Washington the Soldier

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Title: Washington the Soldier
Author: Carrington, Henry B.
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Washington the Soldier" ***

Washington the Soldier

[Illustration:

WASHINGTON

From the St Memin Crayon in possession of J. Carson Brevoort Esq.
]

WASHINGTON
THE SOLDIER

General Henry B. Carrington, LL.D.

AUTHOR OF

“Battles of the American Revolution,” “Battle Maps and Charts of the
Revolution,” “Indian Operations on the Plains,” “The Six Nations,”
“Beacon Lights of Patriotism,” etc.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX AND APPENDICES

“Th’ applause of list’ning senates to command;
The threats of pain and ruin to despise;
To scatter plenty o’er a smiling land,
And read _his history_ in a Nation’s eyes.”

New York
Charles Scribner’s Sons
1899

_Copyright, 1899_
BY CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS

_All rights Reserved_

TYPOGRAPHY BY ROCKWELL AND CHURCHILL

PRESSWORK BY THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

DEDICATED

TO THE

Sons and Daughters of Liberty Everywhere

KNOWING

THAT ALL WHO ASPIRE AFTER INTELLIGENT FREEDOM SHALL FIND THE WATCHWORD
OF WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER—“FOR THE SAKE OF GOD AND COUNTRY”—THEIR
LOFTIEST INCENTIVE.

PREFACE
TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Since the first appearance of this volume, during the winter of 1898–9,
the author has considerately regarded all letters and literary comments
received by him, as well as other recent works upon the life and times
of Washington. His original purpose to treat his subject judicially,
regardless of unverified tradition, has been confirmed.

Washington’s sublime conception of America, noticed in Chapter XXXVI.,
foreshadowed “a stupendous fabric of freedom and empire, on the broad
basis of Independency,” through which the “poor and oppressed of all
races and religions” might find encouragement and solace.

The war with Spain has made both a moral and physical impress upon the
judgment and conscience of the entire world. Unqualified by a single
disaster on land or sea, and never diverted from humane and honorable
methods, it illustrates the intelligent patriotism and exhaustless
resources of our country, and a nearer realization of Washington’s
prayer for America.

Looking to the general trend of Washington’s military career, it is
emphasized, throughout the volume, that the moral, religious, and
patriotic motives that energized his life and shaped his character were
so absolutely interwoven with the fibre of his professional experiences,
that the soul of the Man magnified the greatness of the Soldier.

In connection with Washington’s relations to General Braddock, mentioned
in the First Chapter, it is worthy of permanent record that Virginia
would not sanction, nor would Washington accept assignment, except as
Chief of Staff. He was not a simple _Aid-de-Camp_, but of recognized and
responsible military merit.

HENRY B. CARRINGTON.

HYDE PARK, MASS.,
September 21, 1899.

PREFACE.

The text of this volume, completed in the spring of 1898 and not since
modified, requires a different Preface from that first prepared. The
events of another war introduce applications of military principles
which have special interest. This is the more significant because modern
appliances have been developed with startling rapidity, while general
legislation and the organization of troops, both regular and volunteer,
have been very similar to those of the times of Washington, and of later
American wars.

His letters, his orders, his trials, his experiences; the diversities of
judgment between civilians and military men; between military men of
natural aptitudes and those of merely professional or accidental
training, as well as the diversities of personal and local interest,
indicate the value of Washington’s example and the character of his
time. Hardly a single experience in his career has not been realized by
officers and men in these latter days.

A very decided impression, however, has obtained among educated men,
including those of the military profession, that Washington had neither
the troops, resources, and knowledge, nor the broad range of field
service which have characterized modern warfare, and therefore lacked
material elements which develop the typical soldier. But more recent
military operations upon an extensive scale, especially those of the
Franco-Prussian War, and the American Civil War of 1861–1865, have
supplied material for better appreciation of the principles that were
involved in the campaigns of the War for American Independence, as
compared with those of Napoleon, Wellington, Marlborough, Frederick,
Hannibal, and Cæsar.

With full allowance for changes in army and battle formation, tactical
action and armament, as well as greater facilities for the
transportation of troops and army supplies, it remains true that the
relative effect of all these changes upon success in war upon a grand
scale, has not been the modification of those principles of military
science which have shaped battle action and the general conduct of war,
from the earliest period of authentic military history. The formal
“Maxims of Napoleon” were largely derived from his careful study of the
campaigns of Frederick, Hannibal, and Cæsar; and these, with the
principles involved, had specific and sometimes literal illustration in
the eventful operations of the armies of the Hebrew Commonwealth. As a
matter of fact, those early Hebrew experiences were nearly as potential
in shaping the methods of modern generals, as their civil code became
the formative factor in all later civil codes, preëminently those of the
English Common Law. The very best civil, police, and criminal
regulations of modern enactment hold closely to Hebrew antecedents. And
in military lines, the organization of regiments by companies, and the
combinations of regiments as brigades, divisions and corps, still rest
largely upon the same decimal basis; and neither the Roman legion nor
the Grecian phalanx improved upon that basis. Even the Hebrew militia,
or reserves, had such well-established comprehension of the contingency
of the entire nation being called to the field, or subjected to draft,
that as late as the advent of Christ, when he ordered the multitudes to
be seated upon the grass for refreshment, “they seated themselves in
companies of hundreds and fifties.” The sanitary and police regulations
of their camps have never been surpassed, nor their provision for the
cleanliness, health, and comfort of the rank and file. From earliest
childhood they were instructed in their national history and its
glorious achievements, and the whole people rejoiced in the gallant
conduct of any.

Changes in arms, and especially in projectiles, only induced modified
tactical formation and corresponding movements. The division of armies
into a right, centre, and left, with a well-armed and well-trained
reserve, was illustrated in their earliest battle record. The latest
modern formation, which makes of the regiment, by its three battalion
formation, _a miniature brigade_, is chiefly designed to give greater
individual value to the soldier, and not subject compact masses to the
destructive sweep of modern missiles. It also makes the force more
mobile, as well as more comprehensive of territory within its range of
fire. All this, however, is matter of detail and not of substance, in
the scientific conduct of campaigns during a protracted and widely
extended series of operations in the field.

Military science itself is but the art of employing force to vindicate,
or execute, authority. To meet an emergency adequately, wisely, and
successfully, is the expressive logic of personal, municipal, and
military action. The brain power is banded to various shaftings, and the
mental processes may differ by virtue of different applications; but the
prime activities are the same. In military studies, as in all collegiate
or social preparation, the soldier, the lawyer, or the scientist, must
be in the man, and not the necessary product of a certificate or a
diploma. The simplest possible definition of a few terms in military use
will elucidate the narrative as its events develop the War for American
Independence, under the direction of Washington as Commander-in-Chief.

Six cardinal principles are thus stated:

I. STRATEGY.—To secure those combinations which will ensure the highest
possible advantage in the employment of military force.

NOTE.—The strategical principles which controlled the Revolutionary
campaigns, as defined in Chapter X. had their correspondence in
1861–1865, when the Federal right zone, or belt of war, was beyond the
Mississippi River, and the left zone between the Alleghany Mountains
and the Atlantic Ocean. The Confederate forces, with base at Richmond,
commanded an _interior line_ westward, so that the same troops could
be alternatively used against the Federal right, left, and centre,
while the latter must make a long détour to support its advance
southward from the Ohio River. Federal superiority on sea and river
largely contributed to success. American sea-control in 1898, so
suddenly and completely secured, was practically omnipotent in the war
with Spain. The navy, was a substantially equipped force at the start.
The army, had largely to be created, when instantly needed, to meet
the naval advance. Legislation also favored the navy by giving to the
commander-in-chief the services of eminent retired veterans as an
advisory board, while excluding military men of recent active duty
from similar advisory and administrative service.

II. GRAND TACTICS.—To handle that force in the field.

NOTE.—See Chapter XVII., where the Battle of Brandywine, through the
disorder of Sullivan’s Division, unaccustomed to act as a Division, or
as a part of a consolidated Grand Division or Corps, exactly fulfilled
the conditions which made the first Battle of Bull Run disastrous to
the American Federal Army in 1861. Subsequent _skeleton drills_ below
Arlington Heights, were designed to quicken the proficiency of fresh
troops, in the alignments, wheelings, and turns, so indispensable to
concert in action upon an extensive scale. In 1898 the fresh troops
were largely from militia organizations which had been trained in
regimental movements. School battalions and the military exercises of
many benevolent societies had also been conducive to readiness for
tactical instruction. The large Camps of Instruction were also
indispensably needed. Here again, time was an exacting master of the
situation.

III. LOGISTICS.—The practical art of bringing armies, fully equipped, to
the battlefield.

NOTE.—In America where the standing army has been of only nominal
strength, although well officered; and where militia are the main
reliance in time of war; and where varied State systems rival those of
Washington’s painful experience, the principle of Logistics, with its
departments of transportation and infinite varieties of supply, is
vital to wholesome and economic success. The war with Spain which
commenced April 21, 1898, illustrated this principle to an extent
never before realized in the world’s history. Familiarity with
details, on so vast a scale of physical and financial activity, was
impossible, even if every officer of the regular army had been
assigned to executive duty. The education and versatile capacity of
the American citizen had to be utilized. Their experience furnished
object lessons for all future time.

IV. ENGINEERING.—The application of mathematics and mechanics to the
maintenance or reduction of fortified places; the interposition or
removal of artificial obstructions to the passage of an army; and the
erection of suitable works for the defence of territory or troops.

NOTE.—The invention and development of machinery and the marvellous
range of mechanical art, through chemical, electrical, and other
superhuman agencies, afforded the American Government an immediate
opportunity to supplement its Engineer Corps in 1898, with skilled
auxiliaries. In fact, the structure of American society and the trend
of American thought and enterprise, invariably demand the best
results. What is mechanically necessary, will be invented, if not at
hand. That is good engineering.

V. MINOR TACTICS.—The instruction of the soldier, individually and _en
masse_, in the details of military drill, the use of his weapon, and the
perfection of discipline.

NOTE.—Washington never lost sight of the _set-up_ of the individual
soldier, as the best dependence in the hour of battle. Self-reliance,
obedience to orders, and confidence in success, were enjoined as the
conditions of success. His system of _competitive marksmanship_, of
_rifle ranges_, and _burden tests_, was initiated early in his career,
and was conspicuously enjoined before Brooklyn, and elsewhere, during
the war.

The American soldier of 1898 became invincible, _man for man_, because
of his intelligent response to individual discipline and drill.
Failure in either, whether of officer or soldier, shaped character and
result. As with the ancient Hebrew, citizenship meant knowledge of
organic law and obedience to its behests. Every individual, therefore,
when charged with the central electric force, became a _relay_
battery, to conserve, intensify, and distribute that force.

VI. STATESMANSHIP IN WAR.—This is illustrated by the suggestion of
Christ, that “a king going to war with another king would sit down first
and count the cost, whether he would be able with ten thousand to meet
him that cometh against him with twenty thousand.”

NOTE.—American statesmanship in 1898, exacted other appliances than
those of immediately available physical force. The costly and
insufferable relations of the Spanish West Indies to the United
States, had become pestilential. No self-respecting nation, elsewhere,
would have as long withheld the only remedy. Cuba was dying to be
free. Spain, unwilling, or unable, to grant an honorable and complete
autonomy to her despairing subjects, precipitated war with the United
States. _The momentum of a supreme moral force in behalf of humanity
at large, so energized the entire American people that every ordinary
unpreparedness failed to lessen the effectiveness of the stroke._

It was both statesmanship and strategy, to strike so suddenly that
neither climatic changes, indigenous diseases, nor tropical cyclones,
could gain opportunity to do their mischief. When these supposed
allies of Spain were brushed aside, as powerless to stay the advance
of American arms in behalf of starving thousands, and a fortunate
occasion was snatched, just in time for victory, it proved to be such
an achievement as Washington would have pronounced a direct
manifestation of Divine favor.

But the character of Washington as a soldier is not to be determined by
the numerical strength of the armies engaged in single battles, nor by
the resources and geographical conditions of later times. The same
general principles have ever obtained, and ever will control human
judgment. Transportation and intercommunication are relative; and the
slow mails and travel of Revolutionary times, alike affected both
armies, with no partial benefit or injury to either. The British had
better communication by water, but not by land; with the disadvantage of
campaigning through an unknown and intricate country, peopled by their
enemies, whenever not covered by the guns of their fleet. The American
expedition to Cuba in 1898 had not only the support of invincible
fleets, but the native population were to be the auxiliaries, as well as
the beneficiaries of the mighty movement.

Baron Jomini, in his elaborate history of the campaigns of Napoleon,
analyzes that general’s success over his more experienced opponents,
upon the basis of his observance or neglect of the military principles
already outlined. The dash and vigor of his first Italian campaign were
indeed characteristic of a young soldier impatient of the habitually
tardy deliberations of the _old-school_ movements. Napoleon discounted
time by action. He benumbed his adversary by the suddenness and ferocity
of his stroke. But never, even in that wonderful campaign, did Napoleon
strike more suddenly and effectively, than did Washington on Christmas
night, 1776, at Trenton. And Napoleon’s following up blow was not more
emphatic, in its results, than was Washington’s attack upon Princeton, a
week later, when the British army already regarded his capture as a
simple morning privilege. Such inspirations of military prescience
belong to every age; and often they shorten wars by their determining
value.

As a sound basis for a right estimate of Washington’s military career,
and to avoid tedious episodes respecting the acts and methods of many
generals who were associated with him at the commencement of the
Revolutionary War, a brief synopsis of the career of each will find
early notice. The _dramatis personæ_ of the Revolutionary drama are thus
made the group of which he is to be the centre; and his current orders,
correspondence, and criticisms of their conduct, will furnish his
valuation of the character and services of each. The single fact, that
no general officer of the first appointments actively shared in the
immediate siege of Yorktown, adds interest to this advance outline of
their personal history.

For the same purpose, and as a logical predicate for his early
comprehension of the real issues involved in a contest with Great
Britain, an outline of events which preceded hostilities is introduced,
embracing, however, only those Colonial antecedents which became
emotional factors in forming his character and energizing his life as a
soldier.

The maps, which illustrate only the immediate campaigns of Washington,
or related territory which required his supervision, are reduced from
those used in “Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.” The
map entitled “Operations near New York,” was the first one drafted, at
Tarrytown, New York. In 1847, it was approved by Washington Irving, then
completing his Life of Washington, and his judgment determined the plan
of the future work. All of the maps, however, before engravure, had the
minute examination and approval of Benson J. Lossing. The present volume
owes its preparation to the personal request of the late Robert C.
Winthrop, of Massachusetts, made shortly before his decease, and is
completed, with ever-present appreciation of his aid and his friendship.

HENRY B. CARRINGTON.

HYDE PARK, MASS., Sept. 1, 1898.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I.
PAGE

EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS 1

CHAPTER II.

THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 10

CHAPTER III.

THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY 20

CHAPTER IV.

ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER 31

CHAPTER V.

WASHINGTON IN COMMAND 41

CHAPTER VI.

BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD OF ACTION 50

CHAPTER VII.

HOWE SUCCEEDS GATES.—CLOSING SCENES OF 1775 58

CHAPTER VIII.

AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN.—BOSTON TAKEN 68

CHAPTER IX.

SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN 82

CHAPTER X.

BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA.—HOWE INVADES NEW YORK 93

CHAPTER XI.

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 101

CHAPTER XII.

WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK 114

CHAPTER XIII.

WASHINGTON TENDERS, AND HOWE DECLINES, BATTLE.—HARLEM HEIGHTS AND
WHITE PLAINS 125

CHAPTER XIV.

THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN.—TRENTON 134

CHAPTER XV.

THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED.—PRINCETON 150

CHAPTER XVI.

THE AMERICAN BASE OF OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED.—THE SECOND NEW JERSEY
CAMPAIGN 160

CHAPTER XVII.

BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA.—OPERATIONS ALONG THE HUDSON 171

CHAPTER XVIII.

PENNSYLVANIA INVADED.—BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE 181

CHAPTER XIX.

WASHINGTON RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE.—BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN 192

CHAPTER XX.

JEALOUSY AND GREED DEFEATED.—VALLEY FORGE 198

CHAPTER XXI.

PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE IN WINTER, 1778 210

CHAPTER XXII.

FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS AGAIN.—BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 221

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE TAKES EFFECT.—SIEGE OF NEWPORT 238

CHAPTER XXIV.

MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS, 1779 246

CHAPTER XXV.

MINOR OPERATIONS OF 1779 CONTINUED.—STONY POINT TAKEN.—NEW ENGLAND
RELIEVED 255

CHAPTER XXVI.

SHIFTING SCENES.—TEMPER OF THE PEOPLE.—SAVANNAH 263

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780.—NEW JERSEY ONCE MORE INVADED 269

CHAPTER XXVIII.

BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD.—ROCHAMBEAU.—ARNOLD.—GATES 282

CHAPTER XXIX.

A BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF THE THEATRE OF WAR 294

CHAPTER XXX.

THE SOLDIER TRIED.—AMERICAN MUTINY.—FOREIGN JUDGMENT.—ARNOLD’S
DEPREDATIONS 304

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1781, OUTLINED.—COWPENS.—GUILFORD
COURT-HOUSE.—EUTAW SPRINGS 312

CHAPTER XXXII.

LAFAYETTE IN PURSUIT OF ARNOLD.—THE END IN SIGHT.—ARNOLD IN THE
BRITISH ARMY 323

CHAPTER XXXIII.

NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED.—CORNWALLIS INCLOSED BY LAFAYETTE 333

CHAPTER XXXIV.

BRITISH CAPTAINS OUTGENERALED.—WASHINGTON JOINS LAFAYETTE 344

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE VINDICATED.—WASHINGTON’S MAGNANIMITY.—HIS
BENEDICTION 352

CHAPTER XXXVI.

WASHINGTON’S PREDICTION REALIZED.—THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICA
PRONOUNCED 366

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

APPENDIX A.—American Army, by States 377

APPENDIX B.—American Navy and its Career 378

APPENDIX C.—Comparisons with Later Wars 380

APPENDIX D.—British Army, at Various Dates 383

APPENDIX E.—Organization of Burgoyne’s Army 387

APPENDIX F.—Organization of Cornwallis’s Army 388

APPENDIX G.—Notes of Lee’s Court-martial 389

GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS 393

CHRONOLOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 397

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS.

ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE

WASHINGTON _Frontispiece._

[Hall’s engraving from the St. Memin crayon.]

WASHINGTON AT FOUR PERIODS OF HIS MILITARY CAREER 40

[From etching, after Hall’s Sons’ group.]

WASHINGTON AT BOSTON 80

[From Stuart’s painting, in Faneuil Hall, Boston.]

WASHINGTON BEFORE TRENTON 143

[From Dael’s painting.]

WASHINGTON IN HIS ROOM AT VALLEY FORGE 207

[From the painting by Scheuster.]

MAPS.

I. —OUTLINE OF THE ATLANTIC COAST 1

II. —BOSTON AND VICINITY 69

III. —BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 105

IV. —OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK 125

V. —CAPTURE OF FORT WASHINGTON 132

VI. —TRENTON AND VICINITY 144

VII. —BATTLE OF TRENTON: BATTLE OF PRINCETON 151

VIII. —OPERATIONS IN NEW JERSEY 161

IX. —ATTACK OF FORTS CLINTON AND MONTGOMERY 179

X. —BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE 186

XI. —BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN 196

XII. —OPERATIONS ON THE DELAWARE 202

XIII. —OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA 204

XIV. —ENCAMPMENT AT VALLEY FORGE 211

XV. —BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 224

XVI. —OUTLINE MAP OF HUDSON RIVER 255

XVII. —BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD: OPERATIONS FROM STATEN
ISLAND 283

XVIII. —LAFAYETTE IN VIRGINIA 339

XIX. —OPERATIONS IN CHESAPEAKE BAY 355

XX. —SIEGE OF YORKTOWN 357

[Illustration: Outline of Atlantic Coast]

WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER.

CHAPTER I.
EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS.

The boyhood and youth of George Washington were singularly in harmony
with those aptitudes and tastes that shaped his entire life. He was not
quite eight years of age when his elder brother, Lawrence, fourteen
years his senior, returned from England where he had been carefully
educated, and where he had developed military tastes that were
hereditary in the family. Lawrence secured a captain’s commission in a
freshly organized regiment, and engaged in service in the West Indies,
with distinguished credit. His letters, counsels, and example inspired
the younger brother with similar zeal. Irving says that “all his
amusements took a military turn. He made soldiers of his school-mates.
They had their mimic parades, reviews, and sham-fights. A boy named
William Bustle, was sometimes his competitor, but George was
commander-in-chief of the school.”

His business aptitudes were equally exact, methodical, and promising.
Besides fanciful caligraphy, which appeared in manuscript school-books,
wherein he executed profiles of his school-mates, with a flourish of the
pen, as well as nondescript birds, Irving states that “before he was
thirteen years of age, he had copied into a volume, forms of all kinds
of mercantile and legal papers: bills of exchange, notes of hand, deeds,
bonds, and the like.” “This self-tuition gave him throughout life a
lawyer’s skill in drafting documents, and a merchant’s exactness in
keeping accounts, so that all the concerns of his various estates, his
dealings with his domestic stewards and foreign agents, his accounts
with government, and all his financial transactions, are, to this day,
monuments of his method and unwearied accuracy.”

Even as a boy, his frame had been large and powerful, and he is
described by Captain Mercer “as straight as an Indian, measuring six
feet and two inches in his stockings, and weighing one hundred and
seventy-five pounds, when he took his seat in the Virginia House of
Burgesses in 1759. His head is well shaped though not large, but is
gracefully poised on a superb neck, with a large and straight rather
than a prominent nose; blue-gray penetrating eyes, which were widely
separated and overhung by heavy brows. A pleasing, benevolent, though a
commanding countenance, dark-brown hair, features regular and placid,
with all the muscles under perfect control, with a mouth large, and
generally firmly closed,” complete the picture. The bust by Houdon at
the Capitol of Virginia, and the famous St. Memin crayon, fully accord
with this description of Washington.

His training and surroundings alike ministered to his natural
conceptions of a useful and busy life. In the midst of abundant game, he
became proficient in its pursuit. Living where special pride was taken
in the cultivation of good stock, and where nearly all travel and
neighborly visitation was upon horseback, he learned the value of a good
horse, and was always well mounted. Competition in saddle exercise was,
therefore, one of the most pleasing and constant entertainments of
himself and companions, and in its enjoyment, and in many festive
tournaments that revived something of the olden-time chivalry of
knighthood, Washington was not only proficient, but foremost in
excellence of attainment.

Rustic recreations such as quoits, vaulting, wrestling, leaping, the
foot-race, hunting and fishing, were parts of his daily experience, and
thoroughly in the spirit of the Old Dominion home life of the well-bred
gentleman. The gallantry of the times and the social amenities of that
section of the country were specially adapted to his temperament, so
that in these, also, he took the palm of recognized merit. The lance and
the sword, and every accomplishment of mimic warfare in the scale of
heraldic observance, usual at that period, were parts of his panoply, to
be enjoyed with keenest relish, until his name became synonymous with
success in all for which he seriously struggled. Tradition does not
exaggerate the historic record of his proficiency in these manly sports.

Frank by nature, although self-contained and somewhat reticent in
expression; unsuspicious of others, but ever ready to help the deserving
needy, or the unfortunate competitor who vainly struggled for other
sympathy, he became the natural umpire, at the diverting recreations of
his times, and commanded a respectful confidence far beyond that of
others of similar age and position in society. With all this, a sense of
justice and a right appreciation of the merit of others, even of rivals,
were so conspicuous in daily intercourse with a large circle of familiar
acquaintances, whether of influential families or those of a more humble
sphere of life, that he ever bent gracefully to honor the deserving,
while never obsequious to gain the favor of any.

Living in the midst of slave labor, and himself a slaveholder, he was
humane, considerate, and impartial. Toward his superiors in age or in
position, he was uniformly courteous, without jealousy or envy, but
unconsciously carried himself with so much of benignity and grace, that
his most familiar mates paid him the deference which marked the demeanor
of all who, in later years, recognized his exalted preferment and his
natural sphere of command. The instincts of a perfect gentleman were so
radicated in his person and deportment, that he moved from stage to
stage, along life’s ascent, as naturally as the sun rises to its zenith
with ever increasing brightness and force.

All these characteristics, so happily blended, imparted to his choice of
a future career its natural direction and character. Living near the
coast and in frequent contact with representatives of the British navy,
he became impressed by the strong conviction that its service offered
the best avenue to the enjoyment of his natural tastes, as well as the
most promising field for their fruitful exercise. The berth of
midshipman, with its prospects of preferment and travel, fell within his
reach and acceptance. Every available opportunity was sought, through
books of history and travel and acquaintance with men of the naval
profession, to anticipate its duties and requirements. It was
Washington’s first disappointment in life of which there is record, that
his mother did not share his ardent devotion for the sea and maritime
adventure. At the age of eleven he lost his father, Augustine
Washington, but the estate was ample for all purposes of Virginia
hospitality and home comfort, and he felt that he could be spared as
well as his brother Lawrence. With all the intensity of his high
aspiration and all the vigor of his earnest and almost passionate will,
he sought to win his mother’s assent to his plans; and then, with filial
reverence and a full, gracious submission, he bent to her wishes and
surrendered his choice. That was Washington’s first victory; and similar
self-mastery, under obligation to country, became the secret of his
imperial success. Irving relates that his mother’s favorite volume was
Sir Matthew Hale’s Contemplations, moral and divine; and that “the
admirable maxims therein contained, sank deep into the mind of George,
and doubtless had a great influence in forming his character. That
volume, ever cherished, and bearing his mother’s name, Mary Washington,
may still be seen in the archives of Mount Vernon.”

But Washington’s tastes had become so settled, that he followed the
general trend of mathematical and military study, until he became so
well qualified as a civil engineer, that at the age of sixteen, one year
after abandoning the navy as his profession, he was intrusted with
important land surveys, by Lord Fairfax; and at the age of nineteen was
appointed Military Inspector, with the rank of Major. In 1752 he became
the Adjutant-General of Virginia. Having been born on the twenty-second
day of February (February 11th, Old Style) he was only twenty years of
age when this great responsibility was intrusted to his charge.

The period was one of grave concern to the people of Virginia,
especially as the encroachments of the French on the western frontier,
and the hostilities of several Indian tribes, had imperilled all border
settlements; while the British government was not prepared to furnish a
sufficient military force to meet impending emergencies. As soon as
Washington entered upon the duties of his office, he made a systematic
organization of the militia his first duty. A plan was formulated,
having special reference to frontier service. His journals and the old
Colonial records indicate the minuteness with which this undertaking was
carried into effect. His entire subsequent career is punctuated by
characteristics drawn from this experience. Rifle practice, feats of
horsemanship, signalling, restrictions of diet, adjustments for the
transportation of troops and supplies with the least possible
encumbrance; road and bridge building, the care of powder and the
casting of bullets, were parts of this system. These were accompanied by
regulations requiring an exact itinerary of every march, which were
filed for reference, in order to secure the quickest access to every
frontier post. The duties and responsibilities of scouts sent in advance
of troops, were carefully defined. The passage of rivers, the felling of
trees for breastworks, stockades, and block-houses, and methods of
crossing swamps, by corduroy adjustments, entered into the instruction
of the Virginia militia.

At this juncture it seemed advisable, in the opinion of Governor
Dinwiddie, to secure, if practicable, a better and an honorable
understanding with the French commanders who had established posts at
the west. The Indians were hostile to all advances of both British and
French settlement. There was an indication that the French were making
friendly overtures to the savages, with view to an alliance against the
English. In 1753 Washington was sent as Special Commissioner, for the
purpose indicated. The journey through a country infested with hostile
tribes was a remarkable episode in the life of the young soldier, and
was conducted amid hardships that seem, through his faithful diary, to
have been the incidents of some strangely thrilling fiction rather than
the literal narrative, modestly given, of personal experience. During
the journey, full of risks and rare deliverances from savage foes,
swollen streams, ice, snow, and tempest, his keen discernment was quick
to mark the forks of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers as the proper
site for a permanent post, to control that region and the tributary
waters of the Ohio, which united there. He was courteously received by
St. Pierre, the French commandant, but failed to secure the recognition
of English rights along the Ohio. But Washington’s notes of the winter’s
expedition critically record the military features of the section
traversed by him, and forecast the peculiar skill with which he
accomplished so much in later years, with the small force at his
disposal.

In 1754 he was promoted as Colonel and placed in command of the entire
Virginia militia. Already, the Ohio Company had selected the forks of
the river for a trading-post and commenced a stockade fort for their
defence. The details of Washington’s march to support these pioneers,
the establishment and history of Fort Necessity, are matters of history.

Upon assuming command of the Virginia militia, Washington decided that a
more flexible system than that of the European government of troops, was
indispensable to success in fighting the combined French and Indian
forces, then assuming the aggressive against the border settlements.
Thrown into intimate association with General Braddock and assigned to
duty as his aid-de-camp and guide, he endeavored to explain to that
officer the unwisdom of his assertion that the very appearance of
British regulars in imposing array, would vanquish the wild warriors of
thicket and woods, without battle. The profitless campaign and needless
fate of Braddock are familiar; but Washington gained credit both at home
and abroad, youthful as he was, for that sagacity, practical wisdom,
knowledge of human nature, and courage, which ever characterized his
life.

During these marchings and inspections he caused all trees which were so
near to a post as to shelter an advancing enemy, to be felled. The
militia were scattered over an extensive range of wild country, in small
detachments, and he was charged with the defence of more than four
hundred miles of frontier, with an available force of only one thousand
men. He at once initiated a system of sharp-shooters for each post.
Ranges were established, so that fire would not be wasted upon
assailants before they came within effective distance. When he resumed
command, after returning from the Braddock campaign, he endeavored to
reorganize the militia upon a new basis. This reorganization drew from
his fertile brain some military maxims for camp and field service which
were in harmony with the writings of the best military authors of that
period, and his study of available military works was exact,
unremitting, and never forgotten. Even during the active life of the
Revolutionary period, he secured from New York various military and
other volumes for study, especially including Marshal Turenne’s Works,
which Greene had mastered before the war began.

Washington resigned his commission in 1756; married Mrs. Martha Custis,
Jan. 6, 1759; was elected member of the Virginia House of Burgesses the
same year, and was appointed Commissioner to settle military accounts in
1765. In the discharge of this trust he manifested that accuracy of
detail and that exactness of system in business concerns which have
their best illustration in the minute record of his expenses during the
Revolutionary War, in which every purchase made for the government or
the army, even to a few horse-shoe nails, is accurately stated.

Neither Cæsar’s Commentaries, nor the personal record of any other
historical character, more strikingly illustrate an ever-present sense
of responsibility to conscience and to country, for trusts reposed, than
does that of Washington, whether incurred in camp or in the whirl and
crash of battle. Baron Jomini says: “A great soldier must have a
_physical_ courage which takes no account of obstacles; and a high
_moral_ courage capable of great resolution.” There have been youth,
like Hannibal, whose earliest nourishment was a taste of vengeance
against his country’s foes, and others have imbibed, as did the ancient
Hebrew, abnormal strength to hate their enemies while doing battle; but
if the character of Washington be justly delineated, he was, through
every refined and lofty channel, prepared, by early aptitudes and
training, to honor his chosen profession, with no abatement of aught
that dignifies character, and rounds out in harmonious completeness the
qualities of a consummate statesman and a great soldier.

CHAPTER II.
THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY.

In 1755, four military expeditions were planned by the Colonies: one
against the French in Nova Scotia; one against Crown Point; one against
Fort Niagara, and the fourth, that of Braddock, against the French posts
along the Ohio river.

In 1758, additional expeditions were undertaken, the first against
Louisburg, the second against Ticonderoga, and the third against Fort Du
Quesne. Washington led the advance in the third, a successful attack,
Nov. 25, 1758, thereby securing peace with the Indians on the border,
and making the fort itself more memorable by changing its name to that
of Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh) in memory of William Pitt (Lord Chatham),
the eminent British statesman, and the enthusiastic friend of America.

In 1759, Quebec was captured by the combined British and Colonial
forces, and the tragic death of the two commanders, Wolfe and Montcalm,
made the closing hours of the siege the last opportunity of their heroic
valor. With the capture of Montreal in 1760, Canada came wholly under
British control. In view of those campaigns, it was not strange that so
many Colonial participants readily found places in the Continental Army
at the commencement of the war for American Independence, and
subsequently urged the acquisition of posts on the northern border with
so much pertinacity and confidence.

In 1761, Spain joined France against Great Britain, but failed of
substantial gain through that alliance, because the British fleets were
able to master the West India possessions of Spain, and even to capture
the city of Havana itself.

In 1763, a treaty was effected at Paris, which terminated these
protracted inter-Colonial wars, so that the thirteen American colonies
were finally relieved from the vexations and costly burdens of aiding
the British crown to hold within its grasp so many and so widely
separated portions of the American continent. In the ultimate settlement
with Spain, England exchanged Havana for Florida; and France, with the
exception of the city of New Orleans and its immediate vicinity, retired
behind the Mississippi river, retaining, as a shelter for her fisheries,
only the Canadian islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which are still
French possessions.

In view of the constantly increasing imposition of taxes upon the
Colonies by the mother country, in order to maintain her frequent wars
with European rivals, by land and sea, a convention was held at New York
on the seventh day of October, 1765, called a Colonial Congress, “to
consult as to their relations to England, and provide for their common
safety.” Nine colonies were represented, and three others either
ratified the action of the convention, or declared their sympathy with
its general recommendations and plans. The very brief advance notice of
the assembling of delegates, partly accounts for the failure of North
Carolina, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Georgia, to be represented. But
that convention made a formal “Declaration of Rights,” especially
protesting that “their own representatives alone had the right to tax
them,” and “their own juries to try them.”

As an illustration of the fact, that the suggestion of some common bond
to unite the Colonies for general defence was not due to the agencies
which immediately precipitated the American Revolution, it is to be
noticed that as early as 1607, William Penn urged the union of the
Colonies in some mutually related common support. The Six Nations
(Indian), whom the British courted as allies against the French, and
later, against their own blood, had already reached a substantial Union
among themselves, under the name of the Iroquois Confederacy; and it is
a historical fact of great interest, that their constitutional league
for mutual support against a common enemy, while reserving absolute
independence in every local function or franchise, challenged the
appreciative indorsement of Thomas Jefferson when he entered upon the
preparation of a Constitution for the United States of America.

And in 1722, Daniel Coxe, of New Jersey, suggested a practical union of
the Colonies for the consolidation of interests common to each. In 1754,
when the British government formally advised the Colonies to secure the
friendship of the Six Nations against the French, Benjamin Franklin
prepared a form for such union. Delegates from New England, as well as
from New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, met at Albany on the fourth
of July, 1754, the very day of the surrender of Fort Necessity to the
French, for consideration of the suggested plan. The King’s council
rejected it, because it conceded too much independence of action to the
people of the Colonies, and the Colonies refused to accept its
provisions, because it left too much authority with the King.

Ten years later, when the Colonies had been freed from the necessity of
sacrificing men and money to support the British authority against
French, Spanish, and Indian antagonists, the poverty of the British
treasury drove George Grenville, then Prime Minister, to a system of
revenue from America, through the imposition of duties upon Colonial
imports. In 1755 followed the famous Stamp Act. Its passage by
Parliament was resisted by statesmen of clear foresight, with sound
convictions of the injustice of taxing their brethren in America who had
no representatives in either House of Parliament; but in vain, and this
explosive bomb was hurled across the sea. Franklin, then in London, thus
wrote to Charles Thompson, who afterwards became secretary of the
Colonial Congress: “The sun of Liberty has set. The American people must
light the torch of industry and economy.” To this Thompson replied: “Be
assured that we shall light torches of quite another sort.”

The explosion of this missile, charged with death to every noble
incentive to true loyalty to the mother country, dropped its
inflammatory contents everywhere along the American coast. The Assembly
of Virginia was first to meet, and its youngest member, Patrick Henry,
in spite of shouts of “Treason,” pressed appropriate legislation to
enactment. Massachusetts, unadvised of the action of Virginia, with
equal spontaneity, took formal action, inviting the Colonies to send
delegates to a Congress in New York, there to consider the grave issues
that confronted the immediate future. South Carolina was the first to
respond. When Governor Tryon, of North Carolina, afterwards the famous
Governor of New York, asked Colonel (afterwards General) Ashe, Speaker
of the North Carolina Assembly, what the House would do with the Stamp
Act, he replied, “We will resist its execution to the death.”

On the seventh of October the Congress assembled and solemnly asserted,
as had a former convention, that “their own representatives alone had
the right to tax them,” and “their own juries to try them.” Throughout
the coast line of towns and cities, interrupted business, muffled and
tolling bells, flags at half-mast, and every possible sign of stern
indignation and deep distress, indicated the resisting force which was
gathering volume to hurl a responsive missile into the very council
chamber of King George himself.

“Sons of Liberty” organized in force, but secretly; arming themselves
for the contingency of open conflict. Merchants refused to import
British goods. Societies of the learned professions and of all grades of
citizenship agreed to dispense with all luxuries of English production
or import. Under the powerful and magnetic sway of Pitt and Burke, this
Act was repealed in 1766; but even this repeal was accompanied by a
“Declaratory Act,” which reserved for the Crown “the _right_ to bind the
Colonies, in all cases whatsoever.”

Pending all these fermentations of the spirit of liberty, George
Washington, of Virginia, was among the first to recognize the coming of
a conflict in which the Colonial troops would no longer be a convenient
auxiliary to British regulars, in a common cause, but would confront
them in a life or death struggle, for rights which had been guaranteed
by Magna Charta, and had become the vested inheritance of the American
people. Suddenly, as if to impress its power more heavily upon the
restless and overwrought Colonists, Parliament required them to furnish
quarters and subsistence for the garrisons of towns and cities. In 1768,
two regiments arrived at Boston, ostensibly to “preserve the public
peace,” but, primarily, to enforce the revenue measures of Parliament.

In 1769, Parliament requested the King to “instruct the Governor of
Massachusetts” to “forward to England for trial, upon charges of high
treason,” several prominent citizens of that colony “who had been guilty
of denouncing Parliamentary action.” The protests of the Provincial
Assemblies of Virginia and North Carolina against the removal of their
citizens, for trial elsewhere, were answered by the dissolution of those
bodies by their respective royal governors. On the fifth day of May,
1769, Lord North, who had become Prime Minister, proposed to abolish all
duties, except upon tea. Later, in 1770, occurred the “Boston Massacre,”
which is ever recalled to mind by a monument upon the Boston Common, in
honor of the victims. In 1773 “Committees of Correspondence” were
selected by most of the Colonies, for advising the people of all
sections, whenever current events seemed to endanger the public weal.
One writer said of this state of affairs: “Common origin, a common
language, and common sufferings had already established between the
Colonies a union of feeling and interest; and now, common dangers drew
them together more closely.”

But the tax upon tea had been retained, as the expression of the
reserved right to tax at will, under the weak assumption that the
Colonists would accept this single tax and pay a willing consideration
for the use of tea in their social and domestic life. The shrewd and
patriotic citizens, however boyish it may have seemed to many, found a
way out of the apparent dilemma, and on the night of December 16, 1773,
the celebrated Boston Tea Party gave an entertainment, using three
hundred and fifty-two chests of tea for the festive occasion, and Boston
Harbor for the mixing caldron.

In 1774, the “Boston Port Bill” was passed, nullifying material
provisions of the Massachusetts Charter, prohibiting intercourse with
Boston by sea, and substituting Salem for the port of entry and as the
seat of government for the Province. It is to be noticed, concerning the
various methods whereby the Crown approached the Colonies, in the
attempt to subordinate all rights to the royal will, that Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut, until 1692, were charter governments,
whereby laws were framed and executed by the freemen of each colony. The
proprietary governments were Pennsylvania with Maryland, and at first
New York, New Jersey, and the Carolinas. In all of these, the
proprietors, under certain restrictions, established and conducted their
own systems of rule. There were also the royal governments, those of New
Hampshire, Virginia, Georgia, and afterwards Massachusetts, New York,
New Jersey, and the Carolinas. In these, appointments of the chief
officers pertained to the Crown.

At the crisis noticed, General Gage had been appointed Governor of
Massachusetts Colony, as well as commander-in-chief, and four additional
regiments had been despatched to his support. But Salem declined to
avail herself of the proffered boon of exceptional franchises, and the
House of Burgesses of Virginia ordered that “the day when the Boston
Port Bill was to go into effect should be observed as a day of fasting,
humiliation, and prayer.”

The Provincial Assembly did indeed meet at Salem, but solemnly resolved
that it was expedient, at once, to call a General Congress of all the
Colonies, to meet the unexpected disfranchisement of the people, and
appointed five delegates to attend such Congress. All the Colonies
except Georgia, whose governor prevented the election of delegates, were
represented.

This body, known in history as the First Continental Congress, assembled
in Carpenter’s Hall, Philadelphia, on the fifth day of September, 1774.
Peyton Randolph, of Virginia, was elected president, and Charles
Thompson, of Pennsylvania, was elected secretary. Among the
representative men who took part in its solemn deliberations must be
named Samuel Adams and John Adams, of Massachusetts; Philip Livingstone
and John Jay, of New York; John Dickinson, of Pennsylvania; Christopher
Gadsden and John Rutledge, of South Carolina; Patrick Henry, Richard
Henry Lee, and George Washington, of Virginia.

During an address by Lord Chatham before the British House of Lords, he
expressed his opinion of the men who thus boldly asserted their
inalienable rights as Englishmen against the usurping mandates of the
Crown, in these words: “History, my lords, has been my favorite study;
and in the celebrated writers of antiquity have I often admired the
patriotism of Greece and Rome; but, my lords, I must declare and avow,
that in the master states of the world, I know not the people, or
senate, who, in such a complication of difficult circumstances, can
stand in preference to the delegates of America assembled in General
Congress at Philadelphia.” This body resolved to support Massachusetts
in resistance to the offensive Acts of Parliament; made a second
“Declaration of Rights,” and advised an American association for
non-intercourse with England. It also prepared another petition to the
King, as well as an address to the people of Great Britain and Canada,
and then provided for another Congress, to be assembled the succeeding
May. During its sessions, the Massachusetts Assembly also convened and
resolved itself into a Provincial Congress, electing John Hancock as
president, and proceeded to authorize a body of militia, subject to
instant call, and therefore to be designated as “Minute Men.” A
Committee of Safety was appointed to administer public affairs during
the recess of the Congress. When Captain Robert Mackenzie, of
Washington’s old regiment, intimated that Massachusetts was rebellious,
and sought independence, Washington used this unequivocal language in
reply: “If the ministry are determined to push matters to extremity, I
add, as my opinion, that more blood will be spilled than history has
ever furnished instances of, in the annals of North America; and such a
vital wound will be given to the peace of this great country, as time
itself cannot cure, or eradicate the remembrance of.”

Early in 1775 Parliament rejected a “Conciliatory Bill,” which had been
introduced by Lord Chatham, and passed an Act in special restraint of
New England trade, which forbade even fishing on the banks of
Newfoundland. New York, North Carolina, and Georgia were excepted, in
the imposition of restrictions upon trade in the middle and southern
Colonies, in order by a marked distinction between Colonies, to conserve
certain aristocratic influences, and promote dissension among the
people; but all such transparent devices failed to subdue the patriotic
sentiment which had already become universal in its expression.

At that juncture the English people themselves did not apprehend rightly
the merits of the dawning struggle, nor resent the imposition by
Parliament, of unjust, unequal, and unconstitutional laws upon their
brethren in America. Dr. Franklin thus described their servile attitude
toward the Crown: “Every man in England seems to consider himself as a
piece of a sovereign; seems to jostle himself into the throne with the
King; and talks of ‘_our_ subjects in the Colonies.’”

The ferment of patriotic sentiment was deep, subtle, intense, and ready
for deliverance. The sovereignty of the British crown and the divine
rights of man were to be subjected to the stern arbitrament of battle.
One had fleets, armies, wealth, prestige, and power, unsustained by the
principles of genuine liberty which had distinguished the British
Constitution above all other modern systems of governmental control;
while the scattered two millions of earnest, patriotic Englishmen across
the sea, who, from their first landing upon the shores of the New World
had honored every principle which could impart dignity and empire to
their mother country, were to balance the scale of determining war by
the weight of loyalty to conscience and to God.

CHAPTER III.
THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY.

British authority, which ought to have gladly welcomed and honored the
prodigious elasticity, energy, and growth of its American dependencies,
as the future glory and invincible ally of her advancing empire, was
deliberately arming to convert a natural filial relation into one of
slavery. The legacies of British law and the liberties of English
subjects, which the Crown did not dare to infringe at home, had been
lodged in the hearts of her American sons and daughters, until
resistance to a royal decree had become impossible under any reasonable
system of paternal care and treatment. Colonial sacrifices during Indian
wars had been cheerfully borne, and free-will offerings of person and
property had been rendered without stint, upon every demand. But it
seemed to be impossible for George the Third and his chosen advisers to
comprehend in its full significance, the momentous fact, that English
will was as strong and stubborn in the child as in the parent.

Lord Chatham said that “it would be found impossible for freemen in
England to wish to see three millions of Englishmen slaves in America.”

Respecting the attempted seizure of arms rightly in the hands of the
people, that precipitated the “skirmish,” as the British defined it,
which occurred at Lexington on the nineteenth day of April, 1775, Lord
Dartmouth said: “The effect of General Gage’s attempt at Concord will be
fatal.”

Granville Sharpe, of the Ordnance Department, resigned rather than
forward military stores to America.

Admiral Keppel formally requested not to be employed against America.

Lord Effingham resigned, when advised that his regiment had been ordered
to America.

John Wesley, who had visited America many years before with his brother,
and understood the character of the Colonists, at once recalled the
appeal once made to the British government by General Gage during
November, 1774, when he “was confident, that, to begin with, an army of
twenty thousand men would, in the end, save Great Britain both blood and
treasure,” and declared, “Neither twenty thousand, forty thousand, nor
sixty thousand can end the dawning struggle.”

During the summer of 1774 militia companies had been rapidly organized
throughout the Colonies. New England especially had been so actively
associated with all military operations during the preceding French and
Indian wars, that her people more readily assumed the attitude of armed
preparation for the eventualities of open conflict.

Virginia had experienced similar conditions on a less extended and
protracted basis. The action of the First Continental Congress on the
fifth day of September, 1774, when, upon notice that Gage had fortified
Boston, it made an unequivocal declaration of its sympathy with the
people of Boston and of Massachusetts, changed the character of the
struggle from that of a local incident, to one that demanded organized,
deliberate, and general resistance.

Notwithstanding the slow course of mail communications between the
widely separated Colonies north and south, the deportment of the British
Colonial governors had been so uniformly oppressive and exacting, that
the people, everywhere, like tinder, were ready for the first flying
spark. A report became current during September, after the forced
removal of powder from Cambridge and Charlestown, that Boston had been
attacked. One writer has stated, that, “within thirty-six hours, nearly
thirty thousand men were under arms.” This burst of patriotic feeling,
this mighty frenzy over unrighteous interference with vested rights,
made a profound impression upon the Continental Congress, then in
session at Philadelphia, and aroused in the mind of Washington, then a
delegate from Virginia, the most intense anxiety lest the urgency of the
approaching crisis should find the people unprepared to take up the gage
of battle, and fight with the hope of success. All this simply indicated
the depth and breadth of the eager sentiment which actually panted for
armed expression.

The conflict between British troops and armed citizens at Lexington had
already assumed the characteristics of a battle, and, as such, had a
more significant import than many more pronounced engagements in the
world’s history. The numbers engaged were few, but the men who ventured
to face British regulars on that occasion were but the thin skirmish
line in advance of the swelling thousands that awaited the call “To
arms.”

Massachusetts understood the immediate demand, having now drawn the fire
of the hitherto discreet adversary, and promptly declared that the
necessities of the hour required from New England the immediate service
of thirty thousand men, assuming as her proportionate part a force of
thirteen thousand six hundred. This was on the twenty-second day of
April, while many timid souls and some social aristocrats were still
painfully worrying themselves as to who was to blame for anybody’s being
shot on either side.

On the twenty-fifth day of April, Rhode Island devoted fifteen hundred
men to the service, as her contribution to “An Army of Observation”
about Boston.

On the following day, the twenty-sixth, Connecticut tendered her
proportion of two thousand men.

Each Colonial detachment went up to Boston as a separate army, with
independent organization and responsibility. The food, as well as the
powder and ball of each, was distinct, and they had little in common
except the purpose which impelled them to concentrate for a combined
opposition to the armed aggressions of the Crown. And yet, this mass of
assembling freemen was not without experience, or experienced leaders.
The early wars had been largely fought by Provincial troops, side by
side with British regulars, so that the general conduct of armies and of
campaigns had become familiar to New England men, and many veteran
soldiers were prompt to volunteer service. Lapse of time, increased age,
absorption in farming or other civil pursuits, had not wholly effaced
from the minds of retired veterans the memory of former experience in
the field. If some did not realize the expectations of the people and of
Congress, the promptness with which they responded to the call was no
less worthy.

Massachusetts selected, for the immediate command of her forces, Artemas
Ward, who had served under Abercrombie, with John Thomas, another
veteran, as Lieutenant-General; and as Engineer-in-Chief, Richard
Gridley, who had, both as engineer and soldier, earned a deserved
reputation for skill, courage, and energy.

Connecticut sent Israel Putnam, who had been inured to exposure and
hardship in the old French War, and in the West Indies. Gen. Daniel
Wooster accompanied him, and he was a veteran of the first expedition to
Louisburg thirty years before, and had served both as Colonel and
Brigadier-General in the later French War. Gen. Joseph Spencer also came
from Connecticut.

Rhode Island intrusted the command of her troops to Nathaniel Greene,
then but thirty-four years of age, with Varnum, Hitchcock, and Church,
as subordinates.

New Hampshire furnished John Stark, also a veteran of former service;
and both Pomeroy and Prescott, who soon took active part in the
operations about Boston, had participated in Canadian campaigns.

These, and others, assembled in council, for consideration of the great
interests which they had been summoned to protect by force of arms. At
this solemn juncture of affairs, the youngest of their number, Nathaniel
Greene, whose subsequent career became so significant a factor in that
of Washington the Soldier, submitted to his associates certain
propositions which he affirmed to be indispensable conditions of success
in a war against the British crown. These propositions read to-day, as
if, like utterances of the old Hebrew prophets, they had been inspired
rules for assured victory. And, one hundred years later, when the
American Civil War unfolded its vast operations and tasked to the utmost
all sections to meet their respective shares in the contest, the same
propositions had to be incorporated into practical legislation before
any substantial results were achieved on either side.

It is a historical fact that the failures and successes of the War of
American Independence fluctuated in favor of success, from year to year,
exactly in proportion to the faithfulness with which these propositions
were illustrated in the management and conduct of the successive
campaigns.

The propositions read as follows:

I. That there be one Commander-in-Chief.

II. That the army should be enlisted for the war.

III. That a system of bounties should be ordained which would provide
for the families of soldiers absent in the field.

IV. That the troops should serve wherever required throughout the
Colonies.

V. That funds should be borrowed equal to the demands of the war and
for the complete equipment and support of the army.

VI. That Independence should be declared at once, and every resource
of every Colony be pledged to its support.

In estimating the character of Washington the Soldier, and accepting
these propositions as sound, it is of interest to be introduced to their
author.

The youthful tastes and pursuits of Nathaniel Greene, of Rhode Island,
those which shaped his subsequent life and controlled many battle
issues, were as marked as were those of Washington. Unlike his great
captain, he had neither wealth, social position, nor family antecedents
to inspire military endeavor. A Quaker youth, at fourteen years of age
he saved time from his blacksmith’s forge, and by its light mastered
geometry and Euclid. Providence threw in his way Ezra Stiles, then
President of Yale College, and Lindley Murray, the grammarian, and each
of them became his fast friend and adviser.

Before the war began, he had carefully studied “Cæsar’s Commentaries,”
Marshal Turenne’s Works, “Sharpe’s Military Guide,” “Blackstone’s
Commentaries,” “Jacobs’ Law Dictionary,” “Watts’ Logic,” “Locke on the
Human Understanding,” “Ferguson on Civil Society,” Swift’s Works, and
other models of a similar class of literature and general science.

In 1773, he visited Connecticut, attended several of its militia
“trainings,” and studied their methods of instruction and drill. In
1774, he visited Boston, to examine minutely the drill, quarters, and
commissary arrangements of the British regular troops. Incidentally, he
met one evening, at a retired tavern on India wharf, a British sergeant
who had deserted. He persuaded him to accompany him back to Rhode
Island, where he made him drill-instructor of the “Kentish Guards,” a
company with which Greene was identified. Such was the proficiency in
arms, deportment, and general drill realized by this company, through
their joint effort, that more than thirty of the members became
commissioned officers in the subsequent war.

The character of the men of that period, as in the American Civil War,
supplied the military service with soldiers of the best intelligence and
of superior physical capacities. Very much of the energy and success
which attended the progress of the American army was traceable to these
qualities, as contrasted with those of the British recruits and the
Hessian drafted men.

Greene himself, unconsciously but certainly, was preparing himself and
his comrades for the impending struggle which already cast its shadow
over the outward conditions of peace. Modest, faithful, dignified,
undaunted by rebuffs or failure, and as a rule, equable,
self-sacrificing, truthful, and honest, he possessed much of that simple
grandeur of character which characterized George H. Thomas and Robert E.
Lee, of the American conflict, 1861–5. His patriotism, as he announced
his propositions to the officers assembled before Cambridge, was like
that of Patrick Henry, of Virginia, who shortly after made this personal
declaration: “Landmarks and boundaries are thrown down; distinctions
between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders are
no more;” adding, “I am not a Virginian, but an American.”

By the middle of June, and before the Battle of Bunker Hill (Breed’s
Hill), the Colonies were substantially united for war. During the
previous month of March, Richard Henry Lee had introduced for adoption
by the second Virginia Convention, a resolution that “the Colony be
immediately put in a state of defence,” and advocated the immediate
reorganization, arming, and discipline of the militia.

A hush of eager expectancy and an almost breathless waiting for some
mysterious summons to real battle, seemed to pervade both north and
south alike, when a glow in the east indicated the signal waited for,
and even prayed for. The very winds of heaven seemed to bear the sound
and flame of the first conflict in arms. In six days it reached
Maryland. Intermediate Colonies, in turn, had responded to the summons,
“To arms.” Greene’s Kentish Guards started for Boston, at the next break
of day. The citizens of Rhode Island caught his inspiration, took
possession of more than forty British cannon, and asserted their right
and purpose to control all Colonial stores.

New York organized a Committee of Public Safety,—first of a hundred, and
then of a thousand,—of her representative men, as a solid guaranty of
her ardent sympathy with the opening struggle, declaring that “all the
horrors of civil war could not enforce her submission to the acts of the
British crown.” The Custom-house and the City Hall were seized by the
patriots. Arming and drilling were immediate; and even by candle-light
and until late hours, every night, impassioned groups of boys, as well
as men, rehearsed to eager listeners the story of the first blood shed
at Concord and Lexington; and strong men exchanged vows of companionship
in arms, whatever might betide. Lawyers and ministers, doctors and
teachers, merchants and artisans, laborers and seamen, mingled together
as one in spirit and one in action. An “Association for the defence of
Colonial Rights” was formed, and on the twenty-second of May the
Colonial Assembly was succeeded by a Provincial Congress, and the new
order of government went into full effect.

In New Jersey, the people, no less prompt, practical, and earnest,
seized one hundred thousand dollars belonging to the Provincial
treasury, and devoted it to raising troops for defending the liberties
of the people.

The news reached Philadelphia on the twenty-fourth of April, and there,
also, was no rest, until action took emphatic form. Prominent men, as in
New York, eagerly tendered service and accepted command, so that on the
first day of May the Pennsylvania Assembly made an appropriation of
money to raise troops. Benjamin Franklin, but just returned from
England, was made chairman of a Committee of Safety, and the whole city
was aroused in hearty support of the common cause. The very Tory
families which afterwards ministered to General Howe’s wants, and
flattered Benedict Arnold by their courtesies, did not venture to stem
the patriotic sentiment of the hour.

Virginia caught the flying spark. No flint was needed to fire the
waiting tinder there. Lord Dunmore had already sent the powder of the
Colony on board a vessel in the harbor. Patrick Henry quickly gathered
the militia in force, to board the vessel and seize the powder. By way
of compromise, the powder was paid for, but Henry was denounced as a
“traitor.” The excitement was not abated, but intensified by this
action, until Lord Dunmore, terrified, and powerless to stem the surging
wave of patriotic passion, took refuge upon the man-of-war _Fowey_, then
in the York river.

The Governor of North Carolina, as early as April, had quarrelled with
the people of that Colony, in his effort to prevent the organization of
a Provincial Congress. But so soon as the news was received from Boston
of the opening struggle, the Congress assembled. Detached meetings were
everywhere held in its support, and from all sides one sentiment was
voiced, and this was its utterance: “The cause of Boston is the cause of
all. Our destinies are indissolubly connected with those of our eastern
fellow-citizens. We must either submit to the impositions which an
unprincipled and unrepresented Parliament may impose, or support our
brethren who have been doomed to sustain the first shock of
Parliamentary power; which, if successful there, will ultimately
overwhelm all, in one common calamity.” Conformable to these principles,
a Convention assembled at Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, on the
twentieth of May, 1775, and unanimously adopted the Instrument, ever
since known as The Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence.

In South Carolina, on the twenty-first day of April, a secret committee
of the people, appointed for the purpose, forcibly entered the Colonial
magazine and carried away eight hundred stands of arms and two hundred
cutlasses. Thomas Corbett, a member of this committee, secured and
opened a royal package just from England, containing orders to governors
of each of the southern Colonies to “seize all arms and powder.” These
were forwarded to the Continental Congress. Another despatch, dated at
“Palace of Whitehall, December 23d,” stated that “seven regiments were
in readiness to proceed to the southern Colonies; first to North
Carolina, thence to Virginia, or South Carolina, as circumstances should
point out.” These intercepted orders contained an “Act of Parliament,
forbidding the exportation of arms to the Colonies,” and stimulated the
zeal of the patriots to secure all within their reach. Twenty days
later, the tidings from the north reached Charleston, adding fuel to the
flame of the previous outbreak.

At Savannah, Ga., six members of the “Council of Safety” broke open the
public magazine, before receipt of news from the north, seized the
public powder and bore it away for further use. Governor Wright
addressed a letter to General Gage at Boston, asking for troops, “to awe
the people.” This was intercepted, and through a counterfeit signature
General Gage was advised, “that the people were coming to some order,
and there would be _no occasion_ for _sending troops_.”

Such is the briefest possible outline of the condition of public
sentiment throughout the country, of which Washington was well advised,
so far as the Committee of the Continental Congress, of which he was a
member, could gather the facts at that time.

Meanwhile, Boston was surrounded by nearly twenty thousand Minute Men.
These Minute Men made persistent pressure upon every artery through
which food could flow to relieve the hungry garrison within the British
lines.

Neither was the excitement limited to the immediate surroundings. Ethan
Allen, who had migrated from Connecticut to Vermont, led less than a
hundred of “Green Mountain Boys,” as they were styled, to Ticonderoga,
which he captured on the tenth of May. Benedict Arnold, of New Haven,
with forty of the company then and still known as the Governor’s Guards,
rushed to Boston without waiting for orders, and then to Lake Champlain,
hoping to raise an army on the way. Although anticipated by Ethan Allen
in the capture of Ticonderoga, he pushed forward toward Crown Point and
St. John’s, captured and abandoned the latter, organized a small naval
force, and with extraordinary skill defeated the British vessels and
materially retarded the advance of the British flotilla and British
troops from the north.

These feverish dashes upon frontier posts were significant of the
general temper of the people, their desire to secure arms and military
supplies supposed to be in those forts, and indicated their conviction
that the chief danger to New England was through an invasion from
Canada. But the absorbing cause of concern was the deliverance of Boston
from English control.

CHAPTER IV.
ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER.

The Second Continental Congress convened on the tenth day of May, 1775.
On the same day, Ethan Allen captured Ticonderoga, also securing two
hundred cannon which were afterwards used in the siege of Boston. Prompt
measures were at once taken by Congress for the purchase and manufacture
of both cannon and powder. The emission of two millions of Spanish
milled dollars was authorized, and twelve Colonies were pledged for the
redemption of Bills of Credit, then directed to be issued. At the later,
September, session, the Georgia delegates took their seats, and made the
action of the Colonies unanimous.

A formal system of “Rules and Articles of War” was adopted, and
provision was made for organizing a military force fully adequate to
meet such additional troops as England might despatch to the support of
General Gage. Further than this, all proposed enforcement by the British
crown of the offensive Acts of Parliament, was declared to be
“unconstitutional, oppressive, and cruel.”

Meanwhile, the various New England armies were scattered in separate
groups, or cantonments, about the City of Boston, with all the daily
incidents of petty warfare which attach to opposing armies within
striking distance, when battle action has not yet reached its desirable
opportunity. And yet, a state of war had been so far recognized that an
exchange of prisoners was effected as early as the sixth day of June.
General Howe made the first move toward open hostilities by a tender of
pardon to all offenders against the Crown except Samuel Adams and John
Hancock; and followed up this ostentatious and absurd proclamation by a
formal declaration of Martial Law.

The Continental Congress as promptly responded, by adopting the militia
about Boston, as “The American Continental Army.”

On the fourteenth day of June, a Light Infantry organization of expert
riflemen was authorized, and its companies were assigned to various
Colonies for enlistment and immediate detail for service about Boston.

On the fifteenth day of June, 1775, Congress authorized the
appointment, and then appointed George Washington, of Virginia, as
“Commander-in-Chief of the forces raised, or to be raised, in defence
of American Liberties.” On presenting their commission to Washington
it was accompanied by a copy of a Resolution unanimously adopted by
that body, “That they would maintain and assist him, and adhere to
him, with their lives and fortunes, in the cause of American Liberty.”

It is certain from the events above outlined, which preceded the
Revolutionary struggle, that when Washington received this spontaneous
and unanimous appointment, he understood definitely that the Colonies
were substantially united in the prosecution of war, at whatever cost of
men and money; that military men of early service and large experience
could be placed in the field; that the cause was one of intrinsic right;
and that the best intellects, as well as the most patriotic statesmen,
of all sections, were ready, unreservedly, to submit their destinies to
the fate of the impending struggle. He had been upon committees on the
State of Public Affairs; was constantly consulted as to developments, at
home and abroad; was familiar with the dissensions among British
statesmen; and had substantial reasons for that sublime faith in
ultimate victory which never for one hour failed him in the darkness of
the protracted struggle. He also understood that not statesmen alone,
preëminently Lord Dartmouth, but the best soldiers of Great Britain had
regarded the military occupation of Boston, where the Revolutionary
sentiment was most pronounced, and the population more dense as well as
more enlightened, to be a grave military as well as political error. And
yet, as the issue had been forced, it must be met as proffered; and the
one immediate and paramount objective must be the expulsion of the
British garrison and the deliverance of Boston. It will appear, however,
as the narrative develops its incidents, that he never lost sight of the
exposed sea-coast cities to the southward, nor of that royalist element
which so largely controlled certain aristocratic portions of New York,
New Jersey, and the southern cities, which largely depended upon trade
with Great Britain and the West Indies for their independent fortunes
and their right royal style of living. Neither did he fail to realize
that delay in the siege of Boston, however unavoidable, was dangerous to
the rapid prosecution of general war upon a truly military plan of
speedy accomplishment.

His first duty was therefore with his immediate command, and the hour
had arrived for the consolidation of the various Colonial armies into
one compact, disciplined, and effective force, to battle with the best
troops of Great Britain which now garrisoned Boston and controlled its
waters.

Reënforcements under Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne had already increased
the strength of that garrison to nearly ten thousand men. It had become
impatient of confinement, and restive under the presence of increasing
but ill-armed adversaries who eagerly challenged every picket post, and
begrudged every market product smuggled, or snatched, by the purveyors
or officers and soldiers of the Crown. Besides all this, the garrison
began to realize the fate which afterwards befell that of Clinton in
Philadelphia, in the demoralization and loss of discipline which ever
attach to an idle army when enclosed within city limits. When Burgoyne
landed at Boston, to support Gage, he contemptuously spoke of “ten
thousand _peasants_ who kept the King’s troops shut up.” Gradually, the
_peasants_ encroached upon the outposts. An offensive movement to occupy
Charlestown Heights and menace the Colonial headquarters at Cambridge,
with a view to more decisive action against their maturing strength, had
been planned and was ready for execution. It was postponed, as of easy
accomplishment at leisure; but the breaking morning of June 17, 1775,
revealed the same Heights to be in possession of the “peasant” militia
of America.

The Battle of Bunker Hill followed. Each force engaged lost one-third of
its numbers, but the aggregate of the British loss was more than double
that of the Colonies. It made a plain issue between the Colonists and
the British army, and was no longer a controversy of citizens with the
civil authority. The impatience of the two armies to have a fight had
been gratified, and when Franklin was advised of the facts, and of the
nerve with which so small a detachment of American militia had faced and
almost vanquished three times their number of British veterans, he
exclaimed, “The King has lost his Colonies.”

Many of the officers who bore part in that determining action gained new
laurels in later years. Prescott, who led his thousand men to that
achievement, served with no less gallantry in New York. Stark, so plucky
and persistent along the Mystic river, was afterwards as brave and
dashing at Trenton, Bennington, and Springfield. And Seth Warner, a
volunteer at Bunker Hill, and comrade of Allen in the capture of
Ticonderoga, participated in the battles of Hubbardton and Bennington,
and the Saratoga campaign, during the invasion of Burgoyne in 1777.

Of the British participants, or spectators, a word is due. Clinton,
destined to be Washington’s chief antagonist, had urged General Howe to
attack Washington’s army at Cambridge, before it could mature into a
well equipped and well disciplined force. He was overruled by General
Howe, who with all his scientific qualities as a soldier, never, in his
entire military career, was quick to follow up an advantage once
acquired; and soon after, the junior officer was transferred to another
field of service.

Percy, gallant in the action of June 17th, was destined to serve with
credit at Long Island, White Plains, Brandywine, and Newport.

Rawdon, then a lieutenant, who gallantly stormed the redoubt on Breed’s
Hill, and received in his arms the body of his captain, Harris, of the
British 5th Infantry, was destined to win reputation at Camden and
Hobkirk’s Hill, but close his military career in America as a prisoner
of war to the French.

The British retained and fortified Bunker Hill, and the time had arrived
for more systematic American operations, and the presence of the
Commander-in-Chief.

Congress had appointed the following general officers as Washington’s
associates in conduct of the war.

_Major-Generals._

Some of these have been already noticed.

ARTEMAS WARD.

CHARLES LEE, a retired officer of the British Army, a military
adventurer under many flags, a resident of Virginia, an acquaintance of
Washington, and ambitious to be first in command.

PHILIP SCHUYLER, then a member of Congress; a man of rare excellence of
character, who had served in the French and Indian War, and took part in
Abercrombie’s Ticonderoga campaign.

ISRAEL PUTNAM.

_Brigadier-Generals._

SETH POMEROY.

RICHARD MONTGOMERY, who served gallantly under Wolfe before Quebec, in
1759, and in the West Indies, in 1762.

DAVID WOOSTER.

WILLIAM HEATH, who, previous to the war, was a vigorous writer upon the
necessity of military discipline and a thoroughly organized militia.

JOSEPH SPENCER, of Connecticut, also a soldier of the French and Indian
War, both as Major and Lieutenant-Colonel.

JOHN THOMAS, also a soldier of the French and Indian War, and in command
of a regiment at Cambridge, recruited by himself.

JOHN SULLIVAN, a lawyer of New Hampshire, of Irish blood; a member of
the First Continental Congress, and quick in sympathy with the first
movement for armed resistance to British rule.

NATHANIEL GREENE, already in command of the Rhode Island troops.

Congress had also selected as Adjutant-General of the Army, HORATIO
GATES, of Virginia, who, like Lee, had served in the British regular
army; commanded a company in the Braddock campaign, and gained some
credit for bravery at the capture of Martinique, in the West Indies. He
was also known to Washington, and shared with Lee in aspiration to the
chief command.

If Washington had possessed prophetic vision, even his sublime faith
might have wavered in view of that unfolding future which would leave
none of these general officers by his side at the last conflict of the
opening war.

Ward, somewhat feeble in body, would prove unequal to active service;
lack the military acuteness and discernment which the crisis would
demand, and retire from view with the occupation of Boston.

Lee, so like Arnold in volcanic temper, would be early detached for
other service, in Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and South Carolina;
would become a prisoner of war at New York; would propose to the British
authorities a plan for destroying the American army; would escape
execution as a British deserter, on exchange; and afterwards, at the
Battle of Monmouth, so nearly realize his suggestion to General Howe, as
to show that his habitual abuse of Congress and his jealousy of his
Commander-in-Chief were insufficiently atoned for by dismissal from the
army, and the privilege of dying in his own bed, unhonored and
unlamented.

Schuyler, devoted to his country, with rare qualities as a gentleman and
with a polish of manner and elegance of carriage that for the time made
him severely unpopular with the staid stock of New England, would serve
with credit in Canada; organize the army which Gates would command at
Saratoga; be supplanted by that officer; retire from service because of
poor health; but ever prove worthy of the confidence and love of his
commander-in-chief. Of him, Chief Justice Kent would draw a pen-picture
of “unselfish devotion, wonderful energy, and executive ability.” Of
him, Daniel Webster would speak, in an august presence, in these terms:
“I was brought up with New England prejudices against him; but I
consider him second only to Washington in the service he rendered to his
country in the War of the Revolution.”

Putnam, who had been conspicuously useful at Bunker Hill, would, because
of Greene’s illness, suddenly succeed that officer in command on Long
Island, without previous knowledge of the works and the surrounding
country; would, feebly and without system, attempt to defend the lines
against Howe’s advance; would serve elsewhere, trusted indeed, but
without battle command, and be remembered as a brave soldier and a good
citizen, but, as a general officer, unequal to the emergencies of field
service.

Pomeroy, brave at Bunker Hill, realizing the responsibilities attending
the consolidation of the army for active campaign duty, would decline
the proffered commission.

Montgomery, would accompany Schuyler to Canada, full of high hope, and
yet discover in the assembled militia such utter want of discipline and
preparation to meet British veterans, as to withhold his resignation
only when his Commander-in-Chief pleaded his own greater disappointments
before Cambridge.

The perspective-glass will catch its final glimpse of Montgomery, when,
after the last bold dash of his life, under the walls of Quebec, his
body is borne to the grave and buried with military honors, by his old
comrade in arms, Sir Guy Carleton, the British general in command.

Wooster, then sixty-four years of age, would join Montgomery at
Montreal; waive his Connecticut rank; serve under his gallant leader; be
recalled from service because unequal to the duties of active command;
would prove faithful and noble wherever he served, and fall, defending
the soil of his native State from Tryon’s invasion, in 1777.

Heath, would supplement his service on the Massachusetts Committee of
Safety by efficient duty at New York, White Plains, and along the
Hudson, ever true as patriot and soldier; but fail to realize in active
service that discipline of men and that perception of the value of
campaign experience which had prompted his literary efforts before he
faced an enemy in battle.

Spencer, would discharge many trusts early in the war, with fidelity,
but without signal ability or success, and transfer his sphere of
patriotic duty to the halls of Congress.

Thomas, would prove efficient in the siege of Boston, and serve in
Canada.

Sullivan, would also enter Canada; become a prisoner of war at Long
Island; be with Washington at White Plains; succeed to the command of
Lee’s division after the capture of that officer; distinguish himself at
Trenton; serve at Brandywine; do gallant service at Germantown; attempt
the capture of Staten Island and of Newport; chastise the Indians of New
York, and resign, to take a seat in Congress.

Greene, would attend his chief in the siege of Boston; fortify Brooklyn
Heights; engage in operations about Forts Washington and Lee; take part
in the battles of Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth,
Newport, and Springfield; would then succeed Gates at the south, fight
the battles of Guilford Court-House, Hobkirk Hill, and Eutaw Springs,
and close his life in Georgia, the adopted home of his declining years.

But, during the midsummer of 1775, the beleaguered City of Boston,
astounded by the stolid and bloody resistance to its guardian garrison,
began to measure the cost of loyalty to the King, in preference to
loyalty to country and duty; while the enclosed patriots began to assure
themselves that deliverance was drawing near. Burgoyne, after watching
the battle from Copp’s Hill, in writing to England of this “great
catastrophe,” prepared the Crown for that large demand for troops upon
which he afterwards conditioned his acceptance of a command in America.

The days of waiting for a distinct battle-issue had been fulfilled. The
days of waiting for the consolidation of the armies about Boston, under
one competent guide and master, also passed. Washington had left
Philadelphia and was journeying toward Cambridge.

[Illustration:

WASHINGTON AT FOUR PERIODS OF HIS MILITARY CAREER.

[Etching from H. H. Hall’s Sons’ engraving.]
]

CHAPTER V.
WASHINGTON IN COMMAND.

On the twenty-first day of June, 1775, Washington left Philadelphia for
Boston, and on the third day of July assumed command of the Continental
Army of America, with headquarters at Cambridge.

At this point one is instinctively prompted to peer into the closed tent
of the Commander-in-Chief and observe his modest, but wholly
self-reliant attitude toward the grave questions that are to be settled,
in determining whether the future destiny of America is to be that of
liberty, or abject submission to the Crown.

For fully two months the yeomanry of New England had firmly grasped all
approaches to the City of Boston. This pressure was now and then
resisted by efforts of the garrison to secure supplies from the
surrounding country farms; which only induced a tighter hold, and
aroused a stubborn purpose to crowd that garrison to surrender, or
escape by sea. The islands of the beautiful bay and of the Nantasket
roadstead had become miniature fields of daily conflict; and persistent
efforts to procure bullocks, flour, and other needed provisions, through
the boats of the British fleet, only developed a counter system of boat
operations which neutralized the former, and gradually restricted the
country excursions of the troops within the city to the range of their
guns.

And yet the beleaguering force had fluctuated every day, so that but few
of the hastily improvised regiments maintained either identity of
persons, or permanent numbers. Exchanges were frequent between those on
duty and others at their homes. The sudden summons from so many and
varied industrial pursuits and callings was like the unorganized rush of
men at an alarm of fire, quickened by the conviction that some wide,
sweeping, and common danger was to be withstood, or some devouring
element to be mastered. The very independence of opinion and sense of
oppression which began to assert a claim to absolutely independent
nationality, became impatient of all restraint, until military control,
however vital to organized success, had become tiresome, offensive, and
sharply contested. Offices also, as in more modern times, had been
conferred upon those who secured enlistments, and too often without
regard to character or signal merit; while the familiarities of former
neighborhood friends and acquaintances ill-fitted them to bear rigid
control by those who had been, only just before, companions on a common
level.

Jealousies and aspirations mingled with the claims of families left at
home, and many local excitements attended the efforts of officers of the
Crown to discharge their most simple duties. After the flash of
Lexington and its hot heat had faded out, it was dull work to stand
guard by day, lie upon the ground at night, live a life of half lazy
routine, receive unequal and indifferent food, and wonder, between
meals, when and how the whole affair would end. The capture of
Ticonderoga, so easily affected, inclined many to regard the contest
before Boston as a matter of simple, persistent pressure, with no
provident conception of the vast range of conflict involved in this
defiance of the British Crown, in which all Colonies must pass under the
rolling chariot of war.

And yet, all these elements were not sufficiently relaxing to permit the
enclosed garrison to go free. While thousands of the Minute Men were
apparently listless, and taking the daily drudgery as a matter-of-course
experience, not to be helped or be rid of,—there were many strong-willed
men among them who held settled and controlling convictions, so that
even the raw militia were generally under wise guardianship. Leading
scholars and professional men, as well as ministers of the Gospel and
teachers of the district schools, united their influence with that of
some well-trained soldiers, to keep the force in the field at a
comparatively even strength of numbers. The idle were gradually set to
work, and occupation began to lighten the strain of camp life.

At the date of Washington’s arrival to take command, there was a
practical suspension of military operations over the country at large;
and this condition of affairs, together with the large display of
Colonial force about Boston, gave the other Colonies opportunity to
prepare for war, and for Washington to develop his army and test both
officers and men.

In his tent at Cambridge, he opened the packages intrusted to his care
by Congress, and examined the commissions of the officers who were to
share his councils and execute his will. His own commission gave him all
needed authority, and pledged the united Colonies to his hearty support.
Confidence in his patriotism, his wisdom, and his military capacity was
generous and complete. He represented Congress. He represented America.
For a short time he withheld the delivery of a few of the commissions.
Some officers, hastily commissioned, although formerly in military
service, had been entirely isolated from opportunities for knowledge of
men and of questions of public policy. The emergency required such as
were familiar with the vast interests involved in a struggle in arms
with Great Britain; men who would heartily submit to that strict
discipline which preparation for a contest with the choicest troops of
the mother country must involve.

