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Title: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume II (of 5) - The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Author: Montross, Lynn, Canzona, Nicholas
Language: English
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1950-1953 VOLUME II (OF 5) ***
[Illustration]
U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
1950–1953
VOLUME II
_The Inchon-Seoul Operation_
by
LYNN MONTROSS
and
CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC
[Illustration]
Historical Branch, G-3
Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D. C., 1955
Foreword
The Inchon Landing was a major amphibious operation, planned in
record time and executed with skill and precision. Even more, it was
an exemplification of the fruits of a bold strategy executed by a
competent force. The decision to attack at Inchon involved weakening
the line against enemy strength in the Pusan Perimeter in order to
strike him in the rear. It involved the conduct of an amphibious attack
under most difficult conditions of weather and geography.
The stakes were high and the risk was fully justified. Had it not been
for the intervention of the Chinese Communist Army, the offensive
generated by the Inchon attack would have resulted in a complete
victory for our arms in Korea. A study of the record of this operation
will disclose, with arresting clarity, the decisive power that is to
be found in highly trained amphibious forces when their strength is
applied at the critical place and time.
[Illustration: Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr (signature)]
LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.,
_General, U. S. Marine Corps_,
_Commandant of the Marine Corps_.
Preface
This is the second volume of a series dealing with United States Marine
Operations in Korea during the period 2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953.
Volume II presents in detail the operations of the 1st Marine Division
and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a part of X Corps, USA, during and
immediately following the Inchon Landing on 15 September 1950.
In order to tell a complete story of this historic amphibious
operation, the authors have described the mobilization of the Marine
Corps reserves to form the components of the Division and Aircraft
Wing; the movement to the staging area and the hurried planning for an
amphibious landing; the withdrawal of the 1st Provisional Brigade and
Marine Air Group 33 from the embattled Pusan Perimeter to amalgamate
with the larger force for D-day at Inchon; the seizure of Seoul and its
environs, and finally the withdrawal on 7 October to prepare for the
Wonsan operation.
Again, this is primarily a Marine Corps story. Activities of other
services are presented in sufficient detail only to set this operation
in its proper perspective.
Grateful acknowledgment is made for the valuable information furnished
by the scores of officers and men consulted by interview or letter and
for the assistance provided by the Current History Branch of the Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.
Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.
[Illustration: T.A. Wornham (signature)]
T. A. WORNHAM,
_Major General, U. S. Marine Corps_,
_Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3_.
Contents
_Page_
I The Communist Challenge 1
Authorization of Marine Brigade--First Conference on
Inchon Landing--General Shepherd in Tokyo--Request
for a Marine Division--America’s Force-in-Readiness--
Planning for the Pohang Landing
II The Minute Men of 1950 17
Expansion to Full Peace Strength--Mobilization of
Marine Corps Reserve--The Influx at Camp Pendleton--
Embarkation of 1st Marine Division--Build-up of 7th
Marine Regiment--Staff Groups Flown to Japan
III Operation Plan CHROMITE 37
Interview with General MacArthur--Conferences in
Tokyo--Inception of X Corps--Final Conference on
Inchon--Brigade Victory in Korea--The Marine Amphibious
Mission
IV The Planning Phase 53
Working Around the Clock--X Corps Scheme of Maneuver--
Intelligence Planning for Inchon--The Landing
Force Plan--Naval Gunfire and Rockets--Plans for Air
Support
V Embarkation and Assault 73
Landing of 1st Marine Division--Plan to Seize Kimpo
Airfield--Shipping Assigned to Marines--Movement to
the Objective Area--Strikes and Bombardments--Marine
Landings on GREEN Beach--The Two Harbor Islands
Secured
VI Hitting the Beaches 97
The Assault Plan--Beginning the Ship-to-Shore Movement--
Seizure of Cemetery Hill--RED Beach Secured--LSTs
under Enemy Fire--Fighting on Observatory Hill--1st
Marines on BLUE Beach--Ending the Ship-to-Shore
Movement--Seizure of the 0-1 Line
VII Securing the Beachhead 125
Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches--Surgical Teams on
the Beaches--Artillery and Tank Operations--The Attack
on D-plus 1--Advance to the Force Beachhead Line--
Displacement Ashore of Division CP
VIII On to Kimpo 143
Operations on Other Korean Fronts--Landing of RCT-7
in Japan--Destruction of NKPA Tank Column--General
MacArthur Visits the Front--The Drive to Kimpo
Airfield--Action at 5th Marines CP--Enemy Counterattack
at Kimpo
IX Marine Air Support 165
Helicopters and OYs in Support--Marine Air Units at
Kimpo--Progress of Eighth Army Offensive--Division
CP Displaces to Oeoso-Ri--Advance of RCT-1 to Sosa--
Reports of Enemy Build-up--Preparations for Crossing
the Han
X Crossing the Han 187
Swimming Team Leads the Way--Marine LVTs Grounded
in Mud--Daylight Assault Crossing by 3/5--Departure of
General MacArthur--Supporting Arms of Bridgehead--
Command Ashore Assumed by X Corps
XI The Fight For Yongdungpo 205
Three Hills Taken by 1/5-Enemy Minefields Encountered--
NKPA Counterattacks of 20 September--Recapture
of Hills 80 and 85--1st Marines in Position--Assault
of Yongdungpo--Able Company on a Limb--Yongdungpo
Secured
XII Main Line of Resistance 233
Three Hills Designated 105--RCT-7 North of the Han--
Attack Continued by RCT-5--Modified Plan of Corps
Attack--Climax of the Marine Assault--The Epic of Dog
Company--River Crossing of RCT-1
XIII Seoul as a Battlefield 253
Two More River Crossings--Division Attack of 25
September--Night Pursuit Ordered by Corps--Renewal of
Drive Through Seoul--Entrapment of Dog Company,
RCT-7--Last Fight on Hill 296--1st Marines in the
Heart of Seoul--Objective Secured
XIV The Drive to Uijongbu 281
Operations of 28 September--Liberation Ceremony at
Seoul--Crumbling of NKPA Resistance--RCT-7 and the
Battle for Uijongbu--Last Days of Inchon-Seoul
Operation--Summaries and Conclusions--MacArthur’s Report
to United Nations
_Appendixes_
A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 299
B Build-up of 1st Marine Division (Reinf) 303
C Task Organization of Marine Division for Inchon Landing 305
D Supplies and Equipment for Inchon 311
E Task Organization, Joint Task Force Seven 313
F Final Troop List of Division for the Inchon Landing 321
G Summary of Operation Orders Issued by 1st Marine Division for
the Inchon-Seoul Campaign 323
H Enemy Units During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign 325
I Congratulatory Messages 329
J Casualties During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign 333
K Comments on Close Air Support Provided By 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing 335
L Presidential Unit Citation 339
Bibliography 341
Index 347
Illustrations
_Photographs_
Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages 68 and 180.
_Maps and Sketches_
_Page_
NKPA Gains, 30 June-1 August 1950 29
Plan for Inchon Assault 68
Movements to the Objective Area 82
Seizure of Wolmi-do 89
Plan for Inchon Assault 99
Seizure of Red Beach 109
Seizure of Blue Beach 119
Marine Attacks D + 1 137
NK Counterattack Ascom City, 17 September 149
The Drive to Kimpo 154
NK Counterattack Kimpo Air Field, 18 September 162
Advance by 1st Marines, 17 September 174
Capture of Sosa by 1st Marines, 18 September 179
General Situation, 18 September 182
Han River Crossing and Seizure of Hill 125 189
Action on 19 September 207
Action on 20 September 218
Assault on Yongdungpo 224
Dike Defense--Company A, 1st Marines 230
Approaching the Enemy MLR, 5th Marines, 21 September 237
Smashing the MLR, 5th Marines, 22–24 September 242
Seoul Assault Plan 265
The Battle of Seoul 266
Action North of Seoul, 7th Marines 269
Pursuit of the NKPA and Capture of Uijongbu 288
CHAPTER I
The Communist Challenge
_Authorization of Marine Brigade--First Conference on Inchon
Landing--General Shepherd in Tokyo--Request for a Marine
Division--America’s Force-in-Readiness--Planning for the Pohang Landing_
No spot on earth could have seemed farther removed from war’s alarms
than Yellowstone Park on the tranquil Sunday afternoon of 25 June
1950. Yet it was here that Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,
Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), had his
first news of Communist armed aggression in Korea and the resulting
threat to world peace.
Appointed to his new command only nine days before, he was motoring
from the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico to the West Coast. From
Yellowstone Park he advised Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, of his readiness to proceed to Hawaii and
the Far East. His offer was accepted, and a Marine plane from El Toro
transported him from Salt Lake City to San Francisco. There he boarded
the first available plane to Pearl Harbor, arriving in the early
morning hours of 2 July.[1]
[1] FMFPac _Historical Diary, 1–31 Aug 50_.
On this date, with the Korean conflict only a week old, the armed
forces of the United States were already committed. From the outset
the United Nations had viewed the Red Korean invasion of the Republic
of Korea as a challenge issued to free nations by World Communism. The
so-called North Korean People’s Republic had been set up after World
War II as a Communist puppet state, and the army of invasion was both
trained and armed by Soviet Russia.
More than half of the troops in the original North Korean People’s Army
(NKPA) were veterans of the victorious Chinese Communist forces in the
Chinese Civil War. Weapons and equipment, all the way from T-34 tanks
to Tokarev pistols, had been made available by the Soviet Union; and
Soviet instructors prepared the invading army for its surprise attack
of 25 June on the Republic of Korea.[2]
[2] For a more detailed account of the organization of the
NKPA and ROK forces, see v. I of this series, _The Pusan
Perimeter_, ch. II.
There could have been little doubt as to the outcome. Although the ROK
army included eight divisions and a regiment, estimated at some 98,000
men in all, it could not compare with the NKPA establishment of about
equal numbers. The difference lay in the purposes for which the two
forces had been organized during the joint Soviet-American occupation
of Korea after World War II. While Red Army officers created the NKPA
as an instrument of aggression, American instructors trained the ROK
troops for frontier defense and internal security. They had neither
tanks nor combat aircraft, and their heaviest artillery consisted of a
few battalions of 105mm howitzers. It was scarcely more than a lightly
armed constabulary which crumpled at the first shock of NKPA columns
led by Soviet-made tanks and supported by Soviet-made bombing planes.
The four ROK divisions deployed along the frontier were routed, and
Seoul fell to the invaders on the third day.
The reaction of the United Nations was prompt and decisive. On 27 June
the UN Security Council denounced the NKPA attack as a breach of world
peace and called upon member nations to aid the Republic of Korea. The
United States and 52 other nations approved this resolution, which was
opposed only by the Soviet Union and two of its satellites.[3]
[3] US Dept of State, _Guide to the U. N. in Korea_
(Washington, 1951).
As the NKPA tanks entered Seoul, just evacuated by American nationals,
President Truman ordered American air and sea forces in the Far East to
support the shattered ROK army. With the U. S. Seventh Fleet protecting
Formosa, Task Force 77 bombed and bombarded points on the Korean coast.
Far East Air Forces (FEAF), consisting of eight and a half combat
groups commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF,
flew interdictory strikes meanwhile from bases in Japan against NKPA
supply lines.
Within a few days the NKPA air force, consisting of about 100 Yak-type
planes, was driven from the skies except for occasional night raids.
It would appear that a mountainous peninsula of few good roads would
be a favorable area for strategic bombing, since our naval forces were
denying the sea lanes to the enemy. Yet the FEAF bombers could not
prevent the aggressors from bringing up supplies at night by means
of truck, animal, and human transport. The columns of invasion were
doubtless hampered, but they continued to roll on southward in spite of
interdictory strikes.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East
(CinCFE), concluded on 29 June, during his first flying visit to the
front, “that air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that
nothing short of the intervention of U. S. ground forces could give any
assurance of stopping the Communists and of later regaining the lost
ground.”[4] Unfortunately, he had only the four understrength divisions
of the Eighth U. S. Army at his disposal in the Far East. During the
two World Wars the United States had been able to raise and train
armies while allies held the line. But no such respite was forthcoming
in Korea, and the first U. S. ground forces at the front consisted of a
small task force flown from Japan--an incomplete battalion reinforced
by a battery of artillery.
[4] Quoted from report of Chief of Staff, FECOM: LtGen Edward
M. Almond (USA). _United Nations Military Operations in
Korea, 29 June 1950–31 December 1951_ (Carlisle Barracks,
1952), 10–11. (Hereafter, Almond, _UN Mil Ops_.)
The date was 2 July 1950. And on this same Sunday, CinCFE sent a
request to Washington for the immediate dispatch of a Marine regimental
combat team (RCT) with appropriate air to the Far East.
_Authorization of Marine Brigade_
It is not quite a coincidence that 2 July happened also to be the date
of General Shepherd’s arrival at Pearl Harbor. Previous decisions in
Washington had made it virtually certain that General MacArthur’s
request would be granted, and CG FMFPac was on his way to the Far East
to prepare for the reception of the Marine reinforcements.
The first step had been taken on 28 June. General Clifton B. Cates,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, conferred at the Pentagon with Admiral
Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. He urged that troops
of the Fleet Marine Force be employed, and CNO promptly informed Vice
Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander of Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE),
that a Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired
it.[5]
[5] Gen C. B. Cates ltr to authors, 7 Apr 54.
CinCFE had hoped that an entire Marine division could be sent to the
Far East. But after being briefed by Admiral Joy as to the limitations
of Marine Corps numbers, he had to content himself with the request for
an RCT.
Admiral Sherman acted at once. With the approval of JCS and the
President, he ordered Admiral Radford to transport the Marine units
across the Pacific. This was the inception of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade (Reinf.), which was activated on 7 July with three
squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group 33 as its air component.[6]
[6] For the full story of the 1st ProvMarBrig, see _The Pusan
Perimeter_, _op. cit._
_First Conference on Inchon Landing_
While General Shepherd stopped for a few days at Pearl Harbor, the
possibility of an Inchon amphibious operation was mentioned officially
for the first time at a conference in Tokyo attended by two Marine
officers.
On 4 July a party given by the American colony was interrupted by a
message for Brigadier General William S. Fellers, commanding general
of Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet,
and Colonel Edward S. Forney, commanding Mobile Training Team Able
of that organization. As specialists in amphibious techniques, they
were summoned along with Army and Air Force officers to a meeting at
Headquarters, FECOM, presided over by General MacArthur’s chief of
staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, USA.[7]
[7] Col Edward S. Forney _Transcript of Special Report_, n.
d., Part II.
The Marine officers were in Japan as a result of General MacArthur’s
belief in the efficacy of amphibious tactics. Early in 1950, several
months before the outbreak of the Korean conflict, he had foreseen the
necessity of recovering lost ground by means of a ship-to-shore assault
if an enemy ever won a foothold in the Japanese Islands. His request
for amphibious instructors to train U. S. Army troops in Japan had
found the Navy and Marine Corps ready with units set up for just such a
purpose.[8]
[8] In the autumn of 1946 a TTU team of 35 Marine officers
and 40 enlisted men had been sent to Yokosuka, Japan, at
MacArthur’s request, to train Army troops in amphibious
techniques.
The oldest was the TTU organization of the Phib Tra Pac established
originally on 15 August 1943 to prepare Army as well as Navy and Marine
forces for amphibious operations. After making a distinguished record
in World War II, TTU created a permanent place for itself during the
following five years.[9]
[9] Joint Landing Force Board, Project No. 13-52, Annex
Able, 28–30; see also FMFPac, _Historical Outline of the
Development of FMFPac 1941–1950_ (Preliminary), 15–16
(hereafter, FMFPac _History_); and Maj Gen W. S. Fellers
memo to authors, 16 Feb. 55.
A group of TTU officers and enlisted men under the command of Colonel
Forney made up Mobile Training Team Able in the spring of 1950. Sailing
from San Diego in April, these Marines were accompanied by a second
group of amphibious specialists, the ANGLICO (Air and Naval Gunfire
Liaison Company) instruction team commanded by Lieutenant Edward B.
Williams, USN.[10]
[10] Capt E. P. Stamford interv with HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 51.
The ANGLICOs, composed of both Navy and Marine Corps personnel, evolved
in 1949 to assist Army units lacking the forward air control and naval
gunfire control units which are integral in Marine divisions. Growing
out of the responsibility of the Marine Corps for the development
of those phases of landing force operations pertaining to tactics,
techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces, the first company
was formed in answer to the request of Lieutenant General Mark W.
Clark, USA, for a unit capable of giving an Army division this sort of
amphibious fire support. After taking part in the MIKI exercises with
the Sixth Army in Hawaii during the autumn of 1949, this ANGLICO split
up into instruction teams assigned to various Army units.[11]
[11] _Ibid._ The amphibious functions of the Marine Corps, as
outlined by National Security Act of 1947 and the Key
West Conference of 1948, are discussed in the following
chapter.
Training Team Able and Lieutenant Williams’ ANGLICO team reached Japan
just in time to cooperate with a third organization of amphibious
specialists, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle’s Amphibious Group (PhibGru)
One of the Pacific Fleet. The three teams were given a mission of
training one regiment from each of the four Eighth Army divisions in
Japan. But the instruction program had only been launched when it was
interrupted by the Korean conflict.
PhibGru One and the ANGLICO team were immediately assigned to new
duties in connection with the sea lift of Eighth Army troops to Korea.
They had just begun this task when orders came for Admiral Doyle and
his staff, in the USS _Mount McKinley_ at Sasebo, to proceed by air on
4 July to the conference at Tokyo.[12] There at FECOM Headquarters,
they met General Fellers, Colonel Forney, and the Army officers who had
been summoned from the Independence Day celebration of the American
colony.
[12] ComPhibGru-1 (CTF 90), “Rpt of Ops for 25 Jun 50 to 1
Jan 51,” in CinCPacFlt. _Interim Evaluation Report No.
1_, v. XV, Annex Able Able. (Hereafter, PacFlt _Interim
Rpt No. 1_, XV: Able Able. For detailed description and
location of major reports, see the bibliography.)
At the conference it was made plain that the concept of an Inchon
landing had originated with General MacArthur. Even at this early
date, he envisioned not only a ship-to-shore assault on some east or
west coast seaport, preferably Inchon, but also a drive inland to cut
enemy communications and envelop Seoul. The Joint Strategic Plans and
Operations Group (JSPOG) headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright,
U. S. A. (FECOM G-3) was then drawing up the outline of such an
amphibious attack plan. Code-named Operation BLUEHEARTS, it called for
a landing in the Inchon area by a Marine RCT and an Army assault force
in coordination with a frontal attack from the south by the 24th and
25th Divisions. Inchon had been designated the objective area for the
amphibious assault, and the date would depend upon the availability of
troops for the combined operation.[13]
[13] LtGen Edward M. Almond (USA, Ret.) ltr to authors, 10
Feb 55; Col Edward S. Forney interv, 7 Dec 54. (Unless
otherwise noted, all interviews were conducted by the
authors of this work.)
It would be an understatement to say that the naval and Marine officers
were impressed by the boldness of MacArthur’s thinking. At a time when
he could send only a battalion-size force to the aid of the shattered
ROK army, his mind had soared over obstacles and deficiencies to the
concept of an amphibious operation designed to end the war at a stroke.
It was an idea that fired the imagination. But the amphibious
specialists of TTU and PhibGru One had been trained to view the risks
with a realistic appraisal. Their admiration was tempered by caution,
therefore, when they took into account the difficulties.[14]
[14] Forney interv, 7 Dec 54.
The end of World War II had found the United States at a peak of
military strength never before attained in the Nation’s history.
Then, within a year, the popular clamor for the immediate discharge
of citizen-soldiers had left the Army with scarcely enough troops for
the occupation of strategic areas in the Far East. It took vigorous
recruiting to fill the ranks in time of peace, and on 25 June 1950 the
U. S. Eighth Army in Japan included the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry
Divisions and the 1st Cavalry (dismounted) Division. Infantry regiments
were limited to two battalions.
In the lack of trained amphibious assault troops, a definite decision
could not be reached at the conference of 4 July. But it was proposed
by FECOM officers that Major General Hobart H. Gay’s 1st Cavalry
Division be employed as the Army assault force of the proposed Inchon
operation. PhibGru One and Training Team Able were to give the troops
all possible amphibious training, and Colonel Forney was assigned on 5
July as the G-5 (Plans) of the division.[15]
[15] _Ibid._
_General Shepherd in Tokyo_
The activation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on 7 July freed
General Shepherd to continue his trip to the Far East. That evening,
accompanied by his G-3, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, he took off from the
Pearl Harbor area on the flight to Tokyo.
Upon his arrival, CG FMFPac was acquainted by General Almond with the
deteriorating military situation. As a first step toward sending U. S.
ground forces to Korea, CinCFE had set up the GHQ Advanced Command
Group under the command of Brigadier General John H. Church, USA.
After beginning the reorganization of the ROK forces, it was absorbed
on 3 July by Headquarters, U. S. Armed Forces in Korea. And with the
establishment next day of the Pusan Logistical Command (Brigadier
General Crump Garvin, USA), a start was made toward handling the
mountains of supplies which would be required.[16]
[16] USMA, Dept of Mil Art and Engr, _Operations in Korea_
(West Point, 1953).
On 4 July the initial contact of U. S. ground forces with the enemy
took place near Osan. The little task force from Major General William
F. Dean’s 24th Infantry Division could not attempt anything more
ambitious than delaying actions. But preparations were afoot to send
the rest of the division to Korea as soon as possible, to be followed
by Major General William B. Kean’s 25th Infantry Division.
The first fire fights occurred on 5 and 6 July in the vicinity of Osan.
It was evident at once that the enemy held a great superiority in arms
and equipment. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA, who had been
one of Patton’s favorite subordinates, commented after his first visit
to the Korean front that the NKPA units appeared equal to the Germans
who were his adversaries in World War II.[17]
[17] CG FMFPac _Report of Liaison Visit to the Far East_,
10–11 Jul 50.
Accounts of the early actions in Korea were depressing to FECOM
officers.[18] Many plausible excuses may be found for men snatched
from occupation duties and rushed piecemeal into action against great
material odds. The nation as a whole must share the blame when willing
troops are sent to the firing line without adequate preparation,
as were the first U. S. units. Eighth Army officers had done their
best under the circumstances, but a scarcity of maneuver areas in
Japan had restricted training exercises to the battalion and company
levels. Divisions with barely 70 percent of their full complement of
troops were armed with worn World War II weapons, some of which proved
unserviceable for lack of spare parts and maintenance personnel.
Division tank units, equipped with light M-24 tanks because of poor
roads and bridges in Japan, operated at a handicap against the enemy’s
new Soviet T-34 tanks; and American 2.36-inch rocket launchers knocked
out NKPA armor only at fairly close ranges.[19]
[18] Several of these encounters are realistically described
from first-hand interviews in a study sponsored by the
Chief of Military History, USA: Capt R. A. Gugeler,
_Combat Actions in Korea_ (Washington, 1954), 3–19.
[19] USMA, _op. cit._, 7–8.
At this stage the ground forces were particularly dependent upon air
support because of shortages of artillery. But since the mission of the
Air Force in Japan had been primarily of a defensive nature, neither
the organization nor equipment was available for effective air-ground
cooperation on the tactical level. As a consequence, FEAF units had to
confine their tactical efforts largely to targets of opportunity, and
24th Infantry units had to do without such support when it was most
needed.[20]
[20] _Ibid._
Altogether, the so-called “police action” in Korea proved to be one of
the toughest assignments ever given to American soldiers.
_Request for a Marine Division_
General Shepherd’s few days in Tokyo were filled with conferences, and
history was made on 10 July during the course of a conversation with
General MacArthur at FECOM Headquarters.
The commander in chief was not optimistic about the situation at the
front. Not only had the NKPA invasion developed into a formidable
threat at the end of the first two weeks, but the possibility of Red
Chinese or Soviet armed intervention could not be dismissed.
President Truman had named General MacArthur as supreme commander of UN
forces after the Security Council passed a resolution on 7 July calling
for a unified effort in Korea. General Walker was soon to be appointed
to the command of the Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK), assuming control of
all ROK ground forces.
The personnel situation had grown critical. After being completely
routed, the ROK troops were now in process of reorganization into five
divisions. Meanwhile, the U. S. 25th Infantry Division was being sent
to Korea as rapidly as possible; and it had been decided to withdraw
the 1st Cavalry Division from consideration as the landing force of
the proposed Inchon operation. Not only were these troops lacking in
amphibious training, but they were needed as infantry reinforcements.
Thus it was planned for the combat-loaded 1st Cavalry Division to make
a landing at the East Coast port of Pohang-dong, under the direction of
ComPhibGru One and Mobile Training Team Able, before proceeding to the
front. This would leave only the 7th Infantry Division in Japan, and it
was being stripped of troops to fill out units of the other three.
The outweighed UN forces were still limited to delaying actions. But
General MacArthur hoped that space could be traded for time until
the arrival of stateside units enabled him to take the offensive. At
his urgent request, the 2d Infantry Division and 2d Engineer Special
Brigade had been alerted in the United States for immediate movement to
the Far East. Port dates commencing on 20 July had been assigned, and
General Wright expressed his opinion that these units might be employed
along with the recently activated 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to
initiate the first UN counterstroke.[21]
[21] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50.
The only hope of an early UN decision, General MacArthur told CG FMFPac
at their conference of 10 July, lay in the launching of an amphibious
assault to cut supply lines in the enemy’s rear. This situation,
he added, reminded him of the critical days of World War II in the
Pacific, when troops trained in amphibious techniques were urgently
needed to make ship-to-shore landings on Japanese-held islands.
In a reminiscent mood, MacArthur recalled the competence shown by the
1st Marine Division while under his control during the New Britain
operation of 1943–1944. If only he had this unit in Japan, he said, he
would employ it at his first opportunity as his landing force for the
Inchon assault.
Shepherd, who had been assistant division commander of the 1st Marine
Division during the New Britain landings, immediately suggested that
the UN supreme commander make a request that the 1st Marine Division
with appropriate Marine air be assigned to him. This possibility had
apparently been put aside by MacArthur after being limited to an RCT in
his request of 2 July. He asked eagerly if the Marine general believed
that the division could be made available for an Inchon landing as
early as 15 September. And Shepherd replied that since the unit was
under his command, he would take the responsibility for stating that it
could be sent to Korea by that date, minus the infantry regiment and
other troops of the Brigade.[22]
[22] USMC, MarCorps Board, _An Evaluation of the Influence
of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War_
(4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), v. I, I-B-1. (Hereafter, MarCorps
Board _Study_.)
Thus was history made without pomp or ceremony during the conference at
FECOM Headquarters.
The date was 10 July, but it was already D-minus 67 for thousands of
American young men. On farms and in offices, in cities and villages
from coast to coast, these civilians had no inkling that just 67 days
later they would be fighting their way ashore in a major amphibious
operation. For they were Marine reservists, and the 1st Marine Division
could not be brought up to full strength without calling them back into
uniform.
Shepherd realized, even while assuring MacArthur that the division
could be made combat-ready by 15 September, that the activation of
the Brigade had left the division with less than the strength of a
single RCT. Nearly as many men would be required to bring it up to
full strength as were contained at present in the entire Fleet Marine
Force.[23] But so great was his confidence in the Marine Corps Reserve
that he did not hesitate to take the responsibility.
[23] For statistics on Reserve mobilization, see Ernest H.
Giusti, _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve
in the Korean Conflict_. (HistBr, G-3 HQMC, 1952).
(Hereafter, Giusti.)
Nor did MacArthur lose any time at making up his mind. That very day,
10 July, he sent his first request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a
Marine division.
As the conference ended, Shepherd found the UN supreme commander
“enthusiastic” about the prospect of employing again the Marine outfit
that had been his reliance seven years before in the New Britain
operation. He planned to stabilize the front in Korea as soon as
possible, he said, as a prelude to the landing in the NKPA rear which
he believed would be decisive.[24]
[24] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50.
_America’s Force-in-Readiness_
Long before the New Britain landing, Cates and Shepherd had learned
from first-hand experience as junior officers how decisive a
force-in-readiness can be. The lieutenant from Tennessee and the
lieutenant from Virginia took part in June 1918 with the Marines who
stopped the Germans by counterattacking at Belleau Wood. In terms of
human tonnage, two Marine regiments did not cut much of a figure in the
American Expeditionary Force. What counted was the _readiness_ of the
Marines and a few outfits of U. S. Army regulars at a time when most of
the American divisions had not yet finished training.
More than three decades later, as CMC and CG FMFPac, both Marine
generals were firm advocates of the force-in-readiness concept as
a basic mission of the Marine Corps. It was a mission that had
evolved from practice rather than theory. During the half century
since the Spanish-American War, there had been only two years when
U. S. Marines were not on combat duty somewhere. It had long been a
tradition that the Marines, as transitory naval forces, might land on
foreign soil without the implication of hostilities usually associated
with invasion. This principle was invoked, along with a liberal
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, by the State Department from
1906 to 1932 in the Caribbean and Central America. As a means of
supervising unstable governments in sensitive strategic areas, Marines
were sent to Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,
and China for long periods of occupation.[25]
[25] For a detailed discussion of this subject, see US Dept
of State, Office of the Solicitor, _Right to Protect
Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces_, 3d
rev. ed. with sup. app. to 1933 (Washington, 1934).
(State Dept Pub. No. 538.)
U. S. Marines were not only web-footed infantry during these overseas
operations; they also distinguished themselves as scouts, cannoneers,
constabulary, engineers, and horse marines. As modern warfare grew more
complex, however, the time came when the Leathernecks could no longer
sail on a few hours’ notice as a “gangplank expeditionary force” made
up of men detailed from the nearest posts and stations. No longer could
such light weapons as machine guns, mortars, and mountain howitzers
serve as the only armament necessary for seizing a beachhead.
The Fleet Marine Force evolved in 1933, therefore, to fill the need for
a corps of highly-trained amphibious specialists capable of carrying
out a major ship-to-shore assault against modern defensive weapons.
New landing craft as well as new landing tactics and techniques were
developed during the next ten years, and the reputation of the Marine
Corps as a force-in-readiness was upheld in the amphibious operations
of World War II.
During these three eventful decades of Marine development, General
Cates and General Shepherd had participated in all the stages while
ascending the ladder of command. Thus in the summer of 1950, they were
eminently qualified for leadership in the task of building the 1st
Marine Division up to war strength for the amphibious operation which
General MacArthur hoped to launch on 15 September.
As a prerequisite, the sanction of Congress and authorization of the
President had to be obtained before the Marine Corps Reserve could be
mobilized. General MacArthur’s request of 10 July for a Marine division
went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who referred it to General Cates.
The Commandant could only reply that it would be necessary to call out
the Reserve, and no action was taken on this first request. It was
enough that a beginning had been made, and CMC put his staff to work on
the necessary studies and plans.
General Shepherd was meanwhile winding up his visit to Tokyo by
conferring with Admirals Joy and Doyle and Generals Almond and
Stratemeyer. The Air Force general tentatively confirmed (subject to
discussion with his staff) the assignment of Itami Airfield in Japan
to Marine air units. He also informed CG FMFPac that he accepted as
valid the principle of employing Marine air in support of Marine ground
forces.[26]
[26] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50.
The air situation in Korea had struck General Shepherd as abounding
in paradoxes. He noted that “B-29’s are employed against tactical
targets to the dissatisfaction of all concerned--the Air Force because
of misemployment of its planes, and the ground forces because of the
results achieved. Carrier aircraft, despite the wealth of close support
targets available, were committed against deep and semi-strategic
targets. Jet fighters, with little enemy air to engage, have been
assigned to close support work despite a fuel restriction which holds
them to no more than 15 minutes in the combat zone. Only a very limited
number of aircraft adaptable to tactical support missions are available
(F-51 and B-26) and there appears to be urgent need for suitable close
support aircraft along with competent air-ground liaison units.”[27]
[27] _Ibid._
These conclusions had much to do with a Marine policy, dating back
to World War II, of insisting whenever possible on Marine close air
support for Marine ground forces. Without disparaging other techniques,
Marines believed that their own fliers, trained in Marine infantry
methods, could provide the most effective tactical air for Marine
infantry.
_Planning for the Pohang Landing_
While General Shepherd was flying back to Pearl Harbor, a succession
of sleepless nights awaited the officers of PhibGru One, the ANGLICO
group, and Training Team Able. Upon the shoulders of these amphibious
specialists fell the task of drawing up the orders, planning the
loading, and mounting out the troops of the 1st Cavalry Division for
its landing of 18 July at Pohang-dong.
It was not even certain, when the division commenced loading at
Yokohama on 14 July, that Pohang-dong could be held by the ROKs long
enough for a landing to be effected. Three reinforced NKPA divisions
were making the enemy’s main thrust down the Seoul-Taejon axis. They
were opposed only by weary 24th Infantry Division units fighting
delaying actions while falling back on Taejon and the line of the river
Kum. Along the east coast and the mountains of the central sector,
five regrouped and reorganized ROK divisions held as best they could.
Two of these units in the center were being relieved by the U. S. 25th
Infantry Division, which completed its movement to Korea on the 14th.
As a preliminary step in the Pohang landing, a reconnaissance party of
Army, Navy, and Marine officers flew from Tokyo on 11 July into the
objective area. They returned two days later with valuable information
about the beaches, depths of water, and unloading facilities.
“Because of the extraordinary speed with which the landing at
Pohang-dong was conceived, planned, and executed,” said the report of
ComPhibGru One, “there was no opportunity for conventional and orderly
planning.... Since all echelons of the planning force were installed
in offices at GHQ in Tokyo, it was possible to employ the quickest
and most informal ways of doing business. Telephone conversations and
oral directives were used in place of dispatches, letters, and formal
orders.”[28]
[28] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Able Able.
Lack of amphibious shipping in the area made it a Herculean labor to
provide boat servicing gear, general securing gear, debarkation nets,
towing bridles, and boat and vehicle slings in less than a week. By 14
July, however, enough shipping to move the four embarkation groups of
the division had been assembled at Yokohama--two MSTS transports, two
AKAs, six LSUs, and 16 LSTs in addition to LCVPs and LCMs.
The transport group and screen got under way on the 15th for a
rendezvous near the objective area on D-day with the tractor group.
Naval aircraft of Rear Admiral John M. Hoskins’ carrier group of the
Seventh Fleet were on call to provide support; but at 0558 on the
18th, the armada was unopposed as it steamed into Yongil Bay. CTF 90
signaled orders for the carrying out of Plan Baker, calling for a
landing against little or no enemy resistance. By midnight the _Mount
McKinley_, _Union_, _Oglethorpe_, and _Titania_ had been completely
unloaded, and the LSTs had accounted for 60 per cent of their cargoes.
Altogether, 10,027 troops, 2,022 vehicles, and 2,729 tons of bulk cargo
were put ashore on D-day.
The Second Echelon consisted of six LSTs, three APs, and four Japanese
freighters, while six LSTs made up the Third Echelon. These ships
discharged their cargo from 23 to 29 July, having been delayed by
Typhoon GRACE. And on the 30th, ComPhibGru One, as CTF 90, reported
that the operation had been completed and no naval units were now at
the objective.[29]
[29] _Ibid._
Viewed superficially, the uncontested Pohang landing may have seemed
a tame affair to stateside newspaper readers. Nevertheless, it was
a timely demonstration of Navy and Marine Corps amphibious know-how
and Army energy, and it came at a critical moment. The important
communications center of Taejon had to be abandoned by 24th Infantry
Division units on 20 July, and it was growing apparent that the
Eighth Army would be hard-pressed to retain a foothold in Korea until
reinforcements from the States could give the United Nations a material
equality. It was a time when every platoon counted, and the fresh
regiments of General Gay’s division were rushed to the Yongdong area
two days after their landing to relieve weary and battered elements of
the 24th Infantry Division.
CHAPTER II
The Minute Men of 1950
_Expansion to Full Peace Strength--Mobilization of Marine Corps
Reserve--The Influx at Camp Pendleton--Embarkation of 1st Marine
Division--Build-up of 7th Marine Regiment--Staff Groups Flown to Japan_
On 18 July 1950, it was D-minus 59 for the Marine reservists who would
hit the beaches at Inchon. These young civilians were doubtless more
interested in major league baseball standings at the moment than in
hydrographic conditions at the Korean seaport they would assault within
two months. Yet the proposed amphibious operation moved a long step
closer to reality on the 18th when Major General Oliver P. Smith left
Washington under orders to assume command of the 1st Marine Division at
Camp Pendleton, California.
A graduate of the University of California in 1916, General Smith had
been commissioned a Marine second lieutenant at the age of 24 in the
first World War. After serving in Guam during that conflict, he saw
duty at sea and in Haiti during the early 1920’s, followed by studies
at the Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and duty as an
instructor in the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico.
In Paris, while attached administratively to the office of the U. S.
Naval Attaché, he took the full two-year course at the École Supérieure
de Guerre, and afterwards he was an instructor for three more years at
the Marine Corps Schools. He had an extensive experience of hard-fought
amphibious operations during World War II as a regimental commander in
the Talasea, New Britain, landing, as ADC of the 1st Marine Division
at Peleliu, and as deputy chief of staff of the U. S. Tenth Army on
Okinawa. Returning with the rank of brigadier, he became Commandant of
the Marine Corps Schools; and after putting up a second star, the tall,
slender, white-haired general served as Assistant Commandant at Marine
Corps Headquarters in Washington.
At the outbreak of the Korean conflict, Major General Graves B. Erskine
had commanded the 1st Marine Division. Following his assignment to a
secret State Department mission in southeast Asia, General Smith was
named as his relief.
The division had meanwhile been reduced to 3,386 officers and men as
compared to a strength of 7,789 on 30 June 1950. It had been stripped
of its principal operating elements to build up the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade, which numbered about 5,000 officers and men when it
sailed from San Diego to the Far East on 14 July under the command of
Brigadier General Edward A. Craig.[30]
[30] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra. Estimate of
Brigade numbers will be found to vary according to
different stages of the build-up.
At El Toro, the near-by Marine Corps Air Station, it was the same
story. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with a total strength of 4,004
officers and men on 30 June, provided most of the 1,548 officers and
men of Marine Aircraft Group 33, the air component of the Brigade,
commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, who was also deputy
Brigade commander.[31]
[31] _Ibid._; see also XV: Charlie Charlie.
_Expansion to Full Peace Strength_
General Smith had known before his arrival at Pendleton that his first
task would be the building up of the 1st Marine Division to full
peace strength. As early as 12 July, a dispatch from CNO had warned
CinCPacFlt that this expansion would take place, including the elements
of the Brigade.[32] And on 15 July General Shepherd directed Brigadier
General Harry B. Liversedge, temporary CG 1st Marine Division, to
extend the work day and work week while intensifying training and
making preparations to expand.[33]
[32] CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 12 Jul 50.
[33] CG FMFPac disp to CG 1st MarDiv, 14 July 50.
The 15th was also the date of General MacArthur’s second request for
a war-strength Marine division with its own air for employment in
his proposed Inchon amphibious assault. General Shepherd advised CMC
that same day as to the composition of cadres to facilitate the rapid
expansion of the 1st Marine Division.[34]
[34] CG FMFPac disp to CMC, 15 Jul 50; CG FMFPac ltr to CMC,
16 Jul 50.
Already it was becoming apparent that this build-up would allow little
time for training. Fortunate it was, therefore, that the Division and
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had participated in an intensive training
program during recent months. Following are the principal exercises:
Oct 1949 Air lift field exercise involving movement of a
reinforced battalion and air command to San Nicholas
Island, Calif. One Marine aircraft group carrier-embarked
for participation in Operation MIKI with Sixth Army in
Hawaii.
Nov 1949 Field exercise involving a reinforced regiment and
supporting aircraft.
Dec 1949 Combined field exercise--a simulated amphibious
assault extending over a period of seven days--involving
all principal elements of the Division and Wing.
Jan 1950 Participation by elements of Division in Operation
MICOWEX 50, stressing the use of the transport submarine
and helicopter in amphibious operations.
Feb 1950 Field exercise involving a reinforced regiment with
supporting air.
Mar 1950 Land plane and seaplane air-lift exercise involving
seizure of San Nicholas Island by a reinforced battalion
and a Marine air command.
May 1950 Participation by a majority of Division and Wing
elements in DEMON III, an amphibious demonstration for
students of Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth. Participation by Wing in two-week major
advanced base field exercise, with intensive training in
close support.
Jun 1950 Continuation of training in lesser air-ground
problems, field exercises and command post exercises.[35]
[35] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV:Zebra, 3–5.
Counterparts of nearly all of these exercises might have been found in
the training program for the 2d Marine Division and 2d Marine Aircraft
Wing on the North Carolina coast. Operation CAMID at Little Creek, Va.,
was similar to DEMON III. All principal FMFLant elements participated
in Operation CROSSOVER at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in the spring
of 1950, and a Marine aircraft group was embarked aboard a carrier in
the Mediterranean. Other elements of the Wing took part in PORTREX,
an Army-Navy amphibious exercise in the Caribbean, and in SWARMER, an
Army-Air Force airborne exercise in North Carolina. Units of both the
Division and the Wing were represented in the annual Amphibious Command
Post Exercise at Lejeune; and throughout the winter and spring a
succession of smaller ground, air, and air-ground exercises emphasized
close support and amphibious landings.
Posts and stations were meanwhile conducting annual weapons
qualification firing tests and individual training as required by USMC
General Order No. 10. This program was designed to maintain the basic
military proficiency of men not serving with the Fleet Marine Force. It
is significant, however, that a large proportion of them had reported
to such duty directly from FMF units, in accordance with the rotation
policy.
The program for the Organized Reserve included both armory and active
duty summer training. Air and ground units of reservists were “adopted”
during their summer training by similar units of the Fleet Marine
Force, which supervised the exercises and provided instructors. By the
summer of 1950, a large proportion of the reservists had progressed
beyond basic training into advanced individual and unit training, so
that they could be classed as “nearly combat ready” at the time of the
1st Marine Division expansion.[36]
[36] _Ibid._
_Mobilization of Marine Corps Reserve_
Shortcomings in quantity rather than quality of Marine personnel made
expansion a problem on 19 July 1950, when General MacArthur sent his
third request to the Pentagon for a Marine division with appropriate
air. Again the Joint Chiefs referred the matter to General Cates, who
was prepared with two plans worked out in detail by his staff--Plan
ABLE, providing third rifle companies and replacements for the Brigade;
and Plan BAKER, designed to bring the 1st Marine Division up to full
war strength by calling reservists to active duty.
These plans were based on the personnel statistics of 30 June 1950. The
grand total of 74,279 Marines on active duty at that time (97 per cent
of authorized strength) was distributed as follows:
_Operating Forces_--engaged directly in carrying out assigned
missions and tasks 40,364
_Supporting Establishment_--comprising trained administrative
and supply personnel 24,552
_Special Assignment_--including all personnel serving with
organizations outside the regular establishment 3,871
_Non-Available_--made up of personnel hospitalized, confined,
or en route 5,492
-------
Total 74,279
A breakdown of the Operating Forces reveals that the Fleet Marine Force
numbered 27,703 men, the security detachments included 11,087, and
1,574 Marines were afloat. Of the 11,853 in FMFPac, 7,779 were in the
1st Marine Division, and 3,733 in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The
15,803 Marines in FMFLant included 8,973 in the 2d Marine Division and
5,297 in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.[37]
[37] Giusti, I-2.
These figures make it evident that the 1st Marine Division could not be
brought up to war strength of about 25,000 troops without drawing upon
the 33,527 (77 per cent of authorized strength) in the ground forces
of the Organized Reserve, and the 6,341 (94 per cent of authorized
strength) in the aviation forces. The ground personnel were distributed
among these units:
Twenty-one infantry battalions; 16 rifle companies; seven 105mm
howitzer battalions; five 155mm howitzer battalions; one 155mm gun
battalion; two 40mm gun batteries; two tank battalions; three amphibian
tractor battalions; one amphibian truck company; one signal company
(supplementary); six signal companies; one engineer battalion; 15
women’s reserve platoons.
Aviation units consisted of 30 Marine fighter squadrons (VMF) and 12
Marine ground control intercept squadrons (MGCI).
The Organized Reserve was exceeded as a reservoir of potential man
power by the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve, which had a total of
90,044 men and women on 30 June 1950. This total included 2,267
volunteer reservists on continuous active duty with the regular
establishment, about 5,000 training in some 200 volunteer training
units, and 1316 in the Fleet Reserve.
Altogether, the strength of all Marine reserve components (less
volunteer reservists on active duty) amounted to a total of 128,959, or
nearly double the number of Marines in the regular establishment.[38]
[38] _Ibid._, 1–5, 6.
Behind every Marine regular, figuratively speaking, stood two
reservists who were ready to step forward and fill the gaps in the
ranks. Thus it was scarcely far-fetched when some inspired public
information officer coined the phrase “Minute Men of 1950” for these
recent civilians who made it possible for the 1st Marine Division to
hit the beaches at Inchon.
Events moved swiftly on 19 July. Only a few hours after the receipt of
CinCFE’s third request, the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve
was authorized by President Truman with the sanction of Congress.
Headquarters Marine Corps, on the hill overlooking the Pentagon, was
ablaze with lights that summer night; and decisions were made which
enabled four important steps to be taken next day:
(1) a warning to Reserve District directors that the Organized
Reserve would soon be ordered to active duty;
(2) notification to commanding generals to expect some 21,000
Organized Reservists shortly at Marine Barracks, Camp
Pendleton, and about 5,800 at Marine Barracks, Camp Lejeune;
(3) orders issued by CMC, with the approval of CNO, to
discontinue the practice of discharging reservists at their
own request;
(4) the first reservists--22 units with a total strength of 4,830
men--ordered to active duty with a delay of ten days.[39]
[39] _Ibid._, II-2.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still not convinced that a Marine force
could be embarked to meet General MacArthur’s deadline of 10 September
without stripping FMFLant units to a dangerous extent. On the advice of
Admiral Sherman, they informed CinCFE on 20 July that a Marine division
could not be sent before November or even December.
General Shepherd had a great deal to do with shaping the ultimate
decision. On the 20th, when CNO conferred with Admiral Radford on the
question of a Marine division, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet in
his turn asked the opinion of the Marine general. General Shepherd
replied that a Marine amphibious striking force could be raised for the
proposed Inchon landing without seriously weakening the Fleet Marine
Force as a whole. This striking force, he predicted, would prove to be
“the key of achievement of a timely and economical decision for our
arms.”[40]
[40] CG FMFPac memo to CinCPacFlt, 20 Jul 50.
The Marine general’s statement was one of the main factors in causing
the Joint Chiefs to advise MacArthur on the 22d that they were
reconsidering their stand. During the next 48 hours, as dispatches sped
back and forth across the Pacific, a compromise was reached. CinCFE was
promised his Marine division in time for his target date--but it was to
be a division minus one RCT. In other words, the infantry regiment of
the Brigade would be supplemented by another RCT and supporting troops
with appropriate Marine air. But the Joint Chiefs were adamant in their
decision that MacArthur must wait until autumn or even winter for his
third RCT.
These preliminaries cleared the way so that General MacArthur’s request
was finally approved by JCS on 25 July, the day when General Smith took
over command of the 1st Marine Division. The Marine Corps was directed
to build the division (less one RCT) up to full war strength, and a
date of departure of 10–15 August for the Far East was set.
A 50 percent reduction in Marine security forces within the continental
limits of the United States was authorized by CNO on that same date.
This meant that an additional 3,630 regulars would be enabled to report
for service with the 1st Marine Division.
On the morning of the 26th a courier from Washington arrived at Camp
Pendleton with a communication for General Smith indicating that
the expanded 1st Marine Division would be composed of four types of
personnel: (1) Brigade units, to be combined with the Division upon
arrival in the Far East; (2) units of the 2d Marine Division, to be
ordered to Camp Pendleton to augment elements of the 1st; (3) regular
personnel to be called in from posts and stations; and (4) final
deficiencies to be filled by men from the Marine Corps Reserve who met
minimum combat experience requirements.[41]
[41] MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Notes on the Operations of the
1st Marine Division during the First Nine Months of the
Korean War, 1950–1951_ (MS), 3–4. (Hereafter, O. P.
Smith, _Notes_.) Among the most valuable sources of the
present book are the _Chronicle of the Operations of the
1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the
Korean War, 1950–1951_ (MS), (hereafter, O. P. Smith,
_Chronicle_), and _Notes_ prepared in typescript by the
commanding general of the division. The _Chronicle_ is
a day-by-day account of planning, command decisions,
and resulting events, while the _Notes_ are an
analytical review of the relative facts, statistics,
and directives. Combining accuracy with a keen sense of
historical values, the Marine general by his knowledge
of shorthand was able to keep a fairly complete record
in the field which he later checked with official
reports.
Congress passed legislation on 27 July authorizing the President to
extend for one year all enlistments in the armed forces, both regular
and reserve, which were due to expire before 9 July 1951. This gave the
assurance of a stable body of troops.
On the 31st, with the first reservists arriving at Camp Pendleton and
the first contingents leaving Camp Lejeune for the West Coast, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CNO to expand the 2d Marine Division
to war strength while increasing the number of Marine tactical air
squadrons from 16 to 18.[42] Obviously, the 1st and 2d Divisions could
not be built up simultaneously without serious delays, and priority
must be given to the 1st. It was equally obvious, moreover, that this
expansion must be largely accomplished during the first week of August
if the troops were to be made ready for embarkation between the 10th
and 15th.
[42] Giusti, II-2.
_The Influx at Camp Pendleton_
The first build-up troops to reach Camp Pendleton were three Organized
Reserve units which arrived on 31 July--the 13th Infantry Company, of
Los Angeles; the 12th Amphibian Tractor Company, of San Francisco; and
the 3d Engineer Company, of Phoenix, Arizona. This was the beginning of
an inundation which kept the camp keyed to a 24-hour day and a 7-day
week. A torrent of troops poured into the vast military reservation
by bus, train, and plane at all hours of the day and night. Confusion
seemed to reign from the tawny California hills to the blue Pacific;
and yet this seeming chaos was under the control of veteran officers
and NCOs who had mounted out before. Accommodations for the newcomers
were not de luxe, but men were being processed, assigned, fed, and
equipped as rapidly as they arrived. The tramp of feet could be heard
all night long as details of troops drew clothing and equipment or
reported for medical examinations.
A total of 13,703 Marines reached Camp Pendleton during this busy week.
Counting the personnel already on hand, troops of four categories were
represented:
Officers and men remaining in 1st Marine Division at Camp
Pendleton after dispatch of the Brigade 3,459
Officers and men reporting from posts and stations up to
4 August 3,630
Officers and men reporting from the 2d Marine Division from
3 to 6 August 7,182
Officers and men selected as combat-ready out of the total of
about 10,000 reservists reporting by 7 August 2,891
------
Total 17,162
The expansion took place in two phases. First, of course, came the
bringing of the 1st Marine Division (less one RCT) up to war strength,
including augmentation personnel and supplies for the units of the
Brigade. Next, the organization of a third reinforced infantry
regiment, the 7th Marines, was directed by a letter from CMC to CG 1st
Marine Division on 4 August.[43]
[43] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 5–6.
Headquarters Marine Corps naturally foresaw the necessity for
replacement and rotation troops. The importance of the Reserve in this
long-range expansion program may be seen by glancing ahead at the
statistics of the next few months. Units of these recent civilians
continued to report at such a rate that by 11 September 1950 the
Organized Reserve (Ground) had in effect ceased to exist! In other
words, all acceptable personnel had already reported for active duty,
and the total of 33,528 officers and men represented a 90.02 percentage
of availability.
The record of the Volunteer Reserve proved to be equally good after it
was ordered to active duty on 15 August 1950. During the next seven and
a half months, down to 31 March 1951, the Volunteer Reserve furnished
51,942 of the 84,821 reservists on active duty. As to the quality of
these troops, about 99 per cent of the officers and 77.5 per cent of
the enlisted were veterans of World War II.[44]
[44] Giusti, III-2, 7.
Many of the first reservists to report at Camp Pendleton made unusual
sacrifices. Although they had the privilege of being discharged at
their own request as late as 18 July 1950, the unexpectedness of the
Korean conflict worked hardships in some instances. Reservists with
several dependents or just establishing themselves in a business or
profession had to settle their affairs hurriedly. There was little
applause when the Minute Men of 1950 departed from home communities
which were on a basis of business and pleasure as usual. The Korean
conflict was still regarded as a “police action” which would be ended
shortly. Nobody dreamed that within its first year it would become the
fourth largest military effort of our nation’s history.
The Marine Corps was as lenient as could reasonably be expected when it
came to granting delays and deferments. On 1 August a board of eight
officers at Marine Corps Headquarters initiated daily meetings to
consider such requests emanating from the various Reserve districts.
Two weeks later the Commandant gave Reserve District directors the
authority to grant delays for periods up to six months after judging
each case on its individual merits. But even after every concession had
been made that could be reconciled with the national interest, it was a
wrench for hundreds of reservists to make the sudden plunge from civil
into military life.
There were instances of men seeking deferment by using political
influence or pleading physical disability. But such cases were rare
as compared to the great majority who reported promptly and declared
themselves combat-ready.
In the selection of reservists for the division, two categories were
recognized--combat-ready and noncombat-ready. The first applied to
men whose records proved that they had been members of the Organized
Reserve for two years and had attended one summer camp and 72 drills
or two summer camps and 32 drills. Veterans of more than 90 days’
service in the Marine Corps also qualified. All other reservists were
classified as noncombat-ready.
When lost or incomplete records complicated the equation, a reservist’s
own opinion could not be accepted as proof of his fitness for combat.
This ruling had to be made because so many men were found to have more
spunk than training. Officers of a reservist’s unit were questioned
before a decision was reached, and any man feeling the need of
further training could be removed without prejudice from immediate
consideration for combat.
Standards were so strictly observed that only about half of the
reservists qualified as being combat-ready. This group broke down into
the 15 per cent accepted for the 1st Marine Division and the 35 per
cent assigned to posts and stations to relieve regulars who joined the
division. The remaining 50 per cent consisted of men placed in the
noncombat-ready or recruit class.[45]
[45] Andrew Geer, _The New Breed_ (New York, 1952), 103–105.
The emergency found the Organized Aviation Reserve with 30 VMF and
12 GCI squadrons generally up to peacetime strength. Of the 1,588
officers, about 95 per cent were combat-experienced, and only about 10
per cent of the enlisted men stood in need of basic training. It was a
comparatively simple task, therefore, to comply with the order of 23
July calling for six VMF and three GCI squadrons to report to El Toro.
Their mission was to build up to war strength the units of the 1st MAW
which had been stripped to mount out MAG-33.
On 3 August the remaining nine GCI squadrons of the Organized Aviation
Reserve were ordered to El Toro.[46] By this time the build-up was so
well in hand that Major General Field Harris, commanding the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing, conferred with General Smith about aviation shipping for
the embarkation.
[46] Giusti, III-2.
This veteran Marine pilot, a native of Kentucky, had been commissioned
a second lieutenant in 1917 after graduating from the U. S. Naval
Academy. Three years of service with Marine ground forces in Cuba and
the Philippines were followed by Headquarters duty at Washington and
flight training at Pensacola. Designated a naval aviator in 1929, he
held various Marine air commands before participating as colonel and
brigadier general in the Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons, and Green
Island air operations of World War II. On his return, he was appointed
Assistant Commandant (Air) and Director of Aviation.
In the autumn of 1946, after Operation CROSSROADS had given a glimpse
into the tactical future, Generals Shepherd, Harris, and Smith were
named as a Special Board “to orient the effort of the Marine Corps away
from the last war and toward the next.” The result was recommendations
leading to experiments with rotary wing aircraft as a means of tactical
dispersion in amphibious operations against an enemy employing atomic
weapons. Thus the Marine Corps worked out new helicopter combat
techniques which were soon to create tactical history with the Brigade
and Division in Korea.[47]
[47] Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (New York, 1954),
51–53.
_Embarkation of 1st Marine Division_
It is a curious circumstance that not until 8 August did General Smith
himself have his first information as to the Inchon landing. The
basic directive of 25 July had merely specified that the main body
of the Division would embark from San Diego, prepared for combat.
The commanding general did not learn even unofficially about the
time and the place of the proposed operation until he was told by
General Fellers. While reporting at Camp Pendleton on his return from
Japan, the TTU commander gave General Smith an informal account of
the conference which took place on 4 July at FECOM Headquarters in
Tokyo.[48]
[48] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 18, 41.
On the following day, 9 August, the Division issued Operation Order No.
1-50, which provided for the movement of the Division (less the Brigade
and one RCT) to the Far East to report upon arrival to CinCFE for
operational control. Embarkation was to be carried out in accordance
with Embarkation Plan No. 1-50 of 6 August.
By this date, 17,162 Marines in Camp Pendleton were eligible for
reassignment to the 1st Marine Division. There was no time, of course,
for much training. On 2 August the Division issued Training Bulletin
No. 36–50 as a general guide providing for some rudiments of individual
and small-unit instruction. But about all that could be accomplished
was conditioning training and test firing of weapons. As a result, many
of the weapons issued directly to units were found to be defective,
having been in storage since 1945.[49]
[49] _Ibid._, 16–17.
The war news from Korea at this time lent an atmosphere of grim realism
to preparations at Camp Pendleton. On 2 August the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade had landed at Pusan, the day following the debarkation
of two U. S. Army units, the skeletonized 2d Infantry Division and the
5th RCT. The original destination of the Marines had been Japan, but
during the voyage the military situation deteriorated so rapidly that
on 25 July a landing in Korea was ordered by CinCFE.
Following the capture of Taejon on 20 July, the Red Korean columns
of invasion speeded up their “end run” around the Eighth Army’s open
left flank. Driving eastward as well as southward, the enemy made such
progress during the next ten days that on 31 July the UN forces were
pushed back into a chain of defensive positions in southeast Korea.
This was the Pusan Perimeter, which must be held if the vital line of
communications from the supply port to Taegu was to be maintained.
The Marines jumped off east of Masan on 7 August with the Army 5th
RCT and elements of the 25th Infantry Division in the first sustained
counterattack mounted by UN forces. General Craig had control of Army
as well as Marine units during the most critical period of the initial
two days, and carrier-based MAG-33 squadrons provided tactical air
support. Enemy resistance was so shattered by the 9th that the Red
Korean machine of invasion went into reverse for the first time.
[Illustration: NKPA GAINS
30 JUNE-1 AUGUST
1950]
From the 9th to the 13th, when they were relieved, parallel columns of
Army and Marine assault troops drove from Chindong-ni nearly to Chinju,
a distance of about 40 miles by the seacoast route. It was only a local
setback for the enemy, to be sure, but it had a heartening effect for
tired UN forces which had known only delaying actions so far.
It also added to the problems of staff officers at Camp Pendleton and
Pearl Harbor, since replacements must be sent to the Brigade. With
this in mind, the Commandant had begun the organization of the 1st
Replacement Draft of approximately 800 men on the date of Brigade
activation. These troops, however, were absorbed into the 1st Marine
Division when it expanded to war strength, as was a second draft (also
designated the 1st Replacement Draft) of 3,000 men.[50]
[50] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV:Zebra, 8–9.
On 3 August the 1st Marine Division was directed by FMFPac to send 10
officers and 290 enlisted men to the Brigade by airlift. This draft was
to be ready to move from Camp Pendleton by MATS planes on 9 August, but
not until five days later did it finally proceed to San Francisco by
rail and fly to Japan.
On the 23d another draft of 10 officers and 300 enlisted men from
Marine posts in Hawaii and Guam was sent by air to Japan, these
troops being replaced by the same number of noncombat-ready Marines
airlifted from Camp Pendleton. This process was twice repeated early
in September, when two more drafts totaling 20 officers and 590 men
flew to Japan to provide replacements and third companies for the 5th
Marines of the Brigade.[51]
[51] _Ibid._; Col A. L. Bowser ltr to CMC, 11 Feb 55.
Logistics offered as many problems as personnel at Camp Pendleton,
since both the Brigade and Division units had been on peace tables
of organization and equipment. The 30-day replenishment stock, held
in readiness for such an emergency, was also based on peace strength
tables. Thus it was found that the specification of “requirements” was
best determined in most instances by making out requisitions based on
the difference between T/E for peace and war.
Narrow time limits did not permit the assembly of supplies and
equipment delivered at Camp Pendleton under the relentless pressure
of urgent deadlines. FMFLant air and ground units arriving from Camp
Lejeune brought their own organization equipment, which was staged
through the Recruit Depot at San Diego. Much of the heavy equipment
from the Barstow, California, Annex, Depot of Supplies, was delivered
dockside and loaded without further inspection. Not until arrival at
Kobe, Japan, were such items as the LVTs finally given a mechanical
checkup.[52]
[52] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra, 18–22.
Ammunition was delivered from the depots to the Naval Station, San
Diego, for loading. The following units of fire were specified by
Division Embarkation Plan 1-50:
(1) 3 UF in hands of 1st Marines, LVT, tank, and artillery units;
1 UF in hands of all other units;
(2) 2 UF in hands of 1st Ordnance Bn for the 1st Marines, LVT,
tank, and artillery units;
(3) 4 UF in the hands of the 1st Ordnance Bn for other units.[53]
[53] 1st MarDiv _Embarkation Plan 1-50_, 6 Aug 50, Annex
Charlie.
Even after all items of initial supply had been assembled, the problem
was by no means solved. Since the Division and Wing would be operating
under Army and Air Force control, it became necessary to establish
a long-range policy for resupply. The best answer seemed to be the
procedure adopted by the Brigade, providing that the Army and Air Force
furnish all supplies not peculiar to the Marine Corps. The latter
would be provided by Marine or Navy agencies automatically in 30-day
increments, with 120 days of resupply allotted to ground units and
90 days to air units. Thereafter, supply was to be requisitioned as
needed. And in the lack of a service command as such, the G-4 section
of FMFPac was committed to the task of preparing and submitting
resupply requisitions for items in this category.[54]
[54] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra, 12.
Five hundred civilians were employed to help with the reconditioning of
motor transport and other heavy equipment which had been “in mothballs”
at Barstow since the end of World War II. Such items had to be put
through the shops in many instances and restored to operating condition
before delivery. The enormous supply depot in the California desert
erupted with activity as trains of flatcars and long columns of motor
trucks were routed to San Diego.
The actual loading and embarkation were conducted almost according to
schedule in spite of such handicaps as inadequate dock facilities,
the reception of supplies and equipment from a variety of sources, a
shortage of stevedores, and piecemeal assignments of shipping. Only 54
stevedore crews were available out of the 90 requested, and commercial
ships were necessary to supplement naval shipping. Nevertheless, the
loading began on 8 August and was completed by the 22d. The following
19 ships were employed to mount out the main body of the 1st Marine
Division:
LST 845; LSM 419; two APAs, the USS _Noble_ and USS _President
Jackson_; five APs, the USNS _General Buckner_, USNS _General
Weigel_, USS _Marine Phoenix_, USNS _General Meigs_ and USS _General
Butner_; and ten AKs, the SS _Dolly Thurman_, SS _Green Bay Victory_,
SS _Noonday_, SS _African Patriot_, SS _Twin Falls Victory_, SS
_Southwind_, SS _American Press_, SS _American Victory_, SS _Alma
Victory_, and SS _Belgian Victory_.[55]
[55] 1st Marine Division _Special Action Report for the
Inchon-Seoul Operation_, 20 Apr 51, sec. 1. (Hereafter,
1st MarDiv _SAR_.)
Generals Shepherd and Cates arrived for the main embarkation on the
13th and 14th respectively, accompanied by Major General Franklin
A. Hart and Brigadier General Edwin A. Pollock. While these general
officers were being acquainted with the progress made so far, the AKA
_Titania_ blew out two boilers after being about 20 percent loaded.
Since the repairs would require about ten days, a commercial freighter
was provided as a last-minute replacement.
_Build-up of 7th Marine Regiment_
One of the purposes of General Shepherd’s visit was to discuss with
General Cates the problems of organizing and embarking the 7th
Marines (Reinf.). The activation of this unit had been directed on 10
August 1950, when an officer of the G-1 Section, Headquarters FMFPac,
delivered orders to Camp Pendleton.[56]
[56] FMFPac _Operation Order (Opn O) 3-50_, 11 Aug 50.
This was the result of a change of mind on the part of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. After reconsideration, they decided that it would be
feasible to raise a third RCT much sooner than had at first seemed
possible, though not in time for MacArthur’s assault landing. Arrival
in Japan about 20 September seemed to be the earliest date that could
be managed.
Of the 17,162 eligible Marines at Camp Pendleton at that time, the
regulars in excess of those required to mount out between the 10th and
15th were placed in the rear echelon of the division as a cadre for the
third infantry regiment.[57] The following troops were made available
to draw upon for the formation of the 7th Marines:
[57] See Appendix B for the build-up of the 1st Marine
Division and Appendix C for the Task Organization.
Officers and men from 2d Marine Division 1,822
Officers and men of 3d Bn, 6th Marines in the Mediterranean 735
Officers and men of Marine Corps Reserve selected as
combat-ready 1,972
Officers and men of rear echelon of Division, and from posts
and stations 1,109
---------
Total [58]5,638
[58] This account of the build-up of the 7th Marines is based
on the summary in PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra,
pt. V.
Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg was designated as commanding officer on
the date of activation, 17 August 1950. The Chief of Naval Operations
directed the regiment to embark for the Far East not later than 3
September. These components were included in the build-up:
3d Battalion, 11th Marines; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion; Company D,
1st Engineer Battalion; Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion (including
two Shore Party communication teams from Signal Company, Signal
Battalion); Company D, 1st Motor Transport Battalion; Company E, 1st
Medical Battalion.
Forming the nucleus of the regiment, the 6th Marines, at peace strength
and less two battalions, arrived from Camp Lejeune on 16 August. The
3d Battalion of this FMFLant regiment, then stationed afloat in the
Mediterranean, was ordered to proceed through the Suez Canal to become
part of the 7th Marines upon arrival in Japan.
While the other elements were being absorbed at Camp Pendleton, a
conference attended by General Smith, Major General Alfred H. Noble,
and Colonel Litzenberg was held to discuss rear echelon personnel
and the formation of RCT-7. The following troops were found to be
available to take care of casuals and retain custody of such division
supplies and equipment as had not yet been embarked:
MARINE CORPS NAVY
----------------- -----------------
_Off._ _Enl._ _Off._ _Enl._
224 1,029 11 35
Not included in these figures were 197 noneffective enlisted personnel,
a rocket battery, a motor transport company, and the organizational
rear echelon of eight officers and 28 men. It was decided that General
Noble, as FMFPac representative, would examine MOSs, to determine
how many men would be transferred to the 7th Marines or retained for
FMF units to be activated later. The need was also foreseen for rear
echelon working parties to relieve personnel of units mounting out.[59]
[59] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 36–37.
_Staff Groups Flown to Japan_
Although the 1st Marine Division had enough problems at Camp Pendleton
to keep a full war-strength staff busy, several of the key members
were in Korea with the Brigade. The complete Division staff was never
integrated until after the landing at Inchon. On 7 August, however, a
dispatch from CinCFE requested that the “Commanding General, 1st Marine
Division, and planning group capable of developing Division embarkation
and landing plans be airlifted” to the Far East.[60]
[60] CinCFE disp to CinCPacFlt, 7 Aug 50, info CNO, CMC, CG
1st MarDiv, CG FMFPac, and ComNavFE.
General Smith decided that this flight could best be made in two
echelons. The first, which took off for Japan at 1400 on 16 August
1950, included a group of 12 officers and six enlisted men selected to
initiate planning:
_Officers_ _Enlisted_
G-2 Col B. T. Holcomb, Jr. TSgt W. O’Grady
Ass’t G-2 Maj J. G. Babashanian Cpl J. N. Lareau
G-3 Col A. L. Bowser, Jr. Sgt G. O. Davis, Jr.
Ass’t G-3 LtCol F. R. Moore
Ass’t G-4 LtCol C. T. Hodges
Ass’t Emb Off Capt R. E. Moody PFC H. J. McAvinue
Shore Pty Off Maj J. G. Dibble
Signal Off LtCol A. Creal Cpl L Shefchik
Ass’t G-1 LtCol B. D. Godbold
Fire Sup Coord LtCol D. E. Reeve SSgt P. Richardson
Naval Gunfire Off LtCol L. S. Fraser
Air Off Capt W. F. Jacobs
General Smith stayed at Camp Pendleton for two more days until he
was assured that the main body of the Division had sailed. Then he
accompanied the second echelon of planners which departed by air at
1410 on 18 August:
_Officers_ _Enlisted_
CG MajGen O. P. Smith
C/S Col G. A. Williams Cpl C. V. Irwin
Aide to CG Capt M. J. Sexton PFC W. D. Grove
G-1 Col H. S. Walseth Cpl W. P. Minette
Ass’t Signal Off Capt A. J. Gunther MSgt F. J. Stumpges
G-4 Col F. M. McAlister
Engineer Off Maj E. P. Moses, Jr.
Embark Off Maj J. M. Rouse
Amtrac Off Maj A. J. Barrett
Motor Trans Off Maj H. W. Seeley, Jr.
Ordnance Off Maj L. O. Williams[61]
[61] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 37–38.
The departure of the commanding general coincided with the closing of
the Division CP at Camp Pendleton. There were still several thousand
Marines of the rear echelon left under the control of General Noble in
the sprawling installation, but the brown California hills looked down
upon a scene of strange and brooding quiet as compared to the activity
of the past three weeks.
It was D-minus 28 for the men of the 1st Marine Division.
CHAPTER III
Operation Plan CHROMITE
_Interview with General MacArthur--Conferences in Tokyo--Inception of X
Corps--Final Conference on Inchon--Brigade Victory in Korea--The Marine
Amphibious Mission_
The scars of war heal rapidly. From the air General Smith could see
jungle covering the battlefields of Guam. Iwo Jima looked as untouched
as if it had never been the scene of Marine casualties exceeding the
losses of the Union army at Gettysburg. Even fire-blasted Tokyo had
recovered to a surprising extent from the terrible bombings of 1945.
Now, five years later, the United States had entered upon a new
military effort. As the Marine general landed at Haneda Airfield on the
afternoon of 22 August 1950, he was met by Admiral Doyle and driven to
the _Mount McKinley_, tied up at the dock in Tokyo harbor. And though
assigned to the cabin reserved for the landing force commander, CG 1st
MarDiv found it an ironical circumstance that he did not yet know the
prospective D-day and H-hour of the landing.[62]
[62] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 22 Aug 50.
He had not long to wait for such data. The advance section of the
Marine planning group being already aboard the _Mount McKinley_, he was
quickly informed by Colonel Bowser, the G-3 of the incomplete Division
staff. D-day at Inchon had been tentatively set for 15 September, and
the landing must be made during the high tide of late afternoon. It
meant assaulting a port of 250,000 prewar population over the mud flats
and seawalls, with little opportunity to consolidate positions before
nightfall. Nor would there be time for training and rehearsals, since
the troops would reach Japan barely in time to unload and reload in
amphibious shipping before proceeding to the objective area.
General Smith learned further that a new command structure, to be known
as X Corps, was being hastily erected by FECOM especially for the
operation. No announcement had been made of a project still classified
as Top Secret, but it was known to the planning group that General
Almond would command a corps not yet activated. The 1st Marine Division
would be under his control as the landing force.
Admiral Doyle, an old hand at amphibious warfare, was not happy about
Inchon when he considered the naval aspects. Initiated at Guadalcanal
and Tulagi in 1942, he had taken part in some rugged ship-to-shore
assaults of World War II. Afterwards, as Commander of Amphibious
Shipping for the Pacific Fleet, he had made a career of it. And Admiral
Doyle considered Inchon a hard nut to crack. He refused to admit that
any amphibious operation was impossible as long as the United States
Navy remained afloat, but he did maintain that Inchon bristled with
risks.
In twenty minutes that Tuesday afternoon General Smith heard enough
to convince him that the forthcoming assault would take a great deal
of doing. But there was no time for discussion. For at 1730, just two
hours after stepping from his plane, he had an appointment with the
commander in chief.
_Interview with General MacArthur_
Arriving on the minute at the Dai Ichi building, General Smith
reported to FECOM Headquarters. He was met by an aide, who escorted
him to General Almond’s office. On the way down echoing corridors,
he responded at frequent intervals to the salutes of sentries who
presented arms with fixed bayonets.[63]
[63] This section is based upon: O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 45–51,
_Chronicle_, 22 Aug 50, and interv. 13 Jan 55.
The offices of CinCFE and his chief of staff were connected by an
imposing conference room with paneled walls and pillars along one side.
General Smith had an opportunity to survey his surroundings at leisure
before General Almond appeared. The new X Corps commander explained
that his chief had a habit of taking a long afternoon break and would
arrive later.
Of medium height and stocky build, Almond gave the impression at the
age of 58 of a buoyant temperament and restless energy. A native
Virginian and graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, he had been
an ETO division commander in World War II. After joining MacArthur’s
staff, he became one of the most loyal officers of a group noted for
devotion to their famous chief.
Almond greeted the reserved, white-haired Marine general cordially. He
launched at once into the topic of the Inchon operation, expressing the
utmost confidence in the ability of the UN forces to prevail.
It was the initial contact of the two men. Mutual respect was not
lacking, but differences in temperament made it inevitable that these
generals would not always see eye to eye. History teaches that this is
by no means a deplorable situation when kept within reasonable bounds.
Character can be as decisive a factor as logistics, and some of the
greatest victories of the ages have been won by colleagues who did not
agree at times. Friction, in fact, is more likely to sharpen than to
blunt military intellects; and Smith’s precision had potentialities of
being a good counterpoise for Almond’s energy.
While they were discussing the tactical problems, the commander in
chief returned to his office. He summoned his chief of staff for a
brief conference, then requested that Smith be presented.
MacArthur shook hands warmly, grasping the Marine general’s elbow with
his left hand. Without the celebrated “scrambled eggs” cap, he looked
his 70 years in moments of fatigue, but the old fire and dash were
not lacking. The very simplicity of his attire--shirtsleeves and open
collar--made a dramatic contrast to the military pomp and ceremony
surrounding him in this former Japanese commercial building, one of the
few earthquake-proof and air-conditioned structures in Tokyo.
In a cigarette-smoking age, both MacArthur and Smith preferred the
calm comfort of a pipe. The commander in chief lit up and puffed
reflectively a moment. Then he leaned back in his chair and gave his
concept of the Inchon operation. But it was more than a concept in the
usual military sense; it was a vision of a victory potent enough to end
the Korean conflict at a stroke. And it was more than confidence which
upheld him; it was a supreme and almost mystical faith that he could
not fail.
He granted, of course, that there were difficulties and risks.
Evidently Almond had mentioned Smith’s reservations, for he proceeded
to reassure the Marine general. His voice full of feeling, he expressed
his deep conviction that the war could be won in a month at Inchon,
and that the 1st Marine Division could win it. The enemy, he explained,
had committed nearly all of his troops in the Pusan Perimeter. Thus the
Marines would not be heavily opposed when they stormed ashore at Inchon
and drove inland to cut the main NKPA line of communications at Seoul.
MacArthur said he knew that the Marines had high standards, having
commanded them in the New Britain operations of the last war. He
realized that the Marines strove for perfection, and the Inchon landing
was bound to be somewhat helter-skelter by the very nature of things.
But there was no doubt, he affirmed, that the victory soon to be gained
by the 1st Marine Division would make 15 September 1950 a glorious date
in American history.
His voice was charged with fervor as it rose and fell eloquently. Once
General Smith made a move as if to depart, but the commander in chief
motioned him back to his chair. At last he brought the conversation to
a close by standing suddenly, grasping the Marine general’s hand, and
bidding him a cordial good-bye.
_Conferences in Tokyo_
It was sometimes an awkward situation for Navy and Marine officers in
general, and Admiral Doyle and General Smith in particular. In many
respects they appeared doubters and pessimists in contrast to FECOM
staff officers who reflected General MacArthur’s shining confidence.
But as amphibious specialists, carrying a heavy load of responsibility
for the landing, they had to give serious thought to the risks at
Inchon.
This was brought home forcibly to the Marine general on the morning of
the 23d, when he attended a meeting conducted by Major General Clark L.
Ruffner, Chief of Staff of the future X Corps. Although the conference
proceeded according to the usual form, General Smith felt that it
departed at times from the realism which he considered an essential of
sound amphibious planning. It was announced, for instance, that after
taking Inchon, the 1st Marine Division was to cross the Han and attack
Seoul, although X Corps had neither equipment nor materiel for bridging
the sizeable river.[64]
[64] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23 Aug 50.
A review of the background disclosed that after CinCFE decided on 10
July not to use the 1st Cavalry Division as his landing force, he
briefly considered two other Army outfits. The 2d Infantry Division,
commanded by Major General Lawrence B. Keiser, was then under orders
to embark from the West Coast. Some of the personnel had been given
amphibious training by an ANGLICO instruction team and had taken part
in Operation MIKI, but the division as a whole was much understrength.
The same difficulty led to the elimination of Major General David G.
Barr’s 7th Infantry Division in Japan, which had supplied troops to
units at the front until only a cadre remained.
The assurance on 25 July of a war-strength Marine division took care
of the _who_ question. Next came the problems of _when_ and _where_
an amphibious assault could be best mounted. JANIS (Joint Army and
Navy Intelligence Studies) reports indicated that the east coast of
Korea, though of lesser importance in military respects, offered such
hydrographic advantages as unusually moderate tides and a general
absence of shoals. In forbidding contrast, the shallow west coast
waters could be navigated at most points only by means of narrow
channels winding through the mud flats.[65]
[65] JANIS No. 75, ch. IV, _Theater Study, Korean Coast and
Beaches_.
Of all the west coast seaports, Inchon was probably the least desirable
objective when considered strictly from the viewpoint of hydrographic
conditions. From first to last, however, Inchon was Douglas MacArthur’s
choice. FECOM staff officers ventured to suggest two alternatives,
Wonsan on the east coast and Kunsan on the west coast, but the
commander in chief replied that neither was close enough to the enemy’s
main line of communications to suit his purposes. He would settle for
nothing less than Inchon.
So much for the place. As to the time, the choice was even more
limited. The tidal range varied from an average spring tide[66] height
of 23 feet to an occasional maximum of 33 feet. Landing craft required
a tide of 25 feet to navigate the mud flats of the harbor, and the LSTs
must have 29 feet. Only during a few days in the middle of September
and October were those depths provided by spring tides of the next 12
weeks. MacArthur rejected an October date as being too late in the
season, so that 15 September became D-day by virtue of elimination.
[66] A spring tide is a higher than normal tide caused by the
sun and moon being in conjunction or opposition, as at
new moon and full moon. Conversely, when the moon is at
first or third quarter the tide (neap tide) is smaller
than usual.
A late afternoon H-hour was also a choice of necessity. Islands, reefs,
and shoals restricted the approach to the outer harbor, and currents
ranging from three to six knots multiplied the chances of confusion.
This meant that daylight landings were necessary for all but small
groups.
Much of the inner harbor was a vast swamp at low water, penetrated by a
single dredged channel 12 to 13 feet deep.[67] The duration of spring
tides above the prescribed minimum depth averaged about three hours,
and during this interval the maximum in troops and supplies must be put
ashore. Every minute counted, since initial landing forces could not be
reinforced or supplied until the next high water period.
[67] JANIS No. 75, ch. V.
Time and tide seemed to have combined forces to protect Inchon from
seaborne foes. As if such natural obstacles were not enough, the
target area provided others. Two islands, Wolmi-do and Sowolmi-do,
located in a commanding position between the inner and outer harbors,
were linked to each other and to Inchon by a causeway. In advance of
intelligence reports, it must be assumed that rocky, wooded Wolmi-do
would be honeycombed with hidden emplacements for enough guns to create
a serious menace for the landing craft.
This critical terrain feature must somehow be reduced as a preliminary
to the main landing during the high tide of late afternoon. Inchon
being situated on a hilly promontory, the “beaches” were mere narrow
strips of urban waterfront, protected by seawalls too high for ramps
to be dropped at any stage of the tide. Once past these barriers, the
troops would have about two hours of daylight in which to secure an
Oriental city with a population comparable to that of Omaha.
But the amphibious assault was only the first phase of the operation as
conceived by CinCFE. After taking Inchon the landing force had the task
of driving some 16 miles inland, without loss of momentum, to assault
Korea’s largest airfield before crossing a tidal river to assault
Korea’s largest city.
And even this ambitious undertaking was not the whole show. For a
joint operation was to be carried out meanwhile by Eighth Army forces
thrusting northward from the Pusan Perimeter to form a junction with
the units of the Inchon-Seoul drive. This double-barreled assault, it
was believed, would shatter North Korean resistance and put an end to
the war.
_Inception of X Corps_
The time, the place, the landing force, the main objectives--these
essentials of the proposed Inchon-Seoul operation had been pretty well
settled, at least to General MacArthur’s satisfaction, by the first
week of August. But even though he had his assault troops, there was as
yet no headquarters organization.
Admiral Sherman urged early in August that the commander in chief call
upon General Shepherd and the facilities of the FMFPac organization at
Pearl Harbor. Since there was so little time left before D-day--only a
fraction of the time usually allotted to the planning phase of a major
ship to shore assault--he felt that amphibious know-how and experience
were required. He proposed, therefore, that steps be taken to obtain
the approval of Admiral Radford, who had jurisdiction over FMFPac.
The need for a headquarters organization was discussed on 7 August
by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) of FECOM.
Brigadier General Wright, G-3 of FECOM, received a memorandum from the
other members of the staff recommending that the gap be filled in one
of two ways--either by putting into effect Admiral Sherman’s plan, or
by sponsoring the organization of a provisional corps headquarters.
General Wright favored the first course of action, as did Brigadier
General Doyle G. Hickey, FECOM deputy chief of staff. Ultimately,
however, the FECOM chief of staff decided in favor of the latter
command arrangement.[68]
[68] OCMH, Dept of Army (Maj J. F. Schnabel), _The Korean
Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I.
_Final Conference on Inchon_
The questions of _when_ and _where_ and _who_ had been answered to some
extent. But as late as 23 August, a good many variations of opinion
existed as to _how_ the amphibious assault was to be accomplished.
The natural obstacles of the Inchon harbor area were so disturbing
that Doyle suggested an alternative to MacArthur and Almond. Since
the purpose of the landing was to drive inland and cut the enemy’s
communications, urged ComPhibGru One, why not select a west coast
objective with fewer hydrographic difficulties? He proposed the
Posung-Myon area, about 30 miles south of Inchon on the west coast,
where better approach channels and beaches were believed to be
available in a more lightly populated locality. A landing at this
point, Doyle contended, would not be attended by the risks and
restrictions of Inchon, yet after securing a beachhead the troops would
be in position to strike inland at the enemy’s main line of rail and
highway communications in the vicinity of Osan.[69]
[69] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23 Aug 50, _Notes_, 51–52.
A _myon_ is comparable to our county, being a Korean
political subdivision containing several towns or
villages.
Smith was favorably impressed. He brought up the subject on 23 August,
when he and Barr had a meeting with Almond. The X Corps commander did
not concur, though conceding that Posung-Myon had possibilities as an
area for a subsidiary landing in connection with the Inchon assault.
Nor was Doyle able to obtain MacArthur’s consent to the alternate
objective.
It was the Marine general’s third conference of the day. From the X
Corps meeting he had gone directly to the regular conference at GHQ,
and thence to the talk with Almond and Barr. He came away from all
three meetings with the conviction that CinCFE and his staff were
not to be swerved by his objections. It was definitely to be Inchon
on 15 September, and Smith instructed his planning group to proceed
accordingly.
