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Title: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume V (of 5) - Operations in West Korea
Author: Meid, Pat, Yingling, James M.
Language: English
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1950-1953 VOLUME V (OF 5) ***
[Illustration: KOREA]
[Illustration: WESTERN KOREAN FRONT
SITES OF MAJOR OUTPOST BATTLES
1952–53]
U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
1950–1953
VOLUME V
_Operations in West Korea_
by
LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAT MEID, USMCR
and
MAJOR JAMES M. YINGLING, USMC
[Illustration]
Historical Division
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C., 1972
Preceding Volumes of
_U. S. Marine Operations in Korea_
Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter”
Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Campaign”
Volume III, “The Chosin Reservoir Campaign”
Volume IV, “The East-Central Front”
Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 55-60727
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402--Price $4.50 (Cloth)
Stock Number 0855-0059
Foreword
Mention the Korean War and almost immediately it evokes the memory of
Marines at Pusan, Inchon, Chosin Reservoir, or the Punchbowl. Americans
everywhere remember the Marine Corps’ combat readiness, courage, and
military skills that were largely responsible for the success of these
early operations in 1950–1951. Not as dramatic or well-known are the
important accomplishments of the Marines during the latter part of the
Korean War.
In March 1952 the 1st Marine Division redeployed from the East-Central
front to West Korea. This new sector, nearly 35 miles in length,
anchored the far western end of I Corps and was one of the most
critical of the entire Eighth Army line. Here the Marines blocked
the enemy’s goal of penetrating to Seoul, the South Korean capital.
Northwest of the Marine Main Line of Resistance, less than five miles
distant, lay Panmunjom, site of the sporadic truce negotiations.
Defense of their strategic area exposed the Marines to continuous and
deadly Communist probes and limited objective attacks. These bitter and
costly contests for key outposts bore such names as Bunker Hill, the
Hook, the Nevadas (Carson-Reno-Vegas), and Boulder City. For the ground
Marines, supported by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons, the fighting
continued until the last day of the war, 27 July 1953.
The Korean War marked the first real test of Free World solidarity in
the face of Communist force. In repulsing this attempted Communist
aggression, the United Nations, led by the United States, served notice
that it would not hesitate to aid those nations whose freedom and
independence were under attack.
As events have subsequently proven, holding the line against Communist
encroachment is a battle whose end is not yet in sight. Enemy
aggression may explode brazenly upon the world scene, with an overt
act of invasion, as it did in Korea in June 1950, or it may take the
form of a murderous guerrilla war as it has more recently, for over a
decade, in Vietnam.
Whatever guise the enemy of the United States chooses or wherever he
draws his battleline, he will find the Marines with their age-old
answer. Today, as in the Korean era, Marine Corps readiness and
professionalism are prepared to apply the cutting edge against any
threat to American security.
[Illustration: (signature)]
L. F. CHAPMAN, JR.
_General, U.S. Marine Corps,_
_Commandant of the Marine Corps_
Reviewed and approved: 12 May 1971.
Preface
This is the concluding volume of a five-part series dealing with
operations of United States Marines in Korea between 2 August 1950 and
27 July 1953. Volume V provides a definitive account of operations
of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during
1952–1953, the final phase of the Korean War. At this time the division
operated under Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) control in the
far western sector of I Corps, while Marine aviators and squadrons
functioned as a component of the Fifth Air Force (FAF).
The period covered by this history begins in March 1952, when the
Marine division moved west to occupy positions defending the approaches
to Seoul, the South Korean capital. As it had for most of the war the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, operating under FAF, flew close support
missions not only for the Marines but for as many as 19 other Allied
frontline divisions. Included in the narrative is a detailed account of
Marine POWs, a discussion of the new defense mission of Marine units
in the immediate postwar period, and an evaluation of Marine Corps
contributions to the Korean War.
Marines, both ground and aviation, comprised an integral part of the
United Nations Command in Korea. Since this is primarily a Marine Corps
history, actions of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force are presented
only in sufficient detail to place Marine operations in their proper
perspective.
Official Marine Corps combat records form the basis for the book. This
primary source material has been further supplemented by comments and
interviews from key participants in the action described. More than
180 persons reviewed the draft chapters. Their technical knowledge
and advice have been invaluable. Although the full details of these
comments could not be used in the text, this material has been placed
in Marine Corps archives for possible use by future historians.
The manuscript of this volume was prepared during the tenure of Colonel
Frank C. Caldwell, Director of Marine Corps History, Historical
Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Production was accomplished
under the direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Deputy Director and
Chief Historian, who also outlined the volume. Preliminary drafts
were written by the late Lynn Montross, prime author of this series,
and Major Hubard D. Kuokka. Major James M. Yingling researched and
wrote chapters 1–6 and compiled the Command and Staff List. Lieutenant
Colonel Pat Meid researched and wrote chapters 7–12, prepared
appendices, processed photographs and maps, and did the final editing
of the book.
Historical Division staff members, past or present, who freely lent
suggestions or provided information include Lieutenant Colonel John J.
Cahill, Captain Charles B. Collins, Mr. Ralph W. Donnelly, Mr. Benis
M. Frank, Mr. George W. Garand, Mr. Rowland P. Gill, Captain Robert J.
Kane, Major Jack K. Ringler, and Major Lloyd E. Tatem. Warrant Officer
Dennis Egan was Administrative Officer during the final stages of
preparation and production of this book.
The many exacting administrative duties involved in processing the
volume from first draft manuscripts through the final printed form,
including the formidable task of indexing the book, were handled
expertly and cheerfully by Miss Kay P. Sue. Mrs. Frances J. Rubright
also furnished gracious and speedy assistance in obtaining the tomes
of official Marine Corps records. The maps were prepared by Sergeants
Kenneth W. White and Ernest L. Wilson. Official Department of Defense
photographs illustrate the book.
A major contribution to the history was made by the Office of the
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army; the Naval History
Division, Department of the Navy; and the Office of Air Force History,
Department of the Air Force. Military history offices of England,
Canada, and South Korea provided additional details that add to the
accuracy and interest of this concluding volume of the Korean series.
[Illustration: (signature)]
F. C. CALDWELL
_Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Director of Marine Corps History_
Contents
_Page_
I Operations in West Korea Begin 1
From Cairo to JAMESTOWN--The Marines’ Home in West
Korea--Organization of the 1st Marine Division
Area--The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing--The Enemy--Initial
CCF Attack--Subsequent CCF Attacks--Strengthening the
Line--Marine Air Operations--Supporting the Division
and the Wing--Different Area, Different Problem
II Defending the Line 51
UN Command Activities--Defense of East and West Coast
Korean Islands--Marine Air Operations--Spring 1952
on JAMESTOWN--End of the Second Year of War--A Long
Fourth of July--Changes in the Lineup--Replacement and
Rotation--Logistical Operations, Summer 1952
III The Battle of Bunker Hill 103
The Participants and the Battlefield--Preliminary
Action on Siberia--The Attack on Bunker
Hill--Consolidating the Defense of Bunker Hill--Company
B Returns to Bunker Hill--Supporting Arms at Bunker
Hill--In Retrospect
IV Outpost Fighting Expanded 145
From the Center Sector to the Right--Early September
Outpost Clashes--Korean COPs Hit Again--More Enemy
Assaults in Late September--Chinese Intensify Their
Outpost Attacks--More PRESSURE, More CAS, More
Accomplishments--Rockets, Resupply, and Radios
V The Hook 185
Before the Battle--Preparations for Attack
and Defense--Attack on the Hook--Reno
Demonstration--Counterattack--Overview
VI Positional Warfare 217
A Successful Korean Defense--Six Months on the UNC
Line--Events on the Diplomatic Front--The Marine
Commands During the Third Winter--1st MAW Operations
1952–1953--Behind the Lines--The Quiet Sectors--Changes
in the Concept of Ground Defense--Before the Nevadas
Battle
VII Vegas 263
The Nevada Cities--Supporting Arms--Defense
Organization at the Outposts--Chinese Attack on 26
March--Reinforcements Dispatched--Massed Counterattack
the Next Day--Push to the Summit--Other Communist
Probes--Three CCF Attempts for the Outpost--Vegas
Consolidation Begins--Aftermath
VIII Marking Time (April-June 1953) 313
The Peace Talks Resume--Operation LITTLE
SWITCH--Interval Before the Marines Go Off the
Line--The May Relief--Training While in Reserve
and Division Change of Command--Heavy May-June
Fighting--Developments in Marine Air--Other Marine
Defense Activities--The Division Is Ordered Back to the
Front
IX Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice 363
Relief of the 25th Division--Initial Attacks on
Outposts Berlin and East Berlin--Enemy Probes,
11–18 July--Marine Air Operations--Fall of the
Berlins--Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July--Last
Day of the War
X Return of the Prisoners of War 399
Operation BIG SWITCH--Circumstances of Capture--The
Communist POW Camps--CCF “Lenient Policy” and
Indoctrination Attempts--The Germ Warfare
Issue--Problems and Performance of Marine POWs--Marine
Escape Attempts--Evaluation and Aftermath
XI While Guns Cool 445
The Postwar Transition--Control of the DMZ and the
Military Police Company--Organization of New Defense
Positions--Postwar Employment of Marine Units in FECOM
XII Korean Reflection 475
Marine Corps Role and Contributions to the Korean
War: Ground, Air, Helicopter--FMF and Readiness
Posture--Problems Peculiar to the Korean War--Korean
Lessons
Appendices
_Page_
A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 537
B Korean War Chronology 541
C Command and Staff List 549
D Effective Strength, 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing 573
E Marine Corps Casualties 575
F Marine Pilots and Enemy Aircraft Downed in Korean War 577
G Unit Citations (during 1952–1953 period) 579
H Armistice Agreement 587
Bibliography 611
Index 617
Illustrations
_Photographs_
Sixteen-page sections of photographs following pages 212 and 436
_Maps and Sketches_
_Page_
1 EUSAK Dispositions--15 March 1952 9
2 Western Korea--I Corps Sector--1952–1953 14
3 1st Marine Division Sector--30 April 1952 23
4 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Dispositions--30 April 1952 25
5 2/5 Sector--15–16 April 1952 35
6 West Coast Island Defense Element--Summer 1952 54
7 East Coast Island Defense Element--Summer 1952 57
8 Objectives for 1/5 Attack--9 May 1952 78
9 1st Marines Sector of JAMESTOWN (Division Center)--
8 August 1952 110
10 2/1 Sector--9–11 August 1952 115
11 Bunker Hill Area--2300, 12 August 1952 120
12 Combat Outposts and Ambush Sites--5th Marines Sector
(Division Right)--Early September 1952 151
13 Combat Outposts--KMC Sector (Division Left)--5–7
September 1952 154
14 7th Marines Sector (Division Right)--Early October 1952 164
15 “CCF Creeping Tactics”--March-October 1952 189
16 Hook Sector of MLR--1800, 26 October 1952 198
17 Hook Penetrations--26–27 October 1952 201
18 Outpost Reno Attacks--27 October 1952 204
19 CCF Attack Against KMC Sector (Division Left)--
31 October 1952 219
20 Organization of Ground Defense--Winter 1952–1953 252
21 Typical Hill Defense (Cross Section)--Winter 1952–1953 254
22 5th Marines MLR Sector--26 March 1953 266
23 1st Marines MLR Sector (Division Center)--26 March 1953 269
24 COP Carson--March 1953 272
25 COP Reno--March 1953 274
26 COP Vegas--March 1953 277
27 Attack on 5th Marines Front--26–30 March 1953 282
28 25th Infantry Division Sector (Following Relief of the
1st Marine Division)--5 May 1953 330
29 Eighth Army Sector--1 January-27 July 1953 343
30 7th Marines MLR Sector (Division Right)--Linear Defense--
19–20 July 1953 380
31 7th Marines MLR Sector--Defense-in-Depth--20–21 July 1953 382
32 7th Marines MLR Sector--Defense-in-Depth--22–23 July 1953 384
33 Eighth Army Front--27 July 1953 395
34 POW Camps in which Marines Were Held 417
35 1st Marine Division Post-Armistice Main Battle Position--
30 September 1953 462
CHAPTER I
Operations in West Korea Begin
_From Cairo to_ JAMESTOWN_--The Marines’ Home in West
Korea--Organization of the 1st Marine Division Area--The 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing--The Enemy--Initial CCF Attack--Subsequent CCF
Attacks--Strengthening the Line--Marine Air Operations--Supporting the
Division and the Wing--Different Area, Different Problem_
_From Cairo to_ JAMESTOWN[1]
[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: 1st Marine Division Staff Report,
titled “Notes for Major General J. T. Selden, Commanding
General, First Marine Division, Korea,” dtd 20 Aug 52,
hereafter Selden, _Div. Staff Rpt_; the four previous
volumes of the series _U.S. Marine Operations in Korea,
1950–1953_, namely, Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A.
Canzona, _The Pusan Perimeter_, v. I; _The Inchon-Seoul
Operation_, v. II; _The Chosin Reservoir Campaign_, v.
III; Lynn Montross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, and Maj Norman
W. Hicks, _The East-Central Front_, v. IV (Washington.
HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1954–1962), hereafter Montross,
Kuokka, and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea--Central Front_, v.
IV; Department of Military Art and Engineering, U.S.
Military Academy, _Operations in Korea_ (West Point,
N.Y.: 1956), hereafter USMA, _Korea_; David Rees, _Korea:
The Limited War_ (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964),
hereafter Rees, _Korea_, quoted with permission of the
publisher. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary
material cited is on file at, or obtainable through, the
Archives of the Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps.
During the latter part of March 1952, the 1st Marine Division, a
component of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK), pulled out of its
positions astride the Soyang River in east-central Korea and moved to
the far western part of the country in the I Corps sector. There the
Marines took over the EUSAK left flank, guarding the most likely enemy
approaches to the South Korean capital city, Seoul, and improving the
ground defense in their sector to comply with the strict requirements
which the division commander, Major General John T. Selden, had set
down. Except for a brief period in reserve, the Marine division would
remain in the Korean front lines until a cease-fire agreement in July
1953 ended active hostilities.
The division CG, Major General Selden,[2] had assumed command of the
25,000-man 1st Marine Division two months earlier, on 11 January, from
Major General Gerald C. Thomas while the Marines were still in the
eastern X Corps sector. The new Marine commander was a 37-year veteran
of Marine Corps service, having enlisted as a private in 1915, serving
shortly thereafter in Haiti. During World War I he was commissioned a
second lieutenant, in 1918, while on convoy duty. Between the two world
wars, his overseas service had included a second assignment to Haiti,
two China tours, and sea duty. When the United States entered World
War II, Lieutenant Colonel Selden was an intelligence officer aboard
the carrier _Lexington_. Later in the war Colonel Selden led the 5th
Marines in the New Britain fighting and was Chief of Staff of the 1st
Marine Division in the Peleliu campaign. He was promoted to brigadier
general in 1948 and received his second star in 1951, prior to his
combat assignment in Korea.
[2] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen John T. Selden, Mar 54.
American concern in the 1950s for South Korea’s struggle to preserve
its independence stemmed from a World War II agreement between the
United States, the United Kingdom, and China. In December 1943, the
three powers had signed the Cairo Declaration and bound themselves to
ensure the freedom of the Korean people, then under the yoke of the
Japanese Empire. At the Potsdam Conference, held on the outskirts of
Berlin, Germany in July 1945, the United States, China,[3] and Britain
renewed their Cairo promise.
[3] China did not attend. Instead, it received an advance
copy of the proposed text. President Chiang Kai-shek
signified Chinese approval on 26 July. A few hours
later, the Potsdam Declaration was made public. _Foreign
Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo
and Teheran, 1943_ (Department of State publication
7187), pp. 448–449; _The Conference of Berlin (The
Potsdam Conference)_, 1945, v. II (Department of State
publication 7163), pp. 1278, 1282–1283, 1474–1476.
When the Soviet Union agreed to join forces against Japan, on 8 August,
the USSR also became a party to the Cairo Declaration. According to
terms of the Japanese capitulation on 11 August, the Soviets were to
accept surrender of the defeated forces north of the 38th Parallel in
Korea. South of that line, the commander of the American occupation
forces would receive the surrender. The Russians wasted no time and on
12 August had their troops in northern Korea. American combat units,
deployed throughout the Pacific, did not enter Korea until 8 September.
Then they found the Soviet soldiers so firmly established they even
refused to permit U.S. occupation officials from the south to cross
over into the Russian sector. A December conference in Moscow led to a
Russo-American commission to work out the postwar problems of Korean
independence.
Meeting for the first time in March 1946, the commission was
short-lived. Its failure, due to lack of Russian cooperation, paved
the way for politico-military factions within the country that set up
two separate Koreas. In the north the Communists, under Kim Il Sung,
and in the south the Korean nationalists, led by Dr. Syngman Rhee,
organized independent governments early in 1947. In May of that year,
a second joint commission failed to unify the country. As a result
the Korean problem was presented to the United Nations (UN). This
postwar international agency was no more successful in resolving the
differences between the disputing factions. It did, however, recognize
the Rhee government in December 1948 as the representative one of the
two dissident groups.
In June 1950, the North Koreans attempted to force unification of
Korea under Communist control by crossing the 38th Parallel with seven
infantry divisions heavily supported by artillery and tanks. Acting
on a resolution presented by the United States, the United Nations
responded by declaring the North Korean action a “breach of the peace”
and called upon its members to assist the South Koreans in ousting the
invaders. Many free countries around the globe offered their aid. In
the United States, President Harry S. Truman authorized the use of U.S.
air and naval units and, shortly thereafter, ground forces to evict the
aggressors and restore the status quo. Under the command of General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur, then Far East Commander, U.S. Eighth Army
occupation troops in Japan embarked to South Korea.
The first combat unit sent from America to Korea was a Marine
air-ground team, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, formed at Camp
Pendleton, California on 7 July 1950, under Brigadier General Edward
A. Craig. The same day the UN Security Council passed a resolution
creating the United Nations Command (UNC) which was to exercise
operational control over the international military forces rallying
to the defense of South Korea. The Council asked the United States to
appoint a commander of the UN forces; on the 8th, President Truman
named his Far East Commander, General MacArthur, as Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command (CinCUNC).
In Korea the Marines soon became known as the firemen of the Pusan
Perimeter, for they were shifted from one trouble spot to the next
all along the defensive ring around Pusan, the last United Nations
stronghold in southeastern Korea during the early days of the fighting.
A bold tactical stroke planned for mid-September was designed to
relieve enemy pressure on Pusan and weaken the strength of the North
Korean People’s Army (NKPA). As envisioned by General MacArthur, an
amphibious landing at Inchon on the west coast, far to the enemy rear,
would threaten the entire North Korean position south of the 38th
Parallel. To help effect this coup, the UN Commander directed that the
Marine brigade be pulled out of the Pusan area to take part in the
landing at Inchon.
MacArthur’s assault force consisted of the 1st Marine Division, less
one of its three regiments,[4] but including the 1st Korean Marine
Corps (KMC) Regiment. Marine ground and aviation units were to assist
in retaking Seoul, the South Korean capital, and to cut the supply line
sustaining the NKPA divisions.
[4] The 7th Marines was on its way to Korea at the time of
the Inchon landing. The brigade, however, joined the 1st
Division at sea en route to the objective to provide
elements of the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT).
On 15 September, Marines stormed ashore on three Inchon beaches.
Despite difficulties inherent in effecting a landing there,[5] it
was an outstandingly successful amphibious assault. The 1st and 5th
Marines, with 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) assault squadrons
providing close air support, quickly captured the port city of Inchon,
Ascom City[6] to the east, and Kimpo Airfield. Advancing eastward the
Marines approached the Han River that separates Kimpo Peninsula from
the Korean mainland. Crossing this obstacle in amphibian vehicles,
1st Division Marines converged on Seoul from three directions. By
27 September, the Marines had captured the South Korean government
complex and, together with the U.S. Army 7th Infantry Division, had
severed the enemy’s main supply route (MSR) to Pusan. In heavy, close
fighting near the city, other United Nations troops pursued and cut off
major units of the NKPA.
[5] For a discussion of the hardships facing the
landing force, see Montross and Canzona, _USMC Ops
Korea--Inchon_, v. II, _op. cit._, pp. 41–42, 59–60,
62–64.
[6] In World War II, the Japanese developed a logistical base
east of Inchon. When the Japanese surrendered, the Army
Service Command temporarily took over the installation,
naming it Ascom City. Maj Robert K. Sawyer, _Military
Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War_ (Washington:
OCMH, DA, 1962), p. 43_n_.
Ordered back to East Korea, the Marine division re-embarked at Inchon
in October and made an administrative landing at Wonsan on the
North Korean coast 75 miles above the 38th Parallel. As part of the
U.S. X Corps, the 1st Marine Division was to move the 5th and 7th
Marines (Reinforced) to the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir, from
where they were to continue the advance northward toward the North
Korean-Manchurian border. The 1st Marines and support troops were to
remain in the Wonsan area.
While the bulk of the division moved northward, an unforeseen
development was in the making that was to change materially the
military situation in Korea overnight. Aware that the North Koreans
were on the brink of military disaster, Communist China had decided
to enter the fighting. Nine Chinese divisions had been dispatched
into the area with the specific mission of destroying the 1st Marine
Division.[7] Without prior warning, on the night of 27 November, hordes
of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF, or “Chinese People’s Volunteers” as
they called themselves) assaulted the unsuspecting Marines and nearly
succeeding in trapping the two Marine regiments. The enemy’s failure
to do so was due to the military discipline and courage displayed by
able-bodied and wounded Marines alike, as well as effective support
furnished by Marine aviation. Under conditions of great hardship, the
division fought its way out over 78 miles of frozen ground from Chosin
to the port of Hungnam, where transports stood by to evacuate the weary
men and the equipment they had salvaged.
[7] Montross and Canzona, _USMC Ops Korea--Chosin_, v. III,
p. 161.
This Chinese offensive had wrested victory from the grasp of General
MacArthur just as the successful completion of the campaign seemed
assured. In the west, the bulk of the Eighth Army paced its withdrawal
with that of the X Corps. The UNC established a major line of defense
across the country generally following the 38th Parallel. On Christmas
Day, massed Chinese forces crossed the parallel, and within a week the
UN positions were bearing the full brunt of the enemy assault. Driving
southward, the Communists recaptured Seoul, but by mid-February 1951
the advance had been slowed down, the result of determined Eighth Army
stands from a series of successive defensive lines.[8]
[8] On 9 January 1951, General MacArthur was “directed to
defend himself in successive positions, inflicting
maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea subject to the
primary consideration of the safety of his troops and his
basic mission of protecting Japan.” Carl Berger, _The
Korea Knot--A Military-Political History_ (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 131–132,
hereafter Berger, _Korea Knot_, quoted with permission of
the publisher.
Following its evacuation from Hungnam, the 1st Marine Division early
in 1951 underwent a brief period of rehabilitation and training in
the vicinity of Masan, west of Pusan. From there, the division moved
northeast to an area beyond Pohang on the east coast. Under operational
control of Eighth Army, the Marines, with the 1st Korean Marine Corps
Regiment attached for most of the period, protected 75 miles of a
vital supply route from attack by bands of guerrillas. In addition,
the Marines conducted patrols to locate, trap, and destroy the enemy.
The Pohang guerrilla hunt also provided valuable training for several
thousand recently arrived Marine division replacements.
In mid-February the 1st Marine Division was assigned to the U.S. IX
Corps, then operating in east-central Korea near Wonju. Initially
without the KMCs,[9] the Marine division helped push the corps line
across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. On 22 April, the Chinese
unleashed a gigantic offensive, which again forced UN troops back into
South Korea. By the end of the month, however, the Allies had halted
the 40-mile-wide enemy spring offensive.
[9] The 1st KMC Regiment was again attached to the Marine
Division on 17 March 1951 and remained under its
operational control for the remainder of the war.
CinCPacFlt Interim Evaluation Rpt No. 4, Chap 9, p. 9-53,
hereafter _PacFlt EvalRpt_ with number and chapter.
Once again, in May, the Marine division was assigned to the U.S. X
Corps, east of the IX Corps sector. Shortly thereafter the Communists
launched another major offensive. Heavy casualties inflicted by UNC
forces slowed this new enemy drive. Marine, Army, and Korean troops
not only repelled the Chinese onslaught but immediately launched a
counteroffensive, routing the enemy back into North Korea until the
rough, mountainous terrain and stiffening resistance conspired to slow
the Allied advance.
In addition to these combat difficulties, the Marine division began
to encounter increasing trouble in obtaining what it considered
sufficient and timely close air support (CAS). Most attack and fighter
aircraft of the 1st MAW, commanded by Major General Field Harris[10]
and operating since the Chosin Reservoir days under Fifth Air Force
(FAF), had been employed primarily in a program of interdicting North
Korean supply routes. Due to this diversion of Marine air from its
primary CAS mission, both the division and wing suffered--the latter
by its pilots’ limited experience in performing precision CAS sorties.
Despite the difficulties, the Marine division drove northward reaching,
by 20 June, a grotesque scooped-out terrain feature on the east-central
front appropriately dubbed the Punchbowl.
[10] Command responsibility of 1st MAW changed on 29 May
51 when Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman succeeded
General Harris.
Eighth Army advances into North Korea had caused the enemy to
reappraise his military situation. On 23 June, the Russian delegate to
the United Nations, Jacob Malik, hinted that the Korean differences
might be settled at the conference table. Subsequently, United Nations
Command and Communist leaders agreed that truce negotiations would
begin on 7 July at Kaesong, located in West Korea immediately south of
the 38th Parallel, but under Communist control. The Communists broke
off the talks on 22 August. Without offering any credible evidence,
they declared that UNC aircraft had violated the neutrality zone
surrounding the conference area.[11] Military and political observers
then realized that the enemy’s overture to peace negotiations had
served its intended purpose of permitting him to slow his retreat,
regroup his forces, and prepare his ground defenses for a new
determined stand.
[11] The Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations
Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Commission,
Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, has described how the
Communists in Korea concocted incidents “calculated to
provide advantage for their negotiating efforts or for
their basic propaganda objectives, or for both.” Examples
of such duplicity are given in Chapter IV of his book,
_How Communists Negotiate_ (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1955), hereafter Joy, _Truce Negotiations_,
quoted with permission of the publisher. The quote above
appears on p. 30.
The lull in military offensive activity during the mid-1951 truce talks
presaged the kind of warfare that would soon typify the final phase
of the Korean conflict. Before the fighting settled into positional
trench warfare reminiscent of World War I, the Marines participated
in the final UN offensive. In a bitter struggle, the division hacked
its way northward through, over, and around the Punchbowl, and in
September 1951 occupied a series of commanding terrain positions that
became part of the MINNESOTA Line, the Eighth Army main defensive line.
Beginning on the 20th of that month, it became the primary mission of
frontline units to organize, construct, and defend positions they held
on MINNESOTA. To show good faith at the peace table, the UNC outlawed
large-scale attacks against the enemy. Intent upon not appearing
the aggressor and determined to keep the door open for future truce
negotiations, the United Nations Command in late 1951 decreed a new
military policy of limited offensives and an aggressive defense of
its line. This change in Allied strategy, due to politico-military
considerations, from a moving battle situation to stabilized warfare
would affect both the tactics and future of the Korean War.
Even as Allied major tactical offensive operations and the era
of fire and maneuver in Korea was passing into oblivion, several
innovations were coming into use. One was the Marine Corps employment
of helicopters. First used for evacuation of casualties from Pusan
in August 1950, the versatile aircraft had also been adopted by the
Marine brigade commander, General Craig, as an airborne jeep. On
13 September 1951, Marines made a significant contribution to the
military profession when they introduced helicopters for large-scale
resupply combat operations. This mission was followed one week later
by the first use of helicopters for a combat zone troop lift. These
revolutionary air tactics were contemporary with two new Marine Corps
developments in ground equipment--body armor and insulated combat
boots, which underwent extensive combat testing that summer and fall.
The latter were to be especially welcomed for field use during the
1951–1952 winter.
Along the MINNESOTA Line, neither the freezing cold of a Korean winter
nor blazing summer heat altered the daily routine. Ground defense
operations consisted of dispatching patrols and raiding parties,
laying ambushes, and improving the physical defenses. The enemy seemed
reluctant to engage UN forces, and on one occasion to draw him into
the open, EUSAK ordered Operation CLAM-UP across the entire UN front,
beginning 10 February. Under cover of darkness, reserve battalions
moved forward; then, during daylight, they pulled back, simulating a
withdrawal of the main defenses. At the same time, frontline troops had
explicit orders not to fire or even show themselves.[12]
[12] Col Franklin B. Nihart comments on draft MS, Sep 66,
hereafter _Nihart comments_.
[Illustration:
MAP 1 K. WHITE
EUSAK DISPOSITIONS
15 MARCH 1952]
It was hoped that the rearward movement of units from the front line
and the subsequent inactivity there would cause the enemy to come out
of his trenches to investigate the apparent large-scale withdrawal of
UNC troops. Then Marine and other EUSAK troops could open fire and
inflict maximum casualties from covered positions. On the fifth day of
the operation, CLAM-UP was ended. The North Koreans were lured out of
their defenses, but not in the numbers expected. CLAM-UP was the last
action in the X Corps sector for the 1st Marine Division, which would
begin its cross-country relocation the following month. (See Map 1.)
Code-named Operation MIXMASTER, the transfer of the 1st Marine Division
began on 17 March when major infantry units began to move out of their
eastern X Corps positions, after their relief on line by the 8th
Republic of Korea (ROK) Division. Regiments of the Marine division
relocated in the following order: the 1st KMCs, 1st, 7th, and 5th
Marines. The division’s artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, made
the shift by battalions at two-day intervals. In the motor march to
West Korea, Marine units traveled approximately 140 miles over narrow,
mountainous, and frequently mud-clogged primitive roads. Day and night,
division transport augmented by a motor transport battalion attached
from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) and one company from the
1st Combat Service Group (CSG) rolled through rain, snow, sleet, and
occasional good weather.
Marines employed 5,800 truck and DUKW (amphibious truck) loads to move
most of the division personnel, gear, and supplies. Sixty-three flatbed
trailers, 83 railroad cars, 14 landing ships, 2 transport aircraft, the
vehicles of 4 Army truck companies, as well as hundreds of smaller jeep
trailers and jeeps were utilized. The division estimated that these
carriers moved about 50,000 tons of equipment and vehicles,[13] with
some of the support units making as many as a dozen round trips. The
MIXMASTER move was made primarily by truck and by ship[14] or rail for
units with heavy vehicles.
[13] Marine commanders and staff officers involved in the
planning and execution of the division move were alarmed
at the amount of additional equipment that infantry units
had acquired during the static battle situation. Many
had become overburdened with “nice-to-have” items in
excess of actual T/E (Table of Equipment) allowances. Col
William P. Pala comments on draft MS, 5 Sep 66, hereafter
_Pala comments_.
[14] Heavy equipment and tracked vehicles were loaded aboard
LSDs and LSTs which sailed from Sokcho-ri to Inchon.
Impressive as these figures are, they almost pall in significance
compared with the meticulous planning and precision logistics required
by the week-long move. It was made, without mishap, over main routes
that supplied nearly a dozen other divisions on the EUSAK line and
thus had to be executed so as not to interfere with combat support.
Although the transfer of the 1st Marine Division from the eastern to
western front was the longest transplacement of any EUSAK division,
MIXMASTER was a complicated tactical maneuver that involved realignment
of UNC divisions across the entire Korean front. Some 200,000 men and
their combat equipment had to be relocated as part of a master plan to
strengthen the Allied front and deploy more troops on line.
Upon its arrival in West Korea, the 1st Marine Division was under
orders to relieve the 1st ROK Division and take over a sector at the
extreme left of the Eighth Army line, under I Corps control, where the
weaknesses of Kimpo Peninsula defenses had been of considerable concern
to EUSAK and its commander, General James A. Van Fleet. As division
units reached their new sector, they moved to locations pre-selected
in accordance with their assigned mission. First Marine unit into
the I Corps main defensive position, the JAMESTOWN Line, was the 1st
KMC Regiment attached to the division, with its organic artillery
battalion. The KMCs, as well as 1/11, began to move into their new
positions on 18 March. At 1400 on 20 March, the Korean Marines
completed the relief of the 15th Republic of Korea Regiment in the left
sector of the MLR (main line of resistance). Next into the division
line, occupying the right regimental sector adjacent to the 1st
Commonwealth Division, was Colonel Sidney S. Wade’s 1st Marines with
three battalions forward and 2/5 attached as the regimental reserve.
Relief of the 1st ROK Division was completed on the night of 24–25
March. At 0400 on 25 March the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
assumed responsibility for the defense of 32 miles of the JAMESTOWN
Line. That same date the remainder of the Marine artillery battalions
also relocated in their new positions.
As the division took over its new I Corps mission on 25 March, the
Marine commander had one regiment of the 1st ROK Division attached
as division reserve while his 5th Marines was still in the east.
Operational plans originally had called for the 5th Marines, less
a battalion, to locate in the Kimpo Peninsula area where it was
anticipated Marine reserve units would be able to conduct extensive
amphibious training. So overextended was the assigned battlefront
position that General Selden realized this regiment would also be
needed to man the line. He quickly alerted the 5th Marines commanding
officer, Colonel Thomas A. Culhane, Jr., to deploy his regiment, then
en route to western Korea, to take over a section of the JAMESTOWN
front line instead of assuming reserve positions at Kimpo as originally
assigned. General Selden believed that putting another regiment on the
main line was essential to carrying out the division’s mission, to
aggressively _defend_ JAMESTOWN Line, not merely to _delay_ a Communist
advance.
Only a few hours after the 5th Marines had begun its trans-Korea move,
helicopters picked up Colonel Culhane, his battalion commanders, and
key regimental staff officers and flew them to the relocated division
command post (CP) in the west. Here, on 26 March, the regimental
commander officially received the change in the 5th Marines mission.
Following this briefing, 5th Marines officers reconnoitered the newly
assigned area[15] while awaiting the arrival of their units. When
the regiment arrived on the 28th, plans had been completed for it
to relieve a part of the thinly-held 1st Marines line. On 29 March,
the 5th Marines took over the center regimental sector while the 1st
Marines, on the right regimental flank, compressed its ranks for a more
solid defense.
[15] Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC, dtd 16 Sep 59, hereafter _Culhane ltr_.
Frontline units, from the west, were the 1st KMCs, the 5th, and
1st Marines. To the rear, the 7th Marines, designated as division
reserve, together with organic and attached units of the division,
had established an extensive support and supply area. As a temporary
measure, a battalion of the division reserve, 2/7, was detached for
defense of the Kimpo Peninsula pending a reorganization of forces in
this area. Major logistical facilities were the division airhead,
located at K-16 airfield, just southwest of Seoul, and the railhead at
Munsan-ni, 25 miles northwest of the capital city and about five miles
to the rear of the division sector at its nearest point. Forward of
the 1st Marine Division line, outposts were established to enhance the
division’s security. In the rear area the support facilities, secondary
defense lines, and unit command posts kept pace with development of
defensive installations on the MLR. Throughout the 1st Marine Division
sector outpost security, field fortifications, and the ground defense
net were thorough and intended to deny the enemy access to Seoul.
_The Marines’ Home in Western Korea_[16]
[16] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52; CIA, _NIS
41B_, South Korea, Chap I, Brief, Section 21, Military
Geographic Regions, Section 24, Topography (Washington:
1957–1962); Map, Korea, 1:50,000, AMS Series L 751,
Sheets 6526 I and IV, 6527 I, II, III, and IV, 6528 II
and III, 6627 III and IV, and 6628 III (prepared by the
Engineer, HQ, AFFE, and AFFE/8A, 1952–1954).
In western Korea, the home of the 1st Marine Division lay in a
particularly significant area. (See Map 2.) Within the Marine
boundaries ran the route that invaders through the ages had used in
their drive south to Seoul. It was the 1st Marine Division’s mission
to block any such future attempts. One of the reasons for moving the
Marines to the west[17] was that the terrain there had to be held at
all costs; land in the east, mountainous and less valuable, could
better be sacrificed if a partial withdrawal in Korea became necessary.
At the end of March 1952, the division main line of resistance
stretched across difficult terrain for more than 30 miles, from Kimpo
to the British Commonwealth sector on the east, a frontage far in
excess of the textbook concept.
[17] The two other reasons were the weakness of the Kimpo
defenses and abandonment of plans for an amphibious
strike along the east coast. Montross, Kuokka, and
Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea_, v. IV, p. 253. Planning for
a Marine-led assault had been directed by the EUSAK
commander, General Van Fleet, early in 1952. The Marine
division CG, General Selden, had given the task to his
intelligence and operations deputies, Colonel James H.
Tinsley and Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle. On 12
March General Van Fleet came to the Marine Division CP
for a briefing on the proposed amphibious assault. At the
conclusion of the meeting the EUSAK commander revealed
his concern for a possible enemy attack down the Korean
west coast and told the Marine commander to prepare, in
utmost secrecy, to move his division to the west coast.
Lynn Montross, draft MS.
Although Seoul was not actually within the area of Marine Corps
responsibility, the capital city was only 33 air miles south of the
right limiting point of the division MLR and 26 miles southeast of the
left. The port of Inchon lay but 19 air miles south of the western
end of the division sector. Kaesong, the original site of the truce
negotiations, was 13 miles northwest of the nearest part of the 1st
Marine Division frontline while Panmunjom was less than 5 miles away
and within the area of Marine forward outpost security. From the far
northeastern end of the JAMESTOWN Line, which roughly paralleled the
Imjin River, distances were correspondingly lengthened: Inchon, thus
being 39 miles southwest and Kaesong, about 17 miles west.
[Illustration:
MAP 2 K. WHITE
WESTERN KOREA
I CORPS SECTOR 1952–1953]
The area to which the Marines had moved was situated in the western
coastal lowlands and highlands area of northwestern South Korea. On the
left flank, the division MLR hooked around the northwest tip of the
Kimpo Peninsula, moved east across the high ground overlooking the Han
River, and bent around the northeast cap of the peninsula. At a point
opposite the mouth of the Kongnung River, the MLR traversed the Han to
the mainland, proceeding north alongside that river to its confluence
with the Imjin. Crossing north over the Imjin, JAMESTOWN followed the
high ground on the east bank of the Sachon River for nearly two miles
to where the river valley widened. There the MLR turned abruptly to
the northeast and generally pursued that direction to the end of the
Marine sector, meandering frequently, however, to take advantage of key
terrain. Approximately 2½ miles west of the 1st Commonwealth Division
boundary, the JAMESTOWN Line intersected the 38th Parallel near the
tiny village of Madam-ni.
Within the Marine division sector to the north of Seoul lay the
junction of two major rivers, the Imjin and the Han, and a portion of
the broad fertile valley fed by the latter. Flowing into the division
area from the east, the Imjin River snaked its way southwestward to the
rear of JAMESTOWN. At the northeastern tip of the Kimpo Peninsula, the
Imjin joined the Han. The latter there changed its course from south to
west, flowed past Kimpo and neighboring Kanghwa-do Island, and emptied
eventually into the Yellow Sea. At the far western end of the division
sector the Yom River formed a natural boundary, separating Kanghwa and
Kimpo, as it ran into the Han River and south to the Yellow Sea. To
the east, the Sachon River streamed into the Imjin, while the Kongnung
emptied into the Han where the MLR crossed from the mainland to Kimpo.
In addition, two north-south oriented rivers flanked enemy positions
opposite the Marines and emptied into major rivers in the Marine
sector. Northwest of Kimpo, the Yesong River ran south to the Han; far
to the northeast, just beyond the March 1952 division right boundary,
the Samichon River flowed into the Imjin.
Although the rivers in the Marine division were navigable, they were
little used for supply or transportation. The railroads, too, were
considered secondary ways, for there was but one line, which ran north
out of Seoul to Munsan-ni and then continued towards Kaesong. Below the
division railhead, located at Munsan-ni, a spur cut off to Ascom City.
Roads, the chief means of surface transport, were numerous but lacked
sufficient width and durability for supporting heavy military traffic.
Within the sector occupied by the Marines, the main route generally
paralleled the railroad. Most of the existing roads south of JAMESTOWN
eventually found their way to the logistic center at Munsan-ni.
Immediately across the Imjin, the road net was more dense but not of
any better construction.
From the logistical point of view, the Imjin River was a critical
factor. Spanning it and connecting the division forward and rear
support areas in March 1952 were only three bridges, which were
vulnerable to river flooding conditions and possible enemy attack.
Besides intersecting the Marine sector, the Imjin formed a barrier to
the rear of much of the division MLR, thereby increasing the difficulty
of normal defense and resupply operations.
When the Marines moved to the west, the winter was just ending. It had
begun in November and was characterized by frequent light snowfalls
but otherwise generally clear skies. Snow and wind storms seldom
occurred in western Korea. From November to March the mean daily
minimum Fahrenheit readings ranged from 15° to 30° above zero. The
mean daily maximums during the summer were between the upper 70s and
mid-80s. Extensive cloud cover, fog, and heavy rains were frequent
during the summer season. Hot weather periods were also characterized
by occasional severe winds. Spring and fall were moderate transitional
seasons.
Steep-sided hills and mountains, which sloped abruptly into narrow
valleys pierced by many of the rivers and larger streams, predominated
the terrain in the I Corps sector where the Marines located. The
most rugged terrain was to the rear of the JAMESTOWN Line; six miles
northeast of the Munsan-ni railhead was a 1,948-foot mountain, far
higher than any other elevation on the Marine or Chinese MLR but lower
than the rear area peaks supporting the Communist defenses. Ground
cover in the division sector consisted of grass, scrub brush, and,
occasionally, small trees. Rice fields crowded the valley floors.
Mud flats were prevalent in many areas immediately adjacent to the
larger rivers which intersected the division territory or virtually
paralleled the east and western boundaries of the Marine sector.
The transfer from the Punchbowl in the east to western Korea thus
resulted in a distinct change of scene for the Marines, who went from
a rugged mountainous area to comparatively level terrain. Instead of
facing a line held by predominantly North Korean forces the division
was now confronted by the Chinese Communists. The Marines also went
from a front that had been characterized by lively patrol action to one
that in March 1952 was relatively dormant. With the arrival of the 1st
Marine Division, this critical I Corps sector would witness sharply
renewed activity and become a focal point of action in the UNC line.
_Organization of the 1st Marine Division Area_[18]
[18] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv,
1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar ComdDs, Mar 52; 1st KMC
RCT Daily Intelligence and Operations Rpts, hereafter KMC
Regt UnitRpts, Mar 52; Kimpo ProvRegt ComdDs, hereafter
KPR ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52.
“To defend” were the key words in the 1st Marine Division mission--“to
organize, occupy, and actively defend its sector of Line JAMESTOWN”--in
West Korea. General Selden’s force to prevent enemy penetration of
JAMESTOWN numbered 1,364 Marine officers, 24,846 enlisted Marines,
1,100 naval personnel, and 4,400 Koreans of the attached 1st KMC
Regiment. The division also had operational control of several I Corps
reinforcing artillery units in its sector. On 31 March, another major
infantry unit, the Kimpo Provisional Regiment (KPR) was organized. The
division then assumed responsibility for the Kimpo Peninsula defense on
the west flank with this Marine-Korean force.
A major reason for transfer of the 1st Marine Division to the west,
it will be remembered, had been the weakness of the Kimpo defense.
Several units, the 5th KMC Battalion, the Marine 1st Armored Amphibian
Battalion, and the 13th ROK Security Battalion (less one company), had
been charged with the protection of the peninsula. Their operations,
although coordinated by I Corps, were conducted independently. The
fixed nature of the Kimpo defenses provided for neither a reserve
maneuver element to help repel any enemy action that might develop nor
a single commander to coordinate the operations of the defending units.
These weaknesses become more critical in consideration of the type of
facilities at Kimpo and their proximity to the South Korean Capital.
Seoul lay just east of the base of Kimpo Peninsula, separated from it
only by the Han River. Located on Kimpo was the key port of Inchon and
two other vital installations, the logistical complex at Ascom City and
the Kimpo Airfield (K-14). All of these facilities were indispensable
to the United Nations Command.
To improve the security of Kimpo and provide a cohesive, integrated
defense line, CG, 1st Marine Division formed the independent commands
into the Kimpo Provisional Regiment. Colonel Edward M. Staab, Jr.,
was named the first KPR commander. His small headquarters functioned
in a tactical capacity only without major administrative duties. The
detachments that comprised the KPR upon its formation were:
Headquarters and Service Company, with regimental and company
headquarters and a communication platoon;
1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, as supporting artillery;
5th KMC Battalion;
13th ROK Security Battalion (-);
One battalion from the reserve regiment of the 1st Marine
Division (2/7), as the maneuver element;
Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion;
Company B, 1st Shore Party Battalion, as engineers;
Company D, 1st Medical Battalion;
Reconnaissance Company (-), 1st Marine Division;
Detachment, Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 1st
Signal Battalion;
Detachment, 181st Counterintelligence Corps Unit, USA;
Detachment, 61st Engineer Searchlight Company, USA; and the
163rd Military Intelligence Service Detachment, USA.
The Kimpo Regiment, in addition to maintaining security of the division
left flank, was assigned the mission to “protect supporting and
communication installations in that sector against airborne or ground
attack.”[19] Within the division, both the artillery regiment and
the motor transport battalion were to be prepared to support tactical
operations of Colonel Staab’s organization.
[19] KPR ComdD, Mar 52, p. 13.
For defense purposes, the KPR commander divided the peninsula into
three sectors. The northern one was manned by the KMC battalion,
which occupied commanding terrain and organized the area for defense.
The southern part was defended by the ROK Army battalion, charged
specifically with protection of the Kimpo Airfield and containment of
any attempted enemy attack from the north. Both forces provided for
the security of supply and communication installations within their
areas. The western sector, held by the amphibian tractor company, less
two platoons, had the mission of screening traffic along the east bank
of the Yom River, that flanked the western part of the peninsula.
Providing flexibility to the defense plan was the maneuver unit, the
battalion assigned from the 1st Marine Division reserve.
The unit adjacent to the KPR[20] in the division line in late March
was the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, which had been the first
division unit to deploy along JAMESTOWN. The KMC Regiment, command by
Colonel Kim Dong Ha,[21] had assumed responsibility for its portion of
JAMESTOWN at 0400 on 20 March with orders to organize and defend its
sector. The regiment placed two battalions, the 3d and 1st, on the MLR
and the 2d in the rear. Holding down the regimental right of the sector
was the 1st Battalion, which had shared its eastern boundary with that
of Colonel Wade’s 1st Marines until 29 March when the 5th Marines was
emplaced on the MLR between the 1st KMC and 1st Marines.
[20] The following month the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
would be added to the four regiments on line, making a
total of five major units manning the 1stMarDiv front. It
was inserted between the Kimpo and 1st KMC regiments.
[21] Commandant, Korean Marine Corps ltr to CMC, dtd 20 Sep
66, hereafter _CKMC ltr_.
The 1st Marines regimental right boundary, which on the MLR was 1,100
yards north of the 38th Parallel, separated the 1st Marine Division
area from the western end of the 1st Commonwealth Division, then held
by the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade. In late March, Colonel Wade’s
2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Thell H. Fisher) and 3/1 (Lieutenant Colonel
Spencer H. Pratt) manned the frontline positions while 1/1 (Lieutenant
Colonel John H. Papurca), less Company A, was in reserve. The regiment
was committed to the defense of its part of the division area and
improvement of its ground positions. In the division center sector
Colonel Culhane’s 1/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B. Nihart) and
3/5 (Lieutenant Colonel William S. McLaughlin) manned the left and
right battalion MLR positions, with 2/5 (Lieutenant Colonel William
H. Cushing) in reserve. The latter unit was to be prepared either to
relieve the MLR battalions or for use as a counterattack force.
It did not take the Marines long to discover the existence of serious
flaws in the area defense which made it questionable whether the Allied
line here could have successfully withstood an enemy attack. While
his Marine units were effecting their relief of JAMESTOWN, Colonel
Wade noted that “field fortifications were practically nonexistent in
some sections.”[22] General Selden later pointed out that “populated
villages existed between opposing lines. Farmers were cultivating
their fields in full view of both forces. Traffic across the river was
brisk.”[23] A member of the division staff reported that there was
“even a school operating in one area ahead of the Marine lines.”[24]
In addition to these indications of sector weakness, there was still
another. Although the ROK division had placed three regiments in the
line, when the two Marine regiments relieved them there were then more
men on JAMESTOWN due to the greater personnel strength of a Marine
regiment. Nevertheless, the division commander was still appalled at
the width of the defense sector assigned to so few Marines.
[22] 1stMar ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2.
[23] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App IX, p. 1.
[24] LtCol Harry W. Edwards comments on preliminary draft MS,
_ca._ Sep 59.
At division level, the reserve mission was filled by Colonel Russell
E. Honsowetz’, 7th Marines, minus 2/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Noel C.
Gregory), which on 30 March became the maneuver force for the Kimpo
Regiment. As the division reserve, the regiment was to be prepared
to assume at any time either a defensive or offensive mission of any
of the frontline regiments. In addition, the reserve regiment was
to draw up counterattack plans, protect the division rear, improve
secondary line defenses, and conduct training, including tank-infantry
coordination, for units in reserve. The 7th Marines, with 3/7
(Lieutenant Colonel Houston Stiff) on the left and 1/7 (Lieutenant
Colonel George W. E. Daughtry) on the right, was emplaced in the
vicinity of the secondary defense lines, WYOMING and KANSAS, to the
rear of the 5th and 1st Marines.
Another regiment located in the rear area was the 11th Marines. Its
artillery battalions had begun displacement on 17 March and completed
their move by 25 March. Early on the 26th, the 11th Marines resumed
support of the 1st Marine Division. While the Marine artillery had been
en route, U.S. Army artillery from I Corps supported the division. With
the arrival on the 29th of the administrative rear echelon, the Marine
artillery regiment was fully positioned in the west.
For Colonel Frederick P. Henderson, who became the division artillery
commander on 27 March, operational problems in western Korea differed
somewhat from those experienced in the east by his predecessor,
Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill. The most critical difficulty, however, was
the same situation that confronted General Selden--the vast amount
of ground to be covered and defended, and the insufficient number of
units to accomplish this mission. To the artillery, the wide division
front resulted in spreading the available fire support dangerously
thin. Placement of 11th Marines units to best support the MLR
regiments created wide gaps between each artillery battalion, caused
communication and resupply difficulties, prevented a maximum massing of
fires, and made redeployment difficult.[25]
[25] Col Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC, dtd 25 Aug 59, hereafter _Henderson ltr I_.
In making use of all available fire support, the artillery regiment
had to guard not only against the duplication of effort in planning
or delivery of fires, but also against firing in the Panmunjom peace
corridor restricted areas, located near the sector held by the Marine
division’s center regiment. Moreover, the artillerymen had to maintain
a flexibility sufficient to place the weight of available fire support
on call into any zone of action.
Other difficulties were more directly associated with the nature of
the sector rather than with its broad expanse. The positioning of the
division in the west, although close to the coast, put the Marines
beyond the range of protective naval gunfire. The sparse and inadequate
road net further aggravated the tactical and logistical problems caused
by wide separation of units. Finally, the cannoneers had exceptionally
heavy demands placed on them due to the restricted amount of close air
support allocated to frontline troops under operational procedures
employed by Fifth Air Force. This command had jurisdiction over the
entire Korean air defense system, including Marine squadrons.
Manning the main line of resistance also frequently presented
perplexing situations to the infantry. There had been little time for
a thorough reconnaissance and selection of positions by any of the
frontline regiments. When the 1st Marines moved into its assigned
position on the MLR, the troops soon discovered many minefields, “some
marked, some poorly marked, and some not marked at all.”[26] Uncharted
mines caused the regiment to suffer “some casualties the first night
of our move and more the second and third days.”[27] As it was to turn
out, during the first weeks in the I Corps sector, mines of all types
caused 50 percent of total Marine casualties.
[26] Col Sidney S. Wade ltr to Deputy AsstCofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd
25 Aug 59.
[27] _Ibid._
A heavy drain on the limited manpower of Marine infantry regiments
defending JAMESTOWN was caused by the need to occupy an additional
position, an outpost line of resistance (OPLR). This defensive line to
the front of the Marine MLR provided additional security against the
enemy, but decreased the strength of the regimental reserve battalion,
which furnished the OPLR troops. The outposts manned by the Marines
consisted of a series of strongpoints built largely around commanding
terrain features that screened the 1st Marine Division area. The OPLR
across the division front was, on the average, about 2,500 yards
forward of the MLR. (See Map 3.)
To the rear of the main line were two secondary defensive lines,
WYOMING and KANSAS. Both had been established before the Marines
arrived and both required considerable work, primarily construction
of bunkers and weapons emplacements, to meet General Selden’s strict
requirement for a strong defensive sector. Work in improving the lines,
exercises in rapid battalion tactical deployment by helicopter, and
actual manning of the lines were among the many tasks assigned to the
division reserve regiment.
[Illustration:
MAP 3 K. White
1st MARINE DIVISION SECTOR
30 APRIL 1952]
Rear and frontline units alike found that new regulations affected
combat operations with the enemy in West Korea. These restrictions were
a result of the truce talks that had taken place first at Kaesong and,
later, at Panmunjom. In line with agreements reached in October 1951:
Panmunjom was designated as the center of a circular neutral zone
of a 1,000 yard radius, and a three mile radius around Munsan and
Kaesong was also neutralized, as well as two hundred meters on
either side of the Kaesong-Munsan road.[28]
[28] Rees, _Korea_, p. 295.
To prevent the occurrence of any hostile act within this sanctuary,
Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel, I Corps commander, ordered
that an additional area, forward of the OPLR, be set aside. This
megaphone-shaped zone “could not be fired into, out of, or over.”[29]
It was adjacent to the OPLR in the division center regimental sector,
near its left boundary, and took a generally northwest course.
Marines reported that the Communists knew of this restricted zone and
frequently used it for assembly areas and artillery emplacements.
[29] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52, p. 7.
_The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing_[30]
[30] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Mar 52; 1st MAW ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52.
When the 1st Marine Division moved to western Korea in March 1952, the
two 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units that had been in direct support
of the ground Marines also relocated. Marine Observation Squadron
6 (VMO-6) and Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 (HMR-161)
completed their displacements by 24 March from their eastern airfield
(X-83) to sites in the vicinity of the new division CP. HMR-161, headed
by Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon, set up headquarters at A-17,[31] on a
hillside 3½ miles southeast of Munsan-ni, the division railhead, “using
a couple of rice paddies as our L. Z. (Landing Zone).”[32] The squadron
rear echelon, including the machine shops, was maintained at A-33, near
Ascom City. About 2½ miles south of the helicopter forward site was an
old landing strip, A-9, which Lieutenant Colonel William T. Herring’s
observation squadron used as home field for its fixed and rotary wing
aircraft. (For location of 1st MAW units see Map 4.) In West Korea,
VMO-6 and HMR-161 continued to provide air transport for tactical and
logistical missions. Both squadrons were under operational control of
the division, but administered by the wing.
[31] In Korea, fields near U.S. Army installations were known
as “A”; major airfields carried a “K” designation; and
auxiliary strips were the “X” category.
[32] MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon comments on draft MS, dtd 1
Sep 66.
Commanding General of the 1st MAW, since 27 July 1951, was Major
General Christian F. Schilt,[33] a Marine airman who had brought to
Korea a vast amount of experience as a flying officer. Entering the
Marine Corps in June 1917, he had served as an enlisted man with the
1st Marine Aeronautical Company in the Azores during World War I.
Commissioned in 1919, he served in a variety of training and overseas
naval air assignments. As a first lieutenant in Nicaragua, he had
been awarded the Medal of Honor in 1928 for his bravery and “almost
superhuman skill” in flying out Marines wounded at Quilali.[34] During
World War II, General Schilt had served as 1st MAW Assistant Chief of
Staff, at Guadalcanal, was later CO of Marine Aircraft Group 11, and
participated in the consolidation of the Southern Solomons and air
defense of Peleliu and Okinawa.
[33] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of General Christian F. Schilt,
USMC (Ret.), Jun 59 rev.
[34] Robert Sherrod, _History of Marine Corps Aviation in
World War II_ (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952), p.
26, hereafter Sherrod, _Marine Aviation_.
[Illustration:
MAP 4 E. WILSON
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING DISPOSITIONS
30 APRIL 1952]
As in past months, the majority of General Schilt’s Marine aircraft
in Korea during March 1952 continued to be under operational control
of Fifth Air Force. In turn, FAF was the largest subordinate command
of Far East Air Forces (FEAF), headquartered at Tokyo. The latter was
the U.S. Air Force component of the Far East Command and encompassed
all USAF installations in the Far East. The FAF-EUSAK Joint Operations
Center (JOC) at Seoul coordinated and controlled all Allied air
operations in Korea. Marine fighter and attack squadrons were employed
by FAF to:
Maintain air superiority.
Furnish close support for ground units.
Provide escort [for attack aircraft].
Conduct day and night reconnaissance and fulfill requests.
Effect the complete interdiction of North Korean and Chinese
Communist forces and other military targets that have an
immediate effect upon the current tactical situation.[35]
[35] 1st MAW ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2.
Squadrons carrying out these assignments were attached to Marine
Aircraft Groups (MAGs) 12 and 33. Commanded by Colonel Luther S.
Moore, MAG-12 and its two day attack squadrons (VMF-212 and VMF-323)
in March 1952 was still located in eastern Korea (K-18, Kangnung).
The Marine night-fighters of VMF(N)-513 were also here as part of
the MAG-12 group. Farther removed from the immediate battlefront was
Colonel Martin A. Severson’s MAG-33, located at K-3 (Pohang), with its
two powerful jet fighter squadrons (VMFs-115 and -311) and an attack
squadron (VMA-121). A new MAG-33 unit was Marine Photographic Squadron
1 (VMJ-1), just formed in February 1952 and commanded by Major Robert
R. Read.
In addition to its land-based squadrons, one 1st MAW unit was assigned
to Commander, West Coast Blockading and Patrol Group, designated
Commander, Task Group 95.1 (CTG 95.1). He in turn assigned this
Marine unit to Commander, Task Element 95.11 (CTE 95.11), whose ships
comprised the West Coast Carrier Element. Marine Attack Squadron
312 (VMA-312) was at this time assigned to CTE 95.11. In late March
squadron aircraft were based on the escort carrier USS _Bairoko_ but
transferred on 21 April to the light carrier _Bataan_.[36] Operating
normally with a complement of 21 F4U-4 propeller-driven Corsair
aircraft, VMA-312 had the following missions:
To conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea
from the United Nations front lines northward to latitude 39°/15´
N.
Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.
Maintain surveillance of enemy airfields in the Haeju-Chinnampo
region.[37]
Provide air spot services to naval units on request.
Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services
as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC KOREA).
Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of
opportunity at discretion.
Be prepared to provide combat air patrol to friendly naval forces
operating off the West Coast of Korea.
Render SAR [search and rescue] assistance.
[36] Unit commanders also changed about this time. Lieutenant
Colonel Robert E. Smith, Jr. assumed command of the
Checkerboard squadron from Lieutenant Colonel Joe H.
McGlothlin, on 9 April.
[37] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-75. The Haeju-Chinnampo
region, noted in the surveillance mission, is a coastal
area in southwestern North Korea between the 38th and
39th Parallels.
Because they were under operational control of Fifth Air Force, 1st
MAW flying squadrons, except those assigned to CTG 95.1 and 1st Marine
Division control, did not change their dispositions in March. Plans
were under way at this time, however, to relocate one of the aircraft
groups, MAG-12, to the west.
On 30 March the ground element of the night-fighters redeployed from
its east coast home field to K-8 (Kunsan), on the west coast, 105
miles south of Seoul. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Burnett’s VMF (N)-513
completed this relocation by 11 April without loss of a single day of
flight operations. On 20 April the rest of MAG-12,[38] newly commanded
since the first of the month by Colonel Elmer T. Dorsey, moved to
K-6 (Pyongtaek), located 30 miles directly south of the South Korean
capital.
[38] VMFs-212 (LtCol Robert L. Bryson) and -323 (LtCol
Richard L. Blume) left an east coast field for a flight
mission over North Korea and landed at K-6 thereafter,
also completing the move without closing down combat
operations. The relocation in airfields was designed to
keep several squadrons of support aircraft close to the
1st Marine Division. Col E. T. Dorsey ltr to Hd, HistBr,
G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66.
Marine aircraft support units were also located at K-3 and at Itami
Air Force Base, on Honshu, Japan. Under direct 1st MAW control were
four ground-type logistical support units with MAG-33, a Provisional
Automatic Weapons Battery from Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2),
and most of wing headquarters. This last unit, commanded by Colonel
Frederick R. Payne, Jr., included the 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion (based
at Pusan and led by Colonel Max C. Chapman), and a detachment of Marine
Transport Squadron 152 (VMR-152), which had seven Douglas four-engine
R5D transports. This element and the wing service squadron were based
at Itami.
Marines, and others flying in western Korea, found themselves
restricted much as Marines on the ground were. One limitation resulted
from a FAF-EUSAK agreement in November 1951 limiting the number of
daily close air support sorties across the entire Eighth Army line.
This policy had restricted air activity along the 155-mile Korean front
to 96 sorties per day. The curtailment seriously interfered with the
Marine type of close air support teamwork evolved during World War II,
and its execution had an adverse effect on Marine ground operations as
well. A second restriction, also detrimental to Marine division and
wing efficiency, was the prohibitive cushion Fifth Air Force had placed
around the United Nations peace corridor area north of the Marine
MLR. This buffer no-fly, no-fire zone which had been added to prevent
violation of the UN sanctuary by stray hits did not apply, of course,
to the Communists.
_The Enemy_[39]
[39] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52.
Directly beyond the 1st Marine Division sector, to the west and north,
were two first-rate units of the Chinese Communist Forces, the 65th and
63d CCF Armies. Together, they totaled approximately 49,800 troops in
late March 1952. Opposite the west and center of the Marine division
front was the 65th CCF Army, with elements of the 193d Division across
from the KPR and the 194th Division holding positions opposing the
KMC regiment. Across from the Marine line in the center was the 195th
Division of the 65th CCF Army, which had placed two regiments forward.
North of the division right sector lay the 188th Division, 63d CCF
Army, also with two regiments forward. The estimated 15 infantry
battalions facing the Marine division were supported by 10 organic
artillery battalions, numbering 106 guns, and varying in caliber from
75 to 155mm.[40] In addition, intelligence reported that the 1st CCF
Armored Division and an unidentified airborne brigade were located near
enough to aid enemy operations.
[40] The Korean Marine Corps placed the artillery count at 240
weapons ranging from 57 to 122mm. _CKMC ltr._
Chinese infantry units were not only solidly entrenched across their
front line opposite the Marine division but were also in depth. Their
successive defensive lines, protected by minefields, wire, and other
obstacles, were supported by artillery and had been, as a result
of activities in recent months, supplied sufficiently to conduct
continuous operations. Not only were enemy ground units well-supplied,
but their CCF soldiers were well disciplined and well led. Their morale
was officially evaluated as ranging from good to excellent. In all,
the CCF was a determined adversary of considerable ability, with their
greatest strength being in plentiful combat manpower.
Air opposition to Marine pilots in Korea was of unknown quantity
and only on occasion did the caliber of enemy pilots approach that
of the Americans. Pilots reported that their Chinese counterparts
generally lacked overall combat proficiency, but that at times their
“aggressiveness, sheer weight of numbers, and utter disregard for
losses have counterbalanced any apparent deficiencies.”[41] The
Communists had built their offensive potential around the Russian
MIG-15 jet fighter-interceptor. Use of this aircraft for ground support
or ground attack was believed to be in the training stage only. The
Chinese had also based their air defense on the same MIG plus various
types of ground antiaircraft (AA) weapons, particularly the mobile 37mm
automatic weapons and machine guns that protected their main supply
routes. In use of these ground AA weapons, enemy forces north of the
38th Parallel had become most proficient. Their defense system against
UNC planes had been steadily built up and improved since stabilization
of the battle lines in 1951, and by March 1952 was reaching a
formidable state.
[41] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 4, p. 10-38.
As the more favorable weather for ground combat approached toward the
end of March, the CCF was well prepared to continue and expand its
operations. Enemy soldiers were considered able to defend their sector
easily with infantry and support units. Division intelligence also
reported that Chinese ground troops had the capability for launching
limited objective attacks to improve their observation of Marine MLR
rear areas.
_Initial CCF Attack_[42]
[42] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52; KMC Regt
UnitRpt 31, dtd 2 Apr 52.
Whether by intent or default, the Chinese infantry occupying the enemy
forward positions did not interfere with the Marine relief. With
assumption of sector responsibility by the division early on 25 March,
the initial enemy contact came from Chinese supporting weapons. Later
that day the two division frontline regiments, the 1st and 5th Marines,
received 189 mortar and artillery shells in their sectors which wounded
10 Marines. One man in the 1st Marines was killed by sniper fire on 25
March; in the same regiment, another Marine was fatally wounded the
following day. Forward of the lines, the day after the division took
over, there was no ground action by either side.
During the rest of the month, the tempo of activities on both sides
increased. Marines began regular patrol actions to probe and ambush the
enemy. Division artillery increased its number of observed missions by
the end of the month. By this time the CCF had also begun to probe
the lines of the Marine regimental sectors. In these ground actions to
reconnoiter and test division defenses, the Chinese became increasingly
bold, with the most activity on 28 March. Between 25–31 March, the
first week on JAMESTOWN, some 100 Chinese engaged in 5 different
probing actions. Most of these were against the 1st KMC Regiment on the
left flank of the division MLR.
It was no wonder that the Chinese concentrated their effort against
the Korean Marines, for they held the area containing Freedom Gate,
the best of the three bridges spanning the Imjin. Both of the other
two, X-Ray and Widgeon, were further east in the division sector. If
the enemy could exploit a weak point in the KMC lines, he could attack
in strength, capture the bridge, and turn the division left flank,
after which he would have a direct route to Seoul.[43] Without the
bridge in the KMC sector, the division would be hard pressed, even with
helicopter lift, to maneuver or maintain the regiments north of the
Imjin.
[43] _Henderson ltr I._
On 1 April, at about 2130, the CCF began pounding the frontline
companies in the KMC area with an artillery preparation. A half hour
later, the enemy attacked an outpost and the main line. First to engage
the Chinese were the OPLR troops of the KMC 1st Company; 1st Battalion,
on the regimental right. There, a Chinese company forced an opening
between friendly outposts and reached a point about 200 yards short of
the MLR and just north of a road leading to the main bridge over the
Imjin. While this attack was in progress, another CCF company hit the
outpost line further south. This attack, less successful, ended far
short of the MLR and about a half-mile south of the bridge road. Both
enemy companies withdrew at about 2345.
To the left of the 1st Battalion, the 3d was receiving the brunt of
this initial CCF attack. The 9th, 11th, and 10th Companies (deployed in
that order from west to east, in the left battalion sector), had been
engaged by the same preliminary 30-minute shelling. At 2200, when four
CCF squads attacked the two companies on the left, an enemy company hit
the left end of the 10th Company, occupied by the 2d Platoon. About
midnight the South Koreans, under fire from both flanks and under heavy
frontal assault, were forced to withdraw. In the rear, the company
commander pulled the 1st Platoon from the line, ordered the 3d to
extend left to cover both sectors, and led a counterattack with the 1st
Platoon and elements of the 2d. Positions were quickly restored by the
KMC action.
Soon after it had hurled the Chinese back across the OPLR, the 1st
Battalion was subjected to a second attack. An enemy unit, estimated
to be a company, engaged a 1st Company platoon briefly. When the KMCs
returned heavy defensive fires, the Communists pulled back but struck
again at 0300. After a 20-minute fire fight, the Chinese company
retreated.
This action on 1–2 April cost the attackers 2 killed, 34 estimated
killed, and 10 estimated wounded. For the KMC, casualties were 2
killed, 10 wounded. To all 1st Division Marines, the successful defense
by the 1st KMC regimental Marines was heartening. It had preserved not
only the division western flank but also the vital link over the Imjin.
_Subsequent CCF Attacks_[44]
[44] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, KPR ComdDs, Apr
52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 35, dtd 16 Apr 52.
Following his attempted assault against the KMC regiment, the enemy
opposite the 1st Marine Division reverted to a passive defense. Except
for a probe late on 2 April of the far eastern line held by Lieutenant
Colonel Pratt’s 3/1 and two patrols that scouted MLR positions in the
western Korean Marine area that same date, Communist offensive measures
consisted largely of artillery and mortar fire. Chinese line units
appeared to concentrate on improving their dugouts and trench systems.
Marines reported frequent sightings of enemy groups working in and
around their forward trenches.
Marine division troops, too, were busy fortifying their defensive
positions. On the Kimpo Peninsula they dug gun emplacements and erected
camp facilities for the newly activated Kimpo Provisional Regiment.
North of the Han, mine clearance and construction of trenchworks and
fortifications was the order of the day for most Marines. Other Marines
patrolled forward of the lines as a major aspect of the division’s
continuous active defense. During daylight hours, MLR regiments
dispatched reconnaissance and combat patrols and sent out snipers,
armed with telescope-equipped M-1 rifles. Division tanks firing from
temporary gun slots on the main line and artillery batteries emplaced
in rear area dugouts hammered away at enemy positions and disposed of
his patrols. At night, harassing and interdicting (H&I) artillery fires
and infantry raids continued to keep the Communists off-balance.
A combat raid on 5 April typified the extensive Marine division night
activities forward of the line. Conducted by three platoons, less a
squad, of the KMC 10th Company, the raiding party had the mission of
capturing prisoners. Departing the MLR at 2300, the Korean Marines
worked their way over the low ground and then crossed the Sachon River.
Immediately thereafter the raid leader, who was the 10th Company
commander (First Lieutenant No Won Keun) dispatched two squad-sized
ambushes along the patrol route. The raiders then continued northwest
toward their objective, an area near the village of Tonggang-ni, a
half mile beyond the river. When about 50 yards from its objective,
the patrol ran into tactical wire and an enemy sentry, who alerted his
unit by rifle fire. The KMC raiders opened up and called in pre-planned
mortar and artillery support. The CCF defenders replied immediately
with rifles and machine gun fire.
To complete the maneuver, the patrol leader positioned his machine guns
to fire on the Communist flanks and directed one platoon to prepare
for a frontal assault on the defenders. At 0148, the 1st Platoon
attacked from the right. A minute later the 2d Platoon charged headlong
at the defenders. Hand-to-hand fighting followed until the Chinese
broke contact and disappeared into bunkers within the trenchline.
From inside, the CCF soldiers continued the battle, firing through
gun revetments and wounding several KMC pursuers in the legs. After
30 minutes had passed, the South Korean assault troops observed enemy
reinforcements moving in from the northwest. At 0230, the Marine patrol
withdrew under the cover of artillery, reaching its battalion MLR at
0400. The raiders brought back seven civilians found in the area and
several Russian-made carbines. At the cost of 2 killed and 18 wounded,
the KMCs inflicted casualties totaling 12 counted killed and 25
estimated wounded.
Other division patrols similarly took into custody civilians living
between the MLR and OPLR. It was also the job of these patrols to
destroy buildings that the enemy had used. On the night of 5 April, 5th
Marines patrols apprehended 34 civilians, and a wounded enemy soldier.
The day before, a patrol from 2/1 had also captured a Chinese soldier.
On 12 and 13 April, the enemy stepped up his ground actions. He
launched two probes against the 5th Marines occupying the center
regimental sector. Both attempts were beaten back. The 1st Marines on
the extreme right flank encountered little hostile activity, but in
the western KMC sector, Chinese shelling increased noticeably. The
following day the artillery picked up again, accompanied by several
infantry probes directed against the two KMC frontline battalions. To
the right, the Chinese also tested 5th Marines lines again. On the far
right, in the area held by the 1st Marines, an air alert was sounded
from 0410 to 0726, but no enemy aircraft appeared. By mid-month, the
Chinese were dispatching fewer infantry probes but firing a greater
number of artillery and mortar shells toward the division line. The
enemy even sent 25 rounds to Kimpo, where a total of only 4 had fallen
during the first two weeks in April.
Ushering in the second half of April was another Communist attack,
this one on 15–16 April and to be the last that month against the
central part of the Marine Division sector. This attempt to breach the
Marine lines was directed against Company E of 2/5, manning an outpost
position on the OPLR. The rest of the battalion was now holding the
left sector of the center regimental front, having assumed its new
mission on line three days earlier in relief of 1/5, which reverted
to the role of regimental reserve. Northwest of the 5th Marines MLR,
the Company E commander, Captain Charles C. Matthews, had placed a
reinforced rifle platoon. His Marines had occupied several dug-in
positions near the top of a 400-foot hill, known as Outpost 3 (OP 3).
(See Map 5.) The platoon had been improving this outpost area and
fortifications so that the bunkers could be employed for living and
fighting.[45] During the afternoon and again at dusk on 15 April the
Communists had shelled this location. One Marine was wounded in the
second firing.
[45] Chapter III discusses in detail the construction of
bunkers.
[Illustration:
MAP 5 K. WHITE
2/5 SECTOR
15–16 APRIL 1952]
At 2330 on 15 April, Company E reported that a green flare cluster had
just burst over Hill 67, approximately 1,900 yards southwest of OP
3 and just beyond the OPLR. This signal triggered a 20-minute heavy
enemy preparation of 76mm artillery and 120mm mortars on the friendly
outpost and its supporting mortar position. Ten minutes before
midnight, another green flare exploded over the same height, and the
shelling stopped. After five minutes the signal reappeared. Immediately
thereafter, the Chinese shifted their artillery and mortar fire to an
area west of the OP 3 mortar site and north of a Company F observation
post. At the same time, the enemy attacked Outpost 3.
Initially, the Chinese struck the Marine defenses in a frontal
assault, but as the fighting progressed enemy forces quickly enveloped
the outpost and charged it simultaneously from three sides. The
vastly outnumbered Marine defenders withdrew into a tight perimeter
at the southeastern corner of the outpost where their defending
firepower prevented the enemy from seizing the position. Within 15
minutes the enemy had surrounded the Marines and severed the outpost
communications, but could not take the outpost. The CCF soldiers then
pulled back and let their artillery soften OP 3 while they regrouped
for another assault. The Chinese soon stormed the outpost a second
time, but were again unsuccessful. Moreover, they lost three of their
men who were captured by the tenacious 2/5 defenders.
The fighting continued until 0315, reaching a hand-to-hand clash at one
stage. In addition to mortar and artillery fire, the enemy employed
small arms, automatic weapons, hand and stick-type grenades, bangalore
torpedoes, and 57mm recoilless rifles. During the attack, patrols were
sent out from the MLR and OP 2, to the west, to reestablish contact and
help with casualty evacuation.
Well to the rear of the outpost and unknown to its occupants,
intelligence personnel intercepted a Chinese message ordering the
Communists to withdraw. Immediately, friendly artillery fired on
all known escape routes available to the attackers. Despite this
interdicting fire, the enemy soldiers managed to withdraw without
further loss. Their unsuccessful thrust against the 2/5 OPLR cost the
Chinese 25 known killed, 25 estimated killed, 45 known wounded, and 3
prisoners. Marine casualties were 6 killed, 5 missing, and 25 wounded
and evacuated.[46]
[46] One of those wounded was Corporal Duane E. Dewey, a
machine gunner. He was wounded twice, in fact, the
second time from an exploding enemy grenade which he had
rolled upon to shield two nearby comrades. Dewey somehow
survived, and the following March, after release from
the Marine Corps, he went to the White House where he
received the Medal of Honor, the first to be presented by
the new President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Duane E. Dewey
Biog. File)
Why the Chinese had selected OP 3 for their mid-April attack is not
known. Several theories, however, have been advanced by those involved
in the action. Colonel Culhane, the regimental commander, believed that
the enemy incursion “was the direct result of the aggressive patrols
that frequently used the outpost as a point of departure....”[47]
Brigadier General Merrill B. Twining, the assistant division commander
since 22 March, declared that the position was too large for a
reinforced platoon to hold.[48] Perhaps the Chinese had harbored the
same thoughts before the night of 15–16 April.
[47] _Culhane ltr._
[48] LtGen Merrill B. Twining ltr to Deputy Asst CofS, G-3,
HQMC, dtd 19 Aug 54.
Just before its OPLR was withdrawn in favor of an observation line, the
1st Korean Regiment was struck by the Chinese in the area immediately
north of the 1–2 April clash. Beginning at 0100 on 17 April, the
enemy placed a 15-minute preparatory fire on the left flank of the
3d Battalion, occupying the regimental right sector. The CCF then
probed friendly lines in and around the area pounded during the
preliminary fires. Three separate attacks took place before 0400, when
the Communists withdrew. In these probes, the Chinese made free use
of automatic weapons; the enemy’s well-coordinated action attested
to their training and discipline. Confirmed casualties were 36 CCF
and 2 Koreans killed. The KMCs suffered 5 wounded and estimated that
70 Chinese had been wounded. Although the South Koreans frequently
called down artillery support during the attack, most of the casualties
inflicted on the enemy were from rifle and machine gun fire. The 17
April probe was to mark the last major infantry action for the 1st
Marine Division during its second month on JAMESTOWN.
Throughout the month a total of 5,000 rounds of artillery fire and
3,786 rounds of mortar fire fell in the division sector. On 2 April
the greatest volume for any single day was received: 3,000 artillery
and 118 mortar rounds. An average day’s incoming, during April, was
approximately 167 artillery and 125 mortar rounds.
_Strengthening the Line_[49]
[49] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Apr 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 46, dtd 17 Apr 52.
Even before the Communists had launched their mid-April attacks
against JAMESTOWN, the 1st Marine Division had implemented plans to
strengthen its line in western Korea. Besides the digging, timbering,
and sandbagging to accomplish a major improvement of the physical
defenses, General Selden required Marine infantry regiments to conduct
an aggressive defense of their sector of responsibility. He ordered
MLR units to employ snipers all along JAMESTOWN and to dispatch daily
patrols forward of the line to ambush, raid, kill, or capture Chinese
and their positions. The division commander further directed that
supporting arms such as artillery, tank, and air, when available, be
used to destroy hostile defenses, harass the enemy, and break up his
assemblies as well as to protect Marine positions.
As a result of an I Corps directive, the 1st Marine Division assumed
responsibility for an additional 6,800 yards of front on 14 April from
the 1st Commonwealth Division sector to the right of the division.
In preparation, the 5th Marines had taken over the western end of
the 1st Marines sector, held by 2/1, two days earlier. On the 14th
the 1st Marines, newly commanded by Colonel Walter N. Flournoy,[50]
extended its line eastward to assume new limiting points and part of
the MLR in the western part of the Canadian Brigade sector. Relief of
the Commonwealth unit was completed without any difficulty or enemy
interference. This additional yardage, plus the Kimpo Peninsula front,
now stretched the Marine division MLR to 35½ miles.
[50] Colonel Flournoy became regimental CO on 10 April,
succeeding Colonel Wade.
As a result, General Selden found it necessary to withdraw the division
general outpost line in order to build up his main line of resistance.
On 17 April, the 1st KMC Regiment reduced its OPLR to an OPLO (outpost
line of observation) and the left battalion pulled its MLR back to
more defensible ground. The Marine division center and right regiments
withdrew their outpost lines on 23 and 24 April. Both regiments then
established forward outposts and listening posts which, in many cases,
utilized former OPLR positions. Many of these posts were manned during
daylight hours only.
Abandonment of the forward OPLR added strength to the main line, but it
also meant that frontline battalions had to commit all their companies
on line, thus losing their reserve. To prevent Chinese occupation of
desirable terrain features on the former OPLR, the division dispatched
combat and reconnaissance patrols forward of its line. In the KMC
sector, the only Marine area favorable for tank operations forward of
JAMESTOWN, tank-infantry patrols were periodically employed.
To the west of the KMC sector, the Marine 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Michiel Dobervich) was assigned a
section of the KANSAS Line to defend, beginning 16 April. Reinforced
by attachment of the Division Reconnaissance Company (Major Ephraim
Kirby-Smith) that same day, Lieutenant Colonel Dobervich employed
Company C (two platoons), the headquarters LVT platoon, and the
reconnaissance unit to man 30 defensive positions from the Han River
eastward to the KMC western boundary.[51]
[51] Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had been
attached to the Kimpo Provisional Regiment since 31 March
and Company B was supporting MAG-33 at Pohang.
Two other measures to strengthen his sector of JAMESTOWN were utilized
by the Marine division commander. On 18 April, he asked General
O’Daniel to reconsider the no-fire zone recently established by the
corps commander. General Selden, who had received reports of Chinese
use of the sanctuary located within Marine Corps territory--for firing
positions and assembly areas primarily--recommended, after I Corps
had refused him permission to fire into the haven, a redrawing of the
O’Daniel line to coincide more closely with the boundaries established
by the UN. Approval along the lines submitted by the division was
given by I Corps that same day. The second measure employed by General
Selden was use of an additional defensive line, WYOMING FORWARD. This
position, closely paralleling JAMESTOWN in the KMC and 5th Marines
sectors, added depth to the sector defenses.
A unique rescue and recovery operation also came into existence about
this time. On 19 April the division ordered the 5th Marines, occupying
the center regimental sector, to organize a tank-infantry force for
rescue of the United Nations Truce Team, should such action become
necessary. The regimental plan, published on 22 April, utilized a
reinforced rifle company-tank company organization directly supported
by organic 5th Marines 4.2-inch mortars and 1/11. The Everready Rescue
Force, from the regimental reserve, occupied the high ground (OP 2)
east of and dominating Panmunjom.
In addition to setting forth organizational details of the task unit,
the 5th Marines Operational Plan 6-52 specified the method of operation
for the rescue force. Taking advantage of the peace corridor in the
western end of the center sector, a Forward Covering Force would
speed tank-riding infantry to the high ground one-half mile beyond
the objective, Panmunjon. Following would be the Pick-Up Force, from
the 1st Tank Battalion Headquarters Platoon, which would retrieve the
principal UN delegates and take them quickly to the assembly area
two miles to the rear of the MLR. A Rear Covering Force, composed of
a tank-infantry element, would follow the Pick-Up force both on its
way towards the objective and on the return trip. Withdrawal of both
covering forces was regulated by a series of phase lines.
_Marine Air Operations_[52]
[52] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10;
1st MAW, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, Apr 52; Lynn Montross,
_Cavalry of the Sky--The Story of U. S. Marine Combat
Helicopters_ (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954),
hereafter Montross, _SkyCav_, quoted with permission of
the publishers.
Even though the Marine air-ground team had been shorn of much of its
tactical aviation, what remained was well utilized. Helicopter troop
operations had become commonplace by the end of April 1952. That month
there were three exercises to further evaluate tactical concepts of
helicopter employment. Operation PRONTO, conducted on 5 April, was the
first major troop lift in the new I Corps sector. In this maneuver
approximately 670 troops of 2/7 and 10,000 pounds of rations were
transported by helicopter and truck from the Munsan-ni vicinity across
the Han River to the Kimpo Peninsula. Here the reserve battalion
served as a counterattack force in a hypothetical enemy landing. Due
to the necessity for avoiding the neutrality zone in the Munsan area,
round-trip flights averaged about 57 miles.
The exercise combined the shortest notice and longest distance of any
large-scale helicopter troop movement conducted by HMR-161. It pointed
to the fact that a helicopter unit could successfully lift a troop
organization virtually as an “on call” tactical tool and without the
benefit of previous liaison.
Operation LEAPFROG, on 18–19 April, transported one KMC battalion
across the Han to the peninsula and lifted out another the following
day. The purpose of this test was to determine the feasibility of a
replacement movement conducted over water, with “consideration given to
the language barrier existing between the troops and the transporting
facility.”[53] The six-mile round trip was the shortest troop haul yet
made by the transport chopper squadron. Consequently, it took the 12
HRS-1 single-engine Sikorsky aircraft only 3 hours and 26 minutes to
complete the exchange of the 1,702 KMC troops.
[53] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, 10-73.
Colonel McCutcheon’s HMR-161 pilots found that their helicopters could
carry six combat-equipped Korean Marines instead of five American
Marines, due to the smaller size and weight of the average Korean.
Since the U.S. and KMC Marine battalions were the same size, the larger
load factor for the Korean Marines enabled their unit to be moved
faster. In LEAPFROG the language difference proved to be no handicap,
since there were sufficient interpreters on hand and the troops were
cooperative. Helicopter pilots could use landing sites close together
because the terrain was open and the area of operations beyond the
reach of Chinese artillery.
Close on the heels of LEAPFROG came a third airlift. Operation CIRCUS,
conducted on 23 April, provided for the air deployment of the 7th
Marines reserve regiment, minus two battalions, across the Imjin to
landing sites just to the rear of the secondary defensive line, WYOMING
FORWARD. Ten helicopters carried 1,185 Marines over the river barrier
to blocking positions in 90 minutes. The CIRCUS exercise illustrated
that a minimum distance should be maintained between loading and
unloading sites for a safe and efficient transport operation. It also
pointed up that “consideration must be given to the number of aircraft
assigned to each traffic pattern during short hops over a river.”[54]
This successful maneuver came three days before all HRS-1 aircraft were
grounded due to a defect in the tail rotors. By mid-May the problem had
been corrected and the aircraft returned to flying status.
[54] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-50.
During April, Lieutenant Colonel Herring’s VMO-6 employed its 11
single-engine OE-1 observation planes for a total of 508 fixed-wing
combat flights. More than half of these, 275, were for artillery
spotting; of the remainder, 166 were flown for reconnaissance and 67
represented photo, weather, liaison, and area check-out maneuvers.
Combat flights by the squadron helicopters[55] during the month were
110 liaison, 45 reconnaissance, and 93 evacuations. Of the total 756
combat flights performed by both fixed-wing and rotary craft, 511 were
over enemy territory.
[55] Rotary wing aircraft assigned were two types, HTL-4 and
H03S-1. The former is a two-place, plastic-dome Bell
product; the latter, the first helicopter operated by the
Marine Corps, is an observation-utility, three-passenger
Sikorsky-made craft. HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, _Marine Corps
Aircraft, 1913–1965_, Marine Corps Historical Reference
Pamphlet (Washington: 1967 ed.) pp. 34, 38.
During that same month, Marine squadrons operating under the Fifth Air
Force put a total of 2,708 planes into the air despite restrictive or
prohibitive weather on 20 days. Continuing its emphasis on attacking
the North Korean transportation system, the Air Force command
dispatched 1,397 Marine planes on interdiction missions. Marine-piloted
close air support sorties flown to assist the 1st Marine Division
numbered only 56 throughout April; those piloted by Marines for 16
other UN divisions totaled 547.
Not all the air sortie records were made by land-based Marine
squadrons. On 18 April, VMA-312, the CTE 95.11 squadron provided by
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, flew 80 sorties, a Korean record for a
carrier-based squadron to that date and twice the daily average for the
initial six months of 1952.
By 20 April the three tactical squadrons of MAG-12--VMF(N)-513,
VMF-212, and VMF-323--had completed their relocations on the Korean
west coast. Two days later, combined MAG-12 attack and -33 jet aircraft
participated in what was a Fifth Air Force one-day combat record: 1,049
sorties.
One MAG-33 unit, the newly-formed Marine Photographic Squadron 1,
was already flying a large number of aerial reconnaissance missions
directed by Fifth Air Force. It provided almost one-third of the
daylight photo effort required by FAF with but one-quarter of the
aircraft.[56] VMJ-1’s complement of a dozen 550 mph McDonnell twin-jet
Banshee F2H-2P aircraft mounted three cameras and were capable both of
high altitude work and good speed. Introduction of this single-seat jet
was considered the “first important development in aerial photography
in the Korean War,”[57] since the Banshee could outproduce any photo
plane in Korea.
[56] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, pp. 10-2, 10-108. This record was
established despite the fact that the Marine squadron,
with 10 jets, flying out of K-3 (Pohang) was more than
150 miles further from most targets than the other major
photo unit, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, based at K-14
(Kimpo).
[57] _Ibid._, p. 10-59.
The month of April also marked change of command ceremonies for the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing. On 11 April at K-3, General Schilt turned
over wing responsibility to Brigadier General Clayton C. Jerome. Among
the numerous civilian and military dignitaries attending the ceremony
at the Pohang 1st MAW headquarters were the Honorable John J. Muccio,
U.S. Ambassador to Korea; Air Force Lieutenant Generals Otto P. Weyland
and Frank F. Everest, commanders of FEAF and FAF respectively; and the
Marine division CG, Major General Selden.
The new wing commander, General Jerome, like his predecessor, had a
distinguished flight career. A 1922 graduate of the Naval Academy,
he had served in various foreign and U.S. aviation billets and was
a veteran of five World War II campaigns. In 1943 Colonel Jerome
was operations officer for Commander, Aircraft, Solomon Islands.
Later he was named Chief of Staff, Commander, Aircraft, Northern
Solomons and Commander, Aircraft and Island Commander, Emirau, in the
northern Solomons. Before returning to the States, Colonel Jerome had
participated in the recapture of the Philippines, commanding MAG-32
and directing all Marine air support in the Luzon fighting. Brigadier
General Jerome became Director of Aviation and Assistant Commandant of
the Marine Corps for Air in September 1950 and served in this capacity
until taking command of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea.[58]
[58] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Clayton C. Jerome, Jul
58, rev.
During the command ceremonies the outgoing 1st MAW commander, General
Schilt, was presented the Distinguished Service Medal for his
outstanding leadership of the wing. The award was made by Lieutenant
General Weyland. Shortly before his Korean tour ended, General Schilt
had also received from ROK President Syngman Rhee the Order of Military
Merit Taiguk, for his contribution to the military defense of South
Korea.
_Supporting the Division and the Wing_[59]
[59] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10;
1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, 1st CSG, 11thMar, 1st TkBn ComdDs,
Mar-Apr 52; 1st CSG UnitRpts, Apr 52.
Because of the command relationships existing in Korea, with all
ground units under operational control of CG, EUSAK, the majority of
the logistical support to the Marines was handled by the Army. Eighth
Army, 2d Logistical Command (2d LogCom) provided for resupply of items
used commonly by both Marine and Army personnel; the Marine Corps
(Commanding General, FMFPac) furnished those supplies and equipment
used by Marine units only.
When the division moved to the west, the 1st Shore Party Battalion
opened a rear service area at Ascom City. Here the division established
and maintained Class II (organizational equipment) and IV (special
equipment) dumps for its units, as well as Class I (rations) and III
(petroleum products) facilities for both the Kimpo regiment and the
service units stationed at Ascom. Class I shipments were forwarded
to the Munsan-ni railhead and stored there. Fuels and lubricants and
Class V items (ordnance) were received from the U.S. Army. A forward
ammunition supply point (ASP) was located north of the Imjin to assure
a steady flow of ammunition to frontline combat units in the event that
either an enemy attack or emergency flooding conditions of the river
prevented use of the bridges. For the same reason a truck company was
positioned near this supply point each night.
Reinforcing the division logistic effort was the 1st Combat Service
Group. Commanded by Colonel Russell N. Jordahl, the 1st CSG in late
April had nearly 1,400 Marines and Navy medical personnel stationed at
various points between Japan and Korea. At Kobe, Japan, the Support
Company processed Marine drafts arriving and departing Korea. At Masan,
the Supply Company, 1st CSG, requisitioned for the division those
Class II and IV items peculiar to the Marine Corps needs and forwarded
them upon request. Heavy maintenance of all technical equipment
was performed by the Maintenance Company. Supporting the 1st Motor
Transport Battalion operation was the Motor Transport Company, 1st
CSG. Most of the group, including Headquarters Company, was based at
Masan.[60] Splinter detachments from the group also operated transport
facilities at other locations in Korea.
[60] The Support Company moved to Ascom City on 14 Jun 52.
In western Korea, good rail transport into Munsan-ni and an adequate
but not all-weather road system improved the division’s logistical
situation. Greater storage facilities also existed in the JAMESTOWN
rear supply areas than in the X Corps sector just vacated by the
Marines. Division motor equipment did not suffer any appreciable damage
due to the rigors of the MIXMASTER transplacement. Vehicle maintenance
also presented a favorable outlook, due to the expected decreased use
during the period of positional warfare. On the other hand, an unduly
large number of tanks developed engine troubles in March, which were
traced back to defective oil cooling fans. This condition was corrected
in April and May by installation of new fan assemblies.
Guns of the 1st Tank Battalion immediately began to render valuable
support to Marine frontline regiments with the division’s new
assignment in the west. Companies A, B, and C were placed in direct
support of the three forward infantry regiments. Company D drew the
reserve mission, which included tank-infantry training with the 7th
Marines and preparation for reinforcing division artillery fires. Tank
companies were used almost daily in the forward sectors for destruction
by direct fire of the Chinese MLR fortifications. For such missions the
M-46 tanks, equipped with high-velocity 90mm guns, lumbered forward
from secure assembly areas to the rear of JAMESTOWN to temporary firing
positions on the line.
After pouring direct fire on preselected targets and completion of the
fire mission, the armored vehicles then returned to the rear. Less
frequently, a five-vehicle tank platoon accompanied a reinforced rifle
platoon and conducted daylight reconnaissance missions of forward areas
to engage the Chinese and to gain intelligence about enemy positions
and terrain. During April six such tank-infantry patrols, all in the
KMC regimental area, failed to establish direct contact with the enemy
but did draw mortar and artillery fire.
Marine artillery, which had been receiving its share of attention
from Communist field guns,[61] was faced by problems in two other
respects. Although the enemy held only four more artillery weapons
than did the Marines, General Seiden still lacked the ability to
mass artillery fires to the same degree as did the Chinese.[62] This
limitation stemmed directly from the wide physical separation of 11th
Marines batteries and the frontline infantry regiments being supported.
A second problem, the loss of qualified forward observers--reserve
officers due to return to the States for release from active
service--forced the 11th Marines to begin a school to train infantry
officers for this function. To make the course realistic, all firing
was done at live targets.[63]
[61] One artillery weapon, in particular, as well as the
Marine tanks habitually drew the fury of Chinese
counterfire. The heavy destructive power of the U.S. Army
8-inch, self-propelled howitzers firing on tough Chinese
defensive positions, generally brought down on their own
emplacements a rain of enemy shells, so sensitive were
enemy commanders to these hard-hitting weapons. _Pala
comments._
[62] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9-39.
[63] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to CMC, dtd 6 Sep 66,
hereafter _Henderson ltr II_.
In April 1952, the 11th Marines organization had three light 105mm
howitzer battalions (54 guns), one medium 155mm howitzer battalion (12
guns), the KMC 105mm howitzer battalion (18 pieces), and a 4.5-inch
rocket battery (6 launchers). Attached to the 1st Marine Division and
located in its sector were one battalion and one battery of the I Corps
field artillery. The mission of the Marine artillery regiment was to
provide accurate and timely fires in support of both the MLR and OPLR
defenses, until withdrawal of the latter late in April. Batteries
of the 11th Marines also fired on known and suspected Chinese gun
emplacements and on targets of opportunity. The regiment also provided
intelligence on enemy artillery.
Throughout April, Colonel Henderson’s units continued to improve
their tactical and administrative areas, concentrating on field
fortifications, wire communications, and road trafficability. In the
last category, the artillery dozers and dump trucks not only did
nearly all of this work for the 11th Marines but also provided “a fair
amount of ‘direct support’ bulldozing to the infantry regiments and
occasionally loaned dozers and operators to the engineers.”[64]
[64] _Ibid._
Within a Marine aircraft wing, personnel and equipment for logistic
support are purposely limited to carrying out the wing primary
mission--providing air support during an amphibious operation. The wing
T/O (Table of Organization) provides a streamlined organization with
light, transportable organic equipment. Additional logistical support
personnel and equipment are not included since this would result in (1)
a duplication of support effort between the wing and landing force
and (2) a great increase in wing transport shipping requirements. When
the wing moves ashore, organic units render support necessary for
operations on the airfield only. Responsibility for activities beyond
this basic mission--airfield construction, maintenance of runways,
and movement of supplies to the airfield--must come from more senior
commands. Usually such assistance is obtained by attaching elements of
a naval construction battalion and other logistical support units.
In April 1952, Naval Construction Battalion Unit 1804 assisted in
the construction and maintenance received by MAG-33 at K-3. Here at
the port of Pohang, a detachment from the 1st Combat Service Group
controlled the movement of fuels, oils, lubricants, and ordnance to
wing dumps. Amphibian tractors (LVTs) of Company B, 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion, provided most of the transportation required for
these supplies excepting ordnance. Assistance in the form of amphibious
trucks (DUKWs) was furnished by a platoon from the 1st Amphibian Truck
Company. When required, Marines of these two companies manhandled the
supplies.
Logistical support for the Marine wing was governed by the same general
procedures that applied to the division; 1st MAW supply requirements
beyond its augmented capability became the responsibility of Eighth
Army (2d LogCom) which furnished items common to both Marine and Army
units. If this EUSAK agency did not stock the requisitioned item,
it provided a substitute. Responsibility for resupply of aviation
items rested with the U.S. Navy. Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
(ComNavFE) replaced unserviceable aviation technical equipment such as
aircraft parts and special maintenance tools. Commander, Service Force,
Pacific (ComServPac) replenished aviation ordnance. Responsibility for
supplying items peculiar to the Marine Corps rested with CG, FMFPac.
The repair and maintenance of 1st MAW equipment posed far less of a
problem than the construction and upkeep of airfields. Major repair
work on aircraft was satisfactorily performed in Japan by the wing
support squadron at Itami, and by the U.S. Navy Fleet Air Service
Squadron 11 (FASRon-11), located at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi.
The establishment in Japan of the wing heavy maintenance facility
depended, in part, upon its proximity to the wing flying squadrons.
Other considerations were the availability to the wing commander of
adequate air transport for continuous resupply of both routine and
emergency items and reliable communications between the users and the
maintenance unit. Because these conditions favoring removal of the
heavy maintenance facility from the immediate combat area existed
throughout Korean hostilities, it was possible for the maintenance
units to operate successfully in Japan away from the combat zone.
Air base construction and maintenance of airfield runways and taxiways
had plagued wing operations since the early days of the Korean War.
During the first winter these problems had appeared repeatedly at those
installations where Marine air was either not properly supported or
insufficiently augmented by the operational commander. Shortly after
MAG-33 had moved to K-3 in early 1951, the wing commander requested
emergency repairs for the runway and a permanent solution to the
airfield maintenance difficulties. Assistance was made available, but
it was insufficient. The repair force had to be augmented by Marines
pulled away from their own vital jobs and by native laborers. Later, in
the spring of 1952, when the Air Force assigned some of its engineers
to assist, the maintenance problem almost disappeared.
Motor transport within the wing was a continuing source of logistical
problems. Vehicles for handling the heavier aviation ordnance were
unsatisfactory because their configuration, of World War II vintage,
did not permit them to service the newer aircraft. Other trucks lacked
engine power or rigidity to withstand sustained use under primitive
airfield conditions. World War II vehicles that had been preserved and
placed in open storage required reconditioning before their use in
Korea. Mechanics’ general and special tools had a high replacement rate
throughout the entire period of wing operations in Korea.
Aircraft fuel handling in April 1952 followed outmoded World War
II methods. For K-3, amphibian vehicles received drummed fuel from
ships and landed it at the beach. There MAG-33 personnel transferred
the gasoline to 1,200-gallon fuel trucks, which then moved it to the
airfield servicing area, where other Marines transferred it again,
this time to 3,200-gallon stationary refuelers for dispensing into
the aircraft. Although this method became highly developed, it was
extremely slow and wasteful of manpower and vehicles in comparison to
the tank farm system, which was soon to reach K-3.
Two areas of logistics continued to remain almost trouble free for
division and wing Marines. Medical problems existed but were not
extensive. During a five-day period in late March, Marine Air Control
Group 2 experienced 13 cases of scarlet fever but no fatalities. That
same month, the Pacific Fleet Medical Officer noted that MAG-12 sick
bays were in excellent condition and that medical “personnel have shown
great ingenuity in fabricating various items of medical equipment from
scrap metal and lumber.”[65]
[65] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 12, p. 12-8. The medical
officer’s report to CinCPac noted that a vast improvement
“in the spaces allocated for the care of the sick and
wounded” had been made.
Evacuation of casualties and the utilization of air vehicles for
transport of passengers and cargo proved to be the second asset in
logistical operations. The Itami-based detachment of VMR-152 moved
7,757 personnel from the division and wing and 738.7 tons of cargo
during April 1952. In addition, the R5D craft hauled a total of 325.2
tons of U.S. mail that month for the two Marine organizations. Speedy
removal of patients to better equipped facilities in the rear by
VMO-6 and HMR-161 helicopters was a giant step forward in life-saving
techniques. VMO-6 usually provided this service, but early in April,
Colonel McCutcheon’s squadron was assigned emergency medical evacuation
duties to augment the observation squadron.[66] Pilots flew these
evacuation missions with almost total disregard for adverse weather or
darkness, and without radar control or adequate instrumentation for
all-weather operations.[67]
[66] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-69, p. 10-73.
[67] _Ibid._, p. 10-68. Flights were not made in heavy fog.
Test use by the Marine Corps Equipment Board of some of
the equipment needed to navigate under conditions of
reduced visibility was nearing the end of its development
cycle.
_Different Area, Different Problem_[68]
[68] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23 Jul 53,
Subj: Type “C” Rpt: “Civilian Affairs and the Korean
Service Corps, Mar 52-May 53,” hereafter CG, 1stMarDiv
ltr, _Civ Afrs and KSC_; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52;
HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52.
An additional responsibility the 1st Marine Division inherited
when it moved to western Korea was control of civilians within the
division boundary. In eastern Korea, all nonmilitary personnel had
been evacuated from the vicinity of the MINNESOTA Line in the division
sector; they had not been removed from the JAMESTOWN area. Prior to
the arrival of the division in the west, the STAYBACK Line, averaging
seven miles to the rear of the Imjin River and running in a generally
northeast-southwest direction, had been established to limit the
movement of civilian personnel in the forward areas. The Marines soon
found that their predecessors must have been lax, however, in requiring
that Korean civilians remain behind STAYBACK. What seemed equally
unsuitable to the division was the poor military-civilian relationship
that had apparently existed for some time.
To correct the situation, General Selden cautioned his units to avoid
unnecessary damage or destruction to the civilian economy. He directed
his commanding officers to keep unauthorized Koreans away from Marine
installations. Military police set up check points and instituted
roving patrols to enforce division controls. Civil violators were
turned over to Korean authorities or held for investigation before
release. Civilians who lived in the forward areas were removed to the
rear. They were prevented from going beyond STAYBACK until August 1952,
when a controlled passage system was instituted.
CHAPTER II
Defending the Line
_UN Command Activities--Defense of West and East Coast Korean
Islands--Marine Air Operations--Spring 1952 on_ JAMESTOWN--_End
of the Second Year of War--A Long Fourth of July--Changes in the
Lineup--Replacement and Rotation--Logistical Operations, Summer 1952_
_UN Command Activities_[69]
[69] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: Cdr Malcolm W. Cagle, USN and Cdr Frank
A. Manson, USN, _The Sea War in Korea_ (Annapolis, Md.:
U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), hereafter Cagle and Manson,
_Sea War, Korea_; James A. Field, Jr., _History of United
States Naval Operations_, Korea (Washington: [Div. of
Naval Hist], 1962), hereafter Field, _NavOps, Korea_;
John Miller, Jr., Maj Owen J. Carroll, USA, and Margaret
E. Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_ (Washington: OCMH, DA,
1958), hereafter Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, _Korea,
1951–1953_.
Movement of the 1st Marine Division to the west was part of an Eighth
Army master plan to strengthen UN defenses and at the same time to
enable South Korean forces to assume increased responsibility in the
defense of their homeland. The tactical realignment in the spring
of 1952 put more South Korean infantry units on the main line of
resistance and buttressed the fighting front with five corps sectors
instead of four. In the far west, the I Corps positions were newly
manned (left to right) by the 1st Marine, 1st Commonwealth, 1st ROK,
and the U.S. 45th Infantry Divisions. Next in line was IX Corps, whose
left boundary General Van Fleet[70] had shifted further west, which now
had a divisional line up of the ROK 9th on the left, the U.S. 7th in
the center, and the U.S. 40th on the right.
[70] General Van Fleet, CG, EUSAK since April 1951, had
advocated a program in which South Korean troops would be
rigorously trained to take over an increasingly greater
part of the UNC defense efforts in Korea. See Mark W.
Clark, _From the Danube to the Yalu_ (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1954), p. 185, hereafter Clark, _Danube to
Yalu_, quoted with permission of the publishers.
To fill in the central part of the EUSAK front where the change of
IX Corps boundary had created a gap in the line, the UN commander
inserted the ROK II Corps with three divisions (ROK 6th, ROK Capital,
and ROK 3d) forward. Immediately to the right of this new ROK corps
sector, the X Corps continued in approximately its same position on
the east-central front. Its ROK 7th and U.S. 25th Divisions remained
on line, while the ROK 8th had advanced to the former sector of the
Marine division in the wild Punchbowl country. At the far right of the
UN line, the ROK I Corps front was held by the ROK 11th Division at the
X Corps boundary and the ROK 5th along the Sea of Japan. By 1 May 1952,
nine Republic of Korea divisions had been emplaced on the UNC main
defense line, three more than had been there in mid-March.
Throughout Korea in March and April there had been a general stagnation
of offensive action on both sides because of fog, rain, and mud. In
May, however, the Chinese launched no less than 30 probing attacks
against the ROK 1st Division in the I Corps sector, without gaining
any significant advantage. To the right, the enemy and the U.S. 45th
Division traded blows in several patrol actions. In June, major
EUSAK combat action was still centered in the 45th’s sector, but the
following month was marked by sharp battlefront clashes in nearly all
Eighth Army division areas. For a two-week period in July and August,
heavy seasonal rains limited both ground and air action. With the
return of normal weather, heavy fighting again broke out, this time
concentrated in the I Corps sector. This action did not abate until
late August, when the onset of the heaviest rains of the season again
drastically reduced military operations.
Communist ground activity in the spring of 1952 was marked by increased
artillery support which resulted in telling damage to UN infantry and
artillery positions. Thus, during May, the enemy expended approximately
102,000 artillery and mortar rounds against the Allied front, roughly
12 times the number fired the previous July, just prior to the
period of stabilized battlelines in Korea. The artillery buildup was
accompanied by a sharp decrease in hostile air support activities.
While the Chinese had flown 3,700 jet sorties during the first month of
1952, by June the monthly total had dropped to 308.
As part of the balanced military forces, Allied air and sea units
continued their active defense in support of UN ground units. Beginning
in late May, Fifth Air Force shifted the emphasis of its destructive
effort from interdiction of communication routes to the bombing of
selected industrial targets. Naval air was committed to support the
FAF programs. At sea, ships steamed almost at will to sustain the
U.S. lifeline. Underscoring the complete UN control of Korean waters,
large naval vessels offshore fired their big guns in support of
ground troops. Off both the west and east coasts, Task Force (TF) 95
maintained its blockade of North Korean ports and reduced the extent of
water travel that enemy craft could safely undertake. This same naval
force was responsible for the Allied defense of islands located off the
east and west coasts of Korea.
_Defense of West and East Coast Korean Islands_[71]
[71] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9; No.
5, Chap. 8; West Coast Island Defense Element ComdDs,
Feb-Oct 52, hereafter _WCIDE ComdD_, with date; East
Coast Island Defense ComdDs, Jan-Oct 52, hereafter _ECIDE
ComdD_, with date; Col William K. Davenport ltr to CMC,
dtd 27 Jun 52, Subj: Type D Report of duty as Commander
West Coast Island Defense Element (CTE 95.15); Cagle and
Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Field, _NavOps, Korea_.
Just off the northwest Korean mainland a string of islands extends
from the mouth of the Yalu River down around the peninsula to Pusan in
the southeast. Most of these islands are tiny and are located south of
the 38th Parallel. Only a few lie off the east coast, and these are
clustered primarily in the North Korean harbor of Wonsan. By early
1951, UN forces exercised control over most of the Korean islands.
Their tactical importance is shown from their diverse use as sites for
UN Command intelligence activities, USAF radar installations, locations
for the emergency landing strips used by Allied planes, bases for U.S.
search and rescue operations, and as springboards for possible thrusts
into enemy rear areas.[72]
[72] Evidence of Chinese concern about such rear area attacks
is apparent in the countermeasures taken: “Order of
Battle reports indicated that a total of three North
Korean Corps and three Chinese Communist Armies were
engaged in coastal defense operations on the east and
west coasts of North Korea.” _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 5, p.
8-79.
Another reason for holding some of the islands had come to light
during truce negotiations in December 1951. At that time, in an
attempt to expedite the successful conclusion of the truce meetings,
UN representatives had offered the Communists all the islands north of
the 38th Parallel. Brushing aside the tactical value of the proposal,
the enemy boasted that he could capture the islands at any time.
In November 1951 the Communists had, in fact, seized two western
islands near the mouth of the Yalu. The 1,000 defending guerrillas
there--former North Koreans working for the UNC--had been unable to
stem the assault. The UN Command promptly reviewed the island situation
and on 6 January 1952 gave TF 95, the United Nations Blockading and
Escort Force, responsibility for both overall defense and local ground
defense for the 11 coastal islands north of the 38th Parallel and the
4 islands immediately south of this boundary. Two subordinate blockade
task groups, one in the west and another in the east, were responsible
for the defense of these islands.
[Illustration:
MAP 6 K. White
WEST COAST ISLAND DEFENSE ELEMENT
SUMMER 1952]
In the west, Task Group (TG) 95.1 was charged with the defense of six
islands. (See Map 6.) Two of these, Sok-to and Cho-do, lie between the
38th and 39th Parallels; the four remaining islands, Paengyong-do,
Taechong-do, Yongpyong-do, and Tokchok-to, are above the 37th Parallel.
In the east, TG 95.2 was responsible for keeping nine islands north
of the 38th Parallel in friendly hands. Situated in Wonsan harbor
are Mo-do, Sin-do, So-do, Tae-do, Hwangto-do, Ung-do, and Yo-do, the
largest. (See Map 7.) Another island, Yang-do, actually a two-island
group further north in the area of the 41 st Parallel, is 18 miles
northeast of the coastal city of Songjin. The southernmost island,
tiny Nan-do, is below Wonsan and the 39th Parallel and lies 10 miles
northeast of Kojo, another coastal city.
Ground defense of the islands had been, at best, a haphazard
arrangement before TF 95 took over the responsibility. Many of the
islands, especially those inhabited by friendly guerrillas, had neither
plans for a proper defense nor commanders experienced in organizing
resistance to enemy attack. Soon after the two islands near the mouth
of the Yalu were taken, ROK Marines were rushed to those islands
considered most strategic for South Korean defense. Late in 1951, U.S.
Marines had been assigned to the area in an advisory capacity. By early
1952, Marine Corps detachments were in command of the island defense
activities for both task groups. Korean Marines provided a majority of
the actual defending forces.
Although the 1st Marine Division initially had supplied the officers
and men for the island security missions, in January 1952 FMFPac took
on direct responsibility for furnishing personnel and providing for
their administrative and logistical support through the 1st Provisional
Casual Company, FMFPac. Located at Otsu, Japan, the company was the
administrative headquarters for seriously wounded Marine division and
wing personnel recuperating in service hospitals in Japan. Recovered
patients who volunteered for duty with the offshore commands provided
the bulk of the Marines used in this defense. Major responsibilities
were to plan, organize, and conduct the defense of these islands off
the Korean west and east coasts. A task element under each task group
was created for this purpose.
With its headquarters at Paengyang-do, Task Element (TE) 95.15, the
West Coast Island Defense Element (WCIDE), was organized early in
January 1952. The following month, the initial complement of U.S.
Marines arrived. Colonel William K. Davenport, Jr., element commander,
assigned his 5 officers and 29 enlisted men to the 4 most critical
islands and to his staff. Those islands garrisoned were Cho-do and
Sok-to, north of the Parallel and both within range of enemy mainland
guns, and Paengyang-do and Yongpyong-do, to the south. Taechong-do,
near the command island, and Tokchok-to, southwest of Inchon, were both
considered secure and not provided with U.S. Marine commanders. At each
of the four occupied islands, Marines reconnoitered the terrain, drew
up plans for preparation of defensive positions, organized and trained
the troops available, and began the laborious task of constructing
the defense. Protection against long-range hostile artillery fire was
emphasized for the northern Sok-to and Cho-do garrisons.
Off the other long coast of Korea, TE 95.23, the East Coast Island
Defense Element (ECIDE), commanded until early May 1952 by Colonel
Frank M. Reinecke, had an almost entirely different situation. Eight of
the nine islands in the vicinity of Wonsan Harbor or north of Songjin
that ECIDE was responsible for were within range of Communist shore
batteries and thus frequently fired upon. Even before the January
1952 decision, the U.S. Navy had been charged with the security of
these east coast islands north of the 38th Parallel. For these reasons
ECIDE defenses had to maintain a greater state of readiness and were
more advanced than in the west. Fire support ships and land based
U.S. Marine naval gunfire spotting teams from 1st ANGLICO (Air and
Naval Gunfire Liaison Company), FMF, which also provided forward air
controllers for the KMC regiment, stood by at all times to silence
unfriendly artillery fire emanating from the mainland. The Marines had
also trained Korean Marines to handle the spotting missions.
[Illustration:
MAP 7 K. WHITE
EAST COAST DEFENSE ELEMENT
SUMMER 1952]
A number of events of major interest occurred during those first
difficult weeks following organization of the two offshore island
commands. On 19 and 20 February, elements of two North Korean infantry
battalions launched an unsuccessful assault against the two Yang-do
islands. The combined “action of the island garrison and UN surface
forces”[73] repulsed the enemy attempt, which had been planned to gain
intelligence and kill as many of the defenders as possible.[74] On the
heels of this action, with the first enemy effort to take an east coast
island, came an unexpected bonus in the form of a defector. Brigadier
General Lee Il, NKPA, came ashore on 21 February at Tae-do “in a stolen
sampan with a briefcase full of top secret papers, a head full of top
secret plans, and a strong desire to make himself useful.”[75] He was
rushed immediately to Eighth Army intelligence officers.
[73] CinPac Weekly Intel Digest No. 23-52, dtd 6 Jun 52,
included as App. 17 to _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-110.
[74] First Lieutenant Joseph S. Bartos, Jr., a former
All-American football great, also distinguished himself
during the Yang-do action. His cool, resourceful, and
valiant leadership during the two-day defense earned him
the Silver Star Medal. BGen Frank M. Reinecke comments on
draft MS, dtd 25 Aug 66.
[75] Field, _NavOps, Korea_, p. 426.
The next day command personnel of the west coast TE 95.15 were treated
to a surprise, though not so pleasant as the unforeseen defection of
the NKPA general. Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, Commander Task Force
(CTF) 95, and his staff were engaged in an inspection of the WCIDE
islands. While the party was looking over the antiaircraft defenses at
Paengyong-do:
... an aircraft of VMA-312 made a pass at the CP, followed
closely by a second plane. The second aircraft made a message
drop and accidentally released a 500-pound bomb, which landed
from 75–100 feet west of the CP, shattering all windows and
blowing all the doors off their hinges. Personnel harbored
within the CP were thrown to the floor by the concussion, a
few sustaining minor cuts and bruises, but no fatalities were
incurred.... Commanding Officer, USS _Bairoko_ [the carrier to
which VMA-312 was assigned], sent a note of apology to CTE 95.15
and later followed up with material to repair the CP.[76]
[76] CTE 95.15 ComdD, 1 Feb-31 May 52, p. 8.
In March, CTG 95.1 directed the occupation of Ho-do, barely more than
a speck of dirt 4,000 yards south of Sok-to and within 400 yards
of the Communist mainland. Despite Colonel Davenport’s objection
that the proposed action was beyond the defensive mission of his
command and that the proximity of Ho-do to the enemy shore made the
island untenable,[77] the task group commander would not rescind the
directive. After a detailed reconnaissance by First Lieutenant Wallace
E. Jobusch, Colonel Davenport ordered a reinforced Korean Marine Corps
platoon to occupy the island. This order was carried out, but during
the night of 25–26 March the platoon lost its newly gained objective to
a well-coordinated enemy amphibious attack. Not a single Korean Marine
survivor could be accounted for at daylight. On 2 April, however,
after the enemy force had departed Ho-do, six of the platoon turned
up on Sok-to. They had survived by hiding out at Ho-do. None of the
others were ever seen again. After the island was overrun, it was not
reoccupied by Allied forces.
[77] Colonel Davenport later pointed out that the enemy
could easily employ high-powered rifles against Ho-do
occupants, that resupply posed problems to his command,
and that at times the enemy could even walk to Ho-do
over the winter ice. Col William K. Davenport ltr to Hd,
HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66.
After this latest offensive action in the west, the Communists
made no further attempts to seize any of the islands. U.S. and ROK
Marines enjoyed a period of relative freedom from enemy harassment,
except for frequent shore battery shelling directed against the east
coast islands. For WCIDE command members the quiet island duty was
interrupted only occasionally by hostile artillery fire although rumors
of imminent enemy landings abounded. On 13 October, however, the enemy
bombed Cho-do in the first air attack made against an island garrison
since the U.S. Marines had been assigned the west coast island command
responsibility. No casualties resulted from this raid. The lull in
enemy activity that then ensued enabled island personnel to devote
increased efforts towards improvement of their defenses.
Marines instructed, drilled, and conducted tactical exercises for
the island forces. Island commanders supervised the construction and
improvement of gun pits and other defense installations. At the ECIDE
command island, Yo-do, a 2,700-foot airstrip (Briscoe Field) for
emergency landings and intelligence flights had been completed by June.
Since much of the labor was performed by Koreans, the language barrier
sometimes created difficulties. In all these activities the Marines
found that they were hampered but not unduly burdened by this problem.
One condition, however, did handicap operations of the island Marines.
This was the supply situation which was prevented from becoming
desperate only because the Marines were able to borrow and obtain
necessities from other service activities. The inability of the island
Marines to draw needed supplies from the responsible U.S. Army agency
developed as a result of the slowness of the Marines in approving the
task element tables of equipment (T/E),[78] and from insistence of
the supplying activity that it would deal only with those units that
had approved tables of equipment. The urgency of the situation was
alleviated in May when weekly supply flights were begun by the 1st MAW.
Even when surface ships did arrive with provisions, Marines frequently
discovered that items which had been invoiced were missing.[79]
Consumables, especially, had a high rate of disappearance.
[78] A T/E is a listing of equipment that a unit needs to
accomplish its mission. Tables vary according to type of
unit and its mission.
[79] Commenting on logistical matters, Colonel Kenneth A.
King, who during 1952 commanded first the WCIDE and then
1st CSG, was of the opinion that the main difficulty
lay “not in getting requisitions filled, but in getting
delivery of what was approved” due to the fact Marines
were not assigned to processing of requisitions and
delivery of supplies. He had high praise for the concern
and assistance of 1st MAW units as well as Captain G. L.
G. Evans (RN) of HMS _Ocean_ and various other United
Kingdom ship captains. Colonel King further commented
that “for the benefit of Marines who may have to serve
in isolated areas, and I imagine this often prevails in
Vietnam today, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that
the Marine Corps should be very reluctant to leave the
support of any of its elements, no matter how small, to
other services or nationalities.” Col Kenneth A. King ltr
to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24 Aug 66.
_Marine Air Operations_[80]
[80] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section has
been derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 10; No.
5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW ComdDs, May-Aug 52; MAG-12 ComdDs,
Jun, Aug 52; Robert F. Futrell, _The United States Air
Force in Korea, 1950–1953_ (New York: Duell, Sloan, and
Pearce, 1961), hereafter Futrell, _USAF, Korea_.
Close air support of ground troops remained an almost forgotten mission
of Fifth Air Force tactical aircraft. When planes were allotted for
close support, both their customary late arrival over the target
area and pilot inefficiency left Marine ground commanders less than
satisfied.[81] The particular concern of General Jerome, the new
1st MAW commander, was the continuing limited opportunity for his
Marines to execute their normal primary mission--close air support of
frontline troops. Although FAF assigned Marine pilots to support the
1st Marine Division whenever possible, the infrequent number of close
air support missions performed under the existing sortie limit was
beginning to detract from the quality of delivery. General Jerome set
out to remedy this unfavorable situation.
[81] 1st MAW ComdD, Feb 52, quoted in _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4,
p. 10-45.
Working with General Selden, the Marine wing commander prevailed upon
the Air Force to permit close air support training of wing pilots and
of forward air controllers with the Marine division. On 19 May, CG,
FAF lifted the close air support restriction that he had imposed in
front of General Selden’s MLR. By agreement between the FAF and the
two Marine commanders, Fifth Air Force would permit the scheduling of
12 close air support sorties daily for a one-month period, MAG-12 was
given this training mission, to begin on 21 May.[82]
[82] Two months earlier, FAF had begun “a program for training
pilots in close air support techniques.... Initially,
all training missions for this division were flown by
Air Force aircraft.” The flights, not in response to
specific requests, were assigned by the G-3, I Corps. CG,
1stMarDiv ltr to CG, FMFPac dtd 23 May 52, Subj: CAS sum
for pd 1 Jan-30 Apr 52, cited in _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No.
4, p. 10-196. These flights ceased just before the ones
from MAG-12 began. 1st MarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 4. A 1st
MarDiv staff officer, who had observed the frequency of
General Jerome’s visits to the division CP to discuss the
new close air support training program, has credited the
two Marine CGs for their “great amount of coordinated
personal aggressiveness in bringing this about.” Col
Robert A. McGill comments on draft MS, Sep 66, hereafter
_McGill comments_.
The objective of the CAS program, in addition to providing operational
training and practice for Marine ground officers, air controllers,
and pilots, was to inflict maximum casualties on Chinese troops and
to increase the destruction and damage to their positions. Before
assigning a pilot to the actual training flights, MAG-12 sent him
on a tour of the front lines to become better familiarized with the
topography, the restricted (“no-fly”) areas, and probable enemy
targets. Air strikes requested by the division went directly to MAG-12.
Initially, a limitation of 12 sorties per day was established, but on
17 July--the program having already been extended beyond its original
30-day limit--a new ceiling of 20 daily sorties went into effect. The
division was also allowed additional flights above this prescribed
daily sortie number when air support was needed to repel a large-scale
enemy attack or to assist in a major Marine ground assault.
Almost as soon as the Marines began to derive the benefit of the
training program, the flights were terminated by FAF. On 3 August
1952, following a complaint by CG, Eighth Army that Marines were
getting a disproportionate share of the close air support sorties,
the Fifth Air Force notified General Jerome that the special program
would end the next day. General Selden was instructed to request air
support “in the same manner as other divisions on the Army front.”[83]
Despite the abrupt termination of the training program, the division
had derived substantial benefits from the 12 weeks of Marine-type close
air support. “Air attacks were the most useful weapon for dealing with
enemy dug-in on the reverse slopes,”[84] according to an official
analysis. One regimental commander reported that the 1,000-pound
bombs were effective in destroying enemy bunkers and further noted
that the strikes had produced good results in the “destruction or
damaging of enemy artillery and mortar pieces.”[85] Another senior
officer commented that air overhead kept the Communists “buttoned up,”
which permitted Marines greater freedom of movement for tactical and
logistical operations.[86]
[83] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-54.
[84] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-36.
[85] 1st MarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2.
[86] Col Russell E. Honsowetz ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC, dtd 14 Sep 66.
A second type of Marine close air support aided the mission of Marine
infantrymen in western Korea during the summer of 1952. This was
controlled radar bombing, which permitted delivery of aviation ordnance
at night or under other conditions of limited or poor visibility. The
Air Force had introduced the concept into Korea in January 1951, had
tested and evaluated it in combat, and shortly thereafter had put it
to good use against the Communist spring offensives that year. Based
on a concept oriented towards deep support of troops in extended land
campaigns, the Air Force system made use of 20-ton vans to house its
ground components.[87]
[87] As an Air Force spokesman noted, “... the AN/MPQ-2 radars
introduced into Korea in January 1951 were Strategic Air
Command bomb scoring radars and not tactical equipment.
This would explain the large vans.” Robert C. Futrell,
Historian, Hist Studies Br USAF Hist Div, comments
on draft MS, dtd 12 Oct 66. Dr. Futrell authored the
definitive unclassified history of Air Force operations
in Korea, previously cited as _USAF, Korea_.
The Marine equipment, on the other hand, was more mobile since it was
to be employed close to friendly lines. Referred to as the MPQ-14,[88]
the Marine radar bombing system was designed so that the largest
piece could be put into a one-ton trailer. Major ground items were a
generator power supply, a tracking radar, and a computer; the last
essential component, an automatic bombing control, was mounted in the
aircraft.
[88] These letters indicate first, the type of installation;
next, the kind of electronic equipment; and finally, its
purpose. In this case, M-mobile ground installation,
P-radar, and Q-intended for a combination of purposes.
The figure indicates the model number in the
developmental history of the equipment.
Developed and hand built after World War II by Marines under Major
Marion C. Dalby at the Naval Air Materiel Test Center, Point Mugu,
California, the MPQ-14 was first used in Korea in September 1951.
Initially, considerable mechanical difficulty was experienced with
radar bombing, which affected the accuracy of the bombs, but later the
system became sufficiently reliable to permit bomb drops within one
mile of friendly lines. Subsequent use confirmed the tactical precision
of the MPQ-14. By the middle of summer 1952, the Marines had obtained
Fifth Air Force permission to use radar bombing, controlled by a
forward observer on the ground, in a close support role.
Before this policy change took place another one, at a still higher
command level, had occurred. On 23 June, FAF planes struck at eight
North Korean hydroelectric plants in the central and northwestern part
of the country. The attack represented a departure from the intense
interdiction of enemy lines of communication (Operation STRANGLE)
which, since May 1951, had characterized FAF support operations. The
shift came about after a Far East Air Forces study on the effectiveness
of the interdiction campaign had concluded, in part, that the program
had been indecisive.[89]
[89] HistDiv; Air Univ, USAF, _United States Air Force
Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30
June 1952_, USAF Hist Study No. 72 (Washington, 1955),
p. 159, hereafter USAF, _Ops in Korea_, with appropriate
number. The Air Force operations were published in three
books, numbered 72, 73, and 127.
For more than a year preceding the 23 June attack, the Fifth Air Force
had concentrated its ground support efforts on the disruption of
Communist communication lines so that the enemy would be unable “to
contain a determined offensive ... or to mount a sustained offensive
himself.”[90] During the lifetime of the doctrine, no major offensive
had been launched by the enemy, and on this fact was based the claim
for success of the interdiction program. Opponents, however, pointed
out that despite this maximum FAF air effort, the Communists had built
up their strength, including support areas immediately to the rear
of their front lines and resupply installations. As the recent UN
commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway,[91] told members of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services on 21 May 1952, the same month that FAF had
begun to shift its air effort away from interdiction, “I think that the
hostile forces opposing the Eighth Army ... have a substantially greater
offensive potential than at any time in the past....”[92]
[90] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 435–436.
[91] General Mark W. Clark had succeeded Ridgway as UN
Commander on 12 May 1952. Ridgway was to take over as the
new Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1 June, replacing
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was
returning to the United States.
[92] Cited in Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 435.
A number of factors contributed to the reduced emphasis on the
interdiction strategy. Three, however, appear to have most influenced
the inauguration of Operation PRESSURE, the name given the new policy
of concentrating aerial attacks on major industrial targets considered
of greatest value to the North Korean economy. Mounting FAF aircraft
losses due to enemy flak (fire from ground-based antiaircraft weapons)
and an insufficient number of replacements helped shape the new
program. By April 1952 FEAF had received “only 131 replacement aircraft
of the types engaged in rail interdiction against the 243 it had lost
and the 290 major-damaged aircraft on interdiction sorties.”[93] These
heavy losses had resulted from the increasing accuracy of Communist
antiaircraft ground weapons, a capability Air Force planners had failed
to consider sufficiently.[94]
[93] USAF, _Ops in Korea_, No. 72, p. 156.
[94] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 436–437.
Although significant, this loss factor was not the final consideration
in executing PRESSURE attacks against the power plants. More directly
responsible were two other recent developments. These were the decision
of the new UN commander, General Mark W. Clark, to take forceful
action to bring the Communists around to an armistice agreement and a
top-level Defense Department change of policy that had removed a major
North Korean hydroelectric facility from the restricted bombing list.
This was the Suiho plant, fourth largest in the world. Adjacent to
the Yalu River, about 75 miles northeast of its mouth, Suiho supplied
approximately 25 percent of the electrical power used in nearby
northeast China.[95]
[95] _Ibid._, pp. 452–453 and Cagle and Manson, _Sea War,
Korea_, pp. 443–445.
Results of the PRESSURE strikes, carried on from 23–27 June, were
highly successful. Marine, Navy, and Air Force planes flew 1,654 attack
and escort sorties in these raids. Of the 13 target plants attacked
during this period, 11 were put out of commission and 2 others were
presumably destroyed. North Korea was almost blacked out for two weeks.
Chinese and Russian experts were rushed to North Korea to lend a hand
in restoration. The hydroelectric strikes marked the first time that
Marine, Navy, and Air Force pilots had flown a combined mission in
Korea. The 23 June strike, moreover, was of particular significance
to 1st MAW since it was also the first time that MAGs-12 and -33 were
assigned group strikes at specific adjacent targets at the same time.
Led by Colonel Robert E. Galer, the new MAG-12 commander since 25 May,
group pilots struck and leveled the single power complex, Chosin 3, in
the 23–24 June runs. Colonel John P. Condon, who had taken over MAG-33
on 24 May, put 43 jets from VMFs-311 and -115 into the air during the
two-day mission. The first time that its F9Fs had ever been massed for
a strike of this type, the MAG-33 jets similarly destroyed the Chosin 4
plant, 11 miles northwest of Hamhung.
Although the jets carried a smaller payload than the Corsairs and ADs
of MAG-12 (approximately 37 gross tons to more than 150 tons), the
extremely precise bombing record made by the Grumman Panther jet pilots
forever put to rest the doubts about jet accuracy that had been held by
some in 1st MAW. As the group commander later recalled, “The capability
of jet strike aircraft for extremely accurate bombing, an item of
open discussion prior to this time, was never questioned in the 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing after this mission.”[96] Another gratifying result
was that flight personnel on all of the 150 Marine aircraft returned
safely. In fact, of the total 1,645 FAF sorties, only 2 aircraft were
downed; rescue aircraft successfully picked up these two pilots, both
U.S. Navy officers.
[96] MajGen John P. Condon ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC,
dtd 1 Oct 66.
It was the high probability of being rescued, if forced to abandon
their aircraft, that not only eased the minds of pilots on missions
north of the 38th Parallel but also permitted the fliers a greater
degree of success. As the MAG-12 commander, Colonel Galer, who was
shortly to escape imminent capture by the enemy, later declared, “I do
know that every pilot flying in this theatre should have the highest
possible morale with the knowledge that so many are ready and willing
to risk so much to get them.”[97]
[97] MAG-12 ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-4.
A Medal of Honor holder from World War II, Colonel Galer was leading
a flight of 31 aircraft on 5 August. His objective was the supply area
and tungsten mines in the mountainous northeastern part of North Korea,
just below the 39th Parallel and 35 miles southwest of Wonsan. After
several hits had killed his engine, the MAG-12 commander, preparing
to parachute, climbed out over the side of his plane, but found that
he had one foot stuck inside the cockpit, probably on the shoulder
straps or the loop of the belt. He then pulled himself partially back
towards the cockpit, freed his foot with a vigorous kick, cleared the
plane, and headed in spread-eagle fashion towards the ground. Almost
immediately the plane, falling in a nose dive, caught the descending
pilot on the shoulder and pulled him into a spin. Colonel Galer
recovered in time, however, to pull the ripcord and thus ease his
impact onto enemy terrain. He landed within ten feet of his crashed
AU.[98]
[98] The AU is the attack version of the Marines’ famed World
War II fighter, the F4U Corsair.
“Immediately upon getting free of the chute, I ran as rapidly as
possible, staying low, down through a corn field.”[99] At the end of
the field, the Marine aviator paused momentarily to survey the terrain
for an escape route. Spotting a dry stream bed nearby, Colonel Galer
dashed toward it and quickly but cautiously moved up it some 100
yards. Then he halted to put into operation a small survivor radio to
report his position. The message was received by the rescue air patrol
orbiting overhead which relayed the information to pickup aircraft. The
patrol advised the downed pilot that a rescue helicopter had already
departed for the crash area.
[99] MAG-12, ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-2.
Before breaking radio contact, Colonel Galer told the air patrol his
planned movements in order to facilitate pickup. He then quickly left
the area which was located too near the crashed aircraft for a rescue
attempt. Evading detection by enemy soldiers and curious teenagers
moving towards the wreckage, the Marine worked his way to higher
ground, keeping the air patrol advised of his changing position. By
1845, a search of the area was underway. Of the events that followed:
Colonel Galer wrote:
At 1908 I heard the helicopter go down the next valley and saw it
disappear. I called, told them to make a 180-degree turn since
I was in the valley to the southwest and on the north slope. I
did not get an answer but soon the helicopter came through a
saddle in the ridge.... I immediately let the red smoke (day
flare) go, and came out of the bushes ... calling the helicopter
on the radio also. They apparently saw me immediately and came
over and hovered. The mechanic leaned out and swung the hoisting
sling back and forth.... Finally, I grabbed it and got in ... and
the pilot took off.... The mechanic pulled me up and into the
helicopter as we crossed the valley.[100]
[100] _Ibid._, p. D-3.
The colonel was not yet out of the woods. The trip to a rescue ship at
Wonsan was marked by intermittent bursts of enemy antiaircraft fire.
On one occasion the chopper was hit hard enough to spin it completely
around. As the rescue craft neared the coast patches of fog added
to the hazards of night flying. About this time the warning light
indicating low fuel supply came on but “the pilot gambled on making the
sea at the risk of having to autorotate through the overcast into the
mountains.”[101] It was a correct decision. The fuel lasted until the
helicopter landed on the rescue vessel. It was then 2100.
[101] _Ibid._, p. D-4.
Quite naturally the episode brought forth high praise for the
rescue system, and particularly for those individuals whose skills,
initiative, and courage made downed crew rescues of this type possible.
But Colonel Galer also saw some weaknesses. He pointed out that rescue
helicopter pilots should be kept up to date on changing enemy flak
positions. The Marine group commander also stressed the need for rescue
helicopters to establish and maintain a minimum safe fuel level which
would depend largely upon the position of the downed aircraft. One
final suggestion, not about the system but the aircraft itself, was
that fixed-wing aircraft have ejection-type seats. Remembering his
own difficulties, the MAG-12 commander further cautioned pilots to be
certain they were free of all straps and cords before bailing out.
In addition to attack missions by tactical aircraft and rescue work by
its helicopters, the Marine wing was also responsible for providing
antiaircraft defense. It was not until July 1951, 13 months after
the NKPA invasion of South Korea, that a formal air defense had been
established for the country. Fifth Air Force was given the command
responsibility of coordinating the aerial defense net for South Korea
and its adjacent sea frontiers. In mid-November 1951, the FAF commander
had revised the defensive system, dividing his area into a northern
and southern sector, at a point exactly halfway between the 36th and
37th Parallels.
FAF commanded the northern air defense sector while the southern sector
became the responsibility of CG, 1st MAW. In turn, these two sectors
were further divided into subsectors. Each of these, through a tactical
air direction center (TADC), maintained radar surveillance of its
assigned area and performed plotting and identification functions. Each
subsector was charged with being “directly responsible for sector air
defense.”[102]
[102] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 616.
Although the 1st MAW commander had been designated as the Air Defense
Commander, Southern Sector, Korea, he was not actually given the means
to carry out this responsibility. He still did not have command over
his tactical squadrons, nor could he exercise control over operations
of his tactical air coordination center (TACC) or TADC.[103] Moreover,
his southern sector could not originate practice air warning messages.
The wing commander had to obtain permission from JOC before he could
begin practice intercepts for training his radar intercept controllers.
[103] TACC is the senior agency for controlling all tactical
aircraft and air warning functions; the TADC performs
similar functions in an area controlled by the TACC. JCS,
_Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint
Usage_ (Short title: JD). JCS Pub. 1 (Washington, 1964),
p. 141, hereafter _JCS, JD_.
Several other deficiencies existed in the air defense system that
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had inherited. There were no ground
antiaircraft weapons at the Marine fields until a .50 caliber automatic
weapons battery was detached from the 1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion, FMF, early in 1952 and sent to K-3, the home field of
MAG-33. Other inadequacies were deficient equipment--a search radar
limited to 30 miles out and 20,000 feet up--and lack of an interceptor
aircraft capable of rising to meet the faster swept-wing jets the
enemy was employing. Airfields housing Marine air groups did not have
revetments for either aircraft parking areas or ordnance dumps.
Not all of these weaknesses were acquired with assumption of the air
defense mission. There had been a general lack of concern about air
defense throughout South Korea. This attitude had resulted from the air
supremacy which the Fifth Air Force had quickly established. Camouflage
was seldom practiced. Dispersal of aircraft, supply dumps, and
servicing facilities was employed only rarely. In fact, at K-6, there
was not sufficient land to properly scatter installations and aircraft.
Defense of the southern sector was commanded from K-3 (Pohang),
the site of the TACC (Major Fred A. Steel). Marine Ground Control
Intercept Squadron 1 (MGCIS-1) was set up on the west coast at K-8 and
MGCIS-3 (Lieutenant Colonel Owen M. Hines), on the east coast, near
Pohang. Each of these intercept units had an early warning detachment
operating off the mainland. Antiaircraft artillery was provided by the
90mm AAA battalion, which was controlled, however, by EUSAK. The 1st
MAW commander specified a ready alert status for two aircraft during
daylight hours. Just before sunrise and sunset, four planes were put on
strip alert. Aircraft for night alert were provided by VMF(N)-513 until
April, when the requirement was withdrawn. By 30 June 1952, 1st MAW
air defense operations had destroyed a total of five enemy planes. The
F7F night fighters flown by VMF(N)-513, moreover, had frequently been
scrambled to intercept hostile night intruders that had penetrated into
the Seoul area, or northern sector.
This low kill rate did little to atone for the steadily increasing
number of Marine aircraft lost to enemy flak. Although the number
of friendly planes destroyed or damaged in air-to-air combat during
the latter half of Korean hostilities diminished sharply compared to
the early period, losses due to ground fire were reaching alarming
proportions in early and mid-1952. In May 1952 Navy and Marine air
losses to enemy action were twice the total for April, and the June
figure was even higher. By June, the Communists had massed more than
half of their antiaircraft artillery along communication routes that
FAF struck nearly every day.
Remedial action was soon taken. Stress on flak evasion was emphasized
in pilot briefings and debriefings. The MAG-33 intelligence section
came up with a program that attempted to reduce losses by a detailed
analysis of flak information. The originator of this system, First
Lieutenant Kenneth S. Foley, based his method on:
... photo interpretation of an up-to-date flak map, scale
1:50,000, and an intelligent utilization of flak reports
disseminated by the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron of the
5th Air Force. Frequent briefings were given to each squadron
on the enemy AA capabilities. Elaborate overlays were drawn up
and displayed. Target maps, clearly showing AA positions and
flak clocks [danger areas], were given to flight leaders to aid
them in evading known AA guns in their target area. Through flak
analysis, the safest route to the target area was determined
and an actual attack and retirement route was suggested. These
recommendations appeared in a flak summary presented at each
combat briefing.[104]
[104] VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Jun 52, App II, p. 5. Mention of a flak
analysis program first appeared in the March 1952 records
of MAG-33. Aircraft losses on interdiction strikes (the
program was not applicable to CAS missions) dropped
for the next several months. When Lieutenant Foley
transferred to the night squadron, he took his system
with him and had it put into operation there. LtCol
Kenneth S. Foley interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24
Mar 66.
Other measures attempted to reduce mounting losses of personnel
and aircraft. In all Marine air units, evasion and escape tactics
were stressed. In addition to the FAF de-emphasis on interdiction
of communication routes that had come about, in part, due to heavy
aircraft losses, Fifth Air Force decreed that beginning 3 June, “with
the exception of the AD and F4U aircraft [1st MAW types] only one run
will be made for each type of external ordnance carried and no strafing
runs will be made.”[105] CTF 77 ordered that in all attack runs,
aircraft would pull out by the 3,000-foot altitude level. The Marines,
combining their air and ground efforts, came up with a positive program
of their own. It was to become the first known instance of Marine
ground in support of Marine air.
[105] FAF CbtOps Notam No. 6-10.1 cited in App. 9, _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-199.
Although the originator of the idea cannot be positively identified,
the time that artillery flak suppression firing was first employed
can be traced back to late 1951, when the division was still in East
Korea.[106] It was not until June 1952, however, that a published
procedure for conducting flak suppression firing appeared in Marine
division records. That same month another type of flak suppression,
this by an aircraft, was utilized by the 1st Marines, commanded at the
time by Colonel Walter N. Flournoy. The procedure called for the FAC
[forward air controller] to relay gun positions to friendly strike
planes which temporarily diverted their attack to silence the located
gun. Although the method “worked with good results,”[107] it was not
destined to become the system adopted by the Marines.
[106] _Paid comments_; _Nihart comments_. Both of these
officers, the former artillery, the latter infantry,
recall flak suppression firing late in 1951 or early in
1952 when the division was on the eastern front. Colonel
Nihart pointed out, in addition, that “such expedients
and new tactics went on for some time before getting into
the regimental commander’s reports.”
[107] 1stMar ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2.
The more frequently used flak suppression called for artillery to fire
on hostile gun positions that could impede the success of a friendly
close air support strike. Several Marine officers appear to have had
a major role in the development and employment of this technique.
Among them were Brigadier General Frank H. Lamson-Scribner, Assistant
Commanding General, 1st MAW; Colonel Henderson, the 11th Marines
commander; and Lieutenant Colonel Gerald T. Armitage, 3/1 commander.
The 1st Marines battalion commander explained how the system operated
in late spring 1952:
I was in an outpost watching an air strike. I asked Captain
Shoden [John C., the battalion forward air controller] to work
out some idea of flak suppression. Shoden, G-2, and others worked
two or three weeks to complete the first plot of antiaircraft
positions. My idea was to have a plane start a run and then pull
up before finishing the dive. The enemy antiaircraft gunners
could not tell that the pilot was pulling out at an extremely
high level. The batteries would fire and Marine observers would
plot their positions from their fires. Then, the Marine artillery
would lay a heavy barrage on these positions.[108]
[108] LtCol Gerald T. Armitage interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC,
dtd 15 Aug 61.
While observing an air strike from the Marine division sector,
General Lamson-Scribner noted that prior to the strike there had been
no preparatory firing on enemy antiaircraft artillery positions.
After the strike he discussed this matter with General Selden, who
“directed me to discuss with his chief of staff what I had observed
and my suggestions that division firepower for ‘flak suppression’ be
coordinated with air strikes.”[109] The upshot of this was that the
division chief of staff suggested that the 11th Marines regimental
commander and his staff members develop an SOP[110] for using artillery
flak suppression fires in support of close air support strikes. It was
believed that proper utilization of these fires would reduce aircraft
losses and further increase the opportunity for a successful close air
support mission by destruction of enemy antiaircraft weapons.[111]
[109] MajGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3
Div, HQMC, dtd 12 Oct 66.
[110] An SOP, standing operating procedure, is a set of
instructions for conducting operations that lend
themselves to established procedures. _JCS, JD_, p. 133.
[111] With respect to the effect of enemy fire on attack
aircraft, the CO, MAG-33 later commented that
“Antiaircraft artillery has a direct deterioration effect
on pilot accuracy, particularly with regard to care in
getting on target and doing a precise job.” CO, MAG-33
ltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 25 Jul 52, quoted in _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-76.
On 30 June 1952, the 11th Marines published the SOP. Since the
objective was to prevent enemy fire from interfering with friendly
strike planes, the key to the entire procedure was the precise
coordination of artillery fire with the delivery of aircraft ordnance.
As Colonel Henderson described the system:
When the infantry regiment received word of an air strike, the
air liaison officer plotted on the map ... the target of the
strike, the orbit point, the direction of approach, and the
altitude ... and direction of pullout. Then the artillery liaison
officer, by looking at the map, could determine which of the
Chinese positions could bring effective fire on the strike
aircraft. The artillery battalion had prearranged code names
and numbers for every antiaircraft position. All the artillery
liaison officer had to do was pick up the phone and tell the
F.D.C. [fire direction center] ‘flak suppression’ and read off
what targets he wanted covered.
These fires were then delivered on the request of a forward
observer who was with the forward air controller.... When there
was a forward air controller up in the front lines controlling
the strike, we would put a forward observer with him. When the
planes were ... ready to go, the F.O. [forward observer] got the
word ‘Batteries laid and loaded,’ and he would tell them to fire.
The minute the FO would get the word, ‘On the way,’ the forward
air controller would tell the planes to start their run. As a
result, we had cases where the planes were in their bombing run
within 30 seconds after the flak suppression was fired, which
meant that they were in on the target while the positions were
still neutralized. The question of control and split second
timing is of exceeding importance because the aircraft are going
300 to 400 miles an hour....[112]
[112] _Henderson ltr II._
Early in the program the MAG-12 commander reported that although the
flak suppression procedure was not flawless, it was proving “very
capable and workable.”[113] An indication of the success of 1st Marine
Division pioneering efforts in flak suppression is seen in the fact
that shortly after it was put into operation “there was a steady stream
of visitors to the 11th Marines CP to find out what [it was] and how
we were doing it and to get copies of our SOP.”[114] The procedure was
eventually adopted by other Eighth Army units.
[113] CO, MAG-12 Spdltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 2 Jul 52, Subj:
Comments on 11th Mar Flak Suppression SOP, cited in
_PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 5, Chap. 9, p. 9-78.
[114] _Henderson ltr II._
Marine air losses from hostile ground fire during CAS strikes
immediately began to drop from the June peak and never again reached
this level. In 124 close support sorties flown by 1st MAW on 13 August,
not one plane was shot down and only four received minor damage from
enemy flak. Although there were some complaints as to execution of the
flak suppression program these would be corrected, in the main, by a
revised procedure which the 11th Marines would undertake in the winter
of 1952.
_Spring 1952 on_ JAMESTOWN[115]
[115] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5,
Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Apr-Jun 52; 5thMar ComdDs,
Apr-Jun 52; 7thMar ComdD, Jun 52; 11thMar ComdDs, Apr-May
52; 1/5 ComdD May 52; 1/7, 2/7 ComdDs, May 52.
Earlier in the year the Marines had revised their estimate of enemy
capabilities after the lengthening of the division MLR by I Corps and
the subsequent heavy enemy attack. The re-evaluation placed the most
likely course of Chinese action as defending their present positions
with the 21 infantry battalions assigned and also cautioned that the
Communists could mount a limited objective attack at any time of their
choosing. Division intelligence estimated that the Chinese could muster
up to “57 infantry battalions supported by 12 artillery battalions
and 40 tanks and/or self-propelled guns” for a thrust into the Marine
sector.[116]
[116] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 52, p. 1.
The enemy, however, showed little disposition for any concerted ground
attack during the remainder of April. But before the month ended,
Marines, in conjunction with other I Corps divisions, had deluged the
enemy with artillery and tank fire in Operation CLOBBER. The purpose of
this shoot was to inflict maximum casualties and damage by employment
of the element of tactical surprise. The reinforced 11th Marines,
augmented for this occasion by Company D, 1st Tank Battalion and nine
of the battalion’s 105mm howitzer and flame tanks, blasted Chinese CPs,
bivouac areas, artillery and mortar positions, and observation posts.
Marine frontline regiments joined in with their organic mortars. Since
most of the firing took place at night when results were unobserved, no
estimate could be made as to the effect of the operation on the enemy.
A new Marine artillery tactic about this time was the
counter-counterbattery program instituted by the 11th Marines. The
regiment had developed this technique to counter superior enemy
artillery strength. This situation, as well as the fact that I Corps
artillery available to the division was considered inadequate for
counterbattery support, led the Marine division to adopt the new
program in May 1952. One provision required a battery in each battalion
to select counter-counterbattery positions and occupy them for 24
consecutive hours each week. Another proviso of the program was the
selection by each battalion of 10 roving gun positions that were to
be occupied by a single weapon rotated to each place at least once
weekly. By these tactics, the artillery regiment hoped not only to
mislead the Chinese in their estimate of the strength and location of
Marine artillery but also to dilute enemy counterbattery intelligence
by causing him to fire into areas just vacated by friendly guns. “The
effectiveness of the program was demonstrated on numerous occasions
when the enemy fired counterbattery into unoccupied positions.”[117] An
added advantage was that of providing deeper supporting fires on target
areas.[118]
[117] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-51.
[118] LtCol Bruce F. Hillam comments on draft MS, dtd 31 Aug 66.
Still another concept regarding the employment of artillery developed
during the early days of the JAMESTOWN defense. The 11th Marines had
advised the infantry regiments that it could effectively fire on
enemy troops attacking friendly positions if the Marines had overhead
cover. The idea was to use variable time (VT) fuzes[119] with the
standard high explosive (HE) shells. Artillery battalions supporting
the frontline regiments registered on positions occupied frequently by
patrols going forward from JAMESTOWN.
[119] A type of proximity fuze, the V.T. depends upon an
external source, such as an electronic signal, rather
than the force of ground impact, to detonate the shell at
a predetermined height over the target.
According to the recollections of veteran artillery and infantrymen in
the division, the first occasion that pre-planned artillery fire was
placed on friendly positions occurred in May 1952.[120] The episode
involved a 2/7 platoon patrol that late on 18 May was ordered to return
to the MLR from an outpost on the former OPLR. Operating forward of the
center regimental sector,[121] the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant
Theodore H. Watson, directed that two of the three Marine squads return
to the MLR. The remaining unit, surrounded by about 50 Chinese, engaged
them in a brisk fire fight.
[120] 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 4.
[121] The 7th Marines advanced to the line to relieve the 5th
Marines in the center sector on 11 May.
When the artillery fired to seal off the enemy and box-in the defensive
position failed to discourage the hostile force, Lieutenant Watson
ordered his men into the shelter of two nearby bunkers. He then
requested the artillery to place VT directly over his positions.[122]
The volleys of overhead fire and effective Marine small arms fire then
forced the enemy to call off his assault. Although the exact number
of Chinese casualties could not be determined, the new fire technique
fully accomplished its purpose--repelling the enemy force.
[122] The artillery regiment had earlier developed the
“box-me-in” fires for outpost defense. If under heavy
attack the outpost could call for these pre-planned
close-in fires that completely surrounded the position.
In event of radio or wire communication failures, the
outpost could call for “box-me-in” or “Fire VT on my
position” by signal flare or other pyrotechnic device.
_Henderson ltr II._
Initiating the infantry action in May was the 1st KMC Regiment, holding
the division left flank, with its 2d and 1st Battalions on line. At
dusk on 3 May a platoon-size raiding party, under Second Lieutenant
Kim Young Ha, left an outpost forward of the 1st Battalion line on a
prisoner-taking mission and headed for the objective, Hill 34, adjacent
to the rail line to Kaesong and about a half-mile west of the Sachon
River. When the platoon was within approximately 1,000 yards of its
goal, a support squad was detached near a trail and stream juncture to
ambush any enemy attempting to attack the raiders from the rear.[123]
The remainder of the platoon, two assault squads, then continued
towards the objective, moving cautiously and halting for an hour
because of the bright moonlight.
[123] This support squad itself was later ambushed. The
heavy casualties it received prevented its further
participation in the raid. KMC Regt UnitRpt 53, dtd 4 May
52.
After midnight the moon disappeared behind the clouds, and the Koreans
again emerged. They advanced towards a village immediately south of
the objective. After searching a few houses and not finding any enemy,
the KMCs started on the last leg to Hill 34. As soon as the objective
came into view the raiders deployed for the assault. At 0410 the two
squads of Korean Marines charged the knoll, immediately drawing heavy
Chinese small arms fire. When the raiders continued their assault, the
enemy retreated to his trenchworks and bunkers where he continued to
fire on the KMCs. Since it now appeared to the patrol leader that the
probability of taking a prisoner was unlikely, he prepared to return to
friendly lines. He first arranged for artillery to cover the withdrawal
of the patrol, and then broke off the 18-minute fire fight, taking his
only casualty, a wounded rifleman, with him. The KMCs counted 12 enemy
dead. No prisoners were taken. In the preliminary action, the support
squad had also suffered three killed and seven wounded.
As the KMC raiders were making their way back to the MLR, a combat
patrol from 1/5, the reserve battalion of the 5th Marines, prepared
to move out. This patrol was one of many dispatched by the battalion
during the first week of May in accordance with its mission of
patrolling in front of the OPLR, between the MLR and the OPLR, and
throughout the regimental sector. On this occasion, the patrol was to
occupy the high ground south of former Outpost 3, which had become the
focal point of activity in the center sector.[124] When used as a base
of fire, this ground provided a position from which automatic weapons
could readily cover enemy lines or tie in with adjacent friendly
defenses. In addition, the 1/5 patrol was to drop off friendly snipers
to cover the former OPLR position, to maintain surveillance, and to
ascertain to what extent the Chinese were developing the outpost. The
task went to a Company A platoon, which the unit commander, First
Lieutenant Ernest S. Lee, reinforced with light and heavy machine guns.
[124] This position, the site of the mid-April battle, along
with several others had been abandoned when the division
withdrew its OPLR late in April. Infantry regiments
dispatched frequent patrols in an attempt to discourage
the enemy’s incorporating the hill into his own OPLR.
At sunup the Marines crossed line JAMESTOWN and before 0900 had reached
the high ground they were to occupy. Here the patrol leader set up his
base of fire, then pushed on with the rest of his men to the outpost,
receiving occasional mortar fire before reaching the old position.
While organizing his men at the objective, Lieutenant Lee received word
by radio that the Chinese were preparing to attack. Almost immediately,
intense shelling struck the forward slope of the hill. A Marine aerial
observer (AO) detected 60–70 Chinese advancing from the next hill, some
800 yards to the front of the Marines. The AO also reported that the
enemy was firing mortars towards OP 3.
Shortly thereafter the Chinese fire ceased. Moments before it lifted,
the patrol received a second warning that an enemy attack was imminent.
Even as this message was being received, about 30 Chinese rushed the
patrol. The Marines immediately took the hostile assault force under
fire, killing 14 CCF with well-placed small arms fire. Overhead, four
1947-vintage Marine Corsair fighters (F4U-4Bs) struck at troublesome
mortar positions previously located by the AO. At 1330 another aerial
strike against Chinese mortars and enemy positions on the hill north of
OP 3 was executed. These two air missions were credited with destroying
six mortars, damaging two others, and wrecking seven personnel bunkers.
During the second strike the 1/5 patrol began its withdrawal.
On two occasions during the patrol’s return to its base the enemy
attempted to ambush it. Each time the attempt was thwarted, once by the
patrol itself and the second time, with the help of friendly artillery.
On the way back several loud explosions suddenly halted the patrol.
Investigation revealed that the Marines, carrying their casualties
of one dead and four wounded, had inadvertently stumbled onto a path
not cleared of mines. Two members of the stretcher bearer detail were
killed and three others wounded by the AP (anti-personnel) mines that
had not been charted on friendly maps by the Marines’ predecessors in
the defense sector. A mine clearance team promptly disposed of the
danger. With the aid of fires from a 2/5 patrol on the nose of a nearby
hill, the 1/5 platoon was able to break contact. After pulling back
several hundred yards, the patrol reached a forward medical aid station
where jeeps picked up the more seriously wounded and took them to
helicopters, which completed the evacuation. Patrol members reported 27
known enemy dead, including one that had been propelled into the air by
a direct hit from an artillery round.
The next major Marine ground action soon involved the same Company A
platoon, but this time as part of a larger force. Colonel Culhane, the
regimental commander, directed his 1st Battalion to launch a new raid
on the Outpost 3 area in an attempt to oust the Chinese and thereby
deny the enemy use of the critical terrain. Inflicting casualties and
capturing prisoners were additional tasks assigned. On 8 May Lieutenant
Colonel Nihart issued Operation Order 12-52, calling for 1/5 to seize a
series of three intermediate objectives (S, V and X) en route to OP 3
(Y). (See Map 8.) The combat patrol, reinforced by regimental elements,
less Company B, was to be prepared to move north of OP 3 to occupy the
next hill mass (Z), if necessary.