Washington’s constitutional reticence deepened from his first assumption
of command. Frederick the Great once declared that “if he suspected that
his nightcap would betray his thoughts while he slept, he would burn
it.” Washington, like Frederick, and like Grant and Lee, great soldiers
of the American Civil War, largely owed his success and supremacy over
weak or jealous companions in arms to this subtle power. And this, with
Washington, was never a studied actor’s part in the drama of Revolution.
It was based upon a devout, reverential, and supreme devotion to country
and the right. His moral sense was delicate, and quick to discern the
great object of the people’s need and desire. He was also reverential in
recognition of an Almighty Father of all mankind, whose Providence he
regarded as constant, friendly, and supervising, in all the struggle
which America had undertaken for absolute independence. Under this
guidance, he learned how to act with judicial discretion upon the advice
of his subordinates, and then,—to execute his own sentence. Baron Jomini
pronounced Napoleon to have been his own best chief of staff; and such
was Washington. Congress discovered as the years slipped by, and
jealousies of Washington, competitions for office and for rank, and
rivalries of cities, sections, and partisans, endangered the safety of
the nation and the vital interests involved in the war, to trust his
judgment; and history has vindicated the wisdom of their conclusion. And
yet, with all this will-power in reserve, he was patient, tolerant,
considerate of the honest convictions of those with contrary opinions;
and so assigned officers, or detailed them upon special commissions,
that, when not overborne by Congress in the detail of some of its
importunate favorites, he succeeded in placing officers where their
weaknesses could not prejudice the interests of the country at large,
and where their faculties could be most fruitfully utilized.

If the thoughtful reader will for a moment recall the name of some
battlefield of the Revolution, or of any prominent military character
who was identified with some determining event of that war, he will
quickly notice how potentially the foresight of Washington either
directed the conditions of success, or wisely compensated the effects of
failure.

Washington never counted disappointments as to single acts of men, or
the operations of a single command, as determining factors in the
supreme matter of final success. The vaulting ambition, headstrong will,
and fiery daring of Arnold never lessened an appreciation of his real
merits, and he acquired so decided an affection for him, personally, and
was so disappointed that Congress did not honor his own request for
Arnold’s prompt promotion, at one time, that when his treason was fully
revealed, he could only exclaim, with deep emotion, “Whom now can we
trust?”

Even the undisguised jealousy of Charles Lee, his cross-purposes,
disobedience of orders, abuse of Congress, breaches of confidence, and
attempts to warp councils of war adversely to the judgment of the
Commander-in-Chief did not forfeit Washington’s recognition of that
officer’s general military knowledge and his ordinary wisdom in council.

These considerations fully introduce the Commander-in-Chief to the
reader, as he imagines the Soldier to be in his tent with the
commissions of subordinate officers before him.

He began his duties with the most minute inspection of the material with
which he was expected to carry on a contest with Great Britain. Every
company and regiment, their quarters, their arms, ammunition, and food
supplies, underwent the closest scrutiny. He accepted excuses for the
slovenliness of any command with the explicit warning that repetition of
such indifference or neglect would be sternly punished.

The troops had hardly been dismissed, after their first formal parade
for inspection, before a set repugnance to all proper instruction in the
details of a soldier’s duty became manifest. The old method of fighting
Indians singly, through thickets, and in small detachments, each man for
himself, was clung to stubbornly, as if the army were composed of
individual hunters, who must each “bag his own game.” Guard duty was
odious. Superiority by virtue of rank was questioned, denied, or
ignored. The abuses of places of trust, especially in the quartermaster
and commissary departments, and the prostitution of these
responsibilities to private ends were constant. “Profanity, vulgarity,
and all the vices of an undisciplined mass became frightful,” as
Washington himself described the condition, “so soon as any immediate
danger passed by.” To sum up the demoralization of the army, he could
only add, “They have been trained to have their own way too long.”

But the good, the faithful, and the pure were hardly less restive under
the new restraint, and few appreciated the vital value of some
absolutely supreme control. The public moneys and public property were
held to belong to everybody, because Congress represented everybody.
Commands were considered despotic orders, and exact details were but
another system of slavery.

Nor was this the whole truth. Even officers of high position, whether
graded above or below their own expectations, found time to indulge in
petty neglect of plain instructions, and in turn to usurp authority, in
defiance of discipline and the paramount interests of the people at
large.

The inspection of the Commander-in-Chief had been made. Immediately, the
troops were put to work perfecting earthworks, building redoubts, and
policing camp. “Observance of the Sabbath” was enforced. Officers were
court-martialed, and soldiers were tried, for “swearing, gambling,
fraud, and lewdness.” A thorough system of guard and picket duty was
established, and the nights were made subservient to rest, in the place
of dissipation and revelry. Discipline was the first indication that a
Soldier was in command.

These statements, which are brief extracts from his published Orders,
fall far below a just review of the situation as given by Washington
himself. From some of his reports to Congress it would seem as if, for a
moment, he almost despaired of bringing the army to a condition when he
might confidently take it into an open field, and place it, face to
face, against any well-appointed force of even inferior numbers. That he
was enabled so to discipline an army that, as at Brandywine, they
willingly marched to meet a British and Hessian force one-half greater
than his own in numbers, became a complete justification of the patience
and wise persistence with which he handled the raw troops in camp about
Cambridge, in the year 1775.

His next care was “the practical art of bringing the army fully equipped
to the battlefield,” known as the “Logistics of War.” The army was
deficient in every element of supply. The men, who still held their
Colonial obligation to be supreme, came and went just as their
engagements would permit and the comfort of their families required.
Desertion was regarded as nothing, or at the worst but a venial offence,
and there were times when the American army about Boston, through nine
miles of investment, was less in number than the British garrison within
the city.

But the deficiency in the number of the men was not so conspicuous and
disappointing as the want of powder, lead, tools, arms, tents, horses,
carts, and medical supplies. Ordinary provisions had become abundant.
The adjacent country fed them liberally and supplied many home-made
luxuries, not always the best nourishment for a soldier’s life; but it
was difficult to persuade the same men that all provisions must enter
into a general commissariat, and be issued to all alike; and that such
stores must be accumulated, and neither expended lavishly nor sold at a
bargain so soon as a surplus remained unexpended. Such articles as
cordage, iron, horseshoes, lumber, fire-wood, and every possible thing
which might be required for field, garrison, or frontier service, were
included in his inventory of essential supplies.

In his personal expenditures of the most trivial item of public
property, Washington kept a minute and exact account. Of the single
article of powder, he once stated that his chief supply was furnished by
the enemy, for, during one period, the armed vessels with which he
patrolled the coast captured more powder than Congress had been able to
furnish him in several months.

Delay in securing such essential supplies increased the difficulty of
bringing the troops themselves to a full recognition of their military
needs and responsibilities, so that the grumbling query, “What’s the use
of copying the red-coats’ fuss and training?” still pervaded camp. Plain
men from the country who had watched the martinet exactness of British
drills in the city, where there was so much of ornament and “style,” had
no taste for like subjection to control over their personal bearing and
wardrobe. A single order of General Howe to the Boston garrison
illustrates what the Yankees termed the “red-coats’ fuss.” He issued an
order, reprimanding soldiers “whose hair was not smooth but badly
powdered; who had no frills to their shirts; whose leggings hung in a
slovenly manner about their knees, and other soldierly neglects, which
must be immediately remedied.” This seemed to the American soldier more
like some “nursing process;” and while right, on general principles, was
not the chief requirement for good fighting zeal.

For many weeks it had been the chief concern of the American
Commander-in-Chief how to make a fair show of military preparation,
while all things were in such extreme confusion. Washington, as well as
Howe, had his fixed ideas of military discipline, and he, also, issued
orders respecting the habits, personal bearing, and neatness of the men;
closing on one occasion, thus emphatically: “Cards and games of chance
are prohibited. At this time of public distress, men may find enough to
do in the service of their God and country, without abandoning
themselves to vice and immorality.” In anticipation of active service,
and to rebuke the freedom with which individuals inclined to follow
their own bent of purpose, he promulgated the following ringing caution:

“It may not be amiss for the troops to know, that if any man in action
shall presume to skulk, hide himself, or retreat from the enemy without
the orders of his commanding officer, he will be instantly shot down as
an example of cowardice; cowards having too frequently disconcerted the
best troops by their dastardly behavior.”

Amid all this stern preparation for the battlefield and its incidents,
the most careful attention was given to the comfort and personal
well-being of the privates in the ranks. While obedience was required of
all, of whatever grade or rank, the cursing or other abuse of the
soldier was considered an outrage upon his rights as a citizen, and
these met his most scorching denunciation and punishment.

A Soldier was in command of the Continental Army of America.

CHAPTER VI.
BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD OF ACTION.

The Continental Army about Boston was largely composed of New England
troops. This was inevitable until the action of Congress could be
realized by reënforcements from other Colonies. The experience of nearly
all veteran soldiers in the Cambridge camps had been gained by service
in Canada or upon its borders. British garrisons at Halifax, Quebec, and
Montreal, as well as at Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and St. John’s,
offered an opportunity for British aggression from the north. The
seizure of the nearer posts, last named, temporarily checked such
aggressions, but seemed to require adequate garrisons, and a watchful
armed outlook across the border.

There had been very early urged upon the Massachusetts Committee of
Safety more extensive operations into Canada, especially as the
“Canadian Acts of Parliament” had become nearly as offensive to
Canadians as other Acts which had alienated the American Colonies from
respect for the common “Mother Country.” The Canadian Acts, however, had
not been pressed to armed resistance; and differences of race, language,
and religious forms were not conducive to those neighborly relations
which would admit of combined action, even in emergencies common to both
sections. But the initiative of a general movement into Canada had been
taken, and Congress precipitated the first advance, before Washington
became Commander-in-Chief. In order to appreciate the action of
Washington when he became more directly responsible for the success of
these detachments from his army, for service in Canada, they must be
noticed.

The adventurous spirit of Arnold prompted the suggestion that the
conquest of Canada would bring disaster to Great Britain and fend off
attacks upon the other Colonies. He once traded with its people, was
familiar with Quebec, and after his adventure at Crown Point, in June,
had written from that place to the Continental Congress that Gen. Sir
Guy Carleton’s force in Canada was less than six hundred men, promising
to guarantee the conquest of Canada if he were granted the command of
two thousand men for that purpose. On the second day of June, Ethan
Allen, who had anticipated Arnold in the capture of Ticonderoga, had
made a similar proposition to the Provincial Congress of New York. Both
Allen and Seth Warner had visited Congress, and requested authority to
raise new regiments. Authority was not given, but a recommendation was
forwarded to the New York Provincial Congress, that the “Green Mountain
Boys” should be recognized as regular forces, and be granted the
privilege of electing their own officers.

It is of interest in this connection to notice the fact that when
Arnold, in his first dash up Lake Champlain, found that Warner had
anticipated his projected capture of Crown Point, as Allen had that of
Ticonderoga, he was greatly offended, usurped command of that post and
of a few vessels which he styled his “Navy,” and upon finding that his
assumption of authority was neither sanctioned by Massachusetts nor
Connecticut, discharged his force and returned to Cambridge in anger.
This same navy, however, chiefly constructed under his skilful and
energetic direction, won several brilliant successes and certainly
postponed movements from Canada southward, for many months.

Eventually a formal expedition was authorized against Montreal, and
Generals Schuyler and Montgomery were assigned to its command. This
force, consisting of three thousand men, was ordered to rendezvous
during the month of August at Ticonderoga, where Allen and Warner also
joined it.

During the same month a committee from Congress visited Washington at
Cambridge, and persuaded him to send a second army to Canada, via the
Kennebec river, to capture Quebec. Existing conditions seemed to warrant
these demonstrations which, under other circumstances, might have proved
fatal to success at Boston. The theory upon which Washington concurred
in the action of Congress is worthy of notice, in estimating his
character as a soldier. He understood that the suddenness of the
resistance at Lexington, and the comparatively “drawn game” between the
patriots and British regulars at Breed’s Hill, would involve on the part
of the British government much time and great outlay of money, in order
to send to America an adequate force for aggressive action upon any
extended scale; and that the control of New York and the southern coast
cities must be of vastly more importance than to harass the scattered
settlements adjoining Canada. Inasmuch, however, as New York and New
England seemed to stake the safety of their northern frontier upon
operations northward, while Quebec and Montreal were almost destitute of
regular troops, and the season of the year would prevent British
reënforcements by sea, it might prove to be the best opportunity to test
the sentiment of the Canadian people themselves as to their readiness to
make common cause against the Crown. If reported professions could be
realized, the north would be permanently protected.

Taking into account that General Carleton would never anticipate an
advance upon Quebec, but concentrate his small force at Montreal, with
view to the ultimate recapture of St. John’s, Crown Point, and
Ticonderoga, and estimating, from advices received, that Carleton’s
forces numbered not to exceed eight hundred regulars and as many
Provincials, he regarded the detail of three thousand men as sufficient
for the capture of Montreal. This estimate was a correct one. Its
occupation was also deemed practicable and wise, because it was so near
the mouth of Sorel River and Lake Champlain as to be readily supported,
so long as the British army was not substantially reënforced along the
Atlantic coast.

There was one additional consideration that practically decided the
action of Washington. The mere capture of Montreal, on the north bank of
the St. Lawrence river, and so easily approached by water from Quebec,
would be of no permanent value so long as Quebec retained its place as
the almost impregnable rendezvous of British troops and fleets. This
view of the recommendation of Congress was deemed conclusive; provided,
that the movement against Quebec could be immediate, sudden, by
surprise, and involve _no siege_. Under the assumption that Congress had
been rightly advised of the British forces in Canada, and of the
sentiments of the Canadians themselves, the expedition had promise of
success.

There was a variance of religious form and religious faith which did not
attract all the New England soldiers in behalf of Canadian independence.
This was sufficiently observed by Washington’s keen insight into human
nature to call forth the following order, which placed the Canadian
expeditions upon a very lofty basis. The extract is as follows: “As the
Commander-in-Chief has been apprised of a design formed for the
observance of that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy
of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise that there should be
officers and soldiers in this army so void of common-sense as not to see
the impropriety of such a step at this juncture, at a time when we are
soliciting, and have really obtained the friendship and alliance of
Canada, whom we ought to consider as brethren embarked in the same
cause—the defence of the general liberty of America.... At such a
juncture, and in such circumstances, to be insulting their religion is
so monstrous as not to be suffered or excused; indeed, instead of
offering the most remote insult, it is our duty to address public thanks
to those our brethren, as to them we are so much indebted for every late
happy success over the common enemy in Canada.”

Washington, however, hinged his chief objection to these distant
enterprises, which he habitually opposed throughout the war, upon the
pressing demand for the immediate capture of Boston, and an immediate
transfer of the Headquarters of the Army to New York, where, and where
only, the Colonies could be brought into close relation for the
organization and distribution of an army adequate to carry on war,
generally, wherever along the Atlantic coast the British might land
troops.

As early as June, Congress had disclaimed any purpose to operate against
Canada, and Bancroft says that the invasion was not determined upon
until the Proclamation of Martial Law by the British Governor, his
denunciation of the American borderers, and the incitement of savages to
raids against New York and New England had made the invasion an act of
self-defence. But there had been no such combination of hostile acts
when these expeditions were planned, and Mr. Bancroft must have
associated those events with the employment of Indian allies during the
subsequent Burgoyne campaign of 1777.

The details of the two contemporary expeditions to Canada are only
sufficiently outlined to develop the relations of the Commander-in-Chief
to their prosecution, and to introduce to the reader certain officers
who subsequently came more directly under Washington’s personal command.
The substantial failure of each, except that it developed some of the
best officers of the war, is accepted as history. But it is no less true
that when Great Britain made Canada the base of Burgoyne’s invasion, his
feeble support by the Canadians themselves proved a material factor in
his ultimate disaster. He was practically _starved to surrender_ for
want of adequate support in men and provisions, from his only natural
base of supply.

It is sufficient, at present, to notice the departure of the two
expeditions, that of Schuyler and Montgomery, assembling at Ticonderoga,
August 20, and that of Arnold, consisting of eleven hundred men, without
artillery, which left Cambridge on the seventeenth day of September and
landed at Gardiner, Me., on the twentieth. Several companies of riflemen
from Pennsylvania and Virginia which had reported for duty were assigned
to Arnold’s command. Among the officers were Daniel Morgan and
Christopher Greene. Aaron Burr, then but nineteen years of age,
accompanied this expedition.

As the summer of 1775 drew near its close, and the temporary excitement
of Arnold’s departure restored the routine of camp life and the passive
watching of a beleaguered city, the large number of “Six Months” men,
whose term of enlistment was soon to expire, became listless and
indifferent to duty. Washington, without official rebuke of this growing
negligence, forestalled its further development by redoubling his
efforts to place the works about Boston in a complete condition of
defence. None were exempt from the scope of his orders. Ploughed Hill
and Cobble Hill were fortified, and the works at Lechmere Point were
strengthened. (See map, “Boston and Vicinity.”) Demonstrations were made
daily in order to entice the garrison to sorties upon the investing
lines. But the British troops made no hostile demonstrations, and in a
very short time the American redoubts were sufficiently established to
resist the attack of the entire British army.

A Council of War was summoned to meet at Washington’s headquarters to
consider his proposition that an assault be made upon the city, and that
it be burned, if that seemed to be a military necessity. Lee opposed the
movement, as impossible of execution, in view of the character of the
British troops whom the militia would be compelled to meet in close
battle. The Council of War concurred in his motion to postpone the
proposition of the Commander-in-Chief. Lee’s want of confidence in the
American troops, then for the first time officially stated, had its
temporary influence; but, ever after, through his entire career until
its ignominious close, he opposed every opportunity for battle, on the
same pretence. The only exception was his encouragement to the
resistance of Moultrie at Charleston, against the British fleet, during
June, 1776, although he was not a participant in that battle.

Meanwhile, the citizens of the sea-coast towns of New England began to
be anxious as to their own safety. A British armed transport cannonaded
Stonington, and other vessels threatened New London and Norwich. All of
these towns implored Washington to send them troops. Governor Jonathan
Trumbull, of Connecticut (the original “Brother Jonathan”), whose
extraordinary comprehension of the military as well as the civil issues
of the times made him then, and ever, a reliable and constant friend of
Washington, consulted the Commander-in-Chief as to these depredations,
and acquiesced in his judgment as final.

Washington wrote thus: “The most important operations of the campaign
cannot be made to depend upon the piratical expeditions of two or three
men-of-war privateers.” This significant rejoinder illustrated the
proposition to burn Boston, and was characteristic of Washington’s
policy respecting other local raids and endangered cities. It is in
harmony with the purpose of this narrative to emphasize this incident.
Napoleon in his victorious campaign against Austria refused to occupy
Vienna with his army, and counted the acquisition of towns and cities as
demoralizing to troops, besides enforcing detachments from his fighting
force simply to hold dead property. Washington ignored the safety of
Philadelphia, the Colonial capital, repeatedly, claiming that to hold
his army compactly together, ready for the field, was the one chief
essential to ultimate victory. Even the later invasions of Virginia and
Connecticut, and the erratic excursions of Simcoe and other royalist
leaders into Westchester County, New York, and the country about
Philadelphia, did not bend his deliberate purpose to cast upon local
communities a fair share of their own defence. In more than one instance
he announced to the people that these local incursions only brought
reproach upon the perpetrators, and embittered the Colonists more
intensely against the invader.

CHAPTER VII.
HOWE SUCCEEDS GAGE.—CLOSING SCENES OF 1775.

As the siege of Boston advanced without decisive result, orders from
England suddenly relieved Gage from command, and assigned General Sir
William Howe as his successor. That officer promulgated a characteristic
order “assuming command over all the Atlantic Colonies from Nova Scotia
to the West Indies.” He made his advent thus public, and equally
notorious. Offensive proclamations, bad in policy, fruitless for good,
and involving the immediate crushing out of all sympathy from those who
were still loyal to the Crown, were the types of his character, both as
governor and soldier. He threatened with military execution any who
might leave the city without his consent, and enjoined upon all
citizens, irrespective of personal opinion, to “arm for the defence of
Boston.”

This action imposed upon Washington the issue of a reciprocal order
against “all who were suffered to stalk at large, doing all the mischief
in their power.” Hence, between the two orders, it happened that the
royalists in the city had no opportunity to visit their friends and see
to their own property outside the British lines, and the royalists of
the country who sought to smuggle themselves between the lines, to
communicate with those in the city, were compelled to remain outside the
American lines, or be shot as “spies.”

Up to this time, the British officers and neutral citizens had not been
interfered with in the prosecution of their business or social
engagements; and the operations of the siege had been mainly those of
silencing British action and wearing out the garrison by constant
surveillance and provocations to a fight.

Supplies became more and more scarce within the British lines. Acting
under the peremptory orders of General Howe, Admiral Graves resolved to
make his small fleet more effective, and under rigid instructions to
“burn all towns and cities that fitted out or sheltered privateers,”
Lieutenant Mowatt began his work of desolation by the destruction of
Falmouth, now Portland, Me.

In contrast with this proceeding was the action of Washington. When an
American privateer, which had been sent by him to the St. Lawrence
river, to cut off two brigantines which had left England with supplies
for Quebec, exceeded instructions, and plundered St. John’s Island, he
promptly sent back the citizen-prisoners, restored their private
effects, and denounced the action of the officer in command and his
crew, as “a violation of the principles of civilized warfare.”

Crowded by these immediate demands upon his resources, and equally
confident that there soon would be neither army, nor supplies, adequate
for the emergency, Washington made an independent appeal to Congress,
covering the entire ground of his complaint, and stating his absolute
requirements. He wanted money. He demanded a thoroughly organized
commissariat, and a permanent artillery establishment. He asked for more
adequate control of all troops, from whatever Colony they might come; a
longer term of enlistment; enlargement of the Rules and Articles of War,
and power to enforce his own will. He also demanded a separate
organization of the navy, in place of scattered, irresponsible
privateers, and that it be placed upon a sound footing, as to both men
and vessels.

Congress acted promptly upon these suggestions. On the fourth of
October, a committee, consisting of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Lynch, and
Benjamin Harrison, started for Washington’s headquarters with three
hundred thousand dollars in Continental money, and after a patient
consideration of his views, advised the adoption of all his
recommendations.

A council of all the New England Governors was also called to meet this
committee. As the result of the conference a new organization of the
army was determined upon, fixing the force to be employed about Boston
at twenty-three thousand three hundred and seventy-two officers and men.
Washington also submitted to this committee his plan for attacking
Boston. It was approved; and soon after, Congress authorized him to burn
the city if he should deem that necessary in the prosecution of his
designs against the British army. In all subsequent military operations
the same principle of strategic action was controlling and absolute with
him.

On the thirteenth day of October, Congress authorized the building of
two small cruisers, and on the thirtieth, two additional vessels, of
small tonnage. A naval committee was also appointed, consisting of Silas
Dean, John Langdon, Joseph Hewes, Richard Henry Lee, and John Adams. On
the twenty-eighth of November, a naval code was adopted; and on the
thirteenth of December, the construction of thirteen frigates was
authorized. Among the officers commissioned, were Nicholas Biddle as
captain and John Paul Jones as lieutenant. Thus the American Navy was
fully established.[1]

Footnote 1:

See Appendix, “American Navy.”

On the twenty-ninth day of November, Captain John Manly, who was the
most prominent officer of this improvised navy, captured a British
store-ship, containing a large mortar, several brass cannon, two
thousand muskets, one hundred thousand flints, eleven mortar-beds,
thirty thousand shot, and all necessary implements for artillery and
intrenching service.

As the year drew to its close, the British levelled all their advanced
works on Charlestown Neck, and concentrated their right wing in a strong
redoubt on Bunker Hill, while their left wing at Boston Neck was more
thoroughly fortified against attack.

Congress now intimated to Washington that it might be well to attack the
city upon the first favorable occasion, before the arrival of
reënforcements from Great Britain. The laconic reply of the
Commander-in-Chief was, that he “must keep his powder for closer work
than cannon distance.”

On the nineteenth of November, Henry Knox was commissioned as Colonel,
_vice_ Gridley, too old for active service. Two lieutenant-colonels, two
majors, and twelve companies of artillery were authorized, and thus the
American regular Artillery, as well as the navy, was put upon a
substantial basis, with Knox as Chief of Artillery.

The closing months of 1775 also developed the progress of the
expeditions for the conquest of Canada. The reënforcements required for
the actual rescue of the detached forces from destruction, increased the
burdens of the Commander-in-Chief. This period of Washington’s military
responsibility cannot be rightly judged from the general opinion that
Montgomery’s nominal force of three thousand men represented an
effective army of that strength: in fact, it was less than half that
number.

Montgomery reached Ticonderoga on the seventeenth of August. Schuyler,
then negotiating a treaty with the Six Nations, at Albany, received a
despatch from Washington, “Not a moment of time is to be lost,” and at
once joined Montgomery. They pushed for the capture of St. John’s, under
the spur of Washington’s warning; but on the sixth of September and
again on the tenth, were compelled to suspend operations for want of
artillery, having at the time a force of but one thousand men present,
instead of the three thousand promised. Schuyler’s ill-health compelled
him to return to Ticonderoga; but with infinite industry, system, and
courage he was able to forward additional troops, increasing
Montgomery’s force to two thousand men.

Ethan Allen, who had been succeeded in command of the “Green Mountain
Boys” by Seth Warner, was across the line, endeavoring to recruit a
regiment of Canadians. After partial success, regardless of order, he
dashed forward, hoping to capture Montreal, as he had captured
Ticonderoga. He was captured, and sent to England to be tried on the
charge of treason. In a letter to Schuyler, Washington thus notices the
event:

“Colonel Allen’s misfortune will, I hope, teach a lesson of prudence and
subordination in others who may be too ambitious to outshine their
general officer, and regardless of order and duty, rush into enterprises
which have unfavorable effects on the public, and are destructive to
themselves.”

On the third of November, after a siege of fifty days, St. John’s was
captured, with one hundred Canadians and nearly five hundred British
regulars, more than half the force in Canada. John André was among the
number. General Carleton, who attempted to cross the St. Lawrence river,
and come to the aid of St. John’s, was thrust back by the “Green
Mountain Boys” and a part of the 2d New York Regiment.

The treatment of prisoners illustrates the condition of this army. It
was not a part of the Cambridge army, as was Arnold’s, but the
contributions promised largely by New York, and directly forwarded by
Congress. One regiment mutinied because Montgomery allowed the prisoners
to retain their extra suit of clothing, instead of treating it as
plunder. Schuyler’s and Montgomery’s Orderly Books and letters show that
even officers refused to take clothing and food to suffering prisoners
until peremptorily forced to do it. Washington was constantly advised of
the existing conditions; and when both Schuyler and Montgomery regarded
the prosecution of their expeditions as hopeless, with such troops, and
proposed to resign, the Commander-in-Chief thus feelingly, almost
tenderly, wrote: “God knows there is not a difficulty you both complain
of which I have not in an eminent degree experienced; that I am not,
every day, experiencing; but we must bear up against them, and make the
best of mankind as they are, since we cannot have them as we wish. Let
me therefore conjure you both, to lay aside such thoughts; thoughts
injurious to yourselves, and extremely so to your country, which calls
aloud for gentlemen of your abilities.”

On the twelfth of November, Montgomery reached the open city of
Montreal; and the larger of the two Canadian expeditions reached its
proposed destination. But before the month of November closed, the
American force “wasted away,” until only about eight hundred men
remained. Expiration of enlistments was at hand. Men refused to
re-enlist. Even the “Green Mountain Boys” returned home. This was not
the total loss to Montgomery. Officers and men were all alike fractious,
dictatorial, and self-willed. They claimed the right to do just as they
pleased, and to obey such orders only as their judgment approved.
General Carleton escaped from the city in disguise, and reached Quebec
on the nineteenth. There was no possibility of following him; and the
work laid but for Montgomery, had been done, although at great cost and
delay.

Prof. Charles G. D. Roberts, of King’s College, Nova Scotia, in his
“History of Canada” (1897),[2] uses this language: “General Carleton
fled in disguise to Quebec, narrowly escaping capture, and there made
ready for his last stand. In Quebec he weeded out all those citizens who
sympathized with the rebels, expelling them from the city. With sixteen
hundred men at his back, a small force indeed, but to be trusted, he
awaited the struggle.”

Footnote 2:

Lamson, Wolfe & Co., Publishers, Boston.

Meanwhile Arnold, after unexampled sufferings and equal heroism, had
reached Point Levi, opposite Quebec, on the ninth of November, only to
find that the garrison had been strengthened, and that he was stranded,
in the midst of a severe winter, upon an inhospitable, barren bluff. The
strongest fortress in America, defended by two hundred heavy cannon, and
the capture of which had been the inspiration of his adventurous
campaign, was in full sight. Every condition which Washington had
declared to be essential to success had failed of realization. On the
fifth of October Washington wrote to Schuyler: “If Carleton is not
driven from St. John’s, so as to be obliged to throw himself into
Quebec, it must fall into our hands, as it is left without a regular
soldier, as the captain of a brig from Quebec to Boston says. Many of
the inhabitants are most favorably disposed to the American cause, and
that there is there the largest stock of ammunition ever collected in
America.” On the same day he also writes “Arnold expected to reach
Quebec in twenty days from September twenty-sixth, and that Montgomery
must keep up such appearances as _to fix Carleton_, and prevent the
force in Canada from being turned on Arnold; but if penetration into
Canada be given up, Arnold must also know it, in time for retreat.” And
again: “This detachment (Arnold’s) was to take possession of Quebec, if
possible; but at any rate, to make a diversion in favor of Schuyler.”

But Arnold, on the sixteenth day of October, when, as he advised
Washington, he expected to advance upon Quebec, was struggling with
quagmires, swamps, fallen trees, rain and mud, snow and ice, about Deer
river, and had not even reached Lake Megantic. Men waded in icy water to
their armpits; some froze to death: others deserted. Enos, short of
provisions, as he claimed, marched three hundred men back to Cambridge.
And Arnold, himself, twenty-five days too late, stood upon Point Levi,
in the midst of a furious tempest of wind, rain, and sleet, only to
realize the substantial failure of his vaunted expedition. Most of his
muskets were ruined, and but five rounds of ammunition remained for the
few men that were with him in this hour of starvation and distress. Two
vessels-of-war lay at anchor in the stream. And yet, such was his
indomitable energy, with thirty birch-bark canoes he crossed the river,
gained a position on the Heights of Abraham, and sent to the fortress an
unnoticed demand for surrender. Then, retiring to Point Aux Trembles, he
sent a messenger to Montgomery asking for artillery and two thousand
men, for prosecution of a siege. Montgomery, leaving in command General
Wooster, who arrived at Montreal late in November, started down the
river with about three hundred men and a few pieces of artillery, and
clothing for Arnold’s men; landing at Point Aux Trembles about December
first, making the total American force only one thousand men. On the
sixth day of December, a demand for surrender having been again
unanswered, the little army advanced to its fate. Four assaulting
columns were organized. All failed, and Montgomery fell in a gallant but
desperate attempt to storm the citadel itself. Morgan and four hundred
and twenty-six men, nearly half of the entire command, were taken
prisoners. Only the grand nerve of Montgomery brought the army to the
assault in this forlorn-hope affair,—for such it was. Three of Arnold’s
captains refused to serve under him any longer; and mutiny, or the
entire ruin of the army, was the alternative to the risks of ruin in
battle. Arnold had a knee shattered by a bullet, and the remnants of the
army fell back, harmless, to the garrison, and amid snow, ice, and
proximate starvation, awaited future events.

The treatment of the prisoners by General Carleton, and the burial, with
honors of war, of his old comrade under Wolfe, the brave Montgomery,
savors of the knightly chivalry of mediæval times. When his officers
protested at such treatment of rebels, his response, lofty in tone and
magnanimous in action, was simply this: “Since we have in vain tried to
make them acknowledge us as brothers, let us at least send them away
disposed to regard us as cousins.”

Almost at the same hour of the day when Carleton passed through Point
Aux Trembles, on his escape to Quebec, Washington having heard of
Montgomery’s arrival at Montreal, was writing to Congress, as follows:
“It is likely that General Carleton will, with what force he can collect
after the surrender of the rest of Canada, throw himself into Quebec,
and there make his last effort.”

With Arnold three miles from Quebec, intrenched as well as he was able
to intrench, confining his operations to cutting off supplies to the
city and keeping his five hundred survivors from starving or freezing,
and Carleton preparing for reënforcements as soon as the ice might break
up in the spring, the invasion of Canada for conquest came to a dead
halt. The invasion of the American Colonies was to follow its final
failure.

There were heroes who bore part in those expeditions, and their
experience was to crown many of Washington’s later campaigns with the
honors of victory. Meanwhile, about Boston, enlistments were rapidly
expiring, to be again replaced with fresh material for the master’s
handling into army shape and use; and the American Commander-in-Chief
was beginning to illustrate his qualities as Soldier.

CHAPTER VIII.
AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN.—BOSTON TAKEN.

On the thirty-first day of December, 1775, Admiral Shuldham reached
Boston with reënforcements for its garrison, and relieved Admiral Graves
in command of all British naval forces. The troops within the lines were
held under the most rigid discipline, although amusements were provided
to while away the idle hours of a passive defence.

The winter was memorable for its mildness, so that the American troops,
encamped about the city in tents, did not suffer; but the in-gathering
of recruits, to replace soldiers whose enlistments had just expired,
involved the actual creation of a new army, directly in the face of a
powerful, well-equipped, and watchful adversary. And yet, this very
adversary must be driven from Boston before the American patriot army
could move elsewhere, and engage actively against the combined armies
and navy of the British crown.

Indications of increasing hostilities on the part of royal governors of
the South were not wanting to stimulate the prosecution of the siege to
its most speedy consummation; and although unknown to Washington at the
time, the city of Norfolk, Va., had been bombarded on New Year’s day by
order of Lord Dunmore.

[Illustration: Boston and Vicinity.]

Impressed by the urgency of the crisis, Washington, on the same day, was
writing to Congress in plain terms, as follows, leaving the last word
_blank_, lest it might miscarry: “It is not, perhaps, in the power of
history to furnish a case like ours; to maintain a post within
musket-shot of the enemy, within that distance of twenty, old British
regiments without——”

General Greene kept his small army well in hand, watchful of the
minutest detail, inspecting daily each detachment, as well as all
supplies of ammunition and food; and on the fourth of January, writing
from Prospect Hill (see map of Boston and Vicinity), thus reported his
exact position to the Commander-in-Chief: “The night after the old
troops went off, I could not have mustered seven hundred men,
notwithstanding the returns of the new enlisted men amounted to nineteen
hundred and upwards. I am strong enough to defend myself against all the
force in Boston. Our situation has been critical. Had the enemy been
acquainted with our situation, I cannot pretend to say what might have
been the consequences.”

The reader will appreciate at a glance the real opinion of the American
Commander-in-Chief as to his own immediate future, and the general scope
of operations which he regarded as supremely important in behalf of
American Independence. He understood thoroughly, that Lord Dartmouth
originally opposed the military occupation of Boston in order to prevent
a collision between British troops and the excited people, which he
regarded as an inevitable result. That distinguished and far-sighted
statesman, in order to prevent any overt acts of resistance to the
established representatives of the crown at business or social centres,
wrote to Lord Howe as early as October 22, 1775, to “gain possession of
some respectable port to the southward, from which to make sudden and
unexpected attacks upon sea-coast towns during the winter.” But British
pride had forced the increase of the army in Massachusetts Colony, and
initiated a disastrous campaign. Lord Dartmouth never wavered in the
opinion that New York was the only proper base of operations in dealing
with the Colonies at large. Lord Howe himself had advised that New York,
instead of Boston, should be made the rendezvous and headquarters of all
British troops to be sent to America. Only the contumacy of General Gage
had baffled the wiser plans of superior authority.

During the first week of the new year, and while the American army was
under the stress of reconstruction, Washington learned that General
Clinton had been promised an independent command of a portion of the
fresh troops which accompanied Admiral Shuldham to America, and would be
detailed on some important detached service remote from New England
waters. As a remarkable fact, not creditable to the king’s advisers, the
Island of New York, at that time, was practically without any regular
military garrison; but its aristocratic tory circles of influence could
not conceive of a popular uprising against the supremacy of George III.
within their favored sphere of luxury and independence.

Washington appreciated the situation fully. He recognized the
defenceless condition of New York and its adaptation for the
Headquarters of the Army of America. He was also thoroughly convinced
that General Clinton’s proposed expedition would either occupy New York,
or make the attempt to do so. He acted without delay upon that
conviction, although reserving to himself the responsibility of first
reducing Boston with the least possible delay. General Lee, then upon
detached service in Connecticut, had written to him, urging, in his
emphatic style, “the immediate occupation of New York; the suppression
or expulsion of certain tories of Long Island; and that not to crush the
serpents before their rattles were grown, would be ruinous.”

Washington was as prompt to reply; and ordered Lee to “take such
Connecticut volunteers as he could quickly assemble in his march, and
put the city in the best possible posture of defence which the season
and circumstances would admit of.”

Meanwhile, every immediate energy of the Commander-in-Chief was
concentrated upon a direct attack of the British position. The business
capacity of Colonel Knox had already imparted to the Ordnance Department
character and efficiency. Under direction of Washington he visited Lake
George, during December, 1775, and by the last of February hauled upon
sleds, over the snow, more than fifty pieces of artillery to the
Cambridge headquarters. This enabled him to make the armament of
Lechmere Point very formidable; and by the addition of several half-moon
batteries between that point and Roxbury, it became possible to
concentrate upon the city of Boston the effective fire of nearly every
heavy gun and mortar which the American army controlled.

It had been the intention of Washington to march against Boston, across
the ice, so soon as the Charles river should freeze sufficiently to bear
the troops. Few of the soldiers had bayonets, but “the city must be
captured, with or without bayonets,” and his army released for service
elsewhere. In one letter he used this very suggestive appeal: “Give me
powder, or ice, and I will take Boston.” Upon the occasion of “one
single freeze and some pretty strong ice,” he suddenly called a council
of war, and proposed to seize the opportunity to cross at once, and
either capture or burn the city. Officers of the New England troops who
were more familiar with the suddenness with which the tides affect ice
of moderate thickness, dissuaded him from his purpose; but in writing to
Joseph Reed, for some time after his Adjutant-General, he thus refers to
the incident: “Behold, while we have been waiting the whole year for
this favorable event, the enterprise was thought too hazardous. I did
not think so, and I am sure yet, that the enterprise, if it had been
undertaken with resolution, would have succeeded; without it, _any_
would fail.” “P.S.—I am preparing to take post on Dorchester Heights, to
try if the enemy will be so kind as to come out to us.” This postscript
is an illustration of Washington’s quick perception of the strategic
movement which would crown the siege with complete success. He added
another caution: “What I have said respecting the determination in
Council, and the possession of Dorchester, is spoken _sub-rosa_.”

The month of February drew near its close, when Washington, in the
retirement of his headquarters, decided no longer to postpone his attack
upon the city and its defences. Two floating batteries of light draught
and great strength were quickly constructed, and forty-five batteaux,
like the modern dredge-scow, each capable of transporting eighty men,
were assembled and placed under a special guard. In order to provide for
every contingency of surmounting parapets, or improvising defences in
streets, or otherwise, fascines, gabions, carts, bales of hay,
intrenching-tools, two thousand bandages, and all other contingent
supplies that might, under any possible conditions, be required, were
also gathered and placed in charge of none but picked men. Gen. Thomas
Mifflin, his Quartermaster-General, who had accompanied him from
Philadelphia, shared his full confidence, and was unremitting by night
and by day in hastening the work intrusted to his department.

The inflexibility of purpose which marked Washington’s career to its
close, asserted its supremacy at this crucial hour of the Revolutionary
struggle, when, for the first time, America was to challenge Britain to
fight, and fight at once. It had begun to appear as if his submission of
a proposition to a council of officers implied some doubt of its
feasibility, or some alternate contingency of failure. Washington
discounted all failure, by adequate forethought. Jomini, who admitted
that Napoleon seemed never to provide for a retreat, very suggestively
added: “When Napoleon was present, no one thought of such a provision.”
In like manner Washington had the confidence of his troops.

It certainly is not anticipating the test of Washington, as Soldier, to
state some characteristics which were peculiarly his own. His most
memorable and determining acts were performed when he was clothed with
ample authority by Congress, or the emergency forced him to make his own
will supreme. In the course of this narrative it will appear that
Congress did at last formally emancipate him from the constraint of
councils. Whenever he doubted, others doubted. Whenever he was
persistent, he inspired the nerve and courage which realized results,
even though in a modified form of execution. Partial disappointments or
deferred realization did not shatter nor weaken his faith. Washington,
the American Commander-in-Chief, was in such a mood on the first day of
March, 1776. He had a plan, a secret plan, and kept his secret well,
until the stroke was ready for delivery.

And yet, the progress of the siege up to this date, and through two long
winter months, had not been wholly spent in details for its certain
success. Even after the first day of January, when he became acquainted
with the proposed movement of General Clinton, he began to anticipate
such a movement as an indication of his own future action. A selection
of guns for field service was carefully made; batteries were organized
and thoroughly drilled. Then, as ever after, during the war,
artillerists were few in number, and the service was never popular. The
hauling of heavy guns by hand, then with rare exceptions habitual, made
the service very hard; and accuracy of fire cost laborious practice,
especially where powder was scarce, even for exigent service. Wagons
were also provided. Medical supplies were collected and packed in
portable chests. He also inquired into the nature of the New England
roads when the frosts of spring first tweak the soil, and was informed
that they would be almost impassable for loaded wagons and heavy
artillery.

During the same months the condition of Canada had become seriously
critical, through the activity of General Carleton who expected
reënforcements from England, and had already threatened the northern
border. It seemed to Washington that Congress might even divert a part
of his own army to support the army in Canada, upon the acquisition of
Boston and the retirement of its British garrison. The ultimate
destination of that garrison, in whole or in part, was full of uncertain
relations to his own movements. The disposition of the large royalist
element in Boston was also an object of care; but looming above all
other considerations was the supreme fact that the war now begun was one
which embraced every Colony, every section; and that the conflict with
Great Britain was to be as broad and desperate as her power was great
and pervasive.

And yet, under so vast and varied responsibilities, he matured and
withheld from his confiding troops the secret of his purpose to capture
Boston suddenly and surely, until the day of its crowning fulfilment
arrived.

Just after sunset, on that New England spring evening, from Lechmere
Point, past Cobble Hill, and through the long range of encircling
batteries, clear to the Roxbury line on the right, every mortar and
cannon which could take Boston in range opened fire upon the quiet city.

But this was only a preliminary test of the location, range, and power
of the adversary fire. The British guns responded with spirit, and
equally well disclosed to competent artillery experts distributed along
the American lines, the weight, efficiency, and disposition of their
batteries so suddenly called into action.

At sunrise of March 2d, the American army seemed not to have heard the
cannonading of the previous night; or, wondering at such a waste of
precious powder, shot, and shell, rested from the real experience of
handling heavy guns against the city and an invisible foe, at night. And
through the entire day the army rested. No parades were ordered. Only
the formal calls of routine duty were sounded by fife and drum. No heads
appeared above the ramparts. The tents were crowded with earnest men,
tilling powder-horns, casting or counting bullets, cleaning their
“firelocks,” as they were called in the official drill manual of those
times, and writing letters to their friends at home. The quiet of that
camp was intense, but faces were not gloomy in expression, neither was
there any sign of special dread of the approaching conflict, which
everybody felt to be immediately at hand. As officers went the rounds to
see that silence was fully observed, it was enough to satisfy every
curious inquirer as to its purpose,—“It is Washington’s order.” And all
this time, behind the American headquarters, Rufus Putnam, civil
engineer, Knox, Chief of Artillery, Mifflin, Quartermaster-General, and
General Thomas, were ceaselessly at work, studying the plans and taking
their final instructions from the Commander-in-Chief.

On the night of the third of March, soon after that evening’s sunset-gun
had closed the formal duties of the day, and seemingly by spontaneous
will, all along the front, the bombardment was renewed with the same
vigor, and was promptly responded to. But some of the British batteries
had been differently disposed, as if the garrison either anticipated an
attack upon their works on Bunker Hill, or a landing upon the Common,
where both land and water batteries guarded approach. (See map.)

This second bombardment had been more effective in its range. One solid
shot from the city reached Prospect Hill, but no appreciable damage had
been done to the American works; but some houses in Boston had been
penetrated by shot, and in one barrack six soldiers had been wounded.
Places of safety began to be hunted for. Artificial obstructions were
interposed in some open spaces for protection from random shot and
shell. No detail under orders, and no call for volunteers, to break up
the investment of the city, had been made. No excited commander, as on
the seventeenth of June, 1775, tendered his services to lead British
regulars against Cambridge, to seize and bring back for trial, as
traitor, the arch-rebel of the defiant Colonists. Red uniforms were
indeed resplendent in the sunlight; but there was no irrepressible
impulse to assail earthworks, which had been the work of months, and not
of a single night, and behind which twenty thousand countrymen eagerly
awaited battle. And on this day, as before, the quiet of the graveyard
on Beacon Hill was no more solemn and pervasive than was the calm and
patient resting of the same twenty thousand countrymen, waiting only for
some call to duty from the lips of their silent Commander-in-Chief.

The fourth of March closed, and the night was mild and hazy. The moon
was at its full. It was a good night for rest. Possibly such a whisper
as this might have pervaded the Boston barracks, and lulled anxious
royalists to slumber. “Surely the rebels cannot afford further waste of
powder. They impoverish themselves. Sleep on! Boston is safe!” Not so!
As the sun went down, the whole American camp was alive with its teeming
thousands; not ostentatiously paraded upon parapet and bastion, but
patiently awaiting the meaning of a mysterious hint, which kept even the
inmates of hospital tents from sleeping, that “Washington had promised
them Boston on the morrow.”

From “early candle-lighting” to the clear light of another dawn,
incessant thunder rolled over camp and city. The same quick flashes
showed that fire ran all along the line; and still, the occupants of
camp and city, standing by their guns, or sheltered from their fire,
dragged through the night, impatiently waiting for daylight to test the
night’s experience, as daylight had done before.

At earliest break of day it was announced to General Howe that “two
strong rebel redoubts capped Dorchester Heights.” The news spread
quickly, after the excitements of the night. There was no more easy
slumber in the royal bed-chamber of British repose, nor in the luxurious
apartments of the favored subjects of George III., in the city of
Boston, on that fifth day of March, 1776.

“If the Americans retain possession of the Heights,” said Admiral
Shuldham, “I cannot keep a vessel in the harbor.”

General Howe advised Lord Dartmouth that “it must have been the
employment of at least twelve thousand men.”

Another British officer said, “These works were raised with an
expedition equal to that of the genii belonging to Aladdin’s lamp.”

Lord Howe said, further, “The rebels have done more in one night than my
whole army would have done in a month.”

“Perhaps,” said Heath, “there never was as much done in so short a
space.”

The reader of this narrative, whether citizen or soldier, cannot fail to
be interested in some account of the extreme simplicity with which the
construction of these works had been carried on. The earth, at that
time, was frozen to the depth of eighteen inches, rendering the use of
pick-axe and shovel, and all intrenching-tools, of little use; besides,
the noise of their handling would have betrayed the workmen. The secret
of Washington’s silent preparatory work, and the accumulation of such
heaps of material behind his headquarters, is revealed. Hoop-poles, for
hurdles and fascines,—branches cut from apple orchards, and along
brooks, for abatis, even as far out as the present suburban towns of
Brookline, Milton, Mattapan, and Hyde Park, had been accumulated in
great quantities. Large bales of compressed hay, which were proof
against any ordinary cannon-ball, had been procured also, so that the
merely heaping up and arranging these under the personal direction of
Engineer Putnam, according to a plan fully digested in advance, was but
easy work for a class of country soldiers peculiarly “handy” with all
such materials. Then, on the tops of the improvised redoubts, were
barrels filled with stones. These, at the proper time, were to be rolled
down the hill, to disconcert the formal array of steadily advancing
British regulars.

The management of the whole affair was hardly less simple. Eight hundred
soldiers, not needed during the cannonading, quietly marched out of camp
the night before,—some between Boston and Dorchester Heights, and others
at the east end of the peninsula, opposite Castle Island; while still
others, with tools, and a supporting party of twelve hundred soldiers
under General Thomas, followed the advance. Three hundred carts, loaded
with suitable material, followed.

All this movement was liable to be discovered in spite of the incessant
roar of heavy ordnance over the works of besiegers and besieged. The
flash of heated guns or bursting bombs might light up the trail of this
slowly crawling expedition, and vast interests were staked upon the
daring venture. But, along the most exposed parts of the way, the bales
of pressed hay had been placed as a protecting screen; and behind its
sufficient cover, the carts passed to and fro in safety. Even the moon
itself only deepened the shadow of this artificial protector, while in
position to light, as by day, the steps of the advancing patriots. And
there was, also, a brisk north wind which bore away from the city,
southward, all sounds which were not already lost in the hurricane of
war that hushed all but those of battle.

But the American Commander-in-Chief had fully anticipated the possible
incident of a premature discovery of his design against Dorchester. The
success of his plans for the night did not wholly depend upon the
undisturbed occupation and fortification of Dorchester Heights. That
silent procession of two thousand countrymen was not, as at Bunker Hill,
a sort of “forlorn-hope” affair. It was not hurried, nor was it costly
of strength or patience. Reliefs came and went; and the system, order,
and progress that marked each hour could not have been better realized
by day. Instructions had been explicit; and these were executed with
coolness and precision, as a simple matter of fact, to be done as
ordered by Washington.

The silent preparations of the preceding day had provided for the main
body of the American army other employment than a listless watch of a
vigorous bombardment and its pyrotechnic illumination of the skies. At
battery “Number Two,” the floating batteries and batteaux were fully
manned, for crossing to Boston. Greene and Sullivan, with four thousand
thoroughly rested troops, and these carefully picked men, were ready to
move on the instant, if the garrison attempted to interfere with
Washington’s original purpose.

An eminent historian thus characterized the event: “One unexpended
combination, concerted with faultless ability, and suddenly executed,
had, in a few hours, made General Howe’s position at Boston untenable.”

As soon as General Howe appreciated the changed conditions of his
relations to the besieging rebels, he despatched Earl Percy, who had met
rebels twice before, with twenty-four hundred troops to dislodge the
enemy from Dorchester Heights. The command moved promptly, by boats, to
Castle Island, for the purpose of making a night attack. Sharp-shooting,
by the American “Minute Men,” in broad daylight, behind breastworks, was
not courted by Percy on this occasion, nor desired by General Howe.
During the afternoon a storm arose from the south, which increased to a
gale, followed at night by torrents of rain. Some boats were cast
ashore, and the entire expedition was abandoned.

By the tenth of March, the Americans had fortified Nook’s Hill; and this
drove the British from Boston Neck. During that single night, eight
hundred shot and shell were thrown into the city from the American
lines.

On the seventeenth of March, the British forces, numbering, with the
seamen of the fleet, not quite eleven thousand men, embarked in one
hundred and twenty transports for Halifax. The conditions of this
embarkation without hindrance from the American army had been settled by
an agreement on the part of the British authorities that the city should
be left intact from fire, or other injury, and that the property of
royalists, of whom nearly fifteen hundred accompanied the troops, should
be also safe from violation by the incoming garrison. As the last boats
left, General Ward occupied the city with a garrison of five thousand
troops.

[Illustration:

WASHINGTON AT BOSTON.

[From Stuart’s painting.]
]

Of two hundred and fifty cannon left behind, nearly one-half were
serviceable. Other valuable stores, and the capture of several
store-vessels which entered the harbor without knowledge of the
departure of the British troops, largely swelled the contributions to
the American material of war.

The siege of Boston came to an end. New England was free from the
presence of British garrisons. The mission of Washington to
Massachusetts Colony, as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army of
America, had fulfilled its purpose.

CHAPTER IX.
SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN.

Within twenty-four hours after General Howe embarked his army, the
American Commander-in-Chief developed his matured plan to anticipate any
design of General Clinton to occupy New York City. The great number of
fugitive royalists who accompanied Howe’s fleet and encumbered even the
decks of battleships with their personal effects, and the necessity of
consulting the wishes of very influential families among their number,
were substantial reasons for the selection of Halifax as the destination
of the ships. But of still greater importance was the reorganization of
his army, and a new supply of munitions of war, in place of those which
had been expended, or abandoned on account of the siege of Boston. Time
was also required for the preparation and equipment of any new
expedition, whether in support of Carleton in Canada, or to move
southward.

Washington did not even enter Boston until he started General Heath with
five regiments and part of the artillery for New York. On the twentieth
the Commander-in-Chief entered the city.

The British fleet was weatherbound in Nantasket Roads for ten days; but
on the twenty-seventh day of March, when it finally went to sea, the
entire American army, with the exception of the Boston garrison, was
placed under orders to follow the advance division. General Sullivan
marched the same day upon which he received orders; another division
marched April 3d, and on the 4th General Spencer left with the last
brigade, Washington leaving the same night.

In order to anticipate any possible delay of the troops in reaching
their destination, he had already requested Governor Trumbull, of
Connecticut, to reënforce the New York garrison with two thousand men
from Western Connecticut; and he also instructed the commanding officer
in that city to apply to the Provincial Convention, or to the Committee
of Safety of New Jersey, to furnish a thousand men for the same purpose.
In advising Congress of this additional expense, incurred through his
own forethought, but without authority of Congress, he wrote thus
discreetly: “Past experience and the lines in Boston and on Boston Neck
point out the propriety and suggest the necessity of keeping our enemies
from gaining possession and making a lodgment.”

The Continental Army had entered upon its first active campaign; but
before Washington left Cambridge he arranged for the assembling of
transports at Norwich, Conn., thereby to save the long coastwise march
to New York; and digested a careful itinerary of daily marches, by which
the different divisions would not crowd one upon another.
Quartermaster-General Mifflin was intrusted with the duty of preparing
barracks, quarters, and forage for the use of the troops on their
arrival, and all the governors of New England were conferred with as to
the contingencies of British raids upon exposed sea-coast towns, after
removal of the army from Boston. A careful system of keeping the Pay
Accounts of officers was also devised, and this, with the examination of
an alleged complicity of officers with the purchase of army supplies,
added to the preliminary work of getting his army ready for the best of
service in garrison or the field. Two companies of artillery, with shot
and shell, were detailed to report to General Thomas, who had been
ordered by Congress to Canada, _vice_ General Lee ordered southward.

Washington’s journey to New York was via Providence, Norwich, and New
London, in order to inspect and hasten the departure of the troops.

A reference to the situation in that city is necessary to an
appreciation of the development which ensued immediately upon the
arrival of the Commander-in-Chief.

William Tryon, who subsequently invaded Connecticut twice, and left his
devastating impress upon Danbury, Ridgefield, New Haven, Fairfield,
Norwalk, and Green Farms, was the royal Governor of New York. It is
interesting to recall the antecedents of this governor. He had been
Governor of North Carolina once, and attempted a part similar to that so
foolishly played by Governor Gage at Lexington and Concord. Until this
day, the people of North Carolina will cite the “Battle of Alamance,”
which was a pretty sharp fight between Tryon’s forces and the yeomanry
of the “Old North State,” on the sixteenth day of May, 1771, as the
first blood shed in resistance to the usurpations of the royal
prerogative. It was the same William Tryon, in person, temperament, and
methods, who governed New York City in 1776, and Washington knew him
thoroughly. The royalists and patriots of New York City, in the absence
of a controlling force of either British or Continental troops,
commingled daily. A few British men-of-war really controlled its waters;
but the city was practically at rest. There prevailed a general
understanding that each party should retain its own views; that the
officers of the Crown should keep within the technical line of their
official duty, and that the citizens would not interfere. Congress had
no troops to spare, and there was quite a general suspension of arming,
except to supply the regiments already in the field.

An extraordinary coincidence of the arrival of General Clinton from
Halifax, with a small force, and the arrival, on the same day, of
General Lee, from Connecticut, with about fifteen hundred volunteers,
brought this condition of armed neutrality to an end. Clinton had
positive orders to “destroy all towns that refused submission.” When
Clinton cast anchor at Sandy Hook and communicated with Governor Tryon,
and learned the facts, he judiciously made the official courtesy due to
the governor his plausible excuse for entering the harbor at all, “being
ordered southward.” Lee, doubtful of Clinton’s real purpose, fortified
Brooklyn Heights back of Governor’s Island, and began also to fortify
the city, at the south end of the island, still called “The Battery.”
Clinton followed his orders, sailed southward, visited Lord Dunmore in
Chesapeake Bay, joined Earl Cornwallis at Wilmington, N.C., in May, on
the arrival of that officer from Ireland, and took part with him in the
operations against Fort Sullivan (afterwards Fort Moultrie) near
Charleston, during the succeeding summer.

Lee, ever arrogating to himself supreme command, whenever detached,
placed the Connecticut volunteers whom he accompanied to New York upon a
Continental basis of service. In this he deliberately exceeded his
authority and came into direct collision with Congress, which had
ordered one of the regiments to be disbanded; and offended the New York
patriots, whom he characterized as the “accursed Provincial Congress of
New York.” His action received the official disapproval of Washington;
and the visit of a Committee of Congress accommodated the formal
occupation by the Colonial troops to the judgment of all well-disposed
citizens. In no respect was the episode of Lee’s temporary command a
reflection upon the patriotism of the citizens. He was ordered to the
south; and in the attack upon Fort Sullivan and the preparation of
Charleston for defence he gave much good advice, but had to be repressed
and controlled all the time by President Rutledge, who was as resolute
as Washington himself in the discharge of public duty once confided to
his trust. The attitude of South Carolina, at this time, deserves
special mention, and it has hardly received sufficient recognition in
the development of the United States. Without waiting for the united
action of the Colonies this State declared its own independence as a
sovereign republic. John Rutledge was elected as President, with Henry
Laurens as Vice-President, and William H. Drayton as Chief Justice. An
army and navy were authorized; a Privy Council and Assembly were also
elected; the issue of six hundred thousand dollars of paper money was
authorized, as well as the issue of coin. It was the first republic in
the New World to perfect the organization of an independent State.

When Lee was ordered southward, General Thomas had been ordered to
Canada; and the first act of Washington, after his arrival at New York,
was the enforced depletion of his command by the detail of four
battalions as a reënforcement to the army in Canada. These he sent by
water to Albany, “to ease the men of fatigue.” He also sent five hundred
barrels of provisions to Schuyler’s command on the twenty-second.

The activity of the army about headquarters aroused the royalist element
and prompt action became necessary. Washington addressed a letter to the
New York Committee of Safety, directing that further correspondence with
the enemy must cease, closing as follows: “We must consider ourselves in
a state of war, or peace, with Great Britain.” He enforced these views
with emphasis.

Late at night, on the twenty-fifth, an order was received from Congress
directing him to send six additional battalions to Canada, requesting
also an immediate report as to “whether still additional regiments could
be spared for that purpose.” General Sullivan accompanied this division;
and with him were such men as Stark, Reed, Wayne, and Irvine. In reply
to Congress, Washington stated that “by this division of forces there
was danger that neither army, that sent to Canada and that kept at New
York, would be sufficient, because Great Britain would both attempt to
relieve Canada and capture New York, both being of the greatest
importance to them, if they have the men.”

On the twenty-eighth day of April the whole army in New York amounted to
ten thousand two hundred and thirty-five men, of whom eight thousand
three hundred and three were present and fit for duty. Washington’s
Orderly Book, of this period, rebukes certain disorderly conduct of the
soldiers in these memorable words: “Men are not to carve out remedies
for themselves. If they are injured in any respect, there are legal ways
to obtain relief, and just complaints will always be attended to and
redressed.”

At this time, Rhode Island called for protection of her threatened
ports, and two regiments of her militia were taken into Continental Pay.
Washington was also advised that Great Britain had contracted with
various European States for military contingents; that the sentiment in
Canada had changed to antipathy, and that continual disaster attended
all operations in that department. On the twenty-fourth he wrote to
Schuyler: “We expect a very bloody summer at Canada and New York; as it
is there, I presume, that the great efforts of the enemy will be aimed;
and I am very sorry to say that we are not, in men and arms, prepared
for it.”

General Putnam was placed in command at New York, and General Greene
took charge of the defences on Brooklyn Heights and of their completion.
On the first day of June Congress resolved that six thousand additional
troops should be employed from Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Connecticut, and New York, to reënforce the army in Canada, and that two
thousand Indians should be hired for this same field of service. To this
proposition General Schuyler keenly replied: “If this number, two
thousand, can be prevented from joining the enemy, it is more than can
be expected.”

As early as the fifteenth of February Congress had appointed Benjamin
Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll, as Commissioners to visit
Canada and learn both the exact condition of the army and the temper of
the people. Rev. John Carroll, afterwards Archbishop of Maryland,
accompanied them, and reported that “negligence, mismanagement, and a
combination of unlucky incidents had produced a disorder that it was too
late to remedy.” Ill-health compelled the immediate return of Franklin,
but the other Commissioners remained until the evacuation of Canada. The
scourge of small-pox, to which General Thomas became a victim, and other
diseases, together with the casualties of the service, had cost more
than five thousand lives within two months, and the constant change of
commanders, ordered by Congress, hastened the Canadian campaign to a
crisis. Scattered all the way from Albany to Montreal there could have
been found companies of the regiments which Congress had started for
Canada, and which Washington and the country could so poorly spare at
such an eventful and threatening period. General Sullivan had been
succeeded by General Gates, but with no better results. Sullivan had
under-estimated the British forces, and when apprised of the facts, of
which the American Commander-in-Chief had not been advised in time, he
wrote: “I now only think of a glorious death, or a victory obtained
against superior numbers.” The following letter of Washington addressed
to Congress, enclosing letters intimating the desire of General Sullivan
to have larger command, indicates Washington’s judgment of the
situation, and is in harmony with his habitual discernment of men and
the times throughout the war. He says: “He (Sullivan) is active,
spirited, and zealously attached to our cause. He has his wants and his
foibles. The latter are manifested in his little tincture of vanity
which now and then leads him into embarrassments. His wants are common
to us all. He wants experience, to move on a large scale; for the
limited and contracted knowledge which any of us have in military
matters, stands in very little stead, and is quickly overbalanced by
sound judgment and some acquaintance with men and books, especially when
accompanied by an enterprising genius, which I must do General Sullivan
the justice to say, I think he possesses. Congress will therefore
determine upon the propriety of continuing him in Canada, or sending
another, as they shall see fit.”

Already the St. Lawrence river was open to navigation. On the first of
June, General Riedesel arrived with troops from Brunswick, and General
Burgoyne with troops from Ireland, swelling the command of General
Carleton to an aggregate of nine thousand nine hundred and eighty-four
effective men; and British preparations were at once made to take the
offensive, and expel the American force from Canada. Before the last of
June the “invasion of Canada” came to an end, and the remnants of the
army, which had numbered more than ten thousand men, returned, worn out,
dispirited, and beaten.

Washington had been stripped of troops and good officers at a most
critical period, against his remonstrance; and Congress accounted for
the disaster by this brief record: “Undertaken too late in the fall;
enlistments too short; the haste which forced immature expeditions for
fear there would be no men to undertake them, and the small-pox.”

Gradually the principal officers and many of the returning troops joined
the army at New York. The occupation of New York, the fortification and
defence of Brooklyn Heights, the tardy withdrawal of the army to Harlem
Heights, with a constant and stubborn resistance to the advancing
British army and its menacing ships-of-war, have always been treated as
of questionable policy by writers who have not weighed each of those
incidents as did Washington, by their effect upon the Continental army,
as a whole, and in the light of a distinctly framed plan for the conduct
of the war. This plan was harmonious and persistently maintained from
his assumption of command until the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown,
in 1781.

Operations in Massachusetts, and elsewhere, south as well as north, from
the first, proved that the heat of patriotic resistance must be
maintained and developed by action; that, as at Bunker Hill and before
Boston, passive armies lose confidence, while active duty, even under
high pressure, nerves to bolder courage and more pronounced vigor.

The correspondence of Washington and his Reports, as well as letters to
confidential friends which have been carefully considered in forming an
estimate of his career as a Soldier, evolve propositions that bear upon
the operations about New York. The prime factor in the Colonial
resistance was, to fix the belief irrevocably in the popular mind, in
the very heart of the Colonists, that America could, and would, resist
Great Britain, with confidence in success. The inevitable first step was
to challenge her mastery of the only base from which she could conduct a
successful war. To have declined this assertion of Colonial right, or to
have wavered as to its enforcement, would have been a practical
admission of weakness and the loss of all prestige thus far attained.

It was well known to Washington that the British Government was so
related to Continental rivals that about forty thousand troops would be
the extreme limit of her contributions to subdue America. It will appear
from official tables, appended to this narrative, that, during the
entire war, the British force of every kind, throughout America,
exceeded this number slightly in only one year; and that Washington’s
plans, from time to time submitted to Congress, were based upon
requisitions fully competent to meet the largest possible force which
could be placed in the field by Great Britain.

It was further evident that resistance of the first attempt of the
British to land, and the reduction of their numbers and supplies, by
constant, persistent, and confident battle, would not only dispirit that
army, but equally arouse the spirit of the American army, assure its
discipline, and stimulate both Congress and the people to furnish
adequate men and means to prosecute the war to success. Prolonged face
to face hostilities in and about New York, therefore, indicated not only
Washington’s faith in success, but prolonged the restriction of British
operations to a very limited field.

The Declaration of American Independence, on the Fourth Day of July,
1776, was an emphatic act that enlarged his faith and inspired
resistance, upon the plans so carefully matured before that event. And,
even if there be taken into account the peculiar circumstances which
facilitated the eventual retreat from Brooklyn Heights, it is no less
true that the Battle of Long Island, the resistance at Pell’s Point,
Harlem Heights, White Plains, and about Fort Washington, were
characterized by a persistency of purpose and a stubbornness of
hand-to-hand fighting, which kept his main army practically intact, and
enabled him to terminate the campaign of 1776 with a master stroke that
astounded the world, and challenged the admiration of the best soldiers
of that period.

CHAPTER X.
BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA.—HOWE INVADES NEW YORK.

In order rightly to measure the American War for Independence by fixed
standards, it is both interesting and instructive to notice the
systematic method adopted by Great Britain to suppress revolution and
restore her supremacy over the revolting Colonies. The recovery of
Boston was no longer to be seriously considered; but New England, as a
strong and populous centre of disaffection, must still be so restricted
through her coast exposure as to prevent her proportionate contribution
to the Continental army at New York. If threatened from the north, New
York also would be compelled to retain a large force of fully equipped
militia for frontier defence. The occupation of Newport, R.I., which was
only one day’s forced march from Boston, together with the patrol of
Long Island Sound by ships-of-war, would therefore be positive factors
in both limiting a draft and the transportation of troops from
Massachusetts. If to this were added the control of the Hudson River, by
a competent fleet, the whole of New England would be cut off from
actively supporting the forces to be raised in the Middle Colonies.

The fiery spirit and patriotic fervor of Virginia, as well as the lusty
vigor of North Carolina and other Southern patriots, must also be
subjected to a military surveillance and pressure from the sea, and
thus, equally with New England, be deprived of a free and full
contribution of its proper quota to the American army.

The three sections named, using New York as the base of all British
demonstrations in force, represented so many radiating belts, or zones,
of military operation; and to secure ultimate British success, each of
these zones must be so occupied in its own defence that a force from New
York could be thrown with overwhelming effect upon each, in turn, and
thus render it practically impossible for Washington to concentrate an
effective army of resistance to each assailing column. To the southward,
the waters of Delaware and Chesapeake bays, if once occupied by a
sufficient fleet, would sever the lower Colonies from the American
centre of service, as effectively as those of Long Island and the Hudson
River would isolate New England. This was a sound military policy, and
had been fully adopted so soon as Lord Howe received reënforcements and
recovered breath after his severe punishment at Boston.

The adoption of New York as the base of all British supply, as well as
service, not only had its central and dominating site for the
rendezvous, equipment, and despatch of troops, but through its auxiliary
naval stations at Halifax and the West Indies, afforded opportunities
for expeditions where large land forces were not required, and still
keep such threatened localities under constant terror of assault.

These considerations will have their better appreciation as the progress
of the narrative unfolds successive campaigns.

_Sooner_ or _later_, in order to achieve absolute independence, and
vanquish Great Britain in the fight, _the American army must so
neutralize the domination of New York, that its occupation by either
army would cease to be the determining factor in the final result of the
war_.

The prestige of Great Britain was overshadowing; but could its arm reach
the range of its shadow? Her fleets were many and mighty, but so were
those of her jealous foes across the British Channel. Her armies in
America must be adequate for operations in each of the zones mentioned,
and be constantly supplied with munitions of war and every other
accessory of successful field service. And, on the other hand, the
American army, almost wholly dependent upon land transportation and hard
marching, must have a correspondingly larger force, or fail to
concentrate and fight upon equal terms with its adversary.

The British Government having adopted a sound military policy, so soon
as the object lessons of Lexington, Bunker Hill, and their expulsion
from Boston unveiled their dull vision, did not fail to realize the
necessity for an army strong enough to meet the full requirements of
that policy. Forty regiments were assigned to the American service.[3]
But the militia of New England had already driven twenty battalions
(half the number) from its coast. Washington was no careless observer of
European conditions, nor of the straitened nature of the British army
organization, however superior to rivals on the sea. His deliberate
conviction, ever a rallying force to his faith in deepest peril, that
Britain could never spare more than one more army as large as the
garrison of Boston, was the result of almost literal insight of the
practical resources at her command. Hence, that Government contracted
with petty European principalities for seventeen thousand men, for
immediate delivery. These men were impressed and paid wages by their own
local princes who speculated on the greater sums to be paid them, _per
capita_, by Great Britain. The former estimate of General Gage, at
twenty thousand men, and his significant hint as to the need of more
than that force, was no longer ridiculed; but forty thousand was decided
to be the minimum number required for the immediate prosecution of the
war. Taking into account the foreign troops, the British ministry
estimated as available for the American service a total, on paper, of
fifty-five thousand men. To this was to be added, upon their hopeful
estimate, four thousand Canadians, Indians, and royalists. Allowing for
every possible shrinkage, on account of weakened regiments and other
contingencies, the effective force was officially placed at forty
thousand men.

Footnote 3:

See Appendix for regiments designated.

Two facts are significant in connection with this specious estimate of
the British army. If the drain of this forcible conscription upon the
industry of Hesse-Cassel and Hanau had been applied to England and
Wales, at that date, it would have raised an army of four hundred
thousand men; and yet, Britain did not venture to draw from her own
subjects, at home, for the defence of her own Crown.

Washington rightly conceived that the whole scheme would divide the
sentiment of the British people, and that the success even of these
mercenary troops, against their own blood in America, would prove no
source of pride or congratulation. It was his intense love of English
liberty, exhibited in its history, that undergirded his soul with
sustaining faith in American liberty; and he read the hearts of the
English people aright.

He did not wait long for its echo. The Duke of Richmond used this
emphatic and prophetic utterance: “An army of foreigners is now to be
introduced into the British dominion; not to protect them from invasion,
not to deliver them from the ravages of a hostile army, but to assist
one-half of the inhabitants in massacring the other. Unprovided with a
sufficient number of troops for the cruel purpose; or, unable to prevail
upon the natives of the country [England] to lend their hands to such a
sanguinary business, Ministers have applied to those foreign princes who
trade in human blood, and have hired mercenaries for the work of
destruction.” His closing sentence foreshadowed the alliance of America
with Louis XVI., of France. It reads thus: “The Colonies themselves,
after our example, will apply to strangers for assistance.”

This British army was designed for four distinct, and as nearly as
possible, concurrent, operations: one through Canada, down the Hudson
River to Albany and New York, with divergent pressure upon New England
and central New York; one to occupy Newport, R.I.; the third to control
New York City and its related territory in New Jersey; and the fourth
against representative centres at the South.

Reference has been made to the anxiety expressed by Washington as early
as February, 1776, lest the siege of Boston might be protracted until
Britain could invade the other colonies, particularly New York, with an
overwhelming retentive force. As a fact, only surmised and not known by
him for weeks, Sir Peter Parker and Earl Cornwallis were ready to start
from Cork, Ireland, by the twentieth of January; but did not sail until
the thirteenth of February, and then the transports and ships were so
buffeted by storms, and driven back for refitting, as not to reach
Wilmington, N.C., until the third day of May. Here, as before indicated,
he was joined by General Clinton, and both had the suggestive lesson of
American courage in their repulse by the brave Moultrie, at Charleston,
on the twenty-eighth of June.

And now we are to consider Washington’s reception of the most formidable
of these expeditions.

General Howe sailed from Halifax on the tenth of June with one hundred
and twenty square-rigged vessels besides smaller craft; and on the fifth
day of July the entire force, amounting to nine thousand two hundred
men, was landed upon Staten Island, in the lower bay of New York. During
the voyage two transports were captured by American privateers, and
General Sir William Erskine, with a part of the seventy-first Highland
Regiment, were made prisoners. The incident is worthy of notice as
materially affecting the correspondence between Washington and General
Howe, shortly after the event.

General Howe reached Sandy Hook in the despatch frigate “Greyhound,” on
the twenty-fifth of June, and held a secret conference with Governor
Tryon, on shipboard. His fleet first cast anchor at Gravesend Cove, July
1st, but after conference with Governor Tryon, he changed his purpose.
He would be too near Washington. He wrote to Lord Germaine on July 8th
as follows: “He declined to land, as being so near the front of the
enemy’s works. It would be too hazardous, until the arrival of the
troops with Commodore Holtham, daily expected. He was also waiting for
the return of General Clinton, and deemed it best to defer the
possession of Rhode Island until the arrival of the second embarkation
from Europe, unless Carleton should penetrate early into this province
[New York].” The letter thus closes: “As I must esteem an impression
upon the enemy’s principal force collected in this quarter to be the
first object of my attention, I shall hold it steadily in view without
losing sight of those which may be only considered collateral.”

Admiral Lord Richard Howe arrived on July 12th with a powerful squadron
and one hundred and fifty transports filled with troops. On the
thirteenth a communication was despatched to George Washington, _Esqr._,
on behalf of the Brothers Howe, Commissioners, proposing terms of peace.
Washington, in a letter to Schuyler, facetiously styled these gentlemen
“Commissioners to dispense pardon to repenting sinners.” Howe’s
Adjutant-General, Patterson, called upon General Washington, on the
twentieth of July, respecting the exchange of prisoners, especially
General Erskine, and, “purely to effect, the exchange of these
prisoners,” addressed Washington by his military title.

Generals Clinton and Cornwallis, repulsed at Charleston, arrived August
first, and Commodore Holtham, having arrived on the twelfth, landed
twenty-six hundred British troops, eight thousand four hundred Hessians,
and camp equipage for the entire army. On the fifteenth Sir Peter Parker
arrived with twenty-four sail from the south.

The British army thus encamped on Staten Island numbered, all told,
thirty-one thousand six hundred and twenty-five men. The effective
force, for duty, was twenty-six thousand nine hundred and eight, of
which number twenty thousand accompanied General Howe to the attack upon
Brooklyn Heights. This was the largest army under one command during the
war.

Washington was fully advised of every movement, and the Proclamation of
Commissioner Howe to the people was circulated with his full approval.
Sensational rumors were as common then as in modern times. As late as
the nineteenth of August General Roberdeau notified Washington, in all
seriousness, that “a post-rider had told him, with great confidence,
that General Howe had proposed to retire with the fleet and army, and
was willing to settle the present dispute on any terms asked by
Washington: that this came from an officer who was willing to swear to
it; but as it might have a tendency to lull the inhabitants, he made it
the subject of an express.” This was based upon another false rumor,
that England and France were at war. Such “recklessness of
gossip-mongers” received from Washington a scorching rebuke which he
declared to be the “more important, since many of those who opposed the
war, on account of business relations with the British authorities, were
most active in words, while lacking in courage to take up arms on either
side.”

CHAPTER XI.
BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.

Only a summary analysis of the Battle of Long Island is required for
explanation of the general operations indicated upon the map. Almost
every hour had its incidents of eventful interest, and few historic
battles, from its first conception to the ultimate result, more
strikingly illustrate the influence of one regardful judgment which
could convert unpromising features into conditions of final benefit. The
value of military discipline, of presence of mind, and the subordination
of every will to one ruling spirit, never had a more definite
illustration.[4] The infinite value of small details, in preparation for
and the conduct of so serious a venture as to meet this great British
army, is exhibited at every phase of its progress.

Footnote 4:

See “Battles of the Revolution,” Chapter XXXI.

The American army contrasted unfavorably with its adversary in every
respect. Although the British forces, and generally the American forces
employed during the years of the war, are to be found stated in the
Appendix, the official roll of Washington’s army, on this occasion, will
add interest to the event.

On the third of August its strength was as follows: Commissioned
officers and staff, twelve hundred and twenty-five; non-commissioned
officers, fifteen hundred and two; present for duty, ten thousand five
hundred and fourteen; sick, present and absent, three thousand six
hundred and seventy-eight: making a total of seventeen thousand two
hundred and twenty-five men.