Doyle made a last attempt at 1730 that afternoon to present a
comprehensive picture of the risks and difficulties inherent at Inchon.
This final conference on the subject of a west coast landing was
attended by some of the nation’s highest ranking officers--General J.
Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief
of Naval Operations; General Shepherd, CG FMFPac; Lieutenant General
Idwal H. Edwards, U. S. Air Force; as well as other high-ranking
staff officers who had flown out from Washington. It was no secret in
Tokyo military circles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present
for the purpose of studying General MacArthur’s plans for the Inchon
landing. It was also generally known that doubts and misgivings had
been expressed at various times when the project was discussed at the
Pentagon. General Collins stated candidly at a later date that the
purpose of his Tokyo visit was “... to find out exactly what the plans
were. Frankly, we were somewhat in the dark, and as it was a matter of
great concern, we went out to discuss it with General MacArthur. We
suggested certain alternate possibilities and places....”[70]
[70] MacArthur Hearings, 1295, quoted by Major Schnabel in
_The Korean Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I.
Admirals Joy and Doyle also attended the meeting, and FECOM was
represented by Generals Almond, Ruffner, and Wright. The conference
room on the sixth floor of the Dai Ichi building proved too small
for the audience, and members of the PhibGru One team had to wait
their turn in Almond’s adjoining office. One by one, at eight-minute
intervals, Doyle’s officers took turns at being presented to MacArthur,
who listened gravely while puffing at his pipe. The following
amphibious specialists were heard:
Cdr Edmund S. L. Marshall, USN Navigation
Lt Charles R. Barron, USN Aerology
LtCol William E. Benedict, USMC Military Aspects
LCdr Jack L. Lowentrout, USN Beach Study
LCdr M. Ted Jacobs, Jr., USN Seabees Pontoon Causeway Plans
LCdr Clyde E. Allmon, USN Ship to Shore Plans
LCdr Arlie G. Capps, USN Gunfire Support
Cdr Theophilus H. Moore, USN Air Support[71]
[71] The description of the conference has been derived from:
LCdr Frank A. Manson (USN) interv, 22 Apr 52; Capt
Walter Karig (USNR), _et al._, _Battle Report: The War
in Korea_ (New York, 1952), 165–168 (hereafter, Karig,
_Korea_); VAdm Arthur D. Struble ltr to authors, 25 Apr
55.
The officers spoke of the natural obstacles. They asserted that it
would be the peak of optimism to hope for a strategic surprise at
Inchon, for the enemy also knew that only a few days each autumn month
offered a tidal range sufficient to float the landing craft and supply
ships over the mud flats of the harbor.
They contended that even a tactical surprise was out of the question,
since Wolmi-do must be neutralized before landings could be made on the
mainland. Otherwise, the vulnerable column of landing craft would be
exposed to a slaughter from the flanking fire of the island’s guns.
The Navy group pointed out further that it must also be assumed that
the enemy would not neglect a good opportunity to sow both moored and
magnetic mines in the channels the shipping must take. And to cap all
the other natural and man-made risks, there was danger at the height
of the typhoon season that Nature would intervene and scatter the
amphibious armada during its approach to the objective area.
The presentation lasted for nearly an hour and a half. At the
conclusion, Admiral Doyle summed up by giving his opinion. “The best
I can say,” he told the commander in chief, “is that Inchon is not
impossible.”
General MacArthur heard the amphibious specialists to a finish without
his imperturbability being shaken. Even the onlookers who could not
partake of his perfect faith were impressed. There was something
magnificent about this old warrior in shirtsleeves and open collar,
calmly smoking his pipe while hearing his plan dissected. Daring and
optimism are supposed to be the exclusive prerogatives of youth, yet
this smiling septuagenarian was not only the oldest officer at the
conference, he was also the most confident and assured! After the
PhibGru One presentation ended, he took 45 minutes for his comments.
Speaking with eloquence, he declared that the natural obstacles and
practical difficulties of the proposed Inchon operation were more than
balanced in the strategic scale by the psychological advantages of a
bold stroke. About 90 percent of the NKPA forces were fighting in the
Pusan Perimeter. A combined offensive by X Corps and the Eighth Army
would have the effect of placing the enemy between the hammer and anvil.
Referring to the Kunsan landing favored by General Collins and Admiral
Sherman, CinCFE asserted that this objective was too far south for a
fatal blow to be dealt the invaders. He cited a historical precept in
Wolfe’s victory at Quebec, made possible by audacity in overcoming
natural obstacles that the enemy regarded as insurmountable. He
recalled the amphibious victories he himself had won in the Southwest
Pacific, with the Navy and sometimes the Marine Corps sharing in
the glory. And he ended on a dramatic note with a single, prophetic
sentence spoken in a tense voice:
“We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them!”[72]
[72] Karig, _Korea_, 165–168.
As the officers filed out into the noisy, teeming Tokyo street, most
of them felt certain that the last word had been said. It was still
possible, of course, for the Joint Chiefs to overrule CinCFE; and
it was not likely that all of their doubts had been laid to rest.
Nevertheless, the Navy and Marine planners proceeded on the basis that
a final decision had been reached that August afternoon.
_Brigade Victory in Korea_
Before his arrival at Tokyo, General Shepherd had paid a flying visit
to the headquarters of the Brigade in Korea immediately after the
Marines stormed and seized Obong-ni Ridge. Just as General Craig’s
men had taken part from 7 to 13 August in the first sustained UN
counterattack, so this Army and Marine effort a week later became the
first rout of a major NKPA unit. After putting up a fierce struggle
to hold their bridgehead on the east bank of the river Naktong, the
veteran troops of the NKPA 4th Division were shattered by repeated
Marine attacks. Carrier-borne Corsairs of MAG-33 had a turkey shoot at
the expense of panic stricken enemy soldiers who abandoned their arms
in a wild flight. Some of the fugitives were shot down while trying to
swim the river.
Despite this encouraging little victory, it was still nip and tuck on
the central front of the Pusan Perimeter. With the U. S. 2d Infantry
Division and 5th RCT now in line, the Eighth Army strategy of trading
space for time had resulted in whittling down the enemy’s material
superiority. But the invaders still held the material advantage, and
there were signs that they would soon launch an all-out effort to smash
through to Pusan.
_The Marine Amphibious Mission_
General Shepherd, after being informed as to the Tokyo conferences,
accompanied General Smith on the morning of 24 August to a meeting with
Admirals Sherman, Radford, Joy, and Doyle. It was generally agreed that
not enough weight had been given to amphibious considerations in the
final decision to attack at Inchon. Navy opinion held that one more
attempt should be made to propose another landing point with fewer
hydrographic objections. The area south of Inchon had been investigated
by Navy UDT and Marine amphibious scouts of the Reconnaissance Company,
1st Marine Division, who had sailed to the Far East with the Brigade.
As a preliminary, this group had embarked on the USS _Horace A. Bass_
(APD-124) and gone ashore undetected to stage several raids during the
period 12–16 August on the enemy’s main line of communications along
the west coast. Three tunnels and two railway bridges were destroyed
without the loss of a man.[73]
[73] CTF 90 _Opn O 13-50_, in PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_,
XV:Able, 6.
Next the raiders successfully carried out a survey and reconnaissance
of available landing beaches during the period 22–25 August in the
Posung-Myon area. Their findings impressed General Shepherd so much
that before his departure from Tokyo he called on CinCFE to make a
last plea for reconsideration of the landing area. General MacArthur,
however, remained firm in his preference for Inchon.[74]
[74] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 24 Aug 50.
The meeting of the admirals and Marine generals on the 24th broke up
with a general agreement that the decision as to Inchon on 15 September
must be accepted as the basis for final planning. That same afternoon
General Smith instructed his planning group to begin work on a scheme
of maneuver.
Modern amphibious tactics were in their infancy during World War I
when an appalling object lesson seemed to have been left by the Allied
disaster at Gallipoli in 1915–16. Brilliant in strategic conception,
this major amphibious operation might have knocked Turkey out of
the war and opened the unlocked back door of Austria and Germany.
Unfortunately, the execution fell short; and the failure was too often
charged to amphibious warfare itself rather than a wholesale violation
of its basic principles.
In 1920 the new Marine Corps Schools at Quantico became the center
of Marine amphibious study and research. Marine units participated
in fleet problems at Panama and Culebra during the post-war years;
and in 1927 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy (forerunner of JCS)
stated in a directive that the Marine Corps had the mission of “special
preparation in the conduct of landing operations.”[75]
[75] BrigGen Eli K. Cole, “Joint Overseas Operation,” _US
Naval Institute Proceedings_, 55, No. 11 (Nov 29):927.
During the early 1920s the writings of a brilliant Marine officer,
Major Earl H. Ellis, had a tremendous influence on current amphibious
thought. Predicting that Japan would strike first in the Pacific and
win initial successes, he drew up a strategic plan for assaults on
Japanese-mandated islands which was approved by Major General John
A. Lejeune, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Later known as Operation
Plan No. 712, this Top Secret document helped to shape the ORANGE
plans adopted by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy for offensive
operations against Japan if it came to war.
After making good progress in the early 1920s, with landing exercises
being held annually, the Marine amphibious program bogged down from
1927 to 1932 because of the necessity of sending expeditionary forces
to China and Nicaragua. The turning point came in 1933, a memorable
date in the evolution of modern amphibious warfare. It was then that
Major General John H. Russell, Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps, urged that a staff be set up at Quantico to plan for the
organization of a mobile Marine striking force. This force, under the
Commandant, and fully prepared for service with the fleet, was to be
in readiness for tactical employment subject to the orders of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Navy. General Russell further proposed that
the old name “Expeditionary Force” be discontinued and “Fleet Marine
Force” adopted as a name better expressing this mission.[76]
[76] J. A. Isely and P. A. Crowl, _The U. S. Marines and
Amphibious War_ (Princeton, 1951), 21–24, 33–34.
After the acceptance of these recommendations, the Commandant ordered
classes discontinued at the Marine Corps Schools and a concerted
effort applied to the preparation of a new amphibious manual. Both the
Army and Navy had treated some of the procedures in existing manuals,
but it remained for the Marine Corps in 1934 to put out the first
complete work of the sort. Known as the _Tentative Manual on Landing
Operations_, it became either directly or indirectly the guide for
exercises and maneuvers of the Navy and Marine Corps down to World War
II.
Most of its suggested procedures were endorsed with revisions in the
Navy’s _Fleet Training Publication 167_, published in 1938. This work
in its turn became the model three years later for the Army’s first
basic field manual for landing operations.[77]
[77] FMFPac, _History_, 6–9.
Training exercises were held every year, usually at Culebra or Vieques
in the Caribbean and San Clemente Island off San Diego. At the
suggestion of the Fleet Marine Force, the Navy purchased Bloodsworth
Island in Chesapeake Bay as the first amphibious gunfire range used for
that purpose alone.
Schools were set up to train Army and Navy as well as Marine officers
as specialists in fire control parties. Air support was closely
integrated with naval gunfire, shore artillery, and troop movements.
Technology came to the aid of tactics when the Fleet Marine Force
encouraged and supervised the designing of strange new amphibious craft
and vehicles. Concepts were actually based in several instances on
landing craft not yet developed and the confidence of the Marine Corps
in American inventiveness proved to be justified.
Thus the Nation entered World War II with a system of offensive tactics
which opened Europe, Africa, and the islands of the Pacific to American
invasion without incurring a single major defeat. Not only was the
United States ahead of the enemy in the development of amphibious
operations but the Axis Powers never found the key to an adequate
defense. In an often quoted summary, the British military critic and
historian, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, has asserted that these
techniques were “in all probability ... the most far-reaching tactical
innovation of the war.”[78]
[78] MajGen J. F. C. Fuller, _The Second World War_ (London,
1948), 207.
During the next few years the Marine Corps was twice officially given
the major responsibility for American amphibious tactics. The National
Security Act of 1947 made it the function of the Corps “to provide
fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air
components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of
advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”[79]
[79] 61 _U. S. Stat. at L._ (1947), 495.
At the so-called Key West Conference the following spring (March 11–14,
1948), the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff restated the
Marine Corps’ mission to include that of developing “in coordination
with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the tactics, technique,
and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The
Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those
landing force tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common
interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.”[80]
[80] OAFIE, OSD, _The United States Marine Corps_
(Washington, 1950). (Armed Forces Talk No. 317.)
During these post-war years, the Marine Corps was grappling with the
new amphibious problems posed by atomic weapons. It was fitting,
therefore, that the three men who formed the Special Board for this
research--Generals Shepherd, Harris, and Smith--should have been at the
forefront in 1950 when the Marine Corps faced its next amphibious test.
As veterans of World War II operations, they could recall the scramble
for the beaches of Bougainville, the fight for Bloody Nose on Peleliu,
the off-the-cuff landing on Oroku Peninsula in Okinawa. There had been
some tense moments in those battles, but never had Marine generals
contemplated an objective which held more potentialities for trouble
than the harbor area at Inchon.
CHAPTER IV
The Planning Phase
_Working Around the Clock--X Corps Scheme of Maneuver--Intelligence
Planning for Inchon--The Landing Force Plan--Naval Gunfire and
Rockets--Plans for Air Support_
The champion globe-trotters of the 1st Marine Division were the men of
the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Before returning to their homes from
Korea, these military tourists would have traveled entirely around the
world by various forms of land, water, and air transportation.
The unit was originally an element of the 6th Marines, FMFLant, serving
afloat with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. On 12 August 1950
the CP aboard the USS _Yellowstone_ at Suda Bay, Crete, received a
message from CNO ordering the battalion to the Far East. Lieutenant
Colonel Frederick R. Dowsett, deputy commander, noted that the dispatch
had bypassed such channels as CMC and the Sixth Fleet.[81] This
irregularity, he learned later, was explained by the urgency of an
order which had been framed by Admiral Sherman while General Cates was
present. It directed that the APA _Bexar_ arrive on 14 August at Suda
Bay and depart two days later with the troops.
[81] The battalion commander, Colonel Reynolds H. Hayden, had
a deputy because of the administrative set-up within the
Sixth Fleet and did not accompany the unit to the Far
East.
The rub was that these Marines were dispersed on various ships all over
the Mediterranean.
Given the rush job of picking up the scattered elements of the
battalion was the USS _Leyte_, which was due to return to Norfolk for
refitting afterwards and thence to the Far East via the Panama Canal.
Not only did the carrier complete its assignment before the deadline,
but the _Bexar_ also arrived at Suda Bay on the evening of the 14th.
Both ships had hardly dropped anchor when the LCVPs and LCMs were
shuttling troops and cargo to the transport and the AKA _Montague_,
which was to accompany it to the Far East.[82]
[82] This description is based upon: Col F. R. Dowsett
interv, 2 Nov 54.
On the 16th the two vessels departed according to schedule by way
of Port Said and the Suez Canal. Security regulations were rigidly
enforced, with only one stop being made when the vessels anchored at
Ceylon for six hours to take on fuel. Marine officers were figuratively
as well as literally at sea, since they had no idea of the specific
mission awaiting the battalion in the Far East. Unaware of plans for
the Inchon landing, they envisioned the troops being employed as the
ship-based raiding party of some American task force.
Meanwhile their future teammates of the 7th Marines were preparing to
embark from San Diego. Colonel Litzenberg and his officers had made
a good start at Camp Pendleton even before the activation date of 17
August 1950. In order to build up from cadres of former 6th Marines’
troops, this regiment received the largest proportion of combat-ready
reservists of any major unit in the 1st Marine Division--about 50
per cent, counting the augmentation personnel to bring 3/6 up to war
strength when it would be taken into the outfit in Japan.[83]
[83] Giusti, II-5.
CNO had set 3 September as the date of embarkation. But Headquarters,
FMFPac, prepared the embarkation plans while the regimental staff
solved problems of organization and equipment so effectively that
the 7th Marines sailed on the 1st, thus beating the deadline by two
days.[84]
[84] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Zebra, 15.
Orders came to El Toro on 16 August for the overseas movement of
the remaining elements of the 1st MAW. Units affected were Wing
Headquarters Squadron 1 and MAG-12, comprising Headquarters Squadron
12, Service Squadron 12, VMF-312, VMF-212, VMF(N)-542, and the rear
echelon of VMF(N)-513.
VMF-312 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)-513 were loaded on the USS
_Sitkoh Bay_ with their aircraft and sailed on 24 August. Three days
later VMF-212 and VMF(N)-542 embarked on the USS _Cape Esperance_, and
the USNS _General Morton_ weighed anchor with the remaining components
on 1 September.[85] This completed the overseas movement of the 1st
MAW, since General Harris and his staff had departed from El Toro by
air for Japan the day before.
[85] _Ibid._, XV: Charlie Charlie, 4.
_Working Around the Clock_
The first echelon of the 1st Marine Division planning group had its
preliminary briefing on 19 August, and the tractor elements of the
Attack Force were scheduled to sail for the objective area on 9
September. This left an interval of 20 days for most of the Inchon
planning--probably the shortest period ever allotted to a major
amphibious assault.
Less than one-fourth of the officers and men of the 1st Marine Division
staff were on the _Mount McKinley_ when planning commenced. At that
time the distribution of the staff was as follows:
---------------------------+--------+----------+--------+------
|With the|Aboard |En route|
|1st Prov|USS _Mount|by sea |Total
|Mar Brig|McKinley_ |to Japan|
|in Korea|in Tokyo | |
---------------------------+--------+----------+--------+------
| | | |
Div Cdr Section | | 2 | | 2
Asst Div Cdr Section | 2 | | | 2
Chief of Staff Section | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4
General Staff Section: | | | |
G-1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5
G-2 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 11
G-3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5
G-4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6
Special Staff Section: | | | |
Adjutant | | 4 | 7 | 11
Air & Air Observers | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5
Amph Trac | [a]1 | [a]1 | | 2
Anti-Tank | [b]1 | | 1 | 1
Armored Amtracs | | | [a]1 | 1
Artillery | [a]1 | [a]1 | [a]1 | 3
Chaplains | [b]1 | | 1 | 1
Chem War & Radiol Def | | | 1 | 1
Dental | [b]1 | | 1 | 1
Embarkation | [b]1 | 2 | 1 | 3
Engineer | | [a]1 | |
Food Director | | | 1 | 1
Hq Comdr | [a]1 | | [a]2 | 3
Inspector | | | 2 | 2
Legal | [b]1 | | 1 | 1
Liaison | 3 | | | 3
Medical | 2 | | 1 | 3
Mtr Trans | 1 | 1 | | 2
Nav Gunfire | | 1 | | 1
Ordnance | [b]1 | 1 | | 1
Post Ex | | | [a]1 | 1
Pub Info | [b]1 | | 1 | 1
Prov Marshal | | | [a]1 | 1
Shore Party | | [a]1 | | 1
Signal | 6 | 2 | | 8
Spec Serv | [b]1 | | 3 | 3
Sup & Disb | [b]2 | | 9 | 9
Tank | [b]1 | | [a]1 | 1
+--------+----------+--------+------
Total | 33 | 23 | 51 | 107
---------------------------+--------+----------+--------+------
[a] Carried in other Brigade, Division, or Force units.
[b] Additional duty basis; not counted in total.[86]
[86] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 54–55.
The Marine planners aboard the _Mount McKinley_ were short on elbow
room as well as personnel, time, and equipment. Although it was an
advantage to have the planning groups of the Attack Force and Landing
Force together, the ship did not provide enough space for both without
crowding. Moreover, the already undermanned Marine contingent had to
be further reduced late in August by sending several officers to Kobe
to meet incoming units. Thus the G-2 section, to cite one example,
consisted of only two officers, one of whom was detached on this duty
for a week.
“The issuance of and adherence to a planning schedule was utterly
impossible,” commented the 1st Marine Division report. “Only by a
virtual ‘around the clock’ working day, concurrent ... planning by
Attack Force (ComPhibGru One) and Landing Force (1st MarDiv), willing
teamwork by both, and especially the amphibious ‘know-how’ of key staff
members gained by long experience, was it possible to complete and
issue ... plans and orders for a most difficult ... landing operation.
The time-space factor denied any coordinated orientation, prohibited
even the most elementary rehearsal, made it difficult to distribute
orders, and gave subordinate units very little time for formulation and
distribution of their plans.”[87]
[87] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, basic rpt.
Command relationships during the embarkation and assault phases were as
follows:
+------+
+-----------+CinCFE+-------------+
| +------+ |
+---+----+ +----+-----+
+----+ComNavFe+--------+ |CG X Corps|
| +--------+ | +----------+
| |
+------+-------+ +------+------+
|ComPhibGru One| |CG 1st MarDiv|
+--------------+ +-------------+
All the top commanders were concentrated in Tokyo with the arrival
of Admiral Struble on 25 August. This facilitated the planning and
allowed important decisions to be worked out in conferences between the
principal commanders.[88]
[88] Struble ltr, 25 Apr 55.
Planning was based mainly on studies made by ComPhibGru One as
prospective Attack Force Commander. It was conducted entirely on a
concurrent basis by the Attack Force and Landing Force groups aboard
the _Mount McKinley_. No step was taken by either without the full
knowledge and consent of the other.
_X Corps Scheme of Maneuver_
Army planning had been initiated by the Joint Strategic Plans and
Operations Group until 16 August, when the “Special Planning Staff”
was set up at GHQ to issue directives for Operation Plan CHROMITE.
Published on 12 August as CinCFE Operation Plan No. 100-B, it was based
on these assumptions:
(a) that the North Korean ground advance would be stopped in time to
permit the build-up of our forces in South Korea;
(b) that our forces in South Korea would be built up to the
capability of mounting effective offensive operations against
NKPA forces opposing them;
(c) that we retain air and naval supremacy in the area of operation;
(d) that the NKPA ground forces would not receive major
reinforcements from the USSR or Red China;
(e) that there would be no major change in the basic disposition of
the NKPA forces.[89]
[89] MarCorps Board _Study_, v. II-B, 13–17.
It was understood from the beginning that the Special Plans Staff,
headed by General Ruffner, would be the nucleus of the future X
Corps staff. In order to have the benefit of specialized amphibious
knowledge, ten Marine and two Navy officers of TTU Mobile Training Team
Able were assigned on 19 August:
Col H. A. Forney Deputy Chief of Staff
LtCol J. Tabor Asst Coordinator, FSCC
LtCol C. E. Warren Asst G-4
Maj J. N. McLaughlin Asst G-3
Maj J. F. Warner Asst G-3
Maj C. P. Weiland Air Officer, FSCC
Maj V. H. Vogel Asst G-4
Capt H. S. Coppedge Asst G-2
Capt T. A. Manion Asst Signal Officer, FSCC
Capt V. J. Robinson Target Info Officer
Lt L. N. Lay, USN Asst Surgeon
Lt W. A. Sheltren, USN Asst NGF Officer, FSCC[90]
[90] MarCorps Board _Study_, v. II, app. 67.
These officers did not begin their new assignment in time to contribute
to the preliminary X Corps over-all scheme of maneuver. The main
provisions, as communicated to General Smith at General Ruffner’s
briefing conference of 23 August, were as follows:
(1) The 1st Marine Division, as the landing force, was to seize
the urban area of Inchon (line A-A); to capture a beachhead
(line B-B); to advance as rapidly as possible and seize Kimpo
Airfield (line C-C); to clear out the south bank of the Han
River (line D-D); to cross the river, seize Seoul and secure
the commanding ground to the north (E-E); and, finally, to
fortify and occupy this line with reduced forces until relieved
(apparently by the 3d Infantry Division, still in the United
States), whereupon the Division was to recross the Han and
seize a line (F-F) about 25 miles southeast of Seoul.
(2) The 7th Infantry Division was to land behind the Marines
and advance on their right flank to seize the commanding ground
south of Seoul and the south bank of the river (line D-D); to
continue the advance to phase line (E-E); and to conduct a
reconnaissance in force to the south (line F-F). There, on the
line from Suwon to Kyongan-ni, the 7th Infantry Division and
1st Marine Division would form the strategic anvil as Eighth
Army forces advanced from the Pusan Perimeter in the role of
hammer.
(3) The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was to furnish air support,
air direction, and air warning for the Corps with units
operating from Kimpo Airfield. It was also to be prepared to
operate a control center ashore on order.[91]
[91] _Ibid._, v. I, III-B-8, and v. II, app. 16; O. P. Smith,
_Notes_, 48–49.
The Special Plans Staff gave General Smith a study explaining the
purposes of these maneuvers. “The B-B line in this study appeared
to be a suitable beachhead line,” he commented, “and we decided to
concentrate our efforts on plans for its seizure. Subsequent operations
would be reserved for later consideration.”[92]
[92] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 50.
_Intelligence Planning for Inchon_
Good planning, of course, depended on accurate intelligence. All
possible information about the objective area had been gathered by the
staff of PhibGru One before the arrival of the 1st Marine Division
planners. Air Force planes had taken hundreds of photographs at every
stage of the tide. Hydrographic reports and navigation charts had been
studied. Army and Navy men familiar with Inchon during the American
occupation after World War II were interrogated as well as NKPA
prisoners captured by the Eighth Army.
Although a great deal of useful data was compiled, some disturbing
questions remained. How high were the sea walls of Inchon? Were the
mud flats suitable for landing either troops or vehicles at low tide?
Approximately how many NKPA guns were hidden on Wolmi-do?... These were
some of the intelligence gaps which must be filled before an effective
plan could be drawn up for an assault landing.
PhibGru One made its material available to the G-2 Section of the
1st Marine Division, and the two staffs worked together on the
_Mount McKinley_ in close cooperation. Attached were the 163d
Military Intelligence Service Detachment (MISD) and the 441st Counter
Intelligence Corps (CIC) Team. Both of these units had been furnished
by FECOM and consisted of Army commissioned and enlisted personnel
as well as native Koreans serving in liaison, interpretation, and
translation capacities.
Even when a question could not be answered conclusively, it was up
to the G-2 sections of the Attack Force and Landing Force to arrive
at a conclusion for planning purposes. For instance, it was never
satisfactorily determined from available sources--JANIS publications,
strategic engineering studies, Naval Attaché reports, and photographic
interpretation reports--whether LVTs would be able to traverse the mud
flats of the Inchon harbor area. And since there remained some doubt,
planning proceeded on the assumption that the answer was negative.
This proved to be the correct as well as the prudent decision, later
developments revealed.
Another G-2 planning problem concerned the effect that the height
of the sea walls would have upon the landing. Photographs at hourly
stages of the tide made it appear that the masonry was too high for
the dropping of ramps at any time. As a solution, G-2 officers hit
upon a device reminiscent of the storming of castles during the Middle
Ages. Scaling ladders were recommended with the suggestion that they be
built of aluminum with hooks at one end to be attached to the masonry.
Construction was started at Kobe, but the order could be only partially
filled before D-day, and wooden ladders were built as substitutes.
It is hardly necessary to point out the importance of estimates as
to the numbers and defensive capabilities of the enemy. Yet the G-2
sections on the _Mount McKinley_ were up against a peculiar situation
cited in the 1st Marine Division report:
“Our accumulated knowledge of the enemy’s military tactics, prior
to our landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950, consisted almost in
its entirety of knowledge about the enemy’s offense.... With but
few exceptions, UN forces were forced to take a defensive stand and
denied the opportunity to study large scale enemy defensive tactics
from actual combat. Thus it was that our assault landing was made
with relatively little prior knowledge regarding the enemy’s probable
reaction to a large-scale offensive of this nature, particularly when
it involved the penetration into the very heart of his newly acquired
domain.”[93]
[93] This account of G-2 planning for Inchon is based upon
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Baker.
Photographic coverage showed the Inchon harbor area to be honeycombed
with gun positions and other defensive installations. On the other
hand, daily aerial observation indicated that most of them were not
occupied.
G-2 conclusions during the planning phase often had to be based
on such conflicting evidence, even though the penalties of faulty
interpretation might be drastic. But after being viewed with due
suspicion, signs of negative enemy activity were finally accepted as
valid in estimates of light to moderate NKPA resistance.
“Sadly lacking as was information on the objective area,” commented the
Division G-2 report, “more so was that on the enemy in the area.” Early
in September, however, the Attack Force and Landing Force concurred
in the initial X Corps estimate of 1,500 to 2,500 NKPA troops in the
immediate area, consisting largely of newly raised personnel.[94]
[94] See Appendix I for the Order of Battle of the units
which opposed the 1st Marine Division throughout the
Inchon-Seoul operation, listing them in chronological
order as to area of employment, strength, and
effectiveness.
Radio reports of first-hand observations in the objective area, though
coming too late for initial planning purposes, confirmed some of the
G-2 estimates. This dangerous mission was undertaken by Lieutenant
Eugene F. Clark, a naval officer on General MacArthur’s JSPOG staff.
U. S. and British Marines provided an escort on 1 September when the
British destroyer _Charity_ brought him from Sasebo to a point along
the coast where the South Korean patrol vessel PC 703 waited to land
him at Yonghung-do, an island about 15 miles southwest of Inchon.[95]
[95] This account is based upon: Capt James B. Soper interv,
16 Aug 54; and Karig, _Korea_, 176–191.
Clark went ashore with a small arsenal of firearms, grenades and
ammunition, as well as 30 cases of C rations and 200 pounds of rice.
He quickly made allies of the 400 friendly Korean inhabitants of the
island and organized his own private little “army” of about 150 youths
from 14 to 18 years old. These “troops” were posted about Yonghung-do
for security, since the near-by island, Taebu-do, was occupied by 400
NKPA soldiers within wading distance at low tide.
The naval officer had no illusions as to what his fate might be in
the event of capture. Day and night, he kept a grenade within reach,
since he did not intend to be taken alive. When the long expected
enemy attack from Taebu-do materialized, he commandeered a “one-lung”
South Korean motor sampan and fought it out with the NKPA motor sampan
escorting boats filled with soldiers. The enemy began the strange
“naval” battle with a few badly aimed rounds from a 37mm tank gun.
Clark and his crew of three friendly Koreans finished it with a long
burst from a .50 caliber machine gun. After sinking the NKPA motor
sampan, he destroyed another boat with 18 soldiers aboard and captured
three prisoners for questioning.
One night the intrepid lieutenant rowed a dinghy to the Inchon sea
wall. When the tide went out, he tested the mire by wading in it up
to his waist. This experience led to the sending of a radio report,
“Inchon not suitable for landing either troops or vehicles across the
mud.”
Korean youths, posing as fishermen, brought intelligence which Clark
included in his daily radio messages. One of these spies made an effort
to count the guns on Wolmi-do and describe the locations. Others took
measurements of the Inchon sea wall and penetrated as far inland as
Seoul to report numbers and positions of NKPA troops.
Clark declined all offers to evacuate him. As the climax of his
exploit, he managed to restore the usefulness of the lighthouse on
Palmi Island which the enemy had put out of commission. This structure,
the former entrance beacon for Inchon by way of Flying Fish channel,
served him as a refuge when he had to leave Yonghung-do hurriedly just
ahead of NKPA troops who landed in force and butchered 50 civilians of
both sexes. Clark, who received a Silver Star, stuck it out on Palmi
until midnight of 14 September, when he turned on the beacon light to
guide the amphibious task force.
_The Landing Force Plan_
The decisions behind the Landing Force Plan--1st Marine Division OpnO
2-50--obviously had to be made without benefit of Lieutenant Clark’s
reports, since the publication date was 4 September 1950.[96] It is to
the credit of these conclusions, therefore, that so few of them had to
be corrected in the light of first-hand evidence from the objective
area.
[96] See Appendix G for a chronological list of all 1st
Marine Division operation orders during the Inchon-Seoul
operation.
Although CG X Corps was the assigned Expeditionary Troops Commander,
planning on the Corps level was concerned almost entirely with the
exploitation phase following the seizure of the beachhead. All Landing
Force planning was done on the _Mount McKinley_ by the Division in
close coordination with PhibGru One.
The first consideration, as viewed by the Navy planners, was that
the tides, currents, and tortuous channels of Inchon made necessary
a four-hour daylight approach to the transport area. This meant that
1130, at low tide, was the earliest hour of arrival; and not until
about 1700 would the next high tide provide enough water for an assault
landing.
On 15 September a maximum high tide of 31 feet could be expected at
1919. Evening twilight came at 1909. It was estimated initially that
23 feet of water would take the LCVPs and LVTs over the mud flats, but
that 29 feet were necessary for the beaching of the LSTs.
In view of these conditions, PhibGru One planners concluded that 1700
was the best time for landing the LCVPs and LVTs, and it was decided
to beach the LSTs at about 1900. Simultaneous landings of troops on
Wolmi-do and the mainland were contemplated.
This was the point of departure for Division planners. They maintained
that Wolmi-do was the key terrain feature, and that it should be
secured first in a separate landing. The logical course, according to
the Marines, would be to utilize the morning high tide for the seizure
of this island commanding the waterfront. The enemy would be given the
whole day in which to prepare for the attack on the mainland; but the
Landing Force could also utilize this period for cleaning up Wolmi-do
and moving in supporting artillery.
It was typical of the harmony prevailing between the two planning
groups on the _Mount McKinley_ that PhibGru One immediately accepted
the concept of a double-barreled attack. The rub was that a night
approach would be necessary to assault Wolmi-do at 0600 on the morning
high tide, and the Navy doubted the feasibility of a movement of the
slow-moving and unmaneuverable APAs, AKAs, and LSTs through winding,
mud-lined channels in the darkness.
At length a compromise was reached with the decision to employ DD, APD,
and LSD types primarily, which were more maneuverable in addition to
being equipped with radar navigational instruments.[97]
[97] This summary of Landing Force planning is based upon:
1st MarDiv _SAR_, basic rpt; MarCorps Board _Study_,
v. I, II-B, 13–16; O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 58–62; PacFlt
_Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Able Able, 6–7.
The morning landing on Wolmi-do was to be made with a single battalion
of the 5th Marines, to be designated by the Brigade. On the mainland
the remaining two battalions would land with the evening high tide on
RED Beach, just north of the causeway connecting the island with the
city, while two battalions of the 11th Marines landed in support on
Wolmi-do. Meanwhile the 1st Marines was to hit BLUE Beach, southeast
of the urban area. And after driving rapidly inland to consolidate
their positions before nightfall, the two Marine regiments were to
make a junction in the morning and seize the beachhead while the 17th
ROK Regiment (later replaced by 1st KMC Regiment) mopped up the city
streets.
Marine G-4 planners suggested one of the most daring of all the
calculated risks. This was the decision to use LCVPs for the RED Beach
landings because their comparative speed would clear the landing area
for the beaching of eight LSTs--all that could be crammed into the
narrow confines of this strip of urban waterfront. Each was to be
loaded with ammunition, rations, water, and fuel. Obviously these Navy
workhorses, nicknamed “large slow targets”, would be easy marks for
NKPA shore guns, but this was a chance that had to be taken if the
assault troops were to be adequately supplied.
There was not time, of course, to unload and retract the ships during
the period of evening high tide. They must be unloaded during the night
and taken out on the morning tide.
Since it was not considered feasible to land LSTs on BLUE Beach, that
area would not be developed beyond the needs of the immediate assault.
For this purpose, 16 preloaded LVTs were to be used as floating dumps
until the 1st Marines could link up with the other regiment.
These were the essentials of the Landing Force plan. H-hour was
ultimately determined from a study of late photographs which brought
about a slight change in estimates. Since a tide of 25 feet (two feet
higher than the initial estimate) appeared to be necessary for the
LCVPs and LVTs to reach the sea wall, H-hour was set at 1730 instead of
1700. The completed Landing Force plan provided for these steps:
(1) BLT-3 of RCT-5 to land on Beach GREEN at L-hour on D-day
and seize Wolmi-do.
(2) RCT-5 (-- BLT-3) to land on Beach RED at H-hour, seize
Objective O-A, effect a juncture with RCT-1, and prepare for
further operations to the east in coordination with RCT-1 to
seize the FBHL.
(3) RCT-1, to land on Beach BLUE, with two battalions in
assault, seize Objective O-1, and prepare for further
operations to the east in coordination with RCT-5 to seize the
FBHL.
(4) 11th Marines (-- 3d Bn) (96th F. A. Bn, USA, attached) to
land 1st and 2d Bns on Beach GREEN at H-hour, occupy positions
on Wolmi-do and support seizure of the beachhead with priority
of fires to RCT-1. Remainder of artillery to land on call.
(5) ROK Marines, initially in Division reserve, to land over
Beach RED on call and conduct operations to occupy the city of
Inchon in coordination with RCT-5.
(6) 1st Tank Bn (--) (Reinf.) to be prepared to land on order
one company in LSU on Beach GREEN, remainder of battalion on
order on beaches to be designated.
(7) 1st Engr Bn (--) to land on Beach RED or in harbor on
order, assume control of detached companies on order, and
support seizure of beachhead as directed. Priority to opening
and maintaining MSR along southern edge of the city to RCT-1
zone of action.
(8) 1st Shore Party Bn (--) to land on order on Beach RED or in
harbor and assume control of shore party activities on Beaches
RED and GREEN.
(9) 1st Amph Trac Bn to transport and land elements of RCT-1 on
Beach BLUE and continue support of RCT-1 until released.
(10) 2d Engr Spl Brig, USA (Reinf.) to furnish ships platoons
and augment Division shore party as requested. After landing
and when directed, to assume operational control of Division
shore party and responsibility for control of all port
operations. To provide logistical support of 1st MarDiv.
_Availability of Brigade Troops_
The old recipe for rabbit stew began, “First, catch your rabbit.” And
while the Landing Force plan was being formulated, General Smith had no
assurance for a few days that he could count on having the whole of his
landing force available.
General Almond informed the Marine general on 23 August that the
release of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade for participation in
the Inchon landing would depend on the military situation. He seemed
doubtful and added that the withdrawal of the Marines would be bad for
Eighth Army morale.
The Attack Force and Landing Force began their planning, however,
on the basis of Brigade availability. It had been the intention of
CinCFE to employ a full Marine division, but an embarkation date of 1
September would not permit the 7th Marines to arrive in time. This left
the 1st Marines as the only RCT of the Landing Force unless the 5th
Marines and other Brigade units could be released.
On 30 August, Smith brought up the issue again in a dispatch to X
Corps, whereupon CinCFE issued an order making the Brigade troops
available to the Division on 4 September.
This might have settled the issue if the enemy had not launched an
all-out offensive on 1 September to smash through the Pusan Perimeter.
Although the Brigade had already sent heavy equipment to Pusan for
embarkation, the Marines were rushed up to the front on 2 September as
a mobile reserve. That same day the order for their release was revoked.
There could be no doubt about the gravity of the military situation.
Thirteen NKPA divisions were making a final effort, and the Marines
were needed in the Naktong Bulge sector, where the Korean Reds were
attempting to cut the Pusan-Taegu lifeline.
On the other hand, time was also running out for the Inchon planners.
Colonel Forney, the new deputy chief of staff for X Corps, informed
Smith on 2 September that Almond planned to use the 32d Infantry of the
7th Infantry Division if the 7th Marines could not arrive in time for
the Inchon landing. Recently, the cadres of this Army division had been
brought up to strength with 8,000 South Koreans. The remaining 12,000
U. S. troops had received no adequate amphibious training, though
instructors from Training Team Able had made a start with some of the
units.
This turn of affairs resulted in a meeting in General Almond’s office.
The Navy was represented by Admirals Joy, Struble, and Doyle; the Army
by Generals Almond, Ruffner, and Wright; and the Marines by General
Smith.
Wright opened the discussion by stating that Walker needed the
Brigade troops urgently as a mobile reserve to hold the line in the
current NKPA offensive. Almond conceded that the question of Brigade
availability must be decided on a basis of Eighth Army requirements and
tactical considerations. But if the 5th Marines could not be released,
he reiterated his decision to substitute the 32d Infantry for the
Inchon operation.
Admiral Joy declared that the success of the Inchon assault depended
on the employment of Marines trained in amphibious techniques; and
he called upon Smith for his opinion. The Marine general said that
a hastily instructed unit could not be expected to take the place
of a combat-experienced regiment in the Landing Force, and that
last-minute substitutions of this sort could not be made in complicated
ship-to-shore landings without courting trouble. He added that it would
be necessary in such an event to land in column on one beach instead
of two, with the 1st Marines in advance of the 32d Infantry. These
comments had the support of Doyle, who agreed that the availability of
the 5th Marines might mean the difference between success and failure
at Inchon.
At this point Admiral Struble commented that the issue boiled down to
the need for a mobile Eighth Army reserve. He suggested as a compromise
that a regiment of the 7th Infantry Division be embarked and moved
to Pusan as a floating reserve to be landed in an emergency as a
substitute for the 5th Marines. This solution was accepted. Almond
called up Eighth Army Headquarters immediately, and within an hour
Wright telephoned to inform Smith that the Brigade would be relieved at
midnight on 5 September.[98]
[98] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 74–80. _Chronicle_, 31 Aug-3 Sep
50; Forney _Special Rpt_, II, 4.
As it turned out, the 17th Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division was
embarked and transferred to Pusan to substitute for the 5th Marines,
with Marine officers of Training Team Able assisting in the outloading.
After the amphibious assault, the regiment landed administratively at
Inchon to rejoin its parent unit.
_Naval Gunfire and Rockets_
At a conference on 1 September called by Admiral Struble and attended
by Admirals Richard W. Ruble, John M. Higgins, and Sir William G.
Andrewes (RN)[99] in addition to Generals Ruffner and Smith, it was
tentatively agreed that the cruisers would begin the bombardment on the
morning of D-minus 1, and the destroyers that afternoon after a napalm
air strike had been conducted against Wolmi-do on D-minus 4.
[99] See Appendix E for Naval Task Organization giving
components, ships, and commanders of JTF-7.
At another naval gunfire conference two days later, the napalm strike
was delayed until D-minus 3. On 8 September, when Admiral Struble held
his final meeting, PhibGru One and the 1st Marine Division agreed
on the scope and timing of naval gunfire support. It was decided,
therefore, that the bombardment would commence on D-minus 2 and be
repeated if necessary on D-minus 1.[100]
[100] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 72–74.
During the following week, plans were worked out in detail. The
beachhead was divided into 52 target areas, including two on Wolmi-do
and one on Sowolmi-do. In the channel to the west and southwest of
the port, imaginary lines marked off three fire support areas for the
ships, numbered in order from south to north.
[Illustration: PLAN FOR INCHON ASSAULT]
[Illustration: _Call to Arms----Marine reservists fall in near railway
station in Seattle for departure to Camp Pendleton (U. S. Navy
Photo)._]
[Illustration: _The Invasion Fleet----Above, Marines board troopship in
Japan for voyage to objective; and, below, Marines eating breakfast on
transport at 3:30 on the morning of D-Day (Marine Corps Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Sunrise at Inchon----as seen from the USS Mount
McKinley_ (_U. S. Army Photo_).]
[Illustration: _Smiles of Victory----General MacArthur shows his
approval of the Wolmi-do Landing; behind him (left to right) are Vice
Admiral Struble, Brigadier General Wright, and Major General Almond
(U. S. Navy Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Action on Wolmi-do----Above, Marine using flame thrower
on enemy cave; and, below, assault troops mopping up on the island
(Marine Corps Photos)._]
[Illustration: _H-Hour----Above, the first wave of LCVPs heads for the
beaches at Inchon; and, below, grounded LSTs bring supplies to captured
Wolmi-do (U. S. Navy Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Hitting the Beaches----Above, Marines in landing craft
on way to BLUE Beach with scaling ladders; and, below, assault troops
using ladders to climb seawall at RED Beach (Marine Corps Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Ashore at Inchon----Above, an LST brings supplies to
RED Beach on heels of assault troops (Marine Corps Photo); and, below,
Marines hoisting tank over seawall, with LST 802 in background (U. S.
Navy Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Bombardment of Inchon----Above, railway station in
flames (U. S. Army Photo); and, below, burning factory buildings (U. S.
Navy Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Inchon Secured----Above, enemy gun emplacement (U. S.
Navy Photo); and, below, troops of 5th Marines advancing in streets of
Inchon (U. S. Army Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Advance to Force Beachhead Line----Above, assault
troops of 1st Marines move up in DUKWs; and, below, Marine tanks and
amtracs northeast of Inchon (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Upper Command Level----Above, Generals Almond (left)
and Shepherd go ashore in launch of USS_ Mount McKinley; _and, below,
General Smith and Admiral Doyle confer on the USS_ Rochester (_U. S.
Navy Photos_).]
[Illustration: _Inchon Harbor Scenes----Above, a VMO-6 helicopter gives
a lift to a Marine officer on LCP; and, below, LST 1123 stranded at low
tide (U. S. Navy Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Interludes----Above, Hospitalman Philip A. Barome, USN,
shares his “C” rations with a Korean youngster (U. S. Navy Photo);
and, below, Private G. W. Febrey and Corporal Charles E. Burris of 1st
Marine Division, fill can at captured Yongdungpo brewery (U. S. Army
Photo)._]
[Illustration: _D-Plus 2----Above, Marine tank-infantry team searches
houses in Korean village (Marine Corps Photo); and, below, stripped
NKPA prisoners are marched past killed enemy tank (U. S. Army Photo)._]
[Illustration: _RED Beach----LSTs unloading and Marine trucks taking
supplies to advancing troops on D-plus 2 (U. S. Army Photo)._]
On D-day the four cruisers would stand in from 13,000 to 15,000 yards
offshore in Fire Support Area I, while the destroyers in FSAs II and
III manned stations 800 to 6,000 yards from the beach. The three LSMRs
would first support the Wolmi-do landing from close-in positions to
the north and west of the island. Later, for H-hour, one of the rocket
ships was to remain northward to soften up RED Beach, and the other two
would displace to the vicinity of BLUE Beach.[101]
[101] This summary of naval gunfire planning is derived from:
ComPhibGru One _OpnO_ 14-50, Annex George, app. II, III.
From L-minus 45 to L-minus 2, the cruisers and destroyers would dump
a total of 2,845 shells on Inchon and its outlying island, each ship
concentrating on specifically assigned target areas. From L-minus 15 to
L-minus 2, each of the three LSMRs would saturate Wolmi-do with 1,000
5-inch rockets. Most of the ships were to cease fire two minutes before
the landing on GREEN Beach, when Marine planes strafed possible enemy
positions for final shock effect. Four of the destroyers would continue
to pound Inchon targets with 55 shells during the short air attack.
Another intricate piece in the mosaic of destruction was the mission
assigned to one LSMR for the period immediately preceding and following
the landing of 3/5. The lone rocket ship would lumber parallel to
Wolmi-do’s shoreline, across the front of the advancing first wave, and
pour 40mm shells into the beach area. Clearing the route of approach
to GREEN Beach just in time for the landing craft to speed by, the
LSMR was to continue southward along the coast and direct its heavy
automatic fire at the slopes in advance of the attacking troops.
Once Wolmi-do was secured, the full fury of the support ships would
rain down on targets in the Inchon area. From H-minus 180 to H-minus
5, the cruisers and destroyers were scheduled to blast their assigned
targets with a total of 2,875 shells. Chiming in at H-minus 25 with
2,000 rockets apiece, the LSMRs would pulverize RED and BLUE Beaches
until five minutes before the landings by the two Marine regiments.
At that time, all ships must cease fire to clear the way for strafing
Corsairs and Navy Skyraiders.
The meticulous planning left nothing to chance, even with the
assumption that a foothold would be successfully established by
darkness. During the night of D-day, the cruisers would expend an
additional 250 shells on interdictory missions, and the destroyers
were authorized to fire a total of 300 5-inch rounds on call from the
infantry. To help thwart any possible enemy ambitions at dawn of D-plus
1, the cruisers would be prepared to unload 300 shells for interdiction
and call fires, while the destroyers stood poised with the same number
of high-explosive missiles plus 300 illuminating shells.
Other details of the elaborate plan dealt with the coordination of
naval gunfire, air, artillery, mortars, and rockets. At certain times,
for example, Marine and Navy gunners could fire only below a maximum
trajectory of 1100 feet, so that planes, whose minimum altitude was set
at 1500 feet, could pass safely over Inchon during strikes on adjacent
areas. During those periods when close support Corsairs were scheduled
to descend on beachhead targets, all other heavy weapons would fire
completely clear of broad circles defining strike areas for the air
missions.
More tables and instructions in the formidable appendixes of Admiral
Doyle’s operation order assigned shore fire control parties their ships
and radio frequencies, ships their battery missions and ammunition
allowances, and a host of other tasks and responsibilities.
_Air Support for Inchon_
Air support, of course, was closely related to naval gunfire planning.
After the arrival of CG 1st MAW and his staff at Tokyo on 3 September,
part of the group proceeded at once to Itami Air Force Base while
General Harris and selected staff members remained at Tokyo for
planning conferences.
Air support planning for Inchon was based on the decision that the sky
over the objective area was to be divided between the organic air units
of JTF-7 and X Corps.
JTF-7 counted on its fast carrier task force, TF-77, to gain air
supremacy and furnish deep support and interdiction strikes. Close
support for the landing was to be provided by the two squadrons of
TG-90.5, on board the CVEs _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_, which had
been the main air components of MAG-33 in support of the 1st Marine
Provisional Brigade. In addition, the Attack Force commander could also
call upon the aircraft of TF-77 for close support.
Organic air support for X Corps was to be the mission of the Tactical
Air Control set up under the operational control of the corps
commander and the direct command of General Cushman. The inspiration
for this organization came from Marine officers on the staff of X
Corps. Their suggestions were accepted by General Almond, who used his
authority as FECOM chief of staff to put the idea into effect.
MAG-33 was designated by General Harris from the Forward Echelon, 1st
MAW, to serve as TAC X Corps, with VMFs 212 and 312 in addition to
VMF(N)-542 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)-513. These units were not to
be assigned, however, until X Corps assumed control of operations in
the objective area, whereupon they would be based at Kimpo Airfield.
Meanwhile, they remained under the administrative control of ComNavFE
and MAG-12, with headquarters at the Itami AFB in Japan. The two
Marine carrier-based squadrons and the forward echelon of VMF(N)-513,
having come out to Korea in August as units of MAG-33, continued to be
assigned temporarily to that group for administrative purposes.[102]
[102] 1st MAW _SAR_, basic rpt and Annex Able: PacFlt
_Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Charlie Charlie, 4–5.
TAC X Corps was activated on 8 September, just six days before its
components landed in Japan. 1st MAW planners designated the Air Support
Section of MTACS-2, which had controlled air support for the Brigade,
to continue in that capacity for the Landing Force and later for the
entire X Corps. Arrangements were made with the Combat Cargo Command,
FEAF, to airlift aviation fuel and ammunition from Japan to Kimpo
Airfield, after its capture, until such supplies could be transported
by sea.
Marine air units were also affected, of course, by the planning which
the 1st Marine Division air and naval gunfire representatives of the
Fire Support Coordination Center had already accomplished. Working
aboard the _Mount McKinley_ in conjunction with their opposite numbers
of PhibGru One, the FSCC group had been busy since its arrival in Japan
on 18 August. Planning was conducted with the CO 11th Marines after
the artillery regiment landed in Japan, and the resulting decisions
coordinated with air and naval gunfire plans.
The 1st MAW completed its planning on 9 September. General Cushman was
designated Tactical Air Commander, X Corps, on that date and departed
for the objective area the next day with the air elements scheduled to
proceed by ship.
CHAPTER V
Embarkation and Assault
_Landing of 1st Marine Division--Plan to Seize Kimpo Airfield--Shipping
Assigned to Marines--Movement to the Objective Area--Strikes and
Bombardments--Marine Landings on GREEN Beach--The Two Harbor Islands
Secured_
On 30 August, ComNavFE issued his Operation Plan 108-50, assigning
to JTF-7, of which X Corps was a part, the mission of seizing by
amphibious assault a beachhead at Inchon.
X Corps OpnO No. 1 was dated on the 28th, though not received by
Division until the 30th. By that time, Division planning had made so
much progress that Embarkation Order 1-50 was issued on the last day of
the month, followed on 4 September by the final draft of Division OpnO
2-50. Operations orders of JTF-7 and TF-90 were issued concurrently.
This meant that the assault RCTs, contrary to amphibious doctrine, were
to receive rigid landing plans drawn up completely by the Division.
Lack of time caused this variation from usual procedure, but General
Smith had confidence in the ability of his troops to overcome the
handicap. “Under the circumstances,” he asserted, “adoption of such
methods was justified by the common background and training of all
elements and individuals in amphibious doctrine, procedures, tactics,
and techniques.”[103]
[103] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Charlie.
The most that could be done was to summon Brigade staff officers from
Korea for a conference. Colonel Edward D. Snedeker (Chief of Staff),
Captain Eugene R. Hering, Jr., USN (Brigade Surgeon), Lieutenant
Colonel Arthur A. Chidester (G-4), and Major Donald W. Sherman
(G-1) arrived on board the _Mount McKinley_ for a conference on 28
August and the following day. The Brigade G-3, Lieutenant Colonel
Joseph L. Stewart, reported as liaison officer on the 31st. When he
returned to the front, the 5th Marines was attacking, and he discussed
landing schedules with Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray while the
regimental commander directed the action.
“This,” remarked General Smith, “was hardly in accordance with accepted
procedure for planning amphibious operations.”[104]
[104] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 82. See v. I of this series for a
detailed account of the Brigade in the second battle of
the Naktong and the embarkation from Pusan.
The recommendation of Brigade staff officers that the 3d Battalion,
5th Marines, be designated for the assault on Wolmi-do was accepted
by Division planners. Colonel Snedeker also proposed that the 1st
Korean Marine Corps (KMC) Regiment of nearly 3,000 men be substituted
for the 17th ROK Regiment, which he said was committed in the Pusan
Perimeter and might not be available. The change was approved by GHQ on
3 September, with the Eighth Army being directed to provide weapons for
the newcomers.
This was the beginning of a relationship that would find the KMCs
serving with distinction alongside the men of the 1st Marine Division
and eventually becoming a fourth infantry regiment of the Division.
Activated in 1949 by the Republic of Korea, the unit took part in
anti-guerrilla operations until the NKPA invasion. After the outbreak
of hostilities, the KMCs fought creditably in UN delaying actions in
southwest Korea. The turning point came when they were attached to the
1st Marine Division and sent to Pusan for test-firing of their new
weapons before embarking for Inchon. Immediately the Koreans commenced
to model themselves after U. S. Marines so assiduously as to win
respect for their spirit and rugged fighting qualities.[105] They were
quick to learn, despite the language handicap, and showed aptitude in
mechanical respects.
[105] 1st MarDiv, “1st KMC Regiment and its relationship to
the 1st Marine Division,” (Type “C” Rpt) 1–2.
_Landing of 1st Marine Division_
The main body of the 1st Marine Division troops landed at Kobe from
29 August to 3 September. Marine officers sent in advance to that
seaport had found the authorities there “very cooperative” and brought
back to Tokyo a billeting plan which General Smith approved. Since
the facilities in and about Kobe were limited, two large APs were
designated as barracks ships, thus making available a Marine labor pool
at the docks.
At best, every hour was needed for the tremendous task of transferring
cargo from merchant type shipping into assault shipping.[106] There was
cause for anxiety, therefore, when a telephone message informed the
command of the 1st Marine Division on 3 September that Typhoon JANE
had struck Kobe with winds of 74 miles per hour. First reports had it
that the _Marine Phoenix_ was on the bottom with all of the Division’s
signal gear. Several ships were said to have broken their moorings and
gone adrift; the docks were reported under 4 feet of water, and loose
cargo on the piers had been inundated by breakers.
[106] As a time-saving measure, it was decided to combat-load
only the assault elements, allowing the other elements
to go as organization loads. This was considered
an acceptable risk in view of the enemy’s lack of
effective air and submarine forces.
Later accounts proved to be less alarming. The _Marine Phoenix_, having
merely developed a bad list as a result of shifting cargo, was soon
righted. Nor was the other damage as serious as had at first been
supposed. But 24 hours were lost from the tight reloading schedule
while Typhoon JANE kicked up her heels, and time was one commodity that
could not be replaced. All operations at Kobe had to be speeded up to
pay for this delay.
On 4 September the _Mount McKinley_ set sail for Kobe, arriving at 1445
the next day to be welcomed by an Army band at the pier. The soothing
powers of music were needed by Marine officers who learned that fire
had broken out in the hold of the _Noonday_ as she belatedly approached
Kobe. This “Jonah” had taken so long to load at San Diego that she
lagged behind the others, and now large quantities of much-needed
Marine clothing were apparently ruined by water when the fire was
extinguished. Once again the Army came to the rescue with wholehearted
cooperation by taking the water-soaked boxes to a reclamation depot
where the garments were dried, repackaged and sent back to the docks in
time for loading out on the originally scheduled ships.
Only the most basic troop training could be conducted at Kobe to
supplement the individual and amphibious instruction the men had
received on shipboard. At this time, moreover, an order from the
Secretary of the Navy made it necessary to reduce the size of the
landing force by withdrawing about 500 Marines who had not yet reached
their 18th birthday. They were transferred to the 1st Armored Amphibian
Tractor Battalion, which was to be left behind at Kobe when the
Division embarked for Inchon.
This unit had been organized at Camp Pendleton in accordance with a
directive from the Commandant. It was found necessary, however, to
transfer most of its combat-ready men to the 1st Tank Battalion in
order to bring that outfit up to full strength. The tank battalion
was given priority because its vehicles would be used throughout
the operation while the armored amphibians might be employed only
occasionally. As a consequence, the 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor
Battalion left San Diego with new personnel lacking in the skills to
make it fully combat ready.
Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. Cooper, the commanding officer,
recommended at Kobe that the unit be withheld from action until
drivers, gunners, and maintenance crews could be properly trained.
General Smith and his staff concurred, having learned that a trained
Army unit, Company A of the 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, could be
made available. Orders were given for Cooper’s battalion to remain at
Kobe, therefore, with the 17-year-old Marines attached.
Several other U. S. Army units were to take part along with the
Marines--the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, the 2d Engineer Special
Brigade, the 73d Engineer (c) Battalion, the 73d Tank Battalion, the
50th Engineer Port Construction Company, and the 65th Ordnance and
Ammunition Company. These units comprised a total of about 2,750 troops.
Plans called for the commanding officer of the 2d Engineer Special
Brigade to head a logistical task organization which also included
several Marine units--the 1st Shore Party Battalion, the 1st Combat
Service Group, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion. The Shore Party
troops were to initiate unloading at the objective, whereupon the
over-all control would pass to the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, on
order, to insure continuity of development of unloading facilities.[107]
[107] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. 1, and Annexes Dog and Jig;
O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 101, 104, 107, 110–112.
Division service units, in accordance with current directives, were to
carry the 30-day replenishment of spare parts appropriate to the unit
concerned. Although the Combat Service Group had neither spare parts
nor supplies, it was to have custody of both after the landing. Thus
the units would be freed immediately to move away from the beach in
support of the Division as it drove toward Kimpo and Seoul.[108]
[108] See Appendix D for a list of supplies and equipment to
be embarked in assigned shipping, as prescribed by 1st
MarDiv Embarkation Order 1-50 of 31 Aug 50.
At Kobe the men of the 1st Marine Division were required to leave the
full clothing bags they had brought from San Diego and embark for
Inchon with field transport packs containing only the most essential
items. This meant that some 25,000 sea bags must be stored at the
Japanese port in such a way that future casualties and rotation drafts
could reclaim their personal effects without delay. As a reminder of
the grim task ahead, provisions must be also made to return to proper
custody the effects of deceased personnel.
_Plan to Seize Kimpo Airfield_
Intelligence reports on the eve of embarkation did not depart from
earlier estimates of a maximum of 2,500 NKPA troops in the objective
area. From 400 to 500 were believed to be garrisoning Wolmi-do, 500
defending Kimpo, and the balance stationed in and about Inchon.[109]
Despite the estimates of low to moderate enemy resistance, however,
General Smith differed with the command of X Corps when a commando-type
raid on Kimpo was proposed.
[109] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Baker.
The question came up on 8 September at a conference held at Kobe on the
_Mount McKinley_ and attended by Generals Hickey and Smith, Admiral
Doyle and Colonel Louis B. Ely, USA. Ely commanded the newly formed
X Corps Special Operations Company composed of 124 U. S. Army troops
briefly trained by TTU instructors in demolitions, individual combat
and ship-to-shore movements in rubber boats.[110] General Almond’s plan
called for this company, reinforced by Marines, to embark at Kobe on 10
September in a British frigate and transfer to a South Korean picket
boat. Upon arrival at the objective area on D-day, the raiders were to
paddle three miles in rubber boats to the north of the Attack Force,
land under cover of darkness, and move inland for a surprise attack on
Kimpo at dawn.
[110] Col E. H. Forney, _Special Report_, 5–7.
General Almond felt it necessary to seize the airfield at the earliest
possible moment. Surprise, he felt, would reduce the risks. General
Smith pointed out, however, that Colonel Ely’s men would have to row
their rubber boats against a strong tide and cross a wide expanse of
mud flats on foot. His radios could only reach four miles, and his
presence in the 1st Marine Division’s zone of action would restrict the
use of naval gunfire and air support. Finally, said the Marine general,
it was not certain that the raiders could hold the airfield even if
they took it.[111]
[111] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 92–95.
This conference did not settle the issue. Colonel Williams, the
Division chief of staff, was requested in a telephone call followed
by a dispatch from the G-1 Section of GHQ to turn over 100 specially
qualified Marines to Ely’s company. Smith sent a dispatch requesting
reconsideration. He cited the battle casualties of the Brigade, which
had not been replaced, and the 500 under-age Marines to be left behind
at Kobe. As a final objection, many of his best qualified men had
already embarked on the LSTs.
General Shepherd sent a dispatch supporting the 1st Marine Division
commander, and the order from GHQ was recalled.[112]
[112] _Ibid._ Colonel Ely actually did embark with his
Special Operations Company and make the approach, but
the landing was called off because of his last-minute
decision that too great a distance had to be covered in
rubber boats.
Another proposal by General Almond to speed up the drive inland from
the beachhead was relayed to General Smith aboard the _Mount McKinley_
on 9 September by Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes, ADC of the 7th
Infantry Division. This was a plan to land a battalion of the 32d
Infantry on GREEN Beach, Wolmi-do, with a mission of racing across
the causeway on the late afternoon of D-day and moving rapidly down
the road to seize the high ground south of Seoul, more than 20 miles
inland. The 1st Marine Division was requested to furnish five tanks in
support of the enterprise tentatively scheduled to take place while two
battalions of Marine artillery were landing on Wolmi-do and two Marine
rifle regiments were landing on the Inchon beaches.
This idea struck Smith as being extremely optimistic. Without
going into the tactical objections, he decided that the scheme was
logistically impracticable.[113]
[113] _Ibid._ It later developed that the 32d Infantry, first
regiment of the 7th Infantry Division ashore, did not
land until D-plus 3.
_Shipping Assigned to Marines_
The embarkation at Kobe was not completed without some confusion.
Much of the equipment was in its original containers and had never
been checked or identified. Large quantities of Class I, III, and V
supplies, distributed throughout the incoming shipping, had to be
reassembled and reassigned for the outloading. In the lack of suitable
storage areas near the piers, Classes III and V were off-loaded into
Japanese barges and held in floating storage until they could be
reloaded into assault shipping.[114]
[114] See Appendix D.
Inter-pier transfer of cargo was avoided whenever possible by berthing
incoming shipping so that units could load directly into assault
shipping. Unfortunately, this could not be done in some instances,
since the LST landing was outside but adjacent to the pier area.
Facilities for the embarkation of the Brigade at Pusan were
satisfactory, with pier space for three APAs and one AKA at one
pier and an LSD at another. All of the assigned LSTs could beach
simultaneously along the sea wall.
Only Marine amphibious experience enabled the Division to complete
its tremendous task at Kobe in spite of the time lost as a result of
Typhoon JANE. The shipping tentatively assigned by X Corps consisted
of one AGC, six APAs, eight AKAs, three LSDs, one LSM, three APDs, 12
LSUs, and 47 LSTs. This last figure included 17 Navy-manned and 30
SCAJAP (Japanese-manned) LSTs. The troop list of approximately 29,000
men was broken down by the Division into the following six embarkation
groups with their assigned shipping:
-----------------+-------------------+-------------------------
Embarkation group| Principal units | Shipping
-----------------+-------------------+-------------------------
ABLE |Divisional Troops |1 AGC
|1st CSG |2 APAs
| |5 AKAs
| |9 LSTs
| |1 LSM
| |3 LSUs (towed to
| | objective area by tugs)
| |
BAKER |1st Marine (Reinf) |1 APA
|1st Amtrac Bn |12 LSTs
| |
CHARLIE |5th Marines (Reinf)|3 APAs
|73d Tank Bn, USA |12 LSTs
| |3 APDs
| |1 LSD w/3 LSUs
| |
DOG |11th Marines |1 AKA
| |6 LSTs
| |
EASY |1st Tank Bn |2 LSDs w/3 LSUs each
| |4 LSTs (later
| | increased to 6)
| |
FOX |2d Engr Spec Brig, |1 AKA
| USA |
|96th FA Bn, USA |4 LSTs
-----------------+-------------------+-------------------------
Four of these groups were to embark from Kobe while CHARLIE mounted
out from Pusan and FOX from Yokohama, Yokosuka, and Camp McGill in
Japan.[115] The main body of the Division’s third rifle regiment, the
7th Marines, was scheduled to land in Japan on 17 September. Colonel
Litzenberg, the commanding officer, arrived at Itami Airfield on the
6th, having flown from Camp Pendleton ahead of his troops to make
arrangements.
[115] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. 1, and Annex Jig; O. P. Smith,
_Notes_, 102, 117–119.
_Movement to the Objective Area_
Command relationships during the assault and embarkation phase were as
follows:
+---------+
| CinCFE |
+----+----+
|
+----+----+
|ComNavFE |
+----+----+
|
+----+----+
| CJTF-7 |
+----+----+
|
+---------+--------+
| |
+-----+----+ +-----+-----+
| CTF-90 | |CG X Corps |
+-----+----+ +-----+-----+
| |
+---------+---------+--------+--------+
| | |
+------+-------+ +-------+------+ +------+-------+
| ComPhibGru-1 | |CG 7th Inf Div| |CG 1st Mar Div|
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
The movement of JTF-7 to the objective area was planned in the most
exacting detail, owing to the dispersion of the ships to begin with,
the need for secrecy, and the limited time. Another complication
entered the picture at the last minute, when a second typhoon loomed on
the Pacific horizon with considerably more menace than its exotic name
would imply.
Navy meteorologists had been plotting the movement of Typhoon KEZIA
since the first signs of turbulence near the Marianas Islands on 6
September. Generating winds of 100 miles per hour three days later,
the typhoon was churning a steady course toward the East China Sea and
Tsushima Strait, where it was expected to hit on 12 or 13 September.
The timing could not have been worse as far as Admiral Doyle and
General Smith were concerned. KEZIA threatened to strike the ships
of the task force during the last stages of embarkation and the
first phase of the approach to Inchon. And any serious disruption of
the Navy’s delicate timetable would place the 15 September deadline
hopelessly beyond reach.
With the carriers, cruisers, and destroyers scheduled to be in the
Yellow Sea, beyond the path of the storm, Admiral Doyle’s amphibious
vessels were the most imperiled elements. The Attack Force Commander
planned to move his ships to the objective area in six increments,
three of them loading in Japan, one in Pusan, and two at both places
simultaneously. Because of the last two, certain rendezvous areas
were designated so that fragments of a group could converge at sea to
form the whole. Obviously, then, the mathematics of navigation was a
dominant factor. Success hinged on coordination in terms of hours, not
weeks or days.
Each of the six increments had its own time schedule for an independent
voyage. The route to Inchon was marked off on maps by a chain of check
points, the most significant of which bore the code names ARKANSAS,
IOWA, and CALIFORNIA. The first two, lying in the East China Sea off
the southwestern tip of Korea, formed the junction of the sea lanes
from Japan and Pusan. Consequently, there was no alternative to their
remaining fixed in the direct path of the oncoming typhoon. Point
CALIFORNIA was important in that it marked the end of the open sea
phase and the beginning of the treacherous offshore approach to Inchon
via Flying Fish and East channels.[116]
[116] ComPhibGru-1, _OpOrder 14-50_, Annex Dog.
[Illustration: MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA]
The departure schedule for the Attack Force was set out in Doyle’s
Operation Order 14-50 as follows:
------------------------------------------------------+--------+------
Unit | Port | Date
------------------------------------------------------+--------+------
Pontoon Movement Group (2 ATFs, 3 LSUs, 1 YTB, 1 YW) |Yokohama| 5 Sep
LSMR Movement Element (3 LSMRs) | do | 9 Sep
Tractor Movement Element A (LSM, 1 AMS, 1 AM, 1 ARS, 2| |
LSDs, 36 LSTs) |Kobe |10 Sep
Tractor Movement Element B (1 ARL, 1 PF, 1 PCEC, | |
12 LSTs) | do |10 Sep
Transport Movement Group (5 APAs, 8 AKAs, 1 AP, 2 PFs)| do |12 Sep
Advance Attack Group (Wolmi-do) (1 LSD, 3 APDs) |Pusan |13 Sep
------------------------------------------------------+--------+------
The chart shows the basic pattern, which would evolve only after
considerable shuffling and secondary routing. For instance, two vessels
of the cumbersome Pontoon Movement Group, carrying vital equipment
for the expansion of Inchon’s port facilities, would not leave Sasebo
until 11 September. They were to join the slow Yokohama convoy near
Point IOWA the same day. Tractor Elements A and B, the latter trailing
at a distance of six miles, would pick up the Pusan LSTs at IOWA on
13 September. The Kobe contingent of the Transport Movement Group was
to pass through Point ARKANSAS on the 14th, joining the _Cavalier_,
_Pickaway_, _Henrico_, and _Seminole_ from Pusan.
All ship movements took place on schedule until the morning of 11
September, when angry ocean swells off the coast of Japan marked the
approach of KEZIA. Winds at the center of the typhoon were estimated
at 125 miles per hour, but Admiral Doyle based his decisions on the
assumption that the storm would curve off to the north instead of
colliding with the invasion armada in full force. He was taking a
calculated risk, therefore, when he ordered the Transport Movement
Group at Kobe to weigh anchor on the 11th, a day ahead of schedule, and
proceed to the objective area. The LSTs, already on their way, were now
out of danger; and Doyle believed that advancing the sailing date would
enable the AKAs and APAs to escape the worst of the typhoon.
The _Mount McKinley_, with Doyle, Smith, and their staffs aboard,
departed Kobe at 1030 on the 11th. As the ship rolled and pitched in
heavy seas, the Attack Force Commander remarked that KEZIA was one of
the worst storms he had ever encountered.[117]
[117] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 127–129.
This was also the opinion of Captain Cameron Briggs, USN, then fighting
it out with KEZIA in an effort to reach Sasebo with the carrier _Boxer_
and its 96 planes plus 14 extra aircraft taken aboard at Pearl Harbor.
It was necessary to launch these spares and land them on Okinawa before
he could finally make port on the 12th and prepare to mount out two
days later for Inchon.[118]
[118] Karig, _Korea_, 197.
On 12 September the _Mount McKinley_ overtook the AKAs and APAs. They
had reversed course, apparently on the assumption that they could not
get around the typhoon. If Doyle had not ordered the heaving vessels to
circle about and follow the flagship through the storm, their chances
for meeting the 15 September deadline at Inchon would have vanished
like the wind-whipped spray.[119]
[119] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 127–129.
There was no joy in the troop compartments as the transports plowed
through mountains of water. But Doyle was winning his gamble that the
typhoon would slowly veer off to the north, and starting the Transport
Group a day early proved to be a sound decision. Thanks to the
admiral’s judgment and resolution, every ship weathered the storm and
approached Point ARKANSAS on schedule.
After rounding Kyushu on 12 September, the _Mount McKinley_ docked at
Sasebo that evening to pick up General MacArthur with his party of GHQ
and X Corps officers. The proper ship for this purpose was Admiral
Struble’s flagship, the USS _Rochester_. But CinCFE preferred the
_Mount McKinley_ despite the fact that an AGC was designed for the
staffs of an Attack Force and Landing Force and had no accommodations
suited to a party including seven general officers. The ship was warped
in by two tugs and CinCFE came aboard. General Shepherd had previously
been assigned by General MacArthur to his staff for temporary duty
as amphibious adviser and personal liaison officer to the 1st Marine
Division. The Marine general was accompanied by Colonel V. H. Krulak,
G-3 of FMFPac, and his personal aide, Major J. B. Ord.
In less than an hour the _Mount McKinley_ was back on the high seas,
straining through the darkness toward Korea.[120]
[120] _Ibid._
All elements of the Attack Force completed the last leg of the voyage
without incident on 14 September. Headquarters of the 2d Battalion, 1st
Marines, rode the only cripple, an LST partially incapacitated by an
engine breakdown. Fortunately, an ocean-going tug was on hand to tow
the ailing vessel at eight knots--sufficient speed to get her to the
objective area on time.
The Yellow Sea was quiet as the columns of ships closed on Point
CALIFORNIA and Korea’s coastline. Nothing was taken for granted,
and the approach was carefully screened to the very end by Admiral
Andrewes’ fast Blockade and Covering Force.
_Air and Naval Bombardments_
The softening up of Wolmi-do had begun on 10 September, when the Marine
fliers of TG-95.5 made napalm attacks designed to burn off the trees
screening NKPA artillery. Six planes of VMF-323 and eight planes of
VMF-214 took off from the CVEs at 0600 and scorched the eastern side of
the island. The next flight of 14 planes found it necessary to orbit
for a few minutes until the smoke cleared sufficiently for them to
continue the work of destruction.
Lieutenant Clark’s reports had led G-2 officers to believe that enemy
defensive installations on Wolmi-do were more formidable than had
at first been supposed. As if in support of this conclusion, the
Marine fliers of the second strike were greeted with small-caliber
anti-aircraft fire both from the island and mainland. A third attack,
launched from the decks of the _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_ shortly
before noon, left the hump-backed island in flames from one shore to
another.
After the CVEs returned to Sasebo for replenishment the next day,
the carrier-based Navy planes of TF-77 worked over both Wolmi-do and
Inchon on 12 and 13 September. It was now the turn of the destroyers,
and Admiral Higgins had planned a bold venture. Instead of risking
collision or grounding in a night approach, he decided to forego the
advantages of surprise and attack in broad daylight. And instead of
avoiding NKPA fire, he intended to goad the enemy into retaliations
which would reveal the positions of NKPA guns on Wolmi-do.
The hazards of the operation were increased by the fact that a ROK PC
boat had discovered an NKPA craft laying mines on the morning of the
10th. This confirmed Admiral Struble’s opinion that the Inchon area
offered the enemy excellent opportunities for this form of warfare.
Not only would the muddy waters make detection difficult, but crippled
ships would block the narrow channel.
It was not a pleasant prospect. And the outlook became darker on the
morning of 13 September when four mines were spotted in Flying Fish
Channel. The U. S. cruisers _Toledo_ and _Rochester_ and the British
cruisers _Kenya_ and _Jamaica_ had dropped off in support as the six
destroyers carried out their mission. Pausing only to detonate the
mines with 40mm rounds, the cans moved up within 800 yards of Wolmi-do
to fire down the enemy’s throat while the four cruisers poured in 6-
and 8-inch salvoes and the planes of TF-77 made bombing runs.[121]
[121] Lynn Montross, “Fleet Marine Force Korea,” _United
States Naval Institute Proceedings_, 37, no. 9 (Aug
53): 836–838.
It had been long since the Navy issued the historic order “Prepare to
repel boarders!” But Admiral Higgins did not overlook the possibility
of NKPA infantry swarming out over the mud flats to attack a disabled
and grounded destroyer. And though he did not issue pikes and
cutlasses, the crews of the _Gurke_, _Henderson_, _Swanson_, _Collett_,
_De Haven_, and _Mansfield_ were armed with grenades and Tommy guns for
action at close quarters.
The enemy endured half an hour of punishment before obliging Higgins
by opening up with the shore guns of Wolmi-do. The _Gurke_ and _De
Haven_ took hits, and five NKPA shells found the _Collett_. The total
damage was insignificant, however, and the casualties amounted to one
man killed and eight wounded. These results cost the enemy dearly when
the cruisers and destroyers silenced the NKPA guns shortly after they
revealed their positions.
On the return trip the destroyers found eight more mines and exploded
them. This proved to be all, for the enemy had neglected an opportunity
to make the waters around Inchon dangerous for the attack force. The
next morning, when the destroyers paid another visit to Wolmi-do, the
shore guns appeared to have been effectually silenced. The DDs fired
more than 1,700 5-inch shells and drew only a few scattered shots
in reply. Meanwhile, the Marine planes of VMFs-214 and -323, having
returned from Sasebo, cooperated by spotting for the cruisers and
launching napalm strikes before and after the bombardment.
On the evening of 14 September, after five days of continual pounding,
Wolmi-do was a blasted piece of real estate as the Marines of 3/5
prepared to hit GREEN Beach in the morning.
_Marine Landings on GREEN Beach_
The pre-dawn stillness of the Yellow Sea was shattered as the Corsairs
of VMFs-214 and -323 flashed up from the decks of the _Sicily_ and
_Badoeng Strait_. To the west the planes of Task Force 77 were
assembling in attack formations above the _Valley Forge_, _Philippine
Sea_, and _Boxer_. Squadron after squadron droned eastward through the
blackness, and the first aircraft began orbiting over the objective
area at 0454.[122]
[122] ComAirSupGrp and ComCarDiv 15 _Report of Operations
6–21 Sep 50_; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item: Baker, 4.
Two hours earlier, Advance Attack Group 90.1, under Captain Norman W.
Sears, USN, had glided into the entrance of Flying Fish channel. Led by
the _Mansfield_, the column of 19 ships snaked through the treacherous
passage while captains and navigators sweated over radar scopes.
Lieutenant Clark’s handiwork provided a welcome relief midway along
the route, when the glimmering beacon on Palmi-do guided the vessels
past one of the more dangerous points in the channel. Minutes after
air cover began to form over Inchon, the ships eased into the narrows
west of Wolmi-do and sought assigned battle stations. Training their
big guns on the port city were the cruisers _Toledo_, _Rochester_,
_Kenya_, and _Jamaica_, comprising one of the three Fire Support Units
under Admiral Higgins. Other support vessels scattered throughout the
waters of the objective area were the destroyers _Collet_, _Gurke_,
_Henderson_, _Mansfield_, _De Haven_, _Swenson_, and _Southerland_;
and this array of fire power was further supplemented by the three
bristling rocket ships, LSMR’s 401, 403, and 404.[123]
[123] 1st MarDiv _OpOrder_ 2-50; Karig, _Korea_, 213.
The control ship, _Mount McKinley_, its flag bridge crowded with
star-studded commanders, steamed into the narrows just before dawn.
No sooner had the gray shoreline become outlined in the morning haze
than the 6- and 8-inch guns of the cruisers belched sheets of orange
flame in the direction of Inchon; and at 0545, the initial explosions
rocked the city and reverberated throughout the channel. There was
a deafening crescendo as the destroyers hammered Wolmi-do with their
5-inch guns. Radio Hill, its seaward side already burnt and blackened
from previous bombardments, was almost hidden by smoke when Marine
planes streaked down at 0600 to smother the island with tons of rockets
and bombs.[124]
[124] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. I; 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal,
15–20 Sep 50_; O. P. Smith, _Notes_.
Captain Sears, reporting to the _Mount McKinley_, confirmed L-hour at
0630. To this end, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett’s landing force
was boated by 0600, and the LCVPs and LSUs rendezvoused while Marine
air continued to soften up the target.[125]
[125] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen; and O. P. Smith, _Notes_.
Air attacks ceased at 0615, but Wolmi-do enjoyed only a momentary
respite before the most unnerving blow of all. In strange contrast to
the sleek men-o’-war and nimble aircraft, three squat LSMRs closed on
the island from the north, a few hundred yards offshore. Phalanxes
of rockets arose from the decks of the clumsy ships, arched steeply,
and crashed down. One of the rocket ships, taking a southerly course,
passed GREEN Beach and dumped salvo after salvo along the slopes and
crest of Radio Hill.
When the LSMR cleared North Point of Wolmi-do, seven LCVPs darted
across the line of departure and sped shoreward with 3/5’s first
wave.[126] Rockets and 40mm shells were still ripping the southern
half of the island when one platoon of Company G and three platoons of
Company H stormed GREEN Beach at 0633. Two minutes later, the second
wave of landing craft ground to a halt on the sand, bringing the
remainder of both assault companies.
[126] The following narrative is derived from 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annexes Queen Queen and Oboe Oboe; 1st MAW
_SAR_; 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_; Taplett
interv, 25 Aug 54; Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 27 Jul
54; Capt J. D. Counselman memo to authors, 10 Mar 55;
and MSgt E. L. Knox memo to authors, 10 Jan 55.
The Marines were confronted by a scene of devastation almost devoid
of enemy resistance. Only a few scattered shots greeted the assault
force as it punched inland. The failure of UDT men to clear away all
of the wrecked small craft cluttering the beach had left 3/5 a landing
strip less than fifty yards wide. Consequently, each wave had to
contract like an accordion, and there was considerable crowding during
the first crucial minutes of the landing. But even at this stage, the
potent Marine air arm offered a final measure of protection to the
infantrymen splashing ashore. Pilots swung their F4Us fifty yards ahead
of the assault troops and hosed the routes of advance with machine-gun
bullets.
[Illustration: SEIZURE OF WOLMI-DO
3RD BN, 5TH MARINES
15 SEPT 1950]
After a brief pause for reorganization at the beach, First Lieutenant
Robert D. Bohn’s Company G wheeled to the right and drove up the
northern slopes of Radio Hill, Objective 1-A. Only half-hearted
resistance was met along the way, most of the scattered and numb North
Koreans preferring to surrender rather than face the inevitable. At
0655, Sergeant Alvin E. Smith, guide of the 3d Platoon, secured the
American flag to a shell-torn tree on the crest.
At this point General MacArthur rose from the swivel chair in which
he had been viewing the operation on the flag bridge of the _Mount
McKinley_. “That’s it,” he said. “Let’s get a cup of coffee.”
Meanwhile, the Wolmi-do assault continued as Captain Patrick E.
Wildman, after detaching a small force from Company H to clear
rubble-strewn North Point, attacked across Wolmi-do toward the Inchon
causeway with the rest of his unit. How Company’s mission was to seize
Objective 2-B, which included the eastern nose of Radio Hill and the
shoreline industrial area facing Inchon.
At 0646, the three LSUs comprising the third wave squeezed into the
narrow beach and disgorged the armored detachment of Company A, 1st
Tank Battalion, under Second Lieutenant Granville G. Sweet. Ten tanks
were landed in all--six M-26s, one flame-thrower, two dozers, and one
retriever. The big vehicles crunched inland a short distance to await
calls from the infantry.
Lieutenant Colonel Taplett ordered his free boat to the beach at 0650.
Fifteen minutes later, he radioed the _Mount McKinley_ and _Fort
Marion_ that his assault companies were advancing on schedule.
It was ironic that 3/5’s reserve company should encounter the angriest
hornets’ nest on Wolmi-do. Landing in the fourth wave at 0659, Captain
Robert A. McMullen’s Company I moved through North Point in trace of
the How Company detachment which supposedly had cleared the area.
Suddenly a flurry of hand grenades clattered on the rubble, and the
surprised Marines scattered for cover. Regaining their composure after
the explosions, the infantrymen determined the source of trouble to be
a by-passed string of enemy emplacements dug into a low cliff at the
shoreline facing Inchon. There appeared to be about a platoon of North
Koreans, who would rise from their holes intermittently, fling grenades
inland, then disappear from sight.
