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Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 10
Author: Various
Language: English
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BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 10 ***
[Cover Illustration]
TRIAL
OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
N U R E M B E R G
14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946
[Illustration]
P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y
1 9 4 7
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.
VOLUME X
O F F I C I A L T E X T
I N T H E
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
P R O C E E D I N G S
25 March 1946—6 April 1946
CONTENTS
Ninetieth Day, Monday, 25 March 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 34
Ninety-first Day, Tuesday, 26 March 1946,
Morning Session 75
Afternoon Session 90
Ninety-second Day, Wednesday, 27 March 1946,
Morning Session 119
Afternoon Session 156
Ninety-third Day, Thursday, 28 March 1946,
Morning Session 184
Afternoon Session 196
Ninety-fourth Day, Friday, 29 March 1946,
Morning Session 230
Afternoon Session 255
Ninety-fifth Day, Saturday, 30 March 1946,
Morning Session 279
Ninety-sixth Day, Monday, 1 April 1946,
Morning Session 311
Afternoon Session 346
Ninety-seventh Day, Tuesday, 2 April 1946,
Morning Session 395
Afternoon Session 433
Ninety-eighth Day, Wednesday, 3 April 1946,
Morning Session 466
Afternoon Session 480
Ninety-ninth Day, Thursday, 4 April 1946,
Morning Session 508
Afternoon Session 535
One Hundredth Day, Friday, 5 April 1946,
Morning Session 556
Afternoon Session 583
One Hundred and First Day, Saturday, 6 April 1946,
Morning Session 617
NINETIETH DAY
Monday, 25 March 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): May it please the Court: the
Defendants Streicher and Ribbentrop are absent from this session.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Seidl.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Mr. President, Your
Honors, on Friday last I stated that I would not read anything from the
first volume of the document book; that does not mean, however, that I
should not like to refer to one or another document in my final speech.
The question now arises whether, under these circumstances, documents to
which I may refer, but which I will not read now should be submitted as
evidence to the Court, or whether it is sufficient if these documents
are copied down in the book. I would be grateful if the Court would help
me regarding this question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
My Lord, I have a suggestion to make: That the Tribunal take these
documents _de bene esse_ at the moment, and that when Dr. Seidl comes to
make his final speech, then any point as to admissibility can be
discussed. With regard to the third book, for example, that consists of
a number of opinions of various politicians and economists in various
countries. The Prosecution will, in due course, submit that these have
no evidential value and in fact relate to a matter too remote to be
relevant. But I should have thought the convenient course would have
been to discuss that when we find what ultimate use Dr. Seidl makes of
the documents, at the moment letting them go in, as I suggest, _de bene
esse_.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal think that you should offer the
documents in evidence now, and that they should be numbered
consecutively. Probably the best way would be with the letter “H” in
front of them—H Number 1 and so on—and that then, as Sir David says,
as they are being offered all together, objection, if necessary, can be
taken to them at a later stage—objection on the ground of admissibility
or relevance.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. I turn once more to Volume I of the document book.
The first document is a speech made by the Defendant Rudolf Hess on 8
July 1934. This document will bear the Number H-1, Page 23 of the
document book. The second document can be found on Page 27 of the
document book...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Dr. Seidl. To what issue has this speech got
relevance?
DR. SEIDL: The speech of 8 July 1934?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, it is the one on Page 23. It is 8 July 1934.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Mr. President, this speech deals with the question of
war and peace. Since the Defendant Hess is accused of having
participated in the psychological preparation of aggressive war, and
thus also of being a participant in the conspiracy, it seems to me that
the attitude of the Defendant Hess toward the question of war is of
considerable importance as regards evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will allow you to read it.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I do not intend to read the speech now. I only
want to bring up the speech as an exhibit so as to be able to refer to
it in my final speech, if necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SEIDL: I shall read nothing at all from the first document book. I
shall only mention certain documents as exhibits.
I turn to Page 28 of the document book. This is another speech by the
Defendant Hess, delivered on 27 November 1934. The number of this
exhibit will be H-2.
THE PRESIDENT: The speech of 8 December 1934 begins on Page 27.
DR. SEIDL: Page 27, that is right. It was marked here incorrectly. As
the third exhibit I submit a speech—that is to say, an excerpt from a
speech—of 17 November 1935, Page 31 of the document book, Exhibit
Number H-3.
I turn to Page 32 of the document book, an excerpt from a speech of 11
October 1936, Exhibit Number H-4.
Then comes a speech of 14 March 1936, Page 33 of the document book,
Exhibit Number H-5.
The next exhibit is on Page 35 of the document book, a speech of 21
March 1936, Exhibit Number H-6.
Exhibit Number H-7 is a speech on Page 36 of the document book.
Exhibit Number H-8 is a speech of 6 June 1936, on Page 40 of the
document book.
Then, I turn to Page 43 of the document book, a speech at the
Reichsparteitag in Nuremberg 1936, Exhibit Number H-9.
There follow excerpts of a speech on Page 59 of the document book,
Exhibit Number H-10.
A speech of 14 May 1938 at Stockholm is found on Page 70 of the document
book, Exhibit Number H-11.
The next exhibit is on Page 78 of the document book, Exhibit Number
H-12.
So much for the first volume of the document book.
I pass on to the second volume, to the affidavit which I submitted last
Friday. It can be found on Page 164 of the document book. It is an
affidavit made by the former Secretary, Hildegard Fath, and it will bear
the Exhibit Number H-13.
The next exhibit is on Page 86 of the document book, Volume 2, a decree
of 3 June 1936, Exhibit Number H-14.
And now I come to the point where I shall read certain excerpts from the
minutes of the meeting between the Defendant Hess and Lord Simon, which
took place on 10 June 1941. These minutes begin on Page 93 of the
document book. The minutes will have the Exhibit Number H-15.
Your Honors, the Defendant Hess, on 10 May 1941, flew to England. Nobody
except his then adjutant, Hitsch, knew of this flight. The Führer
himself was informed about the flight and the intentions connected
therewith in a letter which was delivered to the Führer after Hess had
already landed in England. After his arrival in England Hess was
frequently questioned by officials of the Foreign Office, and, as
already mentioned, a meeting took place between him and Lord Simon on 10
June 1941. This meeting lasted two hours and a half. In the course of
this meeting the Defendant Hess told Lord Simon the reasons for his
extraordinary undertaking and he then submitted four proposals, or four
points, which he claimed would give the intentions of Adolf Hitler, and
which he considered to be the basis for an understanding and a
conclusion of peace.
For the conference Lord Simon assumed a pseudonym; in the minutes which
were given to the Defendant Hess shortly after the meeting, he is
referred to as Dr. Guthrie.
As far as I know, this measure was probably taken to prevent the
stenographers or the translators from knowing at once what it was all
about. In the minutes mention is also made of a Dr. Mackenzie, an
official of the Foreign Office, and of Mr. Kirkpatrick, who had
previously already spoken with the Defendant Hess.
After a few introductory remarks by Lord Simon, the Defendant Hess began
to explain the reasons which led him to take his singular step, and I
quote liberally from Page 93 of the document book, about the middle of
the page. I must add that in the minutes, the Defendant Hess is referred
to by the name “J.” The Defendant Hess, after the introductory remarks,
said the following...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, there seems to be a typographical error,
probably in the date. The date is given as the 9th of August. You said
the 10th of June, did you not?
DR. SEIDL: 10 June, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this a mistake at the top of Page 93—9. 8. 41?
DR. SEIDL: On the cover of the document there is the following remark:
“Minutes of the conversation which took place on 9 June 1941 somewhere
in England.” On the inside of the document, there is also the entry 9.
6. 41; so there must obviously be a typographical error here.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it must have been. They put “8” instead of “6.”
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SEIDL: “I know that probably nobody has correctly understood
my coming; but in view of the extraordinary step that I have
taken, that can by no means be expected. Therefore I would like
to begin by explaining how I came to do this.”
I continue on Page 94:
“The idea came to me in June of last year, during the time of
the French campaign, while visiting the Führer....”
I believe I may omit the following incidental remarks and continue
quoting further:
“I must admit that I came to the Führer convinced, as we all
were, that sooner or later in the end we would surely conquer
England, and I expressed the opinion to the Führer that we must
naturally demand from England the restitution of property—such
as the equivalent of our merchant fleet, _et cetera_—which had
been taken from us by the Versailles Treaty.”
I turn to Page 95:
“The Führer then immediately contradicted me. He was of the
opinion that the war could possibly be an occasion for coming to
an agreement with England for which he had striven ever since he
had been politically active. To this I can testify, that ever
since I have known the Führer, since 1921, the Führer has always
said that an agreement between Germany and England had to be
achieved. He said he would bring this about as soon as he was in
power. He told me at that time in France that one should not
impose any severe conditions, even if victorious, on a country
with which one desired to come to an agreement. Then I conceived
the idea that if this were known in England, it might be
possible that England also might be ready for an agreement.”
I turn now to Page 96 of the document book.
“Then, at the conclusion of the French campaign came the
Führer’s offer to England. The offer, as is known, was refused.
This made me all the more firm in my belief that under these
circumstances I had to execute my plan. During the subsequent
period came the air war between Germany and England, which, on
the whole, meant heavier losses and damages for England than for
Germany. Consequently, I had the impression that England could
not give in at all without suffering considerable loss of
prestige. That is why I said to myself, ‘Now I must realize my
plan all the more, for if I were over in England, England could
be enabled to take up negotiations with Germany without loss of
prestige.’”
I turn now to Page 97 of the document book. After a short incidental
remark by Dr. Mackenzie, Hess continued:
“I was of the opinion that, apart from the question of the terms
for an agreement, there would be still in England a certain
general distrust to overcome. I must confess that I faced a very
grave decision, the gravest in my life, of course, and I believe
I was aided by continuously keeping before my inner vision the
picture of an endless row of children’s coffins with the mothers
weeping behind them on the German side as well as on the English
side...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you got the original document there
before you?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Might it be handed up?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
[_The document was handed to the President._]
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
DR. SEIDL: “...and vice versa, the coffins of mothers with the
children behind them.
“I want to mention certain points which, I believe, have a
certain importance from the psychological point of view. I must
go back a bit. After Germany’s defeat in the World War, the
Versailles Treaty was imposed on her, and no serious historian
is today still of the opinion that Germany was responsible for
the World War. Lloyd George has said that the nations stumbled
into the war. I recently read an English historian, Farrar, who
wrote about Edward VII and his policy at that time. This
historian, Farrar, lays the main guilt for the war, on the
policies of Edward VII. After her collapse Germany had this
treaty imposed upon her, which was not only a frightful calamity
for Germany but also for the whole world. All attempts of
politicians, of statesmen in Germany, before the Führer came to
power—that is to say, when Germany was a pure democracy—to
obtain any sort of relief failed.”
I forego the reading of the following part of the minutes literally. A
conversation followed on various points. Among other things the subject
of the conversation then was the air strength of Germany at that time
and the preparations with regard to the building of U-boats. I do not
believe that these questions are relevant in the present connection, and
so I shall turn at once to that part of the minutes where mention is
made of the proposals which Hess made to Lord Simon. This is on Page 152
of the document book. From the minutes we can see that Hess had
previously written down the proposals which he wanted to submit. He gave
these notes to Dr. Mackenzie and Mr. Kirkpatrick, who then read and
translated them, and now I quote on Page 152, at the bottom of the page,
literally:
“Basis for an understanding.” And here I have to ask the Tribunal to
turn from Page 152 of the document book to Page 159 of the document book
because the first point in the proposal obviously has been presented in
the wrong fashion. On Page 159, about the middle of the page, there is a
statement by Dr. Mackenzie which expresses the first point correctly,
and I quote:
“In order to prevent future wars between the Axis and England,
the limits of the spheres of interest should be defined. The
sphere of interest of the Axis is Europe, and England’s sphere
of interest is the Empire.”
I ask now that you turn back, namely to Page 153 of the document book.
Here we find on the last line the second point of the proposals which
Hess made. Dr. Mackenzie is reading:
“2. Return of German Colonies.”
I turn to Page 154 of the document book and begin to quote at the top of
the page—it is possible that the figure “2” is inadvertently repeated
here in the document book. It should be:
“3. Indemnification of German citizens who before or during the
war had their residence within the British Empire, and who
suffered damage to life and property through measures of a
Government of the Empire or as a result of pillage, riot, _et
cetera_; indemnification of British subjects by Germany on the
same basis.
“4. Armistice and peace to be concluded with Italy at the same
time.”
Then there is a personal remark by Hess as follows:
“The Führer in our conversation repeatedly presented these
points to me in general as the basis for an understanding with
England.”
I shall not read any further excerpts from these minutes.
I forego the reading of the other passages marked in red. The conference
was terminated by a statement made by Lord Simon to the effect that he
would bring the proposals made by Hess to the knowledge of the British
Government. That was Exhibit Number H-15.
Your Honors, the Defendant Rudolf Hess is accused in the Indictment of
helping the Nazi conspirators to seize power and of furthering the
military, economic, and psychological preparations for the war as
mentioned under Count One of the Indictment; of participating in the
political planning and preparation of aggressive wars and of war in
violation of international treaties, agreements and promises, as
mentioned in Counts One and Two, and of participating in the preparation
and planning of foreign political plans of the Nazi conspirators as
listed under Count One.
That accusation is the nucleus of the Indictment against Rudolf Hess. It
is therefore my duty to discuss also briefly in evidence the
circumstances which in 1939 led to the outbreak of war. In that respect
I have the following to say:
On 23 August 1939, at Moscow a non-aggression pact was concluded between
Germany and the Soviet Union, which has already been submitted by the
Prosecution as Exhibit GB-145 (Document TC-25). On the same day, that is
to say but 1 week before the outbreak of the war and 3 days before the
planned attack on Poland, these two nations made another secret
agreement. This secret agreement essentially contained the definition of
the spheres of interest of both nations within the European territory
lying between Germany and the Soviet Union.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you are not forgetting, are you, the
Tribunal’s ruling that this is not the opportunity for making a speech,
but simply the occasion for introducing documents and calling witnesses.
You will have the opportunity of making your speech at a later stage.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed. I do not intend to make a speech, but I intend
to say a few introductory words on a document which I shall submit to
the Tribunal.
Germany, in the secret documents, declared herself disinterested in
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, we have not yet seen the document. If you are
going to put in the document, put in the document.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed. I can submit the document at once. It is an
affidavit of the former ambassador, Dr. Friedrich Gaus. In the year 1939
he was the Chief of the Legal Department of the Foreign Office. He was
present at the negotiations as the assistant of the then German
plenipotentiary in Moscow, and it was he who drafted the non-aggression
pact which has already been submitted as an exhibit, as well as the
secret agreement, the contents of which I want to submit now to the
Tribunal as facts which are important as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, will you hand in the document?
DR. SEIDL: Surely. However, I intend to read parts of this document
later.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal does not quite understand what
this document is, because it is not included in your document book and
it does not appear that you made any application for it or made any
reference to it, and it is in German; it is not translated.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, when I prepared the document book for the
Defendant Hess, I did not as yet have this affidavit in my possession.
It dates from 15 March 1946. At that time, when the relevancy of the
applications for Defendant Hess were discussed, I had as yet no definite
knowledge of the context which would have enabled me to make a proper
application. The excerpts which I intend to read from this document are
short, and it will be possible to have them translated immediately by
the interpreters present here in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you a copy for the Prosecution?
DR. SEIDL: Surely, a German copy.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that would not be any use to me. I do not
know whether it is to all the members of the Prosecution. Have the
Prosecuting Counsel any objection to passages being read from this
document?
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr.
President, I did not know about the existence of this document, and I
therefore strenuously object to having it read into the record. I would
wish that the procedure established by the Tribunal be observed by the
Defense. The Prosecution, in the past, when presenting its evidence
invariably presented copies of these documents to the Defense Counsel.
Counsel for Hess is now presenting a completely unknown document, and
the Prosecution, with every reason, would like to familiarize itself
with this document beforehand. I do not know what secrets or what secret
agreements Counsel for the Defense is talking about and on what facts he
is basing his statements. I would therefore, to say the least, define
them as unfounded. I request that this document should not be read into
the record.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecutor for the Soviet Union states that he has no
knowledge of the existence of this secret document which shall be
established by this affidavit. Under these circumstances I am compelled
to move that Foreign Commissar Molotov of the Soviet Union be called as
a witness, so that it can be established, firstly whether this agreement
was actually concluded, secondly, what the contents of this agreement
are, and thirdly...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the first thing for you to do is to have a
translation of this document made, and until you have a translation of
this document made, the Tribunal is not prepared to hear you upon it. We
do not know what the document contains.
DR. SEIDL: As to what the document contains, I already wanted to explain
that before. In the document there is...
THE PRESIDENT: No, the Tribunal is not prepared to hear from you what
the document contains. We want to see the document itself and see it in
English and also in Russian. I do not mean, of course, you have to do it
yourself, Dr. Seidl. If you would furnish this copy to the Prosecution
they will have it translated into the various languages and then, after
that has been done, we can reconsider the matter.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. I turn then to another document, the reading of
which can certainly raise no objections, because it is a document which
has already been submitted by the Prosecution. It is the address made by
the Führer to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on 22 August
1939. It was submitted by the Prosecution of the Soviet Union as 798-PS
and as Exhibit Number US-29. I quote from Page 6 of the German
photostat: “Thereupon Hitler declared...”
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your document book or not, I mean just
for convenience?
DR. SEIDL: The document was already submitted by the Prosecution in
full.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean it is not here. I have not got the document
before me. It is not in your document book?
DR. SEIDL: No, it is not in the document book because the Court has
already ruled that each defendant’s counsel has the right to refer to
any document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution. I
quote:
“...I have gradually brought about a change in our attitude
towards Russia. In connection with the trade agreement, we got
into a political conversation. Proposal of a non-aggression
pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I
took a special step which had as a result that Russia answered
yesterday she was ready for settlement. Personal contact with
Stalin has been established. Von Ribbentrop will conclude the
treaty the day after tomorrow. Now Poland is in the position in
which I wanted her to be.”
End of the quotation.
Mr. President, Gentlemen: I had now the intention to call the witness
Bohle who has already been approved by the Tribunal. The Defendant Hess,
however, has asked me to forego the personal appearance of that witness
and read an affidavit concerning the facts of evidence in reference to
which the witness was to be heard.
I have prepared such an affidavit, and undoubtedly it would accelerate
the proceedings if the Tribunal would permit the reading of this
affidavit. If however, the Tribunal should have the opinion that...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not had the opportunity of seeing the
affidavit. As previously advised, if the witness covers the ground for
which he was asked, I should want him for cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the witness?
DR. SEIDL: He is here. With the permission of the Tribunal I would like
to call the witness Bohle now.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean to call him or to read his affidavit?
DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed; since Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe apparently protests
against the reading of the affidavit, I would like to call the witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not seen the affidavit, of course, My
Lord, so at the moment, as I say, if the affidavit covers the ground
that the witness should speak upon, then I shall want to cross-examine
him.
THE PRESIDENT: Unless the Prosecution are agreeable that the affidavit
should be put in, the witness must be called, but if the Prosecution are
agreeable to the affidavit being read and then the witness presented for
cross-examination, the Tribunal is quite willing that it should be done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not mind that in the least, My Lord. Of
course, I am in slight difficulty not knowing what is in the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the best course would be for the Tribunal to have
a 10-minute adjournment now, and you could perhaps just see what is in
the affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a pleasure, My Lord.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal did not wish to hurry counsel, but we
thought we had better get on with other witnesses, and this document can
be translated and considered and possibly dealt with after the main
adjournment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I have not had the
chance of reading the translation. A preliminary view of the affidavit
convinced my staff that it was not of very great importance, and I was
going to consider whether the quickest way might be to let the affidavit
be read, if the Tribunal would then permit me to read three documents
which I was going to put in cross-examination to the witness. That might
be more convenient than to take the course which Your Lordship suggests,
of waiting until we have seen the full affidavit and then consider what
would be the best way to deal with it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have perhaps seen part of the document, and you
can perhaps judge better which would be the more convenient course.
Whichever you think more convenient.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am quite content if Dr. Seidl reads it,
but it would have to be on the terms that the documents which I was
going to put in cross-examination to the witness are read.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he had better be called.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: If I understood the High Tribunal correctly, they do not wish
to have the affidavit read but to have the witness interrogated before
the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the affidavit has been translated, and
the Prosecution have had an opportunity of considering it, they can let
us know whether they think it will be better to treat the affidavit as
the examination of the witness, and he must then be produced here for
the purpose of cross-examination unless you prefer to examine him orally
yourself.
DR. SEIDL: I believe that under these circumstances it would be best to
call the witness immediately to the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[_The witness Bohle took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
ERNST WILHELM BOHLE (Witness): Ernst Wilhelm Bohle.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were ultimately the leader of the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP? Is that correct?
BOHLE: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: You were also State Secretary of the Foreign Office?
BOHLE: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd of the American Prosecution just made
the suggestion that, in order to save time, it might be possible to
follow the same procedure as in the case of witness Blaha, that is,
first of all, to read the affidavit in the presence of the witness and
then afterwards hear him in cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. SEIDL [_Turning to the witness._]: You made an affidavit which I
shall now read to you. Concerning the matter:
“1. The Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP was founded on 1 May
1931 at Hamburg upon suggestion of some Germans abroad. Gregor
Strasser, Reich Organization Chief at the time, appointed as its
leader the NSDAP Member of the Reichstag, Dr. Hans Nieland.
“I myself became a volunteer assistant of the
Auslands-Organisation in December 1931 and was taken into the
Party on 1 March 1932. On 8 May 1933 Dr. Nieland resigned as
leader of the Auslands-Organisation, having become in the
meantime a member of the Hamburg Government and also, as a
German who had always stayed at home, being less interested in
questions concerning Germans abroad. On account of my
experience—and my connections abroad—I was born in England and
raised in South Africa—I was charged with the leadership of the
Auslands-Organisation.
“2. The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was, upon the
assumption of power, to hold together in an organized way the
approximately 3,300 Party members living outside the boundaries
of Germany at the time of the seizure of power. Further, through
it Germans abroad, who could have only a vague idea of the
political happenings at home, were to be taught the philosophy
and the political program of the new state.
“3. Only German nationals could become members of the Party. The
acceptance of foreigners or former Germans who had acquired
citizenship in another state was strictly prohibited.
“4. The guiding principle of the Auslands-Organisation of the
Party concerning its attitude to foreign countries was found on
the Ausland pass of every German national who was a member of
the Party, in the following passage: ‘Observe the laws of the
country whose guest you are. Let the citizens of the country in
which you stay take care of their internal politics; do not
interfere in these matters, not even by way of conversation.’
“This principle was basic for the work and the attitude of the
Auslands-Organisation with respect to foreign countries from the
day of its founding up to its end. I myself referred to this in
many public speeches, and in so doing coined, among others, the
phrase: ‘The National Socialist honors foreign folkdom because
he loves his own.’
“My speeches in Porchester Hall in London on 2 October 1937 and
in Budapest at the end of January 1938 give a comprehensive
picture of the attitude of the Auslands-Organisation of the
NSDAP toward foreign countries.
“Winston Churchill in the late summer of 1937 repeatedly
attacked the activity of the Auslands-Organisation in newspaper
articles, and in his well-known article, ‘Friendship with
Germany,’ in the London _Evening Standard_ of 17 September 1937,
designated it as an encumbrance on German-English relations. In
the same article he said that he was ready to converse with me
in the most cordial manner about this question. The German
Embassy in London informed the Foreign Office at that time that
a question by Churchill in the House of Commons regarding the
activity of the Auslands-Organisation would be extremely
undesirable. As a result a meeting between Churchill and myself
was advocated as urgent. This took place on the day of my speech
to the Reich Germans in London, in Winston Churchill’s London
home, and lasted more than an hour. I had ample opportunity in
this thoroughly cordial conversation to describe the activity of
the Auslands-Organisation and to dispel his misgivings. At the
end he accompanied me to my car and let himself be photographed
with me, in order, as he said, to show the world that we were
parting as friends. There was no inquiry in the House of
Commons. From that day Churchill never uttered a word of
objection again about the activity of the Auslands-Organisation.
My speech of the same date, which was published shortly
afterwards in English in pamphlet form by an English concern,
was very favorably received. _The Times_ published from it a
lengthy excerpt under the heading ‘Herr Bohle’s Plea for an
Understanding.’ After this conversation Churchill wrote me a
letter in which he voiced his satisfaction with the result of
our conversation.
“6. In the trial of the murderer of the Landesgruppenleiter of
the Auslands-Organisation in Switzerland, Wilhelm Gustloff,
which was held in a Swiss court at Chur in 1936, the legality of
the activity of the Auslands-Organisation was the subject of
investigation by the court. The Defendant, David Frankfurter,
was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. From what I remember, I
can say that the Swiss authorities, who were in no way friendly
to Nazis, had to testify that Gustloff and the Landesgruppen of
the Auslands-Organisation had never in any way given reason for
complaint with regard to their activity. The testimony of
Federal Councillor Baumann, who, to my knowledge, was then
Minister of the Interior and of the Police in Switzerland, was
at that time decisive.
“7. I should further like to point out in this connection that
also after the outbreak of the war the Landesgruppen of the
Auslands-Organisation in neutral countries continued to function
until the end of the war. That is especially true of
Switzerland, Sweden, and Portugal.
“From 1943 on, at the latest, the Reich would hardly have been
able to take any steps against suppression, if the
Auslands-Organisation had come into conflict with the internal
laws of these countries; and suppression would have been the
inevitable result.
“8. Aside from the indisputable legality of the
Auslands-Organisation, as its leader I have repeatedly expressed
the idea that the Auslandsdeutschen (Germans abroad) would
certainly be the last people who would let themselves be misused
as warmongers or as conspirators against the peace. From bitter
experience they knew that with the outbreak of the war they
would face at once internment, persecution, confiscation of
property, and destruction of their economic existence.
“9. As a result of the knowledge of the situation abroad, no one
knew better than the Auslandsdeutschen that any activity in the
sense of a Fifth Column would be just as foolish as detrimental
to the interests of the Reich. To my knowledge, moreover, the
expression ‘Fifth Column’ can be traced back to the Spanish
Civil War. It is in any case a foreign invention. When Franco
attacked Madrid with four columns of troops, it was asserted
that a Fifth Column consisting of nationalist elements was doing
its seditious work underground within the besieged city.
“10. There is no basis whatsoever for applying the term ‘Fifth
Column’ to the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. If this
assertion were true, it would mean that members of the
Auslands-Organisation working together with local oppositional
elements in one or more foreign countries had been delegated, or
had by themselves tried, to undermine this state from within.
Any such assertion would be pure invention.
“11. Neither from the former Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf Hess,
nor from me, as the leader of the Auslands-Organisation, has
this organization or members of this organization in any way
received orders the execution of which might be considered as
Fifth Column activity. Even Hitler himself never gave me any
directive in that respect. In summary, I can say that the
Auslands-Organisation at no time, as long as I was its leader,
displayed any activity in the sense of a Fifth Column. Never did
the Deputy of the Führer give orders or directives to the
Auslands-Organisation which might have led to such activity. On
the contrary, Rudolf Hess most urgently desired that members of
the Auslands-Organisation should under no circumstances take
part in the internal affairs of the country in which they were
living as guests.
“12. Of course, it is known that just as citizens of the then
enemy countries, so also Germans were employed in the espionage
and intelligence services abroad. This activity had however
nothing at all to do with membership in the
Auslands-Organisation. In order not to imperil the existence of
the Auslands-Organisation groups, which worked legally and
entirely in the open, I constantly demanded that members of the
Auslands-Organisation would not be used for such purposes or
that I should previously be given the opportunity to relieve
them of their functions within the Auslands-Organisation.”
And that is the end of the statement of the witness Bohle. For the
moment I have no questions to ask the witness, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask the witness
any questions?
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): I would like to
put several questions to this witness, Your Honor.
Witness, I represent the Defendant Von Schirach, the former leader of
the German Youth. Therefore the following would interest me: Did the
Hitler Youth (HJ) also exist in foreign countries or only in Germany?
BOHLE: The Hitler Youth existed among German nationals in foreign
countries also.
DR. SAUTER: Please tell me whether this HJ, the Hitler Youth abroad, was
subject to the political directives of the competent Landesleiter of the
Auslands-Organisation, or is that not right?
BOHLE: Yes, the Hitler Youth abroad was politically under the control of
the Hoheitsträger of the Party.
DR. SAUTER: Once in the course of the proceedings the assertion was made
that members of the Hitler Youth were trained for service as agents and
for espionage work abroad and also were used for these purposes.
Specific facts, that is, specific instances, were certainly not
mentioned, but only a general assertion was made, and it was also
asserted that Hitler Youth abroad were even used as paratroopers, that
is, that they had been trained at home as paratroopers in order to be
used abroad in this capacity.
That is the assertion which I submit to you, and I now ask to have your
opinion on this, whether, on the basis of your knowledge as the
competent leader of the Auslands-Organisation, something like that did
occur or whether anything like that was at all possible?
BOHLE: I would like to say the following in reply: I consider it
entirely out of the question that members of the Hitler Youth abroad
were misused in this way. I can assert that so much the more since I
know I would have heard anything to the contrary from the leaders of the
Party in the various foreign countries. I know also nothing at all about
the training of the Hitler Youth as paratroopers or anything similar. I
consider these assertions as absolutely pure invention.
DR. SAUTER: Then I may assume, as the result of your testimony, that
things of that sort on the basis of the entire organization would
certainly have come to your knowledge, if something like that had
occurred or perhaps even only had been planned; is that correct?
BOHLE: Yes, indeed.
DR. SAUTER: And then, Witness, I have a last question:
Here in the courtroom a further assertion was also made about the HJ,
that is, about the Hitler Youth. It has been asserted that at Lvov it
once happened that the Hitler Youth or members of the Hitler Youth had
used little children as targets. Also in this report no details of
course were given, but only the assertion was made. The following would
interest me:
As you know the Hitler Youth had, I believe, a membership toward the end
of about 7 to 8 million.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, does that have anything to do with the
Auslands-Organisation?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, it does insofar as my client, the Defendant Von
Schirach, is charged with the fact that the Hitler Youth abroad
committed such atrocities.
THE PRESIDENT: It was not suggested that they did this abroad, was
it—that Hitler Youth ever used children as targets abroad?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, indeed, it was said that at Lvov, in the Government
General, not in Germany, but in Lvov, which means abroad.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean after the war began?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought this witness was speaking about the same
organization before the war.
DR. SAUTER: I do not know whether he was also talking about the
Auslands-Organisation during the war. But in any case, Mr. President,
the witness knows these facts, for he was the head of the
Auslands-Organisation. Therefore this witness seems to me especially
qualified to give us information on these matters.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that we are very far from the point, but
you can go on.
DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President, for otherwise I would have to call
expressly this witness for my client again.
Witness, do you at all recall the last question I put to you, whether
you had any knowledge that the Hitler Youth, or members of the Hitler
Youth abroad, which was under your jurisdiction, is supposed to have
committed atrocities of that nature?
BOHLE: I regret to tell you, Mr. Attorney, that the Government General
did not belong to the Auslands-Organisation, that I was never there and
therefore am not in a position to state anything on that point.
Obviously the erroneous opinion seems to exist that the Government
General, from the point of view of the organization of the Party, was
connected with the Auslands-Organisation; however that was not the case.
I had no organizational powers there.
DR. SAUTER: Otherwise, I have no further questions.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Leadership Corps of the Nazi
Party): Witness, to what extent, in your capacity as Reichsleiter of the
Auslands-Organisation, were you informed about the foreign political
intentions of the Führer?
BOHLE: I was not Reichsleiter, but Gauleiter, and was never informed of
the foreign political intentions of the Führer.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know whether the Führer basically advocated to
your organization an understanding with England?
BOHLE: I do not quite understand your question.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Hitler, before the war, in your presence and before
the other Gauleiter, frequently emphasize the fact that he wanted at all
costs an understanding with England, and that you also were to work for
its achievement?
BOHLE: I received no orders in this respect from the Führer, but
certainly from the Deputy of the Führer. The Führer never discussed
foreign political matters with me during the 12 years I was in office.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of the Defense Counsel want to ask any
other questions?
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the
United Kingdom): Your Auslands-Organisation was organized in the same
way as the Party in Germany was organized; is that not so?
BOHLE: Not in all points, because there were various organizations
within the body of the Party in the Reich which were not intended for
foreign countries, for example, the Office for Municipal Policy.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps I can shorten my question: Did you have
Hoheitsträger abroad in the same way as you had them in Germany?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The organization in each country was under the
Landesgruppenleiter; is that correct?
BOHLE: In almost all countries.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And under many there were lower-ranking
Hoheitsträger?
BOHLE: Yes, the Ortsgruppenleiter.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was the result of that, that you had your
German population in foreign countries well organized and known to the
leaders in those countries?
BOHLE: To a great extent that might be correct, but it was not so
thoroughly organized, nor could it actually be so, because the leader of
the Party did not know all the Reich Germans in the country concerned.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did it never occur to you that in the event of
your army’s invading a country where you had a well-organized
organization, that organization would be of extreme military value?
BOHLE: No, that was not the sense and the purpose of the
Auslands-Organisation and no offices ever approached me in this
connection.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling this Tribunal now that when the
various countries of Europe were in fact invaded by the German Army your
local organizations did nothing to assist them in a military or
semimilitary capacity?
BOHLE: Yes, indeed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, let me ask you about something
else for a moment: You had, had you not, an efficient system of
reporting from your Landesgruppenleiter to your head office in Berlin?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I think you have said yourself, did you not, in
your interrogations, that you took an especial pride in the speed with
which your reports came back?
BOHLE: I did not say that, I believe, with respect to speed but rather
with respect to the accuracy of their political survey.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In fact, your reports did come back with great
speed, did they not?
BOHLE: I cannot say that in general. It depended on the possibility of
dispatching these reports quickly to Berlin, and how far that was the
case in individual instances, I naturally cannot say today. In any case,
I had no special speed or acceleration measures at my disposal.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In fact, you told your interrogator—and I can
refer you to it if necessary—that on occasion you got back information
before Himmler or the Foreign Office had got similar information.
BOHLE: That must be a misunderstanding. It concerns the political
reports from the Landesgruppenleiter which I transmitted from Berlin to
the different offices.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, we will leave the speed out. I have
it from you that you had an efficient system of reporting, had you not?
BOHLE: In order to answer that question I would have to know in respect
to what reports I am supposed to have had an efficient system of
reporting.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was going to be my next question. I was
going to ask you: What in fact did your Landesgruppenleiter report to
you?
BOHLE: The Landesgruppenleiter reported of their own accord to me,
whenever they had anything of importance which they wanted to report to
the competent offices in the Reich.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did they ever report anything which might have
been of military or semimilitary value?
BOHLE: That may have been the case in some instances, although at
present I cannot recall any specific cases.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They were never given any instructions, were
they, to report that kind of information?
BOHLE: No, generally not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: How did you get your reports back? Did you have
wireless sets with your organization in foreign countries?
BOHLE: No, we did not have any such transmission or wireless stations.
Reports either came through courier in special cases or were brought by
individuals to Germany.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: After the war started, did your organizations
continue in neutral countries?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did they never have wireless sets reporting
back information?
BOHLE: I do not know anything about that. I do not believe they had
them, for I would have had to know about it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to ask you about only one or two
documents. Would you look at 3258-PS—My Lord, that is the exhibit
already in, GB-262; I have copies of the extract for the Tribunal and
members of Defense Counsel. I expect you read English—the book itself
is coming.
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There you have before you a copy of some
extracts from it. Would you look at the bottom of the first page, last
paragraph, commencing “In 1938...” Did you have a Landesgruppenleiter in
the Netherlands by the name of Butting?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just pay attention to me for perhaps one moment
before you look at that document. Do you know that Butting shared a
house at The Hague with the military intelligence office? Do you know
that?
BOHLE: No, I do not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to quote you quite shortly two
paragraphs of this document, which is a report, published as an official
United States publication, called “National Socialism, Basic Principles,
Their Application by the Nazi Party’s Foreign Organization, and The Use
of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims.” I just want you to tell the Tribunal
what you think first of all about this report, which is printed in that
book:
“In 1938 the German Legation owned two houses in The Hague. Both
were of course the subject of diplomatic immunity and therefore
inviolable as concerned search and seizure by the Dutch police.
I shall call the house in which Dr. Butting had his office House
Number 2. What went on in House Number 2? It had been remodeled
and was divided like a two-family house—vertically, not
horizontally, but between the two halves there was a
communicating door. One side of the house was Dr. Butting’s. The
other half housed the Nazi military intelligence agent for
Holland....”
You say that you do not know anything about that?
BOHLE: Butting was Landesgruppenleiter of the Auslands-Organisation. I
am hearing about this house—or these two houses—for the first time,
that is quite new to me.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I will just go on.
“S. B. (the military intelligence agent) may have had as many as
a dozen subordinates working in Holland, all subagents of the
Canaris bureau. These were professional spies who knew their
trade. But they could not possibly know Holland as intimately as
was required by the strategy of the German High Command, as it
was revealed following the invasion of May 1940. For this, not a
dozen but perhaps several hundred sources of information were
necessary. And it is at this point that Butting and the military
intelligence agent come together. Through his German Citizens’
Association, Butting had a pair of Nazi eyes, a pair of Nazi
ears, in every town and hamlet of the Netherlands. They were the
eyes and ears of his minor Party officials. Whenever the
military intelligence agent needed information concerning a
corner of Holland which his people had not yet explored, or was
anxious to check information relayed to him by one of his own
people, he would go to Butting.”
Do you know whether Butting assisted the military intelligence agent in
Holland in any way like that?
BOHLE: I was told later that he aided in Holland. To what extent he
helped him I do not know, for he had had no such mission from me.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I understand, he had no instructions but he was
doing it. Just turn now to the last paragraph on that page, too:
“‘I know every stone in Holland,’ S. B. once boasted. By ‘stone’
he meant canal, lock, bridge, viaduct, culvert, highway,
by-road, airport, emergency landing field, and the name and
location of Dutch Nazi sympathizers who would help the invading
army when the time came. Had Dr. Butting’s Party organization
not existed under the innocent cover of his Citizens’
Association, S.B.’s knowledge of Holland would have been as
nothing compared with what it was. Thus the Citizens’
Association served a double purpose; it was invaluable for
espionage at the same time as it fulfilled its primary function
as a Fifth Column agency.”
Do you know whether the members of your organization in Holland were
given instructions to learn about every canal, lock, bridge, viaduct,
railway, and so on?
BOHLE: No, I had not the least idea of this.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I want you to be quite clear. I am
putting to you that your organization was in the first place an
espionage system reporting information of importance back to the Reich,
and, in the second place, it was an organization aimed to help, and
which did help, your invading German armies when they overran the
frontiers of their neighboring states. Do you understand those two
points?
BOHLE: Yes, indeed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your organization publish an annual book,
your _Year Book of the Foreign Organization_?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And did that book contain information as to the
activities of your organization during the year?
BOHLE: Partially, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I suppose that the Tribunal would be safe in
assuming that what was published in that book was accurate information?
BOHLE: One may assume that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at the _Year Book for 1942_? I
have copies of the extracts. Would you turn to Page 37 of that book? If
you look back one or two pages in the book, you will find that that is
an article entitled “The Work of the Norway Branch of the
Auslands-Organisation in the War.” Is that written by your
Landesgruppenleiter in Norway?
BOHLE: I assume so, I cannot recall this.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 37, and you will see that
there are some passages in the book that you have in front of you that
have been lightly marked in pencil along the side.
BOHLE: Yes, I have it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you find the paragraph which starts,
“Therefore, soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939...” Have
you got that?
BOHLE: Yes, I have it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps you will be so kind as to follow me.
“Therefore, soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939,
the enlargement and extension...”
BOHLE: Yes, I am following you.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “...the enlargement and extension of
the German Legation in Oslo and of the consulates at Bergen,
Trondheim, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Hamgesund, Narvik and
Kirkenes proved to be of primary importance. This enlargement of
the Reich agencies resulted in the local organization of the
NSDAP in Norway having to increase its field of activity too, in
the same proportion, in order to support the work of the Reich
agencies, particularly by Party members and other Germans who
had a thorough knowledge of the country and language.”
Why, in September ’39, was it necessary for the Party to increase its
organization in Norway with people having higher knowledge of the
country and language? Answer me that before you read on. You need not
worry about the rest; we are going to deal with it. Why was it necessary
in 1939 to enlarge your organization?
BOHLE: In Norway, as far as I recall, there were only 80 members of the
Party in all, and it goes without saying that after the outbreak of the
war the official agencies, not only of Germany but also, as you know,
those of other states, were enlarged and were assisted by national
elements, who knew the country concerned. That did not hold true for
Germany alone but for all the nations participating in the war.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. I still do not understand why your
perfectly harmless organization should have found it necessary to
increase its membership with people who had a profound knowledge of the
language and the country. Why should the Auslands-Organisation have
found it necessary?
BOHLE: Because the Reich agencies needed Germans who knew the country
and the people, especially to furnish information on the German targets
of attack in Norway—exactly what every other nation did, too.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, your answer is, is it, that you required
them to tell you about targets in Norway? Is that your answer?
BOHLE: No, I did not say that. I said that they were to be at the
disposal of the agencies in Norway in case they were needed for public
enlightenment, that is for German propaganda purposes among the
Norwegians. I would like to emphasize once again that that was done not
only by Germany but, of course, by all the warring countries.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, let us go on and see what happens
next:
“The choice and assignment of these supplementary collaborators
was carried out by the local leader of the organization in close
collaboration with the representatives of the Reich. Therefore,
from the first moment of the outbreak of war a great number of
Party members were taken away from their jobs and employed in
the service of the nation and the fatherland. Without any
hesitation and without considering their personal interests,
their families, their careers or their property, they joined the
ranks and devoted themselves body and soul to the new and often
dangerous tasks.”
Tell me, was finding out and reporting about the Norwegian people, was
that an “often dangerous task”?
BOHLE: Certainly not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What, then, were the often dangerous tasks
which your own Landesgruppenleiter is saying members of his organization
were undertaking from the very moment war broke out, in September ’39?
BOHLE: I cannot tell you anything about that, for I have no knowledge
whatsoever about this and I cannot conceive any of these dangerous
tasks. I have the impression from this article, which, incidentally I
did not know about until now, that the Landesgruppenleiter had the
plausible desire to give more importance to his organization than it had
in reality.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you say you did not know about this. This
appeared in the official yearbook of your organization. Did you never
read what appeared in that book?
BOHLE: Certainly not everything, for I am not familiar with this
article.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have told us that the members of your
organization took no part in this. What about the people who were
responsible for publishing that book? Did they not ever draw your
attention to an article of that kind?
BOHLE: Obviously not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just look at the next little paragraph:
“The success of their work, which was done with all secrecy, was
revealed when, on 9 April 1940, German troops landed in Norway
and forestalled the planned flank attack of the Allies.”
What work was revealed on the 9th of April? What work which had been
done with all secrecy was revealed on the 9th of April, work carried out
by members of your organization?
BOHLE: I am sorry I cannot reply, for I have no knowledge whatsoever of
this. I do not know.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I see. Will you look down to the last paragraph
of that page? It is the second sentence—four, five lines down—at the
end of the fifth line. I beg your pardon. You have the book in front of
you. Will you look at Page 40 of the book? In the center of a paragraph
the last word of one of the lines starts with “According to the task
plan...” Have you got it? It is Page 40. To save time, let me read it:
“According to the task plan which had been prepared since the
outbreak of the war, the Landeskreisleitung gave orders on 7
April for Phase 1 of the state of employment...”
It does not sound, does it, like plans being made for different phases
of an operation? It does not sound, does it, as if the work of your
organization had been simply finding out about Norwegian people?
BOHLE: That might have been since this is entirely new to me,
exclusively an agreement within the country itself with military or
other authorities. I have had no knowledge of it up to this moment.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So I understand you to say. But you were the
head of this organization, were you not?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have come before this International
Tribunal and given them evidence, presumably saying you are in a
position to give them truthful and accurate evidence; is that so?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you understand that?
BOHLE: Yes, I have understood that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, then, do I understand you to say now that
you do not know what was happening in your organization, and therefore
you are not in a position to give evidence as to whether or not it was a
Fifth Column business?
BOHLE: It is quite evident that in an organization of this size the
leader, who has his office at Berlin, cannot be closely acquainted with
everything which is going on abroad and, more so, what is done against
his instructions. I did not have the same disciplinary authority over my
Party members abroad as did, for instance, some Gauleiter within the
Reich. I need not elaborate on that, because it is self-evident. It is
also evident, and this I know, that some Germans abroad, who were called
on because of their patriotism in individual cases let themselves be
used for purposes without the knowledge of the Auslands-Organisation and
against its explicit instructions.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In the interest of time we will not pursue that
particular sphere of activity in Norway, just in case it may have been
an exception which you did not know about.
Let me turn to something else. Will you look at Page 65 of that book?
Is that an article by your Landesgruppenleiter in Greece?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Is it in the form of a day-to-day diary of the
activities of the Auslands-Organisation in Greece when German troops
invaded that country?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 65?
“Sunday the 27th of April. Swastika on the Acropolis.”
That is the heading. I beg your pardon. I do not know whether it comes
directly under that heading. This is the Landesgruppenleiter talking:
“I set out immediately, quickly visiting the other
quarters,”—where the German colony had been interned—“the
Philadelphia and the Institute. I enjoined the inmates of the
house in Academy Street to give up returning home today, and to
hold themselves in readiness. After all, we did want to help the
German troops immediately with our knowledge of the language and
the district. Now the moment has come. We must start in
immediately.”
Do you know...
BOHLE: Yes, I even know all about this. It certainly must be evident
that the moment German troops occupied a foreign city and freed the
Germans living abroad who had been interned, the latter would put
themselves at the disposal of the German troops and help them in every
respect as guides, interpreters, or the like. That is certainly the most
logical thing in the world.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is in fact what they did do, and the
assistance that your organization appears to have given them is that it
managed to organize them and get them ready to do it; is that not so?
That is what your Landesgruppenleiter seems to be doing?
BOHLE: I did not understand this question. Will you please repeat it?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you understand that it is your
Landesgruppenleiter who is organizing the members of your organization,
organizing them so that they can give their assistance most beneficially
to the invading armies?
BOHLE: That is a completely wrong way to express it. The
Landesgruppenleiter in Greece, who filled that post from 1934, could not
possibly tell whether there was to be an invasion of Greece or not. That
had not the slightest thing to do with the nature of his organization.
The moment that German troops were in the country it stands to reason
that they would welcome their countrymen, act as their hosts, and help
them in every way. That was a patriotic duty taken for granted.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I see.
Just turn to Page 66, the next page. Will you find the paragraph which
commences “Meanwhile I organized the employment of all Party members to
do auxiliary service for the Armed Forces.”
Do you have that?
BOHLE: I understand it...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had better find the place.
BOHLE: Where shall I find that place?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On Page 66. It is a new paragraph.
BOHLE: Yes, I have it now.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Meanwhile I organized the employment of all
Party members to do auxiliary service for the Armed Forces.”
It really looks now as though the Landesgruppenleiter is organizing
them, does it not?
BOHLE: In this instance, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Soon our boys and girls could be seen
riding proud and radiant in their Hitler Youth uniforms, beside
the German soldiers on motorcycles and in Army cars....”
Did you yourself know of the organization and work that your
Landesgruppenleiter had put in in Greece to assist your armies in
semimilitary capacities, or was that another case like Norway which you
did not know anything about?
BOHLE: The Landesgruppenleiter in Greece did not create a semimilitary
organization, but set up of course in this instance an organization to
aid the troops entering the country in a sector which was entirely
civilian.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well; I just want to ask you about another
matter. Have you got a document there which is a telegram from somebody
called Stohrer, in Madrid?
BOHLE: Stohrer, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did Stohrer have something to do with the
German Embassy in Madrid?
BOHLE: Stohrer was the German Ambassador himself; Doctor Von Stohrer.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This is dated 23 October 1939. Just let us see
what it says:
“The Landesgruppenleiter can obtain a very suitable house for
accommodating the Landesgruppe, as well as the German Labor
Front, the Ortsgruppe, the Hitler Youth, and the German House
Madrid, also room available in case of embassy having to spread
out, and especially a very suitable isolated room for the
possible installation of second secret radio transmitter, which
can no longer be housed at the school because of reopening.
“Landesgruppenleiter requests me to rent the house through the
embassy, in which way very considerable tax expense will be
avoided. Have no hesitation, in view of anticipated partial use
by embassy as mentioned above. If you do not agree I request
wire by return.
“Please submit also to Gauleiter Bohle.”
Were you telling the truth to this Tribunal when you told them some 30
minutes ago that you had no knowledge of wireless sets being used by
your organization?
BOHLE: Yes, because I have no knowledge of these transmitters, or their
use; I must assume that it concerns apparatus of the embassy.
DR. SEIDL: The copy of the telegram, as I have it before me, does not
indicate to whom this wire was addressed. The last sentence of the
telegram leads one to assume that it was not in any case addressed to
the witness. According to my opinion, I think the witness should next be
asked whether he knew about this wire and to whom it was addressed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps you will tell Dr. Seidl to whom the
Ambassador in Madrid was likely to send a telegram on such matters as
this?
BOHLE: To the Foreign Office at Berlin.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And you, at that time, were State Secretary at
the Foreign Office of Berlin, were you not?
BOHLE: Quite right, in October 1939.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Beneath his signature is set out the
distribution to—it mentions various persons in departments in the
Foreign Office in Berlin. Is that so?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And are you saying now that all of those
departments which were asked to submit this matter to you, that they all
failed to do so?
BOHLE: No, I do not claim that. They surely would have done that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember yourself seeing this telegram
before?
BOHLE: I cannot recall it. I would have noticed it for I never heard
anything about two secret transmitters in Spain. It would also be quite
in order for me to admit it. But I cannot do so if I do not know it. The
distribution under Number 3 mentions "State Secretary,” but that does
not mean me, but the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, the
political one. My designation in the Foreign Office was: Chief A.O.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I can save you all that. I am not suggesting
that that “State Secretary” means you; otherwise it would not be asked
to be submitted to you. What I want to know is what you or your embassy
workers, or both of you working together, wanted with two secret
wireless transmitting sets in Spain in October 1939?
Are you still saying that your organization was quite unconcerned in
reporting back information of military importance?
BOHLE: Just how do you mean, “reporting back”?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling the Tribunal—I want you to be
quite clear—are you telling the Tribunal that your organization was not
being used for espionage purposes in Spain?
BOHLE: Yes indeed, I am asserting that. A distinction must be made
between certain members of the Auslands-Organisation who naturally
without my knowledge—I protested against this often enough—were used
abroad for such purposes. I had no objection to Germans abroad being
utilized in time of war for such tasks, as was the case very frequently
with all other countries. However, I did not want members or officials
of the Auslands-Organisation to become involved. A distinction must...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I do not want to stop you at all. I do not want
to stop you. Go on if you have anything to say. But, in the interest of
time, try and make it as short as possible.
BOHLE: It seems to me there is some confusion between the
Auslands-Organisation as an organization and what certain Germans abroad
did during the war as their patriotic duty. This seems to me to be the
crucial point of the question.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, I will not argue about that. We see that
your organization took sufficient interest to reproduce accounts of what
they were doing in its official book. I just want to show you one thing
further.
[_Turning to the President._] Well, I have one further document to put
to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: You may as well go on.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is a document which I have just had found. I
have not had them copied. The Tribunal will forgive me if I read
extracts from them?
[_Turning to the witness._] It is an original document you hold in your
hand and it appears to be, does it not, a carbon copy of a letter
from...
THE PRESIDENT: Has Dr. Seidl got one?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, he has one in German.
[_Turning to the witness._] Is that a letter from your
Landesgruppenleiter Konradi?
BOHLE: It seems to be a directive from Konradi, but not signed by him.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you will look at the end of the letter you
will see that it is actually signed “Konradi,” after the usual “Heil
Hitler”...
BOHLE: The copy that I have is not signed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you get that copy back? Perhaps these
documents...
[_The document was taken from the witness to Lt. Col. Griffith-Jones._]
It is in fact signed “Konradi.” Show it to him.
[_The document was returned to the witness._]
BOHLE: It is not signed by Konradi, but typed in.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged to you. It is my fault
for not making myself clear. I told you that we have here a carbon copy.
A copy of a letter which was signed and sent by Konradi. That appears to
be so, does it not?
BOHLE: That I do not know, for of course I do not know about all the
letters written by Konradi.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You can take it, so far as you are concerned,
that that is a German document which has been captured, that it is this
bit of paper that you are holding in your hand which was found by Allied
troops and that bears a typewritten signature of Konradi, who was your
Landesgruppenleiter in Romania; is that correct? You remember that you
had a Landesgruppenleiter in Romania?
BOHLE: His name was Konradi.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And is this a letter of instructions to the
Zellenleiter in Constantsa?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is dated the 25th of October 1939. Will you
read the first paragraph?
“From 9 to 12 October conferences took place with the Supreme
Party functionaries, or their deputies, of the Southeastern and
Southern European groups at the head office of the
Auslands-Organisation.”
Does that mean Berlin?
BOHLE: Yes. Berlin.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That means your office, does it not?
BOHLE: Yes, in my office, but not in my personal office.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, but is it in the office over which you had
complete control?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Agreed. I imagine, before we go on, that no
orders would be issued from your head office at a conference of that
kind which were contrary to your direction, would they?
BOHLE: Not on important things, naturally not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to you.
“I subsequently received direct instructions from the competent
department of the head office of the Auslands-Organisation.”
So it appears that the direction given at the conference was confirmed
in writing.
“During the war, every National Socialist abroad must directly
serve the fatherland, either through propaganda for the German
cause or by counteracting enemy measures.”
Now perhaps you will turn over, or rather, you will miss out—I am
reading from copy—the English, the next paragraph, and the next plus
one paragraph, and go on to the paragraph commencing:
“As everywhere else it is extremely important to know where the
enemy is and what he is doing...”
I want you to be quite clear about this and keep it in mind. These are
directions coming directly from your head office in Berlin.
“It has been ascertained that the I.S. (Intelligence Service)
has attempted, sometimes most successfully, to gain admittance
for seemingly trustworthy persons into the activities of the
Party group and its associate organizations. It is therefore
necessary that you thoroughly investigate not only all those
persons coming into contact with you who are not very well known
to you, and above all you must scrutinize any new persons and
visitors appearing in your immediate vicinity. If possible, let
them be taken in hand by a comrade whose absolute Nazi
convictions are not generally known to the man in the
street....”
I think we can leave the rest of that.
“You are to report everything that comes to your notice, even
though it may at first appear very insignificant. Rumors
suddenly arising also come in this category, however false they
may be.”
Do you remember your members in Romania being told to report everything?
Everything they saw?
BOHLE: Yes, of course.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “An important section of both your work
and that of your comrades’ work must be industrial concerns,
business enterprises, _et cetera_. Not only can you spread your
propaganda very well in this way, but it is precisely in such
concerns that you can easily pick up information concerning
strange visitors. It is known that the enemy espionage
organizations are especially active in industrial circles both
in gathering information and carrying out acts of sabotage.
Members with close connections with shipping and forwarding
companies are particularly suitable for this work. It goes
without saying that you must be meticulous and cautious when
selecting your assistants.”
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have some more to read from this document? If so,
we will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is absent
from this session.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Witness, will you look again at the document we
were reading before the Court adjourned. Would you look at the paragraph
which commences “as everywhere else it is extremely important to know
where the enemy is and what he is doing.” My Lord, I am not absolutely
certain that I did not start reading.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, you had read that and the next one and the one
at the top of Page 3 in the English text. At least I think you have. You
read the one beginning “An important section.”
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps I can start the paragraph commencing
“An important section.” Have you got that?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “An important section of both your work
and that of your comrades must be industrial concerns, business
enterprises, _et cetera_. Not only can you spread your
propaganda very well in this way, but it is precisely in such
concerns that you can easily pick up information concerning
strange visitors. It is known that the enemy espionage
organizations are especially active in industrial circles, both
in gathering information and carrying out acts of sabotage.
Comrades with close connections with shipping and forwarding
companies are particularly suitable for this work. Naturally you
must be meticulous and cautious when selecting your assistants.
“In this connection a reference to interstate organizations and
exchange organizations is relevant.”—I particularly want you to
note these next lines:
“It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as
camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of the
Foreign Intelligence Department.”
Witness, doesn’t that exactly describe the way in which the
Auslands-Organisation was carrying on its business? Read it again:
“It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as
camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of the
Foreign Intelligence Department.”
Doesn’t that fit in with the directions that this Landesgruppenleiter of
yours has been writing to his members in this document?
BOHLE: On the contrary, I find that this is clear proof of the fact that
the organizations mentioned here were in a foreign espionage service and
not in the German espionage service. My interpretation is the exact
opposite of that of the British Prosecutor.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you not giving instructions here, or is not
your Landesgruppenleiter giving instructions, to carry out
counterespionage—the work that is carried on by the intelligence
service? Isn’t that what the writer is writing about so far?
BOHLE: The letter, with which I am not personally familiar, apparently
instructs Germans abroad to turn in a report whenever they encounter the
intelligence service at work. I do not think that any objection can be
raised to that in time of war.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. We will not go on arguing about it.
I understand that you know nothing about the instructions which are
contained in that letter. This is the first you have ever seen or heard
of it; is that right?
BOHLE: No, this letter is new to me, and I do not know whether it is
true, for there is no original here.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it then that, of the countries
around Germany in which your organization worked, you have no knowledge
of the activities that they were carrying out in Belgium? You have no
knowledge of the activities that they were carrying out in Norway, none
about what they were doing in Spain, and not very much about what they
were doing in Romania either; is that correct?
BOHLE: No, that is not correct. Of course I knew of the activity of
these groups abroad; but the particular activity that the British
Prosecutor wishes to point out as the aim of the Auslands-Organisation
is not quite clear to me.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you had knowledge of any of their
activities—I understand from your evidence that you had none of the
activities about which your own Auslands-Organisation Yearbook publishes
a story. Both in Norway and Greece the activities were recounted in
those two stories. You knew nothing about them at all; is that right?
BOHLE: I did not know about the activity in Norway. I have already
testified to that effect. I was very familiar with the activity in
Greece which was along perfectly normal lines.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I want to leave that, and I just
want to ask you two questions about another matter. Am I right in saying
that the information—and I am not going to argue with you now as to
what type of information it was—but the information that your
organization sent back, was that passed on to the Defendant Hess?
BOHLE: Sometimes yes and sometimes no. It depended upon the nature of
the information. If it was information on foreign policy it was, of
course, sent to another office.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were in fact acting as a pool of
information, were you not? Let me explain myself: You were forwarding
information that you received, to the SS?
BOHLE: Sometimes, yes; if not to the SS then probably...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: To the Foreign Office?
BOHLE: Sometimes also to the Foreign Office.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And to the Abwehr, were you not?
BOHLE: Very seldom, but it happened occasionally.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say very seldom. Did you not have a liaison
officer attached to your organization from the Abwehr?
BOHLE: No. I had only one assistant who maintained an unofficial
connection with the Abwehr, if the occasion arose.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps we are talking about the same
gentleman. Did you not have a Captain Schmauss attached to your head
office in Berlin?
BOHLE: Mr. Schmauss has never been a captain but he was a political
leader and honorary SS-leader. In the Army, I believe he was a sergeant.
Moreover, he did not come from the Abwehr; he was chief of personnel of
the Auslands-Organisation and his function as liaison was purely
unofficial.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say he was not a liaison officer between
your organization and the Abwehr?
BOHLE: No, he was not an officer at all. He was not a member of the
Wehrmacht.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I do not want to quibble with you about his
rank. Was he, in effect, whatever he was, acting in a capacity of
liaison between you and the Abwehr?
BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, in addition to the information
that Hess obtained through your system of reporting, that is, the
Auslands-Organisation, did he also obtain information from those
organizations which were dealing with the Volksdeutsche, that is to say,
non-German citizens, racial Germans abroad who were not members of your
organization, because you allowed only German citizens to become members
of your organization. But others—Volksdeutsche, I think you call
them—did Hess receive information from other sources about their
activities?
BOHLE: I could not say, because I did not discuss it with Hess, and the
affairs of the Volksdeutsche were entirely out of my field.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Dr. Karl Haushofer was for some time in 1938
and 1939 president of the VDA, was he not?
BOHLE: I believe so.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Which was an organization dealing with the
activities of the Volksdeutsche in foreign countries. Is that correct?
BOHLE: Yes, I believe so. I am not familiar with this field.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And, as you know, Hess and Karl Haushofer were
great friends, were they not?
BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Haushofer had been Hess’ pupil at Munich
University; did you know that?
BOHLE: It was the other way around.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you not know that Hess received information
from Haushofer as to the activities of these other organizations?
BOHLE: No, I know nothing about it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, I do not want to catch you out. Is
that your answer? Are you being honest to this Tribunal?
BOHLE: No. I wanted to add that the Deputy of the Führer very
painstakingly separated the “Auslandsdeutsche,” that is, citizens of the
Reich who worked abroad, and the “Volksdeutsche,” and with equal care he
made certain that I should have nothing to do with the question of
Volksdeutsche. Therefore I knew nothing of these matters.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Hess as Deputy to the Führer was in fact in
charge of all matters concerning Germanism abroad; was he not?
BOHLE: Yes, that is so, because he was born abroad. However, to my
knowledge, he did not take charge of these matters in his capacity as
Deputy to the Führer. I do not believe that there was any connection.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling the Tribunal that just because
he was born in a foreign country he had charge of all matters concerning
Germanism abroad?
BOHLE: I believe so, because any other Reichsleiter of the Party might
just as well have taken care of these matters. However, I assume that
Hess took over these functions simply because he was familiar with
foreign countries.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to be quite clear. Whatever the reason
was, he in fact did have charge of them. That is your evidence?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I just want to remind you of a passage in
your interrogation in this building on the 9th of November. Do you
remember that you were interrogated on the 9th...
BOHLE: [_Interposing._]: September?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On 9 November last.
BOHLE: November, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were interrogated by a Lieutenant Martin,
the afternoon of that day.
BOHLE: By Lieutenant Martin, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me read a short extract from the transcript
of that interrogation and ask you whether, in fact, it is correct. You
were being asked about the information which came back through the
Auslands-Organisation.
“Question: ‘He would have to rely on you for his information on
matters of that kind?’
“Answer: ‘Not entirely; I think Hess had a great many
connections in Hamburg through which he obtained information
which he did not relay to me.’
“Question: ‘What were his connections in Hamburg?’
“Answer: ‘The shipping companies.’
“Question: ‘Rather like your Landesgruppenleiter instructions in
Romania?’
“Answer: ‘I think he knew a number of people there. I have
always been convinced that he knew them.’
“Question: ‘Is that Helferich?’
“Answer: ‘Helferich was one, but then there were many people
from whom he received information. I believe from Professor
Haushofer, his old teacher, with whom he was very friendly. But
he always made it a point not to inform us of anything that
concerned the Volksdeutsche; he said, “It is not your affair at
all.”’”
Is that correct?
BOHLE: That is quite correct, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And as you have said it there, is that a
correct description of the position that Hess was in with regard to
information from abroad, from agents abroad? Does that correctly state
the facts as they were?
BOHLE: So far as I can see, it is probably correct. I myself can judge
only to the extent to which the reports concerned the
Auslands-Organisation. About the others I can make only a guess; I
cannot give definite information, because I was not acquainted with
them.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps I might
get the exhibits in order, the ones that I have referred to.
The Yearbook of the Auslands-Organisation from which the stories about
Norway and Greece came, becomes Exhibit GB-284. The two translations
that you have are numbered Documents M-153 and M-156, both of which
become Exhibit GB-284.
The secret wireless telegram, which was Document Number M-158, becomes
Exhibit GB-285; and the letter from Landesgruppenleiter Konradi, which
was Document Number 3796-PS, becomes Exhibit GB-286.
BOHLE: May I add something to a point which was brought up by the
British cross-examination?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
BOHLE: May I begin?
THE PRESIDENT: You may give a short explanation. You are not here to
make a speech.
BOHLE: No, I do not want to make a speech. I merely wish to say the
following on the question of secret transmitters which was brought up
this morning: Although I am not familiar with the technique of these
secret transmitters, I assume that a secret transmitter would be of use
in a foreign country only if there were a receiving set in Berlin.
I am quite certain that to my knowledge there was never such a receiving
set, either in my office in Berlin or in any other office of the
Auslands-Organisation, and therefore I may assume that such a receiving
set did not exist.
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United
States): Do you recall being interrogated on 11 September 1945, by
Colonel Brundage?
BOHLE: Yes.
COL. AMEN: I want to read you a few questions and answers from your
interrogation and ask you whether you recall being asked those questions
and having made those answers:
“Question: ‘Now, when you started, your immediate superior was
who?’
“Answer: ‘Rudolf Hess, until 1941 when he left for England.’
“Question: ‘Who succeeded him?’
“Answer: ‘Martin Bormann. Martin Bormann automatically succeeded
Hess, but he did not really fill Hess’ position, because Hess
had been born abroad in Egypt, while Martin Bormann understood
nothing about foreign affairs. He paid no attention to them at
all, but of course, he was my superior.’
“Question: ‘But he was nominally your chief?’
“Answer: ‘He was technically my chief, but he gave me no orders,
directives or similar instructions, because he did not
understand anything about these things.’
“Question: ‘So that everything that was done in your office, you
would say you were responsible for?’
“Answer: ‘Absolutely.’
“Question: ‘And you are willing to accept the responsibility for
that?’
“Answers ‘Naturally.’”
Do you remember being asked those questions and having made those
answers?
BOHLE: That is absolutely correct.
COL. AMEN: And were those answers true when you made them?
BOHLE: Absolutely true.
COL. AMEN: And are they still true today?
BOHLE: They are still true.
COL. AMEN: So that you accept responsibility for everything which your
office was conducting, is that true?
BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.
COL. AMEN: Who was Von Strempel?
BOHLE: Von Strempel was, I believe, counsellor to a secretary of a
legation (Gesandtschaftsrat) in the foreign office, but I do not know
him very well.
COL. AMEN: Was he not the first secretary of the German Embassy in the
United States from 1938 until Pearl Harbor?
BOHLE: I cannot say definitely. I knew him only slightly and had
absolutely no contact with him.
COL. AMEN: Well, he was interrogated with respect to the support of the
German-American Bund by the Auslands-Organisation prior to 1938, and I
want to read you just one or two questions and answers which he made and
ask you whether they conform to your understanding of the facts. Do you
understand?
BOHLE: Yes.
COL. AMEN: “Question: ‘Was the German-American Bund supported by
the Auslands-Organisation?’
“Answer: ‘I am positive that it was connected with the foreign
section of the Party. For example, the Bund received
instructions from the Party on how to build up their political
organization, how, where, and when to hold mass meetings and how
to handle their propaganda. Personally, I do not know whether it
received financial support.’”
Does that conform with your understanding of the facts?
BOHLE: No, that is a completely false representation. The
Auslands-Organisation gave no financial support whatever and had no
connection with the German-American Bund. I have stated that clearly in
many interrogations here in Nuremberg, and have signed an affidavit to
that effect.
COL. AMEN: I know you have. So that if Von Strempel has sworn that that
is a fact, your testimony is that he was not telling the truth. Is that
correct?
BOHLE: I am of the opinion that if Von Strempel was legation secretary,
or secretary of another office, he could not have known of the matter
and he therefore testified about something which was not quite clear to
him. In any event, what he said is not true.
COL. AMEN: Are you familiar with the fact that in 1938 an order was
issued prohibiting members of the German embassies and consulates to
continue relations or connections with the Bund?
BOHLE: It was a general order for German citizens abroad to resign from
the Bund if they were members. But as far as I know, that order was
issued some years previously about 1935 or 1936, by the Deputy of the
Führer upon my request.
DR. SEIDL: I object to this question; it has no connection with the
evidence for which the witness Bohle was called. During his direct
examination he was not questioned on any subject which has the slightest
relation to the question of the activity of the German-American Bund. I
do not believe that this form of interrogation is designed to test the
witness, as it has not the slightest bearing on the subject.
COL. AMEN: It seems to me to have a very direct bearing on whether or
not this organization was engaged in espionage work abroad and within
the United States.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly; in the opinion of the Tribunal the questions
are perfectly proper.
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that in spite of that order the foreign
section of the Nazi Party nevertheless continued to support the Bund?
BOHLE: No, I was not aware of that and I consider it to be impossible.
COL. AMEN: Now I would like to read you one or two further extracts from
the interrogation of Strempel and ask you whether these statements
conform with your knowledge of the facts:
“Question: ‘Did the foreign section of the Party continue to
support the Bund after the order you mentioned before was
issued?’
“Answer: ‘I am sure that Mr. Draeger, consul in New York City
and representative of the foreign section of the Party, did
continue to have relations with Bund officials.’”
Does that conform with your recollection of the facts?
BOHLE: No. In my opinion, that does not correspond to the facts.
Naturally, I cannot say whether the consul, Dr. Draeger, maintained his
contacts against my order, but there was an imperative order to withdraw
completely from the Bund, because from the very beginning I objected
strenuously to the activities of the Bund and was supported in my
objections by the Deputy of the Führer.
COL. AMEN: You were acquainted with Draeger, were you not?
BOHLE: Yes.
COL. AMEN: What was his position in the United States, insofar as your
organization was concerned?
BOHLE: He was a liaison man (Vertrauensmann) of the
Auslands-Organisation for the individual Party members in the United
States.
COL. AMEN: He was what was known as a confidential agent, was he not?
BOHLE: No, he was not, naturally, but we had...
COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, you called him a “confidential
agent” in your interrogation, did you not?
BOHLE: No. I called him a “Vertrauensmann,” and this was translated into
“confidence man.” I did...
COL. AMEN: Well, I will accept that correction. He was a confidence man
for your organization in the United States. Correct?
BOHLE: Correct, yes, that is true.
COL. AMEN: And in addition to him there were other confidence men of
your organization in the United States? Correct?
BOHLE: Yes, correct.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what their names were and where
they were located?
BOHLE: One was Wiedemann, consul general in San Francisco. There was
also Consul Dr. Gissling in Los Angeles and Consul Von Spiegel in New
Orleans I believe, but I do not know; perhaps it was Boston. It was one
of the two. I believe these are all.
COL. AMEN: And each of those individuals made reports from time to time
which were forwarded to you through Draeger. Is that not a fact?
BOHLE: No, they made no reports to me. I cannot recall that I ever saw a
report from Wiedemann, Spiegel, or Gissling. That was not their job.
COL. AMEN: Draeger made the reports to you, did he not?
BOHLE: Draeger made the reports to the Auslands-Organisation in Berlin
or to me personally. Mostly to my office.
COL. AMEN: And contained in those reports were various items of
information collected by other confidential agents? Isn’t that correct?
BOHLE: I do not know, because I am not familiar with these reports and I
cannot say whether there was anything to report. We had no Party
organization in the United States, because it had been dissolved by
Rudolf Hess in April 1933.
COL. AMEN: So you say; but you nevertheless had an individual in Germany
whose duty it was to read and pass upon these reports from Draeger as
they came in. Is that not a fact?
BOHLE: So far as I know, and I believe my information is correct; the
reports that we received were of a purely technical nature. We merely
had few Party members in the United States whose card index and
membership fees had to be looked after in order to preserve their
privileges as Party members. Political activity in the United States was
forbidden and did not actually exist.
COL. AMEN: But I am suggesting to you that in spite of the order the
activities of your organization nevertheless continued. Now, is it not a
fact that there was an individual in your organization in Germany who
received these reports from the United States regularly?
BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe, who...
COL. AMEN: I beg your pardon?
BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe.
COL. AMEN: Correct. Why didn’t you tell me that before when I asked you
about the individual who read these reports from the United States as
they came in?
BOHLE: Please repeat the question. I did not fully understand it.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will withdraw that question. After Grothe received
these reports from the United States regularly, to whom did he report
the substance of those reports?
BOHLE: So far as I know, he usually kept them, because they contained
nothing of interest and he himself was not in a position to use them.
Mr. Grothe had an honorary position with us because of his advanced age
and took over this branch of the office because it was of no importance
at all in the Auslands-Organisation.
COL. AMEN: So that you were in no position to know what was contained in
those reports? Is that correct?
BOHLE: That is for the most part correct.
COL. AMEN: So you do not know whether they were important or not and you
do not know whether they contained information relative to espionage
matters or not. Is that correct?
BOHLE: I am sure that if they had contained such information, Grothe
would have submitted them to me.
COL. AMEN: Well, outside of that, you have no knowledge of it
whatsoever. Is that correct?
BOHLE: That is correct.
COL. AMEN: Now, let me just read you one or two more excerpts from the
interrogation of Von Strempel:
“Question: ‘These relationships seem to have violated the order
you mentioned before. Did you report these violations to the
Foreign Office?’
“Answer: ‘Yes, several times. In reports that I drafted for
Thomsen when I was in the Embassy, we called the attention of
Berlin to the fact that this relationship to the Bund was very
detrimental... and stated that the continued support of the Bund
by the foreign section of the Party was harming diplomatic
relations with the United States.’
“Question: ‘What action was taken in Berlin to halt the
activities of which you complained?’
“Answer: ‘I know of no action.’”
Does that conform to your knowledge of the facts?
BOHLE: I have not the slightest idea of this report by Herr Von Thomsen.
This is the first time that I have heard of protests from the Embassy in
Washington regarding prohibited connections between Dr. Draeger and the
Bund.
COL. AMEN: You know who Thomsen was, do you not?
BOHLE: Thomsen was Chargé d’Affaires in Washington.
COL. AMEN: And you know that from time to time various officials of the
Bund came over here and had conferences with representatives of your
organization and of the Führer, do you not?
BOHLE: I have heard that they visited the Führer but they did not visit
me and we had no conferences of any description.
COL. AMEN: I did not say with you. I said with representatives of your
office; perhaps your friend, Mr. Grothe?
BOHLE: That might be possible but I cannot say definitely because he did
not report to me on this matter. They could not have discussed any
official matters with Grothe, because he knew very well that I
completely repudiated the activities of the German Volksbund in America.
COL. AMEN: In any event, however, you accept responsibility for
everything which was done in your organization. Correct?
BOHLE: Naturally.
THE PRESIDENT: Do either of the other Chief Prosecutors wish to
cross-examine? [_There was no response._] Then, Dr. Seidl, you can
re-examine if you wish.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have already answered a question that I intended
to ask you, that is, that there was no secret transmitter in Germany
which would have been in a position to broadcast secret communications
to foreign countries. I ask you now, did you yourself have a transmitter
in Germany?
BOHLE: I myself had no transmitter.
DR. SEIDL: Did the Auslands-Organisation have such a transmitter?
BOHLE: I consider that to be absolutely impossible; if there had been
one, I would have known of it. I never saw one.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that in order to communicate with Germans
overseas by radio you yourself did not use code on the German network?
BOHLE: That is correct.
DR. SEIDL: You stated previously that the Deputy of the Führer, Hess,
was your immediate superior?
BOHLE: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Were the directives given to you by the Deputy of the Führer
of a general nature, or did he go into the details of the work of the
Auslands-Organisation?
BOHLE: The Deputy of the Führer gave only general directives and left
all the details to me because I had his complete confidence. In his
general directives he impressed upon me repeatedly in the sharpest terms
the fact that it was my duty to avoid any measures by the
Auslands-Organisation that might be detrimental to foreign relations.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. SEIDL: Your Honors, before I go on to my next witness—that is the
witness Strölin—I should like to submit the suggestion or rather the
application to the Tribunal that the affidavit of the witness Gaus be
handled in the same way as the interrogation of the witness Bohle. Gaus
has already been admitted as a witness for another defendant. However,
the Defense Counsel for the other defendant waived his right to call
this witness. The situation is the same as it was in the case of Bohle;
therefore it would be preferable, in my opinion, to hear the witness
Gaus now and to read his sworn statement to him during his examination
as has been done in other cases, for instance in the case of Blaha.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet and submitted in
the various languages to the Chief Prosecutors?
DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the translation is complete. At any
rate, this noon I submitted six copies of the affidavit to the
Translation Division.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell me, Sir David or Colonel Pokrovsky?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not seen this affidavit, and, My
Lord, with regard to the last one, we got it hurriedly translated into
English, but it was only by the kindness of my Soviet colleagues, who
allowed the matter to go on without a Russian translation and left it to
my delegation to deal with, that the matter went on. Otherwise, my
Soviet colleagues would have asked the Tribunal to have it put back.
It is very difficult when these affidavits are sought to be put in at
the last minute without having given us a chance of seeing them.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky could tell me whether he has
seen this affidavit or had it translated yet.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.):
Members of the Tribunal, I fully share the viewpoint of Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe. It appears to me absolutely unacceptable to have this
document presented immediately to the Tribunal.
If I understood Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe correctly, he did not receive
this affidavit. The Soviet delegation is in the same position. Besides,
I would like to remind you that the question of this witness has already
been discussed, that it has been definitely solved, and it seems to me
there are no grounds for a further revision of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal considers that the course which
must be taken is that that affidavit must be translated and submitted to
the Tribunal for their consideration, for this witness was allowed to
the Defendant Ribbentrop, I think, and then he withdrew his application
for the witness. You have not applied for the witness Gaus, and I would
point out to you and to the other counsel for the defendants that it is
very inconvenient that documents of this sort—after all the question of
witnesses and documents has been thoroughly gone into by the
Tribunal—should be presented at the last moment and without any
translation whatever. But we will not go into it now, and it must be
translated and submitted to the Tribunal in the three languages.
DR. SEIDL: Perhaps I might make one short remark in regard to the last
point. Up to now I was always under the impression that a formal
application to call a witness would not be necessary in the case of a
witness who has already been admitted by the Tribunal for another
defendant. That was undoubtedly so in the case of Gaus who was named as
a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. Consequently I had no reason
to make a formal application, since I would have the opportunity to
interrogate the witness in cross-examination anyhow.
I have just been informed by counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop
that, as his representative said last Saturday, he will forego calling
the witness Gaus, and now I, in turn, apply to call Ambassador Dr. Gaus
as witness regarding the statements in his sworn affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean by saying you call him. You
can apply to call him if you like, but you do not call him until you
apply.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: When we have seen this document, we will determine the
question.
DR. SEIDL: The next witness admitted by the Tribunal for the Defendant
Hess is the witness Karl Strölin. In order to save time I have also
prepared an affidavit for this witness, and I ask the Tribunal to inform
me whether we will follow the same procedure with this witness as with
the witness Bohle, or whether the Prosecution agree that only the
affidavit should be presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they seen the affidavit?
DR. SEIDL: I gave the affidavit to the Prosecution this morning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have got an English translation of the
affidavit. There are one or two questions the Prosecution want to put to
the witness, so I suggest that the most convenient course would be if
Dr. Seidl did as he did with the last witness, to read the affidavit,
and then after the affidavit is read, the few questions that the
Prosecution desire to be put can be put to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well.
COL. POKROVSKY: I must report to you, Mr. President, that as far as this
document is concerned, the Defense Counsel has violated the procedure
you have established; the Soviet Prosecution received this affidavit
only a very short time ago—about 1 or 2 hours ago—and it was not
received by us in Russian but in English. Therefore, I had the
opportunity of familiarizing myself with it only very slightly, and I
ask to have the presentation of this document postponed until such time
when the order of the Tribunal is complied with, in other words, not
until we have received our document in Russian.
THE PRESIDENT: But, Colonel Pokrovsky, in the interest of the time of
the Tribunal, wouldn’t it be better to get on with it now? Sir David has
apparently seen the affidavit and read it in English, and if he is
satisfied upon that, wouldn’t it be better to go on with it now rather
than to postpone it?
You see, Dr. Seidl has actually been allowed this witness, so that it is
only a question of time, doing it by way of an affidavit when he can
call him, and he can then ask him questions.
COL. POKROVSKY: I must repeat that I have familiarized myself with this
document very slightly. As far as I can understand, it is of no
particular interest to the Soviet Delegation; it is of greater interest
to the British Delegation...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you see the witness was allowed to Dr.
Seidl. Therefore, Dr. Seidl could have put him on the witness box and
could have asked him questions, and the only reason for doing it by way
of an affidavit is to get the matter more clearly and more quickly. So
if we were to order that this affidavit was not to be used, we should
then have Dr. Seidl asking the witness questions, and probably, I am
afraid, taking up rather longer than it would to read the affidavit, and
you would not object to that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps the Tribunal would find it advisable to have Dr.
Seidl ask the witness those questions which have already been answered
in the affidavit? It seems to me that that would give us an opportunity
to reconcile this contradiction, especially since there are only a few
questions, and the first three, as far as I can understand, are mostly
of a historical nature and connected with the organization of the
Institute in Stuttgart in 1917.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have not read the affidavit yet so I
am afraid I am not in a position to present the question which you wish
me to present.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right, I withdraw my objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Call your witness then now.
[_The witness Strölin took the stand._]
What is your name?
KARL STRÖLIN (Witness): Karl Strölin.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were last Lord Mayor of the City of Stuttgart;
is that correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: In this capacity were you also Honorary President of the
German Auslands-Institut?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: You signed a sworn affidavit this morning which I shall now
read to you.
“1. The German Auslands-Institut was founded in Stuttgart in the
year 1917. The fact that Stuttgart was chosen as the seat of
this institute is connected with the fact that the Swabian
district has always furnished a particularly high percentage of
emigrants. That is precisely why there arose in Stuttgart the
need to create an institution for the purpose of preserving the
national ties between the old and the new homeland. The German
Auslands-Institut was to serve this purpose. It had the
following aims:
“(a) Scientific research on Germanism in the world.
“(b) Maintaining cultural connections with the emigrants.
“(c) Informing the people at home about Germanism abroad and
about foreign countries.
“For scientific research the German Auslands-Institut had a
library of more than one hundred thousand volumes on folklore
and an archive for newspaper files concerning Germanism abroad.
For this purpose nearly all newspapers which were published
abroad in the German language and a large number of newspapers
in foreign languages were subscribed to and their contents
evaluated. An extensive collection of pictures was in one filing
room. As the Germans abroad became increasingly interested in
the homeland, genealogical research took on ever greater
proportions.
“In addition to its activities of collecting and registering,
the German Auslands-Institut also had advisory and
representative functions. The question of emigration was also a
subject for consultation for a long time. This required that the
German Auslands-Institut be informed regarding the living
conditions and the possibility of finding employment in the
individual areas favored by emigrants. The records of the German
Auslands-Institut were placed at the disposal of the various
offices and organizations upon request. The representative
activities of the German Auslands-Institut consisted mainly in
organizing exhibitions. The center of this activity was the
Museum of Germandom Abroad, in Stuttgart.
“The scientific work of the German Auslands-Institut found
expression particularly in the books, magazines, and calendars
about the homeland which it published. The connections with the
Germans abroad were maintained by sending out such publications.
The guiding thought of the German Auslands-Institut in its
relations with the Germans abroad was that these Germans abroad
were to be the connecting links between nations in order to
strengthen mutual understanding and the desire for co-operation.
They were to be the envoys of friendship between their old and
their new homeland.
“As President of the German Auslands-Institut, I particularly
emphasized this thought in the speech which I made at Madison
Square Garden in New York City in October 1936 on the occasion
of German Day. Moreover the German Auslands-Institut had no
agencies or representatives abroad acting as liaison for these
corresponding members. Direct or individual care for Germans
abroad was not the task of the German Auslands-Institut. The
welfare of German nationals abroad was taken care of by the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. Relations with the
Volksdeutsche were maintained by the Volksbund für das
Deutschtum im Ausland (League For Germans Abroad).
“2. The German Auslands-Institut never engaged in any activities
which could be termed Fifth Column activities. No one has ever
made a request of this nature to me or to the Institut.
“3. Rudolf Hess, the Deputy of the Führer, did not exert any
influence on the activities of the Institute. He issued no
directives or instructions which could have induced the
Institute to undertake any activity along the lines of Fifth
Column work.”
Witness, are these statements correct?
STRÖLIN: These statements are correct.
DR. SEIDL: I have at the moment no further questions to direct to the
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions of this witness?
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath):
Witness, with the permission of the Tribunal I should like to ask you a
few questions.
First, from when to when were you Lord Mayor of Stuttgart?
STRÖLIN: From 1933 until the end of the war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how long have you known the Defendant Von
Neurath? What was his position at that time and what was his reputation?
STRÖLIN: I have known Herr Von Neurath since the first World War. At
that time, at the end of the first World War, he was Chief of the
Cabinet of the King of Württemberg, and his reputation was excellent. In
my capacity as Lord Mayor I met Herr Von Neurath frequently. In 1938 Von
Neurath became an honorary citizen of the city of Stuttgart.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you enter in still closer relations with him
later when he returned from Czechoslovakia?
STRÖLIN: When he returned from Czechoslovakia Herr Von Neurath retired
to his estate of Leinfelden in the vicinity of Stuttgart, and here I had
closer and more active connection with him.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about his ancestry, his family,
his education, his personality, in general?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath comes from an old Swabian family. His father was
Lord Chamberlain of the King of Württemberg. His grandfather and his
great-grandfather were ministers. Von Neurath was very much respected as
a high-minded character, a distinguished personality, always ready to
help, extraordinarily humane, very conscientious, straightforward and
frank.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During his activity as Foreign Minister and
possibly later, did you have an opportunity to discuss politics with him
and particularly his views on foreign policy?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath repeatedly discussed these matters with me, but of
course, only in general terms. As Reich Foreign Minister he was
convinced that Germany would succeed in getting by peaceful means the
place in the world which she deserved. He rejected any other way. He
strove to build up and strengthen relations of mutual confidence with
other European powers, particularly with England. He was convinced that
it was precisely in this field that he had done everything possible.
Later, I had occasion to examine with him Henderson’s book _Two Years
with Hitler_, which particularly emphasized how extremely popular Von
Neurath had been in London at that time. I recall that we also discussed
the sentence written by Henderson, that he acknowledged Von Neurath’s
honest devotion to peace and to peaceful and friendly relations with
England. Von Neurath was also greatly concerned with the cultivation of
better relations with the United States. I recall that he discussed the
subject with me after my trip to America and said that I had done well
to emphasize in my various speeches Germany’s desire for friendship with
the United States. I also remember how severely Von Neurath criticized
the tone of Hitler’s speech made in the beginning of 1939 in reply to
Roosevelt’s message. He said at that time that the international tension
had been increased by that speech. Then Von Neurath spoke of the Munich
Agreement, in which he had been an active participant. Later he very
frequently spoke of the tragedy that was implicit in the fact that,
despite all efforts, the relation between England and Germany had not
remained one of continuing confidence. He pointed out how tragic it was
for Europe and for the world. All my conversations with Von Neurath
convinced me that he desired an understanding and a peaceful settlement,
and that he would never have pursued a policy that might lead to war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the reasons for his appointment as an
honorary citizen of Stuttgart? This happened after he resigned his
office as Reich Foreign Minister, did it not?
STRÖLIN: He was appointed in 1938, on the occasion of his 65th birthday
on 2 February 1938. This appointment was to express to Von Neurath the
gratitude and appreciation not only of the people of Stuttgart but of
all Swabia for his manifest love of peace and the calm and prudence with
which he had conducted foreign affairs. It was also a token of respect
for his honest and incorruptible character.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, the British Prosecution assert that Herr
Von Neurath repeatedly assured foreign governments or their
representatives that Germany had no military or aggressive intentions
toward these states, but that these assurances were, in fact, given for
the sake of appearances, in order to lull these states into a false
sense of security, because even then Von Neurath knew and approved of
the fact that Hitler actually had aggressive intentions toward these
states.
From your knowledge of his personality do you consider Von Neurath
capable of such infamy?
STRÖLIN: No, I do not consider him capable of such action.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath inform you, at the time, of
his resignation from his position as Foreign Minister?
STRÖLIN: By chance, I was with Von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry on 4
February 1938 at the very moment when his resignation was accepted. He
described how this resignation came about. He said that until the end of
the year 1937 he had been convinced that Hitler was completely in
sympathy with the foreign policy which he was pursuing and that Hitler
as well as himself had not wanted to chance an armed conflict, but at
the end of 1937 Hitler had altogether unexpectedly changed his attitude;
he had suddenly struck a different note, and it was impossible to decide
whether it was to be taken seriously. Von Neurath went on to say that in
a personal conversation with Hitler he had attempted to persuade him to
give up this altered view, but that he had the impression that he had
lost his influence over Hitler, and this prompted him to submit his
resignation.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After, or rather simultaneously with his discharge
from the foreign ministry, Von Neurath was appointed President of the
Secret Cabinet Council. Do you know anything about this appointment—how
and why he received it and what he did in this capacity?
STRÖLIN: He received this appointment as President of the Secret Cabinet
Council at the same time that his resignation was accepted, but this
Cabinet never convened; this was also true of the Reich Cabinet. The
Secret Cabinet was to be convened by Hitler personally, and Hitler had
simply not done this. Von Neurath believed later that he had been
appointed to this post as president only in order to conceal from
foreign countries that the former Foreign Minister no longer had any
influence on the policy of the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, I do not see how this witness can know
whether the Secret Cabinet Council was ever called. In any event we have
already heard it from Göring, and presumably we shall hear it again from
the Defendant Von Neurath, in which case it is grossly cumulative. I do
not think we should waste the time of the Tribunal with it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you occasionally speak to Von Neurath
regarding his attitude and relations toward the Nazi Party?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath’s attitude toward the Party was critical and
disapproving; at first he disapproved and waited to see what would
develop. His relations with the Party were bad. The Party was of the
opinion that Von Neurath was not a National Socialist.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever discuss with him the policy of the
Nazis toward the Christian churches, that is, the Catholic and the
Protestant Church?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath was a faithful Christian and disapproved of the
policy of the Party toward the Christian churches. He particularly
supported Bishop Bohr’s efforts to maintain freedom of religion. He
repeatedly used his influence to see to it that seminaries which had
been requisitioned were released. Following a discussion with Von
Neurath I visited Minister for Churches Kerrl personally and discussed
with him the question of the policy toward the Church. I discovered that
Minister for Churches Kerrl was making every effort to represent and
carry out the ideas of positive Christianity. However, he did not
succeed because his work was continually sabotaged, particularly by
Himmler and Bormann.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Later, when Herr Von Neurath retired to his estate
of Leinfelden, did you discuss his activities as Reich Protector with
him?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath said that he took the post as Reich Protector in
Bohemia and Moravia most unwillingly, and that he had refused it twice,
but finally decided that he must make this sacrifice. He believed that
it was precisely there that he could act as an intermediary and bring
about reconciliation. He had personal difficulties with Himmler and
Frank; he told me of his efforts to gain better treatment for the
Czechs, and of the protests which he made to Hitler in vain. Once, when
I visited Von Neurath in Prague, I was invited to visit President Hacha,
who told me emphatically how pleased he was that Von Neurath had been
sent to Bohemia and Moravia, for he enjoyed fullest confidence and
performed in every respect a conciliatory function. Von Neurath told me
that he was recalled and replaced because in his treatment of the Czechs
he was too mild for the Führer, who preferred a particularly trustworthy
SS-leader in that position.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Who was to be appointed to that post?
STRÖLIN: That was Heydrich.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was that Herr Von Neurath’s reason for resigning?
STRÖLIN: Evidently.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, Von Neurath was also an Honorary
Gruppenführer of the SS. Did he tell you how he attained this—let us
say—honor?
STRÖLIN: He told me that he was appointed honorary leader of the SS
without having been consulted. When he asked the reason, Hitler told him
that Mussolini was soon to pay a visit and that he, Hitler, wanted
everyone in his attendance to wear a uniform. Since Von Neurath had no
uniform he appointed him an honorary leader of the SS. Von Neurath said
he did not intend to become one of Himmler’s subordinates. Thereupon
Hitler told him that that was not necessary; it was merely a question of
wearing a uniform.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward war?
STRÖLIN: On the first day of the war I saw Von Neurath to the railroad
station. He was depressed and rather dismayed. He called the war a
terrible disaster, a gamble with the existence of the nation. He said
that all his work from 1932 to 1938 had thereby been destroyed. I
understood that during the war he saw the Führer occasionally, and on
each such occasion he used the opportunity to ask Hitler to consider the
idea of peace. That he, Neurath...
THE PRESIDENT: How can the witness say this? He was not present at these
meetings; how can the witness tell us what the Defendant Von Neurath
said to the Führer?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As you will understand, that is what the defendant
told him. That was told the witness by the defendant directly.
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath told me so repeatedly. He told me...
THE PRESIDENT: It will be all extremely cumulative.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I do not believe so. The witness himself needs
only to corroborate this to the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal imagines that the
Defendant Von Neurath will give this evidence himself, and the Tribunal
does not wish to hear evidence from witnesses that was told to them.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, I shall dispense with any further
questions along those lines. I should like to ask only one more
question.
[_Turning to the witness._] Did not Von Neurath, with you and other
people, make an effort to put an end to the war and to the Hitler
regime, or at least consider the possibility of doing so?
Now these are facts that the witness knows from his own observation.
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath discussed this question with me on several
occasions after his return from Prague. He tried particularly to bring
about a meeting of the Reich Cabinet, as did the other ministers, but he
did not succeed, since Hitler disapproved of this Reich Cabinet as a
“defeatists’ club.” As a preliminary step for ending the war Von Neurath
tried to bring about a change of ministers and the appointment of a
Reich Chancellor, which was also widely demanded. This also failed.
During the year 1943 Neurath became more and more convinced...
THE PRESIDENT: This is the same thing over again—nothing about what Von
Neurath did but all about what Von Neurath said to this witness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I beg your pardon; these are only preliminary
remarks to clarify what is to follow.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had one last question?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, we come to that now. The question shows the
attempts he made to carry out his intentions.
STRÖLIN: When Von Neurath failed in his attempts at reform, that is,
when he saw that it had miscarried and that Hitler’s attitude was
negative and intransigent, Von Neurath came to the conviction, at the
beginning of 1944, that the saving of Germany from complete destruction
must not be wrecked because of Hitler. He considered the question of how
to speak to Hitler once more and persuade him to end the war. He thought
of Field Marshal Rommel and asked me to discuss the matters with him.
Rommel was at that time very popular in Germany and abroad, and Von
Neurath believed that due to the position he held, Rommel was the right
person to replace Hitler, if necessary. In the beginning of March 1944,
I went to Field Marshal Rommel and discussed the matter with him. Rommel
was just as critical of the situation. I knew him from the first World
War, so that I could speak to him frankly. He was also of the opinion
that if the war could not be won on a military basis, unnecessary
bloodshed and senseless destruction...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, we really do not want all this
conversation between this witness and Rommel. We do not want it. We will
not hear the conversation between this witness and Rommel.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Nor do I want the witness to discuss this matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you stop him then? Why don’t you stop him?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not want to hear it from the defendant
himself, but from the person who was employed by the defendant to take
these steps. That in my opinion has more weight than if the defendant
makes the statement himself. That is why I asked the witness about it.
But it is almost finished now.
THE PRESIDENT: When we come to the defendant then we will not hear him
on these subjects.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, that is not intended—moreover, as far as I
know, the matter will be finished with just a few words. Please,
Witness.
STRÖLIN: Upon Von Neurath’s instigation, Rommel wrote a letter to Hitler
saying that because of the military situation he believed that it would
not be possible to continue the war, and that he, Rommel, suggested to
Hitler that he start political negotiations. Consequently, as he told
me, after his accident Rommel fell from favor for this reason, and thus
Von Neurath’s attempt to end the war with Rommel’s aid also failed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then came 20 July and soon afterwards the end.
I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask
questions of this witness?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May the witness be handed GB-262 (Document
Number 3258-PS). My Lord, that is the same document of which an extract
has already been handed up to the Tribunal while I was cross-examining
the last witness.
Witness, I want to be quite clear as to what you say about the Deutsches
Auslands-Institut. Do you say that that institute had no connection with
either Hess or the Auslands-Organisation?
STRÖLIN: The Deutsches Auslands-Institut had no connection with Hess.
The connection with the Auslands-Organisation was due to the fact that
the Auslands-Organisation had its meetings at Stuttgart.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So that the fact that the Auslands-Organisation
and the Deutsches Auslands-Institut both had their meetings at
Stuttgart, that is the only connection between the two organizations; is
that so?
STRÖLIN: The Auslands-Organisation, to my knowledge, did not consult the
German Auslands-Institut on practical matters, for it had its own
collection of material. The Auslands-Organisation was, as far as I know,
created in the year ’32, and...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I do not want to stop you, but if you can
answer my question “yes” or “no” it will save us all a great deal of
time. I will repeat my question in case you are not quite clear about
it. Do you say that the fact that both those organizations held their
meeting in Stuttgart is the only connection between the two? Now you can
answer that “yes” or “no.”
STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that with “yes” or “no.” I must say that the
connecting link was the fact that Stuttgart was the city of foreign
Germans and so to speak the representative of Germans abroad, because of
its past history.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you read English?
STRÖLIN: A little.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 461 of the book that you
have? At the bottom of Page 461 you will see reproduced a copy of an
article from the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ of 21 September 1933.
The Tribunal will find the extract on Page 4 of the translation.
That article describes the annual meeting of your institution, after its
reorganization in 1933 when the Nazi Party came to power. I want to read
just four short extracts from that article 2 and ask you for your
comments.
“The chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut, Lord Mayor,
Dr. Strölin, opened the celebration.”
That is yourself presumably; is that so?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Among those present, he greeted in
particular, Minister President and Minister of Religion in
Württemberg, Mergenthaler, as the representative of the
supervisory authorities; General Haushofer of Munich as
representative of Rudolf Hess, who has been entrusted by the
Führer with the supreme direction of all matters concerning
Germans in foreign countries....”
Did you say that?
STRÖLIN: I cannot remember having said that. Haushofer was for me the
representative of the VDA, and I cannot conceive how he could have been
the deputy of Hess at this occasion. However, it is probably true.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think the Tribunal is safe in taking it
that the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ on the day after that celebration
would accurately report what you said in your opening address?
You need not look at the rest of it for the moment. It is not likely
that that article is untrue or incorrect, is it?
STRÖLIN: No, the article is probably correct, but I did not
remember—now looking back—that Haushofer was at that time the deputy
of Hess, for Rudolf Hess had no connection with the Deutsches
Auslands-Institut as such.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It appears that you are saying there, and you
are saying it in a speech, that Haushofer is representing Hess, and that
Hess has been charged by the Führer with the supreme command of all
matters concerning Germans in foreign countries. Do you understand what
you are saying there?
STRÖLIN: Yes, it may have been put that way at that time, but in
practice, it never happened that I received a directive of any kind from
Rudolf Hess.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Your institution could correctly be said to
concern itself in matters concerning Germans in foreign countries, could
it not?
STRÖLIN: I did not understand the question.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your institution, the Deutsches
Auslands-Institut, concern itself in matters concerning Germans in
foreign countries?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I shall leave that. Will you look
down the page and omit the next...
STRÖLIN: I would like to add to this point. It was the first time that I
made a speech for the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the speech was, of
course drafted with the approval of the personalities who were to be
welcomed there. I cannot longer remember that Haushofer was present in
that capacity on that occasion and can merely repeat my statement that
as the honorary president of the Institute I know nothing of Rudolf Hess
having given directives to the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may have known nothing about it, but you
were the new chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut at that time,
were you not?
STRÖLIN: No, I was not the chairman. The chairman of the Institute was a
special leader. In my capacity as Lord Mayor it was merely one of my
many extra duties to act as president of the Institute. It is quite
impossible for me to remember which personalities I greeted at the time,
and how I did it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Please confine yourself to answering the
particular question I put to you: Were you or were you not the chairman
of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut on 20 September 1933?
STRÖLIN: Yes, I was appointed to that position at that time.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had just been appointed because you were a
good Nazi and the Nazi Party had come to power and was reorganizing this
institution.
STRÖLIN: I was appointed to this post because I was Lord Mayor of
Stuttgart and because later the city of Stuttgart was called the “City
of Germans Abroad” since, because of its history and tradition it had
always had very close connection with Germans abroad.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, now, we will go on. Will you miss
out the next short paragraph and look at the paragraph which starts off,
“Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing Dr. Goebbels, stated the local
Party leadership...”
STRÖLIN: What page is that on?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is on the same page.
STRÖLIN: Page 461?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, it is on Page 462. And it is
the third paragraph in the center of the page.
STRÖLIN: Yes, I found the place.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing
Dr. Goebbels, stated, ‘The local Party leadership (Gauleitung)
is prepared to co-operate through thick and thin with the new
officers of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.’”
Hess, you know, was in charge of the Party leadership, wasn’t he—the
Gauleiter? We will go on:
“National Socialism will demand the blood unity of all Germans
as its historic right.”
Will you look now at Page 463—we will leave that—Will you look now...
STRÖLIN: May I say something in connection with this?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you please, yes.
STRÖLIN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Schmidt, was here purely in his capacity
as a deputy of the Gauleiter, but he was not the Deputy of Rudolf Hess.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No. But the point I am putting—I will make it
quite clear—is that the Gauleitung which came under Hess was going to
co-operate with your institution through thick and thin. You appreciate
that?
STRÖLIN: That is obvious.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Page 463, and on the second
paragraph:
“In his address the new director of the DAI, Dr. Csaki, stated:
‘We followed with deep distress the inner disunity of the German
people. Now since all that has been overcome, since we see that
all the German Folk (Volksdeutsche) organizations are standing
in one line, we are filled with a feeling of pride for our
German mother-country, a feeling of happiness: Germany is
united.’
“‘The feeling of adherence to the German people gives us a happy
consciousness. In the course of centuries this or that position
has been lost. We must prevent any from being lost. It gives us
a feeling of pride and self-confidence that we are bridges for
the German Lebensraum.’”
Was that in fact what the purpose of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut
was?
STRÖLIN: Dr. Csaki said in this quotation that the Germans abroad were
bridges to the German Lebensraum. This German Lebensraum also applied,
for instance, to the Germans in Hungary and Romania and to that extent
it is true when he says the Germans are “bridges” to this Lebensraum,
that is, the space in which Germans live. This has also always been the
attitude of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut; to build bridges to the
Lebensraum in which these Germans live.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, have you ever read a book by
Dr. Emil Ehrlich, or seen it, entitled: _Die Auslands-Organisation der
NSDAP_? You need not look at that. Have you ever read that book? A title
of that kind?
STRÖLIN: I do not think so.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that Dr. Emil Ehrlich was the
personal adviser to Bohle?
STRÖLIN: I believe he was Bohle’s adjutant at one time.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 305 of the book that you
have in front of you—My Lord, this passage appears on Page 5 of the
document the Tribunal has—and that is a reproduction of Dr. Emil
Ehrlich’s book. Would you look at the second paragraph on Page 305, half
way down that paragraph, starting:
“On 27 August 1936 the Führer designated Stuttgart as the ‘City
of Germans Abroad,’ and the Gauleiter of the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP assumed protection of this
beautiful city, which also houses within its walls the German
Auslands-Institut, which works in hearty co-operation with the
Auslands-Organisation.”
Would I be right in saying that throughout the whole history, from 1933
onwards, the Deutsches Auslands-Institut was working in the heartiest
co-operation with the Auslands-Organisation?
STRÖLIN: This is not correct, inasmuch as there was no practical or
scientific co-operation between the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the
Auslands-Organisation. The hearty co-operation, as I have already
mentioned, referred to the fact that the Ausland Germans had their
meetings in Stuttgart. That was the hearty co-operation between them.
There was no co-operation in practical matters since it was not
necessary.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 127 of this book? I want
you to tell me, looking at the last paragraph, whether that is an
accurate report, “All persons who in the future...” this is, I beg your
pardon, a confidential report on the special schooling work conducted by
the DAI for the foreign organizations. You did in fact, did you not,
assist the foreign organizations in training their Landesgruppenleiter
and other leaders abroad?
STRÖLIN: May I ask who signed this article or report?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I cannot tell you who signed that report. I
asked you a question. Did the Deutsches Auslands-Institut assist in
training leaders for the Auslands-Organisation abroad?
STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just turn over to Page 128, second
paragraph, which I read to you quite shortly:
“The Auslands-Institut plays a part in determining the
curriculum for the training camps (Schulungslager) as well as
serving as an intermediary between the party authorities who run
these camps and the Germans from abroad who attend them.”
You still say that that report is...
STRÖLIN: May I ask the date of this report?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I told you it is a report...
STRÖLIN: I had no knowledge of this report.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I just want to ask you one or two
very short questions on the evidence that you have given about the
Defendant Von Neurath. You have told us that he was a man of peace, with
an excellent, kind character. Do you know that on the 5th of November
1937 he attended a meeting at which Hitler addressed the leaders of his
Armed Forces? Did you ever hear of that meeting, on the 5th of November
1937?
STRÖLIN: No, I did not hear of this meeting, at least not until I was
imprisoned.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well then, perhaps I could tell you quite
shortly what took place. Hitler said at the meeting, among other things,
that the only way out of the German difficulties was to secure greater
living space, and he said that that problem could be solved only by
force. And, having said that, he then went on to say that he had decided
to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia. You never heard of that meeting?
STRÖLIN: No, I have not heard anything of that meeting, and concluded
only later that...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But...
STRÖLIN: May I finish my sentence?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know...
STRÖLIN: I said just that Von Neurath indicated to me that he had
serious differences of opinion with Hitler. That was toward the end of
1937. It was only later that I realized that he must have meant the
conference with Hitler and the attitude which he took on 5 November;
however, it was only when I was in prison that I heard through the
newspapers that such a conference actually took place.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I shall come to all that in a moment. I just
want you to get a picture of what happened at this meeting, and I quote
four lines from the minutes of that meeting:
“Hitler believed that very probably England and presumably
France had already secretly abandoned Czechoslovakia and were
satisfied that this question would one day be cleared up by
Germany.”
And Hitler then went on to say that the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and
Austria would constitute a conquest of food for 5 or 6 million people,
and that he visualized the compulsory immigration of 2 million people
from Czechoslovakia.
Now, that is what took place at that conference. Do you know that some 4
months later—on 12 March 1938—Von Neurath was giving an assurance to
M. Masaryk, and among other things he assured him, on behalf of Herr
Hitler, that Germany still considered herself bound by the
German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of 1925? Do you know that he
said that?
STRÖLIN: I do not recall it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Can you understand, now that I have told you
that that is a fact, can you understand anybody who had been at that
conference and had heard what Hitler had said on 5 November giving an
assurance to Czechoslovakia 4 months later in terms of that kind? Can
you understand any honest man doing that?
STRÖLIN: I cannot judge the situation prevailing at that time. I do not
know from whom Von Neurath might have received an order.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not asking you to judge at that time. I am
asking you now what your opinion is of a man who can do that sort of
thing. I want you to tell the Tribunal.
STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that because I do not have a comprehensive
picture of that situation.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must under any circumstances
object to this type of suggestive question. It is not permissible to put
such a question to the witness without giving him the complete picture
of how this assurance was given. The fact is, and it is correct, that in
the speech of 5 November 1937, Hitler for the first time developed plans
which were no longer in accord with the peace policy of Herr Von
Neurath, and Von Neurath took the opportunity—I believe in December or
early in January—to discuss this thoroughly with Hitler and point out
to him the impossibility of the policy which he apparently wanted to
embark upon and to persuade him not to carry it out. When from Hitler’s
reply he was forced to the conclusion that Hitler would nevertheless
insist on this policy which would lead to aggression in the future he
submitted his resignation. On 4 February 1938 Herr Von Neurath was
permitted to resign. He no longer participated in active politics.
On 11 or 12 March, when the invasion of Austria took place, an invasion
of which Herr Von Neurath had no inkling until that day, Hitler called
him...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly wait? The question was
put about the 5th of March 1938, whether a man who had heard the
conference of the 5th of November 1937 could have given the assurance of
the 5th of March.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I can also clarify that statement, if I may.
The question put by Minister Mastny was whether any military action
against Czechoslovakia was intended immediately or soon after the
invasion of Austria, and Herr Von Neurath believed that he could,
honestly and as a gentleman, answer this question in the negative.
We have to take into consideration the circumstances under which this
statement was made. First, Hitler, in his speech of 5 November 1937,
spoke of the years to come. When he marched into Austria on 12 March,
that is at a time which from 5 March...
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment. We do not want to have all this
argument. The question was what was this witness’ opinion of a man who
had done that. That was all the question that was asked, and that
question is put to credit...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I beg your pardon; no one can
answer that question unless he knows in what connection it was put. Mr.
Mastny asked whether the march into Austria would entail any aggressive
action against Czechoslovakia and Von Neurath answered that question. No
more and no less. He did not want to give an answer regarding the
future. The Minister wanted to know whether in connection with the march
of the German troops into Austria any military actions against
Czechoslovakia were intended. According to the information which my
client had, he could in the given situation answer this question in the
negative with a clear conscience. This question is admissible only if
the witness is informed about what I have just said. The point is not
that he declared once and for all Germany will never march into
Czechoslovakia, but that he merely answered the Czech Minister Mastny’s
question: Is there any danger that in connection with the march into
Austria, military measures will also be taken against Czechoslovakia?
This question he could answer the way he did. Therefore, the question in
the form in which it was put by the British Prosecution is in my opinion
not admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question properly admissible.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we will not pursue the matter. I ask you
just this one further question, so that I make myself quite clear. You
said in your evidence, as I wrote it down, that the Defendant Von
Neurath was well thought of, dignified and of noble character. Having
heard what I have told you, are you still prepared to tell the Court
that you think he is well thought of, dignified, and of noble character?
Is that your opinion now? I just want to get the value of your evidence;
do you see? After what you have been told is that your opinion?
STRÖLIN: It is still my opinion that Herr Von Neurath is a man of
distinguished and decent character. I cannot judge under what
circumstances he acted at the time and what considerations prompted him
to act this way.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say that he was in favor of peace and did
all he could to avoid a war. Do you call a deceit of that kind doing
everything possible to avoid war? Is that what your idea of a peaceful
policy is—giving assurance 4 months after you know perfectly well that
the German intention is to overrun their country? Is that what you call
doing everything to avoid war?
STRÖLIN: I would like to state once more that I do not sufficiently
understand the essential points and ramifications of this question to
form a proper opinion on it. But obviously things cannot be as simple as
they have been pictured here.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me turn to another aspect of this matter.
We have been told at great length that he disapproved of Hitler’s
policy, and that he resigned. Do you know that, having resigned, he was
appointed Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939? Do you know
that?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was after the remainder of Czechoslovakia
had been overrun, occupied.
STRÖLIN: I said previously that Von Neurath told me that he accepted
this post very reluctantly; that he had twice refused to accept it but
later he believed that he had to make a sacrifice in order to achieve
his ends; and, as the State President Hacha told me later, Von Neurath’s
personal influence was of great benefit because, as Hacha told me, Von
Neurath’s activity undoubtedly had a balancing and conciliatory effect.
As I said before, he was recalled because he was too mild.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you have already said it, and we have
heard it, and we have remembered it, so it is quite unnecessary for you
to say it again. Do try to answer my question shortly. Let me ask you
this question. Have you ever thought that the reason for that
appointment might have been as a reward for his assistance in the
occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia that had followed so shortly
before?
STRÖLIN: No, I never thought of that. However, if I may mention it, I
have read quite a different version in the book by Henderson, that is,
that Von Neurath had been put into that post so that his international
prestige could be discredited. I wanted to bring in this version in
order to point out that there were other possibilities that might come
into question.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember that you described him as a
disciplined, humane, and conscientious man?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at that poster.
[_The poster was submitted to the witness._]
My Lord, I regret that I have not got a copy of this for the Tribunal.
It is a very short matter. It has been introduced in the Czechoslovak
report on the German occupation. I will give Your Lordship the number:
Document Number USSR-60.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you see that this is signed by the
Defendant Von Neurath, the humane and conscientious man?
STRÖLIN: Yes, I see that the Czech universities were closed for a period
of 3 years, and that nine culprits were shot. This announcement,
however, does not say, as far as I can see, exactly why this was done.
Consequently I cannot pass judgment on the announcement, because I do
not know what Von Neurath proclaimed in it. The announcement does not
tell me anything, if I do not know the reason why the announcement was
issued. That universities were closed and nine culprits shot must have
been for convincing reasons.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I add the following? I would
like to say this in order to save time. This question of Czechoslovakia
and of this poster, with which I am also familiar, will, of course, be
dealt with, in connection with Von Neurath’s case, and at that stage of
the proceedings. I will then have the opportunity to bring the proof
that this poster did not originate with the Defendant Von Neurath. This
witness was not in Prague and can relate only things which he did not
know of his own experience, but which Herr Von Neurath told him.
Therefore, I believe that this question is not appropriate and is taking
up time unnecessarily, for I would have to raise objections and describe
the actual situation. We should not put questions to the witness which,
though put in good faith, are positively incorrect, that is, questions
which are based on inaccurately reported facts which actually occurred
in a different manner. I shall prove that at the time when this poster
was drafted and put up, Herr Von Neurath was not in Prague and was not
informed of what was going on during his absence.
Therefore I believe that we should not deal with this question today,
since, as I have said, the witness cannot know anything about it from
his own observation.
THE PRESIDENT: It will be open to you to show that this poster was put
up when Von Neurath was not at Prague, and that he gave no authority for
it. That would clear him with reference to this poster; but what is
being put to this witness is: Assuming that this poster was put up by
Von Neurath, is it right to describe him as a humane man? That is all
the cross-examination means.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But, the witness knows nothing of this poster. He
cannot answer the question correctly if he does not know the
ramifications, if he does not know that this poster actually did not
originate with Herr Von Neurath.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was examined at great length by you to show
he was a humane man and had a very good character. Under such
circumstances it is up to the Prosecution to put to the witness
circumstances which would indicate that he was not of that humane
character. That is all that is being done.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that case the most this witness could say would
be “I do not know,” or “if it is true, one cannot call it humane.” Any
one of us can say that. The witness does not need to say it.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can say, “If this is correct it is
inconsistent with what I knew of Von Neurath.”
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He cannot and he will not say that either, for the
simple reason that he does not know the circumstances under which this
poster was published. Frankly I cannot see the purpose of this question,
for if the question is put in that way, every decent individual will say
that it is inhumane; but this would not alter the fact that the witness
would be judging facts which do not exist and which are not true.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, don’t you think this is really
taking up unnecessary time, if this witness doesn’t know anything about
it? I quite see that it is the proper purpose of cross-examination to
discredit the witness.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to the Tribunal. The point of
that cross-examination was, perhaps I might be allowed to say, this:
This defendant has produced a witness to give evidence on his oath
before this Tribunal. If that evidence is unchallenged, then it goes
down on the record, and there is nothing to stop this Tribunal from
regarding this witness as a man who is in a position to give reliable
evidence of that kind. This cross-examination is rather to show that
this witness, whether he is saying it truthfully or untruthfully, is
certainly inaccurate. The evidence he has given as to the good character
of this defendant does not bear investigation—that is quite clear—and
the Tribunal is not saying we are not entitled to cross-examine as to
character. However, I do not think I need occupy the time of the
Tribunal with that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. AMEN: Witness, when were you last in New York City?
STRÖLIN: I was in New York in 1936.
COL. AMEN: At that time you made a speech at Madison Square Garden; is
that correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: That was a rally in the Garden?
STRÖLIN: It was for “German Day,” on 6 October 1936.
COL. AMEN: A “German Day” rally, correct?
STRÖLIN: It was the annual meeting of the Germans which took place on 6
October.
COL. AMEN: And a great percentage of the German-American Bund, is that
correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: In fact, that whole rally was held under the auspices of the
German-American Bund, was it not?
STRÖLIN: The fact is, a festival committee had been commissioned by all
German clubs—I believe there are all in all two thousand of them in New
York—and these 2,000 German clubs had united in one festival committee
which organized the “German Day.” I did not know the composition of this
committee in detail.
COL. AMEN: And it was at the solicitation of the German-American Bund
that you made your speech, was it not?
STRÖLIN: No, it was at the solicitation of the festival committee of the
German clubs of New York.
COL. AMEN: Yes, and on that committee were numerous members of the
German-American Bund; is that true? “Yes” or “no.”
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, there were many of the members of
your organization at that time who were active members of the
German-American Bund; is that correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you personally had had several conferences with them,
both here in Germany and in New York City, correct?
STRÖLIN: No, that is not correct.
COL. AMEN: Well, what is correct?
STRÖLIN: It is correct that I was invited, but there were no further
conferences.
COL. AMEN: But you do not dispute that many of the members of your
organization were at that time members of the German-American Bund?
STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.
THE PRESIDENT [_To the witness_]: I have just taken down that you have
said that was so.
COL. AMEN: Precisely.
STRÖLIN: Please repeat the question.
COL. AMEN: Did you not just tell me a few moments ago, in response to a
previous question, that many members of your organization were members
of the German-American Bund at the time of your speech at the rally in
Madison Square Garden?
STRÖLIN: When you speak of an “organization,” do you mean members of the
German Auslands-Institut?
COL. AMEN: “Your organization” is the way I put it.
STRÖLIN: I had no organization; I had an institute.
COL. AMEN: Exactly. And under whose auspices were you making this speech
in Madison Square Garden?
STRÖLIN: I was asked to make this speech because I had shortly before
been appointed Lord Mayor of the City of Germans Abroad. I was Lord
Mayor of that city, and therefore I was asked to deliver the address.
Stuttgart was made the City of Germans Abroad, since the Swabians
furnished most of the emigrants, and for that reason Stuttgart was to be
the home city of foreign Germans.
COL. AMEN: Well, is it not a fact that many members of the
Auslands-Organisation were at that time also members of the
German-American Bund? “Yes” or “no.”
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Is it not also a fact that at that time many members of the
Institute were also members of the German-American Bund? Yes or no.
STRÖLIN: Yes, some of these Germans had come from America; they were
students who had studied in America and returned to Germany.
COL. AMEN: And is it not also a fact that many of these members of the
German-American Bund, who were likewise members of the
Auslands-Organisation and of the Institute, were indicted and tried and
convicted for various espionage offenses in the Federal courts of the
United States? Yes or no.
STRÖLIN: No, I know nothing about that.
COL. AMEN: You never heard that?
STRÖLIN: No, I never heard about it. I know of the case of Kappe, but
that has no connection with the Deutsche Auslands-Institut.
COL. AMEN: That is one case, as a matter of fact; now, you know some
others too, don’t you?
STRÖLIN: I wonder if you could give me particulars.
COL. AMEN: I could, but I am asking you the questions rather than trying
to tell you the answers.
STRÖLIN: I cannot remember any other case. Please question me.
COL. AMEN: No, I will go to another subject now, because it is getting
late. Are you acquainted with a Mr. Alfred Weninger—W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r?
STRÖLIN: I did not understand the name. Alfred...
COL. AMEN: Alfred Weninger, W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r, or however you pronounce
it.
STRÖLIN: Weninger—yes I am familiar with that name.
COL. AMEN: Who is he?
STRÖLIN: Alfred Weninger is, to my knowledge, at present in France. I
believe he is a jurist.
COL. AMEN: Well, don’t you know? Don’t you know whether he is a jurist
or not?
STRÖLIN: Yes, he is employed as a jurist.
COL. AMEN: What is his nationality?
STRÖLIN: He is a Frenchman.
COL. AMEN: Is he a friend of yours?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Did you intervene on his behalf on at least one occasion?
STRÖLIN: I provided for his release from prison.
COL. AMEN: That was in March 1943?
STRÖLIN: No, there must be some misunderstanding. I mean the Alfred
Weninger who is a Frenchman and whom I helped during the war so that he
was not sentenced to death, and was later released from prison. However,
that took place during the period from 1942 to 1944. I do not know
another Alfred Weninger. There may be two Alfred Weningers.
COL. AMEN: No, that is correct. He was sentenced along with 12 other
comrades for espionage and intelligence with the enemy.
STRÖLIN: Yes, and he is the one whom I helped.
COL. AMEN: And you intervened with the Attorney General at the People’s
Court?
STRÖLIN: Yes, I intervened with Freisler.
COL. AMEN: And also, at the Ministries of the Interior and Justice in
Berlin?
STRÖLIN: I submitted to the Ministry of the Interior a memorandum
regarding conditions in Alsace, at the time, in order to have the
Alsatians pardoned.
COL. AMEN: And as a result of your efforts, these people received
temporary suspension of their sentences; is that correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes. I would like to mention expressly that I asked Herr Von
Neurath to intervene and it is due to a letter which he wrote to Hitler
that these Alsatians were pardoned.
COL. AMEN: So that this individual, to put it mildly, is under a
considerable obligation to you at the present time? Correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes, I imagine so.
COL. AMEN: Well, you saved his life in effect, did you not?
STRÖLIN: I also saved the lives of many others; I do not know if the
people are grateful for it or not.
COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, I take it you do not question the truth
of what he might report as a conversation with you, correct?
STRÖLIN: I do not doubt that he would remember this.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall having a conversation with him in June of 1940?
STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot say unless you tell me what it was
about.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will tell you what you are reported by him to have
said and I ask you whether you recall having said that to him, either in
the exact words which I put to you, or in substance. Do you understand?
STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand.
COL. AMEN: Here are the words: “I warn you against National
Socialism, which does not recoil before anything, and which
makes justice its servile agent. They are criminals and I have
but the one wish—to get out of it.”
Did you say that to Weninger in words or in substance? “Yes” or “no”?
STRÖLIN: I did not quite understand what you said. Will you please
repeat it?
COL. AMEN: You understand English, don’t you, Witness?
STRÖLIN: Some. I understand just a little.
COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, you were interrogated in English by one
of our interrogators, were you not?
STRÖLIN: I spoke a little English only on one occasion, but I believe
that he did not understand me correctly.
COL. AMEN: And you understood perfectly well what I just read to you,
did you not?
STRÖLIN: I did not fully understand the German translation of what you
said and the substance of your question is not clear to me.
COL. AMEN: Well, I shall read it to you again. But I suggest that you
are merely taking this time in order to find out what answer you want to
make. I ask you again whether you said to Weninger in words or in
substance, in June of 1940, the following:
“I warn you against National Socialism, which does not recoil
before anything, and which makes justice its servile agent. They
are criminals and I have but the one wish—to get out of it.”
Do you understand?
STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand but I do not recall having made that
statement.
COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement when I tell you that
Weninger so states—Weninger, whom you have just told us has every
obligation to you?
STRÖLIN: I do not remember it. It may be true that I made critical
statements, but I do not recall the wording.
COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement? Answer yes or no.
STRÖLIN: I deny the statement. I deny that I made it in this form.
COL. AMEN: Did you make it in substance; did you make that statement?
STRÖLIN: I cannot remember the conversation at all.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall having made another statement to Weninger in
1936 in Strasbourg—were you in Strasbourg with Weninger in 1936?
STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot recall.
COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?
STRÖLIN: I cannot recall.
COL. AMEN: It is quite possible?
STRÖLIN: It is possible, but I cannot recall it. I cannot at a moment’s
notice recall the date I was there.
COL. AMEN: And did you not say to Weninger in Strasbourg in 1936, in
words or in substance, the following: “When I am abroad I am ashamed to
be a German”? “Yes” or “no.”
STRÖLIN: It was entirely out of the question at that time, since in the
year of 1936 I was very proud of the fact that I was a German.
COL. AMEN: And then, do you deny having made that statement to Weninger?
STRÖLIN: I am quite certain that I did not make that statement in the
year 1936.
COL. AMEN: When did you make it?
STRÖLIN: I do not recall having made such a statement to Weninger at
all, at least not in 1936.
COL. AMEN: When did you make that statement to Weninger or anybody else?
In what year did you decide to make statements like that?
STRÖLIN: I cannot recall having made such a statement at all.
COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?
STRÖLIN: I frankly admit that there was a time when one was no longer
proud of Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the other Prosecutors wish to cross-examine?
DR. SEIDL: I have no questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. [_The witness left the
stand._]
Does that conclude your case, Dr. Seidl, or have you got any other
evidence to offer?
DR. SEIDL: Yes. First, I have to read into the record the questionnaire
of the witness Alfred Hess which has arrived in the meantime. The
Tribunal has admitted his testimony in the form of a questionnaire. I
would then like to refer to various documents in Document Book Number 3,
but before going into that and to conclude today’s proceedings, I would
like to establish upon the request of the Defendant Hess—this refers to
Volume 2 of the document book—that Lord Simon came to the meeting as
the official representative of the British Government; I therefore read
a few sentences from Page 93 (Volume II, Page 93):
“Lord Simon said: ‘Herr Reichsminister, I was informed that you
had come here feeling charged with a mission and that you wished
to speak of it to someone who would be able to receive it with
Government authority. You know I am Dr. Guthrie and therefore I
come with the authority of the Government and I shall be willing
to listen and to discuss with you as far as seems good anything
you would wish to state for the information of the Government.’”
That was what I wished to state in completion of my reading of the Simon
minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you be able to finish tonight if we went on for a
few minutes or not?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the answers on this questionnaire are rather
long. The witness was cross-examined and I assume that the Prosecution
also intend to read the particulars of the cross-examination and I do
not believe this would be possible today.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-FIRST DAY
Tuesday, 26 March 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, Defendant Streicher will be absent
from this session of the Court.
PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, I now turn to the reading of the
interrogation of the witness Alfred Hess.
THE PRESIDENT: Where shall we find it?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I received this transcript of the
interrogation of the witness only last Saturday, and it has thus not
been possible for me to incorporate it into the document book as yet.
This witness was interrogated at Bad Mergentheim on 19 March.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that we haven’t got copies of it?
DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the General Secretary, from whom I
received this transcript, has supplied a copy for the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you had better go on then. Go on.
DR. SEIDL: Yes. Before answering the first question, the witness made a
few preliminary remarks which are as follows:
“It should be noted that I had to terminate my activity in the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP after the flight to England
of my brother Rudolf Hess, Deputy of the Führer. Therefore, the
following statements are valid only for the period up to 12 May
1941.
“Question 1: ‘What were the tasks and the purpose of the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP?’
“Answer: ‘The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was the
cultural, social, and economic care of all German nationals in
foreign countries, regardless of whether they were Party members
or not. The Auslands-Organisation in this sense was to be a
bridge between Germans abroad and the home country. Its purpose
was to foster and maintain love for and ties with the distant
home country and to keep alive understanding for the fatherland,
as well as to awaken the understanding of Germans at home for
the hard battle for existence of their compatriots all over the
world. The German abroad, through his dignified, upright
bearing, was to make himself popular in the country of his
adoption, and thus act as the best representative of his
fatherland.’
“Question 2: ‘Who could become a member of the
Auslands-Organisation?’
“Answer: ‘The question is not understandable. There was no such
thing as a membership in the Auslands-Organisation; just as
little, for example, as there was a membership in the Foreign
Office of the Reich or in a Gau of the NSDAP in the Reich.’
“Question 3: ‘Is it correct that on the membership card of each
Reich German Party member the following principle was printed as
a ruling principle of the Auslands-Organisation: “Follow the
laws of the country whose guest you are, let its people make the
internal policy of that country, do not interfere in this, not
even in conversation”?’
“Answer: ‘It is correct that the above principle, among similar
ones, was printed on the membership card or on its cover. If I
am not mistaken, underneath this principle there was the warning
even of expulsion from the NSDAP if this principle was not
observed. This latter is to be ascertained without great
difficulty by procuring a cover, which was in the possession of
every Party member in a foreign country.’
“Question 4: ‘Did the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP develop
any activity which could appear as Fifth Column?’
“Answer: ‘“Fifth Column” is not a clear concept, uniformly used.
In general, it would probably mean secret espionage or sabotage
activity. According to its guiding principles, the
Auslands-Organisation could not have carried on any such
activity.’
“‘I remember that the slogan “Fifth Column” of the foreign press
was considered in the Auslands-Organisation as a clever bluff of
the antifascist propaganda, and it caused genuine amusement.
Seriously, no state could conceive that such a widely known,
rather suspect and vulnerable organization could be suited for
any service in the nature of the Fifth Column. I consider it
natural that some individual Germans abroad had secret missions,
services such as other nationals performed likewise for their
fatherland, but the Auslands-Organisation was certainly not the
giver of such assignments nor the intermediary for such agents.’
“Question 5: ‘What kind of instructions and directives did the
Deputy of the Führer give the Auslands-Organisation for its
activity?’
“Answer: ‘The instructions and directives of the Deputy of the
Führer for the activity of the Auslands-Organisation are such as
those mentioned in my answers to Questions 1 and 3. He pointed
out again and again, with special emphasis, his strict
instructions that the groups abroad were not to do anything
which could be detrimental to the countries affording them
hospitality, or which could be considered an interference in the
affairs of those countries. The basic principle must also be
that National Socialism was a purely German movement, not an
article for export which one wanted to force on other countries
as suitable for them.’
“Question 6: ‘Did the Deputy of the Führer give the
Auslands-Organisation any directions or orders which could have
caused them to carry on an activity similar to that of the Fifth
Column?’
“Answer: ‘The Deputy of the Führer not only never issued any
such directions or orders, but as stated above in Answer 5, laid
down principles which absolutely prohibited any activity of the
sort carried on by the so-called Fifth Column.’
“Question 7: ‘Is it correct that, on the contrary, the Deputy of
the Führer took meticulous care that in all circumstances
interference in the internal affairs of the country of adoption
was to be avoided?’
“Answer: ‘I can repeat only that it was a chief concern of the
Deputy of the Führer to direct the work of the
Auslands-Organisation abroad in such a way that no interference
of any kind should take place in the internal affairs of the
country of residence. The few insignificant offenses, which were
unavoidable with the then very large number of German nationals
abroad—already amounting to several million—were
correspondingly severely punished.’
“Question 8: ‘What were the tasks and the aims of the Volksbund
für das Deutschtum im Ausland (League for Germans Abroad)?’
“Answer: ‘The Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland had the
cultural care of the so-called Volksdeutsche. Volksdeutsche are
racial Germans who had lost their German citizenship either
voluntarily or through the laws of other countries, that is, had
acquired the citizenship of another country, for instance,
America, Hungary, Transylvania, _et cetera_.’
“Question 9: ‘Did the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland
ever, in particular however before 10 May 1941, develop any
activity which could have given it the appearance of a Fifth
Column?’
“Answer: ‘I must state in this connection that the activity of
the Auslands-Organisation did not have anything to do with the
Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, so I can have no
insight into its work. But I consider it entirely out of the
question that my brother could have given the Volksbund tasks of
a Fifth Column nature. It would neither have fallen within the
jurisdiction of the Deputy of the Führer, nor have corresponded
with his views as to the mission of the Volksbund für das
Deutschtum im Ausland.’
“Question 10, and last question: ‘What kind of directions and
instructions did the Deputy of the Führer give as to the
activity of this Bund?’
“Answer: ‘Directions, _et cetera_, which my brother gave as to
the activity of this Bund are unknown to me, for, as already
stated, my activity in the Auslands-Organisation was in no way
connected with the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im
Ausland.’”—Signed—“Alfred Hess. Sworn to and subscribed on 19
March 1946.”
The witness Alfred Hess was then cross-examined in connection with his
interrogation. I assume that the Prosecution want to submit this
cross-examination themselves to the Tribunal. But if this
cross-examination and the questions belonging to it have not yet been
translated, it might perhaps be practicable if it were done directly, in
this connection.
MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If
it please the Tribunal, we have received the cross-interrogatories but I
suggest respectfully that, rather than take the time to read them, we
offer them and if the Court will permit us, have them translated into
the four languages. It will take another 10 minutes or so to read them
and we are not interested in doing it unless the Tribunal feels that we
should.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Mr. Dodd.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I do not know whether the
affidavit of Ambassador Gaus submitted by me yesterday has been
translated and whether the Tribunal has received these translations
already. Yesterday at midday I gave six copies to the information office
and have heard nothing further since.
THE PRESIDENT: Can the Prosecution inform the Tribunal what the position
is?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution has not had a copy of
this affidavit yet so we do not know what is in it. We suggest that
perhaps Dr. Seidl could postpone the reading of that until we have had a
chance to consider it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am afraid that must be postponed.
DR. SEIDL: Yes. Now I turn to Volume 3 of the document book.
If it please the Tribunal, this volume of the document book contains, in
substance, statements and quotations taken from books and speeches of
foreign statesmen, diplomats, and political economists, regarding the
history and origin of the Versailles Treaty, the contents of the
Versailles Treaty, the territorial changes made by this treaty, such as
the question of the Polish Corridor, and above all the disastrous
economic consequences which this treaty had for Germany and also for the
rest of the world.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have read the documents in this book
and I should like just to say one or two words about them.
They are opinions expressed by a great variety of gentlemen, including
politicians, economists, and journalists. They are opinions that are
expressed polemically and some of them journalistically, and with most
of them one is familiar and knew them when they were expressed 15 to 25
years ago.
Now, while I submit, as I have submitted to the Tribunal, that the whole
subject is too remote, I have a suggestion which I hope the Tribunal
will consider reasonable, that the Prosecution should, as I suggested
yesterday, let this book go in at the moment _de bene esse_ and that
when Dr. Seidl comes to making his final speech he can adopt the
arguments that are put forward by the various gentlemen whom he quotes,
if he thinks they are right. He can use the points as illustrations,
always provided the thesis that he is developing is one which the
Tribunal thinks relevant to the issues before it. That will preserve for
Dr. Seidl the advantage of the right to use these documents subject, as
I say, to the relevancy of the issues, but I suggest that it would be
quite wrong to read them as evidence at the moment. They are merely
polemical and journalistic opinions and directed to an issue which the
Prosecution has submitted, and I do submit, is too remote.
However, I am most anxious that Dr. Seidl should have every advantage
for his final speech. Therefore, I suggest it would be convenient if
they were put in without being read at the moment and were left subject
to the limitation of relevancy, which can be considered when all the
evidence is before the Tribunal, for him to make use of in his final
speech.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I shortly...
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, Dr. Seidl. We will hear you in a
moment—perhaps it would be better to hear what you have to say now. Do
you think the suggestion made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe would be one
which would be acceptable to you?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, at first glance the suggestion of Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe seems to be very reasonable. But I believe I must say that
if the matter is treated in that way great difficulties will arise for
the Defense. For example the arguments on relevancy, which in their
nature belong in the presentation of evidence and must be heard there,
will be postponed until the final speech of the Defense. This would mean
that the defense counsel in his final speech would be interrupted again
and again; that he would have to argue for the relevancy of his
quotations; that perhaps whole parts of his speech would fall by the
wayside in that manner; and that in that way the danger would arise that
the cohesion of the speech will be broken completely.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is a danger which every advocate
has to meet, that certain portions of his speech may not be deemed
relevant, but I thought that that might be a helpful way out. But if it
is not accepted, then the Prosecution must respectfully but very
strongly submit that the issues of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles
are not relevant to this Tribunal.
I have already argued that and I do not want to develop it at great
length. I do want to make it clear that the questions which are raised
by the quotations here were, of course, the subject of political
controversy in practically every country in Europe, and different
opinions were expressed as to the rightness and the practicality of the
provisions, especially the economic provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles. I am not disputing that that is a matter of controversy, but
I am saying that it is not a controversy that should come before this
Tribunal. I myself have replied to practically all the quotations from
the English statesmen here as a politician over the past years, and I am
sure many people in this Court must have taken one view or the other,
but that is not a relevant issue to this Tribunal, and, of course,
especially is it wrong in my view to put forward as evidential matter
opinions expressed by one side in the controversy. Every one of these
speeches, as far as they were English, was either preceded by matters to
which it was a reply or was followed by a reply, and I should think the
same applies to those of Senator Borah in the United States.
These matters—this is my second point—are not really evidential, and
this is a point for argument; and it will have to be decided what is a
convenient time for the Tribunal to decide on whether this is a relevant
issue. But that was why I put forward this suggestion that it was better
to decide it when the whole of the true evidence of fact had been put
before the Tribunal. But I do want, apart from my suggestion, to make
quite clear that as regards relevance, the Prosecution unitedly submit
that the rightness or practicality of the provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles is not a relevant matter. The other argument—I want to
distinguish between the two—the other argument has been adumbrated by
Dr. Stahmer as to the actual terms of the preamble to the military
clauses. That is quite a different point which we can discuss when, as I
understand, certain propositions of law are to be put forward by one of
the defense counsel on behalf of the Defense. But, as I say, the
rightness and practicality of the Treaty and especially the economic
clauses is a subject of enormous controversy on which there are
literally thousands of different opinions from one shade to the other,
and I submit it is not an issue before this Court, and, secondly, I
submit this is not evidence. It is not evidential matter, even if it
were an issue.
DR. SEIDL: May I perhaps reply briefly?
THE PRESIDENT: Then, Sir David, your proposition would be that Dr. Seidl
could not quote from any of these documents?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, certainly, yes, on my premise that it
is irrelevant matter, he could not.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. They are not admissible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are not admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My original suggestion was of course, leaving
over the discussion of whether they are admissible until all the
evidence had been filed, but if that is not accepted, I submit bluntly
if I may use the word with all respect—that they are not admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl.
DR. SEIDL: May I reply briefly, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.
DR. SEIDL: It would indicate a complete misinterpretation of my
intentions if one were to assume that by the submission of this document
book I wanted to show whether or not the Treaty of Versailles is an
expression of statesmanly wisdom. I am not concerned with that here.
With the submission of this document it is to be shown, or rather there
is to be brought under discussion:
Firstly: Whether the opposite side at the conclusion of the Treaty, in
the preliminary negotiations—I call your attention to Wilson’s Fourteen
Points—was not guilty for its part, of violation of the general treaty
obligations, whether a _culpa in contrahendo_ is not to be assumed here.
Secondly: The presentation of the documents should show whether the
opposite side complied with the obligations arising from the treaty, in
order to establish—that is, to give the Tribunal the opportunity of
establishing—in this way the legal inferences which Germany might draw
from this.
Thirdly: The Treaty of Versailles and its violation by the defendants
forms the nucleus of Count One of the Indictment, namely, the Conspiracy
charged by the Prosecution. The Prosecution, in replying to a question
of the Tribunal as to when the conspiracy may be said to have started,
has said that the date might be set as far back as 1921.
Fourthly: The Prosecution has extensive...
THE PRESIDENT: I have not the least idea what you meant by the last
point. I do not understand what you said in the last point in the least.
DR. SEIDL: I wanted to say that for the beginning of the Conspiracy
alleged by the Prosecution, the Treaty of Versailles played a decisive
part, and that there is at least some causal nexus between the origin of
this treaty and the alleged Conspiracy. Before there can be talk of
illegality and of guilt, the facts have to be established which were
causative for the Conspiracy charged by the Prosecution.
Fourthly: The Prosecution has submitted extensive evidence on the
development of the NSDAP. Numerous document books were submitted to the
Court to show the growth in membership, to demonstrate the increase in
the Reichstag mandates. Now, if this evidence was relevant, it is my
assertion that also the circumstances and the facts that first enabled
this rise of the Party at all must be relevant, if only from the
viewpoint of causal nexus.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it your contention that the opinion of a journalist
after the Treaty of Versailles was made, stating that, in his opinion,
the Treaty of Versailles was unjust to Germany, would be admissible
either for the interpretation of the Treaty or for any other purpose
with which this Tribunal is concerned?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I admit that of course the isolated opinion of
a foreign journalist has not in itself to be a relevant document. But I
do maintain that the opinion of Secretary of State Lansing on the coming
about of the Treaty of Versailles and his connection with the history of
this treaty must be of some evidential relevance. What weight attaches
to his opinion is a question which cannot yet be established at this
point. This question can be decided by the Tribunal only when the
complete evidence has been submitted. I maintain further that the
opinion of the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the
Senate of the United States on the Treaty of Versailles, about its
formulation, about its effects within the Conspiracy alleged by the
Prosecution which purportedly is said to be directed chiefly against the
Treaty of Versailles can _prima facie_ have value as evidence. The same
applies to most of the other statements quoted in this document book. I
would like to call attention to Gustav Cassel, to John Maynard Keynes,
the official financial advisor of the British Government, and to a
number of others.
THE PRESIDENT: It is your contention that because of the provisions of
the Versailles Treaty or because of an infraction of those provisions by
the signatory powers, Germany was justified in making an aggressive war?
DR. SEIDL: I cannot answer that now definitely, so long as I have not
heard the evidence of the other defendants. I do assert, however, that
by violation of the Treaty of Versailles by the opposite side, under
certain circumstances Germany or the defendants could infer the right to
rearm, and that is an infraction of the Treaty of Versailles with which
the defendants are charged. As far as the right to an aggressive war is
concerned, I should not like to make any positive statements at least
until such time as the Tribunal has taken official notice of the
affidavit of Ambassador Gaus.
THE PRESIDENT: One more question I should like to ask you: Are you
saying that the Fourteen Points which were laid down by President Wilson
are admissible evidence to construe the written document of the
Versailles Treaty?
DR. SEIDL: I do not say that the Fourteen Points of Wilson, _per se_,
are admissible evidence. I do assert, on the other hand, that the
connection between these Fourteen Points of Wilson and the Treaty of
Versailles, and the contradiction resulting therefrom are of causal
significance for the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you are really saying that the Versailles Treaty,
insofar as it departed from the Fourteen Points, was an unjust treaty?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, whether the treaty was just or not is a point
which I do not wish to prove with this document at all. Whether the
treaty was unjust or not is in my opinion a fact which perhaps is beyond
the scope of these proceedings. I do assert, however, that the treaty,
at least in many of its terms, did not bring that which the victorious
states themselves expected of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more, Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: Not at this point.
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Since it is a very
fundamental question which has been raised now for discussion by Sir
David, and since the Defense must always calculate on the possibility
that the Tribunal, even at this point, may make a decision on the
question of whether and how far such documentary material as that
discussed can be produced, I consider myself duty-bound to add to the
statements of my colleague, Dr. Seidl, with whom I agree fully, just a
few supplementary words. And I would like to reply to the very precise
question of Your Lordship which starts, “Do you consider it
relevant...?” I believe—and I will avoid any repetition—that a very
vital point as far as relevancy is concerned has not been brought out
yet, and that is the subjective aspect; that is the relevancy of the
investigation of evidence and of facts regarding the subjective state of
the individual defendant, that is, of the facts as seen from within.
If, for example, one of the defendants committed an act which was,
considered purely objectively, a breach of the Treaty of Versailles,
then, as far as criminal law is concerned and looking at it from the
subjective view, it is of great significance whether in the opinion of
reasonable, just, and educated men of all nations, he acted with an
attitude and with a viewpoint which was not merely his special
viewpoint, but that of the most serious men of the various nations and
also of those nations which fought against Germany in the years 1914-18.
In order not to be too abstract, I should like to cite a concrete
example:
A defendant holds the opinion that he is entitled to rearmament—not to
aggressive war; I will not touch this question. He considers rearmament
justified, either because the treaty has not been kept by the other side
or because owing to _expressis verbis_, or to some action, it is to be
considered obsolete. In my opinion it is of decisive relevancy whether
this defendant with this point of view, which explains his action, is
alone in all the world, or whether the opinion which guides his action
is held by men who are to be taken seriously, and who belonged to other
nations, even to those who in the years 1914-18 stood on the other side
and were his enemies.
Rearmament according to the Prosecution, as I understand, is not a
crime, as such, but is merely used by the Prosecution as a charge for
the proving of the crime of having carried on an aggressive war. If,
now, a defendant can prove that he acted from clean and decent views,
views which, as stated, were held by such men of other nations as I have
described, and acted conscientiously and with a clear conscience both as
regards international law and international morals and also as regards
the needs of his country, then this material, which contains opinions,
literary statements, speeches, that coincide with the views of the
defendant in question, is not only of relevant, but of entirely decisive
significance. This viewpoint I ask the Tribunal to bear in mind, if it
desires to decide now the question of principle which Sir David has just
now raised for debate, and which he had to raise, as I fully recognize.