Less than one-third of this force had served from the beginning of the
war. The artillery battalion of Colonel Knox numbered less than six
hundred men, and the guns themselves were of various patterns and
calibre, to be handled by men who knew little of their use or range. On
the fifth of August Governor Trumbull of Connecticut assured Washington
that “he did not greatly dread what the enemy could do, trusting Heaven
to support us, knowing our cause to be righteous.” Washington’s reply,
dated the seventh, was characteristic and practical: “To trust in the
justice of our cause, without our utmost exertion, would be tempting
Providence.” Although Trumbull had already sent five regiments forward,
he soon sent nine additional regiments, averaging about three hundred
men each, in time to be present when the British eventually landed in
Westchester County.

Two regiments under Colonel Prescott, of Bunker Hill fame, were on duty
upon Governor’s Island. The works on Long Island, begun by General Lee,
had been completed by General Greene, who had explored the country
thoroughly and knew the range of every piece. A redoubt with seven guns
crowned the Heights. The exposed point of Red Hook, a combination of
marsh and solid land, was supplied with five guns. The intrenchments,
more than a half mile in length, were protected by abatis and four
redoubts which mounted twenty guns. Greene occupied these redoubts and
lines with two regiments of Long Island militia and six regiments of
Continental troops, not one of which exceeded four hundred men, for
duty. The line extended from Wallabout, the present Navy Yard, to
Gowanus Bay.

The total nominal strength of the American army about New York on the
twenty-sixth of August, including the sick, non-effectives, and those
without arms, was a little over twenty-seven thousand men. The
Connecticut regiments which had just joined brought such arms as they
could provide for themselves, and were simply that many citizens with
nominal organization, but without drill.

Meanwhile, the entire line from Brooklyn to King’s Bridge, fifteen
miles, with the navigable waters of the Hudson, the Harlem, and East
rivers, and their shore approaches, had to be guarded. It was not
entirely certain but that Howe simply feigned an attack upon the
intrenched position upon the Heights, to draw thither Washington’s best
troops, and take the city by water approach. Paulus Hook, then an
island, was fortified in a measure, but was unable to prevent the
passage of two vessels which at once cut off water communication with
Albany and the northern American army.

Washington had previously issued orders for the government of
sharp-shooters; and particularly, “not to throw away fire. To fire first
with ball and shot.” This order had its specific significance, and was
illustrated in the Mexican War, and early in 1861, in America.
“Buck-and-ball” scattered its missiles, and wounded many who would be
missed by a single rifle-shot; and the wounded required details of
others for their care or removal. “Brigadiers were ordered to mark a
circle around the several redoubts, by which officers are to be directed
in giving orders for the first discharge.” He also ordered “small brush
to be set up, to mark the line more distinctly, and make it familiar to
the men, before the enemy arrive within the circle.”

The reader will recall the experience of Washington in his early career,
when similar methods made his success so emphatic.

When advised of the landing of the British on the twenty-second, and
that Colonel Hand had retired to Prospect Hill (now Prospect Park),
Washington sent six regiments to reënforce the garrison of the Heights.
Orders were also sent to General Heath, then at the head of Manhattan
Island, to be prepared to forward additional troops; and live regiments
from the city force were ready to cross East River so soon as it should
be determined whether the attack was to be made, in force, against the
Heights.

General Greene, prostrated with fever, had written on the fifteenth,
that “he hoped, through the assistance of Providence, to be able to ride
before an attack should be made, but felt great anxiety as to the
result.” On the twenty-third, Washington was compelled to write to
Congress, “I have been compelled to appoint General Sullivan to the
command of the island, owing to General Greene’s indisposition.” In a
letter written by Sullivan, on the twenty-third, respecting a minor
skirmish after the British landing, when Hand retired, he said: “I have
ordered a party out for prisoners to-night. Things argue well for us,
and I hope are so many preludes to victory.” This confidence was hardly
less unfounded than his faith in the success of operations in Canada. It
was the inverse of sound reason, and made the “less include the
greater.” He was immediately superseded, and General Putnam was placed
in command.

The following are some of Washington’s orders issued to General Putnam
on the twenty-sixth of August, when it seemed as if only his
omnipresence could compel even general officers to understand their
responsibility for the good behavior of the troops:

“Stop the scattering, unmeaning, and wasteful firing, which prevents
the possibility of distinguishing between a real and a false alarm,
which prevents deserters from approaching our lines, and must
continue, so long as every soldier conceives himself at liberty to
fire when, and at what, he pleases.”

[Illustration: Battle of Long Island]

“Guards are to be particularly instructed in their duty.”

“A ‘brigadier of the day’ is to remain constantly on the lines, that
he may be upon the spot, and see that orders are executed.”

“Skulkers must be shot down upon the spot.”

“The distinction between a well-regulated army and a mob, is the good
order and discipline of the former, and the licentiousness and
disorderly behavior of the latter.”

“The men not on duty are to be compelled to remain at, or near, their
respective camps or quarters, that they may turn out at a moment’s
warning; nothing being more probable than that the enemy will allow
little time enough for the attack.”

“Your best men should at all hazards prevent the enemy passing the
woods and approaching your works.”

These orders were preëminently adapted to the character of the American
troops. Their neglect disconcerted the entire plan of the
Commander-in-Chief for an efficient defence of the works.

The American force on the Heights, including Stirling’s Brigade, which
crossed over the river to Brooklyn on the day of the battle, was not
quite eight thousand men; but included Atlee’s Pennsylvania Rifles,
Smallwood’s Maryland and Haslet’s Delaware regiments, which then, and
ever after, were among Washington’s “Invincibles.” But notwithstanding
Greene’s designation of suitable outposts, and Washington’s orders, the
disposition of the American advance outposts was of the feeblest kind.
At the time of the first landing on the twenty-second, when Colonel Hand
fell back to Prospect Hill (see map), it does not appear from any
official paper, or record, that he gave notice of the landing of the
second British division, or established scouts to ascertain and report
subsequent British movements. Their landing, division after division,
had been as impressive as it was successful, and deserves notice. Four
hundred transports were escorted by ten line-of-battle ships and twenty
frigates. Seventy-five flat-boats, besides batteaux and galleys, moving
in ten distinct, well-ordered divisions, simultaneously touched the
beach near the present site of Fort Hamilton, and landed four thousand
men in just two hours, according to the Admiral’s “log-book,” after the
signal reached the topmast of the “flag-ship.” Five thousand additional
troops were landed with equal celerity and order, a little lower down
the bay. Before twelve o’clock, fifteen thousand men, with artillery,
baggage, and stores, were landed without hindrance or mishap. On the
twenty-fifth, De Heister’s Hessian command landed with equal skill at
Gravesend.

A glance at the map indicates that the long range of hills between
Brooklyn and the sea had four openings available for approach by the
British troops; the first, and shortest, along the bay by Martense Lane;
the second, in front of Flatbush and the American intrenchments; the
third, by road northward from Flatbush, to Bedford and Newtown; and a
fourth, by road past Cypress Hill, which extended to Flushing, but
crossed the Bedford and Jamaica road about three miles eastward from
Bedford.

General Stirling, who had been awakened at three o’clock on the morning
of the twenty-seventh, commanded the extreme American right. In front of
Flatbush there were intrenchments, and one redoubt, with one howitzer
and three field-pieces. General Sullivan, second in command, was, he
stated after his capture, “to have commanded within the lines; but went
to the hill near to Flatbush, to reconnoitre, with a picket of four
hundred men, when he was surrounded by the enemy who had advanced by the
very road he had paid horsemen fifty dollars for patrolling by night,
while he was in command.” Miles’ Pennsylvania Rifles and Wylie’s
Connecticut were at, or near, the Bedford Pass. The Jamaica road had
been overlooked, or neglected. Putnam, already somewhat impaired in
physical vigor, and wholly unacquainted with the outposts, made neither
reconnoissance nor change of pickets, upon receipt of Washington’s
orders. Instead of feeling for, and finding, the enemy, he awaited their
arrival.

Without full details, the following incidents occurred before Washington
arrived and took command in person. The British left wing, under General
Grant, crowded Stirling and his small command of seventeen hundred men
back nearly to the Cortelyou House; but they made a gallant fight near
the present Greenwood Cemetery. The battalions of Smallwood, Haslet, and
Atlee covered themselves with honors. Stirling heard the firing at
Flatbush, and hastened his retreat.

Cornwallis, upon his first landing, on the twenty-second, moved toward
Flatbush, but finding it held by the American advance works, dropped
down to Flatlands. De Heister, however, moved directly upon Flatbush,
and commenced cannonading the redoubt and intrenchments, where Sullivan,
being incidentally present, was in command. This advance of De Heister
was in effect a _feint_ attack, to be made real and persistent at the
proper time.

On the British right, General Howe, with Clinton, Percy, and Cornwallis,
gained the Jamaica road undiscovered, rested their forces until
half-past eight in the morning, and were soon directly in front of the
American works, in the rear of Sullivan and cutting off his retreat.
Cornwallis gained position near the Cortelyou House, in the line of
Stirling’s retreat. De Heister, advised by Clinton’s guns that the
British right had accomplished its flank movement, advanced promptly
upon both Sullivan and Stirling, and captured both, with a considerable
portion of their commands.

The Battle of Long Island had been fought. Washington had declared that
he would make the acquisition of Brooklyn Heights by the British, if
realized, “as costly as possible.” It had been his expectation that by
the advance posts ordered, and careful pickets, he could prolong
resistance, if not winning full success. He had taken pains to convince
the troops that the resistance at Bunker Hill and Fort Moultrie was a
fair indication of their ability, and that the British troops understood
it well. When John Jay proposed to burn New York and leave it in ruins,
Washington insisted that it would tend to demoralize his army, and offer
to the people and to the world a painful contrast with the successful
restoration of Boston to her own people.

The Battle of Long Island _had_ to be fought. As soon as it began,
Washington crossed the river with three regiments. If Howe had made
immediate advance, Washington would have resisted, with quite as large a
force as Howe could have handled, in an assault.

Washington immediately, and in person, examined every phase of the
situation. His first act was to organize a strong detachment to support
Stirling who was opposing the advance by the harbor road; but the swift
advance of the British Grenadiers across the very face of the
intrenchments, defeated his purpose. Every man was summoned to roll-call
and kept on the alert. At early dawn the next morning he went through
all the intrenchments, encouraging the men. Before noon, General Mifflin
arrived with the well-drilled regiments of Glover, Shaw, and Magee.
These organizations, which had been sneered at as “proud of line arms
and fine feathers,” as they marched up the ascent with solid ranks and
steady step, supplied with knapsacks, and trim as if on special parade,
were received by the garrison with cheers and congratulations. The
garrison was now nine thousand strong. But a “north-easter” set in. The
rain fell in torrents, tilling the trenches, and compelling even the
British regulars to keep to the shelter of their tents. Washington was
everywhere, and took no sleep. The British opened trenches six hundred
yards from the face of Fort Putnam (now Washington Park), not daring to
storm the position; but could work only during intervals in the tempest.

Washington held his enemy at bay. But upon the same reasoning which
enforced his first occupation of Brooklyn Heights, boldly facing the
British army at its first landing, he resolved to evacuate the position
without decisive battle. His fixed policy,—to avoid positively
determining issues which were beyond his immediate mastery, so as to
wear out his adversary by avoiding his strokes, and thereby gain
vantage-ground for turning upon him when worn out, over-confident, and
off his guard,—had its illustration now. His army was not versed in
tactical movements upon a large scale, and was largely dependent for its
success upon the supervising wisdom with which its undoubted courage
could be made available in the interests of the new Nation.

The retreat from Brooklyn was a signal achievement, characteristic of
Washington’s policy and of the men who withdrew under his guidance. They
were kept closely to duty, as if any hour might command their utmost
energies in self-defence; but their Commander-in-Chief had his own plan,
as before Boston, which he did not reveal to his officers until it was
ripe for execution. How well he kept his own counsel will be seen by his
action. The military _ruse_ by which he achieved the result had its
climax five years later, when he so adroitly persuaded Sir Henry Clinton
of immediate danger to New York, that the capture of Cornwallis closed
the war, and the surrender of New York followed. And as the month of
August, 1776, was closing, Generals Clinton and Cornwallis were
reckoning, by hours, upon the capture of Washington’s army and the
restoration of British supremacy over the American continent.

Early on the morning of the twenty-ninth day of August, the following
private note was placed in the hands of General Heath, then commanding
at Kingsbridge, by General Mifflin, the confidential messenger of the
American Commander-in-Chief:

LONG ISLAND, Aug. 29, 1776.

DEAR GENERAL: We have many battalions from New Jersey which are coming
over to relieve others here. You will therefore please to order every
flat-bottomed boat and other craft at your post, fit for transporting
troops, down to New York, as soon as possible. They must be manned by
some of Colonel Hutchinson’s men, and sent without the least delay. I
write by order of the General.

MIFFLIN.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Commissary-General Trumbull, also, at the same time, bore orders to
Assistant Quartermaster-General Hughes, instructing him “to impress
every craft, on either side of New York, that could be kept afloat, and
had either oars, or sails, or could be furnished with them, and to have
them all in the East River by dark.” The response to these orders was so
promptly made that the boats reached the foot of Brooklyn Heights just
at dusk that afternoon. An early evening conference of officers was
ordered, and Washington announced his plan for immediate return to New
York. The proposition was unanimously adopted. The Commander-in-Chief
acted instantly. By eight o’clock the troops were under arms. The fresh
and experienced regiments were sent to man the advance works, to relieve
the weary troops, including the militia. The sick were promptly gathered
for the earliest removal. Every indication promised immediate action;
and intimations were disseminated among the troops that as soon as the
sick and inefficient troops were withdrawn, a sortie would be made, in
force, against Howe’s investing works. The _ruse_ of anticipated
reënforcements from New Jersey, upon removal of the invalids, cheered
both sick and well. No possible method of inspiring self-possession and
courage for any endeavor could have been more wisely designed.

Colonel Glover, of Marblehead, Mass., whose regiment was composed of
hardy fishermen and seamen, had charge of the boats. The regiments last
recruited, and least prepared for battle, and the sick, were the first
to be withdrawn. As early as nine o’clock, and within an hour after the
“general beat to arms,” the movement began,—systematically, steadily,
company by company, as orderly as if marching in their own camp. A
fearful storm still raged. Drenched and weary, none complained. It was
Washington’s orders. Often hand-in-hand, to support each other, these
men descended the steep, slippery slopes to the water’s edge, and seated
themselves in silence; while increasing wind and rain, with incessant
violence, constantly threatened to flood, or sink, the miserable
flat-boats which were to convey them to the city, only a few hundred
yards away. And thus until midnight. At that hour the wind and tide
became so violent that no vessel could carry even a closely reefed sail.
The larger vessels, in danger of being swept out to sea, had to be held
fast to shore; dashing against each other, and with difficulty kept
afloat. Other boats, with muffled oars, were desperately but slowly
propelled against the outgoing tide. A few sickly lanterns here and
there made movement possible. The invisible presence of the
Commander-in-Chief seemed to resolve all dangers and apparent confusion
into some pervasive harmony of purpose among officers and men alike, so
that neither leaking boats nor driving storm availed to disconcert the
silent progress of embarking nearly ten thousand men.

Just after midnight, both wind and tide changed. The storm from the
north which had raged thus long, kept the British fleets at their
anchorage in the lower bay. At last, with the clearing of the sky and
change of wind, the water became smooth, and the craft of all kinds and
sizes, loaded to the water’s edge, made rapid progress. Meanwhile,
strange to relate, a heavy fog rested over the lower bay and island,
while the peninsula of New York was under clear starlight.

For a few moments, toward morning, a panic nearly ensued. An order to
hasten certain troops to the river was misunderstood as applying to all
troops, including those in the redoubts; and a rumor that the British
were advancing, and had entered the works, led even the covering party
to fall back. Washington instantly saw the error, restored the men to
their places, and the British pickets never discovered their temporary
absence.

The military stores, and such guns as were not too heavy to be taken
through the mud, were safely placed on the transports. With the last
load, Mifflin, and last of all, Washington, took passage.

During the day, the troops and stores on Governor’s Island were also
removed; and the evacuation was complete. If the landing of ten thousand
disciplined troops by General Howe, on the twenty-second, over a placid
sea, and in bright sunlight, was magnificent for its beauty and system,
the safe embarkation of ten thousand men by Washington, on the night of
the twenty-ninth, was sublime for the implicit faith of the soldiers and
the supreme potency of his commanding will.

The Italian historian Botta says of this event: “Whoever will attend to
all the details of this retreat, will easily believe that no military
operation was ever conducted by great captains with more ability and
prudence, or under more favorable auspices.”

At daybreak of the thirtieth, British pickets entered the American
works; and the most advanced were enabled to fire a few shots at the
last American detachment as it landed safely upon the New York side.

CHAPTER XII.
WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK.

Washington’s labors were neither lessened nor interrupted when he
assembled his army on the thirtieth day of August, 1776. He had been in
the saddle or on foot, without sleep, for more than forty-eight hours;
and it would require a large volume even to outline the mass of minute
details which had to receive his attention. His own account, as
contained in private letters, can be summed up in suggestive groups—such
as, “tools carelessly strewn about”; “cartridges exposed to the rain”;
and, “the soldiers, too often the officers, ignorant as children of the
responsibility of a single sentry or gunner, wherever located, along
rampart or trench.”

On the evening of the thirtieth, he thus described the situation: “The
militia are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return home. Great
numbers have gone off; in some instances almost by whole regiments, by
half ones, and by companies, at a time. With the deepest concern I am
obliged to confess my want of confidence with the generality of the
troops.”

He urged Congress to establish a regular army at once; to enlist men for
the war; pressed the immediate abandonment of the city, and put the
plain question, whether it “should be left standing for British
headquarters.”

On the second day of September, the number of men present for duty was
less than twenty thousand. On the same day he reorganized its formation
into three grand divisions, or corps: one under Putnam, in command of
the city; one under Spencer, in the absence of Greene, at Harlem, to
prevent a British landing there; and the third under Heath, at King’s
Bridge.

On the third of September, Congress ordered two North Carolina
battalions, under General Moore, to march with all possible expedition
to reënforce the army at New York; also a Continental battalion from
Rhode Island; and urged Virginia to forward all the troops within her
power to furnish. On the same day, Putnam urged the fortification of
Harlem Heights, Mount Washington, and the Jersey shore; if possible, to
prevent Howe’s ascending the Hudson River to attack the northern army.
On the next day, the fourth, Washington was again compelled to occupy
himself with such minute details as belonged to officers of the lowest
rank. Such “diabolical practices as robbing apple orchards and gardens,
and straggling without aim or purpose, instead of drilling and preparing
for their country’s safety,” were officially reprimanded, and three
roll-calls per day were advised, to keep the men near their duty. On the
fifth of September, Greene advised a general and speedy retreat from the
city, and a council was called to meet on the day succeeding, for
consideration of the proposition. The council did convene on the sixth,
and Washington thus announces to Congress its action: “The Council was
opposed to retiring from New York, although they acknowledged that it
would not be tenable if attacked by artillery”; and adds significantly:
“Some, to whom the opinion of Congress was known, were not a little
influenced in their opinions, as they were led to suspect that Congress
wished it to be retained at all hazards.” General Putnam, in concurring
with his Commander-in-Chief, shrewdly observed: “This dooms New York to
destruction; but what are ten or twenty cities, to the grand object?”

On the eighth of September, Washington reported the militia of
Connecticut as reduced from six thousand to two thousand men; and in a
few days their number was but nominal, twenty or thirty in some
regiments. The residue were discharged and sent home with a
recommendation to Governor Trumbull, “that it was about time to begin
dealing with deserters.”

Although Washington concurred in Putnam’s general idea of strengthening
the Hudson River shore by earthworks and redoubts, he anticipated
failure to make them adequate for control of its waters, because of the
limited power and range of his guns. The British had already extended
their right wing as far as Flushing (see map), with posts at Bushwick,
Newtown, and Astoria, and had also occupied Montressor and Buchanan’s,
now Ward’s and Randall’s islands.

Upon appeal to Massachusetts, that Colony made a draft of one-fifth of
her population, excepting only certain exposed localities and certain
classes. Connecticut was no less patriotic, and Governor Trumbull made
earnest effort to place the Colony foremost in support of the cause in
peril. That Colony, so closely adjoining New York on the west, and
exposed on its entire southern boundary to maritime excursions, was
peculiarly in danger. On the fourteenth, Congress at last authorized
eighty-five regiments to be enlisted for five years; and the advice of
Greene, when he first joined the army in 1775, and of Washington, after
assuming command at Cambridge, began to be accepted as sound policy and
essential to ultimate success.

At this stage of the narrative of Washington’s career as a Soldier, it
is interesting to consider his own views of the situation as expressed
in a letter to the Continental Congress. He thus wrote: “Men of
discernment will see that by such works and preparations we have delayed
the operations (British) of the campaign till it is too late to effect
any capital incursions into the country. It is now obvious that they
mean to enclose us on the island of New York, by taking post in my rear,
while their shipping secures the front, and thus oblige us to fight them
on their own terms, or surrender at discretion.”

Again, “Every measure is to be formed with some apprehension that all of
our troops will not do their duty. On our side the war should be
defensive. It has even been called a ‘war of posts.’ We should, on all
occasions, avoid a general action, and never be drawn into the necessity
to put anything to risk. Persuaded that it would be presumptuous to draw
out our young troops into open ground against their superior numbers and
discipline, I have never spared the spade and the pick-axe; but I have
never found that readiness to defend, even strong posts, at all hazards,
which is necessary to derive the greatest benefit from them.”

Again, “I am sensible that a retreating army is encircled with
difficulties, that declining an engagement subjects a general to
reproach; but when the fate of America may be at stake on the issue, we
should protract the war, if possible. That they can drive us out is
equally clear. Nothing seems to remain but the time of their taking
possession.”

The thoughtful reader will find these quotations to be very suggestive
of some future offensive action on the part of Washington whenever the
British might be shut up in winter quarters; and the reply of Congress,
whereby they authorize him “not to retain New York longer than he
thought proper for the public service,” was accompanied by the following
_Resolution_: “That General Washington be acquainted that Congress would
have special care taken, in case he should find it necessary to quit New
York, that no damage be done to the said city by his troops, on their
leaving it; the Congress having no doubt of their being able to recover
the same, though the enemy should, for a time, have possession of it.”

The experience of the Continental army before Boston was now repeated.
New recruits came in daily, to fill the places made vacant by expiring
enlistments; but again the army seemed to be “fast wasting away.”

The interval is significant because of another effort on the part of
General Howe and his brother, Admiral Howe, special commissioners, to
settle the controversy upon terms alike satisfactory to the American
people and the British crown; but John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and
Benjamin Franklin, commissioners appointed by Congress, insisted first
upon Independence, and a subsequent alliance between the two nations as
friendly powers. This ended the negotiations. Such a settlement, if it
had been realized, might have imparted to Great Britain even a prouder
destiny than the succeeding century developed.

At that juncture of affairs, however, and as a key to General Howe’s
importunity in securing at least “a suspension of hostilities,” he was
urging upon the British Government, with the same pertinacity as
Washington besought Congress, to increase his army. His figures were
large, and worthy of notice. He wanted ten thousand men for the
occupation of Newport, R.I., that he might threaten Boston, and make
incursions into Connecticut. He demanded for the garrison of New York
twenty thousand men; of which number, seventeen thousand should be
available for field service. He asked for ten thousand more, for
operations into New Jersey, where Washington had established a general
Camp of Instruction for all troops arriving from the south; and still
another ten thousand for operations in the Southern Colonies. It is not
improbable that much of General Howe’s tardiness in following up
temporary success, in all his subsequent campaigns, was based upon the
conviction—embodied in these enormous requisitions for troops—that the
war had already assumed a character of very grave importance and a
corresponding uncertainty of the result.

Events crowded rapidly. On the tenth of September. Washington began the
removal of valuable stores. He acted as quickly as if he were in Howe’s
place, seeking the earliest possible possession of New York. On the
twelfth, a Council of War decided that a force of eight thousand men
should be left for the defence of Fort Washington and its dependencies.
Of eight regiments of the very best troops, reporting three thousand
three hundred and twenty-two present, the sick-roll reduced the
effective strength twelve hundred and nine men. On the fourteenth,
additional British vessels passed up East River, landing troops at
Kipp’s Bay on the sixteenth. Then occurred one of the most stirring
incidents of the war. One of the best brigades in the army, and one
which had previously fought with gallantry and success, gave way.
Washington, advised of the panic, denounced their behavior as “dastardly
and cowardly.” He dashed among them, and with drawn sword mingled with
the fugitives, to inspire them with courage. In his report he says: “I
used every means in my power to rally them to the fight, but my attempts
were fruitless and ineffectual: and on the appearance of not more than
sixty or seventy of the enemy they ran away without firing a shot.” In
the strong language of General Greene: “Washington, on this occasion,
seemed to seek death, rather than life.” These same troops, a part of
Parsons’ Brigade, afterwards redeemed themselves; and Washington was
wise enough to give them opportunity, under his own eye, as especially
trustworthy troops. This incident found its counterpart in the career of
Napoleon. At the siege of Toulon, one demi-brigade fled before a sally
of less than one-fourth its numbers: but afterwards lost nearly half its
strength in storming and entering the same fortress.

Immediately upon this unfortunate affair, the whole army was withdrawn
to Harlem Heights. This position was regarded as impregnable; but the
following extract, from Washington’s report to Congress exposes the deep
anguish of his soul: “We are now encamped with the main body of the army
upon the Heights of Harlem, where I should hope the enemy would meet
with a retreat, in case of attack, but experience, to my great
affliction, has convinced me that this is a matter to be wished, rather
than expected.”

The British lines were advanced, and extended from Bloomingdale across
to Horn’s Hook, near Hell Gate; and General Howe made his headquarters
at the Beekman Mansion, not far from those just vacated by Washington on
Murray Hill.

And just then and there occurred an incident of the war which made
an indelible impress upon the great heart of the American
Commander-in-Chief; and that was the execution of one of his
confidential messengers, who had been sent to report upon the
British movements on Long Island—young Nathan Hale. The Rev. Edward
Everett Hale, of Roxbury, Boston, furnishes the following outline of
service which had greatly endeared Captain Hale to Washington:

“Just after the Battle of Lexington, at a town-meeting, with the
audacity of boyhood, he cried out, ‘Let us never lay down our arms till
we have achieved independence!’ Not yet two years out of Yale College,
he secured release from the school he was teaching in New London;
enlisted in Webb’s Regiment, the 7th Connecticut; by the first of
September was promoted from Lieutenant to Captain; and on the
fourteenth, marched to Cambridge. He shared in the achievement at
Dorchester Heights, and his regiment was one of the first five that were
despatched to New London, and thence to New York, by water. On the
twenty-ninth of August, 1776, while the garrison of Brooklyn Heights was
being hurried to the boats, Hale, with a sergeant and four of his men,
attempted to burn the frigate _Phœnix_; and did actually capture one of
her tenders, securing four cannon. At a meeting of officers, Washington
stated that ‘he needed immediate information of the enemy’s plans.’ When
dead silence ensued, Hale, the youngest of the Captains, still pale from
recent sickness, spoke out: ‘I will undertake it. If my country demands
a _peculiar_ service, its claims are imperious.’ During the second week
in September, taking his Yale College diploma with him, to pass for a
school-master, he procured the desired information; but his boat failed
to meet him. A British boat answered the signal, and his notes, written
in Latin, exposed him. He was taken to New York on that eventful
twenty-first of September, when five hundred of its buildings were
burned; was summarily tried, and executed the next day at the age of
twenty-one. His last sentence, when in derision he was allowed to speak
as he ascended the gallows, was simply this: ‘I only regret that I have
but one life to give to my country.’”

He had become a member of Knowlton’s Connecticut Rangers; and the
Beekman House and Rutger’s apple orchard, where he was hanged from a
tree, located by Lossing near the present intersection of East Broadway
and Market streets, were long regarded with interest by visitors in
search of localities identified with the Revolutionary period of
Washington’s occupation of New York.

In resuming our narrative, we find the American army spending its first
night upon Harlem Heights. Rain fell, but there were no tents. The men
were tired and hungry, but there were no cooking utensils; and only
short rations, at best. They realized that through a perfectly useless
panic they had sacrificed necessaries of life. For four weeks the army
remained in this position, not unfrequently engaging the British
outposts, and on several occasions, with credit, making sallies or
resisting attack; but the fresh troops, as ever before, had to mature
slowly, under discipline. After a brilliant action on the sixteenth, in
which Colonel Knowlton, who had distinguished himself at Bunker Hill,
was killed, as well as Colonel Leich, and where Adjutant-General Reed,
of Washington’s staff, equally exposed himself—“to animate,” as he said,
“troops who would not go into danger unless their officers led the way,”
the Commander-in-Chief issued an order of which the following is an
extract: “The losses of the enemy, yesterday, would undoubtedly have
been much greater if the orders of the Commander-in-Chief had not in
some instances been contradicted by inferior officers, who, however well
they meant, ought not to presume to direct. It is therefore ordered,
that no officer commanding a party, and having received orders from the
Commander-in-Chief, depart from them without orders from the same
authority; and as many may otherwise err, the army is now acquainted
that the General’s orders are delivered by his Adjutant-General, or one
of his _aides-de-camp_, Mr. Tighlman, or Colonel Moylan, the
Quartermaster-General.”

At this time, Massachusetts sent her drafted men under General Lincoln.
General Greene assumed command in New Jersey. Generals Sullivan and
Stirling, exchanged, resumed their old commands.

The army Return of October fifth indicated a total rank and file of
twenty-seven thousand seven hundred and thirty-five men, of whom eight
thousand and seventy-five were sick, or on a furlough; and requiring to
complete these regiments, eleven thousand two hundred and seventy-one
men. On the eighth of October, General Moore, commanding the Camp of
Instruction (called the “Flying Camp,” because of its changeable
location) in New Jersey, reported a total force of six thousand five
hundred and forty-eight men.

On the ninth of October, the frigates _Phœnix_ and _Roebuck_ safely
passed the forts as far north as Dobb’s Ferry. It became evident that
General Putnam’s methods would not control the Hudson River route of
British advance. Sickness increased in the camps. The emergency forced
upon Washington the immediate reorganization of the medical department;
and he ordered an examination of applicants before allowing a commission
to be issued and rank conferred. Such had been the laxity of this
necessary class of officers, that General Greene reported his surgeons
as “without the least particle of medicine”; adding: “The regimental
surgeons embezzle the public stores committed to their care, so that the
regimental sick suffer, and should have the benefit of a general
hospital.” Washington issued an order, after his own very lucid style,
deploring the fact that “the periodical homesickness, which was common
just before an anticipated engagement, had broke out again with
contagious virulence.”

The want of discipline, however, was not wholly with the rank and file.
Adjutant-General Reed, in writing to his wife, expressed his purpose to
resign, for he had seen a captain shaving one of his men before the
house; and added: “To enforce discipline in such cases, makes a man
odious and detestable, a position which no one will choose.” And Colonel
Smallwood, afterwards General, and one of the best soldiers of the war,
in writing to the Maryland Council of Safety, complains of “the
ignorance and inattention of officers who fail to realize the importance
of that discipline which is so excellent in the Commander-in-Chief”;
adding: “It would be a happy day for the United States if there was as
much propriety in every department under him.”

At this period, General Howe again wrote to Lord Germaine, that he “did
not expect to finish the campaign until spring”; “that the Provincials
would not join the British army”; and called for more foreign troops,
and eight additional men-of-war. The monotony of these frequent
requisitions of the British Commander-in-Chief makes a tiresome story;
but like the successive appeals of Washington—to Congress, Provincial
Councils and Committees of Safety—they form an indispensable part of the
narrative of those facts which tested Washington’s character as a
Soldier.

Having observed increased activity of the British shipping in the East
River, and indications that Howe would abandon a direct attack upon his
fortified position upon Harlem Heights, Washington prepared for the
contingency of more active duty elsewhere, and announced October
eleventh as the day for a personal inspection of every company under his
command.

[Illustration: Operations near New York.]

CHAPTER XIII.
WASHINGTON TENDERS, AND HOWE DECLINES, BATTLE.—HARLEM HEIGHTS AND WHITE
PLAINS.

The steady hold of Harlem Heights against Howe’s advance on the
sixteenth day of September, sometimes called the Battle of Harlem
Heights, was another “object lesson” for General Howe’s improvement, and
he observed its conditions. His adversary invited and he declined the
invitation to attack the American position. His next plan was
self-suggestive, to cut the American army from its Connecticut supplies,
since his fleet controlled the Hudson River, and by a flank and rear
movement to pen it up for leisurely capture. He began this movement
October twelfth.

The Guards, Light Infantry, Reserve, and Donop’s Hessians, landed at
Throgg’s Neck (see map). But Hand’s American Rifles had already
destroyed the bridge to the mainland; and even at low tide the artillery
could not safely effect a crossing. Colonel Prescott, with others,
especially detailed by Washington, watched every movement, and held
firmly their posts without flinching; so that Howe placed his troops in
camp, “awaiting reënforcements.” On the sixteenth and seventeenth,
several brigades from Flushing, with the Grenadiers, landed at Pell’s
Point. Even here, Washington had anticipated his advance; for Colonel
Glover made such resistance from behind stone fences, then common to
that region, that this last command also went into camp, “waiting for
reënforcements.” On the twenty-first, Howe advanced his right and centre
columns beyond New Rochelle, where he again went into camp, “waiting for
reënforcements.”

During the week, General Knyphausen reached Staten Island from Europe
with additional Hessian troops; and these, with the British Light
Dragoons, landed at Myer’s Point near New Rochelle. De Heister also came
up from Howe’s first camping-ground, and the entire army advanced
parallel with the River Bronx, to within four miles of White Plains.

Much had been expected of the Light Dragoons and their charges on
horseback, with drawn sabres, to cut to pieces the undisciplined rebels.
But they inspired no terror. It was the rebels’ opportunity. Washington
reminded the army, “that in a country where stone fences, crags, and
ravines were so numerous, the American riflemen needed no better chance
to pick off the riders and supply the army with much-needed horses.” He
offered a “reward of one hundred dollars to any soldier who would bring
in an armed trooper and his horse.” Colonel Haslet crossed the Bronx and
attacked the Queen’s Rangers, captured thirty-six, and left as many on
the field, besides carrying away sixty muskets. Colonel Hand next had a
lively skirmish with the Hessian Yagers, who, accustomed to marching in
close array, met an experience similar to that of Braddock’s command
years before.

Besides all that, it was a constant inspiration to the American troops,
and not least to the Militia, thus to distribute themselves along the
extended British columns, and shoot, when they pleased, at some live
target. Howe had already sent ships-of-war up the Hudson, and proposed
to swing to the left at White Plains, and sweep the entire American army
back upon the Harlem.

When Washington learned from his scouts that the British army was thus
extended along the Sound, he hurried all supplies forward to White
Plains; pushed forward his own army, division by division, along the
west hank of the Bronx, always on high ground; established earthworks at
every prominent point, and made a small chain of communicating posts
throughout the entire distance. His purpose was to crowd the British
army upon the coast, where innumerable sea-inlets made progress
difficult; and by using the shorter, _interior line_ to White Plains, to
place himself in position to fight to advantage, upon ground of his own
selection. Of course time became an element of determining value. Howe
gained a start on the twelfth; but lost five days at Throgg’s Neck, and
four days more at New Rochelle. As Washington already had a depot of
Connecticut supplies at White Plains, he advanced to that point with
vigor, so soon as he perceived that Howe would not attack from the east,
as he had declined to attack from the south.

On the twelfth, General Greene asked permission to join from New Jersey,
and on the fourteenth General Lee reported for duty. Some reference to
this officer is of immediate interest. On that very morning he had
written a letter to General Gates, who, as well as himself, had seen
military service in the British army, each holding commissions in the
American army subordinate to Washington,—Lee, as senior Major-General.
The insubordination and arrogance of this letter are patent. The
following is an extract:

FORT CONSTITUTION, Oct. 14, 1776.

MY DEAR GENERAL GATES: I write this scroll in a hurry. Colonel Wood
will describe the position of our army, which in my breast I do not
approve. _Inter nos_, the Congress seems to stumble at every step. I
don’t mean one or two of the cattle, but the whole stable. I have been
very free in delivering my opinions, and in my opinion General
Washington is much to blame in not menacing ’em with resignation,
unless they refrain from unhinging the army in their absurd
interference.

On the twenty-second of October, while General Howe was still awaiting
reënforcements two miles above New Rochelle, General Heath’s division
made a night march, reached Chatterton Hill at daylight, and began to
strengthen the defences at White Plains. Sullivan’s division arrived the
next night, and General Lord Stirling’s immediately after. On the
twenty-third, Lee’s Grand Division joined from New Jersey, and the
entire American army, with its best officers and troops, awaited the
action of General Howe. McDougall’s Brigade and Lieutenant Alexander
Hamilton, with two guns, occupied Chatterton Hill. (See map.)

Washington’s position was not, intrinsically, the best for final
defence; but he had selected an ultimate position which Howe could not
assail without loss of communication with New York.

The American left was protected by low ground, accessible only with
difficulty. The right was met by a bend in the River Bronx. One line of
breastworks controlled the Connecticut road. Two successive lines in the
rear were upon a gradual ascent, capable of vigorous defence. Washington
also controlled all roads that lead westward to the Hudson River. But
more important than all, somewhat advanced to the south-west, was
Chatterton Hill, commanding the L of the river, in which angle the army
of Howe had taken position. Behind the American army was still higher
ground, which commanded the passes through the hills by the Peekskill
and upper Tarrytown roads.

Washington was now superior to his adversary in respect of numbers, and
was in one of his moods when he invited attack. On the twenty-eighth of
October, the two armies confronted each other. But a direct advance by
Howe required first that he dislodge the Americans from Chatterton’s
Hill. Otherwise, Howe would leave his supplies exposed, as well as his
left wing, to an attack from the rear. He decided to storm the hill. The
guns of Hamilton and the steepness of the ascent foiled the first
attempt. Then Colonel Rahl, afterwards killed at Trenton, and Donop,
with their Hessian brigades, turned the American right by another route,
and the Americans retired just as General Putnam was starting other
troops to their support. The British brigade of General Leslie lost one
hundred and fifty-four men, and the Hessian casualties increased the
entire loss to two hundred and thirty-one. The American casualties were
one hundred and thirty.

On the twenty-ninth, both armies rested. On the thirtieth, Lord Percy
arrived with his division, and the next day was designated for the
advance. But the day was stormy and the movement was suspended. The next
day following, was named in Orders for advance all along the lines,
“weather permitting,” the British improving their time by strengthening
their own position.

The next day came. The British army was by itself. During the night,
Washington had retired in good order, five miles, to North Castle
Heights, from which the entire British army could not dislodge him. Such
was the historical battle of White Plains, more properly, the Battle of
Chatterton’s Hill, where the fighting took place.

Howe immediately abandoned New Rochelle as his base, left White Plains
on the fifth, encamped at Dobb’s Ferry on the sixth, and thus gained
communication with his ships on the Hudson.

On the same day, the sixth, Washington advised Congress that “he
expected a movement of General Howe into New Jersey.” He called a
Council of War, under that conviction, the same afternoon, and decided
to throw a considerable body of troops into that Province.

The retention of Fort Washington was a question of much embarrassment.
Even its capture by Howe would not be a compensation to him, or to Great
Britain, for the escape of Washington’s army. On the twenty-ninth of
October, General Greene prepared a careful itinerary for a march through
New Jersey, minutely specifying the proposed distance for each day’s
progress, and the requisite supplies for each. That itinerary furnishes
a remarkable model of good Logistics. Washington wrote to Congress, that
“General Howe must do something to save his reputation; that he would
probably go to New Jersey”; and then urged, “that the militia be in
readiness to supply the places of those whose terms of service would
soon expire.” To Greene he wrote: “They can have no other capital
object, unless it be Philadelphia.” It was then known that General
Carleton retired from Crown Point November second, so that there was no
danger of a British movement up the Hudson. He again wrote to Greene as
to Fort Washington: “If we cannot prevent vessels from passing up, and
the enemy are in possession of the surrounding country, what valuable
purpose can it answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit
cannot be had? I am therefore inclined to think that it will not be
prudent to hazard the men and stores at Fort Washington; but as you are
on the spot, leave it to you to give such orders as you deem best, and,
so far revoking the order to Colonel McGee, to defend it to the last.”

At this time, more than half of the enlistments of the army were on
their extreme limit of service. Howe promised the militia of New York,
many of whom were in the garrison of the fort, that “he would guarantee
to them their liberties and properties, as well as a free and general
pardon.” Many decided not to reënlist. On the ninth of November, having
in mind the eventualities of a New Jersey campaign, Washington moved one
division of the army across the Hudson at Peekskill, and ordered a
second to move the day following. On the tenth he placed General Lee in
charge of the general camp, with careful instructions as to the
discipline of the men; and notified him, in case the enemy should remove
the whole or the greater part of their force to the west side of the
Hudson, to follow with all possible despatch, leaving the militia to
cover the frontiers of Connecticut, in case of need.

On the eve of his own departure he also notified Governor Trumbull of
Connecticut, that “the campaign into New Jersey would withdraw Lee and
his division from the Hudson”; and made arrangements for the “care and
storage for the winter, of all tents and stores that might remain on
hand after the discharge of enlisted men whose term should expire.”

The following terse order was then issued to all the divisions which
were to accompany him in this, his “First New Jersey campaign”:

“Colonels will examine the baggage of troops under marching orders;
tents and spare arms, to go in the first wagons, then the proper baggage
of the regiment; no chairs, tables, or heavy chests, or personal
baggage, to be put in, as it will certainly be put off and left. No
officer of any rank to meddle with a wagon or a cart appropriated for
any other regiment, or use; that no discharged man be allowed to carry
away arms, camp kettles, utensils, or any other public stores;
recruiting officers, as detailed, to proceed with their duty; no boys,
or old men, to be enlisted, and if so, to be returned at the hands of
the officer, with no allowance for any expense he may be at.”

On the twelfth of November, before crossing the Hudson River, Washington
placed General Heath in command of the Highlands, and proceeded to Fort
Lee, opposite Fort Washington. The British army had already removed from
Dobb’s Ferry to King’s Bridge. At this time, three hundred British
transports with a large force on board, lay at Sandy Hook, and their
destination was suspected to be either Newport, Rhode Island,
Philadelphia, or South Carolina.

Washington established his headquarters about nine miles from Fort Lee.
It is not desirable to burden the narrative with the details of the
capture of Fort Washington. The fort had been built to control the
river, and it was weak, landward; depending upon the river, even for
water, having no well. The ground fell off rapidly; but there were
neither trenches nor regular bastions, and only one redoubt. Washington
wrote to Congress, after reaching Fort Lee: “It seems to be generally
believed that the investing of Fort Washington, is one object they have
in view. I propose to stay in this neighborhood a few days; in which
time I expect the design of the enemy will be more disclosed, and their
incursions made in this quarter, or their investure of Fort Washington,
if they are intended.” While the assault was in preparation, Washington
took boat to cross and examine for himself the condition of the works;
but meeting Generals Putnam and Greene, who satisfied him that there
would be a stout defence, he returned without landing. Three assaults
were made, Generals Knyphausen, Percy, Cornwallis and Matthews
commanding divisions. These repeated charges up the very steep ascents
from the rear, and from the open face of the work northward, were very
costly to the British and Hessian columns. When their forces first
gained the interior lines, surrender, or rescue, was inevitable. To the
demand for surrender Magaw replied with a request for five hours’ delay.
A half hour only was granted. Magaw received a billet from Washington
stating that if he could hold out awhile, he would endeavor to bring off
the garrison at night; but no delay was permitted, and the garrison
surrendered. It was for many years an unexplained fact, how the British
troops appeared so suddenly at the open face of the fort, northward,
below which was a deep ravine, itself almost a protection. But William
Dumont, Magaw’s Adjutant, deserted, two weeks before the investment, and
placed detailed drawings of all the defences in the hands of General
Howe. This fact affords the key to General Howe’s otherwise very
singular excuse to the British Government for not following Washington’s
army from White Plains to North Castle Heights,—“_political reasons_”
having been assigned by General Howe, as “controlling his action.”

[Illustration: Capture of Fort Washington.]

The British loss in the assault was one hundred and twenty-eight; and
that of the Hessian troops, three hundred and twenty-six. The American
loss was one hundred and twenty, killed and wounded, and two thousand
six hundred and thirty-four, prisoners. The loss in cannon, tents, arms
and military stores, was very severe.

Fort Lee was of necessity abandoned, its powder and principal supplies
being first removed in safety.

The first New Jersey campaign immediately ensued.

CHAPTER XIV.
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN.—TRENTON.

Historical accuracy must recognize the First Campaign of Washington in
New Jersey, as a masterly conduct of operations toward American
Independence. The loss of Fort Washington has been a frequent topic of
discussion, as if its retention or loss had determining value. As
already indicated by Washington’s letters, there was no substantial
benefit to be realized by the detachment of troops to retain it, so long
as British ships controlled its water-front. Behind it was New England,
which could furnish no base of American operations for a general war;
and yet, in order to prosecute the war to success, the American army
must be established where it could harass and antagonize British
operations at and out from New York. Fort Washington could do neither,
but, so long as held, must drain resources which were more valuable
elsewhere.

It has already been noticed, that Washington prepared New England for
its own immediate defence; and the assembling of supplies ordered was in
anticipation of the campaign of 1777. The new system of enlistments,
also, provided for five years of contingent service. The rapid
organization of regiments at the South, and the authorized increase of
the army, in excess of any possible British accessions from Europe, had
induced the establishment of the Camp of Observation before alluded to,
and indicated New Jersey as the essential centre of operations for all
general military purposes. British operations from Canada, or against
the Southern Colonies, could be successfully met only by a closely
related and compactly ordered base of operation and supply.

It is therefore a misnomer to dwell with emphasis upon Washington’s next
movement, as simply a “masterly retreat.” The extracts, few out of many
available, already cited, are declarations of a clearly defined
strategic system, which would admit of no permanent failure so long as
Congress and the American people completely filled the measure of his
demands for men and money.

A glance at the disposition of both armies is invited. All operations in
the northern department were practically suspended with Carleton’s
withdrawal to Canada. But on the ninth of November, the official returns
of that northern army showed a force of seven thousand three hundred and
forty-five rank and file, present for duty; with three thousand nine
hundred and sixty-one sick, present, and absent. Enlistments were to
expire with the year, but weeks were to intervene. Lee’s Grand Division,
at North Castle Heights, at date of the loss of Fort Washington, and as
late as November, reported “seven thousand eight hundred and twenty-four
of effective rank and file, present for duty and on command.”
Enlistments here, also, were near their limit; but Lee ultimately
crossed into New Jersey with thirty-four hundred effective troops.
Washington had the right to expect, and did expect, that this force was
available upon call. The division of General Heath, commanding upon the
Hudson, with headquarters at Fishkill, numbered, on November
twenty-fourth, five thousand four hundred and ten men for duty. Leaving
to the governors of New England and New York the responsibility of
maintaining their quotas when enlistments should expire, the time had
come for American operations in the middle _zone_ of military action.

Cornwallis was detached from his immediate command and sent into New
Jersey, with a strong force, to attack Washington. The American army
abandoned the space between the Hackensack and Passaic rivers; crossed
the latter at Aquackonock on the twenty-first of November; burned the
bridge after a slight skirmish, and followed the right bank of the
Passaic to Newark, reaching that city on the twenty-third. At this
point, a muster of the army was ordered by Washington, and five thousand
four hundred and ten reported for duty. New Brunswick was reached on the
twenty-ninth. Here another skirmish with the army of Cornwallis took
place. But Cornwallis halted his command under orders of Howe to
“proceed no further than New Brunswick.”

Washington moved on to Princeton, and then to Trenton, where he arrived
on the third day of December. He immediately gathered from Philadelphia
all available boats, and for a stretch of seventy miles cleared both
banks of the Delaware River of everything that could float, and took
them into his own charge.

The reader should appreciate that these movements were not in the
original design of the American Commander-in-Chief. He would have made a
stand at both Hackensack and New Brunswick, if Lee’s Division,
confidently expected, had joined him as ordered; and at least, the
enemy’s progress would have been retarded.

Having left the Delaware regiment and five Virginia regiments at
Princeton, under Lord Stirling, he moved all heavy military stores
behind the Delaware, and returned to Princeton. Meeting Lord Stirling,
who was falling back before a superior force of the enemy, he recrossed
the Delaware at Trenton, established headquarters, and fixed the base
for future action.

In writing to Congress on the fifth, he used this language: “As nothing
but necessity obliged me to retire before the enemy and leave so much of
New Jersey unprotected, I conceive it my duty, and it corresponds with
my _inclination_, to make head against them so soon as there shall be
the least probability of doing so with propriety.”

On the twelfth, he learned that General Lee had entered New Jersey with
his division. As early as November twenty-fifth, he had ordered General
Schuyler to forward to him all Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops then
in the Northern Department.

A glance at the plans and movements of the British army is now of
interest. Howe reported his movements as follows: “My first design
extended no further than to get, and keep possession of, East New
Jersey. Lord Cornwallis had orders not to advance beyond Brunswick; but,
on the sixth, I joined his lordship with the Fourth Brigade of British,
under General Grant. On the seventh, Cornwallis marched with his corps,
except the Guards who were left at Brunswick, to Princeton, which the
Americans had quitted the same day. He delayed seventeen hours at
Princeton, and was an entire day in marching to Trenton. He arrived
there, just as the rear-guard of the enemy had crossed; but they had
taken the precaution to destroy, or secure to the south side, all the
boats that could possibly have been employed for crossing the river.”

Cornwallis remained at Pennington until the fourteenth, when the British
army was placed in winter quarters; “the weather,” says General Howe,
“having become too severe to keep the field.”

On the previous day, the thirteenth, General Charles Lee, next in rank
to Washington, while leisurely resting at a country house at
Baskenridge, three miles from his troops, was taken prisoner by a
British scouting detachment. It may be of interest to the reader to be
reminded, that this Major-General required from Congress an advance of
thirty thousand dollars, to enable him to transfer his English property
to America, before he accepted his commission, and was disappointed that
he was made second, instead of first, in command. When captured, he was
in company with Major Wilkinson, a messenger from his old Virginia
friend, General Horatio Gates, who had just been ordered by Washington
to accompany certain reënforcements from the northern army, to increase
the force of the Commander-in-Chief. This Major Wilkinson escaped
capture, but the British scouts used his horse for Lee’s removal. On the
table was a letter, not yet folded, which the messenger was to convey to
General Gates. It reads as follows (omitting the expletives),—

BASKENRIDGE, December 13, 1776.

MY DEAR GATES: The ingenious manœuvre of Fort Washington has
completely unhinged the goodly fabrick we had been building. There
never was so —— a stroke. _Entre nous_, a certain great man is ——
deficient. He has thrown me into a position where I have my choice of
difficulties. If I stay in the Province, I risk myself and my army;
and if I do not stay, the Province is lost forever.... Our councils
have been weak, to the last degree. As to what relates to yourself, if
you think you can be in time to aid the general, I would have you, by
all means, go. You will at least save your army.

No comment is required, except to state that repeated orders had been
received and acknowledged by Lee, to join Washington; but he had
determined not to join him, and to act independently with his division,
regardless of the orders of his Commander-in-Chief, and of Congress. Two
extracts only are admissible. Washington had reprimanded Lee for
interfering with the independent command of General Heath, on the
Hudson. On the twenty-sixth of November, Lee wrote to Heath: “The
Commander-in-Chief is now separated from us. I, of course, command on
this side the water; for the future I will, and I must, be obeyed.” On
the twenty-third of November, in order to induce New England to trust
_him_, and _distrust_ Washington, he wrote the following letter to James
Bowdoin, President of the Massachusetts Council:

Before the unfortunate affair at Fort Washington, it was my opinion,
that the two armies, that on the east and that on the west side of the
North River, must rest, each, on its own bottom; that the idea, of
detaching and reënforcing from one side to the other, on every motion
of the enemy, was chimerical; but to harbor such a thought, in our
present circumstances, is absolute insanity.... We must therefore
depend upon ourselves. Should the enemy alter the present direction of
their operation, I would never entertain the thought on being succored
from the western army (that across the Hudson, with Washington).
Affairs appear in so important a crisis, that I think even the
resolves of Congress must be no longer nicely weighed with us. There
are times when we must commit treason against the laws of the State,
for the salvation of the State. The present crisis demands this brave,
_virtuous_ kind of treason. For my part, and I flatter myself my way
of thinking is congenial with that of Mr. Bowdoin, I will stake my
head and reputation on the measure.

James Bowdoin loved Massachusetts; but no selfish or local
considerations, such as were those of Lee, could impair his confidence
in the wisdom and patriotism of the American Commander-in-Chief.

The capture of Lee was thus mildly noticed by Washington: “It was by his
own folly and imprudence, and without a view to effect any good, that he
was taken.”

General Sullivan succeeded to the command of Lee’s Division. Gates
joined from the northern army, and on the twentieth of December, the
Continental Army was reorganized for active service.

General Howe had returned to New York December 20th. The British
cantonments for the winter embraced Brunswick, Trenton, Burlington,
Bordentown, and other places; with the Hessian, Donop, in command at
Bordentown, and Rahl at Trenton.

The month had been one of great strain upon the American
Commander-in-Chief. He was, practically, on trial. The next in command,
who, by virtue of previous military training, largely commanded public
confidence, had failed him, simply because Washington, with the modesty
of a true aspirant for excellence in his profession, would not pass
judgment, and enforce his own will, in disobedience of the will of
Congress. But, by this time Congress itself began to realize that a
deliberate civil body was not the best Commander-in-Chief for field
service, and that it would have to trust the men who did the fighting.
It adjourned on the twelfth of December, quite precipitately, but
_Resolved_ “That, until Congress shall otherwise order, General
Washington be possessed of full power to order and direct all things
relative to the department and to the operations of war.”

Repair of bridges below Trenton, by the British troops, led Washington
to suspect that some move might be made against Philadelphia, from the
east side of the Delaware River. He therefore divided the entire river
front into divisions under competent commanders, on the day of the
adjournment of Congress. Light earthworks were thrown up, opposite all
ferries and places of easy landing, with small guards at frequent
intervals; and constant patrols were ordered to be in motion, promptly
to report any suspicious signs of British activity, or the movement of
other persons than soldiers of the army. Points of rendezvous were also
established, to resist any sudden attempt of persons to cross; all boats
were kept in good order, and under guard; and rations for three days
were distributed and required to be kept up to that standard, by night
and by day. On the same day he promulged an order that affected
Philadelphia itself; viz., “requiring all able-bodied men in the city,
not conscientiously scrupulous as to bearing arms, to report at the
State House yard the next day, with arms and equipments; that all
persons who have arms and accoutrements, which they cannot, or do not
mean to employ in defence of America, are hereby ordered to deliver the
same to Mr. Robert Tower, who will pay for the same; and that those who
are convicted of secreting any arms, or accoutrements, will be severely
punished.”

On the fourteenth, he also definitely resolved to “face about and meet
the enemy,”—a purpose which only the conduct of General Lee had made
impracticable before. He wrote to Governor Trumbull, General Gates, and
General Heath, in confidence, of his purpose, “_to take the offensive_.”
To Congress, he wrote sternly, stating that “ten days will put an end to
the existence of this army”; adding: “This is not a time to stand upon
expense. A character to lose; an estate to forfeit; the inestimable
blessing of liberty at stake, and a life devoted, must be my excuse.”

At this juncture, Washington definitely resolved to establish his
permanent base, as against New York; and selected Morristown, which had
already been made the rendezvous of the New Jersey troops. General
Maxwell, who was familiar with the country, was assigned to the command
of this new position. Three regiments from Ticonderoga were ordered to
halt at the new post. On the twenty-third of December, Washington sent a
confidential communication to Adjutant-General Reed, then with General
Cadwallader, in which he designated “Christmas night, an hour before
day, as the time fixed for an attack upon Trenton.” Reed had fully
shared in the desire for active, offensive duty, and in one letter thus
concurred in the Commander-in-Chief’s opinion, that “to repossess
ourselves of New Jersey, or any part of it, would have more effect than
if we had never left it.” The purpose of Washington was so to combine
the movements of various divisions, including one under Putnam from
Philadelphia, as practically to clear the east bank of the Delaware of
all Hessian garrisons. Putnam feared that the Tory element would rise
during his absence, and that order was suspended. The right wing, under
Cadwallader, was to cross at Bristol (see map); but owing to ice, which
prevented the landing of artillery, he returned to Bristol, and reported
to Washington. After expressing regret over his failure, he thus closes:
“I imagine the badness of the night must have prevented you from passing
over as you intended.” Ewing was to cross over just below Trenton, to
intercept any reënforcements that might approach the garrison from
Bordentown; but the violence of the storm prevented that movement also.
Washington took charge of the left wing, consisting of twenty-four
hundred men, which was to cross at McConkey’s Ferry, nine miles above
Trenton, accompanied by Sullivan and Greene as division commanders. When
preparations were complete, and Washington in his saddle, Major
Wilkinson, of the staff of Gates, notified him that General Gates had
gone to Baltimore to visit Congress. This was a deliberate “_absence,
without leave_,” at an hour when he knew, and in advance, that
Washington intended to force a battle; but Stark, of Breed’s Hill, was
there. Glover, the man of Marblehead and hero of the Long Island
retreat, was there; and William Washington, and James Monroe, were
there!

[Illustration:

WASHINGTON BEFORE TRENTON.

[From Dael’s painting.]
]

The Hessian garrison of fifteen hundred and forty men had enjoyed a
right “merry Christmas,” after the style of their own “old country”
fashion; and the night, inclement without, was bright within, as dance
and song with every cheery accompaniment dispelled thoughts of
watchfulness of ice-bound Delaware and driving tempest. It was indeed a
night for within-door relish, and the season of the year was most
conducive to the abandonment of all care and worry. “Toasts were drank”
with gleesome delight; and the hilarity of the happy Hessian soldiers,
officers and men, only ceased when the worn-out night compelled them to
seek relief in rest. The garrison were sleeping as soundly when the
stormy morning broke into day, as if they had compassed a hard day’s
march during the night hours. The usual detail for guard was
distributed, but no other sign of life appeared on the streets of
Trenton. Before Colonel Rahl’s headquarters, two guns, stationed there
more as a recognition of his commanding position than for use, were
partly buried in snow. A battery of four guns was in open ground, not
far from the Friends’ Meeting house; but neither earthworks nor other
defences had been deemed essential to the security of the British winter
quarters.

General Grant had indeed written from Brunswick on the twenty-fourth:
“It is perfectly certain there are no more rebel troops in New Jersey;
they only send over small parties of twenty or thirty men. On last
Sunday, Washington told his assembled generals that the ‘British are
weak at Trenton and Princeton.’ I wish the Hessians to be on guard
against sudden attack; but, at the same time, I give my opinion that
nothing of the kind will be undertaken.” General Grant did, it would
seem, compliment Washington’s sagacity, without comprehending his
will-power to realize in action every positive conviction of possible
duty. And so it was, that the garrison of Trenton on that Christmas
night slept at ease, until morning dawned and Washington paid his
unexpected visit.

Under cover of high ground, just back of McConkey’s Ferry, on Christmas
afternoon, 1776, Washington held a special evening parade. Neither
driving wind nor benumbing cold prevented full ranks and prompt response
to “roll-call,” as company after company fell into line; and when
darkness obscured the closing day, all was in motion. It had been his
design to complete the crossing by midnight, and enter Trenton at five
o’clock in the morning. He was to lead, in person, and announced as the
countersign, “Victory or Death!” The order to march to the river bank,
by divisions and sub-divisions, each to its designated group of boats,
was communicated by officers especially selected for that duty, so that
the most perfect order attended each movement. The few days of mild
weather which had opened the ice, had been succeeded by a sudden freeze,
and a tempest of hail and sleet that checked the swift current and made
a safe passage of daring and doubtful venture. The shore was skirted
with ice, while the floating blocks of _old_ ice twisted and twirled the
fragile boats as mere playthings in their way. But no one grumbled at
cold, sleet or danger. The elements were not the patriot’s foe that
night of nights. All faces were set against their country’s foes. They
were, at last, to pursue their old pursuers. The “man of retreats,” as
Washington had been called in derision by such men as Gates and Lee, was
guiding, and leading to “Victory or Death!”

The landing of the artillery was not effected until three o’clock in the
morning, with nearly nine miles yet to march. At four o’clock the
advance was ordered. The snow ceased, but the hail and sleet returned,
driven by a fierce wind from the north-east. A mile and a quarter
brought them to Bear Tavern (see map). Three and a half miles more
brought them to Birmingham. Here a messenger from General Sullivan
informed Washington that his men reported “their arms to be wet.” “Tell
your general,” replied Washington, “to use the bayonet, and penetrate
into the town. The town must be taken. I am resolved to take it.”

[Illustration: Trenton and Vicinity]

From this point Sullivan took the river road. Washington and Greene,
bearing to the left, crossed to the old Scotch road, and then entered
the Pennington road, only one mile from Trenton. The distance by each
road was about the same, four and one-half miles. Washington moved at
once to the head of King and Queen streets, where they joined at a sharp
angle; and here, under direction of General Knox, Forrest’s Battery was
placed in position, to sweep both streets, even down to the river. “It
was exactly eight o’clock,” says Washington, “and three minutes after, I
found from the firing on the lower road that that division had also got
up.” The entire movement was with the utmost silence, to enable Sullivan
and Stark to pass through the lower town and take the Hessians in the
rear and by surprise.

The battle was over in an hour. The Hessian troops burst from their
quarters, half dressed, but in the narrow streets already swept by
Forrest’s guns, any regular formation was impossible. The two guns
before Rahl’s headquarters were manned; but before they could deliver a
single round Capt. William Washington and Lieut. James Monroe
(subsequently President Monroe), with a small party, rushed upon the
gunners and hauled the guns away for use elsewhere. Sullivan had entered
the town by Front and Second streets. Stark led his column directly to
the Assanpink Bridge, to cut off retreat to Bordentown; and then swung
to the left, and attacked the Hessians, who were gallantly attempting to
form in the open ground between Queen Street and the Assanpink. Hand’s
Rifles and Scott’s and Lawson’s Virginia regiments were conspicuous for
gallantry. All did well.

The American casualties were two killed and three wounded,—Captain
Washington and Lieutenant Monroe being among the latter. The Hessian
loss in killed and wounded, besides officers, was forty-one. The number
of prisoners, including thirty officers, was one thousand and nine.
Colonel Rahl fell, mortally wounded, while using his bravest energies to
rally his men for an attack on Washington’s position at the head of King
Street; but the surprise was so complete, and the coöperation of the
American divisions was so timely and constant, that no troops in the
world could have resisted the assault. Six bronze guns, over a thousand
stand of arms, four sets of colors, twelve drums, and many valuable
supplies were among the trophies of war.

The American army countermarched during the night after the battle,
reaching the old headquarters at Newtown with their prisoners before
morning; having made the entire distance of fully thirty miles under
circumstances of such extreme hardship and exposure, that more than one
thousand men were disabled for duty through frozen limbs and broken-down
energies.

The Hessian troops were proudly escorted through Philadelphia, and the
country began to realize the value of a Soldier in command. Fugitives
from Trenton reached Bordentown, where Colonel Donop had already been so
closely pressed by Colonel Griffiths in an adventurous skirmish, as to
require the services of his entire garrison to meet it. He abandoned
Bordentown instantly, leaving the sick and wounded, and the public
stores; marched with all haste to Princeton, via Crosswicks and
Allentown, and started the next day for South Amboy, the nearest port to
New York.

On the twenty-seventh, Cadwallader crossed at Bristol with eighteen
hundred men, not knowing that Washington had recrossed the Delaware.
Generals Mifflin and Ewing followed with thirteen hundred men; but Mt.
Holly and Black Horse had also been abandoned by the Hessian garrisons.

While the American army rested, its Commander-in-Chief matured his plans
for further offensive action. A letter from Colonel De Hart, at
Morristown, advised him that the regiments of Greaton, Bond, and Porter
would extend their term of service two weeks. The British post at
Boundbrook and vicinity had been withdrawn to Brunswick. Generals
McDougall and Maxwell, then at Morristown, were instructed by Washington
“to collect as large a body of militia as possible, and to assure them,
that nothing is wanting but for them to lend a hand, and drive the enemy
from the whole Province of New Jersey.” On the twenty-eighth, he wrote
thus to Maxwell: “As I am about to enter the Jerseys with a considerable
force, immediately, for the purpose of attempting a recovery of that
country from the enemy; and as a diversion from your quarter may greatly
facilitate this event, by dividing and distracting their troops, I must
request that you will collect all the forces in your power, and annoy
and distress them by every means which prudence may suggest.”

To General Heath, he wrote: “I would have you advance as rapidly as the
season will permit, with the eastern militia, by the way of the
Hackensack, and proceed downwards until you hear from me. I think a fair
opportunity is offered of driving the enemy entirely from, or, at least
to the extremity of New Jersey.”

On the thirtieth, having again crossed to Trenton, Washington was able
to announce that “the eastern Continental troops had agreed to remain
six weeks longer, upon receipt of a bounty of ten dollars; and the
services of eminent citizens were enlisted in an effort to use the
success at Trenton, as a stimulus to recruiting,” and, “to hasten the
concentration of the militia.” Washington intensely realized that in a
few weeks, at furthest, he was to begin again the instruction of a new
army; and determined to get the largest possible benefits from the
presence of four thousand veterans who had consented to remain for a
short period beyond their exact term of enlistment.

On the twenty-seventh of December, Congress clothed Washington with full
dictatorial authority in the matter of raising troops, and in all that
pertained to the conduct of the war, for the period of six months;
reciting as the foundation of such action, that affairs were in such a
condition that the very existence of civil liberty depended upon the
right exercise of military powers; and, “the vigorous, decisive conduct
of these being impossible in distant, numerous, and deliberative bodies,
it was confident of the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of George
Washington.”

It was under the burden of this vast responsibility that Washington
rested, when he closed the year 1776 in camp near Trenton. He responded
to this confidence on the part of the Continental Congress, in this
simple manner: “Instead of thinking myself freed from all civil
obligation, I shall immediately bear in mind that as the sword was the
last resort for the preservation of our liberty, so it ought to be the
first thing laid aside, when those liberties are finally established. I
shall instantly set about making the most necessary reforms in the
army.”

Thus rapidly, in as natural and orderly sequence as seemed desirable,
omitting incidents, correspondence, and names of persons that do not
seem essential in the illustration of qualities which attach to the
career of Washington as a Soldier, the reader is brought to the midnight
hour of December 31, 1776.

All his struggles in camp, in field, on the march, have closed with one
tremendous blow struck at British prestige and British power. The
greatest soldiers and statesmen of that period recognized its
significance, and rendered unstinted praise to the “wisdom, constancy,
and intrepidity of the American Commander-in-Chief.”

But, at that midnight hour, the Soldier who had been the kind and
faithful guardian of the humblest men in the ranks, as well as the
example and instructor of the proudest veteran, waited with swelling
breast and aching heart for the morning’s dawn; realizing the solemnity
of its certain ordeal, when the organization of a new army, and more
herculean efforts of the British crown, were to test not only his own
capacity and will, but test the readiness and fitness of the American
people to rise to the emergencies of one supreme issue—“Victory or
Death!”

CHAPTER XV.
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED.—PRINCETON.

Washington’s surprise of the garrison of Trenton, equally surprised
General Howe at New York; and he made immediate requisition for twenty
thousand additional troops. His last previous requisition for foreign
auxiliaries met with little favor on the Continent, and only thirty-six
hundred men were secured for service, both in Canada and other American
Colonies. In the meantime, Clinton made no demonstration from Newport;
and Massachusetts had recovered from the temporary effect of his
occupation of that post. Under the impulse of the success at Trenton,
new foundries were established; and systematic effort was made to secure
a complete artillery outfit for the army, on the new basis of
eighty-eight battalions.

[Illustration: Trenton.]

[Illustration: Princeton.]

But on the first day of January, 1777, the Commander-in-Chief did not
pause in the use of the means just at hand. He realized that General
Howe could not afford to remain passive under the new conditions which
his own offensive movement had imposed upon the British army. Lord
Cornwallis, on the eve of returning to England, was at once sent with a
strong division to reoccupy Trenton. But Washington, instead of
retaining his former position on the west bank of the Delaware,
established himself behind the small river Assanpink, which enters the
Delaware just south of Trenton, on the New Jersey side. It was a bold
act. Below him, toward Philadelphia, were the forces of Cadwallader and
Mifflin; and these he ordered to his support. Their arrival, thirty-six
hundred strong, on the morning of January second, increased his command
to about five thousand men. This little Assanpink River, swollen by the
melted snow, was impassable except by a bridge near its junction with
the Delaware. Along its steep and wooded banks, the American army was
distributed for a distance of two miles. Watchful guards and several
pieces of artillery were stationed at every available fording-place, and
these were supported by some of the most reliable Continental troops.
Behind the first line, and on a little higher ground, a second line was
established.

In order to secure ample warning of the arrival of the enemy and delay
their approach, Washington established several small posts along the
road to Princeton. The first, about a mile advanced, occupied rising
ground well flanked by woods and supported by two pieces of artillery.
Colonel Hand’s Rifles were pushed forward as far as Five Mile Creek; and
even, off the road, a small supporting party held a defensive position
at Shebakonk Creek, where heavy timber and broken ground afforded a good
position for skirmishers to annoy an advancing force. General Greene was
placed in command of these outposts. (See map.)

So many writers have worried themselves and their readers in dealing
with Washington’s movements during the first week in January, 1777, as
so many revolutions of a lottery wheel of chance in which he was
remarkably lucky, that it is desirable to understand his own plans, and
how far he anticipated the contingencies which actually happened. His
mind not only grasped possibilities which aroused confidence, at home
and abroad; but embraced strategic conceptions which affected the entire
war.

The Delaware was still filled with floating ice. Large masses were
banked within its curves, so that retreat across the river, in the
presence of a powerful adversary, would be impracticable. And yet, he
had not hesitated to take position at Trenton, on the east bank of the
river. To have remained on the west bank would have made it impossible
for him to prevent Cornwallis from passing down the east bank to
Philadelphia, or at least from driving both Cadwallader and Mifflin to
that city, in disorder. To have retired his own army to Philadelphia,
would have been the abandonment of New Jersey, and of all the prestige
of his exploit on Christmas night. He resolved to save his army; and
leave Philadelphia to the contingencies of the campaign. If compelled to
fight, he would choose the ground; but he did not intend to fight under
conditions that would force him to abandon the aggressive campaign which
he had planned. During December, he had secured a careful reconnoissance
of the roads to Brunswick, had learned the strength of its garrison, and
formed an estimate of the value of the large magazines which General
Howe had located at that post. He believed that a quick dash would
secure their destruction or capture.

While awaiting the advance of Cornwallis, he called a council of
officers, and this bold strategic movement was fully indorsed by them.
But no time was to be lost. The initiative must be taken before the
armies were brought to a deadly struggle for the very ground already
occupied by his camp. Battle must be deferred until another day. The
baggage-wagons which accompanied the commands of Cadwallader and
Mifflin, now parked in the rear of the army, were moved to its extreme
right, toward Princeton, and the army waited.

Washington visited the advance posts, where Greene was on the alert, and
being advised by him that he could keep Cornwallis back until late in
the afternoon, or until night, returned to headquarters. The advance of
Cornwallis was so successively annoyed by the outposts, that he halted
until additional regiments joined him. Greene opened fire with his two
guns, under orders from Washington to “so check the enemy as to prevent
battle until the next day”; and Cornwallis again came to a halt. He knew
that the Delaware River was behind Washington, and felt sure of his
prey. Already the British had made a tiresome march; and at this second
halt, orders were sent back to Princeton to bring up a part of the force
left at that place. Cornwallis had not been neglectful of his flanks,
however, but sent skirmishers along the Assanpink, and even threw both
shot and shell into the woods in the direction of the American lines.

When the day closed, and Cornwallis encamped on the north bank of the
Assanpink, his pickets could see the Americans at work throwing up
intrenchments behind the bridge, and at one point further up the stream.
All along the American lines immense camp-fires burned, and these were
abundantly replenished, during the night, by fence-rails from the
country near by. The British and Hessians also maintained their
camp-fires. A sudden freeze made these fires comfortable. It also
hardened the ground, so that the American artillery and baggage-wagons
could move more readily than on the previous day.

Washington hurried a messenger to General Putnam, at Philadelphia,
advising him of his proposed movement, and instructing him to send
troops to occupy Crosswicks, a short distance above Bordentown, and thus
take charge of some baggage which has been sent in that direction. All
this time, the army, except its wide-awake and conspicuous sentries at
the bridge, and its active fire-builders along the Assanpink, was on the
march for Princeton. When the vanguard reached Stony Brook, Washington
re-formed his columns, and sent General Mercer, who had served with him
in the Indian War of 1756–66, to the left, by the Quaker Road, intending
to advance with the main army directly to the village, by a lower road,
under cover of rising ground, and thus expedite his march upon
Brunswick, now weakened in its garrison by the presence of Cornwallis at
Trenton. But General Mercer’s small command was suddenly confronted by a
part of Colonel Mawhood’s British regiment hastening to reënforce
Cornwallis. This precipitated the action, known as the “Battle of
Princeton.” As soon as firing was heard, Washington hastened to the
scene and took part in the fight. A British bayonet charge was too much
for the American advance guard. The officers in vain attempted to rally
the men. Washington at once appreciated the ruin that would result from
protracted battle; and, as at Kipp’s Bay, dashed into the thickest of
the fight, and with bared head urged the men to rally. He passed
directly across the fire of the British troops, and the Americans
responded to his appeal. Stirling, St. Clair, Patterson and others
promptly brought their troops into action; cut off the retreat of a
portion of the enemy to Princeton, and fought them again, just south of
Nassau Hall, Princeton College.

The short action was costly in precious lives. Colonel Haslet and
General Mercer both fell, while endeavoring to rally their men, and the
total American loss was about one hundred. The British loss was more
than one hundred, besides two hundred and twenty prisoners. The part
taken by Washington in the action requires no further details of its
incidents than its result. But the day was not over. At early dawn, at
Trenton, the “All’s well!” which had been echoed across the little
Assanpink and along its banks the night before, ceased. The fires still
crackled and blazed with fresh wood added to the glowing coals; but no
pacing sentry, nor picketed horses, nor open-mouthed cannon were in view
from the British outposts. And yet, the sullen boom of cannon far in
their rear, from the direction of Princeton, caught the quick ear of
Gen. Sir William Erskine. In an instant he was in the presence of
Cornwallis, with the sharp cry, “Washington has escaped us!” The beat
“To arms!” was immediate. There was no time even to pack supplies
already unloaded for battle. The troops were resting, after hard
marching at the dead of winter, but the presence of Washington’s army at
the head of King Street would not have more thoroughly awakened them to
duty. The distance was only ten miles; while Washington, by his circuit,
had marched sixteen miles. But every moment of delay imperilled their
great magazines of supply for the whole winter at Brunswick. All that
had been stored in the Trenton depot passed into Washington’s possession
on Christmas night. They brought with them, the day before, only
sufficient for a short morning’s capture of their American adversary.
Battalions marched toward Trenton singly, as formed; artillery following
so soon as ready.

The British vanguard reached Stony Brook just as the Americans
disappeared up the road, after destruction of the bridge. Cornwallis
halted, to bring up artillery. Washington, however, had already reached
Kingston, three miles beyond Princeton, and had crossed Millstone River.
Here, a council was held as to future action. British fugitives in the
direction of Brunswick had, most assuredly, warned the garrison of its
danger. At this moment, the sound of cannon at Stony Brook showed that
Cornwallis was pressing forward with despatch. The rear-guard left at
Stony Brook was not yet in sight; but the entire army was put in
marching order, and General Greene led the advance up the Millstone. As
soon as the rear-guard joined, the British not appearing, the bridge was
destroyed, and the army moved through woods, thickets, and improvised
openings, under the lead of well-posted scouts, for the hilly country to
the northward. When Cornwallis reached the Millstone, he had another
bridge to build. A few horsemen toward Brunswick were all that indicated
the presence or whereabouts of Washington’s army. He pushed his men by a
forced march, to save Brunswick, and _fight Washington_. He did indeed
save Brunswick; but Washington and his army were resting in a strong
position near Pluckemin, beyond his reach.

The American soldiers were foot-sore, unshod, weary and hungry. There
had not been time to distribute rations, after breaking camp at Trenton.
More than one-half of the troops had only just arrived with Cadwallader
from Bordentown, when the night march began. The imagination falters and
cannot conceive the experiences of these faithful men, so many of whom
instead of returning immediately home after New Years day, were
voluntarily serving beyond their enlistment, at the simple request of
their heroic Commander-in-Chief.

On the fifth of January, Washington sent his report to Congress, and
despatches to others elsewhere in command. Two of these despatches are
to be noticed. He ordered Putnam, then at Philadelphia: “Give out your
strength twice as great as it is. Keep out spies. Put horsemen in the
dress of the country, and keep them going backwards and forwards for
that purpose. Act with great circumspection, so as not to meet with a
surprise.” He ordered General Heath, then on the Hudson, “to collect
boats, for the contingency of the detail of a part of his forces to New
Jersey”; and also instructed him, that “it had been determined in
council that he should move down toward New York with a considerable
force, as if with a sudden design upon that city.”