Item Company’s interpreter crawled toward the cliff during a lull,
bellowing to the Reds that their predicament was hopeless and
exhorting them to surrender. When the Communists responded to this
advice by throwing more grenades, McMullen signalled Sweet’s tanks
into action. The M-26s and Marine riflemen took covering positions,
while the dozer tank, directed by McMullen himself, rumbled into the
troublesome pocket and systematically sealed the die-hard Reds in their
holes.
Another bit of drama unfolded before the reserve troops when they
closed on the causeway terminus in the wake of How Company’s advance.
From one of many caves drifted noises indicating the presence of
several occupants, hitherto unnoticed. While riflemen covered the
entrance, a Marine tank drove forward and fired two rounds into the
interior.
Muffled explosions shook the area, and billows of black smoke streaked
with flame rolled out of the cave. Wide-eyed, as though watching ghosts
emerge, the Marines of Company I saw thirty enemy soldiers stagger out
of the blazing recess and throw up their hands.
Less than an hour after landing, 3/5 controlled half of Wolmi-do.
Company H, having cleared the causeway terminus, was pivoting southward
to clean out the ruins of the industrial area. Engineers, close on the
heels of the infantry, advanced 25 yards out on the pavement leading
to Inchon and laid an antitank mine field. George Company had advanced
about 400 yards and was clearing the northern crest of Radio Hill.
Action up to this point is best summed up in Taplett’s message to the
_Mount McKinley_ at 0745:
“Captured 45 prisoners. Meeting light resistance.”
Nor did the situation change as Company G occupied the dominating peak
of Radio Hill, some 105 meters high. The enemy lacked the will to
fight, despite the fact that he had sufficient weapons and a formidable
defensive complex from which to fire them. Frightened, dejected Red
soldiers continued to surrender singly or in small groups, and Taplett
exulted over the amazingly light casualties sustained by his battalion.
Since Company H found the going slow in the shambles of the industrial
area, the battalion commander ordered Lieutenant Bohn to seize the
whole of Radio Hill. Accordingly, George Company troops rushed across
the ridgeline to the eastern spur. This done, Bohn dispatched a force
to clear the western reaches of the high ground. By 0800, Radio Hill
became the property of the 1st Marine Division, and with the prize went
control of the island and Inchon Harbor.
When the news of 3/5’s success blared from the loudspeaker on the
flag bridge of the _Mount McKinley_, the commander in chief, wearing
his famous leather jacket and braided campaign cap, withdrew to his
cabin and penned a spirited message to Vice Admiral Struble aboard the
_Rochester_:
“The Navy and Marines have never shone more brightly than this
morning.
MACARTHUR”
Consolidation of Wolmi-do required the reduction of an enemy outpost on
Sowolmi-do, the small lighthouse station connected to the southwestern
tip of the island by a causeway 750 yards long and 12 yards wide. An
islet of about 500 square yards, Sowolmi-do was topped by a low hill
with the navigational beacon on the summit. Before bothering with this
tiny, isolated target, Taplett put his larger house in order.
By previous plan, the three rifle companies of 3/5 took up defensive
positions generally facing Inchon. Item Company occupied North Point,
Wildman’s unit the slopes above the industrial area, and Company G the
crest of Radio Hill. While the battalion dug in, mopping-up operations
throughout the island continued to net more prisoners and reveal
the extent of North Korean fortifications. Radio Hill was ringed by
mutually supporting trenches and emplacements, all of which had brought
only a negligible return on the Reds’ investment in time and labor.
Parked on the western nose of the ridge were two intact 76mm antitank
guns that could have wrought havoc on landing waves approaching GREEN
Beach. Fortunately, these weapons had been exposed to the 40mm fire of
the LSMR covering the beach assault, and their crews had lacked the
stomach to man them.
More antitank guns were scattered around the terminus of the causeway
leading to Inchon, leaving some question as to whether they had been
rushed to the defense of the island or were marked for displacement to
the city.
North Point, once a luxurious resort, was honeycombed with caves used
both for storage and for bomb shelters. The swimming pool, one of the
few structures still recognizable after the bombardment, was converted
by the Marines into a prisoner-of-war stockade.
More than 300 cast-iron antipersonnel mines were found attached to the
barbed wire entanglement stretched along the west coast at the base
of Radio Hill. The explosives were removed and disarmed by Technical
Sergeant Edwin L. Knox and his detachment from Company A, 1st Engineer
Battalion. Though the North Koreans had been helpful in placing these
mines in so obvious a location, they had, oddly enough, failed to
employ similar obstacles on the beaches, roads, and paths around the
island.
Prior to the midmorning advance on Sowolmi-do, total casualties for
the 3d Battalion were 14 wounded--an incredibly small price for a
critical terrain feature commanding the approaches to Korea’s major
west coast port. Evacuation plans so carefully laid out by the 1st
Medical Battalion worked smoothly. In the early phase of the operation,
LCVPs returning from GREEN Beach delivered Marine casualties to the
_Fort Marion_, whose normal medical complement had been augmented
by a special surgical team. Men with particularly bad wounds were
transferred to the _Mount McKinley_ after being administered first aid.
As the battle developed, navy medical corpsmen of 3/5 established a
collecting point on a small pier which could be reached by ambulance
boats even during low water.
Shortly before 1000, Taplett ordered Company G to seize Sowolmi-do.
Bohn in turn assigned the mission to one infantry squad reinforced
with machine guns and a section of tanks, all under the control of
Second Lieutenant John D. Counselman, leader of George Company’s 3d
Platoon. Although the islet was by no means an objective of formidable
proportions, the attackers eyed their route of approach over the long
strip with misgivings. Their skepticism was not unfounded, for they
neared the entrance to the causeway only to be stopped cold by heavy
rifle and machine-gun fire from the other end. A platoon of North
Koreans, almost literally at the end of a rope, preferred to fight it
out.
Taplett ordered the tank-infantry team to hold up while he radioed a
mission to Marine air. A few minutes later, Corsairs of VMF-214 nosed
down and scorched the objective with napalm.
Sweet’s tanks, preceded by an engineer mine-clearance team and followed
by the column of infantrymen, rumbled onto the rock bed tracing the
seaward edge of the causeway. As the task force filed across the
exposed route, 81mm shells from 3/5’s mortar platoon rattled overhead
and tore into the Communist emplacements. Enemy fire was reduced to a
light patter, and the observers on Radio Hill breathed a sigh of relief
when the attackers gained the far end of the causeway at 1048.
Covered by tank fire, the Marine infantry quickly fanned out and closed
with the defenders. There was a sharp outburst of small-arms racket,
interspersed with the clatter of machine guns; then a few scattered
volleys and the main fight was over at 1115. Mopping up with grenades
and a flame thrower continued for almost another hour, owing to the
number of caves and the determination of a few Red soldiers.
Nineteen North Koreans surrendered and 17 were killed, including some
hapless warriors who tried to swim to the mainland. Despite the size
of the islet, eight Reds succeeded in hiding out from the attackers;
and General Craig, after landing on Wolmi-do with the ADC group in the
evening, observed the fugitives escape to the mainland.[127]
[127] LtGen E. A. Craig memo to authors, 12 Jan 55.
_The Two Harbor Islands Secured_
Three Marines were wounded on Sowolmi-do, bringing 3/5’s total
casualties for the day to 17 WIA. In return, Taplett’s battalion could
count 136 prisoners and 108 enemy dead. Since interrogation of captives
established the original number of Red defenders at 400, it could be
concluded that some 150 more Communist fatalities lay entombed in
sealed emplacements and caves throughout the island.
The Wolmi-do garrison was part of a 2,000-man force committed to the
defense of Inchon by NKPA headquarters in Seoul. Represented were
elements of the 226th Marine Regiment, to which two companies of the
2d Battalion, 918th Coast Artillery Regiment were attached with their
Soviet-manufactured 76mm guns. The spiritless resistance encountered
by 3/5 was the natural reaction of green troops to the awesome power
of modern combined arms; for the North Korean marines and their
artillerymen were largely recent conscripts with sketchy training and
no experience. It remained to be seen how the other 1,600 Red troops
would respond to the later assaults on RED and BLUE Beaches.
Mopping-up operations on the island were completed by noon, and with
the support ships standing silent in the narrows, an oppressive quiet
settled on the objective area. Gradually the phenomenal tide rolled
back from its morning high of more than 30 feet. By 1300 the waters
had receded, leaving 3/5 perched on an island in a sea of mud. For the
next several hours Taplett and his men were on their own, speculating
whether an enemy force might suddenly rush out of Inchon’s dead streets
in an attempt to cross the mud flats, or whether a Red tank column
would abruptly streak from the city and make for the causeway.
Nothing happened. The air of unreality caused by the stillness of the
Oriental seaport weighed down on the nerves of the entire attack force.
As the afternoon wore on, the Marines detected movement here and there,
but the distant figures were identified as civilians more often than
not. Captain McMullen, studying the RED Beach area from his OP on North
Point, reported possible enemy “field pieces” on Cemetery Hill. What he
actually sighted were the tubes of the mortar company of the 226th NK
Marine Regiment, as will be shown later.
At Taplett’s OP on Radio Hill, the Shore Fire Control Party Officer,
Second Lieutenant Joseph R. Wayerski, searched Inchon intently through
his binoculars. On one occasion he called down naval gunfire on
small groups of people stirring in the inner tidal basin area to his
right front, but when further observation revealed the figures to be
civilians raiding a pile of rice, the Marine officer promptly cancelled
the mission. Wayerski’s lone tactical target of importance was a
section of trench on Observatory Hill in which he once spotted about 20
enemy soldiers on the move. He smothered the earthworks with 30 5-inch
shells from the _Mansfield_, and what North Koreans remained chose
other avenues from that point on.
Taplett and others of his headquarters picked out enemy gun
emplacements right at the waterfront near the Inchon dry dock. After
the report went out to the _Mount McKinley_, red pencils throughout the
task force circled the locale on maps for special attention during the
pre-H-Hour bombardment.
Thus, the 3d Battalion enjoyed an almost uneventful interlude during
its isolation. An occasional mortar round or long-range machine gun
burst was the feeble reminder that Inchon still remained in enemy hands.
While the infantry lolled in relative ease and safety, service and
support elements, attached to 3/5 for the landing, set the stage at
GREEN Beach for the logistical follow-up so vital to amphibious
operations. First Lieutenant Melvin K. Green’s team from Shore Party
Group A, having unloaded its LSUs in record time, established dumps
for ammunition, rations, and other field necessities. Personnel of
the Ordnance Battalion, Combat Service Group, and Service Battalion
engaged in backbreaking toil to alleviate the headaches of a harried
beachmaster. Signalmen scurried about, setting up their equipment and
creating the familiar maze of wire. The reconnaissance detachment of
the 11th Marines probed around the island’s desolation in search of
battery positions for the howitzers scheduled to roll ashore on the
evening tide.
The narrow strip of sand on North Point would have appeared crowded
and hopelessly confused to the inexperienced eye, but old hands knew
that order would gradually emerge, as if by magic, from the “early rush
hour”--that necessary evil inherent in all assault landings.
CHAPTER VI
Hitting the Beaches
_The Assault Plan--Beginning the Ship-to-Shore Movement--Seizure of
Cemetery Hill--RED Beach Secured--LSTs under Enemy Fire--Fighting on
Observatory Hill--1st Marines on BLUE Beach--Ending the Ship-to-Shore
Movement--Seizure of the O-1 Line_
The concept of the amphibious envelopment of the North Korean Peoples
Army, together with the actual assault on Inchon by United States
Marines, constituted heresy to that school of wishful thinkers which
sprang to life as World War II faded in the first brilliant flashes of
the Atomic Age. Widely accepted and noisily proclaimed was the belief,
perhaps sincere, perhaps convenient, that the nuclear and aeronautical
sciences had relegated armies, navies, and man himself to insignificant
positions in the waging of war. The massing of ships and field forces,
it was argued, was a thing of the past; for the next war, if humanity
dared risk another, would be decided in weeks or even days with the
power unleashed by electronic and mechanical devices--many of which in
1950 were still in rudimentary stages on drawing boards.
This was the controversial “push-button” theory of war which left
the peace-loving nations of the world unprepared in 1950 for violent
aggression by the tough little peasant army of North Korea, supported
by some 100 tanks and a few hundred artillery pieces. And to the
premature acceptance of this theory by a large section of the American
public may be attributed many of the major shortcomings of the Inchon
assault, as it unfolded in the evening of 15 September. That the
operation succeeded despite these shortcomings and the myriad natural
handicaps amounts almost to a tactical miracle.
In the words of General Smith, “... half of the problem was in getting
to Inchon at all.”[128] The tremendous obstacles overcome in solving
that “half of the problem” have already been treated at length; and it
remains now, in the short space of a chapter, to show how the other
half became history.
[128] LtGen O. P. Smith memo to authors, 28 Feb 55.
_The Assault Plan_
Aboard the _Henrico_ and _Cavalier_ in the Inchon narrows on 15
September were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines, yanked out
of the Pusan Perimeter ten days earlier. Having had no time for a
rehearsal and only a few days for planning on the basis of admittedly
sketchy intelligence, these two units would scale the sea wall of
RED Beach and plunge into the dense waterfront area of the sprawling
seaport.
The mission of the 5th Marines (less 3/5 on Wolmi-do) was to seize
the O-A Line, a 3,000-yard arc encompassing Cemetery Hill on the left
(north), Observatory Hill in the center, and thence extending the
last 1,000 yards through a maze of buildings and streets to terminate
at the inner tidal basin. Each battalion would land in a column of
companies, Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton’s 1st, on the left,
seizing Cemetery Hill and the northern half of Observatory Hill;
while Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise’s 2d secured the remainder
of the latter, the hill of the British Consulate, and the inner tidal
basin.[129]
[129] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
Landing nearly three miles southeast of the 5th Marines, the 1st
Regiment would seize BLUE Beach, a north-south strip fronting a
suburban industrial area. BLUE Beach One, on the left, was 500 yards
wide, flanked on the north by the rock revetment of a salt evaporator
that jutted into the water at a sharp angle to the shoreline. A wide
drainage ditch, about which little was known besides the fact that it
existed, formed the south boundary. Just inland a dirt road--the sole
exit from the beach--skirted the north end of a steep knoll that ran
the whole width of the landing site. There being no revetment at the
waterline, Marine planners hoped that amphibian tractors could crawl
ashore with the assault troops.[130]
[130] _Ibid._, Annex Peter Peter.
[Illustration: PLAN FOR INCHON ASSAULT]
BLUE Beach Two, connected to One by the drainage ditch, also extended
500 yards. Like RED Beach it was fronted by a rock sea wall. On the
right half, the wall retained one side of a narrow ramp that jutted
southward like a long index finger. Behind the ramp lay a cove, its
shoreline at a right angle to the sea wall. During the assault, Marines
would scale the waterfront of BLUE Two from LVTs, while the cove around
the corner on the right, unofficially dubbed “BLUE Beach Three,” was
investigated as a possible supplementary landing site.[131]
[131] _Ibid._; and Col T. L. Ridge ltr to authors, 11 May 55.
Preceded by a wave of LVT(A)s of Company A (Reinf), 56th Amphibian
Tractor Battalion, USA, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, would
land abreast on BLUE One and Two respectively. With two companies
initially in the assault, each of the infantry battalions was to drive
forward and secure its portion of the O-1 Line. This four-mile arc bent
inland as far as 3,000 yards to include four main objectives, assigned
as follows:
2d Battalion (BLUE One)
ABLE A critical road junction about 1,000 yards northeast of
the beach.
DOG Hill 117, 3,000 yards northeast of the beach, commanding
Inchon’s back door and the highway leading to Seoul,
22 miles away.
3d Battalion (BLUE Two)
CHARLIE The seaward tip of Hill 233, a long east-west ridge
beginning 1,500 yards southeast of the beach and blocking
off the stubby Munhang Peninsula, which projected
southward.
BAKER A small cape, topped by Hill 94, to the right of Objective
Charlie and flanking BLUE Beach.[132]
[132] 1st MarDiv _OpnO 2-50_; and 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex
Peter Peter.
While a question may arise as to the choice of landing the 5th
Marines in the very heart of Inchon, it must be remembered that
immediate seizure of the port facilities was vital to the success
of the operation. Hitting the beaches at only two-thirds infantry
strength, the 1st Marine Division could not swell to the overwhelming
proportions of an invasion force. A modern harbor for rapid build-up
and exploitation by X Corps figured inherently in MacArthur’s strategy.
If RED Beach thus constituted the critical objective, then the
selection of BLUE Beach for a supporting landing followed in logical
sequence. Once on the O-1 Line, the 1st Marines would flank the single
overland approach to the peninsular seaport, thereby presenting the
NKPA garrison with the grim alternatives of early flight, capitulation,
or strangulation. Without this leverage on Inchon’s flank and rear, the
5th Regiment could easily be swallowed up by two square miles of dense
urban area.
Four assault battalions would have two hours of daylight in which to
bridge the gap between planning and reality. From overhead and behind
they could expect a preponderance of heavy fire support, but ahead lay
enemy and hydrographic situations still clouded by question marks.
_Beginning the Ship-to-Shore Movement_
As the early afternoon of 15 September wore on, the continued silence
of Inchon beckoned temptingly to Lieutenant Colonel Taplett on
Wolmi-do. Having studied the city over a prolonged period without
detecting any significant evidence of Communist defensive capability,
he radioed Division headquarters for permission to move a strong
tank-infantry force across the causeway. The battalion commander
believed that 3/5 could launch either an effective reconnaissance in
force or an actual assault on RED Beach. Although his estimate of the
enemy potential was shortly borne out, the degree of risk in Taplett’s
bold plan drew a firm “negative” from the _Mount McKinley_.[133]
[133] Taplett interv, 25 Aug 54.
Busy with last-minute details aboard the command ship, General Smith
at noon had radioed General Craig instructions to land on Wolmi-do on
the evening tide and set up an advance echelon of the division command
post with the ADC group. Smith did not desire to land the remainder
of his headquarters until D-plus 1, when there would be more room for
dispersion within the expanding beachhead.[134]
[134] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 152.
The Landing Force Commander could look down from the flag bridge at
1400 and note the first signs of activity on the water. A few special
landing craft were beating the forthcoming traffic rush as they sped
toward the various ships to which they were assigned as command boats.
At the same time, the central control vessel, _Diachenko_ (APD 123),
edged forward to its key station 3,000 yards southwest of the BLUE
Beach line of departure. Lieutenant Commander Allmon checked the set
and drift of the current and radioed his observations to Admiral Doyle.
Estimated at three and a half knots, the run of current was heavier
than expected. After receiving the Senior Control Officer’s report, the
Attack Force Commander confirmed 1730 as H-Hour.[135]
[135] _Ibid._; ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_; and LCdr R. W.
Berry ltr to authors, 17 Mar 55.
The confirmation went out to the entire Joint Task Force at 1430, and
Admiral Higgins’ fire support ships immediately commenced the final
bombardment of Inchon. His four cruisers and six destroyers poured
shells into the seaport for the next three hours, smashing every
landmark of tactical importance and starting fires that blazed across
the whole waterfront.
Under the calculating eyes of tactical air observers and coordinators
in F4Us droning high above the objective area, VMFs-323 and -214
and three squadrons of Navy Skyraiders alternately blasted Inchon,
integrating their strikes with naval gunfire from H-minus 180 minutes
onward. Simultaneously, Fast Carrier Task Force 77 kept another 12
planes in the air continuously for deep support missions designed to
freeze all enemy activity within a radius of 25 miles.
As if enough obstacles did not confront the landing force already, rain
squalls began drifting past Inchon during the bombardment. Gradually
the storm clouds merged with the thick smoke boiling up from the city,
and heavy overcasts settled over large areas, particularly in the
vicinity of BLUE Beach.[136]
[136] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
Assault troops of the 5th Marines scrambled down cargo nets on the
_Henrico_ and _Cavalier_ to fill landing craft splashing into the water
from booms and davits. Nearly 200 LCVPs and 70 LCMs soon were joined
by 12 LSUs and 18 LVT(A)s, 164 LVTs, and 85 DUKWs disgorged from the
yawning wells of the LSTs, wherein the Marines of the 1st Regiment had
made ready for battle.[137]
[137] ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Annex Item; I.
Guided by Lieutenant Commander Ralph H. Schneeloch, USNR, the _Horace
A. Bass_, RED Beach control vessel, slowly steamed toward the line of
departure, a long file of assault craft trailing behind like a brood
of ducklings. Lieutenant Theodore B. Clark, USN, ordered the _Wantuck_
to the head of the boat lane to BLUE Beach, and _PCEC 896_, under
Lieutenant Reuben W. Berry, USN, took station off Wolmi-do to regulate
the waves scheduled for the administrative landing on GREEN Beach.[138]
[138] _Ibid._, VII; Cdr C. E. Allmon, USN, ltr to authors, 9
Mar 55; LCdr T. B. Clark, USN, ltr to authors, 11 Mar
55; and LCdr R. H. Schneeloch, USN, ltr to authors, 20
Mar 55.
At 1645, the 18 Army LVT(A)s comprising the first wave of the 1st
Marines crossed the line of departure and headed for BLUE Beach.
Crawling at four knots, the armored vehicles had three quarters of an
hour to cover the 5,500 yards to the target. The LCVPs, capable of
twice the speed of the amphibian tractors, left the inner transport
area near the _Diachenko’s_ station for the five-mile trip northward to
the RED and GREEN boat lanes.[139]
[139] ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Annex Item:VI.
The roar of the fire support ships increased in volume during the
approach of the landing craft until, at 1705 (H-minus 25), Admiral
Higgins signaled the LSMRs into action. At once the cruisers and
destroyers fell silent. Again missiles soared from the squat rocket
ships in high arcs that sent them plunging into the RED and BLUE
landing areas. Upwards of 6,000 rockets detonated in the seaport during
the next twenty minutes, further numbing the defenders but at the same
time increasing the density and volume of the overcast.[140]
[140] _Ibid._, Annex George: II; and Schneeloch ltr, 20 Mar
55.
_Seizure of Cemetery Hill_
The critical moment of every amphibious assault was now at hand--the
moment when intelligence and planning would be put to the test of
actuality. On the bridge of the _Mount McKinley_ high-ranking Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps officers gathered again about General MacArthur,
seated in a swivel chair. They listened for the second time that day as
the loud speaker gave a blow-by-blow account of developments reported
by aerial observers.
Everything that air attacks and naval gunfire could do to soften up
the target had been done, yet no one could be sure just what sort of
opposition the troops would encounter on RED and BLUE Beaches. It might
be as fainthearted as that brushed aside by 3/5 on Wolmi-do; or it
might be that another Tarawa awaited on those cramped strips of urban
waterfront lying between the mud flats of the harbor and the dark,
crooked streets of the Asiatic town and environs. The enemy had been
given ample time in which to prepare for a defense of the mainland.
Even the possibility of undetected mines or surprise NKPA air attacks
at the last minute had not been overlooked. Although the Attack Force
continued to exercise control from the TADC on the _Mount McKinley_
of all aircraft operating in its assigned area, an alternate control
agency had been installed on the USS _George Clymer_, utilizing an
emergency hookup and a control unit attached to TAC, X Corps. All
nets were manned and communications set up to permit a rapid shift of
control to General Cushman in case of disaster.[141]
[141] 1st MAW _SAR_, basic rpt; and LtGen (Ret) T. J. Cushman
interv, 26 Jul 54.
With H-hour only minutes away, the sky above the objective was murky
and the wind whipped rain as well as stinging spray into the faces
of the Marines in the assault waves. Only the Marine and Navy flyers
upstairs could see the panorama of the waterborne attack--the cruisers
and destroyers standing silent in the background, LSMR rocket flashes
stabbing the false twilight ashore, the landing craft trailing pale
wakes behind them like the tails of comets. The pilots observed the
LCVPs to the left of Wolmi-do fan out at the line of departure and
touch the sea wall of RED Beach minutes later. To the right of the
little island, however, they saw the leading waves of the 1st Marines
disappear in a blanket of gloom. For while the smoke and moisture-laden
air had obscured parts of the 5th Marines’ zone of action ashore, it
had completely blotted out BLUE Beach and half the length of the 1st
Regiment’s boat lanes. Because of this development and other factors
which posed special problems for the 1st Marines, the narrative will
treat each landing separately, beginning with that of the 5th Regiment
on the left.
Eight LCVPs had crossed the line of departure at H-minus 8 and sped
toward RED Beach with the first wave of the 5th Marines. Starting from
the left, boats numbered one through four carried parts of two assault
platoons of Company A, 1st Battalion, whose mission was to seize
Cemetery Hill and anchor the regimental left. In boats five through
eight were troops of Company E, 2d Battalion, whose task included
clearing the right flank of the beach and taking the hill of the
British Consulate.[142]
[142] The RED Beach narrative, unless otherwise noted, is
derived from: 1st Mar Div _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen;
LtCol M. R. Olson interv, 29 Dec 54; LtCol H. S. Roise
interv, 21 Dec 54; Maj J. R. Stevens interv, 1 Aug
54; Capt E. A. Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55; Capt G. C.
McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and 1stLt F. W. Muetzel
interv, 6 Jan 54.
From Wolmi-do 3/5’s machine guns, mortars, and supporting M-26s cut
loose with a hail of bullets and high explosive to cover the landing.
Technical Sergeant Knox lead an engineer team forward to clear the
causeway, in order that the detachment of Able Company Tanks could
advance to the mainland after the initial assault waves hit the beach.
As the landing craft passed the midway point of the 2,200-yard boat
lane, the heaving LSMRs ceased firing, so that Lieutenant Colonel
Walter E. Lischeid and Major Arnold A. Lund could lead in VMFs-214 and
-323 for final strikes on both RED and BLUE Beaches. Navy Skyraiders
joined in at the request of Captain John R. Stevens, commander of
Company A; and the FAC of 1/5, First Lieutenant James W. Smith,
controlled their strafing passes as the first wave came within 30 yards
of the sea wall.[143]
[143] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item:Baker; and 1stLt (Ret) F. W.
Muetzel ltr to CMC, 11 Apr 54.
Although the tide was racing in fast, the wall still projected about
four feet above the ramps of the landing craft. The Marines readied
their scaling ladders. On the right the boats of Company E touched the
revetment at 1731. Up went the ladders as the assault troops hurled
grenades over the wall. Following the explosions, the Marines from the
four boats scrambled to the top of the barrier one by one. The ladders
slipped and swayed as the LCVPs bobbed next to the wall. But they
served their purpose, and in short order every man of Second Lieutenant
Edwin A. Deptula’s 1st Platoon was on the beach.
There were no casualties from the few stray bullets cracking through
the air. Filtering through smoke and wreckage, the platoon moved inland
to cover the landing of the second and third waves, carrying the
remainder of Easy Company.
On the north of RED Beach, three of the four LCVPs with the leading
elements of Company A bumped the sea wall at 1733. Boat number one,
carrying Technical Sergeant Orval F. McMullen and half of his 1st
Platoon, was delayed offshore by an engine failure. The remainder of
the 1st, under the platoon guide, Sergeant Charles D. Allen, scaled
the wall from boat number two in the face of heavy fire from the north
flank and from submachine guns in a bunker directly ahead. Several
Marines were cut down immediately, the others being unable to advance
more than a few yards inland.
Boat number three, with Second Lieutenant Francis W. Muetzel and a
squad of his 2d Platoon, touched a breach in the sea wall under the
muzzle of an enemy machine gun protruding from a pillbox. The weapon
did not fire as the Marines scrambled through the gap and onto the
beach. A second squad and a 3.5-inch rocket section joined from boat
number four. Gunfire crackled far off on the left, barely audible amid
the road of fighter planes strafing fifty yards ahead. Muetzel and his
men jumped into a long trench which paralleled the sea wall a few feet
away. It was empty. Two Marines threw grenades into the silent pillbox,
and the six bloody North Koreans who emerged in the wake of the hollow
explosions were left under guard of a Marine rifleman.
Just beyond the beach loomed Cemetery Hill, its seaward side an almost
vertical bluff. To avoid getting trapped if the enemy opened up from
the high ground, Muetzel attacked toward his objective, the Asahi
Brewery, without waiting for the remainder of his men in the tardy
second wave. The skirmish line raced across the narrow beach, ignoring
padlocked buildings and flaming wreckage. Passing to the south of
Cemetery Hill, the 2d Platoon entered the built-up area of the city and
marched unopposed up a street to the brewery.
On the left of Company A’s zone, the beached half of the 1st Platoon
made no progress against the flanking fire and the Communist bunker
to the front. The 3d Platoon, under First Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez,
landed in the second wave, and McMullen finally got ashore with the
other half of the 1st. Both units crowded into the restricted foothold
and casualties mounted rapidly. Enemy guns had felled Lopez as he
climbed ashore and moved against the bunker with a grenade. Unable to
throw the armed missile because of his wound, the young officer was
killed when he smothered the explosion with his body to protect his
men. Two Marines attacked the emplacement with flame throwers. They
were shot down and their valuable assault weapons put out of action.
The situation on the left was at its worst when Captain Stevens landed
in Muetzel’s zone at H-plus 5. Learning of Lopez’ death and unable to
contact McMullen, he ordered his executive officer, First Lieutenant
Fred F. Eubanks, Jr., to “take over on the left and get them organized
and moving.”[144] Time was of the essence, since Cemetery Hill,
objective of the 1st Platoon, yet remained in enemy hands. Succeeding
waves would be landing hundreds of Marines in the shadow of the cliff
within the next half hour. Stevens also radioed Muetzel, whose small
force had just reached the brewery without suffering a casualty, and
ordered the 2d Platoon back to the beach to help out.
[144] Capt F. F. Eubanks, Jr., ltr to CMC, 2 Jun 55.
Muetzel immediately formed his unit in column and struck out on the
return trip to the waterfront. Nearing Cemetery Hill again, he noted
that the southern slope of the vital objective was an excellent
route of approach to the top. In planning Company A’s part of the
operation, Stevens had once told him that the 2d Platoon could expect
to help seize the high ground if the job proved too rough for the 1st
alone.[145] With a creditable display of judgment and initiative,
Muetzel launched an assault on the key to RED Beach.
[145] Maj J. R. Stevens ltr to authors, 29 Mar 55.
The Marines moved rapidly up the incline, flushing out about a
dozen Red soldiers who surrendered meekly. Gaining the summit,
they drove forward and saw the entire crest suddenly come alive
with infantry-crewmen of the 226th NKPA Regiment’s mortar company.
Spiritless and dazed from the pounding by air and naval gunfire, the
North Koreans to a man threw down their weapons, filed quietly from
trenches and bunkers, and marched to the base of the hill where a
small detachment kept them under guard. Hardly a shot had been fired
by the 2d Platoon, still without a single casualty, and the capture of
Cemetery Hill had required about ten minutes.
During the attack on the high ground, Eubanks had taken the situation
in hand on the left of the beach. He first bested the bunker’s
occupants in a grenade duel, then ordered the emplacement fired by a
flame thrower. Just as Muetzel prepared to dispatch assistance from the
top of Cemetery Hill, the 1st and 3d Platoons broke out of the pocket,
drove inland to the edge of the city, and made physical contact with
the 2d.
At 1755, Stevens fired an amber star cluster signifying that Cemetery
Hill was secured for the 5th Marines. The half-hour fight in the north
corner of RED Beach had cost Company A eight killed and 28 wounded.
_RED Beach Secured_
After landing in 2/5’s first wave, the 1st Platoon of Company E
pushed inland 100 yards to the railroad tracks against no resistance
whatsoever. Captain Samuel Jaskilka was ashore with the rest of the
Company by H-plus 10, and reorganization took place quickly near the
Nippon Flour Company buildings, just south of the beach. Deptula’s
platoon then moved unopposed down the railroad tracks and seized the
British Consulate, Regimental Objective C, at 1845. Simultaneously,
another platoon cleared the built-up area across the tracks on the
lower slopes of Observatory Hill. These rapid accomplishments secured
the 5th Marines’ right flank, giving an added measure of protection to
22 more waves of landing craft and LSTs scheduled for RED Beach.
Still in enemy hands, however, was Observatory Hill, reaching well over
200 feet above the center of the regimental zone to buttress the arc of
the O-A Line. Company C of the 1st Battalion, landing in the fourth and
fifth waves shortly before 1800, was to take Objective A, northern half
of the critical terrain feature. To Dog Company of 2/5 was charged the
southern half, designated Objective B.
That the attack did not go off as planned stemmed from a series of
mishaps which began as far out as the line of departure. Despite
the fact that Lieutenant Commander Schneeloch was using standard
control procedures from the _Bass_, including radio contact with the
beach, there was a mixing of waves starting with number four.[146]
This development reflected the lack of a rehearsal in the hurried
preparations for the operation, and the end result was that parts of
Companies C and D, both in the second assault echelon, landed over
the wrong beaches.[147] After landing, Charlie Company had the added
disadvantage of being without its company commander for a crucial 12
minutes. Captain Poul F. Pedersen was delayed when the fifth-wave
commander, who shared his boat, decided to tow a stalled LCVP left
behind by the preceding formation.[148] When he finally reached his
company, the job of reorganization was much more difficult than it
would have been had he arrived at the beach on schedule. With troops
pouring over the sea wall from succeeding waves, what had begun as
intermingling at the point of overlap in the center of the landing area
had grown to temporary congestion and confusion.
[146] Schneeloch ltr, 20 Mar 55.
[147] Col G. R. Newton ltr to CMC, 8 Apr 55.
[148] Capt P. F. Pedersen memo to CMC, 1 May 55.
[Illustration: SEIZURE OF RED BEACH
5TH MARINES]
_LSTs Under Enemy Fire_
Out in the channel, the first of eight LSTs[149] heralded the climax of
the ship-to-shore movement at 1830 by crossing the line of departure
and heading for the sea wall. Prior to the approach, ships’ officers
had spotted the close fighting on the north flank of RED Beach as
they peered through binoculars from their respective bridges. Later,
noting the growing knot of Marines in the center of the waterfront
area, they concluded that the assault troops could not advance inland.
This impression was strengthened by an abrupt procession of gun
flashes on Observatory Hill where, owing to the delay in the attack by
Companies C and D, a handful of enemy soldiers had recovered from shock
sufficiently to set up machine guns. A few North Korean mortar crews in
the city also came to life and manned their weapons.
[149] Under the over all command of LCdr James C. Wilson,
who flew his broad pennant in LST 859, the eight ships
were: 859 (Lt L. Tinsley); 883 (Lt C. M. Miller);
914 (Lt R. L. Holzhaus); 973 (Lt R. I. Trapp); 898
(Lt R. M. Beckley); 975 (Lt A. W. Harer); 857 (Lt D.
Weidemeyer); and 799 (Lt T. E. Houston).
LST 859, leading the pack, came under mortar and machine-gun fire as it
waddled toward its berth about 1835. Gun crews on the ship reacted by
opening up with 40mm and 20mm cannon, spraying Cemetery and Observatory
Hills and the right flank of the beach. Next in the column of ships,
LSTs 975 and 857 likewise commenced firing after taking hits from
mortars and machine guns. Enemy automatic weapons touched off a fire
near ammunition trucks on LST 914, trailing fourth, but sailors and
Marines quickly brought the blaze under control. Guns on the latter
ship remained silent as a result of dispatch orders received by the
captain after leaving the line of departure.[150]
[150] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; LtGen (Ret) E. A.
Craig ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 55; LCdr R. I. Trapp, USN, ltr
to CMC, 18 Mar 55; and Lt (Ret) R. L. Holzhaus, USN,
ltr to CMC, 14 Mar 55.
Lieutenant Muetzel and his platoon were chased by LST fire from the
crest of Cemetery Hill to the slope facing Inchon--where they came
under fire from a Red machine gun in a building on Observatory Hill.
Fortunately, a 40mm shell from one of the LSTs crashed into the
building and obliterated the enemy position. There were no casualties
in Muetzel’s outfit, but Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s 2d Battalion did
not fare as luckily from the misdirected shooting by the American
ships. Weapons and H&S Companies of 2/5 had landed about 1830 and were
just proceeding inland when LST fire seared their ranks, killing one
Marine and wounding 23 others. “If it hadn’t been for the thick walls
of the Nippon Flour Company,” remarked Roise later, “the casualties
might have been worse.”[151]
[151] LtCol H. S. Roise ltr to authors, 23 Mar 55.
All eight of the supply vessels were intact in their berths by 1900.
Guns fell silent as soon as the LSTs touched the sea wall and contact
was established with the infantry.
On the beach, meanwhile, Second Lieutenant Byron L. Magness had
reorganized his 2d Platoon of Company C and, on his own initiative,
attacked Observatory Hill. Second Lieutenant Max A. Merritt’s 60mm
mortar section followed closely behind, but the rest of the company
remained fragmented in the landing area. Sparked by Technical Sergeant
Max Stein, who was wounded while personally accounting for a North
Korean machine gun, the provisional force advanced rapidly in the
gathering darkness and at 1845 seized the saddle between Objectives A
and B on Observatory Hill. This was just about the time when the LSTs
stopped firing.[152]
[152] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Maj F. I.
Fenton, Jr., ltr to authors, 21 Mar 55.
Since their single flare misfired and they were not able to raise
Lieutenant Pedersen by radio, Magness and Merritt were unable to inform
the beach of their success. In the meantime, Company B, 1/5’s reserve,
had landed in the 2d Battalion zone, the waves having swerved to
that area to avoid small-arms fire peppering their assigned approach
on the left. Captain Francis I. Fenton, Jr., led the unit through a
mixed group on the waterfront to an assembly area near the base of
Cemetery Hill. When he discussed the beach situation by radio with the
battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Newton ordered him to take over
Charlie Company’s mission and assault the northern half of Observatory
Hill.[153]
[153] _Ibid._; Newton ltr, 8 Apr 55; and Capt B. L. Magness
ltr to CMC, 29 Mar 55.
_Fighting on Observatory Hill_
Darkness had fallen when Company B drove up the slopes of Objective A
in a two-pronged attack. Six Marines were wounded in brief skirmishes
with North Korean die-hards along the way. Gaining the summit at 2000,
Fenton deployed three platoons on line, making contact with the
Magness-Merritt force dug in on the saddle to the right. With Objective
A seized and Able Company deployed on top and to the flanks of Cemetery
Hill, Newton radioed the 5th Marines at 2240 that 1/5’s segment of the
O-A Line was secured.[154]
[154] _Ibid._
In the right of the 5th Marines’ zone, the 2d Battalion had also been
making gains, despite the handicaps of mixed boat waves, LST fire, poor
visibility, and, finally, enemy action.[155] It will be recalled that
Company E suffered no casualties in landing and clearing the waterfront
as far south as Objective C, the British Consulate. Next to hit the
beach was First Lieutenant H. J. Smith’s Company D, part of which went
ashore in 1/5’s zone. Assembling later near the base of Observatory
Hill, the unit prepared to carry out its mission of seizing Objective
B, the southern half of the big ridge.
[155] The following narrative is derived from: 1st Mar Div
_SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54;
Roise ltr, 23 Mar 55; McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; and
Magness ltr, 29 Mar 55.
Although 2d Battalion overlays show that Easy Company bore no
responsibility for the crest of Observatory Hill, Smith’s men somehow
got the impression that part of Jaskilka’s force was already on the
summit. Its tactics based on this misunderstanding, Company D formed
a simple route column, with Second Lieutenant Ray Heck’s 1st Platoon
leading the way, and marched up a street to the top of the hill. The
vanguard troops cleared the first peak in the company zone without
opposition and continued along the road to the second, expecting to
meet men of Company E. They were greeted, however, by machine-gun fire
from an enemy squad entrenched to the right of the street.
The Marines tumbled into positions on the left. Grenades and small-arms
fire flew back and forth across the road during a brisk exchange that
lasted about 15 minutes. One of Heck’s men was killed and three others
wounded. The company corpsmen was hit but refused evacuation until
he had first administered to the other casualties and seen them off
to safety. Company D’s executive officer, First Lieutenant Michael
J. Dunbar, went forward with Lieutenant Colonel Roise, the battalion
commander, and was wounded by a ricochet.
The enemy troops were driven off just as darkness closed in, leaving
the Marines to grope for night defensive positions on unfamiliar
ground. Eventually Lieutenant Smith formed a line with all three
rifle platoons deployed on the forward slopes of Objective B. Out of
battalion reserve came Second Lieutenant Harry J. Nolan’s platoon of
Company F to bridge the gap between Company D and the Magness-Merritt
positions in 1/5’s zone on the left.
With Cemetery and Observatory Hills secured, the only portion of
the O-A Line not yet under control was the extreme right, anchored
on the inner tidal basin. Since the night was pitch black, Roise
felt apprehensive about sending troops any farther into the city.
In answer to a query, Lieutenant Colonel Murray, whose regimental
headquarters had landed at 1830 and set up near the terminus of the
Wolmi-do causeway, emphasized to Roise that where the O-A Line could
not actually be defended from a suitable tactical standpoint, it must
at least be outposted. The battalion commander forthwith dispatched a
two-squad patrol from Fox Company to the tidal basin, and the small
force returned from the 1,000-yard prowl into the city at 2300, having
seen no sign of the enemy. Roise reacted by committing Company F, less
its platoon on Observatory Hill, to a defensive perimeter on the right
flank. Shortly after midnight, Captain Uel D. Peters deployed the
company next to the tidal basin as ordered; and the 5th Marines’ O-A
Line, though not manned in entirety, came as close to tactical reality
as the tangled black depths of the seaport would allow.
_1st Marines on BLUE Beach_
As mentioned earlier, the overcast resulting from rain squalls and
smoke had completely blotted out BLUE Beach by H-hour, 1730. This fact
in itself would have sufficed to upset a precise landing procedure;
but at this point in the narrative, it is timely to review some of the
other problems which had beset the 1st Marines since the inception of
the plan for the Inchon assault.[156]
[156] The preliminary to the landing account is derived from:
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Col R. W. Rickert
memo to authors, 15 Apr 55; ltr, 11 May 55; Col A.
Sutter and Maj G. S. Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; Col
A. Sutter memo to authors, 5 May 55; and Maj E. H.
Simmons ltr to CMC, 28 Mar 55.
In the short space of weeks, the regiment had been brought up to war
strength by the rapid convergence on Camp Pendleton of Marines--in
units or as individuals, both regular and reserve--from all over the
United States; it had embarked at San Diego and crossed the Pacific;
and it had reloaded and embarked from Japan for a combat operation
designed to quench a major conflagration. There had been time for only
the sketchiest training above the company level. The new 1st Marines
had never operated tactically as a regiment, nor had it ever been
concentrated in one place as an organizational entity up until the time
it hit BLUE Beach.
During the planning phase in Kobe, battalions had to combat-load their
LSTs according to an X factor, while awaiting the prescribed tactical
plans that would be handed down from higher echelon at the last
minute. Intelligence on the enemy and beach conditions was practically
non-existent; and the speculative studies and inadequate photos
available could be kept only a few hours before being passed on to the
next unit in line.
Whenever Marines are given a difficult assignment, the United States
Navy invariably draws its own full measure of handicaps. A typical
example of the problems confronting naval planners was this case, cited
by Major Edwin H. Simmons, of 3/1:
“I was aboard LST 802, which was carrying H&S Company and
elements of Weapons Company. The ship had just been recovered
from the island trade. Her captain had been flown out to
Sasebo from the States, given a pick-up crew and two weeks to
condition the ship and crew for an amphibious landing. Despite
his best efforts, the 802 had three major breakdowns and had to
drop out of convoy several times. At one point it appeared as
though the battalion command group would have to be taken off
the 802 if they were to get to Inchon in time.”
In connection with BLUE Beach itself, officers of the 1st Marines had
only a vague impression of offshore conditions and the accessibility
of the landing site. As already noted, the current in the channel was
underestimated, and so little was known about the consistency of the
mud flats that each landing craft contained planking for emergency use
by the assault troops.
The sole exit from BLUE One was the dirt road already mentioned. On
aerial photos the drainage ditch separating BLUE One and Two appeared
to be some kind of a road over which tractors could crawl ashore. No
one was certain, and “BLUE Beach Three,” the cove on the right, was
ruled out as a possible landing area early in the planning. At the last
minute, however, recent aerial photos and studies led to the conclusion
that both the inlet and the ramp at the southern tip of BLUE Two might
be good approaches after all. Acting on this information while en route
to the target area, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, commanding
officer of 3/1, decided to explore personally the right flank with
his executive officer at the outset of the assault. If the ramp, BLUE
Three, or both were accessible to LVTs, Ridge would divert later
assault echelons on a “follow me” basis.
Thus vital questions were to remain unanswered until the officers
and men of the 1st Marines got their first look at BLUE Beach. It
was keenly disappointing, therefore, when they stared from the line
of departure on the afternoon of 15 September and saw, instead of
the distant shoreline, a murky wall rolling seaward from the blazing
waterfront.
As noted previously, the line of departure was 5,500 yards--3.2
miles--from the beach, a distance requiring 45-minute trips for the
slow-moving LVT waves. The ship-to-shore movement got off to a bad
start owing to the current, which scattered some of the landing
formations during the rendezvous phase. Other obstacles entered the
picture in rapid succession, one of them best described by Lieutenant
Clark, BLUE Beach Control Officer:
“At about H-50, while press boats and the initial waves of
LVT(A) and LVT were milling around the BLUE Beach control
vessel [_Wantuck_], mortar fire was received in the immediate
vicinity. This created some confusion until a destroyer spun
around on her anchor and silenced the battery. This was the
beginning of the end of the well-planned ship-to-shore movement
for BLUE Beach.”[157]
[157] Clark ltr, 11 Mar 55.
Other shortcomings that took on special significance because of the
overcast were the lack of compasses and radios in the amphibian
tractors and the inexperience of many of the crews. The first wave,
consisting of the Army LVT(A)s, was escorted shoreward from the line of
departure by Navy guide boats, manned by UDT crews who possessed both
the compasses and seamanship necessary to pierce the smoke screen and
find the distant beach on time.[158] Wave number two, only a minute
behind and close enough to benefit by the expert guidance, did not fare
too badly. The ragged formation of number three, however, indicated
mounting difficulties at the line of departure. From a study of
numerous accounts, the experience of Major Simmons appears to have been
typical:
[158] Unless otherwise cited, the remainder of this section
is derived from: ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Item, V-VI;
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; 2/1 _SAR_ and
_OpPlan 1-50_; Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and
Capt B. F. Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
“Wave 5 cleared the 802 about 1630. We had been told that
a wave guide would pick us up and lead us to the line of
departure.... Time was passing and we were feeling desperate
when we came alongside what was apparently the central control
vessel. I asked the bridge for instructions. A naval officer
with a bull horn pointed out the direction of BLUE Two, but
nothing could be seen in that direction except mustard-colored
haze and black smoke. We were on our way, and our path crossed
that of another wave. I asked if they were headed for BLUE Two.
Their wave commander answered, ‘Hell no, we’re the 2d Battalion
headed for BLUE One.’ We then veered off to the right. I broke
out my map, but the LVT driver had no compass.... With no
confidence in its accuracy within a steel hull, I got out my
lensatic compass and made a best guess as to the azimuth of our
approach line.”[159]
[159] Simmons ltr, 28 Mar 55.
The nine LVT(A)s leading off for Lieutenant Colonel Alan Sutter’s 2d
Battalion thrashed through the gloom and crawled ashore on BLUE One at
1730, on schedule. Meeting no opposition at the beach, they rumbled
northward to the road skirting the knoll in order to penetrate the
interior. The exit was blocked by an earth slide resulting from the
naval bombardment of the high ground, and the column of amphibious
vehicles ground to a halt.
At H-plus 1, most of the eleven LVTs of the second wave crunched ashore
with elements of two assault companies. The remainder, with troops of
Fox Company embarked, had grounded in mud about 300 yards offshore.
The Marines had to wade to the beach, and they lost several pieces
of communications gear in potholes en route. Company D, on the left,
was to have remained aboard the tractors for the drive inland, while
the troops of Company F debarked at the beach, cleared the knoll, and
continued overland on foot. The latter scheme of maneuver unfolded as
planned, and the Marines encountered no resistance when they swept to
the top of the high ground. Dog Company, meanwhile, had also dismounted
because of the blocked road.
The third wave groped ashore through the smoke at H-plus 4, bringing
the remainder of both assault companies and raising the total strength
on BLUE One to 30 tractors and over 600 men. Noting that the beach was
getting crowded, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter ordered his free tractor
to pull alongside the revetment of the evaporator on the left. When
his battalion headquarters had debarked on the wall, he turned his
attention seaward that he might signal the succeeding three waves,
carrying the rest of 2/1, to do likewise. He looked and waited in vain,
however, for the LVT formations did not materialize out of the offshore
haze.
Meanwhile, Companies D and F reorganized quickly to continue the
attack. Looking inland from the knoll, officers and NCOs could catch
glimpses of the unfamiliar terrain only between billows of smoke.
Several landmarks loomed ahead that were not marked on the inaccurate
tactical maps. Many others that had been recorded were ablaze, and the
numerous fires would make direct compass marches difficult. Moreover,
since the enemy situation inland was open to conjecture, dispersed
tactical formations would add to the problem of controlling the Marine
advance.
Despite these disadvantages, Sutter pressed the attack. Easy Company
in battalion reserve, together with part of Weapons and H&S, had not
landed, nor had all of the vital signal equipment for supporting arms.
But further waiting and delay was out of the question, since only about
an hour of daylight remained.
Company D struck out for Regimental Objective ABLE, the junction on
the left flank 1,000 yards away, and Company F drove northeast in the
direction of Objective DOG, Hill 117. It was almost dark when the last
of the 600 troops plunged forward into the unknown, leaving LVT crews
behind to open the road with picks and shovels.
_Ending the Ship-to-Shore Movement_
The nine LVT(A)s comprising 3/1’s first wave had closed on the sea wall
of BLUE Beach Two shortly after H-hour.[160] Nosing their vehicles
toward the drainage ditch on the left, the drivers apparently eyed
the muck and conformation of the restricted passageway with some
skepticism, for they backed off and exchanged fire with scattered enemy
soldiers shooting from just beyond the waterfront.
[160] Unless otherwise cited, this section is derived from:
ComPhibGru-1 _OpnO 14-50_, Item, V-VI; 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annexes Peter Peter and Tare Tare; LtCol R. R.
Myers interv, 1 Feb 55; LtCol J. D. Trompeter interv,
31 Jan 55; Maj D. W. Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; Maj
W. L. Bates interv with MarCorps HistDiv, 27 Aug 51;
Capt J. G. Costigan interv, 17 Nov 54; Capts R. W.
Crowley and N. L. Adams II interv, 9 Feb 55.
Wave number two passed through the Army tractors and bumped the sea
wall ten minutes late with the leading elements of Companies G and I,
the former on the left. Since the landing echelons had intermingled
in the cloudy boat lane, some LVTs of the third wave arrived with
those of the second. This accounted for Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s
tractor reaching the beach one increment ahead of schedule. The
battalion commander and his executive officer, Major Reginald R. Myers,
immediately swung their separate vehicles around to the right flank,
Ridge heading toward the ramp while the other officer continued around
the corner in the direction of BLUE Three.
On the left of BLUE Two, meanwhile, the amphibians carrying Captain
George C. Westover’s Company G formed a column and crawled into the
drainage ditch.[161] Troops of First Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher’s Item
Company simultaneously scrambled up their aluminum ladders and deployed
just beyond the sea wall in the face of moderate small arms fire.
As had been anticipated, some of the metal scaling devices bent and
buckled under the strain, delaying troop debarkation from the landing
craft crowding the revetment. Assault elements of Captain Lester G.
Harmon’s Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, reached the beach and
anchored cargo nets over the wall to speed up the landing.[162]
[161] Maj G. C. Westover memo to CMC, 21 Apr 55.
[162] Rickert memo, 15 Apr 55. “Study of aerial photos of
BLUE Beach prior to departing Kobe, Japan, convinced
CO, 1st Marines, that aluminum scaling ladders might
not suffice for the sea wall. Consequently, the assault
companies were provided with debarkation nets, 3´
steel picket pins, and sledges with which to anchor
the nets on the reverse slope of the sea wall. The
nets proved very valuable, not only with regard to
getting personnel ashore but particularly in landing
crew-served weapons, ammo, and equipment.”
The lead tractor in George Company’s column bellied down in the mud of
the drainage ditch, blocking five other LVTs behind. Westover ordered
his troops to dismount and move forward along a road near the beach.
After a brief period of reorganization, Company G fanned out for
the drive inland, its mission being to block a lowland corridor and
secondary access road leading to BLUE Beach out of the east.[163]
[163] Westover memo, 21 Apr 55.
Just about the time Westover’s LVTs bogged down in the ditch on the
left, the tractors transporting Ridge and Myers crawled ashore over
the ramp and BLUE Beach Three respectively, setting a precept for the
mounting number of landing craft lying off BLUE Two. A heavy volume of
traffic was thus diverted to the cove, and the appreciable gain in time
far outweighed the intermingling which developed by landing troops at a
right angle to those scaling the sea wall.
[Illustration: SEIZURE OF BLUE BEACH
1ST MARINES]
In recalling the situation ashore as of 1800 (H-plus30), Colonel Lewis
B. Puller, the regimental commander, later observed:
“I personally landed on BLUE Beach with the 3d wave. My reason
for doing so was, exactly, that there was a strong possibility
of confusion and disorganization under the circumstances:
namely, the unavoidable necessity of landing the regiment
without a rehearsal, without even a CPX.... The reorganization
of the assault battalions was accomplished with remarkable
speed and effectiveness. I recall being, at the time, extremely
gratified that my prior concern in this connection was not
warranted.”[164]
[164] MajGen L. B. Puller ltr to authors, 11 May 55.
Despite the initial delays at the ditch and sea wall, Companies G and I
cleared the beach rapidly. Of the few casualties taken during the first
30 minutes ashore, most were caused by an enemy machine gun in a tower
about 500 yards inland. LVT fire silenced the weapon, and the Marine
infantry plunged forward through a labyrinth of blazing buildings
and smoke-filled streets. On the left, George Company groped almost
straight ahead toward the lowland corridor as Item veered sharply
southward to attack Objective CHARLIE, the seaward tip of Hill 233.
While the assault units fought inland, the gathering darkness created
one more formidable handicap for the last wave serials leaving the
line of departure far out in the channel. The four Navy guide boats,
mentioned earlier as having escorted the first wave, were exactly 28
short of the number prescribed by amphibious doctrine for a landing
of the Inchon assault’s magnitude.[165] For this reason the guide
boats took station on either side of the boat lanes after the initial
run, since it was manifestly impossible for them to help out in any
other way. The limited visibility, however, just about negated their
worth as stationary markers, owing to the fact that some landing craft
formations were losing their direction even before they entered the
boat lanes.
[165] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Tare Tare, 4.
In describing the situation as it developed at the line of departure
Lieutenant Clark later commented:
“The BLUE Beach Control Officer was unable to contact LVT
wave commanders or wave guide officers by radio at any time
during the initial assault. The control officer was aware that
waves or groups of LVTs and boats were landing at the wrong
places but was helpless to prevent it without communications.
As a last resort, Casualty and Salvage landing craft were
dispatched to assist the initial wave guides (members of UDT
1) in rounding up vehicles and leading or directing them to
BLUE Beach.”[166]
[166] Clark ltr, 11 Mar 55.
Since current and smoke fought relentlessly against tractors seaward of
the line of departure, not all of the vehicles could find the control
ship. If they did, it was next to impossible to come in close enough to
get instructions shouted from the bridge. Thus many wave commanders,
amtrac officers, and infantry leaders gave orders to head shoreward
on their own initiative. They went in with waves and fragments of
waves, displaying the kind of leadership that made the operation an
overwhelming success in spite of the obstacles. This was the case with
the three waves of 2/1 that failed to arrive at BLUE One. They found
their way ashore, some of the LVTs landing on BLUE Two, others diverted
to BLUE Three; but the important thing was that they got there.[167]
[167] Capt J. L. Carter ltr to CMC, 12 Apr 55.
The most serious error of the day, again offset by initiative and
decision, involved Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins’ 1st Battalion,
landing in regimental reserve.[168] About H-hour, Puller radioed
Hawkins and ordered him to cross the line of departure with LCVP waves
21 through 25, carrying the whole of 1/1. Had the approach to the beach
gone smoothly, the battalion would have begun landing at approximately
H-plus 45 (1815).
[168] The following account of 1/1 is derived from: Rickert
memo, 15 Apr 55; LtCol J. Hawkins ltr, 8 Mar 55; Bates
interv, 27 Aug. 51; Bridges interv, 18 Oct. 54, and
memo to CMC, 31 Mar 55; Maj R. H. Barrow memo to CMC,
25 Apr 55; and Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 23 Apr 55.
Because of conditions in the channel and boat lanes, as already
described, a searchlight on the control ship now beamed the supposed
course to the beach. Actually, the whole area had become so clouded
that the light was mistakenly pointed toward the outer tidal basin,
some 45 degrees off course to the northeast.
Moving in the designated direction, the first two of the reserve waves
reached the sea wall of the basin; and the Marines, believing they were
at the revetment of BLUE Two, began debarking. Hawkins, following in
the third wave (wave number 23), caught the error as his boat passed
within sight of two outlying islands between the basin and the salt
evaporator jutting out from the left of BLUE One. About the same time,
Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rickert, executive officer of the 1st
Marines, noticed some of the errant landing craft from his free boat
between the line of departure and BLUE One. He intercepted a group of
the LCVPs and reoriented them.
In the meantime, Hawkins cruised the length of the basin wall and
shouted instructions to the troops of the first two waves. Most of
Company B had already debarked and a few of the empty boats had left
for the channel. Able Company, having just begun to land, promptly
reembarked in its LCVPs. In short order, the battalion reformed at sea
and headed toward BLUE Two. Owing to the lack of boats, one platoon of
Baker Company remained on the tidal basin all night. Hiking to rejoin
the company on the mainland next morning, this platoon rounded up an
impressive bag of prisoners.
Upon reaching BLUE Two in darkness, Hawkins found Company C, which
had avoided the detour owing to the sixth sense of a boat coxswain,
organizing and setting up local security. The battalion commander led
most of 1/1 forward to a night assembly area along the railroad tracks,
half a mile inland. Major David W. Bridges, battalion S-3, was left
behind to organize late-comers as they arrived from the tidal basin.
_Seizure of the O-1 Line_
The tactical situation ashore had meanwhile begun to crystallize
for the 1st Marines. In the 2d Battalion zone, Dog Company occupied
Objective A, the road intersection, at 2000. Two hours later, Fox
Company reported that it occupied enough of Objective D, Hill 117, so
that it could cover the Inchon-Seoul highway with fire.
The attack from the beach had cost Sutter’s unit one KIA and 19 WIA as
compared to enemy losses of 15 prisoners and an estimated 50 dead.
On the right of the regimental zone, Ridge’s 3d Battalion was also
making good progress against light resistance. Item Company reported at
1900 that it was on Objective C, the western nose of Hill 233. Half an
hour later, George company began deploying in blocking positions across
the corridor and road at the center of the O-1 Line. This movement was
completed about 2030.[169]
[169] Ridge ltr, 11 May 55.
The 1st Platoon of How Company passed seaward of Item at 2030 and
pressed a night attack against a company of North Koreans on Objective
B, the small cape topped by Hill 94. After a token resistance, the
Reds abandoned their well-prepared entrenchments, leaving 30 dead and
wounded to be counted by the Marines.
How Company (less 1st and 2d Platoons) covered the low ground between
George and Item, finally occupying a blocking position about 400 yards
behind the O-1 Line.
With the seizure of Hill 94, the critical portions of the O-1 Line
were secured. There was, however, a good deal of activity within the
perimeter for several more hours. Major Bridges of 1/1 collected about
100 late-comers at BLUE Three and led them forward in search of the
battalion assembly area. Composed of men from H&S, Able and Baker
Companies, the little force not only missed its destination but made
one of the deepest penetrations of the day, finally halting on a hill
to the left of George Company’s front lines.
Shortly after Bridges set up a defensive position for the night, his
position was invaded by an Easy Company contingent in search of the
2d Battalion. Reoriented to some degree, the visitors reached Dog
Company’s intersection much later. The 2d Battalion CP had meanwhile
intercepted a group from Major Whitman S. Bartley’s Weapons Company at
the trail junction selected in the darkness for the initial battalion
CP. At one or the other of these points, the misdirected portions of
Sutter’s battalion were directed to their parent units. All personnel
were present or accounted for before dawn.[170]
[170] Sutter memo, May 55.
Two other troop movements completed the tactical mosaic of the 1st
Marines. The 2d Platoon of How Company was to pass through Item’s lines
on Objective C at 2330 and outpost the summit of Hill 233, some 2,000
yards farther along the ridge and beyond the regimental front. After
setting out on schedule, the small unit covered about half of its
rugged journey upon reaching Hill 180, an intermediate height. With
most of the night gone and his troops wearied by the climb, the platoon
leader radioed for permission to halt and his request was granted.
Another venture into the unknown was made by an even smaller unit.
Second Lieutenant Bruce F. Cunliffe’s 60mm section of Fox Company had
somehow mingled with 3d Battalion troops during the drive inland. When
he led his men through the darkness in search of 2/1, the section
ranged forward of friendly lines and into unexplored territory near
Hill 117.
The surprise was mutual when these Marines stumbled into a small NKPA
patrol. But a brief fire fight in the darkness was enough for the Red
soldiers, who took to their heels and left three dead. Cunliffe’s
force, which had no casualties, spent the rest of the night in
uneventful isolation.
CHAPTER VII
Securing the Beachhead
_Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches--Surgical Teams on the
Beaches--Artillery and Tank Operations--The Attack on D-plus 1--Advance
to the Force Beachhead Line--Displacement Ashore of Division CP_
Of all the calculated risks taken at Inchon, perhaps the most daring
was the decision to ground eight LSTs abreast on RED Beach immediately
after the assault troops landed. The Navy workhorses were vulnerable
enough at best, and on this narrow strip of waterfront they were lined
up so close to one another that shots fired by a blindfolded enemy
could scarcely have missed.
Not all the NKPA shells and bullets did miss, for that matter. But
fortune as usual blessed the bold, and such enemy rounds as found their
targets did not touch off tons of napalm, gasoline, and ammunition.
Only with reluctance had the planners accepted the risk of landing
thin-skinned supply vessels before the immediate battle area was
secured. But Inchon was not a typical amphibious operation. The
tremendous tidal range created an unprecedented situation; and if vital
supplies were not landed on the evening high tide, the assault troops
must pass a precarious first night without adequate quantities of
ammunition, water, and gasoline.
Dusk had fallen, with visibility further reduced by smoke and rain
squalls, when the vessels wallowed into RED Beach. The reconnaissance
element of Shore Party Group Able had gone ahead with the assault
troops to erect landing guides during the last moments of daylight.
While the men were working under fire, one of the beach markers was
riddled by enemy machine guns as it was being erected.
The H&S Company of Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe’s 1st Shore Party
Battalion came in with the first of the LSTs, and other elements of
Groups Able and Baker followed in short order. Each of the eight
vessels brought a cargo consisting of 50 tons of ammunition, 30 tons
of rations, 15 tons of water, and five tons of fuel. These special
loads were in addition to the normal cargo of engineer and shore party
equipment and combat vehicles. Every LST was limited to 500 short
tons, however, in order to insure that it could be beached without
trouble.[171]
[171] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Dog.
The last of the LCMs had not yet unloaded and retracted on RED Beach
when the first of the LSTs appeared slightly ahead of schedule. Naval
officers managed to hold the LSTs back until the beach had cleared, and
the eight vessels made a successful landing in spite of treacherous
currents combined with low visibility. Two of them grounded momentarily
on the mud flats but butted their way through to the beach. And though
the sea wall temporarily prevented several vessels from lowering bow
ramps effectively, the LSTs at each end of the line were able to
discharge cargo over their ramps.[172]
[172] LCdr R. Schneelock, Jr., USN, memo to authors, 20 Apr
55.
Bulldozers were first on the beach. They moved along the sea wall under
enemy fire, pushing down sections of masonry which interfered with
unloading operations.
LST 973 had no more than grated ashore when a Red Korean mortar shell
exploded among the drums of motor fuel. Gasoline flooded the main
deck and leaked down to the crew quarters through holes made by shell
fragments. Orders were given to cut off electric motors and enforce
all possible precautions, and the vessel miraculously escaped a
conflagration even though it took further hits from enemy machine-gun
fire.[173]
[173] Karig, _Korea_, 236–241.
LST 857 ran into a ROK PC boat while heading in toward the beach,
but no harm was done to either vessel. Hits from NKPA mortar and
machine-gun fire punctured eight drums of gasoline without any of them
bursting into flame. This was one of the LSTs which fired back at
enemy gun flashes. During the exchange a sailor was killed and another
knocked unconscious when an enemy projectile damaged one of the LST’s
gun mounts.
LST 859, which had a sailor wounded by enemy mortar fragments, hit
RED Beach with all guns blazing away. When the vessel beached, it was
immediately boarded by Marines who helped themselves to ammunition
while shouting to sailors in the well deck to stop firing. The same
message was slammed home more authoritatively when First Lieutenant
William J. Peter, Jr., appeared on deck, as directed by Lieutenant
Colonel Newton, and demanded that the LST’s guns cease at once.[174]
[174] MSgt B. W. Gifford interv, 17 Nov 54; Col G. R. Newton
memo to authors, 16 Apr 55; LCdr D. Weidemeyer memo to
authors, 12 Apr 55.
This put an end to the bombardment of shore positions. “No LSTs fired
after my ship beached,” commented Lieutenant Trumond E. Houston, USN,
commander of LST 799 at the extreme left of the line. “Earlier LSTs
beaching had opened fire on targets unknown to me, but my command had
received very firm orders not to open fire due to the danger of firing
into our own forces.”[175]
[175] LCdr T. E. Houston ltr to authors, 8 Mar 55.
As dusk shaded into darkness, the Marines on and around Cemetery Hill
extended their lines into the city. Even at the climax of the military
drama there was an unexpected note of comedy--assault troops were to
discover shortly that among the ammunition brought by the LSTs, some
useless .22 caliber cartridges testified to the haste of departure from
Camp Pendleton.[176] There was enough M-1 ammunition, however, so that
the enemy had no cause to complain of being neglected by the Marines.
[176] SSgt H. M. Grenell interv, 15 Nov 54.
_Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches_
It was absolutely essential that the LSTs unload in time to retract
on the morning high tide and allow other cargo vessels to take their
places. This meant an all-night job for the 1st Shore Party Battalion,
which was to initiate unloading on both beaches for the organization
composed also of the 1st Combat Service Group, the 7th Motor Transport
Battalion, and the U. S. Army 2d Engineer Special Brigade, with the
latter in control.
The vehicles came off the LSTs first--about 450 of them, all told--and
darkness had fallen when the unloading of cargo got into full swing.
Congestion on the 650-foot strip of beach did not permit normal
location and employment of dumps. It was catch-as-catch-can for the
shore party troops and engineers, with the cargo being off-loaded
and stockpiled wherever space could be found. Later, as the tactical
situation improved, designated dumps were established.
The men went about their work under the floodlights, heedless of
scattered enemy small-arms fire which continued throughout the
night. At a glance the unloading presented a scene of noisy chaos,
yet everything was so well under control by midnight that the
accomplishment of the mission within prescribed time limits was assured.
In the morning the eight LSTs were retracted according to schedule as
a like number approached the beach to discharge cargo. Two of them
grounded in the mud flats too far out for unloading, but the supply
problem was already so well solved that this setback was not serious.
On BLUE Beach it was not the intention to develop the area beyond the
needs of the initial assault, so that a comparatively small shore party
element was required. Only such equipment as could be carried by hand
was taken ashore in the LCVPs and LVTs.
The reconnaissance element of Shore Party Group B (--) had landed
with the assault troops, followed by the rest of the group at 1930.
Provisions for the use of pre-loaded LVTs having been made in the
assault phase supply plan, the shore party troops set out flanking
lights to mark the entire BLUE area as a single beach. This was in
preparation for the arrival of the 24 LVTs bringing pre-loaded supplies
to sustain the attack in the morning. Ten of these vehicles were so
delayed by adverse currents that a receding tide left them high and
dry. Officers of the 1st Marines decided that the supplies were not
critical enough to warrant unloading by hand over the mud flats, and
the job was postponed until the LVTs could be floated in on the morning
high tide. While they were discharging on BLUE-3, the LCVPs came in
with other gear which was unloaded and stored in the regimental dump.
Prison stockades were set up on both beaches the first night. The LSTs
continued to unload most of the Division supplies on RED Beach in
spite of treacherous currents, the tidal range and the mistakes made
by Japanese crews. BLUE Beach was closed on D-plus 1, having served
its purpose, and the shore party personnel transferred to GREEN Beach,
where facilities for unloading LSTs had been improved. Supplies landed
there could be trucked across the causeway, and on D-plus 2 the shore
party troops on RED Beach were also relieved and sent to Wolmi-do.
The 2d Engineer Special Brigade retained control of all logistical
operations in the Inchon port area on 17 September as vessels began
to discharge at Pier No. 2, designated as YELLOW Beach. There were
assurances by this time that the engineers would soon have the tidal
basin partially operative, thus adding materially to the capacity of
the harbor.[177]
[177] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Mike Mike; Costigan interv,
17 Nov 54; K. W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea” in
_Marine Corps Gazette_, 37, no. 1:48–55 (Jan 53).
The 1st Combat Service Group remained in control of consolidated dumps.
This organization was the storage agency for all X Corps supplies with
the exception of ammunition and engineering materials, both of which
were handled by Army personnel. Owing to the shortage of trucks, the
7th Motor Transport Battalion was held in the port area under control
of the engineer brigade.
The lack of enough motor trucks for port operations was alleviated
by the restoration of rail transportation much sooner than had been
expected. Although the planners did not count on this factor before
D-plus 30, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade rounded up Korean crews and
speeded up the tremendous task of putting the Inchon-Seoul line back
in working order. As early as D-plus 1 a switch engine and six cars
were operating in the Inchon yards. Three days later the first train,
carrying 1,200 Marines, was dispatched over the 5-mile run from Inchon
to Ascom City. As the ground forces advanced, the engineers followed
close behind the front with rail transportation which handled a total
of 350,000 rations, 315,000 gallons of fuel, 1,260 tons of ammunition,
and 10,000 troops before the Division was relieved.
_Surgical Teams on the Beaches_
Casualties of the Landing Force on D-day amounted to 20 KIA, 1 DOW,
1 MIA, and 174 WIA in addition to 14 of non-battle classification.
Medical officers regarded the operation as a landmark because of the
four Navy surgical teams, each composed of three doctors and ten
corpsmen, which went in behind the assault troops on the LSTs. Similar
teams had been employed in the later operations of World War II,
but Inchon had the distinction of being the first amphibious assault
in which carefully planned medical techniques were integrated with
military operations.
The surgical teams had been drilled and rehearsed in Japan for their
tasks. Patients requiring immediate surgery on the night of D-day
were evacuated to LST(H) 898, where an improvised operating room had
been installed. During the assault phase, 42 military and 32 civilian
casualties were treated instead of the 300 which had been expected.
Such an unqualified success was achieved that the teams were recalled
to Japan afterwards to act as instructors. Within a year the numbers of
Navy surgical teams had grown to a total of 22 on standby duty in the
Far East.[178]
[178] Capt E. R. Hering, (MC) USN, memo to authors, 4 Apr 55;
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex How How; Lynn Montross, “They
Make Men Whole Again,” in _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36,
no. 12:42–49 (Dec 52).
Captain Eugene R. Hering, (MC) USN, had served in the Pusan Perimeter
as the Brigade Surgeon. From a study of maps and intelligence reports,
he tentatively selected a site for the Division hospital on the eastern
outskirts of Inchon.
The 1st Medical Battalion, commanded by Commander Howard B. Johnson,
(MC) USN, consisted of an H&S Company and five letter companies.
Able and Baker were hospital companies, while Charlie, Dog, and Easy
functioned as collecting and clearing companies. The last was organized
for attachment to the 7th Marines when that regiment landed at Inchon.
Medical planning necessarily had to be hurried. In view of the unusual
landing conditions at Inchon, it was decided to revert the clearing
platoons, normally attached to infantry regiments, to Division control
when they reached the transport area.
Three casualty teams, each consisting of a medical officer and
six hospital corpsmen--one team from Able Company, and two from
Baker--landed from separate LSTs on D-day with a mission of caring for
initial casualties. Supporting collection sections of Charlie and Dog
Companies landed with the assault troops of the two rifle regiments.
The reconnaissance group and the two hospital companies arrived on
D-plus 1, followed by the H&S Company with equipment for the hospital
set up in a schoolhouse. It was opened at 1500 on D-plus 2, with 47
casualties being received the first day.
These were the forerunners of a total of 5,516 patients to be treated
by the 1st Medical Battalion for all causes during the entire
Inchon-Seoul operation. Most of them were WIA cases, but such ailments
as acute appendicitis, hernia, piles, and sprains are also recorded.
Of the 2,484 surgical patients, only nine died after reaching the first
aid station, and among them were six deaths following major surgery.
The proportion of patients surviving after evacuation, therefore,
reached the figure of 99.43 per cent. This meant that the chances were
about 199 to 1 that a wounded Marine would live.
_Artillery and Tank Operations_
The planners, anticipating the need of artillery support for the
assault on the mainland, had hoped that DUKWs could land two battalions
of Colonel James H. Brower’s 11th Marines on GREEN Beach for this
mission. There was some reason to believe that these vehicles could
cross the mud flats at low tide, thus enabling the 105s to get in
position on Wolmi-do and registered before the Inchon landing. In the
end, however, it was decided that this plan was not feasible, and the
1st and 2d Battalions of the artillery regiment landed on the evening
tide while the rifle regiments were hitting the beaches at Inchon.
A delay of an hour and a half occurred as a result of the confused
maneuvering of ships in the inner harbor. It was not until 2150,
therefore, that the 1st and 2d Battalions were prepared to deliver
massed fires in support of the 5th and 1st Marines respectively.[179]
Fortunately, the lack of this support at H-hour had not been a grave
handicap in view of the light resistance encountered on the beaches.
[179] The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, was attached to RCT-7
and had not yet landed at Inchon.
Low visibility and lack of targets limited the fires to a few rounds
the first night. Next day the artillery landing was completed when
4/11 went ashore on RED Beach, followed on D-plus 2 by the 96th Field
Artillery Battalion, USA. Plans for the drive inland called for 1/11
and 2/11 to fire in direct support of RCT-5 and RCT-1 respectively.
Support was to be provided by 4/11 for RCT-5 and by the Army battalion
for RCT-1.[180]
[180] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Sugar Sugar.
The problems of tank support for the Inchon operation had given the
planners many a headache. BLUE Beach was dismissed from consideration
because of the mud flats, and the possibilities at RED Beach were not
encouraging. GREEN Beach offered the best prospects for landing tanks,
though it was recognized that they would be stranded if the enemy
destroyed the causeway connecting Wolmi-do with the mainland.
The consequences of the hasty embarkation from Camp Pendleton had borne
down heavily upon the 1st Tank Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Harry T. Milne. Crews trained with the M-4A3 (Sherman) and
105mm howitzer were suddenly equipped with the M-26 (Pershing) and its
90mm gun. With the exception of Company A, which saw action with the
Brigade, few of the men had had any experience either at driving or
firing the new tanks. The flame tank platoon of Headquarters Company
had received some training at Barstow, but most of the personnel of
Baker, Charlie, and Dog Companies were limited to shipboard instruction.
The men of the Company A platoon which landed on GREEN Beach in support
of 3/5 were veterans of several fights with NKPA tanks and infantry in
the Pusan Perimeter. In the evening of D-day they supported the landing
on RED Beach and moved across the causeway to the mainland at dusk.
There they joined the other two platoons of Able Company and the flame
tank platoon, which landed with the LSTs in support of the 5th Marines.
At 1700 on D-day a reconnaissance team went ashore on Wolmi-do to
prepare for the landing of B Company, which took place late the
following afternoon. YELLOW Beach, in the inner harbor, was operative
for the landing of Company C on 18 September, and Company D was to
arrive later with the 7th Marines.[181]
[181] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe.
_The Attack on D-plus 1_
The night of 15–16 September passed quietly for both of the infantry
regiments. At 2000 on D-day the 3d Battalion crossed over the causeway
from Wolmi-do to rejoin RCT-5. The most dramatic action on either
regimental front was an episode in the Cemetery Hill area. Two Marines
mistakenly wandered out in front of the high ground and were cut down
by enemy fire from a cave at the base of the hill, just below the lines
of Company A, 5th Marines. Repeated attempts to reach the fallen men
were thwarted by submachine gun fire from the recess, until a ROK
interpreter, threatening the use of tanks, persuaded the occupants to
surrender. As a squad of North Koreans filed out in submission, troops
from Able Company rushed forward to get their two comrades. One of the
Marines was already dead; the other lay mortally wounded.[182]
[182] Muetzel interv, 6 Jan 55.
In the middle of the night, the 1st and 5th Marines received General
Smith’s OpnO 3-50, directing them to attack after dawn. Murray’s
regiment, by previous plan, would march through the southern part of
Inchon, leaving the heart of the seaport to be cleared by the KMC.
About three miles inland, the 5th Marines would reach the O-2 Line
coming abreast of Puller’s front of the night before. (Thus, the O-1
and O-2 Lines were one and the same in the 1st Marines zone). Tied in
along the Inchon-Seoul Highway at Hill 117, the two regiments would
drive eastward to the O-3 Line, approximately five miles inland. This
last arc was the goal specified in Smith’s attack order.[183]
[183] 1st MarDiv _OpOrders 2-50_ and _3-50_; O. P. Smith
_Notes_, 346.
Murray’s tactical plan was dictated by the simple necessity of getting
out of Inchon as quickly as possible. The 5th Marines would therefore
attack in a column of battalions, with Roise’s 2d in the lead,
followed by the 1st and 3d in that order. Two hills, located north of
the highway on the outskirts of the city, were designated Regimental
Objectives D and E. In taking this high ground, 2/5 would automatically
control the 5th Marines’ segment of the O-2 Line and seal off the
Inchon Peninsula in conjunction with the 1st Marines. This would leave
a secure pocket for the great ship-to-shore build-up commencing on the
morning tide.
Following a brief orientation at dawn, Captain Jaskilka led Company E
forward from the British Consulate. Unopposed, the column passed the
inner tidal basin, where Fox Company fell in behind. In the meantime,
Company D left its positions atop Observatory Hill and brought up the
rear of the battalion formation. Inchon’s streets were strangely quiet
during 2/5’s advance. Frightened civilians peeped from windows and
alleyways, but the enemy was nowhere to be found. The sprawling seaport
seemed dead.
Inconsistencies of the Oriental enemy were exposed in a striking
contrast of scenes at 0700. Nearing the edge of the city, Easy Company
was preparing to veer off the road and attack Objective D. The troops
were encountering no resistance whatsoever, and it was obvious that the
North Koreans had abandoned Inchon in haste during the night. Only five
miles away, however, six T-34 tanks were rumbling along the highway in
broad daylight, headed toward the seaport without infantry escort.
An eight-plane strike of VMF-214 intercepted the enemy armor at the
village of Kansong-ni. As the Corsairs swept down on the first pass,
one of the tanks was enveloped in flaming napalm. Another was disabled
when a rocket hit blew off its tracks. A third was left seemingly
helpless on the road, squatting in a pool of motor fuel which poured
out of its wounds.[184]
[184] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig, VMF-214 rpt, 4.
Marines of 2/1 watched the show with enthusiasm from the top of Hill
117, less than two miles away. The joy of victory went flat, however,
when one of the planes failed to pull out of its dive. Captain William
F. Simpson, the pilot, was killed as the F4U crashed beside the
highway.[185]
[185] _Ibid._; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
A second flight of VMF-214 descended on Kansong-ni with a vengeance.
Rocket fire destroyed one T-34, and a direct bomb hit knocked another
off the road. It will be shown shortly that these two tanks must have
been the same pair that were severely damaged by napalm and rockets
during the first strike. When panicky NKPA crewmen fled to nearby
thatched huts for concealment, the dwellings were promptly razed by
napalm. Marine pilots, assuming incorrectly that all six tanks lay dead
beneath the pall of smoke and flame, turned their attention to other
targets in the area. They bombed an enemy jeep and weapons carrier
standing in the open, then strafed two other motor vehicles which had
been cleverly camouflaged.[186]
[186] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig, VMF-214 rpt, 4.
It would soon become more apparent why Red leaders in Seoul had
sacrificed precious armor in a clearly hopeless thrust against the
swelling beachhead. Communications were destroyed, so that NKPA defense
forces fought or fled as isolated units. Adequate reserves were not
at hand initially, with the result that stop-gap detachments were fed
piecemeal into battle, only to be flattened by the Marine steamroller.
In short, the North Koreans lost control. And when they attempted to
regain it, time had run out.
While Marine air hammered the enemy’s armored column, the 2d Battalion,
5th Marines, deployed outside Inchon. Having made sight contact with
Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s troops on Hill 117 at 0730, Captain
Jaskilka led Easy Company off the road and toward Objective D the left.
Fox Company continued along the pavement several hundred more yards,
then also veered northward in the direction of Objective E. Neither
company met opposition, and both were atop their respective hills at
0930.[187]
[187] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen.
Meanwhile, Company D had advanced eastward on the highway with a
platoon of Able Company tanks. There was the occasional whine of a
sniper’s bullet overhead as the column moved rapidly to its junction
with the 1st Marines. At 0900, while Easy and Fox Companies were
climbing their objectives, Dog made contact with 2/1 at Hill 117.[188]
[188] _Ibid._
It was its opposite of the 1st Marines that Dog Company of 2/5 met at
Hill 117. Fox Company of 2/1 had been clearing the eastern reaches
of the big ridge since 0615, and Easy was to spend all morning and
afternoon securing high ground and a village about a mile off on the
right flank. When the attack along the highway resumed shortly after
0900, Company D of the 5th Marines and a platoon of A/Tanks took the
lead. Fox and Dog Companies of 2/1 followed in trace and on the right
as the formation advanced rapidly against nothing heavier than sniper
fire. By 1100, elements of both battalions were deployed at Sogam-ni,
just a few hundred yards short of smoking Kansong-ni. Since the former
hamlet bordered the O-3 Line, the Marines held up to await further
orders.[189]
[189] _Ibid._; 2/1 _SAR_, 4; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54;
LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 55; and Capt J. L.
Carter ltr to CMC, 19 Apr 55.
To the south of the highway, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,
reorganized in the center of Puller’s zone and moved forward as
regimental reserve. Simultaneously, the 3d Battalion began its sweep of
the Munhang Peninsula, Companies G and I attacking generally southward
from Hill 233. Since the broad front was studded with high ground and
villages, Lieutenant Colonel Ridge relied on LVT transport whenever
possible to regain momentum lost to hill-climbing and searching.
Resistance on the peninsula proved negligible, although once again the
capture of prisoners and materiel revealed enemy potential unused.
Among the weapons abandoned by the North Koreans were quantities of
rifles and machine guns, a battery of Russian-made 120mm mortars, and
four coastal guns, the latter pointing menacingly toward the ships of
the Attack Force anchored in the channel.[190]
[190] 3/1 _SAR_; Crowley-Adams interv, 9 Feb 55; Col T. L.