[Illustration:
MAP 8 K. White
OBJECTIVES FOR 1/5 ATTACK
9 MAY 1952]
Operational plans called for Lieutenant Lee’s Company A to do most of
the leg work as the assault unit. Captain Leland Graham’s Company C,
the diversionary force, was to make a feint against Hill 67, an enemy
position southwest of OP 3, and to neutralize it by fire. Weapons
Company, under First Lieutenant Ross L. Tipps, in support of the
Company A force, was to set up a base of fire at a designated position
(T), southeast of OP 3. Artillery support was to be furnished by 1/11,
4/11, and the attached 4.5-inch Rocket Battery. A section of regimental
4.2-inch mortars was also assigned. One platoon of Company B tanks was
to assist the assault force by firing both on designated positions and
targets of opportunity. Close air support flights were to be on station
at two periods during the 9 May daylight operation.
In the early morning hours, under cover of darkness, all units moved
into position. At 0430 the 1st Platoon of Company A crossed the line
of departure heading for Objective S, a small ridge south and west of
OP 3. The 2d Platoon followed and moved out on the right, while the
3d Platoon covered the rear. This hill, lightly defended, was quickly
overrun by the Marines. The 1st Platoon then turned northeast towards
the four peaks (designated as V, X, Y, and Z), its main objectives.
These four positions were all situated at approximately the same
elevation, 450 feet. A distance of some 1,300 yards separated the first
and fourth hills in the north-south ridgeline.
As the 1/5 platoon neared Objective V, friendly rockets lashed the
crest of the hill, which was held by a reinforced enemy platoon in
mutually supporting fighting holes. Assisted by this fire, Marine
two-man teams with rifles and grenades assaulted the fighting holes
occupied by the Chinese. As the Marines proceeded to clear the
objective, half of the Chinese were forced to retreat to safer ground.
Marines estimated that 15 enemy were killed and a like number wounded.
By this time, three hours after setting out on the raid, the platoon
had seized one prisoner and sustained five wounded.
While reorganizing for the attack against Objectives X and Y, the 5th
Marines patrol came under a heavy artillery and mortar barrage that
killed one Marine and wounded three others. As the main body of the
assault force advanced towards Objective X to support the attack, the
lead elements of the company headed for OP 3. Throughout this maneuver,
the company remained under heavy artillery fire.
Proceeding along the eastern slope of the ridgeline to assault knobs
X and Y, the platoon had a good view of the effectiveness of their
friendly supporting artillery fire. In fact, the combined rocket,
howitzer, mortar, tank, and machine gun fire threw up so much dust
that at times it restricted the vision of the Marine assault team. As
platoon members neared the summit of Objective X they encountered a
heavy stream of defending fire. A strong counterattack from the front
and left flank assailed the 1st Platoon, but the Marines repulsed the
enemy with accurate small arms fire, killing six CCF. Infiltrators then
attempted to envelop the Marine platoon and isolate it from the rest of
the Company A assault force. Successive waves of Chinese, employing a
wedge formation, tried to overrun the main body of the assault force.
In repulsing this latest counterattack, Company A killed 12 and wounded
5 enemy.
Quickly sizing up the situation, the company commander ordered the
1st Platoon to rejoin the rest of the assault force. As the platoon
began to pull back at 1435 the Chinese blanketed the route with a
heavy barrage, firing “over four hundred rounds in a five minute
period.”[125] This intense shelling took the lives of three Marines,
wounded a number of others, and halted the assault force just short of
its final goal. Even though the Chinese had been driven from the three
intermediate objectives, the devastating enemy mortar and artillery
fire made the Marine position untenable. A third of the platoon moved
back to Objective V; the rest worked their way along a route east
of that objective. While the rest of Company A and Weapons Company
elements occupied Hill T, the diversionary force, Company C, reinforced
by other Weapons Company personnel, had remained at a strongpoint not
far from Objective S. All supporting ground weapons assisted in the
withdrawal. In addition to lending direct fire support, Marine tanks
brought forward emergency supplies and evacuated casualties. By 1730,
the assault force had returned to friendly lines, followed shortly by
the rest of the battalion.
[125] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 10.
Although the battalion failed to seize and hold all of its objectives,
that part of the mission calling for inflicting casualties and taking
prisoners had been successfully executed.[126] Marines counted 35
enemy dead, 53 wounded, and 1 POW, and estimated that an additional
70 CCF had been killed and 105 wounded. Seven Marines were killed
and 66 wounded in the action described by some observers as “the
largest offensive effort the 1st Marine Division [has] made since last
September.”[127] The battalion fire support was well controlled and
coordinated from an observation post on the MLR. Five air strikes,
including one MPQ-14 mission, were credited with destroying three
artillery pieces and an equal number of mortars, damaging two other
mortars, and demolishing six personnel bunkers.
[126] Lieutenant Colonel Nihart believed that the heavy enemy
shelling, which had caused the early retirement of his
battalion, had been possible either because Chinese
mortar and artillery positions were so well camouflaged
that intelligence had not located them or else so well
protected that UNC counterbattery fire had failed to
destroy them. _Nihart comments._
[127] 5thMar ComdD, May 52, p. 9.
As the regiment noted, the earlier withdrawal of the OPLR had “altered
to a considerable extent the tactics employed in this area. This is
especially apparent in the number of patrol contacts close to the MLR
and displayed the eagerness of the enemy to move in on any ground not
held by friendly forces.”[128] At the same time the increased number
of troops made available for the MLR defense considerably strengthened
the JAMESTOWN Line itself. Sector responsibility changed on 11 May.
Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz’ 7th Marines relieved the 5th Marines in
the center regimental sector, with 2/7 and 1/7 occupying the left and
right battalion positions, respectively.
[128] _Ibid._, p. 1.
When it took over the peace corridor sector the 7th Marines also
assumed the responsibility for emergency rescue of the Allied truce
delegates at Panmunjom.[129] The regiment advanced a mile nearer the
objective when it moved the pick-up force’s assembly area to within
400 yards of the line of departure. The 7th Marines also replaced the
tanks in the force with M-39 personnel carriers, a U.S. Army-developed
tracked vehicle similar in appearance to the Marine amphibian tractor.
Another vehicle the 7th Marines retained in its task force was a medium
tank equipped with additional radios. This armored communication and
control vehicle was used as a radio relay station on the MLR to assist
in liaison between moving infantry and tank units. Marine riflemen
dubbed this command tank the porcupine, to describe the effect of many
bristling antennas sticking out from its top. While the Marine division
right sector, occupied by the 1st Marines, remained relatively quiet
during the spring months on JAMESTOWN, the 7th Marines in the center
MLR would shortly be involved in the division’s major ground action in
late May.
[129] This force and its mission at various times were known as
“Task Force Jig” or “Operation Snatch.”
As part of the active defense of its JAMESTOWN line, Lieutenant Colonel
Daughtry, commanding 1/7, issued a directive on 26 May intended to
deny to the enemy key terrain remaining on the old OPLR. Operation
Plan 16-52 called for an attack to seize two parcels of high ground
to the regiment’s right front. At the same time, the battalion was to
neutralize two Chinese positions west of the main objectives, Hill 104
(Objective 1) and the Tumae-ri Ridge (Objective 2), approximately a
half-mile further north. The designated attack force, Captain Earl W.
Thompson’s Company A, was heavily reinforced. While Company A pursued
its mission to the right, a Company C reinforced platoon under Second
Lieutenant Howard L. Siers would conduct a feint on a pair of enemy
positions to the left. Support for the operation would come from 2/11,
two tank platoons, and from air, which was to be on call.
H-Hour was set for 0300 on 28 May. Attack and diversionary forces on
schedule crossed the line of departure, a half-mile north of the MLR.
Captain Thompson’s main force advanced nearly to the base of Hill 104
before the Chinese, in estimated reinforced platoon strength, began to
counterattack. The fight came to an abrupt end when Second Lieutenant
John J. Donahue led his platoon to the top with bayonets fixed.[130] As
the Marines dug in they came under heavy mortar and artillery fire from
CCF strongholds to the north. On the left, meanwhile, Lieutenant Siers
had received orders to seize the closer of his two objectives, former
OPLR 5, instead of merely placing suppressive fire on it.
[130] Maj Kenneth A. Seal comments on draft MS, dtd Oct 66. At
the time of this attack, Lieutenant Seal commanded the 2d
Platoon, A/1/7.
Moving forward from its base of fire, the platoon soon established
contact with the enemy. At 0554 the platoon began its attack on the
objective. Despite the close-in, hand-to-hand fighting, when it became
apparent the assault could not be stopped the enemy gave way to Marine
persistence in seizing the hill. By 0700 the Company C, 7th Marines
platoon had secured its objectives and begun preparations for defense
of the positions as well as continued support of the main attack force.
Heavy casualties, however, forced Lieutenant Colonel Daughtry to recall
the platoon and it returned to the lines by 0930.
Up on Hill 104, Company A, 1/7 faced practically the same situation.
Taking Objective 1 had been costly and the advance through withering
enemy fire was adding to the casualties. A reinforcing platoon was
sent from the MLR to help the company disengage and return to friendly
lines. Contact with the enemy was broken shortly after noon. With the
aid of air and artillery, the company was able to make its way to the
MLR by 1405.
Advancing only as far as it did, the attack, like the one earlier that
month, failed to take all the designated objectives. Casualties to the
1/7 Marines were placed at 9 killed[131] and 107 wounded. Most of the
latter were evacuated for further treatment. Forty-five of the enemy
were counted dead and three wounded. Marines estimated another 40 enemy
killed and 40 more wounded.[132] The action resulted in a casualty toll
that was the highest to date for any Marine company in western Korea.
All three Company A rifle platoon leaders--Second Lieutenants Donahue,
Jules E. Gerding, and Kenneth A. Seal--were wounded. This battle also
became the occasion for another unwelcomed record--4,053 rounds of
enemy incoming, during a 24-hour period.
[131] Two Marines killed in the action were later posthumously
awarded the Medal of Honor. Corporal David B. Champagne,
A/1/7, was responsible for saving the lives of the
three other members of his fire team. When a grenade
fell in their midst, Champagne grabbed it to hurl back
to CCF positions. Just as it cleared his hand, the
grenade exploded, showering lethal shrapnel into the
body of the 19-year-old Rhode Islander. One of the C/1/7
reinforcement Marines, Private First Class John D. Kelly,
had conducted a one-man assault against a dug-in Chinese
machine gun crew. Though painfully wounded during this
encounter, he disposed of the enemy, then reduced a
second weapons bunker. While firing point-blank into a
third position the brave Marine was fatally wounded. This
1/7 action was the first in the western Korea defense to
result in multiple Medal of Honor awards.
[132] 1/7 ComdD, May 52, pp. 17–18.
Following this late May offensive, a brief period of relative calm
settled over the MLR. Marine and Chinese units continued the active
defense of their respective sectors, with generally only a limited
number of contacts. Fire fights between Marine patrols and CCF
defenders lasted only a short time and usually ended when artillery
fire caused the patrol to pull back. Even though this state of affairs
remained essentially unchanged through June, several other events that
month would affect Marine defense of the westernmost sector in I Corps.
_End of the Second Year of War_[133]
[133] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5,
Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52; 5th Mar ComdDs, Apr,
Jun 52; 7thMar ComdDs, May-Jun 52; 1/7 ComdD, May 52; KMC
Regt Unit Rpt 120, dtd 30 Jun 52.
A second realignment of the Marine-Commonwealth boundary along Line
JAMESTOWN was made on 1 June. Part of the rear of the MLR was moved
eastward to enable the Marine division to assume full responsibility
for a key ridgetop. Prior to this date the hill mass had been divided
along its crest, a factor that made it a potential trouble spot for
both divisions. On 23 and 24 June, the 7th Marines MLR battalions
relocated their positions towards the enemy along JAMESTOWN. This
readjustment of the line varied from 1,300 yards in the center of the
regimental sector to 400 yards near its right. The additional terrain
strengthened the division front by placing the center regiment on
improved and more defensible ground.
A week before this MLR change took place, there had been a shift in
occupants in its far right sector. Colonel Culhane’s 5th Marines
replaced the 1st on line, which then went into division reserve.
Manning the MLR were 2/5 on the left and 1/5 to the right.
In early June the recently appointed UN commander, General Clark, made
his first visit to the 1st Marine Division front. During his briefing,
General Selden reviewed the unusual combat difficulties confronting his
Marines. In addition to the unfavorable terrain, the division commander
noted the special operational restrictions caused by proximity to the
truce talk site. Presence of a large number of uncharted minefields
created another obstacle. Herculean efforts were required of the
Marines to simultaneously man and construct defenses over 35 miles of
JAMESTOWN. Adding to Marine problems were the facts that ground units
were not receiving sufficient close air support and the capabilities
of the Chinese were constantly increasing.
Chinese order of battle (OOB) information was fed into the division
intelligence network by higher commands, I Corps and EUSAK, and
adjacent units, but a large part of the data about Communist forces
was produced by the division itself. Frontline units in contact with
the enemy, by observation of his activities, supplied the bulk of
intelligence about enemy defense tactics, employment of weapons, and
combat characteristics. Supporting Marine division units, particularly
artillery and armor, fed more facts into the system, mostly through
identification of the caliber of enemy shells fired at the Marines. As
a result of its missions forward of the line and actions in defense
of it, the division reconnaissance company also contributed to the
intelligence network. Individual Marines, performing as tactical air
observers and artillery air observers, as well as the VMO and HMR
pilots, were other important sources readily available to the 1st
Marine Division.
G-2 directed the division intelligence effort, including processing of
raw material and supplying of updated reports to 1st Division units.
The G-2 section also maintained OOB and target identification data
on Chinese units and their commanders. Members of the G-2 staff also
assisted in interrogation of prisoners of war (POWs), screened the
civilians apprehended in unauthorized areas, debriefed Marines exposed
to enemy intelligence, and conducted inspections of division internal
security. In areas where the 1st Marine Division had only a limited
intelligence capability it turned to EUSAK for assistance.
Eighth Army teams augmented the division counterintelligence efforts
and provided most of the translation service. In addition, three radio
intercept units furnished information to the Marines. The critical
importance of this service had been proven during several combat
patrols in May when additional information was instantly radioed to a
friendly unit under fire.
Other intelligence activities were less beneficial to the Marines.
These operations were conducted by Tactical Liaison Officers (TLOs,
friendly Koreans trained by U.S. intelligence teams), and members of
a Higher Intelligence Detachment (HID), a Korean unit assigned from
EUSAK. Both the TLO and HID proved of limited value to the division,
due to the generally poor educational background of the agents, their
inadequate training, and frequent failure to return from assignments
behind enemy lines. Some Marines believed the basic fault in these
operatives lay in “an exaggerated opinion of their importance.”[134]
[134] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-33.
Several division intelligence Marines, in conjunction with training
and shore party personnel, took part in an informational activity of a
different type. These Marines reconnoitered several friendly islands
off western Korea to determine their suitability for division landing
exercises. The second one inspected, Tokchok-to, 30 miles southwest
of Inchon, was selected. By early June planning had progressed to
the point where a program had been developed for bimonthly battalion
landing team exercises. The KPR maneuver force, appropriately
reinforced, was designated as a participating unit. Landings were to
employ boat teams, amphibian tractors, and helicopters. The entire
program was designed to provide refresher training for Marines in
carrying out their primary mission of amphibious assault. By the end of
June, 3/5 and 3/1, in turn, had captured Tokchok-to.
Other training concentrated more on the task at hand. Division units
in reserve rehearsed tactics for offensive and defensive warfare. Most
ground units conducted extensive schooling in both mine and booby
trap detection and clearance. Recognizing that patrolling was an
important part of a Marine’s life on the MLR, the division included
in its Noncommissioned Officers’ (NCO) Leadership School a thorough
indoctrination in patrolling tactics.[135] More than 50 percent of
the training at all levels was at night. In addition, an extensive
orientation was conducted for newly arrived combat replacements,
who could not be committed to action for 72 hours after joining the
division.
[135] BGen Austin R. Brunelli ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC,
dtd 13 Sep 66, hereafter _Brunelli ltr_. The division
chief of staff during more than half of 1952, Colonel
Brunelli later observed that the “school produced more
effective patrolling and ... contributed to reducing our
casualties.”
A week after the division’s June replacements landed at Inchon, General
Selden’s headquarters received a directive that would affect a number
of these new Marines. On 10 June CG, EUSAK ordered his corps commanders
to make continuous efforts to secure the identification and changes in
the enemy order of battle. Two days later I Corps followed the Eighth
Army order with a letter of instruction which called for each I Corps
division to “prepare plans for launching swift, vigorous, and violent
large-scale raids to capture prisoners, to gain intelligence, to
destroy enemy positions and material and/or strong limited objective
attacks to improve and strengthen Line JAMESTOWN.”[136] Large scale
was defined as an “attacking force limited to battalion or regimental
(brigade) size with appropriate armor and artillery support.”[137]
Divisions were required to submit detailed proposals for future action
by 21 June. Marine division plans for limited objective attacks during
July by units of the 7th Marines and KMCs were subsequently prepared
and forwarded to I Corps.
[136] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 8.
[137] _Ibid._
One operation conducted north of the 2/5 left battalion sector early
on 22 June was not, however, in response to this enemy identification
mission. Late the previous day, Company G had sent out a 16-man
ambush. Before the Marines reached their destination, a small enemy
force, itself lying in wait, began to pour a heavy volume of fire on
the Marines. At this point the patrol was ordered to pull back. One
group of 10 made it back to the MLR; the remaining Marines headed for
a nearby combat outpost in friendly hands. Reports to the company
revealed one Marine not accounted for. The outpost commander was
directed to search the area for the missing Marine. This reconnaissance
by a fire team failed, but a reinforced squad sent out later brought
back the body of the Marine who had been killed by Chinese artillery.
While this rescue effort was in progress, another similar action was
under way. Not long after its arrival on the MLR, Company E, 2/5 had
spotted in the No-Man’s-Land between the two main defensive lines a
figure that appeared to be the body of a Marine. Since one man had been
reported missing from an earlier 1st Marines patrol, recovery of the
body, which had been propped up against a mound of dirt in the open,
was undertaken. A special Company E patrol left the main line shortly
before dawn on the 22d and reached the recovery area at daybreak. After
artillery had laid down smoke, the patrol moved in, quickly recovered
the body, and set out for friendly territory. Before the Marines had
advanced very far on their return trip, the Chinese interdicted their
route with heavy mortar fire, which killed one member of the patrol and
wounded another. When the 5th Marines patrol returned to JAMESTOWN
shortly after 0700, it carried not only the body it had recovered but
also that of the Marine who had been killed on the recovery mission.
By the end of June, major command changes had taken place within the
1st Marine Division as well as in several other UNC components. On
13 June, Brigadier General Robert O. Bare took over the second spot
from Brigadier General Twining. Both ADCs were graduates of the Naval
Academy and both were native mid-Westerners (General Bare--Iowa,
General Twining--Wisconsin). Before joining the 1st Marine Division in
Korea General Bare had served at Camp Pendleton, California where most
recently he had been commanding general of the Training and Replacement
Command. His World War II experience included participation in both
European and Pacific campaigns. He was the Staff Officer, Plans,
in the U.S. Naval Section for the Allied naval group that planned
the amphibious assault at Normandy, France. Later he served in the
Peleliu and Okinawa campaigns and, with the ending of hostilities, had
participated in the surrender and repatriation of the Japanese in north
China.
The outgoing ADC, General Twining, was being reassigned to the Office
of the Commandant, HQMC. For his outstanding service as assistant
division commander from March through May 1952, he received a Gold Star
in lieu of his second Legion of Merit with Combat “V.”
Other high-level changes in command that had also recently taken place
had included the UNC commander himself, General Ridgway, who had been
succeeded in mid-May by General Clark. Major General Glenn O. Barcus,
USAF, had assumed command of Fifth Air Force, replacing Lieutenant
General Everest on 30 May. On 4 June, Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe
had been named the new Commander, Naval Forces Far East to succeed Vice
Admiral C. Turner Joy who had held the position since August 1949. And
in I Corps, Major General Paul W. Kendall, USA, took over as corps
commander on 29 June from Lieutenant General O’Daniel.
The end of the second year of the Korean fighting and the beginning of
the third was observed by the Chinese with an attack against the 2d
Battalion, 5th Marines, manning JAMESTOWN positions to the left of the
regimental sector. Commanded at that time by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas
J. Cross, 2/5 was new on line, having relieved 2/1 during the night of
15–16 June.
Late in the afternoon of 24 June, the enemy began registering his
mortars and artillery on MLR company positions of 2/5 and a portion of
the rear area occupied by the battalion 81mm mortars. Chinese incoming,
sometimes intense, sometimes sporadic, continued until shortly after
2130. By this time the CCF were moving down their trenches toward a
key outpost, Yoke, known also as Hill 159, which was still occupied
on daytime basis by the Marines and lay north of the Company F Sector
(Captain Harold C. Fuson). Moments later, the 34 men temporarily
outposting Yoke saw the Chinese and opened with small arms fire,
but the Marine positions were quickly enveloped by the Chinese. The
Americans occupying the forward slopes of Yoke suffered many casualties
from the intense fires supporting the enemy rush.
While the initial attack was in progress, the Chinese were able to
position and fire machine guns from behind the outpost and in trenches
on the forward slopes. Communist mortars interdicted the Marine supply
routes to make normal withdrawal and reinforcement measures difficult.
The Marines moved into bunkers, called down pre-planned fires, and
continued the defense. Although the Chinese had overrun Yoke, they
could not evict the Marines. At about 0300, the enemy withdrew. When
the 2/5 troops followed to reoccupy the forward slopes of Yoke, the
enemy renewed his attack and struck again. As before, the Marines took
to bunkers and called in defensive artillery fires. These boxing fires
fell around the outpost perimeter until first light when the attackers
withdrew for the second time.
Four other outposts in the battalion area were involved in the
anniversary attack, but the action around Yoke was by far the heaviest.
It resulted in 10 Marines of 2/5 killed and 36 wounded. At Yoke alone,
9 were killed and 23 wounded. Enemy dead were 12 known and 50 estimated
killed. Chinese wounded were estimated at 100. At one point during the
attack on Yoke, the outpost commander reported that the enemy were
wearing gas masks and using tear-gas grenades. Investigation revealed
that the Chinese had carried and even worn the masks, but that they had
employed white phosphorus grenades rather than tear gas. This was the
first instance Marine division personnel had ever encountered of CCF
soldiers carrying gas masks in an attack and it was “believed part of
the enemy’s hate campaign to impress their troops with the possible
use by the UN Forces of CBR (Chemical, Biological and Radiological)
warfare.”[138]
[138] Selden, _Div Staff Rpt_, p. 16.
This violent eruption of enemy activity on the night of 24 June was
followed by a brief period of greatly reduced ground action. Late on
the 29th, however, the battlefront lull was broken when the 1st KMC
Regiment sent out a raiding party to capture Chinese soldiers and their
weapons and equipment, to inflict casualties, and to destroy positions.
Second Lieutenant Kwak Sang In had his reinforced platoon from the 3d
Company, 1st Battalion, equipped with rifles, carbines, machine guns,
flamethrowers, and explosives. Target for the attack was an enemy
outpost four miles south of Panmunjom that overlooked the Sachon River.
The patrol followed the general pattern of previous raids. It made
use of supporting elements positioned on high ground in front of the
objective. In this action the patrol struck from the rear, using
artillery fire for both the assault and the withdrawal. Another
similarity existed in that the results were nearly the same--no
prisoners taken but fewer casualties to the attackers. One difference
from earlier operations was that this patrol employed flamethrowers
and TNT for destroying bunkers and inflicting casualties. Both weapons
were credited in the killing of 12 and the wounding of 6 Chinese, in
destroying 1 mortar and 7 bunkers, and in burning 3 other bunkers and
numerous automatic weapons and rifles. Because of the heavy weight of a
loaded flamethrower and the small size of the Korean Marines carrying
these weapons, the flamethrower operators were fairly well exhausted by
the end of the patrol.
_A Long Fourth of July_[139]
[139] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8; and
1stMarDiv, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7,
1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 52.
The approach of the American Fourth of July holiday marking an earlier
struggle for freedom was appropriately accompanied by ground action
initiated by all of the mainland MLR regiments. In the KMC area, a 3
July raiding party struck at forward enemy positions before dawn,
killing nine Chinese. In the center regimental sector Colonel Thomas
C. Moore’s[140] 7th Marines were also engaged in an active sector
defense. In the left battalion spot 3/7, which had replaced 2/7 on
line, dispatched raids on each of the first three nights of the month.
Its Company G patrol on the night of 2–3 July was to be involved in one
of the most costly small unit actions in the western Korea tour of duty
for the Marine division.
[140] Colonel Moore took over regimental command on 11 June.
The former CO, Colonel Honsowetz, had been named
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 of the 1st Marine Division.
Operational plans called for the platoon night raid on the 2d to be
followed by a dawn attack the next morning. In both actions, the
prisoner-taking aspect of the mission was considered a primary one.
The early part of the operation was uneventful. One platoon moved
forward toward the objective, Hill 159 (Yoke), 1,200 yards beyond
combat outpost (COP) White, to the regimental left, without making
contact with the enemy. The platoon then established a base of fire on
favorable terrain from which the attack by the second platoon could be
supported.
The second platoon passed through the forward position of the first
shortly before 0630 and moved out into enemy terrain. It advanced less
than 300 yards before its progress was halted by a Chinese force of
battalion strength occupying the objective, Hill 159. Heavy enemy rifle
and machine gun fire, hand grenades, mortar and artillery deluged the
advancing Marines. Many of them quickly became casualties, but the
operation continued, due in part to the determination and initiative
of the NCOs. One of these was Staff Sergeant William E. Shuck, Jr.,
in charge of a machine gun squad. When the leader of one of the rifle
squads became a casualty, Sergeant Shuck assumed command of that squad
in addition to his own. Although wounded, he organized the two units
and led them against the objective. Nearing the summit of the hill, the
sergeant was hit a second time. Still he refused evacuation, remaining
well forward in the lines to direct his assault force.
It was not until he had received orders to break contact with the enemy
that the sergeant pulled back from the attack. During the withdrawal
he looked after the other Marine casualties, making certain that all
dead and wounded had been evacuated from the zone of action. While
directing the last of the evacuation, Sergeant Shuck was struck by a
sniper’s bullet and killed by this third hit.[141] He was one of four
Marines killed in the engagement. Forty others were wounded. Although
no Chinese were captured, Marines estimated the enemy suffered losses
of 50 killed and an additional 150 wounded.
[141] The leadership, bravery, and unselfish devotion to duty
earned for Sergeant Shuck the Medal of Honor, an award
made to 14 Marines during the fighting in West Korea.
During the earlier part of the war, 28 Marines had
received the Medal of Honor. Of these, 17 were awarded
posthumously. Five Navy hospital corpsmen, all attached
to the 1st Marine Division, also earned the MOH. These
awards, with one exception, were for heroism under combat
conditions during the 1952–1953 period of the Korean War.
To the east of the 7th Marines, the 5th Marines in the right MLR sector
ordered a company-size patrol, also on the night of 2–3 July. Company
A, 1/5 was directed to attack successively three outposts in the
vicinity of the village of Samichon along the river bearing the same
name and two miles beyond the point where the MLR crossed the river.
After the reinforced company had taken the first two objectives, which
were unoccupied, it received orders from division to return to the
battalion area. Despite the fact the patrol had ventured far beyond the
Marine lines, it did not come into contact with any Chinese forces.
A 2/5 combat patrol leaving the MLR just after dawn was successful in
inflicting casualties on the enemy, taking prisoners, and destroying
enemy field fortifications. The patrol made good progress until a
Marine inadvertently set off an enemy mine. This mishap gave away the
patrol’s location and prompted reprisal by the Chinese. A one-hour fire
fight followed. Then the patrol called in smoke and returned under its
cover to JAMESTOWN. Marine casualties were 1 killed and 11 wounded.
The second 2/5 patrol that same date was a successful ambush completed
10 minutes before midnight. In the brief clash that developed, Marine
ambushers killed 6 enemy and wounded 8 more. The Marine force suffered
no casualties.
The ambush patrol returned 15 minutes after midnight on 4 July.
Even at that early hour division artillerymen had already initiated
an appropriate ceremony to mark the Fourth. On 2 July, I Corps had
directed the massing of fires on 4 July on the most remunerative
targets in each division area. All objectives in the corps sector were
to be attacked simultaneously at specified times for a one-minute
period by employing a firing technique known as time on target
(TOT).[142] Normal daily fires were also to be carried out. Designated
as Operation FIRECRACKER, the shoot expended 3,202 rounds in the
division sector. Light and medium battalions of the 11th Marines, plus
its 4.5-inch Rocket Battery destroyed some enemy trenches, bunkers,
mortar and artillery positions, and damaged others. The division
reported that the special fires on 4 July had also resulted in 44 known
CCF casualties, including 21 dead, and 12 more who were estimated to
have been injured.
[142] In the TOT technique, participating units time their
initial volleys to ensure that their shells arrive on the
target at the same time.
More casualties, however, resulted from the issuing of another I
Corps directive, this one dealing with the conduct of raids to seize
prisoners, obtain information about the enemy, and to destroy his
positions, supplies, and equipment. Back in June, the EUSAK commander
had first stressed to his corps commanders the increased importance of
combat raids to obtain additional intelligence during this period of
stabilized conflict.
Although General Selden had submitted two division plans, he strongly
believed that smaller patrols could accomplish the objective with fewer
casualties and loss of life.[143] In particular, the division commander
pointed out to I Corps that adequate defense of the 35-mile-long
Marine division front did not permit the withdrawal of a sizable force
for patrol missions without endangering the security of the entire
Corps sector. The attack order was issued, however, on 3 July for
the first large-scale raid to be conducted prior to 7 July. The code
name BUCKSHOT 2B was assigned for this particular raid. As soon as he
received the date of execution for the proposed operation, the Marine
division commander advised I Corps that designation of 7 July as the
cut-off date for the raid precluded proper rehearsal of attack plans.
The operation would also conflict with rotation to the States of 2,651
Marines, whose replacements would not be available until 11 July. Corps
turned a deaf ear; division then ordered a battalion-size attack for
the night of 6–7 July.
[143] Among division commanders in the I Corps area, General
Selden was not alone in his grave misgivings of this
method of gaining information about the Chinese. Major
General A. J. H. Cassels, 1st Commonwealth Division,
shared with the Marine commander the belief that such
operations were too costly for the intended purpose.
_McGill comments_ and Brigadier C. N. Barclay, _The first
Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth
Land Forces in Korea, 1950–1953_ (Aldershot, England:
Gale and Polden Ltd., 1954), p. 127, hereafter Barclay,
_Commonwealth_.
Before dusk on 6 July, Lieutenant Colonel Daughtry’s reinforced
1st Battalion, 7th Marines moved into position--on the left, a
tank-infantry force, A/1/7 (still under Captain Thompson), to create a
diversion; in the center, the main assault force, Company C (Captain
Robert A. Owens); and on the right, a reinforced platoon from Company
B (Captain Lyle S. Whitmore, Jr.) to support the attack by fire from
positions close to the objective, Yoke. Earlier, three reinforced
squads from Captain Thompson’s unit had occupied combat outposts in the
area of operations to deny the use of key terrain to the enemy and to
provide additional fire support in the attack. At 2200, Captain Owens’
Company C crossed the line of departure and set its course for Yoke,
three-quarters of a mile northeast. Five minutes later the Company B
support unit moved out to occupy the intermediate objective, COP Green,
one-half mile southeast of Yoke. As it took up positions on COP Green,
Captain Whitmore’s Company B platoon discovered that no Chinese were
in its vicinity; in fact, the platoon was not to encounter any enemy
forces during BUCKSHOT.
Even though Company B failed to engage any Chinese, the remainder
of the battalion encountered more than its share. About 450 yards
southwest of the objective the Company C attack force was hit by an
enemy ambush, which cut off Captain Owens’ lead element. Although the
Chinese directed strong efforts at halting the Marine advance, they
were unsuccessful in this attempt. The Marines pressed the attack and
seized Yoke 20 minutes after midnight.
On the left, the diversionary attack unit, Company A supported by the
five tanks of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 1st Tank Battalion, and by a
section of flame tanks from the armored battalion headquarters, began
its mission at 2355. In three-quarters of an hour, the tank-infantry
unit reached its objective, the first high ground southwest of Yoke.
Tanks turned their 90mm guns on known Chinese positions on the hill to
the north. During the next hour, the big guns of the M-46 medium tanks
sent 49 rounds into enemy emplacements. The Marine tanks ceased fire at
0113 when Captain Thompson was alerted to assist Company C. He left one
rifle platoon with the tanks.
Over on the high ground to the north and east, the attack force was
under heavy fire from Communist mortars and artillery and was also
receiving a number of enemy small-unit probes. At 0200, Company A made
contact with Company C. Captain Thompson found the main force somewhat
disorganized as a result of the wounding of the company commander,
Captain Owens, the loss of several key officers and NCOs, and the
effects of the lead element of Company C being ambushed and cut off.
After being briefed on the situation by Captain Owens and conducting a
reconnaissance, Captain Thompson recommended to the battalion commander
that the entire force be recalled before daylight. At 0310 the two
companies at Yoke began to disengage, returning to the MLR by 0636 on
the 7th, without further casualties.
The one platoon of Company A and seven tanks of the diversion unit were
still in their forward positions on the left and had prepared to resume
firing. At dawn the M-46s relaid their guns on targets that had become
visible. Tank gunners destroyed two observation posts and three machine
gun positions and damaged many feet of trenchlines. At one point in
the firing, the tank platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Terry K.
Donk, using a power scope, observed “... two officers in forest green
uniforms without equipment. They were definitely giving orders to
machine gunners and infantry.”[144] These 2 were among the 19 counted
casualties (10 wounded) that the tankers inflicted during BUCKSHOT.
[144] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 52.
With the return at 0645 of the tank-infantry diversion force, the
special operation for obtaining prisoners and information ended.
No Chinese had been captured and no data gleaned from Communist
casualties, listed as the 19 reported by the tankers and an estimated
20 more wounded or killed. Marine casualties from the operation were
out of proportion to the results achieved--12 dead, 85 wounded, and 5
missing. It had been a high price to pay for a venture of this type,
particularly when the primary objectives went unaccomplished.
During the entire 4–7 July period, 22 Marines had lost their lives in
combat operations. Division reported that 268 Marines had been wounded
during the long Fourth of July. These figures were the highest since
September 1951 when large scale attacks by UN forces had first been
abolished in line with the new tactic of positional warfare that would
be waged until the truce talks resulted in an armistice.
_Changes in the Lineup_[145]
[145] The material in this section is derived from the
1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52.
Division casualties were considerably higher during the first week in
July than they were for the rest of the month. Once the pace of combat
slowed, following the initial flurry of activity, the front again
settled down to the patrol, raid, and ambush routine that had marked
the static period of the Korean fighting. In accordance with the orders
previously issued by higher authority the division placed continued
emphasis on gathering all information it could about the enemy, his
dispositions, and tactics. To assist in this effort, General Selden
in July removed his reconnaissance company from defense of its small
sector of JAMESTOWN and directed the unit to conduct training for its
primary mission, obtaining intelligence about the enemy. Its place on
the MLR was assumed by the two amphibian tractor companies then on line.
Another change of lineup took place on 14 July. At this time a
battalion from the 15th Regiment, U.S. 3d Infantry Division took over
the role of the maneuver element in the Kimpo Provisional Regiment,
then held by 1/1, thereby releasing that battalion to its parent unit.
With this change, the 1st Marine Division had a full regiment in
reserve for the first time since its arrival in western Korea. A later
shift in units occurred on 26 July when the 7th and 1st Marines traded
places and missions. At that time the MLR, from west to east, was
manned by the KPR, 1st AmTrac Bn, KMC, 1st Marines, and 5th Marines.
Opposing them in mid-July were an estimated 27 infantry battalions,
whose primary missions were to defend the sectors assigned. The
division credited these units with the capability of launching limited
objective attacks at any time or of taking part in a major attack with
a force of up to 57 infantry and 16 artillery battalions, augmented
by 40 tanks or self-propelled guns. It was estimated also that the
enemy could cross the Han in battalion strength in the vicinity of
the northern shore of Kimpo Peninsula at any time and that Communist
aircraft could attack anywhere in the division sector. Enemy forces
identified at the end of July, from west to east, were the 193d, 195th,
and 194th Divisions of the 65th CCF Army; the 189th Division of the 63d
CCF Army; and the 118th Division, 40th CCF Army, which had recently
moved from a position opposite the Commonwealth and U.S. 3d Infantry
Divisions. Infantry strength of the Communists was established at
28,328.
_Replacement and Rotation_[146]
[146] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; No.
5, Chaps. 8, 9.
Marine infantry strength at the end of July 1952 was little more
than half of the Chinese total. The division personnel strength was
maintained by the monthly replacement and rotation program of Marines
to fill vacancies created by the return of Marine combat personnel to
CONUS (Continental United States) and combat losses. In the second
quarter of 1952, the division rotated 433 officers and 6,280 enlisted
men from Korea. In exchange, 506 officers and 7,359 enlisted men
arrived from the States in replacement drafts. A new arrival could
expect to stay with the division about 10½ months.
In the late spring of 1952 many of the division’s new replacements were
“dental cripples”--Marines requiring dental treatment, even emergency
care in some cases.[147] General Selden directed that contact teams be
formed to meet the replacement drafts in Japan. During the last leg of
the trip to Korea dental personnel screened the new combat Marines on
shipboard. By the time the division area had been reached, the dentists
knew what remedial work would be required by incoming troops. At the
end of the summer the problem was well under control.
[147] _Brunelli ltr._
Even though the 1st Marine Division in July continued to be somewhat
in excess of its authorized strength in total personnel, it had
certain imbalances and was in rather short supply of certain ranks and
specialists. While the normal tour for most infantry officers ranged
from 9 to 12 months, an excess of company grade officers, particularly
lieutenants, had resulted in a reduction of the Korean tour for them
to just six months. This brief period of duty plus an intra-division
rotation policy that caused a mass shifting of duty assignments every
three-to-five months tended to reduce unit combat efficiency. On the
other hand the change of assignments had a favorable effect in that
it broadened the experience of individual Marines. Beginning in the
summer of 1952, however, the division modified this policy to reduce
its number of intra-division transfers.
Personnel shortages existed in both the artillery and tank MOSs
(Military Occupational Speciality). Mass rotation of reservist company
grade artillery officers had necessitated the transfer of infantry
officers to the 11th Marines for training and reassignment within the
regiment. During the time when the supply of artillery officers was
limited, however, the quality of support rendered remained high.[148]
The other major shortage in the division was that of qualified
crewmen--both drivers and gunners--for the M-46 tanks. Neither tank
driving nor gunnery for the M-46 was taught in the tank crewmen’s
course conducted at Camp Pendleton, California. General Selden
requested of Lieutenant General Franklin A. Hart (CG, FMFPac) that
“tank crewmen be thoroughly trained prior to leaving the U.S.”[149]
[148] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-27.
[149] 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 52, p. 4.
Fundamental to the tank problem was a shortage of the M-46 itself.
At the training facility, Training and Replacement Command, Camp
Pendleton, M-46 engines had been available for maintenance instruction
but no tanks for the training of gunners and drivers.[150] General
Hart pointed out this deficiency to the Commandant, General Lemuel C.
Shepherd, Jr. On 13 August the Commandant directed the transfer of five
tanks to the training installation from the 7th Tank Battalion,[151]
also located at Camp Pendleton. At the same time General Shepherd
ordered an increase in the school quota for tank crewmen. The first
graduates would not reach the division in Korea, however, until the
November draft.
[150] FMFPac ComdD, Jul 52, App VIII, Encl (7), Anx (E).
[151] FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App I, Encl (35).
The presence of not fully trained personnel in a combat zone was not
limited to the division. In the summer and fall of 1952, a large
number of volunteer reservists, both pilots and enlisted replacements
with little experience since the end of World War II, joined the 1st
MAW. It had not been possible for the Stateside training and tactical
squadrons, themselves short of personnel and aircraft, to qualify all
pilots as combat ready. It fell upon the wing in Korea, therefore,
to take the needed corrective action. The more experienced 1st MAW
pilots, after completing their combat missions, flew instructional
flights to help prepare the rusty fliers. Some reserve pilots, away
from regular daily flying since 1945, found the adjustment too
difficult and turned in their wings. MACG-2 operated “Pohang U,” a
training course for forward air controllers. In practically every
squadron, there were shortages of electronics personnel. Jet squadrons
found mechanics hard to come by. There were never enough motor
transport replacements. For unqualified enlisted Marines, squadrons
operated on-the-job training programs.
To maintain a reasonable degree of unit proficiency, the wing limited
the monthly turnover of pilots to 25 percent. Like the division,
the wing employed split tours between an officer’s primary duty and
staff work to broaden his experience. In some cases the amount of
time required by administrative work as compared to a pilot’s actual
flying time reduced his proficiency in the air. In June, Task Force 95
reported that the proportionately large number of take-off and landing
accidents on the carrier _Bataan_ was caused by the rapid turnover of
pilots and their need for frequent carrier qualification.[152]
[152] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-198.
A Marine pilot joining the wing could expect his assignment to last for
6 to 9 months. Personnel in a nonflight status had longer tours of 10
months to a year. Wing replacements were made on an individual basis,
although there were plans that by mid-1953 a new policy of at least
partial squadron replacement would be in effect. That 1st MAW squadrons
were able to operate effectively on an individual replacement system
was attributable to the peculiarity of combat conditions in Korea.
Absence of real enemy aerial opposition permitted the use of basic,
parade-type flight formations and non-tactical approaches and attacks.
An unusually high-level of experienced pilots in each of the two wing
groups helped in the establishment of training programs and operational
doctrine. The FAF limitation of four aircraft per flight eliminated
the problem of large-scale, precombat squadron training as well as the
difficulty of controlling and coordinating a large number of planes in
a strike.
_Logistical Operations, Summer 1952_[153]
[153] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: Selden, _Div Staff Rpt_; _PacFlt EvalRpts_
No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv, 1st EngrBn
ComdDs, Jun-Jul 52.
Logistical support of the division and wing remained largely unchanged
through July. Several modifications did take place, however, and these
were:
(1) The change of responsibility for logistical support
of ground-based units in Korea from Commanding General,
2d Logistical Command to the Commanding General, Korean
Communication Zone (CG, KComZ).
(2) The opening of a pipeline system for resupply of aviation
fuel at K-3, beginning in May.
(3) The beginning of increased support for airbase maintenance at
those airfields housing Marine squadrons.
Resupply of common items used by both Marine and Army units was still
being hampered by the Marines’ limited knowledge of the Army supply
system in effect and by their inability to obtain the catalogues,
orders, and directives essential for requisitioning.
Two logistical operations, both of an engineering nature, took
place between May and July 1952 in western Korea. One was Operation
TIMBER, undertaken to provide lumber required to complete the bunker
construction on the JAMESTOWN, WYOMING, and KANSAS lines. The division
had estimated that three million linear feet of 4 x 8-inch timbers
would be needed. Since lumber in this amount was not available
through supply channels or standing timber in the division sector,
Corps assigned the Marines a wooded area 50 miles to the east in the
U.S. 45th Infantry Division sector. On 12 May a reinforced engineer
platoon, under Second Lieutenant Roger E. Galliher, a truck platoon,
and 500 Korean Service Corps (KSC) laborers,[154] began the cutting,
processing, and hauling of timbers which were then trucked to the
railhead. Between 500 and 1,000 logs were cut daily. When the operation
ended in July a total of 35,194 sections of timber had been cut. This
was still not enough lumber to complete the required construction.
Eighth Army then made up the difference, mostly with 12 x 12-inch
timbers 30 feet long; these the Marine engineers cut to 4 x 8s for
standard bunker construction.[155]
[154] The KSC was a ROK quasi-military organization for
logistical support of the UNC. Personnel were drafted
from those rejected for Army service. Each KSC unit had
a cadre of ROK officers and enlisted. All types of labor
except personal services were performed by these Koreans.
During its period in western Korea, the 1st Marine
Division was supported by the 103d KSC Regiment of 5,222
men. CG, 1stMarDiv, _Civ Afrs and KSC_, pp. 8–9.
[155] Col Harry D. Clarke ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd
1 Sep 66.
Operation AMAZON, published by I Corps on 12 June, ordered that
bridging preparations be made for the approaching summer flood season.
The previous August at the Honker Bridge, the one nearest the railhead,
the Imjin had crested some 27 feet above normal. One reason for the
precautionary efforts taken to insure bridge security during the
flood season was the potential damage the Chinese could cause. Since
they controlled the upriver area of the Imjin, before it entered the
division sector, they could introduce floatable debris or explosives
into the swift running flood waters. Another major concern was the
logistical problem that would be faced by forward MLR units in event
the bridges became impassable and the enormous strain that would thus
be placed on helicopter resupply operations.
The I Corps directive specified that its divisions maintain a transport
capability that would enable medium tanks to pass safely over bridges
spanning the major rivers in their I Corps sector. The order also
called for the removal of debris that could cause damage to bridges.
Removal of those bridges vulnerable to flood conditions and the
erection of emergency river spans were also to take place on corps
order.
To carry out the I Corps operational order, General Seiden put the
division’s own AMAZON plan into effect on 1 July. On this date
Companies A, B, and D of Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Clarke’s 1st
Engineer Battalion began extensive preparations for debris removal from
the four bridge sites in the division sector. Even before this, Marine
engineers and shore party personnel had been trained at special schools
to handle U.S. Army equipment provided for the AMAZON operation.[156]
[156] This included employment of the 60-inch searchlight
for night illumination, maintenance of boats for
debris removal, and operation of the M-4 ferry. Other
preparations by the division, of a non-engineer nature,
included positioning of 13,000 life-saving floatation
devices for use by frontline troops should they become
shut off from planned evacuation.
Beginning 1 June, division engineers began blasting away at objects
that flood waters could loosen and carry into the bridge supports.
Bridge approaches were improved and their supports strengthened.
Each company had a detail living at the bridge site for which it was
responsible. With the advent of heavy rains, these Marines were to
operate 24-hour boat patrols to keep the river free of debris. The
engineers were also to maintain a round-the-clock debris watch at the
four division bridges--Freedom Gate, or the Munsan-ni Railroad Bridge
in the left regimental sector; Honker and X-Ray in the center; and
finally, Widgeon, very close to the Commonwealth boundary.
Heavy rains began on 27 July and continued until the 30th. On the first
day the decking of Widgeon Bridge was completely submerged and Honker
was removed to prevent its being carried away. Precipitation increased
on 28 July and reached its peak on 29 July when 3.66 inches of rainfall
were recorded. By the 30th, the rains had subsided but not before the
overflowing Imjin had collapsed the X-Ray bridge. During the height of
the four flood days, engineers fought the rains, flooding waters, and
floating debris. The major effort took place downstream to save the
Freedom Gate Bridge.
Assigned personnel removed debris from the bridge supports, guided
large, dangerous pieces away with poles, while upriver the boat teams
blasted still larger sections into manageable chunks that would pass
between the bridge supports. These engineer efforts, in addition to
regular repair and maintenance of the large road net, constituted the
major ground activity in the 1st Marine Division sector in late July.
August would bring more rains and emergency demands on the engineers,
but the critical ground activity at that time would be directed against
the Communists in the area around Bunker Hill.
CHAPTER III
The Battle of Bunker Hill
_The Participants and the Battlefield--Preliminary Action on
Siberia--The Attack on Bunker Hill--Consolidating the Defense of Bunker
Hill--Company B Returns to Bunker Hill--Supporting Arms at Bunker
Hill--In Retrospect_
_The Participants and the Battlefield_[157]
[157] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv
ComdDs, Jul-Aug 52; 1stMar, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52; 1st
MAW ComdD, Aug 52.
The torrential rains that had fallen just before the end of July
continued to affect ground operations into early August. Contacts
between opposing forces were few and brief, and casualties remained
correspondingly low. On 1 August, General Selden assigned the reserve
regiment, the 7th Marines, the task of developing the secondary defense
line, KANSAS, at the extreme right of the division sector. The 5th
Marines, manning this regimental area and originally responsible for
the construction, had been unable to reach the second line because
bridging across the Imjin to the rear of the sector was washed out. By
3 July the division put a ferry service into operation at the site of
the inoperable Honker Bridge for the purpose of feeding ammunition to
combat units north of the Imjin. The critical resupply problem began
to ease the next day when the waters overflowing the Widgeon Bridge
further upstream receded sufficiently to permit restoration of normal
vehicular crossings there.
Traffic in the air had, quite naturally, been less affected by the
heavy rains and by the flooded, mucky terrain that was slowing ground
movement throughout the entire division area. Flight operations during
the first week of August produced a daily sortie rate that would
approximate the monthly average. In fact, the month of August was to
become the record one for 1st MAW attack and fighter pilots during
1952, with a total of 5,869 sorties flown.
While the air people in August were maintaining a good weather pace
against the enemy following the July downpours, the Communist ground
troops apparently found the going too difficult to mount any sustained
attack. The enemy merely continued his active defense, with an average
of two contacts daily, while busily engaged in advancing his OPLR
by creeping tactics. Even the usually assiduous Chinese artillery
was strangely quiet. With respect to the enemy’s excellent artillery
capability, the 1st Marine Division in July learned that the Chinese
had introduced a 132mm Russian rocket in their combat operations. The
presence of this truck-mounted launcher, the _Katusha_, which could
fire 16 rockets simultaneously, was indicated by a POW who had been
informed by “his platoon leader that there were two _Katusha_ regiments
in the CCF.”[158] In addition to this new enemy weapon, the Marine
division reported the same month that positive sightings had been
made of self-propelled guns emplaced well forward, and that there was
an “indication that these guns were being used to fire direct fire
missions from frontline revetments.”[159]
[158] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52, p. 2.
[159] _Ibid._, p. 1.
Communist forward positions were gradually encroaching on JAMESTOWN.
Since April 1952 the division had noted every month that the enemy
was continuing to extend his trenches in the direction of the Marine
MLR. The Chinese technique was to occupy key, high terrain at night,
prepare the ground during darkness by digging trenches and constructing
bunkers, and then vacate the area before daybreak. After nightly
repetitions of this process had produced a tenable position, the
enemy moved in and occupied it. By means of these creeping tactics,
the Chinese hoped to acquire the dominating terrain necessary for
controlling access to Seoul. The ultimate goal of the Communist forces
was believed to be the 750-foot-high Paekhak Hill,[160] the Marine high
ground position also known as Hill 229, just over a mile east of the
road leading to Panmunjom and Kaesong.
[160] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 18 Jun 52, in
1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 5.
During the four months that the 1st Marine Division’s mission had been
to conduct an aggressive defense of the EUSAK left flank, Marines
had become familiar with a number of Chinese small unit infantry
tactics. Shortly after assignment of the division to western Korea,
General Twining, the ADC, had observed that the Chinese first made a
diversionary frontal assault while the main force maneuvered around
UNC defenders to attack from the rear. Almost invariably the Chinese
employed this envelopment technique. Occasionally the enemy also used
more passive measures, such as attempting to demoralize Marines in the
front lines and subvert their allegiance by English language propaganda
broadcasts. These attempts represented wasted effort. Not one Marine
was swayed.
In some cases the Chinese were imaginative in changing their tactics or
improvising new ones. This tendency had been noted as early as May by a
5th Marines battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Nihart, after 1/5
had engaged the enemy in a limited, objective attack:
... when friendlies marked targets with WP [white phosphorus],
the enemy would immediately drop rounds of WP between the target
and friendly troops to conceal the target and to confuse friendly
FOs [artillery forward observers]; the enemy tried very hard
to take prisoners (rather than shoot a friendly, they would
often attempt to knock him out with a concussion type grenade);
counterattacks were made in waves of four to seven men deployed
in a formation somewhat similar to the Marine Corps wedge;
snipers were deployed in holes that were mutually supporting;
concerted efforts were made to knock out automatic weapons; ...
for close-in fighting, the enemy used PPSH [Soviet-made 7.62mm
submachine gun] guns and grenades rather than bayonets; the enemy
attacked behind well coordinated mortar fire; some enemy snipers
were observed to have bushes tied to their backs....[161]
[161] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 12.
On occasion 1st Division Marines found evidence that the enemy
had infiltrated their lines. It appeared the most likely spot for
line-crossers to make their way into the Marine rear area was from the
far bank of the Imjin between the Sachon and Han Rivers where the enemy
MLR was only a short distance from the sector held by the 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion. Two enemy agents “armed with pistols of German
manufacture, six hand grenades, and one set of field glasses”[162] had
been apprehended here by a Marine reconnaissance company patrol. The
prisoners had stated they were “part of a force of one thousand men
who were infiltrating to form a guerrilla force somewhere in South
Korea.”[163] Six days later, after a brief fire fight between a small
group of Chinese and a Marine outpost in the center of the division
sector, the defenders discovered that two of the three enemy dead wore
under their own clothing various articles of Marine uniforms. Neither
of the Chinese had identification or any papers whatsoever. It was
believed that both were enemy agents and that the attack on the outpost
was a diversion “for the express purpose of detracting attention from
infiltrators.”[164]
[162] HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 27.
[163] _Ibid._
[164] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 5.
Even though enemy tactics and attempts to penetrate Marine positions
demonstrated a good deal of soldierly skills, his conduct of defensive
operations was nothing short of masterful. This was especially true of
Chinese construction of underground earthworks. It appeared that the
Chinese had no single pattern for this type of field fortification.
Like the Japanese in World War II, the Chinese Communists were experts
in organizing the ground thoroughly and in utilizing a seemingly
inexhaustible supply of manpower to hollow out tunnels, air-raid
shelters, living quarters, storage spaces, and mess halls. Americans
described the Chinese as industrious diggers,[165] who excavated
quickly and deeply for protection against UN bombardments. From
numerous reports of ground clashes in the 1st Marine Division sector
and from observations made by Marine pilots, it became known that the
enemy was quick to seek cover whenever he was exposed to sustained
artillery bombardment or air attack.
[165] “The Chinese attack by ‘shovel’ proved effective and
difficult to combat. They burrowed forward almost
continuously, even under direct observation. Every foot
of advance provided added opportunity to attack Marine
COPs with greater impunity. While this activity possibly
provided Marines with target practice in both small arms
and mortars, these CCF working parties in a narrow trench
7 to 10-feet deep probably took very few casualties.” Col
William R. Watson, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC,
dtd 18 July 67.
What was not known, however, was the extent of these subterranean
shelters. One Chinese account, allegedly written by a reconnaissance
staff officer named Li Yo-Yang, described the protection of a CCF
shelter to a recently captured UN prisoner as they were under Allied
artillery bombardment. While shells exploded all around the position
the enemy boasted: “There’s no danger of being killed on a position
fortified by the Chinese People’s Volunteers.... Don’t you know it’s
impossible for your shells to penetrate our air-raid shelters?”[166] An
American report on enemy field fortifications estimated that the amount
of earth cover in Chinese air-raid shelters was as high as 20 feet, and
in frontline defensive positions, up to 33 feet.[167]
[166] _A Volunteer Soldier’s Day: Recollections by Men of the
Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist U.S.
Aggression and Aid Korea_ (Peking: Foreign Languages
Press, 1961), p. 193, hereafter CPV, _Recollections_.
[167] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-90.
Marine defensive installations carved out of the ground were not so
extensive as those of the enemy opposing JAMESTOWN. “In spite of
orders, instructions, and inspections many bunkers were only half dug
in, then built up above the ground with sandbags,” observed one Marine
battalion commander.[168] Back in April, just after the Marine division
had settled in the west, its 1st Engineer Battalion, using U.S. Army
drawings, had published bunker construction plans. Express instructions
to frontline units were to “construct bunkers to provide simultaneously
living and fighting space. Overhead cover on all bunkers will be such
as to withstand direct hit from 105mm and to allow friendly VT fire
over position.”[169]
[168] LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr., “Random Notes on Korea,”
_Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 11 (Nov 55), p. 29,
hereafter Batterton, _Korea Notes_.
[169] CO 5thMar msg to 5thMar units, dtd 20 Apr 52, in 5thMar
ComdD, Apr 52, #2, App. II, p. 6.
Some officers felt it was, perhaps, the work-during-light,
patrol-at-night routine that resulted in the shallow draft Marine
bunkers. Others suggested that the relatively limited defensive
training received by the more offensive-minded Marines created a
natural apathy to digging elaborate fighting positions.
It took a hole 12 feet square and 7 feet deep to house the Army,
Lincoln-logs-type bunker the Marines first used in the spring of 1952.
The fortification, using tree trunks up to eight inches in diameter,
had a cover of seven to eight feet. This consisted of four feet of
logs, and three-to-four more feet of rocks, sandbags, and earth fill.
By the summer of 1952, the division developed its own style of bunker,
a prefabricated timber structure designed to fit into a hole eight feet
square and somewhat less than seven feet deep. This size fortification
could accommodate a .50 caliber machine gun, crew members, or several
riflemen. Provision was also made for the inclusion of a sleeping shelf
in the rear of the bunker. Its construction required no saws, hammers,
or nails, only shovels to excavate. The major drawback to erection of
the prefab was the difficulty in manhandling the heavy roofing timbers,
11 feet long, 12 inches wide, and 4 inches thick. On top of this was
placed a two-foot layer of sandbags, tarpaper covering, and a four feet
high layer of earth that completed the structure and partly camouflaged
it.
Battlefield construction was carried out by the infantry regiments to
the limit of unit capabilities. The division engineers, one company per
frontline regiment, augmented at times by shore party units, supplied
the technical know-how and engineering materials and equipment. These
combat support troops processed the lumber for bunker construction and
built fortifications for forward medical treatment and one bunker for
observation of battle action by civilian and military dignitaries,
irreverently called VIPs (Very Important Persons), who frequently
visited the division. Engineers also erected some of the barbed wire
barriers in the forward areas and, when necessary, cleared firing lanes
for weapons housed in bunkers.
The processing of timbers for easier and faster bunker-construction had
begun on 28 July, but this was hardly in time for the most difficult
fighting the division had faced thus far in western Korea. Given the
name Bunker Hill,[170] this battle would take place in the center
sector of the division line manned since 27 July by Colonel Walter F.
Layer’s 1st Marines.[171] On that date Lieutenant Colonel Armitage’s
battalion, 3/1, took over from the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines on the
left, and 2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Batterton, Jr.) relieved the
2d Battalion of the 7th Marines on the right.[172]
[170] Since bunkers were in everyone’s mind and frontline units
were heavily involved in the bunker-construction program,
it is felt likely “someone in G-2 arbitrarily assigned
the name.” Col Gerald T. Armitage ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3
Div, HQMC, dtd 6 July 67, hereafter _Armitage ltr._
[171] Two days earlier Colonel Layer had taken over the command
from Colonel Flournoy.
[172] Lieutenant Colonels Gerald F. Russell and Anthony Caputo,
respectively, commanded 3/7 and 2/7 at this time.
Across No-Man’s-Land, units of two Chinese divisions faced the
3,603 men of the 1st Marines. From west to east opposite the Marine
regiment’s frontline battalions were elements of the 580th Regiment,
194th Division, 65th CCF Army and of both the 352d and 354th Regiments,
118th Division, 40th CCF Army. The 352d Regiment held most of the area
on which the battle would be fought.[173] Enemy combat efficiency
was rated as excellent and his forward units were well-supplied. The
Chinese conducted an active defense, using limited objective attacks,
numerous small-size probes, and creeping tactics to extend their
OPLR line. Communist soldiers offered well-coordinated and tenacious
resistance to Marine patrols, raids, and attacks. Within enemy lines a
775-foot elevation, known as Taedok-san, was situated directly north of
the Marine division center and commanded the entire Bunker Hill area.
[173] 1stMarDiv PIR 657, dtd 13 Aug 52.
On JAMESTOWN, the dominating height was Hill 201, 660 feet high[174]
and immediately to the rear of the MLR in the left battalion sector.
Southwest of this elevation was the Marine stronghold, Hill 229, just
23 feet lower than Taedok, and believed by the Marines to have been the
objective of the August battle. Directly north of Hill 201 was Hill
122, adjacent to the enemy OPLR, and called Bunker Hill by the Marines.
It was shortly to become the scene of bitter fighting. The crest of
Hill 122 was about 350 yards long. At a distance of about 700 yards, it
generally paralleled the northeast-southwest direction of JAMESTOWN in
the left of the 2/1 sector and adjoining 3/1 sector.
[174] Frequently cartographers use elevations for names of
hills. Heights on the Korean maps are in meters, and
many of these hills derive their name (i.e., number)
from their elevation. For changing meters to feet, the
conversion factor 3.28 is used.
Southwest of Bunker and a little more than 200 yards from the Marine
MLR was Hill 124. This Hill 124–122 axis, for tactical purposes, was
known as the Bunker Ridge. The ridgeline, roughly “cashew” in shape
almost anchored back into the MLR on the forward slopes of Hill 229.
To the northeast of Bunker Hill and separated from it by a wide
saddle[175] was another enemy position, Hill 120. (See Map 9, for
outposts and key hill positions in the 1st Marines center regimental
area in early August.)
[175] A saddle, the low point in the crest line of a ridge, is
much in appearance like the side view of a riding saddle.
Approximately one mile east of Hill 124 was Hill 56A, or Samoa, the
right flank limit of the immediate battlefield. It guarded the best
avenue of approach into the Bunker Hill area, the Changdan Road.
Another Marine position west of Samoa was Hill 58A, or Siberia, a
sentinel overlooking a long draw running down the east sides of Hills
122 and 120. Both Samoa and Siberia were outposted by squads. Another
1st Marines squad occupied Hill 52, on the other side of Changdan Road
and not quite a half-mile east of Samoa. The entire battlefield was cut
up by numerous gullies and draws, most of which paralleled Bunker Hill.
[Illustration:
MAP 9 K. White
1ST MARINES SECTOR OF JAMESTOWN
(Division Center)
8 AUGUST 1952]
_Preliminary Action on Siberia_[176]
[176] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section
is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3
Jnls, 9–11 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.
The first round in the battle of Bunker Hill began as the fight for
Siberia, Hill 58A. Just slightly more than a quarter of a mile from
JAMESTOWN, this squad-size outpost, the most western in the right
battalion sector, had been occupied in June when the division moved
its MLR forward. Since Siberia was located halfway between the Marine
MLR and the Communist OPLR, the Marine seizure of Siberia prevented
the Chinese from holding terrain suitable for employing 60mm mortars
against Marine frontline troops.[177] Strong enemy outposts on Hills
120 to the north and 110 to the northeast constantly threatened the
squad on 58A. From these two forward positions, Chinese troops early on
9 August 1952 streamed down to Siberia, launching in the process the
Bunker Hill battle.
[177] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, App. VII, p. 1.
Just before 0100 an estimated four enemy squads fell upon Hill 58A,
outposted by Company E Marines. Using assorted infantry weapons, the
raiding party forced the outnumbered Siberia occupants to withdraw.
By 0145 the outpost Marines returned to the MLR. At this time the
JAMESTOWN sector south of the outpost, also held by Captain Jesse F.
Thorpe’s Company E, was under attack by approximately 50 Chinese.
After breaking up the enemy assault by well placed friendly mortar
fire, the Marines enjoyed a brief respite from Chinese pressure and
formulated plans to recapture Siberia. It was decided that a reinforced
Company E platoon would counterattack to regain the outpost. At 0355,
the 11th Marines fired a five-minute preparation against the objective.
On schedule, the platoon crossed JAMESTOWN at 0400 and in the darkness
headed towards the outpost. Advancing carefully to avoid detection as
long as possible, the Marines reached the area near the base of the
hill by 0525. Heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire again forced the
Marines to withdraw, and the platoon returned to its company CP at
0545. So far, the 58A action had resulted in the wounding of 32 Marines
and the killing of another.
It became evident that more preparation, by Marine air and artillery,
would be required for the recapture of Siberia. At 0650, four Marine
F9F jet fighters worked the hill over with napalm and 500-pound
bombs. Three hours later, a flight of Air Force F-80 “Shooting Star”
jets dropped eight 1,000-pound bombs on the same target. With the
aerial attack complete, Marine artillery opened fire. Five minutes
later another Marine reinforced platoon launched a second ground
attack. This was made by a unit from Company A (Captain Robert W.
Judson) of the regimental reserve battalion, supported by a Company E
platoon. Again the Marines advanced to the open sector south of the
hill before the enemy reacted. As before, the Chinese response was
a devastating barrage from their supporting weapons. The stubborn
Marine assault against Siberia brought down the full weight of Chinese
firepower--rifle, machine gun, and hand grenades--but the attack force
would not be beaten off. At 1103 the Siberia hill again belonged to the
Marines. Quickly the Company A platoon began to organize a defense to
repulse the Chinese counterattack, which was certain to come.
In anticipation of a prompt and violent retaliation by the Chinese,
and to help the speedily improvised defense efforts, the 2/1
battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Batterton, had sent forward
the supporting platoon from Company E. This reinforcing unit reached
Siberia within seven minutes after the Marine attackers had gained
possession of the objective. The new arrivals scarcely had time to dig
in before a hail of mortar and artillery shells forced all the Marines
to seek cover in a defiladed position on the southern side of the
slope. From here, the 2/1 force directed counter mortar and artillery
fire onto the top and far side of Siberia and unleashed their own
assault weapons against the Chinese soldiers pressing for possession of
Siberia. By midafternoon, with heavy enemy counterfire on the position
and their casualties reaching nearly 75 percent, the Marines were
forced to withdraw and return to their own lines. The hill had changed
hands twice and the enemy had employed 5,000 rounds of artillery in the
contested ownership.
Badly mauled by two actions against Hill 58A, Company E came off the
lines to reorganize, exchanging positions with Company A, of Lieutenant
Colonel Louis N. King’s 1st Battalion. About this time Company C, less
one platoon, had moved from the 1/1 rear area forward to an assembly
point behind 2/1 in preparation for a night counterattack to retake
the now battle-scarred outpost. Without the customary artillery
preparation, the attacking force at 2245 crossed the MLR at a point
directly south of the former outpost Samoa, which had been abandoned
earlier when Siberia fell. Working their way northwest towards Siberia,
the Company C Marines, commanded by Captain Casimir C. Ksycewski,
cautiously approached the assault line. Reaching it at 0105 on 10
August the force deployed immediately and rushed the objective.
At about this time the Chinese defenders opened fire but could not halt
the assaulting Marines. The struggle to regain the Siberia objective
was fierce; some of the Chinese refused to yield and fought to their
death. Most, however, held their defense positions only briefly before
retiring to the refuge offered by the reverse slope of the hill.
Gaining the crest of Hill 58A at 0116, the Company C commander ordered
a platoon to the other side of the objective to dispatch remaining
elements of the enemy force. The resulting fire fight lasted nearly
four hours. At daybreak, however, the enemy, in estimated company
strength, strenuously renewed his counterfire and, for a third time,
forced the 1st Marines to retire from the disputed hill and return to
the main line.
Later that day, at the regimental CP, Colonel Layer called a staff
conference to decide on the best course of action. Successive Marine
withdrawals had been caused by the intense enemy shelling. The key to
its effectiveness was the observation provided the Chinese from Hills
122 and 110. Heavy enemy fire had also caused most of the casualties,
17 killed and 243 wounded, in 1st Marine ranks. It was decided to
shift the battle area to better restrict this enemy capability not
only to observe Marine troop movements but also to call down accurate
fire on friendly attacking units. Bunker Hill, an enemy outpost west
of Siberia, was selected. In the eyes of 1st Marines tacticians,
possession of Hill 122 instead of Hill 58A presented three major
advantages:
Hill 122 offered excellent observation into the rear of enemy
outposts;
Possession of Hill 122 would greatly strengthen the MLR in the
regimental sector, effectively neutralize Siberia, provide
dominating terrain that was more defensible than 58A; and
Bunker offered an excellent opportunity for an attack employing
the element of surprise against the enemy.
To help preserve this tactical surprise, the plan for the Bunker Hill
attack included a diversionary attack against Siberia. Making this
secondary effort would be a reinforced rifle platoon and a composite
unit of gun and flame tanks. For the main attack, Lieutenant Colonel
Batterton’s 2d Battalion would employ a reinforced rifle company with
supporting artillery and armor, if needed. The operation was to be
conducted at night, to further ensure the opportunity for tactical
surprise. For the same reason, the attack was not to be preceded by
artillery preparation on either objective. To the right of the 1st
Marines, however, Colonel Culhane’s 5th Marines would support the
diversion by artillery and tank fire placed on enemy strongpoints in
the Ungok area, about 1¼ miles northeast of Siberia. During daylight,
air, artillery, and tanks attacked targets on both 122 and 58A.
Priority of effort in the 1st Marines area went to units preparing for
the Siberia-Bunker offensive.
_The Attack on Bunker Hill_[178]
[178] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is
derived from: Encl (1) to CG, FMFPac ltr 0762/161 over A9
to CMC, dtd 25 Nov 52, Subj: “Summary of 1stMarDiv Sit
from 20 July-20 Oct 52,” hereafter FMFPac, _1stMarDiv
Sum, Jul-Oct 52_; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 2/1, 1st TkBn
ComdDs, Aug 52.
At dusk on 11 August, 1,000 yards behind the MLR in the western sector
of the 2/1 line, the eight Company C tanks that were to provide much
of the diversionary effort at Hill 58A moved out of their assembly
area. Leading the column east of the MSR, Changdan Road, were four M-46
mediums, mounting 90mm guns. They were followed by an equal number
of flame vehicles. Each M-46 was specially equipped with an 18-inch
fighting light, actually a searchlight with a shutter over the lens, to
be used for battlefield illumination. The flame vehicles, World War II
M4A3E8 mediums, mounted a 105mm howitzer in addition to the flame tube.
As the tanks reached the Changdan Road, they turned north, crossed the
MLR, and proceeded to preselected positions. (See Map 10.)
[Illustration:
MAP 10 K. WHITE
2/1 SECTOR
9–11 AUGUST 1952]
When the M-46 gun tanks were in position to fire on Siberia and its
flanks, their powerful 90s opened up on the objective. At this time,
2110, the first section of flames (two tanks) made its way along the
stream bed between the MLR and Hill 56A (Samoa). Lighting their way
with very short bursts of flame, the two tanks advanced in this manner
to the base of Hill 58A. There the vehicles paused momentarily, then
began to move up the near slope, using longer spurts of flame to sear
the ground and sparse vegetation to the crest of the position. The gun
tanks, in the meantime, had shifted their fire from Siberia northeast
to neutralize Hill 110. When the flame vehicles reached the top of
Siberia, they lumbered down the far slope, firing then in shorter
bursts and sweeping the area with machine guns to discourage any enemy
infantry interference.
With some fuel reserved to light their way on the return trip, the
flame section reversed its course from the far side of the objective,
mounted the crest, and clanked back to the Changdan Road. When the
first section had returned, the second departed, completing its mission
in much the same manner. Tank personnel of both groups observed that
the enemy artillery and mortar fire was medium to heavy on Siberia.
Some rifle fire was also received. Gun tanks, firing from Changdan Road
east of Siberia, experienced less fire from the Chinese.
Although the flame vehicles had completed their mission and were on
their way home, the M-46s remained on position in support of the 3d
Platoon, Company D which, at 2230, was advancing from the MLR to
complete the infantry part of the diversion. Staying out of the low
ground that the tanks had used, the platoon swept over Hill 56A at 2255
and immediately struck out for the further objective, Hill 58A. Gun
tanks firing their 90s on the Chinese OPLR on Hill 110 and on Siberia
illuminated the target area with their fighting lights, the shutter
of which the tankers flicked open and closed during each five-second
interval that the light remained on.
Less than an hour after crossing JAMESTOWN, the platoon from Captain
George W. Campbell’s Company D reported the capture of Siberia. The
enemy quickly made his presence felt at the objective; a half hour
before midnight, he assaulted the hill in reinforced platoon strength.
Ten minutes later the Chinese withdrew and the Company D Marines, in
accordance with their battle plan, did likewise. At about the same
time the 5th Marines, having completed its part in the diversion, also
secured from the operation.
Ten minutes after the diversionary infantry had cleared Samoa while
enroute to Siberia, the main attack force, Company B, which had come
under operational control of 2/1 at 1800, crossed the MLR, the line of
departure. Moving at a fast pace to preserve the element of anticipated
surprise, the attack force, commanded by Captain Sereno S. Scranton,
Jr., soon deployed two squads of the lead platoon against the near side
of the hill. By 2318 on 11 August the squads were moving up Bunker Hill
and, 10 minutes later, one platoon had gained the top of the objective
and one was at the base of the hill, both moving northward along the
forward slope. As the advancing units neared the end of their sweep
forward, they began to come under small amounts of rifle fire from
the front and left flank of the position.[179] The Company B platoons
continued to advance, returning well-placed small arms fire.
[179] Recalling the Marine seizure of Bunker, the G-3,
1stMarDiv at that time expressed the view that “taking
these places was easy but holding them under heavy
Chinese artillery and mortar fire was extremely costly.
Our counterbattery fire was ineffective because we were
limited to from one to eight rounds per tube per day,
depending on the weapon, by Army order, because of
an ammunition shortage.” Col Russell E. Honsowetz MS
comments, dtd 15 Jun 67, hereafter _Honsowetz ltr II_.
Soon the intensity of Chinese small arms fire increased; at the same
time enemy mortars and artillery opened up on the company. Marines
attempting to assault the top of Hill 122 also came under a hail of
hand grenades hurled by the staunch Chinese defenders. After a brief
but vicious fight at point-blank range, the Chinese gave ground on the
eastern side, heading uphill. Several Marines pursued the fleeing enemy
to the summit, then joined the rest of the assault units of Company B
in organizing a defense. By 0300, 12 August the battle had quieted down
and for a short while all firing ceased. Then, as the Marines began to
dig in, a bypassed pocket of enemy resistance came to life. Two fire
teams in the 1st Platoon took these Chinese Communists under fire.
Even as the fighting continued, Marines and KSC personnel were hauling
fortification materials towards Bunker to consolidate the precarious
foothold. For a while, enemy mortars unleashed a heavy fire against
the newly won position, but by 0230 Company B was able to report that
enemy shelling had stopped and that the objective was in friendly
hands. A new fire fight broke out at 0345 between a small force of
enemy soldiers occupying a draw forward of Bunker Hill and Marines
nearby. The exchange of fire continued for nearly two hours, but short
of harassing the Marines on Bunker Hill the enemy did not launch
a counterattack. Dawn on 12 August revealed that thus far in the
Bunker Hill fighting 1 Marine of Company B had been killed and 22 were
wounded. The earlier diversionary attack on Siberia had resulted in
only one Marine casualty, the wounding of the platoon commander, Second
Lieutenant James W. Dion.
Personnel losses were kept to a minimum by the well-organized medical
support and the efficient service of medical and evacuation personnel.
A forward aid station was established in the vicinity of the Company
E CP. Casualties that were not ambulatory arrived at this two-bunker
installation usually by hand litter, other wounded men were transported
in armored personnel carriers, U.S. Army tracked vehicles similar in
appearance to the Marine LVT, that had accompanied the diversionary
unit and were part of the Panmunjom rescue force stationed in the
area of COP 2 on the 3/1 left flank. Wounded Marines were examined
immediately. Minor injury cases were treated and discharged; more
seriously injured personnel were given emergency treatment and
evacuated. Movement to the rear was accomplished by ambulance jeeps.
Helicopters, landing only 30 yards from the station, flew out the
critically wounded. A sandbag-protected squad tent was used to house
casualties waiting to be examined. This emergency aid station closed
down on 13 August, when action in the right battalion sector diminished.
Even though the remainder of the morning of 12 August was practically
free of any retaliatory attempts by the Chinese against Bunker Hill,
the Marines occupying the new position were not idle, for they
anticipated an immediate and severe reaction for capturing the hill.
Quickly, but methodically, the company dug in. At noon, regiment
passed to 3/1[180] the responsibility for Bunker Hill and operational
control of Company B. Consolidation of Hill 122 continued until about
1500, when the Marines were forced to put down their entrenching tools
and grab their rifles instead. The Chinese had suddenly launched an
intense mortar and artillery attack against the hill. Defending Marines
expected to see enemy soldiers start up the western slopes at any
minute.
[180] Initially the diversionary attack against Siberia and
subsequent assault against Bunker had been made by
Marines of 2/1 since Siberia was in the 2/1 sector. On
12 August operational control was transferred to 3/1
as the fighting continued at Bunker, in the area of
responsibility of the left battalion sector.
Actually, more than an hour elapsed before the Communists initiated
their first main ground attack to regain Bunker. By that time, heavy
casualties from the continued shelling had forced Company B to pull
back from the ridge and take up positions on the reverse (eastern)
slope of Bunker Hill. At this point, with reduced Company B forces
and with no radio communication between Captain Scranton’s unit and
3/1, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage sent I/3/1,[181] under Captain Howard
J. Connolly, forward from the MLR. Shortly before 1600, a force of
more than 350 Chinese lunged out of the low ground of Hill 123, west
of Bunker, to attack defensive positions along the ridge between
Hills 124–122. Striking in rapid succession first the west side and
then the northern end of the Company B position to find a weak spot
in the defense, the enemy counterattack finally concentrated on the
southwestern part of the hill.
[181] From the division reserve, Captain Anthony J. Skotnicki’s
company, I/3/7, was en route to take over the I/3/1
sector. As an interim measure, Captain Byron J.
Melancon’s Company H extended its MLR positions to the
right to cover the Company I area.
An intense exchange of fire raged here until 1715, when the defending
fire of Company B plus the added weight of the Company I reinforcements
combined to stall the enemy advance. Having failed to gain their
objective, the Communists abruptly broke off their artillery and mortar
fire and ordered their infantry to withdraw. They pulled back only to
the far side of the hill, however. By 1740 the enemy was occupying his
new post on the northern slope, while the Marines continued to hold
their positions on the reverse slope of Bunker Ridge. Enemy supporting
fires had lifted and a lull ensued in the fighting.
_Consolidating the Defense of Bunker Hill_[182]
[182] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
12–13 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.
Even before the Chinese had made their coordinated attack against Hill
122 in the midafternoon of the 12th, the 1st Marines had implemented
a plan of action to assure that the critical position would remain
in Marine hands. In addition to the movement of Company I/3/1 to
reinforce Bunker Hill and of Company I/3/7 as its relief on the MLR,
a precautionary displacement was also made of the 3/1 reconnaissance
platoon to Hill 124 to tie in that terrain feature with both Bunker
and JAMESTOWN and thus consolidate the defense north of the MLR and
west of Bunker. (See Map 11.)
[Illustration:
MAP 11 K. WHITE
BUNKER HILL AREA
2300, 12 AUGUST 1952]
Other activities behind the line aimed at making the Marine position
on the newly seized hill more tenable. As one step in this direction,
General Selden shifted most of his reserve into the zone of action.
Before the end of the day remaining units of 3/7 were placed under
operational control of 3/1, and 2/7 was attached to Colonel Layer’s
reserve. The 7th Marines was directed to place its 4.2-inch mortars
on call to the 1st Marines. Priority of artillery support went to the
Bunker Hill regiment. Within the 1st Marines, the regimental commander
moved two provisional platoons (118 Marines) of the reserve 1st
Battalion to the 3d Battalion sector. All 81mm mortars in 1/1 were sent
to the left battalion. The fire plan also called for employment of all
the 60mm mortars that could bear on the crest of 124–122, with 81mm and
artillery box-me-in barrage fires on the ridge and flanks.
Machine guns from the MLR were assigned missions on the crest of Bunker
Ridge and 4.5-inch ripples were planned on the deep enemy approaches.
Gun and flame tanks were to protect the right flank of Hill 122 where
the steep draw between Bunker and the MLR offered the most dangerous
approach into Bunker Hill. Supplies and fortification materials,
meanwhile, were being carried forward and casualties taken to the rear
by the relief party. Although 3/1 initially reported that the Bunker
Hill fighting had resulted in 58 killed or wounded Marines, a later
battalion count showed this number to be 34--5 killed and 29 wounded.
Most of the casualties had been caused by hostile shelling. Although
the Hill 122 reverse slope afforded some cover from the Chinese
artillery and mortars, the positions on the crest did not offer any
protection, so Marines continued their trenchworks and other defensive
preparations at a rapid pace and supporting fires were registered by
1900. The approach of night was certain to bring renewed Communist
attempts to capture Bunker Hill.
At 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage reported to division that his
force on Hill 122 occupied the entire reverse slope and that the Marine
of I/3/1 and B/1/1 were digging in and consolidating their scant
defenses. Enemy shells were still falling on both Bunker and Hill 124.
Company commanders forward of the MLR estimated that as many as 400
Chinese occupied the ridge on the other side of the slope from the
Marines. Since the crest of the long Hill 124–122 ridgeline was fairly
level, the gentle incline of the Bunker rear slope permitted defending
Marine units excellent fields of fire to the ridge crest, a major
consideration in the 3/1 battalion commander’s decision to adopt a
rear slope defense. Moreover, the top of the ridge could be swept with
direct fire from the MLR as well as supporting weapons from the two
nearest companies on JAMESTOWN. Opposing Marine and Chinese forces were
thus lined up for a continuation of the battle for Bunker Hill.
It appeared that the Chinese wished to attempt a diversionary tactic
of their own. To draw attention away from Hill 122 they engaged a
Marine outpost east of Bunker and a KMC ambush far to the left before
attacking Bunker again. In the KMC sector, shortly after 2300, an enemy
infantry platoon walked into a trap near the eastern edge of the Sachon
and 500 yards south of the Munsan-ni-Kaesong rail line. The brief fire
fight lasted only 10 minutes before the Chinese broke contact.
Perhaps the ambush was incidental to the forthcoming attack against
the Bunker complex, but this same reasoning cannot be applied to
the Communist-inspired action which broke out shortly at Hill 48A,
Stromboli, another friendly outpost far to the east of Hill 122.
Near the right limiting point of Colonel Layer’s 1st Marines and the
5th Marines boundary, Stromboli was another Marine fire-team-by-day,
squad-by-night position. It occupied a small rise 250 yards forward
of the MLR and commanded the immediate sector in all directions. The
entire MLR in the regimental right was dominated by the enemy-held Hill
104, a half-mile north of 48A.
Communist infantry opened the attack without benefit of any supporting
arms preparation and rushed to seize Hill 48A early on the morning of
13 August, a few minutes after midnight. Defending Marines immediately
responded with small arms and automatic weapons fire. By the time the
outpost commander had informed battalion of the attack by radio, the
far right sector of the 1st Marines line, held by Captain Clarence G.
Moody, Jr.’s Company F, had also come under attack. Firing rifles and
submachine guns and hurling hand grenades as they assaulted the main
position, the Chinese attempted to penetrate the JAMESTOWN defenses.
In spite of the enemy’s concerted efforts, the Marine line remained
staunch.
At Stromboli, the Communists met with no greater success, although
they did cause enough casualties to warrant the dispatch of a Company F
reinforcing squad. When this unit left the MLR, at 0106 on 13 August,
the Marine line was still under a heavy attack not only from Chinese
infantry but from hostile artillery and mortars as well. Out at Hill
48A the outpost remained in comparative quiet until the approach of the
reinforcing party. As the Company F squad neared the base of the hill,
Chinese infantry that earlier had been assaulting the Marine MLR turned
their rifle and machine gun fire from positions on the JAMESTOWN side
of the outpost. A heavy rain of devastating mortar fire engulfed the
reinforcing Marines. On order, they broke off the approach march and
returned to the company rear area.
On the main line, meanwhile, Company F positions were still being
bombarded by Chinese artillery and assaulted by their infantry.
Casualties along the entire line forced Lieutenant Colonel Batterton to
order his 1st Provisional Platoon, Headquarters and Service Company,
2/1, to the Company F command post. After the clutch unit departed the
battalion area, at 0210, and approached Captain Moody’s CP, enemy fires
immediately intensified. A violent fight erupted to the left of the
Company F sector, but the Marines there held. The Chinese then tried to
punch holes in other parts of the company line, moving eastward along
JAMESTOWN. Each failure to breach the line seemed to signal a decrease
in the intensity of Chinese shelling.
This easing of Communist pressure against the main line enabled
the Company F commander to put into operation a new attempt at the
reinforcement and rescue of Stromboli. After the initial enemy assault
in the early hours of 13 August had ended in failure, the Chinese made
repeated attempts to capture the outpost. At one time it appeared
that a company of Chinese had overrun the hill. Later, however, the
Stromboli stronghold radioed that the enemy force, subsequently
identified as only a platoon, had encircled the Marine position. To
relieve enemy pressure at Hill 48A, Captain Moody employed a rifle
platoon which set out for the outpost at 0325.
Simultaneously, as if their intelligence had advance knowledge of the
1st Marines recovery plan, the Chinese stepped up the tempo of their
attack at Stromboli. A fresh assault by the enemy was stymied by Marine
superiority in hand-to-hand combat. Thereafter, close-in defensive
fires continued to ring the outpost and to discourage future assaults.
The approach of the second Marine rescue party eliminated much of
the pressure that Communist foot soldiers had maintained around the
hill position. After a 90-minute exchange of fire with the enemy, the
friendly platoon penetrated the encirclement and rushed to the besieged
outpost at the hill crest. At this point the Chinese disengaged and
withdrew towards the north.
After their diversion against Stromboli had approached the proportions
of a full-scale attack, with the enemy having reinforced from platoon
to company size, the Chinese then initiated their main thrust, an
attempt to retake Bunker. Captain Connolly (I/3/1) had reported
that shortly before 0100 Communist mortar fire had begun falling on
his positions on the southern slope of Bunker Hill. Simultaneously,
Chinese artillery stepped up the rate of its barrage fires as did the
assaulting close-in enemy infantry. Captain Connolly then requested
the 11th Marines to place box-me-in fires around the Marine company
positions on Hill 122. Artillery furnished these defensive fires almost
immediately.
Shortly after 0130, the Marines in the center and right of the I/3/1
position observed a large number of Chinese, deployed into a skirmish
line, headed directly for their part of the hill. The attack was
accompanied by intense machine gun and rifle fire. It was countered by
an equally heavy reply from Marines on Bunker. For nearly four hours
the battle raged at Hill 122. Unsuccessful enemy frontal assaults were
followed by attempts to dislodge the defenders from the rear. In their
continuing thrust against the hill, the Chinese were repulsed by Marine
coordinated support fires--tank, rocket, artillery, and mortar.
By firing on known or suspected assembly areas and Chinese infantry
units advancing up the draws towards Hill 122, these Marine
supporting weapons helped to preserve the status quo at Bunker.
Repeated box-me-ins were also fired by the 11th Marines during the
early-morning Communist attacks on 13 August. Exploding friendly mortar
shells increased the effectiveness of the hill defense; nine rocket
ripples[183] fired by the artillery regiment further supported Marines
at the critical terrain position. Tanks unleashed their deadly fire on
nearby enemy outposts to neutralize them; their 90mm guns, aided by the
battlefield illumination from tank fighting lights, helped eliminate
Chinese foot soldiers attempting to envelop Marine positions on Bunker.
[183] A characteristic of 4.5-inch rocket launcher is the
discharge of 24 rounds in quick succession, called a
ripple. A battery of six launchers can fire 144 rounds on
target in less than a minute.
It was in this direction that an enemy force, estimated at reinforced
battalion strength, headed during the early morning fighting on Hill
122. At 0330, the struggle for possession of the height had reached
the climax. For an hour the issue remained in doubt. Then, as the
Chinese small arms fire decreased, the tempo of the enemy’s artillery
shelling increased. This, the division correctly deduced, announced the
beginning of a temporary Communist withdrawal from Bunker Hill.
Although the immediate danger of the enemy onslaught had ended for
the time being, Marines to the rear of the JAMESTOWN Line stepped up
their defensive preparations. Division, regimental, and battalion
operational plans were put into effect to prevent a Chinese victory.
The seriousness of the situation on the 1st Marines right flank at
Stromboli early on 13 August had resulted in the movement of one
company of 5th Marines into blocking positions behind the MLR near
the left regimental boundary. To the south of Bunker Hill, relief
and replacement units from the division reserve, ordered into action
late the previous day, maneuvered into position to strengthen the
regimental front. One of these relief units, G/3/7, under command of
Captain William M. Vanzuyen, had just deployed from its assembly area
to pass through the ranks of an MLR company and take over the Bunker
Hill positions. The Marines’ situation on Hill 122 had deteriorated so
rapidly, however, that the 3/1 commander rushed two reinforced squads
forward from I/3/7, the nearest MLR unit.
The Company G reinforcement unit jumped off from JAMESTOWN and arrived
at Bunker shortly after sunup, where it reinforced Captain Connolly’s
positions during the height of the battle for possession of Hill 122.
Not long after, the Chinese initiated their withdrawal under cover of
increased artillery and mortar barrages. As they left, the Communists
policed the battlefield in their typically thorough manner. A Marine
platoon that swept the northern slope of Bunker failed to find any
enemy bodies in this area so recently abandoned by the Chinese, but did
take under fire and kill seven enemy that had remained on Hill 122.
Before I/3/1 had sent one of its platoons to reconnoiter the far side
of Bunker Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage ordered H/3/7, under
Captain John G. Demas, forward to relieve friendly forces at the
contested height. The exchange of units was completed before noon
of the 13th. By late afternoon, except for Company H, all 2d and 3d
Battalions, 7th Marines units that had moved up to reinforce the 1st
Marines were on their way back to the regimental reserve area. At this
time the 1st Marines CO, Colonel Layer, reported to General Selden
that the Bunker Hill action during 12–13 August had resulted in 24
Marines killed and 214 wounded. On the right, in the 2d Battalion
sector, an additional 40 Marines were listed as casualties, including
7 killed in the Stromboli defense. Chinese known dead numbered 210,
plus an estimated 470 killed and 625 wounded.[184] Artillery and aerial
observers reported that between 1500 on the 12th and 0600 the following
morning an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 rounds of enemy fire had fallen
on 1st Marines positions, the “heaviest incoming fires received by the
Division since coming into the present sector.”[185]
[184] 1stMarDiv PIR 658, dtd 14 Aug 52.
[185] Selden, _Div Staff Rpt_, p. 19.
The number of casualties from the Bunker Hill action was to increase
further that same day with a renewed attack on the outpost. Before
the Chinese again engaged Hill 122, however, they made a diversionary
attack on the western flank at the extreme left of the 3/1 sector.
At dusk on 13 August, the enemy shelled the Company G Marines at COP
2, the critical height overlooking the Panmunjom peace corridor. The
shelling caused several casualties and lasted 90 minutes. Towards the
end, Communist infantrymen moved forward and fired on the outpost.
At about the same time, Company H personnel emplaced on the MLR to
the rear of COP 2 began to receive artillery rounds in preassault
proportions.
A ground attack in this western end of the 3/1 sector did not
materialize, however. Instead, the Chinese resumed their attack on
Bunker Hill. Since their temporary withdrawal early on the 13th, the
CCF had repeatedly sent mortar and artillery barrages against the
bastion to harass its new occupants. On occasion these well-aimed
mortar rounds found their mark. Mortars interdicting a trail used for
resupply of the Hill 122 defenders did inflict some casualties on two
groups rushing emergency supplies forward from the MLR.
At 2100, while continuing his shelling of the left end of the 3/1
sector, the enemy lifted his preparation on Hill 122 to permit a CCF
reinforced company to make a new assault there on the Marine defenders.
Captain Demas called for box-me-ins to seal off his positions and
illumination shells to help locate the enemy force. Utilizing the draw
to the east of Hill 58A, the Chinese proceeded west to Bunker where
they pitted one platoon against the center of the Company H, 3/7 line
and another against the right flank. Defensive fires momentarily held
off the intruders, although some were able to break through to the
Marines’ fighting positions.
Those enemy troops who penetrated the Marine defenses were quickly
eliminated by grenades and small arms fire. Unable to weaken the Marine
defenses any further and by now sustaining sizable casualties from
unrelenting Marine artillery and mortar concentrations, the Communists
withdrew at 2215. Marine defenders estimated they had killed 175 enemy
during this latest encounter; a firm count of 20 bodies were found on
the shell-torn slopes. Company H casualties, all from enemy mortar and
artillery fire, were 7 killed and 21 wounded.[186] Enemy incoming was
again heavy during this period, with a reported 3,000 rounds falling in
the sector.
[186] During the fighting on the 13th, Hospitalman John E.
Kilmer was mortally wounded while “administering aid to
the wounded and expediting their evacuation.” Though
wounded by enemy mortars, he continued his life-saving
efforts until another barrage took his life. He had
died shielding a wounded Marine undergoing emergency
treatment. Hospitalman Kilmer, a distant cousin of poet
Joyce Kilmer, became the first of four corpsmen serving
with the 1st Marine Division to be awarded the Medal of
Honor during the trench warfare in western Korea.
In the 3d Battalion sector, Marine and KSC stretcher bearers brought
casualties to the I/3/1 CP, several hundred yards to the rear of the
front line. At the command post, the critically wounded were airlifted
by helicopter to the rear. Less seriously wounded casualties were
placed in jeep ambulances and carried to the battalion forward aid
station, about two miles away. Here a team of doctors and corpsmen
examined and treated patients, discharged a few, but prepared most for
further evacuation. At the 1st Marines forward aid station, patients
were reexamined and their wounds redressed when required; discharge or
further evacuation was also accomplished. Most of the Marines brought
to this forward facility had become exhausted from vigorous activity
in the high temperature and humidity which characterized the South
Korean summer. The regimental aid station treated these heat cases and
then released them to their units.
_Company B Returns to Bunker Hill_[187]
[187] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 3/1, 1st TkBn ComdDs,
Aug 52.
Division intelligence subsequently reported that the 2100 attack on 13
August had been made by an enemy battalion with a reinforced company
in assault. This same unit again sent a small band of Chinese soldiers
against Hill 122 at 0225 the following morning. This clash was to be
the briefest of all offensives for control of Bunker Hill during the
11–17 August period. Prior to launching this four-minute fire fight,
an enemy machine gun at Siberia had attempted to harass the Marines at
Bunker Hill. In retaliation, Marine tanks illuminated this enemy weapon
with their searchlights and immediately took it under fire with their
90mm guns, knocking it out of action. At the same time, enemy artillery
attempted to shell friendly tanks. During this brief fire exchange,
one tanker was wounded slightly and the lens of one fighting light was
splintered by fragments from enemy shells bursting around the tanks.
The inconsequential probe was made, Marines believed, not so much to
seriously challenge Marines holding Hill 122 as it was to retrieve CCF
dead and wounded from the major attack a few hours earlier that night.
Anticipating that a much heavier ground attack was close at hand,
the 1st Marines ordered a reinforcement of the Bunker Hill position.
Even before the heavy action on the 13th, this machinery had been set
in motion. To this end, the 3d Battalion was to reinforce the Bunker
defense by sending a 1/1 platoon to the hill and the 2d Battalion was
instructed to return Company A (minus this platoon) to the reserve
battalion. At 0415 on the 14th, Company E/2/1, led since 10 August
by Captain Stanley T. Moak, took over from A/1/1 the responsibility
for the 2d Battalion’s MLR “Siberia sector,” adjacent to the Bunker
Hill area held by the 3d Battalion. The Company A reinforcing platoon
arrived at Hill 122 just before dusk, preceding another CCF company
attack by only a few hours.
At midnight the 1st Marines front was suspiciously quiet for a few
minutes. Forward on Hill 122, there was no apparent enemy activity.
Captain Demas sent out a two fire-team patrol from Bunker to
reconnoiter northwest of Bunker towards the Chinese lines. Shortly
after the eight Marines returned with a negative report of contact with
the enemy, the regiment received a report about the outbreak of a small
arms clash between defenders on the left flank of Bunker and an enemy
unit farther west. At 0118 on 15 August what had initially appeared to
be a minor contest suddenly erupted into a heated fire fight all along
the 124–122 Bunker Ridge complex. At the request of Captain Dumas,
Marine artillery fired protective boxes around the Bunker positions.
This defensive maneuver held the attackers in check.
At this moment, Chinese infantrymen in the draw running alongside the
124–122–120 ridge system were massed for an assault on Bunker from the
northeast. The plan might have been successful had not a fighting light
from a tank on the main line intercepted the Communists in this state
of their preparations. In a matter of moments, friendly artillery,
mortar, and tank fire struck the Chinese and scattered the formation.
After discovering he could not successfully pull a sneak attack,
the enemy reverted to his usual procedure, employing a preassault
bombardment prior to his infantry assault. This preparation began at
0206; it reached the rate of approximately 100 rounds of 82 and 122mm
mortar shells per minute. While supporting weapons pounded the Marines,
the Chinese assault commander reorganized his attack force that the
Marine shelling had scattered. Communist infantry then moved forward
and fired on the Bunker Marines, who replied with rifles and machine
guns and box-me-in fires. Unable to penetrate this protective mask
around the positions, the Chinese gradually decreased their small arms
and artillery fire until, at 0315, the rate of exploding shells at Hill
122 had dropped to only four or five per minute. Soon thereafter the
small arms fire slacked off entirely and by 0400 even the mortars had
stopped. Across the entire 1st Marines front, all was quiet again.
During the Company H defense of the hill, enemy losses, caused mostly
by friendly artillery and mortar fire, were placed at 350, including 40
counted dead. Captain Demas’ Marines suffered 35 casualties, of whom
7 were killed. En route to the MLR after relief by B/3/1, the company
suffered four more casualties, including two KIAs, all the victims of
Chinese mortars.
It was not long before these weapons inflicted casualties on Company B,
which had six of its men wounded even before the H/3/7 unit had reached
JAMESTOWN. Another Marine at Bunker was wounded by enemy mortars later
that morning. At 1640 the Communists again probed Bunker Hill, this
time in company strength. Striking in daylight during a thunderstorm
and without any preparatory fires, the Chinese attackers failed to
achieve any tactical surprise. The defenders fired both infantry and
supporting weapons; some threw grenades at the few Communists who did
manage to get close to the fighting positions. At 1750, the Chinese
withdrew, this time leaving 35 of their dead in the attack area. Four
Marines had been wounded; five others suffering from battle fatigue
were later evacuated.
Exactly when the enemy would strike next at Bunker Hill was not known
by the Marines. Most believed that the Communists would return but only
speculated as to when. Although the battalion felt that “the enemy was
not expected to attack again for some time,”[188] events were to prove
otherwise. In any case, the battalion was prepared, having an adequate
force on Bunker and sufficient local reserves to absorb an attack up
to the strength of any received so far. Division supporting arms were
readily available for commitment at critical points.
[188] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.
The Chinese soon put an end to the conjecture about the next attack.
At 0040, 16 August, an enemy force, later estimated as a battalion,
came out of positions to the west and north of Hill 122. Supported
by mortars at first, and later on by artillery, the battalion sent
one company against the Marine outpost. Several attacking elements
were able to penetrate the defensive fires. These Chinese reached the
crest of the hill and began using their rifles, automatic weapons,
and hand grenades against the defenders. Captain Scranton called for
reinforcements. A platoon from I/3/7 was dispatched promptly from the
3/1 sector. The reinforcements departed JAMESTOWN just as the fire
fight on Bunker began to subside. By 0315, the enemy had begun his
withdrawal, and another reinforcing element, I/3/1, had moved forward,
this time from regiment to Lieutenant Colonel Armitage’s CP.
About two hours later a brief fire fight flared up in the Company B
sector. No ground assault was made on Marine positions. The enemy
force, of undetermined strength, never closed with the Marines and
within 10 minutes, the firing stopped. No casualties to the Marines
resulted during this exchange. The earlier clash had resulted in the
death of 3 Marines and the wounding of 27. Enemy losses were estimated
at 40 killed and 30 wounded.
Before it came off the hill, Company B was engaged by enemy fire three
more times. At 1945, Chinese mortars (82mm) wounded two Marines.
Later, heavier mortars placed 20 rounds on Hill 122, but these caused
no casualties. There were some losses, however, early on the morning
of the 17th when C/1/1 was relieving the Bunker defenders. Captain
Scranton’s Marines sustained five more wounded from automatic weapons,
five during the relief.
The second relief of Company B on Bunker brought to a close the battle
that had been waged for possession of the vital hill complex. During
the Hill 122 tours of Company C and other 1st Marines units that
followed in August, seven more ground actions tested the Bunker Hill
defenses. Only one of them, during the night of 25–26 August, was of
significant size. This attack also failed to dislodge the Marines from
the hill.
_Supporting Arms at Bunker Hill_[189]
[189] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 4–16 Aug 52;
1st Mar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs,
Aug 52.
It was quite natural that the flurry of ground activity during the
battle of Bunker Hill created a need for increased participation from
Marine supporting arms. The magnitude of infantry action during the
contest for Hill 122 resulted in a monthly record to date in 1952
for the amount of air support received as well as the volume of both
artillery and tank fires supporting the division. During this critical
9–16 August period, the 11th Marines played a part in every ground
action except the feint attack on Siberia and the seizure of Bunker
Hill, both of which were purposely executed without an artillery
preparation. Medium tanks fired day and night missions during most of
the infantry action. Close air support at times amounted to a strike
every 20 minutes.
During the ground action around Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli, the
division received close air support in amounts unparalleled for
JAMESTOWN Marines to that time. Marine and U.S. Air Force pilots flew
a total of 458 missions (including 27 ground controlled MPQ-14 radar
bombing attacks) during five of the most critical days, 9–13 August.
On two of them, the 1st Marine Division received priority of close air
support along the whole EUSAK front. Fifth Air Force assigned 1st MAW
aircraft to Marine requests for close air support as long as Marine
aircraft were available.
The initial air strike by Marines in the Bunker fighting was on 9
August in support of counterattack plans for Siberia. MAG-33 provided
a morning and evening flight of four F9F jet fighters to destroy enemy
forces and defensive works on 58A (Siberia). USAF fighter-bombers
attacked Siberia and other outposts nearby and enemy artillery
positions supporting the Chinese forward line. On the next day, air
operations, concentrating on Siberia, were stepped up considerably
against enemy outposts. Thirty-five aircraft in nine missions attacked
58A with bombs, rockets, and napalm. These strikes were carried out by
MAG-12 and U.S. Air Force pilots at irregular intervals during daylight
hours. Air controllers reported good results. Other aircraft hit known
mortar locations capable of supporting the Chinese. During the morning,
Marine Attack Squadron 121 (Lieutenant Colonel Philip “L” Crawford)
bombed and burned Bunker Hill. Just before sunset, F-80 and -84 jets
of the U.S. Air Force dropped 15 tons of bombs on mortar positions and
troops on and around Hill 120. Four F-80s also participated with eight
Marine AD-2 propeller-driven attack aircraft in the morning attack on
Bunker.
Air activity in support of the 1st Marines continued unabated on 11
August. Before the diversionary ground attack just after dusk that day,
Marine and Fifth Air Force fliers repeated the treatment that Hills
58A and 122 had received the previous day. During daylight, supporting
weapons positions were hit by FAF fighter planes. At night, MAG-12 air
attacks guided by the MPQ-14 radar bombing system destroyed hostile
artillery and mortars. Also during the dark, the medium bombers of
the FEAF Bomber Command struck deeper in the rear at heavy weapons
locations.
These Air Force bombers conducted four more controlled-bombing attacks
against Chinese artillery during the early hours of 12 August, when
Company B was consolidating its positions and hastily organizing the
defense of Bunker Hill. After daylight and until dusk, MAGs-12 and -33
and USAF squadrons provided four-plane flights to strike troop assembly
areas, supporting weapons positions, and observation posts close to
Hill 122. In late afternoon, Marine pilots in four F9F Panther jets
and three ADs bombed and burned the enemy side of Bunker Hill during
the shelling and subsequent ground attack against the Marines on the
eastern slope.
Marines flew, on 13 August, all of the daylight close air support
missions in support of the actions on both Bunker in the center and
Stromboli in the right of the 1st Marines sector. On 13 August, a total
of 94 aircraft were committed over the regimental sector to conduct
strikes in support of ground operations. Enemy Hill 104, commanding
the 2/1 outpost on 48A (Stromboli), received four attacks. Fighter
bombers (F4U propeller-driven Corsairs) carrying napalm, rockets, and
1,000-pound bombs, raided the hill mass at 0535. The other strikes
against this key terrain-feature were made by attack and fighter
aircraft during the afternoon. Other targets on the regimental right
were weapons positions beyond Hill 104 and an enemy outpost one
thousand yards west of Stromboli.
Most of the air support received by the 1st Marines on the 13th was
directed against targets that were participating--or that were capable
of taking part--in the battle on Bunker Hill. Against the enemy on the
height itself, the Marines directed only three strikes, and these came
late in the morning. A majority of the air attacks were dispatched
against observation and command posts and the firing positions of both
automatic and large caliber weapons. Chinese artillery and mortar
fire had inflicted more casualties and punishment on the Marines than
the enemy infantry assaults. As a consequence, the main effort of the
close air support strikes was directed against these hostile supporting
weapons.
After dark on the 13th, VMF(N)-513 commanded by Colonel Peter D.
Lambrecht,[190] took up the air offensive against the heavy firing
positions in the rear of the enemy line. The squadron conducted four
attacks with its night fighters. Two of its attacks were made just
before sunrise.
[190] Two days later, Colonel Lambrecht, flying a F3D twin jet
night fighter with his radar operator, Second Lieutenant
James M. Brown, disappeared while on a night flight. The
last known position of the plane was over the Yellow
Sea, 50 air miles west of Pyongyang. At about that point
the aircraft faded from the radar screen. Efforts to
reestablish communications failed. It was reported that
observers at sea sighted a crash and explosion at about
this same time. Extensive search failed to uncover any
trace of the Marines or their aircraft.
During the remainder of the battle of Bunker Hill, the ground fighting
subsided and the requirement for close air support abated accordingly.
On the 14th, only four daylight strikes were flown in the 1st Marines
area. These, all by Marine squadrons, were against active artillery and
mortars in the defilade of Hill 120 and others to the west on the far
slope of Hill 123, and Chinese outpost positions, west of 48A, which
had been pestering the Stromboli garrison. There were no flights after
dark on the 14th, but on the following night, two MPQ missions were
flown by VMF(N)-513. Each was a single plane flight against a reported
artillery location. This was the final night air action in the battle
for Bunker Hill. Daylight missions in support of Hill 122 defense after
the sharp decrease of attacks on the 14th numbered only seven attacks,
each by four planes. These, flown by Marines, continued to emphasize
the destruction of enemy artillery.
Marine artillery continued its support of ground troops and air
strikes. Cannoneers of the 11th Marines fired 21 flak suppression
missions during the five days beginning on 11 August. This type of
close coordination between Marine supporting arms further reduced
combat losses of aircraft providing CAS to the division. The Marine
artillerymen had played a vital part in the defense of the besieged
outposts. Lieutenant Colonel Armitage credited the box-me-in fires with
an important role in thwarting each enemy attack on Bunker.[191]
[191] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, pp. 3–4.
In the 24-hour period beginning at 1800 on 12 August, Marine artillery
directly supporting the 1st Marines fired 10,652 rounds. Most of the
ammunition was expended in support of the Bunker Hill defense; some
was used in behalf of the Marines outposting Stromboli during the
Communists’ early morning diversion that day. On the 9th, the direct
support battalion, 3/11 (Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Rogers), had
fired about one-fourth of the 12–13 August total. Many of the shells
that first day of the Bunker battle were preparatory to counterattacks
for regaining Siberia.
When the retaking of Hill 58A was discarded in favor of the surprise
attack on 122, the amount of artillery support was reduced, during
the 1st Marines infantry preparations on the 10th and 11th, in keeping
with the fire support plan. Upon seizure of Bunker, Lieutenant Colonel
Rogers’ business immediately picked up and quickly reached a crescendo
the following day, when the 10,652 shells fired became a Marine one-day
battalion record for western Korea until the last stages of fighting
in 1953. Other Marine artillery battalions fired reinforcing missions
during the critical period as did the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery which
fired a large number of on-call ripples. The regimental commander
later recalled that “during some of the crises every gun that could
bear on Bunker in the 11th Marines and reinforcing units was shooting
there.”[192]
[192] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC and MS comments, dtd 20 Jun 67, hereafter _Henderson
ltr III_.
After a sharp drop on the 14th, the artillery support gradually
decreased in proportion to the amount and strength of the enemy’s
action against Hill 122. By 20 August, 3/11 was firing only 244 rounds
a day. Only on the 26th, during a serious Chinese attempt to retake
Bunker, did the number of artillery rounds match the intensity of the
fire support rendered during the earlier part of the month.
It was not only the quantity of 11th Marines support that the infantry
called for during the battle of Bunker Hill; quality was equally
important. A majority of the more than 28,000 rounds that 3/11 fired
during the eight days of Bunker Hill fell around the besieged outposts.
Many rounds were fired in defense of MLR positions. In both of these
types of protective fires, extreme accuracy and precision were required
due to the proximity of enemy and friendly lines in order to prevent
any “short” rounds from falling among Marine positions. Lieutenant
Colonel Armitage recalled that during the height of the battle on the
night of 12 August, “we did have a bad scare ... when Captain Connolly
reported that friendly mortar fire was falling short.”[193] The
battalion immediately ceased fire with its 60mms, 81mms, and 4.2s and
each piece was checked; the culprit was quickly located and within 5–10
minutes 3/1 resumed fire.
[193] _Armitage ltr_ and comments, p. 12.
During the August battle, artillery in general support of the entire
division and I Corps artillery reinforcing the fires of Colonel
Henderson’s regiment, stepped up their efforts to destroy the distant
and more difficult targets, including mortars and artillery. These
continued to be the main cause of Marine casualties. Some of the labors
of the 11th Marines gun crews did silence enemy heavy weapons, but
personnel losses from enemy shellings still mounted, especially in the
infantry units. To assist in the location and destruction of the enemy
artillery, aerial observers spent considerable time in spotting and
fixing Chinese weapons positions.
Besides these counterbattery efforts, the 11th Marines employed
other artillery means to provide the additional support the 1st
Marine Division requested during Bunker Hill. Two of these were the
counter-counterbattery and the countermortar programs, the former being
a passive defense-deception program to minimize Chinese counterbattery
fires against 11th Marines weapons. Nearly every day C Battery, 17th
Field Artillery Battalion, fired special request missions.[194] Another
type of fire, flak suppression, aided the cause of close air support
pilots delivering ordnance against those Chinese positions taking
Bunker Hill and Stromboli under fire. At night, illumination shells
helped outpost and frontline Marines in locating groups of enemy
massing for assault on Hill 122.
[194] Many of these targets were CCF choke points, dumps,
and weapons emplacements. Targets were identified and
confirmed by a highly developed system that employed air
spotting, aerial photographic interpretation, artillery
evaluation, and POW interrogation.
Mortars (4.2-inch) of the 1st Marines contributed heavily to the
defense of the outposts. Operations reached a peak on 12–13 August
when, in a 24-hour period, Captain Carl H. Benson’s mortar company
fired 5,952 rounds--4,084 high explosive and 1,868 illuminating. In
addition to their defensive fires, these hard-hitting weapons attacked
Chinese mortars, automatic weapons, defensive positions, and troop
formations with deadly accuracy.
No less precise and lethal were the fires of Captain Gene M. McCain’s
gun tanks (Company C, 1st Tank Battalion), and the battalion flame
tanks. Three of the latter had fired their 105s in support of the KMC
on the morning of the 9th before the vehicles received orders to move
east to join Company C temporarily. On the next day, 90s fired on enemy
bunkers, observation posts, and trenches in the vicinity of Siberia
and Stromboli. During 11 August, two gun tanks blasted at targets
immediately beyond Siberia and others to the west of that outpost.
Towards the end of the 11th, the critical part of Bunker battle began
for the tankers also. Those elements of Lieutenant Colonel John I.
Williamson’s battalion supporting the diversion and the subsequent
main attack pulled into positions south of Hill 122 on the MLR and to
the right in the Company F sector. It was not until the next day that
the tanks operating with the 1st Marines reached a peak in gun support
for the Bunker fight. Beginning with the defense of Hill 122 from 1600
that day, and for the next 26 hours, the tankers placed 817 shells
on targets effecting the Chinese capability of capturing Bunker and
Stromboli. In addition to the heavy ammunition, the Company C tanks,
augmented by the 1st Marines antitank platoon and five tanks from the
division tank reserve, fired 32,000 rounds of .30 caliber machine gun
ammunition.
Except on the 11th, most of the tank firing in the fight for Bunker
Hill through 14 August was accomplished during the hours of darkness.
On the latter date, the cannons and machine guns of the mediums blasted
directly at Chinese outposts opposite Colonel Layer’s regiment. The
number of rounds that day fell off considerably from the high on the
13th; on the 15th the tanks in the 1st Marines area did not fire at
all. Heavy rain that had accompanied the late afternoon thundershower
that day made movement forward to firing positions impractical. By
the next day, however, the ground was solid enough to permit some
maneuvering by the tracked vehicles. They fired 52 rounds of 90mm
shells and 14,750 machine gun rounds at automatic weapons positions and
bunkers on the western slope of Hill 122. This marked the final tank
mission in support of the 1st Marines in the battle for Bunker Hill.
During the early part of the August fighting, tanks of the
division were able to get the first real test of a technique of
night support,[195] and at the same time experiment with a towing
device to permit retrieval of disabled vehicles under fire without
getting outside the tank. The use of the lights to support both the
diversionary force and the defense of Hill 122 showed the value of
these instruments. Lieutenant Colonel Williamson recommended that
tanks be employed in pairs, one to spot and adjust fire and the other
to fire. With respect to the towing device, he considered the new
piece of equipment an improvement over the manual hook-up method, but
noted that the device limited tank maneuverability and had a tendency
when bouncing up and down over rough terrain to dig into the ground,
impeding the forward progress of the vehicle.
[195] The use of fighting lights to illuminate targets for tank
gunners had been undertaken in July, but the results were
inconclusive, owing to failure of one of the bulbs of the
two lights tested. 1st TkBn ComdD, Aug 52, App. VI, Encl.
2. Declared the G-3, 1stMarDiv: “The diversion on Siberia
was 100 percent effective, due largely to the new tank
battle lights which we were using for the first time.”
_Honsowetz ltr II._
_In Retrospect_[196]
[196] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_;
_PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar
ComdDs, Aug 52.
Whether the sacrifice of Siberia in favor of the seizure of Bunker
justified the outcome can be determined, in part, by looking back
to the division commander’s reasons for this decision. He had cited
three advantages in seizing and occupying Hill 122 instead of 58A.
One, tactical surprise achieved by an attack on the former, was an
unqualified success. That Bunker Hill would provide more defensible
terrain and at the same time add strength to the main line were two
sound judgments that the test of time would bear out. The third point,
that observation into the enemy’s outpost line would be increased from
the higher hill, also proved to be correct.
Only the inability to neutralize Hill 58A effectively from Bunker
cast any doubt on the considerations. At night the enemy could occupy
Siberia both for firing positions and flank security to attack friendly
forces moving down the corridor east of Hill 122. Action to counter
these two enemy actions came mainly from MLR forces.
One measure of the results of the Bunker Hill fighting is seen in the
price paid. Chinese losses were estimated by the 1st Marine Division
at approximately 3,200, including more than 400 known dead. Marine
casualties in the action were 48 killed and 313 seriously wounded.
Several hundred additional wounded were treated at 1st Marines medical
facilities and returned to duty shortly thereafter.
To replace combat losses in the infantry regiment, General Selden on
12 August directed that rear area service and support units fill the
vacancies. Two hundred Marines, nearly all of them volunteers, were
provided to Colonel Layer by the 14th. To offset other losses within
the division, its commander similarly had requested on 12 August
that the Commandant, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., authorize an
air-lifting of 500 enlisted Marine infantrymen to the 1st Marine
Division as soon as possible. Pointing out that mounting battle
casualties had reduced the effective strength of the division, General
Selden also urged that each of the next two monthly replacement drafts
scheduled for the division be increased by 500 more enlisted men. After
some debate at the next senior administrative headquarters,[197] the
request was granted by General Shepherd, and the emergency replacements
were made available from the 3d Marine Division at Camp Pendleton,
California. The initial replacement of 500 Marines arrived on 21 August.
[197] CG, FMFPac, Lieutenant General Hart, requested the
Commandant to delay decision until FMFPac could
survey the combat replacement situation and aircraft
availability. After a quick evaluation of both these
factors, General Hart on the 14th recommended approval.
FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App. I, Encl. (6). The air lift
of 500 replacements to Korea was an “all out effort for
Marine Aviation Transport based on the West Coast. This
general support of Korean based forces demonstrated the
total capability of Marine Aviation in support of ground
forces.” MajGen Samuel S. Jack to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div,
HQMC, dtd 27 Jun 67, hereafter _Jack ltr_.
More men to replace divisional combat losses might have been required
had not the medical support been such an efficient operation. After
the battle, the regimental surgeon, Lieutenant Robert E. Murto,
called for a review of the medical facilities in effect during the
Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli fighting. In attendance were the
battalion doctors and the division surgeon, Captain Lawrence E.
Bach. Participants discussed both the major difficulties and routine
procedures involved in medical care of the wounded. Problem areas
were the high incidence of heat exhaustion, ground transportation of
the wounded, enemy artillery fire that interfered with helicopter
evacuations, and the need for increased medical support under battle
conditions.
Regarding the last category, the surgeons noted that medical supplies
during the heavy fighting of 9–16 August were never at a dangerously
low level. The only shortage that had developed was in stretchers, due
to the normal delay in transfer of stretchers from medical stations
along the evacuation route to the company forward medical facilities.
To help combat the Chinese artillery problem, medical officers had
placed aid stations on the reverse slopes of hills. There was no
available or known solution to hastening and easing the movement of
battlefield casualties over the ground. The armored personnel carrier
offered some protection from ground fire and a ride less painful than
one in a truck, but the wheeled vehicles remained the most widely used.
There was little that could be done about the number of heat exhaustion
cases. High temperature and humidity, vigorous activity, and the
wearing of the armored vest (and to some degree, the steel helmet),
combined to produce the casualties. All the surgeons agreed that
regardless of the number of heat casualties, the wearing of these two
items must continue. Regimental doctors credited the armored vest with
saving the lives of 17 Marines. Several other Marines, they noted, had
received only slight head wounds from bullets that had spent most of
their velocity penetrating the steel helmet.
Helicopter evacuation saved the lives of other Marines. The doctors
credited the flying skills and bravery of the evacuation pilots
for these rescues. Immediate response to day and night calls was
instrumental in the recovery of numerous Marines. Rear Admiral Lamont
Pugh, Surgeon General of the U.S. Navy, commented upon the value of the
helicopter and on other reasons for success of medical support. After
a Far East inspection trip, which included a visit to the 1st Marine
Division during the battle of Bunker Hill, Admiral Pugh expressed the
following opinion:
... [I] attributed the new low record “2% mortality” of
those men wounded in action to the bullet resistant vest, to
skillful frontline surgery with availability of whole blood,
the utilization of helicopters for casualty evacuation direct
to hospital ships and rear area hospitals, and the efficient
manner in which the Hospital Corpsmen of the Navy fulfilled their
mission with the Marines.[198]
[198] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 12. p. 12-8.
In another logistical area, the performance was not quite
as satisfactory, for the level of supply of one important
item--illuminating shells--fell dangerously low during the Bunker
fighting. On 16 August, 3/1 reported early in the morning that
“artillery illumination was exhausted and 81mm mortar illumination
was fast diminishing.”[199] To replace the shell-produced light, the
regiment used a flare plane.[200]
[199] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.
[200] Earlier, on 13 August, a flare drop requested by the 1st
Marines went awry when the aircraft got off course and
dropped the flares forward of the 5th Marines main line.
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 13 Aug 52.
Ammunition supply appeared to be no problem to the Chinese. The rate
and frequency of mortar and artillery fire proved that the enemy had
a vast store of these shells. During the heavy fighting, the division
observed that the enemy expended approximately 17,000 mortar and
artillery rounds in the 11–16 August period of the battle. It was
noted for the first time that the Chinese used mortars primarily in
support of limited attacks.
About the enemy’s reliance on mortars and the technique of their
employment, the 1st Marine Division reported:
This was particularly true of his 60 and 82mm mortars, which are
easily displaced forward and shifted to alternate positions.
These light mortars were difficult to locate by our observers
mainly because of the small size and limited development of
their positions, and the fact that they are moved frequently. A
large number of enemy mortars were fired from bunkers deep in
the ground with only a narrow aperture at the top through which
to fire. There were some instances, during the Battle of Bunker
Hill, when the enemy brought his 60mm mortars out from cover on
the forward slope and set them up in the open near the crest of
the ridge. After delivering several rounds, the mortars would
then displace quickly back to a covered position. During August,
mortar fire averaged between 50 and 60 percent of the total
incoming received by the 1st Marine Division.[201]
[201] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, p. 2.
Further information about the Chinese was also derived at this time,
although not always directly associated with the battle. Deserters
picked up in the left sectors of the 1st and 5th Marines on 12 and
13 August and papers taken from enemy dead on the 13th confirmed
earlier-reported dispositions of Chinese units. One prisoner, from
the artillery regiment of the 118th Division, the unit facing the
major part of the 1st Marines line, indicated that another artillery
regiment had been assigned to support his division. If true, this extra
unit would account for both the increased Chinese fires in the Bunker
area and the additional artillery emplacements that photo planes had
spotted in the 118th Division sector. Infantry units of this division,
the Marines observed, introduced no new techniques or equipment during
the battle. Prior intelligence had provided the 1st Marines with
typical enemy ground attack tactics. Neither the Chinese envelopment
of Siberia, Stromboli, and Bunker nor the diversion against Hill 48A
before the main attack on Hill 122 represented a departure from normal
CCF practice.
Nor was the earlier Marine diversion new, but unlike the Chinese
attempt, the 1st Marines tactic was successful. Just before the
maneuver, the division pulled off another strategem, described by
General Selden in a letter to General Shepherd:
I worked a ruse that morning which proved to be very profitable.
Throughout the Eighth Army front, it had been routine to put on
a strike, this to be followed by smoke, then a good artillery
barrage, with troops following for the assault. This was done
with the exception that there were no troops. The enemy,
thinking that there were troops, opened up with everything. The
only damage inflicted was on their own forces.... While they
were firing on their own troops, we again opened fire with our
artillery, just to help the situation along.[202]
[202] MajGen John T. Selden ltr to Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,
dtd 14 Aug 52.
One technique the Marines employed in the Bunker Hill battle was
defense of the reverse (protected) side of the hill. Although counter
to the usual American military practice, the reverse slope defense was
required by the intense artillery and mortar fire massed upon the front
slope defenders. As the 3/1 battalion commander later commented:
It’s true, we suffered from the heavy incoming--but had we had to
work replacements, casualties, and supplies all the way up to the
(forward) military crest of Bunker--the losses would have been
prohibitive. With the weight of the incoming and our inability
to get greater infantry mass onto the battlefield at one time, a
conventional defense would have been far more costly ... [after]
the damage done to Baker Company in the [12 August] afternoon
attack ... had we not gone into a reverse slope defense, we could
not [have held] with the strength at hand.[203]
[203] _Armitage ltr_ and draft MS comments, p. 7. For further
details of the Bunker Hill action, see _Armitage ltr_ in
v. V, Korean comment file.
On the other hand, a tactical weakness of the reverse slope defense,
that “plagued us until the end of the battle,”[204] was the fact that
the 1st Marines initial gain was not more fully exploited. As the
battalion commander explained:
[204] _Ibid._, p. 8.
To be successful, in a reverse slope defense, the defender
must immediately counterattack, retake and reoccupy the
_forward_ slope of the position as soon as enemy pressure
diminishes. Because of the incoming and primarily because of
our overextension in regiment, we ... [employed] piecemeal
commitment ... and fed units into the battle by company, where we
should have employed our entire battalion in counterattacks to
punish the withdrawing force and restore the forward slope. To
the very end, lack of decisive strength prevented this. We stayed
on the reverse slope all the way, except for brief forays to the
forward slope.[205]
[205] _Ibid._
Some officers felt, in retrospect, that a more feasible solution during
the August battle might have been to move all three battalions on
line--3/1, 1/1, and 2/1, with the reserve battalion (1/1) deployed on
a narrow front. This would have provided decisive strength on Bunker
and the MLR behind it to give greater depth counterattack capability,
and better control at the point where needed.[206] Departure from
standard doctrine by employment of the reverse slope defense furthered
the existing controversy as to the best method of ground organization
in the division sector. But it was to be some months before a change
would be effected.[207]
[206] _Ibid._, p. 9.
[207] As the military situation changed in Korea to become
increasingly one of a battle of position and attrition,
the Marine Corps Basic School, Quantico, Va. curriculum
was revised to give greater emphasis to tactics of
positional warfare. Close attention was paid to terrain
evaluation, employment of infantry units, offensive and
defensive use of automatic and supporting weapons, night
counterattacks, field problems of reverse slope defense,
and even tasks of “research into WW I--and the American
Civil and Revolutionary Wars for the tactic of Reverse
Slope defense.” _Armitage ltr._
Tank, artillery, air, and ground Marines participating in the battle
of Bunker Hill gave up one outpost but took another, one that added
strength not only to the outpost defense but also to the main line. A
well thought-out plan and its skillful execution permitted Marines to
take the critical terrain quickly without crippling casualties. Defense
of the position on Hill 122 was complicated not so much by the Chinese
infantry action but by the intensive mortar and artillery shelling.
The Marines’ capability to defend was enhanced by close coordination
among artillery, air, and tank units. Chinese casualties, by estimate,
were 500 percent more than the losses actually suffered by the Marines.
The battle of Bunker Hill resulted in the first major Marine action
and victory in West Korea. It ushered in two straight months of hard
fighting, the most difficult ones yet for Marines on the western
front.
CHAPTER IV
Outpost Fighting Expanded
_From the Center Sector to the Right--Early September Outpost
Clashes--Korean COPs Hit Again--More Enemy Assaults in Late
September--Chinese Intensify Their Outpost Attacks--More PRESSURE, More
CAS, More Accomplishments--Rockets, Resupply, and Radios_
_From the Center Sector to the Right_[208]
[208] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs
661–675, dtd 18–31 Aug 52; 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1
ComdDs, Aug 52.
Following the progressively faltering Chinese attacks against Bunker
Hill in mid-August, the 1st Marines in the center MLR sector witnessed
a period of decreased enemy activity. By sunup on the 17th, Captain
Ksycewski’s Company C, from Lieutenant Colonel King’s 1st Battalion had
relieved B/1/1, marking the second complete tour of duty at Hill 122
for Company B that month. In two days on the shell-torn crest, Company
C received only a single enemy probe and only a few rounds of artillery
and mortar fire. In the early morning hours of the 19th, D/2/1 assumed
responsibility for Bunker and Hill 124. These new occupants of the
disputed property almost immediately were subjected to larger and more
frequent Chinese probes as well as increased fire from CCF supporting
weapons.
Enemy ground action was directed against the Marine flank, especially
the right. Four Chinese infantrymen attempted to infiltrate this corner
of the Bunker Hill defenses just before sunrise on 23 August. One even
made his way to the top of Hill 122 where he fired downhill at several
Marine defenders, wounding one. A moment later this lone Chinese’s
reconnaissance efforts was rewarded by a fatal hit from a Marine
sniper’s rifle.
Captain Moody’s Company F next took over the two-hill complex. That
night, the 24th, the Chinese shelled the two hills and probed their
defenses but again showed no inclination to press an attack. On the
following night, however, the Chinese became more aggressive. At dusk,
two squads charged the right flank of Bunker Hill, threw hand grenades,
and fired their submachine guns briefly at the Marines. The enemy then
retired, but about an hour afterwards, a force estimated at two-company
strength assaulted the outpost defenses from the center to the right.
At the same time, enemy shells began exploding around these Marine
positions. Captain Moody called for artillery and tank fire on the
attackers. Pushing forward, the Communist infantrymen forced a small
opening in the defense perimeter; by this time, a standby platoon on
the MLR was moving forward to strengthen the Bunker garrison. Upon
arrival of the Marine reinforcements, at midnight, the Chinese soldiers
withdrew. Simultaneously, the incoming artillery and mortar fire
diminished, and in less than a half hour all firing had ceased.
After the enemy had pulled back, Company F sent its platoon out to
reoccupy a forward listening position temporarily abandoned during the
second attack. Chinese soldiers immediately contested this advance
and, after a local fire fight, caused the Marines to retire once more.
That action ended the significant Bunker Hill action in August. In the
spirited infantry fighting and artillery dueling during the night of
25–26 August, Marines suffered 65 casualties, including 8 killed. The
Chinese losses were estimated at 100 killed and 170 wounded. Supporting
arms fire had contributed largely to the high casualty figures on both
sides.
During August, whenever a lull had occurred in Colonel Layer’s 1st
Marines embattled sector, it almost invariably signaled a step-up
of Chinese action elsewhere along the 1st Marine Division MLR. When
frustrated in their attacks against the positions held by the 1st
Marines, the enemy invariably turned his attention to the right of the
line, manned since June by the 5th Marines. During August the Chinese
seized three outposts forward of the 2/5[209] right battalion line,
which it had been the Marine practice to man during daylight hours
only. The trio, forming a diagonal line southwest to northeast, in
front of the battalion sector were Elmer, Hilda, and Irene.
[209] Command responsibility for this sector changed on 20
August, when Lieutenant Colonel William S. McLaughlin
took over the battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Cross.
After dusk on 6 August the enemy had advanced to COP Elmer, on the
far southwest end, and by skillful coordination of their infantry and
supporting fires denied the position to the Marines approaching to
reoccupy the outpost early the next morning. An hour before midnight
on 11 August, another 2/5 patrol had attempted to temporarily occupy
Hilda, in the center, during the diversionary fires supporting the
Bunker Hill attack. As the Marines neared the outpost, however, they
discovered the Chinese had already occupied it. Enemy mortar and
artillery fire drove the patrol back to its own lines.
A similar situation occurred at dawn on 17 August, when the Marine
outpost detail moved forward to occupy Irene during daylight hours
and found the Chinese already on the position. Enemy troops fired at
the Marines, pinning them down.[210] Although two rescue units were
dispatched to support the Marines, CCF fire interdicted their route of
approach. When it became evident the second reinforcement party could
not reach its objective, the outpost detail was ordered to pull back to
the MLR. The Chinese continued to occupy Irene, the last outpost lost
in August, for the remainder of the 2/5 tour on line.
[210] To escape the murderous hostile fire, the Marines
sought shelter in a trench nearby. During the ensuing
clash, a Chinese grenade landed in the midst of the
Marines. Private First Class Robert E. Simanek, E/2/5,
unhesitatingly threw himself upon the deadly missile an
instant before it exploded. Although gravely wounded, his
courageous action prevented injury or death to fellow
patrol members. The following year, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower presented the Medal of Honor to the Detroit,
Michigan Marine for his “daring initiative and great
personal valor.”
For the remainder of August the Chinese were apparently content to hold
what they had gained without immediately seeking additional positions.
As a result, operations along the front were mostly limited to patrol
action. Chinese infantry units, usually no larger than a squad,
regularly fired on Marine patrols, engaging them for a short period
from afar, and then quickly breaking off the contact. Seldom was this
small unit action supported by artillery or mortars.
On two occasions late in the month, however, the Chinese showed more
spirit. Both encounters took place during the early evening hours of 22
August when Chinese patrols came upon two different Company F ambushes
operating forward of the 2/5 sector. Heavy casualties were suffered by
both sides.
The next day a brief but heavy period of rainfall began with nine
inches recorded between 23–25 August. Although the flooding conditions
in the division sector were not so extensive as the July rains, they
curtailed ground activity considerably and air action to a lesser
degree. Division roads were badly damaged but not trenches and bunkers,
strengthened as a result of the experience with the July floods. High
waters made the ferry inoperable at the Honker Bridge site and also
washed out Widgeon Bridge, where the Imjin crested to 42.5 feet. If
the sudden flash floods wreaked havoc with some of the Marine division
installations, the Chinese were the recipients of similar disfavors;
intelligence indicated that damage to the CCF frontline positions was
even more severe than to the JAMESTOWN defenses.[211]
[211] 1stMarDiv PIR 669, dtd 25 Aug 52.
The end of August saw the relief of General Selden as Commanding
General, 1st Marine Division. He was succeeded on the 29th by Major
General Edwin A. Pollock. A brief ceremony at division headquarters,
attended by senior officers of EUSAK and KMC, marked the event. Earlier
that month, in recognition of his services to the Korean defense,
President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, had awarded General
Selden the Order of Military Merit, Taiguk, the highest Korean award.
The new division commander, General Pollock[212] had commanded the
2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina just prior to his
Korean tour. He had more than 30 years of military experience. During
World War II, he had participated in no fewer than five major campaigns
in the Pacific, including the first at Guadalcanal, where he earned
a Navy Cross, and one of the war’s most costly battles, Iwo Jima.
Following the war, he had served at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, in
command and staff assignments, and later at Headquarters Marine Corps
where in July 1949, he had received his first star.
[212] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, Jan
56, rev.
_Early September Outpost Clashes_[213]
[213] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1, 2/5,
3/5 ComdDs, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 188–189, dtd 6–7
Sep 52.
The new division commander shortly received a first-hand demonstration
of the ferocity and persistence of the Chinese Communists opposite his
division. On 4 September, the enemy suddenly stepped up his activities
which had recently been limited to sporadic probes and occasional
artillery fire against Bunker Hill. At 2030 that date Captain Moak,
E/2/1, commanding officer at the Bunker outpost, reported that an
artillery preparation was falling on his positions. Ten minutes later
he radioed 3/1[214] that an enemy platoon was vigorously probing his
right flank. When Company E Marines returned a heavy volume of small
arms fire, the enemy retired.
[214] Normally a component of the 2d Battalion, Company E
had been attached to the 3d Battalion on 1 September
when the company took over the Bunker Hill outpost. The
relieved Company H was then attached to 2/1, the reserve
battalion, from 1–3 September.
This Chinese withdrawal was only temporary, for the initial probe
proved the forerunner of more serious activity. Again at 0100 on
5 September a heavy deluge of Chinese mortar and artillery began
raining on Hill 122. The intense preparation had apparently convinced
the Chinese attacking force that they had eliminated resistance at
the Marine outpost, for their soldiers walked upright toward Marine
positions, without bothering to make any attempts at concealment. After
discovering that a stout defense was still being maintained at Bunker,
the Chinese again withdrew and reorganized.
When they resumed the attack, the Chinese used considerably greater
caution. This time, in addition to small arms, automatic weapons fire,
and a hail of grenades, their assault was supported by artillery and
mortars. The results of this concerted effort were not too rewarding,
however. Assaults on the center of Hill 122 were repulsed and attempts
to crack the left perimeter of Company E’s defenses were even more
speedily beaten back. A number of Chinese attempting to outflank the
E/2/1 defenders inadvertently strayed too far to the right of the
outpost and found themselves advancing against the MLR south of Hill
122.
When JAMESTOWN forces engaged these wanderers by fire, the latter
quickly realized their mistake and wheeled left for a hasty retreat.
They immediately came under fire of their own troops, some of whom
had meanwhile penetrated 60 yards into the extreme right of the
Bunker positions. At this point, Captain Moak’s Company E launched
a counterattack and restored its positions on the right. This
action forced a general withdrawal of the Chinese force, which the
Marines estimated at battalion strength. Lieutenant Colonel Sidney
J. Altman[215] subsequently advised division headquarters that his
men had killed 30 enemy soldiers and estimated that as many as 305
were probably wounded. This high rate of casualties was attributed,
in part, to the enemy’s mistaken sense of direction, their direct
walking approach which had made them easy standing targets, and to
the box-me-in artillery fires supporting the defenders. Marine losses
were 12 killed and 40 wounded, caused mostly by Chinese mortars and
artillery.
[215] On 20 August Lieutenant Colonel Altman became the
commander of 3/1 in relief of Lieutenant Colonel Armitage.
Although the left battalion area was the center of attention in the
1st Marines line early on 5 September, the far right sector was not
entirely neglected either. Five minutes after their initial attack
on Bunker, other Chinese units also lunged at the Hill 48A outpost,
Stromboli. An estimated reinforced platoon, supported by three active
machine guns on Hill 104, 850 yards to the north, employed submachine
guns, rifles, and grenades in their attack. This battle lasted for
nearly two hours, until the Chinese soldiers withdrew at 0240. There
were no Marine losses. No tally or estimate was made on the number
of enemy KIA or WIA. It was presumed that some of the Communists did
become casualties since the three machine guns that had been chattering
away to support the attacker’s ground action suddenly went silent after
Marines called down mortar and artillery fire on the Hill 104 positions.
The probes of 1st Marines positions at Bunker Hill and, to a lesser
degree, at Stromboli were repeated in the 5th Marines right regimental
sector. At almost exactly the same time Colonel Eustace R. Smoak’s
regiment[216] was struck at five of its forward outposts. In the case
of OP Gary, on the right, the enemy merely shelled the position for
40 minutes. Against the four other outposts, known as Allen, Bruce,
Clarence, and Felix, the Chinese employed both fire and assault
troops. (See Map 12.) At Felix the action had begun at 0130, a half
hour later than at the adjacent outposts. The difference was probably
due to a C/1/5 ambush[217] which had engaged an enemy force operating
between Donald and Felix. After a brief five minute fire fight the
Marines broke off the action, pulling back to Felix. The other three
outposts, clustered to the left of the 3/5 sector, received the brunt
of the enemy thrust which lasted for an hour and 20 minutes before the
Communists withdrew.
[216] Colonel Smoak had relieved Colonel Culhane on 15 August.
[217] Although 1/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Gentleman)
was the regimental reserve at this time, the regiment had
assigned one company to 2/5, manning the right sector.
[Illustration:
MAP 12 K. WHITE
COMBAT OUTPOSTS AND AMBUSH SITES
5TH MARINES SECTOR
(Division Right)
Early September 1952]
Employing a squad against both Allen and Clarence, and sending a
reinforced company against Bruce, the enemy alternately assaulted and
shelled the positions until 0420, after which the Communist units
policed the battlefield for casualties and withdrew to the north.
Although there was no official estimate of enemy losses, one Marine at
outpost Bruce was credited with inflicting approximately 200 casualties
by fire from two machine guns, a carbine, and grenades. He was Private
First Class Alford L. McLaughlin, of I/3/5, who was later to receive
the Medal of Honor for “conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity.” Another
Marine from the same company was posthumously awarded the medal.
Private First Class Fernando L. Garcia, although gravely wounded, had
thrown himself on a hostile grenade to save the life of his platoon
sergeant during the Chinese rush to take OP Bruce.
At daybreak the I/3/5 defenders at Bruce, commanded by Captain
Edward Y. Holt, Jr., were confronted by an almost unbelievable
scene of destruction. All of the bunkers on the forward side of the
hill had been destroyed by Chinese mortar and artillery; on the
reverse slope, only two had escaped ruination. Marine losses were 32
dead and wounded.[218] To restore the position the 3/5 commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Oscar T. Jensen, Jr., directed replacements forward
immediately. Carrying emergency supplies, including building materials,
the relief element reached Bruce about 1000. Evacuation of casualties
was the first task and at 1045 the relieved detail was on its way back
to the MLR. Later that day a supply party reached the outpost, having
been temporarily delayed by Chinese interdicting fire.
[218] Still another award of the Medal of Honor was to come
out of the action that ended on 5 September. Hospitalman
Third Class Edward C. Benfold had ministered aid to
several wounded Marines and was searching for others
who needed medical attention when he saw two wounded
Marines in a shell crater. Just as he neared its edge two
grenades fell into it and two Chinese prepared to assault
the Marines. “Picking up a grenade in each hand, Benfold
leaped out of the crater and hurled himself against the
onrushing hostile soldiers, pushing the grenades against
their chests and killing both.... He gallantly gave his
life for his country.” Medal of Honor citation, case of
Hospital Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold, USN,
4168234.
Reinforcement of Bruce and the repair of its defenses were considerably
slowed by the continuous rain of enemy projectiles during daylight.
Marine and USAF pilots bombed and napalmed enemy bunkers and troops
north of JAMESTOWN in the 5th Marines sector. Ten air strikes were
executed in support of the 5th Marines that day.
Early on 6 September, 10 minutes after midnight, long-range machine gun
fire, buttressed by artillery and mortars, hit outpost Bruce. After 35
minutes the firing subsided, but again at 0305 the outpost experienced
a heavy rate of incoming. At about this time, the Communist soldiers
massed for an assault on the battered position. Marine defenders called
down the artillery box, and the Chinese dispersed.
That evening, at 1915, the outpost commander reported that the Chinese
had again resumed a steady shelling of the position. The bombardment
continued for an hour. After these heavy preparatory fires, a wave of
enemy infantry began scrambling up the sides of Bruce. At the same
time, outpost Allen to the left came under long-range fire from enemy
strongholds to the west and north. After the Chinese made their initial
rush against Bruce, a second and third attack fared no better. Each was
met and repulsed by the 5th Marines.
After the third abortive attack, a period of deathly stillness
descended upon the contested hill. Occasionally, an enemy mortar round
found its mark among the scattered, splintered bunker timbers and the
caved-in trenches, which connected the sandbag and lumber positions.
At 0145 on the 7th, the Chinese interrupted the uneasy peace that had
settled upon Bruce with a brief, heavy preparatory fire.
Exactly an hour later, an estimated two Chinese companies advanced up
the forward slopes, using demolitions to destroy any friendly bunkers
their artillery and mortar had not earlier completely wrecked. By the
time this newest assault had raged for 30 minutes, nearly every 3/5
defender had become a casualty. Still the Marines refused to give
ground, dealing first with the forward slope assault by the Chinese and
later with those who attempted to envelop the Marines on the reverse
side. On the MLR Marines first observed enemy flares falling between
outpost Bruce and Line JAMESTOWN. Soon thereafter the Chinese policed
the battlefield. By 0400 the Communists retired, and the fight for this
key outpost had ended in failure.
During the 51-hour siege of Outpost Bruce, 19 Marines had been killed
and 38 wounded. At the adjacent 5th Marines outposts, additional losses
were 5 killed and 32 wounded. More than 200 enemy dead were counted.
During the last eight hours of the vicious, close-in fighting at Bruce,
it was estimated that another 200 Chinese had been wounded.
[Illustration:
MAP 13 K. White
COMBAT OUTPOSTS
KMC SECTOR
(Division Left)
5–7 September 1952]
The Korean Marines, holding down the western flank of the three
mainland regimental sectors in the 1st Marine Division line, also
received a share of the enemy’s attention. At dusk on 5 September,
Chinese barrages began to smash Outpost 37,[219] the first of a trio
of positions that would merit hostile attention for the next 22 hours.
Throughout the following day the Chinese continued their mortar
and artillery fire against Outposts 37 and 36, and the regimental
observation post located on Hill 155 (also called Hill 167) to the rear
of the MLR. (See Map 13.) The heaviest enemy fire was directed against
OP 36, a small rise in the low land terrain midway between the Sachon
River, on the west and the Munsan-ni-Kaesong rail line, 600 yards to
the east.
[219] Contemporary records of the 1st KMC Regiment for
1952–1953 identify this as Outpost 37. Current reviewer
comments refer to this hill as OP 67. LtCol Kim Yong Kyu,
ROKMC, ltr to CMC, HQMC, dtd 5 Jul 67.
At 1605 a 50-round barrage struck OP 36. After this harassing fire
there was a lull until 1810 when Chinese artillery and mortars again
resumed a steady pounding of the three positions. One hour later enemy
soldiers hit both outposts. Twice the attacking company assaulted OP 37
but neither effort represented, in the view of the defenders, a serious
attempt at capture. Less than a mile south at OP 36, however, the enemy
motive appeared to be quite different.
Crossing the Sachon just north of the Freedom Gate Bridge (also known
as the highway bridge), the Communist infantry moved to assault
positions on the west, north, and northeast sides of the outpost. At
1910, the Chinese began their first rush. It was repulsed, as was a
second one. Another artillery barrage, joined this time by tank fire,
preceded the third attempt. At this point communications went out at
the besieged outpost. At 2150, a squad leader from OP 36 reached the
10th Company CP to report that his position had fallen. In 30 minutes a
communications link was reestablished with the outpost. The defending
Koreans reported that although enemy troops had overrun much of the
hill, they had subsequently withdrawn, apparently because their losses
had been so heavy.
Casualties and damage were severe. The Korean regiment estimated
that 110 enemy had been killed or wounded. An early morning KMC
reconnaissance patrol counted 33 dead Chinese in the vicinity of OP 36.
The attacking force had also left behind much equipment, including more
than 100 grenades and several automatic weapons. No papers were found
on the dead Communist soldiers, but many propaganda leaflets had been
dropped around the outpost. Korean Marine losses at OP 36 were nine
killed and seven wounded. At OP 37 there were four casualties; at the
regimental CP, one Korean and two U.S. Marines had been killed by enemy
artillery. Chinese incoming, estimated at 2,500 rounds during the two
actions, had also caused major damage to part of the OP 36 defenses,
but inflicted less harm to the other two positions. Repairs were begun
before daylight.
_Korean COPS Hit Again_[220]
[220] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts
195–202, dtd 13–20 Sep 52.
After the stepped-up enemy ground activity in early September, both
Chinese and Marine frontline units resumed their earlier pattern
of combat patrols, probes, and ambushes. Possession of Bunker Hill
remained the immediate objective of the enemy and his activities in
the middle of the Marine line were directed to this goal. Once again
on 9 September a marauding Chinese platoon, employing grenades and
submachine guns, sounded out the Bunker defenses, now manned by G/3/1
(Captain William F. Whitbeck, Jr.). After a tentative investigation,
the enemy withdrew. That same day, expanded patrol and raiding
activities were undertaken by Marine line battalions.
These sharply increased offensive measures resulted, in part, from the
Communist interest, as evinced during the summer truce negotiations, in
certain forward positions held by UNC units. On 7 September, the CG, I
Corps had alerted his division commanders to the fact that the enemy
“may attempt to seize and hold certain key terrain features ... over
which there was extensive disagreement during [the 1952 summer truce]
negotiations for the present line of demarcation.”[221] Since much of
the critical land was in his sector, Major General Kendall further
warned his division commanders “to take the necessary action within
your means to hold all terrain now occupied by your divisions.”[222]
Critical terrain features in the 1st Marine Division area of
responsibility were Bunker Hill and the height on which COP Bruce had
been established (Hill 148), in the center and right regimental sectors
respectively.
[221] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 52, App. I, # 8.
[222] _Ibid._
Two days later, General Pollock amplified this directive by
underscoring the necessity for holding these two positions, plus eight
more he considered vital for sound tactical defense. These additional
positions, from west to east, were Hills 86 and 37 in the KMC sector;
Hills 56 and 48A in the center sector; and the outposts then known as
Allen, Clarence, Felix, and Jill, all the responsibility of the right
regiment.[223]
[223] When the 7th Marines took over this sector from the 5th
in early September, the names changed to Carson, Vegas,
Detroit, and Seattle respectively. COP Bruce was also
redesignated as Reno. Since the old names of the outposts
were well known to the enemy, for purposes of security
it was decided to identify them differently. U.S. cities
were selected.
Although the eastern part of the division main line thus contained
at this time more key hills than any other Marine sector, much of
the increase in Marine patrol and ambush activity took place in
No-Man’s-Land forward of the middle frontline regiment. Of the two
JAMESTOWN sectors manned by U.S. Marines, the one in the center of the
division area offered better ground for infantry operations.
On the divisional western flank, the Korean Marines conducted frequent
infantry-tank patrols during the second and third weeks of September,
but the enemy opposite the KMCs initiated little ground activity.
Instead, the Chinese relied upon their supporting weapons to provide
the contact. For a seven-day period ending 19 September, a total of
2,375 enemy rounds had fallen in that regimental sector, an average of
339 per day. Nearly a third had been in the vicinity of Hill 36.
Before sunrise on the 19th, a Chinese infantry company had crossed the
Sachon in the vicinity of the railroad bridge. Once on the east side,
the enemy soldiers concealed themselves in caves and holes, remaining
there until dusk. Then, when they came out of hiding, the Communists
held a briefing and organized themselves into three attack groups. As
these advance infantry elements approached their objective, OP 36,
other reinforcing units were prepared to seize OP 37, to the east, and
OPs 33 and 31, to the south. Artillery and mortar preparation supported
these diversionary attacks.
The main assault was accompanied by even heavier shelling. As the three
assault units reached the bottom of the hill at OP 36, artillery,
mortars, and tanks had fired more than 400 rounds. Approaching from
the north, east, and west, the Chinese scrambled up the hill, gaining
control of the wrecked defenses by 2000. Sporadic exchanges of fire
lasted until nearly midnight. At 0115 the Korean Marines attempted
to retake the hill. The counterattack was cut short, however, upon
discovery of another enemy unit moving towards the outpost and then
only one-half mile away. Three hours later the enemy came back in
strength when a CCF platoon successfully overthrew the outpost at
0520. This new assault occurred without any warning and was so swiftly
executed that a number of the KMC defenders found themselves encircled
and trapped at their posts. Most managed to escape, but several were
captured and later evacuated when the Chinese removed their own battle
casualties.
Another attempt to regain the outpost was made by the Koreans at 1400,
following artillery preparation and two air strikes. Three Marine
attack squadrons, VMAs-323, -121, and -212 blasted the Chinese on the
front slope of OP 36. The contour of the far side of the hill had
provided the enemy a defiladed position and safety from 1st Marine
Division organic weapons. But the MAG-12 air sorties, destroying
many CCF automatic weapons and mortars and breaking up a company
strongpoint, helped the Koreans counterattack and overrun the dazed
defenders. Two KMC platoons, supported by artillery, mortar, and tank
fire, then carried the OP after overcoming token Chinese resistance.
After the enemy vacated OP 36, he still continued to remain in the low
area to the northwest, close to the east side of the Sachon River. No
serious attempt was made by the enemy to occupy the position for the
rest of the month.
The 20-hour clash for control of OP 36 was believed to have developed
from the Chinese ambition to occupy the position and thereby eliminate
the harassing fires from Hill 36 that had struck CCF mainline troops.
The 19–20 September attempts to wrest the outpost from Korean control
resulted in an estimated 150 Chinese casualties, including 20 counted
dead. KMC losses were placed at 16 killed, 47 wounded, and 6 missing.
On the day that the second September battle for OP 36 had ended, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps had also just concluded his three-day
visit and inspection of General Pollock’s troops. Visiting every
battalion in the division, General Shepherd was impressed by the
morale and proficiency of the Marines, including the attached 1st KMC
Regiment. During his visit to Korea, the Marine Corps Commandant was
also presented the Order of Military Merit, Taiguk, by President Rhee.
General Shepherd ended his Korean battlefront visit after a two-day
inspection of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units commanded by Major General
Jerome (he had received his second star on 6 August).
_More Enemy Assaults in Late September_[224]
[224] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 7thMar, 2/1 ComdDs, Sep
52.
Even though the enemy had concentrated his strongest infantry attack
in late September against the Korean Marines, his most frequent probes
were launched against center regimental positions held by Colonel
Layer’s 1st Marines. Here the enemy was more consistent in conducting
his defense. Chinese troops doggedly held on to the northern slopes
of several Marine outposts, notably Hills 124 and 122. In this center
regimental sector, the enemy initiated several attacks, the most
significant of these occurring on the 20th.
This action against the left sector manned by 2/1 centered about Hill
124, where Lieutenant Colonel Batterton’s battalion had established a
24-hour, squad-size outpost three days earlier. At 0345, Marines on
Hill 124 observed two green flares fired from a hill about 1,100 yards
to their front. At the same time the men of 2/1 observed numerous
figures moving about downhill from their own position. It soon became
evident that four enemy groups were converging on Hill 124 and
preparing to assault the Marine defenses which shortly came under fire
from enemy submachine guns and rifles. The main probe was a frontal
assault against Batterton’s men; it was made by about 20 Chinese and
lasted only five minutes. Afterwards, all four assault groups withdrew
but continued firing intermittently at the Marine squad. Nearly every
Marine on the hill suffered wounds, most of these minor. Enemy losses
for the action were placed at 22.
In this same sector Marines in late September attacked the northern
slope of Hill 122, where the enemy still maintained a foothold. The
proximity of Marine defenses at Bunker Hill to enemy positions,
separated in some places by as little as 30 yards, was the cause of
frequent contact and clashes. Marines raided the enemy side of Bunker,
using demolitions and portable flamethrowers to destroy trenches and
bunkers, and their occupants. Tanks and artillery assisted in these
brief offensive actions, usually undertaken at night. Flares were used
frequently to aid in identifying and striking targets and in assessing
the results.
It became routine during the last days of September for the Chinese
to probe the Marine defenses at the Hills 124–122 axis. There did not
appear to be a serious or determined assault to take either outpost,
however. The Marines considered the infantry probes as just another
form of harassment, although perhaps more personal and direct than
the Chinese shelling, which inflicted daily losses. On the division
right, Colonel Moore’s 7th Marines, which had moved into this sector on
7 September, found enemy activities about the same. Artillery rounds
caused the greatest number of casualties, although these attacks were
not particularly spirited. Many enemy contacts occurred during the
Marine combat patrols that largely characterized frontline operations
at the end of September.
_Chinese Intensify Their Outpost Attacks_[225]
[225] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–7 Oct 52;
1stMarDiv PIRS 706–713, dtd 1–8 Oct 52; 1stMar, 5thMar,
7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7 ComdDs, Oct 52; KMC
Regt UnitRpts 214–220, dtd 2–8 Oct. 52.
With the beginning of October, the 1st Marine Division became aware of
certain changes that were occurring to its front. In the center sector,
for the first time in two weeks there was no significant enemy ground
activity, yet across the entire Marine front there was a build-up of
enemy shelling. Part of the increased bombardment was directed at Hill
86 in the KMC sector, one of the positions recently cited as integral
to the defense line in this area. Beginning at 2000 on 1 October, the
Chinese broadcast a warning that they would knock down the outpost
bunkers there unless the Korean Marines surrendered. When the KMCs
manning the position did not, of course, surrender in reaction to
this blatant propaganda tactic, the Chinese began showering Hill 86
with artillery rounds. During the next 20 hours, 145 rounds fell on
and around the outpost. This incident marked the first time that the
Chinese mainline forces had carried out an announced threat.
This type of operational tactic--first to warn, then to carry out
the threat--was not, however, the reason for the increased Chinese
shelling. Rather, as it turned out, the enemy was about to embark on
a series of limited objective attacks against the division flanks,
starting first with major outposts guarding the most critical terrain
on the MLR. The artillery and mortar fire of the 1st had been but an
initial step. At 1830 on 2 October, Communist direct fire weapons
opened up from an area 2,800 yards northwest of OP 36, lashing all the
KMC outposts within range. A tank platoon, dispatched to counter the
fire, returned at 1915 without having located the hostile emplacements.
Shortly after the tanks returned, an extremely heavy artillery barrage
again fell upon all of the KMC regimental outposts. Ten minutes later,
seemingly on the signal of one red and one green flare, the enemy guns
lifted their preparatory fires to permit an infantry attack. The ground
action simultaneously struck OPs 37, 36, and 86, the forward positions
closest to the Sachon River.
At OP 37, the defending Korean Marine platoon fought valiantly for more
than an hour against the assault of two enemy platoons, each of which
required a company-size reinforcement before the Korean Marines were
finally ousted. Although temporarily dislodged, they reorganized at the
base of the position for a counterattack. Two counterattacks were made
the next day, the second one carrying the Koreans to the top of the
hill. Fierce enemy mortar and artillery shelling forced them to seek
the shelter of the reverse slope before again renewing their assault.
On 4–5 October, the outpost changed hands four times. At 1340 on the
latter date, a heavy enemy artillery and ground attack compelled the
KMCs to abandon their ravaged outpost; this withdrawal ended friendly
control of OP 37 for the rest of the month.
Nearby OP 36 was also lost. In the course of the night the Korean
Marines on OP 36 turned back two Communist assaults, but fell under
the weight of the third. By sunup on 3 October, the exhausted Korean
Marines were forced to give ground; the Chinese immediately occupied OP
36 and held it.
One more KMC outpost was to fall during the first week. OP 86 guarded
the southwestern two-thirds of the regimental sector and frequently was
the target of artillery shelling and ground attacks. This position was
also the most distant from the main line and the closest to the Sachon
River.