On the seventh of January, the American army reached Morristown; where
huts were erected and the Headquarters of the Continental Army of the
United States were established. That army was resting, and working;
working, and resting,—but its Commander-in-Chief knew no rest. On the
same day, additional orders were issued to General Heath; to General
Lincoln, who had reached Peekskill with four thousand New England
militia; and to other officers, north and south, in anticipation of
ulterior movements through every probable field of the rapidly expanding
war. This was also the first occasion for Washington’s exercise of the
high prerogative conferred by Congress,—full control of all military
operations without consultation with that body.

Washington could reprimand, when necessary; while always prompt to
commend, when commendation was both deserved and timely. Heath was
before Fort Independence on the eighteenth day of January. General
Lincoln advanced by the Hudson River road; General Scott by White
Plains; and Generals Wooster and Parsons, from New Rochelle and
Westchester. A few prisoners were taken at Valentine’s Hill. General
Heath, with grave dignity, announced to the Hessian garrison of two
thousand men that he would allow them “twenty minutes in which to
surrender,” or they must “abide the consequences.” Twenty minutes,
thirty minutes, and gradually, ten days elapsed. This large American
force, half-organized, as they were—without barracks, in midwinter,
under conditions of terrible exposure—endured it all, without flinching,
and hardest of all, unrelieved by fighting. Suddenly, the Hessians made
a sortie upon the advanced regiment, and the whole army was retired. Its
fighting pluck had been frittered away. The combined divisions had
arrived with admirable concert of time. The plan was well-conceived and
well-initiated; but failed, because a soldier was not in immediate
command. As a demonstration toward New York, it did affect Howe’s
movements, and compelled him to keep his forces well in hand; but its
chief purpose was not realized.

On the third day of February, the American Commander-in-Chief again
wrote to General Heath, as follows: “This letter is additional to my
public one of this date. It is, to hint to you, and I do it with
concern, that your conduct is censured, and by men of sense and judgment
who have been with you in the expedition to Fort Independence, as being
fraught with too much caution; by which the army has been disappointed
and in some degree disgraced. Your summons, as you did not attempt to
fulfil your threats, was not only idle, but farcical, and will not fail
of turning the laugh exceedingly upon us.”

During the winter and spring, the skirmishes were frequent, and often
with benefit to the American troops. They began to acquire confidence,
and the conviction that, man for man, on fair terms, they were a match
for either British or Hessians, and did not care which invited a fight.
Washington issued a counter-proclamation to that which Howe promulged
when the American army advanced into New Jersey; and then, all offensive
operations of the British army came to a sudden halt.

The eminently impartial Italian historian, Botta, thus sums up his
description of this offensive movement:

“Washington, having received a few fresh battalions, and his little army
having recovered from their fatigue, soon entered the field anew, and
scoured the whole country as far as the Raritan. He even crossed the
river and entered the county of Essex; made himself master of Newark, of
Elizabethtown, and finally of Woodbridge; so that he commanded the
entire coast of New Jersey in front of Staten Island.

“He so judiciously selected his positions, and fortified them so
formidably, that the royalists shrunk from all attempts to dislodge him
from any of them.”... “But the British army, after having overrun,
victoriously, the State of New Jersey quite to the Delaware, and caused
even the City of Philadelphia to tremble for its safety, found itself
now restricted to the only posts of Brunswick and Amboy, which,
moreover, could have no communication with New York, except by sea.

“Thus, by an army almost reduced to extremity, Philadelphia was saved;
Pennsylvania protected; New Jersey nearly recovered; and a victorious
army laid under the necessity of quitting all thoughts of acting
offensively, in order to defend itself.”

CHAPTER XVI.
THE AMERICAN BASE OF OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED.—THE SECOND NEW JERSEY
CAMPAIGN.

The narrative of Washington’s career as a Soldier, up to the time when
he foiled the best efforts of Howe and Cornwallis to capture his weary
band of Continentals and militia, has been a continuous story of love of
country and devotion to her brave defenders. The most assiduous care for
their discipline, their health, their moral deportment, and their
loyalty to duty, has been the burden of his soul. Pleading,
remonstrance, and even reprimand, however earnest and pungent, have
never worn a selfish garb, nor breathed of arrogance or fitful temper.
Presumptuous denunciations by his chief antagonist have never impaired
the dignity of his carriage, his felicity of utterance, nor the serenity
of his faith.

The indiscretions of his subordinates, their jealousies, and their
weaknesses, have been so condoned, or accommodated to the eventful hours
of camp or field service, that while he rests in camp, during the
opening week of the second year of battling with the might of Britain,
he has in mind, only words of thanksgiving for mercies realized, and a
bold challenge to the American Congress and the American people for men
and means whereby to make their sublime Declaration of Independence a
realized fact.

[Illustration: Operations in New Jersey.]

And yet, never before has there gathered about his pathway such ominous
mutterings of a threatening tempest. It is no longer the spectacle of a
half-organized army parrying the strokes of a compact enemy, well
equipped for war. He has halted, faced the foe, and assumed the
aggressive. Washington has been fencing. His first lunge in return draws
blood. He will fight to the finish.

Already, he understands that his first New Jersey campaign indicates the
real field of endeavor in which the fate of his country is to be
settled. Whatever may be in store of sacrifice, or battle, he must now
plan for victory; and to ensure its happy realization, he must so
neutralize the domination of New York, that its occupation, whether by
himself or Great Britain, will cease to be a controlling factor in the
momentous struggle.

Even the battle-issue is no longer to be with its strong garrison; but
from Lake Champlain to Savannah, along the entire Atlantic coast, and
wherever great cities or seaboard towns fight strongest for liberty, he
is to be their standard-bearer; and there the people are to bleed and
triumph. Like Habib in the Arabian tale, when he drew from its scabbard
the talismanic sword of Solomon, and there flashed upon the glittering
steel the divine word “Power,” so he had the faith to know that “the
substance of things hoped for” was to be the trophy won.

Thus far, the recital of marchings and fightings has proved his ability
to command the confidence of his countrymen, of Congress, and of
disinterested mankind. Hereafter, the details of battles must be
relegated to fuller records; and this account will be more closely
restricted to the potential part borne by him in their conduct, general
management, and improvement.

A reference to the accompanying map will furnish a simple key to the
progress of the War for American Independence. Concentric circles about
New York, as a radius point, indicate the immediate sweep of the British
arm of offence. Similar circles about Morristown and Middlebrook
indicate, that as a fortified centre this section, like the hub of a
wheel, would endanger along its divergent spokes all operations out from
New York as far up the Hudson River as West Point, and throughout the
Province of New Jersey. It would compel Great Britain to maintain a
permanent garrison of sufficient strength for all such excursions; and a
correspondingly large, half-idle force for the protection of its own
headquarters and its general depot of supplies. It was like a mountain
peak for an observatory; and such was the systematic organization of
scouts, messengers and runners, in the confidence and pay of the
American Commander-in-Chief, that almost daily information was furnished
him of the minutest occurrence in and about the British headquarters;
and a regular Shipping List was supplied by competent spies, of every
movement of British men-of-war, transports, and tenders, as far out as
Sandy Hook.

One of the most noteworthy facts connected with the American civil
conflict of 1861–’65, was the measurement of generals on either side by
knowledge of their antecedent education, qualities and characteristics.
McClellan would have taken Vicksburg, as surely as did General Grant:
the mathematics of a siege are irresistible. But he never could have
marched to the sea, as did Sherman, or swept like a tornado to the rear
of Lee, as did Sheridan. It appears from the correspondence of
Washington, that he carefully studied the antecedents and followed the
operations of his chief antagonists; that in several of the most
critical periods of the war he anticipated their plans as fully as if he
had shared their confidence in advance. But he did not merely interpret
the lessons of campaigns as objectives for his own action. He penetrated
the secret chambers of Howe’s brain. He cross-examined himself: “If I
were in Howe’s place what would I do?” “In his own place, what will Howe
do?” “What must the British Ministry do, to conquer America—in the way
of ships, men, and money?” “Can they do it?” “Can they risk their West
India Colonies, by the diversion of adequate means to conquer America?”
The expectancies of aid from France, partly realized through the
purchase of arms and munitions of war as early as 1776, were never out
of his thought. To maintain one central army intact, and wear out his
adversary, was the pivot on which hinged American destiny. In the hills
of New Jersey he worked this problem to its solution.

Washington remained at the Morristown headquarters until the
twenty-fourth of May.

On the twenty-first day of January, Howe withdrew two thousand troops
from Newport, R.I., to reënforce the garrison of New York. Generals
Spencer and Arnold, then at Providence, R.I., with about four thousand
troops, were ordered by Washington, whenever practicable, to attempt the
capture of Newport; but they regarded their force as inadequate for the
purpose. General Parsons, then upon recruiting service in Connecticut,
was also instructed to make a descent upon Long Island; but his force
was hardly equal to the movement, for want of suitable boats. All these
external signs of American watchfulness and activity were as nettles to
irritate the British Commander-in-Chief, while he sat, powerless, in his
sumptuous headquarters at New York.

Knox was sent by Washington to Massachusetts to enlist a battalion of
artillery, and during his trip mentioned Springfield as the proper site
for the establishment of a laboratory and gun-factory. General Schuyler,
of the northern army, was instructed to draw from New England the entire
force required to resist the anticipated advance of Carleton from
Canada. Washington assigned as a special reason for this limitation,
that “troops of extreme sections could not be favorably combined.”
Besides this, he proportionately relieved New England from sending
troops of her own from her borders, which would be most exposed in case
the invasion from Canada materialized. General Maxwell was stationed at
Elizabethtown to watch tories and the movements of the British. Orders
were issued repressing plundering done by the militia, of which
complaint had been made. Similar outrages had been perpetrated by
British and Hessian troops in the vicinity of New York; and Washington
followed up his own ideas of civilized warfare, by sending to General
Howe a protest, and a demand for similar remedial action on his part.

At this period, a correspondence occurred as to the position of General
Charles Lee, then a prisoner of war in General Howe’s custody. It was
for a time quite in doubt whether Lee would be treated as a prisoner of
war, or be shot as a deserter from the British army. The pledge of
Washington, that he would hang an officer of equal rank if Lee were
executed, ultimately secured Lee’s exchange.

During the month of March, a ship from France landed at Portsmouth,
N.H., another invoice of military supplies; and a second soon after
reached Philadelphia with a large cargo. These timely accessions of
material of war amounted to twenty-three thousand fusees, one thousand
barrels of powder, and blankets and other stores.

On the second of March, Washington communicated to Robert Morris, of
Philadelphia, some of his personal studies of General Howe and his
plans. The following are pertinent extracts:

“General Howe cannot, by the best intelligence I have been able to get,
have less than ten thousand men in New Jersey, and on board of
transports at Amboy. Our number does not exceed four thousand. His are
well-disciplined, well-officered and well-supplied; ours, raw militia,
badly officered and under no government. His numbers cannot be, in short
time, augmented; ours must be, very considerably, and by such troops as
we can have some reliance on, or the game is at an end. His situation as
to horses and forage is bad, very bad; but will it be better? No, on the
contrary, worse; and therefore, if for no other, to shift quarters.
General Howe’s informants are too numerous, and too well acquainted, to
suffer him to remain in ignorance of them. With what propriety, then,
can he miss so favorable an opportunity of striking a capital stroke
against a city from which we draw so many advantages, the carrying of
which would give such _éclat_ to his arms, and strike such a damp to
ours. Nor is his difficulty of moving so great as is imagined. All the
heavy baggage of the army, their salt provisions, flour and stores,
might go round by water, while their superior numbers would enable them
to make a sweep of the horses for many miles around them, not already
taken off by us.”

The separate movements suggested by Washington, some of which have been
referred to, indicated his purpose to keep officers in the field
wherever there promised opportunity for aggressive action, while at the
same time enuring the militia to active field service.

Although Congress had granted the Commander-in-Chief full powers for the
conduct of the war, it did assert its general prerogatives very freely
in the matter of promotions and appointments without consulting him.
Ambition for rapid promotion and honorable commands was as conspicuous
then as since. The promotions made during the month of March were a
source of much jealousy and bitter conflict. Among the new
Major-Generals, much to Washington’s disgust, the name of Arnold was
omitted. General Wooster was at home in command of the Connecticut
militia, having resigned his commission in the regular service. Gen.
George Clinton was assigned to command the forts in the Highlands; and
General McDougall succeeded General Heath at Peekskill. General Sullivan
considered these details as so many independent commands; and fretted
over it so constantly and freely, that Washington administered a rebuke
which illustrates the directness and frankness with which he handled
such provoking interruptions of the domestic harmony of the army. He
writes as follows: “Why these unreasonable and unjustifiable suspicions,
which can answer no other end than to poison your own happiness and add
vexation to that of others? I know of but one separate command, properly
so-called, and that is in the Northern Department; and General Sullivan,
General St. Clair, or any other general officer at Ticonderoga, will be
considered in no other light, while there is a superior officer in the
department, than if he were placed at Chatham, Baskenridge or Princeton.
I shall quit, with an earnest expostulation that you will not suffer
yourself to be teased with evils that only exist in the imagination, and
with slights that have no existence at all; keeping it in mind, that if
there are to be several distinct armies to be formed, there are several
gentlemen before you in point of rank who have a right to claim
preference.”

General Greene was sent to Congress to urge relief for the suffering
army; and all governors were urged to furnish supplies and troops for
the ensuing campaign.

On the twenty-fifth of April, Governor Tryon of New York made an
incursion into Connecticut with two thousand men, and fought with
Wooster and Arnold at Ridgefield; where Arnold distinguished himself,
and Wooster was mortally wounded. The loss of sixteen hundred tents was
also a serious affair at the time. General Greene was despatched to
inspect the Highlands and its defences. A British fleet had ascended the
Hudson as far as Peekskill; and as spring advanced, every possible
preparation was made for active duty, in all departments where British
troops could gain access by land or sea. On the twenty-third of May,
Colonel Meigs crossed from Guilford to Long Island, and destroyed twelve
brigs and sloops, one of them carrying twelve guns, and a large quantity
of British stores, the small detachment guard having been recalled to
New York two days before.

It had become apparent to Washington that General Howe, having withdrawn
so many troops from advanced posts, would enter New Jersey in force; and
on the twenty-ninth of May, he moved his headquarters to the
well-fortified position at Middlebrook. On the seventh of June, Arnold
was placed in command at Philadelphia, to act with General Mifflin in
anticipation of Howe’s possible movement in that direction. On the
twelfth, General Howe, reënforced by two additional regiments recalled
from Newport, R.I., marched from Brunswick towards Princeton with an
aggregate force of seventeen thousand men.

This second New Jersey campaign was short in duration, and of small
results. Howe intrenched near Somerset Court House, where the Raritan
River was not fordable; and neither army could attack the other. He was
between Washington and Philadelphia. It was a challenge to the
abandonment of Middlebrook, risking an open, circuitous march, if the
American army intended to prevent a British movement upon the American
capital. Howe expected to cut off the division of Sullivan, which was at
Princeton, but that officer had moved to the hills to the north-west,
near Flemington. Cornwallis advanced as far as Hillsborough, when he
found that no enemy remained at Princeton. The British left was on the
Millstone, and their right rested at Brunswick. A glance at the
map—“Operations in New Jersey”—will show that any movement of the
American army to the west or south-west would uncover their defences at
Middlebrook to any attack by the road running due north from Brunswick.
Washington, anticipating the possibility of a general action, and
resolved to select a good opportunity to bring it on, ordered all of the
Continental troops at Peekskill, except one thousand effective men, to
march in three divisions, at one day’s interval, under Generals Parsons,
McDougall and Glover, to his support; the first two columns to bring,
each, two pieces of artillery.

It certainly was General Howe’s impression that Washington would have
such fears for the safety of Philadelphia as to risk an action south of
the Raritan. On the succeeding fifth of July he wrote to Lord Germaine,
that his “only object was to bring the American army to a general
action.” But Washington only strengthened his works, and never believed
that Howe was making Philadelphia the object of his movement. The
following letter explains his views: “Had they designed for the
Delaware, on the first instance, they probably would have made a secret,
rapid march of it, and not have halted as they have done, to awaken our
attention and give us time for obstructing them. Instead of this, they
have only advanced to a position to facilitate an attack on our right:
which is the part they have the greatest likelihood of injuring us in.
In addition to this consideration, they have come out as light as
possible, in leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats, and bridges,
at Brunswick, which plainly contradicts the idea of their pushing for
the Delaware.”

On the morning of the nineteenth, Howe suddenly returned to Brunswick.
Greene and Maxwell were advanced by Washington to a position between
Brunswick and Amboy. Howe marched early in the morning of the
twenty-second. Morgan and Wayne drove in the Hessian rear-guard upon the
main army, after a spirited skirmish. It had been Greene’s intention to
have Maxwell strike the column near Piscataway. Washington advanced his
entire army as far as Quibbletown, now Newmarket, upon the advice of his
officers that the retreat was genuine; yet not without a suspicion,
afterward verified, that the whole was a _ruse_ to entice him from his
stronghold.

On the twenty-sixth, Howe put his whole army in motion to resume the
offensive. Cornwallis, with the extreme right, was to gain the passes to
Middlebrook. Four battalions, with six pieces of artillery, were to
demonstrate on Washington’s left. Without further details, the action is
outlined as follows: Cornwallis found himself confronted by Stirling. A
lively skirmish ensued, near Westfield, now Plainfield. The Americans
were overmatched in numbers, and lost nearly two hundred men in
casualties and prisoners, besides three brass guns, but steadily fought
on, while slowly retiring. Washington, comprehending the whole movement,
retired Maxwell’s Division, without loss, and regained the passes
threatened; and the prolonged resistance of Stirling delayed Cornwallis
until too late for him to gain the American rear. On the afternoon of
the twenty-seventh, Cornwallis, after a loss of seventy men, passed
through Sampton unopposed, and joined Howe who had already retired from
Washington’s front. The American Commander-in-Chief dictated the choice
of battlefield. Howe, representing Great Britain, declined his terms. On
the thirtieth, Howe crossed to Staten Island, and his last military
operations in New Jersey came to an end. He afterwards claimed that his
forces were numerically inferior to those of Washington; but both
friends and critics, in the protracted controversy which afterwards
arose as to this costly and fruitless march into New Jersey, admit that
the disparity of force, in all respects, was with the American army.

The simple fact remains unobscured, that as General Howe’s acquaintance
with Washington’s methods matured, he better appreciated his qualities
as a Soldier.

CHAPTER XVII.
BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA.—OPERATIONS ALONG THE HUDSON.

On the twentieth of June, Washington learned that Burgoyne was
approaching St. John’s; and that a detachment of British and Canadian
troops, accompanied by Indians, had been organized for the occupation of
the Mohawk Valley, west of Albany, under Colonel St. Leger. This would
enable them to court the alliance of the “Six Nations,” and to suppress
the enlistment into the American army of the scattered white population
of that region. On the same day, he ordered General Putnam to hold in
readiness to move up the river, at a moment’s notice, four regiments of
Massachusetts troops which were then at his headquarters at Peekskill,
and also to hire sloops at Albany for their transportation northward.

The briefest possible history of these expeditions is all that can find
space in this narrative. Lieutenant-General Burgoyne left London on the
twenty-ninth day of March, and reached Quebec on the sixth day of May.
He promptly notified General Howe of his instructions, and recognized
Albany as his chief objective point, so soon as he might recapture the
posts on Lake Champlain, then occupied by the American forces. The
organization and strength of the force with which he undertook his
memorable campaign is noticed elsewhere.[5] His confident expectation of
obtaining an adequate Canadian force of teams, teamsters, axe-men,
horses, wagons, and guides familiar with the country, proved
unwarranted. Instead of two thousand, less than two hundred reported for
duty. This was not the fault of General Carleton, for of him Burgoyne
said, “He could not have done more for his own brother”; but the
Canadians themselves were more desirous of peace with their New England
neighbors than to be involved in war with them. The proclamation of
Burgoyne to the people of New England and New York was arrogant and
repellant, instead of being sympathetic and conciliatory. Washington at
once furnished the antidote by the following: “Harassed as we are by
unrelenting persecution; obliged by every tie to repel violence by
force; urged by self-preservation to exert the strength which Providence
has given us, to defend our natural rights against the aggressor, we
appeal to the hearts of all mankind for the justice of our course; its
event we leave with Him who speaks the fate of nations, in humble
confidence that as His omniscient eye taketh note even of a sparrow that
falleth to the ground, so He will not withdraw His confidence from a
people who humbly array themselves under His banner, in defence of the
noblest principles with which He has adorned humanity.”

Footnote 5:

See Appendix.

General Burgoyne was equally infelicitous in his negotiations with the
Iroquois, Algonquins, Abenagies and Ottawa Indians, whom he met on the
twenty-second day of June. In fact, General Burgoyne had no sympathy
with the British policy which ordered the hire of Indian allies. The
following declaration stands to his perpetual credit, and should appear
in every volume that may ever be published which refers to his campaign
in America. His words were these: “The Indian principle of war is at
once odious and unavailing, and if encouraged, I will venture to
pronounce its consequences, will be sorely repented by the present age
and be universally abhorred by posterity.” And afterwards, in the
presence of the Earl of Harrington, when St. Luc claimed that “Indians
must fight their own way, or desert,” Burgoyne answered: “I would rather
lose every Indian than connive at their enormities.” And still another
incident is to be noticed, especially as it places before the reader a
very characteristic utterance of General Gates, his adversary in that
campaign. The latter wrote to General Burgoyne as follows: “The
miserable fate of Miss McCrea, massacred by Indians, was peculiarly
aggravated by her being dressed to receive her promised husband, but met
her murderers instead, employed by you. Upward of one hundred men, women
and children, have perished by the hands of ruffians to whom it is
asserted you have paid the price of blood.” To this, the gallant general
replied: “I would not be conscious of the acts you presume to impute to
me, for the whole continent of America; though the wealth of worlds was
in its bowels, and a paradise upon its surface.”

On the twenty-fifth of March, General Gates relieved General Schuyler
from command of the Northern Department; but the latter was promptly
restored, after presenting his case before Congress. General Schuyler
promptly tendered to General Gates the command of Ticonderoga; but it
was sneeringly and disrespectfully declined. To a requisition upon
Washington for tents, made by Gates, Washington replied: “As the
northern troops are hutted, the tents must be used for southern troops
until a supply can be obtained.” The reply of Gates is an illustration
of his ambition and jealousy, and points the trend of his subsequent
career. It reads as follows: “Refusing this army what you have not in
your power, is one thing; but saying that this army has not the same
necessities as the southern army, is another. I can assure your
excellency, the services of the northern army require tents as much as
any service I ever saw.” To Mr. Lovell, of the New England delegation in
Congress, Gates wrote: “Either I am exceedingly dull, or unreasonably
jealous, if I do not discover by the style and tenor of the letters from
Morristown, how little I have to expect from thence. Generals are like
parsons, they are all for christening their own child, first; but let an
impartial, moderating power decide between us, and do not suffer
southern prejudice to weigh heavier in the balance than the northern.”
Washington, of course, used the term “southern” simply in its
geographical sense; but this subtle appeal to Congressmen by Gates was
exactly the counterpart of that of his most intimate friend General
Charles Lee; and both alike, ultimately, paid the penalty of their
unsoldierly conduct. On the ninth of June, Gates took a “leave of
absence” and left the department.

Schuyler ordered all forts to be put in condition for service; appealed
to the States to forward militia; and on the twentieth proceeded to
inspect each post for himself. Although the garrison of Fort Ticonderoga
consisted of only twenty-five hundred and forty-six Continental troops
and nine hundred militia, it was deemed advisable to “protract defence
until reinforcements could arrive, or the stores be removed.” St. Clair
“did not consider it practicable to fortify Sugar Loaf Hill,” which,
subsequently occupied by Burgoyne, placed the garrison at his mercy.
Meanwhile, the personal inspection by Schuyler realized his worst
apprehensions as to the actual condition of the troops in the Northern
Department. Supplies, other than pork and flour, had not been
accumulated, and there was nothing to sustain the belief of the American
people that Ticonderoga had been made a real fortress. Schuyler hastened
to Albany, to forward troops and supplies. St. Clair wrote as late as
the last of June: “Should the enemy attack us, they will go back faster
than they came.” But on the first day of July, Burgoyne was before
Ticonderoga, and St. Clair abandoned the post without prolonged
resistance. The absence of General Schuyler at so critical a time was
the subject of a Court of Inquiry, called at his own request, in view of
very harsh criticisms, chiefly from New England; but he was acquitted,
with “the highest honor for services already rendered.”

The close observation of the American Commander-in-Chief, and the
movements of Burgoyne’s army, drew from him, when so many were
despondent, the following extraordinary prophetic letter to General
Schuyler, dated July 22d: “Though our affairs have for some days past
worn a dark gloomy aspect, I yet look forward to a fortunate and happy
change. I trust General Burgoyne’s army will meet, sooner or later, an
important check; and as I have suggested before [letter of July 15th],
that; the success he has had, will precipitate his ruin. From your
accounts, he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which of all
others is most favorable to us:—I mean, acting in detachments. This
conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our part and expose
his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them
off, though it should not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it
would inspirit the people, and do away much of this present anxiety. In
such an event, they would lose sight of past misfortunes, and, urged at
the same time by a regard for their own security, they would fly to arms
and afford every aid in their power.” This forecast of the Battle of
Bennington was realized in its best promise; That battle, fought on the
sixteenth day of August, in which General Stark and Colonel Warner won
enviable renown, brought to the former his well-earned promotion. Other
nearly concurrent events in the Mohawk Valley—the gallant defence of
Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany, aroused the militia to action;
and General Schuyler succeeded in organizing and preparing for the field
a force fully adequate to meet Burgoyne’s entire force, with the
assurance of victory. That he was superseded by Gates, and lost the
command of the northern army on the eve of its anticipated triumph, was
no discredit to him, but an incident of political management which
Washington himself, at that period, was powerless to control.

On the seventeenth day of October, Burgoyne surrendered his army,
numbering five thousand seven hundred and fifty-three men. The total
strength of the American army opposed to him was eighteen thousand six
hundred and twenty-four; of which number nine thousand nine hundred and
ninety-three Continental troops, besides militia, were present.

Of the incidents most memorable in the entire campaign, was the
monumental daring of Arnold on the seventeenth of September. Tedious
discussions have in vain attempted to deny him due credit for bravery at
a critical hour of that battle-issue; as if his subsequent treason were
to be reflected back to his discredit. His eventual promotion, and the
congratulations of Washington when it was attained, and the latest duly
authenticated documents, are conclusive in his favor.

This brief outline of the invasion of Burgoyne only intensifies the
interest with which the mind returns to the headquarters of the American
Commander-in-Chief. Every possible effort had been made by him, and with
success, to supply the northern army with men and means to meet that
invasion. The side issues, especially that of Bennington, had, as
Washington predicted, imparted courage to other Colonies than those
which were immediately affected; for the cause was the common cause of
all. The location of Washington’s headquarters in the fastnesses of New
Jersey had already so restricted the movements of the garrison at New
York, and threatened the city itself, as to prevent the promised support
which Burgoyne had regarded as essential to the success of his invasion.
A careful perusal of his evidence before the House of Commons, his
field-notes, itineraries, and correspondence with General Howe and the
British War Office, leave no doubt that he regarded his movement as
having for its ultimate result the entire control of the Hudson River
and the practical conquest of New England. But General Howe, having in
vain attempted to force the American Commander-in-Chief to abandon New
Jersey and his perpetual menace to New York, or engage in a general
action without choice of time and place, resolved to move by sea to
Philadelphia and force him to fight for, or lose without battle, the
American seat of government itself. His own views as to such an
expedition are worthy of notice. While practically ready to sail for the
capture of Philadelphia, he made other demonstrations, and wrote a
specious autograph letter, which was designed to reach Washington, and
put him off his guard. Washington was not deceived by it. It reads as
follows, addressed to General Burgoyne:

NEW YORK, July 2, 1777.

DEAR SIR: I received your letter of the 14th of May from Quebec, and
shall fully observe its contents. The expedition to B—— [Boston] will
take the place of that up the North River. If, according to my
expectations, we may succeed rapidly in the possession of B——
[Boston], the enemy having no force of consequence there, I shall,
without loss of time, proceed to coöperate with you in the defeat of
the rebel army opposed to you. Clinton is sufficiently strong to amuse
Washington and Putnam. I am now making a demonstration southward,
which I think will have the full effect in carrying our plan into
execution. Success attend you.

W. HOWE.

The allusion of Howe to General Putnam indicated a better knowledge of
the methods of that officer than appreciation of the character of
Washington. The headquarters of General Putnam, who then commanded the
Highland range of the defences of the Hudson, were at Peekskill. Forts
Clinton and Montgomery were located upon a high spur of the range, on
the west side of the river, separated by the Poplen, a small creek. Both
were above the range of guns from ships-of-war, and so surrounded by
ravines and crags as to be difficult of approach, even by land. A boom
and heavy chain extended from the foot of the cliff to a sharp
promontory opposite, known as “St. Anthony’s Nose.” So many troops had
been sent to the support of Gates, that the garrison consisted mainly of
militia. Advices had already been received that an expedition had been
organized at New York for a diversion of troops from any further
reënforcement of the American Northern army. Governor Clinton therefore
ordered a considerable militia force to report to General Putnam for
strengthening the garrisons of the river posts. But General Putnam
furloughed the men during harvest and seeding, because the New York
garrison seemed to rest so peacefully in their city quarters. Hearing of
this extensive furlough, Governor Clinton promptly modified his own
order, allowing one-half to remain upon their farms; but for the other
half to report at Peekskill and the forts named. Before this modified
order could take effect, the expedition of Clinton was under way; while
the entire force assembled at the two forts was less than six hundred
and fifty men.

[Illustration: Attack of Forts Clinton and Montgomery.]

Clinton’s expedition left New York on the third of October, and
intentionally “made every appearance of their intention to land only at
Fort Independence and Peekskill.” Putnam and his army, and his immediate
surroundings, on the east bank of the Hudson, were ostentatiously
announced as Clinton’s objective, and Putnam acted upon that basis.
Governor Clinton was not so deceived, but adjourned the Legislature,
then in session at Kingston, and hastened to Fort Montgomery to assist
in its defence, and advise its garrison as to the available approaches
to the post through the mountains, with which he was familiar. (See map,
“Attacks of Forts Clinton and Montgomery.”)

Both Governor Clinton at Montgomery and Gen. James Clinton at Fort
Clinton distinguished themselves by a stubborn resistance and great
gallantry; but both posts were taken on the night of the fifth. The
American loss was nearly three hundred—killed, wounded and missing; and
two hundred and thirty-seven were taken prisoners. The British loss was
forty killed and one hundred and fifty-one wounded. General Clinton was
wounded in a bayonet charge, but escaped to the mountains; and Governor
Clinton escaped by a skiff and joined Putnam. That officer was so
confident of attack upon his own position that he had fallen back to the
heights behind Peekskill. He thought it impracticable to leave that
position to attack General Clinton, who first landed upon the east side
of the river, but did make a reconnoissance southward when too late. He
says, in his Report: “On my return from this reconnoissance with General
Parsons we were alarmed by a very heavy and hot firing, both of
small-arms and cannon, at Fort Montgomery. Upon which, I immediately
detached five hundred men to reënforce the garrison; but before they
could possibly cross to their assistance, the enemy, superior in
numbers, had possessed themselves of the fort.”

The British advanced above Peekskill and destroyed some stores at
Connecticut Village, and General Vaughan destroyed Esopus (Kingston).
The forts were dismantled, and General Clinton returned to New York.

General Putnam, reënforced by militia from Connecticut, New York and New
Jersey, soon reoccupied Peekskill; where he was shortly afterwards
strengthened by Continental troops from the northern army. The presence
of an intelligent commanding officer of reasonable military skill, or
the absolute control of both posts by Governor Clinton, would have
prevented their loss. The limited range of this expedition of Sir Henry
Clinton confirms Stedman’s statement, that he had no intention of
pressing north to the aid of General Burgoyne.

CHAPTER XVIII.
PENNSYLVANIA INVADED.—BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE.

The British Commander-in-Chief entertained no doubts of the success of
Burgoyne’s invasion from Canada. His reiterated appeals to Britain for
reënforcements were not heeded, and he certainly knew that troops could
not be furnished up to his demand. But he still hoped that the invasion
from the north would so drain New England and New York of their
able-bodied militia, as to render it impossible for either section to
forward its respective full quota to the Continental army of Washington.
Two campaigns into New Jersey had sufficiently satisfied him that he
never could bend Washington to his knees; and yet he must get Washington
away from his position near New York, and then defeat that army utterly,
before British supremacy could be restored. This conviction, once before
noticed, was reflected in a letter to Lord Germaine, from which extracts
have interest. He had “not overlooked New England,” but says in this
letter, that “Burgoyne’s movement would draw Washington’s army
northward, where the population was dense and the spirit of defence was
animated.” “In Connecticut,” he continues, “there was no object for
which he would be willing to risk a general action; and only two or
three places upon the coast of Long Island Sound could be kept in the
winter.” But he adds that, if his “reënforcements had been forthcoming,
New England would have had a share in the general operations of the
campaign, while the main army acted toward the southward.” “To have
moved up the Hudson, in force, would have imperiled New York, or
sacrificed all other operations to a union with Burgoyne, who was
expected to force his own way to Albany.” “To enter Pennsylvania, was
not only to assail the capital, but attempted the surest road to peace,
the defeat of the rebel army.”

All these considerations, thus tersely communicated to the British
Government, were sound in military policy; and yet all of them had been
anticipated by the American Commander-in-Chief, as prudent on the part
of General Howe. Even very insignificant incidents were weighed by him,
as of determining value in a nearly balanced scale; so that the number,
character and distribution of pickets from the New York garrison became
valuable indications to the keen espionage with which Washington
conducted his search for the real intent of General Howe’s published or
unpublished designs.

The British fleet had actually sailed from New York before Washington
received Howe’s letter of the second. Clinton returned to the city on
the tenth. On the fifteenth, an express from Burgoyne informed General
Howe of the capture of Ticonderoga, and stated, that “his army was in
good health, and [which was never realized] that Ticonderoga would be
garrisoned by troops from Canada, which would leave his force complete
for further operations.” Howe’s expedition southward left New York on
the twenty-third of July, and did not arrive off the Delaware until the
thirtieth.

Upon the first disappearance of the fleet, Washington, suspecting some
_ruse_—its possible return and a movement in support of Burgoyne, or a
descent upon New England, or even New Jersey, started his army for
Coryell’s Ferry; to be ready to march northward, or eastward, in the
prospect of an active campaign. When assured that the entire fleet had
positively sailed southward, he marched with exceeding celerity to
Philadelphia. Active measures were initiated for gathering the militia,
sinking obstructions in the Delaware, and picketing every spot along the
river which might be utilized for the landing of troops. But the
appearance of the British fleet in Delaware Bay, its speedy withdrawal,
and its long absence due to contrary winds, foiled all calculations of
Washington as to its ultimate destination. At a Council of War, held on
the twenty-first of August, it was unanimously concluded that Howe had
sailed for Charleston, S.C. But, on the twenty-second, at half-past one
in the afternoon, Washington received the following despatch from
President Hancock: “This moment an express arrived from Maryland with an
account of near two hundred sail of General Howe’s fleet being anchored
in Chesapeake Bay.”

This information was received with the most intense interest. In the
face of slow enlistments, scarcity of funds, and deficiencies in
clothing and all military supplies, the transfer of British military
operations from the Hudson was regarded as an indication that New Jersey
had been substantially recovered from British aggression, and that
Washington had outgeneraled his adversary. The operations of Burgoyne
northward could be taken care of by the rapidly increasing flow of New
England militia to resist his advance; and the Pennsylvania people were
wide awake.

The army of Washington paraded through Philadelphia, gayly decorated
with evergreens. The enthusiasm of the soldiers, rank and file, received
fresh inspiration from the almost wild demonstrations of thousands who
bordered their course of march. Incessant cheering, loud greetings of
encouragement, as well as bountiful gifts of delicacies and of useful
conveniences for the camp or march, sent them forward hopeful and happy.

The American army which finally marched against General Howe’s well
equipped force of nearly eighteen thousand men was of the nominal
strength of fourteen thousand; but the entire roster added up not quite
eleven thousand “effectives, present for duty.”

The thoughtful reader, of whatever age or training, is prompted to
linger here a moment, and catch a parting view of this column of earnest
men, so proudly and joyfully marching to meet in battle the magnificent
array of Britain’s chief captains and most honored battalions, the
famous Grenadiers of Hanau, and the dragoons and lancers of Hesse. When
all are waiting for the advance, who is that man who swiftly rides past
the column to its front, erect in saddle, calm, self-reliant, imposing
in presence, and with face radiant in confidence and trust? What sort of
faith is that which inspires the utterance, which rings like that of the
Hebrew Captain when about to face the horsemen and chariots of the
Egyptian Pharaoh: “Tell the people that they go _forward_”? How dare
this American soldier reckon upon chances for victory in such an unequal
measurement of physical force, unless he discern, through plainest garb,
the proof-panoply of those whose cause is just? And whence the
inspiration of those men of brawn, whose nerves seemed turned to steel,
that they are so firmly and confidently ready to enter into the trying
ordeal of battle.

_It is the Continental Army of America, with Washington in command!_

Only short halts at Derby, Chester and Wilmington delayed their march;
and after each halt, that single word, “Forward!” as it ran down the
lines, brigade after brigade, again brought shouts from spectators and
soldiers alike.

General Sullivan, who had been detained in New Jersey to make an attack
upon the British posts on Staten Island which failed of its anticipated
success joined the command just in time for Brandywine. There was no
timidity in this advancing army. Every heart beat with steady cadence.
Maxwell, with a selected corps of one hundred men from each brigade,
supplied the place of Morgan’s Rifles, then with the northern army. He
pushed forward even to Elk River, accompanied by the youthful Lafayette,
hoping to save some stores gathered there before the British could
effect a landing, and possibly to obstruct the landing itself.

This was on September third; but too late to save the stores, for the
British were already encamped. A sharp skirmish with Cornwallis was
reported by General Howe to have resulted in a British loss of two
officers and twenty-two men, killed or wounded.

On the seventh, the entire army reached Newport, and took position along
Red Clay Creek. On the same day, General Howe occupied Iron Hill, within
eight miles of Red Clay, and again the American Rifles had a skirmish
with the British advance. These picked men deliberately took up position
after position, and only yielded to superior force as they slowly
retired. The confidence of Washington was everywhere fully realized. On
the eighth, the British army demonstrated in force; with view to turning
the right of Washington, and to cut him off from communication with
Philadelphia. At half-past nine of the morning of the ninth, pursuant to
the unanimous vote of a council of officers, Washington took up a new
position, selected by General Greene, on the east bank of the Brandywine
and on high ground, just back of Chadd’s Ford, and commanding the
Chester and Philadelphia road. The Battle of Brandywine followed. The
space which has been allowed for this narrative can admit only such
leading incidents as unfold Washington’s general management, and the
ultimate results.

A reference to the map will aid the reader to understand the relative
positions of the opposing armies. The American army was on the eastern
bank of the river, which was quite rugged of approach and easily
defended. Its left wing, southward, began with Armstrong’s Pennsylvania
militia. At the next ford, Chadd’s, and nearly as far as Brinton’s, are
Weedon, Muhlenburg and Wayne, with Proctor’s artillery in their rear,
behind light earthworks thrown up in haste. In _their_ rear, on still
higher ground, is the reserve division of General Greene, with
Washington’s headquarters. Next in order, up the river, are the
divisions of Sullivan, Stephen and Stirling, each of two brigades—with
Sullivan in virtual command, and Stirling, next in rank, commanding the
right division—and practically reaching Jones’ Ford. Major Spear had
charge of scouts extended as far as the forks of the Brandywine and the
adjacent fords, both below and above the forks. The upper ford,
Jeffries, was not thoroughly watched, and its distance almost precluded
the liability of its use. A road from Jones’ Ford runs perpendicularly
to the river, over to the Dilworth and Winchester road, and just before
reaching the Birmingham Meeting House, passes high, rough and wooded
ground, where the chief fighting took place. The British encampment on
the tenth is indicated at the left of the map.

[Illustration: Battle of Brandywine.]

On the morning of the eleventh, Maxwell crossed at Chadd’s Ford;
advanced to Kennett Meeting House, and skirmished with Knyphausen, until
compelled by a superior force to fall back to high ground near the
river. Porterfield and Waggoner crossed at his left and attacked
Ferguson’s Rifles. Knyphausen brought up two brigades, with guns; and
this force, with the Queen’s Rangers, on Knyphausen’s extreme right,
compelled both American detachments to recross the river. The American
casualties were sixty, and those of the Hessian and British troops about
one hundred and thirty. A fog along the river had facilitated Maxwell’s
operations; but it prevented the American scouts from gaining accurate
data as to the movements of the British. While Knyphausen was
demonstrating as if to force a crossing at Chadd’s Ford, Cornwallis was
reported to be moving with five thousand men and artillery toward a ford
near the forks of the Brandywine. Bland had crossed at Jones’ Ford,
between nine and ten in the morning, and reported this movement of
Cornwallis. Washington ordered Sullivan to cross and attack Cornwallis,
while he intended to cross at Chadd’s Ford, in person, and attack
Knyphausen, assigning to General Greene an intermediate crossing, to
strike the left of the Hessian general. When the fog disappeared, there
was no evidence of the whereabouts of the British column. It seemed
hardly possible that it had gone further up the river; while, if it had
joined Knyphausen, the force was too strong to be attacked. Washington
therefore revoked his orders, and withdrew the skirmish party that had
already made the crossing. As a matter of fact, the movement of
Cornwallis was but a flanking support to the advance of the entire
British army; while Knyphausen’s advance towards Chadd’s Ford, although
prepared to cross, if opportunity favored, was a _ruse_ to draw
attention from General Howe’s splendid manœuvre. That officer left
Kennett Square at daylight, marched seventeen miles, and by two o’clock
had crossed the upper fork of the Brandywine, and was moving down upon
the right of the entire American army.

As soon as advised that the British were advancing, Washington ordered
Sullivan to bring the entire right wing into position to oppose their
progress. The woods were dense and the surface was rocky, so that three
divisions must swing back and present to the British advance a new
front, almost perpendicular to that with which they had previously faced
the river. But it would bring them to the high ground, before noticed,
between Birmingham Meeting House and the river. This movement, which
practically involved one of the most difficult elements of Grand
Tactics,—defined in the Preface as the “Art of handling force on the
battlefield,”—was not within General Sullivan’s capacity. The best
troops in the world would have found it slow of execution, while no less
vital to success in the existing emergency. It required of the division
commanders just that kind of familiarity with combined movements of
brigades and divisions, which is required of regiments in a single
brigade, or of companies in a regiment. Sullivan could not at the same
time command the Grand Division, or Corps, and his own division proper,
unless able to place that division in charge of a brigadier-general who
was fully competent to command a division. It is also to be borne in
mind that the woods, rocks, undergrowth, and suddenness of the order
complicated the movement. Stirling and Stephen succeeded in gaining the
new position, barely in time to meet the assault of Cornwallis, without
time for intrenching to any effect. Sullivan’s Division fell into such
disorder, that after sending four aides, and then a personal appeal, he
gave up the attempt to rally his division. He says: “Some rallied,
others could not be brought even by their officers to do anything but
fly.” Only three of his regiments—those of Hazen, Dayton and Ogden, ever
reliable—gained and firmly held the new position throughout the battle.

The enemy, which had formed behind Osborne’s Hill, advanced rapidly,
Cornwallis in the lead. The resistance was stubborn and well maintained,
as General Howe admitted, from three o’clock until sunset. Sullivan,
upon finding himself powerless to rally and move his own division, while
he was responsible for the entire combined movement, went to the
battlefield and was conspicuous for bravery during the day. The
resistance of Stirling and Stephen was admirable; but the brigade of
Deborre, a French general, broke and fled, in wild disorder. The absence
of Sullivan’s Division left a gap on the American left of nearly half a
mile, and Deborre’s cowardice shattered the right wing.

As soon as the right wing gave way, Washington hastened, with Greene, to
the front. There was no retreat except toward Dilworth. By a direct
march of nearly four miles in fifty minutes, and a wheel to the left, of
half a mile, Washington was enabled to occupy a defile from which to
open a passage for the retreating battalions. He then closed in upon
their rear, and prolonged the resistance with vigor. In an orchard
beyond Dilworth, three regiments made another stand. Night separated the
two armies. Stirling and Stephen saved both artillery and baggage.
Armstrong’s brigade, on the extreme left, below Chadd’s Ford, was not
engaged: but, together with Maxwell’s, and Wayne, who was compelled to
abandon his guns, joined the main army, without further loss. They had,
however, kept Knyphausen beyond the river. The entire army fell back to
Chester. The American casualties were seven hundred and eighty, and
those of the British were six hundred. Lafayette lost a horse, and was
himself wounded, in this his first service after receipt of his
commission.

Deborre was dismissed for cowardice. Conflicts as to the defective
reconnoissance that nearly sacrificed the army arose, which need not be
discussed. In justice to General Sullivan, Washington wrote a letter
responsive to his request for some testimonial to submit to Congress,
which is here given in part: “With respect to your other query, whether
your being posted on the right was to guard that flank, and whether you
had neglected it, I can only observe that the only obvious if not the
declared purpose of your being there, implied every necessary precaution
for the security of that flank. But it is at the same time to be
remarked, that all the fords above Chadd’s from which we were taught to
apprehend danger were guarded by detachments from your division, and
that we were led to believe by those whom we had every reason to think
well acquainted with the country, that no ford above our picket-lines
could be passed without making a very circuitous march.” The British
army remained on the field; and the wounded of both armies were properly
cared for by General Howe. His skill as a scientific soldier was again
illustrated, as well as his habitual failure to follow up a first
success; but he was under peculiar conditions which must have influenced
his judgment. His army had left its ships, which had been ordered to go
to the Delaware; as his objective was the capture of Philadelphia, after
first destroying the American army. That army had retreated in
remarkable order and under good control. Humanity alone would have
persuaded Howe to care for the wounded, and a night pursuit, of the
Americans through that country, would have been a wild venture.

Washington’s despatch to President Hancock announcing his retreat to
Chester, was dated from that place at midnight, September 11, 1777. The
wonderful presence of mind of the American Commander-in-Chief, his
aptitude for emergencies, and his extraordinary capacity for making the
most of raw troops, were never more thoroughly evinced during his entire
public career. The uneven ground, dense woods, and facilities for good
rifle-practice, were features favorable to inspire his troops with
special resisting capacity; and it is not beyond a fair presumption to
suggest that, if the main army had been allowed two hours for fortifying
their position, the British, accustomed to lighting in close order,
would have been repulsed. It is certain that General Howe had skilful as
well as willing guides, to secure to him, by so long a détour, his
surprise of Sullivan’s right wing. That was part of the same toryism of
that period which a few days later, and not far away, betrayed Wayne’s
forces, with great loss. But with all the mistakes, and the retreat of
the American army, there was much of hope in the experience and in the
sequel of the Battle of Brandywine.

NOTE.—Lafayette, or LaFayette, makes his first appearance in this
battle. At that period “_affix-names_,” derived from fiefs,
seigniories, or estates, long held by families, were emphasized.
Hence, La villa Faya, in Auvergne, when acquired, was added to
the family name Motier. In the parish register, now in
the war archives of France, the name is thus recorded:
“Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Rock-Gilbert Dumotier Lafayette.” He signed
his name _Lafayette_, and his grandsons, Senators Oscar and Edmond
Lafayette, followed his example. The permanent acceptance of the
spelling _Lafayette_ is therefore fully warranted, and harmonizes with
its use for counties and cities in many of the States.

This gallant young volunteer in the cause of American Independence,
attended by Baron John De Kalb, and nine others, came to America in
the ship _Victoire_, chartered by himself; and on the 19th of June,
Lafayette wrote to his wife of his enthusiastic welcome at Charleston,
S.C. On the 27th of July, he reached Philadelphia. He was commissioned
Major-General by the American Congress, and took his first seat at a
Council of War, August 21st, when the movement of the American army
against Howe was under advisement.

CHAPTER XIX.
WASHINGTON RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE.—BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN.

Washington marched directly to Philadelphia to refit his army and secure
ammunition and provisions, and thence marched to Germantown, “for one
day of rest.” His confidence was not abated. The brave soldiers who had
left Philadelphia with such jubilant anticipations of victory, were
conscious of having fought well against a superior force, and were never
more willing to honor the confidence of their Commander-in-Chief. And
Washington himself was not hurried, but systematic and constantly in
motion. On the thirteenth he ordered Monsieur de Coudray to complete
defensive works along the Delaware River; General Putnam, to forward
fifteen hundred Continental troops; and General Armstrong, to occupy the
line of the Schuylkill, as well as to throw up redoubts near its fords,
in case he should find it desirable to cross that river.

The left wing of General Howe’s army demonstrated toward Reading and
Philadelphia. The right wing, under Generals Grant and Cornwallis,
reached Chester on the thirteenth. General Howe had taken care of the
wounded of both armies, but was compelled to obtain surgeons from
Washington to assist in that duty. At Wilmington, he captured the
governor, and considerable coin which he proposed to use for the benefit
of the wounded of both armies. Inasmuch as Grant and Cornwallis were
practically in the rear of the American army, he proposed to march to
Philadelphia via Germantown; and both threaten the city, and cut off
Washington from retreat northward or westward. But, on the fifteenth,
Washington crossed the Schuylkill at Swede’s Ford; so that Howe’s halt,
even of a single day, on the battlefield, rendered it useless for him to
make a forced march to the city; and his opportunity was lost.

Washington moved out on the Lancaster road as far as Warren tavern.
Howe, watching his keen adversary, advanced toward Westchester, and both
armies prepared for battle. Howe made a partly successful attempt to
throw the American army back upon the Schuylkill River, and both armies
were prepared for action; when a heavy rain which nearly ruined the
ammunition of the Americans, and “directly in the faces of the British
troops,” as reported by Howe, averted battle. Washington left Wayne,
however, with fifteen hundred troops, in a strong position at Paoli
(Wayne’s birthplace), with orders to fall upon the British rear so soon
as it should break camp, and then moved to Yellow Springs and Warwick;
but upon finding that Howe did not intend to attack Reading, recrossed
the Schuylkill at Parkes’ Ford, and encamped on the Perkiomy, September
seventeenth. On the twentieth, Wayne allowed himself to be surprised at
night, through the treachery of the country people, his old neighbors;
and left more than three hundred of his force as prisoners in the hands
of General Gray, although saving his guns and most of his baggage.
General Smallwood’s brigade, left by General Washington for Wayne’s
support, and encamped but a mile distant, failed to be in time to render
aid during the night attack. This disaster took all pressure from Howe’s
army, and he moved on. Washington reports as to Howe’s movement: “They
had got so far the start before I received certain intelligence that any
considerable number had crossed, that I found it in vain to think of
overtaking their rear, with troops harassed as ours had been by constant
marching since the Battle of Brandywine.” Colonel Hamilton was sent to
Philadelphia to force a contribution of shoes from the inhabitants, as
“one thousand of his army were barefooted.”

The simplest possible recital of these days of active marching,
sufficiently indicates the character of those brave troops whose
confidence in Washington seemed as responsive to his will as if his
nervous activities embraced theirs as well.

A small portion of the British left wing crossed at Gordon’s Ford on the
twenty-second, and the main body at Flatland Ford, on the twenty-third,
reaching Germantown on the twenty-fifth. On the twenty-seventh,
Cornwallis entered Philadelphia. Colonel Sterling of the British army
was sent to operate against the defences of the Delaware,—and the fleet
of Admiral Howe was already on its way to Philadelphia.

The boldness of Washington’s attempt on the rear of Howe’s army, and all
his action immediately after the Battle of Brandywine, were a striking
indication of his purpose to retain the gage of battle in his own hands.
He sent a peremptory order to General Putnam, who was constantly making
ill-advised attempts upon the outposts of New York, to send him
twenty-five hundred men without delay; and most significant of all,
directed him “so to use _militia_, that the posts in the Highland might
be perfectly safe.” Congress immediately adjourned to Lancaster,—and
then to York,—after enlarging Washington’s powers; and General Gates was
ordered to send Morgan’s riflemen to headquarters. This, however, he
delayed to do until after the close of the northern campaign.

General Howe established his headquarters at Germantown, having been one
month in marching from the head of the Elk to Philadelphia, a distance
of fifty-four miles.

The town of Germantown consisted of a single street, not so straight
that a complete range of fire could reach its entire length, nor so
uniform in grade that a gun at Mt. Aury, its summit, could have a clean
sweep. The headquarters of Washington were near Pennebeck Mills, twenty
miles from Philadelphia. At seven o’clock of the evening of October
third, he moved with two-thirds of his army by four roads which more or
less directly approached the British encampments, intending to gain
proximate positions, rest his troops, and attack the entire British line
at daybreak. The plan of the movement is of interest for its boldness
and good method. The incidents of the morning, which by reason of fog
and other mishaps rendered the battle less decisive, will not be fully
detailed.[6] The woods, ravines, and difficulties in the way of clear
recognition between friend and foe, in that engagement, only enhance the
value of the general plan, and of the cool self-possession and control
of his army which enabled Washington to terminate the action without
greater loss.

Footnote 6:

See “Battles of the American Revolution,” Chapter LI.

Sullivan and Wayne, with Conway in advance as a flanking corps, were to
move directly over Chestnut Hill and enter the town. Maxwell and Nash,
under Major-General Stirling, were to follow this column as a reserve.
Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was sent down the Manatawny
River road, to cross the Wissahickon Creek, and fall upon the British
left wing and rear. Greene and Stephen, led and flanked by McDougall’s
Brigade, were to move by the Limestone Road, enter the village at the
Market House, and attack the British right wing. Generals Smallwood and
Forman, with the Maryland and New Jersey militia, were to follow the old
York road until a convenient opportunity should bring them to the
extreme right and rear of the enemy. (See map.)

Washington accompanied Sullivan’s command; and was able, from his
advanced position, early in the fight, to appreciate that by the failure
of an identity of support on the part of the most remote divisions, the
withdrawal of the army had become necessary. The occupation of the stone
building, known as the Chew House, on the main street, had little
significance; except that it misled the outlying divisions as to the
real centre of conflict, and detained the rear-guard and reserve longer
than necessary. The concurrent action of all the assailing columns, in
the directions indicated by their orders, would have made the issue a
well-balanced question of victory or failure. One single incident is
mentioned. General Stephen left Greene’s command without orders, and
moved toward the sound of firing at the Chew House, only to find himself
firing into Wayne’s command, which was in its right place. He was
dismissed, on charges of intoxication.

General Sullivan was in his best element when under superior command;
and his conduct on this occasion was admirable. His two aides were
killed, and his division rendered most efficient service. General Nash
was among the killed, and the American casualties numbered six hundred
and seventy-three, besides four hundred and twelve prisoners.

The British casualties were five hundred and thirty-five, but among the
killed were General Agnew and Lieutenant-Colonel Bird.

Washington regained Metuchen Hill, very little disturbed by the small
detachments that hung upon his rear; and Howe returned to Philadelphia,
abandoning his encampment beyond the city limits.

[Illustration: Battle of Germantown.]

The Battle of Germantown is a signal illustration of a skilful design,
and, at the same time, of the ease with which a victory almost achieved
can be as quickly lost. Its effect upon European minds was signally
impressive, as will hereafter more fully appear. Count de Vergennes, the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in speaking of the report of this
battle which reached him December 12th, said: “Nothing has struck me so
much, as General Washington’s attacking and giving battle to General
Howe’s army. To bring troops raised within the year, to do this,
promises everything.”

CHAPTER XX.
JEALOUSY AND GREED DEFEATED.—VALLEY FORGE.

The struggle for American independence and the career of the American
Commander-in-Chief very minutely foreshadowed the experience of most
successful soldiers with the political manipulations of partisans in
Congress ever since. The “On to Richmond,” and the “On to Washington”
cries of 1861, and the fluctuations of the popular pulse with the
incidents of successive campaigns in the civil war, were used by
demagogues for selfish ends. But the same spirit had shown itself in a
degree quite as repugnant to devoted sons of liberty, during the throes
which accompanied this nation’s birth.

Nothing seemed too exacting as a test of the American
Commander-in-Chief. As the war enlarged its scope, and the prospects of
success brightened for the moment, clamorous aspirants for office
multiplied. The personal bravery of the soldier was magnified at the
expense of discipline. The slow progress of the army was charged to
excessive caution. Nothing, so far as politicians were concerned, was
deemed too hard for the American militia, if only the right sort of a
quack administered their action, and led them to its tests. But the
consciousness of unselfish devotion to duty, never boldly impeached, and
ever unimpeachable, sustained Washington. Amid these clamors for office
and preferment from Congressmen and politicians, his faith in righteous
methods, in patient training, in kind and considerate treatment of all
who took part in the struggle, whatever their antecedents or rank, never
for a moment swerved. His purpose and his self-control matured, until he
attained such calm contempt for jealousy and intrigue that he could move
on through the deepest waters, regardless of restless, dashing
wave-crests.

The Battle of Germantown, and Howe’s abandonment of his suburban
encampment, naturally suggested the immediate occupation of Philadelphia
by the American army. It, like Boston, “must be seized” at once. The
“almost” victory on the fourth of October, blinded the vision of many to
the broader range of national activity which Washington’s supervision
embraced. News of the surrender of Burgoyne reached his headquarters on
the eighteenth day of October. He promptly congratulated General Gates
and the northern army, in terms of most, gracious sincerity and
emphasis. And yet, General Gates presumed to send his Report to Congress
direct, and not to his Commander-in-Chief. Then, the “almost” victory of
Washington over Howe, at Germantown, was contrasted with the complete
victory of Gates over Burgoyne. The fact that Washington fought with
fewer numbers, and these, of hungry, poorly armed men, nearly worn out
by marches and counter-marches, while the northern army, three to one of
their adversaries, simply penned up first, and then starved out, a force
that had not rations for another day, counted little with these
pseudo-scientific experts. And yet, let it ever be remembered, that the
British garrison of Philadelphia was not panting for any more field
service. The very restriction of that garrison to city limits and the
immediate suburbs, proved not only subversive of their discipline and
efficiency, but ultimately vindicated the wisdom of Washington. He saw
distinctly, just how its partial inaction afforded him time to mature
his own army organization; while the garrison of New York must, of
necessity, be kept equally passive, for lack of this very strong
detachment which idled in barracks, on the banks of the Delaware.

But while the garrison of Philadelphia limited its excursions to
plundering farms and the country adjacent for wood, forage and
provisions generally, both commanding generals were studying the
relations of the Delaware River to the conduct of all future operations
upon any decisive scale. The river had been so obstructed that the fleet
of Admiral Howe, which had been compelled to land his army at the head
of the Chesapeake in September, could not yet communicate with the army
since it gained the city. He arrived off Newcastle on the sixth day of
October. Washington realized that by retaining control of the Delaware
he not only restricted the supply of provisions and military stores to
the garrison, but retained easy communications with New Jersey and the
Camps of Instruction and rendezvous at the adequately fortified posts of
Morristown and Middlebrook.

At Billingsport, _chevaux-de-frise_ obstructed the channel. Just below
the mouth of the Schuylkill was Fort Mifflin, on Mud Island. On the
opposite shore, at Red Bank, was Fort Mercer. Washington determined to
maintain these posts, or make their acquisition by the enemy most costly
in men and materials. His foresight grasped, as if in hand, the rapidly
maturing facts, that Britain could not much longer meet the drain of the
American war and at the same time hold her own against her European
foes; and that America needed only a thoroughly concerted effort to
consummate her independence.

Colonel Christopher Green, courageous at Bunker Hill and during Arnold’s
expedition to Canada, was assigned to command Fort Mercer, with troops
from his own State, Rhode Island. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Maryland,
with Maryland troops, was stationed at Fort Mifflin. These little
garrisons were strengthened by the detail of four hundred Continental
troops to each. In these details, the same wisdom marked Washington’s
choice; as Angel’s Rhode Island regiment reported to Greene, and a
portion of Greene’s Virginia regiment reported to Smith.

The British army was not an idle observer of these movements. On the
twenty-second of October, the two Grenadier regiments of Donop and
Minnigerode, and two regiments of the line, with the Infantry Chasseurs
(all Hessian), with eight 3–pounders and two howitzers, approached Fort
Mercer and demanded its surrender. They had crossed at Coopers Ferry on
the twenty-first, slightly interrupted by skirmishers, and on the
following morning suddenly emerged from the woods, expecting an easy and
an immediate victory. Defiance was returned to their demand. Two
assaulting columns, already formed, made an immediate and simultaneous
advance upon the north and south faces of the fort. The garrison,
however, knowing that it could not hold the exterior works, which were
still incomplete, retired to the interior defences; but still occupied a
curtain of the old works, which afforded an enfilading fire upon any
storming party which should attempt the inner stockade. The withdrawal
of the garrison from the exterior works was misunderstood. The assault
was bold, desperate, and brilliant. The resistance was incessant,
deadly, overwhelming. Colonel Donop fell, mortally wounded, and near
him, Lieutenant-Colonel Minnigerode. These confident assailants lost, in
less than sixty minutes, four hundred men—being one-third of their
entire force. And still, one more attempt was made at the escarpment
near the river; but here also the Americans were on the alert. Armed
galleys in the stream opened a raking fire at short range, and dispersed
the assailants. Two British ships—the _Augusta_ (64–gun man-of-war), and
the _Merlin_ (frigate), which had been so disposed as to aid the
assault, grounded. On the next day, the former took fire from a hot
shot, and blew up, before her entire crew could escape; and the _Merlin_
was burned, to avoid capture. The American loss was fourteen killed and
twenty-one wounded. Colonel Donop was buried carefully by Major Fleury,
a French officer in the American service, and his grave at the south end
of the old works is still an object of interest to visitors. Colonel
Greene, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, and Commodore Hazlewood of the galley
service, received from Washington and from Congress worthy testimonials
for “gallant conduct.”

In the meantime, the British had found two solid points of land amid the
marshy ground at the mouth of the Schuylkill River, within cannon-range
of Fort Mifflin, where they constructed two heavy batteries bearing upon
that fort. Four 32–pounders from the _Somerset_ and six 24–pounders from
the _Eagle_, with one 13–inch mortar, were added to works erected on
Province Island, to bring a more direct fire upon the fort than could be
secured from the batteries at the mouth of the Schuylkill River. (See
map.)

In order to anticipate a possible movement of troops into New Jersey, in
case of a successful assault upon Fort Mifflin, Washington ordered
General Varnum’s brigade to take post at Woodbury, near Red Bank, and
General Forman to rally the New Jersey militia to his support. But the
British made no attempt to land. The later assault upon the fort, made
on the tenth, was successful. Seven ships of the British fleet joined in
the attack; among them the _Somerset_, the _Roebuck_, and the _Pearl_,
which had taken part in operations before Boston and New York.
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith was wounded early in the action and removed to
Fort Mercer, Major Thayer succeeding to the command. Major Fleury, who
planned the works, was also wounded; and after a loss of two hundred and
fifty men, the remnant of the garrison, on the night of the fifteenth,
retired to Fort Mercer. At dawn of the sixteenth, the Grenadiers of the
Royal Guards occupied the island.

[Illustration: Operations on the Delaware.]

The Report of Washington upon this action thus honors the brave
defenders of Fort Mifflin: “The defence will always reflect the highest
honor upon the officers and men of the garrison. The works were entirely
beat down; every piece of cannon was dismounted, and one of the enemy’s
ships came so near that she threw grenades from her tops into the fort,
and killed men upon the platforms, before they quitted the island.”

On the eighteenth, General Cornwallis landed at Billingsport in force,
and Washington sent General Greene to take command of the troops in New
Jersey and check his progress; but the demonstration was so formidable
that the garrison evacuated the works. The Americans, unable to save
their galleys, set fire to them near Gloucester Point; and the British
fleet gained the freedom of the Delaware River.

During this movement, Lafayette, intrusted with a detachment of troops
by General Greene, had several skirmishes with the enemy, and on the
first of December was assigned to command of the division left without a
commander by the dismissal of Stephen. While Cornwallis was on this
detached service, four general officers of Washington’s army against
eleven dissenting voted to attack General Howe. The incident, occurring
at such a period, is noteworthy.

Late in October, the American army advanced from Perkiomy to White
Marsh; General Varnum’s Rhode Island Brigade, twelve hundred strong,
reported for duty, as well as about a thousand additional troops from
Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia. Generals Gates and Putnam still
retained troops for their semi-independent commands; and General Gates,
in particular, only grudgingly sent such as were peremptorily ordered to
report to Washington. It was not until Colonel Hamilton, Aide-de-camp,
visited him in person, that Gates sent the troops which were absolutely
indispensable at army headquarters, and as absolutely useless at Albany.
His ostentatious proclamation of his military success over Burgoyne, and
his criticism of the tardiness and non-efficiency of his
Commander-in-Chief, began to expose his renewed aspirations to succeed
to the chief command.

On the fourth of December, General Howe with a force of fourteen
thousand men, accompanied by Generals Knyphausen and Cornwallis,
advanced to Chestnut Hill, within three miles of the right of the
American army, and slight skirmishing ensued. On the seventh, the
British troops left Chestnut Hill, and took a position at Edge Hill near
the American left. Morgan, just arrived from the northern army, and the
Maryland militia under Colonel Mordecai Gist (subsequently
Brigadier-General) had a sharp skirmish with Cornwallis, losing
forty-four men and indicting an equal loss upon the enemy. Major-General
Gray and the Queen’s Rangers indicted a loss of about fifty men upon an
advance post of the American left; and when night came on, the British
pickets were within a half mile of the American lines, where battle was
awaited with satisfaction and hopeful expectancy. But on the morning of
the eighth, the British camp disappeared, for Howe had suddenly returned
to Philadelphia.

[Illustration: Operations near Philadelphia.]

Howe’s Report, dated December 13th, reads as follows: “Upon the
presumption that a forward movement might tempt the enemy, after
receiving such a reënforcement [reported afterwards as four thousand
men], to give battle for the recovery of this place [Philadelphia]; or,
that a vulnerable part might be found to admit of an attack upon their
camp; the army marched out on the night of the fourth instant.” It was
afterwards learned that Howe had full knowledge of the jealous spirit
then existing towards Washington, and that several of his generals
favored an attack upon Philadelphia, against his better judgment.
Washington, in noticing Howe’s movement, says: “I sincerely wish that
they had made the attack; as the issue, in all probability, from the
disposition of our troops and the strong position of our camp, would
have been fortunate and happy. At the same time, I must add, that
reason, prudence, and every principle of policy, forbid us quitting our
post to attack them. Nothing but success would have justified the
measure; and this could not be expected from their position.”

The army of Washington, nominally eleven thousand strong, had, says
Baron De Kalb, but seven thousand effective men for duty, so general was
the sickness, from extreme cold and the want of sufficient clothing and
other necessaries of a campaign. And yet, under these conditions,
Congress placed in responsible positions those officers who were most
officiously antagonistic to the American Commander-in-Chief. On the
sixth of November, Gates had been made President of the Board of War.
Mifflin, withdrawn from duty as Quartermaster-General, was also placed
upon the Board, retaining his full rank. On the twenty-eighth of
December, Congress appointed Conway Major-General and Inspector-General,
and placed him in communication with the Board of War, to act
independently of the Commander-in-Chief. Lee, then a prisoner of war,
through letters addressed to Gates, Mifflin, Wayne and Conway, united
with them in concerted purpose to oppose the policy of Washington, and
to dictate his action; and more than this, there was a strong influence
brought to bear upon Congress to force Washington’s resignation, or
removal from command.

Washington, however, established his headquarters at Valley Forge,
twenty-one miles from Philadelphia; and on the nineteenth of December
announced his winter quarters by a formal order. On the same day he sent
General Smallwood to Wilmington, to occupy the country south of
Philadelphia and cut off supplies for that city and its garrison.
McDougall was established at Peekskill. Putnam was on the shore of Long
Island Sound until the middle of December, when he was ordered back to
the Highlands. The absence of General Mifflin from the army, and his
total neglect of duty as Quartermaster-General, in which he had once
been so efficient, “caused,” says Washington, “the want of two days’
supply of provisions, and thereby cost an opportunity scarcely ever
offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy.”

It was an hour of deep distress to Washington, when, on the twenty-third
day of December, 1777, he felt compelled to advise Congress of the
condition of his army: “The numbers had been reduced since the fourth of
the month, only three weeks, two thousand men, from hardship and
exposure. Two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight were unfit for
duty, because barefoot and otherwise naked. Only eight thousand two
hundred men were present for duty.” He added: “We have not more than
three months in which to prepare a great deal of business. If we let
them slip, or waste, we shall be laboring under the same difficulties in
the next campaign as we have in this, to rectify mistakes and bring
things to order. Military arrangements and movements, in consequence,
like the mechanism of a clock, _will be imperfect and disordered by the
want of any part_.” The concluding clause, italicized, illustrates one
of his peculiar characteristics—never to slight the humblest man or
agency in his country’s service, and never to count any duty too small
to be done well.

[Illustration:

WASHINGTON AT VALLEY FORGE

[From the painting by Scheuster.]
]

At this time, the Assembly of Pennsylvania began to snuff up some of the
malarious odors of selfish and senseless gossip. They even remonstrated
against his going into winter quarters at all. His reply was not wanting
in directness and clearness. It reads as follows: “Gentlemen reprobate
the going into winter quarters as much as if they thought the soldiers
were made of sticks, or stones. I can assure those gentlemen that it is
a much easier and less distressing thing to remonstrate in a comfortable
room, than to occupy a cold bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow,
without clothing or blankets. However, as they seem to have little
feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly
for them, and from my soul I pity their miseries which it is neither in
my power to relieve, or prevent.”

On the twenty-sixth, General Sullivan, who generally kept aloof from
active participation in the movements of the intriguing class of
officers, urged Washington to “make an attempt upon Philadelphia, and
risk every consequence, in an action.” General Sullivan meant well; but
the reader will recognize the characteristic style of this officer under
circumstances of special doubt as to “what is to be done next.” But
Washington never wavered in his purpose. On the thirtieth of December,
Baron De Kalb was appointed Inspector-General, _vice_ Conway, resigned.
Washington closed the year at Valley Forge. The twelve months since he
recrossed the Delaware at Trenton and outgeneraled Lord Cornwallis, had
indeed been eventful. Once more, amid snow and cold, surrounded by
faithful but suffering thousands, he plans for other perils and
exposure; before the goal of his desire, substantial victory, could
bring to them and to his beloved country the boon of realized
independence. And yet, unknown to him, two days before he occupied the
barren site of Valley Forge a thrilling event occurred beyond the
Atlantic Ocean, and one which was, in the providence of God, to verify
the soldier’s faith, and secure for him final victory.

As early as December 2d, the tidings of Burgoyne’s disaster reached the
royal palace of George III. Fox, Burke, and Richmond favored immediate
peace, and such an alliance, or Federal Union, as would be for the
material interests of both countries. Burke solemnly declared that
“peace upon any honorable terms was in justice due to both nations.” But
the king adjourned Parliament to the twentieth of January, 1778.

Meanwhile a speedy ship from Boston was on the high seas, bound for
France, and the account of Burgoyne’s surrender was received by the
American Commissioners. On the twelfth of the month it was announced to
the Count de Vergennes, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the French
Court. The sensation throughout Paris was intense. “Europe need no
longer dread the British power, since her very Colonies have
successfully defied unjust laws, and equally defied her power to enforce
them.” This was the public utterance. One pregnant sentence already
cited, that of Count de Vergennes, proved the incentive to immediate
action. “Saratoga” and “Germantown” were coupled in a message sent to
Spain, to solicit her co-operation. Without any real sympathy with
America, Spain had already discriminated in favor of American privateers
which took prizes to her ports.

But France did not await reply before announcing her own action. And
just when Washington was gathering his weary army into humble huts for
partial shelter and rest, and while his tired spirit was pained by the
small jealousies which impaired the value of his personal service and
sacrifice, and threatened the harmony of his entire command, a new ally
and friend had taken him to heart; and Louis XVI. was dropping into the
scales both the prestige and the power of France, to vindicate and
accomplish American liberty. On that day, December 17, 1777, Gerard, one
of the secretaries of Count de Vergennes, announced to Benjamin Franklin
and Silas Deane, two American Commissioners, “by the King’s order,”
“that the King of France, in Council, had determined not only to
acknowledge, but to support American independence.”

The declaration of the Duke of Richmond, already cited, which predicted
“the application of the Colonists to strangers for aid, if Parliament
authorized the hire of Hessians,” had been realized.

CHAPTER XXI.
PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE IN WINTER, 1778.

Mr. Charles Stedman, who served on the staffs of Generals Howe, Clinton
and Cornwallis, during the Revolutionary War, in an interesting
historical narrative states that “the British army enlivened the dull
times of their winter residence in Philadelphia, with the dance-house,
the theatre, and the game of faro.” But it is equally true that this
large license which relieved the monotony of garrison life, gradually
aroused disgust and positive hatred on the part of the citizens of that
city. No diversions in force against the American position, or their
chief outposts, were possible, since the garrison must be alert for any
sudden attack upon the city. The large number of wealthy royalist
families had much to dread from the possible capture of their
dwelling-place. Scouting parties from Washington’s army pressed so
closely to the city limits, at times, that occasional efforts of small
detachments to secure wood for fuel and cooking purposes, were
admonished, that the limit of their picket-lines was their boundary of
possession and safe enjoyment. Carriage drives and daily saddle
exercise, which were favorite recreations, had to be abandoned. They
were unsafe; as Washington’s cavalry, scouts and artillery needed all
the horses that were not needed by the farmers for farm use.

The American army drilled daily, under the patient instruction of Baron
Steuben, so far as they had clothing and shoes for that purpose; while
their comrades sat down or laid themselves down by log fires and burning
stumps, to avoid freezing to death.

[Illustration: Encampment at Valley Forge.]

After the camp was fully established, and Washington had asserted his
purpose to command, and allow no interference by civilians of whatever
pretension, or by military men of whatever rank, the antagonism of the
previous months gradually retired from public exhibition. It never drew
breath from popular sympathy, and the soldiers regarded his censors as
their enemies. And so it was, that in spite of sickness, wretchedness,
inevitable desertions and frequent deaths, the soldiers were kept to
duty, and acquired toughness and knowledge for future endeavor. A calm
reliance upon the future, and a straightforward way of dealing with men
and measures, were still vindicating the fitness of Washington for the
supreme command.

To the demand of the British Government for the reasons of the
inactivity of the British army, General Howe replied that, he “did not
attack the intrenched position at Valley Forge, a strong point, during
the severe season, although everything was prepared with that intention,
judging it imprudent until the season should afford a prospect of
reaping the advantages that ought to have resulted from success in that
measure; but having good information in the spring that the enemy had
strengthened the camp by additional works, and being certain of moving
him from thence when the campaign should open, he dropped thought of
attack.”

During the winter, a proposition for the invasion of Canada was again
under consideration; and General Lafayette, with other officers, visited
Albany and the northern army to see what arrangements were both
available and desirable for that purpose. It was soon dropped; and was
never fully favored by Washington.[7]

Footnote 7:

“Battles of the American Revolution,” p. 461.

During January, Congress sent a committee to visit Valley Forge. As the
result, Washington’s whole policy was indorsed and their support was
pledged. Baron Steuben, recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, was
confirmed as Major-General without a dissenting vote. Conway started for
France early in April. The historical “Conway cabal” had lost its most
unprincipled abettor. On the fourth of April, Congress authorized
Washington to call upon Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Jersey, for five
thousand additional militia. On the ninth, General Howe received his
recall to England. On the tenth, Lafayette returned to camp. On the
thirteenth, General McDougall accompanied Count Kosciusko to West Point,
to perfect the fortifications at that post. On the fifteenth, Gates was
placed in command at Peekskill.

When the spring opened at Valley Forge, the propositions of the many
generals, respecting the approaching campaign, were as diverse and
varied as the leafage of the forest. As the mind recalls the relations
of these officers to earlier campaigns, it will be seen how essential to
any real success was the presence of a strong-willed Commander-in-Chief.
It is especially to be noticed, that men whose judgment had been
accredited as uniformly conservative and yet energetic radically
differed as to the immediate objective of army action. It settles beyond
question the principle that the entire war, and the entire country, had
to be made of paramount consideration, in the decision of any important
movement.

Wayne, Patterson and Maxwell recommended an immediate attack upon
Philadelphia. Knox, Poor, Varnum and Muhlenburg advised an attack upon
New York, with four thousand regulars and Eastern militia, Washington in
command; leaving Lee to command in Pennsylvania, while the main army
should remain at Valley Forge. Stirling recommended operations against
both Philadelphia and New York. Lafayette, Steuben and Du Portail
expressed doubts as to making _any_ aggressive movement whatever, until
the army should be strengthened or the British unfold their plans. This
wise suggestion was also the opinion of Washington.

