
other relatives, then fellow-citizens, lastly men in general[44]. The
consideration of the degrees of propinquity (σχέσεις) was a favourite
subject with Epictetus, and a useful defence against those who maintained
that the Stoic sage was lacking in natural affection[45]. The virtue of
Justice appealed specially to the statesman in both its applications, and
is dealt with fully by Panaetius, and by Cicero after him.


[Sidenote: Courage.]

=338.= The third cardinal virtue is Courage (ἀνδρεία, _fortitudo_),
which retains the tradition of the ‘strength and force’ of Socrates.
This again, according to Cicero, has two parts, one passive, which
consists in despising fortune and its buffets, and is in harmony with
the picture of the wise man as usually drawn; the other part, which we
may call Greatness of Soul (μεγαλοψυχία, _magnitudo animi_) is shown
in the undertaking of great enterprises. The virtue of Courage is
characteristically Stoic, and may be considered, like its counterpart
Wisdom, as the foundation and source of all the virtues; the knowledge
of good and evil can only be attained by the soul that is duly strung
to vigorous resolution[46]. The Stoics of the principate perhaps insist
most of all on this virtue, which alone makes men independent of all that
it lies with Fortune to give and to take away. The man of courage will
therefore detach himself from fortune’s gifts; he will treat them as
household furniture lent to him which may be at any moment recalled[47].


[Sidenote: Death not to be feared.]

=339.= Courage appears in its highest development in the face of tyranny
and death. It is the tyrant’s boast that he has men in his power: but
the brave man is an exception. His rank and his property may be taken
away; he may be subjected to the torture; his life may be forfeited; but
the soul, that is the man himself, is beyond the tyrant’s reach[48]. To
pain he answers ‘if I can bear it, it will be light; if I cannot bear
it, it cannot be long[49].’ Amidst all the extremities of fire and rack
men have been found who never groaned, never begged for mercy, never
answered a question, and indeed laughed heartily[50]. Of death the Stoic
has no fear; not only is it no evil, but it is to be welcomed as part
of the course of nature[51]; it is the best of friends, for it offers a
release from all troubles, and in particular from the oppression of the
tyrant[52]. We do not indeed deny that normally life is an advantage,
that nature’s first lesson is self-preservation, and that death in
itself is a thing terrible to contemplate[53]; but life is not the more
desirable for its length[54]; and when old age begins to shatter the
powers of the mind, and to degrade the man to the life of a vegetable,
nature is calling him to quit his mortal body[55]. At no period is life
worth purchasing at the cost of the loss of honour, without which it
loses its savour[56]. The philosopher therefore will not merely see with
calm confidence the approach of death; he will go forward to meet it of
his own free will, if only he is assured that reasonable choice points
that way.


[Sidenote: Reasonable departure.]

=340.= The doctrine of ‘reasonable departure’ (εὔλογος ἐξαγωγή,
_rationalis e vita excessus_) plays a prominent part in the Stoic ethics.
It cannot rightly be described as the recommendation of suicide; for
the Stoics do not permit a man to pass sentence of death upon himself,
but only to cooperate in carrying out the decree of a higher power. The
doctrine is intended in the first instance to justify death gloriously
met in fighting for one’s country or one’s friends; next when intolerable
pain or incurable disease plainly indicates the will of the deity[57];
in the development of Roman history a third reason was found in the
loss of political freedom[58]. These reasons are not added to, but only
systematized, when we are told that it is an ‘ordinary duty’ to quit
life when a man’s natural advantages (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν) are outweighed by
the corresponding disadvantages[59]; for amongst ‘natural advantages’
are included in this connexion all those considerations of which an
honourable man will rightly take account; and the calculation may equally
lead him to the conclusion that, in spite of old age and suffering, and
though he has never attained to true wisdom, his simple duty is to wait
quietly in life[60].


[Sidenote: Its dangers.]

=341.= The practice of ‘reasonable departure’ was largely recommended
to the Stoics by the examples of Socrates (whose death they regarded as
voluntary[61]) and of Cato[62]; and it was at first no small matter of
pride to them to find that these examples found imitators, and that their
system thus showed its power over the greatest of the terrors that beset
humanity. But under the Roman principate ‘free departure’ soon became
so common that it was a reproach rather than a glory to its advocates,
a social disease pointing to morbidity of soul rather than to healthy
resolution[63]. Hence the philosophers turned from recommendation
to reproof. ‘A brave and wise man must not flee from life, but quit
it,’ says Seneca[64]; ‘nothing is more disgraceful than to long for
death’[65]. ‘Friends,’ says Epictetus, ‘wait for God; when he shall give
you the signal, then go to him[66].’


[Sidenote: Courage is active.]

=342.= The ‘free departure’ is the most striking illustration of passive
courage, but even before it was abused Cicero at least had perceived the
attraction which this attitude of soul possesses, and its opposition to
the spirit of active enterprise which he calls Greatness of Soul, and
which he advocates perhaps more on Academic than on Stoic lines. Still
the Stoics had already defined Courage as ‘virtue fighting in the front
rank in defence of justice[67].’ A good man must indeed regard power and
wealth as things indifferent; but he is to be blamed if he makes this an
excuse for avoiding public life, and leaving to others magistracies at
home or commands in the wars[68]. In the old world the love of glory and
praise on the one hand, angry feeling against enemies on the other, has
led men to seek these positions; but now they should seek them at home
that they may have a wide field for the exercise of their virtues[69],
and in the wars in order that all war may be brought to an end[70]. By
the older Stoics this Greatheartedness was advocated by precept and
example: Zeno had said that the wise man should take part in public
life[71], and his hearers Persaeus and Philonides had taken service
under Antigonus Gonatas[72], and Sphaerus with Cleomenes III, king of
Sparta[73]. We shall see later how large was the part played in Roman
political life by men who were Stoics or inclined to Stoicism, in an age
in which there was a strong current of fashion in favour of a quiet life.
We must therefore recognise in Courage, fully as much as in Wisdom or
Justice, a political as well as a private virtue.


[Sidenote: Soberness.]

=343.= The fourth cardinal virtue is Soberness (σωφροσύνη,
_temperantia_). Of this there are various definitions, and amongst them
that it is the principle which regulates our natural appetites so that
they are neither in excess nor in defect[74]. From Cicero’s point of
view Soberness embraces all the virtues, for it is in the due regulation
of the impulses that virtue consists. The standard to be attained is a
healthy state of the soul; and this is to be judged, upon the analogy
of the body, by the canon of that which is beautiful, symmetrical, and
becoming (πρέπον, _decorum_)[75]. ‘Just as bodily beauty is symmetry
established between the limbs mutually, and also between each and the
whole body, so beauty of the soul is symmetry between the reasoning power
and its parts, and mutually between each of those parts[76].’ Although
this is in principle a doctrine accepted by the whole Stoic school,
yet in its application we may easily find an entirely new departure,
that is, if the appeal is made to an artistic standard which depends
upon the taste of the individual. The door is then thrown open to an
abandonment of the Cynico-Stoic theory of life according to reason, and
to the acceptance of the standard of good feeling, which may easily be
so stretched as to include existing prejudices and conventions. This
danger is realized in Cicero’s treatment of the virtue of ‘decorum,’
which in its distinctive sense is defined as having the element of
‘gentlemanliness’ in itself[77]. It begins with respect for the feelings
and opinions of others[78]; it avoids all rough games and obscene
jests[79]; it makes choice of a profession adapted to the natural
character of the individual[80]; it observes, as the actor does, the
proprieties of youth and age, rich and poor, citizen and foreigner[81];
it prescribes dignity as fitting for men, gracefulness for women[82]. In
particular decorum is displayed in modesty (_verecundia_). This is shown
by keeping out of sight those parts of the body which nature, though she
could not dispense with them, has concealed and covered; in attending
to their functions with the utmost secrecy; and in referring both to
these parts of the body and to their uses by words that do not properly
describe them[83].


[Sidenote: Cynism or ‘decorum’?]

=344.= Cicero’s treatment of ‘decorum’ is so full of good sense that his
_de Officiis_ was the most widely-known textbook of Greco-Roman ethics
in medieval schools, and has retained its importance in the classical
public schools of the present day. But its logical justification on Stoic
principles is far from easy. We are therefore not surprised to find that,
just as Zeno and the main body of his followers had proclaimed in advance
that such doctrine was false in principle and ridiculous in detail, so
conversely the followers of Panaetius found it necessary expressly to
repudiate the teaching of a large number of Stoics[84]. We have in fact
here a sharp conflict between the cultured and Platonizing Stoics on the
one side, and the general feeling of the school on the other. Cicero
elsewhere treats it as an accepted Stoic doctrine that ‘the wise man
will blurt things straight out[85]’; and the theory of ‘gentlemanly
professions’ can never have appealed to any large social circle. In the
period of the principate we find the theory of ‘decorum,’ as a whole,
abandoned. Seneca, personally as sensitive as Cicero himself, recognises
the absurdity of wasting time in hinting at a plain meaning[86], nor does
he limit his choice of illustration even when addressing a lady of high
social position[87]. We must look then in some other direction than the
_de Officiis_ for a duly proportioned exposition of the Stoic virtue of
Soberness.


[Sidenote: The appetites.]

=345.= Reverting to the definitions of this virtue, we find, amongst
those that are generally accepted, first, that it is ‘the science of
things that are to be sought or avoided or neither[88]’; secondly, that
it is ‘concerned with the human appetites[89].’ Now the term ‘appetite’
or ‘impulse’ (ὁρμή, _appetitus_) includes in the Stoic philosophy all
those first movements of the soul which draw us on towards some object,
and which are adumbrations of right conduct requiring revision and
control by reason. But it seems clear that Soberness has little to do
with those higher impulses that are characteristic of man, such as the
love of knowledge or of society, since other virtues are concerned with
these. It remains that Soberness is the virtue which is concerned with
the appetites common to men and the lower animals, which we may shortly
call the ‘lower appetites’; they are, as we have already stated, the
desires of eating, drinking, and sexual union. It is just in this sphere
that Pleasure arises, in the sense in which it is condemned by the Cynics
and popular moralists[90]. We may therefore shortly define Soberness
as a right disposition of soul in relation to Pleasure. Its peculiar
characteristic is that it is in the main a negative virtue, displaying
itself in abstinence from indulgence[91].


[Sidenote: Two views of Pleasure.]

=346.= In order then rightly to understand the virtue of Soberness, we
need a clear idea of the attitude of the Stoics towards Pleasure. Zeno,
as we have seen, whilst definitely placing Pleasure in the category of
things indifferent, had nevertheless allowed it to be understood that
it might be an advantage (προηγμένον), and the seeking after it natural
(κατὰ φύσιν)[92]; and this is stated to have been the express teaching of
Hecato, Apollodorus, and Chrysippus[93]. To other Stoics this appeared
to be a disastrous concession to Epicurean views. Cleanthes, who had
scornfully described the ideal of Epicurus by the picture of Pleasure
enthroned as queen, with the Virtues submissively attending as her
handmaidens[94], interpreted the word ‘indifferent’ more strictly; he
refused to admit that pleasure was ‘natural’ or possessed any worth[95].
In this view he was supported by a great many Stoics, and practically by
Archedemus, when he said that pleasure was natural but valueless, like
the hairs under the armpit[96]. Hence followed the acceptable conclusion
that no sensible man would pay much attention to so trivial a matter[97].
Thus the one word ‘indifferent’ came to include two views which were
substantially opposed, the one inclining to the Academic standpoint, and
the other to Cynism.


[Sidenote: Pleasure an aftergrowth, or an evil.]

=347.= From this contradiction an escape was sought by making a
distinction. In one sense pleasure is an affection of the body, namely
a tickling (_titillatio_) of organs of sense, most readily illustrated
in the eating of dainties. This kind of pleasure, even if it is not an
advantage naturally sought, yet has some likeness to one; though it is
not directly to be aimed at, yet it may be welcomed when nature grants
it to us as an extra[98]. This new view practically coincides with
that of Aristotle, who calls pleasure an ‘aftergrowth’ (ἐπιγέννημα,
_accessio_), which of itself follows on virtuous action, and is attached
to it as the scent to a flower[99]. But much more commonly, in ethical
discussions, ‘pleasure’ denotes the excitement which is more strictly
termed ‘hilarity’ (ἔπαρσις, _sublatio animi_), and is the unhealthy
condition of the soul when it is unduly attracted to an object of
choice[100]. For this mischief Cicero suggests the Latin term _laetitia_,
which is perhaps not altogether adequate[101]. This ‘pleasure’ may be
unreservedly condemned as not merely indifferent, but actually contrary
to nature[102]; whilst the virtuous and natural disposition is that of
the man who not only contemplates toil and pain with calm mind, but
actually welcomes them as possible stepping-stones towards his own true
advantage[103].


[Sidenote: Active soberness.]

=348.= Although the prevailing tendency in Stoic teaching is to consider
Soberness as a negative virtue, and as opposed to the perturbation of
Hilarity, there is not wanting some recognition of its positive side. For
Soberness also demands that there shall be a healthy activity of the soul
in matters such as eating, drinking, and the relations of sex; abstinence
is not in itself an end, and if pursued out of season is both a folly
and a fault. But this point of view is not adequately treated by any
Stoic writer. Panaetius in discussing daily duties omitted to consider
the proper care of the body, as was afterwards noticed by Antipater of
Tyre; and Cicero gets little further than a general recommendation of
common sense and self-restraint in all the circumstances of life[104].
The Romans of the principate were disposed to leave the matter to the
physician, suggesting only that food should suffice to allay hunger,
drink to put an end to thirst, and clothing to keep away cold[105]; but
it is probable that popular moral discourses stopped short of this, and
favoured some amount of endurance as a discipline for the soul[106].


[Sidenote: Sober love.]

=349.= With regard to the relations of sex, the Socratic tradition was
favourable to a more positive treatment. Accordingly the Stoics (not
without some feeling that they are adopting a paradoxical position)
assert that love (ἔρως, _amor_) is an essential, both for the maintenance
of the State[107] and for the character of the good man. Zeno had laid
it down that ‘the wise man will love[108].’ We must, however, make a
sharp distinction between love as the desire of sexual union, and the
higher Love (ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή) which is defined anew as ‘an effort to make
friends suggested by a beautiful object[109].’ Upon this impulse, which
is natural in the widest sense, is based friendship in the young, and the
more lasting tie between husband and wife. By imposing self-restraint
on the man, and inviting the woman to share the lessons of philosophy,
the Stoics introduced a new relation between husband and wife based upon
equality and comradeship[110]. A notable precedent was furnished by the
Cynic community, when the witty and learned Hipparchia joined Crates
in the life of the beggar-preacher[111]; and Roman Stoicism supplies
us with numerous instances of the same companionship[112]. Under such
conditions marriage is no longer a matter of free choice; it is a civic
duty incumbent on the young Stoic. The Stoics of the Roman principate
well perceived the danger that threatened the society in which they lived
through the growing practice of celibacy[113].


[Sidenote: Of marriage.]

=350.= The Stoic attitude towards marriage is well illustrated by the
following extract from a discourse by Antipater of Tarsus:

  ‘A youth of good family and noble soul, who has a sense of social
  duty, will feel that no life and no household is complete without
  wife and child. He will also bear in mind his duty towards the
  State, for how can that be maintained unless, as the fathers
  decay and fall away like the leaves of a fine tree, the sons
  marry in the flower of their age, and leave behind them fresh
  shoots to adorn the city, thereby providing for its protection
  against its enemies? He will look upon marriage also as a duty
  towards the gods; for if the family dies out, who will perform
  the accustomed sacrifices?

  Besides this he who knows nothing of wife and child has not
  tasted the truest joys of affection. For other friendships are
  like platefuls of beans or other like mixtures of juxtaposition,
  but the union of man and wife is like the mixing of wine and
  water, or any other case of penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων); for
  they are united not only by the ties of substance and soul and
  the dearest bond of children, but also in body. Other alliances
  are for occasion, this is bound up with the whole purpose of
  life, so that the parents on each side gladly allow that the wife
  should be first in her husband’s affection, and the husband in
  his wife’s.

  But in these days of dissolution and anarchy all things change
  for the worse and marriage is thought a hard thing; and men
  call the celibate life divine because it gives opportunity for
  licentiousness and varied pleasures, and they bar the door
  against a wife as against an enemy. Others have their fancy
  taken by beauty or dowry, and no longer look for a wife who is
  piously brought up and obedient and a good manager; nor do they
  trouble to instruct their wives in these matters. But if a man
  would attend to the warnings of philosophers, of all burdens a
  lawful wife would be the lightest and sweetest. Such a man would
  have four eyes instead of two, and four hands instead of two, to
  supply all his needs: and if he desired leisure to write books or
  take part in politics, he could hand over the whole business of
  housekeeping to his partner[114].’


[Sidenote: Advantages sought.]

=351.= The four cardinal virtues, however widely they are interpreted, do
not exhaust the field of daily duties. All objects that are ‘advantages’
(προηγμένα) are _prima facie_ such that the good man aims at securing
them; although if sufficient reason appears, he will entirely forego
them. The advantages of the soul, good natural disposition, ‘art,’
and ‘progress’ are discussed elsewhere in this chapter; as advantages
of the body are reckoned life, health, strength, good digestion,
good proportions, and beauty; whilst external advantages are wealth,
reputation, noble birth, and the like[115]. In all the details there is
a lack of exactitude and of agreement amongst the teachers. According to
Seneca, men may reasonably wish for tallness[116], and there is a kind
of beauty (not dependent on youth) of which women may be proud without
blame[117]. Fine clothes make no one the better man, but a certain
degree of neatness and cleanliness in dress is an advantage[118]. For
nobility the Stoics have little regard; all men are derived through an
equal number of degrees from the same divine origin; virtue is the true
nobility[119]. Good name (δόξα, _gloria_) is commonly reckoned amongst
‘advantages’[120]; but Chrysippus and Diogenes are said to have taught
that a good man need not move a finger for the sake of reputation, unless
some advantage can be obtained by it. Later teachers, influenced (as we
are told) by the criticisms of Carneades, made it absolutely plain that
they reckoned good name (apart from anything attainable by it) as an
advantage, and they even considered it natural that a man should think
of posthumous reputation[121]. The general feeling of the school seems
to be that the approval of others is too uncertain to be a fitting aim;
its place is taken by the approval of ‘conscience.’ This term, which
originally expressed the burden of a guilty secret, became in the Roman
period modified in meaning, and could thus express the approval awarded
to a man by his inner and personal consciousness, even when all the world
disapproves his acts: this self-approval is closely akin to peace of
mind[122].


[Sidenote: Wealth.]

=352.= On no subject would it be easier to find apparently contradictory
views amongst Stoic writers than on that of wealth. To decry wealth
and praise poverty is to some extent a commonplace with all the
philosophical schools; and with Seneca in particular this was so frequent
a practice[123] that his hearers found some inconsistency between his
words and his deeds; for he was, as is well known, a rich man. But the
position of the school is clear. ‘Riches are not a good’ is a Stoic
paradox, emphasized in a hundred forms, and by every teacher[124]; but
nevertheless they are an ‘advantage,’ and thus are rightly aimed at by
the good man[125]. To the wealthy Stoics generally, and to the Romans of
the republican period especially, the maintenance of the family property
(_res familiaris_) was a duty of high importance; and the wasting of
it in wholesale largess, a serious misdeed[126]. The Stoic view was
sufficiently summed up in a proverb borrowed from Epicurus or one of his
followers: ‘he who feels the need of wealth least, can make the best
use of it[127].’ Although Panaetius did not write a special chapter on
the acquisition and use of wealth[128], yet his views on the latter
point are made sufficiently plain in his treatment of the virtue of
Justice[129]. The justification of wealth lies in the intention to use
it well, and this was a favourite subject with Hecato of Rhodes[130].
As to its acquisition and investment, Cicero is content to refer us
to the high-principled men who conduct the financial affairs of the
capital[131].


[Sidenote: Liberty.]

=353.= Amongst those popular terms which hold an ambiguous place in the
Stoic philosophy we must reckon ‘liberty’ (ἐλευθερία, _libertas_). In one
sense liberty is a condition of soul such as characterizes the free-born
citizen in contrast to the slave; this liberty differs but little from
the virtue of Greatness of Soul already described[132], and in its full
meaning is a good, which the wise man alone can possess[133]. But in
another sense liberty is an external advantage, sometimes defined as
‘the power of living as you wish[134],’ and as such eagerly desired by
the slave; more often perhaps it is conceived as ‘the right of saying
what you please[135].’ In this sense liberty is equivalent to the
παῤῥησία which was the watchword of the democracy of Athens, and was the
equally cherished privilege of the nobility of Rome[136]; in a slightly
different sense it was the boast of the Cynic missionary. The Stoics take
a middle position; whilst all recognise that some sort of liberty is a
precious privilege[137], and are prepared on occasion to sacrifice life
or position for its sake[138], there are not wanting voices to remind us
that it is unreasonable to speak out one’s mind without regard to persons
or circumstances[139], that the wrath of tyrants ought not lightly to be
provoked[140], and that the most terrible of all oppressors is the soul
that has lost its self-control[141].


[Sidenote: Disadvantages.]

=354.= Just as virtue chooses advantages in accordance with natural
laws, so it refuses disadvantages in accordance with a disinclination
(ἔκκλισις, _alienatio_), which is equally natural and right so long
as it is controlled by reason[142]. Since to every advantage there is
opposed a corresponding disadvantage, to choose the one is necessarily
to refuse the other; and the doctrine of ‘reasonable refusal’ is that of
reasonable choice in its negative form. It will therefore be sufficient
to give a formal statement of the theory. Disadvantages, or things that
have negative value (ἀπαξία), may be subdivided according as they are
disadvantages in themselves, as an ungainly figure; or as they bring
about other disadvantages, as shortness of ready money; or for both
reasons, as bad memory or ill-health[143]. They may also be subdivided
into three classes, according as they affect the soul, the body, or
things external. Disadvantages of the soul are such things as inborn
vulgarity or dulness of wit; of the body, ill-health, and dulness of the
organs of sensation; of external things, poverty, loss of children, and
the contempt of our neighbours[144].


[Sidenote: Healthy affections.]

=355.= Since the virtues are permanent dispositions (διαθέσεις) of the
soul, rooted in firm principles in which the wise man never wavers,
but to which none else can attain, some other name is required to
describe those more passing but yet wholesome moods which stand in
contrast with the evil ‘affections’ or perturbations of the soul which
will be discussed in our next chapter. A beginning is made in this
direction with the three ‘good affections’ (εὐπάθειαι, _constantiae_,
_sapientis affectiones_). Here a new use of terms is introduced.
Strictly speaking an ‘affection’ is an evil state of soul; but as we
have no corresponding word for a good and calm condition, the use of
the word ‘affection’ is extended in this direction[145]. Each of these
‘good affections’ is introduced to us in contrast with a perturbation
to which it bears a superficial resemblance. Thus contrasted with Fear
is ‘Caution’ (εὐλάβεια, _cautio_), which is right avoidance, and is
entirely consistent with Courage rightly understood. Subdivisions of
Caution are (i) ‘Shame’ (αἰδώς, _verecundia_), the avoidance of deserved
blame, and (ii) ‘Sanctity’ (ἁγνεία) the avoidance of offences against the
gods[146]. Contrasted with Greed is ‘Readiness’ (βούλησις, _voluntas_),
the reasonable stretching out after future advantages[147]; contrasted
with Hilarity is Joy (χαρά, _gaudium_), the reasonable appreciation of
present advantages[148]. Both Readiness and Joy are entirely consistent
with Soberness rightly understood. To the perturbation of Grief no good
affection is named as bearing any resemblance; but we need not for that
reason question but that the wise man may entertain some quiet form
of sympathy for the troubles of others, and of regret for the blows
which fortune deals to him in political disappointment or personal
bereavement[149].

The ‘good affections’ are possessed by the wise man only[150]; but not
all wise men possess them, nor any at all times[151]. On the other
hand it is a daily duty to approximate to them, so that on this ground
the good citizen enters into competition with the wise man on not
altogether uneven terms[152]. The whole doctrine of ‘good affections’
may be conceived as an answer to those who accuse the Stoic of lack of
feeling[153]; for the much derided ‘apathy’ of the school is substituted
the doctrine of ‘eupathy.’ Wisdom is not to be compared to the surface of
a frozen sea, but to that of a rippling river. The lectures of Musonius
and Epictetus bring out on every point the meaning of ‘eupathy’ in its
various applications.


[Sidenote: The ethical motive.]

=356.= We have now sketched the Stoic system of daily duties in its main
features, and this sketch will be made more complete in many particulars
in the course of the next two chapters. To the modern reader the question
here suggests itself—what compelling force has this system? what motive
is supplied to the ordinary man for thus planning out his life? To this
question the ancient philosophers did not directly address themselves;
nevertheless their answers are implied in their teaching as a whole.
Thus the Stoics would doubtless reply, first, that daily duties are
prescribed to us by reason[154]; not perhaps always by reason in its
highest sense, to which we must not appeal in every individual action,
but at least by the spirit of reasonableness (εὐλογιστία). Secondly, that
the common opinion of mankind, growing daily stronger, recommends them;
they are, as we have seen from the beginning, things that it comes in
our way to do, that every good citizen and good man will be sure to do.
As to future rewards and punishments, though these are not excluded by
Stoicism, they are certainly never pressed as motives for right living.
But the strongest of all motives is undoubtedly the mental picture of
the wise man, the vision of that which is ‘absolutely good.’ Critics may
urge: ‘it is a picture that never has been or will be realized in men’s
lives, a vision of that which is very far off and which you will never
see or touch.’ This the Stoics hardly care to deny, but the difficulty
does not disturb them. The vision attracts by its own beauty, the hope
of attainment is cherished by all but the worst[155]. We have spoken of
the ‘ordinary man,’ or, as the Stoics put it, of ‘us who are not wise
men.’ But, strictly speaking, there is no room for the ordinary man in
the system, but only for the ‘probationer’ (προκόπτων, _proficiens_). It
remains for us to trace the upward path from daily duty to virtue, along
which every good man is endeavouring to advance.


[Sidenote: Progress.]