The heaviest Communist attack on 2 October was against the KMC platoons
defending Hill 86. Nearly a battalion of Chinese took part in this
action, finally overpowering the outpost just before midnight. The
defenders withdrew south to the bottom of the hill, where they were
comparatively safe from enemy fire. Resting, receiving reinforcements,
and regrouping during the early morning hours of the 3d, the Korean
Marine force observed friendly artillery and air pound the outpost
preparatory to their counterattack. It was made at 1015 and succeeded,
after two hours fighting, in routing the Chinese from the outpost.
While the enemy was counteracting the ground loss with artillery and
mortars, Marine air flushed out the Chinese, who had retreated only a
short distance from the outpost. From atop the hill, Korean Marines
witnessed many of the enemy hurriedly leaving the area under attack.
This scattering of the enemy force prevented the Chinese from launching
an immediate counterattack for control of OP 86 and gave the Korean
Marines additional time in which to prepare their defenses. At 2200 on
6 October, an enemy force of undetermined size assaulted the position
and wrested it from the Koreans before the end of the day. Early the
next morning a KMC counterattack was successful, but at 0640 the
Koreans were again compelled to withdraw, due to devastating blows from
Chinese artillery. Loss of the third key outpost during the first week
of October, ended for a time the flare-up of outpost fighting in the
left regimental sector of the division front.
The middle part of the MLR, held in early October by the 1st Marines,
received the least enemy attention in this period. Although frequent
contacts were made with the enemy during the first part of the month,
no outposts were lost. Most of the action was minor, _i.e._, patrol
engagements and Communist probes centered around Bunker Hill and Hill
124. Late on 5 October, a combat patrol from H/3/1 became involved in
the most important ground action in Colonel Layer’s area during early
October. These Marines were surprised by a larger Chinese force lying
in wait. The ambushers held their fire until the Marine combat patrol
had cleared a small hilltop. At 2230, after a 20-minute fire fight, the
patrol withdrew to the reverse slope of the rise, called in 81mm mortar
fire, then broke contact, and returned to the MLR. There were 4 Marine
casualties, and by count, 13 dead Chinese.
By far the greatest number of personal losses at this time occurred
in the right area held by the 7th Marines, where the Chinese began
a series of limited objective attacks against outposts guarding the
division right flank. These offensives to obtain critical terrain
in this sector, and others manned by the 1st Marine Division, would
continue intermittently right up to the brink of the cease-fire, in
July 1953.
In early October, Colonel Moore’s troops manned nine permanent combat
outposts. (See Map 14.) Seven of these had been taken over when
the regiment relieved the 5th Marines in September. Two additional
ones--Frisco and Verdun--had been established by the 7th Marines on
the 14th and 26th, respectively. Of these nine forward positions, the
Communists chose to concentrate on four, which formed a diagonal line
roughly paralleling the center sector of the MLR at an average distance
of about 450 yards. This quartet--Detroit, Frisco, Seattle, and
Warsaw--together with Verdun,[226] at the 1st Commonwealth boundary,
comprised the easternmost permanent outposts of the division. The first
four positions were, on the average, slightly lower in elevation than
the COPs in the regimental area to the west.
[226] The outpost at the extreme right flank was given the name
“Verdun” because of its World War I connotation of “They
shall not pass.” Col. Leo J. Dulacki ltr to Hd, HistBr,
G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2 Jun 67, hereafter _Dulacki ltr_.
The frontline contest began with little forewarning other than a
slight increase in enemy artillery and machine gun fire against
Frisco and a light probe against Detroit. At 1836 on 2 October, the
Communists launched a heavy artillery and mortar barrage against
Seattle and Warsaw, and that part of the MLR nearest Seattle. Exactly
one hour later, the preparation on the outposts lifted, permitting the
enemy attack force to strike. Not less than a company assaulted the
reinforced platoon on Warsaw, while a squad moved against the Seattle
defenders. Warsaw fell in about 45 minutes,[227] Seattle held out five
minutes longer.
[227] During the latter stage of the fight for Warsaw, a
Chinese soldier tossed a grenade into a bunker shared by
five Marines. Private Jack W. Kelso, of I/3/7, quickly
picked up the missile and ran outside with it. As he was
throwing the grenade back to the Chinese, it went off in
his hand. Disregarding his wounds, the Marine moved back
inside the shelter, directed the other four to return to
the MLR and went outside to cover their exit. As he was
firing at the advancing Chinese soldiers, Private Kelso
was hit several times by enemy bullets. His “conspicuous
gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life” was
later recognized in the posthumous award of the Medal of
Honor.
[Illustration:
MAP 14 K. WHITE
7TH MARINES SECTOR
(Division Right)
EARLY OCTOBER 1952]
Immediately, plans for the recapture of both were made. At 2047,
Captain John H. Thomas dispatched a platoon from his company, I/3/7,
from the MLR to counterattack Warsaw. The platoon quickly took the
position, for the enemy had withdrawn. At Seattle, the result was
different. On 3 October, two squads from Company I departed JAMESTOWN
at 0340, but came under enemy artillery fire en route to the objective.
The squads worked their way forward nevertheless, but were unable
to take the outpost. Captain Thomas then recalled the force, which
reached JAMESTOWN at dawn. Later that day, just before dusk, air and
artillery placed a smoke screen on Seattle while two squads advanced
toward the outpost. When the counterattack met stiff resistance, a
squad-size reinforcement[228] was sent from the MLR. Together the
three units attempted to retake the position, but were forced to pull
back because of heavy casualties. As the infantry again regrouped,
Lieutenant Colonel Bert Davis, Jr.’s 2/11 fired preparatory barrages
on the Chinese occupying Seattle. At 2225 the Marines assaulted the
outpost again; as before, overpowering Chinese artillery and grenades
inflicted such high casualties that the counterattackers were compelled
to withdraw.
[228] This squad was from Company A (Captain Frederick C.
McLaughlin), which came under the operational control of
3/7 at 1130 on 3 October, relieving Company C (Captain
Paul B. Byrum). The latter company had reported to the 3d
Battalion from regimental reserve at 2130 the previous
day. Company D was sent immediately to reinforce the
hard-pressed Company I.
By this time, action at the two outposts had resulted in 101 Marine
casualties, including 13 killed. By sundown on 3 October, the regiment
had been forced off the two COPs and had been able to retake only one
of them. Against Warsaw, the one that the Marines had recaptured, the
Chinese immediately launched a counterattack. At 0145 on 4 October
a platoon struck the position. This time the Warsaw garrison held,
inflicting losses on the CCF and receiving none. The Chinese made an
unsuccessful attempt against Frisco at 2300 on 5 October, when a squad
attempted to drive the Marines from the outpost.
The enemy’s repeated attacks and apparent determination to seize
commanding terrain, plus the heavy casualties suffered by 3/7, led the
7th Marines to reinforce its MLR at 1200 on 5 October. At this time the
right battalion sector then held by 3/7, was split into two sectors and
the regimental reserve, 1/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki) took
over the far right of the 3/7 line, assuming responsibility for Warsaw
and Verdun.[229] The 7th Marines thus had all three of its battalions
on line with the regimental front manned, from the left, by 2/7, 3/7,
and 1/7.
[229] At the same time one company, I/3/7, became the
regimental reserve, having been relieved on the MLR at
1500 the previous day by A/1/7.
During the next 30 hours, the Communists launched a series of strong
probing actions against the regimental outposts of the 7th Marines.
Although the numerical strength used in these widespread limited
objective attacks did not exceed that employed in previous large-scale
outpost offensives, the scope of the operation on 6 and 7 October and
the well-coordinated attacks indicated careful and detailed planning.
Each move against the five outposts and two MLR positions attacked
was preceded by unusually close attention to artillery and mortar
preparation. This was to a degree unprecedented even when measured
against those massive concentrations that had characterized Communist
operations since the Chinese intervention in the war late in 1950.
Prior to the Communist general attack, the Marines made another attempt
to retake Seattle. Leaving JAMESTOWN at 0600 on 6 October, a C/1/7
reinforced platoon was halted by solid resistance in the form of
exploding artillery and mortar rounds. The forces returned to the MLR,
reorganized, and jumped off again. At 0815, a two-squad reinforcement
was dispatched from the main line. Meanwhile, the enemy, estimated
at platoon reinforced strength, doubled his garrison, using troops
from his outpost line. By 0900, a heavy fire fight was in progress,
supported by artillery and mortars on both sides. Marines called on
air in support of the attack, but the combined air and infantry action
was unable to penetrate enemy defenses. Finally, at 1100, after five
hours of close heavy fighting, the Marines broke contact and retired,
bringing with them 12 dead and 44 wounded. Estimates of enemy losses
totaled 71.
That evening, at dusk, artillery and mortar fire began falling on
outpost positions across the entire regimental front and at two
locations on the MLR. At the same time an estimated Chinese reinforced
battalion in a coordinated effort advanced toward the Marine line
and at 1930 assaulted the seven positions that had just been under
artillery preparation. By midnight an estimated 4,300 rounds of
artillery fire and 104 rounds of counterbattery fire had fallen on
Marine positions. In the regimental left manned by 2/7 (Lieutenant
Colonel Caputo) the attacks appeared to be more of a diversion--merely
probes by small units, which showed little inclination to press the
attack. Carson, the most western COP held by the regiment, reported
that the enemy soldiers withdrew at 2050. Two hours later Reno, the
next outpost to the east, radioed to the MLR that the Chinese had just
ceased their attacks at that forward post. A total of 12 Marines were
wounded in these two actions.
On the far right, in Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s sector, a reinforced
CCF platoon poured over the Warsaw defenses at 1930. Immediately
the outpost Marines called for the friendly artillery box. As these
protective fires were being delivered all communication at the outpost
was severed by hostile fire. Enemy artillery continued at a heavy rate.
By 2000, however, communication was reestablished between the COP and
MLR. The first message from the besieged outpost was a request for more
artillery. With additional fire support and continued stiff outpost
resistance, the Chinese at 2055 relinquished their quest to regain
Warsaw.
The enemy’s most determined assaults on the night of 6–7 October were
made upon a pair of outposts, Detroit and Frisco, manned by the middle
battalion, 3/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Russell). Two JAMESTOWN
areas in this sector were also attacked, but only briefly. The assault
against the outposts was executed by a Chinese battalion which sent one
company against Detroit and another against Frisco, east of Detroit.
Both outposts were manned by two squads of Marines.
At Detroit, the Company G Marines reported that the initial attack
made at 1940 on 6 October by a Chinese company had been rebuffed. The
enemy did succeed, however, in advancing to the outpost trenchline.
Strong defensive fires prevented him from exploiting this initial gain
by occupying any of the bunkers, and the attackers were forced to pull
back. After regrouping, the Chinese returned at 2100 and again were
able to secure a foothold at the main trench.
Marine artillery assisted the outpost defenders in repulsing this
new attack, but not before Chinese interdictory fires had disrupted
all communications between the COP and its MLR support company. Some
Chinese had also moved south in the vicinity of the MLR, but these
attacks were neither persistent nor heavily supported. At 2115 the last
of the enemy intruders had withdrawn from the MLR. At about this same
time, 3/7 heard Detroit request overhead VT fires, but shortly after
this the battalion again lost contact with the outpost.
Two squads were then sent out to reinforce the position. They were
stopped, however, by heavy Chinese artillery barrages. At the outpost,
Marine artillery fires had forced the Chinese to retreat, but at 0015
the enemy reappeared at the trenchline. The artillery regiment once
again applied the overhead fire remedy, but with less success--the
Chinese, neither retreating nor advancing, took cover in the trenches.
During the long night, attempts to reestablish communications with
Detroit had proved fruitless, although battalion radio operators
reported that they had heard Chinese language coming over one of the
Marine radio nets used by the COP. A six-man reconnaissance detail was
sent forward to investigate. It returned at 0355 with the information
that Detroit was now held by the enemy. Two wounded Marines had
escaped; the rest of the Detroit garrison had fallen to the enemy. At
0630 the Marines withdrew after heavy fighting that had lasted more
than 10 hours.
During the earlier part of the night, while the battle for outpost
control raged at Detroit, reinforcements had also been dispatched to
Frisco to help stabilize the situation at this adjacent Company H/3/7
outpost. Like Detroit, it had been attacked by a Chinese company,
beginning about 2000. An hour and a half later some of the enemy had
made their way into the trenchline, but were repulsed with the help of
friendly artillery VT. Shortly after midnight the enemy again probed
Frisco and reached the trenchline. At 0115, two squads jumped off from
JAMESTOWN, but a rain of Chinese artillery interrupted their progress.
Throughout the early morning hours of 7 October, Company H and I units
were sent out from the MLR to buttress the Frisco defense and stem the
enemy attack. At 0510, a reinforced platoon from the reserve company
was sent to renew the counterattack. It was this Company I unit that
finally restored control of the COP to the Marines.[230] Another
reinforcing platoon arrived at the outpost just as the Marines there
had evicted the remaining Chinese assault forces. At 0715, 7 October,
Frisco was declared secure.
[230] During the predawn attempt to retake Frisco on 7 October,
Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins, I/3/7, although already
wounded, led his rifle platoon in the assault against
Frisco. When an enemy machine gun impeded their progress,
Staff Sergeant Watkins grabbed a wounded man’s automatic
rifle to help get the assault moving forward again. At
that instant, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the
Marines. Staff Sergeant Watkins immediately seized it.
Just as he was about to hurl it away it exploded in his
hand. The grenade took the sergeant’s life but he had
saved his fellow Marines. For his bravery Staff Sergeant
Watkins was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
Its precarious position, however, demanded either an investment of more
outpost troops to retain possession of it or else its abandonment, in
conjunction with other measures to neutralize loss of the position.
At 1804 that day the latter course was instituted. The 7th Marines
reported that the enemy had suffered an estimated 200 KIA and unknown
WIA as a result of the bitterly contested outpost attacks on 6–7
October. Marine casualties were listed as 10 killed, 22 missing, 105
wounded and evacuated, and 23 not-seriously wounded.
In all, during the first week in October, the 1st Marine Division gave
up six outposts, or forward positions, that had been sited on some of
the commanding ground in the Marine area. On the division left, COPs
37, 36, and 86 were the ones most removed from the Korean MLR and thus
easily susceptible to being overrun by the enemy at will and to his
early reinforcement.[231] The division theorized that near winter and
the subsequent freezing of the Sachon would facilitate the movement
of Chinese troops and supplies across the river to new positions.
The enemy was now able to operate patrols east of the river without
interference. At the opposite side of the division MLR, on its right
flank, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle had been lost. By gaining this
string of outposts, the enemy was better able to exert pressure against
other Marine positions forward of the line and the critical ground on
JAMESTOWN.
[231] FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_.
To counter this threat, General Pollock strengthened the outposts close
to the MLR and increased his patrolling requirements. It was decided
that in some cases the mission of the COP--that of providing early
warning of impending attack and slowing it down--could be accomplished
as effectively by using patrols and listening posts at night.
By these activities, the Marines hoped to minimize the Chinese gains
and prevent the launching of new attacks against either division COPs
or JAMESTOWN. The serious situation on the outposts was compounded by
existing political considerations, which prevented the Marines from
initiating any real offensive campaigns. Moreover, any hill taken was
invariably backed up by a still higher one, controlled by the enemy.
The key factor was not so much holding an individual outpost as it was
to insure that the enemy was unable to penetrate the JAMESTOWN line.
_More_ PRESSURE, _More CAS, More Accomplishments_[232]
[232] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW
ComdDs, Jun-Oct 52; MAG-12 ComdDs, Jun, Sep 52; MAG-33
ComdD, Aug 52; MACG-2 ComdD, Sep 52; VMA-312 ComdDs,
Sep-Oct 52; VMA-323 ComdDs, Jun-Jul, Sep 52; VMF(N)-513
ComdDs, Jun-Jul 52; VMJ-1 ComdD, Jul 52; Cagle and
Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Field,
_NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Rees, _Korea_.
Some of the enemy ground pressure against the outposts in September
and October had been relieved by the increase in the number of air
strikes received by the 1st Marine Division. De-emphasis of the Air
Force interdiction strategy in favor of striking the enemy wherever
(and whenever) it hurt him most had made available more aircraft for
close support of ground operations.[233] The UN commander, General
Clark, who had given the green light to the shift in USAF policy and
targets, followed the giant hydroelectric strike in June with a mass
attack the next month on 30 military targets located near the North
Korean Capital. During a year’s freedom from air attack (July 1951-July
1952) Pyongyang had become not only the major logistics center for
combat equipment and personnel but also the focal point for command and
control of Communist ground and air defense efforts.
[233] The 1st MAW chief of staff during this period, then
Colonel Samuel S. Jack, offered the opinion that “the
Fifth Air Force was most sympathetic to Division
requirements for close air support from Wing sources. The
Eighth Army in the Joint Operations Center proved to be
the principal limiting factor in the assignment of air
in accordance with these requests. Also, requirements
that Division CAS requests filter through I Corps and JOC
constituted a major factor in Wing response.” _Jack ltr._
Designated Operation PRESSURE PUMP, the 11 July strike against
Pyongyang called for three separate attacks during daylight and a
fourth at night. This extended time over the target would give enemy
fighters more than ample time to take to the skies in defense of the
Capital. Because Pyongyang “was defended by 48 guns and more than
100 automatic weapons, making it one of the worst ‘flak traps’ in
Korea,”[234] there was considerable hazard in the operation. Added
danger to the pilots resulted from the decision to forewarn the North
Korean civilian population of the air assault. General Clark explained
the reason for dropping warning leaflets prior to the attack on
Pyongyang:
[234] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 482.
The objective was in part humanitarian and in part practical. We
had to hit Pyongyang because the Communists had made it a major
military headquarters and stockpile area. We wanted to warn the
people away from danger areas. By warning them away we disrupted
their daily lives and made it difficult for the Communists to
maintain any kind of schedules in their work in the city.[235]
[235] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, pp. 208–209.
Results indicated that both the destructive and the psychological
aspects of the mission were successful. American, British, and ROK
planes completely destroyed 3 of the 30 military targets attacked. Of
the rest, only two escaped major damage:
According to ... reports, the North Korean Ministry of Industry’s
underground offices were destroyed and a direct hit on another
shelter was said to have killed 400 to 500 Communist officials.
Off the air for two days, Radio Pyongyang finally announced
that the ‘brutal’ strikes had destroyed 1,500 buildings and had
inflicted 7,000 casualties.[236]
[236] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 482.
Of the far-reaching effect of the leaflets, the UN commander later
wrote:
The warning leaflets, coupled with the bombing, hurt North Korean
civilian morale badly. The very audacity of the United Nations
in warning the Communists where bombers would strike hurt morale
because it emphasized to the North Koreans just how complete was
UN mastery of the air. Contrarily, it made them see even more
clearly that the Communists were ineffectual in their efforts to
ward off our air blows....
As a result of the warnings, the bombings, the failure of
the Communists to provide protection, and the refusal of the
Communists to permit evacuation of the clearly defined target
areas, civilian resentment was channeled away from the UNC
bombers and towards the Communist rulers.[237]
[237] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 209. “I told you so” leaflets
were dropped after the raid to impress the inhabitants
with the importance of believing the warning leaflets.
USAF, _Ops in Korea_, No. 127, pp. 36, 37.
The record set by the 1,254 sorties flown in this 11 July operation was
to last only seven weeks. On 29 August, 1,403 sorties were employed in
a new strike against the Capital. The massed raids against military
targets in Pyongyang, known as the “All United Nations Air Effort”
turned out to be the largest one-day air assault during the entire
three years of the Korean War. Again attacking at four-hour intervals
three times during daylight, Allied aircraft blasted a list of targets
that “read like a guide to public offices in Pyongyang and included
such points of interest as the Ministry of Rail Transportation, the
Munitions Bureau, Radio Pyongyang, plus many factories, warehouses,
and troop billets.”[238] Of the 45 military targets in the city, 31
received moderate-to-severe damage according to post-strike photographs.
[238] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 489.
Substitution of the previous interdiction strategy by PRESSURE attacks
brought increased close air support to frontline troops. As a result
of this expanded number of CAS sorties, wing pilots and ground forward
air controllers greatly increased their operational proficiency.[239]
The Marines were still not satisfied with the close support picture,
however, and neither were a number of U.S. Army commanders. Some of the
latter regarded General Clark as the champion of more extensive close
air support missions for frontline units, but he quickly dispelled
this view. Instead, he cautioned these supporters of Marine-type close
air support to accept the existing procedures, which were derived from
the “vast reservoir of experience ... [representing] the composite view
of senior members of the Armed Forces [with] the longest and most
responsible experience in close support during World War II.”[240] At
the same time the UN commander, on 11 August 1952, had advised his
force commanders to study the factors affecting the close air support
situation in Korea and comment on certain UNC proposals for improving
the CAS system.
[239] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-53.
[240] _Ibid._, p. 9-143.
In the close air support picture for the Marines, October was a bright
month. In the outpost battles of early October, the 1st MAW put 319
sorties in the air during both day and night to strike, strafe, bomb,
and burn enemy positions and troops facing General Pollock’s division.
A new level of achievement had been reached during the Bunker Hill
battle in August. That month nearly 1,000 aircraft, predominantly
Marine, loosed ordnance at targets on and near the Chinese MLR and OPLR.
During the first six months of Marine ground operations in defense of
JAMESTOWN, wing squadrons and pilots had made major contributions to
the U.S. air effort in Korea. On 7 June 1952, First Lieutenant John W.
Andre, VMF(N)-513, piloting a World War II model Corsair on a night
armed reconnaissance mission over the west coast of North Korea, shot
down an enemy piston-driven Yak fighter. It was the first time that a
Russian-built plane of that model had been knocked out of the skies at
night by another plane. This aircraft was also the fifth kill for the
lieutenant, making him the first Marine nightfighter ace in Korea.[241]
[241] The first Marine night ace was Captain Robert Baird, who
shot down six Japanese planes between 9 June and 14 July
1945. Sherrod, _Marine Aviation_, p. 404. Lieutenant
Andre’s first four planes were also downed during World
War II. See Appendix F for Marine air kills during the
Korean War.
Nearly three months after that record, another one emerged: the first
Marine to down an enemy jet with a propeller-driven aircraft. Late
on the afternoon of 10 September, Captain Jesse G. Folmar and First
Lieutenant Willie L. Daniels, both of VMA-312, had taken off from the
_Sicily_ to attack an enemy troop concentration reported to be south
of Chinnampo, on the west coast just below the 39th Parallel. Shortly
after reaching the vicinity of the target, the Marine Corsairs were
jumped by a pair of MIG-15s. Two more Russian-made jets tore into the
fight. During a fast exchange of cannon and machine gun fire, the
Marine captain was able to score lethal hits on one of the MIGs. When
four more of them picked up the chase, the vastly outnumbered Marines
broke for home, heading westward in a diving turn.
Captain Folmar’s return to the _Sicily_ was delayed almost immediately:
I had just started picking up good diving speed when I saw balls
of tracer ammo passing on my left and at the same instant felt a
severe explosion in my left wing ... I saw that the left aileron
and four feet of my left wing were gone.[242]
[242] VMA-312 ComdD, Sep 52.
This damage caused the plane to rapidly go out of control. While still
able to maneuver, the Marine aviator headed for the sea and as he
neared it, bailed out of his Corsair and parachuted into the ocean.
A rescue plane out of Cho-do picked him up and returned the captain,
who had sustained a slight shoulder injury, to the carrier. Lieutenant
Daniels, who had alerted the rescue force, circled his descending
flight leader until he hit the water. After ascertaining that the
waterborne flier’s condition was satisfactory, the lieutenant turned
his plane towards the _Sicily_. In a short while he was safely home.
In late September, Major Alexander J. Gillis, VMF-311, assigned earlier
that summer to the Air Force’s 335th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron,
4th Fighter Group, as an exchange pilot.[243] distinguished himself
by becoming not only the first naval aviator to destroy three enemy
aircraft in Korea but also the second one to get a multiple killing
in a single day.[244] Flying in a four-plane Sabrejet formation near
the vicinity of the mouth of the Yalu on 28 September, Major Gillis
led another plane after two MIG-15s. By superior pilot technique and
aggressive tactics, he forced one of the enemy to crash during a low
altitude chase. Later on during the sortie, the Marine initiated an
attack on a solo MIG, closing on it and scoring hits that caused the
plane to become uncontrollable and the pilot to eject. Major Gillis
also had to eject from his F-86 after it became disabled by the MIG.
The incident had occurred on the Marine aviator’s 50th combat mission
with the Air Force. He spent nearly four hours in the Yellow Sea before
a rescue helicopter picked him up.
[243] The exchange program “appears to have originated with the
participation--at Tactical Air Command’s invitation--of
two Marine Corps and two Navy pilots ... in the fall
of 1947.” Within two years, the program designed to
“indoctrinate selected Air Force and Navy pilots in the
air operational and air training activities of each
other’s service, had received Department of Defense
approval.” On 1 October 1949 the program went into
effect. Initially the exchange period was one year,
but after the Korean fighting broke out, the period
was reduced to approximately three months. Marine
participation began late in 1951. Atch 1 to Hq, USAF
(AFCHO) memo to Maj J. M. Yingling, HQMC, dtd 16 Jan 67
in v. V, Korean comment file.
[244] On 15 September, Major Gillis had shot down a solo MIG-15.
Another feat, this one a study in determination and perseverance,
had occurred early in the summer. On 22 July, the VMJ-1 commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Vernon O. Ullman, had taken to the air for a photo
mission over North Korea in the vicinity of Sinanju, located near
the Yellow Sea 40 miles above Pyongyang. During the first of seven
scheduled flights, he encountered heavy flak but nevertheless completed
his first mapping run in the area. Further, the Marine flier decided
that the antiaircraft menace was not going to force him to abandon the
remaining part of his task. He continued. On the second of his seven
runs, some 40 enemy jets (MIG-15s) appeared on the scene. These were
dissuaded from close-in interference, however, by the photo escort of
24 USAF single-engine Sabrejet fighters. Thereafter, the Russian-made
aircraft disappeared; Lieutenant Colonel Ullman continued, despite
the intense, accurate enemy antiaircraft fire, until he concluded his
mission.
The type of determination displayed by Lieutenant Colonel Ullman
helped Marine tactical squadrons achieve some kind of distinction
nearly every month from late spring to the fall of 1952. In May,
VMF-323 (“the Death Rattlers”), then commanded by Major William A.
Weir, established a squadron one-month record for number of combat
sorties, 1,160, and total combat hours, 2,362.7. A high percentage of
aircraft availability, 95.6, helped make this mark possible. On 1 June,
VMA-312 received the congratulations of CTF 95 for its “outstanding
performance under difficult conditions” during the spring months.
During this period the squadron, based on board the USS _Bataan_,
had been particularly hampered by excessive turnover of key squadron
officers and flight leaders. This continual squadron rotation resulted
in considerable variation in pilot indoctrination and need for field
carrier landing qualification, due to the “close tolerances in pilot
skill required by carrier operations.”[245] Despite these difficulties,
VMA-312 had scored an impressive 80-sortie mission, flown by 24
aircraft, on 18 April.
[245] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-77.
Additional recognition of professional excellence was conferred upon
Marine squadrons in July. On the 17th, the senior advisor to the
ROK I Corps expressed the gratitude of the corps commander for the
magnificent support the 1st MAW pilots had provided during the second
week of the month. All four attack squadrons in MAG-12 and both fighter
units in MAG-33 had taken part in these CAS missions. A week later,
eight planes from Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Miller’s VMA-323, (which,
along with Lieutenant Colonel Graham H. Benson’s VMA-212, had been
redesignated from fighter to attack squadrons the previous month),
completed an unusually successful interdiction mission at Hago.
Located 25 miles northwest of Kaesong, the village reportedly was
the site of heavy troop concentrations, active mortar positions, and
antitank weapons. Leaving K-6 at 1725, the eight Marine VMA-323 pilots
were soon over the target. Comprising the Death Rattler’s flight were
Majors John M. Dufford, Raymond C. Holben, William H. Irvin, Jr., and
Curtis E. Knudson; Captain John Church, Jr.; First Lieutenant William
A. Poe, Jr.; and Second Lieutenants Stuart L. Spurlock and James S.
Thompson. At 1810 their attacks were launched, using 1,000-pound bombs,
napalm, rockets, and 20mm ammunition. The strike was over almost as
soon as it had started, and when the Marines departed, not one building
remained in useful condition. But it was not until several days later
that the final results of the strike were known. Intelligence sources
reported that the raid had caught the enemy troops at the evening meal;
more than 500 had been killed by the Corsairs, aptly called “Whistling
Death” by the Japanese in World War II.
For the remainder of the summer and into the fall Marine groups and
squadrons continued their record-breaking and efficient support of
ground troops and naval forces. With four squadrons (two day, one
night-fighter, and one photo), MAG-33 sent 141 sorties against the
enemy on 6 August. This one-day group record occurred just before
the departure of Colonel Condon, who turned over the reins of the
organization to Colonel Herbert H. Williamson on the 11th, and then
took command of MAG-12.
Shortly before Colonel Condon relinquished command, he was particularly
pleased by the success of a four-plane strike by VMF-311 (Major William
J. Sims) in support of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division commanded by
Brigadier General Samuel T. Williams. Major Johnnie C. Vance, Jr.,
strike leader, was accompanied in this flight by Captain George R.
Brier and Second Lieutenants Charles E. Pangburn and Whitlock N.
Sharpe. Up until this time the infantry had been particularly harassed
by several enemy frontline fortifications and supporting artillery. The
four pilots destroyed three bunkers and two heavy guns and also caved
in approximately 50 feet of trenchline on the 7 August strike. Upon
learning of the success of the Marine pilots and the conditions under
which the attacks were carried out--dangerous terrain and constant
ground fire directed towards the planes--the general dispatched a
letter, commending the “skill, courage, and determination displayed by
these pilots....”[246]
[246] MAG-33 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 16.
Another congratulatory message was received in September, this one
from General Pollock for the excellent support given by MAG-12 on the
20th. With three attack squadrons participating, Colonel Condon’s group
had neutralized Chinese weapons and troops at OP 36 to help prevent
a takeover of the Korean position. The pilots reported well over
100 Chinese casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Chamberlain’s
VMA-323 contributed most of the 23 Marine sorties. The other attacking
squadrons were VMA-121 (Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Cargill, who 10
days earlier had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Crawford), and VMA-212,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maurice W. Fletcher.
September was a month of mixed fortunes in the air war over Korea.
The successful CAS strikes of the 20th followed only a few days after
another high point set on 14 September, when Lieutenant Colonel
Cargill’s attack squadron flew its 5,000th combat sortie since
arrival in the Korean theater in October 1951. Then on 15 September,
General Jerome commissioned a new kind of unit in the wing, Marine
Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1), whose mission was to provide electronic
counter-measures (ECM) for UN aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence F.
Fox headed the squadron, the only one in the naval service with an ECM
primary mission in Korea.
Three days after the commissioning, a strange incident transpired.
North of the UN line and at an altitude of 9,500 feet, a F-84
Thunderjet fighter, with U.S. Air Force markings and insignia, attacked
a propeller-driven Air Force trainer. The slower plane immediately
began defensive maneuvering, flying in tight circles. After making five
turns, the trainer pilot saw the supposedly friendly jet fly off.
It was believed that such a paradoxical occurrence was due to
the substantial number of F-84 losses and the enemy’s ability to
piece together and fly an aircraft of that model. A few similar
episodes--attacks by apparently friendly aircraft on UN planes--had
previously taken place. In each case, the impostor was a model of U.S.
aircraft that had suffered particularly heavy losses.
Another incident in September had dire consequences. On the 10th,
MAG-33 dispatched 22 fighter aircraft from VMF-115 (Lieutenant Colonel
Royce W. Coln) to attack reported troop concentrations near Sariwon, 35
miles directly south of Pyongyang. The F9F Panther jets had completed
the strike and were returning to their K-3 base when they were diverted
to land at K-2, Taegu, where the weather was better. Fog had suddenly
swept over the field at K-3, reducing visibility to zero. Sixteen
Panthers landed safely at K-2, 45 miles southwest of the Marine field
at Pohang. The remaining six, piloted by Majors Raymond E. Demers and
Donald F. Givens, First Lieutenant Alvin R. Bourgeois, and by Second
Lieutenants John W. Hill, Jr., Carl R. Lafleur, and Richard L. Roth,
flying in formation in poor weather, crashed into the side of a
3,000-foot mountain while descending.[247] They would have required
only an additional 600 feet of altitude to clear the summit.
[247] Although not definitely proven, there were “some
indications of false radio beacons being used by the
enemy in clandestine operations in the K-2 area.” _Jack
ltr._
Losses of Marine pilots and aircraft had been of growing concern to the
wing command. The initial success of the flak suppression fires had
eliminated the one successful Communist source of air defense, accurate
antiaircraft firing. One result was that noncombat accidents for a
while during the summer became the principal cause of pilot and plane
attrition. To help reduce these operational accidents as well as the
combat losses, the two Marine air groups instituted squadron training
programs and also directed the adoption of several new corrective
procedures. In MAG-12, for example, a study of results from the FAF
policy that limited bombing runs to one for interdiction and two for
CAS targets revealed a sharp reduction in hits from flak. Tactical
squadron commanders in MAG-12 drew up a syllabus during September to
test proposed defensive tactics for their propeller aircraft to employ
against enemy jets. The carrier squadron, VMA-312, began that same
month the additional practice of field carrier landing qualification at
K-6 for new pilots before permitting them to operate from the carriers.
In spite of these efforts, pilot losses spiralled alarmingly in
October. For the rest of 1952, the monthly totals remained near that
month’s level. On the other hand, aircraft losses during October
dropped sharply to 10 from the September total of 22. This lower figure
was not to be exceeded until May 1953. These remedial procedures were
considered at least partially responsible for the substantial decrease
in aircraft losses.
In another area, a mid-October landing at Kojo, on the east coast
immediately south of the 39th Parallel, did not work out as planned.
The amphibious operation was in reality a feint intended to draw troops
away from frontline positions and expose them to naval air and gunfire
as they rushed in reinforcements. The enemy failed to rise to the bait,
and actually only a few Communist troops were sighted. VMA-312 provided
armed reconnaissance, tactical air operation, and naval gunfire
spotting during the feint. Although they made little enemy contact, the
Marine “Checkerboard” pilots operating off the _Sicily_ gained much
experience in landings and take-offs under the adverse conditions of
rough seas and high winds.
_Rockets, Resupply, and Radios_[248]
[248] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1st
MAW ComdD, Oct 52; HMR-161 ComdDs Aug-Sep 52.
Through October 1952, operational control of Korean based Marine
fighter and attack squadrons was still vested in commanders other than
General Jerome. Tactical squadrons continued to be directed by the FAF
or Navy in their missions; the observation and helicopter squadrons
were under operational control of the 1st Marine Division and utilized,
as before, at its discretion.
HMR-161, commanded since 8 August by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Carey,
continued its primary mission of evaluating rotary wing aircraft
and their methods of employment. One tactical innovation, movement
of elements of the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, was undertaken during
August soon after the Bunker Hill battle. With ground-fired rockets,
the problem of a tell-tale cloud of dust and brilliant flash of the
rockets after each salvo had always plagued the artillerymen. This
seldom went unnoticed by the enemy, who often showered the marked area
with counterbattery fire. On 19 and 20 August, in Operation RIPPLE,
HMR-161 and the rocket battery proved that these two units could
successfully shoot and scoot to a new location and fire effectively
again without drawing an enemy reprisal. This Marine Corps innovation
in air mobility--the first displacement of field artillery under combat
conditions--offered a major time-saving advantage. Whereas previously
it took approximately a half-hour for rocket launchers to move from
their bivouac area to firing position,[249] deployment by helicopter
could be made in a matter of minutes, a time factor that could be
critical in event of an enemy attempted breakthrough.
[249] _Henderson ltr III._
The operation demonstrated that helicopters not only could transport
rocket crews with weapons and ammunition to firing areas far more
rapidly than conventional wheeled vehicles, but that the rotary craft
could airlift these weapons into places inaccessible by road. The
nature of the mountainous terrain proved advantageous in that hills
and valleys provided defiladed areas for loading and firing the weapons
as well as protected routes for helicopter movements. An observation
made by pilots for operations in other types of environment, not
offering as much cover and concealment, was that the shiny blue paint
on their birds would make detection easy in most surroundings and that
camouflage paint would lessen the risk from enemy AA.
Transport helicopters of HMR-161 continued to augment those of VMO-6 in
casualty evacuation and ferrying Marines and other frontline troops.
The observation squadron maintained its policy and outstanding record
of emergency flights of the wounded under any weather conditions except
dense fog (electronic navigational aids still were not available). In
August, various mechanical failures developed among the newly received
HO5S-1 Sikorsky helicopters. These three-place observation aircraft
were underpowered but superior in many flight characteristics to the
HTL-4 helicopters then in the squadron. Mechanical difficulties with
the newer aircraft increased until it became necessary to ground them
late in October until replacement parts became available in the supply
system.
Employment of transport helicopters for logistical support continued
to be a principal use of such rotary wing aircraft as the end of
1952 approached. Tests earlier in the year had proved the theory
that this versatile aircraft could resupply a battalion manning the
MLR. The next step was to determine if the logistical support for an
entire combat regiment could be accomplished by helicopter. Operation
HAYLIFT, conducted during 22–26 September, the last of five operations
that month for HMR-161, was to test and evaluate helicopter resupply
of Colonel Moore’s 7th Marines. Plans called for delivering all
Class I, III, and V items and such Class II and IV items as could be
accommodated. Two loading and four unloading sites were prescribed.
All but extremely valuable cargo, such as mail, was to be carried
externally in slings or wire baskets.
HAYLIFT did show that at least for a short period of time--five days--a
helicopter squadron, utilizing 40 percent of its aircraft, could
sustain a MLR regiment. Following the general procedures employed
previously with the battalion, HMR-161 found that no great changes were
necessary for resupply of the regiment. Two recommendations emerged
from an evaluation of HAYLIFT. One stressed the need for establishment
of an operations center manned by representatives of each unit
participating in the exercise. The second called for development of
a more flexible loading system, one that would permit rapid weight
increases or decreases of 50 pound increments, as the situation
demanded. Such a method would make possible a more efficient payload
for each lift.[250]
[250] For example, on 25 September, rain soaked the cardboard
cover of the rations, adding extra weight to each
preloaded lift of these Class I supplies. On the other
hand, a heavier load could have been used at times. As
the helicopter used up its fuel, a commensurate increase
in cargo could have been carried.
Transport on a larger scale in the 1st MAW was accomplished by General
Jerome’s few transport aircraft reinforced by the eight R5Ds from the
VMR-152 detachment. In June, the passenger-carrying operations reached
the peak for the entire Korean War; that month, 17,490 troops and
military-associated civilians utilized the reinforced wing transport
aircraft. June 1952 was also the second busiest month in freight
transportation (7,397,824 pounds, nearly double the figure for June
1951).
Squadrons that were unable to better their performance records in some
cases could trace their trouble to the inability to get all of their
planes off the ground. Several models were subject to spare parts
shortages.[251] New aircraft, the F3D-2s and the AU-1s received in
June by VMF(N)-513 and VMA-212, respectively, had preceded an adequate
stocking of normal replacements for worn out or defective parts. The
night fighter squadron was handicapped also by introduction into the
supply system of inadequate radio tubes, which burned out rapidly. The
most critical shortage, however, was parts for starter units of jet
engines. This deficiency was not corrected until summer. One problem
never quite eliminated was the confusion of supply orders intended for
the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6. It was believed that the close
resemblance of Sikorsky HRS and HO5S part numbers and nomenclatures had
caused the improperly-marked requisitions and mix-up.
[251] Spare parts shortages are “inherent in the introduction
of new equipment into the field and prior to the
development of usage data.” a major effort was made at
this time by 1st MAW to improve its critical spare parts
support by improved stock control procedures and complete
inventory. _Jack ltr._
The 1st Marine Division logistical situation during the summer and fall
of 1952 was generally excellent. General Pollock’s units did not suffer
from the shortage of spare parts experienced by the 1st MAW whose
aircraft sometimes had to be grounded because of a missing spare part.
U.S. Army support in the replacement of worn-out Marine vehicles for
new Army ones proved satisfactory. No major problems arose in engineer
support. Medical evacuation and treatment and the level of supplies in
the five companies of the 1st Medical Battalion remained excellent.
There were two significant changes in the logistical support provided
the Marine division early in the fall. One dealt with employment of
the division’s 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, located in
the rear support areas. Beginning in September, the companies were
placed in direct support of the four infantry regiments, with liaison
by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Martin, division motor transport
officer. It was believed this decentralization would have the following
advantages:
1. Decreased vehicle mileage and therefore less driver fatigue
and prolonged vehicle life.
2. Increased dispersal as a safeguard against loss of wheeled
vehicle support in event of an unexpected and successful enemy
attack.
The other change was a shift in the emphasis of support rendered by
the Korean Service Corps. During October, each of the three frontline
regiments received 300 more laborers, raising the total to 800. Rear
area units paid for the increase, since the KSCs were detached from
support units and sent forward to the MLR.
Logistical support from the 1st Signal Battalion left little to be
desired. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Morris[252] when the
Marines moved to western Korea, the signalmen helped establish and
maintain an extensive communications net, with 5,200 miles of wire
within the division and several vital links to adjacent and higher
commands.[253] Wiremen worked around the clock to lay and maintain the
telephone lines, which suffered considerable damage from the artillery
and mortar barrages. When possible, the signalmen raised the wires off
the ground. The battalion set in more than 1,400 telephone poles. After
the system had been installed and was working efficiently, the July
floods washed away part of the major communications. By improvising
and by setting up emergency equipment, the battalion was able to
maintain the flow of communications traffic at a satisfactory level.
Replacement items were provided by the U.S. Army on a reimbursable
basis in accordance with existing directives.
[252] On 4 April Lieutenant Colonel Alton L. Hicks assumed
command of the battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Jacob E.
Glick relieved him on 3 August.
[253] Communication with General Kendall’s I Corps consisted of
radio-teletype, telephone, radio relay, courier plane,
and motor messenger. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-68.
The 11th Marines also had an additional 1,100 miles of
communication wire. _Henderson ltr III._
In September it became apparent that the signal equipment used to
maintain division communications was no longer equal to the demands
placed upon it. The extensive ground area plus the number and size of
reinforcing units had not only put a heavy burden on radio, telephone,
and teletype equipment but also caused the depletion of reserve stocks.
With the spare equipment in use, there was no pool to draw upon when
units turned in defective equipment for repair. Neither were there
available replacements for materiel destroyed by enemy action. Items
most urgently needed were flown in from the States. Other critical
parts came from Army sources in Japan and Korea. By the end of October,
the communication resupply had returned to a more normal condition.
Before the month ended a different type of critical situation was to
confront the division. It appeared that the enemy’s success in seizing
a half-dozen outposts earlier in October had only whetted his appetite
for more. Chinese eyes were turned towards positions that held still
more potential value than the stepping-stones just acquired. The
extreme right battalion in the division front held by the 7th Marines
was the focal point of the new effort.
CHAPTER V
The Hook
_Before the Battle--Preparations for Attack and Defense--Attack on the
Hook--Reno Demonstration--Counterattack--Overview_
_Before the Battle_[254]
[254] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv, _Info for CG, FMFPac_;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 706–736, dtd 1–31
Oct 52; 7thMar ComdD, Oct 52; LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr.
memo to Dir, MarCorHist, HQMC, dtd 28 Oct 52, Subj: Notes
on 7th Marines’ Action (Defense of “The Hook”), 26–27 Oct
52, hereafter Heinl, _memo_.
After the heavy fighting in early October, there was a change in the
1st Marine Division dispositions. On the 12th, the 5th Marines relieved
the 1st in the center sector and the latter regiment went into reserve.
For the next two weeks the lull that prevailed across the regimental
front was in sharp contrast to the intense fighting there earlier
in the month. On the division left, the Korean Marines, not engaged
in any sizable Communist action, conducted frequent tank-infantry
reconnaissance patrols and ambushes forward of their MLR. In the
center of the division line the 5th Marines, too, found their Chinese
opponent seemingly reluctant to pursue any combat offensives, though
his harassment of the Bunker Hill area represented the strongest action
against the Marine division at this time. The 7th Marines, holding
down the right sector, similarly encountered the enemy for only brief
periods, these contacts during patrol actions lasting no more than 15
to 30 minutes.
Upon its relief from the MLR, the 1st Marines took over the division
rear area. There the regiment continued the improvement of the
secondary defensive lines, conducted extensive training, and dispatched
numerous security patrols throughout the regimental area. These
routine reserve roles were in addition to the primary mission of
augmenting units on the Marine MLR in order to counterattack and defeat
any attempted penetration of JAMESTOWN in the division area. As part
of its counterattack mission, the divisional reserve regiment was to
be prepared for employment anywhere in the I Corps sector to block an
enemy advance.
On the division right, the 7th Marines remained on position in defense
of JAMESTOWN. Following the bitter outpost contests on 6 October,
Colonel Moore continued to retain all three battalions on line: 2/7
on the left, 3/7 in the center, and 1/7 on the right. The regimental
commander had found it necessary to commit his three battalions on line
due to the vastly overextended six-mile front, the rugged terrain,
and the very real possibility of a major Communist attack anywhere
along the MLR. With all battalions forward, Colonel Moore was left
with a very small reserve, one company from 3/7. This battalion had to
use as its reserve what had become known as “clutch platoons”--units
composed of cooks, bakers, clerks, motor transport, and other
Marine headquarters personnel. These local reserves, and even the
reserve company from 3/7, could be employed only with the regimental
commander’s approval.
Line JAMESTOWN, in the 7th Marines area, meandered from the vicinity
of the burned-out village of Toryom, on the left, to the Hook salient
in the right battalion sector and from there southeast to the Samichon
River, the boundary with the 1st Commonwealth Division. From the left
battalion sector to the right, the terrain gradually grew more rugged
until the hills finally spilled over into the Samichon Valley. To the
rear of the MLR, the ground was less jagged; forward of the line, the
hills were more precipitous in character. The steepest heights were
in the right battalion sector. Highest terrain feature along Colonel
Moore’s MLR was Hill 146, located not far from the Hook. Throughout
the 7th Marines sector rice paddies covered the narrow valley floors
between the hills. Vegetation was sparse. A series of dirt roads and
trails served the regimental area.
Combat outposts varied greatly as to their distance from JAMESTOWN.
Farthest from the line were the three in the left battalion sector,
manned by Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2/7. This trio, Carson, Reno, and
Vegas, were approximately 1,000 yards forward of the MLR. Berlin and
East Berlin (a new outpost established on 13 October) were the forward
positions in the center line outposted by Lieutenant Colonel Charles D.
Barrett’s[255] Marines. To the right Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s 1/7
sector held three--COPs Ronson, Warsaw, and Verdun, the latter near the
Commonwealth border.
[255] Responsibility for this part of the 7th Marines line
changed on 13 October, when Lieutenant Colonel Barrett
took command of 3/7 from Lieutenant Colonel Russell.
The latter then was assigned as division senior liaison
officer to the KMC regiment.
Ronson was the outpost nearest to the Hook, a major defensive position
of the regiment. The importance of this part of the MLR, in the extreme
eastern sector, lay not in its strength but rather in its weakness.
Jutting as it did towards the Communist lines, the salient formed a
J-shaped bulge in the main line, which not only gave the Hook its
nickname but also established the vulnerability of the position. Its
susceptibility to capture derived both from violation of a defensive
axiom that the “MLR should not have sharp angles and salients”[256] and
to the fact that the ridgeline on which the Hook was located continued
northwest into Communist-held territory. Seattle, which the Chinese had
seized on 2 October, lay only about 500 yards northwest of the Hook.
[256] Heinl, _memo_. The originator of this memo, Lieutenant
Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., was an experienced Marine
officer and military historian who had just been assigned
to the division for duty. Temporarily attached to the 7th
Marines as an observer, his brief visit there happened to
coincide with the beginning of the Hook battle.
In spite of its vulnerability, the Hook could not be abandoned. There
was no other terrain feature held by the Marines that could command the
critical Samichon Valley, a major avenue of approach from the northeast
directly to Seoul. The salient also dominated the entire nearby area
of the Imjin River to the south. Possession of the Hook and adjoining
ridge would give the Communists observation of a substantial portion
of the Marine rear areas beyond the Imjin, as well as the vital river
crossings. In the opinion of Major General M. M. Austin-Roberts-West,
whose 1st Commonwealth Division was soon to take over the Hook sector,
had the salient been lost, “a withdrawal of 4,000 yards would have been
necessary.”[257]
[257] Quoted in LtCol Herbert F. Wood, _Strange Battleground:
The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defense
Policy of Canada_ (Ottawa: The Army Historical Section,
Canadian Forces Headquarters, 1966), p. 213.
At the beginning of October, this vital area had been protected by COPs
Seattle and Warsaw. When the former was overrun, it became necessary
to establish a new position. This was directed by Lieutenant Colonel
Dulacki, and on 16 October Ronson was established 200 yards southeast
of Seattle and 275 yards west of the Hook. About 600 yards northeast of
the salient the remaining position, COP Warsaw, commanded the lowlands
to the east and the narrow, east-west oriented valley of a Samichon
tributary immediately to the front.
Opposite the three MLR battalions of the 7th Marines were the 356th
and 357th Regiments of the 119th Division, 40th CCF Army. In addition
to these infantry units, numbering close to 7,000, an estimated 10
battalions (120 guns) of Chinese artillery[258] were facing Colonel
Moore’s regiment. Personnel strength of the American unit consisted
of 3,844 Marines, 11 medical officers and 133 corpsmen, 3 U.S. Army
communicators, and 764 Koreans (746 KSCs and 18 interpreters).
[258] The Marine division artillery regiment reported that
in late October nine battalions of Chinese artillery,
ranging from 75 or 76mm guns or howitzers to 122mm
howitzers, opposed the 7th Marines. It was estimated
that one other 122mm battalion was also emplaced north
of the right division sector. In addition to these CCF
units, elements of a 152mm self-propelled howitzer unit
were also believed to be in the area. Late in November
two batteries of 152mm howitzers were tentatively located
about 4,000 yards west northwest of the Hook. Disposition
had been determined “as a result of crater analysis,
shell reports, sound plots, and capabilities of the
weapon.” 11thMar ComdD, Nov 52, “Enemy Artillery Activity
Rpts,” Nos. 21, 23, dtd 1, 21 Nov. 52.
During the summer and early fall, the 7th Marines had amassed
considerable information about the enemy, including Chinese strength
and composition of forces and many of their combat characteristics.
Encroachment on Marine ground positions by steadily creeping the CCF
trenchline forward continued to be the enemy’s major ground-gaining
tactic. In fact, the Chinese units facing the Marine division
concentrated their digging during the fall of 1952 in the sector north
of the 7th Marines MLR. (See Map 15.) Other intelligence, however,
seemed open to question. For example, there was the reported frontline
presence of women among the 90 Chinese who had engaged a 2/1 patrol
on 5 October as well as the sighting in the KMC sector on the 17th of
enemy “super soldiers” far taller than the ordinary Chinese. Many in
the division found it difficult to believe the statements of enemy
prisoners. During interrogation they invariably maintained that the
mission of Chinese Communist Forces in Korea was a “defensive” one.
[Illustration:
MAP 15 K. WHITE
“CCF CREEPING TACTICS”
MARCH-OCTOBER 1952]
The static battle situation encouraged the use of psychological
warfare. In attempting to influence the minds of their opponents and
weaken morale, the Chinese depended upon loudspeakers to carry their
propaganda barrage across No-Man’s-Land. Enemy employment of this
technique was especially heavy during October. To Marines, for example,
Chinese directed pleas of “Go home and have peace,” “Surrender, we
treat POWs well,” “Leave Korea,” “Marines, come and get your buddies’
bodies,” and the like, often to the accompaniment of music. On
occasion, Chinese patrols left propaganda pamphlets behind them in the
KMC sector. Infrequently, the enemy displayed signs along patrol routes
urging Marines to surrender. Most of the Chinese psychological efforts
were directed against the Korean Marines.
In enemy employment of artillery, Marine frontline units and division
intelligence had become well aware of the vast improvements the
Communists had made in recent months. Aided by a plentiful supply
of ammunition, enemy guns and howitzers, including the heavy 152mm
weapon, frequently delivered concentrated fires on critical positions
in the division area. Marines felt the effects of how well the Chinese
had learned to mass their fires against a single target for maximum
destructive power. From the Marines, moreover, the enemy had picked
up the artillery box tactic, employing it for the first time in their
sector opposite Colonel Moore’s regiment during the early October
outpost battles.
During those same clashes, the 11th Marines had observed how the
Chinese displaced some of their batteries well forward for more
effective artillery support of their attacking infantry. One enemy
artillery innovation had been noted the previous month by a Marine AO;
on 19 September a Chinese artillery piece was detected firing in the
open. Previous observations had indicated that the Chinese generally
used wooded areas or extensive bunker-type positions to conceal their
supporting weapons.
By the middle of October, 62.5 percent of the Chinese artillery
opposing General Pollock’s division was located in positions north
of the 7th Marines. The importance the enemy put on the principle of
massed artillery fire and the improvement of their ammunition supply
can be seen in a remark attributed to a Chinese division commander:
The enemy had organized an attack of two-battalion strength on
our first-line platoon. As the enemy were getting into their
assembly area I directed several volleys of rapid fire against
them with a total expenditure of about 120 rounds. That very
evening the army commander rang me up and said disapprovingly,
‘You’ve expended a bit too much ammunition today!’ It seemed as
though the army commander had detected precisely what was in my
mind. There was an instant change in his voice as he said: ‘Oh,
comrade, it really could not be accounted as waste, but you must
know we are short of supplies.’
Scarcely two years had passed but the situation was completely
altered. In the present we had emplaced 120 guns to each
kilometre of front line so that in a rapid-fire bombardment of
25 minutes more than 20,000 rounds of ammunition could be hurled
against the enemy positions. If the fire used in supporting
attacks and in repulsing enemy counterattacks were taken into
account the total would reach 70,000 rounds.[259]
[259] _CPV, Recollections_, p. 360.
Exaggerated as the numbers of guns and rounds may be, the basic massing
technique was in line with U.S. intelligence estimates at the time. The
remark also pointed to the importance the Chinese had learned to place
on employment of artillery, a shift in emphasis that Colonel Moore’s
regiment was soon to experience in unprecedented volume.
_Preparations for Attack and Defense_[260]
[260] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3
Jnls, 24–26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 729–732, dtd 24–27 Oct
52; 7th Mar, 1/7, VMA-323 ComdDs, Oct 52; Heinl, _memo_.
Before the Hook battle erupted, the defensive fires that the 7th
Marines could draw upon were not overpowering in terms of numbers of
units available. Only one battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Bert Davis’
2/11, was in direct support of Colonel Moore’s regiment. In this
mission, the 2/11 fires were reinforced by those of 1/11 (Lieutenant
Colonel David S. Randall). In addition to these organic units, the
batteries of the 623d Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzers)
and one platoon of C Battery, 17th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch
self-propelled howitzers) were readily available to the 7th Marines.
In all, 38 light, medium, and heavy pieces constituted the artillery
support of the right sector.[261] General support was available from
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond D. Wright’s 4/11 and from the 4.2-inch
Rocket Battery (Captain Donald G. Frier). The 159th Field Artillery
Battalion (155mm howitzers) and B Battery, 204th Field Artillery
Battalion (155mm guns), like the other Army units positioned in the
Marine Division sector, reinforced the fires of division artillery.
Fire support from 1st Commonwealth Division weapons within range of the
Hook area could also be depended upon.
[261] 11thMar ComdD, Oct 52, App III, Sheet 3. Eighteen of the
weapons (the 623d Field Artillery Battalion) had just
moved into the Marine sector and begun operating on 14
October. The unit remained under I Corps operational
control, with the mission of providing general support
reinforcing fire.
Although the Army artillery units satisfied the heavy punch requirement
of the 11th Marines, commanded since 21 September by Colonel Harry N.
Shea, there was one basic element the regiment lacked. This missing
ingredient was a sufficient amount of ammunition for the howitzers.
Defense of outposts and mainline positions along the EUSAK front in
early and mid-October 1952 consumed a great deal of this type of
ammunition. This heavy expenditure was brought to the attention of the
corps commanders by Eighth Army. General Van Fleet pointed out that
ammunition consumption rates for both the 105mm and 155mm howitzers
during these two critical weeks in October not only exceeded the
expenditures of the massive Communist spring offensive in 1951 but also
the UN counterstroke that followed.[262]
[262] Later in 1951, during the UN Summer-Fall offensive,
ammunition consumption had again risen sharply, creating
concern among corps commanders and occasioning one of
them to remark to a subordinate, “We have the distinct
impression that two of your battalions are trying to
compete for a world’s record.” Capt Edward C. Williamson,
_et al._, “Bloody Ridge,” ms OCMH, 1951, cited in
James A. Huston, _The Sinews of War: Army Logistics,
1775–1953--The Army Historical Series_ (Washington: OCMH,
1966), v. II, p. 632.
To help remedy the situation, the EUSAK commander urged “continuous
command supervision to insure the maximum return for all ammunition
expended.”[263] The general made it plain that he was not changing his
policy of exacting a heavy toll whenever the enemy began an attack.
This course had been followed by the 1st Marine Division, but the
Marines’ ability to both restrict the enemy’s creeping tactics and
simultaneously fight a siege-type war was noticeably impeded.[264]
[263] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App I, No. 19.
[264] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-71.
As the end of October approached, the shortage of ammunition was
becoming a subject of increased concern to the frontline Marine units.
Daily allowances established for the last 11 days of the month were
20 rounds of 105mm high explosive (HE) and 4.3 rounds of 155mm high
explosive for each tube.[265] With such small quantities to fire
and further restricted by an equally critical shortage of both hand
grenades and 81mm mortar rounds, Colonel Moore was almost powerless to
spike the Chinese preparations for assault of the Hook.[266] Artillery
fires were reserved for only the most urgent situations or for large
bodies of troops. It was one observer’s opinion that the “enemy could
show himself almost at will without receiving fire, and that it was
impossible either to harass or neutralize his continual fortification
activity, let alone embark upon systematic destructive fires of the
kind he was carrying out.”[267]
[265] _Ibid._
[266] For example, during the latter part of the month each
rifle company in the Hook battalion was limited to 150
hand grenades. The total 11-day allowance for Lieutenant
Colonel Dulacki’s 81mm mortars was 475 rounds. 1/7 ComdD,
Oct 52, App. III.
[267] Heinl, _memo_.
As a means of compensating for the shortage of 81mm mortar and 105mm
howitzer ammunition, the Marines reverted to a former method of using
machine guns. This technique, employed during the trench warfare days
of World War I but seldom thereafter, was considered a useful expedient
to discourage enemy defensive creeping tactics as well as to deter his
preparations for objective attacks. The system required emplacing heavy
machine guns both on and to the rear of the MLR to fire into areas that
troops used for assembly or as check points. If the target was visible
to the machine gunner, he could take it under direct fire. At night,
when the enemy operated under cover of darkness, the machine guns fired
into zones which had already been registered in the daytime. Colonel
Moore directed his units on 23 October to resort to this expedient.
A 1st Marine Division daily intelligence report covering the 24-hour
period beginning at 1800 on 24 October noted that there was “a
marked increase in enemy artillery and mortar fire with an estimated
twelve hundred rounds falling in the CT 1010 area of the 7th Marines
sector.”[268] According to the division PIR there was also an increased
number of enemy troops observed that same day in locations west and
northwest of the Hook. Most of the fire was directed against the Hook
area of the MLR and on the two sentinels, Ronson and Warsaw. Efforts by
Marines and some 250 KSCs to repair the damaged or destroyed bunkers,
trenches, communications lines, and tactical wire, during brief
periods of relief from the artillery deluges, were wiped out again by
subsequent shellings.
[268] 1stMarDiv PIR 729, dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2. Ronson, the Hook,
and Warsaw are within the 1,000-meter square, CT 1010.
It would not be correct to say that 1/7 remained entirely passive at
this time. Battalion weapons replied, though in faint voices barely
audible in the din created by Chinese firing. Regimental mortars chimed
in and so did 2/11, which fired 416 rounds in the 24 hours ending at
1800 on the 24th. For that same period, tanks expended 137 rounds at
active weapon positions firing on the Hook. One air strike was directed
against the enemy opposing the Hook battalion. This attack by a quartet
of Marine F9Fs from VMF-311 (Lieutenant Colonel Arthur H. Adams) bombed
and napalmed a troublesome group of Chinese entrenched on the enemy MLR
750 yards east of the Hook.
During the next 48 hours, the enemy continued his preparations for an
attack, concentrating his artillery fire on the Hook area. Colonel
Moore’s battalions received approximately 2,850 artillery and mortar
rounds, most of which rained down on 1/7 to the right. There, the heavy
and continuous fire slowed Marine efforts to restore their wrecked
bunkers and trenches. Late on the 25th there was some relief from the
artillery bombardment, but by that time many of the prophets on the
line and in the rear area were uncertain only as to the precise time of
the unexpected Chinese attack.
Colonel Clarence A. Barninger, the division intelligence officer,
had himself alerted General Pollock to the implications of “the
intensification and character of enemy fires”[269] being received in
the 1/7 sector. The intelligence evaluation was not based only on
recent events. A detailed study of Chinese capabilities and possible
courses of action had just been completed by the G-2 and his staff. In
its discussion of the early October outpost attacks in the division
right, the report concluded that Chinese interests lay in gaining the
“terrain dominating the Samichon Valley....”[270]
[269] Heinl, _memo_.
[270] 1stMarDiv Intell. Est., dtd 19 Oct 52, p. 8, filed with
the divisions PIRs for that month.
Since 5 October when 1/7 had been moved into the line as the regiment’s
third MLR battalion, the enemy had begun a regular shelling of 1/7
positions adjacent to the Hook. Incoming rounds had increased almost
daily. “Troops, vehicles, and tanks moving in daylight even behind the
MLR almost invariably brought down enemy artillery or mortars upon
them. It was apparent that the enemy was making preparation for a
large scale assault in this portion of the MLR,”[271] the battalion
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki, later recalled. Matters took
an even more ominous turn about 23 October when the Chinese “began a
deliberate, deadly accurate precision fire aimed at destruction of the
major fortifications in the Hook’s system of dug-in defense.”[272]
As the tempo of this fire stepped up daily, the destruction of the
battalion’s carefully prepared defenses exceeded the Marines’ ability
to repair the damage. The artillery build-up was believed preparatory
to an attempt to either seize or breach the MLR.
[271] _Dulacki ltr._
[272] Heinl, _memo_.
In late October, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki had two companies on the
MLR to protect this important area. On the 23d, Captain Frederick C.
McLaughlin’s Company A was assigned the left part of the battalion
sector, which included the Hook. A squad outposted Ronson and a
reinforced platoon was stationed at Warsaw. At 0200 on the 26th,
Company C (Captain Paul B. Byrum) departed the battalion reserve area
to take over responsibility as the left MLR company. Relief of Company
A was completed at 0410.[273] Holding down the right flank of the main
line during this time was Company B (Captain Dexter E. Evans). This
area was larger but somewhat less rugged than the western part of the
1/7 sector.
[273] Due to the width of the Hook sector, it was necessary to
keep all three rifle platoons in the line. A reinforced
platoon from the battalion reserve outposted Warsaw.
While Company A was on line, a Company C platoon manned
the outpost; when Company C was relieved on 26 October,
a Company A platoon was sent to Warsaw. Maj Frederick
C. McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Jan 70,
hereafter _McLaughlin ltr_.
In the two days immediately preceding the Chinese attack of 26
October, 1/7 received a limited amount of support intended to harass
the enemy and throw him off balance, if possible. Tanks fired their
90s at bunkers, caves, trenches, and direct fire weapons in the enemy
sector. On the 25th, Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion blasted away
54 times at these targets; on the next day, Captain Clyde W. Hunter’s
gunners more than tripled their previous day’s output, firing 173 high
explosive shells. Artillery, in the meantime, stepped up its rate
of fire on the 25th, when Lieutenant Colonel Davis’ 2/11 fired 575
rounds, followed by 506 more the next day. The division general support
battalion, 4/11, fired a total of 195 rounds on these two days.[274]
Nearly half were to assist the 7th Marines. On both days the regiment
received the benefit of 4.5-inch rocket ripples.
[274] On 24 October, Battery M of the battalion was temporarily
relaid to provide additional support to Colonel Moore’s
regiment.
Air support just prior to the attack was increased slightly, but only
two strikes were flown for the Hook battalion. At 1535 on the 25th,
two Corsair fighters and a pair of AUs, the attack version of the
Corsair, dive-bombed a section of Chinese trench that housed a number
of weapons bothersome to the Marines nearby.[275] The four VMA-323
aircraft claimed destruction of 40 yards of trench and damage to 35
yards more. The target was 1,000 yards southwest of the Hook. Next
morning the squadron sent three of its famed fighters against bunker
positions on a hill 900 yards west of the 1/7 salient. This mission had
been prebriefed to attack enemy artillery positions opposite the KMC
line. Instead, the flight was diverted to take on the bunkers, which
represented, at that time, more of a menace to the division. The attack
destroyed one bunker, damaged another, and produced an estimated seven
casualties.
[275] The flight had been scheduled to attack active artillery
positions 3½ miles north of the Carson-Reno-Vegas area.
When some of their ordnance was unexpended after putting
these guns out of action, the planes, were ordered to
take on the trench target.
Hidden nearby the area of this air strike in the early morning hours
of 26 October was the Chinese infantry unit which later that same
day would attack the Hook. Before daybreak the 3d Battalion, 357th
Regiment, had moved from an area nearly two miles west of the Hook. The
forward elements, two companies, with two day’s rations for each man,
halted about a mile from their objective. There the Chinese remained
throughout most of the 26th, carefully concealing themselves from
observation by friendly forces.[276] While the enemy troops were lying
low, their mortars and artillery began the final preparatory fires.
[276] Within the division there were no reports of sightings
of unusually large groups of enemy soldiers in this
area. In fact, there were fewer enemy seen on the 26th
than any other day since 18 October. During the 23d and
24th, about 100 enemy had been observed almost a half
mile closer to the Hook than the hideout area used on the
26th. 11thMar ComdD, Oct. 52, p. 12; 1stMarDiv PIR 729,
dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2.
_Attack on the Hook_[277]
[277] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 723, 734, dtd 27, 29 Oct 52;
7thMar, 11th Mar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs,
Oct 52; Heinl, _memo_.
On the morning of 26 October, Chinese artillery and mortar fire
striking the MLR slackened a bit but was still sufficiently heavy in
the vicinity of the Hook to prevent visitors in the area any direct
observation from the salient. During his inspection of Hook defenses
that morning, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki was knocked to the ground by
the concussion of an enemy artillery round exploding nearby.[278] In
the afternoon, enemy shelling continued at a steady pace, but towards
the end of the day intense mixed artillery and mortar fire increased
to preattack proportions. Dusk brought no relief from the enemy’s
supporting weapons.
[278] The 1/7 commander, who was uninjured by the blast,
might have become a believer that day in the military
cliche, “Rank hath its privileges,” for Brigadier A.
H. G. Ricketts (29th British Infantry Brigade, 1st
Commonwealth Division), who was standing near Lieutenant
Colonel Dulacki, was untouched. The British division was
scheduled to take over responsibility for the Hook sector
in early November.
Out at the flanking positions, Ronson and Warsaw, there was little
change in the intensity of the enemy shelling for the remainder of the
afternoon. Bunkers and trenches were caved in, just as they were on the
Hook[279] from the preparatory fires that had been building up over a
period of days. (For a sketch of the Hook battle area on 26 October,
see Map 16.) Enemy shelling had also produced a number of casualties.
Marines at Ronson were the first to experience the enemy’s ground
assault. At 1810 the outpost reported an increased rate of mortar
and artillery rounds exploding on the position. Two groups of enemy
soldiers were seen moving towards the outpost, one from the east and
the other from the west. Ronson Marines took these advancing soldiers
under fire immediately.
[279] Prior to the enemy’s steady shelling of the Hook, the
trenches were six feet deep. The preparatory fires of the
past several days had been so intense that in nearly all
areas the trenchline had been leveled by the time of the
Chinese attack. “I am convinced that the Chinese didn’t
realize that they had penetrated our MLR or they would
have exploited the penetration.” Col Russell E. Honsowetz
ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 26 Jan 70.
Initially, the radio messages from Ronson reported that the attacking
force was a company, but a later estimate of approximately 50 Chinese
appeared to be more nearly correct. Communist infantry made their way
through the defensive artillery barrages requested by the COP garrison
and into the rifle and machine gun fire of the Marines. By 1838 the
enemy had overrun the squad of Marines and was in possession of Ronson.
No one had escaped from the outpost.
[Illustration:
MAP 16 K. White
HOOK SECTOR OF MLR
1800, 26 October 1952]
At this time, 800 yards northeast, the 9th Company, 357th Battalion
was working its way towards Warsaw. Striking at the COP from both east
and west, the enemy company was momentarily halted by extremely heavy
Marine mortar and artillery fire. By 1820, the platoon at Warsaw had
requested the protective box around its position; this fire the 11th
Marines delivered promptly. Still the Chinese continued to besiege
the position and Company A defending Marines, under outpost commander
Second Lieutenant John Babson, Jr., were locked in a hand-to-hand
struggle. As a platoon was being readied to reinforce Warsaw the
outpost reported, at 1907, that enemy soldiers had reached the Marine
bunkers and that the defenders were using bayonets, pistols, hand
grenades, and both ends of their rifles to repel the Communist invaders.
Three minutes later came the word, “We’re being overrun.” With this
message all communication from the outpost temporarily ceased, but
at 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s CP heard Warsaw report heavy
fighting still in progress there. The outpost first stated that enemy
soldiers were on top of the bunkers; then called for “VT on own
position” which the 11th Marines furnished.
The seriousness of the situation was immediately apparent at higher
commands. One outpost had been lost; a second was in jeopardy. At about
this time, a veritable avalanche of enemy artillery and mortar fire
began to blanket the Hook. Colonel Moore released Captain McLaughlin’s
company to 1/7. The 7th Marines commander also ordered regimental
ammunition supplies be allotted to Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s area.
Shortly after that, division lifted ammunition restrictions on 1/7.
To counter the impending ground attack, at 1859 Lieutenant Colonel
Dulacki ordered Captain McLaughlin’s Company A forward to reinforce the
Hook sector and to assist Company C in containing the enemy attack. One
platoon, the 1st, departed immediately for the MLR. As the remainder
of the company prepared to move out, the enemy struck in estimated
battalion strength. By 1938 some of the CCF infantry had advanced to
the main trenches immediately south of the Hook. Within a few minutes,
a second wave of Communist soldiers, following closely the preparatory
barrages, hit JAMESTOWN just east of the 1/7 salient and frontally at
the Hook itself. It appeared that the Communists had come to stay, for
many cargo carriers--Chinese with construction materials for bunkers
and trenches--accompanied the attacking infantry.
Fire fights raged during the early phase of the struggle, with
continuous support furnished the assault troops by Chinese artillery
and mortars. The momentum of the enemy’s three-pronged attack, aided
by heavy rear area fire support, enabled the Chinese to overrun the
trenches and push on along the crest of the ridge, its slope near the
spine, and across the segments formed by the spurs that jutted south
from the crest. Marine defenders pulled back while a small rear guard
covered their movement with fire. Along the MLR, about 400 yards south
of the Hook, the Chinese had slipped around the flanks of the COP and
at 2030 forced a penetration in the C/1/7 line. Second Lieutenant
John W. Meikle (1st Platoon, Company C) organized the Marines into a
perimeter defense adjacent to the MLR. At 2130, remaining elements of
the company formed another defense blocking area 550 yards east of the
Hook near the crest of the ridge.
Between these two positions small groups of Marines continued the heavy
close fight to repulse the enemy while inching their way forward to
tie-in with the rest of the unit. (See Map 17 for penetration limits
during the Hook battle.) To the northeast, the platoon at Warsaw had
not been heard from since 1945, and at 2330, Colonel Moore reluctantly
declared the outpost to be in enemy hands.
At the time the loss of Warsaw was announced, counter-measures designed
to halt the enemy assault were in various stages of preparation or
completion. The initial reinforcing element sent forward to strengthen
the main line had linked up with Lieutenant Meikle’s 1st Platoon,
Company C, in the perimeter near the 3d Battalion boundary. The
remainder of Company A was en route to the crest of the east-west ridge
to thwart what appeared to be the main enemy drive. Colonel Moore had
released his meager reserve, H/3/7, at 0300 on the 27th, and General
Pollock had ordered one of the division reserve battalions, 3/1, to the
7th Marines area, although still retaining operational control of the
unit.
As the forward battalion of the division reserve, 3/1 (Lieutenant
Colonel Altman) had prepared counterattack plans for critical
locations in the division sector and had previously made a
reconnaissance of the Hook area. The battalion immediately displaced
from its bivouac site north of the Imjin (Camp Rose) to an assembly
area behind the 7th Marines on the MLR.
[Illustration:
MAP 17 K. White
HOOK PENETRATIONS
26–27 October 1952]
All possible support for 1/7 was made available, since the critical
situation resulting from the major enemy assault automatically
suspended previous restrictions on use of artillery and mortar
allowances. At Warsaw, 2/11 blanketed the position with a continuous
barrage in order to limit the enemy’s ability to effectively hold and
consolidate the captured COP. Lieutenant Colonel Davis’ cannoneers also
blasted enemy formations in response to fire missions from forward
observers. Artillery rounds fell on Chinese outposts supporting the
attack, on approach routes to the battleground, on assembly areas, and
on known and suspected Chinese artillery locations.
Marine aviation and tanks were employed as part of the plan to first
limit the penetration made by the enemy before the counterattack to
expel him. A section of tanks had been firing since 1930 against the
enemy main line; a second section joined the direct fire assault a
half hour later. At 2113, one F7F, with 1,300 pounds of bombs, hit
a portion of the enemy’s MSR. At 2306, another twin-engine Grumman
Tigercat blasted the same area, about three-quarters of a mile west of
the Hook. These initial one-plane strikes in support of the defense of
the salient were flown by Captain Leon C. Cheek, Jr. and Major Laurel
M. Mickelson, respectively, of VMF(N)-513.
_Reno Demonstration_[280]
[280] The material in this section has been derived from
7thMar, “Summary of Action, 26 Oct-1 Nov 52, Hook, Reno,
Ronson”; 2/7 ComdD, Oct 52.
At 0030 on the 27th, Major Mickelson, returning from his MPQ attack,
touched his Tigercat down at K-8 (Kunsan). At the very moment that
the plane set down on the Kunsan runway, the Chinese launched another
assault against the 7th Marines, the second in less than six hours.
This later action, in Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2/7 sector, nearly
two miles west of the Hook, was not a surprise move either. In fact, an
attack against the Carson-Reno-Vegas area had been anticipated for some
time, and it was this state of preparedness that throttled the enemy’s
attempt to seize an outpost here.
Division intelligence had accumulated considerable evidence that the
Chinese buildup in late October was intended to ultimately clear the
way to the 2/7 outposts rather than those of 1/7 in the eastern Hook
area. A majority of the Marine supporting arms effort immediately prior
to 1800 on the 26th had gone to the left battalion of Colonel Moore’s
regiment. Aware of the interest the enemy had shown in the outposts
earlier in the month, the battalion commander had strengthened the
defense of this key area. One measure, increasing the size of the
ambush force maintained at night near Reno from a squad to a platoon,
was to pay handsome dividends before October was over.
Just after dark on the 26th, a reinforced platoon from Captain James
R. Flores’ Company E departed the MLR on a combat patrol and ambush
mission. After reaching its assigned area, about 300 yards short of
the hill that housed COP Reno, the ambush platoon disappeared into
camouflaged dug-in positions and waited. At midnight, the Marines were
alerted by faint noises to the front. There, elements of two Chinese
companies, which had stealthily maneuvered into the ambush area, were
organizing for a sneak assault by an envelopment on Reno from the rear.
(See Map 18.) The waiting platoon apprised the outpost of the enemy’s
presence in the area; then when it appeared that the Chinese were about
to launch their assault, the ambushers opened fire.
As the surprised Chinese turned to take on the hidden ambush
platoon, the two defending squads at Reno began firing. It took 10
minutes before the Chinese were sufficiently recovered to organize
a withdrawal. At 0040, enemy elements quickly began to pull back
towards the north. The outpost had been spared a major action, but its
occupants were to be again engaged by the Chinese before daybreak.
[Illustration:
MAP 18 K. White
OUTPOST RENO ATTACKS
27 October 1952]
At 0400, one platoon from a third CCF company, approaching from an
enemy hill to the northeast, hit Reno. The attack was conducted in a
fashion not previously experienced by the 1st Marine Division in West
Korea--platoons echeloned in depth, assaulting in successive waves.
The first unit to reach Reno was composed of grenade throwers and
supporting riflemen. This advance element was followed immediately
by the rest of the platoon, infantry armed with submachine guns and
rifles. Marines on Reno were not troubled by the initial platoon
assault, but the second one made some inroads before the defenders’
fires forced the enemy to pull back. A third two-phased attack
succeeded, however, in cracking the defenses at the northeast section
of the position. The outpost commander then ordered his Marines into
the bunkers and called for overhead artillery fire. Caught in the open,
the Chinese were forced to withdraw at 0440 and did not return.
_Counterattack_[281]
[281] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
dtd 27–28 Oct 52; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn,
VMAs-121, -212, -323 ComdDs, Oct. 52.
After the Marines in Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2/7 sector had dealt
with the demonstration force, the action shifted back to the Hook.
Early on the morning of the 27th, Captain McLaughlin’s unit, sent
to the Hook-Hill 146 crest to block the penetration of the MLR, had
established contact with Captain Byrum’s Company C, passed through
its lines, and pressed on to the Hook. Suddenly, enemy small arms and
machine guns opened up on lead elements of Company A. Artillery and
mortar fire then began to hit the company. The Marines continued their
advance and made some progress in arresting the Chinese thrust at the
ridge. Shortly thereafter the enemy called in heavy supporting fires,
forcing Company A to halt its attack temporarily. When the company
commander ordered his men to resume the advance, overwhelming enemy
fire again slowed the movement. McLaughlin then ordered his men to hold
and dig in.
When report of the Company A situation reached the regimental CP,
Colonel Moore ordered into action his last reserve unit, Captain
Bernard B. Belant’s Company H.[282] He was directed to report to 1/7,
then to pass through the depleted ranks of Company A, and take up the
attack downridge towards the salient. At 0340 the regiment attached
H/3/7 to 1/7 for operational control; at 0505 the company arrived at
the 1st Battalion CP. Forty minutes later, Company H reached Captain
McLaughlin’s area, where it regrouped and then deployed toward the
ridgeline for the counterattack.
[282] At 0545 on the 25th, Company I (Captain John Thomas),
then the regimental reserve, and Captain Belant’s Company
H, responsible for the right sector of 3/7, had exchanged
roles.
When Captain Belant led his Marines towards the Hook to oust the
Chinese, the enemy drive had reached the point of its deepest
penetration. By this time the Chinese had seized control of slightly
more than a mile of the meandering MLR. Most of the captured main
defense line extended from the Hook east along the ridge towards Hill
146. (One-third of the Communist advance was from the Hook southwest,
in the direction of the 3d Battalion boundary.) Between 0545 and 0800,
H/3/7 worked its way towards the Hook-Hill 146 crest. After two hours
the company was at the ridgeline, and at 0800 Captain Belant was ready
to move forward towards the salient, a straight-line distance of about
a half-mile. On the hour, the push downridge started. After having
advanced about 200 yards, the H/3/7 Marines were assailed by small
arms fire and the rain of heavy caliber rounds supporting the enemy’s
thrust. Captain Belant signalled his Marines to attack.
Immediately, Second Lieutenant George H. O’Brien, Jr. leaped up from
his position and shouted for his platoon to follow. On the run, he
zigzagged across the exposed ridge and continued down the front slope
towards the main trench. Before reaching this objective, the platoon
commander was knocked to the ground by the impact of a single bullet.
Scrambling quickly to his feet he motioned for his men to follow
and took off on the run for the enemy-occupied trenchline. Again he
stopped, this time to assist an injured Marine.
As he neared the trenchline, Lieutenant O’Brien started to throw a
hand grenade into the enemy-occupied bunkers, but was stopped by
the Chinese. With his carbine, the officer methodically eliminated
this resistance, then hurled the grenades. Overcoming this position,
the Texas Marine and his platoon advanced towards the Hook, but the
enemy, now partly recovered, was able to slow and ultimately stop the
counterattack. A profusion of artillery and mortar fire was primarily
responsible for halting the advance, which had carried Company H very
close to the Hook bunkers.
Spurred on by the leadership of Lieutenant O’Brien, who later received
the Medal of Honor,[283] the company was able to execute a limited
advance. Despite the heavy artillery and mortar fire, the company drove
a wedge into the Communist position, thereby retaking the initiative
from the enemy. Company H also took three prisoners in the southeast
end of the Hook before being forced by a deadly enemy mortar and
artillery barrage to withdraw upridge.
[283] Another Medal of Honor resulting from the Hook action
was awarded posthumously to Second Lieutenant Sherrod E.
Skinner, Jr. for “conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity.”
Lieutenant Skinner, whose twin brother was also a Marine
officer, had been assigned as an artillery forward
observer with F/2/11. When the Chinese attack hit the
MLR, Lieutenant Skinner organized the surviving Marines
in defense of their observation post. Fighting off the
enemy and calling down defensive artillery fire on the
assaulting Chinese, he delayed capture of the position.
Twice he left the bunker to direct fire on the enemy and
get more ammunition.
When the Communists finally overran the bunker, Lieutenant
Skinner instructed his fellow Marines to pretend
they were dead; during the next three hours several
different enemy groups frisked the inert Marines without
discovering their ruse. Later, when a skeptical enemy
soldier hurled a grenade into the bunker, Lieutenant
Skinner unhesitatingly rolled on top of the missile,
shielding the two surviving Marines. By thus absorbing
the full force of the explosion, he sacrificed his life
for theirs. (2dLt Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr. Biog. File)
The attack by Company H had been well supported from the air. At
0840, a flight of four ADs from Lieutenant Colonel Cargill’s VMA-121
assaulted the former Marine COP Seattle, where enemy reinforcements
were being funneled through on the way to the Hook. Bombs and napalm
took a heavy toll of the troops, bunkers, and weapons pouring fire on
the counterattacking Marines. One hour later, a division (four planes)
from VMA-323 struck another trouble spot, a former Marine outpost known
as Irene (later, Rome). Aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel Chamberlain’s
squadron hit this objective with three tons of bombs and more than
4,000 pounds of burning napalm. Thirty minutes later, another foursome,
these from VMA-212, (Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Dobson, Jr.),[284]
delivered bombs, napalm, and 20mm shells on enemy soldiers moving on
the MSR towards JAMESTOWN.
[284] The new squadron commander had relieved Lieutenant
Colonel Maurice Fletcher two days earlier. This flight
was the first of two CAS attacks in behalf of the Hook
forces that the new commanding officer participated in
that day.
While these three squadrons were bombing enemy strongpoints and other
targets of opportunity, division artillery and tanks continued their
destructive fire missions. Between 0930 and 1300, two tanks from
Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, blasted away at Chinese bunkers and
trenches, at an enemy 76mm gun on Seattle, and at positions southwest
of the Hook. Artillery--2/11, 4/11, and the rocket battery--contributed
the weight of its support. The 11th Marines, in an effort to stop the
heavy hostile shelling of the Hook sector, fired 60 counterbattery
missions on Chinese gun emplacements during the first 24 hours of the
attack.
In the early afternoon of the 27th, 1st MAW attack squadrons continued
their bombing and strafing of enemy troops engaged in the assault
against the Hook. Before sundown, 30 aircraft had taken part in 8
additional strikes in support of Marine counterattacks along the ridge.
The number of aircraft involved in close air support sorties for the
Hook was approximately half the number received by the division all
day. Of the 72 aircraft flying CAS strikes during the first 24 hours of
the Hook action, 67 were Marine planes, all from MAG-12.
As in the morning’s close air support flights, Lieutenant Colonel
Cargill’s ADs provided the bulk of air support for ground action
that afternoon. Striking first a command post southeast of the 1/7
salient, at 1410, VMA-121 came back a half-hour later with four more
Skyraiders against CCF troops pressing to envelop the right flank of
the counterattack force. At 1635, two squadron aircraft flew in quickly
in response to a sighting of troops moving forward in the Samichon
tributary 1,000 yards north of the Hook. Twenty minutes after this
successful attack, four more Skyraiders attacked bunkers opposite the
left flank of Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s sector. The final daylight
strike for 1/7 was again made by four ADs from -121. These planes took
under attack a target that had been bombarded just 25 minutes earlier
by Corsairs from VMA-323.
Another Marine attack squadron, VMA-212, participated in the Hook
support that afternoon. At 1344, a four-plane flight assaulted troops
moving through Frisco to reinforce the Chinese drive on the Hook. Two
of the planes dropped three 1,000-pound bombs and two 250-pounders
on the enemy soldiers. The other pair of attack Corsairs released
six 780-pound napalm tanks over the position. It was estimated that
25 Chinese casualties resulted from this air attack. Wrapping up the
VMA-212 CAS for the Hook sector on the 27th was a strike, at 1440, on
camouflaged positions and another at 1520 against caves and bunkers.
Each of these air assaults took place about 950 yards from the Hook.
The earlier one was a napalm attack from 50 feet above the ground. One
of the six tanks would not release and three did not ignite. Four caves
were destroyed and one bunker was damaged in the latter strikes.
Between the morning and afternoon air strikes, the ground commanders
put together the final plans for recapture and defense of the Hook.
When General Pollock had released I/3/1 to the regiment during an
inspection trip to the 1/7 area that morning, the company was already
en route to the ridge to make the counterattack. The ground commanders
agreed that after I/3/1 regained the salient, H/3/1 would take over the
right sector of 1/7 and the relieved company, B/1/7, would then occupy
both the critical MLR sector and Warsaw. Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s
scheme to recapture the positions and ground lost on 26 October was a
continuation of the attack from atop the ridge directly towards the
objective. It was to be a hard-nosed, frontal assault, but the only
maneuver deemed advisable.
Clearing the Company C command post about noon, the lead elements of
Captain Murray V. Harlan, Jr.’s Company I, the 1st Platoon, continued
its route to the ridge. After the 40 Marines had gained the crest,
they quickly reoriented themselves to the new direction, and at 1350,
led the I/3/1 assault. Artillery preparation by the 11th Marines had
preceded the crossing of the line of departure, and these supporting
fires were partially responsible for the substantial initial advance
made by the counterattacking Marines. But Chinese artillery was not
idle at this time either, and the volume of enemy fire matched that of
the Marines. The I/3/1 movement forward was also slowed by Communist
soldiers, estimated at about a company, who fired from protected
positions along the perimeter of the Hook.
Inch by inch the company crawled forward. The vicious Chinese
supporting barrages were exacting many casualties among Captain
Harlan’s troops,[285] yet they crept on, and ultimately reached the
artillery forward observer bunker atop the ridge but 150 yards short of
the Hook trenches. At this time, 1635, the enemy supporting fires were
directed not only on the advancing Marines and the MLR defenses but
extended as far back as the regimental CP.[286] Chinese soldiers still
clung to some of the Hook positions and trenches of the MLR just below
the crest on the northern sides. Marines closest to the Hook could see
the virtual ruination caused by enemy artillery and mortar shells to
the trench system within the salient.
[285] During this action, the company suffered 15 killed, 71
seriously wounded, and 6 slightly wounded. 3/1 ComdD,
Oct. 52, p. 3.
[286] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Oct 52.
Nearing their objective, elements of Company I pressed on with even
more determination. By 1700 a few had made it to the shell-torn
ditches, where they sought momentary refuge to reorganize. Several more
joined, and together they reconnoitered the trenches and bunkers for
enemy soldiers. Just then the Communists reacted with an even heavier
supporting arms assault, which forced these few Marines to pull back
with their platoon to the reverse slope of the ridge. To the right,
about 250 yards away, the main body of Company I Marines occupied the
reverse side of the hill, riding out the onslaught of artillery and
mortar rounds while they waited for a lull before making the final dash
to recapture the lost area of JAMESTOWN.
While Captain Harlan’s company was exposed to this extremely heavy
enemy artillery fire, another unit, B/1/7, was on the move from
Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s command post to the ridge to strike what
was intended as a lethal blow to the Communist invaders. At 1932,
Company B began its march forward. By midnight, the 1st Platoon was
nearing its assault position close to the left flank of Company I of
3/1. Simultaneously, the 3d Platoon closed in on its jump-off point.
The going was extremely difficult, complicated by a moonless night and
the many shell craters that pockmarked the terrain. But at 0019, 28
October, the platoons mounted their assault, firing their rifles and
machine guns, and hurling grenades to silence enemy automatic weapons
and to reach dug-in Communist soldiers occupying the trenchline.
The Marine charge was met by a burst of small arms fire and a shower
of grenades. Weapons supporting the Chinese defense were still very
active. After a standoff of 90 minutes the Marines pulled back, calling
on their mortars and artillery to lay precise fire concentrations on
the trouble spots. The weapons also fired on enemy approach routes
through Ronson and Warsaw. After this preparation, Company B again
made an assault against the enemy, at 0340. This advance was contested
vigorously by the Chinese, but their resistance this time was not
lasting. Quickly B/1/7 Marines deployed throughout the entire area, and
by 0600 the Hook was again in Marine hands.
Before the victors could permit themselves the luxury of a breathing
spell, there were a number of critical tasks that demanded immediate
attention. Defense of the MLR had to be quickly and securely shored
up for a possible enemy counterattack. The newly rewon area had to be
searched for Marines, both casualties and holdouts, and for Chinese
diehards or wounded. The company had to be reorganized. In addition to
these missions, there were two others, regaining Ronson and Warsaw. As
it turned out, the duties were discharged nearly at the same time. COPs
Ronson and Warsaw were reoccupied by the 7th Marines at 0630 and 0845,
respectively, on 28 October.
In organizing the recaptured position, the Marines were hampered to
some extent by a dense ground fog. Nevertheless, work still went ahead
on these necessary tasks. Most of the Hook area was held by Company B;
the western part of the 1/7 line, south of the Hook, was still manned
by the platoon from Company A and one from Company C. The 1st Platoon
of Company B quickly searched the retaken area of the MLR (except the
caved in parts of the trenchline and bunkers, which were investigated
later), but found no enemy soldiers. During the day, as Company B
expanded its responsibility along the Marine main line, the platoons
from A/1/7 and C/1/7 were relieved to rejoin their companies.[287]
Supplies began to move in, once the permanency of the defense had been
established.
[287] As a part of the reorganization, H/3/1 remained in the
right sector, and Company C, of the Hook battalion,
filled in the middle. Company A was in position on the
friendly side of that part of the ridge held by Captain
Byrum’s Company C. During the afternoon of the 28th,
I/3/1 and H/3/7 also left Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s
area to rejoin their parent organizations.
_Overview_[288]
[288] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs
734–735, 741, dtd 29–30 Oct 52, 5 Nov. 52.
In evaluating the battle for the Hook, it would appear that the Chinese
assault against Reno was merely a demonstration or feint. By making a
sizable effort near the primary objective after the attack there was
well under way, the Communists expected not to obscure the real target
but rather to cause the Marines to hesitate in moving higher echelon
reserves to influence the action at the Hook. It was to the credit of
the ambush force that the Chinese ruse was unsuccessful.
Including losses from the Reno ambush, Marines estimated that the
Chinese actions against that outpost cost the enemy 38 killed and 51
wounded. The COP defenders and the platoon that had surprised the enemy
counted 22 dead Communist soldiers during and after the Reno action.
Together with the Hook casualties, confirmed at 274 killed and 73
wounded and estimated at 494 killed and 370 wounded,[289] the figure
represented more than a third of an enemy battalion permanently lost in
addition to about a battalion and a half put out of action temporarily.
Distributed among the number of battalions that participated in the two
actions, the total number of casualties lost some impact. What remains
significant, however, are the cost and results--369 counted and 953
estimated casualties for not one inch of ground.
[289] The CCF casualty figures were derived from a comparison
of reports of participating Marine battalions, the 7th
Marines, and division. In addition to these losses caused
by Marine infantry units were enemy casualties listed
by the artillery and tank battalion command diaries and
records of participating air squadrons; these supporting
arms figures amount to 468 casualties, more than
one-third the total number.
Marine losses in the Hook battle were 70 killed, 386 wounded (286
evacuated), and 39 missing, of whom 27 were later definitely known
to have been captured. This was the second highest number of Marines
taken prisoner in any single action during the Korean fighting.[290]
Such a large number was attributed to the tactics of the Chinese
infantry, which followed the preparatory barrages so closely--at times
even advancing into the rolling barrages--that the enemy was able to
surprise and capture a considerable number of Marine outpost defenders.
Nearly all of the 27 were captured in the enemy’s first rushes against
the two outposts and MLR. In the diversion on Reno, an additional 9
Marines were killed and 49 wounded (29 evacuated).
[290] During the Task Force Drysdale operation, in November
1950, more than 40 Marines had been seized by the enemy.
Maj James Angus MacDonald, Jr., “The Problems of U.S.
Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea” (M.A. thesis,
Univ. of Maryland, 1961), App. G, pp. 261–262, hereafter
MacDonald, _POW_.
Perhaps as significant as any result of the Hook fighting is the amount
of supporting fires the Chinese provided their infantry. Calculations
of total incoming ran from 15,500 to 34,000 rounds during the 36-hour
engagement. The 1st Marine Division reported conservatively that the
enemy expended between 15,500–16,000 artillery and mortar rounds;
estimates by supporting arms units put the total at the higher level.
In any event, the 12,500 rounds the 7th Marines received during the
first 24 hours represented the heaviest bombardment any Marine regiment
had been subjected to up to that time. Moreover, it had now become
clearly evident that the enemy could stockpile a plentiful supply of
ammunition, despite attempts of UN aircraft to interfere with the
enemy’s flow of supplies to the frontline.[291]
[291] Comments by Dr. Robert F. Futrell, USAF Historian, in
ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 2 Feb 70: “The Air Force
position about the accumulation of munitions at frontline
units was that by exercising supply discipline and
refraining from combat, the enemy could hoard and build
supply over a period of time.”
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 160346]
_Marine Division Redeploys to West Korea--5th Marines units en
route to new sector in April 1952 are slowed by muddy roads and
spring thaws. Below, Korean washwomen labor at daily tasks while
1st Tank Battalion convoy moves up to new fighting area._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 160984]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164524]
_Surveillance of the Enemy--Men of the Reconnaissance Company,
1st MarDiv, scan CCF positions across the Imjin River. Below,
Marines empty 75mm shell cases from armored amphibian after a
shoot-out on Independence Day, 1952._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162962]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173690]
_Scene of See-Saw Fighting--View of enemy-held outpost Yoke as
seen from Marine trenches. Below, clothing and equipment packed
in a “survival bomb” dropped to Marine pilots awaiting rescue.
Pilots of VMJ-1 are briefed on the day’s mission over North
Korea._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 134927 DOD Photo A 134103]
[Illustration: Official USN Photo]
_Island Marines--Korean Marine platoon undergoes instruction at
Yo-do, ECIDE. Damaged AD-4 had crash landed at Briscoe Field
nearby and was awaiting salvage. Below, Marine tank-infantry unit
in stand-by position during truce sessions at Panmunjom._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162782]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162952]
_Amphibious Exercise--Caterpillars of 1st Shore Party Battalion
pull floating dock ashore during 1st Marines training at
Tokchok-to. Below, HMR-161 choppers airlift 1st 4.5-inch Rocket
Battery to new firing positions during August 1952 maneuver._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 163906]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 16448]
_Main Logistic Link to the Front--View of the Freedom Gate Bridge
from eastern shore of Imjin. This bridge was the only one left
standing after August 1952 floods. Below, the FDC bunker of 1st
Battalion, 11th Marines CP. From this nerve center, fire missions
are relayed to the batteries by radio._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 163812]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162984 DOD Photo A 165569]
_On Guard at Critical Site--Korean Marines clean their 3.5-inch
bazooka at blocking position near Hill 155. Gen Lemuel C.
Shepherd, Jr., CMC, observes fire placed on CCF position during
frontline visit to 1st MarDiv. Below, AU Corsair of Deathrattler
Squadron ready for action._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 349270]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164153 DOD Photo A 164151]
_Battle Humor--Marine replacements moving up to front at Bunker
Hill get friendly warning of occupational hazards. The versatile
“Weasel” hauls ammo and supplies to the MLR. Below, Marine OP
reports on Chinese dispositions during August 1952 battle._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 165141]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 166041]
_Operation Haylift--Cargo lift from 1st Air Delivery Platoon area
to MLR sector occupied by 7th Marines. Cargo net slung under
copter body greatly increased airlift capability. Below, BGen
Robert O. Bare, ADC, inspects pre-fabricated bunker at Marine
outpost._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 167201]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 133865]
_Debriefing--Marine pilots of MAG-33 report to BGen Clayton
C. Jerome, 1st MAW CG, upon return from June 1952 air strike,
biggest to date. Below, aerial shot of 1stMarDiv CP at Yong-ri,
as viewed from mess hall, looking north._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164363]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162261]
_River Patrol--Amtracs of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
Kimpo Provisional Regiment, on the Imjin River. Below, F7F
Tigercat of 1st MAW, carrying napalm bomb, approaches target._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 133537]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 166423 DOD Photo A 167466]
_Support for Battle of the Hook--Marines heading for embattled
Hook carry machine gun ammunition. Note bandoliers. Captured
CCF equipment taken in October 1952 battle included prima cord,
cartridges, Soviet hand grenades. Below, VMO-6 helicopter
returning from front lines lands at Field #19._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 346322]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 168980]
KANSAS _Line--This recently completed secondary line is occupied
by 1/7 while in reserve in late 1952. Below, tactical problems
are reviewed (from left) by MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, CG, 1st
MarDiv; LtGen Paul A. Kendall, I Corps Commander; and Col Russell
E. Honsowetz, AC/S, G-3, 1st MarDiv._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 165743]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171273]
_Combat Surveillance--Marine counter mortar radar crew receives
instruction on adjustment of electronic equipment. Below,
regimental inspection of KMC troops by Col Kim Suk Bom, CO, 1st
Regiment._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 165936]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 168468]
_Combat Interlude--Cardinal Spellman celebrates Christmas Mass
before 2,500 bareheaded Marines in December 1952. Below, the
Black Watch Pipe and Drum Corps honors Marines during their 177th
Anniversary celebration, November 1952._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 166804]
[Illustration: USN Photo 447570]
_Truce Talks Resumed--Marine helicopter approaches truce site
at Panmunjom as negotiations reopen in October 1952. Below,
Master Sergeant Theodore H. Hughes, 1st MAW, presents 900,000 won
(equivalent to $150,000) to Bishop Mousset, of Little Flower’s
Orphanage in Pohang. Money was donated by MAG 33 Staff NCO Club._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 132432]
With regard to combat tactics, the attacks during 26–27 October
confirmed earlier reports that extremely heavy use of preparatory
barrages by the enemy signalled an imminent infantry attack on the
area. Defensive concentrations of apparently unlimited quantity
typified Communist artillery support for their attacking forces.
Meticulous policing of the battlefield, an established Chinese
practice, was also apparent during the Hook battle. In order to prevent
identification of his combat units, the enemy also took pains to ensure
that assault troops remove all papers and unit insignia before going
forward of their own lines.
Two other previously reported tactics were corroborated during the late
October battle for the Hook. One was the presence of cargo carriers
with the attacking force. These soldiers, estimated by the division
to comprise as high as 75 percent of the total number of Chinese
troops committed, carried shovels, lumber, extra rations, medical aid
equipment, and stocks of ammunition. One Marine evacuated from a bunker
reported on a method of bunker searching by the Chinese. “English
speaking Chinese were yelling into bunkers for Marines to ‘Come out
and surrender.’ When there was no evidence of surrender, the Chinese
would use bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges to destroy and seal
bunkers.”[292]
[292] 1stMarDiv PIR 738, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 3. The Chinese also
used hand grenades in searching the bunkers. All of these
explosives had been widely employed during World War II.
In one respect the enemy deviated from his usual tactics. During the
battle for the Hook Marines who took prisoners made the discovery that
the Chinese employed close-up relief forces. Prior to an offensive
action, the enemy positioned a reserve just to the rear of the assault
unit. After the attack had started, and at the appropriate time, the
commander would signal the fresh force forward to take over the mission
of the old unit. In this manner, the enemy hoped to sustain his drive
or to retain a newly-won position.
Though the foresight appeared appropriate, the result was not always
what had been anticipated. In the earlier part of the month, during a
fight in another I Corps sector, the Communists had rushed a reserve
force forward to consolidate the defense of an outpost immediately
after its capture. In the Hook fighting, a fresh unit, which had been
placed immediately to the rear of the assault troops, was ordered
forward to keep the attack alive. Both attempts failed. Marines
attributed this lack of success to the Communists’ apparent inability
to organize or reorganize quickly, a difficulty which was believed to
have resulted from the scarcity of officers in forward areas.[293]
[293] 1stMarDiv PIR 741, dtd 5 Nov 52, Encl. 2, p. 2.
Discussing the defense of the Hook area, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki
commented shortly after the battle ended:
The Chinese seemed to gain their greatest tactical advantage
during action on “The Hook” by assaulting friendly positions
directly under their own artillery and mortar barrages. The
effects on defending Marines were two-fold: heavy incoming either
physically trapped them in their bunkers, or the Chinese, having
overrun our positions through their own barrages, took the
defenders by surprise as they left their bunkers to man their
fighting holes. It is therefore considered imperative that in
future instances of heavy enemy supporting fires, all Marines
physically occupy an individual shelter from which their fighting
positions are readily accessible.
Marines gained a false sense of security by taking cover, in
groups, inside bunkers. In some cases, groups of three or four
Marines were killed when a bunker caved in on top of them. Had
they been spread out along the trenchline, but under individual
cover, it is believed that far fewer casualties would have
resulted, and also the position would have been better prepared
for defense. The false sense of security gained by being with
comrades inside a bunker must be overcome.[294]
[294] 1/7 ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI.
Another factor bothered the 1/7 commander. He directed unit leaders to
exercise closer control over the care and cleaning of weapons under
their custody. During the Hook fighting, the malfunctioning of weapons
due to improper cleaning and loss of some rifles “in the excitement to
gain cover” caused the Marines to take casualties that might otherwise
have been prevented.
These same deficiencies were also observed by General Pollock, and
he ordered their immediate correction. Lieutenant General Hart, CG
FMFPac, whose inspection of the division coincided with the Hook battle
and who saw the trenches after they had been leveled, noted that
shallow trenches and bunkers built above the ground did not offer
sufficient protection from intensive enemy shelling. He directed that
more emphasis be placed on the digging of field fortifications and
bunkers.[295]
[295] CG, FMFPac ComdD, Nov 52, App IV, Encl (8), Anx G, p. 4.
During the Hook fighting, General Hart also witnessed
the helicopter deployment of the 4.5-inch rockets. He
was impressed with the progress that had been made in
this helicopter-ground team performance, particularly the
speed and efficiency with which these weapons could be
set up to fire and then displaced to a new position.
In considering not only how the fight was conducted but why, one has
only to go back to the first part of October and recall the situation
that existed along the 1st Marine Division line. During the hotly
contested outpost battles early in the month, the Chinese had attempted
to outflank the division by seizing key terrain in the left and right
sectors. Where the enemy had been unsuccessful, he returned later in
the month for another major assault. On the night of the 26th the
endeavor was in the division right. A new blow against the left was not
far off.
CHAPTER VI
Positional Warfare
_A Successful Korean Defense--Six Months on the UNC Line--Events on the
Diplomatic Front--The Marine Commands During the Third Winter--1st MAW
Operations 1952–1953 Behind the Lines--The Quiet Sectors--Changes in
the Concept of Ground Defense--Before the Nevadas Battle_
_A Successful Korean Defense_[296]
[296] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Oct-Nov 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs
737–738, dtd 31 Oct-1 Nov 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 238–244,
dtd 24–30 Oct 52.
In both the early and late October outpost battles the Chinese had
attempted to seize critical terrain on the flanks of the 1st Marine
Division. Although the majority of these attacks failed, the enemy had
acquired six outposts early in the month--three in the western Korean
Marine Corps sector and three north of the right regimental line. On
the last day of October, two hours before midnight, the CCF again
struck the Marine left flank. This time their efforts were directed
against four outposts that screened Hill 155, the most prominent
terrain feature in the entire KMC regimental zone. The fighting that
developed was brief but very sharp and would be the most costly of all
KMC clashes during this third winter of the war.
The latest enemy attack came as no real surprise to Korean Marines
of the 5th Battalion, occupying COPs 39, 33, and 31 in the northern
regimental sector, or 2d Battalion personnel at COP 51 in the southern
(western) half of the MLR. (Map 19.) The four outposts assisted in
defense of the MLR (particularly Hill 155 just inside the MLR),
afforded observation of CCF approach routes, and served as a base
for friendly raids and offensive operations. Hill 155 overlooked both
the wide Sachon Valley and Chinese frontline positions to the west.
This critical Korean hill also commanded a view of the Panmunjom peace
corridor, Freedom Gate Bridge, and the Marine division area east
of Line JAMESTOWN in the KMC sector. Hill 155 had further tactical
importance in that it protected the left flank of Paekhak Hill, the key
ground in the entire 34-mile expanse of JAMESTOWN within 1st Marine
Division territory.
Actually, the probability of a determined enemy attack against the four
outposts had been anticipated since early October following CCF seizure
of three positions (former COPs 37, 36, and 86) in their strike against
the KMC regimental OPLR. The enemy had then proceeded to organize an
OPLR of his own with the two northern outposts, COPs 37 and 36, and
informally occupied another position to the south and one toward the
north in the vicinity of COP 39. “With this OPLR once firmly organized,
the enemy will have an excellent jump-off point towards our OPs 39 and
33, his next probable objectives,” KMC officers reasoned.[297]
[297] KMC Regt UnitRpt 216, dtd 4 Oct 52, p. 2.
Sporadic probes throughout the month in the COP 39 and 33 areas
indicated continued enemy interest in the positions. COP 51, to the
south, was considered another likely target because of its location
immediately east of COP 86, previously annexed by the CCF.
Prior to attacking the four outposts on 31 October, the Chinese had
signaled their intentions by sharply stepping up artillery and tank
fire against the sector. During the 24-hour period ending 1800 on 30
October, a total of 1,881 rounds crashed on KMC positions, most of
these against the two northern outposts, COPs 39 and 33. Nearly 1,500
rounds fell the next day. More than 50 sightings of enemy troops and
weapons in the forward area were also reported. By contrast, during the
previous week less than 15 observations of enemy activity had been made
daily and, on the average, only about 200–340 rounds of fire had fallen
in the entire sector. Despite this comparatively moderate rate of
hostile fire, at least one Korean Marine was killed and three wounded
in late October from well-placed Chinese mortar or artillery rounds
striking the outposts.
[Illustration:
MAP 19 K. White
CCF ATTACK AGAINST KMC SECTOR
(Division Left)
31 October 1952]
After the two days of heavy shelling, the regiment warned in its daily
report issued only two hours before the full-scale attack began:
The enemy has made a consistent two-day effort to destroy
friendly outpost positions. Last night, at 1830, two enemy
companies were observed in an apparent attempt to attack OPs 39
and 33. Artillery fire broke up the attempt, but continued enemy
artillery today indicates further attack is probable tonight.
If enemy artillery preparation is indicative, a simultaneous
attack against outposts 39, 51, 33, and 31 can be considered
probable....[298]
[298] KMC Regt UnitRpt 243, dtd 31 Oct 52, pp. 5–6.
These earlier observations and predictions as to the enemy’s action
were shortly confirmed when the CCF launched its new ground attack.
Beginning at 2200,[299] the enemy delivered an intensive eight-minute
76mm and 122mm artillery preparation against the four outposts. Chinese
assault forces from four different infantry regiments then launched a
simultaneous attack on the positions. Moving in from the north, west,
and south, two CCF companies (3d Company, 1st Battalion, 581st Regiment
and 2d Company, 1st Battalion, 582d Regiment) virtually enveloped the
northern outpost, COP 39. Two more CCF companies (unidentified) lunged
against the two central outposts, COPs 33 and 31, a company at each
position.[300] The southern and most-heavily defended post, COP 51,
where a company of Korean Marines was on duty, was assailed by four
Chinese companies (4th Company, 2d Battalion, 584th Regiment; 4th and
6th Companies, 2d Battalion, 585th Regiment; and 1st Company, 1st
Battalion, 585th Regiment). Even though the enemy exerted his strongest
pressure against COP 51, the position held and the Chinese broke off
the attack there earlier than at the other outposts.
[299] The attack on the 31st took place after the KMC 5th
Battalion had taken over the right regimental sector,
at 1700, from the 3d Battalion. The Chinese often
deliberately timed their outpost attacks to coincide with
a relief of lines. Company personnel of both the 5th and
3d Battalions were on line during the fighting. KMC Regt
UnitRpts dtd 1 Nov 52, p. 4; 245, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 4.
[300] KMC Regt UnitRpt 244, dtd 1 Nov 52, pp. 1, 4. A different
account as to size of attacking units is given in Maj
Kang Shin Ho, ROKMC ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 30 Apr
70, which states two reinforced enemy companies assaulted
COP 33 and an estimated enemy battalion struck COP 31.
At COP 31 a heavy fire fight raged until 0155, when the defending
KMC platoon halted the Chinese and forced them to make a partial
withdrawal. To the northwest, at COP 33, the enemy encountered less
resistance from the two squads manning the outpost. The Chinese
achieved some success in penetrating the defenses and occupied several
positions. After heavy close fighting and friendly artillery support,
the Koreans expelled the invaders at 0515.
The enemy’s efforts appeared to have been most successful, temporarily,
at COP 39, the northern post and one nearest to Hill 155. Although
the Chinese wrested some ground from the KMC platoon, artillery fires
continued to punish the enemy and by 0410 had forced him to pull back.
A small hostile force returned at 0600 but after a 15-minute exchange
of small arms it left, this time for good. At about this same time the
last of the Chinese had also withdrawn from the two central outposts,
33 and 31.
In terms of sheer numbers, the enemy’s strongest effort was made
against COP 51. This was the most isolated of the Korean positions and,
at 2,625 yards, the one farthest from the MLR. Ironically, in the week
preceding the attack COP 51 was least harassed by hostile artillery
although it had received 20 rounds of 90mm. tank fire, more than any
other position. On the 31st, elements of three companies struck the
southwestern trenches and defenses, while a fourth attempted to break
through from the north. As it turned out the action here was the least
intense of the outpost clashes. After initial heavy fighting the
Chinese seemed reluctant to press the assault even though they vastly
outnumbered the Korean company deployed at the outpost. In the early
morning hours the enemy broke contact and by 0330 had withdrawn from
COP 51.
During the night approximately 2,500 rounds of CCF artillery and
mortar fire lashed the positions. Korean Marines, aided by friendly
artillery, repelled the assault and inflicted heavy casualties on the
enemy. Supporting fires included more than 1,200 rounds of HE shells
from the KMC 4.2-inch Mortar Company. Chinese casualties were listed
as 295 known killed, 461 estimated wounded, and 9 POWs. Korean Marine
losses were 50 killed, 86 wounded, and 18 missing.[301] By first light
the Korean outposts had thrown back the enemy’s latest well-coordinated
attack. This ended the last significant action of October in the 1st
Marine Division sector.
[301] _Ibid._
_Six Months on the UNC Line_[302]
[302] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: Barclay, _Commonwealth_; Cagle and
Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Clark, _Danube to Yalu_;
Field, _NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Walter
G. Hermes, _Truce Tent and Fighting Front--United States
Army in the Korean War_ (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1966),
hereafter Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Miller, Carroll, and
Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_.
The KMC Regiment’s battle in late October marked the end of two months
of heavy fighting in the division sector. October had witnessed the
most intense combat in more than a year. As the third Korean winter
approached outpost clashes and small unit actions along the rest of the
UNC frontline began to slacken. During November and December, neither
side appeared eager to pursue the offensive. Chinese aggressiveness
declined noticeably.
Despite other action initiated by the enemy, the I Corps sector
remained the chief Communist target. On 19 November, the British 1st
Commonwealth Division successfully withstood what was initially a
company-size attempt to capture the Hook. In sharp fighting between
1900 and 0430, Black Watch and reinforcing Canadian units repulsed
a determined battalion-strength CCF assault, killing more than
100 Chinese.[303] Marine and I Corps artillery units fired almost
continuously throughout the night in support of the Hook defenders.
Fighting flared again, briefly, in December in the I Corps sector when
Chinese soldiers attempted to overrun outposts on the Imjin River line,
but were thrown back by the ROK 1st Division. The enemy then tried
to seize key terrain forward of the U.S. 2nd Division, but was again
halted.
[303] For details of this action see Canadian Department of
National Defence ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70
in v. V, Korean comment file.
Elsewhere before the end of the year, the CCF captured one outpost in
the IX Corps area, to the right of I Corps, but suffered a telling
defeat at the hands of the Ethiopian battalion during an attempt to
crack this sector of the U.S. 7th Division line. After a brief fire
fight the Chinese were forced to withdraw, leaving 131 CCF dead in the
Ethiopian positions. North Korean efforts to seize critical ground in
the X and ROK I Corps sectors, at the far eastern end of the EUSAK
line, was similarly broken up by the U.S. 40th and ROK 5th Divisions.
By the end of 1952 General Van Fleet had not only revitalized his
defenses with recent rotation of frontline units but had also
strengthened his line by inserting another division in the critical
and long-troublesome Chorwon-Kumhwa sector of IX Corps, on the I Corps
right flank. With these changes by late December there were 16 EUSAK
divisions on line--11 Korean, 3 U.S. Army, 1 Marine, and 1 British
Commonwealth--plus 4 divisions in reserve (1 Korean and 3 U.S. Army).
Nearly 75 percent of the UNC line had been entrusted to Republic of
Korea units. Their performance was a tribute to growing ROK military
proficiency and justified the EUSAK decision to assign to ROK troops a
greater role in the Allied ground defense.
The slow pace of infantry action during the last two months of 1952
continued into the new year. Raids by small UNC units highlighted the
limited combat during January and February. During the following month
the battlefront tempo accelerated, due in part to expanded patrol
activities. A number of sharp clashes in No-Man’s-Land resulted in
several Communist setbacks but led the enemy to make an increased use
of ambushes. These traps initially caught the UNC troops by surprise,
inflicting heavy casualties on them. But by far the most severe
fighting of the new year resulted when the Chinese renewed their fierce
outpost and main line of resistance attacks in March.
Again, the western I Corps sector was the major combat area as enemy
pressure mounted along the front. This was believed due, in part, to
the “growing Chinese sensitivity to the I Corps raids”[304] as well as
an attempt by the CCF to regain the initiative as they began to send
out larger forces to probe and assault UNC positions. On 17 March,
the Chinese launched a battalion-size attack against Hill 355 (Little
Gibraltar). This MLR position was defended by elements of the U.S. 2d
Infantry Division, on line immediately east of the Marine division, in
the sector customarily occupied by the 1st Commonwealth Division. (The
Army unit had relieved the British division on 30 January.) A second
large-scale assault on the hill that month was also turned back.
[304] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 392.
On 23 March, a Chinese Communist regiment attempted to capture three
outposts manned by the U.S. 7th Division, at the far right of the
I Corps line. Hills 225 (Pork Chop Hill) and 191 held. The enemy’s
main effort was against Hill 266 (Old Baldy), defended by units of
the division’s Colombian battalion. One attack carried the position,
despite company strength reinforcements of the original defenders. Two
strong UN counterattacks the next day to retake the outpost failed,
and the Chinese retained the crest of Old Baldy. Although the CCF had
gained their objective in Hill 266, the battles on the three hillocks
had cost the enemy 750 casualties, according to 7th Division records.
In one respect, the nature and extent of ground operations affected the
type of air activity over North and South Korea during the winter of
1952–1953. Introduction of PRESSURE strategy, which had embodied the
policy of the Far East Air Forces since mid-1952, brought more aircraft
in close support of Eighth Army ground troops, a change that pleased
the corps commanders. When the heavy outpost fighting throughout
October diminished to only occasional skirmishes in November, there
was temporarily a decreased need for large numbers of CAS sorties.
As a result more planes became available for PRESSURE attacks. These
strikes at first appeared to be reverting to the previous STRANGLE
strategy since railroads were often the targets. But interdiction
of the transportation system was only part of the PRESSURE aerial
concept which also called for striking enemy production, repair, and
storage facilities. The Allied strategy in conducting its air offensive
remained the same: to make the bombing hurt the Communists so that they
would end their deliberate delaying tactics in the truce sessions and
join the UNC in effecting a Korean settlement.
During the winter FEAF maintained a steady air pressure against the
Communists. Major raids were made from time to time, but the number of
strategic targets was gradually disappearing due to repeated UNC air
attacks. Further, much of the enemy logistical net had gone so deeply
underground during the prolonged stalemate that UN bombing and rocket
attacks were having only a limited destructive effect. The U.S. B-29s,
which had carried the fight to the enemy since the first week of the
Korean conflict, found their last worthwhile objectives in stockpiles
hidden in North Korean towns and villages. For the Fifth Air Force
fighters there was little opportunity to increase their skill in
air-to-air combat, since the Communist fliers continued to take evasive
action and avoid “dogfights.”
Naval aviation contributed importantly to UNC air operations from
September 1952 to March 1953. On the first day of this period, three
carriers staged the largest all-Navy Korean air strike to date, which
simultaneously attacked an oil refinery at Aoji and other targets
in the northeastern corner of Korea. Less than two weeks later, two
carriers launched another assault in the same part of the country.
The significance of these September strikes stemmed from the almost
complete lack of enemy response. Apparently the Communists in this
area had felt secure and protected, their territory being next to the
Chinese border. In fact, their location close to the sanctuary had
ruled out bombings proposed earlier. Strikes in this part of Korea
were particularly suited to carrier planes of the Seventh Fleet, whose
mobile airfields brought the targets within easy striking range along
approaches that would not violate the Manchurian haven.
Perhaps the greatest naval contribution to the air war were the
Cherokee strikes, so named after the commander of the Seventh Fleet,
Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, because of his Indian ancestry. This
new type of deep air support attack, which came into use in October
1952, employed the maxim of mass delivery of ordnance. Usually,
targets were immediately behind the enemy MLR but beyond the range of
friendly artillery. In May 1952, when the rail interdiction program
was being phased out and Admiral Clark’s pilots were faced with a
decreasing number of prime industrial targets, the fleet commander had
theorized that he could most effectually damage the enemy by bombing
supply dumps, artillery positions, and reserve forces immediately to
the rear of the Chinese MLR. As the admiral reasoned, the enemy could
not fight the kind of war he was waging “and still have _all_ his
forces, supplies, and equipment underground. _Some_ of his stocks of
supplies had to be above ground, out of sight and out of range of our
artillery.”[305]
[305] Quoted in Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_, p. 461.
Eighth Army welcomed the increased support that would result from
the strikes, but FEAF expressed concern about the lack of top-level
coordination. Admiral Clark had proposed that a EUSAK corps commander
be allowed to authorize the attacks, which employed 24 to 36 aircraft.
The Fifth Air Force initially maintained that it should control
Cherokee strikes, just as it did the CAS missions. The matter was
finally resolved in November.
Following a high-level conference it was decided that attacks inside
the bombline would be subjected to FAF coordination and that a minimal
amount of tactical control would be exercised by the corps commander.
Eighth Army gave a big assist to the Navy by moving the bombline to
within 3,000 meters (nearly two miles) of the outpost line. A line was
also drawn approximately 25 miles beyond the bombline, separating the
area of “general support” from “interdiction.” Thereafter, the Cherokee
strikes were effectively conducted against enemy installations outside
the 3,000-meter line but within 20,000 meters of the ground front.
General Clark, CinCUNC, had high praise for the strikes, which the
Seventh Fleet employed until the end of the war.
Surface ships of the fleet were in much the same static warfare
situation as the ground and air components of the United Nations
Command. Aside from the Kojo demonstration in mid-October, the
fleet had little diversification in its daily routine other than
to maintain the siege around Wonsan. This operation had started in
mid-February 1951 and had grown from the original plan to seize certain
strategically-placed islands on both coasts into an attempt to isolate
the entire port and city of Wonsan. Each day Allied minesweepers
cleared the harbor; at night the enemy sampan fleet resowed the fields.
Daily, usually during mine-clearing operations, ships of Task Force
95 fired on batteries in the mountains beyond the city and at other
military targets in and around Wonsan. From time to time heavy units
of the Seventh Fleet bombarded the area to keep the enemy off-balance
and to partially deter the solid buildup of Communist arms and defenses
just north of the 39th Parallel.
_Events on the Diplomatic Front_[306]
[306] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Dec 52; Berger, _Korea
Knot_; Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_;
Robert Leckie, _Conflict--The History of the Korean
War, 1950–1953_ (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962),
hereafter Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.
For many of the UNC military personnel, the stalemated combat situation
in Korea had become a depressing, no-win daily routine by the end of
1952. Back in the States, the Korean War was not only unpopular and
ill-supported, but the slow progress of the conflict had also dulled
public interest. In the course of the Presidential election campaign
the question of Korea had become increasingly a matter of widespread
national concern. Two weeks before election day the Republican
candidate, former General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,[307] had
vowed to bring the Korean fighting to an end. As a first step toward
accomplishing this he had pledged, if elected, to visit the battlefront.
[307] Eisenhower had resigned his commission, following his
return to the States in April to seek election.
Some had labeled Eisenhower’s statement, “I will go to Korea” as a mere
pre-election gesture. The general intended to act on this pledge and,
following his election, began a four-day visit to Korea on 2 December
1952. Part of the President-elect’s brief tour in Korea was spent
at General Pollock’s command post. Here, on 3 December, the Marine
ground chief briefed his future Commander in Chief on current Marine
division operations. Generals Clark, Van Fleet, and Kendall accompanied
Eisenhower and his party. This included General of the Army Omar
Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as Charles E.
Wilson and Herbert Brownell, Jr., the new designates for Secretary of
Defense and Attorney General, respectively.
Though General Eisenhower’s promise to visit Korea personally to see
the situation first-hand and his subsequent election had renewed
American hopes for an early peace in Korea, negotiations there had been
deadlocked since 1951 on the exchange of prisoners. Disagreement on
this issue thus became the major obstacle which was not overcome until
the truce was signed nearly 20 months later. The Communists insisted on
repatriation to their native land of all NKPA and CCF prisoners held
by the United Nations Command. More than 60,000 of the 132,000 enemy
captives held by the UNC in South Korean POW camps did not wish to
return to Communism, a fact which had been borne out by a UN survey.
To draw attention from this unpopular position the Communists, through
the civil and military links existing in the POW camps, had staged a
series of riots in the spring of 1952. The worst, at Koje Island (just
off the coast of Pusan) lasted six days, largely because the Communist
prisoners planned for, and successfully carried out, the capture of the
UN camp commander. His release, on 12 May, was effected only after the
new commander signed, under duress, a statement which the Communists
immediately exploited in an effort to discredit the validity of the
prisoner survey.
The propaganda gains had enabled the Communists to occupy a commanding
position at the truce talks. In the meantime, the UN had offered
several plans until, on 28 April, Admiral Joy presented “what we called
our final package proposal.”[308] By instituting the tactic of calling
a recess whenever the Communists had nothing constructive to offer, a
recommendation of Admiral Joy’s, the UN regained the advantage of the
conference table. The talks continued but with no appreciable progress.
On 8 October 1952, after continued Communist intransigence, Brigadier
General William K. Harrison, who had become the senior UN delegate
in late May, took the initiative in recessing the truce talks. This
unexpected action, which caught the enemy off-guard, followed three
separate proposals made by Harrison for ending the POW controversy.
All had been promptly rejected by the Communist delegation. As General
Harrison had informed one of its spokesmen, the North Korean General
Nam Il:
[308] Joy, _Truce Negotiations_, p. 156. The proposal was a
“complete armistice agreement,” not merely another offer
to solve the prisoner question.
We are not terminating the armistice negotiations, we are merely
recessing them. We are willing to meet with you at any time
that you are ready to accept one of our proposals or to make a
constructive proposal of your own, in writing, which could lead
to an honorable armistice ... Since you have offered nothing
constructive, we stand in recess.[309]
[309] Quoted in Berger, _Korea Knot_, p. 153.
After October, while the truce negotiations were in a period of
indefinite recess, liaison officers at Panmunjom kept the channels
of communication open between the Communist and UNC sides. Several
developments along other diplomatic lines about this time were to prove
more fruitful and lead the way to solution of the POW dispute and, in
fact, to the end of the war.
In mid-November, an attempt was made to end the prisoner exchange
impasse through a resolution introduced by India at the United Nations
session. The compromise measure recognized the United States position,
namely, that force should not be used in returning prisoners to
their homeland. This principle was to become known as the concept of
voluntary repatriation.
To reconcile the widely conflicting Communist and UNC views on
handling of prisoners, the Indian proposal suggested that a
repatriation commission be established. This body was to be composed
of representatives of two Communist and two Allied nations. It would
function within a designated demilitarized zone in Korea through which
all prisoners would be received and processed. Each prisoner was to be
given a choice of being returned to his homeland or not. Both sides
would have the opportunity of explaining to reluctant nationals “their
rights” of repatriation. If these persuasive efforts failed and a man
still chose not to return to his country, he would then be referred to
a special political conference established by the armistice agreement.
Should this four-member repatriation commission still not agree on
settlement of the nonrepatriates, a final determination was then to be
made by an official named by the commission or UN General Assembly.
Many UNC nations favored the Indian proposal. U.S. official reaction
was frankly skeptical and critical, well aware that the many vague
aspects of the proposal could easily be exploited by the Communists to
the disadvantage of the individual POW. Despite the promise of a good
many headaches in its implementation, the UN adopted the compromise
Indian resolution in December 1952 by a vote of 54 to 5.
Later that same month the Executive Committee of the League of Red
Cross Societies, meeting in Geneva, adopted another feature of the
Indian resolution proposing an exchange of sick and wounded POWs in
advance of a truce. As General Clark observed, “It was hardly an
auspicious omen for an armistice, yet it was the action which set in
motion a chain of events which finally resulted in cease-fire.”[310]
[310] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 240.
On another front, State Department officials advised the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that a resolution similar to that of the Red Cross
would probably be introduced when the UN reconvened on 24 February.
Following a JCS suggestion that a “feeler” proposition be first made
to the Communists, General Clark wrote the NKPA and CCF leaders on
22 February. His letter was addressed to North Korean Premier Kim Il
Sung and General Peng Teh-huai, the CCF military commander. Delivered
through the Panmunjom liaison officers, it requested the immediate
exchange of sick and wounded POWs. As both diplomatic and military
leaders doubtfully awaited the results, a totally unexpected and
far-reaching event, the death of the Russian leader, Premier Joseph
Stalin, jolted the Communist world. Its repercussions soon extended to
the truce tent at Panmunjom and decisively affected the progress of
negotiations there.
_The Marine Commands During the Third Winter_[311]
[311] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Nov 52-Jan 53; 1stMar
ComdDs, Nov 52-Feb 53; 5thMar ComdD, Dec 52; 7thMar
ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53; 11th Mar ComdDs, Jan-Feb 53; 2/1
ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdD, Jan 53; MAG-12 ComdD, Jan
53; MAG-33 ComdD, Oct 52; MACG-2 ComdD, Feb 53.
Although renewed negotiations to bring the war to a close were
under way with the enemy in late 1952 and early 1953, action on the
battlefield continued the tedious routine of the war. An exception
to the general lethargy across the front occurred on 22 November in
the right regimental sector. A predawn raid was conducted by the 1st
Marines, which had advanced to the front upon relief of the 7th Marines
after their battle of the Hook. With the left and right battalion
sectors manned by 1/1 and 3/1, respectively, Lieutenant Colonel Charles
E. Warren’s 2/1, in regimental reserve, had been ordered to provide
a company to raid Chinese positions across from COPs Reno and Vegas.
Drawing the assignment was Company D (Captain Jay V. Poage).
Code-named WAKEUP, the raid was conducted in a manner typical of many
earlier forays against Chinese strongpoints. Its results, too, in most
respects were similar to the outcome of previous raids. Artillery
preparation of the objective area was accomplished, the infantry
assaults were somewhat short of the targets due to heavy CCF defensive
fires, and the prisoner-taking part of the mission was unfulfilled.
Counterbalancing this, and what made the raid of value to the regiment,
was the information gained about enemy defenses and Chinese reaction to
the raid. It was one of the rare occasions during which the CCF did not
employ artillery fire while their positions were under attack, using
instead mortars and automatic weapons against Marine assault forces.
Raids such as WAKEUP, patrols, and ambushes became the pattern of
action in late November and in December. Earlier in November some
changes in the MLR dispositions had taken place. On 3 November,
at 2345, the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch, 29th Infantry
Brigade, 1st Commonwealth Division, had relieved 1/7 of the Hook
sector responsibility, ending Marine occupation of that part of
JAMESTOWN.[312] And, on 16 November, the 7th Marines itself had been
replaced in line by the 1st Marines. In between these changes of
command on the frontlines, Generals Pollock and Jerome had received
many congratulations and well wishes from combat commands and from
government officials in the States. The occasion was the 177th birthday
of the Marine Corps. Both of these senior commanders passed on to their
Marines not only the Commandant’s Anniversary message but also the
congratulations of the UNC commander, General Clark.
[312] At this time a new limiting point between the division
and British division was also established. This slightly
reduced Marine division frontage to 33 miles and allowed
the two MLR regiments to shorten their lines and maintain
somewhat larger reserve units. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5,
Chap. 8, p. 8-23.
Though the Commonwealth division had taken over the Hook area from
the infantry Marines, the division’s participation in defense of
the British sector had not completely ended. On 18–19 November,
the 11th Marines expended more than 2,000 rounds to repel Chinese
attacks on the Hook. This firing by the artillery regiment helped to
repay the British for their “cooperation and outstanding artillery
and tank support during the engagements of 26–28 October....”[313]
And as the Commonwealth division commander, Major General M. M.
Austin-Roberts-West, had himself reported to General Pollock the day
following the Hook attack, “All hands on the Hook much appreciated the
prompt and effective support given last night. Grateful if you would
pass on their thanks to all concerned.”[314]
[313] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to GOC, 1stComWelDiv, dtd 29 Oct 52, in
1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App. II, p. 6.
[314] GOC, 1stComWelDiv msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 19 Nov 52, in
1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52, App. I, p. 3.
Throughout December 1952 and January 1953, the lull in ground fighting
continued. Mass Cherokee strikes by Admiral Clark’s Navy and Marine
fliers had begun for the Marine division on 17 December, when the
bombline was moved in nearer to the MLR for expanded operations. In
noncombat activities, later that month Francis Cardinal Spellman,
Archbishop of New York and Vicar for Catholic Chaplains of the Armed
Forces, conducted a Christmas Mass at the division CP. On the 31st,
His Eminence visited the 1st MAW at K-3 (Pohang). There he delivered
an address to about 1,000 Marines, shook hands with nearly all of
them, and later heard confessions for many. Another special guest, not
long afterward, was Episcopal Bishop Austin Pardue, of the Pittsburgh
Diocese, who held Holy Communion at the division chapel.
The passing of 1952 and the arrival of the new year was not marked by
any special observance on the battlefield. For that matter there was,
it seemed, no change to note; the Marines, like the rest of the Eighth
Army troops, maintained much the same regular, reduced, wintertime
schedule. Activity of Marine infantry units consisted of aggressive
patrolling and raids, and improvement of the secondary defenses of
Lines WYOMING and KANSAS. Units in division reserve, during January,
also participated in MARLEX (Marine Landing Exercise) operations.
No major ground action had taken place in December, although Marine
patrols, on a half dozen occasions, had engaged as many as 50 enemy
for brief clashes and fire fights. January was a different story,
however. On 8 January, a 7th Marines raiding party, reinforced by
air, artillery, and tank support, skirmished with 85 Chinese in the
Hill 134 area not far from COP 2, overlooking Panmunjom. Ten days
later, the 1st and 7th Marines, together with the artillery regiment,
took part in Operation BIMBO. This was another attempt, by combined
infantry-artillery-tank-air action, to create the impression that CCF
objective areas were under attack.
BIMBO began with heavy preparatory fires by the 11th Marines, including
the 155mm projectiles hurled by 4/11, that inflicted early damage
to CCF personnel and materiel. At 0630, on 18 January, frontline
battalions of the two participating infantry regiments opened
fire; reserve battalions assisted with indirect machine gun fire.
Armored vehicles added to the effect of the ruse by shelling Chinese
emplacements from prepared MLR positions. Marine attack planes streaked
in to unload flaming napalm. In response to the BIMBO mock attack, the
Chinese directed mortar fire into suspected Marine avenues of approach
and assembly areas. Forward observers on JAMESTOWN could detect some
enemy troop movement. (Marine artillery took these formations under
intensive fire), but as in similar feint operations in the past,
the enemy again failed to pick up the bait. The operation lasted
approximately an hour and a half.
During the winter months, a number of command changes had occurred in
the Marines’ combat organizations in Korea. In the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing, the rotation of commanders began at the very top when, on 8
January, General Jerome handed over the wing colors to Major General
Vernon E. Megee. During a ceremony at wing headquarters that day, Air
Force Generals Weyland and Barcus paid tribute to General Jerome’s
“exceptionally meritorious service” as 1st MAW CG since April 1952 by
presenting him with the Distinguished Service Medal.
The incoming wing commander, General Megee, had been a Marine flyer for
20 years, having received his wings in 1932. His Marine Corps career
began more than a decade earlier, with enlistment in 1919. Commissioned
in 1922, he served in infantry, artillery, and expeditionary billets
before undergoing pilot training in 1931. Following school, staff, and
command assignments, Major Megee was named advisor to the Peruvian
Minister of Aviation from 1940–1943. During World War II, Colonel Megee
was sent overseas as 3d MAW Chief of Staff in early 1944. As Commander,
Control Unit One, he participated in the Iwo Jima campaign, earning
the Legion of Merit. Later, at Okinawa, he commanded all Marine Corps
Landing Force Air Support Control Units. After promotion to brigadier
general in 1949, General Megee was named Chief of Staff, FMFLant.
Receiving his second star in 1951, he served as Commanding General
at Cherry Point, El Toro, and Air FMFPac prior to his assignment in
Korea.[315]
[315] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Vernon E. Megee, 1959.
Within the wing and the division, every one of the top commands
experienced changes of commanding officers in late 1952 and early 1953:
1st Marines--Colonel Hewitt D. Adams took over from Colonel Layer
on 21 November;
5th Marines--Colonel Lewis W. Walt relieved Colonel Smoak on 10
December;
7th Marines--Colonel Loren E. Haffner took command from Colonel
Moore on 5 November;
11th Marines--Colonel James E. Mills vice Colonel Sea on 22
February;
MACG-2--Colonel Kenneth D. Kerby relieved Colonel Jack R. Cram on
16 February;
MAG-12--Colonel George S. Bowman, Jr. vice Colonel Condon on 13
January;
MAG-33--Colonel Louis B. Robertshaw succeeded Colonel Herbert
Williamson on 22 October.
_1st MAW Operations 1952–1953_[316]
[316] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt Eval Rpts_ No. 5, Chap. 9 and No.
6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdDs,
Oct 52, Jan-Feb 53; MAG-12 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53, Mar
53; MAG-33 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan-Mar 53; VMA-121 ComdDs,
Nov-Dec 52, VMF-115 ComdDs, Nov-Dec 52; VMF(N)-513
ComdDs, Oct 52-Jan 53; HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 52, Nov-Dec
52, Jan 53; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Montross, _SkyCav_.
The heavy ground fighting across the Eighth Army front in October 1952
had drawn heavily upon units of the 1st MAW. That month Marine pilots
logged their greatest number of sorties--3,897--since June 1951.[317]
As a result of the intense infantry action in the 1st Marine Division
sector another air record was established--365 casualty evacuations
by HMR-161 during October. This was a peak number to that time for
the helicopter transport squadron for which med evac was a secondary
mission. These “mercy missions” were not limited only to wounded Marine
infantrymen or downed aviators.
[317] A total of 1,362 CAS sorties were flown, with 443
for the 1st Marine Division. Interdiction missions
numbered 1,842, plus additional miscellaneous and air
reconnaissance flights. 1st MAW ComdD, Oct. 52.
Whenever and wherever immediate air rescue was needed, the choppers
were sent. In July 1952, HMR-161 evacuated “650 Army and Air Force
troops as well as 150 Koreans”[318] from a flooded river island. On the
night of 18 January 1953, a helicopter retrieved five Marines from an
uncharted minefield after one of the group had accidentally stepped on
a mine. On 13 March, HMR-161 sent three helicopters aloft in an attempt
to save five men from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion who had
become trapped in mud near the edge of the Imjin, and later that month
the squadron dispatched a chopper to rescue a hunter marooned in the
middle of the Han River.
[318] Montross, _SkyCav_, p. 189.
Almost obscured in the magnificent record of the mercy missions,
especially the hazardous casualty evacuations by the VMO-6 pilots, were
the problems encountered by the observation and helicopter squadrons.
Under operational control of the division and administrative control of
the wing, the squadrons found themselves exposed to overlapping command
authority which sometimes resulted in conflicting directives from
higher headquarters. Some squadron personnel felt that establishment
of a helicopter group under the 1st MAW might have solved many of the
organizational problems, but such a unit was never established in
Korea, partly because only one helicopter squadron (plus half of the
observation squadron) existed.
Another organizational difficulty beset VMO-6. With two types of
aircraft and two unrelated missions (med evac for the HTL and HO5S
copters; observation and artillery spotting for its little OYs and,
later, OE-1s), the squadron found supply and maintenance problems
doubled and operational control of its rotary and fixed wing sections
extremely complex. Attachment of the VMO-6 choppers (for evacuation,
administrative, and liaison missions) to HMR-161 was suggested as a
possible solution to these difficulties, but was never done.
Other problem areas became apparent during the winter of 1952–1953.
Accompanying the freezing weather were difficulties in starting and,
for a brief time, in flying the helicopters. In order to overcome the
engine starting problem on emergency evacuation missions, HMR-161
preheated its number one standby aircraft every two hours during the
extreme cold. Dilution of engine oil with gasoline and use of warming
huts (the latter, a scarcity) were also employed to cut down cold
weather starting time.
Not related to freezing Korean temperatures were two additional
problems, one navigational and the other mechanical. In January, the
helicopter squadron put into use a jeep-mounted homing device for
operations in reduced visibility. It proved unsatisfactory due to
interference from other radio transmitters in the area, a difficulty
never resolved during the rest of the war. The mechanical problem
lay with the rotary winged aircraft in HMR-161. On 27 March, all of
its HRS-2 choppers with more than 200 hours on the main rotor blades
were grounded. Discovery in the States that minute .002-inch cuts on
the blade surface had occurred during fabrication resulted in the
grounding. New blades were promptly flown to Korea from both Japan and
the United States, and the squadron again became fully operational on 2
April.
Evaluation of transport helicopter techniques continued during the
period despite ever-present minor difficulties. At least one new
HMR-161 tactical maneuver was scheduled each month to evaluate existing
procedures and determine full operational capabilities of the aircraft.
During these landing exercises both the infantry and helicopter
commanders and their staffs had the opportunity to further develop
vertical envelopment techniques that would soon be the new trademark of
U.S. Marine Corps operations.
Most of the time HMR-161 operations drew more attention than those of
VMO-6, but pilots in the latter unit had a host of division Marines who
could attest to the skills and critical role performed by helicopter
fliers in the composite observation squadron. VMO-6 had pioneered the
night casualty evacuation service, and during the active fighting in
Korea, had flown out more than 1,000 Marines from frontline medical
facilities to better-equipped ones in the rear areas. These flights
were made in all kinds of weather and without the benefit of adequate
instrumentation or a homing device. No other Eighth Army helicopter
unit made regularly scheduled night frontline evacuations.[319]
[319] A relatively small number of night med evac flights was
also being flown by HMR-161. During March 1953, for
example, in transferring 283 casualties to the hospital
ships, squadron helicopters made only 15 flights at night.
The courage of these VMO-6 pilots was recalled nearly 15 years later by
a former executive officer of the 1st Marines:
The flying of the evacuation helicopters from the jury-rigged
and inadequate landing sites was nothing short of miraculous.
I’ve always contended those pilots of the observation squadron
received far less credit than they deserved. They used to fly
at night, to frontline landing strips, where I had difficulty
walking without barking my shins.[320]
[320] Col Glenn R. Long ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd
11 Jun 67.
During the latter part of 1952 and the first months of 1953, 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing command relationships underwent a significant
change. On 26 January 1953, General Megee forwarded a memorandum
request to General Barcus. The paper outlined specific recommendations
for restoring 1st MAW tactical elements to wing operational control,
even though the Marine wing would continue as a tactical component
of Fifth Air Force. In the proposal, CG, 1st MAW pointed out (as had
his predecessors) that the existing command structure, in effect,
completely bypassed the Marine wing commander. It had prevented him
from exercising normal tactical command functions, even though he was
fully responsible for the performance of his air groups and squadrons
to FEAF/FAF orders. The 1st MAW commander’s proposal was intended
to counter previous Air Force objections and demonstrate that more
normal command relations would “enhance, rather than reduce [1st MAW]
operational efficiency and effectiveness.”[321]
[321] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-76.
At the same time, having been informally advised in an earlier
conversation that CG, FAF would approve at least some of the requests
made, General Megee implemented changes in his G-2 and G-3 staff
sections. This reorganization was aimed at carrying out the increased
functions which would result from approval of the request. Operational
control of Marine tactical squadrons by FAF since 1951 had “relegated
1st MAW to the status of an administrative headquarters, forcing its
G-2 and G-3 sections partially to atrophy.”[322] To effect the changes
in command relationships and establish the wing on an operational
basis, the G-2 and G-3 sections were expanded. By the nature of
their organization these were not capable of either targeting or
tactical planning. In the intelligence section, a Target Information
Sub-section was established to compile data on the mission targets (and
accompanying photographs) received from FAF and to evaluate the desired
objectives.
[322] _Ibid._
Upon receipt of this information, the G-3 planning group accomplished
the target solution, prepared general tactics for conducting the
strike, (number of planes, amount and kind of ordnance, approach routes
to be used) and provided post-strike target evaluation. The chiefs
of these sections jointly presented the completed information to the
wing commander each afternoon. He selected the targets and forwarded
via teletype and air courier to the wing G-3 representative at FAF
headquarters a report of intended operations, providing a lead time of
36–48 hours.
As soon as the OP INTENT (Operations Intentions Report) was on its way
to General Barcus for approval, the 1st MAW intelligence section began
to prepare the target dossiers (including photographs, flak analysis,
and related identification information) on each of the approved
targets. The compiled dossiers were then sent to the appropriate
tactical squadron. At this point, still perhaps a half-day before
issuance of the FAF orders, the squadrons received two major advantages
over the previous system:
(1) Adequate photo intelligence employed for the first time since
FAF had assumed operational control of 1st MAW; and
(2) A substantial lead time advantage for proper briefing of
pilots and arming of aircraft.
After the strike, and usually within an hour, Marine planes
photographed the targets for damage assessment. These photos were
annotated and an assessment report prepared. This information was
then presented by the G-2 and G-3 to the wing commander. Immediately
thereafter, prints of the photographs were distributed to the
appropriate tactical units, thus making post-strike photography more
freely available on a regular basis to the participating tactical units.
In a letter dated 18 February, General Barcus approved most of the
1st MAW commander’s specific requests, but retained full control over
General Megee’s squadrons used in close air support. This was due to
the fact that EUSAK-FAF joint policy required CAS mission requests to
be approved by JOC, in accordance with daily Eighth Army priorities,
which allocated the aircraft for each request. Returned to operational
control of the Marine wing were planes used on interdiction, armed
reconnaissance and general support activities--the planes on strikes
beyond the bombline, the photo, and all-weather (night) squadrons.
FAF also retained control over assignment of missions to VMC-1, the
electronics unit.
Although some of the Marine wing tactical squadrons thus newly enjoyed
the advantages of flying under their own commander’s wings, 1st MAW
headquarters staff members had to pay for these benefits. An increased
work load swamped the G-2 section, where 7 photo interpreters were
kept busy 16 hours a day, 7 days a week. Marine personnel processed
and reviewed an average of 100,000 prints per month and these were
“only those from that portion of the VMJ-1 effort devoted to 1st
MAW operations.”[323] Expansion of 1st MAW headquarters to set up
a tactical planning capability pointed to a deficiency in the wing
organization T/O, a weakness that existed during the rest of the war.
[323] _Ibid._, p. 10-80.
While General Barcus earlier had General Megee’s recommendations
under study, a radio news broadcast back in the States momentarily
resulted in poor publicity for the Marine Corps. On 1 February a
nationally syndicated columnist reported instances in which friendly
troops had been bombed and strafed by U.S. aircraft. Marine Corps
planes were the most careless, the broadcaster alleged, basing his
statement on incomplete information. The news story had developed from
an unfortunate publicity release issued by FEAF dealing with a MAG-33
incident. The phrasing implied that Marine aviators were “guilty of
gross carelessness resulting in casualties among their own ground
troops.”[324]
[324] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-81.
Actually, of the 63 incidents in which friendly casualties had resulted
from aircraft flown by FAF units between January and October 1952,
1st MAW pilots were responsible for 18, or 28.5 percent of the total
number of incidents and majority of casualties. What was left unsaid,
however, in the unfavorable publicity was that with approximately 14.5
percent of the aircraft represented in FEAF, Marine fliers had been
accomplishing monthly totals of between 30 to 40 percent of all Eighth
Army CAS missions. They also performed virtually all of the very close
air support jobs (50 to 100 yards out from the MLR) which further
reduced the comparative percentage of Marine “carelessness.”
It was true, of course, that on rare occasions freak accidents did
kill and injure UN troops, despite the continual training of pilots
and controllers in strike procedures and target identification. The
position taken by the two senior Marine commanders in Korea was
that although any CAS incident involving friendly troops was highly
regrettable, it was in the same category as “short” mortar and
artillery rounds and just as unavoidable.
Target identification, low visibility flying conditions, and ballistic
computations made the task of precision close air support an enormous
one. If anything, it was almost a wonder that more accidents did
not happen. Despite the similarity of Korean geography, an unending
panorama of almost identical hilltops, ridges, and streams, the pilot
had to release ordnance at the proper altitude and speed, and in a
balanced (trim) flight. While conducting his dive the pilot’s view
could be blocked by cloud formations and his attention distracted by
antiaircraft fire which required evasive action. Even when the ordnance
had been properly released, prevailing wind conditions could affect
the flight path of the bombs. This, in addition to human error and
mechanical factors, such as the occasional malfunctioning of parts,
also affected the accuracy of bombing.
Throughout the November 1952-March 1953 period, 1st MAW squadrons
continued to provide the bulk of close air sorties to the 1st Marine
Division, in keeping with General Barcus’ policy stated earlier in
1952. Between November and January there had been a lull in the heavy
ground fighting that had prevailed in October and little need to
request air strikes. When enemy forces opposing the division began to
grow more active in February, however, the requirement for air support
to 1st MarDiv greatly increased. During this month 1st MAW aviators
reached an all-time high in the percentage of their total CAS sorties
devoted to the division--two of every three wing close support sorties
went to General Pollock’s infantry regiments.
On the critical issue of close air support, the Marine division had
become better satisfied by the end of 1952 with the quantity of air
support received from FAF. A continuing difficulty, however, was the
delayed response to requests for immediate CAS. For the wing, several
other conditions existed which bothered General Megee. One was that the
VMA-312 carrier-based squadron was not utilized to any great extent
in execution of CAS missions. This detrimental condition saddled the
wing commander with an “unqualified” squadron. It also prevented pilots
from practicing a highly developed skill they were responsible for
maintaining, although later in the war this condition was gradually
alleviated. Two other difficulties--centralized control of CAS
mission assignments by JOC and the prevailing differences between
the Marine and Air Force/Army CAS communications systems and request
procedures--were never rectified.[325]
[325] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-80.
One long-standing difficulty, though not a CAS matter, had been solved
early in the winter. Following a series of mechanical troubles with the
F3D-2 aircraft in VMF(N)-513 and prolonged delay in receipt of blast
tube extensions for its 20mm guns, the squadron finally became fully
operational on 1 November with its complement of 12 of the new jet
Skyknight aircraft. Almost as soon as the F3D-2s were ready for night
work, FEAF had put them to escorting B-29s on bombing runs over North
Korea. With the F3D escort and changes in B-29 tactics, bomber losses,
which had been severe, decreased sharply. Enemy attackers became fewer
and fewer so that by February, air-to-air opposition was encountered
only infrequently. Instead of sending up groups of night fighters at
the escorted B-29s, the enemy would fly a single jet across the bomber
formation. If a Skyknight followed, one or two MIG-15s, well to the
rear and higher than the decoy, would attempt to gun down the Skyknight
in its pursuit. But because of the F3D tail warning radar, the Marine
radar operator could detect the enemy plane in its approach for the
kill before it got within effective firing range.
Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson’s VMF(N)-513 pilots soon established
an enviable record for Marine aviation, netting by 31 January five
enemy jets without loss of a single F3D. In addition to the jets, the
squadron downed a piston engine plane and scored a probable destruct on
another. During its first three months of operations with the Douglas
Skyknights--the first Navy-Marine jet night-fighter to arrive in the
Korean combat theater--the squadron earned two night-kill records. It
also quickly proved the design theory and proposed tactics for the
Skyknights that enemy aircraft could be located, intercepted, and
destroyed purely by electronic means.
While on a night combat air patrol in the vicinity of Sinuiju airfield
early on 3 November, Master Sergeant H. C. Hoglind picked up a contact
on his intercept radar, which a ground radar station had passed on
to him, and notified the pilot, Major William T. Stratton, Jr. After
losing and reestablishing radar contact, Major Stratton made a visual
sighting of a jet exhaust straight ahead. When he had been cleared to
proceed, the Flying Nightmare’s pilot sent three bursts of 20mm into
the other plane, identified as a YAK-15. Three explosions followed and
the aircraft plunged towards the airfield directly below. This marked
the first time that an enemy jet had been destroyed at night by use of
airborne intercept radar equipment in a jet fighter.
Five days later the team of Captain Oliver R. Davis and Warrant Officer
Dramus F. Fessler bagged the first MIG-15 for the squadron. Captain
Davis expended only 20 rounds of 20mm cannon fire in his aerial
victory, which took place northwest of Pyongyang near the Yellow Sea.
The next two months brought new distinction to Marines in -513. Shortly
after dark on 10 December, First Lieutenant Joseph A. Corvi had
departed on a night combat patrol mission. About 35 miles northwest of
Chinnampo, his radar operator, Master Sergeant D. R. George, picked up
a target on his scope. Since the “bogey” (an unidentified aircraft,
believed to be hostile) was three miles distant, the pilot quickly
closed on the contact and shot it down. Almost immediately another
blip appeared on the radar screen. Lieutenant Corvi turned to the new
attack and began approaching it, but because of the slower speed of
the enemy plane the Marine pilot was able to fire only one short burst
before overtaking it. An instant before passing the enemy aircraft,
Lieutenant Corvi saw it disappear from the radar screen, but neither
member of the Flying Nightmares crew had made a visual sighting with
the plane itself, listed as a probable kill. What these two Marines
had accomplished with their earlier encounter was the first attempt to
destroy an enemy aircraft without use of a visual sighting by means of
lock-on radar gear.
All-weather squadron crews continued to demonstrate the F3D-2
capability for destruction of hostile aircraft by electronic intercept
during January. The first MIG-15 downed was by Major Elswin P. (Jack)
Dunn and Master Sergeant Lawrence J. Fortin, his radar operator. On 28
January Captain James R. Weaver and Master Sergeant Robert P. Becker
destroyed another of the Russian fighter-interceptors in an aerial
duel. The final kill came on the 31st when the new squadron commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Conley (who had taken over VMF(N)-513 on
the 20th) accompanied by Master Sergeant James M. Scott bagged the
Marine fighter pilots’ 12th MIG of the war.
While VMF(N)-513 wrote several records in the sky, other MAG-33 and
-12 squadrons also made their contribution during the winter of
1952–1953. In MAG-12, a highly successful noontime strike was launched
on 16 November by 21 attack planes from VMAs-121 and -212 against a
hydroelectric plant 25 miles southeast of Wonsan. For this exploit the
group received the plaudits of the Fifth Air Force CG, General Barcus.
Lieutenant Colonel John B. Maas, Jr.’s VMF-115 (he had succeeded
Lieutenant Colonel Coin as CO on 29 September) helped all Marines
celebrate their 177th birthday by sending 22 Panthers against enemy
troops and supply shelters. On these strikes each MAG-33 aircraft
was armed with 760 rounds of 20mm and 4 napalm tanks (500 pounds
each), the first time that 4 tanks that large had been dropped from
a fighter-bomber. This was part of the 98 sorties flown by 1st MAW
against 21 enemy targets on the 10 November anniversary date. During
December 1952, the frequency of combat flights by VMF-115 enabled the
squadron to surpass its old (August 1951) monthly sortie record. The
Panther jet fliers set this new mark of 726 effective sorties in the
last 31 days of the year.
More honors came to wing pilots in the new year. On 8 January, three
MAG-12 squadrons flew more than 28 combat sorties. Some, in support
of the 1st Marine Division near the Panmunjom corridor, by VMAs-121,
-212, and -323, produced outstanding results, earning the praise of
General Pollock. Among the participating pilots was Lieutenant Colonel
Barnett Robinson (VMA-212), who a week earlier had taken command of the
squadron from Lieutenant Colonel Dobson.
Between 9–14 January, MAG-33 participated in a USAF-USMC joint
operation to strike the rail system at Sinanju, 45 miles north of
the enemy capital, and at Yongmi-dong, to the northwest across both
the Chongchon and Taedong Rivers. During the six-day Operation
PARALYSIS, Marine and Air Force jet squadrons flew flak suppression and
interdiction missions, knocking out ground-based air defense weapons
and damaging and destroying bridges, rails, and rolling stock. At night
FEAF Bomber Command, with Flying Nightmare escorts, worked over the
communications net, including repair facilities; during daylight, the
fighter-bombers attacked marshalling yards near Sinanju, where railroad
cars were stacked up awaiting repair of the river bridges. Bomb
assessments and intelligence reports showed that two major rail lines
were inoperative for 16 days and that, as General Barcus had predicted,
the Chinese “hurriedly increased their antiaircraft defenses in the
Chongchon estuary and shot down seven fighter-bombers.”[326]
[326] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 582.
Following this operation, Colonel Robertshaw’s jets from VMFs-115 and
-311 achieved extremely effective close air support in strikes flown
24 January in the I Corps area. About a month later, with an F9F as
an airborne command post and with Lieutenant Colonel Walt Bartosh on
his wing, the MAG-33 commander directed the operations of 208 USAF and
Marine aircraft on another mass strike. The two-day mission was flown
on 18–19 February against the North Korean tank and infantry school
southwest of Pyongyang. More than 240 buildings were destroyed in 379
sorties. The attack was one of the largest all-jet fighter-bomber
strikes of the war. Colonel Robertshaw thereby became the first Marine
to lead such a large joint air-strike force from a CP aloft. And the
next month, on 8 March, the Group CO flew the first Marine jet night
MPQ mission, dropping six 250-pound bombs from an F9F-2 Panther on an
enemy ammunition dump.
_Behind the Lines_[327]
[327] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No.
6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs. Jan-Feb 53; 1/1 ComdD,
Feb 53; HMR-161 ComdD, Feb 53; Montross, _SkyCav_.
The Marine aviation command, like the division, found that its
commitment to a large-scale land campaign in Korea considerably
increased its requirements for nonorganic support, compared with
normal amphibious combat operations. The wing fell heir to more of the
permanent problems because its organization was less suited to the
heavy support requirements of prolonged combat. Whereas the 1st Marine
Division received adequate support through the FMFPac Service Command,
the wing did not since the service command had been tailored more
for support of ground organizations. Moreover, the command relations
established in Korea underscored this situation, with the 1st Combat
Service Group placed under CG, 1st Marine Division. The wing received
emergency logistical support from VMR (Marine transport squadron)
units. This was not an adequate substitute for the various ground
support agencies essential for employment of the wing’s full combat
potential.