On the seventh of May, the British ascended the Delaware and destroyed
public stores at Bordentown. Maxwell and Dickenson had been sent across
the river for the protection of these stores; but heavy rains delayed
their march, and forty-four vessels, including several frigates on the
stocks, were burned.

But the seventh day of May, 1778, was not a day of gloom at Valley
Forge. Spring had fairly opened, and the forest began to don its new
attire for a fresh summer campaign. At nine o’clock in the morning, the
entire army was on parade, with drums beating, colors flying and salutes
echoing among the hills. The brigades were steady in their ranks. No
brilliant uniforms were conspicuous anywhere, and many had neither coats
nor shoes. The pomp and circumstance of war were missing. There was no
display of gold lace, or finery of any kind. Strongly marked faces and
tough muscles showed the fixedness of purpose of these troops. But it
was an occasion of rare interest. This American army was in line, for
the reception of a visitor from over the sea. The visitor was a herald
sent by Louis XVI., King of France, to announce to Washington and the
American people that an armed alliance between France and the United
States of America had been consummated. The French frigate _Le Sensible_
had landed at Falmouth (Portland), Me., with this messenger, and the
American army was drawn up in battle array to receive his message. The
chaplain of each brigade proclaimed the treaty and read its terms. It
was one of those occasions, not infrequent during the war, and habitual
to Washington throughout his mature life, when he had no way through
which to express his deepest anxieties or profoundest sense of
gratitude, other than that of communion with God. And now, the listening
army was called upon to unite in one “grand thanksgiving to Almighty God
that He had given to America this friend.” The scene that followed can
never be described. It can only be imagined and felt. Huzzas for the
King of France mingled with shouts for Washington, whose face, as
described by one, “shone as did that of Moses, when he descended from
the Mount.” Caps were tossed high in air. Hand-shaking, leaping,
clapping of hands, and every homely sign of joy and confident
expectation, followed. Washington had dismounted. He stood with folded
arms—calm, serene, majestic, silent. For several moments the whole army
stood, awaiting his action. He remounted his horse, and a single word to
his assembled staff quickly ran through the lines—that the
Commander-in-Chief proposed that all should speak together, by the
soldier’s method, through powder. No matter if powder were scarce. Every
cannon, wherever mounted about the long circuit of intrenchments,
roared; and the hills carried the echoes to British headquarters.
Throughout the lines of division and brigade, to the remotest picket
post, a running fire at will closed with one grand volley; and then the
camp of Valley Forge resumed the “business” of preparing for battle.

With the opening of the spring of 1778, General Howe also was moved to
action. His winter supplies, as well as those procurable from the fleet
and the city, had been expended. “The storehouses were empty.”
Detachments, large and small, were sent to scour the country. To cut off
and restrict these detachments, General Lafayette was intrusted with a
special command of twenty-four hundred men, and advanced to Barren Hill,
about half the distance to Philadelphia. It also formed a corps of
observation, and was the first independent command of that officer under
his commission as Major-General. He was especially instructed to note
signs of the evacuation of Philadelphia, which Washington regarded as a
military necessity on the part of General Howe. The American
Commander-in-Chief, although reticent of his own opinions, rarely failed
to read other men accurately, and rightly read Lafayette. With singular
enthusiasm, great purity of character, unswerving fidelity to
obligation, and a thorough contempt for everything mean or dishonorable,
this young French gentleman combined a keen sagacity, sound judgment,
prompt execution, and an intense love for liberty.

Having taken position at Barren Hill, Lafayette at once introduced a
system of communication with parties in the city of Philadelphia. He had
with him fifty Indian scouts, and Captain McLean’s Light troops. A
company of dragoons had also been ordered to join him. General Howe had
been relieved from duty on the eleventh, by General Clinton; who
signalized his accession to command by a series of brilliant _fêtes_ in
honor of his predecessor, on the eve of his departure for England. A
regatta on the Delaware; a tournament on land; triumphal arches;
decorated pavilions; mounted ladies, with their escorts in Turkish
costume; slaves in fancy habits; knights, esquires, heralds, and every
brilliant device, made the day memorable from earliest dawn until dark.
And after dark, balls, illuminations both upon water and land,
fireworks, wax-lights, flowers and fantastic drapery, cheered the night
hours, “exhibiting,” as described by André himself, master of
ceremonies, “a _coup d’œil_, beyond description magnificent.” The
procession of knights and maidens was led by Major André and Miss
Shippen, the beautiful daughter of one of the wealthiest royalists in
Philadelphia. She long retained the title of the “belle of the Michianza
_fêtes_.” She subsequently became the wife of General Arnold; and the
incidents thus grouped show how felicitous was Clinton’s subsequent
choice of André to negotiate with Arnold the exchange of West Point, for
“gold and a brigadier-general’s commission in the British army.”

During the evening of this luxurious entertainment, and while at supper,
General Clinton announced to his officers his intention to march at
daybreak to Barren Hill, and bring back for their next evening’s guest,
the distinguished French officer, Marquis de Lafayette. At four o’clock
on the morning of the nineteenth, when the twenty hours of hilarity,
adulation and extravagance closed, General Clinton, accompanied by
Generals Grant, Gray, and Erskine, and five thousand picked troops,
marched to capture Lafayette. General Gray crossed the Schuylkill with
two thousand men to cut off Lafayette’s retreat, in case Clinton
successfully attacked in front. Washington advanced sufficiently to
observe the movement of General Gray, and signalled with cannon to
Lafayette of his danger; but Lafayette, by occupying a stone church and
other buildings, and showing false fronts of columns as if about to take
the offensive, caused the advance column of Grant to halt for
reënforcements; and then retired safely with the loss of but nine men.
Lafayette gives an amusing account of portions of the skirmish: “When my
Indian scouts suddenly confronted an equal number of British dragoons,
the mutual surprise was such that both fled with equal haste.” The
officers and men of Lafayette’s command were greatly elated by his
conduct of the affair, especially as he was at one time threatened by a
force more than twice that of his entire division; and the confidence
thus acquired followed his service through the entire war. The
congratulations of Washington were as cordial upon his return, as those
of the officers of the Philadelphia garrison were chilling upon the
return of Clinton, without Lafayette as prisoner.

On the same day, General Mifflin rejoined the army. In writing to
Gouverneur Morris of New York, the American Commander-in-Chief, noticing
the event, expresses his surprise “to find a certain gentleman who some
time ago, when a heavy cloud hung over us and our affairs looked gloomy,
was desirous of resigning, to be now stepping forward in the line of the
army”; adding: “If he can reconcile such conduct to his own feelings as
an officer, and a man of honor, and Congress have no objection to his
leaving his seat in another department, I have nothing personally to
oppose to it. Yet, I must think that gentleman’s stepping in, and out,
as the sun happens to beam out, or become obscure, isn’t quite the
thing, nor quite just, with respect to those officers who take the
bitter with the sweet.”

By this time, the movements of shipping, and within the city, clearly
indicated the design of the British to abandon Philadelphia without
battle. A Council of War was convened on the twentieth, to hear reports
upon the condition of the various American armies; and Generals Gates,
Greene, Stirling, Mifflin, Lafayette, Armstrong, Steuben and de Kalb
were present. The opinion was unanimous that the army should remain on
the defensive, and await the action of the British commander. On the
twentieth, also, General Lee rejoined the army. He had been exchanged on
the twenty-first of April for Major-General Prescott, who had been
captured five miles above Newport, R.I., on the night of July 20, 1777.
Lee had been placed on his parole as early as the twenty-fifth of March,
and he actually visited York, where Congress was in session, on the
ninth of April.

The relations of Charles Lee to the war were as marked as were those of
Arnold, except that Arnold rendered valuable service until he turned
traitor. During the month of February, 1777, Lee secured permission from
General Howe to write letters to Congress, urging that body to “send
commissioners to confer confidentially concerning the national cause.”
On the twenty-first of February, Congress declined to send such
commissioners, as “altogether improper”; and they could “not perceive
how compliance with his wish would tend to his advantage, or the
interests of the public.” Letters were also written in March; and in one
addressed to Washington on the fifth of April, 1777, Lee had written: “I
think it a most unfortunate circumstance for myself, and I think no less
so for the public, that the Congress have not thought proper to comply
with my request. It could not possibly have been attended with any ill
consequences, and might have been with good ones. At least, it was an
indulgence which I thought my situation entitled me to. But I am
unfortunate in everything, and this stroke is the severest I have ever
experienced. God send you a different fate.” The answer of Washington
was as follows: “I have received your letter of this date, and thank
you, as I shall any officer, over whom I have the honor to be placed,
for their opinions and advice in matters of importance; especially when
they proceed from the fountain of candor, and not from a captious
spirit, or an itch for criticism; ... and here, let me again assure you,
that I shall always be happy to be in a free communication of your
sentiments upon any important subject relative to the service, and only
beg that they may come directly to myself. The custom which many
officers have, of speaking freely of things, and reprobating measures
which upon investigation may be found to be unavoidable, is never
productive of good; but often, of very mischievous consequences.”

During the year 1872 George H. Moore, of the New York Historical
Society, brought to light a certain paper indorsed, “Mr. Lee’s Plan,
29th March, 1777,” which was found among the papers of the brothers
Howe, British Commissioners at New York. Lee was at that date a prisoner
of war, but at the same time a British officer who had been taken in
rebellion to the British crown. This letter is noticed, in order to make
more intelligible the subsequent relations of Lee to the American
Commander-in-Chief. The following is an extract: “It appears to me, that
by the continuance of the war, America has no chance of obtaining its
ends. As I am not only persuaded, from the high opinion I have of the
humanity and good sense of Lord and Admiral Howe, that the terms of
accommodation will be as moderate as their powers will admit; but that
their powers are more ample than their successor would be tasked with, I
think myself not only justifiable, but bound in conscience, in
furnishing ’em all the light I can, to enable ’em to bring matters to a
conclusion in the most commodious manner. 1 know the most generous use
will be made of it in all respects. Their humanity will incline ’em to
have consideration for individuals who have acted from principle.” Then
follow hypothetical data as to troops required on the part of Britain,
and these passages: “If the Province of Maryland, or the greater part of
it, is reduced, or submits, and the people of Virginia are prevented, or
intimidated, from marching aid to the Pennsylvania army, the whole
machine is divided, and a period put to the war; and if the plan is
adopted in full, I am so confident of success, that I would stake my
life on the same. Apprehensions from Carleton’s army will, I am
confident, keep the New Englanders at home, or at least, confine ’em to
that side of the river. I would advise that four thousand men be
immediately embarked in transports, one-half of which should proceed up
the Potomac and take post at Alexandria, the other half up Chesapeake
Bay and possess themselves of Annapolis.” The relations of various posts
to the suggested movement, and the character of the German population of
Pennsylvania who would be apprehensive of injury to their fine farms,
were urged in favor of his “plan” for terminating the war on terms of
“moderate accommodation.”

The reply of Washington to General Lee’s letter is a very distinct
notice that he was advised of the letters written by him to Gates and
others, derogatory of the action of his superior officer, the
Commander-in-Chief.

The return of Lee to duty found the American army in readiness to bid
its last farewell to the camp at Valley Forge; but the ordeals through
which so many brave men passed, for their country’s sake, were hardly
more severe than were those through which their beloved
Commander-in-Chief passed into a clearer future, and the well-earned
appreciation of mankind.

CHAPTER XXII.
FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS AGAIN.—BATTLE OF MONMOUTH.

The abandonment of Philadelphia by the British army, as anticipated by
Washington, had become a military necessity. The city was too remote
from the coast, unless its army of occupation could be so reënforced as
to be independent of support from the British base at New York. The
reënforcements of troops called for by General Howe had not been and
could not have been furnished. The recommendation of General Amherst,
military adviser of George III., “that forty thousand men be sent to
America immediately,” had been positively disapproved. It was therefore
of vital importance that General Clinton should reach New York with the
least possible delay. Any attempt to return by sea was obviously
impracticable.

The incidents of the evacuation of Philadelphia were similar to those
which marked the departure of Howe from Boston. The embarkation of three
thousand citizens with their families, their merchandise, and their
personal effects, upon vessels, to accompany the retiring fleet, was a
moral lesson of vast significance. This withdrawal of the British
garrison was no _ruse_, to entice the American army from its camp, for
battle, but a surrender of the field itself, without a struggle. It
announced to America and to the world, that the British army lacked the
ability to meet the contingencies of field service, either in
Pennsylvania or New Jersey; and that loyalists would be left to their
own resources for protection and safety.

Other considerations precipitated the action of Clinton. Congress had
publicly announced the impending arrival of a formidable French fleet
from the West Indies; and, as a matter of fact, so immediate was its
advent, that the advance frigates entered the Delaware Bay, just after
Admiral Howe turned Cape May, on his return to New York. Meanwhile,
every movement in the city was hourly reported to Washington by his
secret messengers, and by families who kept constantly in touch with all
movements of the garrison. Hardly a ball or social dinner, during the
entire winter, was without the presence of one or more of his
representatives, who as promptly reported the secret influences which
were making of the city a deadly prison-house for the British troops.
Even at the playhouses, comedians had begun to jest upon the “foraging
of the rebel scouts”; and it is said to have been hinted, on one
occasion, that “there were chickens and eggs in abundance outside the
lines, if the soldiers would take the trouble to go after them,” and
that “it was hardly the right thing to let Washington’s ragged army have
the pick of all country produce.”

The actual evacuation began at three o’clock on the morning of June
eighteenth, and the entire British army was on the New Jersey side of
the Delaware by ten o’clock. Washington had so closely calculated the
movement, that General Maxwell’s brigade and the New Jersey militia were
already at work burning bridges and felling trees across the roads, in
order to delay Clinton’s march and afford an opportunity for attacking
his retiring columns. General Arnold, whose wound still prevented field
service, entered the city with a strong detachment as the British
rear-guard left. Twelve miles of baggage-train, loaded with everything
of army supplies that could be heaped upon wagons, formed the long
extended caravan which accompanied nearly eighteen thousand British
veterans as they returned to New York, whence they had started only
eleven months before. The capture of the American capital and the
destruction of the American army had been their fondest desire. Now,
they shrunk away from the same American capital as from a pest-house.
There was no longer an eager search to find Washington. To make the
earliest safe distance from his presence, or his reach, was the
incentive to the speediest possible travel. It was no longer the
destruction of that one principal American army that engrossed thought
and stimulated energy; but how to save the British army itself, for
efficient service elsewhere. And Washington, although fully appreciating
the British situation, did not know the fact that the British cabinet
were actually discussing, at that very time, the propriety of
transferring all active operations to the more sparsely settled regions
of the South.

The movements in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, as well as those of
Burgoyne, away from the sea-coast, recall an emphatic communication from
General Howe, which contained this practical statement: “Almost every
movement in America was an act of enterprise, clogged with innumerable
difficulties. A knowledge of the country, intersected, as it everywhere
is, by woods, mountains, water or morasses, cannot be obtained with any
degree of precision necessary to foresee and guard against the
contingencies that may occur.”

Washington was also fully advised of the character and extent of
Clinton’s retiring column, and of the opportunity which the country
afforded for breaking it up. Haste was the need of Clinton. His delay,
however slight, was Washington’s opportunity. Clinton reached
Haddonfield the same day. The militia of Maxwell made a short
resistance, and then retired to Mount Holy Pass. The increased British
vanguard compelled him to fall back; but the destruction of bridges and
interposed obstructions, together with the excessive summer heat, made
the march of the British troops one of intense strain and exhaustion.
And yet, Clinton used such vigor in pressing forward to anticipate more
formidable obstructions, that he reached Crosswicks before the
destruction of the bridge at that point was complete; and on the morning
of the twenty-fourth, his army crossed the creek. The column of
Lieutenant-General Knyphausen went into camp at Imlay’s Town; while that
of Clinton occupied Allentown, and thereby effectively covered the
advance division in case of an American attack from the north. At this
point, he learned that Washington had already crossed the Delaware, and
that the northern army was expected to unite with that of the American
Commander-in-Chief. Such a combination, just then, would render a direct
retreat to New York, via Princeton and Brunswick, extremely hazardous,
if not impossible. With the promptness which characterized him, Sir
Henry Clinton consolidated his baggage and sent it in advance under
Lieutenant-General Knyphausen; placed the second division in light
marching order, under his own personal command, in the rear, and took
the Monmouth route to the sea. (See map.)

Washington was quickly advised of this organic change in the British
formation, and acted instantly. He had crossed the Delaware River at
Coryell’s Ferry, forty miles above Philadelphia, without assurance of
the definite purpose of his adversary. Any other route of march by
Clinton than by Brunswick, would prevent him from receiving military
support from New York, and hold him to the limit of supplies with which
he started from Philadelphia. When, therefore, couriers from Maxwell
notified Washington of Clinton’s diversion eastward, from Crosswicks, it
was evident that Clinton would take no risks of battle in reaching New
York, or some port on the coast accessible by a British fleet.

[Illustration: Battle of Monmouth.]

Colonel Morgan was sent with five hundred men to reënforce Maxwell. On
the twenty-fourth, General Scott, with fifteen hundred chosen troops,
was despatched to reënforce those in the immediate vicinity of the
enemy, more effectually to retard their retreat. On the twenty-sixth,
Washington moved the entire army to Kingston; and learning that the
British army was moving directly toward Monmouth, advanced an additional
force of one thousand men under General Wayne, placing General Lafayette
in command of the entire corps, including the brigade of Maxwell and
Morgan’s Light Infantry. Orders were also sent to Lafayette: “Take the
first opportunity to strike the rear of the enemy.”

Some writers have involuntarily followed Lee’s theory, that the attempt
by Washington to stop Clinton’s retreat and to defeat so large and so
well-appointed an army as that of the British general, was folly from
the start; but such critics overlook the determining facts of the
situation. Washington never counted numbers so much as conditions. He
never swerved from a steady purpose to wear out superior numbers by
piecemeal, until they were at his mercy or so benumbed by his strokes as
to yield the field. Hence it is seen, that with all his approaches to
the retiring columns of Clinton, he never failed to hold in complete
reserve and mastery every conceivable contingency of a general
engagement. Moreover, as a matter of fact, his army, reënforced from the
north, was not inferior in numbers; was unencumbered with baggage, and
was not exposed to attack. A fight was a matter of choice, and not at
the option of the enemy. It is therefore of essential interest to notice
how systematically Washington advanced in this memorable campaign of
Clinton’s March to the Sea. It is of equal interest to notice the
development of the career of Lafayette, under Washington’s supervision
and confidence; since America is more indebted to this discreet and
gallant officer than to any other, for the immediate service which
assured the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, three years later in
the war.

At half-past four of the afternoon of June 26th, Lafayette and Wayne
were at Robin’s tavern. Lafayette thus wrote to the Commander-in-Chief:
“I have consulted the general officers of this detachment, and the
general opinion seems to be, that I should march in the night, near them
[the enemy], so as to attack the rear-guard on the march. Your
excellency knows that by the direct road you are only three miles
further from Monmouth than we are in this place. Some prisoners have
been made, and deserters are coming in very fast.”

Second despatch, 5 o’clock P.M.: “General Forman is firmly of opinion,
that we may overtake the enemy. It is highly pleasant to be followed and
countenanced by the army; that, if we stop the enemy and meet with some
advantage, they may push it with vigor. I have no doubt but if we
overtake them, we possess a very happy chance.”

Third despatch, dated Ice Town, 26th June, 1778, quarter before seven:
“When I got there [referring to a previously expressed purpose to go to
Ice Town for provisions], I was sorry to hear that Mr. Hamilton [Colonel
Alexander Hamilton of Washington’s staff], who had been riding all
night, had not been able to find any one who could give him certain
intelligence: but by a party who came back, I hear the enemy are in
motion and their rear about one mile off the place they had occupied
last night, which is seven or eight miles from here. I immediately put
General Maxwell’s and Wayne’s brigades in motion, and I will fall lower
down, with General Scott’s and Jackson’s regiments and some militia. I
should be very happy if we could attack them before they halt. If I
cannot overtake them, we could lay at some distance and attack them
to-morrow morning.... If we are at a convenience from you, I have
nothing to fear in striking a blow, if opportunity is offered.”

“Special.—If you believe it, or if it is believed necessary, or useful,
to the good of the service and the honor of General Lee, to send him
down with a couple of thousand men, or any greater force, I will
cheerfully obey and serve him, not only out of duty, but what I owe to
that gentleman’s character.”

The explanation of this passage is of interest, as it happily
illustrates the spirit with which Washington and Lafayette operated in
this important engagement, where very grave discretionary responsibility
devolved upon so young an officer as the French Marquis.

Daily conferences were held by Washington with his officers after
leaving Valley Forge, and especially after leaving Kingston. The
official Reports of Washington show that Lee positively declined the
command of this advance corps, until its large increase rendered it
certain that it held a post of honor, and would be pushed upon the
enemy. Lafayette was first assigned to this command after a hot debate
in council as to the propriety of attacking Clinton’s army at all; and
General Lee used the following language, when the assignment of
Lafayette was made with his concurrence, that “he was well pleased to be
freed from all responsibility for a plan which he was sure would fail.”
But when Lafayette gladly accepted the detail, and was so constantly
reënforced as to have under his command nearly one-third of the army,
with the pledge of support by the entire army, General Lee, as next in
rank to Washington, immediately realized his grave mistake, and when too
late, claimed the command by virtue of his rank. He then wrote to
General Lafayette as follows: “It is my fortune and my honor that I
place in your hands; you are too generous to cause the loss of either.”
Lafayette, in his Memoirs, thus alludes to this surrender by Lee of
claim to command by virtue of rank, after having peremptorily and
scornfully declined it: “_This tone suited me better_”; and the letter
already cited was his response. Washington’s reply to this magnanimous
waiver by Lafayette of so honorable a command is as follows: “General
Lee’s uneasiness on account of yesterday’s transaction, rather
increasing than abating, and your politeness in wishing to ease him of
it, have induced me to detach him from this army with a part of it, to
reënforce, or at least to cover the several detachments at present under
your command. At the same time, I have an eye to your wishes; and have
therefore obtained a promise from him, that when he gives you notice of
his approach and command, he will request you to prosecute any plan you
may have already concerted for the purpose of attacking, or annoying,
the enemy. This is the only expedient I could think of, to answer the
views of both. General Lee seems satisfied with this measure.”

On the evening of the twenty-sixth, the entire army moved forward,
leaving all superfluous baggage, so as best to support the advance. On
the twenty-seventh, a severe rain-storm suspended the march for a few
hours. But the advance corps had been strengthened, as suggested by
Lafayette; and when Lee assumed command it numbered fully five thousand
effective troops. The main army also advanced within three miles of
English Town and within five miles of the British army. The American
forces, now eager for battle, were equal in numbers to the enemy, with
the advantage of being on the flank of the long extended British columns
which could not be consolidated for action with their full strength.

A general idea of the skirmishes of the morning, without elaboration of
details, can be obtained from the map.

At the extreme right, on the Middletown road, Knyphausen conducts the
accumulated baggage-train, which, on the night of June twenty-seventh,
is shown to have been distributed along the road approaching Freehold
(Monmouth). Upon the high ground, below, Clinton gathered his forces as
they arrived from the march. Lafayette was near the Court-House, and had
a sharp skirmish with the Queen’s Rangers. He disposed his army
northward, with skirmishers as far advanced as Bryar Hill—even
threatening the pass by which Knyphausen had retired toward New York.
The baggage column, as early as seven o’clock, had passed the
Court-House. Lee appeared upon the field and practically took command,
but exercised no direction over movements; gave contradictory orders
when he gave any; and brigade after brigade failed to obtain from him
instructions as to their movements, or their relations to other
brigades. At first, Lee announced that the “entire British army was in
retreat.” When Clinton, after eight o’clock, descended from his position
to attack the scattered and irregular formation of the American army,
Lafayette, full of hope, was first advised that a retreat had been
ordered by General Lee. He protested in vain. The brigades were allowed
each to seek its own choice of destination; and all fell back under a
general impression, rather than specific orders, that all were to
retreat and simply abandon demonstration against the British army.
Clinton’s continued advance, even so far as Wenrock Creek, is indicated
on the map.

The truth of history requires a statement which has never been
sufficiently defined, as to the antecedents of this overestimated
officer, Charles Lee. As a subaltern in the British army, he had been
uniformly insubordinate, and was in discredit when he was allowed to go
abroad and fight under various flags as a military adventurer. He knew
nothing of handling a large command, or combined commands. Before the
Battle of Monmouth, if then, he had never been under fire in the lead of
American troops. He was cool enough and brave enough at Monmouth, to
retreat with his division; but it was saved chiefly by the
self-possession of its officers, and the wonderful endurance of the rank
and file. He was unequal to the command, even if he had desired battle.
To have fought the battle, with any chance of being taken prisoner,
would have exposed him to a double penalty for treason at the hands of
General Howe. He was in the attitude of defeating his “plan” (before
alluded to), and defeating the very invasion which he had so ingeniously
advised.

The increasing cannonading, before noon, aroused Washington to his full
fighting capacity. The return of an aid-de-camp, with the information
that General Lee had “overtaken the British army and expected to cut off
their rear-guard,” was regarded as an omen of complete success. The
soldiers cast off every encumbrance and made a forced march. Greene took
the right, and Stirling the left; while Washington in person, conducting
the vanguard, moved directly to the scene of conflict.

All at once, the animation of the Commander-in-Chief lost its impulse. A
mounted countryman rode by in fright, a wild fugitive. A half-distracted
musician, fife in hand, cried “All’s lost!” A few paces more, and over
the brow of a small rise of ground overlooking the creek and bridge,
toward which scattered fragments of regiments were pressing, the bald
fact needed no other appeal to the American Commander-in-Chief to assure
him of the necessity for his immediate presence. Harrison and
Fitzgerald, of his staff, were despatched to learn the cause of the
appearances of fugitives from their respective commands. They met Major
Ogden, who replied to their excited demands, with an expletive: “They
are fleeing from a shadow.” Officer after officer, detachment after
detachment, came over the bridge, ambiguous in replies, seemingly
ignorant of the cause of retreat, only that retreat had been ordered.
Neither was the movement in the nature of a panic. Hot and oppressive as
was the day, there was simply confusion of all organized masses, needing
but some competent will to restore them to place and duty.

Washington advanced to the bridge, and allowed neither officer nor man
to pass him. In turn, he met Ramsey, Stewart, Wayne, Oswald, and
Livingston. To each he gave orders, assigned them positions, and
directed them to face the enemy. Leading the way, he placed Ramsey and
Stewart, with two guns, in the woods to the left, with orders to stop
pursuit. On the right, back of an orchard, he placed Varnum, Wayne, and
Livingston; while Knox and Oswald, with four guns, were established to
cover their front. When Maxwell and other generals arrived, they were
sent to the rear to re-form their columns and report back to him for
orders. Lafayette was intrusted with the formation of a second line
until he could give the halted troops a position which they might hold
until he could bring the entire army to their support.

It was such an hour as tests great captains and proves soldiers. The
ordeal of Valley Forge had made soldiers. In the presence of Washington
they were knit to him as by bands of steel. Company after company sprang
into fresh formation as if first coming on parade.

With the last retreating detachment, Lee appeared, and to his astonished
gaze, there was revealed a new formation of the very troops he had
ordered to seek safety in retreat. Tn reply to his demand for the reason
of this disposition of the troops, he was informed that Washington, in
person, located the troops. He understood that his personal command
ceased with the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief, and he reported for
orders. He had no time to speak, when he met this stern peremptory
demand, “What does this mean, sir? Give me instantly an explanation of
this retreat!” Appalled by the wrathful manner and awfully stern
presence of Washington, as with drawn sword he stood in his stirrups,
towering above the abashed officer, Lee could only answer mechanically,
“Sir? Sir?” The demand was repeated with an emphasis that hushed every
observer. Washington’s manner, bearing and tone, are described by those
who stood awe-bound by the scene, as “more than human.” It was as if
Liberty herself had descended to possess the form of her champion!

All who felt his presence bent their wills as rushes yield to the
tempest,—so immediate, so irresistible was his mastery of the occasion.
When the half suppliant officer ventured to explain that “the
contradictory reports as to the enemy’s movements brought about a
confusion that he could not control,” and ventured farther to remind his
Commander-in-Chief that he “was opposed to it in council, and while the
enemy was so superior in cavalry we could not oppose him,” Washington,
with instant self-control, replied: “You should not have undertaken it
unless prepared to carry it through; and whatever your opinions, orders
were to be obeyed.” Again turning to the silent officer, he asked one
single question. It was this: “Will you remain here in front, and retain
command while I form the army in the rear; or shall I remain?” Lee
remained, until ordered to return to English Town and assist in rallying
the fugitives that assembled there. It requires more time to outline the
events of a few precious moments at such a crisis than the events
themselves occupied. The map discloses the final position. Greene was on
the right, Stirling was on the left—where an admirable position of
artillery prepared him to meet the British columns. Lafayette occupied a
second line, on slightly higher ground in the rear. Greene sent six guns
to McComb’s Hill, where they could direct enfilading fire upon the
British columns, already advancing against the position in which
Washington had placed Wayne, Varnum and Livingston.

The real Battle of Monmouth had begun. The British forces were repulsed
at every point. At the hedge-row, three brilliant charges were made, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton of the British Grenadiers was among the
killed. As the day advanced, Lee reported in person, and again requested
“his excellency’s pleasure,” whether to form his division “with the main
body, or draw them up in the rear.” He was ordered to re-form them in
the rear of English Town, three miles distant. Baron Steuben was also on
duty at that point. When, about five o’clock, all cannonading ceased in
the direction of the battlefield, Colonel Gimât, of Washington’s staff,
arrived at English Town with an order for the advance of the troops
which had been re-formed under Lee’s supervision; announcing that the
British were in confusion. Colonel Gimât stated in his evidence before
the court-martial which subsequently tried Lee, that when he
communicated this order to that officer Lee replied, that “they were
only resting themselves, and there must be some misunderstanding about
your being ordered to advance with these troops”; “and it was not until
General Muhlenburg halted, and the precise orders of Washington were
repeated, that Lee could understand that the cessation of firing was
occasioned by the _retreat_ of _Clinton_, and _not_ by the _defeat_ of
_Washington_.”

During the evening, the American army advanced, ready for a general
attack upon the British troops, at daybreak. Washington, with a small
escort, visited every picket. The position was made impregnable, and the
army was in the best possible spirits for a complete victory, and
expected victory.

At 10 o’clock at night, Clinton silently broke camp and departed for
Middletown, where he joined Knyphausen, reaching New York on the last
day of June. The British and the American casualties were each about
three hundred, some of these being deaths from excessive heat. It
appeared afterwards, that the desertions from the British army numbered
nearly two thousand men.

European comments upon this battle were as eulogistic of the American
Commander-in-Chief as after the battles of Trenton, Princeton, and
Germantown. The historian Gordon says of Washington, upon his reaching
the battlefield: “He animated his forces by his gallant example, and
exposed his person to every danger common to the meanest soldier; so
that the conduct of the soldiers in general, after recovering from the
first surprise occasioned by the retreat, could not be surpassed.”

General Lee was tried for disobedience of orders in not attacking the
enemy; for misbehavior before the enemy; a disorderly retreat; and
insolent letters sent to the Commander-in-Chief, after the battle, and
was sentenced to “suspension from command for twelve months.” A
reasonable self-control, which he never had exercised, might, even at
this crisis of his history, have saved him his commission. He died
ignominiously, and even in his will perpetuated his hatred of religion
and his Maker. An abstract of the testimony taken upon his trial shows
that the adjustment of the advance troops by General Lafayette was
admirable; that up to the time when Lee ordered a retreat without
consulting him, all the troops were steady in their positions, awaiting
some systematic orders from Lee, who had just taken command; that Lee
did not intend to force the battle which Lafayette had organized; that
brigades and detachments had no information of adjoining commands, or
supports; that when Lee’s orders for a general retreat reached brigades,
each brigade moved more through example than instructions, without
direction or intimation of any new formation, or any reason for the
retreat.

Recent writers have revived the tradition as to Washington’s alleged
profanity at the Battle of Monmouth. It would seem that either Charles
Lee, or his witnesses, or the witnesses of the United States, under
cross-examination, immediately after the occurrence, would have
testified to such words, if spoken, for the sake of vindicating Lee,
when his commission and honor were in jeopardy. Every witness agrees
with Lee as to language used; but none imply _profanity_. Silence in
this respect is, _prima facie_, the strongest possible legal evidence in
disproval of the charge.

One of the most eminent of American historians, in a footnote, thus
attempts to verify this vague tradition respecting Washington: “It is
related that when Lafayette visited this country in 1825, he was the
guest of Chief Justice Hornblower at Newark, N.J., and that while seated
on his front porch, one evening, Lafayette remarked that the only time
when he ‘ever heard Washington swear, was when he rebuked Lee at meeting
him on his retreat at Monmouth.’” The late Justice Bradley, who married
a daughter of Judge Hornblower, in a letter, thus meets this statement:
“Nothing of the kind ever occurred. Lafayette did not stay at Mr.
Hornblower’s, but at the principal public house of the city. There he
was visited; but the subject of the Battle of Monmouth was not
mentioned.”

Lafayette does not, in his Memoirs, make such a charge; nor in letters
to his wife, which were voluminous in sketches of his beloved commander.
Invariably, he exalts the character of Washington, as “something more
divine than human.”

An additional statement, however, is given, to indicate the intensity of
feeling and excitement of manner which characterized Washington’s
deportment on the occasion referred to. The late Governor Pennington, of
New Jersey, afterwards Speaker of the American House of Representatives,
was a pupil of Dr. Asahel Green, President of Princeton College, and
related this incident of his college career: “Dr. Green lectured on
Moral Philosophy, and used as his text-book Paley’s work on that
subject. When engaged on the chapter relative to profane swearing, after
Dr. Green had dilated on the subject, expanding Paley’s argument on the
uselessness and ungentlemanliness of the vice, and the entire absence of
any excuse for it, some roguish student put to him this question: ‘Dr.
Green, did not Washington swear at Lee, at the Battle of Monmouth?’ Now,
the doctor was present during the battle, in fact, a chaplain in the
service, although a young man, and was an enthusiastic admirer, almost
worshipper, of General Washington. When the question was put to him, he
drew himself up with dignity and said: ‘Young man, that great man did, I
acknowledge, use some hasty and incautious words at the Battle of
Monmouth, when Lee attempted to excuse his treacherous conduct: but, if
there ever was an occasion on which a man might be excused for such
forgetfulness, it was that occasion!’”

In reply to an insolent letter written by General Lee immediately after
the battle, in which he protested against “very singular expressions
used on the field, which implied that he was either guilty of
disobedience of orders, of want of conduct, or want of courage,”
Washington replied: “I received your letter, expressed, as I conceive,
in terms highly improper. I am not conscious of any very singular
expressions at the time of my meeting you, as you intimate. What I
recollect to have said, was dictated by duty and warranted by the
occasion.”

As at Kipp’s Bay, when Washington denounced the panic as “dastardly and
cowardly,” and tradition called that “profanity,”—thus, at Monmouth,
Washington rebuked Lee’s conduct. Lee’s letter, just cited, conveys his
estimate of Washington’s words and manner. He also testified, that it
was “_manner rather than words_” that gave him offence.

The Battle of Monmouth, from first to last, was a supreme test of
Washington the Soldier. From Monmouth, he marched to Brunswick, where he
rested his troops; thence to Haverstraw Bay; and finally, on the
twenty-second day of July, he established his summer headquarters at
White Plains.

NOTE.—Washington’s Military Order Book, from the 22nd of June to 8th of
August, 1779, in his own hand-writing, contains the following General
Order.

“Many and pointed Orders have been issued against that unmeaning and
abominable custom of swearing,—notwithstanding which, with much regret
the General observes that it prevails if possible, more than ever. His
feelings are continually wounded by the oaths and imprecations of the
soldiers whenever he is in hearing of them. The name of that Being
from whose bountiful goodness we are permitted to exist and enjoy the
Comforts of life is incessantly imprecated and profaned in a manner as
wanton as it is shocking. For the sake therefore of religion, decency
and order, the General hopes and trusts that officers of every rank
will use their influence and authority to Check a vice which is as
unprofitable as it is wicked and shameful. If officers would make it
an invariable rule to reprimand and, if that does not do—punish
soldiers for offences of the kind, it would not fail of having the
desired effect.”

CHAPTER XXIII.
THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE TAKES EFFECT.—SIEGE OF NEWPORT.

Upon the return of General Clinton to New York as the successor to
General Howe in command of “all the Atlantic Colonies from Nova Scotia
to West Indies, inclusive,” his outlook over the territories which fell
under his guardianship must have been that of faith rather than of
sight. With the exception of Staten Island and the British supply depot,
practically a part of New York, only one other post in the Northern
Department, that of Newport, R.I., retained a British garrison. It is
very certain that Clinton did not regard his exodus from Philadelphia
and his collision with Washington’s army at Monmouth with as much
enthusiasm as did Charles Lee, who, shortly after that battle, when
demanding a speedy court-martial, informed Washington that “this
campaign would close the war.” At any rate, Clinton was hardly settled
in his quarters, before tidings reached him that, on the eighth, a
formidable French fleet of twelve line-of-battle ships and four frigates
had made the Delaware Capes; and that one of them, the _Chinier_, had
conveyed to the American capital Monsieur Conrad A. Gerard, the first
French Ambassador to the United States of America. Silas Deane, one of
the American Commissioners at Paris, accompanied Monsieur Gerard.
Clinton had reason to rejoice in this tardy arrival. The fleet sailed
from Toulon, April thirteenth; but on account of contrary winds did not
pass Gibraltar until the fifteenth day of May. A voyage of ordinary
passage would have imperiled both Howe and Clinton; as four thousand
troops accompanied the squadron, and its naval force was, just at that
time, superior to that of Great Britain in American waters.

In order rightly to appreciate the campaign which almost immediately
opened, it is interesting to observe how the operations of both America
and Britain were controlled by incidents over which neither had control.
They also illustrate the contingencies which shape all military and
naval operations over a broad theatre of war. A superior British
squadron, under Admiral Byron, sailed from Portsmouth, England, as soon
as it was known that France would actively support the United States.
This was on the twentieth day of May. Upon receipt of news, supposed to
be trustworthy, that the French fleet had been ordered to the West
Indies only, the order was suspended in time for his return. Admiral
Byron, who had been ordered to relieve Admiral Howe, returned to
Plymouth. He did not actually sail with his fine fleet of twenty-two
ships until the fifth of June. Even then, the ships were scattered by
storms; and four of them, reaching New York separately, narrowly escaped
capture by the French just after Count d’Estaing left that port for
Newport.

The French fleet, when advised of the evacuation of Philadelphia,
immediately sailed for New York. Its arrival produced intense
excitement. The Annual Register (British) of that period reflects the
sentiment very fully. The British ships, then in port, were inferior in
number and weight of metal to those of France. Every available vessel of
sufficient capacity to carry heavy guns was immediately subsidized for
defence. The entire city was exposed to attack as when occupied by the
American army after its retreat from Long Island. It was a strange
change in the relations of the British and American forces in that
vicinity.

Washington, fully satisfied that Clinton could have no possible
inducement again to enter New Jersey, hoped, that through the presence
of the French ships and the accompanying troops he might wrest Newport
from British control, and planned accordingly. He did not, however,
overlook the possibility of even striking New York. He had been advised
by the French Ambassador of the very perilous relations of France in the
West Indies; and that the fleet which accompanied him to Philadelphia,
with the expectation of a decisive action there, must soon be released
for service elsewhere. Its change of destination to the port of New York
involved an unexpected delay upon the American coast, and contingencies
of a very serious character. American critics constantly complained that
the French fleet did not at once bombard New York City. Even some
military men of that period, and some historical speculators since that
time, would denounce the statement of the French Admiral, that the depth
of water was insufficient for his ships to approach the city, as a mere
excuse for not doing so. Washington sent Colonels Laurens and Hamilton,
confidential members of his staff, to learn the facts; and the most
experienced pilots were offered fifty thousand dollars if they would
agree to conduct the ships to the city. Hamilton’s Report read as
follows:

“These experienced persons unanimously declared, that it was impossible
to carry us in. All refused; and the particular soundings which I caused
to be made myself, too well demonstrated that they were right.”

Washington immediately turned his attention to Newport; and the French
fleet sailed at once to Rhode Island. Count d’Estaing cast anchor off
Point Judith, only five miles from Newport, on the twenty-ninth day of
July. As an indication of the condition of affairs at New York after his
departure, the following despatch of General Clinton to Lord Germaine,
bearing the same date, July twenty-ninth, is of interest, declaring: “I
may yet be compelled to evacuate the city and return to Halifax.”

The reader will involuntarily recall the events of July and August,
1776, only two years prior to the date of this despondent letter. Then
General Howe and Admiral Howe superciliously addressed communications to
“George Washington, Esqr.” Now, General Howe was homeward bound,
relieved from further service in America, because the same Washington
had outgeneraled him as a Soldier. And his brother, Admiral Howe, had
been granted his request to be transferred to some other sphere of naval
service.

As soon as the French squadron of Count d’Estaing sailed from New York,
Washington instructed General Sullivan, then in command at Providence,
R.I., to summon the New England militia to his aid for a combined attack
upon Newport; assigned Generals Greene and Lafayette to the command of
divisions; and ordered the brigades of Varnum and Glover to report to
Lafayette. These officers had served with Greene before Boston, and
Varnum was a member of Greene’s old company, the Kentish Guards, which
marched with him to Boston at the outbreak of war. The proposed
coöperation of French troops also made the assignment of General
Lafayette equally judicious.

The British garrison consisted of six thousand troops under
Major-General Pigot. On the fifth of August two French frigates entered
the harbor, and the British burned seven of their own frigates with
which they had controlled the waters, to avoid their capture. Details of
the siege of Newport, except as Washington bore relations to its
progress and its ultimate failure, are not within the purpose of this
narrative. It was unfortunate that General Sullivan so long detained the
French troops on shipboard; where, as one of their officers wrote, they
had been “cooped up” for more than five months. Their prompt landing
would certainly have averted the subsequent disaster; as storms of
unprecedented fury soon after swept the coast, with almost equal
distress to the land forces and those on the sea. In General
Washington’s letter, advising of the departure of Admiral Howe from New
York for Newport, he thus forecast the future: “Unless the fleet have
advices of reenforcements off the coast, it can only be accounted for on
the principle of desperation, stimulated by a hope of finding you
divided in your operations against Rhode Island.”

The American force was about ten thousand men. The tenth of the month
had been specifically designated for a joint movement; but General
Sullivan, without notifying the Count d’Estaing, anticipated it by a
day, and failed. Count d’Estaing was a lieutenant-general in the French
army; but agreed to waive his rank, and serve under Lafayette. The
report was current at that time, that ill-feeling arose between General
Sullivan and Count d’Estaing because of the precipitate action of
General Sullivan on this occasion. On the contrary, Count d’Estaing
understood that but two thousand troops were in the movement. He
promptly called upon General Sullivan to consult as to further
operations; and in a Report to Congress used this language, alike
creditable to his judgment and his candor: “Knowing that there are
moments which must be eagerly seized upon in war, I was cautious of
blaming any overthrow of plans, which nevertheless astonished me, and
which, in fact, merits in my opinion only praise; although accumulated
circumstances might have rendered the consequences very unfortunate.”

When he made his visit to General Sullivan, he left orders for the
troops that were to join in the land expedition to follow. He had no
knowledge, at that time, that Admiral Howe had received reënforcements,
and had left New York to attack the French fleet then at Newport. A
large number of the French seamen were upon Connanicut Island, on
account of scurvy, and the fleet was scattered, without apprehension of
an attack from the sea. A fog prevailed on the morning of the visit.
D’Estaing returned to his flag-ship, and as the fog lifted, there
appeared in the offing a British fleet of thirty-six sail. Admiral Howe
had been reënforced by a portion of Admiral Byron’s fleet, which arrived
in advance of its commander; and this force was superior to that of his
adversary. D’Estaing was alert. Quickly gathering his ships, in spite of
a rising gale, he succeeded in gaining and holding the “weather-gauge”
of Howe, who did not dare press toward the land against such an
advantage in D’Estaing’s favor. Both fleets were dispersed by the
tempest over fifty miles of ocean, repeatedly meeting with collisions,
and after several of his ships had been dismasted, Howe ran the gauntlet
of a part of the French squadron, and returned to New York.

On the twentieth, Count d’Estaing returned to Newport; and on the
twenty-second sailed for Boston to refit. A protest, signed by General
Sullivan and others, including John Hancock, who took an active part in
the operations of the siege, did not change his purpose. He had no
alternative. It is true that much bad feeling, soon proven to have been
absolutely unjustifiable, existed among Americans at the date of his
departure. Sullivan himself issued an intemperate order, which he
speedily modified, but not until it had gone to the public; in which he
used these words: “The general yet hopes the event will prove America
able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refuse to assist
in obtaining.”

Just at this time, a courier from Washington reached Sullivan’s
headquarters with the information that General Clinton had sailed from
New York with four thousand troops to reënforce the garrison of Newport;
and strongly intimated “the importance of securing a timely retreat from
the Island.” The suggestion was heeded. On the twenty-sixth, the heavy
baggage was removed. On the twenty-eighth, a council of officers decided
to withdraw to the north end of the island, until a messenger could be
sent to Boston to urge the return of the French fleet. Lafayette was the
messenger, and made the round trip in a few hours. Count d’Estaing very
properly held, that to put in peril the entire fleet of France, in
support of land operations so far from home and upon a strange coast,
was a practical disobedience of his orders, and unjust to his sovereign;
but, while he _would not return with his fleet_, he informed Lafayette,
that he “_was willing to lead the French troops, in person, to
Newport_,” and place himself “_under General Sullivan’s orders_.” In a
manly explanation of his course, and notwithstanding General Sullivan’s
proclamation, of which he was advised, he used this language: “_I was
anxious to demonstrate that my countrymen could not be offended by a
sudden expression of feeling; and that he who commanded them in America,
was, and would be, at all times, one of the most devoted and zealous
servants of the United States._”

By three o’clock of the twenty-ninth, the Americans occupied Quaker Hill
and Turkey Hill. These localities are still remembered for the gallantry
of their defenders during subsequent British assaults. At eleven
o’clock, Lafayette returned from Boston, and before twelve—as reported
by Sullivan—“the main army had crossed to the mainland with stores and
baggage.” As at Brandywine, Barren Hill and Monmouth, Lafayette remained
with the rear-guard, and brought away the last of the pickets in good
order, “not a man nor an article of baggage having been left behind.”

On the morning of the thirtieth, one hundred and five sail of British
vessels were in sight, bringing Clinton’s army to the rescue of the
garrison. Howe returned immediately to New York, although Gray made an
expedition from Newport which committed depredations at Bedford,
Fairhaven, Martha’s Vineyard, and all places from which American
privateers were fitted out for assaults upon British commerce. Admiral
Howe afterwards sailed for Boston, but being unable to entice Count
d’Estaing to so unequal a contest, returned again to New York. On the
first of November, Admiral Byron appeared off Boston with a large naval
force, but was driven to sea by a storm which so disabled his fleet that
he was compelled to go to Newport and refit. On his voyage from England
he had been compelled to stop at Halifax, and it has been well said of
this officer, that he chiefly “fought the ocean, during the year 1778.”

Count d’Estaing sailed for the West Indies on the third of November. The
first coöperation of the French navy in support of the United States had
resulted in no victories, on land or sea; but it had precipitated the
evacuation of Philadelphia, restricted the garrison of New York to
operations within the reach of the British navy, and was a practical
pledge of thorough sympathy with America in her struggle for complete
independence of Great Britain, and of the emphatic determination of
France to maintain, as well as acknowledge, that independence.

CHAPTER XXIV.
MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS, 1779.

The Headquarters of the American Army remained at White Plains until the
latter part of September. Upon reaching that post, immediately following
the Battle of Monmouth, after two years of absence, the American
Commander-in-Chief, profoundly appreciating the mutations of personal
and campaign experience through which himself and army had kept company
in the service of “God and Country,” thus expressed himself:

“The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous, that he must be worse
than an infidel that lacks faith; and more than wicked that has not
gratitude enough to recognize the obligation.”

Washington’s self-control of a strongly passionate natural temper, and
his equanimity under most exasperating ordeals, first were due to
maternal influence, and then to his faith in some guiding principle of
the inner self which enabled him to devote his entire faculties to
passing duty, unhampered by the many personal considerations which so
grievously worried many of his subordinates.

Upon the failure of operations against Newport, Sullivan reoccupied
Providence; Lafayette occupied Bristol, and afterwards withdrew to
Warren, beyond the reach of the British shipping. Greene, still acting
as Quartermaster-General, went to Boston, to superintend the purchase of
supplies for the French fleet. It is to be noticed, in connection with
the presence of the French fleet at Boston, that one of its officers,
Chevalier de Saint Sauveur, was killed while attempting to quiet an
affray between the French and some disorderly persons who visited a
French bakery. On the next day, the Massachusetts General Assembly,
ordered the erection of a monument to his memory.

Washington removed from White Plains to Fishkill, ever on the watch for
the defences of the Hudson and the assurance of constant communication
between New England and New York. On the tenth, he was at Petersburg. On
the twenty-seventh, he announced the disposition of the army for the
approaching winter.

The formal assignments of commands to posts and departments, at this
time, indicate his judgment of their relative value and exposure: “Nine
brigades are disposed on the west side of the Hudson River, exclusive of
the garrison of West Point; one of which will be near Smith’s Clove, for
the security of that pass, and as a reënforcement to West Point, in case
of necessity. The Jersey brigade is ordered to spend the winter at
Elizabethtown, to cover the lower parts of New Jersey. Seven brigades,
consisting of the Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania troops,
will be at Middlebrook; six brigades will be left on the east side of
the river and at West Point; three of which (of Massachusetts troops)
will be stationed for the immediate defence of the Highlands,—one at
West Point, in addition to the garrison already there, and the other two
at Fishkill and Continental Village. The remaining three brigades,
composed of the New Hampshire and Connecticut troops, and Hazen’s
Regiment, will be posted in the vicinity of Danbury, for the protection
of the country lying along the Sound; to cover our magazines lying on
Connecticut river; and to aid the Highlands, on any serious movement of
the enemy that way. The park of artillery will be at Pluckemin; the
cavalry will be disposed of thus: Bland’s Regiment at Winchester, Va.”

The significance of this last assignment will be apparent, if it be
remembered that the Hessian troops, captured at Saratoga, preferred to
remain in America; so that, when Burgoyne’s army reached Cambridge for
transportation to England, the foreign troops were sent to Virginia.
Some threats had reached the ever-attentive ear of the American
Commander-in-Chief, that an attempt would be made to release this
command and employ it in the field, at the south. Of the other cavalry
squadrons, Baylis’ was to occupy Frederick, or Hagerstown, Md.;
Sheldon’s, to be at Durham, Conn.; and Lee’s Corps, (Col. Harry Lee),
“will be with that part of the army which is in the Jerseys, acting on
the advanced posts.”

General Putnam was assigned to command at Danbury, General McDougall, in
the Highlands; and general headquarters were to be near Middlebrook.

No extensive field operations took place in the Northern States, after
the Battle of Monmouth. Several restricted excursions were made, which
kept the American Commander-in-Chief on the watch for the Highland
posts; but these became less and less frequent as the year 1778 drew
near its close. The British cabinet ordered five thousand of Clinton’s
troops to the West Indies, and three thousand more to Florida.

On the twenty-seventh of September, General Gray surprised Colonel
Baylor’s Light Horse at Tappan, on the Hudson, as completely as he had
surprised Wayne at Paoli. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, accompanied by
Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, confirmed their usual custom of warfare by
forays which brought little plunder and less intrinsic credit.
Cornwallis with five thousand men made an incursion into New Jersey,
between the Hudson and the Hackensack; and Lieutenant-General
Knyphausen, with three thousand men, operated in Westchester County,
between the Bronx and the Hudson, but with small acquisition of
provisions or other supplies.

On the eighth of October General Clinton, in writing to Lord Germaine,
says: “With an army so much diminished, at New York, nothing important
can be done, especially as it is weakened by sending seven hundred men
to Halifax, and three hundred to Bermuda.” On the fifteenth of October,
Captain Ferguson of the Seventieth British Foot, with three thousand
regulars and the Third New Jersey Volunteers (royalists) made a descent
upon Little Neck, N.J., where many privateers were equipped; surprised a
detachment of Count Pulaski’s American Brigade, and inflicted a loss of
fifty killed, but none wounded, including Lieutenant-Colonel the Baron
de Bose, and Lieutenant de la Borderie. Ferguson says, in his official
report: “It being a night attack, little _quarter_, of course, could be
given; so that there were only five prisoners.” Count Pulaski vigorously
pursued the party, inflicting some loss. This Ferguson was one of the
partisan leaders who was merciless in slaughter, as too many of the
auxiliary leaders of that period proved themselves to be when upon
irresponsible marauding expeditions.

Meanwhile, Indian massacres in Wyoming Valley, during July, and that of
Cherry Valley, on the eleventh of November, afterwards to be avenged,
multiplied the embarrassments of the prosecution of the war, and kept
the Commander-in-Chief constantly on the alert. The condition of
Clinton, in New York, had indeed become critical. The position of the
American army so restricted even his food-supplies, that he had to
depend largely upon England; and on the second day of December he wrote
again, and even more despondently, to the British Secretary of State: “I
do not complain; but, my lord, do not let anything be expected of me,
circumstanced as I am.” The British Cabinet had already indicated its
purpose to abandon further extensive operations in the Northern States,
and to utilize the few troops remaining in America, in regions where
less organized resistance would be met, and where their fleets could
control the chief points to be occupied. As early as November
twenty-seventh, Commodore Hyde Parker had convoyed a fleet of transports
to Savannah, with a total land force of thirty-five hundred men; and on
the twenty-ninth of December, Savannah had been captured.

The year 1778 closed, with the Southern campaign opened; but the
American Congress had no money; and the loose union of the States
constantly evoked sectional jealousies. Any thoughtful reader of this
narrative must have noticed with what discriminating judgment
enlistments were accommodated to the conditions of each section, and
that care was taken to dispose of troops where their local associations
were most conducive to their enthusiastic effort. Washington thus
forcibly exposed the condition of affairs, when he declared that “the
States were too much engaged in their local concerns, when the great
business of a nation, the momentous concerns of an empire, were at
stake.”

Bancroft, the historian, thus fitly refers to Washington at this
eventful crisis in American affairs: “He, who in the beginning of the
Revolution used to call Virginia his country, from this time never
ceased his efforts, by conversation and correspondence, to train the
statesmen of America, especially of his beloved State, to the work of
consolidation of the Union.”

At the close of 1778, General Washington visited Philadelphia; and thus
solemnly and pungently addressed Colonel Harrison, Speaker of the
Virginia House of Burgesses. After urging Virginia to send the best and
ablest of her men to Congress, he thus continues: “They must not slumber
nor sleep at home, at such a time of pressing danger; content with the
enjoyment of places of honor or profit in their own State, while the
common interests of America are mouldering and sinking into inevitable
ruin.... If I were to draw a picture of the times and men, from what I
have seen, heard, and in part know, I should, in one word say: that
idleness, dissipation, and extravagance, seem to have laid fast hold of
many of them; that speculation, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for
riches seem to have got the better of every other consideration and
almost of every order of men; that party disputes and personal quarrels
are the great business of the day; ... while a great and accumulating
debt, depreciated money, and want of credit, which in its consequences
is the want of everything, are but secondary considerations, if our
affairs wore the most promising aspect.... An assembly, a concert, a
dinner, a supper, will not only take men away from acting in this
business, but even from thinking of it; while the great part of the
officers of our army, from absolute necessity, are quitting the service;
and the more virtuous few, rather than do this, are sinking by sure
degrees into beggary and want.”

There is a touch of the pathetic, and an almost despondent tone with
which the closing paragraph of this utterance of the American
Commander-in-Chief closes, when he adds: “Our affairs are in a more
distressed, ruinous and deplorable condition, than they have been since
the commencement of the war.”

There was no danger from any extended movement of British armies in
force, and a consequent relaxation of effort pervaded the Colonies which
had been most largely called upon for men to meet immediate invasion.
This partial repose brought actual indolence and loss of enthusiasm in
general operations beyond the districts immediately exposed to British
attack. The winter garrison of Philadelphia, like that of Howe the
previous year, languished in confinement, grew feeble in spirit, and
weakened in discipline. Congress shared the enervating effect of the
temporary suspension of active hostilities; and it was not until the
ninth of March, 1779, that the definite establishment of the army, upon
the fixed basis of eighty battalions, was formally authorized.

The inaction of Clinton at New York gave the American Commander-in-Chief
an opportunity to turn his attention to the Indian atrocities
perpetrated the previous year in central New York; and on the nineteenth
of April he sent a force under Colonel Schenck, Lieutenant-Colonel
Willett and Major Cochran, which destroyed the settlement of the
Onondagas, on the lands still occupied by them, near the present city of
Syracuse in that State. An expedition was again planned for Canada, but
the wisdom of Washington induced Congress to abandon it. Confederate
money dropped to the nominal value of three or four cents on the dollar;
and Washington was constrained to offer his private estate for sale, to
meet his personal necessities. Congress seemed incapable of realizing
the impending desolation which must attend a forcible invasion of the
southern States, and Washington was powerless to detach troops from the
north, equal to any grave emergency in that section, so long as Clinton
occupied New York in force. General Greene, comprehending the views of
Washington and the immediate necessity for organizing an army for the
threatened States, equal to the responsibility, asked permission to
undertake that responsibility; but Congress refused to sanction such a
detail, although approved by Washington. This refusal, and the
consequent delay to anticipate British invasion at the South, protracted
the war, and brought both disaster and loss which early action might
have anticipated, or prevented. The utmost that could be secured from
Congress was permission for the detail of a portion of the regular
troops which had been recruited at the South, to return to that section
for active service.

Lafayette, finding that active duty was not anticipated, sailed from
Boston for France, January 11, 1779, upon the frigate _Alliance_, which
the Continental Congress placed at his disposal.

General Lincoln, of the American army—who had reached Charleston on the
last day of December, 1778—attempted to thwart the operations of the
British General Sir Augustine Prevost; but without substantial,
permanent results. The British, from Detroit, operated as far south as
the valley of the Wabash River, in the Illinois country; but Thomas
Jefferson, then Governor of Virginia, with troops raised in Virginia and
North Carolina, strengthened the western frontier and placed it in a
condition of defence, unaided by Congress.

The Middle States, however, had some experience of the desultory kind of
warfare which characterized the greater part of the military operations
of 1779. General Matthews sailed from New York late in April, with two
thousand troops and five hundred marines, laid waste Norfolk and
Portsmouth, Virginia, destroyed over one hundred vessels, and returned
to New York with seventeen prizes and three thousand hogsheads of
tobacco, without serious loss to his command. As if keen to watch for
the slightest opportunity of resuming active operations from New York,
and constantly dreading the nearness and alertness of the American
headquarters in New Jersey, Clinton, on the thirteenth of May, under
convoy of the fleet of Sir George Collier, surprised the small garrisons
at Verplanck’s and Stony Point, re-garrisoned them with British troops,
and retired to Yonkers, leaving several small frigates and sloops-of-war
to cover each post.

The American army was removed from Middlebrook to Smith’s Clove, on the
ninth. On the twenty-third, Washington removed his headquarters to New
Windsor, leaving General Putnam in command. General Heath was ordered to
Boston, and General Wayne was stationed between the Clove and Fort
Montgomery, near Dunderburg Mountain.

Such were the modified positions of the two armies of the north, at the
close of June, 1779.

[Illustration: Outline Map of Hudson River. Highlands.]

CHAPTER XXV.
MINOR OPERATIONS OF 1779 CONTINUED.—STONY POINT TAKEN.—NEW ENGLAND
RELIEVED.

In Fennimore Cooper’s interesting romance, “The Spy,” he furnishes
graphic delineations of the true character of those minor operations
about New York which were parts of General Clinton’s military
recreation, while he had too small a force to meet Washington’s compact
army in actual battle. Night forays and short excursions, under the
cover of small vessels-of-war and assured of safe retreat, were of
frequent occurrence. Mounted bands, officially known as the Queen’s
Rangers, had very large discretion in their movements and methods. They
galloped to and fro, at will, sometimes securing plunder, and sometimes
barely escaping with less than they started with. As a general rule,
some “spy” was on the watch, and their ventures were simply
mis-adventures. The American “cow-boys” were just as real characters,
although less organized; and each party carried on a small war of its
own, for the plunder realized. Clinton’s lucky capture of Stony Point
encouraged him to undertake other enterprises which weakened the
resources of the people, without enhanced prestige to the British
troops. On the first of July, Tarleton went out for twenty-four hours,
and on his return, made report. He had “surprised Sheldon’s cavalry,
near Salem; captured Sheldon’s colors [accidentally left in a barn],
burned the Presbyterian church, and received little loss.” He says: “I
proposed terms to the militia, that if they would not fire from the
houses, I would not burn them.” But the militia that gathered in his
rear made the expedition unprofitable. In less than eight hours
Washington learned of the excursion.

On the third day of July, General Tryon, under convoy of the fleet of
Sir George Collier, which had escorted General Clinton to Stony Point,
sailed with twenty-six hundred men for New Haven, Conn. On Sunday, July
fourth, when the people were observing the Sabbath and looking forward
with enthusiasm to the following morning and the observance of
“Independence Day,” Tryon published the following letter to the people
of Connecticut: “The ungenerous and wanton insurrections against the
sovereignty of Great Britain into which this colony has been deluded by
the artifices of designing men, for private purposes, might well justify
in you every fear which conscious guilt could form respecting the
intentions of the present movement. The existence of a single habitation
on your defenceless coast, ought to be a constant reproof to your
ingratitude.”

The landing of the various divisions at East Haven, Savin Rock, and
other points; and the vigorous defence upon the New Haven Green, by
Capt. James Hillhouse, in command of the students of Yale College, are
matters of familiar history. Fairfield, Green Farms, Huntington, Long
Island, Greenfield and Norwalk shared in this raid; but it only
embittered the struggle, and on the thirteenth the expedition returned
to New York. When Tryon’s expedition started, Washington was opposite
Staten Island; being on a tour of personal inspection of all posts along
the Hudson and the New Jersey approaches from the sea. On the seventh of
July, when advised that Tryon had sailed, he sent an express to Governor
Trumbull, and ordered General Glover, then at Providence, to coöperate
with the militia in case the enemy should make any descent upon the
Connecticut coast.

Meanwhile, and as the result of his tour of inspection, he planned a
counter movement to these demonstrations of the New York garrison.
During the six weeks’ occupation of Stony Point by the British
Grenadiers of the Seventieth Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Webster,
heavy guns had been mounted; breastworks and batteries had been built in
advance of the fort, and two rows of abatis crossed the slope leading to
the water. Washington, perfectly familiar with the post and the
additions to its defences, prepared a minute plan for its capture.
General Wayne, it will be remembered, had been posted near Dunderburg
Mountain, in the distribution of officers made on the twenty-third of
the month. Wayne entered into the plan with avidity. The detail of
troops made by Washington and the instructions given have interest, as
every possible effort was made to avoid failure or premature disclosure
of the design. Colonel Febiger’s Regiment, followed by Colonel Webb’s
(Lieutenant-Colonel Meigs commanding) and a detachment from West Point
under Major Hull, formed the right. Colonel Butler’s Regiment, and two
companies of North Carolina troops under Major Murphy, formed the left.
Colonel Lee’s Light Horse, three hundred strong, which had been
manœuvered during the day so as not to lead vagrants or spies to suspect
their destination, formed the covering party, and took a position on the
opposite side of a swamp near the post. The troops left Sandy Beach at
midnight and marched by single files, over mountains, through morasses,
and deep defiles. At eight o’clock of the sixteenth, the command was
within a mile and a half of the fort. Wayne made reconnoissance in
person, and at half-past eleven at night the advance was ordered. In
order to prevent any deserter from giving warning to the garrison, the
purpose of the expedition was not announced until the order to attack
could be given personally, by each officer, to his individual command.

The following order was at the same time communicated to the men: “If
any soldier presume to take his musket from his shoulder; attempt to
fire; or begin the battle till ordered by his proper officer, he shall
be instantly put to death by the officer next him.” (This implied, of
course, death by the sword.) The advance was to be “with fixed bayonets,
and unloaded muskets.” Each officer and soldier had been ordered to
place a white paper or cloth upon his cap, to distinguish him from an
enemy; and the watchword, to be shouted aloud whenever one detachment
reached its point of attack, as an encouragement to the others and a
terror to the garrison, was, “_The fort is ours!_” Pioneer parties,
carefully selected, wrenched away the abatis. The detachments moved
instantly, as if impelled by some invisible, resistless force. The two
assaulting columns met in the centre of the works almost at the same
moment. Wayne fell, seriously but not mortally wounded, while passing
the abatis. The entire American loss was fifteen killed, and
eighty-three wounded. The British loss was one officer and nineteen men
killed; six officers and sixty-eight men wounded; twenty-five officers
and four hundred and forty-seven men taken prisoners; two officers and
fifty-six men missing. The night was dark, and the difficulties of
crossing the morass below the fort, at nearly full tide, and clambering
up rugged cliffs thick with briars and underbrush, cannot be described.
A modern visitor will find it difficult enough to make the same trip, by
daylight. The stores, valued at $158,640, were divided by Washington’s
order among the troops, in proportion to the pay of officers and men.
The courteous treatment extended by him to the prisoners received very
gracious recognition from the British authorities. The faithfulness,
skill, and daring, and the good judgment with which Wayne comprehended
and carried out, in almost literal detail, the plans of Washington, were
greatly to his honor, and evoked most appreciative commendation from his
superior officer.

General Clinton promptly organized a force, and proceeded up the river
to recapture the post; but Washington, having dismantled it, decided
that its further retention was not of sufficient value to spare a
garrison for its permanent defence, and left it for occupation by the
British at their leisure.

Another excursion from New York by Tarleton, into Westchester County,
about the middle of August, was reciprocated under Washington’s orders,
with decided _éclat_ and success. On the nineteenth of August, Col.
Henry Lee crossed the Hackensack; moved down the Hudson River, and at
half-past two o’clock in the morning, at low tide, captured Paulus Hook,
where Jersey City now stands, nearly opposite Clinton’s New York
headquarters. Not a shot was fired by the storming party. Only the
bayonet was used. The Americans lost twenty, and the British lost
fifteen, besides one hundred and fifty taken prisoners.

For many months Washington had been watching for an opportunity of
sufficient relief from British activity, to punish the Indians who
perpetrated their outrages in the Wyoming Valley; and as early as the
sixth of March, he tendered to General Gates the command of an
expedition for that purpose. In this assignment he enclosed an order for
him to assume General Sullivan’s command at Providence, in case he
declined the expedition. General Gates, then at Boston, thus replied:
“Last night, I had the honor of your Excellency’s letter. The man who
undertakes the Indian service should enjoy youth and strength, which I
do not possess. It therefore grieves me that your Excellency should
offer me a command to which I am entirely unequal. In obedience to your
command I have forwarded your letter to General Sullivan; and that he
may not be one moment delayed, I have desired him to leave the command
with General Greene until I arrive in Providence.”

General Sullivan marched from Eastern Pennsylvania, reaching Wyoming
Valley on the thirty-first of July, and Tioga Point, N.Y., on the eighth
of August, with a force of five thousand men. Gen. James Clinton joined
him from the northern army. The brigades of Generals Poor, Hand, and
Maxwell, Parr’s Rifle Corps, and Proctor’s Artillery, all familiar to
the reader, formed the invading force. On the twenty-ninth day of
August, the Battle of Chemung was fought, near the present city of
Elmira, and the towns of the Six Nations were laid waste, including
orchards, gardens, houses, clothing, and provisions, indiscriminately.
There was nothing in this punishment of the Six Nations which commended
the American cause to their favor; but they did not regard the details
of these ravages as a part of Washington’s instructions. When the War
for Independence closed, and their alliance with the United States
became a fixed fact, Washington represented their ideal of the great
soldier—“_He had made the power of Britain to yield to his arms_.”
Governor Blackstone, Chief of the Senecas, Cornplanter, and Halftown,
the famous trio who made the treaty with Washington, were ever known as
“the friends of Washington.” A silver medal presented to Governor
Blackstone, which bore the simple inscription “Second Presidency of
George Washington,” was long esteemed as a most precious relic. Handsome
Lake, known as the “Peace Prophet,”—brother of Tecumseh,—made as a
tribute to Washington one of the most impressive utterances of his
mission among the Six Nations. Even as late as the Eleventh United
States Census, 1890, Washington’s name, alone of all the American
Presidents, was not found among the children’s names of the Six Nations;
so greatly was he held in reverence. They also engrafted into their
religion the myth that “he occupies a mansion at the gate of Paradise,
where he becomes visible to all who enter its portals and ascend to the
Great Spirit, and both recognizes and returns the salute of all who
enter.”

This devotion of his Indian admirers is hardly less valuable than the
tributes of Frederick the Great and other European soldiers and
statesmen to the qualities of Washington as a Soldier; and it
permanently redeems the name of Washington from any responsibility for
the excessive desolation with which the Six Nations were visited in the
expedition of 1779.

On the twenty-fifth of August, while Sullivan was upon this Indian
expedition, Admiral Arbuthnot arrived with reënforcements of three
thousand men, and relieved Sir George Collier in naval command. On the
twenty-first of September, Sir Andrew Hammond arrived with an additional
force of fifteen hundred men, from Cork, Ireland. At this juncture,
Count d’Estaing, having captured St. Vincent and Granada in the West
Indies, suddenly made his appearance off the coast of Georgia. Spain had
joined France in war against Great Britain; so that the whole line of
British posts, from Halifax to St. Augustine, was exposed to such naval
attacks as would divert the attention of Great Britain from the designs
of her allied enemies against her West India possessions.

Washington, upon the arrival of these British reënforcements,
strengthened West Point with additional works; but Clinton, even with
his large naval force, did not venture an attack upon that post, as had
been his intention when making requisition for more troops.

On the twenty-fifth of October, 1779, General Clinton abandoned Newport,
R.I.; then Verplanck Point; then Stony Point: and for the first time
since Washington landed in New York, in 1776, the whole of New England
and the entire stretch of the Hudson River, was unvexed by British steel
or British keel.

CHAPTER XXVI.
SHIFTING SCENES.—TEMPER OF THE PEOPLE.—SAVANNAH.

If the mind weary of the recital of events which by night and by day
burdened the soul and tasked the energies of the American
Commander-in-Chief to their utmost strain, it cannot but be refreshed by
evidence of his abiding confidence and patience in the cause of American
Independence, as the theatre of war enlarged and gradually placed every
colony under the weight of British pressure. The issue of two hundred
millions of paper money had indeed been authorized, and a loan was
invited abroad; but, as ever, men were wanted, and were not forthcoming.
Even the States which had longest borne the brunt of battle, and had
only just been relieved from its immediate dangers, seemed to weary
under the reaction of that relief, as if the storm had passed by, never
again to sweep over the same surface. It was also very natural as well
as true, that the pledge of French intervention and the gleam of the
oriflamme of France, did, in a measure, compose anxiety and lessen the
sense of local responsibility for such a contribution of troops from
every section as would make the nation as independent of France as of
Great Britain.

There was a sense of weariness, a tendency to fitful strokes of local
energy, without that overwhelming sense of need which first rallied all
sections to a common cause. Congress also seemed, at times, almost to
stagger under its load. But Washington, who sometimes grew weary and
groaned in spirit, and sometimes panted with shortened breath while
toiling upward to surmount some new obstruction, never, never staggered.
For him, there were “stepping-stones in the deepest waters.” For him,
though tides might ebb and flow, the earth itself forever kept its even
course about the guiding sun; and for him, the sun of Liberty was the
light of the soul. Every circling year but added blessings from its
glow, and energy from its power. The intensity of his emotion when he
penned those solemn truthful words to Harrison, showed but the impulse
of a spiritual power which the times demanded, but would neither
comprehend nor brook if from other sources than Washington’s majestic
will and presence. From the summit of his faith, he clearly indicated
with pen-point the driveling selfishness which postponed triumph and
made the chariot-wheels drag so heavily through the advancing war.

The scenes were suddenly shifted to the southern stage of operations.
New characters were to take the parts of some who had fulfilled their
destiny; but many of both men and ships that participated in the siege
of Boston itself, were still to act an honored part until the revolution
should be complete. The cities of Charleston and Savannah were to be
visited, as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia had been visited: not
with a paternal yearning for their return to a cheerful “mother-home”;
but in the spirit of a master dealing with overworked and fractious
slaves. But the slaves had both burst and buried their shackles; and
whether in city or country, on mountain or in valley, in forest or in
swamp—wherever animal life could exist, there, and everywhere, the
South, ever generous, ever proud, ever self-respecting, and ever loyal
to completions of duty, were to besprinkle the altar of their country
with life-blood, and consummate the War for American Independence upon
her consecrated soil.

The short-sighted critics of the North who had tried to play upon
sectional prejudice, that some one of their self-sufficient number might
till Washington’s saddle, began to wonder why he remained at his post in
New Jersey; why he did not surrender the northern command to one of
their number, and then go where his ancestral home was endangered and
the companions of his youth were to struggle for very life itself. But
the greatness of Washington the Soldier was never more apparent than
now. Calmly he sustained himself at this point of vantage; stretching
out his arm—in turn to soothe and warn, or to hurl defiance in the teeth
of foes or stragglers, but ever to nerve the nation to duty.

There was no costly throne set up at Morristown, or Middlebrook. There
was no luxury there. There were camp-cots, and camp-chairs, and usually,
rations sufficient for the daily need; but the centre of the upheaving
energies of American Liberty was there; and these energies were
controlled and directed, with no loss in transmission, by the immediate
presence of the Commander-in-Chief.

It will be remembered, at the very mention of Southern Colonies, or
Southern States, how peculiar was their relation to the mother country,
from the earliest British supremacy along the eastern Atlantic coast.
The Romanist, the Churchman, the Presbyterian, and the Huguenot, in
their respective search for larger liberty and missionary work, had
shared equally in a sense of oppression, before their migration to
America. They had much in common with the early settlers of the New
England coast. The Hollanders of New Jersey and the Quakers of
Pennsylvania, between the extremes, were not wholly absorbed in business
ventures. But all alike had additional incentives to a more independent
life, far removed from those social and artificial obligations which
reigned supreme in the Old World. There were indeed adventurers for
conquest, for wealth, and for political power, among them; and the
aristocratic usages which accompanied the royal prerogative were
fostered by the presence of slavery, so that they affected the vital
functions of the new Republic for generations. But, with the exception
of elements earlier noticed, the “ferment of American Liberty” was never
more decided, pure, and constant in Massachusetts than in Virginia; nor
more bold, desperate and defiant, among the Green Mountains of Vermont
than among the pine woods and palmetto groves of North and South
Carolina.

The closing months of the nineteenth century seem to have been reserved,
in the providence of God, for the consummation of that lofty
anticipation of Washington which Daniel Webster formulated in one
sublime utterance, “The Union; now and forever; One and Inseparable.”

And now, in the spirit of this memory of the pioneers of American
civilization, the narrative returns to the immediate burdens upon the
mind of Washington; as, in the closing months of 1779, we face the
mirror southward, and catch its reflections.

As the winter season of 1779–’80 drew on, and the ordinary hurricanes of
the West India storm-belt indicated a very restricted use of the French
navy in those waters, an effort was made to induce Count d’Estaing to
support an American attack upon Savannah. He responded promptly; and
besides sending five ships to Charleston to perfect details for the
combined movement of both southern armies, anchored his principal
squadron of twenty ships-of-the-line, two 50’s and eleven frigates,
outside the bar of Tybee Island, on the eighth day of September. Six
thousand French troops accompanied the fleet. Governor Rutledge of South
Carolina so actively aided the enterprise, that a sufficient number of
small craft were procured to land thirty-five hundred and twenty-four of
these troops at Bieulien, on Ossahaw Inlet, about twelve miles from
Savannah. The march was immediately begun. On the sixteenth, Count
d’Estaing demanded surrender of the city. The Legislature of South
Carolina adjourned. Militia replaced the regulars at Fort Moultrie, and
within four days, on the eighth, quite a strong force marched for
Savannah. General Lincoln left on the tenth. Meanwhile, the British
General Prescott had so actively destroyed bridges and obstructed roads,
that the Americans did not join the French troops until the sixteenth.
Trenches were not begun until the twenty-fourth of September, and the
difficulty of obtaining draught animals for hauling heavy siege-guns to
their proper position, still longer delayed the movement. The enthusiasm
of the American officers over the prospect of French coöperation led
them to assure Count d’Estaing that his delay before Savannah would not
exceed from ten to sixteen days; and upon this distinct assurance, he
had thus promptly disembarked his land forces. The French West Indies
had been left without naval support; and already an entire month had
passed with every probability that a British fleet from New York would
take advantage of the opportunity to recapture West India posts so
recently captured by the French. Abandonment of the siege, or an
assault, became an immediate necessity, especially as Count d’Estaing
had undertaken the enterprise, urged by Lafayette, with no other
authority than his general instructions as to America, and his deep
interest in the struggle.