Ridge ltr to CMC, 12 May 55; LtCol J. Hawkins ltr to
CMC, 27 Apr 55; and LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr to CMC, 15
Apr 55.
Although 1/1 and 3/1 did not reach their portion of the objective until
later in the day, Division Headquarters realized by midmorning that
enemy resistance as far out as the O-3 Line could be discounted. Now
that the tremendous obstacles of the actual landing had been overcome,
the tactical advantage of the moment swung from the Red commander at
Seoul to General Smith. Owing to the conformation of the Inchon and
Munhang Peninsulas, which were linked together inland like Siamese
twins, the O-3 Line formed a front three miles long with both flanks
bounded by water. A glance at the map will show the beachhead thus
set off as an ideal foothold. To North Koreans thinking in terms of
counterattack, the vacuum rapidly being filled by the Landing Force was
a defensible bottleneck. To the Marines, on the other hand, it was the
gateway to freedom of maneuver for an overland offensive.
_Advance to the Force Beachhead Line_
Opening the gate was the subject of General Smith’s OpnO 4-50, issued
by dispatch at 1045, D-plus 1. He directed Puller and Murray to
continue the attack from the O-3 Line, seized the Force Beachhead
Line (FBHL), and thereby conclude the assault phase of the amphibious
operation. The order also marked off a new Tactical Bomb Line,[191]
behind which Marine Air was forbidden to strike without ground
coordination.
[191] The first bomb line corresponded to the FBHL, and Corps
Phase Line AA was the equivalent of the O-2 Line.
Roughly the shape of a right angle, the FBHL corresponded to X Corps
Phase Line BB. Like the O-3 arc, it was anchored on the sea at both
ends. The east-west leg of the angle, five miles long, lay above and
almost parallel to the Inchon-Seoul Highway. The north-south leg, about
seven miles inland, added a third projection, the Namdong Peninsula,
to the beachhead. Encompassing the built-up centers of Ascom City and
Mahang-ri on the main road, the apex of the FBHL pointed northeast
toward Kimpo Airfield like an arrowhead.
[Illustration: MARINE ATTACKS
D-PLUS 1]
The Inchon-Seoul Highway remained the boundary between the 1st and
5th Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s order went out to the latter
before noon, directing a two-pronged assault. The 2d Battalion would
jump off from the O-3 Line and trace the course of the highway,
clearing the hills and villages on the left. Simultaneously, the 3d
was to swing sharply northward from behind 2/5 and attack high ground
overlooking the east-west leg of the FBHL. The 1st Battalion would
remain in regimental reserve.[192]
[192] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
There were a number of reasons why Colonel Puller’s scheme of maneuver
was more complex. Not only was the 1st Marines’ front much wider and
the terrain more difficult, but the rapid advance had left troops units
scattered throughout a zone of action some 15 square miles in area.
There was considerable shuffling to be done before the regiment could
deploy along the highway for the drive to the east.
The 2d Battalion would continue along the MSR, clearing the high ground
on the right and coordinating with 2/5 on the left. To the south, the
1st Battalion would move up on the right of the 2d as quickly as the
rugged terrain allowed. The 3d, after clearing the Munhang Peninsula,
was to pass into regimental reserve subsequent to being relieved on the
right flank by the Reconnaissance Company. Swinging around a sharp cove
of salt pans and mud flats, the latter unit would patrol the Namdong
Peninsula to secure the Division right.[193]
[193] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, sec. 1; 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 _SAR_; Ridge
ltr, 12 May 55; and Hawkins ltr, 27 Apr 55.
At 1335, the 5th Marines attacked against minor resistance on the north
of the highway. Moving into Kansong-ni, the vanguard of 2/5 and its
tank escort approached a sharp bend where the road veered northward for
about a mile to avoid two large hills. Around the curve were the enemy
tanks believed to have been knocked out by VMF-214 earlier in the day.
A section of Marine armor turned left off the pavement just short of
the bend. The two M-26s crawled to the top of a knoll from which they
could cover the infantry, as the latter advanced around the corner.
Looking down from their vantage point, the tank crews saw three intact
T-34s parked in column on the highway, about 300 yards beyond the turn.
Hatches on the Communist vehicles were buttoned, with the 85mm guns
leveled at the road bend.[194]
[194] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2dLt J. Sleger, Jr.,
to Dr A. D. Coox, ORO, Dept of Army, n. d. (Sleger rpt).
The M-26s opened up immediately. Twenty rounds of 90mm armor-piercing
(AP) ammunition crashed into the enemy armor. There was no return fire,
probably because the Red crews had not time to elevate and traverse
their manually-operated guns. In the space of a few minutes, each of
the T-34s exploded and burst into flame. The crews did not escape.[195]
[195] _Ibid._
The Marine attack rolled past the blazing hulks. Nearby were two other
wrecked T-34s, obviously the victims of the air attack. If the pilots
of VMF-214 had attacked a total of six enemy tanks, one of the vehicles
must have escaped before the ground troops reached the scene.[196]
[196] _Ibid._; CG 1st MarDiv disp to CTF 90, 16 Sep 50.
Tracing the north-south stretch of highway that led to Ascom City, Dog
Company of RCT-5 marched a thousand yards beyond the bend and ascended
a high hill on the west side of the road. Company F swung out to the
left, crossed the railroad tracks running parallel to the highway, and
seized the high ground adjacent to that held by Company D. Both assault
units encountered only sniping, but it was early evening before the two
hills and surrounding low ground had been searched thoroughly.[197]
[197] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; LtCol H. S. Roise
interv, 24 Nov 54.
Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered 2/5 to dig in for the night. He
was about 3,000 yards short of the highway’s intersection with the
FBHL, but his battalion held the commanding ground. Companies D and
F defended the approach to Ascom City, which sprawled out on the low
ground just forward of their positions. Company E, in reserve, set up a
perimeter in the battalion rear.[198]
[198] Roise interv, 24 Nov 54.
Lieutenant Sweet’s five M-26s, which had supported the day-long
advance from RED Beach, were relieved at dusk by the 1st Platoon of
Able Company tanks. In addition to their score of three T-34s, Sweet’s
veterans of the Pusan Perimeter had captured an impressive tally of
enemy materiel: three NKPA trucks, two 76mm AT guns, two 122mm mortars,
and a pair of Russian-manufactured jeeps.[199]
[199] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe.
During 2/5’s attack along the MSR, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was
occupied with the hills overlooking that portion of the FBHL to the
northwest. Lieutenant Colonel Taplett had launched his drive at 1330
with Companies G and I in the assault and H in reserve. On the left,
George Company seized its high-ground objective at 1440, while Item
took an extra hour to clear adjacent Hill 137. There were no Marine
casualties during a rapid advance that netted 12 enemy prisoners.[200]
[200] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
Patrols from 3/5 ranged westward to the sea, and eastward to the edge
of Ascom City, where Item Company troops discovered an enemy ammunition
dump and vehicle park. Location of these undefended prizes was promptly
reported to the 5th Marines CP.[201]
[201] _Ibid._
South of the Inchon-Seoul Highway, the 1st Marines attacked from the
O-3 Line at 1600. Sutter’s 2d Battalion drove forward on the right
of the MSR and passed below Kansong-ni without incident. Continuing
a thousand yards farther, Company D scaled the rugged slopes of Hill
186, cleared the summit, and dug in. Fox Company climbed the same high
ground shortly afterwards and went into position on the left of Dog and
overlooking the highway. Thus 2/1’s front for the night was across the
road and slightly to the rear of the high ground positions occupied by
Company D of 2/5. Easy Company returned from its independent mission
on the right flank and set up a reserve position in the vicinity of
Kansong-ni, just rearward of Sutter’s CP at the base of Hill 186.[202]
[202] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Sutter-Codispoti
interv, 25 Jan 55; 2/1 _SAR_, 4; and Carter ltr, 19 Apr
55.
The enemy attitude in the 2d Battalion’s zone gradually had developed
from occasional sniping early in the day to a pattern of definite light
resistance as the Marines surged over Hill 186. Though most of the
North Koreans fled after firing a few rounds, their token efforts cost
the battalion four killed and 10 wounded. These figures are noteworthy
in view of the fact that total losses for the whole Division on D-plus
1 were four KIA and 21 WIA.[203]
[203] _Ibid._
Sutter’s troops exacted a comparatively stiff price from the Reds in
return, for it was estimated that 120 of the enemy were killed or
wounded. Moreover, the Marines captured more than 30 prisoners, 70
rifles, 10 machine guns, and an ordnance dump loaded with small-arms
ammunition.[204]
[204] 2/1 _SAR_, 4; and Carter ltr, 19 Apr 55.
Elsewhere on the 1st Marines front there was considerably more hiking
than combat. The 3d Battalion completed its sweep of the Munhang
Peninsula about 1600 and assembled at the southern tip of the O-3 Line
to await relief by the Reconnaissance Company.[205] In the course of
rounding up NKPA prisoners and abandoned weapons, 3/1 had encountered
a group of Korean villagers, headed by their schoolmaster, who called
themselves the Young People’s Anti-Communist Resistance League. They
had armed themselves with Russian rifles and light machine guns left
behind by enemy troops fleeing inland.[206]
[205] 3/1 _SAR_, 6; Ridge ltr, 12 May 55; Simmons ltr 15 Apr
55.
[206] _Ibid._; Maj G. C. Westover ltr to authors, 1 Apr 55;
and Capt J. R. Fisher ltr to authors, 18 Apr 55.
In the center of Puller’s zone, the 1st Battalion had moved rapidly to
fill the gap between the 2d and 3d. Attacking into the vacuum left by
the retreating enemy, Hawkins’ unit drove two mountainous miles beyond
the O-3 Line, finally stopping for the night on high ground about
2,500 yards south of 2/1’s positions on Hill 186. The break in the
regimental front was protected when 3/1 shifted northward and formed a
reserve perimeter to the rear of the lines, after being relieved on the
right at 1700 by Captain Kenneth J. Houghton’s Reconnaissance Company.
Assuming responsibility for the Division’s southern flank, the Recon
troops set up a night defense at the base of the Namdong Peninsula with
their front linked to that of 1/1 on the left.[207]
[207] Recon Co, HqBn, 1st MarDiv _Unit Rpts_, 9 Sep-11 Nov
50; and Ridge ltr, 12 May 55.
_Displacement Ashore of Division CP_
The establishment of a Division CP on shore was delayed by the
necessity of utilizing every minute of the limited periods of high tide
for the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment. General Smith
decided on D-day that it would not be advisable to displace his CP
ashore until General Craig and the ADC group (former headquarters of
1st ProvMarBrig) were able to set up adequate communications. With this
object in mind, the ADC group landed on the evening high tide of D-day
to locate an advance echelon on Wolmi-do.
Not much could be done that evening. And in the morning Craig informed
CG 1st MarDiv that the island was too crowded. He reported that he
and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart had discovered a likely spot on the
southeast outskirts of Inchon and recommended that the CP be moved
without delay.[208] General Smith approved and the move started at once.
[208] BGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to authors, 5 Apr 55.
Meanwhile, a good deal of military housekeeping had been accomplished
in the Inchon port area. Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge’s 1st
Engineer Battalion was given the task of making a survey of beach exit
roads with a view to opening up an MSR between RED and BLUE Beaches.
After elements of Company A hit GREEN Beach, the remaining troops of
the battalion had landed on the two beaches and assisted shore party
units at unloading water, ammunition, and rations. This work was so
well along by the morning of D-plus 1 that the engineers opened up the
MSR between the two beaches and assigned personnel for improvement
and maintenance. A Water point was established at the north end of
RED Beach with 31 distillation units, and 125,000 gallons were issued
during the next six days.[209]
[209] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Nan Nan.
The new Division CP on the outskirts of Inchon was ready by the
afternoon of D-plus 1, and General Smith said goodbye to General
MacArthur on the bridge of the _Mount McKinley_. The commander in chief
wished him well and enjoined him to take Kimpo Airfield at the first
opportunity.[210]
[210] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 188–189.
The Marine general landed at YELLOW Beach at 1730. Upon arrival at the
CP, he sent a dispatch to Admiral Doyle, informing him that he was
assuming responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore at 1800 on
16 September. Thus ended the amphibious assault phase, almost exactly
24 hours after the first wave of Marines set foot on RED Beach.
CHAPTER VIII
On to Kimpo
_Operations on Other Korean Fronts--Landing of RCT-7 in
Japan--Destruction of NKPA Tank Column--General MacArthur Visits the
Front--The Drive to Kimpo Airfield--Action at 5th Marines CP--Enemy
Counterattack at Kimpo_
On Sunday morning, D-plus 2, General Smith was directed as Landing
Force Commander to re-establish civil government in Inchon. Although
parts of the Korean seaport had been burned or battered into rubble,
thousands of refugees were returning to the ruins of their homes after
having fled during the bombardments. The KMC Regiment, operating
under the control of RCT-5, had been given the task of screening the
remaining inhabitants for their loyalty. No fault could have been found
with the thoroughness of these Korean allies who were perhaps inclined
to be too zealous when they suspected subversion.
General Smith concluded that the best procedure was to find loyal
Korean officials and uphold their authority. He consulted Rear Admiral
Sohn Won Yil, the ROK Chief of Naval Operations, and learned that the
former mayor of Inchon had fled during the original NKPA invasion and
never returned. Admiral Sohn vouched for the loyalty of one of the
political prisoners, Pyo Yang Moon, who had been the losing candidate
for the mayoralty in the last election. The Marine general decided to
install him as Inchon’s chief executive and issued a proclamation to
that effect in Korean as well as English.
Induction ceremonies were held on the morning of 18 September on the
portico of the city hall, a once imposing edifice which bore the scars
of war. About 700 prominent citizens attended as the Marine interpreter
led in singing the Korean national anthem. After the proclamation had
been read in both languages, General Smith made a few remarks and
the new mayor responded. A ROK Marine guard of honor officiated, and
Admiral Sohn brought the occasion to a close with a brief address.
Steps were taken immediately to bury the civilian dead, to care for
the orphans, to distribute food and clothing to the distressed, and to
establish a civilian hospital and police force.[211]
[211] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 197–199.
_Operations on Other Korean Fronts_
Dispatches received from the Pusan Perimeter revealed that the Eighth
Army had jumped off according to schedule on the 16th in its joint
offensive. Although gains were negligible the first day, this effort
was pinning down NKPA troops who might otherwise have reinforced the
defenders of Kimpo and Seoul.
Several other operations had been mounted on both coasts as diversions
to keep the enemy guessing as to where the lightning would strike.
Kunsan, it may be recalled, had been briefly considered by X Corps
planners as an alternate amphibious objective. Early in September this
west coast seaport was selected as the chief target of feints during
the preparations for the Inchon landing. General Stratemeyer’s Fifth
Air Force bombers initiated strikes on rail and highway communications
within a 30-mile radius. That same day a hit-and-run amphibious raid on
Kunsan was planned at Admiral Joy’s headquarters in Tokyo. As a result,
Colonel Ely sailed with his company on the British frigate _Whitesand
Bay_ and raided the Kunsan waterfront on the night of 12 September.
Three casualties were incurred from enemy machine-gun fire.
The Seventh Fleet added to the deception by singling out Kunsan
for carrier air strikes and naval gunfire bombardments to give the
impression of softening up an objective for amphibious assault.
Chinnampo, the seaport of Pyongyang, also appeared to be threatened
when it was bombarded by a British task force.
On the east coast the USS _Missouri_, just arrived from the United
States, poured 16-inch shells into Samchok on 14 September while a
Navy helicopter did the spotting. The cruiser _Helena_ and three U. S.
destroyers added their metal to the bombardment.[212]
[212] Material for this section has been derived from Karig,
_Korea_, 112, 243–255.
D-day at Inchon was the date of a landing of ROK guerrillas behind the
NKPA lines at Changsa-dong, a coastal town about midway between Yongdok
and Pohang-dong. After the ROK merchant marine LST struck submerged
rocks and grounded, it was used as an improvised fortress by the
guerrillas, who retreated from the NKPA forces when their ammunition
ran short. The only two Americans, an Army lieutenant and sergeant,
radioed for help; and the cruiser _Helena_ provided naval gunfire for
the Navy relief expedition which took off the survivors.
How much these diversions on both Korean coasts may have contributed
to a surprise at Inchon is a moot question. It might even be argued
that the enemy was not surprised, since an intercepted NKPA radio
message warned Pyongyang on 13 September that United Nations vessels
were approaching Inchon and planes bombing Wolmi-do. The senders
deduced that an amphibious landing was forthcoming and assured NKPA
Headquarters that defensive units were being stationed where they would
repulse the UN forces.[213]
[213] Quoted in Karig, _Korea_, 202.
This would make it appear doubtful that a surprise had been achieved.
But it is the opinion of Admiral Struble that “the actual results in
the Inchon-Seoul area clearly indicate surprise.... While the message
was apparently sent, and was a good report, there is no evidence that
the enemy headquarters accepted the report. It is possible that a later
report that the enemy bombarding ships were retreating from Inchon may
have confused the issue. In any event, only a short time was available
to take advantage of strong defensive positions and certainly not
enough time to mine the harbor.”[214]
[214] VAdm A. D. Struble ltr to authors, 18 May 55.
An excellent analysis of the outcome is to be found in Admiral Doyle’s
official report. After paying tribute to the pre-D-day bombardments by
the cruisers and destroyers, plus the air strikes by planes of TF-77
and TG-90.5, he concluded that “the assault itself was successful only
through the perfect teamwork that existed between the participating
Naval and Marine elements. The successful accomplishment of the
assault on Inchon demanded that an incredible number of individual and
coordinated tasks be performed precisely as planned. Only the United
States Marines, through their many years of specialized training in
amphibious warfare, in conjunction with the Navy, had the requisite
know-how to formulate the plans within the limited time available
and execute those plans flawlessly without additional training or
rehearsal.”[215]
[215] PacFlt _Interim Rpt No. 1_, XV: Annex Able Able, 8.
_Landing of RCT-7 in Japan_
Dispatches were received on D-plus 2 at the new Division CP to the
effect that the 7th Marines was preparing to embark that day from Kobe
and land at Inchon on 21 September.
The 3d Battalion of this regiment, it may be recalled, had originally
been a unit of the 6th Marines on FMFLant duty with the Sixth Fleet
in the Mediterranean. Upon being ordered to the Far East, the unit
sailed from Crete to Japan by way of the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean.
Lieutenant Colonel Dowsett, the battalion commander, did not know
throughout the voyage what specific mission awaited his men.
They later met at Kobe their new regimental commander, Colonel
Litzenberg, who had flown to Japan ahead of the other two battalions
sailing from San Diego. He informed Dowsett that his battalion was
now a part of the 7th Marines and named him executive officer of the
regiment. Major Maurice E. Roach succeeded to the command of the newly
designated 3/7.
A formidable task awaited the 7th Marines in Japan. The officers of the
staff, not having served with the Division before, were unfamiliar with
references and terms in directives dealing with the Inchon landing.
Problems of integrating the regiment into the operations of the
division were solved only by intensive application.
A reshuffling of the regiment had to be accomplished meanwhile before
embarking for Inchon. The purpose was to spread the hundreds of
reservists throughout the three battalions instead of having them
concentrated in several companies.[216]
[216] Dowsett interv, 2 Nov 54.
It took some remarkable adjustments to get the regiment ready for
embarkation from Kobe only 17 days after sailing from San Diego. But
it meant that the 7th Marines would get into the fight at least a week
sooner than Division planners had anticipated.
_Destruction of NKPA Tank Column._
The amphibious assault phase was left behind on D-plus 2 when the 1st
and 5th Marines jumped off from the western outskirts of Ascom City to
initiate their drive inland. With the exploitation phase coming next,
command relationships would be as follows:
+-------------+
| CinCFE |
+------+------+
|
+------+------+
| CG X Corps |
+------+------+
|
+------+------+
|CG 1st MarDiv|
+------+------+
|
+---------+---------+
| |
+------+------+ +------+------+
|CG 1st MarDiv| |CG 7th InfDiv|
+-------------+ +-------------+
The night of 16–17 September had been quiet all along the Division
front. It was so quiet, in fact, that the troops of 2/5 paid no
particular heed to a truck which drove through their lines on the
Inchon-Seoul Highway about midnight. Not until the vehicle penetrated a
few hundred yards into Marine territory was it stopped by curious tank
crews of Able/Tanks’ 1st Platoon, whose M-26s were deployed across the
road in deep anti-mechanized defense. The startled occupants of the
stray truck turned out to be an NKPA officer and four enlisted men, but
they were no more surprised than the Marines who stepped out of the
darkness and took them prisoner.[217]
[217] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Capt J. E.
Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55.
Apparently, neither the tank crews nor anybody else in the area
attached any special importance to the strange truck incident. In a few
hours, however, an epic of smoke, flame, and twisted steel would attest
to the significance of this scrap of evidence. The fact of the matter
was that the Red leaders in Seoul did not know the exact location of
the 1st Marine Division.
It will be recalled that Dog Company of 2/5 occupied a hill on the west
side of the highway as the attack on D-plus 1 ground to a halt. About
200 yards beyond the company front was a large knoll that nosed into
the center of Ascom City. Observing that the highway turned sharply to
the east and passed through a cut at the base of the knoll, Lieutenant
H. J. Smith decided to outpost the natural roadblock in strength. At
dusk, therefore, he dispatched the 2d Platoon, under Second Lieutenant
Lee R. Howard, to man the advance position along with machine-gun and
rocket-launcher attachments.[218]
[218] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; McNaughton interv,
7 Jan 55; and Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55.
As the first rays of dawn creased the sky on 17 September, Howard and
his troops were entrenched in a compact perimeter atop the knoll.
Several hundred yards to the rear, the 1st Platoon of A/Tanks was
augmented in its blocking position by 3.5-inch rocket launchers of 2/5
and the 75mm recoilless rifles of the 5th Marines. Just across the road
from this formidable array were more 75s and 3.5s of the 1st Marines,
emplaced with Fox Company of 2/1 on Hill 186.[219]
[219] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe, Peter Peter, and
Queen Queen; and 2/1 _SAR_, 5.
Records of the 5th Marines describe this bristling gauntlet as “... a
temporary defensive position in depth....” It was more like a giant
torpedo.
Sometime before daybreak, a North Korean column formed on the
Inchon-Seoul Highway a few miles east of Ascom City.[220] In the van
were six sleek T-34s of the 42d NKPA Mechanized Regiment. Perched
atop the tanks and strung out for about a hundred yards were 200
Red infantrymen, comprising a mixed representation of the 18th NKPA
Division in Seoul. The enemy force was on its way to block the advance
of the 1st Marine Division along the highway.
[220] The following narrative, unless otherwise noted, is
taken from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Baker, Oboe Oboe,
Peter Peter, Queen Queen; 2/1 _SAR_; Harrell interv, 4
Jan 55; Roise interv, 21 Dec 54; and McNaughton interv,
7 Jan 55; and Statement of Capt W. D. Pomeroy enclosed
in Maj G. M. English ltr to CMC, 19 Apr 55.
It was obvious that the Communist soldiers had little or no knowledge
of the situation ahead. For as they neared Ascom City at the crack
of dawn, some were still sitting comfortably on the tanks and eating
breakfast. Others laughed and jabbered as they trailed along the road.
Lieutenant Howard saw them approaching his Dog Company outpost on the
knoll. He reported to Smith, who passed the word to Roise at 2/5’s CP,
first one tank, then three, and finally six. Roise took the information
with the proverbial grain of salt, supposing it to be a delusion of
youth and inexperience. Just as quickly as that impression formed in
his mind, it was shattered by the first reverberations of the battle.
[Illustration: NK COUNTERATTACK
ASCOM CITY-17 SEPT]
The attitude of the enemy soldiers as they neared his outpost convinced
Howard that they were unaware of the proximity of Marine lines. He let
the head of the column slip by on the road below, therefore, until the
tanks began to round the bend leading to Dog Company’s MLR. Then the
platoon leader shouted the order, and his men opened up with machine
guns, rifles, and BARs.[221]
[221] _Ibid._
The Red infantry went down under the hail of lead like wheat under the
sickle. Soldiers on the tanks were knocked to the road, where many were
ground under as the big vehicles lurched and roared crazily in reaction
to the surprise.
Corporal Okey J. Douglas moved part way down the knoll and closed on
the lead T-34 with his 2.36-inch rocket launcher. A few well-placed
rounds, fired calmly at a range of 75 yards, killed the armored vehicle
on the spot. Continuing the single-handed assault, Douglas damaged tank
number 2 just as the main Marine position exploded into action.
Under attack by the outpost, the cripple and the four unharmed T-34s
had continued around the road bend, some of them spilling off the curve
in an attempt to deploy in the adjacent rice paddy. All five were taken
under fire by First Lieutenant William D. Pomeroy’s M-26s, about 600
yards away. Within five minutes, the Marine 90mm guns threw 45 rounds
of AP at the enemy armor.
Recoilless rifles of Second Lieutenant Charles M. Jones’ platoon (5th
Marines AT Co) added their hot metal at a range of 500 yards, and the
75s with the 1st Marines across the road also erupted. Simultaneously,
Second Lieutenant James E. Harrell ordered the 3.5-inch rocket
launchers of 2/5’s assault platoon into action.
The T-34’s didn’t have a chance. All of them exploded under the heavy
fusilade; and when the smoke cleared, they were heaps of burning
wreckage. Scattered around the dead tanks and along the road were the
bodies of 200 Red infantrymen. So rapid and complete was the enemy’s
destruction that only one Marine casualty--slightly wounded--resulted
from the fight.
It was only natural that conflicting claims would arise among the
participants in the short, violent clash. To Pomeroy’s tank crews, it
appeared that the M-26s accounted for the five T-34s with little or
no assistance from infantry arms. This was a reasonable conclusion on
their part, owing to the limited visibility from the buttoned vehicles
and the fact that their 90mm guns unquestionably wrought the greatest
destruction on the NKPA machines. Since so many weapons were firing
simultaneously from various other positions, however, and since the
T-34s were wrecked so completely, kills and partial kills were also
claimed by the recoilless rifles of both regiments. Moreover, the
3.5-inch rocket gunners of 2/5 and 2/1 believed that some of their
rounds found the mark in the midst of the furor. It is known, for
instance, that Private First Class Walter C. Monegan, Jr., rocket
man in the assault squad of Fox Company, 1st Marines, closed on the
enemy vehicles after they had rounded the bend and fired his weapon at
point-blank ranges.
_General MacArthur Visits the Front_
The acrid odor of high explosives still lingered in the fresh morning
air as a column of jeeps came slowly around the bend from the rear.
General MacArthur was making his first visit to the front. With him and
Admiral Struble were Generals Almond, Shepherd, Smith, Ruffner, Hodes,
Wright, and a group of X Corps staff officers. Several jeeps filled
with newspaper correspondents and photographers followed close behind
the military cortege.[222]
[222] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 17 Sep 50.
Grimy Marines of RCT-5, their eyes dazzled by the glitter of starry
insignia, gazed in wonder at this sudden revelation of the pomp and
circumstance of war. The generals and admirals in their turn were
equally impressed by the destruction these Marines had wrought--the
warm corpses beside the road, the blazing heaps of twisted metal that
had been T-34 tanks only a few minutes before.
The Marine driver parked the leading jeep on a culvert and General
MacArthur leaped down to survey the spectacle. Instantly he was
surrounded by cameramen snapping pictures which would soon appear on
stateside front pages. All America was rejoicing at the turning tide in
Korea after the humiliating weeks of delaying operations.
Early that morning CinCFE had been met by General Smith at YELLOW Beach
and welcomed to the 1st Marine Division CP, a Quonset hut with a dirt
floor. There the commander in chief was briefed by the Division G-2 and
G-3 on the military situation.
The second stop was at the 1st Marines CP. CinCFE informed Colonel
Puller and Admiral Sohn that he was awarding each of them a Silver
Star. Reaching into the pocket of his leather jacket, he discovered
that he had no medals with him.
“Make a note of that,” he enjoined an aide as the correspondents busily
scribbled on their pads.
Next, the route of the procession led to the zone of RCT-5 and the
scene of the Marine tank ambush. It was not exactly a happy occasion
for General Smith, who felt a heavy responsibility for the lives and
welfare of the 1st Marine Division’s distinguished guests. Not only was
the commander in chief indifferent to danger, but the Marine general
had similar cause to worry about others making the tour of inspection.
For instance, there was Frank Lowe, a 66-year-old retired National
Guard major general visiting Korea as President Truman’s personal
observer. Astonishingly hardy for his age, this admirer of the Marines
took personal risks which gave concern to Smith. Another source of
anxiety was the attractive correspondent of a New York newspaper,
Marguerite Higgins, who had hit RED Beach on the heels of the Landing
Force.
Both she and Lowe were on hand when the column of jeeps stopped to
survey the results of the tank ambush. Smith scanned the landscape with
apprehension, devoutly hoping that some hidden foeman would not choose
this moment to obliterate several visiting generals with a well-aimed
mortar round. It was with relief that he departed with MacArthur for
a visit to the CP of the 5th Marines. And it was just as well that he
did not learn until later what happened shortly after his departure.
First Lieutenant George C. McNaughton’s platoon, hearing a suspicious
noise, had flushed seven armed NKPA soldiers out of a culvert--the
culvert on which General MacArthur’s jeep had been parked! A few rifle
shots persuaded them to surrender as the only survivors of the enemy
expedition.[223]
[223] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
The caravan of distinguished visitors proceeded meanwhile to the CP of
the 5th Marines, raising a cloud of dust that could be seen for miles.
Lieutenant Colonel Murray and General Craig were next to be awarded
Silver Stars by General MacArthur. His tour of inspection ended with a
look at the Marine stockade in Inchon, where 671 NKPA prisoners were
held, and a survey of the defenses of Wolmi-do.
When the Marine general returned to his CP, he found Major General
James M. Gavin, USA, waiting to make a detailed study of Marine close
air support and the weapons employed. The day ended with Ruffner
and Hodes conferring with Smith on plans for the employment of the
32d Infantry, due to land the next day as the first unit of the 7th
Infantry Division to go ashore. Plans were made for the Army unit to
assume responsibility at 1200 on 19 September for the zone of action on
RCT-1’s right flank.[224]
[224] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 29; O. P. Smith,
_Chronicle_, 18 Sep 50.
_The Drive to Kimpo Airfield_
On the evening of D-plus 1, General Smith had issued OpnO 5-50,
directing the 1st and 5th Marines to attack toward Corps Phase Line CC
the next morning.[225] The actual jump-off on 17 September was delayed
about an hour by the intrusion of the ill-fated Red tank column.
[225] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Charlie, 7.
Both in scope and in shape, Phase Line CC was an enlargement of the
FBHL. Beginning on the coast above Inchon and running parallel to the
Inchon-Seoul Highway, the line extended inland about eight miles to
bend around Kimpo Airfield. It then ran southward, intersecting the
highway two miles east of Sosa and finally terminating at an inlet not
far from the Namdong Peninsula.
The 5th Marines’ tactical plan was of necessity an ambitious one, since
approximately two-thirds of the Division’s projected 19-mile frontage
lay in Murray’s zone. On the left, an attached KMC battalion would
attack northward to the phase line, taking high ground Objectives
One, Two, and Three en route. Roise’s 2d Battalion was to advance
in the center on a northeasterly course, which included Objectives
ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE, the latter being Kimpo itself. Newton’s 1st
Battalion would follow the 2d initially, then take over the regimental
right and seize Objectives EASY and FOX, two sprawling hills just
beyond the phase line.[226]
[226] _Ibid._, Annex Queen Queen.
The 3d KMC Battalion passed through 2/5’s lines at 0700 for the purpose
of clearing the western outskirts of Ascom City before driving toward
its numbered objectives to the north. That the initial mission was
accomplished only with considerable difficulty and assistance will be
shown later. Afterwards the Korean Marines made rapid progress, as they
advanced over flatlands almost devoid of enemy resistance.
[Illustration: THE DRIVE TO KIMPO
5TH MARINES
17 SEPTEMBER]
Lieutenant Colonel Roise launched 2/5’s attack at 0900. Company E led
the long route column eastward on the Inchon-Seoul Highway through the
carnage left by the defeat of the Red tank thrust. Having marched about
a mile, the vanguard of the battalion turned left on a secondary road
that traced the eastern edge of Ascom City.[227]
[227] _Ibid._ The word “Ascom” was formed from “Army Service
Command.”
This expansive urban area would prove to be a thorn in the side of the
5th Marines for the next 24 hours. Originally a large Korean village
called Taejong-ni, Ascom City became the site of a huge service command
of the United States Army during the occupation of South Korea after
World War II. The few acres of small buildings and thatched huts had
grown into almost two square miles of residential, industrial, and
storage area. Caves, large warehouses, hundreds of other buildings,
and a complex network of streets made it an ideal hiding place for
fragments of a broken enemy, as the Marines were shortly to learn.
Marching northward through the outskirts, Easy Company of 2/5 was
repeatedly held up by small pockets of resistance among the dwellings
on both sides of the road. Captain Jaskilka’s veteran infantry reduced
the enemy positions methodically, but the whole morning was used up in
the process. Simultaneously with the main advance, the 2d Platoon of
Fox Company marched through the heart of Ascom City and screened 2/5’s
left flank. Second Lieutenant Tilton A. Anderson, the platoon leader,
reported everything quiet in his zone, although his men did not have
time to check all of the side streets and blocks of buildings.[228]
[228] _Ibid._; Capt T. A. Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
Having cleared the eastern fringe of the city by noon, Roise looked in
vain for the branch road shown on his map as leading to Objective Able
and Baker, some four miles distant. The chart was inaccurate, and only
a time-consuming reconnaissance could locate the correct route. It was
already 1400 by the time Company E led off on the hike.
While 2/5 was having its troubles in the eastern outskirts, Lieutenant
Colonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion stepped in to help the Korean Marines on
the other side of Ascom City. In regimental reserve, 3/5 was scheduled
to occupy a series of assembly areas throughout the day, moving forward
by bounds behind the assault elements. The morning displacement, into
the western edge of Ascom City, took place before the KMC attack had
cleared the suburb as planned. Using his initiative, Taplett committed
his battalion against moderate resistance that was holding up the South
Koreans.[229]
[229] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Maj R. A.
McMullen interv, 27 Jul 54.
Company G went into action and knocked out a Communist machine-gun
emplacement in the city. Next, a George Company patrol attacked a
strong enemy force deployed among the buildings. The North Koreans fled
after a hot fight, leaving behind 18 dead at a cost of three wounded to
the Marines. Item and How Companies also spread out through the maze of
streets, and there were several more skirmishes before the “assembly
area” was secured. The Korean Marines then passed through and attacked
to the north, as mentioned earlier.[230]
[230] _Ibid._
The 1st Platoon of A/Tanks, having silenced other enemy positions in
the city, made contact with 3/5 at 1500. Leaving the built-up area,
Lieutenant Pomeroy led his M-26s in search of 2/5, in order to support
that unit’s drive on Kimpo. His armor was escorted by Lieutenant
Anderson’s rifle platoon, which had just completed its independent
mission in Ascom City without incident. Finding a road to the
northeast proved as much of a headache to Pomeroy as it had to Roise,
particularly since his big vehicles could not use the same route over
which 2/5’s infantry column had advanced an hour earlier.[231]
[231] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Anderson interv,
20 Aug 54.
Extending his quest northward, the tank platoon leader found a road
that not only paralleled the infantry’s path but also led to within a
few hundred yards of Kimpo, now about five miles distant. The M-26s
proceeded approximately a mile on the new route and were stopped by a
damaged bridge. First Lieutenant Wayne E. Richards rounded up a party
of Korean natives to help his 2d Platoon of A/Engineers repair the
span. During the layover, Pomeroy’s force was beefed up by another
platoon of M-26s, brought forward by Captain Gearl M. English, the
company commander, and by a long column of rolling stock from 2/5’s
headquarters.[232]
[232] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Queen Queen.
Meanwhile, the leading elements of Roise’s infantry reached the foot
of Objectives Able and Baker, two large hills about 4,000 yards due
south of Kimpo. There being no evidence of the enemy in the area,
the battalion commander did not waste time by committing whole rifle
companies to the high ground. At 1600, Lieutenant Deptula’s 1st
Platoon of Easy Company ascended Objective Baker, while the rest of
the battalion waited on the road below. The hill was laced with vacant
entrenchments, and once on the summit, Deptula further observed that
objective Able was unoccupied. Moreover, he reported by radio that
it appeared to be clear sailing over the low ground leading to the
airfield.[233]
[233] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Deptula
interv, 18 Jan 55.
Acting on this information, Roise promptly launched his attack on
Kimpo, one of the major tactical objectives of the Inchon-Seoul
operation. A left face by the roadbound column put the troops of 2/5 on
line for the assault. Easy and Dog Companies, the latter on the left,
advanced rapidly against only desultory sniper fire.
Captain English’s tanks arrived propitiously, entering far out to the
left front of the attacking infantry. At a point 1,000 yards south of
the airfield, the M-26s came under moderate small-arms fire. Lieutenant
Anderson’s rifle platoon dismounted and engaged the small force of
North Koreans, knocking out one automatic weapon with grenades. The
Marine armor put down the remaining resistance with seven rounds
of 90mm High Explosive (HE) followed by a thorough hosing with bow
machine-gun fire.[234]
[234] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; and Anderson interv,
20 Aug 54.
Just as this action subsided, Company D of 2/5 swept through the area,
picked up a platoon of tanks, and continued toward the airfield. The
other platoon of armor swung to the right to support Easy Company’s
attack. By 1800, the Marines were on the southern tip of Kimpo’s main
runway. Aside from sporadic long range fire from the east, there was no
opposition worthy of note.[235]
[235] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Roise interv, 21
Dec 54; and Deptula interv, 18 Jan 55.
_Action at 5th Marines CP_
Over a mile long and three-quarters of a mile wide, Korea’s principal
airdrome was no mean target to secure. Scattered around the field were
more than half a dozen villages, and the runways themselves were lined
by scores of plane revetments and emplacements. It was already dusk
when Roise ordered his two assault companies to take the objective
“with all speed,” but by nightfall the infantry and tanks had cleared
only the southern portion of the runway.[236]
[236] Maj S. Jaskilka memo to authors, 13 May 55; Roise
interv, 21 Dec 54. In the gathering darkness, Roise
underestimated the size of the airfield and thought
he controlled more than actually was the case. Thus
he reported the objective “secured” at 2020, as 2/5
commenced digging in for the night.
Rather than stretch a single defensive line to the point of diminishing
returns, the battalion commander deployed his three rifle companies in
separate perimeters, each one a tightly knit strong point. Easy Company
dug in on the east of the main runway and Dog on the west. Company F
deployed to the south of the airfield, paying particular attention
to the main road and a pair of intersections that tied in secondary
routes. In a central perimeter was 2/5’s CP, and Able Company Tanks
took up positions in Company D’s area. Just before dark, Lieutenant
Deptula’s platoon had raced northward to outpost the village of
Soryu-li, several hundred yards beyond Company E’s lines.[237]
[237] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and Deptula
interv, 18 Jan 55.
While 2/5 was investing the southern reaches of Kimpo, Lieutenant
Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, pressed the attack on the
regimental right. Encountering no resistance, Company A occupied the
southern portion of Objective Easy at 1900. Company B ascended the
northern half of the high ground without incident later in the evening.
With Charlie Company on another hill to the west, 1/5 settled down for
the night some 1,500 yards southeast of the 2d Battalion’s lines. Two
miles to the rear, 3/5 deployed in regimental reserve around a critical
road junction midway between Kimpo and Ascom City.[238]
[238] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
During the afternoon of 17 September, as the assault elements of the
5th Marines rolled forward over a relatively quiet front, regimental
headquarters suddenly found itself in the center of an angry hornets’
nest. Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP had just displaced to the north of
the railroad station in Ascom City, when Commissioned Warrant Officer
Bill E. Parrish walked across the tracks to reconnoiter a site for his
ordnance dump. Gaining the summit of a small knoll, the officer and his
NCO assistants were met by a heavy fusilade from the orchard and rice
paddy beyond. Parrish was killed instantly and two of his men seriously
wounded.[239]
[239] Capt G. H. Stewart interv, 17 Nov 54.
Cries of help brought First Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona’s 1st
Platoon of A/Engineers, which had just arrived at Murray’s CP. In
a brief clash around the orchard, the engineers killed ten enemy
die-hards. South Korean police swept through the adjoining rice paddy
and came up with seven prisoners.
About the same time, Major James D. Jordan’s party arrived in the area
to select a position for Battery A of 1/11. Again small-arms fire
crackled. Two of Jordan’s NCOs, Technical Sergeants Kenneth C. Boston
and Donald Comiskey, plowed through the hail of lead and killed four
more North Koreans.[240]
[240] Maj J. D. Jordan interv, 27 Sep 54.
North of the railroad, still another Marine was killed and one more
wounded not far from Murray’s headquarters. For obvious reasons a tight
perimeter of engineers and H&S Company troops was drawn around the CP
during the night. Nevertheless, a Red officer stumbled through the
line in the darkness and seriously wounded Second Lieutenant Lawrence
Hetrick of A/Engineers.
At dawn on 18 September the regimental commander and his staff were
awakened by the chatter of an enemy submachine gun a few yards from the
CP. Holed up in a grain field with one Communist rifleman, the officer
who had shot Hetrick fought fanatically against a whole platoon of
engineers. Another Marine was wounded before the suicidal stand was
crushed by grenades and rifle fire.
There were no regrets when Murray’s headquarters took leave of Ascom
City and displaced to Kimpo.
_Enemy Counterattack at Kimpo_
The air at Kimpo was charged with tension during the night of 17–18
September. Troops of 2/5, manning perimeters which had been laid out on
unfamiliar ground during darkness, had every reason to believe that the
North Koreans would not give up the airfield without a fight.
But there were troubles enough in the North Korean camp, where
confusion and panic seemed to be the order of the day. Intelligence
on the enemy garrison in the Kimpo area presents a scrambled picture
so characteristic of the Communist organization throughout the
Inchon-Seoul operation.[241] It appears that elements of the NKPA 1st
Air Force Division were charged with the operation of the airfield.
Under the command of 40-year-old Chinese-trained Brigadier General Wan
Yong, the division was comprised of the following units or, more often
than not, mere fragments thereof:
[241] The intelligence summary is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annexes Baker and Queen Queen.
Division Headquarters
1st Co, Engineer Bn, Fighters Regt
3d Co, Engineer Bn, Fighters Regt
3d Plat, Gunners Co
2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt
2d Bn, 1st Regt
Finance Co, 3d Technical Bn
Supply Co
The Kimpo force was augmented by a motley mixture of poorly trained
troops from the 226th and 107th NKPA Regiments and the separate 877th
Air Force Unit. In the face of the Marine advance, Colonel Han Choi
Han, commander of the 107th had fled across the Han River, leaving the
remnants of his regiment to an obvious fate. Major Kung Chan So, leader
of the 877th AF Unit, was killed in action on 17 September. Of the 400
men originally assigned to this organization, only five remained in
combat by 18 September.
Crowded into undesirable terrain between the airfield and the Han
River, the Red troops were demoralized and bewildered by the rapid
advance of the 5th Marines. Only the fanaticism of a few officers and
NCOs prevented the complete collapse that would have resulted from the
lack of tangible assistance from the North Korean leaders in Seoul. And
it was no boost to sagging morale that white clothing had been issued
by the Supply Company, so that the Red soldiers could quickly change to
the traditional Korean garb when defeat was imminent, and dissolve in
the local populace.
In the counterattack against the airfield, which was designed to uproot
a full-strength Marine battalion backed by tanks and other heavy
fire support, the celebrated night tactics of the Communists fizzled
completely. With only a few hundred men at most, the rest having
slipped away to safer parts, the North Koreans further reduced their
strength by trying to develop three widely separated attacks. That they
launched these assaults with only rifles and submachine guns serves to
make the story more incredible.
The first move was in company strength against Lieutenant Deptula’s
isolated platoon outpost in Soryu-li, far to the north of Easy Company
lines.[242] Deployed on both sides of a road junction in the village,
the Marines heard the enemy column approaching about 0300. Deptula held
fire until the Red vanguard marched into the center of his position.
Sergeant Richard L. Martson then jumped to his feet, bellowed “United
States Marines!” and opened up with his carbine on full automatic. A
sheet of rifle and BAR fire poured into the column from the roadsides,
and a dozen North Koreans went down in a heap. The remainder fled.
[242] The account of the Kimpo counterattacks is taken from:
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Deptula interv, 18
Jan 55; and Harrell interv, 4 Jan 55.
The Communist commander rallied his soldiers for three more thrusts
against the Marine platoon. In between the attacks, his gravel-voiced
exhortations ground the air. The will to fight was lacking, however,
and each time, the attackers barely brushed the Marine position before
darting back into the night.
A T-34 tank was finally brought up to buttress another North Korean
assault. Without AT weapons to stop the armored vehicle rumbling
down the road toward his platoon, Deptula retracted southward in the
direction of 2/5’s main positions. The outpost had suffered only one
KIA and one WIA in blunting the four attacks. It was not pursued during
the withdrawal.
Deptula’s platoon gained Company E’s lines at 0500, just before the
perimeter received enemy small-arms fire from the west. Captain
Jaskilka, supposing it to be coming inadvertently from Dog Company,
forbade his men to reply. He stood up and yelled, “Hey! Cease fire, you
guys, this is Easy Company!” Fortunately, the enemy’s aim must have
been disturbed by the spectacle of a Marine officer giving orders, for
Jaskilka escaped without a scratch after discovering his mistake. This
enemy force proved to number about two squads, and just at that moment
the main NKPA force hit from the east. Easy Company was thus engaged
on two fronts, with Jones’ recoilless gun platoon taking on the attack
from the west while the 2d Platoon bore the brunt of the assault from
the east.[243]
[243] Jaskilka memo, 13 May 55.
The 2d Battalion’s southernmost position, manned by Company F, had
been active throughout the night. Lieutenant Harrell’s assault platoon
together with Richards’ engineer outfit was entrenched around an
overpass within the southeastern arc of the company perimeter. In
the first hours of 18 September, a North Korean lieutenant and his
five-man demolition team tried to reach the bridge in an apparent
attempt to destroy it. Sergeant Ray D. Kearl opposed the intruders
single-handedly, killing the Red officer and three of his men, and
driving the remaining pair back into the night. Before daybreak,
another enemy patrol approached on the road and was annihilated.
[Illustration: NK COUNTERATTACK
KIMPO AIRFIELD--18 SEPTEMBER]
It proved that these and other scattered incidents were the prelude
to the third and final attack against the airfield, which was
launched from the south at dawn. This last maneuver by the Reds,
however, was checked even before it began, for the 1st Battalion,
5th Marines, spotted the attackers moving across its front toward
Kimpo. Baker Company took the North Koreans under fire immediately,
and the battalion commander called down heavy mortar and artillery
concentrations.
Most of the Communist column was disorganized and dispersed before
it could reach 2/5’s southern defenses. The lone platoon that did
connect with Company F’s perimeter engaged the Marines at the overpass.
Harrell’s troops and the engineers poured small-arms fire and white
phosphorus rockets into the attackers. Staff Sergeant Robert J. Kikta,
defying enemy bullets as he moved among his men shouting encouragement,
fell mortally wounded. Sergeant David R. DeArmond, normally a bulldozer
operator for A/Engineers, was killed behind his machine gun.
After the short, bitter clash, the surviving North Koreans retreated
through the rice paddies and hills leading to the Han River. Companies
E and F, supported by A/Tanks, fanned out from their perimeters and
mopped up. In 1/5’s zone, Lieutenant Colonel Newton committed Charlie
Company against the withdrawing enemy and inflicted more casualties.
Kimpo and the surrounding villages were secured by 1000, 18 September.
Half an hour later, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered Company D,
supported by tanks, recoilless rifles, and heavy machine guns, to
seize Regimental Objective Dog--Hill 131, which dominated the banks of
the Han River north of the airfield. Advancing under cover of naval
gunfire, the Marines occupied the high ground unopposed at 1145.[244]
[244] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
In the 24 hours since leaving Ascom City, the 2d Battalion, 5th
Marines, had suffered four KIA and 19 WIA in driving over nine miles of
hills and rice paddies.[245] The rapid advance cost the North Koreans
100 dead in 2/5’s zone, ten prisoners, and one of the finest airdromes
in the Far East.
[245] _Ibid._
CHAPTER IX
Marine Air Support
_Helicopters and OYs in Support--Marine Air Units at Kimpo--Progress of
Eighth Army Offensive--Division CP Displaces to Oeoso-Ri--Advance of
RCT-1 to Sosa--Reports of Enemy Build-up--Preparations for Crossing the
Han_
At 1000 on the morning of 18 September an HO3S-1 helicopter became
the first American aircraft to land on Kimpo Airfield since June.
Mopping up operations had scarcely been completed, following the
enemy counterattack, when Captain Victor A. Armstrong of VMO-6 made
a vertical approach with General Shepherd and Colonel Krulak as
passengers. They were greeted by General Craig, the ADC, who had just
arrived in a jeep.
The field was in surprisingly good shape, considering the fighting it
had seen within the last few hours. As evidence that the enemy had
been surprised, one Russian-built fighter of the Yak III type and two
Stormovik type aircraft were found “relatively undamaged” and turned
over to Air Force Intelligence.[246] Several other Yaks and Stormoviks
had been destroyed by the enemy.
[246] 1st MAW, Annex Able.
On the return trip, Armstrong was requested by his passengers to fly
them across the Han for a preview of the outskirts of Seoul. Except
for scattered small-arms fire, the helicopter was allowed to proceed
without being molested by the enemy. There were few signs of extensive
NKPA preparations to be seen at this time.[247]
[247] Maj V. A. Armstrong interv, 16 Mar 55.
_Helicopters and OYs in Support_
VMO-6, the composite observation squadron commanded by Major Vincent J.
Gottschalk, had already made a name for itself in the Pusan Perimeter
actions. Consisting of eight HO3S-1 helicopters and an equal number of
OY planes, this former Brigade unit came under the operational control
of the 1st Marine Division and the administrative and logistical
control of MAG-33. During the Inchon assault, VMO-6 was based on SCAJAP
LST QO79 in the harbor except for an Oy attached to each of the two
CVEs.
The first of a long sequence of helicopter rescue missions during the
Inchon-Seoul operation took place on D-plus 1 when First Lieutenant
Max N. Nebergall picked up a Navy pilot who had ditched in Inchon
harbor. Flights carried out by other aircraft were reported as three
reconnaissance, two artillery spot, three beach reconnaissance, and one
utility.[248]
[248] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe.
VMO-6 displaced ashore the next day to an airstrip improvised near
the Division CP by the Marine engineers. This was the beginning of
liaison, utility, reconnaissance, evacuation, and rescue flights on a
dawn-to-dark basis.
Division air and naval gunfire representatives of the Fire Support
Coordination Center followed VMO-6 ashore on the 16th. During the
planning phase they had worked with their opposite numbers of PhibGru
One and with the 11th Marines after the Division landed at Kobe.
Although some of the officers and men embarked for Inchon in the _Mount
McKinley_, the materiel and 90 percent of the personnel arrived in the
_President Jackson_. At 1400 on D-plus 2 the FSCC became operational
after all elements and their equipment reported to the Division CP.
Responsibility for the coordination of supporting arms ashore was
assumed at 0630 on 16 September for air, at 1500 on the 17th for
artillery, and at 1800 on the 18th for naval gunfire.[249]
[249] _Ibid._, Annexes Baker Baker, Charlie Charlie, and Dog
Dog.
The rapid advance of Marine ground forces during the first three days
meant that Major Robert L. Schreier’s 1st Signal Battalion had a job
on its hands. The main body reached the objective area on board the
_President Jackson_, and the first units ashore were the battalion and
regimental ANGLICO teams, most of which had embarked in LSTs. When
the ADC group displaced from Wolmi-do to Inchon, radio facilities were
maintained without a hitch.
Radio and message center facilities met all requirements during
the night of 16–17 September. Teletype (through radio carrier) was
initiated between the Division CP and Corps, afloat on the _Mount
McKinley_. And by the morning of D-plus 2, such progress had been made
that wire communication was established not only with both advancing
infantry regiments but also with most of the battalions.[250]
[250] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex George George.
Enemy resistance was so ineffectual from 16 to 18 September that
the Marine infantry regiments were able to advance without much
flank protection. The three battalions of the 11th Marines did more
displacing than firing in their efforts to keep pace, and men and
vehicles of the Signal Battalion were kept busy at laying wire.
Security was provided for the left, or northern, Division flank by
the attack of the KMC Regiment (less the 2d Battalion, left behind
for police duties in Inchon) under the control of the 5th Marines.
Attached to the regiment for possible use in calling down naval gunfire
were two Shore Fire Control Parties. Objectives on Corps Phase Line CC
were reached without much difficulty after the initial KMC setbacks
described in the previous chapter.[251]
[251] _Ibid._, basic rpt, and Annex Queen Queen.
_Marine Air Units at Kimpo_
There had been little or no urgent need for close air support until 18
September, when RCT-1 met stubborn opposition in the Sosa area. Thus
the capture of Kimpo in comparatively good condition was a timely boon,
since it meant that land-based Marine tactical air support could be
initiated as soon as Captain George W. King’s Able Company Engineers
made the field operative with temporary repairs.
This was the conclusion of Generals Harris and Cushman, commanding the
1st MAW and TAC X Corps, when they visited Kimpo by helicopter on the
afternoon of the 18th. They advised CG X Corps accordingly, and that
evening he ordered the deployment of MAG-33 to the captured airfield
with its headquarters and service squadrons.
The tactical squadrons figured in an administrative switch that has
sometimes puzzled chroniclers of Marine air operations. By order of
General Harris, the following reassignments were directed to take
effect on 21 September 1950:
From MAG-33 to MAG-12--VMF-214, VMF-323, and VMF(N)-513;
From MAG-12 to MAG-33--VMF-212, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-542.[252]
[252] CG 1st MAW speedltr, 20 Sep 50.
Both MGCIS-1 and MTACS-2 were already ashore at Inchon under the
operational control of the 1st Marine Division. Aircraft and flight
echelons of the tactical squadrons were to be flown to Kimpo on the
19th from Itazuke and Itami airfields in Japan, with the remaining
elements following by surface shipping. Thus MAG-33 would consist of
these units:
------------+--------+--------+----------
Organization|Officers|Enlisted| Total
------------+--------+--------+----------
HqSq-33 | 74 | 177 | 251
SMS-33 | 29 | 538 | 567
VMF-212 | 32 | 154 | 186
VMF-312 | 53 | 221 | 274
VMF(N)-542 | 54 | 291 | 345
MTACS-2 | 34 | 190 | 224
MGCIS-1 | 19 | 185 | 204
+--------+--------+----------
Total | 295 | 1,756 |[253]2,051
------------+--------+--------+----------
[253] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item.
VMFs-214 and 323 would continue to operate from the carriers _Sicily_
and _Badoeng Strait_, with the night-fighters, VMF(N)-513 being based
as usual at Itazuke AFB in Japan. The only difference was that a
scratch of the pen had transferred these units from MAG-33 to MAG-12.
It was their responsibility to support the advancing ground forces
during the critical period while the other three tactical squadrons
were making the move from Japan to Kimpo.
Control of tactical air support had passed from the TADC on the _Mount
McKinley_ to the Air Support Section of MTACS-2 on D-plus 2, after the
Landing Force Commander signified his readiness to assume it. Calls for
close air support were increasing as the enemy recovered from the first
shock of invasion. On the 18th and 19th, the three fighter squadrons of
MAG-12 flew a total of nearly 50 close support sorties controlled by
the Air Support Section of MTACS-2. Napalm, 20mm ammunition, rockets,
and 500-pound bombs were used to blast NKPA troop concentrations in the
zone of the 1st Marines.[254]
[254] MarCorps Board _Study_, IV-B, 16, 17; 1st MAW _SAR_,
basic rpt, and Annex Jig.
Logistical as well as tactical and administrative problems had to
be solved. During the planning phase, it may be recalled, Colonel
Kenneth H. Weir (C/S TAC X corps) had learned that X corps would not
have enough trucks to support air operations at Kimpo by transporting
aviation gasoline and aircraft munitions from Inchon. As a solution,
arrangements were made to accept the offer of FEAF Combat Cargo Command
to provide logistical support; and these totals in tonnage were flown
in from Japan during the first week:
------+----+-----+-------
Date |Ammo|Avgas| Oil
------+----+-----+-------
18 Sep| 16| 8| 0
19 Sep| 73| 28| 5
20 Sep| 151| 86| 0
21 Sep| 219| 88| 11
22 Sep| 268| 153| 5
23 Sep| 139| 80| 0
24 Sep| 118| 81|[255]16
------+----+-----+-------
[255] 1st MAW _SAR_, basic rpt.
This proved to be the largest total for a single week during the
Inchon-Seoul operation. In addition, about 1,025 tons of POL and 425
tons of ammunition were trucked from Inchon to Kimpo during the entire
period, and the forward echelon of VMR-152 flew in spare parts and
items of urgently needed equipment.
Headquarters of the 1st MAW remained at Itami AFB in Japan, though
General Harris made frequent trips to Kimpo. The chief task of the
Wing during the Kimpo air operations was furnishing administrative and
logistical support to TAC X Corps and MAG-33.
TAC X Corps set up its headquarters at Kimpo Airfield on 19 September,
followed by MTACS-2, MGCIS-1, and VMO-6. The first fighter squadron of
MAG-33 to arrive at the new base was VMF(N)-542. Lieutenant Colonel Max
J. Volcansek, Jr., the commanding officer, and five pilots landed their
F7F-3Ns at 1830 on the 19th after a flight from Itami AFB. This was the
baptism of fire for a majority of the squadron’s pilots. Numbering
54 officers and 274 enlisted men when it left El Toro, VMF(N)-542 had
only 20 trained night fighter pilots. The remainder were volunteer
reservists qualified by “a good experience level and a desire to become
night fighters.”[256]
[256] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item, VMF(N)-542 rpt.
The squadron claimed the distinction of flying the first Marine combat
mission from Kimpo at 0735 on the 20th when four of the F7F-3N aircraft
destroyed two enemy locomotives after expending some 3,000 rounds
of 20mm ammunition. The Corsairs of Lieutenant Colonel Richard W.
Wyczawski’s VMF-212 and two aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel J. Frank
Cole’s VMF-312 also landed at Kimpo on the 19th and got into action the
following day. Conditions were primitive at the outset. In the lack
of refueling facilities, the first strikes had to be flown on fuel
remaining in the aircraft, and bombs were loaded by hand.[257]
[257] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item VMF-212 rpt.
It had been an achievement to have two tactical squadrons of MAG-33 in
action less than 48 hours after the reconnaissance landing by Generals
Harris and Cushman. This accomplishment owed a great deal to the care
shown by the 5th Marines to keep damage at a minimum. Lieutenant
General George E. Stratemeyer, CG FEAF, expressed his appreciation of
this factor in a letter to General Smith:
“I want to take this opportunity of expressing my admiration and
gratification for the manner in which elements of your Division
recently captured Kimpo Airfield and so secured it as to make it
available for use by Far East Air Forces and Marine Corps aircraft in
the shortest possible time.”[258]
[258] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 212–213.
_Progress of Eighth Army Offensive_
General MacArthur had intended the Eighth Army to be the hammer and X
Corps the anvil of a great joint operation. During the first few days,
however, it sometimes appeared as if these roles were reversed. On 18
September, after a penetration of 16 miles on the X Corps front, the
attacking forces in the Pusan Perimeter had just begun to inch ahead
against desperate NKPA resistance. In some sectors, indeed, the enemy
not only put up a stubborn defense but counterattacked vigorously. (See
map in end papers.)
The Eighth Army now consisted of the U. S. I Corps (IX Corps did not
become operational until 23 September) and the ROK I and II Corps.
General Walker’s command was already on the way to becoming the most
cosmopolitan army in which Americans have ever served. Contingents of
British ground forces had reached the front; and before the end of the
year, 40 countries of the United Nations would have offered assistance,
either military or economic, to the fight against Communism.
Most of this aid had not yet materialized on 16 September, but the
Eighth Army had overcome its disadvantage in numbers of trained
troops, thanks to NKPA losses, when it jumped off all along the line
in southeast Korea. In the north the 1st Cavalry Division, 24th
Infantry Division, ROK 1st Division, and British 27th Brigade launched
a determined attack along the Taegu-Waegwon axis to win a bridgehead
across the Naktong. It was nip-and-tuck for the first three days, and
not until the 19th did the UN forces fight their way across the river
against the last-ditch opposition of the 1st, 3d, 10th, and 13th NKPA
Divisions.[259]
[259] Almond, _UN Mil Ops_, 13.
Still farther north, the enemy relinquished little ground until the
18th. On that date the ROK 3d Division recaptured the east coast port
of Pohang-dong, which the invaders had taken in their drive during the
first week of September.
In the south, the U. S. 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions and attached ROK
units were held up for three days by the NKPA 6th and 7th Divisions.
The deadlock lasted until 19 September, when the enemy fell back in the
Masan area along the southern coast.[260]
[260] _Ibid._
Major Joseph H. Reinburg’s VMF(N)-513, operating out of its Itazuke
base, played a conspicuous role in the first days of Walker’s
offensive. Although specialists in night-fighting, the Marine pilots
flew 15 daylight close support missions for Army units from 17 to 19
September. Enemy troops, tanks, vehicles, and artillery were scored
during every strike, as the planes ranged the entire extent of the
Pusan Perimeter.[261]
[261] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item, VMF(N)-513 rpt.
_Division CP Displaces to Oeoso-ri_
So much progress had been made by this date on the X Corps front that
General Smith displaced the 1st Marine Division CP from the eastern
outskirts of Inchon to Oeoso-ri, about a mile and a half southeast of
Kimpo Airfield. This forward location was selected by General Craig
with a view to preliminary Division planning for the crossing of the
Han, which would entail a reshuffling of units.
Oeoso-ri having been an American housing area during the post-World War
II occupation, duplex houses and Quonset huts were available. General
Smith arrived by helicopter on the afternoon of the 19th, and the
new CP opened at 1645. During the next few days the area was treated
to intermittent artillery fire, apparently from a single well-hidden
gun somewhere in the Seoul area. It was an embarrassment to Marine
artillery officers, who were never able to locate the offending weapon,
but no great harm was done.
By this time General Smith could look forward to the arrival of more
units at the front. On D-day the strength of X Corps on paper had been
69,450 ground force troops. In addition to the 1st Marine Division and
7th Infantry Division, there were such major units as the 93d and 96th
Field Artillery Battalions, the 73d Tank Battalion, 56th Amphibian Tank
and Tractor Battalion, the 2d Engineer Combat Group. In GHQ UNC Reserve
were the 3d Infantry Division and the 187th Airborne RCT.[262]
[262] GHQ UNC _OpnO No. 1_, 30 Aug 50.
The 3d Division had not sailed for the Far East in time to take part
in the Inchon-Seoul operation. The 187th Airborne RCT, due to land at
Inchon on 23 September, had been the answer to General MacArthur’s
requests in July for paratroops to land behind the enemy’s lines
in conjunction with the amphibious assault planned as Operation
BLUEHEARTS. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against flying
an airborne RCT to Japan at the time, the 11th Airborne Division was
later directed to organize and train such a unit for service in the
Far East. On account of the large proportion of new troops filling out
a skeleton unit, General Collins stipulated that the 187th was not
to be committed for an airdrop before 29 September. It was decided,
therefore, that the RCT would be given an initial mission of protecting
the left flank of the 1st Marine Division.
_Advance of RCT-1 to Sosa_
Preliminary planning for the crossing of the river Han began as soon
as the Division staff settled down in the new CP. The reshuffling of
various units had to wait, however, until both Marine regiments took
their assigned objectives of 18 and 19 September. Throughout the 17th,
while Murray’s regiment drove northeastward toward Kimpo, the 1st
Marines had continued the attack from Ascom City along the Inchon-Seoul
Highway. As mentioned previously, Monegan’s rocket launcher and the
75mm recoilless rifles, emplaced in 2/1’s positions on Hill 186, helped
smash the North Korean tank-infantry column at dawn. It appeared that
a second enemy force was supposed to have closed on Marine lines by
taking a parallel course through the hills south of the highway. The
Red infantry, in about company strength, was spotted moving along the
high ground toward Company D’s front on Hill 186. Fox Company dispersed
the column with mortar fire and then notified Dog to be on the
alert.[263]
[263] 2/1 _SAR_, 5; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
Though the North Koreans were stopped cold, they did not flee with the
usual rapidity. Their base of operations seemed to be Hill 208, a land
mass that began near Mahang-ri on the highway and spread southward
across most of the 2d Battalion front. Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s
attack plan committed Easy Company on the left of the road, Fox on
the right, and Dog in the high ground to the south. No sooner had the
companies jumped off than they became involved in scattered, stubborn
fighting with Red soldiers on and around Hill 208.[264]
[264] _Ibid._
Howitzers of the 11th Marines raked the high ground ahead of the
attackers, and Sutter’s troops measured off slow but steady progress.
In the low ground bordering the highway, enemy troops had taken
cover in the fields on both sides of a road block about 500 yards
from Mahang-ri. Second Lieutenant Robert C. Hanlon’s 2d Platoon
of Easy Company was pinned down by fire from three sides. Second
Lieutenants Johnny L. Carter and George E. McAlee started forward
with reinforcements, but McAlee was wounded by several bullets. After
summoning a corpsman, Carter got through to Hanlon, and they called
for 3.5-inch rockets and 75mm recoilless fire on huts sheltering enemy
soldiers. The two officers then led an advance which took the platoon
to a small hill on the right of the road block, where the other two
platoons moved up abreast. About 20 NKPA troops were estimated to have
been killed.[265]
[265] Capt J. L. Carter ltr to authors, 9 May 55.
[Illustration: ADVANCE BY 1st MARINES--17 SEP]
At noon, Companies F and D had secured Hill 208 overlooking the FBHL,
but it remained for E to break into Mahang-ri on the highway. By this
time 3/1 had entered the fight with an armored column. Company G, led
by First Lieutenant Robert L. Gover’s 1st Platoon of Baker Company
Tanks, punched down the road in an attempt to pierce the screen of
Red resistance with the rest of 3/1 in column close behind. The M-26
crews spotted an 85mm gun protruding from a thatched hut and destroyed
the camouflaged T-34 before it could fire a shot. An infantry platoon
riding the Marine tanks was forced to dismount at Mahang-ri and deploy,
while the armor fired from the road at numerous targets of opportunity.
The village was finally secured shortly before 1600, and small bands
of enemy were seen darting eastward to take up new positions along the
highway.[266]
[266] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1
_SAR_; and Capt B. J. Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54. Col
T. L. Ridge, memo to authors, 13 May 55.
The advance to Mahang-ri and the FBHL had carried the 1st Marines 3,000
yards from its starting point at Ascom City. As the attack continued
late in the afternoon, the next objective was Corps Phase Line CC,
whose boundaries were defined in the previous chapter. Midway between
Mahang-ri and the phase line was the town of Sosa, and it was from this
locale that North Korean soldiers were pouring westward to delay the
Marine advance on the highway.
Since the 5th Marines had veered to the northeast to attack Kimpo,
its boundary with the 1st had moved well to the left of the highway.
Henceforth, Puller’s regiment would have to go it alone on the main
road. This was the case as the 2d and 3d Battalions butted against
enemy delaying forces between Ascom City and Mahang-ri, and the
isolation became more pronounced as they attacked toward Sosa late on
the 17th.
Sutter’s unit advanced on the left of the highway with Companies E
and F in assault. George Company of 3/1, transported in LVTs and
followed by the rest of the battalion, moved along the road behind the
2d Platoon, Baker Company Tanks. There is a defile halfway between
Mahang-ri and Sosa, and at this spot the North Koreans chose to make a
determined stand. Second Lieutenant Bryan J. Cummings nosed his lead
M-26 into the pass, while infantry moved to the shoulders on either
side against light opposition. Suddenly the troops and lone tank were
hit from the front by a heavy volume of small-arms, antitank, and
mortar fire.[267]
[267] 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 _SAR_; and Cummings interv, 24 Aug 54.
The Marine infantry was thrown back by the intensity of the outburst,
the most severe they had yet encountered. As luck would have it, the
engine of Cummings’ tank went dead at this inopportune moment, and the
big vehicle stalled. Remembering that infantry had been riding on top
of his M-26, the platoon leader opened the hatch to make a quick check.
He yanked a lone rifleman inside and buttoned up just as Red soldiers
scrambled down the embankment.
Fumes from the 90mm gun choked the Marines in the vehicle as they
listened to the clamor of North Koreans on the hull. The infantryman
who had been pulled to safety by Cummings suddenly went berserk and
had to be knocked out. Then the officer was forced to choose between
two evils: either his crew must succumb to the acrid fumes or take its
chances on opening the pistol port for ventilation. He opened the port.
A grenade bounced inside, and the ear-shattering explosion within the
steel enclosure wounded Cummings, the rifleman, and one of the tank
gunners. At this moment the semi-conscious Marines resigned themselves
to the worst.[268]
[268] Cummings interv, 24 Aug 54.
Help was on the way, however, and it was timed to the split second.
Just as the grenade exploded, Sergeant Marion C. Altaire’s M-26 moved
to the mouth of the defile and “scratched the back” of the beleaguered
vehicle with bow machine-gun fire. Riddled Red soldiers were swept from
the top of Cummings’ tank and piled up alongside. Within a few minutes,
a VMF-214 flight appeared over the pass, and the planes peeled off to
bomb, rocket, and strafe the high ground.[269]
[269] _Ibid._; and 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig, VMF-214 rpt, 5.
As the tide of battle swept past, Cummings and his men opened the
hatch, coughing and choking, and drank in long breaths of fresh air.
It took them a moment to realize that they were back again in the land
of the living after one of the closest calls that Marines have ever
experienced.
Company G of 3/1 fought back on the right of the MSR and gained the
high ground above the pass. Simultaneously, Staff Sergeant Arthur J.
MacDonald led the second section of Cummings’ tank platoon into the
defile, and the M-26s laid down heavy 90mm and machine-gun fire on the
crescent of North Korean emplacements ahead. A total of six enemy AT
guns was destroyed, but not before the weapons had knocked a track off
Cummings’ vehicle and damaged two others to a lesser extent.[270]
[270] _Ibid._; 3/1 _SAR_; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
The 2d Battalion drove to the top of the high ground on the left of the
road, and the Marines enjoyed a small-scale “turkey shoot” as the North
Koreans pulled out and pelted toward Sosa. While the assault units
consolidated their holdings, the remainder of the 2d and 3d Battalions
moved into the area around the defile and dug in for the night.
The 1st Marines’ attack along the highway had netted 4,800 yards.
Despite repeated clashes in the course of the day, 2/1 lost only one
killed and 28 wounded, and Company G of the 3d Battalion suffered six
WIA. Enemy losses included 250 killed and wounded, 70 prisoners, one
T-34 tank, several AT guns, and large quantities of small arms and
ammunition.[271]
[271] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe; 2/1 _SAR_; and 3/1
_SAR_. In its account of NKPA losses for 17 September,
2/1 lists four other enemy tanks destroyed. These
vehicles were among the six knocked out jointly by the
1st and 5th Marines and Able Company Tanks at the dawn
ambuscade near Ascom City. 1st MarDiv G-2 reports of
14 NKPA tanks destroyed this date cannot be supported
by the records of subordinate units. In addition to
the six T-34s destroyed in the morning and the single
vehicle knocked out by our tanks near Mahang-ri, one
other kill was recorded by Marine air.
Action on the Division’s southern flank involved little more than hill
climbing and foot races for the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and the
Division Reconnaissance Company. After jumping off in the morning of
D-plus 2, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’ infantry fanned out through a
maze of twisting valleys and ridges. The battalion encountered only
light resistance, which invariably evaporated under pressure, and
by dark the assault elements had gained 4,000 yards. Hawkins then
deployed his troops for night defense on the high ground south of 3/1’s
positions overlooking the highway defile.[272]
[272] McGee-Carlon interv, 9 Feb 55.
On the right of the 1st Battalion, Captain Houghton’s Reconnaissance
Company reached the tip of the Namdong Peninsula. The Recon troops
spent two days, the 17th and 18th, patrolling this spacious tactical
vacuum. A number of dispirited prisoners were collected and caches of
arms and munitions uncovered. One of the more significant discoveries
was a small arsenal in which Russian-type wooden box mines were being
manufactured and stored in quantity. First encountered by Able Company
engineers in the Pusan Perimeter, these crude but effective explosives
would become serious obstacles to the Marine advance in the days
ahead.[273]
[273] HqBn, 1st MarDiv _Unit Rpts_, 9 Sep-11 Nov 50; and
Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54. See also this series, I:225.
The night of 17–18 September passed quietly for the 1st Marines. During
the hours of darkness, Ridge requested intermittent naval gunfire to
interdict Sosa and Hill 123, where he believed enemy defenses to be
located. Jump-off fires were also planned for the morning in addition
to air strikes. Captain P. W. Brock’s HMS _Kenya_ poured in more than
300 6-inch rounds with good results. “Our Royal Navy ally not only
supported the battalion to the maximum of its naval gunfire desires,”
said Ridge, “but volunteered to render more than was requested.”[274]
[274] Ridge memo, 13 May 55.
Shortly after first light on D-plus 3, the 2d Battalion attacked along
the highway with Easy Company on the left of the road and Dog on the
right. Premature air bursts from an artillery preparation resulted in
two KIA and three WIA among the troops of Company E.[275]
[275] 2/1 _SAR_, 6; Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54; Carter ltr, 9
May 55.
Ridge’s 3d Battalion boarded a column of LVTs, DUKWs, and jeeps, then
rumbled down the highway through 2/1’s assault companies. In striking
contrast to the previous day’s advance, there was a conspicuous absence
of NKPA infantry along the way. The Marines brushed aside light
opposition, including an antitank roadblock at Sosa’s outskirts, and
captured the town at noon. Covered by Baker Company Tanks, 2/1 moved
into defensive positions on the right side of the railroad about a mile
beyond the built-up area, and the 3d Battalion deployed on Hill 123
just across the tracks.[276]
[276] _Ibid._; and 3/1 _SAR_, 7.
On the Division’s right, 1/1 gained another 4,000 yards in the course
of 18 September. In its third consecutive day of attack, the battalion
had yet to encounter anything more formidable than steep hills and
vapid enemy bands. Hawkins built his night defenses along a mountainous
two-mile front south of 2/1’s position overlooking the highway.
[Illustration: CAPTURE OF SOSA
1st MARINES--18 SEP]
_Reports of Enemy Build-up_
There was little activity in the 5th Marines’ zone of action during
the 1st Regiment’s drive on Sosa. After helping 2/5 smash the dawn
counterattack at Kimpo, Company C, 1st Battalion, attacked Objective
Fox under cover of an artillery preparation. Lieutenant Pedersen’s unit
seized the high ground against light opposition at 0930, while the
remainder of 1/5 remained entrenched at Objective Easy, captured the
previous day.[277]
[277] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
Murray’s CP displaced to Kimpo at 1245 on the 18th, and the regiment
spent the rest of the day patrolling from its positions which ringed
the airfield. On the 5th Marines’ left, the 3d Battalion of the KMC was
joined by 1/KMC in searching out the base of the Kumpo Peninsula. A
new security force was added to the Division sector when the 17th ROK
Regiment landed at Inchon and fanned out to comb the troublesome area
between Ascom City and the sea.[278]
[278] _Ibid._; and 1st MarDiv _Chief of Staff_ (C/S)
_Journal_, 15–20 Sep 50.
The General Situation Map gives the disposition of friendly and
suspected enemy elements as of late afternoon on 18 September. This
date is particularly important in that the Marine division, regimental,
and battalion headquarters were swamped by a torrent of intelligence
which indicated for the first time the future patterns of organized
NKPA resistance.
Beginning on the left of the broad arc of the 1st Marine Division’s
front, repeated reports told of enemy concentrations north and south of
the Han River in the area of the Kumpo Peninsula.[279] Upwards of 1,000
troops were sighted by natives and air observers, and it was believed
that the North Koreans were organizing for an attempt against Kimpo.
A strike by four Navy Skyraiders caught part of the Red force exposed
on both banks of the Han northeast of the airfield. After killing an
estimated 50 of the enemy and dispersing the remainder, the Navy pilots
reported the area “still active.”
[279] The following narrative, unless otherwise noted, is
derived from: 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal_, 15–20 Sep 50;
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; and 1st Marines
_PIR No. 3_.
[Illustration: _Hail to the Chief--General Smith welcomes General
MacArthur ashore, on D-plus 2, for his first trip of inspection (U. S.
Army Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Drive to Kimpo----Above, Marines pass burning enemy
tank with bodies of NKPA soldiers on top; and, below, enemy transport
knocked out by Marine planes (Marine Corps Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Advance to Yongdungpo----Above, an enemy ammunition
dump goes up in smoke (U. S. Army Photo); and, below, RCT-1 Marines
march prisoners back through a rice paddy (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Kimpo Airfield Secured----Above, correspondents examine
captured Yak fighter (U. S. Army Photo); and, below, First Lieutenant
J. V. Hanes of VMF-214 shows Lieutenant Colonel Walter Lischeid the
flak scars on his Corsair (U. S. Navy Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Aircraft----Above, Corsair fighter-bombers on
Kimpo Airfield; and, below, the F7F Tigercat used as a night fighter
and intruder._]
[Illustration: _Crossing the Han----Above, Marine amtracs take Marines
and KMCs across river, with Hill 125 on far shore; and, below, troops
of 32d Infantry, USA, cross in Marine amtracs (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Approach to Seoul----Above, the rugged terrain
northwest of Seoul as seen by Marine from ridge on south bank of Han;
and, below, Marine fire team fighting in this terrain (U. S. Navy
Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Regimental Commanders----Above, Lieutenant Colonel
Raymond L. Murray, commanding officer of RCT-5, in his CP; and, below,
General Smith being greeted by Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, commanding
officer of RCT-7 (Marine Corps Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Command Conferences----Above (left to right) Colonel
Lewis B. Puller, commanding officer of RCT-1, General MacArthur
and General Smith; and, below (left to right), Colonel Charles E.
Beauchamp, commanding officer of 32d Infantry, General Barr, General
Almond and General Craig (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Battle Casualties----Above, Navy Hospitalmen R. E.
Rosegoom and Frank J. Yasso give first aid to wounded NKPA prisoner;
and, below, Marines carry wounded comrade back from firing line (U. S.
Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Northwest of Seoul----Above, the KMCs move up in
amtracs; and, below, Korean refugees return to ruined homes on
outskirts of Seoul (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _The Fight for Seoul----Above, Marine tank and infantry
close in on northwest approaches; and, below, Marines pass refugees in
battered streets (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Return of Refugees----Displaced residents of Seoul come
back to find railway station (above) and Hotel Banta (below) scarred by
artillery fire (U. S. Army Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Ceremonies----Above, former Marine cemetery at Inchon
is dedicated as United Nations Cemetery; and, below, President Syngman
Rhee and General MacArthur at liberation ceremony in Seoul (U. S. Army
Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Artillery----Two views of 105mm howitzers of
11th Marines in Korea (Marine Corps Photos)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Air Commanders--Above, Major General Field
Harris, commanding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, holding a captured
Russian burp gun; and, below, facing camera from left to right, General
Harris and Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, commanding TAC X
Corps._]
Marine Air in turn warned of a build-up of Communist troops and
equipment in the vicinity of Haengju and Hill 125, directly across
the Han from 2/5’s position north of Kimpo. East of the airfield, the
enemy was withdrawing from the 5th Marines’ zone toward Yongdungpo,
using the Hill 118 area as an intermediate rallying point. Moreover,
interrogation of two NKPA officers captured near Kimpo disclosed that a
Communist regiment was already committed to the defense of Yongdungpo.
Since this large industrial suburb of Seoul rambled across the 1st
Marines’ path to the Han, Colonel Puller knew well in advance that
trouble lay ahead of his regiment.
Further evidence that storm clouds were gathering over the highway came
from a number of sources in Sosa. Informants were almost unanimous
in their predictions that the approaches to Yongdungpo would be sown
liberally with land mines.
VMF-214, which provided effective close air support for the 1st
Marines’ attack through Sosa, reported destroying huge enemy stockpiles
hidden in and around buildings on the sand spit between Yongdungpo and
Seoul. The squadron also sighted six enemy tanks far beyond Marine
lines and killed two of them with direct napalm hits. Its sister unit,
VMF-323, likewise scoured the Division front and radioed similar
findings to Tactical Air Control.
Other reports from scattered sources placed approximately 3,000 North
Koreans in Seoul--with more on the way. Air spotters noted heavy
traffic south from the 38th Parallel and north from the Suwon area.
Tanks, troops, and vehicles from the latter not only were heading
for the capital but also were veering off toward Yongdungpo and the
Division right flank.
Thus, the Marines faced the possibility of major interference from:
(1) the Kumpo Peninsula; (2) the Haengju locale on the north bank
of the Han; (3) the area around Hill 118 between Kimpo Airfield and
Yongdungpo; (4) Yongdungpo itself; (5) Seoul; and (6) the direction
of the Division’s right (southeastern) flank. Strangely enough for an
enemy who was at his best with the artful dodge, only the two flank
threats failed to measure up to expectations.
The North Koreans gave a preview of the changing picture on the
afternoon of 18 September when, at 1415, the first shells of a
sustained mortar barrage crashed into 3/1’s positions on Hill 123.
During the next hour, 120mm eruptions traced accurate paths back and
forth along the ridge, and 30 Marines were cut down by the whirring
fragments. Moving through the explosions with near-miraculous immunity,
the 3d Battalion’s senior medical officer, Lieutenant Robert J.
Fleischaker, (MC) USN, remained fully exposed to the barrage while
administering to the wounded. “He never thought of his own safety
when men needed his services,” commented Lieutenant Colonel Ridge.[280]
[280] Myers interv, 1 Feb 55; Ridge memo, 13 May 55.
[Illustration: GENERAL SITUATION
18 SEPTEMBER]
South of the highway, enemy gunners ranged in on 2/1’s lines at 1800,
adding 14 more Marines to the casualty rolls. Lieutenant Colonel Sutter
and his S-3, Captain Gildo S. Codispoti, narrowly escaped injury when
two mortar rounds hit the battalion CP. The explosions wounded Captain
Albert L. Williams, commander of Company E, and Warrant Officer Bartley
D. Kent, the battalion supply officer.[281]
[281] Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
_Orders for Crossing the Han_
Late in the afternoon of the 18th, both Corps and Division issued
orders within a period of two hours for crossing the Han. In OpnO 6-50,
the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division directed RCT-5 to
seize crossing sites along the south bank the next day and be prepared
to cross on order while RCT-1 continued its attack along the highway
toward Yongdungpo.
Much more territory was taken in by X Corps Operational Instructions
No. 1, which ordered the 1st Marine Division to reconnoiter the river
on the 19th and cross the next day. Then, after enveloping enemy
positions on the north bank in the vicinity of Seoul, the Marines were
to seize and secure both the city and the high ground to the north.
Since the Corps did not concern itself much with ways and means,
General Smith asked for a conference at 0930 the next morning with
General Almond. He informed the X Corps commander that he and his staff
had already given considerable thought to the question of a crossing
site. A preliminary Marine study had disclosed that three abandoned
ferry crossings met military requirements: one downstream from Kimpo
Airfield; one at Yongdungpo in the zone of the 1st Marines; and one
opposite Kimpo near the village of Haengju. The first was too far from
Seoul, and the second too near; but the Haengju site seemed to satisfy
all conditions, subject to General Craig’s verification by helicopter
reconnaissance.[282]
[282] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 218–219.