Major problems pertaining to service and support functions of 1st
MAW units resulted from the use of amphibious Tables of Organization
throughout the period of prolonged land combat without making a T/O
adjustment for the actual combat mission being performed. What the
wing had recommended to solve its longstanding support and supply
problems was either to strengthen its organic logistical structure
or to increase it by the attachment of appropriate units. It was
emphasized that “prolonged Wing operations under Air Force control with
logistical support derived from four different services, each at the
end of its supply pipeline, brought clearly into focus the requirement
for centralized control and monitoring of Wing requisitions and
supplies.”[328]
[328] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-133.
A step toward expanding the amphibious T/O of the wing was made in 1953
with the request from CG, 1st MAW to CG, FMFPac for a detachment of the
1st Combat Service Group to provide electronics logistical support. It
was further recommended that the electronics section be made organic to
the wing to meet its need for this type of service unit.
Unlike the division, existing T/Os made it impossible for the wing to
consolidate and control resupply requests from subordinate units and
then to monitor the requisitions until parts or supplies were received
by the users. This lack of a central wing supply agency had, for some
time, impaired the effective, sustained performance of 1st MAW ground
electronics equipment in Korea. CG, FMFPac concurred with the proposal.
He requested an increase in the wing T/O of four additional electronics
supply personnel to be attached to the wing for this purpose. The basic
problem of establishment of a combat service group tailored to fully
meet 1st MAW needs in the field remained unresolved, however.
Supply problems in the division were less complicated. On 11 November
1952, General Pollock submitted a letter to the theater commander
requesting approval of a special list of equipment in excess of
certain Tables of Organization and Equipment within the division. The
requirements of the Marine land war mission in Korea dictated the need
for additional equipment, primarily crew-served weapons and automatic
rifles. Approval was given on 19 January 1953 by CG, AFFE (Army Forces,
Far East). All equipment received through this program was to be
returned upon the departure of the Marine division from Korea.
During the cold months that ended in March 1953, the division continued
its evaluation of experimental clothing and equipment. Items of winter
wear generally proved to be highly satisfactory. The thermal boot, in
particular, gave excellent service. On the other hand, the leather
combat boot did not fully measure up to expectations. Most of its
deficiencies were caused by the rapid wearing of the composition sole.
One clothing item, the armored vest, had undergone further testing. In
November, delivery of the vests to the division had been completed,
including 400 sets of the new lower torso armor. Recent issue of this
additional type of body armor appeared highly effective in reducing
combat casualties; its extended coverage also raised morale.
Though their ability to halt successfully a Chinese bullet or exploding
shell was being improved on, thanks to armored wear, the Marines’
opportunity to keep the enemy from division outposts or MLR areas was
still being hampered by occasional ammunition shortages. From time to
time during the winter months there was some relief from the grenade
and howitzer firing restrictions that had been in effect before the
Hook fighting. The cutback on use of 81mm mortar shells continued,
however, as the supply level of these projectiles remained dangerously
low.
A new shortage, this one in fuel, developed during the winter. In
January 1953 it became necessary to reduce the distribution of
gasoline for motor vehicles to .829 gallons per man per day, a drop
of 17 percent from the previous month’s allocation. Diesel fuel was
cut back to 1.41 gallons, or 7 percent less than the December ration.
By February, however, the crisis had passed and vehicles returned to
a less restricted operating schedule. No extreme hardship had been
experienced by the Marines during the fuel drought. It was considered
that “prolonged operation under such restrictions would result in a
marked decrease in efficiency since many essential activities may be
temporarily postponed, although not entirely eliminated.”[329]
[329] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.
The month of February also witnessed the largest helicopter supply lift
in Korea, HAYLIFT I, the previous September, had tested the feasibility
of transporting Class I, III, and V supplies to a frontline infantry
regiment for five consecutive days. HMR-161 and the 7th Marines had
turned out an excellent test performance of the rotary craft in this
logistical operation. It then became the task for the infantry and
helicopters to run a resupply operation for two frontline regiments for
a five-day period. HAYLIFT II, conducted 23–27 February, was the code
name for this test.
Both the planning and execution of the February operation followed
the general pattern of HAYLIFT I, but on a much larger scale. As in
September, division ordnance and service battalions moved the supplies
to helicopter loading zones near Lieutenant Colonel Carey’s HMR-161
air strip. It had been estimated that 130 tons each day would have to
be lifted to supply the two MLR regiments, the 7th and 5th Marines.
On the first day, this figure was exceeded by 30 tons. A request
by A/1/5 on 24 February for support during an emergency operation
necessitated additional ammunition[330] and helicopters to be diverted
from those resupplying the 7th Marines. By the third day, a backlog of
supplies had accumulated in the loading areas. In order to eliminate
this buildup and to replace ammunition expended that morning by 1/5,
HMR-161 on 25 February transported 200 tons in a single day, thereby
establishing a new record. This represented 392 lifts made in 138.4
hours flying time. Maximum time for unloading a chopper was 54 seconds;
the minimum, 28 seconds.
[330] The following month, HMR-161 engaged in a four-day
ammunition resupply operation for the division. Except
for one day, the 22d, all available helicopters were
assigned to that mission, beginning 20 March. HMR-161
also had a new CO by that time, Colonel Owen A. Chambers
who had taken over from Lieutenant Colonel Carey on 15
March.
The last two days of HAYLIFT II, although less eventful, contributed
to a resupply tonnage record five times greater than that set by
HAYLIFT I. On the last day, when fog grounded their aircraft for a
second time during the morning, Marines were again reminded of an
operational limitation of the helicopters. In the end, though, the
accomplishments far out-weighed this shortcoming. During the five
days, a total of 1,612,406 pounds of supplies had been lifted to the
two frontline regiments. Not one crewman or helicopter was lost. The
operation contributed significantly to the February record for the
greatest number of combat hours (765), total hours (1,275.5), combat
flights (575), and total flights (1,183) flown by HMR-161 for any
one-month period during the Korean fighting. For the rest of the war,
the February 1953 gross lift of 2,018,120 pounds would also rank as the
largest amount transported by HMR-161 for a single month.
_The Quiet Sectors_[331]
[331] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: KPR ComdDs, Jun, Aug, Oct-Dec 52, Jan-Mar
53; 1st AmTracBn ComdDs, Mar-Dec 52, Jan-Mar 53.
Two frontline units in the division MLR seldom became involved in
setting records or bitter contests with the enemy, even though they
carried out important roles in the sector defense. These were the
Kimpo Provisional Regiment and 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, both
located on the left flank of the Marine line. The Kimpo Provisional
Regiment had been organized as a component of the 1st Marine Division
a week after its arrival in the west, specifically for defending that
vital sector at the extreme left of the UNC line. The next month the
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had been assigned part of Line KANSAS
between the KPR and KMC sectors.
Because it was set apart from the Korean mainland on the north and east
by the Han River,[332] Kimpo Peninsula afforded little opportunity
for its occupants to engage the enemy directly in infantry clashes.
Artillery thus became the normal medium for carrying on the limited
hostilities as they existed in this sector between the Communists
and UNC opponents. Hostile forces opposing the KPR were deployed
in company-sized strongpoints across the river, occupying numerous
fortified heights on the north bank of the Han estuary. Enemy
strength[333] was estimated to be 7 infantry companies, supported by
7 artillery batteries and 40 mortar positions. Sporadic mortar and
artillery rounds fell in the sector, with little harm. Occasionally,
enemy counterbattery fire caused minor damage to the LVTs of the
command. During 1952, the first year of the existence of the Kimpo
regiment, 15 June had stood as the record day for the number of enemy
artillery rounds received. Between 1900–2100 a total of 588 shells had
fallen in the sector.
[332] On the west, the Yom River similarly separates the Kimpo
Peninsula from Kanghwa-do Island, second in size of all
Korean islands and a base for friendly intelligence
operations.
[333] Identified as elements of the 195th CCF Division of the
65th CCF Army and an unidentified CCF division, in a
revised EOOB issued in December. Previously, units of the
193d CCF Division were at the front in this far western
sector. KPR ComdDs, Oct-Dec 52.
As part of its normal defense mission, personnel of the regiment
spent a large part of their time controlling civilians and regulating
traffic, especially water travel. Certain counterintelligence
problems confronted the Kimpo Provisional Regiment. A large civilian
population, numbering nearly 80,000 natives, lived within the
regimental sector. Local restrictions set by the National Police on
Kimpo (who cooperated with the KPR in security matters) included the
STAYBACK LINE to the north of the peninsula. As a rule, no civilians
other than those with daytime farming permits, were allowed beyond this
line. Numerous regulations were also issued to control boat traffic.
Surrounded by rivers on three sides, there was ample opportunity for
enemy agents or line crossers to infiltrate the defense line, despite
continuous screening by friendly outposts and waterborne patrols.
Two months after the “heavy” June shelling came the August floods,
which were more destructive than the artillery had been. The rest of
the summer and fall followed a fairly regular, uneventful pattern with
customary defense duties, rotation of frontline units, and training
exercises. Among the latter were four helicopter demonstrations in
October and a five-hour communication CPX (Command Post Exercise) the
following month.
One episode toward the end of the year created a temporary stir in
the daily routine. In late November, two Communist espionage agents
and their North Korean guides were apprehended on the west bank of
the Han, almost directly east of the Kimpo Airfield. They had crossed
the Imjin-Han Rivers by boat, using this normal infiltration route to
penetrate the Marine defense net. The agents were seized by National
Police on 22 November and their North Korean guides two days later. It
was unusual for agents and guides to be captured so closely together.
Normal defense measures of the peninsula had assigned separate
northern, western, and southern sector units for protection against
possible amphibious or overland attacks or--far more likely--enemy
infiltration.
The following month four more “roving” two-man outposts were
established in the western coastal area of the southern sector.
Manned from sunset to 30 minutes after sunrise daily by either KPR
military personnel or National Police, the outposts occupied different
positions each night. They were responsible for checking for proper
identification and enforcing the rigid 2100–0500 curfew hours. Another
unusual occurrence took place the last four nights of December when a
single-engine light aircraft dropped propaganda leaflets in Colonel
Harvey C. Tschirgi’s[334] sector.
[334] Colonel Tschirgi had taken command of the KPR on 1
December from Colonel Richard H. Crockett, who previously
relieved Colonel Staab (the original KPR commander) on 31
August.
Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dobervich, the 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion (minus Company A at KPR, and Company B at Pohang), reinforced
by the Division Reconnaissance Company, had manned positions on the
KANSAS line since April 1952. By the end of May, the battalion had
inserted an additional unit, a provisional company,[335] in the
KANSAS secondary defense line. In July, the amtrac company relieved
the reconnaissance company on line, the latter then becoming part of
Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. All amphibian tractor
battalion units assigned to ground defense missions received special
refresher training in infantry operations, including the employment of
forward observers.
[335] Comprising a platoon from Company B and several
headquarters elements, the provisional company was
disbanded on 14 June when Company B that had been
supporting MAG-33 at Pohang was reassigned to the
battalion.
During the first summer in the west, the mainland-based amphibian
organization continued its KANSAS defense mission. The battalion also
instituted a training program for patrolling the Han River by tractor.
(Company A, attached to the KPR, had conducted waterborne patrols of
the Yom since June. The unit also manned outposts along that river.)
Headquarters and Service Company assisted the U.S. Army in laying a
signal cable across the river during August, the same month Lieutenant
Colonel Dobervich relinquished unit command to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin
B. Wheeler. In late August the battalion sent 58 of its members to help
augment 1st Marines ranks, thinned by the fierce Bunker Hill fighting.
Through the end of 1952, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion continued
its KANSAS mission. Although the sector had witnessed relatively
little action for some months, several incidents about this time
varied the generally quiet daily routine. In October, Company B (Major
Charles W. Fitzmaurice) sent out an amphibious patrol to capture
prisoners (Operation CAT WHISKER). The plan was to cross the Han in
a rubber boat and set up an ambush after reaching the enemy shore,
but a storm-angered river, with a strong tide boosted by heavy winds,
prevented landing of the boat. Two months later, another snare--this
one set by the enemy--was partially successful. Several hours after
dark on 1 December, the jeep assigned to the battalion commander, Major
George S. Saussy, Jr.,[336] was being driven on the MSR by Private
First Class Billy J. Webb, its operator and only occupant.
[336] Formerly the executive officer, Major Saussy took over
unit command on 7 November, when Lieutenant Colonel
Wheeler was transferred to the 5th Marines. Lieutenant
Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., became the next
commanding officer on 16 March 1953.
Suddenly shots rang out from the side of the road. Within a few
seconds, 23 bullets from a Russian-made submachine gun had struck the
jeep; the driver, astonishingly, received only a knee wound. No trace
of the ambushers could be found by the friendly patrol dispatched to
investigate the incident. An activity of an entirely different nature
that same month was the assignment of battalion LVTs to break up the
heavily encrusted ice that had formed around and endangered supports of
three bridges in the I Corps area. A rash of minor incidents involving
would-be, but unsuccessful, enemy infiltrators also took place during
the winter months in the amtrac sector. In November, three agents
attempted to cross the Imjin on their way to the division area, but
were engaged by a battalion patrol. After a brief fire fight, friendly
artillery was called down on the retreating boat and it was believed
destroyed. Enemy agents on foot were engaged by National Police or
Marine listening posts again in January and March and deterred from
their espionage missions.
Commitment to an infantry role in the KANSAS line, meanwhile, had
permitted little time for operation of the battalion tractors. In
December, construction began on a storage park for those LVTs not in
use. By placing the non-operating tracked vehicles in a single area,
the battalion could handle routine maintenance with just a few men.
This facility, located at Ascom City, was completed early in 1953.
By March, a total of 34 tractors had been placed there in caretaker
status. Implicit in this economy measure was the requirement that all
stowed tractors could revert to combat status, if necessary, on a
48-hour alert.
_Changes in the Concept of Ground Defense_[337]
[337] The material in this section is derived from: _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8.
During the winter months of 1952–1953, the 1st Marine Division modified
the organization of its tactical defense, although it retained the
basic concept of the combat outpost system as the backbone of MLR
defense.[338] Development of much of the KANSAS line and parts of the
Marine MLR during this period reflected several new ideas on how the
ground defense could be better organized. Recent experience during
Communist attacks had shown that defensive emplacements and positions
could be dug deeper and below ground to withstand massed enemy fires.
Contrary to traditional concepts, it had also been found that centering
the defense on the military crest[339] of a hill was not always the
best procedure. Emplacement of machine guns downslope or in low firing
positions to cover draws or flat ground was not entirely suitable to
the Korean terrain, enemy, or nature of positional warfare.
[338] The 1st Commonwealth Division, to the Marine right,
utilized a different defense system. Instead of relying
on the COPs forward of the main line of defense as major
deterrent positions, the British preferred to include all
strategic terrain features within the MLR itself. They
followed a policy of active patrolling to the front and,
at night, occupied selected ground sites, preferring to
fight the enemy from their main battle positions rather
than from more isolated COP positions. _PactFlt EvalRpt_
No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-92, 9-93.
[339] The military crest is that point along the slope of a
hill from which maximum observation up and down the hill
can be obtained. The topographical crest is the highest
point on a hill or ridge.
[Illustration:
MAP DIAGRAM 20 K. White
ORGANIZATION OF GROUND DEFENSE
WINTER 1952–1953]
Altered defense concepts, beginning in October, took the following form:
(1) The trace of defensive positions followed the topographical
crest (A) rather than military crest (B) of key terrain features.
(Map diagrams 20 and 21 illustrate these changes.)
(2) Fighting positions and emplacements were dug a short distance
downslope (C) from the topographical crest.
(3) Trenches on the topographical crest permitted easier, faster,
and more protected access to fighting positions from the reverse
slope and support area (D).
(4) Positions on the topographical crest were less vulnerable to
enemy artillery because it was more difficult for the enemy to
adjust his fire on these positions than on trenches dug along the
military crest. Many shells simply passed over the top (E) of the
hill.
(5) Certain hills and noses were selected and organized so that
trenches and gun emplacements, encircling the crest, would form
mutually supporting positions (X).
(6) Machine guns were moved from the draws (Y) to hilltops and
noses (Z) where better long-range observation and fields of fire
existed.
[Illustration:
MAP DIAGRAM 21 K. WHITE
TYPICAL HILL DEFENSE
(Cross Section)
WINTER 1952–1953]
Another change in the improvement of field fortifications came into use
during the winter months. A different type of barbed wire obstacle,
called “Canadian,” “random,” or “double-apron” wire, began to find
favor with Marine infantrymen. Canadian wire consisted of two parallel
rows of three-strand barbed wire fencing, erected about three feet
apart. The void was filled in with additional barbed wire, placed
at random, but connected to the parallel fences.[340] The new type
barbed wire appeared more effective for several reasons. Besides being
simple and fast to emplace, Canadian wire merely became more entangled
by artillery shelling, which quickly ripped apart the standard
double-apron barbed wire previously used in COP slope defenses.
[340] Commenting on the heavy destruction of Hook
fortifications by CCF preparation, one 7th Marine company
commander stated: “Enemy artillery and mortars did tend
to destroy the protective wire. We noted especially that
the Canadian ‘Random Wire,’ although it tended to move
about under fire, did hold together and continue to offer
good protection.” _McLaughlin ltr._
_Before the Nevadas Battle_[341]
[341] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdDs, Feb-Mar 53; 1stMar ComdD, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdDs,
Feb-Mar 53; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7
ComdDs, Feb 53.
As the Marine division continued to revamp and strengthen its primary
defenses, a change of pace on the battlefront was gradually being felt.
Only a few major raids had taken place during November, December, and
January, and these involved no transfer of real estate. Casualties had
been light. Artillery rounds, both incoming and outgoing, had dropped
substantially. By February, however, it became apparent that the period
of winter inactivity was nearing an end.
Taking the initiative in the renewed action was the 5th Marines,
occupants of the right regimental sector since 25 January. The next
month the regiment conducted three successful daytime raids against
fortified enemy positions. Targets for the initial action, on 3
February, were two consistently troublesome hills, 31 and 31A in the
Ungok Hill mass, north of the left battalion sector.
Since all battalions of the 5th Marines were to be involved either
directly or indirectly in Operation CLAMBAKE, the initial planning and
actual execution of the raid was to be carried out by the regimental
commander, Colonel Walt. CLAMBAKE required especially thorough
coordination of the heavy fire support since it was to be launched with
a tank-artillery feint against several CCF positions (Hill 104, Kumgok,
and Red Hill) generally west of the Ungok objective area. The two
target hills were to be assaulted by reinforced platoons from Company
A (Captain Don H. Blanchard) of the reserve battalion, 1/5, commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel Jonas M. Platt, who was responsible for the later
planning stages of the raid. It was anticipated that intensive air and
artillery preparation on the feint objectives and movement of gun and
flame tanks during the diversion would gain the element of surprise for
the assault platoons. Thus the Marines hoped to take prisoners, the
main purpose of the raid, and to kill enemy troops and destroy their
defenses.
During the five weeks of preparation, every aspect of the maneuver was
thoroughly reviewed and rehearsed. All participating units took part
in the planning conferences. Routes were reconnoitered, mines cleared,
and fire concentrations plotted and registered. MAG-12 pilots studied
the target areas from the nearby Marine MLR. Six rehearsals, including
practice in casualty evacuation, uncovered potential problem areas.
Final rehearsal was held 1 February, with artillery and air preparation
made against the feint objectives. Four close air support strikes were
conducted that day and the next as part of the plan to divert enemy
attention from the CLAMBAKE destruction mission.
Shortly after first light on 3 February, three platoons of tanks
rumbled across the MLR to assault the feint area. A heavy “false”
artillery preparation by 1/11 was also placed on the three western
enemy hills as well as direct fire from gun and flame tanks. The two
Marine assault forces, one against each hill, moved out armed with
flamethrowers, 3.5-inch rockets, machine guns, grenades, satchel
charges, bangalore torpedoes, and automatic weapons. Enemy forces
occupying the positions made three separate counterattack attempts,
which were blunted by Marine supporting arms. During the infantry
attack, friendly air hovered on station and artillery fired continuous
counterbattery and countermortar fire.
With the exception of the change of withdrawal route of one of the
assault teams, the 5th Marines reported that the operation was carried
out according to plan. Company A tanks had swung left across the frozen
rice paddies to provide left flank security for the infantry and to
interdict trenchlines that connected with the Ungok objective. Intense
enemy fire lashed the armored vehicles as they approached Kumgok
and Red Hill as well as those supporting tanks that remained on the
MLR.[342] Air, artillery, infantry, and tanks produced an estimated
390 Chinese casualties (including 90 known KIA) in addition to damaged
or destroyed trenchlines, tunnels, caves, bunkers, and weapons of the
enemy. Marine losses were 14 killed and 91 wounded. One flame tank was
lost.
[342] For a detailed account of the tank action in the CLAMBAKE
raid see Col Clyde W. Hunter ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd
6 Jun 70, in v. V, Korean comment file.
As in the case of the 1st Marines WAKEUP raid in November 1952,
CLAMBAKE was important not so much in accomplishing its primary
mission (actually, no POWs were taken) as in lessons learned. One of
these was to reemphasize the fact that thorough preparation helped
to ensure smooth coordination of infantry and supporting arms. In
his report of the operation, Lieutenant Colonel Platt wrote, “minute
planning to the last detail along with carefully executed rehearsals
are basic to success in actions of this type.”[343] He further noted
that “confidence and enthusiasm stimulated by the rehearsals are
assets which cannot be overlooked.”[344] The battalion commander also
commented on the importance of planning for both troop withdrawal and
maintaining a flexible schedule of fires by supporting arms. Air,[345]
artillery, and tanks all employed fire plans that could be readily
adjusted to meet the changing tactical situation.
[343] 1/5 ComdD, Feb. 53, App. IVc, dtd 19 Feb 53, p. 5.
[344] _Ibid._
[345] In order to assure better close air support during the
assault; an SOP for the airborne tactical controller was
proposed and drafted by MAG-12 for 1st MAW approval.
The plan utilized the marking of targets by rocket and
subsequent corrections to be made by the FAC. This
enabled MAG-12 aircraft “to scramble, fly a CAS mission
at the Division front and be back at the field at K-6 in
approximately 40 minutes.” Col Wayne M. Cargill ltr to
Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70.
On the ground, flame was found to be the best weapon for neutralizing
the well-fortified CCF caves. From Company A, 1st Tank Battalion
(Captain Hunter) came information about Chinese 3.5-inch rocket
launcher teams used in antitank defense. Several of these tank-killer
teams had run down the trenchline holding small bushes in front of
them. The enemy then boldly advanced through a hail of bullets to
within 15–20 yards of the Marine tank before opening fire with their
rockets. Short bursts of flame from headquarters tanks soon caused even
the most intrepid to beat a hurried retreat.
Concluding his after-action report of CLAMBAKE, the regimental
commander, Colonel Walt, observed:
In addition to inflicting large numbers of casualties and
destruction upon the enemy, the operation served a secondary
purpose, none the less important. It provided excellent training
and experience for the various infantry and supporting arms
staffs involved, helping to develop them into a smoothly
functioning infantry-air-artillery-tank team.[346]
[346] 5th Mar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 20 Feb 53, p. 3.
Shortly before the end of the month, the 5th Marines made another
major assault. As in the earlier CLAMBAKE, this raid was again in
two-reinforced-platoon size and made during the early daylight hours
of 25 February. This time the objective was a single height, Hill 15
(Detroit), two miles east of the CLAMBAKE objective. Lieutenant Colonel
Oscar F. Peatross’[347] 2/5, manning the extreme right sector of the
division, gave the assignment to Company F, then under Captain Harold
D. Kurth, Jr. Planning for Operation CHARLIE, a standard-type kill,
capture, and destroy raid, was carried out in much the same detailed
manner as the earlier 1/5 raid.
[347] Lieutenant Colonel Peatross had succeeded Lieutenant
Colonel McLaughlin as battalion CO on 11 Sep 52.
CHARLIE differed somewhat in concept in that the 2/5 operational plan
attempted to gain surprise by launching the attack during the BMNT[348]
period as well as in use of smoke to screen enemy observation.
Supporting arms preparatory fires had been carefully plotted, including
the precision destruction aerial bombing that had proved so effective
in the CLAMBAKE assault. In actual execution of CHARLIE, however, bad
weather prevented the use of almost all the planned pre-D-Day and D-Day
air strikes. Upon reaching the Detroit objective area assault Marines
“found the majority of enemy installations were relatively undamaged,
even though subjected to heavy bombardment by other supporting
arms.”[349] Artillery preparatory fires had been employed successfully
to isolate the battle area and howitzer and tank missions supported the
raid.[350]
[348] Beginning morning nautical twilight is that period
before sunrise or after sunset (BENT, or beginning
evening nautical twilight) when visibility is limited to
approximately 300 yards.
[349] 5thMar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 28 Feb 53, p. 5.
[350] In nearly three hours of firing, the 11th Marines and
its reinforcing and attached units, including the 1st
Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, expended 11,881 rounds.
Indicative of the meticulous planning that preceded an
operation such as CHARLIE is the 11th Marines report of
this raid, 11thMar ComdD, Feb 53.
Between the time of CLAMBAKE and CHARLIE a series of Marine and enemy
small units actions erupted which were soon to become a way of life
for the MLR combatants. By sporadic outpost attacks and increasing
their use of artillery, the Chinese were beginning to demonstrate a
more aggressive attitude than in recent months. On the night of 12–13
February, a CCF platoon supported by mortars and artillery probed
COP Hedy (Hill 124), in the right battalion of the center regimental
sector, held by Lieutenant Colonel Barrett’s 3/7. On the next night,
it was the Korean Marines who turned aggressor. Two of their platoons
raided Hill 240, on the west bank of the Sachon, nearly three miles
north of the mouth of the river. The following night, a 7th Marines
patrol moving into ambush positions was itself stalked by a large CCF
patrol. When reinforcements, including armored vehicles, moved out from
the MLR to support the Marines, the Chinese hastily withdrew.
Three more contacts were made before the end of the month along the
division front. On 19 February CCF soldiers, in two-platoon strength,
engaged KMC sentries forward of COP 33, located about a mile east of
the action the previous week. After the initial exchange of small arms
fire, the Koreans moved back to the outpost and called down supporting
fires on the Chinese. Artillery and mortars tore into the attackers
causing numerous casualties and forcing the enemy to withdraw. On the
morning of 22 February, a raiding party from the 5th Marines assaulted
a smaller enemy force at Hill 35A, approximately 1,300 yards southwest
of the Ungok hills. In this second raid staged by the 5th Marines that
month, assault troops (H/3/5) used flamethrowers in the early stages of
the action to help clear enemy trenches of hostile grenade throwers.
Late the next night a 7th Marines unit, consisting of a reinforced
platoon and four M-46 tanks, set out to raid Yoke, located near the
peace corridor five miles north of Freedom Bridge. The assault against
that position never came off. At 2137 as the B/1/7 platoon moved into
preliminary positions on Hill 90, north of the ultimate objective, a
Chinese company ambushed the patrol from three sides. When the Marines
closed with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting, a support platoon was
sent from the MLR. After an intense 30 minute fire fight, the CCF began
withdrawing at 0138. Enemy losses were listed as 45 counted KIA, 33
estimated KIA, and 35 estimated WIA. As a result of the assault, orders
for the 7th Marines raid on Yoke were cancelled. Marine casualties
numbered 5 killed, 22 wounded.
Whereas February was characterized by a marked increase in ground
contacts between Marines and their CCF adversaries, during the first
part of March the Chinese again assumed an inactive posture. Marine
patrols reported few contacts. Except for a KMC raid on 3 March, little
action that could be considered a sizable engagement took place until
after midmonth. On the 16th there was a brief skirmish involving a 5th
Marines combat patrol near Reno and a short fire fight between Carson
defenders and an enemy squad. The next night a Chinese platoon, waiting
near Vegas for a Marine patrol to pass by, was itself put to flight by
the patrol.
Two encounters with the CCF on 19 March marked the heaviest action
yet of the month. Early that morning, a predawn raid was staged by
B/1/5 (Captain Theodore J. Mildner) at Hill 31A, one of the Ungok twin
objectives in CLAMBAKE the previous month. The March ITEM raid employed
111 Marines. One platoon was to make the assault and the second platoon
to support the operation and assist in casualty evacuation. Following
a series of nearly a dozen air strikes on the objective and artillery
preparation, Captain Mildner’s two assault platoons jumped off from
the MLR check point at 0518. As usually happened in such operations,
the preliminary fire drove the Chinese to reverse slope defenses. No
enemy POWs were taken and at 0700 the Marine units disengaged, due to
casualties sustained from enemy shelling and machine gun fire.[351]
[351] Prior to the raid various combinations of flamethrower
fuels and pressure were extensively used. The purpose
was to determine the maximum effective range of
the flamethrower teams in order to “neutralize the
hand-grenade throwing potential of the enemy, this being
one of the major problems confronting assault elements on
other raids.” Final tests resulted in flame being thrown
more than 40 yards up hill. 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, App. IVf,
p. 3.
Earlier that same date, two attacks had been made simultaneously by
the enemy on outposts in the center regimental sector, where the 1st
Marines had relieved the 7th on 10 March. At 0105 one CCF company
struck in the vicinity of Hedy while a second lunged at Esther, about
1½ miles east. When a G/3/1 reconnaissance patrol operating forward
of COP Esther observed enemy movement, the Marines pulled back to
the outpost, alerting it to the impending attack. After a heavy
incoming artillery barrage, the enemy assaulted the outpost, but when
a three-hour effort failed to carry the position, the attackers
withdrew. By that time the Chinese company which had hit COP Hedy had
also broken off the attack.
Actually the fight in Captain Carl R. Gray’s Company H sector, to the
rear of Hedy, was mainly at the MLR, for the Chinese indulged in merely
a brief fire fight at the latter outpost, bypassing it in favor of a
crack at JAMESTOWN. The main line of resistance failed to yield to
the enemy thrust, which was supported by 2,400 rounds of mortar and
artillery fire along the MLR and outposts.
After being thwarted by Hedy-Esther defenses, the enemy shifted his
efforts westward to the 1st KMC area. The Korean regiment received
the brunt of the enemy’s minor infantry probes immediately preceding
the Nevada Cities battle. Late on 25 March a series of skirmishes
broke out in the 1st Marines sector between one-or-two platoon size
Chinese infantry forces and Marine outpost defenders. Following a quiet
daylight spell on the 26th, the Chinese resumed the offensive with a
probe at COP Dagmar. This coincided with what developed into a massive
regimental assault unleashed against Carson, Reno, and Vegas, outposts
in the 5th Marines sector, to the right. There Colonel Walt’s regiment
would shortly be the target of the bloodiest Chinese attack to date on
the 1st Marine Division in West Korea.
CHAPTER VII
Vegas
_The Nevada Cities--Supporting Arms--Defense Organization at the
Outposts--Chinese Attack on 26 March--Reinforcements Dispatched--Massed
Counterattack the Next Day--Push to the Summit--Other Communist
Probes--Three CCF Attempts for the Outpost--Vegas Consolidation
Begins--Aftermath_
_The Nevada Cities_[352]
[352] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;
1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5
ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdD, Apr 53, Special Action Rpt
Period 26–30 Mar 53, “Battle of the Cities,” hereafter
5thMar SAR “Cities”; Maj Norman W. Hicks, “U.S. Marine
Operations in Korea, 1952–1953 with Special Emphasis
on Outpost Warfare” (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Maryland,
1962), hereafter Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; 1stLt Peter
Braestrup, “Outpost Warfare,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v.
37, no. 11 (Nov 53) and “Back to the Trenches,” _Marine
Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 3 (Mar 55); MSgt Robert T.
Fugate, “Vegas, Reno, and Carson,” _Leatherneck_, v. 36,
no. 6 (Jun 53), hereafter Fugate, “Vegas.”
As the third winter of war in Korea began to draw to an inconclusive
end in late March 1953, some 28,000 Marines of the 1st Division
stationed on the western front suspected that coming weeks would bring
a change of pace. Consider just the matter of basic logistics. Rising
temperatures, tons of melting snow, and the thawing of the Imjin River,
located north of the rear Marine support and reserve areas, would turn
vital road nets into quagmires to tax the patience and ingenuity of men
and machinery alike.
With the arrival of another spring in Korea there was strong likelihood
that the Chinese Communists facing the Marines across a 33-mile front
of jagged peaks and steep draws would launch a new offensive. This
would enable them to regain the initiative and end the stalemate that
had existed since October when they were rebuffed in the battle for the
Hook.
Winning new dominating hill or ridge positions adjacent to the Marine
MLR, in that uneasy No-Mans-Land buffer zone between the CCF and UN
lines, would be both militarily and psychologically advantageous to
the Communists. Any new yardage or victory, no matter how small,
could be exploited as leverage against the “Wall Street capitalists”
when truce talks resumed at the Panmunjom bargaining table. Further,
dominant terrain seized by the CCF would remain in Communist hands
when the truce went into effect. Although wise to the tactics of
the Chinese,[353] UN intelligence had not anticipated the extent or
intensity of the surprise CCF attack that opened up at 1900 on 26 March
when the Communists sent battalions of 700 to 800 men against Marine
outposts of 50 men.
[353] Since the first of the year division intelligence reports
had given the CCF the capability of mounting limited
objective attacks ranging from company to regimental
size. _PacFlt EvalRpt_, p. 9-28, quoting 1stMarDiv PIR
860, dtd 4 Mar 53.
The late March attack centered primarily on a trio of peaks where
Marines had dug in three of their key outposts--Carson, Reno, and
Vegas. Rechristened from earlier, more prosaic names of Allen, Bruce,
and Clarence, respectively, the Nevada Cities hill complex was located
approximately 1,500 yards north of the MLR fronting the 5th Marines
right sector. The trio was the province of 1/5, which manned the
western (left) part of the regimental area. Ultimately, however,
reverberations ran through nearly 10,000 yards of division front,
from the two Berlin outposts, 1,000 yards east of Vegas, to COP Hedy,
midpoint in the 1st Marines center sector. Continuous attacks and
counterattacks for possession of the key Vegas outpost raged unabated
for five days. The action escalated into the bloodiest fighting to
date in western Korea, resulted in loss of a major outpost, and the
killing or wounding of nearly 1,000 Marines. It was a partial success
for the enemy, but he paid a high price for the real estate: casualties
amounting to more than twice the Marine losses, including 800 known
killed and a regiment that was decimated by the Marine defenders.
The three Nevada outposts lay just below the 38th Parallel,
approximately 10 miles northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance
north of the Marine railhead at Munsan-ni. Possession of the area would
give the Communists improved observation of I Corps MLR positions
to the west. Indeed, the enemy had cast covetous eyes (an ambition
translated into action through his well-known creeping tactics) on the
semi-circular net of outposts since the preceding summer.
Mindful of this, the I Corps commanding general back in September had
stressed the importance of holding key terrain features that could be
of major tactical value to the enemy. This included Bunker Hill and
COP Reno, both considered likely targets for renewed enemy aggression
in the future. Particularly, the enemy had indicated he wanted to
annex Reno. The object of increasing hostile attacks since July 1952,
Reno was the closest of the three Nevadas to CCF lines and tied in
geographically with two of the enemy’s high ground positions--Hill 190,
to the northeast, and Hill 101, overlooking the site of the destroyed
village of Ungok. (See Map 22.)
Reno’s companion outpost on the right, Vegas, at 175 meters, was the
highest of the three while Carson, on the left flank, was nearest
JAMESTOWN and also assisted in defense of Reno and Vegas. Each of the
three outposts was manned by a rifle platoon (40 Marines plus two Navy
hospital corpsmen), heavily reinforced with weapons company personnel.
A small hill between Reno and Vegas, known as the Reno Block, further
supported the Nevada Cities complex and at night was defended by a
reinforced squad.
Since they commanded the historic Korean invasion route to Seoul, 30
air miles south, the strategic importance of the Nevada outposts had
been one of the reasons for transfer of the Marines from East Korea to
the West, in 1952. Both Reno and Vegas, moreover, overlooked Chinese
rear area supply routes. This was a matter of special concern to the
enemy at this time since he had recently doubled his stockpiling
efforts and wanted to prevent UNC intelligence from learning about the
build-up. Possession of the Nevada hills would enable the Chinese to
harass the Marines at even closer range and--hopefully--to conduct new
thrusts at the MLR which would ultimately weaken the UNC position.
[Illustration:
MAP 22 K. WHITE
5TH MARINES MLR SECTOR
26 March 1953]
In mid- and late March, the units forward in the 1st Marine Division
sector of the main defense line, JAMESTOWN, remained much as they had
been in recent months. Left to right, the defending components were
the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st
Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team (1st KMC/RCT),[354] 1st
Marines, and 5th Marines. One change had occurred when the 1st Marines
relieved the 7th in the center sector earlier in the month. The latter
was now in division reserve in the Camp Rose rear area. Before long,
this regiment was to see more offensive action in a hotly contested,
five-day period than it had during its entire recent tour on line.
Overall, the 1st Marine Division continued as one of the four infantry
divisions in the I Corps sector of EUSAK[355] and, in fact, the month
itself marked exactly one year since the Marines had arrived on the
western front.
[354] The 1st KMC Regiment had been redesignated the 1st
KMC/RCT on 15 Dec 52. Continuing under opcon of the
1stMarDiv, the Korean RCT consisted of four infantry
battalions, plus attached artillery, armor, engineer, and
service units. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-64.
[355] To the Marine division right were the U.S. 2d Infantry,
ROK 1st, and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions.
Occupying the far eastern end of the division sector, the 5th Marines,
under command of Colonel Walt,[356] had been assigned to the MLR since
late January. The regiment manned six miles of the JAMESTOWN front.
It was flanked on the left by the 1st Marines while to the right its
neighbor was the 38th Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, U.S. Army.
[356] No stranger to the 5th Marines, Colonel Walt had served
with this regiment during World War II at Guadalcanal,
Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. He had commanded, on
separate occasions, 2/5 and 3/5 and had earned two Navy
Crosses for combat leadership and bravery.
Since 20 February, the western part of the 5th regimental sector had
been held by Lieutenant Colonel Platt’s 1/5, with Companies A, B, and
C on line, from left to right. The battalion area held four outposts.
COP Ava was tucked down near the boundary between the 1st and 5th
Regiments, while the Nevada, or Three Cities, triangle screened the
central part of the latter regimental sector. A Company A squad[357]
outposted Ava, some 325 yards forward of the main line. Personnel of
Company C were stationed on Carson and Reno. Vegas had a unique command
situation. Due to its proximity to the boundary between 1/5 and 3/5,
Vegas came under operational control of the former battalion while
personnel charged with its defense belonged to Company H of 3/5.
[357] Normally Ava was a squad-size outpost. Prior to and
during the late March attacks, all 5th Marine COPs were
strengthened.
The right flank of the regimental sector was the responsibility of 3/5,
which had moved to the front on 23 March, under Lieutenant Colonel
Robert J. Oddy. Companies H, G, and I were forward, in that order
from the west, with George personnel on duty at the two reinforced
squad size outposts, Berlin and East Berlin. In regimental reserve was
Lieutenant Colonel James H. Finch’s 2/5.
Westward along JAMESTOWN from Colonel Walt’s 5th Marines was the center
regimental sector, held by the 1st Marines commanded by Colonel Adams.
(See Map 23.) The extreme western part of the regimental line came to
a juncture with KMC territory just as it looped around the critical
Panmunjom peace corridor. This left battalion sector was manned by
Lieutenant Colonel George A. Gililland’s 2/1. Companies E, D, B from
1/1,[358] and F were forward, outposting COPs 1, 2, Marilyn, Kate,
and Ingrid. To the right 3/1, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest
G. Atkin, defended Hedy, Bunker, Ginger, Esther, Dagmar, and Corinne,
with Companies H, G, and I on line. Occupying the area adjacent to the
secondary defense installations, WYOMING and the western part of the
KANSAS line, was Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Findtner’s reserve
1/1. And located to the rear of the 1st and 5th Regiments was the 7th
Marines (Colonel Haffner), in reserve,[359] and the division rear
support units, also south of the Imjin.
[358] Company B from 1/l had been assigned to operational
control of 2/1 when the latter unit relieved 1/7 on
line on 10 March. The increased personnel enabled the
battalion to position a company-size detachment at the
strategic high ground, COP 2, that overlooked Panmunjom
and the critical truce talk site.
[359] Regimental command changed 27 March when Colonel Glenn C.
Funk, former commanding officer of the 1st Shore Party
Battalion, was assigned to the 7th Marines, succeeding
Colonel Haffner, who became G-2.
_Supporting Arms_[360]
[360] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10;
1stMarDiv, 11thMar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1st MAW,
MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, Mar 53.
In support of the three infantry regiments were the artillerymen,
guns, and howitzers of Colonel Mills’ 11th Marines. Two of its three
light battalions, 1/11 and 3/11, provided 105mm direct fires to the
5th and 1st Marines, respectively. The general support battalion was
2/11, prepared to reinforce the fires of 1/11. The regimental medium
battalion, 4/11, was in general support of the division, as was the 1st
4.5-inch Rocket Battery. To the southwest of the division sector, the
75mm guns of the 1st KMC Artillery Battalion, also attached to the 11th
Marines, were in direct support of the 1st KMC/RCT. Newly formed the
preceding month, the 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery-Automatic
Weapons Platoon had the mission of defending two of the Imjin River
Bridges--Freedom and Spoonbill--in the division sector.
[Illustration:
MAP 23 K. WHITE
1ST MARINES MLR SECTOR
(Division Center)
26 March 1953]
In addition to organic and attached units of the 11th, four I Corps
artillery components, located within division territory, further
reinforced 11th Marines capabilities. The 623d Field Artillery
Battalion, with batteries in the 5th and 7th Marines sectors, like 4/11
consisted of 155mm howitzers. Three heavy artillery units were also
available for counterbattery missions. These 8-inch howitzers belonged
to Battery C of the 17th Field Artillery, Battery B of the 204th
Field Artillery, and the 158th Field Artillery Battalion. These Army
units were assigned to general support of I Corps, reinforcing Marine
fires on call, and were under operational control of the 159th Field
Artillery Battalion Group.
Active armored support for the division’s ground troops during
March was provided by three of the four companies from the 1st Tank
Battalion. Company A’s M-46s, flame tanks, and retrievers, well forward
in the right sector, were in direct support of the 5th Marines; Company
D tanks were assigned to the 1st Marines. Company B functioned as the
forward reserve unit, ready to move into firing positions on the MLR if
the tactical situation called for it. The rear reserve unit, Company C,
conducted refresher training and performed equipment checks on the rest
of the battalion tanks. The battalion commander, since May 1952, was
Lieutenant Colonel John I. Williamson.
The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with a personnel strength of 6,400, was
located throughout Korea. Wing headquarters, Marine Air Control Group
2, and Marine Air Group 33, with its F9F day jet fighters and the VMJ-1
photo reconnaissance squadron operated from K-3, Pohang. VMF(N)-513,
with all weather jet fighters, flew out of K-8, Kunsan, on the west
coast, 105 miles below Seoul. MAG-12 and its squadrons of attack ADs
and Corsairs was relatively near the 1st Marine Division sector, at
K-6, Pyongtaek, 30 miles southeast of Inchon. Marine Wing Service
Squadron 1, with its heavy maintenance capability, remained at Itami,
Japan.
Tactical control had been altered radically the previous month when
the Fifth Air Force had relinquished its command of Marine pilots and
planes and they returned to operational control of the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing for the first time since the early days of the war.
Direction of the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6 used in transport
and reconnaissance missions had for some time been closer to home;
both squadrons were under 1st Marine Division operational control.
HMR-161 was based at A-17, in the vicinity of the 1st Marine Division
command post. VMO-6, a composite unit consisting of single-engine
OE-1 observation planes and a copter section of the HTL-4 and the new
larger HO5S-1 craft, was located at A-9, three miles south of division
headquarters. The squadron provided regularly scheduled helicopter
evacuation of night frontline combat-casualties, artillery spotting
flights, and airborne control of air strikes. Both squadrons performed
routine liaison and reconnaissance, administrative, and resupply
flights.
_Defense Organization on the Outposts_[361]
[361] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: 1/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR
“Cities.”
Carson (Hill 27), furthest west of the three Nevada Cities was, at 820
yards, also nearest the Marine main line of resistance. It overlooked
enemy terrain to the northwest and dominated an important approach
from that same direction--the Seoul road. Organized as a perimeter
defense position, Carson security was oriented toward two major Chinese
strongpoints. These were the twin-peaked Ungok Hill mass (31-31A),
approximately 650 yards west of the Seoul road which lay between Ungok
and Carson, and Hill 67 (Arrowhead), an equal distance due northwest.
Other critical features in the immediate Carson vicinity included, on
the right, the west finger of Reno; the ridgeline south from Reno to a
point known as “Ambush Alley,” in the vicinity of enemy Hill 47; and
the ridgeline approaches by the two listening posts--Fox finger and
George finger. (See Map 24.)
[Illustration:
MAP 24 K. WHITE
COP CARSON
March 1953]
Little cover or concealment existed, other than that offered by
the trenchline and a cave used as living quarters. Four weapons
positions--light machine guns and Browning automatic rifles--covered
main enemy avenues of approach. These and two listening posts were each
manned by two men after 1800 and throughout the night. Of Carson’s
customary strength of 38 (1 officer and 37 enlisted), 28 stood watch
and worked on fortifications at night. A six-man security team was on
duty during the day. All posts connected by land line to battalion
headquarters, where a 24-hour phone watch was maintained. Sound power
phones and radios also provided communication with the company CP.
Nearly 350 yards of trenchline encircled the outpost. Most was in good
condition, five or more feet deep and two feet wide. The main trench on
the reverse slope was in spots shallow, only three to five feet, and a
new trench was being dug. Fields of fire for small arms protection were
considered good, although some of the 28 fighting holes were overly
close to culvert and sandbag overheading, which prevented complete
fire coverage of forward slopes. Adequate fire support could be given
along the southern slope of the west finger extending from COP Reno,
which was also mutually supporting with that of the Reno Block. Forward
observer teams for the 60mm and 81mm mortars provided observation for
supporting arms. The arsenal of weapons at Carson included 4 A-4 light
machine guns, 2 flamethrowers, 2 3.5-inch rocket launchers, 9 Browning
automatic rifles, 36 M-1 rifles, 2 carbines, 2 pistols, and 4 grenade
launchers.
Some 450 yards northeast, COP Reno (Hill 25) was dug in on a ridgeline
that fronted enemy Hill 25A (also known as Hill 150), immediately
north. Approximately 1,600 yards away from the MLR, Reno was the
central of the three outposts and also the one most distant from
Marine lines. West to east, critical terrain consisted of five enemy
positions--Hills 31, 67, 25A, 190, and 153--and friendly companion
outpost Vegas, on the right flank. (See Map 25.)
Two main trenches led into the outpost, a reverse slope fortification.
The forward trench, perpendicular to the ridgeline fronting the
position, was approximately 20 yards long and 8 feet deep. The second,
to the rear and about the same length, traversed the outpost in an
east-west direction. Approaching from the entrance, or “Gate” of the
MLR, the two trenches joined on the left, forming a 90 degree angle.
A cave, located in the arc between the trenches, provided overcrowded
living quarters where personnel slept either on the dirt floor or atop
sandbags, since there were no bunkers at Reno. Ammunition supplies, as
well as the corpsman’s first aid facilities, were cached in the cave.
[Illustration:
MAP 25 K. WHITE
COP RENO
March 1953]
A major blocking position, some 100 yards south, and to the rear of
Reno itself was covered by troops posted in the trenchline. Left of the
forward trench, protective wire was placed across the topographical
crest. This left finger had good observation to Ungok and Arrowhead
but also served as an approach to Carson. Most likely enemy approach,
however, was considered to be the ridgeline from Hill 150, on the
north. The Seoul road, rear trenchline, and valley to the right were
alternate approaches. Twenty-four hour security at Reno included an
automatic rifleman at the Gate, at Post 1, on the forward trench, and
Post 2, which was at the extreme right of the rear trench. Ten machine
gunners were also detailed as night watch on the guns. During the
daytime they were responsible for maintenance of ammunition and weapons
which consisted of 18 M-1 rifles, 6 BARs, 5 A-4 LMGs, 2 flamethrowers,
1 carbine, and 7 pistols.
The biggest defense problem at Reno stemmed from restricted fields of
fire. Able gun, for instance, covered the rear of the topographical
crest and Hills 31 and 67, on the left. But dead space masked its
effectiveness practically from the base of Hill 67 to the gun itself.
The Baker gun, protecting the reverse slope, had a lateral firing range
of from 10 to 30 feet. Charlie gun maintained an unlimited sector of
fire, approximately 180 degrees, and Dog gun covered the rear. As
there were no prepared machine gun positions, they were fired from the
parapet protecting both the fighting holes and firing positions in the
trenchline. Two fighting holes were manned by BARs and two were used as
machine gun posts.
Customarily 40 to 43 men were on duty at COP Reno. In fact this number
had been viewed dubiously as being “far too many to man defensive
positions at any one time,” by the commanding officer of the 1/5
Weapons Company during a survey earlier in the month, noting that
“about 20 could adequately defend the position.”[362] A six-man force
was detailed as a permanent working party for the improvement of
fortifications. Sound power phones linked all positions and field
phones connected the forward observer with gun positions. Overall, for
proper defense, Reno depended heavily upon support fires from Carson
and Vegas, on its right flank. Morale was considered “very good to
excellent” with Reno personnel being relieved every 8 to 10 days.
[362] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Reno Report, by Capt
Henry A. Checklou, dtd 12 Mar 53, p. 4.
Vegas (Hill 21), the highest of the three outposts, was located
approximately 1,310 yards in front of the MLR. Observation of the
surrounding terrain from the east slope of enemy Hill 190 on the north,
clockwise to the ridge south of Reno had been pronounced “excellent”
on an inspection trip made earlier the day the outposts were attacked.
From north to south this observation included in its 180-degree sweep,
enemy hill mass 57 to the right, friendly outpost Berlin, the MLR, key
Marine defense highpoints, Hills 229 and 181 in the 1st Marines rear
sector, and intervening terrain. (See Map 26.)
The north-south ridge leading to COP Reno masked the view from Vegas
on the west. To the north full observation was partially limited by
outpost Reno itself and enemy Hills 150, 153, and 190. The latter was
particularly strategic for two reasons. First, it shielded a major
assembly area. And, although the Chinese had observation of the entire
right battalion MLR from Hill 190 on the north, Vegas prevented enemy
close-in view of Marine rear areas. It also dominated the approach to
a major Marine observation point, Hill 126, to the rear of the front
lines in the western part of the 3/5 sector.
Organized as a perimeter defense, Vegas was surrounded by 250 yards
of trenchline. The forward, or north trench, averaged four feet in
depth but deepened to about eight feet as it progressed to the rear.
The most solidly constructed part was the western portion. A center
communication trench was in good condition between the rear and
topographical crest. From this point to the forward trench its depth
decreased to about four feet. The trench leading back to the MLR, about
five feet deep and two wide, was in good condition. A total of 13
fighting holes had been constructed.
Outpost troops, numbering approximately 40, consisted of six fire
teams, heavy weapons and machine gunners, two 81mm mortar crews and two
artillery observers, one corpsman, and a wireman at night. Strength
was reduced during the day, with replacements to make up the normal
complement arriving on position early each evening.
[Illustration:
MAP 26 K. WHITE
COP VEGAS
March 1953]
Major approaches to Vegas included the large draws to the west and
north of the outpost, the ridgeline to the COP from Hill 153 to the
northwest, and the rear trenchline. Several ancillary trenchlines to
the east tended to reinforce this latter approach. A hindrance to the
enemy, however, was the slope leading into the draw west of the
outpost. For security purposes, the perimeter was divided into three
sectors, each manned by two fire teams augmented by heavy weapons
personnel. The outpost detachment stood nighttime posts on a 50 percent
basis and remained within the several living bunkers or other shelters
during daylight hours because of heavy shelling and sniper fire.
Incessant enemy pressure at the exposed outpost made it expedient to
rotate infantry Marines at Vegas every three days and observers, at the
end of four or five days.
Weapons on position included two flamethrowers, one 3.5-inch bazooka,
four machine guns, three pistols, and other small arms. Fields of fire
at Vegas, rated fair to good, were generally restricted due to the
proximity of overheading. Most of the light machine guns had plunging
fields of fire except for the approach along the ridgeline from Hill
153, covered by grazing fire. A fighting hole to the left of Able Gate,
which overlooked the trenchline leading to the MLR, was manned during
the day. No other sentries or listening posts were in effect. Nine
sound power phones were operative. Three were located in the CP bunker
(connecting to C/1/5, G/3/5, and the CP net); one, each, at the four
main posts, the rear Able Gate, and the cave.
Other than periodic work being done by 10 Korean Service Corps
personnel in clearing out the trenches, no construction was in process
at Vegas. KSCs, lugging their traditional A-frames and guided by
Marines, also ran a nightly “supply train” to Vegas as they did to
Carson and Reno. Sufficient personnel manned the outpost for adequate
defense, although an inspecting officer opined that the “one 3.5 rocket
launcher on position did not appear to be necessary for defense of this
type position.”[363]
[363] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Vegas Report, by
Capt Henry A. Checklou, on 26 Mar, dtd 31 Mar 53, p. 4.
_The Chinese Assault of 26 March_[364]
[364] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 26–27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv
PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIRs 86-53, dtd 27
Mar 53, 87-53, dtd 28 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar,
11thMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11,
3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR, 18–28
Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; Fugate, “Vegas.”
Until the final days of March, the CCF units opposite the 5th Marines
had shown little aggressiveness. Regimental reports had officially
cited Chinese actions as having been “extremely limited” other than
their expected resistance to patrols and the Marine ITEM raid staged
earlier in the month by the 1/5 two-platoon unit on Hill 31A, part of
the Ungok complex. The enemy posture had, in fact, been described as
one “reluctant to meet our patrols except in their positions.”[365]
[365] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, dtd 4 Apr 53, p. 2.
A regimental patrol policy early in March established as SOP a minimum
of four reconnaissance and two combat patrols in each MLR battalion
sector daily. Nevertheless, 3/5 had reported no contact with the enemy
for the three-day period prior to the attack which was launched at 1900
on 26 March. Since the middle of the month, 1/5 had conducted nearly a
dozen night combat patrols and ambushes in one- and two-squad strength
to test the enemy in the Carson-Reno-Vegas area. Terminology of the
operation orders read that the Marines were to make contact, capture
prisoners, and deny the ground to the enemy, an injunction that--in
view of events shortly to transpire--was to turn out more prophetic
than anticipated.
That last Thursday in March 1953 was clear, almost unseasonably warm.
Just after darkness had settled down over the Korean ridges, gullies,
MLR, outposts, and rice paddies, the enemy suddenly made his presence
known. Up until that time it had been an average day of activity, and
there had been no especially ominous overtones to the start of the
night.
Suddenly, at 1900, small arms and machine gun fire cracked from enemy
strongholds on Hills 44, 40, 35, and 33, and tore into the left and
center part of the 1/5 sector. Almost immediately, a heavy mortar and
artillery preparation of 15 minutes duration exploded all along the 5th
Marines MLR. A Chinese rifle platoon and half a dozen machine guns on
Hill 140, about 500 yards west of Kumgok, directed additional fire on
the sector.
At the same time 5th Marines outposts Carson and Reno, each manned by
a reinforced rifle platoon from C/1/5, came under attack from Chinese
mortars and 76mm artillery. Approximately 1,200 mortar rounds struck
COP Carson by 1920. As men of D/2/5, some of whom had been detailed
to Carson earlier that night for an ambush, reported, “one round per
second from Chinese 60mm and 82mm landed in or around [our] position
during the first 20 minutes of the engagement. Thereafter, one round
was received every 40 seconds until about 2200.”[366] Interdiction
fires also raked Marine rear areas and supply routes. Counterbattery
fire struck Marine direct support artillery positions in the 5th’s
regimental sector while heavy shelling of the MLR and its battalion
CPs shattered wire communication between those installations and their
advance outposts.
[366] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, p. 10.
Within ten minutes, Vegas, furthest east of the four OPs in 1/5
territory, became the object of serious enemy attention. Outposts
Berlin and East Berlin, meanwhile, still further east in the 3/5 sector
proper were also engaged by fire from hostile small arms and mortars
from Chinese occupying Hills 15 (Detroit), 13 (Frisco), and 98 to the
northeast. As the coordinated fire attack raged throughout the 5th
Marines regimental front, preparatory fire and diversionary probes hit
the 1st Marines sector. Outposts Hedy, Bunker, Esther, and Dagmar, in
the center regimental area, were struck by small arms, mortars, and
artillery shells a few minutes before 1900. Platoon and squad strength
limited attacks were conducted against Dagmar, Hedy, and Esther, and
enemy units were sighted moving in front of the KMC, further west along
the MLR.
At precisely 1910, a force of 3,500 Chinese from the 358th Regiment,
120th Division, 46th CCF Army began to swarm down from Ungok,
Arrowhead, Hill 25A, and Hill 190 and launched a massive assault in
regimental strength against the 5th Marines sector. (Map 27.) Elements
of six companies from three battalions converged on the area from
three directions. Two enemy platoons of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion
from Ungok struck Carson while one infantry company each, initially,
began a direct assault on Reno and Vegas. Units from the 3d Company,
1st Battalion, from Arrowhead and Hill 29, crossed the Seoul road to
hit Reno in a direct frontal assault. Elements of the 7th Company, 3d
Battalion moved down from Hill 190, a mile north, to encircle the left
flank of Reno and thus strike from the rear of the Marine position.
Other Chinese soldiers of the 8th Company, 3d Battalion, supported
by the 9th Company, moved some 500 yards south of their ridgeline
positions on Hill 25A and 155 immediately north of Vegas to attack the
outpost head-on.
Another enemy unit, the 2d Company, 1st Battalion, swept south from
Hill 57A and made diversionary probes of the two most remote outposts
of the entire 1st Marine Division line, Berlin and East Berlin in the
3d Battalion sector. These two smaller positions, each manned by a
reinforced squad-size detachment from G/3/5, were to be successful in
driving off the enemy’s less determined efforts there with a rain of
small arms, mortar, and artillery fires.
As the enemy regiment advanced toward its objectives in a coordinated
three-pronged attack, Marine artillery fired protective boxes and
VT on the outposts and routes of approach from the west, north, and
east. Defending infantry also called down organic 60mm and 81mm mortar
barrages. Actually, prior to the Chinese onslaught at 1900, 1/11,
the direct support battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Olin W. Jones, Jr.)
for the 5th Marines, began a registration and had laid its howitzer
fires on the active area. The artillery regiment had also set up
conference calls linking its four organic battalions and supporting
Army units. The fire plan for the 11th Marines provided for its three
light battalions (1/11, 2/11, and 3/11) to cover enemy approaches and
assembly areas, deliver protective boxing and VT fires requested by
the outposts, and furnish countermortar missions called in by forward
observers. Medium battalions (4/11 and the 623d Field Artillery)
were to reinforce defensive fires and destroy hostile mortars and
artillery emplacements. Heavy 8-inch howitzer support (Battery C,
17th FA Battalion and Battery A, of the 204th) would silence enemy
counterbattery weapons.
As it happened on the night of the 26th, Marine tanks, in addition
to artillery, were also registered before the time of the actual
attack. Eleven of Captain Hunter’s Company A tanks had earlier rumbled
into firing position on the MLR to provide mechanized support for an
infantry raid scheduled at dawn the next morning.
[Illustration:
MAP 27 K. WHITE
ATTACKS ON 5TH MARINES FRONT
26–30 MARCH 1953]
Despite this immediate response of Marine fire support, the Chinese
invaders outnumbered the platoons holding the outposts by a 20 to 1
ratio. The sheer weight of numbers was the decisive factor. By 1935 the
enemy had penetrated the lower trenches of both Carson and Reno. An
hour after the onset of the attack, at 2000, the Marines were throwing
back Chinese forces with bayonets, knives, rifles, and bare fists in
the close, heavy fighting at Carson. There, where 54 men had been
on duty at the time of initial attack, the outpost was successfully
holding off the Communists. Four reinforcing squads quickly dispatched
by battalion were designed to further strengthen the position. At 2000,
just when D/1/5 and C/1/5 relief squads were leaving for the outpost,
the Chinese unexpectedly began to release their grip on Carson as they
concentrated on the two more isolated COPs, Reno and Vegas, that were
further from the MLR.
No other attempt was made by the enemy to occupy Carson that night or
the next day. Barrage fires gradually ceased as the enemy began to
withdraw about 2135. Sporadic bursts of his 60mm and 82mm mortars and
76mm guns, however, continued to rock the position until midnight.
Developments at Reno and Vegas, by 2000, were vastly more ominous.
At Reno, two companies of CCF soldiers thrust into the position from
a frontal and flank attack. Within a half hour they made their way
into the trench defenses. Although VT fires placed on the outposts
and WP flare shells outlined the enemy for the gunners, Chinese in
overpowering numbers continued to batter the Marine post. Due to the
lack of fighting trenches, bunkers, and to limited fields of fire,
Reno defenders fell back on a cave defense within a half hour of the
assault.[367]
[367] At both Reno and Vegas the Marines had moved into the
caves for protection from VT fire. This was the plan in
event of an overwhelming enemy attack. In contrast, the
detachment at Carson fought from covered fighting holes
and employed the cave there only to get their wounded out
of direct fire. 5thMar SAR “Cities,” pp. 2–3.
A message received at 2030, requesting more VT rounds and
reinforcements, indicated that the enemy had sealed all entrances to
the cave and that the men were suffering from lack of air. Of the 40
Company C Marines on the outpost at the time of attack an hour and
a half earlier, only 7 were then reported still able to fight. More
illumination to enable friendly machine guns and rockets to chop up
the enemy was furnished by artillery and a flare plane that arrived
on station at 2205. Two Marine tanks, in position behind Reno, were
alerted and put their 90mm fires to good use on the enemy and his
weapons emplacements.
Meanwhile, at Vegas, the situation was also deteriorating. More than a
hundred Chinese had moved up under the perimeter of exploding shells
and Marine defensive fires into the lower trenches by 1950, less than
an hour after the enemy’s first volley. Ten minutes later, the Marines
were forced to give way to the overwhelming number of enemy soldiers
which began to swarm over the outpost.
In addition to the sudden force and onslaught of the enemy,
communication difficulties also plagued Marine detachments on the
outposts, particularly at Vegas. Enemy mortar and artillery, aimed
at the mainline CPs, had wrecked the ground lines. As early as 1940,
communications between the 1st Battalion CP and Vegas went dead and
continued to be broken despite repeated attempts to reestablish
contact. Carson and Reno also had wire troubles about this time, but
radio contact was shortly established. For the most part, operational
reports and orders during the night and early morning hours were sent
over company and battalion tactical nets. The intensity of the Chinese
fire was not restricted just to forward positions; the 1/5 CP, a mile
south of the MLR, at one point received up to 100 rounds per minute.
_Reinforcements Dispatched_[368]
[368] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
26–27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW
PIR 86-53, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 1/5,
2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11 ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR; 5thMar
SAR “Cities”; VMO-6, HMR-161 ComDs, Mar 53; MacDonald,
_POW_; USMC Biog.
While the Marines on the outposts were trying to drive off the enemy,
reinforcements back at the MLR and in the reserve ranks quickly saddled
up. A F/2/5 advance platoon dispatched to Reno at 2015 by way of the
Reno Block was ambushed near Hill 47 an hour later by two enemy squads
which had moved south to cut off Marine reinforcements. After a fire
exchange, the platoon made its way to the blocking position. Another
relief unit, from Company C, 1st Battalion, that jumped off for Reno 15
minutes later had poorer luck. The men had scarcely gone a half mile
before being shelled. After briefly taking cover the Marines moved out
again, only to draw fire from the enemy at Hill 47. Advancing for a
third time, the Company C two-squad unit was again halted by fire from
two hostile platoons. By this time 10 Marines had been wounded and
evacuated.
A D/2/5 reinforcement platoon ordered to Vegas, at 2129, encountered
strong opposition in the Block vicinity, but it threw back the enemy
in hand-to-hand fighting and prevented him from gaining fire supremacy
at the position. Leading units of F/2/5, meanwhile, had been ordered
to operational control of 1/5 to augment the earlier Company C platoon
at the Block and then move north with them to Reno. After being issued
ammunition and hand grenades at the Company C supply point, the “F” 1st
Platoon left the MLR at 2227, with the 2d Platoon filing out in column
400 yards behind them. Under a constant rain of 76mm artillery and 82mm
and 122mm mortar shells--and with casualties for one platoon reaching
as high as 70 percent within minutes--the F/2/5 men fought their way
into the trenches at the Block. Here they joined the depleted ranks of
Company C which had established a base of fire. Despite the incessant
barrage of Chinese incoming that continued to inflict heavy casualties,
the Marines maintained their precarious grip on the Block and cleared
out large numbers of Chinese attempting to infiltrate the trenches and
approaches from the north and south to the Marine position.
While the Reno and Vegas relief units were pinned down at the Block,
the situation at the outposts remained critical. Throughout the night
new waves of Communist soldiers poured out from their positions behind
Chogum-ni, Hills 31 and 31D. When a company of enemy troops were
observed at 2100 massing near Chogum-ni for a new assault, it was
quickly disposed of by Marine artillery and Company A tankers. At Reno
where the immediate situation was the most grim, a message at 2145
reported the enemy still in the trenches, trying to dig down into the
cave while the Marines were attempting to work their way out by hand.
The final report from Reno received late that night, about 2300, was
weak and could not be understood.
At Vegas, meanwhile, communications failure continued to complicate
defensive measures at the outpost. Because of this, on the order of
regimental commander, Colonel Walt, operational control had been
transferred, at 2119, from 1/5 to 3/5. Three minutes before midnight
all contact with Vegas was lost. As with Reno, reinforcements sent out
with the mission of buttressing the Vegas detachment had been delayed.
When it became evident that the Company D platoon had been pinned down
at the Block, a platoon from E/2/5 jumped off at 2323 for the Vegas
position.
Shored up to reinforced company strength, the composite unit at the
Block had prepared to move on for the ultimate relief of C/1/5 forces
at Reno. Chinese firepower and troops continued to lash the position,
however. There seemed to be no limit to the number of reserve troops
the enemy could throw into the attack. At 2157, two Chinese platoons
had hit the Block. Twenty minutes later, another two platoons struck.
By 2300, the Marines had repulsed three attacks, numbering more than
200 troops, amid a continuing withering avalanche of bullets and
shells. Shortly before midnight, a full enemy company had deployed
south from Reno to the Block, but had been largely cut down by friendly
90mm tank fire and VT rounds from 1/11. Reinforced and reorganized, the
Marines again prepared for a counterpunch on Reno.
By midnight on the 26th, after five blistering hours of battle--to
develop into five days of intense conflict and continuing
counterattacks--the early efforts of the enemy were partly successful.
Two of the Nevada Hill outposts had fallen, and Marine attempts to
strengthen them were initially being thwarted by Chinese troops that
had overflowed the Block and southward toward the MLR. COP Carson was
holding. But the enemy was in control of Reno and Vegas and was using
the Reno position to mass troops and firepower to further brace his
continuing assault on Vegas.
Initially, the 5th Marines had expected to launch an immediate
counterattack to regain Reno. In the early hours of the 27th, however,
it became apparent this plan would have to be revised. Reinforcing
elements from the 5th Marines, composed largely of F/2/5, had been
unable to mount out effectively from the Block for Reno. At 0144, the
commanding officer of Company F, Captain Ralph L. Walz, reported he
had one platoon left. Between then and 0220 his diminishing unit had
rallied for attack three times. It had successively engaged the enemy
in fire fights, one of 30 minutes’ duration, evacuated its wounded,
regrouped, and then had come under heavy incoming again. Countermortar
fire had been requested and delivered on active enemy positions at
Arrowhead, Hills 29, 45, and 21B, some 500 yards northwest of Vegas.
But as the Marines girded their defending platoon at the Block
to company-plus size, the Chinese had done likewise, throwing in
continuous rounds of new mortar attacks and additional troops. When,
at 0246, another hostile company was seen spreading south from Reno
toward the Block, the 1st Battalion directed artillery fires on the
enemy and ordered its troops to disengage and return to the MLR. By
0300, early efforts to retake Reno were suspended. Relief forces from
Companies F and C were on their way back to the battalion area. Ground
action had ceased.
During these early attempts to rescue Reno and its defenders on the
night of 26–27 March, Marine elements had struggled for more than four
hours trying to get to Reno, but the enemy had completely surrounded
it. At Reno itself, the Marine in command of the outpost when the
Chinese struck, Second Lieutenant Rufus A. Seymour, machine gun platoon
commander of C/1/5, had been taken prisoner along with several of his
men. Of the Marines originally on duty there, all but five had been
killed. Casualties of the Reno reinforcing units were later estimated
by the regimental commander as being “as high as 35 percent, with many
dead.”[369]
[369] Statement by LtGen Lewis W. Walt, as cited in Eloise
Engle, _Medic_ (New York, N.Y.: John Day, May 1967), p.
211.
A 21-year-old Navy hospital corpsman from Alexandria, Virginia,[370]
attached to a Company C relief platoon from 1/5, helped save many
Marine lives that night in the Reno Block area. He was Hospitalman
Francis C. Hammond, who lost his own life but was awarded posthumously
the nation’s highest honor for bravery under fire. For more than four
exhausting hours the young hospitalman helped others to safety, even
though he had been struck early in the fighting and was hobbling around
with a leg injury. When his unit was ordered to withdraw from its
attack against a strongly fortified CCF position, Hammond skillfully
directed the evacuation of wounded Marines and remained behind to
assist other corpsmen. Shell fragments from a mortar blast struck him,
this time, fatally.
[370] In 1956, a newly-completed school in Alexandria, Virginia
was named the Francis C. Hammond High School and
dedicated in his memory.
The Vegas reinforcing units, in those dark early hours of the 27th,
had come closer to their objective. Shortly after midnight two
platoons, composed of elements from D/2/5 and C/1/5, had reached a
point 400 yards from the outpost, in the vicinity of the entrance
to the communication trench. When the enemy threw in powerful new
assault forces at Vegas, F/2/7, a company from the regimental reserve,
came under operational control of 3/5 and moved out from the MLR to
reinforce the position. By 0300 the first relief platoon, despite
heavy and continuing Chinese barrages, got to within 200 yards of the
outpost. At this time, however, it was found that the enemy was in
control of Vegas as well as Reno. Marines from D/2/5, C/1/5, E/2/5, and
F/2/7 relief forces, on order, began to pull back to the MLR at 0417.
Initial attempts to regain control of the two outposts were temporarily
halted, and instead it was decided to launch a coordinated daylight
attack.
At about the same time, 0430, the boundary between 1/5 and 3/5 was
moved 250 yards westward to give 3/5 total responsibility for Vegas,
although operational control had been transferred seven hours earlier
the previous night.
Enemy casualties for the eight hours of action were heavy. An estimated
600 Chinese had been wounded and killed. Marine losses were also heavy.
In the action First Lieutenant Kenneth E. Taft, Jr., Officer-in-Charge
at Vegas, was killed and, as it was later learned, some of his H/3/5
defenders had been captured by the Chinese. By midnight the two
line battalions, 3/5 and 1/5, had reported a total of nearly 150
casualties,[371] and this figure did not include those wounded or
killed from the relief platoons and companies being shuttled into
action from the 2/5 reserve battalion. One platoon from E/2/5 had
arrived at the Company C supply point about 0210 and, together with a
provisional unit from Headquarters and Service Company, 1/5, began to
evacuate casualties in front of the MLR. By 0325, a total of 56 wounded
had passed through the C/1/5 aid station and a cryptic entry in the
G-3 journal noted that “more who are able are going back to assist in
evacuation of casualties.”
[371] 1/5 and 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53. At this time 1/5 had suffered
5 killed, 30 wounded, 21 wounded not evacuated, 39
missing (personnel at Reno), or 95. Reports from 3/5
showed 1 killed, 8 wounded/evacuated, and 40 missing (at
Vegas), or 49.
Similar recovery efforts were being made at the same time in the
3d Battalion. Two alternate routes for evacuation were in effect.
From a checkpoint located just south of the MLR in the H/3/5 sector,
casualties were taken to the Company H supply point and thence to
the battalion aid station, or else to the KSC camp from which they
were evacuated to the 1st Battalion aid station. VMO-6 and HMR-161
helicopters flew out the critically-injured to USS _Haven_ and
_Consolation_ hospital ships at Inchon Harbor and transported blood
from supply points to Medical Companies A, E, and C forward stations.
Excepting the original personnel killed or missing at Reno and Vegas,
1st Battalion forces from Companies C and F dispatched to Reno had
returned to the MLR by 0445. Vegas units, ordered to disengage later
than the Reno reinforcements, were back by 0530.
Diversionary probes by the Chinese during the night of the 26th at the
3/5 right flank outposts Berlin and East Berlin, as well as in the 1st
Marines sector, had been beaten back by the Marines. Following the
preassault fire at 1900, a CCF company had sent two platoons against
Berlin and one against satellite East Berlin, both manned by Company
G. These reinforced squad outposts, both only about 325 yards forward
of the MLR, had stymied the enemy’s attempts. Boxing fires and VT on
approach routes had forced the Chinese to retreat at 2115. Ten minutes
later Company G reported that communication, which had temporarily gone
out, had been restored. One squad dispatched by the 3d Battalion to
Berlin and a second, to East Berlin an hour later, further buttressed
the companion positions.
Action in the 1st Marines center regimental sector had also been
relatively brief. Immediately after the 1900 mortar and artillery
preparation, the Chinese in company strength attempted to penetrate
outposts Hedy, Bunker, Esther, and Dagmar. Shelling had been heaviest
at Dagmar and, shortly after 1900, two squads of Chinese began to
assault the outpost with automatic weapons and satchel charges. Machine
guns positioned on enemy Hills 44, 114, and 116 and small arms fire
from Hill 108 supported the attack. The enemy was hurled back at all
places except Dagmar where approximately 25 Chinese breached the wire
entanglement.
Two hours of intense, close fighting in the trenches followed as the
27 defending Marines, directed by outpost commander Second Lieutenant
Benjamin H. Murray of I/3/1, strongly resisted the invaders. More
than 300 rounds of mortar and artillery fire supported the action. A
counterattack from the MLR led by the I/3/1 executive officer, Second
Lieutenant John J. Peeler, restored the position, and at 2120 the CCF
finally withdrew. Less determined efforts had been made by the enemy
at Esther and Bunker. By 2200 the Chinese had departed from the scene
there, too. Altogether, the 1st Marines sector skirmishes had cost the
CCF 10 killed, 20 estimated killed, and 17 estimated wounded to Marine
casualties of 4 killed and 16 wounded.
_Massed Counterattack the Next Day_[372]
[372] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3
Jnls, 27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR Nos. 882–4, dtd 26–28
Mar 53; 1st MAW PIR 86-53, dtd 27 Mar 53, 87-53, dtd 28
Mar 53, 88-53, dtd 29 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar,
1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn
ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar “Artillery
in the Defense of Outpost Vegas, 26–30 Mar 53,” hereafter
11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-212,
-323; VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate,
“Vegas”; USMC Biog.
While the 5th Marines reorganized during the morning hours of the
27th for a new attack to recapture the lost outposts, General Pollock
ordered mortars, tanks, and artillery, including rockets, to neutralize
the Reno and Vegas areas and enemy approaches.
From the time of the 1900 attack the preceding evening until the
temporary break in fighting eight hours later, at 0300, early estimates
indicated 5,000 rounds of enemy mixed fire had been received in the
“Wild” sector (code name for the 5th Marines, and appropriate it was
for this late-March period). And this did not include the vast number
of shells that had fallen on the three Nevada COPs. During the same
period 1/11, in direct support of the 5th, reported it had delivered
some 4,209 rounds on the enemy. Throughout the early hours, two
battalions from the 11th Marines continued to pound away at Reno and
Vegas with neutralizing fires to soften enemy positions, deter his
resupply efforts, and silence those mortars and batteries that were
troubling the Marines.
By 0330 observation planes from VMO-6 had made 28 flights behind
enemy lines which enabled artillery spotters to direct nearly 60 fire
missions on CCF active artillery, mortars, and self-propelled guns.
From nightfall on the 26th through 0600 the following morning a total
of 10,222 rounds of all calibers had been fired by Marine cannoneers
supporting the 1st Division in its ground battles from Berlin to Hedy.
Revised intelligence reports from the 5th Marines S-2, Major Murray
O. Roe, meanwhile, indicated that between 1900 on the 26th and 0400
the next day the Chinese had sent 14,000 rounds of mixed mortar and
artillery crashing into Marine positions. It was also determined that a
reinforced regiment had initially hit the Carson, Reno, and Vegas posts.
Early on the 27th, at 0345 as the 5th Marines prepared for the
counterattack, the division reserve, 2/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander
D. Cereghino), was placed under operational control of the 5th Marines.
(Previously put on alert the battalion had moved into an assembly area
behind 1/5 shortly after midnight, and its F/2/7 had taken part in the
predawn relief attempt.) During the early morning hours a section of
Skyknights, from Lieutenant Colonel Conley’s night fighter squadron,
VMF(N)-513, had made radar controlled bombing runs to strike CCF
artillery positions in the Hill 190 area and enemy troops at Hill 98.
Precisely at 0650, friendly Panthers from VMF-115 began arriving on
station to help the neutralizing artillery fire on Reno and Vegas.
Originally, a dawn ground attack had been envisioned for Reno, but that
was delayed to wait for air support.
A tentative H-Hour was set for 0900 with a dual jump-off for both
Reno and Vegas. At 0930 the attacks still had not begun due to
communication difficulties. While division Marines were waiting to get
off the ground, 1st MAW pilots were enjoying a busy morning. By 0930,
six four-plane air strikes had been completed by VMF-115 (Lieutenant
Colonel Stoddard G. Cortelyou) and -311 (Lieutenant Colonel Francis
K. Coss) plus sorties by Air Force Thunderjets. Tankers from Company
A had also gotten in a few licks when two groups of Chinese were seen
carrying logs for bunker support into Reno; one group was wiped out,
the other got by.
Shortly after 1100, friendly artillery batteries began delivering
smoke on Hills 57A and 190, two enemy high points of observation. The
fire plan was modified to eliminate an early 10-minute preparation on
objective areas. (Basically, the artillery plan for counterattack was
that employed in the 19 March Operation ITEM raid on Ungok, because
of the proximity of Ungok to the Vegas hills. This plan consisted of
massed fires on the objective, with countermortar and counterbattery
fires on known artillery positions. To this prearranged plan were added
those new mortar and counterbattery targets located by air observers
during the night of 26–27 March.) This time, the preparatory fires were
to be on call, as was the 90mm fire support from the tankers. A further
change was made when it was decided to limit the assault to Vegas and
not retake Reno but rather neutralize it by fire.
While artillery, air, mortars, and tanks pounded the objective, assault
elements of D/2/5 from the regimental reserve, under Captain John B.
Melvin, prepared for jump-off. At 1120 the company crossed the line
of departure in the 3/5 sector of the MLR and immediately came under
heavy fires from enemy infantry and artillery units. Within a half
hour after leaving the battalion front for Vegas, Dog Company had
been pinned down by Chinese 76mm artillery, had picked itself up, and
been stopped again by a plastering of 60mm and 82mm shells falling
everywhere in its advance. By 1210 only nine men were left in Captain
Melvin’s 1st Platoon to carry on the fight. The Marine unit continued
to claw its way through the rain-swollen rice paddies and up the muddy
slopes leading from the MLR to within 200 yards of the outpost. In 10
minutes, heavy incoming began to take its inevitable toll and enemy
reinforcements were flowing towards Vegas from the CCF assembly point
on Hill 153.
Between noon and 1300, four enemy groups of varying size had pushed
south from Hill 153 to Vegas. At this time still another group,
of company size, moved in with its automatic weapons and mortars.
Within the next 15 minutes, a reinforced CCF platoon made its
way from the Reno trench to Vegas while still another large unit
attempted to reinforce from Hill 21B. As enemy incoming swept the
slopes and approaches to Vegas, Marine artillery and tank guns fired
counterbattery missions to silence the Chinese weapons. In the skies,
VMA-121 ADs and the sleek jet fighters from MAG-33 squadrons VMF-115
and -311 continued to pinpoint their target coordinates for destruction
of enemy mortars, trenches, personnel bunkers, and troops.
Back at the battalion CP two more companies were being readied to
continue the Vegas assault. The Provisional Company of 2/5, commanded
by Captain Floyd G. Hudson, moved out at 1215. Close on its heels,
E/2/5 left the Company H checkpoint in the 3/5 sector for the zone of
action. At 1305 the counterattack for Vegas was raging in earnest, with
Company D riflemen on the lower slopes, chewing into the enemy with
their grenades, BARs, M-1s, and carbines. Two hours after the original
jump off time, four Marines crawled out of the trenches at Vegas and by
1322 were going over the top, despite incoming that “literally rained
on the troops.” Assault commander Melvin recalled:
It was so intense at times that you couldn’t move forward or
backward. The Chinese 60mm mortars began to bother us about
as much as firecrackers. It was the 120mm mortars and 122mm
artillery that hurt the most. The noise was deafening. They
would start walking the mortars toward us from every direction
possible. You could only hope that the next round wouldn’t be on
target.[373]
[373] Fugate, “Vegas,” p. 20.
Meanwhile, Company E, 5th Marines, under Captain Herbert M. Lorence,
had moved up from the rear and, at 1440, was ordered to pass through
Company D ranks, evacuate casualties, continue the attack, and secure
the crest of Vegas. Although Captain Lorence’s men succeeded in moving
into Company D positions, the deluge of Chinese mortar and artillery
was so heavy that Company E was unable to advance beyond this point.
At 1530, a new Marine company, F/2/7 (Captain Ralph F. Estey), was
dispatched from the MLR to buttress the assault. By this time elements
of D/2/5 had reached the right finger of Vegas but were again pinned
down by intensive enemy artillery and mortars.
Within the first hour after leaving the battalion line, the Company F
Marines nearly reached the advanced positions of 2/5, and Company D,
which had been in the vanguard since 1100, returned to the regimental
CP. During the next hour, however, heavy shelling slowed the Marine
advance. At 1730, as Company F prepared to make its first major
assault, a deluge of 60mm and 82mm mortar shells, 76mm and 122mm
bursts, and machine gun bullets rained on the troops. As the men
crawled forward slowly, planes from VMA-323 which had arrived on scene
two hours earlier, continued to smoke the enemy’s posts on Hills 190
and 139. Captain Hunter’s tanks also moved into their MLR positions to
zero in their 90mm rifles on the CCF stronghold at the Vegas northern
crest.
By 1800, Company F was continuing the Marine counterattack to regain
Vegas and was approximately 400 yards from the outpost summit.
Combining with Company E Marines, for a total strength of three
platoons in position, Captain Estey was able to retake part of the
objective. After an intense 90-minute fire fight and hand-to-hand
fighting in the lower trenches, E/2/7 advanced to the right of the
outpost where at 1930 it began to consolidate. In the next half hour,
two platoons of Company F moved out from the right finger of Vegas
to within 50 yards of the peak, before being forced back by Chinese
machine gun fire and mortars lobbed from the Able (left) gate on
Vegas. The enemy company occupying the outpost resisted the attacking
Marines with mortars, grenades, and small arms fire. In addition, the
CCF employed firing positions at Reno for their machine guns, heavy
mortars, and artillery supporting the Vegas defense and periodically
reinforced their troops from the newly captured Reno outpost.
It was a busy night for Marines and corpsmen alike. One, whose
split-second improvisations in the blazing zone of action were in the
best Hippocratic tradition, was Hospital Corpsman Third Class William
R. Charette. Attached to F/2/7, he was assisting a Marine when an
enemy grenade landed but a few feet away. Charette immediately threw
himself on the injured man, taking the full shock of the missile with
his own body. Since the force of the blast had ripped away his helmet
and medical aid kit, he tore off his clothing to make bandages. Another
time, while attending a seriously wounded Marine whose armored vest
had been blown off, the hospitalman removed his own to place around
the injured man. Without armored vest or helmet, Charette continued
to accompany his platoon in the assault. As a Marine observer, Staff
Sergeant Robert S. Steigerwald, commented, “HM3 Charette was everyplace
seemingly at the same time, performing inexhaustibly.”[374]
[374] Statement cited in personnel record of HMC(SS) William
R. Charette, USN. He was the only corpsman during the
Korean War who was awarded the Medal of Honor and lived
to receive it.
Throughout the night the enemy counterattacked but was unsuccessful
in driving the Marines off the outpost. Between 1830 and midnight,
F/2/7 repulsed three enemy onslaughts and engaged in sporadic fire
fights. Although pushed back from the summit, Company F Marines set up
a perimeter defense at the base of Vegas where the troops dug in for
the rest of the night. Their opposite numbers, from 1st MAW, were also
on the scene. As follow-up to the day’s unremitting air bombardment of
enemy installations, night fighters of VMF(N)-513 and MAG-12 Corsairs
from VMAs-212 and -323 made nine MPQ strikes between 1830 and 0115
unleashing 24½ tons of explosives on CCF hill defenses and supply
strongpoints.
Gradually, heavy incoming on Vegas began to lift, and from midnight
through the early hours of the following morning most of the enemy’s
artillery and mortar fires switched from Vegas to the Marine companies
on the MLR. Intermittent small arms fire still cracked and punctuated
the night from enemy positions on Hills 57A, Detroit, and Frisco, to
the northeast of Vegas.
_Push to the Summit_[375]
[375] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
28 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 884, annex 340-MISP-53-12, POW
Rpt and 1stMarDiv PIR 885, annex 340-MISP-53-13, POW Rpt;
1st MAW PIRs 88-53, dtd 29 Mar 53 and 89-53, dtd 30 Mar
53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11,
1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar SAR
“Arty Defense”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-212, -323, VMFs-115,
-311 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, “Vegas”; USMC Biog.
Although the composite two-platoon unit of Marines from F/2/7 and
E/2/5 had partially won Vegas back in 10 hours of savage fighting on
27 March, after earlier groundwork by D/2/5, it was a precarious hold.
Marines had attained the lower slopes but the Chinese still clung to
the northern crest. As it turned out, three separate company-sized
assaults were going to be needed to dislodge the enemy.
The initial Marine action on the 28th began at 0335 when 105mm and
155mm howitzers of the 1st, 2d, and 4th Battalions, 11th Marines,
belched forth their streams of fire at the pocket of enemy troops on
the northern slopes preparatory to the forthcoming Marine infantry
assault. This 2,326-round pounding was aimed at Chinese assembly areas
and weapon emplacements, with much of the preparation zeroed in on
active mortars.
Within a half hour the weary men of F/2/7, who had spent a wakeful
night in the lower Vegas trenches, moved to within hand grenade range
of the objective in their first attempt to gain the summit. An intense
shower of small arms and mortar fire, however, forced them to pull
back to the south slopes. While Captain Estey’s troops reorganized
for the next assault, air strikes joined the big guns, mortars, and
tanks in battering the enemy’s position on the outpost and supply
routes thereto. Shortly after sunup, a lone AU from VMA-213, followed
a half hour later by a VMA-323 Corsair, arrived on station. They laid
a smoke screen three miles across the front between Arrowhead and the
far eastern Marine-U.S. Army boundary to assist four early-morning air
strikes. Soon afterwards, eight ADs from Lieutenant Colonel John E.
Hughes’ VMA-121 were in the skies to support the Vegas attack in the
opening round of aerial activity that would see day-long bombing and
strafing runs by five 1st MAW squadrons.
A new Marine assault at 0600 was repulsed and Company F pulled back
to a defilade position 375 yards south of Vegas and regrouped. Again
friendly planes from VMA-121 and -323, tanks, artillery, and mortars
plastered the enemy in a new series of preparatory fires, beginning at
0920; and again Captain Estey’s F/2/7 men jumped off in attack. By 1015
the Marines had made their way across the height to within 15 yards
of the trench line on the left finger of Vegas. There they came under
continuous small arms and grenade bursts from the crest and battled the
Chinese in an intense 22-minute fire fight.
It was during this onslaught by Company F for the crest of Vegas that
Sergeant Daniel P. Matthews so defiantly routed the enemy to save the
life of a wounded comrade that his action gave renewed spirit to those
witnessing it. A squad leader of F/2/7, Matthews was in the thick of
a counterpunch against solidly dug-in hill defenses that had repelled
six previous assaults by Marine forces. The 21-year-old California
Marine was coolly leading his men in the attack when the squad suddenly
was pinned down by a hostile machine gun located on the Vegas crest.
When he saw that its grazing fire prevented a corpsman from removing
to safety a wounded Marine who had fallen in full range of the weapon,
Matthews acted instinctively.
Quickly working his way around to the base of the enemy machine gun
position, he leaped onto the rock fortification that surrounded it.
Taking the enemy by surprise, he charged the emplacement with his
own rifle. Severely wounded within moments, the Marine continued his
assault, killed two of the enemy, dispatched a third, and silenced the
weapon. By this action, Sergeant Matthews enabled his comrades on the
ground to evacuate the injured Marine, although Matthews died before
aid could reach him.[376]
[376] The Marine NCO was to be posthumously awarded the Medal
of Honor, presented a year after the action, on 29 March
1954.
Back at battalion, E/2/5, with D/2/7 in column behind it, had moved out
to relieve Captain Estey’s redoubtable F/2/7 forces. By noon, Captain
Lorence’s Company E had completed passage of lines through Company F.
The latter unit, now numbering 43 effectives after its six assaults on
27–28 March to regain the Vegas high ground, returned to base camp.
Heavy air attacks, meanwhile, were assisting the artillery in blasting
out Communist defenses of the Vegas area. Between 0950 and 1300,
seven four-plane strikes by pilots of Colonel Bowman’s MAG-12 had
swept the outpost area and hill lairs of the enemy at 57A, the east
slope of Reno, Tumae-ri (40D), 190, and resupply points. Within one
23-minute period alone, 28 tons of bombs were laid squarely on the
Vegas position. Supported by air, mortars, and artillery, Company E was
400 yards from the objective, and, by 1245, forward elements had moved
up to within 150 yards of the crest. As Marine supporting fires lifted
from Vegas to enemy assembly areas on Hills 150, 153, and 190, E/2/5
launched its final assault at 1301. Although small arms, bursts of
mortar and enemy artillery fire traced their every move, the Marines’
hard-hitting attack brought them to the top of Vegas where they
literally dug the Chinese out of their defenses.
At 1307, the Marines had secured their position and recaptured the
Vegas outpost. At approximately the same time the Marine reinforcing
unit, D/2/7, was ordered to return to MLR, since the objective had been
gained. The Marine in charge of the E/2/5 platoon that retook Vegas was
Staff Sergeant John J. Williams, who had taken over the 1st Platoon
after its leader, Second Lieutenant Edgar R. Franz, had been wounded
and evacuated. Almost immediately after securing Vegas at 1320, the
Chinese launched a counterattack and Company E came under a renewed
barrage of incessant artillery and mortar shells, exploding at the rate
of one round per second in the Marines’ newly gained trenches.
Marine firepower from the tankers’ 90mm rifles and the protective fire
curtain placed around the outpost by the artillery batteries, however,
deterred this heavy enemy effort. For the next hour Captain Lorence’s
men continued with mopping up chores. Gradually and fitfully the
Chinese resistance began to slacken. By 1401 definite control of Vegas
was established, except for the topographical crest at the northernmost
point. Resupply and consolidation of the outpost began at once, with
Vegas under 3/5 administration and Major Benjamin G. Lee, operations
officer of 2/5, in command.
Two prisoners had been taken during the day’s action, one by E/2/5
during its afternoon assault and the other by F/2/7 early in the day.
The soldier seized by a fire team from Company E was a 21-year-old
wounded litter bearer attached to the attacking force, 3rd Battalion,
358th Regiment. He told 5th Marines interrogators that for the
preceding three months the mission of the 358th Regiment (a component
of the 40th CCF Army, under operational control of the 46th CCF Army)
had been to prepare to occupy the Vegas and Reno outposts before
the expected UN spring offensive could be launched. The two key
installations overlooked CCF supply routes. Furthermore, occupation
of these two hills, the Chinese believed, would serve as a valuable
tactical example to the 46th Army, whose ranks at this time were
composed of nearly 65 percent recruits. The POW also reported that
prior to the CCF attack on Reno and Vegas, men of his regiment had
practiced throwing hand grenades every day for the past two weeks.
No political classes had been held during this period as practical
proficiency, apparently, took priority over theoretical indoctrination.
The other Chinese prisoner, captured by Company F at 0610, was a
grenadier with the 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 358th Regiment. Prior
to the attack, his unit had occupied reverse slope positions on
Hills 25A and 155 as reinforcements for the 8th Company. Each CCF
battalion, he revealed, “held a front of approximately 1,000 meters,
utilizing one company on line with two in support.”[377] This remark
interested interrogators since it contradicted the normal pattern of
enemy employment. According to the grenadier, the mission of the 3d
Battalion had been to attack Vegas, while the 1st Battalion (to the
west of the 3d on the Chinese MLR) was to secure Reno. Hill 190.5, an
enemy strongpoint, had several antiaircraft machine guns on its reverse
slope, he declared, and was the location as well of the forward CP of
the 3d Battalion, 358th Regiment.
[377] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 28 Mar 53.
For the next five hours, from 1440 to 1930, the Marines dug in on the
crest and slopes of Vegas, buttressing their positions for the new
Chinese attack sure to come. A muster of the rag-tag group left from
the day’s 10 hours of fighting revealed a total strength of only five
squads--58 effectives from E/2/5 and 8 from F/2/7. Uppermost in the
minds of all the men, regardless of their diminished numbers, was the
ironclad conviction that “we intend to stay.”[378]
[378] _Ibid._
Their leader, Major Lee, was no less determined. At 42, he was a
Marine veteran of 19 years, a former sergeant major from World War
II and holder of the Silver Star and Purple Heart for service at
Guadalcanal. Now he had volunteered for this hazardous duty of holding
together segments of the Vegas enclave until the Marines could once
again possess the entire hilltop outpost. Under his direction the
troops promptly began to prepare individual fighting holes in the best
possible tactical positions and to emplace their weapons. Personnel
from Captain Lorence’s E/2/5 held the hard-won Vegas crest, while 150
men from F/2/5 committed later in the afternoon strengthened the rear
trenches.
Air bombardment, prior to the 28th, had not been employed extensively
against Vegas itself. The goal had been to recapture the outpost and
drive the Communists out without unnecessarily destroying its defenses.
Chinese tenacity in exploiting the Marine weapons positions at COP 21,
while augmenting them, had made it apparent that the Vegas defense
network would have to be reduced to retake the position. Altogether,
during the day 33 missions (more than 100 CAS sorties) were flown by
AUs, ADs, F4Us, and F9Fs of the 1st Marine Air Wing to support division
ground action in regaining the advance outpost. All morning long,
powerful attack planes from three MAG-12 squadrons had winged in from
nearby K-6. Pilots from VMA-121, VMA-212 (Lieutenant Colonel Louis R.
Smunk), and VMA-323 (Lieutenant Colonel William M. Frash) had flown the
bombing runs.
In the early afternoon they were joined by the speedy, stable Panther
jets from VMF-115 and VMF-311, of MAG-33 (Colonel Robertshaw),
based further away at K-3. Between 1300 and 1800, a series of three
four-plane F9F assaults were launched north of the Marine MLR by
VMF-311, while another strike was made further east in support of
the Army 2d Infantry Division’s Old Baldy operations. These planes,
together with two divisions from VMF-115, dumped a total of 23 tons
of bombs and 3,100 rounds of 20mm shells on CCF trenches, bunkers,
mortars, and caves at Vegas, Reno, and Hill 25A. Additionally, VMF-115
Panthers flew four single-sortie daytime MPQ missions north of the
bombline to damage and destroy enemy resupply points.
_Other Communist Probes_[379]
[379] The material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 884-5, dtd 28–29 Mar 53;
1stMar ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR.
Although the Chinese made it plain that their main interest was in the
Vegas outpost area, spotty probes also took place in Colonel Adams’
1st Marines sector. On the 27th, at about 2310, two enemy squads milled
around the wire defense at outpost Kate, but Marine small arms, BARs,
and mortars routed them after a 15-minute fire fight. At midnight, a
CCF reinforced platoon reconnoitered Dagmar and Esther, for the second
successive night, supported by small arms and automatic weapons fire
from Chinese Hills 114 and 44. The enemy platoon started to rush the
forward slope at Dagmar, but Company I defenders pulled back to the
reverse side and directed VT-fuzed shells on the enemy.
Following this barrage the Marines reoccupied their position, with
the help of MLR machine guns, mortars, and artillery from the 3/11
direct support battalion. (Now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alfred
L. Owens, who had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Pregnall on 25 March.)
The enemy reinforced with a second platoon, as did the Marines. After
intense close-in fighting in the Dagmar trenches for two hours, the
Chinese withdrew. An enemy squad also engaged Bunker and Hedy; but
again, 3/11 VT-fuzed concentrations and the organic outpost defenses
sent him off handily. Enemy casualties for the evening’s activity were
15 dead, 25 more estimated killed, and 23 estimated wounded.
The following night the Chinese briefly harassed outpost Hedy, using
as cover an abandoned Marine tank just east of the outpost, as well as
the MLR to the rear of COP Bunker. Marine bullets and mortar shells
dictated a quick retreat, however. Several minor contacts with the
enemy had also been made during the two-day period in the 1st KMC
sector. The most menacing were heavy enemy sightings on the 27th of
some 200 Chinese in the area west of the old outposts 36 and 37, but no
major action developed.
_Three CCF Attempts for the Outpost_[380]
[380] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl,
28–29 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 884-6, dtd 29–31 Mar 53;
1st MAW PIR 89-53, dtd 29 Mar 53; 5th Mar, 7thMar, 11th
Mar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 3/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Mar 53;
5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; Fugate,
“Vegas.”
As darkness blanketed No-Man’s-Land on the night of the 28th, ground
fighting flared up anew at 1955. The Chinese had begun another one of
their nightly rituals, the first of three counterattacks to win back
the disputed territory from the Marines. Vegas reported heavy incoming,
including not only the usual assortment of mortar and artillery fires
but direct 3.5-inch rocket hits. Enemy troops, estimated at nearly a
battalion, began approaching from Reno. By way of answer two Marine
light artillery battalions, 1/11 and 2/11, together with the medium
155mm howitzers of 4/11 and the Army 623d Field Artillery, lashed a
4,670-round barrage to interdict the approaching enemy. Ripples from
the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery reinforced the howitzers in thwarting
this initial enemy assault. On the right flank of the outpost an
intense 20-minute fire fight broke out at 2023, but the Vegas defenders
beat back the intruders. For an hour the enemy, supported by heavy
mortar and artillery fires from Reno and his own positions at Vegas,
tried unsuccessfully to force the Marines to withdraw.
Carson, which had been relatively undisturbed for the past two days,
also came under attack at this time from automatic weapons and mortars
directed on its north slope by the enemy holed up behind Hills 67 and
31. For the rest of the night an enemy company prowled around the area,
but the defense at Carson, plus artillery and mortar fire support from
JAMESTOWN, sent the Chinese off in the early morning hours with their
ambitions thwarted.
At Vegas, meanwhile, outpost commander Major Lee at 2130 radioed
battalion headquarters that he was preparing for a new enemy
counterattack. It was not long in coming. Less than an hour later, the
Chinese were again storming from Hill 153, and Marine boxing fires
picked off the advancing enemy. At 2230 Major Lee’s riflemen, deployed
about 25 yards from the peak, were holding Vegas, surrounded by Chinese
on the southern face of the position. For a brief period the enemy took
the high ground but then gave it up under pressure from the defending
Marines. Close by, another sharp fire fight erupted; then subsided
for about an hour. At 2300 a new onslaught of Chinese reinforcements
made the third major attempt of the evening to recapture the Vegas
position. Two enemy companies descended. Within a half hour another
massive fire fight had broken out, and the battle was raging across the
shell-scarred hilltop. Major Lee reported to G-3 heavy enemy sightings
of at least 200 Chinese on the top slopes challenging Marine possession
of the Vegas crest and attempting to smoke their positions. At 0045,
hostile forces had surrounded the outpost and seized part of the Vegas
height, but 11th Marines fires walled off the enemy and prevented
penetration. Flare planes circling overhead lighted the target and
cannoneers of both sides concentrated on the crest. The heaviest Marine
shoot of the night-long artillery duel, a 6,108-round barrage, rained
down on enemy troops and trenches shortly before midnight.
Altogether, during the night of 28–29 March, two battalions of Chinese
troops had made three separate, unsuccessful ventures to retake the
Vegas crest, but were thrown back by Marine mortar, artillery, and
tank fires. At 0130, following a heavy 37-minute artillery and mortar
concentration, the enemy began to withdraw, but not before venting his
displeasure with a resounding blast of small arms and bazooka fire from
the Reno hill. In their departure, the Chinese were given an assist by
Company E, 7th Marines, which had broken through the enemy encirclement
of Vegas in the early morning hours to join E/2/5 and F/2/5 defending
forces and help drive the invaders off all but the northern tip of the
hill. Now under Captain Thomas P. Connolly, E/2/7 ascended the high
ground, passing through F/2/5 ranks in preparation for the ultimate
relief of E/2/5.
For the next two hours the 11th Marines battalions, together with the
1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, sealed off the outpost and blistered enemy
fortifications at Reno with a total of 4,225 rounds. Air observers on
station fired 10 missions between midnight and 0430. Twenty minutes
later, the artillerymen unleashed still another preparation to dislodge
the unyielding CCF dug in at the Vegas topographical crest. Heavier
fires from the 155mm howitzers of 4/11 and the 623d Field Artillery
Battalions followed on more than two dozen active mortar and artillery
targets.
A new assault by Marine infantrymen (E/2/7, E/2/5, and F/2/5) at 0450
recaptured the critical northern segment of the outpost. Elation over
this encouraging turn of events was dampened, however, by loss of
several Marine leaders in the early morning foray. Shortly before 0500,
Major Lee and Captain Walz were killed instantly by a 120mm mortar
round during an intensive enemy shelling. Another Marine casualty early
on the 29th was First Lieutenant John S. Gray. A forward observer from
C/1/11, he was mortally wounded by an enemy mortar blast when he left
his foxhole to crawl closer to the Vegas peak and thus better direct
artillery fires on the enemy. At the time of his death, Lieutenant Gray
was reported to have been at Vegas longer than any other officer.
_Vegas Consolidation Begins_[381]
[381] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 29–31 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv
PIRs 885–887, dtd 29–31 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIRs 8-53, dtd 29
Mar 53 and 90-53, dtd 30 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar,
1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn
ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar SAR “Arty
Defense”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-212, -323, VMFs-115, -311
ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, “Vegas.”
Only a few surviving enemy were seen when Marines of F/2/5 and E/2/7
moved out to consolidate the position after daybreak. This task was
completed without contact by 0830. In the meantime, the Vegas defense
was reorganized with two reinforced platoons on the main portion and a
third occupying the high ground. A smoke haze placed around the outpost
screened the work of the Marines. Individual foxholes were dug and
automatic weapons emplaced. Major Joseph S. Buntin, executive officer
of 3/5, had taken over as the new outpost commander. Corpsmen and
replacement weapons--machine guns, mortars, BARs, rockets--had arrived.
The morning supply train brought KSC personnel and Marines with
engineering tools to begin work on trenches, fighting holes, weapons
dugouts, and bunker fortifications.
By noon, excavation work on the shell-pocked trench system was well
under way, with all of it dug waist deep and the majority as deep as
a man’s shoulder. Daylight hours between 1000 and 1600 on the 29th
were relatively quiet with only light ground activity. Rainy weather
that turned road nets and fighting trenches into boot-high muck and
giant mud holes further slowed the action. Artillerymen completed
countermortar and smoke missions, and in the skies air observers
directed fire throughout the day on 19 enemy resupply and target points
until dusk when rain and light snow forced them to return to base.
At 1850, the Chinese launched what in some respects was a carbon
copy action of the night of the 26th. Once again there was sudden
heavy incoming and then shortly after dusk the CCF struck in a new
three-pronged attack to overrun Vegas. This time three companies of
Chinese approached both flanks of the outpost from their positions on
Reno and Hill 153. In addition to his infantry weapons, the enemy was
supported by heavy mortars and artillery. But the Marines’ mortars,
illuminating shells, and big guns replied immediately. Ten minutes
after the enemy’s latest incursion, a massed counterfire from five
artillery battalions joined in the heaviest single barrage of the
entire Vegas defense action. This massed fire of 6,404 rounds blasted
the Chinese assault battalion and sent it reeling back with heavy
losses. Two rocket ripples also tore into the Chinese troops.
In addition to the medium and heavy firing batteries, two heavy mortar
units, Companies A and C of the 461st Infantry Battalion, had that
day gone into position in the 5th Marines sector in general support
of 1/11. Other fires came from the 8-inch howitzer unit, Battery C,
424th Field Artillery Battalion, also newly assigned to the 17th Field
Artillery Battalion that day in general support of the 1st Marine
Division.
Although another enemy attack was quickly repulsed at 2045 in a brisk,
savage fight, shortly before midnight the Chinese reappeared, moving
up from behind the right finger of Hill 153. This was believed to be
an attempt to recover their casualties, but Marine artillery, mortars,
and rocket bursts sent them fleeing within ten minutes. Still the enemy
obstinately refused to give up his goal of retaking the high ground
at COP 21. In the early morning hours of the 30th, he again returned
to hit the outpost in his second battalion-strength attack within six
hours. Again he struck from Reno and Hill 153, and again he attempted
to cut off the outpost Marines by encircling the position. Heavy
pounding by artillery, mortar, and boxing fires snuffed out the enemy’s
attack and by 0215 the Chinese had left the Vegas domain--this time, it
was to prove, for good. Their casualties for this latest attempt had
been 78 counted killed, 123 more estimated killed, and 174 estimated
wounded.
With sunup, the Marines at the battered outpost again repaired the
damage of the night’s visits from the Chinese and continued work to
improve their trenches and gun emplacements. Clearing weather enabled
air observers and pilots to follow a full flight schedule. VMA-212 and
VMA-323 were again over the Vegas skies during the morning hours and
shortly before noon a joint mission by eight AU’s, a division from each
squadron, dumped nearly 10 tons of bombs on enemy trenches, mortars,
bunkers, and troops at Hill 25A across from Reno to discourage Chinese
rebuilding efforts. Both flew afternoon sorties to destroy strongholds
at Hill 21B, at Reno, now in possession of the enemy, and to make smoke
screen runs. Early in the day, Company F of 2/5 came up from the 2/5
CP to fill in on the MLR and Berlin outposts for Company G from 3/5.
Later in the afternoon, G/3/5 relieved E/2/7 on Vegas and Major George
E. Kelly, S-3 of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, succeeded Major Buntin as
the new outpost commander.
Two comments, casually made at the time, perhaps typify the grim
staying power of the Marines who defended Vegas. As Corporal George
C. Demars, Company F platoon guide, 5th Marines, observed, “The guys
were like rabbits digging in. The fill-ins [reinforcements] gotten by
the Company during the reorganization, jumped right in. We didn’t know
half the people on the fire teams, but everybody worked together.”[382]
Second Lieutenant Irvin B. Maizlish, assigned as a rifle platoon
commander of F/2/5 on the 25th, the day before the fighting broke out,
and who had the dubious distinction of being one of the few officers
of those originally attached to the company not wounded or killed,
recalled: “I checked the men digging in at Vegas ... I’ve never seen men
work so hard ... I even heard some of them singing the Marine Corps Hymn
as they were digging....”[383]
[382] Fugate, “Vegas,” p. 74.
[383] _Ibid._
The last direct confrontation with the enemy at Vegas had occurred that
morning, about 1100, when five Chinese unconcernedly walked up to the
outpost, apparently to surrender. Then, suddenly, they began throwing
grenades and firing their automatic weapons. The little delegation was
promptly dispatched by two Marine fire teams. Three CCF soldiers were
killed and two taken prisoners, one of whom later died.
As darkness fell on the 30th, Marine artillery fired heavy harassing
and interdiction missions and regimental TOTs on enemy supply routes
and assembly areas. Although the shoot was dual-purposed, both
to prevent another Chinese attempt at retaking Vegas and to foil
a possible diversionary probe elsewhere in the division sector,
neither situation developed. For the fourth consecutive night, giant
searchlights from the Army’s 2d Platoon, 61st Field Artillery Battery
illuminated the battlefield to spotlight the enemy withdrawal routes.
Two of the quadruple .50 caliber machine gun mounts from the 1st
Provisional AAA-AW Battery were also displaced to MLR positions in
anticipation of trouble, but the CCF had apparently had enough of a
thoroughly bloodied nose from the Marine fighters and decided to call
it quits.
By daybreak, the Vegas sentry forces could report that things had been
relatively quiet--the first time in five interminably long nights--and
Companies D and E, 5th Marines, which had been watchdogging it at the
outpost moved back to the MLR. At 0800, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
reverted to parent control, and by noon, reliefs were under way not
only for Vegas but for Corinne, Dagmar, Hedy, and Bunker in the 1st
Marines sector. A 5th Marines body recovery detail, meanwhile, had
moved out to search the draws.
If ground action was light on the 31st, supporting arms activity was
a different story, starting with seven MPQ drops on enemy artillery
positions and ammunition caves in the early hours of darkness. Between
0650 and 1900, 23 air strikes were flown in the Vegas-Reno area by
VMA-121 ADs and AUs of -212 and -323, MAG-12 squadrons, as well as
three quartets of Air Force Thunderjets dispatched by Fifth Air Force.
Artillery fired a total of 800 rounds on 156 enemy concentrations,
again with 4.2-inch mortars from the 461st Infantry Battalion
reinforcing 1/11 fires on hostile mortars, ammunition dumps, and supply
points. If the outgoing was aimed at discouraging Communist plans
for new acquisitions, _their_ incoming had dropped to a new low in
comparison with the heightened activity of the past five days. A total
of 699 rounds was reported in the division sector, most of it falling
in 5th Marines territory.
_Aftermath_[384]
[384] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 887, dtd 31 Mar 53; 5thMar,
7thMar, 11thMar, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 11thMar SAR “Arty
Defense”; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; MacDonald _POW_;
Jane Blakeney, _Heroes--U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955_
(Washington, D.C.: Blakeney, 1957); Leckie, _Conflict_;
Fugate, “Vegas”; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, “A Year in Korea,”
_Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53); _New York Times_,
29–31 Mar 53; _Washington Post_, 29–31 Mar 53.
Recapture and defense of the Vegas outpost was one of the intense,
contained struggles which came to characterize the latter part of
the Korean War. The action developed into a five-day siege involving
over 4,000 ground and air Marines and was the most bloody action that
Marines on the western front had yet engaged in. Its cost can be seen,
in part, by the casualties sustained by the 1st Marine Division. The
infantry strength of two battalions was required to retake Outpost
Vegas and defend it against successive Chinese counterattacks. A total
of 520 Marine replacements were received during the operation. Marine
casualties totaled 1,015, or 116 killed, 441 wounded/evacuated, 360
wounded/not evacuated, and 98 missing, of which 19 were known to be
prisoners. Losses for the critical five-day period represented 70
percent of division casualties for the entire month--1,488 killed,
wounded, and missing (not including 128 in the KMC sector).
Enemy casualties were listed conservatively as 2,221. This represented
536 counted killed, 654 estimated killed, 174 counted wounded, 853
estimated wounded, and 4 prisoners. The Marines, moreover, in the
five days of furious fighting had knocked out the 358th CCF Regiment,
numbering between 3,000 and 3,500 men, and destroyed its effectiveness
as a unit.
Throughout the Vegas operation, the 1st Marine Air Wing had flown 218
combat missions against the Nevada Cities hills (63 percent of the
entire month’s total 346 CAS missions), bombing and strafing enemy
weapons positions, bunkers, ammunition dumps, trenches, and troops.
On the 27th and 28th, while heavy fighting raged in both the Marine
and 7th Army Division sectors, Marine Air Group 33 pilots flew 75
sorties--resulting in their highest daily sortie rate and air hours
since December 1952. The March 28th date was a noteworthy one for
MAG-12, too. It established a new record for combat sorties and bomb
tonnage unloaded on the enemy in a single day; the group executed 129
sorties and dropped 207.64 tons of bombs and napalm.
Although restricted on two days by weather conditions, close air
support was effectively used throughout the Vegas Cities operation. A
total of 81 four-aircraft flights dropped approximately 426 tons of
explosives in CAS missions. Smoke and flare planes--despite a shortage
of both flare planes and flares[385]--were employed throughout the
period as were the rotary aircraft of the two helicopter squadrons, the
latter for casualty evacuation operations.
[385] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to COs, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, KMC,
KPR, dtd 31 Mar 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53, App. II,
p. 9.
Tanks, provided by the Company A direct support tank company, were
used day and night, firing from nine positions along the MLR. Their
effective use to mark air targets was of particular importance in
connection with their support role, while the tank light also helped
to provide illumination of the objective area in hours of darkness.
Approximately 7,000 rounds of 90mm tank ammunition were fired.
During these five tense days the enemy deluged Marine positions with
45,000 rounds of artillery, mortar, and mixed fire. Indicative of the
savage pounding the Vegas area took is the fact that incoming Chinese
artillery for the full two-week period from 1–15 March totaled only
3,289 rounds. Marine efforts to defend, counterattack, secure, and
hold the Vegas outpost against repeated Chinese assaults were “marked
by maximum use of and coordination with various supporting arms and
organic weapons.”[386] Three light artillery battalions, two medium
battalions, two 8-inch batteries, one 4.5-inch rocket battery, and two
companies of 4.2-inch mortars fired a combined total of 104,864 rounds
between 27–31 March; the 11th Marines and its heavy Army reinforcing
elements, in support of 5th and 7th Marines units, executed 332
counterbattery and 666 countermortar missions. Of the total number
fired, 132 were air observed.
[386] 5thMar SAR “Cities,” p. 8.
The artillery shelling was the hottest during a 24-hour period ending
at 1600 on 28–29 March. During this time 35,809 rounds were fired
(33,041 from the four Marine battalions). This even surpassed the
previous record of 34,881 rounds fired during a one-day period in the
Bunker Hill defense of August 1952. A new one-day battalion total
for West Korean fighting was also set on the 28th; 1/11 fired 11,079
rounds, exceeding the record of 10,652 set by 3/11 during the Bunker
Hill fighting.
Marines at a rear area supply point achieved another record. In a
24-hour period, during the heavy fighting on 28–29 March, 130 men
handled 2,841 tons of ammunition. Second Lieutenant Donald E. Spangler,
an ammunition platoon commander with the 1st Ordnance Battalion, who
had but 13 hours’ sleep in the entire five days of fighting, proudly
noted that his unit had “more than doubled the tonnage that the U.S.
Army says a man can handle in 14 hours.”[387]
[387] Heinecke, _op. cit._, p. 50.
As for the men on the front line, besides the Medal of Honor winners,
10 Marines were awarded the Navy Cross, the nation’s second highest
combat award. Nine citations were for the Vegas action and one for the
1st Marines defense of Dagmar, in staving off an enemy penetration on
the night of the 26th.
Battlefront tactics employed by the CCF in its assault of the Vegas
Cities outposts were largely consistent with their previous strategy.
As in the past, the enemy launched simultaneous attacks against
several Marine positions in attempt to fragment defensive artillery
firepower. Characteristically, the enemy preceded his thrust with heavy
preassault concentrations of artillery and mortar fire. He also took
advantage of the twin ploys of surprise and overwhelming strength,
with wave after wave of Chinese rolling over the objective. Innovative
techniques consisted of scaling ladders, fashioned from lightweight but
sturdy bamboo, which were used to traverse Marine wire defenses, and
of having an artillery liaison officer attached to infantry squads to
better direct supporting fires during the attack. Analysis of Chinese
firepower tactics indicated deliberate counterbattery efforts by the
CCF, although this employment of artillery was secondary to its support
of ground troops.
Actually, the Chinese attack on the forward Marine outposts the night
of the 26th appeared to have been part of an overall reinvigorated
spring assault. Opening gun of this offense had been fired three nights
earlier, on the 23d, when they swept over an Army hill defense at Old
Baldy, 25 miles northeast of the Marine Vegas Hills. Despite heavy
Allied gunfire and bombing by Air Force and Marine planes under Fifth
Air Force flight orders, the Chinese had clung to the hill, burrowed
deeply, and resisted all efforts to be dislodged. After three days of
fighting, U.S. 7th Division troops had abandoned the Old Baldy hill
at dawn on the 26th. The CCF, apparently emboldened by this success,
that same night had launched a series of probes at nine UN outposts
on the Korean far western front in an attempt to further extend their
frontline acquisitions.
Following the loss of Reno, a new outpost, Elko, was established on
Hill 47, southeast of Carson and 765 yards from the MLR, to prevent the
enemy from using the Hill 47 position as an attack and patrol route to
the MLR. In addition to this new platoon-strength outpost, the Marines
substantially shored up Vegas from its former platoon garrison to a
detachment consisting of 2 officers and 133 enlisted men.
Headlines had told Americans at home and the free peoples around the
world the story of the “Nevada Cities” in Korea and the Marines’
five-day stand there to prevent loss of critical UNC territory. The
event that marked an official “well done” to the Marines themselves
was a message from the Commandant, General Shepherd, who on 30 March
sent the following dispatch to General Pollock, CG, 1st Marine Division:
Have followed the reports of intensive combat in the First Marine
Division sector during the past week with greatest sense of
pride and confidence. The stubborn and heroic defense of Vegas,
Reno, and Carson Hills coupled with the superb offensive spirit
which characterized the several counterattacks are a source of
reassurance and satisfaction to your fellow Marines everywhere.
On their behalf please accept for yourself and pass on to every
officer and man of your command my sincere congratulations on a
task accomplished in true Marine Corps fashion.[388]
[388] CMC msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 30 Mar 53, cited in
1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53, App. I, p. 7.
In turn, General Pollock congratulated the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
of General Megee and its six participating squadrons (VMAs-121, -212,
-323, VMFs-115, -311, and VMF(N)-513). Citing the close air support
missions of the Marine flyers during the operation, General Pollock
noted that the air strikes of the 28th were “particularly well executed
and contributed materially to the success of the 1st Marine Division in
retaking and holding the objective.”[389]
[389] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 31 Mar 53, in
MAG-12 ComdD, Mar 53, App. VII-3.
Plaudits had also come to the 1st Marine Division from the Korean
Minister of Defense, Pai Yung Shin,[390] the day immediately preceding
the Vegas attack. On 25 March, the Korean Presidential Unit Citation
streamer,[391] for action from 26 October 1950 to 15 February 1953,
had been placed on the division colors in ceremonies at the division
command post, attended by the Korean Defense Minister; Vice Admiral
Woon Il Sohn, Chief of Korean Naval Operations; Major General Hyan Zoon
Shin, Commandant of the Korean Marine Corps; General Pollock, division
commander, and his troops. The event marked the fourth Korean PUC
awarded to Marine units since the beginning of the war.
[390] CROKMC ltr to CMC, dtd 2 Feb 1971, hereafter ROKMC
_Comments_.
[391] See Appendix G for complete text of citation. Previous
awards were as follows: 1stProvMarBrig (for 2 Aug-6 Sep
50 period), 1st MAW (3 Aug 50–26 Feb 51), and 1stMarDiv
(15–27 Sep 50).
A directive at the end of the month put the 7th Marines on the alert
to move into 5th Marines positions in the right regimental sector.
This was to be accomplished on 4–5 April when, after 68 days on line,
the 5th Marines moved south to Camp Rose to become the division
reserve regiment. The prospect of a new stage in the off-and-on
truce negotiations had also come late in the month. On 28 March, the
Communists informed the UN of their willingness to discuss the Allied
proposal for return of sick and wounded prisoners. This exchange
had originally been suggested by the UN more than a year earlier,
in December 1951. Notification of the new Chinese intentions came,
ironically, on a day when the Vegas outpost fighting was at its height.
As the month closed on the Vegas chapter, Marines on line and in the
reserve companies who had just sweated through the bloodiest exchange
of the war on the I Corps front to date added their own epitaph. With a
touch of ungallantry that can be understood, they called the disputed
crest of Vegas “the highest damn beachhead in Korea.”
CHAPTER VIII
Marking Time
(April-June 1953)
_The Peace Talks Resume--Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH_--Interval Before the
Marines Go Off the Line--The May Relief--Training While in Reserve and
Division Change of Command--Heavy May-June Fighting--Developments in
Marine Air--Other Marine Defense Activities--The Division Is Ordered
Back to the Front_
_The Peace Talks Resume_[392]
[392] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv,
1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr 53; Berger, _Korea Knot_;
Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Leckie,
_Conflict_; M/Sgt Robert T. Fugate, “Freedom Village,”
_Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 7 (Jul 53), hereafter Fugate,
“Freedom Village.”
It was April 1953, but it wasn’t an April Fool’s mirage. On 6 April,
representatives of the United Nations Command and the Communist
delegation sat down at the Panmunjom truce tents to resume the peace
talks that had been stalemated six months--since October 1952. If there
was a word that could be said to reflect the attitude of American
officials and private citizens alike--for that matter, the atmosphere
at Panmunjom itself--it was one of caution--not real optimism, not an
unbridled hopefulness, but a wearied caution born of the mountains of
words, gulfs of free-flowing dialogue and diatribe, and then ultimate
plateaus of intransigence that had marked negotiations with Communist
leaders since the original truce discussions had begun in July 1951.
Diplomatic maneuverings had been underway since the end of 1952 for
the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of both sides. This was
considered a first step towards ending the prisoner of war dispute and
achieving an ultimate truce. A resolution introduced in mid-November
by India at the United Nations session dealing with settlement of
nonrepatriate prisoners had been adopted in early December. Later that
month the Red Cross international conference had officially gone on
record favoring the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in advance
of a truce. A letter written on 22 February by the UNC commander,
General Clark, calling for the immediate exchange of ailing prisoners
had been delivered to the NKPA and CCF leaders.
Initially, the Communist answer was an oppressive silence that lasted
for more than a month. During this time the Communist hierarchy had
been stunned by the death, on 5 March, of Premier Stalin. Then, on 28
March, in a letter that reached General Clark at Tokyo in the middle
of the night, came an unexpected response from the two Communist
spokesmen. They not only agreed unconditionally to an exchange of the
sick and injured prisoners but further proposed that “the delegates
for armistice negotiations of both sides immediately resume the
negotiations at Panmunjom.”[393]
[393] Leckie, _Conflict_, p. 373.
This favorable development astonished not only the United Nations
Commander but the rest of the Free World as well. Several steps were
quickly put in motion. The UN Commander’s reply to the Kim-Peng offer
was expressed in such a way that resumption of full negotiations was
not tied in as a condition for the preliminary exchange of ailing POWs.
President Eisenhower, commenting on the new Communist proposals at his
2 April press conference, stated he thought the country should “now
take at face value every offer made to us until it is proved unworthy
of our confidence.”[394] He also further enjoined major military
commanders and subordinates to avoid anything that might be contrary to
this view when they made public remarks or issued press releases.
[394] CG, Eighth Army msg to CG, 1stMarDiv and others, dtd 4
Apr 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53, App. I, p. 1.
In Korea, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command was established on 5 April
under the Commanding General, Eighth Army, in the vicinity of the 1st
Marine Division railhead at Munsan-ni. The command was to prepare for
the many housekeeping details involved in the receiving and orderly
processing of all UNC prisoners. The anticipated exchange itself was
dubbed Operation LITTLE SWITCH. Two Army officers, one Marine Corps,
and one ROKA representative were designed to direct the administrative
machinery of the provisional command. Heading the organization was
Colonel Raymond W. Beggs, USA.
The Marine representative, Colonel Wallace M. Nelson, was named
commanding officer of the United Nations Personnel and Medical
Processing Unit. His responsibility was not limited to the obvious
medical aspects of the exchange, but extended to other details
involving clothing issue, personnel, security, chaplains, food,
communication, motor transport, engineering, and the operation of
unit headquarters. Among those matters to which the Munsan-ni command
directed its immediate attention was the setting up of a temporary
facility for Communist prisoners currently held in UNC camps at Koje,
Cheju, and Yongcho Islands and a hospital near Pusan. Arrangements were
also made for in interpreter pool, debriefing teams, and press center
facilities.
As the new week began on Monday, 6 April, and the world looked to
Panmunjom for the next set of signals in the war, a new stage developed
in the truce negotiations. Within five days after the talks had begun,
both sides agreed to return the disabled prisoners in their custody.
Final papers for the preliminary exchange were signed at noon on 11
April by Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, USN, for the United Nations
Command, and Major General Lee Sang Cho, of the Communist delegation.
The week-long transfer of sick and wounded POWs was scheduled to begin
20 April, at Panmunjom.
The Communists announced they intended to release 600 sick and wounded
UNC prisoners (450 Korean, 150 non-Korean), a figure which Admiral
Daniel called “incredibly small.”[395] For its part, the UNC indicated
that it planned to free nearly ten times that number of North Korean
and Chinese POWs. Communist and Allied representatives also agreed that
truce talks would be resumed at Panmunjom, once the prisoner exchange
was completed.
[395] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 415.
Security precautions went into effect at both Panmunjom[396] and the
entire Munsan-ni area, 10 miles southeast, on the first day of the
prisoner talks. All facilities at both Panmunjom and Munsan-ni were
placed off limits to Eighth Army personnel not directly involved in
the operations. Regulations were strictly enforced. Even before the
negotiations opened at Panmunjom, actual construction work for LITTLE
SWITCH was well under way by Marine engineers. “Operation RAINBOW,” as
the building of the facilities for the POW exchange was called, began 5
April.
[396] With resumption of truce negotiations, the 1st Marines,
whose left battalion sector was immediately adjacent to
the Panmunjom neutral zone between the two battle lines,
took certain precautionary measures. The regiment set
up radio communication with the UN base camp at Munsan
and reactivated its rescue task force. This unit was on
alert to evacuate the UN truce team from Panmunjom in
the event of Communist hostile action or any threat to
security. While the talks were in session, a forward
covering group, composed of a reinforced rifle company
and 1st Tank Battalion platoon, occupied the high ground
east of Panmunjom at COP 2. Here the Marine rescue
force maintained close surveillance of the enemy in the
Panmunjom peace corridor as well as the safe arrival and
departure of the UN truce team shuttled in by helicopter
or motor convoy. 1stMar ComdD, Apr 53, pp. 5, 14 and App.
II, pp. 1–4.
In a little over a day--actually 31 working hours--a task force of less
than 100 Marine construction personnel had erected the entire Freedom
Village POW recovery station at Munsan-ni. The special work detachment
was composed of men from Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, under
Major Charles E. Gocke, and attached to the engineer battalion; utility
personnel from Headquarters and Service Companies; and a Company D
platoon, 1st Engineer Battalion.[397]
[397] The battalion’s new commanding officer was Lieutenant
Colonel Francis “X” Witt, Jr., who a week earlier had
succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Francis W. Augustine.
Early Sunday morning the Marines moved their giant bulldozers, earth
movers, pans, and other heavy duty equipment into Munsan-ni. Ground
leveling started at 0800 and work continued around the clock until
0100 Monday. After a five-hour break the men dug in again at 0600 and
worked uninterruptedly until 2000 that night. Furniture, tentage,
and strongbacking stored at the 1st Engineer Battalion command post,
meanwhile, had been transported and emplaced. When it was all done
the Freedom Village complex, like ancient Gaul, had been divided into
three parts. The command area comprised receiving lines, processing and
press tents, and related facilities for United Nations troops. Adjacent
to this was the 45th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital tent, completely
wood-decked, equipped for mass examinations and emergency treatment.
Across the road from the UN site proper was the area reserved for
returning South Korean prisoners, who would form the bulk of the
repatriates.
Altogether the three camp areas represented some 35,100 square feet of
hospital tentage, 84 squad tents, and 5 wall tents. Gravel to surface
three miles of standard combat road, plus two miles of electrical
wiring, was hauled and installed. More than 100 signs, painted in
Korean and English, were erected, as well as the large one that
stretched clear across the road at the Freedom Village entrance. Six
welcome signs were raised above the UN and ROK processing tents, while
another mammoth Korean-English sign was installed at the Panmunjom
exchange site.
Special areas for ambulance parking; helicopter landing strips; five
50-foot flagpoles; graded access roads and foot paths; sanitation
facilities; and storage areas for food, blankets, and medical
supplies were also constructed. And timing was important. It had been
anticipated that the prisoner exchange might take place on short
notice. For this reason 1st Marine Division work and processing teams
had conducted their rehearsals so that they could complete all duties
within 36 hours after first receiving the “go ahead” signal for the
switch.
_Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH[398]
[398] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap 9; Commander
Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE), “Operation Little
Switch--Apr 53”; ComNavFE Rpt of Intelligence Processing;
ComNavFE Rpt, 24 Jul 53; FMFPac ComdD, Apr 53 (#1);
FMFPac ComdD, May 53 (Pt. 2), rpt LtCol Fisher to CG,
FMFPac, subj, “Debriefing of Returned POWs”; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Apr 53; MacDonald, _POW_; Clark, _Danube to
Yalu_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Fugate,
“Freedom Village”; _New York Times_, 19–21 Apr 53;
_Washington Post_, 19–21 Apr 53.
Nine days after the truce talks were temporarily suspended, 11 April,
Operation LITTLE SWITCH (code-named Little Swap) began the morning of
Monday, 20 April. By the time it ended on 26 April, a total of 6,670
North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners had been returned by the
UNC. The enemy released 684 captives,[399] of whom 149 were Americans.
Among them were 15 Marines, 3 Navy corpsmen who had been attached to
the 1st Marine Division, and a Navy aviator. The first day Allied
prisoners--walking, some hobbling along on crutches, and others carried
on litters--were delivered in two groups. The initial 50 men reached
Panmunjom at 0825, and the second group, two hours later. The first
Marine freed was Private Alberto Pizarro-Baez, H/3/7, a Puerto Rican,
who had been captured at Frisco in the early October 1952 outpost
clashes. Later that day, another POW taken in the same action, Private
Louis A. Pumphrey, was also released.
[399] The 684 UNC prisoners returned in LITTLE SWITCH
represented 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 British,
15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, 1
Greek, 1 South African, 1 Filipino, and 1 Netherlander.
Early moments of the exchange were tense as UNC sick and wounded
captives were shipped in a long line of CCF ambulances from Kaesong,
five miles northwest of Panmunjom, down the neutral corridor past enemy
lines to the exchange point. Despite the fact that all official papers
and agreements had been concluded more than a week earlier, no one was
absolutely sure until the last moment that the prisoner exchange would
actually take place. The mechanics of the transfer operation itself, as
it turned out, went off practically without hitch. One minor unsavory
incident had occurred when 50 North Korean prisoners in UNC custody en
route from Pusan to Panmunjom, had dumped their mess kits into garbage
cans, noisily complaining about breakfast.
There was also a long taut moment of uneasy silence when the first
Communist ambulance pulled up in front of the Panmunjom receiving
center. An American MP, who in the excitement had gotten his orders
confused, forgot to tell the enemy driver where to turn. The ambulance
almost went past the center. A UN officer raced out to the road and
motioned to the driver, who backed around and pulled into the parking
lot.
One of the first things the liberated POWs saw was the big sign
“Welcome Gate to Freedom” raised the preceding night over the Panmunjom
receiving tents. Here they could get a cup of coffee and momentarily
relax before starting the long one-and-a-half hour ambulance trip south
to Freedom Village. The returnees were outfitted in blue Communist
greatcoats, utilities, caps, and tennis shoes. Some of the men were
bearded; some wore thin smiles; some had half-hidden tears in their
eyes. Primarily, there was a subdued and businesslike air to the day’s
proceedings, however, with a marked absence of levity. Admiral Daniel,
whose UNC liaison group had negotiated the exchange, in commenting on
the smoothness of the first day’s operation observed: “It’s been a
tremendous emotional experience for us all. Not much was said between
us here, but we are all very happy.”[400]
[400] _New York Times_, dtd 20 Apr 53, p. 1.
From Panmunjom all Allied prisoners were taken to Freedom Village at
Munsan where they received a medical check, and the more seriously
wounded were flown to a field hospital near Seoul. The first American
prisoner to reach Freedom Village was an Army litter patient, Private
First Class Robert C. Stell, a Negro. Helicoptered in from Panmunjom
at 1007, he was treated “like a 5-star general by all hands, including
General Clark, UN commander.”[401] By noon the routine, agreed upon
in the earlier exchange talks, was moving along evenly and would be
in effect throughout the week-long exchange. The Communist quota was
100 prisoners freed daily, in two groups of 50 each, while the Allies
returned 500. Thirty Americans were among the 100 UNC men released that
first day.
[401] _Ibid._, p. 3.
Upon their arrival at Freedom Village the Marine POWs, all of whom had
been wounded prior to being captured, were greeted by representatives
of the 1st Marine Division. In addition to General Clark, other ranking
officials on hand included Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor,
new EUSAK commander, Major General Pollock, 1st Marine Division CG,
Brigadier General Joseph C. Burger, in one of his first public duties
since assuming the post of assistant division commander on 1 April, and
Dr. Otto Lehner, head of the International Red Cross inspection teams.
Each Marine prisoner was met by a 1st Division escort who gave
him physical assistance, if necessary, as well as a much-prized
possession--a new utility cap with its Marine Corps emblem. Recovered
personnel received a medical examination. Waiting helicopters stood
by to transport seriously sick or wounded Marines to the hospital
ships _Haven_ and _Consolation_ riding at anchor in the Inchon harbor.
Chaplains chatted as informally or seriously as a returnee desired.
Newspapers and magazines gave the ex-prisoners their first opportunity
in months to read unslanted news. And a full set of utility uniforms,
tailored on the spot for proper fit, were quickly donned by Marines
happy to discard their prison blues.
Although returnees received their initial medical processing at
Freedom Village, no intelligence processing was attempted in Korea.
Within 24 hours after their exchange, returned personnel were flown to
K-16 (Seoul) and from there to Haneda Air Force Base at Tokyo. Upon
arrival at the Tokyo Army Hospital Annex, a more detailed medical exam
was conducted, including a psychiatric interview by officials from
the newly formed Special Liaison Group of Commander, Naval Forces,
Far East. Lieutenant Colonel Regan Fuller, USMC, was designated by
ComNavFE as OIC of the detailed briefing of all returned personnel at
Tokyo. Other Marine officers participating in the debriefings included
Lieutenant Colonel Thell H. Fisher and Major James D. Swinson, of
FMFPac headquarters; Major Jack M. Daly, representing the 1st Marine
Division; and Captain Richard V. Rich, of the 1st Marine Air Wing.
Each Marine returnee was interviewed by a two-man debriefing team
that consisted of a Marine and a Navy officer, the latter usually a
counterintelligence expert. The three-phase interrogation averaged 9–12
hours and covered personal data, counterintelligence, and a detailed
military questionnaire. The latter, particularly, sought information
about UN personnel still held captive by the enemy. Since all of the
15 Marine POWs had been captured relatively recently (either in the
October outpost contests or the Vegas battle the previous month), the
information they had about the enemy was of limited intelligence value.
From debriefing reports of Marine returnees, many of whom brought
address books with them, it was learned that at least 115 more USMC and
Navy prisoners were alive and still held in POW camps.
Upon completion of counterintelligence processing, returned personnel
were available for press interviews. Long-distance telephone calls to
parents or other family members were arranged by the Red Cross. Summer
service uniforms and campaign ribbons were issued, pay provided, and
administrative records updated by representatives dispatched by Colonel
John F. Dunlap, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Yokosuka.
All of the 19 Marine and Navy POWs had been released by 25 April.
After final processing and clearance for return to the U.S. the men
were flown home, via Hawaii, in three groups that departed 28 April,
30 April, and 4 May. Each was accompanied by a Marine Corps officer.
Members of the first contingent of POWs arrived at Travis Air Force
Base, California, on 29 April, thereby completing their 7,000-mile
journey from Communist prison camps. Another small group of POWs
considered possible security risks were airlifted directly from Japan
to Valley Forge Hospital, near Philadelphia, for further interviewing.
No Marines were among them. With the initial prisoner exchange
completed, staffs of the major Far East commands began to prepare for
the final return of all POWs. Operation BIG SWITCH would take place
after the ceasefire that, hopefully, was not too far away.
On the day that Operation LITTLE SWITCH ended, 26 April, plenary
truce talks resumed at Panmunjom. The stormy issue of repatriation of
prisoners, which had already prolonged the war by more than a year,
was still the one major problem preventing final agreement. There was
indication, however, that the Communists appeared to be softening on
their rigid insistence of forced repatriation. And, on 7 May, the
Communists accepted the UN proposal that nonrepatriate prisoners be
kept in neutral custody within Korea (rather than being removed to a
foreign neutral nation) and offered an eight-point armistice plan. With
modifications, this ultimately became the basis for the armistice.
While discussions and disagreements continued on this proposal, another
real problem developed from a totally different source.
Since early in April rumblings had been heard, through the polite
ambassadorial circuits, that Syngman Rhee, the aging South Korean
president, was dissatisfied with major truce issues. In particular, he
was disturbed over the possibility that Korea would not become reunited
politically. Further, Rhee gave indication that he might take some
kind of action on his own. The Korean leader had advised President
Eisenhower that if any armistice was signed that permitted Chinese
Communist troops to remain south of the Yalu, with his country divided,
he would withdraw ROK military forces from the UN command. Since South
Korean troops, backed by American specialized units, presently manned
the bulk of the UNC front line, Rhee’s threat to remove them from
General Clark’s command presented harrowing possibilities.
Meanwhile, on 13 May, General Harrison, senior UN representative
at Panmunjom, made a counterproposal to the Communist plan. This
incorporated three measures aimed at reconciling differences in the
long-controversial repatriation issue.[402] Arguments flew back and
forth at Panmunjom, with a temporary recess called in the talks; but
on 4 June the Communists accepted this UN final offer. The dispute of
18 months’ duration had ended and the Allied principle of voluntary
repatriation had won out in the end. About the only homework left for
the negotiating teams was to map out final details of the Demilitarized
Zone.
[402] In brief, these were: (1) that the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission (NNRC) take custody of Chinese
nonrepatriates but give Korean POWs the option of
settling either in North or South Korea, as they wished;
(2) that troops from just one country (India) be used
to guard nonrepatriates, rather than the unwieldy
five-nation force earlier proposed by the Communists;
and (3), that specific procedures, which were clearly
spelled out, be followed for granting political asylum to
returning prisoners who refused repatriation.
President Rhee now even more violently denounced the projected
armistice plan. He declared that he and the Koreans would fight on
alone, if necessary. South Korean delegates boycotted the Panmunjom
truce meetings, and Rhee began a campaign to block the cease-fire.
Final agreement on the POW issue was reached 8 June. It provided that
the NNRC offer a “civilian status” to former POWs who did not exercise
their right of repatriation within four months after being taken into
custody by the commission. Those POWs who desired asylum would be set
free. The South Korean National Assembly unanimously rejected the truce
terms the following day.
Revision of the truce line, to correspond to current battle positions,
and other concluding details of the truce were being settled by 17
June. On 18 June, chaos suddenly replaced progress. Acting on orders
from Rhee, during early morning hours ROK guards at the South Korean
prisons released approximately 27,000 North Korean anti-Communist POW
inmates (the majority of the large group of NKPA who did not wish to
be repatriated). They quickly escaped and became absorbed into the
civilian populace of South Korea. Immediately the Communists charged
the Americans with complicity and demanded to know whether the United
Nations Command was able to control its South Korean ally or not.
For the next two weeks the American ambassadorial and military team
tried to restore some measure of international good grace and hope to
the crisis. Daily talks (and pressure) took place with Rhee, as well
as with the Communist negotiators, to set the course back on track
again in the direction of a final truce agreement. At the end of June,
UNC Commander Clark was authorized by Washington to work out a way in
which it would be possible to sign the tenuous armistice--without the
Koreans, if necessary.
_Interval Before the Marines Go Off the Line_[403]
[403] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Apr 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 896–900, dtd 8–12 Apr 53;
1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 2/11, 1st TkBn
ComdDs, Apr 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311,
VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr 53.
Shortly after the heavy Vegas fighting in late March, Colonel Funk’s
7th Marines, which had been in reserve, exchanged positions with the
5th Marines. The new line regiment assumed responsibility for the
critical, action-prone right sector of the MLR on 4–5 April. In the
center part of JAMESTOWN, the 1st Marines of Colonel Adams continued to
man the MLR and its 12 outposts, including the strategic COP-2 tucked
down by the Panmunjom peace corridor. With the resumption of truce
talks on 6 April, this position had again taken on renewed importance
with its tank-infantry covering force of 5 armored vehicles and 245
Marines on call at all times.
After its relief from the MLR in early April the 5th Marines, as the
new division reserve unit, assumed the regular missions of serving
as a counterforce for Marines in the I Corps sector, if required;
maintenance of the secondary KANSAS line; and a rigorous training
program. On 10 April, the 3d Battalion moved out to the KANSAS position
for a two-day field exercise. By midmonth, spring thaws and heavy rains
had so weakened the trench and bunker fortifications of KANSAS that
an all-out effort was temporarily diverted from refresher training
to reconstruction. The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, under Operation Plan
24-53, pursued an intensive five-day shore-based training program,
7–11 April, in preparation for its coming amphibious exercise, MARLEX
XX. On the 13th, BLT 2/5 under Lieutenant Colonel Finch, with armored
amphibian, tank, amtrac, and 1/11 detachments, proceeded to the landing
area, Tokchok-to, one of the WCIDE command offshore islands southwest
of Inchon. Battalion assault companies hit the southern Tokchok-to
beaches on D-Day, 15 April, according to schedule, although high winds
and rough seas subsequently modified the exercise.[404]
[404] Official records are at variance on this point. The 2/5
command diary indicates that the battalion continued the
exercise on 16–17 April, returning the latter date. The
5th Marines report categorically indicates that MARLEX XX
was cancelled on 15 April, because of the weather.
Not long afterward a training exercise involving UNC personnel got
underway when the 5th[405] and 1st Marines, together with the
artillerymen, combined with the Army, ROK, and Commonwealth Division on
20 April for a four-day I Corps command post exercise (CPX) EVEREADY
GEORGE, not far from Seoul.
[405] Now under a new regimental commander, Colonel Tschirgi,
who had joined the 5th Marines on 14 April, succeeding
Colonel Walt, newly assigned division G-3.
Along the division front the war was still a daily survival contest,
despite the promising outlook at Panmunjom. The most ambitious attempt
by the Chinese during the month took place over a three-day period
in the right regimental sector, not long after the 7th Marines had
moved to the MLR. On 9 April, following a heavy two-hour ballistic
downpour of 2,000 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery, a reinforced
company of about 300 Chinese soldiers launched a strong probe against
Carson at 0345. Attacking in two echelons, the enemy approached from
the direction of Arrowhead on the north and the Reno ridgeline. In an
hour’s time, the enemy had reached the Marine trenches and protective
wire, at some places, and was being unceremoniously repulsed by the 1/7
detachment at Carson. For an hour and a half a heavy fire fight raged
at the outpost while intruders and defenders battled at point-blank
range to settle the dispute.
A reinforcement platoon, from 4/2/7, dispatched from the MLR at 0530,
made it as far as the newly established Marine outpost at Elko, about
400 yards southeast of Carson, before being held up by a heavy shower
of mortar rounds, and small arms fire. Tankers from the Company A
direct element[406] plus a section (two tanks) from the regiment’s
armored platoon leveled their lethal 90mm fires to discourage the
enemy, as did the defender’s barrage of 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch
mortars.
[406] Throughout the three-day action, gun tanks from Companies
A and B (the forward reserve unit) and the regimental
antitank company fired a total of more than 1,469 90mm
shells to neutralize enemy positions and weapons.
Two rocket ripples and 22 defensive fire concentrations unleashed by
2/11, also in direct support of Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Lawrence
Jr.’s 1st Battalion, plus additional reinforcing fires by batteries of
1/11 and 4/11 drove off the enemy at 0700. As a security measure, a
company from the regimental reserve (E/2/7) was assigned to Carson to
buttress the position and assist in reorganizing the outpost defense.
The enemy’s activity had cost him 60 known dead. Additional casualties
were estimated to be 90 killed and 70 wounded. Marine losses numbered
14 killed, 4 missing, 44 wounded/evacuated, and 22 non-seriously
wounded. Meanwhile, beginning at 0715, Marine prop-driven attack AUs
from VMAs-212 and -323 and ADs from VMA-121 were aloft over prime
Chinese targets to perform CAS missions and MPQ drops.
Between the morning’s first strike and midafternoon the three MAG-12
squadrons completed 43 sorties and blasted enemy hills and weapons
positions north of Carson with a total of 67½ tons of bombs. Later that
night three Chinese platoons, operating in small units, reappeared in
the Carson-Elko-Vegas vicinity to recover casualties. Although they
reached an unoccupied caved-in bunker 50 feet from Carson, the enemy’s
nocturnal activity only cost him more casualties from the COP’s defense
fires: 15 known dead, 15 estimated killed, 7 known wounded, and 27
estimated wounded.
The following day, Panther jets from Marine Fighter Squadrons 311 and
115 contributed to the further destruction of hostile emplacements,
but the enemy himself was nowhere to be seen. Again that night,
ground-controlled radar bombing runs were made by VMA-121 and
VMF(N)-513 to help keep the enemy off balance. In the early-morning
hours of the 11th, however, a band of 30 grenade-slinging Chinese
renewed the assault on 7th Marines positions by attacking the reverse
slope of Elko. This ambition was deterred by outpost organic weapons
and box-me-in fires. After a brief fire fight the CCF withdrew, and
the two MAG-33 squadrons later that morning returned to station for
CAS strikes against CCF trouble spots. Another raid on Carson began at
2115 that night when 70 Chinese moved out from Ungok to the west ridge
of the Marine position. Ten minutes later, Marine 81mm and 4.2-inch
mortars, artillery, machine guns, and tanks forced them back with
approximately 20 CCF killed and wounded to show for their efforts.
A brief repeat action occurred the following night when two squads
of Chinese reappeared at Elko, but they were dispatched by Marine
infantry, artillery, and armor direct fires following a 15-minute
spirited exchange. During the night of the 12th[407] Chinese probes
and harassing efforts diminished. Other than a few spotty, abortive
skirmishes in the KMC sector, this pattern of reduced enemy effort
would continue for the next several weeks, until after the change of
the Marine line in early May. As the peace talks at Panmunjom were
beginning to show some progress, enemy psychological warfare efforts
in the KMC, 1st, and 7th regimental sectors became more zealous,
an indication of the Chinese attempt to increase their propaganda
offensive. This included not only loudspeaker broadcasts and propaganda
leaflet fired in mortar shells but a more unusual tactic, on 6 April,
of enemy messages dropped over the COP Vegas area by airplane.
[407] This same date was significant because it marked the
first time a searchlight-guided night close air support
mission was flown by 1st MAW in the division sector.
Little ground action took place in the division sector throughout
the rest of the month. During the last three days of April, as the
operational period for the Marines drew to an end, both infantry and
artillery units noticed an unusual lull across the front. Marine
patrols made few contacts, and there was a sharp decrease in the
heavy enemy sightings of midmonth. Chinese incoming, in fact, during
the latter part of the month decreased markedly, with a total of 873
rounds compared to the 4,149 tallied during the 1–15 April period. An
average of 58.2 rounds daily made it, in fact, the quietest period in
the Marine division sector since the holiday calm of late December when
only 84.2 rounds had fallen the last 10 days of the month.
_The May Relief_[408]
[408] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdDs, Apr-May 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 22 Apr-13 May
53; 1stMar ComdDs, Apr-May 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar
ComdDs, May 53; 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr-May 53; Hermes,
_Truce Tent_.
By late April, plans had moved into high gear for relief of the 1st
Marine Division by the 25th U.S. Infantry Division and transfer of the
Marines to U.S. I Corps reserve at Camp Casey. Although the Marine
division had been in active defense positions for 20 months (first in
the eastern X Corps and, for the past year, on the western front),
some observers noted that there was a reluctance to turn over their
presently occupied positions and that the Marines were coming out
“under protest from commanders who wanted the Division to remain on the
line.”[409]
[409] News story (AP), Robert D. Tuckman, Seoul, dtd 12 May 53,
1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, p. 1.
For its part, the 25th Division, commanded by Major General Samuel T.
Williams, was to shift over to the I Corps far west coastal area from
its own neighboring IX Corps sector on the right. Marine association
with the Army division went back to the early days of the war.[410]
In August 1950, when the Korean Conflict was then only a few weeks
old, the 25th Division, with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and
the Army’s RCT-5, had spearheaded the first UN counteroffensive on the
far southern front, in the Sachon-Chinju area. Now fresh from its own
recent period in reserve[411] the 25th Division, including its attached
Turkish Brigade, was to take over the 33-mile 1st Marine Division line,
effective 5 May. Marine armor and artillery, however, would remain in
support of the 25th Division and transfer to I Corps control.
[410] The two divisions had also seen combat together early in
WW II, at Guadalcanal. Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. ltr to Dir,
MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Sep 70, hereafter _Heinl ltr_.
[411] Soon after assuming command of the Eighth Army, in
mid-February, General Taylor had begun to stress the need
for a complete eight-week training program for reserve
divisions before reentering the line, detailed rehearsal
of patrols, and more frequent rotation of artillery
battalions to maintain their basic mobility. Hermes,
_Truce Tent_, p. 391.
Another change at this time affected the designation of the United
Nations MLR. Called Line JAMESTOWN in the I Corps sector (and variously
in other parts of the EUSAK front as MISSOURI, DULUTH, MINNESOTA,
and CAT), the Allied front was redesignated simply as “main line of
resistance,” beginning 28 April, and was to be so known in all future
orders and communications throughout the entire Eighth Army. A further
modification dropped the reference “in Korea” from the acronym EUSAK,
the title becoming “Eighth U.S. Army.”
In the Marine sector, the last few days of April were a study in
contrasts. While Marine frontline infantrymen and cannoneers were
having a comparatively peaceful interlude during this period of minimal
CCF activity, division engineers were the proverbial colony of beavers.
Following up their rigorous schedule in early April of building Freedom
Village from scratch within 36 hours, engineer personnel moved out from
the division sector late that month to begin construction of the rear
area camps that would shortly be occupied by the Marines while in I
Corps reserve.
Located approximately 15 miles east of the Marine MLR, the Camp Casey
reserve complex consisted of three major areas. They were: the central
one, Casey, which gave its name to the entire installation and would
house the new division CP and 5th Marines; Indianhead, to the north,
where the 7th Marines, 1st KMC Regiment, Division Reconnaissance
Company, machine gun and NCO schools were to be established; and
Britannia, to the south, assigned to the 1st Marines. Motor transport,
engineer, and medical units in support of the respective regiments were
to locate nearby.
On 27 April, the day after resumption of truce talks at Panmunjom,
Company A engineers began the work of clearing the camp site, erecting
prefabricated buildings, and pioneering roads in the 7th Marines
northern area. Two days later the 1st KMC Engineer Company was also
detailed to Indianhead for work on the 1st KMC Regimental camp. Company
C engineers and Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, attached to the
Engineer Battalion, meanwhile moved into the Casey sector to ready the
relocated Division CP and the 5th Marines camp.
Tactical relief of the 1st Marine Division officially began 1 May.
By the time it was over, four days later, more than 2,370 truckloads
of Marine personnel and equipment had been used in the transfer to
Camp Casey. Described another way: if placed bumper to bumper in a
continuous convoy, this would have extended more than six miles, the
length of the MLR held by a Marine regiment in any major defense
sector. As a preliminary step in the relief, on 29 April the division
assumed operational control of several incoming Army artillery units
(the 8th, 64th, 69th, and 90th Field Artillery Battalions, and the 21st
Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion) plus elements of the Turkish
command, including the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion. By midafternoon,
the first of the Army infantry relief personnel had also arrived in
the division sector, when elements of the three battalions of the 35th
Infantry Regiment had reported in to respective 1st Marines[412] host
units, preparatory to assuming responsibility for the center sector of
the Marine line.
[412] The regiment was newly-commanded by Colonel Nelson, the
former UN Personnel and Medical Processing Unit officer,
who succeeded Colonel Adams as CO, 1st Marines on 1 May.
On 1 May the 5th Marines, then in reserve at Camp Rose, took over
responsibility for the 14th Infantry Regiment, designated as the
Army maneuver unit. Later that day, when Colonel Tschirgi’s regiment
closed its headquarters and moved out by motor march to Casey, control
of the Army unit transferred to the division. The same day, the 1st
KMC/RCT artillery battalion--which, like the 11th Marines units, was to
remain on line although KMC infantry personnel were to move to I Corps
reserve--came under control of I Corps; two days later an Army armored
unit, the 89th Tank Battalion, rolled into position in the KMC rear
support area and came under division command.
The 7th Marines right regimental sector, with its critical Nevada
Cities and two Berlin positions, became the new home for the Turkish
battalions of Brigadier General Sirri Acar in a four-day phased
operation, beginning 0115 on 3 May. Actual bulk displacement of the
first Marine MLR units and their respective outposts got underway on
this date, when responsibility for the 7th Marines left battalion
sector transferred from 2/7[413] to the 1st Battalion, TAFC, and the
7th Marines battalion began displacing to Indianhead. On the same day
the division opened its advance command post at Camp Casey.
[413] On 23 April, 2/7 had relieved 1/7 in the left battalion
sector and 1/7 became the regimental reserve. There was
no change in 3/7’s location in the right sector. These
were the positions for transfer with the Turkish troops
in early May.
The first Marine sector to complete the relief was the 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion, to the south of the Munsan-ni railhead; at midnight
on 4 May, with the assumption of sector responsibility by the Army
Task Force Track, it moved to the logistical complex at Ascom City
where it opened its new CP. Throughout the BMNT hours of 4 and 5 May,
Marine positions were transferred to the incoming organic and/or
attached units of the U.S. Army 25th Division. Relief of three of the
major sectors in the Marine division line was thus well under way by
the early hours of the 5th. Final relief and its elaborate phasing
operations were completed that morning. On the left flank, the 1st KMC
was relieved at 1030 by the incoming U.S. Army 27th Infantry;[414] 30
minutes later, the 1st Marines was replaced in the line by the Army
35th Infantry; and on the right, the 7th Marines sector was taken over
by the TAFC. (See Map 28.)
[414] _ROKMC Comments._
Sharply at 1120 on 5 May,[415] the U.S. Army 25th Division assumed
responsibility for defense of the MLR in what had been the 1st Marine
Division sector for more than 13 months. At the same time all 25th
Infantry Division units under operational direction of the division
also reverted to parent control. In addition to the Kimpo Regiment,
several small Korean Service Corps and medical units retained in the
sector also came under Army command.
[415] Final relief was largely complete at this time.
Exceptions were the 7th Marines reserve battalion, 1/7,
relieved by TAFC forces at 0350 the following day and a
few remaining Marine rear echelon elements that closed
out the sector on 7 May.
[Illustration:
MAP 28 K. White
25th INFANTRY DIVISION SECTOR
FOLLOWING RELIEF OF THE 1st MARINE DIVISION
5 MAY 1953]
I Corps Operation Orders No. 31 and 32 had directed that the 11th
Marines remain on line in the sector attached to I Corps Artillery,
with a general support mission of reinforcing the fires of the 25th
Division artillery, and a secondary task of coordinating counterbattery
support. The medium battalion, 4/11, and the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket
Battery, furnished general support for I Corps. Regimental and
battalion CPs, as well as the rocket battery, continued to occupy their
same locations. A change affected the KMC artillery battalion, however;
when transferred to I Corps artillery control it displaced from the
Marine sector, with a new general support role of reinforcing the I
Corps line.
Also on 5 May, at 1130, the 1st Tank Battalion[416] passed to 25th
Division control. Two companies, C and B, were assigned to the TAFC
(which had no armored units) in the left and right battalion areas,
respectively. Company D vehicles came under command of the 35th
Infantry Regiment, in the center sector; while A, the remaining
company, was designated as the single reserve unit. This was a
modification of the Marine system of maintaining two tank companies
in reserve, one a short distance behind the MLR and the other, at the
armored battalion CP near Munsan-ni. A change in tactics also took
place when the Marine tanks came under Army operational control. It
had been the Marine practice to retain the tanks at the company CP
from where they moved to prepared firing slots at the request of the
supported infantry unit.