The assault was made on the ninth day of October. It was desperate, with
alternate success and failure at different portions of the works; but
ultimately, a repulse. The British casualties were few, four officers
and thirty-six men killed; four officers and one hundred and fifteen men
wounded and missing. The French loss was fifteen officers and one
hundred and sixteen men killed; forty-three officers and four hundred
and eleven men wounded. Count d’Estaing was twice wounded, and Count
Pulaski, as well as Sergeant Jasper, so brave at Moultrie in 1776, were
among the killed. Colonel Laurens, aid-de-camp to Washington, was
conspicuous in the assault, as he proved himself at Newport, and
afterwards at Yorktown.

The French withdrew their artillery, and sailed on the twenty-ninth. The
Americans returned to Charleston. The result of the siege affected both
northern armies. Washington abandoned an attack upon New York, for which
he had assembled a large force of New York and Massachusetts militia.
Learning that Clinton was preparing to go South, either to Georgia or
South Carolina, he ordered the North Carolina troops to march to
Charleston in November, and the Virginia regulars to follow in December.
Clinton left New York on the twenty-sixth of December for Charleston
with seven thousand five hundred men, leaving Lieutenant-General
Knyphausen in command.

Washington again placed General Heath in command of the Highlands; sent
the cavalry to Connecticut, and with the remainder of the army marched
to Morristown, which for the second time became his winter headquarters.

CHAPTER XXVII.
THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780.—NEW JERSEY ONCE MORE INVADED.

The first act of General Washington upon reaching Morristown was to
invoice his resources and balance his accounts. He “called the roll” of
his army, made record of all supplies, and framed estimates for
forthcoming necessities. It was a depressing exhibit. Excluding South
Carolina and Georgia troops, which were assigned to their own home
department, the entire Muster, including all independent organizations
as well as drummers, fifers, teamsters, and all _attachés_ of every
kind, and upon the impossible assumption that every man on the original
Roll was still living, and in the service, footed up only twenty-seven
thousand and ninety-nine men.

The army was in huts. The snow was an even two feet in depth. All
defiles were drifted full, and hard-packed, well-nigh impassable. But a
few days more of the year remained. On the thirty-first, within a few
days, two thousand and fifty enlistments would expire. In ninety days
more, March the thirty-first, six thousand four hundred and ninety-six
more would expire. By the last of April, when active operations might be
anticipated, the total reduction by expiration of term of service would
reach eight thousand one hundred and fifty; by the last of September,
ten thousand seven hundred and nine; and, during the year, twelve
thousand one hundred and fifty.

The total force enlisted “for the war” was but fourteen thousand nine
hundred and ninety-eight men; and from the numbers already given, were
to be detailed the necessary number of artificers, armorers, wagoners,
quartermasters’ employees, and all those subordinate detachments which
reduce the fighting force of an army, as well as all casualties since
their first muster. To this is to be added the fact, that the several
States furnished their respective quotas at different times, and for
different periods, so that there was a constant addition of raw levies.
The army, in fact, had no opportunity to be thoroughly drilled and
disciplined, in all its parts. Such was the condition of the Army of the
United States, when the second campaign in the Southern States began.

Some reader may very naturally inquire why Washington did not attack the
British garrison of New York, after Clinton’s departure for Charleston
with so many troops. Critics at the time made complaint, and some
writers have indorsed their criticisms through ignorance of the facts.
An examination of the original Returns of Clinton, still found in the
British archives, gives the following result. This estimate was taken at
the time when Washington was preparing to make an attempt on New York.
The British force of that post and its dependencies was twenty-six
thousand seven hundred and fifty-six effectives. There were in Georgia
three thousand nine hundred and thirty men; and in Florida, one thousand
seven hundred and eighty-seven effectives. At Penobscot, Me., and at
Halifax, subject to call, there was an additional force of three
thousand four hundred and sixty, making an aggregated force of nearly
thirty-eight thousand men.

When General Clinton sailed with his seven thousand five hundred men,
the British force in the Southern Department became thirteen thousand
two hundred and sixty-seven; but it left in New York an effective
strength of twenty-one thousand and six men. And yet this garrison was
not without apprehension of attack. The winter was one of unexampled
severity. New York harbor froze until teams could cross upon the ice.
The British army was almost in a starving condition. Country supplies of
wood were cut off, until vessels at the wharves were chopped up for
fuel. The American army was not wholly idle. Lord Stirling, with
twenty-five hundred men, crossed to Staten Island on the ice, in spite
of the extreme cold, to attack that British supply-post; but a sudden
opening in the ice restored British communication with the city, and his
expedition failed of valuable results. On the twenty-fifth of January,
General Knyphausen sent a small detachment across the ice at Paulus Hook
and captured a company at Newark; while Lieutenant-Colonel Buskirk
crossed from Staten Island, and at Elizabethtown captured the picket and
burned the Town House, as well as the church of the Rev. James Caldwell,
Chaplain of Colonel Elias Dayton’s Regiment. On the second of February,
Lieutenant-Colonel Norton rode in sleighs, to attack a small American
post near White Plains; but, otherwise, the British as well as the
American army had enough to do to prevent freezing to death.

During the extreme freeze of January, 1780, the suffering in the
American camp is reported as “baffling description. The paths were
marked by blood from the feet of barefooted soldiers.” Bancroft
and Irving have left nothing to add here. General Greene,
Quartermaster-General, reported on the eleventh of January: “Such
weather I never did feel. For six or eight days there has been no
living abroad. We drive over the tops of fences. We have been
alternately out of meat and bread for eight or nine days past, and
without either for three or four.” It was a time, also, when the
royalist element gained some hope; and Clinton’s Official Return
for December reports a force of four thousand and sixty-four
Provincials then in British pay. The women of New Jersey came to
the rescue of the suffering soldiers of Washington in a manner
that exhausts all possible forms of recognition. Clothing and
feeding the naked and hungry was their constant employment.
Washington says of New Jersey, that “his requisitions were
punctually complied with, and in many counties exceeded.”

During this entire period there was one supervision exercised by the
American Commander-in-Chief which knew no interruption, whatever the
inclemency of the weather. Every pass to his strongly intrenched camp,
and every bold promontory, or distinct summit, that observed or
commanded approach, was guarded, and watch-fires were instituted for
signals of danger, or warning to the militia. The perpetuation of his
strongholds in New Jersey saved the Republic.

During this well-nigh desperate condition of his army, and the
increasing peril to the Southern Department, he made one more Report of
his condition to Congress, and it belongs to this narrative as a signal
exhibit of his wisdom and courage, as well as his discernment of the
increasing lethargy of sections not in immediate danger from British
aggression. It reads as follows: “Certain I am, unless Congress are
vested with powers by the separate States competent to the great
purposes of the war, or assume them as a matter of right, and they and
the States act with more energy than they have done, our cause is lost.
We can no longer drudge along in the old way. By ill-timing in the
adoption of measures, by delays in the execution of them, or by
unwarranted jealousies, we incur enormous expenses and derive no benefit
from them. One State will comply with a requisition of Congress; another
neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and they differ in the
manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always
working up hill. While such a system as the present one, or rather, the
want of one, prevails, we shall be ever unable to apply our strongest
resources to any advantage.... I see one head gradually organizing into
thirteen. I see one army branching into thirteen, which instead of
looking up to Congress as the supreme controlling power of the United
States, are considering themselves dependent upon their respective
States.”

On the third of April, Washington again wrote in such plain terms of
“the mutinous spirit, intense disgust, and absolute desperation of his
small, famished, ragged, and depleted command,” that after hot debate, a
committee of three was reluctantly sent to advise with him as to
measures of relief.

That the reader may more fully appreciate the temper of some
narrow-minded men of that period, and at so fearful a crisis, the
following extract from a letter to the Count de Vergennes is cited. In
referring to the simple question of appointing a committee to visit
their Commander-in-Chief, this American writes: “It was said that the
appointment of a committee would be putting too much power in a few
hands, and especially in those of the Commander-in-Chief; that his
influence already was too great; that even his virtues afforded motives
for alarm; that the enthusiasm of his army, joined to the kind of
dictatorship already confided to him, put Congress and the United States
at his mercy; that it was not expedient to expose a man of the highest
virtues to such temptations.”

General Schuyler, then in Congress, John Matthews and Nathaniel Peabody
served on this committee, and as the result, Congress resolved to
equalize the pay of the army, and make more systematic efforts to
recruit and maintain it.

On the twelfth of February, Congress affirmed the sentence of a
court-martial which sentenced Arnold, then commanding at Philadelphia,
to a reprimand for giving passes to disaffected citizens and using
public transportation for private use. The reprimand was mildly
administered: but it made Arnold very angry. His life of ostentatious
display, his extravagant habits, and his loose views of moral
obligation, aroused public indignation; and the mere matter of the
charges upon which he was sentenced would not have appeared so grave,
except that he was universally suspected of using his official position
for private emolument.

During all these struggles to keep his army together and prevent British
operations out from New York, Washington was watchful of the operations
then in progress at the South. General Clinton cleared the ice without
difficulty, and left New York on the twenty-ninth of December, as
already stated, expecting to reach his destination within ten days; but
a storm dispersed his fleet, and one vessel foundered. Nearly all of his
cavalry, and all of his artillery horses, perished. Although they
reached Tybee Island, their first rendezvous, within the month, they did
not leave for St. John Island, thirty miles below Charleston, until the
tenth of February; and did not take up their position before Charleston,
between the Ashley and Cooper rivers, until the twelfth of March. It
appears from documentary data that the retention of Charleston,
garrisoned by only two thousand two hundred regulars and a thousand
militia, was largely induced by the inhabitants of the city. It is true
that Commodore Whipple of the American navy regarded it as defensible;
but Washington did not concur in that opinion. He held that the same
force which would be required to hold the city, could do far greater and
better service by remaining without the city, besides being more
independent in securing supplies and coöperating with militia and other
forces seeking their support. Besides this, the defences had been
prepared to resist approach by sea, and not by land. An extract from
Tarleton’s history of the campaigns of 1780–’81, is as follows,
indicating the purpose of the movement itself: “The richness of the
country, its vicinity to Georgia, and _its distance from Washington_,
pointed out the advantages and facility of its conquest.”

The British forces broke ground on the first of April; on the nineteenth
established their second, and on the sixth of May, their third,
parallel. On the twelfth, the British took possession of the city. The
schedule of prisoners prepared by Major André, of General Clinton’s
staff, included all citizens, as prisoners of war. The Continental
troops, including five hundred in hospital, did not exceed two thousand.
General Clinton followed up this success by an absurd proclamation to
the people, and wrote a more absurd letter to Lord Germaine, which is
valuable to the reader, for the interest which attaches to its terms in
connection with subsequent operations of Clinton, upon his return
northward. It is as follows: “The inhabitants from every quarter declare
their allegiance to the king, and offer their services in arms. There
are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners, or in
arms with us.” On the fifth of June, General Clinton returned to New
York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command.

During the absence of Clinton from New York, and with the opening of
spring, Washington’s position became more offensive to the garrison of
New York. Amid all his gloom on account of the condition of his army, a
bright episode gladdened his heart and nerved him for action. He had a
visitor. The Marquis de Lafayette, who reached Boston on the 28th of
April, by the frigate _Hermione_, entered Washington’s headquarters on
the morning of May 10th. He announced, that the Count de Rochambeau was
on the seas with the first division of an army, coming to support the
American Republic. This French army was not directed to report to the
American Congress, nor to take orders from that body. Washington opened
the communication which Lafayette was intrusted to deliver, in advance
of the arrival of Count de Rochambeau, and the following is a copy of
the instructions to that officer: “The French troops are to obey
Washington; to admit the precedence of American officers of equal rank;
on all formal occasions to yield the right to the American army; and
bear in mind that the whole purpose is, heartily and efficiently, to
execute the will of the American Commander-in-Chief.”

On the fourteenth, after four days of confidential conference,
Lafayette, bearing a letter from Washington, reported to the President
of Congress for duty, preserving, for the time, the secret that the
troops of France were already on their way to America.

But what a condition of affairs awaited the arrival of these gallant
allies! The American army had already lost more in numbers than was
anticipated by Washington in the official Report, already noticed. On
the second of April, his entire force on both sides of the Hudson River
consisted of only ten thousand four hundred, rank and file; and of these
two thousand eight hundred had only two weeks to serve. Lord Rawdon had,
indeed, taken from the New York garrison two thousand five hundred men
as a reënforcement to General Clinton; but nearly twelve thousand
remained behind. Although this increase of Clinton’s command afforded
Washington small ground for hope of success in the Southern Department,
he realized that it was impossible for him to abandon his present
position. But he immediately despatched southward the Maryland and
Delaware troops, which had fought in nearly every battle with the skill
of veterans, and the First Artillery, all under the command of the Baron
De Kalb.

While sparing these well disciplined troops, Washington’s position
involved vastly increased responsibility. On the twenty-fifth day of
May, two Connecticut regiments mutinied, declaring that they would
“march home,” or at least secure subsistence at the point of the
bayonet. Handbills were printed in New York and distributed, urging the
soldiers to desert. “This mutiny,” says Washington, most impressively,
“has given infinite concern.” There was no money except the Continental,
and of this he says: “It is evidently impracticable, from the immense
quantity it would require, to pay them as much as to make up the
depreciation.” He further adds: “This is a decisive moment, one of the
most. I will go further, and say, the _most_ important America has ever
seen. The Court of France has made a glorious effort for our
deliverance, and if we disappoint its intentions by our supineness, we
must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind; nor can we, after,
venture to confide that our allies will persist in an attempt to
establish what we want ability, or inclination, to assist them in.”

General Greene thus addressed the Colonel of the Morristown militia:
“There are no more provisions than to serve one regiment, in the
magazine. The late terrible storm, the depth of the snow, and the drifts
in the roads, prevent the little stock from coming forward which is in
distant magazines. The roads must be kept open by the inhabitants, or
the army cannot be subsisted. Unless the good people lend their
assistance to forward supplies, the army must disband. The army is
stripped naked of teams, as possible, to lessen the consumption of
forage. Call to your aid the overseers of the highways, and every other
order of men who can give despatch to this business. P.S.—Give no copies
of this order, for fear it should get to the enemy.”

There was indeed reason for this considerate postscript. The mutinous
spirit which had been evoked by sheer starvation, had been
misinterpreted by the British officers in New York; and General
Knyphausen must have been very proud of an opportunity to distinguish
himself, in the absence of General Clinton, when he conceived of the
poor American soldier as an unfortunate hireling waiting for a
deliverer. He would become their Moses and conduct them back to the
royal father’s embrace. He organized his missionary venture carefully.
Accompanied by Generals Tryon, Matthews, and Sterling, he crossed from
Staten Island to Elizabethtown Point. (See map.) He had a twofold plan
in mind. He would demonstrate to the people of New Jersey that their
half-frozen, hungry, and ragged countrymen with Washington, could not
protect their homes from hostile incursions out from New York; and also
supposed, in case he were very prompt and expeditious, that he might
pounce, like a hawk, upon the coop of the arch-rebel himself. General
Sterling led the advance, starting before daybreak. The column was
hardly distinguishable, company from company, so heavy were the sea-mist
and darkness. Suddenly, one shot, and then another, came from an
invisible American outpost. General Sterling received the first, which
ultimately proved fatal, and was removed to the rear. Knyphausen took
his place at the front. The rising sun dispelled the fog, but disclosed
the assembling of Colonel Elias Dayton’s Regiment, from various
quarters. The anticipated surprise, and a corresponding welcome from the
American soldiers, did not occur. The militia retired after a few
scattering shots, and Simcoe’s Queen’s Rangers dashed forward, followed
by the British and Hessian Infantry. As by magic, the militia
multiplied. Fences, thickets, orchards, and single trees were made
available for as many single riflemen; and at every step of advance, one
and then another of his majesty’s troops were picked off. During the
march to Connecticut Farms, a distance of only seven miles, no friendly
tokens of welcome appeared in sight. Puffs of smoke, and the rifle’s
sharp crack, could hardly be located before similar warnings succeeded,
and details to take care of the wounded soon began to thin out and sag
the beautiful lines of the British front. Still, the column advanced
toward Springfield, and directly on the line of travel which led
immediately to Washington’s encampment.

At this point, Dayton’s Regiment, which had been so troublesome as
skirmishers, hastened step, came into regimental order, and quickly
crossed the Rahway bridge. But, to the surprise of the advancing enemy,
the division of General Maxwell was in battle array, silently inviting
battle. General Knyphausen halted to bring up artillery and his full
force of five thousand men. He stopped also, to burn Connecticut Farms,
because, “shots from its windows picked off his officers and guides.”
Among the victims to his responsive fire, was the wife of Chaplain
Chapman of Dayton’s Regiment. The news of her death spread, as a spark
over pine or prairie regions. When within a half mile of Springfield,
the Hessian general again halted for consultation as to his next order.
Cannon sounds began to be heard from various directions, answering
signal for signal. The ascending smoke of beacon-fires crowned every
summit. The whole country seemed to have been upheaved as if by some
volcanic force. Maxwell’s Brigade was just across the Rahway, and less
than one-third the strength of the Hessian’s command. But General
Knyphausen was too good a soldier not to peer through Maxwell’s thin
line, and recognize, in solid formation, the entire army of Washington,
waiting in silence to give him a hearty soldier’s reception. The day
passed; and for once, both armies were at full halt. Knyphausen, for the
time, was Commander-in-Chief of both, for it devolved upon him alone to
order battle. He was filling the part of Pharaoh, and not that of Moses.

One monotonous sound echoed from a summit near Morristown. It was the
“minute-gun,” which had been designated by the American
Commander-in-Chief as a continuous signal whenever he wanted every man
within hearing, who had a gun, to come at once to his demand. Night came
on, and with it, rain; but still the minute-gun boomed on, with solemn
cadence, and instead of smoking hill-tops, the blaze of quickened
beacons illumined the dull sky as if New Jersey were all on fire. The
night covered the Hessians from view, and when morning came they
attempted to regain Staten Island; but the tide retired, leaving boats
stranded and the mud so deep that even cavalry could not cross in
safety. Having heard on the first of June that Clinton was _en route_
for New York, Knyphausen simply strengthened the New York defences and
awaited the arrival of his superior officer.

On the tenth, Washington wrote: “Their movements are mysterious, and the
design of this movement not easily penetrated.” As a matter of fact,
there were few operations of the war which bore so directly upon the
safety of the American army and the American cause, as the operations
before Springfield during June, 1779; and the conduct of both armies
indicated an appreciation of their importance.

On the thirteenth of June, Congress, without consulting Washington,
appointed General Gates to the command of the Southern Department. Gates
had spent the winter at his home in Virginia, but eagerly accepted this
command, although he had lacked the physical vigor to engage in the
Indian campaign in New York. His most intimate friend and companion,
both in arms and in antagonism to Washington, Charles Lee, sent him one
more letter. It was a wiser letter than earlier correspondence had been,
and decidedly prophetic. It closed with something like pathetic
interest: “Take care that you do not exchange your Northern laurels for
Southern willows.”

At this time, it did seem as if the bitter cup would never be withdrawn
from the lips of the American Commander-in-Chief; for he had neither
provisions for his army, nor the means of making welcome and comfortable
his expected allies and guests from over the sea.

CHAPTER XXVIII.
BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD.—ROCHAMBEAU.—ARNOLD.—GATES.

Sir Henry Clinton returned from Charleston to New York on the
seventeenth day of June, 1780. He must have contrasted his report made
to the British War Office, of the “conquest of South Carolina,” with
that made by General Knyphausen to himself, of the recent experience of
British operations in New Jersey. But Clinton was ever a man of action,
prompt and energetic. He felt deeply the long protracted embarrassment
of his position, while holding such a vast and responsible command
without sufficient resources for pressing exigencies. He knew, and
Washington, with a soldier’s instinct, knew that Clinton knew, that
there was no safety for New York, and no possibility of effective
operations out from New York, so long as a strong, faithful American
army held the fastnesses of New Jersey, and a vigorous espionage of the
Hudson River region was maintained. The sweep of Washington’s arm was
largely shaping the future destiny of America from very humble
headquarters; but no less firmly and decisively.

[Illustration: Battle of Springfield Operations from Staten Island]

Clinton did not remain idle, nor undecided, a single day. Troops were
embarked upon transports immediately; and all suitable demonstrations
were made as if an organized movement against West Point were designed.
Washington placed his entire army in motion and advanced one division
eleven miles, toward Pompton, on the twenty-second, _en route_ for the
Hudson, to be prepared for whatever might be the scheme of his
adversary. His confidential agents in New York were always quick to
report details of British movements. Washington invariably exacted
“minute” details; and from these he interpreted the general plans of the
enemy. In this instance, the embarking of field batteries instead of
heavy guns, which could always be procured from ships, satisfied him
that his own headquarters and the destruction of his army were Clinton’s
real objectives.

He was prepared for Clinton’s choice of the alternate movements.
Although one division had been advanced in the direction of the Hudson
River, Generals Greene, Maxwell, and Stark, with Harry Lee’s cavalry,
and a strong force of militia, had been left in position near
Springfield. Few battles of the American Revolution have received less
attention, as among the decisive battles of the war, than that of
Springfield, N.J. And yet few were more strikingly illustrative of the
strategic wisdom with which Washington had planned the successful
prosecution of the war, as early as 1776.

On the morning of the twenty-third, at five o’clock, the British army,
having crossed from Staten Island in two columns, began its advance.
(See maps, “Battle of Springfield,” and, “Operations in New Jersey.”)
Its force consisted of five thousand infantry, nearly all of their
cavalry, and eighteen pieces of artillery. General Clinton, with the
right wing, advanced along the Springfield road with vigor, but
deliberately, as if this were his principal line of attack. Upon
approaching the first bridge near the Matthews House, he was obliged to
halt until his guns could gain a suitable position, since Colonel
Angel’s Rhode Island regiment, with one gun, commanded the bridge over
the Rahway, and occupied an orchard which gave good cover. At first, the
British guns were aimed too high and did little execution. By fording
the stream, which was not more than twelve yards wide, Angel’s position
was turned, so that he was crowded back to the second bridge, over a
branch of the Rahway, where Colonel Shreve resisted with equal obstinacy
and bravery. By reference to the map it will be seen that General
Greene, as well as Dickinson’s militia on a slight ridge in the rear of
Shreve, was admirably posted for reserve support. Angel lost one-fourth
of his men and was ordered to fall back, with Colonel Shreve, to the
high ground occupied by Generals Maxwell and Stark, near a mill. Colonel
Dayton’s Regiment was also distinguished for its gallant conduct.
Washington Irving refers very pleasantly to the part taken in the action
by Chaplain Caldwell, whose church had been burned on the twenty-fifth
of January and whose wife had been killed on the sixth of June, as
follows: “None showed more ardor in the fight than Caldwell the
chaplain, who distributed Watts’s psalm and hymn books among the
soldiers when they were in want of wadding, with the shout: ‘Put Watts
into them, boys!’”

The other British column had for its special objective the seizure of
the pass leading to Chatham and Morristown. Major Lee’s cavalry, and a
picket under Captain Walker, had been posted at Little’s bridge, on the
Vauxhall road, and Colonel Ogden’s Regiment covered them. General Greene
found that he could not afford to hold so extensive a front, and
concentrated his force at other positions eminently strong and capable
of vigorous defence. The remainder of Maxwell’s and Stark’s brigades
also took high ground, by the mill, with the militia force of Dickinson,
on the flanks.

General Knyphausen led this column in person. But the Vauxhall bridge
was as closely contested as had been that at Springfield. Greene shifted
his position, in view of this second attack and its pronounced
objective, to a range of hills in the rear of Byron’s tavern, where the
roads were brought so near, that succor might be readily transferred
from one to the other. The movement was admirable, scientific, and
successful. Tn his report to Washington, he says: “I was thus enabled to
reach Colonel Webb’s Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunton commanding, and
Colonel Jackson’s Regiment, with one piece of artillery, which entirely
checked the advance of the enemy upon the American left, and secured
that pass.”

The Battle of Springfield had been fought with coolness and unfaltering
bravery, and had been won. General Clinton burned Springfield, crossed
to Staten Island at midnight, withdrew his bridge of boats, and reached
his headquarters in safety. His loss, as reported by contemporary
journalists, was placed at about one hundred and fifty men; but
comparison of his Reports and Musters, before and after the expedition,
make the killed, wounded, and missing twice that number. The American
loss was one officer and twelve non-commissioned officers killed, five
officers and fifty-six privates wounded, and nine missing; “Captain
Davis and the militia not reporting.”

General Clinton’s report says: “I could not think of keeping the field
in New Jersey; and wished to land the troops and give a camp of rest to
an army of which many corps had had an uninterrupted campaign of
fourteen months.”

For five years, New Jersey had been a constant theatre of active war. It
was indeed the strategic centre of the war for American Independence.
The bravery of her soldiery, whose homes were constantly menaced, was
only surpassed by the heroism of her women. These, constantly exposed to
every possible desolation that attended the marching and
counter-marching of contending armies, never flagged, flinched, nor
failed, until her delivery was at last complete.

On the night of June 24, 1780, the day after the Battle of Springfield,
Washington, upon return to his headquarters, addressed another call to
Governors of States for their full quota, under new assignments, and
awaited with interest further tidings from the progress of the French
allies, then on the sea. This Battle of Springfield had vindicated his
confidence in the Continental troops; and, as in all armies, some
regiments proved invariably reliable, under whatever conditions they
fought.

On the tenth day of July, 1780, the first division of the French army
sent by Louis XVI., in aid of American Independence, consisting of six
thousand troops, landed at Newport, R.I. All were under the command of
Lieutenant-General Rochambeau, accompanied by Major-General Chastellux,
a relative of Lafayette, and escorted by seven heavy battleships, under
command of Chevalier de Ternay.

Washington immediately submitted a project for the capture of New York;
but on the thirteenth of July Admiral Graves readied that city with six
ships-of-the-line, which gave to the British such superiority of ships
and guns, that the plan was postponed to wait the arrival of the second
French division, of equal numbers, which was supposed, at the time, to
be already on its way from France. But Sir Henry Clinton was not
inactive. The time to strike was before the French could unite with
Washington and take their place in the American army. He planned a
surprise, and advanced with eight thousand troops as far as Huntington,
L.I., for a descent upon Newport; but Washington put his entire army in
readiness to advance upon New York. Clinton, having learned that
Rochambeau, advised by Washington, had gone into camp in a strong
position, and with the rapidly assembling militia would be superior in
force, recalled his troops. He converted the expedition into a naval
blockade of Newport, if possible thereby to cut off the second division
of the French army, upon its arrival within American waters.

The Count de Rochambeau, with a soldier’s exactness, soon caught the
fire of Washington’s zeal, and well comprehended the situation of
American affairs generally. So intense is his delineation of the
condition of things as he observed them, that if penned by Washington
himself, nothing could have been added. His letter to the Count de
Vergennes, dated on July sixteenth, only six days after his landing in
America, reads, in part, as follows: “Upon our arrival here, the country
was in consternation; the paper money had fallen to sixty for one.... I
spoke to the principal persons of the place, and told them, as I write
to General Washington, that this was merely the advance guard of a
greater force, and that the king was determined to support them with his
whole power. In twenty-four hours their spirits rose, and last night,
all the streets, houses, and steeples were illuminated, in the midst of
fireworks and great rejoicing.... You see, Sir, how important it is to
act with vigor.... Send us troops, ships, and money; but do not depend
upon this people, nor upon their means. They have neither money nor
credit. Their means of resistance are but momentary, and called forth
when they are attacked in their homes. Then they assemble themselves for
the moment of immediate danger, and defend themselves. Washington
sometimes commands fifteen thousand, and sometimes three thousand men.”

The restriction of the French fleet to Narragansett Bay so immediately
after its arrival, led Washington and Rochambeau to postpone operations
against New York; and it is proper to notice the fact that no news was
received of the second division of French troops until late in the fall,
when it was reported as blockaded in the home port of Brest. A
proclamation was made and published by Lafayette, with the sanction of
Washington, announcing to the Canadians that the French would aid them
to expel the British troops from their country. The object of this
proclamation was chiefly to divert the attention of the garrison of New
York from a proposed joint attack upon that city, which Washington kept
always in view. The expedition was never seriously entertained; but
General Clinton, on the thirty-first of August, as anticipated by
Washington, forwarded a copy of the paper to Lord Germaine, while at the
same time he placed before him, in confidence, a proposition of a
different kind, from which he derived a strong expectation of British
gain, through the acquisition, by purchase, of the principal Hudson
River military post, West Point itself.

Washington had advised General Arnold that he would soon be tendered an
active command. But that officer, pleading as excuse continued suffering
from his wounds, expressed a preference for the command of a military
post. After urgent solicitation of himself and his friends, he was
authorized to designate the post of his choice. As the result, on the
third of August, he was assigned to the command of “West Point and its
dependencies, in which all are included, from Fishkill to King’s Ferry.”
At the date of this assignment of Arnold to a post which was rightly
regarded by Washington as most vital to ultimate American success, a
clandestine correspondence had already passed between Generals Clinton
and Arnold, through the medium of Major John André.

The attention of the reader is naturally retrospective, as the name of
André reappears in connection with that of Arnold. He had been taken
prisoner at St. John’s; was once on parole at Montreal, and familiar
with Arnold’s habits and the outrageous abuse of his public trust with
which, there, as afterwards at Philadelphia, he had been charged. André
also knew of his gambling, his extravagance, his ambition, and his
reckless daring, generally. His own personal antecedents during the
grand ovation tendered to General Howe, upon that officer’s departure
from Philadelphia, in which he had so conspicuously figured as escort to
Miss Shippen, afterwards the wife of Arnold, acquire special interest.
He was, and long had been, a confidential member of General Clinton’s
staff. Neither Clinton nor André could conceive, for a moment, that
Arnold and his wife, formerly Miss Shippen, would betray André’s
confidence; or, if the proposition to betray West Point failed, that
André would be allowed to suffer.

On the twenty-fifth of August, General Clinton wrote to Lord Germaine as
follows: “At this new epoch of the war, when a foreign foe has already
landed, and an addition to it is expected, I owe it to my country, and I
must in justice say, to my own fame, to declare to your lordship that I
become every day more sensible of the utter impossibility of prosecuting
the war in this country without reënforcements.... We are, by some
thousands, too weak to subdue the rebellion.” On the twenty-seventh of
September, Lord Germaine wrote in reply: “Next to the destruction of
Washington’s army, the gaining over of officers of influence and
reputation among the troops would be the speediest way of subduing the
rebellion and restoring the tranquillity of America. Your commission
authorizes you to avail yourself of such opportunities, and there can be
no doubt that the expense will be cheerfully submitted to.” The British
archives, then secret, show that Lord Germaine was kept fully advised of
the whole scheme. On the thirtieth of August, Arnold solicited an
interview with some responsible party, in order definitely to settle
upon the price of surrendering West Point to Great Britain. André was
selected, as mutually agreeable to both Clinton and Arnold. On the
eighteenth of September, Arnold wrote, advising that André be sent up to
the sloop-of-war _Vulture_, then anchored in Haverstraw Bay, promising
to send a person with a flag of truce and boat to meet him. Clinton
received the note on the next day. Under the pretence of an expedition
to Chesapeake Bay, freely made public, a body of picked troops embarked
on frigates. André reached the _Vulture_ on the twentieth. On the
twenty-first he landed, met Arnold, accompanied him first to the Clove,
and then to the house of Josiah Holt Smith. (See map, “Highlands of the
Hudson.”) Smith’s antecedents were those of a royalist; but the secret
was too valuable to be intrusted to such a man; and subsequent
investigations failed to connect him with any knowledge of the
conspiracy. The terms of purchase were, in so many words: “Pay, in gold,
and a brigadier-general’s commission in the British Army.”

The terms were settled and the bargain was closed. Besides knowledge of
the plans of the post and its approaches, André was advised of the
signals to be exchanged; the disposition of the guards; and the points
of surest attack which would be within the immediate control of
disembarking grenadiers and sharp-shooters. The _Vulture_ had dropped
down the river with the tide too far to be promptly reached; so that
André crossed the river, and having proper passports attempted to save
time by returning to New York by land. While passing through Tarrytown,
he was challenged, stopped, examined, and made prisoner. On the second
of October, he was executed as a spy. America grieved over his fate, and
no one with more of pity than did Washington. His soul still felt sore
over the fate of Nathan Hale, and after a solitary hour of anguish in
spirit, he suggested to General Clinton a method of escape for André. He
offered to exchange him for Benedict Arnold. Clinton could not do this
without loss of honor to himself and Great Britain. André had to die.
Washington, with tender consideration and profound sympathy, gave to
Mrs. Arnold a safe conduct and escort to her former home in
Philadelphia, and shared the sentiment of all who knew her best, that
the wife was not the confidante of her husband’s treason. Lafayette most
tenderly announced his sympathy in her behalf.

General Greene was immediately assigned to command West Point and its
dependencies. The garrison was also entirely changed. The works were
skilfully modified and strengthened, so that any plans in the possession
of Clinton would be useless; and Washington took post, in person, at
Brakeness, near Passaic Falls, N.J.

It will be remembered that Baron De Kalb left Morristown on the
sixteenth of the previous April with reënforcements for the Southern
army. On the sixth of July, he reached Buffalo Ford and Deep River, N.C.
On the twenty-fifth, Gates, who had been assigned to command of the
Southern Department, joined him. “Away from Washington,” Baron De Kalb
experienced deeply the sentiment of unreasonable, but perhaps natural
jealousy of foreign officers which pervaded portions of the American
army; and General Caswell, in defiance of positive orders to report to
Baron De Kalb, marched directly to Camden and reported to General Gates.
It had been De Kalb’s purpose, as an experienced soldier, to advance by
Charlotte and Salisbury, where supplies could be readily obtained.
“General Gates,” says Irving, “on the twenty-seventh, put what he called
the ‘Grand Army’ on its march through a barren country which could offer
no food but lean cattle, fruit, and unripe maize.” The Battle of Camden,
or “Sanders’ Creek,” which followed, was a complete rout. Baron De Kalb
fought with the utmost confidence and bravery, but fell upon the field,
after having been eleven times wounded. Any support whatever, on the
part of Gates, would have secured victory, or a well-balanced action.
Gates overestimated his own force; refused to examine his
Adjutant-General’s statement, or to consider the advice of his officers,
who understood exactly the true condition of the crude material which he
styled his “Grand Army,” and fled from the battlefield at full speed. He
did not halt until reaching Charlotte, sixty miles away; and by the
twentieth reached Hillsborough, one hundred and eighty miles distant,
without gathering a sufficient force to form an escort. He said that he
was “carried away from the field by a torrent of flying soldiers.” His
self-conceit and presumption, like that of Lee, on account of having
once served in the British army, and his utter want of every soldierly
quality, except the negative sense of pride in having a personal
command, were exposed to the American people without delay. He claimed
to have made an attempt to rally his troops; but he had no influence
whatever. During the Burgoyne campaign, he was never under fire; and
Lee’s unheeded warning did indeed secure to his memory the wreath of
“Southern willow, in place of that of laurel” which Congress had placed
upon his brow, when the laurel had been earned by the brave and
patriotic Schuyler. The troops of Delaware and Maryland alone would have
saved the battle, if properly supported by Gates. The gallant Delaware
Battalion which fought with De Kalb, was almost destroyed. The Maryland
troops lost in killed, wounded and prisoners nearly four hundred, out of
a total of fourteen hundred; but to their perpetual honor it is to be
recorded, that of the number swept away in the final retreat of the
whole army, seven hundred non-commissioned officers and privates
reported for duty by the twenty-ninth of the month.

On the eighth of October, the Battle of King’s Mountain was fought; and
the names of Shelby, Campbell, McDowell, Sevier, and Williams are still
associated with descendants from the brave participants in that battle.
It partially offset the disaster at Camden, and was an inspiration to
Washington in the adjustment of his plans for Greene’s movements. It
compelled Cornwallis to delay his second invasion of North Carolina; and
Tarleton, in writing, says of this people, that “the counties of
Mecklenburg and Rowan were more hostile to England than any others in
America.”

Gates endeavored to gather the remnant of his army; and, before his
leaving to answer before a Court of Inquiry ordered by Congress, about
twenty-three hundred men assembled. On inspection, it was found that but
eight hundred in the whole number were properly clothed and equipped.

The Southern campaign became one of petty operations mostly. Neither
Cornwallis, Tarleton, Rawdon, nor Balfour made progress in subjugation
of the people. Sumner, although wounded at Black’s Plantation on the
twentieth of October, gained credit in several lesser expeditions. But
universal British failures disappointed the expectations of the British
Commander-in-Chief at New York. The loss of Charleston, in the opinion
of Washington and the best military critics, was not without its
compensations; and the collapse of Gates was an illustration of
Washington’s knowledge of men and his foresight as a Soldier.

CHAPTER XXIX.
A BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF THE THEATRE OF WAR.

As a bird’s overlook of its wide field of vision cannot comprehend all
objects within range, except in turn, so must the patient reader come
back again to stand behind Washington and look over his shoulder as he
points the glass of observation to the activities which he in turn
surveys; to catch with him their import, and so far as possible strain
the eye of faith with him, while with slowly sweeping supervision he
comprehends all that the war for American Independence has intrusted to
his care. Mountain and valley, ocean and river, marsh and morass, cave
and ravine, are representatives of the various scenes of agitation and
conflict. The entire land is in excited expectancy, and everywhere war
is waged; but beyond and over all these contending conditions he
discerns the even horizon of assured victory. And just now, immediately
at hand, under his very feet, as well as wherever partisan warfare tears
life out of sweet homes for the sprinkling of liberty’s altar, there is
indescribable pain and anguish. His heart bleeds with theirs; for he is
one with them, and they are one with him, in the willing consecration
which generations yet unborn shall forever honor.

And as the year 1780 came to its close, he drew his sword-girth tighter,
and seemed to stand many inches taller, as he embraced, in one reflected
view, the suffering South and the half-asleep North. Between the two
sections there was some restless impatience over such exacting
contributions of fathers, brothers and sons, to regions so far from
home; and just about his humble sleeping quarters, were suffering,
faithful sharers of his every need.

Tidings of the failure of Gates, with its disaster and its sacrifices of
brave legions, did not reach the Commander-in-Chief until September. But
it was impossible for him to send troops in sufficient numbers to cope
with the army of Cornwallis. The second French division, so long
expected (and never realized), was reported to be blockaded at home, and
of no possible immediate use to America. The British fleet still
blockaded Newport. Lafayette did indeed elaborate a plan for an assault
upon New York, Fort Washington, and Staten Island; but the plan was
abandoned through lack of boats for such extended water-carriage. There
were few periods of the war where more diverse and widely separated
interests required both the comprehensive and the minute consideration
of the American Commander-in-Chief.

A few illustrations represent the many. Forts Ann and George were
captured, by a mixed force of Canadians, Indians, and British regulars,
in October. Fort Edward was saved through the sagacity of Colonel
Livingston, who, having a garrison of only seventy-nine men, averted
attack by sending to the commanding officer of Fort George an
exaggerated report of his own strength, with a promise to come to his
aid. This was designed to be intercepted, and the British regulars had
actually approached Saratoga, before their return to Lake Champlain. An
excursion from Fort Niagara into the Mohawk Valley desolated the homes
of the Oneidas, who were friendly to the United States. Some leaders in
certain Vermont circles corresponded with British officials in Canada;
and such was the uneasiness which prevailed along the northern and
northwestern frontier, that three regiments had to be sent to Albany, to
compose the unrest of that single region. On the seventh of November,
Washington wrote: “The American army is experiencing almost daily want;
while the British army derives ample supplies from a trade with New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, which has by degrees become so common
that it is hardly thought a crime.”

Early in September, a commercial treaty between Holland and the United
States came under consideration, and Colonel Laurens was sent as
commissioner to conduct the negotiations abroad; but he was taken
prisoner and locked up in the Tower of London, to stand trial on the
charge of high treason against the British crown. His papers were
seized, and on the second day of December, Great Britain declared war
against Holland.

The condition of Great Britain, at that time, was indeed one of supreme
trial; and it is well for the people of America to honor the inherent
forces of British liberty which vindicated, under such adverse ruling
conditions, the very principles for which their brethren fought in
America. It was the one solemn hour in British history when America, if
fostered as a trusted and honored child, would have spared England long
years of waste in blood and treasure. Not only were Spain and France
combined to plunder or acquire her West India possessions; but Spain was
pressing the siege of Gibraltar. Both Denmark and Sweden united with
Catharine of Russia to adopt the famous system of “Armed Neutrality,”
which declared that “free ships make free goods,” and that “neutrals
might carry any goods or supplies wherever they pleased, with complete
immunity from search or capture.” That was a deadly blow at British
commerce. Even in the East Indies, her crown was one of thorns. Hyder
Ali swept through the Province of Madras, and Warren Hastings was
contending for very life, to save British rule in India from overthrow.
France sent aid to Hyder Ali, as well as to America; and was thus, at
this very period, unexpectedly limited in her anticipated contributions
to the army of Washington.

Domestic excitements increased Britain’s burdens. Eighty thousand
volunteers had been enrolled in Ireland in view of apprehended French
invasion. A large number of her statesmen favored “peace at any price.”
The wonderful capacity of Great Britain to withstand external force and
to uncover the equally wonderful resources at her command, ought to have
convinced her rulers that on the same basis, and by a legitimate
inheritance, the American Colonies were unconquerable.

On the eleventh of November, General Sullivan, having resigned, took his
seat in Congress. On the twentieth, Washington thus addressed him:

“Congress will deceive themselves, if they imagine that the army, or a
State, that is the theatre of war, can rub through another campaign as
the last. It would be as unreasonable to suppose that because a man had
rolled a snow-ball till it had acquired the size of a horse, he might do
it until it was the size of a house. Matters may be pushed to a certain
point, beyond which we cannot move them. Ten months’ pay is now due the
army. Every department of it is so much indebted that we have not credit
for a single expense, and some of the States are harassed and oppressed
to a degree beyond bearing.... To depend, under these circumstances,
upon the resources of the country, unassisted by foreign bravery, will,
I am confident, be to lean upon a broken reed.”

At a conference held with Count Rochambeau at Hartford, Conn., it had
been proposed by General Sullivan, “that the French fleet seek Boston,
and the French army join Washington”; but this was impracticable. The
stay at Newport prevented the operations of the British blockading fleet
elsewhere along the southern Atlantic coast; and thus far, restricted
British movements generally. As early as October sixteenth, General
Leslie left New York with three thousand troops; landed at Portsmouth,
Va., and joined Cornwallis at Charleston late in December. A son of
Rochambeau left Newport on the eighteenth of October, ran the gauntlet
of the British fleet, in a gale, safely reached France, and urged
“_immediate additional aid of men, arms, and money_.” The Chevalier de
Ternay died at Newport, on the fifteenth of December, and was succeeded
by Chevalier Destouches. Colonel Fleury, who will be remembered as
distinguishing himself at Fort Mifflin and Stony Point, joined
Rochambeau. These gallant French officers, like their sovereign, were so
devoted to Washington, and entertained such absolute faith in his
capacity as patriot and soldier, that the narrative of his career during
the war would savor of ingratitude if their faithful service were not
identified with his memory. At that time, there was a design under
consideration, but never matured, for the association of Spain with
France in active operations on the American coast.

Meanwhile, Washington proposed another plan for the reconstruction of
the army, through the consolidation of battalions; thereby reducing
their numbers, but fixing a permanent military establishment. It will
appear from a letter written to Franklin on the twentieth of December,
that he had reached a point, where, even under so many embarrassments,
he felt that ultimate success was not far distant. The letter reads as
follows: “The campaign has been thus inactive, after a flattering
prospect at the opening of it and vigorous struggles to make it a
decisive one, through failure of the unexpected naval superiority which
was the pivot upon which everything turned. The movements of Lord
Cornwallis during the last month or two have been retrograde. What turn
the late reënforcements which have been sent him may give to his
affairs, remains to be known. I have reënforced our Southern army
principally with horse; but the length of the march is so much opposed
to the measure that every corps is in a greater or less degree ruined. I
am happy, however, in assuring you that a better disposition never
prevailed in the Legislatures of the several States than at this time.
The folly of temporary expedients is seen into and exploded; and
vigorous efforts will be used to obtain a permanent army, and carry on
the war systematically, if the obstinacy of Great Britain shall compel
us to continue it. We want nothing but the aid of a loan, to enable us
to put our finances into a tolerable train. The country does not want
for resources; but we want the means of drawing them forth.”

The new organization was to consist of fifty regiments of foot, four of
artillery, and other bodies of mounted men, including in all, thirty-six
thousand men, fairly apportioned among the States. But not more than
half that number were ever in the field at one time, and the full
complement never was recruited. The prejudice against a regular army of
any size was bitter; and Hildreth states the matter very truthfully when
he says, that “Congress, led by Samuel Adams, was very jealous of
military power, and of everything which tended to give a permanent
character to the army.” Mr. Adams was sound in principle, for he not
only realized that the Colonies had suffered through the employment of
the British army to enforce oppressive and unconstitutional laws, but
equally well knew that a larger army than the State needed for its
protection against invasion and the preservation of the peace, was
inimical to true liberty.

Money was still scarce. A specie tax of six millions was imposed, and
the sixth annual campaign of the war drew near its close. John Trumbull,
Jr., became Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, _vice_ Robert H.
Harrison who became Chief Justice of Maryland; and Colonel Hand became
Adjutant-General, _vice_ Scammon, resigned. Morgan was promoted, and
with General Steuben and Harry Lee’s horse, was ordered to the Southern
Department, accompanied by Kosciusko as engineer, _vice_ Du Portail,
captured at Charleston.

On the twenty-eighth of November, Washington designated the winter
quarters for the army, establishing his own at New Windsor. The
Pennsylvania Line were near Morristown; the Jersey line, at Pompton; the
Maryland horse, at Lancaster, Penn.; Sheldon’s horse, at Colchester,
Conn., and the New York regiments at Fort Schuyler, Saratoga, Albany,
Schenectady, and other exposed Northern posts. This distribution of
troops, from time to time indicated, enables the reader to understand
how a wise disposition of the army, when active operations were
practically suspended, equally enabled Washington to resume active
service upon the shortest notice.

On the eighth of October, General Greene, who had been tendered the
command of the Southern Department, _vice_ Gates, submitted to
Washington his plan of conducting the next campaign. He desired,
substantially, “a flying army”; that is, “one lightly equipped, mobile
as possible, and familiar with the country in which operations were to
be conducted.” To secure to Greene prompt support in his new command,
Washington addressed letters to Gov. Abner Nash, of North Carolina, Gov.
Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, and Gov. Thomas S. Lee, of Maryland,
soliciting their cordial coöperation in the work of the new
Department-Commander. Greene began his journey on the twenty-ninth day
of November, attended by Baron Steuben. He stopped at each capital to
urge the necessity of immediate action, and secured the services of
Generals Smallwood and Gist, of Maryland and Delaware, for recruiting
service in those States. Upon reaching Virginia, he found that State to
be thoroughly aroused for her own defence. General Leslie, whose
departure from New York has been noticed, had fortified both Norfolk and
Portsmouth, and this increase of the British forces had very justly
alarmed the people. Washington had already sent Generals Muhlenburg and
Weedon to Virginia to organize its militia, and they were endeavoring to
confine the forces of Leslie within the range of his fortified
positions. These officers had also served under General Greene, making
their assignment eminently judicious. The matter of supplies, of all
kinds, became a matter of the greatest concern, if operations were to be
carried on effectively against Cornwallis at the South: while also
maintaining full correspondence with the troops of the centre zone, and
the North. The consolidation of regiments left many officers without
commands; but the selection of a competent Quartermaster-General became
an imperative necessity. Col. Edward Carrington was selected, and of
him, Chief Justice Marshall says: “He was eminently qualified to
undertake the task of combining and conducting the means of the
Quartermaster-General’s department; obeyed the call to the office; and
discharged it with unequalled zeal and fidelity.”

For the purposes of this narrative, it is only necessary to indicate the
general conduct of operations southward, so far as they illustrate the
wisdom of Washington in the selection of officers, and the instructions
under which he made use of their services. He concurred with Greene in
his general plan; and the initiative was undertaken with as frequent
exchange of views, through express messengers or couriers, as was then
practicable. Orders were issued for Colonel Carrington to explore the
country of the Dan, the Yadkin, and Catawba rivers, and to make himself
acquainted with the streams into which they discharged themselves.
Kosciusko, Engineer-in-Chief of Greene, was charged with selecting
proper places for defending or securing safe fording-places. A principal
storehouse and laboratory was established at Prince Edward’s
Court-House, and Baron Steuben was charged with maintaining the supply
of powder from the manufactories, and of lead from the mines of
Fincastle County. Such was the general preparation for the forthcoming
campaign.

General Greene reached Charlotte on the second of December, and relieved
Gates, who had been awaiting his arrival for the surrender of his
command. After exchange of the proper courtesies, Gates returned to his
farm. The wisdom of Washington’s choice in the assignment of General
Greene may be seen by the citation of some of Greene’s letters written
at that crisis.

To Jefferson he writes thus: “I find the troops in a most wretched
condition, destitute of every necessity, either for their comfort or
convenience, and they may be literally said to be naked. It will answer
no good purpose to send men here in such a condition.... There must be
either pride, or principle, to make a soldier. No man will think himself
bound to fight the battles of a State that leaves him to perish for want
of clothing, nor can you inspire a soldier with the sentiment of pride
while his situation renders him more an object of pity, than of envy.
The life of a soldier, in the best estate, is liable to innumerable
hardships: but when these are aggravated by the want of provisions and
clothing, his condition becomes intolerable; nor can men long contend
with such complicated difficulties and distress. Death, desertion, and
the hospital, must soon swallow up an army under such circumstances; and
if it were possible for men to maintain such a wretched existence, they
would have no spirit to face their enemies, and would invariably
disgrace themselves and their commander. It is impossible to presume
discipline, when troops are in want of everything: to attempt severity,
will only thin the ranks by more heavy desertion.”

To Marion he wrote: “I am fully sensible that your service is hard, and
your sufferings great; but how great the prize for which we contend! I
like your plan of frequently shifting your ground. It frequently
prevents surprise, and perhaps the total loss of your party. Until a
more permanent army can be collected than is in the field at present, we
must endeavor to keep up a partisan war, and preserve the tide of
sentiment among the people in our favor, as much as possible. _Spies are
the eyes of an army, and without them, a general is always groping in
the dark._”

In all these letters and the measures undertaken, Greene reflects the
principles upon which his Commander-in-Chief carried on the war, and it
was his highest pride so to act, as if under the direct gaze of
Washington. On the twentieth of December, having been detained by rains
at Charlotte, he abandoned his huts; and by the twelfth of January,
1781, was encamped on the banks of the Peedee River, awaiting the
opening of the final campaign of the war for American Independence. Col.
Christopher Greene, as well as Colonel Washington, Harry Lee, and
Morgan, had already joined him, and Washington had thus furnished to the
Southern army his ablest general and such choice details of officers and
men as had been faithful, gallant, and successful throughout the war.

CHAPTER XXX.
THE SOLDIER TRIED.—AMERICAN MUTINY.—FOREIGN Judgment.—ARNOLD’S
DEPREDATIONS.

Nothing new or unfamiliar to the American student can be said as to the
military operations of the British, French and American armies during
the closing year of the war for American Independence; but they may be
so grouped in their relations to Washington as a Soldier, that he may
stand forth more distinctly as both nominal and real Commander-in-Chief.
His original commission, it will be remembered, was accompanied by the
declaration of Congress that “they would maintain and assist him, and
adhere to him, with their lives and fortunes, in the cause of American
liberty.” After the Battle of Trenton, when Congress solemnly declared
that “_the very existence of Civil Liberty depended upon the right
execution of military powers_,” it invested him with dictatorial
authority, being “confident of the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of
George Washington.” And in 1778, after the flash of the Burgoyne
campaign had spent itself, and the experiences of the American army at
Valley Forge attested the necessity for a fighting army under a fighting
soldier, Washington was again intrusted with the reorganization of the
army, both regular and militia, in respect of all elements of
enlistment, outfit, and supply.

From the date of his commission, through all his acts and
correspondence, it has been evident, that he has been perfectly frank
and consistent in his assignments of officers or troops, either to
position or command; and his judgment of men and measures has had
constant verification in realized experience.

It was very natural for European monarchs, including Louis XVI., to
behold in the very preëminent and assertive force of Washington’s
character much of the “one-man power” which was the basis of their own
asserted prerogative; and there were astute and ambitious statesmen and
soldiers of the Old World who hoped that a new empire, and a new
personal dynasty, would yet arise in the western world, to be their
associated ally against Great Britain herself. They did not measure the
American Revolution by right standards; because they could not conceive,
nor comprehend the American conception of, a “sovereign people.”

There was one foreign soldier in the American army, and of royal stock,
who must have clung to Washington and his cause, with most ardent
passion as well as obedient reverence. Nothing of sacrifice, exposure,
or vile jealousy, whether in closet, camp, or field, amid winter’s
keenest blasts or summer’s scorching fires, was beyond the life and soul
experience of Thaddeus Kosciusko. His name, and that of Pulaski, so dear
to Washington, and so true to him, should be ever dear to the American;
and in the history of their country’s fall, there should ever be
cherished a monumental recognition of ancient Poland and the Pole.

It was one of the most striking characteristics of Washington’s military
life that he recognized and trusted so many of these heroic men whose
lives had been nursed and developed in the cause of liberty and country.
Such men as these beheld in Washington a superhuman regard for _man, as
man_; and the youthful Lafayette almost worshipped, while he obeyed,
until his entire soul was penetrated by the spirit and controlled by the
example of his beloved Chief. Some of these, who survived until the
opening of the year 1781, were able to realize that its successive
months, however blessed in their ultimate fruition, were months in which
Washington passed under heavier yokes and through tougher ordeals than
were those of Valley Forge or Yorktown. For the first time during the
Revolutionary struggle, the American citizens who did the fighting might
well compare their situation under the guardianship of the American
Congress, with that of Colonial obligation under the British Parliament
and the British crown.

The fluctuations of numbers in the American army seemed very largely to
depend upon its vicinity to endangered sections. Remoteness from the
seaboard induced indifference to expenditures for the navy, because
British ships could not operate on land; and seaboard towns, which were
constantly in peril, insisted upon retaining their able-bodied militia
within easy reach, until armed vessels could be built and assigned for
their protection. The same unpatriotic principle of human nature
affected all supplies of food and clothing. It has already been noticed
that Washington was profoundly grieved that country people courted the
British markets of New York, and that British gold was of such mighty
weight in the balance of “stay-at-home comfort,” against personal
experience in some distant camp. Starvation and suffering could not fail
to arouse resistance to their constraints. The condition of the army was
one of protracted agony. Lafayette wrote home to his wife as follows:
“Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer one-tenth
part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens, to support hunger,
nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the
condition of our soldiers,—the hardiest and most patient that are to be
found in the world.”

Marshall states the case fairly when he asserts that “it was not easy to
persuade the military, that their brethren in civil life were unable to
make greater exertions in support of the war, or, that its burdens could
not be more equally borne.”

On New Year’s Day, January 1, 1781, the Pennsylvania line (Continentals)
revolted, and Captain Billings was killed in the effort to suppress the
outbreak. Thirteen hundred men, with six guns, started for Philadelphia.
Wayne was powerless to control even his own command; and so advised
Washington. The Commander-in-Chief was at first impelled to leave New
Windsor and go in person to the camps; but knowing that he had troops
who would obey him, whatever conditions might arise, he addressed
himself to this state of affairs with a dignity, deliberation, and
sympathy, so calm and yet so impressive, that he both retained the full
prestige of his position, and secured full control of the disaffection.
He allowed passion to subside; and then resolved to execute his own
will, at all hazards. The details of his mental struggle, and the
precautionary measures taken by him to master the situation, with eager
and excited veterans at his back to enforce his will, would fill a
volume. Recognizing the neglect of State authorities to furnish their
own respective regiments with food, clothing, and money, he proudly,
sublimely, and with a dignity beyond any heroic act of the battlefield,
called upon the Governors of the Northern States to send their militia,
at once, _to take care of Clinton’s army in New York_, if they wished to
prevent the invasion and waste of their own peaceful homes. In other
words, as plainly as he could do it, he made the “stay-at-homes”
responsible for their own further immunity from battle scenes and battle
waste.

This mutiny was indeed, a natural outbreak, inevitable, irresistible! It
did not impair loyalty to country. The emergency overwhelmed every
purely military obligation in that of self-preservation—of life itself.
It did impair discipline, and did disregard authority, for the time; but
in its manifestations had many of the elements of lawful revolution. The
State _first failed in duty_ to its defenders. For such a cause, the
Revolution had its first outbreaks at Lexington and Concord. Washington
was never so great in arms, as when with calm trust and steady nerve he
faced this momentous issue. Besides his demand upon the States most
exposed to British incursions, for men, he demanded money. Massachusetts
and New Hampshire promptly gave twenty-four dollars _extra_, in specie,
to each enlisted man. Colonel Laurens was appointed as special agent to
France, to secure a loan. Eventually, he succeeded; but Count de
Vergennes, when advised of his mission, wrote on the fifteenth of
February: “Congress relies too much on France for subsidies to maintain
their army. They must absolutely refrain from such exorbitant demands.
The great expenses of the war render it impossible for France to meet
these demands, if persisted in.” Franklin, then at Paris, wrote to his
daughter, Mrs. Balche: “If you see Washington, assure him of my very
great and sincere respect, and tell him that all the old Generals here
amuse themselves in studying the accounts of his operations, and approve
highly of his conduct.” Lafayette also wrote, urging full supplies of
men and money; with most pointed assurances that the “American States
would surely realize success, and be amply able to refund all advances
which might be made by the king.”

Up to this time, the individuality of the States, in spite of
Washington’s repeated appeals for entire unity of purpose and action on
the part of all, had been jealously maintained. A partial relief was
afforded, when, on the second of March, 1781, the Articles of
Confederation finally went into effect, Maryland having yielded her
assent on the previous day. Four years and four months had elapsed since
their formal adoption and submission to the several States for
acceptance.

All the insubordination of the American army before referred to, was
well known at British headquarters in New York. That of the previous
year had disappointed both Clinton and Knyphausen, who invaded New
Jersey, it will be remembered, hoping to reap some benefits from its
expression; but now that it assumed such unmistakable signs of armed
revolt, they doubled their interest in its movements. General Clinton,
mindful of his error on a former occasion, simply watched Washington. He
received information of the general insubordination as early as
Washington, and on the morning of the twenty-third, sent messengers to
the American army with propositions looking to their return to British
allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and
his agents were retained in custody. In writing to Lord Germaine, he
says: “General Washington has not moved a man from his army [near West
Point] as yet; and as it is probable that their demands are nearly the
same with the Pennsylvania line, it is not thought likely that he will.
I am, however, in a situation to avail myself of favorable events; but
to stir before they offer, might mar all.”

At this period, the influence of the American Commissioners—Adams,
Franklin and Jay, was proving very beneficial to the American cause with
the Governments of Spain and Holland, as well as with France; and
Colonel Laurens, upon his arrival at Paris, after release from prison,
pretty plainly assured the French Ministry that it “would be much wiser
policy to advance money to America, than to risk such an accommodation
with England as would compel America, so near her West India
possessions, to make common cause with England against France.”
Notwithstanding these negotiations, then in progress, the American army
had become reduced to an effective force of barely five thousand men;
and the French army could not be disposable for general service while
their fleets were so closely confined to the harbor of Newport. The
British fleet was wintering at Gardiner’s Bay, L.I., so as to watch all
vessels that entered or departed from Long Island Sound, and maintained
its blockade. Late in January a violent north-east storm made havoc with
the British ships. The _Culloden_, line-of-battle ship (74 guns), was
sunk. The _Bedford_ was dismasted, and the _America_ was driven to sea.
Washington seized upon this incident to make a diversion southward and
attempt, the capture of Arnold, who was in full commission as a
brigadier-general of the British army.

Arnold had left New York with sixteen hundred men, on the nineteenth of
the preceding December, for Virginia. His command consisted of the
eighteenth British (Scotch) regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Dundas, and the
Queen’s Rangers, Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe; the latter being a skilful
officer, shrewd and cool, but noted, in the heat of battle, for
characteristic ferocity in shortening fights, and thus reducing the
number of wounded prisoners to be cared for. Clinton seems not to have
fully relied upon the discretion of Arnold, since he reports, having
“detailed two officers of tried ability and experience, and possessing
the entire confidence of their commander.” As with so many naval
expeditions of that period, a gale overtook Arnold on the twenty-sixth
and twenty-seventh of December, scattering his transports, so that
without waiting for those still at sea, he landed with twelve hundred
men and moved up the James River on the fourth of January. He landed at
Westover, twenty-five miles below Richmond, and immediately marched upon
the city. On the afternoon of the fifth, he entered Richmond. The
militia, under Col. John Nichols, only two hundred in number, assembled
upon Richmond Hill, but had to retire before Simcoe’s advance. A few men
stationed on Shreve Hill, also retired. At Westham, seven miles above
Richmond, a foundry, a laboratory, and some shops were destroyed, as
well as the Auditor’s Records, which had been removed from Richmond for
safety. Arnold sent a proposition to Governor Jefferson, offering to
spare the city if no opposition were made to his vessels ascending the
river to remove tobacco and other legitimate plunder of war. Upon
rejection of this proposition, he burned so much of the city as time
allowed, and returned to Westover, without loss. He carried off seven
brass cannon, three hundred stands of arms found in the loft of the
Capitol, and a few quartermasters’ stores, as his sole trophies of war.
Upon information, however, that Baron Steuben was at Petersburg with
some militia, Arnold hastened to Portsmouth to put its defences in
better condition.

CHAPTER XXXI.
THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1781, OUTLINED.—COWPENS.—GUILFORD
COURT-HOUSE.—EUTAW SPRINGS.

Before developing Washington’s plan for the capture of Benedict Arnold,
it is advisable to glance at the military condition of the Southern
Department in which Arnold was then serving in command of British
troops. Lafayette had been intrusted with execution of the plan. He knew
perfectly well that Arnold would not venture far from his fortified
position at Portsmouth, and thus incur risk of capture and an inevitable
death upon the gibbet.

The assignment of General Greene to the command of that department was
designed by Washington, for the purpose of initiating a vigorous
campaign against all posts occupied by British garrisons, and gradually
to clear that country of the presence of British troops. He had great
confidence in such men as Marion, Sumter, Hampton, and other partisan
leaders, who were perpetually on the alert, by night and by day, for
opportunities to repress royalist risings, and harass the enemy at every
possible point of contact. It was very natural, then, to overestimate
the British successes at Savannah and Charleston, and even to assume
that the British army would be uniformly equal to active campaign
service, and would not find it difficult to maintain supplies in the
field. In view of the condition of roads, water-courses, swamps, and the
limited agricultural improvements of those times, it is greatly to the
credit of the British officers that so much was accomplished by them, in
the face of the partisan operations above noticed.

Washington appreciated this condition fully; urged the Southern
governors to renewed activity, and furnished General Greene with
instructions respecting what he regarded as the final campaign of the
war. The _first_ element of success which he enjoined as a duty was “to
avoid battle with fresh British troops, just out of garrison, and
therefore in complete readiness for action.” The _second_ injunction
was, “so far as possible, to give a partisan or skirmish character to
engagements where inferior numbers could keep their adversaries under
constant and sleepless apprehension of attack.” The _third_ was, “to
utilize and control streams, swamps, and woods, where the bayonet and
artillery could not be successfully employed by British troops.” The
_fourth_ principle of action was characteristic of Washington’s early
experience, and was exemplified throughout the war—“never to halt, over
night, without making artificial protection against surprise; and to
surprise the enemy so far as practicable, whenever all conditions seem
to render such surprise impossible.” Cæsar’s habitual intrenchments,
upon a halt, were types of Washington’s methods; and the Crimean War
made more impressive than ever the value of slight, temporary cover for
troops in the field. The _camp-kettle_, the _powder_ and _lead_, the
_pick_ and the _spade_, were Washington’s indispensable tools.

It was therefore with great confidence in the result that he intrusted
this Southern campaign to the charge of Nathaniel Greene; and for the
same reasons he sent him his best engineer, and his best corps of rifles
and horse. General Greene, immediately upon taking command, removed all
commissary supplies from the coast, to avoid liability of their seizure,
and to maintain his food-supply. He ordered Quartermaster-General
Carrington to collect all magazines upon the Roanoke, for ready access
whenever he might need ammunition or commissary supplies. He wrote to
Baron Steuben, to “hasten forward his recruits”; to the Governors of
Virginia and North Carolina, to “fill up their quotas of regulars and
call in all the militia _that they could arm_”; to Shelby, Campbell, and
other participants in the Battle of King’s Mountain, fought on the
eighth of October, 1780, “to come forward and assist in the overthrow of
Cornwallis, and defeat his second attempt to invade North Carolina.” It
is certain from his letters to Washington, that he expected to realize
success. The battle of Cowpens immediately followed.

While awaiting response to his demands for troops, both militia and
regulars, Greene promptly detached Morgan, with Colonels Washington and
Howard, to learn the movements of Cornwallis and Tarleton, and fritter
away their strength by worrying tactics. Morgan came so near Tarleton as
to know that he could have a fight, if he wanted a fight. This he
resolved to have. Few military events on record show superior tact,
daring, and success. He placed his command in the sharp bend of Broad
River, then swollen by rains, and so deep and swift that neither boat,
horse nor man could cross it; where, as he afterwards reported, “his men
had to fight, or drown.” All that he asked of his advanced militia was,
that they would give two volleys and scamper from his front, and re-form
in his rear. He secreted Washington’s dragoons out of view, for their
opportunity. Tarleton dashed madly after the scattering militia, and
before he could rally his impetuous charge of horse and foot, was taken
in the rear, utterly routed, and barely saved himself after a sabre-cut
from Colonel Washington; leaving on the field, or as prisoners, seven
hundred and eighty of his command, two cannon, fifty-five wagons, one
hundred horses, and eight hundred muskets. Cornwallis was but
twenty-five miles distant; but the exchange of sharp words afterwards,
between himself and Tarleton, did not lessen the value and prestige of
this timely American victory. Congress and various States united in
recognition of Morgan’s gallant conduct. Broken down by rheumatism, he
was compelled to leave active service. From Quebec, in 1775, to Cowpens,
in 1780, he had been “weighed” in many battle-scales, and never “found
wanting.”

On the twenty-fifth of January, while in camp on Hicks’ Creek, a fork of
the Great Republic, Greene received the message of Morgan that he “had
many prisoners in charge, but was pressed by Cornwallis.” It was most
tantalizing, at such an hour, not to be able to improve this victory.
The Southern army, including Morgan’s force, numbered, all told,
including four hundred militia, only twenty-one hundred and three men,
of whom the artillerists were but forty-seven, and the cavalry only one
hundred and twenty. Greene wrote to Sumter, on the fifteenth of January,
two days before the Battle of Cowpens: “More than half our numbers are
in a manner naked, so much that we cannot put them on the least duty.
Indeed, there is a great number that have not a rag of clothing on them,
except a little piece of blanket, in the Indian form, about their
waists.” But Greene put this force in the best possible order; and on
the twenty-eighth, accompanied by a single guide, one aide-de-camp, and
a sergeant’s party of twenty troopers, he started to join Morgan. On the
night of the thirtieth, after a ride of one hundred and twenty-five
miles, he was with him.

The crisis was immediate. Greene wrote to Varnum, then in Congress; to
Gist, Smallwood, Rutledge, Washington, and others, appealing for five
thousand infantry and from six to eight hundred horse. It seemed as if
this very victory would only precipitate disaster. Washington thus
replied: “I wish I had it in my power to congratulate you on the
brilliant and important victory of General Morgan without the alloy
which the distresses of the department you command, and apprehensions of
posterior events, intermix.... I lament that you find it so difficult to
avoid a general action; for our misfortunes can only be completed by the
dispersion of your little army, which will be the most probable
consequence of such an event.” This letter reflects the wise policy of
Washington throughout the war; ever to reserve in hand a sufficient
force to control the time and place for battle; while incessantly
weakening that of his adversary and compelling him, finally, to flight
“against odds.”

As the mind reverts to the contentions for high command which
characterized the early years of the war; and as one officer after
another disappears from the battle record, it would seem as if the
officer who sat by the side of Morgan on the banks of the Catawba, on
the thirtieth of January, 1781, must have felt as if a new generation
had taken the place of the old comrades of 1776, and that he was simply
waiting to pass away also.

But the hazard of delay was omnipotent to force instant action. Colonel
Lee was ordered to hasten and join Greene. The report of the landing of
British forces at Wilmington, just in the rear of the small army he had
left at Hicks’ Creek, was a new source of anxious concern. The time of
service of the Virginia militia was about to expire, and according to
precedent, they would be prompt in their departure. With quick sagacity,
Greene placed General Stephens in command, anticipating the exact term
of their expiring enlistment, and sent them home, via Hillsborough, in
charge of the prisoners of Tarleton’s command. He thus relieved Morgan
of this encumbrance, and saved the detail of efficient troops for that
escort duty.

At this period, Cornwallis had abandoned Charleston as his base of
supply, and was confident of a successful invasion of North Carolina. He
certainly knew that Phillips, Arnold, and Simcoe could spare no troops
from Virginia; and through the disaster which befell Tarleton, one of
the best soldiers of that period, at Cowpens, he began to appreciate
Clinton’s disappointing experiences about New York. He unburdened his
thoughts to Clinton, in this melancholy vein: “Our hopes of success were
principally founded upon positive assurances, given by apparently
credible deputies and emissaries, that, upon the approach of a British
army in North Carolina, a great body of the inhabitants were ready to
join it, and coöperate with it in restoring his Majesty’s Government.
All inducements in my power were made use of without material effects.”

On the tenth of February, Greene had a force of only two thousand and
thirty-six men; of which, but fourteen hundred and six were regular
troops. A light corps of seven hundred men was organized under Colonels
Williams, Carrington, Howard, Washington, and Lee, to operate in
separate detachments so far as practicable, and thus keep the army of
Cornwallis constantly under exposure to attack, and compelled to make
many exhaustive marches. Kosciusko planned light earthworks, to cover
fords as the army crossed and recrossed the same; and Greene was thus
employing wise strategic methods for future action, when of his own
choice he might confront Cornwallis in battle.

Many vicissitudes of thrilling interest attended these desultory
operations; and when sudden floods, and as sudden abatement of swollen
streams, had been successfully utilized by the patriotic leaders, just
at the right moment, it is not strange that the American people, as well
as Washington, saw in these deliverances the hand of favoring
Providence.

At this juncture, Greene realized also, as well as did Cornwallis, that
he could not expect any substantial aid from Virginia. He could hardly
keep his immediate force in hand, while wear, waste, hunger and sickness
began to impair their fighting energy as well as physical capacity. He
determined to seek the first reasonable opportunity to join battle with
Cornwallis; and the Battle of Guilford Court-House, on the fifteenth of
March, realized Washington’s full anticipations of such protracted
inaction.

The light troops of both armies had skirmished daily. Cornwallis issued
a proclamation giving a limit within which the people must return to
their allegiance to the Crown. On the sixth of March a skirmish occurred
at Wetzell’s Mills, which brought nearly the entire army of Cornwallis
into action. On the eighth, Colonel Carrington and Frederick Cornwallis,
acting as commissioners for the two opposing armies, agreed upon terms
for an exchange of prisoners. Cornwallis had been in the habit of
paroling militia, wherever found, and carrying them on his list, as if
captured in battle. In the adjustment made, Greene obtained a few
officers who would have been otherwise idle during the campaign; but the
arrangement had no other immediate value.

The position of the two armies is worthy of notice, because of its
relations to succeeding events in Virginia. For several weeks Cornwallis
had made special endeavor to control all upper fords. On the
twenty-seventh of February he crossed the river Haw and fixed his camp
on the Alamance, one of its tributaries. Greene adopted a line nearly
parallel with that of his adversary, and advanced to the heights between
Reedy Fork and Troublesome Creek, having his divided headquarters near
the Speedwell Iron Works and Boyd’s Mills, on two streams. Greene had
gained the choice of position, entirely reversing the old relations of
the armies. There were no British troops in his rear, or on his eastern
flank, and none to endanger his communications with Virginia. He could
give battle; retire as he advanced, or move into Virginia, by the same
upper fords which Cornwallis had once so carefully occupied. At this
time, the army of Cornwallis was also in great need of clothing,
medicines, and all other essential supplies. The strain of so many
unequal marches and skirmishes, through woods, thickets, and swamps, and
across innumerable small streams, with no recompense in victories won,
was very severe. He therefore pitched his camp between the Haw and Deep
rivers, where the roads from Salisbury, Guilford and Hillsborough unite,
and thus controlled the road to Wilmington, his only proximate base of
supply.

Troops had already commenced reporting to General Greene, and he decided
to offer battle. The command consisted of only fourteen hundred and
ninety regular infantry, one hundred and sixty-one cavalry, and
twenty-seven hundred and fifty-four militia. The army of Cornwallis,
which on the first of January numbered three thousand two hundred and
twenty-four men, had fallen off, by March 1st, nearly one-third; and
there was reason for Greene’s hope that, in case his militia held firmly
to positions assigned them, victory might be realized. He felt the enemy
with Lee’s and Campbell’s cavalry; disposed his troops in admirable
form; and failed at last, only through the weakness of his raw troops.
For the purposes of this narrative, only the result need be stated. The
American army retired to the iron-works on Troublesome Creek, a distance
of twelve miles, to rally forces and prepare for future action. “It is
certain,” says Colonel Lee, “that if Greene had known the condition of
the British forces, he need not have retreated, and the American victory
would have been complete.” Tarleton, who was wounded in the action,
after stating that “the British army lost one-third of its number in
killed and wounded, during the two hours of battle,” said that “this
victory was the pledge of ultimate defeat.”

Greene, writing to Washington, said: “The enemy gained his cause, but is
ruined by the success of it.” Fox, in the British House of Commons,
said: “Another such victory would ruin the British army.” Pitt called it
“the precursor of ruin to British supremacy at the South.” The
casualties of the American army were, nominally, including missing,
thirteen hundred and eleven; but so many of the missing immediately
rallied, that the Virginia Brigade, after two days, reported as present
for duty, seven hundred and fifty-two; and the Maryland Brigade mustered
five hundred and fifty, showing a loss in action of only one hundred and
eighty-eight men, instead of two hundred and sixty-one, reported on the
seventeenth. Of one militia brigade, five hundred and fifty-two were
missing. The British casualties were five hundred and forty-four, and of
the general officers, only Cornwallis and Leslie escaped without wounds.

Cornwallis, after providing for the wounded as well as possible, and
leaving under a flag of truce those who could not march, immediately
crossed the deep river as if moving to Salisbury; then recrossed it,
lower down, and entered Wilmington on the seventh of April, with only
fourteen hundred and forty-five men. He wrote to Lord Rawdon, that
“Greene would probably invade South Carolina”; but the messenger failed
to get through to Charleston. Greene was delayed after the battle, to
send back to his supply-train for ammunition, lead and bullet-moulds;
but he followed so closely after, that he reached Ramsour’s Mills the
twenty-eighth, the very day on which Cornwallis had bridged the river
and pushed on to Wilmington.

The effect of this withdrawal of Cornwallis was of great value to the
American cause, and cleared away obstructions to a broader range of
operations for the army of the North. Subsequently, on the twenty-fifth
of April Greene met Rawdon, at Hobkirk Hill, in an action sometimes
called the Second Battle of Camden, as it was fought near that town, in
which the American casualties were two hundred and seventy-one, and the
British casualties were two hundred and fifty-eight. Greene, after the
action, withdrew to Rugeley’s Mills, and Rawdon to Camden. Stedman says:
“The victory at Hobkirk Hill, like that at Guilford Court-House,
produced no consequences beneficial to the British army.” On the
seventeenth of the subsequent September, Greene fought with Stewart,
Rawdon’s successor, the Battle of Eutaw Springs, the final battle at the
South. In this battle the American casualties were four hundred and
eight, and the British casualties were six hundred and ninety-three. In
dismissing these operations in the Southern Department, a single extract
from Tarleton’s history of the war is of interest: “The troops engaged
during the greater part of the time were totally destitute of bread, and
the country afforded no vegetable as a substitute. Salt at length
failed, and their only resources were water and the wild cattle which
they found in the woods. In the last expedition, fifty men perished
through mere fatigue.... We must not, however, confine the praise
entirely to the British troops. The same justice requires that the
Americans should not be deprived of their share of this fatal glory....
On the whole, the campaign terminated in their favor, General Greene
having recovered the far greater part of Georgia, and the two
Carolinas.”

This same Nathaniel Greene led the Kentish Guards to Boston on the
morning after the Battle of Lexington, in 1775, and his early
announcement of the principles upon which the war should be conducted to
ensure final success, had been verified. He had vindicated the
confidence of Washington in every line of duty, and in his Southern
campaign cleared the way for the crowning triumph of the American
Commander-in-Chief, at Yorktown.