Moreover I am also now in the agreeable position of being able to agree
with Sir David in the practical handling of this matter. I too—and I am
speaking now for myself only—would prefer to have the decision on this
question postponed until the time suggested by Sir David. As far as I am
concerned I will accept the disadvantages, which Dr. Seidl is right in
seeing, because an advantage will result if the Tribunal decides this
question at that time, since it will then have a much larger view on all
questions and shades which are important for the decision. And at this
point I am not at all in a position to speak comprehensively about them,
for I do not want to make any summarizing speech, but just to treat one
aspect of this question of evidence.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): I should like to
add a few remarks to those made by my colleague Dr. Dix. I request the
Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how many of the Defense
Counsel think that they are entitled to address them. If Dr. Horn wishes
to add a short argument, the Tribunal are prepared to hear it, but they
are not prepared to hear all the defendants’ counsel upon points such as
this, at this stage, and if any of the other defendants’ counsel desires
to address them, they will decide now whether they will hear any more or
not.
It is understood, then, that Dr. Horn alone will address a short
argument to the Tribunal. If it is not, then the Tribunal will decide
whether they will hear any more argument upon the subject.
DR. HORN: I cannot encroach on the rights of my colleagues in this
question, naturally, Mr. President. I should like personally to make
only a very brief statement on the legal points.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you must consult your colleagues then.
DR. HORN: If you wish a decision on this question now, Mr. President, I
must ask my colleagues beforehand, of course.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._]
DR. HORN: May I make first a preliminary remark, Mr. President, to what
has just been said to me by my colleagues. Firstly, this decision has
for the Counsel for the organizations a very particular interest.
For myself personally I would like to make the following remarks: The
Prosecution...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I asked you to consult the other defendants’
counsel and ascertain whether they were willing that you should be
heard, and you alone. That is the only terms upon which I am prepared to
hear you.
[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._]
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, my colleagues are agreed that I shall make
the last statements on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment—very well. Go on.
DR. HORN: There is no doubt that the Prosecution, as far as vital
questions are concerned, base their case on infractions of the
Versailles Treaty. To these treaty infractions, it is absolutely
necessary, in my opinion, to submit the facts which allow the legality
of this treaty to be judged. There is no doubt that this treaty was
signed under duress. It is recognized in international law that such
treaties from the legal point of view have grave deficiencies and are
infamous. In my opinion we must be allowed to submit the facts that
serve to show the soundness of this assertion and legal viewpoint. A
further question—and if I have understood correctly, this is Sir
David’s point—is that of the polemic analysis of the legal, political,
and economic consequences of this treaty.
I do not wish to make any further statements on this point, but I would
like to ask that my first request be granted, that the legal documentary
facts be allowed which would permit a judgment on the legal value of the
Versailles Treaty.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, if I might deal
first with the argument which Dr. Dix has put forward. As I understood
his first main proposition, it was this: That if a defendant has
committed an act which is an infraction of the treaty and can show that
in the opinion of reasonable and just and educated men in the states who
were the other parties to the treaty, the treaty was so bad that an
infraction was justifiable, that is a permissible argument.
I submit that it is, with great respect to Dr. Dix, an unsound argument
and baseless, from any principle either of law or of materiality. Once
it is admitted that there is a treaty and that an infraction is made,
and it follows from the example that Dr. Dix was dealing with that,
these are the conceded facts. It is no answer to say that a number of
admirable people in the countries which were parties to the treaty
believed that its terms were wrong. The treaty is there and the person
who knowingly makes an infraction is breaking the treaty, however strong
is his support.
In his second point Dr. Dix moved to quite different grounds. He said
that this evidence might be relevant in the special reference to the
question of rearmament because it might show that the treaty was
considered obsolete. Now, it is a rare but nonetheless existing doctrine
of international law that treaties, usually minor treaties, can be
abrogated by the conduct of the contracting parties. I would not contest
that you cannot get examples of that, although they are very rare and
generally deal with minor matters. But this evidence which is before the
Tribunal at the moment is not directed to that point at all. This is, in
the main, contemporary polemic evidence saying that certain aspects of
the treaty were bad, either as regards political standards or economic
standards. That is a totally different argument from the one which Dr.
Dix admirably adumbrated—which is one which if it came up would have to
be faced—that a treaty has become obsolete or that the breaches have
been condoned and that, therefore, the terms have really ceased to
exist.
My answer to that is that this evidence is not directed to that point at
all.
Now, if Dr. Dix will forgive me, and I am sure the fault was mine, I did
not quite appreciate what he termed his subjective argument. But insofar
as I did appreciate it, there seems to be a very good answer: that if he
seeks to suggest that a defendant’s guilt may be less because he, that
defendant, believed that the treaty was bad, that is essentially a
matter which can be judged by the Tribunal who will hear that defendant
and appreciate and evaluate his point of view. It really does not help
in deciding whether the Defendant Hess acted because he thought that the
Treaty of Versailles was a bad treaty, to know what the editor of the
_Observer_, which is a Sunday paper in England, expressed as his views
some twenty years ago, or the _Manchester Guardian_ or indeed, with all
respect to them, what distinguished statesmen have said in writing their
reminiscences years after a matter occurred. The subjective point
is—this is my submission—an important point in deciding on evidence.
The subjective point can be answered by the defendant himself, and the
view of the defendant which the Tribunal will receive.
Now, Dr. Horn has opened up a much wider question, and one which I
submit is entirely irrelevant and beyond the scope of these proceedings.
He wishes the Tribunal to try whether the Treaty of Versailles was
signed under duress. Well, that, of course, would involve the whole
consideration of the Government of the German Republic, the position of
the plenipotentiaries, and the legal position of the persons who
negotiated the treaty.
The answer to that is that this Tribunal is concerned with certain quite
clearly stated offenses, fully particularized, which occurred at the
time that is stated in the Indictment; and all the evidence that is
given as to the actions of the pre-Nazi German Government, and indeed of
the Nazi Government, shows that for years Versailles was accepted as the
legal and actual basis on which they must work, and various different
methods were adopted in order to try to secure changes of the treaty,
and I need not go into, with the Tribunal, the whole frame work of the
Locarno Treaties, recognizing Versailles, which were signed in 1925, and
which were treated as existing and in operation by the Nazi Government
itself.
With that, these actual facts, it would, in my submission, be completely
remote, irrelevant, and contrary to the terms of the Charter, for this
Tribunal to go into an inquiry as to whether the Treaty of Versailles
was signed under duress.
As I gathered, Dr. Horn was not so much interested in the economic
clauses and their rightness or wrongness; but I should respectfully
remind the Tribunal that that is a matter which is before them at the
moment—that here we have, as I have pointed out before—and I do not
want to repeat myself—a number of opinions expressed by people of
varying eminence and with varying degrees of responsibility at the time
that they expressed them. And while strongly maintaining the position
which I have endeavored to express with regard to the treaty, I do
equally impress my second point: That to accept as matters of evidence
statements which in the main are made from a polemical standpoint,
either in answer to an attack or in an attack with background of the
politics of the state in which they were made, is simply a misuse of the
term “evidence”. That is not evidence of any kind, and I equally—not
equally because the first point is one of primary importance, which I
respectfully urge to the Tribunal—but I also suggest that to tender in
evidence matters of that kind is a misuse of the term “evidence,” that
they are matters of argument which an advocate may adopt if the argument
is a relevant one, but they should not be received in evidence by the
Tribunal for that reason.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Sir
David, is there anything in the Versailles Treaty that either calls for
disarmament by the signatories other than Germany or which looks to such
disarmament; and, if there is, could you give us the reference to it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is the preamble to the Military Clauses.
That is the point which is usually relied on. It is about four lines at
the beginning of the Military Clauses, and, in quite general terms, it
looks to a general disarmament after Germany has disarmed. Of course,
the position was that—I think I have got the dates right—disarmament
was accepted. Whether, in view of the evidence in this case, it should
have been accepted does not matter; it was accepted in 1927. After that,
you may remember, there were a number of disarmament conferences which
examined that question, and eventually in 1933 Germany left the then
existing disarmament conference.
Now, I am trying to be entirely objective. I do not want to put the
Prosecution view or the Defense view, but that is the position.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not quite clear. When you say
“accepted,” you mean that the extent of the disarmament called for had
been accepted by Germany?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the other way around: that Germany’s
response to the demand of Versailles was accepted by the Allies in 1927,
and the Disarmament Commission which had been in Germany then left
Germany under, I think, a French General Denoue.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then, what I understand you to argue is that
nothing contained in this folder has anything to do with that possible
issue.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is the point.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is not on that issue. I mean we will deal
with that issue when we come to it. I rather thought from some words
that Dr. Stahmer dropped that that would be one of the points which we
should meet in the general argument on law which will be presented,
which the Defense Counsel...
DR. SEIDL: I believe that Sir David is under a slight misconception. In
Book 3 of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a
number of citations of foreign statesmen that refer to this military
clause in the Versailles Treaty and in which it is stated that Germany
fulfilled her obligations in the Versailles Treaty, but that the
reciprocal obligations in it for the opposite side were not fulfilled.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am sorry. I did not remember any. I have
read it through, and there may be some collateral matters dealing with
that, but—and I do not think that I am doing Dr. Seidl’s great industry
in collecting these matters an injustice in saying that if they do exist
they are collateral and the main point of this is an attack on the
political and economic clauses of the treaty. I hope that I have done
him justice. I certainly intended to do so. That is the impression made
on me.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, may I report that the Defendant
Streicher will be absent from this session of Court.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that evidence as to the injustice of
the Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is
inadmissible, and it therefore rejects Volume 3 of the documents on
behalf of the Defendant Hess.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors. Since Volume 3 of the document
book for the Defendant Rudolf Hess is not admissible as documentary
evidence, I am, so far as the submission of documents is concerned, at
the end of my submission of evidence. Now, we are further concerned only
with the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, which I have already submitted,
and I ask you not to decide on the admissibility of this document until
I have had opportunity to present arguments on the relevance of it and
of the secret treaty. But I should like to point out that with this
affidavit only the facts and the contents of this secret treaty are to
be proved; and therefore I shall read only excerpts from it, so that
other events and the history prior to the treaty are not to be
demonstrated by me.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, we understand that this affidavit of the
witness Gaus is now being translated and is going to be submitted to the
various prosecutors. They will then inform us of their position, and we
shall be able to see whether it is admissible or not, and the
Prosecution will likewise be able to tell us whether they want to have
the Ambassador here for the purpose of cross-examining him.
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: So we must postpone that until we get the translations.
DR. SEIDL: I had then the further intention of calling the defendant
himself as a witness. In view of his attitude as to the question of the
competency of this Court, he has asked me, however, to dispense with
this procedure. I therefore forego the testimony of the defendant as a
witness and have no further evidence to put in at this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
Then the Tribunal will now deal with the case against the Defendant
Ribbentrop.
DR. HORN: Your Lordship, Your Honors, my client, Joachim von Ribbentrop,
had instructed me to make the following statement for him at the
beginning of the evidence:
“As Foreign Minister for the Reich, I had to carry through the
directions and orders of Adolf Hitler concerning foreign policy.
For the measures of foreign policy undertaken by me I accept
full responsibility.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought defendants’ counsel knew that the
rule which we have laid down is that at this stage no speeches shall be
made, but that the evidence should be called, the oral evidence should
be called, and the documents should be briefly referred to and offered
in evidence. Did you not understand that?
DR. HORN: I did not know, Mr. President, that one might not submit a
statement on behalf of his client.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has laid down on several occasions, I
think, verbally and certainly once in writing, that no speeches can be
made now, but that speeches can be made at the time laid down in the
Charter. The present opportunity is for all evidence to be given and for
documents to be offered in evidence, with such explanatory observations
upon the documents as may be necessary.
DR. HORN: The former Foreign Minister for the Reich, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, is, according to the general Indictment and according to the
trial brief of the British Delegation and the verbally presented special
charges, held responsible for all crimes cited in Article 6 of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal.
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in the session of the International Military
Tribunal of 8 January 1946, described the facts of the case against my
client as follows:
Firstly, the using of his offices and of his personal influence and
intimate connection with Hitler to facilitate the seizure of power
through the NSDAP and the preparation of wars.
Secondly, the participation in the political planning, and preparation
of the National Socialist Conspiracy for Wars of Aggression...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, are you again making a speech or what are you
doing?
DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I am just enumerating on one page how I
plan to arrange my evidence, and I ask to be allowed to divide it in
this way.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. HORN: Secondly, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe adduced the participation in
the political planning and preparation of the National Socialist
conspirators for aggressive war and the wars in violation of
international treaties. He accordingly bears the responsibility for the
execution of the foreign policy planned by the political conspirators.
Thirdly, participation in and approval of Crimes against Peace, War
Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, especially crimes against persons
and property in the occupied territories.
The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has declared himself not guilty of all
crimes charged against him. To refute the charges made against him, I
will begin now my presentation of evidence.
The honorable prosecutor at the beginning of his statements quoted from
Exhibit Number USA-5, Document Number 2829-PS, and brought out that the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop was an SS Obergruppenführer. The honorable
prosecutor asserted that this rank was not an honorary one. In
opposition to this, the defendant asserts that the rank of an SS
Gruppenführer and later of Obergruppenführer, bestowed by Hitler, was
bestowed upon him only on an honorary basis, because Hitler wished that
the members of the Government should appear on official occasions in
uniform, and the rank of an SS Gruppenführer appeared in keeping with
the official position of the defendant. The defendant neither served in
the SS nor led an SS unit. Neither did he have any adequate military
training and preparation for this high military position.
To demonstrate this I will submit evidence from the defendant himself as
a witness.
The Prosecution has asserted that Von Ribbentrop, after the taking over
of power, for a short period of time was adviser of the Party on foreign
political matters. This assertion is refuted by Document 2829-PS which
is contained in the document book in the hands of the Tribunal. I will
read Paragraph 3, where it says:
“Foreign Policy Collaborator to the Führer, 1933-1938.”
This is the first document of the Ribbentrop document book. According to
it, in the years 1933 to 1938 Von Ribbentrop was only Hitler’s adviser
on foreign political questions. With reference to Document D-472,
Exhibit Number GB-130, the second document in the Document Book
Ribbentrop, which concerns an excerpt from the International
Biographical Archives, the honorable prosecutor claimed that the
defendant even before 1932 worked for the NSDAP, after he had entered
the Party service in 1930. The Prosecution cites Paragraph II, Lines
6-9, of this document, which says:
“Following up his connection with foreign countries, he
established new relations with England and France; having been
in the service of the NSDAP since 1930, he knew how to extend
them to political circles.”
The statement is not correct. The defendant was until 1932 not a member
of any political party in Germany, particularly not of the NSDAP. As far
as his political views were concerned, he leaned toward the Deutsche
Volkspartei—that is the party of Stresemann.
In the year 1932 the defendant came to know Hitler personally. His views
on domestic and foreign political matters brought him...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I do not want to interrupt you unnecessarily,
but I do not understand what you are doing now. You seem to me to be
stating a part of the evidence which presumably the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop will give, and, if so, when he gives it it will be cumulative
to your statement. Also, you seem to be referring to documents which
have been produced by the Prosecution and answering them yourself. Well,
that is not what the Tribunal desires at this stage. It quite
understands that at the appropriate time you will make whatever argument
you think right with reference to the evidence which has been brought
forward, on behalf of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. But, as I have
already said—I thought quite clearly—what the Tribunal wants done now
is to hear all the evidence on behalf of Von Ribbentrop and to have
offered in evidence the documents upon which you will rely, with any
short explanatory statement as to the meaning of the documents. And if
there is any part of a document which has been produced by the
Prosecution but not cited by them which you think it necessary to refer
to, as explanatory of the part of the document which has been used by
them, then you are at liberty to put in, to offer in evidence that part
of the document with any short explanatory words that you wish. But I do
not understand what you are doing now except making a speech.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I was using the opposing fact which I wish to
present against the claims of the Prosecution, because according to my
information and according to my documents, they do not correspond to the
facts. As far as the establishment of Point 1 of what Mr. President has
just said, I would like to state the following: The health of the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop is quite poor at present. This morning the
doctor told me that Ribbentrop is suffering from so-called vasomotor
disturbances in his speech. I wanted to take a part of his evidence
statement from my client by making a statement of it here and thus
showing the position of the defendant to the Tribunal. I do not know
whether the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in view of his present state of
health, that is, his impediment of speech, could make these explanations
as briefly as I myself can. Then, when the defendant is in the box, he
needs only to confirm these statements under oath.
THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is too ill to give
evidence today, then he must give evidence on some future occasion. If
you have any oral witnesses to call other than the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop, then they can give evidence today; and with reference to the
documentary evidence, it is perfectly simple for you to offer those
documents in evidence in the way that it was done by Dr. Stahmer, in the
way that it was done by Dr. Seidl, and the way in which the Tribunal
have explained over and over again.
DR. HORN: I had intended to submit documents first and not to call my
witnesses until later. As far as Von Ribbentrop is concerned, I have
learned that his condition has become constantly worse. I do not know
therefore whether at the end of the presentation of evidence I will be
in a position to summon the Defendant Von Ribbentrop; but I must be
prepared for the possibility that I might not be able to call him. And
otherwise I am concerned with only a very few very general points for
rectification.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you cannot give evidence at any rate and if you
cannot call Von Ribbentrop, then you must, if it is possible to do so,
call some other witnesses who will give the evidence which he would have
given. If, unfortunately, it is not possible to do so, then his case may
suffer; but the Tribunal will give every possible facility for his being
called at any stage. If he is in fact so ill, as you suggest, that he
cannot give evidence, then his evidence may be put off until the end of
the defendants’ case, subject of course to a proper medical certificate
being produced.
DR. HORN: If the Court wants then later to hear the defendant, I will
postpone the matter with the request that if I cannot hear him, that is,
cannot hear him fully—for I emphasize again, there is a speech
disturbance—then he can at least confirm the evidence as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: You may call any of the witnesses; the Tribunal has not
laid down that the defendant must be called first. You have applied for
eight witnesses, I think, in addition to the defendant and you can call
any of them or you can deal with your documents, but whichever you do,
you must do it in the way which the Tribunal has ordered.
DR. HORN: Then, I will turn now to the occupation of the Rhineland.
On 27 February 1936, there was ratified between the French Republic and
the Soviet Union a mutual-assistance pact, the content of which clearly
violated the Locarno Treaty and the covenant of the League of Nations,
and was solely directed against Germany. At the same time...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have just said that something or other is
against international law. Now, that is not a reference to any document
which you are offering in evidence, nor is it any comment upon the
production of oral evidence. If you have a document to offer, kindly
offer it and then make any necessary explanatory remarks.
DR. HORN: Then, I wanted next to refer to Document Number 1 in the
Document Book Ribbentrop. We are concerned with a memorandum of the
German Government to the signatory powers of the Locarno Pact, of 7
March 1936.
THE PRESIDENT: Which page is that?
DR. HORN: That is on Page 6 of the document book. In explanation I may
add that this memorandum was submitted to the signatory powers, because
between the French Government and the Republic of the Soviet Union a
treaty of mutual assistance had been ratified and at the same time, the
German Foreign Office received knowledge of a plan which the French
General Staff had worked out and which arranged that the French Army was
to advance along the line of the Main, so that North and South Germany
in this way would be separated, and even to join hands with the Russian
Army across Czechoslovakia.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, for the formality of the record, it is
necessary to offer each document in evidence and the document should be
given a number. You have not yet offered any of these documents in
evidence or given them any numbers, so far as I know.
DR. HORN: I gave this document the number, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 1.
The number is in the upper right hand corner of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. HORN: And I ask—perhaps I may say this in order to save time—I ask
that all these documents quoted as Ribbentrop exhibit number be accepted
in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, and in the order in which you quote them?
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: They will be numbered that way. Very well.
DR. HORN: As to the particulars just submitted on the reason for this
memorandum being lodged, and as evidence of the fact just cited
regarding the arrangement of the French General Staff, I will call Von
Neurath as a witness. I will question him on this one point, when he is
called into the box. In order to justify the German view, which is
contained in the memorandum and which consists in the fact that the
Locarno Pact and the League of Nations covenant were considered
infringed upon, I would like to refer to Page 3 of the document and wish
to quote the following—this is on Page 8 of the document book:
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, was this document Exhibit Number Ribbentrop-1,
one of the documents for which you applied and which you were allowed in
the applications?
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President. This document is concerned with excerpts
from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_ (_Documents of German
Politics_), Volume 4.
I want to stress that this collection of documents was granted to me at
the same time as the two evidence books.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to see the original document.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are not in a position to present original
documents, since the Foreign Office was confiscated by the victorious
powers and with it a great part of the documents. Then I would have to
make an application now that the signatory powers concerned produce
these original documents, for we simply are not able to. We can only
refer to document collections.
THE PRESIDENT: Where does the copy come from?
DR. HORN: This copy, Mr. President, is from the _Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik_, Volume 4, as is shown in the document book which the President
has before him. The document is found on Page 123 of this document
collection.
I should like, Mr. President, to add an explanatory remark: If the Court
is interested in seeing the original, I should have to have the
collection, which is up in the document room now, brought down. It is in
German, and I do not believe that it would be of any value to the
Tribunal at this time. May I mention further...
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, as a matter of formality and
certainty, the Tribunal ought to have in its record every document which
forms part of the record, whether it is an original or whether it is a
copy; and whatever the document is that is offered in evidence, it ought
to be handed in to the Tribunal and kept by the Tribunal. It ought to be
put in evidence, offered in evidence, and handed to the General
Secretary or his representative, and then the Tribunal has a full record
of every document which is in evidence.
But we cannot have documents such as this, which is a mere copy of the
original document which ought to be offered in evidence. If it is at the
Information Center, then it is quite capable of being produced here.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Court decided that we are justified in
copying documents and certifying to the authenticity in order that these
documents may be submitted as evidence to the Tribunal. Therefore, we
have compared every document with the original we had on hand, or with
the printed copy of the document and at the end of the document we
attested the authenticity of the copy. This document, certified with my
own signature, is in the hands of the Tribunal, I believe in five
copies.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn—Yes, Mr. Dodd.
MR. DODD: We thought that we might be helpful. We say that we are
willing to accept this quotation from the volume referred to, and I do
think that we did put in some documents ourselves and asked the Court’s
indulgence at the time in something of the same fashion.
I think the Court, if I may suggest respectfully, might take this
document on that same basis.
I have conferred only with Sir David, but I feel quite sure that our
French and Russian colleagues will agree as well.
THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Dodd, the point is—and, of course, it is
probably only a formal point—that the only document which is offered in
evidence or put in evidence is a copy which does not contain Dr. Horn’s
signature and therefore there is nothing to show that it is in fact a
true copy. Of course, if we had had Dr. Horn’s signature, we would be
prepared to accept that it was a true copy of the original. What we have
before us is a mere mimeograph, I suppose, of some document which has
not been produced to us.
MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. I have not had an opportunity to
examine it carefully. We did not get these documents, by the way, until
pretty late last night. We have not had the usual period of time to
examine it, but in any event, I have suggested it might go in, and if
Dr. Horn would verify it, as suggested by the President, and later
furnish the original copy, it might be all right.
THE PRESIDENT: That would be all right, certainly.
Dr. Horn, you understand what I mean. If you will produce to us at some
future date the actual document which you signed yourself, to show that
it was a true copy, that will be quite satisfactory.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, in the entire document book there is no
document which I have not signed and given in five copies to be
translated. Of course, I cannot also sign all the translations. This
document which is contained in the document book submitted to the
President has my signature in the German text.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you have handed your documents in to be
translated, in German, with your signature at the bottom, saying it is a
true extract, and you do not know where those documents are because they
have gone into the Translation Division? That is right, is it not?
DR. HORN: Only partially, Mr. President. I know that I handed in these
documents, to the proper office, in German, and with my signature. Then
that office kept them and had them translated. From the moment I handed
them in I naturally have had no further control of what happened.
I may also point out that the document books which we used were
available only in a single copy and must be used by all attorneys, even
now, for their future work. Because of that, I cannot produce the
original for the Tribunal since it is not my property. That can be done
in agreement only with the person in charge of the document section,
Lieutenant Commander Schrader.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, if, in the future, you and the other
defendants’ counsel could get your document books ready in sufficient
time, you could perhaps then make the arrangement that you hand in the
document book, when you are offering it in evidence, and then it would
be capable of being handed to the officer of the Court.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I do not believe that that possibility exists
at all, for these _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_—just to use this
example—are available only in one copy for the use of all Defense
Counsel attorneys; I cannot take these books away, if they wish to
continue work with them, in order to submit them to the Tribunal as
evidence. I would not receive them. I receive these books only to use
them, and make excerpts from them, and then I have to return them.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you are putting in evidence now a certain
extract from the book, and all the Tribunal wants is that that extract
be certified, either by you or by some other person who can be trusted,
as a correct extract from the book, and that that document, so signed,
can be produced. It may be difficult to produce it at the moment because
you have handed it in to some official or to somebody in the Translation
Division and therefore you cannot produce it, but it could be arranged
that it should be produced in the future. I do not mean this particular
one, but in the future other defendants’ counsel can produce their
documents certified by themselves or by some other person of authority.
DR. HORN: That has already been done, Mr. President. Five document books
of the same type, signed by me, were handed to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, the rule of the Tribunal happens to be that
they should be handed in, in this Court, at the time that they are being
used, as well as their being handed in to somebody for the purpose of
translation. That is the rule.
But now perhaps we had better get on as we are taking up too much time
over this.
DR. HORN: I have just heard that the German documents which I signed are
being procured from the Secretariat General, so I will be able to submit
them to the Tribunal with signature, in the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. HORN: I should like to continue and explain the afore-mentioned
opinion of the legal consequences of the Pact made between France and
Russia in 1936, and I refer to Page 3, that is, Page 8 of the document
book. I quote:
“Consequently, the only question is whether France, in accepting
these treaty obligations, has kept within those limits which, in
her relation to Germany have been laid on her by the Rhine Pact.
“This, however, the German Government must deny.
“The Rhine Pact was supposed to achieve the goal of securing
peace in Western Europe by having Germany on the one hand, and
France and Belgium on the other, renounce for all time employing
military force in their relations to each other. If, by the
conclusion of the pact, certain reservations to this
renunciation of war, going beyond the right of self-defense,
were permitted, the political reason for this was, as is
generally known, solely the fact that France had already taken
on certain alliance obligations towards Poland and
Czechoslovakia which she did not want to sacrifice to the idea
of absolute peace security in the West. Germany at that time
accepted in good faith these reservations to the renunciation of
war. She did not object to the treaties with Poland and
Czechoslovakia, placed on the table at Locarno by the
representative of France, only because of the self-understood
supposition that these treaties adapted themselves to the
structure of the Rhine Pact and did not contain any provisions
on the application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations, such as are provided for in the new French-Soviet
agreements. This was true also of the contents of these special
agreements, which came to the knowledge of the German Government
at that time. The exceptions permitted in the Rhine Pact did, it
is true, not expressly refer to Poland and Czechoslovakia, but
were formulated generally. But it was the sense of all
negotiations about this matter to find a compromise between the
German-French renunciation of war and the desire of France to
maintain her already existent pact obligations. If, therefore,
France now takes advantage of the abstract formulation of war
possibilities allowed for in the Rhine Treaty in order to
conclude a new pact against Germany with a highly armed state,
if thus in such a decisive manner she limits the scope of the
renunciation of war mutually agreed upon with Germany, and if,
as set forth above, she does not even observe the stipulated
formal juridical limits, then she has created thereby a
completely new situation and has destroyed the political system
of the Rhine Pact both in theory and literally.”
I will omit the next paragraph and will quote from Page 9 of the
document book as follows:
“The German Government have always emphasized during the
negotiations of the last years that they would maintain and
carry out all obligations of the Rhine Pact as long as the other
partners to the Pact also were willing on their part to adhere
to this Pact. This natural supposition cannot any longer be
regarded as fulfilled by France. In violation of the Rhine Pact,
France has replied to the friendly offers and peaceful
assurances, made again and again by Germany, with a military
alliance with the Soviet Union, directed exclusively against
Germany. Therefore the Rhine Pact of Locarno has lost its inner
meaning and has ceased to exist in any practical sense. For that
reason Germany also on her side does not consider herself bound
any longer by this pact which has become void.”
In consideration of the Franco-Russian pact and the intentions of the
French General Staff, Hitler had the Defendant Von Ribbentrop come to
him in order to question him about the presumable attitude of England to
a possible German reoccupation...
THE PRESIDENT: You are reading from the document, are you not, Dr. Horn?
You begin to tell us something about Hitler.
DR. HORN: Yes, I interrupted at the phrase “as bound by this pact which
has become void,” in order to bring in the role of Ribbentrop briefly.
On the basis of this pact and of the intentions of the French General
Staff, Hitler then had the Defendant Von Ribbentrop...
THE PRESIDENT: We shall hear that from Von Ribbentrop, shall we not?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are permitted to add a few connecting words
to the documents. I can now...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Pokrovsky.
COL. POKROVSKY: As far as I can understand, the Tribunal has already
explained to Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel, Dr. Horn, that the Defense is
now submitting a document. Although Dr. Horn does not consider it
necessary to state when he deviates from the document and when he quotes
from it, I have had the opportunity of noting that in the document he
has just quoted, numbered Ribbentrop-1, there is a complete absence of
any reference to the plans of the French General Staff. Among the
documents in the document book submitted by Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel
I could not find any copies of the plans of the French General Staff. It
is therefore quite incomprehensible to me how Dr. Horn happens to be
informed about the plans of the French General Staff, and on what
grounds he refers to these plans while presenting evidence, in
Ribbentrop’s case, since they appear to be completely absent among the
documents to which he refers.
DR. HORN: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what you appeared to the Tribunal to be doing
then was not anything explanatory of the document, but telling us what
Hitler did, and what the Defendant Ribbentrop did, in consequence of
what Hitler did. That is not in evidence. You cannot tell us what is not
in evidence. You can only give us explanatory remarks to make the
document itself intelligible.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is accused on
account of the conduct of the entire foreign policy. The Prosecution
have presented the foreign political activity as they see it, and we
have been permitted, not to give a speech, but, in connection with the
documents submitted, to present our opposing view, as the Defense see
it. In order to do that, I must refer to certain facts, documents and
quotations. I can never give a complete picture if I may just submit a
document without giving a large frame to this matter, a certain
development in the entire policy.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is not expecting you to give
a complete picture at this stage. All you are doing at the present
moment is introducing the evidence. You are going to give the complete
picture when you make your final speech. It is intelligible, this
document. It is a document which is well known; it is perfectly
intelligible without telling us what Hitler or what the Defendant
Ribbentrop did.
DR. HORN: Regarding these questions raised by the Russian Prosecutor, I
have already asked for the Defendant Von Neurath as a witness. I can
interrogate him on this point only after the Defendant Von Neurath is in
the witness box. But I can still refer now to these facts that are
counterevidence.
THE PRESIDENT: But, you see, that would be his function. If you are
going to tell us what you think the Defendant Von Neurath is going to
say in answer to questions which you put to him, that would be making an
opening statement. Well, that has not been provided for by the Charter.
We must wait until you call Von Neurath or until you question Von
Neurath.
DR. HORN: Then I will read from this document just mentioned, Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 1, on Page 10 of the document book:
“The German Government are now forced to face the new situation
created by this alliance, a situation which is made more
critical by the fact that the Franco-Soviet pact has found its
complement in a pact of alliance of exactly parallel nature
between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In the interest of
the elementary right of a nation to safeguard its borders and to
guarantee its defensive capacities, the German Government have
therefore re-established the full and unrestricted sovereignty
of the Reich in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland,
effective today.”
I ask the Tribunal to accept the entire document as evidence. Through
this step of the German Government certain articles of the Treaty of
Versailles which were concerned with the demilitarization of the
Rhineland zone had become obsolete. Since this morning, by decision of
the Court, the taking of a position on the Versailles Treaty is not
permitted, I will omit the corresponding material from the document book
of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, and turn now to the document Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 8, which is on Page 21 of the document book.
May I put another question first, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
DR. HORN: Is it permitted to submit the official documents on the Treaty
of Versailles that were exchanged between governments before the
conclusion of the treaty? These are purely government documents and not
any arguments on the treaty itself. May these documents be submitted
after the decision of the Tribunal today?
THE PRESIDENT: Which are they, the one on Page 21?
DR. HORN: This is in regard to the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is that?
DR. HORN: It is on Page 14 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal would like to know what issue in
this Trial this document is relevant to.
DR. HORN: I wanted to explain by it the German opinion of the Treaty of
Versailles. Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 2 is the note of Germany to the
United States that contains the offer for an armistice and conclusion of
peace. And I wanted further to show in the next note again that this
offer was one based on the Wilsonian Fourteen Points. Further, with
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 4, I wanted to submit evidence that the peace
and the armistice were to be concluded on the basis of the Fourteen
Points with two exceptions. I also wanted to show through Ribbentrop
Exhibit...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I tried not to interrupt, but really
this is the issue that the Tribunal ruled on a fortnight ago when the
Defendant Göring, I think, applied for documents on exactly this issue;
and that also, as I understand, the Tribunal ruled on again this
morning. The issue is perfectly clear; the only issue to which this can
be directed is whether the Treaty of Versailles was in accordance with
the Fourteen Points and if not, was therefore an unjust treaty which
comes directly within the Tribunal’s ruling of an hour ago.
DR. HORN: May I add something more?
As far as I and my colleagues have understood the ruling of the Tribunal
today, the only prohibition is against making before this Tribunal
statements on the injustice of the treaty and on the fact that it
purportedly was concluded under duress. We have not understood the
decision in any other way.
THE PRESIDENT: That was why I asked you to what issue this was relevant,
and you said that it was relevant to showing what the German opinion on
the treaty was. Well, these are documents of the period before the
treaty was made, and they seem to be only relevant upon the question of
whether or not the treaty was a just treaty or not a just treaty.
DR. HORN: I personally did not want to demonstrate through this document
either that it was a just or an unjust peace, but only that it was a
treaty which had many legal inadequacies, since the main treaty was not
in line with the agreements of the preliminary treaty.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if the main treaty was not in accordance with the
preliminary treaty then the main treaty would, according to that
argument be an unfair treaty. That is the very point upon which the
Tribunal has ruled.
DR. HORN: For that reason, Mr. President, I have just omitted these
documents also and said that I will not refer to them in view of this
ruling. I will now turn to Document Number 8.
THE PRESIDENT: As you are going through a lot of documents we might
break off for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. DODD: I do not want to take much of the Tribunal’s time, but in view
of the statement of Dr. Horn concerning the condition of the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop, I think it is required that we inform the Tribunal of
the situation as we understand it, which is something quite different
from the understanding of Dr. Horn.
I have talked with Colonel Andrus and with one of the Army doctors in
attendance. Colonel Andrus has talked with both of them, and our
understanding is that Ribbentrop is not ill and is able to take the
witness stand; that he is nervous, and appears to be frightened, but he
is not disabled in any sense and is capable of testifying.
DR. HORN: I come now to Page 21 of the document book, and ask the Court
to take judicial notice of the document appearing under Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 8. It is a copy, again from the _Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik_, Volume 4, which I turned over, signed, to the Court. It is the
speech of Ambassador Von Ribbentrop at the 91st session of the League of
Nations Council in London, regarding the Soviet Pact, the Locarno Pact
and the German Peace Plan. The speech was delivered on 19 March 1936. I
refer to Page 3 of the speech and begin my quotation with Number 5. I
quote:
“According to this alliance, France and Russia appoint
themselves judges on their own affairs by independently
determining the aggressor, if occasion arises without a
resolution or a recommendation of the League of Nations, and
thereby are able to go to war against Germany according to their
own judgment.
“This strict obligation of the two countries is clearly and
unequivocally evident from Paragraph 1 of the signatory protocol
to the Treaty of Alliance. That means: In a given case France
can decide, on her own judgment, whether Germany or Soviet
Russia is the aggressor. She merely reserves the right not to be
exposed, on account of military action based on such an
individual decision, to sanctions on the part of the powers
guaranteeing the Rhine Pact, namely, England and Italy.
“From the point of view of law and realistic politics, this
reservation is meaningless.
“In terms of law: How will France be able to foresee, when
determining the aggressor herself, what attitude the guarantors
of the Locarno Pact will afterwards assume towards her one-sided
definition? The answer to the question of whether France would
have to fear sanctions in such a case depends in practice not
only on the faithful adherence to the pact by the
guarantors—about which the German Government do not wish to
raise doubts in any way—but also on the most various
prerequisites of a purely factual nature, the probability or
improbability of which is not to be perceived in advance. In
addition, however, the evaluation of the relationship between
the new Treaty of Alliance and the Rhine Pact cannot be made
dependent on the treaty relationship between France and Germany
on the one hand and the Guaranteeing Powers on the other, but
only on the direct treaty relationship between France and
Germany themselves. Otherwise one would have to expect Germany
to tolerate silently every possible violation of the Rhine Pact
by France, in confidence that the guarantors would have to
provide for her security. That certainly is not the intention of
the Rhine Pact.
“In terms of realistic politics: When a country is attacked by
such a superior military coalition as a consequence of a
decision, incorrect because taken in advance in one of the
party’s own interests, it is an empty consolation to obtain its
right in subsequent sanctions against the aggressors condemned
by the League of Nations Council. For what sanctions could
actually hit such a gigantic coalition reaching from East Asia
to the Channel? These two countries are such powerful and
important members and especially militarily strong factors of
the League of Nations that according to all practical
considerations, sanctions would be unthinkable from the outset.
“Therefore this second reservation dealing with the
consideration of probable sanctions is of no consequence at all
from a realistic political point of view.
“I now ask the members of the Council to bear in mind not only
the legal and practical political scope of this obligation of
France’s to act independently, but to ask yourselves above all
whether the opinion can be advocated that the German Government
of that time, which signed the Locarno Pact, would ever have
taken upon themselves the obligations of this Pact, had it
contained such one-sided stipulations as have now later
developed.”
I now go to Page 26 of the document book, and the same document, and to
clarify the German point of view, I add the following. I quote:
“But the Franco-Soviet Russian alliance means, beyond that—in
the German Government’s view of history—a complete elimination
of the hitherto existing European balance and consequently of
the fundamental political and legal conditions under which the
Locarno Pact was concluded at that time.”
With this, Germany had expressed the legal basis of her attitude toward
the Locarno Pact and the Versailles stipulations regarding the
demilitarization of the Rhineland. In order to prove her will to disarm,
there is in the same document on Page 7, that is, Page 27 of the
document book, an exhaustive and detailed disarmament proposal.
I ask the Tribunal to accept in evidence the document just cited, so
that I may later refer to it.
With this exposition I conclude my presentation on Germany’s reasons for
reoccupying the Rhineland. Regarding the role of the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop in the occupation of the Rhineland, I shall enter upon that
when I call the Defendant to the witness stand.
After the occupation of the Rhineland, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop
returned to London, where he was then ambassador. On 4 February 1938 he
was appointed Foreign Minister, and from that time on, conducted the
foreign policy along the lines laid down by Hitler. In proof of this
statement I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10, to be found in the
document book. This is a very short document that I submit to the
Tribunal for judicial notice. It is an excerpt from the speech of the
Führer before the German Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin on
19 July 1940. I quote:
“I cannot conclude this appraisal without finally thanking the
man who for years has carried out my foreign political
directions in loyal, tireless, self-sacrificing devotion.
“The name of Party member Von Ribbentrop will be linked for all
time with the political rise of the German Nation as that of the
Reich Foreign Minister.”
I submit this quotation to the Tribunal to show according to what
principles the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had to conduct the foreign
policy.
I should like now to ask the Tribunal to hear the witness State
Secretary Von Steengracht.
[_The witness Von Steengracht took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?
ADOLF FREIHERR STEENGRACHT VON MOYLAND (Witness): Adolf von Steengracht.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. HORN: What was your last position in the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: From May 1943 I was State Secretary of the Foreign
Office.
DR. HORN: What were your activities?
VON STEENGRACHT: In order to present my activities in a comprehensible
way, I must make the following prefatory remarks:
From the beginning of the war, the Foreign Minister had his office in
the neighborhood of Hitler’s headquarters; that is to say in most
instances several hundred kilometers distant from Berlin. There he
carried on business with a restricted staff. The Foreign Office in
Berlin had duties of a routine and administrative nature. But above all,
its duty was also the execution of the regular intercourse with foreign
diplomats.
Within the limits of this field of duties, I bore the responsibility, as
State Secretary, from May 1943. The molding of foreign political
opinion, the decisions and instructions in foreign policy, on the other
hand, originated from headquarters, mostly without any participation,
sometimes also without any subsequent information to the Foreign Office.
DR. HORN: Who determined the basic lines of the foreign policy?
VON STEENGRACHT: The foreign policy, not only on its basic lines, but
also usually down to the most minute details, was determined by Hitler
himself. Ribbentrop frequently stated that the Führer needed no Foreign
Minister, he simply wanted a foreign political secretary. Ribbentrop, in
my opinion, would have been satisfied with such a position because then
at least, backed by Hitler’s authority, he could have eliminated partly
the destructive and indirect foreign political influences and their sway
on Hitler. Perhaps he might then have had a chance of influencing
Hitler’s speeches, which the latter was accustomed to formulate without
Ribbentrop, even in the foreign political field.
DR. HORN: Were there other offices or personalities, in addition to the
Foreign Office, that concerned themselves with foreign policy?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, there was practically no office in the Party or
its organizations that, after 1933, had no foreign political ambitions.
Every one of these offices had a sort of foreign bureau through which it
took up connections with foreign countries in the attempt to gain its
own foreign political channels.
I should judge the number of these to be approximately thirty. For
example, the Hitler Jugend, the SA, the German Labor Front, the SS, the
Rosenberg office with its Foreign Political office, the Propaganda
Ministry, the office Waldeck, the Ribbentrop office, the Nordic Society;
further, the VDA, the German Academy, the Reich Railways (Reichsbahn)
and others. Besides these offices, the immediate entourage of Hitler and
personalities like Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann had an influence in
the shaping of foreign policy. Göring, too, as I see it, had perhaps a
certain influence, but only until 1938—at any rate, in matters of
foreign politics, scarcely later than that.
DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop make efforts to prevent such influences or
to exclude them?
VON STEENGRACHT: From my own observation, I can give only the following
judgment: Almost every one of those persons, who had never before lived
in foreign countries and who, as an occasional traveling salesman for
the Third Reich, in peacetime, or after the occupation of a foreign
country, had eaten well in the capital of this or that foreign country,
considered himself an unrivaled expert on this country. They all had a
predilection for bringing their enlightenment and discernment to Hitler.
Unfortunately the further they were removed from actual conditions, the
more they were in contradiction to the political requirements and
necessities, and especially, unfortunately, the more so-called strength
was shown and the more they stood in contradiction to the elementary
feelings of humanity, the more they pleased Hitler. For Hitler regarded
such statements and representations as sound judgment, and they had
sometimes an irreparable effect, and formed in Hitler’s mind, together
with his so-called intuition, the start of some fundamental idea. To the
possible objection that it should have been easy for an expert to
criticize such an opinion or view, I should like to point out the
following: As long as the future German Ambassador in Paris was still a
teacher of painting, Hitler read his reports with interest; but when he
became the official representative of the Reich, his reports were mostly
thrown unread into the wastepaper basket. Himmler’s reports, the slanted
opinions of Goebbels, and Bormann’s influence played, on the other hand,
a decisive role, as did reports from agents which could not be checked
and which carried more weight than the opinions of experts on the
countries.
DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for relations with all
foreign countries?
VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to remark further here that I have not
yet answered the second part of your question, namely, regarding the
elimination of this influence.
With Hitler’s methods of work, these so-called counterinfluences simply
could not be eliminated. Against this “organized disorganization”
Ribbentrop waged an unmitigating, bitter war, and that against almost
all German offices. I should like to state further that at least 60
percent of his time was devoted to these things alone.
DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for the relations with all
foreign countries?
VON STEENGRACHT: In peacetime, yes.
DR. HORN: Did the position of the Foreign Office change with the
outbreak of war?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. In point of fact, the Foreign Office lost its
competency toward the country concerned at the moment when the German
bayonet crossed the border. The exclusive right to maintain direct
relations with foreign governments was eliminated in all occupied
territories; in most instances even the right to have a representative
of the Foreign Office whose post was for observation only and without
competency. This is particularly true for the Eastern Territories and
for Norway.
Where Ribbentrop made the effort to maintain, in spite of the
occupation, a certain degree of independence of a country, as, for
example, in Norway, this activity of our diplomats was termed weak,
traitorous, stupid, and those responsible had to stop their work at
once, on Hitler’s orders, and disappeared from the Foreign Office.
In general the changed position of the Foreign Office during the war is
best characterized by Hitler’s statement: “The Foreign Office shall, as
far as possible, disappear from the picture until the end of the war.”
Hitler wanted to limit the Foreign Office to about 20 to 40 people, and
it was even partially forbidden to form or to maintain any connection
with the Foreign Office.
The Foreign Office, as such, and its officials were detested by Hitler.
He considered them objective jurists, defeatists, and cosmopolitans, to
whom a matter can be given only if it is not to be carried out.
DR. HORN: Was there any foreign policy, in a traditional sense, in
Germany?
VON STEENGRACHT: No; at least, I never noticed anything of it, for
Hitler had in effect made the statement: “Diplomacy is defrauding the
people. Treaties are childish; they are respected only as long as they
seem useful to the respective partners.” That was Hitler’s opinion of
all diplomats in the world.
DR. HORN: Did the Foreign Office have any influence in the Eastern
territories and the territories that were under civilian administration?
VON STEENGRACHT: T have already touched on this question. I have already
said that in the territories in which there was a military government or
a civilian administration, a representative of the Foreign Office—if he
was tolerated at all—was tolerated only as an observation post, at any
rate had no functions; that was the rule.
I think I would be going too far if I went through the condition in
every country. The situations varied.
DR. HORN: Do you consider Von Ribbentrop a typical National Socialist or
not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop was, in his whole attitude, no typical
exponent of National Socialism. He knew extraordinarily little of the
dogma and doctrines of National Socialism. He felt himself only
personally bound to Hitler, whom he followed with soldierly obedience,
and he stood under a certain hypnotic dependence on Hitler. However, I
cannot characterize him as a typical exponent of National Socialism.
DR. HORN: Was Hitler a man who was accessible to suggestions and
objections?
VON STEENGRACHT: In the first years after 1933 he is said still to have
been; but during the course of years he shut himself off more and more
from expert objections and suggestions. From the time that I became
State Secretary, I saw him only twice on official occasions. I can thus
speak only on the success or lack of success of our work. In the course
of my activities, covering almost 2 years, I can now recall almost no
case in which he agreed to one of our suggestions. On the contrary, it
was always to be feared that by some suggestion of a personal nature he
would be led to take violent action in an opposite direction. The basic
trait of his character was probably lack of confidence, and this bore
unprecedented fruit. Thus, experts and decent people who tried to
influence Hitler to their way of thinking were engaged, in my opinion,
in an altogether vain task. On the other hand, irresponsible creatures
who incited him to take violent measures, or who voiced their
suspicions, unfortunately found him extremely accessible. These men were
then termed strong, whereas the behavior of anyone who was even halfway
normal was condemned as weak or defeatist; through a reasonable opinion
voiced only once, the influence of that man could be forever destroyed.
DR. HORN: What conclusions did Hitler draw from contradictory viewpoints
in respect to the contradicting persons?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question in general terms. I have
already shown it in my previous answers. First of all the reaction
depended very much, in my opinion, on the mood of the Dictator at the
time. It was also a matter of importance as to who contradicted and how
much strength or weakness he had already shown or seemed to have shown.
But what the atmosphere was can perhaps be demonstrated by the following
case, shortly after the death of President Roosevelt, as told by
Ribbentrop’s liaison agent with Hitler, a man named Hewel. He said:
“Today I almost met my doom. Goebbels came from the Führer, and
reported on Germany’s prospects, as far as the Führer saw them
affected by Roosevelt’s death, and he drew up a very hopeful
picture of the future. I, Hewel, was of the opinion that such a
view was not justified and remarked as much cautiously to
Goebbels. Goebbels fell into a rage, called me a spirit who
demoralized everyone, who trampled on the happy moods and hopes
of every decent person. I was forced,” Hewel reports, “to make a
special trip to see Goebbels and to ask him to keep the matter
to himself. For if he had informed the Führer of my attitude,
Hitler would have merely pressed a button, and called
Rattenhuber, the Chief of his Security Service, and had me taken
away and shot.”
DR. HORN: How do you explain the fact that so many people remained in
Hitler’s circle, although they could not agree with him on basic
matters?
VON STEENGRACHT: It is true that many people remained in their positions
although at heart they disapproved of Hitler’s methods of government
and, indeed, were inimical to those methods. There are various reasons
for this.
First, it must be said that the NSDAP had come into power according to
the rules of parliamentary procedure as being the strongest Party in the
Reichstag. The officials employed had no reason at all to retire from
service on account of the change of government. In consequence of the
change to dictatorial government and the completely different concept of
the State which the change of government involved, the individual
suddenly found that he was no longer allowed to take a position of his
own concerning this regime. The notorious reign of terror began.
Everywhere, in the ministries and chancelleries, in private dwellings,
and in restaurants there hovered spies who, out of fanaticism or for
pay, were willing to report everything they heard.
Nevertheless, many would deliberately have risked the gravest
consequences, if their withdrawal could have in any way improved
anything. But it became obvious that such persons merely sacrificed
themselves and especially their families unavailingly, because cases of
the kind were painstakingly withheld from publicity and therefore had no
effect. Worst of all was the fact that the appointment vacated was
filled by an especially radical man. Many people realized this and
remained at their posts in order to prevent the development that I have
just described. The great number of atrocities committed or ordered by
Hitler or Himmler have led many foreigners to the conclusion that the
German people as a whole shared the guilt for these crimes, or at least
had knowledge of them. This is not the case. The majority of people even
in high government positions did not learn details of these matters—or
the extent to which they were carried on—until the war was over.
Perhaps the key to this is found in the speech which Himmler delivered
in Posen on 3 October 1943 to his Gruppenführer, and which I learned of
for the first time here. This speech directed that his special
assignments—that means the actions against the Jews and the
concentration camps—were to be kept just as secret as had been the
events of 30 June 1934, of which the German people have only now learned
the authentic story.
Guilt for all these occurrences rests only on a relatively small group,
to be appraised at a few thousand people. It was these who carried out
this unparalleled terror against the German people. But those who
thought differently and who remained are chiefly to be thanked for the
fact that, for example, the Geneva Convention was not renounced, that
tens or even hundreds of thousands of English or American airmen and
prisoners were not shot, that the unfortunate prisoners, those seriously
wounded, were returned during the war to their families in their home
countries; Greece in her dire need received food; exchange was
stabilized as far as possible, as in Belgium and France, and militarily
pointless destruction ordered in foreign countries and in the home
country could be in part prevented or at least lessened; indeed that the
principles of human justice, in some places at least, remained alive.
These circles were discouraged in their attitude earlier by the fact
that no foreign power had used the conditions in Germany as a reason for
breaking off diplomatic relations, but that almost all, until the
outbreak of war negotiated with National Socialism, concluded treaties
and even had their diplomatic representatives at the National Socialist
Party Days at Nuremberg. It was particularly noted that National
Socialist Germany, outwardly at any rate, received much more
consideration, understanding, and respect from foreign countries than
ever had the Weimar Republic despite all its fidelity to treaties or its
integrity.
Then the war came, and with it special duties for civil servants,
officers, and every individual German. Should, and if so when and how
could these people who still felt themselves to be the servants of the
nation, leave their posts under these circumstances? Would they, above
all, by taking such a step be useful to their country and to humanity?
Would they have frightened Hitler or even warned him?
DR. HORN: Did you make peace suggestions of a foreign political nature
to Von Ribbentrop after the French campaign?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I had at that time, to be sure, no official
position. But I nevertheless felt the need, and I believe it was a
heartfelt wish of many, if not all, Germans, to see peaceful conditions
again in the world as soon as possible. On the day of the capitulation
of the King of the Belgians, I suggested:
Firstly, the creation of a United States of Europe on a democratic
basis. This would have meant independence of Holland, Belgium, Poland,
and so on.
Secondly, if this could not be brought about with Hitler, at any rate to
have as few encroachments on the autonomy of the countries as possible.
DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop speak to Hitler on this matter?
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. But at that time Hitler
considered such plans as premature.
DR. HORN: Did you speak to Von Ribbentrop again in the winter of 1942-43
on the same subject?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Ribbentrop at that time also worked out very
concrete proposals. They provided for the sovereignty and independence
of all conquered countries, including Poland, and in addition, a
far-reaching economic collaboration.
DR. HORN: How did Hitler react then to these proposals?
VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler turned down these proposals giving as reason the
fact that the time was not suitable, the military situation not
favorable enough, that this would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
DR. HORN: Now to another question. Before the outbreak of the Russian
campaign, did Von Ribbentrop mention to Hitler Bismarck’s statement
about the danger of preventive wars?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop told me several times that he was very
concerned about the pact with Russia. In regard to preventive war, he
had stated to Hitler: “The good God does not let anyone look at His
cards.” I know too that Ribbentrop made efforts to bring our experts on
Russia to Hitler in order to explain to him the situation there and to
advise him against a war. Hitler did not permit these people to see him,
so far as I know. Only Ambassador Count Schulenburg was granted a short
audience. He, who considered such a war ill-advised and emphatically
rejected the idea, could not, however, advance his views on Russia and
the reasons against a war; for Hitler, having delivered a speech of his
own on this subject, after about 20 minutes dismissed him abruptly
without letting him speak a word.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the order of the Tribunal was that witnesses
might refresh their memory by notes, but this witness appears to the
Tribunal to have read practically every word he has said. That is not
refreshing your memory with notes. That is making a speech which you
have written out beforehand, and if that sort of thing goes on the
Tribunal will have to consider whether it is necessary to alter its rule
and adhere to the ordinary rule, which is that no witness is allowed to
refer to any notes at all except those made at the time.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, to be sure, I discussed the questions with the
witness; but his notes, if they have been made, were made by the witness
independently and without my knowledge of the exact contents. I shall
now ask the witness to answer my questions without making use of any
means which I do not know. I do not—that I want to emphasize once
again—know these answers.
Witness, is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop tried to use his
influence with Hitler to stop the damaging tendencies against the Church
and the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I know that Ribbentrop spoke frequently with
Hitler on this theme. I was absolutely in despair about the policy
toward the Church and the Jews, and for this reason had occasion to
speak to him about it often, as I have said. But he explained to me
again and again when he returned from Hitler: “Hitler cannot be spoken
to on this point. Hitler says that these problems have to be solved
before he dies.”
DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office have any knowledge
of the military planning?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop frequently told me that he was completely in
the dark in military affairs. So far as the Foreign Office was
concerned, it had no ideas whatever of strategic planning.
DR. HORN: What were the relations between Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels,
and Bormann?
VON STEENGRACHT: The relations between Ribbentrop and the aforenamed
gentlemen were as bad as can be imagined. There was a perpetual fight
between them. In my opinion Ribbentrop would have been Himmler’s first
victim if anything had happened to Hitler. A constant struggle and feud,
I should like to state, went on between these men with an exceptionally
sharp exchange of letters.
DR. HORN: What was the relationship in general between the highest Party
and Reich offices?
VON STEENGRACHT: The relationship in the individual departments
naturally varied according to the character and the origin of the
department chiefs. But one can say that the relationship was bad
throughout, and, especially, that reciprocal information, so urgently
necessary for state business, practically never developed. It was almost
more difficult for one minister to discuss a question with another
minister by telephone than to have had the Angel Gabriel himself come
from heaven and speak with one of us. Even on the most important and
essential matters, a factual discussion could not take place. There was,
in other words, practically no connection between these departments.
Moreover, they were very different, both in their character and in their
ideas.
DR. HORN: Is anything known to you about objections on the part of the
Vatican, above all regarding the Polish clergy?
VON STEENGRACHT: I heard about that later, and there must have been two
protests concerning the Catholic Polish clergy. These two notes were
submitted by the Nuncio to the State Secretary of that time. The then
State Secretary turned these over to Ribbentrop according to regulation,
and Ribbentrop in his turn presented them to Hitler. Since the Vatican
had not recognized the Government General, and accordingly the Nuncio
was not competent for these regions, Hitler declared when these notes
were presented to him:
“They are just one blunt lie. Give these notes back to the
Nuncio through the State Secretary in a sharp form, and tell him
that you will never again accept such a matter.”
DR. HORN: Were these notes then dealt with by the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: Sharp and precise instructions were then issued that in
all cases in which representatives of countries brought up matters which
were not within their authority, whether in conversations, or notes,
_note verbale_, memoranda, or other documents, these were not to be
accepted, and verbal protests were to be turned down sharply.
DR. HORN: Is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop prevented the shooting
of about 10,000 prisoners of war after the terrible air attack on
Dresden?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I know the following: Von Ribbentrop’s liaison man
with Hitler called me up one day in great excitement. He informed me
that on a suggestion by Goebbels, the Führer intended, as reprisal for
the holocaust of Dresden, to have English and American prisoners of
war—I believe mostly airmen—shot. I went immediately to Ribbentrop and
informed him of this. Ribbentrop became very excited; he turned pale as
death; he was in fact almost stunned and thought it was impossible;
picked up the phone and called up this liaison man in person in order to
verify this report. The liaison man corroborated it. Then Ribbentrop got
up immediately and went to Hitler, came back, I think after half an
hour, and told me that he had succeeded in having Hitler withdraw this
order. That is all I know about this matter.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about the convocation of an anti-Jewish
congress?
VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the convocation of an anti-Jewish congress I
know something; I believe our liaison man with Hitler informed us that,
on a suggestion of Bormann, Hitler had ordered the calling of an
anti-Jewish congress through the Rosenberg office. Ribbentrop did not
want to believe this; but nevertheless had to accept this too as true,
once he had spoken with our liaison man. Then, since on the basis of
this decision we could do nothing more officially to prevent the thing,
we nevertheless worked our way into it, and we made efforts by a policy
of hesitation, delay, and obstruction to render the convocation
impossible. And although the order was given in the spring of 1944 and
the war did not end until April 1945, this congress never actually took
place.
DR. HORN: Could you observe whether Von Ribbentrop often adopted a stern
manner with his staff, for reasons of state, although he sometimes
thought entirely differently?
VON STEENGRACHT: This would be passing a judgment. But I believe that I
must affirm this: Thinking that he was being loyal to Hitler,
Ribbentrop—it seems to me—in those cases when he went to Hitler with a
preconceived opinion and returned with a totally different view, tried
afterwards to explain to us Hitler’s view. This he always did with
special vehemence. I would assume then that this was contrary to his own
most personal original ideas.
DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop during the course of the war ask that Rome
and Florence be spared?
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. He did speak with Hitler on
these subjects.
DR. HORN: Are you acquainted with an article by Goebbels in the _Reich_,
or perhaps the _Völkischer Beobachter_, dealing with lynch justice?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Once by chance I came to Ribbentrop when he was
reading a paper and was again very excited. He asked me if I had read
the article yet, this shocking article by Goebbels. It was an article on
lynch justice.
DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop lodge a protest with Goebbels about this
article?
VON STEENGRACHT: As far as I know, he charged our press chief who had
the liaison with Goebbels to lodge a protest against this article. But
to his surprise he was forced to see that this protest was useless since
the article had not only been inspired but, I believe, ordered by
Hitler, and thus there was nothing more to be done.
DR. HORN: What attitude did the Foreign Office take in view of the trend
of this article?
VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office repudiated the article vehemently,
because it comprised an offense against international law and thus made
us depart from international law in another field. Moreover, it appealed
to the lower instincts of man, and both in internal and external policy
did great damage.
Besides, such an article, that has been read by several hundred
thousands or by millions, does irreparable damage anyway. We therefore
insisted that under no circumstances should such things appear in the
press again. I must regretfully state, however, that we had a very
difficult stand in this matter, especially since low-flying enemy craft
often shot peasants in the fields and pedestrians in the streets, that
is to say, purely civilian people, with their murder weapons. And our
arguments that in our field we wanted to observe international law under
all circumstances, were not taken into account at all either by most
German officers, or above all by Hitler personally. On the contrary, in
this case too we were regarded again only as formal jurists. But later
we did try, as much as we could, with the help of military offices, to
prevent the carrying out of this order.
DR. HORN: Do you know of a Battalion Günsberg?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know of a Battalion Günsberg. I know, of
course, of a former Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg in the Foreign
Office. This Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg received, as far as I
recall—I did not at that time do any work at all connected with these
matters—received from Ribbentrop the assignment of following, with a
few people from the Foreign Office and a few drivers, the fighting
troops, and seeing to it that, firstly, the foreign missions, for
instance in Brussels and Paris, and so forth, that stood under the
protection of the protective powers, should not be entered by our
troops. And at the same time Günsberg was charged with protecting the
files in the Foreign ministries that were of foreign political interest.
After the conclusion of the French campaign, Günsberg, as far as I
recall, was no longer in the active service of the Foreign Office, but
was listed with the Secret Field Police, from which he had received a
uniform, because as a civilian he could not enter these countries.
DR. HORN: How and when did Günsberg’s job end?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop lost interest after these events in Günsberg
and the original assignment. Then, after the beginning of the Russian
campaign, Günsberg, so far as I remember, reported again for duty and
said that he intended to do the same thing in the East, and Ribbentrop
told him:
“Yes, that is very good. You may go with a few people to the
army groups and see whether anything of interest for us is
happening there and also see to it that when we approach Moscow
the foreign embassies _et cetera_ are not entered, and that the
documents are preserved.”
But he did not consider himself any longer as belonging to the Foreign
Office and apparently received orders from other offices. Then, as I
later heard, he had a large number of men under him and had many
automobiles which he could not have received from the Foreign Office any
more than he could have received a military uniform from the Foreign
Office so he was apparently working for other offices.
DR. HORN: He no longer belonged to the Foreign Office at any rate not in
a military capacity?
VON STEENGRACHT: No. And, in addition, when Ribbentrop heard that he had
undertaken such a large job, he charged me personally to call
immediately on the SS and say that he, Ribbentrop, did not want to have
Günsberg any longer, and at that time I told Obergruppenführer Wolff
that I should like to point out that we wanted nothing more to do with
Günsberg. See to it that you keep him with the Waffen-SS along with all
his subordinates. That is all I know about the matter of Günsberg.
DR. HORN: Would Your Lordship like to interrupt the examination or
should I continue to put further questions?
THE PRESIDENT: Unless you are going to conclude almost immediately, we
had better adjourn. Will you be some time longer with this witness?
DR. HORN: I have a number of further questions.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-SECOND DAY
Wednesday, 27 March 1946
_Morning Session_
DR. HORN: Witness, you knew Count Ciano. Where and when did you meet
him?
VON STEENGRACHT: I knew Count Ciano but not in a political sense, only
personally. I cannot remember exactly when I met him; probably it was on
the occasion of a state visit. I was working at the time in the Protocol
Department in the Foreign Office.
DR. HORN: What experiences did you have with Count Ciano?
VON STEENGRACHT: Since I did not work with him politically, I had no
political experience with him.
DR. HORN: Now, another matter. Is it correct that Herr Von Ribbentrop
gave orders that under all circumstances the French franc should be
sustained against inflation?
VON STEENGRACHT: Such measures can apply only to a time when I was not
yet State Secretary. But I know that the basic attitude towards France
and all occupied territories was that under all circumstances their
currency was to be preserved as far as possible, or rather should be
preserved by all means. That is why we often sent gold to Greece in
order to attempt to maintain the value of the currency there to some
extent.
DR. HORN: What was accomplished in Greece by sending this gold there?
VON STEENGRACHT: By sending gold to Greece we lowered the rate of
exchange of foreign currencies. Thus the Greek merchants who had hoarded
food to a large extent, became frightened and threw the food on the
market, and in this way it was made available to the Greek population
again.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop gave strictest orders not to
undertake any confiscation in occupied territories but to deal directly
only with their governments?
VON STEENGRACHT: If you put the question like that, it is basically
correct, but I say, as I said yesterday, that in principle we had no
functions at all in the occupied territories, therefore no power to
confiscate, nor was such power within the jurisdiction of other
agencies; but it is correct that we negotiated only with the foreign
governments and that Von Ribbentrop had most strictly forbidden us to
support any direct measures concerning an occupied country which were
carried out by other departments.
DR. HORN: For the time being I have no further questions to put to this
witness.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Witness, are you
well acquainted with Von Papen as a result of the period during which
you were working in the Foreign Office and particularly during the time
you were active as State Secretary in the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: I had known Herr Von Papen for several years before
1933, but privately. Then I lost track of him for some time and
re-established contact with him when I became State Secretary in the
German Foreign Office. Then I was continually associated with him in an
official and unofficial capacity.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, particularly in the last period of your
activities as State Secretary, continually receive the reports which Von
Papen, as Ambassador in Ankara, sent to Berlin?
VON STEENGRACHT: Unless Herr Von Papen sent reports directly to Von
Ribbentrop—which may have been possible; I do not know—I received them
weekly through official channels.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you remember that after two previous refusals Von
Papen took over the post of Ambassador in Ankara, in April 1939, on the
day that Italy occupied Albania, whereby an acute danger of war arose in
the Southeast?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I was not State Secretary and also had no
political position, so that I am not acquainted with the events of that
period. But today I have the impression that he took over that position
after the Italians had occupied Albania. And he himself told me later
that at that time there was danger that the Italians would advance
further into the Balkans, possibly causing a conflict with Turkey, as a
result of which world peace would have been endangered. For that reason
he had decided at the time to accept the post. Exactly on which day that
was, I cannot say.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What can you say in general about Herr Von Papen’s
efforts toward peace?
VON STEENGRACHT: I am under the impression that Herr Von Papen always
strove to preserve peace by every means. He certainly considered that it
would be a great disaster for Germany and the world if war were to break
out.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were the efforts which Von Papen made during the war
towards establishing peace aimed at foregoing any annexations regardless
of the military outcome and completely re-establishing the sovereignty
of occupied territories, in short, to achieve, by means of reasonable
renunciation, a bearable status for all European states?
VON STEENGRACHT: In principle it was quite clear that Von Papen always
worked for the re-establishment of peace under conditions which would
have re-established full sovereignty for all countries, and so that no
encroachment nor damage, material or otherwise would be inflicted on any
foreign countries.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was that Von Papen’s attitude even at the time of the
greatest German military successes?
VON STEENGRACHT: I believe that his basic attitude in this respect never
changed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were his continuous personal efforts to establish peace
held against Von Papen by Hitler, and was he considered a disagreeable
outsider in that connection?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not have an opportunity to discuss it with
Hitler; I only know that he was quite generally criticized by Hitler and
other persons as a man who always followed a weak line.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen frankly acknowledge that peace would
be impossible as long as Hitler and the Party existed in Germany and the
necessary credit for negotiating abroad was lacking?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I think it must have been about April 1943 or May
1943, that I spoke to Von Papen in detail about the whole subject,
since, at that time, I had just become State Secretary. At that time he
very clearly voiced the opinion to me which you have just sketched. It
was quite plain to him that foreign countries would conclude no peace
with Hitler and the methods he employed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Just one last question, Witness: The Indictment accuses
the Defendant Von Papen of being an unscrupulous opportunist. You,
Witness, know the defendant from the reports and from all the official
relations the defendant had with his superior office for a number of
years. Did you, on the strength of that knowledge, get the impression
that this characterization of Von Papen is correct, or can you say, on
the strength of these reports and these official relations, that Von
Papen appears to you to be a man who always tells the truth, even when
that truth is disagreeable to his quite unpleasant superiors, and even
when the voicing of that truth involves personal danger for him?
VON STEENGRACHT: I can say that is absolutely so. I find the best
evidence of it is that Herr Von Papen was finally completely eliminated
from the position of Vice-Chancellor and resigned from the government,
then he became a private citizen and only in the greatest emergency was
he called upon. In my opinion, Von Papen made himself available only
because he said to himself, “I have still got a certain amount of
credit, I am a good Catholic, and accordingly I represent an attitude
which is opposed to all inhumanity, _et cetera_. Perhaps I can, through
my intervention, exercise some influence in that direction.” I myself
never attended a meeting or a conference which took place between Hitler
and Von Papen, but, particularly from my liaison officer with Hitler, I
often heard that Von Papen, in his smooth way, often told Hitler many
things which no one else could have told Hitler and I believe that
through his manner he prevented a number of things, at least for a time.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, you have stated
that Hitler, because of the terrible bombing attack on Dresden, intended
to issue an order according to which thousands of prisoners of war were
to be killed in reprisal.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Do I remember your testimony of yesterday correctly, that all
you have said about this matter is information from, or based on
information from Herr Von Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
DR. NELTE: What do you know from your own personal knowledge?
VON STEENGRACHT: From my own personal knowledge I only know that our
liaison man with Hitler called me on the telephone and told me that
Goebbels had proposed to Hitler that 10,000 or more British and American
prisoners of war be shot in reprisal, and that Hitler would agree or had
agreed. I immediately reported this to Von Ribbentrop, and he went there
at once and told me after half an hour that the order had been
withdrawn. About Field Marshal Keitel I know nothing at all in that
connection.
DR. NELTE: You do not know, therefore, who was the originator of that
order?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
DR. NELTE: Who suggested it, I mean.
VON STEENGRACHT: The suggestion for that order evidently came from
Goebbels according to the information which I received.
DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop, do you mean?
VON STEENGRACHT: Who?
DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, Von Ribbentrop had nothing to do with that.
DR. NELTE: Then from Herr Hewel?
VON STEENGRACHT: Herr Hewel told me that. He called me up and told me
that.
DR. NELTE: And you know nothing about the participation of military men?
VON STEENGRACHT: I know nothing at all about the participation of
military men.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the
German Armed Forces): Witness, I have only one question. Did you, as
State Secretary, or did the Foreign Office regularly inform military
offices, for instance, the Army High Command or the High Command of the
Navy, with reference to pertinent matters of German politics?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, they were not informed.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the British Prosecutor wish to cross-examine?
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom):
Witness, you told us yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop was against
the persecution of the churches, was against the persecution of Jews,
and did not know what was going on in the concentration camps. You have
told us that he was not a typical Nazi. What are the qualities of a
typical Nazi?
VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical National Socialist, I mean a man who
fanatically acknowledges and represents all the doctrines of National
Socialism.
Herr Von Ribbentrop, as I said, followed Hitler personally, but he
really knew uncommonly little of any of the other ideology and never
bothered about it. He never spoke at meetings, never participated in
large rallies, and therefore, he really knew extremely little about the
people and the mood of the people.
COL. PHILLIMORE: By “a typical Nazi,” do you mean someone who was
persecuting the churches?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will repeat it. By “a typical Nazi,” do you mean a
man who was engaged in persecution of the churches?
VON STEENGRACHT: At any rate, someone who, if Adolf Hitler considered it
right, did not state his personal opinion on the matter.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And a man who would take his full share in persecution
and extermination of Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I would not like to say either. That was limited
to a certain circle of people. A large number even of fanatical Nazis
knew nothing about these atrocities and repudiated them and would have
repudiated them, had they been properly informed of them.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I understand you to say that you knew nothing of them
yourself. Is that so?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I knew nothing?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes.
VON STEENGRACHT: In my position as State Secretary and because I read
foreign papers, and particularly since I had contact with the
opposition, I knew of many things connected with concentration camps. In
all these cases, as far as it was in my power, I intervened. But
regarding the things which I have heard here now, I knew nothing at all.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you about another matter. You have
told us that Ribbentrop had no responsibility in the occupied
territories. Your words were that “the Foreign Office lost
responsibility at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the
frontier.” Is that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: I said that at that moment at which the German bayonet
crossed the frontier the Foreign Office lost the sole right to negotiate
with foreign governments everywhere. Beyond that, in most countries, the
Foreign Office did not have the right to have even a diplomatic observer
without authority, particularly in Norway and the Eastern Territories.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You have said the Foreign Office had no right to have
an observer there, and that direct relations with occupied territories
were withdrawn, is that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, I said that in all occupied territories the Foreign
Office no longer had the sole right to negotiate with the government,
since there was then either a civil administration in those countries or
a military government with auxiliary command offices and a military
administrative head, and that these offices themselves then approached
the foreign governments and their executive organs in the countries
occupied at that time. Consequently one can no longer say that the
Foreign Office had the sole right to negotiate with the governments. But
in some countries, as in the North and the East, we no longer had any of
our people at all, and Hitler had issued the order that we withdraw our
observers from the other countries, such as Holland, Belgium and so on.
However, we did not do so.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You say that in France you had an ambassador reporting
direct to Ribbentrop, did you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And his duties included advising the Secret Field
Police and the Secret State Police by the impounding of politically
important documents and securing and seizure of public property;
further, of private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the
basis of instructions especially given for the matter. Isn’t that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: I already emphasized yesterday that only since 1943 had
I anything at all to do with political affairs. If I understood your
question correctly, Mr. Prosecutor, you are of the opinion that the
Secret State Police and the German executive organs in France were under
our jurisdiction. That is incorrect.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. I asked you if the
Minister Abetz had not got those duties.
VON STEENGRACHT: He did not have the assignment of confiscating any
French property or carrying out any action against the Jews. No orders
of that kind went through my hands during my time, and he could...
COL. PHILLIMORE: [_Handing the document to the witness._] Will you look
at Document 3614-PS.
My Lord, that was put in as French Exhibit Number RF-1061 on the 4th of
February. It is a letter dated the 3rd of August 1940, signed by
Ribbentrop, to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
(OKW). It reads:
“The Führer has appointed the former Minister Abetz Ambassador
and after my report has decreed as follows:
“I. Ambassador Abetz has the following tasks in France...”
then it sets out a number of tasks and Number 6 is the one I put to the
witness:
“6. Advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police
in connection with the impounding of politically important
documents.
“7. Securing and seizure of public art property; further, of
private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the basis of
instructions specially given for this case.”
Then the concluding paragraphs:
“II. The Führer has hereby expressly ordered that Ambassador
Abetz is exclusively responsible for the handling of all
political questions in Occupied, and Unoccupied France. Insofar
as his functions touch military interests, Ambassador Abetz will
act only in agreement with the Military Commander in France.
“III. Ambassador Abetz is attached to the Military Commander in
France as his Commissioner. His seat remains Paris as
heretofore. He receives instructions for carrying out his tasks
from me and is responsible exclusively to me on these
matters.”—Signed—“Ribbentrop.”
I want to ask you one or two questions about the Jews. You have told us
that you and the Defendant Ribbentrop...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal would like to know why
this witness told them that Ambassador Abetz did not have the task of
confiscating property.
[_Turning to the witness._] Why did you say that?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz had no executive powers, and he was
expressly forbidden to intervene in French internal affairs. He could,
therefore, address himself exclusively to the French Government, and if
the French Government did anything by means of their executive power,
then that was a transaction on the part of the French Government but
never a confiscation carried out by Abetz.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is not an answer to the question. The question is
why, when you were asked whether Abetz had the task of advising the
Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police on the impounding of
politically important documents, did you not say so?
VON STEENGRACHT: I said that no order went through my hands, since I did
not become State Secretary until May 1943. This is an order of 3 August
1940. But here we are concerned only with an official directive
addressed to Ambassador Abetz.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At this time you were Ribbentrop’s personal adjutant,
weren’t you?
VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, but not political secretary. I was
only...
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were adjutant?
VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, that is to say I was concerned with
technical matters. At that time I never presented a political report to
him. But I should add, if I may, this concerns a directive to Ambassador
Abetz and this directive was completely outdated by actual conditions.
Because advising the Secret Field Police...
COL. PHILLIMORE: How do you know that, if you were only personal
adjutant and not acting in political matters?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz was ambassador until May 1945.
Therefore from 1943 to 1945 I continuously corresponded with him, and
during that time Ambassador Abetz continually fought against the
measures which were carried out by the Secret State Police anyway. It
was a bitter struggle and he was personally threatened in all possible
matters. One can talk about advice, but whether people heeded him—he
had no power—that is quite another question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Does it come to this, that your answer about occupied
territories applies only after 1943?
VON STEENGRACHT: From my own experience I can speak only about the
period after 1943.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to turn to the question of Jews. You have
told us that you and Ribbentrop, by adopting a policy of delay,
prevented the holding of the Anti-Jewish Congress in 1944; is that
correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you were against the policy of persecution of
the Jews.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And so was the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I want you to look at Document 3319-PS. [_Handing the
document to the witness._]
My Lord, that is a new document. It will be Exhibit GB-287.
[_Turning to witness._] Now you have got a photostat there. Will you
look at Page 4 of the German—that’s the first page of the English. That
is a letter dated the 28th of April on the subject of anti-Jewish action
in foreign countries. It is marked at the bottom of Page 4.
VON STEENGRACHT: I have not found it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you look at Page 4, marked in a black square at
the bottom of the page. You see a letter dated the 28th of April 1944,
Subject: Anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, and it is addressed to
practically every German legation and mission abroad.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Turn to Page 10. You will see that it purports to be
signed by you; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You remember the letter? I will read you the first
paragraph to refresh your memory. “The Reich Foreign Minister...”
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: “...has ordered the creation of Information
Department XIV (Anti-Jewish Action Abroad) under the leadership
of Envoy I. K. Schleier, whose task it is to deepen and
strengthen the anti-Jewish information service abroad by the
incorporation of all experts of the departments and working
units of the Foreign Office who have an interest and take part
in the anti-Jewish information service abroad, in close
co-operation with all offices outside the Foreign Office which
are engaged in anti-Jewish work and with the German missions in
Europe.”
Then you set out the co-workers, number of departments of the Foreign
Office, and then one permanent representative of the Reich Security Main
Office—that’s Himmler’s office, isn’t it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And one representative of the office of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg. That department just up above “Inland II,” that is the
Foreign Office which had liaison with the SS, isn’t it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At that time the chief was a man called Wagner and the
assistant chief, Von Thadden?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you still say that you were against the policy of
persecution of the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I maintain that now as before. I also say, as I
have already said during earlier interrogations, that even the holding
of an anti-Jewish congress in its effect would not have been directed
against the Jews because what was happening in Germany was all taking
place under the seal of secrecy and no one was informed in any way. The
Jews disappeared. But if there had been an international congress, one
would have been forced in the first place to bring up the question:
where are these Jews anyway? What is actually happening to these Jews?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Is the point this, that you wanted to put off an
anti-Jewish congress because that would be known to the world, but you
were quite prepared to set up an organization in the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: Gentlemen, we must separate two completely different
problems here. The one problem is this: There were offices in Germany
which conducted and carried out anti-Jewish measures. These
organizations also reached abroad and there, without the knowledge and
without the participation of the Foreign Office, did away with the
people in foreign countries. Consequently, an improvement and a policy
guided to some extent into normal channels could exist only if some
German department had really assumed responsibility for these things at
that time. For we did not hear of these matters; we always heard the
complaints which we received from foreign mission heads about events
which took place. But we had no means of control. If I applied to the
inner German offices...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Was this set up to control the anti-Jewish policy, this
department?
VON STEENGRACHT: Apparently we are discussing two different matters here
today. The anti-Jewish congress had been ordered. The fact that
Rosenberg’s office was holding an anti-Jewish congress...
THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. The question was: Was
this organization, referred to in this letter, set up to control the
organization of anti-Jewish work abroad? That is the question. Can you
not answer that by “yes” or “no”?
VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office could not exercise general control
since all anti-Jewish questions were principally dealt with in
Rosenberg’s office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well then, what was the purpose of this organization of
the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: By Hitler’s order we had to contact all German
departments and archives in order to collect all the material there, and
we attached importance...
COL. PHILLIMORE: And this was ordered by Ribbentrop, wasn’t it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: As set out in your letter?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. And we thought it important that we get an idea in
this way of what was actually happening to the Jews, _et cetera_, and
therefore we drew in people from all offices.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you in a minute what was actually happening
and out of your own files, but I just want to put this to you:
The point of your putting off the anti-Jewish congress was simply
because you did not want the world to know. You had not the slightest
objection to setting up an anti-Jewish organization in Germany.
Now, will you look at Page 32 of the German text.
My Lord, that is on Page 23 of the English text.
You will see there a letter from Rosenberg’s office to the Foreign
Office, signed by Bräutigam, Page 32 of the German text. It is marked at
the bottom of Page 32.
Bräutigam was your liaison officer with Rosenberg, wasn’t he, Witness?
Was Bräutigam your liaison officer in Rosenberg’s office?
VON STEENGRACHT: No. Bräutigam was, I think, in the Foreign Office in
1941.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And in 1942.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but in 1941, since he had previously been working
on Eastern problems in the Foreign Office, he had been transferred and
was now in the Rosenberg office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. And you will see there he is referring to a
conference with Obersturmbannführer Eichmann, that is, the chief of the
Jewish section of the Gestapo, and a Dr. Wetzel, and he sends you a copy
of an agreement made at Tighina in Romania on the 30th of August 1941
with the request for acknowledgment.
VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, there could be an error here. This
letter is dated 11 March 1942. I became State Secretary in May 1943. I
therefore know nothing about this matter. I should like to remark...
COL. PHILLIMORE: You just listen and wait until you are asked a
question. We shall get on faster if you just listen to the letter:
“I point out especially Number 7 of the agreements... I have
already taken a position in my letter of 5 March 1942.”
Now, that enclosed an agreement made between the German and Romanian
General Staffs, and, if you will look at Paragraph 7, on Page 38 of the
German, Page 27 of the English, this was the agreement they made:
“Deportation of Jews from Transnistria. Deportation of Jews
across the Bug is not possible at present. They must, therefore,
be collected in concentration camps and set to work until a
deportation to the east is possible after the end of
operations.”
And then there’s a note on the file on the next page of the German,
still on Page 27 of the English:
“According to information from Director General Lecca, today
110,000 Jews are being evacuated from Bukovina and Bessarabia
into two forests in the Bug River Area. As far as he could
learn, this action is based upon an order issued by Marshal
Antonescu. Purpose of the action is the liquidation of these
Jews.”
Now, do you doubt that that agreement, enclosed with that letter sent to
the Foreign Office, would have reached the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Well. I see this document and this agreement for the
first time today. Nothing of this entire affair...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Would you answer the question? Do you doubt that
that letter and that agreement enclosed with it would have been shown to
the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time there was an Under Secretary of State
Luther in the Foreign Office who acted quite independently; and I fought
a bitter battle against him although I was not called upon to do it,
because he wanted to introduce National Socialist methods. Whether he
submitted this matter to Ribbentrop or not I cannot decide.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. We come to a time when you were the State
Secretary. Would you look at Page 31 of the German text, Page 20 of the
English.
THE PRESIDENT: What do the words that follow the passage you have just
read mean on Page 27: “Bucharest, 17 October 1941 (Signature
illegible)”—and below—“To be discussed with Vice Minister President
Antonescu. Confidential, Bucharest, 16 October 1943”?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is badly typed. “Bucharest, 17 October
1943” and then follows the next letter. The previous part is a note on
the file.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a note on the German Legation file on Bucharest.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I have not troubled the Tribunal with the following
letters. They deal with the earlier date on the expulsion of Jews from
firms owned by citizens of the German Reich.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now would you look at Page 31 of the German,
Page 20 of the English. You will see there a document sent to...
THE PRESIDENT: When you started that document you didn’t give the date
in full. The year there appears to be 1944, doesn’t it?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not. In 1942, I think, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: It should be April 29, 1942? Is the date at the head of
the document?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the letter I read was dated March ’42 and
marked with a foreign office stamp “Received 13th of March 1942...”
THE PRESIDENT: I am speaking of the whole document, Page 1 of the
document.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is a file, one of those rather inconvenient
documents, a file, and it starts with the earliest date at the bottom
and then works up to 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then the part you read first...
COL. PHILLIMORE: That was 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. What page are you going to now?
COL. PHILLIMORE: I was going to Page 20 now, My Lord.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now, this is a communication from Von
Thadden who was, as you have told us, assistant in the Department Inland
II, to the German Legation in Bucharest. It is dated 12 October 1943,
and it is stamped as received on 18 October. And he encloses a letter
signed by Müller in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, to all German police
authorities abroad. You will see that it goes to the commander of the
Security Police in Prague, The Hague, Paris, Brussels, Metz, Strasbourg,
Luxembourg, Kraków, Kiev, Smolensk, and so on. October ’43. That is
after you had become Secretary of State, isn’t it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were appointed in April?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Turning to the substance of the letter, the subject is
the treatment of Jews with foreign citizenship in the sphere of German
power:
“In agreement with the Foreign Office, all Jews who remain in
the sphere of German power after the end of the so-called
home-bringing action and who have the citizenship of the
following countries may now be included in the evacuation
measures: Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden,
Finland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey.
“Since the evacuation of these Jews to the East cannot yet take
place at the present time, for reasons of foreign policy, a
temporary stay is provided in Concentration Camp Buchenwald for
male Jews over 14 years of age and in the Concentration Camp
Ravensbrück for Jewesses and children.
“The necessary measures are to be carried out on the following
dates:
“a) for Jews with Italian citizenship, immediately;
“b) for Jews with Turkish citizenship, on 20 October 1943;
“c) for Jews with citizenship of other countries mentioned
above, on 10 October 1943.
“A special application for protective custody is not required
for the transfer to the concentration camp, but the
concentration camp headquarters are to be notified that the
transfer to the concentration camp is taking place in keeping
with the evacuation measures.”
And then there are arrangements about baggage. And if you look at 31-e,
you will see at the foot of Page 22, on the English, that that had been
signed by Müller and then was signed again by a clerk of Himmler’s
office. And then on the next page of the English, still on 31-e of the
German, Himmler’s office sends it to the Foreign Office, to Von Thadden,
on 2 October.
Now, did you not see that document when it got to the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, I see this document today for the first time.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were the State Secretary?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. This obviously concerns a measure which was
ordered by another office. Within the German Reich the Foreign Office
had no executive powers at all and no possibilities and consequently...
COL. PHILLIMORE: No executive powers, but it was sent to you for
information.
VON STEENGRACHT: That was sent to us, this affair, solely for our
information, and it was not given to me, this affair.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You had a departmental liaison with the SS, a Mr. Von
Thadden. Was he not a competent official?
VON STEENGRACHT: The exact content of this affair I do not even know
now, because I have not read it through at leisure. I can imagine only
the following in reference to this whole matter: The question whether
the Jews who were in Germany could be returned to their home countries
was discussed for a long time. This, I think, is what we are concerned
with here?
COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t think we are interested in your imagination.
Either you know or do not know. I asked you whether Von Thadden was a
competent official.
VON STEENGRACHT: I have not seen this document.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. Was Von Thadden a
competent official?
VON STEENGRACHT: Von Thadden was a man from the Foreign Office who knew
his job.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, knew his job. And do you not think that as State
Secretary he ought to have shown you this document?
VON STEENGRACHT: He should have done that, certainly, if this matter was
not arranged in another office, and I was completely excluded from the
anti-Jewish action. Also instructions about anti-Jewish actions abroad
never went through my office. I pointed out yesterday, at the beginning
of my statement, that many matters were arranged directly in the highest
places, and that the Foreign Office also was not notified afterwards,
and orders in these matters...
COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a document you were informed about?
VON STEENGRACHT: Müller sent it to the Foreign Office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And you sent it to your legation at Bucharest?
VON STEENGRACHT: He ought certainly to have put that before me. But I
did not see it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And if you just look again at the letter, you notice
how Müller’s instructions start. He begins, “In agreement with the
Foreign Office...”
VON STEENGRACHT: Where does it say so? Unfortunately I have not found
it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At the start of the letter: “Subject: Treatment of Jews
of foreign citizenship in the sphere of German power.” And then he
begins: “In agreement with the Foreign Office...” Does that just mean in
agreement with Mr. Von Thadden?
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that this type of thing went to the competent
experts, and since this concerns a basic matter it was put directly
before Herr Von Ribbentrop. I request that Herr Von Ribbentrop should be
asked whether he knows of this matter or not. I have not seen this
matter.
COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a matter of such importance that it could not
have been agreed with the Foreign Office without Ribbentrop being
consulted; isn’t that the case?
VON STEENGRACHT: In my opinion, I would never have decided alone on this
matter if it had been put before me. I am of the opinion that it was an
affair which would have to be put before Von Ribbentrop.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Good. And, of course, Von Ribbentrop was one of the
most ruthless persecutors of Jews, wasn’t he?
VON STEENGRACHT: That is not correct.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I am going to read you a short passage from a
conference between the Führer, Ribbentrop and the Hungarian Regent,
Horthy. This is Document D-736, which was put in as Exhibit GB-283 by
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, to the Defendant Göring. This was a meeting at
Klessheim Castle on the morning of 17 of April 1943. And you see the
minutes are signed by Schmidt.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The question of Jews was raised:
“The Führer replied that it was the fault of the Jews who
considered hoarding and profiteering as their main sphere of
activity, even during the World War; in exactly the same way as
in England, sentences for rationing offenses, and the like, now
chiefly concern Jews. To Horthy’s counterquestion as to what he
should do with the Jews, now that he had deprived them of almost
all possibilities of livelihood—he could not kill them off—the
Reich Foreign Minister declared that the Jews must either be
exterminated or taken to concentration camps. There was no other
possibility.”
And then, you see, the Führer goes on to describe them as tuberculosis
bacilli. Now, in the face of that document, do you still say that the
Defendant Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution and
extermination of the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday already that Herr Von Ribbentrop, when
he was with Hitler...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Never mind what you said yesterday. I am putting it to
you now, today. You have now seen that document. Do you still say that
Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution and extermination of
the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: Here, too, I should like to make a distinction between
the real instincts of Von Ribbentrop and what he said when he was under
Hitler’s influence. I said already yesterday that he was completely
hypnotized by Hitler and then became his tool.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, became his tool. And from then on, he was prepared
to do anything that Hitler wanted and was as violent a Nazi as anyone;
isn’t that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: He followed blindly the orders given by Hitler.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. And to the extent of conniving at any and every
atrocity, isn’t that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: Since he had no executive powers he personally did not
commit these cruelties.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other chief prosecutors want to
cross-examine?
COL. AMEN: You testified yesterday that you did not consider Ribbentrop
to be a typical Nazi; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you consider Göring to be a typical Nazi?
VON STEENGRACHT: Göring made speeches at every type of meeting and
fought for the seizure of power, and accordingly he had a completely
different position in the party than Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: I think you can answer my question “yes” or “no.” We are
trying to save time as much as possible.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly.
COL. AMEN: Do you consider Göring to be a typical Nazi according to the
same standards that you were using with Ribbentrop, yes or no?
VON STEENGRACHT: This question one cannot answer in that way with “yes”
or “no.” I am trying every...
COL. AMEN: You answered it that way with respect to Ribbentrop, didn’t
you?
VON STEENGRACHT: Göring was a peculiar type of person. I cannot class
him with the ordinary Nazis, as one usually expresses it.
COL. AMEN: In other words, you don’t know whether you think he is a
typical Nazi or not, is that what you want the Tribunal to understand?
VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical Nazi one understands the “average” Nazi.
Göring is a unique person and one cannot compare his manner of living
with the other National Socialists.
COL. AMEN: Well, are you acquainted with all of the gentlemen in the box
there in front of you?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell me which of those individuals you consider
to be a typical Nazi, according to the standards which you applied
yesterday to Ribbentrop?
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I do not want to interrupt your
cross-examination, but want to say that there is too much laughter and
noise in Court, and I cannot have it. Go on, Colonel, with your
cross-examination.
COL. AMEN: Do you understand my last question? Please name those of the
defendants in the box whom you consider to be typical Nazis, on the same
standard which you yesterday applied to Ribbentrop.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I am convinced that here the witness is making
a decision which in my opinion should be made by the Court at the end of
the proceedings. That is an evaluation which the witness cannot make.
COL. AMEN: This is the subject that was brought up by this very Counsel
yesterday with respect to Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it a perfectly proper question. They
understand that the phrase “a typical Nazi” was used by the witness
himself.
COL. AMEN: And please just give us the names and not a long explanation,
if you can.
VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday that by “typical Nazi” I meant people
who are familiar with the dogma and doctrine. I want to add today that
by “typical Nazis” I mean further those people who during the time of
struggle represented National Socialist ideology and were propagandists
of National Socialism. Rosenberg’s book is known, Herr Frank, as
President of the Academy for German Law is known, these are
really—Hess, of course, too—and these are people whom I want to put
into the foreground very particularly because by their writings and so
forth and by their speeches they became known. No one ever heard
Ribbentrop make an election speech.
COL. AMEN: But you are not answering my question. Am I to assume from
that that in your opinion Rosenberg, Frank and Hess are the only persons
whom you could characterize as being typical Nazis, according to your
standards?
VON STEENGRACHT: Well, shall I go through the ranks of the defendants to
give an opinion on each one?
COL. AMEN: Precisely. Just give me the names. No, I do not want your
opinion. I want to know under your standards which of them you consider
to be typical Nazis.
VON STEENGRACHT: I have already stated the standard before. It can be
proved by whether the people unreservedly represented the National
Socialist ideology in words or at meetings and in this respect I named
the prominent ones.
COL. AMEN: And you consider all of the others not to be typical Nazis?
Correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. Then I would have to go through
them individually.
COL. AMEN: I have asked you to do that three times. Will you please name
them individually?
VON STEENGRACHT: I also see Herr Sauckel. Herr Sauckel was Gauleiter and
was active as a leader in the National Socialist movement. Then I see
the Reich Youth Leader, who educated the Hitler Youth.
COL. AMEN: Who else? Just give me the names. Do not give these
explanations, please.
VON STEENGRACHT: Well, I think that with that I have pointed out the
typical representatives of the Party.
COL. AMEN: Well, how about Streicher?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not see him here, or I would have answered in the
affirmative.
COL. AMEN: In other words, you consider him to be a typical Nazi under
your standards?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but please do not attribute his abuses to all
National Socialists.
COL. AMEN: Now, while you were working with Ribbentrop, do I understand
that you knew nothing about the murders, tortures, starvations and
killings which were taking place in the concentration camps?
VON STEENGRACHT: By the fact that foreign diplomats applied to me, and
by the fact that I was informed by opposition elements in Germany, and
from enemy propaganda, I knew of the existence and some of the methods.
But, I emphasize, only a part of the methods. I learned about the total
extent and degree only in internment here.
COL. AMEN: Did you know that priests were being tortured and starved and
killed in concentration camps while you were working with Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, I heard nothing specific regarding individual
things that occurred there, and if that had happened or has happened to
priests, then I would consider the only authentic information to be that
which the Nuncio or the Vatican had given me; but that did not occur.
But in spite of the fact that, as I said yesterday, the Vatican had no
jurisdiction, I took care of all cases based on humanity, that is, all
humanitarian cases. I took care of them, and always strove to handle
them successfully. I handled 87 cases in which my activity threatened to
bring about my death. I intervened in hundreds of cases, and thus saved,
or at least improved, the lives of thousands and thousands of people.
COL. AMEN: If you don’t confine your answers directly to my questions,
it is very difficult to get through and to save time. Now, will you
please try to answer my questions “yes” or “no,” if possible, and make
your explanations short. Do you understand?
VON STEENGRACHT: I understand perfectly. As far as I can, I shall of
course do so.
COL. AMEN: Did you know that nuns were being tortured and starved and
killed in concentrations camps, while you were working with Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
COL. AMEN: You did not know either about what was happening to priests
or the nuns or to other inmates of concentrations camps? Correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I have just said that I have intervened in hundreds of
cases, in which I was approached by the Nuncio even when it concerned
Jews, for whom the Nuncio was not authorized to act, and in cases in
which the Nuncio was acting on behalf of Polish clergymen, also a sphere
for which he was not authorized. In spite of the fact that I had
strictest orders not to receive such cases, I did receive the cases;
and, in spite of the “Nacht und Nebel” decree, I always gave information
when I could get any information. Details other than those which I
received officially I did not have.
COL. AMEN: And who gave you the instructions not to do anything about
these complaints?
VON STEENGRACHT: These orders came directly from Hitler and came to me
through Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: How do you know?
VON STEENGRACHT: I have already said yesterday that the two notes which
before my time were passed by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker to Hitler
through Ribbentrop were rejected with the remarks that they were blunt
lies and, apart from that, this was not within the jurisdiction of the
Nuncio; these notes were to be returned and in the future such documents
were not to be accepted. Furthermore, there were to be no discussions
and that applied, not only to the Nuncio, it applied to all unauthorized
actions particularly when foreign diplomats intervened in matters in
which they had no jurisdiction.
COL. AMEN: But do you want the Tribunal to understand that you went
ahead and tried to do something about these complaints, whereas
Ribbentrop did nothing; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I tried to settle within my own sphere of jurisdiction
all cases which, according to instructions, I was not permitted to
accept at all. But if a case here and there was of primary importance,
or where the lives of several people could have been saved, I always
applied to Ribbentrop. In most of these cases Ribbentrop took the matter
before Hitler, after we had invented a new competence, so that he could
not raise the objection that the Nuncio had no jurisdiction. Upon this,
Hitler either absolutely rejected them or at least said that the police
would have to investigate the case first. This presented the grotesque
picture that in a humanitarian matter or an affair which under all
circumstances had to be handled as foreign politics, the Foreign
Minister no longer made the decision, but the Criminal Inspector Meier
or Schulze who only needed to state “Undesirable in the interests of
state security.”
COL. AMEN: Did Ribbentrop obey the instructions which you say were
received from the Führer not to do anything about these complaints or
did he not? “Yes” or “no”?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question since I do not know how
many orders he received from Hitler and whether he obeyed in each
individual case.
COL. AMEN: Well, you have been testifying that you received instructions
not to do anything about these complaints from the Vatican; is that not
correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, and I did not obey them.
COL. AMEN: Well, I am now asking you whether Ribbentrop obeyed those
instructions or whether he did not.
VON STEENGRACHT: But he was in a higher position. What orders Hitler
gave to Ribbentrop privately I cannot say since I do not know.
COL. AMEN: Where did you receive your instructions from?
VON STEENGRACHT: From Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: Ribbentrop has testified under interrogation that he knew
nothing of what went on in any of these concentration camps until the
Führer ordered Luther to be placed in a concentration camp. Do you know
who Luther was?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Who was he, please?
VON STEENGRACHT: Luther was an Under Secretary of State of the Foreign
Office who was the head of the “Deutschland” department.
COL. AMEN: And when was he placed in a concentration camp?
VON STEENGRACHT: That must have been about February 1943.
COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact, is it not true that Ribbentrop had
a whole deskful of complaints from the Vatican about killings,
atrocities, the starving of priests and nuns, to which he never made any
reply at all, even an acknowledgment?
VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, what happened before May 1943, I do not
know. As long as I was State Secretary, I never failed to accept a note
or failed to answer it. On the contrary, I accepted all notes and
attempted, as I said before, to assist these people. Regarding
conditions before my term of service, I cannot give you any information
because I do not know them.
COL. AMEN: Well, I am not talking about that time; I am talking about
the period immediately before and following your appearance there in
’43. Now I want to read you from...
VON STEENGRACHT: I am sorry. I would gladly answer your question if I
knew anything about the matter. During my time—I cannot say anything
about it because I do not know.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will read to you from the interrogation of Ribbentrop
and ask you whether what he says conforms with your recollection of the
facts.
VON STEENGRACHT: I should only like to say that until May 1943 I was not
active politically, so that from my own knowledge I cannot make a
statement about it.
COL. AMEN: Well, as I read the testimony to you, you will find that the
interrogation refers to communications which remained in his desk
unanswered for an indefinite period of time. Did you have access to
Ribbentrop’s desk? Did you know what was in it?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
COL. AMEN: “Question: ‘Did you receive from the Vatican a
communication dated 2 March 1943 calling your attention to a
long list of persecutions of bishops and priests, such as
imprisonment, shooting, and other interferences with the
exercise of religious freedom?’
“Answer: ‘I do not recollect at the moment, but I know that we
had protests from the Vatican, that is, we had a whole deskful
of protests from the Vatican.’”
Does that conform with your recollection?
VON STEENGRACHT: That was, I must unfortunately say again, before my
time. I cannot know whether he had a whole drawer full of things.
COL. AMEN: If they had remained in his desk from March until May, then
you would know about them; isn’t that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I? No. I was not Herr Ribbentrop’s servant, who went
over his chairs or drawers.
COL. AMEN: So that your testimony is that you knew nothing about any
protests from the Vatican other than those which you have already
referred to?
VON STEENGRACHT: Apart from those I have mentioned, I know nothing about
protests. I emphasize again that during my time in office I accepted
them all and answered them all.
COL. AMEN: I will read you further from the interrogation:
“Question: ‘Did you reply to these Papal protests?’
“Answer: ‘I think there were very many we did not reply
to—quite a number.’”
Does that conform with your recollection?
VON STEENGRACHT: Certainly, that is correct. That was in accordance with
the instructions which were originally given.
COL. AMEN: By whom?
VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler’s instructions.
COL. AMEN: To whom?
VON STEENGRACHT: Certainly to Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: Those are the instructions which you say that you were
violating on the side, is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Which I did not obey, for otherwise I would not have
been allowed to accept the notes from the Vatican in all those cases
where the jurisdiction was questioned; nor would I have been allowed to
accept, for example, protests from the Swedish Ambassador regarding
mistreatment in Norway, which, however, I also accepted.
COL. AMEN: I will continue to read from the interrogation:
“Question: ‘Now, do you mean to say that you did not even read a
protest from the Vatican that came to your desk?’
“Answer: ‘It is really true. It is so that the Führer took such
a stand in these Vatican matters that from then on they did not
come to me any more.’”
Does that conform with your recollection?
VON STEENGRACHT: That Ribbentrop did not receive the protests any more?
Yes, that is correct, that tallies with what I said, that in all these
cases, where we could not accept them, I tried to settle them on my own
responsibility, since it was against orders.
COL. AMEN: And in the course of reading these complaints from the
Vatican which went unanswered, both you and Ribbentrop learned full
details of exactly what was going on in the concentration camps, did you
not?
VON STEENGRACHT: There was never anything about that in these notes—the
ones I saw—there was never anything about the treatment in them.
Instead they were concerned only with complaints asking why the death
sentence was ever imposed, or why the clergyman was ever arrested, or
similar cases, or the closing of churches or the like.
COL. AMEN: I do not want to take the time of the Tribunal to read to you
the documents which are already in evidence. I am referring to Document
Numbers 3261-PS, 3262-PS, 3264-PS, 3267-PS, 3268-PS and 3269-PS, but in
those documents—I am sorry, sir, 3269 is not in evidence. But in those
documents, Witness, are set forth the details of numerous individual and
collective cases of just what went on in concentration camps. You say
you were not familiar with any of those matters?
VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, I do not think that I expressed myself
in that way. I gave you to understand that everything communicated to me
by foreign diplomats I do, of course, know. In other words, if detailed
reports were received during my term of office, then of course I know
it. I never denied it.
THE PRESIDENT: What you said, Witness, was—at least what I took down
and understood you to say was—that nothing was ever mentioned in the
notes about the treatment in concentration camps.
VON STEENGRACHT: But I remarked with reference to the previous question,
when the question was put generally as to whether I knew about
conditions in concentration camps and the ill-treatment, I said that I
knew everything that had been reported to me by foreign diplomats, by
people of the opposition, and what I could learn from the foreign press.
In other words, if these documents contained details during my time in
office, then I know that too. But may I ask the date of the documents?
COL. AMEN: There are many documents with many dates, which can be
obtained, but we don’t want to take too much of the Tribunal’s time.
What I want to find out is whether or not you and Ribbentrop did not
know all about the murders, tortures, starvations, and killings that
were taking place in the concentration camps, and which were the subject
of constant and continuous protests from the Vatican, which Ribbentrop
has testified were not even read or acknowledged? Do you understand
that, Witness?
VON STEENGRACHT: I understand that. I knew nothing at all of the
ill-treatment in concentration camps to the degree and in the bestial
way that I have heard about here. I must strongly protest against the
suggestion that I had heard things like that through the Vatican at that
time. Also, I am convinced that Herr Von Ribbentrop had no idea of the
details as we have heard them here and as they have been shown in the
films.
COL. AMEN: Isn’t it a fact, Witness, that if you had followed up any of
these complaints from the Vatican which Ribbentrop has testified were
ignored, you would have found out everything which was going on in the
concentration camps to the last detail? “Yes” or “no.”
VON STEENGRACHT: No, that is not correct. I said yesterday already that
perhaps the key to it can be found in the speech made by Himmler on 3
October 1943, in which he said that the action against Jews and the
matter of concentration camps were to be kept just as secret as the
matter of 30 June 1934. And the great majority of the German people will
confirm the fact that until a short time ago they could not discover
anything at all about these events. If I went to Gruppenführer Müller or
other officials I was always told that everything in those concentration
camps was functioning beautifully and that there could be no question of
ill-treatment. Then I insisted that the foreigners, particularly the Red
Cross, inspect a concentration camp, and the Danish Red Cross was taken
to the Concentration Camp Theresienstadt. After that inspection took
place—this was a camp for Jews—the Danish Minister came to me and told
me that contrary to expectation everything had been favorable there. I
expressed my astonishment and he told me, “Yes, our people were there,
there was a theater there, and their own police force, their own
hospital, their own money; the thing is well-run.” I had no reason,
therefore, to doubt that it was true. But I myself could get no idea of
the true conditions from any German department, since they would
certainly have been afraid to tell a member of the Foreign Office
anything about it. But I want to emphasize again that we really had no
idea of the atrocities and such things.
COL. AMEN: Why in the world should they be afraid to advise the Foreign
Office of these atrocities? Had the Foreign Office ever done anything to
discourage them?
VON STEENGRACHT: In all matters which were violations of international
law we attempted to bring the case to the attention of the Red Cross in
one way or another. We did this particularly in all matters relating to
prisoners of war and if anything appeared to be wrong we drew the
attention of the Swiss Delegate to it, on our own initiative: “Go to
this place and see what is going on.” And in this case too, if I had
gone to the Swiss and told them in confidence that this and that has
occurred in the concentration camps, Switzerland and the Red Cross would
probably have interfered, which could ultimately have led to unpleasant
measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I think we ought to have an adjournment for
10 minutes.
COL. AMEN: I have only a few more questions.
[_A recess was taken._]
COL. AMEN: So far as you know, after Ribbentrop had received this
deskful of complaints from the Vatican, which he neither read nor
acknowledged, did Ribbentrop take any steps or do anything to find out
whether those complaints were justified and true, or did he not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the complaints made before my time, I have no
idea.
COL. AMEN: I am asking you about any complaints that were received from
the Vatican that ever came to your attention, with particular reference,
of course, to the deskful to which Ribbentrop himself has testified. Do
you know of any steps that were ever taken by Ribbentrop in connection
with complaints received from the Vatican about the atrocities taking
place in concentration camps? Please try to answer “yes” or “no.”
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I recall he submitted complaints of this sort
to Hitler, when he had the opportunity, and then waited for Hitler’s
order.
COL. AMEN: All right. And when Hitler told him to pay no attention
whatsoever to these complaints, he, as usual, did exactly what the
Führer told him to do, namely, nothing. Is that correct, so far as you
know?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, he obeyed Hitler’s orders.
COL. AMEN: And did nothing?
VON STEENGRACHT: If that is how the order read, he did nothing, yes.
COL. AMEN: Well, didn’t you tell the Tribunal that is what the directive
from the Führer was, to pay no attention to these complaints? “Yes” or
“no,” please.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And so, I say, Ribbentrop, as usual, did nothing about any of
these complaints after the Führer instructed him to disregard them. Is
that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: I could not quite understand that question.
COL. AMEN: I say after Ribbentrop received instructions from the Führer
to disregard these complaints from the Vatican, Ribbentrop, as usual,
did what he was directed, namely, nothing.
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume so, except for those cases where he
nevertheless tried again and then received the same answer. I also know
that he once appealed to Himmler and requested on principle that the
actions against the Jews should not be carried out; and he proposed that
Jewish children and women should, I believe, be turned over to England
and America.
COL. AMEN: And you also know what reply he received to that suggestion,
don’t you?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know the answer.
COL. AMEN: Well, you are certainly familiar with the fact that no such
thing was ever done, are you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: That it was never carried out? I did not understand the
question.
COL. AMEN: The suggestion which you claim that Ribbentrop made to
Himmler. That suggestion was never carried out, was it?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand; in what way not carried out? So
far as I know—Ribbentrop appealed directly to the foreign countries at
that time. I also do not know what answer he received at that time, at
least not in detail.
COL. AMEN: Well, so far as you know, nothing ever came of that
suggestion, correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, nothing came of it.
COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you know that Ribbentrop and
Himmler were not on good terms anyway, do you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: That was a matter of common knowledge to everybody, wasn’t
it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, the enmity became greater in the course of time.
COL. AMEN: So far as you know, did Ribbentrop take bromides every day?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I do not know. He...
COL. AMEN: You never saw him taking any?
VON STEENGRACHT: It could be; I do not know.
COL. AMEN: Well, did you ever see him taking any, or did he ever tell
that he was taking them?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I remember now that he took some sort of red
substance but I did not pay particular attention to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we have anything to do with whether he took bromides?
COL. AMEN: Yes, your Lordship, we will, because in his interrogations he
claims that his memory as to many of these events has been obscured or
removed by the over-use of such medicine.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
COL. AMEN: Now, Witness, were you incarcerated at one time at a place
known as “Ash Can”?
VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can?
COL. AMEN: Outside of Luxembourg.
VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can? I cannot remember it.
COL. AMEN: Near Luxembourg.
VON STEENGRACHT: Locked in a refuse can? No, I do not remember.
COL. AMEN: After you were taken prisoner, where were you incarcerated?
VON STEENGRACHT: Mondorf.
COL. AMEN: For how long a period of time?
VON STEENGRACHT: In Mondorf altogether 11 weeks.
COL. AMEN: And at that time were numerous of the defendants in this case
also incarcerated there?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And while you were there you were free to have conversations
with some of the inmates?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you did, from time to time, have such conversations?
Right?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I was not together with them all the time, because
I was transferred to another camp.
COL. AMEN: Now, in the course of your conversations with one or another
of the inmates there, did you make the statement which I am about to
read to you, either in exact words or in substance? Do you understand
the question? “Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion of decency and truth.
The conception does not exist for him.” Please answer “yes” or “no.” Did
you say that, Witness, did you say that?
VON STEENGRACHT: I should be grateful if I could hear that exactly again
what I am supposed to have said.
COL. AMEN: Now remember, I am asking you whether you said it either in
the exact words or in substance. Do you understand that?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not precisely understand the German translation
of your question.
COL. AMEN: Do you now understand it?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand. I did not exactly understand the
German translation.
COL. AMEN: Yes, but do you understand my question, namely, that you are
to say, whether you used these exact words or some other similar words?
I will now read it to you again. Do you understand?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I would be grateful.
COL. AMEN: “Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion of decency and truth.
The conception does not exist for him.”
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot recall that I ever made such a statement. I
would have to know to whom I am supposed to have said it.
COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement, or is it simply that
you can’t remember whether you did or not?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot remember having said that.
COL. AMEN: Is it possible that you did?
VON STEENGRACHT: It could be that I made such a statement, in some
connection.
COL. AMEN: Very good.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the other prosecutors wish to ask any questions?
MAJOR GENERAL N. D. ZORYA (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): To
save time, I shall restrict myself to a few questions only. Insofar as I
can understand the translation of your testimony, which you submitted
yesterday, you testified to the fact that besides the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs many individuals and organizations had influenced
Germany’s foreign policy.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Tell me, which of the defendants in the present Trial whom
you see in the dock attempted to influence and did, to a certain extent,
influence Germany’s foreign policy.
VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy was, of course, after the beginning of
the war...
GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you here and now not to make any declaration on
Germany’s foreign policy, but to indicate precisely, in the form of a
reply to my question, which of the defendants in the present Trial
attempted to influence and did influence Germany’s foreign policy?
VON STEENGRACHT: The basic lines of foreign policy were determined
solely by Hitler. The fact that we had occupied many countries and in
these various countries had occupied the most varied positions...
GEN. ZORYA: We know all about that. I ask you to indicate by name, which
of the defendants in the present Trial attempted to influence and did
influence Germany’s foreign policy. Is my question clear to you?
VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy, as I stated yesterday, was in its broad
outlines determined by Hitler alone; but those people who were assigned
to special fields naturally exercised some influence in one respect or
another. For example, some one who had a special assignment concerning
the police, carried out police measures; some one who had to take care
of labor problems conducted labor affairs. The same is true of other
sectors.
GEN. ZORYA: You still do not answer my question. I ask you to indicate,
regardless of the form and extent of his influence, which of the
defendants in the current Trial attempted to influence, and did
influence, in one form or another, Germany’s foreign policy, and this
apart from representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that you are asking this question in relation
to Russia; as the Foreign Office no longer had jurisdiction after the
entrance of German troops into Russia...
GEN. ZORYA: I request you to understand my question thoroughly and to
answer which of the defendants, and in what form, regardless of concrete
facts of foreign policy, attempted to influence this foreign policy of
Germany and did, in effect, so influence it.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. As regards Russia, the Eastern ministry was
competent for these questions.
GEN. ZORYA: No, not as regards Russia.
VON STEENGRACHT: In Norway Terboven laid down the policy. Quite
naturally he influenced Hitler in his attitude toward Norway and
Norwegian problems. In the same way the individual chiefs of the
administrations in the individual countries exerted influence depending
on how close they could come to Hitler with their reports.
THE PRESIDENT: We don’t want you to make speeches; we want you to answer
the question. You weren’t asked who influenced the foreign policy, but
which of the defendants influenced foreign policy. You may say none, or
you may say some. It is a question that you must be able to answer.
VON STEENGRACHT: I would assume that Rosenberg had something to say
regarding Russia, Frank had something to say regarding Poland,
Seyss-Inquart had something to say regarding Holland. Other matters
touched only special sectors. Naturally the SS had something to say; the
Wehrmacht had something to say, also the various other offices and they
naturally all exerted a certain influence but only a certain influence.
However, the basic policy was conducted solely by Hitler.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you not wish in this connection to name the Defendant
Göring?
VON STEENGRACHT: Göring carried on the Four Year Plan and in this
capacity he naturally also exercised a certain influence on Russia.
GEN. ZORYA: What did this influence consist of?
VON STEENGRACHT: There again I must say that I and the Foreign Office
had nothing to do with Russia, and that we were strictly forbidden to
intervene in Russian affairs. In the sphere of propaganda and the press
we were in no way permitted to become active. For this reason I am
especially badly informed on Russian affairs.
GEN. ZORYA: Did the Defendant Göring have any influence in other
questions besides the Russian question?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand the question in German.
GEN. ZORYA: Besides the Russian question, did the Defendant Göring
exercise any influence on other questions in the sphere of foreign
policy?
VON STEENGRACHT: I would say that until the year 1938 he certainly had
influence over Hitler in matters of foreign policy.
GEN. ZORYA: You have stated in your testimony that in July ’44 the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs participated in preparations for the
anti-Jewish Congress which, it was assumed, would be held in Kraków.
Will you please answer this question briefly, “yes” or “no.”
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you know who were the candidates for honorary membership
in this congress?
VON STEENGRACHT: Probably there were many, Ribbentrop among others, as
far as I still remember today.
GEN. ZORYA: Who else from among the defendants?
VON STEENGRACHT: I really cannot say. As far as I remember, Rosenberg
and a large number of other leading personalities, but I cannot recall
their names any longer. Naturally there are documents on the subject, so
that it can be ascertained without trouble.
GEN. ZORYA: Did Ribbentrop attempt in any form whatsoever to protest
against the inclusion of his name in the roster of honorary members of
this congress?
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can recall he very unwillingly took over
this post, but I do not believe that he really intended to take any
active part in this matter.
GEN. ZORYA: If I have understood you correctly, you have recently
testified to the fact that relations between Ribbentrop and Himmler were
hostile.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, bad relations.
GEN. ZORYA: But can you state whether any contact existed between
Ribbentrop and Himmler in their work, whether they maintained this
contact in any one particular sphere or branch of their work?
VON STEENGRACHT: As a matter of fact, there was no working contact such
as would have been considered right in a well-organized state. Of
course, now and then there were matters somewhere that concerned both of
these men, and to that extent they did have contact, yes.
GEN. ZORYA: What was the nature of this contact, and what, exactly, did
it represent?
VON STEENGRACHT: It really only amounted to this: that Ribbentrop or
Himmler saw each other every few months. Besides that, we had a liaison
man in the Foreign Office for the Reichsführer SS Himmler.
GEN. ZORYA: Then how does all this fit in with the hostility which, as
you have just mentioned, existed between Himmler and Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: I presume you are referring to the second question I
answered. In every normal state it was the case that the ministers saw
each other at least once a year and exchanged opinions. This, however,
did not take place, since, as we have already heard today at some
length, the fields of jurisdiction overlapped to a great extent and the
activity of one man touched very closely on the activity of the other.
Therefore some connection had to be established whether one wanted it or
not.
GEN. ZORYA: Do I understand you to say that Himmler and Ribbentrop never
even met?
VON STEENGRACHT: They met perhaps once every 3 months. It might have
been every 4 months and they usually met only if, by chance, both
Ribbentrop and Himmler were visiting Hitler at the same time.
GEN. ZORYA: And there were no special meetings, no business contact
between them at all?
VON STEENGRACHT: Actually not.
GEN. ZORYA: I should like you to familiarize yourself with Document
Number USSR-120, which has already been submitted as evidence to the
Tribunal. You will see that this is an agreement between Himmler and
Ribbentrop regarding the organization of intelligence work. Are you
familiar with this agreement?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly.
GEN. ZORYA: The contact between Himmler and Ribbentrop was evidently
closer than you wished to describe.
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not believe, Mr. Prosecutor, that I wanted to give
you any impression other than the one that actually existed. This refers
to Hitler’s order of 12 February 1944. On the basis of this order
Himmler took charge of all activity abroad without the participation of
the Foreign Office, and after he had become the successor to Canaris,
through this order he secured a predominant position abroad. And if the
Foreign Office in one way or another had not tried to contact this
organization, then the Foreign Office would have had no influence at all
even in foreign countries. We had to fight vigorously over this
document, for on the basis of this document Himmler was obliged for the
first time to communicate to us also the information that he brought to
Germany. Otherwise he brought these reports in without telling us about
them. That was the reason why we reached this working agreement. But so
far as I recall, it was not put into practice at all, because Hitler’s
order was issued on 12 February 1944 and we had not come to an agreement
until February 1945. Then it gradually came about. That must be
approximately the date. At any rate it took quite a while.
GEN. ZORYA: You say that this agreement never became valid?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. An agreement becomes effective at
the moment in which it is signed. But it was not put into practice or
hardly put into practice.
GEN. ZORYA: I think we shall have to content ourselves with your reply
and pass over to some other questions. Did you ever come in contact with
Kaltenbrunner?
VON STEENGRACHT: Did I come into contact with Kaltenbrunner? Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: On what questions?
VON STEENGRACHT: On precisely those questions which, for example, the
Nuncio addressed to me and also about people who because of the Nacht
und Nebel decree had been deported from abroad and about whom we were
not allowed to give information, I often went privately to Kaltenbrunner
and pointed out to him that this order was inhuman. As a favor
Kaltenbrunner then frequently gave me information; and I, contrary to
the orders, transmitted this information abroad because I considered it
justified for humanity’s sake. Those were the main points of contact
which I had with Kaltenbrunner.
GEN. ZORYA: Did you, in particular, have any conversation with him on
the subject of the Danish policemen interned by the Gestapo in a
concentration camp without any concrete charges presented against them?
Please reply to this question by saying “yes” or “no.”
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: During one interrogation, an interrogation conducted by an
American interrogator, you stated that, although these policemen were
eventually sent back to Denmark, they were very badly treated.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: What did this ill-treatment consist of?
VON STEENGRACHT: I learned at that time, I believe through the Danish
Minister, that 1600 Danish policemen...
GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you to be brief. Of what did the ill-treatment
consist which was meted out to the Danish policemen who were interned in
a concentration camp without any concrete charges being presented
against them?
VON STEENGRACHT: These policemen were transported from Denmark. When I
learned of it, I went to Kaltenbrunner on the same day and asked him
under all circumstances to treat these people as civilian internees or
as prisoners of war.
GEN. ZORYA: I beg your pardon, but you are not answering my question.
What did the ill-treatment of the Danish policemen consist of?
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that you want to know whether Kaltenbrunner is
personally responsible for it and to this I would have to tell you the
opposite. I am...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question? It was repeated. You must
understand what the question is: What was the bad treatment? Either you
know or you do not know. If you know, you can say so.
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can remember, 10 percent of these prisoners
died.
GEN. ZORYA: Is that all you can say in reply to the question?
VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding details of the ill-treatment I was informed
by Denmark that the men were not allowed to keep their uniforms and had
to wear concentration camp clothes, that this concentration camp
clothing was too thin and the men frequently died of inflammation of the
lungs, also that the food was insufficient. I did not learn any more at
the time. They were also flogged.
GEN. ZORYA: Witness, please tell us: Did you ever come across the
activities of the Defendant Sauckel?
VON STEENGRACHT: I came into touch with Sauckel’s activities only
insofar as we objected that so many people from abroad were brought into
Germany by force.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember a conference at which both you and
Sauckel were present? You have already mentioned this fact in the course
of your interrogation prior to the opening of the current Trial.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember you testified in the course of this
interrogation: “But the measures adopted for recruiting people in Russia
and similar countries are beyond description.”
VON STEENGRACHT: In the session—I did not understand the question.
GEN. ZORYA: You stated, during the interrogation of 28 September 1945—I
am quoting verbatim: “But the measures adopted for recruiting people in
Russia and similar countries are beyond description.” Do you remember
your testimony?
VON STEENGRACHT: I confirm that statement.
GEN. ZORYA: Then you confirm it? Will you kindly enumerate, if only in
brief, what precisely were the indescribable measures adopted by the
Defendant Sauckel in Russia and other countries?
VON STEENGRACHT: I know of only one case that was reported to me at the
time. It concerned the fact that in a certain sector, people were
invited to a theatrical performance and the theatre was surrounded, and
the people who were inside were brought to Germany for forced labor. It
concerns these measures of which I have heard.
GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.
COL. POKROVSKY: I request permission to ask one more question, or
rather, to have one more question elucidated.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal has already indicated
that it wishes the cross-examination to be cut down as far as possible,
and it really cannot hear more than one counsel on behalf of each of the
four countries. It doesn’t wish to hear more than one on behalf of each
of the four countries. I am afraid we can’t hear any further
cross-examination from you.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question is not a new one. The witness has not
answered a question which was repeated four times.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a new counsel though.
COL. POKROVSKY: No. The Soviet Prosecutor asked which of the defendants
influenced the foreign policy of Germany. The witness replied, “The
Armed Forces.” I wished to...
THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry, Colonel Pokrovsky, but I have given you the
Tribunal’s ruling. We cannot hear more than one counsel. I hope, as I
say, that the prosecutors will make their examination as short as
possible.
M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): This
witness having been already interrogated at considerable length, I wish
to ask only a very short question.
Witness, I should like you to confirm precisely what you have already
declared, that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of
Ribbentrop and was responsible only to him; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question in German.
M. FAURE: Is it correct from your declaration, and from what you know,
that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of Ribbentrop
and that it was responsible only to him?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
M. FAURE: Does it mean that every important measure taken by the Embassy
would have to be known by the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
M. FAURE: I simply wanted to have this point elucidated in view of the
interrogatory of the witness, and I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President,
I request permission to ask one question which I could not ask before.
The Russian Prosecutor asked whether the witness had discussed the
question of the Danish policemen with Kaltenbrunner. In this connection
it remained entirely unanswered how Kaltenbrunner himself behaved. I
simply want to ask this one question.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, would you please tell the Tribunal how
Kaltenbrunner behaved when you discussed with him the question of the
Danish police who had been inhumanly treated—how Kaltenbrunner behaved
in this connection and what he did.
VON STEENGRACHT: The question is perhaps not quite correct the way you
put it when you say “who had been inhumanly treated,” for they could not
have been dealt with. They had just been turned over to the
concentration camp. So the moment I heard about it I went to
Kaltenbrunner and told him that these people could not be put into a
concentration camp. They had to be treated either as prisoners of war or
as civilian internees.
Kaltenbrunner listened to this and said he was also of that opinion, and
in my presence gave the order that these men should be transferred from
the concentration camp to a prisoner-of-war camp. I therefore assumed
that the matter was thereby settled and then found out a fortnight later
that they were still in the concentration camp. I appealed to
Kaltenbrunner earnestly. Kaltenbrunner said he could find no explanation
for it. I could not find any either, since the order to transfer these
people had been given in my presence. We subsequently carried on many
negotiations regarding this matter. I had the impression that other
influences were at work there and that Kaltenbrunner could not enforce
his opinion.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was he against this inhuman treatment?
VON STEENGRACHT: He always told me that he was in favor of their being
put in a prisoner-of-war camp. That was naturally a substantial
improvement.
DR. KAUFFMANN: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you wish to re-examine this witness?
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of violating the
Treaty of Versailles or was he opposed to that?
VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to say...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you say “yes” or “no” and then explain
later?
VON STEENGRACHT: He wanted a modification.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of the reoccupation
of the Rhineland?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I did not know Ribbentrop and consequently
cannot answer this question.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop opposed to rearmament?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer this question either, because I did not
know him at that time. I saw him for the first time in the year 1936.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Anschluss?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I assume.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Tripartite Pact?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
[_The witness Von Steengracht left the stand._]
DR. HORN: Yesterday I concluded the presentation of my documents with
the submission of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-10)—on page 35 of the document book. From this document I
proved that Von Ribbentrop conducted his foreign policy according to
lines laid down by Hitler. I should like to prove with the following
documents what the foreign political situation was that Ribbentrop found
when he took office in February of 1938. I ask the Court to take
judicial notice of the following documents, the numbers of which I shall
now communicate to the Tribunal, without my reading anything from them
in order that I may later be able to come back to them in my final
speech.
The first of these documents is the document which bears the Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 14 (Document Number Ribbentrop-14). It is a question here
again of an extract from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume
1, and carries the heading “Proclamation of the Reich Government to the
German People of 1 February 1933.” This document describes briefly
Germany’s position at that time and the intentions of the Hitler
Government that came to power on 30 January 1933.
The next document that I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of is
Ribbentrop Exhibit 15 (Document Number Ribbentrop-15). This document is
also taken from the first volume of the _Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik_. It carries the title “Adolf Hitler’s Address on the Occasion
of the Inauguration on 21 March 1933 in Potsdam”. In this document, too,
basic expositions are made regarding the internal and external policy
agreed upon by the new government.
As the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 16 (Document Number Ribbentrop-16). Again it
is a document from the above-mentioned volume of documents. It is headed
“Adolf Hitler’s Speech on His Program at the Meeting of the Reichstag in
the Kroll Opera House on 23 March 1933.”
I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the next document, Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 17 (Document Number Ribbentrop-17). It is again an
excerpt from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would not like to interrupt Dr. Horn, but not one
single document among those which he now mentions, beginning with Number
14, and as far as I understand, until Number 44, inclusive, was put at
the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution, and I cannot see any possibility
of aiding the Tribunal in the study of these documents until we have
received them. I suppose that the Tribunal will judge it necessary to
put off the studying of these documents until the Soviet Prosecution
have received them.
DR. HORN: May I give a short explanation please. I have inquired as to
what extent the translations have progressed. Three weeks ago I turned
in my documents in the prescribed manner, the last of them about 10 days
ago. I was informed that the Translation Division unfortunately had too
few French and Russian translators available to have the translation of
the documents in these two languages as far advanced as is the case in
the English language up to now. These are, of course, things over which
I have no influence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal appreciates that you have done
what fulfills the obligations which rested upon you and they, therefore,
think that the documents should go in, subject of course to any
objection being taken to them when the translations are available.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, as a precaution I have already informed
Colonel Pokrovsky that this was the case, without knowing in detail what
documents had been translated into Russian. That was as far as I could
possibly go to reach an understanding, because the other thing was
beyond my control.
MR. DODD: I wonder if it would be possible for Dr. Horn to indicate very
briefly the purpose for which he offers these documents as they come up.
We will have objection to some, I know, but some of that objection may
be clarified if we hear beforehand just what the purpose of the offer
is.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, Dr. Horn is putting in a large number of
documents at the present moment and asking the Court to take judicial
notice of them and if the Prosecution finds that there is something
specific that they want to object to, wouldn’t it be best that they
should do that hereafter?
MR. DODD: I thought it might be of assistance and save us from rising
very often if he gave us some idea of the purpose for which the offer is
made.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would take longer probably.
DR. HORN: May I make a short explanation on this subject? Since 1933 my
client has occupied official positions that were closely tied up with
foreign policy. The direction of a foreign policy that had, as its aim,
the waging of aggressive war, has been charged against him. I now submit
with these documents the evidence which demonstrates how the policy
developed and that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop on his part made long
and continuous efforts to avoid a war of aggression, for example,
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 17, (Document Number Ribbentrop-17) of which I
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. It is in the document book on
Page 40 and contains a speech of 17 May 1933 by Hitler before the German
Reichstag on the National Socialist Peace Policy.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: This document of 17 May 1933 I cite as proof of Germany’s
general will to disarm and as proof that the Reich Government made
efforts to bring about a general pacification of Europe.
As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 18 (Document Number Ribbentrop-18). It is
again a document from the same collection and is headed “Treaty of
Agreement and Co-operation of 15 July 1933,” known in brief as the “Four
Power Pact.” It is on Page 42 of the document book. This Four Power Pact
between Germany, France, England, and Italy was inspired by Mussolini.
Its purpose was to bring about general disarmament and particularly, to
make effective the revision article—Number 19—in the Covenant of the
League of Nations. This pact did not come into being because France did
not ratify it.
As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 20 (Document Number Ribbentrop-20). It
concerns a “Proclamation of the Reich Government to the German People in
Connection with the Withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October
1933.” This proclamation of the Reich Government affirms the failure of
the disarmament conference and gives a short account of Germany’s
reasons for withdrawing from the League of Nations. In connection with
this proclamation, Hitler on the same day made a speech over the radio
in order to state the reasons for Germany’s withdrawal from the League
of Nations. I submit this speech to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit
Number 21 (Document Number Ribbentrop-21), and ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of it. The speech is on Page 45 of the document book.
In order to justify the then existing foreign policy to the people as
well as to obtain a confirmation of the policy at that time, Reich
President Von Hindenburg, on 11 November 1933, called the German people
to the ballot box. The proclamation in that connection is contained in
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 23 (Document Number Ribbentrop-23), which is
found on Page 48 of the document book. I present it to the Court again
with the request for judicial notice.
I further ask the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit Number 24
(Document Number Ribbentrop-24) in which the text of the question and
the results of the election are to be found. It is on Page 49 of the
document book which is before you.
In the course of her disarmament policy, Germany, on 18 December 1933,
issued a German Memorandum on the disarmament question and Germany’s
attitude regarding the disarmament problem. I offer the Court this
document for judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 25 (Document
Number Ribbentrop-25).
The next document is contained on Page 51 of the document book and
describes the course of the disarmament negotiations and Germany’s
attitude toward these negotiations. I submit it to the Court for
judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 26 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-26). The document is on Page 51 of the document book, and is
headed “The German Memorandum on Disarmament of 19 January 1934.”
The German view on disarmament is again set forth in the following
document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 27 (Document Number Ribbentrop-27),
set forth on Page 53 of the document book, and is entitled “German
Memorandum of 13 March 1934.” I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice
of this document.
The German Government answered an English disarmament memorandum on 16
April 1934 with an _aide-mémoire_ to the English Government. I ask the
Court to take judicial notice of this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit
Number 28 (Document Number Ribbentrop-28).
In the course of the disarmament negotiations, France, in 1934,
suggested a pact which became known under the name of the “Eastern
Pact.” Regarding this Eastern Pact, the German Government expressed
their view in a communiqué of the German Reich Government of 10
September 1934, which is on Page 56 of the document book, and to which I
have given the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 30 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-30), again with the request that judicial notice be taken of
it.
As the next document, which is on Page 57, I present to the Court for
judicial notice: Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 31 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-31). It concerns a copy of the _Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik_, Volume 3, and shows the reply of the Reich Government of 14
February 1935 to the suggestion for an air pact. Germany’s comments on
this air pact include the following—I read Paragraph 2 from this
exhibit and begin the quotation:
“The German Government welcomes the proposal to increase safety
from sudden attacks from the air by an agreement to be concluded
as soon as possible, which provides for the immediate use of the
air forces of the signatories on behalf of the victim of an
unprovoked air attack.”
In the year 1935 compulsory military service was reintroduced in
Germany. On this occasion the German Government addressed a proclamation
to the German people. This proclamation is on Page 59 of the document
book and carries the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 33 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-33). I request that this excerpt from the proclamation be
given judicial notice.
As Ribbentrop Exhibit 34 (Document Number Ribbentrop-34), I submit a
communiqué of the German Reich Government of 14 April 1935 on Germany’s
attitude toward the Eastern Pact. It is on Pages 61 and following of the
document book and I ask, without my reading anything from it, that the
Tribunal take judicial notice of it.
The introduction of compulsory military service was regarded by the
signatory countries of the Versailles Treaty as an infraction of Part V
of this treaty. The states protested against the reintroduction of
compulsory military service in Germany. A protest was issued by the
Reich Government against this decision of the Council of the League of
Nations of 17 April 1935. This protest is on Page 63 of the document
book. I have this document the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 35 (Document
Number Ribbentrop-35), and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
it. In this document the German Government dispute the right of the
governments represented in the Council of the League of Nations, who
approved the decision of 17 April, to set themselves up as judges over
Germany. In this protest it is stated that this attitude is interpreted
as a manifestation of renewed discrimination against Germany and
consequently is rejected.
I turn now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 36 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-36) which is on Page 64 of the document book. This concerns
the German memorandum to the Locarno Powers of 25 May 1935, and deals
with the incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. The
Defendant Ribbentrop participated decisively in the negotiations that
led to the drawing up of this memorandum and to the presentation of the
German point of view before the League of Nations and the Locarno
Powers. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the document because
it contains Germany’s legal attitude toward this problem.
A further memorandum to the Locarno Powers is to be found on Page 68 of
the document book (Document Number Ribbentrop-36) Exhibit Number
Ribbentrop 36, and it again exposes briefly and clearly the
incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. I ask that
also this German memorandum to the Locarno Powers—it is dated 25 May
1935—be given judicial notice.
The legal point of view which formed the basis for this memorandum was
presented in a speech by Hitler, concerning the peace policy in the
German Reichstag on 21 May 1935, in order again to prove German
willingness for peace and disarmament. At the same time a peace and
disarmament proposal was submitted in London by Ribbentrop. I ask that
this document, this speech by Hitler, be given judicial notice as
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 37 (Document Number Ribbentrop-37). It is on
Pages 69 and following of my document book.
As the next document to prove that Germany made continuous efforts for
disarmament and attempts at agreement, I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit
Number 38 (Document Number Ribbentrop-38), for judicial notice, which is
on Page 77 of my document book. This concerns the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement of 18 June 1935, in which Ribbentrop played a decisive role,
and for the ratification of which Ribbentrop exerted himself
particularly. He induced the French Government in particular, by his own
efforts, to agree to this treaty. That was necessary because this naval
agreement made necessary a change in Part V of the Versailles Treaty,
already cited—it is the part that is concerned with disarmament
instructions and armament stipulations. At that time Ribbentrop
succeeded in persuading the French Government to give their approval to
this agreement. I submit this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 38,
with the request for judicial notice.
I may, in addition, say in this connection that this treaty was at that
time considered, both by Ribbentrop and Hitler, as the cornerstone of a
far-reaching proposal for an understanding and an alliance with England.
During the succeeding years, as well as during the time he served as
ambassador in London and also as Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop made
constant efforts to bring about such a pact of agreement in some form or
other.
As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 39 (Document
Number Ribbentrop-39), which is on Page 79 of the document book.
Again, and in view of the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the German
Government found themselves compelled on 7 March 1936 to present their
attitude, through a memorandum, to the signatory powers of the Locarno
Pact. This point of view is found in the document just mentioned and I
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
The occupation of the Rhineland had led to a protest by the powers
interested in it. Ribbentrop replied to this protest with a speech
before the Council of the League of Nations in London and then delivered
another protest before the Council of the League of Nations against the
protest of the signatory powers of Locarno. This protest of the then
Ambassador Von Ribbentrop, which I present as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number
40 (Document Number Ribbentrop-40), which is on Page 83 of my document
book, I also submit for judicial notice.
As the next document I present to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 41
(Document Number Ribbentrop-41), on Page 84 of the document book, with
the request for judicial notice. It contains the last peace proposals by
Germany in connection with the disarmament and peace proposals of that
time. It is headed “Peace Plan of the German Government of 31 March
1936.”
In subsequent years Germany made repeated efforts to bring about the
withdrawal of the war guilt lie. In the year 1937 German and Italian
relations became constantly closer; and in connection with these
relations Hitler, on 30 January 1937, on the fourth anniversary of the
National Socialist revolution, made a proposal before the German
Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin, that agreements should be
reached with other European nations in Europe on the same basis as
between Germany and Italy, in order to attain harmonious relations. I
ask that this document be accepted as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43
(Document Number Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the document
book. In this document the withdrawal of the war guilt lie was clearly
requested once more. I quote from the third paragraph of the above:
“Above all, therefore, I solemnly withdraw Germany’s signature
from that statement, extorted against her better judgment from
the weak German government of the day, that Germany is to blame
for the war.”
As the next document I bring...
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. Are you referring to 44?
DR. HORN: I was just referring to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43 (Document
Number Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the document book. Please
pardon me if I left that out.
THE PRESIDENT: There was some passage you read in it which does not
appear to be translated here.
DR. HORN: Did I correctly understand you to say, Mr. President, that
there was no English translation in the document book?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am not quite sure. I did not catch it myself. Did
you read anything which is not in the document book?
DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I have cited only what is in the document
book. It is on Page 88, Paragraph 3 and it is specifically the paragraph
that begins, “And fourthly...”
THE PRESIDENT: Thirdly, isn’t it?
DR. HORN: Paragraph 3, and this paragraph is again divided into four
subparagraphs and I have read the fourth subparagraph.
I come now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 44 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-44), which is on Page 90 in the document book. This document
contains the German note on Belgian inviolability, dated 13 October
1937. This document is of importance in view of the events of 1940; and,
in order to make clear the German view, I should like to read the last
paragraph, which in my document book is on Page 91 and which is preceded
by the Roman numeral II. I quote:
“The German Government assert that the inviolability and
integrity of Belgium are of common interest to the western
powers. They confirm their determination not to impair that
inviolability and integrity under any circumstances and to
respect Belgian territory at all times, excepting of course, in
the case of Belgium collaborating in an armed conflict directed
against Germany in which Germany would be involved.”
I ask that this document be given judicial notice.
With this I conclude the series of documents which are to serve me, in
my final speech, as the basis for expounding the conditions of foreign
policy that Ribbentrop found upon his entry into office as Foreign
Minister. I shall refer to these documents when the occasion arises.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you filed them in Court with the Secretary?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, in connection with yesterday’s discussion I
again untied these documents and handed them, signed, to the General
Secretary.
The next documents that I submit serve as substantiation of what I shall
say later regarding Ribbentrop’s participation in the policy that led to
the Anschluss with Austria.
I should like to refer, first of all, to Document 386-PS, already
presented by the Prosecution, which is contained in my document book. I
am unfortunately not in the position to read off the page numbers to the
Tribunal because we ourselves have not yet received the files, that is,
the document book which now follows. This document follows Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 44, which was on page 90 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit Number 44 is the last document in the second
document book. There are not any more, are there? There are not any
more?
DR. HORN: I was informed today that the English Document Book was
finished and had been presented to the Tribunal. We unfortunately have
not yet received a copy, so I cannot compare the page numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we haven’t got it. We have only those two and the
last exhibit in the second book is Number 44, which you have just read.
But, Dr. Horn, as the document has already been put into evidence, it is
not necessary for you to produce it. You can say that you rely upon it;
that is all that is necessary.
DR. HORN: Yes, but I believe that we must immediately decide the
question of the continuation of my presentation. I want to make clear
again that, after the Tribunal had ruled on the way in which documents
were to be presented, I at that time immediately submitted my documents
to the Tribunal for translation in the prescribed way, in that I
presented 6 document books bearing my signature. Unfortunately the
Translation Division was unable to keep up with the pace of the
presentation of evidence by the Defense and I am in the uncomfortable
position of being unable to provide the Tribunal with the assistance of
pointing out the pages in order to continue my delivery smoothly.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn, we think you had better go on, just
notifying us which the documents are and whether they are already in
evidence or whether you are offering them in evidence now. You have told
us Document 386-PS. We can make a note of that—that is already in
evidence. I do not know whether all your other documents are already in
evidence or whether there are any documents which are not and which you
are now going to offer in evidence.
DR. HORN: The following documents are new. As to Document 386-PS, I
should only like to make clear that Von Ribbentrop was not one of those
present at that time. He has also learned here for the first time of
this document and its contents—it concerns the well-known Hossbach
Document.
The next document to which I shall refer in my final speech is Document
Number 2461-PS, already submitted by the Prosecution. It is the official
German communication regarding the meeting between the Führer and Reich
Chancellor with the Austrian Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg in
Berchtesgaden on 12 and 15 February 1938. I refer to this document to
prove to what extent Ribbentrop participated in this discussion.
The next document to which I shall refer, and which I present to the
Tribunal with the request for judicial notice, is Ribbentrop Exhibit
Number 11 (Document Number Ribbentrop-11), which is in my document book.
This document...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think it is really
necessary for you to refer to any documents which are completely in
evidence already unless you are going to read some passage in them and
rely upon some passage in them which has not already been read. I mean,
supposing that the Prosecution read a particular sentence out of a
particular document and you want to refer to some other sentence in it,
then it will probably be right for you to indicate that; but, if the
document has been read in full, any further reference is a mere matter
of argument and is not really a matter of evidence, and you will be at
liberty, you see, to argue it whenever you come to make your speech. So
that, I mean, as a matter of saving time, it would not be necessary to
refer us to 386-PS or 2461-PS unless there is some passage in them which
you rely upon and which has not been read by the Prosecution.
DR. HORN: I may then go on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 11 and present
it to the Court for judicial notice. It concerns an agreement between
the German Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government on 11
July 1936. When, on 12 February 1938, Ribbentrop drove with Hitler to
Berchtesgaden to have a conference with Dr. Schuschnigg, then Chancellor
of Austria, he was not informed about the deviation of Hitler’s plans
from the agreement of the year 1936 between Germany and Austria, and he
conducted his discussion with Schuschnigg also in the spirit of the
agreement of 1936. One month later the Anschluss with Austria came
about.
As proof that this Anschluss corresponded to the wish of the Austrian
population, I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 12 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-12), which I present to the Tribunal for judicial notice. It
is the result of the national plebiscite and of the election to the
Greater German Reichstag of 10 April 1938. From this document it is to
be seen that at that time in Austria a total of 4,484,475 people had the
right to vote, 4,471,477 voted, 4,453,772 voted for the Anschluss, and
only 11,929 voted against it.
THE PRESIDENT: Have we got this document? We do not have it in our
books. Does the clerk of the Court have it?
DR. HORN: It is in the document book as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 12.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it goes from 10 to 14 for some reason. Let me look
at it. There is some mistake, apparently. It has not been copied; that
is all. It is not in our books, but here it is, so it is all right. Go
on.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, it is to be seen from this document that the
Austrian people at that time expressed themselves in favor of the
Anschluss with 99.73 percent of the votes cast.
As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 13 to the
Tribunal for judicial notice. I submit this document as proof that the
Anschluss would hardly have come about by international negotiations,
according to the opinion not only of the German Government, but also of
the English Government. I should like as proof of this assertion to read
the following from this document. It concerns a statement by Under
Secretary of State Butler before the House of Commons, which reads as
follows—it was made on 14 March 1938:
“The English Government discussed the new situation with
‘friends of the Geneva Entente’ and it was unanimously”—I
emphasize the word unanimously—“agreed that a discussion in
Geneva of the situation in Austria would not bring satisfactory
results but that the result would probably again be some kind of
humiliation. The Under Secretary of State stated that England
had never assumed any special guaranty for the ‘independence’ of
Austria which had been forced in the treaty of St. Germain.”
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
Subsequently to this the reunion of Austria with the German Reich took
place as set down in the law of 13 March 1938, which also was signed by
Ribbentrop.