Next to be discussed was the problem of bridging material. The X Corps
engineer officer, Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Rowny, reported that
Corps had no material other than that brought by the 1st Engineer
Battalion of the Marines. Fortunately, that unit’s commanding officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Partridge, was prepared to meet the emergency.
Although he did not have enough floating bridge material to span such a
wide stream, he reported to General Smith that he could have one 50-ton
raft in operation to support the assault of troops crossing in LVTs,
and another shortly afterwards. These rafts would take the tanks and
vehicles across, and Partridge added that later his engineers might be
able to put together an actual bridge by combining floating and Bailey
components.[283]
[283] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv, 23 Nov 54.
The two Marine regiments had been in effect the infantry of X Corps
up to this time. But Almond promised the Marine general that the
32d Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division would be moved up on the
right flank of RCT-1. This Army unit, it may be recalled, had made an
administrative landing at Inchon on the 18th and gone into an assembly
area under 1st Marine Division control. The other two regiments of the
7th Division were the 31st Infantry, due to arrive on the 20th, and the
17th Infantry, still attached to the Eighth Army.
The X Corps commander lost no time at ordering the 32d to move up on
the right, after reverting to the control of the 7th Division, to
relieve the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. This was the first of a series
of maneuvers carried out on the 19th in preparation for the river
crossing. On the left, the 2d Battalion of the KMCs advanced against
negligible opposition to occupy the high ground south of the Han and
provide flank protection for the crossing.
A more intricate maneuver was carried out when 1st Battalion of
the 5th Marines was relieved west of Yongdungpo by its opposite of
RCT-1, which had sideslipped to the left after the 32d Infantry moved
up in protection of the regiment’s right flank. This shift was not
accomplished without some fighting, the account of which belongs in a
forthcoming chapter dealing with the battle for Yongdungpo.
Another preliminary step was taken on the 19th when the 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion was relieved of its mission of supporting the 1st
Marines. All LVTs were withdrawn as the unit displaced by motor march
to the vicinity of Kimpo Airfield, a distance of about 18 miles.[284]
[284] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Tare Tare.
The 1st Shore Party Battalion was also concerned in planning for the
river crossing. On the 19th this unit reverted to Division control and
displaced to the vicinity of Oeoso-ri. Meanwhile, a reconnaissance
detail reported to the CP of the 5th Marines with a mission of
selecting DUKW, LVT, and ferry sites. The shore party battalion was
also to have the responsibility of establishing evacuation stations and
supply dumps on both banks after the crossing while exerting LVT and
DUKW traffic control.[285]
[285] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Mike Mike.
Except for the 1st Battalion, the 5th Marines had no trouble on the
19th while advancing to its assigned positions on the south bank of
the Han. All objectives were occupied against little or no opposition,
placing the regiment in position for the crossing.
CHAPTER X
Crossing the Han
_Swimming Team Leads the Way--Marine LVTs Grounded in Mud--Daylight
Assault Crossing by 3/5--Departure of General MacArthur--Supporting
Arms of Bridgehead--Command Ashore Assumed by X Corps_
The CP of the 5th Marines had a holiday atmosphere during the afternoon
of 19 September. An already large group of newspaper and magazine
correspondents had been reinforced by new arrivals flown in from Tokyo
to report the crossing of the Han. The gathering might have been
mistaken for a journalistic convention, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray
and his regimental planners could scarcely make themselves heard.
Finally it became necessary to request the gentlemen of the press to
leave, so that the battalion and company commanders could be summoned
for briefing and orders.
The CP was located in a basement room of the Kimpo Airfield
administration building. Coleman lanterns lighted the scene as Murray
gave a brief talk to his officers, seated about him on boxes and
bedrolls. There had been little time for planning, said the regimental
commander, but he was confident of success. General Craig, who made a
helicopter reconnaissance of the river and roads leading to Seoul, had
recommended the old ferry crossing to Haengju. The river was about 400
yards wide at this site, which was about a mile from the Kaesong-Seoul
railroad and main highway to Seoul. Hill 125, as the principal terrain
feature, was an isolated knob rising nearly 500 feet and located on the
right of the landing point. To the left was the village of Haengju,
bordered by dikes and rice paddies.
Regimental planning, said Murray, had been conducted in compliance
with 1st MarDiv OpnO 7-50, issued at 1430 that afternoon. The 5th
Marines was directed to cross the Han in the vicinity of Haengju seize
Hill 125 and advance southeast along the railroad to the high ground
dominating the Seoul highway. The units attached for the operation
were the 2d Battalion, KMC Regiment, the Division Reconnaissance
Company, Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion, and Company A of the 56th
Amphibian Tractor Battalion, USA. In addition, the 11th Marines had
been directed to give priority in artillery fires to the 5th Marines,
while the 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Shore Party Battalion and 1st
Amphibian Tractor Battalion were in direct support.
_Swimming Team Leads the Way_
Major William C. Esterline, the S-2 of the 5th Marines admitted that
intelligence as to conditions on the north bank left much to be
desired. He mentioned the reports of an enemy build-up on the other
side of the river, and he added that a POW had told of enemy mining
activities along the road to Haengju. But in spite of these warning
notes, his listeners got the impression that 5th Marines’ planning was
based on assumptions of light resistance.
Major Charles H. Brush, Jr., the S-3, announced the hastily formulated
regimental plan. Houghton’s Recon Company was to lead the advance
by sending a swimming team across shortly after nightfall. If the
swimmers found the other bank clear of the enemy, they were to signal
for the rest of the men to follow in LVTs. Recon Company then had the
mission of seizing a bridgehead consisting roughly of the triangle
formed by Hills 95, 125, and 51. After securing these objectives, about
1,500 yards apart, Recon was to defend until Taplett’s 3d Battalion
crossed at 0400, with Bohn’s and McMullen’s companies in assault and
Wildman’s in reserve. While they passed through Recon and attacked
toward Seoul, Roise’s 2d Battalion would follow in column two hours
later, with Newton’s 1st Battalion remaining in reserve and crossing
on order as the KMC battalion protected the regiment’s left flank.
Tanks and vehicles would be ferried across on 50-ton floating bridge
sections.[286]
[286] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen, 19 Sep 50; Capt
R. B. Crossman ltr to authors, 23 Nov 54.
No alternate plan was provided. After the briefing ended at 1700,
Houghton and Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence C. Hays, Jr., executive
officer of RCT-5, climbed a hill on the south bank and inspected the
old ferry crossing and the opposite shore. They saw no enemy activity.
Houghton was so optimistic that he asked permission to swim across at
dusk but Murray denied the request.[287]
[287] Maj K. J. Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54.
[Illustration: HAN RIVER CROSSING & SEIZURE OF HILL 125
5th MARINES--20 SEP]
The swimming team consisted of Houghton, Second Lieutenant Dana
M. Cashion, and ten enlisted men, accompanied by two Navy reserve
officers, Lieutenant Horace Underwood and Ensign John Seigle. The first
went along as interpreter, and the other as public information officer
with a tape recorder. General Lowe had asked permission to cross in the
LVTs; and when the Division commander refused, the 66-year old observer
showed a card signed by President Truman, requesting that he be allowed
to go anywhere. Even this passport did not swerve General Smith, who
decided that Lowe must wait to accompany the reserve battalion.[288]
[288] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 227.
It was a dark and moonless night when the swimmers trudged through the
muddy grain fields to the river bank, carrying two small rubber boats
in which to tow the arms and equipment. After checking the current
and making allowances for drift, they stripped to their skivvies and
slipped into the tepid water shortly after 2000. Only two or three
sets of rubber fins were available, but speed was not expected of
men using a slow breast stroke to avoid making noise or ripples.
These precautions became all the more necessary after a Marine shell
or aerial bomb set fire to a native house on the far bank and the
flames cast a lurid glow over the water. Apparently the swimmers had
not been observed when they scrambled ashore, dripping, about 2040.
They encountered two Koreans at the water’s edge and overpowered them
without much difficulty. Lieutenant Underwood questioned the captives
in their native tongue and reported that they were escaping from
Seoul.[289]
[289] 1stLt E. L. DeFazio ltr to authors, 11 Dec 54.
Houghton ordered Lieutenant Cashion and four enlisted men out on patrol
duty with a mission of reconnoitering Hill 125 and the Haengju area.
The Recon commander remained at the beach, where Gunnery Sergeant
Ernest L. DeFazio and the other members of the swimming team guarded
the prisoners and prowled the immediate area without encountering
enemy. There were so few signs of NKPA activity that Houghton decided
even before the return of Cashion’s patrol to give the signal for the
rest of the company to cross. And it was when the LVTs revved up on
the south bank, shattering the night’s stillness, that hell broke
loose.[290]
[290] _Ibid._; Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54.
_Marine LVTs Grounded in Mud_
The men in the amtracs had the problem of advancing five miles by road
from Kimpo to an embarkation site they had never seen, crossing a
river in the darkness, and seizing three objectives on a basis of map
reconnaissance. First Lieutenant Ralph B. Crossman, executive officer
of Recon Company, had received oral orders without an overlay or an
opportunity to take notes during the briefing at the Fifth Marines CP.
His first message by SCR-300 from Houghton came about 2000, warning
that the swimming team was taking to the water. This was the signal
for the amtracs to start their road trip. They were on the way when
Houghton prematurely radioed the familiar words:
“The Marines have landed and the situation is well in hand.”[291]
[291] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
An hour later the Recon commander came in again with a message that
no enemy had been encountered. He directed his executive officer to
cross in LVTs with the three platoons of Recon Company and the attached
platoon of Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, which had a mission of
mining road blocks after the objectives were secured.
Crossman acknowledged this message but replied that he could not reach
the river bank for nearly an hour. He had assigned the three objectives
to his platoon commanders, directing that they take their orders from
Houghton upon reaching the other bank. SCR-300 communications were
frequently blurred, however, or blasted off the air altogether by
the more powerful radios of the tractors. Thus the possibilities for
confusion were multiplied as the nine amtracs proceeded in column
to the embarkation point, clanking and revving up thunderously in
preparation for the crossing.[292]
[292] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
The din was deafening enough to arouse even an enemy who had not shown
much fight so far in the zone of RCT-5. Hill 125 suddenly came to life
as NKPA bullets whipped the water and mortar shells exploded among
the LVTs or along the beach occupied by Houghton’s swimmers. Although
Cashion’s patrol reported no enemy encountered on Hill 125, his men
came under fire from that quarter on their return to the beach. One
of them, Private First Class Alphonse O. Ledet, Jr., was reported as
missing in action, and it was assumed that Communists bullets had cut
him down.[293]
[293] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
The embarkation area was so cramped that Crossman had found it
necessary to send the LVTs across the river in column, with First
Lieutenant Francis R. Kraince’s 1st Platoon in the lead, followed by
Second Lieutenant Philip D. Shutler’s 2d Platoon and the 3d commanded
by Second Lieutenant Charles Puckett. Kraince was to seize Hill 125
while Shutler attacked Hill 51 and Puckett went up against Hill 95.
The three platoons were accompanied by a 4.2-inch mortar forward
observer team, two 105mm FO teams from the 11th Marines, and a squad
of engineers. Communications on the SCR-300 net were so badly jammed,
however, that Houghton and Crossman were figuratively as well as
literally in the dark on opposite sides of the river. Crossman’s final
messages from Kraince and Shutler reported that four of their amtracs
had drifted from the course and grounded in the mud. He ordered both
officers to extricate themselves while Puckett, who had not yet left
the south bank, covered them with fire. Just then DeFazio radioed that
Houghton and his team were planning to swim to the LVTs. This was the
last word from the north bank received by Crossman, who lost all radio
contact afterwards with anyone except the 5th Marines.[294]
[294] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
At the height of the pandemonium on the north bank, the two Korean
prisoners attempted to escape. Both were killed by Marines of the
swimming team.[295]
[295] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
Houghton’s first thought had been to swim out and guide the LVTs to
the north bank. But the enemy had shown such unexpected resistance as
to justify the withdrawal of the swimming team. The rubber boats and
excess equipment were hidden along the shore and some of the weapons
thrown in the river to prevent capture.[296] Then the swimmers
started their return trip through water churned by mortar shells,
chiefly Marine 4.2-inch bursts falling short. One of these projectiles
exploded so near to Houghton as to knock him out momentarily, and
he was assisted to a grounded LVT by Corporal James Morgan. The
Recon commander suffered a sprained back and double vision from the
concussion, and two men of the team were slightly wounded. DeFazio led
the remaining swimmers to the south bank.
[296] Ensign Seigle found it hard to part with his tape
recorder containing an account of the venture. He hid
it near the water, but the record had been erased by
subsequent sounds when he retrieved it the next day.
There he learned that all the amtracs had returned except the four
reported grounded. Most of the Recon troops on these stranded vehicles
had chosen to swim or wade back to the south bank. These stragglers
were collected on the northern tip of Hill 131 by Captain John F. Paul
and Corporal James P. Harney of the amtracs and shuttled to Kimpo as
fast as they returned.[297]
[297] 1stLt J. P. Harney interv, 17 Nov 54.
DeFazio took care of his casualties, then set out with eight men in
search of Houghton. It was low tide by this time, but wading through
the mud proved to be more tiring than swimming. After finding Houghton
in a dazed condition on one of the grounded LVTs, the sergeant agreed
with Kraince and Shutler that the approach of dawn made it necessary
to abandon the two amtracs which were still stuck. They returned
on the two that the officers had succeeded in extricating. Thus at
daybreak the swimming expedition ended in the CP of the 5th Marines,
with DeFazio reporting to Murray and Brush after seeing his commanding
officer on the way to a field hospital.[298]
[298] DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
The crews and troops on the LVTs retained a confused impression of the
night’s events. Master Sergeant Edwin L. Knox, who crossed with the
engineers in the second amtrac, could not understand why the column
withdrew. The vehicles were dispersed in every direction after some
became stuck, and it was on his LVT that Captain Houghton received
first aid.[299]
[299] MSgt E. L. Knox, ltr to authors, 13 May 55.
It was not officially established who gave the order for the return
of the LVTs when they neared the north bank, if indeed such an order
was ever given. But all participants agreed that it was for the best.
Events had proved that too much dependence was placed in assumptions
of little or no resistance, despite G-2 warnings of an enemy build-up
in the Haengju area. And even if Recon Company had landed, the task of
taking three hills in a night attack without previous reconnaissance
would probably have been too much for a unit of 126 men against an
enemy estimated by Houghton at a battalion.
_Daylight Assault Crossing by 3/5_
At dawn on the 20th the command and staff of the 5th Marines rebounded
from this preliminary reverse with vigor and firmness. General Craig,
the ADC, summed up the viewpoint of Murray and his officers when he
commented:
“The eyes of the world were upon us. It would have looked bad for the
Marines, of all people, to reach a river and not be able to cross.”[300]
[300] LtGen (Ret) E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 25 Aug 54.
It was decided at 0430 that the 3d Battalion would make a daylight
assault crossing just two hours later. The revised plan called for LVTs
to cross at the Haengju site in waves of two to six vehicles. Troop
units would be organized into boat teams, and the plan provided for a
15-minute artillery preparation by the 1st and 4th Battalions of the
11th Marines.[301]
[301] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 27, 28.
Many of the Marine shells fell short, so that little benefit was
derived from the barrage by the assault troops. On the other hand,
enemy fire from Hill 125 was only too well placed. About 200 hits were
taken by the first wave of amtracs from 14.5mm antitank projectiles and
small caliber high explosive shells as well as machine-gun bullets. The
armor plate prevented any infantry losses, and only four casualties
were suffered by the crews.
Battalion objectives, according to the revised plan, were designated
ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE--Hills 125, 51, and 95. Captain McMullen’s
Item Company landed at 0650 in the first wave, followed by How
and George. While discharging troops, the LVTs were exposed to
more machine-gun and antitank fire, resulting in several infantry
casualties.[302]
[302] This section is based upon: McMullen interv, 27 Jul 54;
Maj J. N. Irick interv, 16 Nov 54; 1st MarDiv _SAR_,
Annexes Peter Peter and Queen Queen.
Item Company, it may be recalled, consisted of newcomers who had
arrived at Pusan to make up third infantry companies just before the
Brigade embarked for Inchon. Barring a few World War II men, these
troops had known no combat experience before they hit GREEN Beach at
Wolmi-do. They acquitted themselves like veterans in the Han crossing,
however, as platoon leaders organized them under fire after they piled
out of the amtracs.
The only covering fires at first were provided by the 50-caliber
machine guns of First Lieutenant Stanley H. Carpenter’s platoon of
amtracs, which had taken the first wave across. Then four Corsairs of
VMF-214 struck the enemy on Hill 125 while Captain Joseph N. Irick of
the amtracs led four of his vehicles eastward to a position where they
could direct 50 caliber fire on the NKPA positions.
Item Company’s plan of attack called for a two-pronged assault on Hill
125 (Objective ABLE) from the northwest by First Lieutenant William F.
Sparks’ 3d Platoon on the right, attacking up the main spur paralleling
the river, while First Lieutenant Elmer G. Peterson’s 2d Platoon
attacked on the left after riding a few hundred yards inland on LVTs.
Second Lieutenant Roy E. Krieger’s 1st Platoon was to remain on call in
reserve.
Item Company had it hot and heavy from the beginning. The two
assault platoons overcame such difficulties as bogged-down amtracs,
intermingled units, and bullet-swept open areas before getting in
position to return the Communist fire. The first phase ended on a
plateau about halfway up the hill when enemy machine guns cut down most
of the mortar section before the Marines could gain a foothold.
At this point it became necessary for the 3d Platoon to fall back and
redeploy. Contact had been lost momentarily with Peterson’s men; but
after he appeared on the left, McMullen called up his reserve unit
to pass through the 3d Platoon. Sparks having been wounded, First
Lieutenant Wallace Williamson took command of his men, now reinforced
by an engineer squad and troops from company headquarters. The revamped
3d Platoon was sent out to envelop the enemy left while Krieger hit the
center and Peterson worked his way around the NKPA right.
This time the plateau was carried in a single rush. But casualties
had reduced the company to the point where another reorganization
was necessary before attacking the military crest. Although Captain
McMullen had been wounded, he remained in action to lead the final
assault.
The 1st and 3d Platoons were clawing their way upward when Peterson
radioed from the left that he could see enemy soldiers in flight from
the peak to the low ground north of the hill mass. One of the VMF-214
Corsairs also reported Communists streaming down the eastern slopes
with Marine planes in hot pursuit. Thanks to their efforts, not many
Korean Reds were left on the crest when the panting Marines arrived
to finish the job. More lucrative targets were presented by the foes
racing down the eastern slopes. Marine rifles and BARs cut down many of
these fugitives when they attempted to change into civilian clothes to
avoid capture.
It was estimated that the enemy had 200 killed on Objective ABLE. The
other two battalion objectives offered little or no resistance to
troops who rode in column from the beaches on LVTs--How Company to
seize Hill 95, and George Company attacking Hill 51. Thus at a total
cost of 43 casualties--most of them in Item Company--the 3d Battalion
had secured its three objectives by 0940.
Among the other results of the successful assault crossing was the
salvaging of the two grounded LVTs, both of which had been in the
enemy’s field of fire. The equipment left on the north bank by the
swimming team was also recovered, and PFC Ledet showed up unharmed.
After being assigned to an observation post, he had inadvertently been
left behind as missing in action when the Reds opened fire. But he kept
his head throughout his lonely night’s vigil and was able to give a
good report of enemy numbers and activities.
At 1000 on the 20th the first wave of amtracs crossed the river
with troops of 2/5. This battalion had orders to remain in the LVTs
while passing through 3/5 and continuing the attack. The scheme of
maneuver called for a sharp turn to the right at Hill 51, and the next
objectives, DOG and EASY, consisted of the high ground on either side
of the Kaesong-Seoul Railroad about three miles east of Haengju.
Company A of the 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, USA, was to follow
with the 2d Battalion of the KMC regiment in DUKWs. These troops had a
mission of providing security for the rear of the 5th Marines.
The 1st Battalion of that regiment was alerted to be ready to cross the
Han at 1330 and move into an assembly area near Hill 95, prepared to
continue the attack toward Seoul.
Once the plan has been told, it would be repetitive to describe a
performance which put it into effect without incident. At 1400 the
regimental CP displaced across the river to the vicinity of Sojong,
about two miles northeast of the Haengju crossing site. Fifteen minutes
later the 2d Battalion reported that it had secured Objectives Dog and
EASY. Troops of that unit had ridden the LVTs as far as Sojong, where
they encountered a swamp and a bridge too small for anything larger
than a jeep. The infantry proceeded on foot while a few LVTs and a
platoon of tanks crossed over a railroad bridge. About 30 prisoners,
believed to be the remnants of enemy forces on Hill 125, were taken
on Objective EASY. They were hiding in a cave and surrendered after a
couple of warning rounds fired by a platoon of the Army amtrac troops
supporting the battalion. Company D dug in on Objective EASY and
Company E on Objective DOG while Company F covered the gap between.[303]
[303] Roise memo to authors, 13 May 55.
The 3d Battalion went into an assembly area a mile north of Hill 95.
And after 1/5 moved a company to Hill 125 to secure the landing area
for the night, the 1st Marine Division had a firm bridgehead on the
north bank of the Han.
_Departure of General MacArthur_
General Shepherd and Admiral Struble witnessed the crossing from a
vantage point on the south bank, where they had a good view of the
fight for Hill 125.[304] Both accompanied General MacArthur that
afternoon, when he made a final tour of the front before his departure
for Tokyo.
[304] Col V. H. Krulak interv, 27 Jun 55.
The caravan of jeep-borne officers and reporters stopped first at the
crossing area, then proceeded to the zone of the 1st Marines, where the
battle for Yongdungpo was going on full blast. General MacArthur got
out of his jeep and continued on foot along rice paddies where Marines
were still flushing out snipers. This meant a period of anxiety for
General Smith which lasted until the responsibility for the safety of
the commander-in-chief passed to General Barr in the zone of the 7th
Infantry Division.
On the afternoon of the 21st the Marine general saw MacArthur off at
Kimpo on his plane for Tokyo. Never had the old warrior worn his famous
“scrambled egg” cap with more verve. Barely a week had gone by since
the Marines scrambled ashore on RED and BLUE Beaches, yet most of the
major objectives had already been taken--Inchon, Kimpo, Yongdungpo,
the north bank of the Han, and the approaches to Seoul. In the Pusan
Perimeter meanwhile, the Eighth Army had been hitting the enemy hard in
its joint offensive.
This was the score on D-plus 7. But perhaps the famous septuagenarian
recalled with pardonable complacency that as late as D-minus 7, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had reiterated doubts of the Inchon landing which
they had expressed on several previous occasions. MacArthur was warned
that if the operation failed, the entire United Nations cause in Korea
might be plunged into serious difficulties. The commander in chief
replied with superb assurance, “I and all of my commanders and staff
officers, without exception, are enthusiastic and confident of the
success of the enveloping operation.”[305]
[305] CinCFE radio to JCS, 8 Sep 50, quoted in OCMH
(Schnabel), _Korean Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I.
Such confidence could not be withstood. But it was not until 8
September 1950 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally acquiesced in an
operation they had never entirely approved--an operation scheduled to
take place in just one week.
It may be that Douglas MacArthur was recalling this exchange of views
as he stood in the sunlight of Kimpo Airfield, his eyes flashing and
his chin outthrust. There is no tonic like victory, and he looked 20
years younger than his actual years as he decorated General Smith with
a Silver Star just before the plane took off.
“To the gallant commander of a gallant division!” said the commander in
chief by way of citation.
_Supporting Arms of Bridgehead_
Even success did not alter the conviction of Navy and Marine amphibious
specialists that risks had been assumed in the Inchon landing which
might have resulted in disaster. It was taking no credit away from
General MacArthur for his unshakeable faith in victory to conclude
that fortune had smiled in some instances when a frown would have been
costly.
The teamwork of Marine supporting arms was never shown to better effect
than in the establishment of a bridgehead over the Han. Lieutenant
Colonel Partridge’s engineers, of course, were on the job from the
beginning. It was up to them to get the tanks across the river as
soon as possible, in case the infantry needed the support of armor.
Approaches and ferry landings had to be constructed for this purpose;
and just six hours after the initial infantry crossing, the engineers
had their first six-float M4A2 raft in operation. It had taken them
four hours to build.[306]
[306] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Nan Nan; Partridge interv, 23
Nov 54.
The 2d Platoon of Able Company, 1st Tank Battalion, crossed the river
at 1410 on 20 September and moved up in support of 3/5. The 1st Platoon
followed at 1600 and the 3d Platoon late that afternoon, after the
engineers completed a second raft.
When the KMCs attempted to cross in DUKWs, the clumsy vehicles bogged
down several yards from the river on the south bank. Partridge
suggested to the KMC commander that his troops build a makeshift
corduroy approach off the main route which Marine engineers were
constructing to the embarkation point. The Korean officer agreed with
Partridge that this was a sensible solution and soon had his men
gathering logs.
Neither of them dreamed that they had stirred up an international
incident which called for a decision on the division level. American
policy makers had felt it necessary to lean backwards to avoid giving
Communist propagandists any excuse to charge us with recruiting Koreans
for “slave labor.” It was an extremely sensitive subject, and Partridge
was astonished at the repercussions. At last General Craig visited
the ferry site and ruled that it was a closed incident after finding
all explanations satisfactory. It was further decided--for mechanical
rather than political reasons--to take the KMCs across in amtracs
rather than waste any more time on DUKWs.[307]
[307] Partridge interv, 23 Nov 54.
On the night of the 20th, Partridge and Colonel McAlister, the Division
G-4, interviewed a captured NKPA engineer major at Kimpo Airfield.
The prisoner informed them that the bombed highway bridge between
Yongdungpo and Seoul had been damaged beyond repair with the means at
hand. This agreed with the conclusions of the Marine officers on the
basis of aerial observation. Prospects for a span over the Han seemed
dim as Partridge was leaving McAlister’s quarters. That very evening,
however, Lieutenant Colonel Rowny, chief of the X Corps engineers,
telephoned to announce that materials for a floating bridge unit had
been accumulated by the Army in Japan and would be flown to Korea
shortly. Up to this time, with rafts the only solution, the Marine
engineers had supplied all the materials. But Rowny announced that
Corps would assume the responsibility after the arrival of enough
materials for a floating bridge unit.[308]
[308] _Ibid._
Military operations could not wait a week or ten days for the new span,
and the Marine ferry plus amtracs and DUKWs[309] had to nourish the
assault on Seoul. With this end in view, the 1st Shore Party Battalion
reverted to Division control on the 19th and displaced from Inchon to
Oeoso-ri. By nightfall the entire battalion was bivouacked in this area.
[309] MajGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to authors, 29 Apr 55.
On the 20th, after establishing a forward CP at Kimpo Airfield, the
shore party troops of Baker Company moved up to the Han in support of
the 5th Marines, followed by two teams from Able Company. Evacuation
stations and supply dumps were set up on both banks. Other shore party
missions were maintaining LVT and DUKW traffic control, providing
guides for the amtracs, posting security at the crossing sites on both
banks, and effecting unit distribution of supplies upon request by the
DUKWs and LVTs.
Control of the ferry site, known as BAKER Ferry, became the
responsibility of Baker Company of the 1st Shore Party Battalion. Teams
1 and 2 were employed on the south bank, and Team 3 plus headquarters
troops on the other shore. Traffic control was of the utmost
importance, since ferry operation had to be limited to periods of low
tide, and during idle intervals a long line of vehicles accumulated.
Most of them were trucks containing cargo to be reloaded in LVTs and
taken across the river. The shore party men had the duty of keeping the
traffic flowing as smoothly as possible, both on land and water, and
special regulations were enforced to prevent the LVTs from colliding
with the ferries. With the establishment of a third ferry, the problem
of supplying the troops across the river was pretty well solved.[310]
[310] 1st Mar Div _SAR_, Annex Mike Mike.
_Command Ashore Assumed by X Corps_
A military ceremony was held on 21 September when the commanding
general of X Corps established his CP in Inchon and assumed command at
1700 of all forces ashore. It was stated in some reports that command
had been transferred from the commander of JTF-7 to the commander of X
Corps. But officers familiar with amphibious doctrine pointed out that
at no time prior to landing did CG X Corps relinquish command; and only
through him did the commander of JTF-7 exercise command.[311]
[311] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 32.
The date was also significant for the 1st Marine Division in that its
third rifle regiment, the 7th Marines, landed at Inchon with Major
Francis F. Parry’s 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines attached. Before
the ships reached the inner harbor, Colonel Litzenberg went ashore and
reported at the Division CP. Informing General Smith that troop units
in the convoy had been vertically loaded for maximum flexibility, he
asked what troops the Division commander desired to have unloaded first.
“An infantry battalion,” said General Smith.
“And what next?”
“Another infantry battalion,” said the commanding general.
Colonel Litzenberg began unloading at once, and by 2200 his CP had
opened at Wonjong-ni, two miles south of Kimpo Airfield, while H&S
Company and the 3d Battalion (Major Maurice E. Roach) occupied near-by
assembly areas. The 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Thornton M.
Hinkle) had reached an assembly area at Hill 131, a mile north of
Kimpo, by 0100 on 22 September with a mission of providing security for
the airfield and a river crossing site. The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant
Colonel Raymond G. Davis) was given the duty of unloading the ships of
the convoy.[312]
[312] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg memo to authors, 11 May 55.
It appeared for a few hours on 21 September that the enemy might be
planning to retake Kimpo Airfield. At 0730 a report came to the 3d
Battalion, KMC Regiment, warning of an attempted NKPA crossing of the
Han in the area about seven miles northwest of the field. Air strikes
were called immediately with the result of dispersing the enemy. At
1310, however, an estimated two NKPA battalions were reported in front
of KMC positions by the air liaison officer attached to the battalion.
All units in the Kimpo area were alerted to the possibility of attack.
The CO of the 1st Shore Party Battalion was designated as coordinator
of defensive forces consisting of his unit, and elements of the 1st
Engineer Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Ordnance Battalion, and 1st
Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Army troops of the 56th Amphibian Tractor
Battalion were also ordered to Kimpo.
With an NKPA attack threatening, some concern was felt about an enemy
Yak type aircraft--fueled, armed, and ready for flight--which had
been discovered in a revetment on the edge of the airfield by First
Lieutenant Edward E. Collins of the Ordnance Battalion and later of
the 5th Marines. The plane was hastily disarmed and painted with U. S.
markings, so that it could be flown to Japan in case the enemy overran
Kimpo.[313]
[313] Capt E. E. Collins ltr to authors, 6 May 55.
Although the NKPA threat did not materialize, there could be no
doubt of an enemy build-up within striking distance. And it was on
this sensitive left flank that the support of naval gunfire was most
effective.
As early as 19 September the 1st and 5th Marines had advanced beyond
the range of the light cruisers and destroyers. The battleship
_Missouri_ was made available the next day, but targets in Seoul
proved to be too distant for her maximum range, and no further efforts
were made to call upon the battleship’s 16-inch rifles. In the Kimpo
area, however, naval gunfire was at its best, and a total of 535
8-inch shells were fired from 21 to 24 September by the _Toledo_ and
_Rochester_. These fires were requested by Lieutenant Wayerski in
support of patrol actions by the 3d KMC Battalion. One of the KMC
attacks wiped out a company-size pocket of Red Korean resistance in the
vicinity of Chongdong--about three miles northwest of the airfield on
the south bank of the Han--with a loss to the enemy of 40 counted dead
and some 150 prisoners.[314]
[314] Capt J. R. Wayerski, interv, of 28 Sep 54.
After the Han crossing, the 1st Marine Division found itself in
the position of advancing astride an unbridged tidal river with
the northern flank wide open. Generals Smith and Craig depended on
VMO-6 helicopters for their visits to the 5th Marines front. Those
rotary-winged aircraft were in increasing demand for evacuating serious
casualties; and the commanding general directed that such missions be
given priority over command and liaison flights. This meant that Smith
and Craig were occasionally “bumped.” In such instances they crossed
the river by LVT or waited until their helicopter could return.
At the time of the Han crossing, the general plan of the 1st Marine
Division had been for RCT-5 to clear the north bank and open up
crossing sites for RCT-1 in the Yongdungpo area. That regiment would
then cross to seize South Mountain, just north of the crossing site,
thus forming an enclave in Seoul proper. Further objectives were to be
seized by RCT-1 to the north and east while the KMC Regiment passed
through RCT-5 to attack the center of the city. Here a political
motive entered the picture, since it was desired to have Koreans take
a prominent part in the liberation of the former ROK capital. To the
north, on the left flank of the Division, it was planned for RCT-7 to
seize objectives to protect the flank and cut off the escape of the
enemy. Meanwhile, RCT-5 would revert to Division reserve as soon as the
tactical situation made it possible.
So much for the plan. Before it could be put into execution, stiffening
NKPA resistance made it necessary to consider revisions.[315] Not only
was the hilly terrain northwest of Seoul well suited to defensive
operations, but it had been a training area as far back as the Japanese
overlordship, with fields of fire accurately charted. Moreover, it
had become evident by the 21st that the enemy was about to exchange
a strategy of delaying operations for one of defending to the last
ditch. The 1st Marines had already experienced the new NKPA spirit
at Yongdungpo, and on the 21st the 5th Marines contented itself with
limited advances for the purpose of seizing high ground from which to
launch the assault on Seoul.
[315] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 253–255.
The attack on the 21st was launched astride the railroad by the 3d
Battalion to the north and the 1st Battalion between the railroad and
the river. After passing through the 2d Battalion, Taplett’s men seized
three hills and by dusk were digging in on Hill 216, about six miles
east of Hill 125 and the ferry landing site.
The 1st Battalion had meanwhile advanced to Hill 96, about 3,000
yards southeast of yesterday’s Objective DOG, now occupied by the
2d Battalion in reserve. Further gains of some 2,500 yards to the
southeast took the battalion to Hill 68, between the railroad and
river, which was seized and held for the night.
Enemy resistance ranged from light to moderate in both battalion zones.
Between them, the 1st Battalion of the KMCs moved up to Hill 104, just
north of the railroad and south of Sachon Creek.[316]
[316] 1st MarDiv, _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; O. P. Smith,
_Notes_, 255–256.
This was the situation across the river at nightfall on the 21st. The
5th Marines was in position to grapple with the enemy for possession of
Seoul. Hill 104, in the center of the 5th Marines front, was only 5,000
yards west of the Government Palace in the northwest section of the
city. Less than three miles, yet officers and men alike realized that
they would have to fight for every inch of the way. If anyone had any
doubts, he had only to watch the flashes of gunfire stabbing the night
sky to the southeast, and he had only to listen to the unremitting roar
of gunfire. For at Yongdungpo the 1st Marines had been slugging it out
with the enemy for the last three days in a battle for the rambling
industrial suburb.
CHAPTER XI
The Fight for Yongdungpo
_Three Hills Taken by 1/5--Enemy Minefields Encountered--NKPA
Counterattacks of 20 September--Recapture of Hills 80 and 85--1st
Marines in Position--Assault of Yongdungpo--Able Company on a
Limb--Yongdungpo Secured_
“If Yongdungpo is lost, Seoul also will fall.” This was the warning
note sounded during the conferences of the Red Korean military leaders
in Seoul. So important did they consider the industrial suburb that a
regiment of the 18th NKPA Division was assigned to the defense of the
built-up area on the south bank of the Han.[317]
[317] 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_.
Slogans of this sort were a favorite form of Communist inspirational
literature, and they may have served to buck up the defenders. From the
tactical standpoint, however, the quoted catch phrase was illogical.
Yongdungpo was untenable. Squatting on the low ground at the confluence
of the Kalchon and Han Rivers, the town was an isolated landmark of
only symbolic significance. It was separated from Seoul by two miles
of sand and water, and the only connecting links, the old railroad and
highway bridges, had long since been destroyed. Thus, what had once
been a vital communications hub south of the Han was now a veritable
dead end.
While the Reds in Seoul were able to ferry troops and materiel
across the exposed river and sand spit by night, they could not hope
by this primitive method to meet the logistical requirements of a
regimental garrison confronted by a modern juggernaut of combined
arms. Nevertheless, the North Koreans chose to make a fight of it, and
in addition to the hundreds of troops in Yongdungpo, they sent over
considerable artillery and armor that could have been put to better use
in the defensible terrain around Seoul.
_Three Hills Taken by 1/5_
Hill 118 was the principal terrain feature between Kimpo Airfield and
Yongdungpo, the dominating peak being about three miles from the former
and two from the latter. Giant spurs from the main ridge extended
northward toward the Han and eastward to the bed of the Kalchon, beyond
which lay Yongdungpo. At the end of one easterly projection were the
twin caps, Hills 80 and 85. Paralleling the Han River, a modern highway
led from Kimpo, passed north of Hill 118, skirted 80 and 85, then
bridged the Kalchon to enter Yongdungpo from the northwest.
It will be recalled that the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, occupied high
ground generally east of Kimpo Airfield at the close of 18 September.
During the night, Lieutenant Colonel Murray ordered the unit to seize
Hills 80 and 85 the next day. To gain these gates to Yongdungpo, it
would be necessary to take Hill 118; and the battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Newton, formulated his plan accordingly.[318]
Company B would leave its positions on old Objective EASY at dawn and
envelop Hill 118 from the south. Company C would attack frontally
from Objective FOX, assist the enveloping force by taking one of
118’s spurs, then continue eastward to seize 80 and 85. Company A was
to remain behind an Objective EASY for the purpose of guarding the
approaches to the airfield.
[318] Unless otherwise noted, the story of 1/5’s fight is
derived from 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
At dawn of 19 September, Company C atop Objective FOX was greeted
by a hail of mortar and small-arms fire. Under this shield part of
a 500-man enemy force attacked the Marine position from the east,
while the remainder attempted to move along the Yongdungpo-Kimpo
Highway, obviously bent on reaching the airfield. Other large NKPA
concentrations were spotted at the base of Hill 118.
Charlie Company’s organic weapons roared into action along with the
battalion 81s. While the Marine fire cut swaths through the exposed
enemy ranks, Baker Company lunged forward to envelop Hill 118 according
to plan. Air and artillery paved the way so effectively that Captain
Fenton’s unit gained the commanding peak about 1100 without suffering a
casualty. This left the North Korean attackers, who had been contained
by Charlie Company, trapped between Objective Fox and Hill 118. After
losses of 300 dead and 100 prisoners, the Red Force broke into a few
small bands that fled across the highway to the fields and villages
bordering the Han. Company C’s casualties in stopping the attack
and moving forward to its spur on Hill 118 were two killed and six
wounded.[319]
[319] _Ibid._; and Capt. P. F. Pedersen memo to authors, 30
May 55.
[Illustration: ACTION ON 19 SEPTEMBER
SHOWING ATTACKS BY 1/5, 2/1, & 3/1]
As the two assault companies reorganized on the newly won ridge, Fenton
spotted a large number of Red troops on Hill 80, now about 1,000 yards
away. He directed an air strike from his advance position, and the
Corsairs not only cut down many of the North Koreans but completely
routed the survivors. While the planes worked over the enemy positions
on the high ground, the Marines of Company B observed a growing throng
of NKPA soldiers in the vicinity of the Kalchon Bridge leading to
Yongdungpo. Some of the Reds were milling around, but others were
filing across the undamaged span and disappearing into a knot of
warehouses and huts at the far end. Fenton radioed for artillery fire
just as Communist machine guns and an AT weapon opened up on Baker
Company from positions across the bridge. Four times firing for effect
with “battery four rounds,” the Marine howitzers sent a total of 96
shells crashing into the enemy positions within the space of a few
minutes. The explosions neutralized the bridge area, but the span
itself was badly damaged in the process.[320]
[320] Maj F. I. Fenton, Jr., memo to authors, 1 Jun 55.
First Lieutenant Pedersen led Company C along the highway toward Hills
80 and 85 at 1430. Owing to the press of time, the area between the
road and the Han River was not cleared, with the result that small
bands of enemy were left free to roam the fields and make their
presence felt later. The 3d Platoon, under Second Lieutenant Harold L.
Dawe, Jr., peeled off the column and attacked Hill 80 shortly after
1500. Following at an interval of 500 yards, Second Lieutenant Robert
H. Corbet’s 1st Platoon continued along the pavement toward Hill 85. A
platoon of A/Tanks supported the two-pronged assault along with Charlie
Company’s mortars and machine guns, and by 1650 the two heights were
secured. In the wake of the air strike called down by Fenton, the
attacking infantry had encountered practically no opposition.
Yongdungpo, bristling with Communist armament, rumbled its challenge
from the low ground 500 yards east of Hill 85. Taken under heavy fire
by artillery, mortars, and small arms, Company C was forced to dig in
on the reverse slopes of its high ground, there to await the expected
counterattack after nightfall.
_Enemy Minefields Encountered_
As noted previously, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, spent
the night of 18–19 September astride the Inchon-Seoul Highway a mile
east of Sosa. The 1st Battalion, deployed over a broad front in the
hills south of the road, was to be relieved in the morning by the
32d Infantry, so that Colonel Puller could shift his regiment to the
left. Since the relief did not take place as early as expected, Puller
ordered his 2d and 3d Battalions to attack at 1030, leaving 1/1 in
position to await replacement by the Army unit.[321]
[321] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
On the left of the highway, 3/1 jumped off from Hill 123 with Companies
H and I in the assault. The battalion’s mission was to clear a rambling
ridge complex that extended more than three miles before stopping short
of Hill 118. Assigned as a final objective was the terminal height,
Lookout Hill, facing western Yongdungpo across the wide bottomland of
the Kalchon.[322]
[322] _Ibid._; and 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_.
Considering the formidable cross-compartment approach, the assault
companies led by the battalion S-3, Major Joseph D. Trompeter, made
good progress against enemy resistance described as “light but
stubborn.” At a cost of two killed and 15 wounded, the Marines combed
the vertical wilderness and seized Lookout Hill late in the evening.
The attack was almost too successful, for the battalion was now out on
a limb. The closest friendly forces were on Hill 118, several hundred
yards to the north, and along the Inchon-Seoul Highway, about a mile to
the south, as will be shown.[323]
[323] _Ibid._; and Myers interv, 1 Feb 55.
The 2d Battalion could boast comparable success along the highway in
the course of 19 September, but gains were made under far different
circumstances. Spearheaded by Charlie Company Tanks commanded by
Captain Richard M. Taylor, the battalion had advanced only 500
yards in the morning when the lead M-26 was enveloped in a violent
explosion. With one track and two road wheels destroyed, the steel
monster settled into the crater left by the detonation of a wooden box
mine.[324]
[324] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe.
Simultaneously, the infantrymen of Company F came under heavy
small-arms fire from Hill 72 to the right front. In an attempt to sight
in on the enemy positions, other tanks tried to bypass the mine field
in the highway, only to discover that explosives were concealed in both
road shoulders as well. Howitzers of the 11th Marines registered on
Hill 72, and during the ensuing bombardment a VMF-214 flight appeared
overhead to lend further assistance.[325]
[325] 2/1 _SAR_; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig; Easy; and Cunliffe
interv, 24 Aug 54.
Despite his generous use of supporting arms, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter
was forced to commit all three rifle companies to the fight. Tank
gunners tried to detonate mines embedded in the road with machine-gun
fire, but without success.[326] It remained for First Lieutenant
George A. Babe’s 2d Platoon, Charlie Company Engineers, to remove the
obstacles under fire. Darting forward on the bullet-swept highway, the
engineers placed “snowball” charges of C-3 on the wooden boxes, then
took cover while the mines exploded.[327]
[326] Owing to the crude design, the top of the wooden box
mine must protrude above the road for best effect.
Although the Communists sometimes concealed the
projections with debris, Marines usually had no
difficulty in spotting them.
[327] Capt G. A. Babe--1stLt P. Paolino interv, 15 Nov 54.
After 2/1 had driven the enemy from the area with the assistance
of Marine air and artillery, the job of clearing the 250-yard mine
field proceeded under less hair-raising conditions. To get the armor
back into the fight as soon as possible, Babe ignored the explosives
embedded in the highway shoulders. Word was passed back to this effect,
but several jeeps and trucks were lost later when drivers failed to
heed the warning.[328]
[328] _Ibid._; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
While the tanks remained on the sideline, Companies D and F punched
about a mile down the highway against continuing resistance, which
gradually solidified at Hill 146. Like 72, this ridge was on the right
side of the road, in the 32d Infantry’s zone of action. Since the Army
unit had yet to enter the picture, the Marine flank was becoming more
and more exposed with each forward bound by 2/1.[329]
[329] 2/1 _SAR_; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55.
Sutter had no choice but to commit troops beyond his zone. Not only
were the Reds entrenched on Hill 146 with machine guns and field
pieces, but they had blocked the highway with trees and other
encumbrances. Thus, while Fox Company seized a knoll on the left, Dog
Company invaded Army territory and battled its way to the top of Hill
146’s western spur. VMF-214 plastered the peak itself, and the 11th
Marines shelled enemy positions across the whole battalion front.[330]
[330] _Ibid._; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
It was 1300 when the mine field to the rear was finally cleared,
enabling Charlie Company Tanks to move forward in an attempt to
overtake Sutter’s infantry. Within sight of the fighting around Hill
146, the armor ground to a halt before the roadblock of trees, rice
bags, and other debris.[331] A dozer tank rumbled ahead, smashed
through the first obstruction, then went up in a cloud of smoke. Under
the litter on the road lay a second mine field, 75 yards long.[332]
[331] Rice bags filled with dirt commonly were used by the
NKPA for barriers in place of sandbags.
[332] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe.
Again the tank men watched from behind as engineers cleared the highway
and 2/1 drove forward out of sight. By 1730, the Marine infantry had
completely smashed the main enemy concentration on the highway. When
the surviving Reds fled, they exhibited the same determination that had
characterized their stand throughout the day. Weapons and equipment
were strewn along the road, and the Marines captured a truck loaded
with mines as further evidence of the hasty retreat.[333]
[333] _Ibid._; and 2/1 _SAR_.
Sutter ordered 2/1 to hold up at 1900 and dig in astride the highway.
The 4,800-yard advance had cost the Marine unit four killed and 18
wounded, against 350 casualties and five prisoners for the North
Koreans. Since all written and personal accounts agree that 19
September amounted to almost one continuous fire fight for the 2d
Battalion, the amazing contrast in friendly-enemy loss figures must be
attributed to the sound employment of Marine supporting arms.[334]
[334] 2/1 _SAR_; Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and
Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54.
As mentioned earlier, 2/1’s positions for the night were a mile
southeast of the 3d Battalion on Lookout Hill. Company E entrenched
on high ground to the left of the highway--4,000 yards from
Yongdungpo--while D and F manned a long, low hill on the right. Because
the latter height ran parallel to the road, the line formed by Dog and
Fox was at a right angle to that held by Easy. Sutter’s choice of this
L-shaped defense would shortly prove to be an extremely wise one.
_NKPA Counterattacks of 20 September_
The right flank of the 1st Marines was bare. Not until 1200, 19
September, did the 32d Infantry begin relieving 1/1 in its old
positions southeast of Sosa. Liaison between the Marine and Army units
at this time was weak. Apparently many of the Marines were unaware that
General Barr’s OpnO No. 2,[335] for the 7th Infantry Division did not
call for a jump-off by the 32d until 0630 on the 20th. At that time
the Army regiment would attack a series of objectives which included
Hill 146 and other high ground above the road.[336] Thus, the schedules
north and south of the highway were running one day apart, and it would
take the enemy himself to straighten the line when he slammed the gates
of Yongdungpo.
[335] Issued at 2000, 19 September.
[336] 7th InfDiv (USA) _Opn Rpt_, in Inclusions to 7th InfDiv
War Diary for Sep 50.
Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, entrucked below Sosa for its
circuitous journey from the right flank of the regiment to the left,
where it was to relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on Hills 118,
80, and 85. The 11-mile trip via Sosa and Wonjong-ni was uneventful,
except that the troops had to dismount at the latter village and
proceed on foot over the primitive road. With the first increment to
arrive at Wonjong-ni, Captain Robert H. Barrow, commanding Company A
of 1/1, set a rugged pace to get his troops on top of Hill 118 before
dark. Relieving Company B of 1/5, he expected Charlie Company to pass
through and replace its opposite of the 5th Marines on Hills 80 and 85.
It was dusk, and Companies B and C were still on the move when Hawkins
of 1/1 met Newton of 1/5. They briefly discussed the lay of the
land, the latter’s tactical disposition, and the requirement that
1/5 assemble at Kimpo within a matter of hours to prepare for the
river-crossing next day. Time, space, and terrain factors were too
great, Hawkins concluded, for his battalion to assume all positions
then occupied by the other. To facilitate the rest of the relief, which
now would take place in darkness, he ordered Charlie Company to occupy
Hill 118 with Able and directed Baker to dig in on a southern extension
of the big ridge.[337]
[337] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Maj R. H. Barrow
interv, 17 Aug 54; and LtCol J. Hawkins ltr to CMC, 21
May 55.
Having relieved Fenton on Hill 118 before nightfall, Barrow enjoyed
the opportunity to reconnoiter 1/5’s area and to realize the tactical
significance of Hills 80 and 85. When it became apparent that
Company C would not arrive before dark, he radioed the battalion S-3
for permission to move his company to the twin peaks immediately,
explaining that Charlie Company of 1/5 could remain in position no
later than 2100. Since Hawkins had already decided against taking over
too much unfamiliar ground after daylight, Major Bridges turned down
the request. Thus, at 2100, with no relief in sight, the 5th Marines’
unit withdrew from the two heights as ordered. Company C of 1/1
reached Hill 118 at 2200 and went into position with Barrow’s outfit
for the night. Unknown to the enemy, Hills 80 and 85 had become a
no-man’s-land.[338]
[338] _Ibid._; and Fenton ltr, 1 Jun 55.
While the battalions of the 1st Marines settled down for the night in
a three-mile arc facing western Yongdungpo, the North Korean commander
within the town organized part of his garrison for two separate thrusts
against the closing vise. In one case he would win by default; in the
other he would see more of his limited resources go down the drain.
Just before dawn of 20 September, the Marines on Hill 118 were alerted
by a furious clatter of small arms and automatic weapons far out to the
east. Daylight disclosed that the enemy was “assaulting” Hills 80 and
85. When the North Koreans finally discovered that their objectives
were unoccupied, they abruptly ceased firing, surged over both crests,
and entrenched in about company strength. An attempt was made to extend
the counterattack to Hill 118, but Companies A and C, backed by a
flight of VMF-323, threw the Reds back with ease.[339]
[339] _Ibid._; and Bates interv, 27 Aug 51.
During the early morning blackness which found the enemy filling the
vacuum on Hills 80 and 85, a stronger North Korean force--estimated at
a battalion--marched out of Yongdungpo toward 2/1’s positions astride
the Inchon-Seoul Highway.[340] In the van of the Red column were five
T-34 tanks preceded, oddly enough, by a truck loaded with ammunition.
Other vehicles, laden with less sensitive supplies, were safely
interspersed among the infantry in the long file.
[340] The account of this counterattack is taken from:
1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; 2/1 _SAR_;
Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; Cunliffe interv, 24
Aug 54; and CMH Citation for PFC W. C. Monegan, Jr.
It will be remembered that Companies D and F, the latter in the
fore, occupied high ground positions parallel to and south of the
highway. Farther back, Easy Company’s line tied in at a right angle
and extended to the north of the road. The troops of Fox Company,
tense with anticipation in their advance deployment, heard the first
distant sounds of clanking armor and racing engines sometime before
0400. The noise grew steadily louder until, at 0430, the shadows of
the ammunition truck and T-34s passed beneath the Marine defenses and
continued along the road toward Easy Company’s lines. At the latter,
Private Oliver O’Neil, Jr., rose from behind his machine gun and
shouted a challenge to the truck, which by this time was well out in
front of the enemy tanks. O’Neil was cut down by automatic fire in
answer, and pandemonium broke out on the highway.
Obviously the North Koreans had stumbled into it again, just as they
had done at Ascom City. Two T-34s stopped short of Easy Company’s front
and opened up wildly. Companies D and F in turn exploded with machine
guns, small arms, grenades, and mortars against the flank of the enemy
column, while E fought to deny further passage along the road. Under
the hail of fire from above, the Red soldiers milled about in panic and
were slaughtered. Some flung themselves into roadside ditches, where
the crowding only increased the odds of destruction. Others sought
escape by scrambling up the slopes--into the very muzzles of Dog and
Fox Company weapons.
The T-34s began to lurch back and forth like trapped animals. Owing
either to mines laid by Marine engineers or a grenade thrown from
above, the ammunition truck exploded in a brilliant spectacle of
pyrotechnics. In the midst of the furor, Private First Class Monegan
moved across the hillside from Company F’s front with his rocket
launcher. Observing his progress against the backdrop of flames from
the truck, his comrades either held or shifted their fire to protect
him.
Monegan closed on the lead tank and wrecked it with one 3.5-inch
projectile. Approaching the second T-34 under intense fire, he paused
and took aim with imperturbability. Again his rocket connected with a
roar, and the black hulk on the road turned into a blazing furnace.
Silhouetted against the hillside, the Marine leveled his weapon at a
third armored vehicle just as it was pivoting around to retreat. But at
this moment an enemy machine gun found the mark, and Monegan--killer of
tanks--fell dead.
Although the North Korean attack was thus smashed at the outset,
fighting along the highway continued until daylight. In addition to the
two T-34s destroyed, another was captured intact with its crew. The
11th Marines closed the “back door” of the highway with a curtain of
high explosive, thereby sealing the fate of the Red battalion.
Dawn of 20 September revealed a scene of utter ruin across the Marine
front. The highway was littered with burnt NKPA trucks, tanks, and
equipment. Heaped on the road, in ditches, and along hillsides were 300
enemy dead.[341]
[341] Marine losses were surprisingly small, although the
exact number cannot be determined. In the whole course
of 20 September, 2/1 sustained four KIA and 32 WIA, but
these figures included losses during the Marine advance
after the NKPA counterattack.
_Recapture of Hills 80 and 85_
For the most part, fighting around Yongdungpo on 20 September was a
contest of the giants. Supporting arms of both sides exchanged heavy
blows, and the 1st Marines reported with business-like frankness that
it was “... leveling the southern part of Yongdungpo, which is infested
with enemy.” North Korean mortars, tanks, and field pieces pumped
hundreds of rounds out of positions in the center of town and the
eastern outskirts. Marine planes and howitzers replied by smothering
Red concentrations and emplacements with literally thousands of
missiles of all types.
The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, commanded by Major William McReynolds,
fired 28 concentrations in the course of the day; and Lieutenant
Colonel Merritt Adelman’s 2d Battalion expended 1,656 rounds in 21
missions. It was the precision firing of these two units which had
supported 2/1 so effectively during the pre-dawn counterattack.[342]
[342] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Sugar Sugar.
Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battalion, FMF, moved to advance
positions in the morning to increase the pressure on the Yongdungpo
garrison. Land counterpart of the LSMRs which rocked the Inchon
waterfront on D-day, this unit had seen little action to date, owing
to the lack of M48 fuses for its missiles. Banking on substitute
detonating devices (M51 for 105mm and 155mm Howitzer shells), First
Lieutenant Eugene A. Bushe ordered his gunners to fire a test salvo
of 24 rockets. No visible effect being noticeable from his OP, the
battery commander then called for a full ripple of 144--enough high
explosive to flatten a good portion of the town. Again the big missiles
plowed into the target area with a dull thud, and Bushe withdrew his
battery to the rear. The M48 fuses did not arrive until 28 September,
with the result that the potent Marine rocket artillery was sidelined
until the closing days of the operation.[343]
[343] _Ibid._; and Capt D. A. Rapp interv, 18 Nov 54, with
comments by Capt E. A. Bushe.
Colonel Puller’s tactics during the bombardment on 20 September were
designed to align the 1st Marines for the actual assault of Yongdungpo,
planned for the next day. It was necessary to occupy in strength all
the final approaches to the town, so that the full weight of the
regiment could be brought to bear against the defending garrison. From
left to right, therefore, the schedule of operations on the 20th was as
follows: (1) 1st Battalion to seize Hills 80 and 85; (2) 3d Battalion
to remain in position on Lookout Hill; and (3) 2d Battalion to advance
to the first of two highway bridges which spanned branches of the
Kalchon just outside of Yongdungpo.
These limited attacks would also provide time for the 32d Infantry
to catch up on the right. The day’s mission for the Army unit was
to attack over a six-mile front and secure, among other objectives,
towering Tongdok Mountain south of the MSR and two miles from
Yongdungpo.[344]
[344] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; and 7th InfDiv
_OpnO 2_.
Shortly after first light, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins reached the
crest of Hill 118 and established his OP. He was in time to see Able
and Charlie Companies repulse disconnected Red elements moving on the
Marine lines from Hills 80 and 85. While the battalion commander issued
his order for the attack, Major William L. Bates, Jr., commander of
1/1’s Weapons Company, set up his “supporting arms center” to cover the
impending assault.[345]
[345] Though not provided for in Fleet Marine Force T/O, the
“supporting arms center,” a provisional facility for
coordination modeled after the regimental SAC, was a
favorite with many battalion commanders in the field.
Hawkins gave Company C the mission of taking Hills 80 and 85.[346]
Deciding on a southerly approach, the company commander Captain Robert
P. Wray ordered his 2d Platoon to lead off by clearing a village
sprawled across the route to the lower peak. Second Lieutenant John N.
Guild moved out at the head of the skirmishers and led them over 500
yards of intervening low ground. Nearing a knoll which topped the clump
of thatched huts, the platoon came under heavy small-arms fire and was
stalled.
[346] The following narrative is taken from: Bates interv, 27
Aug 51; Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and Captains F. B.
Carlon and J. M. McGee interv, 9 Feb 55; Hawkins ltr 21
May 55; and Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 30 May 55.
Wray immediately committed the rest of his company in a two-pronged
attack which wrapped around the flanks of Guild’s line and smashed
through the North Korean resistance. After a hot fire fight, the
surviving Reds fled to Hill 80, and Company C occupied the village and
knoll by early afternoon. The executive officer, First Lieutenant James
M. McGee, led a six-man patrol eastward to clean out a small nest of
holdouts, while Wray reorganized the company for the assault on the
twin caps.
Charlie Company’s tactics in advancing on the enemy’s southern flank
were ideal from the standpoint of Weapons and Able Companies, which
supported the attack from Hill 118. The two units could actually
witness the progress of the assault troops across the 1st Battalion’s
front, so that mortars and machine guns at the base of fire had only to
shift gradually leftward to support the Marine advance.
Late in the afternoon, Wray launched a double envelopment of Hill 80.
Second Lieutenant Henry A. Commiskey led his 3d Platoon around to the
right, and Second Lieutenant William A. Craven’s 1st swung through the
low ground on the left. A few huts concealing snipers were demolished
by 3.5-inch rockets, but otherwise the Marines met little resistance as
they moved over the crest of the objective early in the evening. With
the first signs of darkness already in the sky, Wray lost no time in
preparing for his third double envelopment of the day.
The remnants of the North Korean company were entrenched on the
crest and forward slopes (facing the Marine attack) of Hill 85,
obviously intent on making a determined stand. Anticipating Charlie
Company’s tactics, the Red leader had bent back both flanks to
prevent encroachments on the sides or rear. Thus, though both Marine
assault platoons swung out to stab at the enemy flanks, the Communist
disposition actually relegated each maneuver to a separate frontal
attack.
Craven’s platoon and Charlie Company machine guns, under First
Lieutenant Francis B. Carlon, covered the attackers from a base of fire
on the northern slopes of Hill 80. Moving aggressively through a hail
of bullets, the 2d Platoon on the left crossed the low ground and
drove up the western incline of the objective. Almost to the top, Guild
was grievously wounded by a machine-gun burst.
[Illustration: ACTION ON 20 SEP
SHOWING DAWN NKPA COUNTERATTACK AGAINST 2/1, & 1st MARINES’ ATTACKS
DURING DAY]
On the right, Lieutenant Commiskey paved the way in the face of
heavy resistance. Nearing the crest of Hill 85, the officer abruptly
bounded ahead of his platoon and went over the top. He jumped into a
machine-gun emplacement and was dispatching the last of five occupants
when his lead skirmishers caught up with him. He ran forward again to
clean out another North Korean position in a single-handed attack. By
this time, the Reds on the eastern side of the hill had had enough.
Those who still had hides to save pelted down the northern slopes in
the direction of the mouth of the Kalchon River, where the stream was
spanned by the now damaged bridge.
Guild’s platoon, inspired by its leader who remained in action despite
a mortal wound, gained the summit shortly after Commiskey’s unit.
Captain Wray, following closely behind, later described his meeting
with Guild on the slope as follows:
“He stayed on his feet and turned toward where I was climbing 20 yards
behind him. He dropped at my feet and made every effort to remain
conscious long enough to tell me how his squads were attacking and
pleading with me to keep them attacking. I called for a corpsman; he
tried to refuse, saying that he had a wounded man who needed one more
than he did.”
Lieutenant Guild died shortly afterwards.
_1st Marines in Position_
During the morning phase of Charlie Company’s attack, Hawkins and
the others on Hill 118 were racked by frustration of a type seldom
experienced by Marines in the history of the Corps. It will be recalled
that the ground between the Kimpo-Yongdungpo Highway and the Han River
was not cleared in the course of 1/5’s attack on Hills 80 and 85 on
19 September. Since the 5th Marines’ unit had withdrawn to cross the
Han at Haengju, and since Charlie Company of 1/1 had chosen a southern
route in recapturing the twin heights, enemy bands in hiding along the
river bank were unmolested. The potential danger in the area was not
realized, however, until too late.
From Kimpo came a “weasel” of the 1st Signal Battalion, the crew calmly
stringing wire into the 1st Marines’ zone as the vehicle rattled along
the highway. Just short of the Kalchon bridge, the little tractor
struck a mine and was ambushed by a party of North Koreans. The
power-packed Marine infantry on Hill 118, less than a thousand yards
away, watched helplessly as the communications men were either killed
or captured. No sooner had the Reds disappeared into the brush with two
prisoners than a Marine truck, belonging to A/Engineers, cruised down
the highway with four unsuspecting passengers. Captain Barrow ordered
his troops to fire over the vehicle, hoping that the driver would hear
the bullets in the air and turn back. But the truck continued on into
the ambuscade, where it was stopped by an enemy fusilade.[347]
[347] Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and SSgt C. O. Edwards
interv, 12 May 54.
The engineers piled out and plunged into a rice paddy in an attempt
to escape. Three of them made it. The fourth, Private First Class
Clayton O. Edwards, was tracked down and captured. Although the Marine
was out of ammunition and already wounded, one heroic warrior of the
NKPA stepped forward and bayoneted him in the shoulder after he had
surrendered. Edwards later escaped from a POW train fleeing before the
UN drive into North Korea.
Not long after these incidents, Captain Richard F. Bland led Baker
Company of 1/1 through the area and secured Hill 55 and the nearby
villages on the bank of the Han. The North Koreans pulled out and
crossed the Kalchon to join the Yongdungpo garrison.
With fighting going on to the right and left, 3/1 sat quietly on
Lookout Hill during 20 September without suffering a casualty. An
occasional break in the orange and black pall over Yongdungpo allowed
the Marines a glimpse of the wrecked railroad and highway spans which
once had bridged the Han to Seoul.
The ROK capital was still a long way off for the 1st Marines; and the
2d Battalion, now on the regimental right and in its sixth straight
day of the assault, was more concerned with the immediate foreground.
After smashing the Red attack in the morning of the 20th, Sutter’s unit
jumped off at 0645 against scattered resistance along the Inchon-Seoul
Highway. The assault elements reached the bridge spanning the western
branch of the Kalchon at 1230, and the battalion commander immediately
ordered engineers to inspect the long concrete structure. It was
reported to be in good enough condition to support M-26 tanks for the
attack on Yongdungpo the next day.[348]
[348] 2/1 _SAR_.
While the battalion dug in on the west side of the stream, the Marines
eyed the 2,000-yard stretch of highway leading ahead to a second span,
bridging the Kalchon’s eastern branch at the very edge of the blazing
town. A high ridge on the right of the road--technically in the 32d
Infantry’s zone of action--was a beehive of North Korean activity.
Anticipating the effect of this commanding position on his attack the
following day, Sutter contacted Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. Mount,
USA, commanding the 2d Battalion of the 32d, for permission to shell
the height. The Army officer approved the request at 1300, but more
than _seven hours_ elapsed before the necessary clearance filtered
through 7th Division, X Corps, and 1st Marine Division to reach the
11th Marines. When the howitzers finally opened up, darkness prevented
effective observed fire from being delivered on the enemy strong
point.[349]
[349] _Ibid._; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55.
Out of sight and earshot of 2/1 during 20 September, Colonel Charles
E. Beauchamp’s 32d Regiment, in its first day of actual combat, paid
with seven killed and 36 wounded in taking Tongdok Mountain and part
of “Copper Mine Hill.” Using the Inchon-Anyang road as an MSR, the
Army unit lost three tanks in a field of over 150 wooden box mines.
Beauchamp himself narrowly escaped death or serious injury when his
jeep struck one of the explosives, killing the driver and wounding a
radio operator. By nightfall, the 32d was deployed far out on the right
of the Marines on the Inchon-Seoul Highway; and the 31st Infantry,
having landed at Inchon earlier in the day, went into position even
farther southward.[350]
[350] 32d InfRegt _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
_Assault of Yongdungpo_
There was no infantry action during the night of 20–21 September.
Both sides were steeling themselves for the ordeal each knew would
commence at dawn. The Red commander in Yongdungpo threw up formidable
earthworks to block the approach over the Kalchon from Hills 80 and 85
in the northwest; and he concentrated a strong force between the two
tributaries in the southwest. That edge of town facing due west, though
most defensible, he left unguarded, with the result that a single
Marine rifle company would hasten his demise.
Marine artillery thundered all night long, and the glare from flaming
Yongdungpo rolled back the darkness in an ever broadening arc. Shortly
after dawn, the Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, threaded across
the wreckage of the Kalchon bridge under cover of machine-gun, mortar,
and tank fire from Hill 85. Reaching the eastern bank, the attackers
swept over a knoll overlooking the Han on the left, which the North
Koreans had left undefended. The assault inched forward toward the
town, first through sporadic small arms resistance, then into a deadly
cross-fire from several automatic weapons.[351]
[351] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; and Bates interv,
27 Aug 51.
Baker Company was now confronted by two dikes which the Reds had
converted into a main line of resistance. One of the barriers
paralleled the Han River north of Yongdungpo; the other ran the entire
length of the western edge of town. Where they met to form a point
facing the Kalchon bridge and the Marine advance, a reinforced company
of North Koreans was deployed across each levee in strong, mutually
supporting positions.
Captain Bland chose wisely in directing his attack against the northern
dike alone. By this decision he not only kept his left flank and rear
protected by the Han, but also maintained local superiority in numbers
over the Reds immediately confronting him. Grinding slowly forward with
heavy casualties, Company B rolled up the length of enemy entrenchments
on the levee and pushed eastward 2,000 yards by afternoon. The Marines
then formed a line with their backs to the Han and shot it out with the
Communists on the second dike at a range of 500 yards. At this point
the attack stalled, and the fight settled down to one of attrition.
Casualties on both sides mounted rapidly under the ceaseless exchange
of machine-gun, mortar, and tank fire.[352]
[352] _Ibid._
Part of Bland’s difficulty owed to the random deployment of all
opposing forces at this time, as indicated on the charts of the 11th
Marines. Noting that Company B’s positions were along the Han north
of Yongdungpo, the artillerymen expressed reluctance to fire on the
enemy-held dike to the “rear” in answer to Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’
repeated requests from his OP on Hill 85. It was a matter of the
howitzers pointing generally north toward Seoul, while Bland’s outfit,
at the moment, was trying to head south. The misunderstanding was
finally cleared up late in the afternoon, and Marine air joined the
artillery in pounding the southern barrier. The Reds held stubbornly
under the battering, and at darkness Hawkins sent Charlie and Weapons
Companies across the bridge to form a perimeter with Baker for the
night.[353]
[353] _Ibid._
The narrative will now switch to the action in the 2d Battalion zone,
leaving the separate attack of Company A to be taken up in detail later.
Sutter’s unit jumped off at 0630 on the 21st with Companies D and
E in the assault. The infantry crossed the first bridge without
incident, then fanned out to move on the second. It was no surprise
when the North Koreans on the intermediate ridge to the right of the
highway suddenly threw heavy fire across the Marine front, but it was
disconcerting to Sutter that his calls for artillery fire met with the
same delay as on the previous day. He therefore shelled the high ground
with attached 4.2-inch mortars on his own initiative, before ordering
Companies E and F to attack the enemy bastion.[354]
[354] 2/1 _SAR_; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55.
Meanwhile, Captain Welby Cronk led Company D forward on the left of the
highway against a strongly defended dike fronting the Kalchon’s western
branch. Progress was slow and casualties severe, but the Marines closed
to within 100 yards of the barrier by noon. There they dug in and
slugged it out, while the 2d and 3d Platoons of Charlie Company tanks
alternated in ripping the Communist trenches with 90mm, delayed-action
shells.
Heavy fighting continued on the right side of the road until evening.
Companies E and F fought part way up the slopes of the ridge and
suffered heavily during the close exchange with the Reds on the crest.
Since the enemy was still in control of most of the high ground at
dusk, Sutter ordered the assault units to withdraw into 2/1’s zone and
dig in with Dog Company. VMF-214 covered the hot disengagement--one of
the most difficult of all tactics--under a masterful job of forward
air controlling by First Lieutenant Norman Vining, Sutter’s FAC. After
bombing and rocketing from 75 to 100 yards beyond the Marine front,
the Corsairs closed to within 30 yards for strafing runs to shield the
retracting line of infantry.[355]
[355] _Ibid._; and E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air
Over Inchon-Seoul,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, no. 6
(Jun 52).
[Illustration: ASSAULT OF YONGDUNG-PO
1st MARINES----21 SEP]
The seventh straight day in the assault had cost the 2d Battalion 11
killed and 74 wounded, bringing its total casualties since D-Day to
28 KIA and 226 WIA. Partially because of these crippling statistics,
Colonel Puller, at 1530 on the 21st, had committed 3/1 to the relief
of the battle-weary outfit. The reserve battalion swung northeast from
Lookout Hill to flank the enemy dike positions facing Company D from
the eastern tributary. Crossing the Kalchon against light resistance,
the attackers ran into trouble at the fortified levees fronting
southwestern Yongdongpo.
After heavy machine guns of 3/1 bested a battery of Communist automatic
weapons, Companies G and I, the latter on the right, attacked astride
the stream branch. Progress was slow, but at a cost of 11 killed and 18
wounded, the Marines rolled up the heavily defended dike and reached
the bridge entering the city. Darkness fell with the 3d Battalion
entrenching to the north of the 2d, both units along the left side of
the Inchon-Seoul Highway.[356]
[356] 2/1 _SAR_; 3/1 _SAR_; LtCol T. L. Ridge ltr to CMC, 20
May 55; and LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr to CMC, 19 May 55.
To the south of the 1st Marines, the 32d Infantry met with considerable
success during its attack over a mountainous nine-mile front. The 1st
Battalion on the right mopped up Copper Mine Hill, then seized the high
ground around Anyang against “light sniper fire.” In the left of the
Army zone and adjacent to the Marines, 2/32 took its objective south
of Yongdungpo against light-to-moderate resistance. Thus, at a cost
of two KIA, 28 WIA, and one MIA, the regiment succeeded in cutting
the railroad and highway leading from Suwon to Seoul via Anyang and
Yongdungpo. Difficulties in Marine-Army liaison and coordination
throughout 21 September stemmed from the fact that neither realized
the size of the gap between them. The map will show that the 32d’s
route of advance was planned to miss Yongdungpo by two miles, not even
coming close to the NKPA strong point which gave the 2d Battalion, 1st
Marines, so much trouble.[357]
[357] 32d InfRegt _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
_Able Company on a Limb_
With the coming of night on 21 September, there was grave apprehension
in the 1st Marines over the fate of one rifle company. In the course
of the day, the Reds had staved off major penetrations by two Marine
battalions in the southwest and the better part of another in the
northwest. Incredibly enough, one Marine unit of some 200 men had swept
through the space in between and cleared the very heart of Yongdungpo;
so that when darkness fell, the isolated force was anchored in the rear
of the enemy, a good mile and a half beyond the closest friendly units.
Company A of the 1st Battalion had jumped off from below Hill 80 on
the morning of the 21st, after Baker Company was slowed by the dike
positions east of the Kalchon bridge. In committing the unit to an
attack through a mile of open rice paddies, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins
was gambling with high stakes for surprise.[358]
[358] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Bates interv, 27 Aug 51;
Maj R. H. Barrow intervs, 8 Oct 51 and 17 Aug 54; and
Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54.
Captain Barrow employed the classic approach-march formation. Forward
on the left was Second Lieutenant John J. Swords’ 3d Platoon; on the
right front was the 2d, under Second Lieutenant Donald R. Jones.
To the left rear was First Lieutenant William A. McClelland’s 1st
Platoon, with the dual mission of company reserve and flank guard. In
the right rear were the 60mm mortars, a section of heavy machine guns
of Weapons Company, and the assault squad. Light machine gun sections
were attached to each rifle platoon, so that they could be employed to
the front or flanks on a moment’s notice. Barrow’s six-foot, four-inch
frame loomed between the two assault platoons.
To say that these Marines were tense and expectant as they plodded
across the broad, flat expanse would be an understatement. Far off
on the left and right, small arms crackled continuously at the
bridge entrances to Yongdungpo. Marine planes were swooping down in
the distance, the hollow eruptions of their ordnance adding to the
incessant rumbling of artillery and mortars.
Almost hidden from view by the high grain stalks, Company A swept
through the rice paddies against no opposition whatever. Its advance
was rapid until the 3d Platoon was slowed by muck which marked the
beginning of the Kalchon’s bed. Heads craned eagerly to the front and
flanks as progress dropped to a snail’s pace for several minutes.
The crucial moment seemed certainly at hand when the assault line
stepped forward from the concealment of the rice and waded into the
stream, completely exposed to the wide bank and parallel dike beyond.
Still, not an enemy shot was fired. Dripping mud and water, the
green-clad figures in the van surged ashore and over the dike. The rest
of the men followed, unbelieving, close behind.
Retaining the same tactical formation, ready to engage in any or all
directions, Company A marched into Yongdungpo. The first buildings were
100 yards ahead of the levee. Barrow channeled his advance astride the
main east-west street. Although buildings and dwellings were many, the
layout was not dense; and the Marines were able to keep their ranks
open and enjoy good all-around observation.
The place seemed empty and dead. By noon Able Company was several
hundred yards within the town, its careful search of buildings and
side streets having failed to uncover a flicker of enemy resistance.
Barrow could tell from the din far out on either flank that he was well
ahead (eastward) of Baker Company and the 2d Battalion. He radioed for
instructions, and Hawkins told him to keep going.
Halfway through town, Barrow noted on his map that the Inchon-Seoul
Highway was now converging on his right, so that it would meet the
company’s attack route just east of Yongdungpo. Because of the furious
clatter along the stretch of highway out of sight on the southwest
(2/1’s fight), he ordered the reserve platoon to shift from the left
side to the right. No sooner had McClelland completed the move than his
men spotted an enemy column advancing down the highway in the direction
of 2/1’s front. The Reds were chanting a spirited military air when the
3d Platoon opened up and cut the formation to ribbons.
Simultaneously, the two lead platoons began firing on individuals and
small groups in the streets of eastern Yongdungpo. Astonished at the
sight of a large Marine force in the very heart of their bastion, most
of the North Koreans took to their heels. But there were other Reds “in
the rear with the gear” who obviously did not recognize the attackers.
After glancing curiously from distant streets, they went calmly about
their business.
Swords’ 3d Platoon barreled through town on the left of the street and
broke into the open. A dike topped by a road lay across the Marine
front, and the platoon leader led his men into a hasty defense on
top. From this position they could cover the vast sand spit with its
airfield and approaches to Seoul. Looking north, they observed a large
body of enemy soldiers withdrawing from Baker Company’s zone onto the
spit. Light machine guns took the North Koreans under fire immediately,
and the section of heavies sent forward by Barrow joined in shortly
afterwards. Caught by surprise in the open, the Red outfit suffered
heavy casualties before the survivors could fan out and disappear.
The rest of Company A moved up on the right of the 3d Platoon,
occupying more of the dike and the junction with the Inchon-Seoul
Highway. It was at this point that Company A--if it could hold the
ground--had an opportunity to deal the Yongdungpo garrison a mortal
blow. For the road junction turned out to be the enemy’s supply center.
Across the intersection lay what appeared at first glance to be a huge
coal pile. Actually it was a camouflaged mountain of ammunition. During
a fire fight with a small group of North Koreans taking cover behind
the explosives, one Marine set off the dump with a grenade. The whole
countryside shook with the detonation, and the great cloud of smoke
that shot into the air marked Able Company’s isolated position for the
rest of the 1st Marines on the outskirts of town.
While part of the unit dug in on the dike, the remainder inspected and
cleared the area around the intersection. A five-story building on the
near corner was jammed with captured U. S. Army medical supplies, field
equipment, ammunition, and enemy ordnance. The Marines could not use
the heavy caliber ammo but they did help themselves to blood plasma for
their wounded.
Throughout the afternoon, the Reds made repeated attempts to regain
the vital area by throwing small assault parties against Able Company
from the south. Each attack was smashed, and darkness found the Marines
firmly entrenched on the dike, hoping only that their limited supply
of ammunition would last throughout the night. A weak SCR-300 battery
prevented further communications with the battalion CP.
_Yongdungpo Secured_
If the Marine Corps Schools ever enlarges its varied curriculum to
include “The Defense of a Dike,” Captain Barrow’s tactical disposition
on the night of 21–22 September 1950 can be taken as a unique
precedent. Able Company’s commander chose to defend a 100-yard stretch
of the levee just north of the intersection. Here the macadam road ran
about 25 feet above ground level, and the incline on either side sloped
gently. The Marines staggered their foxholes alongside, some high on
the slope, others low. Machine guns and BARs were emplaced along the
shoulders at the top, so that automatic fire could be directed in
volume in any direction. Since all of their ammunition had been fired
during the afternoon counterattacks, the 60mm mortar crews laid aside
their tubes and went into the line as infantry.[359]
[359] _Ibid._
Company A’s perimeter for the night thus had the shape of a long
sausage, with the 3d Platoon in an arc at the northern end, the 1st
defending the west side, and the 2d in position on the east. From their
foxholes on the top and sides of the levee, the Marines commanded the
sand spit, the road on the dike, Yongdungpo’s eastern exits, and the
vital intersection with the Inchon-Seoul Highway.
Fortunately, they had dug their holes deep. At dusk came the telltale
rattling, revving, and clanking from the direction of 2/1’s front; and
five unescorted T-34s loomed on the Inchon-Seoul Highway, headed toward
the intersection. They turned left just short of the crossroads and
proceeded in column along a street that paralleled Company A’s dike.
The Marines on the levee crouched low in their holes. Cruising
majestically like a file of battleships, the tank column cut loose with
a hail of machine-gun fire and salvoes of 85mm shells at a range of 30
yards. Able Company’s rocket gunners, whose total experience with the
3.5-inch launcher was limited to the firing of a few practice rounds,
popped up from their holes and let fly. One of the tanks exploded in a
convulsion of flame and smoke, its turret twisted askew as though some
giant hand had torn the steel cap from the body.
The other four tanks continued to the end of the perimeter, then
reversed course past the Marine line a second time, pumping a steady
stream of steel into the western slope of the dike. Reaching their
starting point at the Inchon-Seoul Highway, they turned back and made
another round trip, with Marine rocket fire damaging two more vehicles
and sending them limping off the field. The remaining pair, upon
completing the second circuit, again reversed course and made a final
pass--the fifth--on the Marine lines. Clearing the perimeter, they
rumbled into town and disappeared.
[Illustration: DIKE DEFENSE--COMPANY A, 1st MARINES
YONGDUNG-PO--NIGHT OF 21–22 SEP]
Fantastic as it may seem, Company A sustained a single casualty, a
concussion case, during the half hour of sustained heavy caliber
pounding at pistol ranges. Tremendous muzzle velocity had embedded
the 85mm, armor-piercing shells deep in the slope of the dike in the
split second before each explosion; and Marine foxholes proved to be
sufficient protection against the raking machine-gun fire.
Between 1900 and 2100 it was relatively quiet. McClelland’s platoon,
facing town, killed a few Reds attempting to remove stores from the
five-story building. Then the long expected report reached Barrow by
sound-power telephone: Swords’ platoon, manning the northern arc of the
perimeter, could hear a large enemy force approaching its front.
The counterattack hit shortly after 2100. Transmitting a running
account of the sharp fire fight by phone, Swords assured his company
commander that he was “having no trouble.” After 15 minutes of failure,
the Reds withdrew for a breather. They struck in the same place half an
hour later and were thrown back again, despite any inspiration derived
from a display of multi-colored flares and wild cries of “banzai.”
By midnight, the 3d Platoon had withstood five such onslaughts, each
appearing to be in about company strength. Before the last attack, a
captive Red officer escaped from Company A’s POW “compound” east of
the dike and ran northward into the blackness, shouting repeatedly,
according to Barrow’s ROK interpreter, “Don’t attack any more! They’re
too strong for you!”
Apparently his advice was heeded, much to the relief of the Marines,
whose ammunition supply was becoming dangerously low. At midnight,
following the enemy’s fifth unsuccessful attempt against Swords’
position, the fight for Yongdungpo came to an end for the 1st Marines.
There was scattered firing throughout the night, but the North Koreans,
denied access to their vital supplies, quickly withered on the vine.
At dawn, Company A counted 275 dead and 50 automatic weapons around its
perimeter, principally in front of the 3d Platoon. The four T-34 tanks
which had withdrawn into town were found abandoned.
The 1st and 3d Battalions attacked at 0800 against negligible
resistance and converged on the isolated unit, making the historic
linkup in short order. The enemy was gone, except for the hundreds
of dead that littered the borders of the city. He had left behind
practically all of his heavy armament, equipment, and supplies.
Continuing the advance on the 22d, the 1st Marines surged eastward
beyond Yongdungpo, then spent the remainder of the day reorganizing and
patrolling. On the 23d, the regiment moved almost unopposed to the bank
of the Han, 3/1 seizing Hill 108 which dominated the battered bridges.
Late that night Puller received orders to effect the river-crossing
early next morning.
CHAPTER XII
Main Line of Resistance
_Three Hills Designated 105--RCT-7 North of the Han--Attack Continued
by RCT-5--Modified Plan of Corps Attack--Climax of the Marine
Assault--The Epic of Dog Company--River Crossing of RCT-1_
During the night of 21–22 September an NKPA shell crashed through the
roof of the native house serving as CP of the 5th Marines northwest
of Seoul. The explosion wounded Lieutenant Colonel Hays so severely
that the regimental executive officer required immediate evacuation.
Lieutenant Colonel Murray, who escaped with a slight cut, directed that
the CP be moved to a cave on the reverse slope of a hill.