CHAPTER XXXII.
LAFAYETTE IN PURSUIT OF ARNOLD.—THE END IN SIGHT.—ARNOLD IN THE BRITISH
ARMY.

The diversion of thought from Washington’s immediate surroundings will
find its compensation in the development of his plan for the capture of
Benedict Arnold. Its execution had been intrusted to General Lafayette,
who was already assembling his command at Peekskill, on the Hudson.

The superiority of the British fleet before Newport having been reduced
by the storm of January 22nd, Monsieur Destouches, successor to Admiral
de Ternay, deceased, consented to send one ship-of-the-line and two
frigates to prevent Arnold’s escape by sea. The Count de Rochambeau
deemed it unnecessary and inexpedient to send troops, because the
movement was to be so rapid in its execution. He assumed that the
Continental forces in Virginia were adequate for operations under
Lafayette. Letters from Washington, however, suggesting the detail of a
considerable land force, did not reach him until after M. de Tully had
sailed; or the entire French fleet, with a strong military contingent,
would have joined the expedition. The three ships under the command of
Monsieur de Tully sailed on the ninth of February; captured the British
frigate _Romulus_ in Linn Haven Bay, two privateers, and eight other
prizes; but upon arrival at Elizabeth River, Virginia, finding that the
depth of water would not allow the passage up the river of his larger
ships, he returned to Newport.

At this point, the beginning of the end of the war becomes apparent.
Every fortuitous change in the details of immediately succeeding
movements, and every modification of plans previously considered, seem
to occur as if the American Commander-in-Chief adjusted characters and
events with the accuracy of a master of chess who plays with a clear
anticipation of the checkmate of Clinton and Cornwallis, his two
antagonists. Each of the royal partners attempted, too late, the process
of “castle-ing”; so that New York, first, and then Yorktown, became
powerless to protect each other, or the dependent posts, garrisons, and
commanders of each. And it is still more dramatic in the result than if
Arnold had been captured; for the expedition of the French Marquis,
which was at first regarded as only a temporary absence on his part from
the immediate command of Washington, proved to be the vanguard of an
advance which, through his extraordinary tact and skilful handling,
finally inclosed Cornwallis, and made the opportunity for his capture.

Lafayette started from Peekskill immediately upon the departure of M. de
Tully’s ships, taking with him twelve hundred light infantry, made up of
New England and New Jersey troops. He reached Pompton, New Jersey, on
the twenty-fifth day of February; Philadelphia, on the second day of
March, and Head of Elk, on the next day. If the reader will imagine
Lafayette as standing upon the high ground overlooking Chesapeake Bay on
the evening of March 3, 1781, let him recall Maxwell’s visit to the same
spot accompanied by Lafayette, on the third day of September, 1777, just
before the Battle of Brandywine. On the former occasion, Lafayette slept
in a log cabin where he had been watching the British landing. At
daybreak, that cabin was within the British picket-lines. A suspicion
that it was occupied by an officer of Lafayette’s rank was certainly
beyond the conception of the Hessian Chasseurs who bivouacked close by.
In a letter written by Lafayette, to his young wife, which was ever
cherished by the late Senators Oscar and Edmond Lafayette, grandsons of
the Marquis, he humorously contrasts his condition at the two dates.
“The landing of Cornwallis, at this particular point” is noticed; then,
“my first wound, in my first battle near Birmingham Meeting House”; and
then, “my present independent command, and my hopeful expectation that
the same British General will not much longer bar the way to American
Independence.”

From this point, Lafayette sent his advance troops to Annapolis; but he
first made a personal trip, in an open canoe, to Elizabethtown, to
accelerate preparations for the capture of the traitor Arnold. He
visited Baron Steuben at Yorktown, and learned that the Baron would
undertake to raise five thousand militia for his support. He visited
Muhlenburg at Suffolk; and then made a personal reconnoissance of
Arnold’s defences at Portsmouth. The return of M. de Tully to Newport
compelled him to return to Annapolis and there await instructions from
Washington. Meanwhile, Washington, following up his own letters to
Rochambeau, visited Newport, R.I., and accompanied Rochambeau to the
French Admiral’s ship. Eleven hundred men had already embarked, awaiting
the repair of a frigate before sailing. On the eighth, four frigates and
eight battleships proceeded to sea. This was a profound surprise to the
British fleet, still anchored in Gardiner’s Bay, as well as to Clinton,
then in New York. The French fleet was actually under weigh before
Admiral Arbuthnot suspected its design. He sailed promptly in pursuit,
with an equal force, and wrote to General Clinton, to “warn Arnold of
his danger.” On the sixteenth, the British and French squadrons fought a
well-balanced battle, off the Chesapeake; but the presence of the
British fleet having thwarted the chief object of its errand, Monsieur
Destouches returned to Newport on the twenty-sixth, after an absence of
only eighteen days. The inability of the French fleet to control the
waters of the Chesapeake modified all plans.

Washington wrote to Lafayette on the fifth of April, as follows: “While
we all lament the miscarriage of an enterprise [the capture of Arnold]
which bid so fair of success, we must console ourselves in the thought
of having done everything practicable to accomplish it. I am certain
that the Chevalier Destouches exerted himself to the utmost to gain the
Chesapeake. The point upon which the whole turned, the action with
Admiral Arbuthnot, reflects honor upon the Chevalier, and upon the
marine of France. As matters have turned out, it is to be wished that
you had not gone out of the Elk; but, _I never judge of the proprieties
of measures by after results_.” This letter, so timely and wise, as well
as so characteristic of its author, also instructed Lafayette to return
to Philadelphia; but on the sixth, he was ordered to report to General
Greene.

This order had hardly been issued when Washington learned that Clinton,
acting upon Admiral Arbuthnot’s suggestion, had forwarded additional
troops to the support of Arnold, under command of General Phillips. He
at once countermanded Lafayette’s orders to report to General Greene,
and assigned him to command in Virginia, reporting, however, both to
General Greene and himself. Greene received a copy of this order March
18th, three days after the Battle of Guilford Court-House, and he dates
his reply as follows: “Ten miles from Guilford Court-House. I am happy
to hear the Marquis is coming to Virginia, though I am afraid from a
hint in one of Baron Steuben’s letters that he will think himself
injured in being superseded in command. Could the Marquis be with us at
this moment, we should have a most glorious campaign. It would put
Cornwallis and his whole army into our hands.”

Greene, at this time, knowing the condition of the army of Cornwallis at
Wilmington, believed that by the advance of Lafayette from Virginia, and
his own coöperation, just as he started in pursuit of Cornwallis, the
capture of that officer’s entire command would be assured. But in other
ways than had been anticipated, the assignment of Lafayette to command
in Virginia did enforce the ultimate surrender of the British army of
Virginia. Baron Steuben, with perfect confidence in the wisdom of
Washington, gracefully accepted the order as final, and rendered to
Lafayette prompt obedience and thoroughly hearty support.

The troops that accompanied Lafayette, however, did not like their
transfer to a warmer climate. Desertions were frequent, and a mutinous
spirit was exhibited. Lafayette hung the first deserter who was
captured. A second was arrested and brought before him for disposal. He
sent him adrift, with “permission to return to his home, or wherever he
desired to go.” He then issued an order, reciting, that “_he was setting
out upon a dangerous and difficult expedition; and he hoped the soldiers
would not abandon him_; but that whoever wished to go away, might do so
instantly.” “From that hour,” wrote Lafayette, “all desertions ceased,
and not a man would leave.”

Washington himself, at this juncture of affairs, was peculiarly
embarrassed. Congress had assured him that the new regular force of
thirty-seven thousand men would be in the field by the first of January.
Marshall, the historian, makes the following statement: “The regular
force drawn from Pennsylvania, to Georgia inclusive, at no time during
this interesting campaign amounted to three thousand effective men.” Of
the Northern troops, twelve hundred had been detached under the Marquis
de Lafayette, in the aid of Virginia. Including these in the estimate,
the States, from New Jersey to New Hampshire, had furnished only five
thousand effectives. The cavalry and artillery at no time exceeded one
thousand. During May, the total force reached seven thousand, of whom
rather more than four thousand might have been relied on for action; but
even these had been brought into camp too late to acquire that
discipline which is so essential to military service.

As early as February twentieth, when the Virginia campaign was in
prospect, General Washington begged Schuyler to accept the head of the
War Department, in these earnest words: “Our affairs are brought to an
awful crisis. Nothing will recover them but the vigorous exertion of men
of abilities who know our wants and the best means of supplying them.
These qualifications, Sir, without a compliment, I think you possess.
Why, then, the department being necessary, should you shrink from it?
The greater the chaos, the greater will be your merit in bringing forth
order.” General Schuyler replied on the twenty-fifth, and declared his
intention never to hold office under Congress, unless accompanied by a
restoration to military rank; and added that “such inconvenience would
result to themselves [members of Congress] from such a restoration, as
would necessarily give umbrage to many officers.”

Washington’s diary at this period affords a fair show of existing
conditions, and reveals his anxiety better than another can depict it.
On the first of May, his record is this: “Instead of having magazines
filled with provisions, we have a scant pittance, scattered here and
there, in different States. Instead of having our arsenals filled with
military stores, they are poorly provided, and the workmen are leaving
them.... Instead of having the regiments completed under the new
establishment, scarce any State has an eighth part of its quota in the
field, and there is little prospect of getting more than half. In a
word, instead of having everything in readiness to take the field, we
have nothing.... And instead of having the prospect of a glorious,
offensive campaign before us, we have a gloomy and bewildered prospect
of a defensive one, unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships,
land troops, and money, from our generous allies, and these are at
present too contingent to build upon.... Chimney-corner patriots abound;
venality, corruption, prostitution of office for selfish ends, abuse of
trust, perversion of funds from a national to a private use, and
speculations upon the necessities of the times, pervade all
interests.... In fact, every battle and every campaign is affected by
these elements, and the diffusion of political responsibility still
makes the United States only a loose partnership of scattered and
loosely related partners.”

At this date, May first, the British troops in Virginia consisted of
Arnold’s command of fifteen hundred and fifty-three men, and that of
Phillips, of twenty-one hundred and sixty-three men. On the twentieth of
May, including the forces of Cornwallis, the entire British force in
Virginia did not exceed five thousand effective troops. Arnold,
Phillips, and Simcoe made numerous excursions, destroying property,
burning buildings, and leaving marks of desolation upon Williamsburg,
Petersburg, Osborne, Hanover Court-House, Chesterfield Court-House, and
elsewhere.

Lafayette’s command was almost ubiquitous, harassing the enemy at every
point, so that they could hardly make an expedition without being
compelled to abandon portions of the property plundered, and return to
their fortified positions with the loss of some men and horses, every
time. So soon as Lafayette learned that Cornwallis proposed to move
northward from Wilmington to Virginia, and unite his command with those
of Phillips and Arnold, he made an effort to reach Halifax Court-House,
and cut him off; but the shorter route enabled Phillips to defeat
Lafayette’s movement.

On the eighth of May, he wrote to Washington: “There is no fighting
here, unless you have naval superiority; or, an army mounted on
race-horses. Phillips’ plan against Richmond has been defeated. He was
going to Portsmouth. Now, it appears that I have business with two
armies, and this is rather too much. Each is more than double, superior
to me. We have no boats, few militia, and no arms. I will try and do for
the best. Nothing can attract my sight from the supplies and
reënforcements destined to General Greene’s army. I have forbidden every
department to give me anything that may be thought useful to General
Greene. When General Greene becomes equal to offensive operations, this
quarter will be relieved. I have written to General Wayne [who had been
ordered to report to Lafayette, with the Pennsylvania line, ordered
south by Congress, on account of their mutiny] to hasten his march; but
unless I am hard pressed, I shall request him to go southward.”
Washington thus replied to this letter: “Your determination to avoid an
engagement, with your present force, is certainly judicious. General
Wayne has been pressed both by Congress and the Board of War, to make as
much expedition as possible.”

On the eighteenth of May, pursuant to orders of General Greene,
assigning him to sole command in Virginia, and instructing him to report
only to Washington, Lafayette established his headquarters between the
Pamunkey and Chickahominy rivers, equally covering Richmond and other
important points in the State; and sent General Nelson with militia
towards Petersburg. On the twenty-sixth of May, Cornwallis received
reënforcements under General Leslie, and notified General Clinton of his
own intention to “dislodge Lafayette from Richmond.” General Clinton’s
letter of the twentieth had contained the following postscript: “Pray
send Brigadier-General Arnold _here_, by the first opportunity, if you
should not have particular occasion for his services.” Cornwallis
replied: “I have consented to the request of General Arnold to go to New
York; he conceived that your Excellency wished him to attend you, and
his present indisposition renders him unequal to the fatigue of
service.”

In view of the great effort on the part of Washington to arrest Arnold,
it is well to consider some incidents that disclose Arnold’s true
position in the British army. In none of his expeditions in Virginia did
he face Continental troops. He attempted to open a correspondence with
Lafayette, and threatened to send any prisoners he might capture, to the
West Indies; but Lafayette never acknowledged a communication, simply
forwarding them to Washington. Among papers of General Phillips which
came to light upon his decease, was a letter from Clinton showing that
Phillips’ assignment to duty, on the eleventh of April, was “for the
security of Arnold and the troops under his command, and for no other
purpose.” The reader, familiar with the Burgoyne campaign, will remember
the brilliant and explosive burst of Arnold into the British lines, near
Bemis Heights. General Phillips, then serving under Burgoyne, was one of
the severest sufferers by that assault; and the relations of the two
officers, in Virginia, were of the most constrained character. Upon the
death of Phillips an attempt was made on the part of Arnold to conceal
the knowledge of that fact; and some direct correspondence of Arnold
with London officials had disturbed Clinton, so that he desired to have
him under his immediate control. The departure of Arnold from Virginia
resolved the Virginia campaign into a series of spirited marches,
counter-marches, skirmishes and sharp encounters, which ultimately drove
Cornwallis behind the intrenchments at Yorktown; and there he was
securely inclosed, until all things could be prepared for the presence
of the American Commander-in-Chief.

On the thirty-first of May, Washington wrote to Lafayette, and thus
closed his letter: “Your conduct upon every occasion meets my
approbation, but in none more than in your refusing to hold a
correspondence with Arnold.”

CHAPTER XXXIII.
NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED.—CORNWALLIS INCLOSED BY LAFAYETTE.

On the twenty-first day of May, 1781, which proved to have been that of
the arrival of Cornwallis at Yorktown, Washington held a conference with
Count de Rochambeau and General Chastellux at Wethersfield, Conn., as to
the details of the approaching summer campaign. As one result of this
interview, Count de Rochambeau requested Count de Grasse, then in the
West Indies, to coöperate for a while with Count de Barras, and close
the port of New York. The French fleet could not be very well spared
from the West India Station, for the reason that while coöperating with
the Americans, and on a foreign coast, it had neither accessible docks
nor other means of refitting and supply, in case of disaster. Pending
the disposition of this matter, the immediate junction of the two armies
was definitely settled.

The American army, with an effective force of a little less than
forty-six hundred men, was ordered to Peekskill-on-the-Hudson. The Count
de Rochambeau, with the Duke de Lauzun, marched from Newport and took
post at Ridgebury, Conn., near Salem, on the road to Danbury, fifteen
miles back from Long Island Sound.

Two British posts, just out of New York, one at Morrisania, where
Delancey’s Rangers had a station, and from which constant incursions
were made into Winchester county; and the other at the north end of
Manhattan Island, not far from Fort Washington, were designated as the
first objects of assault. Clinton had sent a considerable foraging force
into New Jersey, and it was supposed likely that he might regard the
posts named as not in danger of attack, or leave them lightly
garrisoned. Sheldon’s Dragoons and a division under the Duke de Lauzun
were to attempt the first of the expeditions, and General Lincoln was
intrusted with the other. Washington advised Governor Clinton of his
plan, so that he might concentrate the New York militia at the proper
moment; and signal guns, as well as beacon-fires, had been arranged to
give notice of success.

General Lincoln left Peekskill with eight hundred men, on the morning of
the first of June, proceeded to Teller’s Point; there took boats, and
with muffled oars rowed down Tappan Bay by night, hugging the eastern
shore. On the morning of the second, he reached Dobb’s Ferry, without
being discovered by the enemy. At three o’clock, on the morning of the
second, Washington started, without baggage, and leaving all tents
standing; passed through Tarrytown, reaching Valentine’s Hill, four
miles above King’s Bridge, by sunrise of the third, where he gained a
good position for the support of either expedition.

When General Lincoln crossed the Hudson, at Fort Lee, he at once noticed
that the British expedition into New Jersey had returned and reoccupied
the post near Fort Washington; and that a British man-of-war had
anchored in the stream, near the shore just below that fort. A surprise
of Fort Washington became impossible. He had, however, before leaving
Peekskill, been supplied with alternate instructions, anticipating this
very emergency. It had been Washington’s real purpose, now that the
French army was immediately within his control, to draw Clinton, if
possible, into a general engagement; and the entire French force awaited
his signal for the movement. So soon as Lincoln discovered the British
camp, he recrossed the Hudson and landed his troops just above Spuyten
Duyvil Creek, near old Fort Independence; and then moved to high ground
near King’s Bridge, so as to act in concert with the Duke de Lauzun and
cut off any detachment which might attempt to cross the Harlem to
support Delancey. Meanwhile the Duke de Lauzun had only reached East
Chester, after a hot march over very rough country, and was several
hours later than the hour designated for the assault. The troops of
Lincoln were discovered by a large foraging force of fourteen hundred
men which was sweeping over the country from right to left, in search of
cattle and other supplies, and a sharp skirmish ensued. The Duke de
Lauzun, hearing the firing, pressed forward with forced step to join in
the action. Washington also moved rapidly to the front, and at his
appearance the British fell back rapidly to New York. During the
afternoon, after carefully reconnoitering the position, Washington also
retired to Valentine’s Hill, and then to Dobb’s Ferry, as if entirely
withdrawing his troops; but, on the sixth, he was joined by Rochambeau,
and on the seventh, the American camp was fully established. Its right
rested on the Hudson, covered by earthworks, and its left crossed Saw
Mill River. (See Map, “Hudson River Highlands.”) The French army
occupied the hills still farther eastward, as far as the river Bronx.

Washington at once made an effort to force General Clinton to fight for
the possession of New York. Pickets were ostentatiously posted. Letters,
designed to fall into Clinton’s hands, were written, and as early as the
sixth, Clinton captured some of these “confidential” papers and enclosed
them to Lord Cornwallis, saying: “I am threatened with a siege. Send me
two thousand troops; the sooner they come, the better.”

The agitation in New York is described by contemporary writers as “most
intense and universal.” It was kept under all possible control; but the
coast-guards were doubled, so that no stray boats might pass
unchallenged, by night or day, and mounted couriers constantly passed
and repassed, to furnish the speediest possible information at British
headquarters of any hostile advance. The report published in slips, that
“_brick ovens were to be erected in New Jersey, opposite Staten Island,
to supply bread rations, daily, for thirty thousand men_,” was
encouraged by Washington, and was accepted as true by the country near
by, and generally at the north, New Jersey included.

When the camps were fully established, and guns were disposed for their
best effect, Washington, accompanied by Count de Rochambeau and Generals
de Boville and Du Portail, crossed to Jersey Heights, and with a small
escort of one hundred and fifty Jersey troops, examined all the New York
outposts, as far down as the ocean. Neither was this a mere sham—hollow
in substance. The projected attack upon New York was a deliberate
alternative; to compel Clinton to withhold reënforcements from the
Southern army so that Cornwallis could be overpowered and captured; or,
if he ventured to aid that officer, he must lose New York.

This reconnoissance in New Jersey was known to Sir Henry Clinton, and he
might have been very thankful to General Washington for information that
some of “his [Clinton’s] stores were inadequately guarded”; that “at
some posts the small garrisons were doing no watchful guard duty”; and
that there was “no serious difficulty whatever in seizing or destroying
all the stores on Staten Island, without material loss or risk.”

A second reconnoissance of the entire British front, from King’s Bridge
down the Hudson, and along Hell Gate channel, occurred on the evening of
July 21st. This was no feeble “_feeling of the enemy_.” Five thousand
choice troops took part in the investigation of the British position.
General Chastellux commanded one division, and General Lincoln commanded
the second. As early as the eighth of the month, Sir Henry Clinton wrote
to Lord Cornwallis, as follows: “As your lordship is now so near, it
will be unnecessary for you to send your despatches to the minister; you
will therefore be so good as to send them to me in the future.”

It is a fact that Cornwallis was encouraged by the British War Office
and the Ministry to write directly to those departments. He stood high
in esteem; and, as will appear under his name in the Index, was
subsequently honored, although captured at Yorktown. The letter of the
eighth, thus referred to, was followed by letters on the eleventh,
thirteenth, and nineteenth of June, with similar appeals for
reënforcements; and these appeals were forwarded by special couriers or
fast frigates. Then came the allied parade of the twenty-second. The
troops reached King’s Bridge at daybreak. Lauzun’s lancers in their
brilliant uniform, and Sheldon’s Light Corps, scoured the vicinity of
Morrisania, and the dragoons went as far as Throgg’s Neck. The royalist
refugees fled to islands, vessels, and the woods. This demonstration
lasted during the twenty-second and twenty-third of June. Then
Washington and Rochambeau, escorted by French dragoons, examined all
advance posts, passing directly within range of fire from both vessels
and picket posts. There was no pretence of secrecy in this inquisitive
inquiry as to the British strength and British positions. It was a bold,
deliberate challenge of the garrison to retire if they so desired, or to
fight if they preferred battle. On the twenty-third, the troops resumed
their places in the quiet camp.

On the twenty-sixth, Clinton called upon Cornwallis for “three more
regiments,” to be sent from Carolina, writing: “I shall probably want
them, as well as the troops you may be able to send me from the
Chesapeake, for such offensive and defensive operations as may offer in
this quarter.” Cornwallis had previously offered to send two of the
Hessian regiments, then in South Carolina, “as they could be spared in
the hot summer months,” and Clinton begged him to “renew that offer.”

A brief glance at the Southern Department is necessary in order fully to
measure the designs of the American Commander-in-Chief, which, on the
surface, seemed to be local in their purpose. The army of Cornwallis,
with reenforcements, numbered about seven thousand effective troops when
he entered upon his active campaign against Lafayette. It will be
remembered that Cornwallis had promised Clinton to drive Lafayette from
Richmond. When Lafayette saw that by attempting to hold Richmond he
would risk a general action, with the possible loss of Virginia and
consequent ruin to Greene’s army at the South, he permitted that city to
abide the fate of war, and marched northward to the upper Rappahannock;
to effect an union with the forces of Wayne, approaching from the north.
He decided to avoid further contest with Cornwallis, unless on terms of
his own dictation.

The Assembly of Virginia, quickened to new energy, retired to
Charlottesville May 24th. But they authorized the “issue of fifteen
millions of bills,” and also the declaration of martial law within
twenty miles of any army headquarters. That brought Richmond within the
military control of Lafayette. The Burgoyne prisoners were also removed
from Charlottesville, over the mountains, to Winchester. The details of
the pursuit of Lafayette by Cornwallis, day by day, are full of
thrilling interest, but beyond the province of this narrative.

[Illustration: Lafayette in Virginia.]

On the twenty-eighth of May, Lafayette wrote as follows to Washington:
“The enemy have been so kind as to retire before us. Twice, I gave them
a chance of fighting, taking good care not to engage them farther than I
pleased, but they continued their retrograde motions. Our numbers are, I
think, exaggerated to them, and our seeming boldness confirms the
opinion. I thought, at first, Lord Cornwallis wanted to get me as low
down as possible, and use his cavalry to advantage. His lordship had,
exclusive of the reënforcements from Portsmouth, (said to be six
hundred) four thousand men; eight hundred of whom were dragoons, or
mounted infantry. Our force is about his; but only one thousand five
hundred regulars, and fifty dragoons. One little action more
particularly marks the retreat of the enemy. From the place where he
first began to retire to Williamsburg, is upwards of one hundred miles.
The old arms at the Point of the Fork have been taken out of the water.
The cannon was thrown into the river undamaged, when they marched back
to Richmond; so that his lordship did us no harm of consequence, but
lost an immense part of his former conquests, and did not make any in
the State. General Greene only demanded of me to hold my ground, in
Virginia. I don’t know but what we shall, in our turn, become the
pursuing enemy.”

On the very next day, after this letter was despatched to the American
Commander-in-Chief, May twenty-ninth, Cornwallis did, in fact, abandon
pursuit. Tarleton, who never lost opportunity to express his
appreciation of the tact, skill, and “invariable wisdom of Lafayette’s
movements,” states, that “an American patrol was captured; and among
letters of Lafayette to Greene, Steuben, and others, was one to Governor
Jefferson, urging him to rally militia during his absence, and using
this prophetic expression: ‘The British success in Virginia resembles
the French invasion of Hanover, and is likely to have similar
consequences, if the governor and the country would exert themselves, at
the present juncture.’”

When Cornwallis halted and moved back towards his base, Tarleton was
detached with two hundred and fifty troopers, mounted on the picked
stock of the best private stables, taken at will, and attempted to
capture Governor Jefferson at Monticello. His report says: “I imagined
that a march of seventy miles in twenty-four hours, with the caution
used, might perhaps give the advantage of a surprise.” Tarleton charged
through the Riviana River, captured seven members of the Legislature and
Brigadier-General Scott, and destroyed one thousand arms and four
hundred barrels of powder; but the Governor escaped, and the Assembly
immediately convened at Staunton, beyond Tarleton’s reach. Then he
started down the Riviana to join Simcoe in an attack upon Steuben’s
depot of supplies at Elk Island. But Wayne joined Lafayette, and
Lafayette proceeded southward. They soon started in pursuit of the
retiring column of Cornwallis. The pursued had indeed become the
pursuers. Tarleton thus writes: “The Marquis Lafayette, who had
previously practised defensive measures with skill and security, being
now reënforced by Wayne and about eight hundred continentals and some
militia, followed the British as they proceeded down James River. This
design, being judiciously arranged and executed with extreme caution,
allowed opportunity for the junction of Baron Steuben; confined the
small detachments of the King’s troops; and both saved the property and
animated the drooping spirits of the Virginians.” On the thirteenth,
Tarleton reported his own movements and the waste he had accomplished.

The scouts of Lafayette intercepted the letter, and he published it to
the people before Cornwallis himself had knowledge of its contents.
Cornwallis returned to his headquarters, to find despatches fifteen days
old awaiting his attention. One contained this extraordinary
information: “The Continentals under Lafayette cannot exceed one
thousand; and the Pennsylvania Line, under Wayne, are so discontented,
that their officers are afraid to trust them with ammunition.
Postscript.—This may have, however, since altered.”

On the very day of the receipt of this despatch, Tarleton and Simcoe
were actually compelled to cover the picket-lines of Cornwallis with
their full force, to prevent Lafayette’s Continentals and the
Pennsylvania Line from capturing the supply trains of his command.
Cornwallis started for Portsmouth on the fourth. A sharp action at
Williamsburg, in which Wayne made a brilliant bayonet charge, and in
which Lafayette, having lost a horse, gallantly fought the battle on
foot, resulted in a loss of one hundred and eighteen Americans and
seventy-five British troops. From Portsmouth, Cornwallis took boats for
Yorktown, on the first of August; and on the sixth, Tarleton says: “I
threw my horses into deep water, near shore, and landed without loss,”
joining Cornwallis on the tenth. Gloucester, opposite Yorktown, was
occupied and fortified. Constant skirmishes occurred between Tarleton
and Simcoe, of its garrison, and the detachments which Lafayette kept
active in the vicinity.

On the eighth, Lafayette wrote to Washington as follows: “We shall act
agreeably to circumstances; but avoid drawing ourselves into a false
movement, which, if cavalry had command of the river, would give the
enemy the advantage of us. His lordship plays so well, that no blunder
can be hoped from him, to recover a bad step of ours. Should a fleet
come in at this moment, our affairs would take a very happy turn.” On
the thirteenth, Lafayette established his headquarters in the forks of
the Pamunkey and the Mattaponey. On the twenty-third, he wrote, in part:
“In the present state of affairs, my dear general, I hope you will come
yourself to Virginia. Lord Cornwallis must be attacked with pretty good
apparatus; but when a French fleet takes possession of the Bay, and we
form a land force superior to his, that army must sooner or later be
forced to surrender, as we may then get what reënforcements we please. I
heartily thank you for having ordered me to Virginia. It is to your
goodness that I am indebted for the most beautiful prospect which I may
ever be able to behold.”

On the thirtieth, Count de Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake with
twenty-six sail-of-the-line, besides frigates and transports. On the
third of September, Count de St. Simon landed with three thousand two
hundred French troops, and was joined by Lafayette at Green Spring on
the same day. On the fifth, the allies occupied Williamsburg, about
fifteen miles from Yorktown. The Count de Grasse had a limited period
for operations on the American coast, and united with the Count de St.
Simon to urge an immediate attack upon Yorktown, before its defences
could be completed, waiving seniority of rank, and agreeing to serve
under Lafayette.

Lafayette thus wrote to Washington: “I am not so hasty as the Count de
Grasse, and think that having so sure a game to play, it would be
madness, by the risk of an attack, to give anything to chance. Unless
matters are very different from what I think they are, my opinion is,
that we ought to be contented with preventing the enemy’s forages, with
militia; without committing our regulars. Whatever readiness the Marquis
de St. Simon has been pleased to express to Colonel Gimât respecting his
being under me, I shall do nothing without paying that deference which
is due to age, talents, and experience; but would rather incline to the
cautious line of conduct I have of late adopted. I hope you will find we
have taken the best precautions to prevent his lordship’s escape. I
hardly believe he will make the attempt. If he does, he must give up
ships, artillery, baggage, part of the horses, all the negroes; must be
certain to lose one-third of his army, and run the greatest risk of
losing the whole, without gaining that glory which he may derive from a
brilliant defence.” On the eighth, Lafayette wrote: “If you knew how
slowly things go on in this country! The governor does what he can; the
wheels of government are so rusty, that no governor whatever will be
able to set them free again. Time will prove that Governor Jefferson has
been too severely charged. We will try, if not dangerous, on so large a
scale, to form a good idea of the works; but unless I am greatly
deceived, there will be madness in attacking them now, with our force.
Marquis de St. Simon, Count de Grasse and General Du Portail agree with
me in opinion; but should Lord Cornwallis come out against such a
position as we have, everybody thinks he cannot but repent of it; and
should he beat us, he must soon prepare for another battle.”

The time had arrived for the presence of the American
Commander-in-Chief.

CHAPTER XXXIV.
BRITISH CAPTAINS OUTGENERALED.—WASHINGTON JOINS LAFAYETTE.

Washington was in his tent, where only the quiet of a few hours at a
time interposed their opportunity for other than field duty. At one of
those intervals he was compelled to make assignments of the American
army for associated operations with his French allies. He had just been
advised that three thousand Hessian auxiliaries had reënforced the
British garrison of New York. Appeals to the various State authorities
had failed to realize appreciable additions to his fighting

It was an hour of opportunity for America. Failure to meet French
support with a fair correspondence in military force, would compromise
his country before the world. Amid such reflections, which were the
basis of a fresh public appeal, he was rallied to action by the entrance
of a special messenger from Newport, Rhode Island. The frigate
_Concorde_ had arrived from the West Indies, and the following despatch
was placed in his hands: “Count de Grasse will leave San Domingo on the
third of August, direct for Chesapeake Bay.”

With imperturbable calmness, Washington folded the despatch, and then
consulted with the Count de Rochambeau alone, as to the best disposition
to be made of the squadron of Admiral de Barras, still at Newport. That
officer, although the senior of the Count de Grasse, promptly expressed
his readiness to waive precedence and serve as best advised by the
American Commander-in-Chief. He had indeed but seven ships-of-the-line
disposable and ready for sea; but this force was deemed a sufficient
convoy for the transports which were to carry heavy artillery and
ammunition, for siege purposes before Yorktown. This courtesy of the
French admiral had its important sequel, in changing what would have
been a superior British naval force in those waters to a determining
superiority on the part of France, at the most critical moment of that
final campaign in behalf of American Independence. Every officer of
Washington’s staff received instant instructions. They were only
advised, very reservedly, that supplies of heavy artillery would be
forwarded to General Lafayette, for his use; but it began to be realized
that with French troops sufficient to complete the environment of
Yorktown, and a French fleet competent to destroy the coast defences,
the capitulation of Cornwallis could be enforced.

Letters were immediately sent by trusty messengers to every Northern
governor, to hasten forward their Continental quotas yet in arrears, and
to rally their militia in force, for the “capture of New York.”
Confidential agents were also despatched to General Lafayette and the
Count de Grasse, with the joint instructions of Washington and
Rochambeau, sufficiently embodying an intimation of plans held in
reserve; but explicitly warning them not to permit Cornwallis to escape,
nor to receive reënforcements by sea from New York. Other letters were
written to the authorities of New Jersey and Philadelphia, quite
minutely defining a plan for the seizure of Staten Island, under cover
of a French naval force; while the principal allied armies were expected
to force the upper defences of New York by irresistible assault. Some of
these despatches, carefully duplicated, with enclosed plans, as once
before, were put into the hands of other messengers, designedly for
interception by Clinton. Heavy batteaux on wheels, hauled by oxen, made
ostentatious movement, together with wagon-loads of supplies, to the
seashore opposite Staten Island. General Heath was placed in command of
a large camp near Springfield, New Jersey, for assembling and drilling a
large force of militia. Other small camps of Pennsylvania and New Jersey
militia, easily distinguishable by the spies of General Clinton, dotted
the country. The militia of Connecticut and New York also hastened to
participate in the long-hoped-for emancipation of New York from British
control.

As late as the nineteenth, in order to give General Clinton fair notice
that he might expect no unnecessary or protracted delay in the attack
already ripe for execution, all roads leading to King’s Bridge were
cleared of obstructions. Fallen trees and scattered branches were
removed so as to expedite a swift assault upon the British advanced
outposts. All these were heaped up and burned at night, as a reminder of
the impending crisis. Everything worked admirably as planned, and still,
as on the fourth of March, 1776, before Boston, the American
Commander-in-Chief kept to himself his secret purpose.

Afterwards, he thus explained his action: “That much trouble was taken,
and finesse used, to misguide and bewilder Sir Henry Clinton, in regard
to the real object, by fictitious communications as well as by making a
deceptive provision of ovens, forage, and boats, in his neighborhood,
_is certain. Nor, was less pains taken to deceive our own army; for, I
had always conceived, when the imposition does not completely take place
at home, it would never sufficiently succeed abroad._”

During the nineteenth, while the obstructions were being thus removed
from the roads leading into New York, Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson
at Dobb’s Ferry and demonstrated for an advance upon Staten Island, from
the Jersey shore, immediately opposite. On the twenty-first, a
detachment selected by Washington himself crossed the Hudson at King’s
Ferry, near Haverstraw. The French army followed, and the armies were
united on the twenty-fifth. During this brief delay, Rochambeau
accompanied Washington to a final inspection of West Point; and the
headquarters of the American army at New Windsor, between that post and
Newburg, were formally abandoned.

The combined armies of America and France no longer threatened New York;
but _they had not been missed by Clinton_. The American forces moved
rapidly toward Springfield, on the Rahway, as if to strike Staten
Island. The great baggage-train and the same batteaux demonstrated
toward Staten Island. But the French army marched for Whippany, in the
direction of Trenton. Washington and his suite reached Philadelphia
about noon, August thirtieth. Still _they had not been missed by
Clinton_.

But now, for the first time, the American army realized that it was
destined southward, and that a triumphant entry into New York City was
not to be the crowning reward for service so faithfully done.
Dissatisfaction was openly and bluntly expressed. Even officers, long in
arrears of pay, equally with the rank and file, bitterly complained.
Rochambeau, quickly alive to the situation, promptly advanced twenty
thousand dollars in gold for the men, upon the simple pledge of Robert
Morris, of Philadelphia, that it should be refunded by the first of
October.

Suddenly, Colonel Laurens, just from France, having landed at Boston on
the twenty-fifth, only five days before, appeared at Washington’s
quarters’ with report of the result of his mission to the French king.
His ship brought clothing, ammunition, and half a million of dollars, as
the first instalment of six million of livres ($1,111,111) generously
furnished by Louis XVI., with the pledge of additional sums to follow.
This welcome visitor further announced to the calmly attentive American
Commander-in-Chief this message: “Dr. Franklin advised me that he had
secured a loan of four million of livres ($740,740) to cover American
drafts made before I could arrive in America; and Count de Vergennes
agreed to guarantee a loan in Holland, for ten million livres
($1,851,851).”

If the heavens had opened and reverberating thunder had distinctly
articulated: “American Independence is achieved!” the assurance of a
Divine interposition would hardly have appeared more emphatic to the
waiting faith of Washington, or have more thrillingly encouraged the
weary but obedient soldiers of his command.

And still this American army, thus refreshed in spirit and joyous in the
hope of speedy and final victory, _had not been missed from New York by
General, Sir Henry Clinton_. Another fast-sailing frigate was speeding
through the Narrows, past Sandy Hook, southward, once more to appeal to
Lord Cornwallis to come to the rescue of imperiled, beleaguered New
York.

On the second day of September, the American army made its third formal
entry into Philadelphia, amid glad acclaims of welcome, and sharing with
the people in the spirit of one great jubilee. At that very hour,
_another courier vessel_, in chase of the former, left New York with a
message for Cornwallis, which failed to reach him until the fifteenth.
It was in cipher, and read as follows:

NEW YORK, Sept. 2, 1781.

Mr. Washington is moving an army to the southward, with an appearance
of haste; and gives out that he expects the coöperation of a
considerable French armament. Your Lordship, however, may be assured
that if this should be the case, I shall endeavor to reënforce your
command by all means within the compass of my power; or, make every
possible diversion in your favor.

P.S.—Washington, it is said, was at Trenton, this day, and means to go
in vessels to Christiana Creek, and from thence by Head of Elk, down
Chesapeake Bay also.... Washington has about four thousand French, and
two thousand Continentals, with him.

On the following day, the French army, having taken a day for cleaning
arms, uniforms, and accoutrements, made a dress parade through the
American capital. Every gorgeous trapping of their brilliant,
sentimental outfit was proudly displayed before the wondering and
delighted populace. Contemporary writers could not sufficiently describe
the “magnificence of the parade, and the convulsions of joy that
animated the entire population.” And yet, one eminent French officer, in
describing the march of the American army on the previous day, said:
“The plainly dressed American army lost no credit in the steadiness of
their march and their fitness for battle.”

On the same day, Washington received despatches from Lafayette. One,
dated August 21st, reported that “the British troops were fortifying
Gloucester, across the river from Yorktown.” Others were as follows: “A
small garrison remains at Portsmouth”; “I have written to the Governor,
to collect six hundred militia upon Blackwater”; “I have written to
General Gregory, near Portsmouth, that I am advised that the enemy
intend to push a detachment into Carolina; to General Wayne, to move to
the southward and to have a column ready to cross the James at Westover;
and that my own army will soon assemble again upon the waters of the
Chickahominy.” Reference has already been made to Washington’s receipt
of Lafayette’s letter of August 8th, announcing the occupation of
Yorktown by Cornwallis.

Washington made no delay, but on the fifth of September started for the
“Head of the Elk.” He had but just passed Chester, when he met a courier
from Lafayette, with announcement of the arrival of the Count de Grasse.
Riding back to Chester, Washington advised Rochambeau of the welcome
tidings, and then pushed forward, arriving at the Head of Elk the next
morning.

The previous day had been one of peculiar excitement in the city of
Philadelphia. A formal review and rigid inspection of the entire French
army took place, and the President of the American Congress received the
honors of the occasion. During the evening, the French officers gave a
grand banquet in honor of Chevalier Lauzun. The despatch to Washington
was read amid cheers. A half hour later, a second despatch, announcing
“the landing of Count de Simon and his junction with Lafayette,” was
read; and read a _second_ time, “all standing” in its honor.

On this memorable date, September 6th, other events of interest are to
be noticed. It was Lafayette’s twenty-fourth birthday. In a letter to
his wife, still preserved by the family, he poured forth from an
overflowing soul, his “love for his great Captain”; “for the American
cause”; appreciation of his “enviable lot, as victory is drawing nigh,”
and his “longing to tell her, face to face, of thrilling adventures,
which had never been interrupted by night or day.”

September 6th, also, Clinton wrote to Cornwallis:

As I find by your letters, that Count de Grasse has got into the
Chesapeake, and I have no doubt that Washington is moving with at
least six thousand French and rebel troops against you, I think the
best way to relieve you, is, to join you, as soon as possible, with
all the force that can be spared from here, which is about four
thousand men. They are already embarked, and will proceed, the instant
I receive information from the admiral that we may venture; or that
from other intelligence, the commodore and I should judge sufficient
to move upon. By accounts from Europe we have every reason to expect
Admiral Digby hourly upon the coast.

On this same sixth of September, Clinton disclosed his last move to
check Washington’s advance, and take Cornwallis out of check. Arnold,
who had been so summarily withdrawn from the South, landed at New
London, Connecticut, wantonly destroying houses, stores, a church, the
Court-House, ships, and whatever he could damage without personal danger
to himself; and made forever memorable the cruel massacre of Colonel
Ledyard and the garrison of Fort Griswold after their honorable
surrender. He no less permanently made memorable their extraordinary
defence, in which the British assailing column lost one hundred and
sixty-three officers and men, a number exceeding that of the entire
American resisting force. It was soon over; and Arnold did not dare
delay, and risk his fate with the yeomanry of his native New England.
The secret of Clinton’s cipher despatch to Cornwallis on the second of
August, respecting the _use of Arnold_, was thus revealed. But the
attention of the American Commander-in-Chief was not diverted from his
own supreme purpose, whatever Clinton might undertake in his absence.

The allied French and American armies remained at Head of Elk for
transportation; but during that interval, Rochambeau accompanied
Washington to Baltimore, where illuminations and civil honors attested
the welcome of these distinguished guests. On the ninth, for the first
time in six years, the American Commander-in-Chief visited his Mount
Vernon home. On the tenth, his own staff, together with the Count de
Rochambeau and staff, were his guests. On the eleventh, General
Chastellux and aides-de-camp joined the party. On the twelfth, the visit
came to its close. On the fourteenth of September, Washington reached
the headquarters of General, the Marquis de Lafayette, commanding the
Department, at Williamsburg, Virginia.

CHAPTER XXXV.
THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE VINDICATED.—WASHINGTON’S MAGNANIMITY.—HIS
BENEDICTION.

The story of the siege of Yorktown and the surrender of Earl Cornwallis,
Lieutenant-General in command, has been so fully detailed by many
writers that only a few features of the general conduct of that
campaign, and some special incidents not so frequently noticed, are
within the province of this narrative.

While the control of Chesapeake Bay and of Virginia was essential to
British success, Sir Henry Clinton deliberately proposed to couple with
that general design another invasion of Pennsylvania, but from the
south. When Cornwallis moved northward from his useless position at
Wilmington, he was advised by General Clinton to make a movement upon
Philadelphia. General Clinton must have very feebly remembered the
circumstances of his hasty departure from that city in 1778, or have
overlooked Washington’s strategic control of that entire region. The
movement of Lafayette southward, and the energy with which that officer
rallied Virginians to his support, were not appreciated by either of the
British Generals in time to be of benefit to either.

Clinton and Cornwallis alike failed to comprehend that when the American
Commander-in-Chief parted with Lafayette, and afterwards gave him so
large a command, he must have had in view some special service which
that officer could perform with credit as a significant factor in the
entire campaign. Cornwallis knew, however, that unless he could destroy
Lafayette’s army, the British cause in Virginia would certainly be lost.
But the same profound strategy which had inclosed Clinton at New York,
isolated Cornwallis at Yorktown.

Washington was well aware, that neither Louis XVI. nor Rochambeau wholly
favored an attack upon New York. Their objections were substantial. Such
a movement involved the presence of enormous naval forces, which once
within the harbor, might be easily captured or destroyed, whenever Great
Britain could seriously concentrate ships for that purpose. Neither
could a French fleet secure supplies of any kind, so long as Clinton
controlled the city. It was the natural naval depot of Great Britain for
the American coast, and convenient for her West India dependencies.
France, ever willing to aid America, must, however, always have her
naval base in the West Indies, which wholly depended upon her naval
supremacy for immunity from British aggression. Notwithstanding these
considerations, the harmony of the French and American alliance was
never interrupted, and mutual confidence was invariably enjoyed.

It is never to be overlooked that Washington cared more for his position
in New Jersey than for the possession of New York. Its occupation
without a controlling fleet, would be as fatal as the presence of a
fleet without control of the city.

On the day after his arrival at Lafayette’s headquarters, he requested
the Count de Grasse to hasten the transportation of the American troops
from Baltimore; and yet, added a postscript that “Lafayette already
anticipated” his request. On the seventeenth, he embarked with Count
Rochambeau, General Knox and General Du Portail upon the frigate _Queen
Charlotte_; and on the eighteenth, visited the Count de Grasse upon his
flag-ship, the _Ville de Paris_. The distinguished visitors were
received with appropriate honors, and at once took under consideration
the plan for the most speedy prosecution of the siege.

During that interview, Washington was advised of an immediately
preceding event which must interest the modern reader, at a time when
all maritime nations are interested in naval development and ships of
great power. Just before his visit, there had been concentrated, about
the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, one of the heaviest armaments known to
maritime warfare. Fifty-two ships-of-the-line—each with three, or even
four gun-decks, and ranging from sixty-four to one hundred and twenty
guns, besides frigates—constituted that imposing battle array. It has
already been noticed that Admiral Barras sailed from Newport in convoy
of transports which carried heavy guns for siege use before Yorktown.
When Lafayette first moved southward, Washington supplied his detachment
with twelve heavy guns, including two eight-inch mortars, one
twenty-four and two eighteen-pounder guns, for use in arming small
vessels, or assailing Arnold’s defences. These were difficult of
transportation, but no less indispensable as a contingent part of his
outfit. The wisdom of these provisions had a twofold fruition. A British
fleet had been detached from the West India station for the purpose of
supplementing the New York and Newport squadrons. Admiral Hood, in
command, crossed the mouth of Chesapeake Bay just before the arrival of
the Count de Grasse; looked into Delaware Bay, and reported to Admiral
Graves at Sandy Hook on the twenty-fourth day of August. That officer
had but five ships-of-the-line ready for sea. Upon receiving advices
from Gardiner’s Bay that Admiral de Barras had actually sailed southward
from Newport, he incurred no delay, but on the thirty-first of August
sailed, with nineteen ships, in pursuit of the French. On the fifth of
September, he passed within the Delaware Capes without having
encountered Admiral Barras at sea, and without the slightest intimation
that he was soon to be in the presence of a superior naval adversary.
The Count de Grasse, when notified of the appearance of so many large
ships, supposed at first that the fleet of Admiral Barras, already due,
was at hand. Seventeen hundred of his seamen were on the James River,
planting heavy batteries; but so soon as the British flag revealed the
hostile character of the ships, he moved his first division at once,
seaward and southward, ordering the second division to follow
immediately. By this prompt and judicious manœuvre he not only left the
northern channel open for the admission of De Barras from the north, but
secured the weather-gauge of the British fleet; and this he maintained
with equal skill and intrepidity. These great fleets manœuvered for five
days without a general action, but with several sharp encounters in
which several vessels suffered severely. The French casualties were two
hundred and twenty, and the British three hundred and thirty-six.

[Illustration: Operations in Chesapeake Bay.]

During this exchange of hostilities, Admiral Barras safely entered the
bay with seven ships-of-the-line and fourteen large transports, bringing
heavy guns for the siege. (See map.) The Count de Grasse slowly retired,
followed by Admiral Graves; but when the latter realized that Admiral de
Barras had indeed arrived, and that his own fleet was now greatly
inferior in force to that of his adversary, he returned promptly to New
York. The Count de Grasse at the same time knew that Admiral Digby had
arrived at New York from the West Indies with three line-of-battle ships
(reported as six). All these particulars of the previous week’s
operations were communicated to General Washington and his party, on the
_Ville de Paris_. These officers at once started for their respective
camps. Owing to severe and contrary winds, Washington did not reach
Williamsburg until the twenty-second. All at once, a very grave
question, and one which threatened to defeat his carefully matured
plans, confronted the American Commander-in-Chief. The Count de Grasse
outlined his purpose as follows: “To detach two ships for the mouth of
James River; to leave four frigates and several corvettes, in the James;
then, to sail for New York, and either intercept or fight the British
fleet, before it could receive further reënforcements from England or
the West Indies; then, to return and act in concert, each on his own
side.”

Against this departure from the concerted plans of Washington and
Rochambeau, Lafayette protested in vigorous terms. His influence at that
time with the French Court was paramount as to American affairs, and
Queen Marie Antoinette was even a greater enthusiast in behalf of
American liberty than Louis XVI. The instructions of the King to
Rochambeau, already cited, which made Rochambeau subordinate to
Washington in the use of French auxiliary forces, were produced; and the
Count de Grasse gracefully withdrew his suggestion and accepted the
judgment of the generals in command of the land forces, as his rule of
action respecting his fleet.

On the twenty-fifth, the remaining troops en route from the north
reached Williamsburg, making a total of twelve thousand regular troops,
besides more than four thousand militia. On the twenty-eighth, the
entire army advanced and took position within two miles of the British
works. On the twenty-ninth, after a thorough reconnoissance, the
movement began for the complete investment of Yorktown, and all its
approaches. From the opening of the first parallel of approach until
October seventeenth, the activity of the allied forces, the spirited and
generous emulation of Frenchmen and Americans in repulsing sorties, in
storming redoubts, in bombardment, or silencing the enemy’s guns, was
incessant by night and day.

[Illustration: Siege of Yorktown.]

A careful inspection of the map will disclose the relations of the
allied forces, and the completeness of the investment. Washington opened
the fire in person. The rivalry of the American and French troops became
intense. Generals Lincoln, Wayne, Knox, Du Portail, Steuben, Nelson,
Weedon, Clinton, St. Clair, Lawson, and Muhlenburg, with Colonels
Hamilton, Stevens, Lamb, Carrington, Scammel, and Laurens, were among
the American leaders. Generals de Boville, de Vioménil, Chastellux, de
Choisy, de Lauzun, de St. Simon, and Colonels de Dumas, de Deux Pont,
and Gimât, were as active, on the part of the French.

The line of redoubts and batteries marked F (French) had been completed,
and it was deemed necessary to storm two British redoubts and take them
into the parallel. Famous soldiers and corps took part in simultaneous
assault, upon rocket signals, at night. Lafayette, with Gimât, Hamilton,
Laurens, and Barber, was assigned to the redoubt nearest the river. The
Baron de Vioménil with the Count Deux Pont, supported by the grenadiers
of Gatinais, attacked the other. This regiment had been formed out of
that of Auvergne, once commanded by Rochambeau, and long known as the
_Regiment d’Auvergne, sans tache_. When drawn up in line, Rochambeau
promised that if they did well, he would ask the King to restore their
old name; and this was afterwards done by Louis XVI.

Before the signal of attack was given, some light words passed between
the Baron de Vioménil and Lafayette as to the superiority of the French
Grenadiers for these attacks. Lafayette’s column succeeded first, and he
promptly despatched Major Barber to the Baron, with a tender of
assistance. Hamilton and Laurens were conspicuous for gallantry, moving
over the abatis with unloaded muskets; and the French officers were
equally complimented for daring and disregard of British resistance.

Clinton, at his New York headquarters, was in the fullest possible
possession of the record of events then occurring in and about Yorktown.
Space cannot be given, even to a glance over his shoulder, as he reads,
day by day, repeated messages and short postscripts from Cornwallis
indicating the grave peril of his position, and the conviction that
protracted resistance is not to be looked for. An attempt by Cornwallis,
to cross the river and gain New York by land, was a failure. On the
sixteenth, when he ordered these detachments to return, he closed his
correspondence with Clinton in this sad and desperate paragraph: “Our
works are going to ruin. The boats are now being returned. We cannot
fire a single gun. Only one eight-inch, and a little more than a hundred
cohorn shells remain. I therefore propose to capitulate.”

The seventeenth day of October, 1781, dawned, and at 10 o’clock A.M. two
concurrent events occurred,—one at New York, and its contrary, in
Virginia. Sir Henry Clinton, accompanied by a command of seven thousand
choice troops, under convoy of the magnificent squadron of twenty-five
battleships, two fifty-gun ships, and eight frigates, sailed past Staten
Island, for the rescue of the worn-out garrison of Yorktown. He had
previously sailed past Sandy Hook, and the reader will appreciate the
involuntary contrast with a similar departure southward, in the year
1776.

At the same hour, ten o’clock, A.M., a flag of truce bore to the
headquarters of the American Commander-in-Chief, the following note:

YORK, 17th October, 1781.

EARL CORNWALLIS _To General Washington_:

SIR: I propose a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours, and
that two officers be appointed by each side, to meet at Moore’s house,
to settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester.

I have the honor to be, etc.,
CORNWALLIS.

The following reply partakes of the dignity, wisdom, and appreciation of
existing conditions which have characterized all letters of Washington
previously cited. It reads as follows:

MY LORD: I have the honor to receive your Lordship’s letter of this
date.

An ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood will readily
incline me to such terms for the surrender of your posts of York and
Gloucester as are admissible.

I wish, previously to the meeting of the Commissioners, that your
lordship’s proposals, in writing, may be sent to the American lines;
for which purpose, a suspension of hostilities during two hours from
the delivery of this letter will be granted.

I have the honor to be, etc.,
GEORGE WASHINGTON.

At half-past four in the afternoon, the proposals of Cornwallis were
received; but they were so general in their nature, that the Viscount de
Noailles and Colonel Laurens, on the part of the allied armies, and
Colonel Dundas and Major Ross, of the British army, were charged with
preparing other terms of capitulation, for official signature. These
were completed on the eighteenth. On the nineteenth they were signed at
Yorktown, by Cornwallis and Thomas Symonds of the Royal Navy, who led
the attack upon Fort Sullivan (Moultrie) in 1776; and, “In the trenches,
before Yorktown, in Virginia,” by George Washington and Le Compte de
Rochambeau, and by Le Compte de Barras for himself and Le Compte de
Grasse.

At twelve o’clock, noon, the two redoubts on the left flank of Yorktown
were delivered, one to American infantry, and the other to French
Grenadiers. At one o’clock, two works on the Gloucester side of the
river were respectively delivered to French and American troops. At two
o’clock, P.M., the garrison of York marched to the appointed place of
surrender in front of the post, with shouldered arms, colors cased, and
drums beating a British march; grounded their arms, and returned to
their encampments to await a temporary location in the States of
Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. At three o’clock, P.M., the
Gloucester garrison also marched forth—the cavalry with drawn swords and
trumpets sounding, and the infantry as prescribed for the garrison of
York.

The terms of surrender were the same as those observed when General
Lincoln surrendered Charleston to Cornwallis, in 1780; and when General
O’Hara, on account of the illness of General Cornwallis, tendered the
sword of that officer to General Washington, as the pledge of surrender,
he was graciously referred to General Lincoln as its recipient, and that
officer as graciously returned it. The land forces became prisoners to
the United States, and the marine forces to the naval army of France.
(See Appendix F.)

On the twentieth, Washington issued an order of congratulation to the
allied army, in the following words:

“Divine service is to be performed to-morrow in the several brigades and
divisions. The Commander-in-Chief earnestly recommends that the troops
not on duty should universally attend, with that seriousness of
deportment and gratitude of heart which the recognition of such
reiterated and astonishing interpositions of Providence demand of us.”

The American army which paraded on that Thanksgiving Day was not the
same army that began the war. The one central figure, Washington, the
Commander-in-Chief, is present. Some, crowned with well-deserved honors,
are serving in the Halls of Congress. Some, worn out in service, have
retired from active duty. All who had inordinate ambition, and cared
more for self than country, have dropped from the Army Roster.

After the surrender of Cornwallis, American and French officers vied in
extending courtesies to the British officers, as Lafayette describes
their visits, “with every sort of politeness, especially toward Lord
Cornwallis, one of the men of the highest character in England, who was
considered to be their foremost general.” In a parting interview,
Cornwallis replied to Lafayette: “I am aware of your humanity toward
prisoners of war, and I commend to you my unfortunate army.” Lafayette,
calling attention to the earlier surrender of Burgoyne’s army, answered:
“Your lordship knows that the Americans have always been humane towards
captured armies.” In recalling the incident in his “Mémoires
Historiques,” Lafayette says: “In truth, the English army was treated
with every possible consideration.”

Washington designated Lafayette as commander of an expedition to
Wilmington and Charleston, with the brigades of Wayne and Gist. In his
journal he says: “It was to be entrusted to the Marq’s de la Fayette, in
case he could engage the Admiral to convey it & secure the debarkation.
I left him on board the _Ville de Paris_, to try the force of his
influence to obtain these.” Although fixed for November 1st, it was
dropped, and the French feet sailed for the West Indies.

Lafayette obtained leave of absence, and sailed from Boston on the
frigate _Alliance_, December 23rd, having affectionately parted with
Washington; and after a passage of twenty-three days, landed at
L’Orient, where he was cordially welcomed home by his family and the
entire French people.

Washington’s faithful friend, Rochambeau, remained with him, under his
command, when the troops of the Marquis de St. Simon and the fleet of
the Count de Grasse sailed for the West Indies. Rochambeau wintered at
Williamsburg; in the summer of 1782, returned through Philadelphia, to
the Hudson; thence to New England in the autumn, and sailed for the West
Indies during December, 1782. The American Congress did not fail to
appreciate the services of this distinguished French officer. A “stand
of colors” (ever since appreciated by his family), and a piece of
ordnance, were gifts; and it was decreed that a marble monument should
be erected at Yorktown, “to commemorate the alliance between France and
the United States, and the victory achieved by their associated arms.”

Even before the departure of Rochambeau from America, the crowning event
of the fraternal alliance between France and the United States had been
realized, and Independence was no longer a matter of doubt. On the
seventh day of May, 1782, Sir Henry Clinton was relieved of all further
responsibility in command of New York, by Sir Guy Carleton; who assumed
command, and immediately announced to the American Commander-in-Chief
that he had been appointed as a Commissioner to consider the terms of a
permanent peace between Great Britain and the United States of America.
If the reader will recall the antecedents of this officer and the spirit
with which he paroled the American troops, after the disastrous assault
upon Quebec in the winter of 1775, he will appreciate the fitness of his
taking part in the final negotiations for fraternity and peace.

The negotiations between these officers brought into striking relief
certain qualities of Washington as a soldier which have had too slight
recognition. The terms “tory” and “royalist” have been used in this
narrative as they were specially in vogue at the different times and
places where they occur. It has been too often assumed by youth who
study Revolutionary history, that Hessian soldiers were always brutal,
that Tarleton and Simcoe, and especially the Queen’s Rangers, were
irresponsible marauders, and that the tories generally were cruel, and
deserving no quarter.

As a fact, the Revolutionary War had, at its start, many of those
painful antagonisms among neighborhoods and families which always attach
to civil conflicts under the best possible conditions. Among the
thousands who adhered to the British cause, and especially among the
royalist “Provincial Corps,” there were eminent divines, physicians,
lawyers, and scholars. All they had in the world was involved in the
struggle. Many of these sympathized with the best British statesmen, and
longed for some adjustment of differences which would not require
abandonment of their homes in America. By a grave oversight on the part
of Great Britain, no adequate provision was made by her ministry for
this class of Americans who had fought to the last for the Crown. The
action of Washington in coöperation with Sir Guy Carleton, respecting
these men, disbanded as soldiers, but cast upon the world with no
provision for their relief, was so marked by generosity, active aid, and
wise relief, that until this day their descendants in Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick pay glad tribute to his memory. Through the joint efforts
of these two officers, five thousand were sent to St. John, New
Brunswick. The seventeenth day of May, 1783, when the first large
detachment of the Queen’s Rangers landed, is honored as the Natal Day of
that Province. Simcoe, their old commander, became the first Governor of
Upper Canada. In 1792, he organized a miniature Parliament of two
Houses. He founded the City of Toronto; and in 1796, governed the Island
of San Domingo.

Professor Roberts, in his “History of Canada,” already cited, represents
the migration of thirty thousand Americans to that country immediately
after the Revolutionary War, as “no less far-reaching and significant in
its results than the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth.”

There have been those who regarded as the most noble and unselfish act
of Washington’s public career, his patriotic protest against the demands
of his unpaid, starving, and self-sacrificing comrades, that he accept
royal dignity or else become the Oliver Cromwell of his generation. But
the consideration, firmness, and justice with which he dismissed these
mustered-out, disbanded royalists, and, in spite of abuse and outcry,
assisted them to independence in a land of their own choice, adds
another laurel to his chaplet as the magnanimous, no less than the
great, soldier. The subsequent triumphal entry of Washington into the
City of New York, on the twenty-fifth day of November, 1783, was the
crowning military incident of the war.

The numerous Centennial observances in honor of events of the
Revolution, since the second century of American Independence began,
have helped to bring to light many family and other historical data
which otherwise would have been lost; and all of these relating to the
American Commander-in-Chief have only confirmed the world’s estimate of
Washington the Soldier.

Words, at best, are feeble exponents of principles which actions so much
better reveal; and battles on paper, however minutely described, can
never expose the brain processes through which military orders are
matured; nor can the pen portray the experiences of the “rank and file”
of a suffering army, during such an ordeal of war as that in which
George Washington was both the centra executive force and the
sympathetic guardian of the rights of all, of whatever grade of service
or duty. Stupidity, jealousy, self-sufficiency, personal ambition, and
treason, could not survive their impact upon Washington. His mastery of
every antagonistic force, whether professedly military or distinctly
political, was due to that unsought but real supremacy which incarnated
unselfish patriotism, and made American Independence the sole objective
of a righteous judgment and an irresistible will.

On the eighth anniversary of the Battle of Lexington, April 19, 1783,
the American Commander-in-Chief proclaimed a formal “Cessation of
hostilities between the United States and Great Britain,” as the result
of negotiations concluded with Sir Guy Carleton on the previous day.

This Proclamation, like the Letter of Louis XVI., received at Valley
Forge on the seventh day of May, 1778, was ordered to be read at the
head of every regiment and corps of the army; after which, as the order
reads:

“The chaplains with the several brigades will render thanks to Almighty
God for all His mercies; particularly, for overruling the wrath of man
to His own glory, and causing the rage of War to cease among the
nations.

“On such a happy day, which is the harbinger of peace—a day which
completes the eighth year of the war, it would be ingratitude not to
rejoice; it would be insensibility not to participate in the general
felicity.

“Happy, happy, thrice happy, shall they be pronounced, hereafter, who
have contributed anything, who have performed the meanest office, in
erecting this stupendous fabric of freedom and empire on the broad basis
of independency; who have assisted in protecting the rights of human
nature, and in establishing an asylum for the poor and oppressed of all
nations and religions.”

CHAPTER XXXVI.
WASHINGTON’S PREDICTION REALIZED.—THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICA PRONOUNCED.

The blending of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries comes at a moment
of such marked transition in all that directs human activity and
relationship, that the promise of Washington’s benediction, with which
he proclaimed peace, seems about to be verified with a fuller, grander,
and more universal scope of responsibility and example than even his
sublime faith encompassed.

“A stupendous fabric of freedom and empire on the broad basis of
independency,” has already been established. The present generation and
its actors in every department of public duty—including Washington’s
successor in the Presidential Chair; the American Congress in both
Houses; Governors of all the States; and responsible agencies in all
sections—have seemed to unify their efforts to maintain the empire thus
established. Those now living are the heirs to be made “happy, happy,
thrice happy,” through the legacy of his life; if they do their part in
“protecting the rights of human nature, and in establishing an asylum
for the poor and oppressed of all nations and religions.”

Nothing in the career of Washington the Soldier was more sovereign in
its sway over citizens under arms, than his constant appeal to a Divine
Providence as the truest ally of the soul, in hours of grave
responsibility and peril. This narrative would lose much of its value to
America and to mankind, if the passages reflecting Washington’s
religious faith were to be lightly passed over; and if he were to be
measured only as a distinguished representative of the military
profession.

He has, indeed, been tested by the sternest maxims of the military art.
He has been found responsive to their most exacting demands. But all
such tests are largely those of mere intellectual power—not disclosing
excellence in moral and social relations, except as these illustrate
“Statesmanship in War,” and complement other qualifications of the Ideal
Soldier. But Washington was more than a soldier. It is no ill-conceived
paradox to assert that the ideal soldier, the greatest soldier, is not
the man who most literally represents knowledge of the military art. It
is asserted in the Word of Life, that “he that ruleth his spirit is
greater than he that taketh a city.” It is not to be forgotten that the
only proper function of War is, to eliminate disturbants of the public
peace. To give life for country is to partake of the Divine prerogative
of giving life for humanity.

And the soldiers who fought under Washington were not mere men, of
certain ages, to be handled well in battle, as parts of a machine. They
were not hirelings, discounting the chances of life and death for money.
Peace and its domesticities represented the goal of their pursuit; and
self-sacrifice, even of life, to secure that peace, was their conscious
service to family, to country, and to God. The people, as a people, had
no unholy frenzy for war as a source of purely military glory. Only
barbarous nations, or the devotees of some great conqueror or fanatical
religionist, can thus pervert the patriotic sentiment to the instincts
of the beast.

Washington’s army was strong, because strong at home. Country, was the
aggregate of homes many. Never did the term patriotism have a more
radiant reflection of its intrinsic glory; and Washington, as “Pater
Patriæ,” was so paternal in his trust, that his army was filial as well
as loyal, in the highest quality of duty to their great Captain. His
faith in his country’s future was based upon the intelligence of the
people; and his army was both intelligent and religious, because respect
for law and religion was the basis of the first settlement of the
American Colonies as well as the foundation upon which they established
all domestic and political concerns.

In 1780, Thomas Pownall, once royal Governor of Massachusetts,
pronounced “American Independence as fixed as fate”; adding: “North
America has become a new Primary planet, which, while it takes its own
course, in its own orbit, must shift the common centre of gravity.” He
added this significant inquiry: “Will that most enterprising spirit be
stopped at Cape Horn; or, not pass beyond the Cape of Good Hope? Before
long, they will be found trading in the South Sea, in the Spice Islands,
and in China. Commerce will open the door to emigration. By constant
intercommunication, America will every day approach nearer and nearer to
Europe.”

But this “independency of freedom and empire,” predicted by Washington,
is not independency of moral obligation, or relation. It carries with
its exercise an independent control of both moral and physical
activities with which to insist that its inalienable rights shall be
universally respected.

The associated prediction of Washington has also been realized—in “the
establishment of an asylum for the poor and oppressed of all nations and
religions.” America must therefore bear the responsibility of protecting
her wards everywhere, and penetrate the earth with the conviction that
wrong done to one, is wrong done to all. Oceans are but lakes. Distances
are but steps. Neither light nor sound outspeed the cry of suffering
humanity; and neither light nor sound must be allowed to outrun the
speed of wise relief. Beneficiaries of this Empire-Asylum, between the
great seas, have become elements of our wealth and power. They have
ceased to be foreign elements in crystalized society; and blend, as
integral forces in the body politic, just as the elements of air and
water invisibly combine. Countless messages—of happiness, prosperity,
and peace—cross the great seas by every steamship, to cheer their former
countrymen with the hope of like liberties, in times not far distant,
which they also shall enjoy. The prayers of a Christian people for all
mankind, which Heaven doth “gather in vials, as sweet odors,” are not
lost between earth and sky; but other peoples, inhaling wafted
fragrance, dream of the Land of Washington.

Whatever may be the jealousies or dislikes of personal or dynastic rule
abroad, no truly enlightened nation can long remain insensible to that
exhibition of moral and industrial power under which America is fully
equipped for the support of her honor and her flag. Her indwelling peace
matures and conserves financial independence; and infinitely multiplies
capacity and resources with which to meet every just obligation to all
mankind. Her peace, while enriching herself, blesses all nations. Her
products of the shop and farm have become indispensable to the good of
all. This new “centre of gravity,” has become, as Egypt once chanced to
be, the famine magazine, the granary of relief, to the famishing
millions of every land. The ability of America to spring from the repose
of peaceful industry and protect her rights and the rights of humanity
wherever assailed, has compelled the world’s consideration and respect.

The _terra incognita_ of olden times has become the busy field of
competitive industry. The vast empires of China and Japan have caught
from the American Republic their own best stimulus, and a timely
suggestion to resist aggressive strangers. From America, they fear no
unjust demands, no plunder of territory, no violation of sound
principles of international law. China, indeed, only feebly responds to
the quickening impulse; while Japan recognizes and accepts her
opportunity to become an independent, self-respecting power—a truly
modern State!

At the famous Berlin Conference, Count Schouvaloff of Russia, recently
retired from public life, proposed a formal Resolution, that no modern
arms or ships be sold to the empires of the East; declaring that “if
those nations, India, China and Japan, were thus armed, and once began
to contrast their millions of subjects and associated poverty, with the
smaller populations, but vast treasure-houses of Europe, the cities of
Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, would be in more danger, through some
tidal-wave of desolation and plunder from the East, than from all the
standing armies of Europe.” And now that the earth is but a sensitive
“whisper-gallery,” and every hammer’s stroke and every anvil’s ring
reverberate in every machine-shop where despoilers of the East fabricate
implements for its dismemberment and ruin, those same Eastern nations in
part accept, and Japan quotes, the wise maxim of Washington: “In peace,
prepare for war.”

Washington’s career as a soldier is replete with counsel which finds its
crowning opportunity in the present attitude of America before the
world. So long as we deal honorably with all mankind, the buzzing
electric energies of peace are our best assurance of success in a
righteous war. Only wanton neglect of prudent and adequate preparations
for the protection of our commerce, and of our citizens wherever they
chance to sojourn for legitimate business or pleasure, can engender
mistrust of our courage, and invite the very aggressions otherwise
beyond the possibility of occurrence.

But Washington, skilled in the European complications of his times,
never imagined that the same European nations, or any of them, would
select the extreme East as the arena from which to replenish wasted home
resources by force; and then convert the continent of Europe into one
vast magazine of dynamite, until all chief agencies which belong to
domestic prosperity and happiness should be drawn into the wild whirl of
Colonial adventure, for plunder. And as the reader recalls Washington’s
earnest appeals for unity of spirit in all national affairs, and is
reminded of his Farewell Address to the American People, wherein he
deprecated all political combinations abroad which might qualify or
compromise our absolute independence as a Free Republic, he will be more
profoundly impressed with the great fact, that in the present attitude
of these United States before the world, the sublime anticipations of
the “Father of his Country” are maturing to a resplendent and complete
fulfilment. The only natural alliance, in the event of monarchical
combinations to stay the advancing triumph of true liberty, would be a
concerted action of the United States and the mother country, through
the inheritance of like bequests under Magna Charta. The pregnant future
may yet give birth to that fruition.

There is an awful grandeur, more densely charged with ills than the
fiercest spasms of Nature’s fury, in the visible armaments which are
costing peoples, not thrones, _annually_, more than enough to _feed and
clothe every suffering member of the human race_. The alleged object is,
“to preserve the peace,” as if every nation naturally antagonized all
others. The peace of the silent grave, which would turn one’s neighbor’s
soil into a vast cemetery, seems to supplant that peace “which passeth
understanding,” when every heart and mind shall enter a condition of
happy repose and prosperous industry. The inquiry propounded nearly
nineteen hundred years ago—“From whence come wars and fightings among
you?” can be in like manner answered, with solemn emphasis, to-day. No
uninspired pen can match the imagery of prophetic vision which predicted
the outcome of such conditions as now threaten mankind—“Woe to him that
calleth Peace, Peace, when there is no peace!” But greater woe shall
befall those that “call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for
light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for
bitter.” As with the man who wrongeth his neighbor, and taketh that
which is not his, to his own profit; so shall it be with nations. Only
those nations which love righteousness and do justice shall rise above
the wreck of all oppressors, and take part in the enjoyment of that
destined era of righteousness and peace, when nations shall not “learn
war any more.” That nation alone will be truly great, whose supreme
purpose through every armament and armed expression shall be in behalf
of humanity, and to punish or repress the destroyers of peace.

But present conditions had their marvellous premonition in 1892—when “a
Congress of Nations,” and “a Parliament of Religions,” convened during
the World’s Columbian Exposition, at Chicago, in the State of Illinois.
For the purpose of that Exposition, a miniature city, of more than Roman
or Grecian classical beauty and adornment, sprang up as by the power of
magic, wherein all the nations of earth blended their contributions, in
lines of utility and art. Their representatives, their contributors, and
their wise men, beheld “the triumphs of peace,” uncontrolled by the
prestige of artificial rank, or by the persuasion of bayonet, cimeter,
or dagger. They journeyed to and fro in safety; were treated as
brethren; as children of one supreme creative Father; and took thence
some valuable lessons for thoughtful improvement. No social banquet at
their far-distant homes, nor regal display at their national capitals,
could have surpassed the cordial welcome or the deep significance of
that purely Republican entertainment. The temporary shelter for their
pleasure and comfort, costing millions, besides their own generous
outlay, had its day and its uses; and then was set aside, as one gives
away the morning daily paper, after its quick perusal. Then mighty
warehouses, business blocks, and all the permanent features of a vast
inland city, one thousand miles distant from the nearest ocean-port,
rose instead of the temporary palaces of entertainment; while the
markets of the world had received a new impulse, never to be lost.

And such is the Land of Washington! His retirement from command of the
“Continental Army of America,” in the spirit of Joshua, the Hebrew
Captain, when the people thought no honor too rich for his reward,
magnified his office and immortalized his example. Since his career as a
soldier demands no elucidation of his office as legislator, statesman,
or as the first President of these United States, there remains little
to be added; except to commend to American youth, and to all patriotic
youth, wherever these pages may invite perusal, the exemplar career of
one whose unselfish patriotism, moral rectitude, and exalted qualities
as an Ideal Soldier can never lose charm nor value.

Washington based his hopes of success upon the intelligence of the
American people. For their proper training in arms, and the contingency
of a summons to defend their dearly bought liberties, he designed the
Military Academy at West Point on the Hudson. For a uniform system of
education in all that develops social culture and good citizenship, he
proposed, with gift of a proper site, a National University at the
National Capital. Since his immediate mission on earth closed, the
American Republic, which, under God, he established, has donated through
religious, educational, and benevolent channels, more than three hundred
millions of treasure; and found full compensation, in the civilization
and enlightenment thereby imparted to less favored peoples throughout
the world. The American Census of 1890, disclosed the fact, that
American eleemosynary gifts annually exceeded the cost of the largest
standing army of the world.

To-day, America is able, single-handed, to defend her honor and her
flag, whoever may deride her peaceful habits and her homely virtues. The
words of Washington, used upon his return to White Plains in 1778, as
emphatically appeal to the American people to-day, as when they were
first uttered.

A Nation of nearly eighty millions stands ready to vindicate the
loftiest aspirations and redeem the confidence of Washington. So surely
as the Almighty Father is a covenant-keeping God, whatever may be the
scenes of conflict forwarding His purpose, He will emancipate man from
error’s chain and the oppressor’s lash; and this Republic must be ever
prepared to maintain, from generation to generation, one sentiment of
the great Soldier—

“The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous, that he must be worse
than an infidel, that lacks faith; and more than wicked, that has not
gratitude enough to acknowledge his obligation.”

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A.
AMERICAN ARMY, BY STATES.

The American Army, after 1776, never equalled thirty-eight thousand
Regulars, at any one time. Small, temporary, and unorganized detachments
of minute men were often employed to meet sudden forays; but the
aggregate of those who afterwards claimed Revolutionary service was far
beyond the actual numbers subject to Washington’s orders, or under
control by Congress.

In stating these aggregates as credited to their respective States,
under their designated quota, it is to be taken into account, that each
enlistment received a special credit, and generally, by _years_ or term
of service. Hence, many who served from April 19, 1775, until the
nineteenth of April, 1783, _counted as eight_, in the aggregate.

In the American Civil War of 1861–’65, the same rule followed. Nine Ohio
regiments, for example, and those militia, marched to West Virginia for
three months, reënlisted for three years, and then reënlisted for the
war. Several “One Hundred Day” regiments, including the Sixtieth
Massachusetts, and many in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, became credits
to their respective States. The same men were sometimes counted three
times—that is, for each reënlistment.

The contributions of the States, during the Revolutionary War, on this
basis, were as follows:

New Hampshire 12,497
Massachusetts 69,907
Rhode Island 5,908
Connecticut 31,939
New York 17,781
New Jersey 10,726
Pennsylvania 25,678
Delaware 2,386
Maryland 13,912
Virginia 26,678
North Carolina 7,263
South Carolina 6,417
Georgia 2,679
———————
Total 233,771

Also, see Index, “American Army.”

APPENDIX B.
AMERICAN NAVY AND ITS CAREER.

The original organization of the American Navy is noticed on pages 59–60
of the text.