Herewith I end the submission of those documents of mine that are
related to the question of Austria. I may now...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute Dr. Horn, the only desire of the Tribunal
is to save time, and we observe from the index in your document book
that there are, I think, over three hundred separate documents upon
which you wish to rely, and most of them appear to come from the various
books, the _German White Books_ and these other books, which the
Tribunal provisionally allowed to you. Wouldn’t the most convenient
course be for you to put them in, in bulk, saying that you are putting
in Exhibits 44 to 314, or whatever it may be, rather than simply detail
each document by its number? If you have a particular passage which you
want to read at this moment, you can do so; but it seems to take up
unnecessary time, simply to give each exhibit number one after the
other.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President, I shall mention those numbers in
this way which I should like only to bring to judicial notice, briefly
mention from such and such to such and such, when it is a matter of
several numbers; and I shall ask the Court to accept them then.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. HORN: I will now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. The
American Prosecutor stated in his presentation on this question that
this marked the end of a series of events that struck him as one of the
saddest chapters in human history—the violation and destruction of the
weak and small Czechoslovak people. As proof that there was no
Czechoslovak people in the usual sense of the term either before or
after 1939, I would like to read a few extracts from Lord Rothermere’s
book _Warnings and Prophecies_, which has been expressly granted me
through a ruling by the Tribunal. This is Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 45
(Document Number Ribbentrop-45).
THE PRESIDENT: Did the Tribunal allow Lord Rothermere’s book?
DR. HORN: The Tribunal has granted it to me and even put at my disposal
an English copy, which I herewith hand to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the question of admissibility was to be finally
determined when each book is offered in evidence, and I think you will
remember that the Tribunal stated in one of its orders that the opinions
of particular authors upon matters of ethics, history, and events would
not be admitted.
Lord Rothermere is apparently an author and was not a member of the
British Government; and therefore, unless there is some very particular
reason, it would not appear that his books—or statements in his
books—are in any way evidence.
DR. HORN: The paragraphs to be presented are concerned entirely with
matters of fact; and I therefore request that the Tribunal take judicial
notice of these facts. There is no question of any polemic discussions.
THE PRESIDENT: The distinction which exists is this: The Tribunal under
Article 21 is directed to take judicial notice of official government
documents, reports, _et cetera_. This is not an official government
document. Therefore—you say it is factual evidence—it is not evidence,
for the purpose of this Tribunal, of any facts stated in it. So far as
it is facts, it is not evidence of the facts, and so far as it is
opinion, it is Lord Rothermere’s opinion.
Well, Dr. Horn, can you tell me what you want to prove by it?
DR. HORN: I should like to prove by it, first, a few historical facts;
secondly that the difficulties of a state composed of many
nationalities, of which Czechoslovakia is an example, led to this
conflict with the German minority and consequently with the German
Government. I want to provide you with the reasons and motives that led
to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany.
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, on behalf of the United States I wish
to object very strongly to this offer for the reason given by Dr.
Horn—the first reason—and for the reason given secondly. If I
understood the translation correctly, I understood him to say in the
first place it was offered to prove that there was no such thing as a
Czech people. I don’t think that is a matter that can properly be raised
certainly here before this Court. We object that it is out of place to
offer such proof. We object furthermore for the reason given in the
second explanation by Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: May I again point out that I wish to demonstrate by this
means, the motives that led to the separation of the Sudetenland in the
year 1938?
If I wish to adopt an attitude toward some international offense with
which someone is charged and adjudge it, I must also be in a position to
judge the motives underlying it. Otherwise it is impossible for me to
conduct a legal investigation.
I may also point out that I had first of all asked the Tribunal for
documents of the League of Nations as evidence and I would have referred
to these official documents if this evidence had come into my possession
in time; but as I am not yet in possession of them, I have resorted to
presenting facts to the Tribunal instead.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that, about the League of Nations? I did
not catch what you said.
DR. HORN: I have asked the League of Nations’ Library for the
appropriate documents regarding minorities which are in the possession
of the League of Nations, in order to submit them as evidence. The
office of the General Secretary is obtaining this evidence for me, but
so far I have not received it. Consequently I had to refer to this
weaker source of evidence in connection with documents which are
comparable to the government reports of Article 21, or which are
themselves such reports.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you specified the passages in the book to which you
wish to refer? I mean, have you marked them somewhere in some copy of
the book?
DR. HORN: I have requested documents regarding minorities in
Czechoslovakia, as far as these questions have been decided by legal
proceedings conducted by the League of Nations and by the International
Court at The Hague. This is a collection published by the League of
Nations regarding minority matters and constantly brought up to date. It
is an official collection of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: I was only asking you whether you had specified the
particular passages in Lord Rothermere’s book which you want to put in.
DR. HORN: I am sorry. I did not understand your question. Could I
request you to repeat the question?
THE PRESIDENT: The question I asked was whether you have specified the
particular passages in Lord Rothermere’s book which you want to use.
DR. HORN: I have marked these passages, and they are on Pages 137, 150,
138, 151, 161...
THE PRESIDENT: Not so fast, I want to get them down. 137, 138...
DR. HORN: Pages 161, 162, 140, 144, 145, 157. They are in each case just
short paragraphs.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is an appropriate time for us to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will rule upon the admissibility
of these passages from Lord Rothermere’s book when they have had the
translation submitted to them. In the meantime, will you go on
presenting your documents in the way that I suggested, and not stopping
to detail any of them except those that you particularly want to.
DR. HORN: May I explain very briefly that the oppression of German
racial groups in the border territories of Czechoslovakia led to the
formation of the Sudeten German Party, and to the co-operation and
consultation of the latter with official German agencies. Therefore the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in his capacity of Reich Foreign Minister and
within the scope of the directives he received, held conferences with
leaders of the national groups. A number of documents have already been
submitted in evidence by the Prosecution and I shall refer to them
later. In this connection may I ask to make a correction in Document
2788-PS, where, on Page 2, approximately in the middle, it says “by the
extent and gradual”—there is an error in translation here. Our document
says “provocation,” whereas the original says “specification
(Präzisierung) of the demands in order to avoid entering the
government.” I request the correction of this error, as it distorts the
meaning.
In the course of the Prosecution’s presentation Von Ribbentrop was said
to have supported the high-handed conduct of the Sudeten German leaders.
As evidence to the contrary I refer to a part of Document 3060-PS which
has not yet been read and from which the contrary can be gathered, that
is, that the then Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop took measures against
the high-handedness of the Sudeten German leaders with the help of his
Ministry in Prague. As evidence of this, may I quote the first and
second paragraphs of this document. I quote:
“The rebuff to Frank”—that is, the leader of the Sudeten German
Party at that time—“has had a salutary effect. I have discussed
matters with Henlein, who had avoided me recently, and with
Frank, separately, and have received the following promises:
“1. The policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party must
follow exclusively the lines of German foreign policy as
transmitted through the German Legation. My directives must be
obeyed implicitly.”
These directives do not apply within the frame of the general policy
which had as its aim the avoidance of direct interference in Czech
affairs or in the policy of the Sudeten German Party.
Regarding the details of the activity of the German Government and of
the Foreign Office in their relations with the Sudeten German Party, I
shall question Herr Von Ribbentrop when he is called as a witness.
I now pass on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 46 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-46), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. This
document is a report from the Legation of the Czechoslovak Republic in
Paris. It is concerned with the meaning and purpose of Lord Runciman’s
mission to Prague. It shows that that mission was entrusted to him by
England for the purpose of gaining time for rearmament. I should like to
read the document.
“Paris, 5 August 1938. Secret. Mr. Minister,
“Massigli considers the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague a
good thing. Anthony Eden said, during a conversation with
Ambassador Corbin (the French Ambassador to London) that on
earnest reflection the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague was a
step in the right direction, as he is said to be going to engage
England more directly with Central Europe than has been the case
up to now. Massigli says that the English know that there will
be war, and that they are trying every means to delay it. He is
perfectly aware that Lord Runciman’s mission to Prague for the
purpose of settling that dispute is per se a danger to
Czechoslovakia; for Lord Runciman might, for the alleged purpose
of gaining time, propose something which could be tremendously
detrimental to Czechoslovakia.
“To this view of Massigli’s I add further information which is
extremely instructive. During the recent grain conference held
in London; the British, the Dominions, the United States, and
France conducted separate discussions. The French Delegate had a
discussion with Minister Elliot (British Minister of Health) and
Morrison (British Minister for Agriculture) as well as with the
distinguished expert, Sir Arthur Street, who was in the Ministry
of Agriculture and who had been entrusted with a leading post in
the Air Ministry. From the speeches, conduct, and negotiations
of the British Delegation, the French Delegate gathered the
positive impression that the British were interested in
organizing grain supplies not so much to prevent the conflict as
to win the conflict. The ministers Elliot and Morrison are both
supposed to believe in the possibility of a conflict.
“Sir Arthur Street said that in 6 months’ time he would have put
British aviation on its feet. Therefore much importance is
attached to the gaining of time in England.
“I mention this information at this point in connection with
Lord Runciman’s mission to Prague; because, as I said already,
the question of gaining time plays an important if not decisive
role in the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague.
“With best greetings, yours sincerely—Ususky.”
On 29 September 1938, the Munich Pact was concluded, in which Von
Ribbentrop also participated. Just how far, is something I shall
demonstrate when the defendant is examined in the witness box regarding
his policy.
On 30 September there was a mutual declaration, which I submit to the
Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 47 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-47). That declaration by the Führer and the British Prime
Minister Chamberlain, dated 30 September 1938, was planned to serve the
purpose of removing all differences still pending between Germany and
England.
The reaction to this agreement differed in Germany and in England. As
evidence for the British reaction I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number
48 (Document Number Ribbentrop-48), which I am offering to the Tribunal
with the request for judicial notice. This is an extract from the speech
of the British Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons on 3
October 1938. May I quote the following from its first paragraph:
“If there is a lesson we can learn from the experiences of these
last weeks it is the fact that lasting peace cannot be attained
by sitting still and waiting for it. Active and positive efforts
are required to attain this peace. We, in this country have
already been busy for a long time with a rearmament program
whose speed and extent increase constantly. Nobody should
believe that, because of the signing of the Munich Agreement by
the four powers, we can at present afford to reduce our efforts
regarding this program....”
As evidence of this rearmament program, which Chamberlain himself said
was constantly growing in speed and size, I should like to prove this
assertion by reference to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 49 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-49). This is a speech of the British Secretary of State for
War, Hore-Belisha, at the Mansion House in London, given on 10 October
1938, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this speech
also, from the extracts which I am submitting. May I quote a few words
from them?
“More still, however, is to be done to give full force and
opportunity to the territorial army as a whole.”
I am now skipping one paragraph and read the following paragraph,
Paragraph 5, which says:
“As regards the organization of new formations, infantry
brigades will in future have three battalions, as in the Regular
Army, instead of four. Employing the material that we have, we
find that we can form nine complete divisions on the Regular
Army model...
“We have provided also a considerable number of modern corps and
army units, such as Army Field and Survey regiments. R.A. and
Signal Corps will be ready to take their place in such
formations should war eventuate. This is also in accordance with
Regular Army organization.”
So much for the quotation from the speech of the Secretary of State for
War.
In Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 50 (Document Number Ribbentrop-50) further
stress is laid on armament. It concerns a speech of Winston Churchill’s
of 16 October 1938, and I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
this speech in connection with extracts from it as a document. I am
quoting only a few sentences from it:
“We must arm... We shall no doubt arm.
“Britain, casting away habits of centuries, will decree national
service upon her citizens. The British people will stand erect
and will face whatever may be coming. But
arms—instrumentalities, as President Wilson called them—are
not sufficient by themselves. We must add to them the power of
ideas. People say we ought not to allow ourselves to be drawn
into a theoretical antagonism between Nazidom and democracy, but
the antagonism is here now.”
I prove the fact that England was arming energetically in the air far
beyond the normal needs of defense, by Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 51
(Document Number Ribbentrop-51), which I am offering to the Tribunal
with the request for judicial notice. This is a declaration of the
British Secretary of State for Air in the House of Commons, dated 16
November 1938...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought you understood what the Tribunal
wanted you to do, which was to put in the documents all together. I
think I have said from 44—wasn’t it the document that you had got
to?—to 300 something, that you could put them in all together. But now
you have gone through 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and you seem to be
going through each one in detail, doing exactly what I asked you not to
do. Didn’t you understand what I said?
DR. HORN: The way I understood you, Mr. President, was that I may read
important parts from them. That is what I did. It concerns only
important extracts.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to find an important passage in each of the
300 documents?
DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, certainly not; but if I cannot read these
documents, these extracts, then I would like to ask the Tribunal to
accept my whole document book as evidence so that I can refer to it
later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what we intended to do. What we want you to do is
to offer in evidence now, stating that you offer from Exhibit 44 up to
300 or whatever the number is, and we will allow you, of course, to
refer to them at a later stage when you make your speech; and if there
is any passage which the Prosecution object to, they can inform you
about it beforehand and the matter can then be argued. But what we do
not desire to do is to take up the time of the Tribunal by either
offering each of these documents by its number individually, 44, 45, and
so on, or that you should read anything except passages which are of
especial importance at this moment. After all, you are not putting
forward your whole case now; you are only introducing your evidence.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I had...
THE PRESIDENT: I am reminded that of these last few exhibits to which
you have been referring, you have referred to about six, all of them
upon British rearmament. That is obviously cumulative, isn’t it?
Therefore, it cannot be that all those are all particularly important to
you.
We only desire to get on, and we desire you, as I have said, to put in
these documents, if I may use the phrase, in bulk; and we do not desire
you to refer to any of them beyond that.
DR. HORN: In that case I am offering Number 51...
COL. POKROVSKY [_Interposing_]: If I understand rightly, Dr. Horn up to
now has not drawn any conclusions from those directions which were given
him, time and again, by the Tribunal.
I had an opportunity, that is, as far as I could, actually to acquaint
myself with those translations that are gradually coming to me, and, by
the way, Dr. Horn turned over these documents, not 3 weeks ago, as he
said, but considerably later. As far as I can see up to now, I have a
whole series of objections.
Most of the documents in general are altogether irrelevant to the
matter, and in particular, absolutely irrelevant to the case of
Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we have already indicated that we do
not want to deal with questions of admissibility at the moment, because
the documents are not before us. I do not understand the purpose of your
objections. We haven’t got the documents here. How can we tell whether
they are admissible or not?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have an objection in principle. Part of the
documents—I will not quote their contents but merely for illustration
will name two or three numbers. Some of them are direct filthy and
slanderous attacks by private persons against such statesmen as Mr.
Roosevelt, the late President of the United States. I have in mind the
Documents Number Ribbentrop-290(4), 290(3), 290(1). Some of them are
just provocative forged documents. I have in mind Document Number
Ribbentrop-286.
There is a whole series of documents which fall directly under the terms
of those directions that were given to Dr. Horn by the Tribunal, and it
seems to me that if Dr. Horn will continue reading those documents into
the record...
THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: Colonel Pokrovsky, as I have said, we
haven’t got these documents before us. You say documents 290(1), 290(3),
290(4), and 286—I don’t know even what the documents are. I have never
seen them.
I think the best way would be for the Chief Prosecutors to submit their
objections in writing, and then they will be considered by the Tribunal.
The documents aren’t here. We can’t do anything until we see what the
documents are. In order to try and get on with this case, we are
allowing Dr. Horn to put in the documents in bulk. But your objections
now are really simply taking up time and doing no good at all. If you
would put in your objections in writing, saying that you object on
certain grounds to these documents, that matter would be considered; but
we can’t consider it without that.
COL. POKROVSKY: My objection was dictated by the wish to save time and
is of a very practical nature.
From the moment when a certain document—well, at least the contents of
it—from the moment even a brief account of it is recorded in the
transcript this material becomes the property of the press; and it seems
to me that it is not in our interests to have a document which is a
known falsification, and the fate of which has not been determined by
the Tribunal, that such a document should be turned over to certain
circles and that it should be made public.
Meanwhile, among the documents which have been presented by Dr. Horn,
there are such documents; and it is not quite clear to me why these
particular documents were delayed in translation, why these documents
were presented later than others. And on the basis of this consideration
I thought it my duty to address the Tribunal, and I think that the
Tribunal will consider the reason for my objections.
THE PRESIDENT: I follow what you mean now with reference to documents
being communicated to the press, and steps ought to be taken on that.
The Tribunal will rule now that documents, upon the admissibility of
which the Tribunal has not ruled, are not to be given to the press. I
believe there have been some infractions of that in the past; but that
is the Tribunal’s ruling, that documents should not be given to the
press until they have been admitted in evidence before this Court.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: I ought perhaps to add that the Tribunal are not in
complete control of this matter. It is for the Prosecution to see—and
also possibly for the Defense—that documents should not be given to the
press until they have been admitted in evidence here.
COL. POKROVSKY: Up to now the order was such if the documents mentioned
in Court are recorded in the transcript, then they become public
property.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor, I wonder if I could help on that
practical point, because it is one which has given us a little concern.
As Your Lordship knows, the practice has been that the documents have
been given some 24 hours before they are produced in Court, on the
understanding which has been practically entirely, completely, complied
with, that the press would not publish until the document is put in
evidence. And, My Lord, I am sure that if the Tribunal expressed the
wish that where any objection is taken to a document and the Tribunal
reserves the question of admissibility, the press would, in the spirit
with which they have complied with the previous practice, comply at once
with the Tribunal’s desire and not publish it in these circumstances. I
think that in practice that would solve the difficulty which Your
Lordship has just mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: The only thing is, of course, that we are now dealing
with a very large number of documents which Dr. Horn wants to submit;
and, as you have heard, for purposes of trying to save time we have
asked him to submit those documents in bulk.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And of course it is very difficult, if not impossible,
for members of the Prosecution to make their objections to documents
when they are offered in bulk in that way. Therefore, I think the most
convenient course would probably be if, as soon as the translation of
those documents has been made, the Prosecution could indicate any
objections they have to them and the Tribunal would consider them. And
after the order of the Tribunal has been made upon them, they should
then be made available to the press.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I respectfully and entirely agree. My
Lord, the Prosecutors did confer. Of course the only material that they,
had to confer upon was the short description of the document in Document
Book Number 1, and on that it appeared to all of us that there were a
number of documents which might be and probably were objectionable. But,
clearly, from our point of view it would be much more satisfactory if we
had the opportunity of seeing the actual document in translation, and
then we should gladly comply with what Your Lordship has suggested,
namely, that we will make the objections in writing to such of those as
we think are objectionable and let the Tribunal have them.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them, I believe, are in
English, and you could let us have your objections as soon as possible.
Perhaps the press would act in accordance with our wishes and not make
public those documents to which objection is taken until we have ruled
upon them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, yes. We will make our
objections as soon as we have had the opportunity of reading the
documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. HORN: May I, Mr. President, state that none of my material has been
handed to the press by me up to now. I may further state that by an
order of the Tribunal only that part was to be translated which was
considered relevant by the Prosecution. On the basis of this ruling I
cannot rightly comprehend the one point of Colonel Pokrovsky’s objection
regarding the intrinsic value of the documents. I do not believe that
the Prosecution, on the strength of that ruling, would translate
anything which, as Colonel Pokrovsky emphasized, must be designated as
dirty in its contents. I think that would have been rejected already
before now by the Prosecution and therefore the danger does not exist at
all that any such translation or original will reach the press.
THE PRESIDENT: I haven’t seen the documents, so I can’t say, but if you
would continue in accordance with the scheme that I have suggested to
you, I think that would be the best course for you to take.
DR. HORN: May I now submit the documents referring to armament, military
as well as economic, which at the same time show the co-operation
between Britain and France? These are the Documents Number Ribbentrop-51
to 62, in my document book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice
of these documents.
I come to the question of Czechoslovakia. As evidence for the fact that
Slovakia requested to be taken under German protection I shall present
to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit Numbers 63, 64, and 65 (Documents
Ribbentrop-63, 64, and 65) with the request that they be given judicial
notice. Furthermore, I shall examine the Defendant Ribbentrop concerning
this subject when he takes the stand and, as far as is necessary, I
shall have him express an opinion regarding these particular documents.
Now I shall submit Documents Numbers 66 to 69 (Documents Ribbentrop-66
to 69) to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They contain statements
regarding the reaction in Britain to the occupation of the rest of the
Czech country on 15 March 1939 by Germany. Regarding the details as to
how the creation of the protectorate came about I shall again question
the Defendant Von Ribbentrop concerning the individual documents.
As the next group of exhibits, I present to the Tribunal the document
which refers to Article 99 of the dictate of Versailles and which
specifically refers to the international legal position of the Memel
territory. We are concerned here with Documents Ribbentrop-70 and 71 of
my document book.
Regarding the fact that in accordance with the presentation of evidence
up to now, I had timed myself not to proceed any further today than to
this document, I should like to ask your Lordship’s permission to submit
the rest of the documents to the Tribunal tomorrow. For up to now, on
the strength of the existing practice of the Tribunal that the documents
be partly read with connecting text, I had expected not to go any
further than to this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, why don’t you put them all in now? You say you
have an index of them. All you have to say is that you offer in evidence
the documents from 71 to 300 and something and then they go in, and then
if the Prosecution should take an objection to them, of course you can
be heard upon the question of the objection.
DR. HORN: May I have your permission to confer with my colleague for one
moment and see how much material he has here, so that I can then offer
evidence on the separate subjects to the Tribunal? May I again ask Your
Lordship?—I gather from this ruling of the Tribunal that submission of
evidence here is no longer to take place but merely presentation of
exhibits quite apart from the contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably when these documents are submitted for
translation which I understand you say you have done—but at any rate,
if you haven’t done it already you will be doing it—you will mark the
passages upon which you rely. Some may be in books, and there you will
indicate only certain parts; in documents you will indicate the parts
upon which you rely, which is what we desired you to do. You described
all these documents by numbers and gave them exhibit numbers in your
document book and all we want you to do now is to offer them in evidence
and then the Prosecution, when they have been translated, will have the
opportunity of objecting to them on the grounds of their being
cumulative or of their being inadmissible for some other reasons; and,
if necessary, you will be heard upon that. All we want you to do now is
to get on. What difficulty there can be in submitting these documents,
all of which you have indexed in your document book, the Tribunal is
quite unable to see.
DR. HORN: Until now, however, the ruling of the Tribunal was to this
effect that we, in the Defense presentation, were not only allowed to
submit our documents but also to deliver them with a connecting text so
as to indicate the attitude of the Defense. Just recently, Mr. Justice
Jackson suggested that, on the contrary, the documents should be handed
over in their entirety and that objections could be raised subsequently
by the Prosecution against the individual documents without their being
presented. This suggestion was turned down on the strength of
representations made by Dr. Dix, and the Tribunal intended to continue
the established procedure, namely, that the documents could be read and
brought forward with a connecting text. Now, we come today to a complete
departure from this procedure, in which only the documents, and these in
bulk, are presented to the Tribunal for judicial notice. That is
naturally such a deviation that one first of all has to regroup all
these documents, in order to be able to submit them to the Tribunal in
their proper order, for up to now we had planned to deliver at least
some part of the contents.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not aware of any order of the Tribunal which refers
to an interconnecting text. We did not rule that you should not be
allowed to read any passage from the documents, but what we did rule was
that we wished the documents to be presented and put in evidence and
that the passages upon which you relied should be marked and that the
Prosecution should, if they wished to object to them as being so
irrelevant that they needn’t be translated, that they should do so, and
that the Tribunal should rule, if there was a conflict upon that. Dr.
Horn, of course, you can put any document to your witnesses in the
course of their examination and ask them to explain it. It isn’t as
though you are confined to this presentation of the documents in bulk.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, may I add another word? This matter appears to
me to be again such a question of principle that I do not wish to
prejudice my colleagues and I should like to have an opportunity first
of all to confer with my colleagues about it. That is indeed a basic
departure from the established procedure which was allowed the Defense.
I would not like therefore to take it upon myself now simply to alter
these matters for myself and then in so doing, also commit my
colleagues. I hope that Your Lordship will understand that.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the only material order which the Tribunal has
made, as far as I am aware, is this: It is the order of the 4th of
February 1946, 2(a):
“During the presentation of a defendant’s case, the defendant’s
counsel will read documents, will question witnesses, and will
make such brief comments on the evidence as are necessary to
insure a proper understanding of it.”
DR. HORN: Mr. President, this ruling could naturally only be interpreted
by us to the effect that we were granted approximately the same
procedure as the Prosecution, for that certainly belongs to the
fundamental principles of any trial, that a certain equality of rights
exists between Prosecution and Defense.
So as to save time, we are prepared to adapt ourselves to the Court to
the extent that we submit the documents to the Tribunal in bulk, insofar
as they refer to a definite problem; but still with the reservation to
make those statements upon their contents required in order to
understand the whole problem. This possibility, however, is taken away
from us, if we must now simply submit the entire documentary material
and can make no statements about it at all; for we certainly cannot make
any comments on a document if I now, for example, submit 10 pieces
altogether for a specific problem.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will adjourn now for a few minutes
to consider this question and will return in a short time and announce
their decision so that you can prepare yourself for tomorrow on the
lines which they wish.
DR. DIX: Before the Tribunal confer, may I ask only one question. I have
understood the course of the discussion up to now in this way: That the
difficulty has arisen owing to the fact that as the Russian and French
translations are not available, some of the Prosecution are still unable
to form an opinion with reference to this material and consequently
cannot decide whether they wish to raise objections or not. On the other
hand the Tribunal wants to avoid quotations being read here concerning
matters on which it has not yet been decided whether the Prosecution
want to raise objections. This is the situation which appears to me to
be the cause of the difficulties arising at present.
I have not understood the statements of the Tribunal, of His Lordship,
to mean—I beg to be corrected if I am wrong—that there is to be a
deviation from the already announced decision or from the procedure
followed up to now, that we may quote essential and important portions
of the documents submitted by us, when they have been admitted as
relevant by the Tribunal.
I believe that I am right in my impression that no exception is to be
made to this principle and that no basic new decision is to be made here
now, but only an interim ruling is being sought: How can we surmount the
difficulties that Dr. Horn may not at the moment read individual
passages from his documents because the Tribunal is not yet in a
position to decide their relevancy and admit them, because the Tribunal
cannot yet hear the attitude of the Prosecution?
Before we adjourn, therefore, so that we have a definite basis for our
discussion, I should like to ask the Court if my interpretation is
correct. Is it now merely a question of finding a way out while
basically maintaining the right of the Defense to speak connecting
words, words of explanation of the documents, that is, such words
without which the documents could not be understood, and to read
individual relevant parts, but that on principle only these technical
interim questions are to be decided?
I should be grateful to Your Lordship if I could be told if this
conception of mine, regarding the nature of these difficulties which
have arisen, is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now and we will return to Court very
shortly and we will consider what you have said.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: On the 22 March 1946, the Tribunal made this ruling,
repeating a ruling of 8 March 1946:
“To avoid unnecessary translations Defense Counsel shall
indicate to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents
which they propose to use in order that the Prosecution may have
an opportunity to object to irrelevant passages.
“In the event of disagreement between the Prosecution and the
Defense as to the relevancy of any particular passage, the
Tribunal will decide what passages are sufficiently relevant to
be translated. Only the cited passages need be translated unless
the Prosecution require translation of the entire document.”
That rule has not, for very likely sufficient reason, been able to be
carried out, and therefore certainly the Tribunal have not got the
translations, and they understand that the Prosecution have not got, at
any rate, all the translations. The difficulty which has arisen, the
Tribunal thinks, is in part, at any rate, due to that fact.
The Tribunal, in citing that order of 8 March 1946, on 22 March 1946,
said this:
“In considering the matters which have been raised this morning
the Tribunal has had in mind the necessity for a fair trial and
at the same time for an expeditious trial, and the Tribunal has
decided that for the present it will proceed under rules
heretofore announced, that is to say:
“First, documents translated into the four languages may be
introduced without being read, but in introducing them counsel
may summarize them or otherwise call their relevance to the
attention of the Court and may read such brief passages as are
strictly relevant and are deemed important.
“Second, when a document is offered the Tribunal will hear any
objections that may be offered to it.”
In this connection the Tribunal then went on to read the order of 8
March, which deals with translations.
Now, in the present case, the translations not being in the hands of the
Tribunal or of all the prosecutors, it has been impossible for the
prosecutors to make their objections and impossible for the Tribunal to
rule upon the admissibility of the documents. Therefore, it is natural
that the Prosecution have objected to the Defense reading from documents
which they had not seen.
The Tribunal understands that the translations of these documents of Dr.
Horn’s will be ready tomorrow. They hope, therefore, that the order
which I have just read will be able to be carried out tomorrow, and they
propose for the present, and if the order is reasonably and fairly
carried out by Defense Counsel, to adhere to it. They would draw the
attention of the defendants’ counsel again to the first paragraph of the
order and would remind them that they must adhere strictly to that
order:
“The documents having been translated into the four languages
may be introduced without being read, but in introducing them
counsel may summarize them, or otherwise call their relevance to
the attention of the Court and may read such brief passages as
are strictly relevant and are deemed important.”
In that connection I would add: “and are not cumulative”.
The Tribunal cannot sit here and have three or four hundred documents
read to them and commented upon and argued, and therefore it is
absolutely essential in the opinion of the Tribunal that counsel must
summarize briefly and indicate the relevance of the documents briefly
and read only such passages as are really strictly relevant and are not
cumulative.
The Tribunal are prepared to adhere to that rule, as I say, if counsel
will adhere strictly to it themselves, and they think if Dr. Horn will
state, after offering the documents either in one complete bulk or in a
group or in groups, the relevancy of each group and confine himself to
the reading of only passages which are really necessary to be read in
order to understand the documents, that will be satisfactory to them.
But they cannot sit here to hear either each of those documents offered
in evidence by its number or to hear a short speech or even a longer
speech about the relevancy of each of the documents or to hear passages
read from each of those documents. The number of documents is very great
and it is impossible for the Tribunal to carry on an expeditious trial
unless the rule which they have laid down is interpreted in the way in
which I have indicated.
As I have already indicated in the emphasis which I threw upon the
words, this rule was expressly made for the present and unless it is
marked by the Defense Counsel in a reasonable way the rule will be
altered.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 28 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-THIRD DAY
Thursday, 28 March 1946
_Morning Session_
DR. HORN: In accordance with the request of the Tribunal, I am now
presenting in groups the documents not yet named, as follows:
First of all, the group concerning the Polish question. In my document
book, you will find a document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 200 (Document
Number Ribbentrop-200) which I am submitting to the Tribunal for
judicial notice. In this document, Prime Minister Chamberlain, in a
letter to Hitler dated 22 August 1939, defines his attitude regarding
the basis for conflict between Germany and Poland. In this connection he
emphasizes the question of minorities as one of the main causes of the
conflict. As proof of the fact that this minority question already
played an important part when the Polish State came into being, I refer
to the document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 72 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-72), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. This
contains observations by the German Peace Delegation on the peace
conditions.
In a further document—Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 74 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-74), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice—the
President of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers,
Clemenceau, once again draws the attention of the Polish Prime Minister,
Paderewski, to this problem. May I offer as proof...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I want to explain the position of the
Prosecution.
We have not yet received these documents, and therefore we are in the
position that we have been able to make only a tentative selection of
those to which we object. All this book of documents has been objected
to as far as we know. I want only to make it clear that we are
admitting, without protest, the course taken by Dr. Horn on the basis
which Your Lordship announced yesterday, that he is putting them in _en
bloc_, subject to our right to object formally when we have the
documents.
Therefore it is only right that we must preserve our position, because I
have arranged, and all my colleagues agree, that there should be
objections to a number of these documents on our present state of
knowledge.
DR. HORN: May I ask Your Lordship to hear me for a moment?
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to say something? Were you going to add
something to what Sir David had said?
DR. HORN: In view of the objections raised by the Prosecution I request
that a general ruling be made now as to whether the Defense have to
submit to disadvantages arising out of technical deficiencies and for
which they are not responsible, and whether our already limited
presentation of evidence shall be made practically impossible by our
being unable to discuss even in a general way, documentary material with
the Prosecution and the Tribunal.
May I ask, therefore, that the presentation of documents in their
shortened form, as requested by the Tribunal yesterday, be postponed
until the document books are available.
THE PRESIDENT: The difficulty seems entirely to arise from the fact that
your document books are not ready. That is what causes the difficulty.
If the document books had been ready and had been submitted to the
Prosecution, the Prosecution would be in a position to object to them.
That is the reason why Sir David is objecting in this provisional form.
But if you have witnesses whom you are going to call, why do you not
call them while your books are being got ready? That seems to the
Tribunal to be the obvious course.
Call your witnesses and then we can have the documents introduced at a
later stage, when we can see them. That is the only reasonable course
and why you do not adopt it I do not know.
DR. HORN: An officer of the Translation Division informed me recently,
that he is not in a position, with the personnel at his disposal, to
catch up with translations. That is the cause of the trouble and it is
beyond my control. I submitted the documents in good time for
translation.
THE PRESIDENT: That was not the point I was dealing with. Perhaps the
interpretation did not come through correctly.
What I said was that if you have witnesses whom you propose to call, why
do you not call them now?
DR. HORN: I had intended to call the witnesses in the course of my
presentation of documents and in accordance with the groups of questions
on which witnesses could make statements.
THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you had, but as your documents are not here to
be presented to the Court, then you must get on, and the only way to get
on with your case is to call your witnesses.
DR. HORN: In that case, may I ask for 5 minutes so that I can have a
short conversation with a woman witness and then I shall call her?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. Wait one moment.
Yes, Mr. Dodd?
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I would not begrudge any counsel 5
minutes. This woman witness has been here for a long time. She stood
outside all day yesterday. I think Dr. Horn has talked to her before. He
has had ample opportunity to confer with her. He knew he was going to
call her; he asked this Court for permission to call her. I think we are
faced here with almost a one-man filibuster at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the witness must be called at
once.
DR. HORN: In that case I wish to have Fräulein Blank called as a
witness.
[_The witness Blank took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
MARGARETE BLANK (Witness): My name is Margarete Blank.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. HORN: When did you first meet Herr Von Ribbentrop?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: I met him at the beginning of November 1934 in Berlin,
when he was delegate for disarmament questions.
DR. HORN: When did you become secretary of the former Foreign Minister
Von Ribbentrop?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: On 1 November 1934 I was engaged as secretary in the
Ribbentrop office. His personal secretary gave notice and, as her
successor did not turn up, Von Ribbentrop asked me whether I was willing
to take the post. I said “yes” and became his personal secretary on 1
February 1935.
DR. HORN: What was Von Ribbentrop’s attitude towards Hitler?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge Herr Von Ribbentrop always showed
the greatest admiration and veneration for Adolf Hitler. To enjoy the
Führer’s confidence, to justify it by his conduct and work was his chief
aim, to which he devoted all his efforts. To achieve this aim no
sacrifice was too great. In carrying out the tasks set him by the Führer
he showed utter disregard for his own person. When speaking of Hitler to
his subordinates he did so with the greatest admiration. Appreciation of
his services by the Führer, as for instance the award of the Golden
Party Badge of Honor, the recognition of his accomplishments in a
Reichstag speech, a letter on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday,
full of appreciation and praise, meant to him the highest recompense for
his unlimited devotion.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop adhered to Hitler’s views even if
he himself was of a different opinion?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: What I just said shows that in cases of differences of
opinion between himself and the Führer, Herr Von Ribbentrop subordinated
his own opinion to that of the Führer. Once a decision had been made by
Adolf Hitler there was no more criticism afterwards. Before his
subordinates Herr Von Ribbentrop presented the Führer’s views as if they
were his own. If the Führer expressed his will, it was always equivalent
to a military order.
DR. HORN: To what do you attribute this attitude?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: I attribute it first of all to Ribbentrop’s view that
the Führer was the only person capable of making the right political
decisions.
Secondly, I attribute it to the fact that Herr Von Ribbentrop, as the
son of an officer and as a former officer himself, having taken the oath
of allegiance to the Führer, felt himself bound in loyalty and
considered himself a soldier, so to say, who had to carry out orders
given him, and not to criticize or change them.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Ribbentrop having tendered his
resignation several times?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, that happened several times. But about such
personal matters Ribbentrop would not speak to his subordinates. I
remember only the resignation handed in by him in 1941. I assume that
this resignation, as well as the later ones, was tendered by a
handwritten letter. The reason for this resignation lay in differences
with other departments as to competency; in view of their encroachments
upon the competence of the Foreign Office, Herr Von Ribbentrop felt he
could no longer take responsibility for the Reich’s foreign policy.
DR. HORN: What was the result of these offers to resign?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: They were turned down.
DR. HORN: Were you with Von Ribbentrop while he was Ambassador in
England?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop over a number of years worked for
close alliance between Germany and England?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. For this reason Von Ribbentrop, in the summer of
1936, asked the Führer to send him as ambassador to England. The Naval
Agreement of 1935 was only a first step. Subsequently an air pact was
contemplated, but, for reasons unknown to me, was not concluded.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Von Ribbentrop’s views on the
British theory of balance of power on the continent?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: From numerous statements by Ribbentrop I know he was of
the opinion that England still adhered to her traditional balance of
power policy. In this his ideas were opposed to those of the Führer, who
was of the opinion that with the development of Russia a factor had
arisen in the East which necessitated a revision of the old balance of
power policy—in other words, that England had a vital interest in the
steadily increasing strength of Germany. From Ribbentrop’s attitude it
could be inferred that he expected that in the Polish crisis the English
guarantee for Poland would be honored.
DR. HORN: What political aims did Von Ribbentrop want to achieve by the
conclusion of the Tripartite Pact?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Tripartite Pact was to be a pact for the limitation
of war.
DR. HORN: Do you know whether Ribbentrop endeavored to keep America out
of the war?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, the Tripartite Pact was signed with this end in
view.
DR. HORN: And now another set of questions. What was Herr Von
Ribbentrop’s attitude in church questions?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge, his attitude in church questions
was very tolerant.
To my knowledge, he left the Church already in the twenties, but in this
respect he exercised no pressure or influence on his personnel or,
rather, he did not bother about it at all. His tolerance went even so
far that in 1935 he let his two eldest children have their wish and
rejoin the Church. His tolerance in personal questions of religion was
in line with his political attitude towards the Church. In this
connection I remember Von Ribbentrop’s sending the Führer a fundamental
memorandum in which he advocated a tolerant church policy. In the winter
of 1944 he received Bishop Heckel to discuss church matters with him. On
the occasion of a journey to Rome in 1941 or 1942, he paid a long visit
to the Pope.
DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop of an introspective and secluded character, or
was he not?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, although I was his personal secretary for 10 years,
I hardly ever saw him in a communicative mood. His time and thoughts
were so completely occupied by his work, to which he devoted himself
wholeheartedly, that there was no room for anything private. Apart from
his wife and children there was nobody with whom Von Ribbentrop was on
terms of close friendship. This, however, did not prevent him from
having the welfare of his subordinates at heart and from showing them
generosity, particularly in time of need.
DR. HORN: Is it true that you often felt that there were certain
differences of opinion between Ribbentrop and Hitler?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. True to his attitude, which I mentioned before, Von
Ribbentrop never discussed such differences with his subordinates, but I
do remember distinctly that there were times when such differences
surely did exist. At such times the Führer refused for weeks to receive
Herr Von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop suffered physically and mentally under
such a state of affairs.
DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop independent in the attainment of the goals of
his foreign policy, or was he bound by orders and directives of the
Führer?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Ribbentrop often used the phrase that he was only the
minister responsible for carrying out the Führer’s foreign policy. By
this he meant that, in formulating his policy, he was not independent.
In addition, even in carrying out the directives given him by the
Führer, he was to a large extent bound by instructions from Hitler.
Thus, for instance, the daily reports of a purely informative nature
transmitted by the liaison officer, Ambassador Hewel, between the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Führer were often accompanied by
requests for the Führer’s decision on individual questions and by draft
telegrams containing instructions to the heads of missions abroad.
DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop suffer by the fact that, although he was
responsible for foreign policy, he was not allowed to direct it?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: He never complained about it in my presence, but I had
the feeling that he did suffer.
DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s attitude toward the Foreign Office?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Führer saw in the Foreign Office a body of ossified
red-tape civil servants, more or less untouched by National Socialism. I
gathered from men of his entourage, that he often made fun of the
Foreign Office. He considered it to be the home of reaction and
defeatism.
DR. HORN: In what way did Ribbentrop try to bring the Foreign Office
closer to Hitler?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: When taking over the Foreign Office in February 1938,
Herr Von Ribbentrop intended to carry out a thorough reshuffle of the
entire German diplomatic service. He also intended to make basic changes
in the training of young diplomats. These plans did not go beyond the
initial stage because of the war. In the course of the war they were
taken up again when the question of new blood for the Foreign Office
became acute. Ribbentrop’s anxiety to counteract the Führer’s animosity
towards the Foreign Office led him to fill some of the posts of heads of
missions abroad, not with professional diplomats, but with tried SA and
SS leaders.
DR. HORN: What were Ribbentrop’s views and intentions regarding Russia?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: His intentions regarding Russia were shown by the
Non-aggression Pact of August 1939, and the Trade Agreement of September
1939.
DR. HORN: Do you know that, in addition to the Non-aggression Pact and
the Trade Agreement, a further agreement was concluded in Moscow?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, there was an additional secret agreement.
GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! It appears to me that the witness who has
been called to attend the present sitting of the Tribunal is, by the
very nature of her position as secretary to the former Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, able to testify only to the personality of
the defendant, to his way of life, to the reticence or frankness of his
character, and so forth. But the witness is quite incompetent to pass an
opinion on matters pertaining to agreements, foreign policy, _et
cetera_. In this sense I consider the questions of the Defense
absolutely inadmissible and request that they be withdrawn.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, that is the same matter that is raised, is it
not, upon the affidavit of Dr. Gaus? I mean, you said that you were
going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gaus which dealt with a secret
agreement between—can’t you hear me? I beg your pardon. I ought to have
said that Dr. Seidl was going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gaus with
reference to this alleged agreement. That is right, is it not?
DR. HORN: I assume so, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Soviet Prosecutor objected to that agreement being
referred to until the affidavit should be admitted, until it had been
seen. Well, now, is the agreement in writing?
DR. HORN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the alleged agreement between the Soviet Government
and Germany in writing?
DR. HORN: Yes. It was put down in writing, but I am not in possession of
a copy of the agreement, and I should therefore like to ask the
Tribunal, in case the decision depends on the affidavit of Ambassador
Gaus, to allow me to obtain, at the appropriate time, an affidavit from
Fräulein Blank who saw the original. Would Your Lordship be agreeable to
that?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you a copy of the agreement itself?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, there are only two copies of this agreement.
One copy was left in Moscow on 23 August 1939. The other copy was taken
to Berlin by Von Ribbentrop. According to an announcement in the press
all the archives of the Foreign Office were confiscated by the Soviet
troops. May I, therefore, request that the Soviet Government or the
Soviet Delegation be asked to submit to the Tribunal the original of the
agreement?
THE PRESIDENT: I asked you a question, Dr. Seidl. I did not ask you for
an argument. I asked you whether you have a copy of that agreement
available.
DR. SEIDL: I, myself, am not in possession of a copy of the agreement.
The affidavit of Ambassador Gaus only states the contents of the secret
agreement. He was able to give the contents of the secret agreement
because he drafted it. The secret agreement, as drafted by Ambassador
Gaus, was signed by Foreign Commissar Molotov and Herr Von Ribbentrop.
That is all I have to say.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I wish to make the following statement:
With regard to what was mentioned here by Defense Counsel Seidl, about
the agreement allegedly seized by Soviet troops in connection with the
capture of the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—that is,
the agreement concluded in Moscow in August 1939—I would draw the
attention of the Defense Counsel, to the newspaper in which this
agreement, the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, was
published. That is a known fact.
Insofar as other agreements are concerned, the Soviet Prosecution
considers that Dr. Seidl’s application for the incorporation into the
record of affidavits by Friedrich Gaus should be denied, and for the
following reasons:
Gaus’ testimony on this pact and on the history immediately preceding
the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact is irrelevant. The presentation
of such affidavits, which, moreover, do not shed a true light on events,
can be looked upon only as an act of provocation. This is clearly borne
out by the fact that Ribbentrop himself repudiated this witness even
though his affidavits describe Ribbentrop’s activities, even though
Defense Counsel for Hess has accepted testimonies from this witness and
applied for their incorporation into the record, despite the fact that
they contain no reference to Hess. On the strength of these
considerations, of these circumstances, I request the Tribunal to reject
the request made by Defense Counsel Seidl and to consider the question
submitted by Defense Counsel Horn as being irrelevant to the matter
under our consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl? Do you want to say something?
DR. SEIDL: May I add something? The translation of what the Soviet
Prosecutor has just said has come through incompletely. I could not make
out whether General Rudenko wanted to deny altogether that such an
agreement was concluded or whether he wanted only to state that the
contents of this secret agreement are not relevant.
In the first case, I repeat my application that the Soviet Foreign
Commissar Molotov be called and interrogated before this Tribunal; in
the latter case, I ask to be given the opportunity here and now to
submit to the Tribunal my points regarding the relevance of this secret
agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: At the moment we are considering an objection to the
evidence of this witness, so we won’t trouble with that.
The Tribunal will adjourn for a few moments.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal desires to point out to Counsel for the
Defense, that there was no mention of this alleged treaty in his
application for evidence to be given by the witness now in the witness
box, but as the matter has now been raised the Tribunal rules that the
witness may be questioned upon the matter.
DR. HORN: [_To the witness._] You were speaking about the secret
agreement. How did you come to know about the conclusion of this
agreement?
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that what I said was wrongly translated into
the Russian language. At any rate, I don’t know whether it was rightly
translated into the German language; but what I said was that the
witness may be questioned, not that the witness may not be questioned.
Is that clear to you?
DR. HORN: Thank you. I understood the question correctly.
[_Turning to the witness._] Taking up your previous statement about the
secret agreement I should like to ask you how you came to know about the
conclusion of this agreement?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Owing to illness, I could not accompany Von Ribbentrop
on his two trips to Russia. I was also absent when the preparatory work
for the agreements was being done. I learned of the existence of this
secret agreement through a special sealed envelope which, according to
instructions, was filed separately and bore an inscription something
like “German-Russian secret or additional agreement.”
DR. HORN: You were also responsible for filing separately these secret
matters? Is this correct?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes.
DR. HORN: I should like to turn now to another group of questions. Did
Von Ribbentrop endeavor to keep the pact with Russia in any case?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Having signed the German-Russian pacts, Von Ribbentrop
was, of course, interested in their being kept. Moreover, he realized
fully the great danger a German-Russian war would mean for Germany;
accordingly he informed and warned the Führer. For this very purpose, as
far as I recall, Embassy Counsellor Hilger from Moscow and Ambassador
Schnurre were called to Berchtesgaden to report. Also, in the spring of
1941 Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg was again ordered to report,
to back up and to corroborate and reinforce Herr Von Ribbentrop’s
warnings to the Führer.
DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop was informed beforehand of
Hitler’s intent to attach Austria to the Reich?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: At the time of the German march into Austria, Ambassador
Von Ribbentrop, who in February had been appointed Foreign Minister, was
in London on his farewell visit. There he heard to his surprise of the
Anschluss of Austria. He himself had had a different idea of a solution
of the Austria question, namely an economic union.
DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop made repeated efforts to
end the war by diplomatic methods?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. One of his moves was to send Minister Professor
Berber to Switzerland in the winter of 1943-1944. Later on these moves
were intensified by sending Herr Von Schmieden to Bern and Dr. Hesse to
Stockholm. As the Führer had not given official authority to initiate
negotiations, it was possible only to try to find out on what conditions
discussions might be opened between Germany and the Allies. Similar
missions were entrusted to the German Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid,
Minister Von Bibra, Consul General Möllhausen in Lisbon, and the
Ambassador to the Vatican, Von Weizsäcker. A former member of the Office
Ribbentrop living in Madrid was instructed to make a similar attempt
with the British Government.
On 20 April Von Ribbentrop dictated to me a detailed memorandum for the
Führer in which he asked for official authorization to initiate
negotiations. I do not know the outcome of this request because I left
Berlin.
DR. HORN: In the course of your duties did you get to know what Hitler’s
basic attitude to this question was?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: From what I heard from men of his entourage I know that
the Führer did not expect much of it, or that he would have been in
favor of initiating negotiations only at a time of military successes.
If and when, however, there were military successes, he was likewise
against diplomatic initiative. As to the mission of Dr. Hesse—after its
failure, he, it was disclosed by an indiscretion, remarked that he had
not expected much of it anyway.
DR. HORN: Just one more question: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop was
notified of the impending invasion of Norway and Denmark only a very
short time before this action?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, just a few days previously.
DR. HORN: Have you heard anything to the effect that Von Ribbentrop was
of the opinion England would fight for Poland?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. In line with his view that England would adhere to
the old balance of power policy, he was of the opinion that England
would honor her guarantee to Poland.
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions of this witness? [_There was no response._] Do the
Prosecution?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have very carefully
considered this matter. They hope that the Tribunal will not hold it
against them that they accept everything that this witness says, but
they feel that all the matters could be more conveniently put to the
defendant himself, and therefore they do not intend to cross-examine.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the Tribunal has permitted the question
concerning the secret agreement to be put to the witness. The witness
knew only of the existence of this agreement, not its contents.
May I please be told whether the admission of this question to the
witness is to be considered as implying the decision by the Tribunal on
the admissibility of Ambassador Gaus’ affidavit, and whether I might now
be given the opportunity of reading an excerpt from this affidavit?
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been submitted to the Prosecution?
DR. SEIDL: Last Monday—that is, 3 days ago—I submitted six copies of
the affidavit to the Translation Division or to Lieutenant Schrader of
the Defendants’ Information Center. I assume that in the meantime, since
3 days have elapsed, the Prosecution have received a copy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have not received the
copies. I have not seen the affidavit yet. Neither has my friend Mr.
Dodd, nor have my other colleagues, General Rudenko, or M. Champetier de
Ribes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I think we had better wait until the document is in
the hands of the Prosecution, then it can be considered.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything in my power to
furnish the Prosecution with the affidavit. I have no influence on the
General Secretary’s business, and I should be obliged if the Tribunal
would assist in this matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Nobody has said that you have done anything wrong about
it, Dr. Seidl.
Yes, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: As my next witness I should like to call Minister Paul
Schmidt.
[_The witness Schmidt took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
DR. PAUL OTTO SCHMIDT (Witness): Schmidt is my name.
THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?
SCHMIDT: Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
DR. HORN: Witness, you took part in some of the decisive discussions
between the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, and members of the
Reich Government before the outbreak of war. Is it correct that you were
present at the conference on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop and the British Ambassador?
[_There was a pause in proceedings._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until a quarter to 2.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1345 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. HORN: Witness, is it correct that you were present at the conference
on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the British
Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.
DR. HORN: Where did that conference take place?
SCHMIDT: It took place in the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs
in the Foreign Office in Berlin.
DR. HORN: In what capacity did you take part in that conference?
SCHMIDT: I took part in that conference as interpreter and recorder.
DR. HORN: Since when had you been employed in this capacity in the
Foreign Office and for whom did you work?
SCHMIDT: I had been working in the Foreign Office as interpreter for
conferences since 1923, and in this capacity I interpreted for all
foreign ministers, from Stresemann to Von Ribbentrop, as well as for a
number of German Reich Chancellors such as Hermann Müller, Marx,
Brüning, Hitler, and for other cabinet members and delegates who
represented Germany at international conferences. In other words, I
participated as interpreter in all international conferences at which
Germany was represented since 1923.
DR. HORN: Did you have the opportunity to act as interpreter during the
discussion between Ribbentrop and Sir Nevile Henderson?
SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that opportunity as the discussion was
conducted in German.
DR. HORN: Was Ambassador Henderson able to speak German fluently?
SCHMIDT: Ambassador Henderson’s knowledge of German was rather good, but
not perfect. Hence it could happen that in moments of excitement he did
not quite understand certain points, as is proved by an incident which
occurred during the conference just mentioned; and it was not always
easy for him to express himself in German; but when speaking to Germans
he usually preferred to conduct these discussions in German.
DR. HORN: In the course of the conference Herr Von Ribbentrop read out
to Henderson a memorandum containing the German proposals for a
settlement of the questions pending between Germany and Poland. And now
I am asking you, Witness, did Henderson ask you during that discussion
to translate to him the contents of the memorandum Ribbentrop had read
out?
SCHMIDT: No, he did not do that.
DR. HORN: Did you get the impression from his attitude that Sir Nevile
Henderson had fully understood the contents of the memorandum?
SCHMIDT: That is, of course, very hard to say. You cannot tell what goes
on inside a person’s mind, but I doubt whether he understood the
document in all its details.
DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop, when he read out the document to Sir Nevile
Henderson, give him any explanations?
SCHMIDT: Yes, while reading out the document the Foreign Minister now
and then commented to Henderson about some points which might not have
been quite clear.
DR. HORN: Did Sir Nevile Henderson himself ask for such explanations?
SCHMIDT: No, Sir Nevile Henderson sat and listened to the document being
read out and the comments which were made.
DR. HORN: What atmosphere prevailed during that conference?
SCHMIDT: The atmosphere during that conference was, I think I can say,
somewhat charged with electricity. Both participants were extremely
nervous. Henderson was very uneasy; and never before, and perhaps only
once afterwards, have I seen the Foreign Minister so nervous as he was
during that conference. An incident which occurred during the first part
of the discussion can perhaps serve to illustrate the atmosphere. The
matter under discussion was the specifying of all the points Germany had
against Poland and her government, and the Foreign Minister had done
that in all details and concluded with the words: “So you see, Sir
Nevile Henderson, the situation is damned serious.” When Sir Nevile
Henderson heard those words, “damned serious” he started up, half raised
himself and pointing a warning finger at the Foreign Minister said: “You
have just said ‘damned.’ That is not the language of a statesman in so
serious a situation.”
THE PRESIDENT: To what charge in the Indictment is this relevant?
DR. HORN: To the point in the Indictment that on 30 August 1939, Von
Ribbentrop read out the memorandum, the decisive memorandum, so quickly
that Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson was not able to grasp its contents
and transmit it to his government and have it forwarded to the Polish
Government in order to continue negotiations between Germany and Poland.
England at that time had offered her good offices as intermediary
between both governments. Germany on the basis...
THE PRESIDENT: Which passage of the Indictment are you referring to? You
may be right, I do not know. I only want to know which passage in the
Indictment you are referring to.
DR. HORN: I am referring to the preparation of, that is, to the failure
to prevent aggressive war for which Ribbentrop is indicted as a
co-conspirator.
THE PRESIDENT: That is on Page 9, is it not, from (F) 4? There is
nothing about the way in which this document was handed over to Sir
Nevile Henderson. Presumably you have got the Indictment. Where is it in
the Indictment?
DR. HORN: It has been presented by the Prosecution and it has also been
presented in the House of Commons where Chamberlain insisted that
Ribbentrop had read it out so rapidly that it was impossible to grasp
the contents and transmit them through diplomatic channels, which
England had expressly offered to do. Thus the Defendant Von Ribbentrop
is directly indicted for having prevented this last chance of further
negotiations with Poland. The statement of the witness will prove that
the Defendant Von Ribbentrop cannot be charged with this.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, you made the point that it was read in
that way. There is no charge about it in the Indictment at all. It may
be that the Prosecution referred to it in the course of the history. You
have made the point, surely it is not necessary to go on at length about
it.
DR. HORN: In that case may I proceed?
[_Turning to the witness._] Then you had the impression that both these
statesmen were extremely agitated?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I did have that impression.
DR. HORN: To what causes do you attribute this agitation?
SCHMIDT: To the tension which prevailed during the negotiations, to the
numerous conferences which had taken place almost without interruption
during the preceding days and which had made considerable demands upon
the nerves of all participants.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, as Sir Nevile Henderson
maintains in his book, said in the worst possible language that he would
never ask the Polish Ambassador to call on him?
SCHMIDT: That I cannot remember. The Foreign Minister merely said that
he could receive the Polish Ambassador for negotiations or discussions
only if he came to him with the necessary authority to negotiate.
DR. HORN: Ambassador Lipski did not have that authority?
SCHMIDT: He answered a question respecting this, put to him by the
Foreign Minister when Ambassador Lipski was with him with an emphatic
“no.” He said he had no authority.
DR. HORN: Thereupon, Ribbentrop declared to Sir Nevile Henderson that he
could not receive the ambassador, is that right?
SCHMIDT: No. I was speaking about a conference which the Foreign
Minister had with the Polish Ambassador in the course of which the
latter was asked whether he had authority to negotiate. To this he
replied “no,” whereupon the Foreign Minister said that in this case
naturally no conversation could take place.
DR. HORN: Then Von Ribbentrop did not hand the memorandum which we
mentioned previously to Sir Nevile Henderson. Did you have the
impression that Ribbentrop did not submit the text of the ultimatum to
Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson because he did not wish to or because he
was not allowed to do so?
SCHMIDT: It is difficult for me to give a clear-cut answer to this
question as I was not present at the preliminary discussions which
Hitler doubtless had with the Foreign Minister regarding that point
before the conference with the British Ambassador. I, therefore, have to
rely on the impressions I got during the conference with the British
Ambassador; and from these I can draw my conclusions as to the
instructions Hitler may have given the Foreign Minister for this
conference. In this connection I can say the following:
When Henderson requested that the document containing the German
proposals be submitted to him, the Foreign Minister said: “No, I cannot
give you the document.” These are the words he used. This of course was
a somewhat unusual procedure because normally Sir Nevile Henderson had
the right to expect that a document which had just been read out would
be handed to him. I myself was rather surprised at the Foreign
Minister’s answer and looked up because I thought I had misunderstood. I
looked at the Foreign Minister and heard him say for the second time: “I
cannot give you the document.” But I saw that this matter caused him
some discomfort and that he must have been aware of the rather difficult
position in which he found himself by this answer, because an uneasy
smile played on his lips when he said in a quiet voice to Sir Nevile
Henderson these words, “I cannot give you the document.” Then I looked
at Sir Nevile Henderson as I of course expected him to ask me to
translate the document, but this request was not forthcoming. I looked
at Henderson rather invitingly, since I wanted to translate the
document, knowing how extraordinarily important a quick and complete
transmission of its contents to the British Government was. If I had
been asked to translate I would have done so quite slowly, almost at
dictation speed, in order to enable the British Ambassador in this
roundabout way to take down not merely the general outline of the German
proposal, but all its details and transmit them to his Government. But
Sir Nevile Henderson did not react even to my glance so that the
discussion soon came to an end and events took their course.
DR. HORN: Did you, on the morning of 3 September 1939, receive the
British ultimatum to the German Government?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.
DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this ultimatum?
SCHMIDT: On the morning of the 3rd, at about 2 or 3 o’clock, the British
Embassy telephoned the Reich Chancellery, where I was still present with
the Foreign Minister in order to be available for possible conferences,
to give the information that the British Ambassador had received
instructions from his government, according to which, at exactly 9
o’clock, he was to make an important announcement on behalf of the
British Government to the Foreign Minister. He therefore asked to be
received by Herr Von Ribbentrop at that time. He was given the reply
that Ribbentrop himself would not be available but that a member of the
Foreign Office, namely I, would be authorized to receive the British
Government’s announcement from the British Ambassador on his behalf.
Thus it happened that at 9 o’clock in the morning I received the British
Ambassador in Ribbentrop’s office. When I asked him to be seated
Henderson refused and while still standing he read to me the well-known
ultimatum of the British Government to the German Government, according
to which, unless certain conditions were fulfilled by Germany, the
British Government would consider themselves at war with Germany at 11
o’clock that morning.
After we had exchanged a few words of farewell, I took the document to
the Reich Chancellery.
DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this document there?
SCHMIDT: In the Reich Chancellery I gave it to Hitler, that is to say, I
found Hitler in his office in conference with the Foreign Minister and I
translated the document into German for him. When I had completed my
translation, there was at first silence.
DR. HORN: Was Hitler alone in the room?
SCHMIDT: No, as I said before, he was in his office with the Foreign
Minister. And when I had completed my translation, both gentlemen were
absolutely silent for about a minute. I could clearly see that this
development did not suit them at all. For a while Hitler sat in his
chair deep in thought and stared somewhat worriedly into space. Then he
broke the silence with a rather abrupt question to the Foreign Minister,
saying, “What shall we do now?” Thereupon they began to discuss the next
diplomatic steps to be taken, whether this or that ambassador should be
called, _et cetera_. I, of course, left the room since I had nothing
more to do. When I entered the anteroom, I found assembled there—or
rather I had already seen on my way in—some Cabinet members and higher
officials, to whose questioning looks—they knew I had seen the British
Ambassador—I had said only that there would be no second Munich. When I
came out again, I saw by their anxious faces that my remark had been
correctly interpreted. When I then told them that I had just handed a
British ultimatum to Hitler, a heavy silence fell on the room. The faces
suddenly grew rather serious. I still remember that Göring, for
instance, who was standing in front of me, turned round to me and said,
“If we lose this war, then God help us.” Goebbels was standing in a
corner by himself and had a very serious, not to say depressed,
expression. This depressing atmosphere prevailed over all those present,
and it naturally lives in my memory as something most remarkable for the
frame of mind prevailing in the anteroom of the Reich Chancellery on the
first day of the war.
DR. HORN: So you did not have the impression, then, that these men
expected a declaration of war?
SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that impression.
DR. HORN: Witness, were you in a position to observe how Ribbentrop
reacted to the news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor?
SCHMIDT: I had no direct opportunity, but in the Foreign Office it was
generally known that the news of Pearl Harbor took the Foreign Minister,
as indeed the whole Foreign Office, completely by surprise. This
impression was confirmed by what a member of the Press Department told
me. The Press Department had a listening station for radio news and the
official on duty had instructions to inform the Foreign Minister
personally of important news at once. When the first news of Pearl
Harbor was received by the listening station of the Press Department,
the official on duty considered it of sufficient importance to report it
to his chief, that is to say, the head of the Press Department, who in
turn was to pass it on to the Foreign Minister. He was, however—so I
was told—rather harshly rebuffed by the Foreign Minister who said it
must be an invention of the press or a canard, and he did not wish our
Press Department to disturb him with such stories. After that, a second
and third message about Pearl Harbor was received, I think a Reuters
report had also been received by the listening station; and the head of
the Press Department then again plucked up courage and, in spite of the
order not to disturb the Foreign Minister, he once more gave him this
news.
THE PRESIDENT: This evidence seems to be utterly uninteresting and
irrelevant to the Tribunal.
DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop is accused also of having prepared aggressive
war against the United States of America.
THE PRESIDENT: What you were telling was the reactions of the press.
What have we got to do with the reactions of the press?
DR. HORN: The witness described Von Ribbentrop’s reaction to the attack
on Pearl Harbor. Von Ribbentrop did not know that the Japanese were
about to attack Pearl Harbor or that they were about to attack America
at all. Neither was there such an agreement between Japan and Germany.
It is therefore not correct that Ribbentrop prepared an aggressive war
against the United States of America. That is...
THE PRESIDENT: You were talking about the press. I am not saying that
you ought not to ask him whether the Foreign Minister knew nothing about
the attack upon Pearl Harbor. That was not what I said. What I said was
that the Tribunal was not interested and thought it was irrelevant for
you to go into the reactions of the press.
DR. HORN: Witness, you were present at the negotiations regarding the
Naval Agreement with England. Can you tell us how those negotiations
proceeded, and whether Von Ribbentrop was sincere, and what aims he
pursued?
SCHMIDT: These negotiations, at which I was also present as interpreter,
went perfectly smoothly after some difficulties had been overcome. The
aims which the Foreign Minister...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand it, this is the Naval
Agreement of 1935. In my recollection—I am just trying to check
it—that was one of the matters which we discussed on the application
for witnesses, and the Tribunal ruled against going into the
negotiations antecedent to the conclusion of that treaty. It came up on
application for witnesses. One or two witnesses who were going to give
the negotiations were asked for and, I think, to deal with this exact
point which Dr. Horn put in his last question, namely, the state of mind
of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I found one or two—there is Lord Monsell,
for example, who was on the list of witnesses—who were denied by the
Court, and a number of German ones were denied on the same point. My
Lord, it is in the Tribunal’s statement of the 26th of February; and
Your Lordship will see, on Page 2, I think, certainly the witness
Monsell, who happens to be the one most familiar to myself; but I am
sure there were other witnesses, too. I know that we discussed this
point quite fully on the application for witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Who were the others, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have a list of witnesses who were refused.
There is Admiral Schuster...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he is one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...who was relevant on this question as to who
initiated the treaty. And then there is Sir Robert Craigie, Number 24.
There is Lord Monsell...
THE PRESIDENT: He was refused.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These are on the same points, Number 25.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I think these are the three.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what do you say to this? Those three
witnesses—Schuster, Craigie, and Monsell—who as alleged by you were to
give evidence on this 1935 treaty, were all refused. As to the witness
you are now examining, no such reference was contained regarding him in
the application. He was asked for only as an interpreter in the Foreign
Office.
DR. HORN: I was under the impression that these other three witnesses
had been refused because they were cumulative and I was not going to
question the witness on the Naval Agreement but I merely want to ask him
about the attitude shown by Ribbentrop when the agreement was concluded
and afterwards in order to prove to the Tribunal that Von Ribbentrop was
not, in any case at that time, deliberately working towards an
aggressive war, nor was he participating in a conspiracy to initiate a
war of aggression, at least not at that time. And I wish to prove
further that this agreement was not “eyewash” as the afore-mentioned
British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, put it.
THE PRESIDENT: Your application with reference to Ambassador Craigie was
this: The witness can give evidence that in 1935 Ribbentrop approached
England with a proposal that the Naval Treaty should be signed and
Ribbentrop’s initiative brought about an agreement by France to this
treaty which involved the Treaty of Versailles. Thus the treaty has come
into effect.
Is it not in connection with that, that you were going to ask this
witness questions?
DR. HORN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have nothing about the Naval treaty of 1935, then
you can go on.
DR. HORN: Witness, in 1944, you were present at a conference between
Horthy and Hitler at Klessheim, in which Von Ribbentrop also took part
and during which the solution of the Jewish question in Hungary was
discussed. What did Von Ribbentrop say to you about this question?
SCHMIDT: During this conference there had been a certain difficulty,
when Hitler insisted that Horthy should proceed more energetically in
the Jewish question, and Horthy answered with some heat, “But what am I
supposed to do? Shall I perhaps beat the Jews to death?”—Whereupon
there was rather a lull, and the Foreign Minister then turned to Horthy
and said, “Yes, there are only two possibilities—either that, or to
intern the Jews.” Afterwards he said to me—and this was rather
exceptional—that Hitler’s demands in this connection might have gone a
bit too far.
DR. HORN: On 25 August 1939, you took part in a conference between
Hitler, Henderson, and Ribbentrop, at which Ribbentrop and Hitler once
more expressed their wish to come to an agreement with Poland, using
Britain as intermediary. Is it correct that Ribbentrop then sent you
with a draft note on this conference to Henderson at the Embassy to ask
him to back this proposal as far as possible and to try to put it
through? Is that correct?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is so.
DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this telegram from Sir
Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax? (Document Number TC-72, Number 69.)
[_Turning to the witness._] Is it correct, Witness, that on 28 August
1939, Herr Von Ribbentrop in a further discussion with Sir Nevile
Henderson again stressed that an agreement between Germany and Britain
after a settlement of the Polish question was Chamberlain’s greatest
wish, as the British Prime Minister had stated to Ribbentrop and that
Von Ribbentrop then repeated this to Henderson? Is that true?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is true.
DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal the memorandum in question as an
exhibit?
THE PRESIDENT: You offer a copy of that in evidence, do you?
DR. HORN: I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the
document.
THE PRESIDENT: What number?
DR. HORN: The one number has already been submitted by the Prosecution.
It bears the Document Number TC-72 and another number, and the second
number has also been submitted by the Prosecution. I submit it again to
the Tribunal because I have referred to it just now. (Document Number
TC-72, Number 75).
Witness, one last question: In your extensive experience as an
interpreter, you had much opportunity to observe Hitler in contact with
foreigners. What impression, according to your observations, did Hitler
make on foreign statesmen?
SCHMIDT: Naturally, it is not quite so easy to answer this question, as
one cannot look into the hearts and minds of other people. But as an
observer one can naturally draw certain conclusions from the attitude...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think really that this is
a matter which is relevant, the effect that Hitler’s demeanor had on
foreign statesmen. It does not influence us in the least.
DR. HORN: Then I withdraw my question. I have no further questions to
put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other defendants’ counsel who wish to ask
questions?
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Witness, were you
present at a conversation which, about one year before the outbreak of
war, took place between Lord Londonderry and Field Marshal Göring at
Karinhall?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present at this conversation.
DR. STAHMER: Describe briefly to the Tribunal the substance of this
conversation.
SCHMIDT: After so long a time I cannot, of course, remember the details,
but I recall merely that the subject of conversation was the
Anglo-German rapprochement, or rather the elimination of any points of
dispute between Germany and England, and that in addition, of course,
quite a number of technical questions regarding aviation and the air
force were dealt with. I have always remembered very clearly one
particular remark made by Göring in the course of this conversation,
when at the end of a discussion which was to prove how desirable it was
that Germany and England be friendly and avoid conflicts, he said the
following:
“If our two countries should be involved in a war against each
other, then there will naturally be a victor and a vanquished,
but the victor in this bitter conflict will in the moment of
victory have just enough strength left to strike the last blow
at the defeated and will then fall to the ground himself gravely
wounded and for this reason alone our two countries should get
along with each other without conflict and without war.”
DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in the negotiations in Munich in the
autumn of 1938?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I did take part in these negotiations.
DR. STAHMER: Was the then Field Marshal Göring also present?
SCHMIDT: During the first part he was not present, but later when the
circle of those present became larger he likewise took part.
DR. STAHMER: In what way did he participate in the negotiations?
SCHMIDT: He intervened only in individual questions of lesser
importance. However, he did take part in a way which showed that through
his intervention he wanted to remove insofar as possible, any
difficulties arising from certain technical points which might hamper
the progress of the negotiations. In other words, he was anxious that
the Munich negotiations should not collapse over such technical points
of procedure, which played an important role in the second part of the
negotiations.
DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conversation which took place in the
autumn of 1937 between Lord Halifax and the then Field Marshal Göring
and followed a conference between Lord Halifax and Hitler at the
Berghof?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present.
DR. STAHMER: What course did this conversation take? Briefly, please.
SCHMIDT: First I must say that at the Obersalzberg the conversation with
Lord Halifax had taken a very unsatisfactory turn. The two partners
could in no way come to an understanding, but in the conversation with
Göring the atmosphere improved. The same points were dealt with as at
Obersalzberg, the subjects which were in the foreground at the time,
namely, the Anschluss, the Sudeten question, and finally the questions
of the Polish Corridor and Danzig. At Obersalzberg Hitler had treated
these matters rather uncompromisingly, and he had demanded more or less
that a solution as he conceived it be accepted by England, whereas
Göring in his discussions always attached importance to the fact or
always stressed that his idea was a peaceful solution, that is to say, a
solution through negotiation, and that everything should be done in this
direction, and that he also believed that such a solution could be
reached for all three questions if the negotiations were properly
conducted.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were present at numerous political
conferences of Hitler’s. Did you notice on such occasions that high
military leaders tried to influence him to enlarge German territory in a
peaceful way or by war?
SCHMIDT: No, no such efforts on the part of the military came to my
notice, because at political negotiations the military representatives
were for the most part not present at the beginning when the large
problems were dealt with and they were called in only when purely
military problems were discussed; and then, of course, they stated their
opinion only on purely military questions and did not speak on any
political matters.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I have one more question: On the occasion of such
discussions, did you find that high military leaders were anxious to
exert political influence upon the Reich Government?
SCHMIDT: No, I did not find that, and you could not have found it, since
they were hardly ever present.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you first of all to tell the
Tribunal quite shortly the general background of your views. Do you
remember on 28 November making an affidavit at Oberursel; do you
remember?
SCHMIDT: I cannot remember the date clearly, but I do remember that I
made an affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it. [_Handing the document to
the witness._] Paragraph 1 sets out your experience, the number of
conferences, _et cetera_.
My Lord, I ought to have said that this document is Document Number
3308-PS and will be Exhibit GB-288.
[_Turning to the witness._] Then, in Paragraph 2 you give the basis of
your experience. Would you follow it while I read:
“Whatever success and position I have enjoyed in the Foreign
Office I owe to the fact that I made it my business at all times
to possess thorough familiarity with the subject matter under
discussion, and I endeavored to achieve intimate knowledge of
the mentality of Hitler and the other leaders. Throughout the
Hitler Regime I constantly endeavored to keep myself apprised as
to what was going on in the Foreign Office and in related
organizations, and I enjoyed such a position that it was
possible to have ready access to key officials and to key
personnel in their offices.”
And then, if you will look at the third paragraph, which gives your
impression from that basis of the objectives of the foreign policy:
“The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent
from the start, namely, the domination of the European
Continent, to be achieved, first, by the incorporation of all
German-speaking groups in the Reich, and secondly, by
territorial expansion under the slogan of ‘Lebensraum.’ The
execution of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be
characterized by improvisation. Each succeeding step apparently
was carried out as each new situation arose, but all consistent
with the ultimate objectives mentioned above.”
Is that right, Herr Schmidt? Does that express your views?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I go on to deal with particular
matters, I want you to develop your impressions a little further. You
have told us that you acted under or with every foreign minister since
Herr Stresemann. Did you notice a considerable difference between the
style of living of the Nazi ministers and those who had preceded them?
SCHMIDT: As far as the style of living is concerned, there were certain
differences, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take the Defendant Ribbentrop. Before the
Defendant Ribbentrop went into politics, had he one house in
Berlin-Dahlem? I think Lenze-Allee 19. Was that his possession?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when he was Foreign Minister, had he six
houses? Let me remind you and take them one by one. You can tell me if I
am right. There was a house in Sonnenburg, somewhere near Berlin, with
an estate of 750 hectares, and a private golf course. That was one, was
it not?
SCHMIDT: I knew that there was a house at Sonnenburg, but I did not know
how large it was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then there was one at Tanneck bei Düren, near
Aachen, a house that he used for horse breeding?
SCHMIDT: I did not know about that house.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then there was one near Kitzbühl that he
used for chamois hunting?
SCHMIDT: That is not known to me in detail.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not in detail, but its existence was known?
SCHMIDT: I consider that it is not at all improbable that the house
existed, but I have not heard any details about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, of course, there was the Schloss Fuschl;
that is in Austria, is it not?
SCHMIDT: Near Salzburg, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Near Salzburg, yes. That was taken over as a
state residence. I will ask you about the circumstances a little later.
Then there was a Slovakian hunting estate called “Pustepole,” was there
not?
SCHMIDT: The name is familiar to me, and I know that Herr Von Ribbentrop
sometimes went hunting there, but I know nothing regarding the
proprietorship.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then he also used a hunting lodge, near
Podersan, that had been that of Count Czernin, near Podersan, in
Bohemia, in the Sudetenland?
SCHMIDT: There was a hunting house or something similar, I do not know
the name, where receptions took place, as for instance, that given for
Count Ciano. But I think it had a different name.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the one—where Ciano visited. That is
the one I was indicating to you. I think I am right that it previously
belonged to Count Czernin.
Tell me, was the salary fixed for Reich Ministers?
SCHMIDT: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me put it quite clearly. Was a salary—that
is, a fixed annual remuneration—appointed for Reich Ministers?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How much was that?
SCHMIDT: That I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was kept secret?
SCHMIDT: That is not the reason that I cannot give you any information.
I was not at all interested in how large a salary the Reich Foreign
Minister received.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know?
SCHMIDT: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you say that you do not know, that is good
enough for me. I think, perhaps, you can answer this question. Had any
previous Reich Foreign Minister been able to run six country houses and
estates of various sizes on his salary, anyone that you had worked with?
SCHMIDT: Whether he could have done it I cannot say, but he did not do
it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not. We will leave it there for a moment.
Now, I want you to apply your mind to May 1939. That is about four
months before the war, when the Polish question was just coming up. I
mean, it was getting to be quite a serious question. Do you remember
what I think they call in the German Foreign Office a _conduite de
langage_ that was issued by Ribbentrop about that time and put out by
Baron Von Weizsäcker?
SCHMIDT: No, I do not know that, or at any rate I should say that I
cannot remember it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me try to remind you, to see if this draws
it to your recollection:
“The Polish problem will be solved by Hitler in 48 hours; the
Western Powers will be unable to give any assistance to Poland;
the British Empire is doomed within the next 10 years; France
will bleed to death if she tries to intervene.”
Do you remember a _conduite de langage_ to that effect issued by the
Foreign Minister?
SCHMIDT: I cannot remember a _conduite de langage_ of that kind. It
appears to me rather to resemble a _conduite de langage_ for propaganda
purposes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that Von Ribbentrop issued
instructions that no official of the Foreign Office was to issue any
different views?
SCHMIDT: That is right, that one was to adhere to those _conduites de
langage_.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember what he told Baron Von
Weizsäcker to say would happen to anyone who expressed different views?
SCHMIDT: No, I do not recollect that, but I can imagine that severe
penalties would have been threatened to such a person. But I do not
remember the actual case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that he said they would be
shot by him personally?
SCHMIDT: That such a statement may have been made by him on some
occasion when he was angry, I consider perfectly possible, but I do not
believe that it was meant seriously.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I thought you might remember—I just
suggest it to you—was the distress and difficulty that Baron Von
Weizsäcker had in deciding how he was to say it to the official
conference at the Foreign Office. Do you not remember that?
SCHMIDT: At that time I had not yet been admitted to the morning
conferences. I was not present at that time so I cannot tell you
anything about it, but I can imagine that the State Secretary may have
had quite some trouble in translating that statement into official
language.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want to deal quite shortly with the
points that have been put to you about August 1939. I only want to get
the facts quite clear.
Do you remember that you were with Hitler at the time that he was
expecting the reactions of the Western Powers to the Soviet treaty?
SCHMIDT: No, I was attached to the delegation in Moscow and therefore
not with Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So did you come back with the Defendant
Ribbentrop on the 24th?
SCHMIDT: Yes, but I remained in Berlin and did not go to Berchtesgaden.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now you remember that Hitler saw
Sir Nevile Henderson at 1:30 on the 25th and gave him what has been
called a _note verbale_? Do you remember that?
SCHMIDT: I think that I was not present at that conference, because just
at that time I was in Moscow. It must be possible to establish the date.
I was not present at a conference between Hitler and the British
Ambassador which took place on the Obersalzberg during the time of our
Moscow journey. I think that is the conference to which you are
referring.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is the day after the defendant came back
from Moscow?
SCHMIDT: No, I remained in Berlin. I was not up there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to remind you of the day. If you
were not present, I will pass from it; but were you present when Signor
Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, produced a communication from
Mussolini?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the day I am asking you about. Do you
remember that a communication came from Signor Attolico that afternoon
that the Italian Army and Air Force were not in a condition to go to
war?
SCHMIDT: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to try to help me because it is
rather important as to the time. Was that not about 3 o’clock in the
afternoon?
SCHMIDT: That could be so; but with the many conferences which took
place at the time, the question of hours and dates is naturally a bit
confused.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember the news that the
Anglo-Polish Treaty would be signed that evening coming through about 4
o’clock?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember about 4 o’clock M.
Coulondre, the French Ambassador, having an interview with Hitler?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, were you aware that on that day the orders
for an attack on Poland the next morning were countermanded?
SCHMIDT: I remember that military orders had been withdrawn, but just
what orders these were I naturally never learned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would not ask you about that, Herr Schmidt,
but you knew that orders had been countermanded. I wondered if you could
help me on this point: Was not the countermanding of the orders at
6:15—1815 hours—after the interview with the French Ambassador, M.
Coulondre, was not that the time when they were countermanded?
SCHMIDT: I cannot recall whether that was the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And equally could you help the Tribunal on this
point: Were they not issued about 2 o’clock—1400 hours—after the
interview with Sir Nevile Henderson? Do you know that?
SCHMIDT: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You cannot help us on that point.
Well, now. I am not going to take time about the interview on the night
of the 30-31 August between Sir Nevile Henderson and the Defendant
Ribbentrop, except to ask you this: You have told us that the Defendant
Ribbentrop was very excited; when he read these terms over, did he raise
his voice at times, shouting?
SCHMIDT: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How did he show his nervousness, then?
SCHMIDT: It manifested itself during some incidents which I mentioned
before, which had occurred during the conversation; previously during
those incidents the nervousness became apparent, but not during the
reading of the document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, but you remember and were very much
astounded at the time at the refusal to hand over the vital document to
the British Ambassador?
SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to see if you can help us with one
or two other incidents. It has been suggested by a witness that we heard
yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop knew very little about
concentration camps. I want to make it clear that was suggested. I think
perhaps you can help us on one or two inhabitants of concentration camps
that he knew about. Do you remember a man called Martin Luther? Not the
religious gentleman but a contemporary?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that the Defendant Ribbentrop
brought him into his office, the Bureau Ribbentrop, in 1936?
SCHMIDT: I am not sure about the year, but I do know that he got his job
through the Bureau.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I think it was not received with great joy
by the older members of the German Foreign Office.
SCHMIDT: No, certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There had been some trouble about a small matter
of 4,000 Reichsmark that Mr. Luther had had to deal with in the past?
SCHMIDT: Yes. We learned about that afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was taken into the Foreign Office and
received rapid promotion to counsellor, that is to say minister, and
Under Secretary of State, did he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, do you remember that in 1943 he had a
quarrel with the Defendant Ribbentrop?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he sent to Himmler—I think he did it
through Lieutenant Büttner—suggesting that Ribbentrop’s state of mind
was not such that he ought to continue as Foreign Secretary, and
suggesting that Werner Best, I believe it was, should be appointed. Do
you remember that?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that; but I did not know that he suggested
Werner Best as successor.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, he suggested that Ribbentrop should
go. I think he was quite blunt about it. I believe he suggested that his
mental powers were no longer up to it.
SCHMIDT: I did not see the report. I only heard rumors about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In consequence of that, of course, after an
interview with Ribbentrop, Ribbentrop had Luther put in a concentration
camp, did he not?
SCHMIDT: I do not know whether that happened on Ribbentrop’s initiative,
or whether it came from some other source, but it was said among us in
the office that Luther had landed in a concentration camp.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, the sequence of events was that
Luther had this disagreement with Ribbentrop and shortly afterwards he
appeared in a concentration camp. And not only did he go into a
concentration camp, but is it not correct that even the SS asked that he
should come out of the concentration camp, and Ribbentrop would not
agree to it?
SCHMIDT: That I cannot say, because the whole matter was, of course,
treated rather confidentially in the office by Herr Von Ribbentrop and
the members of the old Foreign Office, of whom I was one, did not have
his confidence to such an extent that they were informed of all such
details. In other words, I heard about the whole Luther affair only by
way of rumor, through special channels—actually through prohibited
channels—so that I cannot therefore give you any authentic information
but I can repeat only what I have heard unofficially.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure you desire to be absolutely frank with
the Tribunal, and the point I am putting to you is that everyone in the
Foreign Office knew that Luther had landed in a concentration camp and,
quite clearly, the Defendant Ribbentrop knew that he had landed in a
concentration camp. That is right, is it not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, let us just take one other incident
relating to this if I may comment as to his extraordinary innocence
about concentration camps.
You remember two unfortunate people called Herr and Frau Von Remitz, to
whom the Schloss Fuschl used to belong? I think the name is either
Remitz or Raenitz. Do you remember?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Schloss Fuschl—would you tell me how
it is pronounced?
SCHMIDT: Well, regarding these matters I am so little...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I want you to tell me how it is pronounced.
SCHMIDT: Fuschl.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
The Schloss Fuschl used to belong to the people that I have just
mentioned. Frau Von Remitz was a sister of August Thyssen, was she not?
SCHMIDT: I cannot say anything about that, since all these questions
refer to the private household of Herr Von Ribbentrop and I had nothing
to do with that. My connections with him were purely official and
limited at that to routine matters and the important political
interpretation affairs in the Foreign Office. I only heard about the
other matters, and naturally not in such a way that I could make any
authentic statements about them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will ask you only one question. After
the Schloss had become the property, or at any rate had come to the use
of the Foreign Minister, did not Herr Von Remitz spend several years in
a concentration camp, where he ultimately died? You knew that, did you
not?
SCHMIDT: I knew it as a rumor; I was told that it had happened in that
way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did he not hear of other stories stronger
than these, that came out of concentration camps?
SCHMIDT: I do not believe that any authentic reports were made there
regarding conditions because naturally, particularly in front of the
Foreign Office, it was treated as taboo by these people who were
responsible for concentration camps, since we were in any case regarded
as not quite reliable and as not belonging to them. Such matters were of
course diligently covered up and concealed from us. Therefore, any
concrete details never became known to us at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you knew, did you not, even in the Foreign
Office, that there were a large number of concentration camps in which a
vast number of people were shut up?
SCHMIDT: We knew that, but our source of information was mostly the
foreign press, which we read, of course; and the foreign radio reports
which appeared on our table, translated, every morning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that if you knew it from the foreign press
and the foreign radio, whoever else in that dock did not know about
concentration camps, the Defendant Ribbentrop, as foreign Minister, did
know. Is that not right?
SCHMIDT: I would like to put it this way: Of course, he had access to
that foreign news material. Just how he evaluated it, whether he
considered it true or completely false, or exaggerated, naturally I
cannot say. Of course he also received the reports as such, but as
reports from abroad and, during the war, as reports from hostile
countries.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Doctor, I will not pursue that further at the
moment. I want you just to tell me this: You have given us your account
of the interview between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Horthy
when the question of the Jews was discussed, on the 17th of April 1943.
I just wanted on record that your account is based on the fact that you
actually made the minutes; the minutes are signed by you.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to pass to another point. From 1943 to
1945 were you still going to Hitler’s headquarters for occasional
interpreting and attending of meetings and the like?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: For example—I do not know if you can remember
it, but I am sure you will try—on the 27th of February 1944, do you
remember a visit of Marshal Antonescu?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you present at that?
SCHMIDT: I remember I was always present during all the visits of
Antonescu, since the discussion could not take place any other way.
Regarding the date I cannot tell you anything exact at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was actually the 27th of February. I wanted
to try and fix it by an incident which might remind you of it, that
Antonescu was there. Now, do you remember on that occasion that the
Defendant Dönitz was present?
SCHMIDT: It is possible, but I have no exact recollection. It is quite
possible that he was present during the military discussions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Exhibit, My Lord, is GB-207, and it is dealt
with on Page 2705 of the shorthand notes (Volume V, Page 249). The
document was originally Number D-648.
[_Turning to the witness._] I want you to tell the Tribunal about the
general governmental setup. There has been considerable evidence given
before the Tribunal that the Reichsregierung, as such, did not meet
after the beginning of the war. Several people have told us that.
Instead of a cabinet meeting, was it not a fact that the Government of
Germany was carried on by these constant meetings at Hitler’s
headquarters?
SCHMIDT: I consider it possible, but naturally I have no exact
knowledge, since I never took part in such internal conferences. I went
to headquarters only whenever I had to accompany a foreigner there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You came only when there was a foreign visitor,
but you know that these meetings were continuously taking place and that
the Defendant Göring, the Defendant Speer, the Defendant Keitel, the
Defendant Jodl, the Defendant Dönitz were constantly attending these
meetings.
SCHMIDT: I do not know, of course, whether you can describe that
conference as a meeting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not mean to play with words with you at
all. I used the word only to describe what was happening. If you prefer
to call it a conference, I am willing to do that.
SCHMIDT: I admit that on occasions conferences with Hitler took place or
could have taken place, while these people you have just named were
present at the headquarters.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you agree with me, do you not, that as
far as one can find any organism or organization through which the
government of the Reich was being carried on, it was this succession of
meetings or conferences at Hitler’s headquarters; is that not so?
SCHMIDT: Well, I do not know whether you can regard that as governmental
activity, because if I drew a parallel with the conferences at which I
was present with these foreign gentlemen, then you will find that the
person who spoke and who pushed through decisions was Hitler alone. If
it was the same at those conferences, then you could call it a
government discussion; but it was only a one-man government. The others
were there only as an audience or to be questioned regarding individual
points. That is how I imagine it, but I was not present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite appreciate your point, but these were
the occasions at which each service and each department and each
organization—like the SS through the Reichsführer SS, Himmler—put its
point of view and put the facts before Hitler on which decisions were
come to, were they not? And that is what happened for the last 2 years
of the war.
SCHMIDT: One could have drawn that conclusion from the presence of those
people, yes, but as I say it could of course have been that there was
only a sort of taking of orders at headquarters. Both possibilities
exist, but which is applicable I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, I think you will agree with this,
will you not, Herr Schmidt, that there was no other place at which the
government of Germany took place except that?
SCHMIDT: Yes. That is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you be good enough to look at your
affidavit? I will just read the rest of it. It is quite short, but I
want it to be on the record. Paragraph 4:
“The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on
25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the
Foreign Office, because these events discredited Germany in the
eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had
been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted
Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge
within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi
methods both in foreign and domestic policy. This concern over
the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by
a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence
in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December
1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning
by the Nazis.
“5. The announcement in March of the establishment of a German
Air Force and of the reintroduction of conscription was followed
on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual-assistance pact
between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the
Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning
as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but
the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude towards the
Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be
intimidated. At this time, the career officials at least
expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I
do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these
expressions of concern to Hitler.
“6. The re-entry of the German military forces into the
Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in
February. A German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed
that the French-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance was
incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the Covenant of the
League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no
real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France.
Considered against the background statements in _Mein Kampf_,
offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest
that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I
do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was
decided upon. I personally knew about it and discussed it
approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear
had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning
the risks of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many
in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign
Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in government
circles, consulted by Hitler, who felt confident that the
Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from
Britain and France. Neurath’s position throughout this period
was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath
than in the general run of ‘old school’ diplomats whom Hitler
tended to hold in disrespect.”
Then there is a paragraph about the sanctions in Italy which I do not
think is a relevant matter before the Tribunal; and then, in Paragraph
8, I will go on:
“Plans for annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program
from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of
Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach to this
problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy by the
League, plus the rapid increase of German military strength,
made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. When Göring
visited Rome early in 1937 he declared that a union of Austria
and Germany was inevitable and could be expected sooner or
later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained
silent, and protested only mildly when I translated them into
French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a
Party matter, in which Von Papen’s role was to preserve smooth
diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more
devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move. The
speech delivered by Papen on 18 Feb. 1938, following the
Berchtesgaden meeting, interpreted the Berchtesgaden agreement
as the first step towards the establishment of a Central
European Commonwealth under the leadership of Germany. This was
generally recognized in the Foreign Office as a clear prophecy
of a Greater Germany which would embrace Austria.”
The final paragraph says these matters are true and that you have made
this affidavit voluntarily and without compulsion. That is right, is it
not, Herr Schmidt?
Now, just one more point and then I have finished with you. It is
correct, is it not, that in his period as Foreign Minister the Defendant
Ribbentrop brought a number of people who had rank in the SS, or, in the
old days in the SA into the Foreign Office and made them part of the
staff?
SCHMIDT: Yes. Principally they were members of his so-called
Bureau—that is to say, his former organization. They were taken into
the Office, not all, but some of them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other prosecutor want to cross-examine? Dr.
Horn, do you want to re-examine?
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): Mr. President, I have just one
question to ask the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Keep the witness.
DR. LÖFFLER: May I have your permission to put one question to the
witness?
THE PRESIDENT: Would you say whom you are appearing for?
DR. LÖFFLER: Dr. Löffler, Defense Counsel for the SA.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you were, as a rule, personally
present during the visit of highly placed foreign statesmen. Were you
also present during the visit of statesmen during the Olympic Games of
1936?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
DR. LÖFFLER: Did any one of the foreign statesmen express the wish to
inspect the German institutions and the establishments set up by the
National Socialists—in particular in the social sphere—before or after
1936?
SCHMIDT: Whether any such wishes were expressed during the Olympic Games
I cannot remember at the moment; but that such wishes were expressed and
that they were fulfilled becomes clear from a number of facts—for
instance, from Lloyd George’s visit to the Obersalzberg and, later on,
his inspection of social institutions in Germany; from the visit of a
number of interested foreign persons who, in my opinion, took a very
lively interest in the social institutions in Germany.
DR. LÖFFLER: You were present personally during these inspections. Do
you remember an inspection during which you were present?
SCHMIDT: Mostly I was not present at these inspections. I only recollect
that, for instance, the Labor Front had an organization which was called
“Joy and Work” and that was an international organization which held a
great annual congress at Hamburg, during which I often acted as
interpreter.
DR. LÖFFLER: Do you know anything about the impressions made by these
institutions on foreign statesmen?
SCHMIDT: The social institutions, as far as I know, always made quite a
favorable impression.
DR. LÖFFLER: Do you remember the visit of the Prince of Wales to
Germany?
SCHMIDT: Yes. I acted as interpreter there.
THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the charges in the
Indictment? Dr. Löffler, your duty was to ask any question you have got
at the same time as the other defense counsels. I asked you whether you
had any questions to ask. You said “no,” or you indicated that you had
not. You now get up and say you have one question to ask and you have
asked about—I don’t know how many you are going to ask, but they are
all, in the opinion of the Tribunal, I think, irrelevant.
DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I am putting are caused
by the cross-examination by Sir David. Sir David has mentioned the SA,
and I want to put a corresponding counterquestion to the witness, and
apart from that...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David had not asked any question as to the social
conditions of Germany, and he did not ask any questions about the
Olympic Games of 1936. In any event, you are not the right person to
re-examine.
DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I have put are
important, because, through those visits which were made here and
through the statements made by the foreign statesmen afterwards, a
number of our members got the impression that the important statesmen
abroad were giving their recognition to the leaders of National
Socialism. And that is of quite decisive importance in the question of
the guilt or innocence of millions of Germans whom I represent here,
since these millions of Germans regarded the attitude of those foreign
statesmen as authoritative. It is therefore not irrelevant, but for us,
in fact, decisive, and he is the only witness who can really make an
authentic report about it. However, I am finished with my questions
about the Olympic Games and I have only two more questions to ask. I ask
you to permit me to put these because Sir David...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the questions you are putting do
not arise out of the cross-examination and are entirely irrelevant, and
they will not hear any further questions from you.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, as you know perfectly well, this is not
the time to put questions on behalf of Von Papen. You have had your
opportunity, and you have not done it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I merely propose to rectify some words
which were probably incorrectly repeated through translation, since I
did not receive copies of the affidavit. I heard that in that affidavit
a speech of Von Papen of 8 or 18 February 1938 was mentioned...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if that is correct, you can correct anything
in the translation you want to.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I would like to mention that the names “Hitler” and
“Papen” were mentioned here just now. I heard “Papen” in the
translation, but Papen never made such a speech, and any conclusions
drawn about Papen from that speech are incorrect.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you will receive the affidavit. You will
have an opportunity to look at the affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall look at the affidavit, and, if necessary, apply
in writing to have it rectified.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If there is any mistake in the affidavit it must be
corrected.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It really says “Papen” in the text, but that is
completely wrong since he has never made such a speech. On Page 4 of the
text it says “The speech delivered by Papen.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is what the affidavit said.
Learned counsel says it is completely wrong; he did not make a speech.
But with the greatest respect to the learned counsel, I must suggest, if
he wants to refute the affidavit, he will have the opportunity of
recalling Von Papen and giving evidence then.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, in this case would it not be of value to
put the one short question to the witness as to whether he really meant
Papen?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; put the question to the witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you think that you said that Papen made a
speech on 18 February 1938? Where was this speech supposed to have been
made?
SCHMIDT: That, in my opinion, is a mistake which may have crept in when
I made the affidavit; because if the speech was not made—at any rate,
at the moment I no longer remember such a speech as I described in that
affidavit. It is, therefore, perfectly possible that a mistake crept in.
And perhaps that mistake is excusable if you consider that this
affidavit was submitted to me at a time when I was rather seriously ill
in bed in a hospital. It can very well have happened that upon reading
through the affidavit I did not notice the mistake and I really consider
it to be a mistake.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That makes the actual fact established and the
conclusions drawn from it unnecessary?
SCHMIDT: After what I have said, yes. I cannot remember the speech, and
I think it can be traced to a mistake on my part and I attribute it to
the circumstances under which I signed the document; I was seriously ill
at the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn.
The witness can now retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. HORN: May I once more ask the Tribunal whether it can be ascertained
if the translations of the documents will be available by tomorrow
morning. I would like to base the further presentation of evidence on
them. If I have translations in the morning, then I would begin now to
examine the Defendant Von Ribbentrop as a witness. If translations
cannot be completed by tomorrow morning, then I would ask the Tribunal
to allow me to submit my documents now.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, this Trial has been going on for many months,
and it is taking a very much longer time than anybody anticipated, at
any rate longer than any member of the Tribunal anticipated, and they
cannot have it put off any longer. You must go on. Have you got any
further witnesses to call?
DR. HORN: No, I have no further witnesses, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you not going to call the Defendant Von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Why can you not put him in the box now?
DR. HORN: I can examine him, but I asked the President whether I can
have the assistance of the Tribunal, whether I can have the documents by
tomorrow morning. Then I would start now to examine the Defendant as a
witness and submit the documents when the Prosecution have their
documents too and can raise their objections here at the same time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the documents are translated, you shall
have them, of course. We have sent out to find out whether they will be
available by tomorrow morning, but we have got 35 minutes now before 5
o’clock. We want to occupy the time.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. In that case I shall examine the
Defendant as witness now.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on please, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: Yes. In that case I shall continue to present the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you said you were going to call the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop. We have not got the documents here, and you must do as
you said.
DR. HORN: Then I request to be given permission to examine the defendant
as a witness.
[_The Defendant Von Ribbentrop took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you say your full name?
JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP (Defendant): Joachim Von Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”
[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. HORN: Please give the Tribunal a brief explanatory report about the
most important points of your life.
VON RIBBENTROP: I was born on 30 April 1893 at Wesel. I came from an old
family of soldiers. My mother came from the country. I went to school at
Kassel and Metz in Alsace-Lorraine. There, in Alsace-Lorraine, I had my
first contact with the domain of French culture; and at that time we
learned to love that country dearly.
In 1908 my father resigned from active military service. The reason was
that there were differences at that time connected with the person of
the Kaiser. My father already had a strong interest in foreign politics
and also social interests, and I had a great veneration for him.
At that time we moved to Switzerland and after living there for about
one year I went to London as a young man, and there, for about one year,
I studied, mainly languages. It was then that I had my first impression
of London and of the greatness of the British Empire.
After about one year, in 1910, I went to Canada. Originally I wanted to
go to the German colonies, but then I went to America instead. I wanted
to see the world. I remained in Canada for several years, approximately
two years as a worker, a plate layer on the railroad, and later on I
turned to the bank and building trade.
In 1914 the first World War caught me in Canada. Like all Germans at the
time we had only one thought—“Every man is needed at home and how can
we help the homeland?” Then I traveled to New York, and finally in
September 1914, after some difficulties, I arrived in Germany. After
serving at the front, for approximately 4 years, and after I had been
wounded, I was sent to Constantinople, to Turkey, where I witnessed the
collapse of Germany in the first World War. Then I had my first
impression of the dreadful consequences of a lost war. The Ambassador at
that time, Count Bernstorff, and the later Ambassador, Dr. Dieckhoff,
were the representatives of the Reich in Turkey. They were summoned to
Berlin in order to take advantage of Count Bernstorff’s connections with
President Wilson and to see—it was the hope of all of us—that on the
strength of these Points perhaps a peace could be achieved and with it
reconciliations.
After some difficulties, in March 1919, I came to Berlin and I became
adjutant of the then General Von Seeckt for the peace delegation at
Versailles. Subsequently, when the Treaty of Versailles came, I read
that document in one night and it was my impression that no government
in the world could possibly sign such a document. That was my first
impression of foreign policy at home.
In 1919 I resigned from the Armed Forces as a first lieutenant, and I
turned to the profession of a businessman. Through these business
contacts, I came to know particularly England and France rather
intimately during the following years. Several contacts with politicians
were already established at that time. I tried to help my own country by
voicing my views against Versailles. At first it was very difficult but
already in the years 1919, 1920, and 1921, I found a certain amount of
understanding in those countries, in my own modest way.
Then, it was approximately since the years 1929 or 1930, I saw that
Germany after the seeming prosperity during the years 1926, 1927, and
1928, was exposed to a sudden economic upheaval and that matters went
downhill very fast.
During the year 1931 and 1932, one noticed as a businessman, which I was
at the time, that in practice the consequences of Versailles were such
that German economic life was becoming more and more prostrate. Then I
looked around. At that time, I was closely attached to the German
People’s Party and I saw how the parties became always more and more
numerous in Germany. I remember that in the end we had something like 30
parties or more in Germany, that unemployment was growing steadily, and
that the government was losing the confidence of the people more and
more. From these years I clearly recollect the efforts made by the then
Chancellor Brüning, which were doubtlessly meant sincerely and honestly
but which nevertheless had no success.
Other governments came, that is well known. They, too, had no success.
The export trade in Germany no longer paid for itself. The gold reserves
of the Reichsbank dwindled, there was tax evasion, and no confidence at
all in the measures introduced by the government. That, roughly, was the
picture which I saw in Germany in the years 1930 and 1931. I saw then
how strikes increased, how discontented the people were, and how more
and more demonstrations took place on the streets and conditions became
more and more chaotic.
I do not think that I am exaggerating if I say that the picture which
presented itself in the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, particularly 1932,
in Germany was not unlike the symptoms of civil war. For me as a
German—and I think I have always been a patriot like many other
Germans—it made a frightful impression. Actually I was not very close
to the political world, but during those years I realized that something
had to be done and that everyone, wherever he might be, would have to
help or assist to create a national front on a broad basis which would
once more have the confidence of men and particularly of the large
working masses of the people. At the same time, I was aware that most of
the men who were responsible for Versailles had not intended this—I am
sure of it—but it was a fact which I believe no one can deny today. I
have already mentioned the disappointment I experienced as a young
officer through personal contacts, in particular, with the German
Ambassador at that time, Dieckhoff, who is a distant relative of mine or
relative by marriage, the disappointment which in fact we all
experienced in the German Armed Forces, among the German people, and in
government circles naturally even more—that these Points of Wilson had
been so quickly abandoned. I do not propose to make a propaganda speech
here. I merely want to represent the facts soberly as I experienced them
at the time. There is no doubt that the defenselessness of the German
people at that time led to the fact that unfortunately a tendency was
maintained among our enemies not toward conciliation but toward hatred
or revenge. I am convinced that this was certainly not the intention of
Wilson, at that time President of the United States, and I myself
believe that in later years, he suffered because of it. At any rate that
was my first contact with German politics.
This Versailles now became...
But it is known that even the severe stipulations of Versailles as we
experienced them, from the closest personal observation, were not
adhered to as is well known. That, too, is perhaps a consequence, an
after-effect of a war, in which men drifted in a certain direction and
just could not or would not adhere to certain things. It is known that
the stipulations of Versailles were not observed then either
territorially speaking or in other very important points. May I mention
that one of the most important questions—territorial questions—at that
time was Upper Silesia and particularly Memel, that small territory. The
events which took place made a deep impression on me personally. Upper
Silesia particularly, because I had many personal ties there and because
none of us could understand that even those severe stipulations of
Versailles were not observed. It is a question of minorities which also
played a very important part. Later I shall have to refer to this point
more in detail, particularly in connection with the Polish crisis. But
right from the beginning, German minorities, as is known, suffered very
hard times. At that time it was again Upper Silesia particularly, and
those territories which were involved and suffering under that problem,
under that treatment. Further, the question of disarmament was naturally
one of the most important points of Versailles. And that, too, has
already been referred to in this courtroom. Therefore I do not want to
go into detail.
At any rate, it was the denial of equality in all these spheres, the
denial of equal rights, which made me decide that year to take a greater
part in politics. I would like to say here quite openly that at that
time I often talked to French and British friends, and of course it was
already a well-known fact, even then—after 1930 the NSDAP received over
100 seats in the Reichstag—that here the natural will of the German
people broke through to resist this treatment, which after all meant
nothing more than that they wanted to live. At the time these friends of
mine spoke to me about Adolf Hitler, whom I did not know at the time,
they asked me, “What sort of a man is Adolf Hitler? What will come of
it? What is it?” I said to them frankly at that time, “Give Germany a
chance and you will not have Adolf Hitler. Do not give her a chance, and
Adolf Hitler will come into power.”
That was approximately in 1930 or 1931. Germany was not given the
chance, so on 30 January 1933 he came—the National Socialists seized
power.
DR. HORN: How and when did you come to know Adolf Hitler?
VON RIBBENTROP: I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time on 13 August 1932
at the Berghof. Since about 1930 or 1931 I had known Count Helldorf in
Berlin, whose name as a National Socialist is known. He was a regimental
comrade of mine in my squadron, and we went through 4 years of war
together. Through him I became acquainted with National Socialism in
Berlin for the first time. I had asked him at that time to arrange a
meeting with Hitler for me. He did so that time, as far as I remember,
through the mediation of Herr Röhm. I visited Adolf Hitler and had a
long discussion with him at that time, that is to say, Adolf Hitler
explained his ideas on the situation in the summer of 1932 to me. I then
saw him again in 1933—that has already been described here by Party
Member Göring—at my house at Dahlem which I placed at their disposal so
that I, on my part, should do everything possible to create a national
front. Adolf Hitler made a considerable impression on me even then. I
noticed particularly his blue eyes in his generally dark appearance, and
then, perhaps as outstanding, his detached, I should say reserved—not
unapproachable, but reserved—nature, and the manner in which he
expressed his thoughts. These thoughts and statements always had
something final and definite about them, and they appeared to come from
his innermost self. I had the impression that I was facing a man who
knew what he wanted and who had an unshakable will and who was a very
strong personality. I can summarize by saying that I left that meeting
with Hitler convinced that this man, if anyone, could save Germany from
these great difficulties and that distress which existed at the time. I
need not go further into detail about the events of that January. But I
would like to tell about one episode which happened in my house in
Dahlem when the question arose whether Hitler was to become Reich
Chancellor or not. I know that at that time, I believe, he was offered
the Vice Chancellorship and I heard with what enormous strength and
conviction—if you like, also brutality and hardness—he could state his
opinion when he believed that obstacles might appear which could lead to
the rehabilitation and rescue of his people.
DR. HORN: Did you believe in the possibility of a revision of the
Versailles Treaty by means of mutual understanding?
VON RIBBENTROP: I must say that the numerous business trips which in the
years of 1920 to 1932 took me abroad proved to me how endlessly
difficult it was or would have to be under the system which then existed
to bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty by means of
negotiations. In spite of that, I felt how from year to year the circles
grew in England and France which were convinced that somehow Germany
would have to be helped. During those years, I established many contacts
with men of the business world, of public life, of art and science,
particularly in universities in England and France. I learned thereby to
understand the attitude of the English and the French. I want to say now
that even shortly after Versailles it was my conviction that a change of
that treaty could be carried out only through an understanding with
France and Britain. I also believed that only in this way could the
international situation be improved and the very considerable causes of
conflict existing everywhere as consequences of the first World War be
removed. It was clear, therefore, that only by means of an understanding
with the Western Powers, with England and France, would a revision of
Versailles be possible. Even then, I had the distinct feeling that only
through such an understanding could a permanent peace in Europe really
be preserved. We young officers had experienced too much at that time.
And I am thinking of the Free Corps men in Silesia and all those things
in the Baltic, _et cetera_. I should like to add, and say it quite
openly, that right from the beginning, from the first day in which I saw
and read the Versailles Treaty, I, as a German, felt it to be my duty to
oppose it and to try to do everything so that a better treaty could take
its place. It was precisely Hitler’s opposition to Versailles that first
brought me together with him and the National Socialist Party.
DR. HORN: Did you attempt to tell Hitler your views regarding this?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is 5 o’clock and the Tribunal thinks they
had better adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-FOURTH DAY
Friday, 29 March 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Before the examination of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop
goes on, the Tribunal desires me to draw the attention of Dr. Horn and
of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to what the Tribunal has said during the
last few days.
In the first place, the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal has allowed the
Defendant Göring, who has given the evidence first of the defendants and
who has proclaimed himself to be responsible as the second leader of
Nazi Germany, to give his evidence without any interruption whatever,
and he has covered the whole history of the Nazi regime from its
inception to the defeat of Germany. The Tribunal does not propose to
allow any of the other defendants to go over the same ground in their
evidence except insofar as is necessary for their own defense.
Secondly, the Tribunal ruled that evidence as to the injustice of the
Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is inadmissible.
Thirdly, though this is not an order of the Tribunal, I must point out
that the Tribunal has been informed on many occasions of the view of the
defendants and some of their witnesses that the Treaty of Versailles was
unjust and therefore any evidence upon that point, apart from its being
inadmissible, is cumulative, and the Tribunal will not hear it for that
reason.
And lastly, the Tribunal wishes me to point out to Dr. Horn that it is
the duty of counsel to examine their witnesses and not to leave them
simply to make speeches, and if they are giving evidence which counsel
knows is inadmissible according to the rulings of the Tribunal it is the
duty of counsel to stop the witness. That is all.
Dr. Seidl, if you are going to refer to Gaus’ affidavit the Tribunal
will not deal with that matter now, it will be dealt with after the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop has given evidence.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I agreed with Dr. Horn, Counsel for the
Defendant Ribbentrop...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I do not care whether you spoke to Dr. Horn or
not or what arrangement you may have made with Dr. Horn; it is not
convenient for the Tribunal to hear Dr. Gaus’ evidence at the present
moment; they want to go on with Ribbentrop’s evidence.
[_Turning to the defendant._]
DR. HORN: Yesterday at the end you were speaking about your political
impressions in England and France. In connection with that I should like
to put the following question: Did you make efforts to tell Hitler of
your views on French and British politics at that time?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, after 30 January 1933 I saw Hitler repeatedly and
of course told him about the impressions which I gathered on my frequent
travels, particularly to England and France.
DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s attitude toward France and England at that
time?
VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler’s attitude was as follows: He saw in France an
enemy of Germany because of the entire policy which France had pursued
with regard to Germany since the end of World War I, and especially
because of the position which she took on questions of equality of
rights. This attitude of Hitler’s found expression at the time in his
book _Mein Kampf_.
I knew France well, since for a number of years I had had connections
there. At that time I told the Führer a great deal about France. It
interested him, and I noticed that he showed an increasing interest in
French matters in the year 1933. Then I brought him together with a
number of Frenchmen, and I believe some of these visits, and perhaps
also some of my descriptions of the attitude taken by many Frenchmen,
and all of French culture...
DR. HORN: What Frenchmen were they?
VON RIBBENTROP: There were a number of French economists, there were
journalists and also some politicians. These reports interested the
Führer, and gradually, he got the impression that there were, after all,
men in France who were not averse to the idea of an understanding with
Germany.
Above all I acquainted the Führer with an argument which sprang from my
deepest conviction and my years of experience. It was a great wish of
the Führer, as is well known, to come to a definitive friendship and
agreement with England. At first the Führer treated this idea as
something apart from Franco-German politics. I believe that at that time
I succeeded in convincing the Führer that an understanding with England
would be possible only by way of an understanding with France as well.
That made, as I still remember very clearly from some of our
conversations, a strong impression on him. He told me then that I should
continue this purely personal course of mine for bringing about an
understanding between Germany and France and that I should continue to
report to him about these things.
DR. HORN: Then you became Hitler’s foreign political advisor, not the
Party advisor? How was that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I reported to Hitler about my
travel experiences. These impressions which I brought from England and
France were of interest to him, and, without any special conferences or
discussions being arranged, I was often received by Hitler. I spoke with
him repeatedly and in that way it came about of itself that, apart from
the official channels, he acknowledged my co-operation and my advice as
to what I had seen and heard in foreign countries.
Of course, he was particularly interested in all questions concerning
England. I told him about public opinion and personalities and
introduced to him, besides Frenchmen, a number of Englishmen with whom
he could exchange ideas outside the official channels, something which
he loved to do.
DR. HORN: In what did your personal co-operation in the efforts made by
Hitler to come to an agreement with France in the years 1933 to 1935
consist?
VON RIBBENTROP: At that time the solution of the Saar question was one
of the first problems up for discussion. I tried through my own private
channels to make it clear to the French in Paris that a reasonable and
quiet solution of the Saar question in the spirit of the plebiscite, as
laid down in the Versailles Treaty, would be a good omen for the
relations between the two countries. I spoke with a number of people
during those years in Paris and also made the first contact with members
of the French Cabinet. I might mention that I had conversations with the
then French President Doumergue, with the Foreign Minister Barthou, who
was later assassinated, with M. Laval, and especially with M. Daladier.
I remember that in connection with the Saar question in particular I met
with considerable understanding on the part of the latter. Then somewhat
later I noticed during the visits of Frenchmen to Hitler that it was
always mentioned, “Yes, but there is _Mein Kampf_ and your policy toward
France is contained in that book.” I tried to get the Führer to bring
out an official revision of this passage of _Mein Kampf_. The Führer
said, however—and I remember the exact words—that he was determined
through his policy, as put into practice, to prove to the world that he
had changed his view in this respect: Things once written down could not
be changed, they were a historical fact, and his former attitude toward
France had been caused by France’s attitude toward Germany at that time.
But one could now turn over a new leaf in the history of the two
countries.
Then I asked Adolf Hitler to receive a French journalist, in order that
possibly by a public statement this revision of the view expressed in
his book _Mein Kampf_ could be made known to the world.
He agreed to this and then received a French journalist and gave him an
interview in 1933. I do not recall the exact date. I believe this
article appeared in _Le Matin_ and created a great deal of excitement. I
was very glad, for thereby a large step toward an understanding with
France had been taken. Then I contemplated what could further be done
and how, from this simple public article, one could work up to a direct
contact between French and German statesmen.
DR. HORN: At that time were you not contemplating the means for bringing
Hitler and Daladier together? What practical efforts did you make?
VON RIBBENTROP: I was just going to come to that. At that time Daladier
was the French Premier. I had several conversations with him and
suggested to him that he meet Adolf Hitler so that quite frankly, man to
man, they could carry on a discussion and see whether Franco-German
relations could not be put on an entirely new basis. M. Daladier was
quite taken by this idea. I reported this to Hitler and Hitler was ready
to meet M. Daladier.
The meeting place was to be in the German Odenwald and was already
agreed upon. I went to Paris to make the last arrangements with
Daladier.
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I am reluctant to interfere in any
respect with this examination of this defendant, but my colleagues and I
feel that this particular part of the examination is quite immaterial
and in any event much too detailed and that we will never get along
here. If counsel would abide by the instruction of the Court given this
morning, we could move along much more directly and much more quickly.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that the objection is
really well founded. The defendant is dealing with a period between 1933
and 1935 and the efforts which he made for good relations with France.
Well now, that is very remote from any question which we have to decide
in this case, and therefore to deal with it in this detail seems to the
Tribunal a waste of time.
DR. HORN: Then I will put other questions, which concern his direct
co-operation.
What caused Hitler to appoint you Plenipotentiary for Disarmament?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe I was appointed Commissioner for Disarmament
in the year—in March or April. The reason was as follows:
Hitler was of the opinion that there should be equality of armament. He
believed that this would be possible only through negotiations with
France and England. That was also my point of view. Because of my
efforts to establish good relations between Germany and England, since
this was the earnest wish of the Führer, I was at that time in London
and there was able to make contacts with men influential in English
politics.
It was mainly the contact with Lord Baldwin. I spoke to Lord Baldwin and
the then Prime Minister, MacDonald, about the German desire for equality
and found that these ministers had an open ear. As the result of a long
conversation which I had with the Lord Chancellor of that time, the
present Lord Baldwin—the latter, I believe on 1 December 1933, made a
speech in the House of Commons, in which he pointed out that one should
meet Germany halfway. Armament equality had been promised and therefore
it would have to be reached somehow. For this purpose there were three
possibilities: One would be, that Germany arm up to the level of the
other powers, and that was not desired; the second possibility, that the
others would disarm to the level of Germany, and that could not be
carried out; and therefore one would have to meet halfway and permit
Germany a limited rearmament, and the other countries for their part
would have to disarm. Adolf Hitler was very happy then about this
attitude, for he considered it a practicable way of carrying through
equality for Germany. Unfortunately it was not at all possible in the
ensuing course of events to put into practice these good and reasonable
ideas and statements made by Baldwin. Adolf Hitler therefore took the
view that within the system now prevailing in the world it was
apparently impossible to attain, by means of negotiations, armament
equality—equality of rights—for Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait. The interpreter isn’t hearing you clearly. Could
you put the microphone a little bit more in front of you? And would you
repeat the last few sentences you said?
VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler saw that unfortunately, within the
international system prevailing at that time, the good ideas of Lord
Baldwin could not be carried out by means of negotiations.
DR. HORN: What practicable steps in limitation of armament did you
obtain in London?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is known that Adolf Hitler, that means Germany, left
the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference because it was
impossible to carry through the German desires by way of negotiations.
Hitler therefore saw no other possibility, except to achieve this aim
through the efforts of the German people themselves. He knew and, of
course, realized that a risk was involved, but after the experiences of
the preceding few years no other means remained, so that then Germany
started to rearm independently.
[_Dr. Horn attempted to interrupt._]
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to finish my answer to your question.
As a practical result of this, the following happened: In the course of
the year 1934 there came about a closer contact between the German and
the British Governments. There followed visits by British statesmen to
Berlin, by Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden, and during these visits the
suggestion was brought up as to whether it would not be possible to come
to an agreement or an understanding at least as far as naval matters
were concerned.
Hitler was very much interested in this idea and in the course of the
negotiations between the British and the German Governments it was
agreed that I should be sent to London to attempt to come to a naval
agreement with the British Government.
It is not necessary for me to go into details of the pact which actually
materialized. Hitler himself had said from the beginning that, in order
to come to a final understanding with England, one would have to
acknowledge the absolute naval supremacy of Great Britain once and for
all. It was he who suggested the naval ratio of 100 to 35, which was an
entirely different ratio from that which was negotiated between Germany
and England before 1914.
After relatively short negotiations this naval agreement was then
concluded in London. It was very important for future Anglo-German
relations, and at that time it represented the first practical result of
an actual armament limitation.
DR. HORN: At that time did France agree to this rearmament and what were
your personal efforts in this step?
VON RIBBENTROP: I might say in advance that Hitler and I were extremely
happy about this pact. I know, it was then styled once by certain
circles, to use an English expression, an “eyewash.” I can say here from
my own personal experience that I have never seen Adolf Hitler so happy
as at the moment when I was able to tell him personally, in Hamburg, of
the conclusion of this agreement.
DR. HORN: And what was France’s attitude to this pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: With France the situation was, of course, a little
difficult. I had already noticed this while the negotiations were taking
place, for one had deviated from the armament limitation of the
Versailles Treaty. Then I myself proposed to the gentlemen of the
Foreign Office—I can mention their names, they were Sir Robert Craigie
in particular and also Little, who was then a British Admiral—that I
would go to France so that I also could utilize my relations with French
statesmen and make clear to them the usefulness of this agreement for a
future German-Anglo-French understanding.
I should like to point out something here. In this courtroom, sometime
ago, a film was shown in which a speech I made for the newsreels of that
time, at the conclusion of this naval agreement, was presented as proof
of the duplicity of German diplomacy. At that time I purposely made this
speech in London in order to record and to declare before the whole
world that this did not concern merely one-sided British-German matters,
but that it was the wish of Hitler—and also the spirit of the naval
agreement—to bring about a general limitation of armament, and that
this naval pact was also designed to improve finally the relations
between France and Germany. This wish was real and sincere.
I then went to France, spoke with French statesmen and, I believe, did
help to some extent so that this first step in the limitation of
armaments was considered a reasonable measure by many Frenchmen in view
of the fact that in the long run equality of rights could not be
withheld from the German people.
DR. HORN: Then you were appointed Ambassador to London. What led to this
appointment?
VON RIBBENTROP: That came about as follows: In the time following the
naval agreement, which was hailed with joy by the widest circles in
England, I made great efforts to bring Lord Baldwin and the Führer
together, and I should like to mention here that the preliminary
arrangements for this meeting had already been made by a friend of Lord
Baldwin, a Mr. Jones. The Führer had agreed to fly to Chequers to meet
Lord Baldwin, but unfortunately Lord Baldwin declined at the last
minute. What led to his declining, I do not know, but there is no doubt
that certain forces in England at the time did not wish this
German-British understanding.
Then in 1936, when the German Ambassador Von Hoesch died, I said to
myself, that on behalf of Germany one should make one last supreme
effort to come to a good understanding with England. I might mention in
this connection, that at that time I had already been appointed State
Secretary of the Foreign Office by Hitler and had asked him personally
that that appointment be cancelled and that I be sent to London as
Ambassador.
The following may have led to this decision of Hitler’s. Hitler had a
very definite conception of England’s balance of power theory, but my
view perhaps deviated somewhat from his. My conviction was that England
would always continue to support her old balance of power theory,
whereas Hitler was of the opinion that this theory of balance of power
was obsolete, and that from now on, England should tolerate, that is,
should welcome a much stronger Germany in view of the changed situation
in Europe, and in view of Russia’s development of strength. In order to
give the Führer a definite and clear picture of how matters actually
stood in England—that was at any rate one of the reasons why the Führer
sent me to England. Another reason was that at that time we hoped,
through relations with the still very extensive circles in England which
were friendly to Germany and supported a German-English friendship, to
make the relations between the two countries friendly and perhaps even
to reach a permanent agreement.
Hitler’s goal was finally and always the German-English pact.
DR. HORN: In what way was your ambassadorial activity hampered in
England?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say first that I was repeatedly in
England in the 1930’s, mainly from 1935 to 1936, and, acting on
instructions from the Führer, I sounded out the opinions there on the
subject of a German-British pact. The basis of this pact is known. It
was to make the naval ratio of 100 to 35 permanent. Secondly the
integrity of the so-called Low Countries, Belgium and Holland, and also
France was to be guaranteed by the two countries forever and—this was
the Führer’s idea—Germany should recognize the British Empire and
should be ready to stand up, if necessary even with the help of her own
power, for the preservation and maintenance of the British Empire; and
England, in return, should recognize Germany as a strong power in
Europe.
It has already been said, and I should like to repeat, that these
efforts in the 1930’s unfortunately did not lead to any results. It was
one of the Führer’s deepest disappointments—and I must mention that
here, for it is very important for the further course of events—that
this pact upon which he had placed such very great hopes and which he
had regarded as the cornerstone of his foreign policy did not
materialize in these years. What the forces were which prevented its
materializing I cannot say, because I do not know. In any case we got no
further.
I came back to this question several times while I was Ambassador in
London and discussed it with circles friendly to Germany. And I must say
that there also were many Englishmen who had a very positive attitude
towards this idea.
DR. HORN: Did you also meet with any attitude that was negative?
VON RIBBENTROP: There was naturally a strong element in England which
did not look favorably upon this pact or this idea of close relations
with Germany, because of considerations of principle and perhaps because
of traditional considerations of British policy against definite
obligations of this kind. I should like to mention here briefly, even
though this goes back to the year 1936, that during the Olympic Games in
the year 1936 I tried to win the very influential British politician,
the present Lord Vansittart, to this idea. I had at that time a very
long discussion of several hours’ duration with him in Berlin. Adolf
Hitler also received him and likewise spoke with him about the same
subject. Lord Vansittart, even though our personal relations were good,
showed a certain reserve.
In the year 1937, when I was in London, I saw that two clearly different
trends were gradually forming in England; the one trend was very much in
favor of promoting good relations with Germany; the second trend did not
wish such close relations.
There were—I believe that I do not need to mention names, for they are
well known—those gentlemen who did not wish such close relations with
Germany, Mr. Winston Churchill, who was later Prime Minister, and
others.
I then made strenuous efforts in London in order to promote this idea
but other events occurred which made my activity there most difficult.
There was first of all, the Spanish policy. It is well-known that civil
war raged in Spain at that time and that in London the so-called
Nonintervention Commission was meeting.
I therefore, as Ambassador to the Court of St. James, had a difficult
task. On the one hand, with all means at my disposal, I wished to
further German-English friendship and to bring about the German-English
pact, but on the other hand, I had to carry out the instructions of my
government in regard to the Nonintervention Commission and Spain. These
instructions, however, were often in direct opposition to certain aims
of British policy. Therefore it came about that this sort of League of
Nations which the Nonintervention Commission represented at that time,
and of which I was the authorized German member, prejudiced the chief
aim with which Adolf Hitler had sent me to London.
But I have to say here—if I may and am supposed to explain that period
openly in the interest of the case—that it was not only the policy
regarding Spain, but that in these years, 1937 until the beginning of
1938, that section which did not want a pact with Germany, doubtless
made itself constantly more evident in England; and that, today, is a
historical fact. Why? The answer is very simple, very clear. These
circles regarded a Germany strengthened by National Socialism as a
factor which might disturb the traditional British balance of power
theory and policy on the Continent.
I am convinced that Adolf Hitler at that time had no intention at all of
undertaking on his part anything against England, but that he had sent
me to London with the most ardent wish for really reaching an
understanding with England. From London I reported to the Führer about
the situation. And before this Tribunal now I wish to clarify one point,
a point which has been brought up very frequently and which is relevant
to my own defense. It has often been asserted that I reported to the
Führer from England that England was degenerate and would perhaps not
fight. I may and must establish the fact here, that from the beginning I
reported exactly the opposite to the Führer. I informed the Führer that
in my opinion the English ruling class and the English people had a
definitely heroic attitude and that this nation was ready at any time to
fight to the utmost for the existence of its empire. Later, in the
course of the war and after a conference with the Führer, I once
discussed this subject in public, in a speech made in 1941.
Summarizing the situation in London in the years 1937 and 1938, while I
was ambassador, I can at least say that I was fully cognizant of the
fact that it would be very difficult to conclude a pact with England.
But even so, and this I always reported, all efforts would have to be
made to come by means of a peaceful settlement to an understanding with
England as a decisive factor in German policy, that is, to create such a
relation between the development of German power and the British basic
tendencies and views on foreign policy that these two factors would not
conflict.
DR. HORN: During the time you were ambassador you concluded the
so-called Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. How was it that just you, the
ambassador, concluded that pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to make the preliminary remark that in
1938 I was appointed Foreign Minister on 4 February. On 4 February I was
in Berlin. The Führer called me and informed me that he had appointed me
Foreign Minister. After that—I am not sure, are you talking of the
Three Power Pact?
DR. HORN: No, you have misunderstood me. During your activity as
ambassador you concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, which in 1937
was joined by Italy and later on by Spain, as well as other countries.
How was it that you, as ambassador, concluded this pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler at that time considered the ideological
difference between Germany, that is, National Socialism and communism
actually one of the decisive factors of his policy. Therefore, the
question arose as to how a way could be found at all to win over other
countries to counter communistic tendencies. The problem, therefore, was
an ideological one. In the year 1933, I believe, Hitler discussed with
me for the first time, the question of whether a closer contact with
Japan could be established in some form or other. I replied that I
personally had certain connections with Japanese persons and would
establish contact. When I did so it came to light that Japan had the
same anti-Comintern attitude as Germany. Out of these conversations of
the years 1933, 1934, 1935, I believe, the idea gradually crystallized
that one might make these common efforts the subject of a pact. I
believe it was one of my assistants who had the idea of concluding the
Anti-Comintern Pact. I presented this idea to the Führer and the Führer
approved of it. However, since it was, so to speak, an ideological
question, he did not wish at that time that it be done through the
official channels of German politics and therefore he instructed me to
prepare this pact which then was concluded in my office in Berlin, as I
believe, in the course of the year 1936.
DR. HORN: If I understand you correctly, this pact was concluded by you
because you were the head of the Bureau Ribbentrop?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. The Bureau Ribbentrop consisted chiefly
of me and just a few aides. But it is correct to say that the Führer
wished that I conclude this pact because he did not wish to give it an
official air.
DR. HORN: Did this pact have aims of practical policy or only
ideological aims?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain that this pact, on principle, I should
say, had an ideological aim. It was meant to oppose the work of the
Comintern in the various countries at that time. But naturally it also
contained a political element. This political element was anti-Russian
at the time, since Moscow was the representative of the Comintern idea.
Therefore, the Führer and I had a notion that through this pact, a
certain balance or counterbalance against the Russian efforts or against
Russia was being created in a political sense as well, because Russia
was at odds with Germany in respect to ideology and also, of course, to
politics.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you and the defendant really think it is
necessary to take as long as the defendant has taken to tell us why he,
as an ambassador in London, was called upon to sign the Anti-Comintern
Pact?
DR. HORN: It is very difficult for me to hear Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: What I asked you was whether you and the defendant think
it necessary for the defendant to make such a long speech in answer to
your question, why he, as ambassador in London, was employed to sign the
Anti-Comintern Pact. He has spoken for at least 5 minutes about it.
DR. HORN: On 4 February 1938, you were made Foreign Minister. What were
the reasons for this appointment?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that on 4 February 1938 I was in
Berlin. The Führer called me and informed me that, because of a shift in
various higher positions, he was going to appoint a new Foreign
Minister, also that he had appointed the then Foreign Minister Von
Neurath, President of the Secret Cabinet Council. I replied to the
Führer that I, of course, would be glad to accept this appointment.
DR. HORN: On this occasion you also received a high rank in the SS? The
Prosecution have asserted that this rank was not purely honorary. Is
that true?
VON RIBBENTROP: I must correct this point, I believe. I had received a
rank in the SS prior to this time and I do not recall whether it was on
the occasion of this appointment or later on that I became SS
Gruppenführer. The Führer bestowed on me the rank and the uniform of an
SS Gruppenführer. That was a position, which formerly in the Army used
to be known as a rank _à la suite_. It happened that I agreed definitely
with the SS idea at that time. My relations with Himmler were also quite
good at the time. I considered the SS idea at that time the possible
basis for producing and creating an idealistic class of leaders,
somewhat like that existing in England, and such as emerged symbolically
through the heroism of our Waffen-SS during the war. Later on, it is
true, my attitude towards Himmler changed. But the Führer bestowed this
rank on me because he wished that within the Party and at the Party
meetings, I should wear the Party uniform and have a Party rank.
May I at this time state briefly my attitude toward the Party. Yesterday
or the day before yesterday, I believe, the question was raised as to
whether I was a true National Socialist. I do not claim to be competent
to judge this question. It is a fact that it was only in later years
that I joined Adolf Hitler. I did not pay very much attention to the
National Socialist doctrines and program nor to the racial theories,
with which I was not very familiar. I was not anti-Semitic, nor did I
fully understand the church question, although I had left the church a
long time ago. I had my own inner reasons for doing so, reasons
connected with the early 20’s and the development of the church in
Germany in those years. However, I believe that I have always been a
good Christian. What drew me to the Party, as I recognized at the time,
was the fact that the Party wanted a strong, flourishing, and
socialistic Germany. That was what I wanted too. For that reason, in the
year 1932, I did, after thorough deliberation, become a member of the
NSDAP.
DR. HORN: Had you put your services at the disposal of the Party before
that date, as the Prosecution assert, namely, from 1930 on?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was in 1930 when in the large Reichstag election
National Socialism obtained more than 100 seats in the German Reichstag.
I set forth yesterday, and perhaps do not need to go into detail any
more, what conditions in Germany were at that time. However, during the
years 1930, 1931 and 1932 I gradually came nearer to the Party. Then
from 1932 on—I believe I entered the Party in August 1932—from that
moment on until the end of this war I devoted my entire strength to
National Socialist Germany and exhausted my strength in so doing. I wish
to profess frankly before this Tribunal and before the world that I have
always endeavored to be a good National Socialist and that I was proud
of the fact that I belonged to a little group of men, idealists, who did
not want anything else but to re-establish Germany’s prestige in the
world.
DR. HORN: What foreign political problems did Hitler describe to you as
requiring solution, when you took office? What directives did he give
you for the conduct of foreign policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: When I took office, the Führer said relatively little to
me. He said only that Germany had now assumed a new position, that
Germany had once more joined the circle of nations having equal rights
and that it was clear that in the future certain problems would also
still have to be solved. In particular, I recall that he pointed out
four problems which, sooner or later, would have to be solved. He
emphasized that such problems could be solved only with a strong
Wehrmacht, not by using it, but through its mere existence, because a
country which was not strongly armed could practice no foreign policy
whatsoever, but rather such a country operated, so to speak, in a vacuum
as we had experienced during the past years. He said we would have to
achieve clear-cut relations with our neighbors. The four problems he
enumerated were, first of all, Austria; then he mentioned a solution of
the Sudeten questions, of the question of the tiny Memel district and of
the Danzig and the Corridor question, all problems which would have to
be solved in one way or another. It would be my duty, he said, to assist
him diplomatically in this task. From this moment on I did my best to
assist the Führer in the preparation of some solution of these problems
in a way agreeable to Germany.
DR. HORN: Shortly after your appointment you...
THE PRESIDENT: I believe this would be a good time to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. HORN: Which course did German foreign policy take after you were
appointed Foreign Minister?
VON RIBBENTROP: First I tried to get an overall picture of the pending
affairs of the Foreign Office and of the situation. German foreign
policy, as I said before, had reached a certain stage, that is, Germany
had regained prestige in the eyes of the world, and the future task
would be to solve in some way or other the important and vital problems
created in Europe by the Versailles Treaty. This was all the more
necessary since, by way of example, ethnic questions always were
material for conflict, that is, contained possibilities for conflict
dangerous to a peaceful development in Europe.
During the period following I familiarized myself with the affairs of
the ministry. That was at first not easy, as I was dealing with
altogether new men. I should like to mention here that Hitler’s attitude
towards the Foreign Office was not always positive and, in continuing
the efforts of Minister Von Neurath, my predecessor, I considered it my
most important task to bring the Foreign Office closer to Hitler and to
bridge the two spheres of ideas.
It was clear to me from the very beginning, after I took over the
ministry, that I would be working, so to speak, in the shadow of a titan
and that I would have to impose on myself certain limitations, that is
to say, that I would not be in a position, one might almost say, to
conduct the foreign policy as it is done by other foreign ministers, who
are responsible to a parliamentary system or a parliament. The
commanding personality of the Führer naturally dominated the foreign
policy as well. He occupied himself with all its details. It went like
this more or less: I reported to him and forwarded to him important
foreign policy reports through a liaison man, and Hitler in turn gave me
definite orders as to what views I should take in regard to problems of
foreign policy, _et cetera_.
In the course of these conversations the problem of Austria crystallized
as the first and most important problem which had to be brought to some
solution or other. Austria had always been a matter very close to the
Führer’s heart, because he was himself a native of Austria and
naturally, with Germany’s power growing, the efforts already long in
existence for bringing Germany and Austria more closely together became
even more pronounced. At that time I did not yet know very much about
this problem, since Hitler himself handled this problem for the most
part.
DR. HORN: When you took over your office, or later, did you get to know
the minutes of a conference of 5 November 1937 which has become known
here under the name of the Hossbach document?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know this document, which has been mentioned
here in various connections. I saw it here for the first time.
DR. HORN: Did Hitler ever say anything to you which conforms to the
contents of this document?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall all the details of the contents of this
document, but it was the Führer’s practice to speak very little at all
about his aims and intentions and his attitude in matters of principle.
At any rate, this was his practice in dealing with me. He did say that
Germany had to solve certain problems in Europe, as I said before, and
that for this reason it was necessary to be strong. He also mentioned
the possibility that this might lead to disagreements, but he said to me
nothing more specific about this. On the contrary, he always emphasized
to me that it was his desire to solve by diplomatic means these problems
in Europe which had to be solved and that, once he had solved these
problems, he had the intention of creating an ideal social state of the
people and that the Germany he would then create would be a model modern
social state with all the new edifices to which he attached special
value. In other words, to me he did casually admit the possibility of an
armed conflict, but he always said it was his unalterable aim, and that
it had always been and was his intention, to achieve this solution of
the “impossibility of Versailles,” as he sometimes called it, in a
peaceful way.
DR. HORN: Shortly after your appointment as Foreign Minister you were
called by Hitler to Berchtesgaden to the conference with Schuschnigg.
What was discussed there and what was your role in these conferences?
VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler informed me—I recall this was on 12 February
1938—that he was going to meet Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg at the
Obersalzberg. I do not remember the details. I see from my notes that
this was on 12 February. One thing I know is that he told me that the
solution to be achieved was that, in some form or other, the German
National Socialists in Austria must be given assistance. Difficulties of
all sorts had arisen there, the details of which I no longer recall. At
any rate, I believe, there were a great many National Socialists in
jail, and, as a consequence of the natural efforts of these Austrian
people to bring about a closer contact with the Reich, this Austrian
problem threatened to become a really serious problem between Germany
and Austria.
Adolf Hitler told me at the time that I should be present in the
Berghof. Later it was said, and I have heard it said here, that Adolf
Hitler once declared that he intended to fight for the right for these 6
million Germans to decide their own fate under all circumstances during
the year 1938. I do not recall that he said so but it is very well
possible that he did say so. On the occasion of Schuschnigg’s reception
I was at the Obersalzberg. Hitler received Schuschnigg alone and had a
long conversation with him. The details of this conversation are not
known to me because I was not present. I recall that Schuschnigg saw me
after this conversation and that I in turn had a long conversation with
him.
DR. HORN: Did you at that time put Schuschnigg under political pressure,
as the Prosecution asserts?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not true. I remember very clearly my
conversation with Schuschnigg, whereas the other details of what was
going on at the Obersalzberg are not so clear in my memory, since I was
not present at either the first or the second meeting between
Schuschnigg and Hitler. My discussion with Schuschnigg proceeded in a
very amicable fashion. I felt that Schuschnigg obviously was very
greatly impressed by the Führer and the Führer’s personality. I wish to
say first that I do not know exactly the details of what Hitler wanted
to achieve or discuss with Schuschnigg, so that on this subject matter I
could say to him very little, or rather nothing. Our discussion
therefore was confined to more general subjects. I told Schuschnigg that
in my opinion these two countries must come into closer contact and that
perhaps it was his historical task to assist in this and to co-operate;
that the fact was undeniable that both nations were German, and two such
German nations could not forever be separated by artificial barriers.
DR. HORN: Was it already at this conference that a recision of the
German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 was discussed?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not discuss this point with Schuschnigg and I
believe that the Führer did not do so either in any way because
according to what Schuschnigg told me, the Führer had told him that
certain measures would have to be carried out in Austria in order to
eliminate the reasons for conflict between the two countries. That is
what I understood him to say without remembering any details. As I said,
my discussion with him was very amicable, and I might mention that, when
I suggested to Schuschnigg that the two countries would have to get into
closer contact, Schuschnigg showed an altogether positive attitude
towards this idea so that, to a certain extent, I was even surprised by
his positive attitude at that time. There can be no talk of any pressure
exerted on Schuschnigg during our discussion. However, the Führer’s
discussion with him, I believe, was conducted in very clear language,
because the Führer wanted to reach some improvement in relations in
order to solve the problems between the two countries, and to achieve
this it was necessary for the two statesmen to reveal their thoughts
openly. I have heard here, and I think this is from an entry in General
Jodl’s diary, that heavy political and military pressure was exerted. I
believe I can testify here that I knew nothing of any military or strong
political pressure at this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. I may
reiterate that I am sure that the Führer used clear and frank language
with Schuschnigg, but I certainly did not notice any pressure of a
military or a political kind, or anything in the nature of an ultimatum.
Also I assume that General Jodl’s remark—I do not believe he was
present—is a diary entry based on hearsay. I should like to add that at
that time—and I have also stated this to several persons who were with
me and also to the Führer—I had an altogether positive and pleasant
impression of Schuschnigg’s personality. Schuschnigg even said that the
two countries, and I remember these words exactly, were bound together
by fate and that he would have to assist in some way in bringing these
two countries closer together. There was no mention in this discussion
of an Anschluss or any such thing. Whether the Führer mentioned that, I
do not know, but I do not believe so.
DR. HORN: At that time, or shortly after, did Hitler mention to you that
he wished to deviate from the German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 and find
some other solution?
VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler did not discuss this matter with me. If at all, I
spoke very little with him about the Austrian problems. This may sound
surprising, but it can be understood from the fact that it was only on 4
February that I took over the Foreign Office and that I first had to get
familiar with all the problems. The Austrian problem was anyway, as I
already said, a problem which was always dealt with by Hitler himself
and which consequently was, so to speak, merely taken note of in the
Foreign Ministry, whereas it was directed by him personally. I know and
I remember that the then Ambassador Von Papen also had the right to
report directly to Hitler and that the Foreign Office received copies of
these reports. These reports, I believe, were presented directly to
Hitler by the Reich Chancellery, so that the problem was anchored rather
in the Reich Chancellery than in the Foreign Office.
DR. HORN: You then went back to London in order to give up your post as
ambassador. What did you hear in London regarding the development of the
Austrian question?
VON RIBBENTROP: I may say the following in this connection: I myself had
always the idea that the Austrian problem should be solved by bringing
about a treaty, a customs and currency union, between the two countries,
since I personally believed that this was the most natural and the
easiest way to bring about a close connection between the two countries.
I might perhaps remind you at this point, that this idea of a currency
union, or at least a customs union, was nothing new and had already been
pursued by the governments before Hitler; it did not materialize at that
time, I believe, because of the veto of the Allied powers. But it was a
long-cherished wish of both countries. I might first answer your
question concerning London. According to my notes, I went to London on 8
March. As I have already mentioned, I happened to be in Berlin for the
celebration of the seizure of power on 30 January, I believe, and then
was appointed Foreign Minister on 4 February. Because of this
appointment I did not have the opportunity to take official leave in
London. On 8 March 1938 I went to London. Before resigning my post I had
a short conversation with Hitler, primarily about English matters. I
remember that he remarked on this occasion that the Austrian problem
beyond a doubt was progressing very nicely in line with the arrangements
agreed upon with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. I wish to add that I did
not know all the details of the agreements but I still remember a small
detail about which we sent an inquiry to the Reich Chancellery only a
few weeks later for the information of our specialist on the Austrian
question. After I arrived in London, I believe it was in the afternoon,
I happened to hear over the radio in the embassy building a speech made
by the then Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg in Innsbruck or in Graz, I
believe. I must say this speech took me very much by surprise. To go
into details would take too long. Nor do I remember all the details. I
do know that the entire manner, and, as it seemed to me, also the tone
of this speech, was such that I immediately had the impression that the
Führer would not tolerate this, and that the entire speech, without any
doubt, contradicted at least the spirit of the agreements made with the
Führer at the Obersalzberg. As I said, I was convinced that Adolf Hitler
would do something about it; and I should like to say quite openly
before this Tribunal that it appeared quite in order to me that the
question be solved in some way or other, I mean, that one would have to
speak to Schuschnigg very frankly, to prevent matters leading to a
catastrophe, perhaps even a European catastrophe. Then, on the next
morning, I had a long discussion with Lord Halifax. Lord Halifax had
also received reports from Austria, and I tried, without knowing the
situation fully, to explain to him that it was better to solve this
problem now in one form or another, and that this would be precisely in
the interests of the German-English efforts toward friendly relations;
that in the long run the assumption would prove false that the
friendship between Germany and England, as striven for by both
countries, could be broken up by such a problem. Lord Halifax was not
alarmed by the situation and told me, as far as I remember, that I
should still have an opportunity to discuss these matters with the
British Prime Minister Chamberlain at the breakfast which was to follow.
After this I had breakfast with the then Prime Minister Chamberlain;
during or after this breakfast I had a long conversation with
Chamberlain. During this conversation Mr. Chamberlain again emphasized
his desire to reach an understanding with Germany. I was extremely happy
to hear this and told him that I was firmly convinced that this was also
the Führer’s attitude. He gave me a special message for the Führer that
this was his desire and that he would do everything he could in this
direction. Shortly after this conversation telegrams arrived from
Austria, from Vienna, I believe from the Minister or the British Consul.
Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax asked me to come to their office. I
believe the breakfast took place at 10 Downing Street and I went then to
their office in order to discuss these telegrams. I told them that of
course I had no precise reports; then the news of an ultimatum came, and
later of the entry of German troops. We arranged that I should try to
contact my government and that Lord Halifax would come to see me in the
German Embassy in the afternoon to discuss these things further. I wish
to emphasize that Mr. Chamberlain on this occasion also took a very
composed and, it seemed to me, very sensible attitude towards the
Austrian question. In the afternoon Lord Halifax visited me and we had a
long talk. In the meantime the entry of German troops had become known.
I should like to emphasize the fact that this talk with Lord Halifax was
very amicable and that at the end of it I invited the English Foreign
Minister to pay Germany another visit. He accepted with the remark that
he would be glad to come and perhaps another exhibition of hunting
trophies could be arranged.
DR. HORN: On the next morning you had a telephone conversation with the
Defendant Göring. This telephone conversation has been put in evidence
by the Prosecution, with the assertion that it is a proof of your
double-crossing policy. What about that?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is not true. Reich Marshal Göring has already
testified that this was a diplomatic conversation, and diplomatic
conversations are carried on all over the world in the same way. But I
may say that through this telephone conversation I learned for the first
time of the details of the events in Austria. Without going into details
I heard, first of all, that this vote without doubt was not in
accordance with the true will of the Austrian people, and a number of
other points which Göring asked me to mention in my conversations with
the British ministers. But I should like to say that actually such
conversations did not take place because I had already taken leave of
the official English circles. In fact, I did not have any further talks
after my conversation with Göring; just a few hours after this
conversation I left London and went to Berlin and later to Vienna.
I might say that first I flew to Karinhall to visit Göring and talked to
him and found him just as happy about the Anschluss—that is, not about
the Anschluss but about the whole Austrian development as I myself was.
We all were happy. Then I flew, I believe, on the same day, to Vienna
and arrived there at about the same time as Adolf Hitler. In the
meantime I heard about the Anschluss and it was only in Vienna that I
learned that the idea of the Anschluss, had definitely not occurred to
Hitler until his drive through Austria. I believe it was prompted by a
demonstration in Linz and then he decided very quickly, I think, to
accomplish the Anschluss.
DR. HORN: What problem did Hitler mention to you as the next one which
you should solve following the Anschluss?
VON RIBBENTROP: The next problem which Hitler outlined to me on 4
February was the problem of the Sudeten Germans. This problem, however,
was not a problem posed by Hitler or the Foreign Office or any office,
it was a _de facto_ problem that existed of itself. I believe it was the
American prosecutor who said here that with the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia a chapter ended which was one of the saddest in the
history of nations, namely, the oppression and destruction of the small
Czechoslovak nation. I should like to state the following from my own
knowledge of these matters.
One may speak in this sense of a Czechoslovak State but not of a
Czechoslovak nation, because it was a state of different nationalities,
a state which comprised the most varied national groups. I mention,
besides Czechs, only Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians,
Carpatho-Ukrainians, Slovaks, _et cetera_. This shows that quite
heterogeneous elements had been welded together in 1919 to form the
state. It is certain, and probably a historical fact, that the efforts
of the different nationalities within the artificially welded state were
divergent to a certain extent and that the Czechs, following their own
tendencies, tried to surround these nationalities with a strong ring, I
should like to say, with an iron ring. This produced pressure as
pressure always created counterpressure, counterpressure from the
various nationalities of this state, and it is evident that a strong
Germany, a Germany of National Socialism at that time, exerted a strong
power of attraction on all the national segments in Europe; or, at any
rate, on those living close to the German border and partly, I might
say, on the others as well. So it came about that the German minorities
in the Sudetenland, who, since 1919, had been constantly exposed to a
considerable pressure on the part of Prague, now were subjected to still
greater pressure. I do not believe I have to go into details, but I can
say from my own knowledge, and even from my own discussions while I was
ambassador in London, that the question of the Sudetenland was very
clearly understood by the Foreign Office in London and that it was
precisely England that very often before 1938 had supported certain
interests of the Sudeten Germans in co-operation with Konrad Henlein.
After the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler the suppression of these
German minorities undoubtedly increased. I should also like to point
out, and I know this from having read the files of the Foreign Office at
the time, that the League of Nations’ Committee for Minorities had a
tremendous amount of documents on the Sudeten Germans and the great
impediments encountered by the Germans in practicing and living their
own cultural life.
I do not believe it is too much to say that the manner in which the
Sudetenland was treated by Prague was, even in the opinion of the
competent and unprejudiced authorities of the League of Nations, in no
way in accord with the provisions of the League of Nations regarding
minorities. I myself thought it was absolutely necessary to reach some
solution in order that this problem might not become a matter of
conflict, whereby again, as in the case of Austria, all Europe would be
stirred up. I should like to emphasize that the Foreign Office and I
always endeavored, from the very beginning, to solve the Sudeten German
problem by way of diplomatic negotiations with the main signatory powers
of Versailles. And I might add that it was my personal conviction, which
I also expressed to Hitler, that with sufficient time on hand and
appropriate action, the Germany that we had in 1938 could solve this
problem in a diplomatic, that is, peaceful way.
The Prosecution have charged me with having stirred up unrest and
discord in Czechoslovakia by illegal means and thereby with having
consciously helped to bring about the outbreak of this crisis. I do not
deny in any way that between the Sudeten German Party and the NSDAP
there had been connections for a long time which aimed at taking care of
the Sudeten-German interests. Nor do I wish to deny, for example, what
was mentioned here, that the Sudeten German Party was supported with
certain funds from the Reich. I might even say, and I believe the
Czechoslovak Government will confirm this, that that was an open secret
which was well known in Prague. However, it is not correct to say that
anything was done on the part of the Foreign Office and by me to direct
these efforts in such a way that a really serious problem might arise. I
do not want to go into further detail, but I should like to mention one
more point. Documents have been mentioned about arrests of Czech
nationals in Germany as reprisals for Czech treatment of Sudeten
Germans. To that I can say merely that these were measures which can be
understood and explained only in view of the situation at that time, but
which were not brought about by us in the Foreign Office in order to
make the situation more critical. On the contrary, in the further course
of events, I attempted through the legation in Prague as well as through
efforts of the gentlemen of my office to restrain the activities of the
Sudeten German Party. I believe that this has to some extent been proved
clearly by the documents which have been made known here. I do not have
these documents before me, so I cannot deal with them in greater detail;
but I believe that perhaps the Defense have the opportunity to make
these matters clear in detail.
DR. HORN: What brought about the critical situation in the summer?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is natural and has always been the case that such a
nationality has its own dynamics. This question of the split of German
groups bordering on Germany was often referred to by us in the Foreign
Office as “the sinister problem,” that is a problem which could not be
solved in a way compatible with the interests of foreign policy. We had
to deal here not with letters and paragraphs but with living people who
had laws and dynamics of their own. Therefore the Sudeten German Party
naturally strove for greater and greater independence; it cannot be
denied that a number of influential leaders, at least at that time,
demanded absolute autonomy, if not the possibility of joining the Reich.
This is perfectly clear, and that was also the goal of the Sudeten
German Party. For the Foreign Office and German foreign policy, as well
as for Hitler, of course, manifold difficulties arose because of this.
As I said before, I tried to get the foreign policy affairs under
control. At the time I received Konrad Henlein—I believe once or twice,
I do not remember exactly—and asked him not to do anything, as far as
Prague was concerned, in the pursuit of his political goals that might
put German foreign policy into a state of emergency. This was perhaps
not always so easy for Henlein either, and I know that the leaders of
the Sudeten German Party could naturally approach and be received by
other offices of the Reich; also Adolf Hitler himself, who was
interested in this problem, occasionally received these leaders. The
crisis, or rather the whole situation, developed more and more
critically, because on the one hand the Sudeten Germans insisted on
their demands in Prague more and more openly and stubbornly and because
the Czechs, the Government in Prague, opposed these demands, which
resulted in excesses, arrests and so on. Thus the situation became even
more critical. At that time I often spoke with the Czech Minister. I
asked him to meet the demands of the Sudeten Germans for autonomy and
all their demands to the furthest extent possible. However, matters
developed in such a way that the attitude displayed by Prague became
more stubborn, and so did the attitude of the Sudeten Germans.
DR. HORN: What brought about Chamberlain’s visit? What were the reasons
for this visit and for the role played by you on that occasion?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to interpolate here that in the summer of
1938 the situation was driving more and more toward a crisis. Ambassador
Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin, with whom I had often discussed this
problem and who was making efforts on his part to bridge matters,
undoubtedly made continuous reports to his government. I do not know
exactly today, but I believe that it was through his initiative that
Lord Runciman went to Prague. Runciman undoubtedly went to Prague in
good faith and tried to get a clear picture of the situation. He also
rendered an opinion which, as far as I recall, was to the effect—I do
not remember the wording—that the right to exercise self-determination,
immediate self-determination, should not be denied the Sudetenland.
Thus, I believe, this opinion was favorable for the Sudeten Germans.
Nevertheless, the crisis was there. I do not remember exactly what the
date was, but I believe it happened that through Ambassador Henderson,
Chamberlain got in touch with the Reich Government. In this way
Chamberlain’s visit to the Führer at the Obersalzberg came about during
the first half of September. Regarding this visit, there is not very
much to be said. The Führer spoke alone with Chamberlain on that
occasion. I do know, however, and we all felt it, that the visit took
place in an altogether good and pleasant atmosphere. As far as I
remember the Führer told me that he had told Chamberlain frankly that
the demand of the Sudeten Germans for self-determination and freedom in
some form or other would have to be met now. Chamberlain, I believe—and
this was the substance of that conference—replied that he would inform
the British Cabinet of these wishes of the German Government and that he
would then make further statements.
DR. HORN: How did the second visit of Chamberlain to Godesberg come
about afterwards?
VON RIBBENTROP: As far as I recall, matters did not progress
satisfactorily. The situation in the Sudetenland became more difficult
and threatened to develop into a very serious crisis, not only within
Czechoslovakia but also between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and thereby
into a European crisis. The result was that Chamberlain once more took
the initiative and thus his visit to Godesberg came about; I believe
this was in the middle of September or during the second half of
September.
DR. HORN: How, then, was the Sudeten German question solved, and what
was your part in this solution?
VON RIBBENTROP: May I first report about Godesberg? In view of the
crisis which had developed, Hitler informed Mr. Chamberlain at Godesberg
that now he had to have a solution of this question under all
circumstances. I might emphasize that I knew nothing regarding details
of a military nature at that time, but I do know that the Führer
concerned himself with the possibility that this problem might have to
be solved by military power. He told Mr. Chamberlain at Godesberg that a
solution of the Sudeten German problem would have to be found as rapidly
as possible. Mr. Chamberlain was of the opinion that it would be
difficult to win Prague over so quickly to a solution, and finally
things broke down altogether at the conference. Adolf Hitler then
personally dictated a memorandum which he or I was to give to Mr.
Chamberlain. Then Sir Horace Wilson, a friend of Mr. Chamberlain,
visited me, a man who deserves much credit in bridging disagreements. I
succeeded in arranging for another meeting in the evening. During this
meeting, which started in a rather cool atmosphere, the Führer received
a report of Czechoslovakia’s mobilization. This was a most deplorable
circumstance since Hitler, just at this moment, resented that very
strongly, and both he and Mr. Chamberlain wanted to break off the
conference. This happened, I believe, exactly at the moment when the
interpreter was about to read the Führer’s memorandum containing a
proposal for the solution of the Sudeten German problem. By a remark and
a short conversation with Hitler and then with Chamberlain, I succeeded
in straightening matters out. Negotiations were resumed, and after a few
hours of negotiations the result was that Mr. Chamberlain told the
Führer he could see now that something had to be done and that he was
ready, on his part, to submit this memorandum to the British Cabinet. I
believe he also said that he would suggest to the British Cabinet, that
is to say, to his ministerial colleagues, that compliance with this
memorandum be recommended to Prague. The memorandum contained as a
solution, in general outlines, the annexation of the Sudetenland by the
Reich. I believe, the Führer expressed his desire in the memorandum
that, in view of the critical situation there, it would be advisable
that this be carried out, if possible, within a definite period of
time—I believe, by 1 October, that was within 10 days or two weeks. Mr.
Chamberlain then departed and a few days passed. The crisis did not
improve but rather became worse. I remember that very well. Then, during
the last part of September, I do not have the date here, the French
Ambassador came and said that he had good news about the Sudeten German
question. Later on the British Ambassador also called. At the same
time—Reich Marshal Göring has already testified to this—Italy wanted
to take part in the solution of the crisis acting on a wish made known
to Göring by Mussolini and offered to mediate. Then came Mussolini’s
proposal that a conference be held, which proposal was accepted by
England, France, and Germany. The French Ambassador, and later on the
British Ambassador, saw the Führer and outlined on a map the approximate
solution which apparently was being proposed by France, England, and
Italy as a solution of the Sudeten problem. I still remember that the
Führer in the first place stated to the French Ambassador that this
proposal was not satisfactory, whereupon the French Ambassador declared
that of course further discussions should be held regarding this
question and the question of where Germans really were living and how
far the Sudetenland extended; all these questions could still be
discussed in detail.
Anyway, as far the French Government was concerned—and I believe, Sir
Nevile Henderson used similar words later at his reception by the
Führer—the Führer could be assured that the British as well as the
French intended to contribute to the solution of this problem in
conformity with the German view.
Then came the Munich conference. I take it I need not go into the
details of this conference; I should like only to describe briefly the
results of it. The Führer explained to the statesmen, with the aid of a
map, the necessity, as he saw it, of annexing a particular part of the
Sudetenland to the German Reich to reach final satisfaction. A
discussion arose; Mussolini, the Italian Chief of Government, agreed in
general with Hitler’s ideas. The English Prime Minister made at first
certain reservations and also mentioned that perhaps the details might
be discussed with the Czechs, with Prague. Daladier, the French
Minister, said, as far as I recall, that he thought that since this
problem had already been broached, the four great powers should make a
decision here and now. In the end this opinion was shared by all the
four statesmen; as a result the Munich Agreement was drawn up providing
that the Sudetenland should be annexed to Germany as outlined on the
maps that were on hand. The Führer was very pleased and happy about this
solution, and, with regard to other versions of this matter which I have
heard during the Trial here, I should like to emphasize here once more
particularly that I also was happy. We all were extremely happy that in
this way in this form the matter had been solved.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 minutes past 2.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow morning from 10 o’clock
until 1 in open session. And now before going on, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal
wish me to say that they think that entirely too much time is being
taken up by the defendant in detailed accounts of negotiations which led
up to an agreement which is a matter of history and which is perfectly
well known to everybody. That is not the case which the defendant has to
meet; what the defendant has to meet is not the making of agreements
which are perfectly well known, but the breach of those agreements by
Germany and any part which he may have played in the breach of those
agreements. It is very important that the time of this Tribunal should
not be taken up by unnecessary details of that sort.
DR. HORN: What foreign political reaction did the Munich Agreement have?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Munich Agreement is well known. Its contents were
the following: Germany and England should never again wage war; the
naval agreement on the ratio of 100 to 35 was to be permanent and, in
important matters, consultations were to be resorted to. Through this
agreement the atmosphere between Germany and England was undoubtedly
cleared up to a certain degree. It was to be expected that the success
of this pact would lead to a final understanding. The disappointment was
great when, a few days after Munich, rearmament at any cost was
announced in England. Then England started on a policy of alliance and
close relationship with France. In November 1938 trade policy measures
were taken against Germany, and in December 1938 the British Colonial
Secretary made a speech in which a “no” was put to any revision of the
colonial question. Contact with the United States of America was also
established. Our reports of that period, as I remember them, showed an
increased—I should like to say—stiffening of the English attitude
toward Germany; and the impression was created in Germany of a policy
which practically aimed at the encirclement of Germany.
DR. HORN: You are accused by the Prosecution of having contributed to
the separation of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia in violation of
international law. What part did you take in the Slovakian declaration
of independence?
VON RIBBENTROP: There is no doubt that there were relations between
Slovakians and quite a number of members of the National Socialist
German Workers Party. These tendencies naturally were known to the
Foreign Office, and it would be wrong to say that we in any way did not
welcome them. But it is not correct to say that the autonomy was
demanded or forced by us in any way. I remember that Dr. Tiso proclaimed
this autonomy; and the Prague Government, under the influence of Munich,
also recognized the autonomy. What the situation was like at the time
after Munich can be seen from the fact that all minorities of
Czechoslovakia wanted autonomy and independence. Shortly thereafter the
Carpatho-Ukrainians declared their independence and others as well had
similar aspirations. In the Munich Agreement, I should like to add,
there was a clause according to which Germany and Italy were to give
Czechoslovakia a guarantee; but a declaration to this effect was not
made. The reason for that was that Poland, after the Munich Agreement,
sent an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, and on her own initiative, severed
the Polish minorities and occupied these areas. The Hungarians also
wanted autonomy, or rather, incorporation of Hungarian areas; and
certain areas of Czechoslovakia were thereupon given to Hungary by the
Vienna decision. The situation in Czechoslovakia, however, was not yet
clear and also remained difficult during the following period. Then the
Slovak, Tuka, approached us. He wanted to win Germany’s approval for
Slovakia’s independence. The Führer received Tuka at that time and,
after a few interludes, the final result was the declaration of
independence of Slovakia made by Tiso on 13 March. The Prosecution have
submitted a document in which I am alleged to have said, during the
conversation which took place between the Führer and Tiso, that it was
only a matter of hours, not of days, that Slovakia would have to come to
a decision. However, this was to be understood to mean that at that time
preparations for an invasion had been made by Hungary in order to occupy
Carpatho-Ukrainia as well as some other regions of Slovakia. We wanted
to prevent a war between Slovakia and Hungary or between Czechoslovakia
and Hungary; Hitler was greatly concerned about it, and therefore he
gladly complied with Tiso’s desire. Later, after the declaration of
Slovakia’s independence by the Slovak parliament, he complied with
Tiso’s request and took over the protection of Slovakia.
DR. HORN: What brought about Hacha’s visit to Berlin on 14 March 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: Events in Slovakia had their repercussions, of course,
and chiefly very strong excesses against racial Germans in the area of
Prague, Brünn, Iglau, _et cetera_, were reported to Hitler. Many
fugitives came into the old Reich. In the winter of 1938-39 I repeatedly
attempted to discuss these matters with the Prague Government. Hitler
was convinced that a development was being initiated in Prague which
could not be tolerated by the German Reich. It was the attitude of the
press and the influential government circles in Prague. The Führer also
wished that the Czech nation should reduce her military power, but this
was refused by Prague.
During these months I tried repeatedly to maintain good German relations
with Prague. In particular I spoke frequently with Chvalkovsky, the
Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister. In the middle of March, Chvalkovsky,
the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, turned to our German
representative in Prague to find out whether Hitler would give Hacha the
opportunity of a personal interview. I reported this to the Führer and
the Führer agreed to receive Hacha; however, he told me that he wished
to deal with this matter personally. To that effect I had an exchange of
telegrams with Prague: A reserved attitude should be taken in Prague but
Hacha should be told that the Führer would receive him.
At this point I should like to mention briefly that the Foreign Office
and I myself did not know anything at this date of impending military
events. We learned about these things only shortly before they happened.
Before the arrival of Hacha I asked the Führer whether a treaty was to
be prepared. The Führer answered, as I recall distinctly, that he had
the intention of going far beyond that. After the arrival of Hacha in
Berlin I visited him at once and he told me he wanted to place the fate
of the Czech State in the Führer’s hands. I reported this to the Führer
and the Führer instructed me to draft an agreement. The draft was
submitted to him and corrected later on, as I remember. Hacha was then
received by the Führer and the results of this conference, as far as I
know, are already known here and have been submitted in documentary form
so that I do not need to go into it.
I know that Adolf Hitler at that time spoke pointedly to Hacha and told
him that he intended to occupy Czechoslovakia. It concerned old historic
territory which he intended to take under his protection. The Czechs
were to have complete autonomy and their own way of living, and he
believed that the decision which was being made on that day would result
in great benefit for the Czech people. While Hacha talked to the Führer,
or rather afterwards—I was present at the Führer’s conference with
Hacha—I had a long discussion with the Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky. He
adopted our point of view fairly readily and I asked him to influence
Hacha so that the Führer’s decision and the whole action might be
carried out without bloodshed.
I believe it was the deep impression made on him first of all by the
Führer and then by what Adolf Hitler had told him which caused Hacha to
get in touch by telephone with his Government in Prague and also, I
believe, with the Chief of the General Staff. I do not know this
exactly. He obtained the approval of his Government to sign the
agreement which I mentioned at the beginning. This agreement was then
signed by Hitler, Hacha, and both the Foreign Ministers, that is by
myself also. Then Hacha, as I recall, gave instructions that the German
Army should be received cordially and, as far as I know; the march into
and the occupation of Czechoslovakia, that is Bohemia and Moravia, was
completed without serious incident of any kind.
After the occupation I went to Prague with the Führer. After the
occupation, or maybe it was in Prague, the Führer gave me in the morning
a proclamation in which the countries of Bohemia and Moravia were
declared to be a protectorate of the Reich. I read out this proclamation
in Prague which, I may say, was somewhat a surprise to me. No protest of
any sort was made as far as I recall, and I believe I might mention that
the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, which the Führer considered
necessary in the ultimate interest of the Reich, took place for
historical and economic reasons and above all for reasons of security
for the German Reich. I believe that Göring has given the details.
DR. HORN: What did the European situation look like to you at the time
of the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia?
VON RIBBENTROP: I might say that after the proclamation at Prague I had
a lengthy discussion with the Führer. I pointed out to the Führer that
this occupation, of course, would have considerable repercussions in
British-French circles. In this connection I should like to point out
that in England those circles which had turned against Germany had grown
larger and were led by important persons. In this connection I should
like to come back to or mention briefly one incident which took place
while I was still Ambassador in London, when Mr. Winston Churchill paid
me a visit at the Embassy. Mr. Winston Churchill was not in the
government at that time, and I believe he was not leader of the
opposition—it has already been discussed—but he was one of the most
outstanding personalities in England. I was especially interested in
arranging a meeting between him and Adolf Hitler and therefore had asked
him to come to see me at the Embassy. We had a conversation which lasted
several hours and the details of which I recall exactly. I believe it
would go too far to relate all the details of this conversation. But
whereas important men like Lord Vansittart in 1936...
THE PRESIDENT: Documents with reference to Mr. Winston Churchill at this
time when he was not a member of the government have already been ruled
by the Tribunal to be irrelevant and what he said and such a
conversation as this appears to the Tribunal to be absolutely irrelevant
and the Tribunal will not hear it.
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I called the Führer’s attention
to the British reaction. Adolf Hitler explained to me the necessity of
the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, especially on historic and
strategic grounds. I remember that in this connection he quoted
especially the former French Minister of Aviation, Pierre Cot, who had
called Bohemia and Moravia, that is Czechoslovakia, the “airplane
carrier” against Germany. I believe it was Reich Marshal Göring who
already mentioned that at that time we received intelligence reports of
Russian pilots or Russian missions being on Czech airdromes.
Hitler said to me, and I remember these words distinctly, that he could
not tolerate an inimical Czech thorn in the German flesh. One could get
along well enough with the Czechs, but it was necessary for Germany to
have in her hands the protection of these countries. He mentioned Soviet
Russia, allied with Czechoslovakia, as a factor of inestimable power.
When I mentioned England and her reaction he said that England was in no
position to take over the protection of the Germans in Czechoslovakia.
Furthermore, the structure of the Czechoslovakian State had
disintegrated and Slovakia had become independent. Therefore he thought
it was necessary in the interest of future German-English relations that
the countries of Bohemia and Moravia should come into a close contact
with the Reich. A protectorate seemed to him to be the appropriate form.
Adolf Hitler said that while this question was utterly unimportant to
England it was absolutely vital for Germany. This becomes evident if one
glances at the map—this is what he literally said. Besides, he said, he
was unable to see how this solution could disturb the co-operation which
was being striven for between Germany and England. Hitler pointed out
that England—by chance I still remember the figure—had about 600
dominions, protectorates, and colonies and therefore should understand
that such problems have to be solved.
I told Adolf Hitler about the difficulties which might confront Mr.
Chamberlain personally because of this action on the part of Germany,
that England might consider this an increase of Germany’s power and so
on; but the Führer explained the whole question with the reasons I have
mentioned before.
The English reaction at first, in the person of Mr. Chamberlain in the
House of Commons, was rather a positive one. He said it was not a
violation of the Munich Agreement and the British Government was not
bound by any obligation. The Czechoslovakian State had disintegrated and
the guarantee which England had said she would give had not come into
effect, or rather the obligations of the guarantee did not apply under
the circumstances.
I might say that all of us were glad that this attitude was taken in
England. I believe it was 2 or 3 days later when Mr. Chamberlain in
Birmingham...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what have we got to do with the reactions in
England unless they took the form of a note? I do not see what it has to
do with it. What we want to know is the part that the Defendant
Ribbentrop played in the breach of the Munich Agreement.
DR. HORN: The Defendant Von Ribbentrop is accused of having participated
in a conspiracy when he was Foreign Minister, and it is charged that his
foreign policy contributed to the bringing about of aggressive war. If
the Defendant Von Ribbentrop wishes and is allowed to defend himself
against these charges then he must be permitted to describe the
circumstances as he saw them and the motives behind his actions. I am
putting only such questions to the defendant in this case as have
reference to his forming certain opinions.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don’t think you asked him any question about it.
He was just...
DR. HORN: It is not coming through quite audibly.
THE PRESIDENT: What I said was, I did not think you asked him any
questions as to the reactions in England.
THE INTERPRETER: The channels seem to be disturbed in some way. I think
they are getting more than one language.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had better adjourn, I think.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what I was attempting to say to you when the
system broke down was that it seems to the Tribunal that the defendant
ought to be able to keep his evidence within stricter limits and not to
go into so much detail, and that, with regard to the reactions, the
political reactions in England, they are not relevant in themselves, and
that the bearing which they may have upon the case is really remote.
DR. HORN: What caused Hitler to commission you, in October 1938, to
enter into negotiations with Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: There had always been the minority problem in Poland,
which had caused great difficulties. Despite the agreement of 1934, this
situation had not changed. In the year 1938 the “de-Germanization”
measures against German minorities were continued by Poland. Hitler
wished to reach some clear settlement with Poland, as well as with other
countries. Therefore he charged me, I believe during October 1938, to
discuss with the Polish ambassador a final clarification of the problems
existing between Germany and Poland.
DR. HORN: Besides the minority problem, what other problems were
involved?
VON RIBBENTROP: There were two questions: One, the minority problem, was
the most burning one; the second problem was the question of Danzig and
the Corridor, that is to say, of a connection with East Prussia.
DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s and your attitude toward the Danzig and
Corridor questions?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is clear that these two questions were the problems
that had caused the greatest difficulties since Versailles. Hitler had
to solve these problems sooner or later one way or another. I shared
this point of view. Danzig was exposed to continual pressure by the
Poles; they wanted to “Polandize” Danzig more and more and by October of
1938 from 800,000 to a million Germans, I believe, had been expelled
from the Corridor or had returned to Germany.
DR. HORN: How did the Polish Ambassador take your suggestions in October
1938?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Polish Ambassador was reticent at first. He did not
commit himself, nor could he do so. I naturally approached him with the
problem in such a way that he could discuss it at ease with his
government, and did not request, so to speak, a definitive answer from
him. He said that of course he saw certain difficulties with reference
to Danzig, and also a corridor to East Prussia was a question which
required much consideration. He was very reticent, and the discussion
ended with his promise to communicate my statements, made on behalf of
the German Government, to his government, and to give me an answer in
the near future.
DR. HORN: How did your second discussion with Ambassador Lipski on 17
November 1938 end?
VON RIBBENTROP: On 17 November 1938 Lipski came to see me and declared
that the problem involved considerable difficulties and that the Danzig
question in particular was very difficult in view of Poland’s entire
attitude.
DR. HORN: Did you then, on Hitler’s order, submit the request to Lipski
to take up direct negotiations with Foreign Minister Beck?
VON RIBBENTROP: I invited Foreign Minister Beck to Berlin.
DR. HORN: When did Foreign Minister Beck come to Berchtesgaden?
VON RIBBENTROP: Unfortunately, Minister Beck did not come to Berlin; he
went to London.
DR. HORN: You misunderstood my question. When did Foreign Minister Beck
come to Berchtesgaden?
VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler had said that he wanted to speak with Mr. Beck
personally about this problem. Thereupon Mr. Beck came; I do not know
the date exactly...
DR. HORN: It was the beginning of January, on 5 January.
VON RIBBENTROP: ...to Berchtesgaden and had a long talk with Adolf
Hitler.
DR. HORN: What was the result of this talk?
VON RIBBENTROP: I was present at that conversation. The result was that
Adolf Hitler informed Beck, once more in detail, of his desire for good
German-Polish relations. He said that a completely new solution would
have to be found in regard to Danzig, and that a corridor to East
Prussia should not give rise to insurmountable difficulties. During this
conversation Mr. Beck was rather receptive. He told the Führer that
naturally the question of Danzig was difficult because of the mouth of
the Vistula, but he would think the problem over in all its details. He
did not at all refuse to discuss this problem, but rather he pointed out
the difficulties which, due to the Polish attitude, confronted a
solution of the problem.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Beck was, as a matter of principle, willing to
negotiate and therefore invited you, at the end of January, to make a
visit to Warsaw?
VON RIBBENTROP: One cannot put it quite that way. After the meeting at
Berchtesgaden with the Führer, I had another lengthy conversation with
Beck in Munich. During this conversation Beck explained to me again that
the problem was very difficult, but that he would do everything he
could; he would speak to his governmental colleagues, and one would have
to find a solution of some kind. On this occasion we agreed that I would
pay him a return visit in Warsaw. During this visit we also spoke about
the minority question, about Danzig and the Corridor. During this
conversation the matter did not progress either; Mr. Beck rather
repeated the arguments why it was difficult. I told him that it was
simply impossible to leave this problem the way it was between Germany
and Poland. I pointed out the great difficulties encountered by the
German minorities and the undignified situation, as I should like to put
it, that is, the always undignified difficulties confronting Germans who
wanted to travel to East Prussia. Beck promised to help in the minority
question, and also to re-examine the other questions. Then, on the
following day, I spoke briefly with Marshal Smygly-Rydz, but this
conversation did not lead to anything.
DR. HORN: At that time did you ask Beck to pay another visit to Berlin,
and did this visit take place, or did Beck decide on a different course?
VON RIBBENTROP: What happened was that I invited Foreign Minister Beck
to Berlin, because his first visit was not an official one.
Unfortunately, however, Beck did not come to Berlin, but, as I have
already said, he went to London.
DR. HORN: What was the effect of his visit to London on the subsequent
negotiations?
VON RIBBENTROP: The effect of this London visit was a complete surprise
to us. Minister Lipski, I believe it was on 21 March, yes, it was,
suddenly handed us a memorandum.
DR. HORN: Let me interrupt you. On 21 March you had previously another
conversation with Lipski regarding the partition of Czechoslovakia and
the problems arising from the establishment of the Protectorate?
VON RIBBENTROP: That may be true, in that case I meant 26.
DR. HORN: Yes.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is right; on the 21st I had a talk with Lipski,
that is true, and in this talk Lipski expressed certain doubts
concerning Slovakia and the protection afforded by Germany. He expressed
the wish that between Hungary and Poland, two countries which had always
had close relations with each other, a direct, common boundary might be
established and asked whether or not this would be possible. He also
inquired indirectly whether the protection afforded to Slovakia was
directed in any way against Poland. I assured Mr. Beck that neither
Hitler nor anybody else had been motivated by the slightest intention of
acting against Poland when the protection was promised. It was merely a
measure to point out to Hungary that the territorial questions were now
settled. However, I believe I told Mr. Lipski to look forward to such a
link being established via the Carpatho-Ukraine.
DR. HORN: Is it true that consultations were initiated between Poland
and the British Government, the French Government and the Russian
Government about 20 March?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. These consultations, as far as I
recall, go back to a suggestion made by Lord Simon. A common declaration
was to be made with regard to Poland. But Poland did not regard this as
satisfactory, and made it clear in London that this solution was out of
the question for Poland.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Poland worked toward a concrete alliance with
England and France?
VON RIBBENTROP: There can be no doubt, and it is a historical fact that
Poland strove for an alliance with England.
DR. HORN: When did the German Government find out that Poland had been
promised support by England and France?
VON RIBBENTROP: That became known, I cannot tell you the date precisely,
but it was, at any rate, during the latter part of March. Anyway, I
know, and we all were convinced of what, I believe, is an established
fact today, that these relations taken up during the latter part of
March between Warsaw and London determined the answer which was, to our
surprise, communicated to us by memorandum on 26 March, I believe.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that this memorandum stated that a further
pursuit of German aims regarding a change in the Danzig and Corridor
questions would mean war as far as Poland was concerned?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. That was a great surprise to us. I
know that I read the memorandum, and for a moment I simply could not
believe that such an answer had been given, when one considers that for
months we had tried to find a solution, which—and I wish to emphasize
this—only Adolf Hitler, at that time, with his great authority over the
German people could bring about and be responsible for.
I do not want to get lost in details, but I do want to say that the
Danzig and Corridor problem, since 1919, had been considered by
statesmen of great authority the problem with which somehow the revision
of Versailles would have to start. I should like to remind you of the
statement by Marshal Foch and other statements by Winston Churchill, who
also elaborated on this subject, as well as by Clemenceau, _et cetera_.
All these statesmen were undoubtedly of the opinion that a territorial
revision of this Corridor would really have to be undertaken. But
Hitler, for his part, wanted to make it an overall settlement and reach
an understanding with Poland on the basis of his putting up with the
Corridor and taking only Danzig back into the Reich, whereby Poland was
to be afforded a very generous solution in the economic field. That, in
other words, was the basis of the proposals which I had been working on
for 4 to 5 months on Hitler’s order. All the greater was our surprise
when, suddenly, the other side declared that a further pursuit of these
plans and solutions, which we regarded as very generous, would mean war.
I informed Hitler of this, and I remember very well that Hitler received
it very calmly.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that on the following day you stated to the
Polish Ambassador that the memorandum of 26 March 1939 could not serve
as the basis for a solution?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. I just said that Hitler received this
harsh and serious message of the Polish Ambassador very calmly. He said,
however, that I should tell the Polish Ambassador that of course no
solution could be found on this basis. There should be no talk of war.
DR. HORN: Is it true that thereupon, on 6 April 1939, the Polish Foreign
Minister Beck traveled to London and returned with a temporary agreement
of mutual assistance between Poland, England, and France?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
DR. HORN: What was the German reaction to this pact of mutual
assistance?
VON RIBBENTROP: The German reaction—here I might refer to Hitler’s
Reichstag speech in which he stated his attitude toward this whole
problem. We felt this pact of mutual assistance between Poland and
England to be not in agreement with the German-Polish pact of 1934, for
in the 1934 pact any application of force was excluded between Germany
and Poland. By the new pact concluded between Poland and England without
previous consultation with Germany, Poland had bound herself for
example, to attack Germany in case of any conflict, between Germany and
England. I know that Adolf Hitler felt that it was also not in
conformity with the agreements between him and Mr. Chamberlain in
Munich, namely, the elimination of any resort to force between Germany
and England, regardless of what might happen.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Germany then sent through you a memorandum to
Poland on 28 April by which the German-Polish declaration of 1934 was
rescinded?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. It was, I believe, on the same day as the
Reichstag speech of the Führer. This memorandum stated more or less what
I have just summarized here, that the pact was not in agreement with the
treaty of 1934 and that Germany regarded this treaty as no longer valid.
DR. HORN: Is it true that as a consequence of this memorandum
German-Polish relations became more tense and that new difficulties
arose in the minority question?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. During the preceding period
negotiations had been pending in order to put the minority problem on a
new basis. I still remember that no progress was made. That was already
the case before 28 May, and after 28 May the situation of the German
minority became even more difficult. In particular the Polish
association for the Western Territories was very active at that time and
persecution of Germans and their expulsion from hearth and home was the
order of the day. I know that just during the months following 28 May,
that is to say, in the summer of 1939, the so-called refugee reception
camps for German refugees from Poland showed a tremendous influx.
DR. HORN: How did you and Hitler react to the British-French
declarations of guarantee to Romania and Greece, and later on Turkey?
VON RIBBENTROP: These declarations could be interpreted by the German
policy only as meaning that England was initiating a systematic policy
of alliances in Europe which was hostile to Germany. That was Hitler’s
opinion and also mine.
DR. HORN: Is it true that these declarations of guarantee and
Roosevelt’s message of 14 April 1939 were then, on 22 May 1939, followed
by the German-Italian pact of alliance? And what were the reasons for
this pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is known that between Germany and Italy friendly
relations had naturally existed for a long time; and when the European
situation became more acute these relations were, at Mussolini’s
suggestion, intensified and a pact of alliance, which was discussed
first by Count Ciano and me in Milan, was drawn up and provisionally
signed on the order of the Government heads. This was an answer to the
efforts of English-French policy.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that the crisis with Poland became acute through
the fact that on 6 August in Danzig a dispute with the customs
inspectors took place by which Germany was forced to take a stand?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. A quarrel had arisen between the Polish
representative and the Senate of the City of Danzig. The Polish
representative had sent a note to the President of the Senate informing
him that certain customs officers of the Senate wanted to disobey Polish
regulations. This information proved later to be false, was answered by
the Senate, and led to a sharp exchange of notes between the Senate and
the Polish representative. On Hitler’s order I told the State Secretary
of the Foreign Office to lodge appropriate protests with the Polish
Government.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Weizsäcker, the then State Secretary, on 15
August called the English and French Ambassadors in order to inform both
these ambassadors in detail of the seriousness of the situation?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. He did that on my order.
DR. HORN: On 18 August was Ambassador Henderson again asked to see your
State Secretary because the situation was becoming more acute in Poland
and Danzig?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. A conversation took place a few days later between
the English Ambassador and the State Secretary. The State Secretary
explained to him in very clear words the great seriousness of the
situation and told him that things were taking a very serious turn.
DR. HORN: Is it true that in this phase of the crisis you made up your
mind, on the basis of a suggestion made to you, to initiate negotiations
with Russia, and what were your reasons for doing that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Negotiations with Russia had already started sometime
previously. Marshal Stalin, in March 1939, delivered a speech in which
he made certain hints of his desire to have better relations with
Germany. I had submitted this speech to Adolf Hitler and asked him
whether we should not try to find out whether this suggestion had
something real behind it. Hitler was at first reluctant, but later on he
became more receptive to this idea. Negotiations for a commercial treaty
were under way, and during these negotiations, with the Führer’s
permission, I took soundings in Moscow as to the possibility of a
definite bridge between National Socialism and Bolshevism and whether
the interests of the two countries could not at least be made to
harmonize.
DR. HORN: How did the relations taken up by the Soviet Russian
commercial agency in Berlin with your Minister Schnurre develop?
VON RIBBENTROP: The negotiations of Minister Schnurre gave me within a
relatively short period of time a picture from which I could gather that
Stalin had meant this speech in earnest. Then an exchange of telegrams
took place with Moscow which, in the middle of August, led to Hitler’s
sending a telegram to Stalin, whereupon Stalin in answer to this
telegram invited a plenipotentiary to Moscow. The aim in view, which had
been prepared diplomatically, was the conclusion of a non-aggression
pact between the two countries.
DR. HORN: Is it true that you were sent to Moscow as plenipotentiary?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is known.
DR. HORN: When did you fly to Moscow, and what negotiations did you
carry on there?
VON RIBBENTROP: On the evening of 22 August I arrived in Moscow. The
reception given me by Stalin and Molotov was very friendly. We had at
first a 2-hour conversation. During this conversation the entire complex
of Russo-German relations was discussed. The result was, first, the
mutual will of both countries to put their relations on a completely new
basis. This was to be expressed in a pact of non-aggression. Secondly,
the spheres of interests of the two countries were to be defined; this
was done by a secret supplementary protocol.
DR. HORN: Which cases were dealt with in this secret supplementary
protocol? What were its contents and what were the political bases?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say, first of all, that this secret
protocol has been spoken about several times here in this Court. I
talked very frankly during the negotiations with Stalin and Molotov, and
the Russian gentlemen also used plain language with me. I described
Hitler’s desire that the two countries should reach a definitive
agreement, and, of course, I also spoke of the critical situation in
Europe. I told the Russian gentlemen that Germany would do everything to
settle the situation in Poland and to settle the difficulties peacefully
in order to reach a friendly agreement despite everything.
However, I left no doubt that the situation was serious and that it was
possible that an armed conflict might break out. That was clear anyway.
For both statesmen, Stalin as well as Hitler, it was a question of
territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. It
is, therefore, wrong to look at these things from any other point of
view. And just as Adolf Hitler was of the opinion which I expressed in
Moscow, that in some form or other this problem would have to be solved,
so also the Russian side saw clearly that this was the case.
We then discussed what should be done on the part of the Germans and on
the part of the Russians in the case of an armed conflict. A line of
demarcation was agreed upon, as is known, in order that in the event of
intolerable Polish provocation, or in the event of war, there should be
a boundary, so that the German and Russian interests in the Polish
theater could and would not collide. The well-known line was agreed upon
along the line of the Rivers Vistula, San, and Bug in Polish territory.
And it was agreed that in the case of conflict the territories lying to
the west of these rivers would be the German sphere of interest, and
those to the east would be the Russian sphere of interest.
It is known that later, after the outbreak of the war, these zones were
occupied on the one side by Germany and on the other side by Russian
troops. I may repeat that at that time I had the impression, both from
Hitler and Stalin, that the territories—that these Polish territories
and also the other territories which had been marked off in these
spheres of interest, about which I shall speak shortly—that these were
territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. And
both statesmen undoubtedly held the opinion that if these
territories—if, I should like to say, the last chance for a reasonable
solution of this problem was exhausted—there was certainly a
justification for Adolf Hitler to incorporate these territories into the
German Reich by some other procedure.
Over and above that, it is also known that other spheres of interest
were defined with reference to Finland, the Baltic States, and
Bessarabia. This was a great settlement of the interest of two great
powers providing for a peaceful solution as well as for solution by war.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that these negotiations were drawn up
specifically only in the event that, on the basis of the non-aggression
pact and the political settlement between Russia and Germany, it might
not be possible to settle the Polish question diplomatically?
VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that it was clearly stated that this solution
was designed only to provide for the event that, despite the Pact of
Non-aggression with Russia, the Polish conflict might not be solved by
diplomatic means and that the treaty was to become effective only in
this case?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. I stated at that time that on the
German side everything would be attempted to solve the problem in a
diplomatic and peaceful way.
DR. HORN: Did Russia promise you diplomatic assistance or benevolent
neutrality in connection with this solution?
VON RIBBENTROP: It could be seen from the Pact of Non-aggression and
from all the conferences in Moscow that this was so. It was perfectly
clear, and we were convinced of it, that if, due to the Polish attitude,
a war broke out, Russia would assume a friendly attitude towards us.
DR. HORN: When did you fly back from Moscow, and what sort of situation
did you find in Berlin?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Pact of Non-aggression with the Soviet Union was
concluded on the 23rd. On the 24th I flew back to Germany. I had thought
at first that I would fly to the Führer, to the Berghof in
Berchtesgaden, but during the flight or prior to it—I do not know
exactly—I was asked to come to Berlin.
We flew to Berlin, and there I informed Hitler of the Moscow agreements.
The situation which I found there was undoubtedly very tense. On the
next day I noticed this particularly.
DR. HORN: To what circumstances was this aggravation of the
German-Polish situation to be attributed?
VON RIBBENTROP: In the middle of August all sorts of things had happened
which, as I should like to put it, charged the atmosphere with
electricity: frontier incidents, difficulties between Danzig and Poland.
On the one hand, Germany was accused of sending arms to Danzig, and, on
the other hand, we accused the Poles of taking military measures in
Danzig, and so on.
DR. HORN: Is it true that on your return from Moscow to Berlin, you were
informed of the signing of the British-Polish Pact of Guarantee and what
was your reaction and that of Hitler to this?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was on 25 August. On 25 August I was informed about
the conversation which the Führer had had with Ambassador Henderson
during my absence from Germany, I believe at Berchtesgaden on 22 August.
This was a very serious conversation. Henderson had brought over a
letter from the British Prime Minister which stated clearly that a war
between Germany and Poland would draw England into the picture.
Then, early on the 25th I—the Führer then answered this letter, I
believe on the same day—and the answer was couched so as to mean that
at the moment a solution by diplomatic means could not be expected. I
discussed with the Führer on the 25th this exchange of letters and asked
him to consider this question once more and suggested that one more
attempt might be made with reference to England. This was 25 August, a
very eventful day. In the morning a communication came from the Italian
Government, according to which Italy, in the case of a conflict over
Poland, would not stand at Germany’s side. The Führer decided then to
receive Ambassador Henderson once more in the course of that day. This
meeting took place at about noon of the 25th. I was present. The Führer
went into details and asked Henderson once more to bear in mind his
urgent desire to reach an understanding with England. He described to
him the very difficult situation with Poland and asked him, I believe,
to take a plane and fly back to England in order to discuss this whole
situation once more with the British Government. Ambassador Henderson
agreed to this and I sent him, I believe in the course of the afternoon,
a memo or a _note verbale_ in which the Führer put in writing his ideas
for such an understanding, or rather what he had said during the
meeting, so that the ambassador would be able to inform his government
correctly.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that after the British-Polish Pact of Guarantee
became known, you asked Hitler to stop the military measures which had
been started in Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. I was just about to relate that. During
the course of the afternoon—I heard in the course of the day that
certain military measures were being taken and then in the afternoon I
received, I believe, a Reuters dispatch, at any rate it was a press
dispatch—saying that the Polish-British Pact of Alliance had been
ratified in London.
I believe there was even a note appended that the Polish Ambassador
Raczynski had been sick but had nevertheless suddenly given his
signature in the Foreign Office.
DR. HORN: Was this treaty signed before or after it was known that Italy
refused to sign the Italian mobilization?
VON RIBBENTROP: This treaty was undoubtedly concluded afterwards. Of
course, I do not know the hour and the day, but I believe it must have
been on the afternoon of 25 August, and Italy’s refusal had already
reached us by noon; I believe in other words, it had undoubtedly been
definitively decided in Rome in the morning or on the day before. At any
rate, I can deduce this from another fact. Perhaps I might, however,
answer your other question first, namely, what I did upon receipt of
this news.
DR. HORN: Yes.
VON RIBBENTROP: When I received this press dispatch, of which I was
informed once more when I came to the Chancellery, I went immediately to
Hitler and asked him to stop at once the military measures, whatever
they were—I was not familiar with military matters in detail—and I
told him that it was perfectly clear that this meant war with England
and that England could never disavow her signature. The Führer reflected
only a short while and then he said that was true and immediately called
his military adjutant, and I believe it was Field Marshal Keitel who
came, in order to call together the generals and stop the military
measures which had been started. On this occasion he made a remark that
we had received two pieces of bad news on one day. That was Italy and
this news, and I thought it was possible that the report about Italy’s
attitude had become known in London immediately, whereupon the final
ratification of this pact had taken place. I still remember this remark
of the Führer’s very distinctly.
DR. HORN: Did you and Hitler, on this day, make efforts with Henderson
to settle the conflict, and what were your proposals?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already stated that the Führer, I believe it was
in the early afternoon, saw Henderson on the 25th and told him that he
still had the intention of reaching some final understanding with
England. The question of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved
in some way and he wanted to approach England with a comprehensive offer
which was not contained in the _note verbale_, in order to settle these
things with England on a perfectly regular basis.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Hitler then put an airplane at Henderson’s
disposal so that the latter could submit these proposals to his
government at once and request his government to make their promised
mediation effective in regard to Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. I know that Henderson—I believe it
was on the next day, the 26th—flew to London in a German airplane. I do
not know the details, but I know that the Führer said during the
meeting, “Take an airplane immediately and fly to your government.”
DR. HORN: What results did Ambassador Henderson bring back to Berlin on
28 August?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say in this connection, that in view of
the critical situation between Poland and Germany, which, of course, was
also known to the British Ambassador, Hitler expressed to me a certain
disappointment that the British Ambassador had not returned more quickly
with his answer, for the atmosphere was charged with electricity on that
day. On the 28th, Henderson then had another discussion with the Führer.
I was also present. The answer brought back by Sir Nevile Henderson from
London appeared at first not very satisfactory to the Führer. It
contained various points which seemed unclear to the Führer. But the
main point was that England announced her readiness for a wholesale
solution of the existing problems between Germany and England, on the
condition that the German-Polish question could be brought to a peaceful
solution.
In the discussion Adolf Hitler told Sir Nevile Henderson that he would
examine the note and would then ask him to come back. Then he...
DR. HORN: Is it true that in this memorandum England suggested that
Germany take up direct negotiations with Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. One of the points in the note—I intended
to go into that—was that the English suggested that German-Polish
direct negotiations would be the most appropriate way to reach a
solution and, secondly, that such negotiations should take place as soon
as possible, because England had to admit that the situation was very
tense because of the frontier incidents and in every respect.
Furthermore the note stated that no matter what solution might be
found—I believe this was in the note—it should be guaranteed by the
great powers.
DR. HORN: Did England offer a mediator to forward to Poland German
proposals for direct negotiations?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.
DR. HORN: What were these German proposals like, which on 29 August
1939, were given by Hitler to Henderson in answer to Henderson’s
memorandum?
VON RIBBENTROP: The situation was this: On the 29th Adolf Hitler again
received the British Ambassador and on this occasion told him that he
was ready to take up the English suggestion of the 28th, that is to say,
that despite the great tension and despite the Polish attitude, which he
resented so profoundly, he was prepared to offer his hand once more for
a peaceful solution of the German-Polish problems, as suggested in the
British note of the 28th.
DR. HORN: What were the reasons for including in this German proposal a
request that a Polish plenipotentiary be sent by 30 August?
VON RIBBENTROP: In Adolf Hitler’s communication to Ambassador Henderson
for the British Government it was stated that the German Government, in
view of the tense situation, would immediately set about working out
proposals for a solution of the Danzig and Corridor problems. The German
Government hoped to be in a position to have these proposals available
by the time a Polish negotiator arrived who was expected during the
course of 30 August.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Hitler included this condition or this
request to send a plenipotentiary within 24 hours because he was afraid
that a conflict might arise due to the fact that the mobilized armies of
the two countries faced each other?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely true. I might say that during the
meeting on the 29th Ambassador Henderson, as I recall, asked the Führer
whether this was an ultimatum. The Führer answered “No,” that that was
not an ultimatum, but rather, I believe he said, a practical proposal or
a proposal arising from the situation, or something of that sort. I
should like to repeat that it was a fact that the situation near the
frontiers of Danzig and the Corridor during the last days of August
looked, one might say, as if the guns would go off on their own unless
something was done rather soon. That was the reason for the relatively
short respite which was made a condition by the Führer. He feared that
if more time were allowed, matters would drag out and danger of war not
decrease but rather increase.
DR. HORN: Is it true that, despite this information given to Ambassador
Henderson, the answer of the British Government called this proposal
unreasonable?
VON RIBBENTROP: I know of the British reaction from several documents
that I saw later. The first reaction came during my discussion with
Henderson on 30 August.
DR. HORN: Is it true that on 30 August you received a confidential
communication regarding Poland’s total mobilization?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. On the 30th Hitler awaited word from the
Polish negotiator. This, however, did not come, but, I believe, on the
evening of the 30th the news arrived that Poland had ordered, although
not announced, general mobilization. I believe it was not announced
until the next morning. This, of course, further aggravated the
situation enormously.
DR. HORN: Is it true that the British Government then practically
withdrew their offer to mediate by suggesting that Germany take
immediate and direct steps to prepare negotiations between Germany and
Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: You mean on the 30th?
DR. HORN: Yes, on the 30th.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is so. As I said before, we had been waiting on the
30th, but the Polish negotiator had not arrived. In the meantime, Hitler
had prepared the proposals which he wanted to hand to a Polish
negotiator who, as he had expressly promised Sir Nevile Henderson, would
be able to negotiate with Germany on the basis of complete equality. Not
until shortly before midnight, or at least in the late evening, a call
came through saying, that the British Ambassador wanted to transmit a
communication from his government. This meeting, I believe, was then
postponed once more; at any rate at midnight on 30 August the well-known
conversation between Henderson and me took place.
DR. HORN: You heard yesterday Minister Schmidt’s description of this
meeting. Do you have anything to add to his description of it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to add the following about this
conversation. It is perfectly clear that at that moment all of us were
nervous, that is true. The British Ambassador was nervous and so was I.
I should like to and must mention here the fact that the British
Ambassador had had on the day before a minor scene with the Führer which
might have ended seriously. I succeeded in changing the subject.
Therefore, there was also a certain tension between the British
Ambassador and myself. However, I intentionally received the British
Ambassador composedly and calmly, and accepted his communication. I
hoped that this communication would, in the last moment, contain his
announcement of a Polish negotiator.
However, this did not happen. Rather, Sir Nevile Henderson told me:
1. That his government could not recommend this mode of procedure,
despite the tense situation, which had been aggravated still more by the
Polish total mobilization; rather the British Government recommended
that the German Government use diplomatic channels.
2. That, if the German Government would submit the same proposals to the
British Government, the British Government would be ready to exert their
influence in Warsaw in order to find a solution, as far as these
suggestions appeared to be reasonable. In view of the whole situation
this was a very difficult answer because, as I said, the situation was
extremely tense and the Führer had been waiting since the day before for
a Polish emissary. I, in turn, feared also that the guns would go off by
themselves unless a solution or something else came quickly, as I have
said. I then read to Henderson the proposals given to me by the Führer.
I should like to state here once more under oath that the Führer had
expressly forbidden me to let these proposals out of my hands. He told
me that I might communicate to the British Ambassador only the substance
of them, if I thought it advisable. I did a little more than that; I
read all the proposals, from the beginning to the end, to the British
Ambassador. I did this because I still hoped that the British Government
wanted to exert their influence in Warsaw and assist in a solution. But
here too I must state frankly that from my talk with the British
Ambassador on 30 August, from his whole attitude, which Minister Schmidt
also described to a certain extent yesterday, as well as from the
substance of the communication of the British Government, I got the
impression that England at this moment was not quite prepared to live up
to the situation and, let us say, to do her utmost to bring about a
peaceful solution.
DR. HORN: What did the German Government do after the contents of the
note were made known to Ambassador Henderson?
VON RIBBENTROP: After my conversation with the British Ambassador I
reported to the Führer. I told him it had been a serious conversation. I
told him also that in pursuance of his instructions I had not handed the
memorandum to Sir Nevile Henderson despite the latter’s request. But I
had the impression that the situation was serious and I was convinced
that the British guarantee to Poland was in force. That had been my very
definite impression from this conversation. Then, in the course of the
31st the Führer waited the whole day to see whether or not some sort of
Polish negotiator would come or whether a new communication would come
from the British Government. We have heard here about Reich Marshal
Göring’s intervention, how he informed Mr. Dahlerus of the contents of
this note in every detail. There can thus be no doubt that during the
course of that night, at the latest in the morning of the 31st the
precise proposals of the Reich Government were in the hands of both the
London Government and the Warsaw Government. On the 31st the Führer
waited the whole day and I am convinced, and I want to state it very
clearly here, that he hoped that something would be done by England.
Then in the course of the 31st the Polish Ambassador came to see me. But
it is known that he had no authority to do anything, to enter into
negotiations or even to receive proposals of any sort. I do not know
whether the Führer would have authorized me on the 31st to hand
proposals of this sort to him, but I think it is possible. But the
Polish Ambassador was not authorized to receive them, as he expressly
told me. I might point out briefly that regarding the attitude in Warsaw
the witness Dahlerus has already given additional testimony.
DR. HORN: It is correct that England did not forward the German
proposals to Warsaw until the evening of 31 August?
VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that the German proposals which had been
submitted by you on the preceding evening of the 30th to Ambassador Sir
Nevile Henderson were not forwarded to Warsaw until the evening of 31
August?
VON RIBBENTROP: You mean from London?
DR. HORN: From London.
VON RIBBENTROP: That I cannot tell you precisely, but that can
undoubtedly be verified from official documents.
DR. HORN: What considerations then led to the final decision to take
military action against Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you the details of this. I know only that
the Führer—that the proposals which I had read to the British
Ambassador in the night of the 30th were published by broadcast, as I
believe, on the evening of the 31st. The reaction of the Warsaw radio, I
remember this reaction exactly, was unfortunately such as to sound like
a veritable battlecry in answer to the German proposals which, as I
heard, had been characterized by Henderson as reasonable. I believe they
were characterized by the Polish radio as an insolence, and the Germans
were spoken of as Huns or the like. I still remember that. At any rate,
shortly after the announcement of these proposals a very sharp negative
answer came from Warsaw. I assume that it was the answer which persuaded
the Führer in the night of the 31st to issue the order to march. I, for
my part, can say only that I went to the Reich Chancellery, and the
Führer told me that he had given the order and that nothing else could
be done now, or something to this effect, and that things were now in
motion. Thereupon I said to the Führer merely, “I wish you good luck.”
I might also mention that the outbreak of these hostilities was the end
of years of efforts on the part of Adolf Hitler to bring about
friendship with England.
DR. HORN: Did Mussolini make another proposal of mediation and how did
this proposal turn out?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. On 3 September, in the morning, such
a proposal of mediation arrived in Berlin stating that Mussolini was
still in a position to bring the Polish question in some way before the
forum of a conference, and that he would do so if the German Government
agreed rapidly. It was said at the same time that the French Government
had already approved this proposal. Germany also immediately agreed. But
a few days later—I cannot now state the time precisely—it was reported
that, in a speech I believe, by the British Foreign Minister Halifax in
the House of Commons or in some other British declaration, this proposal
had been turned down by London.
DR. HORN: Do you know whether France also turned down this proposal?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that we received along with the
proposal, I believe through the Italian Government, the information that
the French Government either was in favor of the suggestion or had
already accepted it.
DR. HORN: Did you see any possibilities for peace after the conclusion
of the Polish campaign and were they pursued?
VON RIBBENTROP: After the conclusion of the Polish campaign I had some
lengthy conversations with Adolf Hitler. The situation was then such
that beyond a doubt there was a certain lack of enthusiasm for this
whole war on the part of the French. During these weeks military people
occasionally used the expression “potato war in the West.” Hitler, as
far as I can judge from everything that he told me, was not interested
in bringing the war in the West to a decision, and I believe this was
true of all of us members of the Government. I should like to remind you
of the speech made by Reich Marshal Göring to this effect at that time.
Hitler then made a speech in Danzig, and I believe later somewhere else,
perhaps in the Reichstag, I believe in the Reichstag, in which he twice
told England and France in unmistakable language that he was still ready
to open negotiations at any time. We tried to find out also very
cautiously by listening to diplomatic circles what the mood was in the
enemy capitals. But the public replies to Adolf Hitler’s speeches
clearly demonstrated that there could be no thought of peace.
DR. HORN: What did you do from then on to prevent the war from becoming
more extended?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was, I should like to say, my most ardent endeavor
after the end of the Polish campaign to attempt to localize the war,
that is, to prevent the war from spreading in Europe. However, I soon
was to find out that once a war has broken out, politics are not always
the only or rather not at all, the decisive factor in such matters, and
that in such cases the so-called timetables of general staffs start to
function. Everybody wants to outdo everybody else. Our diplomatic
efforts were undoubtedly everywhere, in Scandinavia as well as in the
Balkans and elsewhere, against an extension of the war. Nevertheless,
the war did take that course. I should like to state that according to
my conversations with Adolf Hitler, and I am also convinced that the
German military men were of the same opinion, Hitler wished in no way to
extend the war anywhere.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that you received information which pointed to
the intention of the Western Powers to invade the Ruhr?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. We received numerous reports all the
time. Our intelligence service was such that we had a great many
channels doing intelligence work. All of these channels led to the
Führer. The Foreign Office had relatively little intelligence service,
but relied rather on official diplomatic channels. But we too received
reports and news at that time which undoubtedly allowed inferences to be
drawn. We in the Foreign Office also received reports implying that the
Western Powers had the intention of advancing into the Ruhr area at the
first appropriate opportunity. The situation in the West was such that
the West Wall was a very strong military barrier against France and this
naturally gave rise to the idea that such an attack might come through
neutral territory, such as Belgium and Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: How much longer will you take, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: I believe an hour to an hour and a half, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has listened with great patience to a
very great deal of detail. All I can say is that this exaggerated going
into detail does not do the defendant’s case any good in my opinion. We
will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-FIFTH DAY
Saturday, 30 March 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Dönitz is absent from
Court this morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: On 16 February 1923 a conference of ambassadors transferred to
Lithuania the sovereignty over the territory of Memel, which had already
been annexed in 1923 by a surprise attack by Lithuanian troops. What
caused Hitler to issue these directives for the reintegration of the
Memel territory in 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: The small territory of Memel, being the land mentioned
in our National anthem, was always very dear to the hearts of the entire
German people. The military facts are well known. It was placed under
the control of the Allied Powers after the World War I and was later
seized and occupied by Lithuanian soldiers by a _coup de main_. The
country itself is ancient German territory, and it was natural that it
should wish to become a part of Germany once more. As early as 1938, the
Führer referred to this problem in my presence as one which would have
to be solved sooner or later. In the spring of 1939 negotiations were
begun with the Lithuanian Government. These negotiations resulted in a
meeting between Urbisk, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, and myself, and
an agreement was signed, by means of which the Memel territory was once
more to become part of the Reich. That was in March 1939. I do not need
to describe the sufferings which this region has had to endure in the
past years. At any rate it was quite in accordance with the principle of
the self-determination of peoples, that the will of the people of Memel
was granted in 1939, and all that the agreement did, was to restore a
perfectly natural state of affairs and one which would have had in any
case to be established sooner or later.
DR. HORN: It was followed half a year later by the war with Poland.
What, in your opinion, were the decisive causes which brought about this
war?
VON RIBBENTROP: I gave evidence in this matter yesterday. The decisive
factor was the English guarantee extended to Poland. I do not need to
elaborate this point. This guarantee, combined with the Polish
mentality, made it impossible for us to negotiate with the Poles or to
come to an understanding with them. As for the actual outbreak of war,
the following reasons for it can be given:
1. There is no doubt...
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I generalized this morning and I repeat
my assertion of yesterday that I am most reluctant to interfere here
with this examination. But as the witness has said himself, we did go
all through this yesterday, we have heard this whole story already in
the occasion of yesterday afternoon’s session. My point is that the
witness himself, before going into his answer, stated that he had
already given the causes for the war, yesterday afternoon, and I quite
agree. I think it is entirely unnecessary for him to go over it again
today. I might add parenthetically that we had some great doubt about
the relevancy or the materiality of it even on yesterday’s occasion, but
surely we do not have to hear him again.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: I would like to say that the former German Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who is accused of being co-responsible for a war of
aggression, might perhaps say a few words about the decisive causes,
which according to him led to this war. The defendant, of course, should
not repeat what he said yesterday. I want him to give only some details
on points to which he referred in only a general way yesterday, and it
will not take up very much of the Tribunal’s time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Horn, provided, of course, that he does
not go over the identical ground that he went over yesterday.
DR. HORN: Please tell us very briefly the facts that determined your
attitude.
VON RIBBENTROP: There are just a few brief facts that I would like to
mention, and they concern only the events of these last 2 days:
First of all, there is no doubt that on 30 and 31 August, England was
well aware of the extreme tension of the situation. This fact was
communicated to Hitler in a letter, and Hitler said that the decision
must be made and a way of solving the problem found, with all possible
speed. This was Chamberlain’s letter to Hitler.
Secondly: England knew that the proposals made by Germany were
reasonable, for we know that England was in possession of these
proposals in the night of 30 to 31 August. Ambassador Henderson himself
declared that these proposals were reasonable.
Thirdly: It would have been possible, therefore, on 30 or 31 August, to
give a hint to Warsaw and tell the Poles to begin some sort of
negotiations with us. This could have been done in three different ways:
Polish negotiator could have flown to Berlin, which would have been, as
the Führer said, a matter of an hour to an hour and a half; or, a
meeting could have been arranged between the foreign ministers or the
heads of the states to take place on the frontiers; or else, Ambassador
Lipski could simply have been instructed at least to receive the German
proposals. If these instructions had been given, the crisis would have
been averted and diplomatic negotiations could have been initiated.
England herself, had she wished to do so, could have sent her ambassador
to represent her at the negotiations, which action, after what had gone
before, would undoubtedly have been regarded very favorably by Germany.
This, however, did not take place, and, as I gather from documents which
I saw for the first time here, nothing was done during this period to
alleviate this very tense situation. Chauvinism is natural to the Poles;
and we know from Ambassador Henderson’s own words and from the testimony
of Mr. Dahlerus that Ambassador Lipski used very strong language
illustrative of Polish mentality. Because Poland was very well aware
that she would, in all circumstances, have the assistance of England and
France, she assumed an attitude which made war inevitable to all intents
and purposes. I believe that these facts really are of some importance
for the historical view of that entire period. I would like to add that
I personally regretted this turn of events. All my work of 25 years was
destroyed by this war; and up to the last minute I made every possible
effort to avert this war. I believe that even Ambassador Henderson’s
documents prove that I did make these attempts. I told Adolf Hitler that
it was Chamberlain’s most ardent desire to have good relations with
Germany and to reach an agreement with her; and I even sent a special
messenger to the Embassy to see Henderson, to tell him how earnestly the
Führer desired this, and to do everything in his power to make this
desire of Adolf Hitler’s clear to his government.
DR. HORN: Denmark and Norway were occupied in April 1940. You had
concluded a non-aggression pact with Denmark on 31 May 1939 and on the
basis of these facts you are accused by the Prosecution of perfidious
diplomacy. When and in what way did you receive knowledge of the
imminent occupation of Denmark and Norway?
VON RIBBENTROP: It had always been the Führer’s wish and mine to keep
Scandinavia neutral. In accordance with Adolf Hitler’s policy, I did my
best to prevent the war from spreading.
One day in April 1940 Hitler summoned me to the Chancellery. He told me
that he had received reports stating that the British were on the point
of occupying Norway, or of landing troops there. He had therefore
decided to occupy Norway and Denmark on the morning of the day after
next. That was the first I heard of it. I was amazed; and the Führer
then showed me the documentary evidence which he had received through
his intelligence service. He ordered me to prepare notes at once,
informing the Norwegian and the Danish governments that German troops
were about to march in. I reminded the Führer that we had a
non-aggression pact with Denmark and that Norway was a neutral country,
and told him that reports received from our Legation at Oslo did not
indicate any landing. When the documents were shown to me, however, I
realized how grave the situation was and that these reports had to be
taken seriously.
The next day along with my assistants, I prepared diplomatic notes to be
sent by plane to Oslo and Copenhagen on 8 April. On that day we worked
day and night in order to finish these notes. The Führer had given
orders that these notes were to arrive shortly before the German
occupation. The order was executed.
The occupation of Denmark was completed without trouble, as far as I
know. I believe that hardly a shot was fired. As soon as we had occupied
the country, we negotiated with the Danish Government, under Stauning,
and made agreements so that everything should go on without disturbances
and as far as possible in a friendly atmosphere. Denmark’s integrity was
fully guaranteed, and matters went on, even in the later stages, in a
comparatively quiet and orderly way.
The situation was rather different in Norway. Resistance had developed.
We tried to keep the King of Norway in the country and to induce him to
stay there. We negotiated with him but we had no success. He went north,
I believe, to Narvik; and so there was no longer any possibility of
negotiating with Norway. Norway was occupied, as you know, and a civil
administration established. After this date, Norway was no longer any
concern of the Foreign Office; but one thing I should like to add: that
the Führer told me repeatedly that the measures he had taken were
extremely necessary, and that documents found after the landing of
British troops in Norway, and published at a later date, showed that the
occupation of these countries and the landing in Norway had doubtlessly
been planned for a long time by England.
Frequent allusions have been made in the course of this Trial to the
great sufferings of the Norwegian and Danish peoples. I personally am of
the opinion that whatever one may think of the German occupation, for
all intents and purposes it prevented Scandinavia from becoming a
theater of war, and I believe, that in that way the Norwegian and Danish
peoples were spared untold suffering. If war had broken out between
Germany and the Scandinavian countries, these people would have been
exposed to much greater suffering and privation.
DR. HORN: Did you have anything to do with Quisling before the
occupation of Norway?
VON RIBBENTROP: I must explain that the name of Quisling became known
only at a much later date. Before the occupation of Norway his name
meant nothing to me. It is true that Herr Rosenberg contacted me with a
view to assisting pro-German Scandinavians within the frame of the
former Nordic Movement (Nordische Bewegung) and that was a perfectly
natural thing to do. At that period, we also provided funds for
newspapers, propaganda, and also for political activities in Norway.
At these discussions, I remember this distinctly, no mention was ever
made of any seizing of political power through certain circles in
Norway, or of military operations.
DR. HORN: What influence did the Foreign Office have in Denmark after
the occupation of the country?
VON RIBBENTROP: After the occupation of Denmark the Foreign Office was
represented by a minister at the Danish Court. Later, because of certain
events—I believe it would take too long to enumerate them—the Danish
Government resigned and a Reich Plenipotentiary was appointed. There was
also a Military Commander in Denmark and later on a Higher SS and Police
Leader.
The activities of the minister of the Danish Court were those of an
ordinary and very influential minister, who tried to straighten out all
the difficulties which might naturally arise during an occupation; and
later on the function of the Reich Plenipotentiary, according to my
instructions, was to treat Denmark, not as an enemy of Germany, but as a
friend. This was always a guiding principle in Denmark and even at a
much later period, when more serious difficulties arose as a result of
the intensified warfare, there was really complete quiet and calm in
Denmark throughout the long years of war and we were very well satisfied
with conditions there.
Later, because of the activities of enemy agents against our measures,
_et cetera_, things took a more rigorous turn; the Reich Plenipotentiary
always had instructions from me not to aggravate things but to
straighten them out and to work on the continuation of good relations
between the Danes and the Germans. His task was not always an easy one;
but on the whole, I believe, he did his work satisfactorily.
DR. HORN: Since when and how did you receive reports about the intention
of the Franco-British General Staff to include Belgium and Holland in
their theater of operations?
VON RIBBENTROP: Great importance has obviously been attached to this
question during the proceedings here as well. The situation was as
follows: In 1937, Germany declared that she had made an agreement with
Belgium in which Germany undertook to respect Belgium’s strict
neutrality on condition that Belgium on her part would maintain her
neutrality.
After the Polish campaign the Führer told me on several occasions that,
according to his intelligence reports, the enemy intended to cross Dutch
and Belgian territory to attack the Ruhr. We also sometimes received
reports of this kind; these were of a less concrete nature.
In any event, Adolf Hitler believed that an attack on the Ruhr district,
which was Germany’s most vital area, was a possibility that had to be
reckoned with at all times. I had a good many discussions with the
Führer about that time, regarding the importance of Belgian neutrality
for the world in general; but I knew, too, that we were involved in a
struggle, a hard struggle of larger dimensions where completely
different standards would have to be applied.
In the course of events, in the spring of 1940, our intelligence reports
about an attack of this kind became more and more concrete, and I may
mention that documents belonging to the French General Staff, _et
cetera_, which were found later and published by the German Foreign
Office, proved conclusively that the reports which Germany had received
were absolutely true and that an attack on the Ruhr area had actually
been repeatedly considered by the enemies of Germany, that is, by those
who were her enemies at the time.
In this connection I would like to call attention to a document
concerning a meeting between Prime Minister Chamberlain and M. Daladier
in Paris, at which Mr. Chamberlain suggested an attack for the
destruction of the vitally important industrial areas of the Ruhr
through the so-called “chimneys” of Holland and Belgium. I believe this
document is here and has been granted to the Defense.
The situation before the offensive in the West on which the Führer had
decided was therefore such that an attack by the enemy through these
great areas had to be expected at any time. For this reason he decided
to attack across this area, across these two neutral territories, and I
believe that after the attack—the military authorities will confirm
this—further documents were found and facts established, which as far
as I remember, showed that the closest co-operation had existed between
the Belgian and I believe also the Dutch General Staffs, and the British
and French General Staffs.
Of course it is always a very grave matter in such a war to violate the
neutrality of a country, and you must not think that we dismissed it, so
to speak, with a wave of the hand. It cost me many a sleepless night and
I would like to remind you that the same questions arose on the other
side and other statesmen also discussed them at the time. I remind you
of a statement to the effect that “one got tired of thinking of the
rights of neutrals”; and this assertion was made by the eminent British
statesman, Winston Churchill.
DR. HORN: What caused Germany to violate the integrity of Luxembourg?
VON RIBBENTROP: Luxembourg was in much the same situation as Belgium and
Holland. It is a very small country, and obviously in a war on the scale
of this one the armies cannot suddenly bypass one particular country.
But I would like to point out just one thing in connection with
Luxembourg: The summer before, that is during the summer of 1939, we had
started negotiations with France and Luxembourg with a view to making
perfectly definite pacts of neutrality to be established by treaties. At
first, the negotiations seemed to be going very well; but they were
suddenly broken off by both France and Luxembourg. At the time we did
not understand the reason for this, but I know that when I reported it
to the Führer, it made him a little distrustful as to the motives that
may have been of importance on the other side. We never knew the exact
reason.
DR. HORN: How far was the German Foreign Office able to exert its
influence in France after the partial occupation of the country?
VON RIBBENTROP: After the occupation or partial occupation of France,
although we were not yet at peace with France and there was therefore
really no reason to resume diplomatic relations, as only an armistice
had been declared, the Führer, at my request, appointed an ambassador to
the Vichy Government. I was especially anxious for this to be done
because it had always been my aim to come to a closer co-operation with
France. I would like to emphasize the fact that I resumed my efforts in
this direction immediately after the victory and the armistice. I
have—the Führer readily agreed to this and also initiated the so-called
Montoire Policy at my request, by meeting Marshal Pétain at Montoire
after a meeting with General Franco. I was present at this meeting.
I believe I may say in the interests of historical truth that Adolf
Hitler’s treatment of the head of the defeated French nation is probably
unexampled and must be described as chivalrous. There cannot be many
parallel cases in history. Adolf Hitler immediately made proposals to
Marshal Pétain for a closer collaboration between Germany and France,
but Marshal Pétain, even at the very first meeting, adopted an attitude
of marked reserve towards the victor, so that, to my great personal
regret this first meeting came to an end somewhat more quickly than I
had really hoped it would. In spite of this, we continued to try to
carry out a systematic policy of conciliation and even of close
collaboration with France. Our lack of success was probably due to the
natural attitude of France and the will of influential circles. Germany
did not fail to make every effort.
DR. HORN: What influence did you yourself, and the German Foreign Office
have on conditions in Belgium after the occupation?
VON RIBBENTROP: We had no influence whatsoever on conditions in Belgium
or in Holland. The Führer set up military and civilian administrations,
and the Foreign Office had no further connection with them, beyond being
represented by a liaison officer who, in practice, had nothing or almost
nothing to do. I would like to add that it was rather different in
France, inasmuch as we were naturally in a position to exercise a
certain amount of influence on the Vichy Government through our
ambassador. I did so, for instance, in matters of finance.
We have heard here in court a good deal about the activities of Herr
Hemmen. I should just like to say that, no matter how his powers may
have been defined, I appointed him for the express purpose of preventing
inflation and the collapse of the French currency. That was the special
mission entrusted to Hemmen. Even if France was no longer willing to
co-operate politically with Germany, she was undoubtedly of economic
importance to us; and I wanted to keep her on a sound basis and to
preserve her system of finance. That was the real reason for Herr
Hemmen’s mission.
DR. HORN: What plans did Hitler have with regard to his foreign policy
after the conclusion of the campaign in the West?
VON RIBBENTROP: After the conclusion of the campaign in the West, I
discussed future developments with the Führer at his headquarters. I
asked him what his further intentions were with regard to England. The
Führer and I proposed at the time, whether we had not better make
another attempt with England. The Führer seemed to have had the same
idea and was delighted with my proposal for making a fresh peace offer
or attempting to make peace with England. I asked the Führer whether I
should draft such a treaty for this case. The Führer spontaneously
replied: “No, that will not be necessary, I will do that myself, that
is, there is no need to do it at all.”
He said, word for word: “If England is ready for peace, there are only
four points to be settled. Above all, after Dunkirk, I do not want
England in any circumstances to suffer a loss of prestige, so under no
circumstances do I want a peace which would involve that.”
With regard to the contents of such a treaty, he enumerated four points:
1. Germany is ready to recognize in all respects the existence of the
British Empire.
2. England must, therefore, acknowledge Germany to be the greatest
continental power, if only because of the size of her population.
3. He said, “I want England to return the German colonies. I would be
satisfied with one or two of them, because of the raw materials.”
4. He said that he wanted a permanent alliance with England for life and
death.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that at the end of 1939, you heard from Hitler
that conferences had taken place between the Greek and French General
Staffs and that French officers had been sent to Greece?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. It came within the scope of the
Führer’s policy for preventing the war from spreading, as entrusted to
me, that I should keep a sharp watch on these things and, of course,
especially on the Balkans; Adolf Hitler wished in all circumstances to
keep the Balkans out of the war.
As for Greece the situation was as follows: Greece had accepted a
British guarantee. Also, there were close links between Yugoslavia and
England and, especially, France. Through the Führer’s intelligence
service and through military channels we repeatedly heard about staff
conferences between Athens, Belgrade, London and Paris, which were
supposed to be taking place. About that time I summoned the Greek
Minister on several occasions and drew his attention to these things. I
asked him to be very careful, and told him that Germany had no intention
of taking any steps against the Greek people, who had always been very
much liked in Germany.
However, further intelligence reports came in to the effect that Britain
had been given permission to establish naval bases in Greece. I
believe—and all this led up to the intervention of Italy, which we did
not desire at all—I believe Reich Marshal Göring has already discussed
this topic. It was impossible to prevent this intervention, for when we
arrived in Florence—I was with Adolf Hitler at the time—for his
conference with Mussolini, it was too late and Mussolini said: “We are
on the march.”
The Führer was very much upset and depressed when he heard this news. We
then had to do everything in our power so that the war between Greece
and Italy might at least be prevented from spreading. Yugoslav policy
was naturally the decisive factor here. I tried in every possible way to
establish closer links with Yugoslavia and to win her over to the
Tripartite Pact which had already been concluded then. It was difficult
at first, but with the help of the Regent Prince Paul and the
Zvetkovitch Government, we finally succeeded in inducing Yugoslavia to
join the Tripartite Pact. We knew very well, however, that there was
strong opposition in Belgrade to the adhesion of Yugoslavia to the
Tripartite Pact and to any kind of closer connection with Germany. In
Vienna at the time the Führer said that the signing of the Tripartite
Pact seemed like a funeral to him.
All the same, we were very much surprised when—I think it was 2 or 3
days after the conclusion of this pact—the government was overthrown by
General Simovic’s coup and a new government was set up which certainly
could not be described as friendly to Germany.
Reports came from Belgrade concerning close collaboration with the
British General Staff. I believe American observers in this field are
informed on the point, and during the last few months I have heard from
English sources that British elements had played a part in this coup.
That was quite natural, for we were at war.
All these events caused the Führer to intervene in the Balkans, first of
all, to help Italy, whom the courageous resistance of the Greeks had
forced into a very difficult position in Albania; and secondly, to
prevent a possible attack from the north on the part of Yugoslavia,
which might have made the Italian situation still more serious or even
brought about a crushing defeat for our Italian ally.
Those were the military and strategic factors which induced the Führer
to intervene and to conduct the campaign against Greece and Yugoslavia.
DR. HORN: If I understood you correctly, Greece put bases on her
territory at the disposal of the British Navy before the Italian attack
in October 1940, in spite of the fact that she had declared her
neutrality. Is that correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was the substance of the military reports which I
received.
DR. HORN: In September 1939, General Gamelin, then French
Commander-in-Chief, approved the project for an Allied landing at
Salonika. When did Germany receive knowledge of this intention?
VON RIBBENTROP: We first learned the exact details from the files of the
French General Staff on the outbreak of war. But I know that from the
very beginning all the reports which the Führer received from the
various intelligence branches of the Reich caused him to fear the
possibility that a new front might be built up at any moment in Salonika
as had happened in the first World War, and that would mean a
considerable dispersal of the German forces.
DR. HORN: In September 1939 you made a second trip to Moscow. What was
the reason for this visit and what was discussed there?
VON RIBBENTROP: My second visit to Moscow was made necessary by the
ending of the Polish campaign. I flew to Moscow toward the end of
September, and this time I received an especially cordial reception. The
situation then was such that we had to create clear conditions in the
Polish territory. Soviet troops had occupied the eastern regions of
Poland, and we had occupied the western parts up to the line of
demarcation previously agreed upon. Now we had to fix a definite line of
demarcation. We were also anxious to strengthen our ties with the Soviet
Union and to establish cordial relations with them.
An agreement was reached in Moscow, fixing a definite line in Poland,
and an economic treaty to put economic relations on an entirely new
basis was envisaged. A comprehensive treaty regulating the exchange of
raw materials was envisaged and later on concluded. At the same time
this pact was politically amplified into a treaty of friendship, as is
well known. One question remained, about the territory of Lithuania. For
the sake of establishing particularly trustful relations between Moscow
and Berlin, the Führer renounced influence over Lithuania and gave
Russia predominance in Lithuania by this second treaty, so that there
was now a clear understanding between Germany and Soviet Russia with
respect to territorial claims as well.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that on 15 June 1940, after the delivery of an
ultimatum, the Russians occupied the whole of Lithuania, including the
part which was still German, without notifying the Reich government?
VON RIBBENTROP: There was no special agreement concerning this, but it
is well known that these areas were actually occupied.
DR. HORN: What further Russian measures caused Hitler anxiety as to
Russia’s attitude and intentions?
VON RIBBENTROP: Various things made the Führer a little sceptical about
the Russian attitude. One was the occupation of the Baltic States, which
I have just mentioned. Another was the occupation of Bessarabia and
North Bukovina after the French campaign and of which we were simply
informed without any previous consultation. The King of Romania asked us
for advice at that time. The Führer, out of loyalty to the Soviet pact,
advised the King of Romania to accept the Russian demands and to
evacuate Bessarabia. In addition, the war with Finland in 1940 caused a
certain uneasiness in Germany, among the German people who had strong
sympathies for the Finns. The Führer felt himself bound to take this
into account to some extent. There were two other points to consider.
One was that the Führer received a report on certain communist
propaganda in German factories which alleged that the Russian trade
delegation was the center of this propaganda. Above all, we heard of
military preparations being made by Russia. I know after the French
campaign he spoke to me about this matter on several occasions and said
that approximately 20 German divisions had been concentrated near the
East Prussian border; and that very large forces—I happen to remember
the number, I think about 30 army corps—were said to be concentrated in
Bessarabia. The Führer was perturbed by these reports and asked me to
watch the situation closely. He even said that in all probability the
1939 Pact had been concluded for the sole purpose of being able to
dictate economic and political conditions to us. In any case, he now
proposed to take countermeasures. I pointed out the danger of preventive
wars to the Führer, but the Führer said that German-Italian interests
must come first in all circumstances, if necessary. I said I hoped that
matters would not go so far and that, at all events, we should make
every effort through diplomatic channels to avoid this.
DR. HORN: In November, from 12 to 14 November 1940 to be exact, the
Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov visited Berlin. On whose initiative
did this visit take place and what was the subject under discussion?
VON RIBBENTROP: The conferences with Molotov at Berlin concerned the
following subjects: I might interpolate that when we were trying to
effect a settlement with Russia through diplomatic channels, I wrote a
letter to Marshal Stalin, with the Führer’s permission, in the late
autumn of 1940 and invited Mr. Molotov to come to Berlin. This
invitation was accepted, and Russo-German relations were discussed in
their entirety during a conversation between the Führer and Mr. Molotov.
I was present at this discussion. Mr. Molotov first discussed with the
Führer Russo-German relations in general and then went on to mention
Finland and the Balkans. He said that Russia had vital interests in
Finland. He said that when the delimitation of zones of influence had
been settled, it had been agreed that Finland should be included in the
Russian sphere of influence. The Führer replied that Germany also had
extensive interests in Finland, especially with regard to nickel, and
furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the entire German people
sympathized with the Finns. He would therefore ask Mr. Molotov to
compromise on this question. This topic was brought up on several
occasions.
With regard to the Balkans, Mr. Molotov said that he wanted a
non-aggression pact with Bulgaria, and generally closer ties with
Bulgaria. He also thought of establishing bases there. The Führer
replied, or rather asked, whether Bulgaria had approached Molotov in the
matter, but that apparently was not the case. The Führer then said that
he could not express any opinion on this question until he had discussed
it with Mussolini, who was his ally and who was naturally interested in
the Balkans too.
Various other points were also discussed, but no final settlement was
reached at this discussion. The discussion rather proceeded on lines
which seemed to me not those best calculated to lead to a bridging of
all contrasts. As soon as the meeting was over, I requested the Führer
to authorize me to take up again the discussions with Mr. Molotov and
asked him if he would consent to my discussing with Mr. Molotov the
possibility of Russia’s joining the Tripartite Pact. That was one of our
aims at the time. The Führer agreed to this and I had another long
discussion with the Russian Foreign Commissar. In this conversation the
same topics were discussed. Mr. Molotov alluded to Russia’s vital
interest in Finland; he also referred to Russia’s deep interest in
Bulgaria, the kinship between the Russian and the Bulgarian people, and
her interest in other Balkan countries. It was finally agreed that on
his return to Moscow he should speak to Stalin and try to arrive at some
solution of the question. I proposed that they join the Tripartite Pact
and further proposed that I should discuss with the Führer the various
points which had been raised. Perhaps we could still find a way out. The
general result of this conversation was that Molotov went back to Moscow
with the intention of clearing up through the embassies the differences
still existing between us.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, surely, as these negotiations did not eventuate
in any agreement, they are very remote from anything we are considering.
You are not suggesting that any agreements were come to, are you?
DR. HORN: No. I wanted to prove only that Germany made efforts to
prevent the conflict with Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: There was no question of a conflict with Russia in any of
these negotiations.
DR. HORN: No. It is evident from all the efforts made by Germany, and
from Ribbentrop’s testimony, that they wanted to eliminate as far as
possible any differences which might lead to a conflict between Germany
and Russia. As regards a deliberate—the Prosecution assert that the
pact with Russia was made with the intention of violating it and
attacking Russia, that it was intended to attack Russia all along. I
want to prove with this evidence that this was not the case.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me to be very remote, indeed. It only goes to
show that Ribbentrop entered into certain negotiations with Russia which
had no result. That is all. You may go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: In one of your previous answers you spoke of troop
concentrations on the East Prussian border mentioning 20 German
divisions. I assume that that was just a _lapsus linguae_ on your part.
VON RIBBENTROP: I meant to say Russian divisions. The Führer, I know,
mentioned this many times. He said, I believe, that we had only one
division in the whole of East Prussia.
DR. HORN: Was not the occupation of Balkan territory by the Russians the
reason for your discussion with Molotov?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand the question. Please repeat
it.
DR. HORN: Was not the Russian occupation of territory in the Balkans and
also in the Baltic States the reason for inviting Molotov to Berlin?
VON RIBBENTROP: In the Balkans, no; for there were no Russian occupation
zones there. But it did apply to Bessarabia, which is not a Balkan
country in the strictest sense of the term. It was the occupation of
Bessarabia, which took place with surprising speed, and that of Northern
Bukovina, which had not been agreed to fall within the Russian sphere of
influence in the discussions at Moscow—and which was, as the Führer
said at the time, really an old Austrian crown land—and the occupation
of the Baltic territories. It is true that this caused the Führer a
certain amount of anxiety.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that in the summer of 1940 you and Hitler were
informed that a Franco-British military commission was in Moscow?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes—no. What was the date, please?
DR. HORN: The summer of 1940; that is, after June 1940?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. Such reports came in continually,
but I cannot say now how far that was correct for the summer of 1940.
When I arrived in Moscow in 1939, I found French and English military
commissions there, with instructions from the British and French
governments to conclude a military alliance between Russia, England, and
France. This was part of the policy which the Führer described as
“British encirclement policy” in his speech to the Reichstag, I think on
28 May, and which Mr. Churchill in 1936 in the embassy had made quite
evident to me.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that at these conferences between...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am trying very hard to follow this. I
wonder if I could be helped? Did the witness refer to 1940? I wanted to
get it clear whether it was 1940 or 1939. It makes a big difference.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean about an English mission? 1940, I believe.
VON RIBBENTROP: I was going to reply to that. I have already said that I
am not quite sure about 1940; I said only that these reports existed. I
know, however, that this mission was there in 1939.
DR. HORN: During Molotov’s visit to Berlin in the year 1940, was any
allusion made to the fact that Russia was not satisfied with the last
Russo-Finnish peace treaty and that she intended to annex the whole of
Finland?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was not as definite as that, but it was clear from
her attitude that Russia considered Finland as her sphere of influence.
What measures Russia intended to take there is not in my power to say.
DR. HORN: On 5 April 1941 a Russian-Yugoslav Non-aggression and
Friendship Pact was concluded. What was the effect of this conclusion
upon Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: This seemed to the Führer to confirm the fact that
Russia had deviated from the 1939 policy. He considered it an affront,
to use his own words, for he said that he had concluded a pact with the
other government and Russia only a short time afterwards had concluded a
pact with the government which was definitely hostile to Germany.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Hitler thereupon forbade you to take any
further diplomatic steps in connection with Russia?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. I told the Führer at the time that we
must now make even more determined efforts to come to an understanding
about Russia’s attitude. He said that would be useless and he did not
think it would change the Russian attitude.
DR. HORN: What were the causes which led to the outbreak of the conflict
with Russia?
VON RIBBENTROP: I must say this here: In the winter of 1940-41 the
Führer was confronted with the following situation. I think it is most
important to make this clear.
England was not prepared to make peace. The attitude of the United
States of America and of Russia was therefore of decisive importance to
the Führer. He told me the following about this—I had a very lengthy
discussion with him on the subject and asked him to give me clearly
defined diplomatic directives. He said that Japan’s attitude was not
absolutely secure for Germany; although we had concluded the Tripartite
Pact, there were very strong oppositional elements at work in Japan and
we could not know what position Japan would take; Italy had proved to be
a very weak ally in the Greek campaign. Germany might, therefore, have
to stand entirely alone.
After that, he spoke of the American attitude. He said that he had
always wanted to have good relations with the United States, but that in
spite of extreme reserve the United States had grown steadily more
hostile to Germany. The Tripartite Pact had been concluded with a view
to keeping the United States out of the war, as it was our wish and our
belief that in that way those circles in the United States which were
working for peace and for good relations with Germany could be
strengthened. We were not successful in this, however, as the attitude
of the United States was not favorable to Germany after the conclusion
of the Tripartite Pact. The Führer’s basic idea, and mine, namely, that
if the United States did enter the war in Europe, they would have to
reckon with a war on two fronts and therefore would prefer not to
intervene, was not realized.
Now the further question of Russia’s attitude came up and in this
connection the Führer made the following statement: We have a friendship
pact with Russia. But Russia has assumed the attitude which we have just
been discussing and which causes me a certain amount of concern. We do
not know, therefore, what to expect from that side. More and more troop
movements were reported; he had himself taken military countermeasures,
the exact nature of which was, and still is, unknown to me. However, his
great anxiety was that Russia on the one hand and the United States and
Britain on the other, might proceed against Germany. On the one hand,
therefore, he had to reckon with an attack by Russia and on the other
hand with a joint attack by the United States and England, that is to
say with large-scale landings in the West. All these considerations
finally caused the Führer to take preventive measures, to start a
preventive war against Russia on his own initiative.
DR. HORN: What actual political reasons were there for the Tripartite
Pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Tripartite Pact was concluded, I believe, in
September 1940. The situation was as I have just described it, that is
to say, the Führer was alarmed that the United States might sooner or
later enter the war. For this reason I wanted to do all I could, in the
field of diplomacy, to strengthen Germany’s position. I thought we had
Italy as an ally, but Italy showed herself to be a weak ally.
As we could not win France over to our side, the only friend apart from
the Balkan States was Japan. In the summer of 1940 we therefore tried to
achieve closer collaboration with Japan. Japan was trying to do the same
with us and that led to the signing of the pact. The aim, or substance,
of this pact was a political, military, and economic alliance. There is
no doubt, however, that it was intended as a defensive alliance; and we
considered it as such from the start. By that I mean that it was
intended in the first place to keep the United States out of the war;
and I hoped that a combination of this kind might enable us to make
peace with England after all. The pact itself was not based on any plan
for aggression or world domination, as has often been asserted. That is
not true; its purpose was, as I have just said, to arrive at a
combination which would enable Germany to introduce a new order in
Europe and would also allow Japan to reach a solution acceptable to her
in East Asia, especially in regard to the Chinese problem.
That was what I had in mind when I negotiated and signed the pact. The
situation was not unfavorable; the pact might possibly keep the United
States neutral and isolate England so that we might all the same arrive
at a compromise peace, a possibility of which we never lost sight during
the whole course of the war, and for which we worked steadily.
DR. HORN: What effect, according to the embassy reports which reached
you, did the Anschluss of Austria and the Munich Agreement have on the
United States?
VON RIBBENTROP: There is no doubt that the occupation of Austria and the
Munich Agreement produced a much more unfavorable feeling towards
Germany in the United States.
DR. HORN: In November 1938 the American Ambassador at Berlin was
recalled to Washington to report to his government, and the normal
diplomatic relations with Germany were thus broken off. According to
your observations, what were the reasons for this measure?
VON RIBBENTROP: We never really found out the details, and we very much
regretted it, as it forced us to recall our own Ambassador in
Washington, at least to call him back to make a report. It is, however,
evident that this measure was determined by the whole attitude of the
United States. Many incidents took place about that time which gradually
convinced the Führer that sooner or later they would bring the United
States into the war against us.
Permit me to mention a few examples. President Roosevelt’s attitude was
defined for the first time in the “quarantine speech” which he made in
1937. The press then started an energetic campaign. After the ambassador
was recalled the situation grew more critical and the effect began to
make itself felt in every sphere of German-American relations.
I believe that many documents dealing with the subject have been
published in the meantime and that a number of these have been submitted
by the Defense, dealing, for instance, with the attitude adopted by
certain United States diplomats at the time of the Polish crisis; the
cash-and-carry clause was then introduced which could benefit only
Germany’s enemies; the ceding of destroyers to England; the so-called
Lend-Lease Bill later on; and in other fields the further advance of the
United States towards Europe: The occupation of Greenland, Iceland, on
the African Continent, _et cetera_; the aid given to Soviet Russia after
the outbreak of this war. All these measures strengthened the Führer’s
conviction that sooner or later he would certainly have to reckon with a
war against America. There is no doubt that the Führer did not, in the
first instance, want such a war; and I may say that I myself, as I think
you will see from many of the documents submitted by the Prosecution,
again and again did everything I could, in the diplomatic field, to keep
the United States out of this war.
DR. HORN: In the summer of 1941 President Roosevelt gave his so-called
“firing order” to the American Fleet in order to protect transports
carrying armaments to England. How did Hitler and German diplomacy react
to this order?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was a very regrettable event for us. I am not
competent to deal with technical details but I remember exactly that
Hitler was greatly excited about this order. I believe it was in a
speech at some meeting—probably at Munich, but I do not remember
exactly—that he replied to this speech and issued a warning in answer
to the announcement. I happen to remember the form which his reply took,
because at the time I thought it rather odd. He said that America had
given the order to fire on German ships. “I gave no order to fire but I
ordered that the fire be returned”; I believe that is the way he
expressed it.
Documentary evidence of these events reached us in the diplomatic
service, but the Navy is better informed on the subject than I am. After
that, I believe, there were protests and publications about the measures
which made the German attitude plain; I cannot give you exact details of
these protests without referring to the documents themselves.
DR. HORN: Did Japan notify Germany in advance of her attack on Pearl
Harbor?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, she did not. At the time I tried to induce Japan to
attack Singapore, because it was impossible to make peace with England
and I did not know what military measures we could take to achieve this
end. In any case, the Führer directed me to do everything I could in the
diplomatic field to weaken England’s position and thus achieve peace. We
believed that this could best be done through an attack by Japan on
England’s strong position in East Asia. For that reason I tried to
induce Japan, at that time, to attack Singapore.
After the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I also tried to make Japan
attack Russia, for I thought that in this way the war could be ended
most speedily. Japan, however, did not do that. She did then—she did
neither of the things we wanted her to do, but instead, she did a third.
She attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. This attack came as a
complete surprise to us. We had considered the possibility of Japan’s
attacking Singapore, that is England, or perhaps Hong Kong, but we never
considered an attack on the United States as being to our advantage. We
knew that in the case of an attack on England, there was a possibility
that the United States might intervene; that was a question which,
naturally, we had often considered. We hoped very much, however, that
this would not happen and that America would not intervene. The first
news I received of the attack on Pearl Harbor was through the Berlin
press, and then from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima. I should like to
say under oath that all other reports, versions, or documentary evidence
are entirely false. I would like to go even further to state that the
attack came as a surprise even to the Japanese Ambassador—at least he
told me that.
DR. HORN: Does Your Lordship wish for a recess now?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, how much longer are you going to take?
DR. HORN: Not much more, Your Honor. I should say 15 or 20 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will recess for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. HORN: What considerations caused Hitler and you to enter the war
against the United States on the side of Japan?
VON RIBBENTROP: When the news of Pearl Harbor came, the Führer had to
make a decision. The text of the Tripartite Pact bound us to assist
Japan only in case of an attack against Japan herself. I went to see the
Führer, explained the legal aspect of the situation and told him that,
although we welcomed a new ally against England, it meant we had a new
opponent to deal with as well, or would have one to deal with if we
declared war on the United States.
The Führer then decided that the United States had already fired upon
our ships and thereby had practically created a state of war; that it
was therefore only a question of form, or, at least, that this official
state of war might supervene at any moment, as a result of an incident;
and that in the long run it was impossible that this state of affairs in
the Atlantic continue without a German-American war.
He then instructed me to draft a note—which he subsequently
altered—and to hand the American Ambassador his papers.
DR. HORN: How did the Foreign Office co-operate with Germany’s allies
during the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: We naturally had close co-operation with Italy. By that
I mean that in the further course of war, we were forced to all intents
and purposes to take charge of all military operations there ourselves,
or, at least, to take joint charge of them.
Co-operation with Japan was very difficult, for the simple reason that
we could communicate with the Japanese Government only by air. We had
contact with them from time to time through U-boats, but there was no
co-ordinated military or political plan of campaign. I believe that on
this point General Marshall’s view is correct, namely, that there was no
close strategic co-operation or planning of any kind; and, really, there
was not any.
DR. HORN: How was co-operation with Italy?
VON RIBBENTROP: As I have just said, we naturally had very close
co-operation with Italy, but difficulties arose through the many
heterogeneous influences at work; and Italy proved herself, right from
the start, to be a very weak ally in every respect.
DR. HORN: Why, in the course of the Russian campaign, did you suggest to
Hitler the conclusion of separate peace agreements?
VON RIBBENTROP: A certain atmosphere of confidence between the Soviet
Government and ourselves had been created at Moscow, between Stalin,
Molotov and myself, and also extending to the Führer. For instance, the
Führer told me that he had confidence in Stalin, whom he considered one
of the really great men of history, and whose creation of the Red Army
he thought a tremendous achievement; but that one could never tell what
might happen. The power of the Soviets had grown and developed
enormously. It was very difficult to know how to deal with Russia and
make an agreement with her again. I myself always tried, through
diplomatic and other channels, to maintain contact to a certain extent,
because I still believed and hoped that some sort of peace could be made
which would relieve Germany in the East and allow her to concentrate her
forces in the West and even lead, perhaps, to a general peace. With this
in view, I proposed to the Führer, for the first time, in the winter of
1942, it was before Stalingrad, that an agreement should be reached with
Russia. I did that after the Anglo-American landing in Africa which
caused me great misgivings. Adolf Hitler—I met him in the train at
Bamberg—most emphatically rejected the idea of any such peace or peace
feelers, because he thought that if it became known, it would be liable
to create a spirit of defeatism, _et cetera_. I had suggested to him at
the time that we should negotiate peace with Russia on a very moderate
basis.
Secondly, in 1943, I again advised the Führer in a lengthy, written
exposition, to seek such a peace. I think it was after the collapse of
Italy. The Führer was at that time open to consider such a peace; and he
drafted a possible mutual line of demarcation which might be adopted,
and said that he would let me know definitely on the following day. Next
day, however, I did not receive any authorization or directive from him.
I think that the Führer probably felt that it was impossible to heal the
breach between National Socialism and communism and that such a peace
would be no more than an armistice.
I made one or two further attempts but the Führer held the view that a
decisive military success must be achieved first, and only after that
could we start negotiations, otherwise the negotiations would be
useless.
If I were asked to express an opinion as to whether such negotiations
would have been likely to succeed, I would say that I think it very
doubtful. I believe that, considering the strong stand taken by our
opponents, especially England, even since the beginning of the war,
there was never any real chance of Germany’s attaining peace; and that
holds good for both the East and the West. And I am convinced that with
the formulation at Casablanca of the demand for unconditional surrender,
the possibility ceased entirely to exist. I base my opinion not on
purely abstract considerations, but on continuous feelers, made through
indirect channels, often unidentifiable as such, by the other side, and
which expressed the opinion of important personalities with a guiding
influence on policy in those countries. They were determined to fight it
out to the bitter end. I think the Führer was right when he said that
such negotiations would serve no purpose.
DR. HORN: To come to a different subject, the witness Lahousen has
testified here that in September 1939 a conversation took place in
Hitler’s private train at which you were also present, and which dealt
with the instigation of a rebellion in the Polish Ukraine. What led to
this conversation and what part did you play in the discussion?
VON RIBBENTROP: I remember that in the course of the Polish campaign
Admiral Canaris, who was at the time Chief of the Wehrmacht
Counterintelligence Service, came to see me, as he sometimes did when he
was making a short personal visit. I was in my compartment on the
Führer’s train at the time. I do not remember that the witness Lahousen
was present; I had the impression when I saw Herr Lahousen here that I
had never seen him before. Canaris came to me from time to time to tell
me about his activities in the Intelligence and other fields. He did so
on this occasion; and I believe it was he who told me that he had set
all his agents to fomenting a revolt among the Ukrainian and other
minorities in the rear of the Polish Army. He certainly received no
instructions or directives from me, as was alleged here—and cannot have
received any, for these two reasons:
1. The German Foreign Minister was never in a position to give any
directives to a military authority.
2. At the beginning of the Polish campaign, the German Foreign Office
was not at all concerned with the question of the Ukraine, and similar
questions—or at any rate I myself was not. I was not even sufficiently
well acquainted with the details to be able to give directives.
DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a circular issued by the
Foreign Office...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something more about this? The witness
Lahousen has alleged that I said that houses were to be burned down or
villages were to be burned down and the Jews were to be killed. I would
like to state categorically that I never said such a thing.
Canaris was with me in my car at that time, and it is possible, although
I do not remember it exactly, that I may have seen him going out later
on. Apparently he received instructions which originated with the Führer
as to the attitude he was to take in Poland with regard to the Ukrainian
and other questions. There is no sense in the statement ascribed to me,
because especially in the Ukraine—the Ukrainian villages—those were
Ukrainians living in them, and they were not our enemies but our
friends; it would have been completely senseless for me to say that
these villages should be burned down. Secondly, as regards killing the
Jews, I can only say that this would have been entirely contrary to my
inner conviction and that the killing of the Jews never entered the mind
of anybody at that time. I may say, in short, that all this is
absolutely untrue. I have never given instructions of this kind, nor
could I have done so, nor even a general indication on those lines. May
I add that I remember that Herr Lahousen himself was not quite convinced
that I had made this statement; at least, that was my impression.
DR. HORN: Have you anything to say about the Foreign Office circular
submitted by the Prosecution and bearing the title: “The Jewish question
as a factor in foreign politics in the year 1938”?
VON RIBBENTROP: I saw this circular here for the first time. Here are
the facts: There was a section in the Foreign Office which was concerned
with Party matters and questions of ideology. That department
undoubtedly co-operated with the competent departments of the Party.
That was not the Foreign Office itself. I saw the circular here. It
seems to me that it is on the same lines as most of the circulars issued
at the time for the information and training of officials, and so on. It
even might possibly have gone through my office, but I think that the
fact that it was signed by a section chief and not by myself or by the
state secretary, should prove that I did not consider the circular very
important even if I did see it. Even if it did go through my office or
pass me in some other way, I certainly did not read it because in
principle I did not read such long documents, but asked my assistants to
give me a short summary of the contents. I may add that I received
hundreds of letters in the course of the day’s work, some of which were
read to me, and also circulars and decrees which I signed, and many of
which I did not acquaint myself with. I wish to state, however, that if
one of my officials signed the circular it goes without saying that I
assume full responsibility for it.
DR. HORN: The Prosecution have several times spoken of the Geneva
Convention. Your name was frequently mentioned in this connection also.
What was your attitude toward the Geneva Convention?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe, and many people will and could confirm it,
that from the beginning of the war the Foreign Office and I have always
supported the Geneva Convention in every way. I should like to add that
the military authorities always showed much understanding for these
things—at least, for the affairs I had to deal with. If, later on, this
no longer held good in every respect, it was due to the rigors of war,
and possibly to the harshness of the Führer.
As to the terror-fliers I must state that in 1943 and 1944 the English
and American air raids gradually became a terrible threat to Germany. I
saw this for the first time in Hamburg, and I remember this event
because I was with the Führer at the time and I described to him the
terrifying impression I had received. I do not believe that anyone who
has not experienced such a raid and its results can imagine what it
means. It is evident that we Germans, and especially Adolf Hitler,
continually sought means to master this menace.
I must also mention the terrible attack on Dresden, and I would like to
ask the Tribunal’s permission to name a witness, the former Danish
Minister Richard, who was there during the attack and described it to me
2 days later. It was, therefore, self-evident that the problem of
terror-fliers had to be solved somehow by the Führer. This was in
contrast to our view insofar as we wanted to find a solution which would
not infringe upon the Geneva Convention, or at least a solution which
could be publicly proclaimed to our enemies. My department was not
directly concerned with the question, for we had nothing to do with
defense problems which were taken care of by the military authorities,
the police and those responsible for home policy. But we were indirectly
concerned where the matter was affected by the Geneva Convention, and my
point of view, which I frequently expressed, was that if any steps were
taken an official proclamation should be published, giving a definition
of a terror-flier, and stating that these terror-fliers convicted or
airmen suspected of an attack upon the civilian population would be
tried by courts-martial. Geneva would then be officially notified of
this measure or preparatory measure and then the enemy would be informed
through the protecting powers. Fliers found guilty of deliberate
terrorist raids by the courts-martial would be sentenced; if not, they
would revert to the normal status of prisoners of war. But this was
never carried out in practice. It was not a suggestion by me but an idea
which I expressed to Hitler in the course of conversations on one or two
occasions and which was not put into practice because, in practice, it
was impossible to find a definition for these raids. I believe some
mention was also made of a conference supposed to have taken place in
Klessheim during which I was said to have proposed or supported
farther-reaching measures. I remember quite clearly that this conference
did not take place. I do not believe, or at least, I do not remember,
that I ever discussed this question at that time with Himmler, with whom
I was not at that time on good terms, or Göring, whom I did not see very
often. I believe that it is possible that the subject was brought up in
a conversation during an official visit to Klessheim, as often happened,
with the Führer, but that I do not know any more, I do know one thing
that if allusion is made to a more thorough-going proposal emanating
from me it can refer only to the following: At the time we were anxious
to arrive at a clear definition of these attacks by terror-fliers and in
the course of discussion various suggestions were made for the
definition of certain categories of attacks, such as machine-gunning
from the air, as terror attacks. It is possible that this note, or
whatever it was, came into being in this way: That the person in
question knew my views, that is, the person trying to find a practical
solution—if one was arrived at—to agree officially with the Geneva
Convention or could, at least, have been officially discussed with
Geneva.
Another document has also been submitted in this connection. I believe
it was a suggestion for an expert opinion on this question by the
Foreign Office. I do not remember exactly how this expert opinion came
to be given, whether it was done on my orders or whether it was the
result of a discussion with the Wehrmacht authorities concerned, who
wanted to know the opinion of the Foreign Office. All I know is that the
Wehrmacht always attached great importance to an exact knowledge of our
opinion with regard to the Geneva Convention. I remember that expert
opinion, however, and that I have seen it. I am now said to have
approved it. It would take too long to go into details, but that is not
correct. I remember that I submitted that expert opinion to the Führer
as being a very important matter which I could not deal with alone. I
think that the Führer—or I remember rather exactly, that the Führer
dismissed it as nonsense at the time, so this expert opinion was not
well received by the Führer. In the further course of events all we
heard, because we were only concerned indirectly, was that no order of
any sort was issued by the Führer or any Wehrmacht authority, because
the Wehrmacht shared our very views on this subject. Admittedly, I do
not know that in detail; but I can say with absolute certainty that
since this question of defense against terror-fliers was under
consideration, and afterwards, not a single case of lynching came to my
ears. I did not hear that this had happened until I was here.
DR. HORN: The other day witness Dahlerus was brought here. How long have
you known Dahlerus?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that I saw Dahlerus here for the first time.
Of course, it is possible that I may have seen him once from a distance
or possibly in the Reich Chancellery during one of his apparently
frequent visits to the Führer. But I do not remember him, and when I saw
him here I had the impression that I had never seen him before.
DR. HORN: Were you in a position to exercise influence regarding planes
for visitors to the Reich Government?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I had no such influence.
DR. HORN: One more question on a different subject. What real estate was
at your disposal in your official capacity as Foreign Minister?
VON RIBBENTROP: The other day the British Prosecutor declared that, to
begin with, I had one house and later on I had six. I want to clear this
matter up for the Court. After losing my entire fortune in America, I
became quite wealthy again through my own work. As such, and in other
ways, too, I had certain possibilities and I also had funds through
relatives, through my wife. I built a house in Berlin-Dahlem in 1922-23
and bought several lots there. We lived there for many years.
Furthermore, in 1934—I want to emphasize the fact that this had nothing
to do with my political activities, because at the time I had only just
started them—I bought a small house and estate called Sonnenburg, near
Berlin, with some funds which my wife inherited, I think, and from funds
of my own.
The other—or I should say rather that since that time I have not
acquired a square yard of property in Germany or anywhere else. The
other houses mentioned by the British Prosecutor, that is, the so-called
Schloss Fuschl, this became known because various foreign statesmen were
received there during the war. That is not really a castle but a tower,
an old hunting tower of the Archbishops of Salzburg. The Führer had put
it at my disposal to have a roof over my head when I was at
Obersalzberg, because he did not want me to stay in the hotel, which was
always very crowded, and I had to bring my staff with me. Fuschl was
never my personal property, but was a so-called Foreign Office
establishment, which belonged exclusively to the state and was kept up
by the state. I knew the former owners of this castle or tower only by
name and, therefore, I cannot give any information about them. I only
heard that this building was confiscated by the Reich Government, along
with other property belonging to political opponents in Austria.
The second house mentioned here was, I think, a house in Slovakia. There
was also a question of a third house in Sudetenland, which was alleged
to be the property of a Count Czernin. I believe I can explain this
also. Here are the facts: The Führer had given me permission to arrange
hunting parties to which I could invite foreign statesmen for the
purpose of more informal talks. I was also a hunter, so the Foreign
Office, that is to say the Reich Government, had leased ground from some
of the farmers in Sudetenland for hunting purposes, along with a
suitably impressive house. I believe they were rented for only a couple
of years; they were not even purchased. The same thing was done in the
case of a hunting ground in Slovakia. I do not think that this was our
property at all. The Slovak Government placed it at our disposal for a
few days every year, to shoot deer. It was a hunting lodge in which I
once or twice spent 2 or 3 days, but it has nothing to do with my own
property.
Another place was mentioned, a house called Tanneck. I may mention that
I have never even seen this house, situated, I believe, in the
Rhineland. According to the description which I have received, it is a
small house occupied by a man responsible for looking after several
horses. I had formerly served in the cavalry and was interested in
horses which had been purchased in France by the State, from the
well-known racing stable owner, the Aga Khan in Normandy, as they would
otherwise have been ruined. I should like to emphasize the fact that
full compensation—I always paid particular attention to this—was paid
for the horses, as I think the Aga Khan will gladly confirm. They were
brought to Germany with the Führer’s full consent, although he was not
greatly interested in horses; but he understood my point of view. These
horses were later to be put in the stud farm Grabitz, which belonged to
the Reich Government.
If the Tribunal permits, I would like to say that, as far as my personal
affairs are concerned, my Defense Counsel will present the necessary
testimony. I gave instructions at that time that I did not want to have
a single Reichsmark more at the end of my term of office than I had at
the beginning, with the exception of two gifts which I received from the
Führer, but most of which, or at least part of which, I believe, has
since been spent by the State for my official expenses.
DR. HORN: One last question: During your activities, in regard to
foreign policy, did you see any possibility of realizing prospects of
revision which had been conceded to Germany but which had not
materialized?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was precisely the great problem out of which, in
the final analysis, this war developed. As Adolf Hitler often told me,
he wanted to build up an ideal social state in Europe after the solution
of the problems which he had recognized as vital. He wanted to erect
buildings, _et cetera_; that was his aim. Now, the realization of these
aims defined as vital by the Führer was greatly hampered by the
petrified political system, which had been established in Europe and the
world in general.
We, the Führer, and then I myself on his order—so I believe I can be
the chief witness—always tried to solve these problems through
diplomatic and peaceful channels. I brooded many nights over the League
of Nations—day and night over Paragraph 19 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, but the difficulty was that the Führer was not in a
position, or was convinced that it was simply impossible to obtain
results through negotiation—at least, without having strong armed
forces to back him up. The mistake was, I believe, that, although
Paragraph 19 was a very good paragraph of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, and one which we all would have been very willing to sign and
follow or one which we did sign and would have followed, no means of
putting it into practice existed. That gradually created a situation in
which the powers, and that is quite natural, who wanted to retain this
state of petrifaction, as I might call it, or _status quo_, opposed any
steps taken by Germany, which of course, caused reaction on the part of
the Führer, until finally it reached the point, the very tragic point,
where this great war began over a question like Danzig and the Corridor,
which could have been solved comparatively easy.
DR. HORN: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I do not think it would be possible to go any
further with the examination of the witness today, but the Tribunal
would welcome your assistance and the assistance of the Prosecution with
reference to your documents, if you could tell us what the position is
with reference to your documents, and if the Prosecution could tell us
how far they have been able to see these documents since they have been
translated and how far they have been able to make up their minds as to
what documents they wish to object to and what documents they are
prepared to admit as being offered in evidence before us. Could you tell
us what the position is with reference to these documents; how many of
your documents have been translated?
DR. HORN: A gentleman from the British Prosecution told me this morning
that the English Document Book will be ready on Monday and that I can
discuss with him the question of what documents will be admitted. He
also told me that the British Prosecution would arrange everything with
the other delegations of the Prosecution, so that on Tuesday I should be
in a position to submit the remaining documents and, I believe, this
could be done in 2 or 3 hours. I want to submit these documents in
groups and do not wish to read too much from them, but only explain to
the Tribunal my reason for asking them to take judicial notice of these
documents.
THE PRESIDENT: You said, did you not, it would take you no longer than 2
or 3 hours to explain the documents after you had come to the
arrangement with the Prosecution?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And have you any other witnesses to call besides the
defendant?
DR. HORN: No. I would like only to submit an affidavit by a witness
requested by me, Counsellor of Legation Gottfriedsen, dealing with the
personal financial circumstances of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, former
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Gottfriedsen was the Foreign Office
official whose task was to look after the official income of the Foreign
Minister and who is also very well acquainted with his private financial
affairs. He can give information about the personal and official estates
belonging to the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry. I have
embodied this information in the form of a few questions in an
affidavit. If the Prosecution have no objection to this affidavit, I
could dispense with the calling of the witness, Gottfriedsen. However,
if the Prosecution want him to appear, then I would question him on the
contents of the affidavit.
I have no other witnesses for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. When all my
documents will have been presented, the case for the Defense will be
concluded.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the Prosecution tell us their view on this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as far as the British Prosecution is
concerned, we have now had six document books, I think, taking us up to
Number 214, roughly two-thirds of the documents which Dr. Horn wishes to
tender, and we have been able to go through up to Number 191. I made out
a list—I could hand one to the Court and give Dr. Horn another one—of
those documents that we object to, which are very briefly set out. I
should think we object to something like 70 or 80, between the Numbers
45 and 191, maybe a little more. The Soviet Delegation are, I think, in
a position to tender their objections, which are practically entirely in
accord with ours, though they were prepared separately. M. Champetier de
Ribes has at least two batches of documents to which he wishes to make
objections. I think I may say that Mr. Dodd is more or less leaving this
point to me and will act in accordance with the British Delegation’s
view on the point. So that is the position. It probably would be
convenient if I handed in a very outlined list of objections which I
have up to date.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know, Sir David, what the
position of the Prosecution is about the translation of the documents.
You remember that the Tribunal did make an order that the Prosecution
should object to documents, if possible, before they were translated, so
as to avoid unnecessary translations, and in the event of any
disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense any matter should
be referred to the Tribunal. It was thought that there were a great
number of documents on which agreement could be achieved in that way,
and the labor and time taken up in translating would be obviated.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The difficulty we have been in over these
documents, is that we did our best to try to formulate our view on the
index, but it is a very difficult matter to form a view when you get a
short description of only a line and a half about a document. But it
might be that that would be the most practical way of doing it, despite
its difficulty. If the Prosecution were given an index with as good a
description as possible of the document, the Prosecution then formulated
their objections on the index, and the Tribunal heard any outstanding
differences before the documents were translated, I should think—I am
afraid I can put it only tentatively—it would be worth a trial.
Otherwise, you would get a terrible blockage in the Translation Division
of the Tribunal by a vast number of documents, such as we have had in
this case, to which ultimately we are going to make full and numerous
objections, but that holds up the translation of all the documents
belonging to the subsequent proceedings. So I should be prepared—and I
think my colleagues would support me—in making a trial, if the Tribunal
thought it could be done, to hand in an objection on a list of documents
and see if we could in that way arrive at the results which would
obviate the necessity of translating them all.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be of assistance to the Prosecution, supposing
the defendants’ counsel were to give them the entire documents in German
with also a full index in English, and then the Prosecution, or some
member of the Prosecution who is familiar with German, could go through
the documents in German and the Prosecution can then make up their minds
in that way? Would that be an assistance to the Prosecution? They would
have not only the index to inform them as to what was the nature of the
documents, but they would have the documents in German.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think that would be a great help, especially
if he underlined the more material passages.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, with the co-operation of the defendants’ counsel,
some measure of agreement might be arrived at as to what were the
necessary documents to lay before the Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I think that could be done, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, Sir David, with reference to the immediate
future, on Monday, of course, some of the defendants’ counsel may wish
to ask questions of the Defendant Ribbentrop and then the Prosecution
may wish to cross-examine him, and that, I suppose, might possibly take
all Monday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think that is highly probable, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Under those circumstances, if the scheme which Dr. Horn
has outlined is carried out, there would not necessarily be any delay at
all, because by Tuesday morning his documents would have been all
examined by the Prosecution and the objections to them would have been
put in, and he could then go through, as he says, in 2 or 3 hours, the
documents which remain for the consideration of the Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I respectfully agree, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal would like to know what the position is
with reference to the next defendant. It may be that on Tuesday after
the midday adjournment the case of Defendant Keitel would come on. Now,
are his documents in order? As far as I remember, most of his documents
are documents which have already been put in evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A great many.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not so?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Dr. Nelte could help us.
THE PRESIDENT: If he would, yes.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am ready to begin at any time. The documents
have been presented and affidavits were already presented to the
Prosecution last week. I am waiting only for the Prosecution to decide
as to the relevancy of those documents which the defendant has submitted
as his own statements and which are to be submitted in order to shorten
the examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not had the chance of going through them
myself but, as a matter of principle, we have always been quite prepared
that a statement should be read so long as the witness is there to be
cross-examined. If the Tribunal has no objection, there will be none
from the Prosecution on that procedure.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal has no objection at all to that method
of presenting written documents, provided the Prosecution does not
object to them, and, therefore, no cross-examination is necessary. Could
Dr. Nelte tell us whether the documents which he wishes to present,
insofar as they have not already been put in evidence, have been
translated yet?
DR. NELTE: They all were sent to the translation office and the last two
documents were sent 3 days ago. I assume, therefore, that the
delegations of the Prosecution have, in the meantime, received the
translations.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you received them, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, we have not received them.
DR. NELTE: Perhaps they have not been distributed yet. Several or about
two-thirds of the documents were translated into French and English
about two weeks ago and are ready. I subsequently also sent these
documents to the Russian Delegation so that they could be translated
into Russian.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am told, My Lord, from General Mitchell, that
the documents are translated. They have not yet been distributed.
THE PRESIDENT: Then there ought to be no cause for delay in connection
with the Defendant Keitel’s case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not think so.
DR. NELTE: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, does the same apply to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner,
who is the next one? Dr. Kauffmann, are your documents yet translated?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have only a very few affidavits and
there is no doubt that they will be in the hands of the Prosecution in
due time.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. So that you will be quite ready to go on
then?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, after Keitel, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, after Keitel, very well. Sir David, then you will
present to us the objections which you are making to Dr. Horn’s
documents, and the Soviet Prosecutor will present his objections.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall hand them in as far as I have gone,
if I may, at once.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and M. Champetier de Ribes, so far as he has any.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If My Lordship pleases, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-SIXTH DAY
Monday, 1 April 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Von Ribbentrop resumed the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Have any of the defendants’ counsel any questions they
want to put to the defendant?
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Your Honor. Witness, the preamble to the secret pact
concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939 is
worded more or less as follows:
“In view of the present tension between Germany and Poland, the
following is agreed upon in case of a conflict...”
Do you recall whether the preamble had approximately that wording?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact wording, but it is
approximately correct.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the chief of the legal department of the
Foreign Office, Ambassador Dr. Gaus, participated as legal adviser in
the negotiations in Moscow on 23 August 1939 and drafted the treaty?
VON RIBBENTROP: Ambassador Gaus participated partly in the negotiations
and drafted the agreements with me.
DR. SEIDL: I shall now read an extract from the statement by Ambassador
Gaus and ask you a few questions in connection with it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, what document are you going to read?
DR. SEIDL: I shall read from Paragraph 3 of the statement made by Dr.
Gaus and in connection with it ask a few questions of the witness,
because some points concerning this pact do not seem to have been
sufficiently clarified as yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not know, Mr. President, what relation these
questions have with the Defendant Hess, who is defended by Dr. Seidl, or
with the Defendant Frank. I do not wish to discuss this affidavit, as I
attach no importance whatsoever to it. I wish only to draw the attention
of the Tribunal to the fact that we are not investigating the problems
connected with the policy of the Allied nations, but are investigating
the charges against the major German war criminals; and such questions
on the part of the Defense Counsel is an attempt to divert the attention
of the Tribunal from the issues we are investigating. I therefore think
it proper that questions of this kind should be rejected as not
relevant.
[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the questions.
DR. SEIDL: Gaus stated, under Paragraph 3 of his affidavit:
“The plane of the Reich Foreign Minister whom I had to accompany
as legal adviser in the intended negotiations arrived in Moscow
at noon on 23 August 1939. On the afternoon of the same day the
first conversation between Herr Von Ribbentrop and Mr. Stalin
took place at which, on the German side, besides the Reich
Foreign Minister, only Embassy Counsellor Hilger, as
interpreter, and perhaps also Ambassador Count Schulenburg, but
not myself, were present.
“The Reich Foreign Minister returned very satisfied from this
long conference and indicated that it was as good as certain
that it would result in the conclusion of the agreements desired
on the part of Germany. The continuation of the conference, at
which the documents to be signed were to be discussed and
completed, was scheduled for later in the evening. At this
second conference I participated personally and so did
Ambassador Count Schulenburg and Embassy Counsellor Hilger. On
the Russian side the negotiations were conducted by Messrs.
Stalin and Molotov, whose interpreter was Mr. Pavlov. An
agreement on the text of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact
was reached quickly and without difficulties.
“Herr Von Ribbentrop himself had inserted in the preamble to the
agreement which I had drafted a rather far-reaching phrase
concerning the formation of friendly German-Soviet relations to
which Mr. Stalin objected with the remark that the Soviet
Government could not suddenly present to the public
German-Soviet assurances of friendship after they had been
covered with pails of manure by the Nazi Government for 6 years.
Thereupon this phrase in the preamble was deleted or rather
changed.
“Besides the Non-aggression Pact there were negotiations for
quite some time on a separate secret document, which according
to my recollection was called a ‘secret agreement’ or ‘secret
additional agreement’ and the terms of which were aimed at a
demarcation of the mutual spheres of interest in the European
territories situated between the two countries. Whether the
expression ‘spheres of interest’ or other such expressions were
used therein, I do not recall. In the document, Germany declared
herself politically disinterested in Latvia, Estonia and Finland
but considered Lithuania to be part of her sphere of influence.
“Regarding the political disinterest of Germany in the two
Baltic countries mentioned, controversy arose when the Reich
Foreign Minister, in accordance with his instructions, wanted to
have a certain part of the Baltic territory exempted from this
political disinterest; this, however, was rejected on the part
of the Soviets, especially on account of the ice-free ports in
this territory.
“Because of this point, which apparently had already been
discussed in Ribbentrop’s first conversation, the Foreign
Minister had put in a call to Hitler which came through only
during the second discussion, and during which, in direct
conversation with Hitler, he was authorized to accept the Soviet
standpoint. A demarcation line was laid down for the Polish
territory. I cannot remember whether it was drafted on a map
which was to be attached to the document or only described in
the document. Moreover, an agreement was reached in regard to
Poland, stating approximately that the two powers would act in
mutual agreement in the final settlement of questions concerning
this country. It could, however, be possible that this last
agreement regarding Poland was reached only when the change of
the secret agreement mentioned later in Paragraph 5 was made.
“Regarding the Balkan States, it was confirmed that Germany had
only economic interests there. The Non-aggression Pact and the
secret agreement were signed rather late that same evening.”
Witness, in the affidavit of Gaus, a pact is mentioned whereby the two
powers agree to act in mutual agreement with regard to the final
settlement of the questions concerning Poland. Had such an agreement
already been reached on 23 August 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. At that time the serious
German-Polish crisis was acute, and it goes without saying that this
question was thoroughly discussed. I should like to emphasize that there
was not the slightest doubt in either Stalin’s or Hitler’s mind that, if
the negotiations with Poland came to naught, the territories that had
been taken from the two great powers by force of arms could also be
retaken by force of arms. In keeping with this understanding, the
eastern territories were occupied by Soviet troops and the western
territories by German troops after victory. There is no doubt that
Stalin can never accuse Germany of an aggression or of an aggressive war
for her action in Poland. If it is considered an aggression, then both
sides are guilty of it.
DR. SEIDL: Was the demarcation line in this secret agreement described
merely in writing or was it drawn on a map attached to the agreement?
VON RIBBENTROP: The line of demarcation was roughly drawn on a map. It
ran along the Rivers Rysia, Bug, Narew, and San. These rivers I
remember. That was the line of demarcation that was to be adhered to in
case of an armed conflict with Poland.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of that agreement, not
Germany but Soviet Russia received the greater part of Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the exact proportions, but, at any rate,
the agreement was that the territories east of these rivers were to go
to Soviet Russia and the territories west of these rivers were to be
occupied by German troops, while the organization of this territory as
intended by Germany was still an open question and had not yet been
discussed by Hitler and myself. Then, later the Government General was
formed when the regions lost by Germany after World War I were
incorporated into Germany.
DR. SEIDL: Now, something else. You stated last Friday that you wanted
Russia to join in the Tripartite Pact. Why did that fail?
VON RIBBENTROP: That failed because of Russian demands. The Russian
demands concerned—I should perhaps say first that I had agreed with M.
Molotov in Berlin to conduct further negotiations through diplomatic
channels. I wanted to influence the Führer regarding the demands already
made by Molotov in Berlin in order that some sort of an agreement or
compromise might be arrived at.
Then Schulenburg sent us a report from Moscow with the Russian demands.
In this report was, first of all, the renewed demand for Finland. To
this the Führer, as is well known, told Molotov that he did not wish
that after the winter campaign of 1940 another war should break out in
the North. Now the demand for Finland was raised again, and we assumed
that it would mean the occupation of Finland. It was difficult since it
was a demand which the Führer had already turned down.
Another demand of the Russians was that of the Balkans and Bulgaria.
Russia, as is well known, wanted bases there and wished to enter into
close relations with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government, with whom we
got in touch, did not want this. Moreover, this Russian penetration of
the Balkans was for both the Führer and Mussolini a difficult question
because of our economic interests there: grain, oil, and so on. But
above all it was the will of the Bulgarian Government themselves, which
was against this penetration.
Then, thirdly, there was the demand of the Russians for outlets to the
sea and military bases on the Dardanelles; and then the request which
Molotov had already expressed to me in Berlin, to secure somehow at
least an interest in the outlets of the Baltic Sea. M. Molotov himself
told me at that time that Russia naturally was also very much interested
in the Skagerrak and Kattegat.
At that time I discussed these demands and requests fully with the
Führer. The Führer said we would have to get in touch with Mussolini,
who was very much interested in some of these demands. This took place,
but neither the demands for the Balkans nor the demands for the
Dardanelles met with the approval from Mussolini. As far as Bulgaria is
concerned I have already stated that she did not want it either; and
with regard to Finland, neither Finland nor the Führer wanted to accede
to the demands of the Soviet Union.
Negotiations were then carried on for many months. I recall that upon
receipt of a telegram from Moscow in December 1940 I had another long
conversation with the Führer. I had an idea that, if we could bring
about a compromise between the Russian demands and the wishes of the
various parties concerned, a coalition could be formed which would be so
strong that it would eventually induce England to remain at peace.
THE PRESIDENT: What is this all an answer to? What was your question
that this is supposed to be an answer to?
DR. SEIDL: In essence he has already answered the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if he has answered the question you should
stop him.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. I now come to another question: What was Adolf
Hitler’s opinion regarding the military strength of Russia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler once said to me—he expressed himself
thus—and this was when he became worried about what was taking place in
Russia in the way of preparations against Germany: “We do not know of
course what is concealed behind this gate, if some day we should really
be forced to kick it open.” From this and other statements which the
Führer made at this time I concluded that, on the basis of reports about
Russia, he suffered great anxiety about the strength and the possible
display of might by the Soviet Union.
DR. SEIDL: My next question: What circumstances induced Hitler to
anticipate the threatening danger of an offensive by the Soviet Union?
VON RIBBENTROP: This was as follows...
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t this been dealt with extensively and exhaustively
by the Defendant Göring? You are here as counsel for Hess.
DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal is of the opinion that this has been dealt
with exhaustively, I shall withdraw the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you sit down, Dr. Seidl, you were putting Gaus’
affidavit to the defendant, I suppose with the intention that he should
say that the affidavit was true; is that right?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You didn’t put to him Paragraph 4 of the affidavit at
all, did you?
DR. SEIDL: I read only Paragraph 3 of the affidavit. I did not read
Paragraph 1, 2, 4, and 5 in order to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: The answer to my question was, “yes,” that you did not
put it. Should you not put the end of Paragraph 4 to him, which reads in
this way:
“The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner
that he let a warlike conflict of Germany with Poland appear not
as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent
possibility. No statements which could have included the
approval or encouragement for such a conflict were made by the
Soviet statesmen on this point. Rather the Soviet
representatives limited themselves in this respect simply to
taking cognizance of the explanations of the German
representatives.”
Is that correct?
DR. SEIDL: That is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking the witness. Is that correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: I may say the following to this. When I went to Moscow
no final decision had been reached by the Führer...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, couldn’t you answer the question directly? I asked
you whether the statement in the affidavit was correct or not. You can
explain afterwards.
VON RIBBENTROP: Not quite correct, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you can explain.
VON RIBBENTROP: It is not correct insofar as at that time the decision
to attack Poland had in no way been made by the Führer. There is,
however, no doubt that it became perfectly clear during the discussions
in Moscow that there was at any time the possibility of such a conflict,
if the last effort at negotiations failed.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the difference between that and what I have
just read to you? What I read to you was this:
“The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner
that he let a warlike conflict of Germany with Poland appear not
as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent
possibility.”
I should have thought your explanation was exactly the same as that.
That’s all.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I mention something briefly in this
connection? This witness Gaus was present only at the second conference.
He was, however, not present at the long conference which took place
previously between the witness Ribbentrop on the one hand and Molotov
and Stalin on the other hand. At these conferences only Embassy
Counsellor Hilger was present and I ask the Tribunal to call witness
Hilger, who has, in view of the importance of this point, already been
granted me.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, as you know, you can make any application in
writing for calling any witness that you like; and also the Tribunal
wishes me to say that if the Prosecution wish to have the witness Gaus
here for a cross-examination they may do so.
DR. SEIDL: Then I should like to put in as Hess Exhibit Number 16
(Document Number Hess-16) the sworn affidavit of Ambassador Gaus.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, as far as I understand, there is
some slight danger of the witness Gaus being removed from Nuremberg. I
would like to state at this time that we would like to have him retained
here for long enough time for possible cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?
DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel states that in the autumn of 1940, when
the idea of a war with Russia was discussed by Hitler, he went to Fuschl
in order to talk to you about this question. He believed that you too
had misgivings about it. Do you recall that Keitel at the end of August
or at the beginning of September was in Fuschl?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. He did visit me at that time.
DR. NELTE: Do you recall that Keitel at that time stated to you his
opinion about the probably imminent war?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. He spoke of that at the time. I
believe he said that the Führer had discussed it with him.
DR. NELTE: What I am driving at is this: Keitel states that he spoke
with you about a memorandum he intended to submit to Hitler which
referred to the considerations which were to be taken into account in
case of war with Soviet Russia.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. Field Marshal Keitel told me at that
time that he intended to submit a memorandum to Hitler, and he expressed
his misgivings concerning a possible conflict between the Soviet Union
and Germany.
DR. NELTE: Did you have the impression that Field Marshal Keitel was
opposed to the war at that time?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I had absolutely that impression.
DR. NELTE: Is it true that he, as a result of this discussion, asked you
to support his point of view with Hitler?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct, and I told him at that time that I
would do so, that I would speak to Hitler, and he ought to do the same.
DR. NELTE: Another question, regarding the escape of the French General
Giraud. Is it true that Keitel, when the French General Giraud escaped
from Königstein, asked you to take steps with the French Government to
bring about the voluntary return of General Giraud?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. At that time he asked me whether it
would not be possible, by way of negotiations with the French
Government, to induce Giraud to return to imprisonment in some way or
other.
DR. NELTE: Did a meeting then take place with General Giraud in occupied
France through the intervention of Ambassador Abetz?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, such a meeting took place. I believe Ambassador
Abetz met Giraud, who, as I recall, appeared in the company of M. Laval.
The Ambassador did everything he could in order to induce the General to
return, but finally did not succeed. The General was promised safe
conduct for this meeting and upon its conclusion the General and Laval
left.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has submitted an order, the subject of which
was the branding of Soviet prisoners of war. The Defendant Keitel is
held responsible for this order. He states that he spoke with you about
this question at headquarters located at the time in Vinnitza; that he
had to do it because all questions pertaining to prisoners of war also
concerned the department for international law of the Foreign Office. Do
you recall that in this connection Keitel asked you whether there were
any objections from the point of view of international law to this
branding which Hitler wished.
VON RIBBENTROP: The situation was this: I heard about the intention of
marking prisoners of war and went to headquarters to speak with Keitel
about this matter because it was my opinion that the marking of
prisoners in such a way was out of the question. Keitel shared my
opinion; and, so far as I recall, I believe he gave later orders that
this intended form of marking was not to be used.
DR. NELTE: I have no further question.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Witness,
when did you make the acquaintance of Admiral Dönitz?
VON RIBBENTROP: I made his acquaintance after he was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That was in 1943?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe so.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz before or after this time
exert or try to exert any influence on German foreign policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have never heard that Admiral Dönitz tried to exert
any influence on German foreign policy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you recall Marshal Antonescu’s visit to
the Führer headquarters on 27 February 1944?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do recall the visit but not the date. Marshal
Antonescu used to visit the Führer frequently. I should say every six
months or so; I believe you said at the beginning of 1944?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, on 27 February 1944.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I think it is correct that he visited the Führer at
the beginning of 1944.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you recall whether Antonescu, at that
time, attended the discussion of the military situation, as guest?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am quite certain, because this was usually the case
when Antonescu came to see the Führer. The Führer always explained the
military situation to him, that is, he invited him to the so-called noon
discussion of the military situation. I do not recall exactly now, but
there can be no doubt that Marshal Antonescu attended the discussion of
the military situation in February.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Besides the military discussions were there
also political discussions with Antonescu?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, every visit with Marshal Antonescu began by the
Führer’s withdrawing either with the Marshal alone or sometimes also
with me, but mostly with the Marshal alone, because he was the chief of
state; a long detailed political discussion would ensue, to which I was
generally called in later.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz take part in these
political discussions?
VON RIBBENTROP: Certainly not, because the Führer seldom invited
military leaders to these political discussions with Marshal Antonescu.
Later however, he did occasionally, but I do not recall that Admiral
Dönitz took part in a discussion with Antonescu.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Witness, the
Prosecution have submitted a document concerning a discussion between
you and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 March 1941. The
document carries the Document Number 1877-PS, and is Exhibit Number
USA-152. A part of this document was read into the record by the
Prosecution, and on Page 1007 of the German transcript (Volume III, Page
379) can be found among other things, the following passage which
concerns Grossadmiral Raeder:
“Next, the RAM (Foreign Minister) turned again to the Singapore
question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of
possible attacks by submarines based in the Philippines, and of
the intervention of the English Mediterranean and Home Fleets,
he had again discussed the situation with Grossadmiral Raeder.
The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year
would have its hands so full in English home waters and in the
Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single
ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder had described the
United States submarines as so poor that Japan need not bother
about them at all.”
Witness, as the Defendant Raeder clearly remembers, you, as Foreign
Minister, never spoke with him about strategic matters regarding Japan
or even about the worth or worthlessness of American submarines. I
should be obliged to you if you could clarify this point, whether there
might be some confusion as to the person involved in this discussion.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is altogether possible. I do not recall that I ever
spoke with Admiral Raeder about German-Japanese strategy. The fact was
that we had only very loose connections with Japan on these questions.
If at that time I said to Matsuoka what is written there, it is quite
possible that I quoted the Führer that he had said it to me. Naturally I
could not have said it on my own initiative, because I did not know
about it. I know that the Führer spoke to me frequently about such
points particularly with regard to Japan. It is possible therefore that
this did not originate with Admiral Raeder but the Führer. I do not know
who made this note. Is it a...
DR. SIEMERS: The document is entitled, “Notes on the conference between
the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister,
Matsuoka...”
VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that here. It is possible that the Führer
said that to me. In fact, I consider that probable. It is possible that
some mistake was made in the note; that I do not know.
DR. SIEMERS: Witness, did you inform the Defendant Raeder of such
political discussions as you had with Matsuoka or Oshima?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not the case.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever speak with Grossadmiral Raeder about other
political questions or have him present at political negotiations?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not our practice. Generally, the Führer
kept military and political matters strictly separate, so that I, as
Foreign Minister, never had an opportunity to discuss military or
strategic matters at my office; but when questions of foreign policy
were to be discussed, this took place at the Führer headquarters, but as
I have seen from documents which I read for the first time here, matters
were kept separate even there. In other words, if such discussions took
place at all, a fact which I cannot recall at the moment, it could have
been only at the Führer headquarters.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the State Secretary of the Foreign Office,
Steengracht, who was heard here as a witness, answered in the negative
my question as to whether the high military leaders were regularly
informed by him about current political matters. Now I ask whether you,
as Foreign Minister, informed high military leaders about political
matters?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must answer this question in the same way as I
answered the previous one. That was not our practice. All political and
military matters were dealt with exclusively by the Führer. The Führer
told me what I had to do in the diplomatic and political field, and he
told the military men what they had to do militarily. I was
occasionally, but very seldom, informed about military matters by the
Führer, and whatever the military men had to know about political
matters they never learned from me; but if they learned at all, it was
from the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, did you have an order or an
instruction according to which you were to inform the SA leaders of the
development and treatment of foreign political matters?
VON RIBBENTROP: The SA? No. There was no such order, and I had no such
instructions.
HERR BÖHM: Did the SA leadership have any influence on foreign policy at
all?
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
HERR BÖHM: And now I should like to ask a question for my colleague Dr.
Sauter who is ill: Were you in 1943 witness to a conversation between
Hitler and Himmler, in which the question was discussed as to whether
Von Schirach, who was then Reichsleiter, should be summoned before the
Volksgericht (People’s Court)?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
HERR BÖHM: What consequences would such a trial before the Volksgericht
have had for Schirach?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say exactly, of course. I do not know the
details of this matter. I only know that Himmler, in my presence, made
the suggestion to the Führer that Schirach should be brought and tried
before the Volksgericht for some reason or other. I do not know the
details. I was not interested in them. I said to the Führer that this,
in my opinion, would make a very bad impression from the point of view
of foreign policy and I know that Himmler received no answer from the
Führer; at any rate, he did not give the order. What consequences that
would have had I cannot say, but when such a suggestion came from
Himmler, the consequences were very serious.
HERR BÖHM: How is it that you were witness to this conversation and how
did you react to it?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was purely accidental; I have just stated that I told
the Führer as well as Himmler that it would make a very bad impression.
HERR BÖHM: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions on behalf of the
defendants’ counsel?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, when you began to advise Hitler on
matters of foreign policy in 1933, were you familiar with the League of
Nations declaration of 1927?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know which declaration you mean.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember the League of Nations
declaration of 1927?
VON RIBBENTROP: The League of Nations has made many declarations. Please
tell me which one you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It made a rather important one about aggressive
war in 1927, didn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know this declaration in detail, but it is
clear that the League of Nations, like everyone, was against an
aggressive war, and at that time Germany was a member of the League of
Nations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was a member, and the preamble of the
declaration was:
“Being convinced that a war of aggression would never serve as a
means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence
an international crime...”
Were you familiar with that when you...
VON RIBBENTROP: Not in detail, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was rather an important matter to be familiar
with if you were going to advise Hitler, who was then Chancellor, on
foreign policy, wasn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: This declaration was certainly important, and
corresponded exactly with my attitude at that time. But subsequent
events have proved that the League of Nations was not in a position to
save Germany from chaos.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold that as your own view?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold the expression of
opinion I have quoted to you from the preamble as your own view?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was as such my fundamental attitude, but on the
other hand I was of the opinion that Germany should be given help in
some way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I gathered. Now, apart from that, if you were
not familiar in detail with that resolution, were you familiar in detail
with the Kellogg-Briand Pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was familiar with it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with the view expressed in the
preamble and in the pact that there should be a renunciation of war as
an instrument of national policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell us how you carried that
out. Let’s take the first example. Are you telling this Tribunal that as
far as you know, no pressure or threats were made to Herr Von
Schuschnigg?
VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean in the discussions with Hitler at the
Obersalzberg?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, on the 12th of February.
VON RIBBENTROP: At this discussion...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, answer the question first, and then you
can give your explanation. Are you saying that no pressure or threats
were put to Herr Von Schuschnigg on the 12th of February? Answer that
“yes” or “no”, and we will go into the explanation later.
VON RIBBENTROP: Not exactly, no. I believe that the dominating
personality of the Führer and the arguments that he presented made such
an impression on Schuschnigg that he finally agreed to Hitler’s
proposals.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s just look into that.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I continue? I personally had a conversation at that
time with Herr Schuschnigg after his first talk with Adolf Hitler, in
which his reaction to the first conference became very clear to me. This
reaction was one of being deeply impressed by Hitler’s personality and
by the arguments which Hitler submitted to him. Schuschnigg told me in
this conversation, which was extremely cordial, that he too—and I
believe these were his words—regarded it as a historical mission to
bring the two peoples closer together.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were present at the Berghof—I don’t say in
the room, but in the building or about? Were there present Hitler,
yourself, the Defendant Von Papen, the Defendant Keitel, General
Sperrle, and General Von Reichenau?