=357.= The doctrine of progress (προκοπή, _progressio_) is not peculiar
to Stoicism, but it is nevertheless an essential feature of it[156].
Critics may indeed dispute as to whether virtue has ever been in practice
attained; but the Stoic must hold fast to the ethical principles that
‘virtue can be taught[157]’ and that ‘virtue is an art[158].’ Every
man has from birth a capacity for acquiring virtue[159], which varies
in degree according to his natural disposition of soul[160]; on this
foundation every man builds by concurrent learning and practice[161].
The child is greatly helped if he possesses the trait of ‘modesty’
(αἰδώς, _verecundia_), which is essentially a readiness to defer to
others and to learn from those who are older and wiser[162]; though
later it may turn to ‘false shame,’ which is a hindrance[163]. He will
then learn to understand and perform his daily duties; and as his
character ripens, this performance will daily become easier and more
pleasurable to him[164], more certain and more steady in itself. And now
daily duties come near to Right Actions, which are indeed daily duties
perfected (τέλειον καθῆκον, _perfectum officium_), and complete in every
point[165]. In order to rise to this higher standard the good man must
first perform his duty in all particulars[166]; he must do so with
regularity and in harmony with the order of nature[167]; he will then
need only a certain fixity, conviction, and stability to pass into the
ranks of the wise[168].


[Sidenote: Conversion.]

=358.= The stages of progress are variously expounded by Stoic
writers[169]; but on one principle all are agreed. Progress is not a
half-way stage between vice and virtue, as the Peripatetics teach[170];
it is a long preparation, to be followed by a change sudden and complete
(μεταβολή, _conversio_)[171]. The final step, by which a foolish man
becomes in an instant wise, is different in kind to all that have gone
before. This position is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that
‘the good is not constituted by addition[172],’ and is enforced by
various illustrations. The probationer is like a man who has long been
under water; little by little he rises to the surface, but all in a
moment he finds himself able to breathe. He is like a puppy in whom
the organ of sight has been for days past developing; all at once he
gains the power of vision[173]. Just so when progress reaches the end
there dawns upon the eyes of the soul the complete and dazzling vision
of the good, of which till now only shadows and reflections have been
perceived. For a moment he is wise, but does not even yet realize his
own wisdom; then again in a moment he passes on to the complete fruition
of happiness[174].


[Sidenote: Duty.]

=359.= Thus from the lowlier conception of ‘daily duties’ we have again
climbed upwards to the supreme ethical end, to absolute goodness, which
is Virtue in her full royalty and the Universal Law (κοινὸς νόμος) as it
appeals to the individual man. In this connexion the ideal is familiar
in modern times under the name of Duty. The ancient Stoics perhaps never
quite reached to any such complete formulation of their ethical theory
in a single word; but their general meaning is perfectly expressed by
it. Just as the Socratic paradoxes mark the quarrel of philosophy with
outworn ideas expressed in conventional language, so its reconciliation
with the general opinion is marked by those newly-coined terms such as
‘conscience’ and ‘affection’ which are now familiar household words. We
cannot indeed demonstrate that ‘Duty exists,’ any more than we can that
deity or providence exists; but we may well say that without it ethical
discussion would in our own day be hardly possible. The following stanzas
from Wordsworth’s ‘Ode to Duty,’ based upon a Stoic text[175], may be a
useful reminder, not only of the dominant position of this conception in
modern thought, but also of the continued tendency of the human mind to
express its supreme convictions in anthropomorphic language.

          ‘Stern daughter of the Voice of God!
          O Duty! if that name thou love
          Who art a light to guide, a rod
          To check the erring, and reprove:
          Thou who art victory and law
          When empty terrors overawe:
          From vain temptations dost set free;
  And calm’st the weary strife of frail humanity!

          Stern Lawgiver! yet thou dost wear
          The Godhead’s most benignant grace;
          Nor know we anything so fair
          As is the smile upon thy face:
          Flowers laugh before thee on thy beds
          And fragrance in thy footing treads:
          Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;
  And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong.

          To humbler functions, awful Power!
          I call thee: I myself commend
          Unto thy guidance from this hour;
          O let my weakness have an end!
          Give unto me, made lowly wise,
          The spirit of self-sacrifice;
          The confidence of Reason give;
  And in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live!’[176]


FOOTNOTES

[1] The English term, like so many we have to use, is an imperfect
translation; in discussing such questions as marriage and death we speak
instead of ‘ordinary’ or ‘simple’ duties.

[2] κατωνομάσθαι δ’ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ‘κατά
τινας ἥκειν’ τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης Diog. L. vii 108.

[3] ‘est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis’ Cic. _Fin._
iii 18, 59.

[4] Stob. ii 7, 8.

[5] Diog. L. vii 107.

[6] Stob. ii 7, 8.

[7] τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα
λέγεσθαι Stob. as above; ‘[sapiens] iudicat, cum agit, officium illud
esse’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 18, 59.

[8] See below, §§ 357, 358.

[9] Diog. L. vii 4.

[10] _ib._ 175.

[11] ‘omnia officia eo [referuntur], ut adipiscamur principia naturae’
Cic. _Fin._ iii 6, 22.

[12] ‘Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia
naturae acceperat’ _ib._ iv 16, 45.

[13] καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν Diog.
L. vii 107; ‘est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti
probabilis ratio reddi possit’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 17, 58; ‘ratio [non] debet
agere quidquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere’ _Off._ i
29, 101; ‘huic respondebimus, nunquam exspectare nos certissimam rerum
comprehensionem, quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio; sed ea ire, qua
ducit verisimilitudo, omne hac via procedit officium’ Sen. _Ben._ iv 33,
2; and see above, § 159.

[14] See above, § 110.

[15] ‘quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico
bonum sed initium boni’ Sen. _Ep._ 124, 7.

[16] See above, § 306.

[17] ‘placet his, simul atque natum sit animal, ipsum sibi conciliari et
commendari ad se conservandum, et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia
sunt eius status, diligenda’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 5, 16; the maintenance of a
complete life is illustrated by the desire to avoid the loss of a limb
or deformity, _ib._ 17. ‘Universally (be not deceived) every animal is
attached to nothing so much as to its own interest’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 22,
15.

[18] ‘commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus
procreandi causa, et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sunt’ Cic. _Off._
i 4, 11.

[19] _ib._

[20] _ib._ 12.

[21] Cic. _Off._ i 4, 13.

[22] _ib._

[23] _ib._ 14.

[24] ‘formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem honesti vides;
quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret
sapientiae’ _ib._ 5, 14.

[25] ‘in principiis autem naturalibus plerique Stoici non putant
voluptatem esse ponendam: quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne si
voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur,
multa turpia sequantur’ _Fin._ iii 5, 17. Yet Cicero, still writing as
a Stoic, can say: ‘[beluae] nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque
feruntur omni impetu’ _Off._ i 30, 105. See below, §§ 346, 347.

[26] See below, §§ 343, 344.

[27] ‘in iis, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem
perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt’ Cic.
_Off._ iii 3, 13; ‘vivitur cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, si sunt
simulacra virtutis’ _ib._ i 15, 46; ‘est autem quaedam animi sanitas,
quae in insipientem etiam cadat, cum curatione medicorum turbatio mentis
aufertur’ _Tusc. disp._ iv 13, 30.

[28] Diog. L. vii 92; ‘in duas partes virtus dividitur, in
contemplationem veri et actionem’ Sen. _Ep._ 94, 45.

[29] ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας (leg. τέχνας Hirz. ii
482) εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων· ἄλλας δὲ
ἐπιγίνεσθαι ταύταις, οὐκ ἔτι τέχνας οὔσας, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινάς, ἐκ τῆς
ἀσκήσεως περιγιγνομένας Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4.

[30] For the virtues recognised by Chrysippus and others see Arnim iii
262-293; we find a sufficiently long list in Seneca: fortitudo, fides,
temperantia, humanitas, simplicitas, modestia ac moderatio, frugalitas et
parsimonia, clementia, _Ep._ 88, 29 and 30.

[31] Plut. _virt. mor._ 2; _de fort._ 2; _Sto. rep._ vii 1.

[32] Thus φρόνησις became ἐπιστήμη ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ
οὐδετέρων Stob. ii 7 5 b 1, cf. Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 37 (Arnim iii 283).

[33] ‘omnis cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus
honestis aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versatur’ Cic. _Off._
i 6, 19; ‘natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et
actioni’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 5, 1.

[34] ‘quid ergo? nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia? ad alia multum,
ad virtutem nihil. quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus? quia
animum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant’ _Ep._ 88, 20.

[35] ‘sine hac arte (sc. dialectica) quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci
fallique posse’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 21, 72.

[36] ‘qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei proficiscendum est ab
omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione’ _ib._ 22, 73.

[37] ‘ad eas virtutes dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque
ambas virtutum nomine appellant’ _ib._ 21, 72.

[38] ‘ad hoc nobis proderit inspicere rerum naturam. primo discedemus a
sordidis; deinde animum ipsum, quo summo magnoque opus est, seducemus
a corpore; deinde in occultis exercitata subtilitas non erit in aperta
deterior’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii Praef. 18.

[39] ‘quae omnes artes [sc. astrologia, geometria, ius civile] in veri
investigatione versantur, cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra
officium est’ Cic. _Off._ i 6, 19.

[40] ‘est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium ... in res conferunt
non necessarias’ _ib._ 6, 18.

[41] A. Gellius, _N. A._ xiv 4, 4.

[42] Cic. _Off._ i 7, 21 and 22.

[43] _ib._ 13, 41.

[44] ‘principes sint patria ac parentes; proximi liberi, totaque domus,
quae spectat in nos solos; deinde bene convenientes propinqui’ Cic.
_Off._ i 17, 58.

[45] ‘I ought not to be free from affections (ἀπαθής) like a statue, but
I ought to maintain the relations (σχέσεις) natural and acquired, as a
pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 2,
4; ‘Duties are usually measured by relations (ταῖς σχέσεσι). Is a man
a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all
things. Does a brother wrong you? Maintain then your own position towards
him’ _Manual_ 30. All the duties of relationship on the one side imply
corresponding duties on the other side; ‘invicem ista, quantum exigunt,
praestant, et parem desiderant regulam, quae (ut ait Hecaton) difficilis
est’ Sen. _Ben._ ii 18, 2.

[46] ‘[fortitudo] scientia est distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid
non sit’ _Ep._ 85, 28; ‘quomodo igitur Chrysippus? fortitudo est,
inquit, scientia rerum perferendarum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac
perferendo, summae legi parens sine timore’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 24, 53.

[47] ‘quicquid est hoc, Marcia, quod circa nos ex adventicio fulget,
liberi honores opes, ampla atria et exclusorum clientium turba referta
vestibula, clara nobilis aut formosa coniunx ceteraque ex incerta et
mobili sorte pendentia, alieni commodatique adparatus sunt; nihil horum
dono datur; collaticiis et ad dominos redituris instrumentis scena
adornatur’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 10, 1; ‘victrix fortunae sapientia’ Juv.
_Sat._ xiii 20.

[48] ‘cum potentes et imperio editi nocere intendent, citra sapientiam
omnes eorum impetus deficient’ Sen. _Dial._ ii 4, 1.

[49] ‘levis est, si ferre possum; brevis est, si ferre non possum’ _Ep._
24, 14.

[50] ‘inter haec tamen aliquis non gemuit. parum est, non rogavit. parum
est, non respondit. parum est: risit, et quidem ex animo’ _ib._ 78, 19.

[51] ‘mors optimum inventum naturae’ _Dial._ vi 20, 1; ‘fortem posce
animum, mortis terrore carentem, | qui spatium vitae extremum inter
munera ponat | naturae’ Juv. _Sat._ x 357-9.

[52] ‘caram te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 20, 3;
‘nullo nos invida tanto | armavit natura bono, quam ianua mortis | quod
patet’ Silius _Pun._ xi 186-8; ‘adeo mors timenda non est, ut beneficio
eius nihil timendum sit’ Sen. _Ep._ 24, 11.

[53] ‘[mors] quin habeat aliquid in se terribile, ut et animos nostros,
quos in amorem sui natura formavit, offendat, nemo dubitat’ _ib._ 36, 8.

[54] So Heraclitus had said ‘unus dies par omni est’ _ib._ 12, 7; ‘ut
prorogetur tibi dies mortis, nihil proficitur ad felicitatem: quoniam
mora non fit beatior vita, sed longior’ _Ben._ v 17, 6.

[55] ‘si [senectus] coeperit concutere mentem, si partes eius convellere,
si mihi non vitam reliquerit sed animam, prosiliam ex aedificio putri ac
ruenti’ _Ep._ 58, 35.

[56] ‘melius nos | Zenonis praecepta docent; nec enim omnia, quaedam |
pro vita facienda putant’ Juv. _Sat._ xv 106 to 108.

[57] Diog. L. vii 130. Ingenious members of the school found five good
reasons for voluntarily quitting life, resembling the causes for breaking
up a banquet. As the guests part, because of (i) a sudden need, such as
the arrival of a friend, (ii) revellers breaking in and using violent
language, (iii) the food turning bad, (iv) the food being eaten up, or
(v) the company being drunk; so the wise man will depart, because of
(i) a call to sacrifice himself for his country, (ii) tyrants doing him
violence, (iii) disease hindering the use of the body, (iv) poverty, (v)
madness, which is the drunkenness of the soul. See Arnim iii 768.

[58] Notably in the case of Cato.

[59] ‘in quo plura sunt, quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est
in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria, aut fore videntur,
huius officium est e vita excedere’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 18, 60.

[60] ‘perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui iidem miseri sint, officium
esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerum, quas secundum
naturam esse dicimus’ _ib._ iii 18, 61.

[61] He might easily have obtained acquittal by a judicious defence: Xen.
_Mem._ iv 4, 4.

[62] ‘Catoni gladium adsertorem libertatis extorque: magnam partem
detraxeris gloriae’ Sen. _Ep._ 13, 14.

[63] ‘ille adfectus multos occupavit, libido moriendi’ _ib._ 24, 25;
‘quid ergo? non multos spectavi abrumpentes vitam? ego vero vidi, sed
plus momenti apud me habent qui ad mortem veniunt sine odio vitae, et
admittunt illam, non adtrahunt’ _ib._ 30, 15.

[64] _ib._ 24, 25.

[65] _ib._ 117, 22.

[66] Epict. _Disc._ i 9, 16.

[67] ‘probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt
propugnantem pro aequitate’ Cic. _Off._ i 19, 62.

[68] _ib._ 21, 71.

[69] _ib._ 26, 92.

[70] _ib._ 23, 80.

[71] ‘Zenon ait; accedet ad rempublicam [sapiens], nisi si quid
impedierit’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 3, 2.

[72] See above, §§ 89, 90.

[73] See above, § 91.

[74] ‘efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi obediant, eamque
neque praecurrant, nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque
tranquilli atque omni perturbatione animi careant’ Cic. _Off._ i 29, 102.

[75] ‘hoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latine _decorum_ potest; Graece
enim πρέπον dicitur; huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari’
_ib._ i 27, 93.

[76] Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4; ‘ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum
cum coloris quadam suavitate, ea quae dicitur pulchritudo; sic in animo
opinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia, cum firmitate quadam
et stabilitate, pulchritudo vocatur’ _Tusc. disp._ iv 13, 31.

[77] ‘id decorum [volunt] esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in
eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali’ _Off._ i
27, 96.

[78] ‘adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines, et
optimi cuiusque et reliquorum’ _ib._ 28, 99; ‘to order myself lowly and
reverently to all my betters’ English Church Catechism.

[79] Cic. _Off._ i 29, 104.

[80] ‘id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. suum
quisque igitur noscat ingenium’ _ib._ 31, 113-4. Retail trading, and all
the arts that subserve luxury, are illiberal; agriculture is the most
truly liberal: _ib._ 42, 150 and 151.

[81] _ib._ 34, 122-124.

[82] ‘venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem’ _ib._ 36,
130. In the same spirit Epictetus says ‘we ought not to confound the
distinctions of the sexes’ _Disc._ i 16, 14.

[83] Cic. _Off._ i 35, 127.

[84] ‘nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene
Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea quae re turpia non sint,
verbis flagitiosa ducamus; illa autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus
appellemus suis’ _ib._ i 35, 128; ‘Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam
alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis eiusmodi forte casus inciderit,
ut id faciendum sit: alii nullo modo’ _Fin._ iii 20, 68.

[85] ‘habes scholam Stoicam, ὁ σοφὸς εὐθυῤῥημονήσει. ego servo et servabo
(sic enim adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. itaque tectis verbis ea ad te
scripsi, quae apertissimis agunt Stoici’ _Fam._ ix 22, 5. See also above,
§ 318.

[86] ‘rem ineptissimam fecero, si nunc verba quaesiero, quemadmodum dicam
illum matelam sumpsisse’ Sen. _Ben._ iii 26, 2.

[87] _Dial._ vi 20, 3.

[88] σωφροσύνην δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων
Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.

[89] τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου _ib._ 7, 5 b 2.

[90] μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην was the expression of Antisthenes, see
Diog. L. vi 3; ‘voluptas est ... res humilis, membrorum turpium aut
vilium ministerio veniens’ Sen. _Ben._ vii 2, 2.

[91] ‘intellegitur appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse’ Cic.
_Off._ i 29, 103.

[92] See above, § 319. It does not seem possible to accept Pearson’s view
(on Z. fr. 128) that Zeno intended πόνος to be the προηγμένον, and ἡδονή
the ἀποπροηγμένον; but both he and his successors undoubtedly recognised
the value of πόνος (toil) as a discipline. The following remarks
communicated to the writer by Mr Pearson throw much light on a really
difficult question. ‘Even the Cynics are forced to admit that not all
“pleasure” is to be condemned (the evidence is in Zeller’s _Socratics_,
p. 308), but the only form of it which deserves consideration is that
which is the result and after-effect of πόνος. In other words, it may
be argued that true pleasure is the cessation of pain (Plat. _Phileb._
44 B). The glorification of Heracles the toilsome hero corresponds; but
pleasure as understood by the vulgar is unhesitatingly to be rejected.
Zeno was the inheritor of all this, and, if he ever said that ἡδονή was
προηγμένον, his remark can only have applied to the ἀπονία-ἡδονή; and
such certainly was the view of Chrysippus (Plut. _Sto. rep._ 30, 2).’
In the passage here referred to from Plutarch ἀπονία takes the place of
ἡδονή as a προηγμένον; so also in Stob. ii 7, 7 e and Cic. _Fin._ iii 15,
51. See further §§ 347, 371.

[93] ἡδονή as an advantage is contrasted with πόνος (suffering) as a
disadvantage in the list attributed to these writers in Diog. L. vii 102.

[94] Cic. _Fin._ ii 21, 69.

[95] Κλεάνθης μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν [ἡδονὴν] εἶναι μήτ’ ἀξίαν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ
βίῳ Sext. _math._ xi 74 (Arnim iii 155).

[96] Arnim iii 136, 155.

[97] ‘sit impudens, si [voluptas] pluris esse contendat dulcedinem
corporis, et titillationem, ex eave natam laetitiam, quam gravitatem
animi’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 1, 1; ‘quis mortalium per diem noctemque titillari
velit?’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 5, 4; ‘quidni ista bene penset cum minutis et
frivolis et non perseverantibus corpusculi motibus?’ _ib._ 4, 4.

[98] ‘voluptas habet quiddam simile naturali bono’ Cic. _Leg._ i 11, 31;
‘[voluptas] condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit’
_Off._ iii 33, 120; ‘voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non
ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere, gratiora
nobis illius faceret accessio’ Sen. _Ep._ 116, 3; ‘[virtus voluptatem]
non praestat, sed et hanc; nec huic laborat, sed labor eius, quamvis
aliud petat, hoc quoque adsequetur’ _Dial._ vii 9, 1. That this view was
held by Chrysippus appears from Diog. L. vii 86 (cf. Arnim iii 229 a);
see also above, notes 92 and 93.

[99] _Eth. N._ x 7.

[100] ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν Diog. L.
vii 114 (of Chrysippus); ‘hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in
animo, vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt; sublationem
animi sine ratione, opinantis se magno bono frui’ Cic. _Fin._ ii 4, 13;
‘vitium esse voluptatem credimus’ Sen. _Ep._ 59, 1.

[101] ‘quam [perturbationem] Stoici ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam
appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic. _Fin._
iii 10, 35. Sometimes Cicero translates with more fulness by _laetitia
gestiens_ or _nimia_; _Tusc. disp._ iv 6, 13.

[102] Παναίτιος δὲ [ἡδονήν φησί] τινα μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν, τινὰ δὲ
παρὰ φύσιν Sext. _math._ xi 73 (Arnim iii 155).

[103] See below, §§ 371, 402, 403. On the whole subject see further
Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, pp. 110 to 112.

[104] ‘Antipater Tyrius, Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper est mortuus,
praeterit[am] censet a Panaetio valetudinis curationem. valetudo
sustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quae res aut prodesse
soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu corporis
tuendi causa, postremo arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent’
Cic. _Off._ ii 24, 86.

[105] ‘hanc sanam et salubrem formam vitae tenete, ut corpori tantum
indulgeatis, quantum bonae valetudini satis est ... cibus famem sedet,
potio sitim extinguat, vestis arceat frigus, domus munimentum sit
adversus infesta corporis’ Sen. _Ep._ 8, 5; and so Musonius, below, § 381.

[106] Epict. _Disc._ iii 22 and 26.

[107] See above, § 304.

[108] Diog. L. vii 129; ‘Stoici sapientem amaturum esse dicunt’ Cic.
_Tusc. disp._ iv 34, 72.

[109] ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον Diog. L. vii 130;
‘[Stoici] amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis
specie definiunt’ Cic. as above. The ἐπιβολή or _conatus_ is a variety of
the ὁρμή or _appetitio_, Hirzel p. 390.

[110] Not of course new in any absolute sense; in the country at least
such relations must always have been common.

[111] Diog. L. vi 96-98.

[112] See above, § 300, and § 306, note 29; and below, §§ 431, 439, 444,
and 446.

[113] ‘in consensu vidui caelibatus nemo uxorem duxit, nisi qui abduxit’
Sen. _Ben._ i 9, 4.

[114] Stob. iv 22, 25; and see further, §§ 406, 407.

[115] Diog. L. vii 106.

[116] ‘non contemnet se sapiens, etiamsi fuerit minimae staturae; esse
tamen se procerum volet’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 22, 2.

[117] ‘unicum tibi ornamentum pulcherrima et nulli obnoxia aetati forma’
_ib._ xii 16, 4.

[118] ‘contra naturam est, faciles odisse munditias’ Sen. _Ep._ 5, 4;
‘non splendeat toga, ne sordeat quidem’ _ib._ 5, 3.

[119] ‘unus omnium parens mundus est: ad hunc prima cuiusque origo
perducitur’ _Ben._ iii 28, 2; ‘[philosophia] stemma non inspicit
... animus facit nobilem’ _Ep._ 44, 1 and 5.

[120] Diog. L. vii 106; Cic. _Fin._ iii 15, 51.

[121] ‘de bona autem fama ... Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta
utilitate, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant. qui
autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc quam
dixi bonam famam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt’ _ib._
17, 57. Cicero and Seneca were both keenly sensitive to the judgment of
posterity: ‘paucis natus est, qui populum aetatis suae cogitat: multa
annorum milia, multa populorum supervenient: ad illa respice. etiamsi
omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor indixerit, venient qui sine
offensa sine gratia iudicent’ Sen. _Ep._ 79, 17.

[122] ‘pacem demus animo, quam dabit ... intenta mens ad unius honesti
cupiditatem. conscientiae satis fiat; nil in famam laboremus’ _Dial._ v
41, 2.

[123] ‘multis ad philosophandum obstitere divitiae; paupertas expedita
est, secura est’ _Ep._ 17, 3; ‘transeamus ad patrimonia, maximam
humanarum aerumnarum materiam’ _Dial._ ix 8, 1.

[124] ‘Posidonius sic interrogandum ait: quae neque magnitudinem animo
dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, non sunt bona. divitiae autem ... nihil
horum faciunt; ergo non sunt [bonum]’ _Ep._ 87, 35.

[125] ‘divitias nego bonum esse; nam si essent, bonos facerent. ceterum
et habendas esse et utiles et magna commoda vitae adferentis fateor’
_Dial._ vii 24, 5; ‘[sapiens] non amat divitias, sed mavult. maiorem
virtuti suae materiem subministrari vult’ _ib._ 21, 4.

[126] ‘largitio quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis
exhaurit’ Cic. _Off._ ii 15, 52; ‘mentitur prodigus liberalem, cum
plurimum intersit utrum quis dare sciat an servare nesciat’ Sen. _Ep._
120, 8.

[127] ‘is maxime divitiis fruitur, qui minime divitiis indiget’ _ib._ 14,
17.

[128] Cic. _Off._ ii 24, 86.

[129] See above, § 337.

[130] ‘Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris,
quos de Officiis scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere “sapientis esse, nihil
contra mores leges instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris.
neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis propinquis
amicis, maximeque reipublicae. singulorum enim facultates et copiae
divitiae sunt civitatis”’ Cic. _Off._ iii 15, 63.

[131] ‘toto hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, commodius
a quibusdam optimis viris, ad Ianum medium sedentibus, quam ab ullis
philosophis ulla in schola disputatur’ _ib._ ii 25, 90; and see further,
§ 408.

[132] See above, § 342.

[133] τὴν μὲν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαθόν, ... δι’ ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν
σπουδαῖον εἶναι μόνον ἐλεύθερον Stob. ii 7, 11 i.

[134] ‘quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis’ Cic. _Par._ 5,
34.

[135] ‘asperitas agrestis | vult libertas dici mera’ Hor. _Ep._ i 18, 6
and 8.

[136] Juv. _Sat._ i 151-153.

[137] ‘non potest gratis constare libertas; hanc si magno aestimas, omnia
parvo aestimanda sunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 104, 34, where the reference is to
‘libertas’ in both senses.

[138] ‘nec civis erat, qui libera posset | verba animi proferre, et vitam
impendere vero’ Juv. _Sat._ iv 90 and 91.

[139] οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ πρὸς ὁντινοῦν λεκτέον ἃ φρονοῦμεν
Muson. apud Stob. iii 40, 9 (Hense, p. 754, 6).

[140] ‘sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit; immo declinabit, non
aliter quam in navigando procellam’ Sen. _Ep._ 14, 7.

[141] ‘Can we abolish the acropolis that is in us, and cast out the
tyrant within us, whom we have daily over us?’ Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 86.

[142] Χρύσιππός φησι μαίνεσθαι τοὺς ... τὴν ἀπονίαν ἐν μηδενὶ ποιουμένους
Plut. _Sto. rep._ 30, 2; ‘in aliis satis esse causae [Stoici voluerunt]
quamobrem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut ... in doloris vacuitate’ Cic.
_Fin._ iii 15, 51.

[143] Stob. ii 7, 7 b; Cic. _Fin._ iii 17, 56.

[144] Stob. as above.

[145] For a similar change in the meaning of the word ‘conscience’ see
above, § 351; the new use of this word as of the word ‘affection’ is that
now commonly understood in ethical discussion.