[416] The 1st Tank Battalion was now commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Charles W. McCoy, who had relieved Lieutenant
Colonel Williamson on 16 April 1953.
When the 1st Tank Battalion was attached to the 25th Division, the
armored vehicles were shifted to firing slots near the MLR where they
occupied semifixed positions.[417] Armored personnel carriers (APCs)
were assigned by the Army to Company B and used by both B and C as
resupply vehicles to haul food, water, fuel, and ammunition to the
tanks on line. Also as part of the relief, control of the KMC tank
company was transferred from the Marine 1st Tank Battalion to I Corps,
although the company still continued in its same location in the old
KMC sector.
[417] The tanks were not kept in exposed firing positions
at all times. They were parked in protected, defilade
revetments and were periodically driven into the firing
slots to zero in on targets of opportunity. One tank
might thus use any of several slots, and in cases of
major attacks reserve tanks could reinforce. LtCol
Robert J. Post ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May 70,
hereafter _Post ltr_.
Also remaining in their same positions were MASRT-1 (Marine Air Support
Radar Team One), in support of the 25th Infantry Division, MTACS-2
(Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two), and VMO-6. The mobile air
support section of the observation squadron, however, had moved with
the 1st Marine Division to the new Casey area for participation in the
coming MARLEX operations scheduled during the reserve training period.
Thus with the relief completed, components of the old Marine division
front, from left to right, were: the Kimpo Provisional Regiment; Task
Force Track; the 27th Infantry Regiment; 35th Infantry Regiment in the
center sector, including its armor and heavy mortar company and 2d and
3d Battalions forward, replacing the 1st Marines 3d and 1st Battalions;
and in the right sector, the Turkish Brigade 4.2-inch mortar company
and its 1st and 3d Battalions initially located[418] in the MLR
positions vacated by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines.
[418] Later, the Turkish forces were to place three battalions
forward [adding the 2d], with a fourth in reserve.
In addition to the 1st Marine Division railhead and truckhead at
Munsan-ni and Ascom City, a subsidiary railhead/truckhead was opened
at Tongduchon-ni, two miles southwest of the new division CP at Casey.
No change was made in the airhead at K-16. Effective with the 5 May
change, remaining elements of the division CP staff at Yongji-ri joined
the advance elements at Casey. As the Marines moved off the front
lines they received “well-done” messages from the Commandant, General
Shepherd, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander in Chief, Admiral
Arthur W. Radford, as well as the new I Corps Commander, Lieutenant
General Bruce C. Clarke[419] who cited the “excellence of the planning,
coordination and cooperation which enabled the operation of the past
few days to be successfully accomplished.”[420]
[419] General Clarke had succeeded General Kendall on 10 April
1953.
[420] CG, I Corps msg to CGs, 1stMarDiv, 25th InfDiv, dtd 6 May
53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. I, p. 2.
_Training While in Reserve and Division Change of Command_[421]
[421] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt Eval Rpts_ No. 5. Chap 6, No. 6,
Chaps. 7, 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, May-June 53; 1stMarDiv G-3
Jnls, 22 Apr-30 Jun 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar,
1st EngrBn, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, May-June 53; Field,
_NavOps, Korea_.
While the division was in reserve, its tactical mission consisted of
preparation for commitment on I Corps order as a counterattack force
in any of the four division sectors of I Corps. Division Operation
Plan 7-53 implemented this I Corps Plan “RESTORE” and set forth the
designated blocking positions in the 25th Army, Commonwealth, 1st ROK,
and 7th Army Division sectors in event of threatened or actual enemy
penetration of the MLR.
The 1st Marine Division’s Training Order 8-53, issued on 6 May, the
day after the relief was officially effected, outlined the training
to be accomplished during the eight-week reserve period, 10 May-5
July. Following a few days’ interval devoted to camp construction
and improvement of facilities, an active training program commenced.
Its objective was the continued improvement of amphibious and ground
offensive combat potential of all personnel. Three major regimental
combat team MARLEXES were scheduled.[422] The training syllabus
called for a four-phased progressive schooling from individual to
battalion and regimental level conducted in all phases of offensive,
defensive, and amphibious warfare. Weaponry familiarization, small unit
tactics, and combined unit training, with tank-infantry deployment and
integration of helicopters at company-level exercises, were emphasized,
culminating in a week-long field maneuver.
[422] Relief from the Eighth Army defense line provided the
first opportunity for expansion of the 1st Marine
Division amphibious training to regimental level.
Amphibious training in battalion-sized MARLEXES had
been under way since June 1952, upon transfer of the
Marines to the western coastal sector. This had, in
fact, “produced an extra dividend as [their] amphibious
retraining program, conducted throughout the summer in
the Tokchok Islands, was apprehensively observed by the
enemy.” Field, _NavOps, Korea_, p. 430.
Lectures were to be kept to a minimum, with at least 50 percent of
the tactical training conducted at night. Specialty training in
intelligence, signal communications, antitank and mortar, machine gun,
mine warfare, and staff NCO schools was also prescribed. Numerous
command post exercises were programmed to obtain a high standard of
efficiency in both battalion and regimental-level staff functioning.
It was the first time the division had been in reserve since a brief
two-week period in late July-August of 1951. A brisk 40–44 hour week,
plus organized athletics, insured that the training period was to be
fully utilized.
No time was lost getting under way. At a staff conference with
battalion commanders on 11 May, General Pollock, division CG, stressed
the importance of using the time they were in reserve for enhancing
division combat-readiness. Even as he spoke, his 5th Marines had the
day before boarded ships at Inchon and were en route to the Yongjong-ni
landing area for MARLEX I. Since the 5th Marines, in division reserve,
had been the first of the regiments to displace and on 1 May had turned
its sector over to the incoming 14th Infantry Regiment, it got the jump
on training during the reserve period. Regimental Operation Plan 12-53,
of 28 April, had outlined requirements for the 5th Marines RCT LEX
1; from 2–9 May the regiment had participated in a week of intensive
amphibious training, including reduced and normal distance CPX dry runs
for the coming MARLEX.
With ships from CTE 90.85,[423] and air defense by VMFs-311 and -115,
Colonel Tschirgi’s RCT-5 made the D-Day landing on 13 May with its two
assault BLTs securing the objective. An unexpectedly shallow beach
gradient and difficulties encountered in unloading vehicles from the
causeway resulted in less than a 100 percent performance rating. These
were deficiencies that might have been prevented had not the customary
rehearsal been cancelled the previous day when a heavy fog obscured the
landing beaches. Besides regimental antitank and 4.2-inch mortar units,
participating support elements included Company D, 1st Tank Battalion;
Company A, 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; Company C, 1st Engineer
Battalion; 1/11; and helicopters from HMR-161 and VMO-6.
[423] CTE 90.85 constituted the MARLEX training element of
TF-90, Amphibious Force Far East, redesignated Amphibious
Group Western Pacific earlier that month.
Meanwhile, on 15 May, command post and subordinate units from the 1st,
5th (less RCT-5 currently deployed in MARLEX I), and 7th Marines and
support elements took part in a one-day division CPX at Camp Casey
stressing mobility, security and operational procedures. Another CPX on
22–23 May by 11th Marines and engineer personnel emphasized dispersion,
camouflage, and message handling under simulated combat conditions.
Units of the three infantry regiments plus the KMCs training with the
7th Marines at Indianhead combined in a CPX-FEX (command post-firing
exercise) on 26–27 May. Realism bowed to current ordnance supply
economics in that ammunition was carried for individual weapons, but it
would “not be loaded except on specific orders from an officer.”[424]
[424] 1stMarDiv msg to addees in 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 22 May
53.
The CPX-FEX was held as a trial exercise for an Eighth Army CPX
scheduled later in the month, which was postponed indefinitely on
29 May because of the critical battlefront situation and continuing
enemy attacks across the EUSAK front. Extensive preparations were also
underway for MARLEX II, with RCT-7, from 2–10 June; and concluding
MARLEX III, scheduled 14–23 June, with RCT-1.
Armor and advance regimental elements had left for the Ascom
City-Inchon staging area by 1 June, preparatory for departure to the
Yongjong-ni beaches on the Korean west coast in the vicinity of Kunsan.
The troop list included approximately 250 officers and 4,450 enlisted
from Colonel Funk’s 7th Marines and support units, including USN and
KMC. Infantry personnel from the regiment’s three battalions formed the
three assault teams plus a reserve battalion composed of 475 Korean
Marines designated as BLT 5/KMC. Regimental support units included
Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion; Company D, 1st Medical Battalion;
Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion; Company B, 1st Armored Amphibian
Battalion, and various motor transport, amphibian truck, military
police, and helicopter detachments.
R-Day on 5 June went off per schedule. Despite intelligence estimates
which cheerily predicted that only “nine days of rain can be expected
during the month of June”,[425] RCT-7 drew one out of the barrel with
its D-Day landing, 6 June. This took place during heavy rains and
decreased visibility which threw the boat waves off phase by minutes
and required more than the allotted time for HMR-161 troop and cargo
lifts.
[425] MAR RCT LEX II, Opn Plan I, App. 1 to Annex B, dtd 9 May
53, p. 1, in 7thMar ComdD, May 53.
Use of a 144-foot-long M-2 steel treadway pontoon bridge loaned by the
Army, emplaced from the end of the causeway to the beach high water
mark, was considered highly successful. It solved unloading problems
encountered in the earlier MARLEX, in that all heavy equipment and
vehicles were landed on the designated beaches. Further experimentation
with this novel employment of the M-2 was recommended to test the
coupling system of bridge and causeway during periods of heavy surf.
On the minus side, shore party officers noted that night transfer
operations had been hindered because of the lack of running lights on
the amtracs.
On 9 June, as RCT-7 was on the way back from its amphibious exercise,
a directive from ComNavFE (Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe) notified
the division of cancellation of the forthcoming RCT MARLEX III. All
available shipping was being held on 24-hour readiness for the expected
final repatriation of POWs (Operation BIG SWITCH). All afloat training
exercises by Marine, Army, and Navy units between 6 June and 15 October
were to be cancelled.
The division was host to ranking I Corps, Eighth Army, Korean, and 1st
Commonwealth officials when a special helicopter assault demonstration
was staged 11–12 June at Camp Casey. Two rocket launcher sections, 14
HMR-161 copters, and 2/5 infantrymen were deployed to show the diverse
combat capabilities of the aerial workhorse. While in I Corps reserve,
the division was also host--and winner--of the I Corps Pistol Matches.
And 3/11, which the previous month had taken the Army Training Test 6-2
(a) Modified, was notified the battalion had scored 92.91 percent and
received congratulations from the CGs, I Corps Artillery and Eighth
Army.
A change of command within the 1st Marine Division took place on 15
June with the arrival of Major General Randolph McC. Pate. The retiring
CG, General Pollock, was presented the Distinguished Service Medal by
the I Corps commander, General Clarke, for his “outstanding success in
the defense of Carson, Vegas, and Elko.” The previous month, General
Pollock had received the Korean Order of Military Merit, Taiguk for his
active part in the formation, development, and training of the Korean
Marine Corps. Attending the change of command ceremonies were General
Megee, CG 1st MAW, General Schilt, CG AirFMFPac, and other Marine, I
Corps, Commonwealth, and Korean senior officers.
The new 1st Marine Division CG was coming to his Korean post from Camp
Lejeune, N. C. where (like General Pollock before him) he had most
recently commanded the 2d Marine Division. Commissioned originally
in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1921, General Pate was to later rise
to four-star rank. Prior to World War II, he had seen expeditionary
service in Santo Domingo, in 1923–1924, and in China from 1927–1929,
and also served in Hawaii. For his outstanding service and skill in
complicated staff duties, first at Guadalcanal, and later during
amphibious operations at Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, General Pate
had been awarded the Legion of Merit and a Gold Star in lieu of a
second Legion of Merit.
After the war, he had served two tours as head of the Division Reserve,
in 1946 and 1951. Other assignments included Director of the Marine
Corps Educational Center at Quantico and Deputy Director of Logistic
Plans in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[426]
[426] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of Gen Randolph McC. Pate, Jan
56, rev.
_Heavy May-June Fighting_[427]
[427] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 15 May, 28–30
May 53; 11thMar, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1st
MAW ComdD, May 53; 1st MAW PIR 136-53, dtd 14–15 May 53
and PIR 150-53, dtd 28–29 May 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323,
VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, May 53; Hermes, _Truce Tent_;
Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_.
After the early May change of lines, the Chinese lost little time
in testing the new UNC defenses. Shortly after 0200 on 15 May, the
CCF directed a two-battalion probe on the Carson-Elko-Vegas trio and
the Berlin-East Berlin outposts newly held by the Turkish brigade.
Supported by heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery, one
battalion of enemy soldiers moved against each of the two major defense
complexes. Marine Company C tanks, occupying the firing slots that
night, accounted for heavy enemy losses in the action, estimated at
200 CCF killed and 100 wounded. Assisting the TAFC Field Artillery
Battalion in throwing back the attack were 1/11, 2/11, and 4/11 which
sent 3,640 rounds into the sharp four-hour engagement.
The TAFC defense was further reinforced later that day with 21 air
strikes against hostile personnel and weapons positions north of the
Turkish sector. Adding their weight to the clash, 3/11 and the rocket
battery also brought their guns into action, for a combined 5,526
Marine rounds[428] dispatched against the enemy.
[428] Total ammunition expenditure by the 11th Marines and the
25th Division artillery batteries was 11,527 rounds,
to the Chinese output of approximately 10,000 rounds.
11thMarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 13.
It was not until 25 May, after the UNC had made its final offer at the
truce talks, however, that CCF artillery really began to open up on
the Nevada complex. The increased activity by hostile pieces, during
the 25–27 May period, was duly noted by the artillery Marines who
laconically reported, “Operations followed the recent pattern: enemy
shelling of the Turkish Brigade increased during the afternoon; no
contacts were reported.”[429]
[429] 11thMar ComdD, May 53, dtd 27 May, p. 19.
This latter situation changed abruptly on 28 May. Beginning at 1800,
major elements of the Chinese 120th Division launched simultaneous
attacks over 17,500 yards of I Corps front that stretched from COP-2
eastward to that consistent trouble-spot, the Nevada Cities, on to
the Berlins, and finally the Hook area in the adjacent Commonwealth
Division sector. Supported by heavy artillery fires, one CCF battalion
moved in towards Carson and Elko. Another battalion,[430] under cover
of smoke, attacked central COP Vegas, while a third struck Berlin and
East Berlin on the right flank. Three hours after the initial attack,
defenders at Carson and Elko were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with
the Chinese.
[430] Some historians indicate that the 120th Division
initially sent four battalions forward in the action,
with two against the main objective, Vegas. Hermes,
_Truce Tent_, p. 463.
By midnight the men of the 35th Infantry had beaten back the attack at
COP-2. The Turks, likewise, were still in possession of the two Berlin
(platoon-strength) outposts, but Commonwealth forces were involved in
a pitched battle at Ronson and Warsaw. The situation was even grimmer
at this time in the Nevada Cities area outposted by the TAFC. Although
the Turkish troops continued to hold Vegas, where 140 men were dug
in, Carson (two-platoon size) had fallen and Elko (platoon-strength)
was heavily besieged. Shortly thereafter, the 25th Division ordered
that the TAFC withdraw from the latter position to its own MLR. The
diversionary attack against Berlin-East Berlin had been broken off and
the twin positions were secured.
During the first six hours of the attack, the night of 28–29 May,
Colonel Mills’ 11th Marines, now under I Corps command, had sent 9,500
rounds crashing into Chinese strongpoints, while Marine air observers
directed eight missions against active enemy artillery positions.
Ripples from the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, transferred to the
Commonwealth sector to support the Hook defense, were fired on CCF
troop activity there. Another curtain of flame engulfed the Carson
intruders. When the fighting started, 15 Marine tanks were positioned
in the Turkish sector. Company B and C vehicles, under Captains James
M. Sherwood and Robert J. Post, relentlessly pounded the approaching
CCF columns, while Company D was put on a 30-minute standby. As the
action developed, additional tanks were committed until 33 were on line
at one time or another.[431]
[431] Discussing the Army employment of tanks in fixed MLR
positions, Lieutenant Colonel Post recalled that although
many Marine tankers were originally opposed to this
procedure, “I am forced to confess that it worked well
in that static defensive situation.” A major advantage
resulting from this change was that tanks effectively
linked the MLR with rear area CPs through land line and
radio. While initial preparatory fire often tore out
the phone lines, the radios worked well and this was
“generally the only reliable means of communications with
the scene of action.” _Post ltr._
When savage Chinese pummeling of the 25th Division outposts continued
the following day, Colonel Nelson’s 1st Marines was transferred at
1315 to operational control of I Corps. The regiment’s three infantry
battalions, antitank, and heavy mortar companies promptly moved out
from their Britannia headquarters and within two hours had relocated at
25th Division bivouac areas south of the KANSAS line in readiness for
counterattack orders. The 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company
was similarly ordered to 25th Division control to relieve a 14th
Infantry Regiment reserve company in position along the east bank Imjin
River defenses.
Overhead, close air support runs were being conducted by pilots of
Marine Attack Squadrons 212, 121, and 323. A series of seven 4-plane
strikes hit repeatedly from noon on those Chinese troops, hardware,
and resupply areas north of the 25th Division line. The aerial assault
continued late into the night with MPQ missions executed by VMA-121 and
VMF-311.
During the 29th, control of the Vegas outposts--where 1st Division
Marines had fought and died exactly two months earlier--changed hands
several times between the indomitable Turkish defenders and the
persistent Chinese. By dark, the CCF had wrested the northern crest
from the TAFC which still held the southeastern face of the position.
In the 24-hour period from 1800 on the 28th through the 29th, the 11th
Marines had expended 41,523 rounds in 531 missions. At one point in
the action Chinese counterbattery fire scored a direct hit on Turkish
gun emplacements, knocking six howitzers out of action from the
explosions of charges already loaded. As a result 2/11, under its new
battalion commander, Major Max Berueffy, Jr., took over the direct
support mission of the TAFC Brigade. Marine artillery spotters on
station from 0450 to midnight directed 42 fire missions on CCF guns,
while the rocket battery unleashed 20 ripples against troop activity,
one of which caused 50 WIAs. Although an Allied counterattack early in
the day had restored Elko to friendly control, the enemy refused to be
dislodged from Carson.
I Corps had previously regarded the defensive positions of the Nevada
complex as “critical,” with the TAFC having been “instructed to hold
them against all enemy attacks.”[432] By midday on the 29th, however,
the I Corps commander, General Clarke, and 25th Division CG, General
Williams, had apparently had a change of mind. The Vegas strength was
down to some 40 Turks. Altogether more than 150 men under the 25th
command had been killed and another 245 wounded in defense of Nevada
positions. It appeared that the Chinese, constantly reinforcing with
fresh battalions despite estimated losses of 3,000, intended to retain
the offensive until the outposts were taken.
[432] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 462.
With Carson and Vegas both occupied by the enemy, the Elko position
became untenable without the support of its sister outposts. Six times
the CCF had crossed over from Carson to Elko to try to retake the
latter position, but had been thus far deterred by Allied firepower.
Accordingly, at 2300, the 25th Division ordered its reserve 14th
Regiment, earlier committed to the Elko-Carson counterattack, to
withdraw from Elko and the Turks to pull back from Vegas to the MLR.
By daybreak the withdrawal was completed and 25th Division and Turkish
troops had regrouped on the MLR.
The Army reported that more than 117,000 rounds of artillery and 67
close air support missions had buttressed the UNC ground effort.
Official estimates indicated that in the three-day action the Chinese
had fired 65,000 rounds of artillery and mortar, “up to this point an
unprecedented volume in the Korean War.”[433] The Marine artillery
contribution from its four active battalions during this 28–30 May
period totaled 56,280 rounds in 835 missions.
[433] _Ibid._, p. 464.
During the three-day siege, 15 to 33 Marine tanks poured their lethal
90mm projectiles on the enemy from MLR firing slots. At times the
action was so heavy that the tanks were refueled on line. As they ran
out of ammunition and fuel, “armored utility vehicles of the battalion,
with a basic load of ammunition aboard, maneuvered beside the tanks
in position and rearmed them on the spot,”[434] to permit virtual
uninterrupted tank firing. One Marine was killed in the action the
first night. Although 4,162 rounds of Chinese fire fell near the tank
positions, no damage to materiel was reported. For their part the M-46s
and flames were responsible for 721 enemy deaths, an estimated 137 more
killed, 141 wounded, and an estimated 1,200 injured.
[434] 1st TkBn ComdD, May 53, p. 3.
During the second day of action, nearly 20 missions were flown by
Corsairs and Skyraiders of the three Marine attack squadrons and the
jet fighters of VMF-311 and -115. Altogether throughout 28–30 May,
Marine aircraft had flown no less than 119 sorties for the inflamed
sectors of the U.S. Army 25th Division and adjacent British 1st
Commonwealth Division. Of these, 99 were in support of the sagging
Carson-Elko-Vegas-Berlins line.
Ground action ceased the following day as rain drenched the
battlefield, although the 11th Marines reported sightings of more than
200 Chinese soldiers, most of them on the three recently lost outposts.
Benched while the fierce battle was going on, the 1st Marines remained
under operational control of I Corps as a possible contingency force
from 29 May to 5 June. On the latter date, following the Eighth Army
decision not to retake the Carson-Elko-Vegas outposts, the regiment
reverted to Marine control and returned to Camp Britannia. The previous
day the Communists had agreed on all major points of the UNC final
offer and it appeared that a ceasefire was close at hand.
Diplomats and military leaders both felt this latest Chinese assault
was to show a strong military hand and win dominating terrain features
along the MLR. Thus the enemy would be able to improve his defensive
posture when final battlelines were adjusted at the truce. It was not
believed that the CCF effort was an attempt to expand their operations
into a general offensive. In any event, the Nevada positions were
downgraded from their previous designation as major outposts. I Corps
also decreed no further effort would be made to retake them and that a
“revaluation of the terrain in view of the destruction of the defensive
work indicates these hills are not presently essential to defense of
the sector.”[435]
[435] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 7thInfDiv, CG, 25thInfDiv, CG,
1stMarDiv, GOC, 1stComWelDiv, CG I Corps Arty, dtd 9 Jun
53 in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 53, App. 1, p. 1.
If things were now relatively quiet along the battlefront of the
I Corps coastal sector, the situation had begun to heat up in the
central part of the UNC defense line. On 10 June, following a CCF
realignment of troops and supply buildup that had not gone unnoticed
by Eighth Army intelligence officials, elements of the CCF 60th and
68th Armies struck the ROK II Corps area, on the east-central front.
(See Map 29.) Advancing south along both sides of the Pukhan River with
two divisions, the Chinese struck at the ROK II defense line which
originally had bulged out to form a salient in the Kumsong vicinity.
Within six days the ROK line had been forced back 4,000 yards. In
subsequent assaults the enemy made new penetrations further west in the
ROK II MLR. Although the main Communist thrust was directed against the
ROK II Corps, secondary attacks were also made in the X Corps sector
east of ROK II, in the Punchbowl area manned by the ROK 20th Division.
It was the heaviest, all-out drive since the CCF spring offensive of
April-May 1951, when the UNC had been pushed south approximately 30
miles across the entire Korean front.
By 18 June, the CCF assaults started to settle down. During the nine
days of flaming action, ROK units had suffered some 7,300 casualties
to enemy losses of 6,600. Boundaries had been redrawn and three ROK
divisions had been redeployed in counterattacks to plug holes in the
line that the Chinese had punched open. Nearly 15,000 yards of ROK
front had been pushed 4,000 yards south and several hill positions east
of the Pukhan had been lost.
[Illustration:
MAP 29 K. WHITE
EIGHTH ARMY SECTORS
1 JANUARY-27 JULY 1953]
The brief respite ended 24 June when the CCF again directed heavy blows
against the ROK troops, ignoring other UN forces in the Eighth Army
line. It was generally considered a retaliatory move for the 18 June
mass release of anti-Communist prisoners by South Korean President
Rhee. This time the major target of the renewed Chinese offensive was
the ROK 9th Division, in the IX Corps sector immediately west of the
ROK II Corps. On 25 June the 1st ROK Division on the eastern flank of
I Corps, to the right of the 1st Commonwealth Division, was pounded
by another Chinese division. Significantly, the date was the third
anniversary of the invasion of South Korea.[436] The 7th Marines,
training in I Corps reserve, was put on standby status. The regiment
was removed the following day when the 1st KMC/RCT (minus its 3d
Battalion) was instead placed in readiness,[437] and subsequently moved
out from its Indianhead area to be committed as a relief force in the
left sector of the 1st ROK line.
[436] The strong likelihood of such attacks at this time
had been noted by Eighth Army in a warning issued
the previous day that reminded all commanders to be
“particularly alert” at this time. CG, 8th Army msg to
CG, 1stMarDiv and addees, G-3 Jnl, dtd 24 Jun 53.
[437] This change was due to the existing policy of not having
a United States unit serving under operational control
of a Korean commander. Had the 7th Marines or other U.S.
unit been so committed, it is expected that a provisional
task force would have been created for the assignment,
under a non-Korean commander. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6,
Chap. 9, p. 9-20. Actually, the 7th Marines alert on the
25th was of such short duration that no mention of it
appears in the regimental command diary, although the
fact is so noted in division records. The 1st KMC/RCT
was ordered to move out from the Indianhead area at 1630
on 26 June and came under operational control of 1st ROK
Division at 1540, 27 June. By 0100 the following day, it
had relieved 11th ROK Regiment. _ROKMC Comments._
By the 26th, the persistent Chinese probes of the 1st ROK sector had
resulted in several forward outposts being overrun. To help stem the
action the Marine 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery was displaced on I Corps
Artillery order from its regular position (in the right regimental
sector) 20 miles east to support the hard-pressed ROK division. On at
least two occasions the battery placed ripples between ROK positions
only 600 yards apart and it was felt that these “continued requests
for fire close to friendly troops attested to the gunnery of the
unit.”[438] Between that date and the 30th, the rocket battery remained
in the ROK sector, firing a total of 25 ripples. For the 25th Infantry
Division sector, however, the front continued undisturbed throughout
the entire month of June.
[438] 11thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 15.
_Developments in Marine Air_[439]
[439] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap 10, No. 5,
Chap 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1/7
ComdD, Apr 53, App. IV, Rpt of Night Air Strikes; 1st
MAW, MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311,
VMF(N)-513, VMJ-1 ComdDs, Apr-Jun 53; VMA-312 ComdDs,
Apr-May 53; VMA-251 ComdD, June 53; VMO-6 ComdD, Apr 53;
Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_.
While the division was in I Corps reserve during the greater part
of the April-June period, the 6,800-man 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
continued its missions as an operational component of Fifth Air Force.
For the Marine air arm it was a time of a major tactical innovation,
a number of new air records set, and rapid personnel changes in the
squadrons.
Shortly before the Marine division went off the line, a new method of
close air support at night was introduced. This employed the use of two
or more ground controlled 24-inch searchlights located on prominent
terrain features along the MLR in the 7th Marines left battalion sector
where the missions were to be flown. Enemy-held reverse slopes--in
some cases less than 500 yards from Marine positions--were thereby
pinpointed by the powerful intersecting searchlight beams. These long
pencil-shaped beams created an excellent artificial horizon and enabled
pilots to make bombing or strafing runs with a high degree of accuracy
even on the blackest of nights. Manned by ANGLICO personnel, the lights
were employed either for target location or illumination (both shadow
and direct). A tactical airborne observer in an OE light liaison plane
of VMO-6 directed the searchlight teams and controlled the missions.
A week of experimentation and trial runs to perfect the night close
air support (NCAS) was conducted by several VMF(N)-513 pilots under
direction of Colonel Jack R. Cram. Formerly CO of Marine Air Control
Group Two at K-3, he had extended his tour in Korea to complete work
on the new program. On 12 April, the first night of operations, Major
Charles L. Schroeder and Second Lieutenant Thomas F. St. Denis flew two
night support missions in F7F Tigercats. Although employed only a few
weeks prior to the division going into reserve on 5 May, the new system
rated an enthusiastic response from both pilots and ground commanders,
all the way up to the division CG. As the latter reported to the
Commandant following the first week of night close support missions,
“results ... exceeded all expectations.”[440]
[440] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CMC, dtd 18 Apr 53; in 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Apr 53, App. II, p. 2.
Between 12 April and 5 May, the night fighter squadron conducted 58
NCAS sorties in the division right sector employing this new control
system with excellent results.[441] The procedure was a marked success
and made it possible to provide continuous 24-hour-a-day close support
to Marine infantry units. It was considered a supplement to, not a
replacement for the MPQ (radar controlled bombing) missions of MASRT-1.
Plans called for F9F aircraft to be integrated into the program, since
the F7F Tigercats were being replaced by jets. Allied psychological
warfare teams on 17 April introduced a different theme in their
broadcasts to the enemy: that of the dangers to the CCF from the new
searchlight marking of targets. As a Marine training bulletin noted:
“It is believed that this method of attack by aircraft is particularly
demoralizing to the enemy because he is unable to anticipate where
the strike will hit, and therefore has no means of defending himself
against it.”[442]
[441] Confirmed damage assessment in this period: 75 enemy
KIA, 5 WIA; 25 bunkers, 12 personnel shelters, 20 mortar
positions, 32 automatic weapons positions, 1 ammunition
bunker, and 1 37mm AA position destroyed; 1 supply area,
3 weapons damaged; 1,545 yards trenchline destroyed;
and 190 secondary explosions or fires. Due to operating
conditions, these figures represented only 80 percent of
the total flights made on which TAOs confirmed results.
VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr-May 53.
[442] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-106, quoting
1stMarDiv Training Bulletin No. 5-53, dtd 10 Jun 53.
Another tactical improvement about this same time dealt with artillery
flak suppression in support of close support aircraft. Two refinements
made in the procedure in the late spring of 1953 involved firing of
HE rounds during the actual run of planes over the target. Basically,
the plan consisted of releasing a TOT or VT concentration on the most
lucrative enemy antiaircraft positions within a 2,500-yard circle
around the strike area. A continuous rain of HE-fuzed projectiles was
placed on these targets for a three-minute period, during which Marine
planes made their runs.
Favorable results were achieved in that new system tended to keep enemy
antiaircraft gunners off-balance for a longer period of time and thus
decreased the danger to friendly attacking aircraft. On the other hand,
pilots quickly noted that this became an “unimaginative employment of
an unvarying flak suppression schedule which Communist AA gunners soon
caught onto and turned to their own advantage.”[443]
[443] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-70.
With respect to squadron hardware, Marine combat potential increased
substantially during the spring months with the phasing out of F7Fs in
Night Fighter Squadron 513 and introduction of the new F3D-2 twin-jet
Skyknight intruder. By late May the Allocation of 24 of these jet
night fighters had been augmented by 4 more jets from the carrier USS
_Lake Champlain_ and the squadron “assumed its primary night-fighter
mission for the first time in the Korean War.”[444] While the sturdy,
dependable Tigercats[445] made their final contribution to the United
Nations air effort early in May with the experimental NCAS program, the
new Skyknights continued the squadron’s unique assignment inaugurated
in late 1952 as night escort to Air Force B-29 bombers on their strike
missions. Not a single B-29 was lost to enemy interceptors after 29
January 1953. The capabilities of the skilled Marine night-fighters
were noted in a “well done” message received by the CO, VMF(N)-513 in
April from the Air Force.[446]
[444] _Ibid._, p. 10-99.
[445] Also characterized by squadron members as the “tired old
Tigercats” in reference to the war-weary, 1945-vintage
aircraft. VMF(N)-513 ComdD, May 53, p. 6.
[446] CO, 19th Bomber Group (Col Harvey C. Dorney, USAF)
msg to CO, VMF(N)-513 (LtCol Robert F. Conley), n.d.,
reading: “19th Bomber Group Airborne Commander and crews
participating in attack on Sinanju Bridge Complex, 11
April, have high praise for night fighter protection. All
feel that without their protection severe damage or loss
of B-29’s would have resulted.” VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Apr 53,
p. 6.
Organizational changes within the wing included the arrival, on 29
May, of a new MAG-12 unit to replace the “Checkerboard” squadron.
VMA-332 (Lieutenant Colonel John B. Berteling) was slated to operate
on board the USS _Bairoko_ (CVE-115) for the F4U carrier-based
squadron VMA-312[447] due for return to CONUS. Veteran of 33 months of
combat while attached to the wing as West Coast (CTE 95.1.1) aerial
reconnaissance and blockade squadron, VMA-312 (Lieutenant Colonel
Winston E. Jewson) was officially relieved 10 June. The change,
moreover, was the first phase of a new personnel policy, carrier unit
rotation, that was expected to implement a unit rotation program for
land-based squadrons. It was anticipated that the new unit rotation
program would eliminate inherent weakness of the individual pilot
rotation system and thus increase the combat effectiveness of the
wing.[448]
[447] Prior to early May, VMA-312 had been based aboard the USS
_Bataan_ (CVL-29). The carrier itself was scheduled for
relief from the Korean Theater shortly before the new
afloat MAG-12 squadron reported in, and a transfer was
made by 312 to the new, larger escort carrier on 8 May.
[448] Comments _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-33:
“Severe tactical operations weakness developed throughout
the war in Korea which can be traced directly to the
individual pilot rotation system. These weaknesses are
inherent in any system which precludes pre-combat unit
training of pilots in the tactical squadron with which
they later go into combat. The situation is aggravated
further when pilots, many of them inadequately pre-combat
trained, are rotated through combat engaged units so
rapidly that squadron esprit cannot develop to a degree
which will insure a high standard of tactical efficiency.”
During the period other organizational changes included transfer
of administrative control of VMF(N)-513 on 15 May from MAG-33 to
MAG-12.[449] The squadron, with its new twin-engined jet fighters,
moved from K-8 (Kunsan) further up the coast to the MAG-12 complex at
K-6 (Pyongtaek), upon completion of the new 8,000-foot concrete runway
there. This phased redeployment of nightfighter personnel and equipment
began in late May and was concluded on 6 June without any interim
reduction of combat commitments. Replacement of the squadron F7F-3Ns
with F3D-2s was also completed in early June.
[449] MAG-12, since 1 April, had been under Colonel Edward B.
Carney, who assumed command upon reassignment of Colonel
Bowman to the States.
Late that month, plans were underway for two additional changes:
the Marine photographic squadron, VMJ-1, was due to be separated
administratively and operationally from MAG-33 on 1 July and revert
to 1st MAW; and Marine Wing Service Squadron One (MWSS-1) was to be
deactivated, effective 1 July.
The change of command relationships between CG, FAF and CG, 1st MAW
earlier in the year[450] which had restored operational control of
certain designated Marine air units to the wing commander, increased
the efficiency of 1st MAW operations. Despite the fact that VMJ-1 at
times contributed nearly 40 percent to the total FAF input of all
daylight combat photographs,[451] aerial intelligence (both pre-
and post-strike photos) supplied to wing and group headquarters was
considered inadequate. As a MAG-33 intelligence officer commented with
some exasperation as late in the war as May 1953:
[450] See Chapter VI.
[451] The magnitude of the VMJ-1 work load “can be gauged by
one day’s peak effort of 5,000 exposures, which, if laid
end to end, would cover a strip of ground one and one
half miles long.” _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10, p.
10-67.
The Section continued to experience difficulty in obtaining
1:50,000 scale overlays of friendly MLR and OP positions. These
overlays are important for making up target maps for close
support missions, but they are continually held up for long
periods by higher echelons, and, if received here at all, are
then often too old to be considered reliable.[452]
[452] MAG-33 ComdD, May 53, p. H-2.
Similarly, at the individual squadron level, the carrier unit VMA-312
shortly before its relief, reported: “The one limitation on squadron
activities continued to be photo coverage of the strikes. With limited
facilities available, the squadron has no clear cut pictures of strike
results.”[453] Return of VMJ-1 to operational control of General Megee
ultimately “gave the Wing adequate photo-intelligence for the first
time since commencement of combat operations in Korea.”[454]
[453] VMA-312 ComdD, May 53, p. G-2.
[454] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-65.
Indoctrination of new replacement personnel within the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing took a swift upturn during the spring period. Pilots
who had completed 100 combat missions were transferred to staff duty
elsewhere in the wing in Korea or rotated Stateside. The average
squadron personnel strength ran to 88 percent of T/O for enlisted; and
officer strength, considerably less, frequently dipped as low as 61
percent. Under the 100-missions policy, it was a time of rapid turnover
of unit commanders, too, as witnessed from the following squadron diary
entries:
_VMA-212_--Lieutenant Colonel James R. Wallace assumed command
from Major Edward C. Kicklighter, effective 19 June; the latter
had been squadron ExO and acting CO in interim period following
30 April departure of former CO, Lieutenant Colonel Smunk;
_VMA-323_--Lieutenant Colonel Clarence H. Moore vice Lieutenant
Colonel Frash, on 11 April; and Major Robert C. Woten succeeding
Lieutenant Colonel Moore on 27 June;
_VMA-121_--Major Richard L. Braun vice Lieutenant Colonel Hughes,
on 21 April;
_VMF(N)-513_--Lieutenant Colonel Ross S. Mickey vice Lieutenant
Colonel Conley, on 6 May; in June, Lieutenant Colonel Robert
L. Conrad, acting CO, named CO for Lieutenant Colonel Mickey,
hospitalized for injuries received in a May aircraft accident;
_VMJ-1_--Lieutenant Colonel Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. vice Lieutenant
Colonel William M. Ritchey, on 15 May;
_VMF-311_--Lieutenant Colonel Arthur M. Moran vice Lieutenant
Colonel Coss, on 21 April; Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane
vice Lieutenant Colonel Moran, on 1 June;
_VMF-115_--Lieutenant Colonel Lynn H. Stewart vice Lieutenant
Colonel Warren, 5 June.
With respect to CAS activities, excellent weather in April--only a
single day of restricted flying--brought the 1st MAW air tally that
month for its land-based squadrons to 3,850 effective combat sorties
(440 more by VMA-312) and 7,052.8 combat hours. This was a substantial
increase over the preceding months. Not surprisingly, the average daily
sortie rate for the month was correspondingly high: 128.3. Of 1,319
CAS sorties the largest proportion, 579 and 424 (43.9 percent, 32.1
percent), were for Marine and ROK operations, respectively.
The outstanding day of the month was 17 April. During the 24-hour
reporting period, 262 sorties were completed by MAGs-33 and -12
pilots,[455] who expended a combined total of 228.3 tons of bombs
and 28,385 rounds of 20mm ammunition. For the two MAG-33 fighter
bomber squadrons, it represented maximum effort day. Preparation had
been made a week earlier to devise the targeting and best all-round
flight schedules for ordnance and line sections. Objective areas for
the mass attack were picked by the wing G-3 target selection branch
and approved by the EUSAK-Fifth Air Force JOC. It was decided that
“flights of eight aircraft staggered throughout the day would offer the
best efficiency in expediting reloading and refueling with not more
than sixteen aircraft inactive on the flight line at one time.”[456]
Throughout the day, from 0410 to 2030, VMFs-311 and -115 continuously
pounded designated targets in support of the U.S. 7th and 3d Infantry
Divisions.[457] Commented MAG-33:
[455] Between 15–18 April the west coast carrier squadron
was under a FEAF order restricting normal interdiction
missions. This was to protect UNC sick and wounded POWs
in transit from China to Kaesong for final exchange
at Panmunjom. VMA-312 air operations were held to CAS
along the bombline. “Marine fliers of the ‘Checkerboard’
squadron proved adept at this unusual role [CAS support
missions along the front lines], and received a ‘well
done’ from JOC Korea as the Corsairs flew more than 100
close air support sorties from 16–18 April.” _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-110.
[456] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.
[457] Their respective locations were: 7th Division, at the
extreme right of I Corps sector; and further east, the
3d Division occupied the corresponding right flank of IX
Corps sector. VMF-311 concentrated on the 7th Division
targets while VMF-115 efforts were devoted primarily to
the 3d Division.
Hitting an all-time high in the annals of memorable days, this,
the seventeenth of April not only further proved MAG-33’s ability
to cripple the enemy’s already diminishing strength but it also
allowed VMF-115 to set records in total airborne sorties launched
in a single day plus a record total ordnance carried and expended
in one day by jet type aircraft.[458]
[458] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.
VMF-115 alone, with 30 pilots and 23 aircraft, had flown 114 sorties
and delivered 120 tons of bombs on North Korean targets.
A sample of the intensity of this maximum day was a series of three
early-morning interdiction strikes led by three VMF-115 pilots that
launched the effort. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Joe L. Warren, Major
Samuel J. Mantel, Jr., and Major John F. Bolt, the 23 attacking Panther
jets lashed the objective with 22.35 tons of ordnance and 4,630 rounds
of 20mm ammunition. The three missions destroyed half of the buildings
and inflamed 95 percent of the target area in the enemy supply
concentration point T’ongch’on on the Korean east coast.
By contrast, wing operations in May were considerably hampered by the
bad weather peculiar to this time of the year in Korea. Restricted
flying conditions were recorded for 18 days of the month. A total of
153 CAS sorties were flown for the Marine division before its 5 May
relief from the front lines. Of the wing’s 3,359 sorties[459] during
the month, 1,405 were for close support to forward units beating back
Communist encroachment efforts. The allocation of CAS sorties was
412 for U.S. infantry divisions (including 211 for the 25th Division
occupying the customary Marine sector); 153 for the 1st Commonwealth
Division at the Hook which the Communists assaulted on 27–28 May as
part of their overall thrust against western I Corps defenses; 412
sorties for ROK units; and 63, miscellaneous. Heaviest action for
Marine aviators took place towards the end of the month to thwart
enemy blows in the I Corps sector where Army and Turkish units were
attempting to repulse the Chinese.
[459] This figure does not include sorties by VMA-312
(carrier-based), VMO-6, or HMR-161, the latter two under
operational control of the 1st Marine Division.
The renewed effort of the Chinese Communists against UNC ground forces
in late May continued sporadically the following month. A number of new
records were set by Marines flying CAS assignments under the Fifth Air
Force. During the intense mid-June attacks on the ROK II Corps area
and adjacent X Corps sector, MAGs-12 and -33 pilots chalked up some
busy days. Between 10–17 June, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft
had flown 8,359 effective sorties, the bulk of this massive FAF
effort to buttress the crumbling ROK defense. Of this number, Marine
sorties totaled 1,156, or nearly 14 percent. (Combat sorties for the
1st MAW throughout June came to 3,276 despite 23 days of marginal to
nonoperational weather.) Marine pilots scored as high as 48 percent
of a single day’s interdiction strikes made by FAF. This occurred 15
June when the 1st MAW flew a record-breaking 283 sorties, followed by
another peak 227 sorties the next day.
Actually, when the ground situation in the ROK II Corps front began to
deteriorate on 12 June, the new Fifth Air Force commander, Lieutenant
General Samuel E. Anderson, “waived the [3,000 foot] minimum-altitude
restrictions on his fighter-bombers and ordered his wings to give
all-out support to the Eighth Army.”[460] The Seventh Fleet commander,
Admiral Clark, likewise kept his carriers on line for seven days and
ordered its naval pilots to “team with Marine and Fifth Air Force
airmen for a close-support effort exceeding anything up to that
time.”[461] When the ROK II Corps defenses cracked open on 15 June,
temporary clearing weather “allowed General Anderson and Admiral Clark
to hit the Reds with everything they had. FEAF planes flew a total of
2,143 sorties of all kinds for the largest single day’s effort of the
war.”[462]
[460] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 631.
[461] _Ibid._
[462] _Ibid._
Commenting on this heavy action period, 14–17 June, a dispatch to
General Megee from the new FAF commander, who had succeeded General
Barcus the previous month, noted:
The figures are now in. From 2000, 14 Jun 53, to 0001, 17 Jun
53, Fifth Air Force units flew a total of 3,941 combat sorties.
The cost was 9 pilots lost, 11 aircraft lost, 11 aircraft major
damage, 42 aircraft minor damage. The results: 1 enemy offensive
stopped cold. I very deeply appreciate the splendid efforts of
all members of the 5th AF at all levels. Only a concerted team
effort made the foregoing possible.[463]
[463] CG, FAF msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 17 Jun 53, in 1st MAW
ComdD Jun 53 (Vol I), p. 3 and App., IV (Vol III).
This came, incidentally, only five days after receipt by the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing of the Korean Presidential Unit Citation.[464] The award
cited the wing’s “outstanding and superior performance of duty” between
27 February 1951 and 11 June 1953. During this period Marine fliers
executed more than 80,000 combat sorties for UNC divisions.
[464] Presentation of this second Korean PUC to the 1st MAW
was made by South Korean President Rhee in impressive
ceremonies 12 June at MAG-33 headquarters, K-3. Among
the many ranking military officials attending the
ceremony was Admiral Radford, former CinCPacFlt, and
newly-appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The fighter-bombers of MAG-33 and the MAG-12 attack planes saw heavy
action during 24–30 June when the Chinese again concentrated their
attention on ROK divisions in the UNC line. Peak operational day was 30
June. Marine squadrons alone executed 301 sorties, including 28 percent
of the CAS and 24 percent of total FAF interdiction missions. It was
also an outstanding day for MAG-12 which “outdid itself by flying 217
combat sorties against enemy forces. The 30th of this month saw MAG-12
establish a new ordnance record when an all-time high of 340 tons of
bombs and napalm were dropped on North Korea.”[465] Contributing
heavily to this accomplishment was Marine Attack Squadron 121. It
unleashed 156 tons of ordnance, a squadron record. It was believed this
also established an all-time record for tonnage expended on the enemy
by a Marine single-engine propeller squadron.
[465] MAG-12 ComdD, Jun 53, p. C-1.
_Other Marine Defense Activities_[466]
[466] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 5, Chaps. 2, 8, No.
6, Chaps. 2, 9; WCIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; ECIDE(U)
ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; Cagle and Manson, _Sea War,
Korea_; Field, _NavOps, Korea_.
Like their counterparts on the Korean mainland, the Marines, naval
gunfire teams, and ROK security troops comprising the West Coast and
East Coast Island Defense Commands felt the alternating pressure
build-up and slow-down that typified the closing months of the war.
At both installations the defense had been recently strengthened,
more or less by way of response to a CINCPacFleet intelligence
evaluation in December 1952. This alerted the isolated island forces
to the possibility of a renewed Communist attempt to recapture their
positions. The Allied east coast defense structure at Wonsan, right at
the enemy’s own front door just above the 39th Parallel, was considered
particularly vulnerable.
As in the preceding months, the mission of the west coast island group
remained unchanged--namely, the occupation, defense, and control of
its six island components. These, it will be remembered, were: Sok-to,
Cho-do, Paengyong-do (command headquarters), Yongpyong-do, and the two
lesser islands at Taechong-do and Tokchok-to.[467] Formal designation
of the island commands was modified on 1 January 1953. At this time
the West Coast and East Coast Island Defense Elements (TE 95.15 and
TE 95.23) were redesignated as Task Units (TU 95.1.3 and TU 95.2.3)
respectively. Korean Marines, who represented the bulk of these task
units, were provided from the 2d KMC Regiment, the island security
force. This unit constituted the main defense for the important U.S.
Marine-controlled islands off the Korean west and east coasts.
[467] Locations given on WCIDE map, Chapter II.
Approximately 17 Marine officers and 100 enlisted men were assigned
to the western coastal complex, with two battalions of Korean Marines
fleshing out the garrison defense. The primary mission of this
island group was to serve as offshore bases for UNC intelligence
activities, including encouragement of friendly guerrilla operations
conducted by anti-Communist North Korean personnel. Artillery based
on the Marine-controlled islands provided both defensive fires and
counterbattery missions against enemy guns sited on the nearby mainland.
The secondary mission of WCIDU, that of training Korean troops in
infantry and weapons firing exercises, continued to be hampered
somewhat by faulty communication. As one officer observed, the training
program to qualify selected KMCs for naval gunfire duties “met with
only modest success, due primarily to the language barrier and lack
of communications equipment in the Korean Marine Corps. Personnel
who had received this training did prove to be extremely helpful in
accompanying raiding parties on the mainland in that they were able to
call for and adjust fires.”[468]
[468] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-128. See also
Chapter II.
Enemy pressure against the West Coast Islands, both from Communist
shore guns and bombing, had increased during the fall and winter of
1952. Cho-do, shaped roughly like a giant downward-plunging fish, as
previously noted had been bombed in October for the first time in the
history of the command. This new trend was repeated for the next two
months. By way of response, two 90mm guns were transferred to Cho-do
from Kanghwa-do (a more peaceful guerrilla-controlled island northwest
of Inchon) for use there as counterbattery fire against aggressive
mainland batteries. The islands of Sok-to and Paengyong-do had
likewise been bombed during this period, although no damage or serious
casualties resulted. In December, enemy shore guns fired 752 rounds
against Task Force 95 (United Nations Blockading and Escort Force)
ships charged with responsibility for the island defense, in contrast
to the 156 rounds of the preceding month.
Intelligence in December from “Leopard,” the friendly Korean guerrilla
unit at Paengyong-do, also reported the presence of junks, rubber
boats, and a nearby enemy artillery battalion off Chinnampo, believed
to be in readiness to attack the island. A captured POW, moreover,
on 22 December reported that elements of the 23d NKPA Brigade located
on the mainland across from Sok-to would attempt to seize the island
group before the end of the year. The next day, shortly after dusk,
when a concentration of 200 rounds[469] of 76mm suddenly fell on
Sok-to, and another 125 rounds struck neighboring Cho-do, it looked as
if it might be the beginning of trouble. Naval gunfire (NGF) spotters
on the islands directed the fire from UNC patrol boats cruising the
Yellow Sea. This counterbattery fire quickly silenced the enemy guns.
Again, at the end of the month, West Coast islands were alerted for an
invasion, but it never materialized.
[469] An average day’s enemy harassment consisted of 4, 7, 10,
or at the most approximately 28 rounds of fire. WCIDE
ComdDs, _passim_.
A matter of continuing concern to the command during the fall and
winter months was the North Korean refugee problem. So serious was the
situation, in fact, that it had warranted a directive from the TF 95
commander (Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich). In the early fall, a large
number of refugees had filtered into the West Coast Islands, raising
serious doubts as to their feeding and ultimate survival during the
Korean winter. Through the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, a
tentative date of September had been set for evacuating these North
Korean refugees to South Korea. By November the question of their
relocation was still not settled, although the feeding problem had been
eased somewhat by two LST-resupply loads of emergency rations and grain
by CTF 90.
Activities followed a fairly consistent pattern during early 1953,
with harassing fire striking the islands from the North Korean shore
batteries and sporadic bomb and propaganda drops. Periodically USAF
pilots who had strayed off course, planes from the nearby British
carriers HMS _Glory_ or _Ocean_, or Marine fliers from USS _Badoeng
Strait_ or _Bataan_ made emergency landings on the beach airstrips
at Paengyong-do for engine repairs or refueling. Logistical support
continued to be a problem, due to the peculiarities of the joint
ordering system through the Army. In January the western islands had
unfilled requisitions dated from as early as February 1952. Official
unit reports also noted the difficulty of obtaining medical supplies
either promptly or in full.
In April, with the hot-cold cease-fire talks again taking one of their
spasmodic upswings, WCIDU commander, Colonel Harry N. Shea, conferred
with American and British naval officials regarding CTG 95.1’s (Royal
Navy Commander, West Coast Blockading and Patrol Group) Operation
PANDORA. This called for the evacuation of Sok-to and Cho-do, the two
WCIDU islands north of the 38th Parallel, at the time of the armistice.
Increased naval gunfire and artillery missions against active
enemy mainland targets, caves, and observation posts gave the two
new 90mm guns delivered to the Sok-to garrison the month before
and the pair already at Cho-do, as well as their gun crews, some
unscheduled practice. Marine garrison personnel at the two islands
and nearby patrol ships were busy 25 days of the month knocking out
or neutralizing Communist mainside batteries. Late that month, the
battleship USS _New Jersey_ stationed off the east coast, sailed around
the Korean peninsula to add its 16-inch guns to the bombardment. Enemy
shelling of the two western islands increased in June, with 1,815
rounds expended in response by the two Marine gun sections.
During June, as it appeared the end of the war was in sight, the
first phase of PANDORA got underway with the evacuation by CTF 95 of
approximately 19,425 partisans, their families, and refugees from
Sok-to and Cho-do to islands south of the 38th Parallel. A new WCIDU
commander, Colonel Alexander B. Swenceski, had also arrived by this
time, since the average tour of duty was but a brief four months at
both island commands.
Across the Korean peninsula, the east coast Allied offshore island
defense centered on a cluster of islands in Wonsan Harbor. Situated
more than 100 miles north of the battleline, these strategically-placed
islands comprised the northernmost UN-held territory in Korea. The East
Coast Island Defense Command numbered approximately 35 Marines, 1,270
Korean Marines, and 15 Naval personnel. Headquarters for TU 95.2.3 was
Yo-do, the largest installation, which was garrisoned by approximately
300 Korean Marines and a limited detachment of USMC and USN personnel.
Smaller defense forces were located on the other islands under ECIDU
command.[470] In addition, an improvised NGF spotting team was also
stationed at the three forward islands (Mo-do, Tae-do, and Hwangto-do).
Mission of the ECIDU was a defensive one: to hold the islands as a
base for covert intelligence activities. The island defense system
existed for the purpose of “containing and destroying any enemy forces
who escape detection or who press home an attack in the face of Navy
attempts at their destruction.”[471]
[470] See Chapter II and ECIDE map.
[471] ECIDE ComdD, Oct 2, p. 1.
Individual island commanders were responsible for the defense of their
small parcels of seaborne real estate, control of both defensive and
offensive NGF missions in the area, and evaluation of intelligence
regarding enemy troop locations, the movement of supplies north, or
new emplacements of hostile guns. Fire support for the ECIDU islands,
exposed to the enemy shore batteries above the 39th Parallel, was
available from Task Force 95, which maintained a task, group of ships
off both the east and west coasts. Aircraft and ships of Task Force
77 (Seventh Fleet Striking Force), operating off the East Korean
coastline, were also on call. In December, for instance, the Corsairs
of TF 77 had resumed their rail-bridge interdiction. All-out attacks on
railroad and highway bridges, as well as bombing runs on the 90-mile
stretch of east coast railroad from Hungnam to Songjin, were undertaken
to cut off supplies being moved north for Communist industrial use.
February marked the second anniversary of the siege of Wonsan by the
UNC, the longest blockade of a port in recent U.S. history. Some
naval authorities by this time argued that the venture had become one
of doubtful merit which “should never have been undertaken, but its
long history made it difficult to abandon without apparent admission
of defeat.”[472] In any event, the month also signaled increasing
attention paid by hostile shore batteries to the little island enclave.
For seven consecutive days, 9–15 February, the harbor islands were
targets for enemy mixed artillery and mortar shells. Minor materiel
damage and casualties were sustained at Yo-do during a Valentine’s Day
bombardment, 14 February.
[472] Field, _NavOps, Korea_, p. 434.
Altogether, the enemy harassed the harbor islands for 16 days during
the month, expending 316 rounds, compared with 11 days in January.
Hostile fire, not limited to the Wonsan Harbor islands, was also
directed against friendly ships USS _DeHaven_ and USS _Moore_. These
provided counterbattery fire and were, in turn, fired upon, the nearest
shells landing only 400 yards from the two vessels. This attack,
also on 14 February, was described as an “unusually determined and
precise”[473] effort. The enemy, moreover, did not appear to take his
usual precautions with respect to disclosing his positions. The fact
that a Communist shore battery would cease fire when subjected to
friendly counterbattery, with other positions then immediately taking
up the delivery, “indicated some sort of central control for the first
time.”[474] The I Corps, NKPA artillery units across from the Wonsan
Island command revealed the “heavy, effective artillery capability of
enemy batteries which encircle Wonsan Harbor.”[475]
[473] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 2, p. 2-5.
[474] _Ibid._
[475] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Feb 53, p. 1. Seventh Fleet intelligence
estimated that there were no less than “21 active
batteries emplaced on Wonsan Bay and within range of our
islands.” _Heinl ltr._
Unseasonably good weather the latter part of February improved the
transportation and supply situation. With the bitter cold and wind
subsiding, maintenance crews could repair the ravages of the past
several months. Craft, up to LCVP size, were hoisted in on a large
pontoon for repair. For most of December and January, “this small,
physically remote Marine Corps command,”[476] as the ECIDU commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr. himself described it, had
been snowbound. Winds howled in excess of 40 knots, and temperatures
dropped to 10° below at night. Personnel at the command island,
Yo-do, subsisted on C rations for eight days. With boating operations
suspended because of the high winds, it was not possible to send
supplies or water to Hwangto-do which for several days relied solely on
melted snow.
[476] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.
The prolonged foul weather, moreover, interrupted all classified radio
communications between the ECIDU and the outside world. Crypto guard
for the Wonsan islands was maintained by elements of the East Coast TG
95. Coded and decoded security radio messages had to be picked up by
patrol boat which could not reach the islands during extreme conditions
of icy seas and heavy snows.
As with the men on the front line, the Communists stepped up their
pressure and gunfire against the island command Marines during
March. The record[477] 524 rounds which fell on the ECIDU islands
in March doubled the following month when the command received 1,050
rounds from active mainland batteries. In April the persistent NKPA
artillerymen kept up a continuing bombardment of the eastern coastal
UNC islands, missing only three days of the entire month, that caused
nine casualties when a direct hit was made on the Tae-do CP bunker. It
was the highest rate of incoming since UN occupation of the islands.
Another April record was enemy mine laying, which increased sharply
in both the WCIDU and ECIDU command areas. A total of 37 mines were
sighted, the highest number since August 1952. Communist shore gunners,
in addition to harassment of the island themselves, fired 2,091 rounds
against TF 95 ships, another all-time high.
[477] Another record at this time was the spate of senior
visiting officers. Seven times during the month no less
than 15 flag and general officers had taken their turn
inspecting the ECIDU command headquarters at Yo-do.
Services represented were the Marine Corps, U.S. Army,
Korean Marine Corps, ROK Navy, and ROK Army. “One local
statistician computed the total number of stars for the
month (one side of the collar only) as 38,” the monthly
report brightly noted. This was believed possibly an
all-time high for any headquarters in the Korean theater,
short of the Eighth Army. ECIDE(U) ComdD, Mar 53, p. 1.
With respect to personnel, the situation had improved markedly. An
increase in ECIDU command strength authorized by CG, FMFPac in March
provided for an additional 9 Marine officers, 38 enlisted Marines,
and 6 Navy personnel. These were exclusive of the current detachments
of 1st ANGLICO shore party and naval maintenance personnel, and
represented nearly a 40 percent strength increase.[478] Not long
afterward the new ECIDU commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hoyt U. Bookhart,
Jr., arrived to succeed Lieutenant Colonel Heinl, who had held the
position since the preceding November.
[478] The previous T/O for the ECIDU was 5 officers and 30
enlisted USMC, 15 USN attached primarily to the Navy
maintenance unit, and 55 officers and 1,217 enlisted KMCs.
As with the WCIDU force, by late spring it appeared that the days of
UNC control and occupation of the east coast islands were numbered.
In view of the imminent armistice, a CinCFE directive of 11 June
called for the evacuation of all civilians, supplies, and equipment
“in excess of immediate needs.”[479] This was a preliminary step
towards full evacuation of the islands once the armistice agreement was
reached. Accordingly, on 11 June, as evacuation of the friendly west
coast partisans got under way, villagers from Yo-do, the largest and
ECIDU headquarters site, and the far northern island of Yang-do were
similarly moved south. The evacuation was completed by mid-June.
[479] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.
_The Division is Ordered Back to the Front_[480]
[480] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv,
1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar ComdDs, Jun 53.
A rash of political activity in June markedly affected the tenor
of military operations in Korea. Intensified Communist aggression
broke out north of ROK sectors in the Eighth Army line, largely as
a reaction to President Rhee’s unprecedented action on 18 June of
freeing, with the help of ROK guards, approximately 25,000 North
Korean anti-Communist prisoners at POW camps in the south. Other
anti-Communist POWs at Camp No. 10, near Ascom City, staged violent
break-out attempts at that same time and Company A, 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion passed to operational control of the camp commanding
officer there to help prevent a repetition of any such incidents in the
future. Following a recess of truce talks, pending a clarification of
the status of the current military-diplomatic agreements, key delegates
held crisis meetings at Panmunjom and Tokyo to get the beleaguered
talks back on track.
Despite the furor, signing of the armistice agreement was expected
shortly. As a result, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command was
reorganized with the 1st Marine Division assigned the responsibility
of reactivating the United Nations Personnel and Medical Processing
Unit for the anticipated post-truce exchange of prisoners of war. This
was to be conducted along lines similar to that for Operation LITTLE
SWITCH, the initial limited exchange. The Division Inspector was named
processing unit commander and functional sections (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4,
interpreters, messing, medical, engineer) were also activated. As the
division training tour in I Corps reserve drew to a close, a number of
regimental CPXs were held during June. And the 5th Marines drew a new
assignment: training in riot control. Following civilian demonstrations
that had erupted in various populated areas of Eighth Army, including
the I Corps sector, the regiment was ordered “to be prepared to move
in battalion size increments, to be employed as army service area
reserve in suppression of civil disturbances anywhere in army service
area.”[481]
[481] 5thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.
While the Marine infantry regiments concluded their training period,
the 1st Tank Battalion, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, and Division
Reconnaissance Company remained under operational control of the
frontline U.S. 25th Infantry Division. Marine artillerymen likewise
continued under orders of CG, I Corps Artillery, in the forward area,
reinforcing division artillery fires. Tentative plans were underway for
movement of the 1st Marine Division back to its former position on the
MLR in early July. After the signing of the cease-fire, the division
would comply with provisions of the truce agreement by closing out its
former MLR and withdrawing to designated positions two kilometers south
of the former defensive positions.
CHAPTER IX
Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice
_Relief of the 25th Division--Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and
East Berlin--Enemy Probes, 11–18 July--Marine Air Operations--Fall of
the Berlins--Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July--Last Day of the War_
_Relief of the 25th Division_[482]
[482] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _Pac Flt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;
1stMarDiv ltr to CMC 3/cpc, A16-13, n.d., Subj: Berlin
and East Berlin Action, Rpt of, in 1stMarDiv Summary
of Activities, Jul 53 (G-3) file (Records Group 127,
61A-2265, Box 74, FRC, Alex., Va.), hereafter _CG,
1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53;
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–9 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar,
11th Mar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53.
For the first week of July the 1st Marine Division continued its
mission as I Corps Reserve and its two-month period of intensive combat
training that had begun on 5 May. Planning got under way on 1 July,
however, for return of the division to its former sector of the MLR, as
the western anchor of I Corps, in relief of the 25th Infantry Division.
Marine infantry components were directed by I Corps to effect the
transfer of operational control during the night of 7–8 July. Tank and
artillery units--already in the division sector throughout the reserve
period--were to make whatever minor relocations were necessary at
suitable times thereafter. Division Operation Plan 10-53 ordered the
7th Marines to reassume its responsibility for the right regimental
sector of the MLR, eastward to the 1st Commonwealth boundary. The 5th
Marines, which had been in reserve at the time of the May relief of
lines, was assigned to the center sector of the MLR, while the 1st
Marines was designated as divisional reserve.
Relief of the 25th Infantry Division by Marine units got underway on
6 July when the first incoming elements of Colonel Funk’s 7th Marines
moved up to the right regimental sector manned jointly by the U.S.
14th Infantry Regiment and the Turkish Armed Forces Command. Advance
personnel reported into the left sector, to be taken over by the Marine
1st Battalion, and at 1400 the 3d Battalion relieved the TAFC reserve
battalion in the rear area.
Two platoons from the Marine regiment’s 4.2-inch Mortar Company,
meanwhile, also began their phased relief of the Turkish Heavy Mortar
Company. The incoming mortar crews had some unexpected early target
practice. As the men took up their active MLR firing positions in the
right battalion sector, they were promptly forced to put their tubes
into action to silence a troublesome machine gun, enemy mortars, and
hostile troops behind the Jersey Ridge to the north and Reno and Elko
on the west. That evening the 2d Battalion opened its new command post
in the eastern sector, occupied by two TAFC battalions.
Sharply at 0455 on 7 July, the 7th Marines assumed responsibility for
the right regimental sector and came under operational control of
the 25th Division. Shortly after noon that day, forward units of 1/7
reached the 25th Division sector after a three hour motor march from
Camp Indianhead, through driving rains in their second day without
letup. At the battalion sector, 1/7 joined the advance echelon of 40
men who had arrived the previous day and took over its MLR positions
from the 14th Infantry. Additional 7th Marines units reporting in
throughout the day and assuming new locations were the weapons, mortar,
and antitank companies.
The first of Colonel Tschirgi’s 5th Marines returned to their center
regimental sector before dawn that same day to begin their relief of
the Army 35th Infantry Regiment. At 0300 the 3d Battalion assumed
responsibility for the eastern half of the MLR. By late afternoon,
antitank personnel and the 2d Battalion were in line, the latter taking
over the western battalion sector at 1716. In the rear regimental area,
early elements of Colonel Nelson’s 1st Marines, locating just south of
the Imjin River, had begun to arrive by 1300. The regiment would assume
ground security for the Spoonbill and Libby (formerly X-Ray) bridges in
the sector as well as MASRT #1.
No one needed to remind the 1st Marine Division that the territory it
was moving back into was not the same--with respect to defense posts
in the right regimental sector--that it had left two months earlier.
Three of its six outposts there (Carson, Elko, Vegas) had fallen to
the enemy in the late-May battle, despite the formidable resistance
of the defending Turks. Outpost Ava remained at the far western end of
the line, with the Berlin-East Berlin complex in the right battalion
area. Some 6,750 yards of intervening MLR--more than four miles--lay
in between, bereft of any protective outposts to screen and alert the
defending line companies to sudden enemy assaults. The Marines were
thus returning to a main line of resistance considerably weakened in
its right regimental sector.
As the 1st Division CG, General Pate, observed:
Vegas [had] dominated the enemy approaches to Berlin from the
north and northwest and therefore made Berlin relatively secure.
Berlin, in turn, dominated the enemy approaches from the north
and northwest to East Berlin and made East Berlin relatively
secure. The loss of Outpost Vegas to the CCF placed Berlin and
East Berlin in very precarious positions and negated their being
supported by ground fire except from the MLR.[483]
[483] _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_., p. 1.
Ground support fire from the MLR, moreover, tended to be only
moderately successful in supporting the outposts because of the nature
of the terrain. A major Communist stronghold, Hill 190, lay northeast
of the Carson-Elko-Vegas complex. Since Berlin (COP 19) and East Berlin
(COP 19-A) were sited on extensions of this same hill mass, the enemy
could make sudden “ridgeline” attacks against the Berlins. With buffer
outpost Vegas now lost, the likelihood of CCF success in such attacks
was “immeasurably increased.”[484]
[484] _Ibid._, p. 2.
_Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and East Berlin_[485]
[485] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10;
_CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 53;
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–10 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 992, dtd
8–9 Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/7,
2/7, 3/7, 2/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1st MAW, VMF-311,
VMO-6, HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_;
MacDonald, _POW_.
It did not take the Chinese long to exploit this situation. At about
2100 on 7 July, while the relief of lines was in progress, the two
Berlin outposts and newly-located MLR companies of Lieutenant Colonel
Cereghino’s 2d Battalion (from the left: D, F, and E), were greeted
by a heavy volume of Chinese mortar and artillery fire. The barrage
continued unremittingly, followed by waves of a reinforced Chinese
battalion that swept over the two platoon-sized outposts, from the
direction of Vegas. By 2345 defending Marines at both outposts were
engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy, identified as elements
of the 407th Regiment, 136th Division, 46th CCF Army.
Berlin, manned at the time by TAFC[486] and Marine personnel, was
unexpectedly strengthened by a Company F reinforced squad that had been
dispatched on an earlier ambush patrol in the vicinity of the outpost.
At East Berlin, however, the overwhelming hordes of Chinese soldiers
advanced to the trenchline of the steep forward slope and quickly
locked with the Marines at point-blank range. Despite the coordination
of MLR machine gun, 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortar, and artillery
fires from 2/11[487] and 4/11, the enemy overran the outpost at 2355
after heavy, close fighting. Chinese mortar and artillery barrages, by
midnight, had continuously disrupted the Marine communications net at
East Berlin, and by 0130 radio relay was also out at Berlin proper.
[486] Discussing this phase of operations, the 2/7 commander
stated: “As it turned out we were in great shape with
both Marines and Turks fighting side by side in some
instances. We had a great rapport with the Turks in that
they had previously relieved 2/7. In fact, they made
us honorary members of their battalions, giving each
2/7 Marine one of the unit patches.” Col Alexander D.
Cereghino ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 19 Jun 70.
[487] On 7 July, 2/11 had become the direct support battalion
for the 7th Marines.
A provisional platoon from Headquarters and Service Company of 2/7
was quickly ordered to reinforce the main line against any attempted
breakthrough by the Chinese. This was a distinct possibility since the
Berlins were only 325 yards from the MLR, nearer than most outposts.
Men from Companies H and I of the rear reserve 3d Battalion (since 26
May commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Jones) were also placed
under operational control of 2/7 and ordered to forward assembly areas
in readiness for a thrust against the enemy at East Berlin.
At 0355 a Company F squad jumped off for the initial counterattack.
This was made at 0415, without artillery preparation, in an attempt to
gain surprise for the assault. It was thrown back. A second Company F
unit, by 0440, was on its way to reinforce the first but got caught by
25 rounds of incoming, with 15 men wounded. It continued on, however,
but an hour later the Marines were ordered to disengage so that the
artillerymen could place TOT fire on the area preparatory to a fresh
attempt to dislodge the enemy soldiers.
During the early morning hours of 8 July, large numbers of Chinese
were seen at their new Vegas and Reno strongholds. Marines of the
1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery blanketed hostile troops there and
at the Berlin outposts with four ripples. On another occasion, a
time-on-target mission launched by the 2/11 direct support battalion,
landed in the midst of an enemy company assembled on Vegas. Friendly
firepower by this time consisted of all four battalions of the 11th
Marines, as well as seven Army and Turkish artillery battalions still
emplaced in the area during the relief period and thus under tactical
control of 25th Division Artillery.
Throughout 7–8 July, 11 Marine tanks from Company B placed 800 shells
on enemy installations and troops. In the characteristic pattern,
use of Marine armor heightened unfriendly response. The tanks drew
in return 2,000 rounds of Chinese mortar and artillery on their own
positions, but without any serious damage. Elements of the Army 14th
Infantry Regiment Tank Company, still in the area, also opened up with
some additional shells and bullets.
Despite the Chinese attack, the relief of lines continued during
the night. In the center MLR sector, the 5th Marines had taken over
regimental responsibility at 2130, with 3/11 becoming its direct
supporting unit. And in the western half of the 7th Marines line--about
the only undisturbed part of the regimental sector--1/7 had routinely
completed is battalion relief at 0335 on 8 July.
At 0630 it was confirmed that East Berlin, an extension of the ridge on
which Berlin was located, was under enemy control. Better news at first
light was that Berlin,[488] 500 yards west, had repulsed the enemy,
a fact not definitely known earlier due to communication failure. At
this time, G-3 reported that 18 effectives were holding Berlin, and 2/7
assigned an 18-man reinforced squad to buttress the defense. It was not
considered feasible to send a larger reinforcement “since the Berlin
area [could] accommodate only a small garrison.”[489]
[488] The ridge on which COP Berlin was located was split by
two valleys. Both of these and the ridge itself served
as approaches to the Marine MLR. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6,
Chap. 9, p. 9-169.
[489] _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_, p. 2.
Meanwhile, another 7th Marines counterforce was being organized for
a massed assault to retake East Berlin. At 1000, under cover of a
thundering 1,600-round mortar and artillery preparation by Marine and
TAFC gunners, a reinforced two-platoon unit from Companies George
and How, launched the attack. The unlucky H/3/7 platoon, in the lead,
got caught between well-aimed Chinese shells and the Marines’ own
protective wire. In less than 15 minutes the platoon had been reduced
to 20 effectives, with Company G passing through its ranks to continue
the attack. By 1123 the Marines were in a violent fire fight and
grenade duel in the main trenchline at East Berlin.
Tank guns, meanwhile, blasted away at Chinese troops, bunkers, active
weapons, and trenches. On call they placed their fire “only a few yards
in front of the friendly attacking infantry and moved this fire forward
as the foot troops advanced.”[490] Heavy countermortar and artillery
rounds were also hitting their mark on forward, top, and reverse slopes
of East Berlin to soften the Chinese defenses. A few minutes later
the 3d Battalion men had formed for the assault. During the heavy
hand-to-hand fighting of the next hour the Marines “literally threw
some of the Chinese down the reverse slope.”[491] Gaining the crest of
the hill, the Marines by force and fire dispatched the enemy intruders.
At 1233 they were again in possession of East Berlin. With just 20 men
left in fighting condition at the outpost, a reinforcing platoon from
I/3/7 was dispatched to buttress the assault force.
[490] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2.
[491] Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_, p. 136.
North of the 7th Marines sector four F9F Panthers, led by the
commanding officer of VMF-311, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane,
found their way through the rainy skies that had restricted aerial
support efforts nearly everywhere. In a noon MPQ mission, the quartet
delivered five tons of ordnance on Chinese reinforcement troops and
bunkers.
Promptly at 1300--a half hour after retaking the outpost--the 7th
Marines effected the relief of the last Turkish elements at Berlin and
occupied the twin defense positions. And by 1500 on 8 July, the 1st
Marine Division assumed operational control of the entire division
sector from the Army 25th Infantry Division. Relief of individual units
would continue, however, through several more days. At the same time,
the mission of the 11th Marines, since 5 July under a new regimental
commander, Colonel Manly L. Curry, changed from general support of
U.S. I Corps, reinforcing the fires of the 25th Division Artillery,
to direct support of the Marine Division. The 1st Tank Battalion
similarly took over its regular direct support role. Other units under
temporary Army jurisdiction, such as the Kimpo Provisional Regiment and
Division Reconnaissance Company, reverted to Marine control.
During the rest of the day, gunners of the 11th Marines continued their
fire missions despite reduced visibility that hindered surveillance
by the OY spotting planes and forward observers. Only 42 Chinese were
sighted during the daytime, although shortly before dusk a CCF group
reportedly heading toward the Berlins area southwest from Frisco was
taken under fire. Estimates of enemy incoming throughout the 7–8 July
action from 17-odd battalions of Chinese artillery dug in across the
division sector was placed at 19,000 rounds of all types. Marine and
Army-controlled battalions, for their part, pounded Chinese strongholds
with a total of 20,178 rounds.
That night Colonel Funk authorized a 3d Battalion platoon to bolster
the MLR. Five tanks were also ordered to locate in the Hill 126 area,
the Marine high-ground terrain feature to the rear of the frontlines.
This foresight was well rewarded. During the late evening hours strange
motor noises “sounding like a convoy pulling in and then back out
again”[492] floated over the Korean hills and the tanks immediately
swept suspected hostile installations with their 90mm guns. Later that
night of 8–9 July, the Chinese suddenly renewed their probing efforts
at the battered Marine outposts. Moving in from Vegas, an estimated
reinforced enemy company attacked Berlin at 0104, then brushed on
to East Berlin. An intense fire fight ensued off and on for nearly
two hours at the two posts. Marine 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars, plus
artillery illumination, boxing fires, and tanks blunted the assaults.
At 0315 the enemy broke contact and action quieted down at both
locations.
[492] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 9 Jul 53.
Throughout the rest of the day, eight Company C[493] armored vehicles
assisted the infantrymen in consolidation of positions. A total of 25
rounds of shells and 19,140 rounds of .30 and .50 caliber machine gun
bullets were expended on CCF strongpoints and troops during a 24-hour
firing period that ended at 1700.
[493] On 9 July Company C relieved Company B on the MLR in
support of the 7th Marines. Both tank companies had been
in action with the TAFC during the entire 60-day period
the division was in I Corps reserve. Due to the rotation
system, however, Baker Company had been on line longer
and transferred to the rear ranks for a “much needed rest
and rehabilitation.” 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 3.
Because of the casualties at Berlin, an H/3/7 reinforcement squad was
sent to augment the Marine force there. Losses suffered by the 7th
Marines for the two successive nights were 9 killed, 12 missing,[494]
126 wounded and evacuated, and 14 with minor wounds. The cost to the
CCF was 30 known dead, and an estimated 200 killed and 400 wounded.
[494] Later it was determined that only two were actually
captured and they were subsequently repatriated.
MacDonald, _POW_, p. 211.
With the Marines back on line, VMO-6 and HMR-161 which were under
division operational control again resumed normal combat routine.
Returning on 8 July to their forward airstrip in the center regimental
sector, VMO-6 helicopters made eight frontline helicopter evacuations.
Observation planes that same day conducted four artillery spotting
missions behind enemy lines. HMR-161, assuming normal operations on 10
July, resupplied Marine division outposts with 1,200 pounds of rations,
water, and gear as part of its 25.3 hours flight time this first day
back in full service.
_Enemy and Marine Probes, 11–18 July_[495]
[495] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 10–17 Jul 53;
1stMarDiv PIRs 923–930, dtd 10–17 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar,
7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53;
Hermes, _Truce Tent_.
After the flare-up on the Berlin front, there was relatively little
action for the next 10 days. Marines continued the relief of the last
of the outgoing 25th Division units. When this was completed on 13
July, 1st Marine Division units, including the 1st KMC/RCT[496] and
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, were all back in their accustomed
sectors. They thus rejoined the 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, Kimpo
Regiment, and Division Reconnaissance Company which had remained on
line throughout the period. The July relief was one that could hardly
be characterized as routine. Interfering elements had included not only
the Chinese but torrential summer rains. These had continued virtually
nonstop from 5–8 July causing bridge and road washouts, rerouting of
supply trucks, and juggling of manifests at a time when the regiments
were using an average of 90 transport vehicles daily.
[496] The 1st KMC/RCT turned over its sector of the 1st ROK
Division front to the 1st ROK Regiment at 1800 on 8 July
and relieved the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment on 12 July.
_ROKMC Comments._
Forward of the MLR the regular nightly patrols probed enemy territory,
often with no contact. On at least three occasions division
intelligence reported entire 24-hour periods during which the elusive
Chinese could not be sighted anywhere in No-Man’s-Land by friendly
patrols operating north of the Marine division front.
More rain,[497] continual haze, and ground fog for 6 of the 10 days
between 9–18 July not only reduced the activity of air observers and
Marine pilots, but apparently inspired the ground-digging Chinese to
pursue--at least across from the division sector of I Corps--a more
mole-like existence than ever. Enemy troop sightings during the daytime
decreased from as many as 310 CCF to a new low of 14. Incoming, for one
24-hour period, totaled no more than 48 rounds of Chinese artillery and
228 of mortar fire that struck Marine positions, causing only slight
damage.
[497] Spoonbill Bridge was submerged under 11 feet of water and
destroyed by the pressure against it on 7 July. Flood
conditions existed again on 14–15 July when the Imjin
crested at 26 feet at Libby Bridge. Roads in the vicinity
were impassable for three days. Resupply of forward
companies was made via Freedom Bridge. One command diary
writer, discussing the elaborate series of six moves made
by 1/1 during July, added a touch of unconscious humor
when he observed, “During the month, it seemed as if the
Battalion was constantly on the move.... Rain hampered
these moves considerably. The weather between moves was
generally clear and dry.” 1/1 ComdD, July 53, p. 1; 1st
TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, pp. 5, 11–12, 23; _PacFlt EvalRpt_
No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-68, 9-136.
The same could not be said for their mines. One 7th Marines
reconnaissance patrol located a new minefield staked out with Soviet
antipersonnel mines (POMZ-2) of an unfamiliar type with both pull and
tension fuses. It appeared that mines which had lain dormant during the
winter months had suddenly come to life with the warm weather, or else
been recently re-laid. Nearly a dozen were uncovered by 5th and 7th
Marines patrols, soon after their return to the front, and sometimes
the discovery came too late. Probably the worst day was 12 July when
four Marines were killed and eight wounded as a result of accidentally
detonating mines.
At the same time, in the 5th Marines sector near the vicinity of truce
corridor COP-2, the persistent voice of the Dragon Lady taunted Marines
with such lackluster gambits as “Surrender now! What is your girl
doing back home?” in the stepped-up pace of its midnight propaganda
broadcasts.
The regular nightly patrols checked in and out, performing their
mission routinely. Even during this last month of the war, when word
of the final truce agreement was expected daily, fire fights ensued.
On 12 July, a 5th Marines 13-man reconnaissance patrol clashed briefly
north of COP Esther, while a 7th Marines platoon-size combat patrol
brushed with a Chinese squad west of Elko in an 18-minute fire fight.
The same night the 11th Marines reported increased enemy sightings of
318 CCF soldiers--the most seen since the Berlin probe of 7–8 July.
No follow-up was made. The Chinese were busy with major offensives
elsewhere along the UNC front, devoting their primary efforts to ROK
divisions on the central and eastern sectors of the Eighth Army line.
Apparently they fully intended to demonstrate to the South Koreans that
continuation of the war would be a costly business.[498]
[498] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 470.
Along the Marine front, three patrol contacts took place on the night
of 16–17 July. Two of them were grim reminders that despite the
promising look (and sound) of the peace talks, for those men lost the
toll of the war was as final and unremitting as it had been at any time
during the past three years of combat. The first was a routine maneuver
for a 5th Marines 13-man combat patrol that, at 2252, engaged an enemy
squad just north of outpost Hedy. After an eight-minute fire fight the
enemy withdrew, with two Chinese soldiers counted dead and one wounded
and no friendly casualties.
Not so lucky was a 2/5 reconnaissance patrol. At midnight, its 15
members encountered a band of 30 to 40 Chinese, deployed in a V-shaped
ambush in the Hill 90 area, an enemy stronghold two miles east of
Panmunjom. The Marines set up a base of fire, beating off the enemy
with their rifles, BARs, mortars, and bare fists. Reinforcements and
artillery fires were called in. The first relief unit was intercepted
by vicious mortar shelling which wounded the entire detail. A second
relief squad, also taken under mortar fire, continued the action in an
intense fire contest that lasted nearly two hours. In the meantime, the
direct support artillery battalion, 3/11, reinforced by 1/11, showered
280 rounds of countermortar on Chinese long-range machine guns and
mortars barking from the surrounding hills.
During the engagement the Chinese made several attempts to capture
prisoners. When the enemy finally began to withdraw, CCF casualties
were 10 known dead, an estimated 9 more dead, and 3 wounded. Seven
Marines were found to be missing after the Chinese broke contact. A 5th
Marines platoon that extensively screened the battalion front during
the hours of darkness on the 17th returned at 2210 with six bodies.
The third encounter took place not long after midnight in the 7th
Marines territory. This brief skirmish was also to have an unpleasant
aftermath and, inadvertently, fulfill the psywar broadcast of the
previous day that had warned Marines “not to go on patrols or be
killed.” As it was leaving the Ava Gate (250 yards northwest of the
outpost proper) at 0045, a 30-man combat patrol from Company A was
challenged on three sides by 40–50 CCF employing small arms, automatic
weapons, grenades, and mortars. After a 15-minute fire exchange, during
which the patrol lost communications with its MLR company, the enemy
withdrew. Six CCF had been counted dead, and 12 more estimated killed
or wounded.
Upon returning to the outpost, a muster of the men engaged in the
action showed four Marines were missing. A rescue squad recovered three
bodies. When, several hours later, daylight hampered movements of the
search party, 2/11 laid down a smoke screen to isolate the sector.
Between 0050 and 0455, its gunners also directed 529 rounds of close
support and countermortar fire on Chinese troops and active weapons
in the area. The recovery unit continued to sweep the area for the
last missing man until 0545 when it was decided that the search would
have to be terminated with negative results. Marine casualties from
the encounter were 3 killed, 1 missing, 19 wounded (evacuated), and 2
nonseriously wounded.
The following day patrol activity and enemy contacts quieted down.
Action shifted to the 1st KMC/RCT sector. Here, during the late hours
of the 18th, four Korean combat patrols brushed quickly and briefly
with Chinese squad and platoon units in light skirmishes of but a
few minutes duration. The Korean Marines killed 2 of the enemy and
estimated they accounted for 16 more.[499]
[499] _ROKMC Comments._
The only activity in the Marine right regimental sector occurred when
a 7th Marines 36-man combat patrol, on prowl the night of 17–18
July, advanced at 0112 as far as hand-grenade range of the Chinese
trenchline at Ungok. Undetected by the enemy, a patrol member fired a
white phosphorus rifle grenade squarely at the CCF machine gun that
was harassing the friendly MLR. The Marines then engaged 15 Chinese
defending the position in a brief 20-minute skirmish. Although two men
were wounded,[500] the Company C patrol members in a somewhat roguish
gesture as they left also planted a Marine Corps recruiting sign at
their FPOA (Farthest Point of Advance), facing the enemy.
[500] One, who died that morning, was squad leader Sergeant
Stephen C. Walter, posthumously presented the Navy Cross.
Also awarded the nation’s second highest combat medal
for extraordinary heroism in a patrol action on 16–17
July was Private First Class Roy L. Stewart, of the 5th
Marines.
_Marine Air Operations_[501]
[501] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 10, No.
5, Chap. 9, No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53;
1stMarDiv PIR 924, dtd 10–11 Jul 53; 1st MAW, MAGs-12,
-33, VMAs-121, -212, -251, -323, VMF(N)-153, VMF-311
ComdDs, Jul 53; Field, _NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF,
Korea_.
If the monsoon rains of July hung like a shroud over the infantryman,
they were an even more serious impediment to air operations of MAGs-12
and -33. There were 24 days of restricted flying when the weather at
home base or target area was recorded as marginal to non-operational.
On 12 full days air operations were cancelled entirely. Precipitation
for July rose to 7.38 inches, with 22 days of rain recorded throughout
the month. The generally unfavorable weather conditions not only
limited the normal support missions flown by 1st MAW but delayed the
arrival of VMA-251[502] en route from Japan to relieve VMA-323.
[502] Marine Attack Squadron 251 (Lieutenant Colonel Harold A.
Harwood) administratively joined MAG-12 on 6 July for
323, which had rotated back to MCAS, El Toro three days
earlier. Movement of -251 aircraft to Korea could not
take place, however, until 12 July. When VMA-323 (Major
Woten) departed, the famous “Death Rattlers” had the
distinction of being the Marine tactical (VMA/VMF) air
squadron in longest service during the Korean War. The
unit’s final combat mission on 2 July brought its total
Korean operations to 20,827 sorties and 48,677.2 hours.
On 6 August 1950, roaring up from the flight deck of the
USS _Badoeng Strait_, the VMA-323 Corsairs (then VMF-323)
had launched their opening blow against North Korean
installations, led by Major Arnold A. Lund, CO. The
initial Marine air offensive action of the Korean War had
been flown three days earlier by VMF-214. This unit was
reassigned to CONUS in November 1951, giving the Death
Rattlers the longest continuous service flight record.
Jul 53 ComdD, 1st MAW, p. 2; _USMC Ops Korea-Pusan_, v.
I, pp. 89–90, 98; VMF-214 Squadron History, HRB.
During July the wing’s nearly 300 aircraft (250 operational, 43
assigned to pool status in Korea) flew 2,688 combat sorties[503]
and 5,183.1 combat hours. The bulk of the sorties, 1,497, were CAS
operations flown for 19 different UNC divisions. Nearly 900 supported
the 12 ROK divisions involved in the heavy fighting on the central UNC
sector. Approximately 250 of the CAS sorties were for the 1st Marine
Division, with more than 200 being day or night MPQ drops and the rest,
daytime CAS runs. No night close support missions were conducted.
[503] Individual reports by the two groups result in a
slightly higher figure. MAG-12 recorded 2,001 combat
sorties (including more than 400 flown by carrier-based
VMA-332, not in the 1st MAW sortie rate). MAG-33 listed
945 sorties, or a combined group total of 2,946 for the
month. ComdDs Jul 53 MAG-12, p. C-1 and MAG-33, p. I.
When nearly a week of inclement weather finally lifted, Colonel Arthur
R. Stacy’s[504] MAG-33 pilots based at Pohang welcomed a brisk change
in the tempo of operations. In seven MPQ strikes on 11 July, they
hurled 13 tons of ordnance on Chinese fortifications north of the 7th
Marines sector. It was the wing’s first active day in support missions
for the 1st Marine Division, newly back on the line.
[504] Colonel Stacy was group commander until 24 July, when he
was detached for assignment to 1st MAW as Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2. He was succeeded at MAG-33 by Colonel John
L. Smith.
During the interim period of 9–18 July, between the two Berlin outpost
attacks, F9F jet fighters from MAG-13 again carried out approximately
35 MPQ missions for the division. (MAG-12 attack planes, during this
time, were assigned to the flaming central Allied line.) Nearly 20 of
these were on a single day, 14 July, when VMFs-311 and -115 Panther
jets roared over enemy country from morning to sundown unleashing 25
tons north of the Marine troubled right regimental sector and 9 more
tons on hostile emplacements near the western end of the division line.
In middle and late July, however, the majority of missions by Marine
fliers bolstered UNC operations in the central part of the Allied front
where a major enemy counterthrust erupted. The peak operational day for
MAG-33 pilots during this period occurred 17 July when 40 interdiction
and MPQ missions (136 combat sorties) were executed for Army and ROK
divisions. The corresponding record day for Colonel Carney’s MAG-12
aviators was 19 July when 162 combat sorties were flown on heavy
destruction missions to support UNC action.
Marine exchange pilot Major John F. Bolt, of VMF-115, chalked up a
record of a different kind on 11 July. Attached to the Fifth Air Force
51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, he shot down his fifth and sixth MIG-15
(the previous four having been bagged since 16 May) to become the first
Marine jet ace in history. Major Bolt was leading a four-plane F-86
flight in the attack on four MIGs east of Sinuiju and required only
1,200 rounds of ammunition and five minutes to destroy the two enemy
jet fighters. Bolt thereby became the 37th jet ace of the Korean War.
Earlier in the month, Navy Lieutenant Guy P. Bordelon won a Silver Star
medal and gold star in lieu of a second Silver Star. Attending the K-6
ceremonies were General Megee and Admiral Clark, 1st Wing and Seventh
Fleet commanders. Bordelon, flying with the Marine Corsair night
fighters, had downed four of the harassing “Bedcheck Charlie” planes. A
member of VC-3 attached to MAG-12, Lieutenant Bordelon on 17 July made
his fifth night kill and was subsequently awarded the Navy Cross.
On the minus side, the 1st Marine Air Wing this last month of the war
suffered a higher rate of personnel losses on combat flights than in
any month since June 1952.[505] Captain Lote Thistlethwaite and Staff
Sergeant W. H. Westbrook, of VMF(N)-513, were killed in an air patrol
flight on 4 July. (Two nights earlier, the same squadron had lost a
Navy pilot and crewman on temporary duty with the night-fighters when
their F3D-2 similarly failed to return to Pyongtaek.) Another MAG-12
casualty was Captain Carl F. Barlow, of VMA-212, killed 13 July on a
prebriefed CAS mission when he crashed while flying instruments.
[505] Wing casualties for July 1953 were listed as three
killed, seven missing, and two wounded in action. Names
of enlisted crew members on flights are not always given
in air diaries, which accounts for the discrepancies.
On 17 July, Captain Robert I. Nordell, VMF-311, flying his third
mission that day, and wingman First Lieutenant Frank L. Keck, Jr.
were hit by intense automatic weapons fire while on an interdiction
flight. Their planes reportedly went down, at 2000, over the Sea of
Japan. After a four-day air and surface search conducted by JOC, they
were declared missing and subsequently reclassified killed in action.
Another MAG-33 pilot listed KIA was Major Thomas M. Sellers, VMF-115,
on exchange duty with the Air Force, shot down 20 July in a dogfight
after he had scored two MIG-15s. Two days earlier a VMO-6 pilot, First
Lieutenant Charles Marino, and his artillery spotter, First Lieutenant
William A. Frease, flying a flak suppression mission, were struck
by enemy fire and crashed with their ship in the 5th Marines center
regimental sector.
_Fall of the Berlins_[506]
[506] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;
_CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53;
1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 933–934,
dtd 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMar ComdD, Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar,
11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11,
1stTkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar Preliminary Special Action
Report, period 8–27 Jul 53 in ComdD, Jul 53, hereafter
1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212
ComdDs, Jul 53.
Despite their preoccupation with other corps sectors on the central
front of the Eighth Army line, the Chinese had not forgotten about the
Berlin complex held by the Marines. On the night of 19–20 July,[507]
the enemy lunged against the two Marine outposts in reinforced
battalion strength to renew his attack launched 12 days earlier.
Beginning at 2200, heavy Chinese mortar and artillery fire struck the
two COPs and supporting MLR positions of the 3d Battalion, which had
advanced to the front on 13 July in relief of 2/7.[508] In the center
regimental sector, 5th Marines outposts Ingrid and Dagmar, and the line
companies were also engaged by small arms, mortar, and artillery fires.
An attempted probe at Dagmar was repulsed, aided by 3/11.
[507] The 19th of July, ironically, was the date that truce
negotiators working at Panmunjom had reached final
agreement on all remaining disputed points. Staff
officers were scheduled to begin drawing up details
of the armistice agreement and boundaries of the
demilitarized zone. USMA, _Korea_, p. 51.
[508] Company E and a detachment of the 81mm mortar platoon
from the 2d Battalion remained on line. They were
attached to the 3d Battalion when the sector command
changed.
Concentrating their main assault efforts on the Berlins, however, the
Chinese forces swarmed up the slopes of the outposts at 2230, with more
troops moving in from enemy positions on Jersey, Detroit, and Hill
139, some 700 yards north of Berlin. The Chinese struck first at East
Berlin, where 37 Marines were on duty, and then at Berlin, held by 44
men. Both positions were manned by First Lieutenant Kenneth E. Turner’s
Company I personnel and employed the maximum-size defenses which could
be effectively utilized on these terrain features.
By 2300 hostile forces were halfway up Berlin. Continuous volumes
of small arms and machine gun fire poured from the defending MLR
companies. Defensive boxes were fired by 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch
mortars. Eight Company C tanks augmented the close-in fires, with their
lethal direct-fire 90mm guns tearing into Chinese troops and weapons.
Within two hours after the initial thrust, the 11th Marines had fired
20 counterbattery and 31 countermortar missions. Artillerymen from 2/11
and 1/11 had expended 1,750 rounds. In addition, 4/11 had unleashed
124 of its 155mm medium projectiles. More countermortar fire came from
the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion. Despite the heavy fire support,
by midnight the situation was in doubt and at 0146 the twin outposts
were officially declared under enemy control. Nearly 3,000 rounds of
incoming were estimated to have fallen on division positions by that
time, most of it in the 7th Marines sector.
During the early morning hours of the 20th, Marine tank guns and
continuous shelling by six[509] artillery battalions wreaked havoc
on Chinese hardware, reinforcing personnel, supply points, and
fortifications. Reserve units from 2/7 were placed on 30-minute
standby, with Companies D, E, and F already under 3/7 operational
control. Battalion Operation Order 20-53, issued at 0400 by Lieutenant
Colonel Jones, called for Easy and Dog to launch a two-company
counterattack at 0730 to restore Berlin and East Berlin respectively.
Incoming, meanwhile, continued heavy on the MLR; at 0520, Company I,
located to the rear of the contested outposts, reported receiving one
round per second.
[509] Three Marine, one TAFC, and two Army battalions.
The Marine assault was cancelled by I Corps a half hour before it was
scheduled to take place. A decision subsequently rendered from I Corps
directed that the positions not be retaken.[510]
[510] At a routine conference that same morning attended by
CG Eighth Army (General Taylor), CG I Corps (General
Clarke) and CG 1st Marine Division, the earlier decision
about not regaining the outposts was affirmed. General
Taylor maintained the positions “could never be held
should the Chinese decide to exert sufficient pressure
against them” and recommended instead that the sector
be organized on a wide front defense concept. Actually,
following the initial Berlins attack of 7–8 July, a
discussion about possible readjustment of the Marine
sector defense had been initiated by General Pate. A
staff study recommending that just such a “strongpoint”
concept (rather than the customary linear defense) be
adopted had been completed by Marine Division officials
on 15 July. I Corps staff members had concurred with the
study and it was awaiting consideration by CG, I Corps
when the Berlins were attacked for the second time on 19
July. _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_, pp. 3–4.
Since the outposts were not to be recaptured,[511] efforts that day
were devoted to making the two hills as untenable as possible for
their new occupants. Heavy destruction missions by air, armor, and
artillery blasted CCF defenses throughout the day. Air observers were
on station from 0830 until after dark, with nine CAS missions conducted
by MAG-12 pilots from VMA-121 and -212. The day’s series of air strikes
on the Berlin-East Berlin positions (and Vegas weapons emplacements)
began at 1145 when a division of ADs from Lieutenant Colonel Harold
B. Penne’s[512] -121 hurled nine and a half tons of ordnance on enemy
bunkers and trenches at East Berlin.
[511] Commenting on this point, the I Corps commander noted:
“The outposts in front of the MLR had gradually lost
their value in my opinion because, between the MLR and
the outposts, minefields, tactical wire, etc. had made
their reinforcement and counterattacks very costly.”
Resupply was thus restricted to narrow paths on which
the CCF had zeroed in and “holding poor real estate
for sentimental reasons is a poor excuse for undue
casualties.” Gen Bruce C. Clarke, USA, ltr to Dir,
MCHist, HQMC, dtd 20 May 70.
[512] The new squadron commander had taken over 16 July from
Major Braun.
The artillery was having an active day, too. Six firing battalions had
sent more than 3,600 rounds crashing against the enemy by nightfall.
The 1st 4.5-inch rocketeers also contributed four ripples to the melee.
Heavy fire missions were requested and delivered by the Army 159th
Field Artillery Battalion (240mm howitzers) and 17th Field Artillery
Battalion (8-inch howitzers) using 11th Marines airborne spotters. The
precision fire on enemy positions, which the air spotters reported
to be “the most effective missions they had conducted in Korea”[513]
continued for several hours. By 1945 the big guns had demolished the
bunkers and all but 15 yards of trenchline at East Berlin. For their
part the Chinese had fired an estimated 4,900 rounds of mortar and
artillery against the 3d Battalion right hand sector in the 24-hour
period ending at 1800 on the 20th.
[513] BGen Manly L. Curry ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May
70, hereafter _Curry ltr_.
Armored vehicles, meanwhile, during 19–20 July had expended 200
rounds of HE and WP shells and 6,170 machine gun rounds.[514] Tank
searchlights had also effectively illuminated enemy positions on the
East Berlin hill. The tankers’ performance record included: 20 Chinese
bunkers and 2 57mm recoilless rifles destroyed; an estimated 30 enemy
soldiers killed; a dozen more firing apertures, caves, and trenchworks
substantially damaged.
[514] Tank and artillery ammunition allocations had been cut
50 percent the afternoon of the 19th, with a subsequent
reduction of normal destruction missions and elimination
of H&I fires. ComdDs Jul 53 1st TkBn, p. 3 and App. 2, p.
4 and 1/11, p. 5.
[Illustration:
MAP 30 K. White
7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR
(Division Right)
LINEAR DEFENSE
19–20 July 1953]
Between noon and the last flight of the day, when a trio of AUs from
Lieutenant Colonel Wallace’s VMA-212 attacked a northern enemy mortar
and automatic weapons site, 35 aircraft had repeatedly streaked over
the Berlin territory and adjacent Chinese strongpoints. Strikes by
VMA-121 at 1145, 1320, 1525, 1625, 1700, 1750; and VMA-212 at 1413,
1849, and 1930 had released a combined total of 69½ tons of bombs and
6,500 rounds of 20mm ammunition on hostile locations.
The Chinese casualty toll during this renewed flareup in the fighting
on 19–20 July was conservatively placed by 3/7 at 75 killed and 300
wounded. It was further believed that “the enemy battalion was so
weakened and disorganized by the attacks that it was necessary for
the CCF to commit another battalion to hold the area captured.”[515]
Regimental reports indicated that 6 Marines had been killed, 56 listed
missing,[516] 86 wounded and evacuated, and 32 not seriously wounded.
[515] 3/7 ComdD, 20 Jul 53, p. 5. With respect to the number
of enemy casualties that night, battalion, regimental,
artillery support, and division command diaries given
differing accounts. Other figures cited are: 9 CCF
killed, between 234–284 estimated killed, and 630
estimated wounded.
[516] Subsequently, it was learned that of 56 Marines
unaccounted for at the time, 12 were actually captured.
They were returned after hostilities ended. Several men
from 1st Marines units under operational control of the
7th were also taken in this battle. MacDonald, _POW_, pp.
212, 268–269.
As a result of the critical tactical situation and number of casualties
suffered during the Berlins operation, the 7th Marines regimental
commander requested that units of the division reserve be placed under
his control to help check any further aggressive moves of the enemy.
For it now appeared that the Chinese might continue their thrust and
attempt to seize Hill 119 (directly south of Berlin and East Berlin) in
order to be in position to deny part of the Imjin River to UNC forces
after signing of the armistice.
While the lost outposts were being neutralized on the morning of
the 20th, the CO of the incoming 1st Marines, Colonel Nelson, also
ordered an immediate reorganization and strengthening of the MLR. This
employed the defense in depth concept, used by the British Commonwealth
Division in the sector adjacent to the Marines on the east. The wide
front defense concept was fully developed with one company occupying
a portion of the MLR to the rear of the Berlin complex, known as Hill
119 or more informally, Boulder City. Three companies organized the
high ground to the right rear of the MLR east to Hill 111, the limiting
point on the boundary between the Marine and Commonwealth divisions.
Three more companies fortified the Hill 126 area to the rear and left
of Berlin to its juncture with the western battalion sector held by
Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd’s 1/7. (See Maps 30 and 31.)
[Illustration:
MAP 31 K. WHITE
7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR
Defense-in-depth
20–21 July 1953]
The afternoon of the 20th, 2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Long) was
transferred to 7th Marines control and positioned in the center of
the regimental MLR, as the first step in the scheduled relief of the
7th, due off the line on 26 July. For the next three days the regiment
continued to develop the sector defense to the rear of the MLR.
Elements of the regimental reserve, 2/7, were employed to reinforce the
3/7 sector. Initially, on 20–21 July, F/2/7, under operational command
of 3/7, was assigned the mission of reinforcing Hill 119. Later a 2/1
platoon was also ordered to strengthen the position.
[Illustration:
MAP 32 K. WHITE
7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR
Defense-in-depth
22–23 July 1953]
Incoming 1st Marines platoons and companies from the 2d and 3d
(Lieutenant Colonel Roy D. Miller) Battalions augmented the forces at
the two critical Hill 119 and 111 locations. As it turned out, 1st
Marines personnel returning to the front from division reserve were to
see the last of the war’s heavy fighting in the course of their relief
of the 7th Marines. Ultimately, the regimental forward defense, instead
of being divided into two battalion sectors as before, now consisted
of three--a left, center, and right sector. By 23 July the depth
reorganization had been completed and these sectors were manned by 1/7,
2/1, and 3/7. (See Map 32.)
_Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July_[517]
[517] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv
ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, dtd 21–28 Jul 53;
1stMarDiv PIRs 935–941, dtd 21–27 Jul 53 and 942, dtd 7
Aug 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7,
3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 53;
1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -251,
VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_;
Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley,
_Korea, 1951–1953_; Martin Russ, _The Last Parallel: A
Marine’s War Journal_ (New York: Rinehart and Company,
1957); USMA, _Korea_.
Sightings of enemy troops for the next few days were light. A large
scale attack expected on the 21st by the 5th Marines at Hedy and Dagmar
failed to materialize. Instead, a token force of a dozen Chinese
dressed in burlap bags made a limited appearance at Hedy before
departing, minus three of its party, due to Marine sharp-shooting
skills. In the skies, MAG-33 fliers from VMF-115 and -311 had been
transferred by Fifth Air Force from exclusive missions for the central
and eastern UNC front (the IX, ROK II, and X Corps sectors) to join
VMA-121 in MPQ flights supporting the 1st Marine Division. During the
21–23 July period, despite layers of thick stratus clouds and rain that
turned off and on periodically like a water spigot, more than 15 radar
missions were executed by the three squadrons.[518] They unleashed a
gross 33-ton bomb load on CCF mortar and 76mm gun positions, supply
areas, CPs, bunkers, and trenches.
[518] One additional flight expending three 1,000-lb. bombs
was made 22 July by a single AD from replacement
squadron VMA-251. This was the unit’s first combat
sortie in support of the 1st Marine Division after its
indoctrination flights. VMA-251 also flew four MPQ
flights for the 7th Marines in the early hours of 24
July, the day the outposts were attacked again. VMA-251
ComdD, Jul 53.
The lull in ground fighting lasted until late on the 24th. Then, at
1930, a heavy preparation of 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars combined
with 76mm and 122mm artillery shells began to rain down on Boulder
City. Men of G/3/1, under command of First Lieutenant Oral R. Swigart,
Jr., were deployed at that time in a perimeter defense of the position
having that morning completed the relief of G/3/7.
Enemy troops were reported massing for an assault. One regiment located
by forward observers behind Hill 139, some 700 yards northwest of
Berlin, was taken under fire at 1940 by artillery and rocket ripple. At
2030, following their usual pattern of laying down a heavy mortar and
artillery barrage, the CCF began to probe the MLR at Hills 119 and 111
in the Marine right battalion sector. They hit first at Hill 111, the
far right anchor of the division line, currently held by 7th Marines
personnel. Then the CCF moved westward to Hill 119. Their choice of
time for the attack once again coincided with the relief of 7th Marines
units by the 1st Marines.[519] When the assault began, H/3/1 was moving
up to relieve H/3/7 at the easternmost point of the line in the Hill
111 vicinity, and Company I was preparing to relieve I/3/7, to its left.
[519] A similar incident had occurred on 7 July when the 7th
Marines was attacked while in the process of relieving a
regiment of the 25th Infantry. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p.
9-58.
The Communist troops temporarily penetrated Hill 111 positions. At
Boulder City, where the main force of the CCF two-battalion unit
had struck, they occupied a portion of the trenchline. Attempting to
exploit this gain, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted the Berlin Gate,
on the left flank of Company G’s position and the East Berlin Gate, to
its right. Marine units of the two regiments posted at the two citadel
hills were heavily supported by MLR mortar, artillery, and tank fires.
No artillery spotter or CAS flights were flown through the night, once
again due to weather conditions.
By 2120, the bulk of Chinese soldiers had begun to withdraw from Hill
111, this attack apparently being a diversionary effort. But the
enemy’s main thrust continued against the central Hill 119 position.
Here the close, heavy fighting raged on through the morning hours,
with enemy troops steadily reinforcing from the Jersey Ridge and
East Berlin, by way of the Berlin Gate, the best avenue of approach
to forward positions of Hill 119. At approximately 2100, the Chinese
hurled a second attack against Hill 119 in the strength of two
companies, supported by intense mortar and artillery fire. An hour
later hand-to-hand combat had developed all along the 700 yards of the
forward trenches. Company G men of the 1st Marines were down to half
their original number, ammunition was running low, and evacuation of
casualties was slowed by the fact that two of the eight corpsmen had
been killed and most of the rest were themselves casualties.
By midnight, the front, left, and right flanks of the perimeter had
been pushed back to the reverse slope of the hill and a 1st Marines
participant commented “... only a never-say-die resistance was keeping
the enemy from seizing the remainder of the position.”[520] At 0015,
the thinning ranks of G/3/1 Marines (now down to 25 percent effectives)
were cheered by the news that Company I men were about to reinforce
their position. This latter unit itself suffered 35 casualties while
moving into the rear area, when the Chinese intercepted a coded message
and shifted a substantial amount of their mortar and artillery fires to
the rear approaches of Hill 119.
[520] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” Aug 53, p. 4.
In response to the enemy bombardment, Marine artillery fires crashed
against the Chinese continuously from 2100 to midnight. Four ripples
were launched in support of the Hill 119 defenders. In one of the
regiment’s most intense counterbattery shoots on record, the 11th
Marines in three hours had fired 157 missions. By 2400, an estimated
6,000 to 8,000 hostile rounds had fallen in the division sector.
Meanwhile, the Chinese were also attempting to punch holes in the 5th
regimental sector. In a second-step operation, rather than striking
simultaneously as was customary, the enemy at 2115 had jabbed at
outposts Esther and Dagmar in the right battalion of the 5th Marines.
The reinforced Chinese company from the 408th Regiment quickly began to
concentrate its attention on Esther, outposted by Company H Marines.
During the heavy fighting both Marines and Chinese reinforced. By
early morning, the enemy had seized part of the front trenchline, but
the Marines controlled the rear trenches and reorganized the defense
under rifle platoon commander, Second Lieutenant William H. Bates.
The Chinese unsuccessfully attempted to isolate the position by heavy
shelling and patrolled vigorously between Esther and the MLR.
Marines replied with flamethrowers and heavy supporting fires from the
MLR, including machine guns, 81mm and 4.2-inch mortar boxes. Three
tanks--a section from the regimental antitank platoon and one from
Company A--neutralized enemy targets with 153 rounds to assist the 3d
and 2d Battalions. The 3/11 gunners supporting the 5th Marines also
hurled 3,886 rounds against the Chinese in breaking up the attack.
After several hours of strong resistance, the Chinese loosened their
grip, and at 0640 on the 25th, Esther was reported secured.
By this time an enemy battalion had been committed piecemeal at the
position. The action had developed into the heaviest encounter of the
month in the 5th Marines sector. During that night of 24–25 July, more
than 4,000 artillery and mortar rounds fell in the outpost vicinity;
total incoming for the regimental sector throughout July was recorded
at 8,413 rounds. Twelve Marines lost their lives in the battle, with 35
wounded and evacuated, and 63 suffering minor injuries. A total of 85
CCF were counted dead, 110 more estimated killed, and an estimated 250
wounded.
Back at the Berlin Complex area of the 7th Marines where the major
action centered, intense shelling, fire fights, and close hand-to-hand
combat continued through the early morning of the 25th. Chinese
infiltrators had broken through a substantial part of the trenchwork
on the forward slope of Boulder City. For a while they temporarily
occupied the rocky, shrub-grown hill crest as well.
A swift-moving counterattack launched at 0130 by 1st Marines from
Companies G and I, led by Captain Louis J. Sartor, of I/3/1, began to
restore the proper balance to the situation. At 0330 the MLR had been
reestablished and the Marines had the controlling hand. By 0530 the
Hill 119 area was secured, with four new platoons from Companies E of
the 7th and 1st Marines aiding the defense. Scattered groups of Chinese
still clung to the forward slopes, and others vainly tried to reinforce
by the Berlin-to-Hill 119 left flank trenchline.
Direct fire from the four M-46s on position at Boulder City[521] had
helped disperse hostile troop concentrations. The tanks had also played
a major communication role. Although surrounded by enemy forces during
the peak of the fighting, two of the armored vehicles were still able
to radio timely tactical information to higher echelons. This Company
C quartet, plus another vehicle from the 7th Marines antitank unit,
between the time of the enemy assault to 0600 when it stabilized, had
pumped 109 HE, 8 marking shells, and 20,750 .30 caliber machine gun
bullets into opposition forces.[522] Five tanks from the 1st Marines
AT company located to the west of the Berlin site meted out further
punishment to enemy soldiers, gun pits, and trenches.
[521] One participant remarked: “I think the Boulder City
action ... is the classic example of where the Army system
worked well. The tanks were generally given credit for
saving the position, and I seriously doubt our ability to
have done the job under the previous system which would
have required the tanks to move to the scene after the
action had begun.” _Post ltr._
[522] In retaliation, between 2200 and 0600, the four tanks at
Hill 119 drew 2,200 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery.
Sporadic fighting and heavy incoming (at the rate of 60–70 rounds per
minute for 10 minutes duration) also rained down on eastern Hill 111
in the early hours of the 25th. Assault teams with flamethrowers and
3.5-inch rocket launchers completed the job of clearing the enemy out
of Marine bunkers.
Altogether the Communists had committed 3,000 troops across the Marine
division front during the night of 24–25 July. Between 2200 and 0400,
a total of 23,725 rounds had been fired by the 11th Marines and 10
battalions under its operational control in the division sector. This
included batteries from the 25th Division Artillery, I Corps Artillery,
and 1st Commonwealth Division Artillery.[523] The artillery outgoing
represented 7,057 rounds to assist the 5th Marines at outpost Esther
and 16,668 in defense of Boulder City.
[523] The British were not hampered by any ammunition
restrictions at this time. The excellent liaison between
the 11th Marines and Commonwealth Division Artillery
resulted in a humorous incident. After the battle of
24–25 July, a young British artillery officer arrived
at a Marine regimental CP. He identified himself as
being from the unit that had provided artillery support
to the Marines the previous night, for which he was
profusely thanked. Before his astonished audience he then
unrolled an impressive scroll. This proved to be a bill
enumerating the various types and amounts of projectiles
fired and specifying the cost in pounds sterling. When
he felt the Marine staff was properly flabbergasted, he
grinned and conceded waggishly: “But I am authorized to
settle for two bottles of your best whiskey!” _Curry ltr._
On the morning of 25 July, the Chinese at 0820 again assaulted Hill
119 in company strength. Marine mortar and artillery fire repulsed the
attack, with heavy enemy losses. See-saw action continued for most of
the rest of the day on the position. No major infantry attempt was
made at Hill 111. Intense hostile shelling was reported here at 1100,
however, when the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, still in operational
control of the area, began receiving 125 to 150 rounds per minute. The
last of the Chinese marauders were forced off the forward slope at
Boulder City at 1335. For some welcomed hours both Marine positions
remained quiet. A conservative estimate by 3/7 of the toll for the
enemy’s efforts were 75 CCF killed and 425 wounded.
Air support that morning was provided by 32 of the sleek, hard-hitting
F9Fs from VMF-115 and -311. Working in tandem over Chinese terrain
directly north of the right regimental sector, the two squadrons,
between 0616 and 1036, flew nine MPQ missions. In the aerial assault,
they bombarded the enemy with more than 32 tons of explosives.
Twelve Marine tanks had a workout, expending 480 HE and 33 WP shells
and 21,300 rounds of machine gun ammunition in direct fire missions.
The traditional inequity of battlefront luck was plainly demonstrated
between a section (two) of armored vehicles near the Hill 111 company
CP and a trio located at Boulder City. It was practically a standoff
for the former. Together they were able to fire only 71 high explosive
shells, drawing a return of 1,000 rounds of CCF 60mm mortar and 122mm
cannon shells. Blazing guns of the three tanks in the Hill 119 area,
meanwhile, during the 24-hour firing period had sent 158 HE, 10 WP,
and 17,295 bullets to destroy hostile weapons and installations and
received but 120 mortar and another 120 rounds of artillery fire.
The 11th Marines were also busy as heavy firing continued on Chinese
policing parties and those enemy batteries actively shelling MLR
positions. By late afternoon, 13,500 rounds of Chinese mortar and
artillery had crashed against the 7th Marines right sector--the highest
rate of incoming for any 24-hour period during the entire Berlin
action. For its part, the regiment and its medium and heavy support
units completed 216 counterbattery missions and sent 36,794 rounds of
outgoing into Chinese defenses between 2200 on 24 July and 1600 on the
25th.
Meanwhile, during 25 July, Colonel Nelson’s men continued with their
relief of the 7th Marines. At 1100 Major Robert D. Thurston, S-3 of
3/1, assumed command of Hill 119 and reorganized the embattled Company
G and Company I personnel, 1st Marines. That night, at 1940, E/2/1 and
F/2/7 effected the relief of the composite George-Item men. At the
eastern Hill 111 Company H, 1st Marines had assisted Company H, 7th
Marines during the day in clearing the trenchworks of the enemy; then
at 1815, the 1st Marines unit completed its relief of H/3/7 and took
over responsibility for the MLR right company sector. Not long after,
beginning at 2130, 1st and 7th Marines at the critical Hill 119 complex
were attacked by two enemy companies. MLR fire support plus artillery
and tank guns lashed at the enemy and he withdrew. Between 0130 and
0300 the Chinese again probed Hills 111 and 119, gaining small parts of
the trenchline before being driven out by superior Marine firepower.
Marine casualties were 19 killed and 125 wounded. The CCF had suffered
30 known dead, an estimated 84 killed, and 310 estimated wounded.
With dawn on the 26th came the first real quiet the battlefield had
known for two days. Small enemy groups tried to reinforce by way of the
Berlin trenchline, only to be stopped by Marine riflemen and machine
gunners. Hostile incoming continued spasmodically. At 1330 the 1st
Marines assumed operational control of the right regimental sector,
as scheduled, and of the remaining 7th Marines units still in the
area.[524] By this time Marine casualties since 24 July numbered 43
killed and 316 wounded.
[524] Seventh Marines units were Companies D and E, and
elements of the 4.2-inch Mortar Company.
That night the Communists, knowing the armistice was near and that
time was running out for seizing the Boulder City objective, made
their final attempts at the strongpoint. Again they attacked at 2130.
Defending 1st Marines were now under Captain Esmond E. Harper, CO
of E/2/1, who had assumed command when Major Thurston was seriously
wounded and evacuated. They fought off the Chinese platoon-size drive
when the enemy advanced from Berlin to the wire at Hill 119. Shortly
after midnight another Chinese platoon returned to Hill 119 in the last
skirmish for the territory, but Marine small arms and artillery handily
sent it home. At 0045, a CCF platoon nosed about the Hill 111 area for
an hour and twenty minutes. Again the Marines discouraged these last
faltering enemy efforts. Action at both hills ceased and what was to
become the concluding ground action for the 1st Marine Division in
Korea had ended.
Despite impressive tenacity and determination, the Chinese Communist
attacks throughout most of July on the two Berlin outposts and Hills
119 and 111 achieved no real gain. Their repetitive assaults on
strongly-defended Boulder City up until the last day of the war was an
attempt to place the Marines (and the United Nations Command) in as
unfavorable a position as possible when the armistice agreement was
signed. While talking at Panmunjom, the Communists pressed hungrily on
the battlefront for as much critical terrain as they could get under
their control before the final ceasefire line was established.
Had the enemy succeeded in his assaults on the two hill defenses after
his earlier seizure of the Berlins, under terms of the agreement UNC
forces would have been forced to withdraw southward to a point where
they no longer had free access to all of the Imjin River. If the
Chinese had taken Boulder City this would have also provided the CCF
a major high ground position (Hill 126) with direct observation into
Marine rear areas and important supply routes.
From the standpoint of casualties, the last month of the Korean War
was a costly one, with 181 infantry Marines killed in action and
total losses of 1,611 men.[525] This was the highest rate for any
month during 1953. It was second only to the October 1952 outpost
battles[526] for any month during the year the 1st Marine Division
defended the line in West Korea. The closing days of the war produced
the last action for which Marines were awarded the Navy Cross. These
Marines were Second Lieutenant Bates, H/3/5; First Lieutenant Swigart,
G/3/1; Second Lieutenant Theodore J. Lutz, Jr., H/3/1; and Sergeant
Robert J. Raymond, F/2/7, who was mortally wounded.
[525] Casualty breakdown: 181 killed, 86 missing, 862 wounded
and evacuated, 474 wounded (not evacuated), and 10
non-battle deaths.
[526] During this period 186 Marines were killed and 1,798
listed as casualties.
The 7th and 1st Marines, as the two regiments involved during July in
the Berlin sector defense, sustained high monthly losses: 804 and 594,
respectively. Forty-eight men from the 7th Marines and 70 from the
1st Marines were killed in action. In contrast, the 5th Marines which
witnessed little frontline action during the month (except for a sharp
one-night clash at Outpost Esther), suffered total monthly casualties
of 150 men, of whom 26 lost their lives. Chinese losses were also high:
405 counted killed, 761 estimated killed, 1,988 estimated wounded, 1
prisoner, or 3,155 for the month of July.
In their unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Marines from their MLR
positions the Chinese had pounded the right regimental flank with
approximately 22,200 artillery and mortar shells during the last 24–27
July battle. In reply, 11th Marines gunners and supporting units had
expended a total of 64,187 rounds against CCF strongpoints. The enemy’s
increased counterbattery capabilities in July, noted by division
intelligence, also received particular attention from the artillerymen.
A record number of 345 counterbattery missions were conducted during
the period by Marine and Army cannoneers.
More than 46,000 rounds of outgoing had been fired by the Chinese in
their repeated attempts of 7–9, 19–20, and 24–27 July to seize the
Berlin posts and key MLR terrain. Operations during this final month,
as the 2/11 commander was to point out later, on numerous occasions had
verified the wisdom of leaving “direct support artillery battalions in
place during frequent changes of frontline infantry units.”[527]
[527] Col Gordon H. West ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 1 Jul
70, hereafter _West ltr_.
Armored support throughout the 24–27 July period consisted of more than
30 tanks (Company C, AT Company elements of the 1st and 7th Marines, a
section of flames, and Company D platoon) on line or in reserve. Marine
tankers used a record 1,287 shells and 54,845 bullets against the CCF,
while drawing 4,845 rounds of enemy mixed mortar and artillery.
The enemy’s attack on Marine MLR positions, beginning 24 July,
constituted the major action in the I Corps sector the final 10 days
of the war. During this period the Chinese probed I Corps positions 25
times (8 in the Marine, 5 in the 1st Commonwealth, 6 in the 1st ROK,
and 6 in the 7th Infantry Division sectors).
In other parts of the Eighth Army line, the last large-scale action
had broken out east of the Marine sector beginning 13 July when major
elements of six Chinese Communist divisions penetrated a ROK unit to
the right of the IX Corps. As the division’s right and center fell
back, units withdrew into the zones of the IX and ROK II Corps on the
east. General Taylor directed that a new MLR be established south of
the Kumsong River, and a counterattack 17–20 July by three II Corps
divisions attained this objective.
Since the armistice agreement was imminent, no attempt was made
to restore the original line. The Chinese had achieved temporary
success[528] but at heavy cost. Eighth Army officials estimated that
CCF casualties in July reached 72,000 men, with more than 25,000 of
these dead. The enemy had lost the equivalent of seven divisions of
the five Chinese armies committed in attacks upon the II and IX Corps
sectors.
[528] Minor realignments of the military line of demarcation
were made in the center sector to include a few miles
of territory gained by the Communists in their massive
July offensive there. Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 292;
Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 640; Leckie, _Conflict_, p.
385.
_The Last Day of the War_[529]
[529] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9;
1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 26–28 Jul
53; 1stMarDiv PIR 941, dtd 27 Jul 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul
53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, 4/11
ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; HRS Log Sheet, dtd
21 Aug 67 (n.t., about Korean War Casualties, prepared
on request for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC); Leckie,
_Conflict_; Capt C. A. Robinson and Sgt D. L. Cellers,
“Land of the Morning Calm,” _Midwest Reporter_ (Jul 68).
Representatives of the Communist Forces and the United Nations Command
signed the armistice agreement that marked the end of the Korean War
in Panmunjom at 1000 on Monday, 27 July 1953. The cease-fire, ending
two years of often fruitless and hostile truce negotiations, became
effective at 2200 that night. After three years, one month, and two
days the so-called police action in Korea had come to a halt.
Actually, final agreement on the armistice had been expected since
late June. By mid-July it was considered imminent, even though the
CCF during these waning days of the war had launched several major
counteroffensives against ROK troops defending the central part of the
Eighth Army line as well as the Marines in the western I Corps sector.
With the final resolution of hostilities at 1000, a flash message
went out immediately to the 26,000 Marines of General Pate’s division
directing that there be “no celebration firing related in any way to
the advent of the armistice.”[530] Fraternization or communication with
the enemy was expressly forbidden. Personnel were reminded that firing
of all weapons was to be “restricted to the minimum justified by the
tactical situation.”[531] No defensive firing was to take place after
2145 unless the Marines were actually attacked by enemy infantry. Each
frontline company was authorized to fire one white star cluster at
2200, signalling the cease fire.
[530] Msg 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoting Cease Fire
and Armistice Agreement, IUS-OP-9-53.
[531] _Ibid._
The signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July thus ended 36 months
of war for the Marines in Korea. On that date, the 1st Marine Division
initiated plans for its withdrawal to defensive positions south of the
Imjin River. One regiment, the 5th Marines, was left north of the river
to man the general outpost line across the entire division front. A
transition was made at this time from the customary wide-front linear
defense to a defense in depth, similar to that employed in the July
Boulder City battle.
[Illustration:
MAP 33 K. WHITE
EIGHTH ARMY FRONT
27 JULY 1953]
Briefly, the armistice agreement decreed that both UNC and Communist
forces:
Cease fire 12 hours (at 2200, 27 July) after signing of agreement;
Withdraw all military forces, supplies, and equipment from the
demilitarized zone (2,000 yards from line of contact) within 72
hours after effective time of ceasefire;
Locate and list all fortifications and minefields in the DMZ
within 72 hours, to be dismantled during a subsequent salvage
period;
Replace combat personnel and supplies on a one-for-one basis, to
prevent any build-up; and
Begin repatriation of all POWs, with exchange to be completed
within two months.
The 1st Marine Division began that afternoon to close out its existing
MLR[532] and withdraw to its designated post-armistice main battle
position located two kilometers to the south, in the vicinity of the
KANSAS Line. This tactical withdrawal was to be completed no later than
2200 on 30 July.
[532] See Map 33 for Eighth Army dispositions on the last day
of the war.
By early afternoon the three infantry regiments had been ordered to
furnish mine teams to mark, remove, and clear minefields. For units of
the 1st and 7th Marines deployed at the Boulder Hill Outpost--quiet
only since 0300 that morning--the cease-fire news understandably
carried a “let’s see” reaction as the men “waited cautiously throughout
the day in their fortifications for the White Star Cluster which would
signify the end ...”[533] Convincing the men at shell-pocked Boulder
City that a cease-fire was to take place within a few hours would have
been a difficult task that day, however, even for the Commandant.
[533] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” p. 5.
The Marine infantrymen who had been the target of the last heavy
Communist attacks of the war might well have had a special sense of
realism about the end of hostilities. Between the skirmish with Chinese
attacking units in the early hours of the 27th and mine accidents, a
total of 46 Marines had been wounded and removed from duty that last
day of the war and 2 others declared missing in action.
For the more free-wheeling artillerymen of the 11th Marines, that
final day was one of fairly normal operations. During the day, 40
counterbattery missions had been fired, the majority in reply to
Communist batteries that came alive at dusk.[534] A total of 102
countermortar missions were also completed, bringing the total outgoing
that last month to 75,910 rounds. Action of the regiment continued
until 2135, just ten minutes before the preliminary cease-fire which
preceded the official cease-fire at 2200.
[534] The CO of the direct support artillery battalion in the
defense of Boulder City, recalled that “on the evening
of the 27th, with the Armistice only hours away, 2/11
received heavy Chinese artillery fire apparently directed
at the batteries. Of the many rounds ... 80% were duds and
no damage was done. Numerous time fuzed shells detonated
hundreds of meters above ground. We figured that they
were using up old rounds to keep from hauling them back
north.” _West ltr._
For the 7,035 Marine officers and men on duty with General Megee’s 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing, the day was also an active one. That final day of
the war Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Pantherjets from the wing mounted 222
sorties and blasted the enemy with 354 tons of high explosives along
the front. Banshees from VMJ-1 flew 15 reconnaissance sorties during
the day for priority photographs of enemy airfields and railroads.
Last Marine jet pilot in action was Captain William I. Armagost of
VMF-311. He smashed a Communist supply point with four 500-pounders, at
1835, declaring his flight felt “just like the last winning play of a
football game.”[535]
[535] 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53 (Folder 3), CTF-91 msg to ComNavFE,
dtd 27 Jul 53.
The wing closed out its share of the Korean War 35 minutes before
the cease-fire. A VMA-251 aviator, Captain William J. Foster, Jr.,
dropped three 2,000-pound bombs at 2125 in support of UN troops. The
distinction of flying this final Marine mission over the bombline had
gone, fittingly, to the wing’s newly-arrived “Black Patch” squadron.
At sea, U.S. and British warships ended the 17-month naval siege by
shelling Wonsan for the last time, and at 2200 the ships in the harbor
turned on their lights. In compliance with the terms of the armistice,
full evacuation of the WCIDU and ECIDU islands north of the 38th
Parallel started at 2200. Island defense forces off both coasts at this
time began a systematic destruction of their fortifications as they
prepared to move south.
As early as 2100 Marine line units reported seeing Chinese soldiers
forward of their own positions, policing their areas. An hour later
large groups of enemy were observed along the division sector. Some
“waved lighted candles, flashlights, and banners while others removed
their dead and wounded, and apparently looked for souvenirs.”[536]
A few attempts were made by the Chinese to fraternize. One group
approached a Marine listening post and asked for water and wanted to
talk. Others hung up gift bags at the base of outpost Ava and shouted,
“How are you? Come on over and let’s have a party,” while the Marines
stared at them in silence.[537] The last hostile incoming in the 1st
Marine Division sector was reported at 2152 when five rounds of 82mm
mortar landed on a Korean outpost, COP Camel.
[536] 1stMarDiv, ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2. One Marine officer, Major
General Louis Metzger, who at the time was Executive
Officer, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, recalled how voices
of the Chinese Communists’ singing and cheering drifted
across the Han River that night. “It was an eerie
thing ... and very depressing.” MajGen Louis Metzger
comments on draft MS, dtd 1 Jul 70, hereafter _Metzger
comments_.
[537] 1stMarDiv ComdD, _op. cit._, and Rees, _Korea_, p. 434.
Marines on line that night warily scanned the darkness in front of
their trenches. Slowly at first, then with increasing rapidity the
white star cluster shells began to burst over positions all along the
line. Thousands of flares illuminated the sky and craggy hills along
the 155-mile front, from the Yellow Sea to Sea of Japan. The war in
Korea was over. Of the men from the one Marine Division and air wing
committed in Korea during the three-year conflict, 4,262 had been
killed in battle. An additional 26,038 Marines were wounded. No fewer
than 42 Marines would receive the Nation’s highest combat decoration,
the Medal of Honor, for outstanding valor--26 of them posthumously.
CHAPTER X
Return of the Prisoners of War
_Operation_ BIG SWITCH--_Circumstances of Capture--The Communist POW
Camps--CCF “Lenient Policy” and Indoctrination Attempts--The Germ
Warfare Issue--Problems and Performance of Marine POWs--Marine Escape
Attempts--Evaluation and Aftermath_
_Operation_ BIG SWITCH[538]
[538] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9,
10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv G-3
Jnls, Jul-Aug 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53; 11thMar,
MAG-33 ComdDs, Jul 53; HRS Subject File VE23.2.S8
“CMC Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File #1
“Prisoners of War--Korea--General”; HRS Subject Files
“Prisoners of War--Korea--News Clippings, folders #1,
#2, #3”; Korea War casualty cards from Statistical
Unit, Casualty Section, Personal Affairs Br, Code DNA,
HQMC; MacDonald, _POW_; Berger, _Korea Knot_; Clark,
_Danube to Yalu_; T. R. Fehrenbach, _This Kind of War--A
Study in Unpreparedness_ (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1963), hereafter Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, quoted with
permission of the publisher; Field, _NavOps, Korea_;
Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_;
USMA, _Korea_; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, “Big Switch,”
_Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53), hereafter
Heinecke, “Big Switch”; _Life_ Magazine, Jul-Aug 53
issues; _New York Times_, 5 Aug-6 Sep 53; _Washington
Post_, 5 Aug-6 Sep 53.
Between August 1950, the month that the first Marine was taken prisoner
and July 1953, when 18 Marine infantrymen were captured in final rushes
by the CCF, a total of 221 U.S. Marines became POWs.[539] The majority
of them--nearly 90 percent--ultimately returned. After the conclusion
of hostilities, Marine POWs were among the UNC fighting men returned in
Operation BIG SWITCH.
[539] Marine Corps prisoners, including their unit designations
and date of release (or death), are listed in MacDonald,
_POW_, pp. 249–273.
The new mission of the 1st Marine Division, with the cease-fire,
called for organization of the Post Armistice Battle Positions and
establishment of a No-Pass Line approximately 200 yards south of the
Demilitarized Zone boundary. In addition to maintaining a defensive
readiness posture for full-scale operations if hostilities resumed,
the Marine division was charged with control of the Munsan-ni area
and assisting in repatriation of prisoners of war. Obviously, since
the Panmunjom release point for receiving the POWs was located in the
Marine zone of action, the division--as in the earlier LITTLE SWITCH
prisoner exchange--would play a major part in the final repatriation.
With the armistice and ending of the war expected almost daily, the
Munsan-ni Provisional Command was activated and reorganized in June.
Once again, the 1st Marine Division was responsible for the United
Nations Personnel and Medical Processing Unit, organized along lines
similar to those used during the preliminary exchange. The division
inspector, Colonel Albert F. Metze, was designated Processing Unit
Commander. Sections under his direction were staffed by Marine and
naval personnel. The normal command structure was reinforced by special
engineer, medical, interpreter, food service, chaplain, security,
signal, supply, and motor transport teams. Planning for the project,
like all military operations, was thorough and continuous.
As in April, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command assumed responsibility
for handling the UN repatriation at Panmunjom as well as supervision of
the receiving and processing of ROKA personnel. Brigadier General Ralph
M. Osborne, USA, was placed in charge of the command, with headquarters
at the United Nations Base Camp. The RCT landing exercise for the
1st Marines, scheduled in July, was cancelled because of shipping
commitments for Operation BIG SWITCH, as the Navy Amphibious Force
readied itself for the repatriation of prisoners. By the end of July,
the 1st Marine Division was supporting “approximately 42,400 troops
with Class I [rations] and 48,600 with Class III [petroleum products]
due to the influx of units and personnel participating in Operation BIG
SWITCH.”[540]
[540] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-134.
Several days before the exchange, however, it became evident that the
old site of the Gate to Freedom used in the April exchange would have
to be abandoned. It was found inadequate to handle the larger number of
returning prisoners--approximately 400 daily--to be processed in the
new month-long operation. The new site, Freedom Village, near Munsan-ni
contained an old Army warehouse which was renovated by the 1st Division
engineers and transformed into the 11th Evacuation Hospital where the
UN Medical and Processing Unit was located. Members of the division
Military Police Company provided security for the exchange area.
Marines from practically every unit of the division were assigned
duties at the United Nations Processing Center. As General Clark, UNC
Commander later recalled:
Preparations for Big Switch were necessarily elaborate. At Munsan
we had a huge warehouse stocked high with clothing, blankets,
medical equipment and other supplies for the returning POWs. At
Freedom Village nearby we had a complete hospital unit ready. It
was one of the Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) which had
done such magnificent work close to the front through most of the
war.[541]
[541] Clarke, _Danube to Yalu_, pp. 298–299.
On 5 August, the first day of BIG SWITCH, Colonel Metze took a final
look around the processing center. Readiness of this camp was his
responsibility. If anyone had real understanding of a prisoner’s
relieved and yet shaken reaction to new freedom it was this Marine
Colonel. Chosen by the United Nations Command to build and direct the
enlarged Freedom Village, Colonel Metze himself had been a prisoner of
war in World War II. He knew from personal experience how men should be
treated and what should be done for them early in their new freedom.
For many, this was after nearly three long years in Communist prison
camps. That morning, as described by an observer:
Members of his [Colonel Metze’s] command stood by their cubicles,
awaiting the first signal. The 129 enlisted Marines, corpsmen,
doctors and other UN personnel had held a dress rehearsal only
the day before. Everything was ready.[542]
[542] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 44.
Fifteen miles northwest another group of Marines assigned to the
Provisional Command Receipt and Control section waited almost in the
shadow of the famous “peace pagoda” at Panmunjom. UNC receiving teams,
each headed by a Marine Corps major, “watched the road to the north for
the first sign of a dust cloud which would herald the approach of the
Communist convoy.”[543] The United Nations POWs had been assembled at
Kaesong and held there in several groups, preparatory to the return.
The exchange agreement had specified that the repatriation would
begin at 0900. Precisely at 0855 the Communist convoy, led by three
Russian-made jeeps, each carrying one CCF and two _NKPA_ officers,
moved out from the Communist side of the peace corridor. Trucks and
ambulances followed the jeeps.
[543] _Ibid._
As they approached the exchange site, “a Marine officer bellowed the
familiar naval command, ‘Marines, man your stations!’”[544] Rosters
of the UNC prisoners in the trucks and ambulances were then presented
to the Marine team captains who checked the lists. As they called the
names, “thin, wan, but smiling men shuffled from the trucks to the
medical tents.”[545]
[544] _Ibid._, p. 45.
[545] _Ibid._
Official receipt of the POWs at Panmunjom was by the Munsan-ni
Provisional Command Receipt and Control Officer, assisted by 35
officers and enlisted men from the 1st Marine Division. After their
screening by medical officers, UN returnees not in need of immediate
medical aid were transferred by ambulance to Freedom Village at
Munsan-ni for further processing. Helicopter priority went to litter
patients too weak to travel by ambulance. POWs requiring prompt
treatment were loaded aboard the HMR-161 carriers and flown to the 11th
Evacuation Hospital at Freedom Village.
Seriously injured men were transferred directly to the Inchon hospital
ships for embarkation to the United States, or were air-evacuated to
Japan. South Korean repatriates were processed and went their way to
freedom through nearby Liberty Village, the ROK counterpart of Freedom
Village. A huge map was used to check progress of the POW convoys en
route from Panmunjom to Freedom Village. The departure of ambulances
and helicopters from Panmunjom was radioed ahead to Freedom Village,
where medical personnel and vehicles lined the landing mat.
At Munsan-ni, the newly-freed men received a more thorough physical
exam and the rest of their processing. Here they were again screened
by medical officers to determine their physical condition. Able-bodied
POWs were escorted to the personnel data section where necessary
administrative details were recorded and their military records
brought up to date. Those medically cleared were available for press
interviews. New clothing issue, individually tailored, probably as much
as anything emphasized to a prisoner that his particular Korean War was
over. And nearly all of them found news[546] awaiting them in letters
from home. When all basic details were completed, returnees went into
the recreation and refreshment section. Commonplace iced tea, coffee,
ice cream (the favorite), milk, sandwiches, cigarettes, and the latest
periodicals were luxuries. In their weakened condition, the POWs could
be served only light fare; the big steaks would come later.
[546] For at least two Marines their return home was news in
itself. Captain Paul L. Martelli, VMF-323, had been
reported KIA. First Lieutenant Robert J. O’Shea, of
division headquarters, the son of Marine Brigadier
General George J. O’Shea (Ret), had also been thought
dead by his family. He had been reported missing in July
1951 and had not been carried on the official POW list
released the following December.
The first Marine and fifth man in the processing line on the initial
day, 5 August, was Private First Class Alfred P. Graham, Jr., of H/3/5.
Although too weak to enter the press room, the 21-year-old repatriate
told newsmen later in Tokyo of being fed a diet of cracked corn during
his prison camp stay and of being forced to carry firewood 11 miles
each day. The second Marine returned that day, and the 34th man to
enter Freedom Village, was Sergeant Robert J. Coffee, of the 1st Signal
Battalion. Captured in November 1950, he had been wounded just before
being taken prisoner and had received little medical treatment. Like
other returnees, Coffee stated that the treatment had been very poor
while he was in the hands of the North Koreans but that it had improved
somewhat after he was turned over to the Chinese.
Third and last Marine to come through the line was Private First
Class Pedron E. Aviles, previously with the Reconnaissance Company
of Headquarters Battalion. Knocked unconscious with a rifle butt
while battling the enemy on a patrol on 7 December 1952, he regained
consciousness to find himself a prisoner of the CCF.
On the second day, three more USMC infantrymen traveled that final
road to freedom. They were Private First Class Francis E. Kohus, Jr.,
of A/1/7; Corporal Gethern Kennedy, Jr., I/3/1; and Private First
Class Bernard R. Hollinger, H/3/5. Like the preceding three, their
stories bore a similar pattern: usually they had been captured only
after having been wounded or clubbed unconscious. As with other UNC
prisoners being released daily, they told of the physical cruelty of
their North Korean captors and the mental strain under the Chinese.
Observers noted that many of the men released this second day were in
much poorer physical condition than the initial returnees. In fact, one
ROK prisoner was found to have died in an ambulance while en route to
Liberty Village.
Mostly the repatriates asked questions about their old outfits: “Do you
know if any of the other guys on the outpost got back off the hill?”
and “Did we finally take the damn thing?” “Where’s the 24th Division
now?”[547]
[547] HRB Subject File: “#1, ‘Prisoners Of War--Korea--General,’”
HQMC Div Info release, n.d., n.t.
Technical Sergeant Richard E. Arnold was one of the two Marine combat
correspondents at Freedom Village during BIG SWITCH. He described his
impressions of the returning men--in some cases, coming home after 30
months’ confinement in North Korean POW camps, and others, as little as
30 days:
All are relieved and some a little afraid ... It’s their
first hour of freedom, and most tell you that they can still
hardly believe it’s true. Some are visibly shaken, some are
confused--and all are overwhelmed at the thought of being free
men once again.[548]
[548] _Ibid._
As in prison life everywhere, the POWs told of the hated stool pigeons,
the so-called “progressives.” These were the captives who accepted (or
appeared to accept) the Communist teachings and who, in turn, were
treated better than the “reactionary” prisoners who resisted the enemy
“forced feeding” indoctrination. Continued the Marine correspondent:
They don’t talk much. When they do, it’s ... mainly of
progressives and reactionaries--the two social groups of prisoner
life under the rule of Communism, the poor chow and medical care,
and of the desire to fight Communism again.
When you ask, they tell you of atrocities committed during
the early years of the war with a bitterness of men who have
helplessly watched their friends and buddies die. Of forced
marches, the bitter cold, and the endless political lectures they
were forced to attend.[549]
[549] _Ibid._
One of the last--possibly _the last_--Marine captured by the Chinese
was Private First Class Richard D. Johnson, of G/3/1. The 20-year-old
machine gunner had been in the final battle of the war, the Boulder
City defense, and was taken 25 July, just two days before the signing
of the truce. Private First Class Johnson was returned the 19th day of
the exchange. Another Marine seized in that same action was Private
First Class Leonard E. Steege, H/3/7. As he entered the gate, he
momentarily shook up Corporal James E. Maddell, a military policeman
on duty at Freedom Village. Maddell said the last time he saw Steege
was during the fighting for the outpost. “He was a dead Marine then,”
Maddel said, “but I guess it was just a case of mistaken identity.”[550]
[550] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 48.
Captain Jesse V. Booker of Headquarters Squadron 1, the first Marine
POW of the war, who had been captured on 7 August 1950, was also one
of the earliest MAW personnel released. Booker and First Lieutenant
Richard Bell, VMF-311, were returned to UNC jurisdiction on 27 August,
the first Marine aviators to be sent back.
In addition to the regular issue of Marine utilities, gold naval
aviator’s wings, donated by 1st MAW fliers, were pinned on the chests
of returning pilots by Wing General Megee and Division General Pate.
Also welcoming Marine returnees at Freedom Village were Brigadier
General Verne J. McCaul, the new Assistant Wing Commander; General
Burger, ADC; and Colonel Metze, who also “found time during the busy
days to greet and talk with every Marine and Navy Corpsman who passed
through.”[551] Among those dignitaries[552] present for the occasion
were General Taylor, EUSAK CG; General Clarke, I Corps Commander;
Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens; and various U.S. senators.
[551] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 53, App. VI, p. 12.
[552] As the exchange got underway, General Mark Clark was on a
trip to the U.S. Unable to greet the returning prisoners,
as he had at LITTLE SWITCH, the UNC Commander had a
welcoming letter waiting for each repatriate. A booklet
especially prepared for returning POWs which contained a
quick fill-in on world news and sports events they may
have missed as prisoners was also given each returnee.
_Washington Post_, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 3.
During August enlisted POWs were recovered in large numbers.
Officers, generally, did not arrive at Kaesong--the first step to
Panmunjom--until about 21 August. After that date they were gradually
returned to friendly control.
Even as late as 26 August there was considerable concern over the
fate of hundreds of Allied officers not yet repatriated. Some early
returning officers told of colonels, majors and captains who had been
sentenced up to ten years for forming “reactionary groups” in camp. One
field grade officer had been sentenced to a long prison term on the
eve of the armistice.[553] A similar thing nearly happened to Captain
John P. Flynn, VMF(N)-513, long a thorn in the side of his Communist
captors. Like a number of UNC airmen falsely charged with waging germ
warfare, he vigorously denounced these allegations. “Even as late as
the end of August the Marine was threatened with nonrepatriation, and
his experience formed the basis for an episode in the novel _A Ride to
Panmunjom_.”[554]
[553] HRS Subject File: “#1. “PRISONERS OF
WAR--Korea--General,” _Washington News_ article, dtd 26
Aug 53 from Panmunjom, “Officers’ Fate Worries Army,” by
Jim G. Lucas.
[554] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 225.
Between 5 August-6 September, 3,597 U.S. servicemen were returned
during Operation BIG SWITCH, including 129 ground and 28 air Marines.
This 157 figure represents a total of 42 officers and 115 enlisted
repatriated during this second and final POW exchange. Of the 27 Naval
personnel freed, at least 6 were hospital corpsmen serving with the 1st
Marine Division when they were taken. Counting the 157 Marines released
in Operation BIG SWITCH and the 15 wounded POWs sent back in April, a
total of 172 division and wing Marines were returned in the two POW
exchanges.
Although the switch took place over a five-week period, 38 Marines,
or 24 percent, were not released until late in the proceedings, in
September. As one author noted, “It was Communist policy to hold the
‘reactionaries’ ... to the last.”[555]
[555] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, p. 651.
Two of the best-known Marine “reactionaries” who had openly defied
their Communist jailers during their entire period of captivity,
were then-Lieutenant Colonel William G. Thrash, a VMA-121 pilot, and
then-Major John N. McLaughlin, taken POW in November 1950. McLaughlin
was released on 1 September and Thrash on 5 September in a group of 275
Americans returned, the largest number for any single day’s transfer
since the exchange began. The most famous U.S. prisoner held by the
Communists was Major General William F. Dean. Formerly commander of the
U.S. Army 24th Division, he had been captured in August 1950 after the
fall of Taejon.
Ever since Operation BIG SWITCH got under way, every returnee had
been asked if he had seen or heard of General Dean. None had. Many UN
officers felt--uneasily--that he would probably be the last officer to
be sent back. In fact, he emerged from imprisonment on 4 September “to
be greeted with cheers at Freedom Village.”[556] Major Walter R. Harris
and the most senior Marine captured during the war, Colonel Frank H.
Schwable, later to be the central figure in a Court of Inquiry, were
among the last nine Marines returned on 6 September, the final day
of the switch. And so, one by one, the last 160 American POWs passed
through Panmunjom. All were men marked by the enemy as “war criminals.”
[556] _Life_ Magazine, v. 35, no. 11 (15 Sep 53), p. 42.
One Army sergeant, who freely admitted he could “never adequately
describe how he felt when he knew he was going home”[557] recalled
those final moments as a newly-freed prisoner:
[557] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, p. 651.
At 1100 his truck pulled up at Panmunjom, the last convoy of
American POWs to be exchanged. A huge, moustached Marine master
sergeant walked up beside the truck, called out: “I will call
out your last name. You will answer with your first name, middle
initial, and Army serial number ...”
“Schlichter!”
Schlichter [Charles B., Sgt.], barked out his response, and
stepped down.
“Sergeant,” the big Marine said gravely, “glad to have you home.”
“Fella, you don’t know how glad _I_ am,” Schlichter said.[558]
[558] _Ibid._
In the preliminary prisoner exchange, the week-long “LITTLE SWITCH”
in April 1953, all of the returned Marine personnel were men who had
been wounded at the time of their capture. They were recently-captured
POWs, deliberately segregated by the enemy from early captives. All of
these home-coming Marines had been captured since May 1952. Generally
speaking, they had all been fairly well-treated.
During Operation BIG SWITCH, by contrast, 41 Marines were repatriated
who had spent nearly three years as Communist prisoners of war. The
majority of USMC returnees in this second exchange, however--a total of
91--had been captured relatively recently, in 1952 and 1953, and 25 had
been held since 1951.
Throughout Operation BIG SWITCH, the Allied Command transferred a total
of 75,799 prisoners (70,159 NKPA and 5,640 CCF) seeking repatriation.
The Communist returned 12,757 POWs. In addition to the 3,597 Americans,
this total represented 1,312 other UNC troops (including 947 Britons,
228 Turks, and small numbers of Filipinos, Australians, and Canadians)
and 7,848 South Koreans.
The BIG SWITCH exchange went relatively smoothly, marred for a while
only by the unruly behavior of some Communist diehard POWs. In a manner
reminiscent of their earlier camp riots, the Communist POWs put on
a blatant propaganda show for the benefit of world newsreel cameras.
As the train carrying CCF and North Korean prisoners moved into the
Panmunjom exchange point, enemy POWs noisily shouted Communist slogans,
defiantly waved Communist flags, and hurled insults at UN forces.
Some POWs stripped off their [U.S. provided] uniforms, “tossing them
contemptuously to the ground.”[559] Others spat in the faces of U.S.
supervising officers, threw their shoes at jeep windshields, and sang
in Korean and Chinese “We will return in the Fall.”[560]
[559] _Life_ Magazine, v. 35, no. 7 (17 Aug 53), p. 22.
[560] _Metzger comments._
Marine division and wing elements were designated responsible for
the security of nonrepatriated enemy POWs. By terms of the armistice
agreement, these were held by UNC custodial forces from India. In
commenting on the airlift operations, performed largely by HMR-161, the
UNC Commander noted:
We had to go to great lengths to live up to our pledge to Syngman
Rhee that no Indian troops would set foot on South Korean soil.
Therefore, we set up an airlift operation which carried more than
six thousand Indians from the decks of our carriers off Inchon by
helicopter to the Demilitarized Zone. It was a major undertaking
which just about wore out our helicopter fleet in Korea.[561]
[561] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 299.
One of the recommendations made by military officials after the April
LITTLE SWITCH exchange was that all interrogation of returning POWs
be done either in America or on board ship en route home, rather than
in Tokyo. This system was followed and worked out well. The POWs
boarded ships at Inchon, following their clearance at Freedom Village.
Interrogation teams, in most cases, completed this major part of their
repatriation processing before docking at San Francisco. Two weeks
of recuperation, good food and rest aboard ship enabled many POWs to
arrive home in far better shape for reunion with their families than
they had been in when received initially at Panmunjom.
As in LITTLE SWITCH, Marine and Navy personnel were processed by
members of the Intelligence Department of Commander, Naval Forces
Far East, augmented by officers from other Marine staffs. Marine
officers who conducted the shipboard interrogations again included
Lieutenant Colonel Fisher, ComNavFE liaison officer, as well as
Lieutenant Colonel William A. Wood, Major Stewart C. Barber, and First
Lieutenant Robert A. Whalen. All returning POWs were queried in depth
by counterintelligence personnel about enemy treatment and atrocities,
questionable acts committed by that small proportion of our own men
whose conduct was reprehensible, and routine military matters. A
security dossier was prepared on each prisoner, and all data about
him went into his file case. The LITTLE SWITCH reports had indicated
earlier--and this was subsequently confirmed--that some U.S. servicemen
were definitely marked for further detailed questioning and scrutiny.
_Circumstances of Capture_[562]
[562] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE 23.2.S8 “CMC
Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File:
“Korea--Korean War--General”; MacDonald, _POW_; Montross,
Kuokka, and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea--East-Central Front_,
v. IV; Matthew B. Ridgway, _The Korean War_ (Garden City:
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter Ridgway, _Korean
War_; Heinecke, “Big Switch.”
As the Commandant, General Shepherd, was to testify later during an
investigation, “the prisoner of war question had never been a major
problem [in the Marine Corps] due to the extremely limited number of
Marines taken prisoner.”[563] As one returnee at BIG SWITCH bluntly
put it: “You fought until they reached you with a bullet or a rifle
butt--that was the end.”[564]
[563] HRS Subject File: “VE 23.2.S8--CMC Statements on Korean
POWs,” CMC Statement dtd 14 Apr 54, p. 2.
[564] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 58.
Of the 221 U.S. Marines captured during the Korean War, more than
half--121--were seized after 20 September 1951. For the Marine Corps
this date marked the time when “warfare of position replaced a warfare
of movement throughout the remaining 22 months of the conflict in
Korea.”[565] Both in the X Corps sector in eastern Korea where the
1st Marine Division was located at that time, as well as later on the
Korean western front, the Marine Corps was denied its traditional
aggressive fighting role. The Marines (along with the rest of the UNC
forces) ceased offensive operations, were reduced to making limited
attacks, and were under order from higher echelons to “firm up the
existing line and to patrol vigorously forward of it.”[566]
[565] Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea_, v. IV, p.
201.
[566] _Ibid._
The mission of the Marine division thereby evolved into “an aggressive
defense of their sector of responsibility” as records duly phrased it.
On a larger scale, the nature of the Korean War, from about November
1951 on, reverted to that of July and August,[567] characterized
primarily by minor patrol clashes and small unit struggles for key
outpost positions. This became the pattern for the remainder of the
war. It changed only when the decreed mission of an “active defense
of its sector” by a UNC unit became this in fact. Normal defense
then escalated into sharp, vigorous fighting to retain friendly key
ground positions being attacked by the enemy. One American writer, in
a discussion of the British defense in depth concept (adopted by the
Marine Corps late in the war), went so far as to blame heavy Marine
casualties in Korea on EUSAK’s outpost system.[568]
[567] In July 1951, fighting had quieted down all along the
UNC front, as a result of truce talks initiated by the
Communists. This conveniently provided the enemy, at that
time hard-pressed, a much-needed breathing spell. The
lull in ground fighting continued until late August when
the truce negotiations were suspended.
[568] HRS Subject file “Korea--Korean War--General,” article
_Washington Times-Herald_, dtd 20 Aug 53, by Walter
Simmons, p. 27.
Approximately half of the 100 Marines taken prisoner by September
1951--43--had fallen into enemy hands during the last two days
of November 1950. They had been part of the ill-fated Task Force
Drysdale,[569] a composite Royal Marine-USMC-Army convoy that was
ambushed by the Chinese en route to the Chosin Reservoir. These facts
are relevant to a better understanding of the Commandant’s statement
that, traditionally, few Marines become prisoners of war.
[569] For further details of this action, see MacDonald,
_POW_, pp. 33–43; Montross and Canzona, _USMC Ops
Korea--Chosin_, v. III, pp. 140–141, 225–235; and Reese,
_Korea_, p. 162.
Overall, the survival rate for Marines taken captive during the
Korean War was 87.8 percent. Even for the worst year, 1950, when NKPA
treatment was more ruthless and brutal than the CCF (and in any event,
for those men longest-held), the Marine survival rate was 75 percent.
Marine Corps statistics show that of 221 Marines captured, 194 (43
officers, 151 enlisted) returned, and 27 or 12.2 percent died.[570]
Only a few Marines were afflicted with “give-up-itis,” the malady
that struck countless POWs and took a heavy toll of lives. Included
among these 194 returnees were the 172 men from the two POW exchanges,
as previously noted; plus a group of 18 Marines captured in 1950 who
escaped and rejoined USMC units in May 1951; two enlisted men who
escaped less than a week after being taken; and two others released by
the enemy after less than a month’s captivity.
[570] Records indicate that 3 officers and 18 enlisted died
while in captivity. Three officers and 3 enlisted POWs
were also presumed to have died. MacDonald, _POW_, pp.
257–259.
In a pure statistical oddity, the survival percentage for both Marine
officers and enlisted (as well as the overall return rate) turned out
to be the same: 87 percent.
Without going into an analysis here of the possible relevant factors,
it is interesting to note that 62 percent of all U.S. captured military
personnel returned after the Korean War and that roughly 38 percent
died while imprisoned.[571] During World War II, the death rate for
U.S. prisoners held by the Axis powers was approximately 11 percent.
[571] The number of American servicemen returned was
approximately 4,428 of 7,190 captured during the war.
_Encyclopaedia Britannica_, 1966 edition, “Prisoners
of War--Korean War,” p. 519B. Earlier DOD “Tentative
Final Report of U.S. Battle Casualties in the Korean
War,” cited by MacDonald, _POW_, p. 230, indicated 7,140
Americans were captured, 4,418 recovered, and 2,701 died.