VON RIBBENTROP: I think that is correct, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the morning of the 12th, I think that
Hitler and Von Schuschnigg were together for about 2 hours before lunch
in the morning, isn’t that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the time exactly. Anyway, they had a
long conversation, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, after lunch, Von Schuschnigg was
allowed to have a short conversation with his own Foreign Minister,
Guido Schmidt, isn’t that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know exactly, but it is possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, Von Schuschnigg and Guido
Schmidt were called before you and the Defendant Von Papen, isn’t that
right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. I do not think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember that? Just think again.
VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean—then I believe I did not understand the
question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I will put it again. After a conversation
that Schuschnigg had with Guido Schmidt, he and Schmidt came before you
and the Defendant Von Papen and they had a conversation with you, which
I will put to you in a moment. Now, isn’t it right that you and Von
Papen saw Von Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not believe so. I do not believe that is true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember exhibiting to Von Schuschnigg
a typewritten draft containing the demands made on Von Schuschnigg? Now,
just think.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely possible. Hitler had dictated a
memorandum, and it is possible that I gave it to Schuschnigg. I am not
sure of the details now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the subject of that memorandum?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know; and in order to explain my ignorance
about the entire conference I would like to state that at this time I
was not at all informed about the Austrian problem because Hitler had
handled these matters personally and I had become Foreign Minister only
a few days before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you hand someone a memorandum, at an occasion
which you have described to him as a historic meeting, presumably you
can give the Tribunal at any rate an outline of what the memorandum
contained. What were the points in the memorandum?
VON RIBBENTROP: Curiously enough, I really do not remember that in
detail. This meeting was one between the Führer and Schuschnigg, and
everything that was done and agreed upon there was either dictated by
the Führer himself or was suggested to the Führer by someone else. I did
not know the details. I only knew that it was primarily a question of
bringing about better relations between Germany and Austria. Since many
National Socialists had been arrested in Austria the relations between
the two countries had been greatly troubled.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if I remind you, perhaps, it will bring it
back. Were not they the three points for the reorganization of the
Austrian Cabinet, including:
The appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the Ministry of
Security in the Interior; second, a general political amnesty of Nazis
convicted of crimes; and thirdly, a declaration of equal rights for
Austrian National Socialists and the taking of them into the Fatherland
Front?
Are these the points that you were putting to Von Schuschnigg?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember exactly now but that may be about
correct. At that time that corresponded with the vague notion and
knowledge I had about Austrian affairs.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you tell Von Schuschnigg that Hitler had
informed you that these demands which you were offering were the final
demands of the Führer and that Hitler was not prepared to discuss them?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that, but it is possible that I told Von
Schuschnigg something to that effect but at the moment I do not
remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say, “You must accept the whole of these
demands?”
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so, I did not say that. I exerted no
pressure whatsoever on Schuschnigg, for I still remember that this
conversation which lasted about an hour to an hour and a half was
confined to generalities and to personal matters and that I gained from
this conversation a very favorable impression of Schuschnigg’s
personality, which fact I even mentioned to my staff later on. I put no
pressure on Schuschnigg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us that before, and I am suggesting to
you that at this conversation you were trying to get Schuschnigg to sign
the document containing these terms which you agree that you may have
had. I want you to remember the answer and remind you of that.
Don’t you remember Herr Von Schuschnigg turning to the Defendant Von
Papen and saying, “Now, you told me that I would not be confronted with
any demands if I came to Berchtesgaden,” and Herr Von Papen apologizing
and saying, “That is so. I did not know you were going to be confronted
with these demands.”
Don’t you remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that. That cannot be quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will just see. Do you remember Von
Schuschnigg being called back to speak to Hitler again and Guido Schmidt
remaining with you to make some alterations in the document which you
were putting?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that changes were made; it is
conceivable, I do not remember the details, though.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you hear that in this second
conversation with Hitler, Hitler telling Schuschnigg that he must comply
with these demands within 3 days?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am hearing that for the first time today. I did
not know that. I was not present at the second conversation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just be a little careful before you say you have
heard that for the first time today, because in a moment I will show you
some documents. Are you sure you did not hear that Hitler told
Schuschnigg that he must comply within 3 days, or Hitler would order the
march into Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that to be out of the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If he had said that, you will agree that that
would be the heaviest military and political pressure? There could be no
other heavier pressure than suggesting a march into Austria, could
there?
VON RIBBENTROP: In view of the tense situation that existed between the
two countries at that time, that, of course, would have been a pressure.
But one thing must be taken for granted; and that is, that under no
circumstances would it have been possible in the long run to find any
solution between the two countries if there were no closer contact, and
from the beginning—I should like to state this here—it was always my
view that the two countries should form some sort of close alliance, and
I visualized a customs and currency union...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve given that view about three times. Let us
come back to this interview which I am putting back to you, that took
place on the 12th of February. Don’t you know that Schuschnigg said: “I
am only the Bundeskanzler. I have to refer to President Miklas, and I
can sign this protocol only subject to reference to President Miklas.”
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that any more in detail.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Hitler opening the door and
calling Keitel?
VON RIBBENTROP: No; I only learned here that this is supposed to have
happened. I have no knowledge whatsoever about that. I heard about it
here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know it is true, don’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know. I heard about it here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Keitel’s going in to speak to
Hitler?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I did not hear about that. I do
not know, I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Von Schuschnigg signed this
document on the condition that within 3 days these demands would be
fulfilled, otherwise Germany would march into Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it would be convenient if the witness
had the German Document Book in front of him. I tried to get most of the
pages agreeing.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps this would be a good time to break
off.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, will you look first at the Defendant
Jodl’s diary, the entry of the 13th of February, it is the Ribbentrop
Document Book, Page 9, Exhibit Number USA-72, Document Number 1780-PS.
The entry is as follows:
“In the afternoon General K.”—that is Keitel—“asks Admiral
C.”—that is Admiral Canaris—“and myself to come to his
apartment. He tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect
that military pressure by shamming military action should be
kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers
are drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone for
approval.”
You were suggesting on Friday that the Defendant Jodl had got hold of
some rumors or gossip that were going around the Berghof. That rumor or
gossip was a definite order from his superior officer, General Keitel,
wasn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I know absolutely nothing about any military measures,
therefore I cannot pass judgment on the value of this entry. The Führer
did not inform me about any military measures regarding Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal you were there,
that you were taking part, handling the document, and that Hitler never
said a word to you about what he was arranging with the Defendant
Keitel, who was also there?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the next entry for the
14th of February:
“At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer arrives. Canaris
went to Munich to the Counterintelligence Office (Abwehrstelle
VII) and initiated the different measures. The effect was quick
and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is
undertaking serious military preparation.”
Are you telling this Tribunal that you know nothing about either these
military measures or the effect on Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about the military measures, but
I consider it quite possible that the Führer, in order to put more
stress on his wishes, caused something to be done in this field...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, just a moment!
VON RIBBENTROP: ...and that may have contributed in the end to the
solution of the problem.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I quite agree. That is just why I am
putting it to you that it did contribute. But surely you as Foreign
Minister of the Reich, with all the channels available to a foreign
minister, knew something about the effect in Austria, which General Jodl
was remarking, that “the effect was quick and strong.”—the impression
was “created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.”
Are you telling the Tribunal, on your oath, that you knew nothing about
the effect in Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to point out again that I did not know
anything about military measures and, if I had known, I would not have
the slightest reason not to say here that it was not so. It is a fact,
however, that in the days before and after the conversations between the
Führer and Schuschnigg, I was so busy taking over the Foreign Office
that I treated the Austrian problem, at that time, merely as a secondary
matter in foreign policy. I did not play a leading role in the handling
of the Austrian problem...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We know you said that before, that you were
engaged in the Foreign Office, and my question was perfectly clear—my
question was: Are you telling this Tribunal that you did not know
anything about the effect in Austria—you, as Foreign Minister of the
Reich? Now answer the question. Did you or did you not know of the
effect in Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about that effect, and I did not
observe it in detail either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, that is your story and you want that to
be taken as a criterion, a touchstone of whether or not you are telling
the truth; that you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich, say that you knew
nothing about the effect in Austria of the measures taken by Keitel on
the Führer’s orders? Is that your final answer?
VON RIBBENTROP: To that I can tell you again quite precisely, I learned
from the Führer when I went to London a little later, and that is
absolutely the first thing I remember about the entire Austrian affair,
that matters in Austria were working out more or less as agreed upon in
the conversations in Berchtesgaden. I did not make any particular
observations in detail at that time, so far as I remember. It is
possible that this or that detail slipped my memory in the meantime, for
many years have passed since then.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next two entries in Jodl’s
diary:
“15 February. In the evening, an official announcement about the
positive results of the conference at Obersalzberg was issued.”
“16 February. Changes in the Austrian Government and the general
political amnesty.”
Do you remember my putting to you what Herr Von Schuschnigg signed, and
the condition was made that the matters would come into effect within 3
days; within 3 days there was a conference about the effects and the
changes were announced in Austria in accordance with the note that you
had put to Schuschnigg. You can see that that is clear, isn’t it—3
days—you still say...
VON RIBBENTROP: Of these 3 days, as I have told you already, I know
nothing; but it was a matter of course that this meeting would have some
results in the way of appeasing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You call it “appeasing”? Is that your considered
view to the Tribunal, that assuming that the Defendant Jodl is telling
the truth or assuming that the Defendant Keitel said that to him, as
General Jodl was saying, that these military preparations should be put
in hand, isn’t that the most severe political and military pressure that
could be put on the chancellor of another state?
VON RIBBENTROP: If one considers the problem from a higher viewpoint,
no; I have a different opinion. Here was a problem which might possibly
have led to war, to a European war; and I believe, and I also said that
later to Lord Halifax in London, that it was better to solve this
problem than to allow it to become a permanent sore spot on the body of
Europe.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to put words in your mouth. Do you
mean by the last answer, that it was better that political and military
pressure should be put on Schuschnigg, so long as the problem was
solved? Is that your view?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not get that question. May I ask you to repeat it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question was: Is it your view that it was
better that political and military pressure should be put on Herr Von
Schuschnigg if by that means the problem was solved?
VON RIBBENTROP: If by that means, a worse complication, that is to say a
war was actually avoided, I consider that was the better way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just tell me, why did you and your friends keep
Schuschnigg in prison for 7 years?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, at any rate, I believe Schuschnigg—I do
not know the details—must at that time have done something which was
against the State or the interests of the State. But if you say
“prison”, I know only from my own recollection that the Führer said and
emphasized several times that Schuschnigg should be treated particularly
well and decently and that he was not in a prison but lodged in a house
and also, I believe, that his wife was with him. I cannot, however, say
more on the subject from my own experience and from my own observation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean “prison.” I will substitute for it
“Buchenwald” and “Dachau”. He was at both Buchenwald and Dachau. Do you
think he was enjoying himself there?
VON RIBBENTROP: I only heard here that Herr Schuschnigg was in a
concentration camp; I did not know before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just make a change, just try to answer my
question. Why did you and your friends keep Schuschnigg in prison for 7
years?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything on that point. I can only say and
repeat, that, according to what I heard at that time, he was not in
prison but confined in a villa and had all the comforts possible. That
is what I heard to that time and I was glad about it because, as I have
said already, I liked him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is one thing he did not have, Witness, he
did not have the opportunity of giving his account as to what had
happened at Berchtesgaden or of his side of the Anschluss to anyone for
these 7 years, did he? That is quite obvious with all you say, that he
was very comfortable at Buchenwald and Dachau, wherever he was, but
comfortable or not, he didn’t get the chance of putting his side of the
happenings to the world, did he?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I could not judge.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You couldn’t judge? You know perfectly well,
don’t you, that Herr Von Schuschnigg was not allowed to publish his
account of anything while he was under restraint for these 7 years?
Don’t you know that quite well?
VON RIBBENTROP: That may be assumed...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now...
VON RIBBENTROP: It may have been in the interests of the State, however.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is your view of it. We will pass to
another subject.
I am going to ask you a few questions now about your share in the
dealing with Czechoslovakia. Will you agree with me, that in March of
1938, the Foreign Office, that is, you, through your ambassador in
Prague, took over control of the activities of the Sudeten Deutsche
Party under Konrad Henlein?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am sorry but that is not correct. May I explain...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Before you explain, I think you might save time
if you look at the document book on Page 20 in your book, it is Page 31
in the English book, and listen while I refer you to a letter from your
ambassador.
VON RIBBENTROP: Which number, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 20. It is a letter from your ambassador in
Prague to the Foreign Office.
If I may explain to the Tribunal, it is not the defendant’s document
book, it is the Prosecution’s book. I will see, hereafter, that it is
correct.
[_Turning to the defendant_]: Now, this letter from your ambassador to
the Foreign Office...
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know about that letter. May I...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me refer you to Paragraph 1. I refer
you also to Paragraph 3, so you need not be worried that I shall miss
it.
Paragraph 1:
“The line of German Foreign policy, as transmitted by the German
Legation, is exclusively decisive for the policy and tactics of
the Sudeten German Party. My”—that is, your
ambassador—“directives are to be complied with implicitly.”
Paragraph 2:
“Public speeches and the press will be co-ordinated uniformly
with my approval. The editorial staff of _Zeit_ is to be
improved.”
Paragraph 3:
“Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which,
in the end, might lead to political complications, and adopts
the line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. The
objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and
to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action.” (Document Number
3060-PS)
Having read that, don’t you agree with me—what I put to you a moment
ago—that the activities of the Sudeten German Party were to take place
according to the directives?
VON RIBBENTROP: May I state an opinion on that now?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like the answer to that question first,
and I am sure the Tribunal will let you make an explanation. It is
perfectly easy to answer that question “yes” or “no”. Isn’t it right
that that letter shows that the Sudeten German Party was acting under
your directives; isn’t that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to explain. This letter in itself is a
crowning proof of the fact that things were quite to the contrary.
Between the Sudeten German Party and many agencies in the Reich,
connections had been established; this was quite natural, because there
was a very strong movement among the Sudeten Germans which was striving
for closer connection with the Reich, especially after Adolf Hitler had
come to power. These tendencies were beginning to impair the relations
between Germany and Czechoslovakia and this very letter bears proof of
the fact that I attempted gradually to put these uncontrolled
connections, which existed between the Sudeten Germans and the Reich, in
some way under control.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I am asking you, Witness. What
I put to you, and I put it to you three times, I think, quite clearly:
Does this letter show that that Party, the Sudeten German Party, was
from that time acting under your directions? Are you still denying that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I deny that emphatically. The case is just the
opposite. This letter indicates an attempt to direct the German-Czech
relations, which had become very difficult due to the natural desire of
the Sudeten Germans to establish closer relations with the German
people, into right and sensible channels, which however, shortly after
this letter, unfortunately failed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you deny what I have put to you, what is
meant when your ambassador writes to the Foreign Office and says that
the line of German policy, as transmitted by the German Legation, is
exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party?
What does that mean if it doesn’t mean what you have said—that the
Party was acting under your direction? What else can it mean if it
doesn’t mean that?
VON RIBBENTROP: It means exactly what I have said, that the legation
should try to induce the leadership of the Sudeten Germans to adopt a
sensible program, so that the illegal tendencies which were existent
should not lead to difficulties in German-Czech relations. That was at
that time the purport of the conversation with the legation in Prague
and that is quite clearly expressed by this letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us see what this sensible program which you
were suggesting was. The next day, on the 17th of March, Konrad Henlein
writes to you and suggests a personal talk; and if you will turn over to
Page 26 of the German document book—Page 33 of the English—you will
find the note of the personal talk which you had at the Foreign Office
on the 29th of March with Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, and two other
gentlemen whose names are not so well known. (Document Number 2788-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-95) I only want you to look at four sentences in
that, after the first one: “The Reichsminister started out by
emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference, which had been
scheduled, strictly a secret.”
And then you refer to the meeting that the Führer had had with Konrad
Henlein the afternoon before. I just want you to have that in mind.
Now, if you will look down the page, after the “1” and “2”, there is a
paragraph which begins “The Foreign Minister”, and the second sentence
is:
“It is essential to propose a maximum program which as its final
aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It appears
dangerous to be satisfied prematurely with promises of the
Czechoslovakian Government, which, on the one hand, would give
the impression abroad that a solution has been found and, on the
other hand, would only partially satisfy the Sudeten Germans.”
Then, if you will look one sentence further on, after some
uncomplimentary remarks about Beneš, it says:
“The aim of the negotiations to be carried on by the Sudeten
German Party with the Czechoslovakian Government would finally
be to avoid entry into the government”—observe the next
words—“by the extension and gradual specification of the
demands to be made.”
And then you make the position of the Reich Cabinet clear:
“The Reich Cabinet”—the next sentence but one—“itself must
refuse to appear towards the government in Prague or towards
London and Paris as the advocate”—note the next words—“or
peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands.”
The policy which I suggest to you was now to direct the activities of
the Sudeten Germans. They were to avoid agreement with the Czechoslovak
Government, avoid participation in the Czechoslovak Government, and the
Reich Cabinet in its turn would avoid acting as mediator in the matter;
in other words, Witness, that you, through your influence on the Sudeten
Germans, were taking every step and doing your utmost to see that no
agreement could be reached on the difficulties or the minority problem.
Isn’t that right? Isn’t that what you were telling them at that
interview?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Give your explanation. What would you say these
words meant?
VON RIBBENTROP: I summoned Konrad Henlein at that time, and believe it
was the only time, or perhaps I saw him once more; unfortunately, only
once or twice, in order to enjoin him, too, to work for a peaceful
development of the Sudeten German problem. The demands of the Sudeten
Germans were already far-reaching at that time. They wanted to return to
the Reich. That was more or less tacit or was expressed. It seemed to me
a solution which was dangerous and which had to be stopped in some way
or another because otherwise it might lead to a war. Henlein finally
came to see me then, but I wish to point out in advance that it was the
only time, I believe, that I discussed the matter thoroughly with
Henlein, and soon afterwards I lost control of the matter. The entire
Sudeten German problem, that is, what is contained in this letter and
about which there can be no doubt, is:
Firstly, that I wanted to bring the efforts of the Sudeten Germans to a
peaceful development so that we could support it diplomatically also,
which seemed to me absolutely justified.
And secondly, that in this way we should avoid the sudden development of
a situation which, by acts of terror or other wild incidents, would lead
to a German-Czech and European crisis.
Those were at that time the reasons why I summoned Henlein.
Now, as to the various sentences which the Prosecutor has read, it is
clear that the Sudeten German Party had at that time very far-reaching
demands. Naturally, they wanted Adolf Hitler to send an ultimatum to
Prague saying “You must do that, and that is final,” and that is what
they would have preferred.
We did not want that, of course. We wanted a quiet, peaceful development
and solution of these things. Therefore, I discussed with Henlein at
that time the way in which the Sudeten German Party was to proceed in
order to put through their demands gradually. The demands which I had in
mind at that time were demands for a far-reaching cultural autonomy, and
possibly autonomy in other fields too.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you were thinking of cultural and social
autonomy, why were you telling these gentlemen not to come to an
agreement with the Prague Government?
VON RIBBENTROP: I could not specify that now. That may have been for
tactical considerations. I assume that Konrad Henlein made such a
suggestion and that I agreed with it. Naturally I did not know the
problem too well in detail and this note must be—I presume that what
happened was that Henlein himself merely explained his program—the
details are not contained here—and that I agreed to it more or less.
Therefore, I assume that at that time it seemed perhaps advisable to
Henlein for tactical reasons not to enter into the government and assume
responsibilities at that moment, but rather to try first to proceed with
the matter in a different way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the 29th of March, and you have told
the Tribunal a moment ago about your anxiety for peace. You very soon
knew that there wasn’t going to be any question of relying on peaceful
measures, didn’t you? Can you remember? Just try and apply yourself to
it, because you have obviously been applying your mind to this. Can you
remember when Hitler disclosed to you that he was making the military
preparations for occupying Czechoslovakia that autumn?
VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler spoke very little to me about military
matters. I do not remember such a disclosure, but I know of course that
the Führer was determined to solve this problem at a fixed time; and
according to the experiences which Germany had had in past years, it was
for him a matter of course that to do this he was obliged, I might say,
to take some sort of military measures in order to put more pressure on
his demands.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me help you about that. Turn on to Page 31
of your document book. It is Page 37 of the English Document Book.
(Document Number 2360-PS, Exhibit GB-134)
VON RIBBENTROP: Page 31?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 31 of your document book, yes. It is a
quotation from Hitler’s speech in January 1939, but it happens to make
clear this point. You see he says—have you got it, Witness?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “On the basis of this unbearable provocation,
which was still further emphasized by truly infamous persecution and
terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve the
Sudeten German question in a final and radical manner. On 28 May I gave:
“1. The order for the preparation of military steps against this
State”—that is Czechoslovakia—“to be completed by 2 October.
“2. I ordered the intensive and speedy completion of our line of
fortifications in the West.” (Document Number 2360-PS)
I want to remind you of that, because there was a meeting on the 28th of
May, and that is Hitler’s own account of it. Put in another way, he
said, “It is my absolute will that Czechoslovakia should disappear from
the map.” And then he made clear the other thing about the defensive
front in the West.
Now, do you remember that meeting, the 28th of May?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have here, I believe, seen the document about it. I do
not recall the meeting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if—I think Captain Fritz Wiedemann was
still adjutant of the Führer at that time; it was before he went
abroad—he says you were there, would you deny it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that, but I believe that is an error by Herr
Wiedemann.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you think you weren’t there?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am inclined to believe that it is an error. At any
rate I do not remember that meeting. I could not say for sure. Generally
I was not drawn into military affairs, but in this case I cannot say for
sure. But I knew that it was common talk that the Führer, in the course
of the year 1938, became more and more determined to assure the rights,
as he put it, of the Sudeten Germans; I knew that he had made certain
military preparations for that purpose, but I did not know in what form
and to what extent.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just to put your point of view fairly—I don’t
want to put anything more into it—you knew that military preparations
were being made, but you did not know the details of what we know now as
“Fall Grün.”
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know any details; I never heard about
them, but I knew that during the last weeks and months of the crisis...
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I object to this question. I believe I may, in
order to save time, just point out that the entire Sudeten German policy
was sanctioned by the four great powers, England, France, Italy, and
Germany, and by the Munich Agreement which determined this policy.
Therefore, I do not see that in this respect there can be a violation of
International Law.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is perfectly proper.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, at the time you knew enough to discuss the
possible course of the possible war with the foreign personalities.
Would you look on to Page 34, that is Page 40 of the English book. These
are the notes of a discussion with the Italian Ambassador. I do not know
which of your officials it took place with, but I want you to look at
where it says in a handwritten note “only for the Reichsminister.”
“Attolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed
unmistakably to the Italians our intentions against the Czechs.
Also, as to the date he had information so far that he might go
on leave for perhaps 2 months, but certainly not later than...”
(Document Number 2800-PS)
If you look at the date you will see it is the 18th of July, and 2
months from the 18th of July would be the 18th of September. Then if you
will look, a month later there is a note, I think signed by yourself, on
the 27th of August:
“Attolico paid me a visit. He had received another written
instruction from Mussolini, asking that Germany communicate in
time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia.
Mussolini asked for such notification, as Attolico assured me,
in order: ‘to be able to take in due time the necessary measures
on the French frontier.’
“Note: I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former
_démarche_, that I could not give him any date, that, however,
in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of
any decision.” (Document Number 2792-PS)
So that it is quite clear, isn’t it, that you knew that the general
German preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia were under way but
the date had not been fixed beyond the general directive of Hitler, that
it was to be ready by the beginning of October. That was the position in
July and August, wasn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: In August, 27 August, there was, of course, already a
sort of crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia about that problem;
and it is quite clear that during that time there was some alarm as to
the final outcome. And apparently, according to this document, I said to
the Italian Ambassador that in case crisis developed into a military
action, Mussolini would, of course, be notified in advance.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And Mussolini would be ready to make a
demonstration on the French frontier in order to help forward your
military plans; is that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is in this document, but I do not know anything
about it. Perhaps Attolico said that; if it says so here he must have
said it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over to about the same time,
Pages 36 to 38, Pages 41 to 43 of the English book. I do not want to
take up time in reading it all, but that is the account of the meeting
which you had with the Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya. And I
should be very glad if, in the interest of time, you would try to answer
the general question.
Weren’t you trying in your discussions with Imredy and Kanya to get the
Hungarians to be prepared to attack Czechoslovakia, should war
eventuate?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am not very familiar with the contents of this
document. May I read it first, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just read to you...
VON RIBBENTROP: I may perhaps be able to answer it from recollection. I
do not know exactly what the document says, but my recollection is, that
at that time a crisis was impending. It is quite natural, if an armed
conflict about the Sudeten German problem was within the realm of
possibility, that Germany should then establish some sort of contact
with neighboring states. That is a matter of course, but I believe...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you went a little beyond contacting them,
didn’t you? The document says at the end of the sixth paragraph, “Von
Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good
opportunity and participate.” (Document Number 2796-PS)
That is a bit beyond contacting people. What you are saying to the
Hungarians is: “If you want the revision of your boundaries, you have to
come into the war with us.” It is quite clear, isn’t it, Witness, that
is what you were saying, that is what you were trying to do?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is exactly in line with what I just said. I do not
know if that expression was used, but, at any rate, it is clear that at
that time, I remember, I told these gentlemen that the possibility of a
conflict was present and that in such a case it would be advisable if we
reached an agreement regarding our interests. I would like to mention
that Hungary, during all the preceding years, considered it one of the
hardest conditions of the peace treaty that these territories in the
north had been separated from her and naturally she was very much
interested in the agreement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were very much interested in offering them
revision. Just look at the last two paragraphs. It is headed “The 25th.”
It should be Page 38 of your document book. It begins—the very end of
this statement:
“Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness for participation in
case of a German-Czech conflict, Von Kanya mentioned several
days ago that his country would need a period of one or two
years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of
Hungary. During today’s conversation, Von Kanya corrected this
remark and said that Hungary’s military situation was much
better; his country would be ready, as far as armaments were
concerned, to take part in the conflict by 1 October of this
year.” (Document Number 2797-PS)
You see that? What I am putting to you, Witness, is this: That your
position was perfectly clear. First of all, you get the Sudeten Germans
under your control. Then you learned from Hitler that there were
military preparations. Then you get the Italians in line. Then you get
the Hungarians in line. You are getting everyone ready for aggression
against Czechoslovakia. That is what I am putting to you. I want you to
be quite clear about it, to be under no misapprehension. Now, look,
what...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I answer to that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, if you like.
VON RIBBENTROP: I said once before that the Sudeten German Party was
unfortunately not under my control. Moreover, it is and was my view that
it was the fundamental right of the Sudeten Germans, according to the
law of the sovereign rights of peoples which had been proclaimed in
1919, to decide themselves where they wanted to belong.
When Adolf Hitler came, this pressure to join the Reich became very
strong. Adolf Hitler was determined to solve this problem, either by
diplomatic means or, if it had to be, by other means. That was obvious,
and became more so to me. At any rate, I personally did everything to
try to solve the problem diplomatically. On the other hand, however, in
order to bring about a situation such as eventually led to Munich, I
naturally tried my utmost to surround Germany with friends in order to
make our position as strong as possible in the face of such a problem.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew perfectly well, did you not, that the
Fall Grün and Hitler’s military plans envisaged the conquest of the
whole of Czechoslovakia? You knew that, didn’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. As far as the Sudeten-German
problem is concerned, the British Government themselves concluded the
agreement at Munich by which the entire problem was solved in the way I
always strove to achieve it by German diplomacy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I am not going to argue politics with
you on any point. I only remind you of this: That the Fall Grün and
Hitler’s plans on this matter had been known to His Majesty’s Government
only since the end of the war, when it came into our possession as a
captured document. What I asked you was—you say that as the Foreign
Minister of the Reich, you did not know of these military plans, that
the conquest of the whole Czechoslovakia was envisaged? You say that?
You want the Tribunal to believe that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I repeat again that I read about Fall Grün and the
conception of Fall Grün here for the first time in the documents. I did
not know that term before, nor was I interested. That the Führer
envisaged a more far-reaching solution became, of course, clear to me
later in the course of the subsequent developments and by the
establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment. We will get to that in a moment.
I just want you to look at the final act of preparation which you were
doing, and I am suggesting for this clear aggression; if you will look
at Page 45 in the book in front of you, you will see a note from the
Foreign Office to the Embassy in Prague.
“Please inform Deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get
into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start
their demands for autonomy tomorrow.” (Document Number 2858-PS)
That was your office’s further act, wasn’t it, in order to make things
difficult for the Government in Prague? You were getting your friends to
induce—to use your own word—the Slovaks to start an advance for
autonomy, is that right? Is that what your office was doing?
VON RIBBENTROP: This is, beyond doubt, a telegram from the Foreign
Office. I do no longer recall the details, but according to the
contents, Henlein apparently approached us to send a telegram because
Henlein was apparently of the opinion, at that time, that he should put
the demands for autonomy to the Prague Government. How that came about,
I could not say in detail today. I would like to emphasize again that
Conrad Henlein’s activity—I say, unfortunately, and I said so
before—was far beyond my control. I saw Henlein only once or twice
during that entire time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take you through all the
details. You understand what I’m suggesting to you, that your office was
now taking one of its last steps, because this was in the middle of the
crisis, on the 19th of September, trying to weaken the Czech Government
by inducing demands of autonomy from the Slovaks. You said that you were
only passing on Henlein’s wishes. If you like to leave it at that, I
shall not trouble you further. Besides, you suggested—I come on to what
took place in the spring and ask you one or two questions about that. In
the spring Hitler was out and you acquiesced in his wishes, without—I
was going to say swallowing, but I want to choose my language
carefully—to obtain the adherence of Bohemia and Moravia to the Reich
and to make Slovakia separate from Bohemia and Moravia. Now, just look
on to Page 65 of the book in front of you. That is a telegram in secret
code from the Foreign Office, from yourself in fact; to the Embassy in
Prague.
“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today,
in case you should get any written communications from President
Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take
any other action but pass them on here by ciphered telegrams.
Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the legation
to make a point of not being available during the next few days
if the Czech Government wants to communicate with you.”
(Document Number 2815-PS)
Why were you so anxious that your ambassador should not carry out these
ordinary functions and form a channel of communication with the Czech
Government?
VON RIBBENTROP: That happened as follows. I remember very well. That had
the following reasons: The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia,
Chvalkovsky, on one of these days, it must have been the same day,
approached the envoy in Prague, saying that President Hacha wished to
speak to the Führer. I had reported that to the Führer, and the Führer
had agreed to receive the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister or the
Czechoslovakian President. The Führer said, at the same time, that he
wished to conduct these negotiations himself and that he did not wish
anybody else, even the legation, to interfere in any way. That,
according to my recollection, was the reason for this telegram. No one
was to undertake anything in Prague; whatever was done would be done by
the Führer personally.
I wish to point out that also at that time signs of an impending crisis
between Prague and ourselves became apparent. The visit of President
Hacha or his desire to see the Führer can be explained as being the
result of this situation in general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like to remind you what you
and the Führer were doing on that day. You will find that if you look at
Page 66, which is 71 of the English book. You were having a conference,
you and the Führer, with Meissner and the Defendant Keitel and Dietrich
and Keppler; and you were having the conference with the Slovaks, with
M. Tiso. Do you remember that conference?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember that conference very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I will ask you a general question
and perhaps without putting the details to you. What Hitler and you were
doing at that conference was saying this to the Slovaks: “If you do not
declare your independence of Prague, we shall leave you to the tender
mercies of Hungary.” Isn’t that in a sentence a fair summary of what
Hitler and you were saying at that conference?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct to a certain degree. But I would like to
add a further statement to that. The situation at the time was as
follows, and one has to look at it from a political point of view: The
Hungarians were highly dissatisfied and they wanted to regain the
territories which they had lost by the peace treaty and today form a
part of Czechoslovakia, that is the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. There
were, therefore, constantly great differences between Pressburg
(Bratislava) and Budapest and, chiefly, also between Prague and
Budapest. The outbreak of an armed conflict could be expected at any
time; at least half a dozen times we were given to understand by the
Hungarian Government that this could not go on forever; that they must
have their revision in one way or the other. The situation was such that
for quite some time very strong movements for independence existed among
the Slovaks. We were approached on this matter quite frequently, at
first by Tuka and later by Tiso. In this conference described here, the
situation was that the Führer, who knew for weeks of the endeavors of
the Slovaks to become independent, finally received Tiso, later
President of the State, and told him that now, of course—I believe he
told him during this conversation—that he was not interested in the
question for its own sake. But if anything should happen at all, then
the Slovaks must proclaim their independence as quickly as possible.
There is no doubt that at the time we expected an action by Hungary. It
is, however, correct...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can see how very anxious the Slovaks seemed
to be for independence and what action Hitler and yourself were taking
to secure it; if you try to find it, it will probably be at Page 67; it
is at the end of a paragraph beginning, “Now he has permitted Minister
Tiso to come here...”
And just below the middle of that paragraph, Hitler is reported as
saying that he would not tolerate that internal instability and he had
for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It
was not a question of days but of hours. He stated at that time that, if
Slovakia wished to make herself independent, he would support this
endeavor and even guarantee it; he would stand by his words so long as
Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she
hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he
would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of the events for which
he was no longer responsible.
Then in the next paragraph he asks you if you had anything to say and
you are reported as saying (Document Number 2802-PS, Exhibit USA-117):
“The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the
view that in this case a decision was a question of hours and
not of days. He showed Hitler a message he had just received
which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontier.
The Führer read this report and mentioned it to Tiso and
expressed his hope that Slovakia would soon come to a clear
decision.”
Are you denying, Witness, that Hitler and you were putting the strongest
possible pressure you could on the Slovaks to dissolve connections with
Prague and so leave the Czechs standing alone to meet your pressure on
Hacha which was coming in a couple of days?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. Very strong pressure was not
used. There is no doubt that on the part of Hungary—and my remark
refers to the possibility of warlike developments with the
Hungarians—but wishes for independence had for a long time been
conveyed to us again and again by the Slovaks. It is possible that, at
the time, as the document shows, Tiso was hesitating, because after all
it was an important step. But in view of the wish of the Führer, which
must have been obvious by then, to solve the question of Bohemia and
Moravia in one way or another, it was in the interest of the Führer to
do his part to bring about the independence of Slovakia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: One point. This is my last question before I
come to the interview with President Hacha. Don’t you remember that 2
days before Herr Bürckel—that is in my recollection—Herr Bürckel and
another Austrian National Socialist, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart and a
number of German officers, at about 10 in the evening of Saturday, the
11th of March, went into a Cabinet meeting at Bratislava and told the
_soi-disant_ Slovak Government that they should proclaim the
independence of Slovakia? Don’t you know that? It was reported by our
consul.
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall it in detail, but I believe that
something of the kind took place but I do not know exactly what it was.
I believe that it was directed by the Führer. I had, I believe, less to
do with that. I no longer recall that exactly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal very shortly...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it is a quarter to 1 now. We had better
adjourn until 2.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, you were present at the interview
between President Hacha and Hitler on 15 March 1939, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler’s saying at that
interview that he had given the order for German troops to march into
Czechoslovakia, and that at 6 o’clock in the morning the German Army
would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact words, but I know that Hitler
told Hacha that he would occupy the countries of Bohemia and Moravia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember his saying what I put to you,
that he had given the order for German troops to march into
Czechoslovakia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is what I just said.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the Defendant Göring, as he told
the Tribunal, telling President Hacha that he would order the German Air
Forces to bomb Prague?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that in detail, because at
that discussion I was not...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you for a detailed statement; I
am asking you if you remember what I should suppose was a rather
remarkable statement, that the Defendant Göring said to President Hacha
that he would order the German Air Force to bomb Prague if Czech
resistance was not called off. Do you remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that; I was not present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there during the whole interview, were
you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not. If the British Prosecutor will give me a
chance I shall explain how it was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question at the moment.
You say you do not remember that. At any rate, if the Defendant Göring
said that he said it, would you accept that it happened?
VON RIBBENTROP: If Göring says so, then it must, of course, be true. I
have merely stated that I was not present during that conference between
President Hacha and the then Reich Marshal Göring.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that within 2 days
the Czech Army would not exist any more?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that in detail, no; it was a very long
conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that at 6 o’clock
the troops would march in? He was almost ashamed to say that there was
one German division to each Czech battalion.
VON RIBBENTROP: It is possible that something like that was said.
However, I do not remember the details.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If these things were said, will you agree with
me that the most intolerable pressure was put on President Hacha?
VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly Hitler used very clear language. However, to
that I must add that President Hacha, on his part, had come to Berlin in
order to find a solution, together with Hitler. He was surprised that
troops were to march into Czechoslovakia. That I know, and I remember it
exactly. But he agreed to it eventually and then contacted his
government and his chief of staff, so that there would be no hostile
reception for the German troops. He then concluded with Hitler, with the
Czech Foreign Minister and me, the agreement which I had drafted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree with me that that agreement was
obtained through a threat of aggressive action by the German Army and
Air Force?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain, since the Führer told President Hacha
that the German Army would march in, that naturally, this instrument was
written under that impression. That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think you could answer one of my
question directly? I will ask it again. Will you agree with me that that
document was obtained by the most intolerable pressure and threat of
aggression? That is a simple question. Do you agree?
VON RIBBENTROP: In that way, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What further pressure could you put on the head
of a country except to threaten him that your army would march in, in
overwhelming strength, and your Air Force would bomb his capital?
VON RIBBENTROP: War, for instance.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is that but war? Do you not consider it war
that the Army would march in with a proportion of a division over a
battalion, and that the Air Force would bomb Prague?
VON RIBBENTROP: President Hacha had told the Führer that he would place
the fate of his country in the Führer’s hands, and the Führer had...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question. My question is
a perfectly simple one, and I want your answer to it. You have told us
that that agreement was obtained after these threats were made.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what you said a moment ago.
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you that that agreement was obtained by
threat of war. Is that not so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that this threat is incomparably lighter than
the threats under which Germany stood for years through the Versailles
Treaty and its sanctions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, leaving whatever it is comparatively, will
you now answer my question? Do you agree that that agreement was
obtained by threat of war?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was obtained under a pressure, that is under the
pressure of the march into Prague; there is no doubt about that.
However, the decisive point of the whole matter was that the Führer
explained to President Hacha the reasons why he had to do this, and
eventually Hacha agreed fully, after he had consulted his government and
his general staff and heard their opinion. However, it is absolutely
correct that the Führer was resolved to solve this question under any
circumstances. The reason was, that the Führer was of the opinion that
in the remainder of Czechoslovakia there was a conspiracy against the
German Reich; Reich Marshal Göring had already stated that Russian
commissions were said to have been at Czech airdromes. Consequently the
Führer acted as he did because he believed that it was necessary in the
highest interest and for the protection of the German Reich. I might
draw a comparison: For instance, President Roosevelt declared an
interest in the Western Hemisphere; England has extended her interest
over the entire globe. I think, that the interest which the Führer
showed in the remainder of Czechoslovakia was, as such, not unreasonable
for a great power; about the methods one may think as one pleases. At
any rate one thing is certain, and that is that these countries were
occupied without a single drop of blood being shed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were occupied without a single drop of
blood being shed because you had threatened to march in overwhelming
strength and to bomb Prague if they didn’t agree, isn’t that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, not because we had threatened with superiority, but
because we had agreed beforehand that the Germans could march in
unimpeded.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you again, that the agreement was
obtained, however, by your threatening to march in and threatening to
bomb Prague, was it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already told you once that it was not so, but
that the Führer had talked to President Hacha about it and told him that
he would march in. The conversation between President Hacha and Göring
is not known to me. President Hacha signed the agreement after he had
consulted his government and his general staff in Prague by telephone.
There is no doubt that the personality of the Führer, his reasoning, and
finally the announced entry of the German troops induced President Hacha
to sign the agreement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember—would you mind standing up,
General, for a second? [_A Czechoslovakian Army officer arose._] Don’t
you remember that General Ecer asked you some questions once, this
general from Czechoslovakia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say to him that you thought that this
action on the 15th of March was contrary to the declaration of Hitler
given to Chamberlain but, in fact, that Hitler saw in the occupation a
vital necessity for Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I was wrong in the first point; I
will admit that openly; I remembered it afterward. In the Munich
Agreement between Hitler and Chamberlain nothing like that is contained.
It was not intended as a violation of that agreement. In the second
place, I think I stated that Hitler believed he had to act that way in
the interest of his country.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to tell us one or two
general things about your views with regard to Great Britain. Is it
correct that when you went to London as Ambassador of the Reich you
thought there was very little chance of an agreement, in fact that it
was a hundred-to-one chance of getting an understanding with Great
Britain?
VON RIBBENTROP: When I asked the Führer to send me to London
personally...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Here is a simple question I am asking you: Is it
right that when you went to London as Ambassador you thought there was
very little chance of an understanding with England, in fact, that the
chance was a hundred-to-one?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the chances were not good.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These, as you know, are your own words...
VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to add something.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: First answer my question. These are your own
words, aren’t they, that the chance was a hundred-to-one? Do you
remember saying that?
VON RIBBENTROP: A hundred-to-one? I do not remember that, but I want to
add something. I told Hitler that the chance was very small; and I also
told him that I would try everything to bring about an Anglo-German
understanding in spite of the odds.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England did you believe that
war was inevitable? When you left England, when you ceased being
ambassador, did you believe that war was unavoidable?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not of the opinion that it was inevitable, but
that, considering the developments which were taking place in England, a
possibility of war existed, of that I was convinced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to be careful about this. Did you say
that you didn’t think war was unavoidable when you left England?
VON RIBBENTROP: I can neither say that it was unavoidable nor that it
was avoidable; at any rate, it was clear to me that with the development
of the policy towards Germany which was taking place in England, an
armed conflict might lie in the realm of possibility.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at page 211-E of the document book;
English book, 170.
VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 211?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now will you look at the second paragraph? It
reads like this:
“He, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister), had been more than
skeptical even on his arrival in London and had considered the
chances for an understanding as a hundred-to-one. The
warmongers’ clique in England had won the upper hand. When he
(the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable.” (Document Number
1834-PS)
Is that what you said to Ambassador Oshima?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I said exactly that; at any rate,
that is diplomatic language, Mr. Prosecutor, and it is quite possible
that we at that time, as a result of the situation, in consultation with
the Japanese ambassador, considered it opportune to express it that way.
At any rate, that is not the important point; the important thing is
that as I remember, when I left England a certainty and inevitability of
war did not exist. Whether in later years I said this or that has no
bearing on what I said when I left London. I do not think that there is
the least bit of evidence for that. Perhaps I tried to draw him into the
war against England and therefore used forceful language.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As you said “no,” just look at Document Number
TC-75, Exhibit GB-28, and at your conclusions that are to be drawn. You
will see it at the end under Number 5, “Therefore, conclusions to be
drawn by us...” It is about the end of the third page:
“5) Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us:
“1) Outwardly further understanding with England while
protecting the interest of our friends;
“2) Formation, under great secrecy but with all persistence, of
a coalition against England, that is, in practice a tightening
of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the winning over of
all nations whose interests conform with ours, directly or
indirectly; close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats
of the three great powers towards this purpose.”
And the last sentence:
“Every day on which—no matter what tactical interludes of
rapprochement towards us are attempted—our political
considerations are not guided fundamentally by the thought of
England as our most dangerous adversary, would be a gain for our
enemies.”
Why did you tell the Tribunal a minute ago that you had not advised the
Führer that there should be outward friendly relations and in actuality
a coalition against her?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what kind of a document that is at all.
May I see it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by yourself on the 2d of January
1938. It is your own report to the Führer.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite correct as such; that is the
conclusive statement: Only thus can we, some day, come to an agreement
or to a conflict with England. The situation at that time was clearly
this, that England was resisting the German wishes for a revision which
the Führer had declared vital and that only through a strong diplomatic
coalition did it seem possible to induce England, by diplomatic and not
by bellicose means.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You probably told him what was untrue?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, and I also do not know whether the
details have been recorded accurately. It is a long record; I do not
know where it comes from.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your own record of the meeting, from
captured German documents.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is quite possible, but many things are said in
diplomacy every word of which is not weighed carefully. At any rate, the
truth is that when I left London there was no certainty that the war was
inevitable, but there is no doubt that I was skeptical when I left
London and did not know in what direction things would be drifting,
particularly on account of the very strong pro-war party in England.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, will you speak a little bit more slowly?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, Sir.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England, was it not your view
that the German policy should be pretended friendliness toward England
and actual formation of a coalition against her?
VON RIBBENTROP: Put this way, that is not correct. It was clear to me,
when I became Foreign Minister, that the realization of the German
desires in Europe was difficult and that it was principally England who
opposed them. I had tried for years, by order of the Führer, to achieve
these things by means of a friendly understanding with England.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now to answer my question: Did you
advise the Führer that the proper policy was pretended friendliness with
England and in actuality the formation of a coalition against her? Did
you or did you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not the right way of putting it to agree to
these German aspirations. That without doubt, was the situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, Witness, why you told the
Tribunal 5 minutes ago that you had not advised Hitler in the sense in
which I put to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Which advice do you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Outwardly an understanding with England and
formation under great secrecy of a coalition against her. I put that to
you twice and you denied it, I want to know why you did deny it.
VON RIBBENTROP: I said quite clearly that England was resisting the
German requests and that therefore, if Germany wanted to realize these
aspirations, she could do nothing but find friends and bring England
with the help of those friends to the conference table so that England
would yield to these aspirations by diplomatic means. That was my task
at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to direct your attention to the
relations with Poland. I will give you the opportunity of answering a
question generally, and I hope in that way we may save time.
Will you agree that up to the Munich Agreement, the speeches of all
German statesmen were full of the most profound affection and respect
for Poland? Do you agree with that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the purpose of what is shown in the
Foreign Office memorandum of 26 August 1938? I will give you the page
number, Page 107 of your document book. I want you to look at it. I
think it is the fourth paragraph, beginning, “This method of approach
towards Czechoslovakia...”; and you may take it from me that the method
of approach was putting forward the idea that you and Hitler wanted the
return of all Germans to the Reich. I put it quite fairly and
objectively. That is what preceded it. I want you to look at that
paragraph.
VON RIBBENTROP: Which paragraph do you mean? I did not hear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The fourth, “This method of approach towards
Czechoslovakia...” it begins. The fourth on my copy.
VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet. Paragraph 5, yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “This method of approach towards
Czechoslovakia is to be recommended also because of our
relationship with Poland. The turning away of Germany from the
boundary question of the southeast and her change-over to those
of the east and northeast must inevitably put the Poles on the
alert. After the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian question, it
will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn;
but the later this assumption becomes a factor in international
politics, the better.” (Document Number TC-76)
Does that correctly set out the endeavors of German foreign policy at
that time?
VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly no, for, first of all, I do not know what
kind of a document it is. It has apparently been prepared by some
official in the Foreign Office where sometimes such theoretical
treatises were prepared and may have come to me through the State
Secretary. However, I do not remember having read it. Whether it reached
me, I cannot tell you at the moment; but it is possible that such
thoughts prevailed among some of our officials. That is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now, if you do not agree, would you look
at Page 110, on which you will find extracts from Hitler’s Reichstag
speech on 26 September 1938. I am sorry. I said Reichstag; I meant
Sportpalast.
VON RIBBENTROP: Sportpalast, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the end of this extract the Führer is quoted
as saying with regard to Poland, after a tribute to Marshal Pilsudski:
“We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting
pacification. We realize that here are two peoples who must live
together and neither of whom can do away with the other. A
people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the
sea. A way to understanding, then, had to be found. It has been
found, and it will be continually extended further. Certainly,
things were difficult for this area. The nationalities and small
groups frequently quarreled among themselves, but the decisive
fact is that the two Governments and all reasonable and
clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two
countries possess the firm will and determination to improve
their relations. This is a real work of peace, of more value
than all of the idle talk at the League of Nations Palace in
Geneva.” (Document Number TC-73, Number 42)
Do you think that is an honest statement of opinion?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I believe that that was definitely the Führer’s
view at the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so at that time all the questions of the
treatment of minorities in Poland were very unimportant; is that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, they were not unimportant. They were a latent and
even difficult point between Poland and ourselves, and the purpose of
that particular kind of statement by the Führer was to overcome it. I am
so familiar with the problem of the minorities in Poland because I
watched it for personal reasons for many years. From the time I took
over the Foreign Ministry, there were again and again the greatest
difficulties which, however, were always settled on our part in the most
generous way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate you have agreed with me that the
speeches at that time—and you say quite honestly—were full of praise
and affection for the Poles; is that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, we were hoping that thereby we could bring the
German minority problem, in particular, to a satisfactory and sensible
solution. That had been our policy since 1934.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, immediately after Munich you first
raised the question of Danzig with M. Lipski, I think, in October,
around 21 October.
VON RIBBENTROP: Right, 28 October.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28 October. And the Poles had replied on the
31st; it may have reached you a day later through M. Lipski, suggesting
the making of a bilateral agreement between Germany and Poland, but
saying the return of Danzig to the Reich would lead to a conflict. I put
it quite generally. I just wanted to remind you of the tenor of the
reply. Do you remember?
VON RIBBENTROP: According to my recollection it was not quite like that.
The Führer had charged me—it was on 28 October, to be exact—to request
Ambassador Lipski to come to Berchtesgaden. His order was given because
the Führer in particular, perhaps as a sequel to the speech in the
Sportpalast, but that I do not remember, wanted to bring about a
clarification of the relations with all his neighbors. He wanted that
now particularly with respect to Poland. He instructed me, therefore, to
discuss with Ambassador Lipski the question of Danzig and the question
of a connection between the Reich and East Prussia.
I asked Ambassador Lipski to come and see me, and stated these wishes in
a very friendly atmosphere. Ambassador Lipski was very reserved; he
stated that after all Danzig was not a simple problem but that he would
discuss the question with his government. I asked him to do so soon and
inform me of the outcome. That was the beginning of the negotiations
with Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you will turn—I do not want to
stop you, but I want to get on quickly over this matter—if you will
turn to Page 114, you will find the minutes of M. Beck’s conversation
with Hitler on 5 January. I just want to draw your attention to the last
paragraph, where, after M. Beck had said that the Danzig question was a
very difficult problem:
“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this
problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite
new, some new formula, for which he used the term
‘Körperschaft,’ which on the one hand would safeguard the
interest of the German population and on the other hand the
Polish interest. In addition the Chancellor declared that the
Minister could be quite at ease; there would be no _fait
accompli_ in Danzig and nothing would be done to render
difficult the situation of the Polish Government.” (Document
TC-73, Number 48)
Do you see that, before I ask you the question?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have read that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the summary of your own
conversation with M. Beck on the next day. It is Page 115, at the
beginning of the paragraph, the second paragraph. You will see that,
after M. Beck had mentioned the Danzig question, you said, “In answer,
Herr Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking
any violent solution.” (Document TC-73, Number 49). That was almost word
for word what Hitler had said the day before; do you see that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, turn back to Page 113. (Document Number
C-137, Exhibit GB-33) These are the Defendant Keitel’s orders to—or
rather, to put it exactly—the Defendant Keitel’s transmission of the
Führer’s order with regard to Danzig. It is dated 24 November. That was
some 6 weeks before, and it is supplementary to an order of 21 October,
and you see what it says:
“Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the
instructions of 21 October, preparations are also to be made to
enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops
by surprise. (‘4. Occupation of Danzig’).
“The preparations will be made on the following basis. The
condition is a _coup de main_ occupation of Danzig, exploiting a
politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland.”
(Document Number C-137)
Did you know of these instructions?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. This is the first time that I
have seen that order or whatever it may be. May I add something?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not for the moment. Hitler must have known of
the order, mustn’t he? It is an order of the Führer?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, of course, and therefore I assume—that is what I
wanted to add—that the British Prosecution are aware that political
matters and military matters are in this case two completely different
conceptions. There is no doubt that the Führer, in view of the permanent
difficulties in Danzig and the Corridor, had given military orders of
some kind—just in case—and I can well imagine that it is one of these
orders. I see it today for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Supposing that you had known of the orders,
Witness, would you still have said on the 5th of January that Germany
was not seeking a _fait accompli_ or a violent solution? If you had
known of that order would you still have said it?
VON RIBBENTROP: If I had known this order and considering it an order of
the General Staff for possible cases, as I am compelled to do, then I
would still continue to have the same opinion. I think it is part of the
General Staff’s duty to take into consideration all possible
eventualities and prepare for them in principle. In the final analysis
that has nothing to do with politics.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Nothing to do with politics to have a
cut-and-dried plan how the Free State of Danzig is to be occupied by
German troops by surprise when you are telling the Poles that you won’t
have a _fait accompli_? That is your idea of how matters should be
carried on? If it is I will leave it.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must rather add that I know that the Führer was
alarmed for a long time, particularly during 1939, lest a sudden Polish
attack take place against Danzig; so that to me, I am not a military
man, it appears quite natural to make some preparations for all such
problems and possibilities. But, of course, I cannot judge the details
of these orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when did you learn that Hitler was
determined to attack Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: That Hitler contemplated a military action against
Poland, I learned for the first time, as I remember, in August 1939.
That, of course, he had made certain military preparations in advance to
meet any eventuality becomes clear from this order regarding Danzig. But
I definitely did not learn about this order, and I do not recollect now
in detail whether I received at that time any military communication. I
do remember that I knew virtually nothing about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that you did not know
in May that Hitler’s real view was that Danzig was not the subject of
the dispute at all, but that his real object was the acquisition of
Lebensraum in the East?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know it in that sense. The Führer talked
sometimes about living space, that is right, but I did not know that he
had the intention to attack Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at Page 117, or it may be
118, of your document. On Page 117 you will find the minutes of the
conference on the 23rd day of May 1939 at the new Reich Chancellery.
VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 117?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 117. I want you to look at it. It may be on Page
118, and it begins with the following words:
“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a
question of expanding our Lebensraum in the East and of securing
our food supplies and of the settlement of the Baltic problem.
Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas.
Added to the natural fertility, the German, through cultivation,
will enormously increase the surplus. There is no other
possibility for Europe.” (Document Number L-79)
Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never explained that view to
you?
VON RIBBENTROP: It may be strange to say so, but I should like to say
first that it looks as though I was not present during this conference.
That was a military conference, and the Führer used to hold these
military conferences quite separately from the political conferences.
The Führer did now and then mention that we had to have Lebensraum; but
I knew nothing, and he never told me anything at that time, that is in
May 1939, of an intention to attack Poland. Yes, I think this was kept
back deliberately, as had been done in other cases, because he always
wanted his diplomats to stand wholeheartedly for a diplomatic solution
and to bring it about.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean to say that Hitler was deliberately
keeping you in the dark as to his real aims; that Danzig was not the
subject of dispute and what he really wanted was Lebensraum; is that
your story?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I assume that he did that deliberately because...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the very short paragraph
a little further on where he says:
“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with no
alternative but to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.
There will be fighting. The task is to isolate Poland.”
Do you tell the Tribunal that he never said that to his Foreign
Minister?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand that question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a perfectly simple one. Do you tell the
Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned what I have just read from his
speech, that there is to be no question of sparing Poland, that you had
to attack Poland at the first opportunity, and your task was to isolate
Poland? Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned that to
his Foreign Minister, who would have the practical conduct of foreign
policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not do that at that time; but, according to
my recollection, only much later, in the summer of 1939. At that time he
did say that he was resolved—and he said literally—to solve the
problem one way or another.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you say that you didn’t know in May that
Hitler wanted war?
VON RIBBENTROP: That he wanted what?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know in May that Hitler wanted war?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not convinced of that at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear from the document that he did
want war, isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: This document, no doubt, shows the intention of an
action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used strong language
to his military men, that is, he spoke as though he had the firm
intention of attacking a certain country in some way, but whether he
actually would have carried it out later politically is an entirely
different question. I know that he repeatedly told me that one had to
talk with military men as if war was about to break out here or there on
the next day.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about another point. You
said on Friday that you had never expressed the view that Great Britain
would stay out of war and would fail to honor her guarantee to Poland.
Do you remember saying that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you to look at one
or two other documents. Do you remember on the 29th of April 1939
receiving the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister at 3:30
in the afternoon?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we have the minutes of your meeting signed
by Von Erdmannsdorff, I think. Did you say this to the Hungarian Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister:
“The Reich Foreign Minister added that it was his firm
conviction that, no matter what happened in Europe, no French or
English soldier would attack Germany. Our relations with Poland
were gloomy at the moment.”
Did you say that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think I ever said that. I consider that
impossible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you got a copy...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I perhaps have a look at the document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, with pleasure. This will become
Exhibit GB-289, Document D-737.
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot, of course, tell you now in detail what I said
at that time, but it may be possible that there was an effort at that
time to reassure the Hungarians who were probably concerned about the
Polish problem; that is absolutely possible. But I hardly believe that I
said anything like this. However, it is certain that the Führer knew,
and I had told the Führer that England would march to the aid of Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are a little doubtful would you look at
Document Number D-738, which will be Exhibit GB-290. Apparently you saw
these gentlemen again 2 days later. Just look at the last sentence of
that:
“He (the Reich Foreign Minister) pointed out again that Poland
presented no military problem for us. In case of a military
clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.”
That is quite straight speaking, isn’t it, “The British would coldly
leave the Poles in the lurch”?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know on just what page that is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 7, and it is the report of the
1st of May, the last sentence of my quotation. It is signed by a
gentlemen called Von Erdmannsdorff; it appears above his signature. The
words I am asking you about are, “In case of a military clash the
British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.”
VON RIBBENTROP: Is that on Page 8 or where? On what page, if I may ask?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My heading is Paragraph 7. It begins:
“The Reich Foreign Minister then returned to our attitude
towards the Polish question and pointed out that the Polish
attitude had aroused great bitterness.”
VON RIBBENTROP: It is perfectly conceivable that I said something like
that, and if it has been said it was done in order not to alarm the
Hungarians and to keep them on our side. It is quite clear that that is
nothing but diplomatic talk.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think there is any requirement to tell
the truth in a political conversation?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was not the point; the point was to bring about a
situation which made it possible to solve this and the Polish question
in a diplomatic way. If I were to tell the Hungarians today, and this
applies to the Italians also, that England would assist Poland and that
a great war would result, then this would create a diplomatic situation
which would make it impossible to solve the problem at all. There is no
doubt that during the entire time I had to use very strong language,
just as the Führer had always ordered, for if his own Foreign Minister
had hinted at other possibilities, it would naturally have been very
difficult, and I venture to say, it would have meant that this would, in
any case, have led to war. But we wanted to create a strong German
position so that we could solve this problem peacefully. I may add that
the Hungarians were somewhat worried with regard to the German policy,
and that the Führer had told me from the start to use particularly clear
and strong language on these subjects. I used that kind of language also
quite frequently to my own diplomats for the same reasons.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You want us to assume that you were telling lies
to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That
is what it comes to shortly, isn’t it? That is what you want us to
understand—that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are
telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what you want us to
understand isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether one can talk of lies in this case,
Mr. Prosecutor. This is a question of diplomacy; and if we wanted to
create a strong position, then of course we could not go beating about
the bush. Consider what the impression would have been if the German
Foreign Minister had spoken as if at the slightest German step the whole
world would attack Germany! The Führer used frequently such strong
language and expected me to do the same. I want to emphasize again that
often I had to use such language, even to my own Foreign Office, so that
there was no misunderstanding. If the Führer was determined on the
solution of a problem, no matter what the circumstances, even at the
risk of war if it had to be, our only chance to succeed was to adopt a
firm stand, for had we failed to do that, war would have been
inevitable.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you to have in mind what Count
Ciano says that you said to him on, I think the 11th or 12th of August,
just before your meeting at, I think it was at Salzburg, with you and
Hitler. You remember that according to Count Ciano’s diary he said that
he asked you, “What do you want, the Corridor or Danzig?” and that you
looked at him and said, “Not any more; we want war.” Do you remember
that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is absolutely untrue. I told Count Ciano at
that time, this is on the same line, “the Führer is determined to solve
the Polish problem one way or another.” This was what the Führer had
instructed me to say. That I am supposed to have said “we want war” is
absurd for the simple reason that, it is clear to every diplomat, those
things are just not said, not even to the very best and most trusted
ally, but most certainly not to Count Ciano.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should just like you to look at a report of
the subsequent conversation that you had with Mussolini and Count Ciano
not very long after, on the 10th of March 1940, that is, about 9 months
later. If you look at Document Number 2835-PS, which will become Exhibit
GB-291, and if you will turn to, I think it is Page 18 or 19...
VON RIBBENTROP: You mean Page 18?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I remind you again, a conversation between you
and Mussolini and Ciano on the 10th of March 1940. It begins by saying:
“The Reich Foreign Minister recalled that he actually had stated
in Salzburg to Count Ciano that he did not believe that England
and France would assist Poland without further questions, but
that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of
intervention by the Western Powers. He was glad now about the
course of events, because, first of all, it had always been
clear that the clash would have to come sooner or later and that
it was inevitable.”
And then you go on to say that it would be a good thing to finish the
conflict in the lifetime of the Führer.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was after the outbreak of war; is that it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. What I am putting to you are these words:
“He was glad now about the course of events, because, first of
all, it had always been clear that the clash would have to come
sooner or later and that it was inevitable.”
And if you will look at where it says “secondly”...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; but what I am suggesting to you is that
that shows perfectly clearly that Count Ciano is right, and that you
were very glad that the war had come, because you thought this was an
appropriate time for it to happen.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree. On the contrary, it says here also
“that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of intervention
by the Western Powers.” It says so here quite clearly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is the second part that I am putting to
you. I pass from that point about British intervention. I say, “he was
glad now about the course of events,” and if you will look down at the
paragraph where it says “secondly,” so that you will have it in mind,
the third line says:
“Secondly, at the moment when England introduced general
conscription it was clear that the ratio of war strength would
not develop in the long run in favor of Germany and Italy.”
VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask where it says that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A few lines further down. The word “secondly” is
underlined, isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not here. Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Secondly, at the moment when England introduced
general conscription...” It is about 10 lines further on.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, what does the British Prosecutor try to prove with
that; I do not quite understand?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at the next sentence before
you answer my question.
“This, along with the other things, was decisive for the
Führer’s decision to solve the Polish question, even under the
danger of intervention by the Western Powers. The deciding fact
was, however, that a great power could not take certain things
lying down.”
What I am saying...
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that appears correct to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was your view at the time and the view
that you declared afterwards as being your view, that you were
determined that you would solve the Polish question even if it meant
war? Count Ciano was perfectly right in saying that you wanted war. That
is what I am putting to you.
VON RIBBENTROP: No; that is not correct. I told Count Ciano at the time
at Berchtesgaden that the Führer was determined to solve the problem one
way or another. It was necessary to put it in that way because the
Führer was convinced that whatever became known to Rome would go to
London and Paris at once. He wanted therefore to have clear language
used so that Italy would be on our side diplomatically. If the Führer or
myself had said that the Führer was not so determined to solve that
problem, then it would have been without doubt passed on immediately.
But since the Führer was determined to solve the problem, if necessary
by war if it could not be solved any other way, this would have meant
war, which explains the clear and firm diplomatic attitude which I had
to adopt at that time in Salzburg. But I do not know in what way this is
contradictory to what is being said here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to pass on to the last week in August
and take that again very shortly, because there is a lot of ground to
cover.
You agreed in your evidence that on the 25th of August the Führer called
off the attack which was designed for the morning of the 26th. You
remember that? I just want you to have the dates in mind.
VON RIBBENTROP: I know that date very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were here in court the day Dahlerus gave his
evidence, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And let me remind you of the date, that on the
evening of the 24th the Defendant Göring asked Herr Dahlerus to go to
London the next morning to carry forward a preliminary outline of what
the Führer was going to say to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th. So you
remember that was his evidence? And on the 25th, at 1:30...
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the dates exactly, but I suppose they
are correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I know these dates pretty well, and the Tribunal
will correct me if I am wrong, but I am giving them as I have looked
them up. That was the night of the 24th; Dahlerus left on the morning of
the 25th, and then at 1:30 on the 25th—you said about noon, I am not
quarreling with you for a matter of minutes—midday on the 25th the
Führer saw Sir Nevile Henderson...
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And gave him what is called a _note verbale_,
that is, an inquiry in general terms.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was given to him in the evening. At noon he had
only talked to him and in the evening I had Minister Schmidt take the
_note verbale_ to him, I think that is the way it was, with a special
message in which I asked him again to impress upon his Government how
serious the Führer was about this message or offer. I think that is
contained in the _British Blue Book_.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Whenever you gave him the actual note, Herr
Hitler told him the general view in the oral conversation which he had
with Sir Nevile in the middle of the day?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the actual calling off of the attack on the
morning of the 26th, as you have said, was not done until you had had
the message from Signor Mussolini at about 3 o’clock, and the news that
the Anglo-Polish formal agreement was going to be signed that evening
about 4 o’clock. That is what you have said.
Now, the first point that I am putting to you is this: That at the time
that Herr Dahlerus was sent, and the time of this note, when the words
were spoken by the Führer to Sir Nevile Henderson, it was the German
intention to attack on the morning of the 26th; and what I suggest is
that both the message to Herr Dahlerus and the words which were spoken
to Sir Nevile Henderson were simply designed in order to trouble the
British Government, in the hope that it might have some effect on them
withdrawing from their aid to Poland; isn’t that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: Do you want me to answer that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly; I am asking you.
VON RIBBENTROP: The situation is that I am not familiar with the message
of Dahlerus, I cannot say anything about it. Regarding the meeting
between Hitler and Sir Nevile Henderson, I can say that I read the
correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler in the morning, I
think it was dated the 22d, and somehow had arrived at a sort of
deadlock. I talked to the Führer afterwards, about whether or not
another attempt should be made in order to arrive at some kind of a
solution with England. Subsequently, towards noon, I think it was 1 or 2
o’clock, the Führer met Sir Nevile Henderson in my presence and told him
he should take a plane and fly to London in order to talk to the British
Government as soon as possible. After the solution of the Polish problem
he intended to approach England again with a comprehensive offer. He
gave, I believe, a rough outline of the offer already in the _note
verbale_; but I do not recall that exactly. Then Sir Nevile Henderson
flew to London. While the Führer was having that conversation, military
measures were under way. I learned of that during the day, because
Mussolini’s refusal had arrived, I believe, not at 3 o’clock, but
earlier in the course of the morning or at noon. Then at 4 or 5 in the
afternoon I heard about the ratification of the Polish-British
agreement. I went to the Führer immediately and suggested to him to
withdraw the military measures; and he did so after short deliberation.
There is no doubt that in the meantime certain military measures had
been taken. Just how far they went I regret not to be able to say. But
when the Führer sent that offer, that _note verbale_ to England I was
convinced and under the impression that if England would respond to it
in some way, it would not come to an armed conflict, and that in this
case the military measures which, I believe, were automatically put in
effect, would somehow have been stopped later on. But I cannot say
anything about that in detail. I recollect only one thing, and that is
that when I received the _note verbale_ from the Führer, which I think
was in the afternoon or in the evening, these measures had already
either been stopped or were, at any rate, in the process of being
stopped. I cannot give it to you in chronological order at the moment.
For that I have to have the pertinent documents which, unfortunately,
are not at my disposal here. But one thing is certain, the offer of the
Führer to England was made in order to try once again to come to a
solution of the Polish problem. When I saw the _note verbale_ I even
asked him, “How about the Polish solution?” and I still recollect that
he said, “We will now send that note to the British, and if they respond
to it then we can still see what to do, there will still be time.”
At any rate, I believe, the military measures had either been stopped
when the note was submitted, or they were stopped shortly after.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you were not present at the meeting of the
Führer and his generals on the 22d of August, but you must have heard
many times the account of it read out since this Trial started. You
remember the Führer is reported, according to minutes, to have said:
“I shall use propagandistic reasons for starting the war; never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and
making the war, not the right is what matters but victory.”
(Document Number 1014-PS).
That is what was said at Obersalzberg. Has Hitler ever said anything
like that to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say the 27th?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the 22d. What I am asking you is, has Hitler
said anything similar to that to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, at the meeting on the 22d, I was not present; I
think I was on my way to Moscow.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said you were not present. That is why I put
it in that way. Has he ever said anything similar to you? You say “no.”
Well, now, I want you to come to the 29th.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something about that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No; if you say that he has not said it to you, I
am not going to pursue it, because we must not waste too much time on
each of these details. I want you to come to the 29th of August when you
saw Sir Nevile Henderson, and while accepting, with some reservations,
the idea of direct negotiation with Poland, you said that it must be a
condition of that negotiation that the Poles should send a
plenipotentiary by the next day, by the 30th. You remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, well, it was like this...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I really do not want to stop you, but I do want
to keep it short on this point.
VON RIBBENTROP: In that case I must say “no”. May I make a statement?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, because this is only preliminary. I
thought it was common ground that you saw Sir Nevile on the 29th, that
you put a number of terms. One of the terms was that a Polish
plenipotentiary should be present by the 30th. If you don’t agree with
that, please tell me if I am wrong, because it is my recollection of all
documents.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 30th you have told us that your
reason for not giving a copy of the terms to Sir Nevile was, first,
because Hitler had ordered you not to give a copy. And I think your
reason given at the time was that the Polish plenipotentiary had not
arrived, and therefore it was no good giving a copy of the terms. That’s
right, isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, these terms that were given, that were read
out by you, were not ready on the 29th, because in your communication
demanding a plenipotentiary you said if he came on the 30th you would
have the terms ready by that time. So may I take it that these terms
were drawn up by Hitler with the help of the Foreign Office between the
29th and the 30th?
VON RIBBENTROP: He dictated them personally. I think there were 16
points, if I remember rightly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you really expect after the treatment
of Von Schuschnigg, of Tiso, of Hacha, that the Poles would be willing
to send a fly into the spider’s parlor?
VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly counted on it and hoped for it. I think
that a hint from the British Government would have sufficed to bring
that envoy to Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And what you hoped was to put the Poles in this
dilemma, that either these terms would stand as a propagandistic cause
for the war, to use Hitler’s phrase—or else you would be able, by
putting pressure on the Polish plenipotentiary, to do exactly what you
had done before with Schuschnigg and Tiso and Hacha, and get a surrender
from the Poles. Wasn’t that what was in your mind?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, the situation was different. I must say, that on the
29th the Führer told the British Ambassador that he would draft these
conditions or this agreement and by the time of the arrival of the
Polish Plenipotentiary, would make them also available to the British
Government—or he hoped that this would be possible, I think that is
what he said. Sir Nevile Henderson took note of that, and I must repeat
that the Führer, after the British reply had been received on the 28th,
once more, and in spite of the extremely tense situation between Poland
and Germany, agreed to that kind of negotiation. The decisive thing in
these crucial days of the 30th and 31st is, therefore, the following:
The Führer had drafted these conditions, England knew that the
possibility of arriving at a solution existed. All during the 30th of
August we heard nothing from England, at least nothing definite. Only at
midnight, I think, did the British Ambassador report for this
discussion. In the meantime, I must mention that at 7 o’clock in the
evening news of the general mobilization in Poland had been received,
which excited the Führer extremely. Through that, the situation had
become extraordinarily acute. I still remember exactly the situation at
the Chancellery where almost hourly reports were received about
incidents, streams of refugees, and so forth. It was an atmosphere
heavily charged with electricity. The Führer waited all through the
30th; no definite answer arrived. Then, at midnight of the 30th, that
conversation took place. The course of that conversation has already
been described here by me and also by a witness, the interpreter
Schmidt. I did more then than I was allowed to do, in that I had read
the entire contents to Sir Nevile Henderson. I was hoping that England
perhaps might do something yet. The Führer had told Sir Nevile Henderson
that a Polish plenipotentiary would be treated on equal terms.
Therefore, there was the possibility of meeting somewhere at an
appointed place, or, that someone would come to Berlin, or that the
Polish Ambassador Lipski would be given the necessary authority. Those
were the possibilities. I would even like to go further. It was merely
necessary, during the 30th or the 31st, until late that night, or the
next morning when the march began, for the Polish Ambassador Lipski to
have authority at least to receive in his hands the German proposals.
Had this been done, the diplomatic negotiations would in any case have
been under way and thus the crisis would have been averted, at least for
the time being.
I also believe, and I have said so before, that there would have been no
objections. I believe the Führer would have welcomed, if the British
Ambassador had intervened. The basis for the negotiations, I have also
mentioned this here before, was called reasonable by Sir Nevile
Henderson personally. One hint from the British Government during the
30th or 31st, and negotiations would have been in course on the basis of
these reasonable proposals of the Führer, termed reasonable even by the
British themselves. It would have caused no embarrassment to the Poles,
and I believe that on the basis of these reasonable proposals, which
were absolutely in accord with the Covenant of the League of Nations,
which provided for a plebiscite in the Corridor area, a solution,
perfectly acceptable for Poland, would have been possible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal desire me to say that they think
that your answers and your explanations are too long, too argumentative,
and too repetitive, and they are upon matters which have been gone over
and over again before the Tribunal, so they would therefore ask you to
try to keep your answers as short as possible.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did I understand you correctly, Witness, on
Friday, that you didn’t know about the connection between Quisling and
the Defendant Rosenberg in the spring and summer of 1939? It was well
before the war, in the spring and summer, before June of 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I knew that Rosenberg had friends
in Norway and that the name of Quisling was mentioned, but this name
meant nothing to me at that time. On the request of the Führer, at that
time I gave Rosenberg certain amounts of money for his friends in
Norway, for newspapers, propaganda, and similar purposes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know, as I understand your testimony,
that some of Quisling’s men had been in a schooling camp in Germany in
August of 1939, before the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: No I do not remember that. I learned of it here through
a document. But I do not recall having known anything about it. At any
rate, if I knew anything about it, I did not know any of the details.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the Germans living in Norway
had been used to enlarge and extend the staff of the various German
official agencies, the legation and the consulates, soon after the
beginning of the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that at the moment, at all. At
that time I probably never did learn correctly about that, if that was
the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the quotation from the _Yearbook of the
NSDAP_. All I want to know at the moment is whether or not you knew
about that. If you say you did not...
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know and cannot say a thing about it, I’m
afraid...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know at the time, in December 1939, that
Quisling had two interviews with Hitler on the 16th and 18th of
December?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either. What was the date, may I
ask?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 16th and 18th December 1939, through the
Defendant Raeder.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing of these interviews, according to my
recollection.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that practically the first matter that you
knew about in regard to Norway was, first, when you got the letter from
Raeder, dated the 3rd of April?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that was a letter from Keitel. I believe
this is a misunderstanding.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is a mistake of mine. I am
sorry. Do you remember a letter from Keitel, where he says:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway had been, by
command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High Command
of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht had
therefore ample time to deal with all questions connected with
the carrying out of this operation.”
So really, Witness—I may perhaps be able to shorten the matter—you are
really not a very good person to ask about the earlier preparations with
regard to Norway, because you weren’t in on these earlier discussions
with Quisling and with Raeder and Hitler. Is that right? If so, I will
leave the subject.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not in on these discussions. But I should like
to clarify one thing briefly: that I received this letter—why, I do not
know—only some days later. The first intimation of the intention to
occupy Norway, due to the anticipated landing of the British, I received
about 36 hours ahead of time from the Führer. The letter was probably
longer under way than it should have been. I saw it only afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall not occupy time, because there is a
good deal to cover, and I will take you straight to the question of the
Low Countries. You have heard me read, and probably other people read,
more than once, the statement of Hitler’s on the 22d of August 1939:
“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and
Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well
as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available
means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of
these countries.” (Document Number 798-PS)
That is what Hitler said on the 22d of August. You weren’t there, and I
ask you again if he expressed the same opinion to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that from a very early date, on the
7th of October 1939, an army group order was given that Army Group B is
to make all preparations, according to special orders, for immediate
invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so
demands. Did you know of that order on the 7th of October?
VON RIBBENTROP: No; I believe I have seen it here; I did not know it
before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that on the 9th of October
Hitler issued a directive:
“A longer delay would not only result in the abandonment of
Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality in favor of the
Western Powers, but would also serve to strengthen the military
power of our enemies to an increasing degree, and would lessen
the confidence of neutral states in final German victory.
Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern
flank of the Western Front, crossing the area of Luxembourg,
Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon
and as forcibly as possible.” (Document Number C-62)
Did you know that Hitler issued that directive on the 9th of October?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that as far as you were concerned you are
telling the Tribunal that Hitler gave his assurance, the many
assurances, in August and October, without telling his Foreign Minister
that on the 7th and 9th of October, he had given the directive for the
attack on the Low Countries, that he did not tell you about his order or
his directive for his attack on the Low Countries? Are you sure of that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am pretty sure of that, otherwise I should recall it.
I know one thing, that such ideas, as to whether or not an offensive
should be assumed in the West, after the Polish Campaign, had
occasionally been discussed, but I never heard about any orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. If you say that is the state of your
knowledge, we will pass on to something about which you did know a
little bit more. Do you remember the meeting of Hitler and yourself with
Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I saw the document, the minutes, about it, here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I want you just to look at that
document, and it is on Page 181. I want you to follow while I read one
passage, which should be about 182. It is on my second page and it is a
paragraph which begins, “As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude
that in case of conflict...”
VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you look for that “As Poland makes it
clear by her whole attitude...”
VON RIBBENTROP: On Page 2?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It should be on Page 2, on my Page 2. It may be
further on in yours.
VON RIBBENTROP: Is that the beginning of the paragraph?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. “As Poland makes it clear...” It is two
paragraphs on from a single line that says at the point “Count Ciano
showed signs of...”
VON RIBBENTROP: I have found it, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at the next sentence: “Generally
speaking...” This is the next sentence but one:
“Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the
pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This could be done fairly
easily if one Axis partner protected the rear of the other, who
was just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and _vice
versa_. For Italy, Yugoslavia was to be considered such an
uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul, he, (the
Führer) had suggested, particularly in consideration of Italy,
that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis
by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the
Axis, and Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of Nations. Prince
Paul had agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent had
been in London and sought reassurance of the Western Powers. The
same thing was repeated that had happened in the case of
Gafencu, who had also been very reasonable during his visit to
Germany, and had denied any interest in the aims of the Western
democracies.” (Document Number 1871-PS)
Now, that was Hitler’s formulation of his policy, and may I take it that
that was the policy which you were assisting to carry out, to liquidate
the pseudo-neutrals one after the other, and include among these
pseudo-neutrals Yugoslavia?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not to be understood in that way. I must
state the following in this connection. The situation was this at that
time: Hitler wanted under all circumstances to keep Italy on our side.
Italy was always a very unreliable partner. For that reason the Führer
spoke at that time in a way designed to tell Italy, so to speak, that,
if it came to difficulties with Yugoslavia, he would support Italy. It
can be understood only from the situation which was this: Germany, with
Italy’s assistance, had already peacefully carried out some of her
revisions in Europe, except for Danzig and the Corridor, in which
Mussolini supported Hitler. I remember the situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite a long explanation. But it is not
an explanation of the words I put to you which is the important thing.
“It would be best to liquidate uncertain neutrals one after the other.”
Are you denying that that was your policy, to liquidate uncertain
neutrals?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not that. That cannot be taken so literally,
for in diplomatic discussions—and I do not think it is different in
other countries—many things are said sometimes...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to...
VON RIBBENTROP: This was the question of Yugoslavia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This had always been Mussolini’s view, hadn’t
it, that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible
opportunity?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, would you look at Document 2818-PS. My
Lord, this will be Exhibit GB-292. Remember this is the secret
additional protocol to the Friendship and Alliance Pact between Germany
and Italy made on the 22d of May 1939, and appended to it there are some
comments by Mussolini on the 30th of May 1939. Do you see?
VON RIBBENTROP: What page?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just wanted you to look at two passages.
Do you see where the comments by Mussolini begin? Under the Pact itself,
do you see the comment by Mussolini?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, Number 1 says:
“The war between the plutocratic and, therefore, selfishly
conservative nations and the densely populated and poor nations
is inevitable. One must prepare in the light of this situation.”
Now, if you will turn to Paragraph 7, you will see Mussolini is hoping
that the war will be postponed, and he is saying what should happen if
the war comes; he says that:
“The war which the great democracies are preparing is a war of
exhaustion. One must therefore start with the worst premise,
which contains 100 percent probability. The Axis will get
nothing more from the rest of the world. This assumption is
hard, but the strategic positions reached by the Axis diminish
considerably the vicissitude and the danger of a war of
exhaustion. For this purpose one must take the whole Danube and
Balkan area immediately after the very first hours of the war.
One will not be satisfied with declarations of neutrality but
must occupy the territories and use them for the procurement of
necessary food and industrial war supplies.”
Do you see that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you agree that it was Mussolini’s view
that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible moment?
VON RIBBENTROP: They are utterances of Mussolini which I see here for
the first time. I did not know them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to the remarks of Hitler
which you have seen considerably more than once. You remember, after the
Simovic _coup d’état_ on the 26th of March, there was a meeting, a
conference with Hitler, where he announced his policy:
“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in
order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a state. With
regard to foreign policy neither will diplomatic inquiries be
made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav
Government, which cannot be trusted in any case in the future,
will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the
means and troops available for it are ready.” (Document Number
1746-PS)
Do you remember Hitler’s saying that on the 27th of March?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. Could I perhaps see the
document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember it? It has been read many
times in this court, Hitler’s statement.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember it, not the individual words, but in
general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that was the sense of it, and I
read his words. Now, that was the policy...
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what you mean by “the sense of it.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I’ll put it to you now. What I mean is
this, that it was your policy to attack Yugoslavia without asking them
for assurances, without any diplomatic action of any kind. You decided
to attack Yugoslavia and to bomb Belgrade. Isn’t that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was entirely different; and I ask to be permitted
to explain the actual state of the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want your explanation of these points which I
have specifically read and mentioned to you. “No diplomatic inquiries
will be made.” Why did you decide, or why did Hitler decide, and you
help, to attack Yugoslavia without making any diplomatic inquiries,
without giving the new government any chance to give you assurances? Why
did you do it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Because the new government had been formed mainly by
England, as one of the British interrogation officers himself, in the
course of the preliminary hearings, admitted to me. Therefore it was
perfectly clear to the Führer, when the Simovic Putsch was carried out,
that the enemies of Germany at that time stood behind Simovic’s
government and that it mobilized the army—this information had been
received—in order to attack the Italian army from the rear. It was not
my policy, for I was called into the conference of which you are
speaking only later, I believe, and at that time Hitler categorically
announced his position without being contradicted by anyone. I ask you
to question the military men about that. I was present, and had a
serious encounter with the Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think it right to attack this country
without any diplomatic measures being taken at all, to cause military
destruction, to use Hitler’s words, “with unmerciful harshness” and to
destroy the capital of Belgrade by waves of bomber attacks? Did you
think that was right? I ask you a simple question: Did you think it was
right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot answer this question either with “yes” or “no,”
as you want it, without giving an explanation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you need not answer it. If you cannot
answer that question “yes” or “no,” you need not answer it at all. And
you come on to the next point, which is the question of Russia. Now, as
far as I could understand your statement, you said that Hitler had
decided to attack the Soviet Union after Mr. Molotov’s visit to Berlin
on, I think, the 12th of November of 1940.
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not say that, because I did not know it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, as I understood it, one of the reasons
which you were giving as a justification for the attack on the Soviet
Union was what was said by Mr. Molotov during his visit of November
1940. Isn’t that what you said?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was one of the reasons that caused the Führer
concern. I did not know anything about an attack at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that the Defendant Jodl says that even
during the Western campaign, that is, May and June 1940, Hitler had told
him that he had made a fundamental decision to take steps against this
danger, that is, the Soviet Union, “the moment our military position
made it at all possible.” Did you know that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I learned that first now here in Nuremberg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is Document L-172, USA-34, Jodl’s lecture.
And did you know that on the 14th of August 1940 General Thoma was
informed during a conference with Göring that the Führer desired
punctual deliveries to the Russians only until the spring of 1941; that
“later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the
Russian demands.” Did you know that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that in November of 1940,
General Thoma and State Secretaries Körner, Neumann, Becker, and General
Von Hannecken were informed by Göring of the action planned in the East?
Did you know that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know now, don’t you, that a long time before
any of the matters raised in Molotov’s visit came up for discussion,
Hitler had determined to attack the Soviet Union?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that at all. I knew that Hitler had
apprehensions but I knew nothing about an attack. I was not informed
about military preparations, because these matters were always dealt
with separately.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Even on 18 December, when Hitler issued the
directive Number 21 on “Barbarossa,” he told you nothing about it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, because just in December, as I happen to remember
exactly, I had another long talk with the Führer in order to obtain his
consent to win the Soviet Union as a partner to the Three-Power Pact,
and to make it a four-power pact. Hitler was not altogether enthusiastic
about this idea, as I noticed; but he told me, “We have already made
this and that together; perhaps we will succeed with this too.” These
were his words. That was in December. I believe there is also an
affidavit about that from a witness, which the Defense is going to
present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you understand what you are saying? This is
after the Defendant Göring had announced it to General Thoma and these
under-secretaries, after the directive had actually gone out for
Barbarossa, that Hitler let you suggest that you should try to get the
Soviet Union to join the Tripartite Pact, without ever telling you that
he had his orders out for the attack on the Soviet Union. Do you really
expect anyone to believe that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question was, do you really expect anyone to
believe that after it had been announced time and again that the Reich
was going to attack the Soviet Union, and after the actual directive had
gone out for the attack, that Hitler let you tell him that you were
thinking of asking them to join the Tripartite Pact? Is that your
evidence?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is exactly the way it was. I suggested this to
Hitler again in December, and received his consent for further
negotiations. I knew nothing in December of an aggressive war against
the Soviet Union.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And it was quite clear that, as far as your
department was concerned, you were getting the most favorable reports
about the Soviet Union and about the unlikeliness of the Soviet Union
making any incursion into political affairs inimical to Germany? Is that
right, so far as your reports from your own ambassador and your own
people in Russia were concerned?
VON RIBBENTROP: Reports of this sort came from the embassy in Moscow. I
submitted them repeatedly, or rather always, to the Führer but his
answer was that the diplomats and military attachés in Moscow were the
worst informed men in the world. That was his answer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But that was your honest view, based on your own
information, that there was no danger from Russia, that Russia was
keeping honestly to the agreement that she had made with you. That was
your honest view, was it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that. I said those were the reports
from the diplomats, which we received from Moscow.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t you believe them? Didn’t you believe your
own staff yourself?
VON RIBBENTROP: I was very skeptical myself as to whether these reports
were reliable, because the Führer, who received reports, had reports of
an altogether different nature and the political attitude also pointed
in a different direction.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, in the spring of 1941, your office
joined in the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, did it
not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know precisely when, but in the spring things
came to a head and there must have been conferences between some offices
that dealt with the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union.
However, I do not recall details about that any more.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Again, I do not want to occupy too much
time over it, but it is right, is it not, that in April of 1941 you were
co-operating with Rosenberg’s office in preparing for the taking over of
Eastern territories, and, on the 18th of May, you issued a memorandum
with regard to the preparation of the naval campaign?
VON RIBBENTROP: So far as the preparations with Rosenberg are concerned,
that is in error. I spoke, according to my recollection, about this
matter to Rosenberg only after the outbreak of war. So far as that Navy
memorandum is concerned, I saw that document here; I had not known of it
previously. I believe it is an expert opinion on international law about
matters which might arise in connection with a war in the Baltic Sea.
Such expert opinion was doubtless submitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It says, “The Foreign Office has prepared, for
use in Barbarossa, the attached draft of a declaration of operational
zones.” Don’t you remember anything about that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that did not reach me at all at that time.
That was acted upon by another office. Of course I am responsible for
everything that happens in my ministry.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn’t Ambassador Ritter the liaison officer
between your office and the Wehrmacht?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, again, I want you to help me about one or
two other matters. You have told us that you negotiated the
Anti-Comintern Pact back in 1936; and, of course, at that time the
Anti-Comintern Pact—and I think you said so yourself—was directed
against the Soviet Union. That is so, isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it was more an ideological pact, which, of course,
had certain political implications. That is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was extended by the Tripartite Pact of
the 27th of September 1940? That was an extension of the first pact, was
it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: It had in itself nothing to do with the first pact,
because this one was a purely political, economic, and military pact.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the fact is—and I think I can take
this quite shortly—that you were urging Japan to enter the war quite
early in March of 1941, weren’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: That could be; at that time for an attack on England.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I am taking it shortly, because you have
given your explanation. You say you were at war with England, and
therefore you were entitled to see an ally in the Japanese. That is your
point, is it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not believe that I did anything other than what
other diplomats would do, for instance, what those of Great Britain have
done in America, and later in Russia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to put any points to you on that
actual fact; but it did occur to you quite early, didn’t it, that if
Japan came into the war, then it was a possibility that the United
States might be brought in very shortly after? And you agreed, in April
of 1941, that if the coming in of Japan produced the fact that Japan
would be involved with the United States, you would be prepared to fight
the United States too. That is right isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. I believe I did everything I
could, until the day of Pearl Harbor, to keep America out of the war. I
believe also that that is proved by many documents that I have seen here
for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, since you said that, I would like you
to look at the Document 352 of your book, at Page 204 of the English
document book.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know this document; I have read it here already.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was a week before Pearl Harbor, on
the 29th of November; and according to the Japanese Ambassador, you are
saying this to him—if you look at Paragraph 1:
“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in
East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been,
and probably never will be, a time when closer co-operation
under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at
this time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European
New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United
States will be concentrated against Japan. As the Führer Hitler
said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right
to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We
have received advice to the effect that there is practically no
hope of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded
successfully, because of the fact that the United States is
putting up a stiff front.
“‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a
decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident
that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan
jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan
herself.’” (Document D-656)
Do you still say, in view of that document and that statement that you
made to the Japanese Ambassador, that you were trying to prevent war
with the United States? I suggest to you that you were doing everything
to encourage Japan to go to war with the United States.
VON RIBBENTROP: I must contradict you there, Mr. Prosecutor; that is not
true. I do not know this document, nor do I know where it comes from. At
any rate, under no circumstances did I express it that way; and I regret
that all the other documents which prove that I tried again and again to
keep the United States out of the war, have not yet been read here. I
have seen this document here and I have been pondering all the time as
to how this passage would have gotten into the document. All the other
documents, I believe a dozen or a dozen and a half, which have been
presented here prove clearly my wish to keep America out of the war. I
can prove that for years I had made efforts in all fields, despite the
intransigent attitude of the United States, not to undertake anything
against America. I can explain this only as follows: The Japanese
Ambassador earnestly desired that his country should take some action
and I know he sent many telegrams to Tokio in order to get Japan to
participate in the war, particularly against Singapore. I can only
presume that this is perhaps, if I may say so, an incorrect
interpretation of this conference. I ask you to give the Defense an
opportunity to submit all the other documents up to this date, which
will prove the exact opposite of what is laid down in this one
paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, this is the official report to the
Government of the Japanese Ambassador. You say that he is wrong when he
says that you told him—he gives your exact words—that you were
comforted that it would not only be in the interest of Germany and Japan
jointly but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself.
Well, just look at the next document, if you deny that one, on Page 356.
This is another report of the Japanese Ambassador and he said, the day
after Pearl Harbor:
“At 1 o’clock... I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and
told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal
declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that
Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general
headquarters, discussing how the formalities of declaring war
could be carried out, so as to make a good impression on the
German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at
once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out
properly.”
Now, look at the last three lines:
“At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th,
Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack
American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them.”
(Document Number D-657)
That was 3 days before the declaration of war. You say that that report
of the Japanese Ambassador is also wrong?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that it is an error.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is wrong about it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe it is an error. That was after the attack on
Pearl Harbor?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Exactly, the day after Pearl Harbor.
VON RIBBENTROP: That was an order of Adolf Hitler’s to attack America
who, as everyone knows, had been attacking our ships for months. This is
an altogether different affair.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When you say “attacking German ships,” do you
mean defending themselves against German submarines?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, so far as I know, some months earlier, I cannot tell
you the exact date; but it was a long time before Pearl Harbor, we had
delivered an official protest to the United States, in which we pointed
out, in the case of the two ships _Greer_ and _Kerne_, that these two
boats had pursued German submarines and had thrown depth charges at
them. I believe the Secretary of the Navy Knox admitted this openly in a
press conference. I mentioned yesterday that Hitler said in his speech
in Munich that he did not give the order to shoot or to attack American
vessels but he had given the order to fire back if they fired first.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know from you is this: Did you
approve of the policy of ordering the entire German Navy to attack
American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them 3 days before
war was declared? Did you approve of that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that now, because I do not
remember it and do not even know the document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about another point. Do
you remember that the...
VON RIBBENTROP: It would have been understandable, that I must add.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given your answer. Do you remember, in
June 1944, that there was a conference about which we have heard
evidence, regarding the shooting of what is known as “terror-fliers”?
Now, just listen to this question and try to answer it directly, if you
would. Is it correct, as is stated in the report, that you wished to
include among terror-fliers every type of terror attack on the German
civilian population, that is, including bombing attacks on cities? Is it
right that you wished to include the airmen engaged in attacks on German
cities as terror-fliers?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not true like that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at Page 391. This is a report signed
by General Warlimont on the conference on the 6th of June, and in the
fourth line—well, let me read it. It says:
“Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy chief of
the Operations Staff in Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th
that a conference on this question had been held shortly before,
between the Reich Marshal, the Reich Foreign Minister, and
Reichsführer SS. Contrary to the original suggestion made by
Ribbentrop, who wished to include every type of terror attack on
the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on
cities, it was agreed at the above conference that only attacks
carried out with aircraft armament should be considered as
criminal actions in that sense.” (Document Number 135-PS)
Do you say that Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he said that you wished to
include every type of attack?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yesterday I answered this question at length. I do not
know whether I should refer to this point again. I dealt with this
point, I think, very exhaustively. If you wish, I can repeat it now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I do not want you to repeat it. I want you
to answer my question. Do you say that Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he
said at this conference that you wished to include those who were
engaged in bombing of cities?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is not so. First of all, so far as I remember, this
conference never took place; and, secondly, I stated my attitude
perfectly clearly yesterday, how I wished to treat terror-fliers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, answer my question.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not true as you have stated it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Then answer this question. Did you
approve that those you called “terror-fliers” were to be left to be
lynched by the population or handed over to the SS?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not my attitude.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look on Page 393, Page 214
of the English? This, as you know, is a memorandum from the Foreign
Office; and it is stated on Page 396 that General Warlimont states that
Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone that the Minister for
Foreign Affairs has approved this draft (Document 740-PS). The draft
deals with the two actions in Paragraph 1, that of lynching, and the
draft says, “The German authorities are not directly responsible, since
death occurred before a German official intervened” (Document 728-PS).
Do you agree with that view? Is that your view of the lynching of
fliers?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not my view. I explained that yesterday
quite exhaustively and stated what my attitude was toward this document.
This document is an expert opinion of the Foreign Office, which was
submitted to me. I do not know how it originated, upon my order or upon
a statement of the military authorities. I did not approve this expert
opinion as it is submitted to me here, but I did send it to the Führer
and asked him to decide about it. The Führer then called this document
“nonsense,” I believe, and therewith this expert opinion of the Foreign
Office was rejected and did not come into effect.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that, with regard to this, you say that when
Warlimont says that Ambassador Ritter advised the Wehrmacht by telephone
on 29 June that you approved the draft, that either Warlimont is not
speaking the truth or Ritter is not speaking the truth?
VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, it is not true, because it can be seen from
another document which I have also seen here that this document was sent
to the Führer and that I said there that the Führer must approve it. I
did see also another document regarding it. That is also my recollection
of the matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, if you referred to the Führer’s
view, let us just have a look at what that was. Have a look at Document
3780-PS, which will be GB-293, which is an account of a meeting that you
and Hitler had with Oshima on the 27th of May 1944. It is on Page 11,
Lines 9 to 12. Do you remember in your presence Hitler advising Oshima
that the Japanese should hang, not shoot, every American terror pilot,
that the Americans will think it over before making such attacks? Did
you agree with that view?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree with that view. If that is in this
document, that is not my meaning, not my opinion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now...
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not even know where what you said here is in the
document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will find it on Page 11, Lines 9 to 12.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that, but I can only say that this
attitude of Hitler’s as it appears in this document was brought about by
the terrible results of the air attacks at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I heard all that before. I asked you whether you
agreed or not; you said “no.” I want you now to deal with another point.
VON RIBBENTROP: I want to say something further, however, regarding this
point because it is of decisive importance.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will say that to learned Counsel after you
have answered my question on this. I want you now to direct your
attention to Stalag Luft III. You may have heard me asking a number of
witnesses a certain number of questions about it. These were the 50
British airmen who were murdered by the SS after they escaped. Do you
know that? Do you know what I am talking about?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that my colleague, Mr. Eden, made a
strong statement in the House of Commons, saying that these men had been
murdered and that Great Britain would exact justice upon the murderers?
Do you remember that, in June of 1944?
VON RIBBENTROP: I heard of this through the speech made by Mr. Eden in
the House of Commons, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that the Reich Government
issued a statement saying that, in a communication by the Reich
Government conveyed to the British via Switzerland, this unqualifiable
charge of the British Foreign Minister had been sharply refuted, that
being issued in July 1944? Do you remember that being issued?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember it. I remember only the following:
That at that time we received evidence of what had happened and that it
was communicated to us in a note from the protecting powers. That is all
I know about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to ask you: Did you know
at the time that this statement was issued—did you know that these
officers had been murdered in cold blood?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not. I heard that these men had been shot
while trying to escape. At that time, to be sure, we did have the
impression that everything was not in order, I know that. I remember
that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me take it in two stages. Who told you the
lie that these men had been shot trying to escape? Who informed you of
that lie?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember in detail. At that time we received
the documentation from the competent authorities and a memorandum was
forwarded to the Swiss Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From whom did you get your documentation which
contained that lie? Did you get it from Himmler or Göring?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you told us, I think, that you had a good
idea that things were not all right, hadn’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, I want you to tell us a word
about your connection with the SS. You are not suggesting, are you, at
this stage that you were merely an honorary member of the SS? It has
been suggested by your counsel, and I am sure it must have been on some
misunderstanding of information, that you were merely an honorary member
of the SS. That is not the case, is it?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is no misunderstanding. This is exactly how it was:
I received the SS uniform from Adolf Hitler. I did not serve in the SS,
but as ambassador and later as Foreign Minister it was customary to have
a rank of some sort and I had received the rank of SS Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you that that is entirely untrue,
that you joined the SS by application before you became
ambassador-at-large in May 1933, isn’t that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I know that. At any rate I always belonged to the SS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said just now it was honorary, because
Hitler wanted you to have a uniform. I am putting it to you; you applied
to join the SS in May 1933, in the ordinary way. Did you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Of course, one had to make an application; but the fact
was this, that I occasionally went around in a grey greatcoat and
thereupon Hitler said I must wear a uniform. I do not remember when that
was. It must have been 1933. As ambassador I received a higher rank, as
Foreign Minister I received a still higher one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in May 1933, after you made application, you
joined the SS in the not too high rank of Standartenführer, didn’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that could be.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you became an Oberführer only on the 20th of
April 1935, a Brigadeführer on 18 June 1935, and Gruppenführer on the
13th of September 1936—that was after you became an ambassador—and
Obergruppenführer on the 20th of April 1940. Before you were made an
ambassador you had been in the SS for 3 years and you had received
promotion in the ordinary way, when you did your work with the SS, isn’t
that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: Without ever taking any steps or doing anything myself
in the SS, yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look. It is Document D-744(a), Exhibit
GB-294. The correspondence is 744(b). You may take it; you need not go
through it in detail. That is your application, with all the
particulars. I just want to ask you one or two things about it. You
asked to join, did you not, the “Totenkopf,” the Death’s-Head Division
of the SS?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that cannot be true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember getting a special
Death’s-Head ring and dagger from Himmler for your services? Don’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember. I never belonged to a
Death’s-Head Division. You were just talking about a Death’s-Head
Division, were you not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A Death’s-Head Division.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. If it says so here, it is not true.
But I think that I at one time received a so-called dagger, like all SS
Führer. That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the ring, too. Here is a letter dated the
5th of November 1935, to the Personnel Office of the Reichsführer SS:
“In reply to your question I have to inform you that Brigadeführer Von
Ribbentrop’s ring size is 17. Heil Hitler,” (signed) (Adjutant)
“Thorner.” Do you remember getting that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that everyone received such a ring but I do
not remember precisely. No doubt it is true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took, didn’t you, continuous interest in
the SS from 1933 up to well into the war? I think your correspondence
with Himmler goes on to well into 1941 or 1942.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, that is certainly correct.
Of course, we had a great deal to do with the SS in all fields. That is
quite clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had, and especially in the field of
concentration camps, hadn’t you? Are you saying that you did not know
that concentration camps were being carried on in an enormous scale?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing about that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look around for the moment. [_A
map behind the witness box was uncovered._] That is an enlargement of
the exhibits put in by the French Prosecution and these red spots are
concentration camps. Now, I would just like you to look at it. We will
see now one of the reasons for the location of your various residences.
There, one north of Berlin, Sonnenburg. Do you see roughly where that is
on that map?
VON RIBBENTROP: Sonnenburg is 1 hour’s auto ride from Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: North of Berlin?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, east of Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another house. You are quite near it
yourself, your schloss or tower at Fuschl. That is quite near the
border; just over the border, and very near it, the group of camps which
existed around Mauthausen. Do you see them, just above your right hand?
Do you see the group of camps, the Mauthausen group?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to state on my oath that I heard the name
of “Mauthausen” for the first time in Nuremberg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another of the places. You say you
did not go there very often, but you used to...
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe I can make this much more brief for you. I can
say that I heard of only two concentration camps until I came here—no
it was three: Dachau, Oranienburg, and Theresienstadt. All the other
names I heard here for the first time. The Theresienstadt camp was an
old people’s home for Jews, and I believe was visited a few times by the
International Red Cross. I never heard previously of all the other
camps. I wish to make that quite clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that near Mauthausen there were 33
camps at various places, within a comparatively short distance, and 45
camps as to which the commandant did not give the names because there
were so many of them, and in the 33 camps there were over 100,000
internees? Are you telling the Tribunal that in all your journeys to
Fuschl you never heard of the camps at Mauthausen, where 100,000 people
were shut up?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me, and I can produce
dozens of witnesses who can testify to that. Dozens.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not care how many witnesses you produce. I
ask you to look at that map again. You were a responsible minister in
the Government of that country from the 4th of February 1938 till the
defeat of Germany in May 1945, a period of 7 and a quarter years. Are
you telling the Tribunal that anyone could be a responsible minister in
that country where these hundreds of concentration camps existed and not
know anything about them except two?
VON RIBBENTROP: It may be amazing but it is 100 percent true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that it is not only amazing,
but that it is so incredible that it must be false. How could you be
ignorant of these camps? Did you never see Himmler?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I never saw him about these things. Never. These
things were kept absolutely secret and we heard here, for the very first
time, what went on in them. Nobody knew anything about them. That may
sound astounding but I am positively convinced that the gentlemen in the
dock also knew nothing about all that was going on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear from them in their turn. Did you
know that at Auschwitz alone...
VON RIBBENTROP: I heard the name Auschwitz here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the German official of Auschwitz has sworn
an affidavit that 4 million people were put to death in the camp. Are
you telling the Tribunal that that happened without your knowing
anything about it?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me. I can state that here
on my oath.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, there is one other subject, which I
would like you to deal with; and here, fortunately, I am in the position
of assisting your memory with some documents. It is a question of the
partisans. I want you to look at a few documents, three documents, with
regard to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish tonight?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall, if Your Lordship will allow me 5
minutes. That is what I have been trying to do.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you agree that you were in favor of the
harshest treatment of people in the occupied countries?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand. Could you repeat the question?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question is, would it be a fair way of
expressing your point of view to say that you were in favor of the
harshest treatment of—I will put it first of all—of partisans?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I ever expressed myself about the
treatment of partisans. I do not recall having done so. In any case, I
was against it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, look at Document D-735, which will be
Exhibit GB-295. That is a discussion between you and Count Ciano in the
presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Cavallero in the Führer’s
headquarters after breakfast on the 19th of December 1942. Now, if you
will look at Page 2, you will see that there is a passage where Field
Marshal Keitel told the Italian gentlemen that:
“The Croatian area was to be cleaned up by German and Italian
troops working in co-operation; and this while it was still
winter, in view of the strong British influence in this area.
The Führer explained that the Serbian conspirators were to be
burned out, and that no soft methods were to be used in doing
this. Field Marshal Keitel here interjected that every village
in which partisans were found had to be burned down. Continuing,
the Reich Foreign Minister declared that Roatta must not leave
the third zone, but must on the contrary advance, and this in
the closest collaboration with the German troops. In this
connection Field Marshal Keitel requested the Italian gentlemen
not to regard the utilization of Croatian troops to help in this
cleaning-up operation as a favoring of the Croatians. The Reich
Foreign Minister stated in this connection that the Poglavnik to
whom he had spoken very clearly, was 100 percent ready to come
to an agreement with Italy.”
Did that represent your view, that “the Serbian conspirators should be
burned out”?
VON RIBBENTROP: Please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did that represent your view, that “the Serbian
conspirators should be burned out”?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know that expression. At any rate it is certain
that they should have been locked up.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What it means is that their villages should be
razed to the ground by fire.
VON RIBBENTROP: Where did I say that? I do not believe I said that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the Führer’s point of view. Was it your
point of view?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Führer took a very harsh attitude on these
questions, and I know that occasionally harsh orders had to be issued
also from other offices, including the military. It was a struggle for
life and death. One should not forget that it was war.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you denying...
VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, I do not see where I said anything about
partisans, that is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that is not your point of view? Is that
what you are saying? That is not your point of view? Are you saying that
it is not your point of view as to the way to treat them? Do not look at
the next document. Tell me, is that your point of view?
VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question that you want me to answer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you say that you were not in favor of harsh
treatment of partisans?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am of the opinion that the partisans who attack the
troops in the rear should be treated harshly. Yes, I am of that opinion,
I believe everyone in the Army is of that opinion, and every politician.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Including women and children?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, by no means.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at that, if you deny this attitude to
women and children. Look at the document, Number D-741.
My Lord, that will be Document D-741; this will be GB-296.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at the end of that. That is
a conference between you and Ambassador Alfieri in Berlin on 21 February
1943. The last paragraph says:
“Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that the
conditions which Roatta’s policy had helped to produce in
Croatia were causing the Führer great concern. It was
appreciated on the German side that Roatta wished to spare
Italian blood, but it was believed that he was, as it were,
trying to drive out Satan with Beelzebub by this policy. These
partisan gangs had to be exterminated, including men, women, and
children, as their further existence imperiled the lives of
German and Italian men, women, and children.”
Do you still say that you did not want harsh treatment of women and
children?
VON RIBBENTROP: What page is that on?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is on Pages 10 to 13. It is the last
paragraph of my translation.
“These partisan gangs had to be exterminated, including men,
women and children, as their further existence imperiled the
lives of German and Italian men, women, and children.”
VON RIBBENTROP: If I did say that at any time, it must have been under
great excitement. In any case, it does not correspond to my opinion
which I have proved by my other acts during the war. I cannot say
anything else at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just show you one of your other acts,
which will be the final one, if the Tribunal will bear with me. It is
Document D-740, which will be GB-297. This is a memorandum of the
conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Secretary of State
Bastianini in the presence of Ambassadors Von Mackensen and Alfieri at
Klessheim castle on the afternoon of the 8th of April 1943. If you will
look at the beginning, I think you were discussing some strike in Italy.
You say:
“The Reich Foreign Minister’s supposition that this strike had
perhaps been instigated by British agents was energetically
contested by Bastianini. There were Italian communists who were
still in Italy and who received their orders from Moscow. The
Reich Foreign Minister replied that, in such a case, only
merciless action would remedy.”
And then, after a statement with regard to the information, you say:
“He (the Reich Foreign Minister) did not want to discuss Italy
but rather the occupied territories, where it had been shown
that one would not get anywhere with soft methods or in the
endeavor to reach an agreement. The Reich Foreign Minister then
explained his views by a comparison between Denmark and Norway.
In Norway brutal measures had been taken which had evoked lively
protests, particularly in Sweden.”
And then you go on, and after a certain criticism of Dr. Best...
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot find it; what page is it on, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The paragraph begins: “The Reich Foreign
Minister’s supposition that this strike has perhaps been instigated by
British agents...”
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see what I have put to you. You say:
“Only merciless action would be any good. In Norway brutal
measures had been taken.”
And at the beginning of the next paragraph:
“In Greece, too, brutal action would have to be taken if the
Greeks should sense a change for the better. He was of the
opinion that the demobilized Greek Army should be deported from
Greece with lightning speed, and that the Greeks should be shown
in an iron manner who was master in the country. Hard methods of
this kind were necessary if one was waging a war against Stalin,
which was not a gentleman’s war but a brutal war of
extermination.”
And then, with regard to France, after some statement about the French
you say:
“Coming back to Greece, the Reich Foreign Minister once again
stressed the necessity of taking severe measures.”
And in the third line of the next paragraph:
“The Führer would have to take radical measures in the occupied
territories to mobilize the local labor potential in order that
the American armament potential might be equaled.”
Do you agree? Does that fairly express your view, that you wanted the
most severe measures taken in occupied territories in order to mobilize
labor to increase the Reich war potential?
VON RIBBENTROP: I can say the following in regard to this document. I
know that at that time...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE; Well, you can say that, but you can answer my
question first. Do these views express your view that...
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...severe measures should be taken with foreign
labor and with people in occupied territories. Does that document
express your view?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it does not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why did you say it? Why did you say these
things?
VON RIBBENTROP: Because at that time, on the commission of the Führer, I
had to keep the Italians’ noses to the grindstone, since there was
complete chaos in some of the areas and the Italians always attempted to
cause complete confusion in the rear areas of the German Army by some of
the measures they took there. That is why I occasionally had to speak
very harshly with the Italians. I recall that very distinctly. At that
time the Italians were fighting together with the Chetniks partly
against German troops; it was complete chaos there and for this reason I
often used rather earnest and harsh language with the diplomats—perhaps
an exaggerated language. But things actually looked quite different
afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was not a bit exaggeration, was it, in both
Norway and Greece? You were taking the most brutal measures against the
occupied countries.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. We had absolutely nothing to say in
Norway; we always tried to do things differently. And in Denmark we did
everything to reduce these harsh measures, which were in part necessary,
because of the paratroopers and so forth, and tried not to have them
carried out.
I think it can be proved, from a number of other documents, that I and
the Foreign Office always worked toward compromise in the various
occupied countries. I do not believe that it is quite fair and correct
to take only one or two such statements from the innumerable documents
where occasionally I did use harsh words. It is certain that in the
course of 6 years of war harsh language must be used from time to time.
I may remind you that foreign statesmen also used harsh language
regarding the treatment of Germany. But I am sure they did not mean it
that way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me this: Every time today when you have
been confronted with a document which attributes to you some harsh
language or the opposite of what you have said here you say that on that
occasion you were telling a diplomatic lie. Is that what it comes to?
Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, do you have all these documents in evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-SEVENTH DAY
Tuesday, 2 April 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Von Ribbentrop resumed the stand._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Your Lordship will have noticed that I
did not deal with the question of Jews. That will now be taken up by my
learned friend, M. Faure, of the French Delegation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I say a few words on an important
question? A map was discussed here yesterday, the map which is now
visible in court. From that map the Prosecution conclude that a large
number of concentration camps were distributed all over Germany. The
defendants are contradicting this statement as energetically as
possible. In the treatment of my case, the case of the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner, I hope to adduce evidence to the effect that only a very
few of the red spots on this map are accurate. I wish to make this
statement here and now, in order that the impression does not arise over
again, in the subsequent cases, that this map is a correct one.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, this is only a reproduction of what has
already been put in evidence.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, but I am at liberty to adduce proof to the contrary.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course you are, but it is not necessary for you to say
so now. The fact that the evidence was put in by the Prosecution at an
earlier date, of course, gives you every opportunity to answer it, but
not to answer it at this moment.
M. FAURE: Defendant, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, you were the chief
of the diplomatic personnel, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
M. FAURE: The personnel followed your instructions, did they not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
M. FAURE: You declared yesterday that you were responsible for the acts
of your subordinates?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
M. FAURE: Would you tell me if Dr. Best, Plenipotentiary for Denmark,
was a member of your Ministry?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
M. FAURE: Dr. Best told you, did he not, that Hitler had given an order
to assassinate Danes when there were acts of sabotage?
VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask you to repeat the question?
M. FAURE: According to the documents that have been produced before the
Tribunal, Dr. Best saw you on 30 December 1943 and told you that Hitler
had given the order to assassinate Danes when there were acts of
sabotage in Denmark; is that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was to be done against saboteurs. Hitler had
ordered it.
M. FAURE: The order, according to the terms employed by Dr. Best in the
document, was to “execute persons, terrorists or non-terrorists, without
trial.” Can that not be considered as assassination?
VON RIBBENTROP: From the beginning I strongly opposed these measures,
and so did Dr. Best. We went so far as to...
M. FAURE: Defendant, I am not trying to say that you were pleased with
this state of affairs. I am merely asking you if you were informed
thereof. Is that correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the Führer wanted that. I do not know the details.
M. FAURE: But I am not asking for details.
VON RIBBENTROP: And what was ordered afterwards I do not know because,
so far as I am aware, it did not go through us, but through another
department.
M. FAURE: I note that you actually were informed of the Führer’s order
given that day to permit assassination. You therefore considered it
normal to belong to a government, the head of which was a murderer.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, the exact opposite is true here, the exact
opposite...
M. FAURE: All right, all right, just answer, please.
VON RIBBENTROP: ...for I told him that I had taken my stand and that I
held divergent views. The Führer was most dissatisfied with Dr. Best and
had the matter handled through other channels, since Dr. Best was
against it and so was I.
M. FAURE: I am merely asking you to answer my question very briefly. You
can give details through your counsel later.
With regard to Denmark, there was action against the Jews in that
country in order to deport them. Did you have anything to do with that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you anything about matters relating to the
Jews in Denmark, since I know nothing.
M. FAURE: Did you never hear anything about it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I remember that I discussed the fact with Best, that
this question was of no significance in Denmark. He was therefore not
proposing to do anything in particular about the Jewish question there,
and I declared myself in complete agreement with him.
M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown Document 2375-PS. This document has
not yet been submitted to the Tribunal. I would like to submit it under
French Exhibit Number RF-1503. I would like to read with you the second
paragraph of this document. It is an affidavit from Mildner, a colonel
of the police in Denmark.
“As commander, I was subordinate to the Reich Plenipotentiary,
Dr. Best. Since I was opposed to the persecution of the Jews, on
principle and for practical reasons, I asked Dr. Best to give me
the reasons for the measures that were ordered.
“Dr. Best declared to me that the Reich Foreign Minister,
Ribbentrop, obviously knew Hitler’s intention to exterminate the
Jews in Europe. He had furnished Hitler with a report about the
Jewish problem in Denmark and proposed to deport the Jews from
Denmark.
“Dr. Best declared furthermore that Ribbentrop was afraid of
being held responsible in case the Jews remained in Denmark.
“Dr. Best was now compelled to carry out the measures that were
proposed to Hitler by Ribbentrop.
“From the discussion with Dr. Best I gathered that he must have
had a discussion or a telephone conversation with Ribbentrop.”
You read that, did you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: What is written in this document is pure fantasy. It is
not true.
M. FAURE: Very well; I ask then that you be shown Document 3688-PS,
which I wish to deposit under the French Exhibit Number RF-1502. It is a
note of 24 September 1942, signed by Luther, and addressed to his
collaborators. I should like to read with you the first two paragraphs
of that document.
“The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me today by
telephone to expedite as much as possible the evacuation of the
Jews from different countries in Europe, since it is certain
that the Jews stir up feelings against us everywhere and must be
held responsible for acts of sabotage and outrages.
“After a short report on the evacuation of Jews at present in
process in Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, and the occupied
territories, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has ordered us now
to approach the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Danish Governments
with the aim of getting the evacuation started in these
countries.”
I suggest that this second document confirms the first as regards your
participation in the deportation of Jews in Denmark. Do you agree?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was the Führer’s plan, at the time, to deport the
Jews from Europe to North Africa, and Madagascar was also mentioned in
this connection. He ordered me to approach various governments with a
view to encouraging the emigration of the Jews, if possible, and to
remove all Jews from important government posts. I issued instructions
to the Foreign Office accordingly, and, if I remember rightly, certain
governments were approached several times to that effect. It was the
question of the Jewish emigration to certain parts of North Africa; that
is true. May I return to this affidavit? This sworn affidavit is pure
fantasy of Colonel Mildner’s and is absolutely untrue.
M. FAURE: But, in any case, you admit...
VON RIBBENTROP: Dr. Best once discussed the Jewish question with me, and
he said that as far as Denmark was concerned, the question was of no
particular importance, since there were not many Jews left there. I
explained to him that he would have to let matters take their own course
there. That is the truth.
M. FAURE: You admit, nevertheless, that this document signed by Luther
is correct, and that you did give the order to evacuate the Jews of
Denmark? It is in the letter.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, not in Denmark. I do not even know this document of
Luther’s. This is the first time I have seen it.
M. FAURE: Please, simply answer my questions; otherwise we shall waste a
lot of time. In your opinion, both these documents are incorrect, you
said so; let us pass on.
The German Embassy in Paris...
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say so. That is incorrect. I said that I
did not know Luther’s document. It is, however, true that the Führer
gave me instructions to tell the Foreign Office to approach certain
foreign governments with a view to solving the Jewish problem by
removing the Jews from government positions and, wherever possible, to
favor Jewish emigration.
M. FAURE: The German Embassy in Paris was under your orders, was it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: The German Embassy in Paris, that is, the Ambassador to
the Vichy Government, naturally received orders from me.
M. FAURE: French Document RF-1061 has already been read to the Tribunal
and in this document you defined the functions of Ambassador Abetz. It
is 3614-PS.
In this document, which has already been read to you twice here, I would
remind you that you commissioned Abetz to put in a safe place the public
and private art treasures, particularly those belonging to Jews, on the
basis of special instructions mentioned here. Abetz executed this
mission by pillaging art collections in France.
VON RIBBENTROP: It is not true.
M. FAURE: I would ask that you be shown Document 3766-PS, which has not
yet been produced, and to which I should like to give the French Exhibit
Number RF-1505. I will go over merely a few lines of this document with
you. It is a report from the military administration, which was
distributed in 700 copies. It is entitled: “Report on the Removal of
French Works of Art by the German Embassy and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg
in France.”
If you will look at Page 3, you will see that the title in the margin is
very significant: “German-Embassy: Attempt to remove paintings from the
Louvre.”
Page 4, I will read the first sentence at the top of the page...
VON RIBBENTROP: When may I refer to the individual points? Not at all,
or here and now?
M. FAURE: When I ask you a question you will answer. I am reading a
passage to you:
“Ambassador Abetz, disregarding the prohibition pronounced by
the military administration, undertook to send to Germany a
series of works of art from the Louvre which had been placed in
safety.”
Were you informed of this?
VON RIBBENTROP: I declare that this is absolutely untrue. Not a single
work of art was taken out of the Louvre by Ambassador Abetz. That would
have been contrary to the express orders of the Führer, who had strictly
forbidden it. The report is incorrect.
May I mention that on one occasion the French Government wanted to
present me with a work of art from the Louvre, a painting by Boucher. I
returned this picture to the Louvre. I do not possess anything, and the
Foreign Office never even saw a single work of art, from the Louvre.
M. FAURE: You state that this report is incorrect?
THE PRESIDENT: What is this report you are putting to him?
M. FAURE: It is Document 3766-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but what is this document?
M. FAURE: It is a report from the German military administration, which
is in the American documents in the PS series. The Tribunal received a
general affidavit referring thereto.
THE PRESIDENT: Captured documents?
M. FAURE: Yes, captured documents. I indicate to the Tribunal that this
captured report contains numerous other passages relating to the actions
of Abetz, but as the defendant declares that the report is inexact as
regards one of its passages, I shall not continue reading the document,
in order to save time.
In addition...
VON RIBBENTROP: But this is not a captured document, not a report.
M. FAURE: Please answer my questions. We are not going to carry on this
controversy. Your counsel can interrogate you later on.
DR. HORN: I must ask your permission to inquire into the nature of the
documents submitted to the defendant. If it is stated that it is a
captured report and then that it is not a captured report, the matters
should be put right, here and immediately.
M. FAURE: I have already indicated that this document belongs to the PS
series of captured documents. The Tribunal has a large number of such
documents and I do not think that their authenticity will be disputed.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I would now like to ask you the following
question:...
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to ask further questions upon this
document?
M. FAURE: No, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Apart from the questions of art treasures,
Abetz also dealt with the question of the treatment of Jews in general,
did he not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Abetz had no order. As far as I know he also had nothing
to do with the Jewish question. This question was handled by other
departments.
M. FAURE: Is it not true that in October 1940 Abetz communicated with
you with a view to settling the situation of Jews of German or Austrian
descent who were residing in France?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know; it did not interest me.
M. FAURE: I would like to show you Document EC-265, which I wish to
submit as French Document RF-1504. It is a telegram from Abetz dated 1
October 1940. I will read merely the first and last sentences:
“The solution of the Jewish problem in the occupied territory of
France requires, besides other measures, a regulation as soon as
possible of the citizenship status of the Reich German Jews who
were living here at the beginning of the war...”
And the last sentence:
“The measures proposed above are to be considered as merely the
first step toward the solution of the entire problem. I reserve
the right to make other proposals.”
VON RIBBENTROP: May I have time to read the telegram first?
THE PRESIDENT: That is a little too fast.
M. FAURE: Yes.
VON RIBBENTROP: So far as I can see, this telegram apparently deals with
the fact that Austrian and German Jews are to be repatriated to Austria
and Germany from France. I do not know that. This is the first time I
have seen this telegram, and I can give no information about it. It
probably represents one of the routine measures dealt with by the
Foreign Office in the course of the day’s work, but which were not
submitted to me; and apart from that, these matters were individually
dealt with by other departments, not by us.
M. FAURE: If you will look on the left-hand side of the telegram, you
will see the distribution list. There were 19, including you, were there
not? You were Number 2.
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to inform the French prosecutor that every
day four, five, six, or eight hundred such documents and telegrams
reached my office, of which only 1 or 2 percent were submitted to me.
M. FAURE: Apart from the question...
VON RIBBENTROP: In any case I know nothing about this telegram.
M. FAURE: Apart from the question of Jews of Austrian and German origin,
your colleagues and subordinates in the Embassy also dealt with the
question of the French Jews. Now, before asking you this question, I
should like to read out to you two sentences from a document which was
submitted to the Tribunal as French Document Number RF-1207. It is a
report from Dannecker, who was responsible for solving the Jewish
problem in France. Dannecker concluded his report as follows:
“In this connection, I cannot speak of this matter without
mentioning the genuinely friendly support which our work
received from the German Ambassador Abetz, his representative,
the envoy Schleier, and SS Sturmbannführer and Counsellor of
Legation Dr. Zeitschel. I should like to add that the Embassy in
Paris has, on its own initiative, placed quite large sums at the
disposal of the branch in charge of the Jewish question, for the
financing of the Anti-Jewish Institute, and that it will
continue to do so in future.”
Therefore, according to these documents, Abetz, Schleier, and Zeitschel
worked together.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Faure, we do not know where you are reading from.
M. FAURE: Mr. President, this document was not given to you in this
folder because it has already been submitted to the Tribunal. I merely
wished to read two sentences from it.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
M. FAURE: It is evident therefore, from this document, that three
officials of the German Embassy, Abetz, Schleier, and Zeitschel,
collaborated with Dannecker in the settlement of Jewish affairs. That is
shown by the document, is it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Am I supposed to answer that? Is it a question?
M. FAURE: It is a question.
VON RIBBENTROP: To that question I must answer “naturally.” They
certainly collaborated to some extent in the Jewish question in France;
that is perfectly clear. But I can also add that the French Prosecution
surely is informed that Ambassador Abetz was not only instructed by me,
but also acted on his own initiative in always attempting to reach some
kind of conciliatory settlement of this question. It goes without saying
that the Embassy was involved, one way or the other, in this sphere of
action. And it also goes without saying that I must assume
responsibility for anything done by the gentlemen in the Embassy, and I
should like to repeat that my instructions as well as the activities of
Ambassador Abetz were always in the opposite direction. It is quite
clear that the basic anti-Semitic tendency and policy of the German
Government spread over all the departments and naturally, in any
sphere—I mean, every Government office somehow or other came into
contact with these matters. Our task in the Foreign Office—which could
be proved in thousands of cases if the documents would be submitted—was
to act as an intermediary in this sphere. I might say, we often had to
do things in accordance with this anti-Semitic policy, but we always
endeavored to prevent these measures and to reach some kind of
conciliatory settlement. In fact, the German Embassy was not responsible
for any anti-Semitic measures of any description in France.
M. FAURE: I would like to draw your attention to another document,
Number RF-1210, a French document which is a second report from
Dannecker of 22 February 1942, Page 3 of the document, Page 2 of the
German text.
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say here and now that I do not even
know who Dannecker is. Perhaps you can give me some information on that
subject.
M. FAURE: I informed you that Dannecker was the person responsible for
Jewish affairs in France. As a matter of fact, these documents were
submitted a long time ago to the Tribunal and communicated to the
Defense.
At Page 3 of the document, which is Page 2 of the German, there is a
paragraph entitled, “Actions,” from which I read one sentence: “Up to
the present, three large-scale operations have been undertaken against
the Jews in Paris.”
Now, if you will look at the last page of the document, the last
paragraph but one, we read as follows:
“Since the middle of 1941 there has been a conference every
Tuesday in which the following services participate:... I, II,
and III, military commands, administrative, police, and economic
sections; IV, German Embassy, Paris; V, Einsatzstab Westen of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
“The result of the conference is that—with very few exceptions
naturally called for by outsiders—the anti-Jewish policy is
being brought into one common line in the occupied territory.”
This document clearly shows, does it not, that your collaborators were
in agreement with the anti-Jewish policy in the occupied territories and
that this policy included the arrest of Jews?
VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to this statement? According to my
information, in this case, as so often happened in such cases, the
German ambassadors could have served as the branch offices. They might
have joined in with a view to guiding matters into peaceful channels.
M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown French Document RF-1220, which is a
letter from the German Embassy of 27 June 1942, addressed to the head of
the Security Police and the SD in France. Before asking you a question I
would like to read with you the first two paragraphs of this letter:
“Following my interview with Hauptsturmführer Dannecker on the
date of 27 June, during which he indicated that he required that
50,000 Jews from the unoccupied zone be deported to the East as
soon as possible, and that on the basis of notes sent by the
Commissioner General for Jewish Questions, Darquier de
Pellepoix, under any circumstances something had to be done for
this, I reported the matter to Ambassador Abetz and Minister
Rahn immediately after the discussion. The latter is to confer
with President Laval this afternoon, and he has promised me that
he will speak to him at once about the handing over of these
50,000 Jews; also he will insist that Darquier de Pellepoix be
given complete freedom of action according to the laws already
promulgated, and that the credits which have been promised to
him be handed to him immediately.”
Now, I should like to ask you a question. I ask you to answer as briefly
as possible: Were you aware of this _démarche_ for the handing over of
these 50,000 Jews?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not; I heard about it here for the first time,
when this document was, I believe, read out once before.
M. FAURE: If your collaborators Abetz, Rahn, and Zeitschel took such
action on this subject without informing you, was it not because they
thought they were acting in accordance with your general directives?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so; they worked very independently in
Paris, but I should like to repeat once again that I am assuming
responsibility for everything that these gentlemen have done. I make a
point of emphasizing this fact. I did not, however, know anything about
the proposed measure against the 50,000 Jews. And I do not even know
whether it was ever put into effect, and in what manner these gentlemen
had implicated themselves in the matter. The letter does not make it
clear. I know only one thing, and that is that my general instructions
were to tread cautiously in such matters and, if possible, to bridge
difficulties according to my own basic concepts and not to do anything
to force matters but, on the contrary, to smooth them over. I can say no
more on the subject.
M. FAURE: During the interrogation of your witness Steengracht, the
British Prosecution produced a document, 3319-PS, under the British
Exhibit Number GB-287. I should like to refer to this document for one
question only.
In this document there is an account of a meeting, or a congress, at
which were present all the reporters on Jewish questions from the
various diplomatic missions in Europe. This congress was held on 3 and 4
April 1944 in Krummhübel. It was organized by Schleier. This was read
the other day. You knew about this congress, I suppose?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, this is the first time I have heard about it. What
congress was that? I have never heard that such a congress ever took
place. What kind of congress was it supposed to be?
M. FAURE: This document has already been submitted; it was a congress
held...
VON RIBBENTROP: I know only about one congress which I asked the Führer
not to hold. That I do know. But I know nothing at all about a congress
which did take place. Please give more detailed information on the
subject.
M. FAURE: The document was handed over to the Tribunal, and I would like
to ask you one question. You testified that you were unaware of this
meeting at which 31 persons, most of whom belonged to the diplomatic
service, were present. I will inform you that during this meeting
Embassy Counsellor Von Thadden made a declaration which was reported in
the following terms:
“The speaker explained the reasons why the Zionist solution of
Palestine and similar alternative solutions must be rejected and
why the Jews must be expatriated into the Eastern territories.”
I suggest that this declaration made by an embassy counsellor in the
presence of 31 people belonging to your service voiced your own attitude
on these matters.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but I do not know in the very least what you mean.
May I, to begin with, please have some information on the matter with
which we are dealing? I do not understand it at all. I have told you
once before that I know nothing about any congress except the one which
I countermanded. That was an international congress which was to have
been held. I know nothing of a congress of diplomats. Would you kindly
place the document in question at my disposal in order that I may make
my reply?
M. FAURE: I do not intend to show you this document. I read one sentence
contained in this document, and I am merely asking you if this phrase
represents your opinion or not. Answer “yes” or “no”.
VON RIBBENTROP: Then I must request you to repeat the sentence. I wish
to confirm again, however, that no congress took place; it is not true.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I object to that question, if the opportunity
is not afforded the defendant to give a truthful answer.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question was proper.
M. FAURE: I ask you whether this sentence which I have read out to you
corresponded to your opinion.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask you to repeat the sentence. I did not
understand it correctly.
M. FAURE: “The speaker explained the reasons why the Zionist
solution of Palestine and similar alternative solutions must be
rejected and why the Jews must be expatriated to the Eastern
territories.”
Was that your thesis?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not.
M. FAURE: Was your attention drawn to the fact that the Italian
authorities in France protected the Jews against persecution by Germans?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I recollect that there was something of the kind
but I no longer remember exactly.
M. FAURE: Did you approach the Italian Government on this subject?
VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect that on one occasion I spoke either to
Mussolini or to Count Ciano about certain acts of sabotage, espionage,
or something of that kind which had occurred in France and against which
one would have to be on the alert, and in this connection, I believe,
the Jewish problem was also discussed.
M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown Document D-734, which I would like to
submit as French Exhibit Number RF-1501. This note is headed:
“Account of a conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and
the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia in the presence of Ambassadors
Von Mackensen and Alfieri and the State Secretary Bastianini on
the 25th of February 1943.”
I would like to read with you the second paragraph on this page:
“Further, the Reich Foreign Minister dealt with the Jewish
question. The Duce was aware that Germany had taken a radical
position with regard to the treatment of the Jews. As a result
of the development of the war in Russia she had come to an even
greater clarification of this question. All Jews had been
transported from Germany and from the territories occupied by
her to reservations in the East. He, the Reich Foreign Minister,
knew that this measure was described as cruel, particularly by
enemies, but it was necessary in order to be able to carry the
war through to a successful conclusion.”
I shall not read the following paragraph, but the fourth:
“France also had taken measures against the Jews which were
extremely useful. They were only temporary, because here, too,
final solution would be the deportation of the Jews to the East.
He, the Reich Foreign Minister, knew that in Italian military
circles, and occasionally among German military people too, the
Jewish problem was not sufficiently appreciated. It was only in
this way that he could understand an order of the _Comando
Supremo_ which, in the Italian occupation zone of France had
canceled measures taken against the Jews by the French
authorities acting under German influence. The Duce contested
the accuracy of this report and traced it back to the French
tactics of causing dissension between Germany and Italy.”
Now I shall ask you a question: A short while ago you told us that you
wanted to make all the Jews emigrate to Madagascar. Is Madagascar in the
Eastern reservations mentioned in the document?
VON RIBBENTROP: About what? I have not understood.
M. FAURE: You were talking in this document of deporting Jews to the
reservations in the Eastern territories, and a short while ago you spoke
to us of settling the Jews in Madagascar. Is Madagascar meant here?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was the Führer’s plan. This document refers to
the fact that a large-scale espionage system had been discovered, I
believe, in France. The Führer sent me while I was on a journey to Italy
and told me to speak to Mussolini and see to it that in cases of Jews
involved in these acts of sabotage and espionage, the Italian Government
or the Italian Army did not intervene to prevent this measure. Also I
should like to state definitely that I knew, and it was also the
Führer’s plan, that the European Jews were to be resettled on a
large-scale either in Madagascar, North Africa, or in reservations in
the East. This was generally known in Germany. That is all that we are
concerned with here, and I also knew that some very unpleasant things
had occurred at that time and that the Führer was convinced that all of
them could be attributed to Jewish organizations in the south of France,
I believe. I now recollect very well that at the time I discussed the
matter with Mussolini and begged him to adopt suitable measures since
these Jews were furnishing all the information to the English and
American Intelligence Services. At least that was the information which
the Führer was constantly receiving.
M. FAURE: You said, did you not, that all Jews were to be deported to
the Eastern reservations? Is that correct? Please reply “yes” or “no”.
VON RIBBENTROP: Whether I was in favor of it?
M. FAURE: Germany deported all the Jews from German territory and
territories occupied by her to Eastern reservations. That is true, is it
not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the contents of the document in detail. I
do not know what I myself said in detail. But at any rate I knew that
the Führer had ordered that the Jews of the occupied territories in
Europe were to be transported to reservations in the East and resettled
there. That I did know. The carrying out of these measures, however, was
not my task as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Foreign Office, but I
did know that it was the Führer’s wish. In this connection, I remember
that I received an order from him to discuss the matter with the Italian
Government so that they too would introduce corresponding measures
regarding the Jewish problem. That applied to other countries as well,
where we had to send telegrams quite frequently, so that these countries
should solve the Jewish question.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, did you read to the witness the second
paragraph beginning: “Further, the Reich Foreign Minister dealt with the
Jewish question...”?
M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President, the second paragraph. That is the
paragraph which I have just been reading.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you read the third one, but I did not know you read
the second one too. You read the second one too, did you? Very well.
M. FAURE: Yes, I read it as well, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The document is a new document, is it not?
M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President, it is a document which I would like to
submit under the Exhibit Number RF-1501. It belongs to the “D” series;
it is D-734 of the British document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the defendant said whether he admits that it is a
substantially accurate account of the conversation?
VON RIBBENTROP: I can no longer say for certain, Mr. President; what I
did say at the time, I know only, and gather, from this document, from
these words, that the Jews were spreading news from British and American
sources. I can remember that at that time a large espionage and sabotage
organization was in existence, and that this organization was causing a
great deal of trouble in France, and that the Führer ordered me to
discuss the matter with Mussolini since the Italians were opposing
certain measures we had introduced in France. I spoke to Mussolini and
told him that the Führer was of the opinion that, where this question
was concerned, we should have to come to a definite understanding.
THE PRESIDENT: I think, Defendant, you have already told us that. The
question that I asked was whether you agreed that it was a substantially
accurate account of the conversation.
VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that in certain points the report is
incorrect, but fundamentally the position was as I have just explained
it.
M. FAURE: Now, you also spoke about this question with Horthy, did you
not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I had to confer several times with the Hungarian
Government so as to persuade them to do something about the Jewish
problem. The Führer was extremely insistent on this point. I therefore
discussed the question repeatedly with the Hungarian Ambassador and the
question was primarily to centralize the Jews somehow or other in some
part of Budapest, I think it was slightly outside Budapest or in—as a
matter of fact, I do not know Budapest very well—in any case, it was
somewhere in Budapest itself. That was the first point. And the second
point dealt with the removal of the Jews from influential Government
posts, since it had been proved that Jewish influence in these
departments was sufficiently authoritative to bring Hungary to a
separate peace.
M. FAURE: The document relating to your conversation or one of the
conversations which you had with Horthy has already been produced. It
was that of 17 April 1943. It is Document D-736, which was submitted as
GB-283.
During the interrogation of your witness, Schmidt, the British
prosecutor asked this witness if he admitted having compiled this
account, and this was confirmed by Schmidt. This note bears the
following remark at the bottom of the first paragraph: “The Foreign
Minister declared that the Jews were either to be exterminated or sent
to concentration camps. There was no other solution.”
You did say that, did you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I definitely did not say it in those words. But I would
like to reply as follows:
It was apparently an account prepared by “Minister” Schmidt, as was his
habit, some days after a long discussion between the Führer and Horthy.
I have already said that the Führer had repeatedly charged me to talk to
Horthy, to the Hungarian Government, to the Ambassador, in order to
reach a solution of the Jewish question. At the time when Horthy visited
the Führer the Führer emphasized the question to him in a very irritable
manner, and I remember perfectly that subsequent to this discussion I
talked the matter over with “Minister” Schmidt, saying that I, strictly
speaking, had not quite understood the Führer.
The remark mentioned was definitely not made in this way. M. Horthy had
apparently said that he could not, after all, beat the Jews to death. It
is possible, since there would have been no question of that in any
case, that in this connection I did endeavor to persuade Horthy to do
something or other at once about the Jewish question in Budapest,
namely, that he should undertake now the centralization which the Führer
had already wished to carry out for a long time. My objection or my
interpolation may have referred to this question.
I must add that the situation, at that time, was as follows: We had been
receiving repeated indications from Himmler, to the effect that Himmler
wished to handle the Jewish situation in Hungary himself. I did not want
this, since, one way or another, it would probably have created
political difficulties abroad.
Consequently, acting on the wish of the Führer, who was extremely
obstinate on this subject, I, as is known, repeatedly attempted to
smooth matters over and, at the same time, pin the Hungarians down to do
something about it in any case. Therefore, if, from a long conversation,
some remark has been extracted and summarized in brief, and contains
some such statement, it certainly does not mean that I wished the Jews
to be beaten to death. It was 100 percent contrary to my personal
convictions.
M. FAURE: I do not understand whether you answered my question or not. I
will have to ask you again. Is the report correct, or is it not correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, in this form it cannot be correct. These are notes.
I personally have never seen these notes before; otherwise I should have
said at once that this is nonsense and liable to misconstruction. I did
not see these notes before; I saw them for the first time in Nuremberg.
I can say only one thing which may possibly have occurred. I might have
said...well yes, “the Jews cannot be exterminated or beaten to death,
so, please do something in order that the Führer will be satisfied at
long last, and centralize the Jews.”
That was our aim, at that time at any rate. We did not want to render
the situation more acute, but we were trying to do something in Hungary
so that no other department could take the matter in hand, thereby
creating political difficulties abroad for the Foreign Office.
M. FAURE: You knew at that time that many Jews had been deported. That
may be gathered from your explanations.
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, please. Are you passing from this
document?
M. FAURE: I was continuing to speak of it in more general terms.
THE PRESIDENT: You are passing from it, did you say?
M. FAURE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Defendant, the Tribunal would like to know whether
you did say to the Regent Horthy that Jews ought to be taken to
concentration camps.
VON RIBBENTROP: I consider it possible that such may have been the case,
for we had, at that time, received an order that a concentration camp
was to be installed near Budapest or else that the Jews should be
centralized there, and the Führer had instructed me a long time before
to discuss with the Hungarians a possible solution of the Jewish
question. This solution should consist of two points. One was the
removal of the Jews from important government positions and two, since
there were so many Jews in Budapest, to centralize the Jews in certain
quarters of Budapest.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand your suggestion to be that this document is
inaccurate.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it is not accurate. The way I should like to put
it, Mr. President, is that when reading the document, it would appear
from this document that I considered it possible or desirable to beat
the Jews to death. That is perfectly untrue but what I did say here and
what I emphasized later on could be understood to mean only that I
wished something to be done in Hungary to solve the Jewish problem, so
that other departments should not interfere in the matter. For the
Führer often spoke to me about it, very seriously indeed, saying that
the Jewish problem in Hungary must be solved now...
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that, I think, already. What I wanted to
ask you was this: Are you suggesting that Schmidt, who drew up this
memorandum, invented the last few sentences, beginning with the words:
“If the Jews there did not want to work they would be shot. If
they could not work they would have to perish. They had to be
treated like tuberculosis bacilli with which a healthy body may
become infected. This was not cruel if one remembered that
innocent creatures of nature, such as hares or deer, have to be
killed so that no harm is caused by them. Why should the beasts
who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be shown more leniency?
Nations which did not rid themselves of Jews perished. One of
the most famous examples of this was the downfall of a people
who once were so proud, the Persians, who now lead a pitiful
existence as Armenians.”
Are you suggesting that Schmidt invented those sentences or imagined
them?
VON RIBBENTROP: Mr. President, I should like to add that I myself was
very grieved by these words of the Führer, and I did not quite
understand them. But perhaps this attitude can be understood only if we
remember that the Führer believed that the Jews had caused this war, and
that he had gradually developed a very fanatical hatred for them.
I remember too that later on, after this conference, I discussed with
the interpreter Schmidt and the two gentlemen the fact that this was the
first time the Führer had used expressions in connection with the Jewish
problem which I could no longer understand. These words were certainly
not invented by Schmidt. The Führer did express himself in some such way
at that time. That is true.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure.
M. FAURE: It appears from his document that you thought there were
concentration camps in Hungary and yet you said yesterday that you did
not know there were any in Germany. Is that not so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know that there were any concentration camps
in Hungary, but I did say that the Führer had instructed me to ask
Horthy to ask the Hungarian Government to concentrate the Jews in
Budapest, in certain parts of the city of Budapest. As to concentration
camps in Germany, I already spoke yesterday about my knowledge of that
subject.
M. FAURE: You admitted that you knew Hitler’s policy to deport all Jews
and you admitted that insofar as you were competent as Minister for
Foreign Affairs, you assisted this policy, did you not? That is right,
is it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: As his faithful follower I adhered to the Führer’s
orders even in this field, but I always did my utmost to alleviate the
situation as far as possible. This can be stated and proved by many
witnesses. Even in 1943 I submitted a comprehensive memorandum to the
Führer in which I urged him to alter the Jewish policy completely. I
could also quote many other examples.
M. FAURE: If I understand your testimony rightly, you were morally
opposed to this persecution of Jews, but you did help to carry them out,
is that not so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I repeatedly said at the very beginning of my
examination, that in that sense I have never been anti-Semitic. But I
was a faithful follower of Adolf Hitler.
M. FAURE: Apart from the Jewish question, you dealt with arrests of
French people, did you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: The arrests of Frenchmen...
M. FAURE: Yes. Did you or did you not give orders to arrest Frenchmen?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that this was so. Quite possible.
M. FAURE: Can you be more precise on that subject?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I cannot, for the moment, remember any details. In
any case I know that Frenchmen were arrested. Just how far this depended
on us, at that time, I do not know. It was, I think, in 1944, shortly
before the invasion that the Führer issued an order to the effect that a
large number of important French members of the resistance movement were
to be arrested on the spot, and I believe that we were advised
accordingly. It is also possible that we co-operated in this action to a
certain extent, but I cannot remember any details.
It was a question of arresting those elements who would kindle the flame
of the Resistance Movement in the event of an invasion, and would attack
the German armies in the rear. But I cannot give you any more
particulars now.
M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown a document which will be submitted as
Exhibit Number RF-1506 (Document Number RF-1506). It is an affidavit by
Dr. H. Knochen. I shall read some passages from this document.