[146] Diog. L. vii 116; ‘declinatio [malorum] si cum ratione fiet, cautio
appelletur, eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._
iv 6, 13.

[147] ‘eiusmodi appetitionem Stoici βούλησιν appellant, nos appellamus
voluntatem: quam sic definiunt—voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione
desiderat’ _ib._ 6, 12.

[148] ‘cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud
gaudium dicitur’ _ib._ 6, 13.

[149] See below, §§ 374, 379.

[150] ‘scio gaudium nisi sapienti non contingere. est enim animi elatio
suis bonis verisque fidentis’ Sen. _Ep._ 59, 1 and 2; ‘sola virtus
praestat gaudium perpetuum’ _ib._ 27, 3.

[151] χαρὰν δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ φρόνιμον περιπάτησιν [λέγουσιν] οὔτε
πᾶσι τοῖς φρονίμοις ὑπάρχειν οὔτε αἰεί Stob. ii 7, 5 c.

[152] ‘in huius gaudii possessione esse te volo’ Sen. _Ep._ 23, 4.

[153] ‘ἀναλγησία enim atque ἀπάθεια quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu
prudentiorum hominum, sicut iudicio Panaetii, inprobata abiectaque est’
A. Gellius _N. A._ xii 5, 10.

[154] τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον
ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ iv 2, p. 368 K.

[155] ‘negat [Zenon] Platonem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa,
qua tyrannum Dionysium. huic mori optimum esse propter desperationem
sapientiae; illi propter spem vivere’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 20, 56.

[156] See above, §§ 289, 324.

[157] For the Socratic paradox ‘virtue can be taught,’ see above, § 46,
also Diog. L. vii 91; ‘nemo est casu bonus. discenda virtus est’ Sen.
_Ep._ 123, 16.

[158] Arnim iii 214.

[159] ‘omnibus natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum’ Sen. _Ep._ 108,
8.

[160] The emphasis occasionally laid on εὐφυΐα (_bona indoles_) reflects
aristocratic and Platonic influences, see Pearson, pp. 205, 206; ‘those
who have a good natural disposition (οἱ εὐφυεῖς), even if you try to turn
them aside, cling still more to reason’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 6, 9.

[161] ‘Modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions
destroy him; actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the
contrary actions destroy him’ _ib._ ii 9, 11; ‘What then is progress? if
any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will
(προαίρεσις) to exercise it and to improve it by labour’ _ib._ i 4, 18.

[162] Cic. _de Off._ i 28, 99 (§ 343 above); ‘verecundiam, bonum in
adulescente signum’ Sen. _Ep._ 11, 1.

[163] ‘[obstitit] verecundia, quae multorum profectus silentio pressit’
_Dial._ vi 24, 2; cf. _Ep._ 40, 14.

[164] ‘paulatim voluptati sunt quae necessitate coeperunt’ _Dial._ i 4,
15.

[165] Stob. ii 7, 8, 8 a, and 11 a; Cic. _Off._ i 3, 8 and iii 3, 14.

[166] ὁ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος], προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι
τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει Stob. iv (Flor.) 103, 22 M (Arnim iii
510).

[167] ‘primum est officium, ut se conservet in naturae statu; deinceps ut
ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint; ... deinde ea [selectio] perpetua;
tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae; in qua primum inesse
incipit et intellegi, quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici’ Cic. _Fin._
iii 6, 20.

[168] ἐπιγίγνεσθαι [τῷ προκόπτοντι] τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις
αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἑκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξίν τινα λάβωσι Stob.
as above; ‘illud, quod ultimum venit, ut fidem tibi habeas et recta ire
te via credas’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 2. Epictetus uses the technical term
ἀμεταπτωσία ‘unchangeable firmness of mind’ _Disc._ iii 2, 8.

[169] See especially Seneca, _Epp._ 75 and 95.

[170] Diog. L. vii 127.

[171] τὴν δὲ μεταστροφὴν τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ ἐκ μεταβολῆς φασὶ
γίνεσθαι, μεταβαλλούσης τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν Clem. Al. _Strom._ iv 6, 28
(Arnim iii 221).

[172] Cic. _Fin._ iii 14, 45; and see above, § 322.

[173] ‘ut qui demersi sunt in aqua, nihilo magis respirare possunt, si
non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam
tum essent in profundo; nec catulus ille, qui iam appropinquat ut videat,
plus cernit quam is qui modo est natus; item, qui processit aliquantum
ad virtutis aditum, nihilominus in miseria est, quam ille qui nihil
processit’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 14, 48.

[174] As to the man who is ‘wise without knowing it’ (διαλεληθὼς σοφός)
see Arnim iii 539 to 542, and Plut. _Sto. rep._ 19, 3 and 4.

[175] ‘iam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus, ut non tantum recte
facere posset, sed nisi recte facere non posset’ Sen. _Ep._ 120, 10.

[176] Written in 1805.



CHAPTER XIV.

SIN AND WEAKNESS.


[Sidenote: Sin.]

=360.= The Stoic view of the universe is coloured by optimism. All comes
from God, all works towards good. None the less the Stoic morals are
stern. Men in the mass are both foolish and wicked; they defy God’s
will and thwart his purpose. The world is full of sin, and all sins (to
use the Socratic paradox) are equal. What then is sin? It is a missing
of the mark at which virtue aims (ἁμάρτημα); it is a stumbling on the
road (_peccatum_); it is a transgressing of the boundary line[1]. It
is the child of ignorance, the outward expression of ill health of the
soul. Everywhere and in every man it weakens, hampers, and delays the
work of virtue. It cannot however finally triumph, for it is at war
with itself. The Persians were wrong when they conceived an Evil Power,
a concentration of all the powers of mischief in one personality. This
cannot be, for sin lacks essential unity. It destroys but does not
build; it scatters but it does not sow. It is an earth-born giant, whose
unwieldy limbs will in the end be prostrated by a combatant, small to the
outward view, but inspired with divine forcefulness. If we understand
what sin is, we shall see its repulsiveness; if we learn how it spreads,
we shall seek protection against its infecting poison; if we attack it in
detail, in individual men and in their daily acts, we shall in the end
lay it low. Philosophy then proceeds to arm itself for its task.


[Sidenote: The four sinful conditions are errors.]

=361.= Sin is ignorance; more accurately, it is that which appears to be
knowledge, but is not knowledge; it is false judgment. If we follow the
process by which knowledge is attained, we find that there is no error
in the mind-picture (_visum_), whether it is sensory or partly sensory
and partly rational; this is an adumbration automatically presented to
the mind. But ‘assent is in our power’; it is both an intellectual and
a moral act. A too hasty assent to that which appears to be but is not
is both an error and an offence; and most particularly so when it lies
in the application of the general conceptions (προλήψεις) of ‘good’ and
‘evil’ to particular cases[2]. In this way we quickly reach four sinful
conditions, which come about by mistaking things indifferent, that is,
advantages and disadvantages, for things good or evil. These are:

(i) Fear (φόβος, _metus_), in which a future disadvantage is mistaken for
a future evil;

(ii) Greed (ἐπιθυμία, _libido_), in which a future advantage is mistaken
for a future good;

(iii) Grief (λύπη, _aegritudo_), in which a present disadvantage is
mistaken for a present evil;

(iv) Hilarity (ἡδονή, _laetitia_), in which a present advantage is
mistaken for a present good[3].

In the case of the last two evils the title presents difficulty in
all languages; thus for Grief we might substitute any term such as
Discontent, Vexation, Worry or Fretfulness; it is a lack of Courage in
bearing pain or disappointment. Again for Hilarity we might substitute
Elation, Exaltation, Excitement: it is a lack of Soberness in the moment
of pleasure.


[Sidenote: They are also maladies.]

=362.= From another point of view all sin is due to a lack of moral
force, a want of tone in the moral sinews, an unhealthy condition
of the soul[4]. Ultimately this point of view agrees with that just
described: for it is the lack of health and strength which leads to hasty
and ill-judged assent[5]. But for practical purposes we may use this
distinction to lead up to a difference of grade. Thus we may associate
ignorance with that rooted perversity of mind which is the exact opposite
of virtue, and which is therefore in the strictest sense ‘vice’ (κακία,
_vitium_)[5]; and want of tone with a passing condition which we cannot
deny to be an evil, but may nevertheless describe by the gentler terms
‘perturbation’ and ‘affection[6].’ Such an evil is a disturbance of the
soul’s calm, an ‘infection’ of its health. It may exist in three grades
to be hereafter described, as a ‘ruffling,’ a ‘disturbance,’ a ‘disease’;
and in both the latter forms it must be rooted out, for in both grades it
is an evil, and in the last it is a vice which threatens to poison the
man’s whole nature. Hence we reach the Stoic paradox that ‘the affections
must be extirpated[7].’ But although this is our only ethical standard,
we are not debarred from suggesting remedies which may alleviate the
malady in particular persons and under special circumstances.


[Sidenote: Fear.]

=363.= The evil of Fear (φόβος, _formido_, _metus_) is practically
opposed to the virtue of Courage. Here philosophy builds upon the
foundations of common opinion, and its task is the easier. The youth who
is brought up not to regard suffering, poverty, exile, or death as evils,
will never be afraid. Since it is death that most alarms mankind by its
grim aspect, he who can face this giant without trembling will not know
fear, or at the most will only feel a slight ruffling of the soul. In
asserting that ‘fear should be rooted out’ the Stoics cross no general
sentiment; the tradition of the heroic age is the same.


[Sidenote: Greed.]

=364.= The treatment of Greed (ἐπιθυμία, _libido_) is similar. This fault
is opposed to the Soberness with which men should aim at advantages; and
when we have determined the standard of Soberness every transgression of
it reveals Greed. But under this heading the Stoics include the vices of
Anger[8] and Cruelty, for which the heroic age had no condemnation. In
regard to the former they come into conflict with the Peripatetics also,
who maintain that Anger serves useful ends, and should be controlled, not
extirpated[9]. The consideration of this condition of mind will therefore
bring out the divergence between the two schools.


[Sidenote: Anger.]

=365.= The Peripatetics assign Anger to the passionate part of the soul
(τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν); they admit that it needs to be restrained by reason,
but hold that within proper limits it is both natural and necessary. In
war it is essential to heroic action; he who is filled with it despises
danger, and rushes on to great achievements[10]. It is no less necessary
in peace, in order that the wicked may not go unpunished[11]. Aristotle
says compendiously that ‘anger is the spur of virtue[12],’ the armour of
the man of high soul. To this point of view the Stoics are opposed alike
on the ground of principle and of experience. We do not need disease as a
means to health[13], or armour which sways instead of being swayed[14].
A good man will face danger unmoved, from the sense of duty; and will
face it more firmly and more perseveringly than he whose passions are
excited[15]. He will punish wrong-doers either for their amendment or for
the protection of others, without being angry with them[16]. Fabius the
Delayer conquered his own spirit before he overcame Hannibal[17]; and the
very gladiators strike, not when their feelings move them, but when the
opportunity has come[18].


[Sidenote: Degrees of anger; remedies for it.]

=366.= Anger is technically defined as ‘the greedy desire of avenging
an injury,’ or (more precisely) as ‘the greedy desire to punish one
whom you deem to have injured you unjustly[19].’ That it is a temporary
madness has always been held by the wise[20]; and this is indicated by
the appearance of the angry, the threatening look, the heightened colour,
the gnashing teeth, the stamp of the foot[21]; also by the fact that
children are specially prone to anger, even for frivolous causes[22], and
that anger is often directed against harmless persons or objects[23].
Nevertheless anger does not consist of a merely instinctive feeling,
but implies the assent of the will[24]; so that we can always trace the
three stages, first the appearance of an injury done (_species oblata
iniuriae_), secondly the assent (_animus adsentit atque adprobat_),
thirdly the outbreak of anger (_sequitur ira_)[25]. To check anger the
first necessity is time[26]: reflection will often show us that we have
not been injured at all, or not so much as we supposed[27]. Then it is
well to put ourselves in the place of the offender, and try to look at
the offence from his point of view[28]. Where anger has become a disease
(_iracundia_), more violent remedies must be used; some have been cured
by looking at themselves in a mirror[29]; others must apply the ‘contrary
twist[30],’ and learn when struck to turn quietly away[31].


[Sidenote: Variations of anger.]

=367.= Anger is an evil that has many varieties, and the precisians
exercise their ingenuity in distinguishing the bitter-humoured
(_amarus_), the fiery (_stomachosus_), the fierce (_rabiosus_), the man
who is hard to get on with (_difficilis_), and many other shades of
character. But one variety deserves special notice, because the evil
disposition exists though its expression is checked. The angry man of
this type does not allow himself to go beyond complaint and criticism,
but he nurses his feeling in the depths of his heart[32]. He would on no
account express himself in loud outcries, but his displeasure is easily
excited and persistent. This evil we call moroseness; it is a feeling
characteristic of a decadent society[33], and (like all other kinds of
anger) it calls for unsparing repression.


[Sidenote: Cruelty.]

=368.= Cruelty, a tendency to excess in punishment[34], is an evil
constantly attendant upon the possession of power, and directly opposed
to the virtue of clemency. Roman history has exhibited many examples of
it, beginning with Sulla who ordered seven thousand Roman citizens to be
slain on one day[35], continuing with the many masters who are hated for
cruelty to their slaves[36]. It cuts at the root of the ties of humanity
and degrades man to the level of the beast[37]; in its extreme form it
becomes a madness, when the slaying of a man is in itself a pleasure[38].
As a remedy for cruelty in its milder forms it is well to consider the
true objects of punishment; first, to reform the offender; secondly, to
make others better by a warning; thirdly, to give a sense of safety to
the community by removing offenders[39]. All these objects are better
effected if punishment is moderate and rare, and appears to be awarded
with reluctance. When cruelty has become a disease it is necessary to
remind the tyrant that his manner of life is a pitiable one[40], and that
a complete cure can be worked by putting him to death[41].


[Sidenote: Grief.]

=369.= In reckoning Grief in its countless varieties as an evil the
Stoics did not altogether run counter to public opinion. In the heroic
age grief was indeed not forbidden, but it was sharply limited; women
might grieve, men should remember. But in prescribing the total
extinction of this state of mind the Stoics appeared to pass the bounds
of human nature; public feeling revolted against what seemed impossible
of attainment. Our position to-day is not greatly altered; but we may
notice that whereas in ordinary social life Grief is not only tolerated
but approved, yet in battle, earthquake, flood, and pestilence our ideal
of the hero is one which almost entirely excludes the indulgence of this
emotion.

Grief takes many forms, as Fretfulness, Disappointment, Restlessness,
Pity, and Mourning; we proceed to examine them in order.


[Sidenote: Fretfulness.]

=370.= The simplest form of Grief is fretfulness under bodily pain, the
effect of depression of the soul and contraction of its sinews[42]. In
all ages and under all philosophies the capacity of bearing pain without
flinching is the primary test of virtue; and in the Cynic and Stoic
schools alike the dogma ‘pain is no evil’ is of critical importance.
In this matter correct doctrine needs to be strengthened by life-long
discipline; but it is not required by Stoic principles that general
principles should be forced upon the acceptance of individual sufferers.
Panaetius therefore acted quite correctly when, in writing to Quintus
Tubero on the subject of the endurance of pain, he abstained from
pressing the usual paradox[43]. But all who see this trial awaiting them
will do well to consider how much hardship men willingly endure for evil
purposes, such as those of lust, money-making, or glory. Cocks and quails
will fight to the death for victory: jugglers will risk their lives
swallowing swords, walking on tight ropes, or flying like birds, when in
each case a slip means death[44]. If we compose our minds long before to
meet suffering, we shall have more courage when the time comes[45].


[Sidenote: Discipline of pain.]

=371.= Still more effective is active training[46]. Happy was the Spartan
youth who came to Cleanthes to ask him whether pain was not a good;
his education had taught him that this was a more practical question
than that other, whether pain is an evil[47]. Recruits cry out at the
slightest wound, and are more afraid of the surgeon’s touch than of the
sword; on the other hand veterans watch the life-blood draining away
without a sigh[48]. Some men groan at a box on the ear, whilst others
smile under the scourge[49]. Inexperience therefore is the chief cause
for weakness under pain; familiarity with it brings strength[50].


[Sidenote: Disappointed ambition.]

=372.= The Grief that gives way to pain of mind has very various forms;
but that which is due to disappointed ambition is perhaps the most
typical. Even men who had overcome the fear of death were known to
shudder at the bitterness of soul (_aegritudo animi_) which accompanies
defeat in a contested election (_repulsa_) in a republic, or displacement
from the favour of the powerful under a monarchy[51]. For this malady
the complete remedy is found in the paradox that ‘the wise man is king,’
that virtue can never be unseated from the curule chair[52]; temporary
alleviations may be found, even by philosophers, in biting sarcasms
aimed at the incapacity of one’s fellow-citizens[53]. It may be in the
abstract the duty of a good man to take part in politics; but experience
shows that the State has yet to be discovered which can tolerate a sage,
or which a sage can tolerate[54]. Hence we find even Stoic teachers
relapsing into practical Epicureanism, and bidding their followers to
let the community go hang, and to reserve their energies for some nobler
occupation[55]. To these lapses from sound principle we need not attach
any serious importance; the individual Stoic did not always live up to
his creed.


[Sidenote: Restlessness.]

=373.= Restlessness is grief of mind without known cause; the unquiet
soul rushes hither and thither, vainly seeking to be free from its own
company[56]. The lesson that Horace had pressed a century earlier, that
disquiet can only be cured by quiet, has not been learnt[57]. In Homer
Achilles tosses on his bed in fever, lying first on his face, then on his
back, never long at rest in any position; and so to-day our wealthy man
first travels to luxurious Campania, then to the primitive district of
the Bruttii; north and south are tried in turn, and alike disapproved,
whilst after all the fault is not in the place, but in the man[58]. In
this temper men come to hate leisure and complain that they have nothing
to do[59]. This folly reaches an extreme when men trust themselves to
the sea, take the chance of death without burial, and place themselves
in positions in which human skill may avail nothing[60]. It even leads
to great political disasters, as when Xerxes attacks Greece because he
is weary of Asia, and Alexander invades India because the known world is
too small for him[61]. The times will come, when men will seek novelty
by travelling through the air or under the sea; they will force their way
through the cold of the poles and the damp heat of the forests of Africa.
The remedy lies either in humbler submission to the will of the deity, or
in a sense of humour which sees the absurdity of taking so much trouble
for so little advantage[62].


[Sidenote: Pity.]

=374.= Pity is that weakness of a feeble mind, which causes it to
collapse at the sight of another man’s troubles[63], wrongly believing
them to be evils. Pity looks at the result, not at the cause, and it is
most keenly felt by women of all ages, who are distressed by the tears
even of the most abandoned criminals, and would gladly burst open the
doors of the gaols to release them[64]. The cause of pity lies in a too
rapid assent; we are caught napping by every sight that strikes on our
senses. If we see a man weeping, we say ‘he is undone’: if we see a poor
man, we say ‘he is wretched; he has nothing to eat[65].’ Now we Stoics
have a bad name, as though we recommended to governors a system of harsh
punishments[66]; but, on the contrary, none value more highly than we the
royal virtue of clemency[67]. Only let it be considered that a wise man
must keep a calm and untroubled mind, if only that he may be ready to
give prompt help to those who need it; a saving hand to the shipwrecked,
shelter to the exile, the dead body of her son to a mother’s tears. The
wise man will not pity, but help[68].


[Sidenote: Sensibility.]

=375.= Nearly akin to the evil of pity is that sensitiveness to the
sufferings of others which leads men, contrary reason, to turn the other
way and avoid the sight of them. Of this weakness Epictetus gives us a
lively picture:

  ‘When he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus
  inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he
  had children and a wife. The man replied that he had; and
  Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circumstances.
  ‘Miserable,’ the man said. Then Epictetus asked ‘In what
  respect? For men do not marry and beget children in order to be
  wretched, but rather to be happy.’ ‘But I,’ the man replied,
  ‘am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little
  daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not
  endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me
  news that she had recovered.’ ‘Well then,’ said Epictetus, ‘do
  you think that you acted right?’ ‘I acted naturally,’ the man
  replied; ‘this is the case with all or at least most fathers.’
  ‘Let us be careful,’ said Epictetus, ‘to learn rightly the
  criterion of things according to nature. Does affection to
  those of your family appear to you to be according to nature
  and to be good?’ Certainly.’ ‘Is then that which is consistent
  with reason in contradiction with affection?’ ‘I think not.’
  ‘Well then, to leave your sick child and to go away is not
  reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is; but
  it remains to inquire if it is consistent with affection.’ ‘Yes,
  let us consider.’ ‘Has the mother no affection for her child?’
  ‘Certainly she has.’ ‘Ought then the mother to have left her, or
  ought she not?’ ‘She ought not.’ ‘And the nurse, does she love
  her?’ ‘She does.’ ‘Ought then she also to have left her?’ ‘By no
  means.’ ‘But if this is so, it results that your behaviour was
  not at all an affectionate act[69].’

Seneca draws for us the same picture of sentimental neglect of duty.
‘Of our luxurious rich,’ he says, ‘no one sits by the side of his dying
friend, no one watches the death of his own father, or joins in the last
act of respect to the remains of any member of his family[70].’


[Sidenote: Sensitiveness.]

=376.= Another form of the evil of Grief is that of undue sensitiveness
to criticism and abuse. This mental weakness is illustrated by the case
of Fidus Cornelius, who burst into tears because some one in the senate
called him a ‘plucked ostrich’; and in an earlier period Chrysippus
had been acquainted with a man who lost his temper merely because
he was called a ‘sea-calf[71].’ Others are annoyed by seeing their
eccentricities imitated, or by reference to their poverty or old age.
The remedy for all these things is humour; no one can be laughed at who
turns the laugh against himself[72]. Another is to cease thinking about
oneself[73].


[Sidenote: Mourning.]

=377.= The hardest to bear of all distresses is the loss of friends by
death, and most particularly, the loss by parents of their children. To
meet this trouble a special class of literature, called _consolationes_,
grew up, not confined to any one school of philosophers. The treatise of
Crantor the Academic was famous in Cicero’s time[74]; and in the letter
of Servius Sulpicius to Cicero upon his daughter’s death we have an
admirable example of the ‘consolation’ in private correspondence[75].
Sulpicius bids Cicero think of all the grief and trouble in the world,
the loss of political liberty at Rome, the destruction of so many famous
cities of antiquity, until he feels that man is born to sorrow, and that
his own loss is but a drop in the ocean of the world’s suffering. He also
calls on the mourner to think of his own character, and to set an example
of firmness to his household[76]. Cicero found his real comfort in none
of these things, but in industrious authorship. We have unfortunately no
example of a ‘Consolation’ by Musonius. Seneca has left us two treatises
in this style, one a formal document addressed to the minister Polybius
on the death of his brother, the other a more personal appeal to Marcia,
a lady of an ‘old Roman’ family, on the death of a son. Besides the
arguments already used by Sulpicius[77], he recommends to Polybius
attention to the public service and the reading of Homer and Virgil[78].
Both to him and to Marcia he pictures the happiness of the soul now
admitted to the company of the blest[79], or at any rate at peace and
freed from all the pains of life[80]. In writing to Marcia he recalls
with effect the examples of Octavia the sister, and Livia the wife of
Augustus, each of whom lost a promising son in early manhood. Octavia
gave herself up to her grief, never allowed her dead son to be mentioned
in her presence, and wore mourning to the day of her death, though she
was surrounded by her children and grandchildren. Livia, after paying the
last tokens of respect, laid aside her grief, recalled with pleasure her
son’s achievements, and (advised so to act by her philosopher Areius)
devoted herself to her social duties, refusing to make all Rome sad
because one mother had lost a son[81].


[Sidenote: Resignation.]

=378.= The consolations of Epictetus include less philosophical
speculation, and more religious resignation. To begin with, preparation
should be made for the loss of children. Parental affection should
not pass the bounds of reason; every time that a father embraces his
child, he should reflect ‘this child is only lent to me,’ ‘this child
is mortal[82].’ If the child dies, his first thought should be ‘he who
has given takes away[83].’ To others he will say ‘I have restored the
child[84].’ His abiding mood will be that of resignation to the divine
will. He will realize that in the course of a long life many and various
things must happen; and that it is impossible to live to old age, without
seeing the death of many whom we love[85].


[Sidenote: Comfort.]

=379.= All ‘consolations’ aim at diminishing the grief of mourners,
nature being inclined rather to excess than to defect in this matter.
But the Stoics could not altogether avoid the direct issue whether or
not grief is a sin, and weeping a weakness. The plain teaching of the
school was that ‘death is no evil,’ and therefore that grief for the
dead is against reason. And to this view the teachers give from time to
time formal adhesion, as being the better cause[86]. But in individual
cases they find that to a certain extent there is not only excuse,
but justification, for grief and tears; and thus they come into touch
with the common feelings of humanity[87], whilst the plea of ‘natural
necessity’ serves to ward off the criticism of sterner philosophers[88].
From this concession emerges in the Roman period the definite precept
of a time-limit for grief[89]; and its undue continuance is sternly
denounced as due to love of ostentation[90], and the morbid enjoyment of
sorrow by an ill-balanced mind[91]. Grief in this shape is a dangerous
disease; there must be no trifling with it, but it must be totally
destroyed[92].


[Sidenote: Misanthropy.]

=380.= Lastly, we include under the heading of Grief a weakness which
often developes into serious disease; that general discontent, which
is voiced in complaints as to the wickedness of the age[93] and the
degeneracy of young Rome. Such discontent has always been characteristic
of the old[94]; but under the principate it has developed into a special
evil, the ‘hatred of the human race’ (_odium generis humani_). Of this
fault even philosophers may be suspected; for it must be admitted that
men are bad, have been bad, and always will be bad[95]; in short, that
the whole human race is made up of madmen[96]. But wise men will bear
with this fact quietly and with a smile[97]. It is futile to bring
accusations against the whole race[98], and a delusion to think our own
times worse than those of our predecessors. The old Romans, to whom we
look up as models of virtue, made just the same complaints of their own
times; and as a matter of fact the standard of general morality never
varies greatly from its average, either in an upward or a downward
direction[99].


[Sidenote: Eating.]