Either way, the percentages remain the same.
Circumstances accounting for the capture of Marines during the Korean
War were, as in every war, an occupational hazard. In most cases,
prisoners were taken in one of two situations. One occurred when
overwhelming numbers of hostile forces suddenly surrounded and overran
a small outpost, and either killed or captured a high proportion of its
defenders. The second resulted from the well-known increasing accuracy
of CCF antiaircraft fire. Halfway through the war it began to take its
toll of 1st MAW pilots with similarly predictable results: either death
or capture. Simple mischance and the human error of confused directions
caused at least two ground Marines to blunder into enemy territory.[572]
[572] A similar mishap had dire consequences for Major
General Dean of the Army. Cut off from his unit, he
was attempting to return to the U.S. line. Lacking a
compass he walked to the southwest--and thereby into NKPA
hands--instead of the southeast where U.S. troops were
then heavily engaged in the fierce battle of the Pusan
Perimeter.
A brief review of the Korean War, chronologically, illustrates how
some of the men of the 1st Marine Division wound up as prisoners. In
the first week of August 1950, leading elements of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade and the 1st MAW air squadrons arrived in Korea. Soon
thereafter the Marine Corps was in the thick of these early-moving
offensives: at the Pusan Perimeter; the September Inchon-Seoul
amphibious landings; Fox Hill at Toktong Pass, Yudam-ni, the Task Force
Drysdale operation, all in November; and the October-December Chosin
Reservoir campaign, including the two-day movement from Hagaru to
Koto-ri in early December. Marine infantry, military police, tankers,
motor transport personnel, and artillerymen were listed MIA in these
operations.
Altogether, 79 Marines were captured during the first year. November
1950, when 58 Marines were lost to the enemy, would rank as the most
costly month of the entire war in terms of Marines seized in combat.
The first air POW, Captain Booker, was shot down 7 August while flying
a reconnaissance mission from the USS _Valley Forge_. (This was the
same date that infantrymen of the Marine Provisional Brigade saw their
initial heavy fighting in what was then considered only a “police
action.”) Captain Booker was to remain the only Marine pilot in enemy
hands until April 1951.
One ground Marine captured during the hectic days of August 1950
escaped before ever becoming listed as a casualty. Although Private
First Class Richard E. Barnett thus does not technically qualify as a
POW statistic, he still holds the distinction of being both one of the
first Marine captives and one of the few to escape.[573]
[573] A radio-jeep driver, Private First Class Barnett, was
returning to his unit when he made a wrong turn and,
instead, came upon a group of North Koreans. The enemy
fired and halted the vehicle, quickly taking Barnett
prisoner. Beaten, searched, and interrogated, the Marine
was placed in a heavily-guarded cellar. For several days
he was given only a few crackers to eat. On the third
night, unaccountably, the Koreans took him along on an
attack. As they neared the objective, Barnett noticed
that all but one of his NKPA guards had gotten ahead of
him. He deliberately fell, throwing a rock in the face
of the nearby guard, and raced for safety. Successfully
eluding his captors, Private First Class Barnett later
rejoined his own forces. MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 8–10.
Few Marines were taken during 1951. Of the 31 seized throughout the
entire year, 13 were from the division and 18 from the wing. The
Marines were engaged in antiguerrilla activities until late February
when a general advance was ordered by U.S. IX and X Corps to deny
positions to the enemy. The 1st Marine Division was committed near
Wonju, as part of the IX Corps. A second offensive, Operation RIPPER,
was launched in March, and for the next six weeks small inroads were
made against CCF forces. Relieved in the Hongchon area the next month
by elements of the U.S. 2d and 7th Divisions, the Marines continued to
operate as part of the IX Corps. Their mission was to secure objectives
north of the 38th Parallel. On 21 April the 1st Marine Division
launched its attack, on IX Corps order, encountering moderate to
heavy resistance. Throughout the first half of 1951, only five Marine
infantrymen were captured.
Truce negotiations, as earlier noted, began at Kaesong on 10 July
1951 and ground fighting slowed. When the Communists broke off the
truce sessions in late August General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander,
ordered an offensive by the X Corps to seize the entire Punchbowl.
Along with other X Corps divisions, the Marines attacked on 31
August. They secured initial objectives, and then moved north to the
Soyang River to seize additional designated objectives. Following the
bitter action in the Punchbowl area, the Marines were involved in
consolidating and improving their defenses.
As the battle lines became comparatively stabilized in 1951, the enemy
began to develop his AA defenses to peak efficiency. Marine pilots
engaged in CAS, observation, interdiction, and armed reconnaissance
missions began to encounter accurate and intense ground fire.[574]
Aircraft losses increased, and with them, the number of USMC aviators
who fell into enemy hands. More than half of the Marine POWs taken
during the year--18 of 31--were on 1st MAW station lists. Captive
airmen represented VMF-323, VMF(N)-513, Hedron MAG-33 (Headquarters
Squadron 33), VMO-6, VMF-312, VMF-311, and VMA-121.
[574] One Marine who had conducted volunteer AAA reconnaissance
missions over North Korea was Lieutenant Colonel Charles
W. May, CO of the 1st 90mm AAAGunBn. In December 1951
he was lost in such a mission--the same flight in which
Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, of VMA-121, was captured.
MajGen A. F. Binney ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd
14 Sep 66.
The year 1952, like 1950, saw a large number of Marines taken into
hostile custody--a total of 70. As the year began, CCF and UNC ground
forces had settled down to a bunker warfare system often compared to
the trench warfare of World War I. Air activity remained much as it
had the preceding year. Air losses decreased, however, with only 11
pilots becoming POWs, in contrast to the 59 infantry Marines captured.
In March, the 1st Marine Division moved from the X Corps zone of
action on the east-central front to the I Corps western coastal flank.
Here the Marines encountered “steadily increasing aggressiveness as
the enemy launched larger and more frequent attacks against outpost
positions.”[575] Probes, patrol actions, and aggressive defense of the
MLR and its outposts took their toll.
[575] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 139.
Enemy pressure reached its height in October, when 41 Marine
infantrymen were seized, the second highest number taken in any month
during the war. In the COPs Detroit and Frisco defense of 6–7 October,
the 7th Marines listed 22 MIA, of whom 13 became POWs, practically all
of them being wounded prior to capture. On 26 October, the Communists
lunged at 7th Marines COPs Ronson and Warsaw, adjacent to the main
battle position, the Hook. In the ensuing action, 27 Marines were
“marched, carried, or dragged off the hill and taken into the Chinese
lines.”[576] Surprisingly, all 27 were recovered alive in the prisoner
exchanges the following year.
[576] _Ibid._, p. 149.
Of the 11 Marine airmen who became statistics on a POW list in 1952, 4
were shot down in an ill-fated 10-day period beginning 6 May. Again,
all-too-accurate hostile AA fire was the villain. In similar incidents
during the year, two Marines engaged in “good Samaritan” aerial
activities became POWs for their efforts. In February, First Lieutenant
Kenneth W. Henry, an AO assigned to the Marine detachment aboard the
light cruiser USS _Manchester_, and Lieutenant Edwin C. Moore, USN,
whirled off in the cruiser’s HO3S to attempt rescue of a downed Navy
fighter pilot, Ensign Marvin Broomhead. In the bright early afternoon,
as Henry was maneuvering the helicopter sling, their ship suddenly
crashed--apparently from enemy machine gun fire intended for a combat
air patrol operating in the vicinity. Two of the three men--Broomhead
and Henry--were injured, but managed to drag themselves to a hidden
position and waited to be rescued. Instead, they were discovered
shortly before midnight by a Chinese patrol.
A similar mishap occurred on 16 May to First Lieutenant Duke Williams,
Jr., of VMF-212. Searching for a crashed pilot, his plane was struck by
AA and he managed to jump. His parachute blossomed down into the midst
of 15 waiting Koreans who had gathered to take him prisoner.
During the last seven months of hostilities in Korea, from January-July
1953, 41 Marines were captured. These included a VMO-6 pilot and air
observer in the little OE-1 spotting planes shot down in two separate
incidents, plus 39 ground Marines trapped in the vicious outpost
struggles of March and July. Except for two Marines who died, the rest
were freed a few months after their capture during Operation BIG SWITCH.
Summarizing it another way, of the 221 Marines captured during the
three-year conflict:
-- 49 were officers and 172 enlisted;
-- 190 were ground personnel and 31 aviators;
-- of the 190 ground troops, 19 were officers and 171 enlisted;
-- of the 31 aviators, 30 were officer pilots and 1 was enlisted.
The 7th Marines, which was the unit on line at the time of several
major CCF attacks, had the highest number of POWs in the division.
A total of 70 men, or 59.3 percent[577] of the 118 infantry Marines
taken, were from the 7th. The record during this 1950–1953 period for
the others is as follows: 1st Marines, 15 POWs; 5th Marines, 33; and
the division artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, 14. Six pilots from
Marine Fighter Squadron 312 found themselves unwilling guests in North
Korea. Four other units--VMO-6, VMF-323, VMF-311, and VMF(N)-513--each
had five members who served out the rest of the war as POWs.
[577] Recapitulation of facts from MacDonald, _POW_, pp.
260–269 and _passim_.
_The Communist POW Camps_[578]
[578] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Montross, Kuokka,
and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea--East-Central Front_, v. IV;
Barclay, _Commonwealth_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_;
Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.
The Communist POW camp system, under Chinese direction, began in late
December 1950. Marines captured in November and December, along with
U.S. Army troops, British Commandos, and other Allied personnel,
were forced-marched north to Kanggye, not far from the Manchurian
border.[579] In the bitter cold, while winter howled through North
Korea, the column of prisoners limped its way to its final destination,
arriving the day after Christmas. Several of the group, including
Marines, perished during the four-day march--victims of malnutrition,
untreated combat wounds, pneumonia, the stinging, freezing wind,
and subzero temperatures. Usually, “the Communists moved them [the
prisoners] by night, because they feared the United Nations air power
which ... ranged over the whole of North Korea.”[580]
[579] Although some American prisoners were taken in the summer
of 1950, it was not until the late autumn that large
numbers of men taken in several major engagements created
a need for a permanent prison-camp system. Rees, _Korea_,
p. 330.
[580] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, pp. 423–424.
During the first three months of 1951, a network of POW camps was
developed along the southern shores of the Yalu River. Occupants of
the forlorn villages were evacuated, and newly captured UNC prisoners
moved in. The main camp operation at this time was in the Kanggye area.
This was a temporary indoctrination center established in October
1950 before the development of regular POW camps. (For various CCF
camp locations, see Map 34.) Ultimately a group of a half dozen or so
permanent camps were developed northeast of Sinuiju, along a 75-mile
stretch of the Yalu.
By early 1951, Major McLaughlin, a captured Marine staff officer
previously attached to X Corps, was senior officer among the Kanggye
prisoners which included a heterogeneous collection of U.S. 7th
Division soldiers, U.S. Marines, 18 Royal Marine Commandos, and Navy
hospitalmen. UN personnel were scattered throughout several farmhouses,
with no attempt made to segregate the enlisted and officers. The
Chinese designated prisoner squads of 8–12 men, depending on the size
of the room to which they were assigned. CCF-appointed squad leaders
were those prisoners who appeared more cooperative.
In direct opposition to orders, Major McLaughlin set about establishing
communication between the small scattered POW groups, despite
ever-present surveillance. He tried to achieve effective control of
the POWs so that a united front of resistance against the enemy could
be maintained. At mass indoctrination meetings, held regularly every
few days, the Marine officer issued instructions to enlisted personnel
through five Marine noncommissioned officers. As one ex-prisoner
recalled, the “cold, smoke-filled barn was the locale for wide-spread
exchange of information between the many little groups.”[581] Daily
routine at Kanggye stressed study and political indoctrination. Squad
leaders were responsible for lectures and discussions on assigned
topics in Marxian dialectical materialism. The curriculum was more
intense than most college courses. On the other hand, physical
treatment of inmates--except for chronic malnutrition and grossly
inadequate medical care--at Kanggye was less brutal than at most of the
other prisoner compounds.
[581] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 63.
[Illustration:
MAP 34 K. White
POW CAMPS IN WHICH MARINES WERE HELD]
Interrogations went hand-in-hand with indoctrination. Prisoners were
grilled regularly on order of battle, close air support, naval gunfire
methods, UN aircraft, weapons, unit locations, and other tactical
information. The Chinese were even more interested in the life
histories and biographical data of their captives. POWs were required
to answer “economic questionnaires” and at frequent intervals compelled
to write elaborate self-criticisms of their political attitudes and
class backgrounds. The CCF were satisfied only when prisoners--whose
original truthful answers had been rejected--revised their own family
status and income statistics downward. POWs, being interrogated, often
found the Chinese arguing with them over such far-away matters as the
prisoner’s parents or his own family annual income and social level.
In March 1951, after an indoctrination period of about eight weeks, the
Kanggye POWs were transferred, and the camp itself was later abandoned.
The officers were relocated at Camp 5, Pyoktong, while the majority
continued the march westward to the newly opened Camp 1, at Chongsong.
Despite its numerical designation as Camp 5, the Pyoktong compound had
been organized two months earlier and was the first of the permanent
CCF centers. It became the headquarters of the entire prison-camp
system. Approximately 2,000 UNC prisoners were interned here by the
early part of the year. They were housed in native huts. New inmates
arrived regularly from temporary collection centers in the south, where
they had been held for months. Sometimes they were marched to the Yalu
during the Korean winter while still wearing their summer fatigues.
Pyoktong offered little chance for escape. The compound, situated on a
barren peninsula that jutted out into the Yalu Reservoir, was so secure
that the Communists did not even surround it with barbed wire or employ
searchlights. It was hemmed in on three sides by fast water currents,
while the one exit from the peninsula was closely guarded.
Conditions were far more severe here than at Kanggye. A starvation diet
and complete lack of medical care quickly had their inevitable effect.
Pneumonia, dysentery, and malnutrition were rampant. The basic diet of
boiled corn or millet resulted in associated deficiency diseases, such
as beriberi and pellagra. Between 20 and 30 prisoners died daily. Many
experts, nonetheless, felt that “if the Chinese during the winter of
1950–51 killed their prisoners by deliberate neglect, the North Koreans
who had handled the captives before they became primarily a Chinese
responsibility killed them by calculated brutality.”[582]
[582] Rees, _Korea_, p. 330.
Although now junior to some Army and Air Force officers, Major
McLaughlin was elected by his fellow officer-prisoners to represent
them. Recognized by the Chinese as a staunch non-cooperative and
dedicated trouble-maker, the enemy concentrated their pressure on the
Marine officer--and he was subjected to intimidation, maltreatment, and
threats of death.
As they had at Kanggye, the CCF attempted to organize progressive
groups to write peace appeals, propaganda leaflets, and articles
condemning the United States for the war. Typically, progressive
POWs (usually weaker, less resilient members) who went along with
the Communist propaganda conditioning, received better rations and
treatment. Rugged resisters, on the other hand, could dependably expect
to stand a considerable amount of solitary confinement, usually in an
unspeakably foul, vermin-infested “hole.” Here a POW was forced to
remain in a debilitating, crouched position usually 56 hours or more.
Throughout the war a good many Marines were to know this particular
enemy treatment. One Marine artilleryman, Second Lieutenant Roland L.
McDaniel, tied to a Korean POW in the hole for 10 days, emerged with
pneumonia and tuberculosis.
In addition to the POW compounds at Pyoktong and Chongsong, other sites
where Marines were held were Camp 3, at Changsong (nearby and with a
nearly identical name to Camp 1), primarily for enlisted personnel, and
at “The Valley.” This was a temporary medical processing center in the
Kanggye area. Marine inmates here were often confined to a pig pen.
Largely because of the filthy conditions of this camp, the death rate
quickly earned the Valley the opprobrious name of Death Valley.
Another cluster of POW camps was located further south. These were
primarily run by the North Koreans, and were transit camps where
prisoners were collected and interrogated before being moved north
by truck or on foot to the permanent establishments. Among them were
collection centers at Kung Dong and Chorwon, and Camp 10, south of the
North Korean Capital Pyongyang. The latter was also known variously
as the Mining Camp, the Gold Mine, or Bean Camp--this due to its
prevailing diet. At this southernmost Communist camp, POWs were
required to dig coal in the nearby mine shafts. Loads of coal were then
hauled in small hand carts over icy roads to the camp, a task made more
difficult by the prisoners’ skimpy mealtime fare.
The most notorious of all the camps, however, was Pak’s Palace,[583]
the interrogation center near Pyongyang. POWs also called it Pak’s
Death Palace for its chief interrogator, a sadistic North Korean
officer, Major Pak. Captain Martelli, a F4U fighter pilot from VMF-323
shot down in April 1951, was the first Marine processed through Pak’s,
where POWs were continuously threatened and beaten with little or no
provocation. Another Marine aviator, Captain Gerald Fink, VMF-312,
upon being asked during interrogation here why he had come to Korea
won a sentence of several days solitary confinement in the hole for
his forthright answer: “to kill Communists.” Second Lieutenant Carl
R. Lindquist, also of VMF-312, was the only one of 18 Marine officers
captured in 1951 not processed through Pak’s before being sent north.
[583] The Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners
of War later adjudged Pak’s to have been “the worst camp
endured by American POWs in Korea.” MacDonald, _POW_, p.
104.
Gradually the Chinese developed the policy of segregating officer and
enlisted personnel. Commenting on this procedure, one British observer
offered the following:
By this means the lower ranks were deprived of their leaders
and for a short time this had a depressing, and generally bad,
effect. It was not long, however, before the natural leaders
among the rank and file asserted themselves. The standard of
leadership naturally varied in different compounds; but in all
there was some organization and in some it was highly efficient.
It was ... the policy of the Chinese ... to discourage the
emergence of thrustful leaders.... Consequently, clandestine
rather than open leadership was usual.[584]
[584] Barclay, _Commonwealth_, p. 190.
By midyear, noncommissioned officers were also separated from the
enlisted men, in an attempt to better control prisoners. In October
of 1951 another one of the Yalu River Camps was set up. This was Camp
2, at Pi-chong-ni, which thereafter served as the main officers camp.
The next month a POW column of nearly 50 men, including 6 Marines, left
Kung Dong for these northern camps on a death march that covered 225
miles in two weeks. During the excruciating march, prisoners had been
forced to strip naked and wade across the Chongsong River, a procedure
which caused several deaths and cases of frostbite. One British
participant, however, recalled that the “Marines banded together during
the terrible march, and the Royal Marines were drawn close to the U.S.
Marines.”[585]
[585] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 127.
In December 1951 the Communist and UNC forces exchanged lists of
captured personnel. The list of 3,198 American POWs (total UNC: 11,559)
revealed that 61 Marines were in enemy hands. Nine others, captured
late in the year, were still in temporary collection points and thus
not listed. Although Marines represented only a small portion of the
total POWs, they were present in most of the nearly dozen regular camps
or collection points then in existence. In any event the 1951 POW
list[586] gave a picture of the growing Communist camp system.
[586] Negotiations broke down at this point. No other list was
offered by Communist officials until the first exchange
of wounded POWs, 17 months later, in the April 1953
LITTLE SWITCH operation. Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks,
_USMC Ops Korea_, v. IV, p. 223.
As 1951 was drawing to an end, the Camp 2 commandant, a fanatical
Communist named Ding, ordered UNC prisoners to prepare and send
a New Year’s greeting to the commander of the CCF, General Peng
Teh-huai. Senior UN officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, USAF,
was determined that the prisoners would not sign the spurious holiday
message. Major McLaughlin voluntarily organized Marine resistance, and
senior officers of other nationality groups followed suit. No greetings
were sent. As usually happened, an informer reported the organized
resistance and furnished names of the reactionary leaders. The
following month, the six ranking officers were sentenced to solitary
confinement, ranging from three to six months, for their “subversive
activities.”
The episode marked the first really organized resistance to the
Chinese. “Although the principals were subjected to months of solitary
confinement, coercion, torture, and very limited rations during the
bitterly cold months of early 1952, their joint effort laid the
foundation for comparatively effective resistance within Camp 2 during
the remainder of the war.”[587]
[587] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 138.
In January 1952, Major McLaughlin and the other five officers were
removed to begin their long tours of solitary confinement. Although the
remaining Marine officers at Pi-chong-ni had “formed a tightly knit
group and consulted among themselves on every major issue,”[588] the
atmosphere within the camp itself became highly charged and strained.
Suspicion of informers and opportunists was rampant. The officers at
Camp 2 were generally agreed that Marine Lieutenant Colonel Thrash,
who arrived in June, was largely responsible for restoring discipline.
He issued an all-inclusive order about camp behavior for all personnel
which read, in part:
[588] _Ibid._, p. 164.
Study of Communist propaganda would not be countenanced. If study
was forced on them, POWs were to offer passive resistance and no
arguments.
If prisoners were subject to trial or punishment they were to
involve no one but themselves.
There would be no letters written using any titles or return
address which might prove beneficial to the Communists for
propaganda value.[589]
[589] _Ibid._, pp. 165–166.
Expectedly, it was not long before Lieutenant Colonel Thrash’s efforts
to influence and organize his fellow officers outraged CCF officials.
In September he was removed from the compound, charged with “Criminal
Acts and Hostile Attitude against the Chinese People’s Volunteers.”
The Marine airman spent the next eight months in solitary. Here he
was subjected to constant interrogation, harassment, and duress. On
one occasion he was bound, severely beaten, and thrown outside half
naked in sub-zero weather. Shock of the severe temperature rendered
him unconscious, and he nearly died. Throughout his eight-month ordeal
there were demands that he cooperate with the “lenient” Chinese upon
his return to the compound.
During 1952, the Communists developed the system of keeping
newly-captured Marines (and other UNC troops) apart from those taken
prior to January 1952 who had suffered more brutal treatment. Beginning
in August, noncommissioned officers were also segregated. They were
removed from Chongsong (Camp 1) and taken further north along the Yalu
to the “Sergeants Camp” (Camp 4) at Wiwon. Although a few Marines had
been interned at the Camp 2 Annex, at Obul, from late 1951 on, they
were not sent there in any sizable number until mid-1952.
Adjacent to a steeply-walled valley, the Obul camp was also known as
“No Name Valley.” Although the inmates of the annex were aware of
other POWs in the main compound and throughout the valley, they were
under heavy guard to prevent contact between the groups. An Air Force
officer, the senior member, and Major Harris, the ranking Marine,
went about organizing the prisoners in a military manner. In order to
exchange information, notes were hidden under rocks at common bathing
points or latrines. Messages were baked in bread by POWs on kitchen
detail, and songs were loudly sung to convey information. Hospitalized
POWs, meanwhile, were held at the Pyoktong (Camp 5) hospital or, in the
southern sector, at a second hospital a few miles north of Pyongyang.
Other locations where prisoners were confined in 1952 were “Pike’s
Peak,” also in the same general southern area, and the Manpo Camp on
the Yalu.
For POWs incarcerated behind the bamboo curtain, 1952 marked several
other developments. It was the year that American airmen began to
receive special grilling and threats from their Communist captors. This
was in connection with the germ warfare hoax, to be discussed later.
It was also the year that Marine POWs at Pi-chong-ni (Camp 2) observed
their own traditional 10 November Marine Corps birthday ceremony.
Eggs, sugar, and flour were stolen for a cake surreptitiously baked
and suitably decorated with the Marine Corps globe and anchor. Another
group accomplished the task of bootlegging rice wine. When the special
date arrived, the Marine officers toasted the President, Commandant,
and Marine Corps and spiritedly sang the National Anthem and Marine
Corps hymn. One of the invited guests, Quartermaster Sergeant James Day
of the Royal Marines, later recalled the reaction of other prisoners:
Firstly some were apprehensive in case of trouble with the
Chinese, and its always consequent rash of gaol [jail] victims.
Some thought it a little childish, and not worth the trouble
of interrupting the daily routine of the place. And I feel
that quite a lot were rather envious that the small band of
USMC should be able to get together and do this sort of thing
quite seriously, quite sincerely, and with no thought of any
consequence.[590]
[590] _Ibid._, p. 190.
This same month the Chinese staged a “Prisoner of War Command Olympics”
at Pyoktong. Although most Marines opposed the idea of participation
in the event, because of its inevitable propaganda exploitation by
the CCF, the decision rendered by the senior UN officer was that POW
athletes would be represented. Much improved quality food was served
for the occasion, Communist photographers were everywhere, and a CCF
propaganda brochure (with articles written by POW turncoats) was later
distributed in Geneva purportedly to show the healthy recreational
activities available to UNC prisoners. An Air force pilot, in
describing the performance of Major McLaughlin, noted that “his skill
as an athlete helped restore the prestige of the officers torn down by
the enemy’s propaganda.”[591]
[591] _Ibid._, p. 195.
More important, he defied the guards by deliberately circulating
among the enlisted men (often younger, impressionable, less mature
individuals) to point out lies in enemy propaganda tactics designed to
slander the U.S. government and its leaders. The Marine officer also
collected names of American POWs held in isolated places who it was
suspected the enemy might attempt to hold as hostages at the end of the
war--possibly as a bargaining tool for the granting of a seat to Red
China in the UN.
During the last year of the war although a number of prisoners were
still being captured in some of the most savage attacks unleashed by
the enemy, the lot of the average POW had improved. More attention
was being paid to the former pitiful medical care. The men were more
warmly clad, even though still huddled into filthy, crowded huts. And
the monotonous poor chow had improved. Most POWs, although carefully
kept from learning developments of the outside world, naturally
suspected that some reason lay behind the changes. And so there was:
the Communists had no desire to repatriate skeletonized prisoners.
_CCF “Lenient Policy” and Indoctrination Attempts_[592]
[592] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Barclay, _Commonwealth_;
Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_;
Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.
As early in the war as July 1951, the CCF was seeking propaganda
benefits out of its so-called “lenient” policy toward captured
United Nations personnel. Basically, this could be described as
“calculated leniency in return for cooperation, harassment in return
for neutrality, and brutality in return for resistance.”[593] Others
have characterized the CCF psychological techniques of indoctrination
as monotonous and single-minded “repetition, harassment and
humiliation.”[594]
[593] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 61. One former Marine POW commented:
“The ‘lenient policy’ applied to the ‘liberated
soldiers,’ who had supposedly been ‘liberated’ from the
American capitalists by the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
Unless a prisoner accepted this absurd concept, he was a
‘war criminal’ and subject to being treated as such. The
North Vietnamese use this same characterization (‘war
criminal’) in reference to U.S. POWs when queried by
U.S. representatives at the Paris talks.” MajGen John N.
McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 17 Jul 70.
[594] Rees, _Korea_, p. 337.
In some respects, it is true that the Chinese treatment of prisoners
appeared to be more humane than that of the North Koreans. The latter
freely used physical cruelty and torture, to the point of being
barbaric.[595] Sometimes it appeared that Allied POWs did not receive
any harsher treatment from the CCF than did local civilian prisoners.
[595] There were, for example, instances when POW columns were
being marched north and the NKPA treatment was so rough
that “Chinese guards intervened to protect the prisoners
from the North Koreans.” MacDonald, _POW_, p. 43.
Whereas the NKPA regularly resorted to physical brutality, the Chinese
“introduced a more insidious form of cruelty.”[596] Although they
used physical violence less often, it was usually more purposeful and
combined with deliberate mental pressure. CCF officials announced that
treatment of captives would be “fair and lenient,” but that wrongdoers
would be publicly punished. Usually this CCF punishment took the form
of less drastic methods--solitary confinement, prolonged interrogation,
and a reduced diet. Even under this decreed lenient policy, however, no
relief parcels were delivered to POWs, nor were any neutral observers
ever allowed to inspect the prison camps.
[596] _Ibid._, p. 60.
In any event, the Chinese were considerably more effective than
the NKPA in their intelligence activities. Often their skilled
interrogators were officers who spoke excellent English. Occasionally,
they had even attended such U.S. schools as the University of Chicago
and had considerable insight into American psychology, customs, and
values--even slang. Interrogation sessions usually employed recording
devices and sometimes were further equipped with one-way mirrors. One
Marine, subjected to frequent interrogation, was kept awake by the
Chinese who slapped his face and blew smoke in his eyes.
From early 1951 to the end of the war UNC prisoners were subjected to
a systematic attempt at mass conversion to Communism. This intensive
indoctrination effort--like the riots of Communist prisoners in Allied
POW camps and the CCF germ warfare fabrications--was designed to gain
a propaganda advantage. From highest-ranking officer to lowly private,
no one was immune to this thought-reform process. General Dean,
prize Communist captive, who was subject to three years of intense
Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, upon his release commented wryly, “I’m
an authority now on the history of the Communist Party and much of its
doctrine.”[597]
[597] Rees, _Korea_, p. 334.
English-speaking POWs, both American and British, particularly became
the target for Communist thought-control conditioning. Many experts
have discussed glowingly the superb example and iron discipline--both
on the battlefield and in POW camp--displayed by the Turkish soldiers.
This is true, and their outstanding performance is to their credit
as a national group. The fact remains, however, that the Turks were
long-term professional soldiers. Usually they were left alone by
the Communists who neither spoke their language nor needed them for
propaganda purposes. As a rule all non-American troops of the United
Nations received better treatment than American and British personnel.
The basic tenet of the Communist party line was that this aggressive
war against the peace-loving people of Korea had been caused by
American imperialists seeking additional foreign markets. All UNC
soldiers were, therefore, by simple definition war criminals who
deserved no better treatment than death. But as most UN soldiers
were misguided and misled by their capitalist rulers they would “not
be shot if they admitted their mistakes and showed themselves to be
progressive”[598] by becoming properly indoctrinated.
[598] _Ibid._, p. 335.
Often, the thought-reform processing started long before prisoners
reached their permanent camps, while they were under initial
interrogation in the transit collection center. Captain Samuel J.
Davies, Anglican Chaplain of the British Gloucestershire Regiment,[599]
noted that lecture subjects presented to his officer group at one
North Korean temporary collection center included:
Corruption of the UN by the American warmongers;
The Chinese Peoples’ right to Formosa;
The Stockholm Peace Appeal;
Progress in Peoples’ China;
Churchill, tool of the Truman-MacArthur-Dulles Fascist clique;
The Soviet Union heads the World Peace Camp.[600]
[599] Davies was the only one of the four captured UNC
chaplains who survived the war. During his imprisonment,
he visited hospitalized POWs at the makeshift hospital
near Camp 2 and held weekly community services. Another
well-remembered chaplain was Captain Emil J. Kapaun,
Chaplains Corps, USA. The Catholic priest stole food
and sneaked into the enlisted compounds at Camp 5 to
distribute it. His heroic behavior and selfless interest
in his fellow-men were an inspiration to fellow POWs.
MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 77, 136.
[600] Rees, _Korea_, p. 336.
Systematically the enemy ground away at theory and practice of
Communism, with its superiority to American democracy. From emphasis on
the Korean War as imperialist aggression, the programmed thinking then
dealt with shortcomings of western countries (particularly Southern
lynchings, poor treatment of Negroes, and colonialism) to the idyllic
socialism in people’s democracies where “everyone is equal.” “Together
with the emotional pressures involved, this dramatic presentation of
Marxism-Leninism to prisoners who often not only failed to comprehend
why they had fought in Korea, but even the rudiments of democracy
itself, was bound to have some sort of effect.”[601]
[601] _Ibid._, p. 337.
Compulsory lectures and discussions often went on until 2200. Together
with the unceasing indoctrination efforts, the CCF attempted to
maintain complete control over every aspect of POW life. Each camp was
divided into POW companies (ranging from 60 to 300 men), platoons, and
squads. Squad leaders, appointed by the Chinese, reported regularly
to authorities the opinions of men in their group. “Converted”
progressives were responsible for much of the internal policing.
Every prisoner with reactionary tendencies was isolated. The varied
pressures of hunger, fear, constant threats of torture, coercion,
nonrepatriation, anxiety, and guilt[602] were used to break him down.
[602] Some analysts have pointed out that the Lenient Policy
with its “emphasis on confession and repentance, and
its propaganda exploitation” closely resembled POW
indoctrination tactics developed by the Russians with
their German prisoners in World War II. Rees, _Korea_, p.
338.
In an attempt to convert the Marines and other prisoners to their
own beliefs, the Communists prohibited the use of the term “prisoner
of war.” Instead they used the phrase “newly liberated friends” and
insisted the POWs do likewise. They also denounced religion as a
superstition and device for controlling people’s minds. Curiously, POWs
were often permitted to retain whatever religious articles they had on
them when captured, so that Bibles, rosaries, etc., were available for
squad groups that sought to hold informal religious discussions and
readings. Such religious expression was, of course, strictly forbidden.
It might be noted here that Marines, as a group, did not appear to be
any more or less interested in religious services than other POWs.
By mid-1952 the compulsory lectures were considered a failure, and the
emphasis shifted to “voluntary” study groups led by progressives. More
insidious methods of indoctrination were being used--books, papers,
and articles written by camp progressives. Personal interrogation and
indoctrination had proved it could have a more powerful effect than
attempts at mass conversion. Then, too, the Chinese had by this time
perfected another propaganda tool that admirably suited their purposes.
It was to have even still more effective, far reaching results.
_The Germ Warfare Issue_[603]
[603] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of
War_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.
Besides their routine interrogations and indoctrinations, by 1952
the Communists had found a new angle to exploit. This was to have
strong repercussions on the treatment of some captured personnel. And,
ultimately, it was to affect American public reaction to the entire
Korean War and to shake the nation’s confidence in some of its fighting
men who became POWs.
The germ warfare issue developed from an incident in January 1952
when the Communists shot down a U.S. Air Force B-26 bomber. Several
months later, in May, the enemy propaganda campaign moved into high
gear when the navigator and pilot both purportedly confessed that they
took part in a raid in which germ bombs were dropped on North Korean
towns. After the CCF successfully extracted false confessions from the
two USAF officers, the enemy exposed both prisoners to a select group
of Oriental medical specialists and newspapermen. The two Americans
apparently performed according to plan, and a relentless flood of
Communist propaganda was unleashed on the world.
While the allegation of bacteriological warfare was not new in the
Korean War, it was not until 1952 that the Chinese successfully
exploited it. After suffering their first reverses in Korea in
September 1950, the Communists charged that Americans were waging germ
warfare. Even after they regained the tactical initiative in late 1950
they continued their campaign of vilification. In early 1951, while
the UNC battled epidemics of smallpox, typhus, and amoebic dysentery
prevalent among the civil population and within the POW camps, the CCF
branded medical efforts to curb the diseases as experiments in germ
warfare. A formal complaint was made by the CCF to the United Nations
in May 1951; thereafter, the germ warfare charges lay dormant for the
rest of the year.
The effect of the two airmen’s “confessions” in 1952 was far-reaching.
From that time until the end of hostilities “captured aviators of
all services were subjected to a degree of pressure and coercion
previously unknown by prisoners of war. Prior to the turn of the year
aviation and ground personnel received relatively the same treatment in
Communists’ hands. After January 1952, aviators were singled out for a
special brand of treatment designed to wring bacteriological warfare
confessions from them.”[604] North Korean officials joined the CCF
spokesmen in loudly denouncing American bacteriological attacks. As the
campaign gained momentum, an elaborate, cleverly-concocted “War Crimes
Exhibit” was set up in Peiping in May. Similar displays were later on
view at the UNC officers’ camp at Pi-chong-ni, including hand-written
and sound-recorded confessions by the two American pilots, as well as a
convincing array of photos depicting the lethal “bomb containers.”
[604] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 175.
All the while air personnel were being put under acute stress to
confess alleged war crimes. Captured Marine aviation personnel
encountered this new subject in their interrogations. Lieutenant
Henry, captured in February, was asked about germ warfare. Major
Judson C. Richardson, of VMF(N)-513, during interrogations at Pak’s
was told he would never leave Korea when he denied that the U.S. was
waging bacteriological warfare. Master Sergeant John T. Cain, VMO-6,
a well-known Marine enlisted pilot whose plane was shot down in July
1952, was questioned, confined to the hole, and taken before a firing
squad when he refused to acknowledge American participation. Captain
Flynn was also subjected to intensive and brutal interrogation by
North Korean and Chinese Communist Air Force personnel who sought a
confession. Others were to meet similar pressure and be questioned
until their nerves shrieked.
On 8 July 1952, the first of a chain of events occurred that was
to link the Marine Corps with the spurious bacteriological warfare
propaganda. Colonel Frank H. Schwable, 1st MAW Chief of Staff and
Major Roy H. Bley, wing ordnance officer, were struck by Communist
ground fire while making a reconnaissance flight. The enemy had little
difficulty in compiling Colonel Schwable’s biography. Although he
repeatedly maintained he had just arrived in Korea and had not yet
received an assignment, he was in uniform with insignia and full
personal identification. A Department of Defense press release issued
two days later gave considerable data, correctly identifying him as the
Marine Wing Chief of Staff. The Chinese knew they had a prize.
Two weeks after his capture, the colonel was taken to an interrogation
center where he remained in solitary confinement until December.
He quickly became aware of CCF intentions to utilize him for their
propaganda mill. He was interrogated relentlessly, badgered, accused
of being a war criminal, fed a near-starvation diet, denied proper
latrine privileges, refused medical and dental attention, and subjected
to extremes of temperature. Ultimately the discomfort, almost constant
diarrhea, extreme pain from being forced to sit in unnatural positions,
fatigue, and naked threats wore him down. At the same time he was
also convinced that had he continued to resist Communist demands for
a confession the enemy would have affixed his forged signature to a
document to achieve their ends. He later commented:
In making my most difficult decision to seek the only way out, my
primary consideration was that I would be of greater value to my
country in exposing this hideous means of slanderous propaganda
than I would be by sacrificing my life through non-submission or
remaining a prisoner of the Chinese Communists for life, a matter
over which they left me no doubt.[605]
[605] _Ibid._, p. 180.
General Dean, held in solitary confinement for much of his three years’
captivity, stated the greatest problem facing a prisoner of war is
“maintaining his judgment--he has no one on whom he can try out his
ideas before turning them into decisions.”[606] Possibly this was also
Colonel Schwable’s problem. Many drafts of his confession were made
before the Chinese were satisfied that specific details reinforced the
information earlier obtained in other prisoners’ false statements.
The confession that finally evolved in December cleverly combined
factual order of battle data and technical terminology to create a
most convincing lie. It was more sophisticated than efforts of earlier
captives and was, unquestionably, damaging.
[606] _Ibid._, p. 182.
_Problems and Performance of Marine POWs_[607]
[607] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10;
MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_.
Problems faced by Marine and other UNC prisoners ranged from the
fundamentals of sheer survival to more abstract questions involving
honor and duty that have less sharply defined interpretations. Was it,
for instance, a prisoner’s duty to overtly resist the enemy at all
costs and on all possible occasions? Or was an attitude of passive
resistance that created less hostility and attention better in the long
run? Were such passive techniques liable to render a POW unable to
continue making fine distinctions in his conduct and behavior so that
he unwittingly went over the line to become a collaborator with the
enemy? What about a ranking POW’s responsibility of leadership?
In a practical, day-in, day-out way, every prisoner had to decide for
himself as to how actively or passively he would resist the enemy. In
a number of cases Marine (and other Allied) POWs gave deliberately
false or misleading information in response to threats, coercion,
or maltreatment. Three Marines at Pak’s regularly held counsel “to
determine their courses of action and to coordinate their false
stories.”[608] Captain Fink’s list of ships, all sunk in World Wars I
and II, was similar to the story told by an Air Force officer of the
new B-108 bomber (three B-36s).
[608] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 121.
Not infrequently a POW faced threats of death, reduced rations, still
worse medical care, solitary, or physical beatings and torture if he
failed to make some response to questions. Major Richardson finally
wrote untruthful answers to five questions about the Navy, although his
NKPA interrogators told him his lies were detected. Master Sergeant
Cain authored a fanciful report about the Fleet Logistic Wing, an
organization about which he knew nothing, not too surprisingly since
it did not exist. He later admitted, however, that he felt he’d “made
a mistake at that time [his first interrogation] by lying about
inconsequential things.”[609]
[609] _Ibid._, p. 185.
Expressed in simplistic terms, a spirit of cohesion and of group
identity seemed to be the key factor in--to use a bromide that is
particularly apt here--separating the men from the boys. Even when
avowed reactionary leaders were removed to serve one of their many
solitary tours, there seems little doubt that their example served to
instill a spirit of resistance (either open or underground) in fellow
POWs. This was particularly true when the leadership gap was filled by
the next senior man and the chain of command remained unbroken.
Prisoners who were able to rise above their own personal situation
(_i.e._, to adjust, without giving in) and to assist others seemed,
unquestionably, to have gained greater resiliency and determination.
Whether this is a cause-or-effect reaction, however, might be a grey
area difficult to pinpoint precisely. In any event, glimpses of
Marines from behind the barbed wire indicated that steadfastness under
pressure, ingenuity, and outstanding leadership earned them the respect
of fellow prisoners as well as a place in Marine Corps history.
Even in a situation as inhospitable and hazardous as a POW camp, it is
not surprising that characteristic behavior and certain distinctive
personality traits tend to show through, no matter what. Captain
Fink, captured early in the war, endured unspeakable humiliations at
the hands of the North Koreans. Although he felt his morale was at
its lowest point at this time, and was not sure he could go on, he
was later responsible for providing a high degree of civility for
POWs confined to Camp 2. His most notable artistic and mechanical
achievement was probably the construction of an artificial leg[610]
for USAF Major Thomas D. Harrison. This prosthetic was so expertly
fashioned that its owner could play volley ball using his new limb!
Fink also built stethoscopes for POW doctors, using resonant wood and
tubing stolen from Chinese trucks. After a discussion with other POWs
on the need for a religious symbol in camp, the resourceful Marine
made a 22-inch crucifix, christened “Christ in Barbed Wire.”[611] His
efforts on behalf of religion earned him a 10-day sentence in the hole.
[610] A hollowed-out compartment of the leg was used to
hide written records on deaths, atrocities, and other
administrative data. Ultimately, the records were
brought back to the U.S. The Air Force officer was a
cousin, interestingly enough, of the chief Allied truce
negotiator, General Harrison. MacDonald, _POW_, p. 227,
and _Washington Post_, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 1.
[611] The crucifix was brought back to freedom by Camp 2 POWs
and later placed in the Father Kapaun High School, in
Wichita, Kansas. MacDonald, _POW_, p. 172.
Captain Arthur Wagner, VMF(N)-513, spent an unusually long six-month
tour at Pak’s during 1951. For new captives headed in that direction,
the word via USMC grapevine was that he “could be trusted.”[612]
Captain Wagner counselled other prisoners at Pak’s, helped chop wood,
draw water, cook, ease the burden of sick POWs, and resisted the
Communists at every turn.
[612] _Ibid._, p. 121.
Another member of the same squadron, Captain Flynn, had completed 59
combat missions against the enemy in North Korea before being shot
down in May 1952.[613] While captive, the veteran Marine fighter
pilot withstood intense interrogation, influenced others to suppress
CCF-inspired talks made by progressives, and strengthened morale by
planning a group escape. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by a
mock court. Throughout it all, according to Master Sergeant Cain, the
POWs “owed much to Flynn who kept them amused.”[614] First Lieutenant
Robert J. Gillette’s “reactionary” attitude resulted in his being
placed in the hole on several occasions. Once, at No Name Valley, he
managed to scribble a novel on toilet paper which subsequently provided
some light moments for fellow prisoners. And First Lieutenant Felix L.
Ferranto, 1st. Signal Battalion, spent more than two years of his 33
months’ imprisonment in solitary confinement or isolated with small
units of “non-cooperative” POWs. The CCF pronounced him a “hopeless
capitalist, an organizer with an ‘unsincere attitude.’”[615]
[613] Parachuting from his burning plane after it was struck
by hostile AA fire, Captain Flynn duplicated an earlier
action from World War II. In July 1945 he had bailed out
of an aircraft similarly hit by fire while on a combat
patrol over Japan. Biog File, HRS, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC.
[614] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 185.
[615] _Ibid._, p. 122.
The type of amiable accommodation that could sometimes be made, without
compromising one’s standards, was once successfully demonstrated by
Captain Jack E. Perry, VMF-311 briefing officer. On a bombing run
his F9F fuel tank was hit, and he parachuted down. Seized almost
immediately by the Chinese, his captors “showed him bomb holes from
numerous strikes in the area, and they pointed out several wounded
soldiers. Then, as he describes it, ‘They laughed like hell.’ Although
Captain Perry failed to see anything funny, he laughed along with
them.’”[616]
[616] _Ibid._, p. 109.
Three Marines captured during the Korean War had suffered a similar
fate in World War II. Ironically, Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison,
of the Military Police Company; Warrant Officer Felix J. McCool, of
1st Service Battalion; and Master Sergeant Frederick J. Stumpges,
Headquarters Company, were all captured in the same 29 November 1950
action. Comparisons of treatment by the Communists and Japanese were
inevitable. A survivor of the Bataan Death March, Stumpges felt that
although the Japanese confinement was more difficult physically,
imprisonment in North Korea was a far worse mental ordeal. “They [the
Communists] were around all the time and you could never speak your
mind.”[617]
[617] _New York Times_, dtd 30 Aug 53, p. 2.
The other two Marines similarly thought that the Japanese were more
brutal but had more character. Harrison, captured at Wake Island, said
he admired them because “they really believed in their cause and were
loyal to it.”[618] The Chinese, on the other hand, he characterized as
employing “false friendship and deceit.”[619] McCool, who had spent 70
hours in a slimy, lice-infested hole for refusing to confess to a phony
charge of rape and pillage, knew that he “hated the Chinese Communists
far more than he had hated the Japanese.”[620]
[618] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 79.
[619] _Ibid._
[620] _Ibid._, p. 167.
Master Sergeant Cain had distinguished himself by flying little OE
reconnaissance planes 184 hours and had 76 combat missions in one
month. Just before his capture, Cain had paid for six months’ education
for nine Korean youngsters who lived near his air base. Because of his
graying hair and lack of rank insignia, Sergeant Cain was mistaken for
a senior officer. In fact, the Chinese insisted that he was Lieutenant
Colonel Cain, CO of VMF-121. His equal amount of insistence that he
was not a Marine officer, plus his refusal to reveal any significant
information, made him a particular nuisance to the CCF. He was
subjected to intensive interrogation sessions, confined to the hole,
and stood at attention for periods of five to eight hours. Describing
the occasion on which he thought it was all over, Sergeant Cain related
that he:
... was taken to a hillside, blindfolded, and placed in front of
a firing squad. He heard rifle bolts click. The commander of the
firing squad asked if he was ready to tell all.[621]
[621] _Ibid._, p. 186.
When the Marine sergeant replied that he was not going to talk, the
Chinese returned him to solitary confinement. Eventually, after
questioning him for 84 days, the CCF gave up trying to indoctrinate
him in the ways of Communism. Major Harris, senior officer of the Obul
complex, freely acknowledged that Sergeant Cain “assumed more than his
share of duties and responsibilities and set an example for all to
follow.”[622]
[622] _Ibid._, pp. 186–187.
_Marine Escape Attempts_[623]
[623] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Korean War casualty cards
from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, HQMC.
As the Korean War came to a close, assessments were being made of
America’s role in it. Operation BIG SWITCH swung into high gear and
national attention focused on the returning POWs and their experiences
in Communist camps. The widely-accepted statement was that no prisoners
had escaped. Even more discrediting was the prevailing belief that,
“worse, not a single American attempted to escape from captivity.”[624]
These reported facts are not borne out by the actual record.
[624] Leckie, _Conflict_, p. 389.
In May 1951, a group of 18 Marines and a U.S. Army interpreter found
their way back to American control through a combination of fortuitous
events and quick thinking. All of the Marines had been captured several
months earlier, in the 28 November-11 December period, the majority
on the night of 29–30 November. There were peculiar circumstances
connected with their escape. In early April, a group of nearly 60
UNC prisoners had been brought south by the enemy from the Majon-ni
area. Presumably they were to perform working details in the rear of
Communist front lines.
While a larger number of prisoners, both Army and Marine, were marched
westward to Pyoktong, First Lieutenant Frank E. Cold and a group of
17 enlisted were sent further south to the general Chorwon area, not
far from the 38th Parallel. In the meantime the Chinese launched their
spring counteroffensive on 22 April. It appears that, subsequently, the
Marines and Army interpreter, Corporal Saburo “Sam” Shimamura, who had
been attached to the 1st Marine Division, were told they would be taken
to the area in which the Marine division was operating and released
there.
The group was then trucked southeast to Chunchon, just below the
Parallel, under guard, and marched toward the vicinity of the front
lines. On 24 May, while in proximity to the main battle area, an
artillery preparation suddenly registered nearby. The CCF guards fled,
while the prisoners ran in the opposite direction, heading for high
ground where they successfully eluded the guards. For the rest of that
day and night the escapees quietly watched Communist troops retreat
past them. The next day, 25 May, the Marines fashioned make-shift air
panels from wallpaper they stripped from a ruined Korean house in the
area. They spelled out “POWS--19 RESCUE.” Their signal attracted the
attention of an Army observation pilot who radioed their position to an
Army reconnaissance unit.
Three Army tanks were dispatched and escorted the ex-prisoners to
safety. They entered friendly lines in the vicinity of Chunchon,
“the first and only group of prisoners to experience Communist
indoctrination and to reach freedom after a prolonged period of
internment.”[625] Two members of the unit[626] were of special
interest. One man was 56-year-old Master Sergeant Gust H. Dunis, who
had barely survived the brutal, frozen death march to Kanggye in late
December. The other was Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison, previously
introduced as a unique two-time prisoner of war.
[625] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 84, reporting news stories in _The
Washington Post_, dtd 27 Aug 53, p. 7, and _Saturday
Evening Post_, 25 Aug 51, p. 109.
[626] Roster of this May 1951 escape group: 1stLt Cold,
H&S/3/7; MSgt Dunis, Military Police Co; SSgt Harrison,
MPCo; SSgt James B. Nash, MPCo; Sgt Charles W. Dickerson,
1stTkBn; Sgt Morris L. Estess, 1stSigBn; Sgt Paul M.
Manor, A/7 MT Bn; Cpl Clifford R. Hawkins, 1stTkBn; Cpl
Ernest E. Hayton, 1stTkBn; Cpl Frederick G. Halcomb,
11thMar; Cpl Leonard J. Maffioli, 1stTkBn; Cpl Theodore
R. Wheeler, 1stServBn; Cpl Calvin W. Williams, Hq,
1stDiv; PFC John A. Haring, 7thMar; PFC Theron L.
Hilburn, 1stTkBn; PFC Charles M. Kaylor, W/2/7; PFC
Paul J. Phillips, A/7 MTBn; and PFC Charles E. Quiring,
5thMar. MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 260–263.
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 169702]
_Ice-Breaker at Work--Amphibian tractor of 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion destroys thick-crusted ice to prevent its backing up
against Spoonbill Bridge. Below, the 1st Engineer Battalion
maintenance shop in operation at Ascom City._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 168178]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 16373]
_Captured Enemy Weapons--Various types of mortar and artillery
shells, machine guns, rifles, and a 60mm mortar are displayed at
1st Marine Division CP. Below, F9F Pantherjet fighter taxies down
runway for takeoff._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 346720]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170084]
_Outpost Defense--Inside view of one of the many sleeping
caves, which shelter two to four men, on Marine outpost Carson.
Below, COP Dagmar under artillery bombardment preceding enemy
diversionary ground attack on 26 March 1953._
[Illustration]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 17096]
_POW Exchange--Frontline Marines watch Army convoy bringing first
UN prisoners to Freedom Village in Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH.
_Below, NKPA and CCF delegation upon adjournment of first day’s
truce talks, April 1953._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170778]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170795 DOD Photo A 170766]
_Freedom Village--Marines of 1st Engineer Battalion raise
welcoming sign at entrance to camp. Rear Admiral John C. Daniel,
USN, senior delegate at truce talks, reports progress at press
conference. Below, KSC workers and Marine reroll barbed wire for
use at the front._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170106]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 13392]
_Ready to Strike--Ground crew loads rockets on “Devilcat” Corsair
in preparation for day’s mission. Below, protective screen of
M-46 dozer of 1st Tank Battalion is designed to explode 3.5-inch
rockets before they hit armored vehicle. The wire fence turns
with the turret._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170228]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171000]
_Evacuation from MLR--Improvised trolley rigged up by 2d
Battalion, 1st Marines, safely transfers Marine casualty. Below,
front view of first aid bunker, built on reverse slope, by 1st
Engineer Battalion personnel._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171077]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171351]
_Marine Relief--Advance party of the Turkish 3d Battalion arrives
at 3/7 CP to reconnoiter its new sector preparatory to relief
of 1st Marine Division, May 1953. Below, mine damage absorbed
by thermo boot. Its sturdy construction saved limb of wounded
Marine. Navy corpsman displays armored jacket worn by infantryman
who survived blast of 5 lbs. of TNT accidentally exploded at
close range._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 172596 DOD Photo A 16050]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171293 DOD Photo A 173207]
_Street Signs--Markers for the new Marine division CP at Camp
Casey await completion of road work. Casey is command post of 1st
MarDiv while in I Corps reserve. Marine tank fires in support
of Turkish Brigade during May attack. Below, 5th Marines slog
through flooded area on way back from day’s training._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173233]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173914]
_Defense of Boulder City--Men of 1st and 7th Marines receive
supplies during CCF assaults in July 1953 against Boulder City.
Below, aerial view of pock-marked terrain in front of Boulder
City as seen from HMR-161 helicopter._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173886]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 174359]
_Cease-fire--1st Marines move off MLR on 28 July, following
cease-fire order. How Company marches to Camp Lee from position
at the front. Below, contemplative Marine surveys trench line
being filled in in accordance with armistice agreement._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173720]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 174381]
_Operation_ BIG SWITCH_--Road map of route taken by repatriated
UN prisoners of war as convoy reaches radio check points.
Progress of convoy is immediately relayed to Freedom Village and
entered on map._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 174586]
_UN Custodial Forces--Indian troops board Marine helicopter on
deck of USS Point Cruz. They are then flown to the buffer zone to
guard CCF and NKPA nonrepatriated POWs. Below, LtCol William G.
Thrash receives naval aviator wings upon his release at Freedom
Village from MajGen Vernon E. Megee, CG, 1st MAW._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 349140]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173860]
_Dismantling the MLR--KSCs, under Marine supervision, load and
carry lumber from torn-down bunkers to new sector. Below, guard
shack at entrance to 1/1 CP show results of flood waters, August
1952. Road approach to Spoonbill Bridge completely submerged by
annual summer rains, in July 1953._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164548 DOD Photo A 173282]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 349563]
_Shore-to-Ship Operation--F3D is hauled aboard ship after being
ferried by four DUKWs, as 1st MAW redeploys from Korea to Japan
in June 1956. Below, 1st Marine Division in Korea functions as
security force. Marine DMZ policemen inspect enemy positions,
February 1955._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 366097]
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 366210]
_Mission Completed--1st Marine Division equipment and records at
dockside prior to loading for division’s return to the States.
Below, 1st Marines march across Freedom Gate Bridge on their way
to Ascom City and thence home to U.S., March 1955._
[Illustration: DOD Photo A 366127]
An additional four enlisted Marines returned to military control after
a brief period of capture. Corporal William S. Blair, B/1/7, and PFC
Bernard W. Insco, D/2/11, were taken prisoner on 24 April 1951 while
the 1st Marine Division was operating as a component of IX Corps.
Although originally sent north to a POW camp, both were released on 12
May by the enemy after less than a month’s captivity. Another pair of
lucky Marines were PFC Richard R. Grindle and Corporal Harold J. Kidd,
both of B/1/7. Seized on 11 May in patrol actions, they were the only
Marines captured in ground fighting that month, and escaped to return
to the division four days later.
At least six escape attempts are known to have been made by Marine
POWs, and another elaborate plan late in the war was foiled before it
got under way. The incidents follow:
#1. In the early winter months of 1951, Sergeant Donald M.
Griffith, F/2/5, became increasingly upset by the filth, steady
attrition of POWs, and semi-starvation diet at The Valley. He
vowed to escape. Late one night he pretended to go to the latrine
and finding the guard asleep, instead hurried down the path
leading out of the valley. He walked until dawn, then found a
hut where he hid among a pile of rice bags for some much-needed
sleep. Later, he knocked at a hut, asking for food. While he ate,
however, his genial host’s son was out contacting a military
patrol which even then was on Griffith’s trail.
A group of Communist soldiers closed in to recapture him. As
early punishment, Griffith’s shoe pacs were taken from him and
he was forced to walk back to the Valley in his threadbare ski
socks. Returned to the camp, the Marine sergeant was beaten
across the face. He was also directed to walk up a nearby hill
and for three successive times a rifle bullet tearing by his head
barely missed him. Later he learned that plans of his escape were
leaked to the CCF by an informer, thus triggering an early search.
#2. In May 1951, Captain Bryon H. Beswick, VMF-323, was a member
of a large POW column being marched north. Although still
suffering severe burns on his face, hands, and leg incurred
while bailing out of his plane that had caught fire, Beswick and
four others attempted to outwit their guards while on the march.
All the would-be escapees were placed in solitary confinement.
#3. Shortly after his capture in July 1951, PFC Alfred P. Graham,
Jr., H/3/5, was interned temporarily at what appeared to be a
divisional headquarters. One afternoon when the guards seemed
slack, Graham and another Marine sneaked off. Ultimately they
approached a farmhouse to get food and there stumbled into a half
dozen Koreans who took them into custody. The two Marines were
beaten with a submachine gun and their hands were bound behind
their back with communications wire. On their forced reappearance
at the original site of escape, a Korean officer beat and
interrogated them for three days.
#4. A short-lived escape attempt at Pak’s Palace, not long after
his capture in October 1951, had earned Lieutenant Gillette
a solitary confinement tour. Arriving at Officers’ camp in
Pi-chong-ni the following spring, the former VMF(N)-513 squadron
member and a South African air force pilot laid plans for a
mutual escape. Gillette deliberately set himself on a course of
reduced rations to prepare himself for the coming feat. When the
two men made their break, they were shot at but managed to safely
clear the camp.
The first night out the other pilot so badly injured himself in
a fall that Gillette had to leave him and go on alone. Although
the apparent escape route lay to the west, nearer the coast, the
Marine chose to go east across rugged mountains that offered
little in the way of cover, concealment, or food. His unorthodox
planning nearly paid off. “Whereas most escapees were recaptured
within hours, or at best within days, Lieutenant Gillette was
free for several weeks before the Communists found him halfway
across Korea.”[627] One Royal Marine described the attempt as
“the finest and most determined one he knew of.”[628]
[627] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 169.
[628] _Ibid._
#5. In July 1952, three Marine officers were involved in an abortive
escape attempt at Camp 2. They were Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, Major
McLaughlin, and Second Lieutenant Richard L. Sill, 1st 90mm AAA
Gun Battalion. When detected outside of camp they were able to get
back inside the compound, but the Chinese did identify Lieutenant
Still. His escape attempt earned him a three-month sentence in the
hole from which he later “emerged unbothered and steeled against the
Communists.”[629]
[629] _Ibid._, p. 170.
#6. Captain Martelli escaped from the Camp 2 compound in September
1952. Retaken 10 days later, he was put in the same hole for two
months. On release from the confinement, he was visibly upset by the
experience, but quickly recovered. As a matter of interest, Martelli,
like the other men whose exploits are recounted here, returned home in
Operation BIG SWITCH.
#7. In the spring of 1953 a group of 30 officers, including two British
Marines, at Camp 2 organized classes in mathematics, physics, and
survival lectures. Conferences on escape and evasion techniques were
held and the men formed escape groups. The teams drew straws to pick
priorities for escape, and each one presented its plan to a senior body
for approval. On 1 July, with support of the other teams, the first
group went over the fence surrounding their house. Their freedom was
brief, however, and the camp guard doubled. When rumors of armistice
began circulating, further escape plans were cancelled. Clandestine
prisoner escape committees--although unsuccessful in terms of actual
results achieved--had existed at various camps. Second Lieutenant
Rowland M. Murphy had been a member of such an organization at Obul.
Major McLaughlin had assumed similar responsibilities at Camp 5, in
1951, and later at Camp 2 served on the secret all-UNC prisoners
escape committee and senior officers’ organization within Camp 2. In
early 1953 Major Harris became senior officer at the Camp 2 Annex. He
organized Spanish classes as a facade for having a regular meeting
place to announce policy and issue orders. Maps of North Korea were
prepared for use in escape attempts and counter-Chinese political
indoctrination was disseminated.
The Camp 2 officers performed another useful service. As rumor leaked
out of the impending truce, they drafted a policy guide on POW behavior
that was secretly circulated to other camps. UNC prisoners were
directed to refrain from any appearance of fraternizing with the enemy,
or acts of exuberance or violence. Specifically, they were reminded
not to show any great enthusiasm upon their release, to prevent
the Communist cameras on the scene from recording this as another
propaganda victory.
_Evaluation and Aftermath_[630]
[630] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE23.2.S8 “CMC
Statements on Korean POWs”; Biog File, HRB, HistDiv,
HQMC; MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_; Elliot
Harris, _The “UnAmerican” Weapon--Psychological Warfare_
(New York: M. W. Lads Publishing Co., 1967); Leckie,
_Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_.
With but a few exceptions, circumstances indicated that capture of most
Marines was unavoidable. Theoretically, it can be argued that several
seized in bunkers might have avoided captivity had they been occupying
fighting-holes instead. On the other hand, they might just as readily
have become statistics on a KIA list, instead, by falling victim to
preparatory fire that preceded the enemy’s main assault.
As Marine historian, then-Major, MacDonald has noted:
A shadow fell over American POWs in the aftermath of the Korean
War. Courts-martial and other official inquiries revealed that
a small segment of the Americans captured by the Communists
had been guilty of behavior ranging from questionable to
treasonable.[631]
[631] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 3.
Both the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War
and the United States Congress, which investigated the entire POW
issue, returned favorable verdicts for Marine POW conduct. The U.S.
Senate report summarized its findings:
The United States Marine Corps, the Turkish troops, and the
Colombians as groups, did not succumb to the pressures exerted
upon them by the Communists and did not cooperate or collaborate
with the enemy. For this they deserve greatest admiration and
credit.[632]
[632] _Ibid._, p. 237.
In commenting on prisoner attitudes and activities that seemed
to account for those men who became “survival types”, an Army
psychiatrist, Major William F. Mayer, observed:
The Marines were a statistically significant group from the
standpoint of size, something over two hundred; the only thing
I can say about them is that more of them survived than we. I
think this is a function of discipline and morale and esprit; and
the attitude in the Marine Corps I expressed a little while ago,
that if something happens to me, these jokers will take care of
me.[633]
[633] _Ibid._, pp. 236–237, address to U.S. Army Chaplain
School, 1957.
In the nature of self-judgment, Sergeant Griffith referred to “that
certain ‘something’ that seems to weld men together prevailed
more among the Marine POWs than it did with the other captured UN
Troops.”[634] The Marine with probably more experience as a POW than
anyone else, Sergeant Harrison, noted that “without USMC training I
would never have lived through several tight spots. I am not talking
strictly about physical training as I am mental conditioning. It is
something that causes you to think ... about what the other guy will
think or how it [your action] might affect or endanger them.”[635]
[634] _Ibid._, p. 88.
[635] _Ibid._, p. 238.
A senior Air Force officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, who headed
POW units at Camp 2 and 5 between his tours of solitary confinement,
declared:
I was extremely proud of the conduct of U.S. Marine Corps
personnel with whom I came in contact during my period of
confinement. Their esprit de corps was perhaps the highest of
any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States during this
period.[636]
[636] _Ibid._, p. 220.
And Navy Chief Duane Thorin, a former inmate of the Camp 2 annex,
who later inspired the character of the helicopter pilot in James A.
Michener’s _The Bridges of Toko-ri_, pointed out:
The Navy and Marine Corps POWs were generally excellent.
The Marines who left something to be desired were more than
compensated for by the majority of them.[637]
[637] _Ibid._, p. 223.
Another view was offered by a prominent neurologist and consultant
to the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee, Dr. Harold G. Wolff.
After investigating the performance of American POWs in Korea, Dr.
Wolff concluded they had not “behaved much differently from other men
in other armies and places” but that Americans had been made to appear
much worse “by the enemy’s propaganda devices and our own initial
ineptitude in countering the Communist propaganda.”[638]
[638] _Ibid._, p. 237.
As a postscript to the POW story, five Marines received awards, on 11
January 1954, for their exceptionally meritorious conduct while serving
as prisoners of the Communists in Korea. They were:
Lieutenant Colonel Thrash--awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a
second Legion of Merit;
Major McLaughlin--awarded the Legion of Merit;
Major Harris--also awarded the Legion of Merit;
Captain Flynn--awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal; and
Master Sergeant Cain--awarded a Letter of Commendation with
Ribbon.
On the negative side, one enlisted Marine was disciplined for his
cooperation with the enemy in writing a pro-Communist magazine article.
A Court of Inquiry, convened in March 1954, did not recommend a
court-martial for the 45-year-old pilot, Colonel Schwable. After a
month-long review of circumstances involved in the case, the court
opined that he had resisted Communist pressure and torture “to the
limit of his ability before giving in.”[639] Its final judgment was
that Schwable--a Naval Academy graduate, veteran of 20 years’ military
service, and distinguished WW II night-fighter pilot and squadron
CO--not be subjected to disciplinary action. At the same time the court
held that his future usefulness as a Marine officer was “seriously
impaired” by his conduct as a war prisoner.
[639] _Ibid._, p. 233.
On a larger scale, 192 Americans were found guilty of misconduct
against fellow prisoners or various degrees of collaboration with the
enemy. None of these was a Marine. In comparison with some 22,000
Communists who refused repatriation, 21 U.S. and 1 British prisoner
succumbed to CCF brainwashing tactics. Twelve of the Americans have
since returned to the U.S., apparently disenchanted with the Communist
version of “people’s democracy” after getting a closer look at it.
Investigations later showed that “only a handful of the POWs in Korea
were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation.
Nearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the [Geneva
Convention] ‘absolute’, name, rank, serial number, and date of birth
restriction.”[640] Although giving false or misleading information was
a common occurrence in POW camps, such testimony was usually quickly
detected. American military authorities, drawing up a revised Code of
Conduct (1955) subsequently recommended against making untruthful
statements. Further, even though several Marines seemed to have
suffered none the worse for giving false information, in at least one
case a prisoner’s own situation was weakened by enemy detection of his
lie and increasing pressure was brought against him.
[640] _Ibid._, p. 230.
It was found too, that in every group of prisoners there were always
gradations of those more cooperative with the enemy (“progressives”)
and those who offered open or passive resistance (“reactionaries”).
One Korean War analyst, in seeking the final explanation of what POW
tactics succeeded best against a dedicated enemy, cited the Turkish
“chain of command that was never broken” and which helped to mold
them together. He noted the “permissive” culture and background
of Americans where freedom of choice and individual decisions are
basic tenets. Despite the effect of military indoctrination and
discipline, this concept of individualism and freedom appeared to be so
strongly engrained that unless there was a corresponding emphasis on
responsibility and strong beliefs it tended to weaken a man when his
action and values were put to a prolonged test--as in the POW compound.
The analyst concluded:
Only an extremely cohesive group, with tight leadership and great
spiritual strengths, coupled with inner toughness and concern for
one another, could have survived the shocks visited upon their
minds and bodies.... They [the Turks] remained united against the
enemy, and they survived.[641]
[641] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, pp. 541–542.
This judgement, to a large degree, tells the Marine POW story.
CHAPTER XI
While Guns Cool
_The Postwar Transition--Control of the DMZ and the Military Police
Company--Organization of New Defense Positions--Postwar Employment of
Marine Units in_ FECOM
_The Postwar Transition_[642]
[642] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9,
10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type “C”
Rpt--Defense of “C” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder
#3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records
currently retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland,
Md.); 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53; 1stMar Hist
of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3
(contains brief histories of 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, AT Co/1,
4.2-inch MortCo/1); 5thMar Hist of Def of “D” Sector,
27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3; 5thMar Hist, same period,
Folder #4 (brief histories of 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, AT Co/5,
4.2-inch MortCo/5, DMZ Police Co/5), dtd 26 Dec 53;
7thMar Hist of Defense, 27 Jul 53–10 Feb 54 (brief
histories 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, AT Co/7, 4.2-inch MortCo/7),
Folder #5; 1stMarDiv-Type “C” Rpt--Defense of “C” Div
Sect, 27 Jul-31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among
others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st Engr Bn, 1st MT
Bn, 7th MT Bn, 1st KMC Regt, 2d KMC Regt).
Terms of the Armistice Agreement required EUSAK components, including
the 1st Marine Division, to carry out a number of major tasks in the
months following the end of active hostilities. As stipulated by the
cease-fire, UNC troops all along the front withdrew to a new main
battle position (MBP) south of the main line of resistance. A military
demarcation line (MDL) was established between enemy and friendly
positions, corresponding to the end-of-war battle lines. Each side
pulled back 2,000 yards from this MDL, with the combined 4,000-yard
buffer strip on both sides being known as the demilitarized zone.(DMZ).
A continuous double-strand barbed wire fence, known as the No-Pass
Fence, or No-Pass Line, was erected 200 yards below the southern
boundary of the DMZ by infantry units manning the MLR at the time of
the cease-fire. Appropriate marking signs, in Chinese, Korean, and
English, were placed at regular intervals along the fence, prohibiting
unauthorized entry into the Demilitarized Zone.
Strict requirements by I Corps enjoined that the “fence on the southern
boundary of the DMZ must present a continuous unbroken line except for
gates and where it crosses large streams.”[643] Beginning late on 27
July 1953, the 1st Marine Division’s modified mission became that of
withdrawal to and organization of the post-armistice MBP, establishment
of the No-Pass Line, and defense of the new position in readiness for
any possible resumption of hostilities by the enemy.
[643] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 2 Aug 53.
Division officers, from commanding general to platoon leader level,
repeatedly emphasized that the armistice agreement was only a cessation
of active fighting. As such, it could be violated by the enemy at any
time. The armistice was not a peace, but had simply paved the way for a
political conference. As the UNC commander, General Mark W. Clark, had
stated, the 27 July document was merely “a military agreement between
opposing commanders to cease fire and to permit the opposing sides to
arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict.”[644] Since many felt
the cease-fire might be only temporary and not necessarily a permanent
peace, all hands showed an attitude of skepticism and watchful waiting.
There was little disposition or time for celebration. The response of
many men to the complete lack of noise across the front was one of
simple restlessness and expectancy.
[644] 1stMarDiv ComdD Aug 53, App. VII, Annex E to
IMARD-00-10-53, p. 2.
From the 7th Marines just engaged in the vicious Boulder City battle,
the reaction
... was one of disbelief and caution. Extensive movements of the
enemy during the night of 27 July only bolstered the feeling
of wariness and suspicion. Only after dawn broke on 28 July,
without any shots being fired, did the realism [reality] of the
truce become apparent, followed by a wide-spread sensation of
relief.[645]
[645] 7thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #5.
A 5th Marines representative noted:
The fact that negotiations had been going on for some time with
numerous false alarms dulled the edge for most people, and a
prior announcement that the agreement would be signed took most
of the steam away from the actual culmination of the fighting ...
in effect [the cease-fire] meant “we’re giving you ten dollars
but don’t spend it for we might take it back.”[646]
[646] Co H Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (2), CO 3/5
ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder
#4.
The view expressed by a Korean regimental commander was that:
Many of the officers and men were relieved to see the fighting
cease; others, particularly among the officers, would rather have
seen the fighting continue until the country could be united.
However, the officers and men accepted the cease-fire as a
military order and acted accordingly.[647]
[647] 1st KMC Regt Rpt, dtd 7 Apr 54, p. 1, in 1stMarDiv Type
“C” Rpt, Folder #6.
Division MLR units on 27 July had been the 1st KMC, the 5th Marines,
and 1st Marines in the left, center, and right regimental sectors,
respectively. With the pullback of the division to new defensive
positions, the 5th Marines--the infantry regiment that had not been
heavily engaged in recent combat--was assigned the mission of defending
the forward general outpost (GOP) line across the division front. In
addition, the 5th Marines, or Northern Regiment as it came to be called
since it was the only one remaining north of the Imjin River, was also
charged with police duties and security of the UNC part of the DMZ
located in the division sector.
Marine regiments, battalions, and companies began withdrawing from the
DMZ to move to their new MBP early on the morning of 28 July, less than
24 hours after the signing of the Korean armistice. To some extent, the
relocation of units was facilitated by the fact that the forward part
of the division sector had been defended by the three MLR regiments.
Since the lateral boundaries, initially, would remain the same, the
three 5th Marines battalions were to occupy positions held by the three
line regiments. Orders called for 2/5 to occupy the left regimental
sector previously held by the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat
Team; 1/5 to man the 5th Marines center sector; and 3/5 to assume the
right regimental sector.
Whereas 5th Marines battalions were directed to occupy their new
positions by D+84 hours (or 2200, 30 July), other units in some cases
were not required to pull out of their respective positions until
positions by D+108 hours (2000, 1 August). This was done to insure
that no portion of the division front was left unmanned during this
very critical period. It did, however, force small units to make two
moves and “in one instance, a battalion and a regimental headquarters
were occupying the same area.”[648] Because of the need to move almost
immediately, only a hasty physical reconnaissance was made. Small unit
leaders were not always familiar with the area and this gave rise, in
some instances, to confusion about exact unit boundaries. This resulted
in a later relocation of several units.
[648] 5thMar Hist, dtd 26 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.
For the first 72 hours after the armistice, Marines were engaged in
a maximum effort to tear down installations, salvage fortification
materials, and physically move out of the Demilitarized Zone.
Infantry units were responsible for this destruction and salvage work
within assigned sectors, with 1st Engineer Battalion assistance and
supervision, as available. For the nearly 50 Marine infantry companies
and attached KMC units, the order of priorities for those first three
days generally appears to have been:
(1) Recovery of ordnance and removal to company supply dumps;
(2) Removal of all combat equipment to supply dumps; and
(3) Destruction of field fortifications and salvage of all bunker
timbers and other building materials from the old MLR sector.
Specifications of the initial armistice agreement, as originally
drawn up in August 1952, had called for a complete withdrawal of all
military personnel, supplies, and equipment from the DMZ within 72
hours after the cease-fire. Destruction of all fortifications within
the DMZ likewise was to be accomplished within this 72-hour deadline.
It subsequently became evident, however, that it would be impossible to
complete the entire job of dismantling and salvaging MLR fortifications
within a three-day period. In mid-June 1953, CinCUNC had advised major
commands that Communist and UNC negotiators had agreed to extend
the original 72 hours to an additional 45-day period, or until 13
September.[649]
[649] Other modifications and deadline extensions included:
(a) withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and
equipment from coastal islands and waters north of the
38th Parallel within 5 days increased to 10 days; (b)
Personnel and equipment to be evacuated from Korea only
through those ports of entry specified in the armistice
agreement. 1st MAW ComdD, Vol. III, Jun 53, Msg from
CinCUNC to CG, AFFE, COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, info 1st MAW and
others, dtd 17 Jun 53.
Division order 1MARD-OP-11-53, issued at 1600 on 27 July, clearly
stated that all “removable materials”[650] would be taken out of
the DMZ within the immediate 72-hour period following the effective
date of the armistice (2200, 27 July). The end-of-war order further
directed that division personnel would “locate and list all valuable
materials which should be salvaged but cannot be moved during this
prescribed time ... an additional period of 45 days, after the initial
72-hour period, will be used to complete salvage operations within the
Demilitarized Zone under the supervision of the Military Armistice
Commission....”[651]
[650] 1stMarDiv Folder “Withdrawal to and Organization of Post
Armistice MBP 1MARD-OP-11-53-July 1953,” dtd 27 Jul 53.
[651] _Ibid._
From top to lower echelons, however, a breakdown in communications
seems to have taken place in the maze of post-truce orders. At the pick
and shovel level, initial instructions were sometimes to the effect of:
Salvage everything possible in the 72 hours we have to get out of
here. If unable to salvage; then destroy.... No word was passed
that there would be a period following the truce in which we
could conduct a thorough salvage operation. Had this information
been available, a more systematic process could have been
devised....[652]
[652] Co H Rpt, _op. cit._, p. 1, 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
One regiment commented “that early directives from higher authorities
did not clearly establish the relative priority for salvage
operations.”[653] More specifically, 1/7 related:
[653] 7thMar Hist, dtd 28 Jan 54, p. 5, Folder #5.
Periodically, messages would be received stressing certain
items of salvage as critical. This required revision of working
schedules and shifting of men to other jobs ... if all salvageable
material had been designated as critical at the commencement
of salvage operations, the work could have been completed more
expeditiously....[654]
[654] 1/7 Hist, in 7thMar Hist, p. 4, Folder #5.
A 5th Marines observer commented on the confusion in these words:
It is evident, however, that in dissemination to some of the
lower echelons, pertinent information was either ignored or
improperly passed ... some Company Commanders were under the
impression that the entire job of dismantling and salvaging was
to be completed in 72 hours. The result of this misconception was
that in some areas bunkers were filled in with earth and then
later had to be evacuated [excavated] in order to salvage the
materials.[655]
[655] 5thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #4.
Initial salvage operations were conducted from 28–30 July. Trenchlines
were filled in; tank slots dozed under; bunkers torn down and usable
timbers carried to salvage collecting points.
Beginning on 28 July, 1st Marines line units on the division right
flank came under operational control of the 5th Marines, with their new
mission being to “man an outpost line on the most formidable ground
south of the southern boundary of the newly planned Demilitarized
Zone in the MLR regimental sector.”[656] Movement to the new outpost
positions was under way by 29 July.
[656] 1/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #3.
As the Marine units moved south to establish their new outpost
positions in previously undeveloped areas, the limited engineering
equipment available for simultaneously dismantling bunkers and
constructing new camps tended to slow the latter job. Personnel of 1/1,
which had utilized 124 vehicles for the transfer, were among those
housed in widely scattered areas for several days during the moving and
setting up of new camps. Torrential rains, of several days’ duration,
which had engulfed the division’s transport operations on so many
occasions in the past, caused the new campsites to turn into a muddy
quagmire. Men of 2/5, during part of the relocation period, lived in
shelter tents until regular tentage became available.
A short moratorium on salvage activities took place between 31 July-3
August while the details for entry into the DMZ were being settled.
Marine division salvage efforts encompassed an area extending from the
MLR to the sector rear, in the vicinity of the KANSAS Line, as far as
the Imjin River. Work in the areas south of the DMZ did not begin, in
most cases, until after 13 September, and fortifications of secondary
defense lines were left in place.
All salvage materials removed from the DMZ were placed in battalion
and regimental dumps where they would be readily available for use
in building the new battle positions. Recovery of ammunition was
accomplished in some sectors early on the 28th. At the far right flank
of the division line, the scene of the Marines’ final action in the
Korean War, salvage efforts took on an additional task. Most of the
first day was allotted to recovery of the dead at Hills 119 and 111 and
the removal of their bodies to rear areas.
Although the enemy had policed in front of Marine lines on the night
of 27–28 July, at first light the CCF indicated the desire to recover
their dead from Marine positions. Enemy parties were thus permitted to
temporarily enter 3/1 lines to retrieve these bodies. This procedure
provoked some consternation and renewed vigilance by Marine personnel
upon “seeing the enemy moving around within a stone’s throw of our
front lines so soon after his determined attacks.”[657]
[657] 3/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
As soon as the Marines’ own corresponding unhappy task was completed,
ammunition was removed to supply dumps, a laborious task not finished
in the 1st Marines sector until noon on 29 July. The fierce fighting
that had started after dark on 24 July and lasted until the morning
of the ceasefire also accounted for the large amount of salvageable
items found in the area including M-1 rifles, helmets, armored vests,
and quantities of blood serum. All ordnance, equipment, and building
materials were separated into stockpiles of good or nonrepairable
items. Ammunition in excess of a one-half a basic JAMESTOWN fire unit
(a unit of fire is the amount of ammunition a weapon will use in a day
of combat), was placed in company and battalion dumps for collection by
regimental ordnance teams.
On occasion, salvage of friendly ammunition was made more difficult
because COP stockpiles struck by enemy mortar fire contained both
damaged and live, usable ammunition mixed together. Although 1st
Engineer Battalion ordnance disposal teams covered the positions
thoroughly, unexploded mortar and artillery rounds were often unearthed
by Marines filling in the old trenches, knocking down bunkers, or
recovering wire. Anti-personnel mines forward of the protective wire
prevented full salvage operations in some cases.
Three Marine combat outposts required special attention. These were
Bunker Hill and Esther, in the central part of the MLR, and Ava, in
the right sector. Although occupied by Marines at the time of the
cease-fire, the COPs fell north of the MDL and thus became inaccessible
for salvage after the initial 72-hour period. The positions were
reduced and materials salvaged in the allotted time.
During the first night, Marines of 3/5 (originally the right battalion,
center sector) removed more than 11 truckloads of ammunition. Outposts
Hedy and Bunker offered a particular problem due to the distance from
the MLR and nearest road. As described by some veterans of 24-hour work
crews, the trail to Bunker was “particularly tortuous and made the
packing of first the ammunition and later the fortification materials a
physical ordeal.”[658]
[658] Co I Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (3), CO 3/5
ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder
#4.
At Hedy the extreme proximity of CCF and Marine lines posed an
additional difficulty. On the afternoon of the 28th, an interval of 20
yards separated the two; by the following day the enemy had completed
his work in the area and was never again that close. Operations here
were also somewhat delayed “by an influx of visitors: newspapermen and
newsreel cameramen all interested in the great numbers of enemy visible
to our front engaged in the same tasks that we were.”[659]
[659] _Ibid._
Dismantling bunkers was the single biggest problem of the entire
salvage program. This operation began at dawn on the 28th and was
not completed until the second week of September. Ultimately, more
than 500 bunkers were reclaimed from MLR materials and installed in
the new division position. Most of the bunkers were built of 12x12
timbers, buried deep in the ground, fastened together with 10- to
16-inch spikes. Infantry organic tools and equipment were inadequate
to dismember bunkers so constructed. Crowbars, picks, shovels, pinch
bars, and sledge hammers were all in short supply. Engineer equipment
and other tools were not stockpiled in sufficient quantity to buttress
a demolition program of such magnitude.
In places where the terrain permitted operation of bulldozers, their
use drastically shortened the time spent uncovering bunkers. Where
these had been emplaced on reverse slope positions of steep hills,
however, the timbers had to be removed by hand. The latter was the
generally prevailing situation.
Not surprisingly, throughout the demolition program “basic equipment
was usually the Marine himself and his ingenuity.”[660] Effective
on-the-spot, problem-solving was seen in the many “jury-rigged” levers
or prybars fashioned from timbers and crowbars from scrap steel. The
“Korean Sling Method,” with heavy rope and carrying poles, was often
used to move heavy timbers. Trucks equipped with winches and wreckers
were effective for this purpose. Dozer tanks were also used, but only
after having their guns removed as required by the armistice agreement.
Division engineers experimented at some length with three different
ways to pull apart the larger 12x20 bunkers, in which the cross beams
were secured to columns with two-feet spikes. The least technical
approach which involved “winching the bunkers out of their positions
and bouncing them down a steep slope until they broke apart proved the
most successful and the quickest method.”[661]
[660] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #4.
[661] 1st EngrBn Rpt, dtd 19 Apr 54, p. 3, Folder #6.
Besides the lack of engineering tools, limited motor transport
facilities and manpower shortages also created difficulties. Heavy
commitments across the front, with virtually every division unit
displacing to a new location, resulted in a shortage of trucks that
slowed both salvage and logistics operations. Assignment of personnel
to around-the-clock shifts during the critical initial 72-hour
period and use of lighting trailers produced maximum results from
the available equipment. Company G, 3/5 reported that its men were
allowed “ten minute breaks every hour and, because of the heat, they
were given from 1200 to 1500 hours for sleep and worked all through
the darkness.”[662] During this three-day period alone, the 1st
Tank Battalion transported 275 tons of ammunition and fortification
material, or a total of 111 loads in 2½-ton trucks.
[662] Co G Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (1), CO 3/5
ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder
#4.
At this time, the restrictive provisions of the truce agreement led
to a problem involving the use of heavy engineer vehicles. After 3
August, it was difficult to bring into the DMZ any hauling or motorized
gear that could be construed as “combat equipment.” The 2½-ton trucks,
however, continued to be employed for much of the motor transport
operations.
By 0930 on 1 August, the 1st Marine Division had completed its
withdrawal and manned the new MBP south of the DMZ. The 5th Marines
continued its mission as the northern outpost regiment. South of the
Imjin, the 7th Marines occupied the right regimental sector; the 1st
KMC moved into the center of the MBP; and the 1st Marines became the
division reserve.
Between 3 August-13 September, each rifle company sent daily working
parties into the DMZ to excavate those sectors occupied by Marine
units on 27 July. Depending on available transportation, the size
of the working parties varied from 25 to 100 men. These shortages
were alleviated, to some extent, by KSC (Korean Service Corps)
personnel.[663] The heavy-duty, “pure drudgery without glamour,”
monotonous tasks performed in tropical weather, 103 degree-plus
temperatures and high humidity, caused one Marine infantryman to
comment ruefully:
[663] KSC units were deactivated shortly thereafter. Following
a EUSAK order in August to begin discontinuing use of the
Korean laborers, the number of KSC workers was reduced.
By the end of October, the 103d KSC Regiment attached to
the division had been completely disbanded.
Close officer supervision proved to be absolutely necessary due
to the nature of the work, which made the maintenance of interest
and enthusiasm in the average individual, very difficult.[664]
[664] 1/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.
In another 5th Marines unit the motivation gap was partially solved by
“use of a graph posted on the bulletin board showing the money value
of materials salvaged each day, with the exhortation to better the
previous day’s total.”[665]
[665] 4.2-inch Mort Co/5, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.
Throughout the month of August and until 13 September, destruction
of MLR positions and removal of materials took place concurrently
with organization of defensive positions in the new sector. After the
initial three-day period and its top priority of physical withdrawal
of troops from the DMZ, division tactical requirements called for
completion of the MBP as rapidly as possible. This now became the first
priority. New company perimeter defense sites, battalion blocking
positions, coordinated fire plans in event of attack, counterattack
orders, and evacuation routes were mapped out. Construction began
immediately. By 5 August, the new battalion camps had begun to take
form and work on the blocking positions was in progress. Marine units,
like other UNC forces, had to be prepared at all times for any act of
enemy aggression. Whether the Communists would continue to respect the
cease-fire agreement or not remained an open question.
Stockpiling, meanwhile, had been accomplished at company, battalion,
and regimental dumps. All materials were stacked by size to facilitate
reissue during construction of new positions. As much as 90 percent of
the materials salvaged were usable in the new fortification. Although
a certain amount of inter-battalion exchange took place, battalion
stocks--with the exception of sandbags--were usually adequate to
provide sufficient fortification materials for the rebuilding. For 5th
Marines units that had the least distance to relocate, timbers moved
from the old MLR in the morning were sometimes emplaced in the new
defensive positions by late afternoon. Helicopters, as well as trucks,
were used extensively to move stockpiles from company and battalion
areas to rear regimental supply dumps.
Division MLR supplies salvaged by the 5th Marines represented:
T/E material 12 tons
Signal equipment (wire) 2,000 miles
Engineer items
barbed wire 2,850 rolls
concertina 340 rolls
pickets, 6-foot 11,000
pickets, 3-foot 8,000
sandbags 339,000
timbers (from 3×8 to 12×12) 150,000 linear feet
Total tonnage 2,000 short tons
The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines estimated that wire rolls, sandbags,
timbers, and other materiel “recovered by this battalion and assisting
units was valued at approximately $150,000.”[666]
[666] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 3, Folder #4.
By early September, the 1st Marine Division work priority once again
had reverted from camp construction to salvage operations. It had
become apparent that another maximum effort period would be necessary
if all salvageable materials were to be removed from the DMZ no later
than the 13 September deadline reaffirmed by I Corps on 2 September.
During this last phase of salvage work, participating battalions
again came under operational control of the 5th Marines. Elements of
the 1st and 11th Marines, neither of which at that time had a sector
of responsibility for salvage, as well as KMC troops, augmented the
organic units. One battalion alone, 1/1, detailed 400 men in work
parties. At 2130, on 13 September, the division completed its salvage
mission in the Demilitarized Zone, thus meeting the specified time
limit. Under terms of the armistice agreement, after 13 September all
personnel were prohibited from entering the Korean Demilitarized Zone.
The only exceptions were members of the DMZ police companies of the
Allied and Communist sides and other persons specifically authorized
passage by the Military Armistice Commission (MAC).
_Control of the DMZ and the Military Police Company_[667]
[667] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53;
Demilitarized Zone Police Co Rpt, dtd 18 Dec 53, in
5thMar Hist, Folder #4; MSgt Paul Sarokin, “DMZ Marines,”
_Leatherneck_, v. 37, no. 10 (Oct 54), hereafter Sarokin,
“DMZ Marines.”
Since the late July signing of the armistice, one of the missions of
the 5th Marines GOP regiment had been the marking, control of entry,
and policing of the DMZ. At the time the No-Pass Fence was constructed,
roadblocks, called “crossing stations” were located at each route
leading into the DMZ. Initially, 21 crossing stations were opened
across the regimental front. When it later became apparent that not
all of these security points would be needed, some were closed and the
roads barricaded. Each crossing station was manned by a minimum of
two sentries who insured that no weapons were carried into the DMZ.
Along the fence itself, signs printed in three languages prohibited
unauthorized entry into the southern boundary of the DMZ. On roads and
trails approaching the southern boundary fence, additional signs placed
200 yards from the fence warned of the proximity to this southern end
of the military zone. Air panels and engineer tape also marked the DMZ.
After 31 July, entry into the DMZ was limited to those persons holding
a valid pass, issued under the auspices of the Military Armistice
Commission. Authority was also delegated to CG, U.S. I Corps to issue
passes for the I Corps sector. With salvage operations requiring a
large number of passes, authority was further delegated to the CO,
5th Marines, to issue permits for the regimental sector, good only
for unarmed[668] working parties engaged in salvage operations. The
regimental S-2 established a pass control center, and anyone desiring
to enter the DMZ made application through that office. Each pass
contained the bearer’s name, rank, service number, organization,
number of personnel and vehicles in the working party, and reason for
entry.
[668] With the exception of the DMZ Police, all persons
entering the DMZ for salvage were required to check their
weapons at the zone entry.
Security procedures also required that a log book of all zone entries
and exits be kept by crossing station guards. This information was
ultimately telephoned or radioed to higher echelons. At battalion and
regimental levels a master log or “status board” indicated the number
of people, vehicles, passes, and pass identification numbers present
in the DMZ at all times. As the salvage program reached its height
in August and early September, just the “issuance and recording of
passes and the checking of the working parties into the zone became a
major operation.”[669] Between 4 August-13 September, a total of 3,523
vehicle passes and an unknown number of personnel permits were issued.
With the ending of salvage operations on 13 September, the Marine
regiment no longer issued DMZ passes, although I Corps continued to
authorize MAC personnel entry permits.
[669] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
A stipulation set by the armistice agreement was that both the
Communist and UNC sides police their respective sections of the DMZ
with “civil police,” not to exceed 1,000 in the zone at any one time
across the entire front. With further allocation of police personnel
to army and I Corps units, the number of 1st Marine Division police on
duty within the DMZ at any one time was originally set at 50. Since
no civilian police were available to either side, requirements were
modified so that a specially designated military unit, in lieu of civil
police, could be employed and the original quota enlarged if this
became feasible.
Due to the delicate political aspect of the DMZ as well as the
non-repatriated POWs in the custody of Indian forces, security measures
were of utmost importance. The Marine division activated a new unit,
the 1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company at 0800 on 4
September. The new unit, charged with maintaining security throughout
the 1st Marine Division sector, became operational three days later.
Commanding officer was Captain Samuel G. Goich, formerly of F/2/7. Each
regiment from the division furnished 25 enlisted men and 1 officer to
form the company, including standby personnel. On 21 September, the
DMZ Police Company was attached to the 5th Marines. Police Company
personnel were required to have had at least three months’ Korean
service, a General Classification Test score of at least 95, a minimum
height of 5 feet 10 inches, and were “selected for physical stature
and mental capacity required in coping with the delicate situation
existing within the Demilitarized Zone.”[670] The average DMZ company
member was said to know “map-reading on an officer level, first aid,
radio, and understand the fine print of the cease-fire agreement like a
striped-trouser diplomat.”[671]
[670] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 53, p. 2.
[671] Sarokin, “DMZ Marines,” p. 23.
The mission of the Marine provisional police company as set up by the
truce agreement was to furnish military police escort for special
personnel visiting the DMZ and to apprehend truce violators or enemy
line crossers. Visitors who rated a military escort were members of
MAC, Joint Observer Teams, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
personnel,[672] NNSC inspection teams or agency assistants, or other
VIPs authorized to enter the UN half by the Military Armistice
Commission.
[672] The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission supervised all
phases of implementation of the armistice. It consisted
of the Secretariat and 20 neutral nations inspection
teams staffed by personnel from Sweden, Switzerland,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Six Marine DMZ military policemen, each armed with a .45 caliber pistol
and M-1 rifle, accompanied UN joint observer teams to the demarcation
line, midpoint between enemy and friendly boundaries, but did not
cross the MDL. I Corps orders directed that military police were to be
“responsible for the safety of the United Nations members of the team
and, when meetings are held south of the demarcation line, they will be
responsible for the safety of the CCF members of the team as well.”[673]
[673] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 1 Aug 53, msg CG I U.S. Corps to
addees, dtd 31 Jul 53.
Major tasks performed by the 104-man company operating within the
2,000-yard wide, 28-mile-long zone were:
To maintain surveillance over civilians within the UN half of the
DMZ;
To apprehend and deliver to the Division Provost Marshal any line
crossers encountered who did not possess an authorized pass,
regardless of the direction from which such persons entered the
DMZ; and
To provide check points on known routes through the zone and
observation posts, especially during the hours of reduced
visibility, and telephone all suspicious incidents to Regimental
S-2.
DMZ Police Company personnel operated in motorized patrol teams and
traveled the entire division sector in radio or cargo jeeps. One
platoon was kept on a standby basis at camp to serve as a mobile
reserve in the event of an emergency. The roving patrols submitted
reports of all incidents, which were then compiled in a company report.
A copy was submitted to the S-2, the Northern Regiment, and 1st Marine
Division G-2.
UNC security measures at all times were strict and uncompromising in
the Korean DMZ buffer zone. This included the salvage period, the
BIG SWITCH prisoner exchange that took place within the division
sector at Freedom Village from 5 August-6 September, and the lengthy
nonrepatriate POW settlement that extended through January 1954. In
places where the military demarcation line was not marked on the ground
or clearly recognizable, the conservative ruling was to stay at least
500 yards south of its estimated location. This applied both to body
recovery and salvage operations. The No-Fly line was scrupulously
verified.
Alleged violations charged by the CCF/NKPA were checked out with
the Marine ground observation posts set up in August to record all
movements of fixed-wing (reconnaissance) and rotary aircraft in the
area. Helicopters were allowed to fly in the DMZ but no closer than the
500 yard limit from the MDL. Helicopters operating forward of CPs of
5th Marines units having sector responsibility were required to obtain
clearance from the ground unit concerned for each flight. Medical
evacuation copters, generally, were exempted from this restriction and
authorized a standing clearance.
Commitments for the DMZ Police Company increased substantially with
arrival of the nonrepatriated POWs at their camp in the DMZ corridor
west of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines area. The Communist “explainers,”
as well as Polish and Czech members of the neutral Nations Commission,
had to be escorted while in the UN half of the DMZ. This required that
a 24-hour checkpoint and escort cadre be established in the zone. As
the number of enemy sightings, a daily occurrence in the DMZ, continued
to increase, the size of the police patrols increased correspondingly.
A typical example was related by a member of the police company:
It was common practice of the Communists to have a group of
their men, supposedly their DMZ Police, walk up to the Military
Demarcation Line and either stand close to it or step across.
When one of our patrols approached in superior numbers to
attempt to apprehend them, the Communists would immediately
reinforce with more men. This made it necessary to have our
patrols at sufficient strength that they could protect themselves
from being kidnapped.[674]
[674] Demilitarized Zone Police Co/5 rpt, p. 4, in 5thMar Hist,
Folder #4, _op. cit._
As these requirements for security increased, the original complement
of approximately 5 officers and 99 men became inadequate to patrol
the DMZ. By late October the T/O strength of the 1st Provisional
Demilitarized Zone Police Company had been increased to 6 officers and
314 men. Authorization for the number of police personnel on duty in
the DMZ had similarly been augmented from 50 to 175.
During the September salvage operations, five Marines in the DMZ were
taken into custody by the Chinese Communists. Charged with being in
unauthorized territory and violating terms of the armistice agreement,
they were later returned to United Nations jurisdiction.
_Organization of New Defense Positions_[675]
[675] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type
“C” Rpt Defense of “C” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder
#3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records
retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMar
Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder
#3 (contains brief histories of individual units); 5thMar
Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, in
Folders #3 and #4; 7thMar Hist of Defense of “D” Sector,
27 Jul 53–10 Feb 54, in Folder #5; 1stMarDiv Type “C” Rpt
Defense of “C” Div Sect, 27 July-31 Dec 53, Folder #6
(containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn,
1st EngrBn, 1stMTBn, 7th MTBn, 1st KMC Rgt, 2d KMC Rgt).
Upon withdrawal from the demilitarized zone and organization of the
MBP, the Eighth Army established its plan for defense on a wide front.
This was based on the organization of strongpoints disposed in depth,
with planned counterattacks by mobile reserves.
As it had during active hostilities, the 1st Marine Division in the
post-armistice period continued as one of the four UNC divisions
manning the general outpost and MBP in the U.S. I Corps sector.
Immediately east of the division was its long-time neighbor, the 1st
Commonwealth Division. Still further east in I Corps were the 1st ROK
and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions.
Since 1 August, the Marine division had continued to outpost the most
favorable terrain in its sector below the southern boundary of the
DMZ. The division manned the No-Pass Line and prepared its defenses
to resume full scale military operations, if necessary. The Munsan-ni
Provisional Command, composed of the Marine-Navy-Army personnel
responsible for implementing the final prisoner exchange, was also
headquartered in the 1st Marine Division sector.
The strongpoint organization of the division’s main battle position
was accomplished by the deployment of the 5th Marines at the general
outpost line of resistance (or OPLR, a term and concept not in use
since April 1952). The outpost defense concept embodied a number
of forward positions, lightly held in actual numbers of men but
strongly defended in numbers of automatic weapons and firepower.
(This capability was possible due to the excess number of automatic
weapons on hand, above normal T/E allowances, which previously had
been required by MLR defenses.) In the organization of the positions,
emphasis was placed on construction of bunkered observation posts, the
emplacement of automatic weapons with flanking fires, and clearing of
fields of fire for these weapons.
Basically, the general concept of OPLR defense was to establish
mutually supporting defensive positions across the front, as well as to
develop additional defense in depth positions whose strength increased
from front to rear. The positions thus formed successive defense lines,
from the southern DMZ boundary--the new Marine division front--south
to the KANSAS Line, the Main Battle Position. (These defense lines
were the old secondary defensive lines of WYOMING, KANSAS, and KANSAS
SWITCH.) The KMC, 1st Marines, 7th Marines, and other units located
in the KANSAS vicinity engaged in bunker construction and trench
improvement. Battalion fire plans coordinated the organic, attached,
and supporting weapons. Construction of the new positions and
development of the KANSAS Line would be a continuing process throughout
the rest of the year.
The 1st Marines received the assignment of developing the blocking
positions, most of these battalion-sized strongpoints. As in the past,
division support units continued to be located in the old rear supply
areas south of the Imjin. In early August the division had stationed
the 7th Marines in the right sector; the 1st KMC in the center; and
the 1st Marines, to the south of the KMC sector. The 11th Marines,
to the rear of the 7th Marines, had displaced its artillery, relaid,
and was prepared to fire in support of the general outpost and MBP.
(Map 35.) Additional artillery battalions included I Corps and army
units. Essentially these were the positions held until early October
when, during a period of political unrest resulting from the prisoner
exchange, the 1st Marines relieved the 1st KMC/RCT in the center
sector (which held the southern approaches to Freedom Bridge and the
nonrepatriate war compound). The Korean unit then relocated to blocking
positions and assumed the mission of reserve regiment.
[Illustration:
MAP 35 K. WHITE
E. WILSON
1st MARINE DIVISION
POST-ARMISTICE MAIN BATTLE POSITION
30 SEPTEMBER 1953]
Marine support units--motor transport, tank, service, medical, aerial
liaison (VMO/HMR)--were in the same general rear area, as was the
headquarters of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division. The Marine Division
CP continued to be located at Yongji-ri, although construction of a
new site further south at Chormyon was due to be completed by engineer
personnel on 1 October. The division railhead and truckhead remained,
respectively, at Munsan-ni and Ascom City. To the left of the KMC
sector was the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Still further west,
separated from other units by the Han River, was the Kimpo Provisional
Regiment, in its former wartime sector.
As the division OPLR regiment, the 5th Marines held a line 36,000 yards
in length--about 21 miles--roughly corresponding to the front manned
by three regiments during the war. The OPLR sector included the entire
area in the divisional zone of responsibility north of the Imjin.
Boundaries of the 5th Marines territory were the southern DMZ truce
line on the west and north, the Samichon River to the east, and that
major water barrier, the curving Imjin River, to the rear.
After establishment of the DMZ, the division occupied unfavorable low
ground poorly suited to the defense and inferior to that held by the
enemy--continuing the same situation that had existed during the period
of stabilized combat operations in West Korea. Almost without exception
the southern boundary of the DMZ prohibited the Marines from moving
onto the commanding terrain, as the No-Pass Line was behind or along
the reverse slopes of the high ground. On the other hand, in most cases
the CCF had the advantage of having forward slope positions as well as
the crests plus most of the commanding terrain in the area.
Communist territory in the northern DMZ sector included the former
strongholds of Yoke, Bunker Hill, Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, East
Berlin and Warsaw. Within the Marine division postwar area were the
Panmunjom Corridor and outposts Marilyn, Kate, the Boulder City hills,
and the Hook. Much of the terrain between the major hill positions
along the 5th Marines regimental front and the Imjin River consisted of
low-rolling hills rising abruptly out of the rice paddies.
Construction of new positions and the defense system of the 5th
Marines was based on several assumptions about enemy capabilities,
made by G-2 and the new regimental CO, Colonel Rathvon McC. Tompkins,
who had assumed command on 2 August. These were: that in the event
of resumption of hostilities by the CCF the enemy would use his jet
fighters and bombers in support of operations; that he would continue
to have numerical superiority in artillery; and that the northern
outpost regiment would have no reinforcement or surface resupply from
units south of the Imjin.
The defense plan for the forward part of the 5th Marines sector in
event of a resumption of hostilities called for furnishing patrols
equipped with radios and FO teams to occupy Hills 155, 229, and 181.
(Hill 155 was directly south of the DMZ in the 2/5 left battalion
sector; Hills 229 and 181 were, respectively, just inside and just
outside the southern boundary of the truce line in the center 1/5
sector.) From these three elevations the patrols would then have the
mission of bringing down artillery fire on enemy concentrations and
relaying communications about the situation to the friendly main attack
force. Other critical hill masses in the OPLR regimental sector were
Hill 126 (in the 3/5 eastern battalion sector, just inside the Marine
side of the DMZ) and Hill 163, in the Hook area. The latter hill was
not as suitable for defense since it was located south of the military
demarcation line and was thus less accessible.
These hill masses so completely dominated the major enemy approaches
through the division sector to the Imjin, the lower river crossing
sites and bridges, that their occupation by Marine personnel was
considered essential in the event of any attack. Hill 229, adjacent to
the Chan-dang corridor and part of the 229-181 axis, was considered the
most critical terrain feature in the entire northern section.
Key areas to the rear of the 5th Marines’ sector were the two operating
bridges (Freedom in 2/5 territory and Libby on the 3/5 right) and the
two interior crossing sites (Honker and Spoonbill). All provided access
to the Imjin and division support units deployed on the south side of
the river. In the event of threatened hostile attack, the Northern
Regiment was under orders to destroy the bridges to prevent their use
by the enemy on any attempted advance to the rear.
Strong perimeter defenses, called “Bridgehead Positions” were to be
built by 5th Marines’ battalions. Two were to protect the two bridges
and a third, to include both ferry sites. Between the forward defended
localities and the rear bridgehead positions, alternate and secondary
sites were organized to create mutually supporting defenses in depth.
The bridgeheads were a combination of linear and strongpoint defense,
capable of withstanding severe pressure.
Organization of the defensive positions in the 5th Marine sector
was complicated both by peculiarities of the terrain and political
restrictions due to proximity of the DMZ. In addition to the regiment’s
excess frontage, the demilitarized zone immediately to the front
precluded use of either aerial or motorized reconnaissance for early
warning. Security measures for the OPLR were less than ideal. Neither
proper patrols nor a covering force in front of the OPLR was possible;
the best that could be done was to maintain patrols along the friendly
side of the No-Pass Line.
As the regimental left battalion pointed out: “Location of the DMZ and
the No-Pass Line made the trace of the OPLR follow an artificial and
arbitrary line rather than that of the best terrain.”[676] The most
critical terrain feature in the sector, Hill 155, was located just
outside the southern boundary of the DMZ. Although its possession was
essential to successful defense of the OPLR and the bridgehead defense
positions being developed to the interior and rear of the battalion
sector, Hill 155 could not be occupied because of the armistice
agreement. The solution to the problem was simply to occupy the best
ground adjacent to the No-Pass Line.
[676] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.
Placement of automatic weapons was a factor of great importance in
organizing the defensive positions. In order to accomplish the mission
of an OPLR, weapons had to be situated to bring the enemy under fire at
maximum ranges. Accordingly, machine guns and other weapons were placed
on high ground well to the front. Some Marines commented that:
Many individuals having the MLR concept in mind insisted that
weapons should be located forward on low ground to provide
grazing fire. A period of education was required. For the same
reason, it was necessary to place 81mm mortar and 4.2-inch mortar
positions further forward than they would normally be in support
of the MLR.[677]
[677] _Ibid._
The problem of establishing depth to the defensive positions was never
solved to the satisfaction of everyone. This was due primarily to the
extended front which necessitated using more units for support elements
than would normally be done. This situation was partly alleviated by
establishing some unit defensive sectors further to the rear in the
company areas.
Another difficulty was the inadequate allocation of ammunition:
one-half JAMESTOWN load on position, and another half-load available
at the regimental dump. The JAMESTOWN load unit had been developed for
use in a stabilized defense situation where automatic weapons were
aimed as the enemy came in close proximity to the MLR. On the other
hand, OPLR machine guns and weapons were required to open up at maximum
ranges and might well be fired for extended periods of time. It was
calculated that A4 machine guns firing at medium rate (75 rpm) would
expend the one-half JAMESTOWN load in 22 minutes, while an A1 machine
gun at medium rate (125 rpm) would exhaust the same load in 13 minutes.
A partial improvement was obtained by moving the ammunition loads from
regimental to battalion dumps although the basic problem of limited
allocation--shared also by rear infantry regiments--continued to exist.
An unique situation that had confronted the 2d Battalion and at times
the adjoining 1st Battalion stemmed from the large numbers of Army
engineer personnel building the nonrepatriate POW camp in the DMZ
immediately west of the 2/5 sector. During August and the first part of
September, the area in front of 2/5 had been used as a base camp for
5,000–7,000 construction personnel. Although their area was crowded
with these additional units, the Marine battalions could not exercise
any control over them. The Marines were still responsible for security
of the sector, however. Presence of as many as 22,000 nonrepatriate
CCF and NKPA prisoners as well as the Indian custodial forces further
complicated the matter. It was noted that:
At the same time the Army engineers were building the camp, the
prisoners were situated in the middle of the 2/5 area and the MSR
to Panmunjom led completely across the battalion position into
the 1/5 sector [and thence] into the DMZ. Upon completion of the
camp, the engineers withdrew from the area but as they withdrew
the 5,500 troops of the Custodial Forces India were brought in
to guard the nonrepatriate prisoners. With the arrival of the
prisoners, the number of personnel in the regiment’s sector
of responsibility rose to 28,000–30,000. Thus, the problem of
having a GOP mission and at the same time having never less than
5,000 and as many as 30,000 friendly, neutral, and/or prisoner
personnel in front of our most forward defended localities was
always present.[678]
[678] 5thMar Hist, pp. 6–7, Folder #3.
Camp construction and development of the new positions south of the
river continued at a furious pace from August through early October.
Since the new camp sites were in civilian populated areas, “it was
necessary to secure real estate clearance before they could be
occupied or improved.”[679] After clearance was obtained on 29 July,
division engineers immediately began work on five separate camps.
These camp building activities and reconnaissance of assigned blocking
positions continued until 10 August. At this time, construction began
on the major blocking positions, so organized and developed as to be
self-sustaining for several days. Whether squad, platoon, or company,
all positions were organized using a perimeter type defense and were
mutually supporting laterally and in depth. Connecting trenches,
bunkers, ammunition holes, and tank slots were also built.
[679] 1st EngrBn Rpt, Operations during 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, dtd
19 Apr 53, p. 4, Folder #6.
By early October, construction of the blocking positions was completed
by the 1st Marines despite the fierce summer heat, the numerous rock
formations in the area that were difficult to dig out with limited
tools and demolitions, and the shortage of personnel due to units
participating in the new series of division MARLEX exercises, resumed
in October. Within three months, the Marine division had thus largely
completed building of a solid defense in its new main battle position.
The importance of maintaining combat readiness for any renewed
hostility on the part of the enemy demanded continuing vigilance at all
times.
Defense specifications throughout the 5th Marines northern general
outpost sector called for some 1,560 individual fighting positions,
400 automatic weapons sites, 8 bunkered infantry OPs, 30 bunkered
CPs, 15,400 yards of trenchlines, and 70,000 yards of protective
and tactical wire. In construction of the MBP, all bunkers were so
blended and camouflaged with the natural terrain that they were almost
impossible to be seen.
To the division rear, the location of recoilless rifle positions, FDC
bunkers, and tank slots in the blocking positions and bridgeheads was
the major priority. In the antimechanized defense plan, tanks covered
likely avenues of approach into the general outpost area and also
overlooked critical river crossing sites. Wherever possible old firing
positions which had been previously prepared to support the secondary
lines WYOMING and KANSAS were utilized. By the end of the year, 204
tank firing positions had been emplaced throughout the Marine division
sector.
Three rehearsals for the occupation of the main battle position were
held by the 1st Marine Division in September. All division units,
both combat and service, participated in these exercises. Tactical
units were required to occupy the MBP and be fully prepared for combat
on four hours’ notice; service units were to provide additional
local security required for the elimination of enemy infiltrators or
guerrilla agents. Divisional and I Corps test exercises indicated
that three hours were necessary to man the MBP during daylight and
approximately three and one half hours at night.
_Postwar Employment of Marine Units in_ FECOM[680]
[680] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10; AnlRpt
CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug 54; AnlRpt CMC
to SecNav for FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55; 1st MAW ComdDs,
Aug-Sep 53; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, Aug-Sep 53; MSgt Roy E.
Heinecke, “Four Star Visit,” _Leatherneck_, v. 37, no. 1
(Jan 54).
The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Post-Armistice Plan, as part of Fifth
Air Force operations, was effective at 2200, on 27 July. Its purpose,
basically, was to insure that wing elements carried out provisions of
the armistice and yet continued to maintain a high level of combat
readiness in the uneasy truce period.
Two major operational restrictions had been imposed on the UNC air
force by the armistice. The first was establishment of the “No-Fly
Line” south of the Allied southern boundary of the DMZ. Any flight
beyond that point had to be authorized by JOC and a barrier patrol was
maintained by FAF to apprehend any violators of the truce provisions.
The 1st MAW contribution to this aerial security team was night patrols
performed by F3D-2s from VMF(N)-513 and radar-configured AD aircraft
from VMC-1 (later, by the new VMA-251 squadron).
The second post-truce restriction, which affected wing logistic
movements, limited the entry and departure of all Korean air traffic
to five airfields. These aerial ports were K-2, K-8, K-9, K-14, and
K-18. (K-16 was later added.) Neither K-3, the east coast home field of
MAG-33 nor K-6, located just inland from the west coast and the site of
MAG-12 operations, was included. All Marine traffic landed either at
K-9 or K-2 for inventory, a procedure which subsequently developed into
a bottleneck, and caused supply delays due to the substantial reduction
in payload made to accommodate the necessary extra fuel due to greater
overland distances between airfields. When the CG, 1st MAW requested
that K-3 be made a port of entry to avoid the difficulties involved in
use of the two FAF fields, ComNavFE disapproved the request with the
following rationale:
ComNavFE feels that to ask for designation of K-3 as an
additional port of entry would be politically inadvisable. It
would provide the Communists with a basis for a propaganda claim
that the United Nations were attempting to further delay an
armistice agreement. Should the Communists propose an additional
port of entry for their side, COMNAVFE states the UN Military
Armistice Commission will offer designation of K-3 as a _quid pro
quo_.[681]
[681] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 6, p. 10-74.
Removal from Korea to Japan of operational combat aircraft for routine
maintenance runs and their return thus had to be made through the same
port of exit and reentry. Inspections were conducted by the USAF combat
aircraft control officer at the port.
The post-truce 1st MAW mission, in part, comprised the following:
... to maintain assigned forces in a state of combat
readiness, provide for security of assigned forces, areas,
and installations; observe the conditions of the Armistice
Agreement; support other elements of the United Nations Command
as required; be prepared to counter any attempt on the part
of the enemy to resume active hostilities; continue current
missions other than combat; insure that 1st MAW personnel and
combat material are not increased beyond the level present at
the instant of the effective time of the Armistice Agreement;
submit reports on 1st MAW personnel and controlled items of Wing
equipment entering or leaving Korea; be prepared to disperse
air units within or from Korea as necessary to provide maximum
security during an Armistice....[682]
[682] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #1, p. 1.
The strict interpretation of replacing combat aircraft, armored
vehicles, weapons, and ammunition that were destroyed, worn out, or
used up during the period of armistice was, of course, due to the
sensitive political considerations. It was felt that replacement of
combat equipment by UNC forces:
... would result in the Communists adopting the same liberal
interpretation which is undesirable since it will lessen the
control of combat material in North Korea and could permit
them to replace phenomenal unauthorized quantities of material
damaged, destroyed, worn out or used up prior to the effective
date of the Armistice Agreement.[683]
[683] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #2, msg ComNavFE to all
units, dtd 16 Aug 53.
In August, postwar procedures were mapped out for 1st MAW personnel,
as part of the overall quota limitations prescribed by FECOM (Far
East Command) through FEAF and FAF echelons. A 1st MAW headquarters
section, designated as 1st MAW, rear echelon, was established at Itami
AFB, Japan, two hours’ flight from Korea. All incoming or outgoing
aviation personnel on permanent change of station orders were to report
to the rear echelon, 1st MAW. Announcement of Marine Corps plans to
initiate future postwar rotation on a stretch-out basis (for both air
and ground personnel) was also made in August. Preliminary plans called
for changing the current 11-month combat tour in Korea to 14 months by
March 1954, and possibly 16-month tours by July 1954, if extension of
Korean service proved necessary. As with division personnel, monthly
cumulative arrivals were not to exceed the number of departing aviation
Marines. The quota set by FEAF for 1st MAW rotation for the month of
August was 600, compared to the Marine division quota of 3,000 for
ground personnel.
With the 1st Marine Division engaged for an unknown length of time
in its postwar mission as an occupation force and 1st MAW units
continuing to operate under FAF in Korea, new Marine ground and
air units were assigned to the Far East theater shortly after the
conclusion of Korean hostilities. On 23 July, the 3d Marine Division,
together with supporting air units, was readied for deployment from
Camp Pendleton to Japan the following month. On 13 August the division
CP was opened afloat and units proceeded to Japan between 16–30 August.
The mission of this division and the two major air units, MAGs-11
and -16, was to maintain a high state of readiness in the Far East
Command and to assist in the air defense of Japan. As explained by the
Commandant, their redeployment was accomplished “in order to provide
the amphibious capability which is an important element of national
strategy in that predominantly maritime theater.”[684]
[684] AnlRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug. 54, p. II-2.
The new Marine units thus joined in the Pacific, the 1st Provisional
Marine Air-Ground Task Force[685] that had been activated in Kaneohe,
Hawaii in January of 1953. Commanded by Brigadier General James P.
Risely, it was to include a headquarters company, reinforced regiment,
and reinforced aircraft group. The special task force was designated
as a hard-hitting, air-ground team that could respond immediately as a
force-in-readiness to any emergency in the Pacific area.
[685] The Task Force was subsequently redesignated as the 1st
Marine Brigade, FMF, in May 1956.
Commanded by Major General Robert H. Pepper, the 21,100-man 3d Marine
Division was called the “Three-Dimensional Division,” in reference
to its training in airborne, amphibious, and atomic warfare. Within
six months, its components were to stretch from Kobe to Tokyo, with
division headquarters and the 9th Marines at Gifu, the 4th Marines at
Nara, and other units at Otsu.
New Marine air units, which included Marine Transport Squadron 253
and Marine Observation Squadron 2, as well as MAGs-11 and -16, all
came under 1st MAW operational control. Commanded by Colonel John
D. Harshberger, the all-jet MAG-11, formerly based at Edenton,
N.C., arrived at NAS Atsugi on 10 September. It comprised three F9F
squadrons, VMFs-222, -224, and -314. Also at Atsugi, the Marine Corps
aerial gateway to Japan, was the new transport squadron, VMR-253,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Carl J. Fleps, which reported in to
CG, 1st MAW, on 16 August. Following numerous FMFPac requests for
additional air transport capability, the Commandant had authorized
transfer of the squadron from El Toro to assist the veteran wartime
carrier VMR-152 in the enormous postwar airlift program.
Flying new R4Q Fairchild Packets, which could carry 42 troops, the
squadron from August to May 1954 logged more than 5,000,000 passenger
miles in transporting Marine replacements for the 1st and 3d Marine
Divisions. Additional air capability was provided by Marine Helicopter
Transport Group 16 (at Hanshin AFB) under Colonel Harold J. Mitchener,
with its two HRS-2 (HMR-162, HMR-163) and service squadrons (MAMs-16,
MABS-16) and VMO-2, commanded by Major William G. MacLean (based at
Itami). Both units reported to 1st MAW and FECOM on 13 August.
Major command changes within the 1st MAW that month were: Brigadier
General Verne J. McCaul, vice Brigadier General Alexander W. Kreiser,
Jr. as ACG, 1st MAW, effective 16 August; and Colonel William F.
Hausman, vice Colonel Carney, CO, MAG-12, on 8 August. (The new MAG-33
CO, Colonel Smith, had succeeded Colonel Stacy in late July.)
In the immediate post-armistice period, extensive training programs
were instituted by MAGs-12 and -33 to maintain high operational
efficiency. Marine aircraft remained on JOC alert as required by the
Fifth Air Force and flew training missions scheduled by 1st MAW and
FAF. These consisted of practice strikes against heavily-defended
targets, practice CAS for Eighth Army units, GCI (ground control
intercept) flights under MGCIS-3 control, and bombing practice using
the Naktong Bombing Range. Other training sorties were scheduled
in reconnaissance navigation, weather penetration, determining
fuel bingos,[686] target location and identification, air defense
patrolling, and coordination of tactical procedures in the target area.
The training schedules provided a well-balanced indoctrination program
for new squadron flight leaders, pilots, radar operators, and other
crew members arriving in Korea on the postwar personnel drafts.
[686] A fuel bingo is the amount of fuel needed by a pilot to
reach home base plus enough additional fuel to divert to
an alternate airfield.
A new work day schedule of 0700–1500 implemented in August made more
time available for athletics, swimming, studying, and R&R (Rest &
Recreation). That same month the MAG-12 softball team won the Fifth Air
Force “All Korea” softball championship. Following this achievement,
the team left for Japan to compete in the FAF “Far East” softball
tournament which included teams from all the major Pacific bases.
Subsequently, the K-6 players “disguised in Air Force uniforms, went
onward and upward to become FEAF champions in September.”[687] MAG-33
pilots, meanwhile, participated in Operation SPYGLASS, a FAF training
exercise in August and Operation BACK DOOR, the following month.
Both emphasized interception flying and work with GCI squadrons. As
“aggressors,” the Pohang-based airmen made simulated attacks on South
Korean targets “defended” by Air Force and other land-based Marine
units. In October, MAG-33 pilots flew CAS missions for the 1st Marine
Division training problem, MARLEX IV, a battalion landing exercise
staged by 1/7 on Tokchok-to Island. Beginning that month a new
procedure was inaugurated by MAG-33 and the recently-arrived MAG-11.
Every week, four MAG-11 pilots came to Korea for a week of orientation
flying with a MAG-33 squadron to gain a better picture of typical
flying conditions in the Korean theater.
[687] Field, _NavOps, Korea_, pp. 456–457.
Early in 1955 the 1st Marine Division, which had been in the Korean
front lines almost continuously since September 1950, returned to
Camp Pendleton. Redeployment by echelons began in February. By June,
all units had returned to CONUS. The transfer from Korean occupation
duty was effected in order that the division’s “valuable capability
as a highly trained amphibious force in readiness may be fully
realized.”[688] Now under Major General Merrill B. Twining,[689] the
division had been a part of Eighth Army occupying postwar defense
positions in Korea until its relief on 17–18 March 1955 by the U.S.
24th Infantry Division.
[688] AnlRpt of CMC to SecNav FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55, p. 3,
quoting statement made by SecDef in Dec 54 on forthcoming
departure of 1stMarDiv from FECOM.
[689] Postwar commanders of 1stMarDiv to date had been Major
General Robert H. Pepper, who succeeded General Pate, and
served from 12 May 54–22 Jul 54; Major General Robert
E. Hogaboom, 23 Jul 54–17 Jan 55; and General Twining,
beginning 18 Jan 55.
In addition to its official mission in the Eighth Army line, the 1st
Marine Division had conducted an active small-unit amphibious training
program during its postwar Korea duty. All but two of its infantry
battalions had carried out assault landings on Tokchok-to, off the
Korean west coast south of Inchon, prior to its departure for the
United States. The 3d Marine Division had also conducted an active
training program, with numerous small-unit exercises and regimental
landings staged at Iwo Jima and Okinawa as part of its continuous
readiness conditioning.
For Marine air personnel, their official departure from Korea following
the 1st MAW wartime assignment there, came the next year. Beginning in
June 1956, initial units of the Marine aircraft wing were withdrawn
from Korea and relocated at NAS Iwakuni, Japan. Plans called for the
wing, then under Brigadier General Samuel S. Jack[690] and occupying
bases in both Korea and Japan, to be permanently headquartered at
Iwakuni and revert to CinCPacFlt control. The wing remained on station
in the Far East as a component of postwar United States defense
strength in that area.
[690] CGs, 1st MAW, in the immediate post-armistice period
were: Major General Megee, until 4 Dec 53; Major General
Albert D. Cooley, 5 Dec 53–25 Mar 54; Brigadier General
McCaul, 26 May 54–24 Aug 54; Brigadier General Marion L.
Dawson, 25 Aug 54–24 Sep 55; and Brigadier General Jack,
25 Sep 55–30 Jun 56.
The prewar Fifth Air Force and Eighth U.S. Army commands, under which
Marine Corps air and ground units had functioned during the Korean
War, were permanently deployed in the Far East as operative military
echelons. EUSAK-FAF transferred from its wartime JOC location at Seoul
to Osan-ni in January 1954 and in September of that year relocated to
Nagoya, Japan. Eighth Army headquarters remained at Seoul.
CHAPTER XII
Korean Reflection
_Marine Corps Role and Contributions to the Korean War: Ground, Air,
Helicopter--FMF and Readiness Posture--Problems Peculiar to the Korean
War--Korean Lessons_
_Marine Corps Role and Contribution to the Korean War: Ground_[691]
[691] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Reports
of the Secretary of Defense, 1951–1954, hereafter _Rpt
of SecDef_; _PacFlt EvalRpts_, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10, No.
5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; Marine Corps Board
Study, An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps
Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec
50), vs. I and II, hereafter _USMC Board Rpt_, held in
James C. Breckinridge Library, MCDEC, Quantico, Va; A
Summary of the General Officers’ Conference, HQMC, 19–21
Aug 53, hereafter _Generals’ Summary_, at Breckinridge
Library; 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, Summary of
USMC Action in Korean War; _USMC Ops Korea_, vs. I, II,
III, IV, _passim_; Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_;
Robert D. Heinl, Jr., _Soldiers of the Sea: The United
States Marine Corps, 1775–1962_ (Annapolis, Md.: United
States Naval Institute, 1962), hereafter Heinl, _Soldiers
of Sea_; Release “1st Marine Division ‘The Old Breed’”
from 1st MarDiv folder, HRB RefFile; Release “Outline
of the First Two Years of the 1st Marine Division in
Korea,” HistBr, G-3 Div, HRS Folder; _CheVron_, MCRD, San
Diego, Calif., V. 27, no. 31 (2 Aug 68), p. 4–5, “From
Camp Pendleton to Inchon--18 Years Later, LtGen E. A.
Craig, 1st Provisional Brigade CG, Recalls Experiences in
Korea,” Cpl C. N. Damopoulos, hereafter _CheVron_.
Ground operations of the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War can
be divided into six periods. These are the Pusan Perimeter defense
(August-September 1950), Inchon-Seoul assault (September-October 1950),
the Chosin Reservoir campaign (October-December 1950), East-Central
Korea (January 1951-March 1952), West Korea (March 1952-July 1953), and
the post-armistice period (July 1953-February 1955).
Marine Corps traditional concepts of readiness and fast, effective
deployment were never better illustrated than in the hectic weeks
following 25 June 1950. The NKPA invasion of South Korea came at a
time when U.S. military forces were in the final stages of a cutback
to peacetime size. Ships and planes were being “mothballed”; personnel
of all the Armed Services were being reduced in number to the lowest
possible effective manpower levels.
From the peak of its six-division, five-wing wartime strength of
475,600 in 1944–1945, the Marine Corps at the outbreak of the Korean
emergency had only two skeletal divisions and two air wings. There
were but 74,279 Marines on active duty, 97 percent of the Marine Corps
authorized strength. Although a ceiling of 100,000 had been established
for the Corps by law, it was a period of tight purse strings for all
defense components. Fiscal austerity in the post-World War II period
had whittled Corps numbers from 85,000 in FY 1947 to what was projected
at 67,000 by the end of FY 1950.
This critically reduced strength found the normal Marine triangular
infantry organization cut back to two companies per battalion, two
battalions per regiment, and two regiments per division. The 1st Marine
Division, at Camp Pendleton, and 2d Marine Division, at Camp Lejeune,
were structured along the regular peacetime T/O of 10,232 USMC/USN vice
the wartime minimum T/O of 22,355. No Marine units of any size were
located in the Far East.
Despite its lean numbers in late June 1950, the Marine Corps once
again would be in the forefront of American military response to the
Communist aggression 6,000 miles across the Pacific. As hard-pressed
South Korean forces and understrength U.S. occupation troops from Japan
attempted to halt the Communist invaders, General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, on 2 July, requested the JCS to send immediately a Marine
RCT with supporting air to the Far East. On 7 July, the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade was formed at Camp Pendleton from units of the 1st
Division. Major components of the brigade--a balanced force of ground,
service, and aviation elements--were the 5th Marines and MAG-33. Five
days later, the 6,534-man brigade had mounted out from San Diego to
answer the CinCFE plea for Marines to help turn the Communist tide
engulfing Korea.
The brigade buttressed the faltering UNC defense in the Pusan
Perimeter. Employed as a mobile reserve it helped prevent three enemy
breakthroughs--at Chinju and the two Naktong River battles. On 7
August, a month after its activation, the brigade launched an attack
toward Chinju. The Marine brigade was the first unit sent from CONUS
to see combat in what was then considered a short-term police action.
Later, in leading the way to destruction of an enemy bridgehead at the
Naktong, the Marine brigade gave the defending Eighth Army its first
victory against the NKPA in the Korean conflict.
Even before the brigade had been dispatched to the Far East, as the
Korean situation continued to deteriorate, MacArthur had requested the
JCS to expand the brigade to a full war-strength division. Between
10–21 July MacArthur, now CinCUNC, had made three separate requests
for a Marine division. This persistence was reinforced by his growing
determination to conduct a tactical amphibious operation to the rear of
the overextended NKPA lines and thereby seize the initiative from the
enemy.
In the States, meanwhile, authorization was received to bring the badly
understrength 1st and 2d Marine Divisions up to full 22,000-man war
levels. By stripping posts and stations, reassignment and rerouting
of units, and callup of additional reserve personnel, major elements
of the 1st Marine Division were on their way to Korea by mid-August.
Timing was critical in order to meet the projected D-Day target date of
15 September.
Pulled out of the Pusan line on 12 September, the brigade was absorbed
by the newly arrived 1st Marine Division in preparation for the coming
Inchon invasion. As the brigade commander, Lieutenant General Edward A.
Craig, USMC, later reminisced:
Although the 1st Provisional Brigade and the 1st MarDiv had never
actually trained or worked together, they still combined and
executed a successful landing. To me, this simply emphasized the
fine training and techniques laid down for amphibious landings by
the Marines.[692]
[692] _CheVron_, pp. 4–5.
Organized as a unit less than four months, the brigade left behind it
a reputation for mobility, effectiveness, and rapid deployment in the
face of national emergency. Although Marine air and ground forces had
operated together since 1919 in Haiti, formation of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade “marked the first time that the air and ground elements,
task organized under a single commander, had engaged in combat.”[693]
[693] _Ibid._ Even though Marine air and ground forces had
on occasion operated jointly ever since the 1920s, air
support in the early days was considered a subsidiary
rather than integral part of the team. The doctrine of
Marine close air support was formulated in WW II but not
fully employed before the end of hostilities.
In the brilliant Inchon landing of 15 September 1950, Major General
Oliver P. Smith’s 1st Division Marines led the X Corps attack in the
first major counterstroke by United Nations forces on Communist-held
territory. This maneuver was closely timed against enormous odds
of personnel, logistics, and hydrography (tidal fluctuations of 31
feet) which made 15 September the only suitable assault date until
mid-October. When outlined in earlier planning sessions by General
MacArthur, the mammoth difficulties of the operation had been so
unsettling that the designated Attack Force Commander for the landing,
Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, expressed the view that “the best I can
say is that Inchon is not impossible.”[694]
[694] Quoted in _USMC Ops Korea_, v. II, p. 46. Admiral Doyle
was Commander of Amphibious Forces for the Pacific Fleet.
Despite all the difficulties, the landing at Inchon and recapture of
Seoul, the South Korean Capital, and its adjacent Kimpo airfield by the
Marines was a stunning tactical blow by the UNC that broke the backbone
of the North Korean People’s Army 1950 offensive. The 1st Marine
Division, in its successfully executed amphibious landing, had offered
UNC forces an opportunity to defeat the enemy decisively before a
Siberian-like Korean winter set in. Accomplished under the most adverse
weather and geographic conditions, the assault proved anew the decisive
power of amphibious forces employed at a critical time and place. This
capability and readiness of the Marine Corps had totally reversed the
military situation, and a battered enemy was on the run. The subsequent
routing of the NKPA divisions in the Inchon-Seoul campaign by X Corps
and the Eighth U.S. Army forces would have led to an early UN victory
had not the Chinese Communists intervened to support their Korean
counterparts. The operation had validated Far East Commander General
MacArthur’s early premise that:
... air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that
nothing short of the intervention of U.S. ground forces could
give any assurance of stopping the Communists and of later
regaining the lost ground.[695]
[695] _Ibid._, p. 3.
The Inchon operation, moreover, had been planned in record
time--approximately 20 days. This was one of the shortest periods
ever allotted to a major amphibious assault, involving the planning,
assembly of shipping, and mounting out of a combined force of 29,000
Marines and support personnel.
With the Inchon-Seoul operation ended, the 1st Marine Division
(including the 7th Marines which had reached Inchon in time for the
liberation of Seoul) reembarked on 12 October for deployment to the
east coast of Korea. A new military operation was envisioned north of
the 38th Parallel against Pyongyang, the North Korean Capital. As part
of the drive, X Corps was to make an amphibious envelopment on the east
coast, in the area of the enemy-held port of Wonsan. From here X Corps
would advance westward toward Pyongyang, to link up with Eighth Army
troops and trap NKPA forces withdrawing from the south.
While the Marines were en route to the objective, word was received
that ROK troops had overrun Wonsan and were pushing north. The revised
X Corps plan of operation called for a three-pronged attack towards the
Yalu. The Marine division would advance on the left, the U.S. Army 7th
Division in the center, and 1st ROK Division on the right flank. This
drive to the north and subsequent action at the Chosin Reservoir would
rank as one of the most rigorous campaigns in the entire history of the
Marine Corps.
Fighting as part of EUSAK, by this time fanned out throughout North
Korea, the 1st Marine Division did not meet the expected NKPA
resistance. Instead, large-scale Chinese Communist Forces had entered
the war. As X Corps swept north toward the Yalu River in November 1950,
the Marines became the first United States troops to defeat the Chinese
Communists in battle. At Sudong, after four days of savage fighting,
the Marine RCT-7 so badly crippled major elements of the 124th CCF
Division that it was never again committed as an organic unit.
When the Chinese forces struck in full force at the Chosin Reservoir,
X Corps units were forced back. Elements of a nine-division assault
force, the CCF 9th Army Group, which had been sent into Korea with
the specific mission of annihilating the 1st Marine Division, began
to attack. On 27 November, the Chinese directed a massive frontal
assault against 5th and 7th Marines positions at Yudam-ni, west of the
reservoir. Another CCF division, moving up from the south, cut the MSR
held by the 1st Marines so that the division at Yudam-ni, west of the
reservoir, was completely encircled by Communist forces. Many experts
considered the 1st Marine Division as lost. Others thought the only
way to save it was to airlift it out, leaving its equipment behind.
Instead, the Marines seized the initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path
through CCF units blocking a route to Hagaru. The division battled its
way out in 20-degree-below-zero weather 78 miles over icy, winding
mountain roads from the reservoir to the Hamhung-Hungnam area where, on
15 December, it redeployed to South Korea.
Integrated ground and air action enabled the 10,000 Marines and
attached 4,000 Army-Royal Marine troops to break out of the entrapment
and move south. During 13 tortuous days the Marines had withstood
hostile strength representing elements of six to eight CCF divisions.
The major result, from the military view, was that the Marine division
properly evacuated its dead and wounded, brought out all operable
equipment, and completed the retrograde movement with tactical
integrity.
Not only had the Chinese (with a total of 60,000 men in assault or
reserve) failed to accomplish their mission, destruction of the
division, but the Marine defenders had dealt a savage blow to the enemy
in return. POW debriefings later revealed that assault units of the CCF
9th Army Group had been rendered so militarily ineffective that nearly
three months were required for its replacement, re-equipment, and
reorganization.
Early in 1951, the 1st Marine Division was reassigned to IX Corps for
Operation KILLER, a limited offensive ordered by the EUSAK Commander,
General Matthew B. Ridgway. In Operation RIPPER, in March, the division
led another IX Corps advance as it drove toward the 38th Parallel on
the east-central front. When the Chinese struck back with their spring
offensive on 22 April, the Marines were transferred to operational
control of X Corps and counterattacked to restore the UNC defensive
position in the far eastern sector. During May and June, the 1st Marine
Division continued to punish the enemy in the Punchbowl area of eastern
Korea, driving the CCF back to Yanggu and the Soyang River corridor.
Activity all along the UNC front came to an uncertain halt in July 1951
when Allied and Communist negotiators met at Kaesong for truce talks
initiated by the enemy. In August the MLR flared into action again, and
the Marine Division was engaged in new counterthrusts in the Punchbowl
area. Fighting during the next three weeks involved the division in
some of its hardest offensive operations in Korea. It also developed
that this would be the last offensive for the Marines. In November
1951, as a result of the truce talks and possibility of ending
hostilities, General Ridgway, now UNC Commander, ordered the Eighth
Army to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of the
front.
The war of fire and movement had turned into one of positional warfare,
a defensive posture by UN forces that would continue for the last 21
months of the three-year conflict. Throughout the winter of 1951–1952,
the Marines conducted vigorous patrol activities in their sector of X
Corps. Although it was a lackluster period of trench warfare for the
average infantryman, major tactical innovations were being pioneered by
the division with its use of the transport helicopter for logistical
and resupply missions.
In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division was transferred from the eastern
X Corps line 140 miles west to strengthen the far end of the Eighth
Army MLR in the I Corps sector. The division was relocated in the
path of the enemy’s invasion route to Seoul, where weak defenses in
the Kimpo coastal area had threatened the security of the UNC front.
Here the division’s four infantry regiments (including the 1st Korean
Marine Corps RCT) held nearly 35 miles of front line in the critical
Panmunjom-Munsan area. The demilitarized route for the United Nations
negotiators led through the Marine lines. It was the most active sector
of the UN front for the next 16 months. This key position guarded the
best routes of advance from North Korea to Seoul and indicated the high
regard in which General James A. Van Fleet, EUSAK commander, held the
Marines.
West Korean terrain was rugged, hilly, and friendly to the CCF who had
the advantage of high ground positions as well as considerably more
manpower. Although cast in an unaccustomed defensive warfare role,
rather than a true attack mission, the Marines repelled an almost
continuous series of enemy probes. While truce talks went on at nearby
Panmunjom, fighting as furious as at any time earlier in the war
flared up intermittently as the CCF tried to gain additional terrain
for bargaining purposes. During 1952–1953, the Marine division beat
off determined CCF limited objective attacks on Bunker Hill, the Hook,
Vegas, and Boulder City outposts up until--literally--the final day of
the war, 27 July 1953.
In reviewing Marine actions during this period, the Secretary of the
Navy commented:
Marines in Korea have established an enviable record of success
in carrying out their assigned missions. The First Marine
Division began its third year in Korea holding an active sector
of the United Nations front guarding the enemy’s invasion route
to Seoul. It was frequently subjected to fanatical Chinese
attacks supported by intensive artillery fire. Some of the
heaviest fighting during the year took place along the front
held by this Division. Enemy attacks were well coordinated and
numerically strong. Continued patrol activity to keep the enemy
off balance frequently resulted in bitter hand-to-hand fighting
with numerous casualties on both sides.[696]
[696] Semianl Rpt of SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 185.
This type of prolonged static warfare gave little real satisfaction
to Marines accustomed to waging a war of movement and a more tangible
“mission accomplished.” The year of positional warfare in western Korea
was costly, too. Total U.S. casualties in the Korean War numbered
approximately 137,000 men killed, missing, or wounded. The Marine
Corps toll was 30,544. Of this number, 4,262 were KIA, an additional
244 were listed as non-battle deaths, and 26,038 were wounded. During
this last part of the war, Marine casualties (both ground and air)
totaled 13,087, plus an additional 2,529 for the attached 1st KMC/RCT.
Astonishingly, 1,586 Marines or 39.6 percent[697] of the infantry
Marines killed in the entire war were victims of the “static,” outpost
warfare in the west. Another 11,244 were listed WIA during this
period--representing 43.9 percent of the total number of ground Marines
wounded during the three years of conflict.
[697] See Appendix E. Percentages represent Marine ground only;
air casualties have been deducted. Of 1st MAW casualties
of 432 (258 KIA, 174 WIA) during the entire war, 103 were
KIA and 41 WIA during the April 1952-July 1953 period
cited above.
* * * * *
Conditions varied widely during the 1950–1952 and 1952–1953 periods of
the war. The enemy’s improved capability in artillery during the latter
period of positional warfare largely accounts for the high casualty
rate at this time. It has been noted that:
Prior to February 1952, with a warfare of mobility prevailing,
the enemy was inferior in artillery, the causative agent of most
personnel losses. Afterwards, during the outpost warfare of
western Korea, the front remained more or less static, and the
Chinese Reds had as much artillery support as the Marines.[698]
[698] Lynn Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” _Marine
Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 6 (Jun 55), p. 16.
It might be valid to question the use of Marine Corps specialists
in amphibious warfare in an Army-type conventional land war. The
protracted land campaign that characterized the latter stages of
the Korean conflict actually was waged for the majority of the war
period--from September 1951 to July 1953, or nearly two years. In terms
of economy of manpower it could be considered an inefficient, though
not ineffective use of Marines. On the other hand, the history of
warfare down through the ages makes it repeatedly clear that a nation
fights the pitched battle against its opponent with the arsenal of
weapons and personnel at hand.
As an Eighth U.S. Army component (attached variously to the X, IX,
and I Corps), the 1st Marine Division (one of nearly 20 divisions
representing U.S. Army, British Commonwealth, and ROK troops) performed
its assigned mission--to repulse and punish the enemy. It contributed
heavily to maintaining the integrity of the EUSAK front and was
considered one of the two crack EUSAK divisions--the other being the
Marines’ neighbor to the right, the British Commonwealth Division. With
the attached KMCs, the 1st Marine Division, moreover, was also the
biggest and strongest division in EUSAK.
Most importantly, fast deployment of the Marine division had made
possible the brilliant tactical maneuver at Inchon. Many military
experts, following World War II, had envisioned future conflicts only
in terms of atomic warfare and massive strategic air assaults. Even the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “had predicted publicly, hardly
six months before, that the world would never again see a large-scale
amphibious landing.”[699] In contradiction to new atomic-age tactics,
however, the United Nations commander in September 1950 had turned the
tide of the battle by his use of a conventional maneuver--envelopment
by amphibious assault. The performance of the Marine Corps was thus
responsible, in part, for changing post-Korean War military doctrine
from total reliance on new tactics and weaponry to a more balanced
concept that combined both sophisticated innovations and viable,
established procedures.
[699] Statement by Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, as quoted by Gen
G. C. Thomas, Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. and RAdm A. A. Ageton,
_The Marine Officer’s Guide_ (Annapolis: United States
Naval Institute, 1956), p. 130.
Although unemployed in its primary amphibious role after late 1950, the
1st Marine Division had originally been positioned on the eastern front
because of this capability. It was the UN commander’s desire to have
EUSAK’s only amphibious trained and equipped division near the coast
in the event that an amphibious maneuver was required for offensive or
defensive purposes. Again, in the division’s 1952 move to the western
coastal front in the Kimpo area, this fighting capability was a major
consideration.
To a large extent, U.S. forces in Korea fought the early part of
the Korean War with weapons from the preceding war--only five years
removed. Three tactical innovations employed by the Marine Corps during
the Korean War were highly successful and largely adopted by the other
services. These were the thermal boot, individual body armor, and the
helicopter. All were first combat tested in 1951.
Frostbite casualties during the first winter in Korea resulting
from inadequate footwear made it necessary to provide combat troops
with specially insulated footgear. The new thermal boot virtually
eliminated frostbite for both Marine infantrymen and aviators. Armored
utility jackets had been developed toward the end of World War II but
were not actually battle tested. The Marine Corps had renewed the
experimentation in 1947. First combat use of the plastic, light-weight
body armor was made in July 1951 by Marines while fighting in the
Punchbowl and Inje areas of X Corps. Improvements were made to the
prototypes and by the following summer the Marine Corps, following a
request made by the Army Quartermaster General, furnished some 4,000
vests to frontline Army troops. By 1953 the 1st Marine Division had
received its authorized quota of 24,000 vests and new lower torso body
armor had also been put into production.
Medical experts reported that the effectiveness of enemy low-velocity
missile weapons striking a man wearing body armor was reduced from
30–80 percent. Chest and abdominal wounds decreased from 90–95 percent
after issuance of the armored vests. Overall battle casualties
were estimated to have been cut by 30 percent. By the time of the
cease-fire, the protection offered by the Marine body armor had been
extended to some 93,000 Marine and Army wearers. Hardly anywhere could
the U.S. taxpayer or fighting man have found a better buy for the
money: mass production had reduced the per unit cost of the Marine
armored vest to just $37.50.
_Air_[700]
[700] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 6, Chap. 9, No. 5,
Chap. 8, No. 4, Chap. 10; _USMC Board Rpts_, vs. 1-11;
_Generals’ Summary_; AnlRpt SecNav 1952–1953; _USMC Ops
Korea_ vs. I-IV, _passim_; Monograph, _A Brief History of
Marine Corps Aviation_, (HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1960);
Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Sherrod, _Marine
Aviation_; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka,
“1st MAW in Korea, Part I, Pusan to the Reservoir: The
Acid Test,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 5 (May
57), pp. 22–27; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D.
Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part II, January 1951 to the
Armistice,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 6 (Jun
57), pp. 22–26; Brochure, Change of Command Ceremonies,
11 Jul 56, First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, 1st MAW
folder, HRB ref. file.
On 3 August 1950, eight VMF-214 Corsairs led by squadron executive
officer, Major Robert P. Keller, catapulted from the deck of the USS
_Sicily_ to launch the first Marine air strikes in the Korean action.
From then until 27 July 1953, units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
flew 127,496 combat sorties in the Korean War, considerably in excess
of the 80,000-odd sorties for all Marine aviation during World War II.
Of this Korean number nearly a third, more than 39,500, represented the
Marine Corps close air support specialty, even though 1st MAW pilots
were heavily engaged in other assignments from Fifth Air Force. These
included interdiction, general support, air defense patrols, air rescue
operations, photo and armed reconnaissance, and related tasks to insure
Allied air superiority.
With the outbreak of Korean hostilities, Stateside Marine air units
were alerted for combat duty by 5 July. At Major General Field Harris’
1st MAW headquarters, El Toro, MAG-33 elements were quickly readied
for deployment to Japanese bases and thence to Korea. Commanded by
Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, MAG-33 comprised Headquarters and
Service Squadron 33, fighter squadrons VMF-214 and -323, an echelon of
nightfighters from VMF(N)-513, two radar units (Marine Ground Control
Intercept Squadron 1 and Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2), plus
the observation squadron, VMO-6. Forward elements were quickly on their
way, arriving in Japan on 19 July, while the rear echelon reached the
Korean Theater on 31 July. Twenty R5Ds from Marine Transport Squadrons
152 and 352 were already providing logistical support for Pacific lift
operations.
After practicing some last minute carrier landing approaches, the
fighter pilots got into combat almost at once. Following -214 into the
war, VMF-323 started operations on 6 August, flying from USS _Badoeng
Strait_ in support of the Pusan ground defenders. When the brigade
mounted out on 7 August on its drive to Chinju, the two MAG-33 carrier
squadrons were there with their 5-inch HVARs, napalm, 100- to 500-pound
bombs, and 20mm cannon. VMF(N)-513 began its regularly-scheduled night
tours over the Korean perimeter that same date, lashing at enemy supply
and transportation centers in the Sachon-Chinju area of southern Korea.
VMO-6 had already started evacuating casualties from the Pusan area
three days earlier.
Many Army ground commanders witnessed the Marine system of close air
support for the first time during the Pusan fighting. After the second
Naktong battle, when air strikes had silenced enemy guns and 300 troops
near Obong-ni, the commander of the 23rd Regiment to the right of the
brigade wrote General Ridgway in Washington:
Infantry and artillery is a good team, but only by adding
adequate and efficient air support can we succeed without
devastating losses ... The Marines on our left were a sight to
behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal to ours,
but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it
like artillery. It was, ‘Hey, Joe, this is Smitty, knock the
left of that ridge in from Item Company.’ They had it _day and
night_.[701]
[701] Quoted in Andrew Geer, _The New Breed--The Story of the
U.S. Marines in Korea_ (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1952), pp. 94–95, quoted with permission of the publisher.
And while Marine, Army, and Navy staffs were completing plans for the
forthcoming Inchon assault, MAG-33’s little aerial Photo Unit (part of
Headquarters Squadron) took a series of reconnaissance photographs of
the landing beaches in preparation for the closely coordinated maneuver.
During Inchon-Seoul operations, MAG-33 was joined by three MAG-12
fighter squadrons: VMF-212, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-542. After the
capture of Kimpo airfield, 212’s “Devilcats” and 542’s nightfighters
transferred from Itami to Kimpo. Flying out of 2d MAW headquarters,
Cherry Point, N.C., on 18 August, the Devilcats had climaxed a hurried
dash halfway around the world to get into action. The squadron flew
its first combat mission from Kimpo a month after its departure from
the East Coast. While the MAG-12 land-based squadrons and the carrier
pilots functioned as the division’s flying artillery, MGCIS-1 set up a
radar warning system and MTACS-2 established a Tactical Air Direction
Center to direct all aircraft in the X Corps zone of action.
With the conclusion of the Inchon operation on 8 October, VMF-312
and VMF(N)-542 remained at Kimpo. Other Marine squadrons (VMF-212,
VMF(N)-513, VMO-6, HqSq-12, and carrier-based VMF-323) shifted to the
Korean east coast in readiness for the Wonsan landing and subsequent
deployment north of the Marine infantry regiments. Wing elements began
arriving at the port city’s airfield on 13 October. Division Marines,
meanwhile, on board ship in the Wonsan harbor while more than 3,000
expertly laid Communist mines were being removed, did not land until 26
October. For the men who fought the vertical war in Korea, it was “one
of the rare times in the air-ground association, the 1st MAW had landed
ahead of the 1st Marine Division. The aviators didn’t miss putting up a
big sign-board “_Welcome, 1st Division!_”[702]
[702] LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in
Korea,” Part I, _Marine Corps Gazette_, May 1957, p. 45.
As 30 CCF divisions slammed into UNC forces all across the fighting
front in late November to change the nature of ground operations (and
the future of the war), so did the onset of the first Korean winter
test 1st MAW aerial skills and ingenuity. Low hanging ceilings, icing
conditions, and three-inch snows on the carrier decks were common
operating hazards. For the shore-based pilots, the bad weather often
caused changed flight plans as they were forced to land at alternate
fields or on Navy carriers. Nonetheless, Marine RD4s flew up to the
southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, at Hagaru, to air-drop ammunition
and supplies and evacuate casualties from the entrapment. Logistical
support to this tiny frozen makeshift air strip was also provided by
Air Force C-47s and C-119s. Later on, during the first step of the
grinding movement south, Air Force pilots paradropped a sectionalized
steel bridge vitally needed at Koto-ri to replace a destroyed span over
a chasm.
Beginning with the load-out for Wonsan in early October, the 1st MAW
was placed under operational control of the Seoul-based Fifth Air
Force.[703] Echelons of FAF air command and control initially slowed
operational orders anywhere from 4 to 36 hours. Simplified interservice
communications and command liaison between 1st MAW and FAF helped
improve the situation. With a verbal agreement, on 1 December, for CG,
1st MAW to receive full control over X Corps area aircraft, problems
eased substantially. To a large degree the close coordination of Marine
aviation and ground forces during the Chosin campaign was due to the
use of flexible, simplified, and fast battle-tested Marine Corps-Navy
CAS techniques and to having increased the number of pilot FACs from
one to two per battalion.
[703] Technically, FAF had also been the controlling agency
for air support during Pusan operations. Marine aviation
units, as a component of an integrated Fleet Marine
Force, however, were directed to fly support for 1st
ProvMarBrig as their highest priority. Except for the
formality of checking in with the FAF Tactical Air
Control Center (TACC) at JOC, 1st MAW units operated
under the Marine Corps-Navy CAS doctrine. During the
Seoul-Inchon campaign, control of air operations came
under ComNavFE, since it was an amphibious operation, and
the air system followed Marine-Navy doctrine. USMC Board
Rpt, v. I, p. IV-B-9, 14.
The Marine movement south from Hagaru was protected by one of the
greatest concentrations of aircraft during the entire war. Twenty-four
CAS aircraft covered the breakout column, while attack planes assaulted
enemy forces in adjacent ridge approaches. Marine planes on station at
Yonpo (south of the Hamhung-Hungnam axis) and carrier-based VMF-323
flew some 130 sorties daily. Another 100 attack sorties were flown
daily by Navy carrier-based planes, while FAF flew interdiction
missions beyond the bombline. Marine Panther jets of VMF-311, operating
with the Air Force from the Pusan area, got into the action at Yonpo.
It was also at this time that an airborne TADC (tactical air direction
center) was first improvised when the radio jeeps moving south with
the column had communication failures. For six days, a VMR-152 R5D
transport orbited 2,000 to 4,000 feet above the Marine units to control
air support between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni as a flying radio nerve
center.
From late November to early December, as the division battled its way
from Chosin to Hamhung, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft evacuated
more than 5,000 Marine, Army, and ROK casualties. And during the most
critical period, the little OY spotter planes and HO3S-1 helicopters
from VMO-6 provided the only physical contact between units separated
by enemy action. Marine tactical squadrons in these three early major
offensives of the war, from 3 August to 14 December, flew 7,822
sorties, 5,305 of them CAS for the battered UNC ground units.
From 1951–1953, 1st MAW pilots and planes came under direct control of
FAF. They alternated between principal missions of interdiction raids
to harass and destroy Communist supply lines north of the battlefront,
general support sorties outside the bombline, and CAS flights to
support infantry forces threatened by enemy penetration. Typical of FAF
focus on massive aerial assaults were the following assignments that
Marine flyers participated in:
In January 1951 (prior to Operation KILLER), the 1st MAW
undertook a series of interdiction raids against the Communist
supply net located in the Korean waist between the 38th and 39th
Parallels, to disrupt the CCF transport-truck system.
On 9 May 1951, 75 1st MAW Corsairs and Panther jets were part of
the 300-plane raid staged by FAF against Communist airfields at
Sinuiju, on the Korean side of the Yalu.
Operation STRANGLE, a major Fifth Air Force all-out interdiction
effort to cripple the enemy supply life line, was undertaken 20 May.
When the Chinese Communist spring offensive broke shortly thereafter,
MAG-12 Corsairs and -33 Panther jets delivered maximum support to the
MLR regiments, the 1st and 7th Marines. When the truce talks began
in Kaesong, in July 1951, 1st MAW planes and the radar searches of
MACG-2 stood guard. Batteries of the Marine 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion,
attached to the wing, were also alerted to keep under surveillance the
approaches to key military ports.
New tactical developments pioneered by 1st MAW during the Korean War
advanced the UNC air effort and added to the 1st MAW reputation for
versatility. Several major steps forward were taken toward Marine
aviation’s primary goal of providing real operational 24-hour CAS,
regardless of foul weather conditions. The new MPQ-14 radar-controlled
bombing equipment, developed between 1946 and 1950, was employed by
MASRT-1, as a device to control night fighter sorties of a general
support nature flown by day attack aircraft. By means of height-finding
and directional radars, it enabled a pilot to leave his base, drop a
bomb load on target, and return to home field without ever having seen
the ground. It offered major practical improvement in blind bombing
methods. MPQ was limited, however, in its use in sudden, moving battle
situations because of some of its sophisticated, hand-built ABC
components. A real tactical breakthrough in night CAS came in April
1953 when VMF(N)-513 and the VMO-6 spotter planes evolved the new
searchlight beam control system which made possible 24-hour coverage
for 1st Marine Division ground units.
In other innovations, it will be remembered that the Air Force in late
1952 had requested escort by VMF(N)-513’s new two-place jet-intruder
F3D Skyknights on Air Force B-29 night bombing missions. During a
four-month period from 1952–1953, the Marine night fighters downed
one enemy plane or more a month while escorting the B-29s. Once the
F3Ds began their night escort role, Air Force bomber losses became
negligible.
A unique capability of the long-range, jet-intruder night-fighter
was that the F3D carried a radar operator who replaced the ground
controller, thereby extending air-defense radar range to the aircraft.
It could thus operate independently and effectively at great distance
from its base. Without GCI (ground control intercept) aid, VMF(N)-513
direct escort to bombers at night was so successful that the squadron’s
planes were used as exclusive escort of the Bomber Command B-29s. In
November 1952, the Marine squadron’s two night kills were the first
ever recorded by airborne intercept radar-equipped jet fighters. At the
end of the war, Skyknights and -513 pilots (flying F3Ds as well as the
earlier F7Fs) had destroyed more enemy aircraft than any other Marine
or Navy day or night fighter plane. Tactics employed by VMF(N)-513
were original in concept and required a high-level of training and
individual pilot-AIO (airborne intercept operator) proficiency. It was
noted that:
The enthusiasm with which this Marine aid to the Air Force has
been received by FEAF Bomber Command indicates that VMF(N)-513
had successfully adapted its equipment and personnel to a
mission usually associated with Air Force operations, making an
important contribution to interservice cooperation, but even more
important, to tactical progress in the night escort of bomber
formations.[704]
[704] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-82.