“At the end of 1943—it must have been in December—there was a
conference at the Foreign Office on arrests to be made in
France. As I was in Berlin, I was also summoned to it. Present
at this conference were: The Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop;
the State Secretary Von Steengracht; Ambassador Abetz; another
member of the Foreign Office, whose name I do not know; the
Chief of the SIPO and the SD, Dr. Kaltenbrunner; the Higher SS
and Police Leader in France, Oberg; and representing the
Military Commander-in-Chief was his Chief of Staff Colonel
Kossmann, if my memory serves me right.
“The Minister stated the following: The Führer expects in France
more attention to be paid in the future than hitherto. The enemy
force must not be allowed to increase. Therefore all German
services will have to carry out their duties more meticulously.”
I omit the next paragraph. Then we read the following:
“He sees arising danger, in the event of invasion, of those
prominent Frenchmen who do not wish to collaborate with Germany,
and who are secretly active against her. They might constitute a
danger to the troops. These dangerous elements should be sought
out in business circles, university centers, in certain military
and political circles, and all classes of society connected with
them. He believes that it will be necessary to strike an
immediate blow against these people. He suggests that they
number easily 2,000 people or more. At a moment when it is
necessary to defend Europe against her enemy, there is no reason
why we should shrink from taking preventive measures of this
kind in France. As to the practical means of putting this into
effect, the Minister stated, Ambassador Abetz will have to take
up this matter immediately and draw up a list in collaboration
with the German services in order to take account of all the
questions that arise out of this matter.”
I end the quotation here. Do you admit the accuracy of this document?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I distinctly remember that discussion. This was a
Führer order to the effect that immediate action be taken—I have just
spoken about this—in view of the pending invasion, to arrest all
potentially dangerous elements who could fan the flame of resistance in
the rear of the German armies. I considered this a perfectly
comprehensible measure which any Government, with the welfare of the
troops at heart, would have made.
I then held this conference. The Führer expected a far greater wave of
arrests, but only a comparatively small number, I believe, were arrested
then.
Subsequently we had comparatively little to do with the actual arrests;
they were carried out by the police.
But it is perfectly clear that this conference did take place at the
time indicated and that we did what had to be done at the moment, as
proposed, namely, the arrest of those elements which might have been
dangerous in case of an invasion. That is quite true.
M. FAURE: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: There are two things that I want to say. One of them
relates to the Prosecution and one of them relates to the Defense. It is
desired that the Prosecution should furnish documents to the
interpreters when they are going to use documents in the course of
examination or cross-examination. Documents need not necessarily be in
the language which the interpreter is going to use, but there must be
some document in some language, one of the languages, placed before the
interpreters in order to assist.
The other point is that I am told that the defendants’ counsel are not
getting their documents ready for the Translation Division in anything
like the 2 weeks beforehand which was specified by the Tribunal. The
Tribunal, it is true, said that the documents must be furnished to the
Tribunal or the Translation Division 2 weeks ahead, if possible. Those
words “if possible” are being treated too lightly and the documents, I
am told, are sometimes coming in as late as 48 hours before the case of
the particular defendant is to be taken. That is not sufficient and it
will lead to delay. That is all.
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, in the course of the
cross-examination of this defendant by the French Prosecution, reference
was made to Document 3766-PS and I understood Dr. Horn to say that that
document was not a captured document. That was my understanding of his
statement. I am not altogether sure that that was what he said when he
approached the microphone. So that the record will be perfectly clear, I
now wish to inform the Tribunal that it is a captured document and I do
not know upon what basis Dr. Horn made that assertion.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have not, so far, had any opportunity—it has
been stated that we are dealing with a captured document, and I have had
no opportunity of checking the matter beforehand. It said on the top of
this document that it was a USA exhibit, Document Number 3766-PS, and I
had no opportunity of checking this on its arrival. I have therefore
requested that this fact be kindly established by the French
Prosecution. That was my sole objection. I did not deny that it was a
captured document; I was merely unable to prove it.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecutors wish to ask questions of
the defendant? Colonel Amen, the Tribunal hopes that you are not going
over ground which has already been gone over.
COL. AMEN: Most certainly not, Sir.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You speak English pretty well, Ribbentrop?
VON RIBBENTROP: I spoke it well in the past and I think I speak it
passably well today.
COL. AMEN: Almost as well as you speak German?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I would not say that, but in the past I spoke it
nearly as well as German, although I have naturally forgotten a great
deal in the course of the years and now it is more difficult for me.
COL. AMEN: Do you know what is meant by a “yes man” in English?
VON RIBBENTROP: A “yes man”—_per se_. A man who says “yes” even when he
himself—it is somewhat difficult to define. In any case, I do not know
what you mean by it in English. In German I should define him as a man
who obeys orders and is obedient and loyal.
COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you were a “yes man” for Hitler,
isn’t that correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: I was always loyal to Hitler, carried through his
orders, differed frequently in opinion from him, had serious disputes
with him, repeatedly tendered my resignation, but when Hitler gave an
order, I always carried out his instructions in accordance with the
principles of our authoritarian state.
COL. AMEN: Now, you were interrogated frequently by me, were you not,
before this Trial?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, once or twice, I believe.
COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read to you certain questions and answers
which were given in the course of these interrogations, and simply ask
you to tell the Tribunal whether or not you made the answers that I read
to you. That question can be answered “yes” or “no”; do you understand?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
COL. AMEN: “I have been a loyal man to the Führer to his last
days. I have never gone back on him. I have been a loyal man to
his last days, last hours, and I did not always agree with
everything. On the contrary, I sometimes had very divergent
views, but I promised to him in 1941 that I would keep faith in
him. I gave him my word of honor that I would not get him into
any difficulties.”
Is that correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that according to my recollection is correct. I did
not see the document and I did not sign anything, but as far as I can
remember, that is correct.
COL. AMEN: Well, what did you mean by saying that you would not get him
into any difficulties?
VON RIBBENTROP: I saw in Adolf Hitler the symbol of Germany and the only
man who could win this war for Germany, and therefore I did not want to
create any difficulties for him, and remained faithful to him until the
end.
COL. AMEN: Well, what you really meant was that you were never going to
cross him, and you promised him that in 1941, isn’t that true?
VON RIBBENTROP: I would never cause him any difficulties, yes, I did say
that. He often found me a rather difficult subordinate, and that is when
I told him that I would not cause him any difficulties.
COL. AMEN: In 1941 you told him that no matter whether you differed with
his opinion in the future, you would never press the point, isn’t that
true?
[_There was no response._] “Yes” or “no”?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite that, but...
COL. AMEN: Well, approximately that, is that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it cannot be put that way. I only meant, if I may
explain it this way, that I would never cause him any difficulties; if a
serious divergence of opinion should ever arise, I would just withhold
my own view. That was what I meant.
COL. AMEN: Well, you gave him your word of honor to that effect, isn’t
that true?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct, yes.
COL. AMEN: And at that time you had talked about resigning, isn’t that
correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is also true, yes.
COL. AMEN: And that made the Führer lose his temper and become ill,
correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. “Ill” is not the correct expression, but he became
very excited at that time. I should prefer not to mention the details.
COL. AMEN: Well, he said it was injuring his health, isn’t that correct,
and told you to stop arguing with him about any of these questions and
do what he told you to do? Right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not wish to say anything more about the personal
reasons, nor do I believe that these are matters which could be of any
interest here. Those would be personal matters between the Führer and
myself.
COL. AMEN: Well, I am not interested in that. I am interested only in
ascertaining if it is not a fact, and if you did not swear under oath,
that on that occasion you swore to Hitler that you would never express
or press any divergent views to anything which he desired. Is that not
correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, no! That is absolutely untrue, the interpretation is
false. I told the Führer that I would never create any difficulties for
him. After 1941 I had many divergencies with him, and even at that time
I always voiced my own opinions.
COL. AMEN: Well, Ribbentrop, whatever divergent views you had you were
never able to put any of them into effect after 1941, were you? “Yes” or
“no?”
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question. Please repeat it.
COL. AMEN: I say, no matter how divergent your views were, or what views
you expressed to the Führer on any of these questions after 1941, your
suggestions being contrary to the Führer’s were never put into effect.
Isn’t that correct? You always eventually did what the Führer told you
to do and what he wished, regardless of your own views.
VON RIBBENTROP: You are putting two questions to me. To the first I must
reply that it is not correct that Hitler never accepted suggestions from
me. Question Number 2, however, is correct. I can answer it by saying
that if Hitler at any time expressed an opinion to me and issued an
order, I carried the order through as was natural in our country.
COL. AMEN: In other words, eventually you always said “yes”, isn’t that
correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: I carried out his order, yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you some more of your testimony:
“He”—referring to the Führer—“considered me his closest
collaborator. We had a very serious conversation then, and when
I wanted to go away, I promised it to him and I have kept it to
the last moment. It was sometimes very difficult, I can assure
you, to keep this promise, and today I am sorry that I gave it.
Perhaps it would have been better if I had not given it. It put
me from then on in the position that I could not talk to Hitler,
in very serious and important moments of this war, in the way in
which I would have liked to, and in which, perhaps, I might have
been able to talk to him after this conversation in 1941.
“I must explain all this to you. If you do not know the
background of these things you might think perhaps that as
Foreign Minister during these last years I would like to say
more about this. Perhaps I might say one could give some more
information about this, but I want to be and remain loyal to
this man, even after his death, as far as I can possibly do it.
But I reserve the right to prove to posterity that I kept my
promise and also the right to show the role which I have played
in the whole of this drama.”
Did you or did you not make those statements under oath to me?
VON RIBBENTROP: They are...
COL. AMEN: “Yes” or “no”?
VON RIBBENTROP: Here again we have two questions. To question Number 1,
I would say that I know nothing at all. To the second question, I answer
“no.” I certainly never testified under oath to that. I was put on oath
only twice, but that is not relevant here. The statement is not verbatim
and must have been wrongly translated. It is correct that I said that I
was loyal to the Führer and that I further said that I had many
arguments with him, that we were not always of the same opinion, and
that is the essence of my statement. That is correct.
COL. AMEN: I asked you only one question, and I ask you again to answer
it “yes” or “no.” Did you or did you not make those statements in the
exact language that I just read them to you?
THE PRESIDENT: I think, Colonel Amen, he really did answer that, because
he said it is not verbatim.
COL. AMEN: But it is verbatim.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of opinion. He says it is not verbatim.
COL. AMEN: Well, very good, Your Lordship.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In any event, you can see that you stated
the substance of what I just read to you; correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: As I have just said, yes.
COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, Ribbentrop, you testified and gave this
particular testimony in English, did you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have often spoken English at interrogations, that is
quite true, but whether it was precisely this statement which was made
in English, I do not know. In any case, I repeat, these statements on
both points are to be understood that way; that is how they were meant.
COL. AMEN: And when you gave your testimony in English, that was at your
own request, was it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct.
COL. AMEN: At whose request?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know. I believe it just happened that way;
I cannot remember. I believe I spoke English mostly, and German a few
times. Most of the time, however, I spoke English.
COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you a little more of your testimony
and ask you the same question, which I hope you will answer “yes” or
“no,” namely: Did you give this testimony in the course of the
interrogation:
“Question: ‘Do you feel that you have an obligation to the
German people to set forth historically not only the good
things, but the bad things, for their education in the future?’
“Answer: ‘That is a terribly difficult question to answer.’
“Question: ‘Does that counterbalance the loyalty you feel
towards the Führer?’
“Answer: ‘I do not want to stand before the German people as
being disloyal to the Führer.’”
Did you make those statements?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, though I can no longer
remember very exactly. But that is quite possible. So much has been said
in the course of the last few months, and then too, from a physical
point of view, I have, as you know, not been quite up to the mark, so
that I just cannot remember every single word.
COL. AMEN: All right. Now see if you recall having made these
statements:
“I always told the Führer openly my view if he wanted to hear
it, but I kept myself entirely back from all decisions, but if
the Führer once had decided, I, according to my attitude toward
the Führer, blindly carried out his orders and acted in the
sense of his decision. In a few decisive foreign political
points, I tried to give my opinion more forcefully. This was in
the Polish crisis and also in the Russian question, because I
considered this absolutely important and necessary, but from
1941 I had but very little weight and it was difficult to bring
an opinion through with the Führer.”
Do you recall having made those statements? “Yes,” or “no,” please.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is more or less true. Yes, I practically remember
it.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal has already heard a very long
cross-examination of the defendant, and they think that this is not
adding very much to what they have already heard. The defendant has
given very similar evidence already.
COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. I will pass to another subject.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You have testified that there was a sharp
line of demarcation between the political and the military situations.
Correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: Between—I did not understand that.
COL. AMEN: You have testified that there was always a sharp line of
demarcation between the political and the military elements.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. The Führer always differentiated rather strongly
between these two elements; that is correct.
COL. AMEN: And that information belonging to the military was kept
exclusively for the military and not made available to your office, for
example? Is that correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: I heard little of military matters and plans; yes, that
is correct.
COL. AMEN: And that the contrary was also true, that the information
which you obtained was not made available to the military; is that
correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I am in no position to judge, but I would assume
so, since I do not know what information the military received from the
Führer.
COL. AMEN: Well, you told us that the Führer’s entire plan was to keep
those political and military channels separate each from the other.
Correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, in general he kept them very severely apart. I have
already said so several times. That is why I have only just now had
cognizance of many military documents for the first time. That was
perfectly in keeping with the Führer’s decrees on secrecy, that no one
department should know more than was absolutely essential.
COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact that was not true at all; was it,
Ribbentrop?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already given you my answer.
COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact you had secret agents out who were
working jointly in foreign countries for your office, for the Army, and
for the Navy; isn’t that true?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is incorrect.
COL. AMEN: You are quite sure of that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I am certain of that.
COL. AMEN: And you are swearing to that?
VON RIBBENTROP: You mean agents who did something, who...
COL. AMEN: Who were out obtaining information for your office, for the
Army, and for the Navy at the same, jointly?
VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that highly improbable. It is, of course,
possible that somehow or other, some man may have worked for different
departments, but this was definitely not done on an organized scale. The
organization—we maintained a very small intelligence service
abroad—and the intelligence services of the other departments of the
Reich generally worked, as far as I was informed, completely apart from
ours. It is possible that here and there some person or other would work
for other, for different departments. That is quite conceivable. For
instance, some person or other in our legations, as was customary at the
English, American, Russian, and other legations, who had dug themselves
in as consular assistants or some other kind of assistants, and carried
out intelligence work for some organization or other.
COL. AMEN: So you want to change the answer you made a moment ago; is
that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not wish to change it at all. Fundamentally, as
an organized routine matter, I never introduced any of the secret agents
who worked for the different departments abroad. It is, however,
conceivable that the department of the Foreign Office dealing with such
matters may have appointed somebody. It was, however, a fairly
insignificant affair. Today I say “unfortunately.” It is quite possible
that other agents from this department, working for other departments,
for Counterintelligence or the SD, _et cetera_, were correlated. Later
on we even—I should like to add the following: I had pronounced
differences of opinion with Himmler, over the intelligence services
abroad, and it was only through the good offices of the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner that I obtained an agreement to the effect that certain
items of information would be placed at my disposal. But later this
agreement was not honored. I think it was practically ineffective,
because it was already too late. That, I believe, was in 1944.
COL. AMEN: Will you look at Document Number 3817-PS, please? Will you
first tell the Tribunal who Albrecht Haushofer was, please?
VON RIBBENTROP: Albrecht Haushofer was a former collaborator of mine and
was a man who, yes, who dealt with German minority questions. Could I
perhaps read the letter first? Is it a letter from Haushofer? It is not
signed.
COL. AMEN: Yes, it is. Have you finished reading?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite, not yet. Shall I read the others too, or
only the first letter?
COL. AMEN: We shall get to the other letters in a moment. I am trying to
make this as short as we possibly can. Does that letter refresh your
recollection that Haushofer was out in the Orient investigating various
matters and making reports to you as early as 1937?
VON RIBBENTROP: At the moment I cannot recall that Haushofer was in
Tokio but it is conceivable, it is possible that such was the case.
COL. AMEN: Well, the letter is addressed to you and it encloses a
report, does it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Isn’t this a letter from Count Dürckheim? Isn’t there
some misunderstanding? But if you say this was written by Haushofer,
then it is conceivable that he was in Tokio; it is possible. I am not
acquainted with the details. I sent Count Dürckheim to Tokio at that
time but it is possible that Haushofer was there too. To be candid, I
have, at present, forgotten all about it.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have just seen that this letter is not fully
dated and is unsigned but I hear from Colonel Amen it was allegedly
written in 1937. In 1937 Ribbentrop was not yet Foreign Minister. He was
appointed Foreign Minister only on 4 February 1938.
COL. AMEN: It has the date on it—3 October—and it was captured with
Haushofer’s documents.
VON RIBBENTROP: But I consider it quite probable that this letter is
from Haushofer, although, to be quite candid, I no longer remember
exactly that he had been to Tokio in 1937.
COL. AMEN: Well, now...
VON RIBBENTROP: He was a collaborator who worked with us in the early
years but later dealt more with German minority questions, so that I
lost track of him in recent years.
COL. AMEN: I will just pass along through this document. You will find
the next document is dated 15 April 1937, requesting reimbursement and
funds for this trip.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And then passing to the next document, you will find a letter
to the Deputy of the Führer, Hess, saying:
“I am using the courier to send you also personally a short
report which is going to Ribbentrop at the same time. It
contains as briefly as possible a summary of what I could
observe and hear over here in 4 weeks.”
Do you see that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see the letter. Yes, yes!
COL. AMEN: Then you will pass on to the next letter, dated 1 September
1937, addressed to yourself.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Enclosing a report covering the first 4 weeks.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it before me.
COL. AMEN: Now, we will pass the report over just for the moment and you
will come to a letter dated 17 December 1937.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal thinks this is very far from
the matters which they have really got to consider.
COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. If seems to me that this indicates very
clearly that copies of the same report which is included here were being
sent simultaneously to the Army, to the Navy—that went to Raeder—and
one to the Army and to Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is true that the witness’ first answer was that
they did not have joint agents but he subsequently qualified that and
said they might sometimes have had joint agents.
COL. AMEN: That is right, Sir. If you think he has conceded that
point...
I should like to put this in as Exhibit USA-790.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but may I be allowed to say that we are not, in
this case, dealing with an agent. Herr Haushofer was a free collaborator
of ours, interested in politics in general, and in the question of the
German minorities in particular. If he was in Tokio at that time, and he
doubtless was there, although it has slipped my memory, then I must have
told him to speak to several persons over there and report to me. He
apparently, as I have only just gathered from this letter, either
because he liked to be busy or for some other reason unknown to me, or
because he knew the other gentlemen, placed these reports at the
disposal of these other gentlemen, on his own initiative. But he
certainly was no agent sent out by different departments. I think the
only person who knew him well was Rudolf Hess; otherwise, I believe, he
knew nobody at all. I fear I am not giving you quite the right ideas; he
was a private tourist, who submitted his impressions.
COL. AMEN: Now, I believe you have told the Tribunal that you were not
very close to Himmler; is that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have always said that my relations with Himmler were
good during the first few years, but I regret to say that in the latter
years I was not on good terms with him. I naturally—it was not very
noticeable to the outside world—but I do not wish to discuss this
matter in detail. Many things have already been said about it and there
were serious and violent divergencies, due to many reasons...
COL. AMEN: I do not care what the divergencies were. In what years did
you get along closely with him?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand your question.
COL. AMEN: In what years were you close to him?
VON RIBBENTROP: The first divergencies between Himmler and myself arose,
I believe, in 1941, over Romania and difficulties in Romania. These
divergencies were smoothed over, and naturally to all outward
appearances we had to work together as before, and we often exchanged
letters on our respective birthdays and on other occasions. But later on
relations were not very good. The final break came in 1941. Formerly I
had been on good terms with him and also shared his opinion for the
creation of a leadership class, at which he was aiming.
COL. AMEN: And you had at least 50 social appointments with Himmler in
1940 and 1941?
VON RIBBENTROP: How many?
COL. AMEN: Fifty?
VON RIBBENTROP: Fifty? No, that certainly could not have been the case.
Perhaps five or thereabouts, I cannot say for certain. But after 1941
relations between us were more strained, and later they were not very
good. Others, I believe, have already testified to that effect.
COL. AMEN: Well, I do not want to take any more time, except...
THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing with social appointments between
Ribbentrop or something other?
COL. AMEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that a matter which the Tribunal has to go into?
COL. AMEN: Well, I expect, Sir, that any person that has as many
appointments as are indicated by these books certainly has discussed
with Himmler the matter of concentration camps and the entire matters
which Himmler was exclusively handling. He has told the Tribunal that he
had never heard anything about concentration camps from Himmler.
VON RIBBENTROP: I wish to repeat my statement that at no time did
Himmler discuss this matter with me. As for our 50 meetings, I do not
know, we may have met frequently, despite everything, but I cannot
remember 50 meetings. Possibly five or ten, I do not know. I do not
believe it to be of vital importance since it is not a decisive factor.
Of course we had to work together in various fields and this
collaboration was mostly very difficult.
COL. AMEN: Well, there were many business appointments which you had
with him also, were there not? Just take a look at this sheet of entries
from Himmler’s appointment book and tell me whether that conforms to
your...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not want this matter gone
into any further.
COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir, but these were business appointments as
distinguished from social. There are no further questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, during the last sessions of the
Tribunal you explained in great detail the bases of German foreign
policy. I should like to ask you a few comprehensive questions and
request you to answer these questions laconically in terms of “yes” or
“no.” Do you consider the Anschluss as an act of German aggression?
Please answer this.
VON RIBBENTROP: Austria?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression. It was the accomplishment of a
purpose.
GEN. RUDENKO: I must request you...
VON RIBBENTROP: But I presume I can say a few sentences at least, after
saying “yes,” or must I never say anything else but “yes” and “no”?
GEN. RUDENKO: I must beg you to answer my questions. You have replied
far too extensively. I would like you to summarize your replies,
precisely by saying “yes” or “no.”
VON RIBBENTROP: That depends on my state of health. I must ask you to
forgive me.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand.
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not consider the Anschluss as an act of aggression,
that is “no.” I consider it the realization of the mutual purpose of
both nations involved. They had always wished to be together and the
government before Adolf Hitler had already striven for it.
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more: Please answer “yes” or “no.” Do you
consider that the Anschluss was not an act of German aggression? Do you
consider...
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, he gave you a categorical answer to
that; that it was not an aggression.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: And we have already ruled that the witnesses are not to
be confined to answering “yes” or “no.” They must answer “yes” or “no”
first, and then make a short explanation if they want to. But, anyhow,
with reference to this question, he has answered it categorically.
GEN. RUDENKO: The second question: Do you consider the seizure of
Czechoslovakia as an act of aggression by Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression in that sense, but a union in
accordance with the right of self-determination of nations, as laid down
in 1919 by the President of the United States, Wilson. The annexation of
the Sudetenland was sanctioned by an agreement of four great powers in
Munich.
GEN. RUDENKO: You evidently have not understood my question. I asked you
whether you considered the seizure of Czechoslovakia, of the whole of
Czechoslovakia, as an act of aggression by Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not an act of aggression by Germany. I
consider, according to the words of the Führer, and I believe he was
right, that it was a necessity resulting from Germany’s geographical
position. This position meant that the remaining part of Czechoslovakia,
the part which still existed, could always be used as a kind of
aircraft-carrier for attacks against Germany. The Führer therefore
considered himself obliged to occupy the territory of Bohemia and
Moravia, in order to protect the German Reich against air attack—the
air journey from Prague to Berlin took only half an hour. The Führer
told me at the time that in view of the fact that United States had
declared the entire Western Hemisphere as its particular sphere of
interest, that Russia was a powerful country with gigantic territories,
and that England embraced the entire globe, Germany would be perfectly
justified in considering so small a space as her own sphere of interest.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Poland as an act of
aggression by Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No. I must again say “no.” The attack on Poland was
rendered inevitable by the attitude of the other powers. It might have
been possible to find a peaceful solution to the German demands, and I
think the Führer would have trodden this path of peace, had the other
powers taken this path with him. As matters stood, the situation had
become so tense that Germany could no longer accept it as it was, and as
a great power Germany could not tolerate Polish provocations any
further. That is how this war arose. I am convinced that primarily the
Führer was never interested in conquering Poland.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Denmark as an act of
aggression by Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, the “invasion” of Denmark, as it is called, was,
according to the Führer’s words and explanation, a purely preventive
measure adopted against imminent landings of British fighting forces.
How authentic our information was is proved by the fact that only a few
days later English and German troops were engaged in battle in Norway.
That means that it was proved that these English troops had been ready
for a long time for fighting in Norway, and it came out from the
documents discovered later on and published at the time, and from orders
issued, that the English landing in Scandinavia had been prepared down
to the smallest detail. The Führer therefore thought that by seizing
Scandinavia, he would prevent it from becoming another theater of war. I
do not therefore think that the invasion of Denmark can be considered as
an act of aggression.
GEN. RUDENKO: And you do not consider this attack on Norway as an act of
aggression on the part of Germany either?
VON RIBBENTROP: We have just been talking about Norway. I was talking
about Norway and Denmark, a combined action.
GEN. RUDENKO: Together with Denmark. All right, it was a simultaneous
action. Do you consider the attack on Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg
as an act of aggression on the part of Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is the same question. I must again say “no,” but I
would like to add an explanation.
GEN. RUDENKO: Just a moment. I would like you to give shorter replies
because you explain the basic questions far too extensively. You deny
that this was an act of aggression on the part of Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Russian Prosecutor will understand that we are
dealing with very important questions, which are not easily explained in
a sentence, especially since we did not have the opportunity to explain
the matter in detail. I shall be quite brief.
GEN. RUDENKO: I quite appreciate that you have already been answering
questions of this nature for 3 days running.
VON RIBBENTROP: I shall now be very brief. After the Polish campaign
military considerations proved to be the decisive factors. The Führer
did not wish the war to spread. As for Holland, Belgium, and France, it
was France who declared war on Germany and not we who declared war on
France. We therefore had to prepare for an attack from this direction as
well. The Führer told me at the time that such an attack on the Ruhr
area was to be expected, and documents discovered at a later date have
proved to the world at large beyond a shadow of doubt that this
information was perfectly authentic. The Führer therefore decided to
adopt preventive measures in this case as well and not to wait for an
attack on the heart of Germany, but to attack first. And so the
timetable of the German General Staff was put into practice.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Greece as an act of
aggression on the part of Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: The attack on Greece and Yugoslavia by Germany has
already been discussed. I do not believe I need give any further details
on this point. That is here...
GEN. RUDENKO: I also do not think it is necessary to give detailed
replies. I ask whether you consider the attack on Greece as an act of
aggression on the part of Germany? Answer “yes” or “no.”
VON RIBBENTROP: No, and I consider that the measures adopted in
Yugoslavia and the measures taken by Greece in granting bases, _et
cetera_, to the enemies of Germany justified the intervention of Adolf
Hitler, so that here too one cannot speak of aggressive action in this
sense. It was quite clear that British troops were about to land in
Greece, since they had already landed in Crete and the Peloponnesos, and
that the uprising in Yugoslavia by the enemies of Germany, in agreement
with the enemies of Germany, as I mentioned yesterday, had been
encouraged with the intent of launching an attack against Germany from
that country. The documents of the French General Staff discovered later
in France showed only too clearly that a landing in Salonika had been
planned...
GEN. RUDENKO: Witness Ribbentrop, you have already spoken about that in
much detail. You explained it yesterday at great length. Now will you
please answer “yes” or “no” to my last question: Do you, or do you not
consider the attack on the Soviet Union as an act of aggression on the
part of Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was no aggression in the literal sense of the word,
but...
GEN. RUDENKO: You say that in the literal sense of the word it was not
an act of aggression. Then in what sense of the word was it an
aggression?
THE PRESIDENT: You must let him answer.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I offer a few words of explanation? I must be
allowed to say something.
GEN. RUDENKO: You...
VON RIBBENTROP: The concept of “aggression” is a very complicated
concept, which even today the world at large cannot readily define. That
is a point I should like to emphasize first. We are here dealing,
undeniably, with a preventive intervention, with a war of prevention.
That is quite certain, for attack we did. There is no denying it. I had
hoped that matters with the Soviet Union could have been settled
differently, diplomatically, and I did everything I could in this
direction. But the information received and all the political acts of
the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1941 until the outbreak of war, persuaded
the Führer, as he repeatedly told me, that sooner or later the so-called
East-West pincers would be applied to Germany, that is, that in the
East, Russia with her immense war potential, and in the West, England
and the United States, were pushing steadily towards Europe with the
purpose of making a large-scale landing. It was the Führer’s great worry
that this would happen. Moreover, the Führer informed me that close
collaboration existed between the General Staffs of London and Moscow.
This I do not know; I personally received no such news. But the reports
and information which I received from the Führer were of an extremely
concrete nature. At any rate, he feared that, one day, Germany, faced
with this political situation, would be threatened with catastrophe and
he wished to prevent the collapse of Germany and the destruction of the
balance of power in Europe.
GEN. RUDENKO: In your testimony you have frequently stated that, in the
pursuit of peaceful objectives, you considered it essential to solve a
number of decisive questions through diplomatic channels. Now this
testimony is obviously arrant hypocrisy since you admitted just now that
all these acts of aggression on the part of Germany were justified.
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not mean to say that; I said only that we were not
dealing with an act of aggression, Mr. Prosecutor, and explained how
this war came to pass and how it developed. I also explained how I had
always done everything in my power to prevent the war at its outbreak
during the Polish crisis. Beyond the precincts of this Tribunal, history
will prove the truth of my words and show how I always endeavored to
localize the war and prevent it from spreading. That, I believe, will
also be established. Therefore, in conclusion I should like to say once
more that the outbreak of war was caused by circumstances which, at long
last, were no longer in Hitler’s hands. He could act only in the way he
did, and when the war spread ever further all his decisions were
principally prompted by considerations of a military nature, and he
acted solely in the highest interests of his people.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now I beg you to answer the following
questions:
I understand that you have submitted to the Tribunal a document, Number
311, written by yourself, which is an appreciation of Hitler entitled
the “Personality of the Führer.” You wrote that document not so very
long ago. I am not going to quote from it, since you doubtlessly
remember it, as you wrote it a very short time ago.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am not quite sure what document that is. May I
look at it?
GEN. RUDENKO: This document was submitted by you to your own defense
counsel, as Exhibit Number 311, and submitted to the Tribunal by your
attorney. On Page 5 there...
VON RIBBENTROP: Will you be kind enough to give a copy of this document?
GEN. RUDENKO: It is Document Number 311.
THE PRESIDENT: It cannot have been submitted to the Tribunal as 111,
without anything more. What is it, 111-PS or 111?
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is a document of the Defense submitted
as Ribbentrop-311. We have only a Russian translation here, which came
to us together with a German document book. I presume that the document
book has been submitted to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: It is R-111—it is Ribbentrop-111, you mean. It is not
111; it is Ribbentrop-111.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is Document 311.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I’ve got it now. It is in Document Book Number 9.
GEN. RUDENKO: May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: On Page 5 of the document, your appreciation of Hitler,
you state, “After the victory over Poland and in the West, under an
influence which I mainly ascribe to Himmler, Hitler’s plans were
extended, that is, in the direction of establishing German hegemony in
Europe.” Do you remember the passage of the document you wrote yourself,
Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON RIBBENTROP: May I see this document? I do not know it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to ask counsel for Defendant
Ribbentrop to submit this document to his client.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are dealing here with...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is inclined to think that this document is quite
irrelevant. It is apparently a document prepared by the Defendant
Ribbentrop, upon the personality of the Führer. I do not know when it
was prepared, but it seems to us to be irrelevant.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I too am of the opinion that it is
irrelevant. I included this document only in case the defendant did not
have an opportunity to speak in greater detail of his relation to
Hitler. Since he has had that opportunity I should like to withdraw the
document.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal consider the document quite
irrelevant.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this document was presented by the defense
counsel in the Document Book. It was written by the Defendant Ribbentrop
in the course of this Trial. All the prosecutors considered it
admissible since this document, this appreciation, presented by the
Defendant Ribbentrop would justify us in asking a large number of
questions. But if the Tribunal considers that it really is quite
irrelevant to the case, I shall, of course, refrain from quoting it.
THE PRESIDENT: We have not yet had an opportunity of ruling on the
admissibility of these documents. It is the first time we have seen them
this morning. We all consider this document irrelevant.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I should like to put a few questions with
regard to German aggression against Yugoslavia. I should like you to
acquaint yourself with Document 1195-PS. This document is entitled
“Preliminary Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.” I invite your
attention to Paragraph 4 of the first section of the document. It
states: “The Führer has, in connection with the partition of
Yugoslavia...” Have you found the place?
VON RIBBENTROP: Can you tell me, please, on what page it is?
GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4: “In connection with the partition of
Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions...”
VON RIBBENTROP: I must have the wrong document.
GEN. RUDENKO; Document 1195-PS.
VON RIBBENTROP: Ah, yes. The beginning.
GEN. RUDENKO: I begin again:
“In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued
the following instructions:
“The transfer of territories occupied by the Italians is being
prepared for by a letter of the Führer to the Duce and will be
carried out by detailed directive of the Foreign Office.”
Have you found the place?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not see the place.
GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4, beginning with the words: “The
Führer...” Do you have it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have already read this paragraph into the record.
VON RIBBENTROP: It begins: “In connection with the partition of
Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions.” That is
how the document begins. May I ask—now what passage are you quoting?
GEN. RUDENKO: It ends with the following words: “...will be carried out
according to a detailed directive of the Foreign Office.” And then
reference is made to a teletype from the Quartermaster General of the
OKH.
VON RIBBENTROP: There must be some mistake. It is not mentioned here.
GEN. RUDENKO: Probably you did not find it in the document.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, it is 12:45 now. Perhaps this would be a
good time to adjourn.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, have you acquainted yourself with
the contents of the document?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have.
GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with the entire document or
with Paragraph 4 only?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have read Paragraph 1 of which you spoke previously.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you find the passage referring to the plenary powers
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the partition of the
territory of Yugoslavia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it says in my document that the surrender of the
territory occupied by the Italians is to be prepared by a letter from
the Führer to the Duce and put into effect on further instructions from
the Foreign Office.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct. That is precisely the passage which I had
in view, that is, Section 2 of this document, which is headed “The
Delimitation of the Frontiers.” It is stated there—Section 2, Page 2 of
the Document—it is stated:
“As far as the delimitation of the frontiers was not in the
foregoing Section I, this is done in agreement with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs....”
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see that.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have only one question to ask in this connection. May I
assume that this document defines the part played by the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs in the partition of Yugoslav territory? Is this correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: That appears from the fact that the Foreign Office was
to take part in fixing the other frontiers, in addition to those defined
here, the main lines of which were probably, already, fairly clear. That
is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is quite evident. I should like to put two more
questions to you concerning Yugoslavia.
On 4 June 1941—this no longer refers to the previous document—a
conference was held in the German Legation, presided over by the German
Minister in Zagreb, Siegfried Kasche, at which it was decided forcibly
to evacuate the Slovenes to Croatia and Serbia and the Serbs from
Croatia into Serbia. This decision results from a telegram from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Number 389, dated 31 May 1941. Do you know
about these measures?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I do not know them, but perhaps I
may read through them.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please do.
VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect that resettlement was undertaken there but I
do not know the details.
GEN. RUDENKO: It goes without saying that it must be very difficult for
you to remember all the details at the present time. But you do remember
that such deportations did actually take place and precisely in
accordance with the directives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. It states here that the Führer had approved a
resettlement program, but I do not know the details. At any rate, we
undoubtedly had something to do with it, for this meeting definitely
took place in the Foreign Office; that is certain. Unfortunately I
cannot add any details since I am not informed.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand you. There is one more question in this
connection. This was a compulsory resettlement of the population?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know; I cannot say. No.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know? All right. And now the last question in
connection with Yugoslavia: After Germany’s attack on Yugoslavia about
200 employees of the Yugoslav Foreign Office attempted to leave for
Switzerland. They were arrested; and then, in spite of protests
addressed to your Ministry, they were forcibly taken to Belgrade whence
many of them were sent to concentration camps and there died. Why did
you not take the measures which you were obliged to take after such a
glaring breach of diplomatic immunity?
VON RIBBENTROP: I must say that at the moment I cannot recollect it at
all; but, as far as I know, instructions have always followed the
principle that diplomats must be treated as diplomats and sent back to
their own countries. If it did not happen in this case, I do not know
why it was not done. However you yourself say that they were sent to
Belgrade. That, at any rate, is certainly in accordance with my
instructions. Why or whether they were later interned in Belgrade, I
must say I do not know. I do not think we had anything to do with that.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know that they were interned in concentration
camps?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Now for a further series of questions. Who,
beside Hitler, signed the decree regarding the Sudetenland of 21
November 1938? Can you remember?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know to which order you are referring. May I
look through it? I see that I am one of those who signed it. This is the
law regarding the reincorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich.
GEN. RUDENKO: You remember that you actually signed this decree?
VON RIBBENTROP: No doubt. If it says so here, then it must certainly
have been so. At the moment, of course, I do not remember it exactly.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is evident. Who, beside Hitler, signed the decree
regarding the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, of 16 March 1939,
which by its very nature destroyed any remaining vestige of the
sovereignty of the Czechoslovakian Republic?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that I was one of those who signed that one,
too. At least so I assume. Yes, I see that I signed it; here it is.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, surely all these documents speak for
themselves. The defendant has not challenged his signature upon these
documents.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I only want to remind the
defendant. Since he appears to forget I simply present the documents to
him.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You also signed the decree of 12 October
1939 regarding the occupation of the Polish territories. Do you remember
that?
VON RIBBENTROP: 12 October ’39? No, I do not remember it. I signed a
great many things during those years but I cannot remember them in
detail.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is the decree dated 12 October.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if he does not dispute his signature,
why should you waste time in putting these documents to him? His
signature is on the document. He does not dispute it. This is a mere
waste of time.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Mr. President. Then I have only one more question in
this connection.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Your signature also appears on the decree
of 18 May 1940, regarding the annexation by Germany of the Belgian
territories, Eupen and Malmédy.
I put these questions so that I may conclude with the following
question. Am I right in stating that each time the Hitler Government was
attempting to lend the appearance of legality to their territorial
annexation by a decree, this decree invariably bore the signature of the
Reich Minister Ribbentrop?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe not. If any territorial changes were
undertaken, it was the Führer who ordered them; and, as is probably
evident from these documents, the various ministers who were in any way
concerned then countersigned the Führer’s order or the laws decreed by
the Führer, and, of course, I probably countersigned most of these
orders myself.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now, I should like you to acquaint yourself
with the document already submitted in evidence to the Tribunal as
Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document Number USSR-120). It is your agreement
with Himmler for the organization of intelligence work. It is an
extensive document and I should like you to acquaint yourself with
Subparagraph 6 of this document.
VON RIBBENTROP: I beg your pardon. This is a different document. This
concerns the intelligence service. You spoke of slave labor, but this
concerns the intelligence service.
GEN. RUDENKO: This has been incorrectly translated to you. I was not
speaking about slave labor; I was speaking about intelligence work.
Please refer to Subparagraph 6 of this document. It is an extensive
document and the time of the Tribunal should not be taken up unduly. It
is stated here, and I quote:
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives every possible assistance
to the Secret intelligence service. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs, as far as this is compatible with the requirements of
foreign policy, will install certain members of the intelligence
service in the diplomatic missions.”
I want to omit one long paragraph and will read the final paragraph:
“The responsible member of the intelligence service must keep
the head of the mission informed on all important aspects of
secret intelligence service activities in the country in
question.”
You did sign such an agreement? Is that true?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: We are therefore forced to the conclusion that the foreign
organization of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs was actually
engaged in espionage work?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, you cannot really say that, for the following
reasons:
I mentioned once before this morning in the course of the examination
that there were differences of opinion between Himmler and myself in
regard to the intelligence service abroad. Thanks to the efforts of the
Defendant Kaltenbrunner, that agreement was eventually signed. We
planned to co-operate, and I do not deny that we intended to work
intelligence service personnel into the Foreign Office organization.
This, however, was not put into practice. The agreement could not become
effective because it was concluded so late that the end of the war
intervened. I think the date of the conclusion of this agreement, which
is lacking in this copy, must have been 1944 or even 1945. Thus, there
was no actual co-operation. Such co-operation was, however, planned; and
I was particularly interested in it. There had been all sorts of
differences and I wanted to end them and put matters on a more uniform
basis. That was the reason. In any case, I think that is part of the
procedure which all countries had to employ abroad. I do not think it is
anything unusual.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am not asking you your opinion. I was only interested in
this document; it is true that you did sign such an agreement. You
replied in the affirmative. I am not asking you further questions about
this document.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I replied in the affirmative—yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I wanted to know this only. I have another document from
this series. Do you remember a letter of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner in
which he asked for one million Tomans for bribery in Iran?
VON RIBBENTROP: One million...? What is that? I did not hear it; please
repeat it. I did not hear the word very well...
GEN. RUDENKO: One million Tomans. Tomans are Iranian currency. I should
like you to acquaint yourself with this document; it is a short one.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I see it, please?
GEN. RUDENKO: Of course.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I recollect the matter, and I think certain funds
were placed at their disposal.
GEN. RUDENKO: The money was placed at Kaltenbrunner’s disposal?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the details, but I believe I did give
instructions to the Foreign Office at the time that financial support
should be given in this matter. That is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: It was precisely that point which interested me. The
document speaks for itself.
I now proceed to the following series of questions.
You have testified that in August or September 1940 in the Schloss
Fuschl, you met the Defendant Keitel to discuss a memorandum on the
possibility of an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union. Consequently,
nearly one year prior to that attack on the Soviet Union, you were
already informed of the plans for this attack, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. The Defendant Keitel was with
me at the time at Fuschl, and on that occasion he told me that the
Führer had certain misgivings regarding Russia and could not leave the
possibility of an armed conflict out of his calculations. He said that,
for his part, he had prepared a memorandum which he proposed to discuss
with the Führer. He had doubts as to the wisdom of any conflict of that
kind in the East, and he asked me at the time if I would also use my
influence with the Führer in that direction. I agreed to do so. But an
attack or plans for an attack were not discussed; I might say that all
this was a discussion more from a General Staff point of view. He made
no mention to me of anything more concrete.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not want to detain the attention of the Tribunal on
this question, because it has already been sufficiently investigated.
But I want to ask you in this connection the following question: You
replied to Keitel during this conversation that you would express your
opinion regarding the war with the U.S.S.R. to Hitler. Did you have a
conversation with Hitler on that subject?
VON RIBBENTROP: I discussed the subject several times with Hitler, and
on this occasion I spoke of the danger of preventive wars to him. Hitler
told me of his misgivings, which I have already mentioned here.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, you have testified in that sense. Tell me, did you
know that the so-called “Green File” of the Defendant Göring, containing
directives for the plunder and exploitation of the temporarily occupied
territories of the Soviet Union was prepared a long time prior to the
attack on the Soviet Union? Did you know this?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. I heard the term “Green File”
here for the first time.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right—you did not know the name. And when did you
learn about the contents? The contents of this file?
VON RIBBENTROP: Neither the file nor the name.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know. All right. You knew that already before
the war directives were drafted for the extermination of the peaceful
Soviet population?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either.
GEN. RUDENKO: And when did you know about that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I heard nothing at all about such plans.
GEN. RUDENKO: And the directives?
VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding the preparation of such plans...
GEN. RUDENKO: And regarding the directives concerning jurisdiction in
the Barbarossa region? You evidently did know about that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding what? I did not understand that.
GEN. RUDENKO: Regarding jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region. It is a
supplement to Plan Barbarossa.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I have never occupied myself
personally with that subject. It might be possible that some department
in my office did have a hand in it somewhere; but as far as I remember
I, myself, was never concerned with the subject of jurisdiction; for
after the outbreak of the conflict with the Soviet Union the Foreign
Office had nothing more to do with these territories.
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you to take cognizance of a telegram which
you addressed on 10 July 1941, at 1451 hours, to the German Ambassador
in Tokio. We are submitting this document, Number 2896-PS, to the
Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-446. You must remember this telegram.
VON RIBBENTROP: To whom is it addressed? It does not say here.
GEN. RUDENKO: To the German Ambassador in Tokio. Do you remember?
VON RIBBENTROP: Oh, Tokio, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You apparently remember it. I must ask you to pay
attention to the words on Page 4 at the end of this document. They are
underlined in pencil for the sake of convenience. Have you found the
passage? I shall read only that part into the record.
VON RIBBENTROP: Which part are you referring to? The last page?
GEN. RUDENKO: It is on Page 4. It is underlined.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have found it now.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am going to read this passage into the record.
“I request you to use every means in your power to influence
Matsuoka, in the way I have indicated, so that Japan will
declare war on Russia as soon as possible; for the sooner this
happens, the better it will be. It must still be our natural aim
to shake hands with Japan on the Trans-Siberian railway before
the winter. With the collapse of Russia the position of the
countries participating in the Three Power Pact will be so
strong that the collapse of England or the complete annihilation
of the British Isles will be only a question of time.”
Have you found this passage?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have the passage; yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: What is it? Is it one of your efforts to localize the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand that last question?
GEN. RUDENKO: I say, is this one of your efforts to localize the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: The war against Russia had started, and I tried at the
time—the Führer held the same view—to get Japan into the war against
Russia in order to end the war with Russia as soon as possible. That was
the meaning of that telegram.
GEN. RUDENKO: This was not only the policy of the Führer; it was also
your policy as the then Minister for Foreign Affairs?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask. You state that you
never heard a thing about the cruelties perpetrated in the concentration
camps?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: During the war you, as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
studied the foreign press and the foreign newspapers. Did you know what
the foreign press was saying?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is true only up to a certain point. I had so
much to read and so much work to do every day that, on principle, I
received only the foreign political news selected for me from the
foreign press. Thus, during the whole of the war I never had any news
from abroad about the concentration camps, until one day your armies,
that is, the Soviet Russian armies, captured the camp at Maidanek in
Poland.
On that occasion news came from our embassies and I asked for press
news, _et cetera_, to be submitted to me. How I took these news releases
to the Führer and what resulted from that has already been discussed
here. Before that I knew nothing about any atrocities or any measures
taken in the concentration camps.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know about the notes of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Soviet Union, Molotov, concerning the atrocities
committed by the German fascists in the temporarily occupied territories
of the Soviet Union, the deportation into slavery of the people of the
Soviet, the pillaging?
VON RIBBENTROP: I think that note reached me somehow through diplomatic
channels. I am not quite sure how; it may have come through news
agencies. However, I do remember that at the time—I believe there were
even several notes—at any rate I remember one of these notes which I
submitted to the Führer. But since the beginning of the Russo-German war
we could not carry out any action in these territories, and we had no
influence there. Therefore, I am not informed about details.
GEN. RUDENKO: I was primarily interested in one fundamental fact,
namely, that you were aware of the notes from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Soviet Union. Tell me, please, do you know that millions
of citizens were driven into slavery to Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know! And that those citizens were used as
slaves in Germany—you were not aware of that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No. According to what I heard, all these foreign workers
are supposed to have been well treated in Germany. I think it is
possible, of course, that other things might have happened, too; but on
the whole, I believe that a good deal was done to treat these workers
well. I know that on occasion departments of the Foreign Office
co-operated in these matters with a view to preventing those possible
things. Generally speaking, however, we had no influence in that sphere,
as we were excluded from Eastern questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: Why were you informed that foreign laborers were treated
well and why were you not informed that they were being treated as
slaves?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think that this is correct. We in the Foreign
Office—in the case of the French, for instance, and quite a number of
other foreign workers—co-operated in getting musicians, _et cetera_,
from France for them. We advised on questions concerning their welfare.
And I know that the German Labor Front did everything in its power, at
least with regard to the sector which we could view to some extent, to
treat the workers well, to preserve their willingness to work, and to
make their leisure pleasant. I know, at least, that those of its efforts
in which we co-operated were on these lines.
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I now present a penultimate group of questions in
connection with the activities of the “Ribbentrop Battalion.” I must now
request you to read the testimony of SS Obersturmbannführer Norman Paul
Förster. This document is submitted as Exhibit Number USSR-445 (Document
Number USSR-445). Please pay particular attention to Page 3 of Förster’s
testimony. This passage is underlined. It is stated there:
“When in that same month, August 1941, I reported to the address
given to me in Berlin, I learned that I had been transferred to
Special Command SS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A member
of the Foreign Ministry, Baron von Kunsberg, was at the head of
the SS Special Command... In this command there were about 80 to
100 men altogether and 300 or 400 men were added later. The
special command was later rechristened the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Battalion ‘z.b.V.’ (for special employment).
“I was received by Baron von Kunsberg in a building belonging to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the Sonderkommando was
quartered. He explained to me that the Sonderkommando was
created on instructions from the Reich Minister of Foreign
Affairs Von Ribbentrop. According to Von Ribbentrop’s
instructions, our Sonderkommando was to move forward with the
front-line troops in occupied territory in order to protect the
cultural treasures—museums, archives, scientific institutions,
art galleries, and so forth—from ruin and destruction by the
German soldiers, to confiscate them and transport them to
Germany.”
Here I omit a few lines and then:
“On the evening of 5 August 1941, in the presence of Nietsch,
Paulsen, Krallat, Remerssen, Lieben, and others, Von Kunsberg
informed us of Von Ribbentrop’s verbal order according to which
all scientific institutions, libraries, palaces, _et cetera_, in
Russia were to be thoroughly ‘combed out’ and everything of
definite value was to be carried off.”
Did you find that passage in the document?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. Shall I answer?
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you first of all to reply to my question,
reading as follows: You know that such a battalion of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs existed, and that in accordance with your directives, it
was especially concerned—as is stated in this document—with the
preservation of cultural treasures? Please reply to this question.
VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite incorrect as it appears in this document. I
cannot acknowledge it in any way and I must object to it. The following
is correct:
This Herr Von Kunsberg is a man who was appointed, with a few
assistants, long before the Russian campaign with the idea even at that
time of confiscating in France documents, important documents, which
might be found there and which might be of importance or value to us.
Any order which—at the same time, I may say, he had orders to see to it
that there should be no unnecessary destruction of art treasures, _et
cetera_. In no circumstances did he receive from me orders to transport
these things to Germany or to steal any of them. I do not know how this
statement came to be made; but in this form it is certainly not correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have protested against a great many of the documents
here. That does not mean that they are incorrect. I am not going to
quote from this testimony any further. I shall now refer to a document;
it is a letter from the Defendant Göring addressed to the Defendant
Rosenberg. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal under Document
Number 1985-PS. I shall here quote Paragraph 2 of the document. It has
already been submitted, so I shall read this letter addressed by Göring
to Rosenberg into the record. He writes:
“After all the fuss and bother I very much welcomed the fact
that an office was finally set up to collect these things,
although I must point out that still other offices refer here to
authority received from the Führer, especially the Reich
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who sent a circular to all the
organizations several months ago, stating amongst other things,
that he had been given authority in the occupied territories for
the preservation of cultural treasures.”
We can assume that the Defendant Göring is better acquainted with the
circumstances anent the preservation of art treasures. Don’t you
remember those things at all?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know how this letter from Reich Marshal Göring
came to be written. I do not know, but if there is any mention in it of
authorities or anything of that kind, that could only refer to the fact
that these art treasures were secured in these territories. I have
already stated here that during the war neither I myself nor the Foreign
Office confiscated or claimed any art treasures whatsoever, whether for
my personal use or for our use. It is possible that these art treasures
were temporarily placed in safekeeping. Certainly none of them passed
into our possession. Therefore it might be a misunderstanding in this
letter because I remember clearly that at that time we were dealing with
the safekeeping of art treasures. In France, for instance, at that time
robberies were beginning to be committed in private houses and art
galleries, _et cetera_; and I still remember asking the Wehrmacht to
provide guards to keep a watch on these art treasures, _et cetera_. At
any rate we in the Foreign Office never saw any of these works of art
ourselves.
GEN. RUDENKO: I think we had better not go too deeply into details. I
should like to ask another question in this connection. Don’t you think
that the term “safekeeping of art treasures in the occupied territories”
actually concealed the looting of art treasures?
VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly never intended that; and I have never given
any order to that effect. I should like to state that here,
emphatically. Perhaps I may add that when I heard that Kunsberg had
suddenly assembled such a large staff, I immediately ordered the
dissolution of his entire battalion—it was not a battalion; that is
badly expressed—at any rate, its immediate dissolution; and I think I
even remember dismissing him from the Foreign Office, because he did not
do what I wanted. I think he was removed from his office.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I am closing my interrogation. You were
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the fascist Germans from 4 February 1938.
Your appointment to this post coincided with the initial period, when
Hitler had launched on a series of acts involving a foreign policy which
in the end led to the World War. The question arises: Why did Hitler
appoint you his Minister of Foreign Affairs just before embarking on a
wide program of aggression? Don’t you consider that he thought you were
the most suitable man for the purpose, a man with whom he could never
have any differences of opinion?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you anything about Adolf Hitler’s
thoughts. He did not tell me about them. He knew that I was his faithful
assistant, that I shared his view that we must have a strong Germany,
and that I had to get these things done through diplomatic and peaceful
channels. I cannot say more. What ideas he may have had, I do not know.
GEN. RUDENKO: Here is my last question. How can you explain the fact
that even now, when the entire panorama of the bloody crimes of the
Hitler regime has been unfolded before your eyes, when you fully realize
the complete crash of that Hitlerite policy which has brought you to the
dock—how can we explain that you are still defending this regime; and,
furthermore, that you are still praising Hitler and that you are still
declaring that the leading criminal clique consisted of a group of
idealists? How can you explain that?
THE PRESIDENT: That seems to be a number of questions in one, and I do
not think it is a proper question to put to the witness.
GEN. RUDENKO: I thought that this was only one question which summarizes
everything.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you answer please, Defendant
Ribbentrop?
THE PRESIDENT: I told you, General Rudenko, that the Tribunal does not
think it a proper question to put.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you want to re-examine?
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the defendant, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat.
Now, Dr. Horn, I understand that you are going to deal with your
documents now, are you not?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I see the time; we might perhaps adjourn for 10 minutes
now.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to announce that the Tribunal will
not sit on Good Friday or the Saturday afterwards nor on Easter Monday.
MAJOR J. HARCOURT BARRINGTON (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom):
May it please the Tribunal, I am speaking for all the four prosecutors,
to put the Prosecution’s comments on the document books which the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop has put in. I am speaking for all the four
prosecutors, with one exception, that the French Chief Prosecutor wishes
to speak on two particular groups of documents which are of special
interest to the French Delegation. I think, if it is convenient to the
Tribunal, I might put the whole of the Prosecution’s position before Dr.
Horn puts his answer if that is agreeable to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree, Dr. Horn, that he might put his view first?
Is it agreeable to you that Mr. Barrington should put the position
first?
DR. HORN: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: There are, in all, nine books in the English version;
and the last two have been received only today, so, as they contain
perhaps about 350 documents, I regret that I have not been able to agree
in the list with Dr. Horn, himself, although I have acquainted him with
the comments that the Prosecution proposes to make.
The first two books, comprising Documents 1 to 44, have already been
read in open court on the 27th of March by Dr. Horn, and I take it that
Your Lordship does not want them gone into again.
THE PRESIDENT: No.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: So that leaves simply Books 3 to 9, and I have made
out a working note of which I have copies. I do not know whether the
members of the Tribunal have them.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Oh, yes; Your Lordship will see that on the left
column are the documents which the Prosecution would object to, and in
the middle column are those that they would allow, and there are remarks
on the right-hand side.
Although this does not show it, I have, for convenience, divided these
documents up into nine groups; and so I think I need not go through all
the documents in detail unless there is any particular question on any
one of them.
Before saying what the groups are, perhaps I might make two general
remarks, that the Prosecution takes the position that the _German White
Books_, which figure very largely in this list—_White Books_ issued by
the government of the Nazi conspirators,—cannot be regarded as evidence
of facts, stated therein; and secondly, that there are among these
documents a considerable number which are only discussions of subjects
in a very vague and tentative stage, and a great many of them, in the
Prosecution’s view, are cumulative.
Now, of the first of the nine groups, I have broken them down to
Czechoslovakia; and if you will look at the note that I have handed up,
that consists of the first few documents down to 45. I beg your
Lordship’s pardon. That is wrong. From after 45, there are six PS
documents which are already exhibits and there are 46 and 47 and over
the page there are 7 more on Czechoslovakia, and the Prosecution’s
position on those is that six PS documents are allowed and 46 and 47;
but, over the page, 66, 67, and 69 are objected to purely on the ground
that they are cumulative—cumulative, I think of Number 68.
THE PRESIDENT: Which volume are they in, 66 and 69?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: In Volume 3, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: As they have already been translated does it make much
difference if there are objections that they are cumulative?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, there is not any difference, My Lord, at all,
except if they are going to be read into the record.
THE PRESIDENT: They have all been translated?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: They have all been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: And in the other languages, too?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I understand so, My Lord, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: So they need not be read into the record.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: If your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the rule, isn’t it, that if they have been
translated into the four languages, they need not be read into the
record?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That would apply to all the documents in all these
nine books now because they all have been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it would; but there may be other objections to the
documents besides their being cumulative.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: There will be, according to the Prosecution’s
submission, a very large number that are cumulative _in toto_.
THE PRESIDENT: There will be a very large number?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the point was that, being translated, they are
there already.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is the only point the Prosecution has against
those. The thing is, My Lord, the Prosecution say they are cumulative.
Of course, Dr. Horn might not say so and perhaps he would welcome a
ruling as to whether they should be used or not.
THE PRESIDENT: No. What I was suggesting to you was that if the only
objection to them was that they were cumulative they may just as well go
in, be put in evidence, because they have already been translated—it
saves time—as to have them all argued.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord, unless Dr. Horn wishes to read any of
these documents and refer to them specifically.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you mean that he might read them all and then...
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not know what Your Lordship is going to allow him
to do. I understood perhaps he would read some of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably, if he reads many that are cumulative, we
shall stop him.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I will pass on to the second group, which are Numbers
48 to 62 inclusive, and those are on the subject of Allied rearmament
and alleged warlike intentions before the outbreak of war. Number 54
appears to be missing from my book, and I do not know whether it was
intentionally left out.
The Prosecution would object to all those on the ground that they are
irrelevant. They are in Book 3, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: 59 is different, isn’t it? 59 is dealing with a speech by
Sir Malcolm MacDonald about the colonies.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. That is not exactly rearmament, but of course it
is on the same theme in a way, that it is a provocation to war. It is
certainly in rather a different category from the others.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: The third group deals with Poland, and that is a very
large group because it includes all the negotiations before the outbreak
of the war, and the numbers involved in that group are 74 to 214.
I think it would perhaps be convenient to break that group down into two
phases. The first one would be the questions of the minorities and
Danzig and the Corridor and the incidents connected with them, and the
second phase—slightly overlapping in time, but roughly it follows after
the other one—would be the diplomatic events involving countries other
than Poland, that is to say, very approximately from the 15th of March
1939 onwards. The first phase of that group would be Numbers 74 to 181,
and the second phase 182 to 214.
Now, in regard to the first phase, there are two points. The Prosecution
says that these are, with very few exceptions, irrelevant because they
treat of incidents and the problems arising out of these minority
questions, and the Prosecution says those are irrelevant for two
reasons. One of the documents among them consists of an exchange of
notes between the German and Polish governments on the 28th of April
1939. That is TC-72, Number 14, in Book 5. And that exchange of notes
consists of a confirmation that both parties unconditionally renounce
the use of force on the basis of the Kellogg Pact. That had been done
previously on the 26th of January 1934, as appears in another document
here. It is on Page 2 of my note, TC-21.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of TC-72?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: TC-72, Number 14, was the 28th of April 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: And on the footing that the two countries
unconditionally renounced, the use of force on the basis of the Kellogg
Pact, added to the fact that the Defendant Ribbentrop has himself said
that during 1938 Germany was on very good terms with Poland. And also
there was a declaration made by Germany and Poland on the 5th of
November 1937 about minorities—that is Number 123 in this list of
documents; it occurs at the top of Page 4 in the note. In view of these
things, the Prosecution says that the accounts of these and reports of
these incidents and minority problems are irrelevant and very old
history.
I think perhaps I might...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You have them all cumulative or irrelevant
starting with 76. You mean the cumulative?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, I am afraid to say, Your Honor, this was
originally got out purely as a working note, and that is rather an
error. It should be irrelevant on account of TC-21.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I was going to say that perhaps I might
anticipate an objection that Dr. Horn has been good enough to tell me
that he will make to this, that yesterday he contended that certain
incidents before Munich had been condoned by the Munich Agreement, and
that the argument I have just put up is on the same lines as that which
the Tribunal turned down yesterday.
But, of course, there is this difference, that the Munich Agreement was
negotiated in ignorance of the Fall Grün and that, from the point of
view of condoning previous incidents, it is not on the same footing as
an agreement negotiated in full knowledge of the circumstances.
So, My Lord, taking Group 3, Poland and the first phase of it, the
Prosecution would suggest—looking at the middle column on Page
2—allowing Number 75, which is the Polish Treaty of 1919, and TC-21,
which I have already mentioned, which reaffirmed the Kellogg Pact, and
Number 123 and TC-72, Number 14 and 16, which I have already mentioned.
The remainder, perhaps, might all be said to be irrelevant; but it would
be reasonable, perhaps, to allow Numbers 117, 149, 150, 153, 154, 159,
160, 163, and TC-72, Number 18. These were largely discussions between
ambassadors and heads of state, which may have rather more importance
than the other documents in this particular group.
As a matter of fact, My Lord, I think they are all in anyhow, those that
I have just mentioned.
That goes up to 182. Starting now at 182, and the first five, 182 to
186...
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to 155 which is the calling out of
Polish reserves, 155 to 158?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, My Lord, the objection to that was simply based
on the fact that...
THE PRESIDENT: I think they are all mentioned in the conversation which
is 159, and that is probably the reason.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. I am obliged, Your Lordship. I think that it is
so, but I do not think the objection to them could be very strong.
THE PRESIDENT: No.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 182 to 186, My Lord, they are reports by the
German chargés d’affaires in various capitals, and the Prosecution say
that those would not be proper evidence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why not?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are just accounts of the German chargés
d’affaires’ observations and conclusions of fact, for the most part by
them, transmitted to their Foreign Office.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you mean they are irrelevant on the ground
of hearsay?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I beg your pardon.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Because they are hearsay they should not be
admitted; is that what you mean?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, of course, partly hearsay. They are
also vague, and again, they are transmitted with an object in view. At
least that has been the submission of the Prosecution, that they are
transmitted to color the picture from the German point of view.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Would you admit these if they were made by
chargés d’affaires of other states?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: If they were made by chargés d’affaires of other
states?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they would be admissible if they were put in as
government reports by Allied nations under the Charter; but they are not
really admissible if they are German documents.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry; I do not know what you mean.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Article 21 of the Charter...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry. Perhaps I do not make myself
clear. I do not quite understand why these are different from any other
official reports made by chargés d’affaires of any country. Is it
because they are German reports?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Because they are German reports.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see. In other words, you think German
reports should be excluded.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think under the Charter they should be excluded,
except, of course, if they are used by the Prosecution as admissions
against the German Government itself.
THE PRESIDENT: We are going to hear you in a moment, Dr. Horn. Anyhow,
Mr. Barrington, your objection to 182 to 214 is that it is self-serving
evidence and therefore not admissible; is that it?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is right, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other objection to them?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, as I said, conclusions of fact drawn
by an observer in a foreign country. They tend to get rather vague.
THE PRESIDENT: That might apply to a great deal of the evidence.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 187 to 192 and TC-77 there is no objection to.
Number 193 and 194 are German Foreign Office memoranda and they are mere
discussions, internal to the German Foreign Office. 193 is a memorandum
of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, and it deals with a visit
to him of the French Ambassador. And Number 194 is similar, a visit of
the British Ambassador. Number 195, that is Sir Nevile Henderson’s White
Paper, _Failure of a Mission_, and there are a number of extracts from
that; it is a book and there are a number of extracts from that in the
document book and it is contended that they are cumulative of evidence
which has already been given and that in particular most of them are
really provocative. That applies particularly to the first extract.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by provocative?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Your Lordship will see that in the first extract
there are some rather strongly worded opinions.
THE PRESIDENT: Which book are they in?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: They are in Book 6, My Lord. There are some rather
strongly worded opinions about the position of Soviet Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Number 196 and 197 are German memoranda and reports
for Foreign Office use, and they cover the same category as 193 and 194.
One of them is internal to the Foreign Office and the other from the
German chargé d’affaires in Washington.
Numbers 198 to 203 are all right.
Number 204 is objected to as not being evidence; it is a memorandum of
the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office in
Berlin, and it merely talks of a report in the _Berliner Börsenzeitung_.
It is merely secondhand evidence.
Number 205 and 206 are not objected to.
The next one, TC-72, Number 74, is not objected to.
Number 207 is the same document as the previous one. It is a mere
repetition.
Now, Number 208, My Lord, consists of a collection of extracts from the
_British Blue Book_, and I am afraid I have not had time to check up
which of them are actually in evidence already. But it is clear that the
majority of them are obviously relevant, but it is suggested that those
in the left-hand column do include unnecessary detail in view of the
rest of them.
Number 209, there is no objection.
Number 210 is a conversation between the Defendant Ribbentrop and Sir
Nevile Henderson on the 30th of August 1939, and that of course has been
the subject of evidence already and is perhaps in any event cumulative
for that reason.
Number 211(a) and 211(b) are just repetitions of documents quoted from
the _British Blue Book_.
Number 212 is a Polish wireless broadcast, and Number 213 is a German
communiqué to the German public, and it is contended that those have no
evidential value.
Number 214 is an extract from a book which the Tribunal has already
refused to the defendants.
Now, the next page of the note, My Lord, deals with my next group, which
is Norway and Denmark.
THE PRESIDENT: Group 4, is it? Group 4, is that right?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is Group 4, My Lord, yes.
215(a) and 215(b) deal with the case of Iceland and Greenland. They are
not very long documents; they are just considered to be irrelevant.
Objection to them could not be very strong.
There is no objection to 216(a) and 216(b), which are already in
evidence, I think; and D-629 is also already in evidence.
Number 217 is simply an interview which the Defendant Ribbentrop gave to
the press, which the Prosecution says is not proper evidence.
Number 004-PS is already in evidence.
Number 218 and 219, I think, are also in evidence.
Number 220 again is objected to as it is simply an interview with the
press.
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to those two Ribbentrop communications
to the press?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: It is self-created evidence, My Lord. He has
presumably given that evidence already. He had not given it at the same
time.
THE PRESIDENT: What he said 6 years ago might be relevant.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, if Your Lordship thinks so; but the point I was
making is simply that it is self-created evidence and created at the
time with a view to create an impression. It is propaganda.
THE PRESIDENT: You may say that, yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Then, My Lord, the next group is the Low Countries.
That group really began at 218, of course, and it goes on to 240...
THE PRESIDENT: Is this another group? Communiqué of the 5th group?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: This is the fifth group, My Lord, yes. That goes on
from 218 to 245, and I shall not deal in detail with that because the
French Chief Prosecutor is going to speak about that. And the same with
the next group, Number 6, which is the Balkans. The French Chief
Prosecutor will deal with that, Documents 246 to 278.
The next group, Number 7, is Russia, that is, Documents 280 to 295, with
the exception, I think of 285(a), which seems to have got there by
mistake; it appears to refer to the United States.
Number 279—I cannot identify from the English translation what it is at
all. Perhaps Your Lordship will be good enough to make an amendment
against Numbers 232 and 283; they should be put into the middle column,
there being no objection to them. But there is an objection to all the
other Russian documents. Your Lordship will see, beginning at the bottom
of the group, 291 to 295, they all concern the Anticomintern Pact.
Working up the page again from the bottom, 290, 1 to 5, are extracts
from the book which the Tribunal has already refused. And, of the
documents above that, 280 is Hitler’s speech about Russia in October
1939. And 281 is a repetition of a document we have already had, Number
274, which is the Three Power Pact. That will be dealt with.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that that is a textual reproduction?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think I am right in saying that it is actually a
textual reproduction.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But why is there an objection if it is simply
a textual reproduction? The Prosecution has been given textual
reproduction.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: There is no objection at all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean it is not in the right column?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I was putting in the Allied column only the ones which
could make up a complete set according to the Prosecution’s views.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that true of 284 also, the Soviet-German
pact?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not know whether that has come before...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why do you object to that then?
THE PRESIDENT: By “Pact,” is it the German Pact of the 28th of September
1939?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: This is the 28th of September 1939. I am told that
there is no objection to that.
Number 285 is again simply a German report which draws conclusions of
facts, and the Prosecution says that has no proper evidential value. It
is a very long report by the German Foreign Office concerning the
agitation in Europe against the German Reich by the Soviet Union, and it
is full of conclusions of fact and opinions.
THE PRESIDENT: It is after the date of the beginning of war against
Russia?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: It is after the beginning of that war, My Lord, yes.
Number 286 and 287, those are objected to as being without value as
evidence. They come from the _Völkischer Beobachter_.
Number 288 is said to be a captured Soviet document; but it has
deteriorated generally in the English version, had no date and no
signature, and it seems of very doubtful value.
Number 289 is a report from the Yugoslav military attaché in Moscow,
which is also thought to be irrelevant by the Prosecution.
Then Group Number 8, My Lord, is the group concerning the United States
of America, Documents 299 to 310, and including 285(a). The first ten
documents, Your Lordship will see, are reports from, we would say they
come from a very indirect source, the process report by the Polish
Ambassador on the political situation in the United States in 1939. The
next one seems to come from Portugal, the next from the Polish
Ambassador again, the next two also from the Polish Ambassador. Then the
next one, Number 300, is President Roosevelt’s Quarantine Speech in
1937, which seems too far back to be of any proper relevance. Number 301
is a German summary of events in the United States, which we say is
irrelevant for the reasons I have stated: That they are German
summaries, rather more unreliable than irrelevant. Number 302 again is
the Polish Ambassador’s report. Number 303 is a statement by President
Roosevelt in 1936, and Number 304 is President Roosevelt’s message to
Congress on the 4th of January 1939. I do not think there is anything
very objectionable about that. To numbers 305 to 308, there is no
objection; 309—in my copy there are two different versions of 309. The
first one is a German summary of the facts without any dates and with no
sources indicated. It seems to be of no proper value as evidence, and
the second one, 309 and 309(a), are declarations of the Pan-American
Conference and the German note in reply to it. I do not think the
Prosecution can take a very strong objection to that, but it does not
seem to be very closely in point.
TC-72, Number 127, and TC-72, Number 124, are both appeals of President
Roosevelt to Hitler and are not objected to. 310 is another German
summary of facts without any sources indicated.
The ninth group is simply a miscellaneous group; and, if My Lordship
will turn back to the first page of my note, it is the first 8 documents
on that page, down to Number 45. They are all allowed. There is no
objection to them, except Number 12, which is the announcement of the
Reichstag election results. It does not seem to matter one way or the
other whether that is in.
Number 45 is Lord Rothermere’s book of predictions and prophecies,
_Warnings and Prophecies_. I think the Prosecution contends that it is
not relevant evidence in this case.
The next lot of miscellaneous ones is on Page 2, Numbers 70 to 73.
Number 71 is the German-Lithuanian treaty about Memel, and there is no
objection. Number 70 is thought to be rather irrelevant. Numbers 72 and
73 are objected to because they deal with the Fourteen Points of
President Wilson.
The next lot of miscellaneous ones is on the last page of one of my
notes right down at the bottom, Number 296, and that is a speech by
Hitler on the Rhineland. You have all the evidence that has been given.
It appears to be rather cumulative, if it is not in already. I have not
actually checked whether it is in.
Number 298 on the top of the next page is, in fact, superfluous. It is
the same as Number 274. And down at the bottom of the last page, My
Lord, 311, is a paper written by the Defendant Ribbentrop on the
Führer’s personality.
THE PRESIDENT: That has already been ruled out.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That, I think, has been ruled out this morning by Your
Lordship. Number 312 is an affidavit of Frau Von Ribbentrop. Number 313
is an affidavit of Dr. Gottfriedsen. I understand from Dr. Horn that,
although he had been allowed Dr. Gottfriedsen as a witness, he thinks it
will save time if he reads the affidavit or a part of it. Perhaps, if
Your Lordship will allow the Prosecution to make what comments they
think fit when he comes to do that, it would be the best way of treating
it.
That is all—all my points, My Lord. There are just the Low Countries
and the Balkans.
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, it is true that Mr. Barrington has
spoken for all of us; and I do not intend to go over any of these
documents, except this, because I fear there is some question in the
minds of the members of the Tribunal about our objection running from 76
through 116, 118 to 122, and 114 to 148, the Polish documents. We also
say, of course, with Major Barrington that they are cumulative, but it
seems to me there is a much more basic objection. Perhaps they all have
to do with the alleged incidents inside Poland and they were published
in these _White Papers_. These incidents involved the mistreatment of
Polish citizens inside Poland, who were perhaps of German extraction.
Well, it is our view that such documents are irrelevant here because
that is no defense at all to the charges; and we cannot permit, we say,
a nation to defend itself or these defendants to defend themselves on
charges such as have been preferred here, by proving that citizens of
another state, although they may have been of German extraction or any
other extraction, were mistreated inside that state. Beginning with 76
running through to 116, 118 through 122, 114 through 148, and 151
through 152—it is 124 through 148 rather than 114 through 148, 124
through 148. The last are 151 and 152.
M. AUGUSTE CHAMPETIER DE RIBES (Chief Prosecutor for the French
Republic): I will ask the Tribunal’s permission to make two short
remarks about documents which are part of the fifth and sixth group, and
which concern entirely French documents taken from the _German White
Book_. It is, as a matter of fact only for this reason, that the French
Prosecution has any knowledge of them, for, contrary to what the
Tribunal believes, the French Prosecution has not yet received a
translation of the documents submitted by Dr. Horn. The first group,
Number 5, Documents 221 to 245; these are General Staff documents; and
it appears that from them Dr. Horn wishes to draw the conclusion that
England and France violated the neutrality of Belgium. If we ask the
Tribunal to reject the 25 documents, it is only because we see a grave
risk of the Tribunal’s losing time in useless discussions. Far from
having any reason to fear discussion, we feel that on the contrary
France and Britain would both be found to have respected scrupulously
the two pacts which they had signed: The first being to respect the
neutrality of Belgium, and the second being to respect the pact by which
they had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium.
What is the precise issue here, Gentlemen? Only to find out whether
Germany, France, or England violated the neutrality of Belgium. The
Defendant Ribbentrop has been asked this by his counsel, and has
answered it in the clearest possible manner, during Saturday’s session,
in a statement which the Tribunal is certain to remember. The Defendant
Ribbentrop said, “Of course it is always very hard in a war like this to
violate the neutrality of a country; and you must not think that we
enjoyed doing things like that.”
That, Gentlemen, is a formal admission that Germany violated the
neutrality of Belgium. Why should we waste time in discussing the
relevance of these 25 documents now?
I go on to the second group, Group Number 6. These are General Staff
documents, which Germany claims to have seized; and they concern events
in the Balkans in 1939 and 1940. The French Prosecution asks you to
reject the 22 documents submitted by Dr. Horn for the two reasons
following: They have absolutely no claim to be considered authentic, and
they are not relevant. They have absolutely no claim to be considered
authentic—they are all extracts from the _White Book_; and the Tribunal
knows the Prosecution’s views on this point. Moreover, the great
majority of these documents are extracts from documents originating with
the Allied general staffs. No originals have been produced; and the
supposed copies are not even submitted in their entirety. In the second
place, they are not relevant, for they all concern plans studied by the
general staffs in the last months of 1939 and the early part of 1940.
These plans for French or British intervention in Yugoslavia and Greece
naturally presupposed the consent of the governments concerned as an
indispensable condition. The plans were never carried through. They were
definitely abandoned after the Armistice of June 1940. The documents
date from 1939 and 1940; and the Tribunal will remember that the
aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece occurred on 6 April 1941 at a
time when the Hitler Government no longer had any reason to fear plans
made in 1939.
These documents, which have no claim to be considered authentic, are
also in no way relevant to the present discussion; and for that reason
the French Prosecution asks the Tribunal to reject them.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Horn. Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that you may
possibly, in view of the evidence which the Defendant Ribbentrop has
given, find it possible to withdraw some of these documents, in view of
the time that has been taken up. I mean the Defendant Ribbentrop has
dealt with the subject very fully; and it may be, therefore, that you
will be able to withdraw some of these documents in order to save time.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I will withdraw all the documents which
are cumulative. I should like first...
THE PRESIDENT: If you let us know now what it is you wish to withdraw...
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.
To begin with may I state my position on a few basic questions? That is
the probative value of the _White Books_ and the ambassadors’ reports. I
would like to point out that these documents had a decisive influence on
political opinion. That applies to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop as well
as Hitler. And in addition, I would like to point out that the
Prosecution have relied largely on reports of this kind. I should like,
therefore, to ask for equal rights for the Defense.
Then I would like to say a few words about the documents of the French
General Staff which were found in the town of La Charité during the
French campaign. If the High Tribunal shares the doubts and misgivings
expressed by the representative of the French Prosecution, I ask
permission to question the Commander of Army Group 10, Field Marshal
Leeb, as to the fact that these General Staff documents were found in
the town of La Charité.
The Polish documents to which I have referred were found in the Polish
Foreign Ministry at Warsaw. The Commander-in-Chief at that time, Field
Marshal or Generaloberst Blaskowitz, can testify to that effect. And in
this connection I would also name Generaloberst Blaskowitz as a witness,
if the Tribunal has any misgivings.
Moreover, I can summarize the opinion of the Defense by saying that I
believe that objections can be raised against a document only if its
inaccuracy is obvious from the contents or if it can be shown to be a
forgery. I ask the Tribunal to admit all the other documents contained
in the _White Books_ or the ambassadors’ reports.
As to the documents on Polish minority questions I would like to point
out that Prime Minister Chamberlain himself described the minority
question as being the decisive question between Germany and Poland.
Since these negotiations, of which the main subject, besides Danzig and
the Corridor, was the minority question, led to war, the minority
question is therefore one of the causes of the war. Therefore I ask that
the documents on this point, which prove continuous violation of the
minority pacts on the part of Poland be admitted in evidence.
If the High Tribunal agree, I will now begin to submit the documents to
the Tribunal for judicial notice or to read certain essential passages;
and I would like to tell the Tribunal now which documents I will
dispense with.
DR. DIX: I should be grateful to the Tribunal if I might just state my
position—not as regards the case of Ribbentrop, with whom I am not
concerned; my colleague, Dr. Horn, is dealing with him—but simply on
principle, not exclusively from the Defense point of view, but quite
objectively and basically in regard to the various problems which the
Tribunal must consider before making their decision as to the
admissibility of any piece of evidence—either in the form of a question
put to a witness or a document to be submitted.
I am not asking for permission to talk for the sake of talking, but
because I believe that by doing so I can shorten the later stages of the
proceedings; because I hope that the Tribunal will be in agreement with
the main points of my statements and that therefore it will be
unnecessary for the Defense to make these statements at a later stage.
I have naturally to leave it entirely to the Tribunal whether they
consider it now the appropriate time or whether I shall do it only after
my colleague Horn has finished with his documentary evidence. At any
case I should like to make the statements before the Tribunal have ruled
upon the applications of the Prosecution and of Dr. Horn.
I should like to ask Your Lordship whether the Tribunal will allow me
now to make clear, as shortly as possible, the position I take up in
principle on the questions which I consider of vital importance for the
decision. May I do this?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. DIX: I believe, without wishing to criticize the juridical value of
the statements which we have heard here, that there has been some
confusion of ideas. We must keep the distinction quite clear in our
minds: 1. Is an item of evidence—and that applies to witnesses as well
as documents—relevant? 2. Is an item of evidence useful as such? 3. Is
an item of evidence cumulative and therefore to be rejected?
If the Tribunal rule that something offered in evidence is not relevant,
not useful, or cumulative, then it must refuse the application for it at
this stage of the proceedings. On the other hand, the question of the
credibility of something offered in evidence—that is, whether the
answer of a witness is to be believed or not, whether the contents of a
document may be considered credible, whether expositions set forth in a
_White Book_, for instance, are to be believed or not believed—that, in
my opinion, is a question which can be decided only when the evidence in
question has been brought into the proceedings and the Tribunal have
taken judicial notice of it and are able, when freely evaluating the
evidence—a course which is open to the Tribunal—to pass judgment on
its credibility or otherwise. For that reason I think that at the
present moment there seems to be no reason for saying, for instance that
this document cannot be used at all because it is part of a _White Book_
published by the German Government. No one will deny that a _White
Book_, that is, a publication, an official publication, issued by any
government, can as such be useful and relevant evidence. Whether the
passage read and introduced into the proceedings is such that the
Tribunal can give it credence is a question that can be decided after
the evidence in connection with the _White Book_ has been introduced
into the proceedings, and the Tribunal have taken official notice of the
passage in question.
Now, I turn to the question of relevancy and effectiveness. The
representative of the British Prosecution has stated here that the
reports sent by the German ambassadors to their Foreign Minister are,
_per se_, not useful. At least, that is the way I understood him. They
will be admitted only if the Prosecution wishes to use them. In other
words, they are to be admitted only if the Prosecution, wishes to use
them to the detriment of the defendants. I do not think that this point
of view can be maintained. The representative of the British Delegation
cited Article 21 of the Charter in this connection. Article 21 of the
Charter has nothing whatsoever to do with this question. Article 21 of
the Charter merely states, so far as I remember it—I do not have the
Charter on hand but I believe I know the contents of it very well—that
documents referring to the investigation by the governments of the
victorious powers of war crimes committed in their own countries do not
have to be read, but may merely be submitted to the Tribunal for
judicial notice. This question however has nothing whatsoever to do with
the question of the usefulness or relevancy of a report submitted at any
time by a German ambassador to his Foreign Office. Whether this report
has been admitted, or is to be admitted, can be decided according to
whether the Tribunal consider as relevant the subject which it concerns
and which it is to prove—if the fact which is to be proved by it is
considered relevant by the Tribunal and is adequately established by one
or both parties. Then, in my opinion, this ambassador’s report should be
admitted; and after its admission the Tribunal can, by freely weighing
the evidence, consider the value of the evidence, that is, its
credibility, and moreover its objective as well as its subjective
credibility. So much for the clear-cut differentiation of the concepts
of relevancy and usefulness and for the concept of the value of
evidence, that is, the objective and subjective credibility of evidence.
Now, with regard to the question of whether evidence is cumulative. It
is certain that every jurist in this courtroom agrees that cumulative
evidence should not be admitted; but the question of whether evidence is
cumulative may in no circumstances be judged formally, so to speak,
mechanically. I can well imagine that a question with the same wording
as one that has already been put, need not necessarily be cumulative,
for reasons which I will enumerate in a moment and that a question which
in form does not resemble one already put, may nevertheless be
cumulative because it requires an answer from the witness regarding the
same evidence, but expressed in different words. The fact that a
question may be identical in wording with one which has already been put
does not necessarily mean that it is cumulative as shown by the old
proverb _Si duo faciunt idem non est idem_. If, for instance, I ask a
witness who bears the stamp of a fanatical adherent of the Nazi regime
for his subjective impression of something and then put the same
question on the same impression to a witness who is known to be a
fanatical opponent of the Nazi regime, then these two questions are
certainly not cumulative, for it is of paramount importance, if the
Tribunal is to be in a position to form an opinion and make a decision,
to find out whether an impression is registered in the same way by two
worlds, so to speak—by two diametrically opposed persons. Therefore one
has to take the witness into consideration in judging whether a question
is cumulative or not. A further example of the fact that a question
which is exactly similar to one previously put need not be cumulative
would be, for instance, if I put the question to the defendant and then
to a witness who is not interested. In saying this I wish in no way to
disparage the evidence given by the defendant under oath. That is far
from being my intention. In principle, the testimony of both the
witnesses is alike. There is, however, a great difference. In order not
to take too long I will cite only one example—whether when
investigating some phase of the defendant’s inner life about which he
himself is best informed, I question a witness who had an impression of
this incident concerning the defendant, or whether I question the
defendant himself for whom this inner impression is a part of the
psychological background of his deed.
I should like to stop at this point, in order not to take up too much of
the Tribunal’s time with theoretical expositions. My intention in making
this statement was only to request the high Tribunal in making their
decision, I repeat in regard to relevancy and usefulness, to make a
clear distinction in the question of the value to be attached to
subjective evidence, which should be decided after its admission, and to
ask the Tribunal, when considering whether evidence is cumulative, not
to be guided solely by the outward form of the question or the document
but to investigate whether it would not be in the interest of truth and
give a deeper insight into the case to put the same question to
different people, or to have the same question confirmed, or not
confirmed, by written statements by different people.
My conscience is uneasy about this academic exposition, but I hope that
the clarification which I have tried to make and in which I may perhaps
have succeeded to some extent, may help to shorten somewhat later stages
of the proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how long you think you
are going to be over these documents, because we are getting further and
further behind. And how long do you anticipate you will be? Have you
made up your mind yet what documents you are prepared to withdraw, if
any?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I should need about two more hours—that is
without objections on the part of the Prosecution, and I believe that in
that time I can finish my entire presentation including the reading of
the most important passages, which are limited to a very few documents.
Therefore, without objections about two hours.
THE PRESIDENT: You have heard the Prosecution’s objections. We have
heard them. We will consider them, and we will consider any answer that
you make to them; but we do not desire at this stage, when we have all
these other defendants’ cases to be heard, that you should go into these
documents in detail now and read them, and we hope that you will not
think it necessary to read from these documents after you have answered
the objections of the Prosecution to certain of the documents.
DR. HORN: I have the intention...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you the idea that you had finished your argument in
answer to the Prosecution’s objections or not? Did you intend to deal
further with the admissibility of any of these particular documents or
not?
DR. HORN: In accordance with the wishes expressed by the Tribunal I
intend to submit these documents in groups, with a brief connecting text
and in each group where the Prosecution has made objections to add a few
remarks on the points raised. I do not intend to do any more.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you see, the position is this. The Prosecution
have objected to certain documents on certain grounds, and we want to
give you a full opportunity to answer those objections. When you have
your full answer to those objections, we think it will be appropriate we
should adjourn and decide upon those objections and upon your arguments.
Do you see? That we should rule that, after you have given your answer
to the objections, we should adjourn and decide which of the documents
we rule to be admissible in evidence.
DR. HORN: If the Tribunal intends to give its ruling after I have taken
my position on the objections of the Prosecution, then I ask that I be
given an opportunity now, for, to begin with, I would like...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Horn. Because you see, it is 5
o’clock, and we shall not be able to conclude it tonight.
Dr. Horn, if you could conclude your arguments in answer to the
questions of principle which have been raised by the Prosecution now, we
think it would be the most convenient course if you could do it in a
fairly short time. I mean, you have heard what the Prosecution say about
these various groups, and it would be more convenient, we think, if you
could answer that in the space of a quarter of an hour now.
DR. HORN: First of all, I would like to refer to documents numbered 48
to 61. In regard to these I can take only the following position.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. HORN: Number 48 to 61. Perhaps I may again use these pages of the
Prosecution, with their objections, as a basis. Documents 48 to 61 were
rejected as irrelevant, but these documents deal with rearmament and
preparation for war by the opposite side. I can arrive at the basic
motives animating Hitler and Ribbentrop only by contrasting the German
evidence with the evidence given by the other side. I cannot judge of
the illegality of an action unless I know all the facts. To know all the
facts, I have to know the attitude taken by the other side. Therefore, I
consider these documents highly relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. HORN: The next group of decisive importance consists of the
documents dealing with the Polish minority problem. The representative
of the Prosecution has said that by the German-Polish agreement of 5
November 1937, the minority problem was sanctioned by both countries.
That is, all violations of international law in regard to minority
questions would be considered a closed chapter if they had occurred
before that year. This view is certainly not correct, because one
agreement cannot sanction the violation of a prior agreement. Moreover,
during the negotiations for the 1934 pact between Germany and Poland it
was expressly agreed, as I can prove by means of these documents that,
after a general political agreement had been made, the minority question
as well as that of Danzig and of the Corridor should be settled.
These questions were expressly held in abeyance pending a further
settlement by agreement, and as no such settlement of the two questions
was made, the documents dealing with the violations by the Poles of
international law with regard to minority pacts cannot be rejected on
account of this agreement. For this agreement, as I should like to
emphasize once more, particularly deals with a further agreement for the
settlement of this question.
The second objection for this group is the fact that the minority
problem on the whole is called irrelevant. Previously I stated briefly
that the British Prime Minister Chamberlain himself realized the need
for regulating this problem. I will submit this document too; it is
Document Number 200 in my document book. All the political circles
concerned thought that the solution must be found for this question and
therefore considered it relevant. I ask the Tribunal therefore to admit
the documents referring to it. These documents cannot be rejected in
part as cumulative, as was done here, for on the strength of these
documents, I wish to prove that these minority pacts have been
repeatedly violated since 1919, and I submit documents from the
international tribunal of The Hague and the League of Nations at Geneva,
showing that these violations took place during a period of over 20
years.
I accept the objections made by the Soviet Delegation to Documents 286
to 289, and I withdraw Documents 286 to 289.
Since the Tribunal recently objected to the book _America in the Battle
of the Continents_, I also withdraw documents presented under Number
290, 1 to 5. I have also referred to that book under several other
numbers, and I withdraw also all those numbers which refer to the book,
_America in the Battle of the Continents_. As for the ambassadors’
reports, I again refer to my statement and the basic statements made
here a moment ago by my colleague, Dr. Dix. I am convinced that, on
principle, and on the strength of the legal arguments adduced and also
in view of the fact that the Prosecution have used such reports
extensively, the Defense should also be granted the right of referring
to these reports, especially as they formed the foundation on which
German political opinion was based.
I shall not be able to dispense with the files of the French General
Staff either, for the reasons I have stated. It has been said that
Documents 221 to 269 are irrelevant. They are not irrelevant, because we
had neutrality pacts with those countries, and in the neutrality pacts
it was agreed that Germany would respect their neutrality as long as the
other side also respected it. As it would now be possible here to prove
that the other side did not respect this neutrality, the proof of
whether a war of aggression against these countries by Germany...
THE PRESIDENT: The point that M. Champetier de Ribes was making was that
France was out of the war by 1940. Therefore documents which were drawn
up by the French General Staff in 1940 had no relevance in 1941. Isn’t
that so? That is the point that he was making.
DR. HORN: You mean the French Prosecutor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the French Prosecutor.
DR. HORN: Yes. However, the fact that breaches of neutrality were
committed by France and were known to the German Government at the time
alters the legal situation completely. You cannot say that Germany waged
an aggressive war against these countries when we knew through our
intelligence service that our opponents intended to occupy these
countries, and did in fact do so, by sending out General Staff officers.
Thus it was the other side which was guilty of violation, and the files
which have been found have only confirmed the intelligence reports
submitted to us at the time; I say, at the time.
Therefore, you cannot accuse Germany of violating the neutrality pact in
these cases. I would like to ask the Tribunal, therefore, to admit those
files as relevant for the reasons stated. With reference to the other
documents, I ask to be permitted to make my statement when I submit the
documents to the Tribunal in the presentation of evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, we want to rule upon it when we have
heard your arguments; we do not want to have to rule again over every
document. We want you to take them in groups, in the way the Prosecution
has, so that we may make up our minds and rule.
DR. HORN: These are the main objections which I have to make to the
arguments of the Prosecution. I ask the Tribunal once more to
differentiate between considerations of principle raised by Dr. Dix, and
between the factual considerations raised by myself with regard to the
individual groups.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-EIGHTH DAY
Wednesday, 3 April 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has read and considered every one of the
documents produced by Dr. Horn on behalf of the Defendant Ribbentrop and
the Tribunal rules as follows:
I will refer only to the documents to which no objection was taken,
where the Tribunal rejects them; that is to say, documents to which no
objection is taken are allowed with the particular exceptions which I
make.
With reference to the documents to which objection was taken, the
Tribunal rejects Numbers 12, 45, 48 to 61 inclusive. It allows Document
62. It rejects Documents 66, 67 and 69. It allows Document 70. It
rejects Documents 72, 73, 74. It rejects Documents 76 to 81 inclusive.
It grants Document 82. It rejects Document 83. It grants Documents 84 to
87 inclusive. It rejects Documents 88 to 116 inclusive. It rejects
Documents 118 to 126 inclusive. It allows Document 127. It rejects
Documents 128 to 134 inclusive. It rejects Documents 135 to 148
inclusive. It rejects Documents 151 and 152. It allows Documents 155 and
156. It rejects Documents 157 and 158. It rejects Document 161. It
allows Document 162. It allows Document 164. It allows Documents 165 to
183 inclusive. It rejects Document 184. It allows Documents 185 and 186.
It rejects Document 191. It allows Documents 193 and 194. It rejects
Document 195, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. It grants Document 195,
Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. It rejects Documents 196 and 197 and 198. It
rejects Document 204. It rejects Document 207. It grants the whole of
Document 208. It grants Document 210. It rejects Document 211 (a) and
(b) and Document 212. It grants Document 213. It rejects 214. It rejects
215 (a) and (b). It grants Documents 217 and 220. It grants Documents
221 to 245, except Document 238, and it also excludes all comments
contained in those documents. It rejects Documents 246 to 269. It
rejects 270 and 271. It rejects 275. It rejects 276. It grants 277 and
278. As to 279, the Tribunal would like Dr. Horn to inform them what
that document is because in the copy that they have got it is
unidentified. That is 279, Dr. Horn, in Book 8, I think.
DR. HORN: The document contains the Non-aggression Treaty between
Germany and the Soviet Union, of 23 August 1939. It contains the text of
that treaty.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well, then that will be allowed. 280 and 281 are
granted. 282, 283, and 284 are granted. 285 is rejected. 286 to 289 were
withdrawn. 290 was withdrawn. 291 is granted. 292 is rejected, 293 is
rejected, 294 is rejected. 295 is rejected. 296 is granted. 298 to 305,
inclusive, are rejected. 306 is granted. 307 is rejected. 308 is
granted. 309 and 309 (a) are both rejected. 310 is rejected. 311 had
already been ruled out. 313 is granted. 314 is rejected. 317 is granted.
318 is rejected. Well, 312 is granted; it had not been objected to. I do
not have a note of 315 and 316; are they asked for?
DR. HORN: 315, Mr. President, is the reproduction of a PS number, that
is 1834-PS, and has already been submitted and therefore need not be
submitted again.
THE PRESIDENT: Does that apply also to 316, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: 316 also has a PS number and therefore need not be
resubmitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, that deals with all the numbers, I think.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I will dispense with Number 312, and ask
instead for Number 317. This contains a notarized statement under
oath...
THE PRESIDENT: 317 is granted.
DR. HORN: Thank you, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Horn, will you deal with the ones which we have
left in, as far as you wish to deal with them. If you wish to comment
upon any of the ones that we have allowed, you may do so now. We do not
desire you to do so, but if you wish to do so, you may.
DR. HORN: May I ask Your Lordship for permission to present my
arguments. I will present only very brief arguments at a time to be
determined by the High Tribunal, so that I can sort the documents and
need not take up your time unnecessarily? All the documents are fastened
together at present and it would take longer if I were to present my
case now than if I could present the sorted documents. I therefore ask
the Tribunal to set a time when I may present these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The application is granted.
DR. HORN: Yes. I will then have concluded my case and will need only a
relatively short time to comment briefly on some but not all of the
documents.
THE PRESIDENT: If Dr. Nelte is already to go on with the case of the
Defendant Keitel, the Tribunal suggests possibly you might be able to
deal shortly with your documents at 2 o’clock.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be agreeable to Dr. Nelte?
DR. HORN: I will consult my colleague.
Dr. Nelte has just advised me that he will fetch his documents and then
he can proceed with the presentation of his case immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[_Dr. Nelte returned to the courtroom._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal is much obliged to you for
presenting your argument now.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I will begin the presentation of the case for
Keitel by asking you to summon the defendant to the witness stand, and I
shall question him. The documents which I will use in this interrogation
were submitted with a list yesterday. I hope that those documents are at
your disposal so that you will be able to follow my questions in a
manner which is desirable in the interest of a smoothly conducted
interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you will call the Defendant Keitel?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
[_The Defendant Keitel took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
WILHELM KEITEL (Defendant): Wilhelm Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. NELTE: Please describe your military career briefly.
KEITEL: In the year 1901, in the beginning of March, I became an officer
candidate in an artillery regiment of the Prussian Army. At the
beginning of the first World War, in 1914, I was the regimental adjutant
of my regiment. I was wounded in September 1914, and in the beginning of
November I became chief of a battery of my regiment. Since the spring of
1915 I served in various general staff capacities, first with higher
commands of the field army, later as a general staff officer of a
division. Towards the end I was the first general staff officer of the
Naval Corps in Flanders. Then I joined the Reichswehr as a volunteer.
Beginning with the year 1929 I was Division Head (Abteilungsleiter) of
the Army Organizational Division in the Reichswehrministerium. After an
interruption from 1933 to 1935 I became, on 1 October 1935, Chief of the
Wehrmacht Department (Wehrmachtsamt) of the Reichskriegsminister, that
is Chief of Staff with the Minister of War. While on active service I
became Generalmajor. At that time I was chief of an infantry brigade. On
4 February 1938 to my surprise I was appointed Chief of Staff of the
Führer, or Chief of the OKW—Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. On 1 October
1939, I became General of the Infantry and after the campaign in the
West in 1940 I became Field Marshal.
DR. NELTE: Were you a member of the National Socialist German Labor
Party?
KEITEL: No, I was not a member. According to military law I could not be
or become a member.
DR. NELTE: But you received the Golden Party Badge. For what reason?
KEITEL: That is correct. Hitler presented this Golden Badge of the Party
to me in April 1939, at the same time that the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, General Von Brauchitsch, received it. The Führer said it was to be
in commemoration of the march into Czechoslovakia. The Golden Badge had
“16 and 17 March” engraved on it.
DR. NELTE: In the year 1944 the Military Service Law was changed so that
active soldiers could also become members of the Party. What did you do
at that time?
KEITEL: That is correct. In the late summer or autumn of 1944 the
Military Service Law was changed so that active soldiers could also be
Party members. At that time I was invited to submit personal data for
the Party in order to be listed as a member of the Party. At the same
time I was asked to send in a donation of money to the Party. I
submitted personal data to Party headquarters and also sent in a
donation, but as far as I know I never became a member. I never received
a membership card.
DR. NELTE: To what extent did you participate at Party functions?
KEITEL: Owing to my position and to the fact that I accompanied the
Führer constantly, I participated at public functions of the Party
several times, for example, at the Party rallies in Nuremberg, also each
year when the Winter Relief Work campaign was launched. Finally,
according to orders, each year on the 9th of November, I had to attend,
together with a representative of the Party a memorial service at the
graves of the victims of 9 November 1923. It took place symbolically in
memory of the fight on 9 November, between the Party and the Wehrmacht.
I never participated in internal conferences or meetings of the Party
directorate. The Führer had let me know that he did not want this. Thus,
for example, every year on 9 November I was in Munich, but never
participated in the gatherings of the so-called Hoheitsträger (bearers
of power) of the Party.
DR. NELTE: What decorations did you receive during the war?
KEITEL: During the war—it must have been in the winter of 1939-1940—I
received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross. I did not receive any
other German war decorations.
DR. NELTE: Do you have any sons?
KEITEL: I had three sons, all of whom served at the front as officers
during this war. The youngest one died in battle in Russia in 1941. The
second was a major in Russia and has been missing in action, and the
eldest son, who was a major, is a prisoner of war.
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Keitel, beginning with essential matters, I
would like to put the following basic questions to you: What basic
attitude did you, as a soldier, an officer, and a general, have toward
the problems with which you had to deal in your profession?
KEITEL: I can say that I was a soldier by inclination and conviction.
For more than 44 years without interruption I served my country and my
people as a soldier, and I tried to do my best in the service of my
profession. I believed that I should do this as a matter of duty,
laboring unceasingly and giving myself completely to those tasks which
fell to me in my many and diverse positions. I did this with the same
devotion under the Kaiser, under President Ebert, under Field Marshal
Von Hindenburg, and under the Führer, Adolf Hitler.
DR. NELTE: What is your attitude today?
KEITEL: As a German officer, I naturally consider it my duty to answer
for what I have done, even if it should have been wrong. I am grateful
that I am being given the opportunity to give an account here and before
the German people of what I was and my participation in the events which
have taken place. It will not always be possible to separate clearly
guilt and entanglement in the threads of destiny. But I do consider one
thing impossible, that the men in the front lines and the leaders and
the subleaders at the front should be charged with the guilt, while the
highest leaders reject responsibility. That, in my opinion, is wrong,
and I consider it unworthy. I am convinced that the large mass of our
brave soldiers were really decent, and that wherever they overstepped
the bounds of acceptable behavior, our soldiers acted in good faith,
believing in military necessity, and the orders which they received.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution, in presenting evidence regarding violations
of the laws of war, Crimes against Humanity, repeatedly point to
letters, orders, _et cetera_, which bear your name. Many so-called
Keitel orders and Keitel decrees, have been submitted here. Now we have
to examine whether and to what degree you and your actions are guilty of
and responsible for the results of these orders. What do you wish to say
to this general accusation?
KEITEL: It is correct that there are a large number of orders,
instructions, and directives with which my name is connected, and it
must also be admitted that such orders often contain deviations from
existing international law. On the other hand, there are a group of
directives and orders based not on military inspiration but on an
ideological foundation and point of view. In this connection I am
thinking of the group of directives which were issued before the
campaign against the Soviet Union and also which were issued
subsequently.
DR. NELTE: What can you say in your defense in regard to those orders?
KEITEL: I can say only that fundamentally I bear that responsibility
which arises from my position for all those things which resulted from
these orders and which are connected with my name and my signature.
Further, I bear the responsibility, insofar as it is based on legal and
moral principles, for those offices and divisions of the OKW which were
subordinate to me.
DR. NELTE: From what may your official position and the scope of your
legal responsibility be inferred?
KEITEL: That is contained in the Führer’s decree of 4 February 1938
which has been frequently cited.
DR. NELTE: I am submitting this decree to you so that you can have the
text before you. In this Führer decree, Paragraph 1, you will find:
“From now on I will directly and personally take over the Supreme
Command of the entire Wehrmacht.”
What did that mean compared with the conditions that had existed until
then?
KEITEL: Until that time we had a Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht,
Field Marshal Von Blomberg. In addition there was the Supreme Commander
of the Wehrmacht who, according to the constitution, was the head of the
State—in this case, Hitler. With the resignation of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Von Blomberg, there was only one
Supreme Commander and that was Hitler himself. And from that time on he
himself exercised command of all three arms of the Wehrmacht: The Army,
Navy, and Air Force. It also says “from now on directly.” That should
establish unequivocally that any intermediary position with authority to
issue orders was no longer to exist, but that Hitler’s orders as Supreme
Commander were issued directly to the three arms of the Wehrmacht and
their Commanders. It also says here “directly” and “personally.” That,
too, had its meaning, for the word “personally” was to express the fact
that there was and would be no, I would say, “deputizing” of this
authority.
DR. NELTE: I assume therefore that you never signed your orders “acting
for”?
KEITEL: No, I do not remember a single instance in which I signed
“acting for.” According to our military principles, if the question had
arisen to appoint a deputy, it could have been only one person, the
Commander-in-Chief of the three arms of the Wehrmacht, namely the one
highest in rank.
DR. NELTE: In Paragraph 2 of the decree of 4 February 1938 it says:
“...the former Wehrmacht office in the Ministry of War, with its
functions is placed directly under my command as OKW and as my
military staff.”
What does this signify in regard to the staff which was thereby formed?
KEITEL: The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht had his military staff
in the Wehrmachtsamt, that is to say, the Wehrmachtsamt in the Ministry
of War. Hitler, as Supreme Commander, took over the Wehrmachtsamt as his
military staff. Thus, this staff was to be his personal working staff.
At the same time that the post of Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht was
eliminated, that of Reich Minister of War was also removed. There was no
War Ministry and no Minister of War as heretofore. Thus one could
clearly see what Hitler wanted, namely, that between him and the
Wehrmacht divisions there was to be no one holding office with any
authority either in command channels or in ministerial functions.
DR. NELTE: When this decree was issued you were installed as holder of a
new office with the title of “Chief OKW.” Will you please clarify
whether this term “Chief OKW” is correct; that is, whether it really was
what the title seems to indicate.
KEITEL: I must add that I realize only now that this term in its
abbreviated form is not quite apt. To be exact one should have said,
“Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht,” and not the
abbreviation, “Chief OKW.” From the case presented by the Prosecution I
gathered that the idea of “Chief” was interpreted as if that were a
commander, chief of an office, with authority to issue orders. And that,
of course, is an erroneous conclusion. It was neither a position of a
chief in the sense of a commander, nor, as might have been assumed or
has been assumed, was it a position as chief of a general staff. That
too, is incorrect. I was never Chief of the General Staff of the
Wehrmacht. It was Hitler’s unmistakable wish to concentrate in his own
person all the authority, all the power of command. That is not merely a
retrospective statement. He clearly expressed this desire to me on
several occasions, partly in connection with the fact that he told me
repeatedly, “I could never put this through with Blomberg.”
DR. NELTE: I have here a statement made by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch
and submitted by the Prosecution.
KEITEL: Perhaps I might add something further. I was discussing the fact
that it was not a position of Chief of the General Staff, since it was
Hitler’s basic view that commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches
each had his own general staff, or operations staff, and that he did not
want the High Command of the Wehrmacht, including the Wehrmacht
Operations Staff, to take over the functions of a general staff.
Therefore, in practice the work was done by the general staffs of the
Wehrmacht branches, while the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the OKW,
which was purposely kept small, was a working staff for Hitler, a staff
for strategic planning and for special missions.
DR. NELTE: Then Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch’s statement in his
affidavit, of which I have already spoken, is correct? It says here:
“When Hitler had decided to use military pressure or military
power in attaining his political aims, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army, if he participated, received his instructions first
orally, as a rule, or by an appropriate order. Thereupon the OKW
worked out the operation and deployment plans. When they had
been submitted to Hitler and were approved by him, a written
order from the OKW to the branches of the Wehrmacht followed.”
Is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes, in principle it is correct insofar as the final formulation
of the order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army took the form of a
directive, as we called it, based on the general plans which had already
been submitted and approved. This work was done by the Wehrmacht
Operational Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab); thus the Wehrmacht
Operational Staff was not an office which became independently active
and did not handle matters concerning the issuing of orders
independently; rather the Wehrmacht Operational Staff and I took part in
the basic determination or approval of these proposals and formulated
them in the manner in which they were then carried out by Hitler as
Commander-in-Chief. To speak technically we then passed these orders on.
DR. NELTE: Then I have an affidavit by Generaloberst Halder which deals
with the same subject. You know this affidavit Number 1. I believe I can
dispense with the reading of it and as evidence refer only to Halder’s
affidavit Number 1, which has been submitted by the Prosecution
(Document Number 3702-PS).
In addition the Prosecution submitted another treatise without a special
number. The title of the treatise is “Basis for the Organization of the
German Wehrmacht.”
THE PRESIDENT: Is this the document which you say the Prosecution
offered in evidence but did not give a number to?
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, this document was given to us by the
Prosecution, I believe by the American Prosecution, on 26 November 1945.
I do not know...
THE PRESIDENT: You mean it never was deposited in evidence by the
Prosecution?
DR. NELTE: I do not believe I can decide that. I assume that a document
which has been submitted to the Defense Counsel was submitted to the
High Tribunal at the same time, if not as evidence, then at least for
judicial notice.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the document? Is it an affidavit or not?
DR. NELTE: It is not an affidavit; it is really a study by the American
Prosecution. And, I assume, it is a basis for the indictment of the
organization OKW, and so forth.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your document book or not?
DR. NELTE: No, I do not have it in the document book, because I assumed
that was also at the disposal of the High Tribunal. Besides, Mr.
President, it is a short document.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, Mr. Dodd can tell us what it is.
MR. DODD: If I could see it I might be able to be helpful. I am not
familiar with it. It is probably one of the documents which we submitted
to the Defense but which we did not actually introduce in evidence, and
that happened more than once, I think, in the early days of the Trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: I refer to a single short paragraph of this study which I
would like to read. Perhaps we can thus obviate submitting the document.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering in evidence the whole of the affidavit?
I do not mean at this moment, but are you proposing to offer it?
DR. NELTE: I assume that the Prosecution have already submitted it. I am
only referring to it.
THE PRESIDENT: The whole affidavit? What is the number of it, if it has
been submitted?
DR. NELTE: This affidavit also does not have a number. The
Prosecution...
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been submitted if it has not a number on it
then.
It is suggested to me that possibly the Halder affidavit was offered and
then rejected.
DR. NELTE: No. At that time a series of affidavits was submitted: By
Brauchitsch, Halder, Heusinger, and many other generals who are in
Nuremberg. None of these affidavits had an exhibit number.
MR. DODD: This affidavit was put in by the United States as an exhibit.
I do not have the number handy, but I think it was submitted at the time
Colonel Telford Taylor submitted the case on behalf of the Prosecution
against the High Command and the OKW. This Halder “affidavit,” the first
document which Doctor Nelte referred to, is not an affidavit. It was a
paper submitted to the Tribunal and to the Defense by Colonel Taylor. It
set out some of the basic principles of the organization of the High
Command and the OKW wholly before he presented his part of the case. It
is really just the work of our own staff here in Nuremberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Nelte, as the document you are referring to, not
the Halder affidavit, appears to be a mere compilation, the Tribunal
thinks it should not go in as an exhibit, but you can put a question to
the witness upon it.
DR. NELTE: [_Turning to the defendant._] In the essay which you have
before you, the Prosecution asserted the following: After 1938 there
were four divisions: The OKW (High Command of the Wehrmacht); the OKH
(High Command of the Army); the OKL (High Command of the Air Force); the
OKM (High Command of the Navy); and each had its own general staff. What
can you tell us about that?
KEITEL: I can say only that this is not correct, and also contradicts
the description which I have already given of the functions of the High
Commands of the Wehrmacht branches and of the OKW. There were not four
such departments. There were only three: The High Command of the Army,
the High Command of the Navy, and the High Command of the Air Force.
As I have just stated, the High Command of the Wehrmacht as a personal,
direct working staff, was in no way an independent authority in that
sense. The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches were
commanders, had the authority to issue orders and exercised this power
over troops which were subordinate to them. The OKW had neither the
power to issue orders, nor subordinate troops to which orders could have
been issued. It is also not correct, if I recall the speeches of the
Prosecution, to use the expression “Keitel was Commander-in-Chief of the
Wehrmacht.” I am mentioning it only to emphasize this point. Further, I
would like, briefly, to call attention to the diagram on the last page
of the document which has been shown to me.
DR. NELTE: This sketch is the diagram which is called “The Wehrmacht.”
It is an exposition, a diagrammatic exposition of the entire Wehrmacht
and its branches.
KEITEL: I believe I should point briefly to the fact that it is this
diagram which was the basis for this erroneous conception, because in it
the High Command of the Wehrmacht is designated as a special office or
office of command, and that is incorrect.
DR. NELTE: What tasks had you in this military sector as the Chief of
the OKW?
KEITEL: First of all, it was an essential task to secure for the Führer
with and through the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, all the documents and
all the numerous informations and reports which he desired. I dare say
that the Wehrmacht Operational Staff had, in this connection, the
function to one might say arrange and establish direct and close
communication between Hitler and the general staffs of the branches of
the Wehrmacht. In addition to securing a countless number of such
documents which were demanded daily, there was a second function, namely
to be regularly present at all conferences in which the
commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches and the chiefs of their
staffs participated as well as the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational
Staff. On those occasions as soon as a series of oral orders was given,
these orders, in compliance with military principles, naturally had
later to be confirmed in writing. Only in this way could we prevent
mistakes or misunderstandings from arising, that is, by confirming these
orders to those who had already received them orally the orders were
made clear. That is the purpose and meaning of the order.
DR. NELTE: How did you sign the orders and documents which you drew up?
KEITEL: It is correct that this form of orders and directives were
almost exclusively signed by me. They were actually orders which had
already been given and which had already long since been transmitted
through military channels. As can be seen from the bulk of the documents
submitted here, this gave rise to the form which I made a habit of using
in which I always wrote at the beginning or after a few preliminary
words, “The Führer has therefore ordered...”
In the large majority of cases this order was no longer a surprise to
the office which received it. It was nothing new but it was only a
confirmation. In a similar way I naturally had also a considerable
number of organizational and other directives and orders also in not
purely operational fields worked out under my supervision and passed on.
In this respect I should like to point out particularly that in no case
did I send out orders without having shown them again to my supreme
commander when making the daily reports, in order to be certain that I
had not misunderstood him in any form or manner or that I was not
issuing anything which—and this I would like to emphasize—did not have
his approval to the letter.
DR. NELTE: There was another category of orders and directives...
KEITEL: May I perhaps add a few words?
DR. NELTE: Please do.
KEITEL: In order to clarify this: Among the documents submitted here are
those which Hitler personally signed and released under the heading “The
Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.” There are some
exceptions in which such directives were signed by me “by order of,” I
would like to explain this matter also. In this case it is also true
that if these directives, which for the most part had been corrected
several times by Hitler personally, had to be issued urgently and the
Supreme Commander was prevented from signing himself, it was necessary
for me to let the signature go out in this form, never as “deputy” but
always as “by order of.” Otherwise, orders were issued as I have already
stated, in the form of directives which were signed by me.
At the same time I should like to mention that even if we have a series
of documents here headed “Chief, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht”
or—some of them are different: “High Command of the Wehrmacht”—if they
are signed, “by order, Jodl,” I can say that it can be proved almost
automatically that I did not happen to be there at the time; otherwise I
would have signed it myself, knowing that I was Chief of Staff who, in
accordance with military regulations, had to sign such documents.
DR. NELTE: The memorandum which you have before you contains the
following sentence:
“The OKW united in itself the activity of a staff and of a
ministry; the matters involved, which had previously been taken
care of by the Reich War Ministry, have probably also been
turned over to the OKW.”
Please clarify the ministerial function of the OKW.
KEITEL: Yes, this formulation as set down in this document is not
exactly incorrect, but it is on important points at least, open to
misunderstanding, for it was not at all true that all functions which
had been previously carried out by the War Minister were turned over to
the OKW. There were many functions and rights which the War Minister, in
his capacity as minister, and thus the person responsible for them,
could and did decide even for the branches of the Wehrmacht and their
commanders, which were never transmitted to the Chief of the OKW, that
is, to me.
The following things happened at that time: Everything in this
connection involving authority to issue orders or exercise supreme
command, and which the Führer did not wish to take over personally, was
transferred to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht
as far as supreme authority and authority to make decisions were
concerned. To touch on the subject briefly, I should like to mention a
few essential facts which I remember. For example, the officers’
personnel records, decisions on complaints, documentary material on
budget questions, court jurisdiction and court authority, which formerly
belonged to the Minister of War, were transferred to the
commander-in-chief, as well as all questions concerning officials and
all questions of the rights of officials. I could mention still more,
but I merely wished to point out that even in cases where decisions had
to be made, as for example, removing an official or dismissing an
employee, the chief of the OKW did not decide. These powers were
delegated to the commanders-in-chief in addition to the powers they held
previously and which were transferred from the War Minister’s
jurisdiction. There were only certain reservations which the Führer made
for himself. Similarly some of the other fields of the OKW were limited
in their assignments in the course of the following years through the
dissolution of the Economic Armament Office. The position of Armament
Minister was created because of the dissolution of the Amt Ausland
Abwehr, that is, the Counterintelligence Service, of which only the
branch self-protection of the troops was left with the Wehrmacht;
everything else was transferred, and so forth.
My authority included the following: It was my duty in all cases to get
Hitler’s decision on all basic questions with which this ministerial
section was concerned. I was free from the necessity of doing this only
in current matters or if there was complete agreement between the
persons involved in a ministerial or administrative question and the
branches of the Wehrmacht in my department. In such a case a decision by
Hitler was not necessary. I must emphasize again, in summary, that the
OKW had no authority of its own, and that one can say only that Hitler
actually functioned as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, just as the
functions of the War Minister were combined in his person so as to, to
repeat that, to eliminate an intermediary official at all costs. That
is, there was to be no intermediary between him and the
commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, although the Tribunal did say that they would
hear Dr. Horn at 2 o’clock, they would not wish to interrupt the
examination of the Defendant Keitel if you prefer to go on with that
now. It is a matter for you to consider whichever you like.
DR. NELTE: Dr. Horn agrees that I continue the interrogation of Keitel
now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, for the assistance of the Tribunal
I have ascertained that the first Halder affidavit, referred to this
morning by Dr. Nelte, was introduced as Exhibit USA-531 (Document Number
3702-PS) on 4 January, by Colonel Taylor; and the second Halder
affidavit referred to by Dr. Nelte was introduced as Exhibit USA-533
(Document Number 3707-PS) on 5 January, by Colonel Taylor.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd was kind enough to put at my disposal
a number of copies of the pamphlet, “Principles of Organization of the
German Armed Forces” so that I can submit them to the Tribunal. I do so
now.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You last explained that on 4 February
1938, part of the authority of the War Ministry was transferred to
branches of the Armed Forces, and part to the High Command of the
Wehrmacht. In the decree which has been mentioned it says, concerning
this matter:
“The OKW at the same time is taking care of the affairs of the
Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the OKW, on my orders will
exercise the authority which the Reich Minister of War had
heretofore.”
Tell me briefly to which fields this applied. I myself will submit to
the Tribunal a diagram which has already been sent to the Translation
Division for translation. I do not know, however, if the Tribunal
already has the translation.
KEITEL: The ministerial functions actually transferred to the OKW were
executed by a number of offices. I shall name the most important now,
indicating their functions:
First of all, a few words about the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
(Wehrmachtführungsstab) which, being an office of the OKW, was
subordinated to it in the same way as the other offices of the OKW were,
but which was on a higher level than the other offices. As the name
implies, the Wehrmacht Operations Staff was an organ of the Führer’s
High Command with which he frequently—I might say, mostly—collaborated
personally. It had no ministerial powers.
Then there was the General Armed Forces Office (Allgemeines
Wehrmachtsamt) which took care mainly of ministerial and administrative
questions. One could almost call it a war ministry on a small scale.
Then the office of Counterintelligence Service (Amt Ausland Abwehr),
which was to a large extent ministerial but to some degree an aid in
operational questions.
Then the Economic Armament Office, in regard to which I must point out
that in the year 1940 this office was dissolved and only a small Defense
Economy Office (Wehrwirtschaftsamt) remained, which was mainly concerned
with questions of supply of all consumer goods needed by the Armed
Forces, such as fuel, coal, gasoline, _et cetera_, and which I need not
mention further.
Then an important field of activity: Replacements Administration for the
entire Armed Forces, or abbreviated, Recruiting, a central office which
was designed mostly to take care of personnel questions within the OKW.
Then the Legal Administration, the Budget Department, and a number of
other offices which it is not necessary to enumerate.
In these offices the ministerial functions of the OKW were carried out.
I would like...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think the Tribunal has followed the
distinction which the defendant has made between the General Staff for
the High Commands and the position of the OKW; but is it necessary for
the Tribunal to go into all these details?
DR. NELTE: I had finished dealing with this section.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: I want to put just one more...
THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document that you have just put
before the Tribunal, this diagram, are you desiring to make an exhibit
of that?
DR. NELTE: I would like to submit it in evidence. You will also be given
a translation.
THE PRESIDENT: If so, what number will you give it? You must number all
your exhibits.
DR. NELTE: Please number it, Keitel-1(a).
THE PRESIDENT: Who prepared it?
DR. NELTE: We prepared it and the technical division of the Prosecution
has reproduced it. The Prosecution also are in possession of the
diagram.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you asked the defendant to confirm that it is
correct?
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal, would you please look at this diagram and
confirm whether it is correct?
KEITEL: Yes, I recognize the diagram...
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, the Prosecution have not received this
diagram. Therefore, the Prosecution would like, before making
conclusions, to acquaint themselves with this diagram.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any more copies of it, Dr. Nelte?
DR. NELTE: They can be obtained and distributed right away. Then I would
like the Tribunal to reserve its decision until the diagrams have been
submitted in sufficient numbers.
KEITEL: I recognize this diagram as correct. It does not contain the
minor changes which occurred from the time of the creation of the OKW up
to the time which I have mentioned, changes brought about by the
reorganization of the armament ministries, _et cetera_, but it shows the
manner in which it actually worked during the last years.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: In order to terminate this group of questions I would like to
say the following: Is it correct that according to this, all the Keitel
orders, Keitel decrees, which have been submitted by the Prosecution,
were in reality Führer orders, that is to say, orders which were the
expression of Hitler’s will, based on his instructions and commands?
KEITEL: Yes, that is the correct definition of the summary of the
testimony I have given. I would like to state again in summarizing that,
as I have stated from the beginning, I assume and have assumed
responsibility for these orders insofar as they are connected with my
name, for the position was this: I, of course, knew the contents of
these orders which I executed. I recognize my signature, of course, in
the documents which have been submitted to me and therefore I accept the
documents as authentic. I may add that insofar as I had military or
other objections to the orders, I naturally expressed them very forcibly
and that I endeavored to prevent orders being given which I considered
controversial. But I must state in all truth that if the decision had
been finally made by Hitler, I then issued these orders and transmitted
them, I might almost say, without checking them in any way.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, before I enter upon the next phase of my
questions I should like to state the following:
The Prosecution have deduced Keitel’s participation in the many crimes
which have been described here from various facts, facts which cannot
always be connected with each other and made to agree. The Prosecution
have stated that he was a powerful and important staff officer. That is
set out in the Indictment. Then the Prosecution stated that he was a
tool without a will of his own and that the relation between himself and
Hitler was an intimate one.
You will understand that if the defendant wants to clarify or to protest
against these things he must explain the relation between himself and
Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, that is what the defendant has been doing. He
has been explaining his relationship to Hitler, and if you want to
elucidate it further you must ask him further questions.
DR. NELTE: I only wanted to let him speak about the private relation to
Hitler. So far we have been concerned only with the official relation.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Would you please tell us something about
the co-operation between you and Hitler? I ask you to be as brief as
possible and tell us only the most necessary facts, but at the same time
give us a correct picture.
KEITEL: The co-operation can be characterized only as one between a high
military superior and his subordinate. In other words, the same
relations as I have always had in my military career with the senior
officers of whose staff I was a member. The relation between Hitler and
myself never departed from this strictly military and soldierly
relationship. Of course, it was my right and my duty to express my
opinions. How difficult that was can be judged only by someone who knows
that Hitler, after a few words, was wont to take over the entire
discussion and to exhaust the subject entirely from his point of view.
It was then very difficult, of course, to come back to the subject
again. I may say that due to my various positions in high staff offices
I was quite used to dealing with the superior commanders, if I may use
that expression. However, I was quite unaccustomed to the conditions
which I encountered here. They surprised me, and not infrequently they
reduced me to a state of real uncertainty. That can be understood if one
knows that Hitler, in soldiering or military questions, if I were to
express myself very cautiously, was a man with far-reaching plans for
reform with which I, with my 37 years of service as a soldier of the old
school, was confronted.
DR. NELTE: Was it the same during the war or do you refer to the time
before the war?
KEITEL: During the war these controversies were moderated by the events,
so that actuality was strongly influenced by the urgency of the
situation. Therefore, these things did not appear in that form. On the
other hand, the position then was that Hitler in his discussions about
the situation had a comparatively large circle of about twenty people
assembled around him, and speaking in military terms, unsparingly made
his accusations—objections and criticism—directed, as a rule, at
people who were not present. I took the part of the absent person as a
matter of principle, because he could not defend himself. The result was
that the accusations and criticism were then aimed at me, and my
training as a soldier finally forced me to control myself, because it is
unseemly to answer back or to oppose or to attempt to contradict a
superior before very young subordinates, such as those who were present.
Opposition to a superior or to personalities, no matter what their rank,
was unbearable to the Führer. One could then attempt to speak to him
about these things only in private.
DR. NELTE: Had you the feeling that you had Hitler’s confidence?
KEITEL: I could not say yes. I must frankly admit that Hitler’s
confidence in me was not without reservations, and today I know only too
well that there were many things concerning which he had never spoken
frankly to me and about which he never took me into his confidence. It
was a fact that Hitler was very suspicious of the old or elderly
generals. For him they were products of an old and antiquated school and
in this sense he was to us old soldiers a man who brought new
revolutionary ideas into the Wehrmacht and wished to incorporate them
into Wehrmacht training. This frequently led to serious crises. I
believe I do not have to elaborate on that. The real evil, however, was
that this lack of confidence led him to believe that I was in conspiracy
with the Army generals behind his back and that I supported them against
him. Perhaps that was a result of my habit of defending them because
they could not defend themselves. At various instances that led to
extremely acute and serious crises.
DR. NELTE: Much will depend upon stating how your co-operation with
Hitler has to be valued, particularly to what extent you could be
considered his collaborator or adviser. Will you tell me whether Hitler
discussed his plans with you in the manner which is customary in close
collaboration?
KEITEL: In general I must deny that. It was not in any way in keeping
with Hitler’s peculiar disposition and personality to have advisers of
that kind, that is, if you call an adviser someone who gives advice in
the sense of presenting, let us say, a great number of military elements
from long experience as an officer, but not in the sense of an adviser
to help to formulate a decision, such far-reaching decisions which are
doubtlessly meant here. On principle, such a decision was preceded by
weeks or months of careful consideration. During that time one had to
assist by procuring documents, but concerning the main point, the
decision itself, he did not brook any influence. Therefore, strange as
it may sound, the final answer always was: “This is my decision and it
is unalterable.” That was the announcement of his decision.
DR. NELTE: But if various departments were competent for these
decisions, were there no general conferences?
KEITEL: No. I cannot recall that any one of the really important
decisions after the year 1938 had ever been formulated as the result of
joint counsel for instance between the politicians, the soldiers or
other ministers, because it was Adolf Hitler’s own way to speak,
privately as a rule, to each department and each department chief, to
learn from him what he wanted to know, and then to find out some element
that could be used in the elaboration of his plans. Things were not at
all as would appear from the documents here of minutes of conferences of
generals, of meetings and similar things with a list of those present.
Never did such a meeting have the character of a deliberation. There
could be no question of that. Rather, the Führer had a certain idea, and
if for various reasons he thought that we opposed that idea even
inwardly, he used that as a reason to clarify his thoughts before a
large circle without any discussion. In other words, in these
assemblies, which the documents here speak of as conferences, there was
never any deliberation. I must add that even the external form which
these things took was such that, following the military example, the
senior commander convened a certain number of generals, everyone was
seated, the Führer arrived, spoke and went out. No one in such a
situation could have found an opening to say anything. To use just one
word for it, and I certainly do not exaggerate, it was the issuing of an
order but not a conference.
DR. NELTE: To come to a different subject, the Prosecution have asserted
that you had been a member of the Reich Government. What do you have to
say about that?
KEITEL: I never belonged to the Reich Government and I was also never a
member of the Cabinet. I must also state that I never became a minister,
but as is stated in the decree of 1938, “he has the rank of a Reich
minister,” not “he is Reich minister.” The expression “minister” is, of
course, simply intended to indicate the rank of minister and there was a
good reason for that. I need point out only what I said this morning: It
was not intended that there should be anyone holding an office with the
authority of a minister between Hitler and the Wehrmacht, and the
branches of the Wehrmacht. I must clarify the question which has been
frequently raised by the Prosecution that “He had the rank of a
minister,” by saying that, before the decree was issued, I asked whether
I was to deal with the State secretaries or with the ministers, and
Hitler said, “If on my orders you deal with other ministers of the
Reich, then, of course, you can do so only with the rank of a minister,
not on the level of a state secretary.”
That is the explanation of the expression in the decree “He has the rank
of a Reich minister.”
DR. NELTE: Did you, in the headquarters have any conferences with other
important and competent personalities, such as Ribbentrop, Rosenberg,
Speer, Sauckel, _et cetera_?
KEITEL: Ministers or special plenipotentiaries visited headquarters
according to a plan which very seldom led to the simultaneous presence
of several of them. Generally, it was carefully arranged so that a
special time was set aside for each one. As a rule, I was of course
informed that “the Foreign Minister is here” or “Minister Speer is here”
or the “Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor Sauckel is
here.” However, I was called in only in regard to purely military
questions which the Führer discussed with these gentlemen in private and
I could give instances of this. However, as has already been mentioned
recently, during the interrogation of State Secretary Steengracht, it
would be false to believe that these gentlemen who came to headquarters
formed a small or select cabinet. Hitler dealt with each of these
officials and functionaries separately, gave him his orders, and
dismissed him. It sometimes happened that on the way home, these
gentlemen visited me, mostly to ask me about small questions and small
favors which I could do for them or with instructions to inform me about
a decision or with the order to forward a decision to those military
offices which had to be notified.
DR. NELTE: In concluding, I would like to know whether the expression
“intimate” which is contained in the Indictment, is correct in order to
describe the relations between you and Hitler, privately or officially?
KEITEL: I found the word “intimate” in the Indictment and I asked myself
the question, “Where does this conception originate?” To be quite frank,
I have but one answer for it, that is that no one ever heard a single
word from me about the actual and constant difficulties that I had. I
deliberately kept quiet about them. Intimate relations are, according to
my definition of “intimate”—I do not know if in the English translation
“intimate” expresses the same thing which we call “intim”—relations
where there is confidence and frank discussion and these did not exist.
I have already characterized it. Intimacy was not Hitler’s attitude
towards the generals, to whose senior generation I also belonged. Apart
from the very formal intercourse which sometimes lasted for weeks and in
which even the external forms were hardly observed—I do not want to
discuss this in detail here—the relation never reached a point where it
could be classified as that of a close adviser or a close collaborator
as I conceived it in my Army staff positions. I must say that for my
part I have been faithful and loyal and I always fulfilled my duties in
that manner. However, I must also say that a sincere and personal
relation based upon mutual understanding and confidence never existed.
It has always been correct, but it was military and official, and never
went beyond that.
DR. NELTE: By the decree of 4 February 1938 a Secret Cabinet Council was
established. According to the contents of that decree, you are supposed
to have been a member of the Cabinet Council. In order to save time, I
merely wish to ask you: Do you confirm from your own knowledge the
statement made by Reich Marshal Göring, that the Secret Cabinet Council
was established only for appearances and that a Secret Cabinet Council
was never constituted and that it never had a session?
KEITEL: I can answer only, “Yes, never.”
DR. NELTE: I come now to the question of the Reich Defense Council
(Reichsverteidigungsrat). In the session of 23 November, the prosecutor
submitted in evidence, as proof of the rearmament and the active
participation of the Wehrmacht in the planning of war of aggression,
among others:
Document EC-177, which was designated as “Meeting of the Reich Defense
Council of 22 May 1933.” I must say that I have taken the translation
from the minutes and I am not sure whether the expression
“Reichsverteidigungsrat” was translated correctly. In the minutes it
states that it is a meeting of the working committee. For your
information may I say that the Reichsverteidigungsrat was supposed to be
a sort of ministerial body and that in addition, there was a working
committee.
A second document, EC-405, was submitted concerning a meeting of the
same body on 7 March 1934; and a third document, 2261-PS, dealing with
the Reich Defense Law of 1935 and the simultaneous appointment of Dr.
Schacht as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.
Beyond doubt, you have been active in questions of national defense.
These documents are also submitted as evidence against you. I ask you,
therefore, to state whether these meetings in which you participated and
which you conducted, were concerned with preparations for war and
rearmament.
KEITEL: From the very beginning, as long as we were working on these
things and by means of a committee of experts from which everything else
evolved, I personally participated in these matters, and I may call
myself the founder of that committee of ministerial experts which was
set up to co-operate with the War Ministry. As Chief of the
Organizational Department of the Army, in the winter of 1929 and 1930,
that is, 3 years before Hitler came to power, I formed and personally
assembled that committee after the Chancellor—I believe it was
Brüning—and the Prussian and Reich Minister of the Interior Severing
had consented to it. I would like to add that a representative of
Minister Severing was always present to make sure that nothing took
place which would have been in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
This work was very difficult, because no Reich minister and no
department head was officially obliged to carry out the wishes of the
National Ministry of Defense, this was purely voluntary. Consequently,
the work went along haltingly and slowly. In this committee of experts
which met perhaps two or three times a year, we dealt with, if I may put
it briefly, what assistance the Civilian Department could render, in
order to set free the small army of 100,000 soldiers for purely military
tasks, naturally limiting ourselves to the defense of our frontiers, as
stated in the Treaty of Versailles: “The Defense of the Frontiers”; I
could perhaps still repeat our discussion from memory, since, with the
exception of the period from 1933 to 1935, I conducted every one of
these meetings myself, that is as leader of the discussion, not as
chairman. I can, however, refer you now to the _Mobilization Handbook
for Civil Authorities_, which was the outcome of this work and about
which I shall speak later. It may be possible to submit it here. We were
concerned only with questions of defense, such as the protection of our
frontiers, and, in order to make myself clear, I should like to mention
some of them. The Wehrmacht was to be free to protect railway property,
post office property, repeater stations, radio stations, and to man the
frontiers with security units for which the Customs Services were to be
responsible. Cable and sea communications with East Prussia were also to
be improved.
I will not bore you with all this. They were all defensive measures with
a view to freeing the few soldiers for purely military functions,
because for purposes of actual military operations I need not tell you
what we could have done with an army of only 100,000 men. Any questions
which went beyond this were never dealt with in that committee. The
manner in which we worked was this: I asked the experts to submit their
wishes to the heads of departments or state secretaries and then to try
to persuade the heads of departments to take over the tasks from us, so
that we could say that was being done by others and we need not bother
about it. I can guarantee that operational questions, strategic
questions, armament questions, questions of supply of war equipment,
were never discussed in this committee. They were only organizational
questions of the taking over of functions which generally should be
performed by a soldier, but which we wanted to transfer to the civil
authorities.
Now, as to the meeting of 22 May 1933, which has been discussed several
times, it was already stated in the heading of the minutes which we have
before us: “Competency—heretofore the Reichswehrminister, now the Reich
Defense Council”—I have just explained that. Hitherto
Reichswehrminister, over the committee, voluntary participation of the
ministers of other departments, now obligatory activity of the heads of
departments, that is, the group of ministers who received the title of
“Defense Council.” I will express that even more clearly, so that it
cannot be misunderstood. Every member of the committee represented a
ministry. The minister to whom the committee member was responsible,
along with his colleagues, formed the Reich Defense Council, as
envisaged by us then. They were the Council and we were the Committee.
Therefore, “heretofore the Reichswehrminister”—now, one could say, as I
have just expressed it, the other ministers were obliged to do that.
In Paragraph 3 the working plans were particularly mentioned. These
working plans, in a word, are the forerunner of the _Mobilization Book_,
which is the final stage; whereas the working plans of about 1933 were
the intermediary stage. Then as regards the concluding words at the
meeting of 22 May 1933, which have been given special prominence here by
the Prosecution, and which deal with the need for secrecy—the passage
where I said, according to the minutes, that nothing which could lead to
objections at the Disarmament Conference should be left lying in the
desks of the ministries—that is correct. I did say that, and I have
said it because the experts told me that, with the exception of a small
wooden box or a drawer in a desk which could not be locked, they had no
place in which to keep anything, and because Von Blomberg, Reich War
Minister at that time, who had been in Geneva at the Disarmament
Conference for almost two years, gave me the definite order before this
meeting, to point out these things, because in Geneva one was surrounded
by an extremely large number of agents who were only waiting to be able
to present proof that, in spite of the disarmament negotiations, there
were things going on which could be interpreted as violations of the
Versailles Treaty. That is what I had to say about the document.
DR. NELTE: I have given to you now the _Mobilization Book for the Civil
Administration_. It is Document 1639-PS. It has been submitted in order
to prove that aggressive wars were being planned. Would you explain to
us the purpose of this book?
KEITEL: I have already stated that at an earlier stage, that is, during
the years 1932-33, the individual ministries had so-called working
plans, indicating what they were to do if something happened which
necessitated their participation in defending the country. In the course
of years, naturally, a number of new tasks were added and that finally
led to this _Mobilization Book_ for the civil authorities and civil
administration, the study of which would certainly show nothing which
might have anything to do with strategic, operational, or other
preparations for war. On the other hand, I am not in a position to prove
that everything contained in this book could never have been useful in
military operations which could develop from an aggressive war plan.
Many measures, one could almost say most measures, in the event of
mobilization would not indicate on the surface whether it is a measure
for defense or a measure which is necessary or indispensable for
aggressive action. That cannot be determined. But I believe I can say,
because I, myself, have been engaged so deeply in this work, perhaps
more than in any other, that there was no reason at all to burden the
civilian experts—they were high government counsellors—with strategic
or operational planning. I do not believe that it is necessary to prove
that such work is not within their scope. I have looked through and
studied this mobilization book here. I do not wish to bore you by citing
points which are of a purely defensive nature. I could name them:
barriers, reinforcement of the frontier defenses, demolitions, cutting
of railroads and similar things, all this is in the book. One of the
most important chapters, which, if I remember correctly, we discussed
during four or five of these sessions, was the question of evacuation,
that is, evacuating territories close to the border of valuable war
material and personnel, so that, in case of war with the neighbor, they
should not fall into the hands of the enemy. This problem of evacuation
was one of the most difficult, because the extent to which one can
evacuate, that is, what things can be evacuated, is perhaps one of the
most difficult decisions to make.
I would like to say one more thing about the Reich Defense Committee,
supplementing the ideas which I expressed before. Until the year 1938,
no meeting or session of the Reich Defense Council was ever held, that
is, the ministers who were the superiors of the committee members never
met, not even once. I would have known about it, although at the cabinet
meeting, I believe as early as March 1933, we passed a resolution to
make these ministers responsible for a Reich Defense Council which
should deal with these tasks, and to oblige them to take over these
tasks as their necessary contribution to the defense of the Reich, and,
of course, to finance them. That was the main purpose, otherwise the
Reich Defense Council never met.
DR. NELTE: Actually, the minutes which have been presented, for the
period of ’33 to ’38, are of the meetings of the working committee. But
you know that about eight days ago two documents were submitted which
appeared to be the minutes of the meetings of the Reich Defense Council.
One session or assembly is supposed to have taken place in November
1938, and the second one in March 1939. Unfortunately these documents
have not been submitted to me, but I have looked at them and you have
also seen them. Can you explain to us how these minutes, that is, these
meetings came about and what they mean?
KEITEL: I merely wish to add a few supplementary words to the statement
which Reich Marshal Göring has already made. In December 1938, there was
passed the Reich Defense Law, which had been drawn up in 1935, a shelved
law, that is, a law which had not been made public and which required
modification, the reason being that the Reich Defense Law of ’35 was
devised by the Reich War Minister, Commander-in-Chief Von Blomberg, who
no longer held office. I was with Reich Marshal Göring at that time to
discuss this with him and to find a new basis for this law, which until
then had not been published. This law of the autumn of 1938 had a number
of supplementary clauses as compared to the old one, and perhaps I will
be able to give details later. Among other things, according to this law
also, Reich Marshal Göring was the delegate of the Führer, a function
formerly held by the Reich War Minister and which I could not exercise.
This conference in November 1938, to recall it briefly, had been
convened by Reich Marshal Göring in order to present this law which had
not been published, and which was not to be published, to a large circle
of members of the ministries. There were about seventy or more persons
present to whom the Reich Marshal explained the purpose and the essence
of this law in the form of a speech. There was no discussion, apart from
that speech, and there was certainly no question of a meeting of the
Reich Defense Council at that time.
You also recently showed me the second document of a meeting of the
Reich Defense Council as it is called and as also appears in the heading
of the minutes of the summer 1939.
DR. NELTE: No, March 1939.
KEITEL: That has been mentioned here, and I believe it was the second
meeting of the Reich Defense Council. I can explain that. This is how it
was: I called a meeting of the committee and, of course, furnished Reich
Marshal Göring with the agenda and the names of the people who were to
be present. Reich Marshal Göring informed me that he would come himself
and that since he wished to discuss other questions, he would
accordingly enlarge the attendance. This conference, therefore, had an
agenda which I had planned for the committee, and concrete questions
were also brought up for debate. It is, however, remarkable that
according to the list of those present, that is, according to the
numbers, the members of the Reich Defense Council were represented by
only a very small number, almost not at all, although there were about
forty or fifty people present. The Reich Defense Council itself was a
body of 12 people, and it needs no further explanation that, from the
form in which these two conferences took place, one could not say that
this was a plenary session of the Reich Defense Council based upon a
clearly defined agenda, but rather that there were two meetings, the
motive and extent of which I have described here.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal thinks that you might get on a
little more quickly with the defendant. The Tribunal recall that you
asked a few days ago that you might submit an affidavit of the
defendant’s evidence, and there is in your document book an affidavit.
You have been over all those matters in the affidavit at very much
greater length than you would have gone into them if you read the
affidavit, and we hope that you will be able to deal more shortly with
the evidence in future.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I made every effort to be as brief and concise
as possible in my questions, but testimony is, of course, always
subjective. The defendant is unfortunately the one who is mentioned most
frequently in this Trial and naturally he is interested in clarifying
those matters which he considers essential in order to present his case
clearly.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Nelte, I do not think it is necessary to
discuss the matter further; but the Tribunal have expressed their wish.
DR. NELTE: As far as I am able, I shall comply with your request, Mr.
President.
[_Turning to the defendant._]
Field Marshal Keitel, you have just given us an explanation of the Reich
Defense Council and the Reich Defense Committee. You probably realize
that we are not and should not be so much concerned with whether
decisions are made by a Reich Defense Council or a Reich Defense
Committee. We are interested in what actually took place and whether or
not these things justify the imputations of the Prosecution. In this
respect I ask you to tell me if those things which you discussed and
planned on the Reich Defense Committee justify the suspicion that you
were considering aggressive war?
KEITEL: I realize fully that we are not concerned with the formality of
whether it was the Council or the Committee, since the Council was a
board of ministers while the Committee was a board of minor experts. We
are concerned with what actually did take place and what was done. With
the exception that in the year 1934 and until the autumn of 1935 I was
not present at these discussions, and therefore cannot vouch for every
word which was spoken at that time, I must state that nothing about the
planning of wars, the preparing for wars, the operational, strategical,
or armed preparedness for war, was ever discussed.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has labeled you as a member of the Three Man
College, from which they have deduced that you had special powers to act
within the German Reich Government. I am submitting to you Document
2194-PS. In this document in the Reich Defense Law of 1938, Paragraph 5,
Subsection 4, you will find the source of this term which in itself is
not official.
KEITEL: The Reich Defense Law of 1938 provided for a plenipotentiary
general for administration in order to restrict the size of the body.
The Reich Minister of the Interior was to have this office and further,
according to Paragraph 5, Subsection 4, the Supreme Command of the Army
was to have priority influence in regard to the State Railways and the
State Postal Services, for in the event of mobilization, transports must
run and the services for the transmission of news must be available, as
is the case in all countries.
The Three Man College is a concept which I have never heard of until
just now. It probably refers to the Plenipotentiary General for
Administration, the Plenipotentiary General for Economy and the Chief of
the OKW. It referred to these three. There is no doubt about it,
because, in line with the Reich Defense Law, they were already supposed
to have a number of decrees ready in the drawers which were to be
published when this law was made public, and each one of the three had
to make the necessary preparations in his own sphere. From the right to
assume these functions by reason of these authorities the Three Man
College concept originated.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution then contended that according to Document
2852-PS you were a member of the Council of Ministers for Defense of the
Reich. Did you become a minister through this membership in the Reich
Defense Council?
KEITEL: I might perhaps say a few words to begin with about the Council
of Ministers, insofar as the Reich Defense Law, the Reich Defense
Committee and the Reich Defense Council, disappeared as a result of the
law regarding the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, that
is, they were never made public and never put into effect. The Council
of Ministers for Defense of the Reich was newly created on 1 September
1939 and this made all these preparations on paper in the Reich Defense
Council, Reich Defense Committee and the law null and void and put in
its place a new thing, an institution. This institution, the Council of
Ministers for Defense of the Reich, was now the small war cabinet,
which, if I may say so, should previously have been the Reich Defense
Council with their limited number of members. Thus, a new basis was
established, and new decrees which were necessary were put into effect
by the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, after it had been
created and officially confirmed.