=381.= The fault of Hilarity (ἄλογος ἔπαρσις, _elatio animi_) is a
departure from Soberness and cheerful Joy with regard to the things that
appeal to our appetites, and this in the direction of excess. With regard
to food, it corresponds to ‘greediness’ in modern speech. The matter is
but little discussed, but we have two interesting lectures by Musonius,
which are chiefly concerned with this vice, from which we take the
following extracts:

  ‘Greediness’ is an unpleasant fault, making men to resemble
  pigs and dogs: but on the other hand healthy eating requires
  much supervision and practice (ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ἄσκησις). Of all
  pleasures that tempt men, greediness is the hardest to contend
  against; for it assails us twice every day. To eat too much is
  wrong; to eat too fast is wrong; so it is also to take too much
  pleasure in food, to prefer the sweet to the wholesome, or not
  to give your companions a fair share. Another fault is to let
  meals interfere with business. In all these points we should look
  chiefly to health. Now we observe that those who use the simplest
  foods are generally the strongest; servants are stronger than
  their masters, countryfolk than townsmen, the poor than the rich.
  There is therefore good reason to prefer cheap food to that
  which is costly, and that which is ready to hand to that which
  is only obtained with great trouble. Further, some foods are
  more congenial than others to men’s nature; as those which grow
  from the earth, or can be obtained from animals without killing
  them. Food that requires no cooking has an advantage, as ripe
  fruit, some vegetables, milk, cheese, and honey. Flesh food is
  for many reasons objectionable. It is heavy and impedes thought;
  the exhalations from it are turbid and overshadow the soul.
  Men should imitate the gods, who feed on the light exhalations
  of earth and water. But to-day we have even worse corruptions.
  Many men are dainty and cannot eat food without vinegar or
  some other seasoning. Also we call in art and machinery to aid
  our pleasures, and actually have books written on cookery. All
  this may serve to titillate the palate, but is mischievous to
  health[100].’

The sarcasms of Seneca are aimed not so much against excess in quantity
or fastidiousness in quality, as against the collection of dainties from
all parts of the world[101].


[Sidenote: Drinking.]

=382.= As to drinking, the Stoic period marks a great change in feeling.
In the times of Zeno, hard drinking had almost the honour of a religious
ceremony; and the banquet (συμπόσιον) was the occasion of many a
philosophical discussion. Zeno began by laying it down as a principle
that ‘the wise man will not be drunken[102],’ and Chrysippus went so
far as to name drunkenness as causing the loss of virtue[103]. But
the prohibition was carefully guarded. The earlier teachers permitted
‘wininess[104]’; and Seneca justifies this means of banishing care,
pointing out many instances of public men of drinking habits who
discharged their duties admirably[105]. Yet on the whole he inclines
to a stricter view, finding that ‘drunkenness is a voluntary madness,’
and that it removes that sense of shame which most hinders men from
wrongdoing[106]. Meanwhile a change in public taste, and perhaps the
continual example of Cynic missionaries, had produced a tide of feeling
in favour of simple living. The philosophical discussions sketched by
Cicero take place at all times of the day, but most usually in the
morning hours; they are never associated with riotous banqueting, but
if necessary the meal is cut short to make room for the talk. Under the
principate the fare is of the simplest; Seneca himself was a vegetarian
in his youth[107]; his teacher Attalus was well content with porridge and
water, and found an audience ready to approve his taste[108].


[Sidenote: Sexual indulgence.]

=383.= A similar but more profound change had taken place at the same
time in regard to sexual relations. In the time of Socrates courtesans
and boy-favourites played a large part in social life; associated
with the banquet, they formed part of the accepted ideal of cultured
enjoyment; even moralists approved of them as providing a satisfaction to
natural desires and indirectly protecting the sanctity of the home[109].
The same attitude of mind is shown by Seneca under similar circumstances,
when he recommends that princes be indulged with mistresses in order to
make their character more gentle[110]. But little by little a more severe
standard prevailed[111]. From the first the Stoics set themselves against
the pursuit of other men’s wives[112]. With regard to other relations,
they did not feel called upon to condemn them in other men[113]; they
were indeed, in themselves, matters of indifference[114]; but they
found it contrary to reason that a man’s thoughts should be occupied
with matters so low, or that he should bring himself into subjection to
irregular habits and become a slave to a woman[115]. As the courtesan
was gradually excluded by this rule[116], the general opinion fell
back on the slave as the most accessible and least dangerous object of
indulgence[117]. But the philosophers of the principate, following Zeno,
who in these matters took the πρέπον (_decorum_) as his rule[118], find
it in a high degree unfitting that the master, who should in all things
be a model of self-control in his own household, should display so grave
a weakness to his slaves.


[Sidenote: Chastity.]

=384.= Thus little by little there emerged the ideal of a strict
chastity, to the principle of which not even the marriage relation
should form an exception[119]. Every falling off from this ideal is sin
or transgression[120]; and it is especially true in this matter that
each act of weakness leaves its trace on the character, and that he who
yields becomes a feebler man[121]. The Socratic paradox, that the wise
man will be a lover[122], is consistently maintained by the Stoics; but
the practical limitations of this doctrine are well illustrated by the
following striking passage from the lectures of the Stoic Musonius:—

  ‘Men who do not wish to be licentious and bad should consider
  that sexual relations are only lawful in marriage, and for
  the begetting of children; such as aim at mere pleasure are
  lawless, even in marriage. Even apart from adultery and unnatural
  relations, all sexual connexions are disgraceful; for what
  sober-minded man would think of consorting with a courtesan, or
  with a free woman outside marriage? and least of all would he
  do so with his own slave. The lawlessness and foulness of such
  connexions is a disgrace to all who form them; as we may see that
  any man who is capable of a blush does his utmost to conceal
  them. Yet one argues: “in this case a man does no injustice; he
  does not wrong his neighbour or deprive him of the hope of lawful
  issue.” I might reply that every one who sins injures himself,
  for he makes himself a worse and less honourable man. But at any
  rate he who gives way to foul pleasure and enjoys himself like
  a hog is an intemperate man; and not least he who consorts with
  his own slave-girl, a thing for which some people find excuse. To
  all this there is a simple answer; how would such a man approve
  of a mistress consorting with her own man-servant? Yet I presume
  he does not think men inferior to women, or less able to restrain
  their desires. If then men claim the supremacy over women, they
  must show themselves superior in self-control. To conclude;
  sexual connexion between a master and his female slave is nothing
  but licentiousness[123].’


[Sidenote: ‘Bear and forbear.’]

=385.= Thus our detailed study of the four perturbations has led us to
lay little stress on Fear and Greed, the weaknesses of the heroic period
when men’s minds were actively turned to the future, and to concentrate
our attention on Grief and Hilarity, the two moods in which life’s
troubles and temptations are wrongly met with as they arrive. As we
follow the history of Stoic philosophy through the times of the Roman
principate, we find that this tendency to lay stress on the training of
the passive character increases: till Epictetus tells us that of all the
vices far the worst are ‘lack of endurance’ (_intolerantia_), which is
the developed form of Grief, and ‘lack of restraint’ (_incontinentia_),
which is the persistent inclination towards Hilarity[124]. Hence
the cure for vice is summed up by him in the golden word, ‘bear and
forbear[125]’; that is, practise Courage and cast off Grief, practise
Soberness and keep Hilarity far from you. ‘A good rule,’ a Peripatetic
would reply, ‘for women and slaves.’


[Sidenote: Avoidance of temptation.]

=386.= This negative attitude is most strongly marked in Epictetus in
connexion with the dangers of sexual passion. Thus his short advice
to all young men with regard to the attractions of women is ‘Flee at
once[126]’; and even in this his advice was countenanced in advance by
the more tolerant Seneca[127]. It would appear from both writers that the
battle between the sexes had become unequal at this period, so often is
the picture drawn of the promising and well-educated youth literally and
hopelessly enslaved by a mistress presumably without birth, education,
or honour[128]. It causes us some surprise to find that the distinction
between heavenly and earthly love[129] is not brought in as a corrective
of the latter. Only in a general way the suggestion is made that
seductive attractions should be driven out by virtuous ideals:

  ‘Do not be hurried away by the appearance, but say: “Appearances,
  wait for me a little; let me see who you are and what you
  are about; let me put you to the test.” And do not allow the
  appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of the things
  which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off wherever
  it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beautiful
  and noble appearance and cast out this base appearance. And if
  you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see
  what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have.... This is
  the true athlete.... Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great
  is the combat, divine is the work; it is for kingship, for
  freedom, for happiness. Remember God; call on him as a helper and
  protector[130].’


[Sidenote: Gradations of vice.]

=387.= From the study of the separate evils we revert to the general
theory of Vice. And here we must recall the point that so far as vice
is weakness or ill-health of the soul, it admits of gradations, which
may conveniently be stated as three, namely (i) rufflings of the soul;
(ii) commotions, infections, or illnesses; (iii) diseases or vices
proper[131]. It is not quite easy to classify the rufflings or first
slight disturbances of the soul (_prima agitatio animi_) under the
four perturbations; but the bodily indications of them seem to be more
marked in the weaknesses of the active or heroic character, namely Fear
and Greed. Thus in the direction of Fear we meet with hair standing on
end—pallor of complexion—trembling limbs—palpitation, and dizziness,
all of which are bodily indications that fear is not far off; in the
direction of Anger (a form of Greed) we meet with heightened colour,
flashing eyes, and gnashing teeth[132]. In the direction of Grief we
meet with tears and sighs, and in that of Hilarity the automatic sexual
movements, amongst which we must perhaps include blushing.


[Sidenote: Rufflings.]

=388.= It does not appear that the early Stoic masters occupied
themselves much with the gradations of vice; although a text can be taken
from Zeno for a discourse on this subject. Neither does the earnest and
cynically-minded Epictetus care to dwell on such details. On the other
hand Seneca lays the greatest possible stress on the doctrine that
‘rufflings’ are not inconsistent with virtue. For this two arguments are
available, which are perhaps not quite consistent. First, the bodily
indications are beyond the control of the mind; they are necessary
consequences of the union of body and soul, that is, of our mortal
condition[133]. Secondly, the ‘rufflings’ correspond to the mind-pictures
presented to the soul in thought, and therefore are neither moral nor
immoral until the soul has given its assent to them[134]. From either
point of view we arrive at a result congenial to this philosopher. The
wise man is, in fact, subject to slight touches of such feelings as grief
and fear[135]; he is a man, not a stone. Secondly, the sovereignty of the
will remains unimpaired; give the mind but time to collect its forces,
and it will restrain these feelings within their proper limits[136].
The doctrine is in reality, though not in form, a concession to the
Peripatetic standpoint; it provides also a convenient means of defence
against the mockers who observe that professors of philosophy often
exhibit the outward signs of moral weakness.


[Sidenote: ‘Commotions.’]

=389.= If the soul gives way to any unreasoning impulse, it makes a
false judgment and suffers relaxation of its tone: there takes place a
‘commotion’ or ‘perturbation’ (πάθος, _affectus_, _perturbatio_), which
is a moral evil[137]. The Greek word πάθος admits of two interpretations;
it may mean a passive state or a disease; we here use it in the milder
sense. By an ‘emotion’ we mean that the soul is uprooted from its
foundation, and begins as it were to toss on the sea; by ‘affection’
that it is seized or infected by some unwholesome condition[138]; by
‘perturbation’ that it has ceased to be an orderly whole, and is falling
into confusion. When we regard these words in their true sense, and
shake off the associations they carry with them in English, it is clear
that all of them denote moral evils; nevertheless they cannot rightly be
called ‘diseases’ of the soul[139]. The evils and weaknesses which have
been discussed are commonly displayed in ‘commotions’ or ‘perturbations,’
and are normally equivalent to them.


[Sidenote: Diseases of the soul.]

=390.= The soul by giving way to perturbations becomes worse; it
acquires habits of weakness in particular directions. This weakness
from a passing disposition (ἕξις) changes into a permanent disposition
or habit (διάθεσις), and this is in the full sense a ‘disease’ of the
soul[140]. These diseases or vices are, strictly speaking, four in
number[141]: but the Stoics run into great detail as regards their
titles and subdivisions. Diseases in the ordinary sense (ἀρρωστήματα)
display restlessness and want of self-control; such are ambition,
avarice, greediness, drunkenness, running after women[142], passionate
temper, obstinacy, and anxiety. An opposite class of maladies consists
of unreasonable dislikes (κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα, _offensiones_);
such are inhospitality, misogynism, and quarrelling with the world in
general[143].


[Sidenote: Men are good or bad.]

=391.= The study of vice in its various forms and gradations leaves
untouched the main positions of Stoic ethics, including the Socratic
paradoxes. Men are of two classes only, the wise and the foolish, the
good and the bad[144]. This bold dualism the Stoics hold in common with
the Persians[145]; and though it is on the one hand tempered so as to
meet the common opinion that most men are of middling character, and on
the other hand subordinated to the monistic principle that good shall
in the end prevail, it remains the key-stone of this department of
philosophy. Virtue is a right state of mind; everything that falls short
of it is therefore a wrong state of mind. Virtue and vice lie in the
inward disposition, not in the outward act[146]; and one who has crossed
the line is equally out of bounds whatever the distance to which he has
travelled on the far side[147]. Each man has therefore an all-important
choice to make. The great Stoic teachers were filled with a yearning
after righteousness and reconciliation with the divine purpose and a
disgust and horror of the condition of the man who is at variance with
his Creator, his neighbour, and himself[148]. These convictions they
encased as usual in paradoxes and syllogisms.


[Sidenote: All sins are equal.]

=392.= That ‘the affections must be extirpated[149]’ ceases to be a
paradox, as soon as we have defined affections as states of mind contrary
to reason, and have made room for the ‘reasonable affections’ of caution,
good will, and joy[150]. That ‘all sins are equal[151]’ remains still,
as of old, a stumbling block[152]. Yet this Socratic paradox has a
simple interpretation; it is a protest against the light-heartedness
which tolerates ‘petty’ acts of wrongdoing, and is indifferent to the
evil habits of mind thus acquired[153]. Two of the Stoic teachers of the
transition period, Heraclides of Tarsus and Athenodorus, are said to have
abandoned the paradox[154], and all Stoics were ready to admit that sins
are ‘unlike’[155]. But, as usual, the main body held firmly to a doctrine
in which they had discovered a real practical value. Just the same
principle is expressed by other paradoxes, as that ‘he who has one vice
has all, though he may not be equally inclined to all[156]’; and again
that ‘he who is not wise is a fool and a madman[157].’


[Sidenote: Sin is curable.]

=393.= In spite of the parallelism of virtue and vice the latter is
destined to subordination, not only in the history of the universe, but
also in the individual man. Even if sins are equal, vice as ill health
of the soul has degrees. The first ‘rufflings’ of the soul are, as we
have seen, not to be reckoned as real evils; its ‘perturbations’ give the
hope of a coming calm; and grievous though its ‘diseases’ are, we have no
suggestion of incurable sin, or of the hopeless offender. Even he who has
most fallen retains the germs of virtue, and these may again ripen under
a proper discipline[158].


[Sidenote: Stoic austerity.]

=394.= The attitude of the Stoic school towards sin and weakness exposed
it, as we have seen, to constant criticism and ridicule. To some extent
this was due to the profession of philosophy in itself: for every such
profession implied some claim to clearer knowledge and more consistent
action than that of the crowd[159]. But the Stoics also sought to be
‘austere’ with regard to social pleasures, and thus it seemed that they
neither offered others a share in their own happiness nor sympathetically
partook in that of others[160]; whilst at the same time they claimed
exemption from the weaknesses and failings of their neighbours. We have
seen both Seneca and Epictetus anxious to meet criticism on these points
by laying stress on those touches of natural feeling in which wise and
foolish alike share. But in addressing the members of the sect their
tone is very different; they hold out, as a prize worth the winning, the
prospect of attaining to that calm and unchanging disposition of mind
which has for ever left behind the flutterings of fear and greed, of
grief and hilarity, and which is attuned to reason alone[161]. Epictetus
indeed often expresses elation and pride upon this theme:

  ‘I will show the sinews of a philosopher. What are these? A
  desire (ὄρεξις) never disappointed, an aversion (ἔκκλισις) which
  never meets with that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit
  (ὁρμή), a diligent purpose (πρόθεσις), an assent which is not
  rash. These you shall see[162].’

  ‘Men, if you will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you
  are doing, you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, nor compulsion,
  nor hindrance, but you will pass your time without perturbations
  and free from everything. When a man has this peace (not
  proclaimed by Caesar, for how should he be able to proclaim it?)
  but by God through reason, is he not content when he reflects—Now
  no evil can happen to me[163]?’


FOOTNOTES

[1] ‘est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic. _Par._ iii 20.

[2] ‘Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not
useful?... Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things’
Epict. _Disc._ ii 17, 10 and 11.

[3] ‘omnes [hae perturbationes] sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures;
aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et
animi ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis
animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 35; ‘est igitur
aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, ... laetitia opinio recens
boni praesentis; ... metus opinio impendentis mali, ... libido opinio
venturi boni’ _Tusc. disp._ iv 7, 14; ‘hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent
gaudentque’ Verg. _Aen._ vi 733. See also Diog. L. vii 110 and Stob. ii
7, 10 b.

[4] Χρύσιππος ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κενὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ
τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δὲ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς
συστολὰς καὶ χύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ πτώσεις τής ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ
πάθη Galen _Hipp. et Plat._ v i, p. 429 K; cf. _ib._ iv p. 387 K (Arnim i
461).

[5] In this sense there are four vices, each the precise opposite of one
of the virtues; they are ἀφροσύνη (_insipientia_), ἀδικία (_iniustitia_),
δειλία (_ignavia_) and ἀκολασία (_intemperantia_); and each of these is
rooted in a fixed perverse judgment, so that he who has one vice has all
(Stob. ii 7, 11 k, p. 106, 7 Wachsmuth).

[6] This view is summed up in the phrase that ‘the perturbations
are κακά, but not κακίαι’ (Stob. ii 7, 5 b), which accords with the
principle that only vice and what is akin to vice is evil. The Roman
writers realized the difficulty in the use of words: ‘morbi autem et
aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis; sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem
partes quaestio est. vitia enim adfectiones sunt manentes, perturbationes
autem moventes, ut non possint adfectionum manentium partes esse’ Cic.
_Tusc. disp._ iv 13, 29 and 30.

[7] ‘utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum
est; nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant’ Sen. _Ep._ 116,
1; ‘vacandum omni est animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate et metu, tum
etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et iracundia’ Cic. _Off._ i 20, 69;
‘contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum est’ Sen. _Dial._ x
10, 1.

[8] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι
Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπάγεται ὀργή _ib._ 10 b.

[9] Here Panaetius is faithful to the Stoic view: ‘ira procul absit, cum
qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest’ Cic. _Off._ i 38, 136.

[10] ‘[ira] extollit animos et incitat; nec quicquam sine illa magnificum
in bello fortitudo gerit’ Sen. _Dial._ iii 7, 1.

[11] ‘“non potest” inquit “fieri” Theophrastus, “ut non vir bonus
irascatur malis”’ _ib._ 14, 1; ‘“quid ergo?” inquit “vir bonus non
irascitur, si caedi patrem suum viderit, si rapi matrem?”’ _ib._ 12, 1.

[12] ‘stat Aristoteles (fr. 80 Rose) defensor irae et vetat illam nobis
exsecari; calcar ait esse virtutis’ Sen. _Dial._ v 3, 1.

[13] ‘abominandum remedii genus est sanitatem debere morbo’ _ib._ iii 12,
6.

[14] ‘haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non
expectant manum, et habent non habentur’ _ib._ 17, 1.

[15] ‘adfectus cito cadit, aequalis est ratio’ _ib._ 17, 5.

[16] ‘corrigendus est qui peccat meliorque faciendus, non sine
castigatione, sed sine ira’ _ib._ 15, 1.

[17] ‘[Fabius] iram ante vicit quam Hannibalem’ _ib._ 11, 5.

[18] ‘nec [athletae] cum ira suadet, feriunt, sed cum occasio ... ira enim
perturbat artem’ _ib._ iv 14, 2 and 3.

[19] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία [τοῦ] τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα
ἠδικηκέναι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον Stob. ii 7, 10 c; ‘ira est cupiditas
ulciscendae iniuriae, aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius, a
quo te inique putes laesum’ Sen. _Dial._ iii 2, 4.

[20] ‘ira furor brevis est’ Hor. _Ep._ i 2, 62; ‘quidam ex sapientibus
viris iram dixerunt brevem insaniam’ Sen. _Dial._ iii 1, 2.

[21] _ib._ 4.

[22] ‘non pietas iram, sed infirmitas movet, sicut pueris, qui tam
parentibus amissis flebunt quam nucibus’ _ib._ 12, 4.

[23] ‘nec in ea tantum, quae destinavit, sed in occurrentia obiter furit’
_ib._ v 1, 3.

[24] ‘nobis placet nihil [iram] per se audere, sed animo adprobante’
_ib._ iv 1, 4; ‘nunquam impetus sine adsensu animi est’ _ib._ 3, 4.

[25] _ib._ 3-5.

[26] ‘maximum remedium irae mora est’ _ib._ 29, 1; ‘Keep quiet, and count
the days on which you have not been angry’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 18, 12.

[27] ‘pleraque eorum, propter quae irascimur, offendunt nos magis quam
laedunt’ Sen. _Dial._ v 28, 4; ‘contempt is that which putteth an edge
upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself’ Bacon, _Essay_ 57.

[28] ‘eo nos loco constituamus, quo ille est cui irascimur’ Sen. _Dial._
12, 3.

[29] ‘quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit adspexisse speculum’
_ib._ iv 36, 1.

[30] See below, § 403.

[31] ‘percussit te: recede. referiendo enim et occasionem saepius
feriendi dabis et excusationem’ _ib._ 34, 5.

[32] ‘quaedam [irae] ultra querelas et adversationes non exeunt. quaedam
altae gravesque sunt et introrsus versae’ _ib._ iii 4, 3.

[33] ‘inter hos morosum ponas licet, delicatum iracundiae genus. quaedam
enim sunt irae, quae intra clamorem concidant, quaedam non minus
pertinaces quam frequentes’ Sen. _Dial._ 2 and 3.

[34] Defined as ‘atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis’ or ‘inclinatio
animi ad asperiora’ Sen. _Clem._ ii 4, 1 and 3.

[35] _ib._ i 12, 1.

[36] ‘domini crudeles tota civitate commonstrantur invisique et
detestabiles sunt’ _ib._ 18, 3.

[37] ‘ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere et vulneribus’ _ib._ 24, 3.

[38] ‘tunc ille dirus animi morbus ad insaniam pervenit ultimam, cum
crudelitas versa est in voluptatem et iam occidere hominem iuvat’ _ib._
25, 3.

[39] _ib._ 22, 1.

[40] ‘puta tutam esse crudelitatem; quale eius regnum est?’ _ib._ 26, 2.

[41] ‘optimum est abire ei, qui ad se nunquam rediturus est’ _Ben._ vii
20, 3.

[42] λύπην δ’ εἶναι συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ Stob. ii 7, 10 b; ‘est
aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo
rectum esse videatur’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 7, 14.

[43] See above, § 114.

[44] Muson. ap. Stob. iii 29, 75.

[45] ‘nemo non fortius ad id, cui se diu composuerat, accessit et duris
quoque, si praemeditata erant, obstitit’ Sen. _Ep._ 107, 4; and see
further, § 339.

[46] ‘id in quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit. ad contemnendam
malorum potentiam animus patientia pervenit’ Sen. _Dial._ i 4, 13.

[47] Stob. ii 31, 125 (Wachsmuth, p. 242, 30). The point is however
complicated by the ambiguity of the Greek word πόνος, which corresponds
equally to _dolor_ and _labor_ in Latin; see Cic. _Tusc. disp._ ii 15, 35.

[48] ‘tirones leviter saucii tamen vociferantur et manus medicorum magis
quam ferrum horrent; at veterani, quamvis confossi, patienter ac sine
gemitu velut aliena corpora exsaniari patiuntur’ _ib._ xii 3, 1.

[49] ‘scio alios inter flagella ridere, alios gemere sub colapho’ _Ep._
13, 5.

[50] ‘magna autem pars apud imperitos mali novitas; hoc ut scias, ea quae
putaverant aspera, fortius, cum adsuevere, patiuntur’ _ib._ 76, 34.

[51] ‘quae maxima credis | esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam’
Hor. _Ep._ i 1, 43.

[52] ‘virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae, | intaminatis fulget honoribus; |
nec sumit aut ponit secures | arbitrio popularis aurae’ Hor. _C._ iii 2,
17-20.

[53] ‘Chrysippus, when asked why he took no part in politics, replied:
‘because, if a man is a bad politician, he is hateful to the gods; if a
good politician, to his fellow-citizens’ Stob. iv 4, 29.

[54] ‘si percensere singulas [res publicas] voluero, nullam inveniam,
quae sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 8, 3.

[55] ‘si potes, subduc te istis occupationibus; si minus, eripe’ _Ep._
19, 1.

[56] ‘mobilis et inquieta homini mens data est. nunquam se tenet, vaga et
quietis impatiens, et novitate rerum laetissima’ _ib._ xii 6, 6.

[57] ‘ratio et prudentia curas | ... aufert; | caelum non animum mutant,
qui trans mare currunt’ Hor. _Ep._ i 11, 25-27.

[58] Sen. _Dial._ ix 12-15.

[59] ‘inde ille adfectus otium suum detestantium querentiumque nihil
ipsos habere quod agant’ _ib._ 2, 10.

[60] ‘incertam fortunam experimur, vim tempestatum nulla humana ope
superabilem, mortem sine spe sepulturae. non erat tanti’ _N. Q._ v 18, 6
and 7; ‘non eadem est his et illis causa solvendi, sed iusta nulli’ _ib._
16; ‘quid non potest mihi suaderi, cui persuasum est ut navigarem?’ _Ep._
53, 1.

[61] _N. Q._ v 18, 10.

[62] ‘magis ridebis, cum cogitaveris vitae parari, in quae vita
consumitur’ Sen. _N. Q._ 16.

[63] ‘misericordiam [boni viri] vitabunt; est enim vitium pusilli animi,
ad speciem alienorum malorum succidentis’ _Clem._ ii 5, 1.

[64] ‘anus et mulierculae sunt, quae lacrimis nocentissimorum moventur,
quae, si liceret, carcerem effringerent’ _ib._

[65] Epict. _Disc._ iii 3, 17.

[66] ‘cum dicas esse pares res | furta latrociniis, et magnis parva
mineris | falce recisurum simili te, si tibi regnum | permittant
homines’ Hor. _Sat._ i 3, 121-124; ‘scio male audire apud imperitos
sectam Stoicorum tanquam nimis duram et minime principibus regibusque
bonum daturam consilium ... sed nulla secta benignior leniorque est’ Sen.
_Clem._ ii 5, 2 and 3.

[67] See below, § 409.

[68] ‘non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret’ Sen. _Clem._ ii 6, 3.