An operation somewhat in reverse of the nightfighters was that of
VMJ-1, the Marine photographic squadron, which had its own Air Force
escort. Formerly the Wing Photo Unit, VMJ-1 was commissioned in
February 1952 and flew a total of 5,025 combat flights. Under FAF
operational control until late in the war, the squadron’s 550-mph
F2H-2P twin-jet Banshees flew unarmed deep into enemy country--even
as far as the MIG-guarded Yalu--photographing positions, airfields,
power plants, and other targets. An escort plane flew cover while the
photo ship took pictures. Photo missions to the Suiho Reservoir were
rated so important that “24 Air Force F-86 jets flew an umbrella.”[705]
Introduction of the squadron’s jet Banshee early in 1952 was a major
step in improved aerial photography. The Banshee was the superior
photographic aircraft in the combat theater, because of its new
advanced-design view finder and operating range.
[705] “1st MAW in Korea,” _op. cit._, Part II, Jun 57, p. 23.
Coverage from VMJ-1’s gross wartime output of 793,012 feet of processed
prints was equal to a continuous photographic strip six and half times
around the earth at the equator. The Marine photo squadron contributed
a third to the entire UN photo reconnaissance effort and at times flew
as much as 50 percent of all FAF intelligence missions.
Throughout the war the four attack squadrons of MAG-12 (VMAs-212, -251,
-121; and -332 at the end of the war) had dumped seemingly endless bomb
loads on CCF installations, while MAG-33’s two jet-fighter squadrons
(VMF-115 and -311) had provided the Marine exchange pilots who scoured
the lower side of the Yalu with the Air Force F-86s on fighter sweeps.
During Korea the Marine CVE/CVL squadrons (VMAs-214, -233, -312, and
-251) flew more than 25,000 sorties, experimenting with improved
techniques for carrier landings. The carrier qualification program of
Marine air units, a regular part of their training, also proved its
value in combat. In the earliest days of the war, VMF-214 and -323[706]
had operated from two CVEs based off the south coast of Korea, thereby
providing close support to the brigade and other Eighth Army elements
at a time when all shore-based aircraft were forced to operate from
Japan.
[706] With phaseout of the Corsairs in 1952, the VMF squadrons
were subsequently redesignated as attack units.
In other tactical refinements, the 1st MAW had employed an airborne
tactical air control center in combat for the first time. In July
1952, when the static ground situation led to a build-up of enemy flak
along the front lines that interfered with effective CAS delivery,
the 11th Marines had instituted a flak suppression program in front
of the division sector. Later that year, CG Eighth Army had ordered a
similar program used by all other Eighth Army commands. By December,
apparently because of lack of success with their own methods, EUSAK
had adopted the system developed by the Marine artillery regiment. The
antiaircraft program, together with a reduction in the number of runs
per aircraft per mission,[707] had measurably decreased casualties
for CAS missions conducted within artillery range. During 1952–1953
this loss rate for pilots and planes had dropped by a third, with no
corresponding reduction in the sortie rate.
[707] In August 1952, FAF had introduced a new policy limiting
pilots to one pass on general support or interdiction
missions and two passes on CAS flights.
Stabilized warfare and enemy AA build-up had also led to an increasing
use of enemy radars. Passive electronics countermeasures (ECM) were
instituted by FAF. This program was enhanced in September 1952 by the
commissioning of VMC-1 (Marine Composite Squadron 1), administratively
assigned to MACG-2. The squadron possessed the only Fifth Air Force
ECM capability to locate enemy radars and was the primary source of
ECM intercept equipment in FAF squadrons for early warning and radar
control monitoring. Throughout the duration of hostilities, VMC-1
remained the only Navy-Marine unit in the Korean theater with ECM as
its prime function.
For its combat action, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was awarded two
Korean Presidential Unit Citations and the Army Distinguished Unit
Citation for the Wonsan operation. Wing pilots were responsible for
downing 35 enemy planes, including the first night kill made by a
United Nations aircraft. Participation of the 1st MAW in the war could
also be measured in a different way. On the inevitable red side of the
ledger: 258 air Marines had been killed (including 65 MIA and presumed
dead) and 174 WIA. A total of 436 aircraft were also lost in combat or
operational accidents.
From the command level, Korean operations marked the first time the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing had functioned for an extended period as a
component in a broad, unified command structure such as FAF. Despite
the weak links initially inherent in such a situation, the command
structure did work. Marine-Navy and Air Force-Army differing aerial
doctrines and tactics of close tactical air support, however, were
never fully reconciled. The Marine wing made a notable contribution
in providing really effective close, speedy tactical support during
the sudden fluid battle situation that erupted in mid-July 1953.
Simplified Marine TACP control, request procedures, and fast radio net
system enabled 1st MAW pilots to reach the target area quickly. During
this final month of the war--and indicative of the enormous amount of
coordination involved in the FAF administrative apparatus--1st MAW
planes flew 1,500 CAS sorties for the 19 different EUSAK frontline
divisions.
CG, 1st MAW noted in General Order No. 153 issued the last day of the
war, that “the Wing’s association with the Eighth Army, the Fifth Air
Force and the Seventh U.S. Fleet in combined operations had been a
professionally broadening experience--teaching tolerance, teamwork, and
flexibility of operations.”[708]
[708] MajGen V. E. Megee, GO 153, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoted in 1st
MAW, Part II, _op. cit._, p. 26.
Besides the FAF interdiction work and support missions for frontline
units, new 1st MAW tactics and equipment had diversified the wing’s
skills and capabilities in its primary role of providing CAS for Marine
ground units. Of new tactical air support developments in the Korean
action none had a more revolutionary effect than those created by the
helicopter--which dramatically reshaped battlefield logistics and
pointed the way to a new era in Marine Corps air-ground teamwork.
_Helicopter_[709]
[709] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9,
No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 6, Chap. 9; _USMC Board Rpt_, v.
I; Generals’ _Summary_; _USMC Ops Korea_, vs. I-IV,
_passim_; Montross, _SkyCav_.
A promising newcomer on the Marine aviation scene was the helicopter,
whose tactical employment in Korea was to far exceed all expectations.
A few helicopters had been used experimentally in the European and
Pacific theaters toward the end of World War II, too late to evaluate
their performance. But it was the Marine Corps, beginning in 1947,
that had pioneered the development of combat techniques utilizing the
rotor-driven aircraft as a means of enhancing its capability for the
amphibious assault. When the Korean incident erupted in June 1950,
the Marine Corps was in a position to assign four HO3S-1 Sikorsky
two-place helicopters and flight personnel from its Quantico test unit,
HMX-1, together with fixed-wing planes and pilots to form the brigade
observation squadron, VMO-6. These Marines had the distinction of
being the first helicopter pilots of any U.S. service to be formed into
a unit for overseas duty.
Further, the Marine Corps also had 31 months’ experience with the
strange looking, pot-bellied, ungainly aircraft in diverse battlefield
tasks. These included casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, wire-laying,
liaison, and administrative missions. But promising test exercises at
Quantico and Camp Lejeune were hardly enough. The real test would come
at the front. There, the helicopter’s military value would reflect and
“depend to a large extent on how well the Marine Corps had worked out
combat doctrines and techniques where none had existed before.”[710]
[710] Montross, _SkyCav_, p. 108.
Landing with the brigade in August 1950, the choppers performed
invaluable service from the earliest days of Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, and
the Reservoir. During the most critical phase of the Chosin operation,
the helicopters provided the only liaison between isolated commands.
Wire-laying by air was first employed by VMO-6 during the second battle
of the Naktong River, in September 1950. The ground had changed hands
several times and control was uncertain. Using makeshift communication
rigs, VMO-6 pilots unreeled telephone wire at a mile a minute. This
method of putting telephone lines across Korean mountains became
routine through the rest of the war, and Marine choppers strung miles
of lines in rain and wind with the enemy blasting away at them. Wire
was laid over terrain in a matter of hours where it would have taken
men on foot weeks--if it could have been done.
Perhaps the greatest innovation of VMO-6, however, was its night
casualty evacuation techniques first employed at Pusan. Darting in and
out at treetop level around the Korean mountains, the light, easily
maneuverable craft could land on a tiny patch of earth to evacuate
injured men or bring in supplies. Once, during the early part of the
war, when the aeronautical pioneer Igor Sikorsky was asked how his
revolutionary vehicles were performing in combat, Mr. Sikorsky, bowing
from the waist in his Old World manner, replied:
Thank you. Our things go very well in Korea. The helicopter has
already saved the lives of several thousands of our boys in Korea
and the score is still mounting.[711]
[711] _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 10 (Oct 55), p. 61
quoting Eugene E. Wilson, _Wings of the Dawn_ (Hartford,
Conn.: Connecticut Printers, Inc., 1955).
With the advent of the helicopter, as little as 43 minutes elapsed
between the time a Marine was hit and the time he was on board the USS
_Repose_ or other hospital ships. Later on when the Marine transport
copters arrived in Korea, HMR-161 pilots felt a new record had been
set when only 30 minutes[712] intervened between the time a frontline
Marine was hit and delivered to a hospital facility 17 miles from the
zone of action. The _Consolation_ had been outfitted with a helicopter
loading platform in July 1951, and eventually all hospital ships had
such landing platforms. In Korea the flying ambulances could make the
trip from rear area aid station to ship in five minutes and unload the
wounded and clear the deck in 45 seconds flat.
[712] By contrast, in 1945 World War II campaigns the Secretary
of the Navy James V. Forrestal had visited hospital
ships and praised the air evacuation methods then in use
when he commented, “I went aboard the _Samaritan_, where
Navy surgeons and corpsmen were already dealing with the
casualties from the day and night before.” Capt Clifford
P. Morehouse, _The Iwo Jima Campaign_, (Washington:
HistDiv, HQMC, 1946), p. 139.
Throughout the war nearly 10,000 wounded Marines were evacuated by
helicopter; more than 1,000 such missions were carried out at night.
Records indicate that VMO-6 flew out 7,067 casualties and that another
2,748 medical evacuations were made by HMR-161, for which the task
ranked as a secondary mission. Although these humanitarian gains were
important, major tactical innovations made by the helicopter were even
more significant.
In the fall of 1951, HMR-161 successfully executed the first combat
troop resupply mission in history. At this time while the division
was deployed in the jagged razorback-ridge Punchbowl area, “a glimpse
of future warfare was provided when Marine helicopter lifts on a
company scale led to the lift of an entire battalion and its organic
equipment.”[713] Arriving in Korea on 31 August, the squadron had a
complement of 15 new 10-place HRS-1 transport vehicles, with cruising
speed of 60–85 knots. Developed specifically to meet Marine Corps
combat requirements, the HRS marked a new era in Marine airborne
support to ground troops. Both VMO-6 and HMR-161 came under operational
control of the division. (With 1st Division and Wing headquarters
separated geographically by more than 200 miles, it was particularly
expedient to have the two squadrons under division control.)
[713] HistBr outline, p. 4.
The first step toward using the rotor-blade aircraft in the mission
most closely related to the USMC basic helicopter concept--that
of transporting troops and supplies by vertical envelopment--was
accomplished 13 September 1951. In Operation WINDMILL I, HRS choppers
carried out the first Marine mass helicopter combat resupply operation
in history. A lift of one day’s supplies was made to 2/1 in the Soyang
River vicinity. A total of 28 flights were executed in overall time of
2½ hours (a total flight time of 14.1 hours) to transport 18,848 pounds
of gear and 74 Marines a distance of seven miles.
HMR-161 first applied the Corps’ new concept of vertical envelopment
on 21 September when, despite heavy fog, it transported 224 fully
equipped Marines and 17,772 pounds of cargo from the reserve area
to the MLR. This was the first helicopter lift of a combat unit in
history. Company-size troop lifts inevitably led to more complicated
battalion-size transfers. In the 11 November Operation SWITCH, HMR-161
effected the relief of a frontline battalion, involving the lift of
nearly 2,000 troops. Twelve of the 3½-ton aircraft made 262 flights in
overall time of 10 hours (95.6 hours flight time).
The tactical and logistical possibilities of the multi-purpose rotor
craft attracted considerable attention. So impressed, in fact, were
Eighth Army officers by the mobility and utility displayed by Marine
helicopters that in November 1951 General Ridgway had asked the Army
to provide four Army helicopter transport battalions, each with 280
helicopters. Korea, Ridgway said, had “conclusively demonstrated that
the Army vitally needed helicopters,”[714] and he recommended that the
typical field army of the future have 10 helicopter transportation
battalions.
[714] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 533–534.
Ridgway was thereby renewing requests for helicopters made in the
early days of the war by both the Army (through General MacArthur)
and the Air Force (by General Barcus). But the UNC Commander’s
enthusiasm, although understandable, turned out to be the undoing
for substantial Army use of the rotary-blade aircraft in Korea. The
scale of operations[715] envisioned by Ridgway unwittingly led to a
“jurisdictional controversy”[716] about possible duplication of aerial
functions not reconciled by the two services until a year later.
Although both services had helicopters in limited use, “hostilities
were in their last stages before either the Army or the Air Force
began to receive the cargo helicopters which they had put on order in
1950 and 1951.”[717]
[715] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 184, comments: “In order to
insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he [Ridgway]
suggested that procurement be started on a scale
that would permit manufacturers to expand production
immediately.”
[716] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 534.
[717] _Ibid._
A successful three-day Army regimental supply exercise in May 1953 and
a combat maneuver the following month in which the choppers formed an
air bridge to a heavily attacked, isolated ROK unit caused General
Taylor, then CG, EUSAK, to observe: “The cargo helicopter, employed
in mass, can extend the tactical mobility of the Army far beyond
its normal capability.” He strongly recommended that the Army make
“ample provisions for the full exploitation of the helicopter in the
future.”[718]
[718] _Ibid._, p. 535.
Pioneering developments by the Marine Corps had, of course, continued
meanwhile. Logistical operations had grown increasingly complex and
diversified. In Operation HAYLIFT II, 23–27 February 1953, Marine
helicopters set an all time cargo-carrying record when they lifted
1,612,306 pounds of cargo to completely supply two JAMESTOWN regiments
with daily requirements for the five-day period. This represented a
total of 1,633 lifts and 583.4 flying hours for the operation. The
record day’s lift was 200 tons, whereas plans had called for lifting
a maximum 130 tons per day. Experience gained during the operation
indicated that similar tactical maneuvers in warmer weather would be
even more successful when troop fuel oil requirements were reduced.
Other Marine innovations by HMR-161 included supplying ammunition
from the rear area ASP to the MLR and redeployment of 1st 4.5-inch
Rocket Battery personnel and guns from one firing area to another.
And although VMO-6 executed most of the mercy missions, the transport
squadron performed an unusual assignment in July 1952. Flood conditions
throughout Korea brought an urgent request from the Army for use of
HMR-161. On 30 July, the Marine squadron evacuated 1,172 Army troops
from their positions in the Chunchon area where they had been trapped
by the heavy rains.
With a new tactical exercise held nearly every month, HMR-161
operations that once had rated world-wide headlines were now
practically routine. VTOL-style battalion troop lifts were no longer
novel and regimental resupply operations were becoming almost standard
practice. In both relocation of units and logistical support, combat
helicopters had provided high mobility and reasonable speed. They
had introduced a new infantry technique of “hit and run” tactics.
The transport helicopter squadron had proved most effective when
employed in major tactical movements and not when used piecemeal on
minor missions. Marine Corps wartime use of the new aerial vehicle had
clearly proven that helicopters had become a necessary and integral
component of the modern-day balanced military force.
_FMF and Readiness Posture_[719]
[719] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: Semianl Rpts of SecDef (including SecNav),
1951–1955; _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5,
Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6. Chaps. 9, 10; _USMC Board Rpt_, vs.
1-11; _Generals’ Summary_; Brochure titled “Historical
Outline of the Development of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
1941–1950 (Preliminary),” held at HRB; HRS Log Sheet of
Korean War Statistics prepared for Policy Analysis Br.,
HQMC, dtd 21 Aug 67; Ernest H. Giusti, _The Mobilization
of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict,
1950–1951_ (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1967 ed.),
hereafter Giusti, _Mobilization, MCR_; _USMC Ops Korea_,
vs. I-II; Public Affairs Unit 4-1, _The Marine Corps
Reserve--A History, 1916–1966_ (Washington: Division of
Reserve, HQMC, 1966); HQMC Press Kit, “Men of Color,”
issued July 1968; U.S. Bureau of the Census, _Historical
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957_
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1961).
The flexibility and readiness capability inherent in the Marine Corps
FMF structure was a strong undergirding factor in its swift response to
the Korean crisis. As noted, in June 1950 the Marine Corps had 74,279
officers and men on active duty. Its Fleet Marine Force, consisting of
FMFPac and FMFLant, numbered 27,656. The 11,853 personnel of FMFPac
included 7,779 men in General Smith’s 1st Marine Division at Camp
Pendleton and 3,733 in General Harris’ 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at El
Toro. On the East Coast, FMFLant numbered 15,803 with approximately
8,973 Marines in the 2d Division at Camp Lejeune and 5,297 air
personnel attached to the 2d Wing at Cherry Point.
Outbreak of Korean hostilities thus presented the Marine Corps with
the tasks of organizing and deploying for combat first a brigade and
then a full war-strength reinforced division, each with supporting
aviation elements. Despite the low strength to which FMFPac had shrunk
due to stringent national defense economy measures, the heavy demands
placed upon it were met. Both missions were accomplished quickly and
effectively. In fact, “few achievements in the long history of the
Marine Corps can equal what was achieved in the 11 weeks which elapsed
between the outbreak of the Korean War and the amphibious assault of
the 1st Marine Division at Inchon.”[720]
[720] Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac,
1941–1950, p. 49.
As early as 2 July, CinCFE MacArthur had requested that a Marine
RCT-air unit be dispatched to the Far East. On 7 July the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade was activated; on 12–14 July it embarked.
With departure of the brigade, personnel shortages within the 1st
Division and 1st Wing became acute. The division was reduced to 3,459,
less than a RCT; and the wing to 2,300. Meanwhile, as the increasing
demand had continued for a Marine Division deployed to Korea, it
became equally apparent that if the Marine Corps were to fulfill this
requirement of deploying a full-strength division to Korea,[721] its
reservists would have to be called up to alleviate these shortages.
[721] With 7,779 men in 1stMarDiv and 8,973 in the 2dMarDiv,
even “had they been combined into a single unit, its
numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one
war-strength division.” Giusti, _Mobilization_, MCR, p. 9.
Manpower potential of the Marine Corps Reserve was 128,959, nearly
twice that of the regular establishment. In June 1950, the Organized
Marine Corps Reserve (Ground) numbered 1,879 officers and 31,648
enlisted personnel being trained in 138 OMCR units of battalion size
or less. Membership of the ground reserve was approximately 76 percent
of its authorized strength. At the same time the Organized Reserve
(Aviation) consisted of 30 fighter and 12 ground control intercept
squadrons attached to the Marine Air Reserve Training Command organized
at Glenview, Ill. in 1946. These MARTCOM squadrons numbered 1,588
officers and 4,753 enlisted, or approximately 95 percent of authorized
strength. In addition to nearly 40,000 members of the OMCR, the Marine
Volunteer (nondrill, nonpay status) Reserve carried approximately
90,000 on its rolls.
A warning notice went out on 19 July from the Commandant, General
Cates, to District Directors that the OMCR would shortly be ordered
to active duty; later that same day mobilization of the Reserve was
authorized by President Truman, with Congressional sanction. On 20
July, the first 22 ground units, with nearly 5,000 men, were ordered to
active duty on a schedule that took into account the unit’s state of
readiness, proximity to its initial duty station, and facilities there
for handling the personnel overload.
Less than a month after hostilities began in Korea, key infantry,
artillery, and engineer units of the OMCR had been ordered to extended
active duty. On 31 July, West Coast ground reserve units from Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, and Phoenix were the first to report
in to Camp Pendleton for augmentation into the 1st Marine Division. The
following day their opposite numbers from the East Coast units arrived
at Camp Lejeune. By 11 September, all of the organized ground units had
reported for duty and the OMCR (Ground) had ceased to exist.
While the organized ground reserve was being mobilized, the first
of the 42 MARTCOM fighter and intercept squadrons began arriving at
El Toro. Personnel of six reserve VMF and three MGCI squadrons were
ordered to duty on 23 July as replacements in the 1st MAW which had
furnished units and men for the MAG-33 component of the brigade.
Commenting on the success with which the Marine Corps achieved this
expansion, the Secretary of Defense was to note later:
The speed with which this mobilization was effected was an
important factor in the rapid buildup of the First Marine
Division, the first units of which sailed for the Far East in
July 1950.[722]
[722] Semianl Rpt of SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 187.
As late as 20 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed MacArthur
that a Marine division could not be sent before November or even
December. Finally, on 25 July, the CinCUNC’s third request for the
division was approved. It would, however, be a division minus one RCT,
and the Joint Chiefs were “adamant in their decision that MacArthur
must wait until autumn or even winter for his third RCT.”[723]
[723] _USMC Ops Korea_, v. II, p. 23.
The JCS also directed on 25 July that the Marine Corps build its
division (less one RCT) to full war strength. The date of 10–15
August was set for its departure to the Far East. Among the many
steps taken in the mobilization schedule, the JCS directed that the
Camp Lejeune-based 2d Marine Division be expanded immediately to war
strength.
Fleshing out personnel--against short-fuzed manpower and time
factors--for the 1st Marine Division and Wing, due to embark in
mid-August, a month after the brigade had left, was a round-the-clock
operation for all hands. Between 25 July-5 August, the Marine Corps
provided personnel for the expanded Division/Wing by:
transfer of FMFLant-selected, 2d Division/Wing air and ground
units, of 6,800 men, to FMFPac;
transfer of 3,600 regular Marines from 105 posts and stations
throughout the U.S.;
mobilization of 2,900 from early OMCR ground and air units; and
utilization of two replacement drafts, number 900, intended for
the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.
Expansion of the 1st Marine Division was in two phases, bringing the
division (less one RCT) up to war strength and then organizing its
third reinforced infantry regiment, the 7th Marines. With the cadre
of 3,459 men in the division after the brigade left and the influx of
regulars and reservists, the 1st Division embarked for Korea between
10 and 24 August. It had reached wartime strength (less one RCT) on 15
August, just 27 days after beginning its buildup from a peacetime T/O.
As it had approached war strength, the Division CG, General Smith, was
directed by CMC ltr of 4 August to activate a third RCT and prepare it
for departure to Korea no later than 1 September.
While mounting out, the division transferred approximately 1,000 of
its rear echelon to be used in the buildup of the 7th Marines. The
6th Marines of the 2d Division provided the base for building this
new regiment. (Approximately 800 Marines of 3/6 were reassigned from
Mediterranean duty and ordered to the Far East, via the Suez Canal,
to join the 7th Marines upon its arrival there.) By drawing men from
widely scattered sources, it was possible to activate the 7th Marines
on 17 August. Departure of this regiment on 1 September was thus far in
advance of the late fall or winter target date originally set by the
JCS.
With all OMCR ground units called up and absorbed into the 1st and 2d
Divisions, and air squadrons being mobilized on a slower schedule (due
to less-urgent combat needs for air personnel in the early war stage),
the Marine Corps dealt with its remaining body of reserve strength.
Bulk orders went out beginning 15 August to the Volunteer Reserve, and
by the end of the year 58,480 men and women in this category were on
active duty. More than 80 percent of the volunteer reservists on Marine
Corps rolls served during the Korean War.
Attesting to the impact of events in Korea is the fact that “following
the epic withdrawal of the 1st Division from the Chosin Reservoir, the
number of new enlistments into the active Volunteer Reserve jumped from
877 in December to 3,477 in January.”[724]
[724] Giusti, _op. cit._, p. 36.
Complete mobilization of the organized ground reserve had been
accomplished in just 53 days, from 20 July to 11 September. A previous
estimate had shown an expected 80 percent availability of ground
reserve on M-Day; the actual mobilization figure was 90 percent.
Of 33,528 OMCR ordered to active duty, a total of 30,183 (1,550
officers/28,633 enlisted) reported. Marine aviation also expanded
rapidly. By January 1951, 32 organized reserve air units (20 of the
30 existing VMFs and all 12 MGCIs) had been activated and by October
of that year all of the reserve squadrons had been called to active
duty. Of the 6,341 organized air reservists, 5,240 received orders;
4,893, or 93.4 percent, reported in. In contrast to the ground reserve,
air units had been recalled on a staggered or partial mobilization
schedule, a matter which was later to receive Congressional attention
(and ultimately to set a new trend) when the Nation’s entire Korean War
mobilization procedures were reviewed and subsequently revised.
Of the Marines participating in the Inchon invasion, 17 percent were
reservists. By June 1951 the proportion of reservists in Marine Corps
units in Korea had increased to nearly 50 percent. Between July 1950
and June 1953, approximately 122,000 reservists, both recruits and
veterans, saw active duty with the Marine Corps.
Throughout the war the Marine Corps effected approximately 34
replacement drafts and another 31 rotation drafts. Ground Marines
served an average tour of 13 months overseas (although actual time
attached to the division was about 10½ months). The collapse of North
Korean forces after the Inchon-Seoul operation and the unopposed
landing at Wonsan had pointed to an early end of the Korean conflict.
Massive Chinese intervention in November 1950, however, changed
the prospect of a short war to a long one and made it necessary to
implement a rotation and release policy. By March 1951, HQMC had
worked out a preliminary phaseout program for reserve personnel (based
on the various categories and length of service prior to recall) which
was put into effect in June 1951.
During 1952 and up until July 1953, approximately 500 officers and
15,500 enlisted men joined the 1st Marine Division in Korea every six
months. Individual monthly replacement drafts generally ranged from
1,900 to 2,500, depending on the combat situation and other personnel
needs within the Marine Corps. Monthly rotation drafts of Marines
assigned to the States or other duty stations from Korea were usually
somewhat smaller than their corresponding incoming numbers. Ranks and
MOS of replacement personnel to the end of the war, however, did not
always meet the needs of the division. Specialty training conducted
by the 1st Marine Division in Korea helped remedy most of the worst
deficiencies.
During the latter half of 1952 and throughout 1953, tours for Marine
pilots/combat air crews averaged 9 months, and for aviation ground
officer/enlisted personnel, 12 months. Following a detailed HQMC
study of the advantages of tactical unit as opposed to individual
pilot rotation, a new squadron replacement policy was instituted.
This procedure assured standard precombat training of all pilots[725]
and development of a team spirit prior to the squadron’s arrival in
the combat theater. Previously this had not been possible with the
continuing turnover of 1st MAW personnel under the individual release
system. Despite plans during 1952–1953 for replacement and rotation of
squadrons as an entity, this did not come about until late in the war
when carrier squadron VMA-312 was replaced by VMA-332 in June 1953.
With the end of hostilities, tours were extended to approximately 14
months for both aviation and ground Marines.
[725] Even as late as July 1952, the influx of Class III
volunteer reserve pilots, many of whom lacked adequate
recent precombat flying experience, had presented a
serious wing personnel problem and resulted in on-the-job
training for pilots in the VMO-6 fixed-wing section.
As another measure to improve squadron operational
proficiency and partially correct weaknesses of the
individual pilot rotation system and fast turnover, a
100-mission ceiling was inaugurated in February 1953.
This applied to aviators in the VMF/VMA tactical units,
with the exception of VMF(N)-513 pilots who were rotated
after 60 missions.
Buildup of Marine Corps personnel during the Korean War from the June
1950 base of 74,279 is seen in the following strength figures:
June 1951 192,620 Marines on active duty
June 1952 231,967 Marines on active duty
June 1953 249,219 Marines on active duty
Altogether, an estimated 424,000 Marines served during the period of
hostilities. The war also witnessed a sizable increase in the number of
Negro Marines on active duty. This figure grew from 2 officers/1,965
enlisted in 1950 to 19 officers/14,468 enlisted by 1953. Marine
officials commented on their fine combat performance, including that
of many outstanding NCOs. In line with the changing climate of events
and legislation,[726] the Korean War marked the first time that Negro
personnel were fully integrated into the military services, in contrast
to the segregated units before and during World War II.
[726] Assignment of Negro personnel in the armed forces
continued to expand as a result of the President’s 1948
Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity.
The Far East Command in July 1951 and the European
Command in April 1952 initiated steps towards the racial
integration of combat units, followed by similar programs
for service units. Semianl Rpt SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun
1952), p. 21.
Peak strength of the Marine Corps during the Korean emergency occurred
on 30 September 1953, when 261,343 were on duty. At the end of the war,
33,107 Marines (26,072 division, 7,035 wing) were stationed in Korea.
The time of peak deployed strength in Korea during 1950–1953 appears to
have been April 1953, when Marines of the 1st Division/Wing numbered
35,306.[727]
[727] For detailed breakdown of figures, see 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW
ComdDs, Apr 53 and _PacFlt Eval Rpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p.
9-54, Chap. 10, p. 10-29. Also, _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5,
Chap. 8, p. 8-33 and No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9-26.
While the Korean War was still in progress, Congress passed new
legislation to remedy certain shortcomings that had become apparent
during the emergency, particularly the Nation’s recent experience
with partial mobilization. These new laws affected the size of the
FMF structure of the Marine Corps, its active-duty strength, and its
reserve component.
Public Law 416, enacted 28 June 1952, represented several major
advances for the Marine Corps. It authorized an increase of Marine
Corps strength to a minimum of three combat divisions and three wings;
raised the ceiling of regular active-duty personnel to 400,000 (except
for normal expansion in a national emergency or war); and provided
for the Commandant to sit as co-equal member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff[728] on matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps. In
reaffirming the role of Marine Corps in the seizure and defense of
advanced naval bases, as well as land operations incident to naval
campaigns, the law also cited the corollary Marine Corps mission of
“performing such other duties as the President may direct.” Commenting
on Public Law 416, the Commandant observed: “Our views are considered.
Our interests are protected. The entire Marine Corps has benefited
greatly by these gains.”[729] General Shepherd further noted that the
new legislation “expresses clearly the intent that the Marine Corps
shall be maintained as a ready fighting force prepared to move promptly
in time of peace or war to areas of trouble. It recognizes that in the
future there may be a series of continuing international crises--each
short of all-out war, but each requiring our nation ... to move shock
forces into action on the shortest of notice.”[730]
[728] Previously, Marine Corps views had been represented at
the JCS level by the SecNav or CNO.
[729] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 1.
[730] Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, _op. cit._, p. 70.
The two new laws affecting the future training and composition of
the Marine Corps and other services were: (1) the Universal Military
Training and Service Act (UMT&S), as amended, approved 19 June 1951;
and (2) the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (Public Law 476), approved
9 July 1952. Basically, the two laws sought to establish a sounder
mobilization base and were complementary in nature. The Armed Forces
Reserve Act of 1952 implemented a new mobilization concept: either
a partial or total callup of the Nation’s reserve forces. In the
past, the M-Day target had been geared to a total war only. A limited
war, resulting in a partial, Korean-type mobilization, had not been
envisioned. The 1952 act thereby provided greater flexibility for
dealing with both contingencies and also consolidated much of the
existing legislation affecting reserve forces.
Members of the reserve were newly designated by different categories
of M-Day priority: ready, standby, and retired reserve. These
varying degrees of availability for callup reflected training status
(OMCR/volunteer), length of prior service, and related factors (i.e.,
men with the least service were designated for first callup, or the
“Ready” category.) Previously, they were all equally subject for recall
in an emergency, regardless of prior service.
The 1952 act and its new provisions thereby distinguished between a
future national emergency and an all-out war. Theoretically, at least,
a national emergency could be proclaimed by the President, calling for
a partial mobilization, as in Korea. A declaration of war by Congress,
as in World War II, would call for total mobilization. Thus the Marine
Corps Reserve was newly earmarked for either a partial or total
mobilization.
Under UMT&S, a military service obligation of eight years was
established for all young men under age 26 entering the armed forces
(whether by enlistment, draft, appointment, or reserve) after 19 June
1951. The act also authorized drafting of male citizens for two-year
active duty periods. This new system of eight-year obligors provided
the post-Korean MCR with a stable body of personnel who had received
their basic training but still had a reserve obligation.
Also as a result of the Korean mobilization, the Organized Marine
Corps Reserve troop list was modified in order to provide a manpower
pool for additional elements of the regular establishment. Supply,
service, and security units were added to provide more of an FMF type
of augmentation than that furnished by reserve units in the past.
Reestablishment of the OMCR began in October 1951, when the first group
of recalled reservists were released from Korean duty. Plans called for
a larger reserve and more comprehensive training. Ground units were to
be increased from 138 to approximately 255, with the air squadrons to
number 42. The Volunteer Reserve was similarly to be strengthened by
stricter requirements for participation.
Traditionally the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve, since 1916,
had been defined as “providing trained personnel for integration into
the Marine Corps in time of national emergency.” The strengthened MCR
program as a result of Korea and the new laws led to a more serious
reappraisal of its role. In looking to its post-Korea future, the
Marine Corps planned a revitalized training program that would now
“assist in extending the ‘force-in-readiness’ concept to the Marine
Corps Reserve.”[731] More than ever before, the Marine Corps sought to
make its reserve a mirror-image of the regular establishment.
[731] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 96.
_Problems Peculiar to the Korean War_[732]
[732] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No.
5, Chaps. 1, 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9, 10; _USMC Board
Rpt_ vs. I-II; 1st Marine Division Training Bulletin
No. 5-53, “Lessons Learned,” dtd 10 Jun 53, hereafter
_Lessons Learned 5-53_; _Generals’ Summary_; Futrell,
_USAF, Korea_; Heinl, _Soldiers of Sea_.
The undeclared war of Communist China against United Nations forces
resulted in major changes in high-level policy and strategy that
affected military tactics for the rest of the war. In an attempt to
prevent escalation of Korean hostilities into an all-out nuclear war,
the decision was made that U.N. forces, both ground and air, would not
strike enemy bases in Chinese territory. After the beginning of truce
negotiations in July 1951, the mission of Allied ground forces was
changed from initiating offensive operations to one of maintaining an
active defense of the MLR across Korea. The basic strategy became one
of containment and prevention of any further enemy gains south of the
38th Parallel. It involved attempting to inflict maximum losses on the
enemy while attempting to minimize those of the UNC. Militarily, these
restrictions removed the possibility of winning a decisive victory.
For the next two years, fighting seesawed back and forth across the
parallel.
Static and defensive warfare thus characterized the greater part of
the Korean War. During this period, the Marine division performed
a land war mission similar to other Eighth Army components while
Marine aviation squadrons flew under control of Fifth Air Force. Both
the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing faced tactical
restrictions that resulted from the strategic policies governing
the overall role of EUSAK and FAF. Problem areas arose from the
limited nature of this particular war. These involved not only the
shift in the UNC strategy from an offensive posture to a defensive
(“active defense”) concept, but also from the paralyzing effect of the
protracted truce negotiations on battlefield tactics.
For nearly two years (16 months in West Korea and 5 months earlier
while in IX Corps on the East-Central front), the Marine division
assumed an unaccustomed defensive role. Such a sustained, basically
non-win position was hardly morale-building to the average Marine
unable to see personally any yardage gained, any progress made in his
particular war. Not surprisingly, such a passive battle assignment
did result in a temporary loss of amphibious skills on the part of
both individual Marines and the division. End-of-war evaluations noted
that “long and indecisive defensive situations such as existed in
Korea do little to foster the offensive spirit so long traditional
with the Marine Corps and certainly tend to detract from the immediate
amphibious readiness required of a Marine Division.”[733]
[733] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-2.
Prior to its tour of duty as I Corps reserve in mid-1953, the 1st
Marine Division had noted that it would “require intensive training
and reequipping for a period of at least 60 days” upon release from
active combat in order to “reach a desirable standard of amphibious
readiness.”[734] Rigorous MARLEX and RCT exercises initiated in June
1952 after the division had moved to the western coastal sector off
the Yellow Sea and expanded during its I Corps reserve period, were
important steps in rectifying this skill attrition. This was, of
course, in addition to the continuous training schedule in offensive
and defensive warfare maintained by the division for the battalions and
regiment periodically in regular reserve status.
[734] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-5. Subsequently, the
division’s ground readiness was rated as excellent; a
conservative estimate placed individual unit amphibious
readiness at between 25 and 60 percent; and indicated
a 30-day training period would bring the division to
complete amphibious readiness. _Generals’ Summary_, p. 53.
Outpost warfare in West Korea was characterized by overextended MLR
frontage. The more than 60,000 yards held by the division while in the
I Corps sector resulted in a thinly-held line which invited penetration
and encirclement. “Normal” frontage for an infantry division in defense
with two regiments on line was considered by U.S. Army doctrine to be
8–9,000 yards. Even with four MLR regiments (two Marine, 1st KMC/RCT,
and KPR) and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion on line (the third
Marine regiment in reserve with a counterattack mission), this was
a very lengthy sector. It was further complicated by the Han River
obstacle on the left flank and the Imjin River to the rear of the
sector that separated Marine frontline troops from rear support and
reserve units.
Infantry battalions thus occupied “extremely wide fronts, as a
rule 3,500 to 5,000 yards,” while individual rifle companies were
assigned anywhere from “1,200 to 1,700 yards of the MLR to occupy and
defend.”[735] Prior to the battle of the Hook in October 1952, one of
the major engagements on the western front, the 7th Marines at the far
right end of the division sector had emplaced all three battalions on
line, rather than the customary procedure of two on line and the third
in reserve. There was little other choice, for the regimental sector
exceeded 10,000 yards, “more properly the frontage for a division
rather than a regiment.”[736]
[735] _Lessons Learned_ 5-53, p. 19.
[736] Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_, p. 107.
During a 100 percent watch, at least theoretically, a Marine could
be spaced at intervals about every 10 to 15 yards along the MLR. A
night 50 percent watch--with personnel of rifle platoons assigned to
COPs, listening posts, combat patrols, repair of fortifications, and
the KSC nightly supply trains--not infrequently spread personnel to a
point where the MLR was dangerously thin, often with 50 yards between
men.[737] Such an over-wide lineal deployment dissipated defensive
strength and made mutually supporting fires difficult.
[737] Lessons Learned, _op. cit_.
Division artillery, too, was thinly positioned across the wide sector,
making it difficult to execute counterbattery missions. This led to
development of the innovative counter-counterbattery program (or
“roving guns”) devised by the 11th Marines in May 1952 to deliberately
mislead the CCF as to the strength and location of divisional
artillery; the situation resulted as well in the reinforcement of the
four Marine artillery battalions by heavier I Corps 155mm and 8-inch
howitzers. The static situation in the prolonged land campaign also
led to the growth of large, semi-permanent type camps which somewhat
hampered traditional Marine mobility. Organizations had additional
personnel and equipment above T/O and T/E because of the peculiar
defense requirements of the sustained battle situation.
The lack of depth in the defense did not provide for receiving the
shock of a determined enemy attack, particularly since the normal
OPLR had been withdrawn to strengthen the overextended MLR in April
1952, shortly after the division’s arrival in West Korea. Ultimately,
as we have seen, this main line of resistance concept was modified
and rather than a long thin trenchline the Marine division employed a
defense-in-depth concept using a series of strongpoints, as in Boulder
City and the organization of the postwar main battle position. In
contrast to the Marine situation (and that of most other divisions
in the EUSAK line), the CCF confronting the 1st Marine Division
beyond No-Man’s-Land deployed their forces in great depth, boasted
unlimited manpower, and employed an elastic type of defense on mutually
supporting key terrain features. The enemy had also developed an
artillery capability that was numerically superior to ours. And they
held high ground positions that overlooked virtually the entire Marine
front.
As in World War II, Korean operations provided another instance in
which various military services and components were coordinated by
joint commands: EUSAK for the ground defense and FAF for air. These
massive operational command structures accomplished the desired
goals. On lower level echelons, however, some policies tended to
be so restrictive that they precluded normal combat initiative and
aggressiveness. The net result was thus to allow the enemy to maintain
the tactical initiative while, in effect, hampering UNC counter-defense
measures.
New directives issued by I Corps in late 1952, for example, changed the
corps policy of large-scale raids for prisoners, previously encouraged
in the spring of 1952, which affected infantry raids and patrol
activities for the rest of the war. Plans for all raids, company size
or larger, required both I Corps and EUSAK approval, and were to be
submitted 10 days prior to planned execution. Complete patrol plans
for even platoon-size operations had to be submitted at least 24 hours
in advance. Although the reason for the new policy stemmed from a
desire to minimize casualties during the prolonged stalemate, negative
effects of such a lead-time factor were quickly apparent. Battalion or
regimental commanders frequently were unable to capitalize on targets
of opportunity that developed or changes in local conditions, such as
weather or troop deployment, to gain maximum effectiveness from the
operation.
Directives covering offensive maneuvers that could be taken on local
initiative were so restrictive that “any independent action below the
level of the Division Commander became practically nonexistent.”[738]
Similarly, counterattack plans to retake previously considered major
COPs were countermanded, on several occasions, by corps or army higher
echelons shortly before jump-off time with the reason given that the
action was not worth the cost of further UNC casualties or possible
jeopardy to the fragile peace negotiations.
[738] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-84.
Allied offensive capability was further restricted by various EUSAK and
I Corps orders issued during the protracted period of truce talks. Many
directives had as their well-intentioned rationale the desire not to
upset the precarious balance in UNC-Communist negotiations by providing
the enemy further opportunities for exploitative propaganda victories.
The actual record shows, however, that the Communists were never at a
loss to conjure up and capitalize on fabricated “events” that suited
their purpose--whether charging UNC aircraft had violated the Kaesong
neutrality strip, that American fliers were engaging in germ warfare,
or deliberately instigating POW camp disruptions and breakouts.
Neutrality restrictions[739] on supporting arms within the entire
Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan-ni area further complicated the UNC tactical
situation and hampered both offensive and defensive operations of the
1st Marine Division. This was particularly true of the center Marine
regimental sector which was bisected by the Panmunjom corridor and the
no-fire lines. The truce talk neutral zone restrictions prevented the
Marines in this area from massing their artillery fires on a desirable
scale and also, at times, interfered with proper CAS delivery forward
of the MLR. The numerous and sometimes conflicting “no-fly, no-fire”
restricting lines stemmed from original agreements made between UNC
and Communist representatives in 1951. Subsequently, however, the
prohibitions against firing any type of weapon in the area were
modified from time to time and added to by FAF, EUSAK, and I Corps,
“each time adding to the frustration of the local commanders.”[740]
[739] Basically, these consisted of a no-hostile-act three-mile
circular area radiating from Kaesong; a six-mile radius
forbidding FAF planes in the skies over Kaesong and
another two-mile, no-fly radius over Panmunjom; and
various other prohibitions on military craft, air-dropped
leaflets, and firing of artillery to include propaganda
shell leaflets.
[740] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, 9-78.
The double-standard effect of the neutrality restrictions became
readily apparent, however. The CCF artfully used this area, by means
of his tactics of “creeping” toward the Allied MLR, as a supply and
reserve buildup location. The enemy emplaced artillery, assembled
troops, and even used the neutral territory for equipment buildups,
including tanks, in the Kaesong vicinity.[741] Thus the restrictive
lines gave the enemy an opportunity to maneuver within an approximate
12 square-mile area, all within effective artillery range and outside
of the Kaesong-Panmunjom restricted territory, but UNC units were
powerless to take any action.
[741] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-37.
Intelligence operations, during the latter stages of the war, were
not considered optimum--for either the division or wing. While dug in
on the western end of I Corps, the Marine information effort had been
“seriously hampered by the lack of prisoners of war.”[742] Only 94 CCF
had been captured by the division during the period, compared with more
than 2,000 prisoners taken earlier on the East-Central front.[743]
This deficiency was attributed to the “static defensive situation, the
reluctance of the Chinese to surrender and the heavy volume of fire
placed on our reconnaissance patrols.”[744]
[742] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 39.
[743] Between December 1950-July 1953, the 1st Marine Division
took 2,445 _NKPA/CCF_, with an additional 656 enemy
seized by its attached 1st KMC/RCT, or a total of
3,101. Marine capturing units included Headquarters
Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, the three
infantry regiments, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion. An
additional 4,792 POWs were also taken by the 1st Division
in the early Inchon-Seoul operations. G-1 Folder, Aug 53
(Box 4), “Personnel Periodic Rpt. No. 94,” dtd 15–31 Aug
53; _USMC Board Rpt_, v. I, p. II-B-46.
[744] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 39.
In the air, photo reconnaissance results were not rated entirely
satisfactory as a source of current information by either air or ground
Marines. The command channels in effect designated the Air Force as
responsible agent for control and coordination of all photo missions
in Korea. Requests for photographic missions thus were relayed on to
FAF and flown by its Reconnaissance Wing or the Marines’ own VMJ-1
squadron. The system produced relatively good vertical coverage with
photos available in about 10 days. Special requests for immediate
coverage on areas of local importance, however, customarily were either
not flown or “delayed to the point where they were of no value”[745]
because the tactical situation had been changed.
[745] _Ibid._
Delays were due to the shortage of photographic aircraft throughout
FAF and the limited provision in T/Os for photo interpretation.
Intelligence of air-strike targets (particularly post-strike) was
consistently mediocre. Oblique photos of frontline positions took an
average of three-four days to be processed and sometimes longer. As
an expedient, aerial observers began to shoot their own vertical and
oblique photos with hand-held cameras slung over the side of a VMO-6
plane.
Probably the most serious problem of all, from the Marine Corps point
of view, was that during much of the Korean War Marine air-ground
components, trained to work as a team, were to a large extent
precluded from operating together. The separate missions of the wing
and division reflected, on a smaller scale, the divergent UNC air and
ground doctrine and tactics. After the early moving battles, Korean
hostilities had settled down to a protracted land war in which ground
and air tactical commands did not operate jointly and were never
coordinated to deal a truly devastating blow to the enemy. Since the
Korean War was a limited one most of the fighting was confined to the
stabilized front across Korea. Both air and naval forces were viewed
largely as supporting arms for the ground operation.
Due to political-military considerations, UNC tactical air power had
been, in effect, handcuffed so that its use would not appear “overly
aggressive” and threaten an enlargement of the Korean hostilities into
a nuclear armageddon of World War III.[746] Since the earliest days of
the war, a strict embargo had been placed on any bombing of Chinese
rear supply areas or industrial complexes although it was obvious that
much of the enemy’s logistical strength lay beyond the Manchurian
border.
[746] Much of the unwritten but basic policy mitigating against
full use of Allied air superiority stemmed from the
desire to employ “humanitarian” standards in the UNC war
effort. Following WW II there had been wide criticism
of the “moral wrong of massed air bombardment” as well
as employment of the atomic bomb by the U. S. to hasten
the end of the war. The UNC goal, in Korea, was to avoid
needless civilian casualties and for air strikes to be
directed against purely military targets. Futrell, _USAF
Korea_, p. 41.
Air efforts were concentrated largely on nuisance or harassing raids
within North Korea and close air support efforts of various types,
rather than a systematic destruction of the enemy’s primary supply
installation’s. Some ranking officers had informally interpreted
official Washington policy as “Don’t employ airpower so that the
enemy will get mad and won’t sign the armistice.”[747] Indeed, it was
not until after the Communists had rejected what the UNC called its
“final truce package,” in April 1952, that it was decided to exert
greater pressure against the Communists. The list of approved aerial
targets was then enlarged to include North Korean hydroelectric power
facilities, previously exempted from air attack.
[747] _Ibid._, p. 402.
From late 1950 until early 1953, Marine air squadrons were assigned
directly by FAF, with CG, 1st MAW, having virtually no tactical control
over his own units. Marine Corps aerial doctrine traditionally employed
close air support of ground operations as the primary role of its air
arm. FEAF and FAF, however, in their interpretation of employment of
tactical air power directed FAF maximum efforts toward interdiction
missions, sometimes even to the expense of immediate CAS needs.[748]
As Far East Air Forces stated late in 1951, “when required, close air
support of United Nations Army forces may take precedence over other
FEAF programs.”[749] Interdiction, general support, and close support
missions were the normal order of priorities flown by _FEAF_-FAF.
[748] Comments Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 430–431: “Despite
the fact that responsible Eighth Army and Fifth Air
Force commanders had decided that the rail-interdiction
attacks would best accomplish the United Nations mission
in Korea, Eighth Army subordinate commanders were gravely
dissatisfied with the limitations [96 sorties daily for
the entire Eighth Army front, decided upon by EUSAK-_FAF_
in November 1951] placed on close support.” One of
those dissenting subordinates at the time was CG, 1st
Mar Div. Following the September 1951 heavy fighting in
the Punchbowl area, General Thomas officially described
the Marine division’s air support as unsatisfactory and
stated his division had “taken unnecessary casualties
because its air support had not been adequate or timely.”
Average elapsed time between the division’s CAS requests
and its 187 approved missions that month had been nearly
two hours. Only 32 immediate air-support requests had
been filled within 30 minutes.
[749] _Ibid._, p. 432.
Operation STRANGLE, the 10-month, all-out, air interdiction campaign
during 1951–1952 originally had as its objective the destruction of
the North Korean road-rail network. The interdiction program had
been defined at first as a move to “paralyze enemy transportation in
the zone between the railheads at the 39th Parallel and the front
lines.”[750] and later somewhat more conservatively as a measure to so
“disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication ... that he will be unable
to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces ... or to mount a
sustained offensive himself.”[751]
[750] _Ibid._, p. 296.
[751] _Ibid._, pp. 435–436.
Despite more than 87,552 interdiction sorties flown during the period,
CinCFE daily intelligence summaries showed that aerial harassment of
the CCF had not hindered their defensive efforts. Instead, by the
summer of 1952 the enemy had “actually doubled in troop strength,
reinforced their artillery strength to equal that of the UN forces,
developed a tremendous AA capability, and established the capability
for launching a general offensive.”[752] With UNC air and sea
superiority, the Chinese Communists had still succeeded in keeping
their main supply route open. Rail track cuts were being repaired in
as little as 36 hours. And the CCF was employing more fire power than
ever: in May 1952, some 102,000 rounds fell against UNC positions
compared to only 8,000 the previous July.
[752] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-58.
Even the retiring UNC Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, admitted
before Congressional representatives in 1952 that the enemy had greater
offensive potential than ever before, and the Commander, Seventh Fleet,
Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, declared flatly: “The interdiction
program was a failure ... It did _not_ interdict.”[753] USAF spokesmen
felt it had attained its limited purpose but opined: “Seen abstractly,
the United Nations railway-interdiction campaign was defensive and
preventive rather than offensive and positive.”[754] In early 1952, CG,
FAF, General Everest, recognizing that his pilots “had been so long
engaged in interdiction attacks that they were losing their skills in
close support”[755] inaugurated a new system. Beginning in March all
fighter-bomber squadrons were to be rotated on weekly close-support
missions.
[753] Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_, p. 270.
[754] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 437–438.
[755] _Ibid._, p. 434.
Actually, the skies had begun to clear for Marine aviation operational
difficulties by the latter half of 1952. A better understanding had
developed between both high-level officials and the working day-to-day
liaison operations at JOC CG, 1st MAW had “established his position
so firmly he was able to guide establishment of the policies which
governed his operations merely by expressing his desires to CG 5th
AF.”[756] The battle for Bunker Hill in August 1952 had marked
excellent cooperation between Eighth Army and FAF, with the 1st Marine
Division receiving air priority for two days. In any event, matters
were substantially improved from late 1951-early 1952 when, during a
12-month period, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1st MarDiv had plummeted to
the incredibly low figure of 1,956[757] or 15.8 percent of the wing’s
total 12,372 CAS sorties during FY 1952 (1Jul51–30Jun52).
[756] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-45.
[757] By contrast: in FY 1951, 1st MAW CAS sorties for
1stMarDiv were 7,000 of total 14,028 CAS sorties, or 50
percent; for FY 1953, the _figure_ was 4,912 of total
14,540 CAS sorties, or 32.4 percent. _Generals’ Summary_,
Chart C, following p. 58.
Commenting on this unhappy period for both air and infantry Marines,
Lieutenant General Richard C. Mangrum, USMC (Retired), who was CO,
MAG-12 during part of the STRANGLE operations, said “for the rest of
1951 and well into 1952 the major effort of my Group and of MAG-33 was
devoted to cutting the rail lines in North Korea. Without success, of
course. Little by little we were able to increase the percentages of
effort devoted to close support of the troops.”[758] And by the last
six months of the war the bulk of all CAS missions received by the
division were flown by 1st MAW aircraft, in contrast to earlier periods
when a third or half of the division’s sorties were Marine-flown. As
the last Korean War Wing CG noted, despite basic differences between
Army-Air Force and Marine Corps-Navy concept and tactics, ultimately
“the commanders of the Fifth Air Force in actual daily practice
decentralized control to a marked degree.”[759]
[758] Quoted in Heinl, _Soldiers of Sea_, p. 647.
[759] MajGen V. E. Megee, “Tactical Air Support of Ground
Forces,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55),
p. 17.
Throughout the war, however, a lack of standardized terms and
differences in request procedures continued to exist. (This was
resolved by using Marine control procedures when flying for the
division, and Army-Air Force procedures when scrambled on flights for
other divisions.) Whereas EUSAK-FAF considered strikes inside the
bombline[760] as “close air support” and those outside it as “general
support,” the Marine CAS concept was one of support in close proximity
to frontlines (ranging from 50 to 500 yards out) that affects the fire
and maneuver of those ground units. In the hands of Marine FACs, Marine
planes employed on close support strikes had a definite influence on
the MLR tactical situation.
[760] The bombline had been moved in to an average of 3–4,000
meters from the MLR in December 1952 to expose more
targets to the “mass” strike treatment.
Then, too, the Marine system of maintaining aircraft “on air alert”
resulted in CAS requests being filled in 5 to 15 minutes. Air support
requests screened in the regular manner by Eighth Army and FAF at the
JOC level resulted in a delivery of ordnance to the target in a minimum
of 30 minutes and delays sometimes of nearly four hours.[761] During
fluid situations, when the division required more than 40 sorties per
day, the “on station” system proved more tactically effective than the
FAF pre-planned “on call” procedure.
[761] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ Chap. 1, No. 6, p. 1-15.
Operational differences between the Marine-Navy and Army-Air Force type
of CAS in a critical ground situation were never more apparent than
in a major CCF last-ditch effort when the enemy slammed against ROK
defenses in the Kumsong area. An end-of-war report noted:
CCF penetration of the II ROK Corps sector, in July, 1953,
brought clearly into focus the ineffectiveness of the Air
Force-Army close air support (CAS) system during periods of fluid
operations. CCF eruption through the II ROK Corps MLR and deep
into friendly territory eliminated, as effective or practical,
the complete reliance by 5th AF on pre-planned CAS strikes (using
aircraft from the ground-alert pool), against fleeting targets
or targets of an immediate nature. These types of targets are
considered normal during a fluid situation.
The inadequacy of communications for rapid transmission of
air support requests in the CAS system employed in Korea, the
impossibility of only four TACP’s per division (U.S. and ROK
Army) to keep up with frontline battalion battle actions in
order to control CAS strikes, and the over-centralization of
control of CAS request approvals and CAS aircraft allocation
were all clearly demonstrated during that period of fluid ground
operations in July.[762]
[762] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-3.
Despite the accommodation reached during the Korean War, many of these
fundamental differences in doctrine and employment of air support to
ground troops in combat persisted until recent years.[763]
[763] For a penetrating discussion of interservice problems
dealing with air-ground liaison and communications, use
of FACs, and CAS capability, etc., see U.S. Congress,
Rpt of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of
the Committee on Armed Services, Otis G. Pike, Chairman
(House of Reps., 89th Congress, 1 Feb 66), Washington:
GPO, 1966.
As military history has shown countless times in the past, wars are
fought under the prevailing difficulties of the time. There never was a
war waged under ideal conditions. A reflection on operational problems
of the Korean period is predicated on the thought that a review of
them--and the solutions effected where possible--may help avoid their
repetition in a conflict of the future.
_Korean Lessons_[764]
[764] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No.
5, Chaps. 1, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9; _Generals’ Summary_;
_Lessons Learned 5-53_; 1stMarDiv PIR 942, dtd 7 Aug 53;
1st MAW PIR 127-53, dtd 7 May 53, Encl (1) Estimate of
Enemy Ground Situation #1-53 (end-of-war analysis); 1st
MAW PIR 169-53, dtd 18 Jun 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy
Air Situation 1-53, dtd 20 May 53 (end-of-war analysis);
5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI: Comments on Tactics,
Techniques, and Equipment, pp. 1–12; J. Lawton Collins,
_War in Peacetime--The History and Lessons of Korea_
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969); S. L. A. Marshall,
_The Military History of the Korean War_ (New York:
Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963); S. L. A. Marshall, _Pork
Chop Hill--The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea,
Spring 1953_ (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956),
quoted with permission of the publisher; Ridgway, _Korean
War_; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; Batterton, _Korea Notes_.
In the early phase of the Korean War, the 1st Marine Division
deployment was in a moving battle situation similar to numerous
engagements it had fought in the past 175 years. Most of the “lessons”
learned from the enemy, the tactical situation itself, and the terrain
in Korea are derived largely from the later outpost warfare stage when
the Marines were employed in a stabilized and sustained defensive
situation similar to that facing other Allied units across the entire
Eighth Army front. Tactics of defense on a wide front, construction
of permanent type field fortifications, and organization of the
battle position in difficult terrain was a new experience to Marines.
This period of limited objective attacks and battles of attrition
highlighted the importance of small unit tactics and demonstrated some
modified concepts regarding employment of supporting arms.
During the period of outpost warfare, the 1st Marine Division
was never confronted by a general enemy offensive or combined
infantry-armor-artillery-air assault. The nature of the conflict was
one of limited objective attacks, with strong and sometimes sustained
probes. Typically, these were two-battalion assaults against a
platoon-size outpost.
Time after time, as UNC defending troops learned, the CCF
characteristic pattern of attack was repetitive and almost predictable.
After dark, heavy preparatory fires deluged an isolated advance
outpost. Crude, but effective, improvised demolitions often reduced
COP fortifications[765] so that the enemy could assail the position.
Waves of attacking Chinese then overwhelmed the greatly outnumbered
defenders. Almost invariably the initial attack made on the front of
the position was a feint; the real attack would be made by troops
that had enveloped the position and moved to the rear. Enemy ambush
forces were also located to the rear of the outpost, between the COP
and MLR, at normal reinforcement routes to prevent both a pullback by
the defenders to the MLR and to stop reinforcements from reaching the
outpost.
[765] If the enemy advanced closer than 50 yards, by closely
following under heavy preparatory fires, he could
penetrate the position. At this close range, normal
box-me-in artillery fires were not close enough to break
up the attack. _Lessons Learned_ 5-53, p. 10.
Effective defensive fire plans for the COPs covered all likely enemy
approaches and assembly areas, as well as close-in boxing fires of the
COP on all sides. Marine defense positions were sited for all-round
defense, with special attention paid to covering the rear approaches
at night. This tactic of rear envelopment also applied on a smaller
scale to patrols. Invariably the CCF maneuvered to the flanks and rear
of a friendly patrol in an attempt to encircle it. The CCF skillfully
employed both the terrain and troops and regularly attacked from more
than one direction.
Experience with Communist combat techniques forced UNC leaders to
reevaluate their own night-fighting tactics. The Chinese had a marked
superiority in night operations. Every major attack on Marine outposts
during the last year of the war was made at night. When they were
not directly assaulting a friendly site, the CCF advanced their own
ground positions by digging and their well-known creeping tactics. This
enabled them to establish an OP line within small arms and mortar range
of Marine COPs and the MLR. The battle for Bunker Hill came about as
a result of this enemy tactic. Organization in early 1952 of COP-2A,
adjacent to the Panmunjom corridor, was in direct rebuttal to this same
tactic. By such indirect methods, the Chinese were further able to
extend their already favorable high ground positions which gave them
observation over practically all of the Marine front line. Defensively
the enemy used the cover of darkness equally well: mountain roads were
aswarm with trucks and supply movements, which UNC night-fighters and
bombers slowed with only moderate success.
Skilled, rapid construction of field fortifications and excellent
camouflage discipline by the enemy were also object lessons. Entrances
to tunnels and caves, as well as the bunkers themselves were so
carefully disguised by fresh branches, weeds, logs, and other natural
foliage that they were rarely visible either by air observer or
aerial photographs. Active weapons positions were also effectively
camouflaged. Often 60mm and 82mm mortars were housed in bunkers and
fired through a narrow opening at the top. If moved out temporarily
to an open slope, they were quickly returned to the bunker to avoid
detection. The Chinese elaborate underground system of trenchworks and
radial tunnels between forward and rear bunkers was sometimes as much
as 35 yards long. Underground bunkers and tunnels often had 20 feet or
more of protective dirt cover and offered security from anything except
a direct aerial hit.
Destruction of the enemy’s trenches, bunkers, and cave network by
medium and heavy artillery was only partially successful. Napalm was
generally ineffective due to the lack of combustible materials in CCF
ground defenses. The well-prepared, deeply dug fortifications were
virtually impervious to anything less than air assaults with heavy
ordnance (1,000-pound bombs and over) which were required to destroy
CCF reverse slope positions.
A well dug-in secondary line was located four to eight miles to the
rear of the Chinese MLR. Intelligence indicated that an attack to
infiltrate CCF defenses would “require the penetration of a fortified
area to a minimum depth of 10 miles.”[766] Some Korean War analysts
maintained that behind their front line the Chinese had entrenched
the ridges to an average depth of 14 miles and that the enemy “could
have fallen back upon successive prepared positions for all that
distance.”[767] Although the trench warfare period of the Korean War
was often likened to World War I, the Chinese defensive works were
estimated to have “ten times the depth of any belt of entrenchments
in World War I.”[768] Some areas had even been engineered for defense
against nuclear attack. Caves, tunnels, and particularly reverse slope
positions also showed CCF skill in the selection and organization of
terrain features.
[766] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-29.
[767] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, p. 24.
[768] _Ibid._, p. 116.
Both the nature of the ground fighting and weather in Korea quickly
indicated that our bunker construction needed to be improved. Siting
them lower into the ground, so that the outline of the bunkers would
not make them such ready targets, and reinforcing them to withstand
a 105mm direct hit were steps in this direction. Use of sandbags (of
which there was a continuing shortage) for both bunkers and trenches
proved to be almost as much a problem as a solution. Bunkers above
ground shored up with sandbags frequently collapsed in times of heavy
rains or Korean spring thawing conditions.
Outpost warfare also proved that the average bunker often became a
deathtrap when used defensively. This was due to the enemy proclivity
for sealing entrances with their satchel charges, as occurred in the
Vegas Cities battle. It became evident that large living-fighting
bunkers could easily turn into traps in which many men could become
casualties simultaneously, and from which few could fight. Despite
their exposed nature, fighting holes were often safer. Some Korean
combat officers were of the opinion that rather than our six- to
eight-man bunkers, smaller two-man fighting units would be obviously
faster to build, more effective, and safer since they would present a
smaller target.
A 1st Marine Division training bulletin issued near the end of the war
stated categorically:
As a rule no bunker or cave should be large enough to accommodate
more than four men. If the cave is bombardment proof, there
is another greater danger that the men will fail to man their
fighting positions quickly enough after the enemy fire lifts or
ceases.[769]
[769] _Lessons Learned_, 5-53, p. 11.
UNC reconnaissance and security activities also showed need for
improvement. Night raids, patrol operations, and ambushes were
conducted continuously to maintain contact with the enemy, keep him
off balance, and obtain intelligence. This type of mobile, small-unit
action repeatedly indicated an urgent need for more basic training in
night combat operations at the squad and platoon level. The frequent
breakdown of communications in night fighting, whether it involved
a small patrol or besieged outpost, was particularly critical. Some
regimental commanders noted the failure to employ properly organic
small arms in combat action during darkness before requesting heavier
supporting fires. It was felt that the practice of calling for mortar
or artillery fire to the exclusion of using small arms was a dangerous
practice which was being overused and that “_even in the defense the
spirit of the offensive must be maintained_.”[770] Meticulous planning
was vital for effective fire plans, alternate avenues of approach, and
evacuation. Detailed rehearsals of raids were essential.
[770] 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4.
Night operations proved it was necessary to have a combat patrol
sufficiently large to allow for both the accomplishment of the mission
and evacuation of casualties. In evaluating the Korean experience,
Marine officers pointed to the difficulties of operating effectively
on “pitch black nights when a man could barely see his own hand in
front of him or when the most prominent terrain feature could not be
silhouetted.”[771] Some commanders declared that such circumstances
often lead to patrols accidentally walking into minefields--their own,
as well as the enemy’s.
[771] Batterton, _Korea Notes_, p. 34.
In their security measures, CCF strict policing of the battlefield
after either a small raid or major assault was well known to every
Marine infantryman as part of the Chinese elaborate precautions to
preserve order of battle identity. CCF counterintelligence efforts
were equally scrupulous. Despite extensive precautions to keep the
relief of the Marines by the 25th Infantry Division secret in May 1953,
enemy psychological warfare loudspeakers predicted the relief date
one week in advance. Later they broadcast a change in date that was
equally accurate. Two heavy enemy probes made in July while individual
battalion reliefs were in process also demonstrated the Chinese acuity
in intelligence activities.
The necessity for UNC commanders to avoid a fixed pattern in operations
was insufficiently recognized. A battle diary found on a CCF soldier
killed in early 1953, had observed about the Americans:
Two days before an enemy relief they clamor in their trenches,
and at the same time heavily bombard our positions.
For small scale attacks, the enemy sends out a small group of
men crawling on their hands and knees; however, in large scale
attacks, they intensely bombard our positions.
An enemy artillery bombardment following air reconnaissance
indicates that the enemy will probably launch a ground attack
within a short period.[772]
[772] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6 p. 9-58 citing Eighth U.S. Army
PIR No. 948.
As the CG, 1st Marine Division further commented about overuse of
established procedures:
The same tactics and techniques should not be followed in every
raid. The pattern should be altered to the extent that the
tactics and techniques employed will not indicate the objective
to the enemy. The time selected for raids should vary to permit
the conduct of both daylight and night raids. Employment of
supporting arms including the delivery of smoke must be varied to
prevent indication of the objective.[773]
[773] _Lessons Learned 5-53_, p. 2.
Enemy ability to locate listening posts and take them under direct
fire or mortar attack also dictated the need for frequent change in
location.
Regarding the use of supporting arms, the Korean terrain itself
dictated a need for modification of traditional practices of employing
both direct and indirect fire weapons in order to achieve maximum
effectiveness. Standard Marine Corps use of both crew-served infantry
weapons and artillery centered around the concept of interlocking and
mutually reinforcing bands of fire. Neither the frontage nor terrain in
Korea was what could be termed “normal.” Battalion frontages were often
more than twice the accepted maximum. The terrain consisted of steep
main ridge lines with many steep finger ridges leading off both sides.
Such contours require twice as many machine guns for adequate defense
against enemy attacks if employed in positions affording the usual
interlocking grazing fire.
For both infantry weapons on the forward COPs and MLR, and supporting
artillery batteries, the combination of “stretching unit fronts
and unstretchable ranges”[774] of the weapons caused them to lose
a considerable amount of their mutual support capability, as one
artillery regimental commander commented about the experience of the
1st Marine Division in Korea. As a result, a compromise was often
effected whereby machine guns were emplaced on the high ground of the
ridge line, with their individual sectors of fire extended to 180
degrees. Although the guns were no longer mutually supporting, the
numerous finger ridges could be better covered by fire to prevent the
enemy from gaining a foothold on them prior to assault on the main
ridge line.
[774] Col F. P. Henderson, “Amphibious Artillery of the
Future,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55),
p. 30.
As previously noted, the Marine division also modified its concept
about occupying the military crest, rather than the topographical
crest, of forward slopes.[775] In view of CCF tactics, forward slope
positions offered the advantage of observation and superior fields of
fire and assisted in bringing fire on the enemy in those areas and
approaches masked from the view of reverse slope positions.
[775] See Chapter VI.
Under conditions of stabilized defensive lines in Korea, the great
offensive power of Marine tanks was somewhat limited. They were used
extensively as direct fire weapons and supplemented the artillery
regiment by firing deep H&I (harassing and interdiction) missions. In
West Korea, it proved expedient to have friendly tanks positioned in
defiladed assembly areas where they were on call and ready to move
into MLR firing slots on short notice. They often provided close fire
support to Marine patrols and outpost defense actions, sometimes being
called in for fire missions before the direct support artillery.
Since tanks under enemy observation invariably drew retaliatory fire,
they usually remained in firing positions on the MLR only long enough
to complete their fire mission. Deployment of several M-46s in mutually
supporting MLR positions, however, tended to reduce the volume of
hostile fire. When operating forward of the MLR, it was important that
the armored vehicles be protected by infantry from enemy tank-killer
teams. Often the Marine artillery observer’s knowledge of the terrain
and familiarity with objective targets upon which the tank could be
effectively used was thus relayed to the tanker, particularly when such
targets were themselves obscured to the tank gunner. In registering the
target, however, the adjustment system used by the gunner differed from
that of the artillery FOs. It was recommended that use of tank guns and
lights be made part of the regular COP fire plan.
The Korean experience demonstrated in particular the need for better
rehearsed tank-infantry patrols. It also showed the need for a reliable
tank-mounted searchlight with a range up to 2,000 yards. Smoke and
muzzle blast of the 90mm gun often reduced the effectiveness of the
tank searchlight. When two tanks were employed as a team (one spotting
targets and adjusting fire with the light, while the other zeroed in on
the illuminated targets), the searchlight was markedly more effective.
Outpost warfare, which was predominantly night fighting, was thus
characterized by patrolling and ambushes, artillery dueling, and sharp
battles for contested terrain that would offer improved observation.
In this stand-off period of positional warfare, ground defenses were
developed to the point where “both sides were incomparably stronger
than they had been in actual [moving] battle.”[776]
[776] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 72.
Lessons from Korea dealt not only with modified battle tactics, but
involved an evaluation of enemy performance and capabilities, as well
as certain strategic considerations which had so markedly affected the
course of the war. UNC forces in Korea faced an adversary who had vast
resources of manpower and, accordingly, was wholly indifferent to the
cost of victory in terms of personnel and time. In fact, the enemy
believed that mass was the key to victory. In many instances Chinese
commanders did not launch an offensive unless their attack force had a
three-to-one superiority over the defending friendly unit.
Combat effectiveness of the CCF was evaluated as good to excellent.
Chinese officers demonstrated good combat leadership. They were well
schooled in both offensive and defensive military tactics. Some units
had been trained for amphibious operations. During the long period of
positional warfare, the CCF had built up their military capability
(troops, artillery, AA guns) and resupplied their forward units.
Maintaining a steady flow of supplies had been an earlier weakness of
the CCF logistics system. During the last six months of the war Chinese
stockpiles were adequate for 35 days of offensive operations; the enemy
was capable of supporting a major offensive for a 17–24 day period.
By contrast, the North Korean soldier was considerably less effective.
The larger number of NKPA prisoners taken and their greater desertion
rate indicated poorer discipline and lower morale. NKPA units were
rated from poor to good. After 1951, NKPA forces decreased in
importance while the CCF assumed a greater role in the combat effort as
well as in the truce negotiations.
Chinese weapons and equipment were characterized by a lack of
standardization due to the absence of a central system of production or
ordnance supply. Their weapons included a wide assortment of foreign
manufacture--Japanese, U.S., German, Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and
Chinese design. Because of a shortage of small arms, usually not more
than a third of the personnel in their combat units were individually
armed. Despite this fact the CCF soldier was convinced he was good and
had “proved himself to be a formidable opponent in combat.”[777]
[777] 1st MAW PIR 127-53, Encl (1), p. 1.
Individually and as units, the CCF exhibited the traditional Oriental
characteristics of extreme patience, passivity, and determination. Some
authorities went so far as to declare that the Chinese ability to:
... remain quiet for a long period and to patrol stealthily are
the main reasons for the success of his engagements. The enemy’s
successes which have resulted from his patience and stealth show
that our troops need more training in the same technique.[778]
[778] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-41.
The enemy’s tenacious determination to hold key terrain, regardless of
the costs of lives, was well known. Another evaluation concluded:
The Chinese [is] well and courageously led at the small unit
level. He is thoroughly disciplined. He is an industrious digger.
His conduct of the defense is accomplished in spite of UN
superiority in the air, his inferior communications equipment and
his hodgepodge of weapons and equipment.[779]
[779] _Ibid._, No. 5, p. 8-31.
Battlefront lightweightness and mobility, particularly in Korean winter
operations, was another important object lesson from the enemy. Marine
cold weather clothing, including thermal boot and body armor which
had saved so many lives, was of excellent design and quality. Despite
this, some authorities felt that during the Korean War the Marine was
“placed at a disadvantage when he met the CCF soldier,”[780] because
of bulky cold-weather clothing that hindered freedom of movement. The
weight of some of the Marine infantryman’s weapons, such as the 16½ lb.
BAR (plus magazines) and the 9½ lb. M-1 rifle, was felt to contribute
further to this lack of mobility. In contrast, “the CCF soldier dressed
in his quilted uniform and armed with a ‘burp’ [submachine] gun, moved
freely and quietly over the roughest of terrain, thereby gaining a not
inconsiderable advantage over his heavily burdened adversary.”[781]
[780] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-82.
[781] _Ibid._
This superior mobility led to the related advantage of tactical
surprise. Since CCF units were unencumbered by heavy weapons they
could readily use primitive routes of approach in the darkness. Their
movements through disputed terrain were typically so furtive that often
there was no preliminary warning until the CCF were virtually within
grenade-throwing distance of friendly patrols or installations. The
enemy practice of hiding by day and moving by night also concealed
their presence from UN air reconnaissance.
One observer of the Korean scene, both in the early battles of 1950
and again in 1953, has compared the CCF development of military skills
during this period, as follows:
In 1950, the Red Chinese were a crude lot, given more to
pell-mell attacks and diehard stands than to deception and
protection. But they stayed and they learned as they went along.
When they entered the war, apart from their exceptional skill and
persistence with the machine gun, they were not accurate users
of hand weapons ... by 1953, few of the old signs remained. They
had become as tenacious and as earth-seeking as ants, and in that
lay a great part of their success. Two and one-half years of war
in Korea were a bonanza for Communist China. On that training
ground her armies became as skilled as any in the world in the
techniques of hitting, evading and surviving.[782]
[782] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, pp. 20–21.
The most telling characteristic of the Chinese Communist soldier, who
essentially was a guerrilla fighter, may thus be his ready capacity to
learn from experience, particularly the fine art of deception.
As important as any of the lessons from the battlefield was the
experience of dealing with the Communists at the truce table.
Cease-fire talks dragged on interminably over a period of 2 years and
17 days. Some 158 meetings were held, with more than 18 million words
recorded, most of these dealing with the prisoner exchange that had
been the major stumbling block since early 1952. During the two years
of the truce talks, from July 1951-July 1953, an additional 56,000
Americans had been killed or wounded, bringing total U.S. combat losses
to more than 136,000.[783] (U.S. forces suffered some 80,000 casualties
in the first year of the war.) And in the end, the final solution to
the POW problem was substantially that first proposed by the UNC in
April 1952.
[783] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, pp. 77, 78.
Commenting on the Communist strategem that opened the truce talks
in July 1951, U.S. government officials observed at the time the
negotiations began:
The suggestion was received with caution since the free people of
the world have learned that Communist words and Communist intent
seldom coincide. Regardless, our leaders initiated action for
preliminary ceasefire talks with the hope that the Communists
were acting in good faith.[784]
[784] Semianl Rpt SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun), 1951, p. 187.
Despite this early realistic appraisal of the enemy, the degree to
which the Communists were to employ truce negotiations as simply an
extension of the battlefield was not immediately evident.
A key factor is involved here. The proverbial Chinese quality of
passivity and seemingly endless patience, both on the individual and
national level, was fully utilized to their advantage. In contrast,
the Western people, particularly Americans, are characteristically
impatient to complete a task once it is started. As Admiral C. Turner
Joy, USN, who initially headed the UNC delegation to the Korean
Armistice Conference, commented, “We are a people who like to get
things _done_.... The Communist negotiating method recognizes and seeks
to gain advantage by aggravating our American tendency to impatience
through the imposition of endless delays.”[785] The American attitude
is to feel that a deadlocked issue should be resolved by mutual
concessions, which puts the enemy on favorable ground in employing his
delaying tactics. The Communist view is that by deliberately slowing
the progress toward completion of the armistice the position of their
opponent will gradually be undermined. Thus, Communists regard any
concession made by their opponents as a sign of weakness. Whereas
Westerners often feel that to accept part of a negotiating proposal
will encourage the Communists to respond in kind, such an action is apt
to lead to an even more unyielding position on their part.
[785] Joy, _Truce Negotiations_, p. 39.
* * * * *
The armistice effort in Korea also taught the following lessons:
Never weaken your pressure when the enemy sues for [an]
armistice. Increase it.
Armistice conferences should be brief ... to allow ... talks to
become protracted is to indicate weakness on your part. This
encourages your Communist opponents.
The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside the
area of conflict.
Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to
make progress.[786]
[786] _Ibid._, pp. 166–173, _passim_.
Possibly no one had more first-hand experience in negotiating with the
enemy in the Korean War than Colonel James C. Murray, the Marine Corps
staff officer who was involved in the truce talks from 8 July 1951 to
27 July 1953. In these two years he served as liaison officer between
the delegations of the two sides and participated actively in meetings.
On three different occasions he negotiated the truce line which was
to separate UNC and Communist forces. In July 1953, as Senior Liaison
Officer, he was in charge of the UNC staff group that determined the
final line of demarcation. He has noted that Communist rationalizations
readily disregard whatever facts or logic which do not fit their
purpose, no matter how inconsistent.
While customarily ignoring all restrictions of the Geneva Convention
in dealing with prisoners, for example, when it was expedient to their
interests the Communists would then argue for an incredibly narrow
interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Declared Colonel Murray:
“Having come to the conference table only because they were near
defeat, the Communists were prepared from the very first to make the
most of the negotiations to create ... a ‘climate of victory’.”[787]
This accounts for their concern with even the smallest detail of “stage
setting,” for maintaining “face,” and for practical advantages from
negotiating conditions, such as the physical setting of the truce talk
site.
[787] Col J. C. Murray, “Prisoner Issue in the Korean Armistice
Negotiations,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 9 (Sep
55), p. 30.
* * * * *
As the Marine officer further observed:
A fundamental objective of the Communists in respect to the
truce was the appearance of the Communist victory in Korea....
An armistice, no less than war, could be looked upon only as
a means to an end ... to this end they negotiate patiently and
skillfully ... temporary inconveniences must be borne for ... the
attainment of long-range political objectives.[788]
[788] _Ibid._, p. 29.
Certainly, the close interaction between Communist military operations
and truce negotiations, a key factor since 1951, was particularly
apparent during April-July 1953 as the war drew to an end.
In addition to Communist China which had emerged stronger and with
considerably more prestige from the war, the other Asian nation to
have undergone marked military growth was the Republic of Korea. In
June 1950, the ROK army had numbered approximately 98,000 inadequately
trained troops, armed chiefly with hand-carried weapons such as rifles
and carbines, ill-prepared to hold back a determined enemy attack. The
ROK army was little more than a constabulary force organized by KMAG
(Korean Military Advisory Group) for internal police duty. Only 65,000
men had actually received unit combat training. ROK armed forces during
the three years of the war had increased six-fold and by July 1953
totaled nearly 600,000 men.
Training and equipment had steadily improved the ROK battle efficiency
which, in the 1950–1951 period, had been handicapped by lack of heavy
tanks, mortars, artillery, antitank mines and shells, and other heavy
weapons. By the spring of 1951 the ROK army was being transformed
into an effective fighting force, due largely to the determination of
General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander. In 1952 the ROK army had been
enlarged to 12 divisions and the ROK Marine forces had been similarly
expanded. Gradual augmentation resulted in a total of 16 ROK divisions,
most of these with organic artillery; by July 1953 ROK troops had
assumed responsibility for the majority of the UN line.
Marine Corps experience with its ROK counterpart had been instructive
and generally encouraging.[789] Organized in 1949 by the Republic of
Korea with assistance from KMAG, the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment
had taken part in antiguerrilla operations until the NKPA invasion.
With the outbreak of hostilities, the KMCs engaged in UN delaying
actions in southwest Korea until September 1950 when the Korean
regiment of nearly 3,000 men was attached to the 5th Marines as part of
the Inchon assault force. Later the KMCs were involved in defense of
Wonsan and the Hamhung-Hungnam beachhead as well as the Pohang patrol.
After serving as a maneuver element with the ROK forces in early
1951, the 1st KMC Regiment was attached permanently to the 1st Marine
Division in March of that year, participating in the Hwachon Reservoir
fighting and performing valuable service in the interrogation of POWs.
[789] See “1stMarDiv, 1st KMC Regt. and Its Relationship to the
1stMarDiv,” “SAR” File (Korea), Type “C” Rpt.
The KMCs modeled themselves after U.S. Marines, particularly emulating
the traditional offensive Marine _esprit de corps_ and overriding goal
to “close with the enemy and seize the objective” regardless of strong
resistance. The combat courage and determination of the KMCs was cited
by CG, 1st Marine Division, on several occasions.
During the 1952–1953 period, the KMC/RCT provided the Marine division
with nearly a quarter of its combat strength and became the fourth
regiment of the division. The ROK Marine Corps also consisted of the
2d KMC Regiment, which furnished personnel for the WCIDU/ECIDU island
security forces, and the 5th KMC Battalion, attached to the Marine
division in 1952. Classes in infantry tactics for KMC officer and
enlisted personnel were conducted at the Korean Marine Corps Training
Center at Chinhae. This was patterned after U.S. Marine Corps recruit
and officers’ basic schools, under supervision of USMC staff personnel.
Coupled with an offensive spirit and desire to attain U.S. Marine Corps
standards and combat performance, the Korean Marines largely overcame
early major problems resulting from the language barrier, translation
of U.S. basic training materials, and the insufficient number of
qualified and experienced Korean military instructors. One early
recruit class possibly established a record for brevity in training
when its members, after only a few weeks, were ordered to participate
in the Inchon assault which was the Korean Marines’ first specialized
amphibious operation.
Many of the hard lessons of Korea--as well as some of its unique
problems--resulted from the fact that this was America’s first major
experience in a modern, undeclared, and limited war. Accustomed to the
tradition of hard-hitting, all-out war and decisive victory, both the
fighting man at the front and Nation tended to view the conflict as
well as its ultimate accomplishments as inconclusive.[790]
[790] The course of the war, particularly its protracted and
static nature, had led to growing national apathy and
opposition, particularly on the U.S. home front. In late
1950, national opinion polls found that 80 percent of the
people were in favor of the war and seven months later
that 67 percent were against it. On the Korean front
lines, morale was generally highest during heavy ground
actions or large scale air attacks. _Washington Post_,
dtd 12 Jul 70, p. A-17; _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 1-16.
Most importantly, immediate collective security action by the UNC had
prevented another small country from being subdued by direct, armed
aggression. And the Communists had failed to attain their objective:
the forced unification of Korea, not as a free nation but as a Russian
satellite, as was North Korea. The balance sheet for UNC military
intervention showed that 22 nations (including the ROK) had provided
assistance, either personnel or materiel in defense of South Korea.
Many of these countries had supplied token units of battalion-size or
less and several had furnished noncombat medical facilities. Despite
the fact these detachments from other Allied countries totalled “only
44,000 men they were disproportionately valuable in emphasizing the
collective, coalition nature of the Korean war effort.”[791] Major
losses, however, had been borne by ROK and American troops.
[791] Rees, _Korea_, p. 33.
UNC casualties numbered 996,937 killed, wounded, and missing. U.S.
losses were 136,937, of which 33,629 represented battle deaths and
103,308 wounded in action. A measure of the role that ground forces
played in Korea “may be judged from the fact that, of the total United
States battle casualties for the entire conflict, the Army and Marines
accounted for 97 percent.”[792] Casualties of other UNC countries,
exclusive of the U.S. and ROK, totaled approximately 17,000 although
no other Allied nation lost as many as 1,000 dead. ROK casualties were
listed at 850,000. Communist losses were estimated at 1,420,000 (CCF:
900,000 killed and wounded; NKPA: 520,000 killed and wounded).
[792] Ridgway, _Korean War_, p. viii.
For the Republic of South Korea, the end of the war in some respects
represented a _status quo ante bellum_. Korea still remained
politically partitioned and geographically divided. Whereas the 38th
Parallel had been the territorial boundary prior to the Communist
attack of 25 June 1950, the cease-fire line dividing North and South
Korea in 1953 was the point of contact between ground forces at
the time the armistice was signed. This demarcation line, however,
“represented a stronger defense than the 38th Parallel as it possessed
a geographical basis all along its approximately 155-mile length.”[793]
The new boundary ran above the KANSAS Line, the commanding ground north
of the 38th Parallel.
[793] Rees, _Korea_, p. 431. In the three years of war, North
Korea had gained 850 square miles of territory southwest
of the Parallel, while the ROK acquired 2,350 square
miles north of the original June 1950 boundary.
Possibly the single, most important lesson to be drawn from the Korean
War is that many of our nation’s military assumptions--and resulting
tactical decisions--tended to be based on a lack of appreciation
of enemy capabilities. In many instances intelligence evaluations
focused on “probable intentions of the enemy rather than on his
capabilities.”[794]
[794] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, p. 175.
While America put great military value and reliance on its massive
destructive air power, for example, we were confronted by an enemy
who practically never employed his own air capability, but instead
moved freely at night and hid by day and was thus little deterred by
our aerial harassment. And while our own battle summaries regularly
cited kill ratios of 1 USMC to 3.75 CCF and substantial Communist
losses,[795] we seemed to ignore an enemy mind that thought in terms
of numerical superiority and was little concerned about the high human
cost of holding key terrain or annexing a desired position. In the
last month of the war alone, Eighth Army estimated that CCF casualties
numbered 72,000, with more than 25,000 killed.
[795] Official records show that the 1stMarDiv inflicted
approximately 59,805 CCF casualties (11,957 KIA; 15,111
estimated WIA or KIA; 32,643 estimated WIA; and 94 POWs)
during the Apr 52-Jul 53 period on the western front.
For the same time, Marine infantry casualties were
approximately 13,000 plus some 2,500 for its 1st KMC/RCT.
In both battlefield tactics and high-level strategy, the Korean
War revealed a strong tendency on the part of the UNC to predict
enemy action by values and ideology largely reflecting our own.
Whether because of wishful thinking, basic mistakes in judgment,
or international _naiveté_, the 1950–1953 experience repeatedly
indicated a need on the part of Allied nations for considerably more
hard-headed realism in dealing with a Communist adversary. The original
UNC military objective of halting Communist aggression in Korea had
been successfully accomplished, without enlarging the conflict into
a nuclear war. At the same time, Korea had also provided a sobering
lesson. It demonstrated how, in a limited war, overriding political
considerations may permit the enemy to operate from a privileged
sanctuary and allow him to seize and, in many respects, retain the
initiative.
The Korean War had made America more aware of the threat of world
Communism and had resulted in the strengthening of our national defense
commitments in the Far East as well as in Europe. It had also validated
the concept of a balanced defense force. In contrast to the emphasis
on air capability and atomic power that had dominated the strategic
thinking in the post-World War II era, the Korean hostilities pointed
to the requirement for a balanced, diversified military force of
sufficient strength and readiness to cope effectively and on short
notice with any emergency. Korea had underscored how severe peacetime
budgetary cut-backs had led to unpreparedness. The Korean experience
had also shown the need for flexibility in mobilization planning.
Previously, this had been projected for an all-out, general war, based
on America’s role in World War II. The Nation’s post-Korean policy thus
sought, for the first time, a military strategy that would effectively
deter either a major war or local aggression.
Korean hostilities illustrated another important lesson. South
Korea had been attacked by an act of direct aggression, in flagrant
violation of the Cairo Declaration and U.N. Charter. It was apparent
that, despite the defense treaties and mutual aid pacts which the
United States had signed during and after World War II, “any number
of alliances, if not supported by strong military preparedness, would
never restrain aggression.”[796] It had taken the Korean War to drive
home the harsh reality that military preparedness, possession of
superior power, and _the willingness to use that power_ were the only
deterrent to enemy aggression throughout the world.
[796] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 2.
The Korean War also caused the Communists to modify their strategy
from one of overt aggression to more insidious means of gaining their
political and economic objectives. As the Marine Corps Commandant,
General Shepherd, warned: “Their tactic is to use war by proxy, war by
satellite, war by threat and subversion.”[797] And, although it was not
fully apparent at the time, the Korean attack “was to prove to be one
of the first in a series of ‘wars of liberation’”[798] that the world
would be witness to.
[797] Anl Rpt of the CMC to SecNav, FY 1955, p. 3.
[798] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, pp. 3–4.
In the final analysis, the Korean War evolved into a prolonged battle
of position and attrition in which the Communists, operating close to
their base of supply, were fought to a standstill by United Nations
forces under unfavorable conditions of climate and logistics. In
countering the enemy threat in Korea, the American units committed
there initially suffered from the effects of peacetime apathy that had
followed the rapid demobilization following World War II. As the Korean
War, originally visualized as a “police action” of brief duration,
ground on into a major effort spanning a period of three years and
one month, loud voices were raised on the home front to protest the
expenditure of lives and materiel in a venture that was not always
clearly understood by all Americans.
Among the U.S. forces committed on this far flung battlefront, it
was once again the Marine Corps component that stood out in its
sacrifice, military skills, and devotion to duty. When rushed into
the battle during the first desperate weeks and months of the war,
the quickly-augmented Marine units helped to restore stability to the
shattered EUSAK front line. During the daringly conceived and executed
operation at Inchon, Marines accomplished this incredibly complex
amphibious operation with their customary spirit and precision. Never
was their courage and tenacity more conspicuous than during those
bitter days of the Chosin Reservoir campaign following the Chinese
Communist intervention.
In the static, or positional, warfare that marked the final operations
in Korea, the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
executed their respective missions with professional skill and
dispatch, regardless of tactical problems and the dreary monotony that
characterized a large part of the Korean War. U.S. Marines had seen
combat throughout much of the Korean peninsula. The fighting had taken
them from Pusan to Inchon and Seoul, to the Chosin, to Inje and the
Hwachon Reservoir in the Punchbowl area, and finally, in 1952–1953, to
the critical 35-mile front in West Korea near Panmunjom. In Korea, as
in past wars, Marines demonstrated the versatility, aggressiveness, and
readiness which has always been a tradition of the Corps.
Marine courage and combat performance went far toward removing the
image of Western softness and decadence which the Communists had so
mistakenly construed in their own minds. It is a record of which all
Americans and the Free World can be proud.
APPENDIX A
Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
AAA--Antiaircraft Artillery
AA--Antiaircraft
AD--Douglas “Skyraider” Single-Engine Attack Aircraft
ADC--Assistant Division Commander
ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO--Aerial Observer
ASP--Ammunition Supply Point
AT--Antitank
AU--Attack model of Vought F4U “Corsair”
BAR--Browning Automatic Rifle
BLT--Battalion Landing Team
Bn--Battalion
Brig--Brigade
Btry--Battery
CAS--Close Air Support
CCF--Chinese Communist Forces
CG--Commanding General
CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East
CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CMC--Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO--Chief of Naval Operations
Co--Company
CO--Commanding Officer
ComdD--Command Diary (also called Historical Diary, or War Diary)
ComNavFE--Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
ComServPac--Commander, Service Force, Pacific
CONUS--Continental United States
COP--Combat Outpost
CP--Command Post
CPX--Command Post Exercise
CSG--Combat Service Group
CTE--Commander Task Element
CTF--Commander Task Force
CTG--Commander Task Group
CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier
CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier
Div--Division
DMZ--Demilitarized Zone
DOW--Died of Wounds
Dtd--Dated
DUKW--Marine Amphibious Truck
ECIDE(U)--East Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)
ECM--Electronic Countermeasures
Engr--Engineer
EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea
F2H-2P--McDonnell “Banshee” Two-Engine Jet Fighter (photo model)
F3D-2--Douglas “Skyknight” Two-Engine Jet Fighter
F4U--Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Fighter
F7F-3N--Grumman “Tigercat” Twin-Engine Night Fighter
F9F-2,4,5--Grumman “Panther” Single-Engine Jet Fighter
F-80--Air Force “Shooting Star” Fighter Aircraft
F-84--Air Force “Thunderjet” Fighter Aircraft
FAC--Forward Air Controller
FAF--Fifth Air Force
FASRon--Fleet Air Service Squadron
FDC--Fire Direction Center
FEAF--Far East Air Forces
FECOM--Far East Command
FMFLant--Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FO--Forward Observer (artillery)
FY--Fiscal Year
HE--High Explosive
Hedron--Headquarters Squadron
H&I--Harassing & Interdiction
HMR--Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron
H03S-1--Sikorsky Three-Place Observation Helicopter
Hq--Headquarters
HQMC--Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
HRS-1--Sikorsky Single-Engine Helicopter
H&S--Headquarters and Service
HTL-4--Bell Two-Place Helicopter
Interv--Interview
JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOC--Joint Operations Center
KCOMZ--Korean Communication Zone (sometimes KComZ)
KIA--Killed in Action
KMAG--Korean Military Advisory Group
KMC--Korean Marine Corps
KMC/RCT--Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team
KPR--Kimpo Provisional Regiment
KSC--Korean Service Corps
LogCom--Logistical Command
Ltr--Letter
LST--Landing Ship, Tank
LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked
M4A3E8--Flame Tank, Medium
M-46--Medium Tank
MAC--Military Armistice Commission
MACG--Marine Air Control Group
MAG--Marine Aircraft Group
Mar--Marine(s)
MARLEX--Marine Landing Exercise
MASRT--Marine Air Support Radar Team
MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing
MBP--Main Battle Position
MDL--Military Demarcation Line
MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron
MIA--Missing in Action
MIG--Russian Single-Seat Jet Fighter-Interceptor
MLR--Main Line of Resistance
MOH--Medal of Honor
MOS--Military Occupation Specialty
Mosquito--Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and for Target
Spotting
MP--Military Police
MPQ--Ground Radar-Controlled Bombing
MS--Manuscript
Msg--Message
MSR--Main Supply Route
MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron
MT--Motor Transport
NCAS--Night Close Air Support
NCO--Noncommissioned Officer
NGF--Naval Gunfire
NKPA--North Korean People’s Army
N.d.--Date not given
NNRC--Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
NNSC--Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
N.t.--Title not given
OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA)
OE-1--Cessna Single-Engine Light Observation Plane
OOB--Order of Battle
OP--Observation Post (Sometimes used to refer to an Outpost)
OPLR--Outpost Line of Resistance
OY--Consolidated-Vultee Light Observation Plane
PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report
PO-2--Russian Trainer Aircraft
POW--Prisoner of War
PPSH--Soviet-made 7.62mm Sub-machine (“Burp”) Gun
Prov--Provisional
PUC--Presidential Unit Citation
R4D--Douglas Twin-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps
designation of C-47)
R5D--Douglas Four-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps
designation of C-54)
RCT--Regimental Combat Team
ROK--Republic of Korea
SAR--Special Action Report
SecDef--Secretary of Defense
SecNav--Secretary of Navy
Serv--Service
Sig--Signal
SOP--Standing Operating Procedure
TACC--Tactical Air Coordination Center
TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center
TAFC--Turkish Armed Forces Command
TAO--Tactical Air Observer
TE--Task Element
T/E--Table of Equipment
TF--Task Force
TG--Task Group
Tk--Tank
T/O--Table of Organization
TOT--Time on Target Fuze
TU--Task Unit
UN--United Nations
UNC--United Nations Command
USA--United States Army
USAF--United States Air Force
USMC--United States Marine Corps
USN--United States Navy
VMA--Marine Attack Squadron
VMC--Marine Composite Squadron
VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron
VMF(N)--Marine Night (All-Weather) Fighter Squadron
VMJ--Marine Photographic Squadron
VMO--Marine Observation Squadron
VMR--Marine Transport Squadron
VT--Variable Time Fuze
WCIDE(U)--West Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)
WIA--Wounded in Action
WP--White Phosphorous Shell
YAK--Russian Fighter Aircraft
APPENDIX B
Korean War Chronology
_1950_
25 Jun North Korean People’s Army, with 60,000 troops and 100
Russian tanks, crosses 38th Parallel to invade South
Korea.
25 Jun United Nations Security Council calls for end of
aggression and withdrawal of NKPA troops.
27 Jun UN, adopting a U.S. resolution, proclaims NKPA attack
a breach of world peace. Asks member nations to assist
ROK in repelling invasion.
27 Jun Pres Truman orders U.S. air-sea units to support ROK
and for U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize Formosan
Strait.
28 Jun NKPA captures Seoul, South Korean capital.
29 Jun Pres Truman orders naval blockade of Korean coast;
authorizes Far East Commander, Gen MacArthur, to send
U.S. ground troops into Korea.
30 Jun Pres Truman receives Congressional authorization
to order into active service any or all reserve
components of Armed Forces, for a period of 21 months.
2 Jul CNO directs that Marine reinforced regiment with
supporting air be prepared for assignment to Far East.
2 Jul CinCFE requests Marine RCT-air unit for Far East.
This was inception of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade,
formed less than a week later.
3 Jul Inchon captured by North Koreans.
5 Jul-4 Aug UNC fights series of delaying actions in Korea.
7 Jul U.N. Security Council authorizes formation of a
United Nations Command as counterforce against NKPA
aggression.
7 Jul 1st ProvMarBrig activated at Camp Pendleton, under
BGen Edward A. Craig. Basic elements of 6,534-man
Brigade are 5th Marines and MAG-33.
8 Jul Gen MacArthur named Commander, UNC.
10 Jul CinCUNC asks Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize
expansion of Marine Brigade to full war-strength
division.
12–14 Jul 1st ProvMarBrig embarks for Korean theater.
12 Jul LtGen Walton H. Walker named CG, Eighth U.S. Army in
Korea.
19 Jul CinCUNC makes 2d request for Marine division.
19 Jul Pres Truman authorizes Defense Dept to call up reserve
units and individuals.
19 Jul CMC alerts Marine Corps organized reserve units
for call to active duty following Presidential
announcement.
20 Jul CMC, Gen Clifton B. Cates, orders to duty Organized
Marine Corps ground reserve units, consisting of 22
units and 4,830 personnel. Partial callup for 6,000
air reservists in 30 Marine VMF and 12 MGCI squadrons.
20 Jul Taejon, temporary ROK capital, captured.
21 Jul CinCUNC makes 3d request for Marine division.
25 Jul UNC defense at Pusan deteriorates. CinCUNC orders 1st
ProvMarBrig directly to Korea.
25 Jul JCS directs Marine Corps to build 1stMarDiv to
war-strength.
31 Jul Masan and Chinju fall to enemy.
2–3 Aug 1st ProvMarBrig arrives Pusan. Moves to bivouac area
near Masan.
3 Aug First Marine air strike launched by VMF-214.
4 Aug Pusan Perimeter established by UNC in southeastern end
of Korea.
4 Aug First evacuation of casualties from Pusan by Marine
VMO-6 helicopters.
6 Aug First air mission flown by VMF-323.
6–8 Aug CinCUNC confers with U.S. military-diplomatic
officials about proposed Inchon amphibious landing.
7–13 Aug Marine Brigade engaged in first combat operations at
Chinju.
10 Aug First Marine helicopter rescue made by VMO-6 to
recover downed pilot.
10–24 Aug 1stMarDiv units embark for Korea.
16 Aug EUSAK X Corps activated for coming Inchon-Seoul
operation. Principal elements are 1stMarDiv and Army
7thInfDiv.
17 Aug Marine Brigade opens battle for Obong-ni (“No Name”)
Ridge, leading way to destruction of enemy bridgehead
at Naktong and first UNC victory in Korea.
17 Aug 7th Marines activated at Camp Pendleton and on 1 Sep
embarks for Far East, arriving 21 Sep.
1–5 Sep NKPA launches all-out offensive to break UNC perimeter
defense at Pusan. In Second Naktong Battle, Brigade
contains enemy at Yongsan.
13 Sep 1st ProvMarBrig deactivated and absorbed by 1stMarDiv
for Inchon operation.
15 Sep D-Day, Inchon amphibious assault, spearheaded by
1stMarDiv.
17 Sep 1stMarDiv (5th Marines) recaptures Kimpo Airfield.
19–25 Sep Enemy resistance at Pusan begins to collapse. NKPA
troops in retreat north from Pusan.
27 Sep 1stMarDiv recaptures Seoul. ROK Capital officially
liberated 29 Sep.
30 Sep Communist China Foreign Minister Chou En-lai warns:
“The Chinese people will not supinely tolerate
seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the
imperialists.”
30 Sep-1 Oct ROK 3d Div crosses 38th Parallel in pursuit of
retreating NKPA.
7 Oct UN General Assembly authorizes UNC forces to cross
38th Parallel to defeat NKPA.
10 Oct Wonsan, east coast port at 39th Parallel, captured by
ROK troops.
10 Oct Chinese repeat warning of intervention in Korean
conflict.
16 Oct First Chinese Communist troops secretly enter Korea
from Manchuria.
19 Oct Pyongyang, North Korean Capital at 39th Parallel,
captured by EUSAK.
26 Oct Chinese troops attack ROK units at Yalu River and
points south of Sino-Korean border.
26 Oct 1stMarDiv lands at Wonsan, establishes security for
port, and drives north.
1 Nov UNC forward elements reach positions along Yalu. First
Russian-built MIG appears along Yalu to attack U.S.
aircraft.
2 Nov Strong Chinese and NKPA forces attack EUSAK at Unsan,
causing withdrawal across Chongchon River. First
identification of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in
Korea.
3–7 Nov Initial Marine encounter with CCF. 7th Marines units
defeat major elements of 124th CCF Division.
6 Nov MacArthur warns JCS that movement of CCF across Yalu
threatens UNC position.
15 Nov Marine units reach Chosin Reservoir area in X Corps
drive north.
24 Nov MacArthur announced “win the war” offensive. EUSAK
begins advance toward Yalu.
26–27 Nov CCF, 200,000-strong, attack EUSAK troops forcing
withdrawal. 1stMarDiv isolated at Yudam-ni, west of
Chosin. MSR cut.
28 Nov-3 Dec 1stMarDiv turns back CCF attacks. Prepares to move
south. Regroups at Hagaru-ri for drive to Hungnam.
4 Dec Pyongyang recaptured by enemy.
5–7 Dec 1stMarDiv evacuates wounded by air and fights through
to Koto-ri.
6 Dec Innovation of using airborne TADC as tactical CP to
control air support.
10 Dec First Marine jet squadron to fly in combat, VMF-311,
begins operations.
11 Dec 1stMarDiv completes fighting breakout from Chosin
entrapment. Begins march to join rest of X Corps at
Hungnam.
15 Dec 1stMarDiv deployed from Hungnam to Pusan.
15 Dec UNC establishes new defensive line at 38th Parallel.
18 Dec-27 Jan Marine division routs enemy guerrilla forces in
Masan-Pohang-Sondong-Andong area.
23 Dec EUSAK CG Walker killed in jeep accident. Gen Matthew
B. Ridgway named to succeed him.
24 Dec Hungnam evacuation completed by X Corps.
29 Dec Large enemy buildup reported north of 38th Parallel,
preparing for new attack.
_1951_
31 Dec-1 Jan Enemy launches all-out offensive against UNC across
38th Parallel, pushing EUSAK back 10–12 miles.
4 Jan Seoul recaptured by Communists.
7–15 Jan Enemy offensive halted, UNC sets up new defense line
along Pyongtaek-Wonju axis, at 37th Parallel.
25 Jan UNC reassumes offensive. Operation THUNDERBOLT
launched by I and IX Corps to regain territory south
of Han River.
Jan-Feb 1stMarDiv continues antiguerrilla operations in Masan
area.
7 Feb Communists forced north of Han River. UNC retakes
Inchon peninsula.
mid-Feb 1stMarDiv reassigned from X to IX Corps.
21 Feb Operation KILLER, a general limited objective advance
by U.S. IX and X Corps, ordered by Gen Ridgway.
1stMarDiv reenters frontlines for operation.
7 Mar Operation RIPPER begins in central and eastern zones,
with advance across Han by IX and X Corps.
14 Mar Seoul retaken by U.S. Eighth Army for second time.
27–31 Mar 1stMarDiv occupies 28,000-meter sector north of
Hongchon. UNC elements reach 38th Parallel.
1–21 Apr 1stMarDiv in general advance north to the Hwachon
Reservoir.
8 Apr Operation RIPPER clears enemy troops from South Korea
east of Imjin River.
11 Apr Pres Truman relieves Gen MacArthur as CinCUNC,
replacing him by Gen Ridgway, CG, EUSAK. LtGen James
A. Van Fleet named Commander, EUSAK.
15 Apr UNC establishes defensive line along 38th
Parallel, or KANSAS Line. Enemy heavily emplaced
in Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyonggang (“The Iron Triangle”)
assembly area.
22 Apr-8 Jul CCF launches all-out “Spring Offensive.”
23–27 Apr 1stMarDiv halts CCF left flank breakthrough of IX
Corps, establishes defense line in Chunchon vicinity.
30 Apr UNC completes withdrawal to new defense line north of
Seoul. Intelligence reports indicate CCF plans renewed
attack.
1 May 1stMarDiv reassigned to X Corps.
9 May 1st MAW squadrons participate in FAF 300-plane strike
on Sinuiju, near Yalu. Biggest raid of war to date.
16 May Second phase of enemy offensive begins. CCF drives
south from Iron Triangle area, making penetrations
15–20 miles deep along the front.
20 May FAF launches Operation STRANGLE, massive all-out
interdiction effort.
21 May UNC launches counter offensive, pushes enemy north of
38th Parallel again. 1stMarDiv drives toward Yanggu at
eastern end of Hwachon Reservoir.
30 May Eighth Army back on KANSAS Line again.
1–16 Jun 1stMarDiv advances northeast from Hwachon Reservoir
to Punchbowl. Claws out daily gains of 1,000–2,000
meters, reaching objective despite heavy NKPA fire.
mid-Jun UNC forces consolidate positions at 38th Parallel. UNC
front approximately the same line as when Communist
spring offensive began.
23 Jun UN Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, proposes cease-fire
discussions.
30 Jun UN notifies enemy of its readiness to discuss an
armistice.
10 Jul Truce talks begin at Kaesong and fighting dies down
along front. UN delegation led by U.S. Vice Admiral C.
Turner Joy. Communists represented by LtGen Nam Il,
NKPA.
26 Jul Negotiators at Kaesong agree on preliminary agenda.
5 Aug UNC suspends truce talks because of armed enemy troops
in neutral area. Cease-fire talks resumed 10 Aug.
22 Aug Communists halt cease-fire talks, charge UN aircraft
has violated neutrality zone.
31 Aug In final UNC offensive action of war, 1stMarDiv opens
assault at Punchbowl. UN launches limited attacks to
straighten line.
5 Sep 1stMarDiv gains initial objectives in Punchbowl area,
new ridgeline to become part of Line MINNESOTA,
EUSAK defensive line. Heavy attacks by IX Corps at
Heartbreak and Bloody Ridge.
13 Sep HMR-161 effects first Marine mass helicopter combat
resupply maneuver, Operation WINDMILL I.
18 Sep Marines advance to Soyang River, north of Punchbowl.
21 Sep Operation SUMMIT, first helicopter deployment of a
combat unit, lands 224 fully-equipped troops and
17,772 lbs of cargo in Punchbowl area.
25 Oct Following two weeks of discussion between liaison
officers, truce talks resumed at new site, Panmunjom.
28 Oct Cease-fire line agreed upon as present line of contact.
11 Nov HMR-161 conducts first frontline relief of a Marine
battalion, in Operation SWITCH.
12 Nov Gen Ridgway, CinCUNC, orders EUSAK Commander, Gen Van
Fleet to cease offensive operations and begin active
defense of UN front.
Nov-Dec General stalemate along Korean battlefront during
truce discussions.
18 Dec Prisoner of war lists exchanged by UN and Communists.
_1952_
2 Jan UNC proposes principle of “voluntary repatriation” in
POW exchange.
3 Jan UNC proposal violently rejected by Communists.
Jan-Apr Disorders in UNC prison camps as screening of
prisoners begins.
22 Feb Communist Korean Foreign Affairs Minister charges
America with renewed bacteriological warfare attacks
in North Korea. Chinese Communist Foreign Minister
Chou En-Lai, issues similar statement on 8 Mar,
alleging U.S. flyers participate in “germ warfare.”
17 Mar 1stMarDiv reassigned from X Corps eastern-Korea
position to I Corps far western end of EUSAK line.
Takes over approximately 35 miles of Line JAMESTOWN on
24 Mar.
28 Apr Adm Joy presents UN “final offer,” insists on
voluntary repatriation principle.
7–11 May Rioting prisoners at Koje-do camp seize Gen Dodd and
hold him hostage, until order restored.
12 May Gen Mark W. Clark succeeds Ridgway as CinCUNC, upon
latter’s departure to assume NATO command from Gen
Eisenhower.
22 May MajGen William K. Harrison succeeds Adm Joy as chief
of UN delegation at Panmunjom.
Jun-Oct General stalemate along battlefront while truce talks
deadlocked on POW repatriation question. Sharp limited
objective attacks made by enemy against UNC defensive
line.
9–16 Aug First major Marine ground action in western Korea,
Battle of Bunker Hill (1st Marines).
19–20 Aug HMR-161 Operation RIPPLE introduces tactical
innovation of transporting 4.5-inch rocket battery
weapons and personnel to new firing position.
29 Aug Largest one-day FAF air assault of entire war, “All
United Nations Air Effort” sends 1,403 sorties against
North Korean Capital, Pyongyang.
22–26 Sep First resupply of MLR regiment by helicopter in
Operation HAYLIGHT.
8 Oct UNC adjourns armistice talks “indefinitely”; complete
deadlock on POW question.
26–28 Oct Battle of the Hook (7th Marines).
4 Nov Dwight D. Eisenhower elected President.
17 Nov India introduces compromise truce plan at United
Nations.
2 Dec President-elect Eisenhower begins three-day tour of
Korea.
3 Dec UN General Assembly adopts compromise Indian
resolution by 54 to 5 vote.
_1953_
Jan-Feb Winter lull in fighting. Cease-fire talks remain
suspended.
2 Feb President Eisenhower, in State of Union message, ends
“neutralization” of Formosa Strait.
11 Feb Gen Maxwell D. Taylor assumes EUSAK command from Gen
Van Fleet.
22 Feb UNC proposes exchange of sick and wounded POWs, as
preliminary step in full exchange of prisoners.
5 Mar Premier Joseph Stalin of Russia dies. Georgi Malenkov
named to succeed him.
26–30 Mar 1stMarDiv combat outposts Vegas-Reno-Carson (5th
Marines) under heavy attack.
28 Mar Communists accept UN proposal to discuss exchange of
sick and wounded POWs.
30 Mar Chou En-lai indicates Communists will accept Indian UN
compromise proposal. Truce talks to be resumed.
12 Apr 1st MAW flies first night CAS missions, using
intersecting searchlight beams to mark enemy targets.
20–26 Apr Exchange of sick and wounded POWs, “Operation LITTLE
SWITCH,” takes place at Panmunjom, under direction of
Munsan-ni Provisional Command.
26 Apr Truce talks resumed at Panmunjom.
5 May 1stMarDiv relieved by U.S. 25thInfDiv; 1st Division
assigned mission of I Corps Reserve.
7 May Communists accept UN proposal that prisoners unwilling
to be repatriated be kept in neutral custody within
Korea, rather than be removed elsewhere to a neutral
nation.
28–30 May Savage fighting while truce details worked out by
negotiators. CCF launches regimental-strength attack
against I Corps sector. Heavy action in Nevada Cities
and Hook area outposts. Marine tanks and artillery in
support of defending 25thInfDiv line units.
6 Jun ROK national Assembly demands freedom for
anti-Communist North Koreans held in South Korean POW
camps. Civilian demonstrations break out in various
EUSAK and I Corps localities.
8 Jun Agreement reached on POW question. POW nonrepatriates
to be turned over to five-member neutral commission to
decide disposition of POW cases. Pres Rhee declares
armistice terms unacceptable to South Korea.
9 Jun ROK National Assembly unanimously rejects truce terms.
10–17 Jun Communists launch heaviest offensive in two years
against ROK II Corps sector in Kumsong area. Heavy
penetrations, with ROK II Corps pushed 4000 yards
south to new MLR.
18 Jun Breakout of 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist
prisoners from South Korean POW camps, assisted by
ROK guards. Release ordered by Pres Rhee as protest
against proposed armistice.
18–20 Jun Communists accuse UNC of complicity in freeing
prisoners; truce talks suspended.
23–25 Jun Pres Rhee continues opposition to truce terms. Walter
Robinson, U.S. Asst. Sec. of State for Far East and
Gen Mark Clark start confidential talks with Rhee.
7–8 Jul COPs Berlin-East Berlin (7th Marines right regimental
sector) under attack during Marine relief of
25thInfDiv.
8 Jul 1stMarDiv assumes operational control of its former
MLR sector, relieving 25thInfDiv.
8 Jul Communists agree to resume armistice negotiations;
talks reconvened 10 July.
11 Jul Robertson announces that Pres Rhee will no longer
oppose truce terms.
11 Jul Maj John F. Bolt, VMF-115, becomes first Marine jet
ace with kill of his fifth and sixth MIGs.
13–20 Jul CCF launches even larger offensive than June attack
along central Korean front. IX and ROK II Corps MLR
reestablished south of Kumsong River.
19 Jul Negotiators at Panmunjom reach agreement on truce.
19 Jul Marine outposts Berlin-East Berlin overrun; I Corps
decrees positions should not be retaken.
24–27 Jul Heavy enemy attack in Berlin Complex (“Boulder City”)
area held by 7th and 1st Marines.
27 Jul Cease-fire agreement signed at Panmunjom at 1000.
Fighting ends. Armistice effective at 2200.
5 Aug-6 Sep Final exchange of prisoners in Operation BIG SWITCH,
at Panmunjom.
APPENDIX C
Command and Staff List
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)
AND
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
MARCH 1952-JULY 1953
_1st Marine Division_
Commanding General MajGen John T. Selden (to 28 Aug 1952)
MajGen Edwin A. Pollock (from 29 Aug)
MajGen Randolph McC. Pate (from 16
Jun 1953)
Asst Division Commander BGen William J. Whaling (to 23 Mar
1952)
BGen Merrill B. Twining (from 24 Mar)
BGen Robert O. Bare (from 13 Jun)
BGen Joseph C. Burger (from 31 Mar 1953)
Chief of Staff Col Austin R. Brunelli (to 10 Oct 1952)
Col Henry W. Buse, Jr. (from 11 Oct)
Col Lewis W. Walt (from 15 Jun 1953)
G-1 Col Walter N. Flournoy (to 31 Mar 1952)
Col John F. Dunlap (from 1 Apr)
Col Sidney M. Kelly (from 11 Sep)
Col Albert F. Metze (from 1 Jun 1953)
Col Wendell H. Duplantis (from 20 Jul)
G-2 LtCol James H. Tinsley (to 9 Apr 1952)
Col Sidney S. Wade (from 10 Apr)
LtCol William R. Watson, Jr. (from 24
Apr)
Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from
11 Oct)
Col William F. Prickett (from 20 Dec)
Col Loren E. Haffner (from 1 Apr 1953)
Col James E. Mills (from 10 Jul)
G-3 LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (to 22 Apr 1952)
LtCol James H. Tinsley (from 24 Apr)
Col Russell E. Honsowetz (from 15 Jun)
Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Dec)
Col Lewis W. Walt (from 18 Apr 1953)
LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 15 Jun)
G-4 Col Robert A. McGill (to 27 Aug 1952)
Col Thomas A. Culhane (from 28 Aug)
Col Kenneth A. King (from 12 Nov)
Col Richard H. Crockett (from 15 Dec)
Col Thomas S. Ivey (from 15 May 1953)
_Special Staff_
Adjutant Maj James K. Young (to 5 May 1952)
Maj Charles T. Lamb (from 6 May)
Maj Clyde W. Shealy (from 24 Feb 1953)
Maj George K. Acker (from 1 Jun)
Air Officer LtCol Edward V. Finn (to 14 Mar 1952)
LtCol Walter F. Cornnell (from 15 Mar)
LtCol William E. Abblitt (from 12 Feb
1953)
Anti-Tank Officer Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952)
Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug)
LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov)
Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan
1953)
Capt William F. Doehler (from 6 Apr)
Amphibian Tractor Officer LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug
1952)
LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug)
LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7
Nov)
LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from
16 Mar 1953)
Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun)
Armored Amphibian Officer LtCol John T. O’Neill (to 5 Aug 1952)
Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug)
LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12
Aug)
LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec)
Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May
1953)
LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15
Jul)
Artillery Officer Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep
1952)
Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep)
Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953)
Col Manley L. Curry (from 5 Jul)
Chaplain Cdr Walter S. Peck, Jr., USN (to 16
Apr 1952)
Cdr Edward A. Slattery, USN (from 17
Apr)
Cdr Lonnie W. Meachum, USN (from 28
Dec)
Chemical Warfare and
Radiological Defense
Officer Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952)
Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug)
LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov)
Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan
1953)
Capt Gerald W. Gibson (from 30 Jan)
Dental Officer Capt Francis C. Snyder, USN (to 26
Apr 1952)
Cdr Clifford H. Rice, USN (from 27
Apr)
Capt William M. Fowler, USN (from 26
May)
Capt James R. Justice, USN (from 12
Mar 1953)
Embarkation Officer LtCol John H. Papurca (to 1 Mar 1952)
LtCol James F. Coady (from 2 Mar)
LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 5 Sep)
Maj Edwin J. St. Peter (from 6 Nov)
LtCol John N. Rentz (from 24 Nov)
LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 12 May
1953)
Engineer Officer Col August L. Vogt (to 5 Jul 1952)
(None listed for 6–16 July)
Col Robert E. Fojt (from 17 Jul)
LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 1 Feb
1953)
Col Walter R. Lytz (from 1 Apr)
Exchange Officer Capt Benjamin Reed (to 28 Nov 1952)
Capt John H. Thomas (from 29 Nov)
Food Director 1stLt Herbert E. McNabb (to 15 Jun
1952)
Maj Louis P. Penny (from 16 Jun)
Maj Francis K. Bernardini (from 23
Apr 1953)
Historical Officer 2dLt Francis X. Goss (to 22 Mar 1952)
Capt Robert F. Seward (from 23 Mar)
Capt William R. Smith (from 16 Jul)
1stLt Virgil S. Price (from 8 Nov)
2dLt John J. Creamer, Jr. (from 7 Dec)
Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 6 Apr 1953)
2dLt Thomas A. MacCalla (from 22 Jul)
Inspector Col William K. Davenport, Jr. (to 17
Mar 1952)
Col Thomas C. Moore (from 18 Mar)
Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 18 Jul)
Col Clayton O. Totman (from 9 Aug)
Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 5 Dec)
Col Albert F. Metze (from 29 Apr 1953)
Col Manley L. Curry (from 1 Jun)
Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 13 Jul)
Legal Officer LCdr Arnold W. Eggen, USN (to 12 Jan
1953)
Cdr Earl C. Collins, USN (from 13 Jan)
LtCol Raymond G. Coyne (from 8 Jul)
Motor Transport Officer Maj Walter R. O Quinn (to 14 May 1952)
LtCol Kenneth E. Martin (from 15 May)
LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 12 Mar
1953)
LtCol Jack F. McCollum (from 29 Jun)
Naval Gunfire Officer Maj John V. Downs (to 5 Aug 1952)
LtCol William P. Pala (from 6 Aug)
LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 16 Sep)
LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 20
Dec)
LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 26 Apr
1953)
Capt Robert J. Daeschler (from 15 Jul)
Ordnance Officer Maj Harold C. Borth (to 5 May 1952)
LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May)
Maj Joseph O. Weist (from 4 Jun)
Maj Stanley Tesko (from 21 Oct)
LtCol Marshall R. Pilcher (from 1 Apr
1953)
LtCol Samuel L. Grigsby (from 1 Jun)
Postal Officer CWO George C. Hunter (to 25 Jun 1952)
2dLt Frederick T. McNamara, Jr. (from
26 Jun)
2dLt Rudolph R. Hendrick (from 18 May
1953)
CWO Emerson R. Murrell (from 2 Jun)
Provost Marshal LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar
1952)
LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr)
LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15
Aug)
LtCol Jess P. Ferrill (from 12 Jan
1953)
LtCol Harold R. Warner, Jr. (from 18
Apr)
Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul)
Public Information Officer 1stLt Robert S. Gray (to 5 May 1952)
1stLt Robert F. Coll (from 6 May)
Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 5 Jul)
Capt Bem Price (from 7 Nov)
Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 21 Jul
1953)
Shore Party Officer LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul
1952)
Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul)
LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct)
Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec)
Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar
1953)
Signal Officer LtCol Jino J. D’Allessandro (to 5 Apr
1952)
LtCol John E. Morris (from 6 Apr)
LtCol Eugene A. Dueber (from 18 Aug)
LtCol Ralph M. Wismer (from 14 Nov)
LtCol Frank G. Casserly (from 27 Jul
1953)
Supply Officer Col Chester R. Allen (to 27 Apr 1952)
Col Hawley C. Waterman (from 28 Apr)
Col LeRoy Hauser (from 1 Feb 1953)
Special Services Officer LtCol John E. Gorman (to 23 Jul 1952)
Maj Alfred A. Tillmann (from 24 Jul)
Maj William J. Kohler (from 8 Nov)
Capt Don H. Blanchard (from 20 Apr
1953)
Surgeon Capt Louis P. Kirkpatrick, USN (to 18
Jun 1952)
Capt Lawrence E. Bach, USN (from 19 Jun)
Capt Walter R. Miller, USN (from 25
Apr 1953)
Tank Officer Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20
May 1952)
LtCol John I. Williamson, Jr. (from
21 May)
LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr
1953)
_Headquarters Battalion_
Commanding Officer Col Robert T. Stivers, Jr. (to 5 Jul
1952)
Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 6 Jul)
LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 12 Jul)
LtCol John F. Corbett (from 11 Sep)
Col Alexander W. Gentleman (from 21 Nov)
LtCol John C. Landrun (from 16 May 1953)
Executive Officer Maj Corbin L. West (to 16 Mar 1952)
Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 17 Mar)
Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 10 Nov)
Maj John K. Hogan (from 31 Jan 1953)
(None listed for 29Feb-14May)
Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 May)
Commanding Officer,
Headquarters Company Capt “J” E. Hancey (to 9 Mar 1952)
Capt Robert J. McKay (from 10 Mar)
1stLt George C. Schatteman (from 6 May)
Maj Louis A. Cortright (from 1 Jul)
2dLt Neil O. Snepp (from 17 Jul)
Maj Val Price, Jr. (from 29 Aug)
Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 Jan 1953)
Capt Robert A. Hohmann (from 15 May)
Capt Martin S. Hauge (from 28 May)
Commanding Officer,
Military Police Company LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar 1952)
LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr)
LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15
Aug)
LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 12
Jan 1953)
LtCol Harold B. Warner, Jr. (from 18
Apr)
Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul)
Commanding Officer,
Reconnaissance Company Maj Ephraim Kirby-Smith (to 10 Jun 1952)
Capt James O. Webb (from 11 Jun)
Capt James H. A. Flood (from 11 Sep)
Maj Dermott H. MacDonnell (from 3 Dec)
Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 21 Jun 1953)
_1st Marines_
Commanding Officer Col Sidney S. Wade (to 9 Apr 1952)
Col Walter N. Flournoy (from 10 Apr)
Col Walter F. Layer (from 25 Jul)
Col Hewitt D. Adams (from 21 Nov)
Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 1 May 1953)
Executive Officer LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (to 26 Mar
1952)
Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from
27 Mar)
LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 2 May)
LtCol Glenn R. Long (from 16 Sep)
LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 4 Feb
1953)
LtCol Lowell E. English (from 8 May)
LtCol Harold C. Boehm (from 2 Jul)
_1st Battalion, 1st Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Papurca (to 2 Aug 1952)
LtCol Louis N. King (from 3 Aug)
LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 13 Sep)
Col Frederick R. Findtner (from 14
Jan 1953)
LtCol Stanley M. Adams (from 5 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj Ralph “C” Rosacker (to 5 Apr 1952)
Maj Leo V. Gross (from 6 Apr)
Maj John K. Logan (from 14 Jul)
Maj William C. Chip (from 20 Aug)
Maj John K. Hogan (from 30 Dec)
Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 4 Feb 1953)
Maj Roger D. Peterson (from 19 Jun)
_2d Battalion, 1st Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Thell H. Fisher (to 1 Apr 1952)
LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 2 Apr)
LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr. (from 23
Jun)
LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 18 Oct)
LtCol George A. Gililland (from 9 Feb
1953)
LtCol Frank A. Long (from 1 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj Frank J. Harte (to 5 May 1952)
Maj Fletcher R. Wycoff (from 6 May)
Maj John N. Rentz (from 29 Jul)
Maj John P. McNeill (from 21 Aug)
Maj Horace C. Reifel (from 9 Mar 1953)
Maj John B. Bristow (from 20 Apr)
Maj Albert S. Dooley, Jr. (from 1 Jul)
_3d Battalion, 1st Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Spencer H. Pratt (to 11 Apr 1952)
LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 12 Apr)
LtCol Gerard T. Armitage (from 2 May)
LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 20 Aug)
LtCol Ernest G. Atkin, Jr. (from 6 Dec)
LtCol Lowell E. English (from 1 Apr
1953)
LtCol Roy D. Miller (from 6 May)
Executive Officer Maj Robert V. Perkins (to 2 Jul 1952)
Maj Wesley R. Christie (from 3 Jul)
Maj Charles S. Robertson (from 27 Oct)
Maj Norman C. Smyle (from 3 Jan 1953)
Maj Robert D. Thurston (from 26 Mar)
Maj Walter L. Williams (from 20 May)
Maj John T. Quinn (from 2 Jul)
_5th Marines_
Commanding Officer Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. (to 15 Aug
1952)
Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Aug)
Col Lewis W. Walt (from 10 Dec)
Col Harvey C. Tschirgi (from 14 Apr
1953)
Executive Officer LtCol John A. Saxten (to 1 Jun 1952)
LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 2 Jun)
LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20
Jul)
LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 21
Aug)
LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Jan
1953)
LtCol James H. Finch (from 23 May)
LtCol James Taul (from 18 Jul)
_1st Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (to 24 May
1952)
Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 25 May)
LtCol Alexander W. Gentleman (from 15
Jul)
LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 11 Nov)
LtCol Jonas M. Platt (from 26 Dec)
LtCol Jackson B. Butterfield (from 29
Apr 1953)
Executive Officer Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (to 4 May
1952)
Maj Lyle K. London (from 5 May)
Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 29 Aug)
Maj William C. Doty, Jr. (from 25 Jan
1953)
Maj Thomas W. Pearson (from 2 Apr)
Maj George R. Burke (from 11 Jun)
Maj Charles E. McPartlin, Jr. (from
22 Jun)
_2d Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol William H. Cushing (to 10 Jun
1952)
LtCol Thomas J. Cross (from 11 Jun)
LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20
Aug)
LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 11 Sep)
LtCol James H. Finch (from 27 Feb
1953)
LtCol Andrew C. Geer (from 14 May)
Executive Officer Maj Robert S. Hudson (to 10 Jun 1952)
Maj John C. Lundrigan (from 11 Jun)
Maj Philip H. McArdle (from 16 Jul)
Maj Paul C. Scofield (from 19 Dec)
Maj Thomas M. Fields (from 26 Jun
1953)
_3d Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol William S. McLaughlin (to 15
Jul 1952)
LtCol Oscar T. Jensen, Jr. (from 16 Jul)
LtCol Robert J. Oddy (from 16 Nov)
LtCol John T. Hill (from 11 Apr 1953)
Executive Officer Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (to 22 May
1952)
Maj Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr. (from
23 May)
Maj Joseph A. Bruder, Jr. (from 7 Jul)
Maj Vernon Burtman (from 1 Nov)
Maj Joseph S. Buntin (from 7 Feb 1953)
_7th Marines_
Commanding Officer Col Russell E. Honsowetz (to 10 Jun
1952)
Col Thomas C. Moore, Jr. (from 11 Jun)
Col Loren E. Haffner (from 5 Nov)
Col Glenn C. Funk (from 27 Mar 1953)
Executive Officer LtCol John D. Wiggins (to 17 Jul 1952)
LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 18 Jul)
LtCol Richard D. Strickler (from 24 Nov)
LtCol Robert S. Howell (from 22 Mar
1953)
LtCol Russell Duncan (from 26 May)
LtCol Stanley J. Nelson (from 31 Jul)
_1st Battalion, 7th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol George W. E. Daughtry (to 2 Aug
1952)
LtCol Leo J. Dulacki (from 3 Aug)
LtCol James C. Short (from 22 Nov)
LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 28
Dec)
LtCol Harry A. Hadd (from 18 May 1953)
Executive Officer Maj Henry V. Joslin (to 14 Jul 1952)
Maj Theodore R. Cathey (from 15 Jul)
Maj James C. Short (from 23 Jul)
Maj Floyd M. Johnson, Jr. (from 2 Aug)
Maj Roy H. Thompson (from 1 Dec)
Maj Glenn E. Ferguson (from 3 Jun
1953)
Maj Joseph R. Motelewski (from 25 Jun)
_2d Battalion, 7th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Noel C. Gregory (to 18 Jul 1952)
LtCol Anthony Caputo (from 19 Jul)
LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 12 Nov)
LtCol Alexander D. Cereghino (from 19
Mar 1953)
LtCol Joseph C. Missar (from 21 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj Erwin Madsen (to 19 Apr 1952)
Maj William J. Zaro (from 20 Apr)
Maj James C. Fetters (from 8 Jun)
Maj Richard H. Mickle (from 24 Oct)
Maj Littleton K. Smith (from 16 Apr
1953)
Maj Ralph E. June (from 17 Jun)
Maj Don P. Wyckoff (from 17 Jul)
_3d Battalion, 7th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Houston Stiff (to 26 Apr 1952)
Maj Franklin C. Bacon (from 27 Apr)
LtCol Gerald F. Russell (from 17 Jun)
LtCol Charles D. Barrett, Jr. (from
13 Oct)
LtCol Russell Duncan (from 14 Mar
1953)
LtCol Paul M. Jones (from 26 May)
Executive Officer Maj Franklin C. Bacon (to 26 Apr 1952)
Maj Richard M. Remington (from 27 Apr)
Maj Harold T. Clemens (from 28 Aug)
Maj Guy L. Wade (from 13 Oct)
Maj Alfred A. Tillman (from 23 Oct)
Maj John Mesko (from 25 May 1953)
_11th Marines_
Commanding Officer Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep
1952)
Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep)
Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953)
Col Manly L. Curry (from 5 Jul)
Executive Officer LtCol Lewis A. Jones (to 4 Jun 1952)
LtCol Robert F. Steidtmann (from 5
Jun)
LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 16 Jan
1953)
LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. (from 6
May)
Maj Joseph E. Fogg (from 6 Jul)
LtCol Wade H. Hitt (from 9 Jul)
_1st Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol James R. Haynes (to 24 Jun 1952)
LtCol David S. Randall (from 25 Jun)
LtCol Olin W. Jones, Jr. (from 2 Nov)
LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 8 May
1953)
Executive Officer Maj Harold E. Nelson (to 21 Jun 1952)
Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 22 Jun)
Maj Lee P. Vance (from 26 Jul)
Maj Harry L. Sherwood, Jr. (from 14 Nov)
Maj Thomas L. Randall (from 17 Dec)
Maj John J. Jarvis, Jr. (from 25 Mar
1953)
_2d Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol George B. Thomas (to 2 May 1952)
LtCol William P. Pala (from 3 May)
LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 6 Aug)
LtCol Arthur J. Bachhuber (from 17 Nov)
LtCol William H. Atkinson (from 10
Feb 1953)
Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 21 May)
LtCol Gordon H. West (from 18 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj Morris R. Snead (to 10 Jun 1952)
Maj Edward L. Fossum (from 11 Jun)
LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 1 Jul)
Maj Roy E. Moffett (from 10 Aug)
Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 2 Sep)
Maj Joseph F. Donahoe, Jr. (from 24
May 1953)
Maj Herman Poggemeyer, Jr. (from 13
Jul)
_3d Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Henry E. W. Barnes (to 13 Jul
1952)
LtCol Charles O. Rogers (from 14 Jul)
LtCol Daniel S. Pregnall (from 27 Nov)
LtCol Alfred L. Owens (from 25 Mar 1953)
Maj Dale D. Meyers (from 28 Jul)
Executive Officer LtCol Charles A. Lipot (to 5 Jul 1952)
Maj Joseph S. Gardner (from 6 Jul)
Maj William J. Kohler (from 27 Jul)
Maj Lawrence L. Graham (from 17 Nov)
Maj Robert M. Jenkins (from 15 Dec)
Maj Adoph J. Honeycutt (from 28 Mar
1953)
Maj Robert C. Hilliard (from 7 May)
Maj Leslie L. Page (from 12 Jun to 26
Jul)
_4th Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol William M. Gilliam (to 11 Apr
1952)
LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (from 12 Apr)
Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 16 Jun)
LtCol Raymond D. Wright (from 16 Jul)
Maj William J. Sullivan (from 18 Dec)
LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 20 Dec)
Maj David L. Moberly (from 23 Apr 1953)
LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 27
Apr)
Executive Officer LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (to 16 Apr 1952)
Maj Richard H. Jeschke, Jr. (from 17
Apr)
Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 11 Jun)
Maj Edward E. Davis (from 16 Jun)
Maj William J. Sullivan (from 17 Oct)
Maj David L. Moberly (from 22 Feb
1953)
Maj Johnny Jennings (from 2 May)
Maj George W. Carrington, Jr. (from
13 Jun)
_7th Motor Transport Battalion_
Commanding Officer Maj Herbert E. Pierce (to 1 Jul 1952)
LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 2 Jul)
Maj John H. Faggart (from 27 Jul)
Maj Robert S. Anderson (from 16 Jun
1953)
Executive Officer Maj Ben Sutts (to 5 May 1952)
Maj John J. Howe (from 16 Aug)
Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 20 Nov)
Maj Alfred G. McCormick (from 26 Apr
1953)
_1st Ordnance Battalion_
Commanding Officer Maj Harold C. Borth (to 5 May 1952)
LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May)
Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 26 Aug)
Maj Maurice C. Pulliam (from 25 Mar
1953)
Executive Officer Capt Frederick V. Osborn (to 5 May 1952)
Maj Harold C. Borth (from 6 May)
Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 16 Jul)
Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 26 Aug)
Maj Allen F. Stockdale (from 1 Sep)
Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 15 Sep)
Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 4 Nov)
Maj Maurice C. Pulliam (from 21 Dec)
Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 25 Mar
1953)
Maj Jack G. Fitzgerald (from 4 Jul)
_1st Service Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Bernard W. McLean (to 18 May 1952)
LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 19 May)
LtCol Edwin A. Law (from 1 Oct)
LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 5 Jul 1953)
Executive Officer Maj George E. Allison (to 27 Oct 1952)
Maj James C. Fetters (from 28 Oct)
Maj Robert “J” Vroegindewey (from 19
Mar 1953)
_1st Tank Battalion_
Commanding Officer Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20
May 1952)
LtCol John I. Williamson (from 21 May)
LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr
1953)
Executive Officer Maj Edward C. Nelson, Jr. (to 15 Jun
1952)
Maj Robert B. Jeter (from 16 Jun)
Maj William W. Day (from 21 Feb 1953)
Maj Francis C. Hogan (from 6 May)
_1st Armored Amphibian Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol John T. O’Neill (to 5 Aug 1952)
Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug)
LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12
Aug)
LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec)
Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May
1953)
LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15
Jul)
Executive Officer Maj James L. Jones (to 5 Aug 1952)
Maj David Young (from 6 Aug)
Maj James L. Jones (from 12 Aug)
Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 21 Nov)
Maj Robert S. Wilson (from 16 May 1953)
_1st Motor Transport Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Howard E. Wertman (to 15 May 1952)
Maj Walter R. O’Quinn (from 16 May)
LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 27 Jul)
LtCol Robert E. McCook (from 24 Mar
1953)
Executive Officer Maj Raymond L. Luckel (to 2 Aug 1952)
Maj Marvin D. Grush (from 3 Aug)
Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 6 Sep)
Maj Gobe Smith, Jr. (from 4 Oct)
Maj Robert C. McNab, Jr. (from 17 Feb
1953)
_1st Combat Service Group_
Commanding Officer Col Russell N. Jordahl (to 29 Jun 1952)
Col Kenneth A. King (from 30 Jun)
LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Nov)
Col James T. Wilbur (from 8 Dec)
Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 8 Feb 1953)
Col James A. Moreau (from 8 Jul)
Executive Officer LtCol James G. Kelly (to 20 May 1952)
Col Frank M. Reinecke (from 21 May)
LtCol William H. Cushing (from 11 Jun)
LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Dec)
LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 28 Jan 1953)
LtCol Tillman N. Peters (from 15 Mar)
Maj Harvey B. Atkins (from 11 May)
_1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug 1952)
LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug)
LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7 Nov)
LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from
16 Mar 1953)
Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj William L. Eubank (to 3 Jun 1952)
Maj George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 4 Jun)
Maj William E. Lunn (from 7 Nov)
Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 24 Mar
1953)
Maj John J. DePalma (from 20 Jun)
_1st Shore Party Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul
1952)
Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul)
LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct)
Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec)
Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar
1953)
Executive Officer Maj Frederick F. Draper (to 3 Jun
1952)
Maj William E. Buron (from 4 Jun)
LtCol Clyde P. Ford (from 12 Aug)
LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 3
Mar 1953)
LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 18
Apr)
LtCol James M. Joyner (from 8 Jul)
_1st Engineer Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol John V. Kelsey (to 5 May 1952)
LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 6 May)
LtCol Francis W. Augustine (from 1 Dec)
LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 20
Apr 1953)
Executive Officer Maj Grover C. Williams, Jr. (to 5 Jun
1952)
Maj Francis W. Augustine (from 6 Jun)
Maj George W. Torbert (from 1 Dec)
Maj Donald V. Nahrgang (from 26 Jun
1953)
_1st Medical Battalion_
Commanding Officer Cdr Richard Lawrence, Jr., USN (to 31
Aug 1952)
Cdr William W. Ayres, USN (from 1 Sep)
Executive Officer Cdr James C. Luce, USN (to 12 May 1952)
(none listed from 13 May to 8 Jun)
LCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN (from 9
Jun)
Cdr Roald N. Grant, USN (from 24 Aug
to 21 Sep)
(none listed from 22 Sep to 25 Apr 1953)
Lt Roger D. Williams, USN (from 26 Apr)
_1st Signal Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol John E. Morris (to 3 Apr 1952)
LtCol Alton L. Hicks (from 4 Apr)
LtCol Jacob E. Glick (from 3 Aug)
LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 16
Feb 1953 to 22 Apr 1953)
Executive Officer Maj Ernest C. Bennett (to 4 Apr 1952)
Maj Bolish J. Kozak (from 5 Apr)
Maj Mauro J. Padalino (from 12 Jul)
Maj Frederick J. Cramer (from 30 Dec)
Maj John J. Reber (from 8 Feb 1953 to
22 Apr 1953)
(This battalion was disbanded on 22 Apr 1953.)
_1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW)_
Commanding General MajGen Christian F. Schilt (to 11 Apr
1952)
MajGen Clayton C. Jerome (from 12 Apr
1952)
MajGen Vernon E. Megee (from 9 Jan
1953)
Asst Commanding General BGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner (to 30
Aug 1952)
BGen Alexander W. Kreiser, Jr. (from
31 Aug)
Chief of Staff Col Arthur F. Binney (to 30 Apr 1952)
Col Frank H. Schwable (from 1 May)
Col John Wehle (from 9 Jul)
Col Samuel S. Jack (from 8 Sep)
Col John C. Munn (from 8 May 1953)
Asst Chief of Staff, G-1 Col Robert O. Bisson (to 7 Sep 1952)
Col Lewis H. Delano, Jr. (from 8 Sep)
LtCol William M. Frash (from 11 May
1953)
Col Lawrence B. Clark (from 29 May)
Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 Col John W. Stage (to 14 May 1952)
LtCol Chester A. Henry, Sr. (from 15
May)
Maj Donald E. Kramer (from 22 Jul)
LtCol Harold Granger (from 16 Sep)
Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 25 Jul 1953)
Asst Chief of Staff, G-3 Col Stanley W. Trachta (to 8 Apr 1952)
Col William R. Wendt (from 9 Apr)
Col Louis B. Robertshaw (from 2 Sep)
Col Charles H. Hayes (from 29 Sep)
Col William D. Roberson (from 30 May
1953)
Col Frank H. Wirsig (from 5 Jul)
Asst Chief of Staff, G-4 Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 Mar 1952)
Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 Mar)
Col Robert W. Clark (from 24 May)
Col Richard D. Hughes (from 11 Feb
1953)
Col Richard M. Baker (from 4 Jul)
_Headquarters Squadron, 1st MAW_
Commanding Officer Maj Earl C. Miles (to 29 May 1952)
Maj David R. Moak (from 30 May)
Maj Charles H. Woodley (from 1 Sep)
Maj Lionel D. Hastings (from 26 Sep)
Maj Charles W. Boggs, Jr. (from 1 Mar
1953)
Maj Fred J. Gilhuly (from 1 Jul)
_Marine Wing Service Squadron 1 (MWSS-1)_
(Decommissioned 1 Jul 1953)
and
_Marine Wing Service Group 17 (MWSG-17)_
(Commissioned 1 Jul 1953)
Commanding Officer Col John Wehle (to 8 Apr 1952)
LtCol Birney B. Truitt (from 9 Apr)
LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 17 Jul)
Col Lyle H. Meyer (from 21 Sep)
LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 11 May 1953)
Col Robert J. Johnson (from 30 Jun)
Executive Officer LtCol Birney B. Truitt (to 8 Apr 1952)
Maj William L. Woodruff (from 9 Apr)
Maj Edward L. Schnettler (from 4 Jun)
Maj Franklin L. Kemper (from 26 Aug)
LtCol William G. Voss (from 20 Dec)
LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 21 Apr 1953)
Maj Elswin P. Dunn (from 11 May)
LtCol Charles J. Prall (from 6 Jul)
_Headquarters Squadron, MWSG-17_
(Commissioned 1 Jul 1953)
Commanding Officer Capt James D. Ireland (from 1 Jul 1953)
_Marine Air Base Squadron 17 (MABS-17)_
(Activated 1 Jul 1953)
Commanding Officer Maj Bryce Howerton (from 1 Jul 1953)
_Marine Aircraft Repair Squadron 17 (MARS-17)_
(Activated 1 Jul 1953)
Commanding Officer Maj Vincent Franano (from 1 Jul 1953)
Maj James G. Fox (from 29 Jul)
_Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2)_
Commanding Officer Col Frederick R. Payne (to 18 May 1952)
Col John W. Stage (from 19 May)
Col Jack R. Cram (from 11 Jul)
Col Kenneth D. Kerby (from 16 Feb 1953)
Executive Officer LtCol Russell D. Rupp (to 1 May 1952)
LtCol Philip “L” Crawford (from 2 May)
LtCol William A. Houston, Jr. (from
20 Jun)
LtCol Harold L. Lantz (from 11 Aug)
LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (from 24 Feb 1953)
LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from
23 May)
LtCol John S. Flickinger (from 10 Jun)
LtCol Morris E. Flater (from 21 Jun)
_Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Hensley Williams (to 2 Jun 1952)
Maj Clinton E. Jones (from 3 Jun)
LtCol William H. Whitaker, Jr. (from
1 Aug)
LtCol Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from
21 Aug)
LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 28 Jan
1953)
Col Joseph A. Gerath, Jr. (from 20 Feb)
LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from
11 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj Clinton E. Jones (to 2 Jun 1952)
Capt John F. Driftmier (from 3 Jun)
Maj George C. Henshaw (from 28 Aug)
Maj Thomas H. Hughes, Jr. (from 25 Sep)
LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 20 Feb
1953)
(none listed from 15 Mar to 9 Jul)
Capt Robert L. Dietrichson (from 10 Jul)
_Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1
(MGCIS-1)_
Commanding Officer Maj Fred A. Steele (to 15 Aug 1952)
Maj Henry W. Hise (from 16 Aug)
Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 16 Oct)
LtCol Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 3
Feb 1953)
Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 1 Jun)
LtCol Harold F. Brown (from 23 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr (to 11 Apr
1952)
Capt William J. Wachsler (from 12 Apr)
Capt Francis K. McManus (from 22 May)
Maj William Sloane (from 1 Aug)
Maj Romeo F. Bordigon (from 4 Oct)
Maj Tolbert T. Gentry (from 2 Nov)
Maj Francis F. Rotter (from 8 Jan 1953)
Capt John E. Dixon (from 31 May)
Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 23 Jun)
_Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3
(MGCIS-3)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Owen M. Hines (to 20 May 1952)
Maj James H. Foster (from 21 May)
LtCol Robert J. Hoey (from 14 Jun)
LtCol Kenneth D. Frazier (from 16 Aug)
LtCol John B. Maas, Jr. (from 3 Feb
1953)
Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 19 May)
Maj James E. Lovin, Jr. (from 1 Jul)
LtCol Lowell D. Grow (from 27 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj James H. Foster (to 1 Jun 1952)
Capt Lee B. Swindall (from 2 Jun)
Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 21 Jun)
Maj Raleigh E. Fletcher (from 5 Sep)
Maj Francis E. Lee, Jr. (from 29 Oct)
Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 4 Feb
1953)
Capt William K. Lebo (from 19 May)
Maj Thomas E. Archer (from 20 Jun)
Maj James E. Lovin, Jr. (from 27 Jul)
_Marine Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1)_
(Activated 15 Sep 1952)
Commanding Officer LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (to 24 Jan 1953)
LtCol Ernest C. Fusan (from 25 Jan)
LtCol Thomas “H” Mann, Jr. (from 16 Mar)
Maj George H. Linnemeier (from 6 Apr)
LtCol Wilbur A. Free (from 1 Jun)
_Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)_
Commanding Officer Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 May 1952)
Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 May)
Col John P. Condon (from 10 Aug)
Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 13
Jan 1953)
Col Edward B. Carney (from 1 Apr)
Executive Officer LtCol Robert J. Hoey (to 5 Jun 1952)
LtCol Joseph A. Gray (from 6 Jun)
Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 17 Aug)
LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 20 Feb
1953)
Col Robert J. Johnson (from 19 Mar)
Col William F. Hausman (from 30 Jun)
_Headquarters Squadron, MAG-12_
Commanding Officer Capt George Byers, Jr. (to 22 Apr 1952)
1stLt Daniel F. McConnell (from 24 Apr)
Maj Godfrey Muller (from 1 Jul)
Capt William M. Crooks (from 18 Sep)
Capt Edgar F. Remington (from 21 Dec)
Capt Bradford N. Slenning (from 15
May 1953)
_Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Carl M. Longley (to 31 Mar 1952)
Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 1 Apr)
LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 25 Aug)
LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 11 Oct)
LtCol Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Jan
1953)
LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 1 Mar)
LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 1 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj Robert A. Collett (to 31 Mar 1952)
Maj LeRoy T. Frey (from 1 Apr)
Maj Oscar C. Hauge, Jr. (from 26 May)
Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 18 Aug)
LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 18 Sep)
Maj Frank Hick (from 11 Oct)
Maj Harry J. Anderson (from 20 Jan 1953)
LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 14 Apr)
Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 11 Jul)
_Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12 (MAMS-12)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Joseph A. Gray (to 31 May 1952)
Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 1 Jun)
Maj William M. Johnston, Jr. (from 19
Aug)
Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 29 Dec)
LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 20 Feb
1953)
LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 27 Jun)
Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 18 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj Robert E. Will (to 26 Apr 1952)
Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 27 Apr)
Capt Robert T. Kinsey (from 1 Jun)
Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 19 Aug)
Maj Warren L. MacQuarrie (from 1 Sep)
Maj John R. Hyneman (from 15 Dec)
Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 20 Feb 1953)
Maj Alexander Gagyi (from 15 Apr)
Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 12 Jul)
_Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121)_
Commanding Officer LtCol William Q. Houston, Jr. (to 19
Jun 1952)
LtCol Philip “L” Crawford (from 20 Jun)
LtCol Wayne M. Cargill (from 11 Sep)
LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 7 Dec)
LtCol John E. Hughes (from 1 Mar 1953)
Maj Richard L. Braun (from 21 Apr)
LtCol Harold B. Penne (from 16 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj Henry W. Horst (to 31 May 1952)
Maj Robert H. Brumley (from 1 Jun)
Maj Julius B. Griffin (from 30 Jul)
LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 2 Nov)
LtCol Roy R. Hewitt (from 11 Dec)
LtCol John E. Hughes (from 17 Jan 1953)
Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 1 Mar)
Maj Robert C. Woten (from 16 Jul)
_Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF-212)_
redesignated
_Marine Attack Squadron 212 (VMA-212)_
on 10 Jun 1952
Commanding Officer LtCol Robert L. Bryson (to 9 Jun 1952)
LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 10 Jun)
LtCol Maurice W. Fletcher (from 5 Sep)
LtCol Charles E. Dobson, Jr. (from 25
Oct)
LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 1 Jan
1953)
LtCol Louis R. Smunk (from 20 Feb)
Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 1 Jun)
LtCol James R. Wallace (from 19 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj Richard B. Elliott (to 29 Feb 1952)
Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 8 Mar)
Maj Leslie C. Reed (from 10 Jun)
LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 25 Oct)
Maj Norman O’Bryan (from 20 Feb 1953)
Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 7 Mar)
Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 1 Jun)
Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 19 Jun)
Maj Boris J. Frankovic (from 20 Jul)
_Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (VMF-323)_
redesignated
_Marine Attack Squadron 323 (VMA-323)_
on 30 Jun 1952
(Transferred from operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing on 7 Jul 1953)
Commanding Officer LtCol Richard L. Blume (to 25 Apr 1952)
Maj William A. Weir (from 26 Apr)
LtCol Henry S. Miller (from 1 Jun)
LtCol Kenneth R. Chamberlain (from 1
Sep)
LtCol Williard C. Lemke (from 20 Nov)
LtCol William M. Frash (from 13 Jan
1953)
LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 11 Apr
to 26 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj William A. Weir (to 8 Jun 1952)
Maj Richard E. Pryor (from 9 Jun)
Maj Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Sep)
Maj Thomas M. Forsyth, Jr. (from 20 Nov)
LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 2 Jan
1953)
LtCol Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from
29 Jan)
Maj Robert C. Woten (from 3 May to 26
Jun)
_Marine Attack Squadron 332 (VMA-332)_
(Came under the operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
on 29 May 1953)
Commanding Officer LtCol John B. Berteling (from 29 May
1953).
Executive Officer Maj Gordon L. Allen (from 29 May 1953)
_Marine Attack Squadron (VMA-251)_
attached to
_1st Marine Aircraft Wing_
on 9 Jun 1953
Commanding Officer LtCol Harold A. Harwood (from 9 Jun
1953)
Executive Officer Maj James W. Merritt (from 9 Jun 1953)
_Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (VMF(N)-513)_
Commanding Officer LtCol John R. Burnett (to 11 Jun 1952)
Col Peter D. Lambrecht (from 12 Jun)
LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 19 Jun)
LtCol Homer G. Hutchinson, Jr. (from
9 Sep)
LtCol Robert F. Conley (from 20 Jan
1953)
LtCol Ross S. Mickey (from 6 May)
LtCol Robert L. Conrad (from 10 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj Frank H. Simonds (to 19 Apr 1952)
Maj William D. Patterson, Jr. (from
23 Apr)
LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 15 Aug)
Maj Gorden E. Gray (from 20 Aug)
LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 8 Sep)
LtCol Jack B. Winters (from 14 Sep)
Maj Dave E. Severance (from 20 Jan 1953)
Maj Richard M. Hunt (from 9 Jun)
LtCol Robert L. Conrad (from 24 Jun)
Maj Richard M. Hunt (from 10 Jul)
_Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33)_
Commanding Officer Col Martin A. Severson (to 23 May 1952)
Col John P. Condon (from 24 May)
Col Herbert H. Williamson (from 11 Aug)
Col Louis B. Robertshaw (from 22 Oct)
Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 10 May 1953)
Col John L. Smith (from 24 Jul)
Executive Officer LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (to 13 May 1952)
LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 14 May)
Col Herbert H. Williamson (from 26 Jul)
LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (from 11 Aug)
Col John P. Coursey (from 17 Aug)
Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 25 Mar 1953)
LtCol James K. Dill (from 11 May)
LtCol Thomas V. Murto, Jr. (from 26 Jul)
_Headquarters Squadron, MAG-33_
Commanding Officer Capt Allen R. Schutter (to 30 May 1952)
Maj Guy M. Cloud (from 1 Jun)
Maj Richard J. Collins (from 21 Jul)
Maj Reuel H. Pietz (from 1 Nov)
Maj Thomas J. Cushman, Jr. (from 14
Apr 1953)
Capt Jerry N. Hendershot (from 26 May)
_Marine Air Base Squadron 33 (MABS-33)_
Commanding Officer Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (to 9 Jun 1952)
Maj John W. Zuber (from 10 Jun)
Maj William D. Patterson, Jr. (from 6
Aug)
Maj Kenneth B. Nelson (from 9 Dec)
LtCol Bernard McShane (from 21 Apr 1953)
LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 1 Jun)
LtCol Jack Cosley (from 26 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj George K. Harshberger (to 1 May
1952)
Maj Summerfield M. Taylor, Jr. (from
2 May)
Capt Frederic T. Watts, Jr. (from 11
Aug)
Maj Harold N. McLaffey (from 2 Oct)
Maj Darwin P. Glaese (from 23 Dec)
Capt George J. Collins (from 22 May
1953)
_Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33 (MAMS-33)_
Commanding Officer Maj Zadik Collier (to 1 Sep 1952)
Maj William N. Case (from 2 Sep)
Maj Patrick Harrison (from 5 Feb 1953)
Maj Julian P. Craigmiles (from 29 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj Alton C. Bennett (from 1 Aug 1952)
Maj John L. Herndon (from 12 Aug)
Maj James Aldworth (from 2 Dec)
Capt Marshall S. Austin (from 22
April 1953)
_Marine Fighter Squadron 115 (VMF-115)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas M. Coles (to 20 May 1952)
Maj John W. Zuber (from 21 May)
LtCol Robert C. Armstead (from 5 Jun)
Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 17 Jul)
LtCol Royce W. Coln (from 18 Aug)
LtCol John B. Maas, Jr. (from 29 Sep)
LtCol Stoddard G. Cortelyou (from 1
Feb 1953)
LtCol Joe L. Warren (from 31 Mar)
LtCol Lynn H. Stewart (from 5 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj Conrad G. Winter (to 26 Apr 1952)
Maj John W. Zuber (from 27 Apr)
Maj Griffith B. Doyle (from 21 May)
Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 10 Jun)
Maj Arthur N. Nehf, Jr. (from 5 Aug)
LtCol Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 19
Nov)
LtCol Joe L. Warren (from 2 Feb 1953)
Maj Carol Bernard (from 31 Mar)
Maj James H. Phillips (from 25 Jun)
_Marine Fighter Squadron 311 (VMF-311)_
Commanding Officer LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (to 2 Jun 1952)
Maj Henry W. Hise (from 3 Jun)
Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 10 Jun)
Maj William J. Sims (from 26 Jun)
LtCol Arthur H. Adams (from 1 Oct)
LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 1 Feb 1953)
LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 21 Apr)
LtCol Bernard McShane (from 1 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj Jay E. McDonald (to 27 Mar 1952)
Maj Henry W. Hise (from 28 Mar)
Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 26 Jun)
Maj Harold A. Langstaff, Jr. (from 22
Aug)
Maj Williams J. Sims (from 1 Oct)
LtCol Walter R. Bartosh (from 12 Oct)
LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 20 Jan
1953)
Maj John Skinner, Jr. (from 21 Apr)
Maj William D. Heier (from 3 Jul)
_Marine Attack Squadron (VMA-312)_
(On 16 Jun 1953, this squadron was reassigned to the
3d Marine Aircraft Wing.)