I was called into this Council of Ministers or rather I received a chair
in this Council of Ministers. I prefer not to give the reasons, because
they were entirely private. It was a compensation for opposition against
these things—I never became active in this Council of Ministers for
Defense of the Reich, but I was a member; it was not necessary to be
active since in the purely military sphere, that is, things with which
the Wehrmacht immediately was concerned, the Führer personally, without
the Council of Ministers, issued the necessary decrees with his own
signature and the detour via the Council of Ministers in Berlin was not
necessary; and in my opinion I must deny that I became a minister by
this appointment. The authority to exercise the functions of a minister
was in no way given. I was only the representative of the Wehrmacht in
this Council of Ministers.
DR. NELTE: However, your name is indisputably at the bottom of many laws
and decrees which were issued. How do you explain the signature on these
laws?
KEITEL: Yes, I did sign a series of decrees issued by the Council of
Ministers because they were submitted to me by the Secretariat, that is,
the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Minister Lammers, with a request for
my signature. When I questioned the necessity for doing this, I received
a formal answer from Lammers to the effect that other Reich departments
might see that the Wehrmacht was not excluded from these decrees or
laws. That is why my signature is included. It means that the Wehrmacht
must also obey these decrees and laws. That is why I had no misgivings
in signing my name.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution further accuse you of having been a political
general. Undoubtedly you appeared at various special functions. Will you
please answer this accusation and tell us how it came about?
KEITEL: I can readily understand the fact that functions of a
ministerial nature which necessarily brought me frequently into contact
with ministers of the Reich—in the course of a war everything is tied
up with the Wehrmacht in some way or other—would seem to indicate that
I had exercised a political function in these matters. The same
conclusion can be drawn from other events. That is, my presence at State
visits and similar functions as indicated by many documents might
suggest that I was exercising political functions or in some way had
been called to exercise such functions. Neither is true; neither in
regard to internal German ministerial functions nor in regard to matters
connected with foreign policy. There were naturally a great many things
to be settled with the ministries, the technical ministries. The
Wehrmacht had to participate and had a voice in almost all the decrees
which were issued by the civilian ministries. This work was naturally
done in Berlin. The fact that I had to remain with the Führer at his
headquarters kept me away; and this meant that my offices, the offices
of the OKW, had to settle these questions with the Reich departments and
their experts rather independently on the whole. Thus it happened,
naturally, that decrees of this kind were drawn up requiring my comments
and the Führer’s consent, which was obtained through me and that in this
connection I was the person who co-ordinated the various wishes and
views of the High Commanders of the Wehrmacht branches and reduced them
to a common Wehrmacht denominator, so to speak. Through these activities
I was naturally drawn into the general apparatus of this work, but I do
not believe that this would justify the application of the term
“political general” to the Führer’s Military Chief of Staff.
DR. NELTE: What can you tell us with regard to foreign policy and the
meetings at which foreign policy was discussed?
KEITEL: Concerning the sphere of foreign policy, I would merely like to
emphasize what the former Reich Foreign Minister has already said about
collaboration with the leaders of the Wehrmacht. If at all, two of the
leading partners marched their own roads, then it was the foreign policy
on one side and the Wehrmacht on the other, especially under the
influence of the Führer himself, who did not desire collaboration and
opposed the mutual exchange of ideas. He kept us in avowedly separate
camps, and wished to work with each one separately. I must emphasize
that most strongly. To conclude, this applied to all other departments
who came to headquarters, that is, everything was discussed with them
alone, and they also left the headquarters alone.
There were contacts with the Foreign Office, as State Secretary Von
Steengracht has stated, with regard to all questions of international
law or, in connection therewith, with questions affecting the prisoners
of war, questions of communication with the protecting powers, and
questions which Von Steengracht may have had in mind when he said, “With
the Wehrmacht the whole field of an attaché’s work,” since all reports
sent by military attachés in neutral and friendly countries to the
Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht branches went through Foreign
Office channels. They all arrived there and we received them from there.
It was quite natural that during the war any news of special interest
might call for special contacts in that we often had to complain that
the reports did not reach us in time from the Foreign Office, and that
our Ministry wanted to have them sent direct and not by a roundabout
way. Otherwise, however, I must emphasize that there was no
collaboration in any other field nor, I might say, any community of work
in the field of strategics with the Foreign Office.
DR. NELTE: About ten days ago Document D-665 was submitted by the
Prosecution. This document is headed “The Führer’s Ideas Regarding the
Waffen-SS” dated 6 August 1940. In this document there is a passage by
the OKW which states the following:
“The Chief of the OKW has decided in this connection that it can
be only desirable for the ideas of the Führer to be given the
utmost publicity.”
Do you know this document?
KEITEL: Yes, I read this document at the time it was submitted, and I
remembered it. To explain the origin of this document I must say
briefly: After the war in France Hitler planned to give an independent
status to the SS units, the Waffen-SS units, or form them into complete
military bodies of troops. Until that time they had been parts of
infantry troops attached to different Army formations. Now these groups
were to be made into independent and fully-equipped units and would thus
become independent formations. This created extreme unrest in the Army,
and caused acute dissatisfaction among the generals. It was said to
denote competition to the Army and the breaking of the promise made to
the army that “there is only one bearer of arms in Germany, and that is
the Wehrmacht.” They asked: “Where would this lead to?”
At that time the Commander-in-Chief of the Army asked Hitler’s chief
adjutant for information about this revolting affair and General
Schmundt, with Hitler’s approval, then wrote the passage mentioned in
this document.
I went to the Führer personally about this question to tell him plainly
that the Army considered it an insult. He decided to handle the matter
through his chief adjutant, as it had nothing to do with the High
Command of the Wehrmacht. This announcement was then made by the Army
itself in order to calm the excited minds. My personal comment that
there was no objection to the widest publicity in this case either was
given to satisfy General Von Brauchitsch, who expressly requested to be
allowed to distribute it to every unit, in order to reassure the Army
that the troops in question were police troops who under all
circumstances had to have experience of active service, as otherwise
they would be denied any recognition at home as troops. That is how that
came about, and if I am asked today about my views on this matter I may
say briefly: I also thought at the time that there ought to be a limit
to these things; I believe 10 percent was the figure mentioned. With the
development of events in connection with the setting up of new
formations after 1942, these troops lost their original character of an
elite selected on physical and racial grounds. There was no mistaking
the fact that considerable pressure was exercised; and I myself was very
much afraid that some day this instrument of the Waffen-SS, which had
swelled to a force more than 20 divisions strong, would grow into a new
Army with a different ideology. We had very grave misgivings in this
respect, especially as what we now saw before us was no longer an elite
in any sense of the term, and since we even saw commissioned and
noncommissioned officers and men transferred from these troops to the
Wehrmacht. It was no longer the pick of volunteers. I do not think there
is anything further to add.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have submitted Document L-211 to me. It is
headed “War Operations as an Organizational Problem,” and contains the
comments of the OKW on the memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army regarding the organization of the leadership of the Wehrmacht. This
document was submitted to prove that the OKW and you, as Chief of the
High Command of the Wehrmacht, held views which favored aggression and
had expressed them in this study.
I assume that you remember this study. What have you to say about the
accusation which is based on this study?
KEITEL: This study was submitted to me during my preliminary
interrogation and thus I was reminded of its existence. In this
connection I must also give a brief description of the background. It is
not an exaggeration to say that in the early twenties, that is, shortly
after the end of World War I, there was a great deal of literature
produced, I believe, in all countries which had taken part in the war,
on the most efficient organization and co-ordination at the highest
level in the Armed Forces (Kriegsspitzengliederung). I myself wrote on
the subject and I know the opinions held in the United States, England,
and France. At that time everybody was occupied with the question of
that organization, and Von Blomberg said he was in favor of the eighth
solution—seven had already been discarded.
In this connection a struggle developed, led by the High Command of the
Army and the General Staff of the Army, who constantly opposed the idea
of a combined supreme operational command of the Wehrmacht, and demanded
that the supreme authority should be in the hands of the Army General
Staff, as it was before.
When the High Command of the Wehrmacht was created and Blomberg had
gone, the Army thought the moment opportune to return with renewed vigor
to the attack. The result was a memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army, written by General Beck, and the answer to this is the
study mentioned here. As I collaborated in the drafting of this answer,
I can vouch for the two men responsible for it, namely, Generaloberst
Jodl and myself, who were the only two who worked on it. I can state
that at that time we were not motivated by any acute problem or by any
preliminary general staff work in preparation for war, but only by the
fact, as I might put it, that of all the many memoranda and
investigations into the most expedient method, the one drawn up by us
appeared to be the most practical.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, does not the document speak for itself? He
says he collaborated in it, but that it was not concerned with war, so
that is all that needs to be said. The document speaks for itself then.
DR. NELTE: But surely he may clarify some of the ideas contained in this
document. Moreover, Mr. President, in regard to this question I took the
liberty of submitting the affidavit in Document Book Number 2: “High
Command of the Wehrmacht and General Staff” which is signed by the
Defendant Keitel as well as by Herr Jodl. It has been submitted to you
as Number 2 of Document Book 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that the affidavit of 8 March?
DR. NELTE: 29 March, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The first one in the book, or where is it?
DR. NELTE: No, in the second part.
THE PRESIDENT: But what page?
DR. NELTE: The pages have not been numbered consecutively, it has a
table of contents, and under that you will find it as Number 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you quoting them from L-211 now? Are you finished
with that?
DR. NELTE: This affidavit belongs to L-211.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought the witness said he had collaborated in the
study, which is L-211, and that it was not concerned with war. You might
leave it at that.
DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, in this Trial it matters to hear
what the defendants have to say about those documents which allegedly
accuse them. The explanation of Document L-211 which the Defendant
Keitel wishes to make is contained in the affidavit which I submitted in
Document Book Number 2.
THE PRESIDENT: If what he wishes to say was put down in the affidavit
then he should not have been asked about it; the affidavit should have
been read.
DR. NELTE: The difference between the length of his verbal statement and
the length of the affidavit is indicated by the relation of 1 to 10. He
gave only a brief summary of the answer he wished to make. The affidavit
is longer, and therefore I thought I could dispense with reading the
affidavit if he would give us a brief summary of the chief points with
which we are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: You and I have a different idea of the word summary.
DR. NELTE: May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
DR. NELTE: I now come to the question of rearmament, and the various
cases of Austria, Czechoslovakia, _et cetera_. I would like to ask you
about the accusation of the Prosecution that you participated in the
planning and preparation of wars of aggression. So that we can
understand each other, and that you can give your answers correctly, we
must be quite clear as to what is meant by war of aggression. Will you
tell us your views on that subject?
KEITEL: As a soldier, I must say that the term “War of Aggression” as
used here is meaningless as far as I am concerned; we learned how to
conduct actions of attack, actions of defense, and actions of retreat.
However, according to my own personal feelings as a military man, the
concept “war of aggression” is a purely political concept and not a
military one. I mean that if the Wehrmacht and the soldier are a tool of
the politicians, they are not qualified in my opinion to decide or to
judge whether these military operations did or did not constitute a war
of aggression. I think I can summarize my views by saying that military
offices should not have authority to decide this question and are not in
a position to do so; and that these decisions are not the task of the
soldier, but solely that of the statesman.
DR. NELTE: Then you mean to say, and this applies also to all commanders
and offices involved, that the question of whether or not a war is a war
of aggression, or whether it has to be conducted for the defense of a
country, in other words, whether a war is a just war or not, was not in
the field of your professional deliberations and decisions?
KEITEL: No; that is what I wish to express, since...
DR. NELTE: What you are giving is an explanation. But you are not only a
soldier, you are also an individual with a life of your own. When facts
brought to your notice in your professional capacity seemed to reveal
that a projected operation was unjust, did you not give it
consideration?
KEITEL: I believe I can truthfully say that throughout the whole of my
military career I was brought up, so to speak, in the old traditional
concept that one never discussed this question. Naturally, one has one’s
own opinion and a life of one’s own, but in the exercise of one’s
professional functions as a soldier and an officer, one has given this
life away, yielded it up. Therefore I could not say either at that time
or later that I had misgivings about questions of a purely political
discretion, for I took the stand that a soldier has a right to have
confidence in his state leadership, and accordingly he is obliged to do
his duty and to obey.
DR. NELTE: Now let us take up the questions individually. Did you know
Hitler’s plans first in regard to rearmament, and later in regard to any
aggression, as the Prosecution calls it? I am thinking chiefly of the
period from February 1933 to 1938.
KEITEL: It was clear to me that when Hitler became Chancellor, we
soldiers would undoubtedly have a different position in the Reich under
new leadership, and that the military factor would certainly be viewed
differently from what had been the case before. Therefore we quite
honestly and openly welcomed the fact that at the head of the Reich
Government there was a man who was determined to bring about an era
which would lead us out of the deplorable conditions then prevailing.
This much I must confess, that I welcomed the plan and intention to
rearm as far as was possible at that time, as well as the ideas which
tended in that direction. In any event, as early as 1933, in the late
summer, I resigned from my activities in the War Ministry. I spent two
years on active service and returned only at the time when the military
sovereignty had been won back and we were rearming openly. Therefore,
during my absence I did not follow these matters. At any rate, in the
period from 1935 to 1938, during which I was Chief under Blomberg, I
naturally saw and witnessed everything that took place in connection
with rearmament and everything that was done in this field by the War
Ministry to help the Wehrmacht branches.
DR. NELTE: Did you know that the occupation of the Rhineland in the
demilitarized zone, the re-establishment of military sovereignty, the
introduction of conscription, the building up of the Air Force and the
increase in the number of Wehrmacht contingents violated the Versailles
Treaty?
KEITEL: The wording of the Versailles Treaty, as long as it was
considered binding upon us, did not, of course, permit these things. The
Treaty of Versailles, may I say, was studied very closely by us in order
to find loopholes which allowed us, without violating the treaty, to
take measures which would not make us guilty of breaking the treaty.
That was the daily task of the Reich Defense Committee. From 1935 on,
conditions were entirely different, and after my return as Chief, under
Blomberg, I must state frankly that I no longer had any misgivings as to
whether the Treaty of Versailles was violated or not because what was
done, was done openly. We announced that we would raise 36 divisions.
Discussions were held quite openly, and I could see nothing in which we
soldiers could, in any way, see a violation of the treaty. It was clear
to all of us, and it was our will to do everything to free ourselves of
the territorial and military fetters of the Treaty of Versailles. I must
say honestly that any soldier or officer who did not feel similarly
about these things would in my estimation have been worthless. It was
taken as a matter of course if one was a soldier.
DR. NELTE: During this Trial, an order, C-194, which bears your
signature, was submitted. It concerns aerial reconnaissance and
movements of U-boats at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland.
This order leads to the inference that you participated in the
occupation of the Rhineland. In what capacity did you sign this order?
KEITEL: The order shows already the future introductory phrasing: “The
Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Minister Von Blomberg, upon report,
has ordered...” I transmitted in this form an instruction which General
Von Blomberg had given me, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force
and I recall that it concerned the introduction of control measures
during the days when the three battalions were marching into the
demilitarized zone.
DR. NELTE: Did you, up to the time of your appointment as Chief of the
OKW, learn from Hitler himself or from other sources, that there were
plans in existence which, contrary to Hitler’s avowed peace assurances
could be put into effect only by force, that is, through a war?
KEITEL: During this period of time until the first practical measures
were taken in the case of Austria, I cannot remember having had any
knowledge of a program, or the establishment of a program or
far-reaching plan, or one covering a period of years. I must say also
that we were so occupied with the reorganization of this small army of
seven divisions into an expanded force of twice or three times its
original size, apart from the creation of a large air force which had no
equipment at all, that in those years a visit to our office would have
shown that we were completely occupied with purely organizational
problems, and from the way Hitler worked, as described by me today, it
is quite obvious that we saw nothing of these things.
DR. NELTE: Did you have any personal connection with Hitler before 4
February 1938?
KEITEL: In the years from 1935 to 1938, as chief under Blomberg, I saw
the Führer three times. He never spoke one word to me and so he did not
know me. If he knew anything at all about me it could have been only
through Herr Von Blomberg. I had absolutely no contact with the Führer
either personally or through other people who were prominent in the
Party or in politics. My first conversation with him was in the last
days of January before I was appointed to this office.
DR. NELTE: Did you hear anything of the meeting or discussion with
Hitler in November 1937? I am referring to a conference in which Hitler,
as it is alleged, made public his last will.
KEITEL: I already stated under oath at the preliminary interrogation
that I did not know about this, and that I saw a document or the minutes
or a record of this meeting at this Trial for the first time. I believe
it is the Hossbach document and I do not remember that Von Blomberg gave
me any directions to take preparatory steps after this conference. That
is not the case.
DR. NELTE: Did you know of any of Hitler’s intentions regarding
territorial questions?
KEITEL: Yes. I must answer that in the affirmative. I learned of them,
and I also knew from public political discussions that he proposed to
settle in some form, gradually, sooner or later, a series of territorial
problems which were the result of the Treaty of Versailles. That is
true.
DR. NELTE: And what did you think about the realization of these
territorial aims, I mean the manner in which they were to be solved?
KEITEL: At that time I saw these things and judged them only according
to what we were capable of in military terms. I can only say, when I
left the troops in 1935, none of these 24 divisions which were to be
established existed. I did not view all this from the standpoint of
political aims, but with the sober consideration: Can we accomplish
anything by attack and the conduct of war if we have no military means
at our disposal? Consequently for me everything in this connection
revolved around the programs of rearmament, which were to be completed
in 1943-1945, and for the Navy in 1945. Therefore, we had 10 years in
which to build up a concentrated Wehrmacht. Hence, I did not consider
these problems acute even when they came to my attention in a political
way, for I thought it impossible to realize these plans except by
negotiations.
DR. NELTE: How do you explain the general directives of June 1937 for
preparation for mobilization?
KEITEL: This document is actually an instruction for mobilization kept
in general terms and was in line with our traditional General Staff
policy before the war and before the World War, the World War I, that on
principle something of the kind must be prepared beforehand. In my
opinion, this had nothing to do with any of Hitler’s political plans,
for at that time I was already Chief of Staff under Blomberg, and
General Jodl was at that time the Chief of the National Defense
Division. Perhaps it sounds somewhat arrogant for me to say that we were
very much satisfied that we were at last beginning to tell the Wehrmacht
each year what it had to do intellectually and theoretically. In the
former General Staff training which I received before the World War, the
chief aim of these instructions was that the General Staff tours for the
purpose of study should afford an opportunity for the theoretical
elaboration of all problems. Such was the former training of the Great
General Staff. I no longer know whether in this connection Blomberg
himself originally thought out these salient ideas of possible
complications or possible military contingencies, or whether he was
perhaps influenced by the Führer.
It is certain that Hitler never saw this. It was the inside work of the
General Staff of the Wehrmacht.
DR. NELTE: But in it you find a reference to a “Case Otto,” and you know
that that was the affair with Austria.
KEITEL: Of course I remember the Case Otto, which indicated by its name
that it concerns Otto von Hapsburg. There must have been—were of
course—certain reports about an attempted restoration, and in that case
an intervention, eventually an armed one, was to take place. The Führer,
Adolf Hitler, wished to prevent a restoration of the monarchy in
Austria. Later this came up again in connection with the Anschluss. I
believe that I can omit that now and perhaps explain later. In any
event, we believed that on the basis of the deliberations by the Army
some sort of preparations were being made which would bring into being
Case Otto, because the code word was “Case Otto comes into force.”
DR. NELTE: You mean to say that no concrete orders were given in regard
to Case Otto on the basis of this general directive?
KEITEL: You mean the Anschluss at the beginning of February?
DR. NELTE: I beg your pardon?
KEITEL: I can state here only what I experienced when Hitler sent me to
the Army. I went into General Beck’s office and said: “The Führer
demands that you report to him immediately and inform him about the
preparations which have already been made for a possible invasion of
Austria”, and General Beck then said, “We have prepared nothing; nothing
has been done, nothing at all.”
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution contends that you participated in planning
the action against Austria as it was put into effect in March of 1938. I
have here the directive regarding Case Otto, C-102.
Can you still affirm that the whole matter was improvised?
KEITEL: I remember that this order was not issued to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and to the other Commanders-in-Chief
until the whole project was under way. Nothing had been prepared. It was
all improvised and this was to be the documentary registration of facts
which were being put into practice. The commands were given verbally and
individually regarding what was to be done and what actually was done on
the morning of 12 March, when Austria was invaded.
DR. NELTE: I must now return to the events preceding the case of
Austria. You know that in General Jodl’s diary it is stated:
“Schuschnigg signs under strongest political and military pressure.” In
what manner did you participate in this conference at the Obersalzberg
which took place with Schuschnigg?
KEITEL: May I add to my previous answer that we can see from this that
the invasion took place on the morning of 12 March and the order was
issued late in the evening of 11 March. Therefore this document could
not have had any real influence on this affair. Such an order cannot be
worked out between 10 in the evening and 6 in the morning.
I can say the following in regard to my participation at Obersalzberg on
10 or 11 February:
It was the first official action in which I took part. In the evening of
4 February Hitler left Berlin. He summoned me to be at Obersalzberg on
10 February. There, on that day the meeting with the Austrian Federal
Chancellor, Schuschnigg, which has been frequently discussed here, took
place. Shortly after I arrived—I had no idea why I had been
summoned—General Von Reichenau arrived from Munich, and General of the
Air Force, Sperrle; so that we three Generals were present when at about
10:30 Herr Schuschnigg arrived with Herr Von Papen. Since I had never
attended a conference or a political action or any meeting of that
nature, I did not know what I was there for. I must tell you this
frankly, otherwise you will not understand it. In the course of the day
the reason for the presence of the three representatives of the
Wehrmacht naturally became clear to me. In certain respects they
represented a military, at least a military demonstration—I may safely
call it that. In the preliminary interrogation and also in later
discussions I was asked the significance of the fact that in the
afternoon my name was suddenly called through the house and I was to
visit the Führer. I went to him in his room. Perhaps it sounds strange
for me to say that when I entered the room I thought that he would give
me a directive but the words were “Nothing at all.” He used the words,
“Please sit down.” Then he said, “Yes, the Federal Chancellor wishes to
have a short conference with his Foreign Minister Schmidt; otherwise I
have nothing at all.” I can only assure you that not one word was said
to me about a political action apart from the fact that Herr Schuschnigg
did not leave until the evening and that further conferences took place.
We Generals sat in the anteroom, and when in the evening, shortly before
my departure, I received the direction to launch reports that we were
taking certain measures for mobilization, of which you have been
informed here through a document, then it became quite clear to me that
this day had served to bring the discussions to a head by the
introduction of military representatives, and the directive to spread
reports was to keep up the pressure, as has been shown here.
Upon my return to my apartment in Berlin, in the presence of Goebbels
and Canaris, we discussed the reports which were to be sent out and
which Canaris then broadcast in Munich. Finally, in order to conclude
this matter, it might be interesting to point out that the Chief of
Intelligence in the Austrian Federal Ministry, Lahousen, who has been
present here in court, told Jodl and me when later on he came into the
service of the Wehrmacht: “We were not taken in by this bluff.” And I
indubitably gave Jodl a basis for his entry in the diary, even though it
is somewhat drastically worded, for I was naturally impressed by this
first experience.
DR. NELTE: What is your position on the measures against Austria?
KEITEL: Nothing further need be said concerning the further developments
of the affair. It has already been presented here in detail. On the day
of the invasion by the troops I flew with Hitler to the front. We drove
along the highways through Braunau, Linz. We stayed overnight and
proceeded to Vienna. And to put it modestly, it is true that in every
village we were received most enthusiastically and the Austrian Federal
Army marched side by side with the German soldiers through the streets
over which we drove. Not a shot was fired. On the other side the only
formation which had a certain military significance was an armored unit
on the road from Passau to Vienna which arrived in Vienna with very few
vehicles. This division was on the spot for the parade the next day.
That is a very sober picture of what I saw.
DR. NELTE: Now we come to the question of Czechoslovakia. When did
Hitler for the first time discuss with you the question of
Czechoslovakia and his intentions in that respect?
KEITEL: I believe 6 to 8 weeks after the march into Austria, that is,
after the Anschluss toward the end of April. The Anschluss was about the
middle of March and also took the form of a sudden summons, one evening,
to the Reich Chancellery where the Führer then explained matters to me.
This resulted in the well-known directive in the Case Green. The history
of this case is well known by the Schmundt Files all of which I
identified in the preliminary interrogation. At that time he gave me
first directives in a rather hasty manner. It was not possible for me to
ask any questions, as he wished to leave Berlin immediately. These were
the bases for the questions regarding the conditions under which a
warlike action against Czechoslovakia could or would arise.
DR. NELTE: Did you have the impression that Hitler wanted to attack
Czechoslovakia?
KEITEL: In any event the instructions which he gave me that evening were
to the effect that preparations for a military action with all the
preliminary work, which was the responsibility of the General Staff,
were to be made. He expressed himself very precisely although he
explained explicitly that the date was quite open and said that for the
time being it was not his intention. These were the words: “...for the
time being it is not my intention.”
DR. NELTE: In this connection was a difference made between the
Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia?
KEITEL: I do not believe that we discussed it at all that evening during
that short conference. The Führer did not discuss with me the political
aspects; he merely assigned me to the consideration of the necessary
military measures. He did not say whether he would be content with the
Sudetenland or whether we were to break through the Czechoslovakian line
of fortification. That was not the problem at that time. But in any
event—if they had to be settled by going to war—then the war had to be
prepared; if it came to a conflict with the Czech Army, that is, a real
war it would have to be prepared.
DR. NELTE: You know that the record of the Hitler-General Keitel
Conference on 21 April, of which there are two versions, speaks of a
lightning action being necessary in case of an incident. In the first
one after the word “incident” it reads: “for example, the assassination
of the German Minister” following a demonstration hostile to Germany. In
the second one, after the word “incident” it reads only “for example,
action in case of an incident.” Will you please explain to what this
note, which is not a record in the proper sense of the word, can be
attributed?
KEITEL: I saw the Schmundt notes for the first time here. We did not
receive it at that time as a document to work with. It is not a record.
These are notes made subsequently by an adjutant. I do not want to doubt
their correctness or accuracy, for memory would not permit me to recall
today the exact words which were used. However this question, which is
considered significant here, the assassination of the German Minister in
Prague, is a situation which I have never heard of, if only for the
reason that no one ever said such a thing. It was said it might happen
that the Minister is assassinated whereupon I asked which minister, or
something similar. Then, as I recall it, Hitler said that the war of
1914 also started with an assassination at Sarajevo, and that such
incidents could happen. I did not in any way get the impression at that
time that a war was to be created through a provocation.
DR. NELTE: You will have to tell me some more on that point.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-NINTH DAY
Wednesday, 4 April 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday we discussed last the meeting on 21 April of you,
Hitler, and Adjutant Schmundt. I am again having Document 388-PS brought
to you and ask you to answer when I ask you. Was this not a conference
of the kind which you said yesterday in principle did not take place?
KEITEL: To a certain extent it is true that I was called in and to my
complete surprise was presented with ideas concerning preparation for
war against Czechoslovakia. This took place within a very short time,
before one of Hitler’s departures for Berchtesgaden. I do not recall
saying one word during these short instructions, but I asked only one
question, and then with these extremely surprising directives I went
home.
DR. NELTE: What happened then, so far as you were concerned?
KEITEL: My reflections during the first hour after that were that this
could not be carried out in view of the military strength which I knew
we then possessed. I then comforted myself with the thought that the
conversation premised that nothing had been planned within a measurable
lapse of time. The following day I discussed the matter with the Chief
of the Operations Staff, General Jodl. I never received any minutes of
this discussion, nor any record. The outcome of our deliberations was
“to leave things alone because there was plenty of time, and because any
such action was out of the question for military reasons.” I also
explained to Jodl that the introductory words had been: “It is not my
intention to undertake military action against Czechoslovakia within a
measurable lapse of time.”
Then, in the next weeks, we started theoretical deliberations; this,
however, without taking into consultation the branches of the Wehrmacht
because I considered myself not authorized to do so. In the following
period it is to be noted, as can be seen from the Schmundt File, that
the adjutants, the military adjutants, continuously asked innumerable
detailed questions regarding the strength of divisions, and so on. These
questions were answered by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to the best of
their knowledge.
DR. NELTE: I believe we can shorten this considerably, Herr Marshal,
however important your explanations are. The decisive point now is—if
you would take the document in front of you and compare the draft which
you finally made on pressure from Obersalzberg and tell me what happened
after that.
KEITEL: Yes. About four weeks after I had been given this job, I sent to
Obersalzberg a draft of a directive for the preparatory measures. In
reply I was informed that Hitler himself would come to Berlin to speak
with the commander-in-chief. He came to Berlin at the end of May, and I
was present at the conference with Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. In
this conference the basic plan was changed altogether, namely, to the
effect that Hitler expressed the intention to take military action
against Czechoslovakia in the very near future. As reason why he changed
his mind he gave the fact that Czechoslovakia—I believe it was on the
20th or 21st of May—had ordered general mobilization, and Hitler at
that time declared this could have been directed only against us.
Military preparations had not been made by Germany. This was the reason
for the complete change of his intentions, which he communicated orally
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and he ordered him to begin
preparations at once. This explains the changes in the basic
orders—that is to say, the directive which was now being issued had as
its basic idea: “It is my irrevocable decision to take military action
against Czechoslovakia in the near future.”
DR. NELTE: War against Czechoslovakia was avoided as a result of the
Munich Agreement. What was your opinion and that of the generals about
this agreement?
KEITEL: We were extraordinarily happy that it had not come to a military
operation, because throughout the time of preparation we had always been
of the opinion that our means of attack against the frontier
fortifications of Czechoslovakia were insufficient. From a purely
military point of view we lacked the means for an attack which involved
the piercing of the frontier fortifications. Consequently we were
extremely satisfied that a peaceful political solution had been reached.
DR. NELTE: What effect did this agreement have on the generals regarding
Hitler’s prestige?
KEITEL: I believe I may say that as a result this greatly increased
Hitler’s prestige among the generals. We recognized that on the one hand
military means and military preparations had not been neglected and on
the other hand a solution had been found which we had not expected and
for which we were extremely thankful.
DR. NELTE: Is it not amazing that 3 weeks after the Munich Agreement
that had been so welcomed by everyone, including the generals, Hitler
gave instructions for the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia?
KEITEL: I believe that recently Reich Marshal Göring enlarged on this
question in the course of his examination. It was my impression, as I
remember it, that Hitler told me at that time that he did not believe
that Czechoslovakia would overcome the loss of the Sudeten-German
territories with their strong fortifications; and, moreover, he was
concerned about the close relations then existing between Czechoslovakia
and the Soviet Union and thought that Czechoslovakia could and perhaps
would become a military and strategic menace. These were the military
reasons which were given to me.
DR. NELTE: Was it not pointed out to Hitler by anyone that a solution by
force of the problem regarding the remainder of Czechoslovakia involved
a great danger, namely, that the other powers, that is England, France,
would be offended?
KEITEL: I was not informed of the last conversation in Munich between
the British Prime Minister Chamberlain and the Führer. However, I
regarded this question as far as its further treatment was concerned as
a political one, and consequently I did not raise any objections, if I
may so express myself, especially as a considerable reduction in the
military preparations decided on before the Munich meeting was ordered.
Whenever the political question was raised, the Führer refused to
discuss it.
DR. NELTE: In connection with this question of Czechoslovakia, I should
like to mention Lieutenant Colonel Köchling, who was characterized by
the Prosecution as the liaison man with Henlein. Was the Wehrmacht or
the OKW engaged in this matter?
KEITEL: Köchling’s job remained unknown to me; it was I who named
Köchling. Hitler asked me if an officer was available for a special
mission, and if so he should report to me. After I dispatched Lieutenant
Colonel Köchling from Berlin I neither saw nor spoke to him again. I do
know, however, that, as I heard later, he was with Henlein as a sort of
military adviser.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has pointed out that you were present at the
visit of Minister President Tiso in March 1939, as well as at the visit
of President Hacha, and from this it was deduced that you participated
in the political discussions which then took place. What role did you
play on these occasions?
KEITEL: It is true, I believe in every case, that on the occasion of
such state visits and visits of foreign statesmen I was present in the
Reich Chancellery or at the reception. I never took part in the actual
discussions of political questions. I was present at the reception and
felt that I should be present to be introduced as a high ranking
representative of the Wehrmacht. But in each individual case that I can
recall I was dismissed with thanks or waited in the antechamber in case
I should be needed. I can positively say that I did not say one single
word either to Tiso or to President Hacha on that night, nor did I take
part in Hitler’s direct discussions with these men. May I add that just
on the night of President Hacha’s visit I had to be present in the Reich
Chancellery, because during that night the High Command of the Army had
to be instructed as to how the entry which had been prepared was to take
place.
DR. NELTE: In this connection I wish to establish only this, since I
assume that this question has been clarified by Reich Marshal Göring’s
testimony. You never spoke to President Hacha of a possible bombing of
Prague in the event that he should not be willing to sign?
KEITEL: No.
DR. NELTE: We come now to the case of Poland. Here too the Prosecution
accuses you of having participated in the planning and preparation for
military action against Poland and of having assisted in the execution
of this action. Would you state in brief your basic attitude towards
these Eastern problems?
KEITEL: The question concerning the problem of Danzig and the Corridor
were known to me. I also knew that political discussions and
negotiations with regard to these questions were pending. The case of
the attack on Poland, which in the course of time had to be and was
prepared, was, of course, closely connected with these problems.
Since I myself was not concerned with political matters, I personally
was of the opinion that, as in the case of Munich and before Munich,
military preparations, that is, military pressure if I may call it such,
would play the same kind of role as in my opinion it had played at
Munich. I did not believe that the matter would be brought to an end
without military preparations.
DR. NELTE: Could not this question have been solved by direct preceding
negotiations?
KEITEL: That is hard for me to say, although I know that several
discussions took place concerning the Danzig question as well as
concerning a solution of the Corridor problem. I recall a remark that
impressed me at the time, when Hitler once said he deplored Marshal
Pilsudski’s death, because he believed he had reached or could have
reached an agreement with this statesman. This statement was once made
to me.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has stated that already in the autumn of 1938
Hitler was working on the question of a war against Poland. Did you
participate in this in 1938?
KEITEL: No. This I cannot recall. I should like to believe that, to my
recollection, at that time there were even signs that this was not the
case. At that time I accompanied Hitler on an extensive tour of
inspection of the eastern fortifications. We covered the entire front
from Pomerania through the Oder-Warthe marshland as far as Breslau in
order to inspect the various frontier fortifications against Poland. The
question of fortifications in East Prussia was thoroughly discussed at
that time. When I consider this in this connection today, I can only
assume that for him these discussions were possibly connected with the
Danzig and Corridor problem and he simply wanted to find out whether
these eastern fortifications had sufficient defensive strength, should
the Danzig and Corridor question eventually lead to war with Poland.
DR. NELTE: When were the preparations made for the occupation of Danzig?
KEITEL: I believe that as early as the late autumn of 1938 orders were
issued that Danzig be occupied at a favorable moment by a _coup de main_
from East Prussia. That is all I know about it.
DR. NELTE: Was the possibility of war against Poland discussed in this
connection?
KEITEL: Yes, that was apparently connected with the examination of the
possibilities to defend the border, but I do not recall any, nor was
there any kind of preparation, any military preparations, at that time,
apart from a surprise attack from East Prussia.
DR. NELTE: If I remember rightly you once told me, when we discussed
this question, that Danzig was to be occupied only if this would not
result in a war with Poland.
KEITEL: Yes, that is so. This statement was made time and again, that
this occupation of, or the surprise attack on Danzig was to be carried
out only if it was certain that it would not lead to war.
DR. NELTE: When did this view change?
KEITEL: I believe Poland’s refusal to discuss any kind of solution of
the Danzig question was apparently the reason for further deliberations
and steps.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution is in possession of the directive of 3 April
1939...
KEITEL: I might perhaps add that generally after Munich the situation
also in regard to the Eastern problem was viewed differently, perhaps,
or as I believe, from this point of view: The problem of Czechoslovakia
has been solved satisfactorily without a shot. This will perhaps also be
possible with regard to the other German problems in the East. I also
believe I remember Hitler saying that he did not think the Western
Powers, particularly England, would be interested in Germany’s Eastern
problem and would sooner act as mediators than raise any objection.
DR. NELTE: That is Document C-120, the “Fall Weiss”. According to this,
the directive was issued on 3 April 1939.
KEITEL: Let us take the document first. In the first sentence it is
already stated that this document was to replace the regular annual
instructions of the Wehrmacht regarding possible preparations for
mobilization, a further elaboration of subjects known to us from the
instructions which had been issued in 1937-38 and which were issued
every year. But in fact, at that time or shortly before, Hitler had, in
my presence, directly instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to
make strategic and operative preparations for an attack on, for a war
with Poland. I then issued these first considerations, as can be seen
from this document, that is, the Führer had already ordered the
following: Everything should be worked out by the OKH of the Army by 1
September 1939, and that after this a timetable should be drawn up. This
document was signed by me at that time.
DR. NELTE: What was your attitude and that of the other generals towards
this war?
KEITEL: I must say that at this time, as in the case of the preparations
against Czechoslovakia, both the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the
generals to whom I spoke, and also I, myself, were opposed to the idea
of waging a war against Poland. We did not want this war, but, of
course, we immediately began to carry out the given orders, at least as
far as the elaboration by the General Staff was concerned. Our reason
was that to our knowledge the military means which were at our disposal
at that time, that is to say, the divisions, their equipment, their
armament, let alone their absolutely inadequate supply of munition kept
reminding us as soldiers that we were not ready to wage a war.
DR. NELTE: Do you mean to say that in your considerations only military
viewpoints defined your attitude?
KEITEL: Yes. I must admit that. I did not concern myself with the
political problems but only with the question: Can we or can we not?
DR. NELTE: I want to establish only this. Now, on 23 May 1939, there was
a conference at which Hitler addressed the generals. You know this
address? What was the reason for and the contents of this address?
KEITEL: I saw the minutes of it for the first time in the course of my
interrogations here. It reminded me of the situation at that time. The
purpose of this address was to show the generals that their misgivings
were unfounded, to remove their misgivings, and finally to point out
that the conditions were not yet given and that political negotiations
about these matters still could and perhaps would change the situation.
It was however simply to give encouragement.
DR. NELTE: Were you at that time of the opinion that war would actually
break out?
KEITEL: No, at that time—and this was perhaps rather naïve—I believed
that war would not break out, that in view of the military preparations
ordered, negotiations would take place again and a solution would be
found. In our military considerations a strictly military point of view
was always dominant. We generals believed that France—to a lesser
extent England—in view of her mutual-assistance pact with Poland would
intervene and that we did not at all have the defensive means for this.
For this very reason I personally was always convinced that there would
be no war because we could not wage a war against Poland if France
attacked us in the West.
DR. NELTE: Now then, what was your opinion of the situation after the
speech of 22 August 1939?
KEITEL: This speech was made at the end of August and was addressed to
the generals assembled at Obersalzberg, the commanders-in-chief of the
troops preparing in the East. When Hitler, towards the end of this
speech, declared that a pact had been concluded with the Soviet Union, I
was firmly convinced that there would be no war because I believed that
these conditions constituted a basis for negotiation and that Poland
would not expose herself to it. I also believed that now a basis for
negotiations had been found although Hitler said in this speech, a copy
of which I read here for the first time from notes, that all
preparations had been made, and that it was intended to put them into
execution.
DR. NELTE: Did you know that England actually attempted to act as
intermediary?
KEITEL: No, I knew nothing of these matters. The first thing which was
very surprising to me was that on one of those days which have been
discussed here repeatedly, namely on the 24th or 25th, only a few days
after the conference at Obersalzberg, I was suddenly called to Hitler at
the Reich Chancellery and he said to me only, “Stop everything at once,
get Brauchitsch immediately. I need time for negotiations.” I believe
that after these few words I was dismissed.
DR. NELTE: What followed thereupon?
KEITEL: I at once rang up the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and passed
on the order, and Brauchitsch was called to the Führer. Everything was
stopped and all decisions on possible military action were suspended,
first without any time limit, on the following day for a certain limited
period, I believe it was 5 days according to the calculations we can
make today.
DR. NELTE: Did you know of the so-called minimum demands on Poland?
KEITEL: I believe that I saw them in the Reich Chancellery, that Hitler
himself showed them to me, so that I knew about them.
DR. NELTE: As you saw them, I would like to ask whether you considered
these demands to be serious?
KEITEL: At that time I was always only a few minutes in the Reich
Chancellery and as a soldier I naturally believed that these were meant
perfectly honestly.
DR. NELTE: Was there any talk at that time of border incidents?
KEITEL: No. This question of border incidents was also extensively
discussed with me here in my interrogations. In this situation and in
the few discussions we had at the Reich Chancellery in those days there
was no talk at all on this question.
DR. NELTE: I am now having Document 795-PS brought to you, notes which
deal with the Polish uniforms for Heydrich.
KEITEL: May I add...
DR. NELTE: Please do.
KEITEL: ...namely, that on 30 August, I believe, the day for the attack,
which took place on 1 September, was again postponed for 24 hours. For
this reason Brauchitsch and I were again called to the Reich Chancellery
and to my recollection the reason given was that a Polish Government
plenipotentiary was expected. Everything was to be postponed for 24
hours. Then no further changes of the military instructions occurred.
This document deals with Polish uniforms for border incidents or for
some sort of illegal actions. It has been shown to me, I know it; it is
a subsequent note made by Admiral Canaris of a conversation he had with
me. He told me at that time that he was to make available a few Polish
uniforms. This had been communicated to him by the Führer through the
adjutant. I asked: “For what purpose?” We both agreed that this was
intended for some illegal action. If I remember rightly I told him at
that time that I did not believe in such things at all and that he had
better keep his hands off. We then had a short discussion about Dirschau
which was also to be taken by a _coup de main_ by the Wehrmacht. That is
all I heard of it. I believe I told Canaris he could dodge the issue by
saying that he had no Polish uniforms. He could simply say he had none
and the matter would be settled.
DR. NELTE: You know, of course, that this matter was connected with the
subsequent attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. Do you know anything
of this incident?
KEITEL: This incident, this action came to my knowledge for the first
time here through the testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was
charged to carry out such things and I knew nothing of the raid on the
radio station at Gleiwitz until I heard the testimonies given here
before the Tribunal. Neither do I recall having heard at that time that
such an incident had occurred.
DR. NELTE: Did you know of the efforts of America and Italy after 1
September 1939 to end the war in one way or another?
KEITEL: I knew nothing at all of the political discussions that took
place in those days from the 24th to the 30th, 31st of August or the
beginning of September 1939. I never knew anything about the visits of a
Herr Dahlerus. I knew nothing of London’s intervention. I remember only
that, while in the Reich Chancellery for a short time, I met Hitler, who
said to me: “Do not disturb me now, I am writing a letter to Daladier.”
This must have been in the first days of September. Neither I nor, to my
knowledge, any of the other generals ever knew anything about the
matters I have heard of here or about the steps that were still taken
after 1 September. Nothing at all.
DR. NELTE: What did you say to Canaris and Lahousen in the Führer’s
train on 14 September, that is, shortly before the attack on Warsaw,
with regard to the so-called political “house cleaning”?
KEITEL: I have been interrogated here about this point, but I did not
recall this visit at all. But from Lahousen’s testimony it appeared—he
said, as I remember—that I had repeated what Hitler had said and had
passed on these orders, as he put it. I know that the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army who then directed the military operations in Poland had at
the daily conferences already complained about interference by the
police in occupied Polish territory. I can only say that I apparently
repeated what had been said about these things in my presence between
Hitler and Brauchitsch. I can make no statements regarding details.
I might add that to my recollection the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
at that time complained several times that as long as he had the
executive power in the occupied territories he would under no
circumstances tolerate other agencies in this area and that at his
request he was relieved of his responsibility for Poland in October. I
therefore believe that the statements the witness made from memory or on
the strength of notes are not quite correct.
DR. NELTE: We come now to the question of Norway. Did you know that in
October 1939 Germany had given a declaration of neutrality to Denmark
and Norway?
KEITEL: Yes, I knew that.
DR. NELTE: Were you and the OKW taken into consultation about
declarations of neutrality in this or other cases?
KEITEL: No.
DR. NELTE: Were you informed of them?
KEITEL: No, we were not informed either. These were discussions
referring to foreign policy, of which we soldiers were not informed.
DR. NELTE: You mean you were not informed officially. But you as a
person who also reads newspapers knew of it?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Good. Before our discussion about the problem of aggressive
war I asked you a question which, in order to save time, I would not
like to repeat. However, it seems to me that the question I put to you
in order to get your opinion on aggressive war must be asked again in
this connection because an attack on a neutral country, a country which
had been given a guarantee was bound to cause particular scruples on the
part of people who have to do with these things, with the waging of war.
Therefore, I put this question to you again in this case and ask you to
describe what your attitude and the soldiers’ attitude was to it.
KEITEL: In this connection, I must say we were already at war. There was
a state of war with England and France. It would not be right for me to
say that I interfered in the least with these matters, but I regarded
them rather as political matters, and, as a soldier, I held the opinion
that preparations for military actions against Norway and Denmark did
not yet mean their outbreak and that these preparations would very
obviously take months if such an action was executed at all and that in
the meantime the situation could change. It was this train of thought
which caused me not to take any steps in regard to the impossibility to
consider and to prepare strategically this intervention in Norway and
Denmark; therefore, I left these things, I must say, to those who were
concerned with political matters. I cannot put it any other way.
DR. NELTE: When did the preparations for this action start?
KEITEL: I think the first deliberations took place already in October
1939; on the other hand, the first directives were issued only in
January, that is to say, several months later. In connection with the
discussions before this Tribunal and with the information given by Reich
Marshal Göring in his statements, I also remember that one day I was
ordered to call Grand Admiral Raeder to the Führer. He wanted to discuss
with him questions regarding sea warfare in the Bay of Heligoland and in
the Atlantic Ocean and the dangers we would encounter in waging war in
this area.
Then Hitler ordered me to call together a special staff which was to
study all these problems from the viewpoint of sea, air, and land
warfare. I remembered this also upon seeing the documents produced here.
This special staff dispensed with my personal assistance. Hitler said at
the time that he himself would furnish tasks for this staff. These were,
I believe, the military considerations in the months from 1939 to the
beginning of 1940.
DR. NELTE: In this connection I should only like to know further whether
you had any conversation with Quisling at this stage of preliminary
measures?
KEITEL: No, I saw Quisling neither before nor after the Norway campaign;
I saw him for the first time approximately one or two years later. We
had no contact, not even any kind of transmission of information. I
already stated in a preliminary interrogation that by order of Hitler I
sent an officer, I believe it was Colonel Pieckenbrock, to Copenhagen
for conferences with Norwegians. I did not know Quisling.
DR. NELTE: As to the war in the West, there is once more in the
foreground the question of violation of neutrality in the case of
Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. Did you know that these three
countries had been given assurances regarding the inviolability of their
neutrality?
KEITEL: Yes, I knew and also was told that at that time.
DR. NELTE: I do not want to ask the same questions as in the case of
Norway and Denmark, but, in this connection, however, I should like to
ask: Did you consider these assurances by Hitler to be honest?
KEITEL: When I remember the situation as it was then, I did at that time
believe, when I learned of these things, that there was no intention of
bringing any other state into the war. At any rate, I had no reason, no
justification, to assume the opposite, namely that this was intended as
a deception.
DR. NELTE: After the conclusion of the Polish campaign did you still
believe that there was any possibility of terminating or localizing the
war?
KEITEL: Yes, I did believe this. My view was strengthened by the
Reichstag speech after the Polish war, in which allusions were made
which convinced me that political discussions about this question were
going on, above all, with England, and because Hitler had told me time
and again, whenever these questions were brought up, “The West is
actually not interested in these Eastern problems of Germany.” This was
the phrase he always used to calm people, namely that the Western Powers
were not interested in these problems.
Furthermore, seen from a purely military point of view, it must be added
that we soldiers had, of course, always expected an attack by the
Western Powers, that is to say, by France, during the Polish campaign,
and were very surprised that in the West, apart from some skirmishes
between the Maginot Line and the West Wall, nothing had actually
happened, though we had—this I know for certain—along the whole
Western Front from the Dutch border to Basel only five divisions, apart
from the small forces manning the fortifications of the West Wall. Thus,
from a purely military operative point of view, a French attack during
the Polish campaign would have encountered only a German military
screen, not a real defense. Since nothing of this sort happened, we
soldiers thought of course that the Western Powers had no serious
intentions, because they did not take advantage of the extremely
favorable situation for military operations and did not undertake
anything, at least not anything serious, against us during the 3 to 4
weeks when all the German fighting formations were employed in the East.
This also strengthened our views as to what the attitude of the Western
Powers would probably be in the future.
DR. NELTE: What plans did Hitler have for the West?
KEITEL: During the last phase of the Polish campaign, he had already
transferred all unnecessary forces to the West, in consideration of the
fact that at any time something else might happen there. However, during
the last days of the Polish campaign, he had already told me that he
intended to throw his forces as swiftly as possible from the East to the
West and if possible, attack in the West in the winter of 1939-1940.
DR. NELTE: Did these plans include attacks on and marching through
Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland?
KEITEL: Not in the beginning, but first, if we can express it from the
military point of view, the deployment in the West was to be a
protective measure, that is, a thorough strengthening of the frontiers,
of course preferably to take place where there was nothing except border
posts. Accordingly, already at the end of September and the beginning of
October, a transportation of the army from the East to the West did take
place, as a security measure without, however, any fixed center of
gravity.
DR. NELTE: What did the military leaders know about Belgium and
Holland’s attitude?
KEITEL: This naturally changed several times in the course of the
winter. At that time, in the autumn of 1939—I can speak only for
myself, and there may be other opinions on this matter—I was convinced
that Belgium wanted to remain out of the war under any circumstances and
would do anything she could to preserve her neutrality. On the other
hand, we received, through the close connections between the Belgian and
Italian royal houses, a number of reports that sounded very threatening.
I had no way of finding out whether they were true, but we learned of
them, and they indicated that strong pressure was exerted on Belgium to
give up her neutrality.
As for Holland, we knew at that time only that there were General Staff
relations between her and England.
But then of course, in the months from October 1939 to May 1940 the
situation changed considerably and the tension varied greatly. From the
purely military point of view, we knew one thing: That all the French
swift units, that is motorized units, were concentrated on the
Belgian-French border, and from a military point of view, we interpreted
this measure as meaning that at least preparations were being made for
crossing through Belgium at any time with the swift units and advancing
up to the borders of the Ruhr district.
I believe I should omit details, here, because they are not important
for the further developments, they are of a purely operative and
strategic nature.
DR. NELTE: Were there differences of opinion between the generals and
Hitler with reference to the attack in the West which had to take place
through this neutral territory?
KEITEL: I believe I must say that this at that time was one of the most
serious crises in the whole war, namely, the opinions held by a number
of generals, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch,
and his Chief of General Staff, and I also personally belong to that
group, which wanted at all costs to attempt to prevent an attack in the
West which Hitler intended for that winter. There were various reasons
for this: The difficulty of transporting the Eastern Army to the West;
then the point of view—and this I must state—the fact that we believed
at that time, perhaps more from the political point of view, that if we
did not attack, the possibility of a peaceful solution might still exist
and might still be realizable. Thus we considered it possible that
between then and the spring many political changes could take place.
Secondly, as soldiers, we were decidedly against the waging of a winter
war, in view of the short days and long nights, which are always a great
hindrance to all military operations. To Hitler’s objection that the
French swift forces might march through Belgium at any time and then
stand before the Ruhr district, we answered that we were superior in
such a situation in a war of movement, we were a match for it; that was
our view. I may add that this situation led to a very serious crisis
between Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and also me,
because I had this trend of thought which Hitler vigorously rejected
because it was, as he declared, strategically wrong. In our talks he
accused me in the sharpest manner of conspiring against him with the
generals of the Army and strengthening them in their opposition to his
views. I must state here that I then asked to be relieved immediately of
my post and given another, because I felt that under these circumstances
the confidence between Hitler and myself had been completely destroyed,
and I was greatly offended. I may add that relations with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army also suffered greatly from this. But the
idea of my discharge or employment elsewhere was sharply rejected, I
would not be entitled to it. It has already been discussed here; I need
not go into it any further. But this breach of confidence was not to be
mended, not even in the future. In the case of Norway, there had already
been a similar conflict because I had left the house. General Jodl’s
diary refers to it as a “serious crisis.” I shall not go into this in
detail.
DR. NELTE: What was the reason for Hitler’s speech to the
Commanders-in-Chief on 23 November 1939, in the Reich Chancellery?
KEITEL: I can say that this was very closely connected with the crisis
between Hitler and the generals. He called a meeting of the generals at
that time to present and substantiate his views, and we knew it was his
intention to bring about a change of attitude on the part of the
generals. In the notes on this speech, we see that individual persons
were more than once directly and sharply rebuked. The reasons given by
those who had spoken against this attack in the West were repeated.
Moreover, he now wanted to make an irrevocable statement of his will to
carry out this attack in the West that very winter, because this, in his
view, was the only strategic solution, as every delay was to the enemy’s
advantage. In other words, at that time, he no longer counted on any
other solution than resort to force of arms.
DR. NELTE: When, then, was the decision made to advance through Belgium
and Holland?
KEITEL: The preparations for such a march through and attack on Belgium
and Holland had already been made, but Hitler withheld the decision as
to whether such a big attack or violation of the neutrality of these
countries was actually to be carried out, and kept it open until the
spring of 1940, obviously for all sorts of political reasons, and
perhaps also with the idea that the problem would automatically be
solved if the enemy invaded Belgium or if the mobile French troops
entered, or something like that. I can only state that the decision for
the carrying out of this plan was withheld until the very last moment
and the order was given only immediately before it was to be executed. I
believe that there was also one other factor in this, which I have
already mentioned, namely the relationship between the royal houses of
Italy and Belgium. Hitler always surrounded his decisions with secrecy
for he was obviously afraid that they might become known through this
relationship.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal will be glad if when you refer to
Czechoslovakia or any other state you will refer to it by its proper
name, you, and the defendants, and other witnesses.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, the Defendant Keitel wishes to make a slight
correction in the statement which he made earlier upon my question
regarding the occupation in the West during the Polish campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
KEITEL: I said earlier that in the West during the war against Poland,
there were five divisions. I must rectify that statement. I had confused
that with the year 1938. In 1939 there were approximately 20 divisions,
including the reserves in the Rhineland and in the West district behind
the lines. Therefore, the statement I made was made inadvertently and
was a mistake.
DR. NELTE: Now we come to the Balkan wars. The Prosecution, with
reference also to the war against Greece and Yugoslavia, have accused
you of having co-operated in the preparation, planning, and above all in
the carrying out of those wars. What is your attitude toward this?
KEITEL: We were drawn into the war against Greece and against Yugoslavia
in the spring of 1941 to our complete surprise and without having made
any plans. Let me take Greece first: I accompanied Hitler during his
journey through France for the meetings with Marshal Pétain and with
Franco on the Spanish border, and during that journey we received our
first news regarding the intention of Italy to attack Greece. The
journey to Florence was immediately decided upon, and upon arrival in
Florence, we received Mussolini’s communication, which has already been
mentioned by Reich Marshal Göring, namely, that the attack against
Greece had already begun.
I can only say from my own personal knowledge that Hitler was extremely
angry about this development and the dragging of the Balkans into the
war and that only the fact that Italy was an ally prevented a break with
Mussolini. I never knew of any intentions to wage war against Greece.
DR. NELTE: Was there any necessity for Germany to enter into that war or
how did that come about?
KEITEL: At first the necessity did not exist, but during the first
months, October-November, of that campaign of the Italians, it already
became clear that the Italian position in this war had become extremely
precarious. Therefore, as early as November or December, there were
calls on the part of Mussolini for help, calls to assist him in some
form or other.
Moreover, seen from the military point of view, it was clear of course
that for the entire military position in the war, a defeat of Italy in
the Balkans would have had considerable and very serious consequences.
Therefore, by improvised means, assistance was rendered. I think a
mountain division was to be brought in, but it was technically
impossible, since there were no transportation facilities. Then another
solution was attempted by means of air transport and the like.
DR. NELTE: At the time when improvisations ceased, we come, however, to
the plan presented by the Prosecution and called “Marita.” When was
that?
KEITEL: The war in Greece and Albania had begun to reach a certain
standstill because of winter conditions. During that time, plans were
conceived in order to avoid a catastrophe for Italy, to bring in against
Greece certain forces from the North for an attack to relieve pressure,
for such I must call it. That would, and did of course, take several
months.
May I just explain that at that time the idea of a march through
Yugoslavia, or even the suggestion that forces should be brought in
through Yugoslavia was definitely turned down by Hitler, although the
Army particularly had proposed that possibility as the most suitable way
of bringing in troops.
Regarding the “Operation Marita,” perhaps not much more can be said than
to mention the march through Bulgaria, which had been prepared and
discussed diplomatically with Bulgaria.
DR. NELTE: I would like to ask just one more question on that subject.
The Prosecution have stated that even before the overthrow of the
Yugoslav Government, that is to say, at the end of March 1941,
negotiations were conducted with Hungary for the eventuality of an
attack on Yugoslavia. Were you or the OKW informed of this, or were you
consulted?
KEITEL: No. I have no recollection at all of any military discussion on
the part of the OKW with Hungary regarding the eventuality of a military
action in the case of Yugoslavia. That is completely unknown to me. On
the contrary, everything that happened later on—a few words about
Yugoslavia will have to be said later—was completely improvised.
Nothing had been prepared, at any rate not with the knowledge of the
OKW.
DR. NELTE: But it is known to you, is it not, that military discussions
with Hungary had taken place during that period? I assume that you
merely want to say that they did not refer to Yugoslavia.
KEITEL: Of course, it was known to me that several discussions had taken
place with the Hungarian General Staff.
DR. NELTE: You said you wanted to say something else about the case of
Yugoslavia. Reich Marshal Göring has made statements upon that subject
here. Can you add anything new? Otherwise, I have no further questions
with regard to that subject.
KEITEL: I should merely like to confirm once more that the decision to
proceed against Yugoslavia with military means meant completely
upsetting all military advances and arrangements made up to that time.
Marita had to be completely readjusted. Also new forces had to be
brought through Hungary from the North. All that was completely
improvised.
DR. NELTE: We come now to Fall Barbarossa. The Soviet Prosecution,
particularly, have stressed that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
and you as Chief of Staff, as early as the summer of 1940, had dealt
with the plan of an attack against the Soviet Union. When did Hitler for
the first time talk to you about the possibility of a conflict, of an
armed conflict with the Soviet Union?
KEITEL: As far as I recollect, that was at the beginning of August 1940,
on the occasion of a discussion of the situation at Berchtesgaden, or
rather at his house, the Berghof. That was the first time that the
possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union was discussed.
DR. NELTE: What were the reasons which Hitler gave at that time which
might possibly lead to a war?
KEITEL: I think I can refer to what Reich Marshal Göring has said on
this subject.
According to our notions, there were considerable troop concentrations
in Bessarabia and Bukovina. The Foreign Minister, too, had mentioned
figures which I cannot recall, and there was the anxiety which had been
repeatedly voiced by Hitler at that time that developments might result
in the Romanian theater which would endanger our source of petroleum,
the fuel supply for the conduct of the war, which for the most part came
from Romania. Apart from that, I think he talked about strong or
manifest troop concentrations in the Baltic provinces.
DR. NELTE: Were any directives given by you at that time or by those
branches of the Wehrmacht which were affected?
KEITEL: No. As far as I can recollect this was confined firstly to
increased activities of the intelligence or espionage service against
Russia and, secondly, to certain investigations regarding the
possibility of transferring troops from the West, from France, as
quickly as possible to the Southeast areas or to East Prussia. Certain
return transports of troops from the Eastern military districts had
already taken place at the end of July. Apart from that no instructions
were given at that time.
DR. NELTE: How was the line of demarcation occupied?
KEITEL: There were continual reports from that border or demarcation
line on frontier incidents, shootings, and particularly about frequent
crossings of that line by aircraft of the Soviet Union, which led to the
due exchange of notes. But at any rate there were continual small
frontier fights and shootings, particularly in the South, and we
received information through our frontier troops that continual or at
certain times new Russian troop units appeared opposite them. I think
that was all.
DR. NELTE: Do you know how many divisions of the German Wehrmacht were
stationed there at the time?
KEITEL: During the Western campaign there were—I do not think I am
wrong this time—seven divisions, seven divisions from East Prussia to
the Carpathians, two of which, during the Western campaign, had even
been transported to the West but later on were transported back again.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution submitted that at the end of July 1940
Generaloberst Jodl had given general instructions at Reichenhall to
several officers of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to study the Russian
problem, and particularly to examine the railway transport problems.
Since you said a little earlier that not until August did you hear for
the first time from Hitler what the situation was, I am now asking you
whether you were informed about these conferences of Generaloberst Jodl.
KEITEL: No. I did not hear until I came here, that such a conference
took place in Berchtesgaden at the end of July or beginning of August.
This was due to the fact that I was absent from Berchtesgaden. I did not
know of this conference, and I think General Jodl probably forgot to
tell me about it at the time. I did not know about it.
DR. NELTE: What were your personal views at that time regarding the
problem which arose out of the conference with Hitler?
KEITEL: When I became conscious of the fact that the matter had been
given really serious thought I was very surprised, and I considered it
most unfortunate. I seriously considered what could be done to influence
Hitler by using military considerations. At that time, as has been
briefly discussed here by the Foreign Minister, I wrote a personal
memorandum containing my thoughts on the subject, I should like to say,
independently of the experts working in the General Staff and the
Wehrmacht Operations Staff and wanted to present this memorandum to
Hitler. I decided on that method because, as a rule, one could never get
beyond the second sentence of a discussion with Hitler. He took the word
out of one’s mouth and afterwards one never was able to say what one
wanted to say. And in this connection I should like to say right now
that I had the idea—it was the first and only time—of visiting the
Foreign Minister personally, in order to ask him to support me from the
political angle regarding that question. That is the visit to Fuschl,
which has already been discussed here and which the Foreign Minister Von
Ribbentrop confirmed during his examination the other day.
DR. NELTE: Then you confirm what Herr Von Ribbentrop has said, so that
there is no need for me to repeat it?
KEITEL: I confirm that I went to Fuschl. I had the memorandum with me.
It had been written by hand, since I did not want anybody else to get
hold of it. And I left Fuschl conscious of the fact that he wanted to
try to exercise influence on Hitler to the same end. He promised me
that.
DR. NELTE: Did you give that memorandum to Hitler?
KEITEL: Yes. Some time later at the Berghof, after a report of the
situation had been given, I handed him that memorandum when we were
alone. I think he told me at the time that he was going to study it. He
took it, and did not give me a chance to make any explanations.
DR. NELTE: Considering its importance did you later on find an
opportunity to refer to it again?
KEITEL: Yes. At first nothing at all happened, so that after some time I
reminded him of it and asked him to discuss the problem with me. This he
did, and the matter was dealt with very briefly by his saying that the
military and strategic considerations put forward by me were in no way
convincing. He, Hitler, considered these ideas erroneous, and turned
them down. In that connection I can perhaps mention very briefly that I
was again very much upset and there was another crisis when I asked to
be relieved of my post, and that another man be put in my office and
that I be sent to the front. That once more led to a sharp controversy
as has already been described by the Reich Marshal when he said that
Hitler took the attitude that he would not tolerate that a general whose
views he did not agree with should ask to be relieved of his post
because of this disagreement. I think he said that he had every right to
turn down such suggestions and ideas if he considered them wrong. I had
not the right to take any action.
DR. NELTE: Did he return that memorandum to you?
KEITEL: No, I do not think I got it back. I have always assumed that it
was found among the captured Schmundt files, which apparently is not the
case. I did not get it back; he kept it.
DR. NELTE: I do not wish to occupy the time of the Tribunal in this
connection any further. I will leave it to you as to whether you wish to
disclose the contents of that memorandum. I am not so much concerned
with the military presentation—one can imagine what it was—but the
question is: Did you refer to the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 in that
memorandum?
KEITEL: Yes, but I must say that the main part of my memorandum was
devoted to military studies, military studies regarding the amount of
forces, the requirements of effectives, and the dispersal of forces in
France and Norway at the time, and the Luftwaffe in Italy, and our being
tied down in the West. In that memorandum I most certainly pointed to
the fact that this Non-Aggression Pact existed. But all the rest were
military considerations.
DR. NELTE: Were any military orders given at that time?
KEITEL: No. No orders were given at that time except, I think, for the
improvement of lines of communications from the West to the East to
permit speeding up troop transports, particularly to the Southeastern
sector, in other words, north of the Carpathians and in the East
Prussian sector. Apart from that no orders of any kind were given at
that time.
DR. NELTE: Had the discussion with Foreign Minister Molotov already
taken place at that time?
KEITEL: No. On the contrary, at that time, in October the idea of a
discussion with the Russians was still pending. Hitler also told me that
at the time, and he always emphasized in that connection that until such
a discussion had taken place he would not give any orders, since it had
been proved to him by General Jodl that in any case it was technically
impossible to transfer strong troop units into the threatened sectors in
the East which I have mentioned. Accordingly, nothing was done. The
visit or rather discussion with the Russian delegation was prepared, in
which connection I would like to say that I made the suggestion at that
time that Hitler should talk personally with M. Stalin. That was the
only thing I did in the matter.
DR. NELTE: During that conference were military matters discussed?
KEITEL: I did not take any part in the discussions with M. Molotov,
although in this instance too I was present at the reception and at
certain social meetings. I remember that on two occasions I sat next to
Molotov at the table. I did not hear any political discussion, nor did I
have any political discussions with my table companion.
DR. NELTE: What did Hitler say after these discussions had come to an
end?
KEITEL: After the departure of Molotov he really said very little. He
more or less said that he was disappointed in the discussion. I think he
mentioned briefly that problems regarding the Baltic Sea and the Black
Sea areas had been discussed in a general way and that he had not been
able to take any positive or desired stand. He said he did not go into
details. I asked him about military things which had a certain
significance at the time—the strong forces, for instance, in the
Bessarabian sector. I think Hitler evaded the answer and said that this
was obviously connected with all these matters and that he had not gone
into it too deeply, or something similar, I cannot remember exactly. At
any rate, there was nothing new in it for us and nothing final.
DR. NELTE: After that conference were any military orders given?
KEITEL: I think not even then, but Hitler told us at the time that he
wished to wait for the reaction to these discussions in the Eastern area
after the delegation had returned to Russia. Certain orders had been
given to the ambassador, too, in that respect, however not directly
after the Molotov visit.
DR. NELTE: May I ask you to give the date when the first definite
instructions were given?
KEITEL: I can only reconstruct it retrospectively, on the strength of
the instruction Barbarossa which has been shown to me here and which
came out in December. I believe it must have been during the first half
of December that the orders were issued, the well-known order
Barbarossa. To be precise, these orders were given at the beginning of
December, namely, the orders to work out the strategic plan.
DR. NELTE: Did you know about the conference which took place at Zossen
in December and which has been mentioned by the Prosecution here?
Perhaps I may remind you that the Finnish General Heinrichs was present.
KEITEL: No, I knew nothing about the conference in Zossen, and I think
General Buschenhagen was also there, according to the statements he has
made here. I did not know anything about the Finnish General Heinrichs’
presence in Zossen and have heard about it for the first time here. The
only way I can explain this is that the General Staff of the Army wanted
to get information or other things and that for that purpose they
discussed that with the persons concerned. I did not meet General
Heinrichs until May 1941. At that time I had a conference with him and
General Jodl at Salzburg. Before that I had never seen him and I had
never talked to him.
DR. NELTE: Is there any significance in the fact that Directive Number
21 says that Hitler would order the actual deployment of the troops 8
weeks before the operational plan would become effective?
KEITEL: Yes, there was considerable significance attached to that. I
have been interrogated about that by the Soviet Delegation here. The
reason was that according to the calculations of the Army, it would take
about eight weeks to get these troops, which were to be transported by
rail, into position; that is to say, if troops from Reich territory were
to be placed in position on an operative starting line. Hitler
emphasized when the repeated revisions of the plan were made that he
wanted to have complete control of such deployment. In other words,
troop movements without his approval were not to be made. That was the
purpose of this instruction.
DR. NELTE: When did it become clear to you that Hitler was determined to
attack the Soviet Union?
KEITEL: As far as I can recollect, it was at the beginning of March. The
idea was that the attack might be made approximately in the middle of
May. Therefore the decision regarding the transport of troops by rail
had to be made in the middle of March. For that reason, during the first
half of March a meeting of generals was called, that is to say, a
briefing of the generals at Hitler’s headquarters and the explanations
given by him at that time had clearly the purpose of telling the
generals that he was determined to carry out the deployment although an
order had not yet been given. He gave a whole series of ideas and issued
certain instructions on things which are contained in these directives
here for the special parts of Fall Barbarossa. This is Document 447-PS,
and these are the directives which were eventually also signed by me. He
then gave us the directive for these guiding principles and ideas, so
that the generals were already informed about the contents, which in
turn caused me to confirm it in writing in this form, for there was
nothing new in it for any one who had taken part in the discussions.
DR. NELTE: It appears to me, however, that what Hitler told the generals
in his address was something new; and it also seems to me that you who
were concerned with these matters, that is to say, who had to work them
out, understood or had to understand that now a completely abnormal
method of warfare was about to begin, at least when seen from your
traditional point of view as a soldier.
KEITEL: That is correct. Views were expressed there regarding the
administration and economic exploitation of the territories to be
conquered or occupied. There was the completely new idea of setting up
Reich commissioners and civilian administrations. There was the definite
decision to charge the Delegate for the Four Year Plan with the supreme
direction in the economic field; and what was for me the most important
point, and what affected me most was the fact that besides the right of
the military commander to exercise the executive power of the occupation
force, a policy was to be followed here in which it was clearly
expressed that Reichsführer SS Himmler was to be given extensive
plenipotentiary powers concerning all police actions in these
territories which later on became known. I firmly opposed that, since to
me it seemed impossible that there should be two authorities placed side
by side. In the directives here it says: “The authority of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army is not affected by this.”
That was a complete illusion and self-deception. Quite the opposite
happened. As long as it was compatible with my functions, I fought
against this. I think I ought to say that I have no witness to that
other than General Jodl, who shared these experiences with me.
Eventually, however, Hitler worked out those directives himself, more or
less, and gave them the meaning he wanted. That is how these directives
came about.
That I had no power to order the things which are contained in these
directives is clear from the fact that it says that the Reich Marshal
receives this task...the Reichsführer SS receives that task, _et
cetera_. I had no authority whatever to give orders to them.
DR. NELTE: Was it never actually discussed that if one wanted to launch
an attack on the Soviet Union, one would previously have to take
diplomatic steps or else send a declaration of war, or an ultimatum?
KEITEL: Oh, yes, I discussed that. As early as the winter of 1940-1941,
whenever there were discussions regarding the strength of the Russian
forces on the demarcation line, that is, in December-January, I asked
Hitler to send a note to the Soviet Union so as to bring about a
cleaning-up of the situation, if I may express it so. I can add now that
the first time he said nothing at all, and the second time he refused,
maintaining that it was useless, since he would only receive the answer
that this was an internal affair and that it was none of our business,
or something like that. At any rate, he refused. I tried again, at a
later stage, that is to say I voiced the request that an ultimatum
should be presented before we entered upon an action, so that in some
form the basis would be created for a preventive war, as we called it,
for an attack.
DR. NELTE: You say “preventive war.” When the final decisions were made,
what was the military situation?
KEITEL: I am best reminded of how we, or rather the Army judged the
situation, by a study or memorandum. I believe it is Document 872-PS,
dated the end of January or the beginning of February, a report made by
the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to Hitler on the state of
operative and strategic preparations. And in this document I found the
information we then had on the strength of the Red Army and other
existing information known to us, which is dealt with fully in this
document.
Apart from that, I have to say too that the intelligence service of the
OKW, Admiral Canaris, placed at my disposal or at the Army’s disposal
very little material because the Russian area was closely sealed against
German intelligence. In other words, there were gaps up to a certain
point. Only the things contained in Document 872-PS were known.
DR. NELTE: Would you like to say briefly what it contained, so as to
justify your decision?
KEITEL: Yes, there were—Halder reported that there were 150 divisions
of the Soviet Union deployed along the line of demarcation. Then there
were aerial photographs of a large number of airdromes. In short, there
was a degree of preparedness on the part of Soviet Russia, which could
at any time lead to military action. Only the actual fighting later made
it clear just how far the enemy had been prepared. I must say, that we
fully realized all these things only during the actual attack.
DR. NELTE: You were present during Hitler’s last speech to the
commanders in the East, made on 14 June 1941, in the Reich Chancellery,
were you not? I ask you, without going over old ground, to state briefly
what Hitler said on that occasion, and what effect it had on the
generals.
THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t there a document in connection with this? It must
all be in the document. Isn’t that so?
DR. NELTE: I wanted to ask one question on that subject and then submit
the document; or, if the Tribunal so desires, I will not read the
document at all, but will merely quote the short summaries which are at
the end of the document. Will the Tribunal agree to that?
THE PRESIDENT: But what you did was to ask the defendant what was in the
document.
DR. NELTE: The document contains, if I may indicate it briefly, the
following: The developments, and the ever increasing influence of
organizations alien to the Wehrmacht on the course of the war. It is the
proof that the Wehrmacht, during this war, which must be called a
degenerate war, tried, as far as possible, to keep within the limits of
international law and that when the...
THE PRESIDENT: I only want to know what your question is, that is all.
DR. NELTE: My question to Field Marshal Keitel was to tell me about the
speech on the 14th of June 1941, and what Hitler ordered the generals to
do and what the effect on them was. With that, I intended to conclude
the preparations for the Russian campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: He can tell what the effect was upon himself, but I don’t
see how he can tell what the effect was upon the other generals.
DR. NELTE: He can only assume of course, but he can say whether the
others reacted in one way or another. One can talk and one can take an
opposing stand. I merely wanted to know whether this happened or not.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better ask him what happened that day at
the conference; if you want to know what happened at the conference, why
don’t you ask him?
DR. NELTE: Please, tell us about it.
KEITEL: After short reports regarding the operational orders to the
individual commanders, there followed a recapitulation, which I must
describe as a purely political speech. The main theme was that this was
the decisive battle between two ideologies, and that this fact made it
impossible—that the leadership in this war, the practices which we knew
as soldiers, and which we considered to be the only correct ones under
international law, had to be measured by completely different standards.
The war could not be carried on by these means. This was an entirely new
kind of war, based on completely different arguments and principles.
With these explanations, the various orders were then given to do away
with the legal system in territories which were not pacified, to combat
resistance with brutal means, to consider every local resistance
movement as the expression of the deep rift between the two ideologies.
These were decidedly quite new and very impressive ideas, but also
thoughts which affected us deeply.
DR. NELTE: Did you, or did any other generals raise objections to or
oppose these explanations, directives, and orders?
KEITEL: No, I personally made no remonstrances, apart from those which I
had already advanced and the objections I had already expressed before.
However, I have never known which generals, if any of the generals,
addressed the Führer. At any rate, they did not do so after that
discussion.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think that now the time has come to decide
whether you will accept the affidavits of the Defendant Keitel contained
in my Document Book Number 2 under the Numbers 3 and 5, as exhibits.
Perhaps the Prosecution can express an opinion on this.
Up to now we have merely discussed the history before the actual Russian
war. Insofar as the Defendant Keitel and the OKW is concerned, I should
like to shorten the examination by submitting these two affidavits. The
affidavit Number 3 is an exposé of the conditions governing the
authority for issuing orders in the East. The extent of the territory
and the numerous organizations led to an extremely complicated procedure
for giving orders. To enable you to ascertain whether the Defendant
Keitel, or the OKW, or some other department might be responsible, the
conditions governing the authority to issue orders in the East have been
presented in detail. I believe it would save a great deal of time if you
would accept this document as an exhibit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Mr. Dodd and I have no objection to
this procedure used by the Defense and we believe that it might probably
help the Tribunal to have in front of them the printed accounts.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte intend to read or only summarize these
affidavits?
DR. NELTE: I intend merely to submit it to you after I have asked the
defendant whether the contents of the affidavit have been written and
signed by him.
THE PRESIDENT: And the Prosecution, of course, have had these affidavits
for some time?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
DR. NELTE: The same applies, if I understand Sir David correctly, to
affidavit Number 5.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it would be convenient, I think, if you gave
these affidavits numbers in the sequence of your exhibit numbers and
gave us also their dates so that we can identify them. Can you give us
the dates of the affidavits?
DR. NELTE: May I be permitted to arrange the matter in the secretary’s
office during the recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The first is dated the 8th of March, isn’t it? The
other is the 18th, is it? Dr. Nelte, you can do it at the recess and
give them numbers. You can give them numbers at the recess.
It is nearly 1 o’clock now, and we are just going to adjourn. You can
give them numbers then. Does that conclude your examination?
DR. NELTE: We come now to the individual cases which I hope, however, to
conclude in the course of the afternoon. Mr. President, I am sorry but I
must discuss the prisoner-of-war affairs and several individual matters.
I think I still need this afternoon for myself. I believe that if I bear
in mind the interests of the Defendant Keitel, I am limiting myself a
good deal.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you desire to put your questions to him now or not?
DR. NELTE: I think—I do not know how the President feels about it—it
would be convenient if we had a recess now so that in the meantime I can
put the affidavits in order. I have not yet finished the discussion of
this subject.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, of the two documents mentioned this morning,
the first document, Number 3 of Document Book Number 2, entitled “The
Command Relationships in the East,” will be given the number 10 of the
Keitel Documents.
THE PRESIDENT: That is dated the 14 March 1946?
DR. NELTE: Yes, 14 March 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: The document that I have got is headed the 23 February
1946, and at the end, the 14 March 1946. Is that the one?
DR. NELTE: The document was first written down and later attested. There
is, therefore, a difference in the two dates.
THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to identify which it is, that is all.
DR. NELTE: It is the document of 14 March 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: The affidavit is dated 14 March.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are giving it what number?
DR. NELTE: I give it Number Keitel-10. The second document, which is
fifth in the document book, is dated at the head 18 March 1946 and has
at the end the defendant’s attestation as of 29 March 1946. This
document has received the number Keitel-12. Permit me to read a summary
of a few points on Pages 11 and 12 of the German copy. This, as it
appears to me, is of very great importance for this Trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Of which document?
DR. NELTE: Document Number 12.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: The question in this document...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. I do not think the interpreters have found
the document yet, have they? It comes just after a certificate, by
Catherine Bedford, and I think it is about halfway through the book,
and, although the pages are not numbered consecutively, it appears to
have the figure 51 on it.
DR. NELTE: I shall begin where it says, “In summing up...” Those are the
last three pages of this document:
“In summing up it must be established that:
“1. In addition to the Wehrmacht as the legal protector of the
Reich internally and externally (as in every State)”—I
interpolate, ‘in the SS organizations’—“a particular,
completely independent power factor arose and was legalized,
which politically, biologically, in police and administration
matters actually drew the powers of the State to itself.
“2. Even at the beginning of military complications and
conflicts the SS came to be the actual forerunner and standard
bearer of a policy of conquest and power.
“3. After the commencement of the military actions the
Reichsführer SS devised methods which always appeared
appropriate, which were concealed at first, or were hardly
apparent, at least from the outside, and which enabled him in
reality to build up his power under the guise of protecting the
annexed or occupied territories from political opponents.
“4. From the occupation of the Sudeten territory, beginning with
the organization of political unrest, that is, of so-called
liberation actions and ‘incidents,’ the road leads straight
through Poland and the Western areas in a steep curve into the
Russian territory.
“5. With the directives for the Barbarossa Plan for the
administration and utilization of the conquered Eastern
territories, the Wehrmacht was, against its intention and
without knowledge of the conditions, drawn further and further
into the subsequent developments and activities.
“6. I (Keitel) and my colleagues had no deeper insight into the
effects of Himmler’s full powers, and had no idea of the
possible effect of these powers.
“I assume without further discussion that the same holds true
for the OKH, which according to the order of the Führer made the
agreements with Himmler’s officials and gave orders to the
subordinate army commanders.
“7. In reality, it was not the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
who had the executive power assigned to him and the power to
decree and to maintain law in the occupied territories, but
Himmler and Heydrich decided on their own authority the fate of
the people and prisoners, including prisoners of war in whose
camps they exercised the executive power.
“8. The traditional training and concept of duty of the German
officers, which taught unquestioning obedience to superiors who
bore responsibility, led to an attitude,—regrettable in
retrospect,—which caused them to shrink from rebelling against
these orders and these methods even when they recognized their
illegality and inwardly refuted them.
“9. The Führer, Hitler, abused his authority and his fundamental
Order Number 1 in an irresponsible way with respect to us. This
Order Number 1 read, more or less:
“‘1. No one shall know about secret matters which do not belong
to his own range of assignments.
“‘2. No one shall learn more than he needs to fulfill the tasks
assigned to him.
“‘3. No one shall receive information earlier than is necessary
for the performance of the duties assigned to him.
“‘4. No one shall transmit to subordinate offices, to any
greater extent or any earlier than is unavoidable for the
achievement of the purpose, orders which are to be kept secret.’
“10. If the entire consequences which arose from granting
Himmler authority in the East had been foreseen, in this case
the leading generals would have been the first to raise an
unequivocal protest against it. That is my conviction.
“As these atrocities developed, one from the other, step by
step, and without any foreknowledge of the consequences, destiny
took its tragic course, with its fateful consequences.”
Witness, Defendant Keitel, did you yourself write this statement, that
is, dictate it as I have just read it? Are you perfectly familiar with
its contents and did you swear to it?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: I shall submit the document in the original.
[_Turning to the defendant_]: We had stopped at Document C-50, which
deals with the abolition of military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa
area. I do not know whether you still want to express your opinion on
it, or whether that is now superfluous after what has just been read.
KEITEL: I should like to say to this only that these documents, C-50 and
884-PS, beginning at Page 4, are the record of the directives that were
given in that General Staff meeting on 14 June. In line with military
regulations and customs they were given the form of written orders and
then sent to the subordinate offices.
DR. NELTE: I have a few more short questions regarding the war against
America. The Prosecution assert that Japan was influenced by Germany to
wage war against America and have, in the course of their presentation,
accused you of participation and co-operation in this plan. Would you
like to make some statement regarding this?
KEITEL: Document C-75 is a directive by the Supreme Command of the
Wehrmacht which deals with co-operation with Japan. Of course, I
participated in the drawing-up of this order and signed it by order. The
other document, Number 1881-PS, regarding a conference between the
Führer and Matsuoka, I do not know, and I did not know anything about
it. I can say only the following for us soldiers:
In the course of all this time, until the Japanese entry into the war
against America, there were two points of view that were the general
directives or principles which Hitler emphasized to us. One was to
prevent America from entering the war under any circumstances;
consequently to renounce military operations in the seas, as far as the
Navy was concerned. The other, the thought that guided us soldiers, was
the hope that Japan would enter the war against Russia; and I recall
that around November and the beginning of December 1941, when the
advance of the German armies west of Moscow was halted and I visited the
front with Hitler, I was asked several times by the generals, “When is
Japan going to enter the war?” The reasons for their asking this were
that again and again Russian Far East divisions were being thrown into
the fight via Moscow, that is to say, fresh troops coming from the Far
East. That was about 18 to 20 divisions, but I could not say for
certain.
I was present in Berlin during Matsuoka’s visit, and I saw him also at a
social gathering, but I did not have any conversation with him. All the
deductions that might be made from Directive 24, C-75, and which I have
learned about from the preliminary examination during my interrogation,
are without any foundation for us soldiers, and there is no
justification for anyone’s believing that we were guided by thoughts of
bringing about a war between Japan and America, or of undertaking
anything to that end.
In conclusion, I can say only that this order was necessary because the
branches of the Wehrmacht offered resistance to giving Japan certain
things, military secrets in armament production, unless she were in the
war.
DR. NELTE: There was also a letter submitted by the Prosecution, a
letter from Major Von Falkenstein to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.
Reich Marshal Göring testified to this in his interrogation. I only
wanted to ask you if you knew of this letter, or if you have anything to
add to Reich Marshal Göring’s testimony?
KEITEL: I have nothing to add, for I never saw this letter by Von
Falkenstein until I saw it here during my interrogation.
DR. NELTE: We come now to the individual facts with which you and the
OKW are charged by the Prosecution. Because of the vast number of points
brought up by the Prosecution I can naturally choose only individual
groups and those with the most serious charges, in order to elucidate
whether and to what extent you were involved and what your attitude was
to the ensuing results. In most cases it is a question of orders from
Hitler, but in your statement on the actual happenings you have admitted
to a certain participation in these things and knowledge of them.
Therefore, we must discuss these points. One of the most important is
that of hostages. In this connection I want to show you Document C-128.
These are orders for operations in the West. Let me ask you, however,
first of all, what is the basis for the taking of hostages as it was
usually carried out by the Wehrmacht?
KEITEL: These are the printed regulations “Secret G-2” (Army Service
Regulation G-2) and headed, according to the order: “Service
Instructions for Army Units.”
DR. NELTE: I ask you, Mr. President, to turn to Document Book Number 1,
Number 7 on Page 65 of my document book. I ask you to establish that
this is a copy from the afore-mentioned Army Regulations, Section 9,
which deals with the question of hostages. This is Document K-7, and it
reads as follows:
“Hostages may be taken only by order of a regimental commander,
an independent battalion commander or a commander of equal rank.
With regard to accommodation and feeding, it is to be noted
that, though they should be kept under strictest guard, they are
not convicts. Furthermore, only senior officers holding at least
the position of a division commander can decide on the fate of
hostages.”
That is, if you want to call it so, the Hostage Law of the German
Wehrmacht.
KEITEL: I might say in this connection that in Document C-128, which is
the preparatory operational order of the Army for the battle in the
West, this is mentioned specially under the heading: “3a. Security
measures against the population of occupied territory. A) Hostages.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you offering that as Keitel-7?
DR. NELTE: I ask to have these printed Army Instructions put in evidence
as Exhibit Keitel-7 (Document Number Keitel-7).
THE PRESIDENT: Would you kindly say what you are putting it in as each
time, because if you simply say “7” it will lead to confusion.
DR. NELTE: Keitel-7.
[_Turning to the defendant_]: Was Document C-128 the order of the High
Command of the Army on the occasion of the march into France?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Now I have here another document, Document Number 1585-PS,
which contains an opinion expressed by the OKW. It is a letter to the
Reich Minister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; and in
this letter, I assume, are contained the convictions held by the office
of which you were head.
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: What do you say today in connection with this letter?
KEITEL: I can say only that it is precisely the same standpoint that I
represent today, because there is here, with reference to the
above-mentioned order, the following paragraph, beginning with the
words, “For the protection against any misuse...” and so on. Then the
order is quoted.
DR. NELTE: This is in reference to Regulation G-2, and further, that the
“decision regarding the fate of hostages...”
KEITEL: It says, “According to which the decision on the fate of
hostages is reserved to senior officers holding at least the position of
a division commander.”
DR. NELTE: Is it correct when I say that this letter was drawn up by the
Legal Department of the OKW after examination of the situation as
regards international law and its implications?
KEITEL: Yes, it is to be seen from the document itself that this point
of view was taken into consideration.
DR. NELTE: Did you issue any general orders on this question of hostages
in your capacity as chief of OKW, apart from those we have had up to
now?
KEITEL: No, the OKW participated only in helping to draw up this order.
No other basic orders or directions were issued on this question.
DR. NELTE: Did you nevertheless in individual cases have anything to do
with this question of hostages? You and the OKW are charged by the
Prosecution with having expressed yourselves in some way or having taken
some kind of attitude when inquiries were made by Stülpnagel and
Falkenhausen.
I show you Document 1594-PS.
KEITEL: This document, 1594-PS, is a communication from Von
Falkenhausen, the Military Commander of Belgium, and is directed to the
OKH, General Staff, Quartermaster General, and, further, to the
Commander-in-Chief and Military Commander in France and for the
information of the Wehrmacht Commander in the Netherlands and Luftgau
Belgium.
I do not know this document nor could I know it, for it is directed to
the Army. The assumption expressed by the French Prosecutor that I
received a letter from Falkenhausen is not true. I do not know this
letter and it was not sent to me. Official communication between the
military commanders in France and Belgium took place only between the
OKH and these two military commanders subordinate to it. These
commanders were not subordinate either to the OKW or to me.
DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution has submitted Document Number UK-25
and has asserted that this document was the basis for the hostage
legislation in France, that there is, in other words, a basic connection
between the order you signed on 16 September 1941 and the treatment of
hostages in France. I will show you these documents, 1587-PS and
1588-PS, in addition to UK-25 and request you to comment on them.
KEITEL: I must first answer the question as to whether I had any
discussion on individual matters with military commanders regarding the
question of hostages. Did you not ask me that?
DR. NELTE: With regard to Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen?
KEITEL: Yes, with regard to Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen. It is possible,
and I do recall one such case, Stülpnagel called me up from Paris on
such a matter because he had received an order from the Army to shoot a
certain number of hostages for an attack on members of the German
Wehrmacht. He wanted to have this order certified by me. That happened
and I believe it is confirmed by a telegram, which has been shown to me
here. It is also confirmed that at that time I had a meeting with
Stülpnagel in Berlin. Otherwise, the relations between myself and these
two military commanders were limited to quite exceptional matters, in
which they believed that with my help they might obtain certain support
with regard to things that were very unpleasant for them, for example,
in such questions as labor allocation, that is, workers from Belgium or
France destined for Germany, where also, in one case, conflicts arose
between the military commanders and their police authorities. In these
cases I was called up directly in order to mediate.
Permit me, please, to look at the documents first.
DR. NELTE: You must begin with UK-25, 16 September 1941.
KEITEL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It is impossible for the Tribunal to carry all these
documents in their heads by reference to their numbers, and we do not
have the documents before us. We do not know what documents you are
dealing with here. It is quite impossible for us.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, for this reason, I took the liberty of
submitting to the Tribunal before the beginning of the sessions a list
of documents. I am sorry if that was not done. I could not submit the
documents themselves. You will always find a number to the left of this
list.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see that, but all that I see here is 1587-PS,
which is not the one that you are referring to, apparently, and it is
described as a report to the Supreme Command of the Army. That does not
give us much indication of what it is about. The next one is 1594-PS, a
letter to OKH. That again does not give us much indication of what it is
about, except that they have something to do with the hostage question.
DR. NELTE: It is concerned with the question which the Defendant Keitel
is about to answer. Do you not also have the order bearing Document
Number C-128?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have that. That is directions for the operation in
the West.
DR. NELTE: And UK-25?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: And 1588-PS?
THE PRESIDENT: We have got them all. The only thing that I was pointing
out to you was that the description of them is inadequate to explain to
us what they mean and what they are. Perhaps by a word or two you can
indicate to us when you come to the document what it is about.
DR. NELTE: Document UK-25, about which the Defendant Keitel is about to
testify, is an order of 16 September 1941, signed by him, regarding
“Communist Uprisings in the Occupied Territories.” It contains, among
other things, the sentence, “The Führer has now ordered that most severe
measures should be taken everywhere in order to crush this movement as
soon as possible.” The French Prosecution asserted that, on the basis of
this order, hostage legislation was promulgated in France, which is
contained in Document 1588-PS. If you have Document 1588-PS, you will
find on the third page a regular code regarding the taking and treatment
of hostages.
The defendant is to state whether such a causal relation did exist, and
to what extent the OKW and he himself were at all competent in these
matters.
KEITEL: Document UK-25, the Führer Order of the 16 September 1941, as
has just been stated, is concerned with communist uprisings in occupied
territories, and the fact that this is a Führer order has already been
mentioned. I must clarify the fact that this order, so far as its
contents are concerned, referred solely to the Eastern regions,
particularly to the Balkan countries. I believe that I can prove this by
the fact that there is attached to this document a distribution list,
that is, a list of addresses beginning, “Wehrmacht Commander Southeast
for Serbia, Southern Greece, and Crete.” This was, of course,
transmitted also to other Wehrmacht commanders and also to the OKH with
the possibility of its being passed on to subordinate officers. I
believe that this document, which, for the sake of saving time, I need
not read here, has several indications that the assumption on the part
of the French Prosecution that this is the basis for the hostage law to
be found in Document Number 1588-PS is false, and that there is no
causal nexus between the two. It is true that the date of this hostage
law is also September—the number is hard to read—but, as far as its
contents are concerned, these two matters are, in my opinion, not
connected. Moreover, the two military commanders in France and Belgium
never received this order from the OKW, but they may have received it
through the OKH, a matter which I cannot check because I do not know.
Regarding this order of 16 September 1941, I should like to say that its
great severity can be traced back to the personal influence of the
Führer. The fact that it is concerned with the Eastern region is already
to be seen from the contents and from the introduction and does not need
to be substantiated any further. It is correct that this order of 16
September 1941 is signed by me.
DR. NELTE: We come now to the second individual fact, “Nacht und Nebel.”
The Prosecution charges you of having participated in the Nacht und
Nebel decree of 12 December 1941, Document Number L-90...
KEITEL: May I say one more thing regarding the other question?
DR. NELTE: Please, if it appears to be necessary. In the communication
of 2 February 1942 we find the words, “In the annex are transmitted: 1)
A decree of the Führer of 7 December 1941...” You wanted to say
something more; if it is important, please. Do you have Document Number
L-90?
KEITEL: L-90, yes.
DR. NELTE: What was the cause for this order, so terrible in its
consequences?
KEITEL: I must state that it is perfectly clear to me that the
connection of my name with this so-called “Nacht und Nebel” order is a
serious charge against me, even though it can be seen from the documents
that it is a Führer order. Consequently I should like to state how this
order came about. Since the beginning of the Eastern campaign and in the
late autumn of 1941 until the spring of 1942, the resistance movements,
sabotage and everything connected with it increased enormously in all
the occupied territories. From the military angle it meant that the
security troops were tied down, having to be kept on the spot by the
unrest. That is how I saw it from the military point of view at that
time. And day by day, through the daily reports we could picture the
sequence of events in the individual occupation sectors. It was
impossible to handle this summarily; rather, Hitler demanded that he be
informed of each individual occurrence, and he was very displeased if
such matters were concealed from him in the reports by military
authorities. He got to know about them all the same.
In this connection, he said to me that it was very displeasing to him
and very unfavorable to establishing peace that, owing to this, death
sentences by court-martial against saboteurs and their accomplices were
increasing; that he did not wish this to occur, since from his point of
view it made appeasement and relations with the population only more
difficult. He said at that time that a state of peace could be achieved
only if this were reduced and if, instead of death sentences—to shorten
it—in case a death sentence could not be expected and carried out in
the shortest time possible, as stated here in the decree, the suspect or
guilty persons concerned—if one may use the word “guilty”—should be
deported to Germany without the knowledge of their families and be
interned or imprisoned, instead of lengthy court-martial proceedings
with many witnesses.
I expressed the greatest misgivings in this matter and know very well
that I said at that time that I feared results exactly opposite to those
apparently hoped for. I then had serious discussions with the legal
adviser of the Wehrmacht, who had similar scruples, because there was an
elimination of ordinary legal procedures. I tried again to prevent this
order from being issued or to have it modified. My efforts were in vain.
The threat was made to me that the Minister of Justice would be
commissioned to issue a corresponding decree, should the Wehrmacht not
be able to do so. Now may I refer to details only insofar as these ways
were provided in this order, L-90, of preventing arbitrary application,
and these were primarily as follows:
The general principles of the order provided expressly that such
deportation or abduction into Reich territory should take place only
after regular court-martial proceedings, and that in every case the
officer in charge of jurisdiction, that is, the divisional commander
must deal with the matter together with his legal adviser, in the legal
way, on the basis of preliminary proceedings.
I must say that I believed then that every arbitrary and excessive
application of these principles was avoided by this provision. You will
perhaps agree with me that the words in the order, “It is the will of
the Führer after long consideration...” put in for that purpose, were
not said without reason and not without the hope that the addressed
military commander would also recognize from this that this was a method
of which we did not approve and did not consider to be right.
Finally we introduced a reviewing procedure into the order so that
through the higher channels of appeal, that is, the Military Commander
in France and the Supreme Command or Commander of the Army, it would be
possible to try the case legally by appeal proceedings if the verdict
seemed open to question, at least, within the meaning of the decree. I
learned here for the first time of the full and monstrous tragedy,
namely, that this order, which was intended only for the Wehrmacht and
for the sole purpose of determining whether an offender who faced a
sentence in jail could be made to disappear by means of this Nacht und
Nebel procedure, was obviously applied universally by the police, as
testified by witnesses whom I have heard here, and according to the
Indictment which I also heard, and so the horrible fact of the existence
of whole camps full of people deported through the Nacht und Nebel
procedure has been proved.
In my opinion, the Wehrmacht, at least I and the military commanders of
the occupied territories who were connected with this order, did not
know of this. At any rate it was never reported to me. Therefore this
order, which in itself was undoubtedly very dangerous and disregarded
certain requirements of law such as we understood it, was able to
develop into that formidable affair of which the Prosecution have
spoken.
The intention was to take those who were to be deported from their home
country to Germany, because Hitler was of the opinion that penal
servitude in wartime would not be considered by the persons concerned as
dishonorable in cases where it was a question of actions by so-called
patriots. It would be regarded as a short detention which would end when
the war was over.
These reflections have already been made in part in the note. If you
have any further questions, please put them.
DR. NELTE: The order for the carrying out of this Nacht und Nebel decree
states that the Gestapo was to effect the transportation to Germany. You
stated that the people who came to Germany were to be turned over to the
Minister of Justice, that is, to normal police custody. You will
understand that, by the connection with the Gestapo, certain suspicions
are raised that it was known from the start what happened to these
people. Can you say anything in elucidation of that matter?
KEITEL: Yes. The order that was given at that time was that these people
should be turned over to the German authorities of justice. This letter
signed “by order” and then the signature, was issued 8 weeks later than
the decree itself by the Amt Ausland Abwehr as I can see from my
official correspondence. It indicates the conferences, that is, the
agreements, which had to be reached at that time, regarding the method
by which these people were to be taken from their native countries to
Germany. They were apparently conducted by this Amt Abwehr, which
evidently ordered police detachments as escorts. That can be seen from
it.
I might mention in this connection—I must have seen it—that it did not
seem objectionable at that time, because I could have, and I had, no
reason to assume that these people were being turned over to the
Gestapo, frankly speaking, to be liquidated, but that the Gestapo was
simply being used as the medium in charge of the transportation to
Germany. I should like to emphasize that particularly, so that there can
be no doubt that it was not our idea to do away with the people as was
later done in that Nacht und Nebel camp.
DR. NELTE: We come now to the question of parachutists, sabotage troops,
and Commando operations. The French Prosecution treat in detail the
origin and effect of the two Führer Orders of 18 October 1942 regarding
the treatment of Commandos.
Does the Tribunal have a copy of this Führer Order? It is 498...
THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t got a copy of the order. You mean 553-PS or
498?
DR. NELTE: The second is Document Number 553-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: We have not got that either, “Combating of Individual
Parachutists, Decree of 4. 8. 42.”
DR. NELTE: Could you please repeat your statement? What you just said
did not come through.
THE PRESIDENT: 553-PS, “Combating of Individual Parachutists, Decree of
4. 8. 42.” That is what we have, nothing else. You also have 498...
DR. NELTE: Document Number 553-PS is a memorandum signed by Keitel. The
French Prosecution has assumed correctly that there is some connection
between the Document 553-PS and the Führer Order of 18 October 1942. The
defendant is to testify what were the reasons that lay behind this
Führer Order and this notice.
KEITEL: First of all, Document 553-PS, the note: This memorandum was
issued by me in August 1942. As I have already described in connection
with the Nacht und Nebel Decree, sabotage acts, the dropping of agents
by parachute, the parachuting of arms, ammunition, explosives, radio
sets and small groups of saboteurs reached greater and greater
proportions. They were dropped at night from aircraft in thinly
populated regions. This activity covered the whole area governed by
Germany at that time. It extended from the west over to Czechoslovakia
and Poland, and from the East as far as the Berlin area. Of course, a
large number of the people involved in these actions were captured and
much of the material was taken. This memorandum was to rally all
offices, outside the Wehrmacht, as well, police and civilian
authorities, to the service against this new method of conducting the
war, which was, to our way of thinking, illegal, a sort of “war in the
dark behind the lines.” Even today, after reading this document through
again—it has already been given to me here—I consider this memorandum
unobjectionable. It expressly provides that members of enemy forces,
that is members of any enemy force, if captured by the police, should be
taken to the nearest Wehrmacht office after being identified. I know
that in the French sector the French police did their full share in
arresting these troops and putting them in safe charge. They
collaborated in preventing these acts of sabotage. It will perhaps make
clear how extensive these activities were if I mention that on certain
days there were as many as 100 railways blown up in this way. That is in
the memorandum.
Now, as to the Führer orders of 18 October 1942, which have been
mentioned very often here and which I may describe as the further
development of the regulations mentioned in this memorandum: As to these
methods, this way of conducting illegal warfare kept on increasing, and
individual parachutists grew into small Commando units which landed from
heavy aircraft or by parachute and were systematically employed, not to
create disturbances or destruction in general, but to attack specific,
vital, and important military objectives. In Norway, for instance, I
recall that they had the task of blowing up the only aluminum works. It
may sound strange, but during this period half to three-quarters of an
hour of the daily discussion on the situation was devoted to the problem
of how to handle these incidents. These incidents in all sectors caused
the Führer to demand other methods, vigorous measures, to combat this
activity, which he characterized as “terrorism” and said that the only
method that could be used to combat it was severe countermeasures. I
recall that in reply to our objections as soldiers the following words
were spoken: “As long as the paratrooper or saboteur runs the danger
only of being taken captive, he incurs no risk; in normal circumstances
he risks nothing; we must take action against this.” These were the
reasons behind his thoughts. I was asked several times to express myself
on this subject and to present a draft. General Jodl will also recall
this. We did not know what we, as soldiers, were to do. We could make no
suggestion.
If I may sum up briefly, we heard Hitler’s bursts of temper on this
subject almost every day, but we did nothing, not knowing what we could
do. Hitler declared that this was against the Hague Convention and
illegal, that it was a method of waging war not foreseen in the Hague
Convention and which could not be foreseen. He said that this was a new
war with which we had to contend, in which new methods were needed.
Then, to make it short, as I have already testified in the preliminary
investigation, these orders—this order itself and the well-known
instructions that those who did not carry out the first order should be
punished—were issued in a concise form and signed by Hitler. They were
then distributed, I believe, by the Chief of the Operations Staff, Jodl.
I might add that many times the commanders who received these orders
asked questions about how they were to be applied, particularly in
connection with the threat that they would be punished if they did not
carry them out. The only reply we could make was, “You know what is in
the orders,” for we were not in a position to change these signed
orders.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have accused you personally of having issued
the order to kill the English saboteurs captured in the Commando
operations at Stavanger. In this connection I submit to you Documents
498-PS, 508-PS, and 527-PS. [_The documents were submitted to the
defendant._]
This, Mr. President, was a Commando mission in the vicinity of
Stavanger. The troops who fell into German hands had to be killed,
according to the Führer decree. There was a remote possibility of
interrogating these persons, if that was demanded by military necessity.
In this case the Commander-in-Chief in Norway, General Von Falkenhorst,
dealt with the matter. He turned to the OKW, as he has already testified
in the minutes of an interrogation.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Would you make any statement in this
connection?
KEITEL: I was interrogated on this subject, and in the course of the
interrogation I was confronted with General Von Falkenhorst. As I
recall, I did not remember his having asked me questions regarding the
carrying out of this order. I did not know of it. Even the event itself
was no longer in my memory, and I remembered it again only after I had
seen the documents. During the interrogation, I told the interrogator
that I had no authority to change that order, that I could refer any one
concerned only to the order, as such. As regards my confrontation with
General Von Falkenhorst, I should like to say only what is stated here
in the minutes, “He obviously shelved the answers and altered his
earlier statements, but did not deny them. Keitel did not deny having
had this talk with me but denied that the subject of it was what I
said.”
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I can only say that this is a summary of the
interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst, a document which was submitted
by the Prosecution without having a document number.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you finished your statement?
KEITEL: Yes. I believe that suffices.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Prosecution did not put in this document,
did they? They have not offered it in evidence?
DR. NELTE: I believe they did.
THE PRESIDENT: I think they must have put it to the Defendant Keitel in
one of his interrogations, did they not? Isn’t that right? That does not
mean that it is put in evidence, because the interrogation itself, you
see, need not be put in evidence. You must put it in now if you want it
to go in.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is some error here. This document was
put in by the Prosecution here as proof of the assertion that the
Defendant Keitel had given the order to kill these paratroopers. I
received the document here.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will tell me if that is so, but I cannot
think of any document having been put in here that has not had an
exhibit number.
MR. DODD: We have no recollection of having put it in. Many of these
interrogations did not have document numbers; but, of course, if they
were put in, they would have USA or Great Britain exhibit numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps the best way would be for Counsel for the
Prosecution to verify whether it was read in evidence.
MR. DODD: That will take me a few minutes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I mean at your leisure. Would that be a convenient
time to break off for 10 minutes?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at a quarter to
5. They will then sit again in this Court in closed session, and they
desire that both Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense
should be present then, as they wish to discuss with those counsels on
both sides the best way of avoiding translating unnecessary documents.
There have, as you know, been a very great number of documents put in,
and a great burden has fallen upon the Translation Division. That is the
problem which the Tribunal wish to discuss in closed session with
Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense; They will,
therefore, as I say, sit here in closed session where there is room for
all the Defense Counsel. That is at 5 o’clock.
DR. NELTE: Do you remember an inquiry of the Commander-in-Chief West, in
June 1944, regarding the treatment of sabotage troops behind the
invasion front? A new situation had been created by the invasion and,
therefore, by the problem of the Commandos.
KEITEL: Yes, I remember, since these documents too have been submitted
to me here, and there were several documents. It is true that the
Commander-in-Chief West, after the landing of Anglo-American forces in
Northern France, considered that a new situation had arisen with
reference to this Führer Order of 18 October 1942 directed against the
parachute Commandos.
The inquiry was, as usual, reported, and General Jodl and I represented
the view of the Commander-in-Chief West, namely, that this order was not
applicable here. Hitler refused to accept that point of view and gave
certain directives in reply, which, according to the document, had at
least two editions; after one had been cancelled as useless, the
Document 551-PS remained as the final version as approved by the Führer
during that report.
I remember all this so accurately because, on the occasion of presenting
that reply during the discussion of the situation, this handwritten
appendix was added by General Jodl with reference to the application in
the Italian theatre, too. With that appendix, this version, which was
approved and demanded by Hitler, was then sent out to the
Commander-in-Chief West.
DR. NELTE: In this connection, was the question discussed as to how the
active support of such acts of sabotage by the population could be
judged from the point of view of international law?
KEITEL: Yes, that question arose repeatedly in connection with the order
of 18 October 1942, and the well-known memorandum previously discussed.
I am of the opinion that, giving any assistance to agents or other enemy
organs in such sabotage acts, is a violation of the Hague Rules for Land
Warfare. If the population takes part in, aids, or supports such action,
or covers the perpetrators—hides them or helps them in any way or in
any form—that, in my opinion, is clearly expressed in the Hague Rules
for Land Warfare, namely that the population must not commit such
actions.
DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have submitted a letter of 30 July
1944, which is Document 537-PS. This document is concerned with the
treatment of members of foreign military missions caught together with
partisans. Do you know this order?
KEITEL: Yes I do. Yes, I have already been interrogated on this Document
537-PS during the preliminary investigation, and I made the statement
which I will repeat here: It had been reported that, attached to the
staffs of these partisans, particularly those of the leaders of the
Serbian and Yugoslav partisans, there were military missions which, we
believed, were certainly individual agents or teams for maintaining
liaison with the states with which we were at war. It had been reported
to me, and I had been asked what should be done if such a mission, as it
was called, were captured. When this was reported to the Führer he
decided to reject the suggestions of the military authority concerned,
namely, to treat them as prisoners of war, since, according to the
directive of 18 October 1942, they were to be considered as saboteurs
and treated as such. This document is, therefore, the transmission of
this order which bears my signature.
DR. NELTE: The problem of terror-fliers and lynch law has been mentioned
during the examination of Reich Marshal Göring. I shall confine myself
to a few questions which concern you personally in connection with that
problem. Do you know what we are concerned with in the conception of
terror-fliers and their treatment? What was your attitude toward this
question?
KEITEL: The fact that, starting from a certain date in the summer of
1944, machine-gun attacks from aircraft against the population as has
already been mentioned here, increased considerably, with 30 to 40 dead
on certain days, caused Hitler to demand categorically an adequate
ruling on this question. We soldiers were of the opinion that existing
regulations were sufficient, and that new regulations were unnecessary.
The question of lynch law was dragged into the problem and the question
of what was meant by the term terror-flier. These two groups of
questions resulted in the very large quantity of documents which you all
know, and which contain the text of the discussion on these subjects.
DR. NELTE: I think it will not be necessary to repeat the details which
have already been discussed. In connection with your responsibility, I
am interested in the words which you have written across this document.
Please, will you explain those?
KEITEL: I merely wanted to state, first of all, that I had suggested,
following the lines of the warning issued when German prisoners of war
taken at Dieppe were shackled, that a warning should be issued here,
too, in the form of a similar official note, saying that we should make
reprisals unless the enemy commanders stopped the practice of their own
accord. That was turned down as not being a suitable course of action.
And now let us turn to the documents, which are important to me.
DR. NELTE: Document 735-PS.
KEITEL: There are some notes in handwriting made by Jodl and myself.
That is the record of a report written by me in the margin which runs as
follows: “Courts-martial will not work”; at least that was the content.
That was written at the time because the question of sentence by
courts-martial came up for discussion since this very document laid down
in detail for the first time what a terror-flier was, and because it
stated that terror attacks were always attacks carried out from
low-flying aircraft with machine guns. I was led to think that crews
attacking in low-level flights could not, generally speaking, in 99 out
of 100 cases be captured alive, if they crashed; for there is no
possibility of saving oneself with a parachute from a low-level attack.
Therefore, I wrote that remark in the margin. Furthermore, I considered,
apart from the fact that one could not conduct proceedings against such
a flier, one would, secondly, not be able to conclude a satisfactory
trial or a satisfactory investigation if an attack had been carried out
from a considerable height, because no court, in my opinion, would be
able to prove that such a man had had the intention of attacking those
targets which possibly were hit.
Finally, there was one last thought, which was that, in accordance with
the rules, court-martial sentences against prisoners of war had to be
communicated to the enemy state through the protecting power, and 3
months’ grace had to be given during which the home state could object
to the sentence. It was, therefore, out of the question that, through
those channels the deterrent results desired could be achieved within a
brief period. That was really what I meant. I also wrote another note,
and this refers to lynch law. It states: “If you allow lynching at all,
then you can hardly lay down rules for it.”
To that I cannot say very much, since my conviction is that there is no
possibility of saying under what circumstances such a method could be
regulated or considered justified by mob justice, and I am still of the
opinion that rules cannot be laid down, if such proceedings are
tolerated.
DR. NELTE: But what was your attitude regarding the question of lynch
law?
KEITEL: It was my point of view that it was a method completely
impossible for us soldiers. One case had been reported by the Reich
Marshal in which proceedings against a soldier who had stopped such
action were suppressed. I know of no case where soldiers, with reference
to their duty as soldiers, behaved towards a prisoner of war in any way
other than that laid down in the general regulations. That is unknown to
me.
I should also like to state, and this has not been mentioned yet, that I
had a discussion with Reich Marshal Göring at the Berghof about the
whole question, and he, at that time, quite clearly agreed with me: We
soldiers must reject lynch law under any circumstances. I requested him
in this awkward position in which we found ourselves to approach Hitler
once more personally, to persuade him not to compel us to give an order
in these matters or to draft an order. That was the situation.
DR. NELTE: We are now turning to questions relating to prisoners of war.
KEITEL: May I just say finally that an order from the OKW was never
submitted and never issued.
DR. NELTE: There is hardly any problem in the law of warfare in which
all nations and all people are so passionately interested as the
prisoner-of-war question. That is why, here too, the Prosecution have
stressed particularly those cases which were considered to be violations
of laws for prisoners of war, according to the Geneva Convention, or to
international law in general.
Since the OKW, and you as its Chief, were responsible for
prisoner-of-war questions in Germany, I should like to put the following
questions to you: What had been done in Germany to make all departments
and offices of the Wehrmacht acquainted with international agreements
which referred to prisoners of war?
KEITEL: There was a special military manual on that subject, which I
think is available, and which contained all the clauses in the existing
international agreements and the provisions for carrying them out. That
is, I think, Directive Number 38, which applied to the Army and the
Navy, and also to the Luftwaffe as a military manual. That was the
basis, the basic order.
DR. NELTE: How was that put into practice? Were people who were
concerned with such questions in practice instructed, or was it
sufficient to draw their attention to the Army directives?
KEITEL: Every department right down to the smallest unit had these
directives, and every soldier up to a certain point was instructed on
them. Apart from that, no further explanations and regulations were
issued at the beginning of the war.
DR. NELTE: I am thinking of the courses of instruction instituted in
Vienna for that particular purpose. Do you know that they took place in
Vienna?
KEITEL: It is known to me that such matters were the subject of courses
of instructions suitable for those people who were actually in contact
with prisoner-of-war matters. They took the form of training courses.
DR. NELTE: Is it, furthermore, correct that every soldier had a leaflet
in his pay book?
KEITEL: Yes. That has already been confirmed by General Milch the other
day, who had it with him.
DR. NELTE: When were the first instructions regarding prisoners of war
given in our case?
KEITEL: As far as I know, the first instructions appeared after the
beginning of the Polish campaign in the East, since every—I should like
to say—preparatory measure for reception of prisoners of war had been
rejected by Hitler. He had prohibited it. Afterwards things had to be
improvised at very short notice.
DR. NELTE: What was ordered?
KEITEL: It was ordered that the three branches of the Wehrmacht, the
Navy, Army and Luftwaffe—the latter had to do with it only to a limited
extent—but particularly the Army should make appropriate preparations
for camps, guards, and whatever was necessary for the establishment and
the organization of such things.
DR. NELTE: Please tell us what the functions of the OKW were regarding
the treatment and care of prisoners of war?
KEITEL: The principal instruction was treatment according to Directive
KGV-38 (Prisoner of War Regulation 38) based on international
agreements; in my opinion it contained absolutely everything which the
people concerned should know. Apart from that, no additional
instructions were issued at that time, but the above directive was
applied.
DR. NELTE: I should like to know first of all how far the OKW had
jurisdiction regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.
KEITEL: The OKW was, shall I say, the ministerial directing department
which had to issue and prepare all basic regulations and directives
concerning these questions. It was entitled to make sure, by means of
inspections and surprise visits, that the instructions were carried out.
In other words, it was the head office which issued directives and was
entitled to make inspections, but was not in command of the camps
themselves.
DR. NELTE: Should one not add the contact with the Foreign Office?
KEITEL: Of course, I forgot that. One of the main tasks of the entire
Wehrmacht, and therefore of the Navy and Luftwaffe too, was to
communicate with the protecting powers, through the Foreign Office and
also to communicate with the International Red Cross and all agencies
interested in the welfare of prisoners of war. I had forgotten that.
DR. NELTE: Therefore the OKW was, generally speaking, the legislator and
the control organ.
KEITEL: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: What did the branches of the Wehrmacht have to do?
KEITEL: The Navy and the Luftwaffe had camps under their command, which
were restricted to prisoners of war belonging to their own arms; and so
did the Army. But owing to the large numbers belonging to the Army, the
deputy commanding generals of the home front, that is, the commanders of
the Wehrkreise were the commanding authorities who in their area were in
charge of the camps.
DR. NELTE: Now, let us take the prisoner-of-war camps. Who was at the
head of such a camp?
KEITEL: In the Wehrkreis command, there was a commander or a general
responsible for questions relating to prisoners of war in the Wehrkreis
concerned, and the camp itself was under the charge of a camp commandant
who had a small staff of officers, among them an intelligence officer
and similar personnel who were necessary for such matters.
DR. NELTE: Who was the superior officer of the general for
prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis?
KEITEL: The commander of the Wehrkreis was the superior officer of the
commander for prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis.
DR. NELTE: Who was the superior of the Wehrkreis commander?
KEITEL: The Wehrkreis commanders were under the Commander-in-Chief of
the Home Army and the Reserve, and he in turn under the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDREDTH DAY
Friday, 5 April 1946
_Morning Session_
DR. NELTE: The last question I asked you yesterday concerned the channel
through which orders were transmitted in matters concerning prisoners of
war. You said that orders went from the camp commander to the army
district commander and then by the commander of the reserve army to the
OKH, the High Command of the Army. I should now like to have you tell me
who was responsible if something happened in a PW camp which violated
the Geneva Convention or was a breach of generally recognized
international law. Was that your business? Was the OKW responsible?
KEITEL: The OKW was responsible in the case of incidents which violated
general orders, that is, basic instructions issued by the OKW, or in the
case of failure to exercise the right to inspect. In such circumstances
I would say that the OKW was responsible.
DR. NELTE: How did the OKW exercise its right to inspect camps?
KEITEL: At first, in the early days of the war, through an inspector of
the Prisoners of War Organization (the KGW), who was at the same time
the office or departmental chief of the department KGW in the General
Office of the Armed Forces. In a certain sense, he exercised a double
function. Later on, after 1942 I believe, it was done by appointing an
inspector general who had nothing to do with the correspondence or
official work on the ministerial side.
DR. NELTE: What was the control by the protecting powers and the
International Red Cross?
KEITEL: If a protecting power wished to send a delegation to inspect
camps, that was arranged by the department or the inspector for the
prisoner-of-war matters, and he accompanied the delegation. Perhaps I
ought to say that, as far as the French were concerned, Ambassador
Scapini carried out that function personally and that a protecting power
did not exist in this form.
DR. NELTE: Could the representatives of the protecting powers and the
Red Cross talk freely to the prisoners of war or only in the presence of
officers of the German Armed Forces?
KEITEL: I do not know whether the procedure adopted in camps was always
in accordance with the basic instructions, which were to render possible
a direct exchange of views between prisoners of war and visitors from
their own countries. As a general rule, it was allowed and made
possible.
DR. NELTE: Did you as the chief of the OKW concern yourself personally
with the general instructions on prisoner-of-war matters?
KEITEL: Yes. I did concern myself with the general instructions. Apart
from that, my being tied to the Führer and to headquarters naturally
made it impossible for me to be in continuous contact with my offices.
There were, however, the KGW branch office and the inspector, as well as
the Chief of the General Armed Forces Office who was, in any case,
responsible to me and dealt with these matters. These three departments
had to deal with the routine work; and I, myself, was called on when
decisions had to be made and when the Führer interfered in person, as he
frequently did, and gave orders of his own.
DR. NELTE: According to the documents presented here in Court, Soviet
prisoners of war seem to have received different treatment from the
other prisoners. What can you say on that subject?
KEITEL: It is true that in this connection there was a difference in
treatment due to the view, frequently stated by the Führer, that the
Soviet Union on their part had not observed or ratified the Geneva
Convention. It was also due to the part played by “ideological
conceptions regarding the conduct of the war.” The Führer emphasized
that we had a free hand in this field.
DR. NELTE: I am now going to show you Document EC-388, Exhibit USSR-356.
It is dated 15 September 1941.
Part 1 is the minutes of a report by the Foreign Intelligence Department
of the OKW. Part 2 is a directive from the OKW, dated 8 September 1941,
regarding the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war. Part 3 is a
memorandum on the guarding of Soviet prisoners of war, and the last
document is a copy of the decree by the Council of People’s Commissars
regarding the prisoners of war matters dated 1 July 1941.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
KEITEL: Perhaps I can say by way of introduction that these directives
were not issued until September, which can be attributed to the fact
that at first an order by Hitler existed, saying that Russian prisoners
of war were not to be brought back to Reich territory. This order was
later on rescinded.
Now, regarding the directive of 8 September 1941, the full text of which
I have before me, I should like to say that all these instructions have
their origin in the idea that this was a battle of nationalities, for
the initial phrase reads, “Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of National
Socialist Germany.” That, in my opinion, immediately shows the basis on
which these instructions were made and the motives and ideas from which
they sprang. It is a fact that Hitler, as I explained yesterday, did not
consider this a battle between two states to be waged in accordance with
the rules of international law but as a conflict between two ideologies.
There are also several statements in the document regarding selection
from two points of view: Selection of people who seem, if I may express
it in this way, not dangerous to us; and the selection of those who, on
account of their political activities and their fanaticism, had to be
isolated as representing a particularly dangerous threat to National
Socialism.
Turning to the introductory letter, I may say that it has already been
presented here by the Prosecutor of the Soviet Union. It is a letter
from the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the OKW, Admiral Canaris,
reminding one of the general order which I have just mentioned and
adding a series of remarks in which he formulates and emphasizes his
doubts about the decree and his objections to it. About the memorandum
which is attached I need not say any more. It is an extract, and also
the orders which the Soviet Union issued in their turn I think on 1
July, for the treatment of prisoners of war, that is, the directives for
the treatment of German prisoners of war. I received this on 15
September, whereas the other order had been issued about a week earlier;
and after studying this report from Canaris, I must admit I shared his
objections. Therefore I took all the papers to Hitler and asked him to
cancel the provisions and to make a further statement on the subject.
The Führer said that we could not expect that German prisoners of war
would be treated according to the Geneva Convention or international law
on the other side. We had no way of investigating it and he saw no
reason to alter the directives he had issued on that account. He refused
point-blank, so I returned the file with my marginal notes to Admiral
Canaris. The order remained in force.
DR. NELTE: What was the actual treatment accorded to Soviet prisoners of
war? Was it in compliance with the instructions issued or was it handled
differently in practice?
KEITEL: According to my own personal observations and the reports which
have been put before me, the practice was, if I may say so, very much
better and more favorable than the very severe instructions first issued
when it had been agreed that the prisoners of war were to be transported
to Germany. At any rate, I have seen numerous reports stating that labor
conditions, particularly in agriculture, but also in war economy, and in
particular in the general institution of war economy such as railways,
the building of roads, and so on, were considerably better than might
have been expected, considering the severe terms of the instructions.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, may I refer on this occasion to Document
Number 6 in the document book?
THE PRESIDENT: Which document book?
DR. NELTE: Document Number 6, in Document Book Number 1—in my document
book, Number 6—“Conditions of employment for workers from the East, as
well as Soviet Russian prisoners of war.” In this document book I have
included from the book I am submitting only those passages which concern
the conditions of employment for Soviet Russian prisoners of war. I am
submitting this book in evidence as Exhibit K-6, and beg the Tribunal to
admit it in evidence without my having to read from it. These
instructions refer expressly to the points which indicate that at a
later period Soviet Russian prisoners of war were to be treated in
accordance with the Geneva Convention as laid down by the OKW, author of
the decree.
May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. You do not wish to read from it?
DR. NELTE: No, I do not want to.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, will you explain to me just what
relations existed between the police, or rather Himmler, on the one hand
and the Prisoners of War Organization, the KGW, on the other?
KEITEL: May I say, first of all, that there was constant friction
between Himmler and the corresponding police services and the
departments of the Wehrmacht which worked in this sphere and that this
friction never stopped. It was apparent right from the first that
Himmler at least desired to have the lead in his own hands, and he never
ceased trying to obtain influence of one kind or another over
prisoner-of-war affairs. The natural circumstances of escapes, recapture
by police, searches and inquiries, the complaints about insufficient
guarding of prisoners, the insufficient security measures in the camps,
the lack of guards and their inefficiency—all these things suited him;
and he exploited them in talks with Hitler, when he continually accused
the Wehrmacht behind its back, if I may use the expression, of every
possible shortcoming and failure to carry out their duty. As a result of
this Hitler was continually intervening, and in most cases I did not
know the reason. He took up the charges and intervened constantly in
affairs so that the Wehrmacht departments were kept in what I might term
a state of perpetual unrest. In this connection, since I could not
investigate matters myself, I was forced to give instructions to my
departments in the OKW.
DR. NELTE: What was the underlying cause and the real purpose which
Himmler attempted to achieve?
KEITEL: He wanted not only to gain influence but also, as far as
possible, to have prisoner-of-war affairs under himself as Chief of
Police in Germany so that he would reign supreme in these matters, if I
may say so.
DR. NELTE: Did not the question of procuring labor enter into it?
KEITEL: Later on that did become apparent, yes. I think I shall have to
refer to that later but I can say now that one observation at least was
made which could not be misinterpreted: The searches and inquiries, made
at certain intervals in Germany for escaped persons, made it clear that
the majority of these prisoners of war did not go back to the camps from
which they had escaped so that obviously they had been retained by
police departments and probably used for labor under the jurisdiction of
Himmler. Naturally, the number of escapes increased every year and
became more and more extensive. For that, of course, there are quite
plausible reasons.
DR. NELTE: The prisoner-of-war system, of course, is pretty closely
connected with the labor problem. Which departments were responsible for
the employment of prisoners of war?
KEITEL: The departments which dealt with this were the State Labor
Offices in the so-called Reich Labor Allocation Service, which had
originally been in the hands of the Labor Minister and was later on
transferred to the Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor. In
practice it worked like this: The State Labor Offices applied for
workers to the Army district commands which had jurisdiction over the
camps. These workers were supplied as far as was possible under the
existing general directives.
DR. NELTE: What did the OKW have to do with the allocation of labor?
KEITEL: In general, of course, they had to supervise it, so that
allocation was regulated according to the general basic orders. It was
not possible, of course, and the inspector was not in a position to
check on how each individual was employed; after all, the army district
commanders and their generals for the KGW were responsible for that and
were the appropriate persons. The actual fight, as I might call it, for
prisoner-of-war labor did not really start until 1942. Until then, such
workers had been employed mainly in agriculture and the German railway
system and a number of general institutions, but not in industry. This
applies especially to Soviet prisoners of war who were, in the main,
agricultural workers.
DR. NELTE: What was the actual cause for these labor requirements?
KEITEL: During the winter of 1941-42 the problem of replacing soldiers
who had dropped out arose, particularly in the eastern theater of war.
Considerable numbers of soldiers fit for active service were needed for
the front and the armed services. I remember the figures. The army alone
needed replacements numbering from 2 to 2.5 million men every year.
Assuming that about 1 million of these would come from normal recruiting
and about half a million from rehabilitated men, that is, from sick and
wounded men who had recovered, that still left 1.5 million to be
replaced every year. These could be withdrawn from the war economy and
placed at the disposal of the services, the Armed Forces. From this fact
resulted the close correlation between the drawing off of these men from
the war economy and their replacement by new workers. This manpower had
to be taken from the prisoners of war on the one hand and
Plenipotentiary Sauckel, whose functions may be summarized as the task
of procuring labor, on the other hand. This connection kept bringing me
into these matters, too, since I was responsible for the replacements
for all the Wehrmacht—Army, Navy, and Air Force—in other words, for
the recruiting system. That is why I was present at discussions between
Sauckel and the Führer regarding replacements and how these replacements
were to be found.
DR. NELTE: What can you tell me about the allocation of prisoners of war
in industry and in the armament industry?
KEITEL: Up to 1942 or thereabouts we had not used prisoners of war in
any industry even indirectly connected with armaments. This was due to
an express prohibition issued by Hitler, which was made by him because
he feared attempts at sabotaging machines, production equipment, _et
cetera_. He regarded things of that kind as probable and dangerous. Not
until necessity compelled us to use every worker in some capacity in the
home factories did we abandon this principle. It was no longer
discussed; and naturally prisoners of war came to be used after that in
the general war production, while my view which I, that is the OKW,
expressed in my general orders, was that their use in armament factories
was forbidden; I thought that it was not permissible to employ prisoners
of war in factories which were exclusively making armaments, by which I
mean war equipment, weapons, and munitions.
For the sake of completeness, perhaps I should add that an order issued
by the Führer at a later date decreed further relaxation of the
limitations of the existing orders. I think the Prosecution stated that
Minister Speer is supposed to have spoken of so many thousands of
prisoners of war employed in the war economy. I may say, however, that
many jobs had to be done in the armament industry which had nothing to
do with the actual production of arms and ammunition.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have frequently stated that prisoners of war
were detained by the police and even placed in concentration camps. Can
you give an explanation about that?
KEITEL: I think the explanation of that is that the selection process
already mentioned took place in the camps. Furthermore there are
documents to show that prisoners of war in whose case the disciplinary
powers of the commander were not sufficient were singled out and handed
over to the Secret State Police. Finally, I have already mentioned the
subject of prisoners who escaped and were recaptured, a considerable
number of whom, if not the majority, did not return to their camps.
Instructions on the part of the OKW or the Chief of Prisoners of War
Organization ordering the surrender of these prisoners to concentration
camps are not known to me and have never been issued. But the fact that,
when they were handed over to the police, they frequently did end up in
the concentration camps has been made known here in various ways, by
documents and witnesses. That is my explanation.
DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have presented a document which bears
the Number 1650-PS. This is an order, or, rather, an alleged order, from
the OKW ordering that escaped prisoners of war who are not employed are
to be surrendered to the Security Service. After what you have just told
us, you will have to give an explanation of that. I am showing you, in
addition, Document 1514-PS, an order from the Wehrkreiskommando VI (Area
Command), from which you will be able to see the procedure adopted by
the OKW in connection with the surrender of prisoners of war to the
Secret State Police.
KEITEL: First of all, I want to discuss Document 1650-PS. To begin with,
I have to state that I did not know of that order, that it was never in
my hands, and that so far I have not been able to find out how it came
to be issued.
DR. NELTE: Wouldn’t you like to say, first of all, that the document as
such is not a document of the OKW?
KEITEL: I am coming to that.
DR. NELTE: I am afraid you must start with that in order to clear up the
matter.
KEITEL: The document starts like a document which has been confiscated
in a police department. It starts with the words, “The OKW has ordered
as follows:”; after that come the Numbers 1, 2, 3 and then it goes on to
say, “In this connection I order...”, and that is the Supreme Police
Chief of the Reich Security Head Office; it is signed by Müller, not
Kaltenbrunner but Müller. I have certainly not signed this order OKW 1
to 3, and I have not seen it; there is no doubt about that. The fact
that technical expressions, “Stage 3 b” _et cetera_, are used proves
that in itself. These are terms used by the police and they are unknown
to me. I must say, therefore, that I am not sure how this document was
drafted. I cannot explain it. There are assumptions and possibilities,
and I should like to mention them briefly because I have given a great
deal of thought to the matter. First, I do not believe that any
department of the OKW, that is, the Chief of Prisoners of War
Organization or the Chief of the General Wehrmacht Office, could have
issued this order independently without instructions to do so. I
consider that quite impossible, as it was completely contrary to the
general tendency. I have no recollection that I have ever received any
instructions of this kind from Hitler or that I have passed any such
instruction on to anybody else. I conclude that even if this may look
like an excuse, there were, of course, other channels which the Führer
used without regard to competency. And, if I must supply an explanation,
such orders could have been given through an adjutant without my
knowledge. I emphasize that this is a supposition and that it cannot
absolve me from blame.
There is only one thing that I would like to say, and that is with
reference to the Document 1514-PS. This is a captured order from the
Wehrkreiskommando VI, at Münster, dated 27 July 1944, in other words,
the summer of 1944. It deals with escaped prisoners of war and how they
are to be dealt with. It says “Reference,” and then it quotes seven
different orders from the year 1942 up to the beginning of July 1944.
This order deals with the question of escaped prisoners of war and ought
to have been incorporated in this document, if the military office of
Wehrkreis VI had had such an OKW order. That fact is remarkable, and it
led me to the conclusion that there never was a written order and that
the military authorities in question never received such an order at
all. I cannot say more about it since I cannot prove it.
DR. NELTE: You know that the Prosecution have submitted an order,
according to which Soviet Russian prisoners of war were to be marked by
means of tattooing, so that they could be identified. Would you please
make a statement on that?
KEITEL: The facts are as follows: During the summer of 1942, the Führer
called the Quartermaster General of the Army to headquarters for a
report lasting several hours, at which the Führer asked him to report on
conditions in the Eastern rear army territory. I was suddenly called in
and told that the Quartermaster General was saying that thousands of
Russian prisoners of war were escaping every month, that they
disappeared among the population, immediately discarded their uniforms,
and procured civilian clothes, and could no longer be identified. I was
ordered to make investigations and to devise some means of
identification which would enable them to be identified even after they
had put on civilian clothing. Thereupon I sent instructions to Berlin,
saying that such an order should be prepared but that investigations
should first be made by the international law department of the Foreign
Office to find out whether such an order could be given at all; and,
secondly, whether it could be carried out technically.
I should like to say that we were thinking of tattoo marks of the kind
found on many seamen and bricklayers in Germany. But I heard no more
about it. One day I met the Foreign Minister at headquarters and talked
to him about the question. Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop knew about
the inquiry submitted to the Foreign Office and considered the measure
extremely questionable. That was the first news I had about the subject.
I gave immediate instructions, whether personally or through the
adjutant I cannot remember, that the order was not to go out. I had
neither seen a draft nor had I signed anything. At any rate I gave an
unmistakable order: “The order is in no circumstances to be issued.” I
received no further detailed information at the time. I heard nothing
more about it and I was convinced that the order had not been issued.
When I was interrogated, I made a statement on those lines. I have now
been told by my Defense Counsel that the woman secretary of the Chief of
the Prisoners of War Organization has volunteered to testify that the
order was rescinded and was not to be issued and, further, that she had
received those instructions personally. She said in her statement,
however, that this did not happen until several days after the order had
actually gone out and that that was the only possible explanation of how
that order came to be found in the police office as still valid.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I shall submit the affidavit of the witness
which has been received at the appropriate time.
[_Turning to the defendant._] We now turn to the case of Sagan. The
Prosecution originally accused you of giving the order for the killing
of 50 Royal Air Force officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III at
Sagan.
I am no longer clear as to whether the Prosecution still maintain this
grave accusation since Reich Marshal Göring and the witness Westhoff
have been interrogated, the latter outside these proceedings. I have the
report of Westhoff’s interrogation before me and I have also submitted
it to you. I should like to ask you now to amplify the statement which
the witness Westhoff made during the preliminary proceedings and which
he will make shortly in this court, and to say what you yourself know
about this extremely grave incident.
KEITEL: The facts are that one morning it was reported to me that the
escape had taken place. At the same time I received the information that
about 15 of the escaped officers had been apprehended in the vicinity of
the camp. I did not intend to report the case at the noon conference on
the military situation held at Berchtesgaden, or rather, at the Berghof,
as it was highly unpleasant, being the third mass escape in a very short
period. As it had happened only 10 or 12 hours before, I hoped that in
the course of the day the majority of them would be caught and that in
this way the matter might be settled satisfactorily.
While I was making my report Himmler appeared. I think that it was
towards the end of my report that he announced the incident in my
presence, as he had already started the usual general search for the
escaped prisoners. There was an extremely heated discussion, a serious
clash between Hitler and myself, since he immediately made the most
outrageous accusations against me on account of this incident.
Things are sometimes incorrectly represented in Westhoff’s account, and
that is why I am making a detailed statement. During this clash the
Führer stated in great excitement, “These prisoners are not to be sent
back to the Armed Forces; they are to stay with the Police.” I
immediately objected sharply. I said that this procedure was impossible.
The general excitement led Hitler to declare again and with considerable
emphasis, “I am ordering you to retain them, Himmler; you are not to
give them up.”
I put up a fight for the men who had already come back and who should,
according to the original order, be brought out again and handed over to
the police. I succeeded in doing it; but I could not do anything more.
After that very grave clash...
DR. NELTE: Will you tell me, please who was present during that scene?
KEITEL: As far as I remember, Colonel General Jodl was certainly
present, at least for part of the time, and heard some of it, though
perhaps not every word, since he was in the adjoining room at first. At
any rate, Jodl and I returned to our quarters together. We discussed the
case and talked about the extremely unpleasant consequences which the
whole matter would have. On returning to my quarters I immediately
ordered General Von Graevenitz to report to me the following morning.
In this connection I must explain that Reich Marshal Göring was not
present. If I was a little uncertain about that during my interrogation
it was because I was told that witnesses had already stated that Göring
was present. But right from the beginning I thought it improbable and
doubtful. It is also incorrect, therefore, that Göring raised any
accusations against me at the time. There had not been a conference in
Berlin either. These are mistakes which I think I can explain by saying
that Graevenitz, who came with Westhoff and saw me for the first time,
was present during the report and witnessed a scene of a kind unusual in
military life, because of the violence of my remarks in connection with
the incident.
Do you want me to say anything more about the discussion with
Graevenitz?
DR. NELTE: The only thing which interests me in this connection is,
whether you repeated to Graevenitz the order previously given by Hitler
in such a way that both Graevenitz and Westhoff who was also present,
might get the impression that you yourself had issued the order for the
shooting of the escaped officers.
KEITEL: According to the record of Westhoff’s interrogation, which I
have seen, I can explain it, I think, as follows: first of all, I made
serious accusations. I myself was extraordinarily excited, for I must
say that even the order that the prisoners were to be retained by the
police caused me extreme anxiety regarding their fate. I frankly admit
that the possibility of their being shot while trying to escape remained
in my subconscious mind. I certainly spoke in extreme agitation at the
time and did not weigh my words carefully. And I certainly repeated
Hitler’s words, which were, “We must make an example,” since I was
afraid of some further serious encroachments upon the Prisoners of War
Organization in other ways, apart from this single case of the prisoners
not being returned to the Wehrmacht. On reading the interrogation report
I saw the statement by Graevenitz, or rather, Westhoff, to the effect
that I had said, “They will be shot, and most of them must be dead
already.” I probably said something like, “You will see what a disaster
this is; perhaps many of them have been shot already.”
I did not know, however, that they had already been shot; and I must
confess that in my presence Hitler never said a word about anybody being
shot. He only said, “Himmler, you will keep them; you will not hand them
over.” I did not find out until several days later that they had been
shot. I saw among other papers also an official report from the British
Government stating that not until the 31st—the escape took place on the
25th—that not until the 31st were they actually shot.
Therefore Westhoff is also wrong in thinking that orders had already
been issued saying that an announcement was to be made in the camp
stating that certain people had been shot or would not return and that
lists of names were to be posted. That order did not come until later,
and I remember it; I remember it because of the following incident:
A few days afterwards, I think on or about the 31st, before the
situation report, one of the adjutants told me that a report had been
received that some had been shot. I requested a discussion alone with
Hitler and told him that I had heard that people had been shot by the
police. All he said was that he had received it too—naturally, since it
was his report. In extreme disgust I told him my opinion of it. At that
time he told me that it was to be published in the camp as a warning to
the others. Only upon this the announcement in the camp was ordered. In
any case, Westhoff’s recollection of some of the facts, which he has
sworn to, is not quite accurate, even if such expressions as those used
by him and explained by me here may have occurred. We shall hear his own
account of that.
DR. NELTE: Did Hitler ever tell you that he had ordered those men to be
shot?
KEITEL: No, he never told me that. I never heard it from him. I heard it
very much later, as far as I can remember, from Reich Marshal Göring,
with whom the whole incident was, of course, the subject of discussions
and conversations, especially as an Air Force camp was involved.
DR. NELTE: I should like to say in conclusion: Are you stating under
oath, here, that you yourself neither ordered these Royal Air Force
officers to be shot, nor did you receive and pass on such an order, nor
did you yourself learn who gave the order?
KEITEL: That is correct. I neither received that order nor did I know or
hear of it; nor did I pass on such an order. I can repeat this herewith
under oath.
DR. NELTE: We now turn to deportations. What the Prosecution refer to as
deportation of workers is the removal of bodily fit citizens of the
occupied territories to Germany or other occupied territories for the
purpose of using them for “slave labor” on defense work or other tasks
connected with warfare. That is the accusation which I have read to you.
The Prosecution have repeatedly coupled your name with these accusations
and have said that you, that is, the OKW, had co-operated in supplying
workers for the German war economy. You know that in fact the Defendant
Sauckel was the Plenipotentiary in that field. I should like to ask you
whether workers had been taken from the occupied territories and brought
to Germany before Plenipotentiary Sauckel was appointed.
KEITEL: As far as I know, workers came from occupied territories,
especially those in the West: Belgium, Holland—I do not know about
Holland, but certainly France—to Germany. According to what I heard, I
understood at the time that it was done by recruiting volunteers. I
think I remember that General Von Stülpnagel, the military commander of
Paris, told me in Berlin once during a meeting that more than 200,000
had volunteered, but I cannot remember exactly when that was.
DR. NELTE: Was the OKW the competent authority on these matters?
KEITEL: No, the OKW had nothing to do with it. These questions were
handled through the usual channels, the OKH, the Military Commanders in
France and in Belgium and Northern France with the competent central
authorities of the Reich at home, the OKW never had anything to do with
it.
DR. NELTE: What about civilian administration in occupied territories?
KEITEL: In occupied territories with civilian administration, the
Wehrmacht was excluded from any executive powers in the administration,
so that in these territories the Wehrmacht and its services had
certainly nothing to do with it. Only in those territories which were
still operational areas for the Army were executive powers given to
military troops, high commanders, army commanders, _et cetera_. The OKW
did not come into the official procedure here either.
DR. NELTE: According to an interrogation report submitted here the
Defendant Sauckel said that you, that is, the OKW, were responsible for
giving instructions to the military commanders in the occupied
territories and that he, Sauckel, was to have their support in his
recruiting campaigns for getting the quotas. What can you say about
that?
KEITEL: The view held by Plenipotentiary Sauckel can obviously be
explained by the fact that he knew neither the official service channels
nor the functions of the Wehrmacht, that he saw me at one or two
discussions on the furnishing of manpower, and, thirdly, that he
sometimes came to see me when he had made his report and received his
orders alone. He had probably been given orders to do so, in Hitler’s
usual way: Go and see the Chief of the OKW; he will do the rest. The OKW
had no occasion to do anything. The OKW had no right to give orders, but
in Sauckel’s case I did take over the job of informing the OKH or the
technical departments in the General Quartermaster’s office. I have
never issued orders or instructions of my own to the military commanders
or other services in occupied territories. It was not one of the
functions of the OKW.
DR. NELTE: A document has been submitted here according to which
Generals Stapf and Nagel had agreed to ask you to exercise pressure or
coercion during the recruiting campaigns in the East. That, at any rate,
is the assertion by the Prosecution. Do you know of this happening?
KEITEL: I remembered it when the document was presented. It was
obviously an attempt on the part of Stapf, who had worked with me in the
Army for many years, to get the Führer’s support or assistance through
my mediation. Stapf, who was the director of the Economic Staff East at
the time, and General Nagel, who was also mentioned in this connection
and who was in charge of the Economic Inspectorate Department in the
East, had obviously tried to involve me in the matter. According to the
document, some pressure had to be applied from higher quarters; but I
took no steps at all as I had nothing to do with these things.
DR. NELTE: I am now going to deal with the question of the pillage of
art treasures.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we might adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have accused you, among other things,
of issuing directives regarding the safeguarding and confiscation of
objects of art, libraries, _et cetera_. Were any military orders,
directives, or instructions laid down before the campaign in the West or
in the East, with regard to objects of art, libraries, and their
treatment in occupied territories?
KEITEL: No, as far as I know, there was nothing at all about these
matters, although thorough provision had been made for everything else
which might happen in the course of a war. I am not aware of any orders
which were given with that in mind.
DR. NELTE: I am going to show you three documents submitted by the
French Prosecution, which mention you in connection with Rosenberg’s
special staff, which has already been mentioned here on various
occasions. These are Documents 137-PS, 138-PS, and 140-PS. These are
documents from the Chief of the OKW to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army in France and in the Netherlands.