[69] Epict. _Disc._ i 11.

[70] ‘ex his nemo morienti amico adsidet, nemo videre mortem patris sui
sustinet, quotusquisque funus domesticum ad rogum sequitur? fratrum
propinquorumque extrema hora deseritur’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii 18, 6.

[71] _Dial._ ii 17, 1.

[72] ‘[Vatinius] in pedes suos ipse plurima dicebat et in fauces
concisas. sic inimicorum et in primis Ciceronis urbanitatem effugerat’
Sen. _Dial._ ii 17, 3; ‘nemo risum praebuit qui ex se cepit’ _ib._ 2.

[73] ‘cum primum te observare desieris, imago ista tristitiae discedet’
_Ep._ 63, 3.

[74] Cicero wrote a treatise ‘de Consolatione’ based on this work, but
only a few fragments remain. Plutarch’s ‘Consolation’ for Apollonius was
drawn from the same source (Schmekel, p. 150).

[75] Cic. _Fam._ iv 5.

[76] ‘denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse, et eum qui aliis
consueris praecipere et dare consilium’ _ib._ 5, 5.

[77] ‘maximum ergo solatium est cogitare id sibi accidisse, quod ante se
passi sunt omnes omnesque passuri’ Sen. _Dial._ xi 1, 4. On the other
side ‘malevoli solatii est turba miserorum’ _ib._ vi 12, 5; ‘[cogita]
fratribus te tuis exemplo esse debere’ _ib._ xi 5, 4.

[78] _ib._ 8, 2.

[79] _ib._ 9, 3; ‘inter felices currit animas’ _ib._ vi 5, 1.

[80] _ib._ xi 9, 4; ‘excepit illum magna et aeterna pax’ _ib._ vi 19, 6.
See also above, §§ 298, 299.

[81] Sen. _Dial._ vi 3 to 5; above, § 123.

[82] ‘If you are kissing your wife or child, say that it is a human being
whom you are kissing; for when the wife or child dies, you will not be
disturbed’ Epict. _Manual_ 3 (after Anaxagoras).

[83] _Disc._ iv 1, 101.

[84] ‘Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say, I have restored
it. Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has
been restored’ _Manual_ 11.

[85] _Disc._ iii 24, 27.

[86] ‘illud, ut non doleas, vix audebo exigere; et esse melius scio. sed
cui ista firmitas animi continget?’ Sen. _Ep._ 63, 1.

[87] ‘inhumanitas est ista, non virtus, funera suorum iisdem oculis,
quibus ipsos, videre’ Sen. _Ep._ 99, 15; cf. _Dial._ xii 1, 2.

[88] ‘cum primus nos nuntius acerbi funeris perculit, lacrimas naturalis
necessitas exprimit’ _Ep._ 99, 18.

[89] ‘nos quod praecipimus, honestum est; cum aliquid lacrimarum adfectus
effuderit, non esse tradendum animum dolori’ _ib._ 27.

[90] ‘at enim naturale desiderium suorum est. quis negat? sed plus est
quod opinio adicit quam quod natura imperavit’ _Dial._ vi 7, 1.

[91] ‘fit infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor’ _ib._ 1, 7.

[92] ‘non possum molliter adsequi tam durum dolorem; frangendus est’ _ib._

[93] ‘obirascens fortunae animus et de seculo querens’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 2,
11.

[94] ‘difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti | se puero, censor
castigatorque minorum’ Hor. _A. P._ 173, 174.

[95] ‘idem semper de nobis pronuntiare debebimus; malos esse nos, malos
fuisse, invitus adiciam et futuros esse’ Sen. _Ben._ i 10, 3; ‘cupidi
omnes et maligni omnes et timidi omnes’ _ib._ v 17, 3.

[96] ‘non est quod irascaris; omnes insaniunt’ _ib._

[97] ‘satius est humana vitia placide accipere’ _ib._ ix 15, 5; ‘omnia
vulgi vitia non invisa nobis, sed ridicula videantur’ _ib._ 2.

[98] ‘generi humano venia tribuenda est’ _ib._ iv 10, 2.

[99] ‘hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri
nostri querentur, eversos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res
humanas et omne nefas labi; at ista eodem stant loco stabuntque, paulum
dumtaxat ultra aut citra mota’ _Ben._ i 10, 1.

[100] Stob. iii 17, 42 and 18, 37.

[101] ‘ad vos deinde transeo, quorum profunda et insatiabilis gula hinc
maria scrutatur, hinc terras. alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium
variis generibus cum magno labore persequitur. nullis animalibus nisi
ex fastidio pax est’ Sen. _Ep._ 89, 22. Another form of luxury is in
the eating of food extremely hot or extremely cold: ‘quemadmodum nihil
illis satis frigidum, sic nihil satis calidum est, sed ardentes boletos
demittunt’ _N. Q._ iv 13, 10.

[102] See above, § 83, note 82.

[103] See above, § 324, note 155.

[104] καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μὲν [τὸν σοφόν], οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ Diog. L. vii
118. This was the view of Chrysippus; see A. C. Pearson in _Journ. Phil._
xxx pp. 221 sqq.

[105] ‘nonnunquam et usque ad ebrietatem veniendum [est], non ut mergat
nos, sed ut deprimat. eluit enim curas et ab imo animum movet’ Sen.
_Dial._ ix 17, 8; see further _Ep._ 83, 14 and 15.

[106] ‘nihil aliud esse ebrietatem quam voluntariam insaniam’ _Ep._
83, 18; ‘omne vitium ebrietas et incendit et detegit, obstantem malis
conatibus verecundiam removet. plures enim pudore peccandi quam bona
voluntate prohibitis abstinent’ _ib._ 83, 19.

[107] See above, § 126.

[108] Sen. _Ep._ 110, 14 and 18.

[109] Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 5.

[110] ‘si pro magno petet munere artifices scenae et scorta et quae
feritatem eius emolliant, libens offeram’ Sen. _Ben._ vii 20, 3. The
furthering of the amour of Nero with Acte was a practical application
of this theory: ‘tradit Cluvius ... Senecam contra muliebres illecebras
subsidium a femina petivisse, immissamque Acten libertam’ Tac. _Ann._ xiv
2, 2.

[111] ‘non est itaque quod credas nos plurimum libidini permisisse. longe
enim frugalior haec iuventus quam illa est’ Sen. _Ep._ 97, 9.

[112] See above, § 306, note 27.

[113] ‘As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before
marriage; but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is
conformable to custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who
indulge in these pleasures’ Epict. _Manual_ 33, 8.

[114] τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀδιάφορον εἶναι Stob. ii 7, 5 b 9; cf. § 317.

[115] ‘eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam
quaerenti, an sapiens amaturus esset: “de sapiente” inquit “videbimus;
mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut
incidamus in rem commotam, impotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi”’
Sen. _Ep._ 116, 5; ‘Did you never love any person, a young girl, slave
or free?... have you never flattered your little slave? have you never
kissed her feet? What then is slavery?’ Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 15 and 17.

[116] ‘magno pudoris impendio dilecta scorta’ Sen. _Dial._ ii 6, 7.

[117] Hor. _Sat._ i 2, 116-119.

[118] See above, § 318, note 104.

[119] ‘Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry
with the adulterer’ Epict. _Disc._ i 18, 11. Ascetic principles were
already practised in Seneca’s time; ‘vino quidam, alii Venere, quidam
omni umore interdixere corporibus’ _Dial._ iv 12, 4.

[120] ‘lapsa est libido in muliere ignota ... peccavit vero nihilominus,
si quidem est peccare tanquam transilire lineas’ Cic. _Par._ iii 1, 20.

[121] ‘When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person,
do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also
increased your incontinence’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 18, 6.

[122] καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων Diog. L. vii 129.

[123] Stob. iii 6, 23.

[124] ‘idem ille Epictetus solitus dicere est duo esse vitia multo omnium
gravissima ac taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, cum aut
iniurias, quae sunt ferendae, non toleramus neque ferimus, aut a quibus
rebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus, non tenemus’ A. Gellius, _N.
A._ xvii 19, 5.

[125] ‘verba haec duo dicebat: ἀνέχου et ἀπέχου _ib._ 6.

[126] ‘At first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself; the
contest is unequal between a charming young girl and a beginner in
philosophy’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 12, 12.

[127] ‘id agere debemus, ut inritamenta vitiorum quam longissime
profugiamus’ Sen. _Ep._ 51, 5; ‘ei, qui amorem exuere conatur, evitanda
est omnis admonitio dilecti corporis’ _ib._ 69, 3.

[128] Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 15-21.

[129] See above, § 349.

[130] Epict. _Disc._ ii 18, 24-29.

[131] The terms ‘ruffling’ (_levis motus_), and ‘commotions’
(_emotiones_) or ‘perturbations’ (_perturbationes_) are metaphors taken
from the disturbance of a calm sea; the remaining terms properly describe
bodily ill-health. The English words ‘emotions,’ ‘affections’ have almost
entirely lost their original force, and are therefore no longer suitable
as translations. The substitution of ‘commotion’ for ‘emotion’ has
already been adopted by Maudsley, _Pathology of the Human Mind_.

[132] ‘ad peiores nuntios subriguntur pili, et rubor ad improba verba
subfunditur sequiturque vertigo praerupta cernentes’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 2,
1; ‘erubescunt pudici etiam loqui de pudicitia’ Cic. _Leg._ i 19, 50. See
also the following notes.

[133] ‘si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem humoris
obsceni altumve suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile
indicium adfectus animique signum putat, fallitur nec intellegit corporis
hos esse pulsus’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 3, 2; ‘est primus motus non voluntarius
quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio’ _ib._ 4, 1.

[134] ‘prima illa agitatio animi, quam species iniuriae incussit, non
magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae species’ _ib._ 3, 5.

[135] ‘[sapiens] sentit levem quendam tenuemque motum, nam, ut dicit
Zenon, in sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix
manet. sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras adfectuum; ipsis
carebit’ _ib._ iii 16, 7; ‘scio inveniri quosdam, qui negent doliturum
esse sapientem; hi non videntur mihi unquam in eiusmodi casum incidisse’
_ib._ xi 18, 5; ‘nullo [dolore adfici] inhumana duritia est’ _ib._ xii
16, 1.

[136] ‘nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit’ _ib._ i 2, 2; ‘invicti
esse possumus, inconcussi non possumus’ _N. Q._ ii 59, 3.

[137] ‘adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permittere
se illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi’ _Dial._ iv 3, 1; ‘[Zeno]
perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi,
et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quandam
intemperantiam’ Cic. _Ac._ i 10, 39; perturbationes autem nulla naturae
vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones et iudicia levitatis’ _Fin._
iii 10, 35.

[138] ‘neque enim sepositus est animus et extrinsecus speculatur
adfectus, sed in adfectum ipse mutatur’ Sen. _Dial._ iii 8, 2.

[139] ‘perturbationes animorum, quas Graeci πάθη appellant, poteram
ego verbum ipsum interpretans, morbos appellare: sed non conveniret ad
omnia. quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere?
sed illi dicunt πάθος. sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa
declarari videtur’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 10, 35.

[140] ὅταν εἰς μόνιμον ἀφίκηται διάθεσιν ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ὀνομάζεται νόσημα
Gal. _loc. aff._ i 3, p. 32 K (Arnim iii 429); on the other hand a
νόσημα is called ἕξις Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘adfectus sunt motus animi
improbabiles, subiti et concitati, qui frequentes neglectique fecere
morbum’ Sen. _Ep._ 75, 12; ‘morbi sunt inveterata vitia et dura; altius
haec animum implicuerunt et perpetua eius mala esse coeperunt’ _ib._ 11.

[141] For the technical terms see above, § 362, note 6.

[142] Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 11, 25.

[143] εἶναι δέ τινα [νοσήματα] κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα, οἷον μισογυνίαν,
μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν Stob. vii 7, 10 e; ‘offensionum autem
definitiones sunt eius modi, ut inhospitalitas sit opinio vehemens valde
fugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhaerens et penitus insita, et mulierum
odium, ut Hippolyti, et ut Timonis generis humani’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv
11, 27.

[144] ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο
γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων Stob. ii
7, 11 g.

[145] See above, § 8.

[146] See above, § 317.

[147] ‘cum [lineam transilieris] culpa commissa est; quam longe
progrediare, cum semel transieris, ad augendam culpam nihil pertinet’
Cic. _Parad._ iii 20.

[148] Here we must altogether part company from Bishop Lightfoot, who
writes ‘the Stoic, so long as he was true to the tenets of his school,
could have no real consciousness of sin’ _Philippians_, p. 290. It may
however be admitted that the feelings we ascribe to the Stoics are more
forcibly expressed by Cleanthes, Antipater, Musonius and Epictetus than
by Seneca.

[149] See above, § 362, note 7.

[150] See above, § 355.

[151] ἀρέσκει τε αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος
καὶ Περσαῖος καὶ Ζήνων Diog. L. vii 120.

[152] ‘omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum
qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem
suffocaverit’ Cic. _Mur._ 29, 61.

[153] ‘parva, inquis, res est. at magna culpa, nec enim peccata rerum
eventu, sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt’ Cic. _Par._ iii 20; ‘facilius
est excludere perniciosa quam regere’ Sen. _Dial._ iii 7, 2; ‘optimum est
ipsis repugnare seminibus’ _ib._ 8, 1; ‘si das aliquid iuris tristitiae
timori cupiditati ceterisque motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra
potestate’ _Ep._ 85, 11.

[154] Diog. L. vii 121.

[155] ἶσά τε πάντα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δ’ ὅμοια Stob. ii
7, 11 l.

[156] ‘stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in omnia natura pronus est;
alius in avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, alius in petulantiam inclinatur
...’ Sen. _Ben._ iv 27, 1; ‘omnes stulti mali sunt; qui autem habet
vitium unum, omnia habet’ _ib._ v 15, 1.

[157] ‘intellegendum est eos sensisse hoc idem, quod a Socrate acceptum
diligenter Stoici retinuerunt, omnes insipientes esse non sanos’ Cic.
_Tusc. disp._ iii 5, 10.

[158] πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετήν· ὅθεν
ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους Cleanthes
ap. Stob. ii 7, 5 b 8; ‘in pessima ab optimis lapsus necesse est etiam
in malo vestigia boni teneat. nunquam tantum virtus exstinguitur, ut non
certiores animo notas imprimat, quam ut illas eradat ulla mutatio’ Sen.
_Ben._ vii 19, 5; ‘inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet, modo
deliciis ac situ, modo officii inscitia’ _ib._ v 25, 6.

[159] ‘satis ipsum nomen philosophiae, etiamsi modice tractetur,
invidiosum est’ _Ep._ 5, 2.

[160] αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς
πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν μήτε παρ’ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν προσδέχεσθαι Diog. L.
vii 117.

[161] ‘[sapiens] nec cupit nec timet beneficio rationis’ Sen. _Dial._ vii
5, 1; ‘erectus laetusque est, inde continuo gaudio elatus’ _ib._ ii 9, 3.

[162] Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 29.

[163] _ib._ iii 13, 11 to 13.



CHAPTER XV.

COUNSELS OF PERFECTION.


[Sidenote: Precepts.]

=395.= We have now set forth the Stoic theory of ethics, both in its
high philosophic framework and in its more detailed treatment, in which
it prescribes what is to be done and what to be left undone, and how the
soul is to be disciplined in health and medicined in sickness. It remains
for us to study the application of the system to individual cases, a
matter which perhaps lies outside the scope of philosophy as understood
at the present day, but is an essential part of the work of churches and
social organizations. This department of philosophy was termed by the
ancients ‘precepts,’ or (more fully) ‘advice, dissuasion, admonition,
exhortation, consolation, warnings, praise, reproof’ and so forth[1]; by
some philosophers, as for instance by Aristo of Chios, it was held in
contempt, by others (less inclined to Cynism) it was considered alone
worthy of pursuit[2]. But the steady conviction of the main body of
Stoic teachers was that theory and precept must go hand in hand[3]; that
moral principles have no strength apart from their daily application[4],
and that practical suggestions apart from a sound and reasoned system
are like leaves cut from the bough, without lasting greenness[5].
Since precepts apply directly to individual persons and particular
circumstances, they presuppose some relationship between teacher and
hearer[6]; the latter must be either a convert to the school or one who
has grown up under its influence. In the Roman period the department
of precepts is of increasing importance; we have something to learn
from Antipater, Panaetius and Cicero, but we find much more material in
the lectures (διατριβαί, ‘diatribes’) and letters of Musonius, Seneca,
Epictetus and other teachers of the period of the principate.


[Sidenote: Training of the young.]

=396.= The ‘precepts’ which we find illustrated by our various
authorities are not easily systematized, but they have all the more the
charm of personal intimacy; through them we are admitted to the home
life of the Stoics. As Seneca wrote to Lucilius, so every day did Stoic
fathers, Stoic teachers, Stoic jurists, address those who came within
their influence. Believing every man to have the seed of virtue in
him, they had confidence that by their words it would often be stirred
to life[7]; and that in other cases, in which the promising shoot had
become overshadowed by ignorance or evil habits, it would by the same
means begin to grow again[8]. But the full benefits of precepts could
only be seen where they fell on well-prepared ground, and formed part
of a training extending from infancy to the grave; where the instructor
could daily ensure their enforcement and observe their effect. This
opportunity was necessarily found most often in the teaching of the
young; and the Stoic system of precepts, though not restricted to one
period of life, was to a large extent a foreshadowing of a ‘Theory of
Education.’ It was under all circumstances guided by the rule of ‘little
by little.’ Precepts must be few[9], and must be in themselves easy for
the individual to carry out[10]; but by steady practice great things will
be accomplished.


[Sidenote: The teacher’s example.]

=397.= Since the value of precepts depends on the personal influence of
the instructor, it is clear that his example will be of the greatest
importance, and we may first ask what the discipline is to which he
himself submits. Here the Cynic teacher seems to have the advantage, for
he lives in the sight of all men; and the Indian, who allows himself
to be scorched or burnt to show his contempt for pain, makes a still
more forcible appeal[11]. The Stoic does not parade himself in this
fashion, but neither does he lock the door of his private life against
any who wish to examine it[12]. In the early morning he shakes off
sleep, rousing himself to do the day’s work of a man[13]. Having clothed
himself, he turns his mind towards his Maker, and sings his praises;
he resolves during the coming day to cooperate in his purposes, and to
bear cheerfully any burden that may be placed upon him[14]. He will then
give a short time to gymnastic exercises for the good of his health[15];
after which, if his strength allows it, he will take, winter or summer,
a plunge into the cold bath[16]; next comes the slightest of meals[17];
then a short nap or reverie[18]. From this he is aroused by the stir
around him, and he then applies himself to the day’s studies, being
careful to alternate reading and writing, so that his mind may be neither
exhausted by the latter nor relaxed by the former[19]. Later on he will
consider his practical duties towards his relatives, his friends, and
society in general. He will order his household and settle the disputes
of his dependents. He will visit his friends, saying a word here and
there in season[20], but not (like the Cynics) to all and sundry[21]. He
will encourage those who are making progress in virtue, and sharply warn
those who are in danger of a fall[22]. He advises a young mother to nurse
her child at her own breast; and when he meets with objections, points
out the wisdom and propriety of obeying the prescriptions of nature[23].
Returning home, he will again enjoy some slight bodily exercise, joining
perhaps in a game of ball; his thoughts however will not always turn
on success in the game, but he will consider how many principles in
physics and ethics may be illustrated by it[24]. Now that evening comes
on, he sits down to a meal (not over-elaborate) in the company of one
or two favourite pupils[25]. Afterwards comes the temptation to burn
the midnight oil in gathering seeds of wisdom for the morrow from the
well-thumbed manuscript of Cleanthes or, it may be, of Epicurus[26].
Retiring to his chamber, he will examine his conscience, review the
events of the past day, and be at peace with himself before he sleeps[27].


[Sidenote: The child’s life.]

=398.= With the training of children the Stoic teacher is perhaps not
altogether familiar, but he knows its importance[28]; it must be based
on simplicity and austerity, for just at this time indulgence and luxury
are most dangerous stimulants to the passions[29]. The child must learn
to eat and drink in a mannerly way[30], to refrain from loud talking and
laughing[31], to express himself in respectful and graceful words[32]. He
must be taught to do right before he can understand the reason why[33],
or else by doing wrong he will make it difficult for himself afterwards
to do right; he must be ruled until he can rule himself[34]. For this
reason we give children proverbs (_sententiae_) or anecdotes (χρεῖαι) to
write out and learn, such as ‘honesty is the best policy’ or ‘Socrates
being asked of what city he was ...’; and these short pithy sayings sink
deep[35]. But in the school life of children no attempt must be made
to grapple with the real problems of life, because these are too hard
for them, though parents often forget this objection[36]. Games and
amusements may be permitted; for though in discussions on high principle
the Stoics may be entirely opposed to ‘relaxation of soul[37],’ yet in
practical life they freely admit its importance[38]. All dealings with
children should be gentle; the discipline of the rod has long ago been
abandoned by all sensible parents and teachers[39].


[Sidenote: Harm of soft living.]

=399.= Soft living is at all ages to be avoided[40]. It is in these
days a danger to the bodily health; for when a man is accustomed to be
protected from a draught by glass windows, to have his feet kept warm
by foot-warmers constantly renewed, and his dining-room kept at an even
temperature by hot air, the slightest breeze may put him in danger of
his life[41]. Those who envy men who ‘live softly’ forget that their
character becomes soft thereby[42]. In particular clothing should not
be such as altogether to protect the body from heat in summer, and from
cold in winter. It is better to wear one shirt than two, best still to
have only a coat. Then again, if you can bear it, it is better to go
without shoes; for after all to be shod is not very different from being
fettered, and runners do not use shoes[43]. So also avoid luxurious
furniture; of what use is it that couches, tables and beds should be
made of costly woods, and adorned with silver and gold? We eat, drink,
and sleep better without these things. In all these matters the Spartans
set us a good example; for while disease injures the body only, luxury
corrupts both body and soul[44].


[Sidenote: Training of girls.]

=400.= Boys and girls must be educated alike. This nature teaches us, for
we train colts and puppies without any regard for the difference of sex.
The true education of children is in the practice of the virtues, and
these are the same for men and for women. Women need Wisdom to understand
the ordering of a household, Justice to control the servants, Soberness
that they may be modest and unselfish. But they also need Courage; in
spite of the name ‘manliness’ (ἀνδρεία), this is not a virtue reserved
for men. Without it women may be led by threats into immodest acts.
Females of all kinds fight to defend their young; the Amazons too were
good fighters, and it is only for want of practice that women cannot
do the same to-day. That men, being the stronger, should do the heavier
work, and women the lighter, is an arrangement which is often convenient,
but circumstances may require the contrary. Girls at any rate must learn
equally with boys to bear suffering, not to fear death, not to be in low
spirits about anything that happens; to avoid grasping habits, to love
equality and benevolence, and to do no harm to man or woman[45].


[Sidenote: Obedience to parents.]

=401.= Children should obey their parents, but in the spirit of reason.
We do not obey a father who gives orders for the treatment of a sick
person contrary to those of the physician; nor one, who being himself
ill, demands things that are not good for him; nor one who bids his son
steal, or appropriate trust funds, or sacrifice his youthful bloom. We
do not even obey him when he tells us to spell a word wrongly or strike
a false note on the lyre. If your father forbids you to philosophize,
show him by your manner of life, by prompt obedience, by good temper,
by unselfishness, how good a thing philosophy is. But after all, the
command of the universal Father is more urgent upon you; which is, to
be just, kind, benevolent, sober, high-souled; above labours and above
pleasures; pure from all envy and plotting. You need not assume the
outward appearance of a philosopher; for the power of philosophy is in
the innermost part of the soul, which the father can no more reach than
the tyrant[46].


[Sidenote: Example of gladiators and soldiers.]

=402.= The fancy of young men is easily attracted by the vision of
virtue, but it is hard for them to persevere; they are like soft
cheese which slips away from the hook by which it is taken up[47]. We
must therefore put before them an ideal which appeals to them, and in
which the advantages of fixed purpose and severe training are apparent
to the eye. Such is the training of the athlete, the gladiator, and
the soldier[48]. The teachers of wrestling bid the pupil try again
after each fall[49]; the trained boxer is eager to challenge the most
formidable opponent[50]. The gladiator has learnt the lesson that pain is
no evil, when he stands up wounded before a sympathetic crowd and makes
a sign that it matters nothing[51]. But most of all the soldier’s oath
serves as an example, when he pledges himself to serve Caesar faithfully
all his life: let the young philosopher pledge himself to serve his God
as faithfully, to submit to the changes and chances of human life, and to
obey willingly the command to act or to suffer[52]. Without effort, as
Hesiod has taught us, no greatness can be attained[53].


[Sidenote: The ‘contrary twist.’]

=403.= In youth bad habits are apt to acquire some strength before
they can be rooted out, and it will be well to anticipate this evil by
exercising body and soul in advance in a direction contrary to that of
the most common temptations. The teacher will therefore give to his
precepts an exaggerated character, reckoning upon human frailty to bring
about a proper standard in practice[54]. Thus since luxury is a chief
enemy of virtue, the body should at least occasionally be brought low.
A practice approved by the example of eminent men is to mark out from
time to time a few days for the exercise of the simple life; during this
time life is to be maintained on coarse bread and water, in rough dress
and all the surroundings of poverty[55]. Since Cynism is a ‘short cut
to virtue[56],’ philosophers may well employ the methods of Diogenes for
short periods, as a corrective to any tendency to excess; rich people do
as much for love of change[57].


[Sidenote: Personal appearance.]

=404.= On the question of personal appearance there is much to be said on
both sides. Foppishness is a disagreeable vice, and it is contemptible
that a young man should smell of perfumes. On the other hand a total
disregard of appearances is not approved by the Stoics; ‘it is against
nature’ says Seneca ‘to be averse to neatness in appearance[58].’ In
these outward matters a sensible man will conform to fashion, nor will he
wish to make the name of philosopher still more unpopular than it is[59].
The founders of Stoicism laid it down that men and women should wear the
same dress; but the later teachers laid stress on the natural distinction
of the sexes; and to men the beard should be an object of just pride, for
it is more becoming than the cock’s comb, or the lion’s mane[60]. This is
to the Stoic a point of honour; he should part with his head more readily
than with his beard[61]. But the beard may be trimmed; for, as Zeno has
observed, nature provides rather against the ‘too little’ than against
the ‘too much,’ and reason must come to her help. Women do right to
arrange their hair so as to make themselves more beautiful; but for men
any kind of artistic hair-dressing is contemptible[62].


[Sidenote: Solitude and society.]