Commanding Officer LtCol Joe H. McGlothlin, Jr. (to 8
Apr 1952)
LtCol Robert E. Smith, Jr. (from 9 Apr)
LtCol George C. Axtell, Jr. (from 11
Jul)
LtCol Robert E. Cameron (from 4 Oct)
LtCol Winston E. Jewson (from 25 Jan
to 15 Jun 1953)
Executive Officer Maj Alexander S. Walker, Jr. (to 7
Apr 1952)
Maj Edmond P. Hartsock (from 9 Apr)
Maj Walter D. Persons (from 11 Jul)
Maj Marshall C. Gregory (from 1 Sep)
Maj James W. Baker (from 13 Jan 1953)
Maj Grover R. Betzer (from 2 Feb)
Maj James L. Cooper (from 4 May to 10
Jun)
_Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ-1)_
Commanding Officer Maj Robert R. Read (to 13 May 1952)
LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (from 14 May)
LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 11 Sep)
LtCol Howard L. Walter (from 1 Nov)
LtCol William M. Ritchey (from 16 Feb
1953)
LtCol Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. (from 15 May)
Executive Officer Maj Albert E. James (to 3 Jun 1952)
Maj Marion B. Bowers (from 4 Jun)
Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 18 Jul)
LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 28 Aug)
Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 11 Sep)
Maj Howard L. Walter (from 2 Oct)
Maj Louis Conti (from 6 Nov)
LtCol Grant W. McCombs (from 14 Dec)
Maj Louis Conti (from 5 Feb 1953)
Maj John E. Worlund (from 1 Apr)
_Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 (HMR-161)_
Commanding Officer Col Keith B. McCutcheon (to 7 Aug 1952)
LtCol John F. Carey (from 8 Aug)
Col Owen A. Chambers (from 15 Mar 1953)
Executive Officer Maj James R. Dyer (to 10 May 1952)
Maj Zigmund J. Radolinski (from 11 May)
LtCol David M. Danser (from 28 May)
LtCol Russel R. Riley (from 1 Sep)
Maj Gilbert Percy (from 3 Jun 1953)
LtCol John H. King, Jr. (from 1 Jul)
_Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)_
Commanding Officer LtCol William H. Herring (to 10 May
1952)
Maj Wallace J. Slappey, Jr. (from 11
May)
LtCol Elkin S. Dew (from 11 Sep)
LtCol William A. Cloman, Jr. (from 2
Feb 1953)
LtCol Earl E. Anderson (from 1 Jul)
Executive Officer Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (from 1 Jul)
Maj Lynn E. Midkiff (from 26 Jun)
Maj Alton W. McCully (from 5 Feb 1953)
Maj John A. Hood (from 15 May)
_1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion_
Battalion Commander Col Max C. Chapman (to 22 Nov 1952)
Col Edgar O. Price (from 23 Nov)
LtCol Henry S. Massie (from 7 Apr 1953)
Executive Officer LtCol Kenneth P. Dunkle (to 30 Apr 1952)
Maj Thomas J. Matthews (from 1 May)
Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 15 Mar
1953)
Maj Henry V. Leasure (from 9 Jun)
APPENDIX D
Effective Strength
1ST MARINE DIVISION AND 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING[799]
Listed below are selected dates and figures which represent the
effective strength of 1stMarDiv and 1st MAW throughout the 1952–1953
period.
--------------------------------------------------------
Date Officers Enlisted Total
--------------------------------------------------------
31 Mar 52 2,238 30,790 33,028
ground (1,412) (24,811) (26,223)
aviation ( 826) ( 5,979) ( 6,805)
30 June 52 2,560 34,509 37,069
ground (1,684) (28,549) (30,233)
aviation ( 876) ( 5,960) ( 6,836)
31 Oct 52 2,403 33,726 36,129
ground (1,423) (26,795) (28,218)
aviation ( 980) ( 6,931) ( 7,911)
31 Jan 53 2,329 32,976 35,305
ground (1,352) (26,766) (28,118)
aviation ( 977) ( 6,210) ( 7,187)
30 Apr 53 2,307 33,995 36,302
ground (1,370) (28,172) (29,542)
aviation ( 937) ( 5,823) ( 6,760)
31 Jul 53 2,335 31,881 34,216[800]
ground (1,412) (25,299) (26,711)
aviation ( 923) ( 6,582) ( 7,505)
--------------------------------------------------------
[799] Personnel figures file, Statistics Br., HQMC, 31 May
1950–31 Jan 1955.
[800] In addition, the 1stMarDiv was reinforced throughout
this period by other indigenous military and civilian
personnel.
APPENDIX E
Marine Corps Casualties
(Ground and Air)
KOREAN WAR 1950–1953[801]
---------------------------------------------------------------
Date KIA[802] Killed WIA Cumulative
non-Battle Total
---------------------------------------------------------------
Aug-Dec 1950 1,526 30 6,229 7,785
Jan-Dec 1951 960 82 7,924 8,966
Jan-Mar 1952 87 19 600 706
-------------------------------------------
Aug 1950-Mar 1952 2,573 131 14,753 17,457
Apr-Dec 1952 960 66 6,815 7,841
Jan-Jul 1953 729 47 4,470 5,246
-------------------------------------------
Apr 1952-Jul 1953 1,689 113 11,285 13,087
TOTAL:
Aug 1950 to
Jul 1953 4,262 244 26,038 30,544
---------------------------------------------------------------
[801] Abstracted from U. S. Marine Corps Strength in Korea vs
Korean Casualties by Month, 25 Jun 1950–27 Jul 1953,
based on Korean Operation Report, Statistics Br., HQMC
and Log Sheet, dtd 21 Aug 1967.
[802] KIA includes DOW, Captured and Died, and Missing In
Action, Presumed Dead.
APPENDIX F
Marine Pilots and Enemy Aircraft Downed in Korean War
21Apr51 1stLt Harold D. Daigh
(VMF-312, F4U-4, USS _Bataan_) 1 YAK
21Apr51 Capt Phillip C. DeLong
(VMF-312, F4U-4, USS _Bataan_) 2 YAKs
30Jun51 [A]Capt Edwin B. Long
(VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N) 1 PO-2
12Jul51 Capt Donald L. Fenton
(VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL) 1 PO-2
23Sep51 Maj Eugene A. Van Gundy
(VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N) 1 PO-2
4Nov51 [B]Maj William F. Guss
(VMF-311) 1 MIG
5Mar52 [B]Capt Vincent J. Marzello
(VMF-311) 1 MIG
16Mar52 [B]LtCol John S. Payne
(1st MAW) 1 MIG
7June52 1stLt John W. Andre
(VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL) 1 YAK-9
10Sep52 Capt Jesse G. Folmar
(VMA-312, F4U, USS _Sicily_) 1 MIG
15Sep52 [B]Maj Alexander J. Gillis
(VMF-311) 1 MIG
28Sep52 [B]Maj Alexander J. Gillis
(VMF-311) 2 MIGs
3Nov52 [C]Maj William T. Stratton, Jr.
(VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 YAK-15
8Nov52 Capt Oliver R. Davis
(VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG
10Dec52 [D]1stLt Joseph A. Corvi
(VMF(K)-513, F3D-2) 1 PO-2
12Jan53 Maj Elswin P. Dunn
(VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG
20Jan53 [B]Capt Robert Wade
(MAG-33) 1 MIG
28Jan53 Capt James R. Weaver
(VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG
31Jan53 LtCol Robert F. Conley
(VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG
7Apr53 [B]Maj Roy L. Reed
(VMF 115) 1 MIG
12Apr53 [B]Maj Roy L. Reed
(VMF 115) 1 MIG
16May53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt
(VMF-115) 1 MIG
18May53 [B]Capt Harvey L. Jensen
(VMF 115) 1 MIG
22Jun53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt
(VMF 115) 1 MIG
24Jun53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt
(VMF 115) 1 MIG
30Jun53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt
(VMF 115) 1 MIG
11Jul53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt
(VMF-115) 2 MIGs
12Jul53 [B]Maj John H. Glenn
(VMF-311) 1 MIG
19Jul53 [B]Maj John H. Glenn
(VMF-311) 1 MIG
20Jul53 [B]Maj Thomas M. Sellers
(VMF-115) 2 MIGs
22Jul53 [B]Maj John H. Glenn
(VMF-311) 1 MIG
[A] Marines on temporary exchange duty with Fifth Air Force.
[B] First enemy aircraft destroyed at night by UNC.
[C] First enemy jet aircraft destroyed through use of
airborne intercept radar equipped fighter.
[D] First enemy aircraft destroyed by means of lock-on radar
gear.
APPENDIX G
Unit Citations[803]
[803] For text of previous awards to 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, and
1st ProvMarBrig, see earlier volumes of this series.
PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION
_The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure
in citing
for outstanding and superior performance of duty during the
period 26 October 1950 to 27 July 1953_[804]
THE FIRST UNITED STATES MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)
_for the award of_
PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION
Landing at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 the First United States Marine
Division (Reinforced) advanced to Yudam-ni where they engaged the
Chinese Communist Forces. The heroic and courageous fighting of the
First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), which was outnumbered
but never outfought by the Chinese Communist Forces; coupled with its
fight against the terrible winter weather in this return to Hungnam,
has added another glorious page to the brilliant history of the United
States Marines. After regrouping and retraining, the First United
States Marine Division (Reinforced) rejoined the United Nations
Forces and began the attack to the north which drove the aggressors
relentlessly before them. The enemy spring offensive during April
1951 which threatened to nullify the recent United Nations gains was
successfully repulsed by the First Marine Division (Reinforced) and
when other Republic of Korea Forces were heavily pressed and fighting
for survival the timely offensive by this Division gave heart to the
peoples of Korea. In March 1952 the First Marine Division (Reinforced)
assumed responsibility of defending the western flank of the Eighth
Army. In carrying out the responsibilities of this assignment the
Marines won everlasting glory at Bunker Hill. Continuing active
operations against the Communist enemy until the Armistice, the First
Marine Division (Reinforced) inflicted heavy losses upon the aggressors
and successfully repulsed their assaults upon strong point Vegas and
Reno during March 1953, and during July 1953, just prior to the signing
of the Armistice, again threw back the enemy in several days of severe
fighting at strong points Berlin and East Berlin. Although suffering
heavy losses during these engagements the First Marine Division
(Reinforced) was at all times successful in maintaining the integrity
of the United Nations’ positions within their assigned sector. The
First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), by its unparalleled
fighting courage and steadfast devotion to duty, has won the undying
affection and gratitude of the Korean people. During its entire
campaign the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) remained
true to its motto of “Semper Fidelis”. In keeping faith with the
highest traditions of its own country the First United States Marine
Division (Reinforced) kindled new hope in the breasts of all free men
and women in the Republic of Korea. This Citation carries with it the
right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual
member of the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) who
served in Korea during the stated period.
/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE
_President_
[804] The Korean PUC, for the period 26 Oct 50 to 15 Feb 53,
was presented to the 1stMarDiv in March 1953. Later,
President Syngman Rhee furnished a second citation
extending the period to include 16 Feb-27 Jul 53. The
division was thus cited for the overall period 26 Oct 50
to 27 Jul 53, and the entire period is considered one
award. Decorations & Medals Br., HQMC.
PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION
_The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure
in citing
for outstanding and superior performance of duty_
THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
The First Marine Aircraft Wing has distinguished itself in support of
United Nations Forces in Korea from 27 February 1951 to 11 June 1953.
During this period, Marine Aircraft flew over 80,000 combat sorties
braving intense opposition to strike enemy fortifications, weapons
and logistical installations throughout North Korea. These extensive
combat operations, often conducted in hazardous weather, have provided
United Nations’ ground forces with unparalleled close air support and
have inflicted heavy casualties and tremendous damage on enemy forces.
Flying from forward Korean bases and from naval aircraft carriers,
Marine aircraft have continually harassed enemy communication and
transportation systems, successfully curtailing the resupply of hostile
front line troops. The exceptional achievements of the officers and men
of the First Marine Aircraft Wing have materially assisted the Republic
of Korea in its fight for freedom. Their outstanding performance of
duty reflects great credit upon themselves and is in accord with the
highest traditions of military service.
The citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit
Citation Ribbon by each individual member of the First Marine Aircraft
Wing who served in Korea during the stated period.
/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE
_President_
PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION
_The President of the Republic of Korea
takes pleasure in citing_
THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ADVISORY COMPONENT
United States Naval Advisory Group
for outstanding service to the people of Korea and for aid in the
development of the Korean Marine Corps during the period February 1953
to 27 July 1954.
While attached to the Republic of Korea Marine Corps the United States
Marine Advisory Component performed commendable service by giving
valuable advice and guidance thus enabling the Korean Marine Corps to
attain a ready status for any emergency.
By their initiative and constant attention the officers and men have
contributed materially to the effective operation of all offices and
departments of the Korean Marine Corps. Their thorough knowledge of
techniques and military matters has helped in the practical routine
training and in the fitting of the Korean Marine Corps for effective
combat duty.
By exemplary conduct and indomitable spirit the United States Marine
Corps Advisory Component has left a permanent imprint on the Korean
Marine Corps which will assist in the accomplishment of the missions
assigned to it in the future.
The outstanding service of the officers and men of the United States
Marine Corps Advisory Component is in the best tradition of the United
States Naval Service and this Presidential Unit Citation is given in
recognition of their significant contribution to the welfare of the
Republic of Korea.
/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE
_President_
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED
for service as set forth in the following CITATION:
“For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against
enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953
and from 7 to 27 July 1953. During these periods the First Marine
Division, Reinforced, maintained the integrity of over thirty-five
miles of defense line in Panmunjom Truce Area against the constant
aggressions of the enemy. During the time the Division was in the
lines, it was under fire and attack by a resolute, well-equipped and
fanatical hostile force. The Division maintained an raiding defense
and constantly kept the enemy off balance by continuously patrolling,
probing and raiding enemy positions, accompanied by the full weight of
artillery and air support. Commencing in August 1952, and frequently
thereafter, during the months of October 1952, March 1953, and July
1953, the enemy launched a series of large scale attacks to capture
certain terrain features critical to the defense of friendly lines.
The outposts and main defensive positions called Bunker Hill, The
Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, along with certain
smaller outposts, gave title to battles of unsurpassed ferocity in
which the full effort of the Marine Division was required to hurl
back the attackers at heavy cost to both the Division and the enemy.
That the lines in the Division sector remained firm and unbreached at
the cessation of hostilities on 27 July 1953 gave eloquent tribute to
the resourcefulness, courage, professional acumen and stamina of the
members of the First Marine Division, Reinforced. Their inspiring and
unyielding devotion to the fulfillment of their vital mission reflects
the highest credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service.”
All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Division,
Reinforced, during the periods 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953 and 7 to
27 July 1953, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the
NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This includes all organic units of the
Division and the following reinforcing units:
FLEET MARINE FORCE UNITS AND DETACHMENTS: 1st 4.5 Rocket Battery;
1st Combat Service Group; 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 7th Motor
Transport Battalion; 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; 1st Amphibian
Truck Company; Team #1, 1st Provisional Historical Platoon; 1st
Fumigation and Bath Platoon; 1st Air Delivery Platoon; Radio Relay
Team, 1st Signal Operations Company; Detachment, 1st Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Company; 2nd Platoon, Auto Field Maintenance Company; 1st
Provisional Truck Company; Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison
Company.
UNITED STATES ARMY UNITS: (For such periods not included in Army
Unit Awards) 1st Bn, 32nd Regt, 7th Inf Div; 7th Inf Div; 74th Truck
Co.; 513th Truck Co; 3rd Plt, 86th Engr Searchlight Co (passed to
operational control of 11th Marines); 558th Trans Truck Co (Amphibious,
was attached to 7th MT Bn, FMF); 196th Field Arty Bn; 92nd Army
Engr Searchlight Plt; 181st CIC Det USA; 163rd MIS Det USA (Unit
redesignated 1 Sep 1952 to MIS Plt); TLO Det USA; UNMACK Civil Affairs
Team USA; 61st Engr Co; 159th Field Arty Bn (155 Howitzer); 623rd Field
Arty Bn; 17th Field Arty Bn “C” Btry; 204th Field Arty Bn “B” Btry;
84th Engr Construction Bn; 1st Bn, 15th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 65th US
Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 2nd US Div (attached to KPR); Recon Co, 7th
US Inf Div; 461st Inf Bn; Heavy Mortars, 7th Inf Div; 204th Field Arty
Bn “A” Btry; 69th Field Arty Bn; 64th Field Arty Bn; 8th Field Arty Bn;
90th Field Arty Bn; 21st AAA-AW Bn; 89th Tank Bn; 441st CIC Det, USA;
Prov Bn, USA (Dets 31st and 32nd RCTS); Co D, 10th Engr (C) Bn, USA;
Tank Co, 31st Inf, USA; Hqr Co, 31st Inf, USA; 2nd Bn, 31st Inf, USA
(less Co E); 185th Engr (C) Bn, USA (less Co A); Co B, 1st Bn, 31st
Inf, USA.
CHARLES S. THOMAS
_Secretary of the Navy_
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the
FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, REINFORCED
for service as set forth in the following CITATION:
“For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against
enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 1 August 1952 to 27 July 1953.
Flying more than 45,000 combat sorties against determined opposition
during this period, the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, struck
repeatedly and effectively at enemy troops, fortifications, logistical
installations and lines of communication throughout North Korea.
These extensive combat operations provided friendly ground forces
with decisive close air support during such battles as Bunker Hill,
The Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, and inflicted
heavy casualties and tremendous damage upon the enemy. Operating from
naval aircraft carriers and from forward Korean bases, Marine aircraft
continually harassed enemy communication and transportation systems,
curtailing the movement of hostile troops to the front lines, and
provided the air defense of South Korea. The notable record achieved
by the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, is an eloquent tribute
to the resourcefulness, courage and stamina of all her gallant
officers and men. Their inspiring and unyielding devotion to duty in
the fulfillment of these vital tasks reflect the highest credit upon
themselves and the United States Naval Service.”
All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Aircraft
Wing, Reinforced, during the above period, or any part thereof, are
hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This
includes all organic units and the following reinforcing units:
Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 1; 1st 90mm Anti-Aircraft
Artillery Gun Battalion; and Ground Control Approach Unit 41M.
CHARLES S. THOMAS
_Secretary of the Navy_
EXTRACT
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 16 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
_Washington 25, D.C., 3 March 1954_
DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION--Citation of Unit--Section 1
1--DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION.--As authorized by Executive Order 9396
(sec. I, WD Bul, 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec.
III, WD Bul 11, 1942), the following unit is cited under AR 220-315 in
the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of
deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:
1. The Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and the
following attached units: The Turkish Liaison Detachment, 8215th Army
Unit; Company B, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division; and
Company C, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, are cited
for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action
against the enemy near Munsan-ni, Korea, during the period 28 to 29
May 1953. On the night of 28 May, an assault, supported by a heavy
barrage, was launched by a powerful enemy force, determined to wrest
outposts “Elko,” “Carson,” and “Vegas” from friendly hands. The valiant
troops occupying these positions were soon surrounded and hand-to-hand
combat ensued. With great tenacity and courage, the friendly troops
fought on until, with only three of them still standing on outpost
“Carson,” the first position fell. Despite the tremendous number of
casualties they had suffered, the foe intensified the attack on the two
remaining terrain features, rushing repeatedly up the slopes only to be
hurled back by the gallant defenders. Friendly reinforcements arrived
together with concentrated artillery support. All fire power was
brought to bear on the charging enemy, as the defending troops fought
desperately to hold. The foe came on in seemingly endless numbers and
friendly tanks moved into highly vulnerable positions to fire at close
range. Friendly casualties were heavy, but the toll of enemy dead was
enormous. The determined foe paid apparently no attention to their
thousands of casualties and appeared prepared to sacrifice thousands
more to gain their objectives. Realizing that these friendly outposts
could not hope to stand in the face of the endless waves of hostile
troops, the friendly command ordered the outpost defenders to withdraw
to the main line of resistance. The extraordinary heroism, singleness
of purpose, and magnificent fighting spirit exhibited by the members of
the Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and attached
units throughout this crucial battle, resulted in the frustration of
enemy plans to breach the main line of resistance, thus reflecting the
greatest credit on themselves and the military profession.
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
OFFICIAL:
WM. E. BERGIN
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
M. B. RIDGWAY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the
PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to
MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON SIX
for service as set forth in the following CITATION:
“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in
Korea from August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Pioneering in the development
of frontline helicopter evacuation of casualties, Marine Observation
Squadron Six skillfully carried out unprecedented low-altitude
evacuation flights during all hours of the day and night over rugged
mountainous terrain in the face of enemy fire and extremely adverse
weather, thereby saving untold lives and lessening the suffering of
wounded marines. In addition, this valiant squadron completed thousands
of day and night artillery spotting, reconnaissance and tactical air
control missions, contributing materially to the extensive damage
inflicted upon enemy positions, supply lines and troop concentrations.
The splendid record achieved by Marine Observation Squadron Six attests
to the courage, determination and esprit de corps of the officers and
men of this unit and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the
United States Naval Service.”
For the President,
CHARLES S. THOMAS
_Secretary of the Navy_
APPENDIX H
Armistice Agreement
_Volume I_
TEXT OF AGREEMENT
_Agreement between the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on
the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and
the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand,
concerning a military armistice in Korea._
PREAMBLE
The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on
the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army
and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other
hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great
toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective
of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation
of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final
peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and
mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions
and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and
Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely
military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in
Korea.
_Article I_
MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE
1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall
withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a
Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone
shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of
incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.
2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the
attached map.
3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern
boundary as indicated on the attached map.
4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed
by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The
Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected
along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective
areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection
of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the
boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.
5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping
of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other
bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission
shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River
Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side
shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control
of that side.
6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against
the Demilitarized Zone.
7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the
Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by
the Military Armistice Commission.
8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be
permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either
side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into
whose territory entry is sought.
9. No person, military or civilian shall be permitted to enter the
Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil
administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter
by the Military Armistice Commission.
10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized
Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the
responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and
civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone
which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint
responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army
and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. The number of
persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to
enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration
and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but
in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed
one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil
police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by
the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry
arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice
Commission.
11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the
complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized
Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint
Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral
Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other
persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the
Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of
movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military
control of either side over any route necessary to move between points
within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by
roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.
_Article II_
CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE
A. _General_
12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a
complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces
under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground,
naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice
Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and
hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)
13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as
to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the
holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the
Commanders of the opposing sides shall:
a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice becomes
effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and
equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided
herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other
hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice
Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the
Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom,
together with lanes known to be free of all hazards, shall be reported
to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose
forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall
be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the
termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall
be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the
supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of
the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized
a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under
Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police
nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice
Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and
personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of
either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.
b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies and
equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of
the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the
stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason
for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action
which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The
term “coastal islands,” as used above, refers to those islands which,
though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950;
provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of
the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall
be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean
People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers
except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58´N, 124°40´E),
TAECHONG-DO (37°50´N, 124°42´E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46´N, 124°46´E),
YONPYONG-DO (37°38´N, 125°40´E), and U-DO (37°36´N, 125°58´E), which
shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea
lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the
military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.
c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military
personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel,
the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the
return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary
duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed
below. “Rotation” is defined as the replacement of units or personnel
by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in
Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from
Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43
hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided,
however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in
the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in
any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel
of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of
such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel
of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this
Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military
personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date.
Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military
personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, such reports shall include
places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at
or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct
supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel
authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43
hereof.
d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft,
armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that
combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are
destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the
armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the
same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored
vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only
through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order
to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles,
weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement
purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items
shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements
regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be
replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the
ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams
shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat
aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above,
at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.
e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any
of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.
f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record
and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration
personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit
after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of
Korea under their Military control, for the purpose of proceeding
to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased
military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war.
The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the
above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission.
The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side
all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the
deceased military personnel of the other side.
g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation
to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations
Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and
responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry
enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication
agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of
this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In
order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and
means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of
communication are closed or impassable.
h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and
transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice
Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their
Teams.
i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their
respective ports of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the
headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the
Commission may determine.
j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and
facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their function,
including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to
those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under
international usage.
14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces
under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall
respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military
control of the opposing side.
15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval
forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the
Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military
control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any
kind of Korea.
16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces,
which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized
Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the
opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.
17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms
and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories
hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing
sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures
and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of
the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall
actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice
Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring
observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions
of this Armistice Agreement.
18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission
and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams
shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.
B. _Military Armistice Commission_
1. Composition
19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.
20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten
(10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall
be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s
Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Of the ten
members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The
two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier
generals, colonels, or their equivalents.
21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to
use staff assistants as required.
22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the
necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat
charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping,
secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission
may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a
Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized
personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in
English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.
23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided
with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may
be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the
Military Armistice Commission.
b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than
four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of
whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme
Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People’s Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks,
and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the
functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.
2. Functions and Authority
24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be
to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to
settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.
25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:
a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57´29´´
N, 126°40´00´´ E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate
its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by
agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.
b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.
c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem
necessary.
d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice
Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River
Estuary.
e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.
f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice
Agreement.
g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all
reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and
all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission.
h. Give general supervision and direction to the Committee for
Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the
Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.
i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the
Commanders of the opposing sides; provided however, that the foregoing
shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from
communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire
to employ.
j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its
Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles,
aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.
26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the
Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the
provisions of this Armistice Agreement to the Demilitarized Zone and to
the Han River Estuary.
27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of
either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams
to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to
have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary;
provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer
Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice
Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of
either side on the Commission.
28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either
side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places
outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice
Agreement have been reported to have occurred.
29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation
of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report
such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.
30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation
of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it
shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.
3. General
31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of
not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members
of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on
twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.
32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the
Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of
the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.
33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the
Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in
addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by
them, or as may be required by the Commission.
34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files
of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice
Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of
such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct
of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set
of the above files shall be turned over to each side.
35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to
the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or
additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should
generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.
C. _Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission_
1. Composition
36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.
37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed
of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by
neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall
be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme
Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People’s Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term
“neutral nations” as herein used is defined as those nations whose
combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea.
Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of
the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate
member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal
member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the
same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from
the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of
members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.
38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be
permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as
required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members
of the Commission.
39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative
personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the
Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial,
interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to
it.
40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially
provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members
of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations
Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be
subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
only.
b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less
than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall
be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United
Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations
nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army
and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Members appointed
to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of
the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the
Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom
shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation
nominated by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and
the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, may be formed as
circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks,
interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may
be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished
by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone
and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations
Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its
own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be
personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission is composed.
2. Functions and Authority
41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be
to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and
investigation, as stipulated in Subparagraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph
28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation,
inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.
42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:
a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the
Military Armistice Commission.
b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem
necessary.
c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs
13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry
enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and
inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where
violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have
occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons,
and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such
as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft,
armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into
Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or
examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat
aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.
d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations
Inspection Teams.
e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports
of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory
under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports
of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory
under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean
People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; and
establish initially ten (10) mobile neutral Nations Inspection Teams
in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced
by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military
Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations
Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with
requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice
Commission.
f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct
without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice
Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of
this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice
Commission or by the senior member of either-side on the Commission.
g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and
its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for
all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its
mission.
43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the
following ports of entry:
Territory under the military control of the United Nations command
INCHON (37°28´N, 126°38´E)
TAEGU (35°52´N, 128°36´E)
PUSAN (35°06´N, 129°02´E)
KANGNUNG (37°45´N, 128°54´E)
KUNSAN (35°59´N, 126°43´E)
Territory under the military control of the Korean People’s Army and
the Chinese People’s Volunteers
SINUIJU (40°´N, 124°24´E)
CHONGJIN (41°46´N, 129°49´E)
HUNGNAM (39°50´N, 127°37´E)
MANPO (41°09´N, 126°18´E)
SINANJU (39°36´N, 125°36´E)
These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full
convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of
communication set forth on the attached map.
3. General
44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily.
Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the
members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that
such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any
member.
45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the
Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting.
Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.
46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports
concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections,
and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as
required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special
reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or may be required by the
Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may
also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided,
that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof
shall be considered as informational only.
47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection
Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the
language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of
translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall
forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter
of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final
action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has
been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members
of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be
subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the
request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice
Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.
48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain
duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by
this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain
duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be
necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of
the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each
side.
49. The Neutral Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the
Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions
to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally
be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.
50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof,
shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military
Armistice Commission.
_Article III_
ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR
51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the
custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions
agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice
Agreement.
a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly
repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in
its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they
belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in
accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to
expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall,
prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total
numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated.
Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be
accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank
(if any) and internment or military serial number.
b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who
are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from
its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the
Annex hereto: “Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission.”
c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of
three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side
to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement,
be called “repatriation” in English, “song hwan” in Korean, and “ch’ien
fan” in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence
of such prisoner of war.
52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the
Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident
to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.
53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon
repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible,
there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with
the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care
and attendance en route.
54. The repatriation of all the prisoners of war required by
Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of
sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.
Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the
repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at
the earliest practicable time.
55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will
be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of
delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone
may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of
Prisoners of War.
56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby
established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade,
three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United
Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander
of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the
general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission,
be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for
the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution
by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement
relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the
duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of
prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners
of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when
necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard
to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of
war; to coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established
in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners
of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the
actual repatriation or prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and
54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery
and reception of prisoners of war, and to carry out such other related
functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.
b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its
responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of
War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice
Commission for decision. The Commission for Repatriation of Prisoners
of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters
of the Military Armistice Commission.
c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be
dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the
program of repatriation of prisoners of war.
57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective,
joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national
Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the
United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the
Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People’s Republic of
China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross
teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions
of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the
prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist
upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services
as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of
war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide
assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both
sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war,
and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the
prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the
comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams
may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner
of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of
war.
b. The Joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:
(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten
(10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each
side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war
by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners
of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between
representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work
and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for
Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty
(30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each
side, to visit the prisoners of war camps under the administration of
the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This
team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the
prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of
prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of
the People’s Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.
(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty
(30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each
side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of
the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners
of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s)
of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a
Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations
Command shall serve as chairman of this team.
(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross
team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the
team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be
formed as circumstances require.
(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters,
and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to
perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each
side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.
(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both
sides or any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be
increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for
Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red
Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to
insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in
the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall
provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities
as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his
military control.
d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of
the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in
Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation.
58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of
the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10)
days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following
information concerning prisoners of war:
(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped
since the effective date of the data last exchanged.
(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality,
rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place
of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.
b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of
the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall
furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of
Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the
provisions of Sub-paragraph 58a hereof. Such data shall be furnished at
ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and
reception of prisoners of war.
c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the
detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and
reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military
Armistice Commission for disposition.
59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950,
resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this
Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted
and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to
return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all
civilians, who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective,
are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander
of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s
Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military
Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if
they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme
Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People’s Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military
Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for
publicizing widely throughout territory under his military control
the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling
upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and
assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.
b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this
Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the
military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army
and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers shall, if they
desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted
to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this
Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the
military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,
shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military
control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and
the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, be permitted and
assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for
publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control
the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling
upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and
assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to
proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the
other side.
c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in
Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in
Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as
possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.
d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is
hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field
grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly
by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander
of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the
general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission,
be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for
assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for
supervising the execution of both sides of all of the provisions of
this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned
civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary
arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and
coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select
the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will
cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the
crossing points; and to carry out such other functions as are required
to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.
(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its
responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced
Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice
Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of
Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the
headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians
shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon
fulfillment of its mission.
_Article IV_
RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES
60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question,
the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the
governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within
three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes
effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides
be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through
negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from
Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.
_Article V_
MISCELLANEOUS
61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be
mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.
62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall
remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually
acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate
agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both
sides.
63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than
Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.
Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July 1953,
in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.
KIM IL SUNG
Marshall, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Supreme Commander, Korean People’s Army
PENG TEH-HUAI
Commander, Chinese People’s Volunteers
MARK W. CLARK
General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command
PRESENT
NAM IL
General, Korean People’s Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s
Volunteers
WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General,
United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation
ANNEX
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION
(_See Sub-paragraph 51b_)
1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to
exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden,
Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested
by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those
prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers,
have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission shall establish its headquarters within the
Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station
subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation
Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both
sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation
Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and
interviews.
2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required
to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out
its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by
India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with
the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention and shall also
be chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall
be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50)
each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations is absent
for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate
representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and
authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph
shall be limited to military police type small arms.
3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners
of war specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their
repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their
dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any
purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined
on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This
Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be
treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the
Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.
_II_
CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR
4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of
repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement
shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the
detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty
(60) days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement
to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to
be designated by the detaining side.
5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes
control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of
the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations
specified in the preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by
the armed forces of India.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining
side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring
security and order in the areas around the locations where the
prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining
any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under
its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the
locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in
this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate
functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war
under its temporary jurisdiction.
_III_
EXPLANATION
8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received
and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not
exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make
arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which
the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send
representatives to locations where such prisoners of war are in custody
to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations
their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return
to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home
to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:
a. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed
seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not
be less than a total of five (5);
b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall
have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral
Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;
c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence
of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;
d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be
prescribed by the Neutral Repatriation Commission, and will be designed
to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this
Paragraph;
e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall
be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel
for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel
shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining
representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners
of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams
shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6)
communications personnel.
9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities
to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies
of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of
their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves,
in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission.
_IV_
DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR
10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of
repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to
a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is
made, it shall be considered immediately by majority vote the validity
of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated
by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war
concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the
tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he
shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange
point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in
the Armistice Agreement.
11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody
of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission,
access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in
Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition
of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be
repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended
to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall
endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which
period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue
to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoners
of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have
not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other
disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one
hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to
the application of each individual, and those who choose to go to
neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be
completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions
and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those
above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of
war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of
the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them
in returning to their fatherlands.
_V_
RED CROSS VISITATION
12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in
accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission.
_VI_
PRESS COVERAGE
13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall insure freedom
of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as
enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.
_VII_
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR
14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war
in the area under its military control, delivering required support to
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point
in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.
15. The cost of repatriating prisoners to the exchange point at
Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the
exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend in accordance
with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.
16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing
such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as
required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.
17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical
support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining
side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those
cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of
war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate
such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be
returned to a prisoners of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4
above.
18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain
from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in
carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any
name and in any form interfere or exert influence.
_VIII_
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION
19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for
the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed
in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute
on an equal basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The
precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each
case.
20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting
the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit
over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph
23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of
residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each
of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security
of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where
the prisoners of war are in custody.
21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing,
communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining
representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its
military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable
basis.
_IX_
PUBLICATION
22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this
agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the
custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be
repatriated.
_X_
MOVEMENT
23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of
communication, as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side
and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these
lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing
side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such
personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above,
shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side
in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement
shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.
_XI_
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Repatriation Commission,
and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are designed or
assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate
on the basis of majority vote.
25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly
report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in
its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the
end of each week.
26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the
five powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the
Armistice becomes effective.
Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in
English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.
NAM IL
General, Korean People’s Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s
Volunteers
WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation
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1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
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2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
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3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-October 1953.
1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-December 1953.
2d Battalion, 5th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-December 1953.
3d Battalion, 5th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-December 1953.
1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-February 1954.
2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-February 1954.
3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-February 1954.
1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-December 1953.
2d Battalion, 11th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-December 1953.
3d Battalion, 11th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-December 1953.
4th Battalion, 11th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
1952-December 1953.
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Command Diaries, selected dates, March
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1st Engineer Battalion. Command Diaries, March 1952-December 1953.
1st Tank Battalion. Command Diaries, March 1952-December 1953.
East Coast Island Defense Element (Unit). Command Diaries, January
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VMO-6. Command Diaries, March 1952-July 1953.
HMR-161. Command Diaries, March 1952-July 1953.
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VMA-212. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953.
VMA-251. Command Diaries, June-July 1953.
VMA-312. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953.
VMA-323. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953.
VMF-115. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953.
VMF-311. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953.
VMF(N)-513. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953.
VMJ-1. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953.
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Batterton, Roy J., Jr., LtCol, USMC. “Random Notes on Korea,”
_Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39 no. 11:28-34 (November 1955).
Berger, Carl. _The Korea Knot--A Military-Political History._
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957.
Blakeney, Jane. _Heroes--U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955._
Washington, D.C.: Blakeney, 1957.
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New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954.
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Korea._ Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969.
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Fehrenbach, T. R. _The Fight for Korea, From the War of 1950 to
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----. _This Kind of War--A Study in Unpreparedness._ New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1963.
Field, James A., Jr. _History of United States Naval Operations,
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Fugate, Robert T., MSgt, USMC. “Vegas, Reno, and Carson,”
_Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 6:16-21, 74 (June 1953).
----. “Freedom Village,” _Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 7:20-23, 70
(July 1953).
Futrell, Robert F. _The United Stales Air Force in Korea,
1950–1953._ New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961.
Heinecke, Roy E., MSgt, USMC. “A Year in Korea,” _Leatherneck_,
v. 36, no. 11:49-53, 85 (November 1953).
----. “Big Switch,” _Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 11:44-48 (November
1953).
----. “Four Star Visit,” _Leatherneck_, v. 37, no. 1:14-17, 74
(January 1954).
Heinl, Robert D., Jr. _Soldiers of the Sea: The United States
Marine Corps, 1775–1962._ Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962.
Hermes, Walter G. _U.S. Army in the Korean War--Truce Tent and
Fighting Front._ Washington: Office of the Chief of Military
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York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963.
----. _Pork Chop Hill--The American Fighting Man in Action,
Korea, Spring 1953._ New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956.
Miller, John, Jr., Carroll, Owen J., Maj, USA, and Tackley,
Margaret E. _Korea 1951–1953._ Washington: Department of the
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Montross, Lynn and Canzona, Nicholas A., Capt, USMC. _U.S. Marine
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Inchon-Seoul Operations_. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3
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Chosin Reservoir Campaign_. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3
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Montross, Lynn. _Cavalry of the Sky--The Story of U.S. Marine
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September 1953.
Phillips, C. A., LtCol, USMC and Kuokka, H. D., Maj, USMC. “1st
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_Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 6:20-26 (June 1957).
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Index
Acar, BGen Sirri, 329
Adams, LtCol Arthur H., 194
Adams, Col Hewitt D., 233, 268, 300, 323, 328_n_
Air activities
Communist, 18, 34, 52, 59, 99, 170, 178, 354–355, 516
United Nations, 52, 62, 70, 77, 132–133, 170–172, 224–225, 242, 244,
257, 291, 295–296, 307, 341, 345, 347, 349, 350_n_, 351,
374–375, 379_n_, 389, 413–414, 416, 418, 483, 488–489,
491–492, 514, 516_n_, 520, 526, 531. _See also_ Helicopters.
Air lift, 138–139, 139_n_, 408, 479, 496–497
Air control, 132, 257_n_, 488_n_, 490–491
Air drops, 487, 511_n_
Bombing, 62, 133, 170, 172, 294–295, 299, 309, 489–490
Escort, 490
Evacuation, 495_n_
Flaredrop, 140, 140_n_
Interdiction, 53, 63–64, 70, 170, 350, 350_n_, 352, 357, 375–376,
413, 485, 488–489, 492_n_, 493, 514–515
Liaison, 72, 517_n_
Mapping, 174, 178
Observation, 76–77, 85, 126, 136, 190, 291, 302–304, 338, 370–371,
379, 414, 512, 519
Patrolling, 66, 241, 376, 414
Photography, 43, 69, 136_n_, 172, 174, 348–349, 397, 485, 491, 512
Reconnaissance, 42, 141, 397, 412–413, 430, 465, 485–486,
491, 512, 522
Search and Rescue, 53, 485
Strikes, 61–62, 65, 70–72, 77, 81, 132–134, 158, 170, 176, 196,
208, 224–226, 231, 238, 240, 258, 260, 271, 291, 295, 297,
306, 310, 325, 337, 339, 347–348, 379, 485–486, 512, 513_n_,
516
Support, 28, 38, 61–62, 64–65, 103–104, 131, 133, 158, 196, 207,
225, 234, 240, 243–244, 291, 297, 325, 341, 345, 346_n_,
349–352, 368, 374, 374_n_, 375, 375_n_, 383, 389, 397, 485,
486_n_, 488, 488_n_, 489, 491–492, 492_n_, 493, 514, 514_n_,
516–517. _See also_ Close air support.
Aircraft
Communist, 30, 68–69, 96, 170, 173–174, 241, 347, 376, 464
United Nations, 7, 42, 61, 61_n_, 132–133, 171, 224, 241, 347,
347_n_, 375, 418, 428, 431, 488, 490, 492, 511, 511_n_, 516,
519. _See also_ Helicopters.
Types
AD (Skyraider), 65, 70, 132–133, 207–208, 270, 292, 295, 299, 306,
325, 341, 379, 385, 469
AU (Corsair), 66, 181, 196, 295, 299, 304, 306, 325, 381
C-47, 487
C-119, 487
F2H-2P (Banshee), 43, 397, 490–491
F3D (Skyknight), 134_n_, 139, 181, 240–242, 291, 346–348, 469, 490
F4U (Corsair), 27, 65–66, 66_n_, 77, 133, 173, 176, 196, 208, 270,
294–295, 299, 341, 347, 350_n_, 357, 374, 397, 420,
485, 489, 491_n_
F7F (Tigercat), 133, 202, 345–348, 490
F9F (Panther), 65, 112, 132–133, 177, 194, 242–244, 270, 291, 299,
325, 350, 368, 375, 397, 434, 471, 488–489
F-80 (Shooting Star), 112, 132
F-84 (Thunderjet), 132, 177, 291, 306
F-86 (Sabrejet), 174, 376, 491
Observation planes, 345, 369–370, 488–490
OE-1, 42, 235, 271, 414
OY, 235
R4D, 487
R4Q (Fairchild Packet), 472
R5D, 28, 49, 139, 181, 485, 488
Aircraft losses
Communist, 490
United Nations, 64, 66, 69–72, 134, 134_n_, 243, 352, 376, 376_n_,
413_n_, 490, 492
Air doctrine, 492, 513
Airfields
Communist, 397, 489
United Nations, 24, 24_n_, 26, 28, 53, 59, 68, 202, 241, 348, 355,
469, 487, 489
K-2 (Taegu), 177, 178_n_, 469
K-3 (Pohang), 27–28, 43, 47–48, 68–69, 100, 177, 231, 299,
345, 352_n_, 469
K-6 (Pyontaek), 28_n_, 69, 175, 178, 257_n_, 270, 299,
376, 469, 473
K-8 (Kunsan), 28, 69, 202, 270, 348, 469
K-14 (Kimpo), 4, 18–19, 249, 469, 478, 486
K-16, 12, 319, 332, 469
Air Force-Army close air support system, 178, 517. _See also_ Close
air support.
Air Force, U.S., 26, 42, 62, 62_n_, 64, 68, 132–133, 152, 170, 174,
237, 243, 245, 291, 306, 347, 376, 428, 473, 487–488, 490,
490_n_, 491, 496–497, 512, 515
Units
Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 26, 43, 63–64, 224–225, 237, 239, 241,
350_n_, 352, 470, 473, 514
Fifth Air Force (FAF), 7, 21, 26–28, 42–43, 52, 61, 61_n_, 62–64,
67–70, 88, 97, 132, 170_n_, 179, 224–226, 236–240, 271, 306,
309, 345, 348, 351–352, 376, 385, 468–469, 470–474, 493,
507, 510–511, 511_n_, 512–514, 515–517
Tactical Air Command, 174_n_
Fifth Air Force Reconnaissance Wing, 512
19th Bomber Group, 347_n_
4th Fighter Group, 174
51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, 376
335th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 174
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 69
Air observers. _See_ Air activities, United Nations.
Air support. _See_ Air activities, United Nations.
Alexandria, Va., 287, 287_n_
Altman, LtCol Sidney J., 149, 200
American Civil War, 143_n_
American Revolutionary War, 143_n_
Ammunition
Communist, 93, 140, 190, 212–213, 246, 286, 293, 409
Artillery, 30, 34, 37, 52, 103, 112, 121, 128–129, 140, 146, 246,
248, 286, 293, 306, 356–357, 368, 382, 389, 396, 396_n_
Duds, 396_n_
Dumps, 244, 306–307
Expenditure, 337_n_
Mortar, 30, 34, 37, 112, 129, 140, 292–293, 297, 326, 357, 389,
392
Rockets, 104
Small arms, 92, 140, 246, 286, 293, 409
Supply, 140, 190
United Nations, 134, 137, 192, 192_n_, 247, 275, 285, 308, 376, 386,
451–452, 466, 470
Artillery, 74, 93, 127, 134–137, 140, 192, 195, 203–207, 221, 231,
253, 280, 284, 303, 324_n_, 346, 369, 379, 379_n_, 388–389,
392, 397, 530
Bombs, 62, 132–133, 202, 208, 244, 297, 299, 304, 307, 325, 350,
352, 381, 385, 397, 486, 489, 491, 520
Expenditure, 337_n_, 339
Fuzes, 74–75, 168, 199, 281, 283, 283_n_, 286, 300, 346
Mortar, 124, 280, 300
Restrictions, 389_n_
Resupply, 44, 247_n_, 273, 331, 497
Rockets, 124, 124_n_, 135
Shortages, 117, 192–193, 246
Small arms, 137, 257, 280, 300, 367, 369–370, 379, 388–389, 392
White phosphorus, 105, 283, 379, 389
Amphibious
Assault, 86, 483, 493, 499
Combat operation, 244
Large-scale landing, 483
Maneuver, 484
Operation, 46, 488_n_, 531, 535
Readiness, 508_n_
Retraining program, 333
Strike, 13_n_
Training, 12, 333_n_, 334
Warfare, 482
Anderson, LtGen Samuel E., 351
Andre, Lt John W., 173
Anglican chaplain, 426
Armagost, Capt William I., 397
Armed Forces of the United States, 64, 441
Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, 505–506
Armistice, 95, 321, 356, 359, 381, 389, 394, 396_n_, 397, 400, 405,
449, 456, 458_n_, 468, 470, 528–529, 532
Agreement, 64, 228_n_, 360, 377_n_, 391, 393–394, 408, 445–446, 448,
448_n_, 457, 460, 465, 469–470
Conferences, 528
Negotiations, 228, 314, 322, 433_n_, 448, 480, 528
Post-armistice period, 475
Projected plan, 322
Armitage, LtCol Gerald T., 71, 108, 108_n_, 119, 121, 126, 131,
134–135, 149_n_
Armor, 114, 325, 327, 367, 379
Army, U.S., Chaplain School, 440_n_
Army, U.S., Doctrine, 508
Army, U.S., Quartermaster General, 484
Army, U.S., Supply Agency, 60
Army, U.S., Training Test, 336
Army, U.S., Units
Far East Command, 321, 470–472, 473_n_, 504_n_
Army Forces, Far East, 245
Army Service Command, 4_n_
2d Logistical Command, 44, 47
Munsan-ni Provisional Command, 314
Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, 1, 3, 5–8, 10–11, 28, 44, 47, 51–52, 64,
69, 72, 85–86, 93, 101, 105, 132, 141, 148, 170_n_, 192,
222–226, 232, 234, 236, 238–239, 267, 315, 327, 327_n_,
333_n_, 335–336, 341–342, 344_n_, 351, 359_n_, 360, 372,
377, 393–394, 396, 445, 454, 460, 472–474, 477–479, 481,
483, 491–493, 496, 507, 509–511, 514_n_, 515–516,
518, 533, 535
I Corps, 1, 11, 16–17, 21–22, 24, 38–40, 46, 51–52, 61, 73, 84–88,
92–93, 93_n_, 101, 135, 170_n_, 182_n_, 186, 191_n_, 214,
222–223, 243, 251, 264–265, 267, 270, 311, 323–324, 326–328,
331–333, 336, 338–342, 344, 350_n_, 351, 360, 363, 368–369,
371, 378, 378_n_, 379_n_, 388, 393–394, 446, 455–458,
460–461, 468, 481, 483, 508–512
IX Corps, 6, 51–52, 222–223, 326, 342, 350, 385, 393, 412–413, 437,
480, 483, 507
X Corps, 2, 5–6, 10, 45, 52, 222, 326, 342, 351, 409, 412–413, 416,
477–479, 481, 483–484, 487–488
2d Infantry Division, 222–223, 267, 267_n_, 299, 412
3d Infantry Division, 96–97, 350, 350_n_
7th Infantry Division, 5, 51, 222–224, 267_n_, 307, 309, 333, 350,
350_n_, 393, 412, 460, 479
25th Infantry Division, 52, 176, 326–327, 329, 331, 333, 337_n_,
338–341, 344, 351, 361, 363–364, 367–368, 370, 385,
388, 463, 522
40th Infantry Division, 51, 222
45th Infantry Division, 51–52, 100
5th Infantry Regiment, 327
14th Infantry Regiment, 328, 334, 339–340, 364, 367
23d Infantry Regiment, 486
24th Infantry Regiment, 404, 473
27th Infantry Regiment, 329, 332
35th Infantry Regiment, 328–329, 331–332, 338, 364
38th Infantry Regiment, 267
461st Infantry Regiment, 304, 306
21st Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, 328
8th Field Artillery Battalion, 328
17th Field Artillery Battalion, 136, 191, 270, 281, 304, 379
64th Field Artillery Battalion, 328
69th Field Artillery Battalion, 328
90th Field Artillery Battalion, 328
158th Field Artillery Battalion, 270
159th Field Artillery Battalion, 191, 270, 379
204th Field Artillery Battalion, 192, 270, 281
424th Field Artillery Battalion, 304
623d Field Artillery Battalion, 191, 191_n_, 270, 281, 301–302
89th Tank Battalion, 329
181st Counterintelligence Corps, 18
61st Engineer Searchlight Company, 18
11th Evacuation Hospital, 401–402
61st Field Artillery Battery, 305
163d Military Intelligence Service Detachment, 18
45th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, 316
Arnold, TSgt Richard E., 404
Artillery
Communist, 3, 29, 32, 34, 36, 41, 45, 52, 56, 59, 67, 69, 73–74,
79–82, 87, 89, 91, 93–94, 104, 111–112, 116–119, 121,
123–130, 132–134, 136, 139–140, 142–143, 145–147, 149–150,
152–153, 155–156, 158, 160, 162–168, 188, 188_n_, 190,
193–194, 196–197, 199–200, 202, 205–206, 209–210, 212–214,
218, 220–221, 225, 230, 248–249, 253, 255, 255_n_, 259–261,
284, 290–291, 293–294, 297, 301–303, 306, 308–309, 324, 326,
337–338, 340, 355, 358, 365–367, 369, 371, 377, 385, 385_n_,
386–387, 389, 392, 396, 464, 482, 482_n_, 491–492,
510–511, 525
United Nations, 21, 33, 37–38, 45, 52, 69, 69_n_, 70–71, 71_n_,
72–75, 79–80, 82, 87, 90, 98, 112, 114, 121, 126–127, 129,
131, 134–137, 142, 142_n_, 143, 146, 153, 158, 160, 162,
165–168, 178, 191–192, 195, 199, 202, 205, 207_n_, 209–210,
220–222, 225, 230–232, 239, 248, 255–257, 259, 281, 283,
285, 287, 290–292, 296–297, 300–302, 304–306, 308–309,
324–325, 327–328, 331, 340, 346, 354, 356, 361, 363,
367–369, 372, 377–379, 379_n_, 386, 389, 389_n_, 391–392,
396, 464, 482, 491–492, 509, 511, 511_n_, 520–524, 530
Ascom City, 4, 4_n_, 18, 24, 44, 44_n_, 251, 329, 332, 360, 463
Atkin, LtCol Ernest G., 268
Atomic age warfare, 483, 513_n_
Atsugi, Japan, 471
Attorney General, U.S., 227
Augustine, LtCol Francis W., 316_n_
Austin-Roberts-West, MajGen M. M., 187, 231
Australians, 318_n_
Ava Gate, 373
Aviators, 317, 351, 375, 397, 405, 413, 420, 487. _See also_
Air activities.
Aviles, PFC Pedron E., 403
Axis powers, 411
Azores, 26
Babson, 2dLt John, Jr., 199
Bach, Capt Lawrence E., 139
_Badoeng Strait_, USS, 355, 374_n_, 486
Baez, Pvt Alberto P., 317
Baird, Capt Robert, 173_n_
_Bairoko_, USS, 27, 58, 58_n_, 347
Barber, Maj Stewart C., 409
Barcus, MajGen Glenn O., 88, 233, 236–240, 242–243, 352, 496
Bare, BGen Robert O., 88
Barlow, Capt Carl F., 376
Barnett, PFC Richard E., 412, 412_n_
Barninger, Col Clarence A., 194
Barrett, LtCol Charles D., 187, 187_n_, 259
Bartos, Lt Joseph S., Jr., 58
Bartosh, LtCol Walter R., 243
_Bataan_, USS, 27, 99, 175, 347_n_, 355
Bates, 2dLt William H., 387, 392
Batterton, LtCol Roy J., Jr., 107_n_, 108, 112, 114, 123, 159
Becker, MSgt Robert P., 242
Beggs, Col Raymond W., 315
Belants, Capt Bernard B., 205, 205_n_, 206
Bell, 1stLt Richard, 405
Benfold, HM3 Edward C., 152_n_
Benson, Capt Carl H., 136
Benson, LtCol Graham H., 175
Berteling, LtCol John B., 347
Berueffy, Maj Max, Jr., 340
Beswick, Capt Byron H., 437–438
Binney, MajGen Arthur F., 413_n_
Blair, Cpl William S., 437
Blanchard, Capt Don H., 256
Bley, Maj Roy H., 430
Blume, LtCol Richard L., 28_n_
Bolt, Maj John F., 350, 376
Booker, Capt Jesse V., 405, 412
Bookhart, LtCol Hoyt U., Jr., 359
Bordelon, Lt Guy P., 376
Bourgeois, 1stLt Alvin R., 177
Bowman, Col George S., Jr., 234, 297, 348_n_
Bradley, Gen Omar, 227, 483_n_
Braun, Maj Richard L., 349, 379_n_
Bridges, 16, 31, 101–102, 157, 335–336
Freedom Gate, 31, 102, 155, 218, 259, 370, 371_n_, 463
Honker, 101–103, 148, 464
Libby, 364, 371_n_, 464
Sinanju Complex, 347_n_
Spoonbill, 270, 364, 371, 464
Widgeon, 31, 102–103, 148
X-Ray, 31, 102, 364
Brier, Capt George R., 176
Briscoe, VAdm Robert P., 88, 336
British, 318_n_, 356, 389_n_, 410, 420
Broomhead, Ens Marvin, 414
Brown, LtCol Gerald, 421, 441
Brown, 2dLt James M., 134_n_
Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 227
Brunelli, Col Austin R., 86_n_; BGen, 86_n_
Bryan, LtCol Leslie T., Jr., 349
Bryson, LtCol Robert L., 28_n_
Buntin, Maj Joseph S., 303, 305
Burger, BGen Joseph C., 319, 405
Burnett, LtCol John R., 28
Byrum, Capt Paul B., 165_n_, 195, 205, 211_n_
Cain, MSgt John T., 429, 432–435, 442
Cairo Declaration, 2, 534
Campbell, Capt George W., 116
Camp Casey, 326–329, 332, 334, 336
Camp Indianhead, 327–329, 335, 344, 364
Camp Lejeune, 148, 336, 476, 494, 498, 500
Camp Pendleton, 3, 88, 98, 139, 471, 473, 476, 500
Training and Replacement Command, 98
Camp Rose, 202, 267, 310, 328
Caputo, LtCol Anthony, 108_n_, 167, 186, 202, 205
Carey, LtCol John F., 179, 247, 247_n_
Cargill, LtCol Wayne M., 177, 207–208; Col, 259_n_
Carney, Col Edward B., 348_n_, 375, 472
Carriers. _See_ Ships.
Cassels, MajGen A. J. H., 93_n_
Cates, Gen Clifton B., 499
Casualties
Communist, 6, 10, 32–34, 36–37, 61, 73, 75–77, 80–81, 83, 89, 92–93,
95, 103, 106, 106_n_, 125–130, 138, 141, 143, 146, 149–150,
152–153, 155, 158–159, 163–166, 169, 171, 176, 208, 210–212,
212_n_, 221–224, 257, 258_n_, 259, 264, 288–289, 296, 300,
304–305, 307, 324–325, 337, 340–342, 346_n_, 370, 372–373,
379, 381, 381_n_, 387, 389, 392–393, 451, 482_n_, 507, 522,
532–533, 533_n_
United Nations, 22, 32–34, 36, 49, 59, 75–77, 79–81, 83, 87–89,
91–92, 95–97, 103, 111–113, 118–119, 121, 123, 126–127,
129–131, 133, 136, 138–140, 142, 142_n_, 146, 150, 152–153,
155–156, 158–160, 163–167, 169, 197, 209, 209_n_, 210, 212,
214, 214_n_, 218, 227, 239, 246, 256–257, 260, 264, 285,
288, 288_n_, 289, 306–307, 324, 340–342, 357, 359, 366,
370–374, 374_n_, 379_n_, 381, 381_n_, 386–387, 391, 391_n_,
392, 396, 398, 410–411, 411_n_, 450, 480, 482, 482_n_, 484,
495, 495_n_, 510, 514_n_, 521, 527, 531–532, 533, 533_n_
Casualty evacuation, 127, 140, 234, 271, 287–288, 293, 486–488, 494,
521
CAT Line, 327
Cease-fire, 321–322, 341, 361, 393–394, 396–397, 399, 445–447, 451,
484
Agreement, 2, 454
Line, 391, 532
Cereghino, LtCol Alexander D., 291, 365; Col, 366_n_
Chamberlin, LtCol Kenneth R., 176, 207
Chambers, Col Owen A., 247_n_
Champagne, Cpl David B., 83_n_
Chapman, Col Max C., 28
Charette, HM3C William R., 294, 294_n_, 299
Checklou, Capt Henry A., 275_n_, 278_n_
Cheek, Capt Leon C., Jr., 202
Cherry Point, 486, 498
Chiang Kai-shek, 2_n_
China, 2, 2_n_, 5, 58, 64, 88, 377, 350_n_, 357, 427, 513, 525, 529
Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 3, 5, 7, 7_n_, 17, 24, 26, 28–34,
36–39, 45–46, 52–53, 53_n_, 55, 59, 61, 69, 73–74, 79–80,
82–83, 85, 87–89, 92–95, 97, 101–102, 104–106, 108, 111–113,
116–119, 122–127, 129–130, 136, 140–141, 147–148, 157–158,
187–188, 203, 207–208, 217–218, 220, 223, 227–230, 242,
257_n_, 259–261, 263–264, 264_n_, 279, 283–292, 294–305,
307, 309, 311, 315–316, 321, 321_n_, 322, 324–326, 337–342,
346, 351–352, 357–358, 364–365, 367–374, 377–379, 381, 383,
385–389, 391–393, 393_n_, 394, 397–399, 403–404, 406–408,
410–411, 413–414, 416, 418–431, 433–442, 445, 451, 454,
457–460, 463–466, 469–470, 478, 478_n_, 479–481, 482_n_,
509, 511–514, 517–520, 525–527, 529. _See also_ Air
activities; Artillery; Defenses; Supplies; Weapons.
Amphibious operations, 59, 249
Antiaircraft defenses, 64, 69, 71, 71_n_, 170, 174, 240, 243, 283,
346, 411, 414, 433, 492, 514
Assembly areas, 24, 292, 295, 297, 305, 519
Attacks, 6, 18, 31, 34, 73, 106_n_, 121, 130, 163, 186, 220–221,
223, 231, 241, 249, 253, 261, 264, 264_n_, 265, 294, 298,
301, 303–304, 308–309, 326, 335, 340–342, 351, 353, 367,
377, 386, 388–389, 391–392, 396, 413, 415, 424, 481, 482_n_,
518, 522, 529
Bases, 507
Capabilities, 85, 464, 524, 532
Cargo carriers, 200
Choke points, 136
Combat efficiency, 108, 525–526
Combat techniques, 519
Command posts, 133, 385
Counterattacks, 82, 105, 112, 119, 256, 297, 300–301, 307, 379_n_
Counterbattery fire, 136, 166, 179, 291, 339, 375, 392, 394
Counterintelligence efforts, 522
Defensive efforts, 117, 341, 514
Employment of weapons, 85
Encroachment efforts, 351
Equipment, 170
Espionage agents, 249, 251
Explainers, 459
Flags, 408
Ground defenses, 7, 87, 94, 104, 117, 170, 218, 230, 243, 256, 265,
273, 287, 293–294, 296, 298, 324_n_, 338, 341, 365, 369–370,
372, 392, 394, 483, 519, 523
Guerrillas, 6, 527
Harassment, 59, 325, 355, 357, 359, 422, 425
Hierarchy, 314
Infiltration, 249, 251, 387
Junks, 354
Leaders, 7, 313–314
Observation posts, 73, 95, 133, 258, 519
Offensives, 5–6, 32, 263, 342, 514–515, 518, 525
Officials, 421_n_, 422, 425
Order of battle, 85–86, 248_n_
Outposts, 133–134, 137–138
Plans, 306, 322
Propaganda, 7_n_, 469
Psychological efforts, 188, 190, 325, 373, 425, 522
Reinforcements, 33, 300–301, 340, 368, 378
Reserves, 225, 511
Shore defenses, 56, 357–358
Slogans, 408
Strategy, 534
Strength, 188, 248, 309, 350
Units
9th Army Group, 479–480
40th Army, 96, 108, 141, 188, 199, 297
46th Army, 280, 298, 366
60th Army, 342
63d Army, 29, 96
65th Army, 29, 96, 108, 248_n_
68th Army, 342
1st Armored Division, 29
118th Division, 96, 108, 141
119th Division, 188, 199
120th Division, 280, 338, 338_n_
124th Division, 479
136th Division, 366
188th Division, 29
189th Division, 96
193d Division, 29, 96, 248_n_
194th Division, 29, 96, 108
195th Division, 29, 96, 248_n_
352d Regiment, 108
356th Regiment, 188
357th Regiment, 188, 196, 199
358th Regiment, 297–298, 307
388th Regiment, 280
407th Regiment, 366
408th Regiment, 387
580th Regiment, 108
581st Regiment, 220
582d Regiment, 220
584th Regiment, 220
585th Regiment, 220
Chinhae, 531
Chinhung-ni, 488
Chinju, 327, 476, 486
Chinnampo, 173, 242, 354
Cho-do Island, 55–56, 59, 173, 353–356
Chogum-ni, 285
Chongsong River, 243, 418, 421–422
Chormyon, 463
Chorwon Kumwha, 223, 420, 436
Chosin Reservoir, 5, 410, 412, 475, 479–480, 487–488, 494, 502, 535
Chunchon, 436, 497
Church, Capt John Jr., 175
Churchill, Winston S., 427
Clark, Gen Mark W., 64, 88, 170–171, 171_n_, 172, 226–227, 229, 231,
314, 319, 321–322, 336, 340, 378_n_, 401, 405, 405_n_, 446
Clarke, LtGen Bruce C., 332, 332_n_, 379_n_
Clarke, LtCol Harry D., 101; Col, 101_n_
Clarke, VAdm Joseph J., 225, 231, 352, 376, 515
Close air support, 4, 7, 21, 27–28, 42, 61–62, 71–72, 79, 84, 132–134,
136, 170, 170_n_, 172, 177, 207_n_, 208, 224–225, 234_n_,
238–240, 243, 256, 257_n_, 299, 307, 310, 325, 326_n_,
339–340, 345, 347–352, 375–376, 379, 386, 413, 473, 477_n_,
485–486, 488–489, 491–492, 492_n_, 493, 511, 513–517. _See
also_ Air activities, United Nations.
Clothing
Communist, 318, 526
United Nations, 245, 319–320, 401, 405
Body armor, 8, 140, 140_n_, 246, 294, 451
Boots, 8, 245–246, 484, 526
Cold weather gear, 526
Coffee, Sgt Robert J., 403
Cold, 1stLt Frank E., 436, 436_n_
Coln, LtCol Royce W., 177, 242
Combat outposts, 106, 106_n_, 509, 518–519, 523–524. _See also_
Hills; Outposts.
1, 268
2, 118, 126, 232, 268, 268_n_, 316_n_, 323, 338, 371
2A, 519
19, 365
19A, 365
21, 299, 304
31, 217, 220, 220_n_, 221
33, 217–218, 220, 220_n_, 221, 259
36, 169, 218
37, 169, 218
39, 217–218, 220, 220_n_, 221
51, 217–218, 220, 220_n_, 221
86, 169, 218
Ava, 267, 451
Berlin, 367_n_
Bruce (Hill 148), 157, 157_n_
Bunker Hill (Hill 122), 300, 306, 451, 481, 515, 519
Camel, 397
Carson (Hill 27), 260, 278, 280, 286
Corine, 306
Dagmar, 261, 306
Detroit (Hill 15), 163, 414
Esther, 260–261, 372, 451
Frisco (Hill 13), 163, 414
Green, 94
Hedy (Hill 124), 259–261, 264, 306
Hook, 186–187, 187_n_, 188, 188_n_, 191–193, 193_n_, 194–196,
196_n_, 197, 197_n_, 199–200, 202–203, 205–207, 207_n_,
208–211, 211_n_, 212–214, 215_n_, 222, 230–231, 246, 255_n_,
263, 338–339, 351, 414, 508
Ingrid, 268
Kate, 268
Marilyn, 268
Nevada, 267, 290
Reno (Hill 25), 211–212, 230, 265, 273, 275–276, 278–283
Reno Block, 273
Ronson, 187, 211, 414
Seattle, 163, 187–188, 207
Vegas (Hill 21), 230, 260, 276, 278, 280, 283, 294–295, 302,
305–307, 311, 326, 338
Verdun, 163, 163_n_, 187
Warsaw, 163, 163_n_, 187–188, 202, 211, 414
White, 91
Yoke, 259–260
Commandant of the Marine Corps, 88, 98, 138–139, 139_n_, 158–159, 231,
310, 332, 345, 396, 409–410, 423, 471–472, 499, 501,
504–505, 534
Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, 478_n_
Commander in Chief, Far East, 3, 359, 476, 478, 499, 514
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 332, 352_n_, 353, 474
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, 4, 52, 64, 84, 170, 226,
231, 314, 322, 401, 405, 408, 446, 448, 457, 477, 481, 483,
496, 500, 522
Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, 47, 98, 320, 336, 408, 469, 488_n_
Commander, Seventh Fleet, 351–352, 376, 515
Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army in Korea, 13_n_, 44, 51_n_, 62,
86, 314, 319, 336, 378, 405, 413, 480–481, 491, 497, 530
Commanding General, I Corps, 156, 332, 336, 340, 361, 378, 405, 456
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, 2, 11, 13_n_, 18, 148, 310,
319, 334, 336, 345, 365, 378_n_, 501, 514_n_, 522, 530
Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 24, 43, 68, 233, 236,
348, 376, 469, 472, 474, 488, 493, 513, 515–516
Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, 237, 242, 348, 515
Communications
Communist, 63, 69, 514, 522
United Nations, 134_n_, 167–168, 280, 289, 339_n_, 354, 373, 438,
449, 464, 517, 517_n_, 521
Armored vehicle, 81
Difficulties, 21, 284, 291
Failures, 75_n_, 285, 367, 488
Installations, 18
Interservice, 487
Lines, 193, 339_n_, 494
Makeshift rigs, 494
Nets, 182, 366
Radio, 6, 67, 75_n_, 81, 85, 119, 123, 168, 182_n_, 235, 273, 284,
316_n_, 339_n_, 358, 388, 464, 488, 493
Trench, 287
Wire, 46, 193, 273, 275, 278, 391, 494
Communism, 404, 426–427, 435, 442, 527–529, 531–535
Condon, Col John J., 65, 176, 239; MajGen, 65_n_
Congress, United States, 440, 502, 504, 506, 515, 517_n_
Conley, LtCol Robert F., 242, 291, 347_n_, 349
Connolly, Capt Howard J., 119, 124–125, 135
Connolly, Capt Thomas P., 302
Conrad, LtCol Robert L., 349
_Consolation_, USS, 288, 319, 495
Cooley, MajGen Albert D., 474_n_
Cortelyou, LtCol Stoddard G., 291
Corvi, 1stLt Joseph A., 242
Coss, LtCol Francis K., 291, 349
Craig, BGen Edward A., 3, 8; LtGen, 475_n_, 477
Cram, Col Jack R., 233, 345
Crawford, LtCol Philip “L”, 132, 177
Crockett, Col Richard H., 249_n_
Cross, LtCol Thomas J., 89, 146_n_
Culhane, Col Thomas A., Jr., 12_n_, 20, 37, 77, 84, 114, 150_n_
Curry, Col Manly L., 368; BGen, 397_n_
Cushing, LtCol William H., 20
Cushman, BGen Thomas J., 7_n_, 485
Czechoslovakia, 458_n_, 459, 525
D-Day, 258, 334–335
Daly, Maj Jack M., 320
Damopoulos, Cpl C. N., 475_n_
Daniel, RAdm John C., 315, 318
Daniels, Lt Willie L., 173
Daughtry, LtCol George W. E., 20, 82–83, 93
Davenport, Col William K., 56, 58, 59_n_
Davies, Capt Samuel J., 426, 427_n_
Davis, LtCol Bert, Jr., 165, 191, 195, 202
Davis, Capt Oliver R., 241
Dawson, BGen Marion L., 474_n_
Day, QMSgt James, 423
Dean, MajGen William F., 406, 411_n_, 426, 431
Declaration of war, 506
Defense, Department of, 64, 174_n_, 430
Secretary, 227, 500
Defenses
Communist, 16, 166, 230, 256, 296–297, 299, 368, 379, 389,
509, 520, 526
Active weapons positions, 519
Air-raid shelters, 106–107
Antiaircraft, 413
Antitank, 257
Artillery emplacements, 24, 338
Artillery preparation, 289
Automatic weapons site, 381
Bivouac, 73
Bunkers, 33, 62, 75, 77, 81, 83, 90, 93, 104, 136, 141, 160, 190,
195–196, 200, 207–208, 257, 291–292, 299, 304, 307, 368,
379, 385, 519–520
Camouflage, 519
Caves, 195, 208, 257, 299, 356, 379, 519, 520
Counterbattery efforts, 309
Dugouts, 32
Emplacements, 232, 325, 375
Field fortifications, 92, 106–107, 519
Firing positions, 138
Flank security, 138
Flares, 159
Fortifications, 302, 375, 378, 520
Ground, 519–520
Guns, 357
Emplacements, 46, 207
Positions, 71, 74, 385
Installations, 389
Living quarters, 100
Machine gun positions, 95, 289
Mess halls, 106
Mortar positions, 73, 381, 385
Mortar preparation, 289
Observation posts, 136, 356
Positions, 33, 72, 90, 93, 136, 379, 520
Revetments, 33
Secondary line, 520
Shelter, 106
Storage spaces, 106
Strong points, 207, 381
Tactical wire, 33
Trenches, 10, 32, 89, 93, 104, 136, 160, 168, 195, 196_n_, 200,
206–207, 259, 292–293, 295, 299, 302, 304, 307, 368, 379,
385, 388, 520
Trenchlines, 95, 188, 206, 210, 267, 296, 374, 379, 388
Trenchworks, 75, 379, 389, 519
Tunnels, 106, 257, 519–520
Underground earthworks, 106
Weapons emplacements, 136, 283, 295, 379
Weapons positions, 133, 136, 307, 337
Works, 520
Korea, Republic of, 160, 162, 220
United Nations
All-round, 519
Ambushes, 8, 203, 524
Ammunition holes, 467
Antiaircraft defense, 67
Antiguerrilla activities, 412
Artillery box traffic, 190
Artillery fire, 258, 289
Artillery firepower, 309
Attacks, 53_n_, 109
Automatic weapons sites, 303, 467
Barbed wire obstacle, 258
Box-me-ins, 75, 75_n_, 89, 121, 124, 127, 129, 134, 150, 281, 289,
301, 304, 325, 369, 518_n_, 519
Bunkers, 22, 34, 75, 89, 100–101, 107–108, 108_n_, 118, 148,
152–153, 193–194, 197, 199, 205–206, 207_n_, 210–211, 213,
213_n_, 214–215, 273, 283, 303, 323, 388, 467–468, 520–521
Camp facilities, 32
Caves, 273, 283, 285, 521
Combat outposts slope defenses, 255
Command posts, bunkered, 467–468
Counterattacks, 134, 206, 308
Counterbattery, 117, 117_n_, 207, 256, 291–292
Countermortar, 256, 281, 286, 291
Defense-in-depth concept, 509
Defensive boxes, 378
Emplacements, 253
Field fortifications, 215
Fighting holes, 299, 303, 521
Fighting light, 18-inch, 114
Fighting positions, 253
Fires, 127, 324, 354, 369, 373, 379, 387, 389, 519
Fire support, 21, 309, 357
Flames, 392
Flares, 160
Fortifications, 32, 121, 397, 448, 452, 509, 518
Foxholes, 302–303
Ground, 1, 8, 391
Gun emplacements, 32, 253, 304, 339
Hill defenses, 391
Individual shelter, 214
Installations, 107
Linear defense, 465
Listening posts, 273
Marine, U.S., 82, 84, 127
4.2-inch mortar positions, 466
81mm mortar positions, 466
Outpost, 75
Positions, 34, 106, 203, 253, 467–468
Preparations, 121
Protective boxes, 281
Protective wire, 324
Reconnaissance, motorized, 465
Sandbags, 520
Searchlight, 114
Stabilized lines, 523
Stabilized situation, 466
Strongpoint, 465
Tactics, 518
Tank slots, 467–468
Timbers, 107, 448
Trenches, 148, 153, 193–194, 197_n_, 209, 214, 253, 273, 283–285,
299, 303–304, 323–324, 387, 398, 467, 520, 522
Trenchline, 211, 214, 257, 273, 275–276, 366, 386–387,
389, 468, 509
Trenchworks, 32, 121, 387
Weapon
Dugouts, 303
Emplacements, 22
Positions, 299
Wire, 300, 309, 368, 379, 494
_DeHaven_, USS, 347
Demarcation line, 458, 529, 532
Demars, Cpl George C., 305
Demas, Capt John G., 126–127, 129
Demers, Maj Raymond E., 177
Demilitarized Zone, 322, 377_n_, 394, 399, 408, 445–450, 453–456,
456_n_, 457–461, 463–467, 469
Police companies, 456, 456_n_, 457, 459
Deputy Director of Logistic Plans, 337
Detroit, 147_n_
Dewey, Cpl Duane E., 37_n_
Dickerson, Sgt Charles W., 436_n_
Dion, 2dLt James W., 118
Diplomatic maneuverings, 313
Director of the Marine Corps Educational Center, 337
Distinguished Service Medal, 233, 336
Division of Reserve, 337
Dobervich, LtCol Michiel, 39, 250
Dobson, LtCol Charles E., 207, 243
Donahue, 2dLt John J., 82–83
Donk, 2dLt Terry K., 95
Dorney, Col Harvey C., 347_n_
Dorsey, Col Elmer T., 28, 28_n_
Doyle, RAdm James H., 478, 478_n_
Dragon Lady, 371
Dufford, Maj John M., 175
Dulacki, LtCol Leo J., 165, 167, 187, 193, 195, 197, 197_n_, 199,
208–211, 214; Col, 163_n_
Dulles, John Foster, 427
DULUTH Line, 327
Dunis, MSgt Gust H., 436_n_, 437
Dunlap, Col John F., 320
Dunn, Maj Elswin P. 242
Dyer, RAdm George C., 58
East Coast Island Defense Command. _See_ Marine Units.
Edenton, 471
Edwards, LtCol Harry W., 20_n_
Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., 64_n_, 227, 227_n_;
President, 37_n_, 147_n_, 314, 321
Electronic countermeasures, 177, 492. _See also_ Air Activities,
United Nations.
El Toro, 233, 374, 472, 485, 498, 500
English language, 317, 445
Equipment
Communist, 90, 93, 225, 511, 525–526
United Nations, 5, 8, 10, 10_n_, 11, 44, 60, 63, 101, 241, 250, 309,
316, 359, 401, 448, 451–452, 480, 509, 512_n_
Estess, Sgt Morris L., 436_n_
Estey, Capt Ralph F., 293, 295–296
European
Campaigns, 88
Command, 504_n_
Theater of Operations, 493
Evans, Capt Dexter E., 195
Evans, Capt G. L. G., RN, 60_n_
Everest, LtGen Frank F., 43, 88, 515
Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, 504_n_
Exercises, 86, 232, 249, 323–324, 334–336, 360, 400, 497, 508. _See
also_ MARLEX exercises.
Far East, 471, 474, 476–477, 499–500, 500_n_, 501, 533
Farthest Point of Advance, 374
Fascist, 427
Ferranto, 1stLt Felix L., 433
Filipinos, 318_n_
Finch, LtCol James H., 268, 323
Findtner, Col Frederick R., 268
Fink, Capt Gerald, 420, 431–433
Fire direction center, 72. _See also_ Artillery.
Fisher, LtCol Thell H., 19, 320, 408
Fitzmaurice, Maj Charles W., 250
Flares, 67, 75, 140, 398
Fleps, LtCol Carl J., 471–472
Fletcher, LtCol Maurice W., 177, 207_n_
Fliers, 132, 375, 385, 405, 511. _See also_ Air activities.
Flores, Capt James R., 203
Flournoy, Col Walter N., 38, 38_n_, 70, 108
Flynn, Capt John P., 406, 430, 433, 433_n_, 442
Foley, Lt Kenneth S., 69
Folmar, Capt Jesse G., 173
Formosa, 427
Forrestal, James V., 495_n_
Fortin, MSgt Lawrence J., 242
Forty-first Parallel, 55
Forward air controllers, 56, 70–72, 99, 172, 257_n_, 488, 516, 517_n_.
_See also_ Air Activities, United Nations.
Forward observers, 72, 105, 202, 232, 250, 273, 275, 299, 302, 369,
464. _See also_ Artillery.
Foster, Capt William J., Jr., 397
Fourth of July, 90, 92–93
Fox, LtCol Lawrence F., 177
Franz, 2dLt Edgar R., 297
Frease, 1stLt William A., 377
Freedom Gate, 400
Freedom Village, 316–319, 327, 400–406, 408, 459
Free World, 314, 535
Fressler, WO Dramus F., 241
Frier, Capt Donald G., 191
Fuel, 67, 235, 246, 260_n_, 341, 472_n_
Fuller, LtCol Regan, 320
Funk, Col Glenn C., 268_n_, 323, 335, 363, 369
Fuson, Capt Harold C., 89
Futrell, Dr. Robert C., 62_n_
Galer, Col Robert E., 65–67
Galliher, 2dLt Robert E., 100
Garcia, PFC Fernando L., 152
Gayle, LtCol Gordon D., 13_n_
General Classification Test, 457–458
Geneva, 229, 424
Convention, 442, 539
Gentleman, LtCol Alexander W., 150_n_
George, MSgt D. R., 242
Gerding, Jules E., 83
German manufacture, 525
Gifu, 471
Gililland, LtCol George A., 268
Gillette, 1stLt Robert J., 433, 438
Gillis, Maj Alexander J., 174
Gingrich, RAdm John E., 355
Givens, Maj Donald F., 177
Glenview, 499
Glick, LtCol Jacob E., 182_n_
_Glory_, HMS, 355
Gocke, Maj Charles E., 316
Goich, Capt Samuel G., 457
Gold Star, 88, 337, 376, 442
GOP mission, 467
Graham, PFC Alfred P., Jr., 403, 438
Graham, Capt Leland, 77
Gray, Capt Carl R., 261
Gray, 1stLt John S., 302
Great Britain, 2
Greek, 318_n_
Gregory, LtCol Noel C., 20
Griffith, Sgt Donald M., 437, 441
Grindle, PFC Richard R., 437
Ground Control Intercept, 490. _See also_ Air Activities, United
Nations.
Guadalcanal, 26, 148, 267_n_, 298, 327_n_, 337
Hadd, LtCol Harry A., 383
Haeju-Chinnampo, 27, 27_n_
Haffner, Col Loren, 233, 268, 268_n_
Hagaru, 412, 480, 487–488
Haiti, 2, 477
Hamhung, 65, 488
Hamhung-Hungnam area, 480, 488, 530
Hammon, HM Francis C., 287, 287_n_
Haneda Air Force Base, 319
Han River, 4, 15, 18, 32, 39–41, 96, 105, 234, 248–250, 398, 463, 508
Hanshin Air Force Base, 472
Haring, PFC John A., 436_n_
Harlan, Capt Murry V., Jr., 209–210
Harper, Capt Esmond E., 391
Harris, MajGen Field, 7, 7_n_, 485
Harris Maj Walter R., 406, 423, 439, 442
Harrison, SSgt Charles L., 434, 436_n_, 437, 441
Harrison, Maj Thomas D., 433, 435
Harrison, BGen William K., 228, 322, 433
Harshberger, Col John D., 471
Hart, LtGen Franklin A., 98, 139_n_, 214, 215_n_
Hausman, Col William F., 472
_Haven_, USS, 288, 319
Harwood, LtCol Harold A., 374_n_
Hawaii, 320, 337
Hawkins, Cpl Clifford R., 436_n_
Hayton, Cpl Ernest E., 436_n_
Heinl, LtCol Robert D., Jr., 187, 359;
Col 327_n_, 358
Helicopters, 8, 12, 22, 40–41, 66, 66_n_, 67, 67_n_, 77, 86, 118, 127,
140, 180, 215_n_, 235–236, 246–247_n_, 271, 288, 307,
316_n_, 319, 333–334, 336, 370, 402, 408, 414, 455, 459,
481, 484, 493–494, 494_n_, 495–498. _See also_ Air
Activities, United Nations and Aircraft, United Nations.
Casualty evacuation, 8, 42, 49, 139–140, 234–236, 236_n_, 271, 307,
370, 402, 459, 494–495, 497
Liaison, 494
Lifts, 8, 31, 335, 495–496
Reconnaissance, 494
Rescue, 67, 174
Resupply, 8, 101, 246, 481, 495–497
Types
HO3S, 414
HO3S-1, 42_n_, 488, 493
HO5S, 181, 235
HO5S-1, 180, 271
HRS-2, 235, 472
HTL, 235
HTL-4, 42_n_, 180, 271
Hemphill, Col Bruce T., 21
Henderson, Col Frederick P., 21, 21_n_, 46, 71–72, 136;
BGen, 46, 46_n_, 135_n_, 179_n_
Henry, 1stLt Kenneth W., 414, 429
Herring, LtCol William T., 24, 42
Hicks, LtCol Alton L., 182_n_
Hilburn, PFC Theron L., 436_n_
Hill, 2dLt John W., Jr., 177
Hill 13 (Frisco), 280
Hill 15 (Detroit), 258, 280
Hill 21B, 286, 292, 304
Hill 25A (Hill 150), 273, 280–281, 298–299, 304
Hill 27 (Carson), 273
Hill 29, 280, 286
Hill 31, 255, 273, 275, 285, 301
Hill 31A, 255, 260, 273, 279
Hill 31D, 285
Hill 33, 279
Hill 34, 75
Hill 35, 279
Hill 35A, 259
Hill 36, 157
Hill 37, 157
Hill 40, 279
Hill 44, 279, 289, 300
Hill 45, 286
Hill 47, 273, 285, 309
Hill 48A (Stromboli), 122–126, 132–134, 136–137, 139, 141, 150, 157
Hill 52, 109
Hill 56, 157
Hill 56A (Samoa), 109, 113, 116
Hill 57, 276
Hill 57A, 281, 291, 294, 297
Hill 58A (Siberia), 109, 111–114, 116, 118, 118_n_, 128, 131–132, 134,
136, 138–139, 141
Hill 67 (Arrowhead), 36, 79, 273, 275, 286, 301
Hill 86, 157, 160, 162
Hill 90, 259, 372
Hill 98, 280, 291
Hill 101, 265
Hill 104, 82–83, 122, 133, 150, 256
Hill 108, 289
Hill 110, 111, 113, 116
Hill 111, 383, 385–386, 388–389, 391, 450
Hill 114, 289, 300
Hill 116, 289
Hill 119, 381, 383, 385–386, 388, 388_n_, 389, 391, 450
Hill 120, 109, 111, 129, 132, 134
Hill 122, (Bunker Hill), 109, 113–114, 118–119, 121–122, 124–133,
135–139, 141, 143, 145, 149, 159
Hill 123, 119, 134
Hill 124, 109, 119, 121–122, 129, 145, 159–160, 162, 259
Hill 126, 276, 369, 383, 391, 464
Hill 134, 232
Hill 139, 293, 377, 385
Hill 140, 279
Hill 146, 186, 205–206
Hill 150 (Hill 25A), 275–276, 297
Hill 153, 273, 276, 278, 292, 297, 301, 303–304
Hill 155 (Hill 167), 155, 217–218, 221, 281, 298, 464–465
Hill 159 (Yoke), 89, 91
Hill 163, 464
Hill 167. _See_ Hill 155.
Hill 181, 276, 464
Hill 190, 265, 273, 276, 280–281, 291, 293, 297, 365
Hill 190.5, 298
Hill 191, 223
Hill 201, 109
Hill 229, 104, 109, 276, 464
Hill 240, 259
Hill 255, 223
Hill 266, 224
Hill 355, 223
Hill Bunker (Hill 122), 102, 108–109, 111, 113–114, 117–118, 118_n_,
119, 121–122, 124–143, 145–147, 149–150, 156, 159–160, 162,
172, 179, 185, 250, 265, 308, 452
Hill Detroit (Hill 15), 258, 294
Hill Fox, 412
Hill Frisco, 294
Hill Kumgok, 256–257
Hill Nevada, 286
Hill Old Baldy, 223–224, 299, 309
Hill Paekhak, 104
Hill Pork Chop, 223
Hill Red, 256–257
Hill Sahon, 122
Hill T, 80
Hill, Tumae-ri, 297
Hill Ungok, 255–257, 259–260, 271, 275, 291
Hill Z, 77
Hillam, LtCol Bruce F., 74_n_
Hines, LtCol Owen M., 69
Hippocratic tradition, 294
Hogaboom, MajGen Robert E., 473_n_
Hoglind, MSgt H. C., 241
Holben, Maj Raymond C., 175
Holcomb, Cpl Frederick G., 436_n_
Hollinger, PFC Bernard R., 403
Holt, Capt Edward Y., Jr., 152
Holy Communion, 232
Hongchon area, 412
Honshu, 28
Honsowetz, Col Russell E., 20, 62_n_, 81, 91_n_, 117_n_, 197_n_
Hudson, Capt Floyd G., 292
Hughes, LtCol John E., 349
Hungnam, 5–6, 357
Hunter, Capt Clyde W., 195, 257, 281, 293; Col, 257_n_
Hutchinson, LtCol Homer G., Jr., 241
Hwachon Reservoir, 530, 535
Hwangto-do Island, 55, 356, 358
Hyan, MajGen Zoon Shin, 310
Il, BGen Lee, 58
Il, Gen Nam, 228
Imjin River, 15–16, 31–32, 41, 44, 50, 101–103, 105, 148, 187, 202,
234, 249, 251, 263, 268, 270, 339, 364, 371, 381, 391, 394,
447, 450, 453, 461, 463–464, 508
Inchon, 4, 4_n_, 5, 10_n_, 13, 15, 18, 56, 86, 270, 288, 319, 323, 334,
354, 402, 408, 474, 477–479, 483, 486–487, 494, 499, 502,
530–531, 535
Inchon-Seoul, 4, 12, 475, 478–479, 486, 502, 512_n_
India, 228, 314, 321_n_, 408
Indian Resolution, 228–229
Indians, 408
Inje, 484, 535
Insco, PFC Bernard W., 437
Intelligence
Communist, 58, 74, 85, 123, 228, 425, 522
United Nations, 29–30, 36, 45, 53, 58–59, 69, 81, 85, 93, 96, 128,
141, 193, 237, 264_n_, 319, 320, 335, 346, 348, 353–354,
357, 371, 388, 392, 512, 514, 520–521, 532
International Red Cross inspection teams, 319
Irvin, Maj William H., Jr., 175
Itami Air Force Base, 28, 47, 49, 210, 470, 472, 486
ITEM raid, 260, 279, 291
Iwakuni, 474
Iwo Jima, 148, 233, 337, 474
Jack, Col Samuel S., 170_n_;
BGen, 474, 474_n_;
MajGen, 139_n_, 178_n_, 181_n_
JAMESTOWN Line, 11–12, 15–17, 19–20, 22, 31, 37–39, 45, 49, 74, 76,
81–82, 84, 87–88, 92, 96, 100, 104, 106–107, 109, 111,
121–123, 125, 130, 132, 148–149, 152–153, 157, 165–170, 172,
186, 200, 207, 218, 231–232, 261, 265, 267–268, 301, 323,
327, 451, 466, 497
Japan, 2–3, 6_n_, 44, 47–48, 56, 97, 183, 235, 320, 374, 402, 433_n_,
469, 471, 473–474, 476, 485, 491
Japanese, 4_n_, 88, 106, 434, 485, 525
Jensen, LtCol Oscar T., Jr., 152
Jerome, Col Clayton C., 43;
BGen, 43, 61, 61_n_, 62;
MajGen, 159, 177, 179, 181, 231, 233;
LtGen, 43_n_
Jersey Ridge, 364
Jewson, LtCol Winston E., 347
Jobusch, Lt Wallace E., 59
Johnson, PFC Richard D., 404
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 229, 337, 476–477, 500–501, 505, 505_n_
Chairman, 352_n_, 483
Joint Observer Teams, 458
Joint Operations Center, Korea, 26–27, 68, 170_n_, 238, 350, 376, 469,
472, 474, 488_n_, 515–516
Jones, LtCol Olin W., Jr., 281
Jones, LtCol Paul M., 366, 378
Jordahl, Col Russell N., 44
Joy, VAdm C. Turner, 7_n_, 88, 228, 528
Judson, Capt Robert W., 112
Kaesong, 7, 13, 15–16, 22, 75, 104, 175, 318, 350_n_, 401, 405, 413,
480, 489, 511, 511_n_
Kaesong-Munsan road, 24
Kaesong-Panmunjom restricted territory, 511
Kaneohe, 471
Kang, Maj Shin Ho, 220_n_
Kanggye, 415–416, 437
Kanghwa-do Island, 15, 248_n_, 354
KANSAS Line, 20, 22, 39, 100, 103, 232, 248, 250–251, 253, 268, 323,
339, 396, 450, 461, 468, 532
KANSAS SWITCH Line, 461
Kapaun, Capt Emil J., 427_n_
Kapaun High School, Father, 433_n_
Kaylor, PFC Charles M., 436_n_
Keck, 1stLt Frank L., Jr., 376
Keller, Maj Robert P., 485
Kelly, Maj George E., 305
Kelly, PFC John D., 83_n_
Kelso, Pvt Jack W., 164_n_
Kendall, MajGen Paul W., 88, 156, 182_n_, 227, 332_n_
Kennedy, Cpl Gethern, Jr., 403
Keun, 1stLt No Won, 33
Kicklighter, Maj Edward C., 349
Kidd, Cpl Harold J., 437
Kilmer, HM John E., 127
Kilmer, Joyce, 127
Kim, Col Dong Ha, 19
Kim, 2dLt Young Ha, 75
Kim-Peng offer, 314
Kimpo, 12–13, 13_n_, 15, 17–18, 34, 481, 484, 486–487
Kimpo Peninsula, 4, 11–12, 15, 17–18, 32, 38, 40, 96, 248, 248_n_, 249
King, Col Kenneth A., 60, 60_n_
King, LtCol Louis N., 112, 145
Kirby, Col Kenneth D., 233
Kirby-Smith, Maj Ephraim, 39
Knudson, Maj Curtis E., 175
Kobe, 44, 471
Kohus, PFC Francis E., Jr., 403
Kojo, 55, 178, 226–227
Kongnung River, 15
Korea, 2–4, 4_n_, 5, 6_n_, 7_n_, 24, 24_n_, 26–27, 29, 38, 43–45,
48–49, 51_n_, 52, 56, 62, 62_n_, 83, 86, 88, 96–100, 105,
108, 127, 135, 139, 143, 188, 225–227, 233, 235–236,
244–246, 263, 270, 309, 314, 319, 321, 327, 345, 347_n_,
349, 356, 374_n_, 375, 379, 391, 393–394, 398, 408–411, 414,
420_n_, 426–427, 429–430, 438, 441–442, 448, 469–473,
476–482, 484–487, 491, 493–497, 499–504, 506–508, 512–513,
513_n_, 514_n_, 517, 520, 523–524, 527–535
East, 1, 5–6, 17, 53, 56, 59, 70, 205, 342, 351, 353, 356, 409, 475,
487, 507, 512
North (People’s Republic), 3–7, 27_n_, 28_n_, 53, 55, 65–66,
170–171, 224, 241, 321, 353, 403, 412_n_, 413_n_, 415–416,
419–420, 425, 428, 432–434, 438–439, 470, 479, 481, 513,
516, 531–532, 532_n_
Hydroelectric plants, 63–65, 513
North Korean People’s Army, 3–5, 17, 20, 26, 58, 67, 229, 314,
355_n_, 350–359, 402, 410, 411_n_, 412, 425, 430, 459, 475,
474–479, 525, 530
Units
I Corps, 358
23d Brigade, 355
Tank and Infantry School, 244
South (Republic of Korea), 3–6, 15, 28, 31, 43, 51, 67–68, 100, 106,
224, 318, 321–322, 355, 360, 478, 480, 529–532, 532_n_, 534
Army, 20, 51–52, 100, 155, 223, 314, 321, 323, 342, 344, 351–352,
359_n_, 360, 372, 375, 393–394, 400, 476, 483, 497,
517, 529–530
I Corps, 52, 175, 222, 393, 460
II Corps, 52, 342, 351, 385, 393, 517
Capital Division, 52
1st Division, 11, 51–52, 222, 257_n_, 333, 342, 479
3d Division, 52
5th Division, 52, 222
6th Division, 52
7th Division, 52
8th Division, 10, 52
9th Division, 51, 342
11th Division, 52
20th Division, 342
15th Regiment, 11
13th Security Battalion, 17–18
Marine Corps, 6, 11, 32–34, 39, 41, 45, 55–56, 59, 87, 90, 122, 136,
185, 188, 190, 196, 217–218, 220–221, 248, 259–260, 268,
280, 303, 310, 328, 335–336, 353–354, 356, 359_n_, 448, 455,
461, 463, 483, 529–531
1st Regiment, 4, 6, 6_n_, 10–12, 17, 19, 19_n_, 29, 31–32, 37–39,
75–76, 96, 148, 155–162, 169, 176, 187, 190, 217, 222, 261,
265, 267_n_, 270, 300, 325, 327–329, 331, 344, 370, 373,
447, 461, 463, 481, 508, 512_n_, 530
1st Battalion, 19, 31–33, 75, 90
2d Battalion, 19, 32, 75
3d Battalion, 19, 31, 37, 220_n_, 344
5th Battalion, 17–18, 217, 22_n_, 335, 530
2d Regiment, 353, 530
1st Artillery Battalion, 11, 270, 328, 331
1st Engineer Company, 328
Tank Company, 331
Navy, 359_n_
Service Corps, 100, 100_n_, 117, 182, 188, 193, 278, 288, 329,
454, 454_n_, 509
103d Regiment, 100, 454_n_
West, 10–11, 13, 13_n_, 16–17, 22, 32, 53, 92, 143, 203, 261,
264–265, 335, 353, 391, 409, 463, 474–475, 507–509, 523, 535
Korean Armistice Commission, 7_n_, 528
Korean Communication Zone, 100
Korean Defense Minister, 310
Korean Military Advisory Group, 529–530
Korean National Police, 249, 251
Korean Presidential Unit Citation Streamer, 310, 352, 352_n_, 492
Koto-ri, 412, 487
Kreiser, BGen Alexander W., Jr., 472
Ksycewski, Capt Casimir C., 113, 145
Kumgok, 279
Kumsong, 342, 393, 517
Kung Dong, 420–421
Kunsan, 202, 270, 335
Kurth, Capt Harold D., Jr., 258
Kwak, 2dLt Sang In, 90
Kyu, LtCol Kim Yong, 155_n_
Lafleur, 2dLt Carl R., 177
_Lake Champlain_, USS, 346
Lambrecht, Col Peter D., 133–134
Lamson-Scribner, BGen Frank H., 71; MajGen 71_n_
Lawrence, LtCol Henry C., Jr., 324
Layer, Col Walter F., 108, 113, 121–122, 126, 137–138, 146,
159, 162, 233
League of Red Cross Societies, 229
Lee, Maj Benjamin G., 297–298, 301–302
Lee, Lt Ernest S., 76–77
Lee, MajGen Sang Cho, 315
Legion of Merit, 88, 233, 337, 442
Lehner, Dr. Otto, 319
Leopard (Korean guerrillas), 354
Letter of Commendation, 442
_Lexington_, USS, 2
Li, Yo-Yang, 106
Liberty Village, 402, 404
Little Swap, 317
Logistics,
Communist, 224, 478, 513, 525
United Nations, 11–12, 16, 18, 24, 44, 46–49, 60_n_, 62, 100, 140,
244–245, 263, 355, 469, 485, 487, 493, 497, 534
Long, LtCol Frank A., 383
Long, Col Glenn R., 236_n_
Lorence, Capt Herbert M., 293, 296–297, 299
Los Angeles, 500
Lund, Maj Arnold A., 374_n_
Lundquist, 2dLt Carl R., 420
Lutz, 2dLt Theodore J., Jr., 392
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 3–5, 6_n_, 427, 476–478,
496, 499–500
MacDonald, Maj James A., Jr., 212_n_, 440
MacLean, Maj William G., 472
Madam-ni, 15
Maddell, Cpl James E., 405
Maffioli, Cpl Leonard J., 436_n_
Main Battle Position, 445–447, 453–454, 460–461, 468
Main Line of Resistance, 11–12, 15–16, 19–20, 22, 30–33, 36, 38, 40,
45, 51, 61, 73–74, 76, 81–84, 86–87, 89–90, 92, 95–96, 101,
104–105, 109, 111, 113–114, 116–117, 119, 121–123, 125–127,
130, 135, 137, 143, 145, 147, 149, 152, 163, 165–167, 169,
185–187, 193–195, 197_n_, 199–200, 202–203, 205–206, 207_n_,
209–210, 217, 221, 225, 230, 231_n_, 232, 239, 247–248, 251,
253, 253_n_, 256–257, 259, 261, 264–265, 267, 270, 273, 276,
278–281, 283–289, 292–294, 297–300, 304–307, 309, 323–324,
327–329, 331–332, 339–341, 345, 361, 363–366, 367_n_, 369,
369_n_, 371, 373–374, 377–379, 379_n_, 381, 383, 385–388,
393, 396, 414, 445, 447–448, 450–452, 454–455, 465–466, 480,
496–497, 508–509, 511, 516, 518–520, 524
Main Supply Route
Communist, 5, 202, 514
United Nations, 114, 207, 467, 479
Maizlish, 2dLt Irvin B., 305
Majon-ni, 436
Malik, Jacob, 7
_Manchester_, USS, 414
Manchurian border, 415, 513
Mangrum, LtGen Richard C., 515
Manor, Sgt Paul M., 436_n_
Mantel, Maj Samuel J., Jr. 350
Marine Corps, U. S., 8, 13, 26, 37_n_, 39, 44, 55, 61, 86, 239, 323,
333–334, 359_n_, 409–411, 423, 430, 440–441, 471, 474–479,
482–484, 493–495, 497–502, 504–505, 505_n_, 506–508, 512,
523, 528, 530–531, 534–535
Air Reserve Training Command, 499
Basic School, 143_n_
Equipment Board, 49_n_
Fleet Marine Force, 10, 55, 139_n_, 244–245, 320, 482, 488_n_, 501
Headquarters, 148, 503
Study, 503
Reserve, 336, 499–502, 503_n_, 504–506
Units
Air. _See also_ Air activities, United Nations.
AirFMFPac, 233
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 4, 7, 24, 26–28, 42–43, 47, 60, 60_n_,
65, 68–70, 72, 98–100, 104, 132, 159, 170_n_, 172, 175, 181,
207, 231, 233–240, 243–245, 257_n_, 270–271, 294–295, 299,
307, 310, 310_n_, 320, 326_n_, 344, 348–349, 351–352,
352_n_, 370, 374–375, 375_n_, 376, 397–398, 405–406, 411,
413, 467–472, 474, 485, 487, 488_n_, 489, 490–493, 495,
500–501, 503–504, 507, 512, 515, 515_n_, 516, 535
2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 486, 498
Marine Air Control Group 2, 28, 49, 99, 233, 270, 345,
489, 492, 505
Marine Aircraft Group 11, 26, 471, 473
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 26–28, 42, 49, 61, 65–67, 72, 132–133,
158, 175–176, 187, 208, 234, 242–243, 256, 257_n_, 270, 294,
297, 299, 306–307, 325, 347, 347_n_, 348, 348_n_, 350–352,
374, 374_n_, 375, 375_n_, 376, 379, 469, 472–473, 486,
489, 491, 515
Marine Aircraft Group 13, 375
Marine Aircraft Group 16, 471–472
Marine Aircraft Group 32, 43
Marine Aircraft Group 33, 26–27, 39_n_, 42, 47–48, 65, 68–69,
71_n_, 132–133, 175–178, 234, 239, 242–244, 250_n_, 270,
292, 299, 307, 325, 347–348, 350–352, 352_n_, 374–375,
375_n_, 376, 385, 469, 472–473, 476, 485–486, 489,
491, 500, 516
Air Base Squadron 16, 472
Air Maintenance Squadron 16, 472
Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1, 69, 485, 487, 502
Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3, 69, 472
Headquarters Squadron 1, 405
Headquarters Squadron 12, 487
Headquarters Squadron 33, 413, 485
Tactical Air Control Squadron 2, 332, 485, 487
Wing Service Squadron 1, 270, 348
HMR-161, 24, 40–41, 49, 179–181, 234–236, 236_n_, 246–247,
247_n_, 271, 288, 334–336, 351, 370, 402, 408, 486, 495–497
HMR-163, 472
HMX-1, 493
VMA-121, 27, 132, 158, 177, 207–208, 242–243, 292, 295–296, 299,
306, 310, 325, 339, 349, 353, 379, 381, 385, 406,
413, 413_n_, 491
VMA-212, 158, 181, 207, 295, 325, 349, 486
VMA-233, 491
VMA-251, 374, 374_n_, 385_n_, 397, 469, 491
VMA-312, 27, 27_n_, 42, 58, 173, 175, 178, 240, 347, 347_n_,
348–349, 350_n_, 351_n_, 413, 415, 420, 486, 488, 491, 503
VMA-323, 158, 176, 196, 207–208, 243, 293–296, 299, 304, 306,
310, 325, 339, 349, 374, 374_n_
VMA-332, 347, 375_n_, 491, 503
VMC-1, 177, 238, 469, 492
VMF-115, 27, 65, 177, 242–243, 291–292, 299, 310, 325, 334, 341,
349–350, 350_n_, 375–376, 385, 491
VMF-121, 435
VMF-212, 26, 28_n_, 42, 175, 177, 208, 242–243, 294, 299, 304,
306, 310, 339, 376, 379, 381, 414, 487, 491
VMF-214, 374_n_, 485, 491
VMF-222, 471
VMF-224, 471
VMF-253, 471
VMF-311, 27, 65, 174, 176, 194, 243, 291–292, 299, 325, 334,
339, 341, 349–350, 350_n_, 368, 375–376, 385, 389, 397, 405,
413, 415, 434, 488, 491
VMF-312, 487
VMF-314, 471
VMF-323, 26, 28_n_, 42, 175, 374_n_, 403, 413, 415, 420, 437,
486–488, 491
VMF(N)-513, 26–28, 42, 69, 133, 139, 173, 181, 202, 240–243,
291, 294, 310, 325, 345–347, 347_n_, 349, 376, 406, 413,
429, 433, 438, 469, 485–487, 490–491, 503_n_
VMF(N)-542, 486–487
VMJ-1, 27, 42–43, 174, 238, 270, 348, 348_n_, 349, 397,
490–491, 512
VMO-2, 471–472
VMO-6, 24, 42, 49, 179–181, 234–236, 271, 288, 290, 332, 334,
345, 351_n_, 370, 377, 413, 415, 430, 485–488, 490, 493–495,
497, 503_n_, 512
VMR-152, 28, 49, 181, 472, 485, 488
VMR-253, 471
VMR-352, 485
Air Support Radar Team 1, 332, 346, 364, 489
1st Marine Aeronautical Company, 26
Ground
1st Marine Division, 1–2, 4, 4_n_, 5–6, 6_n_, 7, 10, 10_n_,
11–13, 15, 17, 19, 19_n_, 21–22, 24, 27, 28_n_, 29–33,
37–39, 42, 46, 49, 51–52, 55, 61, 72, 74, 81, 84–85, 88,
91–92, 96–97, 100, 100_n_, 102–108, 111, 117, 119, 125–127,
131–132, 136–141, 169–170, 170_n_, 185, 188, 192–193, 203,
212, 215, 217–218, 221–222, 231, 234, 234_n_, 240, 243–245,
247_n_, 251, 255, 257_n_, 258–259, 261, 263, 264_n_, 265,
267, 267_n_, 270–271, 281, 290, 304, 306, 310, 310_n_, 314,
317, 319–320, 326, 326_n_, 328–329, 333, 333_n_, 334, 336,
339, 345, 351, 351_n_, 360–361, 363–364, 368, 370–371, 375,
378_n_, 383, 385, 385_n_, 388, 391–394, 396–403, 405–406,
409–413, 436, 436_n_, 437, 445–446, 453, 455, 457, 459–461,
468, 470, 472–473, 473_n_, 475–477, 477_n_, 478–481, 481_n_,
482, 482_n_, 483–484, 487–488, 490–491, 495, 498–499,
499_n_, 500, 500_n_, 501–504, 507–508, 508_n_, 509, 511–512,
512_n_, 514_n_, 515, 515_n_, 516, 518, 521, 523, 530,
533_n_, 535
2d Marine Division, 148, 336, 476–477, 498, 499_n_, 500–501
3d Marine Division, 139, 471–472, 474
1st Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force, 471, 471_n_
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 310_n_, 327, 411–412, 471_n_,
476–477, 488_n_, 491, 494, 499, 501
1st Marines, 4–5, 10–12, 19–20, 22, 30, 34, 38, 71, 82, 87, 96,
108–109, 112–114, 119, 121–122, 125–129, 131–138, 140–142,
145–146, 150, 159, 162, 185, 230–233, 236, 250, 257,
260–261, 264, 267–268, 276, 289, 300, 306, 308, 316_n_, 323,
325, 328, 328_n_, 329, 332, 339, 341, 363–364, 381, 381_n_,
383, 385–386, 388–389, 391–392, 396, 400, 415, 447, 450,
453, 455, 461, 463, 467, 479, 489
1st Battalion, 19, 96, 112, 121–122, 128, 131, 143, 145, 230,
268, 268_n_, 332, 450, 455
2d Battalion, 19, 34, 38, 89, 108–109, 112, 114, 117–118,
118_n_, 123, 128, 133, 145–146, 149, 159, 188, 230, 268,
268_n_, 383, 388, 390–391, 496
3d Battalion, 19, 32, 71, 86, 108–109, 118, 118_n_, 121–122,
124–128, 130–131, 135, 140, 142, 149_n_, 156, 162, 200,
208–209, 209_n_, 210, 211_n_, 230, 260, 268, 289, 300, 332,
385–386, 388–389, 392, 403–404
4th Marines, 471
5th Marines, 2, 4–5, 10–12, 19–20, 30, 33–34, 38–39, 74, 76, 79,
81, 84, 87, 92, 96, 103, 105, 114, 116, 122, 125, 140_n_,
141, 146, 150, 152–153, 157_n_, 164, 185, 233, 247, 250_n_,
255–256, 258–261, 264, 267, 267_n_, 268, 270, 279–281, 286,
290–291, 297, 304–306, 308, 310, 323, 323_n_, 324_n_,
327–328, 334, 363–364, 367, 371–373, 374_n_, 377, 383,
387–388, 392, 394, 415, 436_n_, 446–447, 449–450, 453–457,
459, 461, 463–465, 467, 476, 479, 530
1st Battalion, 20, 34, 76–77, 79, 84, 92, 105, 105_n_, 150,
247, 256, 258, 260, 264, 267, 275, 278–280, 283–288, 288_n_,
291, 447, 464, 466–467
2d Battalion, 11, 20, 34, 36, 77, 87–89, 92, 146–147, 147_n_,
150_n_, 254, 258, 267_n_, 268, 280, 284–288, 291–293,
295–299, 302–306, 323, 323_n_, 336, 372, 451, 447, 450, 455,
459, 464, 466–467
3d Battalion, 20, 86–87, 150, 152–153, 259, 267, 267_n_, 268,
276, 278–281, 285, 287–288, 288_n_, 289, 292, 297, 303, 305,
323, 392, 403, 438, 447, 451, 453, 464
6th Marines, 501
3d Battalion, 501
7th Marines, 4_n_, 5, 10, 12, 20, 41, 45, 79, 81–82, 84, 87,
91–92, 96, 103, 121, 157_n_, 160, 164–166, 168–169, 180,
183, 185–188, 188_n_, 190–191, 193, 195, 199–200, 202,
211–212, 212_n_, 231–233, 236, 246–247, 255_n_, 259–260,
267–268, 268_n_, 270, 308, 310, 323–325, 327–329, 329_n_,
334–335, 344, 344_n_, 345, 363–364, 366_n_, 367–368, 369_n_,
370–371, 373, 375, 378, 381_n_, 383, 385, 385_n_, 387–389,
389_n_, 392, 396, 414–415, 436_n_, 446, 453, 461, 479,
489, 501, 508
1st Battalion, 20, 81–82, 82_n_, 83, 83_n_, 94–95, 165,
165_n_, 166, 166_n_, 186–187, 194–196, 197_n_, 199–200,
202–203, 205, 208–211, 211_n_, 214, 231, 259, 268, 268_n_,
324, 329_n_, 364, 367, 383, 403, 437, 449, 473
2d Battalion, 12, 18, 20, 40, 74, 81, 91, 108, 108_n_, 121,
126, 165_n_, 166, 186, 202–203, 205, 287–288, 291, 293–298,
302–303, 305–306, 324, 329, 329_n_, 332, 364–366, 366_n_,
367, 377, 377_n_, 378, 383, 388, 390, 390_n_, 392, 436_n_,
457
3d Battalion, 20, 91, 108, 108_n_, 119, 121, 125–127, 130,
163_n_, 165, 165_n_, 166, 166_n_, 167–168, 168_n_, 186,
187_n_, 200, 205, 205_n_, 206–207, 211_n_, 259, 317, 329_n_,
332, 364, 366, 368, 370, 377, 377_n_, 378–379, 381, 383,
385, 389–390
9th Marines, 471
11th Marines, 10, 18, 21, 30, 46, 71–74, 93, 98, 111, 124, 131,
134–136, 182_n_, 188, 190, 192, 194, 207, 209, 231–233,
268_n_, 268, 270, 281, 290, 302, 308, 331, 334, 337_n_,
338–339, 341, 367–370, 372, 378–379, 386, 388–389, 389_n_,
392, 396, 415, 436_n_, 455, 461, 491, 509, 512_n_
1st Battalion, 11, 39, 79, 191, 256, 268, 281, 286, 290, 295,
301–302, 304, 306, 308, 323–324, 334, 337, 372, 378
2d Battalion, 82, 165, 191, 194–195, 202, 207, 207_n_, 208,
281, 295, 301, 324, 337, 340, 366, 366_n_, 367, 369, 373,
378, 387, 392, 396_n_, 437
3d Battalion, 134–135, 268, 281, 300, 308, 336–337, 367, 369,
372, 377, 387
4th Battalion, 79, 191, 195, 195_n_, 207, 268, 270, 281, 295,
301–302, 324, 331, 337, 366, 378
Kimpo Provisional Regiment, 17–19, 19_n_, 20, 29, 32, 39_n_, 44,
96, 248–249, 249_n_, 250, 265, 332, 360, 369–370,
398_n_, 463, 508
1st Combat Service Group, 10, 44, 47, 60, 245
Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division, 250, 512_n_
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 18–19, 19_n_, 39, 39_n_, 47,
96, 105, 239, 248, 250, 250_n_, 251, 265, 324, 360,
370, 463, 508
1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, 17–18, 335
1st Engineer Battalion, 101, 107, 316, 328, 334–335, 448, 451
1st Medical Battalion, 18, 182, 288, 335
1st Motor Transport Battalion, 44, 482
7th Motor Transport Battalion, 182, 436_n_, 512_n_
1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 28, 68–69,
413_n_, 438, 489
1st Ordnance Battalion, 308
1st Service Battalion, 434, 436_n_
1st Shore Party Battalion, 18, 44, 268_n_, 316, 328, 335
1st Signal Battalion, 18, 182, 403, 433, 436_n_
1st Tank Battalion, 40, 45, 73, 94, 136–137, 195, 195_n_, 207,
256–257, 270, 316_n_, 331, 331_n_, 334, 337–339, 360,
364_n_, 369, 370, 436_n_, 453, 512_n_
East Coast Island Defense Command, 53_n_, 55–56, 59, 353,
356–359, 397, 530
West Coast Island Defense Command, 53, 55–56, 58–60, 323,
353–356, 359, 397, 530
1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 18, 56, 345, 359
1st Amphibian Truck Company, 47
1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery-Automatic Weapons
Battery, 270, 305
1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, 79, 93, 135, 179, 208, 301–302,
308, 331, 338, 344, 367, 379, 497
Military Police Company, 1st Marine Division, 401, 434, 436_n_
1st Provisional Casual Company, 55
1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company, 457–458, 460
Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division, 18, 39, 250, 327,
339, 360, 369–370, 403
Marino, 1stLt Charles, 377
MARLEX operations, 332–333, 333_n_, 334, 334_n_, 335, 467, 508
MARLEX I, 334
MARLEX II, 335, 335_n_
MARLEX III, 335–336
MARLEX IV, 473
MARLEX XX, 323, 323_n_
Martelli, Capt Paul L., 403_n_, 420, 439
Martin, LtCol Kenneth E., 182
Marxism-Leninism, 418, 426–427
Masan, 6, 44
Mass, LtCol John B., Jr., 242
Matthews, Capt Charles C., 34
Matthews, Sgt Daniel P., 296
May, LtCol Charles W., 413_n_
Mayer, Maj William F., 440
McCain, Capt Gene M., 136
McCaul, BGen Verne J., 405, 472, 474_n_
McCool, WO Felix J., 434
McCoy, LtCol Charles W., 331_n_
McCutcheon, Col Keith B., 24, 41, 49;
MajGen, 24_n_
McDaniel, 2dLt Roland L., 419
McGill, Col Robert A., 61_n_
McGlothlin, LtCol Joe H., 27_n_
McLaughlin, PFC Alford L., 152
McLaughlin, Capt Frederick G, 165_n_, 199, 205
McLaughlin, Maj John H., 406, 419, 421–422, 424, 438–439, 442;
MajGen, 425_n_
McLaughlin, LtCol Williams S., 20, 146_n_, 258_n_
McShane, LtCol Bernard, 349, 368
Medal of Honor, 26, 37_n_, 65, 83, 92, 92_n_, 127, 147_n_, 152,
164_n_, 168_n_, 206, 207_n_, 287, 294_n_, 296_n_, 308, 398
Medical, United Nations
Aid Stations, 77, 118, 127–128, 139, 288, 495
Blood, 140, 451
Care, 139
Corpsmen, 127, 140
Doctors, 127
Evacuation, 139, 182, 495
Facilities, 138–139, 236, 273, 531
Frostbite, 484
Heat casualties, 128, 139–140
Hospitals, 140, 495
Problems, 49
Stretcher bearers, 127
Stretchers, 139
Supplies, 139, 355
Support, 118, 139–140
Tents, 402
Treatment, 108
Mediterranean duty, 501
Megee, Maj Vernon E., 233;
Col, 233;
BGen, 233, 236–238, 310, 336, 348–349, 352, 376, 397, 405;
MajGen, 233, 474_n_, 493_n_, 516_n_
Meikle, 2dLt John W., 200
Melancon, Capt Byron J., 119_n_
Melvin, Capt John B., 292
Metze, Col Albert F., 400–401, 405
Metzger, MajGen Louis, 398_n_
Michelson, Maj Laural M., 202
Michener, James A., 441
Mickey, LtCol Ross S., 349
Mildner, Capt Theodore J., 260
Military Armistice Commission, 449, 456–458
Military Demarcation Line, 445, 451, 459, 464
Miller, LtCol Henry S., 175
Miller, LtCol Roy D., 383
Mills, Col James E., 233, 268, 338
Mines, 22, 32, 77, 84, 92, 256, 359, 371, 379_n_, 394, 396, 451, 487,
522. _See also_ Weapons.
MINNESOTA Line, 8, 49, 327
MISSOURI Line, 327
Mitchener, Col Harold J., 472
Moak, Capt Stanley T., 128, 149
Mo-do Island, 55, 356
Moody, Capt Clarence G., Jr., 122–123, 146
_Moore_, USS, 357
Moore, LtCol Clarence H., 349
Moore, Lt Edwin C., 414
Moore, Col Luther S., 26
Moore, Col Thomas C., 90–91, 160, 180, 186, 188, 190–191, 193–194,
195_n_, 199–200, 203, 205, 273
Moran, LtCol Arthur M., 349
Morris, LtCol John E., 182
Muccio, Honorable John J., 43
Munsan-ni, 12, 16, 22, 24, 40, 44–45, 264, 314–316, 316_n_, 319, 329,
331–332, 400–402, 463, 511
Munsan-ni-Kaesong rail line, 122, 155
Munsan-ni Provisional Command, 360, 400, 402, 461
Murphy, 2dLt Rowland M., 439
Murray, 2dLt Benjamin H., 289
Murray, Col James C., 528–529, 529_n_
Murto, Lt Robert E., 139
Nagoya, 474
Naktong, 472, 476–477, 486, 494
Nan-do Island, 55
Napalm, 112, 116, 132–133, 207–208, 232, 307, 352, 486, 520
Nara, 471
Nash, SSgt James B., 436_n_
National Anthem, 423
Naval Academy, 88, 442
Naval gunfire, 21, 56, 178, 353–357, 418
Navy and Marine Corps Medal, 442
Navy Cross, 148, 267_n_, 308, 374, 376, 392
Navy, Secretary of the, 481, 495_n_, 505_n_
Navy, Surgeon General of the, 140
Navy, U.S., 47, 56, 65, 140, 226, 432.
_See also_ Task Organizations.
Units
Amphibious Force Far East, 334_n_
Amphibious Group Western Pacific, 334_n_
Pacific Fleet, 478_n_
Seventh Fleet, 225–226, 357, 358_n_, 493
Fleet Logistic Wing, 432
Composite Squadron 3, 376
Fleet Air Service Squadron 11, 47
Naval Construction Battalion Unit 1804, 47
Negro Marines, 504, 504_n_
Nelson, Col Wallace M., 315, 328_n_, 364, 381, 389
Neutral corridor, 318
Neutral custody, 321
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, 321_n_, 322
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 458, 458_n_
Neutral observers, 425
Neutrality zone, 7
New Britain, 2
_New Jersey_, USS, 356
Nihart, LtCol Franklin B., 20, 70, 77, 81, 105; Col, 8_n_
No-Fire-Line, 511
No-Fly Line, 459, 468–469, 511
No-Man’s-Land, 87, 108, 157, 190, 223, 264, 300, 371, 509
No-Pass Fence, 445, 456
No-Pass Line, 399, 445–446, 461, 463, 465
Nordell, Capt Robert I., 376
Normandy, 88
North Korea. _See_ Korea.
Oakland, 500
Objective 1, 82–83
Objective 2, 82
Objective S, 77, 80
Objective V, 77, 79–80
Objective X, 77, 79–80
Objective Y, 79–80
Obong-ni, 486
O’Brien, 2dLt George H., 206
_Ocean_, HMS, 60, 355
O’Daniel, LtGen John W., 24, 39, 88
Oddy, LtCol Robert J., 268
Okinawa, 26, 88, 233, 337, 474
Operation AMAZON, 101
Operation BACK DOOR, 473
Operation BIG SWITCH. _See_ Prisoners of War, Exchanges.
Operation BIMBO, 232
Operation CAT WHISKER, 250
Operation CHARLIE, 258, 258_n_, 259
Operation CIRCUS, 41
Operation CLAMBAKE, 255–257, 257_n_, 258–260
Operation CLAM-UP, 8, 10
Operation CLOBBER, 73
Operation FIRECRACKER, 93
Operation HAYLIFT, 180, 246
Operation HAYLIFT I, 247
Operation HAYLIFT II, 246–247, 497
Operation KILLER, 480, 489
Operation LEAPFROG, 41
Operation LITTLE SWITCH. _See_ Prisoners of War, Exchanges.
Operation MIXMASTER, 10–11, 45
Operation PANDORA, 356
Operation PARALYSIS, 243
Operation PRESSURE, 64, 224
Operation PRESSURE PUMP, 170–172
Operation PRONTO, 40
Operation RAINBOW, 316
Operation RIDDLE, 179
Operation RIPPER, 412, 480
Operation SPYGLASS, 473
Operation STRANGLE, 63, 224, 489, 514–515
Operation SWITCH, 496
Operation TIMBER, 100
Operation WINDMILL I, 496
Order of Military Merit, Taiguk, Korean, 43, 148, 159, 336
Ordnance, 70, 136, 196_n_, 225, 247, 350, 352–353, 368, 375, 448, 451,
516, 520, 525
Osan-ni, 474
Osborne, BGen Ralph M., 400
O’Shea, BGen George J., 403_n_
O’Shea, 1stLt Robert J., 403_n_
Otsu, 55, 471
Outposts
Communist, 111, 519
United Nations, 34, 36, 75, 122, 348, 447, 519. _See also_ Combat
Outposts; Hills.
2, 36, 40
3, 34, 36, 76–77, 79
31, 157
33, 157
36, 155–156, 158, 161, 176, 300
37, 155–156, 161, 300
67, 155
86, 161
Allen, 150, 152, 157, 264
Arrowhead, 275, 280, 295, 324
Ava, 267, 267_n_, 365, 397
Berlin, 186, 264, 268, 276, 280–281, 289–290, 305, 329, 337–338,
341, 365–370, 372, 375, 377–378, 378_n_, 379, 381, 383, 385,
388–389, 391–392, 463
Berlin Gate, 386
Boulder City, 381, 385, 387–388, 388_n_, 389, 391, 394, 396,
396_n_, 404, 446, 464, 481, 509
Bruce, 150, 152–153, 264
Bunker, 268, 280, 289, 300
Bunker Hill, 463
Carson, 157_n_, 167, 186, 196_n_, 202, 261, 264–265, 267, 273,
275, 279–280, 283, 283_n_, 284, 290, 301, 309, 310_n_,
324–325, 336–341, 364–365, 463
Clarence, 150, 152, 157, 264
Corinne, 268
Dagmar, 268, 280, 289, 300, 308, 377, 383, 387
Detroit, 157_n_, 163, 167–169, 377
Donald, 150
East Berlin, 186, 268, 280–281, 289, 329, 337–338, 341, 365–369,
375, 377–378, 378_n_, 379, 381, 386, 391–392, 463
Elko, 309, 324–325, 336–338, 340–341, 364–365, 372
Elmer, 146–147
Esther, 268, 280, 289, 300, 387–388, 392
Felix, 150, 157
Frisco, 163, 165, 167–168, 168_n_, 169, 208, 317, 369
Gary, 150
Ginger, 268
Hedy, 268, 280, 289, 290, 300, 383, 451–452
Hilda, 146–147
Hill, 119, 388
Hook, 195, 195_n_, 464, 481
Ingrid, 377
Irene, 146–147, 207
Jamestown, 210
Jersey, 377
Jersey Ridge, 386
Jill, 157
Kate, 300, 464
Marilyn, 464
Nevada, 264–265, 338, 340, 342
Nevada Cities, 261, 264–265, 273, 307, 309, 329, 338
Old Baldy, 309
Reno, 158_n_, 167, 186, 196_n_, 202–203, 261, 264–265, 267, 273,
275–276, 279–281, 283, 283_n_, 284–288, 288_n_, 289–292,
294, 297–299, 301–304, 306, 309, 310_n_, 324, 364, 367, 463
Reno Block, 265, 284–287
Rome, 207
Ronson, 193, 193_n_, 195, 197, 199, 210, 338
Seattle, 157_n_, 163, 165–166, 169, 207
Stromboli, 124
Three Cities, 267
Ungok, 275, 279–280, 374
Vegas, 157_n_, 186, 196_n_, 202, 261, 264–265, 267, 273, 275,
278–281, 283, 283_n_, 284–288, 288_n_, 289–299, 301–310,
310_n_, 311, 320, 323, 325, 336–338, 338_n_, 339–341,
364–367, 369, 379, 463, 481, 521
Verdun, 163, 163_n_, 166
Warsaw, 163, 165–167, 193, 193_n_, 195, 195_n_, 197, 199–200,
202, 209–210
Yoke, 89, 91, 94–95, 463
Outpost Line of Observation, 37–38
Outpost Line of Resistance
Communist, 104, 109, 111, 116, 172
United Nations, 22, 24, 31–34, 36–39, 46, 74, 76, 76_n_, 81–82, 218,
461, 463–466, 509
Owens, LtCol Alfred L., 300
Owens, Capt Robert A., 94–95
Pacific, 3, 88, 471, 473, 476, 485, 493
Pacific Fleet Medical Officer, 49
Paengyong-do Island, 55–56, 58, 353–355
Pak, Maj, 420
Pala, Col. William P., 10_n_
Pangburn, 2dLt Charles I., 176
Panmunjom, 13, 22, 40, 81, 90, 104, 228, 230, 232, 264, 268_n_, 313,
315–316, 316_n_, 317–319, 321–322, 324–325, 328, 350_n_,
360, 372, 377_n_, 391, 393, 400–402, 405, 407–408, 467, 481,
511, 511_n_, 535
Bargaining table, 264
Corridor, 243
Exchange site, 317
Liaison officer, 229
Negotiations, 314
Neutral zone, 316_n_
Peace corridor, 21, 126, 218, 268, 316, 323, 464, 511, 519
Receiving center, 318
Receiving tents, 318
Rescue force, 118
Truce meetings, 322
Truce tents, 313
Papurca, LtCol John H., 19
Pardue, Bishop Austin, 232
Paris talks, 425_n_
Pate, MajGen Randolph McC., 336–337, 365, 378_n_, 394, 405, 473_n_
Patrols
Communist, 169, 190, 259, 309, 414
United Nations, 30, 32–33, 39, 84–87, 90, 109, 185, 203, 232,
249–250, 259–260, 326, 371–373, 374_n_, 413, 414, 437,
464–465, 469, 481, 482_n_, 509, 519, 524
Payne, Col Frederick R., Jr., 28
Peace Corridor, 259, 402
Peace negotiations, 7–8, 510
Peace pagoda, 401
Peace talks, 313, 325, 372
Peatross, LtCol Oscar F., 258, 258_n_
Peeler, 2dLt John J., 289
Peiping, 429
Peleliu, 2, 26, 88, 267_n_, 337
Peng, Gen Teh Huai, 229, 421
Penne, LtCol Harold B., 379
Pepper, MajGen Robert H., 471, 473_n_
Perry, Capt Jack E., 434
Peruvian Minister of Aviation, 233
Philadelphia, 321
Phillips, PFC Paul J., 436_n_
Phoenix, 500
Pilots, 29, 61, 99, 132, 140, 174, 234, 291, 304, 347_n_, 349, 351,
371, 375–377, 379, 397, 405–406, 411–415, 420, 424, 429,
433, 436, 438, 485, 487, 489, 491–492, 492_n_, 493–495, 515.
_See also_ Air Activities, United Nations.
Pittsburgh Diocese, 232
Plans, United Nations, 11, 20, 40, 82, 93, 125, 258, 323, 333–334,
335_n_, 363, 468, 479
Platt, LtCol Jonas M., 256–257, 267
Poage, Capt Jay V., 230
Poe, 1stLt William A., 175
Pohang, 6, 39_n_, 43, 47, 69, 177, 250, 250_n_, 375, 473, 530
Pohang University, 99
Poland, 458_n_
Polish members of the Neutral Nations Commission, 459
Pollock, MajGen Edwin A., 148, 157–158, 169, 172, 176, 181, 190, 194,
200, 208, 214, 227, 231, 240, 243, 245, 290, 310,
319, 334, 336
Post, Capt Robert J., 339; LtCol, 331_n_, 339_n_
Post-truce orders, 499
Postwar airlift program, 472
Postwar situation, 470
Potsdam Conference, 2
Potsdam Declaration, 2_n_
Pratt, LtCol Spencer H., 19, 32
Pregnall, LtCol Daniel S., 300
President (U.S.), 423, 505–506
President elect, 227
Presidential election, 276
Prisoners of War
American, 81, 212–213, 297–298, 305, 307, 317, 319–320, 354, 381_n_,
399, 399_n_, 405–408, 411–415, 415_n_, 416, 420_n_, 421–424,
425_n_, 426, 431, 437, 440–443, 480, 512
Communist, 34, 79, 104, 106, 206, 227, 287, 298, 307, 315, 317–319,
407–408, 426, 467, 512, 512_n_, 524
Nonrepatriates, 314, 321, 321_n_, 322, 408, 457, 459, 463, 466–467
Repatriates, 316, 319, 321–322, 336, 396, 400–402, 407, 442
Exchanges, 229, 311, 313–319, 321, 360, 400, 406–407, 411,
414, 461, 527
Operation BIG SWITCH, 321, 336, 399–401, 404, 406–407, 409, 415,
435, 439, 459
Operation LITTLE SWITCH, 314, 316–317, 318_n_, 321, 360, 400,
405_n_, 407–409, 421_n_
Interrogation
Communist, 418, 420, 425, 428–430, 432–433
United Nations, 85, 87, 136, 297–298, 408, 530
United Nations, 106, 314, 316–318, 318_n_, 319–321, 350_n_, 401–403,
407, 409, 416, 418–419, 421–422, 424–426, 431, 435, 439, 443
Propaganda, Communist, 105, 249, 326, 355, 372, 406, 408, 419,
422–424, 426, 428–430, 441, 511, 511_n_
Public Law 416, 504–505
Pugh, RAdm Lamont, 140
Pukhan River, 342
Pumphrey, Pvt Louis A., 319
Punchbowl, 7, 17, 52, 413, 480
Punchbowl area, 342, 413, 484, 495, 514_n_, 535
Purple Heart, 298
Pusan, 4–6, 8, 53, 227, 318, 477, 486, 488, 488_n_, 494, 535
Pusan Perimeter, 4, 411_n_, 412, 475–476
Pyongtaek, 270, 376
Pyongyang, 139, 170–172, 174, 177, 241, 244, 420, 423, 479
Quantico, 143, 337, 493–494
Quilali, 26
Quiring, PFC Charles E., 436_n_
R-Day, 335
Radar, United Nations, 53, 63, 68, 134, 241, 291, 325, 385, 487,
489–490, 492
AN/MPQ-2, 62_n_
MPQ-14, 81, 132, 134, 202, 244, 294, 299, 306, 325, 339, 345–346,
368, 375, 385, 385_n_, 389, 489
Radford, Adm Arthur W., 332, 352_n_
Randall, LtCol David S., 191
Raymond, Sgt Theodore J., 392
Read, Maj Robert R., 27
Reconnaissance, 27, 42, 45, 56, 59, 86, 95, 105, 256
Red Cross, 229, 314, 320
Reinecke, Col Frank M., 56; BGen, 58
Report of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the
Committee on Armed Services, 517_n_
_Repose_, USS, 495
Rhee, President Syngman, 3, 43, 148, 159, 321–322, 342, 352_n_, 360,
408
Rich, Capt Richard V., 320
Richardson, Maj Judcon C., 429, 432
Ricketts, Brigadier A. H. G., 197_n_
Ridgway, Gen Matthew B., 63–64, 88, 480–481, 486, 496, 496_n_, 515
Riseley, BGen James P., 471
Ritchey, LtCol William M., 349
Roads, 10, 21, 45, 480, 519
Robertshaw, Col Louis B., 243–244, 299
Robinson, LtCol Barnette, 243
Roe, Maj Murray O., 290
Rogers, LtCol Charles O., 134–135
Roth, 2dLt Richard L., 177
Royal Marine-USMC-Army convoy, 410
Russell, LtCol Gerald F., 108_n_, 167, 187
Russo-American Commission, 3
Sachon, 327
Sachon-Chinju area, 486
Sachon River, 15, 33, 75, 90, 105, 157–158, 161–162, 169, 259
Sachon Valley, 218
St. Denis, 2dLt Thomas R., 345
_Samaritan_, USS, 495_n_
Samichon River, 15, 92, 186, 188, 208, 463
Samichon Valley, 186–187, 194
Samichon Village, 92
San Diego, 476
San Francisco, 408, 500
Santo Domingo, 337
Sariwon, 177
Sartor, Capt Louis J., 388
Saussy, Maj George S., Jr., 250, 250_n_
Schilt, 1stLt Christian F., 26; MajGen, 43, 336
Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War,
420_n_, 440–441
Schlichter, Sgt Charles B., 407
Schwable, Col Frank H., 407, 430–431, 442
Scott, MSgt James M., 242
Scranton, Capt Sereno S., Jr., 117, 119, 130–131
Schroeder, Maj Charles L., 345
Seal, 2dLt Kenneth A., 83; Maj, 82_n_
Sea of Japan, 52, 376, 398
Selden, LtCol John T., 2; BGen, 2; MajGen, 2, 12, 13_n_, 17, 20–22,
38–39, 43, 46, 50, 61–62, 71, 84, 86, 93, 93_n_, 96–98, 101,
103, 121, 126, 138–139, 141, 142_n_, 148
Sellers, Maj Thomas M., 376
Seoul, 1, 4, 6, 12–13, 15–16, 18, 26, 28, 31, 69, 187, 265, 270, 273,
275, 280, 319, 324, 326_n_, 474, 478–479, 481, 482_n_, 494,
535
Severson, Col Martin A., 26–27
Seymour, 2dLt Rufus A., 287
Sharpe, 2dLt Whitlock N., 176
Shea, Col Harry N., 192, 233, 355
Shepherd, Gen Lemuel C., Jr., 98, 138–139, 141, 142_n_, 310, 332,
409, 505, 534
Sherwood, Capt James H., 339
Shimamura, Cpl Saburo, 436
Ships, United Nations, 5, 56, 67, 358, 397
Carriers, 10, 485, 487, 491
Cruisers, 414
CVEs, 491
Hospital, 140, 402, 495, 495_n_
LSDs, 10_n_
Minesweepers, 226
Shoden, Capt John C., 71
Shuck, SSgt William E., Jr., 91–92, 92_n_
_Sicily_, USS, 173, 179, 485
Siers, 2dLt Howard L., 82
Sikorsky, Igor, 499
Silver Star, 298, 376
Simanek, PFC Robert E., 147_n_
Sims, Maj William J., 176
Sinanju, 174, 243
Sin-do Island, 55
Sinuiju, 376, 416
Skinner, 2dLt Sherwood E., 207_n_
Skotnicki, Capt Anthony J., 119_n_
Smith, Col John L., 375_n_, 472
Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 477, 498, 501
Smith, LtCol Robert E., Jr., 27_n_
Smoak, Col Eustace R., 150, 233
Smunk, LtCol Louis R., 299, 349
So-Do Island, 55
Sokcho-ri, 10_n_
Sok-to Island, 55–56, 58–59, 353–356
Solomon Islands, 26, 43
Songjin, 55–56, 357
South African, 318_n_
South Korea. _See_ Korea.
Soyang River, 1, 413, 480, 496
Spangler, 2dLt Donald E., 308
Spellman, Francis Cardinal, 231
Spurlock, 2dLt Stuart L., Jr., 175
Staab, Col Edward M., Jr., 18–19, 249_n_
Stacy, Col Arthur R., 375, 375_n_, 472
Stalin, Premier Joseph, 230, 314
Standing Operating Procedure, 71–72, 257_n_, 279
STAYBACK Line, 50
Steege, PFC Leonard E., 405
Steel, Maj Fred A., 69
Steigerwald, SSgt Robert S., 294
Stell, PFC Robert C., 319
Stevens, Robert T., 405
Stewart, LtCol Lynn H., 349
Stewart, PFC Roy L., 374_n_
Stiff, LtCol Houston, 20
Still, 2dLt Richard L., 438–439
Stockholm Peace Appeal, 427
Stratton, Maj William T., Jr., 241
Stumpges, MSgt Frederick J., 434
Sudong, 479
Suez Canal, 501
Suiho, 64
Suiho Reservoir, 491
Sung, Kim Il, 3, 229
Supplies
Communist, 4, 7, 93, 169, 212, 225, 357, 396, 489, 519, 525
Areas, 66, 171, 339, 385, 513
Buildup, 342, 511
Dumps, 136, 225, 351, 486
Installations, 63, 513
Lines, 489
Points, 294, 306, 378, 397
Resupply, 290, 297, 299, 303, 525
Routes, 30, 265, 295, 298, 305
Shelter, 242
Stockpiles, 224, 451, 525
United Nations, 10, 16, 19, 40, 44, 47, 60, 60_n_, 62, 67, 72, 80,
100, 121, 127, 140, 142, 181_n_, 199, 211, 245, 247, 331,
355, 358–359, 370, 396–397, 455, 497
Areas, 45, 253, 288, 308
Class I, 180, 246, 400
Class II, 180
Class III, 180, 246, 400
Class IV, 180
Class V, 180, 246
Dumps, 68, 448, 451, 455
Island defense, 60
Resupply, 16, 21, 59, 245–247, 371_n_, 379_n_
Routes, 6, 391
Sweden, 458_n_
Swenceski, Col Alexander B., 356
Swigert, 1stLt Oral R., Jr., 385, 392
Swinson, Maj James D., 320
Switzerland, 458_n_
Tables of Equipment, 245, 461
Tables of Organization, 244–245
Tactical Air Control Parties, 493, 517. _See also_ Air activities,
United Nations.
Tactical Air Coordination Center, 68–69. _See also_ Air activities,
United Nations.
Tactical Air Direction Center, 68, 487–488. _See also_ Air activities,
United Nations.
Tactical Liaison Officers, 85
Tactics
Communist, 104–106, 192–193, 213, 224, 264, 309, 511, 519, 523
United Nations, 11, 24, 62, 70, 81, 86, 333, 381, 418, 484, 490_n_,
507, 512, 517, 524, 530, 532–533
Taechong-do Island, 55–56, 353
Tae-do Island, 55, 346, 359
Taedok-san, 109
Taedong-san, 109
Taedong River, 243
Taegu, 177
Taejon, 406
Taft, 1stLt Kenneth E., Jr., 288
Tai, Yung Shin, 310
Tanks
Communist, 3, 70, 96, 155, 158, 218, 511
United Nations, 33, 38–39, 45, 73, 80–82, 94–95, 98, 101, 114, 116,
121, 124, 128–129, 131, 136–137, 146, 160–161, 194–195, 202,
207–208, 231, 243, 256–259, 270, 281, 283, 286, 290–293,
295–296, 300, 302, 307–308, 323–325, 331, 331_n_, 339,
339_n_, 341, 363, 367, 369, 378, 386–388, 388_n_, 392, 436,
468, 523–524, 530
Task organizations
Forces
Drysdale, 212, 410, 412
Track, 329, 332
77, 357
90, 334
95, 53, 55, 99, 226, 354–355, 357, 359
Groups
95, 358
95.1, 55
95.2, 55
Elements
90, 85, 334, 334_n_
95.15, 56, 58, 353
95.23, 56, 353
Units
95.1.3, 353
95.2.3, 353, 356
Taylor, LtGen Maxwell D., 319, 327_n_, 378_n_, 393, 405, 497
Terrain, 5–6, 13, 15–17, 24, 33, 61, 66–67, 77, 79, 82, 84, 103, 109,
122, 129, 133, 138, 143, 143_n_, 186–187, 206, 239, 248,
253, 253_n_, 263–264, 275–276, 279, 292, 306, 345, 367, 369,
387, 391, 398, 452, 461, 463–465, 467–468, 481, 494–495,
509, 517–520, 523–524, 526, 533
Texas, 206
Thirty-sixth Parallel, 68
Thirty-seventh Parallel, 55, 68
Thirty-eighth Parallel, 2–7, 15, 19, 27_n_, 30, 53, 55–56, 65, 264,
356, 397, 412, 436, 448_n_, 479–480, 489, 507, 532, 532_n_
Thirty-ninth Parallel, 27_n_, 55, 66, 173, 178, 226, 353, 357, 489,
514
Thistlethwaite, Capt Lote, 376
Thomas, MajGen Gerald C., 2, 514_n_
Thomas, Capt John H., 165, 205_n_
Thompson, Capt Earl W., 82, 94–95
Thompson, 2dLt James S., 175
Thorin, Chief Duane, 441
Thorpe, Capt Jesse F., 111
Thrash, LtCol William G., 406, 413_n_, 422, 438, 442
Thurston, Maj Robert D., 389, 391
Time on target, 92–93, 305, 346, 367
Tinsley, Col James H., 13_n_
Tipps, Lt Ross L., 79
Tokchok-to Island, 55–56, 86, 323, 333, 353, 473
Toktong Pass, 412
Tokyo, 26, 314, 320, 360, 403, 408, 471
Tokyo Army Hospital Annex, 320
Tompkins, Col Rathvon McC., 464
T’ongch’on, 351
Tongduchon-ni, 332
Tonggang-ni, 33
Toryom, 186
Transportation
Communist, 42, 53, 224, 243, 357, 397, 486, 514
United Nations, 10, 16, 45, 75, 100–101, 248–249, 264, 314, 332, 514
Travis Air Force Base, 320
Truce, 227, 264, 314, 341, 529
Agreement, 322, 361, 372, 377_n_, 404, 458, 469, 513
Corridor, 371
Line, 322, 464, 528
Negotiations, 7–8, 13, 22, 53, 95, 156, 228, 264, 311, 313–316, 321,
323, 328, 338, 360, 377_n_, 393, 410_n_, 413, 446, 480–481,
489, 510–511, 525, 527–529
Restrictions, 469
Talks, 264, 315, 321, 323, 328, 338, 360, 410_n_, 480–481, 489,
510–511, 527–528
Truman, President Harry S., 3–4, 427, 499, 504_n_
Tschirgi, Col Harvey C., 249, 249_n_, 324_n_, 328, 334, 364
Tuckman, Robert D., 326_n_
Tumae-ri Ridge, 82
Turner, 1stLt Kenneth E., 377
Twining, BGen Merrill B., 37, 88, 105; MajGen, 473, 473_n_;
LtGen, 37_n_
Ullman, LtCol Vernon O., 174–175
Ung-do Island, 55
Ungok, 114, 265, 325
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 2–3, 427, 525
Soviet manufacture, 525
Soviet soldiers, 3
United Kingdom, 2
United Nations, 3–4, 7–8, 27, 39, 51, 170–172, 228–229, 311, 322, 424,
426–427, 429, 458–459, 469
Charter, 534
Civil Assistance Command, 355
Command, 3–5, 7–8, 17–18, 52, 55, 88, 100, 100_n_, 222–224, 226–229,
315, 317, 321–322, 337–338, 340, 342, 351–352, 357, 372,
375, 391, 399, 401, 405, 413, 429, 459, 469–470, 476, 478,
480, 507, 513, 521, 527, 531, 533
General Assembly, 229
Military Armistice Commission, 469. _See also_ Truce.
Personnel and Medical Processing Unit, 315, 328_n_, 360, 400–401
Provisional Command Receipt and Control Section, 401
Secretariat, 458_n_
Security Council, 3–4
Units. _See also_ Army; Air Force; Marine Corps; Navy; Korea.
British
1st Commonwealth Division, 11, 13, 15, 19, 38, 51, 93, 97, 102,
164, 186–187, 192, 197, 222–223, 231, 253_n_, 323–324, 333,
336, 338–339, 341–342, 344, 351, 363, 381, 383, 388, 389_n_,
393, 460, 483
29th Infantry Brigade, 197_n_
Black Watch Regiment, 222, 231
Gloucestershire Regiment, 426
Royal Marines, 415, 421, 423, 480
Canadian
25th Infantry Brigade, 19, 38
1st Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, 258_n_
Columbian Battalion, 233, 318_n_, 440
Ethiopian Battalion, 222
Turkish Armed Forces Command, 327–329, 329_n_, 331, 332_n_,
337–340, 351, 364, 366–368, 369_n_
1st Battalion, 329, 332, 378_n_
2d Battalion, 332_n_
3d Battalion, 332
Field Artillery Battalion, 328, 337, 367, 378
4.2-inch Mortar Company, 332, 364
United States, 2–4, 43, 64_n_, 93, 97–98, 226, 227_n_, 229, 231, 235,
239, 320, 344_n_, 348_n_, 349, 375, 402, 405_n_, 419, 424,
433_n_, 442, 474, 477, 497, 501, 513_n_, 527, 531, 534
United States Senate, 64, 440
United States State Department, 229
Universal Military Training and Service Act, 505–506
Valentine’s Day bombardment, 357
_Valley Forge_, USS, 412
Valley Forge Hospital, 320
Vance, Maj Johnnie C., 176
Van Fleet, Gen James A., 11, 13_n_, 51, 51_n_, 192, 222, 227,
413, 481, 530
Vanzuyen, Capt William M., 125
Vegetation. _See_ Terrain.
Vehicles. _See also_ Tanks.
Communist
Ambulance, 318, 402
Jeeps, 402
Trucks, 402, 433, 489, 519
United Nations
Ambulance Jeeps, 118, 127, 402
Amphibian tractors, 47, 81, 86, 323
Amphibian trucks. _See_ DUKWs.
Amphibian vehicles, 4, 48
Armored amphibians, 323
Armored personnel carriers, 81, 118, 139, 331
Armored utility vehicles, 341
Armored vehicles, 232, 257, 259, 331, 369, 379, 388–389, 470
Artillery dozers, 46
Bulldozers, 316
DUKWs, 10, 47
Flame vehicles, 114, 116
Jeeps, 10, 77
Jeep trailer, 10
Radio jeeps, 488
Tracked vehicles, 10_n_, 81, 137, 251
Tractors, 250–251
Trailers, one-ton, 63
Trucks, 10, 40, 46, 139, 370, 455
Very Important Persons, 108
Vicar for Catholic Chaplains of the Armed Forces, 231
Wade, Col Sidney S., 19–20, 22_n_, 38_n_
Wagner, Capt Arthur, 433
Wake Island, 434
WAKEUP Raid, 230, 257
Wallace, LtCol James R., 349, 381
Walt, Col Lewis W., 233, 256, 258, 261, 267, 267_n_, 268, 285, 324;
LtGen, 287_n_
Walter, Sgt Stephen C., 374_n_
Walz, Capt Ralph L., 286, 302
War Crimes Exhibit, 429
Warren, LtCol Charles, 230, 349
Warren, LtCol Joe L., 350
Washington, D. C., 322, 486, 513
Watkins, SSgt Lewis G., 168_n_
Watson, 2dLt Theodore H., 74–75
Watson, Col William R., Jr., 106_n_
Weapons. _See also_ Artillery; Tanks.
Communist, 90, 132, 136, 207, 218, 257, 292, 324–325, 368, 373, 378,
389, 525–526
Antiaircraft, 30, 64, 69, 170, 525
Artillery, 62, 81, 117, 149, 190, 279, 281
Self-propelled, 73, 96, 104, 260
57mm, 29_n_
75mm, 29, 188_n_
76mm, 188_n_, 207, 220, 280, 283, 285, 385
105mm, 520
122mm, 29_n_, 188_n_, 220, 292_n_
152mm, 188_n_, 190
155mm, 29
Automatic weapons, 30, 36–37, 90, 130–131, 133, 136, 149, 155,
230, 289, 292, 301, 305, 373, 376
Bangalore torpedoes, 36, 213
Bazookas, 302
Carbines, 33
Grenades, 36, 37_n_, 83_n_, 89, 91, 105, 112, 117, 122, 130, 146,
147_n_, 149–150, 152, 155–156, 165, 168_n_, 203, 210, 259,
260_n_, 293–294, 296, 298, 305, 325, 373
Machine guns, 30, 33, 83, 89, 91, 112, 123–124, 128, 150, 153,
164, 205, 260, 279, 293–294, 296, 298, 364, 372,
374, 414, 527
Mortars, 32, 36, 45, 52, 62, 76–77, 80–81, 81_n_, 82, 87, 89–91,
93–94, 111, 116–119, 121, 123–127, 129–134, 136, 140–143,
145–147, 149–150, 153, 155, 158, 162, 164, 166, 193–194,
196–197, 199–200, 205–206, 209–210, 212, 214, 218, 221, 230,
232, 248, 255_n_, 259, 261, 279, 281, 284, 286–287, 290,
292–293, 293_n_, 294–295, 297, 299, 301–304, 306, 308–309,
324, 337, 340, 364–367, 371–373, 377, 379, 385–387, 388_n_,
389, 392, 451, 519
4.2-inch, 324
60mm, 111, 280, 283, 292_n_, 324, 385, 519
81mm, 324
82mm, 131, 141, 280, 283, 285, 385, 397, 519
120mm, 36, 292_n_, 302, 385
122mm, 285
United Nations, 108, 143, 214, 276, 418, 466, 470
Antiaircraft, 64, 71
Atomic, 210
Automatic, 68, 76, 105, 122, 143, 256, 300, 465–466
Bangalore torpedoes, 256
Bayonets, 82, 199, 283
Bazookas, 278
Cannons, 20mm, 241, 486
Carbines, 90, 152, 206, 273, 275, 292, 529
Flamethrowers, 90, 160, 256, 259, 260_n_, 273, 275, 278, 387–388
Grenade launchers, 273, 374
Grenades, 79, 127, 130, 152, 193, 193_n_, 206, 207_n_, 210, 246,
256, 285, 292, 295, 374
Guns, 95, 268, 275, 295, 300, 530
Tank, 358, 384, 524
75mm, 270
90mm, 45, 94, 114, 116, 125, 128, 354, 356, 369, 378, 524
155mm, 192
Howitzers, 80, 192, 246, 258, 268, 281, 301, 339
8-inch, 191, 270, 281, 304, 379
105mm, 46, 114, 192, 268, 295, 509
155mm, 46, 191–192, 270, 295, 301–302, 509
240mm, 379
Knives, 283
Machine guns, 37, 76, 80, 90–91, 107, 116, 121, 129, 137, 152,
193, 232, 253, 256, 273, 275, 278, 283, 300, 303, 305, 325,
327, 366, 378, 387, 465–466, 523
Mortars, 73, 79–90, 90, 106_n_, 112, 124, 127, 129, 150, 166, 194,
199, 202, 210, 239, 259, 289–291, 295–297, 300–304, 367,
372, 386, 389, 521
4.2-inch, 39, 79, 121, 135–136, 306, 325, 366, 369, 378, 387
60mm, 121, 135, 273, 281, 366, 378
81mm, 89, 121, 135, 140, 162, 193, 193_n_, 273, 276, 281, 325,
366, 369, 378, 387
Pistols, 199, 273, 275, 278, 485
Rifles, 37, 79, 90–91, 118, 129, 145, 199, 210, 214, 283,
296, 372, 529
Automatic, 168_n_, 245
BARs, 273, 275, 292, 300, 303, 372, 526
M-1, 32, 273, 275, 292, 451, 458, 526
Rockets, 79–80, 124, 132–133, 179, 283, 290, 301, 303–304, 328,
340, 344, 367, 379, 385–386
Launchers, 124, 124_n_, 179
3.5-inch, 48, 256, 273, 388
4.5-inch, 46, 121, 124, 124_n_, 196, 215, 215_n_
5-inch HVAR, 486
Satchel charges, 256
Searchlights, 101_n_, 128, 305, 345, 490, 524
Small arms, 75–76, 80, 106, 117, 122, 127, 149, 259, 273, 278,
300, 378, 391, 521
Weather, 8, 10, 16, 30, 48–49, 52, 102–104, 128, 130, 137, 139, 148,
211, 235, 263, 303, 323, 335, 349, 351, 355, 358, 364, 368,
370–371, 371_n_, 374–375, 385–386, 415, 418–419, 422, 450,
454, 467, 478, 480–481, 484, 487, 489, 494, 496–497, 520
Weaver, Capt James R., 242
Webb, PFC Billy J., 251
Weir, Maj William A., 175
Welcome Gate to Freedom, 318. _See also_ Freedom Gate.
West, Col Gordon H., 392_n_
Westbrook, SSgt W. H., 376
Weyland, LtGen Otto P., 43, 233
Whalen, 1stLt Robert A., 409
Wheeler, LtCol Edwin B., 250, 250_n_
Wheeler, Cpl Theodore R., 436_n_
Whitbeck, Capt William R., Jr., 156
White House, 37_n_
Whitemore, Capt Lyle S., Jr., 94
Wichita, 433_n_
Wilkinson, LtCol Frank R., Jr., 250_n_
Williams, Cpl Calvin W., 436_n_
Williams, 1stLt Duke, Jr., 414
Williams, SSgt John J., 297
Williams, BGen Samuel T., 176; MajGen, 326, 340
Williamson, Capt Edward C., 192_n_
Williamson, Col Herbert H., 176, 234
Williamson, LtCol John I., 137, 270, 331_n_
Wilson, Charles E., 227
Wilson, Col Nelson, 339
Witt, LtCol Francis “X,” Jr., 316_n_
Wiwon, 423
Wolff, Dr. Harold G., 441
Wonju, 6, 412
Wonsan, 5, 53, 55–56, 66–67, 226, 353, 356–358, 397, 479, 487, 492,
502, 530, 538_n_
Wood, LtCol William A., 409
Woon, VAdm Il Sohn, 310
World Peace Camp, 427
World War, I, 2, 7, 26, 143, 193, 413, 431, 520
World War II, 2, 4_n_, 26, 28, 48, 65, 88, 98, 106, 114, 148, 172,
173_n_, 176, 213_n_, 233, 267_n_, 298, 327_n_, 336, 401,
411, 427_n_, 431, 433_n_, 434, 442, 477_n_, 483–485, 493,
495_n_, 504, 506, 510, 513_n_, 533–534
Post-World War II, 476, 533
World War III, 513
Woten, Maj Robert C., 349, 374_n_
Wright, LtCol Raymond D., 191
WYOMING Line, 20, 22, 100, 232, 268, 461, 468
WYOMING FORWARD Line, 39, 41
Yalu Reservoir, 418
Yalu River, 53, 55, 64, 174, 321, 416, 418, 423, 479, 489, 491
Yang-do Island, 55, 359
Yanggu, 480
Yellow Sea, 15, 134, 174, 241, 355, 398, 508
Yesong River, 480
Yo-do Island, 55, 59, 356–359, 359_n_
Yokosuka, 320
Yom River, 15, 19, 248_n_, 250
Yongji-ri, 332, 463
Yongjong-ni, 334–335
Yongmi-dong, 243
Yongpyong-do Island, 55–56, 353
Yonpo, 488
Yudam-ni, 412, 479, 480
✩ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972 O-427-555
[Illustration: THE FAR EAST]
[Illustration: U. S. MARINE GROUND OPERATIONS KOREAN WAR 1950–1953]
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
were not changed.
Frequent, simple typographical errors were silently corrected;
unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious,
and otherwise left unbalanced.
Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs
and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support
hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to
the corresponding illustrations.
The index was not systematically checked for proper alphabetization or
correct page references; some minor errors or omissions were silently
corrected.
Page 62: Two lines of text near the top of the page were in the wrong
order and have been swapped back to the correct order.
Photo sections: Some of the photo credit numbers may be incomplete, as
the right-hand sides of some pages were clipped in all available images
of the pages of the original publication.
Page 579: “Presidental” was printed that way, and retained here as it
may have been printed that way in the original Citation.
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