Thus did the enemy serve notice that henceforward the battle for the
northwest approaches to Seoul would be furiously contested. Yongdungpo
had been taken by the 1st Marines only after a grim, three-day struggle
in which the Korean Reds made their first real stand as distinguished
from delaying operations. And now it was the turn of the 5th Marines to
meet opposition such as that regiment had not encountered since D-day.
Two new NKPA units had much to do with the sudden stiffening of
resistance. One was the 78th Independent Regiment, commanded by Colonel
Pak Han Lin. This unit, numbering about 2,000 recruits in July, was
organized into three battalions of infantry supported by medical,
motorcycle, weapons, reconnaissance, mortar and 76mm gun companies, and
an engineer platoon.
Another recent arrival which won the respect of the Marines for rugged
fighting qualities was the 25th Brigade of 4,000 to 5,000 troops.
Commanded by Major General Wol Ki Chan, who had reportedly studied in
Russia in 1947, the unit was made up of four heavy weapons battalions
and an infantry battalion in addition to engineer, 120mm mortar, heavy
artillery, and brigade artillery battalions.[360]
[360] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Baker, and Queen Queen:Baker,
app. I.
It was literally a fight to the death for these two NKPA outfits, which
were all but wiped out of existence by the Marines of RCT-5 during the
battle for Seoul. But while they lasted, the 78th Regiment and 25th
Brigade put up a determined and at times desperate resistance in hill
country well adapted to defense.
_Three Hills Designated 105_
The grapple for the northwest approaches to Seoul began in deadly
earnest at 0700 on the morning of 22 September. From north to south,
the three assault battalions of the reinforced 5th Marines were the
3d on the left, the 1st KMC in the center, and the 1st on the right.
They were jumping off from the high ground about three miles southeast
of Haengju along a line bounded by Hill 216 on the north, 104 in the
center, and 68 on the south.
Misunderstandings in regard to routes and unit boundaries were made
inevitable by maps disagreeing as to place names and heights of ridges.
Added to the confusion was the fact that each battalion zone had a Hill
105 as one of its final objectives. (Staff officers played safe by
designating them 105-N, 105-C, and 105-S to indicate north, central and
south.)
Ahead of the Marines lay a hill complex which constituted a great
natural bastion of interlocking heights and fields of fire. Spurs and
defiles leading from one ridge to another enabled NKPA troops to move
up in concealment and launch counterattacks in the most unexpected
quarters.
Casualties of the next three days were the heaviest for a comparable
period that RCT-5 had suffered in Korea. Added to previous totals, it
meant that 17 of the original 18 platoon leaders were killed or wounded
in a 50-day period, and five of the six company commanders who landed
with the Brigade.[361]
[361] Geer, _The New Breed_, 163.
Grim as the outlook was, the Marines of the 2d Battalion enjoyed a
sideshow on the eve of battle when Sergeant James I. Higgins and a
companion made a prize of an enemy locomotive. Knowing nothing about
operating it, they found a simple but effective solution by firing up
and opening throttles or depressing levers until the gauges were at the
halfway mark. This policy of moderation led to success. The locomotive
took off with ponderous docility, and Higgins managed to bring it to
a safe stop near the regimental CP. His exploit was not applauded,
however, by supply officers taking alarm from the dense clouds pouring
out of the smokestack. They did not relish the idea of providing enemy
artillery with a target marker, visible for miles, in an area full of
exposed Marine ammunition. As a result of their anxiety, Higgins was
promptly invited to keep rolling until he reached the rear.[362]
[362] Capt G. H. Stewart interv, 17 Nov 54.
The 2d Battalion remained in reserve while the 1st KMC Battalion jumped
off in the center from Hill 104. Heavy resistance was met immediately.
In fact, NKPA detachments infiltrated all the way to Hill 104 itself,
though it had been secured by 3/5 the previous afternoon. They poured
small-arms fire into KMCs already taking a pounding from mortar and
artillery fire, and the battalion was held up until the high ground to
the front could be cleared by artillery and air strikes.[363]
[363] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
On the left, 3/5 also ran into trouble after deceptively easy progress
at first. At 0700 all three companies jumped off from Hill 216, secured
by Item Company the day before. The new objective, as directed by 5th
Marines’ Operations Order 24–50, was Hill 296.
This height was reported by How Company as taken at 0945. It was not
realized at the time that Hill 296 was actually the bastion of the Red
Korean defense complex northwest of Seoul if its three southern spurs
were considered. Attached to the main land mass like the roots of an
ulcerated molar were Hills 56, 88, and 105-N, with 105-C, 72, and 105-S
describing an arc to the southward. Nearly all of these positions would
have to be reduced before the road could be opened to Seoul.
Only long-range small-arms fire from Hill 338 was encountered by How
Company at the outset, but enemy pressure steadily increased from the
southern spurs of 296. An NKPA counterattack in estimated company
strength was repulsed with heavy enemy losses, including some 40
prisoners, by Marine riflemen supported by tanks. Communist pressure
was soon renewed, however, with How Company receiving heavy small-arms,
automatic, AT, and mortar fire.
Patrols from the other two companies, ranging to the northeast of Hill
216 in the early afternoon, met determined opposition. A reinforced
rifle platoon of Item Company encountered an NKPA force, in estimated
company strength, defending the village of Nokpon-ni. During the
ensuing fight the Marines lost two men killed and 11 wounded. Action
was broken off at dusk, when the 3d Battalion received oral orders to
defend against an enemy infiltrating from the south, southeast, and
northeast in attempts to regain lost ground.
The fight for Hill 296 had only begun.[364]
[364] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
South of the railroad, 1/5 had about 2,000 yards to cover to its
objective, Hill 105-S. The battalion plan of maneuver called for Baker
Company to deliver fire support while Able passed through Charlie and
advanced to the base of the hill. Meanwhile, Charlie was to envelop
the objective from the right. When the three Able platoons moved into
position, they were pinned down by enemy automatic fire from the
forward slope of 105-S. First Lieutenant Joseph A. Schimmenti of 3/A
and his men had a grim reminder of American reverses earlier in the
war when they found a 50-caliber machine gun and ammunition of U. S.
manufacture which the enemy had abandoned.[365]
[365] Capt J. A. Schimmenti interv, 4 Jan 55.
Schimmenti was severely wounded and First Lieutenant Nathaniel F. Mann,
Jr., killed before Able Company won a foothold on the lower slopes of
105-S. It took until 1500 for Charlie Company, supported by a machine
gun section, to complete its wide swing and close in on the right of
the enemy’s positions. Baker Company passed through Able meanwhile and
attacked the forward slopes. At 1720, after an intense mortar, air,
and artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion needed only 15 minutes in
which to secure the objective. The three companies had taken losses of
12 killed and 31 wounded during the day.[366]
[366] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Nan.
Close air support was provided for RCT-5 by the MAG-33 squadrons which
had begun tactical operations at Kimpo on the 20th. Although they were
still in process of moving to the airfield from Japanese bases, VMF-212
and VMF(N)-542 flew strikes in support of all three assault battalions.
Of the two carrier-based squadrons, VMF-323 almost doubled its usual
number of daily missions on 22 September.[367]
[367] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig: Appendix Fox; Annex Item:
Roger, Sugar.
[Illustration: APPROACHING THE ENEMY MLR
5th MARINES--21 SEP]
Just before nightfall, Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed 1/5 to pull
back to Hill 68 with one company while holding Hill 105-S with the
other two. This shift was made necessary by the fact that the KMCs had
been compelled to withdraw to Hill 104, their starting point. As a
consequence, the center of the line was more than 1,000 yards in the
rear of the battalions on the right and left. The company on Hill 68
was to provide covering fires in the morning, therefore, when the KMC
battalion would renew its attack in an effort to regain lost ground.
_RCT-7 North of the Han_
On D-plus 8 the 1st Marine Division had its third rifle regiment in
line for the first time. OpnO 9-50, issued at 1200 on 23 September,
directed the 7th Marines (less 2d Battalion) to cross the Han into a
zone of action in the rear of the 5th Marines.
In response to verbal instructions and a fragmentary warning order the
day before, the regimental headquarters and 3d Battalion crossed late
on the morning of the 23d. Colonel Litzenberg set up his CP on the
north bank at 1710, and his men had their first contact with the enemy
the following morning. A 3d Battalion patrol ranging to the north of
the battalion zone of action encountered an estimated 200 NKPA troops,
and Marine air and artillery supported a successful attack.[368]
[368] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Roger Roger.
Division orders called for the relief of 2/7 on the 24th in the area
northwest of Kimpo by the 2d Battalion of the 187th Airborne RCT, USA.
The Marine unit was directed to cross the Han that afternoon, followed
by the 1st Battalion, which had completed unloading at Inchon.
It had been decided by the Division command and staff to give the 7th
Marines time for shaking down instead of committing the newcomers
immediately to the attack on Seoul. The regiment was assigned a series
of five objectives along a ridgeline extending from the ferry crossing
at Haengju on a gentle arc to a point north of the city. Protecting
the north flank and rear of the 5th Marines was a primary mission, and
Colonel Litzenberg was also directed to prevent the escape of the enemy
to the northward.[369]
[369] O. P. _Smith, Notes_, 251–252.
_Attack Continued by RCT-5_
On the morning of the 23d the 1st KMC Battalion was directed to attack
from Hill 104 at 0700 to straighten out the line. The 1st and 3d
Battalions of the 5th Marines were to remain in position and assist the
advance by fire.
Heavy and immediate resistance was encountered from NKPA troops dug
in on Hill 56. Although the KMCs made a valiant effort, they were
soon stopped cold. Only slight gains resulted at an excessive cost in
casualties from artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire.[370]
[370] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
Lieutenant Colonel Roise moved his CP forward at 1300 to the western
base of Hill 104. While his 2d Battalion assembled under cover of that
height, he conferred with Lieutenant Colonel Murray after receiving
orders to pass through the KMCs and continue the attack on Hill 56.
Both officers realized the advantages of swinging around to hit the
enemy from the left after approaching along the low ground. But it was
already midafternoon and this movement could not be completed before
darkness. The only alternative was a line-buck in the center if Hill
56 was to be taken that day. And since the line had to be stabilized
and the KMCs pulled back in reserve to give the regimental defense some
depth, Murray and Roise agreed that the situation called for a frontal
assault without delay.[371]
[371] LtCol H. S. Roise interv, 9 Nov 54.
At this stage the Marine officers did not realize that Hill 56 was
part of the enemy’s main line of resistance. It seemed logical to them
that he would make his final stand on the next ridgeline, crowned with
Hills 105-C and 105-N. As for the repulses suffered by the KMCs, it was
a logical assumption that their inexperience had been a contributing
factor. In view of these circumstances, a brief artillery preparation
and the support of a platoon of tanks seemed sufficient when Companies
D and F attacked and E contributed fires from the eastern slopes of
Hill 104.[372]
[372] _Ibid._
Captain Peters’ Fox Company was to lead off on the right, south of the
railroad, and seize the portion of the objective below the railroad
tunnel. From this high ground, his men could then support First
Lieutenant H. J. Smith’s Dog Company, moving forward under cover of a
sunken road, to assault Hill 56 north of the tunnel. About 1,000 yards
of rice paddies had to be crossed at the outset, and the expected
support of the tanks in this low ground failed to materialize. The
leading M-26 bogged down in a wide ditch which prevented the advance of
the other four. One of them remained in the paddies to give supporting
fires while three took a new route along the railroad tracks. Fox
Company received increasingly heavy casualties meanwhile on the way
across the low ground.
Peters ordered Second Lieutenant S. E. Sansing’s mortar section
forward, but the officer reported afterwards that his radio did not
pick up the message. This left the three assault platoons without 60mm
support as they climbed the lower slopes of Hill 56 and became heavily
engaged with NKPA troops just below the railway tunnel.[373]
[373] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
Apparently the Reds so overrated the weight of Company F’s assault that
they lost the topographical peak of Hill 56 by default. Whether their
timely withdrawal from Dog Company’s initial objective was meant to
be permanent is not known, for they might have been caught flatfooted
while shifting troops against Fox. Nevertheless, Company D emerged from
the sunken road in a column of platoons and moved onto the high ground
in its zone against negligible opposition.
Lieutenant Heck’s 1st Platoon, according to plan, then pivoted leftward
to spearhead the attack on the final objective, Smith’s Ridge--named
by the men after their company commander. Halfway into the connecting
saddle, the Marines were caught in the open by a heavy burst of fire
from a large knoll on the southern tip of the wooded ridge. Heck fell
mortally wounded, and his senior NCO, Staff Sergeant T. Albert Crowson,
went down with a shattered leg. In the space of a few minutes, more
than half of the exposed platoon became casualties.[374]
[374] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; McNaughton interv,
7 Jan 55.
Startled by the intensity of enemy reaction from this unexpected
quarter, Smith personally retrieved the battered 1st Platoon, while
the 2d and 3d were clearing the northeastern slopes of Hill 56. Then,
owing to the lateness of the hour, he deployed Company D defensively on
that high ground for the night. There was no contact with Fox Company
or any other friendly unit. This fact, coupled with the evidence of
strong enemy positions on Smith’s Ridge, led the company commander to
reconsider carefully his plans for the postponed attack.[375]
[375] _Ibid._
Fox Company had meanwhile been heavily engaged along the eastern
slopes of Hill 56 in the vicinity of the railway tunnel. Peters
ordered Lieutenant Anderson to lead his 2d Platoon against the strong
NKPA positions just beyond the tunnel. Only 27 men were left to fight
it out at close quarters with an entrenched enemy estimated by the
platoon leader at company strength. The Communist force was wiped out
in exchanges of small-arms fire and grenades at murderous ranges, but
the effort took a frightful toll of the 1st Platoon in KIA and WIA
casualties. Only seven able-bodied men were left when Peters ordered a
withdrawal to the company position south of the tunnel.[376]
[376] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
All of Anderson’s wounded and most of his dead were brought back, and
he combined his remnants with the survivors of Lieutenant Nolan’s 2d
Platoon. A gap of about 50 yards separated their position from First
Lieutenant Albert F. Belbusti’s isolated 3d Platoon as Fox Company dug
in for the night.[377]
[377] _Ibid._
No fault could be found with the over-all plan of attack, providing as
it did for each assault company to seize ground from which it could
support the advance of the other. But as darkness approached, it became
evident that the 2d Battalion had bargained for more North Korean real
estate than it could handle. The two isolated companies had no choice
but to cling desperately to their scorched holdings while organizing to
meet an expected NKPA counterattack.
Although the other two battalions of the 5th Marines had defensive
missions on 23 September, enemy threats and encroachments kept them
occupied. On Hill 296, in the zone of 3/5, Weapons Company took a
good deal of satisfaction in firing a captured NKPA howitzer to break
up hostile troop concentrations in the vicinity of Nokpon-ni. How
Company remained in contact with the enemy all day, supported by
50-caliber and 90mm fires from Marine tanks.[378]
[378] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
[Illustration: SMASHING THE MLR
5th MARINES--22–24 SEP]
It was in the How Company zone that Taplett’s men first made the
acquaintance of “Fireproof Phil.” This was the name applied to a
gigantic NKPA officer, towering head and shoulders over his troops, who
exposed himself with contempt for Marine bullets. Not only his burly
build but his light complexion gave some of the Marines the conviction
that he was Russian. At any rate, Fireproof Phil was both fearless and
lucky. Machine gun bullets and mortar rounds seemed to bounce off his
frame. Finally, the tanks paid the honor of making him the special
target of 90mm ammunition, and still Fireproof Phil always had the
benefit of a minor miracle at the last moment.[379]
[379] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 19 Apr 55.
Combat leadership by enemy officers and NCOs was outstanding in the
operations north of Seoul. On Hill 105-S the 1st Battalion came under
pressure all day on 23 September. Movement was impossible for the
men of Baker and Charlie Companies, and supplies of water, food, and
ammunition had to wait for darkness. Enemy smoke pots created a haze
restricting air activities, but it did not prevent a timely strike
flown by Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid and five planes of VMF-214 to
break up a threatened enemy counterattack on Hill 105-S. This was one
of six close support missions completed on the 23d by that squadron in
the zone of RCT-5.[380]
[380] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Nan; 1st MAW _SAR_,
Annex Jig:Easy.
Why the enemy did not launch a counterattack that night against the
hard-hit assault companies of the 2d Battalion is one of the mysteries
of the war. But the weary Marines on the slope of Hill 56 attributed
their respite to effective and unremitting artillery support. All
night long the howitzers of the 11th Marines lit up the night sky like
heat lightning in the rear and crashed like thunder in front as they
scourged the NKPA positions.
_Modified Plan of Corps Attack_
Up to this time the Corps plan of attack had called for the 1st
Marines to clear the south bank of the Han and cross in the vicinity
of Yongdungpo to join the 5th Marines in an assault on Seoul from the
west and southwest. In view of the location of the boundary between the
1st Marines and the 7th Infantry Division, this meant that the Army
troops would not participate in the attack on the city.
General Almond had already made it plain in conversations with General
Smith that it was highly desirable to take Seoul by 25 September as GHQ
wished to announce the liberation just three months to the day after
the NKPA invasion.
The subject came up again during a conference at Corps Headquarters
on 23 September. Almond proposed that Smith send RCT-1 around to
attack Seoul from the southeast while RCT-5 continued its assault from
the northwest. This plan struck the Corps commander as promising to
maneuver the enemy out of the city sooner than the attack as formerly
conceived.
Smith replied that the NKPA forces defending Seoul had proved to be
much stronger than had been expected. He said he was convinced that
the enemy would put up a fight from street to street regardless of any
flanking maneuvers. The Marine general added that the fierce opposition
met by RCT-5 had demonstrated that the western approaches to Seoul were
too much for one regiment to handle, and he urged that no change be
made in the original plan of crossing RCT-1 northwest of Yongdungpo to
aid the attack. This plan, Smith asserted, would offer the advantage
of keeping the 1st Marine Division together; for when the 1st and 5th
Marines had penetrated well into the city, the 7th Marines could be
brought around from the northwest to deliver the _coup de grace_.[381]
[381] This section has been derived from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_,
sec. 1; O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 252–253, 262–265, and
_Chronicle_, 23–24 Sep 50.
Differences between commanders are not remarkable, and it is noteworthy
that Corps and Division usually managed in the Inchon-Seoul operation
to reach an acceptable solution. Such was the case when General Almond
reconsidered on the 23d and agreed to allow the 1st Marines to cross
northwest of Yongdungpo, as originally planned, and take part in a
two-regiment attack on Seoul from the west and southwest. In place of
the 1st Marines, the 32d Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division was to
cross the Han and enter Seoul from the southeast. Amphibian tractors
for the operation would be furnished by the 1st Marine Division.
Revised 1st Marine Division plans called for RCT-1 to take position
on the right flank of RCT-5 after the crossing, then pivot to the
northeast and continue the attack through the heart of the city. RCT-7
(less one battalion in Division reserve) would have the mission of
advancing across the northern approaches to protect the left flank and
prevent the enemy from escaping while RCT-5 sliced through the western
edge of the built-up area. Thus the burden of capturing Seoul fell
chiefly upon Colonel Puller’s regiment.
_Climax of the Marine Assault_
As the eastern sky turned gray on the Saturday morning of 24 September,
the men on the firing line northwest of Seoul knew that the time had
come. They knew with the instinct of battle-wise troops that supporting
arms had done all they could. Now it was up to the infantry to come to
grips with the enemy. Supporting arms could only sue for victory and it
was up to the infantry to collect.
The two companies of 2/5 were still clinging by their eyelashes to
the scarred slopes of Hill 56. All three of the Company F platoon
leaders, Nolan, Anderson, and Belbusti were carrying on in spite of
wounds. Corporal Welden D. Harris, who had killed three Red Koreans in
hand-to-hand combat the day before, refused to be evacuated after a
second wound.[382]
[382] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
The survivors of Captain Peters’ outfit could not say too much in
praise of the support given continuously throughout the night by
Captain Arnold C. Hofstetter’s Baker Battery of the 11th Marines. There
were indications that several incipient NKPA counterattacks had been
broken up during the night by the bombardment.
In the Dog Company zone the night had been relatively uneventful except
for sniping, though the enemy could be heard digging new positions and
bringing up ammunition.
The regimental scheme of maneuver, as outlined in OpnO 26-50, called
for the 2d Battalion to continue the attack, with Hill 105-N as a final
objective. This meant going up against practically the entire Hill 296
defense system, since Smith’s Ridge and all of Hill 88 also remained
to be seized. An estimated 2,500 enemy troops, well supported by
automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery were defending every foot of
defensible ground in front of the two thinned companies of 2/5.
It was intended that 3/5 should assist by attacking down the principal
eastern spur of 296 to outflank the enemy and contribute supporting
fires. Taplett’s men were to be relieved in gradual stages on Hills
216 and 296 by elements of the 1st Battalion. As a preliminary, Newton
was to send out a patrol to secure a portion of the river bank on the
right flank of Hill 105-S in preparation for the crossing of the Han
by the 1st Marines that morning. The reserve company of 1/5 would then
commence the relief of the 3d Battalion while the 1st Battalion of
the KMC Regiment remained in an assembly area in the rear of the 5th
Marines and elements of the 7th Marines protected the left flank. Units
of 1/5 were to continue to defend 105-S--seized and held at a total
cost of 27 KIA and 72 WIA--until the crossing of the 1st Marines and
the relief of 3/5 had been completed.[383]
[383] 1st MarDiv OpnO 10-50, 24 Sep 50.
Two small enemy counterattacks were repulsed without much trouble by
elements of 3/5 on Hill 296 before dawn. Company H remained in contact
with the enemy on the eastern slopes until 1550, when Company G moved
around the right flank and a coordinated attack was launched against
moderate NKPA artillery, mortar, and AT fires. Relief of Item Company
and other 3/5 troops remaining on Hill 216 was completed by the 1st
Battalion at 2000. Casualties of the 3d Battalion for the day were five
killed and 33 wounded.[384]
[384] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
The movements of these two battalions were subsidiary to the main
attack launched by 2/5 on 24 September. H-hour at 0630 was preceded
by a 20-minute artillery preparation and an air strike by VMF-323
planes. Lieutenant Colonel Roise planned to bring up Easy Company from
reserve on Hill 104 and push it forward between Dog and Fox while those
companies completed the seizure of Hill 56 and cleared the heavily
wooded spur to the north known as Smith’s Ridge, linking up with the
main land mass of Hill 296. Easy Company would then take the lead in a
battalion attack aimed at Hills 88 and 105-N as the final objectives.
Fox Company jumped off on the eastern slope of Hill 56. Nolan having
been evacuated, Anderson led what was left of the 2d and 3d Platoons--a
total of some 20 riflemen. Belbusti commanded about the same number in
the combined assault on the heavily defended finger of high ground
east of the tunnel. Counting machine gunners, mortarmen, and troops
bringing up ammunition, Fox Company had been reduced to fewer than 90
effectives, including wounded men refusing evacuation.
Corsairs of VMF-323 swooped down to drop 500-pound bombs less than
a hundred yards in front of the attackers. Thanks to such close air
support, Fox Company soon seized high ground which enabled the men to
gain fire superiority.[385] At this point they took cover to make use
of their advantage in an exchange of small-arms and automatic fire.
[385] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex
Queen Queen:Oboe.
Dog Company, with two platoons still almost at full strength, had at
least a dozen walking wounded who elected to keep on fighting. Ground
mist and smoke from burning huts made for low visibility when the men
jumped off in a column of platoons. The enemy opened up from Smith’s
Ridge as the Marines came within close range, pinning them down for two
hours by concentrated and accurate artillery, mortar, AT, and automatic
fire. One of the Marine tanks moving up the road in support was
disabled by a mine and another became inoperative after a direct hit by
an NKPA mortar shell on the motor hatch.[386]
[386] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex
Queen Queen.
_The Epic of Dog Company_
The large knob across the sunken road from Hill 56 remained to be
taken before Dog Company completed its mission by advancing northward
to clear the enemy from the wooded spine of Smith’s Ridge. After
the attack stalled with heavy casualties Lieutenant H. J. Smith
ordered every available man into line, including personnel of company
headquarters. Two Marine machine guns were kept in action at a cost
of repeated casualties as First Lieutenant Karle Seydel made five
consecutive trips under fire to bring up ammunition.
At some points the opposing forces were within long grenade-throwing
distance. In these exchanges the Marines had a pronounced advantage
because of stronger arms and the control developed by baseball.
Both sides attempted without success to break the deadlock by sending
out detachments for flanking movements. Sergeant Robert Smith of
McNaughton’s platoon led a squad in a wide end sweep to the north, only
to meet such fierce NKPA opposition that Smith and eight of his men
were killed, including a corpsman. Only three wounded Marines ever got
back.[387]
[387] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
At 1000 the company commander sent the first of three messages to
inform the battalion CP of his situation and request reinforcements.
Roise could only reply that Easy Company, his reserve unit, was
irrevocably committed to the attack on the final objectives. During
the course of the battle the battalion commander himself was wounded
by a mortar fragment but returned to the CP after having his arm
dressed.[388]
[388] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Oboe.
When Second Lieutenant George Grimes’ 60mm mortar section ran out of
ammunition, the survivors fought as riflemen. Two platoon leaders,
McNaughton and Lieutenant Howard, were wounded but continued in action.
About 1030, as the smoke and mist cleared, the howitzers of the 11th
Marines and the 81mm mortars of 2/5 poured it into the enemy positions
along the wooded ridge. The men on the firing line had another welcome
assist when four Corsairs of VMF-323 roared in to make passes with
bombs, rockets, and napalm.
Lieutenant Smith had 44 effectives left as he alerted his men for the
assault. McNaughton, Seydel, Grimes, and First Lieutenant Karl Wirth
were the other officers still on their feet. Platoons, sections, and
squads had ceased to exist as units when the 44 men of Dog Company
moved out of their foxholes and swarmed over the high ground that had
held them up for more than two hours.
First impressions under more normal circumstances would have been
shocking, for the position held more enemy dead and dying than the
Marines had ever seen before in Korea. The entire area was honeycombed
with foxholes, trenches, and bunkers, which had become the graves of
Red Koreans cut down by Marine air and artillery. There they had died
at their posts, crowded together so closely that every shell, bomb, or
rocket had caused frightful carnage. The dead outnumbered the living,
in fact, for the men of Dog Company met unexpectedly weak resistance
from the few NKPA effectives who trusted to their weapons instead of
their feet.[389]
[389] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
Lieutenant Smith paused to regroup in a skirmish line for the final
attack to clear the remainder of the ridge. Again the Marines seemed
to prevail by sheer moral ascendancy as the assault went forward by
leaps and bounds. But the victory was bought at the cost of the company
commander’s life, for Smith was killed at the head of his men.
Only five additional casualties were taken in this phase, but Marines
dropped from exhaustion until McNaughton, as acting commander, had just
26 able-bodied men left at the finish. They were greeted by the strange
spectacle of three enemy officers exhorting about 150 Red Koreans to
retreat. No second invitation was needed, and the Marines had a “turkey
shoot” at the expense of foemen scurrying down the eastern and northern
slopes in the direction of Seoul.[390]
[390] _Ibid._
Seydel was the only officer left unwounded when Dog Company notified
the Battalion CP at 1300 that objectives had been secured. Fox Company
reported about two hours later that it also had seized all assigned
ground and was digging in after a mopping-up period.[391]
[391] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Oboe.
Casualties had not been heavy on the east side of the ridge as compared
to the day before. The Company F attack consisted of two prolonged fire
fights in which the Marines seized better positions and made good use
of their advantage. After reaching the objective, they took cover and
proceeded systematically to cut the enemy down to size with the support
of VMF-214 planes. Captain Peters then sent both platoons forward to
eliminate an NKPA force firing on them from a distance. Anderson’s men
passed through a small built-up area and took cover behind a stone wall
on the enemy’s flank. Opening fire on Communists about 300 yards away
in an open field, they made short work of the opposition.[392]
[392] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
Second Lieutenant Wiley J. Grigsby, the machine gun platoon leader,
was killed in the day’s final Fox Company attack. Anderson’s composite
platoon had three men killed and three wounded. Among the casualties
was Corporal Harris, who received a mortal wound after twice refusing
evacuation. He was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross.[393]
[393] _Ibid._
The attack of Easy Company on Hill 105-N was delayed until after the
other two companies took their objectives. At 1500, after moving up
from battalion reserve, Jaskilka’s men ran into heavy enemy mortar
and automatic fire soon after passing Hill 56. Two tanks of the 1st
Platoon, Company B, 1st Tank Battalion were knocked out, one by an AT
mine and the other by a direct hit of a mortar shell. The remaining
three tanks could not have continued in action except for the efforts
of Staff Sergeant Stanley B. McPherson of Company A, 1st Engineer
Battalion, who went ahead and cleared a path through the enemy mine
field. By some miracle he survived the hail of NKPA fire unhurt, and
the tanks went on to destroy two enemy AT guns and several machine gun
emplacements.
The main enemy stronghold appeared to be Hill 72, a conical height
located between Hills 105-N and 105-C and enfilading both of them. Not
enough daylight remained on 24 September to mount an assault on this
position, and the effort was put off until the following morning.[394]
[394] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Oboe; Deptula
interv, 18 Jan 55.
Marine air had a busy day. Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid’s VMF-214,
repeating the pattern of the day before, launched strikes of five
aircraft every two hours in support of 2/5 attacks northwest of
Seoul--a total of six missions. Not only was the city a flak-trap, but
Marine pilots were flying Corsairs from which the armor around the
air-cooler system had been removed by order of BuAer as a peacetime
economy measure and never restored. As a consequence, NKPA small-arms
fire was likely to hit the oil lines and send a machine down in
flames.[395]
[395] Cushman interv, 26 Jul 54.
A 1st MAW record for combat sorties flown in a day by a single squadron
was set on the 24th by VMF-212 with 12 flights and 46 sorties. Close
support missions were about equally represented along with search and
attack.[396]
[396] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item:Roger.
Nightfall of this eventful day found 2/5 in possession of ground
containing the most enemy dead in a small area ever seen in the
Inchon-Seoul operation. Lieutenant Colonel Roise estimated that 1,500
NKPA bodies were left on Hill 56 and Smith’s Ridge, and the command of
the 1st Marine Division put the figure at 1,750 enemy killed in the
Hill 296 defenses.[397]
[397] Roise interv, 9 Nov 54; and O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 286.
Survivors of Dog Company agreed that in spite of such frightful losses,
the Red Koreans had enough able-bodied men left at the finish to make
mincemeat of the 26 attackers who took Smith’s Ridge. But this Marine
effort seemed to break the heart of enemy resistance in the Hill 296
defense complex, thus giving fresh proof of Napoleon’s famous dictum,
“The moral is to the material in war as three to one.”
_River Crossing of RCT-1_
The battle for Seoul entered its final stage on the 24th with the
river crossing of the 1st Marines. At first light a site about 2,000
yards southwest of Hill 105-S was cleared by Charlie Company of the
1st Engineer Battalion. Extensive mine-clearing operations at the
crossing site area caused delays, and it was 0800 when reconnaissance
and assault elements of 2/1 embarked in the LVTs of Company A, 1st
Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Sutter’s troops completed their crossing
at 0945 against scattered and ineffectual fire, and made contact
that afternoon on the north bank with elements of Company C, 5th
Marines.[398]
[398] 2/1 _SAR_; and O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 268.
For lack of a ferry, the 1st Marines had no tank support at the
crossing site. Plans had been made to send Baker Company, 1st Tank
Battalion, around by the Haengju ferry to join the infantry north of
the river. As it worked out, however, the armor was delayed by a fight
on the north bank which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Hill 79, about 4,000 yards from the crossing site, had been assigned
to the 1st Marines by Division OpnO 10-50 as an objective. The 2d
Battalion began a rapid advance toward this point after moving into
position on the north bank abreast of the 5th Marines on a 1,500-yard
front.
The 1st Battalion and Regimental Headquarters were next to cross.
Puller ordered Hawkins and his men to drive eastward along the river
and pass through the 2d Battalion. Since that unit was rapidly
advancing at the time, one of the 1/1 staff officers looked dubious.
“You’ll just have to advance a little faster,” explained the veteran
regimental commander.[399]
[399] Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54.
This proved to be a practical even if not exactly a school solution.
On the march the 1st Battalion had the same experience as the 2d when
small-arms and automatic fire came from Hill 105-S, supposedly secured
by 1/5. Again the enemy was demonstrating his ability to hide out
behind the Marine lines and make the most of his nuisance value. The
2d Battalion had two men killed and nine wounded by harassing fires,
and the 1st suffered four casualties while passing through at 1300 to
continue the attack.
Effective Marine artillery and 4.2-inch mortar fire supported the
advance. After drawing out of range of Hill 105-S, Hawkins and his men
encountered long-range small-arms fire, and roads into the city were
mined. Hill 79 was located in the southwest section of Seoul itself,
commanding a good view of the railroad marshaling yards and industrial
area. After seizing the objective at 1500, the men celebrated by
raising an American flag, thus precipitating a friendly race with the
5th Marines in exuberant ceremonies of this sort.
At 1515 the 3d Battalion was relieved by the Division of its mission of
defending Hill 108, south of the wrecked Han bridges, and reverted to
regimental control for a river crossing completed at 2000. On the north
bank Ridge’s outfit was thought to have pulled the last fangs of enemy
resistance on Hill 105-S after his men in their turn came under fire
from hidden opponents. Since this height dominated the new regimental
CP, Company I was given the mission of outposting the height. A small
but lively fire fight took place at dusk, and the Marines bagged ten
prisoners at a cost of one man killed and two wounded.[400]
[400] 3/1 _SAR_.
The 3d Battalion went into an assembly area near the crossing site for
the night. Hawkins set up a perimeter defense on the objective, and the
2d Battalion occupied positions about 2,000 yards in the rear. A few
probing attacks were received from enemy patrols on Hill 79, but Marine
artillery and 4.2-inch mortars made short work of these attempts.
CHAPTER XIII
Seoul as a Battlefield
_Two More River Crossings--Division Attack of 25 September--Night
Pursuit Ordered by Corps--Renewal of Drive Through Seoul--Entrapment of
Dog Company, RCT-7--Last Fight on Hill 296--1st Marines in the Heart of
Seoul--Objective Secured_
On the morning of 25 September 1950, with RCT-1 across the river, the
1st Marine Division was in a position for the first time since D-day to
launch an attack of all three regiments abreast.
This was but one of the portents indicating that the days of the North
Korean People’s Army were numbered. Exactly three months had passed
since the invasion of the Republic of Korea, and now the forces of the
Communist puppet state were reeling under blows from two directions.
While X Corps pounded inland to seize the NKPA main communications hub,
the Eighth Army had smashed through the Pusan Perimeter and was driving
northward to place the enemy between two fires.
The big break in South Korea came on 23 September. Up to that time,
the NKPA 5th, 8th, 12th, and 15th Divisions had put up a stubborn
resistance on the northern front of the Pusan Perimeter against six ROK
divisions. Then the enemy crumpled and the ROKs began an advance (see
map in end papers) that would take them 70 miles during the ensuing
week.[401]
[401] Almond, _UN MilOps_, 13.
It was much the same story along the Kumchon-Taejon axis of the central
front. There the U. S. I Corps, comprising the U. S. 24th Infantry
and 1st Cavalry Divisions, the 1st ROK Division, and the British 27th
Brigade, drove a deep salient into the line of the 1st, 3d, 13th,
10th, and 2d NKPA Divisions. UN gains of 35 miles were made from the
22d to the 25th.
In the south the U. S. 2d and 25th Divisions had hurled the NKPA 6th,
4th, 9th, and 7th Divisions back from the vicinity of Masan to the
Chinju area. This gain of about 15 miles from 21 to 23 September was
only a prelude as the two U. S. divisions pressed their advantage
against a retreating enemy.[402]
[402] _Ibid._
The ultimate purpose of the joint Eighth Army and X Corps offensive
must already have been made alarmingly apparent to NKPA generals. Not
only was the Eighth Army salient along the Kumchon-Taejon axis being
extended northwest, but a X Corps regiment was driving southeast toward
a junction. This was the 31st Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division,
which had been given the mission of following in the trace of the 32d,
then wheeling southward toward the Suwon area to meet the elements of
the 1st Cavalry Division spearheading the Eighth Army advance. Thus was
the drawstring being rapidly pulled on the remnants of the invading
NKPA army, soon to have its main routes of escape cut off by UN forces.
_Two More River Crossings_
After nearly a week of commanding a division in combat on both sides
of an unbridged tidal river, Generals Smith and Craig now had a
consolidated front north of the Han, with RCT-1 on the right, RCT-5 in
the center, and RCT-7 on the left. The 11th Marines was in position
on the south bank. The 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions lined up northwest
of Yongdungpo, while the 2d Battalion and the U. S. Army 96th Field
Artillery emplaced to the east of that shattered suburb.[403]
[403] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 37.
Two more river crossings took place on 25 September. First, the 32d
Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division moved to the north bank in
accordance with the revised Corps plan. The Marine 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion (less Company B) and the Army’s Company A, 56th
Amphibian Tractor Battalion had to make a 25-mile round trip that night
to bring the troops to an embarkation point about 5,000 yards east
of the railroad bridge at Yongdungpo. Scattered enemy small-arms and
artillery fire was received during the crossing, resulting in a few
casualties among crews and soldiers. The LVTs took the troops about 200
yards inland, where they advanced on foot to their objectives on South
Mountain without encountering any opposition other than long-range
harassing fires.[404]
[404] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 37; Irick interv, 16 Nov
54.
Later that same day the 17th ROK Regiment, under the control of the 7th
Infantry Division, crossed in the LVTs. It was hoped by United Nations
leaders that this unit, known as the Seoul Regiment, could take part in
the liberation of the ROK capital. Apparently the second river crossing
of the day alarmed the enemy, for it drew mortar and artillery fire in
greater volume and accuracy than had been encountered before.
The support given to the two crossings by the 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion was commended by General Barr in a letter to General Smith.
“Despite long hours, loss of sleep, maintenance difficulties, and
exposure to fire,” said the commanding general of the 7th Infantry
Division, “the personnel of your battalion performed so magnificently
that I have nothing but praise to offer. If at any time in the future
elements of this Division are called upon to cross a river, it is my
sincere wish that they may be supported by the 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion.”[405]
[405] MajGen D. G. Barr (USA) ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 5
Oct 50.
From South Mountain the troops of the 32d Infantry looked down upon the
city. They could not enter as yet because of the danger of interfering
with the fires of the 1st and 5th Marines. But the 32d and the ROK unit
were assigned a zone of action by Corps for an advance on the right of
the Marines when the time came for a concerted effort.
_Division Attack of 25 September_
At 0700 on the 25th the 1st Marine Division launched the final phase of
its attack on Seoul. The following objectives were assigned by Division
OpnO 11-50:
RCT-1, with the 2d KMC Battalion attached, was to seize the part of
Seoul within its zone of action and Objective ABLE, consisting of the
high ground beyond the northeastern outskirts and about six miles from
the jump-off positions. The zone of action, ranging from a mile to
a mile and a half wide, carried the attack through the heart of the
city, with South Mountain on the right and Ducksoo Palace on the left.
Mopping-up operations were assigned to the KMCs, who would revert to
their own regimental control afterwards.
RCT-5, with the Division Reconnaissance Company and 1st KMC Battalion
attached, was to seize that part of Seoul within its zone of action
and Objective BAKER, comprising the high ground overlooking the
Seoul-Uijongbu road six miles from the line of departure. About a mile
and a half wide, this zone included the northwest section of the city
and the Government Palace, though the regiment would be operating in
open country after an advance of about two miles. The KMCs were to be
used for mopping up after RCT-5.
RCT-7 had the mission of protecting the left flank of the Division and
seizing Objective CHARLIE--the high ground astride the Seoul-Kaesong
road about six miles northwest of the center of Seoul in the vicinity
of Chonsong-ni.
The KMC Regiment (less the 1st and 2d Battalions) was designated the
division reserve. It was to be prepared to resume control of detached
battalions and occupy Seoul.
The 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT, with Special Operations Company
attached, was to continue under operational control of the 1st Marine
Division and protect the Corps left flank west and south of the river
Han.[406]
[406] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 133–135.
Following the artillery and air preparation, 3/5 and 2/5 jumped off
abreast from left to right in an attack on the remaining defenses of
the Hill 296 complex. Roise’s objective was Hill 105-N. He was to
be supported by fires from Taplett’s men, attacking down the slopes
of Hill 296 in an advance that would eventually pinch out the 2d
Battalion, which would go into reserve. The 1st Battalion had completed
its relief of 3d Battalion elements on Hills 216 and 296, thus placing
it in position to move up on the left of the 3d.[407]
[407] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
During the air strikes, VMF-214 had its second pilot fatality in two
days when Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid was shot down in flames over the
western edge of the city. His death brought to light a curious train
of circumstances. It was recalled that the squadron had lost its first
pilot on D-plus 2 when enemy fire killed Captain Simpson in plane No.
17. Two days later, while inspecting the new No. 17 on the flight deck
of the _Sicily_, Technical Sergeant George C. Underwood received a
mortal wound from an accidental discharge of the guns. Major Robert
Floeck was flying this Corsair when he met his death on 23 September,
but the machine was saved. And it was in plane No. 17 that the squadron
commander crashed on the 25th. This was enough for Captain John H.
Thach of the _Sicily_, and he issued an order banning the number
forever on the carrier.[408]
[408] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig:Easy; Karig, _Korea_, 259.
Within two hours of Lischeid’s death, two other squadron commanders
were shot down, Lieutenant Colonel Wyczawski of VMF-212 and Lieutenant
Colonel Volcansek of VMF(N)-542. Both escaped with moderate injuries,
but in the space of a few minutes Volcansek had pressed his luck within
a hair’s breadth of the point of no return. Wounded, his plane badly
damaged by enemy fire from Seoul, the squadron commander stubbornly led
his flight in two more passes on Red positions. Approaching Kimpo, he
was forced to keep the battered F7F-3N at almost 200 knots--twice the
landing speed--to prevent its stalling.
There was no alternative but to bail out. When he jettisoned the
canopy, his altimeter needle wavered around the 1,000-foot mark.
Slipstreams from the twin engines pinned him to the cockpit as the
plane continued losing altitude. In desperation he kicked violently at
the stick with both feet. The aircraft lurched downward and Volcansek
was thrown clear, the big tail of the machine missing him by inches
as both plummeted earthward. A few seconds after the officer’s chute
opened and broke the fall, his feet touched earth a few miles northwest
of Kimpo. Within 45 minutes he was aboard a helicopter rattling back to
the airfield.[409]
[409] _Ibid._, Annex Item:Sugar; Col M. I. Volcansek, Jr.
interv, 15 Mar 55.
It was the last day for the Sicily and VMF-214 in the Inchon-Seoul
operation. That evening the CVE left the area for maintenance work, and
the _Badoeng Strait_ took over with VMF-323.
Easy Company led the attack of 2/5 on the 25th, with Dog on the left
and Fox in reserve. The advance was supported by a platoon of tanks as
well as fires from 3/5 on Hill 296. An effective artillery preparation
aided the advance, but Captain Jaskilka’s men were enfiladed by enemy
mortar and automatic fire from Hill 72. Lieutenant Deptula’s platoon
led the assault and seized this position by 1335 after suffering
heavily along the way. Lieutenant Seydel commanded the remnants of
Dog Company which jumped off from Smith’s Ridge and took Hill 88 at
1320.[410]
[410] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Oboe.
While Fox Company moved up to occupy Hill 72, an airstrike was called
on Hill 105-N at 1310, and the artillery bombardment began 15 minutes
later in preparation for the final assault by Easy Company. Second
Lieutenants James W. Epley and Samuel L. Eddy, Jr., led the advance
with their platoons, and Hill 105-N was reported as secured at 1545.
The 2d Battalion, with the exception of Deptula’s platoon had met
moderate opposition as compared with the last two days. It was in the
zone of the 3d that the enemy put up his most stubborn resistance on
25 September. George and How Companies, the latter on the exposed
left flank, led the attack on the remaining NKPA positions along the
two southeastern spurs of Hill 296. Initial progress was slow, the
attackers being harassed by long range fires from Hill 338 on the
left and 105-N on the right. Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed the
battalion to hold up until the situation around 105-N clarified.
Resuming the attack against mounting resistance on the left, at 1435,
the two companies reached their objectives two hours later and made
contact with 2/5 on the right.[411]
[411] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
Since 105-N capped the terminus of the lower of 3/5’s two spurs, the
whole length of the 1,000-yard projection was tagged with that number.
This fact accounts for both Roise and Taplett reporting that they
were in possession of the height. Actually, 2/5 was on 105-N, and
George Company of 3/5 held an unnumbered peak to the north on the same
ridge.[412]
[412] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 11 May 55; and LtCol H. S.
Roise interv, 11 May 55.
Company H, in moving down the huge spur on the open left flank, had
taken heavy casualties before reaching its objective, an intermediate
peak. Just as Item Company was passing through to continue the attack
at about 1700, the Marines were hit hard by a force of 200 Reds, who
advanced under cover of accurate supporting fire. The close-in fire
fight raged until after nightfall, and both depleted companies were
hard-pressed to hold their own. Weakened by the loss of 100 dead, the
enemy finally withdrew, thereby allowing Item Company to take over the
front line while How reverted to battalion reserve.[413]
[413] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Taplett interv, 11
May 55; and Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 25 Aug 54.
Thus, the 3d Battalion was now in position to pinch out the 2d on the
morrow and to trace Item Company’s spur into the very heart of Seoul.
In preparation for the assault of Hill 338, Newton’s 1st Battalion had
shifted to the regimental left, where, with the Division Recon Company
and the 1st KMC Battalion, it blocked the precipitous approaches to 216
and 296.
In the zone of the 7th Marines, the 2d Battalion had jumped off at 0630
and occupied Objective CHARLIE at 1215 without meeting resistance.
Patrols of the 1st Battalion devoted the day to reconnoitering the
area between RCT-7 and RCT-5, maintaining contact with both. The 3d
Battalion was employed defensively along roads and trails in an arc
around the ferry crossing site at Haengju.[414]
[414] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 286–287.
_Tank Victory on Hill 105-S_
In preparation for the attack of the 1st Marines, the 3d Battalion
moved forward before daybreak in a column of companies. Passing
eastward through the 2d Battalion, Ridge’s men began a sharp wheel to
the north. The 1st Battalion, on Hill 79, withdrew slightly, pivoting
on its left flank in order to reorient its direction of attack and tie
in with the 3d Battalion on the left.
Thus did RCT-1 carry out the Corps plan of maneuver on the morning of
the 25th by making a 90-degree change of direction, after advancing
eastward to Hill 79, and driving straight northward toward the heart
of Seoul. It was necessary to jump off without tank support, however,
since the assigned armor had been delayed by a fight on the way.
The 2d and 3d Platoons of Captain Bruce F. Williams’ Baker Company, 1st
Tank Battalion, had crossed the river at the Haengju ferry on the 24th.
Reports of enemy mines along the railroad leading into Seoul caused
Lieutenant Babe’s 2d Platoon of Company C Engineers to be attached to
the tanks. And since the column was to pass through the zone of the 2d
Battalion, 5th Marines, a depleted infantry platoon of Company F was
attached under the command of Staff Sergeant Arthur Farrington.
Owing to the shift of 1/5, a gap existed at this time between the zones
of the 1st and 5th Marines; and the little task force entered this area
with the infantry at the point and the engineers sandwiched between the
tanks--a total of some 50 men supporting the armor. About half of the
gap between the regiments had been safely traversed when the head of
the column received a few scattered shots from the slope of Hill 105-S.
After being supposedly secured by 1/5, with a final mopping up by 3/1,
this troublesome position now erupted into enemy small-arms fire that
could only have come from at least a company-size pocket of resistance.
Lieutenant Babe was severely wounded before he could carry out his plan
of sending Farrington’s platoon around to envelop the left flank of the
NKPA troops entrenched on the slope. After Technical Sergeant Pasquale
Paolino took command of the engineers, his men and the infantry platoon
were so badly outnumbered that Captain Williams considered pulling them
inside the tanks and withdrawing. Then it occurred to him to send a
flame-thrower tank, escorted by Staff Sergeant Altaire’s M-26, around
the enemy’s left flank by way of a primitive trail leading southward
from the railway tracks.[415]
[415] The description of this fight is based upon the
following sources: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter;
Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54; and Babe-Paolino interv, 15
Nov 54.
This maneuver had a spectacular success. The flame tank moved into
a position enabling it to sear the length of the NKPA trenches with
bursts of napalm. When the terrified Red Koreans fled down the slope,
they became targets for the machine guns of Lieutenant Cummings’
platoon of tanks.
Sergeants Paolino and Farrington had meanwhile been organizing an
infantry and engineer base of small-arms fire from men taking cover
along the railroad embankment and the lower slopes of the hill. The
engineer NCO noticed that enemy grenades were being lobbed from three
thatched huts below the NKPA trenches on the left flank. Closer
inspection revealed the mouth of a cave, concealed by the third house
and extending back into Hill 105-S.
Paolino, after getting Williams’ permission to direct tank fire, banged
on the hull of Cummings’ M-26 and indicated the huts and mouth of the
cave as targets. A few 90mm rounds destroyed the huts; but before
Cummings could fire into the cave, eight or ten NKPA soldiers came out
with upraised hands. When they were allowed to surrender unharmed, the
example had an amazing effect as a seemingly endless file of enemy
troops poured out of the cave. Altogether, 131 prisoners were taken, in
addition to an estimated 150 killed, on a hill first reported secured
two days before. Apparently the undiscovered cave had provided a refuge
for nearly 300 Red Koreans.
Among the captives, as the Marines discovered later were two women in
uniform who had evidently been armed. Because of the NKPA reputation
for treachery, it was considered necessary to search them; but they
were treated with respect and provided with garments more appropriate
to their sex. In spite of the consideration shown them, the incident
resulted in sensational articles in stateside publications after the
women reached the rear and claimed mistreatment on the grounds that
they were nurses.
Two wounded engineers and an infantry casualty were the price of the
Marine success after a surprise encounter had been turned to the
disadvantage of the enemy. Since the NKPA prisoners were more than
double the numbers of the engineers and infantry, they were placed
between two M-26s when the column resumed the march.
It was 1200 when Cummings reported to Colonel Puller at the
intersection of the railroad and a boulevard with street car tracks
leading into the heart of the city. The tanks took the lead, joining
3/1 in its fighting advance up both sides of the north-south boulevard.
Enemy mines knocked out two of the M-26s, one of them being Cummings’
tank, but both were retrieved in spite of heavy NKPA fire.
Successive road blocks consisting of earth-filled rice bags were
stubbornly defended by enemy infantry supported by NKPA automatic,
AT, and mortar fire from the roof tops. The Marines pressed forward
methodically and by evening the 3d Battalion had penetrated about 2,000
yards into the city to occupy positions astride the streetcar line
and on the western slopes of Hill 97. The 1st Battalion, on the high
ground to the right, had advanced about 2,000 yards when both assault
units tied in for the night with defensive positions on Hill 82. The 2d
Battalion, as regimental reserve, deployed in the rear of the 1st to
protect the right flank and rear.[416]
[416] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; O. P. Smith,
_Notes_, 284–285.
_Night Attack Ordered by Corps_
The battle for Seoul took a sudden and unexpected new turn at 2009 on
the night of 25 September 1950 when the following X Corps flash (plain)
message was received at the CP of the 1st Marine Division:
“Info addressee (X Corps TacAir Commander) reports enemy fleeing city
of Seoul on road north of Uijongbu.... He [TacAir] is conducting
heavy air attack and will continue same. You will push attack now to
the limit of your objectives in order to insure maximum destruction of
enemy forces. Signed Almond.”[417]
[417] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 288–289.
The Division G-3 immediately called the Corps G-3 for corroboration.
Colonel Bowser questioned the ability of night air observation to
determine whether the movement out of the city consisted of urban
refugees or enemy troops. He was informed, however, that the intention
of Corps was for the attack to begin at once.
General Smith then called the X Corps chief of staff for confirmation,
pointing out the inadvisability of attacking at night in an unfamiliar
Oriental city of the size and complexity of Seoul, particularly as
there was no indication of the enemy fleeing from the Division front.
But General Ruffner replied that General Almond himself had dictated
the message and it was to be executed without delay.[418]
[418] _Ibid._
General Smith gave the attack order to the commanding officers of the
1st and 5th Marines, directing them to coordinate their efforts and
confine them to avenues of advance which could be identified at night.
His order was receipted by the 1st Marines at 2205 and the 5th Marines
at 2215 just a few hours after the NKPA counterattack hit the 3d
Battalion of Murray’s regiment.
While the two rifle regiments made preparations to jump off, the order
was relayed to the 7th and 11th Marines. Colonel Puller coordinated
hastily with the 5th Marines and supporting arms for an attack
scheduled to begin at 0145 on 26 September, following a 15-minute
artillery preparation.[419]
[419] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter, Queen Queen;
MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 38–39.
At 0138, deciding that the preparation was inadequate, he notified the
assault battalions to “stand fast, preparatory fires to be repeated.” A
new jump-off time of 0200 was set, but at 0153 a dramatic interruption
came in the form of a flash message from the 3d Battalion of the 1st
Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge reported that a heavy enemy attack,
supported by tanks and self-propelled guns, was moving down the main
avenue leading from the center of the city to the southwest in the zone
of the 1st Marines.[420]
[420] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
It was the enemy’s misfortune that 3/1 had sent out a patrol of eight
Marines and three natives under Corporal Charles E. Collins to make
contact with a similar patrol from the 5th Marines. But at 0130 the
clamor of a fire fight about 400 yards in front of 3/1 was followed
by the return of members of the patrol who gave the alarm. Corporal
Collins was still missing when Major Simmons heard the sound of tracked
vehicles and was warned that two enemy tanks were approaching the
George Company roadblock defended by heavy machine guns, 3.5-inch
rocket launchers and 75mm recoilless guns.[421]
[421] 3/1 _SAR_.
These weapons accounted for the destruction of one enemy tank and the
hasty retreat of the other. The Division attack scheduled for 0200 was
indefinitely postponed, of course, until 3/1, astride the principal
avenue of approach, could deal with a large-scale enemy counterattack
launched by an estimated battalion of infantry and about 12 tanks
supported by self-propelled guns and mortars. A terrific concentration
of Marine artillery was called down upon an NKPA effort that reached
its peak about 0230. High-angle Marine howitzer and 81mm mortar fire
almost literally blasted the attacking column out of existence, and
enemy infantry action was negligible afterwards.[422]
[422] _Ibid._
At 0315 the artillery liaison officer informed Puller that the three
battalions of the 11th Marines must cease barrage fire at the penalty
of burning out the tubes of their howitzers. During the comparative
lull the T-34s continued to attack at intervals until daybreak, and
the last two tanks were killed at 0630.[423] About that time Corporal
Collins returned safely after having been given up as dead. Exposed
to friendly as well as enemy fire all night, he had made his way back
through enemy-held areas in a disguise of Korean civilian garments.
[423] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
POW interrogation and examination of the ground revealed that seven
enemy tanks and two self-propelled guns were destroyed or disabled
by Marine mines, rockets, mortars, or artillery. An estimated 475 to
500 infantry of the NKPA 25th Brigade had been killed and many more
wounded, and the Marines took 83 prisoners at a relatively light cost
in casualties.[424]
[424] _Ibid._
At 0500, as 3/1’s fight in the city was tapering off, another Red
force of battalion strength hit the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, on
South Mountain. A section of the Army unit’s front was overrun, but
a counterattack restored the line by 0700. Finally driven from the
ridge, the North Koreans left behind 394 dead and 174 prisoners,
according to the regimental report.[425]
[425] 32d Inf _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
_Entrapment of Dog Company, RCT-7_
On the morning of 26 September it may have occurred to some of the
Marines that yesterday’s announcement by X Corps of the capture of
Seoul was a bit premature. The lines of the Division remained where
they were the night before, with only the difference that hundreds of
enemy dead gave testimony of a busy night.
Division OpnO 12-50, issued at 1230 on the 26th, directed a
continuation of the attack on Seoul, the principal change from the last
order being the commitment of the 7th Marines. This regiment, augmented
by the Division Recon Company and 5th KMC battalion, was given the
mission of pinching out the 5th Marines about 1200 yards beyond the
Government Palace and attacking abreast of the 1st Marines toward
the northeast. In the 7th’s zone of advance north of the city lay
Objectives DOG (northern half of Hill 338), EASY (Hill 342), FOX (Hill
133), GEORGE (Hill 343), and BAKER (Hill 171)--as rugged an order of
terrain as any outfit could be served. Puller’s regiment, with the 2d
KMC Battalion attached, would drive northward from Hills 97 and 82 in
lower Seoul, clear the center of the city, then wheel to the right to
take Objective ABLE, Hill 133 in the northeastern outskirts.
The 5th Marines, with the 1st KMC Battalion attached, was to support
Litzenberg’s attack until being pinched out, whereupon it had orders to
assemble in Division reserve and relieve elements of the 7th Marines.
The KMC Regiment was still under orders to resume control of its
detached battalions for the occupation of Seoul. The 3d Battalion,
however, was detached from the 1st Marine Division and ordered to
report to the 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT, for operational control
in Kumpo Peninsula operations. Responsibility for the security of Kimpo
Airfield now rested upon X Corps.[426]
[426] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 294–295.
Thus, the Marine front prior to the assault formed a semicircle
extending from the Kaesong Highway in the northwest to Hill 82 in the
south, and the concave side faced Seoul like a giant scythe poised to
mow down the last remnants of NKPA resistance.
[Illustration: SEOUL ASSAULT PLAN
26 SEP 50
SHOWING DIVISION & REGTL BOUNDARIES]
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF SEOUL
SHOWING ATTACKS BY 5th MARINES, 1st MARINES, & 32d INF]
Colonel Litzenberg dispatched Dog Company of the 7th Marines southwest
along the Kaesong Highway at 0630 on 26 September. The mission of the
unit was to approach Seoul and make contact with the 5th Marines on the
right. In the van of the column was the company machine gun officer,
First Lieutenant William F. Goggin. For a while it seemed as though
this untried unit was reaping the laurels earned by its battle-weary
relatives of the 1st and 5th Marines, since hundreds of Koreans lined
the highway to welcome the “victors” with resounding cheers.[427]
[427] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annex Roger Roger; and Maj J. D. Hammond interv,
17 Aug 54.
Progress was marked off rapidly in the absence of enemy resistance. The
Marines passed through Hoengjeoe-ri, and by 0900 the great slopes of
Hill 296 loomed up on the right and those of 338 on the left. Tracing
the road through the narrow valley between, the company approached the
Sodaemun Prison at the northwest corner of Seoul. Suddenly the column
came under machine-gun fire from a high tower about 400 yards down the
road. The initial burst caused several casualties, including Lieutenant
Goggin, and the Marines quickly deployed on both sides of the road.
Several more enemy machine-guns and rifles opened up from hillside
positions only a hundred yards away. Since the throngs of well-wishers
along the highway had prevented the use of flank guards, Company D was
caught flatfooted in the low ground by the hail of lead.
After a few minutes, other Red weapons began firing from the lower
slopes of Hills 296 and 338, directly to the flanks, and encirclement
seemed imminent. Dog Company’s commander, Captain Richard R. Breen,
reacted by ordering the 2d Platoon to attack the high ground around
the prison. Simultaneously, First Lieutenant Paul P. Sartwell set up
two 60mm mortars on the road and silenced one of the North Korean
emplacements. Directing his crews from an exposed position, the young
officer was wounded three times before finally being put out of action.
First Lieutenant Edward H. Seeburger closed on the prison with his 2d
Platoon, while First Lieutenant Paul V. Mullaney’s 1st ascended the
slopes of Hill 338 on the left. The 3d, under First Lieutenant James
D. Hammond, Jr., remained in position along the road. When the assault
platoons were stopped on the high ground by stiffening resistance,
Company D settled down in an elongated perimeter for a battle of
survival. There was no artillery support, but Marine air assisted by
pounding the crescent of Red positions.
The S-3 of the 7th Marines, Major Raymond V. Fridrich, radioed Captain
Breen and asked about the situation. Though now wounded himself, Breen
stated that he could hold his ground. A small tank-infantry column was
dispatched from regiment to reach the beleaguered force with ammunition
and supplies. By this time, however, the Reds had set up in the rear of
Dog Company, and the relief force was turned back.
Faced with the bleak fact that it was now surrounded, Company D
withdrew 1000 yards to a defensible road cut between Hills 296 and
338. The Marines completed the move with their wounded and dead at
1600. After being resupplied by air drop in their tight perimeter, they
prepared grimly for an all-night stand.
Elsewhere in the 7th Marines’ zone, 26 September would be remembered
as much for exhausting marches and climbs as for enemy contacts.
In the morning the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Davis,
had taken over flank responsibility far to the northeast along the
Kaesong highway, thereby relieving the 2d (less Company D) and 3d for
the advance on Seoul. The 2d Battalion then moved out in trace of
Dog Company, but according to plan veered leftward into the hills at
Hoengjeoe-ri, one mile short of the ambuscade. While 2/7 reconnoitered
the high ground above the village, Major Roach’s 3d Battalion completed
an eight-and-a-half-mile forced march to gain an assembly area in
preparation for the assault of northern Hill 338.
At 1400 Fox and Easy Companies of 2/7 attacked eastward from the height
above Hoengjeoe-ri to seize Hill 343. After an advance of 1000 yards,
they were stopped cold by heavy fire from the direction of Hill 338 to
the south. Lieutenant Colonel Hinkle ordered 2/7 to dig in short of the
objective, since any further progress would only make his right more
vulnerable to the enemy guns on the flank.
Captain Thomas E. Cooney led Company G of 3/7 through Hoengjeoe-ri
about 1700, circled the northern half of Hill 338, then launched a
two-platoon assault on the crest. His Marines gained the north summit
against no opposition, but Company H, led by Captain Nicholas L.
Shields, was taken under fire in a draw to the right and held up on the
slopes for the night.[428]
[428] _Ibid._; and Capt H. H. Harris--Capt R. R. Van Cleve
interv, 10 Aug 54.
[Illustration: ACTION NORTH OF SEOUL
7th MARINES]
_Last Fight on Hill 296_
While the 7th Marines were fighting uphill on 26 September, the 3d
Battalion, 5th Marines, punched downward in a bitter contest to clear
the last NKPA resistance from the Hill 296 complex. The attack was
launched early in the morning after preparatory fires by artillery and
81mm mortars. Item Company on the left was to sweep the remainder of
the giant spur which descended into the very heart of Seoul. George,
upon jumping off from the ridge above Hill 105-N, would clear the low
ground on Item’s right.
Dissatisfied with the accuracy of the preparatory barrages, and
underestimating the enemy’s strength and determination, Captain
McMullen called off supporting arms and based the success of his
two-platoon assault on organic company weapons alone. No sooner had the
Marines lunged downhill than great gaps were torn in the skirmish line
by fire from swarms of North Koreans on the lower slopes. Both assault
platoon leaders were wounded before an intermediate knoll was taken,
and McMullen was forced to commit his reserve to bolster the hard-hit
3d Platoon on the right.
Continuing the attack under the personal leadership of its commander,
the entire company waded into a maze of entrenchments manned by 200
enemy soldiers. In the close-in fighting that followed, the Reds were
driven from their emplacements to seek cover farther down the spur. The
depleted ranks of Item Company ground to a halt.
There followed a brief calm--abruptly shattered when the North Koreans
rallied and counterattacked uphill against the company center. A wild
melee enveloped the ridgeline, and the tactical situation gradually
became a blur. Just as it seemed the Marines’ hold on the lower spur
would be pried loose, Lieutenant Williamson plowed into the tumult at
the head of a small supply party. Ammunition distributed in the heat of
the fighting tipped the scales in favor of the Marines, but not before
McMullen was carried from the field as a result of his seventh battle
wound in two wars.
The heavy fighting finally eased toward the close of the day. Although
the last organized defenses of the enemy were smashed, Company I was
too badly battered to seize the tip of the spur before nightfall.
Abreast on the right, First Lieutenant Charles D. Mize led Company
G into defensive positions after a day of inching forward against
stubborn opposition in the low ground.[429]
[429] As is frequently the case after heavy fighting, 3/5’s
_SAR_ contains inaccuracies in its account covering
24–27 September, leaving the reader with the impression
that the entire spur leading into the city was secured
on the 26th. In retracing the progress of the attack
during interviews with the authors, both Lieutenant
Colonel Taplett and Captain (now Major) McMullen agree
that the foregoing account is correct.
Other units of the 5th Marines experienced little action during 3/5’s
day-long engagement. While the 2d Battalion mopped up in its zone south
of the 3d, the 1st KMC Battalion moved into position between the latter
and the Reconnaissance Company, now manning the topographical peak
of Hill 296 in the northwest. To the rear of 3/5, the 1st Battalion
enjoyed a quiet interlude in regimental reserve.
_1st Marines in the Heart of Seoul_
Early in the morning of 26 September, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,
moved out of reserve to pass through the 3d on the streetcar line
and continue the attack northward into the center of Seoul. On the
right of Puller’s zone, 1/1 prepared to descend Hill 82 and clear the
main railroad station and adjoining slopes of South Mountain, where
increasing enemy activity had been noted below the positions of the 32d
Infantry.[430]
[430] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Peter Peter; 2/1 _SAR_;
Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and Cummings
interv, 12 Oct. 54.
Sutter’s unit completed the passage of lines at 0900 and attacked along
the boulevard with Fox and Easy Companies in the assault. Leading the
advance up the street were the tanks of Baker Company, Cummings’ M-26
in the van. The young officer’s machine had proceeded only a few yards
when it struck an American M6 mine, overlooked by Marine engineers
while they were removing their hasty field of the previous night. Not
only did the explosion wreck the tank, but it also caused several
casualties among the infantry on either side.
The attack edged forward in the second day of the “Battle of the
Barricades.” Every 200–300 yards, fanatical Red detachments manned
rice-bag barriers about eight feet high and five feet thick,
stretching the whole width of the street. It fell to the M-26s to
smash the emplacements and silence the NKPA antitank guns behind each
one. Marine tank action in turn hinged on mine clearance by supporting
engineers, who looked to flanking infantry for covering fire. Thus was
a system of three-party teamwork developed and perfected during the
roar of battle.
Aiding the Communists behind the barricades were other North Koreans
who fired their rifles and submachine guns from roof tops, windows,
and side streets. The Marine infantry, therefore, had to defend in
every direction as it attacked to the front. Intense heat from burning
buildings along the street added to the handicaps, and the constant
discovery of South Korean civilians, including women and children,
huddled in the rubble further strained the taut nerves of men who
looked for trouble from every quarter.
It was a dirty, frustrating fight every yard of the way, perhaps
best described by Puller himself, who reported that “progress was
agonizingly slow.” A principal deterrent to speed was the fact that all
supporting tanks simultaneously expended their ammunition and fuel,
so that all had to return to the rear for replenishment at the same
time. During their absences from the fight, the infantry understandably
chose to await their return rather than pay heavily in casualties by
assaulting barricades with small arms alone.
At one point in the street battle, an enemy soldier darted from behind
a building and charged a flame tank advancing behind two lead M-26s.
Ignoring the Marine infantrymen, who gaped in disbelief, the North
Korean hurled a huge satchel charge over the engine compartment of the
armored vehicle, then escaped unharmed as the explosion rocked the
area. The flame tank was wrecked, but the crew escaped serious injury
with the assistance of supporting infantry. Apparently a suicide squad
of NKPA demolitions men had been assigned the mission of destroying
Marine armor in this fashion, for several other Red soldiers tried
single-handed assaults shortly afterwards. The riflemen of 2/1 were
alert for the later attempts, however, and the enemy fanatics were cut
down before inflicting further damage.
The crucial period in the 2d Battalion’s day-long fire fight came as
Captain Goodwin C. Groff’s Fox Company approached a street junction
below Hill 97. It had been planned that this unit would advance through
the intersection and continue along the streetcar line, while Company
E, moving behind in column, veered off on the right branch. Enemy
resistance against Fox’s advance proved so fierce that Captain Norman
R. Stanford by-passed the fork and threw Easy Company’s weight in
support of the other unit. The North Korean strong point crumbled under
the two-company onslaught, but not before Stanford and several others
were added to the casualty rolls.[431]
[431] Capt N. R. Stanford, “Road Junction,” _Marine Corps
Gazette_, 35 no. 9 (Sep 51): 16–21.
By dark, 2/1 had measured off a hard-won gain of 1200 yards. Lieutenant
Colonel Sutter ordered the battalion into defensive positions astride
the boulevard a scant 100 yards from the tip of the ridge spur which
was costing Item Company, 5th Marines, so dearly.
In the right half of Puller’s zone on 26 September, the 1st Battalion
stamped out a hornets’ nest around the main railroad station, nestled
at the foot of South Mountain.[432] Charlie Company had led off the
early morning attack in the wake of a preparation by air, artillery,
and mortars. After descending Hill 82 in a column of platoons, the
company formed on line along a stream paralleling the rail yard. Then,
at a signal from Captain Wray, the platoons crossed over, wheeled to
the north, and advanced up the tracks by leaps and bounds.
[432] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54;
and Capt F. B. Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.
Though the over-all intensity of enemy resistance in this quarter
could be termed only moderate, the random deployment of the Reds
among buildings and train cars made the going slow and costly for the
Marines. After clearing out the yard, the attackers converged on the
station house itself and drove the last North Koreans from the building
during a sharp exchange. The interior of the bullet-pocked structure
produced only a handful of enemy dead, but in one corner were heaped
the bodies of several South Korean women and children. It was obvious
that the latter had been gunned by Communist executioners, since their
sheltered location within the building was ample protection against the
small arms of the advancing Marines.
By darkness, Company C was in undisputed control of the railroad
terminal, a patrol led by Lieutenant Carlon having mopped up the fringe
area. To the right, Company A had secured the park promontory on the
northwestern tip of South Mountain in conjunction with Baker Company’s
drive which included the nose jutting out below.
East of the 1st Marines, the 32d Infantry’s zone was the scene of
considerable activity throughout 26 September. After the 2d Battalion
repulsed the enemy’s pre-dawn counterattack, the 3d jumped off at 0800
from positions a mile and a half east of South Mountain. Its objective,
Hill 106, lay more than 3000 yards away, just south of the highway
leading eastward out of Seoul. Approaching the base of the ridge,
Company L surprised and destroyed a strong NKPA position, while Company
I swept up the objective itself against light opposition.
Reaching the summit, the company commander called an air strike on an
enemy column marching out of Seoul on the highway. As the planes broke
up the Red formation, Company L, reinforced with tanks and additional
infantry, drove down the road to mop up and block the escape route.[433]
[433] 32d Inf _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
In the day-long attack, 3/32 and its supporting armament accounted for
500 enemy dead, five tanks, 45 vehicles, three artillery pieces, and
two ammunition dumps, according to regimental reports. The remainder of
the 32d, now augmented by the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, in addition
to the 17th ROK, saw spots of heavy fighting during the mop-up and
consolidation on and around South Mountain. Casualties for the 32d, as
reported on 26 September, were six KIA, 92 WIA, and three MIA. Most of
those reported the following day--32 KIA, 33 WIA, and nine MIA--could
also be traced to action on the 26th.[434]
[434] _Ibid._
Thus the Army regiment, having been impressively blooded in its eight
days of action, could lay claim to clearing both South Mountain and
that 15 per cent of Seoul’s built-up area east of the great height.[435]
[435] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 42.
In the course of the day, the 1st Marines had made patrol contact with
the 5th Marines in the left rear and with Army elements atop South
Mountain on the right flank. Prospects for the morrow appeared much
brighter at Division and Corps levels, where there must have existed
some apprehension over the complicated maneuvering which had denied the
attackers a solid front until they were in the heart of the sprawling
capital.
_Objective Secured_
The twenty-seventh of September dawned as the day of reckoning.
Applicable to the tactical situation in Seoul was the old law of
physics, that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time.
With X Corps troops pouring into the city and environs to share them
with the Communist garrison, it was axiomatical that one side or the
other would shortly have to go.
Oddly enough, despite the electrified atmosphere, the night of 26–27
September had passed quietly, even for Dog Company, 7th Marines,
isolated in the road cut between Hills 296 and 338.[436] At dawn a
tank-infantry team supported by engineers of Company D, 1st Engineer
Battalion, advanced down the Kaesong Highway against negligible
resistance and escorted the beleaguered rifle company back to the 7th
Marines CP at Hoengjeoe-ri.
[436] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annex Roger Roger; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54;
Harris--Van Cleve interv, 10 Aug 54; and Maj W. R.
Earney, _Notes on Operations of 3d Bn, 7th Mar, in
South Korea_ (Earney Notes), MS.
While the anticlimatical “rescue” was taking place, the 3d Battalion
jumped off in the attack, supported by fire from the 2d on the left, to
clear the northern reaches of Hill 338. How Company pressed forward up
the draw on George’s right but was stalled by heavy fire which suddenly
erupted on the slopes above. The 3d Platoon, under Second Lieutenant
Paul E. Denny, broke through in its zone, only to be recalled by
Shields when the rest of the company failed to regain the lost
momentum. Captain Richard H. Sengewald’s Item Company, en route to take
positions on the left of George, paused to assist Shields’ outfit for
a short time. After further attempts by Company H to gain the summit
were unsuccessful, Sengewald led his unit to the north and attacked the
right flank of the NKPA elements scattered indiscriminately over the
remote humps of Hill 338. The situation on the northern half of the
towering objective did not change appreciably in the course of the day.
Colonel Litzenberg developed further pressure against the enemy’s right
by ordering 2/7 to continue the attack against Hill 343 in midmorning.
On the right of the battalion zone, Captain Walter D. Phillips, Jr.,
led Company E forward in the face of stubborn enemy resistance from the
crest. Owing to steady North Korean fire and the rugged terrain, gains
were measured off by the yard, both for Phillips’ unit and for Captain
Elmer J. Zorn’s Fox Company on the left. By nightfall, nevertheless,
the Marines had mastered the situation to the extent that Company E sat
firmly entrenched atop Hill 343--2500 yards from its starting point.
More force was applied to Litzenberg’s flanking lever north of Seoul
when Company G was withdrawn from its ridgeline on Hill 338 and ordered
to attack eastward to seize Hill 342, which loomed above the capital
building in the northern tip of Seoul. Circling through the low ground
north of Hill 338, the company passed safely through an extensive
minefield that had been conveniently marked off by friendly South
Koreans. As the Marines approached the base of their objective and
came under heavy sniper fire, Captain Cooney ordered the 1st Platoon,
under Second Lieutenant Arthur R. Mooney, to set up a base of fire on
intermediate high ground in order to support an assault by the 2d and
3d.
The plan backfired, for the 1st Platoon became engaged in a hot fire
fight as it moved toward the designated position. The two assault units
fared no better when, without the expected covering fire, they were hit
by a hail of lead on the lower slopes of Hill 342. Several officers
and NCOs were killed or wounded within a matter of minutes, and the
scattered fighting that continued until nightfall brought about no
significant change in the local situation.
Thus, the day ended on Litzenberg’s “Seoul Front” with the 7th Marines
in control of Hill 343 but sharing parts of 338 and 342 with the
NKPA. The story would not be complete, however, without a brief visit
to the regiment’s “Haengju Front,” several miles to the west, which
had crackled with activity during the early afternoon. About 1200, a
company of North Koreans emerged from the northern hills and attacked
toward the old ferry crossing at Hill 125. On the way the Reds had
the misfortune to stumble into Captain David W. Banks’ Able Company
of 1/7, manning a blocking position at Ryokoku. (See map of Han
River crossing). To avoid the danger of infiltration in the bustling
bridgehead, Lieutenant Colonel Davis promptly committed Company C,
under Captain Richard F. Delamar, III.
Despite their disadvantages in numbers and fire power, the dogged
Reds extended the fight sufficiently to involve even a platoon of
Captain Myron E. Wilcox’s Baker Company. After a prolonged clatter, the
engagement ended almost as abruptly as it had begun; and the immediate
result was that all Communist troops above the ferry site withdrew to
Kaesong.
The 7th Marines claimed 375 enemy killed and 34 taken prisoner in the
fighting which ranged its vast front from 23 to 27 September. The
spoils of war included the strangely unbalanced assortment of four
machine guns, six rifles and 600 bayonets.
While the 2d and 3d Battalions of Litzenberg’s regiment struggled among
the massive ridges north of Seoul on the 27th, the 1st and 5th Marines
struck at the vital nerve center of the ROK capital. The regimental
attacks through the center of the city began as separate thrusts in the
morning, but as the day wore on they took on aspects of a coordinated
foot race. It could even be said, finally, that the battle became a
flag-raising contest between the two Marine units, as the last NKPA
resistance died in heaps of rubble and torn rice bags.
At 0645, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, jumped off to clear the tip
of Hill 296’s troublesome eastern spur. For the first time in longer
than they cared to remember, the infantrymen were greeted not by a
sheet of small-arms and machine-gun fire, but by occasional, erratic
pops from the rifles of dispirited snipers. Groping through the smoke
and haze boiling up from the shattered city, Companies G and I swept
the high ground by 0730 and--at long last--slowly filtered through the
first streets of western Seoul. In short order they were encountering
the expected barricades and minefields. There was a hint of stiffening
opposition, but it quickly dissolved as the riflemen, backed by
supporting tanks and engineers, ground forward relentlessly.[437]
[437] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
By 0930, George Company made contact with the 1st Marines on the
right.[438] Less than an hour later, after wheeling northward 3/5
controlled Middle School and adjacent high ground--the springboard
for the assault on the capital building 1000 yards away. At 1200,
Lieutenant Colonel Taplett ordered Companies G and I to continue the
attack, guiding on the two Red flags which whipped the wind defiantly
on both sides of the great dome ahead. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion
moved up behind and prepared to advance on the left of the 3d. Its
mission in the final assault was to seize the craggy peak of Hill 338,
which reared upward on the left of the capital building like a grim
fortress.[439]
[438] Contact on 26 September was between rearward elements
of the 1st and 5th Marines, not between assault units.
[439] _Ibid._
On the right of the 5th Regiment, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
had smashed through another series of rice-bag barriers on the
boulevard and at 1057, the United States colors unfurled above the
French Consulate. A furious fight exploded around the city’s main
intersection, where the principal streetcar lines crossed to form an X
not far from Middle School. Company D, spearheading 2/1’s drive, waded
into the fray with determination. Lieutenant Cummings, who by this time
appeared to have a remarkable affinity for heavy trouble, again lost
his tank to enemy mines, but not before he had knocked out two Russian
76mm self-propelled guns emplaced in the middle of the intersection.
Staff Sergeant MacDonald’s M-26 obliterated an NKPA truck with two
90mm rounds when the vehicle tried to escape with a howitzer and its
crew.[440]
[440] 2/1 _SAR_; and Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54.
The afternoon of 27 September was a time of climax as the 1st Marine
Division front surged forward of Middle School and the central
intersection. Though beaten and faltering, the North Koreans still
managed to fight stubbornly here and there; but their over-all
deployment no longer bore any semblance of tactical integrity.
By early afternoon the Reds facing the 5th Marines broke and fled.
Troops of 3/5 poured into the government compound, their final
objective, and secured it at 1508. The North Korean flags were struck,
and in their place rose the United States colors. Somewhat awed by
the historic import of their accomplishment, young Marine riflemen
wonderingly probed the spacious halls and chambers of the huge building
that shortly would be reoccupied by the government of the Korean
Republic.[441]
[441] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
On the left of the 3d Battalion, Company A of 1/5 had launched its
attack on Hill 338 at 1300 in the wake of devastating preparations by
air, artillery, and mortars. Second Lieutenant Nicholas M. Trapnell
led off with the 1st Platoon, which seized an intermediate piece of
high ground against moderate resistance. The 2d Platoon, under Second
Lieutenant Edward E. Collins, then drove forward on the left of the
ancient wall leading to the crest of the objective; but the attack was
stopped by heavy mortar and small-arms fire. Marine air thundered down
to rake the target with machine guns and rockets. The ground troops
followed up with heavy concentrations of 60mm and 81mm mortars. Moving
closely behind the supporting fire, the 1st Platoon overran a knob
situated below the dominating peak. The 2d Platoon then resumed its
advance on the left of the wall, and the 3d, under Technical Sergeant
George W. Bolkow, took the lead on the right. It was the latter unit
that smashed through the last resistance and secured the cliffs at the
summit of Hill 338 at 1850.[442]
[442] _Ibid._
While the 5th Marines completed its final mission in Seoul, 2/1 on
the right continued along the streetcar line which curved below the
government buildings to run eastward to the far edge of the city. Since
the 7th Marines had been slowed in the hills north of the capital, the
expected tie-in on the left flank did not occur, and Puller’s troops
had to go it alone through the dense maze of streets in eastern Seoul.
At 1530 infantrymen of 2/1 raised the American flag over the Russian
Consulate, just to the right of the curve in the boulevard. Seven
minutes later the flag also waved above the United States Consulate,
about 350 yards farther off on the flank.[443]
[443] 2/1 _SAR_.
To the right of 2/1, the 1st Battalion was making good progress after
a slow start against stiff opposition. Charlie Company had been
held up at the outset in the neighborhood of the railroad station,
but supporting tanks, including flame throwers, had paved the way
by blasting and burning a formidable nest of NKPA automatic weapons
and AT guns. One armored vehicle was disabled by a mine and another
by antitank fire before the Marines finally broke through. As the
battalion pivoted eastward in accordance with the general plan, both
Charlie Company and Able on the right hammered through the usual
barricades and suicide detachments.[444]
[444] Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.
The 32d Infantry and elements of the 17th enjoyed a relatively quiet
day on and around South Mountain, for these units had only to hold firm
in their positions until the 1st Marines could complete its wheeling
movement and come abreast, facing east.[445]
[445] 32d Inf _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
Shortly before 1630, 2/1 was pounding eastward through a stretch of the
streetcar line south of the government compound. Fire poured into the
ranks of Dog Company from three sides, and Marines sweltered in the
heat of burning buildings that offered dubious protection. Corsairs
screamed down to plaster enemy positions only a block ahead of the
foremost infantry. Immediately after each pass by the gull-winged
planes, Second Lieutenant Carl B. Thompson, Jr., led his 1st Platoon in
the assault with covering fire provided by supporting tanks.[446]
[446] 2/1 _SAR_; and Capt T. Culpepper interv, 9 Feb 55.
There was a final surge up the street by the green-clad riflemen and
BAR-men, and then it was all over. At 1630 enemy resistance across
the 1st Regiment’s front abruptly collapsed, with the result that the
Battle of Seoul came to an end. Snipers and bypassed pockets remained
to be mopped up by the Marines, KMC units, and South Korean Police; but
the NKPA had clearly quit the fight and abandoned the city. The 1st
and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines marched rapidly through desultory
sniper fire to the eastern part of town, where they dug in for the
night.[447]
[447] _Ibid._; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv,
1 Mar 55.
CHAPTER XIV
The Drive to Uijongbu
_Operations of 28 September--Liberation Ceremony at Seoul--Crumbling
of NKPA Resistance--RCT-7 and the Battle for Uijongbu--Last Days of
Inchon-Seoul Operation--Summaries and Conclusions--MacArthur’s Report
to United Nations_
As rapidly as the advance of the troops permitted, preparations were
made for the restoration of civil government to Seoul. A group of
former city officials had arrived by plane from Pusan; and on 26
September, Mayor Lee opened a temporary office in Yongdungpo. The
police chief, construction engineer, and the health and welfare
officials also resumed their old duties.