=405.= The young should train themselves alternately to bear solitude and
to profit by society[63]: since the wise man is never dependent on his
friends, though none can take better advantage of them[64]. In living
alone a man follows the example of the deity, and comes to know his own
heart[65]. But solitude must not be a screen for secret vices; a man
only uses it rightly when he can without shame picture the whole world
watching his hours of privacy[66]. The right choice of friends calls for
true wisdom; for the soul cannot but be soiled by bad company[67]. The
only true friendship is based on the mutual attraction of good folk[68];
therefore the wise are friends one to another even whilst they are
unacquainted[69]. It is well to consider much before choosing a friend,
but afterwards to give him implicit trust[70]; for a true friend is
a second self[71]. Such friendship can only arise from the desire to
love and be loved[72]; those who seek friends for their own advantage,
will be abandoned by them in the day of trial[73]. In the companionship
of well-chosen friends there grows up the ‘common sense,’ which is an
instinctive contact with humanity as a whole, making each man a partner
in the thoughts and needs of all around him. This feeling is a principal
aim of philosophy[74]. But the young philosopher should make no enemies;
he should be free from that dislike of others which so often causes a man
to be disliked, and should remember that he who is an enemy to-day may be
a friend to-morrow[75].


[Sidenote: Comradeship in marriage.]

=406.= As the young Stoic passes from youth to manhood, he will turn
his mind towards marriage as a political and social duty[76]; but if
he is really touched by the divine flame, he will also find in it that
enlargement of his own sympathies and opportunities of which the wise
man is always glad[77]. Under the Roman principate we observe a rapid
development of personal sympathy between husband and wife; and though in
society girls who attended philosophers’ classes had an ill name as being
self-willed and disputatious[78], yet it is from this very circle that
the ideal of a perfect harmony of mind and purpose was developed most
fully. Musonius often speaks on this subject:

  ‘Husband and wife enter upon a treaty to live and to earn
  together, and to have all things in common, soul, body and
  property. Unlike the lower animals, which mate at random, man
  cannot be content without perfect community of thought and mutual
  affection. Marriage is for health and for sickness alike, and
  each party will seek to outrun the other in love, not seeking his
  own advantage, but that of his partner[79].’

  ‘A man should look for a healthy body, of middle stature, capable
  of hard work, and offering no attraction to the licentious. But
  the soul is far more important; for as a crooked stick cannot
  be fitted with one that is straight, so there can be no true
  agreement except between the good[80].’

Seneca is reticent as to marriage, but we have no reason to doubt that
his life with Paulina was typical of the best Stoic marriages. Thus
he excuses himself for taking more thought for his health than a
philosopher should, by saying that the happiness of Paulina depends upon
it. ‘Her life is wrapped up in mine, for its sake I must take care of my
own. What can be more delightful than to be so dear to one’s wife, that
for her sake one becomes dearer to himself[81]!’


[Sidenote: Celibacy.]

=407.= On the question of marriage Epictetus strikes a contrary note,
characteristic of his time, and of his bias towards Cynic practice:

  ‘In the present state of things, which is like that of an army
  placed in battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should
  without any distraction be employed only on the ministration of
  God? To say nothing of other things, a father must have a heating
  apparatus for bathing the baby; wool for his wife when she is
  delivered, oil, a bed, a cup; and so the furniture of the house
  is increased. Where then now is that king, who devotes himself to
  the public interests,

    “The people’s guardian and so full of cares[82]”

  whose duty it is to look after others; to see who uses his wife
  well, who uses her badly, who quarrels, who administers his
  family well, and who does not? Consider what we are bringing the
  Cynic down to, how we are taking his royalty from him[83]!’

To this very definite conception of a celibate order of philosophers,
devoting themselves to the good of humanity and entitled thereby to
become the rulers of society, Musonius makes the following reply in
advance from the true Stoic standpoint:

  ‘Marriage was no hindrance to Pythagoras, Socrates or Crates;
  and who were better philosophers than they? Since marriage is
  natural, philosophers should set the example of it. Why else
  did the Creator separate the human race into two divisions,
  making the honourable parts of the body distinct for each, and
  implanting in each a yearning for the other, but that he wished
  them to live together and to propagate the race? He who would
  destroy marriage, destroys the family and the commonwealth. No
  relationship is so essential or so intimate; friend does not
  agree so well with friend, nor does a father feel so keenly
  separation from his son. And why should a philosopher be
  different from other men? Only that which is unbecoming is a
  hindrance to a philosopher; but by doing his daily duty as a man
  he will become kindlier in disposition and more social in his
  thoughts[84].’


[Sidenote: Means of livelihood.]

=408.= The head of a household must have a means of living; and therefore
the making of money (χρηματισμός, _cura rei familiaris_) comes within
the range of precepts. The Greek writers recognised three proper means
of livelihood; (i) from kingship, that is, to be either a king or a
king’s minister or general; (ii) from politics, that is, by acting as
a magistrate or a judge; (iii) from sophistry, that is, by teaching
philosophy to those who are wishing to learn[85]. To each profession
there are obvious objections; indeed the sharp critic of Stoicism can
see no reason why a wise man, who lacks nothing, should trouble himself
about money-making. Each of the three professions named assumes the
existence of men willing to be guided by philosophy, and these are not
easily found. If pupils are taken, the question arises whether fees
should be paid in advance or not. Now it is certainly more reasonable
that a student should only pay if he profits by his teaching; but on the
other hand no one can absolutely promise to make a man good in a year,
and deferred payments are often found unsatisfactory[86]. Under the Roman
principate we hear little of the professions connected with public life;
but it is clear that the teacher and the physician are held in special
regard[87]. Seneca has not the breadth of mind to respect the painter or
the sculptor, any more than the wrestler or the stage-engineer[88]. Yet
Chrysippus had suggested a bolder standpoint when he said that ‘the wise
man will turn three somersaults for a sufficient fee[89]’; and no rule
can be laid down except that a man should earn his own living without
injuring his neighbour[90]. Agriculture, as a calling favourable both to
health of body and to innocence of soul, continued to be praised, but was
seldom practised except as an amusement[91].


[Sidenote: Kingly duties.]

=409.= For every profession philosophy has appropriate precepts,
beginning with the king. There came one day to Musonius a king of Syria,
for in those times there were kings subject to the Roman empire. Musonius
addressed him thus:

  ‘You ought to be a philosopher as much as I. Your wish is to
  protect and benefit your fellow-men; to do that, you must know
  what is good and what is evil. A king too must understand
  Justice; for wars and revolts come about because men quarrel
  about their rights. Also he must show Soberness and Courage, that
  he may be an example to his subjects[92]. The ancients thought
  that a king should be a living law (νόμος ἔμψυχος), and an
  imitator of Zeus. Only a good man can be a good king.’

The king was highly pleased, and asked him to name any boon he would.
‘Abide by my words,’ said Musonius, ‘that will be the best boon both for
me and for you[93].’

Two precepts in particular are addressed to kings. The first, that they
should encourage friends who will speak the truth to them. Even Augustus
Caesar needed this lesson; bitterly as he lamented the deaths of Agrippa
and Maecenas, he would not have allowed them to speak frankly had they
lived[94]. The second, that they should practise clemency, following the
example of Julius Caesar, who destroyed the evidence upon which he might
have punished his enemies[95]. None does this virtue better become than
kings and rulers[96].


[Sidenote: Court life.]

=410.= To the man of high rank it is natural to desire to move in the
society of the great and the powerful. Epictetus gives us a striking
description of the man who desires to be on the list of the ‘Caesaris
amici,’ which he thinks to be a good, though experience shows that it is
not such.

  ‘Of whom shall we inquire? What more trustworthy witness have we
  than this very man who is become Caesar’s friend? “Come forward
  and tell us, when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you
  became Caesar’s friend?” Immediately you hear the answer, “Stop,
  I entreat you, and do not mock me; you know not what miseries
  I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; but one comes and
  says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going forth; then come
  troubles and cares.” “Well, and did you sup with more pleasure,
  now or before?” Hear what he says about this also. He says that
  if he is not invited, he is pained; and if he is invited, he
  sups like a slave with his master, all the while being anxious
  that he does not say or do anything foolish. As befits so great
  a man, Caesar’s friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head.
  I can swear that no man is so stupid as not to bewail his own
  misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar[97].’

It is exactly under these circumstances that a thorough training in
philosophy is of really practical value.

  ‘When you are going in to any great personage, remember that
  another also from above sees what is going on, and that you
  ought to please him rather than that other. He then who sees
  from above asks you: “In the schools what used you to say about
  exile and bonds and death and disgrace?” “That they are things
  indifferent.” “And the end of life, what is it?” “To follow
  thee.” “Do you say this now also?” “I do.” Then go in to the
  great personage boldly and remember these things: and you will
  see what a youth is who has studied these things, when he is
  among men who have not studied them. I imagine that you will have
  such thoughts as these; “Why do we make such great and so many
  preparations for nothing? Is this the thing which is named power?
  All this is nothing[98].”’

Yet a wise man will never challenge the anger of the powerful; he will
turn aside from it, as a sailor from a storm[99]. The virtuous affection
of caution must be called in to help him, so many are his dangers.
An independence of look, a slight raising of the voice, an outspoken
expression, an appeal to public opinion, even unsought popularity are
enough to excite suspicion[100]. Perhaps after all the poet may be the
wisest, who advises good men to stay away from court altogether, for it
is a place where there is no room for them[101].


[Sidenote: Life in the city.]

=411.= A common cause of moral corruption is the routine of city life.
Here fashion dictates a round of occupations which are unnatural, but
in which men and women are alike absorbed[102]. Half of the morning
is absorbed in sleep[103]; then follows the visit to the public shows,
which are centres of demoralisation[104], and conversation with numerous
friends, each one of whom suggests some abandonment of principle[105]. In
the clubs all the most worthless members of society foregather[106]. The
baths, which were at one time simply constructed, and for the purpose of
cleanliness, are now instruments of luxury; and the water is now so hot
as to be better fitted for torture than pleasure[107]. For the evening
meal there must always be some novelty discovered, even if it is only to
begin with the dessert and end with the eggs[108]; even the order of the
seasons must be inverted, that roses may adorn the table in winter[109].
Upon the ill-spent day follows a disorderly night, and a heavy headache
the next morning[110]. From the temptations of such a life the adherent
of Stoicism will gladly escape.


[Sidenote: Life in the country.]

=412.= A more real happiness is reserved for the man who gives up town
life for that of the country. For it is most natural to win sustenance
from the earth, which is our common mother, and liberally gives back
many times over what is entrusted to her; and it is more healthy to
live in the open than to be always sheltering in the shade. It matters
little whether one works on one’s own land or on that of another; for
many industrious men have prospered on hired land. There is nothing
disgraceful or unbecoming in any of the work of the farm; to plant trees,
to reap, to tend the vine, to thrash out the corn, are all liberal
occupations. Hesiod the poet tended sheep, and this did not hinder him
from telling the story of the gods. And pasturage is (says Musonius)
perhaps the best of all occupations; for even farm work, if it is
exhausting, demands all the energies of the soul as well as of the body,
whereas whilst tending sheep a man has some time for philosophizing also.

It is true that our young men to-day are too sensitive and too refined to
live a country life; but philosophy would be well rid of these weaklings.
A true lover of philosophy could find no better discipline than to live
with some wise and kindly man in the country, associating with him in
work and in relaxation, at meals and in sleeping, and so ‘learning
goodness,’ as Theognis tells us to do, ‘from the good[111].’


[Sidenote: The householder.]

=413.= Within the household the head of it is a little king, and needs
to display the kingly virtues of Justice and Soberness. In his dealings
with the perverse he must consider how far each man is capable of bearing
the truth[112]. Indeed, willingness to listen to reproof is no small
virtue; few words are best, so that the wrongdoer may be left as far as
possible to correct his own ways[113]. Punishment must be reserved for
extreme cases, and is always to be administered with calmness; it is
felt more keenly when it comes from a merciful master[114]. Persistent
kindness wins over even bad men[115]. It is further the privilege of the
head of a household to distribute kindnesses to those below him. His
wealth he must regard as given him in trust; he is only the steward of
it, and must neither hoard nor waste; for he must give both a debit and
a credit account of all[116]. But if the right use of money causes the
possessor anxious thought, no trace of this should appear to others;
giving should be without hesitation, and as a delight[117]. The good
citizen will pay his taxes with special pleasure, because in his eyes
the welfare of the community stands higher than his own or that of his
family[118]; but he will not refuse a kindness even to an enemy who is
in need[119]; and in giving a farthing to a beggar, he will imply by
his manner that he is only paying what the other is entitled to as his
fellow-man[120]. In short, he will give as he would like to receive[121],
and with the feeling that the chief pleasure of ownership is to share
with another[122].


[Sidenote: Treatment of slaves.]

=414.= The good householder will associate on easy terms with his
slaves, remembering that they too are men, made of flesh and blood as
he is himself[123]. It is however a difficult matter to decide whether
a master should dine with his slave. Men of the old Roman type find
this a disgraceful practice, but the philosopher should decide in its
favour[124]. We do not need to inquire into a man’s social position, if
his character is attractive[125]. Plato has well said that we cannot find
a king who is not descended from a slave, or a slave who is not descended
from a king[126]; and in fact many a Roman slave was far better educated
than his master[127]. Even if we do not suppose that Seneca’s rule was
commonly practised in great Roman houses, the suggestion itself throws
a pleasing light on the position of a Roman slave. But if the master
was thus called upon to ignore differences of social position, as much
might be expected of the slave. With him it was doubtless an instinct
to prize liberty, ‘the power of living as you like,’ as the dearest of
possessions. Yet many a slave who won this reward by years of faithful
service found that liberty delusive, and would have been wiser to stay in
the home where he was valued[128].


[Sidenote: Large families.]

=415.= A question of pressing practical importance is that of large
families (πολυπαιδία). Statesmen have always considered it best that the
homes of citizens should be crowded with children; and for this reason
the laws forbid abortion and the hindrance of conception; they demand
fines for childlessness, and pay honours to those who bring up large
families. Public opinion takes the same view; the father of many children
is honoured as he goes about the city, and how charming is the sight of
a mother surrounded by a swarm of children[129]! No religious procession
is so imposing. For such parents every one feels sympathy, and every one
is prepared to cooperate with them[130]. But nowadays even rich parents
refuse to rear all their children, so that the first-born may be the
richer. But it is better to have many brothers than few; and a brother is
a richer legacy than a fortune. A fortune attracts enemies, but a brother
helps to repel them[131].


[Sidenote: Comfort in poverty.]

=416.= We have now accompanied the man of mature years in his duties
and his temptations: philosophy has also a word to speak with regard
to his trials. It is well indeed if he is convinced that the buffets
of fortune are no real evils; but this doctrine can be supplemented by
other consolations. Of the most bitter of all sufferings, bereavement by
the death of friends and children, we have already spoken; we may now
consider two other conditions usually held to be evil, namely poverty and
exile. In poverty the first comfort is in the observation that poor men
are usually stronger in body than the rich[132], and quite as cheerful
in mind[133]. Further the poor are free from many dangers which beset
the rich; they can travel safely even when highwaymen are watching the
road[134]. Poverty is an aid to philosophy, for a rich man, if he wishes
to philosophize, must freely choose the life of the poor[135]. A poor man
is not troubled by insincere friends[136]. In short, poverty is only hard
for him who kicks against the pricks[137].


[Sidenote: Comfort in exile.]

=417.= The subject of exile has the special interest that in fact so
many philosophers endured this evil. To the Stoic there is in principle
no such thing as exile, since the whole world is his country; but he
does not for this reason disregard other sources of consolation. Cicero
was plainly miserable, not only when he was formally exiled, but also
when he was away from Rome in an honourable position; Seneca at least
made the attempt to bear exile more bravely. Is it then so hard to be
away from one’s native place? Rome is crowded with strangers, who have
come thither for pleasure or profit, study or novelty[138]. True, it is
a beautiful town; but there is no place on earth so bare and unsightly,
not even this Corsica to which Seneca is banished, but that some men
choose it to reside in as a matter of taste[139]. Whole peoples have
changed their abode, and we find Greek cities in the midst of barbarism,
and the Macedonian language in India[140]; wherever he conquers the
Roman dwells[141]. The exile has everywhere the company of the same
stars above[142], of the same conscience within him[143]; even if he is
separated from those near and dear to him, it is not for the first time,
and he can still live with them in his thoughts and affections.


[Sidenote: Old age.]

=418.= Free or slave, rich or poor, powerful or insignificant, wherever
a man stands in the order of society, old age comes at last and
imperiously stops all ambitions. It is, in the general opinion, a time
of sadness[144]; to associate it with pleasure is not scandalous, only
because it is paradoxical[145]. Cicero’s work _de Senectute_ shows how
old age became attractive according to Roman tradition; Seneca is hardly
so successful. With the fading of hope the stimulus to effort dies away
in old age[146]; but though philosophy forbids idleness, nature cries out
for rest. We cannot then approve when old men follow their professional
occupations with undiminished zeal[147], and we must highly blame those
who cannot quit their pleasures[148]. The great boon which old age brings
is leisure; for this many great men, amongst them Augustus, have longed
in vain[149]. This leisure gives the opportunity of making acquaintance
with great men through their books, but better still, that of making
acquaintance with our own selves.


[Sidenote: Musonius’ ‘viaticum.’]

=419.= ‘Give me,’ said one to Musonius, ‘_a viaticum_ for old age.’ He
replied as follows:

  ‘The rule is the same as for youth, to live methodically and
  according to nature[150]. Do not grieve because you are cut
  off from the pleasures of youth; for man is no more born for
  pleasure than any other animal: indeed man alone is an image of
  the deity[151], and has like excellences. And do not consider
  the divine excellences as beyond your reach; for we have no
  other notion of the gods than such as we derive from observing
  good men, whom therefore we call divine and godlike. He who has
  acquired in youth sound principles and systematic training will
  not be found to complain in old age of the loss of pleasures,
  of weakness of body, or because he is neglected by friends and
  acquaintance; he will carry about with him a charm against
  all these evils, namely his own education. But if he has not
  been rightly educated, he will do well to go to a friend wiser
  than himself, and listen to his teaching and profit by it. And
  specially he will ponder over death, how it comes in nature’s
  course to all, and therefore is no evil. With such thoughts he
  will be cheerful and contented, and so he will live a happy life.
  But let no one say that wealth brings happiness in old age; that
  it does not bring a contented spirit is witnessed every day by a
  crowd of rich old men, who are in bad temper and low spirits, and
  feel deeply aggrieved[152].’


[Sidenote: Will-making.]

=420.= When we see death before us there remains a last act to be
performed. We look at the wealth which no longer belongs to us, and
consider to whom it can most worthily be entrusted. We stand in the
position of a judge who can no longer be bribed, and, with all the wisdom
and good will that we have, we give this last verdict on those around
us[153].


[Sidenote: Death.]

=421.= For death the whole of philosophy is a preparation; yet when it
is no longer a matter of uncertain fear, but close at hand and sure,
some last words are to be said. All this is in the course of nature, is
according to the will of the Creator.

  ‘God opens the door and says to you, “Go.” “Go whither?” To
  nothing terrible, but to the place from which you came, to your
  friends and kinsmen, to the elements[154]. What there was in you
  of fire goes to fire; of earth, to earth; of air, to air; of
  water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus,
  but all is full of gods and demons[155]. God has invited you; be
  content when he calls others to the feast in your place.’

The philosopher does not look forward to renewing his personal life, or
to meeting again with parent, wife, or child. But death is a release from
all his pains and troubles; and he who has striven to live his life well
will know how to meet death also at its due time[156]. If it come to him
in the shipwreck, he will not scream nor blame God; if in the arena,
he will not shrink from his enemy, whether man or beast. In this last
short crisis he will bear witness that he accepts contentedly his mortal
lot[157].


FOOTNOTES

[1] ‘omnia ista [monitiones, consolationes, dissuasiones, adhortationes,
obiurgationes, laudationes] monitionum genera sunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 94, 39.

[2] ‘eam partem philosophiae, quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta
... quidam solam receperunt, sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem
levem existimat’ _ib._ 94, 1 and 2. The Cynics gave exhortations, but
without having a system for the purpose. See above, § 52.

[3] ‘Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem, sed etiam suasionem et
consolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat’ _ib._ 95, 65. Cf.
Cic. _Off._ i 3, 7; Sen. _Ep._ 94, 34.

[4] ‘ipsum de malis bonisque iudicium confirmatur officiorum exsecutione,
ad quam praecepta perducunt’ _ib._

[5] ‘quemadmodum folia virere per se non possunt, ramum desiderant; sic
ista praecepta, si sola sunt, marcent; infigi volunt sectae’ Sen. _Ep._
95, 59.

[6] See below, § 397, note 21.

[7] Sen. _Ep._ 94, 29 and 108, 8.

[8] ‘inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet; modo deliciis et
situ, modo officii inscitia’ _Ben._ v 25, 6.

[9] ‘plus prodesse, si pauca praecepta sapientiae teneas, sed illa in
promptu tibi et in usu sint, quam si multa quidem didiceris, sed illa
non habeas ad manum’ _Ben._ vii 1, 3; ‘We ought to exercise ourselves in
small things, and beginning with them to proceed to the greater’ Epict.
_Disc._ i 18, 18.

[10] ‘debet semper plus esse virium in actore quam in onere. necesse est
opprimant onera, quae ferente maiora sunt’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 6, 4.

[11] Arnim i 241.

[12] ‘sic certe vivendum est, tanquam in conspectu vivamus’ Sen. _Ep._
83, 1.

[13] ‘In the morning, when you feel loth to rise, fall back upon the
thought “I am rising for man’s work. Why make a grievance of setting
about that for which I was born, and for sake of which I have been
brought into the world? Is the end of my existence to lie snug in the
blankets and keep warm?”’ M. Aurel. _To himself_ v 1.

[14] ‘I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the Commander, praising
his acts; for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go away when
it pleases him; and while I lived it was my duty to praise God’ Epict.
_Disc._ iii 26, 29 and 30. See also above, § 258.

[15] ‘minimum exercitationi corporis datum’ Sen. _Ep._ 83, 3.

[16] ‘ab hac fatigatione magis quam exercitatione in frigidam descendi’
_ib._ 5.

[17] ‘panis deinde siccus et sine mensa prandium’ _ib._ 6.

[18] ‘brevissimo somno utor et quasi interiungo. satis est mihi vigilare
desiisse. aliquando dormisse me scio, aliquando suspicor’ _ib._

[19] ‘nec scribere tantum nec tantum legere debemus; altera res
contristabit, vires exhauriet (de stilo dico), altera solvet ac diluet’
Sen. _Ep._ 84, 2.

[20] ‘nulli enim nisi audituro dicendum est’ _ib._ 29, 1.

[21] ‘[Diogenes et alii Cynici] libertate promiscua usi sunt et obvios
monuerunt. hoc, mi Lucili, non existimo magno viro faciendum’ _ib._ 29, 1
and 3.

[22] ‘audebo illi mala sua ostendere’ _ib._ 4.

[23] A. Gellius, _N. A._ xii 1. Favorinus, of whom this is related, was
not himself a Stoic.

[24] Sen. _Ben._ ii 17, 3 to 5 and 32, 1 to 4.

[25] See above, § 125, note 90.

[26] ‘at te nocturnis iuvat impallescere chartis; | cultor enim iuvenum
purgatas inseris aures | fruge Cleanthea’ Pers. _Sat._ v 62-64; ‘quid est
tamen, quare tu istas Epicuri voces putes esse, non publicas?’ Sen. _Ep._
8, 8.

[27] ‘qualis ille somnus post recognitionem sui sequitur? quam
tranquillus, quam altus ac liber!’ _Dial._ v 36, 2.

[28] ‘plurimum proderit pueros statim salubriter institui’ _ib._ iv 21, 1.

[29] ‘tenuis ante omnia victus [sit] et non pretiosa vestis’ _ib._ 11;
‘nihil magis facit iracundos quam educatio mollis et blanda’ _ib._ 6.

[30] ‘if he ... eats as a modest man, this is the man who truly
progresses’ Epict. _Disc._ i 4, 20 and 21.

[31] ‘veritatis simplex oratio est’ Sen. _Ep._ 49, 12; ‘Let silence be
the general rule, or let only what is necessary be said, and in a few
words. Let not your laughter be much’ Epict. _Manual_ 33, 2 and 4.

[32] ‘loquendum est pro magnitudine rei impensius et illa
adicienda—pluris quam putas obligasti’ Sen. _Ben._ ii 24, 4.

[33] ‘inbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necesse est aliquem praeire—hoc
vitabis, hoc facies’ _Ep._ 94, 50.

[34] ‘regi ergo debet, dum incipit posse se regere’ _ib._ 51.

[35] ‘facilius singula insidunt circumscripta et carminis modo inclusa.
ideo pueris et sententias ediscendas damus et has quas Graeci chrias
vocant’ _ib._ 33, 6 and 7.

[36] ‘He is ridiculous who says that he wishes to begin with the matters
of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things;
and we ought to use this fact as an argument to parents’ Epict. _Disc._ i
26, 4 and 5.

[37] See above, § 316.

[38] ‘lusus quoque proderunt. modica enim voluptas laxat animos et
temperat’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 20, 3; ‘danda est animis remissio’ _ib._ ix 17,
5; ‘mens ad iocos devocanda est’ _ib._ 4.

[39] Chrysippus had approved of the rod: ‘caedi discentis, quamlibet
receptum sit et Chrysippus non improbet, minime velim’ Quint. _Inst. Or._
i 3, 14. But Seneca writes quite otherwise: ‘uter praeceptor dignior, qui
excarnificabit discipulos, si memoria illis non constiterit ... an qui
monitionibus et verecundia emendare ac docere malit?’ _Clem._ i 16, 2 and
3.

[40] ‘fugite delicias, fugite enervatam felicitatem’ Sen. _Dial._ i 4, 9.

[41] ‘quem specularia semper ab adflatu vindicaverunt, cuius pedes inter
fomenta subinde mutata tepuerunt, cuius cenationes subditus ac parietibus
circumfusus calor temperavit, hunc levis aura non sine periculo stringet’
_ib._

[42] ‘audire solemus sic quorundam vitam laudari, quibus
invidetur—molliter vivit hoc dicunt—mollis est’ _Ep._ 82, 2.

[43] Stob. iii 29, 78 (from Musonius).

[44] _ib._ 29, 75.

[45] Muson. apud Stob. ii 31, 123.

[46] Muson. _ib._ iv 79, 25.

[47] ‘It is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to
hold soft cheese with a hook’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 6, 9.

[48] See above, § 326.

[49] ‘See what the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen? Rise, they
say, wrestle again till you are made strong’ Epict. _Disc._ iv 9, 15.