KEITEL: The first two documents, 137-PS and 138-PS, came from
headquarters. They were dictated in part by myself and sent to offices
of the Army. One says “To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,” the other
one “To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Occupied France” and to
the “Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands.” They originated
partly in answers to queries from various military offices which
considered themselves responsible for the safekeeping or guarding of
whatever was in the occupied territories, and also from offices which
obviously were going to collect, inspect, to register, or otherwise
investigate these art treasures, libraries, _et cetera_, and to
confiscate them. In one case I was called up on the phone by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, I think, who protested against this, at
other times by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. The Führer directed me to
instruct military services to acquiesce in this and to state their
agreements, as they were directives which he had issued and approved
himself. The way in which the documents are drawn up shows, in itself,
that they did not emanate from an OKW office. My adjutant signed them;
but I myself dictated them on the Führer’s orders and sent them out.
These queries may have been made just because no provision had been made
and no orders given. I did not know what was to be done with these art
treasures, _et cetera_; but I naturally took the view that the object
was to safeguard them. No mention was made of transport, or
confiscation, or expropriation; and the question did not occur to me; I
merely gave these instructions in quite a brief form and did not bother
any further about the matter. I took them to be precautionary measures
and they did not seem to me to be unjustified.
DR. NELTE: Then you mean the OKW had no jurisdiction over these affairs?
KEITEL: No.
DR. NELTE: It was a question of merely transmitting letters to the
military authorities to make known Hitler’s wishes to assist Rosenberg
in his task?
KEITEL: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: I should like to put a personal question to you in this
connection. Have you ever appropriated to yourself any of the art
treasures from public or private ownership in the occupied countries, or
did any office whatever assign any work of art to you?
KEITEL: No, I never had anything to do with these things.
DR. NELTE: We now come to the so-called economic exploitation of
occupied territories. You are accused of participating, in your official
position as Chief of the OKW, in the economic exploitation of the
occupied Eastern countries and the Western occupied countries. This
question has already been discussed in Reich Marshal Göring’s
examination, so I can treat it relatively briefly. It is, however,
necessary for you to clarify the extent to which the OKW, and yourself
in particular, were connected with these matters, for both the OKW and
yourself are mentioned in this connection, as well as the
Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt (Economic Armament Office), which was a branch of
the OKW. General Thomas of that office prepared a compilation which was
produced by the Prosecution. What can you say about this question, if I
have Document 1157-PS and USSR-80 shown to you?
KEITEL: 1157-PS deals with “Plan Barbarossa Oldenburg.” I would like to
say this:
The Wehrwirtschaftsamt (War Economy Office), which even then was no
longer known as the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt carried out under its chief,
General Thomas, certain organizational preparations, first for the
campaign in the West and later for campaign Barbarossa in the East. They
were made by the military economic organization at home, in the Reich,
which had teams attached to all Wehrkreiskommandos. As a result,
advisers and some personnel with experience in problems of war economy
supplies and a few small detachments called Feldwirtschaftskommandos
(Field Economic Detachments) were assigned to the Army Commands (the
A.O.K’s).
The personnel attached to the Quartermaster Staffs at the A.O.K. were
responsible for securing, or causing to be secured, supplies, fuel, and
food stuffs found in occupied or conquered territories, as well as other
articles suitable for the immediate requirements of the troops. They
should then co-operate with the Senior Quartermaster, who looks after my
army supplies, and the intendant in charge of the transport of supplies,
in making them available for the fighting troops. Information obtained
regarding war economy in the important areas of France and Belgium, as
far as such information could be obtained, was kept for later use. The
East, as I believe Reich Marshal Göring has already explained at length,
was organized on quite a different basis with a view not only to
supplying the troops, but also to exploiting the conquered territories.
An organization serving this aim was built up, called
Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost-Oldenburg (Economic Organization
East-Oldenburg). Its connection with the OKW lay in the fact that the
necessary preparations for organizing and developing panels of experts
and technical branch offices had to be discussed with the Ministry of
Economics, the Four Year Plan, and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
That was Wirtschaftsorganisation Oldenburg. The OKW and its Chief, that
is myself, had no power to give orders or instructions affecting its
activities. The organization was created and placed at the disposal of
those responsible for putting it in action, giving it instructions and
working with it. If General Thomas wrote in his book, which was produced
here as a document...
DR. NELTE: 2353-PS (Exhibit Number USA-35), Page 386. Perhaps you will
just read that, so that you can give us a summary.
KEITEL: Yes. This is an excerpt from the book of General Thomas, where
he describes in detail his own functions and those of the organization
which he directed in the OKW, from its origin until far into the war. He
says here:
“The functions exercised by the Economic Armament Office
(Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt) while the Eastern campaign was going on
consisted mainly in the organizational management of the
economic machinery set in motion and in advising the Operational
Staff for War Economy East.”
DR. NELTE: You need read only Paragraph 4 for your summary.
KEITEL: The Operational Staff for Military Economy East, attached to the
Four Year Plan as Barbarossa-Oldenburg, was responsible for the entire
economic direction of the whole of the Eastern area. It was responsible,
for the technical instructions of the State Secretaries in the
Operational Staff for Military Economy, for the organization of Thomas’
Economic Armament Office, and for applying all measures to be taken by
the Operational Staff for Military Economy East under the direction and
command of the Reich Marshal.
DR. NELTE: How were conditions in the West?
KEITEL: I described very briefly the small group of experts attached to
the High Command quartermaster departments in the West. Later on, as I
have already stated, at the beginning of June, the entire economic
direction was transferred to the Four Year Plan and the
plenipotentiaries for the Four Year Plan, as far as anything passed
beyond current supplies intended to cover daily requirements, fuel, _et
cetera_. This was done by a special decree, which has already been
mentioned by the Reich Marshal and which had been issued by the Führer.
DR. NELTE: That was laid down by General Thomas on Page 304 in Document
2353-PS, which we have already mentioned. There is no need for me to
read this; and I request the Tribunal to allow me to present the
defendant’s affidavit in Document Book Number 2 for the Military
Economic Armament Office of the OKW, as Document Keitel-11 in evidence,
so that no further questions on the subject may be necessary. I assume
that the Prosecution will agree to this procedure.
THE PRESIDENT: What number is it in Book 2?
DR. NELTE: Number 4 in this Document Book Number 2. It is Page 27 and
following, in Document Book 2, submitted to the Court. The document is
dated 29 March 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: What date did you say it is?
DR. NELTE: The 29th of March 1946. I do not think there is any date in
the document book. I will present the original, which I have here.
THE PRESIDENT: How is it described in the document itself? We have a
document dated 4 March 1946, “The Economic Armament Office of the
Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.” Is that right?
DR. NELTE: The document was written on 4 March 1946, but the affidavit
was added on 29 March 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: But that appears to have been 8 March? Is it that
document?
DR. NELTE: The Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt in the OKW. It is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: That’s here.
DR. NELTE: In any case, there is no doubt about the identity of the
document.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now I come to a topic which is presented
again and again before the high Tribunal and which is very difficult
because the reason for these questions is not properly understood.
The charge has been made against you that in your capacity as a member
of the government, as the Prosecution contend, you knew, or must have
known of the happenings in the concentration camps. I am therefore
compelled to ask you what you know about the existence of the
concentration camps, how much you knew and what you had to do with them.
Did you know of their existence? Did you know that concentration camps
existed?
KEITEL: Yes, I knew already before the war that concentration camps
existed; but at that time I knew only two of them by name; and I
supposed and assumed that there were other concentration camps besides
the two I knew. I had no further particulars about the existence of
concentration camps. As far as internees in such camps were concerned, I
knew that they included habitual criminals and political opponents. As
Reich Marshal Göring has said, that was the basis of the institution.
DR. NELTE: Did you hear anything about the treatment of internees?
KEITEL: No, I heard nothing precise about it. I assumed that it was a
severe form of detention, or one which brought severe measures in its
train, under certain specific circumstances. I knew nothing about the
conditions found there, especially ill-treatment of internees, tortures,
_et cetera_.
I tried in two cases to free individuals who were in concentration
camps. One was Pastor Niemöller, by intervention of Grossadmiral Raeder.
With the help of Canaris and at the request of Grossadmiral Raeder, I
tried to get Pastor Niemöller out of the concentration camps. The
attempt was unsuccessful. I made a second attempt at the request of a
family in my home village, in a case where a peasant was in a
concentration camp for political reasons; and in this case I succeeded.
The individual involved was set free. That was in the autumn of 1940. I
had a talk with this man; and when I asked him what things were like
there, he gave me a non-committal reply to the effect that he had been
all right. He gave me no details. I know of no other cases.
DR. NELTE: When you talked to this man did you have the impression that
anything had happened to him?
KEITEL: Undoubtedly he did not give that impression. I did not see him
directly after his release. I saw him later when I was at home. The
reason that I talked to him was because he came to thank me. He said
nothing about being badly treated or anything like that at all.
DR. NELTE: It has been stated here that now and again these
concentration camps were visited by members of the Wehrmacht, by
officers—and high ranking officers, too. How do you explain that?
KEITEL: I am convinced that these visits took place on Himmler’s
invitation. I myself once received a personal invitation from him to pay
a visit to the Dachau Camp from Munich. He said he would like to show it
to me. I know also that large and small groups of officers and
commissions were shown through the camps. I think I need scarcely say
how these visits were handled as regards the things that were shown to
them. To supplement my statement I would like to say it was not uncommon
to hear such remarks as “You’ll end up in a concentration camp!” or “All
sorts of things go on there.” I do know, however, that whenever anyone
came to me with these rumors and stories and I asked what exactly they
knew and where the information came from, the reply was always: “I
really do not know; I just heard it.” So that whatever one might think,
one never got at the facts and never could get at them.
DR. NELTE: You heard that medical experiments were made on these
internees, and that this was done by agreement with higher quarters. I
ask you whether you had knowledge of that, either personally or from the
Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.
KEITEL: No, I never heard anything about the medical experiments on
internees, which have been described here in detail, either officially
or otherwise. Nothing.
DR. NELTE: I turn now to a group of questions relating to the
Prosecution’s assertion that you intended to have General Weygand and
General Giraud assassinated or, at least, were participating in plans to
that end. You know that witness Lahousen, on 30 November 1945 stated
that Admiral Canaris had been pressed by you for some time,
November-December 1940, to do away with the Chief of the French General
Staff, General Weygand.
Lahousen added that Canaris told his departmental heads that after a
talk with you. Did you discuss the case of General Weygand with Canaris?
KEITEL: That is probably correct, for there were reports at the time
that General Weygand was traveling in North Africa, visiting the troops,
and inspecting the colonial troops. I consider it quite natural that I
told Canaris, who was the Chief of Counterintelligence, that it should
be possible to determine the object of General Weygand’s journey, the
places at which he stopped in North Africa, and whether any military
significance could be attached to this visit, as regards putting
colonial troops into action or the introduction of other measures
concerning them in North Africa. He is sure to have received
instructions to try to get information through his Intelligence
Department as to what was taking place.
DR. NELTE: I assume, also to keep an eye on him?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Could the Counterintelligence department send members of its
staff to North Africa?
KEITEL: I believe that certain channels of information existed via
Spanish Morocco; and I know that Canaris maintained intelligence links
with Morocco by way of Spain.
DR. NELTE: My question was meant to find out whether it was officially
possible to visit North Africa in agreement with France.
KEITEL: Of course it was possible. After the Armistice, there were
Disarmament Commissions in North Africa, as well as in France. We had
several Army departments there in connection with checking up the
armaments of the North African troops.
DR. NELTE: What was the point, or was there any point, in wishing
General Weygand ill? Was he a declared opponent of the policy Germany
wished to carry through? What was the reason?
KEITEL: We had no reason to think that General Weygand might be, shall
we say, inconvenient. In view of the connection with Marshal Pétain,
which was started about the end of September and the beginning of
October of that year, and the well-known collaboration policy which
reached its height in the winter of 1940-41, it was absurd even to think
of doing away with the Marshal’s Chief of Staff. An action of this kind
would not have fitted into the general policy followed in dealing with
the situation in North Africa. We released a large number of officers in
the regular French Colonial Army from French prisoner-of-war camps in
the winter of 1940-1941 for service with the colonial forces. There were
generals among them; I remember General Juin in particular who, as we
knew at the time, had been Chief of the General Staff in North Africa
for many years. At my suggestion he was put at the disposal of the
Marshal by Hitler, obviously with the aim of utilizing him in the
colonial service. There had not been the slightest motive for wishing
General Weygand ill or to think of anything of the sort.
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that conferences even took place with the
French General Staff and Laval about co-operating in operations in
Africa and the strengthening of West Africa?
KEITEL: Yes. Among the documents of the French Armistice Delegation
there ought to be a large number of documents asking for all sorts of
concessions in connection with North Africa and more especially Central
and West Africa, owing to the fact that during the winter of 1940-41
riots had taken place in French Central Africa against which the French
Government wanted to take measures. I believe that in the spring of 1941
a conference lasting several days took place in Paris with the French
General Staff, in order to prepare measures in which the German
Wehrmacht, which already had troops stationed in Tripoli in the Italian
area, would participate.
DR. NELTE: So there is no apparent motive?
KEITEL: No.
DR. NELTE: Something must have been said, however, in this conversation
with Canaris, which led to this misunderstanding. Can you suggest
anything which might have caused this misunderstanding?
KEITEL: It can only be that, according to the very comprehensive details
given by Lahousen in his testimony, I said at a later meeting, “What
about Weygand?” That was the phrase Lahousen used; and he might have
drawn the conclusion that, perhaps, in that sense of the word, as he
represented it, he kept on saying “in that sense of the word,” and when
asked what that meant, he said, “To kill him.” It is due only to that,
it can be due only to that. I must say that Canaris was frequently alone
with me. Often he brought the chiefs of his departments along. When we
discussed matters by ourselves, I thought he was always perfectly frank
with me. If he had misunderstood me, there would certainly have been
discussions about it, but he never said anything like that.
DR. NELTE: Is it clear to you that if there had been any idea of putting
Weygand out of the way, it would have constituted an act of high
political significance?
KEITEL: Yes, of course. In the collaboration of the Führer Adolf Hitler
and Marshal Pétain an act of that kind would have had the greatest
imaginable political significance.
DR. NELTE: Then you still believe that if it had happened, it would have
meant the breaking-off of the policy initiated by Hitler?
KEITEL: Certainly one would have had to expect that.
DR. NELTE: Only with regard to the great importance of General Weygand’s
personality?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Can you give any other explanation, or any proof that the
designs attributed to you, but thanks be to God were never put into
practice, had no foundation in fact?
KEITEL: Although it was at a much later date that General Weygand was
taken to Germany, on the occupation of the hitherto unoccupied zone of
Southern France, I was told by the Führer himself that he had given
orders only for the general to be interned in his own home, without
being inconvenienced by guards—an honorable arrest and not the
treatment accorded to an ordinary prisoner of war. Of course, that was
in 1942.
DR. NELTE: Therefore, you finally and repeatedly deny under oath that
you gave any order or expressed yourself in any way which might lead
your hearers to conclude that you intended or wished General Weygand to
be put out of the way?
KEITEL: Yes. I can expressly reaffirm that.
DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen also spoke of Giraud and described the
case much in the same way as that of Weygand. In neither case was he in
a position to say from his own first-hand knowledge that you had given
such an order, but he reported what Canaris had told him and illustrated
his testimony by means of later inquiries. I ask you to tell us what you
know about the case of Giraud, which created a sensation at the time and
also here, and to say what part you took in discussions regarding
Giraud.
KEITEL: Giraud’s successful escape from the Fortress of Königstein near
Dresden on 19 April 1942 created a sensation; and I was severely
reprimanded about the guard of this general’s camp, a military fortress.
The escape was successful despite all attempts to recapture the general,
by police or military action, on his way back to France. Canaris had
instructions from me to keep a particularly sharp watch on all the
places at which he might cross the frontier into France or
Alsace-Lorraine, so that we could recapture him. The police were also
put on to this job; 8 or 10 days after his escape it was made known that
the general had arrived safely back in France. If I issued any orders
during this search I probably used the words I gave in the preliminary
interrogations, namely, “We must get the general back, dead or alive.” I
possibly did say something like that. He had escaped and was in France.
Second phase: Efforts, made through the Embassy by Abetz and Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop to induce the general to return to captivity of his
own accord, appeared not to be unsuccessful or impossible, as the
general had declared himself willing to go to the occupied zone to
discuss the matter. I was of the opinion that the general might possibly
do it on account of the concessions hitherto made to Marshal Pétain
regarding personal wishes in connection with the release of French
generals from captivity. The meeting with General Giraud took place in
occupied territory, at the staff quarters of a German Army Corps, where
the question of his return was discussed. The Military Commander
informed me by telephone of the general’s presence in occupied
territory, in the hotel where the German officers were billeted.
The commanding general suggested that if the general would not return
voluntarily it would be a very simple matter to apprehend him if he were
authorized to do so. I at once refused this categorically for I
considered it a breach of faith. The general had come trusting to
receive proper treatment and be returned unmolested.
Third phase: The attempt or desire to get the general back somehow into
military custody arose from the fact that Canaris told me that the
general’s family was residing in territory occupied by German troops;
and it was almost certain that the general would try to see his family,
even if only after a certain period of time and when the incident had
been allowed to drop. He suggested to me to make preparations for the
recapture of the general if he made a visit of this kind in occupied
territory. Canaris said that he himself would initiate these
preparations through his Counterintelligence office in Paris and through
his other offices. Nothing happened for some time; and it was surely
quite natural for me to ask on several occasions, no matter who was with
Canaris or if Lahousen was with him, “What has become of the Giraud
affair?” or, in the same way, “How is the Giraud case getting on?” The
words used by Mr. Lahousen were, “It is very difficult; but we shall do
everything we can.” That was his answer. Canaris made no reply. That
strikes me as significant only now; but at the time it did not occur to
me.
Third phase: At a later stage—Shall I continue?
DR. NELTE: Fourth phase.
KEITEL: Fourth phase. This began with Hitler saying to me: “This is all
nonsense. We are not getting results. Counterintelligence is not capable
of this and cannot handle this matter. I will turn it over to Himmler
and Counterintelligence had better keep out of this, for they will never
get hold of the general again.” Admiral Canaris said at the time that he
was counting on having the necessary security measures taken by the
French secret state police in case General Giraud went to the occupied
zone; and a fight might result, as the general was notoriously a
spirited soldier, a man of 60 who lowers himself 45 meters over a cliff
by means of a rope—that is how he escaped from Königstein.
Fifth phase: According to Lahousen’s explanation in Berlin, Canaris’
desire to transfer the matter to the Secret State Police, which Lahousen
said was done as a result of representations from the departmental
heads, was because I asked again how matters stood with Giraud and he
wanted to get rid of this awkward mission. Canaris came to me and asked
if he could pass it on to the Reich Security Main Office or to the
police. I said yes, because the Führer had already told me repeatedly
that he wanted to hand it over to Himmler.
Next phase: I wanted to warn Canaris some time later, when Himmler came
to see me and confirmed that he had received orders from Hitler to have
Giraud and his family watched unobtrusively and that I was to stop
Canaris from taking any action in the case. He had been told that
Canaris was working along parallel lines. I immediately agreed.
Now we come to the phase which Lahousen has described at length. I had
asked about “Gustav” and similar questions. I wanted to direct Canaris
immediately to stop all his activities in the matter, as Hitler had
confirmed the order. What happened in Paris according to Lahousen’s
detailed reports, that excuses were sought, _et cetera_, that the matter
was thought to be very mysterious, that is, Gustav as an abbreviation
for the G in Giraud, all this is fancy rather than fact. I had Canaris
summoned to me at once, for he was in Paris and not in Berlin. He had
done nothing at all, right from the start. He was thus in a highly
uncomfortable position with regard to me for he had lied to me. When he
came I said only, “You will have nothing more to do in this matter; keep
clear of it.”
Then came the next phase: The general’s escape without difficulty to
North Africa by plane, which was suddenly reported—if I remember
correctly—before the invasion of North Africa by the Anglo-American
troops. That ended the business. No action was ever taken by the
Counterintelligence whom I had charged to watch him, or by the police;
and I never even used the words to do away with the general. Never!
The final phase of this entire affair may sound like a fairy tale, but
it is true nevertheless. The general sent a plane from North Africa to
Southern France near Lyons in February or March 1944, with a liaison
officer who reported to the Counterintelligence and asked if the general
could return to France and what would happen to him on landing in
France. The question was turned over to me. Generaloberst Jodl is my
witness that these things actually happened. The chief of the
Counterintelligence Office involved in this matter was with me. The
answer was: “Exactly the same treatment as General Weygand who is
already in Germany. There is no doubt that the Führer will agree.”
Nothing actually did happen, and I heard no more about it. But these
things actually happened.
DR. NELTE: To complete our information, I must ask you a few questions
for the French Prosecution have mentioned that later, in a later phase,
the family of General Giraud suffered inconveniences or losses of a
rather serious nature. When you were searching for Giraud did you cause
any trouble to his family, who were living in occupied France? Did you
give any directives which would confine or inconvenience the family in
any way?
KEITEL: No. I had only an unobtrusive watch kept on the family’s
residence in order to receive information of any visit which he might
have planned. But no steps of any kind were ever taken against the
family. It would have been foolish in this case.
DR. NELTE: Foolish of you?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: To make matters quite clear: You had no knowledge of anything
having happened later on?
KEITEL: No, none at all.
DR. NELTE: Well, General Giraud is still alive and I will only ask you,
in conclusion, under your oath: Can you confirm that you did not, at any
time, give an order or a directive which might be interpreted to mean
that General Giraud was to be killed?
KEITEL: No. I never gave such an order, unless the phrase “We must have
him back, dead or alive” may be considered of weight in this respect. I
never gave orders that the general was to be killed or done away with,
or anything of the kind. Never.
DR. NELTE: I have concluded my direct examination of the Defendant
Keitel. May I ask you to permit me to submit in evidence the affidavit,
that last one, Number 6 in Document Book Number 2. I would like to
submit that affidavit in evidence. It is on Page 51 and following and is
Document K...
THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you put that in as K-12 yesterday?
DR. NELTE: Today I submit Keitel-13...
THE PRESIDENT: This affidavit that you want to submit now, where is it
and what is the date of it?
DR. NELTE: It is Page 51 and following, and it is dated 9 March 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
DR. NELTE: This affidavit has also been attested to by Generaloberst
Jodl. I ask permission to question him about the affidavit or to show it
to him for confirmation when he is called to the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: If the Court please, we have looked into the matter of the
so-called interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst referred to yesterday
by Dr. Nelte. Insofar as we can determine, this paper was never offered
in evidence by any members of the Prosecution. It was referred to by M.
Dubost—I mean, it was not referred to by him, but it was included in
his brief. I did not refer to it, and I did not offer it in evidence.
That is how it came into the hands of Dr. Nelte, but not in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte want to offer it in evidence now?
DR. NELTE: I ask to submit it as Document Number Keitel-14.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number or another number?
DR. NELTE: No, Mr. President, it has no other number.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
Now, do any of the other Defense Counsel want to ask questions?
DR. STAHMER: Mr. Defendant, as you have corrected your former statement
by answering the question put by your counsel with a statement that
Reich Marshal Göring was not present at the conference in which Hitler
gave orders for the airmen who had escaped from the Sagan Camp should be
held by the police and since you further said that a conference with
Reich Marshal Göring in Berlin did not take place, I have only the
following questions on this subject: Some weeks after that escape, did
you receive a letter from the Quartermaster General of the General Staff
of the Luftwaffe informing you that the Luftwaffe wanted to hand over
their prison camps to the OKW?
KEITEL: Yes, I received this letter and following an interview with
Hitler I declined the offer.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
DR. SEIDL: At the beginning of the war, the Defendant Dr. Frank was a
lieutenant of the 9th Infantry Regiment; is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Do you remember receiving a letter from Dr. Frank, who was
then Governor General, in 1942, saying that he wanted to rejoin the
Wehrmacht?
The purpose of that letter was, of course, that he be relieved of his
office as Governor General in this way. Is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes, I received such a letter and handed it to the Führer who
merely made a movement with his hands and said “Out of the question.” I
informed Frank of that decision through the liaison officer who was
temporarily with him at the time.
DR. SEIDL: That is all.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is 3 minutes to one and it will not take me
very long, but it might take me beyond 1 o’clock, so it might be better
to adjourn now. I would then put my question to the witness after the
recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn until 2:00 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. DIX: May it please the Tribunal, this witness is competent and an
expert who can give the Tribunal definite figures about the armament
expenditures of the Reich. However, the witness is certainly not in a
position to remember these figures just at the moment. Professor Kraus,
my colleague, therefore, during my absence, was kind enough to mark
these figures down and to check them in co-operation with the witness.
The written deposition was signed by the witness at that time, in order
to avoid any misunderstanding. In order to help him recollect these
figures, I now ask your permission to have submitted to the witness this
deposition which he has signed. I have had translations made of this
deposition into the three languages in question and I now submit to the
Tribunal eight copies. I also have four copies for the four delegations
of the Prosecution, and German copies for the counsels of the Defendants
Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Dönitz, and the OKW.
May I ask for just one moment so that the witness can read it?
[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, would you please look at the
first column only, which bears the heading “Total Expenditures.” The
second and the third columns show which of those sums were raised
through the Reichsbank, on the one hand, and which were raised from
other sources, on the other hand. These figures I should like to have
certified during the interrogation of Schacht himself, because they were
the results of Schacht’s calculations and the witness here can therefore
give no information about them. May I ask you concerning these armament
expenditures of the Reich, beginning with the fiscal year of 1935, the
fiscal year running from 1 April to 31 March: The figures stated herein
are: 5,000 millions for 1935, 7,000 millions for 1936, 9,000 millions
for 1937, 11,000 millions for 1938, and 20,500 millions for 1939. Are
these figures correct?
KEITEL: According to my conviction these figures are correct. May I add
that at the beginning of my captivity I also had an opportunity to speak
to the Reich Finance Minister about these figures and to co-ordinate our
opinions.
DR. DIX: Now, a question about the armament strength of the Reich on 1
April 1938. Is it correct to say that at that time there existed: 24
infantry divisions, 1 armored division, no motorized division, 1
mountain division, 1 cavalry division, and that in addition 10 infantry
divisions and 1 armored division were being formed? I wish to add, that
of the 3 reserve divisions none had been completed on 1 April 1938; and
only 7 to 8 were in the process of being formed and expected to be
complete by 1 October 1938.
KEITEL: I consider these figures correct and I have therefore confirmed
them in this affidavit.
DR. DIX: That is as far as the deposition goes. I would like to put two
more questions to the witness which have not been discussed with him so
that I do not know whether he remembers the figures in question.
I consider it possible that the Tribunal would be interested in the
proportion of strength between the Reich, on the one hand, and
Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, at the time of Hitler’s march into
Czechoslovakia; that is the relation of strength (a) concerning the
armed might and (b) concerning the civilian population.
KEITEL: I do not remember the accurate figures about that. In the
preliminary interrogation I have been questioned about it and I believe
the figures will be correct if I say that in the fall of 1938, going by
military units, that is, divisions...
DR. DIX: I mean now the time when Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia, in
the spring of 1939.
KEITEL: That was in the same year of mobilization, that is to say at
that time, as far as figures are concerned, there were fewer divisions
than Czechoslovakia had at her disposal. In the fall of 1938 the number
of formations, that is, divisions, was probably equal. In the spring of
1939, when we marched in, the strength which was used then was less than
that which stood ready in the fall of 1938. Accurate figures, if they
are important to this Tribunal, you could get rather from General Jodl.
DR. DIX: As to the number of divisions which Czechoslovakia had at her
disposal in March 1939, could you not tell us anything about that?
KEITEL: No, I do not know that exactly.
DR. DIX: Then I shall possibly ask General Jodl about that later.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you will actually offer this document in evidence
when the Defendant Schacht gives evidence. Is that what you intend to
do?
DR. DIX: I am going to submit it in evidence and it will be included in
my document book. It is not necessary to keep it now, because I have to
take it up again when Schacht will be examined and you will find it then
in the document book. However, I would like to suggest that the copy
which I have given to the witness should become a part of the record,
because my questions have referred to this document. For this reason it
might be useful to make this copy a part of the record.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to make it a part of the record it had better
be given a number now. It had better be S-1 had it not?
DR. DIX: Yes. Your Lordship, may I suggest Schacht-1?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STAHMER (Representing Dr. Robert Servatius, Counsel for Defendant
Sauckel, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Witness, on 4
January 1944, a conference allegedly took place between the Führer and
Sauckel about the procuring of manpower. Were you present at this
conference?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: Did Sauckel on this occasion state that he could not fill,
to the extent demanded, the manpower demands of those who asked for it?
KEITEL: Yes, he discussed it thoroughly and also gave his reasons for
it.
DR. STAHMER: What reasons did he give?
KEITEL: He pointed out the great difficulties encountered in the areas
from which he was supposed to draft or recruit manpower; the strong
activity of guerillas and partisans in these areas, the great obstacles
in obtaining sufficient police forces for protecting the action, and
similar reasons. I do not remember any details.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Field Marshal, were you the leader of the
German delegation which signed the capitulation with which the war in
Europe was terminated?
KEITEL: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When and where did that take place?
KEITEL: In Berlin on 8 May, that is to say during the night from 8 to 9
May 1945.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you asked for full powers which would
authorize you to negotiate about the capitulation?
KEITEL: Yes. I took the full powers with me to Berlin. They had been
signed by Grossadmiral Dönitz in his capacity as Chief of State and
Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and stated in a few words that he
had authorized and ordered me to conduct the negotiations and to sign
the capitulation.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these full powers examined and
acknowledged by the Allies?
KEITEL: In the course of the afternoon of 8 May I was asked to present
the full powers. Obviously they were examined and several hours later
they were returned to me by a high ranking officer of the Red Army who
said that I had to show them again when signing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you show them again?
KEITEL: I did have my credentials at hand during the act of capitulation
and handed them over to become part of the record.
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness,
during your testimony you have explained the organization of the Supreme
Command of the Wehrmacht. This organization was based on a decree of the
Führer and Reich Chancellor of 4 February 1938. In that decree the OKW
was designated as the military staff of the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces. So, in that aspect you were the Chief of Staff. Now, the
Prosecution have repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is that
correct?
KEITEL: No, General Jodl never was my Chief of Staff, he was the Chief
of the Armed Forces’ Operations Staff and one of the departmental chiefs
of the Armed Forces High Command as I have already stated, although the
first among equals.
DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say, the Chief of several collateral
co-ordinated offices?
KEITEL: Yes; I never had a Chief of Staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mention was made here about the discussion between Hitler
and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938. Do you remember
that? A diary entry by Jodl referring to this conversation has been
submitted to the Tribunal. Was Jodl present at this conference?
KEITEL: No, he was not present and his knowledge is derived from the
conference which I described before and which I held with him and
Canaris about the news to be disseminated as to certain military
preparations during the days following the Schuschnigg conference; it is
therefore an impression gained by General Jodl as a result of the
description made to him.
DR. JAHRREISS: In the course of the preparations to make the
German-Czechoslovakian question acute, that is, the Sudeten question,
the plan to stage an incident played a great role. Did you ever give an
order to the department Abwehr II (Counterintelligence) under Canaris,
to stage such an incident in Czechoslovakia or on the border?
KEITEL: No, such orders were never given to the Abwehr, anyway, not by
myself.
DR. JAHRREISS: After Munich, that is in October 1938, Field Marshal, the
then Chief of National Defense, Defendant Jodl, left this position and
was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor?
KEITEL: Jodl was transferred to active service. He became chief of an
artillery division in Vienna and his successor was Warlimont, at that
time Colonel Warlimont.
DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say his successor...
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I understood you correctly, that is to say Jodl was
not only sent on leave but he definitely left his office?
KEITEL: Jodl had definitely left the High Command of the Armed Forces
and was personnel officer of a division; Warlimont was not his
representative but successor in Jodl’s position.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, the Prosecution has said that, at the occasion of
that famous conference of 23 May 1938—no, 1939—Warlimont was present
as deputy designate for Jodl. What had Jodl to do with that conference?
KEITEL: Nothing at all, he was at that time a front-line officer and
commander in Vienna.
DR JAHRREISS: Why did you choose Jodl to be chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff?
KEITEL: That was in consequence of our co-operation from 1935 to 1938.
My opinion was that I could not find a better man for that position.
DR. JAHRREISS: How did Jodl picture his military career, once his
command as artillery commander in Vienna or Brünn had ended?
KEITEL: I knew about his passion and his desire to become commander of a
mountain division. He has frequently told me about it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, would there have been any chance to get such a
command?
KEITEL: Yes, I tried to use my influence with the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and I remember that during the summer of 1939, I wrote him that
his wish to become the commander of a mountain division in
Reichenhall—I do not remember the number—would come true. I was glad
to be able to give him that information.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it up to you to make the decision or was it up to the
OKH?
KEITEL: I had made a request to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
he had made the decision.
DR. JAHRREISS: And if I understand correctly, you yourself notified
Jodl?
KEITEL: I wrote him a letter because I knew that I would make him very
happy.
DR. JAHRREISS: May I ask, Field Marshal, did you correspond regularly
with Jodl?
KEITEL: No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to him
during that year.
DR. JAHRREISS: I ask that for a definite reason: Jodl leaves the OKW. He
knows that if the necessity arises he will become chief of the future
so-called Armed Forces Operations Staff, that is to say, a rather
important position. He goes on active service, as you say. One should
think that then he would not only receive a private letter once from you
but would be kept informed by you regularly.
KEITEL: That was certainly not done by me and, according to my personal
opinion, every general staff officer who goes on active service is very
happy if he is not bothered with such things any longer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but fate does not grant us everything which would
make us happy. It could be that somebody received the official order for
instance, to keep this gentleman informed.
KEITEL: I certainly did not do it. I do not believe that it happened,
but I do not know for sure whether or not somebody tried to do it.
DR. JAHRREISS: During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and Brünn, that
is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly in Berlin in order to get
information?
KEITEL: I did not see him and he did not come to see me. I believe it is
very unlikely because if such were the case he would have visited me.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have to understand from what you say, that when he
came to Berlin shortly before the beginning of the war, in response to a
telegram, he first had to be informed as to what was going on?
KEITEL: Yes, and that was the first thing done between him and myself.
DR. JAHRREISS: You informed him?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Another thing, Field Marshal. You remember, perhaps, the
somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellery after the Simovic
Putsch; that was 27 March 1941, was it not?
KEITEL: Yes, Yugoslavia.
DR. JAHRREISS: If one reflects on the politics and the history of the
wars of the last 200 years in Europe, one asks: Was there nobody at that
conference in the Reich Chancellery who might have suggested that
instead of attacking immediately, it would be better to march to the
borders of a state whose attitude was completely uncertain and then
clarify the situation by an ultimatum?
KEITEL: Yes, during all these pros and cons under turbulent conditions
in that morning session, Jodl, himself, to my knowledge, brought that
point up in the debate. Proposal: To march and to send an ultimatum;
that is about the way it was.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I am correctly informed, you were in the East in
October 1941 for the purpose of an inspection or a visit to Army Group
North; is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes, in the autumn of 1941 I frequently went by plane to Army
Group North in order to get information for the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was Field Marshal Von Leeb the commander of Army Group
North?
KEITEL: Yes, he was.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Von Leeb tell you about particular worries which he
had at that time?
KEITEL: I think it was my last or the next to the last visit to Von Leeb
where the questions of capitulation, that is to say, the question of the
population of Leningrad, played an important role, which worried him
very much at that time because there were certain indications that the
population was streaming out of the city and infiltrating into his area.
I remember that at that time he asked me to make the suggestion to the
Führer that, as he could not take over and feed 1 million civilians
within the area of his army group, a sluice, so to speak, should be made
towards the east, that is, the Russian zone, so that the population
could flow out in that direction. I reported that to the Führer at that
time.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did the population turn in any other direction?
KEITEL: Yes, especially to the south into the Southern forests.
According to Von Leeb a certain pressure exerted by the population to
get through the German lines made itself felt at the time.
DR. JAHRREISS: And that would have impeded your operations?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Field Marshal, you are aware, I suppose, since it has
been mentioned this morning, of the order issued by the Führer and
Supreme Commander about the Commandos, dated 18 October 1942, that is
Document Number 498-PS which has been submitted here. It had been
announced publicly beforehand that an order of that kind would be
issued. Do you know that?
KEITEL: Yes; the item in question was included in one of the daily
communiqués of the Wehrmacht.
DR. JAHRREISS: We are dealing with the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October
1942, which, below the usual report, states with reference to what has
happened, “The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore considers
itself obliged to issue the following orders.” The first item is of no
interest here, and then, at the second item appears the following
sentence:
“In the future all terror and sabotage Commandos of the British
and their accomplices who do not behave like soldiers, but
rather like bandits, will be treated as such by the German
troops and will be killed in combat without mercy wherever they
appear.”
Field Marshal, who drafted this wording?
KEITEL: The Führer personally. I was present when he dictated and
corrected it.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to continue at the point which was
last mentioned by Professor Jahrreiss. The order about Commandos,
Document Number 498-PS, was discussed. In this order on Commandos, under
Number VI, Hitler threatened that all commanders would be
court-martialed if they did not carry out this order. Do you know what
considerations prompted Hitler to include this particular passage in the
order?
KEITEL: Yes, they are actually quite clear; I should think that the
purpose, was to put emphasis on the demand that this order should
actually be carried out, since it was definitely considered by the
generals and those who were to carry it out, as a very grave order; and
for that reason compliance was to be enforced by the threat of
punishment.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I should like to ask you several questions
concerning the nature of the so-called Groups of the General Staff and
the OKW. What do you understand to be the German General Staff?
KEITEL: By the General Staff I understand those officers who are
especially trained to be assistants to the higher leadership.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already spent a very long time in
explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff of the various
commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically and quite
clearly what the group is, which they are asking the Court to declare as
criminal; and therefore, I do not see what relevance any further
evidence on the subject can have. What are you trying to show by asking
him now about what he understands by the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: This question was purely preparatory. I intended to
connect this question with another one; and, by the answer to the second
question, I wanted to prove that under the alleged group, a group has
been accused under a wrong name.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong name if the
group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has already told us what
he understands by the General Staff. Will you put your second question.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if the higher military leaders are considered
collectively to form one group which is designated as General Staff and
OKW, do you consider this designation to be correct or misleading?
KEITEL: According to our German military concepts this designation is
misleading, because to us the General Staff always means a body of
assistants, whereas the commanders of armies and army groups and the
commanding generals represent the leadership corps.
DR. LATERNSER: The military hierarchy has been discussed sufficiently in
this Trial. I want to know only the following from you: Was the relation
of these echelons to each other that of military superiors and
subordinates or did there exist an additional organization involving
these ranks which went beyond purely professional military duties?
KEITEL: No, the General Staff, that is to say, the General Staff
officers as assistants to the leaders, could be recognized by their
uniforms as such. The leaders or so-called commanders themselves had no
relation to each other through any interoffice channels or through any
other organizations of any kind.
DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday the affidavit made by Generaloberst Halder was
put to you. I would like to discuss now the last sentence of that
affidavit; I shall read it to you, “That was the actual General Staff
and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces.” Is the statement in
that sentence correct or incorrect?
KEITEL: I understand it this way, that Halder wanted to say that those
few officers who had General Staff positions were the ones who did the
real work in the General Staff of the Army, while the rest of the far
more than 100 General Staff officers in the OKH had nothing to do with
these matters. That is what I think he wanted to say, a small group
which was concerned with these problems.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know of a single incident where Hitler ever
consulted a military leader on a political matter?
KEITEL: No, that did not happen.
DR. LATERNSER: I assume that you were present at most of the conferences
with Hitler when the situation was discussed. Could you tell me anything
about protests made, with or without success, by any commanders who had
come from the front and who happened to be present?
KEITEL: As a rule front Commanders who were present were silent
listeners at the general discussion of the situation; and afterwards,
according to circumstances, such commanders used to make a special
report to Hitler about their respective areas. Then there was also an
opportunity, as I believe was already mentioned by Kesselring, to
discuss these things personally and to advance opinions. But otherwise
nobody had anything to say in these matters.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you ever present when particularly emphatic
objections were raised, by any commander, to Hitler?
KEITEL: During the discussion of the situation?
DR. LATERNSER: No, I mean, whatever the occasion may have been.
KEITEL: I was not, of course, present at every conference which Hitler
had with high ranking commanders in his quarters, but I do not know of
any such incidents. I have related in detail those cases which played a
role in this war, namely the opposition of the generals in the West,
before the beginning of the war, and I understood your question to mean
whether I knew of any cases beyond that.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
KEITEL: I have related all that and must emphasize once more that the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the limit of
anything which could be justified from the military viewpoint.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of Hitler toward the General Staff
of the Army?
KEITEL: It was not a good one. One may say that he held a prejudice
against the General Staff and thought the General Staff was arrogant. I
believe that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this once, if not more than once.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not believe that this witness has
been asked about that. As far as I remember, this particular witness has
not been asked about these points.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he has been asked about it.
DR. LATERNSER: I would have paid special attention to this point and
would have crossed off this question already if one of my colleagues had
put it before.
[_To the defendant._] Would Hitler, in case an application for
resignation was tendered by one or more front commanders have been
willing to take back an order which he had once given...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, nearly every officer who has come and
given evidence to this Court has spoken about that subject, certainly
many of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, does your objection refer to the question
I have put now?
THE PRESIDENT: Nearly all the officers who have been examined in this
Court have told us it was impossible to resign. That is what you are
asking about, isn’t it?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I will be glad to forego that question, if I can
assume that the Tribunal accepts those facts which I wanted to prove, as
true.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether they accept
its truth or not, is a different question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to say something also to
this question. I do not believe that it can be considered cumulative,
since as has already been pointed out by my colleague, Dr. Dix, the same
question when put to two different witnesses is in each case a different
question, because the subjective answer of the individual witness to
this particular point is desired. But I will forego that question.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have a few more questions.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, to what extent was the
headquarters of the Führer protected against attacks during the war?
KEITEL: There was a special guard detachment of the Army and also I
believe one company of the Waffen-SS. Very thorough security measures
had been taken with every kind of safety device such as fences,
obstacles, and similar things. It was very well secured against any
surprise attack.
DR. LATERNSER: Were there several zones?
KEITEL: Yes, there was an inner zone and an outer zone and several areas
which were fenced in separately.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. You have already stated that the commanders of the
army groups and armies in the East did not have any authority outside
their area of operation. Was there a tendency to keep that operational
area as small as possible, or as large as possible?
KEITEL: Originally the tendency definitely was to have large areas of
operation in order to assure the greatest possible freedom of movement
in the rear of the armies and army groups. The Führer was the first who,
by drastic means, caused the limitation of these zones to make them as
small as possible.
DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons?
KEITEL: As he said, in order to free military officers from
administrative measures and get them out of the extended space they had
sought for their equipment and to concentrate them into narrowly limited
areas.
DR. LATERNSER: You mentioned during your interrogation, units of the
Waffen-SS which were assigned to the Army for operational, that is, for
combat purposes. I am particularly interested in getting that point
clear because, as far as I see, there still prevails some confusion. Did
the forces of the SD have anything to do with the units of the Waffen-SS
which were subordinated to army units for the purpose of operational
assignments?
KEITEL: No, the formations of the Waffen-SS within divisions were
incorporated as such into the armies and had nothing to do with anything
else. They were in that case purely Army Forces.
DR. LATERNSER: Was it possible for a commander to punish an SS man for
any offense?
KEITEL: If the man was caught in the act I believe no commander would
have hesitated; but apart from that, the last resort for disciplinary
measures and jurisdiction was the Reichsführer Himmler, and not the
commander of the army.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the executives of the Einsatzgruppen of the SD have
to report to the commanders of the armies upon what they did on
Himmler’s orders?
KEITEL: This question has been dealt with here in great detail by the
witness Ohlendorf, and I am not informed about the connections which
existed between the commanders and the Einsatzgruppen and commands. I
was not involved and took no part in it.
DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to know from you whether the Einsatzgruppen of
the SD, according to your knowledge of the regulations, were obliged to
report to the military commanders in whose rear areas they operated.
KEITEL: I do not believe so; I do not know the orders which were in
force in this respect; I have not seen them.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military commanders at any
time were informed of the intention of Hitler or Himmler to kill the
Jews?
KEITEL: According to my opinion, that was not the case, since I
personally was not informed either.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have only one more question, on the subject of the
prisoners of war. It had already become known during the war that the
conditions relating to the food supply of Soviet Russian prisoners of
war during the first period of the eastern campaign were miserable. What
was the reason for these conditions which prevailed during that first
period?
KEITEL: I can base my statement only on what the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army said during the situation report conferences. As I recall, he
repeatedly reported that it was clearly a problem of large masses which
required extraordinary efforts of organization to provide food supply,
housing, and security.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, these conditions were without doubt actually chaotic
during a certain period of time. I am thinking of a particular reason
which existed, and in order to refresh your memory, Witness, I would
like to mention the following:
The Army had already prepared camps in the homeland for the future
prisoners of war, because it was planned in the beginning that these
prisoners should be transferred to the homeland. In spite of these
preparations, however, as has been stated here, this was stopped by a
sudden order from Hitler which prohibited the transfer of these Russian
prisoners into the homeland.
KEITEL: I explained that this morning; and I said that during a certain
period until September, the transfer of Soviet Russian prisoners of war
into the Reich was prohibited and only after that the transfer into the
home camps was made possible in order to utilize the manpower.
DR. LATERNSER: And the deficiencies which appeared during this first
period could not be remedied by the means at the disposal of the troops?
KEITEL: That I do not know. I am not informed about that. Only the OKH,
which had the exclusive responsibility, would know that.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions about the position of
the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. When was that
position set up?
KEITEL: I believe in 1942.
DR. LATERNSER: 1942. What was the rank connected with that position?
KEITEL: It could be a colonel or a general.
DR. LATERNSER: What I mean is whether it was about the same as the
position of a commander of a division?
KEITEL: Well, I would say it was equal to the position of the commander
of a brigade or a division, a section chief.
DR. LATERNSER: How many section chiefs were there in the OKW?
KEITEL: I could not say that at present from memory. By way of estimate
I had eight department chiefs, each of which had one, two, three or four
sections. Therefore there would have been about 30 or 35 section chiefs.
DR. LATERNSER: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was
one of the eight or of the 30 section chiefs?
KEITEL: No, I would not like to say that definitely. We had among the
department chiefs so-called department group chiefs, who combined
several small sections. That was about his position.
DR. LATERNSER: What were the official duties connected with that
position?
KEITEL: Naturally the supervision and direction of all the work of that
part of the Armed Forces Operations Staff which was attached to the
Führer’s headquarters. It was his task to direct that work in accordance
with the directives given by Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff
responsible for the strategic planning to a particularly high degree, as
is maintained by the Prosecution?
KEITEL: He was, of course, not responsible for that in this capacity,
but as a matter of fact he belonged to the small group of high ranking
and outstanding general staff officers who were concerned with these
things, as Halder has pointed out.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question. Was, therefore, the
position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, not
equal in importance to the other positions which are included in this
group or alleged group of the General Staff and the OKW?
KEITEL: I said chief of a group of departments in the Armed Forces
Operations Staff and co-worker in the small group of those who had to
deal with operational and strategical questions, but subordinate to
General Jodl and director of the work supervisor in the Arbeitsstab.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, I believe that the question which I have
put to you was not completely answered. I have asked you whether the
importance of that position was equal to or even approached equality
with that of the other offices which are included in the group of the
general staff and the OKW.
KEITEL: No, certainly not, because in the group of the General Staff and
the OKW there were the commanders-in-chief, the supreme commanders, and
the chiefs of the general staff. He certainly did not belong to those.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.
HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, you have said in your
Affidavit Keitel-12 that the SS, at the beginning of the war, became the
champions and standard bearers of a policy of conquest and force. In
order to exclude any misunderstandings, I should like to clarify the
following: What did you mean by SS in this case?
KEITEL: I can say to that, that what has been read here by my counsel
was a short summary of a much longer affidavit. If you read the latter
you would find for yourself the answer to your question. To state it in
a more precise way: It concerned the Reich SS Leadership under Himmler
and under those functionaries within his sphere of command, police and
SS, who appeared and were active in the occupied territories. The
concept of the so-called general SS in the homeland had nothing to do
with that. I hope that makes it clear.
HERR BABEL: Yes, thank you.
DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): Witness, the
Prosecution in their trial brief have charged the Defendant Bormann also
with his activity in the so-called Volkssturm. In that connection, I
would like to put a few questions to you.
Was an offensive or defensive activity planned for the Volkssturm as it
was formed by decree of the Führer of 18 October 1944?
KEITEL: To that I can only say that Reichsleiter Bormann refused to give
the military authorities any advice, any co-operation, and any
information on the Volkssturm.
DR. BERGOLD: You mean to say that you were not at all informed of the
purpose of the Volkssturm?
KEITEL: Only that I saw it as the last levy of men to defend their own
homesteads.
DR. BERGOLD: That means that, within the framework of the Wehrmacht, the
Volkssturm was not designed for any offensive purpose?
KEITEL: No, but all services of the Wehrmacht which encountered the
Volkssturm units in their areas, either incorporated them or sent them
home.
DR. BERGOLD: Did I understand you correctly that you wanted to say that
that institution, the Volkssturm, was a product of Bormann’s brain or
did it originate with Hitler?
KEITEL: I do not know that, perhaps from both.
DR. BERGOLD: Hitler did not tell you about it, either?
KEITEL: No, he spoke only about the Volkssturm and similar things, but
military authorities had nothing to do with it.
DR. BERGOLD: Did Bormann report any other military matters to the Führer
besides the odd things about the Volkssturm?
KEITEL: He has often accused the Wehrmacht of all sorts of things; I can
conclude that only from what I was told, and assume that it originated
with Bormann. I do not know it.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, after his
return from Moscow in August 1939, on account of the changed foreign
political situation—the guarantee pact between England and Poland had
been ratified—advised Hitler to stop the military measures which had
been set in motion?
KEITEL: I had the impression at that time that the orders given to me by
Hitler were based upon a conversation between him and his foreign
minister. I was not present at that conversation.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, just like the other
ministers with portfolio, was as a rule not informed about the strategic
plans?
KEITEL: I can say only for myself and for the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, that we were not authorized to do it and that we never
did it. If the Reich Foreign Minister was informed about such questions,
that information could have come only from Hitler himself. I doubt that
he made an exception here.
DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a letter of 3 April 1940,
concerning the impending occupation of Denmark and Norway which you sent
to the then Reich Foreign Minister. In that letter you informed the
Reich Foreign Minister of the impending occupation and requested him to
take the necessary political steps. Had you already instructed Von
Ribbentrop before that date about the intended occupation of Norway and
Denmark?
KEITEL: No, I would not have been allowed to do that, according to the
way in which the Führer worked with us. That letter was an unusual
method of giving information about this, by the Führer’s order, to the
Reich Foreign Minister, who knew nothing about these things. I was
ordered to write it to him.
DR. HORN: In connection with the testimony by General Lahousen, I want
to ask you one question. At the time of the Polish campaign, was there a
directive or an order by Hitler to exterminate the Jews in the Polish
Ukraine?
KEITEL: I cannot recall any such things. I know only that during the
occupation of Poland—that is after the occupation—the problem of the
Polish Jews played a part. In that connection I also put a question once
to Hitler to which, I believe, he answered that that area was well
suited for settling the Jews there. I do not know or remember anything
else.
DR. HORN: At the time of the Polish campaign, was there any plan to
instigate a revolt in the Polish Ukraine in the rear of the Poles?
KEITEL: I cannot answer that question, although I have heard such things
said here by Lahousen. I do not know or remember anything about it.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): Field Marshal, you were Chief of
the OKW and thereby also the Chief of the KGF, that is, Prisoners of War
Organization. Did you ever issue orders or have orders issued on the
basis of which members of the SA or units of the SA were detailed to
guard prisoners of war or prisoner-of-war camps, or were to be used for
that purpose?
KEITEL: I cannot remember that any such directive had been issued by the
OKW. I believe that certainly was not the case.
HERR BÖHM: In that respect, was a report ever made to you that any such
guard duty was performed?
KEITEL: I cannot remember but I do not mean to deny that some units of
the army in some particular place may have used SA men temporarily to
assist in guard duty, which I would not know.
HERR BÖHM: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in open session tomorrow morning at
10 o’clock. At 1230 it will take the supplementary applications for
witnesses and documents, and after that at a quarter to 1 it will
adjourn into a closed session.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I would like you to tell me exactly when
you received your first commission as an officer?
KEITEL: On 18 August 1902.
GEN. RUDENKO: What military training did you receive?
KEITEL: I came into the army as an officer candidate. Starting as a
simple private I advanced through the various ranks of private first
class, corporal and ensign to lieutenant.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you about your military training.
KEITEL: I was an army officer until 1909, and then for almost 6 years
regimental adjutant; then during the World War I, battery commander, and
then after the spring of 1915 I served on the general staff.
GEN. RUDENKO: You were evidently not given a correct translation. Did
you pass the Staff College or any other college, that is to say, did you
receive preliminary training?
KEITEL: I never attended the War Academy. Twice I participated in
so-called Great General Staff trips as regimental adjutant and in the
summer of 1914 I was detailed to the Great General Staff and returned to
my regiment later when the war broke out in 1914.
GEN. RUDENKO: What military training and military rank did Hitler
possess?
KEITEL: Only a few years ago I found out from Hitler himself that after
the end of World War I, he had been a lieutenant in a Bavarian infantry
regiment. During the war he was a private, then private first class and
maybe corporal during the last period.
GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not, therefore, conclude that you, with your
thorough military training and great experience, could have had an
opportunity of influencing Hitler, very considerably, in solving
questions of a strategic and military nature, as well as other matters
pertaining to the Armed Forces?
KEITEL: No. I have to declare in that respect that, to a degree which is
almost incomprehensible to the layman and the professional officer,
Hitler had studied general staff publications, military literature,
essays on tactics, operations, and strategy and that he had a knowledge
in the military fields which can only be called amazing. May I give an
example of that which can be confirmed by the other officers of the
Wehrmacht. Hitler was so well informed concerning organization,
armament, leadership, and equipment of all armies, and what is more
remarkable, of all navies of the globe, that it was impossible to prove
any error on his part; and I have to add that also during the war, while
I was at his headquarters and in his close proximity, Hitler studied at
night all the big general staff books by Moltke, Schlieffen, and
Clausewitz and from them acquired his vast knowledge by himself.
Therefore we had the impression: Only a genius can do that.
GEN. RUDENKO: You will not deny that by reason of your military training
and experience you were Hitler’s adviser in a number of highly important
matters?
KEITEL: I belonged to his closest military entourage and I heard a lot
from him; but I pointed out yesterday to the question of my counsel that
even in the simple, every-day questions concerning organization and
equipment of the Wehrmacht, I must admit openly that I was the pupil and
not the master.
GEN. RUDENKO: From what date do you consider that your co-operation with
Hitler began?
KEITEL: Exactly from the day when I was called into that position, 4
February 1938.
GEN. RUDENKO: That means that you were working with Hitler during the
entire period of preparation for and realization of aggressive warfare?
KEITEL: Yes. I have already given all the necessary explanations as to
how, after I entered my new position in the beginning of February,
events followed in quick succession, often in a very surprising manner.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military leaders of the OKW
and the OKH had the rank of Reich Minister?
KEITEL: The rank of Reich Minister was given to the three
commanders-in-chief of the sections of the Armed Forces, and among these
the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reich Marshal Göring, was also
Reich Minister of Aviation; likewise I received, as I said yesterday,
the rank but not the authority and title of a minister.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military collaborators of the
OKH and the OKW, signed decrees together with Hitler and the other Reich
Ministers?
KEITEL: In the ministerial sector of the Reich Government, there was the
method of the signatures of the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the
Ministers immediately involved, and, finally of the Chief of the Reich
Chancellery. This did not hold good for the military sector, for
according to the traditions of the German Army and the Wehrmacht the
signatures were given by the principal experts who had worked on the
matter, by the Chief of Staff, or by whoever had given or at least
drafted the order, and an initial was added on the margin.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you said that you signed such decrees together
with other Ministers of the Reich.
KEITEL: Yes, yesterday I mentioned individual decrees and also gave the
reasons why I signed them, and that in so doing I was not Reich Minister
and did not receive the function of a minister in office.
GEN. RUDENKO: What organization exercised the function of the War
Ministry from February 1938 on?
KEITEL: Until the last days of January, or the first days of February,
it was the former Reich Minister for War, Von Blomberg. Beginning with 4
February there was neither a Minister for War nor a War Ministry.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely why I asked you what government
organization had replaced the War Ministry and exercised its function,
since I knew that this Ministry did not exist.
KEITEL: I, myself, with the Wehrmachtsamt, the former Staff of the War
Ministry, whose chief I was, carried on the work and distributed it, as
I described in detail yesterday, that is, I transferred all command
functions to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht.
But this was not an order of mine but an order of Hitler’s.
GEN. RUDENKO: From the diagram you have submitted to the Tribunal it
would appear that the OKW was the central, coordinating, and supreme
military authority of the Reich and that it was directly under Hitler’s
control. Would this conclusion be correct?
KEITEL: Yes, that was the military staff of Hitler.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who, in the OKW, directly supervised the drafting of
military and strategic plans? I am referring specifically to the plans
for the attack on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland,
France, Norway, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.
KEITEL: I believe that yesterday I stated that very precisely, saying
that the operational and strategic planning, after an order had been
given by Hitler, was prepared and then submitted to Hitler by the
commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht; that is to say,
for the Army, by the High Command of the Army and the General Staff of
the Army, and then further decisions were made with respect to it.
GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to Yugoslavia I should like to ask you the
following question: Do you admit that a directive issued under your
signature, for the preliminary partition of Yugoslavia, is _per se_ a
document of great political and international importance, providing for
the actual abolition of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state?
KEITEL: I did nothing more or less than to write down a decree by the
Führer and forward it to those offices which were interested and
concerned. I did not have any personal or political influence whatsoever
in these questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: Under your own signature?
KEITEL: As to the signatures which I have given, I made a complete
explanation yesterday, as to how they came about and what their
significance is.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, we did talk about it, we did hear about it, and I
shall ask some more questions on the subject later on. I should now like
to determine with greater precision your own position in the question of
Yugoslavia. Do you agree that you, with the direct participation of the
OKW, organized acts of provocation in order to find a reason for
aggression against Yugoslavia and a justification for this aggression in
the eyes of the world?
KEITEL: This morning, in response to questions of the counsel of other
defendants, I answered clearly that I did not participate in any
preparation of an incident and that Hitler did not wish either that any
military offices should ever participate in the discussion, preparation,
deliberation, or the execution of incidents. I use “incident” here in
the sense of provocation.
GEN. RUDENKO: Undoubtedly. What part did the OKW take to insure the
arming of the Free Corps in the Sudetenland?
KEITEL: Which Free Corps, General? I do not know to which Free Corps you
refer.
GEN. RUDENKO: The Free Corps of the Sudetenland.
KEITEL: I am not informed as to whether any military office did any
gun-running, if I may say so, or secretly sent arms there. I have no
knowledge concerning that. An order to that effect was not given, or at
any rate did not pass through my hands. I cannot remember that.
GEN. RUDENKO: By whom and for what reason was the order issued to occupy
Ostrau in Moravia and Witkovitz by German troops, on 14 March 1939, in
the afternoon, while President Hacha was still on the way to Berlin for
negotiations with Hitler?
KEITEL: The order was eventually released and decided by the Führer.
There had been preparations to occupy by a _coup de main_ that area
where the well-known big and modern steel works were located near
Mährisch Ostrau—I cannot remember the name now—before the date of the
march into Czechoslovakia as originally set. As a justification for that
decision, Hitler had told me that it was done in order to prevent the
Poles from making a surprise attack from the north, and thereby perhaps
taking possession of the most modern rolling mill in the world. This he
gave as a reason, and the operation, that is, the occupation, actually
took place in the late hours of 14 March.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but during the same time, President Hacha was on the
way to Berlin to negotiate with Hitler?
KEITEL: Yes, that is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is treachery!
KEITEL: I do not believe that I need to add my judgement to the facts.
It is true that the occupation was carried out on that evening. I have
given the reasons, and President Hacha learned about it only after he
arrived in Berlin.
Now I remember the name. The rolling mill was Witkovitz.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask you in connection with
the aggression against the Soviet Union. You testified to the Tribunal
yesterday on the subject. You explained your position, with regard to
the attack on the Soviet Union. But you informed the Tribunal that the
orders for preparing Plan Barbarossa were given at the beginning of
December 1940. Is that right?
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you definitely remember and confirm this?
KEITEL: I do not know of, or do not remember, any specific order by the
High Command of the Wehrmacht which called for the drawing up of this
plan called Barbarossa any earlier than that. I explained yesterday,
however, that some order had been issued, probably in September,
concerning transport and railway facilities and similar matters. I
cannot recall whether I signed that order, but yesterday I mentioned
such a preparatory order to improve transport conditions from the West
to the East.
GEN. RUDENKO: In September?
KEITEL: It may have been in September or October, but I cannot commit
myself as to the exact time.
GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to know the exact time.
KEITEL: More accurate information may probably be obtained at a later
stage from General Jodl, who ought to know it better.
GEN. RUDENKO: Of course we shall ask him about it during the course of
his interrogation. I should like you to recollect the following briefly:
Did you first learn of Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union in
the summer of 1940?
KEITEL: No. In the summer of 1940 this conversation which is mentioned
in Jodl’s diary—I believe that is what you are referring to, you mean
the conversation from Jodl’s diary—I was not present at this obviously
very casual and brief conversation and did not hear it. My recollections
concerning that period also justify my belief that I was not present,
because I was on the move almost every day by airplane and was not
present at the discussions of the situation at that time.
GEN. RUDENKO: And when did your conversation with Ribbentrop take place?
KEITEL: That may have been during the last days of August; I believe, it
was in the beginning of September, but I cannot give the exact date any
more. I reconstruct the date by the fact that I did not return to
Berchtesgaden until 10 August, and that I wrote the memorandum which I
mentioned yesterday at a later date.
GEN. RUDENKO: And so you assure the Tribunal that you first heard about
Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union from the conversation with
Ribbentrop?
KEITEL: No, no. After having been absent from Berchtesgaden for about
two weeks, partly on leave and partly on duty in Berlin, I returned to
headquarters at Berchtesgaden; and then on one of the subsequent days,
probably during the middle of August, I heard for the first time ideas
of that kind from Hitler. That was the basis for my deliberation and my
memorandum.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, have I put my question correctly in asking
whether you learned of Hitler’s schemes in the summer of 1940?
KEITEL: Yes. The middle of August, after all, is still summer.
GEN. RUDENKO: August is still summer, we will not quibble about that.
Further, I should like to remind you of the evidence of the witness
Paulus, which he gave here before the Tribunal, on 11 February of this
year. Paulus, as you will remember, informed the Tribunal that when he
entered the OKH on 3 September 1940, he found among other plans an
unfinished preliminary operational draft of a plan for attacking the
Soviet Union, known under the name of Barbarossa. Do you remember that
part of Paulus’ testimony?
KEITEL: I remember it only insofar as he stated that it was a study or a
draft for a maneuver, and that he found a document on the occasion of
his transfer to the OKH, to the General Staff of the Army. This is not
known to me, and it could not be known to me because the documents,
files, and other reports of the General Staff of the Army were never at
my disposal; and I never had an opportunity to look at them.
GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to establish one fact. Do you deny that the OKH, in
September 1940, was elaborating plans in connection with Plan
Barbarossa?
KEITEL: If we go by the testimony of Field Marshal Paulus, then I could
not say that it is not true, since I cannot know whether it actually was
true. I can neither deny nor affirm it.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You informed the Tribunal that you were opposed
to the war with the Soviet Union.
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You also stated that you went to Hitler with the
suggestion that he should change his plans with regard to the Soviet
Union. Is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes, not only to change them, but to drop this plan and not to
wage war against the Soviet Union. That was the content of my
memorandum.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely what I asked you. I would like to ask
you now about a conference, evidently known to you, which was held 3
weeks after Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, the conference of 16
July 1941. Do you remember that conference, which dealt with the tasks
for the conduct of the war against the Soviet Union?
KEITEL: No, at the moment I do not know what you mean. I do not know.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to submit that document to you at this
particular minute. You may remember that I submitted it to the Defendant
Göring, when the question of the dismemberment and of the annexation of
the Soviet Union arose. Do you remember?
KEITEL: That is a document which I know. I believe it is marked on top
“BO-FU,” and during my interrogation here I have identified it as a
memorandum from Reichsleiter Bormann.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct.
KEITEL: I made that statement. At that time I also testified that I was
called in only during the second part of the conference and that I had
not been present during the first part of it. I also testified that it
was not the minutes but a free summary made by Reichsleiter Bormann,
dictated by him.
GEN. RUDENKO; But you do remember that even then, on 16 July, the
question was already being advanced about the annexation by Germany of
the Crimea, the Baltic States, the regions of the Volga, the Ukraine,
Bielorussia and other territories?
KEITEL: No, I believe that was discussed at the first part of the
conference. I can remember the conference, from that stage on where
questions of personnel were discussed, that is, certain personalities
who were to be appointed. That I remembered. I have seen the document
here for the first time and did not know of it before; and did not
attend the first half of the conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case may I put the question differently: What were
the final aims pursued by Hitler and his entourage at that time, against
the Soviet Union?
KEITEL: According to the explanations which Hitler had given me, I saw
the more profound reasons for this war in the fact that he was convinced
that a war would break out some way or other within the next years
between the Greater Slav Empire of Communism and the German Reich of
National Socialism. The reasons which were given to me were something
like this: If I believe or rather if I am convinced that such a conflict
between these two nations will take place, then it would be better now
than later. That is how I can put it. But I do not remember, at least
not at the moment, the questions which are in this document about the
dismemberment of several areas. Perhaps they were constructions of
fantasy.
GEN. RUDENKO: And you tell the Tribunal under oath that you did not know
of the Hitlerite plans to seize and colonize the territories of the
Soviet Union?
KEITEL: That has not been expressed in that form. It is true that I
believed that the Baltic provinces should be made dependents of the
Reich, and that the Ukraine should come into a closer connection from
the point of view of food supply or economy, but concrete plans for
conquest are not known to me and if they were ever touched upon I never
considered them to be serious problems. That is the way I looked at it
at that time. I must not explain how I see it today, but only how I saw
it at that time.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know that at this conference of 16 July Hitler
announced the necessity of razing the city of Leningrad to the ground?
KEITEL: I do not believe that during that conference—I have read that
document here again. That it is contained in the document I cannot
remember now. But I have had this document here in my hands; I have read
it in the presence of the American Prosecutor; and if it is stated
therein, then the question of whether or not I have heard it depends
entirely on the moment at which I was called to that conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to hand you the document now, because it
has already been submitted several times. But in the minutes previously
quoted to the Defendant Göring, who read them himself, it is said, “The
Leningrad region is claimed by the Finns. The Führer wants to raze
Leningrad to the ground and then cede it to the Finns.”
KEITEL: I can only say that it is necessary to establish from what
moment on I attended that conference. Whatever was said before that
moment I did not hear, and I can indicate that only if I am given the
document or if one reads the record of my preliminary interrogation.
That is what I told the interrogating officer at that time.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We shall give you the minutes of the conference
of 16 July immediately. While the passages required are being found, I
shall ask you a few more questions, and by that time the passages will
have been found.
With regard to the destruction of Leningrad, did you not know about it
from other documents?
KEITEL: I have been asked about that by the Russian Delegation and the
general who is present here in this courtroom. He has called my
attention to a document.
GEN. RUDENKO: That was during the preliminary investigation, that is
quite right.
KEITEL: I know the document which came from the Navy, from an admiral,
as well as a second document which contained a short directive, I
believe on the order of Jodl, concerning Leningrad. I have been
interrogated regarding both documents. As to that I can state only that
neither through artillery operations during the siege, nor by operations
of the Air Force, could the extent of destruction be compared with that
of other places we know about. It did not materialize, we did not carry
it out. It never came to a systematic shelling of Leningrad, as far as I
know. Consequently, only that can be stated which I said at that time
under oath to the gentlemen of the Soviet Delegation.
GEN. RUDENKO: According to your knowledge was Leningrad never shelled?
KEITEL: Certainly artillery was also used in the Leningrad area, but it
never went so far as to constitute shelling for the purposes of
destruction. That would have occurred, General, if it had come to an
attack on Leningrad.
GEN. RUDENKO: Look at this document, and I shall then ask you a few
supplementary questions. [_The document was submitted to the
defendant._]
KEITEL: It is very simple. My entry is exactly after the moment after
this remark had been made. I told the American interrogator at the time
that I just heard the discussion about the appointment of Gauleiter
Lohse when I entered the room. The preceding remarks I did not hear.
GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with those minutes of the
report on the conference of 16 July that deal with Leningrad?
KEITEL: Yes, that is where I entered.
GEN. RUDENKO: You saw that there was such an entry in the minutes of the
meeting. You arrived at the conference just as they had finished talking
about Leningrad?
KEITEL: Yes. I entered the room when they were talking about the
qualifications of Gauleiter Lohse, whether or not he was suitable for an
administrative office. These were the first words which I heard. A
debate was going on about that subject just when I entered.
GEN. RUDENKO: It states there quite clearly: “Raze the city of Leningrad
to the ground.”
KEITEL: Yes, I have read that here.
GEN. RUDENKO: The same is stated in the decree, is it not?
KEITEL: Yes; but there is no direct connection with me. Do you mean the
order of the Navy, the order which was found with the Navy?
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that there were two decrees, one issued by the
naval command and the other by the OKW, signed by Jodl? You do know
that, do you not?
KEITEL: Yes, I have seen both these decrees here. They were submitted by
the Russian Delegation.
GEN. RUDENKO: And you know that the decree signed by the Defendant Jodl
also refers to the destruction of the city of Moscow.
KEITEL: That I do not remember exactly, any more since only Leningrad
was referred to at that time, when I glanced at it. But if it is stated
there, I will not doubt it at all.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you: Did the OKW issue decrees for the purpose
of having them obeyed?
KEITEL: The order or communication of the Navy is first of all no OKW
order and how it originated is not known to me. The short order of the
OKW, signed “By order of Jodl,” was not drafted in my presence, as I
already stated yesterday. I would have signed it but I was absent and
therefore do not know either to which reasons or discussions this order
was due.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have not replied to my question. I am asking you: The
directives issued by the OKW were given out to be obeyed? Can you reply
to me briefly?
KEITEL: This is a directive but not an order, because an order can be
given only by the office of the local command of the army. It was
therefore a directive, an aim, an intention.
GEN. RUDENKO: And are directives from the OKW not meant to be carried
out?
KEITEL: Certainly they are meant to be carried out.
GEN. RUDENKO: As to your statement that no one shelled Leningrad, it
does not even call for further denial, since it is a well-known fact.
KEITEL: May I at least say that I did not issue that order. That is why
I do not know anything about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that before the beginning of the war against
the Soviet Union the Defendant Göring issued a so-called Green Folder
containing directives on the economic matters in the territories of the
U.S.S.R. intended for occupation?
KEITEL: Yes, that is known to me.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you affirm that in your directive of 16 June 1941 you
instructed all the German troops to obey these directives implicitly?
KEITEL: Yes, there is a directive which makes known to all units of the
Army the organizations which are assigned for important tasks and what
their responsibilities are, and that all the military commands of the
Army must act in compliance therewith. That I passed on; it was not my
order, I passed it on.
GEN. RUDENKO: Was it your own order or were you merely obeying the
Führer’s instructions?
KEITEL: I merely passed on the orders received from the Führer, and I
could not give any orders at all to Reich Marshal Göring in that
respect.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not issue an order to Field Marshal Göring, but
addressed your order to the troops?
KEITEL: I could not give him any orders either; I could only communicate
the will of the Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he had
to pass it on to his army groups.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not disagree with this will of the Führer’s?
KEITEL: I did not raise any objection, since this did not concern a duty
of the OKW. I followed the order and passed it on.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that this order gave you instructions for the
immediate and complete economic exploitation of the occupied regions of
the Soviet Union in the interest of German war economy?
KEITEL: I did not give such an order containing the aims and tasks which
were to be carried out by the organization Economic Staff Oldenburg,
since I had nothing to do with that. I only passed on the contents of
the Green Folder—it is known what this name stands for—to the High
Command of the Army for appropriate action.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that the directives contained in Göring’s
Green Folder were aimed at the plunder of the material wealth of the
Soviet Union and all her citizens?
KEITEL: No. In my opinion nothing was said about destruction in the
Green Folder. Instead of destruction one ought to say, to make good use
of surplus, especially in the field of the food supply and the
utilization of raw materials for the entire war economy of Germany, but
not the destruction of them.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please repeat what you have said.
KEITEL: I said that in the Green Folder there were principles for the
utilization of present and future reserves which were considered
surplus, but never for their destruction. To let the Soviet population
starve at the same time, on account of this, that was not the case. I
have seen these things on the spot and therefore I am qualified to speak
about them.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not consider that plunder?
KEITEL: The quibble about words, whether booty, or exploitation of
reserves found during the war, or looting, or the like, is a matter of
concepts which I believe need not be defined here. Everyone uses his own
expressions in this respect.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, do not let us argue about it. I have one last
question to ask you with regard to the attack on the Soviet Union: Do
you agree that the methods of warfare adopted by the German Army in the
East stood in striking contrast with the simplest concept of military
honor of an army and the exigencies of war?
KEITEL: No, I cannot admit that in this form. I would rather say, the
fact that the brutalizing—I have used this term before—that the
brutalizing of the war against the Soviet Union and what occurred in the
East, is not to be attributed to instigation by the German Army but to
circumstances which I have stated in an affidavit submitted by my
counsel to the Tribunal. I would furthermore like to ask the Russian
Prosecutor to read it so that he can see my opinion about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. To conclude the question of aggression and to
pass to the question of atrocities, I have to ask you the following
question, and I trust you will impart to the Tribunal the information
you possess in your capacity as Hitler’s closest adviser on the conduct
of the war.
My question is the following: What tasks did the High Command of the
Armed Forces entrust to the German Army in case Germany fought to the
finish a victorious war against the Soviet Union?
KEITEL: I do not know what you mean by that. Which demands were put to
the military leadership in case the war would be a success? May I ask
you to put this question differently. I did not understand it.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have in mind tasks for the further conduct of the war
after a successful conclusion of the Eastern campaign.
KEITEL: There could have occurred what actually did occur later, that
is, the landing of the British and American forces in France, in
Denmark, or in Germany, _et cetera_. There were various possibilities of
warfare which might occur and which could not be anticipated at all.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am not asking this question in general. You are
evidently acquainted with a document entitled, _Manual of Naval
Warfare_, which had already been drafted on 8 August 1941 and contained
plans for the subsequent conduct of the war after the conclusion of the
Eastern campaign. I refer here to the drafting of plans for an attack on
Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Do you know this document?
KEITEL: It has not been submitted to me so far. It is a surprise at the
moment, and I cannot recall it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know this document.
This document, Your Honors, is Number S-57; it was submitted to the
Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-336. I shall show it to you in a minute.
Please hand this document to the defendant. [_The document was submitted
to the defendant._]
KEITEL: I see this document for the first time, at any rate here during
the proceedings. It begins with the sentence, “A draft of directives
concerning further plans after the end of the Eastern campaign was
submitted to the Naval Operations Staff.” This order or directive of the
Navy I have never seen nor could I have seen it. It is a draft of
directives which could come only from the High Command of the Wehrmacht.
In the Armed Forces Operations Staff there were officers from the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force, and it is quite possible that ideas which
took the shape of drafts of directives were made known at the time to
the officers of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. I cannot remember any
such draft of directives of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, but perhaps
Generaloberst Jodl may possibly be in a position to give information
about that. I cannot remember it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember it? I shall not examine you about it
closely but you see that the document plans the seizure of Gibraltar
with the active participation of Spain. In addition it provides for an
attack on Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and so forth. And you say that you
know nothing of this document?
KEITEL: I shall be glad to give information about that. An attack to
seize Gibraltar, the entrance to the Mediterranean straits, had already
been planned for the preceding winter but had not been carried out, that
is, during the winter of 1939-40. It was nothing new and the other
topics which have been mentioned were those which developed ideas based
on the situation existing north of the Caucasus as a result of the
operations. I do not at all mean to say that these ideas were not given
any thought, but I do not remember it and I did not read every document
or paper of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff when it was in the drafting
stage.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you consider as mere scraps of paper documents
concerning the seizure of foreign countries, then what documents do you
consider as important?
KEITEL: I can state only the following, which is true and sincere. In
wartime one makes many plans and considers various possibilities which
are not and cannot be carried out in the face of the hard facts of
reality; and therefore it is not permissible to regard such papers
afterwards from an historical point of view, as representing throughout
the will and intention of the operational and strategic war leadership.
GEN. RUDENKO: I agree with you that from an historical point of view
this document is at present of no importance whatsoever. But taken in
conjunction with the plan of the German General Staff at a time when
this Staff thought it was going to defeat the Soviet Union, the document
does acquire a very different meaning. However, I shall not examine you
any further about this document, for the time being.
I now pass on to the subject of atrocities and of your attitude towards
these crimes. Your counsel, Dr. Nelte, has already handed you the
principal documents of the Prosecution on the subject of atrocities. I
do not therefore intend either to submit them again or to enter into any
detailed argument on the subject. I shall merely examine you on the
basic principles of these documents which were submitted by your counsel
when he interrogated you.
I shall first of all refer to a document entitled, “Directive on the
Introduction of Military Jurisdiction in Region Barbarossa and on the
Adoption of Special Military Measures.” Do you remember that document?
It was drawn up on 13 May 1941 more than a month before the outbreak of
war against the Soviet Union. Do you remember that in that document,
drawn up before the war, instructions were given that suspect elements
should immediately be brought before an officer and that he would decide
whether they were to be shot? Do you remember that directive? Did you
sign the document?
KEITEL: Yes, I have never denied that. But I have given the necessary
explanations as to how the document came into being and who was its
originator.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?
GEN. RUDENKO: Document C-50, dated 13 May 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
GEN. RUDENKO: [_To the defendant_]: Although you declare that you have
already elucidated the matter to your counsel, I am nevertheless obliged
to put this question to you in a slightly different form: Did you
consider that an officer had a right to shoot people without trial or
investigation?
KEITEL: In the German Army there have always been courts-martial for our
own soldiers as well as for our enemies, which could always be set up,
consisting of one officer and one or two soldiers all three of whom
would act as judges. That is what we call a court-martial
(Standgericht); the only requisite is always that an officer must
preside at this court. But as a matter of principle I have to repeat the
statement which I have made yesterday...
GEN. RUDENKO: One moment! Please reply to this question. Did not this
document do away with judicial proceedings in the case of so-called
suspects, at the same time leaving to an officer of the German Army the
right to shoot them? Is that correct?
KEITEL: In the case of German soldiers it was correct and was permitted.
There is a military tribunal with judicial officers and there is a
court-martial which consists of soldiers. These have the right to pass
and to execute an appropriate sentence against any soldier of the German
Army in court-martial proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. The question is, what
right does this document give, not what the orders in the German Army
are.
GEN. RUDENKO: Can you reply to the following question? Did this document
do away with judicial proceedings and did it give the German officer the
right to shoot suspects, as stated herein?
KEITEL: That was an order which was given to me by Hitler. He had given
me that order and I put my name under it. What that means, I explained
in detail yesterday.
GEN. RUDENKO: You, a Field Marshal, signed that decree. You considered
that the decree was irregular; you understood what the consequences of
that decree were likely to be. Then why did you sign it?
KEITEL: I cannot say any more than that I put my name to it and I
thereby, personally, assumed in my position a degree of responsibility.
GEN. RUDENKO: And one more question. This decree was dated 13 May 1941,
almost a month before the outbreak of war. So you had planned the murder
of human beings beforehand?
KEITEL: That I do not understand. It is correct that this order was
issued about 4 weeks before the beginning of the campaign Barbarossa,
and another 4 weeks earlier it had been communicated to the generals in
a statement by Hitler. They knew that weeks before.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know how this decree was actually applied?
KEITEL: I have also told my opinion to the interrogating General of the
Soviet Army in the preliminary interrogations; whether generals
discussed this order with me has not been mentioned, but I wish to point
out that it says specifically here that the higher commanders have the
right to suspend this order concerning court jurisdiction as soon as
their area is pacified. I have given the same answer to every general
who has asked me about the reasons for this order and its effect. I said
that it provides that they were allowed to suspend this order as soon as
they considered their area to be pacified. That is an individual
subjective question for the discretion of the commanders and it is
provided therein.
GEN. RUDENKO: And now for the final question in connection with this
order or directive. This order actually assured German soldiers and
officers impunity for arbitrary actions and actions of lawlessness?
KEITEL: Within certain limits, within certain limits! The limit was
strictly defined in the oral order to the generals, namely, application
of severest disciplinary measures among their own troops.
GEN. RUDENKO: I think, Defendant Keitel, that you have seen these
“certain limits” in the documents submitted to the Tribunal and in the
documentary films.
I shall now ask you the following question: On 12 May 1941 the question
of the treatment of captured Russian political commissars and military
prisoners was under consideration. Do you remember that document?
KEITEL: At the moment I cannot recall which one you mean. It is not
clear to me what you are referring to at the moment.
GEN. RUDENKO: I refer to the document dated 12 May 1941, which
established that the political leaders of the Red Army should not be
recognized as prisoners of war but should be destroyed.
KEITEL: I have seen only notes on it. I do not recall the document at
present but I know the facts. I cannot recall the document at the
moment. May I see it please?
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. [_The document was handed to the
defendant._]
THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?
GEN. RUDENKO: Number 884-PS. It is a document dated 12 May 1941 and
entitled: “Treatment of Political and Military Russian Functionaries.”
KEITEL: It is not an order but a memorandum on a report by the
Department of National Defense, with the remark that decisions by the
Führer are still required. The memorandum probably refers to a suggested
order, I remember this now; I saw it at the time and the result of the
report is not mentioned but merely a suggestion which was put down for
the ruling. As far as I know, the ruling was taken on those lines then
communicated to the High Command of the Army as having been approved by
the Führer or having been attended to, or discussed, or agreed upon,
directly between the Führer and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
GEN. RUDENKO: What do you mean when you speak of “regulation”? We have
learned so many expressions from German Army terminology, such as
“regulation,” “special treatment,” “execution,” but they all, translated
into vulgar parlance, mean one thing, and one thing only—murder. What
are you thinking of when you say “regulation”?
KEITEL: I did not say “regulation.” I do not know which word was
understood to mean regulation. I said that, in the sense of that
memorandum, according to my recollection, directives had been issued by
Hitler to the Army at that time, that is, an approval to the suggestion
which has been made in the memorandum.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case you do not deny that as far back as May, more
than a month before the outbreak of war, the document had already been
drafted which provided for the annihilation of Russian political
commissars and military personnel? You do not deny this?
KEITEL: No, that I do not deny. That was the result of the directives
which had been communicated and which had been worked out here in
writing by the generals.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST DAY
Saturday, 6 April 1946
_Morning Session_
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I am asking you about the directive
concerning the so-called communist insurrectionary movement in the
occupied territories. Yesterday your counsel showed you this directive.
It is an order of 16 September 1941, Number R-98. I shall remind you of
one passage from this order. It states:
“In order to nip in the bud any conspiracy, the strongest
measures should be taken at the first sign of trouble in order
to maintain the authority of the occupying power and to prevent
the conspiracy from spreading...”;
and furthermore:
“...one must bear in mind that in the countries affected human
life has absolutely no value and that a deterrent effect can be
achieved only through the application of extraordinarily harsh
measures.”
You remember this basic idea of the order, that human life absolutely
does not amount to anything. Do you remember this statement, the basic
statement of the order, that “human life has absolutely no value”? Do
you remember this sentence?
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You signed the order containing this statement?
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider that necessity demanded this extremely
evil order?
KEITEL: I explained some of the reasons for this order yesterday and I
pointed out that these instructions were addressed in the first place to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht offices in the Southeast; that
is, the Balkan regions, where extensive partisan warfare and a war
between the leaders had assumed enormous proportions, and secondly,
because the same phenomena had been observed and established on the same
or similar scale in certain defined areas of the occupied Soviet
territory.
GEN. RUDENKO: Does this mean that you consider this order to have been
entirely correct?
KEITEL: I have already explained in detail, in replying to questions, my
fundamental standpoint with regard to all orders concerning the
treatment of the population. I signed the order and by doing so I
assumed responsibility within the scope of my official jurisdiction.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that you are not answering the
question. The question was perfectly capable of an answer “yes” or “no”
and an explanation afterwards. It is not an answer to the question to
say that you have already explained to your counsel.
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more, do you consider this order, this
particular order—and I emphasize, in which it is stated that “human
life has absolutely no value”—do you consider this order correct?
KEITEL: It does not contain these words; but I knew from years of
experience that in the Southeastern territories and in certain parts of
the Soviet territory, human life was not respected to the same degree.
GEN. RUDENKO: You say that these words do not exist in the order?
KEITEL: To my knowledge those exact words do not appear; but it says
that human life has very little value in these territories. I remember
something like that.
GEN. RUDENKO: According to your recollection now, you remember that you
were interrogated by General Alexandrov on 9 November 1945. To a
question in regard to the meaning of this sentence you replied: “I must
admit that this sentence is authentic, although the Führer himself
inserted this sentence in the order.”
Do you remember your explanation?
KEITEL: That is correct. That is true.
GEN. RUDENKO: I can produce this order for you. I did not produce it
because you were familiarizing yourself with it yesterday.
KEITEL: I did not read through all the points yesterday. I merely
admitted its actual existence.
THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal if you got a translation of
the document. When you are cross-examining upon a document and as to the
actual words of it, it is very inconvenient for us not to have the
document before us.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I shall at once present this order to the
defendant.
[_Handing the document to the defendant._]
THE PRESIDENT: Is it Document 389-PS?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, this is Document 389-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: When you are citing a document it would be a good thing
if you would cite the number rather slowly because very often the
translation does not come through accurately to us.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, I shall observe this in the future, Mr.
President. I numbered this document R-98, but it has a double number,
R-98 and 389-PS. I cited Subparagraph 3 b) of this order.
Defendant Keitel, have you familiarized yourself with the document?
KEITEL: Yes. The text in the German language says that “in the countries
affected human life frequently has no value...”
GEN. RUDENKO: And further?
KEITEL: Yes, “...and a deterrent effect can be obtained only by extreme
harshness. To atone for the life of a German soldier...”
GEN. RUDENKO: Quite clear. And in this same order, in this same
Subparagraph “b,” it is stated that:
“To atone for the life of one German soldier, 50 to 100
Communists must, as a rule, be sentenced to death. The method of
execution should strengthen the measure of determent.”
Is that correct?
KEITEL: The German text is slightly different. It says: “In such cases
in general, the death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists may be considered
adequate.”
That is the German wording.
GEN. RUDENKO: For one German soldier?
KEITEL: Yes. I know that and I see it here.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is what I was asking you about. So now I ask you once
more...
KEITEL: Do you want an explanation of that or am I not to say any more?
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall now interrogate you on this matter. I ask you
whether, when signing this order you thereby expressed your personal
opinion on these cruel measures? In other words, were you in agreement
with Hitler?
KEITEL: I signed the order but the figures contained in it are
alterations made personally by Hitler himself.
GEN. RUDENKO: And what figures did you present to Hitler?
KEITEL: The figures in the original were 5 to 10.
GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, the divergence between you and Hitler
consisted merely in the figures and not in the spirit of the document?
KEITEL: The idea was that the only way of deterring them was to demand
several sacrifices for the life of one soldier, as is stated here.
GEN. RUDENKO: You...
THE PRESIDENT: That was not an answer to the question. The question was
whether the only difference between you and Hitler on this document was
a question of figures. That admits of the answer, “yes” or “no.” Was the
only difference between you and Hitler a question of figures?
KEITEL: Then I must say that with reference to the underlying principle
there was a difference of opinion, the final results of which I no
longer feel myself in a position to justify, since I added my signature
on behalf of my department. There was a fundamental difference of
opinion on the entire question.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. Let us continue.
I would like to remind you of one more order. It is the order dated 16
December 1942, referring to the so-called “Fight against the Partisans.”
This document was submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-16; I
shall not examine you in detail with regard to this order. It was
presented to you yesterday by your defense counsel.
KEITEL: I do not remember that at the moment.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember?
KEITEL: Not the one that was presented yesterday.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. If you do not remember I can hand you this
document in order to refresh your memory.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the PS number of this document?
GEN. RUDENKO: This is the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution
as Exhibit Number USSR-16 (Document Number USSR-16).
THE PRESIDENT: I just took down that it was USA-516, but I suppose I was
wrong in hearing. It is USSR-16, is it?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, USSR-16.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
GEN. RUDENKO: [_Handing the document to the defendant._] I shall
interrogate you, Defendant Keitel, only on one question in connection
with this order. In Subparagraph 1 of this order, Paragraph 3, it is
stated, and I would draw your attention to the following sentence:
“The troops are therefore authorized and ordered in this
struggle to take any measures without restriction even against
women and children, if that is necessary to achieve success.”
Have you found this passage?
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Have you found the order calling for the application of
any kind of measures you like without restriction, also against women
and children?
KEITEL: “To employ without restriction any means, even against women and
children, if it is necessary.” I have found that.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is exactly what I am asking you about. I ask you,
Defendant Keitel, Field Marshal of the former German Army, do you
consider that this order is a just one, that measures may be employed at
will against women and children?
KEITEL: Measures, insofar as it means that women and children were also
to be removed from territories where there was partisan warfare, never
atrocities or the murder of women or children. Never!
GEN. RUDENKO: To remove—a German term—means to kill?
KEITEL: No. I do not think it would ever have been necessary to tell
German soldiers that they could not and must not kill women and
children.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not answer my question.
Do you consider this order a just one in regard to measures against
women and children or do you consider it unjust? Answer “yes” or “no.”
Is it just or unjust? Explain the matter later.
KEITEL: I considered these measures to be right and as such I admit
them; but not measures to kill. That was a crime.
GEN. RUDENKO: “Any kind of measures” includes murder.
KEITEL: Yes, but not of women and children.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but it says here “Any kind of measures against women
and children.”
KEITEL: No, it does not say “any measures.” It says “...and not to
shrink from taking measures against women and children.” That is what it
says.
No German soldier or German officer ever thought of killing women and
children.
GEN. RUDENKO: And in reality...?
KEITEL: I cannot say in every individual case, since I do not know and I
could not be everywhere and since I received no reports about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: But there were millions of such cases?
KEITEL: I have no knowledge of that and I do not believe that it
happened in millions of cases.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not believe it?
KEITEL: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall proceed to another question. I shall now refer to
one question, the question of the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
I do not intend to examine you in regard to the branding of Soviet
prisoners of war and other facts; they are sufficiently well known to
the Tribunal. I want to examine you in regard to one document, the
report of Admiral Canaris, which was presented to you yesterday. You
remember yesterday your counsel submitted to you the Canaris report; it
is dated 15 September 1941 and registered under Document Number EC-338.
As you will remember, even a German officer drew attention to the
exceptional arbitrariness and lawlessness admitted in connection with
the Soviet prisoners of war. Canaris in this report pointed to the mass
murders of Soviet prisoners of war and spoke of the necessity of
definitely eliminating this arbitrariness. Did you agree with the
statements advanced by Canaris in his report, with reference to
yourself?
KEITEL: I did not understand the last statement. With reference to
myself?
GEN. RUDENKO: The last question amounts to this: Were you, Keitel,
personally in agreement with the proposals made by Canaris in his
report, that the arbitrary treatment permitted should be done away with
where Soviet prisoners of war were concerned?
KEITEL: I answered my counsel yesterday...
GEN. RUDENKO: You can answer my question briefly; were you in agreement
with it?
KEITEL: Yes, I will be brief—on receiving that letter, I immediately
submitted it to the Führer, Adolf Hitler, especially on account of the
enclosed publication by the Peoples’ Commissars, which was dated the
beginning of July, and I asked for a new decision. On the whole I shared
the objections raised by Canaris, but I must supplement that...
GEN. RUDENKO: You shared them? Very well. I shall now present you with
the original copy of Canaris’ report, containing your decision.
Mr. President, I shall now present to the defendant the document
containing his decision. This decision was not read into the record in
court and I shall also present the text of his final decision to the
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the original?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I gave it to the defendant.
And now, Witness Keitel, will you please follow?
KEITEL: I know the document with the marginal notes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Listen to me and follow the text of the decision. This is
Canaris’ document, which you consider a just one. The following are the
contents of your decision:
“These objections arise from the military conception of
chivalrous warfare. We are dealing here with the destruction of
an ideology and, therefore, I approve such measures and I
sanction them.” Signed: “Keitel.”
Is this your resolution?
KEITEL: Yes, I wrote that after it had been submitted to the Führer for
decision. I wrote it then.
GEN. RUDENKO: It is not written there that the Führer said so; it is
said “I sanction them”—meaning Keitel.
KEITEL: And I state this on oath; and I said it even before I read it.
GEN. RUDENKO: This means that you acknowledge the decision. I will now
draw your attention to another passage of this document. I draw your
attention to Page 2. Please observe that the text of Canaris’ report
mentions the following:
“The separation of civilians and prisoners of war who are
politically undesirable, and decisions to be made in regard to
their fate, is to be effected by task forces (Einsatzkommando)
belonging to the Security Police and the SD in accordance with
directives not known to the Wehrmacht establishments and whose
execution cannot be checked by the latter.”
Canaris writes this; your decision, Defendant Keitel, is written in the
margin. It says, “Highly expedient.” Is that correct?
KEITEL: Please repeat the last question. The last words I heard were
“Canaris writes.”
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, and I am now mentioning the fact that your decision
“Highly expedient” appears in the margin, opposite that paragraph, and
written by your own hand. Have you found this?
KEITEL: Yes. The word “expedient” refers to the fact that the army
offices had nothing to do with these Einsatzkommandos and knew nothing
about them. It states that they are not known to the Wehrmacht.
GEN. RUDENKO: And furthermore it refers to the fact that the Security
Police and the SD should wreak vengeance on civilians and prisoners of
war? You consider that expedient?
KEITEL: No, I thought it expedient that the activities of these
Kommandos be unknown to the Armed Forces. That is what I meant. That
appears here and I underlined “unknown.”
GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you, Defendant Keitel, known as Field Marshal
and one who, before this Tribunal, has repeatedly referred to yourself
as a soldier, whether you, in your own blood-thirsty decision of
September 1941, confirmed and sanctioned the murder of the unarmed
soldiers whom you had captured? Is that right?
KEITEL: I signed both decrees and I, therefore, bear the responsibility
within the sphere of my office; I assume the responsibility.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is quite clear. In this connection I would like to
ask you, since you have repeatedly mentioned it before the Tribunal,
about the duty of a soldier. I want to ask you: Is it in accordance with
the concept of a “soldier’s duty” and the “honor of an officer” to
promulgate such orders for reprisals on prisoners of war and on peaceful
citizens?
KEITEL: Yes, as far as the reprisals of August and September are
concerned, in view of what happened to German prisoners of war whom we
found in the field of battle, and in Lvov where we found them murdered
by the hundreds.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, do you again wish to follow the path to
which you resorted once before, and revive the question of the alleged
butchery of German prisoners of war? You and I agreed yesterday that as
far back as May 1941, prior to the beginning of the war, you had signed
a directive on the shooting of political and military workers in the Red
Army. I have some...
KEITEL: Yes, I also signed the orders before the war but they did not
contain the word “murder.”
GEN. RUDENKO: I am not going to argue with you since this means arguing
against documents; and documents speak for themselves.
I have a few last questions to ask you: You informed the Tribunal that
the generals of the German Army were only blindly carrying out Hitler’s
orders?
KEITEL: I have stated that I do not know if any generals raised
objections or who they were, and I said that it did not happen in my
presence when Hitler proclaimed the principles of the ideological war
and ordered them to be put into practice.
GEN. RUDENKO: And do you know that the generals, on their own
initiative, promulgated orders on atrocities and on the violation of the
laws and customs of war, and that these orders were approved by Hitler?
KEITEL: I know that high authorities in the Army issued orders altering,
modifying, and even cancelling in part; for instance, as regards
jurisdiction, the March decree and other measures, because they also
discussed it with me.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not understand me. I did not ask about
modifications, but whether the generals, on their own initiative, ever
promulgated orders inciting to the violation of the laws and customs of
war.
KEITEL: I do not know of that. I do not know what order you are
referring to, General. At the moment I cannot say that I know that.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall refer to one order only. What I have in mind is
General Field Marshal Reichenau’s order governing the conduct of troops
in the East.
This document, Mr. President, was presented by the Soviet Prosecution as
Exhibit Number USSR-12 (Document Number USSR-12). The passages to which
I refer are underlined in this document, and I shall read into the
record one quotation from this order governing the conduct of troops in
the East:
“Feeding the inhabitants and prisoners of war...is...a mistaken
humanity...”
KEITEL: I know the order. It was shown to me during a preliminary
interrogation.
GEN. RUDENKO: This order, issued on Reichenau’s initiative and approved
by Hitler, was distributed as a model order among all the army
commanders.
KEITEL: I did not know that; I heard about it here for the first time.
To my knowledge I never saw the order either.
GEN. RUDENKO: Of course you would, quite obviously, consider such orders
as entirely insignificant. After all, could the fate of Soviet prisoners
of war and of the civilian population be of any possible interest to the
Chief of the OKW, since their lives were of no value whatsoever?
KEITEL: I had no contact with the commanders at the front and had no
official connection with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was
the only one who had.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing your cross-examination. When testifying
before the Tribunal you very often referred, as did your accomplices,
the Defendants Göring and Ribbentrop, to the Treaty of Versailles, and I
am asking you, were Vienna, Prague, Belgrade and the Crimea part of
Germany before the Treaty of Versailles?
KEITEL: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: You stated here that in 1944, after the law had been
amended, you received an offer to join the Nazi Party. You accepted this
offer, presented your personal credentials to the leadership of the
Party, and paid your membership fees. Tell us, did not your acceptance
to join the membership of the Nazi Party signify that you were in
agreement with the program, objectives, and methods of the Party?
KEITEL: As I had already been in possession of the Golden Party Badge
for three or four years, I thought that this request for my personal
particulars was only a formal registration; and I paid the required
Party membership subscription. I did both these things and have admitted
doing them.
GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, before this formal offer was ever made,
you already, _de facto_, considered yourself a member of the Nazi Party?
KEITEL: I have always thought of myself as a soldier; not as a political
soldier or politician.
GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not conclude, after all that has been said here,
that you were a Hitler-General, not because duty called you but on
account of your own convictions?
KEITEL: I have stated here that I was a loyal and obedient soldier of my
Führer. And I do not think that there are generals in Russia who do not
give Marshal Stalin implicit obedience.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have exhausted all my questions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember on the 2d of October
1945 writing a letter to Colonel Amen, explaining your position? It was
after your interrogations, and in your own time you wrote a letter
explaining your point of view. Do you remember that?
KEITEL: Yes, I think I did write a letter; but I no longer remember the
contents. It referred to the interrogations, however.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
KEITEL: And I think it contained a request that I be given a further
opportunity of thinking things over, as the questions put to me took me
by surprise and I was often unable to remember the answers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to remind you of one passage and ask you
whether it correctly expresses your view:
“In carrying out these thankless and difficult tasks, I had to
fulfill my duty under the hardest exigencies of war, often
acting against the inner voice of my conscience and against my
own convictions. The fulfillment of urgent tasks assigned by
Hitler, to whom I was directly responsible, demanded complete
self-abnegation.”
Do you remember that?
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want you to tell the Tribunal,
what were the worst matters in your view in which you often acted
against the inner voice of your conscience? Just tell us some of the
worst matters in which you acted against the inner voice of your
conscience.
KEITEL: I found myself in such a situation quite frequently, but the
decisive questions which conflicted most violently with my conscience
and my convictions were those which were contrary to the training which
I had undergone during my 37 years as an officer in the German Army.
That was a blow at my most intimate personal principles.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted it to come from you, Defendant. Can you
tell the Tribunal the three worst things you had to do which were
against the inner voice of your conscience? What do you pick out as the
three worst things you had to do?
KEITEL: Perhaps, to start with the last, the orders given for the
conduct of the war in the East, insofar as they were contrary to the
acknowledged usage of war; then something which particularly concerns
the British Delegation, the question of the 50 R.A.F. officers, the
question which weighed particularly heavy on my mind, that of the
terror-fliers and, worst of all, the Nacht und Nebel Decree and the
actual consequences it entailed at a later stage and about which I did
not know. Those were the worst struggles which I had with myself.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take the Nacht und Nebel.
My Lord, this document and a good many to which I shall refer are in the
British Document Book Number 7, Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, and it
occurs on Page 279. It is L-90, Exhibit USA-503.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, I will give you the German
document book. It is 279 of the British document book, and 289...
KEITEL: Number 731?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 289. I do not know which volume it
is; Part 2, I think it is.
You see, the purpose of the decree is set out a few lines from the
start, where they say that in all cases where the death penalty is not
pronounced and not carried out within a week,
“...the accused are in the future to be deported to Germany
secretly, and further proceedings in connection with the
offenses will take place here. The deterrent effect of these
measures lies in: (a) the complete disappearance of the accused;
(b) the fact that no information may be given as to their
whereabouts or their fate.”
Both these purposes, you will agree, were extremely cruel and brutal,
were they not?
KEITEL: I said both at the time and yesterday, that I personally thought
that to deport individuals secretly was very much more cruel than to
impose a sentence of death. I have...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn to Page 281—291 of yours—281 of
the English Book?
KEITEL: Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that this is your covering letter:
“The Führer is of the opinion:”—Line 4—“In the case of
offenses such as these, punishment by imprisonment, or even
penal servitude for life, will be considered a sign of weakness.
Effective and lasting intimidation can only be achieved either
by capital punishment or by measures which keep the culprit’s
relatives and the population generally uncertain as to his
fate.”
You will agree that there again these sentences of the Führer which you
are here transmitting were cruel and brutal, were they not?
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I...
KEITEL: May I add something?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, as shortly as you can.
KEITEL: I made a statement yesterday on this subject and I drew your
attention particularly to the words: “It is the Führer’s long considered
will,” which were intended to convey to the generals who were receiving
these orders what was written between the lines.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, you know, Defendant, that that was by no
means the end of this series of orders, was it? This order was
unsuccessful despite its cruelty and brutality in achieving its purpose,
was it not? This order, the Nacht und Nebel Order, in that form was
unsuccessful in achieving its purpose; it did not stop what it was
designed to stop? Is that right?
KEITEL: No, it did not cease.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that in 1944 you had to make a still more
severe order. Would you look at Document D-762? My Lord, that will
become Exhibit GB-298.
[_Turning to the defendant._] It says:
“The constant increase in acts of terror and sabotage in the
occupied territories, committed more and more by bands under
unified leadership, compels us to take the sternest
countermeasures in a degree corresponding to the ferocity of the
war which is forced upon us. Those who attack us from the rear
at the crisis of our fight for existence deserve no
consideration.
“I therefore order:
“All acts of violence committed by non-German civilians in the
occupied territories against the German Wehrmacht, the SS, or
the Police, or against installations used by them, are to be
combated in the following manner as acts of terrorism and
sabotage:”—(1)—“The troops,”—the SS and so on—“are to fight
down on the spot...all terrorists and saboteurs.”—(2)—“Those
who are apprehended later are to be handed over to the nearest
local Security Police and the SD office.”—(3)—“Accomplices,
especially women, who take no active part in the fighting, are
to be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.”
Now, would you look at Paragraph II:
“The Chief of the OKW will issue the necessary executive
instructions. He is entitled to make alterations and additions
as far as required by the exigencies of war operations.”
Did you think that was a cruel and severe order or not?
KEITEL: Yes, I do think so, but may I make one small correction? It must
have been incorrectly translated. The actual wording is: “Women are to
be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.” So it says in the
original version which I have before me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “spared.” “Spared” meant that they were
not to be treated thus. I was careful to mention that.
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had authority to make alterations and
additions. Did you, by your alterations and additions, attempt to
mitigate the severity of that order in any way?
KEITEL: I have no recollection of having issued any additional orders to
mitigate its severity. I may also say that I never would have issued
anything without first presenting it to the Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see what you did issue. Would you
look at Document D-764, which will be Exhibit GB-299?
Now, that is your executive order, countersigned I think by the Senior
Military Judge, putting forward your order based on that decree; and
would you look at Paragraphs 4 and 5:
“All legal proceedings now going on in connection with acts of
terrorism, sabotage, or other crimes committed by non-German
civilians in the occupied territories which imperil the security
or readiness for action of the occupying power are to be
suspended. Indictments are to be dropped. Sentences already
pronounced are not to be carried out. The culprits are to be
handed over with a report on the proceedings to the nearest
local Security Police and SD office. In the case of death
sentences which have already become final, the regulations now
in force will continue to apply.
“Crimes affecting German interests but which do not imperil the
security or readiness for action of the occupying power do not
justify the retention of jurisdiction over non-German civilians
in the occupied territories. I authorize the commanders of the
occupied territories to draw up new regulations in agreement
with the Higher SS and the Police Leader.”
And then you ask them to consider among the first, one handing them over
to the SD for forced labor.
That was certainly not mitigation of the order, was it? You were not
making it any easier.
KEITEL: There are a few sentences to be added here. This arose out of
the daily discussion of these matters which I dealt with later on the
same lines as the first decree. I made suitable annotations, and signed
them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what you called terrorism and
sabotage. Let us look at what happened to people who were guilty of
something less than terrorism or sabotage. Look at Document D-763. That
will be GB-300. “Non-German civilians...”
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Non-German civilians in the occupied
territories who endanger the security or tactical preparedness
of the occupying power otherwise than through acts of terrorism
and sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD. Section I, Number
3...”—that is the part that says women will be employed on
labor and children will be spared—“of the Führer’s order also
applies to them.”
Well, you knew perfectly well what would happen to anyone who was handed
over to the SD, that he would probably be killed, certainly be put into
a concentration camp, did you not?
KEITEL: I did not interpret it that way; the words “to be allocated on
labor” were always used; but it has become clear to me from what I have
learned that they frequently ended in the concentration camp. However,
it was always described to us, to me, as a labor camp. That was the
description, “labor camps of the Secret State Police.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But this is August 1944. You will agree that
that is a most severe course to take with people who have been guilty of
something less than terrorism or sabotage, do you not?
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us...
KEITEL: I assume that you do not wish me to discuss this origin and
development here. Otherwise I could explain them; but I will merely
answer the question. The answer is, yes, it was a very severe measure.
The explanation, if I may state it very briefly, is that, as is known,
during the interminable daily situation reports on the incidents in all
the occupied territories, I received from the Führer instructions and
orders which were afterwards crystallized in a form similar to this
document; and I think I have already described in detail the way in
which I discussed these things with him and how I worked, that on
principle I never issued or signed anything which did not agree in
principle with his wishes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was severe enough for you for only 3 weeks,
was it not, because on 4 September, which is barely 3 weeks later, you
issued another order, Document D-766, Exhibit GB-301. Now, this was
issued, as it shows, as an agreement with Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, the
Reich Minister of Justice and Dr. Lammers. Now look at I:
“Non-German civilians in occupied territories who have been
sentenced by German courts for a criminal act against the
security or tactical preparedness of the occupying power, the
sentence having become final, and who are in custody in the
occupied territories or in the home front area, are to be handed
over, together with a report on the facts, to the nearest local
Security Police and SD office. An exception is made only in the
case of those sentenced to death for whom the execution of the
penalty has been ordered.
“II. Persons convicted of criminal acts against the Reich or the
occupying power and prohibited, in accordance with the
directives...issued by the Führer for the prosecution of such
acts, from intercourse with the outside world, are to be given a
distinguishing mark.”
Now, had you any idea how many people would be affected by that order?
KEITEL: No, I cannot say anything about that. I know only that it was
made necessary by the increasing tension in the occupied territories,
due to lack of troops to keep order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me remind you. You called a conference
to consider this matter. That is shown in Document D-765, and I also
show you D-767, the report of the conference. You need not worry about
765, which just says that there is to be a conference, but in Document
D-767, which will be Exhibit GB-303, there is a report of the
conference. The second paragraph says:
“The Reichsführer SS”—Himmler—“demands in his letter the
immediate surrender to the SD of approximately 24,000 non-German
civilians who are under arrest or held for interrogation.”—Now
listen to this: “No answer was given to the question raised
during the discussion as to why they must be surrendered to the
SD at the present moment, in spite of the considerable amount of
administrative work involved.”
Can you give any answer now as to why 24,000 people who had been
sentenced should be transferred to the tender mercies of the SD?
KEITEL: May I read this note? I do not know it; may I read it now,
please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. You will see that I did not trouble
you with it all, but it says what I had already put to you earlier, that
the Nacht und Nebel Decree had become superfluous as a result of the
terror and sabotage decree, and that the Wehrmacht Legal Department had
presented these things for discussion.
Now, can you give us any answer as to why these 24,000 unfortunate
persons who had been sentenced should be handed over to the tender
mercies of the SD?
KEITEL: I must say that I am surprised by the whole incident. I did not
attend the conference, and apparently I did not read the note since, as
a matter of principle, I always marked every document which had been
presented to me with my initials. I am not acquainted with the figures
quoted; this is the first time I have seen them; I am not acquainted
with them and I do not remember them, unless another order was...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will give you something which you have read.
KEITEL: As regards the facts about which you ask, I must answer in the
affirmative. I do not know the figures, only the facts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you cannot answer my question. You cannot
give us any reason as to why the Wehrmacht and these other offices were
sending the 24,000 people, who had been sentenced by ordinary courts,
over to the SD? You cannot give us any reason for that?
KEITEL: No; I may say that up to a point I can. I think “SD” is a
misinterpretation. I think police custody was meant. That does not mean
the same thing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly not.
KEITEL: I do not know if it might have been the same thing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely you have been at this Trial too long to
think that handing people over to the SD means police custody. It means
a concentration camp and a gas chamber usually, does it not? That is
what it meant in fact, whether you knew it or not.
KEITEL: I did not know it, but it obviously led to the concentration
camp in the end. I consider it possible; in any case, I cannot say that
it was not.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the last paragraph but one refers to the OKW.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I am just coming to that.
[_Turning to the defendant._] If you will notice that, Defendant, two
paragraphs below the one I put to you it states:
“As the OKW is not particularly interested in trying the minor
matters still remaining for the military tribunals, they are to
be settled by decrees to be agreed upon by local authorities.”
It is quite clear that your office was deeply concerned in this
business, was it not, Defendant?
KEITEL: I do not know exactly what it means, but it was obviously
mentioned at that conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I put the next document, I want you
to realize how we have been going. We started with the Nacht und Nebel
Decree, which disappeared, and we went on to the Terror and Sabotage
Decree. We then proceeded to acts which were less than terror and
sabotage, but were criminal acts under the rules of the occupying power.
I now want you to consider what was done to people who simply refused to
work. Would you look at Document D-769? That is Exhibit GB-304. That is
a telegram from Luftwaffe General Christiansen, who was in the
Netherlands, Commander of the Air Forces in the Netherlands, through his
Chief of Staff.
Now listen to this:
“Owing to railway strike, all communications in Holland at
standstill. Railway personnel does not respond to appeals to
resume work. Demands for motor vehicles and other means of
transport for moving troops and maintaining supplies are no
longer obeyed by the civil population. According to the Führer’s
decree of 18 August 1944”—that is the Terror and Sabotage
Decree, which you have already had—“and the supplementary
executive instructions of the Chief of the OKW”—which we have
already seen—“troops may use weapons only against persons who
commit acts of violence as terrorists or saboteurs, whereas
persons who endanger the security or tactical preparedness of
the occupying power in any other way than by terrorism or acts
of sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD.”
Then General Christiansen comes in with this:
“This regulation has proved too complicated, and therefore
ineffective. Above all, we do not possess the necessary police
forces. The troops must again receive authority to shoot also,
with or without summary court-martial, persons who are not
terrorists or saboteurs in the sense of the Führer’s decree, but
who endanger the fighting forces by passive resistance. It is
requested that the Führer’s decree be altered accordingly, as
the troops cannot otherwise assert themselves effectively
against the population, which in its turn, appears to endanger
the conduct of operations.”
Now, Defendant, will you agree that shooting, with or even without
trial, railway men who will not work, is about as brutal and cruel a
measure as could well be imagined by the mind of man? Do you agree?
KEITEL: That is a cruel measure, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your answer to that cruel measure?
KEITEL: I cannot say. I do not recollect the incident at all, but
perhaps the answer is there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at the Document D-770, which is, I
think, your answer; it is Exhibit GB-305. You will notice on the
distribution list that that goes to the Commander of the Armed Forces in
the Netherlands, and further to the signal which we have just been
looking at. Now, you say:
“According to the Führer’s order of 30 July 1944, non-German
civilians in the occupied territories who attack us in the rear
in the crisis of our battle for existence deserve no
consideration. This must be our guiding principle in the
interpretation and application of the Führer’s decree itself and
the Chief of the OKW’s executive decree of 18 August 1944.
“If the military situation and the state of communications make
it impossible to hand them over to the SD, other effective
measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently. There is,
naturally”—and I ask you to note the word “naturally”—“no
objection to passing and executing death sentences by summary
court-martial under such circumstances.”
I can not remember, Defendant, whether you have ever had an independent
command yourself or not. Have you? Have you had an independent command,
apart from your division? I think that was the last independent command
you had. You have not had an independent command yourself, have you?
Don’t I make myself clear?
KEITEL: I did not understand. What do you mean by “independent”?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I mean that you have not been a commander or
chief of an army or army group yourself, if I remember rightly, or of an
area, have you?
KEITEL: No, I have not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I ask you to put yourself in General
Christiansen’s position. That answer of yours was a direct
encouragement, practically amounting to an order, to shoot these railway
men out of hand, was it not? “To take other effective measures
ruthlessly and independently.”
KEITEL: That is explained by the form of summary court-martial. It is
not left to the discretion of the individual; jurisdiction of summary
court-martial was provided.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the way it is put, Defendant. I
suggest to you that it is quite clear. One sentence states: “If handing
over to the SD is impossible, owing to the military situation and the
state of communications, other effective measures are to be taken
ruthlessly and independently.”
Then, the next sentence: “There are, naturally”—look at the word
“naturally.” I suppose that it was “natürlich” in German. Is that
correct?
KEITEL: I have not the word “natürlich” here. Two words, so far as I can
make out, have been inserted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it says: “There are, naturally, no
objections to passing and executing death sentences by summary
court-martial procedure.” What you are saying is that, of course, there
is no objection to a summary court, but you are telling him, in addition
to that, that he is to take effective measures ruthlessly and
independently. If General Christiansen had shot these railway men out of
hand, after getting that letter from you, neither you nor any other
superior could have blamed him for it, could you?
KEITEL: According to the last sentence, he was obliged to carry out
summary court-martial procedure. It says: “There are no objections to
the executing of this sentence by summary court-martial under such
circumstances.” That is how I meant it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what did you mean by “effective measures to
be taken ruthlessly and independently”? What did you mean by that, if it
was only an ordinary summary court procedure?
KEITEL: Not apart from summary court procedure, but by means of the
same. That is what the last sentence means. It is already unusual to
appoint a summary court-martial in such cases.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, even on your basis, to use a military
summary court to shoot railway men who will not work is going rather far
even for you, is it not? It is going rather far, isn’t it?
KEITEL: That was a very severe measure, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that when you make all
these additions, taking you through the chain of additions that you make
to the order replacing the Nacht und Nebel Order, of which you
disapproved, do you say that you went to Hitler for every one of these
executive orders and answers that you made?
KEITEL: Yes. I went to him on the occasion of every one of these orders.
I must emphasize the fact that I did not issue any of these orders
without previously submitting it to the Führer. I must expressly point
out that that was so.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think a misunderstanding has crept into the
translation. The translation interprets “Standgericht” as summary court.
I do not believe that the words “summary court” reflect accurately what
we understand in the German language by “Standgericht.” I do not know
just what you understand in the English or American language by “summary
court,” but I can imagine that this means some summary procedure.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was taking it in favor of the Defendant that
it meant the court he referred to yesterday, one officer and two
soldiers. I was taking that. If I am wrong, the Defendant will correct
me. Is that right, Defendant?
KEITEL: I described this Standgericht (summary court-martial procedure)
briefly yesterday, and the criterion of a summary court-martial was that
it was not always necessary for a fully trained legal expert to be
present, although it was desirable.
THE PRESIDENT: While you are on the subject of translation, the
Defendant seemed to suggest that there was no word in the German which
is translated by the English word “naturally.” Is that true?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had it checked and I am told that the
translation is right.
THE PRESIDENT: There is a German word which is translated by
“naturally”? I should like to know that from Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: I am told that a false conception or false judgment might be
produced in this connection since in British and American law a summary
court has no right to pass sentences of death. I am told that a summary
court...
THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me, Dr. Nelte, I did not ask that question. The
question I asked you was whether there was any German word which is
translated into English by the word “naturally.” Is that not a clear
question?
DR. NELTE: In the German text it says “under such circumstances, of
course.” I think the English translation is incorrect in using the word
“naturally” and in putting it after “in these circumstances” instead of
at the beginning, so that one is led to conclude that it means, “there
are naturally no objections (es gibt natürlich keine Einwendungen),”
whereas the German text says, “Against the passing and executing of
death sentences by summary court procedure there are—under such
circumstances, of course—no objections (Gegen die Verhängung und
Vollstreckung von Todesurteilen im standgerichtlichen Verfahren bestehen
unter solchen Verhältnissen selbstverständlich keine Bedenken).”
THE PRESIDENT: Then the answer to my question is “yes.” There is a word
in the German which is translated “naturally.”
DR. NELTE: Yes, but the words “naturally” and “under such circumstances”
are separated in the English version, while in the German version they
belong together. “Naturally” refers to “under such circumstances.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to come to another point. You told us
yesterday that with regard to forced labor you were concerned in it
because there was a shortage of manpower and you had to take men out of
industry for the Wehrmacht. Your office was concerned with using
military forces in order to try and round-up people for forced labor,
was it not?
KEITEL: I do not think that is quite the correct conception. The
Replacement Office in the High Command of the Wehrmacht...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are going to deny it, I put the document
to you. I put General Warlimont’s views to you and see if you agree. I
think it saves time in the end. If you look at Document 3819-PS, which
will be Exhibit GB-306, Page 9 of the English version. It is the report
of a meeting at Berlin on 12 July 1944. You have to look on through the
document after the letters from the Defendant Sauckel and the Defendant
Speer, the account of a meeting in Berlin. I think it is Page 10 of the
German version. It starts with a speech by Dr. Lammers and goes on with
a speech from the Defendant Sauckel, then a speech from the witness Von
Steengracht, then a speech from General Warlimont: “The Deputy of the
head of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer
order.” Have you found the portion? I will read it if you have.
KEITEL: Yes, I have found the paragraph “The Representative of the Chief
of the OKW...”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The Representative of the Chief of the
OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer
order, according to which all German forces had to participate
in the task of raising manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was
stationed, if it was not employed exclusively in pressing
military duties (as, for example, in the construction of coastal
defenses), it would be available, but it could not be assigned
expressly for the purpose of the GBA. General Warlimont made the
following practical suggestions:
“a) The troops employed in fighting the partisans are to take
over, in addition, the task of raising manpower in the partisan
areas. Everyone who cannot give a satisfactory reason for his
presence in these areas is to be recruited by force.
“b) When large cities are wholly or partly evacuated on account
of the difficulty of providing food, those members of the
population suitable for labor are to be utilized for labor with
the assistance of the Wehrmacht.
“c) The refugees from the areas near the front should be rounded
up with special vigor with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.”
After reading this report of General Warlimont’s words, do you still say
that the Wehrmacht...
KEITEL: I am not aware that the Armed Forces have ever received an order
mentioning the rounding-up of workers. I would like to say that I know
of no such demand and I have not found any confirmation of it. The
conference as such is unknown to me and so are the proposals you
mentioned. It is new as far as I am concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear that General Warlimont is
suggesting that the Wehrmacht should help in the rounding-up of forced
labor, isn’t it?
KEITEL: But as far as I know it has never happened. I do not know that
such an order was given. According to the record, this is a proposal
made by General Warlimont, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps in those circumstances you should read
the three lines after the passage you have read.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I should. The next line:
“Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks and
expressed the expectation that a certain amount of success could
be achieved by this means.”
KEITEL: May I say something about that? May I ask that Gauleiter Sauckel
be asked at a given time whether and to what extent troops of the Armed
Forces did actually participate in such matters. It is not known to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No doubt the Defendant Sauckel will be asked a
number of questions in due time. At the moment I am asking you. You say
that you do not know anything about it?
KEITEL: No, I do not recollect that any order was given in this
connection. I gather from the statement by Warlimont that discussions
took place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to ask you a few questions about the
murder of various prisoners of war. I want to get it quite clear. Did
you mean yesterday to justify the order for the shooting of Commandos,
dated 18 October 1942? Did you wish to say that it was right and
justified, or not?
KEITEL: I stated yesterday that neither General Jodl nor I thought that
we were in a position, or considered it possible, to draft or submit
such a written order. We did not do it because we could not justify it
or give reasons for it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next question that I put to you is this: Did
you approve and think right the order that was made that Commandos
should be shot?
KEITEL: I no longer opposed it, firstly on account of the punishment
threatened, and secondly because I could no longer alter the order
without personal orders from Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that that order was right?
KEITEL: According to my inner convictions I did not consider it right,
but after it had been given I did not oppose it or take a stand against
it in any way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that your orders had contained
provisions for the use of parachutists being dropped for sabotage
purposes, don’t you? Your own orders have contained that provision of
parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes. Don’t you remember in
the Fall Grün against Czechoslovakia? I would put it to you if you like,
but I would so much prefer that you try to remember it yourself. Don’t
you remember that your own orders contained a provision for parachutists
being dropped for sabotage purposes in Czechoslovakia?
KEITEL: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You don’t?
KEITEL: No, I do not remember the order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I refer you to it. My Lord, it is Page 21 and 22
of the document book.
KEITEL: Which document book, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. It ought to be your first document book,
and quite early on. It is part of the Fall Grün, which is Document
388-PS, and it is Item 11. I think it is somewhere about Page 15 or 16
or 20. You remember the Schmundt minutes and then it is divided into
items.
The Tribunal will find it at the foot of Page 21:
[_Turning to the defendant._]
“For the success of this operation, co-operation with the
Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the
Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops, and
with units of the sabotage service will be of importance.”
KEITEL: May I read the paragraph that I think you mean?
SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; it is headed “Missions for the Branches of
the Armed Forces...”
KEITEL: “Missions for the Branches of the Armed Forces.” It states:
“For success, co-operation with the Sudeten German frontier
population and the deserters from the Czechoslovakian Army, with
parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage
service can be of importance.”
These parachutists and airborne troops were in fact to be set to work on
frontier fortifications, as I explained yesterday, since army
authorities believed that the artillery resources at our command were
insufficient to permit our combating them with artillery.
This does not mean parachutists or saboteurs, but actual members of the
German Air Force, and the sabotage service is mentioned at the end.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sabotage service must be people who are
going to do sabotage if they are going to be of any use, must they not?
They do sabotage, don’t they?
KEITEL: Undoubtedly; but not by means of airborne troops and
parachutists, but through saboteurs in the frontier areas who offer
their services for this kind of work. Yes, that is what they are
thinking of. We had many such people in the Sudeten region.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you, but I want to
have it clear. I now want to come to the way in which this order of the
Führer was announced. You will find the order—the Tribunal will find it
on Page 64—but what I want him to look at if he would be so kind, is
Page 66 of the book, Page 25, Defendant, of your book. The second
sentence of the Defendant Jodl’s “To the Commanders” about this order.
That is on Page 25, and Defendant Jodl says: “This order is for the
commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy
hands.” Was that because you and the Defendant Jodl were ashamed of the
order, that you had this secrecy provision put on it?
KEITEL: I have not found it yet, and I would like to know the
connection. Page 25 is a teletype letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the Oberkommando Wehrmacht, dated 19
October. Now have you got it, the second sentence?
KEITEL: Dated 18 October 1942?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 19 October, issuing order of the 18th. “This
order is for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall
into enemy hands.” Was that because you were ashamed of the order, that
it was put like that?
KEITEL: I have not seen the letter and I think General Jodl should be
asked about it. I do not know the contents, but I have already stated
the opinion of both of us. I cannot give you the reason.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t give me the reason for this secrecy?
KEITEL: I do not know the motives behind it and I would ask you to put
this question to General Jodl. I have not seen it. But I have already
stated my own views and those of General Jodl.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want you to look at the way that
even Hitler expresses it with regard to this. If you look—I guess it is
Page 31 in our book. It is a report from Hitler wherein he says:
“The report which should appear on this subject in the Armed
Forces communiqué will state briefly and laconically that a
sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and
exterminated to the last man.” (Document Number 503-PS)
You were doing your best—and when I say “you,” I mean you collectively,
Hitler, yourself, and Jodl and everyone else concerned. You were doing
your best to keep quiet about this, about anything being known about
this order, weren’t you?
KEITEL: That was not my impression; on the contrary, in every case we
subsequently published the facts in the Wehrmacht orders, the Wehrmacht
report. It is my recollection, namely, that in the Wehrmacht report we
stated that such and such an incident had occurred, followed by such and
such consequences. That is my recollection.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am now only going to ask you to look at one
document further on, because in that regard, you remember, after the
Soviet Union tried certain people at Kharkov, when you were trying to
get up some counterpropaganda—now, look at this document, about these
executions, it is Page 308, Document UK-57. You have got a copy of it. I
am going to ask you about only two incidents. You see it is a memorandum
and the passage that I want you to look at is Number 2, the fourth
memorandum, Paragraph 2, which is headed “Attempted Attacks on the
Battleship _Tirpitz_.” Do you see that?
KEITEL: Just one moment, I have not found it yet. Battleship _Tirpitz_,
oh, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got it? Just listen, now:
“At the end of October 1942 a British Commando that had come to
Norway in a cutter, had orders to carry out an attack on the
Battleship _Tirpitz_ in Drontheim Fjord, by means of a two-man
torpedo. The action failed since both torpedoes, which were
attached to the cutter, were lost in the stormy sea. From among
the crew, consisting of six Englishmen and four Norwegians, a
party of three Englishmen and two Norwegians were challenged on
the Swedish border; however, only the British seaman in civilian
clothes, Robert Paul Evans, born 14 January 1922, in London,
could be arrested and the others escaped into Sweden.
“Evans had a pistol pouch in his possession, such as are used to
carry weapons under the armpit, and also a knuckle duster.”
And now the next page:
“Violence representing a breach of international law could not
be proved.”
Did incidents such as that, under this order, come to your attention?
KEITEL: I do not remember the actual incident, but I can see that it has
been reported by the department.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now you have told us that you have been a
soldier for 41 years; that emphasizes your military position. What, in
the name of all military tradition, has that boy done wrong by coming
from a two-man torpedo to make an attack on a battleship; what had he
done wrong?
KEITEL: No, this is an attack against a weapon of war, if carried out by
soldiers in their capacity of members of the armed forces, it is an
attack made with the object of eliminating a battleship by means of
sabotage.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But why, why should you not if you were prepared
to go on a two-man torpedo for an attack against a battleship, what is
wrong with a sailor doing that? I want to understand what is in your
mind. What do you, as a man who has been a soldier for 40 years, what do
you see wrong for a man doing that, towing out a torpedo against a
battleship? Tell us. I cannot understand what is wrong.
KEITEL: This is no more wrong than an attack with an aerial bomb if it
is successful. I recognize that it is right, that it is a perfectly
permissible attack.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you did not see that incident I
will not go through putting the others in, as they are all just the
same, men in uniform coming up to the Gironde to attack German ships.
What I want to understand is this. You were a Field Marshal, standing in
the boots of Blücher, Gneisenau, and Moltke. How did you tolerate all
these young men being murdered, one after the other without making any
protests?
KEITEL: I have stated here in detail my reasons for not making any
further resistance or objection; and I cannot alter any statement now. I
know that these incidents occurred and I know the consequences.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Field Marshal, I want you to understand
this. As far as I know, in the German military code, as in every
military code, there is no obligation on the part of a soldier to obey
an order which he knows is wrong, which he knows is contrary to the laws
of war and law. It is the same in your army, and our army, and I think
in every army, isn’t that so?
KEITEL: I did not personally carry out the orders of 18 October 1942. I
was not present either at the mouth of the Gironde or at the attack on
the battleship _Tirpitz_. I knew only that the order was issued,
together with all the threats of punishment which made it so difficult
for the commanders to alter or deviate from the order on their own
initiative. You, Sir David, asked me yourself whether I considered this
order to be right or to serve any useful purpose and I have given you a
definite answer: that I could not have prevented the action taken at the
mouth of the Gironde or in the case of _Tirpitz_ if I had wanted to.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my difficulty. I have given you only two
cases; there are plenty more. There are others which occurred in Italy
which we have heard. The point I am putting to you is this: You were the
representative; that you have told us a hundred times, of the military
tradition. You had behind you an officers corps with all its...
KEITEL: No, Sir David, I must deny that. I was not responsible either
for the Navy or for the Army or for the Air Force. I was not a
commander; I was a Chief of Staff and I had no authority to intervene in
the execution of orders in the various branches of the Armed Forces,
each of which had its own Commander-in-Chief.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have heard about your staff rank, but I want
to make this point perfectly clear. You were a Field Marshal, Kesselring
was a Field Marshal, Milch was a Field Marshal, all, I gather, with
military training behind them and all having their influence if not
their command, among the Armed Forces of Germany. How was it that there
was not one man of your rank, of your military tradition, with the
courage to stand up and oppose cold-blooded murder? That is what I want
to know.
KEITEL: I did not do it; I made no further objection to these things. I
can say no more and I cannot speak for others.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us pass if you can say no more than
that. I want to see what you did with regard to our French allies
because I have been asked to deal with some matters for the French
Delegation.
You remember that on the Eastern Front you captured some Frenchmen who
were fighting with the Russians. Do you remember making an order about
that? You captured some De Gaullists, as you called them, that is Free
French people who were fighting for the Russians. Do you remember your
action with regard to that?
KEITEL: I recollect the transmission of a Führer order in regard to the
surrender of these Frenchmen to their lawful government, which was
recognized by us.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not, of course, the part of the order I
want to put to you.
“Detailed investigations are to be made in appropriate cases
with regard to relatives of Frenchmen fighting for the Russians.
If the investigation reveals that relatives have given
assistance to facilitate escape from France, then severe
measures are to be taken.
“OKW/Wi. Rü is to make the necessary preparations with the
respective military commander or the Higher SS and Police Leader
in France.—Signed—Keitel.”
Can you imagine anything more dreadful than taking severe measures
against the mother of a young man who has helped him to go and fight
with the allies of his country? Can you imagine anything more
despicable?
KEITEL: I can think of many things since I have lost sons of my own in
the war. I am not the inventor of this idea; it did not originate with
me; I only transmitted it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate the difference, Defendant,
between the point which you made and the point which I make. Losing sons
in a war is a terrible tragedy. Taking severe measures against a mother
of a boy who wants to go and fight for his country’s allies, I am
suggesting to you, is despicable. The one is a tragedy; the other is the
height of brutality. Do you not agree?
KEITEL: I can only say that it does not state the consequences of the
investigations and findings. I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is all the answer you can make I
will ask you to look at something else.
KEITEL: No, I should like to add that I regret that any families were
held responsible for the misdeeds of their sons.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will not waste the time by taking up the
word “misdeed.” If you think that is a misdeed it is not worth our
discussing it further. I just want to protest against your word.
Now, let us see; that was not an isolated case. Just look at Page 110
(a) of the document book which you have, Page 122. This is an order
quite early on 1 October 1941.
“Attacks committed on members of the Armed Forces lately in the
occupied territories give reason to point out that it is
advisable that military commanders always have at their disposal
a number of hostages of different political tendencies, namely:
“(1) Nationalists,
“(2) Democratic-bourgeois, and
“(3) Communists.
“It is important that these should include well-known leading
personalities, or members of their families whose names are to
be made public.
“Hostages belonging to the same group as the culprit are to be
shot in case of attacks.
“It is asked that commanders be instructed
accordingly.—Signed—Keitel.” (Document 1590-PS).
Why were you so particular that, if you happened to arrest a
democratic-bourgeois, your commanders should have a sufficient bag of
democratic-bourgeois to shoot as hostages? I thought you were not a
politician.
KEITEL: I was not at all particular and the idea did not originate with
me; but it is in accordance with the instructions, the official
regulations, regarding hostages which I discussed yesterday or on the
day before and which state that those held as hostages must come from
the circles responsible for the attacks. That is the explanation, or
confirmation, of that as far as my memory goes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with that as a course of action,
that if you found a member of a democratic-bourgeois family who had been
taking part in, say, sabotage or resistance, that you should shoot a
number of democratic-bourgeois on his behalf? Did you approve of that?
KEITEL: I have already explained how orders for shooting hostages, which
were also given, were to be applied and how they were to be carried out
in the case of those deserving of death and who had already been
sentenced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am asking you a perfectly simple question,
Defendant. Did you or did you not approve of a number of
democratic-bourgeois to be taken as hostages for one
democratic-bourgeois who happened to be...
KEITEL: It does not say so in the document; it says only that hostages
must be taken; but it says nothing about shooting them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you mind looking at it since you corrected
me so emphatically? Depending upon the membership of the culprit, that
is, whether he is a nationalist, or a democratic-bourgeois or Communist,
“hostages of the corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks.”
KEITEL: If that is in the document then I must have signed it that way.
The document referring to the conference with the commanders shows
clearly how it was carried out in practice.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now answer my question. Did you approve of that?
KEITEL: I personally had different views on the hostage system, but I
signed it, because I had been ordered to do so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you had a different view. Will you just
look at a letter from Herr Terboven, who was in charge in Norway,
Document 870-PS, and it is Page 85, 71 (a), RF-281. This is a report
from Terboven for the information of the Führer and I want you to look
at Paragraph 2, “Counter-measures”, Subparagraph 4. Do you see it? Have
you got it, Defendant? I am sorry, I did give you the number; probably
you did not hear it, 71 (a), Page 71 (a) of the document book. So sorry
I did not make it clear. My Lord, I am told that this has been put in by
the French Prosecution as Exhibit RF-281. I gave it a GB number, as I
recall.
THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: RF-281.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you find Section 2, Paragraph 4? That
is:
“Now I have just received a teleprint from Field Marshal Keitel,
asking for a regulation to be issued, making members of the
personnel, and, if necessary their relatives, collectively
responsible for cases of sabotage occurring in their
establishments (joint responsibility of relatives). This demand
serves a purpose and promises success only if I am actually
allowed to perform executions by firing squads. If this is not
possible, such a decree would have exactly the opposite effect.”
Opposite the word “if I am actually allowed to perform executions by
firing squads” there is the pencil note from you, “Yes, that is best.”
So that is a third example where I suggest that you, yourself, are
approving and encouraging the shooting of next of kin for the act of
some member of their family. What do you say to that, your own pencil
mark?
KEITEL: I did make that marginal note. An order given in this matter was
different. A reply was given which was different. I wrote that note.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to know. Why did you write
this remark, “Yes, that is best,” approving of a firing squad for
relatives of people who had committed some occupation offense in Norway?
Why did you think it was best that there should be a firing squad for
the relations? Why?
KEITEL: It was not done and no order to that effect was given. A
different order was given.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I am asking, and I shall give
you one more chance of answering it. Why did you put your pencil on that
document, “Yes, that is best”?
KEITEL: I am no longer in a position to explain that today, in view of
the fact that I see hundreds of documents daily. I wrote it and I admit
it now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, unless it means something entirely
different from what you have written, it meant that you approved it
yourself and thought the best course was that the relations should be
shot by a firing squad.
I think Your Lordship said that you wished to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not finished, My Lord. I have a few matters
for Monday morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the defendant can return to the dock, and we will
proceed with the other applications.
[_The defendant left the stand._]
Sir David, shall we deal with these applications in the same way as we
have done before?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The first one that I have is an
application on behalf of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner for a witness
called Hoess, who was former Commander of the Auschwitz Concentration
Camp. My Lord, there is no objection on the part of the Prosecution to
that.
THE PRESIDENT: So that is the application which has to be made by a
great number of the defendants’ counsel.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, yes, Your Lordship is quite right.
My Lord, as Commandant of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, the
Prosecution feel that he could contribute to the information of the
Tribunal, if no objection is forthcoming.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I see that you are among the counsel who
applied for him. Is there anything you wish to add about that?
DR. STAHMER: I have nothing to add to my written application.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Then the Tribunal will consider this, you see,
after you have dealt with them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next one is Dr. Naville. Dr.
Naville was allowed as witness to the Defendant Göring, provided he can
be located. He has been located in Switzerland and I understand he has
informed the Tribunal that he sees no use in his coming here as a
witness for Göring, and he is now asked for by Dr. Nelte, Counsel for
Keitel, to prove that prisoners of war had been treated according to the
rules of the Geneva Convention, Dr. Naville having been a representative
of the Red Cross. Dr. Nelte, I am told, will be satisfied with an
interrogatory, and the Prosecution have no objection to an
interrogatory.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte?
DR. NELTE: That is correct; I agree, providing that I am allowed to put
my questions to Dr. Naville in writing.
But may I add something here, not to this application to present
evidence, but with reference to another application, which I already
submitted to the Prosecution through the Translation Division yesterday
or the day before. My application, to admit Hitler’s stenographers as
witnesses was rejected by the Tribunal as irrelevant. I have now
received a letter and an affidavit from one of these stenographers, and
in that affidavit I find a passage which refers to Keitel’s attitude
towards Hitler at interviews and conferences with him.
Public opinion has criticized the defendants as being in the habit of
quoting dead men whenever they want to say anything in their favor; and
similar statements have been made in this Court. The Defendant Keitel
requests that the part of the affidavit which I have already submitted
and which I intend to submit, be admitted as an affidavit so that the
witness can still be rejected and yet it will be possible for me to
submit that passage of the affidavit with the agreement of the
Prosecution.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Dr. Nelte, My Lord, will submit the passage,
we will consider it, but I have not had the chance of doing it up until
now.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you will carry out that course and if you want,
there is no objection to it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, you will let me have it, a copy of
it?
DR. NELTE: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next application is on behalf of
the Defendant Von Schirach, a request to submit an affidavit of Dr. Hans
Carossa. The gist of the affidavit is that the defendant tried to keep
himself independent of Party directives in matters of literature and art
and that, while Gauleiter in Vienna, he repeatedly intervened on behalf
of Jews and concentration camp inmates. My Lord, the Prosecution have no
objection to an affidavit being filed.
The next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Funk for
interrogatories to be submitted to Mr. Messersmith, dealing with Funk’s
relation to the Party and his work in the Reich Ministry of Propaganda.
My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection, but remind the Tribunal that
the Defendant Funk has already, on the 15th of March, asked permission
to submit another affidavit to Mr. Messersmith, dealing with Mr.
Messersmith’s affidavit. The Prosecution did not raise any objections,
but the Tribunal has not, as far as we know, granted that yet. So I
wanted the Tribunal to know there was a previous request...
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean an affidavit or interrogatory on the 15th of
March?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Interrogatories.
THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories? Surely we must have dealt with it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is the information that my office
had. They have not seen the...
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In case the Tribunal had not dealt with it, we
want to point out that there is one outstanding. We have no objection to
either.
Then the Defendant Rosenberg requests Hitler’s decree to Rosenberg of
June 1943. There is no objection on the part of the Prosecution. I am
told that we can not trace any previous application but the position at
the moment is that we haven’t any objection to it.
Then, My Lord, the next is Von Neurath, an application for a
questionnaire for Professor Kossuth, long a resident of Prague. Really
they ask for interrogatories. My Lord, there is no objection to
interrogatories.
Then, My Lord, there is an application in reverse, if I may put it so,
from Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht, the downgrading of Herr
Huelse, who was drafted as a witness, to an affidavit. My Lord, we have
no objection to that.
DR. DIX: This is the witness Huelse. He was granted to me as a witness.
In order to shorten and simplify the proceedings, I have decided to
forfeit the right to hear the witness because there was an affidavit. I
have received the affidavit. While my application to dispense with the
witness was pending, however, the witness arrived in Nuremberg. He is
here now, and I think therefore, that it will be best for him to stay
and for me to be allowed to examine him by confronting him with his own
affidavit, asking him to confirm it, and then put some additional
questions to him. I think that would be much more practical than having
the witness here to no purpose, sending him back again and retaining
only the affidavit. My purpose, in any case, was partly to avoid the
complications connected with getting him here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you withdraw the application to have the
affidavit...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the witness Huelse a prisoner or not, or an internee?
DR. DIX: He is a free witness. He is not in detention and he is free to
move about Nuremberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Can he remain here until the Defendant Schacht’s case
comes on?
DR. DIX: I hope so. He has told me that he can stay and that he is
willing to do so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have no objection. The Tribunal has
already granted him as a witness. If Dr. Dix wants him as a witness, of
course we have no objection to it.
The next one is an application on behalf of the Defendant Streicher, for
an affidavit from a Dr. Herold. To put it quite shortly, the Prosecution
suggest that it should be interrogatories rather than an affidavit and
on that basis we would make no objection.
My Lord, there is only one thing I have to say. I had a most useful
discussion with Dr. Dix last night, following out the Tribunal’s
suggestion of going through the documents. Dr. Dix was most helpful in
explaining the purpose of his documents and what they were. I do suggest
that if any of the Defense Counsel when they are explaining the
documents would also care to explain the purport of their witnesses—I
do not want to embarrass them in any way—but if they would voluntarily
explain the purport of witnesses, either to Mr. Dodd or myself, we might
be able to save them a great deal of time, by indicating whether the
evidence of that witness would be agreed to or might be the subject of
objection.
I only throw it out now, as we are going to meet over the documents, and
if they would extend it to witnesses, I am sure we could achieve a most
profitable co-operation.
THE PRESIDENT: You are suggesting, Sir David, are you, that they should
explain to you the nature of the evidence which the witness was going to
give?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And if the Prosecution were not going to dispute it, that
it might be incorporated in an affidavit?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that we could probably dispense with the
witness, and probably incorporate that in an affidavit. Of course, I
have been told the general purport of the witness, because I attended on
the application, but if they could elaborate on it a little more as it
often happens when they see the witness and let me know what the scope
of the witness’ testimony would be, I could probably concede, either in
whole or in part, and save them a lot of work and the Tribunal a lot of
time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Tribunal would like to know whether the
defendants’ counsel think that is a possible course, whether it might
lead to some shortening of the defense. Could Dr. Dix possibly tell us
whether he thinks it would be possible?
DR. DIX: Of course, I cannot make any statement on the views of my
colleagues, since I cannot read their minds. All I can say at the moment
is that I will recommend to my colleagues, as unusually helpful and
practical, the kind of conversation which I had the honor of having with
Sir David yesterday. Personally, I think that my colleagues too will
agree to this procedure unless there is any particular objection to it,
which is, of course, always possible. I cannot say any more at the
moment.
THE PRESIDENT: You understand what Sir David was suggesting, that such a
conversation should apply not only to documents but also to witnesses
and if you could indicate rather more fully than you do in your
applications what the subject of their evidence was going to be,
possibly the Prosecution might be able to say in those circumstances
that upon those matters they should not propose to dispute the evidence
and therefore it might be incorporated in an affidavit?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if Your Lordship allows me to
interject, if they care to bring a statement on a particular witness’
testimony, the Prosecution would, I am sure, in many particulars be
prepared to say, “Well, you produce that statement on that point and we
will admit it, without any formality.”
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, Dr. Dix, you and the other counsel for the
defendants could consider that matter.
DR. DIX: I have understood it to be exactly as Your Lordship has just
stated it. I discussed both the witnesses and the documents with Sir
David and that was very helpful; and in that sense I will...
THE PRESIDENT: If that is all we need do at the moment, then...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 8 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;
however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus
“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes
French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals:
hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in
the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as
possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal Vol. 10_, by Various.]
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