Collecting points were set up for handling the civilian wounded. The
following statistics, comprising the patients treated for all causes by
the 1st Medical Battalion of the 1st Marine Division, show that Korean
civilians were second in numbers only to the Marines themselves:
U. S. Marine 2,811
Korean civilian 1,908
U. S. Army 358
KMC and ROK 322
U. S. Navy 78
POW [448]39
[448] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex How How.
The problem of food for a city with a pre-war population of a million
and a half was met during the advance when stores of rice and other
supplies were turned over to Seoul officials by the Marines. Medical
supplies found in the city were redistributed for use in Seoul and
Inchon hospitals as well as the hospital established at Yongdungpo by
Captain Hering, the Division Surgeon, expressly for the treatment of
civilian wounded.
A shipment of some 50 tons of rice through X Corps, plus large amounts
located in Seoul by the Marines, enabled the officials to take over
without critical food shortages. On the 28th, Mayor Lee moved into
the city hall at Seoul and acted immediately to re-establish police
authority, clear destroyed areas and provide for the restoration of
such public utilities as water and electricity.[449] These prompt
measures did much to ease the hardships of thousands of returning
refugees.
[449] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 312–313.
_Operations of 28 September_
The 5th Marines passed an uneventful day on 28 September, having taken
its assigned objectives and been pinched out by the 1st Marines on the
right and the 7th Marines on the left, as planned. An assembly area was
established in the vicinity of the Women’s University, and though the
regiment sent out patrols, no enemy were encountered.[450]
[450] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
The 7th Marines put in a busy day at seizing objectives which consisted
of the high ground north of Seoul on both sides of the main highway
from the capital to Uijongbu. Opposition was light to moderate, with
the stiffest resistance occurring in areas which indicated that the
enemy intended to put up a fight to protect his escape route to
Uijongbu. Seventy-five tons of American-made dynamite and explosives,
captured by the 7th Marines, were believed to have been originally
supplied to the ROK forces before the war and abandoned during the
NKPA invasion.[451] Total advances for the day ranged from 1,500 yards
in the zone of the 3d Battalion to 2,600 yards in the zone of the 2d
Battalion.
[451] _Ibid._, Annex Roger Roger.
When the 1st Marines jumped off at 0645 on the 28th, the 1st and 2d
Battalions were in assault. The 3d Battalion remained in an assembly
area in the rear and continued mopping up along with the 2d KMC
Battalion. Although organized resistance in the city had been broken,
the 1st Battalion met stubborn resistance from enemy groups and
encountered many mines. The 2d Battalion, on the left, made headway
against light opposition.
These attacks cleared the remainder of Seoul and took the assault
battalions to Hill 133 (Objective ABLE) commanding the city on the
northeast.[452]
[452] _Ibid._, Annex Peter Peter.
General Smith visited the CPs of all three regiments on the 28th by
helicopter. He found Colonel Puller at the Ducksoo Palace, near the
intersection of the streetcar lines. Colonel Litzenberg’s CP was
located a short distance to the west, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray had
established his headquarters in the Women’s University on the northwest
outskirts of the city.
Later that day Generals Smith and Craig displaced the Division CP from
Oeoso-ri to a barracks area in Seoul, southwest of South Mountain. The
two Marine generals took over a former infirmary, but they decided that
the mortuary slab was too depressing and had that fixture removed.[453]
[453] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 308, 338–339.
_Liberation Ceremonies at Seoul_
Planning for impressive liberation ceremonies at Seoul had begun while
the street fighting was at its height. The 1st Marine Division was
requested by Corps to furnish two honor guards and a band. Musical
instruments having been left behind in Japan, air shipment was
prescribed.[454]
[454] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 27 Sep 50, _Notes_, 313–315.
General MacArthur had hoped to hold the liberation ceremony at Seoul
on 25 September, just three months to the day after the launching
of the NKPA invasion. The enemy, however, was not cooperative with
respect to this date; and even on the morning of the 29th, three NKPA
counterattacks were repulsed on the outskirts of the city. As it
proved, General MacArthur vetoed plans for a ceremony with band music.
“I will personally conduct the proceedings without being introduced,”
said his message to X Corps, and he specified that there be no honor
guard.[455]
[455] CinCFE msg to CG X Corps, 28 Sep 50.
Two pre-dawn counterattacks on the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, were
not auspicious beginnings for the day of the liberation exercises.
The first occurred at 0445 on 29 September, when the OP, located on a
spur projecting forward of the MLR and defended by a rifle platoon,
was infiltrated by an estimated 70 to 100 NKPA troops. A second enemy
attack hit the left flank of the battalion shortly afterwards. Both
attempts were repulsed with total losses of 48 to the Communists, and
the Marines had casualties of 4 KIA and 28 WIA, most of them resulting
from hand grenades.[456]
[456] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
Another assault, launched by the enemy at 0600 in the zone of action of
the 7th Marines, was repulsed without trouble. Most of the fighting on
29 September was done by this regiment, which pushed forward to gain
all the rest of its objectives before nightfall.
At dawn, in preparation for the liberation ceremony, Marine guards
were unobtrusively stationed along the route of approach from the new
floating bridge to the Government Palace. This duty fell chiefly on
3/1, with elements of the 5th Marines being responsible for security in
the western part of the city.
General MacArthur and President Syngman Rhee drove directly to the
Palace after separate arrivals at Kimpo Airfield. The guests included
Korean dignitaries and United Nations officials in addition to
high-ranking representatives of military organizations.
The commander in chief opened the ceremony with a moving five-minute
address ending with the Lord’s Prayer. The rumble of artillery could be
heard at times, and some of the guests glanced up apprehensively at the
shattered skylight overhead.
“Occasional falls of glass from the dome and drifting smoke and ashes
were part of the scene,” commented a Marine officer. “Unheeded noise
of rifle shots punctuated the talks. Grim Marines from Puller’s
regiment surrounded the seated audience.... The youth of the guards
was offset by the tall, gray-haired figures of Generals Smith and Barr
at the front of the audience. They were patently the men who had borne
precisely and capably the load of decision.”[457]
[457] Col E. H. Forney memo to authors, Dec 54.
With the 1st Marine Division still responsible for security, it was
a relief to General Smith when the distinguished visitors departed
unharmed. Not all the mines had been removed from the streets as
yet, and it was suspected that snipers might still be lurking in the
ruins.[458]
[458] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 29 Sep 50.
_Crumbling of NKPA Resistance_
Although more hard fighting lay ahead in the Inchon-Seoul operation, X
Corps alerted its major units on 29 September to the possibility of a
new amphibious landing on the east coast of Korea. This was one of the
earliest announcements of the planning which led to the Wonsan landing
and the advance to the Chosin Reservoir, but the history of those
events belongs in the next volume of this series.
The new operation was suggested by the rapid disintegration of the
main body of the NKPA invasion forces. In a single day, 26 September,
elements of the 1st Cavalry Division had advanced more than 100 miles;
and a total of about 23,600 prisoners were taken by the Eighth Army
before the end of the month. Enemy resistance was still encountered,
to be sure, and sometimes it was of a desperate nature as Red Korean
troops fought to escape encirclement. But all hope and heart had gone
out of the Communist cause. One Eighth Army column sliced across the
peninsula to Kunsan while other spearheads drove northward and ROK
units pushed up the east coast nearly to Samchok. NKPA opposition was
crumbling everywhere as demoralized invasion troops threw away their
weapons and changed to civilian clothes in the hope of making their way
to North Korea through the ever tightening Eighth Army cordon.[459]
[459] U. S. MilAcad, _Operations in Korea_, 18–19.
The X Corps troops in the Seoul area had enough on their hands to
finish the old operation before starting a new one. 1st Marine Division
OpnO 13-50, issued at 2000 on 29 September, provided for the securing
of the captured city by these means:
(1) a continuation of the attack to the east;
(2) the conduct of reconnaissances in force to the north and
northwest;
(3) the relief of elements of the 7th Infantry Division north of
the river Han;
(4) the seizure of prescribed blocking positions.[460]
[460] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 318.
The Division plan of maneuver called for the three Marine rifle
regiments to take blocking positions forming a rough semi-circle
defending Seoul from three sides--the 5th Marines to the northwest,
the 7th Marines to the north, and the 1st Marines to the northeast.
Responsibility for the area north of the Han river and west of the
Pukhan River had passed to the 1st Marine Division, and at 1500 on 30
September the following missions were assigned by OpnO 14-50:
RCT-1--To protect the right flank of the Division and be
prepared to assemble in Division reserve by battalions for a
motor lift. Blocking positions, as assigned by OpnO 13-50,
consisted of high ground from two to five miles northeast of
Seoul.
RCT-5--To continue reconnaissance in force with minimum of
a reinforced battalion to Suyuhyon and establish a blocking
position; to protect the left flank of the Division; and to
be prepared to provide a reinforced rifle company for Task
Force Kumpo, on order. These attachments to be made: 1st
Battalion, 11th Marines, and one battery of 50th AAA Battalion,
USA; Company A, 1st Tank Battalion; Company A, 1st Engineer
Battalion; and a company from the 1st Motor Transport Battalion.
RCT-7--To advance rapidly and seize blocking positions in
the vicinity of Uijongbu. These attachments to be made: 3d
Battalion, 11th Marines, and one battery of 50th AAA Battalion,
USA; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion; and one company of the KMC
Regiment.
The KMC Regiment (less the 1st and 3d Battalions and one
company of the 5th Battalion, with a detachment of ANGLICO
attached) was meanwhile to advance to the east and seize
blocking positions at the junction of the Han and Pukhan rivers
where the road leading northeast from Seoul reaches that point.
The 1st KMC Battalion had been attached to the 7th Infantry
Division, and the 3d Battalion was operating on the Kumpo
Peninsula.
Task Force Kumpo, when activated on Division order, was to
consist of the 3d KMC Battalion and Battery C, 50th AAA
Battalion, USA, plus a 5th Marines rifle company and a tank
detachment, if required. As it proved, however, X Corps held
responsibility for the defense of this area until 2 October,
when the 187th Airborne RCT was relieved by Task Force
Kumpo.[461]
[461] _Ibid._, 318–319, 336–337. Both “Kimpo” and “Kumpo”
are used in reports to designate the same area--the
peninsula formed by the mouth of the Han. The first
name was derived from the airfield, of course, and the
second from the principal town of the peninsula.
Two more small fire fights awaited the 5th Marines in carrying out
the missions assigned by Division OpnO 14-50. At 1030 on 1 October,
while patrolling the extensive area of regimental responsibility, a
detachment of 2/5 made contact with an NKPA force estimated at 150 to
200 men. Air strikes and mortar fire soon took the fight out of the
enemy, who left 30 dead behind.
At 0600 on 1 October the 3d Battalion, reinforced with a battery of
artillery and a platoon of tanks and engineers, moved out toward
Suyuhyon. Charlie Company of 1/5 followed in trace to protect the
battalion rear and provide security for returning motor transport.
Two road blocks were cleared before the battalion tied in for the night
on high ground just short of the objective. Then, at 0230 the next
morning, the enemy struck in estimated company strength. The attempt
was repulsed by machine-gun fire, and 67 Red Korean bodies were found
at daybreak in the attack area. At 0700 the column resumed the march to
Suyuhyon, which was occupied without further incident.[462]
[462] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen: basic rpt and
Peter.
The 1st Marines found little difficulty in carrying out all missions
assigned by Division OpnO 14-50. In fact, the regiment had only a few
minor patrol actions after taking blocking positions northeast of Seoul.
Colonel Litzenberg’s men were now making the main effort of the 1st
Marine Division. Preparations for the drive to Uijongbu began with
every indication that the enemy was bent upon flight. A patrol from the
3d Battalion found 30 Korean bodies beside a wall, including several
women and a child, whose hands had been bound behind them before
they were shot. The victims, according to a POW, were members of the
families of ROK soldiers.[463]
[463] _Ibid._, Annex Roger Roger.
Positions had been consolidated by the late afternoon of 30 September
in readiness for the jump-off in the morning. The 7th Marines might
well have been called Task Force Litzenberg at this stage for it was
reinforced by Major Parry’s 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines, Captain
Lester T. Chase’s Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion, Captain Byron
C. Turner’s Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion, and Captain Kim’s
Company C of the 5th KMC Battalion.
The drive to the new objective began at 0630 on 1 October in a column
of battalions. Air reconnaissance had made it appear likely that any
NKPA resistance would probably take advantage of a tactical bottleneck,
about halfway to Uijongbu, where steep and rocky ridges overlooked a
narrow defile through which the road passed. Colonel Litzenberg and his
staff decided to maneuver by sending the 1st Battalion to make a broad
feint to cover the entry of the 3d Battalion into the defile with tank
support while the 2d Battalion followed in reserve.
Lieutenant Colonel Davis secured his preliminary objectives, then
swiftly spread out on both sides of the defile for his feint.
Unfortunately, Major Roach was delayed by an enemy mine field, which
brought the 3d Battalion and the tanks to a halt while the engineers
cleared the way. Davis’ simulated attack had meanwhile disclosed that
the enemy was entrenched in depth along the high ground on each side of
the defile. Both Marine battalions took heavy NKPA artillery and mortar
fire before halting for the night.[464]
[464] This section is derived from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes
Oboe Oboe and Roger Roger; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex
Item:Queen; Col H. L. Litzenberg interv with HistDiv,
22 Apr 51; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54; and Capt R. T.
Bey interv, 17 Nov 54.
[Illustration: PURSUIT OF THE NKPA & CAPTURE OF UIJONGBU
28 SEP--3 OCT 1950]
At least the day’s attacks had unmasked the enemy’s positions and
exposed them to savage attacks by the Corsairs of VMF-312. RCT-7
continued the attack at 0630 on the 2d, with Roach on the left of the
road and Davis on the right. About halfway through the defile the 3d
Battalion was pinned down by a concentration of NKPA artillery, mortar,
and small-arms fire. Again the tanks were held up while the engineers
cleared away mines, working in a hail of bullets. The tanks of the
1st Platoon repaid the favor by closing in on two huts sheltering
NKPA troops and killing an estimated 35. Here an attached dozer tank,
without blade, had a freakish accident when two men in the turret were
wounded by enemy fire down a 105mm gun tube while the breech was open.
The 1st Battalion managed to cross the stream east of the defile and
seize the high ground just beyond. But the day ended with gains of only
300 yards in the defile.
Roach’s men returned to the attack in the morning, supported by the
tanks of the 2d Platoon. Again VMF-312 flew one close air support
sortie after another. Major Charles E. McLean was hit by enemy AA fire
but crash-landed his plane in friendly territory. First Lieutenant
Robert O. Crocker was killed in action shortly after being brought down
by NKPA small-arms fire.
VMF-312 fliers intercepted an enemy convoy and First Lieutenant
Franklin Stratton reported the destruction of seven out of eight
trucks. The tanks also gave the infantry helpful support, firing 167
90mm rounds during the day and an estimated 20,000 machine gun rounds
at enemy troops along the ridge.
While 1/7 cleared the high ground on the east side of the road and 3/7
on the west side, Colonel Litzenberg directed Major Webb D. Sawyer[465]
to pass between them with 2/7 and drive directly along the highway.
Progress was satisfactory from the start. When Sawyer’s men began to
overrun abandoned NKPA artillery pieces and supply dumps, they pounded
ahead with the realization that enemy resistance was broken.
[465] Lieutenant Colonel Hinkle, the former 2/7 commander,
had been wounded and evacuated on 28 September.
At five that afternoon the 2d Battalion entered the ruins of Uijongbu,
evacuated by the enemy. The last large-scale fight of the Inchon-Seoul
operation had ended in a smashing victory for the Division’s youngest
regiment.
Identifications showed that the Marines had been opposed by three
battalions of the 31st Regiment of the 31st NKPA Division. Elements of
the 17th and Seoul Divisions and of an artillery battalion were also
encountered. These troops had been supported by 13 tanks, of which
four were killed by Marine air attacks and two captured in a damaged
condition by 2/7 after the others escaped.
The three-mile advance of RCT-7 on 3 October had resulted in the
cutting of lateral communications to the east and west of Uijongbu and
the securing of an important blocking position on the X Corps final
phase line. Losses of 13 killed and 111 wounded were suffered by the
regiment in the three-day fight.
_Last Days of Inchon-Seoul Operation_
The climax of the battle was witnessed by General Cates, who visited
the front on 3 October, accompanied by Major Generals Edwin A. Pollock
and Clayton C. Jerome. After being briefed at the Division CP by the
G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, the Commandant inspected the positions of RCT-1
and RCT-5 by helicopter before taking a jeep tour along the road to
Uijongbu to watch Colonel Litzenberg’s men slug their way forward into
the battered town.[466]
[466] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 2–3 Oct 50.
That evening the fighting virtually came to an end, for the 1st Marine
Division had a total of only seven casualties during the last four days
of the Inchon-Seoul operation. The rifle regiments had only to maintain
their blocking positions while patrolling to front and flank.
Operations on the Kumpo Peninsula, which had been sputtering
intermittently ever since the occupation of the airfield, also drew
to a close.[467] Responsibility for the area having passed from Corps
back to Division on 2 October, elements of the 187th Airborne RCT were
relieved by Task Force Kumpo, consisting of the 3d KMC Battalion, a
detachment from the 1st Signal Battalion, and Battery C of the 50th AAA
Battalion, USA.
[467] Capt J. E. Dolan memo to authors, 24 Nov 54.
Naval gunfire had found its greatest mission of the exploitation phase
in support of the widely assorted units which protected the left flank
of X Corps at various times. The 187th, being short on artillery, had
relied on the naval gunfire and spot teams commanded by Lieutenant
(jg) Leo D. McMillan, USN, and First Lieutenant J. E. Dolan, of the
2d Battalion, 7th Marines. These officers and their men remained with
Task Force Kumpo after it relieved the 187th, but patrols reported no
enemy contacts after 2 October. The chief activity on the peninsula
was listening to the baseball games of the World Series, which came in
clearly over the radios of the naval gunfire teams.[468]
[468] _Ibid._
As directed on 5 October by OpnO 15-50, the last to be issued by the
Division in the Inchon-Seoul Operation, the major Marine units were
scheduled to close into staging areas in Inchon as follows:
5th Marines 1800 on 5 October;
11th Marines 1700 on 6 October;
1st Marines Prior to darkness, 6 October;
7th Marines Midafternoon, 7 October;
KMC Regiment Prior to darkness, 7 October.
An impressive ceremony was held on the 6th, when the cemetery
established by the Marines on the outskirts of Inchon was taken over
by the United Nations. After an invocation by Chaplain R. M. Schwyhart
of the 1st Marine Division, General Almond made a few remarks and
laid a wreath on the grave of an unknown soldier. Then General Smith,
General Barr, and Colonel Lee performed the same ceremony over Marine,
Army, and ROK graves. Volleys were fired, taps were sounded, and the
dedication ended with the national anthems of the United States and
Korea.[469]
[469] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 342; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex
George, 7.
There could be no doubt, as the Marines prepared to mount out for a
new amphibious operation, that the NKPA invaders had been knocked out
of the war by the combined X Corps and Eighth Army offensives. The Red
Korean retreat had become a rout, and Marine staff officers considered
it doubtful whether the enemy could hold the east coast port of Wonsan
long enough to defend it against the proposed new Marine assault
landing.[470]
[470] Wonsan fell without a fight on 10 October, before the
Marines embarked, to ROK units advancing up the coastal
route.
It was apparent, in fact, that only the active intervention of Red
China or the Soviet Union could save the North Korean People’s Republic
from imminent collapse. At this time, however, it did not seem likely
that any such attempt would be made.
And so it was that one of the most remarkable amphibious operations
in Marine Corps annals came uneventfully to an end on 7 October 1950.
Early in the morning the Division CP displaced from Seoul to a housing
area just north of Ascom City. At 0935, in accordance with X Corps OpnO
5, General Smith reported to Admiral Doyle, ComPhibGru One, for duty
as commander of the landing force for the proposed Wonsan assault.
And at 1200 the Inchon-Seoul operation passed into history when the
last troops of the 7th Marines were relieved in the Uijongbu area by
elements of the Eighth Army.
_Summaries and Conclusions_
At this stage the men of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing were still too close to the operation to see it clearly
in detail. If there was any one overwhelming impression they all had in
common, it was a sense of the speed with which events had raced toward
a climax.
This was by no means an illusion. Hundreds of Marine reservists had
watched baseball games or enjoyed picnics with their families on the
Fourth of July, never dreaming that shortly after Labor Day they would
be scrambling out of landing boats to assault a flaming Asiatic seaport
on the other side of the earth!
Speed was an essential if the assault landing were to be completed
on the prescribed D-day. But there was no place for the proverbial
haste that leads to waste. It had to be the speed of precision--an
acceleration of men and events made possible by the amphibious know-how
of a Navy-Marine Corps team that had worked together throughout the
Pacific operations of World War II.
Sometimes this acceleration was so unobtrusive as to pass almost
unnoticed. Shipping does not grow on trees, particularly the enormous
amounts of shipping required for a major amphibious operation. Yet the
U. S. Navy made it appear a simple and routine matter to assemble from
all the seven seas an invasion fleet made up of craft ranging from
cruisers to rowboats.
The Marines, as the Landing Force, worked hand-in-hand with the Attack
Force commanded by Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, who had no superior
in the world of 1950 as an amphibious specialist. From preliminary
planning to final execution, Doyle and his staff officers of PhibGru
One supplied a precision which had much to do with the success of an
operation holding so many potentialities of disaster.
Looking back, some of the Marine participants could hardly recall a
full night’s sleep from 25 July 1950, the date of the order directing
that the 1st Marine Division be brought up to full war strength, until
7 October 1950, when the operation came to a victorious end. From the
mobilization at Camp Pendleton to the street fighting in Seoul, it was
often necessary to utilize the hours of darkness ordinarily devoted to
rest. At Kobe, for instance, there were so few copies of the plans for
the Inchon landing that they were circulated on a 24-hour schedule for
study by Marine officers who took turns.
The acceleration of the 1st Marine Division in 64 days from a peacetime
basis to the capture of Seoul has been summarized as follows:
(a) Expansion from a reduced peace strength (less the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade) to a reinforced war strength, less
one RCT, was completed in a period of approximately 15 days.
(b) Administrative sea lift and movement of over 15,000
personnel, organic equipment, and partial resupply from San
Diego to the Far East Command commenced in less than three
weeks after expansion was ordered.
(c) Debarkation and unloading from administrative shipping,
and reembarkation and reloading at Kobe, Japan for the assault
landing at Inchon were done in a period averaging about seven
days per unit, two days of which were lost due to a heavy
typhoon in the Kobe area.
(d) Completed planning and the issuance of the complete
operation order for the amphibious landing at Inchon were
accomplished 17 days after the receipt of the initial directive.
(e) The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was disengaged from
active combat with the enemy on the South Korean front at
midnight on 5 September, moved to Pusan, and outloaded in
combat shipping in less than 7 days.
(f) A successful assault landing was executed at Inchon,
Korea, on 15 September under some of the most adverse landing
conditions in the history of amphibious operations.
(g) The Force Beachhead Line approximately six miles from
landing beaches was seized within 24 hours after the main
landing on Beaches RED and BLUE.
(h) Kimpo Airfield, a primary objective of the operation in the
1st Marine Division’s zone of action, was captured 50 hours and
35 minutes after H-Hour, D-Day.
(i) The first assault crossing of the Han River (400 yards wide
at the crossing site) was executed by RCT-5, employing LVTs,
DUKWs, and pontoon ferries, less than five days after landing
at Inchon.
(j) The remainder of the Division crossed the Han River without
bridging, and after intense fighting completed the seizure of
Seoul 12 days after landing at Inchon.
(k) The effectiveness of the Marine air-ground team and close
air support doctrine were reaffirmed with outstanding success.
(l) The ability of Marine units to participate in extended land
operations, provided additional transportation requirements are
met during the emergency, was demonstrated in the Inchon-Seoul
operation.[471]
[471] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 365–366.
In any such summary, it is understood that credit for the
accomplishments of the 1st Marine Division was shared by the 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing. Two more days of fighting remained for the
squadrons at Kimpo after the relief of the ground forces, since
Marine air operations cover the period from 7 September to 9 October
1950. Altogether, 2,774 combat sorties were flown by the five Marine
squadrons during this 33-day period, most of them in close support of
infantry units. Following are the totals:
--------------+--------+----------
Squadron | Days in| Combat
| Action| Sorties
--------------+--------+----------
VMF-214 | 16 | 484
VMF-323 | 22 | 784
VMF-212 | 19 | 607
VMF-312 | 10 | 288
VMF(N)-542 | 19 | 573
| +----------
Total | |[472]2,774
--------------+--------+----------
[472] Summaries and statistics for Marine air have been
derived form: 1st MAW _SAR_, Annexes Able, Item, Jim,
Queen, Sugar; also E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit,
“Marine Air over Inchon-Seoul,” _Marine Corps Gazette_,
36, no. 6 (Jun 52): 19–27.
Note that the total of 2,774 combat sorties includes 38
flown by two aircraft of VMF-312, which began operating
from Kimpo nine days before the rest of the squadron
arrived.
“No enemy air operations of any significance were encountered,” stated
the TAC X Corps report. “Some enemy antiaircraft fire from light to
moderate was encountered. Most of this AA fire was of small caliber.”
Eleven Marine planes (not counting VMO-6 aircraft) were shot down by
NKPA ground forces. Six pilots and a crewman were killed in action and
two pilots wounded.
As an example of the types of missions, the 326 combat sorties flown
by VMF-322 fell into these categories: close air support, 163;
reconnaissance, 99; rescue cover, 18; deep support, 17; helicopter
escort, 8; photo escort, 6; combat air patrol, 6; tactical air control,
4; leaflet, 2; R4D escort, 2; message drop, 2. In addition, the
squadron was credited with 151 noncombat sorties.
There could be no question that Marine close air support had won
the esteem of Army infantry units. Generals Harris and Cushman were
the recipients of many spontaneous comments of appreciation from
individuals as well as formal endorsements. (See Appendix L for the
record.)
On the other hand, the Marines had cause to be grateful for the deep
support and interdiction strikes provided by the Naval fast carrier
planes of JTF-7 in combination with the Fifth Air Force, which was
committed primarily to the support of the Eighth Army in South Korea.
During the first two weeks of September, JTF-7 had responsibility
for the gradual isolation of the Inchon target area by means of air
operations conducted as far as 150 miles north of the objective and 100
miles to the south.
The air defense of our forces at sea and in the Inchon area, and the
air interdiction operations of the first five or six days of the
landing--these were carried out largely by Naval air effort under
Commander JTF-7. Mutual assistance between JTF-7 and the Fifth Air
Force was provided for, with coordination being achieved by the
delineation of areas for each.[473]
[473] VAdm A. D. Struble ltr to authors, 3 May 55.
VMO-6, under the control of the 1st Marine Division and administration
control of MAG-33, completed a total of 643 helicopter and OY flights
in 515 hours. Of the 139 seriously wounded men evacuated by helicopter
from the firing line, a large proportion owed their lives to the
speed and ease with which they were transported to the hospital. The
helicopters also were credited with twelve rescue missions of friendly
pilots shot down behind the enemy lines.[474]
[474] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex William William.
In the long run, of course, it took the coordinated efforts of ground,
air, and sea forces to win the final victory in one of the most unusual
and difficult amphibious operations of all time. And though this book
is limited to an account of Marine activities primarily, the Marines
who took part would be first to acknowledge how much the final victory
owed to the efforts of other ground forces--the U. S. Army units, the
KMC Regiment, and the ROK contingents.
Many of these units, like the Marines, had been handicapped by a hasty
build-up which allowed little or no time for special training and
rehearsals. No greater feat of organization was recorded in 1950 than
the creation of a new 7th Infantry Division from the bare bones of the
old in only a few weeks. The Marines saw more of the 32d Infantry than
General Barr’s other units, for it was this regiment which protected
the right flank during critical periods of the advance on Seoul while
elements of the 187th Airborne RCT were responsible for the security of
the left flank.
The Army artillery units, amphibian tractor troops, and AAA companies
also deserve their full share of credit for the victory. And though
the Marines were not often in contact with the ROKs, they realized
how much these allies had contributed, often under the most adverse
circumstances.
Naturally, the Marines felt a special interest in the KMC Regiment,
which they had trained and equipped. The KMCs repaid this feeling by
the valor with which they fought in every phase of the operation from
the mopping up of Inchon to the battle for Seoul.
The Inchon landing and its exploitation have been made the subject of a
study by officers of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, who summed
up the over-all effects as follows:
(a) The amphibious envelopment at Inchon produced a decisive
threat to the North Korean forces which led directly to the
rapid disintegration of their front on the Pusan Perimeter. The
1st Marine Division was the landing force in this amphibious
envelopment.
(b) It completed the dislocation of the enemy’s entire
logistical system by the capture of Seoul, which, together with
the combat action of other UN forces, shattered the enemy in
all of South Korea, causing the complete rout of the North
Korean forces. The 1st Marine Division played a principal role
in the capture of Seoul.
(c) The successful completion of the campaign made available to
UN forces the port facilities of Inchon and the extensive Seoul
communications complex for carrying offensive action into North
Korea.
(d) By the direct action of the 1st Marine Division, the
enemy’s potential was reduced by the capture of 4,692 POWs, by
inflicting 13,666 casualties on the enemy, by destroying 44
tanks, and by destroying or capturing much other material.[475]
[475] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 45–46. Here again it
may be noted that later reports, not available when
this study was made, indicate that duplicate claims
were entered for four of these 44 tanks, with two
others unaccounted for in records. The actual total,
therefore, is 38.
In view of such far-reaching results, total casualties for the 1st
Marine Division of 366 KIA, 49 DOW, 6 MIA, and 2,029 WIA cannot be
considered excessive for an operation fraught with so many calculated
risks. No man’s life was given in vain, for the Communist challenge
to the free nations was met in Korea and the aggressors beaten so
decisively that the world would soon have had peace except for the
intervention of Red China.
_MacArthur’s Report to United Nations_
Again it is worthy of emphasis that the victory was not won by any
one nation or any one branch of the military service. As far as this
country is concerned, the Inchon-Seoul operation was conducted jointly
by the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. General
Douglas MacArthur was spokesman for all of them late in September 1950,
in these extracts from the Sixth Report of the Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command, to the Security Council of the United Nations:
“Events of the past two weeks have been decisive. The strategic
concepts designed to win the war are rapidly proving their
soundness through aggressive application by our ground, sea,
and air forces.
“The seizure of the heart of the enemy’s distributing system
in the Seoul area has completely dislocated his logistical
supply to his forces in South Korea and has quickly resulted in
their disintegration. Caught between our northern and southern
forces, both of which are completely self-sustaining because of
our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy is thoroughly
shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our
combined combat activities.
“The prompt junction of our two forces is dramatically symbolic
of this collapse.
“The obstacles to this wide envelopment were not only the
enemy opposition, but also the natural obstacles of poor
beaches fronted by miles of mud flats, a narrow channel and
an extraordinary tidal range of over 29 feet. The success
demonstrated a complete mastery of the technique of amphibious
warfare, clockwork coordination, and cooperation between the
units and services participating. There was nothing noteworthy
about the North Korean opposition, but there could have been.
The potential was there. The North Koreans were proceeding with
the construction of coastal fortifications, dug-in tanks and
guns of all calibers, beach defenses and mining operations. Had
this development been delayed for as much as a month, the enemy
would have been ready and the assault, if possible, would have
been more costly to United Nations forces.”
At no time, not even when the United Nations forces were fighting with
their backs to the wall at Pusan, did the commander in chief ever have
any doubts as to the outcome. It was fitting, therefore, that he should
have summed up the results of the combined Eighth Army and X Corps
offensives in this conclusion written after the securing of Seoul:
“A successful frontal attack and envelopment has completely
changed the tide of battle in South Korea. The backbone of the
North Korean army has been broken and their scattered forces
are being liquidated or driven north with material losses in
equipment and men captured.”
APPENDIX A
Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
AAA(AW)Bn--Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion (USA).
AD--Destroyer Tender.
AE--Ammunition Ship.
AerialDelPlat--Aerial Delivery Platoon.
AF--Air Force; Store Ship.
AGC--Amphibious Force Flagship.
AH--Hospital Ship.
AK--Cargo Ship.
AKA--Assault Cargo Ship.
AKL--Cargo Ship--Light.
AKS--Stores Issue Ship.
AM--Minesweeper.
AmphTracBn--Amphibious Tractor Battalion.
AmphTrkBn--Amphibious Truck Battalion.
AMS--Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper.
ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.
AO--Oiler.
AOG--Gasoline Tanker.
AP--Transport.
APA--Assault Transport.
APD--High Speed Transport.
ARG--Repair Ship--Internal Combustion Engines.
ARH--Repair Ship--Heavy Hull Damage.
ARL--Repair Ship--Landing Craft.
ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion.
ARS--Salvage Vessel.
AT--Antitank.
ATF--Ocean Tug--Fleet.
AV--Seaplane Tender.
AVP--Seaplane Tender, Small.
Bchmstr Unit--Beachmaster Unit.
BLT--Battalion Landing Team.
Bn--Battalion.
CA--Heavy Cruiser.
CG--Commanding General.
CICDet--Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment (USA).
CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East.
CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
CL--Light Cruiser.
CMC--Commandant of the Marine Corps.
CNO--Chief of Naval Operations.
CO--Commanding Officer.
Co--Company.
ComAirSupGrp--Commander Air Support Group.
ComCarDiv--Commander Carrier Division.
ComNavFE--Commander Navy Far East.
ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One.
CP--Command Post.
C/S--Chief of Staff.
CSG--Combat Service Group.
CTF--Commander Task Force.
CV--Aircraft Carrier.
CVE--Aircraft Carrier--Escort.
CVL--Aircraft Carrier--Light.
DD--Destroyer.
DDE--Escort Destroyer.
DDR--Radar Picket Destroyer.
DOW--Died of wounds.
DUKW--Amphibious Truck.
Emb Off--Embarkation Officer.
EngrBn--Engineer Battalion.
EngrPortConstCo--Engineer Port Construction Company (USA).
EngrSpecBrig--Engineer Special Brigade (USA).
ETO--European Theater of Operations.
EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea.
FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA).
FAC--Forward Air Controller.
FBHL--Force Beachhead Line.
FEAF--Far East Air Force.
FECOM--Far East Command.
F4U--Vought “Corsair” Fighter.
FMF--Fleet Marine Force (Pac-Pacific; Lant-Atlantic).
FO--Forward Observer.
FSA--Fire Support Area.
FSCC--Fire Support Coordination Center.
F7F-3--Grumman “Tigercat” Night Fighter.
Fum & Bath Plat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon.
GCI--Ground Control Intercept.
GHQ--General Headquarters.
H & S Co--Headquarters and Service Company.
HO3S-1--Sikorsky Helicopter.
HqBn--Headquarters Battalion.
HqCo--Headquarters Company.
HqSq--Headquarters Squadron.
InfDiv--infantry Division (USA).
interv--Interview.
JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.
JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group.
JTF--Joint Task Force.
KIA--Killed in Action.
KMC--Korean Marine Corps.
LCM--Landing Craft, Mechanized.
LCVP--Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel.
LSD--Landing Ship, Dock.
LSM--Landing Ship, Medium.
LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket.
LST--Landing Ship, Tank.
LSU--Landing Ship, Utility.
LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked.
LVT(A)--Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored).
MAG--Marine Air Group.
MAW--Marine Air Wing.
MedBn--Medical Battalion.
MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron.
MIA--Missing in action.
MOS--Military Occupational Specialty.
MPCo--Military Police Company.
MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron.
MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion.
NCO--Noncommissioned Officer.
NGF--Naval Gunfire.
NK--North Korea(n).
NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army.
OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA).
Off--Officer.
OP--Observation Post.
OpnO--Operation Order.
OrdAmmCo--Ordnance Ammunition Company (USA).
OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion.
OY--Consolidated-Vultee light observation plane.
PC--Submarine Chaser.
PCEC--Escort Amphibious Control Vessel.
PF--Frigate.
PhibGru--Amphibious Group.
PhibTraPac--Training Command, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.
PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report.
Plat--Platoon.
POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants.
POW--Prisoner of War.
RAF--Royal Air Force.
RcnCo--Reconnaissance Company.
RCT--Regimental Combat Team.
RktBn--Rocket Battalion.
ROK--Republic of Korea.
SAC--Supporting Arms Center.
SAR--Special Action Report.
SCAJAP--Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Japan.
ServBn--Service Battalion.
SigBn--Signal Battalion.
SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company (USA).
SPBn--Shore Party Battalion.
SpOpnsCo--Special Operations Company (USA).
TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator.
TAC X Corps--Tactical Air Command, X Corps.
TacAir--Tactical Air.
TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center.
T-AP--Transport Operated by MSTS.
T/E--Table of Equipment.
TF--Task Force.
TG--Task Group.
T/O--Table of Organization.
UDT--Underwater Demolitions Team.
UF--Unit of fire.
UN--United Nations.
UNC--United Nations Command.
USA--United States Army.
USAF--United States Air Force.
USMC--United States Marine Corps.
USN--United States Navy.
VMF--Marine fighter type aircraft (squadron).
VMF(N)--Marine night fighter type aircraft, all-weather (squadron).
VMO--Marine observation type aircraft (squadron).
VMR--Marine transport type aircraft (squadron).
WIA--Wounded in action.
WP--White phosphorous.
YMS--Motor Minesweeper.
YTB--Harbor Tug, Big.
YW--District Barge, Water (self-propelled).
APPENDIX B
Build-Up of 1st Marine Division (Reinf)
(Figures include Marine Corps and Navy, both officer and enlisted)
------------------------------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
Authorized by CMC ltr conf. |1st Prov | Main | 7th RCT | Total in
Ser. 03C20550 of 25 Jul 54 | Marine | body | (sailed | Inchon-
and CMC ltr conf. Ser. | Brigade | (sailed | from | Seoul
03A21250 of 4 Aug 50 |(sailed | San Diego|Mediterranean| area on
---------------------+--------+San Diego| 10–22 Aug| 16 Aug 50 |23 Sep 50
| |14 Jul 50| 50 | and San | [477]
Units |Strength| arrived | arrived | Diego |
| | Pusan, | Kobe | 28 Aug- |
| | Korea | Japan | 2 Sep 50 |
| |2 Aug 50)|28 Aug to | arrived |
| | |10 Sep 50)| Inchon on |
| | | | 21 Sep 50) |
| | | | [476] |
---------------------+--------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
DIVISION | 22,343 | 4,770 | 12,195 | 5,336 | 20,218
+--------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
Hq Bn | 923 | 259 | 725 | | 860
Hq Co | (656)| (182)| | |
Mp Co | (140)| (38)| | |
RcnCo | (127)| (39)| | |
1st Serv Bn | 827 | 173 | 656 | | 785
1st Sig Bn | 960 | 249 | 591 | 116 | 661
1st MT Bn | 783 | 118 | 582 | 89 | 761
1st Ord Bn | 558 | 124 | 438 | | 518
1st Med Bn | 636 | 99 | 432 | 107 | 667
1st Tank Bn | 907 | 181 | 677 | 132 | 921
1st SP Bn | 755 | 188 | 357 | 196 | 836
1st Engr Bn | 1,180 | 218 | 815 | 163 | 969
11th Marines | 3,108 | 518 | 1,845 | 697 | 3,009
1st Marines | 3,902 | | 3,942 | | 3,393
5th Marines | 3,902 | 2,643 |[478]1,135| | 3,170
7th Marines | 3,902 | | | 3,836 | 3,666
+========+=========+==========+=============+==========
FMF TROOPS | 3,969 | 554 | 3,167 | | 2,973
+--------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
1st Armd Amph Bn | 526 | | 490 | |
1st Amph Trac Bn | 944 | 256 | 720 | | [479]842
1st Amph Trk Co | 245 | 77 | 166 | | 236
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ | 90 | | 89 | | 77
Rkt Bn | | | | |
Carrier Plat FMF | 94 | | 84 | | 86
1st Comb Serv Grp | 1,434 | 109 | 1,120 | | 1,167
7th MT Bn | 431 | | 418 | | 410
1st Air Delivery Plat| 63 | | 62 | | 63
1st Fum & Bath Plat | 30 | | 18 | | 30
VMO 6 | 112 | 112 | | | 62
+========+=========+==========+=============+==========
Total reinforced | 26,312 | 5,324 | 15,362 | 5,336 | 23,191
division | | | | |
---------------------+--------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
[476] Activated 17 Aug 50. The 3d Bn 6th Marines, in the
Mediterranean, was assigned to the 7th Marines and,
upon arrival in Kobe, Japan, on 3 Sept 50, was
redesignated the 3d Bn 7th Marines. Augmentation
personnel for this Battalion arrived in Kobe, Japan,
on 14 Sept 50 on the USS _Thomas Jefferson_. The
regimental commander and his staff arrived by air at
Kobe on 6 Sept 50.
[477] Based on Division Personnel Periodic Report No. 1
covering the period 15–23 Sept 50. The following losses
and gains during the period are reflected in this
report:
_Net
_Losses_ _Gains_ Loss_
KIA 118 Replacements 28
WIA 845 Returned to duty 160
MIA 14 ----- -----
Non-battle Cas 286 188 1,075
-----
1,263
[478] Augmentation personnel for the 5th Marines (Reinf)
already in Korea. The CO, 1st Marines was charged with
the assembly and organization of the augmentation units
for the 5th Marines (Reinf). Augmentation personnel
were organized into three reinforced rifle companies.
(The battalions of the 5th Marines in Korea contained
only two rifle companies each.) The reinforced
rifle companies were embarked together on one ship.
Augmentation personnel for units of the Brigade, other
than the 5th Marines, were attached to the reinforced
rifle companies.
[479] The 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion was left
in Kobe. In addition, at Kobe, were the Division
Administrative Center and some 500 17-year olds, who,
by order of SecNav, were removed from the troop list
just before sailing for Inchon. As of 15 Sept 50 there
were the following personnel of the 1st Marine Division
(Reinf) at Kobe:
Key: _O_: Officers
_E_: Enlisted
_Marine Corps_ _Navy_ _Total_
-------------- -------- ----------
_O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_
59 1,268 3 14 62 1,282
APPENDIX C
Task Organization of Marine Division for Inchon Landing
In order to present a concise picture of the Task Organization of
the 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF, for the period of 1 August-7
October 1950, task organizations are presented for the following five
conditions:
(1) Completion of mobilization of the Division (less 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade and RCT-7) at Camp Pendleton,
Oceanside, California, 12 August.
(2) Organization for landing at INCHON, KOREA, 15 September.
(3) RCT-7 task organization on arrival INCHON, KOREA, 21
September.
(4) Intermediate temporary attachments and detachments during
the period 15 September-7 October.
(5) Completion of INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL operation on 7 October.
The detailed Task Organizations are as follows:
(1) Completion of Mobilization on WAR “K” series T/O, 12 August.
_1st Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH
HqBn, 1stMarDiv, less Brig Det LtCol M. T. STARR
1st SigBn, less Brig Det, 2 SP
Comm Sects & Det Anglico
Carrier Plat, FMF Maj R. L. SCHREIER
1st ServBn, less Brig Det LtCol C. L. BANKS
1st OrdBn, less Brig Det Maj L. O. WILLIAMS
1st MT Bn, less Cos A and D; 1st
Amph Trk Co, FMF, less 1 Plat LtCol O. L. BEALL
1st Med Bn, less Cos A and E Comdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN
1st EngrBn, less Cos A and D LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE
1st SP Bn, less Cos A and C LtCol H. P. CROWE
1st Tk Bn, less Cos A and D;
Tk Plat AT Co, 1st Mar
Tk Plat AT Co, 5th Mar LtCol H. T. MILNE
1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF, less Cos
A and D LtCol E. F. WANN
1st Armd Amph Bn, FMF, less
1st Plat Co A and Cos C and D LtCol F. H. COOPER
1st CSG, SC, FMF, less BrigDet;
1st Fum & Bath Plat, SC, FMF
1st Aerial Del Plat, SC, FMF Col J. S. COOK
7th MT Bn, SC, FMF Maj J. F. STEPKA
1st Mar, less Tk Plat, AT Co; Cos
C, F, and I, Reinf, 5th Mar Col L. B. PULLER
11th Mar, less 1st and 3rd Bns;
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF Col J. H. BROWER
(2) Organization for landing at INCHON, KOREA (1st Prov Mar
Brig disbanded 13 September, units and detachments reverted
control parent organizations of division). Task Organization
from Annex “A”, 1st Mar Div Op Order 2-50 as derived from X
Corps Op Order No. 1.
_1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH
HqBn, Reinf, 1stMarDiv, less dets
163rd Mil Int Service Det
441st CIC Det
1st Sig Bn, Reinf, less dets;
Det, 205th Sig Rep Co USA
Carrier Plat, FMF
Det, 4th Sig Bn, USA
1st Serv Bn, less Dets
1st MT Bn
1st Ord Bn, less dets
Det, MTACS-2
_Blt-3, RCT-5_ LtCol R. D. TAPLETT
3dBn, 5th Mar
Det, ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn
Det, Co A, 1st Tk Bn
Recon Det, 11th Mar
Team 1, SP Gp A
1stPlat, Co A, 1st SP Bn
SP Comm Sqd, 1st Sig Bn
Amm Sqd, 1st Ord Bn
Det, Rat Sec, 1st Ser Bn
Det, 1st CSG, (SP Aug)
Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN
_RCT-5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY
5th Mar, less 3dBn & Tk Plat, AT Co
Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Co C, 1st Med Bn
Det Anglico, 1st Sig Bn
ROK Marine Bn
SP GP A, less Team 1;
Co, A, 1st SP Bn, less 1 Plat
Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn
Det, Ord Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Auto Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Engr Sup Plat, CSG
Det, CS Plat, CSG
Det, Sig Sup Plat, CSG
SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn
Det, 1st CSG (SP Aug)
Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN
1st Traffic Plat, MP Co
Police Sqd, MP Co
FO & Ln Sec, 1st Bn, 11th Mar
Co A, 1st Tk Bn, less det
Det, Sig Co, 1st Sig Bn
_RCT-1_ Col L. B. PULLER
1st Mar, less Tk Plat, AT Co
Co A, Reinf, 56th Amph Trac Bn, USA
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF
Co C, Reinf, 1st Engr Bn, less det;
Water Sup Sec
Co D, 1st Med Bn, less det
Det ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn
SP Gp B, less Team 3;
Co B, 1st SP Bn, less 1 Plat &
Equip Sec
Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn
Amm Plat, less 1 Sqd, 1st Ord Bn
Rat Sec, 1st Ser Bn
Fuel Sec, 1st Ser Bn
SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn
Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN
Det, 1st CSG (SP Aug)
2d Traffic Plat, MP Co
Police Sqd, MP Co
FO & Ln Secs, 2d Bn, 11th Mar
_11th Mar, less 3d Bn, reinf_ Col J. H. BROWER
96th FA Bn, USA
Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn
1st Amph Trk Co, FMF
_1st Tk Bn, less dets, reinf_ LtCol H. T. MILNE
Tk Plat, AT Co, 1st Mar
Tk Plat, AT Co, 5th Mar
_1st Engr Bn, less dets_ LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE
_1st SP Bn, less dets_ LtCol H. P. CROWE
H&S Co, 1st SP Bn, less dets
SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn
Team 3, SP Gp B
3d Plat, Co B, 1st SP Bn
Equip Sec, Co B, 1st SP Bn
SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn
Det, Ord Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Auto Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Engr Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Sig Sup Plat, CSG
Det, GS Plat, CSG
Det, Depot Plat, CSG
_Rcn Co, 1st MAR Div_ Capt K. J. HOUGHTON
_1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN
_VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK
_ROK Marine Regt_ (-) Col SHIN, KMC
_2d Engr Spec Brig reinf_ Col J. TWITTY, USA
1st CSG, SC, FMF, less dets
1st Fum & Bath Plat
1st Aerial Del Plat
Naval Beach Gp 1, less dets
7th MT Bn, SC, FMF
73d Engr (C) Bn, USA
50th Engr Port Const Co, USA
65th Ord Amm Co, USA
(3) RCT-7 Task Organization on landing at INCHON, KOREA, 21 September.
Attachments reverted to parent control on arrival assembly areas.
_RCT-7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG
7th Mar
3d Bn, 11th Mar
Co D, 1st MT Bn
Co D, 1st Tk Bn
Co D, 1st Engr Bn
Co E, 1st Med Bn
Co C, 1st SP Bn
Det, 1st Sig Bn (ANGLICO
& 2 SP Comm Sec)
(4) Intermediate temporary attachments and detachments during the
period 15 September-7 October.
18 Sept--32nd RCT USA attached 1st Mar Div
19 Sep--SpOpnsCo USA attchd 1st Mar Div
32nd RCT detached 1st MarDiv reverted to 7th Inf Div
23 Sep--17th ROK Regt attchd 1st Mar Div
17th ROK Regt detached 1st Mar Div
24 Sep--3d Bn, 187th Airborne RCT USA Attchd 1st Mar Div
3d Bn, KMC Regt detached 1st Mar Div attached 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT
1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF, less 3 Cos, detached 1st Mar Div attchd 7th
Inf Div
Co A, 1st Amph Tk and Trac Bn, USA, detached 1st Mar Div attchd
7th Inf Div
25 Sept--3d Bn, 187th AB RCT detached 1st Mar Div, attchd X Corps
3d Bn, KMC Regt det 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT attchd 1st MarDiv
161st KMC Bn (redesignated 5th KMC Bn) attchd 1st Mar Div
Sp Opns Co, USA detached 1st Mar Div, attchd 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT
26 Sep--3d Bn KMC Regt detached 1st Mar Div, attchd 187th AB RCT
(TF ABLE)
29 Sep--1st Amph Trac Bn, less 3d Cos, detached 7th Inf Div attchd 1st
Mar Div 96th FA Bn, USA detached 1st Mar Div
30 Sep--50th AAA(AW)Bn attached 1st Mar Div
3 Oct--50th AAA(AW)Bn detached 1st Mar Div
(5) Completion of INCHON-SEOUL operation, 7 October, and prior to
mounting out at INCHON.
_1st Marine Division Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH
HqBn, 1st MarDiv
163d MISD
441st CIC
Civ Asst Team LtCol M. T. STARR
1st Sig Bn
Carrier Plat, FMF Maj R. L. SCHREIER
1st Serv Bn LtCol C. L. BANKS
1st Ord Bn Maj L. O. WILLIAMS
1st MT Bn
1st Amph Trk Co, FMF LtCol O. L. BEALL
1st Tk Bn LtCol H. T. MILNE
1st Med Bn Comdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN
1st SP Bn LtCol H. P. CROWE
1st Engr Bn LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE
1st Mar Col L. B. PULLER
5th Mar LtCol R. L. MURRAY
7th Mar Col H. L. LITZENBERG
11th Mar
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF Col J. H. BROWER
1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF
less Co D LtCol E. F. WANN
1st Armd Amph Bn, FMF
less Cos C & D LtCol F. H. COOPER
7th MT Bn, SC, FMF Maj J. F. STEPKA
1st CSG, SC, FMF less dets;
1st Fum & Bath Plat
1st Aerial Del Plat Col J. S. COOK
APPENDIX D
Supplies and Equipment for Inchon
1st Marine Division Embarkation Order 1-50 of 31 August 1950 provided
that the following supplies and equipment would be embarked in assigned
shipping:
a. Class I
(1) Rations: 30 days as follows:
For attached Army units and 5th Marines (Reinf)
Individual Assault Type C 5 days
(Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
Operational Type B 25 days
(Unit Loaded) (25 days)
PX Accessories Pack 30 days
(Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
(Unit Loaded) (10 days)
(Convoy Loaded) (15 days)
For 1st Marine Division (Reinf) (Less Army elements
and 5th Marines (Reinf)) 5 days
Operational Type B
(Convoy Loaded)
Food Packet, Individual Assault 1A1 2 days
(In hands of individuals) (1 day)
Individual Combat, Type C 10 days
(Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
(Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
PX Accessories Pack 30 days
(Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
(Unit Loaded) (10 days)
(Convoy Loaded) (15 days)
Small Detachment 5 in 1 Type 5 days
(Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
Individual Combat Type C
(Convoy Loaded-Corps Reserve) 150,000 Rations
(In hands of 1st Serv Bn)
(2) Water
(a) All water containers filled, not less than 5 gallons per
man combat loaded; 5 gallons per man to be unit loaded.
(b) Assault Elements: 2 filled canteens per individual.
(c) Others: 1 filled canteen.
b. Class II
(1) Essential Class II items as determined by unit commanders.
Vehicles to be loaded on priority basis within available space.
(2) Initial (less chemical warfare) in hands of units.
(3) Chemical warfare in hands of 1st Serv Bn.
(4) 30 day replenishment in hands of appropriate service units.
(5) All distillation units to have high priority for unloading.
(6) No special services gear to be lifted in assault shipping.
(7) Tentage: not to exceed 10% of T/E allowance.
(8) Other Class II in accordance AdOrder 2-50.
c. Class III
(1) Vehicle tanks ¼ full. Jeeps-1 filled expeditionary can
(5 gal); all other vehicles: 2 filled cans (5 gal each).
(2) Replenishment 30 days
Assault units:
(Combat Unit Load) (15 days)
(Unit Load) (15 days)
Other Units:
(Combat Unit Load) ( 5 days)
(Unit Load) (25 days)
d. Class IV
(1) In accordance with AdOrder 2-50.
e. Class V--5 units of fire
(1) Assault Units
(Combat Unit Load) ( 2 U/F)
(Unit Load) ( 3 U/F)
(2) Other than Assault Units
(Combat Unit Load) ( 1 U/F)
(Unit Load) ( 4 U/F)
(3) Flame thrower fuel 15 U/F
(Combat Unit Load) ( 5 U/F)
(Unit Load) (10 U/F)
APPENDIX E
Task Organization Joint Task Force Seven
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN VAdm Arthur D. Struble
Task Force 90--Attack Force RAdm James H. Doyle
92.1 Landing Force MajGen Oliver P. Smith
1st Marine Division (Reinforced)
92.11 Regimental Combat Team 1 Col Lewis B. Puller
92.11.1 Battalion Landing
Team 1, 1st Marines LtCol Jack Hawkins
92.11.2 Battalion Landing
Team 2, 1st Marines LtCol Alan Sutter
92.11.3 Battalion Landing
Team 3, 1st Marines LtCol Thomas L. Ridge
92.12 Regimental Combat Team 5 LtCol Raymond L. Murray
92.12.1 Battalion Landing
Team 1, 5th Marines LtCol George R. Newton
92.12.2 Battalion Landing
Team 2, 5th Marines LtCol Harold R. Roise
90.00 Flagship Element
_Mount McKinley_ AGC Capt Carter A. Printup
_Eldorado_ (RAdm Lyman K.
Thackrey embarked) AGC Capt Joseph B. Stefanac
90.01 Tactical Air Control Element
Tactical Air Squadron 1 Cdr Theophilus H. Moore
90.02 Naval Beach Group Element Capt Watson T. Singer
90.02.1 Headquarters Unit
90.02.2 Beachmaster Unit LCdr Martin C. Sibitzky
90.02.3 Boat Unit 1 LCdr Herman E. Hock
90.02.4 Amphibious
Construction
Battalion LCdr M. Ted Jacobs, Jr.
90.02.5 Underwater
Demolition
Team Unit LCdr David F. Welch
90.03 Control Element LCdr Clyde Allmon
_Diachenko_ APD LCdr James R. Wilson
90.03.1 Control Unit Red LCdr Ralph H. Schneeloch, Jr.
_Horace A. Bass_ APD LCdr Alan Ray
90.03.2 Control Unit Green Lt Reuben W. Berry
PCEC 896 PCEC Lt Reuben W. Berry
90.03.3 Control Unit Blue Lt Theodore B. Clark
_Wantuck_ APD LCdr John B. Thro
90.04 Administrative Element Capt Virginius R. Roane
90.04.1 Service Unit
_Consolation_ AH Capt Charles M. Ryan
12 LSU (plus additional
LSUs on arrival) 12-20 LSU
90.04.2 Repair and Salvage Unit Cdr Emmanuel T. Goyette
_Lipan_ LCdr Howard K. Smith
_Cree_ Lt George E. Poore
_Arikara_ 3 ATF LCdr Kenneth A. Mundy
_Conserver_ ARS Lt James L. Thompson
_Askari_ ARL LCdr Robert J. Siegelman
YTB 406 YTB
_Gunston Hall_ Cdr Charles W. Musgrave
_Fort Marion_ Cdr Noah Adair, Jr.
_Comstock_ 3 LSD Cdr Emmanuel T. Goyette
90.1 Advance Attack Group Capt Norman W. Sears
92.12.3 Advance Landing
Force Unit
Battalion Landing Team 3 LtCol Robert D. Taplett
5th Marines
90.11 Transport Element Capt Norman W. Sears
_Fort Marion_ Cdr Noah Adair, Jr.
3 LSU embarked
90.11.1 Transport Unit Cdr Selden C. Small
_Horace A. Bess_ LCdr Alan Ray
_Diachenko_ LCdr James R. Wilson
_Wantuck_ LCdr John B. Thro
90.2 Transport Group Capt Virginius R. Roane
_George Clymer_ Capt Raymond S. Lamb
_Cavalier_ Capt Daniel J. Sweeney
_Pickaway_ Capt Samuel H. Crittenden, Jr.
_Henrico_ Capt John E. Fradd
_Noble_ 5 APA Capt Michael F. D. Flaherty
_Union_ Capt Gerald D. Zurmuchlen
_Alshain_ Capt Robert N. S. Clark
_Achernar_ Capt Crutchfield Adair
_Oglethorpe_ Capt Paul F. Heerbrandt
_Seminole_ Capt Henry Farrow
_Thuban_ Cdr Erle V. Dennett
_Whiteside_ Capt Eugene L. Lugibihl
_Washburn_ 8 AKA Capt James A. Prichard
_President Jackson_ AP Capt Charles A. Ferriter
_Gunston Hall_[A] Cdr Charles W. Musgrave
_Comstock_[A] Cdr Emmanuel T. Goyette
90.3 Tractor Group Capt Robert C. Peden
LST 611 Lt Delmar E. Blevins
LST 715 Lt Willie J. Gros
LST 742 Lt Robert B. Leonnig
LST 802 Lt Vladimir Fedorowicz
LST 845 Lt John F. Butler
LST 1048 Lt Rayburn M. Quinn
LST 1123 Lt Charles L. Wall
LST 1134 Lt William B. Faris
LST 1138 Lt Mike Stapleton
LST 857 Lt Dick Weidemeyer
LST 859 Lt Leland Tinsley
LST 898 Lt Robert M. Beckley
LST 914 Lt Ralph L. Holzhaus
LST 973 Lt Robert I. Trapp
LST 799 Lt Trumond E. Houston
LST 883 Lt Charles M. Miller
LST 975 17 LST Lt Arnold W. Harer
SCAJAP LSTs 30 LST
LSM 419 LSM Lt John R. Bradley
90.4 Transport Division 14 Capt Samuel G. Kelly
(7th RCT U. S. Marines and MAG
33 embarked; did not arrive
Inchon until 21 Sept.)
_Bayfield_ Capt William E. Ferrall
_Okanogan_ Capt Timothy F. Donohue
_Bexar_ Capt Clarence E. Coffin, Jr.
_Thomas Jefferson_ 4 APA Capt Tyrrell D. Jacobs
_Algol_ Capt John A. Edwards
_Winston_ Capt Jack Maginnis
_Montague_ 3 AKA Capt Henry P. Wright, Jr.
_Catamount_ Cdr Kenneth Loveland
_Colonial_ 2 LSD Cdr Thomas J. Greene
90.5 Air Support Group RAdm Richard W. Ruble
90.51 CVE Element RAdm Richard W. Ruble
Badoeng Strait Capt Arnold W. McKechnie
Sicily 2 CVE Capt John S. Thach
90.52 CVE Screen Cdr Byron L. Gurnette
_Hanson_ DDR Cdr Cecil R. Welte
_Taussig_ Cdr William C. Meyer
_George K. MacKenzie_ Cdr William R. Laird, Jr.
_Ernest G. Small_ 3 DD Cdr Franklin C. Snow
90.6 Gunfire Support Group RAdm John M. Higgins
90.61 Cruiser Element RAdm John M. Higgins
90.6.2 Fire Support Unit 1 RAdm John M. Higgins
_Toledo_ Capt Richard F. Stout
_Rochester_ Capt Edward L. Woodyard
_HMS Kenya_ Capt P. W. Brock, RN
_HMS Jamaica_ Capt J. S. C. Salter, D.S.O.,
O.B.E., RN
90.62 Destroyer Element Capt Halle C. Allan, Jr.
90.6.2 Fire Support Unit 2 Capt Halle C. Allan, Jr.
_Mansfield_ Cdr Edwin H. Headland
_De Haven_ Cdr Oscar B. Lungren
_Lyman K. Swenson_ 3 DD Cdr Robert A. Schelling
90.63 Fire Support Unit 3 Cdr Robert H. Close
_Collett_ Cdr Robert H. Close
_Gurke_ Cdr Frederick M. Radel
_Henderson_ Cdr William S. Stewart
90.63 LSMR Element Cdr Clarence T. Doss, Jr.
90.6.4 Fire Support Unit 4 Cdr Clarence T. Doss, Jr.
LSMR 401 LCdr Melvin E. Bustard, Jr.
LSMR 403 Lt Frank G. Schettino
LSMR 404 3 LSMR Lt George M. Wrocklage
90.7 Screening and Protective Group Capt Richard T. Spofford
_Rowan_ DD Cdr Alan R. Josephson
_Southerland_ DDR Cdr Homer E. Conrad
_Bayonne_ LCdr Harry A. Clark
_Newport_ LCdr Percy A. Lilly, Jr.
_Evansville_ LCdr Elliot V. Converse, Jr.
_HMS Mounts Bay_ Capt J. H. Unwin, D. S. C., RN
_HMS Whitesand Bay_ LCdr J. V. Brothers, RN
_HMNZS Tutira_ LCdr P. J. H. Hoare, RNZN
_HMNZS Pukaki_ 7 PF LCdr L. E. Herrick, D. S. C., RNZN
_RFS La Grandiere_ 8 PF Cdr Urbain E. Cabanie
_Pledge_ AM Lt Richard Young
_Partridge_ Lt(jg) Robert C. Fuller, Jr.
_Mockingbird_ Lt(jg) Stanley P. Gary
_Kite_ Lt(jg) Nicholas Grkovic
_Osprey_ Lt(jg) Philip Levin
_Redhead_ Lt(jg) T. R. Howard
_Chatterer_ 6 AMS Lt(jg) James P. McMahon
90.8 Second Echelon Movement Group Capt Louis D. Sharp, Jr.
92.2 7th Infantry Division
(Reinforced)
_General G. M. Randall_ Capt Alexander C. Thorington
_General J. C. Breckinridge_ Capt Fremont B. Eggers
_General H. W. Butner_ 3 AP Capt Dale E. Collins
_Fred C. Ainsworth_
_General Leroy Eltinge_
_Aiken Victory_
_Private Sadao S. Munemoi_ 4 T-AP
_SS African Rainbow_
_SS African Pilot_
_SS Robin Kirk_
_SS Helen Lykes_
_SS Meredith Victory_
_SS Empire Marshall_
_SS Mormacport_
_SS Lawrence Victory_
_SS Southwind_
_SS Beaver Victory_
_SS Robin Goodfellow_
_SS California Bear_
90.9 Third Echelon Movement Group Capt Albert E. Jarrell
X Corps troops
_General William A. Mann_ AP Capt Charles H. Walker
_General William Weigel_
_Marine Phoenix_ 2 T-AP
_SS Robin Trent_
_SS Dolly Turman_
_SS Charles Lykes_
_SS Twin Falls Victory_
_SS American Veteran_
_SS American Attorney_
_SS Empire Wallace_
_SS Green Bay Victory_
_SS P. & T. Navigator_
_SS Luxembourg Victory_
_SS Belgium Victory_
_SS Bessemer Victory_
_SS Cotton State_
91 Blockade and Covering Force RAdm Sir William G. Andrewes,
K. B. E., C. B., D. S. O., RN
_HMS Triumph_ CVL Capt A. D. Torlesse, D. S. O., RN
_HMS Ceylon_ CL Capt C. F. J. L. Davies, D. S. C., RN
_HMS Cockade_ LtCdr H. J. Lee, D. S. C., RN
_HMS Charity_ LtCdr P. R. G. Worth, D. S. C., RN
_HMCS Cayuga_ Capt Jeffry V. Brock, D. S. C., RCN
_HMCS Sioux_ Cdr P. D. Taylor, RCN
_HMCS Athabaskan_ Cdr R. T. Welland, D. S. C., RCN
_HMAS Bataan_ Cdr W. B. M. Marks, RAN
_HMAS Warramunga_ Cdr O. H. Becher, D. S. C., RAN
_HNethMS Evertsen_ 8 DD LtCdr D. J. Van Doorninck
ROK NAVAL FORCES Cdr Michael J. Luosey, USN
_Paik Doo San_ (PC 701) Cdr Chai Yong Nam, ROKN
_Kum Kang San_ (PC 702) Cdr Lee Hi Jong, ROKN
_Chi Ri San_ (PC 704) 4 PC LCdr Hyun Sibak, ROKN
YMS 302
YMS 303
YMS 306
YMS 307
YMS 501
YMS 502
YMS 503
YMS 510
YMS 512
YMS 515
YMS 518 11 YMS
TASK FORCE 77--FAST CARRIER GROUP RAdm Edward C. Ewen (in
_Philippine Sea_)
Carrier Division 1 RAdm Edward C. Ewen
_Philippine Sea_ CV Capt Willard K. Goodney
Carrier Division 3 RAdm John M. Hoskins
_Valley Forge_ CV Capt Lester K. Rice
Carrier Division 5
_Boxer_ CV Capt Cameron Briggs
77.1 Support Group Capt Harry H. Henderson
_Worcester_ Capt Harry H. Henderson
77.2 Screen Group Capt Charles W. Parker
DesDiv 31 Capt Charles W. Parker
_Shelton_ Cdr Charles B. Jackson, Jr.
_James E. Kyes_ Cdr Fran M. Christiansen
_Eversole_ 3 DD Cdr Charles E. Phillips
_Higbee_ DDR Cdr Elmer Moore
DesDiv 111 Capt Jeane R. Clark
_Wiltsie_ Cdr Carrol W. Brigham
_Theodore E. Chandler_ Cdr William J. Collum, Jr.
_Hamner_ 3 DD Cdr Jack J. Hughes
_Chevalier_ DDR Cdr Blake B. Booth
DesDiv 112 Capt Bernard F. Roeder
_Ozbourn_ Cdr Charles O. Akers
_Mc Kean_ Cdr Harry L. Reiter, Jr.
_Hollister_ 3 DD Cdr Hugh W. Howard
_Frank Knox_ DDR Cdr Sam J. Caldwell, Jr.
CortRon 1
_Fletcher_ Cdr W. M. Lowry
_Radford_ 2 DDE Cdr Elvin C. Ogle
TASK FORCE 79--COMMANDER
SERVICE SQUADRON 3 Capt Bernard L. Austin
79.1 Mobile Logistic Service Group Capt John G. McClaughry
_Cacapon_ (Initially) Capt John G. McClaughry
_Passumpsic_ (Initially) 2 AO Capt Frank I. Winant, Jr.
_Mount Katmai_ AE Capt Albert S. Carter
_Graffias_ AF Capt William W. Fitts
79.2 Objective Area Logistic Group Capt Philip H. Ross
_Navasota_ (Initially) AO Capt Robert O. Strange
_Virgo_ AKA Capt Philip H. Ross
_Grainger_ AK Cdr Horace C. Laird, Jr.
_Hewell_ Lt Stanley Jaworski
_Ryer_ Lt Gurley P. Chatelain
_Estero_ 3 AKL Lt Tom Watson
79.3 Logistic Support Group Capt Bernard L. Austin
_Piedmont_ Capt James R. Topper
_Dixie_ 2 AD Capt Jose M. Cabanillas
_Kermit Roosevelt_ ARG Cdr Lester C. Conwell
_Jason_ ARH Capt William B. Epps
_Cimarron_ AO Capt Stanley G. Nichols
_Warrick_ Capt George Fritschmann
_Uvalde_ 2 AKA Capt Louis F. Teuscher
_Nemasket_ AOG Lt Harry F. Dixon
_Karin_ AF LCdr Berley L. Maddox
79.4 Salvage and Maintenance Group
_Mataco_ ATF Lt Frank P. Wilson
_Bolster_ ARS Lt Billis L. Whitworth
TASK FORCE 99--PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE
FORCE RAdm George R. Henderson
_Curtiss_ AV Capt Anson C. Perkins
_Gardiners Bay_ AVP Capt Frank G. Raysbrook
_Salisbury Sound_ AV Capt Francis R. Jones
99.1 Search and Reconnaissance Group Capt Joseph M. Carson
99.11 Patrol Squadron 6 Cdr Arthur F. Farwell, Jr.
99.12 88th Squadron RAF Squadron Leader P. Helme
99.13 209th Squadron RAF Squadron Leader P. Le Cheminant
99.2 Patrol and Escort Group Capt Joseph M. Carson
99.21 Patrol Squadron 42 Cdr Gordon F. Smale
99.22 Patrol Squadron 47 Cdr Joe H. Arnold
[A] 3 LSU embarked
APPENDIX F
Final Troop List of Division for the Inchon Landing
Below, as nearly as can be determined, is the troop list of the 1st
Marine Division (Reinf) for the Inchon Landing. The list is correct as
to units included, but it has been difficult to reconcile the totals
given for units.
_Unit_ _Actual
Strength_
Headquarters Bn 916
1st Serv Bn 873
1st Sig Bn [480]652
1st MT Bn 686
1st Med Bn 566
1st Am Trk Co 244
1st Ord Bn 533
1st Shore Party Bn [481]648
1st Engr Bn 1,038
1st Tank Bn [482]811
11th Marines [483]2,360
1st Marines 3,850
5th Marines 3,611
7th Marines 0
1st Am Trac Bn 868
1st CSG [484]1,291
7th MT Bn 430
Det MTACS-2 55
VMO-6 62
-------
Total Marine Corps and Navy 19,494
-------
Korean MC Regt 2,786
-------
Co A, 56th Am Trac Bn, USA 151
Hq Det, USA 38
Sig Det, USA 37
96th FA Bn, USA 388
2d Engr Spec Brig, USA 952
73d Engr (c) Bn, USA 724
50th Engr Port Const Co., USA 214
65th Ord Amm Co., USA 256
------
Total U. S. Army 2,760
------
Grand Total 25,040
[480] Includes Carrier Platoon, FMF.
[481] Includes Detachments of Naval Beach Group 1.
[482] Includes Anti-Tank Platoons of the Antitank Companies
of the 1st and 5th Marines.
[483] Includes Battery C, 1st 4.5″ Rocket Bn, FMF.
[484] Includes 1st Fumigation and Bath Plat., FMF; 1st Aerial
Delivery Plat., FMF; and Naval Beach Group 1 (less
dets. with the 1st Shore Party Bn).
_Distribution of Units of the Division Not Participating in the Inchon
Landing_
The following units of the Division, distributed as indicated, did not
participate in the Inchon Landing:
Key: _O_: Officers
_E_: Enlisted
_Marine Corps_ _Navy_ _Total_
-------------- -------- ----------
_O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_
RCT-7, en route to the Far East. 233 4,905 21 224 254 5,129
Administrative Center Pusan,
Korea 9 172 1 9 173
Division Administrative Center,
1st Armd Amph TracBn,
17-year-olds and casuals
at Kobe, Japan 59 1,268 3 14 62 1,282
------------------------------------
Total 301 6,345 24 239 325 6,584
APPENDIX G
Summary of Operation Orders Issued by 1st Marine Division for the
Inchon-Seoul Campaign
1-50 9 Aug 50 Movement of the Division to the Far East
2-50 4 Sep 50 Inchon Landing
3-50 15 Sep 50 (2328) Seizure of Objective O-3 short of the FBHL
4-50 16 Sep 50 (1045) Seizure of FBHL
5-50 16 Sep 50 (1600) Capture of Kimpo Airfield. Prepare to seize
Corps Phase Line C-C
6-50 18 Sep 50 (1814) Seizure and preparation of crossing of Han
River by 5th Marines. 1st Marines to
continue attack relieved on the right
(south) flank by the 32nd Infantry now
attached to 1st MarDiv
7-50 19 Sep 50 (1430) Crossing of the Han River by the 5th Marines
and uncovering crossing sites by 1st
Marines
8-50 20 Sep 50 Continuation of attack by 5th Marines toward
Seoul to uncover the northern approaches
of the main Seoul bridge sites.
Continuation of attack by 1st Marines to
seize the southern and western approaches
and the Seoul bridge sites, prepared to
cross the Han River in that vicinity
9-50 23 Sep 50 (1200) Continuation of attack by 1st Marines to
seize high ground south of the road and
rail bridges leading to Seoul prepared to
cross the Han River. Continuation of attack
by 5th Marines to uncover the bridge
sites. Crossing of the Han River at
Haengju by the 7th Marines to seize
objectives covering the north flank of the
Division
10-50 23 Sep 50 (2200) Crossing of the Han River by the 1st Marines.
Continuation of the attack by the
5th Marines. 7th Marines to continue or
Mission assigned by 1st MarDiv OpnO
9-50
11-50 24 Sep 50 (2400) Continuation of the attack with all three
regiments to capture Seoul and the high
ground north thereof
12-50 26 Sep 50 (1230) Continuation of the attack to capture Seoul.
Boundary between 5th and 7th Marines
changed to pinch out 5th Marines beyond
the Government Palace. The 7th Marines
to make an enveloping attack from the
northwest
13-50 29 Sep 50 (2000) Continuation of the attack to the east to
secure Seoul and conduct a reconnaissance
in force to the northwest prepared to
relieve elements of the 7th Infantry
Division north of the Han River. Seizure of
prescribed Corps blocking positions
14-50 30 Sep 50 (1500) Continuation of the attack and prescription
of blocking positions to be occupied by the
Division
15-50 5 Oct 50 Movement of the Division to staging area
in the vicinity of Inchon in anticipation of
the move in assault shipping to Wonsan
APPENDIX H
Enemy Units During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign
The enemy’s method of operation, except for a brief determined stand
near and in Seoul, consisted of moderate to strong delaying actions.
The first reaction following the initial disorganization at Inchon
was an attempt to contain our advance until such time as sufficient
reinforcements could arrive to warrant initiating a counteroffensive.
In view of the scarcity of reinforcements and our own rapid advances,
this never materialized.
The Order of Battle of the units which opposed the advance of the
Division from the time of the landing at Inchon until the capture of
Uijongbu, north of Seoul, is given below:
--------------+--------+-------------+--------+------------------------
Unit | POWs | Area of |Strength| Remarks
|captured| employment | |
--------------+--------+-------------+--------+------------------------
226th Marine | 183 |Inchon | 2,000 |In the Inchon area
Regt | | | | prior to the landing.
| | | | Newly conscripted
| | | | and poorly trained.
| | | |
918th (Coast) | 2(?) | do | 200 |In the Inchon area prior
Art Regt | | | | to the landing. 8 76mm
(Elements). | | | | guns. Wiped out or
| | | | scattered by naval and
| | | | air bombardment.
| | | |
Air Force | 91 |Kimpo | [485] |When out troops
Division | | Airfield | | approached the
| | | | airfield area part
| | | | of the personnel from
| | | | this unit withdrew
| | | | across the Han River.
| | | |
42d Mech | 11 |Between | 500 |Arrived in Seoul from
(Tank) Regt | | Inchon and | | Sinuiju in early Sept.
| | Seoul. | | 18 T-34 tanks.
| | | |
| | | |
107th Security| 270 |Kimpo Area | 2,500 |In the Kimpo area when
Regt | | | | we landed. A
| | | | quasi-military
| | | | organization.
| | | |
Rehabilitation| 16 |West of | 230 |This unit was organized
Bn (Special | | Yongdungpo.| | on 19 Sept and contained
Cultural) | | | | NK prisoners serving
Bn. | | | | sentence in Seoul.
| | | | Officers were also
| | | | former prisoners. Most
| | | | were serving sentence
| | | | for desertion.
| | | |
3d Regt, 9th | 23 |Yongdungpo | 2,000 |Remainder of the division
Rifle Div | | | | on the southern front.
| | | |
25th Inf Brig | 179 |Seoul |4,000- | Arrived from Chorwon on
| | | 5,000 | 20 Sept. An excellent
| | | | unit which opposed the
| | | | 5th Marines on the
| | | | western approaches
| | | | to Seoul.
| | | |
18th Rifle Div| 301 |Seoul and |8,000- |Arrived from Chorwon in
| | Yongdungpo.| 10,000| mid-August. Known as
| | | | the Seoul Defense
| | | | Division. It was the
| | | | only unit of division
| | | | strength in the area.
| | | |
43d Tank Regt | 56 |Seoul | 500 |Arrived from Wonsan 23
| | | | Sept. 10–15 T-34
| | | | tanks.
| | | |
19th AA Regt | 5 | do | 1,200 |In Seoul when we landed.
| | | | 37mm, 85mm, and 12.7mm
| | | | AT guns.
| | | |
76th Ind Regt,| 218 | do | 3,000 |Arrived from Wonsan after
42d Div | | | | 17 Sept. Was opposite
| | | | the 5th Marines but
| | | | withdrew from Seoul
| | | | almost intact.
| | | |
78th Ind Regt | 528 | do | 2,000 |Arrived from Sariwon on
| | | | 20 Sept. Opposed the
| | | | 5th and 1st Marines.
| | | | Put up stubborn defense
| | | | and suffered heavy
| | | | losses.
| | | |
513th Art Regt| 33 | do | 1,500 |Arrived from Chorwon on
| | | | 23 Sept. 1 76mm and 5
| | | | 45mm guns. Most of
| | | | the regiment served
| | | | as infantry.
| | | |
10th Railroad | 17 | do | 900 |In Seoul when we landed.
Regt. | | | | Its mission was to
| | | | maintain the security
| | | | of the railroad lines
| | | | and keep them in
| | | | operation. It
| | | | participated in the
| | | | defense of Seoul.
| | | |
31st Rifle | 345 | do | 3,600 |In Seoul when we landed.
Div/or Seoul| | | | Formed as a division
City Regt. | | | | on 20 Sept by an
| | | | amalgamation of units
| | | | in Seoul. Participated
| | | | in the defense of Seoul
| | | | and delayed our advance
| | | | north to Uijongbu.
| | | |
36th Bn, 111th| 32 | do | 750 |In Seoul when we landed.
Security | | | |
Regt | | | |
| | | |
2d Regt 17th | 41 |Seoul- | 3,500 |Withdrawn from the
Rifle Div | | Uijongbu | | southern front after
(Reinforced)| | | | the landing at
| | | | Inchon.
| | | |
75th Ind Regt.| 16 |Uijongbu | 2,000 |Arrived from Hamhung on
| | | | 30 Sept. Used as a
| | | | covering force to
| | | | cover the withdrawal
| | | | through Uijongbu.
| | | |
27th Inf Brig.| 123 |Suyuhyon | 5,000 |Arrived from Kumchon on
| | | | 1 Oct. Withdrew in
| | | | the face of the
| | | | advance of the 5th
| | | | Marines to Suyuhyon,
| | | | 17 miles northwest
| | | | of Seoul.
| | | |
Total Enemy Strength 44,380
[485] Unknown.
A total of 428 prisoners interrogated did not know enough of their own
units to be further identified. Approximately 1,000 prisoners were not
interrogated due to the heavy initial influx.
Prisoners were captured from some 24 units not listed above, but the
number of prisoners captured from individual units was not sufficient
to accept the presence of the unit. Further, many of these POWs were
deserters or wounded from the southern front.
The identification, by date, of North Korean units opposing the 1st
Marine Division is indicated below:
15 September 226th Ind Marine Regt 2,000 defending Wolmi-do
(2 Bns). and Inchon
918th Art Regt (2 Cos) 200 defending Wolmi-do
16 September 18th Rifle Div (Opposing 300 POWs and 1,350
1st Marines) enemy casualties for
the first two days,
15 and 16 Sep
17 September 42d Mech (Tank) Regt Lost 14 T-34 tanks
(Opposing 1st Marines)
107th Security Regt 400 POWs and 350 enemy
(Kimpo) (Opposing casualties
KMC & 5th Marines)
18 September NK Air Force EngBn 197 POWs and 450 enemy
(Opposing 5th Marines) casualties
19 September No additional 126 POWs and 600 enemy
identifications on casualties
fronts of 1st and
5th Marines
20 September 78th Ind Regt (Opposing 326 POWs and 600 enemy
5th Marines) No casualties
additional identifications
on front of 1st Marines
21 September No additional identifications 355 POWs and 1,350
enemy casualties
22 September Rehabilitation Bn (Opposing 395 POWs and 1,250
1st Marines). casualties
25th Inf Brig (Opposing
5th Marines)
31st Rifle Div (Seoul City
Regt) (Opposing 5th Marines)
23 September No additional identifications 169 POWs and 900
casualties
24 September do 67 POWs and 950
casualties
25 September do 142 POWs and 1,750
casualties
26 September 76th Ind Regt 407 POWs and 950
43d Tank Regt casualties
19th AA Regt
513th Art Regt
17th Rifle Div
(Opposing 1st & 5th
Marines)
27 September No additional identifications 139 POWs and 1,252
casualties
28 September do 206 POWs and 332
casualties
29 September do 507 POWs and 102
casualties
30 September do 328 POWs and 305
casualties
1 October do 124 POWs and 75 casualties
2 October 27th Inf Brig (Opposing 5th 82 POWs and 350 casualties
Marines)
75th Ind Regt (Opposing 7th
Marines)
3 October No additional identifications 103 POWs and 800 casualties
4 October do 118 POWs
5 October do 57 POWs
6 October do 144 POWs
In the above tabulation, a unit is shown only for the first day upon
which it was identified by the capture of prisoners. In the cases of
most of the units there were recurring captures of prisoners.
APPENDIX I
Congratulatory Messages
The following messages, of a commendatory nature, were transmitted
to the 1st Marine Division by the X Corps upon completion of the
Inchon-Seoul Campaign.
_From CG, X Corps to CG, 1st Marine Division under date of 28 September
1950_
“On this date the X Corps attained one of its distinct objectives--the
securing of the city of Seoul. In recognition of the heroic efforts of
the officers and men of the 1st Marine Division I extend my deepest
thanks and my continuing admiration for a task well done.” Signed
Edward M. Almond, Major General, United States Army, Commanding.
_From the President to General MacArthur_
“I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you
my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved
under your leadership in Korea. Few operations in military history can
match either the delaying action where you traded space; for time in
which to build up your forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has now
resulted in the liberation of Seoul. I am particularly impressed by
the splendid cooperation of our Army, Navy, and Air Force. I wish you
would extend my thanks and congratulations to the commanders of those
services--Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T.
Joy and Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer. The unification of
our arms established by you and by them has set a shining example. My
thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to
your gallant forces--soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen--from the
United States and the other countries fighting for freedom under the
United Nations Banner. I salute you all, and say to all of you from all
of us at home, ‘well and nobly done.’” Signed Harry S. Truman.
_From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur_
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff are proud of the great successes you have
achieved. We realize that they would have been impossible without
brilliant and audacious leadership and without the full coordination
and the fighting spirit of all forces and all arms. From the sudden
initiation of hostilities you have exploited to the utmost all
capabilities and opportunities. Your transition from defensive to
offensive operations was magnificently planned, timed, and executed.