[50] ‘[athletis] cura est, cum fortissimis quibusque confligere’ Sen.
_Dial._ i 2, 3.

[51] ‘[gladiator fortissimus] respiciens ad clamantem populum significat
nihil esse et intercedi non patitur’ _ib._ ii 16, 2.

[52] ‘ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia’ _ib._ vii 15, 7;
Epict. _Disc._ i 14, 15 and 16.

[53] See above, § 33; and compare Horace in his Stoic mood: ‘nil sine
magno | vita labore dedit mortalibus’ _Sat._ i 9, 59 and 60.

[54] ‘quaedam praecipimus ultra modum, ut ad verum et suum redeant’ Sen.
_Ben._ vii 22, 1; ‘We ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and
where there is great slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the
habit of exercise. I am rather inclined to pleasure; I will incline to
the contrary side above measure for the sake of exercise’ Epict. _Disc._
iii 12, 6 and 7.

[55] ‘interponas aliquot dies, quibus contentus minimo ac vilissimo
cibo, dura atque horrida veste, dicas tibi “hoc est quod timebatur?” ...
grabatus ille verus sit et sagum et panis durus ac sordidus—hoc triduo ac
quatriduo fer’ Sen. _Ep._ 18, 5 and 7; ‘quod tibi scripsi magnos viros
saepe fecisse’ _ib._ 20, 13.

[56] Diog. L. vii 121.

[57] ‘divites sumunt quosdam dies, quibus humi cenent, et remoto auro
argentoque fictilibus utantur’ Sen. _Dial._ xii 12, 3.

[58] ‘contra naturam est faciles odisse munditias’ Sen. _Ep._ 5, 4; ‘I
would rather that a young man, who is making his first movements towards
philosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed’ Epict.
_Disc._ iv 11, 25.

[59] ‘asperum cultum et intonsum caput et neglegentiorem barbam evita.
intus omnia dissimilia sint, frons populo conveniat’ Sen. _Ep._ 5, 2.

[60] ‘We ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes.... How much
more becoming is the beard than the cock’s comb and the lion’s mane! For
this reason we ought to preserve the signs which God has given’ Epict.
_Disc._ i 16, 13 and 14.

[61] ‘Come then, Epictetus, shave yourself.’ If I am a philosopher, I
answer, ‘I will not shave myself.’ ‘But I will take off your head.’ ‘If
that will do you any good, take it off’ Epict. _Disc._ i 2, 29.

[62] Stob. iii 6, 24 (from Musonius).

[63] ‘miscenda tamen ista et alternanda [sunt], solitudo ac frequentia’
Sen. _Dial._ ix 17, 3.

[64] ‘ita sapiens se contentus est, non ut velit esse sine amico, sed ut
possit’ _Ep._ 9, 5.

[65] ‘proderit per se ipsum secedere; meliores erimus singuli’ _Dial._
viii 1, 1; ‘A man ought to be prepared in a manner to be able to be
sufficient for himself and to be his own companion. For Zeus dwells by
himself and is tranquil by himself’ Epict. _Disc._ iii 13, 6 and 7.

[66] ‘tunc felicem esse te iudica, cum poteris vivere in publico;
parietes plerumque circumdatos nobis iudicamus, non ut tutius vivamus sed
ut peccemus occultius’ Sen. _Ep._ 43, 3.

[67] ‘It is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is
covered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself’ Epict.
_Disc._ iii 16, 3.

[68] Diog. L. vii 124.

[69] ‘Stoici censent sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos;
nihil est enim virtute amabilius’ Cic. _N. D._ i 44, 121; so Stob. ii 7
11 i.

[70] ‘post amicitiam credendum est, ante amicitiam iudicandum’ Sen. _Ep._
3, 2.

[71] Ζήνων ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι φίλος “ἄλλος ἐγώ” ἔφη Diog. L. vii 23.

[72] ‘Hecaton ait; ego tibi monstrabo amatorium: si vis amari, ama’ Sen.
_Ep._ 9, 6; ‘multos tibi dabo, qui non amico sed amicitia caruerunt’
_ib._ 6, 3.

[73] _ib._ 9, 8.

[74] ‘hoc primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem et
congregationem’ _ib._ 5, 4; ‘nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio
est’ _ib._ 6, 4.

[75] ‘monemus, ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum’ _ib._ 95, 63.

[76] See above, § 349.

[77] ‘[sapiens] ducit uxorem se contentus, et liberos tollit se
contentus’ Sen. _Ep._ 9, 17; ‘If indeed you had [this purpose], you would
be content in sickness, in hunger, and in death. If any among you has
been in love with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true’
Epict. _Disc._ iii 5, 18 and 19.

[78] ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, φασί τινες, ὅτι αὐθάδεις ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ θρασείας εἶναι
ἀνάγκη τὰς προσιούσας τοῖς φιλοσόφοις γυναῖκας Mus. apud Stob. ii 31, 126.

[79] Stob. iv 22, 90.

[80] Stob. iv 22, 104.

[81] ‘nam cum sciam spiritum illius [sc. Paulinae] in meo verti, incipio,
ut illi consulam, mihi consulere. quid enim iucundius quam uxori tam
carum esse, ut propter hoc tibi carior fias?’ Sen. _Ep._ 104, 2 and 5.

[82] Hom. _Il._ ii 25.

[83] Epict. _Disc._ iii 22, 69 to 75.

[84] Stob. iv 22, 20.

[85] Stob. ii 7, 11 m.

[86] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 20, 10.

[87] ‘omnium horum [medicorum et praeceptorum] apud nos magna caritas,
magna reverentia est’ Sen. _Ben._ vi 15, 1; ‘ex medico ac praeceptore in
amicum transeunt’ _ib._ 16, 1.

[88] _Ep._ 88, 18 and 22.

[89] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 30, 3.

[90] ‘sic in vita sibi quemque petere quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum
est; alteri deripere ius non est’ Cic. _Off._ iii 10, 42.

[91] See below, § 412.

[92] So too Epictetus: ‘To whose example should [the many] look except
yours [the governors’]?’ _Disc._ iii 4, 3.

[93] Stob. iv 7, 67.

[94] Sen. _Ben._ vi 32, 4.

[95] _Dial._ iv 23, 4.

[96] ‘nullum tamen clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem
decet’ _Clem._ i 3, 3.

[97] Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 46 to 50.

[98] _ib._ i 30, 1 to 7.

[99] ‘sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit, immo declinabit, non
aliter quam in navigando procellam’ Sen. _Ep._ 14, 7.

[100] _Dial._ iii 18, 2.

[101] ‘exeat aula | qui volet esse pius. virtus et summa potestas | non
coëunt: semper metuet, quem saeva pudebunt’ Lucan _Phars._ viii 493 to
495.

[102] Sen. _Ep._ 77, 6, and 95, 20 and 21.

[103] ‘turpis, qui alto sole semisomnus iacet, cuius vigilia medio die
incipit’ _ib._ 122, 1.

[104] ‘nihil tam damnosum bonis moribus quam in aliquo spectaculo
desidere’ _ib._ 7, 2.

[105] ‘inimica est multorum conversatio; nemo non aliquod nobis vitium
aut commendat aut imprimit aut nescientibus adlinit’ _ib._

[106] ‘vilissimus quisque tempus in aliquo circulo [terit]’ _Dial._ i 5,
4.

[107] _Ep._ 86, 9 and 10.

[108] _ib._ 114, 9.

[109] _ib._ 122, 8.

[110] ‘oculos hesterna graves crapula’ _ib._ 122, 2.

[111] Stob. iv 15, 18. Seneca gives a more qualified approval to country
life: ‘non est per se magistra innocentiae solitudo, nec frugalitatem
docent rura; sed ubi testis et spectator abscessit, vitia subsidunt,
quorum monstrari et conspici fructus est’ _Ep._ 94, 69.

[112] ‘de cetero vide, non tantum an verum sit quod dicis, sed an ille
cui dicitur veri patiens sit’ _Dial._ v 36, 4.

[113] ‘moneri velle ac posse secunda virtus est; flectendus est paucis
animus, sui rector optimus’ _Ben._ v 25, 4.

[114] ‘gravior multo poena videtur, quae a miti viro constituitur’
_Clem._ i 22, 3.

[115] ‘vincit malos pertinax bonitas’ _Ben._ vii 31, 1.

[116] ‘quid tanquam tuo parcis? procurator es, in depositi causa
[divitiae] sunt’ _Ben._ vi 3, 2; ‘donabit cum summo consilio dignissimos
eligens, ut qui meminerit tam expensorum quam acceptorum rationem esse
reddendam’ _ib._ 23, 5.

[117] ‘demus ante omnia libenter, cito, sine ulla dubitatione’ _Ben._ ii
1, 1.

[118] Cic. _Off._ i 17, 57.

[119] ‘non desinemus opem ferre etiam inimicis’ Sen. _Dial._ viii 1, 4.

[120] ‘[sapiens] dabit egenti stipem (non hanc contumeliosam, qua pars
maior horum qui se misericordes videri volunt, abicit et fastidit quos
adiuvat contingique ab his timet) sed ut homo homini ex communi dabit’
_Clem._ ii 6, 2.

[121] ‘sic demus, quomodo vellemus accipere’ _Ben._ ii 1, 1.

[122] ‘nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est’ _Ep._ 6, 4.

[123] ‘servi sunt? immo homines. servi sunt? immo humiles amici’ _ib._
47, 1; ‘animas servorum et corpora nostra | materia constare putat
paribusque elementis’ Juv. _Sat._ xiv 16 and 17.

[124] ‘cognovi familiariter te cum servis tuis vivere. hoc eruditionem
decet. rideo istos, qui turpe putant cum servo suo cenare’ Sen. _Ep._ 47,
1 and 2.

[125] ‘refert cuius animi sit, non cuius status’ _Ben._ iii 18, 2.

[126] _Ep._ 44, 4.

[127] ‘[Calvisius Sabinus] magna summa emit servos, unum qui Homerum
teneret, unum qui Hesiodum. novem praeterea lyricis singulos adsignavit.
magno emisse illum non est quod mireris: non invenerat, faciendos
locavit’ _Ep._ 27, 6.

[128] Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 33 to 40.

[129] But hear Epictetus on the other side: ‘Are those men greater
benefactors to mankind who introduce into the world to occupy their own
places two or three grunting children, or those who superintend as far
as they can all mankind? Did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons
contribute more to the community than Homer?’ _Disc._ iii 22, 77 and 78.

[130] Stob. iv 24, 15 (from Musonius).

[131] _ib._ 27, 21.

[132] See above, § 399.

[133] ‘compara inter se pauperum et divitum voltus; saepius pauper et
fidelius ridet’ Sen. _Ep._ 80, 6.

[134] ‘etiam in obsessa via pauperi pax est’ _ib._ 14, 9.

[135] ‘si vis vacare animo, aut pauper sis oportet aut pauperi similis’
_ib._ 17, 5.

[136] ‘[paupertas] veros certosque amicos retinebit; discedet quisquis
non te, sed aliud sequebatur. vel ob hoc unum amanda paupertas quod, a
quibus ameris, ostendet’ _ib._ 20, 7.

[137] ‘paupertas nulli malum est nisi repugnanti’ _ib._ 123, 16.

[138] _Dial._ xii 6, 2.

[139] ‘usque eo commutatio ipsa locorum gravis non est, ut hic quoque
locus a patria quosdam abduxerit’ _ib._ 5.

[140] _ib._ 7, 1.

[141] ‘ubicunque vicit Romanus habitat’ _ib._ 7, 7.

[142] _ib._ 8, 6.

[143] ‘licet in exilium euntibus virtutes suas secum ferre’ _ib._ 8, 1.

[144] ‘subeunt morbi tristisque senectus’ Verg. _G._ iii 67 quoted by
Sen. _Ep._ 108, 29.

[145] ‘plena est voluptatis [senectus], si illa scias uti’ Sen. _Ep._ 12,
4.

[146] ‘nihil magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se
desidiaeque dedat’ Cic. _Off._ i 34, 123; ‘iuvenes possumus discere,
possumus facilem animum et adhuc tractabilem ad meliora convertere’ Sen.
_Ep._ 108, 27.

[147] ‘adeone iuvat occupatum mori?’ Sen. _Dial._ x 20, 3. He instances
an old gentleman of 90, who had consented to resign his official post
at that age; but when the time came, he threw his whole household into
mourning until he got his work back again.

[148] ‘luxuria cum omni aetate turpis, tum senectuti foedissima est’ Cic.
_Off._ i 34, 123.

[149] Sen. _Dial._ x 4, 1 and 2.

[150] τὸ ζῆν ὁδῷ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν.

[151] ἄνθρωπος μίμημα θεοῦ μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων (see on hymn of Cleanthes,
l. 5, in § 97).

[152] Stob. _Flor._ 117, 8 (M).

[153] ‘ubi mors interclusit omnia et ad ferendam sententiam incorruptum
iudicem misit, quaerimus dignissimos quibus nostra tradamus; nec quicquam
cura sanctiore componimus quam quod ad nos non pertinet’ Sen. _Ben._ iv
11, 5.

[154] ‘reverti unde veneris quid grave est?’ _Dial._ ix 11, 4.

[155] Epict. _Disc._ iii 13, 14 and 15; _ib._ iv 1, 106.

[156] ‘male vivet quisquis nesciet bene mori’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 11, 4; and
see above, §§ 298, 299.

[157] ‘quod tam cito fit, timetis diu?’ Sen. _Dial._ i 6, 9; ‘puto
fortiorem eum esse, qui in ipsa morte est quam qui circa mortem. mors
enim admota etiam imperitis animum dedit non vitandi inevitabilia; sic
gladiator tota pugna timidissimus iugulum adversario praestat et errantem
gladium sibi adtemperat’ _Ep._ 30, 8; ‘the ship is sinking! what then
have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned full
of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been
produced must also perish; for I am not an immortal being’ Epict. _Disc._
ii 5, 11 to 13.



CHAPTER XVI.

STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE.


[Sidenote: Spread of Stoicism.]

=422.= Although up to this point it has been our main purpose to set
forth the doctrines of Stoicism, we have seen incidentally that these
came to exercise a wide influence in Roman society, and that the later
teachers are far less occupied in the attainment of truth than in the
right guidance of disciples who lean upon them. In the present chapter
we propose to describe more particularly the practical influence of
Stoicism. Our information, whether drawn from history or from poetry,
refers generally to the upper classes of Roman society; as to the
influence of the sect amongst the poor we have no sufficient record.
But although it is very generally held that the Stoics made no effort
to reach the working classes of Rome, or met with no success in that
direction[1], the evidence points rather to an opposite conclusion,
at any rate as regards all that development of the system which was
coloured by Cynism, the philosophy of the poor[2]. Our actual records are
therefore rather of the nature of side-lights upon the system; the main
stream of Stoic influence may well have flowed in courses with which we
are imperfectly acquainted, and its workings may perhaps come to light
first in a period of history which lies beyond our immediate scope.


[Sidenote: Conversion direct and indirect.]

=423.= Individual Romans who professed themselves disciples of the Porch
owed their allegiance to the sect to two causes, in varying proportion.
On the one hand they had attended lectures or private instruction
given by eminent Stoic teachers, or had immersed themselves in Stoic
literature. This influence was in almost all cases the influence of Greek
upon Roman, and the friendship between the Stoic Panaetius and Scipio
Aemilianus was the type of all subsequent discipleship. Scipio himself
did not perhaps formally become a Stoic, but he introduced into Roman
society the atmosphere of Stoicism, known to the Romans as _humanitas_;
this included an aversion to war and civil strife, an eagerness to
appreciate the art and literature of Greece, and an admiration for the
ideals depicted by Xenophon, of the ruler in Cyrus, and of the citizen
in Socrates[3]. All the Stoic nobles of the time of the republic
are dominated by these feelings. On the other hand individuals were
often attracted by the existence of a society which proclaimed itself
independent of the will of rulers, and offered its members mutual
support and consolation. Such men were often drawn into Stoicism by
the persuasion of friends, without being necessarily well-grounded in
philosophical principle; and in this way small groups or cliques might
easily be formed in which social prejudice or political bias outweighed
the formal doctrine of the school. Such a group was that of the ‘old
Romans’ of the first century of the principate; and with the spread of
Stoicism this indirect and imperfect method of attachment constantly
grows in importance as compared with direct discipleship.


[Sidenote: The Scipionic circle.]

=424.= Of the first group of Roman Stoics the most notable was C.
LAELIUS, the intimate friend of Scipio, who became consul in 140 B.C.
In his youth he had listened to the teaching of Diogenes of Babylon,
in later life he was the friend of Panaetius[4]. He was in his time
a notable orator with a quiet flowing style[5]; his manners were
cheerful[6], his temper was calm[7]; and, as we have seen[8], he seemed
to many the nearest of all the Romans to the ideal of the Stoic sage. He
is brought on as the chief speaker in Cicero’s _de Amicitia_. Another
close friend of Africanus was SP. MUMMIUS, the brother of the conqueror
of Achaia; his oratory was marked by the ruggedness characteristic of the
Stoic school[9]. Passing mention may be made of L. FURIUS PHILUS, consul
in 136 B.C., and a member of the same group, though his philosophical
views are not known to us[10].


[Sidenote: The Gracchan period.]

=425.= From the ‘humane’ movement sprang the Gracchan reforms, which all
alike aimed at deposing from power the class to which the reformers by
birth belonged. To the temper of mind which made such a desire possible
Stoic doctrine had largely contributed. The Greeks had taught their
Roman pupils to see in the nascent Roman empire, bearing the watchword
of the ‘majesty of the Roman name’ (_maiestas nominis Romani_), at
least an approximation to the ideal Cosmopolis: and many Romans so far
responded to this suggestion as to be not unfriendly towards plans for
extending their citizenship and equalizing the privileges of those who
enjoyed it. C. BLOSSIUS of Cumae, a pupil of Antipater of Tarsus, went
so far as to instigate Tiberius Gracchus to the schemes which proved his
destruction[11]; whilst other Stoics, equally sincere in their aims,
disagreed with the violence shown by Tiberius in his choice of method.
Amongst the latter was Q. AELIUS TUBERO, a nephew of Africanus[12],
who became consul in 118 B.C. He devoted himself day and night to the
study of philosophy[13], and though of no mark as an orator, won himself
respect by the strictness and consistency of his life[14]. Panaetius,
Posidonius, and Hecato all addressed treatises to him[15]; and he is a
leading speaker in Cicero’s _Republic_.


[Sidenote: Laelius to Lucilius.]

=426.= After the fall of the Gracchi the Stoic nobles continued to
play distinguished and honourable parts in public life. A family
succession was maintained through two daughters of Laelius, so that
here we may perhaps recognise the beginning of the deservedly famous
‘Stoic marriages.’ Of the two ladies the elder was married to Q. MUCIUS
SCAEVOLA, known as ‘the augur,’ who was consul in 117 B.C. He was a
devoted friend of Panaetius, and famous for his knowledge of civil
law[16]. The younger daughter was married to C. FANNIUS, who obtained
some distinction as a historian[17]. In C. LUCILIUS we find the Latin
poet of Stoicism; the views which he expresses in his satires on
religion and ethics are in the closest agreement with the teaching of
Panaetius[18], and the large circulation of his poems must have diffused
them through wide circles[19]. At the same time his attacks on the
religious institutions of Numa and his ridicule of his own childish
beliefs may well have brought philosophy into ill odour as atheistic and
unpatriotic: and we find the statesmen of the next generation specially
anxious to avoid any such imputations.


[Sidenote: Scaevola ‘the pontifex.’]

=427.= A dominating figure is that of Q. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA, commonly called
‘the pontifex,’ who was a nephew of his namesake mentioned above, and
derived from him his interest in civil law; he was consul in 95 B.C. He
overcame the difficulty about the popular religion by distinguishing on
Stoic lines three classes of deities, (i) mythical deities, celebrated by
the poets with incredible and unworthy narrations[20]; (ii) philosophical
deities, better suited for the schools than for the market-place; (iii)
civic deities, whose ceremonies it is the duty of state officials to
maintain[21], interpreting them so as to agree with the philosophers
rather than with the poets[22]. In this spirit he filled the position
of chief officer of the state religion. He was however no time-server;
for being appointed after his consulship to be governor of Asia, he
joined with his former quaestor P. RUTILIUS RUFUS in the design of
repressing the extortion of the _publicani_. A decisive step taken by him
was to declare all dishonourable contracts invalid[23]; and more than
a generation later his just and sparing administration was gratefully
remembered both at Rome and in the provinces[24]. The _equites_ took
their revenge not on Scaevola but on Rutilius[25], whom they brought
to trial in 92 B.C., when Scaevola pleaded his cause in a simple and
dignified way that became a Stoic, but did not exclude some traces of
elegance[26]. He is regarded as the father of Roman law, for he was the
first to codify it, which he did in eighteen volumes[27]. He also wrote a
special work on definitions, which no doubt reflected the interest which
the Stoics took in this part of logic.


[Sidenote: The Stoic lawyers.]

=428.= It seems beyond dispute that the systematic study of law, which
developed in later centuries into the science of Roman jurisprudence,
and as such has exercised a weighty influence on the development
of Western civilisation, had its beginnings amongst a group of men
profoundly influenced by Stoic teaching. It does not therefore follow
that the fundamental ideas expressed by such terms as _ius gentium_, _lex
naturae_, are exclusively Stoic in origin. The former phrase appears
to have been in common use at this time to indicate the laws generally
in force amongst the peoples that surrounded Rome; the latter is a
philosophical term derived from the Greek, denoting an ideal law which
ought to exist amongst men everywhere[28]. The principle of obedience
to nature is not peculiar to the Stoic philosophy, but belongs to the
common substratum of all philosophical thought. It does however seem to
be the case that the Stoic theory of the ‘common law’ (κοινὸς νόμος)
was in fact the stimulus which enabled the Romans to transform their
system of ‘rights,’ gradually throwing over all that was of the nature
of mechanical routine or caste privilege, and harmonizing contradictions
by the principle of fairness. The successor of Scaevola was C. AQUILIUS
GALLUS, praetor in 66 B.C. with Cicero, of whom it is specially noted
that he guided his exposition of law by the principle of equity[29];
and after him S. SULPICIUS RUFUS, the contemporary and intimate friend
of Cicero. We do not know that he was a Stoic, but he was a student of
dialectic under L. LUCILIUS BALBUS, who as well as his brother belonged
to this school[30]; and he followed Stoic principles in studying oratory
just enough to make his exposition clear[31]. He was the acknowledged
head of his profession, and compiled 180 books on law[32]. In the civil
war he took sides with Caesar[33].


[Sidenote: Stoics of the Sullan period.]

=429.= Amongst men of high rank definitely pledged to Stoicism in the
generation preceding Cicero are further L. AELIUS STILO (circ. 145-75
B.C.)[34], who devoted himself to Roman grammar and antiquities, and
was the teacher of both Cicero and Varro; Q. LUCILIUS BALBUS, whose
knowledge of this philosophy rivalled that of his Greek teachers[35], and
who is the exponent of the Stoic view in Cicero’s _de Natura Deorum_, the
scene of which takes us back to about 76 B.C.; SEXTUS POMPEIUS, uncle
of Pompey the Great, and distinguished both as a philosopher and as a
jurist[36]; and more particularly P. RUTILIUS RUFUS, to whom we have
already referred[37]. A pupil and devoted admirer of Panaetius[38], a
trained philosopher[39], and a sound lawyer[40], he brought his career
at Rome to an abrupt end by his firm resistance to the _publicani_, as
already recounted[41]. With true cosmopolitanism he retired to Smyrna,
and accepted the citizenship of that town. His stern principles did not
prevent him from saving his life in the massacre ordered by Mithradates,
by assuming Greek dress[42]; the massacre itself was the ripe fruit
of the abuses which he had endeavoured to repress. He is one of the
characters in Cicero’s _de Republica_.


[Sidenote: Cato.]

=430.= Of the Stoics of Cicero’s time the most eminent was M. PORCIUS
CATO (95-48 B.C.). In him Stoicism received a special colouring by
association with the traditions of ancient Roman manners. In his early
years he became a pupil of Antipater of Tyre[43], and so far adopted the
Cynic ideal as to train himself for public life by freely submitting to
hunger, cold, and hardship[44]. After a period of service in the army he
made a journey to Asia to secure the companionship of Athenodorus the
elder[45]. He became a practised speaker; and though he adhered firmly to
the Stoic tradition of plain language and short sentences[46], yet could
become eloquent on the great themes of his philosophy[47], and could win
the approval of the people even for its paradoxes[48]. He was resolutely
opposed to bribery and extortion. As quaestor in B.C. 66 he introduced
reform into the public finances, and put an end to embezzlements by
officials. His popularity became very great, and he was elected tribune
of the plebs towards the end of the year 63 B.C., when his voice decided
the senators to decree the death of the associates of Catiline. With his
subsequent policy Cicero finds fault, because Cato refused to connive
at the extortions of the _publicani_: and from Cicero’s criticisms has
arisen the accepted view that Cato was an unpractical statesman. On
the other hand it may well be held that if the Roman aristocracy had
included more men like Cato, the republic might have been saved: and
towards the end of his life Cicero bitterly lamented that he had not
sufficiently valued the sincere friendship which Cato offered him[49].
In the year 54 B.C. the candidates for the office of tribune paid him a
singular compliment; each deposited with him a large sum of money, which
he was to forfeit if in Cato’s opinion he was guilty of bribery[50]. His
whole political life was guided by the strictest moral principle[51];
even in so unimportant a matter as Cicero’s request for a triumph he
would do nothing to oblige a friend[52]. In private life he attempted
to put into practice the principle of the community of women taught in
Zeno’s _Republic_. He had married Marcia, daughter of Philippus, and
had three children by her: in 56 B.C. he gave her up to his friend C.
Hortensius, whose family was in danger of becoming extinct: finally on
the threatening of the civil war in B.C. 50 he took her back to his own
home. At a time when the marriage bond was lightly treated by many of
his contemporaries he at least rose above petty motives. In the civil
war he took sides strongly against Caesar, his old political opponent.
His self-sought death after Pharsalia won him a distinction which he had
earned better by his life: and the unmeasured praise bestowed upon him a
century later is perhaps due more to political bias than to philosophical
respect[53]. The few words with which Virgil honours his memory are more
effective, when he pictures Cato as chosen to be a judge in the world of
the blest[54]. Cato represents the Stoic view as to the _summum bonum_ in
Cicero’s _de Finibus_.


[Sidenote: Varro, Brutus and Porcia.]

=431.= Contemporary with Cicero and Cato was M. TERENTIUS VARRO (B.C.
116-28). In his public career and political principles he was not unlike
Cato; in his literary activity he more resembled Cicero. Both Varro
and Cicero were deeply influenced by Stoic teaching, but as they were
by no means professed adherents of this philosophy[55], they may be
here passed by. In the next generation M. JUNIUS BRUTUS (85-42 B.C.)
concerns us more: for by his marriage with PORCIA, Cato’s daughter
and an ardent Stoic, he came into a family connexion with the sect,
with which his personal views, as we have seen, were not entirely in
agreement[56]. Still Brutus was not altogether unfitted to play the part
of Cato’s successor; he was no mean orator[57], and wrote more than
one philosophical treatise[58]; whilst Cicero dedicated several of his
philosophical works to him[59]. But the practical Stoicism of Porcia, who
stabbed herself in the thigh to show that she was fit to be trusted with
a political secret, shines out more brightly than the speculations of
her husband. In her honour Martial has written one of the few epigrams
in which he allows himself to be caught in a mood of admiration: yet his
story of Porcia’s death must be rejected as unhistorical[60].


[Sidenote: Horace.]

=432.= After the death of Brutus Stoicism ceases for a while to play
a prominent part in Roman history; but its indirect influence is very
marked in the two great poets of the Augustan epoch, Horace and Virgil.
Of these HORACE is in the main an Epicurean, and as such is quite
entitled to use the Stoic paradoxes as matter for ridicule, and even to
anticipate dangerous consequences from their practical application[61].
But in fact his works show a constantly increasing appreciation of the
ethics of Stoicism. He recognises the high ideals and civic activity
of its professors[62], and he draws a noble picture of the Stoic sage,
confident in his convictions, and bidding defiance to the crowd and the
tyrant alike[63]. Of that practical wisdom and genial criticism which has
made Horace the favourite poet of so many men eminent in public life, no
small part consists of Stoic principles deftly freed from the paradoxical
form in which they were conveyed to professed adherents.


[Sidenote: Virgil.]

=433.= With this picture of Stoicism seen from without we must contrast
that given us by VIRGIL, who inherited the Stoic tradition from
Aratus[64], his model for the _Georgics_. Virgil’s mind is penetrated by
Stoic feeling, and his works are an interpretation of the universe in
the Stoic sense; but like so many of his contemporaries he holds aloof
from formal adherence to the sect, and carefully avoids its technical
language. Quite possibly too he incorporated in his system elements
drawn from other philosophies. In physics he accepts the principle
that the fiery aether is the source of all life[65]; it is identical
with the divine spirit[66] and the all-informing mind[67]. From this
standpoint he is led on to the doctrine of purgatory[68], and from that
he looks forward to the time of the conflagration, when all creation
will be reconciled by returning to its primitive unity in the primal
fire-spirit[69]. Still Virgil’s picture must be regarded rather as an
adaptation than as an exposition of Stoicism; it lacks the sharp outlines
and the didactic tone of the poetry of Cleanthes or Lucretius, and other
interpretations are by no means excluded.


[Sidenote: Virgil’s theology.]

=434.= With the problem of the government of the universe Virgil’s mind
is occupied throughout the _Aeneid_. He is constantly weighing the
relative importance of the three forces, fate, the gods, and fortune,
precisely as the philosophers do. To each of the three he assigns a
part in the affairs of men; but that taken by fate is unmistakably
predominant. The individual gods have very little importance in the
poem; they are to a large extent allegorical figures, representing human
instincts and passions; they cannot divert destiny from its path, though
with their utmost effort they may slightly delay its work or change
its incidence. Above all these little gods Jove towers aloft, a power
magnificent and munificent; at his voice the gods shudder and the worlds
obey. But the power of Jove rests upon his complete acceptance of the
irrevocable decrees of fate[70]. The critic may even describe him as a
puppet-king, who wears an outward semblance of royalty, but is really
obedient to an incessant interference from a higher authority. Virgil
however appears truly to hold the Stoic principle that Fate and Jove
are one; he thus takes us at once to the final problem of philosophy,
the reconciliation of the conceptions of Law formed on the one hand by
observing facts (the modern ‘Laws of Nature’) and on the other hand by
recognising the moral instinct (the modern ‘Moral Law’). As we have seen,
a reconciliation of these two by logic is intrinsically impossible.
Virgil however shows us how they may be in practice reconciled by a
certain attitude of mind; and because that attitude is one of resignation
to and cooperation with the supreme power, it would seem right to place
Virgil by the side of Cleanthes as one of the religious poets of Stoicism.


[Sidenote: Virgil’s ethics.]

=435.= Virgil’s conception of ethics is displayed in the character of
Aeneas. Much modern criticism revolts against the character of Aeneas
exactly as it does against that of Cato, and for the same reason, that it
is without sympathy for Stoic ethics. To understand Aeneas we must first
picture a man whose whole soul is filled by a reverent regard for destiny
and submission to Jove, who represents destiny on its personal side. He
can therefore never play the part of the hero in revolt; but at the same
time he is human, and liable to those petty weaknesses and aberrations
from which even the sage is not exempt. He can hesitate or be hasty, can
love or weep; but the sovereignty of his mind is never upset. In a happy
phrase Virgil sums up the whole ethics of Stoicism:

  ‘Calm in his soul he abides, and the tears roll down, but in vain[71].’

In contrast to Aeneas stands Dido, intensely human and passionate, and
in full rebellion against her destiny. She is to him Eve the temptress,
Cleopatra the seducer; but she is not destined to win a final triumph. A
modern romance would doubtless have a different ending.


[Sidenote: Ovid.]

=436.= Amongst writers who adopted much of the formal teaching of
Stoicism without imbibing its spirit we may reckon OVID (43 B.C.-18
A.D.). Not only does he accept the central idea of Stoicism, that it is
the divine fire by virtue of which every man lives and moves[72], but
he opens his greatest work by a description of the creation[73] which
appears to follow Stoic lines, and in which the erect figure of man is
specially recognised as the proof of the preeminence which Providence
has assigned to him over all the other works of the Creator[74]. But
the tales related in the _Metamorphoses_ show no trace of the serious
religious purpose of Virgil; and the society pictured in Ovid’s love
poems gives only a caricature of the Stoic doctrines of the community of
women, the absence of jealousy, and outspokenness of speech. Finally the
plaintive tone of the _Tristia_ shows how little Ovid was in touch with
Stoic self-control amidst the buffetings of fortune.


[Sidenote: Cremutius Cordus.]

=437.= In the time of the next _princeps_ we first find Stoicism
associated with an unsympathetic attitude towards the imperial
government. There was nothing in Stoic principles to suggest this
opposition. Tiberius himself had listened to the teaching of the Stoic
Nestor, and the simplicity of his personal life and the gravity of his
manners might well have won him the support of sincere philosophers.
But if Stoicism did not create the spirit of opposition, it confirmed
it where it already existed. The memory of Cato associated Stoic
doctrines with republican views: vague idealisations of Brutus and
Cassius suggested the glorification of tyrannicide. CREMUTIUS CORDUS (ob.
A.D. 25) had offended Seianus by a sarcastic remark: for when Tiberius
repaired the theatre of Pompey, and the senate voted that a statue of
Seianus should be erected there, Cordus said that this meant really
spoiling the theatre[75]. Seianus then dropped a hint to his client
Satrius, who accused Cordus before the senate of writing a history in
which he highly praised Brutus, and declared Cassius to have been ‘the
last of the Romans.’ A word of apology would have saved the life of
Cordus; he resolved to die by his own act[76], to the great annoyance
of his prosecutors[77]. From this time on suicide became an object of
political ambition. The Stoic tradition continued in the family of
Cordus, and to his daughter Marcia, as a fellow-member of the sect,
Seneca addressed the well-known _Consolatio_[78]; but the title of ‘old
Romans’ describes far better the true leanings of the men of whom Cordus
was the forerunner.


[Sidenote: Kanus Iulius.]

=438.= In the reign of Gaius (Caligula) we first find philosophers as
such exposed to persecution; and we may infer that, like the Jews, they
resisted tacitly or openly the claim of the emperor to be worshipped as
a god. IULIUS GRAECINUS, according to Seneca, was put to death for no
other reason than that he was a better man than a tyrant liked to see
alive[79]. KANUS IULIUS reproved the emperor to his face, and heard with
calmness his own doom pronounced. During the ten days still left to him
he went quietly on with his daily occupations; he was engaged in a game
of chess when the centurion summoned him. ‘After my death,’ he said to
his opponent, ‘do not boast that you won the game.’ His philosopher
accompanied him, and inquired how his thoughts were occupied. ‘I
propose,’ said Kanus, ‘to observe whether at the last moment the soul is
conscious of its departure. Afterwards, if I discover what the condition
of departed souls is, I will come back and inform my friends[80].’


[Sidenote: Arria the elder.]

=439.= In the reign of Claudius we find Stoics engaged in actual
conspiracy against the emperor. The name of PAETUS CAECINA introduces us
to a famous Stoic family, for his wife was ARRIA the elder. Pliny tells
us, on the authority of her granddaughter Fannia, how when her husband
and son both fell sick together, and the latter died, she carried out the
whole funeral without her husband’s knowledge; and each time that she
entered his sick chamber, assumed a cheerful smile and assured him that
the boy was much better. Whenever her grief became too strong, she would
leave the room for a few minutes to weep, and return once more calm. When
Scribonianus in Illyria rebelled against Claudius, Paetus took his side;
upon his fall he was brought a prisoner to Rome. Arria was not allowed to
accompany him, but she followed him in a fishing boat. She encouraged him
to face death by piercing her own breast with a dagger, declaring ‘it
doesn’t hurt[81],’ and upon his death she determined not to survive him.
Thrasea, her son-in-law, tried to dissuade her. ‘If I were condemned,
would you,’ said he, ‘wish your daughter to die with me?’ ‘Yes,’ said
Arria, ‘if she had lived with you as long and as happily as I with
Paetus.’ Here we have a deliberate justification of the Hindu practice of
the Satī.


[Sidenote: Seneca.]

=440.= In the reign of Nero the Stoics are still more prominent, and
almost always in opposition. SENECA, of course, the emperor’s tutor and
minister, is on the government side; and from his life we can draw the
truest picture of the imperial civil servant in high office. We shall
certainly not expect to find that Seneca illustrated in his own life all
the virtues that he preached; on the other hand we shall not readily
believe that the ardent disciple of Attalus[82] and affectionate husband
of Paulina was a man of dissolute life or of avaricious passions. Simple
tastes, an endless capacity for hard work, and scrupulous honesty were
the ordinary marks of the Roman official in those days, as they are of
members of the Civil Service of India to-day[83]. Seneca is often accused
of having been too supple as a minister; but he was carrying out the
principles of his sect better by taking an active part in politics than
if he had, like many others, held sullenly aloof[84]. He did not indeed
imitate Cato or Rutilius Rufus, who had carried firmness of principle
to an extent that laid them open to the charge of obstinacy; but in
submitting frankly to power greater than his own he still saw to it that
his own influence should count towards the better side. For the story of
his political career we cannot do better than to refer to the latest
historian of his times[85]; of his work as a philosopher, to which he
himself attributed the greater importance, a general account has been
given above[86] and more particular discussions form the central theme of
this book.


[Sidenote: Persius and Lucan.]

=441.= From Seneca we pass naturally to some mention of the poets Persius
and Lucan. A. PERSIUS FLACCUS (34-62 A.D.) became at 16 years of age
the pupil and companion of the Stoic philosopher Cornutus: he was also
a relative of the Arriae already mentioned. He gives us a charming
picture of his teacher’s ways of life, which were doubtless typical[87]:
and his summary view of the scope of philosophy well indicates how its
proportions had shrunk at this period. Dialectic is not mentioned, and
physics has interest only in its bearing upon the position and duty of
the individual.

  ‘Go, study, hapless folk, and learn to know
  The end and object of our life—what are we;
  The purpose of our being here; the rank
  Assigned us at the start, and where and when
  The turn is smoothest round the perilous post;
  The bounds of wealth; life’s lawful aims; the use
  Of hoards of coin new-minted; what the claims
  Of fatherland and kinsfolk near and dear;
  The will of God concerning thee, and where
  Thou standest in the commonwealth of man[88].’

His contemporary M. ANNAEUS LUCANUS (39-65 A.D.), a nephew of Seneca,
plunged more deeply both into philosophy and into politics. In both he
displayed ardour insufficiently tempered with discretion; he had a far
keener sense of his personal grievances than became a Stoic, and was much
more of a critic than of a reformer. Yet hardly any writer expresses more
forcibly the characteristic doctrines of Stoicism, as they seized the
imagination of young Romans of the upper classes. Amongst such doctrines
that of the conflagration was clearly prominent.

  ‘So when this frame of things has been dissolved,
  And the world’s many ages have received
  Their consummation in one final hour,
  Chaos recalled shall gain his utmost seat,
  The constellations in confusion dire
  Hurled each on each together clash; the stars
  Flaming shall fall into the deep; the earth
  No longer shall extend her barrier shores,
  And fling the waters from her; and the Moon
  Shall meet the Sun in fratricidal war[89].’

  ‘One pyre awaits the Universe; in ruin
  ’Twill mix with bones of men the heavenly spheres[90].’

Lucan emphasizes the pantheistic interpretation of the divine nature;

  ‘God is all eye can see or heart can feel[91].’

  ‘The powers of heaven are round about us all;
  And though from out the temple come no voice,
  Nought can we do without the will of God[92].’

To the idealized Cato he addresses the noblest praises;

  ‘For sure a consecrated life is thine,
  The laws of heaven thy pattern, God thy guide[93].’

  ‘See the true Father of his country, worth
  The homage of thine altars, Rome; for they
  Who swear by him shall never be ashamed.
  If e’er the yoke is lifted from thy neck,
  Now or hereafter he shall be thy God[94].’


[Sidenote: Civil service and ‘old Romans.’]

=442.= The careers of Seneca and Musonius, and the early years of Lucan
himself, indicate sufficiently that there was no essential opposition
between Stoic principles and the Roman principate; in other words, that
Stoics as such were not ‘republicans.’ Rather the contrary; for nearly
all the Greek philosophers had been inclined to favour monarchy, and the
Stoics had been conspicuous in the desire to abolish the distinctions of
birth and class upon which the Roman aristocracy laid so much stress,
and which the principate was disposed to ignore. But in fact Stoicism
was the common mould in which the educated youth of Rome were shaped at
this period; it produced honest, diligent, and simple-minded men, exactly
suited to be instruments of the great imperial bureaucracy. Large numbers
entered the service of the state, and were heard of no more; such an
one (except for Seneca’s incidental account of him) was C. LUCILIUS,
Seneca’s correspondent. The great work of Roman government was carried on
in silence, just as that of India in the present day. This silence was
probably on the whole beneficial to society, though it was often felt as
a constraint by the individual. For this reason and many others there
were at Rome (as everywhere and at all times) many able but disappointed
men; they became the critics of the government, and from being critics
they might at any time become conspirators; but at no period did they
seriously aim at restoring the republican system. Their political
creed was limited, and did not look beyond the interests of the class
from which they sprang. They claimed for members of the senate at Rome
their ancient personal privileges, and especially that of _libertas_,
that is, freedom to criticize and even to insult the members of the
government; they sang the praises of Cato, celebrated the birthdays of
Brutus and Cassius[95], and practised a kind of ‘passive resistance’
based on Oriental methods, by quitting life without hesitation when
they were baulked in their immediate wishes by the government. When the
administration was carried on decently these men were ridiculous; when
from time to time it became a scandal they were heroes.


[Sidenote: Republican prejudices.]

=443.= The early years of Nero’s reign show us plainly that true spirit
of Stoicism was far more developed on the side of the government than on
that of the aristocracy. Nothing distinguishes Seneca more honourably
than his humane attitude towards the slave population; and he was chief
minister of the princeps when in the year A.D. 61 a ‘notable case[96]’
arose, in which the human rights of slaves were involved. The city
prefect, Pedanius Secundus, was killed by one of his slaves. It was
contended in the senate that by ancient custom the whole household, old
and young, guilty and innocent, must be put to death alike; and this
view prevailed and was carried into effect. Public opinion, according
to Tacitus[97], was unanimous against such severity; it looked, not
unreasonably, to the emperor and his minister to prevent it[97a]. They on
the contrary left the decision to the free judgment of the senate. Where
now were the men of philosophic principle, of world-wide sympathies, of
outspoken utterance? The historian tells us that not one was found in the
senate. The honourable men who could defy an emperor’s death-sentence
still lacked the courage to speak out against the prejudices of their own
class; many indeed uttered exclamations, expressing pity for the women,
the young, and the indubitably innocent, and even voted against the
executions; but even in so simple a matter there was not a man to follow
the lead of Catiline in Cicero’s days, and take up as his own the cause
of the oppressed. The leader of the merciless majority was C. Cassius
Longinus, a celebrated jurist, and one who regularly celebrated the
honours of Cassius the conspirator.


[Sidenote: Nero and the Stoics.]

=444.= But although the administration of which Nero was the head was
largely manned by professed Stoics, and stood as a whole for the better
sympathies of the Roman people, the course of court intrigue brought
about a fierce conflict between the government and a growing force of
public opinion of which the ‘old Roman’ group of Stoics were sometimes
the spokesmen, and at other times the silent representatives. To Nero the
consideration of his own safety was predominant over every consideration
of justice to individuals, and herein he stood condemned (and knew that
it was so) by the judgment of all men of philosophic temper. The first
of his victims, and perhaps the most deserving of our admiration, was
RUBELLIUS PLAUTUS, accused by Tigellinus because he maintained the
irritating cult of the ‘tyrannicides,’ and had joined the disloyal sect
of the Stoics[98]. The charge of disloyalty against himself and his
companions he disproved; for, advised by his Stoic teachers Coeranus and
Musonius, he declined to take part in a rising which might have been
successful, and calmly awaited his fate (60 A.D.). In the conspiracy of
Piso, which broke out a few years later, PLAUTUS LATERANUS is named by
the historian as one of the few whose motives were honourable and whose
conduct was consistently courageous[99]. The later years of Nero’s reign
are illuminated in the pages of Tacitus by the firmness of men like
THRASEA PAETUS, PACONIUS AGRIPPINUS, and BAREA SORANUS, and the heroic
devotion of women like the younger ARRIA, Thrasea’s wife, and SERVILIA,
the daughter of Soranus[100]. In the persecution of this group the modern
historian finds extenuating circumstances, but at Rome itself it appeared
as though the emperor were engaged in the attempt to extirpate virtue
itself[101].


[Sidenote: Helvidius Priscus.]

=445.= Upon the fall of Nero the ‘old Romans’ came for a short time
into power under the principate of Galba, and amongst others HELVIDIUS
PRISCUS, Thrasea’s son-in-law, returned from exile. From the account of
Tacitus he appears to have been a very sincere adherent of the Stoic
school.

  ‘He was not like others who adopt the name of philosopher in
  order to cloak an idle disposition. He followed those teachers
  who maintain that only the honourable is good, and only the base
  is evil; power, nobility, and other things external to the soul
  being neither good nor evil. He designed so to fortify himself
  thereby against the blows of fortune that he could play his part
  in public affairs without flinching[102].’

His first act on returning to Rome was to commence a prosecution of the
accuser of Thrasea. The senate was divided in opinion as to the wisdom
of this step, and when Helvidius abandoned the suit some praised his
charity, whilst others lamented his indecision[103]. He resumed his
attempt, as we shall see, at a later time.


[Sidenote: His fall.]

=446.= Vespasian was undoubtedly tolerant in his views: his reign
began with the restitution of honours to the deceased Galba, and the
much-respected Musonius[104] seized the opportunity to attack in the
senate P. Egnatius Celer, whose treachery had brought about the fall of
Soranus[105], for false evidence. The trial was postponed, but resulted a
little later in the condemnation of Celer[106]. Public opinion took the
side of Musonius: but the accused found a champion in Demetrius the Cynic
philosopher, and at least defended himself with the ability and courage
of his sect. Thereupon Helvidius resumed his prosecution of the accuser
of Thrasea; but the emperor, now anxious to let bygones be bygones,
refused to approve[107]. This second failure appears to have embittered
Helvidius: his opposition to Vespasian became open and insulting, and
brought about his death[108]. The life of his wife FANNIA was worthy
of the two Arriae, her grandmother and her mother. Twice she followed
her husband into exile; a third time she brought this punishment upon
herself, by encouraging his friend Senecio to publish his biography,
supplying him with the materials, and openly justifying her action. In
her private life she had singular charm and affability; and her death
appeared to Pliny to close an era of noble women[109].


[Sidenote: Renewal of the Stoic opposition.]

=447.= It seems probable that the Stoic nobles found the low birth
of Vespasian as intolerable as the tyranny of Nero; at any rate they
soon resumed their attitude of opposition to the government, and the
punishment of Helvidius, if intended as a warning, proved rather a
provocation. It appears that he and the ‘old Romans’ began a systematic
propaganda in favour of what they called ‘democracy[110],’ that is,
the government of the Roman empire by the senatorial class; and they
probably involved many professed philosophers in this impracticable
and reactionary movement. Vespasian resolved on expelling all the
philosophers from Rome. From this general sentence the best known of all,
Musonius, was excepted[111], and we must infer that he had shown the
good sense to keep himself free from political entanglements. In spite
of this act of Vespasian, Stoicism continued to gain ground, and during
the greater part of the period of the Flavian dynasty met with little
interference.


[Sidenote: Persecution by Domitian.]

=448.= But towards the end of the reign of Domitian a more violent
persecution broke out. ARULENUS RUSTICUS had been tribune of the plebs
in 66 A.D., and had then proposed to use his veto in an attempt to save
the life of Thrasea Paetus[112]. In 69 A.D. he was praetor, and as such
headed an embassy sent by the senate to the soldiers under Petilius
Cerealis. On this occasion he was roughly handled and wounded, and barely
escaped with his life[113]. After many years of quiet, he was accused
in 93 A.D., when Pliny was praetor, of having written and spoken in
honour of Thrasea Paetus, Herennius Senecio, and Helvidius Priscus; he
was condemned to death and his books were destroyed[114]. SENECIO was
condemned at the same time for having written the biography of Helvidius
Priscus, and for the further offence that since holding the quaestorship
he had not become a candidate for any higher office[115]. About the same
time were banished Artemidorus, the most single-minded and laborious of
philosophers, whom Musonius had selected out of a crowd of competitors
as the fittest to claim his daughter in marriage[116]; Junius Mauricus,
brother of Arulenus Rusticus, who had joined Musonius in the attempt to
secure the punishment of the _delatores_ of Nero’s time[117]; Demetrius,
and Epictetus[118]; and further many distinguished ladies, including
Arria and her daughter Fannia[119]. But from the time of the death of
Domitian in A.D. 96 the imperial government became finally reconciled
with Stoicism, which was now the recognised creed of the great majority
of the educated classes at Rome, of all ages and ranks. As such it
appears in the writings of JUVENAL, who not only introduces into serious
literature the Stoic principle of ‘straight speaking,’ but actually
expounds much of the ethical teaching of Stoicism with more directness
and force than any professed adherent of the system.


[Sidenote: Stoic reform of law.]

=449.= Stoicism, received into favour in the second century A.D., won new
opportunities and was exposed to new dangers. Its greatest achievement
lay in the development of Roman law. As we have just seen[120], the
‘old Romans’ of Nero’s day, in spite of their profession of Stoicism,
were unbending upholders of the old law, with all its harshness and
narrowness; and we have to go back a hundred years to the great lawyers
of the times of Sulla and Cicero[121] to meet with men prepared to
throw aside old traditions and build anew on the foundations of natural
justice. But the larger view had not been lost sight of. It remained
as the ideal of the more generous-minded members of the imperial civil
service; and in the times of the emperors Antoninus Pius (138-161 A.D.)
and Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A.D.) it became the starting-point for a
new development of Roman law, which is one of the great achievements of
Roman history. The most eloquent of the historians of the origins of
Christianity thus describes this movement.

  ‘Le stoïcisme avait [déjà] pénétré le droit romain de ses
  larges maximes, et en avait fait le droit naturel, le droit
  philosophique, tel que la raison peut le concevoir pour tous les
  hommes. Le droit strict cède à l’équité; la douceur l’emporte sur
  la sévérité; la justice paraît inséparable de la bienfaisance.
  Les grands jurisconsultes d’Antonin continuèrent la même œuvre.
  Le dernier [Volusius Moecianus] fut le maître de Marc-Aurèle en
  fait de jurisprudence, et, à vrai dire, l’œuvre des deux saints
  empereurs ne saurait être séparée. C’est d’eux que datent la
  plupart de ces lois humaines et sensées qui fléchirent la rigueur
  du droit antique et firent, d’une législation primitivement
  étroite et implacable, un code susceptible d’être adopté par tous
  les peuples civilisés[122].’

In the legislation of Antoninus and Aurelius the humane and cosmopolitan
principles of Stoic politics at last triumph over Roman conservatism.
The poor, the sick, the infant, and the famine-stricken are protected.
The slave is treated as a human being; to kill him becomes a crime, to
injure him a misdemeanour; his family and his property are protected by
the tribunals. Slavery in fact is treated as a violation of the rights of
nature; manumission is in every way encouraged. The time is within sight
when Ulpian will declare that ‘all men, according to natural right, are
born free and equal[123].’ This legislation is not entirely the work of
professed Stoics; it is nevertheless the offspring of Stoicism.


[Sidenote: Repression of zeal.]

=450.= There was in the second century, as there is still, a sharp
antagonism between the manners of cultivated society and the ardent
profession of intellectual convictions. An anecdote related by Gellius
well illustrates the social forces which were now constantly at work to
check superfluous enthusiasm.

  ‘There was with us at table a young student of philosophy who
  called himself a Stoic, but chiefly distinguished himself by an
  unwelcome loquacity. He was always bringing up in season and
  out of season recondite philosophical doctrines, and he looked
  upon all his neighbours as boors because they were unacquainted
  with them. His whole talk was strown with mention of syllogisms,
  fallacies, and the like, such as the “master-argument,” the
  “quiescent,” and the “heap”; and he thought that he was the only
  man in the world who could solve them. Further he maintained that
  he had thoroughly studied the nature of the soul, the growth
  of virtue, the science of daily duties, and the cure of the
  weaknesses and diseases of the mind. Finally he considered he
  had attained to that state of perfect happiness which could be
  clouded by no disappointment, shaken by no pains of death[124].’

Such a man, we may think, might soon have become an apostle of sincere
Stoicism, and might have left us a clear and systematic exposition of
Stoic doctrine as refined by five centuries of experience. It was not
to be. The polished Herodes Atticus crushed him with a quotation from
the discourses of Epictetus. Not many offended in the