You have given new inspiration to the freedom-loving peoples of the
world. We remain completely confident that the great task entrusted to
you by the United Nations will be carried to a successful conclusion.”
_From CG, X Corps to all units of the X Corps under date of 2 October
1950_
“It is desired that this message be disseminated to all members of
your command. The achievements of the U. N. forces comprising the X
Corps should be a pride and inspiration to all who participated in
the recent operations so successfully concluded and which resulted in
the liberation of Seoul, the capital city of Korea. Your efforts have
greatly contributed in freeing the Republic of Korea of the forces of
Communism that threatened to enslave her people. Koreans may now take
their rightful place among the freedom-loving people of the world.
History will long remember the feat of arms that you, through your
untiring efforts and superb valor have accomplished. I am proud of the
units comprising the X Corps. Each of you should be proud of the unit
in which you serve, the nation it represents, and your part in this
military operation. I am confident that the tasks that are before us
will be accomplished with the same splendid cooperation, leadership,
and determination that you have so recently displayed.” Signed Major
General Edward M. Almond, Commanding General, X Corps.
_Division Commander’s Message to the 1st Marine Division upon
Completion of the Inchon-Seoul Campaign_
On 8 October 1950, the Division Commander issued Division Memorandum
No. 192-50, quoted below, in recognition of the accomplishments of the
1st Marine Division during the Inchon-Seoul Campaign:
“1. Upon completion of the campaign in the Inchon-Seoul area of Korea
I desire to express my appreciation and admiration of the superb
manner in which all hands have cooperated in bringing to a successful
conclusion a very difficult operation.
“2. From the time the decision was made to bring the Division to
war strength and to commit it in Korea until the city of Seoul was
captured, urgency has been the order of the day. Urgency has been
necessary because tidal conditions dictated that a landing at Inchon be
made on September 15th. For the Division this meant that its elements
in the United States had to be brought to war strength immediately, had
to be re-equipped and, in the absence of amphibious shipping, had to be
loaded on such other ships as could hurriedly be made available. Upon
arrival in Kobe, Japan, there was the pressing necessity of reloading
in minimum time in amphibious shipping, with the disruption caused by
a destructive typhoon. Elements of the Division comprising the First
Provisional Marine Brigade were not released from combat in South Korea
until midnight of September 5th and between that date and September
12th were required to move to Pusan, re-equip and mount out.
“3. It is now history that the First Marine Division did meet its
commitments, did land at Inchon on September 15th under conditions
which required the maximum of coordination, aggressive action, and
devotion to duty; went on to capture the Kimpo airfield three days
after landing, to effect a difficult amphibious crossing of the Han
River, and to liberate the city of Seoul by driving the North Korean
invaders far beyond its limits.
“4. I fully appreciate, and I am sure the American people now fully
appreciate and realize, that only well-trained and determined troops,
completely devoted to duty, could have accomplished what the First
Marine Division did in Korea. You have established your place in
history. The memory of those who made the supreme sacrifice in the
accomplishment of this mission will forever remain an inspiration to
all Marines.”
APPENDIX J
Casualties During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign
Following is a daily breakdown of the casualties suffered by the 1st
Marine Division during the Inchon-Seoul Campaign (15 September-7
October 1950), together with a tabulation of the number of POWs
captured by the Division and the estimated casualties inflicted on the
enemy.
------+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+---------------
Date |KIA |DOW |MIA | WIA | Total | POWs | Estimated
|[486]|[486]|[486]| [486]| battle | captured | enemy
| | | | |casualties| [487] |casualties[488]
------+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+---------------
15 Sep| 20 | 1 | 1 | 174 | 196 | [488] | [489]
16 Sep| 2 | 1 | 1 | 22 | 26 | 300 | [489]1,350
17 Sep| 6 | 0 | 0 | 70 | 76 | 400 | 350
18 Sep| 7 | 3 | 0 | 92 | 102 | 197 | 450
19 Sep| 10 | 1 | 0 | 61 | 72 | 126 | 600
20 Sep| 24 | 1 | 3 | 119 | 147 | 326 | 600
21 Sep| 30 | 3 | 0 | 198 | 231 | 355 | 1,350
22 Sep| 27 | 3 | 0 | 135 | 165 | 395 | 1,200
23 Sep| 19 | 7 | 0 | 117 | 143 | 169 | 900
24 Sep| 68 | 4 | 0 | 217 | 289 | 67 | 950
25 Sep| 33 | 4 | 1 | 238 | 276 | 142 | 1,750
26 Sep| 29 | 7 | 0 | 167 | 203 | 407 | 950
27 Sep| 33 | 3 | 0 | 153 | 189 | 139 | 1,252
28 Sep| 8 | 4 | 0 | 31 | 43 | 206 | 332
29 Sep| 19 | 1 | 0 | 49 | 69 | 507 | 102
30 Sep| 11 | 2 | 0 | 48 | 61 | 328 | 305
1 Oct| 2 | 1 | 0 | 16 | 19 | 124 | 75
2 Oct| 15 | 1 | 0 | 81 | 97 | 82 | 350
3 Oct| 2 | 1 | 0 | 35 | 38 | 103 | 800
4 Oct| 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 118 | 0
5 Oct| 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 57 | 0
6 Oct| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 144 | 0
7 Oct| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+---------------
Total | 366 | 49 | 6 |2,029 | 2,450 | 6,492 | 13,666
------+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+---------------
[486] Based on compilation on 15 March 1951 by Casualty
Reporting Officer.
[487] Based on G-2 Report included in the Special Action
Report for the Inchon-Seoul Campaign. The figures
shown are less than the total of regimental reports of
captures, as only those POWs remaining after processing
by the G-2 were counted. Oftentimes civilians were
turned over to the G-2 as POWs. A lag is also reflected
in the figures of the G-2 Section. Both regiments
captured prisoners on D-Day, 15 September, but the
prisoners were not processed until 16 September.
[488] Estimated enemy casualties do not include POWs. Figures
shown are based on the G-2 Report included in the
Special Action Report for the Inchon-Seoul Campaign.
[489] The figure shown for 16 September includes the
casualties inflicted on the enemy on 15 September.
APPENDIX K
Comments on Close Air Support Provided by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
HEADQUARTERS
7TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 7
10 January 1951
Subject: Marine Air Support
To: Commandant, United States Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.
Thru: Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, APO 7.
1. In my capacity as Division Artillery Commander and Fire Support
Coordinator of the Seventh Infantry Division I have been able to
observe closely the most effective system of close air support
currently used by the Marines. During the period 19 September to 20
December 1950, close air support of this division was furnished almost
exclusively by the First Marine Air Wing.
2. In an effort to parallel as nearly as possible the Marine system of
controlling close support air this division had attached to it the Far
East Detachment, ANGLICO, FMF, Atlantic. This detachment was augmented
by nine (9) Tactical Air Control Parties, Fifth U. S. Air Force,
trained in the Marine system of control by the ANGLICO detachment.
This enabled the placement of Tactical Air Control Parties with each
infantry battalion. Such placement proved to be ideal and gave the
battalion commander a means of controlling and coordinating the close
air support he received.
3. It is worthy to note that in 57 days of combat 1024 sorties were
flown by Marine Aircraft in close support of the division without a
single casualty among our own troops due to friendly air action. This
record I attribute to the fact that adequate control was available with
front line units. In many instances Marine planes were bombing and
strafing within 200 yards of our front lines.
4. I wish to express my appreciation for the superior cooperation
of Captain Charles E. Crew, 023897, USMC, Far East Detachment,
ANGLICO, FMF, Atlantic and his enlisted assistants during the period
19 September 1950 to 20 December 1950. In his capacity as Marine
Air Liaison Officer to the Seventh Infantry Division Captain Crew
functioned as a member of the division team with a common objective.
The excellent air support received by this division was due in no
small part to the enthusiastic manner in which Captain Crew performed.
Unfortunately, I was not able to observe the work of the other two
Marine Forward Air Controllers attached to the division. Reports
indicate that they performed equally as well.
5. Again, allow me to reemphasize my appreciation for the outstanding
air support received by this division. The Marine system of control, in
my estimation, approaches the ideal and I firmly believe that a similar
system should be adopted as standard for Army Divisions.
(s) HOMER W. KIEFER
_Brigadier General, USA_
_Commanding_
[1st Endorsement]
Subject: Marine Air Support
Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division, APO 7 12 January 1951
To: Commanding General, X Corps, APO 909
I wish to express my own appreciation to all members of the 1st Marine
Air Wing who assisted in the fine air support given to the 7th Infantry
Division and also to commend Forward Air Controllers, Captain Edward P.
Stamford and 1st Lieutenant Jack R. Grey as well as Captain Crew for
outstanding performances of duty in connection with the support.
(s) DAVID G. BARR
_Maj Gen., USA_
_Commanding_
[2nd Endorsement]
Headquarters, X Corps, APO 909, 16 January 1951
To: Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, APO 301
1. The effective close air support rendered by the 1st Marine Air Wing
through the Forward Air Controllers with the 7th Infantry Division
greatly aided in the successful accomplishment of X Corps operations.
The actions of the personnel concerned are worthy of commendation, and
I wish to add my appreciation for their assistance.
2. Further, I wish to emphasize the statements of General Kiefer in
paragraph 5, basic letter, in which he endorses the Marine system of
Tactical Air Control. It has proved itself on every occasion.
(s) EDWARD M. ALMOND
_Major General, United States Army_
_Commanding_
[3rd Endorsement]
CHO FEC-SCAP
AG RECORDS
FIEDAG 330.13
4795
AG 373 KAR (10 Jan 51)
Subject: Marine Air Support
Hq Eighth U. S. Army Korea (EU AK), APO 301 30 JAN 1951
TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East, APO 500
I note with gratification the splendid spirit of cooperation that
existed between the 1st Marine Air Wing and the 7th Infantry Division
in recent combat operations. I congratulate not only Captain Crew,
Captain Stamford, and Lieutenant Grey but all officers and men of the
1st Marine Air Wing for their magnificent performance.
(s) M. B. RIDGWAY
_Lieutenant General, United States Army_
_Commanding_
[4th Endorsement]
AG 330.13 (10 Jan 51) GA
General Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500, 4 February 1951
To: Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East, Navy No. 1165
Commander-in-Chief, Far East, takes pleasure in forwarding this
correspondence which again illustrated the outstanding support that
Marine Air is providing ground forces in the Korean operations.
By Command of General MacArthur
(s) K. B. BUSH
_Brigadier General, USA_
_Adjutant General_
CNFE/P15 05/RVW/the
Serial: 1213 12 Feb 1951
Fifth Endorsement on CG, 7th INFDIVART ltr of 10 Jan 1951
From: Commander Naval Forces, Far East
To: Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Via: (1) Commanding General, First Marine Air Wing
(2) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
Subj: Marine Air Support
1. Readdressed and forwarded.
2. Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, takes great pleasure in
forwarding correspondence and desires to recognize also the outstanding
performance of duty of Marine Corps personnel concerned.
(s) C. T. JOY
APPENDIX L
Presidential Unit Citation
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the
PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED
for service as set forth in the following Citation:
“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces
in Korea from 15 September to 11 October 1950. In the face of a
determined enemy and against almost insurmountable obstacles, including
disadvantageous tidal and beach conditions on the western coast of
Korea, the First Marine Division, Reinforced, rapidly and successfully
effected the amphibious seizure of Inch’on in an operation without
parallel in the history of amphibious warfare. Fully aware that the
precarious situation of friendly ground forces fighting desperately
against the continued heavy pressure of a numerically superior hostile
force necessitated the planning and execution of this extremely
hazardous operation within a period of less than thirty days, and
cognizant of the military importance of its assigned target, the
Division moved quickly into action and, on 15 September, by executing
three well-coordinated attacks over highly treacherous beach approaches
defended by resolute enemy troops, captured the island of Wolmi-do,
the city of Inch’on and Kimp’o Airfield, and rendered invaluable
assistance in the capture of Seoul. As a result of its aggressive
attack, the Division drove the hostile forces in hasty retreat over
thirty miles in the ensuing ten days, completely severed vital hostile
communication and supply lines and greatly relieved enemy pressure on
other friendly ground units, thereby permitting these units to break
out from their Pusan beachhead and contributing materially to the total
destruction of hostile ground forces in southern Korea. The havoc and
destruction wrought on an enemy flushed with previous victories and the
vast accomplishments in turning the tide of battle from a weakening
defensive to a vigorous offensive action reflect the highest credit
upon the officers and men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, and
the United States Naval Service.”
The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division
participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from
15 September to 11 October 1950:
_Fleet Marine Force Units and Detachments_: Radio Relay Platoon, 1st
Signal Operations Company; Battery C, 1st 4.5 Inch Rocket Battalion;
1st Amphibian Truck Company; 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less
Company “D”); 1st Combat Service Group, Service Command; 1st
Fumigation and Bath Platoon; 1st Aerial Delivery Platoon; 7th Motor
Transport Battalion, Service Command; 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion;
Detachment Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two; Team #1, First
Provisional Historical Platoon; Marine Observation Squadron Six;
Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three, Reinforced, including Headquarters
Squadron Thirty-Three, Marine Service Squadron Thirty-Three, Marine
Ground Control Intercept Squadron One, Marine Fighter Squadron Two
Hundred Twelve, Marine Fighter Squadron Two Hundred Fourteen, Marine
Fighter Squadron Three Hundred Twelve, Marine Fighter Squadron Three
Hundred Twenty-Three, Marine Night Fighter Squadron Five Hundred
Thirteen, and Marine Night Fighter Squadron Five Hundred Forty-Two.
_United States Navy Units_: Naval Beach Group One.
_United States Army Units_: Detachment 205th Signal Repair Company;
Detachment 4th Signal Battalion; 163rd Military Intelligence Service
Detachment; Company “A” Reinforced, 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion;
96th Field Artillery Battalion; 441st Counter-Intelligence Corps
Detachment; 2nd Engineer Special Brigade; 73rd Engineer (C) Battalion;
50th Engineer Port Construction Company; 65th Ordnance Ammunition
Company; 32nd Regimental Combat Team; Special Operations Company;
3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team; and the 50th
Antiaircraft Artillery Air Warning Battalion.
For the President,
(s) DAN A. KIMBALL
_Secretary of the Navy_
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GEORGE Chaplain
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JIG Embarkation
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MIKE Food Director
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WILLIAM Special Services
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DOG DOG Naval Gunfire
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ROGER ROGER 7th Marines
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Index
Adams, Cape Nate L. II, 117_n_, 136_n_
Adelman, LtCol Merritt, 215
Advance Attack Group. _See_ U.S. Navy, Task Group 90.1
Africa, 50
_African Patriot_, SS, 32
Air attacks, North Korean, 104, 295
Air drop, 268
Air Force, U.S., 297
Intelligence, 165
Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 2, 8, 13, 71, 170
Combat Cargo Command, 71, 169
Fifth Air Force, 144, 295
Air strikes. _See_ Air support.
Air support, U.S., 8, 67, 69–71, 102, 144, 145, 153, 166, 167, 170,
180, 181, 201, 208, 223, 235, 236, 243, 246–250, 256, 258,
268, 273, 274, 278, 286, 289, 294, 295
Aircraft, U. S., 13, 70, 145, 236, 243, 295
Air Force, 59, 144
Marine, 69, 86, 88, 93, 170, 215, 223, 226, 238, 295
Navy, 84–87, 102
AD (Skyraiders), 102, 105, 180
Bombers, 144
B-26 (Invader), 13
B-29 (Superfort), 13
F4U (Corsair), 47, 87, 88, 93, 102, 134, 171, 195, 196, 208, 223,
247, 248, 250, 257, 279, 289
F7F (Tigercat), 169, 170, 257
F-51 (Mustang), 13
Helicopter, 27, 144, 167, 172, 187, 202, 290, 295
HO3S-1 Helicopter, 165, 166
OY (Grasshopper), 166, 295
Transport planes, 30
Aircraft, North Korean
Bombers, 2
Stormovik, 165
YAK, 2, 202
YAK III, 165
Aircraft carriers (CV), 81
Aircraft losses, U. S., 294
Allen, Sgt Charles D., 105
Allmon, LCdr Clyde E., USN, 45, 102, 103_n_
_Alma Victory_, SS, 32
Almond, MajGen Edward M., USA, 3_n_, 4, 6, 7, 12, 38, 39, 43–45,
65–67, 71, 77, 78, 151, 183, 244, 262, 291
Altaire, Sgt Marion C., 176, 260
Ambush, North Korean, 220
_American Press_, SS, 32
American Revolution, 48
_American Victory_, SS, 32
Ammunition
North Korean, 177
South Korean, 145
U.S., 125, 127, 169, 170, 228, 231, 235, 238, 268
Bombs, 88, 248
Rockets, 69, 70, 88, 107, 134, 169, 248, 263, 278
3.5-inch rockets, 173
WP rockets, 163
Ammunition dump, North Korean, 228, 274
Ammunition dump, U. S., 96
Amphibian tractors, 98, 191–193, 296
Amphibious Doctrine, development, 48–50
Amphibious force flagship (AGC), 79
Amphibious vessels, 81
Anderson, 2d Lt Tilton A., 155–157, 240_n_, 241, 245, 246, 247_n_, 249
Andrewes, RAdm Sir William G., RN, 67, 85
ANGLICO, 5, 6, 13, 41, 166
Anyang, 225
ARKANSAS, Point, 81, 83, 84
Armstrong, Capt Victor A., 165
Army Chief of Staff. _See_ Gen J. Lawton Collins
Army, U. S., 5, 8, 47, 49, 50, 59, 75, 103, 296, 297
Amphibious Training, 4, 5
Demobilization 1945–46, 6
Army Units, U. S.
Far East Command. _See_ Far East Command.
Army of Occupation, Japan, 6
Headquarters, U. S. Armed Forces in Korea, 7
Sixth Army, 5, 19
Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 3, 5–9, 15, 28, 42, 46, 47, 59,
65–67, 73, 85, 144, 170, 171, 184, 198, 253, 254, 285,
291, 292, 295, 298
Tenth Army, 17
I Corps, 171, 253
IX Corps, 171
X Corps, 38, 40, 46, 58, 61, 62, 65, 66, 70, 71, 73, 107, 172, 201,
253, 254, 264, 275, 283, 285, 286, 290, 291, 298;
Inception, 43;
Staff, 58;
Tactical Air Command (TAC), 71, 100, 104, 167, 169, 295
1st Cavalry Division, 7, 9, 13, 41, 171, 253, 254, 285
2d Infantry Division, 9, 28, 41, 47, 171, 254
3d Infantry Division, 58, 172
7th Infantry Division, 7, 9, 41, 58, 66, 67, 78, 153, 172, 184, 197,
212, 221, 244, 254, 255, 285, 286, 296
11th Airborne Division, 172
24th Infantry Division, 6–8, 14, 15, 171, 253
25th Infantry Division, 6–9, 171, 254
2d Engineer Special Brigade, 9, 65, 76, 80, 127, 129
187th Airborne RCT, 172, 286, 290, 296
2d Battalion, 238
3d Battalion, 256, 264
5th Regimental Combat Team, 28
17th Infantry Regiment, 67, 184, 279
2d Battalion, 274
31st Infantry Regiment, 184, 221, 254
32d Infantry Regiment, 66, 78, 153, 184, 209, 210, 212, 216, 221,
225, 244, 254, 255, 271, 273, 279, 296
1st Battalion, 225
2d Battalion, 211, 225, 263, 273
3d Battalion, 273, 274
56th Amphibian Tank and Tractor Battalion, 172, 196, 202
Company A, 76, 100, 188, 254
50th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 286, 291
2d Engineer Combat Group, 172
73d Engineer (c) Battalion, 76
93d Field Artillery Battalion, 172
96th Field Artillery Battalion, 172, 254
73d Tank Battalion, 79, 172
50th Engineer Port Construction Company, 76
X Corps Special Operations Company, 77, 78_n_, 256
65th Ordnance and Ammunition Company, 76
441st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Team, 59
163d Military Intelligence Service Detachment (MISD), 59
Arsenal, North Korean, 178
Artillery. _See_ Weapons.
Artillery Support, 243, 246, 268, 270, 273, 278
Asahi Brewery, 106
Ascom City, 138–140, 147, 148, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 164, 173, 175,
180, 214, 292
Assault Shipping, 75, 79
Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division. _See_ Brig Gen
Edward A. Craig.
Attack Force. _See_ U. S. Navy, Task Force 90.
Attacks, North Korean, 206, 213, 231, 258, 276
Austria, 48
Aviation Gasoline, 169
Babashanian, Maj John G., 34
Babe, 1stLt George A., 210, 259, 260
_Badoeng Strait_ (CVE), USS, 70, 85, 86, 168, 257
BAKER Ferry, 200
Band, 75, 283
Banks, Capt David W., 276
Barges, Japanese, 79
Barome, Hospitalman Philip A., USN, _pic._
Barr, MajGen David G., USA, 41, 44, 197, 212, 255, 284, 291, _pic._
Barracks ships, 75
Barrett, Maj A. J., 35
Barricades, 277, 279
Barron, Lt. Charles R., USN, 45
Barrow, Maj R. H., 121_n_, 212, 213, 216_n_, 220, 226–228, 231
Barstow, California, Annex, Depot of Supplies, 31, 132
Bartley, Maj Whitman S., 123
Bates, Maj W. L., 117_n_, 121_n_, 213_n_, 216, 226_n_
Battleship, 202
Beaches
BLUE, 63–65, 69, 94, 98, 100–105, 113–118, 120–123, 128, 131, 142,
198, 294, _pic._
BLUE One, 98, 100, 113, 116, 121, 122
BLUE Two, 100, 113, 116–118, 121, 122
BLUE Three, 100, 113, 118, 121, 123
GREEN, 64–65, 69, 78, 86–88, 90, 92, 93, 95, 103, 128, 131,
132, 142, 195
RED, 64–65, 69, 94, 95, 98, 101–102, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110–113,
125–128, 132, 139, 142, 152, 198, 294, _pic._
YELLOW, 129, 132, 142, 151
Beauchamp, Col Charles E., 221, _pic._
Beckley, Lt R. M., USN, 110
Belbusti, 1stLt Albert F., 241
_Belgian Victory_, USS, 32
Belleau Wood, 11
Benedict, LtCol William E., 45
Berry, LCdr Reuben W., USN, 102_n_, 103
_Bexar_ (APA), USS, 53
Bey, Capt Robert T., 289_n_
Bland, Capt Richard F., 220, 222
Blockade, 2
Blood plasma, 228
Bloodsworth Island, 49
BLUEHEARTS, Operation, 6, 172
Bohn, 1stLt Robert D., 90, 91, 93
Bolkow, TSgt George W., 279
Boston, TSgt Kenneth C., 159
Bougainville, 51
Bowser, Col Alpha L., 30_n_, 34_n_, 37_n_, 262
_Boxer_ (CV), USS, 84, 86
Breen, Capt Richard R., 267, 268
Bridge, 184, 188, 197, 199, 216, 219–221, 223, 225, 232, 252, 254.
_See also_ Floating Bridge, Kalchon Bridge.
Bridges, Maj David W., 117_n_, 121_n_, 122, 123, 213, 226_n_, 251_n_,
279_n_, 280_n_
Bridging equipment, 40
Briggs, Capt Cameron, USN, 84
British Consulate Hill, 104
Brock, Capt P. W., RN, 178
Brower, Col James H., 131
Brush, Maj Charles H., Jr., 188, 193
Bulldozers, 126
Burris, Cpl Charles E., _pic._
Bushe, 1stLt Eugene A., 215, 216_n_
CALIFORNIA, Point, 81, 85
CAMID, Operation, 19
Canzona, 1stLt Nicholas A., 159
_Cape Esperance_ (CVE), USS, 54
Capps, LCdr Arlie G., USN, 45
Cargo Ships, Attack (AKA), 63, 79, 80, 84
Caribbean, 49
Carlon, 1stLt Francis B., 216_n_, 217, 273, 279_n_, 280_n_
Carpenter, 1stLt Stanley H., 195
Carter, 2dLt Johnny L., 121_n_, 135_n_, 140_n_, 141_n_, 173, 175, 178
Cashion, 2dLt Dana M., 190, 192
Casualties
North Korean, 94, 123, 141, 150, 156, 158, 159, 161, 164, 171, 173,
177, 196, 211, 215, 228, 231, 241, 260, 263, 284, 286,
289, 297, _pic._
United States, 86, 93, 105, 107, 111, 112, 122, 126, 130, 133, 140,
144, 150, 156, 158, 159, 164, 177, 178, 181, 183, 195,
196, 202, 208, 209, 211, 221–223, 225, 234, 236, 240, 241,
246, 247, 249–252, 261, 267, 273, 274, 276, 284,
290, 297, _pic._
Cates, Gen Clifton B., 3, 11, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 32, 42, 53, 76, 290
_Cavalier_ (APA) USS, 83, 98, 102
Caves, 91, 92, 94, 197, 260
Cemetery Hill, 95, 98, 104, 106, 107, 110–113, 127, 132
Ceylon, 54
Changsa-dong, 145
_Charity_ (DD), HMS, 61
Chase, Capt Lester T., 287
Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., 73
Chief of Naval Operations. _See_ Adm Forrest P. Sherman.
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. _See_ Gen J. Lawton Collins.
China, 12, 49
China, Communist, 57, 292, 297;
Possible intervention in Korea, 9
Chinese Communist Forces, 1, 2
Chindong-ni, 38
Chinju, 30, 254
Chinnampo, 144
Chongdong, 202
Chonsong-ni, 256
Chosin Reservoir, 285
Church, BrigGen John H., USA, 7
Civil Government, 143, 281
Clark Lt Eugene F., USN, 61, 62, 85, 87
Clark, LtGen Mark W., USA, 5
Clark, Lt Theodore B., USN, 102, 103_n_, 115, 120, 121_n_
Clothing, 75, 77
Close air support. _See_ Air support.
Codispoti, Capt Gildo S., 113_n_, 116_n_, 117_n_, 140_n_, 183, 210_n_,
211_n_, 213_n_, 221_n_, 223_n_, 271_n_
Cole, BrigGen Eli K., 48_n_
Cole, LtCol J. Frank, 170
Coleman lanterns, 187
_Collett_ (DD), USS, 86, 87
Collins, Cpl Charles E., 262, 263
Collins, 2dLt Edward E., 278
Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, 44, 46, 172
Comiskey, TSgt Donald, 159
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 19
Commander, Amphibious Group 1. _See_ RAdm James H. Doyle.
Commander in Chief, Far East. _See_ General Douglas MacArthur.
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. _See_ Adm Arthur W. Radford.
Commander Naval Forces, Far East. _See_ VAdm C. Turner Joy.
Commander, Task Force 90. _See_ RAdm James H. Doyle.
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. _See_ LtGen Lemuel C.
Shepherd, Jr.
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. _See_ MajGen Oliver P. Smith.
Commiskey, 2d Lt Henry A., 217, 219
Communications
Equipment, 75
Radio Frequencies, 70
SCR-300, 191, 192, 228
Condit, Kenneth W., 129_n_, 223_n_, 294_n_
Conference of 4 July, 4
Conference of 10 July, 9
Cooney, Capt Thomas E., 268, 276
Cooper, LtCol Francis H., 76
Coox, Dr. A. D., 139_n_
“Copper Mine Hill”, 221, 225
Corbet, 2dLt Robert H., 208
Corduroy road, 199
Correspondents, 151, 187
Costigan, Capt James G., 117_n_, 129_n_
Counselman, 2dLt John D., 88_n_, 93
Counterattacks
North Korean, 235, 241, 245, 246, 262, 263, 283
United States, 263, 264
Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 18, 28, 47, 94, 100_n_, 101, 135n, 142, 152,
165, 172, 183, 187, 194, 199, 202, 203, 254, 283. _pic._
Craven, 1stLt William A., 217
Creal, LtCol Albert, 35
Crete, 146
Crocker, 1stLt Robert O., 289
Crook, Capt Welby, 223
Crossman, 1stLt Ralph B., 188_n_, 191, 192
CROSSOVER Operation, 19
CROSSROADS Operation, 27
Crowe, LtCol Henry P., 126
Crowl, Philip A., 4_n_, 9_n_
Crowley, Capt Richard W., 117_n_, 136_n_
Crowson, SSgt T. Albert, 240
Cruisers, 67, 70, 81, 86, 88, 102–104, 145, 202
Cuba, 12, 27
Cuban, 48
Culebra, 48, 49
Culpepper, Cape Theodore T., 279_n_
Cummings, Lt Bryan J., 175, 176, 260, 261, 271, 278, 278_n_
Cunliffe, 2dLt Bruce F., 116_n_, 123, 134_n_, 135_n_, 173_n_, 177_n_,
178_n_, 183_n_, 211_n_, 213_n_
Cushman, BrigGen Thomas J., 18, 71, 104, 167, 170, 250_n_, 295, _pic._
Dai Ichi building, 45
Davis, Sgt, G. O., Jr., 34
Davis, LtCol Raymond G., 201, 268, 276, 287, 289
Dawe, 2dLt Harold L., Jr., 208
Dean, MajGen William F., USA, 7
DeArmond, Sgt David R., 163
DeFazio, 1stLt Ernest L., 190, 192_n_, 193
Defenses, North Korean, 83, 90, 92, 95, 106, 107, 219
_De Haven_ (DD), USS, 86, 87
Delamar, Capt Richard F., III, 276
Denny, 2dLt Paul E., 275
DEMON III Operation, 19
Department or State, U. S., 2_n_, 11, 12_n_, 18
Deptula, 2dLt Edwin A., 104_n_, 105, 108, 156–158, 161, 250_n_, 257, 258
Destroyers (DD), 63, 67, 69, 70, 81, 83, 86, 102–104, 115, 144, 145
_Diachenko_ (APD), USS, 102, 103
Dibble, Maj John G., 35
Dolan, 1stLt John E., 290_n_, 291
_Dolly Thurman_, SS, 32
Dominican Republic, 12
Douglas, Cpl Okey J., 150
Dowsett, LtCol Frederick R., 53, 54_n_, 146
Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15, 35, 38, 40, 43–47, 66,
70, 77, 81, 83, 84, 102, 142, 292, 293, _pic._
Dunbar, 1stLt Michael J., 112
Earney, Maj William R., 275_n_2
East Channel, 81
East China Sea, 81
Eddy, 2dLt Samuel L., Jr., 258
Edwards, PFC Clayton O., 220
Edwards, LtGen Idwal H., USAF, 44
El Toro, California, 1, 18, 26, 27, 54, 55, 170
Ellis, Maj Earl H., 48
Ely, Col Louis B., USA, 77, 78, 144
Embarkation Plans. _See_ Plans and orders.
Embarkation Groups, 79
ABLE, 79
BAKER, 79
CHARLIE, 79, 80
DOG, 80
EASY, 80
FOX, 80
English, Capt Gearl M., 148_n_, 156, 157
Epley, 2dLt James W., 258
Equipment, abandoned, 215
Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 18
Escort Carriers (CVE), 85, 166
Esterline, Maj William C., 188
Eubanks, 1stLt Fred F., Jr.
Europe, 50.
Evacuation stations, 185, 200
Far East Command, 7, 8, 38, 40, 43, 45, 59, 293
Advanced Command Group, 7
Headquarters, 4, 6, 9, 10, 14, 28, 38, 44, 57
Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), 6, 43, 61
Special Planning Staff, 57–59
Farrington, SSgt Arthur, 259, 260
Febrey, Pvt G. W. _pic._
Fellers, BrigGen William S., 4, 6, 27
Fenton, Capt Francis I. Jr., 111_n_, 206, 208, 213
Ferry, 185, 200, 203, 261, 294. _See also_ BAKER Ferry, Haengju Ferry.
Fire Support Areas, 69
Fire Support Coordination Center, 71, 166
Fire Support Units, 87
“Fireproof Phil”, 243
Fisher, 1stLt Joseph R., 118, 141_n_
_Fleet Training Publication 167_, 49
Fleischaker, Lt Robert J., USN, 181
Floating Bridge, 200
Floeck, Maj Robert, 256, 257
Flying Fish channel, 62, 81, 86
Food shortages, 282
Force Beachhead Line, 136, 153
Force in Readiness Concept, 11, 12
Formosa, 2
Forney, Col Edward S., 4–7, 66, 67_n_, 77_n_, 284_n_
Forrestal, James V., 50
_Fort Marion_ (LSD), USS, 93
Forward observer, 192
Fraser, LtCol Loren S., 35
Fridrich, Maj Raymond V., 268
Frigates (PF), 83
Fuller, MajGen John F. C., 50
Gallipoli, 48
Garvin, BrigGen Crump, USA, 7
Gasoline, 125
Gavin, MajGen James M., USA, 153
Gay, MajGen Hobart H., USA, 7, 15
Geer, Andrew, 26_n_
_George Clymer_ (APA), USS, 104
Germany, 48
_General Buckner_, (T-AP), USNS, 32
_General Butner_ (AP), USS, 32
_General Meigs_ (T-AP), USNS, 32
_General Morton_, (T-AP), USNS, 54
_General Weigel_ (T-AP), USNS, 32
Gettysburg, 37
Gifford, MSgt B. W., 127_n_
Giusti, Ernest H., 11_n_, 54_n_, 223_n_, 294_n_
Godbold, LtCol Brygthe D., 35
Goggin, 1stLt William F., 267
Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 166
Gover, 1stLt Robert L., 175
GRACE, Typhoon, 15
Great Britain
Ground forces, 171
27th Brigade, 171, 253
Marines, 61
Naval forces, 144
Frigate, 77
Green, 1stLt Melvin K., 96
_Green Bay Victory_, SS, 32
GREEN Beach. _See_ Beach, GREEN.
Green Island, 27
Grenell, SSgt H. M., 127_n_
Grimes, 2dLt George, 248, 249
Groff, Capt Goodwin C., 272
Grove, PFC W. D., 35
Guadalcanal, 27, 38
Guam, 17, 30, 37
Guantanamo Bay, 48
Gugeler, Capt Russell A., USA, 8_n_
Guild, 2dLt John N., 216, 217
Gunther, Capt Albert J., 35
_Gurke_ (DD), USS, 86, 87
Haengju, 180, 181, 183, 187, 188, 190, 194, 196, 197, 234, 238, 259
Haengju ferry, 231, 259
Haiti, 12,17
Hammond, Maj James D., 267_n_, 268, 275_n_, 289_n_
Han Choi Han, Col, NKPA, 160
Han River, 40, 58, 160, 163, 165, 172, 173, 180, 181, 183–185, 187,
196–202, 205, 206, 208, 219, 220, 222, 232, 238, 243, 244,
246, 254, 256, 285, 286, 294
Han River, crossing of, 187, 188, 190–195
Haneda Airfield, 35
Hanes, 1stLt J. V., _pic._
Hanlon, 2dLt Robert C, 173, 178
Harer, Lt Arnold W., USN, 110_n_
Harmon, Capt Lester G., 118
Harney, Cpl James P., 193
Harrell, 2dLt James E., 147_n_, 148_n_, 150, 161, 163
Harris, MajGen Field, 27, 51, 55, 71, 167–170, 295, _pic._
Harris, Cpl Welden D, 245, 249, 270_n_
Hart, MajGen Franklin A., 32
Hawaii, 1, 5, 19, 30
Hawkins, LtCol Jack, 121, 122, 136_n_, 138_n_, 177, 178, 212, 213,
216, 219, 222, 226, 227, 251, 252
Hayden, Col Reynolds H., 53_n_
Hays, LtCol Lawrence C, Jr., 188, 233
Heck, 2dLt Ray, 112, 240
_Helena_ (CA), USS, 144, 145
Helicopter evacuation, 295
Helicopter rescue missions, 166
Helicopters. _See_ Aircraft, U. S.
_Henderson_ (DD), USS, 86, 87
_Henrico_ (APA), USS, 83, 98, 102
Hering, Capt Eugene R., Jr., USN, 73, 130, 282
Hetrick, 2dLt Lawrence, 159
Hickey, BrigGen Doyle G., USA, 43, 77
Higgins, Sgt James I., 234, 235
Higgins, RAdm John M., USN, 67, 85–87, 102, 103
Higgins, Marguerite, 152
Hill 51----188, 192, 194, 196
Hill 55----220
Hill 56----235, 239–241, 243, 245–247, 249
Hill 68----203, 234, 238
Hill 72----210, 235, 250, 257, 258
Hill 79----251, 252, 259
Hill 80----206, 208, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 221, 226
Hill 82----264, 271, 273
Hill 85----206, 208, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 221, 222
Hill 88----235, 245, 246, 258
Hill 94----90, 123
Hill 95----192, 194, 196, 197
Hill 96----203
Hill 97----261, 264, 272
Hill 104----204, 234, 235, 238–240, 246
Hill 105----234
Hill 105-C----234, 235, 239, 250
Hill 105-N----234, 239, 245, 246, 249, 250, 256, 258, 270
Hill 105-S----234–236, 238, 243, 246, 251, 252, 260
Hill 108----232, 252
Hill 117----100, 117, 122, 133–135
Hill 118----181, 206, 208, 209, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 220
Hill 123----178, 181, 209
Hill 125----180, 187, 188, 190–192, 194, 195, 197, 203, 276, _pic._
Hill 131----163, 201
Hill 133----264, 283
Hill 137----140
Hill 146----210–212
Will 171----264
Hill 180----123
Hill 186----140, 141, 148, 173, 186
Hill 208----173, 175
Hill 216----203, 234–236, 246, 256, 259
Hill 233----180, 120, 122, 123, 135
Hill 296----235, 236, 241, 245, 246, 250, 256–259, 267, 268,
270, 271, 277
Hill 338----235, 258, 264, 267, 268, 275, 279
Hill 342----264, 276
Hill 343----264, 268, 275, 276
Hinkle, LtCol Thornton M., 201, 268, 289_n_
Hodes, BrigGen Henry I., USA, 78, 151, 153
Hodges, LtCol Charles T., 34
Hoengjeoe-ri, 267, 268, 275
Hofstetter, Capt Arnold C., 245
Holcomb, Col Bankson T. Jr., 34
Holzhaus, Lt Ralph L, USN, 110_n_
Honor guard, 144, 283
_Horace A. Bass_ (APD), USS, 48, 102, 108
Hoskins, RAdm John M., USN, 14
Houghton, Cape Kenneth J., 141, 177, 178_n_, 188, 190–194
Houston, Lt Trumond E., USN, 110_n_, 127
Howard, 2dLt Lee R., 148, 150, 248
Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, 17
Inchon, 4, 6, 7, 17, 18, 22, 41, 74, 143, 145, 146, 152, 153, 167,
172, 180, 195, 198, 200, 201, 215, 238, 291, 295, 297,
_pic._ _See also_: Inner tidal basin, outer tidal basin.
Hospital, 281
North Korean garrison, 94
Railway station, _pic._
Inchon Landing, 9, 10, 22, 27, 97–142, 144, 146, 198, 293, 296, _pic._
Air support, 87, 104
Artillery, 131
Assault plan, 64, 65
BLUE Beach. _See_ Beach BLUE.
Command relationships, 56, 81
Conception, 6
Fire Support Areas, 69
Gunfire support, 87, 103, 115
H-Hour, 101
Intelligence, 59–61, 77
Logistics, 71, 76, 125, 127–129
Medical, 130
Movement to, 81, 83, 84
Objections to, 39, 40, 43, 45, 47, 58
Planning, 6, 37, 38, 40–46, 48, 55–60, 62–64, 67, 69–71, 73, 78, 100
Preliminary bombardment, 85, 86, 145
Tanks, 131, 132
Weather, 102, 114
Inchon-Anyang road, 221
Inchon Peninsula, 133, 136
Inchon Railroad Yards, 129
Inchon-Seoul highway, 122, 133, 136, 138, 140, 147, 148, 153, 155,
173, 209, 213, 220, 221, 225, 227–229
Inchon-Seoul operation, 244, 250, 257, 285, 290, 291, 294, 297
Inchon-Seoul railroad, 129
Indian Ocean, 146
Inner tidal basin, Inchon, 98, 113, 133
Intelligence, U. S., 59–61, 77, 165, 180–181
Interdictory strikes, 3
IOWA, Point, 81, 83
Irick, Cape Joseph N., 194_n_, 195, 255_n_
Irwin, Cpl C. V., 35
Isely, Jeter A., 49_n_
Itami Air Force Base, 13, 70, 71, 80, 168, 169
Itazuke Air Force Base, 168, 171
Iwo Jima, 37
_Jamaica_ (CL), HMS, 86, 87
JANE, Typhoon, 75, 79
Jacobs, LCdr M. Ted, Jr., USN, 45
Jacobs, Capt Walter F., 35
Japan, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 28, 30, 33, 48, 49, 54, 55, 71, 81, 114, 146, 172
Japanese freighters, 15
Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, 108, 112, 133, 135, 155, 158_n_, 161, 249, 257
Jerome, MajGen Clayton C., 290
Johnson, Cdr Howard B., USN, 130
Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), 41
Joint Board of the Army and Navy, 48, 49
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4, 20, 22–24, 32, 44, 46, 50, 172, 198
Joint Landing Force Board, 5_n_
Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG). _See_ Far
East Command.
Jones, 2dLt Charles M., 150, 161
Jones, 2dLt Donald R., 226
Jordan, Maj James D., 159
Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, 3, 4, 12, 45, 47, 66, 71, 73, 144
Kaesong, 276
Kaesong-Seoul highway, 256, 264, 267, 268, 275
Kaesong-Seoul railroad, 187, 196
Kalchon Bridge, 220, 222
Kalchon River, 205, 206, 208, 209, 216, 219–221, 223, 225, 226
Kansong-ni, 134, 135, 138, 140
Karig, Capt Walter, USN, 45_n_, 46_n_, 61_n_, 87_n_, 126_n_, 144_n_,
145_n_, 257_n_
Kean, MajGen William B., USA., 8
Kearl, Sgt Ray D., 163
Keiser, MajGen Lawrence B., USA., 41
Kent, WO Bartley D., 183
_Kenya_ (CL), HMS, 86, 87, 178
Key West Conference, 5_n_, 50
KEZIA, Typhoon, 81, 83, 84
Kikta, SSgt Robert J., 163
Kim, Capt, KMC, 287
Kimpo Air Field, 42, 58, 71, 77, 78, 138, 142, 144, 153, 156–161, 163,
165, 167–170, 172, 175, 180, 183, 184, 187, 191, 193,
198–202, 206, 212, 219, 236, 238, 257, 264, 284, 294, _pic._
Proposed commando raid on, 77, 78
Refueling facilities, 170
Kimpo-Yongdungpo highway, 219
King, Capt George W., 167
Knox, TSgt Edwin L., 88_n_, 93, 105, 193
Kobe, Japan, 31, 74–79, 83, 114, 146, 166, 293
Korea, 5, 81
Geography, 2
Hydrographic conditions, 40, 41
North. _See_ People’s Democratic Republic of.
People’s Democratic Republic of, 1
Air Force, 2
1st Air Force Division, 159, 160
877th Air Force Unit, 160
Invasion of South Korea, 2
Marines, 94
226th Marine Regiment, 94, 95, 107, 160
Navy: Minelayers, 85
People’s Army, 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 13, 46, 47, 57, 58, 60–62, 64, 66,
90, 93, 97, 101, 124, 136, 144, 145, 152, 161, 169–171,
173, 178, 180, 181, 201–203, 236, 253, 254, 270, 276, 280,
285, 287, 291, 298
Infantry, 86
Logistics, 2
Units
Headquarters, 145
1st Division, 171, 253, 254
2d Division, 254
3d Division, 171, 253, 254
4th Division, 47, 254
5th Division, 253
6th Division, 171, 254
7th Division, 171, 254
8th Division, 253
9th Division, 254
10th Division, 171, 254
12th Division, 253
13th Division, 171, 254
15th Division, 253
17th Division, 290
18th Division, 148, 205
Seoul Division, 290
25th Brigade, 233, 234, 263
31st Regiment, 290
42d Mechanized Regiment, 148
78th Independent Regiment, 233, 234
107th Regiment, 160
2d Battalion, 918th Coast Artillery Regiment, 94
Republic of Korea, 1, 2, 7, 9
Army, 2, 6, 13, 253, 282, 285, 296
Reorganization, 9
Army Units
I Corps, 171
II Corps, 171
1st Division, 171, 253
3d Division, 171
17th Regiment, 64, 74, 180, 255, 274
Chief of Naval Operations. _See_ RAdm Sohn Won Yil.
Guerrillas, 145
Marines, 64, 144, 199
1st Regiment, 64, 73, 133, 143, 167, 203, 256, 264, 286,
291, 296, _pic._
1st Battalion, 180, 204, 234, 235, 238, 239, 246, 256, 259,
264, 271, 286
2d Battalion, 184, 188, 196, 255, 264, 282
3d Battalion, 153, 180, 201, 202, 264, 286, 290
5th Battalion, 264, 287
Navy:
LST, 145
Picket boat, 77
Korean national anthem, 143
Kraince, 1stLt Francis R., 192, 193
Krieger, 2dLt Roy E., 195
Krulak, Col Victor H., 7, 165, 197_n_
Kum River, 14
Kumchon, 253, 254
Kumpo Peninsula, 180, 181, 264, 286, 290
Kung Chan So, Maj, NKPA, 160
Kunsan, 41, 46, 144, 285
Kyongan-ni, 58
Kyushu, 84
LCM, 54, 102, 126
LCP, _pic._
LCVP, 54, 63, 64, 88, 93, 102–105, 108, 121, 122, 128, _pic._
LSM, 83
LSM 419, 32
LSMR, 69, 83, 88, 92, 103–105, 215
LSMR 401, 87
LSMR 403, 87
LSMR 404, 87
LSMR Movement Element, 83
LST, 14, 41, 63, 64, 78–80, 84, 102, 108, 110, 125–128, 130, 167, 175,
178, 184, 185, _pic._
LST 799, 110_n_, 127
LST 802, _pic._
LST 845, 32
LST 857, 110, 126
LST 859, 110, 127
LST 883, 110_n_
LST 898, 110_n_, 130
LST 914, 110
LST 973, 110_n_, 126
LST 975, 110, 111
LST 1123, _pic._
LSU, 65, 79, 83, 88, 96, 102
LVT, 31, 59, 63, 64, 100, 102, 115–118, 120, 121, 135, 178, 184, 185,
188, 190–197, 200, 203, 251, 255, 294
LVT(A), 100, 102, 103, 115, 117
Land mines. _See_ Mines, land.
Landing Craft, 41, 45, 88, 102, 108
Landing Ships, Dock (LSD), 63, 79, 80, 83
Lareau, Cpl J. N., 34
Ledet, PFC Alphonse O., Jr., 192, 196
Lee, Col, ROKA, 291
Lee, Mayor, 281, 282
Lejeune, MajGen John A., 48, 49
Lejeune, Camp, 33, 31, 24, 19, 22
_Leyte_ (CV), USS, 53
Liberation ceremony, 283, 284, _pic._
Lischeid, LtCol Walter E., 105, 243, 250, 256, 257, _pic._
Little Creek, Virginia, 19
Litzenberg, Col Homer L., 33, 54, 80, 146, 201, 238, 239, 264, 267,
275, 276, 283, 287, 289, 290, _pic._
Liversedge, BrigGen Harry B., 18
Locomotive, 129, 170, 234
Lookout Hill, 209, 211, 216, 220, 225
Lopez, 1stLt Baldomero, 106
Lowe, MajGen Frank, USA, 152, 190
Lowentrout, LCdr Jack L., USN, 45
Lund, Maj Arnold A., 105
McAlee, 2dLt George E., 173
McAlister, Col Francis M., 35, 199
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 3, 4, 5_n_, 6, 7, 9–12, 18,
20, 22, 23, 28, 38–46, 48, 57, 65, 84, 90, 92, 100, 103,
142, 151, 152, 170, 172, 197, 198, 283, 284, 297, _pic._
McAvinue, PFC H. J., 34
McClelland, 1stLt William A., 226, 227, 231
MacDonald, SSgt. Arthur J., 176, 278
McGee, 1stLt James M., 216_n_, 217
McGill, Camp, 80
McLean, Maj Charles E, 289
McMillan, Lt(jg) Leo D., USN, 291
McMullen, TSgt Orval F., 105, 106
McMullen, Capt Robert A., 88_n_, 90, 91, 95, 156_n_, 188, 194–196,
258_n_, 270
McNaughton, Capt George C., 104, 112_n_, 148_n_, 152, 240_n_, 247–249
McPherson, SSgt Stanley B., 250
McReynolds, Maj William, 215
Magness, 2dLt Byron L., 111, 112_n_, 113
Mahang-ri, 138, 173, 175
Mann, 1stLt Nathaniel F. Jr., 236
_Mansfield_ (DD), USS, 86, 87, 95
Manson, LCdr Frank A., USN, 45_n_
Marianas Islands, 81
_Marine Phoenix_ (T-AP), USNS, 32, 75
Marine Corps, U. S., 4, 5, 11, 12, 15, 20, 24, 46–50, 61, 66, 74, 103,
105, 110, 113, 145, 297, _pic._
Air-Ground Team, 12, 294
Enlistments extended, 23
Headquarters, 18, 22, 25
Request for Marines, 3, 4, 11, 18, 20, 22
Reserve, 12, 19, 21–27, 33
Mobilization, 12, 20, 22, 24, _pic._
Reserve District directors, 22, 26
Reserve Units
12th Amphibian Tractor Company, 24
3d Engineer Company, 24
13th Infantry Company, 24
Schools, 17, 48, 49
Strength, 20
Training, 13, 18, 19
Units
Expeditionary Force, 49
Fleet Marine Force, 10, 12, 49, 30
Atlantic, 19, 21, 22, 31, 146
Pacific, 11, 21, 22, 32, 43, 54
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 19, 21, 27, 54, 55, 58, 70, 71, 167,
169, 250, 292, 294
2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 19, 21
Wing Headquarters Squadron 1, 54
MAG-12, 54, 71, 168
Headquarters Squadron 12, 54
Service Squadron 12, 54
Marine Aircraft Group 33, 4, 18, 28, 47, 70, 71, 166–170, 236, 295
Headquarters Squadron 33, 168
Service Squadron 33, 168
VMF-212, 54, 71, 168, 170, 236, 257, 294
VMF-214, 85–87, 93, 102, 105, 134, 138, 139, 168, 176, 181, 195,
196, 210, 211, 223, 243, 249, 250, 256, 257, 294
VMF-312, 54, 71, 289, 294, 295
VMF-323, 85–87, 102, 105, 168, 181, 213, 238, 246–248, 257, 294
VMF(N)-513, 54, 71, 168, 171
VMF(N)-542, 54, 71, 168, 169, 236, 257, 294
VMR-152, 169
VMO-6, 165, 166, 169, 202, 295
MGCIS-1, 168, 169
MTACS-2, 168, 169
Air Support Section, 71
1st Marine Division, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18, 20–23, 25, 28, 30, 34, 35,
38, 40, 53–56, 58–60, 62, 65, 67, 71, 74, 75, 77, 79, 100,
147, 148, 160, 168, 172, 180, 183, 197, 201–203, 221, 238,
244, 245, 250, 253, 255, 256, 261, 264, 278, 283, 284,
286, 287, 290, 292–295, 297
Advance party, 34, 35
Arrival in Japan, 74
ADC Group, 94, 142
Command Post, 151, 172
Departure from San Diego, 31, 32, _pic._
Expansion, 10, 18, 23, 24, 26, 293
Logistic support, 30, 31
Outloading from Kobe, 77, 79, 80
Rear Echelon, 33
Staff, 55
Training, 28
Withdrawal of 17-year-olds, 75
2d Marine Division, 19, 21, 23, 24, 33
1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinf), 4, 9, 18, 23, 28, 30, 34,
46, 48, 55, 63, 65, 70, 195, 234, 293
Activation, 7
Availability, 65–67
Dispatch of, 4, 30
1st Marines, 31, 63–66, 79, 100, 103, 104, 113, 114, 128, 131,
133, 138, 140, 141, 147, 148, 150, 153, 167, 169, 173,
175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 197, 202–204, 212, 213,
215, 216, 220, 225, 228, 231–233, 243, 244, 246, 247, 251,
253–255, 259, 262, 264, 267, 277, 279, 280, 282, 285, 287,
290, 291, _pic._;
Command Post, 152. _See_ Col Lewis B. Puller.
1st Battalion, 121, 122, 135, 136, 138, 141, 177, 178, 184, 188,
212, 216, 217, 219, 236, 251, 259, 261, 271, 273, 279,
280, 282. _See also_ LtCol Jack Hawkins.
Headquarters & Service Company, 123
Company A, 122, 123, 212, 213, 216, 217, 220, 222, 226–228,
236, 273, 279
Company B, 122, 123, 206, 208, 212, 223, 226–229, 231, 236, 273
Company C, 122, 209, 212, 213, 216, 217, 219, 223,
236, 273, 279
Weapons Company, 216, 217, 223, 226
2d Battalion, 84, 100, 116, 117, 121, 122, 134, 135, 138, 140,
141, 151, 173, 175, 177, 178, 183, 209–211, 213, 215, 216,
220, 221, 223, 225, 227, 229, 251, 252, 259, 261, 271–273,
279, 280, 282, 283. _See also_ LtCol Allan Sutter.
Headquarters & Service Company, 117
Company D, 116, 117, 122, 123, 135, 140, 173, 175, 178, 210,
211, 214, 223, 225, 279
Company E, 117, 123, 140, 173, 175, 178, 211, 214,
223, 271, 272
Company F, 116, 117, 122, 123, 135, 140, 148, 151, 173, 175,
210, 211, 214, 223, 271, 272.
Weapons Company, 117, 123
3d Battalion, 100, 115, 117, 122, 135, 136, 138, 141, 175, 177,
178, 181, 209, 211, 216, 220, 225, 231, 232, 252, 259,
261, 262, 263, 271, 282, 284. _See also_ LtCol
Thomas L. Ridge.
Headquarters & Service Company, 114
Company G, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 135, 175, 176, 225, 263
Company H, 123, 209
Company I, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 135, 209, 225, 252
Weapons Company, 114
Fifth Marines, 30, 47, 53, 64–67, 73, 79, 98, 100, 101, 104, 107,
108, 112, 131–133, 138, 143, 147, 148, 151–153, 155, 158,
160, 167, 170, 175, 180, 183, 187, 188, 191, 193, 194,
196, 200, 202–204, 233, 234, 236, 238, 239, 241, 243–246,
251, 252, 254–256, 259, 262–264, 267, 271, 274, 277–279,
282, 284–286, 290, 291, 294, _pic._;
Command Post, 152, 191. _See also_ LtCol Raymond L. Murray.
Antitank Company, 150
Headquarters & Service Company, 159
1st Battalion, 98, 101, 112, 113, 133, 138, 153, 158, 163, 180,
184, 185, 196, 197, 203, 206, 212, 213, 219, 234, 236,
238, 239, 243, 246, 251, 256, 258, 259, 277. _See also_
LtCol George R. Newton.
Company A, 100, 104–107, 112, 132, 158, 236, 243, 278
Company B, 111, 158, 163, 206, 212, 236, 243
Company C, 108, 110, 111, 158, 163, 180, 206, 213,
236, 251, 286
2d Battalion, 98, 112, 133, 135, 138–140, 147, 148, 150, 151,
153, 155–157, 159, 161, 163, 164, 180, 188, 196, 197, 203,
234, 235, 239, 241, 243, 245, 246, 248, 250, 251, 256,
258, 259, 271, 277, 286;
Command Post, 158. _See also_ LtCol Harold S. Roise.
Headquarters & Service Company, 110
Company D, 108, 110, 112, 113, 133, 135, 139, 140, 147, 148,
150, 157, 158, 161, 163, 197, 240, 241, 245–250, 257, 258
Company E, 104, 105, 112, 133–135, 139, 155, 157, 158, 161,
163, 183, 197, 240, 246, 248, 249, 257, 258
Company F, 113, 133, 135, 139, 155, 158, 161, 163, 197, 240,
241, 245, 246, 249, 257, 258, 259
Weapons Company, 110
3d Battalion, 64, 69, 86, 88, 90–95, 101, 103, 105, 132, 133,
138, 140, 155, 156, 158, 188, 194, 196, 197, 199, 203,
234–236, 239, 246, 256–258, 262, 270, 271, 277, 278, 286.
_See also_ LtCol Robert D. Taplett.
Company G, 88, 90, 93, 140, 156, 194, 196, 246, 258,
270, 271, 277
Company H, 86, 90, 91, 140, 156, 194, 196, 235, 243, 246, 258
Company I, 90–92, 140, 136, 194–196, 235, 236, 246, 258, 270,
271, 273, 277
Weapons Company, 241
6th Marines, 33, 53, 54, 146
3d Battalion, 33, 54
7th Marines, 25, 32, 33, 37, 54, 65, 66, 80, 130, 131n, 146, 201,
203, 238, 244–246, 254, 256, 259, 262, 264, 268, 270, 276,
279, 282, 284, 285, 287, 289–292;
Command post, 275. _See also_ Col Homer L. Litzenberg.
Headquarters & Service Company, 201
1st Battalion, 201, 238, 239, 268, 287, 289. _See also_ LtCol
Raymond G. Davis.
Company A, 276
Company B, 276
Company C, 276
2d Battalion, 201, 238, 259, 268, 273, 277, 282, 287, 289, 290.
_See also_ LtCol Thornton M. Hinkle, and Maj Webb D. Sawyer.
Company D, 267, 268, 275
Company E, 268, 275
Company F, 268, 275
3d Battalion, 53, 146, 201, 238, 268, 277, 282, 287, 289. _See
also_ Maj Maurice E. Roach
Company G, 268, 275, 276
Company H, 268, 275
Company I, 275
11th Marines, 63, 64, 71, 80, 96, 131, 166, 167, 173, 188, 192,
210, 211, 215, 221, 222, 243, 248, 254, 262, 263, 291
1st Battalion, 64, 131, 194, 254, 286
Battery A, 159
Battery B, 245
2d Battalion, 64, 131, 215, 254
3d Battalion, 33, 131n, 201, 254, 287
4th Battalion, 131, 194, 215, 254
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 65, 79, 184, 188, 202, 254, 255
Company A, 251
1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 76
1st Combat Service Group, 76, 79, 96, 127, 129
1st Engineer Battalion, 65, 142, 184, 188, 202
Company A, 91, 93, 142, 156, 159, 163, 167, 178, 191, 220, 250
Company C, 118, 210, 251, 259
Company D, 33, 275, 287
1st Medical Battalion, 93, 130, 131, 281
Company E, 33
1st Motor Transport Battalion, 286
Company D, 33
7th Motor Transport Battalion, 76, 127, 129
1st Ordnance Battalion, 31, 96, 202
Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battalion, 215
1st Service Battalion, 96
1st Shore Party Battalion, 65, 76, 126, 127, 185, 188, 200, 202
Headquarters & Service Company, 126
Group A, 96, 125
Group B, 128
Company C, 33
1st Signal Battalion, 166, 167, 219, 291
1st Tank Battalion, 65, 76, 80, 132, 202
Headquarters Company, 132
Company A, 105, 132, 135, 139, 147, 148, 156, 158, 163,
188, 199, 286
Company B, 132, 249, 251, 259, 271
Company C, 132, 209, 211
Company D, 33, 132, 286, 287
Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division, 47, 138, 141,
177, 184, 188, 194, 256, 259, 264, 271
1st Replacement Draft, 30
Marshall, Cdr Edmund S. L. USN, 45
Martson, Sgt Richard L., 161
Masan, 28, 171, 254
Medical collecting points, 281
Medical supplies, 281
Mediterranean, 33, 53
Merritt, 2dLt Max A, 111–113
Mexico, 12
MICOWEX, Operation, 50, 19
MIKI, Operation, 5, 19, 41
Miller, Lt C. M., USN, 110_n_
Milne, LtCol Harry T., 132
Mine field
North Korean, 210, 211, 250, 251, 259, 261, 276, 277, 287
United States, 91, 271
Mines, land
North Korean, 92, 93, 178, 181, 210, 221, 247, 278, 279, 284, 289
United States, 45, 214, 220, 263, 271
Mines, naval, North Korean, 85, 86, 104
Mine, land, clearance, 272, 281
Minesweepers (AM), 83
Minesweepers, Auxiliary Motor (AMS), 83
Minette, Col W. P., 35
_Missouri_ (BB), USS, 144, 202
Mize, 1stLt Charles D., 271
Monegan, PFC Walter C. Jr., 151, 173, 213_n_, 214
Monroe Doctrine, 11
_Montague_ (AKA), USS, 54
Montross, Lynn, 27_n_, 86_n_, 130_n_
Moody, Capt Richard E., 34
Mooney, 2dLt Arthur R., 276
Moore, Cdr Theophilus H., USN, 45
Moore, LtCol Floyd R., 34
Morgan, Cpl James, 193
Moses, Maj Emile P. Jr., 33
Mount, LtCol Charles M., USA, 221
_Mount McKinley_ (ACC), USS, 14, 35, 37, 55–57, 60, 62, 63, 71, 74,
75, 77, 78, 83, 84, 87, 88, 90–93, 95, 101, 103, 104, 142,
166–168, _pic._
Muetzel, 2dLt Francis, W., 104_n_, 105, 133_n_
Mullaney, 1stLt Paul V., 267
Munhang Peninsula, 100, 135, 136, 138, 141
Murray, LtCol Raymond L., 73, 113, 136, 138, 152, 158, 159, 187, 190,
193, 194, 206, 233, 238, 239, 258, 283, _pic._
Musical instruments, 283
Myers, Maj Reginald R., 117_n_, 115, 183_n_, 209_n_
Naktong River, 47, 171
Naktong Bulge, 66
Namdong Peninsula, 138, 141, 153, 177
Napalm, 67, 85, 86, 93, 125, 134, 169, 248, 260
National Security Act of 1947, 5_n_, 50
Naval gunfire support, 67, 69, 71, 95, 102, 144, 145, 163, 166, 167,
178, 202, 291
Naval vessels. _See_ individual ships and types.
Navy, U. S., 5, 15, 45, 46, 48, 49, 59, 103, 145, 146, 297
Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command, Pacific
Fleet, 4–6, 28, 77
Mobile Training Team Able, 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 58, 66, 67
Sixth Fleet, 53, 146
Seventh Fleet, 2, 14, 144
Joint Task Force (JTF-7), 70, 73, 81, 102, 201, 295
Task Force 77, 2, 70, 85–87, 102, 145
Task Force 90, 73
Task Group 90.1, 81, 87
Task Group 90.3, 83
Task Group 90.5, 70, 145
Task Group 95.5, 85
Amphibious Group One (PhibGru 1) 5–7, 9, 13–15, 45, 46, 56, 57, 59,
62, 63, 67, 71, 166, 293
Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT), 47, 88, 115
Underwater Demolition Team 1, 121
Surgical teams, 130
Nebergal, 1stLt Max N., 166
New Britain operation, 9–11, 17
Newton, LtCol George R., 98, 108_n_, 111, 112, 127, 158, 163, 188,
206, 212, 246
Nicaragua, 12, 49
Nippon Flour Company, 108, 111
Noble, MajGen Alfred H., 33–35
_Noble_ (APA), USS, 32
Nokpon-ni, 236, 241
Nolan, 2dLt Harry J., 113, 241, 245, 246
_Normday_, SS, 32, 75
Norfolk, Virginia, 53
North Point, 92, 95, 96
Northern Solomons, 27
Objective
Able, 100, 108, 111, 112, 117, 122, 126
Baker, 100, 108, 111–113, 126
Charlie, 100, 112, 120, 122, 126
Dog, 100, 115, 122
Obong-ni Ridge, 47
Observatory Hill, 95, 98, 108, 110–113, 133
Oeoso-ri, 172, 185, 200, 283
_Oglethorpe_ (AKA), USS, 14
O’Grady, TSgt W., 34
Okinawa, 17, 51, 84
Olson, LtCol Merlin R., 104_n_
Omaha, Nebraska, 42
O’Neil, Pvt Oliver, Jr., 214
Operation Order (OpnO). _See_ Plans and orders.
Osan, 7, 8, 44
Outer tidal basin, Inchon, 121
PC 703 (ROKN), 61
PCEC, 83
PCEC 896----102, 103
Pak Han Lin, Col, NKPA, 233
Palmi-do, 62, 87
Panama, 48
Panama Canal, 53
Paolino, TSgt Pasquale, 210_n_, 260
Paris, France, 17
Parrish, CWO Bill E., 158
Parry, Maj Francis F., 201, 287
Partridge, LtCol John H., 142, 184, 184_n_, 199
Patton, Gen George C., USA, 8
Paul, Capt John F., 193
Pearl Harbor, 1, 3, 4, 7, 13, 30, 43, 84
Pedersen, Capt Pool F., 108, 111, 180, 208
Peleliu, 17, 51
Pendleton, Camp Joseph H., California, 17, 18, 22–25, 27, 28, 30, 32,
33, 35, 54, 76, 80, 113, 127, 132, 293
Pensacola, Florida, 27
Pentagon, 3, 22, 44
Peters, Capt Uel D., 117, 240, 241, 245
Peterson, 1stLt Elmer G., 195, 196, 208
Petroleum-Oil-Lubricants (POL), 169
Phase Line CC, 153, 167, 175
_Philippine Sea_ (CV), USS, 87
Philippines, 27
Phillips, Capt Walter D., Jr., 275
_Pickaway_ (APA), USS, 83
Plans and orders
Operation Plan 712, 49
Plan ABLE, 20
Plan BAKER, 14, 20
FECOM
Operation Plan CHROMITE, 57
Operation Plan 110-B, 57
ComNavFE Operation Plan 108-50, 73
X Corps
Operational Instructions No. 1, 183
Operation Order 1, 73
Operation Order 2, 212
Operation Order 5, 292
1st Marine Division
Embarkation Plan 1-50, 28, 31, 73
Operation Order 1-50, 28
Operation Order 2-50, 62, 73
Operation Order 3-50, 133
Operation Order 4-50, 136
Operation Order 5-50, 153
Operation Order 6-50, 183
Operation Order 7-50, 187
Operation Order 9-50, 238
Operation Order 10-50, 251
Operation Order 11-50, 255
Operation Order 12-50, 264
Operation Order 13-50, 285, 286
Operation Order 14-50, 286, 287
Operation Order 15-50, 291
5th Marines
Operation Order 24-50, 235
Operation Order 26-50, 245
Pohang-dong, 9, 13, 14, 145, 171
Landing, 14, 15
Pollock, MajGen Edwin A., 32, 290
Pomeroy, Capt William D, 148_n_, 150, 156
Pontoon Movement Group, 83
Port Said, Egypt, 54
PORTREX Operation, 19
Posung-Myon, 44, 48
Premature air bursts, 178
_President Jackson_ (APA), USS, 32, 166
Prisoner of war stockade, 92, 128
Prisoners of war. North Korean, 59, 90, 91, 94, 106, 107, 133, 141,
147, 152, 159, 190, 197, 202, 206, 235, 252, 260, 263,
264, 285, 287, _pic._
Puckett, 2dLt Charles, 192
Pukhan river, 285, 286
Puller, Col Lewis B., 120, 121, 136, 138, 152, 181, 209, 216, 225,
232, 245, 251, 261–263, 272, 283, _pic._
Pusan, 47, 66, 67, 74, 79–81, 83, 195, 281, 293, 298
Logistical Command, 7
Perimeter, 28, 42, 46, 47, 58, 65, 74, 98, 130, 139, 144, 166, 170,
171, 178, 198, 253, 296
Pyo Yang Moon, 143
Pyongyang, 144, 145
Quantico, Virginia, 1, 17, 48, 49
Quebec, 46
Radford, Adm Arthur W., 1, 4, 23, 43, 47
Radio Hill, 88, 90–93, 93
Raft, 184, 199, 200
Rapp, Capt David A., 216_n_
Reclamation depot, 73
Reconnaissance raids, 47, 48
Recruit Depot, San Diego, California, 31
RED Beach. _See_ Beach, RED.
Reeve, LtCol Douglas E., 35
Refugees, 282
Reinburg, Maj Joseph H., 171
Rendezvous areas, 81
Repair Ship, Landing Craft (ARL), 83
Rhee, President Syngman, 284, _pic._
Rice, 282
Rice paddies, 197
Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., 156
Richardson, SSgt P., 33
Rickert, LtCol Robert W., 113, 118_n_, 121
Ridge, LtCol Thomas L., 100_n_, 113_n_, 115, 118, 122, 135, 136_n_,
138_n_, 141_n_, 175_n_, 178, 183, 223_n_, 232, 262
Roach, Maj Maurice E., 146, 201, 268, 287, 289
Roadblock, 178, 191, 211, 261, 263, 287
_Rochester_ (CA), USS, 84, 86, 87, 92, 202
Roise, LtCol Harold S., 98, 104_n_, 110, 111_n_, 112, 113_n_, 139,
148, 133–157, 163, 188, 197_n_, 239, 246, 248,
250, 256, 258
Rosegoom, Hospitalman R. E., _pic._
Rouse, Maj Jules M., 35
Rowny, LtCol Edward L., USA, 200
Ruble, RAdm Richard W., USN, 67
Ruffner, MajGen Clark L., USA, 40, 45, 58, 66, 67, 151, 153, 262
Russell, MajGen John H., 49
Russia, _See_ USSR.
Ryokoku, 276
SCAJAP LSTs, 79
SCAJAP LST QO79, 166
Sachon Creek, 204
Salt Lake Cry, Utah, 1
Salvage vessel (ARS), 83
Samchok, 144, 285
Sampson, RAdm William P., USN, 48
San Clemente Island, 49
San Diego, California, 5, 27, 31, 34, 75–77, 114, 146, 293
San Francisco, California, 1, 30
San Nicholas Island, California, 19
Sansing, 2dLt S. E., 240
Santiago, Cuba, 48
Sartwell, 1stLt Paul P., 267
Sasebo, Japan, 6, 61, 83, 86, 114
Sawyer, Maj Webb D., 289
Scaling ladders, 60, 103, 118, _pic._
Schimmenti, Capt Joseph A., 236
Schnabel, Maj James F., USA, 43_n_, 43_n_
Schneelock, LCdr Ralph H., USN, 102, 103, 108_n_, 126_n_
Schreier, Maj Robert L., 166
Schwyhart, Cdr Robert M., USN, 291
Sea bags, 76
Sea wall, 98, 100, 105, 108, 110, 118, 126, _pic._
Sears, Capt Norman W., USN, 87, 88
Seattle, Washington, _pic._
Seeburger, 1stLt Edward H., 267
Seeley, Maj Henry W., Jr., 35
Seigle. Ensign John, USN, 190, 193_n_
_Seminole_ (AKA), USS, 83
Sengewald, Capt Richard H., 275
Seoul, 2, 6, 40, 58, 76, 136, 144, 147, 148, 160, 165, 172, 181, 183,
187, 190, 196, 198–200, 202–205, 220, 222, 225, 227,
233–235, 238, 243, 245, 249, 251–283, 285–287, 292, 293,
296, 299, _pic._
Ducksoo Palace, 255, 283
Government Palace, 204, 255, 264, 278, 284
Hospital, 281
Hotel Banta, _pic._
Middle School, 277, 278
Railroad station, 271, 273, 279
Sodaemun Prison, 267
Women’s University, 282, 283
Seoul-Ujiongbu road, 256
Sexton, Capt Martin J., 35
Seydel, 1stLt Karle, 247–249, 257
Shefchik, Cpl L., 35
Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., 3, 9, 44, 78, 84, 151, 165, 197, _pic._
Sherman, Maj Donald W., 73, 74
Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, 3, 4, 18, 22, 24, 33, 41, 46, 47, 53, 54
Shields, Capt Nicholas L., 268–270, 275
Shore Fire Control Party, 95
Shutler, 2dLt Philip D., 192, 193
_Sicily_ (CVE), USS, 70, 85, 87, 168, 256, 257
Simmons, Maj Edwin H., 113_n_, 114, 116, 136_n_, 141_n_, 225_n_, 263
Simpson, Capt William F., 134, 256
_Siskoh Bay_ (CVE), USS, 54
Sleger, 2dLt J., Jr., 139_n_
Smith, Sgt Alvin E., 90
Smith, 1stLt H. J., 240, 247, 248
Smith, 1stLt James W., 105, 112, 113
Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 17, 18, 23, 27, 28, 33–35, 37, 38, 40, 44,
47, 48, 51, 56_n_, 58, 59, 65–67, 73, 74_n_, 75–78, 80_n_,
81, 83, 84_n_, 88_n_, 97_n_, 98, 101_n_, 133_n_, 136,
141–144, 148, 151–153, 170, 172, 183, 184, 190, 197, 198,
201–203, 204_n_, 239_n_, 241, 244, 250_n_, 251_n_, 254,
255, 256_n_, 259_n_, 261_n_, 262, 282_n_, 283, 284,
285_n_, 291, 292, _pic._
Conference with Gen Ruffner, 40
Interview with Gen MacArthur, 38, 39
Smith, Sgt Robert, 247
Smith’s Ridge, 240, 245–247, 250, 257
Smoke pots, 243
Snedeker, Col Edward W., 73, 142_n_, 200_n_
Snipers, North Korean, 197, 217, 276, 280, 284
Sogam-ni, 135
Sohn Won Yil, RAdm, ROKN, 143, 144, 152
Sojong, 197
Soper, Capt James B., 61_n_
Soryu-li, 158, 161
Sosa, 153, 167, 175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 209, 212
South Mountain, 203, 255, 263, 273, 274, 279, 283
_Southerland_ (DD), USS, 87
_Southwind_, SS, 32
Soviet-American occupation of Korea, 2
Soviet Union. _See_ USSR.
Sowolmi-do, 42, 67, 92–94
Spanish-American War, 11
Sparks, 1stLt William F., 195
Stamford, Cape Edward P., 5_n_
Stanford, Capt Norman R., 273
Stein, TSgt, Max, 111
Stevens, Capt John R., 104_n_, 105–107
Stewart, Cape Gerald H., 158_n_, 235_n_
Stewart, LtCol Joseph L., 73, 142
Strategic bombing, 3
Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, 2, 12, 144, 170
Stratton, 1stLt Franklin, 289
Struble, VAdm A. D., USN, 45_n_, 57, 66, 67, 84, 85, 92, 145, 151,
197, 295_n_, _pic._
Stumpges, MSgt F. J., 35
Suda Bay, Crete, 53
Suez Canal, 33, 54, 146
Supplies
North Korean, 232
United States, 79, 200, 243
Medical, 228
Supply Dumps
North Korean, 289
United States, 127–129, 185
Medical, 200
Sutter, LtCol, Allan, 113_n_, 116, 123, 135, 140_n_, 173, 183, 210,
211, 213, 221, 223_n_, 271_n_, 273
Suwon, 58, 181, 225, 254
Suyuhyon, 286, 287
SWARMER Operation, 19
Sweet, Lt Granville G., 91, 93, 139
_Swanson_ (DD), USS, 86, 87
Swords, 2dLt John J., 226, 227, 231
Tactical Air Control, 70, 181
Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), 104, 168
Taebu-do, 61
Taegu, 28, 171
Taejon, 14, 15, 28, 253, 254
Taejong-ni, 155
Talasea, 17
Tanks. See Weapons.
Tank support, U.S., 251
Taplett, LtCol Robert D., 88, 91–95, 101, 140, 155, 156, 188, 243,
256, 258, 277
Tarawa, 103
Task Force Kumpo, 286, 290
Taylor, Capt Richard M., 209
_Tentative Manual on Landing Operations_, 49
Thach, Capt John H., USN, 257
Thirty-Eighth Parallel, 181
Thompson, 2dLt Carl B., Jr., 279
Tide, 94
Tinsley, Lt Leland, USN, 110_n_
_Titania_ (AKA), USS, 14, 32
Tokyo, 4, 7, 9, 12, 14, 28, 35, 37, 44, 46–48, 75, 144, 197, 198
_Toledo_ (CA), USS, 86, 87, 202
Tongdok Mountains, 216, 221
Tractor Movement Group. _See_ U. S. Navy, Task Group 90.3.
Traffic control, 200
Training, 75, 196
Training Bulletin No. 36–50 (1st Marine Division), 28
Trapnell, 2dLt Nicholas M., 278
Transport Group, 84
Transport Movement Group, 83
Transports (AP), 75, 83, 84
Transports, Attack (APA), 63, 79, 83
Transports, High speed (APD), 63, 79, 83
Transportation,
North Korean
Vehicles, 171, 181, 213, 274
Trucks, 140, 147, 213–215, 278, 289
Jeeps, 140
United States
Vehicles, 127, 188, 287
DUKWs, 102, 131, 178, 185, 196, 199, 200, 294
Jeeps, 178, 197, 221, 290
Trucks, 169, 220
“Weasel”, 219
Trapp, LCdr R. I., USN, 110_n_
Trompeter, Maj Joseph D., 117_n_, 209
Truman, President Harry S., 2, 4, 9, 22, 152, 190
Tsushima Strait, 81
Tugs, 83, 85
Tulagi, 38
Turkey, 48
Turner, Capt Craig B., 287
_Twin Falls Victory_, SS, 32
Uijongbu, 282, 286, 287, 290
Underwood, TSgt George C., 256
Underwood, Lt Horace, USN, 190
_Union_ (AKA), USS, 14
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1, 2, 57, 233, 292;
possible intervention in Korean War, 9
United Nations, 1, 2
Blockade and Covering Force, 65
Cemetery, Inchon, 291, _pic._
Command, 9, 28, 57, 297, 298
Security Council, 2, 9, 297
Supreme Commander. _See_ General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.
United States, 2, 7
Forces in the Far East, 2
Ground Forces
1st enemy contact by, 7
intervention,3
Military Academy, 7_n_
_Valley Forge_ (CV). USS, 87
Van Cleve, Capt Roy R., 270_n_, 275_n_
Vieques, 49
Vining, 1stLt Norm, 223
Volcansek, LtCol Max J. Jr., 169, 257
Waegwon, 171
Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, 8, 9, 46, 171
Walseth, Col Harvey S., 35
Wan Yong, BrigGen (NKPA), 160
_Wantuch_ (APD), USS, 102, 115
Washington. D C., 3, 17, 23, 27, 44
Water, 125
Water Barge (YW), 83
Water Point, 142
Wayerski, 2dLt Joseph R., 95, 202_n_
Weapons
North Korean
Antiaircraft guns, 85, 289, 295
Antitank guns, 92, 177, 208, 246, 247, 250, 261, 272, 279, _pic._
76mm, 92, 140
14.5mm, 194
Armor, 8, 205, 214
Artillery, 93, 97, 171, 205, 209, 210, 215, 235, 241, 245–247,
274, 289, 290
Heavy, 234
Automatic Weapon, 157, 222, 245, 261, 279
Bayonets, 277
Grenades, 101, 112, 260
Guns, 45, 84–86
Coast defense, 136
76mm, 94, 233
76mm self-propelled, 262, 263, 278
Howitzer, 278
Machine guns, 94, 106, 110, 111, 120, 136, 156, 159, 194, 195,
208, 210, 250, 267, 277
Mortar, 95, 110, 209, 215, 245–247, 257, 261, 263, 289
120mm, 136, 234
122mm, 140
Pistols, 2
Rifles, 136, 160, 267, 272, 277
Small arms, 177, 209
Submachine guns, 160, 272
Tanks, 2, 95, 97, 132, 134, 139, 171, 181, 229, 262, 263,
274, 290, 297
T-34, 2, 8, 134, 139, 148, 150, 151, 161, 175, 213–215, 229,
231, 263, _pic._
South Korea: 105mm howitzers, 2
United States
Artillery, 31, 63, 64, 70, 166, 180, 194, 222, 235, 236, 238, 239,
248, 251, 252, 257, 258, 263, 286, 296
Shortages of, 8
BAR, 150, 161, 196, 229
Carbine, 161
Flame thrower, 94, 106
Grenades, 86, 94, 105, 106, 107, 112, 157, 214, 228
Howitzers, 96, 208, 210, 215, 221, 222, 243, 248, 263, _pic._
Machine guns, 105, 148, 150, 208, 214, 217, 229, 247
Heavy, 163, 226, 227, 263
Light, 226, 228
50-caliber, 236
Mortar, 70, 105, 217, 236, 273, 278, 263
4.2 inch, 251, 252
81mm, 206, 214, 248, 263, 270, 278
60mm, 226, 229, 240, 267, 278
Recoilless rifles, 163, 173
75mm, 148, 150, 263
Rifles, 150, 161
Rocket-launchers, 148, 214
2.36-inch, 8, 150
3.5-inch, 148, 150, 229, 263
Submachine guns (Tommy guns), 86
Tanks, 31, 91, 93, 94, 138, 163, 188, 199, 208, 210, 221, 235,
239, 243, 247, 250, 257, 259, 260, 272, 277–280, 286,
287, 289, _pic._
Dozer, 211
Flame, 260, 272, 279
M-4A3, 132
M-24, 8
M-26, 91, 105, 138, 139, 147, 150, 156, 157, 175–177, 209, 220,
240, 260, 261, 271, 272
Weidemeyer, Lt Dick, 110_n_, 127_n_
Weir, Col Kenneth H., 169
Westover, Capt George C., 118, 141_n_
_Whitesand Bay_ (PF), HMS, 144
Wilcox, Capt Myron E., 276
Wildman, Capt Patrick W., 90, 92, 188
Williams, Capt Albert L., 183
Williams, Capt Bruce F., 259, 260
Williams, Lt Edward B., USN, 5
Williams, Col Gregon A., 35, 78
Williams, Maj Lloyd O., 35
Williamson, lstLt Wallace, 195, 270
Wilson, LCdr James C., USN, 110_n_
Wirth, lstLt Karl, 248
Wol Ki Chan, MajGen, NKPA, 233
Wolmi-do, 42, 45, 59, 63, 64, 67, 69, 74, 77, 78, 85–94, 101, 103–105,
129, 131, 142, 145, 152, 167, _pic._
Wonjong-ni, 201, 212
Wonsan, 41, 285, 292
World Series, 291
World War I, 48
World War II, 7, 49, 51, 59, 97, 130, 292
Wray, Capt Robert P., 121_n_, 216, 217, 219, 273
Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, 6, 9, 43, 45, 66, 67, 151, _pic._
Wyczawski, LtCol Richard W., 170, 257
Yasso, Hospitalman Frank J., _pic._
YELLOW Beach. _See_ Beaches, YELLOW.
Yellow Sea, 81, 85, 87
_Yellowstone_ (AD), USS, 53
Yellowstone Park, 1
Yokohama, Japan, 13, 14, 80, 81, 83
Yokosuka, Japan, 5_n_, 80
Yongdok, 145
Yongdong, 15
Yonghung-do, 61, 62
Yongdungpo, 180, 181, 183, 184, 197–199, 203–206, 208, 209, 212, 213,
215, 216, 220–222, 225–229, 231–233, 243, 244, 254, 281
Brewery, _pic._
Hospital, 281
Yongil Bay, 14
Young People’s Anti-Communist Resistance League, 141
Zorn, Capt Elmer J., 275
SET AND PRINTED FOR THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS BY THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955. TEXT SET IN 12-POINT GRANJON AND
PRINTED ON OFFSET VELLUM STOCK.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing
Office Washington 25, D.C.--Price $2.50
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation
marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left
unbalanced.
Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs
and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support
hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to
the corresponding illustrations.
The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page
references.
The index reference to page 186 is incorrect: that page is blank.
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