On the thirteenth of December, 1775, several frigates, were authorized,
the annexed figures indicating their _rate_, by _guns_:

_Alliance_ (32), twice identified with Lafayette (pp. 253, 361), and
sold after the war.
_Andrea Doria_ (32), burned in the Delaware to prevent capture 1777

_Boston_ (28), captured at Charleston 1780

[8]_CONGRESS_, burned in the Hudson, to prevent capture 1777

_Delaware_ (24), captured by the British, in the Delaware 1777

_Effingham_ (28), destroyed by the British, in the Delaware 1777

_Hancock_ (32), taken by British ships _Rainbow_ (44) and _Victor_
(16) 1777

[8]_Montgomery_ (24), burned in the Hudson to prevent capture 1777

_Providence_ (28), captured at Charleston 1780

_Queen of France_ (18), captured at Charleston 1780

_Raleigh_ (32), captured by the British ships _Experiment_ (50)
and _Unicorn_ (16) 1777

_Randolph_ (32), blown up in action with the _Yarmouth_ (64) 1778

_The Confederacy_ (32), taken by a British ship-of-the-line, off
the Virginia coast 1781

_Trumbull_ (28), taken by British fleet, near Cape Henry 1778

_Virginia_ (28), taken by British fleet, near Cape Henry, 1778

_Warren_ (32), burned in the Penobscot, by the Americans 1779

_Washington_ (32), destroyed by the British, in the Delaware 1778

Footnote 8:

Never went to sea.

NOTE.—John Paul, who took the name of John Paul Jones through
gratitude to a citizen of North Carolina who assisted him in securing
a naval commission (noticed on page 60 of the text), distinguished
himself upon the British coast, and in his capture of the British ship
_Serapis_, Sept. 23, 1779. His own ship, the _Bon Homme Richard_, was
fitted out in France, by the aid of Benjamin Franklin, to war against
British commerce. Franklin, in the issue of his “Almanack,” with
shrewd business and moral maxims at the bottoms of the pages, used the
nom-de-plume, “Poor Richard.” It was graceful in John Paul to name the
ship Richard, in Franklin’s honor, with a complimentary prefix.

Of the later navy, that of 1812, the _Brandywine_ (44), named after
the battle of that name, was placed at the service of Lafayette when
he visited America in 1825. (See note at end of Chapter XVIII.,
concerning Lafayette as first appearing in that battle.)

APPENDIX C.
COMPARISONS WITH LATER WARS.

The analogies between the Revolutionary War and later American wars are
noticed in the Preface. Some special points should be noted for further
comparisons.

The _field_ casualties, including killed and wounded, in twenty-six of
the principal engagements of the Revolution, do not greatly exceed
9,000; but other causes kept the army upon a very unsatisfactory basis
in respect of numbers as well as efficiency.

Operations in Canada, early in the war, irrespective of the expeditions
of Montgomery and Arnold, cost, through a visitation of small-pox, 5,000
lives in sixty days. (Page 88.)

At the April muster of the army in 1776, only 8,303, out of a total of
10,235, were fit for duty. (Page 87.)

At the August muster, 1776, 3,678 were reported as sick, either present
or on furlough, out of a total of 17,225. (Pages 101, 102.)

At the September muster, 1776, less than 20,000 were reported as fit for
duty (page 114), out of a total of 27,000 (page 103).

At the Battle of Trenton, Christmas night, 1776, more than 1,000 out of
a force of 2,400 were disabled by frost during the brief march and
engagement which gave such fresh vigor to the cause of American
Independence. (Page 142.)

At the October muster of the same year, out of a total of 25,735, the
large number of 8,075 was reported as sick, or on furlough. (Page 122.)

The camps at Morristown, Valley Forge, and at the South, were scenes of
great suffering, distress, and waste. The suffering was greater in
crowded and stationary camps than when on the march. Special diseases
like measles, then as ever since, prostrated great numbers who suddenly
changed house for canvas shelter. In 1862, at one of the healthiest
cantonments at the North, near Indianapolis, fully 1,400 were disabled
for duty within four weeks after reporting for muster. A similar
experience marked Camps Chase, Dennison, and Jackson, Ohio, and Camp
Douglas, Illinois.

That “three months” service in 1861 was exceptionally effective under
existing conditions, and similar service in the war with Spain, in 1898,
reads more like some fabulous tale than the faithful record of
continuous victories by an improvised army, with a minimum sacrifice of
life. (See Military Notes in Preface.)

In the Revolutionary War, gardens and orchards, near camps, seriously
endangered both discipline and health. Home luxuries from visiting
friends became so injurious in their effects that Washington was
compelled to deal sternly with this mistaken kindness. Besides all this,
quartermasters and commissaries, ignorant of their duties, speculated
upon public stores; and even surgeons embezzled supplies until some
regiments had no medicines for immediate emergencies. (Page 123.)

Derelictions from duty were not peculiar to Revolutionary times. Early
in 1861, when haste was so urgent, and the North was not prepared to
clothe promptly even seventy-five thousand men, the First and Second
Ohio reached Harrisburg, en route for Washington, only to find that the
uniforms contracted for and delivered were worthless. The Fifteenth
Ohio, after a rain, found themselves at Grafton, W. Va., just after the
battle of Philippi, with soleless shoes, glue having been used in their
manufacture instead of pegs or thread. The Adjutant-General of that
State, then inspecting Ohio troops, peremptorily forbade their moving
until an entire refit could be supplied, and William Dennison, then
Governor, sustained his action.

The Continental Congress, during the war with Great Britain, tried to
act as Commander-in-Chief, until in conscious impotence it surrendered
military trusts to Washington, with the impressive Resolution, that “the
very existence of civil liberty depends upon the right exercise of
military powers,” and that “the vigorous, decisive conduct of these” is
“impossible in distant, numerous and deliberative bodies.” (Page 148.)

The Revolutionary War, therefore, illustrated every form of distemper
which belongs to war in a republic, when its citizens are suddenly
called to face camp and battle conditions without adequate training and
preparation in advance. Jealousy of a standing army, greed for office
and place, and incessant, selfish, or self-asserting antagonisms, were
the chief burdens that grieved the soul and embarrassed the movements of
Washington, the American Commander-in-Chief.

APPENDIX D.
BRITISH ARMY, AT VARIOUS DATES.

The British Official Records show that the entire British force in
America, including troops in Canada, Florida and the Bahama Islands,
hardly exceeded, at any one time—and then not until 1780—42,000 men.
Some of the regiments appear upon the maps as participants in battles
from the attack upon Breed’s Hill until the final surrender of
Cornwallis. The colonels of these regiments, under British regulations,
held command as general officers; but the regiments retained their
personal relation to the commanding officer, although the
lieutenant-colonel commanded the battalions in the field, one recruiting
battalion always remaining at the home depot.

The following Tables have peculiar value, being compiled direct from
original sources:

1. British regiments assigned to America, 1776.

17th Dragoons Preston’s.
4th Foot Hodgsin’s.
5th Foot Percy’s.
10th Foot Sanford’s.
22d Foot Gage’s.
23d Foot Howe’s.
35th Foot F. H. Campbell’s.
38th Foot Pigot’s.
40th Foot Hamilton’s.
43d Foot Cray’s.
44th Foot Abercrombie’s.
45th Foot Haviland’s.
47th Foot Carleton’s.
49th Foot Maitland’s.
52d Foot Clavering’s.
63d Foot T. Grant’s.
64th Foot Pomeroy’s.
65th Foot Armstrong’s.

The above were stationed in Boston, with five companies of the Royal
Artillery.

On their passage from Ireland to Boston:

17th Foot Monkton’s.
27th Foot Massey’s.
46th Foot Vaughn’s.
53d Foot James Grant’s.

Then, in Canada:

7th Foot Berlier’s.
8th Foot T. Armstrong’s.
26th Foot Lord Gordon’s.
2 Companies Royal Artillery.

Ready to sail for America, from Cork:

15th Foot Caven’s.
33d Foot Cornwallis’.
37th Foot Coote’s.
42d Foot Lord Murray’s.
54th Foot Frederick’s.
57th Foot Irwin’s.

Ordered for Boston:

16th Dragoons Burgoyne’s.
King’s Guards 1,000 men.

Ordered for Quebec:

9th Foot Lagonier’s.
20th Foot Parker’s.
24th Foot Taylor’s.
34th Foot Lord Cavendish’s.
33d Foot Elphinstone’s.
62d Foot Jones’.

Also, 29th Foot upon opening of navigation.

Cunningham’s Regiment, the 14th Foot, was in part in Virginia; the
residue, with a Company of the Royal Artillery, was at St. Augustine,
Florida.

2. British Army at the Battle of Long Island.

ADVANCE CORPS.

Four Battalions of Light Infantry and the Light Dragoons.

RESERVE CORPS.

Four Battalions of Grenadiers, 33d and 42d Regiments.

BRITISH COLUMN.

1ST BRIGADE 44th, 15th, 27th and 45th Regiments.

2D BRIGADE 5th, 28th, 55th and 49th Regiments.

3D BRIGADE 10th, 37th, 38th and 52d Regiments.

4TH BRIGADE 17th, 40th, 46th and 55th Regiments.

5TH BRIGADE 22d, 43d, 54th and 63d Regiments.

6TH BRIGADE 23d, 44th, 57th and 64th Regiments.

7TH BRIGADE 71st Highland Regiment, New York Companies and
Royal Artillery.

Colonel Donop’s command consisted of the Hessian Grenadiers and the
Chausseurs.

General De Heister’s command consisted of two Hessian brigades.

TOTAL OF COMBINED ARMIES, INCLUDING FORCE ON STATEN ISLAND.

General Clinton in his report gives Howe’s “effectives fit for duty” as
26,980—officers not included; but, including all officers, commissioned
and non-commissioned, as 31,625 men.

3. British effective force in America, June 3, 1777.

In New Jersey.
British Artillery 365
British Cavalry 710
British Infantry 8,361
Hessian Infantry 3,300
Anspach Infantry 1,043
——————
13,779

In New York.
British Artillery 20
British Infantry 1,513
Hessian Infantry 1,778
—————
3,311

Aggregate, 17,090.

On this date, 2,631 men had been sent to Rhode Island, and the total
force of foreign troops which had arrived—including those of Hesse,
Anspach, and Waldeck—amounted to 14,777.

4. British effective force in America, March 26, 1778.

In New York. In Philadelphia. In Rhode Island.
British 3,486 13,078 1,610
German 3,689 5,202 2,116
Provincial 3,281 1,250 44
—————— —————— —————
10,456 19,530 3,770

Aggregate, 33,756.

5. Aug. 15, 1778.

In New York and vicinity, 19,586; in Long Island, 8,117; in Rhode
Island, 5,189; Lord Howe’s fleet, 512; making an aggregate of 33,404.

A later return of November 1, on account of troops sent to Halifax and
to the West Indies, reduced the aggregate to 22,494 for duty.

6. May 1, 1779.

New York 9,123
Long Island 6,056
Staten Island 1,344
Paulus Hook 383
Hoboken 264
Rhode Island 5,644
——————
22,814

Halifax 3,677
Georgia 4,794
West Florida 1,703
Bermuda and Providence Island 470
——————
10,644

Aggregate, 33,458.

7. December 1, 1779.

At New York and its dependencies:

British 13,848
German 10,836
Provincial 4,072
——————
Total 28,756

Halifax and Penobscot 3,460
Georgia 3,930
West Florida 1,787
Bermuda and Providence Island 636
—————
Total 9,813

Aggregate, 38,569.

8. British effective force in America, May 1, 1780.

New York. South Carolina. Nova Scotia. East Florida. Georgia.
British 7,711 7,041 2,298 590
German 7,451 3,018 572 547 862
Provincials 2,162 2,788 638 316 1,016
—————— —————— —————— —————— ——————
17,324 12,847 3,508 1,453 1,878

Aggregate, including East Florida, Providence Island and Bermuda,
38,002.

9. December 1, 1780.

New York 17,729
On an expedition 2,274
South Carolina 7,384
Georgia 968
——————
28,355

West Florida 1,261
Nova Scotia 3,167
Bermuda 387
Providence Island 143
—————
4,958

Aggregate, 33,313; besides Provincial troops, 8,954. Total, 42,267.

10. May 1, 1781.

New York 12,257
On an expedition 1,782
With Leslie 2,278
With Arnold 1,553
With Phillips 2,116
South Carolina 7,254
——————
27,240

East Florida 438
West Florida 1,185
Nova Scotia 3,130
Bermuda 366
Providence Island 128
Georgia 887
—————
6,134

Aggregate forces, 33,374.

11. Sept. 1, 1781.

New S. N. W.
York. Virginia. Carolina. Georgia. Floridas. Scotia. Indies.

British, 5,932 5,544 5,024 920 1,745 498

German, 8,629 2,204 1,596 486 558 562

Provincial, 2,140 1,137 3,155 598 211 1,145

—————— —————— —————— —————— —————— —————— ———

Total, 16,701 8,885 9,775 1,084 1,689 3,452 498

Aggregate, including Providence Island and Bermuda, 42,075.

NOTE.—Stedman has the following estimate:

BRITISH AND REBEL FORCE
IN 1776.

Dates. British. Rebel.
August 24,000 16,000
November 26,600 4,500
December 27,700 3,300

IN 1777.

March 27,000 4,500
June 30,000 8,000

APPENDIX E.
ORGANIZATION OF BURGOYNE’S ARMY.

To remain in Canada, part of 8th regiment, 460 men; part of 34th, 348
men; parts of 29th and 31st regiments, 896 men; eleven additional
companies expected from Great Britain, 616 men; brigade detachments, 300
men; detachments from German troops, 650 men, and Royal Highland
emigrants, 500 men; making a total of 3,770 men.

The army of invasion (see page 171) numbered as follows:

Men.

The grenadiers and light infantry (except of the 8th and 24th
regiments), as the advance corps under General Fraser 1,568

_First brigade_; battalion companies of the 9th, 21st, and 47th
regiments 1,194

_Second brigade_; battalion companies of the 20th, 53d, and 62d
regiments, leaving 50 of each in Canada 1,194

_German troops_, except the Hanau Chasseurs, and 650 left in
Canada 3,217

—————

Total, with artillery 7,173

To this force were to be associated “as many Canadians and Indians as
might be thought necessary for the service.”

APPENDIX F.
ORGANIZATION OF CORNWALLIS’S ARMY.

This force, when fully concentrated on Virginia, Aug. 1, 1781, consisted
of the following troops: British, 5,541; German, 2,148; Provincials,
1,137; on detachments, 607; making a total of 9,433 men.

The general Return of officers and privates surrendered at Yorktown, as
taken from the original Muster Rolls, is stated by the Commissary of
prisoners to have been as follows—General and staff, 79; Artillery, 23;
Guards, 527; Light Infantry, 671; 17th Reg’t, 245; 23d Reg’t, 233; 33d
Reg’t, 260; 43d Reg’t, 359; 71st Reg’t, 300; 76th Reg’t, 715; 80th
Reg’t, 689; two battalions of Anspach, 1,077 (these two battalions alone
had Colonels present), Prince Hereditary, 484; Regiment of De Bose, 349;
Yagers, 74; British Legion, 241; Queen’s Rangers, 320; North Carolina
Vols., 142; Pioneers, 44; Engineers, 23. Total, including commissary
department, and 80 followers of the army, 7,247 men. Total of officers
and men, 7,073. Seamen and from shipping, about 900 officers and men.
Other authorities increase this number to over 8,000. It is evident that
the Return of August 15, cited on page 385, overestimates the really
effective force.

Seventy-five brass cannon, 69 iron guns, 18 German and 6 British
regimental standards, were among trophies captured.

The military chest contained £2,113, 6s, sterling. The _Guadaloupe_ 28,
the old _Fowey_, the _Bonetta_ (sloop) 24, and _Vulcan_ (fire-ship),
thirty transports, fifteen galleys, and many smaller vessels, with
nearly 900 officers and seamen, were surrendered to the French.

APPENDIX G.
NOTES OF LEE’S COURT-MARTIAL.

MAJOR-GENERAL LORD STIRLING, _President_.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL POOR.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOODFORD.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL HUNTINGTON.
COLONEL IRVINE.
COLONEL SHEPARD.
COLONEL SWIFT.
COLONEL WIGGLESWORTH.
COLONEL ANGEL.
COLONEL CLARKE.
COLONEL WILLIAMS.
COLONEL FEBIGER.
JOHN LAWRENCE, _Judge-Advocate_.

The Court met July 1, 1778, at the house of Mr. Voorhees, New Brunswick,
N.J.

The charges were as follows:

_First_—For disobedience of orders, in not attacking the enemy on the
twenty-eighth of June, agreeably to repeated instructions.

_Second_—For misbehavior before the enemy on the same day, by making
an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat.

_Third_—For disrespect to the Commander-in-Chief, in two letters dated
the first of July and the twenty-eighth of June.

GENERAL LEE PLEAD “NOT GUILTY.”

On the twelfth of August, the Court found him to be _guilty_ under all
the charges, and sentenced him to be “suspended from any command in the
Armies of the United States of America, for the term of twelve months.”

Forty-two witnesses were examined. (See page 235 of text, for their
unanimity in vindication of Washington from use of any language not
proper, in his rebuke of Lee at the time of his retreat.)

The following are the letters that concluded with Lee’s demand for a
court-martial:

FIRST LETTER.

CAMP ENGLISH-TOWN, July 1, 1778.

SIR: From the knowledge I have of your Excellency’s character, I must
conclude that nothing but misinformation of some very stupid, or
misrepresentation of some very wicked, person, could have occasioned
your having made use of so very singular expressions as you did on my
coming up to the ground where you had taken post; they implied that I
was guilty either of disobedience of orders, of want of conduct, or
want of courage; your Excellency will therefore infinitely oblige me
by letting me know on which of these three articles you ground your
charge, that I may prepare for my justification, which, I have the
happiness to be confident, I can do to the army, to the Congress, to
America, and to the world in general. Your Excellency must give me
leave to observe that neither yourself nor those about your person
could, from your situation, be in the least judges of the merits or
demerits of our manœuvres; and, to speak with a becoming pride, I can
assert, that to these manœuvres, the success of the day was entirely
owing. I can boldly say, that had we remained on the first ground, or
had we advanced, or had the retreat been conducted in a manner
different from what it was, this whole army and the interests of
America would have risked being sacrificed. I ever had, and hope ever
shall have, the greatest respect and veneration for General
Washington; I think him endowed with many great and good qualities;
but in this instance, I must pronounce that he has been guilty of an
act of cruel injustice towards a man who certainly has some
pretentions to the regard of every servant of this country; and, I
think, Sir, I have a right to demand reparation for the injury
committed, and, unless I can obtain it, I must, in justice to myself,
when this campaign is closed (which I believe will close the war),
retire from a service at the head of which is placed a man capable of
offering such injuries; but, at the same time, in justice to you, I
must repeat, that I from my soul believe, that it was not a motion of
your own breast, but instigated by some of those dirty earwigs who
will forever insinuate themselves near persons in high office; for I
really am convinced, that when General Washington acts for himself no
man in his army will have reason to complain of injustice or
indecorum.

I am, Sir, and hope ever shall have
Reason to continue, your most sincerely
Devoted, humble servant,
CHARLES LEE.

HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.

SECOND LETTER.

CAMP, June 27, 1778.

SIR: I beg your Excellency’s pardon for the inaccuracy in mis-dating
my letter. You cannot afford me greater pleasure than in giving me the
opportunity of showing to America the sufficiency of her respective
servants. I trust that the temporary power of office, and the tinsel
dignity attending it, will not be able, by all the mists they can
raise, to obfuscate the bright rays of truth; in the meantime, your
Excellency can have no objection to my retiring from the army.

I am, Sir, your most obedient,
Humble servant,
CHARLES LEE.

GENERAL WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON’S LETTER IN REPLY.

HEADQUARTERS, ENGLISH-TOWN, June 30, 1778.

SIR: I received your letter (dated through mistake, the 1st of July),
expressed, as I conceive, in terms highly improper. I am not conscious
of having made use of any very singular expressions at the time of my
meeting you, as you intimate. What I recollect to have said was
dictated by duty and warranted by the occasion. As soon as
circumstances will permit, you shall have an opportunity either of
justifying yourself to the army, to Congress, to America, and to the
world in general, or of convincing them that you were guilty of a
breach of orders, and of misbehavior before the enemy on the 28th
inst., in not attacking them as you had been directed, and in making
an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat.

I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,
GEORGE WASHINGTON.

MAJOR-GENERAL LEE.

After the reading of the foregoing letters by the Judge-Advocate,
General Lee requested the following letter to be also read:

CAMP, June 30, 1778.

SIR: Since I had the honor of addressing my letter by Colonel
Fitzgerald to your Excellency, I have reflected on both your situation
and mine, and beg leave to observe, that it will be for our mutual
convenience that a Court of Inquiry should be immediately ordered: but
I could wish it might be a court-martial, for if the affair is drawn
into length, it may be difficult to collect the necessary evidences,
and perhaps might bring on a paper war betwixt the adherents to both
parties, which may occasion some disagreeable feuds on the continent,
for all are not my friends, nor all your admirers. I must entreat,
therefore, for your love of justice, that you will immediately exhibit
your charge, and that on the first halt, I may be brought to a trial;
and am, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

CHARLES LEE.

The date of the assembling of the court-martial shows that Washington
acted promptly.

GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS.

=Abatis.=—Felled trees, with sharpened branches, pointing outward
toward an approaching enemy.

=Bastion.=—A work of two faces and two flanks, with salient angles.

=Batteau.=—An old-style flatboat of large capacity, in form of the
modern scow.

=Billet.=—An old term for a brief letter; or, an assignment of troops
to certain quarters.

=Boom.=—A chain cable or line of spars bound together to prevent the
passage of vessels at a harbor entrance, or across a river.

=Cabal.=—A plot, or secret intrigue.

=Cantonment.=—A lodgment for troops.

=Cheveau-de-Frise.=—A cylinder, of iron when practicable, with sharp,
projecting spears on all sides; to oppose an invading force, or to
close a gap in the defences.

=Command.=—A body of troops, or a separate command.

=Corduroy.=—(“Cord of the King.”) An extemporized road, a uniting
cord, by a series of parallel logs across a swamp or soft ground.

=Countersign.=—A confidential word of recognition, changed daily or
more frequently, emanating from the officer in chief command.

=Curtain.=—A wall connecting two bastions.

=Detachment.=—A fraction of a command, or troops assigned to some
special duty.

=Detail.=—An assignment for special duty.

=Engineering.=—See PREFACE.

=Fascines.=—Bundles or faggots of brushwood, or small poles, tied
together, for defence or for crossing swamps.

=Fusee.=—A small musket of early times.

=Gabions.=—Cylindrical wicker baskets open at both ends, filled for
defensive purposes, making a temporary parapet.

=Galleys.=—Small vessels of light draft.

=Grand Tactics.=—See PREFACE.

=Hurdles.=—Pickets about three feet high, united by twigs, to give a
solid footing for a battery, or for crossing soft ground and swamps.

=Itinerary.=—Record of daily marches; including notes of country
traversed, streams crossed, and whatever may be valuable for record
or subsequent guidance.

=Line-of-battle ship.=—A full-rigged ship, with two or more gun-decks.

=Log-book.=—The itinerary of a ship.

=Logistics.=—See PREFACE.

=Magazine.=—A depot of powder or of other supplies.

=Muster.=—A detailed record of troops, periodical or otherwise, for
exact information of the force under command.

=Orderly Book.=—A record of current orders, whether of commissioned or
non-commissioned officers.

=Parapet.=—A work, breast-high or more, for defence.

=Patrol.=—A small scouting-party beyond the usual line of sentries; or
a detail of search as to the movements of the enemy.

=Picket.=—An outside sentry, to guard against surprise.

=Quota.=—A fixed apportionment upon the basis of numbers.

=Reconnoissance.=—A personal examination of country within the range
of military movements.

=Redoubt.=—An inclosed defence.

=Rendezvous.=—A designated place for assembling troops or supplies.

=Roster.=—A list of officers, or of officers and men; on any duty, or
subject to duty.

=Salient.=—An angle projecting outward, toward hostile approach.

=Strategy.=—See PREFACE.

=Surveillance.=—On the constant watch, with critical observation of
existing or contingent conditions.

=Taking Post.=—Occupying a designated position, whether under orders,
or in the contingencies of a march or an advance.

=Zone.=—A belt or stretch of country, indicating the sphere of action
of the various parts of an army, which secures concert of action in
combined movements.

CHRONOLOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX.

NOTE.—The contemporaries of Washington named in this index are in
general only persons so associated with or opposed to the cause he
stood for as to influence his military action.

Events are treated and indexed in chronological order, so that the
index becomes thereby a miniature biography of the characters taking
part in the events narrated. It may often prove interesting to note
the age of a prominent actor in these events at the time, by
calculating it from the year of his birth when given below.

ABBREVIATIONS.—For various nationalities: _Am._ (American); _Br._
(British); _Fr._ (French); _H._ (Hessian). In the biographical
notices, _b._ for birth and _d._ for death are used; and occasionally,
_k._ for killed, _w._ for wounded, and like familiar abbreviations may
be found. The subsequent career of many is indicated thus—Cornwallis,
_sub._ gov.-gen. India.

Acts of Parliament to be resisted, 17

ADAMS, JOHN—statesman; _sub._ pres, twice; _b._ 1735, _d._ 1826.
in first Continental Congress, 16
on special naval committee, 60
commissioner in the interests of peace, 116
his influence abroad, 309

ADAMS, SAMUEL—orator; _b._ 1722, _d._ 1803.
exempted from the proffered pardon, 32
his opinion of a regular army, 299

AGNEW, JAMES— _Br._ maj.-general;
_k._ at Germantown, 196

Alamance, N.C., battle of, May 16, 1771, 84

Albany Convention of July 4, 1754, 12

ALLEN, ETHAN—col.; _b._ 1637, _d._ 1789.
captures Ticonderoga, May 10, 1775, 30
tries to capture Montreal, without orders, 62
captured and sent to England, 62
insubordination commented upon by Washington, 62

_Alliance_ frigate, twice takes Lafayette to France, 253, 362

American army,
wholly composed of militia, 21
call for 30,000 under arms, 22
officially recognized, 32
its strange experience, March 2, 1776, 75
occupies Boston, March 17, 1776, 80
begins its first campaign, 83
April muster, 1776, 87
August muster, 1776, 101
September muster, 114
85 regiments authorized, 116
its condition, Sept. 10, 1776, 119
October muster, 122
its lack of discipline, 123
Lee’s grand division, 135
special muster ordered by Washington, Nov. 23, 1776, 136
its condition, Dec. 30, 1776, 147
parades in Philadelphia, 183
August muster, 1777, 184
condition at Valley Forge, Dec., 1777, 205–6
at Newport, 1778, 242
assignments of divisions, 1778, 247
fixed at 80 battalions, 252
at Philadelphia, weakened in discipline, 252
its condition, Dec., 1779, 269
its condition, Nov. 7, 1780, 296
reorganization proposed, 298
new basis, of 36,000 men, 299
divisions again assigned, 300
its condition, 1781, 306
mutinous elements noticed, 307
at the South, 315–317
at Peekskill, 1781, 333
before Yorktown, 1781, 356
by States (Appendix A), 377

American Civil War referred to, for comparison (Preface), vii
policy defined, 91
commissioners appointed in the interests of peace, 115
cow-boys near New York, 255
speculators feed the British, 306

Americo-Spanish War of 1898 illustrating the principle of “Strategy and
Statesmanship in War” (Preface), x, xii

ANDRÉ, JOHN—_Br._ major, _sub._ asst. adjt.-gen.; _b._ 1751, _d._ 1780.
taken prisoner, at St. John’s, 62
arranges _fête_ in honor of Howe, 215
at capture of Charleston, 275
his antecedents noticed, 289
former relations to Miss Shippen, 289
executed as a spy, 290
his fate regretted, 290
exchange for Arnold morally impracticable, 291

ANGEL,—col. at Fort Mercer, R.I., 201
at Battle of Springfield, 283–4

ARBUTHNOT, MARIOT—_Br._ admiral; _b._ 1711, _d._ 1794.
arrives at New York, 261
relieves Sir George Collier, 261
fights a French fleet, 326

Armies of modern times, 370–1
of the Revolution as given by the British authority, Stedman
(Appendix D), 386

Arms from France, 164

ARMSTRONG, JOHN—brig.-gen.; _b._ 1758, _d._ 1843.
at Brandywine, 186
on the Schuylkill, 192

ARNOLD, BENEDICT—_sub._ maj.-gen.; _b._ 1740, _d._ 1801.
takes a company to Boston, 30
hastens to Lake Champlain, 30
anticipated by Allen, 30
organizes a naval force, 30
loved by Washington, 45
returns in angry mood, 51
proposes conquest of Canada, 51
his expedition for Quebec, 55
his disastrous march, 64
wounded in a bold assault, 66
his captains refuse longer service, 66
the siege of Quebec fails, 66
at Providence, 163
unjustly treated by Congress, 165
gallantry at Ridgefield, 166
in command at Philadelphia, 167
gallantry in Burgoyne campaign, 176
finally promoted, 176
court-martialed, 274
is married to Miss Shippen, 289
suffers from old wound, 222, 288
in command at West Point, 288
corresponds with Clinton, 288
invites André to visit him, 290
dictates price of his treason, 290
antecedents in Philadelphia, 289
his treason anticipated by Lord Germaine, 289
his exchange for André impossible without dishonor, 291
leaves N.Y. with troops, 310
overtaken by a storm, 310
his discretion doubted by Clinton, 310
plunders Richmond, Va., 311
cannot intimidate Jefferson, 311
returns to fortify Portsmouth, 311
writes to Lafayette, 331
treated with silent contempt, 331
tries threats to no purpose, 331
relations with Gen. Phillips, 331
ordered back to New York, 331
lays waste New London, 351
his recall explained, 351

ARNOLD, Mrs. (formerly Miss Shippen)—ignorant of Arnold’s treason, 289
honored by Washington, 291
sympathy of Lafayette, 291

Articles of Confederation finally adopted, 309

“Art of War” (Preface), x–xii

ASHE, JOHN—brig.-gen.; _b._ 1721, _d._ 1781; declares while speaker of
the North Carolina Assembly, concerning the Stamp Act, “We will
resist its execution to the death,” 13

ATLEE, SAMUEL J.—col.; _b._ 1738, _d._ 1786.
joins the army at Brooklyn, 105
commands Pennsylvania Rifles, 105
makes a gallant fight, 107
prisoner with Stirling, 107

_Augusta_ 74, _Br._; blown up in the Delaware, 202

Aux Trembles reached by Benedict Arnold, 65
reached by Montgomery, 65
reached by Carleton, 66

Baltimore pays honor to Rochambeau and Washington, 351

BANCROFT, GEORGE—diplomat and historian; _b._ 1800, _d._ 1891.
as to the invasion of Canada, 54
his estimate of Washington, 250

BARRAS, PAUL FRANÇOIS JEAN, _Count_ DE—_Fr._ admiral; _b._ 1755, _d._
1829.
sails from Newport, 354
enters the Chesapeake, 355
signs capitulation of Yorktown, 360
also signs for Count de Grasse, 360

Bennington unwisely attacked by Burgoyne; anticipated by Washington,
176

Berlin conference noticed, 370

BIDDLE, NICHOLAS—appointed naval captain, 60

Billingsport raided by Cornwallis, 203

BIRD—_Br._ lieut.-col.; _k._ at Germantown, 196

BLACKSTONE—chief of the Senecas; friend of Washington, 260

Bordentown occupied by Donop (_H._), 139
occupied by Cadwallader, 156
visited by British troops, 213

Boston, massacre of March 5, 1770, 15
Tea Party entertainment, Dec. 16, 1773, 15
Port Bill, 1774, 15
surrounded by 20,000 minute men, 30
deliverance from British control a fixed purpose, 30
not a proper British base, 33
bombarded three nights, 74, 77
evacuated, 80
visited by D’Estaing, 243
visited by Greene, 246
visited by Lafayette, 244
visited by Rochambeau, 361

BOTTA, CARLO GIUSEPPE GUGLIELMO—_Ital._ historian; _b._ 1768, _d._
1837.
as to Battle of Long Island, 113
as to Battle of Trenton, 149
reviews New Jersey campaign, 159

BOVILLE, DE—_Fr._ maj.-gen.; reconnoitres with Washington, 336

BOWDOIN, JAMES—pres. Mass. Council; _b._ 1727, _d._ 1790;
addressed by Charles Lee, 139

Braddock’s operations noticed, 7

BRADLEY, JOSEPH P.—Justice U.S. Supreme Court; _b._ 1813, _d._ 1892;
corrects a tradition as to Lafayette’s alleged reminiscence of
Washington’s profanity, 235

Brandywine, Battle of, 185

British army, at various dates (Appendix D), 383
troops quartered by British Parliament in Boston, 1768, 14
estimates for troops, by British ministry, 96
foreign auxiliaries opposed by British statesmen, 96
four military operations proposed, 97
its movements after Battle of Long Island, 116
advances to Horn’s hook (see map), 120
lands at Throgg’s Neck (see map), 125
advances beyond New Rochelle, 126
awaiting reënforcements, 127
in New Jersey, 139
invades the Illinois country, 253
opposed by Gov. Jefferson, 253
fed by _Am._ speculators, 296

British military policy defined, 95

British Parliament urges king to arrest Americans, 1769, 14
rejects “Conciliatory Bill,” 1775, 18
restricts New England trade, 18
favors certain colonies, 18

Brookline, Mass., furnished fascine rods, 78

Brooklyn, N.Y., occupied by Lee, 85
fortified by Greene, 102
evacuated by Washington, 112

Bull Run, 1861, illustrates Brandywine (Preface), x

Bunker Hill or Breed’s Hill, significance of the battle, 34

BURGOYNE, _Sir_ JOHN—lieut-gen.; _b._ 1730, _d._ 1792.
arrives at Boston, 33
describes rebels as _peasants_, 34
calls battle on Breed’s Hill “a great catastrophe,” 40
reaches Canada from Ireland, 89, 171
issues an unwise proclamation, 172
responded to by Washington, 172
has no sympathy with “hire of Indians”, 172
sharp letter from Gates, 173
his noble response, 173
captures Ticonderoga, 175
his diversion to Bennington an error, 175–6
surrenders his army, 176
organization of his army (Appendix E), 387

BURKE, EDMUND—_Br._ statesman; _b._ 1730, _d._ 1797.

BURR, AARON—col.; _sub._ vice-pres.; _b._ 1750, _d._ 1830.
accompanies Arnold to Quebec, 55

BUTLER, THOMAS—col.; at storming of Stony Point, 257

BYRON, JOHN—_Br._ admiral; _b._ 1723, _d._ 1786.
relieves admiral, Lord Howe, 239
fleet scattered by a storm, 239
arrives off Boston, 245

CADWALLADER, JOHN—brig.-gen.; _b._ 1743, _d._ 1786.
guarding the Delaware, 141
fails to cross river, 142
crosses Delaware at Bristol, 146
arrives at Trenton, 151
at Princeton, 156
at Bordentown, 156

CÆSAR, JULIUS—Roman general; _b._ 100 B.C., _d._ 44 B.C.
his campaigns cited in comparison (Preface), viii
his methods imitated by Washington, 313

CALDWELL, JAMES—his church burned by the British, 271
his wife shot by the British, 279
furnishes hymn books for gun-wadding at Springfield, 284

CAMPBELL, WILLIAM—_Am._ col.; _b._ 1745, _d._ 1781;
at Battle of King’s Mountain, 293

Canada lost to France, 1763, 10
as a British base, 30
invasion urged by Congress, 50
Arnold its active spirit, 51
Congress again moves, 52–3
difference in religious faith, 52
two expeditions planned, 55
did not support Burgoyne, 55
failure of the expeditions, 66
visited by commissioners, 88
visited by small-pox, 88
costs five thousand American lives in sixty days, 88
British reënforcements come, 89
abandoned by the American army, 89
the excuse of Congress, 89

Canadian Acts of Parliament, 50
expeditions of Schuyler and Montgomery, 52, 55
expedition again suggested, but opposed by Washington, 252

CARLETON, _Sir_ GUY—gov., of Canada, _sub._ gov. New York; _b._ 1724,
_d._ 1808.
Arnold’s report of his small force in Canada, 51
flees from Montreal in disguise to Quebec, 64
pays military honors to his old comrade, Montgomery, 66
his magnanimous parole of American prisoners of war, 66
being largely reënforced in June, 1776, takes the offensive, 89
succeeds Clinton in N.Y., 362
coöperates with Washington, 363
surrenders New York, 363

CARRINGTON, EDWARD—col., _sub._ quartermaster-gen. (South); _b._ 1749,
_d._ 1810.
indorsed by Chief Justice Marshall, 301
explores the Southern rivers, 302
commissioner to exchange prisoners, 318

CARROLL, CHARLES—last survivor of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence; _b._ 1737, _d._ 1832;
commissioner to Canada, 88

CARROLL, _Rev._ JOHN—_sub._ Archbishop of Maryland; visits Canada and
reports a terrible condition of affairs, 88

CATHARINE II. OF RUSSIA—_b._ 1729, _d._ 1796;
is hostile to British commerce, but favors American interests, 296

Charleston, S.C., captured by Clinton, 275

Charlestown Heights, neglected by British, 34
occupied by Americans, 34
occupied by British, 35
abandoned, 61

Charlottesville, Va., a Hessian prison-camp, visited by Tarleton, 340

CHASE, SAMUEL—Md.; _b._ 1741, _d._ 1811;
appointed commissioner to Canada, 88

CHASTELLUX, FRANÇOIS JEAN, _Marquis_ DE—maj.-general; _b._ 1734, _d._
1789.
accompanies Rochambeau to America, 286
a relative of Lafayette, 286
marches from Newport to Ridgebury, Conn., 333
in conference at Wethersfield, 333
commands a division, 337

CHATHAM, _Lord_ (WILLIAM PITT)—orator and statesman; _b._ 1756, _d._
1835.
Pittsburgh named in his honor, 10
describes the First Continental Congress, 17
his conciliatory bill defeated, 18
as to making slaves of American Englishmen, 20
as to Battle of Guilford, 320

Chatterton Hill, battle near White Plains, 129

Chemung, Battle of, noticed, 260

Chesapeake Bay memorable in naval warfare, 354

“Chimney-corner patriots” disgust Washington, 328

China stimulated by American example, 370

Civil liberty requires right execution of military power, 304

CLINTON, JAMES—brig.-general; _b._ 1736, _d._ 1812.
gallantry at Fort Clinton, 179
in Indian expedition, 260

CLINTON, GEORGE—gov., brig.-gen.; _sub._ vice-pres.; _b._ 1736, _d._
1812.
commands in the Highlands, 166
his services noted, 178, 190

CLINTON, _Sir_ HENRY—lieut.-gen.; _b._ 1758, _d._ 1795.
arrives in America, 33
urges attack upon Cambridge, 35
overruled by Howe, 35
expects an independent command, 70
anticipated by Washington, 70
visits Tryon in New York, 85
ordered to destroy Southern cities, 85
in attack upon Fort Sullivan, S.C., 85
returns to New York, 89
in battle of Long Island, 107
expects large success, 110
at Newport, R.I., 150
in expedition up the Hudson, 178
outgenerals Putnam, 178
captures Forts Clinton and Montgomery, 179
did not intend to join Burgoyne, 180
returns to New York, 182
relieves Howe in command, 215
gives a _fête_ to Howe, 215
attempts capture of Lafayette, 216
fails to capture Lafayette, 217
his policy outlined, 221
evacuates Philadelphia, 222
moves toward Monmouth, 223–4
followed by Lafayette, 225
prepares for battle, 229
abandons position at night, 234
regains New York, 234
escapes the French fleet, 238
tries to reënforce Newport, 245
reports to Lord Germaine, 249
inactive at New York, 252
captures Stony Point, 253
reoccupies Stony Point, when Washington abandoned it, 259
declines to attack West Point, 261
abandons Newport and New England, 262
sails for Charleston, 268
reports his force, 270
reports as to Provincials, 272
expedition suffers from storm, 274
captures Charleston, 275
issues absurd proclamation, 275
reënforced by Rawdon, 276
returns to New York, 282
plans a new expedition, 283
invades New Jersey, 283
Battle of Springfield, 283–4
burns Springfield, 285
“needs rest for his army”, 285
plans descent upon Newport, 286
writes Lord Germaine as to West Point, 288
corresponds with Arnold, 289
again writes Lord Germaine, 289
closes bargain with Arnold, 290
cannot exchange Arnold for André, 291
watches the American mutiny, 309
advises with Lord Germaine, 309
sends Arnold to Virginia, 310
doubts Arnold’s discretion, 310
sends good officers with him, 310
equally powerless with Cornwallis, 324
learns of effort to capture Arnold, 325
sends Phillips to support Arnold, 326
orders Arnold to New York, 331
disturbed by Arnold’s correspondence with London officials, 332
receives Washington’s decoy letters, 335
“in a state of siege”, 335
other decoy letters reach him, 336
orders Cornwallis to report to him, 337
calls for reënforcements, 338
intercepts other decoy letters with plans enclosed, 346
outgeneraled by Washington, 347–8
writes Cornwallis—promising help, 350
advises Cornwallis to strike Philadelphia, 352
does not understand Washington, 352
hears from Cornwallis, 358
sails for Yorktown too late, 358
contemporaneous surrender of Cornwallis, 359–60
is relieved of command in New York, 361
succeeded by Sir Guy Carleton, 361

COLLIER, _Sir_ GEORGE—_Br._ commodore.
convoys Clinton and his troops up the Hudson, 253
his fleet visits New Haven, 256
relieved by Admiral Arbuthnot, 261

Colonial Congress at New York, 1765, 11
nine Colonies represented; others ratify action, 11
names of Colonies that were not represented, 11
the Declaration of Rights, 11
denounces Stamp Act, Oct. 7, 1755, 13

Colonial expeditions, 1755, 10
additional, 1758, 10

Colonial governments and their forms described, 16

Columbian Exposition, 1892, noticed, 372–3

Commissioners sent to Canada, 88
General and Admiral Howe meet American commissioners in New York, 98
arrange terms between Cornwallis and Washington, 359

Committee of Congress visits Boston, 60

Committee of Correspondence, 1773, and their purpose, 15

Connecticut Farms, N.J., burned by General Knyphausen, 279

Connecticut sends 2,000 men to Boston, April 26, 1775, 23
assigns Putnam, Wooster, and Spencer to command, 23
sends volunteers to New York with Lee, 71
her militia greatly reduced, 116
responds to Washington’s appeal, 116
twice invaded by Tryon, 166, 256
invaded by Arnold, 351

Continental Army organized, 32

Continental Congress adopts militia about Boston as the American
Continental Army, 32
forms Light Infantry corps, 32
appoints Washington Commander-in-Chief, 32
accompanies commission with pledge of support, 32
sends committee to Washington at Cambridge, 52
disclaims purpose to operate against Canada, 54
but initiated and pressed every expedition, 54
sends a second committee to Cambridge, 60
authorizes a navy, 60
urges attack upon Boston, 61
sends committee to N.Y., 85
orders additional troops to Canada, 88
proposes to hire Indian allies, 88
appoints commissioners to Canada, 88
authorizes abandonment of New York, 117
confers large powers upon Washington, 140
imparts dictatorial powers, 148
makes promotions without consulting Washington, 165
adjourns to Lancaster and to York, 194
honors the defenders of Fort Mifflin, 202
places enemies of Washington in responsible commands, 205
sends a committee to Valley Forge, 212

Continental money worth 3 cents on the dollar, 252

CONWAY, THOMAS—Irish adventurer; brig.-gen. at Battle of Germantown,
195
promoted major-general and inspector-general, 205
resigns his commission, 207
responsible for the “Conway cabal”, 212
departs for France, 212

CORNWALLIS, CHARLES, _Lord_—_sub._ lieut.-gen. India; _b._ 1738, _d._
1805.
sails for America, 97
lands at Wilmington, N.C., 97
accompanies Clinton to Charleston, S.C., 97
returns to New York, 99
in Battle of Long Island, 107
enforces the surrender of Sullivan and Stirling, 108
assaults Fort Washington, 132
invades New Jersey, 136
halts at Brunswick, 137
on eve of departure for England, 150
ordered back to New Jersey, 150
advances upon Trenton, 152
threatens Washington’s position, 154
strengthens his own position, 154
outgeneraled by Washington, 156
retires to Brunswick, 156
again on the aggressive, 167
attempts to gain Washington’s defences, 169
retires to Staten Island, 169
in skirmish upon invasion of Pennsylvania, 185
moves up the Brandywine, 188
leads the advance of Howe’s army, 188
surprises Sullivan’s division, 187–9
moves to Chester, 192
enters Philadelphia, 194
lands in New Jersey, 203
compels Americans to destroy their galleys, 203
threatens Washington at Chestnut Hill, 204
skirmishes with Morgan, 204
makes incursion into New Jersey, 248
in command at the South, 275
suspends invasion of North Carolina, 293
fails to subjugate the people, 293
sore over Tarleton’s defeat at Cowpens, 315
presses closely upon Greene, 315
informs Clinton of his condition, 317
abandons Charleston, 317
expects no aid from Virginia, 318
his proclamation to rebels, 318
arranges for exchange of prisoners, 318
parols militia as prisoners, 318
seeks to control upper fords, 318
is outgeneraled by Greene, 319
in need of all supplies, 319
at Guilford Court-House, 319
cannot improve success, 320
practically a defeat, so judged by contemporaries, 320
retires to Wilmington, leaving his wounded, closely pursued by
Greene, 321
his position, and that of Clinton, noticed, 324
reminiscence of earlier campaign, 325
his effective force reduced, 329
arrives at Yorktown from Wilmington, 333
sustained by British ministry, 337
Clinton wants his troops, 338
promises to expel Lafayette from Virginia, 338
in pursuit of Lafayette, 38–9
his course described by Lafayette, 339
abandons the pursuit, 339
is followed by Lafayette, 340
returns to headquarters, 341
finds old despatches from Clinton, 341
takes boats for Yorktown, 341
his movements reported to Washington, 342
is warned by Clinton of danger, 350
relations to Clinton noticed, 352–3
must destroy Lafayette’s army to hold Virginia, 353
attempts escape by Gloucester, 358
the movement abandoned, 358
graphic report to Clinton, 358
terms of surrender fixed, 359
surrender completed, 360
courtesies between officers of the three armies, 361
his interview with Lafayette, 361

CORNWALLIS, FREDERICK—acts as _Br._ commissioner to exchange prisoners,
318

COUDRAY, _Monsieur_ DE—ordered to complete defensive works along the
Delaware, 192

Court-martial of Arnold, 274

Court-martial of Lee (Appendix G), 389

Cowpens, Battle of, 312

COXE, DANIEL—urges union of Colonies, 1722, 12

Crimean War noticed, 313

CROMWELL, OLIVER—Lord Protector of England; _b._ 1599, _d._ 1659.
cited by Washington’s officers as a precedent for assuming permanent
command, 364

Crown Point, expedition against, 1755, 10
visited by Allen and Arnold, 30
captured by Seth Warner, 51

CUSTIS, _Mrs._ MARTHA—_b._ 1732, _d._ 1802.
her marriage to Washington, 8

Danbury, Conn., invaded (with Ridgefield) by Tryon, 166

DARTMOUTH, GEORGE, _Lord_—_Br._ statesman; _b._ 1748, _d._ 1791.
comments upon Lexington and Concord, 20
opposed military occupation of Boston, 33
advised Howe to attack Southern cities, 69
regarded New York as the true British base, 69

DAYTON, ELIAS—col.; _b._ 1735, _d._ 1807.
his regiment in battle, 278–9

DEANE, SILAS—_b._ 1737, _d._ 1834.
on naval committee, 60
commissioner to France, 209
returns to Philadelphia, 238

DEBORRE, PRUDHOMME—brig.-gen.; disgraced at Brandywine, 189

Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, 91

D’ESTAING, CHARLES HECTOR, _Count_—_Fr._ lieut.-general; _b._ 1729,
_d._ 1794.
reaches the Delaware with French fleet, 238
sails at once for New York, 239
unable to cross the bar, 240
arrives at Newport, R.I., 240
consults Sullivan as to attack, 242
not affronted by Sullivan’s landing first, 243
is confronted by British fleet, 243
both fleets dispersed, 243
returns to Newport, 243
sails for Boston to refit; notices Sullivan’s protest, 243
his manly course vindicated, 244
sails for the West Indies, 245
off the coast of Georgia, 261
his siege of Savannah, urged by Lafayette, 267
twice wounded, 268

DE FLEURY, LOUIS—_Fr._ lieuten’t, _sub._ col.
at defence of Fort Mercer, 202
planned Fort Mifflin, 202
wounded in its defence, 203

DE GRASSE, FRANÇOIS JOSEPH PAUL—_Fr._; b. 1723, d. 1788.
arrives in the Chesapeake, 342
limited in period of operations, 342
urges assault upon Yorktown, 342
yields to Lafayette’s judgment, 343
is visited by Washington, 354
has naval fight with Admiral Graves (see map), 355
suggests a plan of action, 356
opposed by Lafayette, 356
sails for the West Indies, 361
his trophies at Yorktown (Appendix F), 388

DE HEISTER—_H._ lieut.-gen.; lands at Gravesend, Aug. 25, 1776, 106
captures Sullivan and Stirling, and parts of their commands, 108
advances to support Howe, 126

DE KALB, JOHN, _Baron_—maj.-gen.; _b._ 1732, _d._ 1780.
comes to America with Lafayette. Note to Chap. XVIII, 191
reports as to the army, 205
appointed inspector-general, 207
commands Maryland and Delaware troops, 277
Southern campaign, 291
_k._ in Battle of Camden, 292

Delaware troops always efficient, 277
gallantry at Camden, 292

Denmark and Sweden hostile to England, 296

DESTOUCHES, _Chevalier_—succeeds De Ternay, deceased, 298
supports Washington, 323
indorsed by Washington, 326

DE TERNAY, _Chevalier_—convoys Rochambeau’s army from France, 286
blockaded by British at Newport, 298
dies at Newport, 298
is succeeded by Destouches, 298

DICKENSON, JOHN—in first Continental Congress, 17

DINWIDDIE, ROBERT—gov. of Virginia; _b._ 1690, _d._ 1770; sent
Washington as commissioner to French frontier, 6

DONOP—_H._ col.;
in the storming of Chatterton Hill, 129
abandons Bordentown, 146
_k._ in storming Fort Mercer, 201
is buried by the Americans, 202

Dorchester Heights occupied by the Americans, 76–80

DRAYTON, WILLIAM H.—_b._ 1742, _d._ 1779; chief justice, South
Carolina, 1776, 86

DUMAS, MATHIEU, _Count_ DE—_Fr._ col.; _sub._ marshal-de-camp and
historian; _b._ 1753, _d._ 1837;
gallantry at Yorktown, 357
_Note._—He was wounded in storming redoubt.

DUNDAS, FRANCIS—_Br._ lieut.-col.; _b._ 1750, _d._ 1824; goes to
Virginia with Arnold, 310

DUNMORE, JOHN MURRAY, _Lord_—_Br._ gov. Virginia; _b._ 1732, _d._ 1818.
seizes colonial powder, 28
opposed by Patrick Henry, 28
takes refuge on board the man-of-war _Fowey_, 28
bombards Norfolk, New Year’s day, 1776, 68
is visited by Gen. Clinton, 85

DU PORTAIL, LEBEGUE—_Fr._ brig.-gen.; _d._ 1802.
captured at Charleston, 300
succeeded as engineer by Kosciusko, 300
reconnoitres with Washington, 336
visits the Count de Grasse with Washington, 353

EFFINGHAM, _Lord_—_Br._; resigns when ordered to America, 21

Elizabethtown, N.J., visited by Knyphausen, 227

Engineering defined, with note (Preface), xi

ERSKINE, _Sir_ WILLIAM—_Br._ brig.-gen.; captured by _Am._ privateer at
sea, 98, 99
warns Cornwallis at Trenton, 155
attempts to capture Lafayette, 216

Eutaw Springs—the last battle at the South, 321

Evacuation of Boston (_Br._), 80
Brooklyn (_Am._), 113
New York (_Am._), 127
Philadelphia (_Br._), 222
Charleston (_Am._), 267
Yorktown (_Br._), 361
New York (_Br._), 363

EWING, JAMES—brig.-general; failed to cross at Trenton, 1776, on
Christmas night, 162

FAIRFAX, BRYAN, _Lord_—_b._ 1730, _d._ 1802; friend of Washington, 5

Fairfield, Conn., raided by Governor Tryon, 255

FEBIGER, CHRISTIAN—colonel at Stony Point, 257

First Continental Congress, at Philadelphia, Sept. 5, 1774, 16
its officers and members noticed, 16
Washington a member, 17
honored by Lord Chatham, 17
supports Massachusetts, 17

FLEURY, LOUIS DE. See De Fleury.

FORMAN—brig.-gen.,
at Battle of Germantown, 195

Forrest’s battery (_Am._) at Trenton, 145

Forts Clinton and Montgomery captured (see map), 179

Fort Du Quesne, became Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh), 10

Fort Mercer and its gallant defence, 201

Fort Mifflin, planned by De Fleury (_Fr._), 202

France retains certain American possessions by Treaty of Paris, 1763,
11
makes a formal alliance with America, 213
sends an ambassador to America, 238
sends a fleet to America, 238
sends a second fleet to America, 261
sends an army to America, 286
sends a third fleet and troops to America, 342
sends money to America, 348
shares in the trophies of Yorktown, 388

Franco-Prussian war cited in comparison (Preface), vii

FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN—philosopher, diplomat, and statesman; _b._ 1716,
_d._ 1790.
urges a union of the Colonies, 1754, 12
the convention of July 4, 1754, the result, 12
reasons for its failure, 12
on passage of Stamp Act, writing to Charles Thompson, 13
Thompson’s reply quoted, 13
describes the servile attitude of the English people, 18
chairman Penn. Committee of Safety, 28
his opinion of fight at Breed’s Hill, 34
commissioner to Canada, 88
commissioner to meet Gen. and Admiral Howe, 116
secures French support, 209
writes as to Washington’s standing abroad, 308
influence with Holland and Spain noticed, 309
secures a loan from Holland, 348

FREDERICK II.—third king of Prussia (called “the Great”); son of
Frederick William I.; _b._ 1712, _d._ 1786; like Washington in
reticence, 44

French army at Newport, R.I., 286
marches through Connecticut, 335
joins Washington, 335
threatens New York, 336
supports Lafayette, 342
parades in Philadelphia, 349
reviewed by the president of Congress, 349
in siege of Yorktown, 357
competes with Americans, in action, 358

French fleet off the Delaware, with French Ambassador, 238
unable to enter New York, 240
sails for Newport, R.I., 240
engages fleet of Howe, 243
repairs at Boston, 243
at Savannah, Ga., 261
blockaded at Newport, 295
off the Chesapeake, 350
engages with British fleet, 354
leaves America, 361

Frigate _Le Sensible_ (_Fr._) brings French treaty to America, 213
_La Chinier_ (_Fr._) brings French minister to America, 238

Frigates built during the war, and their fate (Appendix B), 378

GAGE, THOMAS—_Br._ lieut.-gen.; _b._ 1721, _d._ 1787.
appointed gov. Massachusetts and Commander-in-Chief, 16
his fatal movement upon Concord, 20
succeeded by Howe, 58

GATES, HORATIO—maj.-general, _sub._ adj.-general; _b._ 1728, _d._ 1806.
his antecedents, 36
succeeds Sullivan in Canada, 88
the confidant of Charles Lee, 127
confidential letter from Lee, 127
another letter from Lee, 138
reports for duty, 139
absent without leave, 141
dodges Battle of Trenton, 142
insolent letter to Burgoyne, 173
its lofty rebuke, 173
relieves Schuyler, and himself relieved, 173
declines command of Ticonderoga, 173
insulting letter to Washington, 173–4
Washington’s reply, 174
appeals to congressmen, 174
on leave of absence, 174
supersedes Schuyler, 176
captures Burgoyne’s army, 176
congratulated by Washington, 179
reports direct to Congress, 179
president of Board of War, 205
still corresponds with Lee, 205
commands at Peekskill, 212
on Council of War, 217
letters to Lee known to Washington, 220
declines to fight Indians, 259
“unequal to the command,” 260
spends winter in Virginia, 281
Congress gives him the Southern Department, 281
sarcastic letter from Charles Lee, 281
in command at the South, 291
criticised by Irving, 291
routed at Camden, 292
his disgraceful flight, 292
his abject apology, 292
could have saved the battle, 292
attempts to gather his army, 293
the tidings reaches Washington, 295
is succeeded by Greene, 300
turns command over to Greene, 302
retires to his farm, 302

GEORGE III.—King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the
Faith; _b._ 1738, _d._ 1820.
does not understand Englishmen in America, 20
hears of Burgoyne’s surrender, 208
unwisely adjourns Parliament, 208

GERARD (DE RAYVENAL), _Monsieur_ CONRAD A.; _d._ 1790.
pledges to Franklin and Deane French support, 209
first _Fr._ ambassador to America, 238

GERMAINE, GEORGE (_Viscount_ SACKVILLE), _Lord_—_Br._ Prime Minister;
_b._ 1716, _d._ 1785.
correspondence with Howe, 98
with Clinton, 249, 289

Germantown, Battle of, Chapter XIX., 192–7

GIMÂT—_Fr._ col. on Washington’s staff.
at Monmouth, 233
witness on Lee’s trial, 233
at siege of Yorktown, 357

GIST, MORDECAI—brig.-gen., _sub._ gov. Del.; _b._ 1743, _d._ 1792.
skirmishes with Cornwallis, 204
recruits for Greene’s army, 301

GLOVER, JOHN—col.; _sub._ brig.-gen.; _b._ 1732, _d._ 1797.
at Battle of Long Island, 108
covers the retreat, 111
resists British landing at Throgg’s Neck, 125
at Battle of Trenton, 142

GORDON, _Rev._ WILLIAM, as to Battle of Monmouth, 234

Grand tactics defined, with note (Preface), x

GRANT, JAMES—_Br._ maj.-gen.; _b._ 1720, _d._ 1806.
at Battle of Long Island, 107
watches Washington from Brunswick, N.J., 143
compliments Washington’s sagacity, 143
put Hessians off their guard, 143

GRANT, ULYSSES SIMPSON—Gen. U.S.A., _sub._ pres. twice; _b._ 1822, _d._
1885.
his example cited, 66

GRAVES, THOMAS, _Baron_—_Br._ admiral; _b._ about 1725, _d._ 1802.
ordered to burn coast towns, 59
counter-action of Washington, 59
attempts to capture Lafayette, 216
sails for the Chesapeake, 355
misses Count de Barras, 355
engages a superior French fleet, 355
returns to New York, 355

GRAY—_Br._ maj.-gen.
surprises Wayne at Paoli, 193
in attack upon Washington at Chestnut Hill, 204
attempts to capture Lafayette, 216
surprises Light Horse, at Tappan, 248

Great Britain sublimely faces world-wide antagonisms, 296
unjust to her Provincial troops, 362
Washington aids Carleton in their behalf, 363

GREENE, ASHBEL—chaplain at Monmouth; _sub._ pres. Princeton College,
N.J.; _b._ 1762, _d._ 1848;
as to Washington’s interview with Lee at Monmouth, 236
See also Washington’s letter as to the language used by him, 391

GREENE, CHRISTOPHER—colonel; _b._ 1737, _d._ 1781.
in Arnold’s expedition to Canada, 55, 200
commands Fort Mercer, 200

GREENE, NATHANIEL—maj.-gen.; _b._ 1740, _d._ 1786.
commands Rhode Island troops, 24
a Quaker youth and blacksmith’s apprentice, 25
studied by forge-light, after work hours, 25
announces principles essential to success, 25
thorough work as member of the Kentish Guards, 26
antecedents and studies, 26
likened to Grant and Lee, 26
outline of his career anticipated, 39
his brigade noticed, 69
in charge of Brooklyn Heights, 87
completes the defences, 102
prostrated by fever, 104
succeeded by Putnam, 104
advises retreat, 115
describes Washington at Kipp’s Bay, 119
assumes command in New Jersey, 122
describes corrupt practices of surgeons, 123
joins for duty, 127
prepares for campaign in New Jersey, 130
regards Fort Washington as defensible, 132
at Battle of Trenton, 142
commands advance posts before Trenton, 151
leads the advance, Jan. 2, 1777, 155
visits Congress, 166
advances to meet Howe, 168
his plan vindicated, 169
selects position on the Brandywine, 185
commands the reserve, 186
with Washington, covers the retreat, 189
at Battle of Germantown, 195
enters New Jersey, 203
assigns Lafayette to duty, 203
at Council of War, 217
at Monmouth, 230, 233
at Boston, as quartermaster-general, 246
describes the winter, 1780, 271
in Battle of Springfield, 283
manœuvres for position, 284
scientific movements noticed, 285
succeeds Arnold at West Point, 291
submits plan for Southern campaign, 300
succeeds Gates and goes South, 300
relieves Gates, 302
his reports and letters, 302
graphic letter to Marion, 303
“spies are the eyes of an army”, 303
acts as if under the eyes of Washington, 303
initiates his campaign, 313
his army without clothing, 315
uses blankets, “Indian style”, 315
rides 125 miles to see Morgan, 315
joined by Harry Lee, 316
provides for Morgan’s prisoners, 316
his wise strategic methods, 317
expects no aid from Virginia, 318
decides to fight Cornwallis, 318
battle of Guilford Court-House, 319
drives Cornwallis into Wilmington, 320
his report to Washington, 320
fights Rawdon, at Hobkirk Hill, 321
the casualties stated, 321
fights Stewart, at Eutaw Springs, “the final battle at the South”,
321
redeems Georgia and the Carolinas, 322
welcomes Lafayette to the South, 326
regards capture of Cornwallis as settled, 327
his army reënforced by Lafayette’s self-denial, 330

Greenfield, Conn., raided by Tryon, 256

Green Mountain Boys, Vt., regularly organized, 51
resist Carleton’s advance from Canada, 62
decline to reënlist after capture of Montreal, 63

GRENVILLE, GEORGE—_Br._ Prime Minister; _b._ 1712, _d._ 1770;
ordains a revenue system, 1764, 12

GRIDLEY, RICHARD—col.; _b._ 1711, _d._ 1796.
Engineer-in-Chief at Bunker Hill, 23
resigns, and succeeded by Knox, 61

Griffiths—_Am._ col.; skirmishes with Donop (_H._), 146

HALE, EDWARD EVERETT—clergyman, journalist, and author; _b._ Boston,
Mass., 1822.
his tribute to Nathan Hale, 120, 121

Hale, Nathan—_Am._ captain; _b._ 1755; _d._ 1776.
confidential messenger of Washington, 120
executed as a spy, Sept. 22, 1776, 121
his memorable last words, 121
his career sketched by the Rev. E. E. Hale, 120–121
place of his execution identified by Lossing, 131

HAMILTON, ALEXANDER—col., _sub._ eminent financier; _b._ 1757, _d._
1804.
occupies Chatterton Hill, with two guns, 128
is sent to Gates for troops, 204
with Lafayette at Monmouth, 226
reports New York Harbor too shallow for French fleet, 240
gallantry at Yorktown, 357

HAMMOND, _Sir_ ANDREW—_Br._ commodore;
arrives with troops, 261

HAMPTON, WADE—col.; _b._ 1754, _d._ 1835;
honored by Washington, 312

HANCOCK, JOHN—statesman and maj.-gen.; _b._ 1737, _d._ 1793.
pres. Mass. Provincial Congress, 17
advises Washington of Howe’s movements, 183
at siege of Newport opposes departure of D’Estaing, 243

HAND, EDWARD—col.; _b._ in Ireland, 1744, _d._ 1802.
in skirmish on Long Island, 104
falls back to Prospect Hill, 105
delays British landing at Throgg’s Neck, 125
skirmishes with the Hessian Yagers, 126
in front of Trenton, 1776–7, 151
in Sullivan’s expedition, 260
becomes adjt.-gen., _vice_ Scammon, resigned, 300

HANNIBAL—Carthaginian prince and general; _b._ 229 B.C., _d._ 183 B.C.
(Preface), v

HARRISON, BENJAMIN—signer of Declaration of Independence; _b._ 1740,
_d._ 1791;
visits Boston on naval affairs, 60

HARRISON, ROBERT H.—col.
secretary to Washington, 300
becomes C.J. of Maryland, 300

HARRISON, THOMAS—speaker of Virginia House of Burgesses;
addressed by Washington, 250

HASLET—col. Delaware reg’t; _b._ in Ireland, _d._ 1777.
joins army at Brooklyn, 105
makes a gallant fight, 107
attacks the Queen’s Rangers successfully, 126
_k._ at Battle of Princeton, 154

HAZELWOOD, JOHN—_Am._ naval officer; b. 1726, d. 1800;
gallantry on the Delaware, 202

HAZEN, MOSES—col., _sub._ brig.-gen.; _b._ 1733, _d._ 1802;
threatens Staten Island, 347

HEATH, WILLIAM—maj.-general; _b._ 1735, _d._ 1814.
appointed brig.-gen, 36
his antecedents, 36
subsequent career outlined, 39
describes occupation of Dorchester as “never so much done in so short
a space”, 77
ordered to New York, 82
efficient at New York, 104
aids in the retreat, 110
makes a night march, 128
commands in the Highlands, 131
at Fishkill, 135
advised of Washington’s plans, 141
ordered to take the offensive, 147
special assignment to duty, 156
reprimanded for mismanagement, 157–8
ordered to Boston, 254
again in the Highlands, 268
commands camp in New Jersey, 346

Hebrew military and civil antecedents (Preface), viii, ix

HENRY, PATRICK—orator and statesman; _b._ 1736, _d._ 1799.
charged with treason, 13
denounces British Stamp Act, 13
in first Continental Congress, 17

Hessian prisoners taken at Saratoga remain in America, 248
quartered in Virginia, 248

Hessian soldiers misunderstood, 363

HILDRETH, RICHARD—historian; _b._ 1807, _d._ 1865.
criticises Samuel Adams, 299
Mr. Adams’ position sound in principle, 299

HILLHOUSE, JAMES—captain, _sub._ eminent lawyer and senator; _b._ 1754,
_d._ 1832.
resists Tryon’s invasion of New Haven, 256

Hobkirk Hill noticed, 321

HOOD, _Sir_ SAMUEL—_Br._ admiral; _b._ 1724, _d._ 1816.
arrives in America, 354
looks into Delaware Bay, 354
proceeds to New York, 354
reports to Admiral Graves, 354

HORNBLOWER, JOSEPH C.—Chief Justice of New Jersey; _b._ 1777, _d._
1864;
misreported as to Washington’s language at Monmouth, 235

HOWE, _Lord_ RICHARD—admiral; _b._ 1725, _d._ 1799.
reaches N.Y. July 12, 1776, 98
joint commissioner with General Howe, 98
refuses to recognize Washington’s military title, 96
does so in order to secure Erskine’s exchange, 99
returns to New York, 245
sails for Boston, 245

HOWE, _Sir_ WILLIAM—lieut.-gen.; _b._ 1730, _d._ 1814.
declares martial law, 32
offers pardon to all but Samuel Adams and John Hancock, 32
established in America, 33
overrules Clinton’s advice to attack Cambridge, 35
his martinet discipline, 48
ordered to succeed Gage, 58
issues an unwise proclamation, 58
Washington’s counter-proclamation, 58
orders coast towns to be devastated, 59
instructed by Lord Dartmouth, 69
“New York is the proper British base”, 70
overruled by Gage, 70
Dorchester Heights seized, 77
his report to Lord Dartmouth, 77
fails to recapture the Heights, 80
evacuates Boston, 80
embarks for Halifax, 80
sails from Halifax for New York, 97
lands troops on Staten Island, 98
confers with Governor Tryon, 98
writes Lord Germaine as to plans, 98
addresses George Washington, Esq., 98
changes the address to secure a military exchange, 99
“dispensing pardon to repentant sinners,” as Washington styles Howe’s
mission, 99
brilliant landing of his army, 106
the battle outlined, 107–9
negotiations with American commissioners, 108
advance of his army, 117
makes enormous requisitions for troops, 118
movements anticipated by Washington, 120
writes Lord Germaine as to a long campaign, 124
will not attack Harlem Heights, 125
lands at Throgg’s Neck, 126
orders storming of Chatterton Hill, 126
awaits reënforcements, 126
outgeneraled by Washington, 129
crosses to the Hudson, 129
anticipated by Washington, 130
tries to deter American enlistments, 130
guarantees “liberties and properties”, 130
captures Fort Washington, 132
knew of Adjutant Dumont’s treason, 133
excuse for not following Washington, 133
specific instructions given, 133
sends Cornwallis into New Jersey, 137
“weather too severe for field service”, 137
returns to New York, 139
winter quarters specified, 139
surprised by news from Trenton, 150
calls for 20,000 more troops, 150
hurries Cornwallis to New Jersey, 150
withdraws troops from Newport, 163
plans anticipated by Washington, 165
marches again into New Jersey, with 17,000 men, 167
details of the campaign, 168–170
will invade Pennsylvania, 177
writes a decoy letter, which Washington detects, 177
no doubts of Burgoyne’s success, 181
sails for the Chesapeake, 182–183
skirmishes with American advance, 185
masterly strategy in the Battle of Brandywine, 187–190
cares for the wounded of both armies, 192
his rear threatened by Washington, 194
his headquarters at Germantown, 195
repels Washington’s attack, but does not attack in turn, 195
after battle returns to Philadelphia, 196
threatens American army at Chestnut Hill, 204
explains the failure of his movement, 204
succeeded in command by Clinton, 215
his army in detail (Appendix D–2), 384

Huntington, L.I., raided by Tryon’s expedition, 256

Hyde Park, Mass., where fascine rods were made available, 78

Independence, National, proclaimed at Philadelphia, July 4, 1776, 91

Independence proclaimed at Charlotte, N. C., May 20, 1774, 29

Indian atrocities during the Revolution, 249
summarily avenged, 252, 260

Indian auxiliaries advocated by Great Britain, 172
advocated by Congress, 88
denounced by Burgoyne, 172–3
ridiculed by Schuyler, 88

IRVING, WASHINGTON—diplomat, historian, scholar; _b._ 1783, _d._ 1859.
his personal aid acknowledged by the author (Preface), xiv
his sketch of Washington’s youth, 1
his tribute to Mary Washington, 5

Japan honors the example and teachings of Washington, 370

JAY, JOHN—statesman and jurist; _b._ 1745, _d._ 1829.
in first Continental Congress, 17
suggests to burn New York, 108
commissioner to France, 309
his services recognized, 309

JEFFERSON, THOMAS—patriot and statesman, governor Va., _sub._ pres.
twice; _b._ 1743, _d._ July 4, 1826.
sees basis for a constitution in government of Iroquois Indian
Confederacy, 12
protects the western frontier, 253
advised by Washington, 300
defies Arnold’s threats, 311
narrowly escapes capture by Tarleton, 340
is vindicated by Lafayette, 343

JOMINI, HENRI, _Baron_ DE—gen.; chief of staff to Napoleon;
aide-de-camp Emperor of Russia; military writer; _b._ 1799, _d._
1869.
gives grounds of Napoleon’s success (Preface), xiii
as applied to Washington, 44
as to retreats, 73

JONES, JOHN PAUL—lieut., captain in the navy, _sub._ admiral in the
Russian navy; _b._ 1747, _d._ 1792.
appointed in the navy, 59
history of his name, 379
his naval success, 379

JOSHUA—the Hebrew captain, an antetype of Washington upon completion of
his mission, 373

Jubilee, _Am._, at Valley Forge, 213
French alliance honored, 213
_Br._ at Philadelphia, 215
General Howe honored, 215
noted participants, 215

KENT, JAMES—chief justice, jurist, and author, N. Y.; _b._ 1763, _d._
1847;
his opinion of General Schuyler, 37

Kentish Guards, R.I., identified with Greene, 26
their prompt start for Boston, 27
their subsequent promotions in the service, 26

KEPPEL, AUGUSTUS—_Br._ admiral; _b._ 1725, _d._ 1786; gives an opinion
of the war, 21

King’s Mountain, Battle of, mentioned, 293

Kingston, N. Y., burned by Gen. Vaughn, 179

KNOWLTON, THOMAS—capt., _sub._ col.; _b._ 1740, _d._ 1776.
at Bunker Hill, 122
_k._ at Harlem Heights, 122

KNOX, HENRY—chief of artillery, _sub._ maj.-gen.; _sub._ Sec. of War;
_b._ 1750, _d._ 1806.
succeeds Gridley, resigned, 61
efficient in ordnance department, 71
mounts Ticonderoga cannon at Cambridge, 71
reports his artillery force, 102
efficient at Trenton with Forrest’s battery, 145
recruits artillery in Mass., 163
establishes gun-factory at Springfield, 163
visits Count de Grasse, with Washington, 353

KNYPHAUSEN, WILHELM, _Baron_ VON—_H._ lieut.-general; _b._ 1730, _d._
1789.
arrives in America and joins Howe, 126
in attack upon Fort Washington, 132
at Brandywine, 186–7
conducts Clinton’s baggage-train from Philadelphia, 224
pushes for Monmouth, 224
reaches New York, 229
invades New Jersey, 271
in Battle of Springfield, 279
acts the part of Pharaoh, instead of that of Moses, 280

KOSCIUSKO, THADDEUS—Polish maj.-general; _b._ 1750, _d._ 1817.
perfects fortifications at West Point, 212
appointed chief engineer, _vice_ Du Portail, captured, 300
ordered to the South, 302
his efficiency, 302
his antecedents, 305
locates earthworks, 317

LAFAYETTE, or LA FAYETTE, MARIE-JOSEPH-PAUL-YVES-ROCK-GILBERT DUMOTIER,
_Marquis_ DE—maj.-general; _b._ 1757, _d._ 1835.
arrives in America, 191
reaches Philadelphia, 191
joins Washington, in council, 191
his first scout, 185
commands a division, 203
visits Albany as to Canadian movement, 211
rejoins Washington, 212
concurs with his chief, 213
skilful at Barren Hill, 215
amusing incident of the battle, 216
outmanœuvres Clinton, 216
attends a Council of War, 217
pursues Clinton, 225
reports progress, 226
his relations to Lee, 228
skirmishes with Queen’s Rangers, 229
protests against retreat, 229
commands second line at Monmouth, 231
conduct during the battle, 235
alleged statement as to Washington at Monmouth disproved, 235
a letter to his wife, 236
on duty at Newport, 241
corresponds with D’Estaing, 244
makes quick trip to Boston, 244
covers retreat to Newport, 245
occupies Bristol, 245
sails for France, 253
returns to America, 276
joins Washington, 276
reports to Congress, 276
his proclamation as to Canada, 288
his sympathy with Mrs. Arnold, 291
his estimate of Washington, 305
extols the American army, 306
intrusted with arrest of Arnold, 312, 323
starts on his expedition, 324
an interesting reminiscence, 325
letters to his wife, 325
wounded at Brandywine, 325
his active movements, 325
orders from Washington, 326
has confidence of Greene, 327
how he treated deserters, 327
harasses the enemy, 329
his letter to Washington, 330
headquarters established, 331
ignores Arnold’s letters, 331
complimented by Washington, 332
marches to meet Wayne, 338
reports his movements, 339
takes the offensive, 339
joined by Wayne and unites with Steuben, 340
intercepts Tarleton’s correspondence, 340
in sharp action at Williamsburg, 341
gallantry noticed, 341
writes Washington in full, 342
reports landing of French troops, 342
declines grave risks, 342
outgenerals Cornwallis, 343
ready for Washington’s arrival, 343
has Cornwallis inclosed, 343
complains of “rusty wheels”, 343
vindicates Gov. Jefferson, 343
confident of victory, 343
receives special orders from Washington not to let Cornwallis escape,
345
sends despatches to Washington, 349
his twenty-fourth birthday, and incidents, 350
writes to his wife as to his “thrilling adventures” and “enviable
lot”, 350
welcomes Washington at his headquarters, 351
hastens Washington’s army from Baltimore, 353
relations to the French court, 356
overrules plans of De Grasse, 356
storms a redoubt, 357
pleasantry with Baron Vioménil, 358
relations to Cornwallis, 361
their mutual appreciation, 362
expedition to Charleston abandoned, 362
sails from Boston for France, 362
bids farewell to Washington, 362

LAURENS, HENRY—statesman; _b._ 1724; _d._ 1792.
vice-president of South Carolina, 86
reports New York Harbor too shallow for French fleet, 240
in the siege of Savannah, 268
sent commissioner to Holland, 296
taken prisoner in London, 296
in London Tower for high treason, 296
sent on special mission to France, 296
arrives in Paris, 309
speaks plain words at Paris, 309
returns to America with funds and pledges of French support, 348

LAUZUN, ARMAND LOUIS DE GOUTANT, _Duke_ DE—_b._ 1747, _d._ 1793.
with Rochambeau, 333
threatens Morrisania, 334
in concert with General Lincoln, 335
his lancers in action, 337
tendered a banquet at Philadelphia, 350
despatches from Lafayette read, 350
at Yorktown, 357

LEDYARD, WILLIAM—col.; _b._ 1750, _d._ 1781;
massacred at Fort Griswold, 351

LEE, CHARLES—retired _Br._ officer, maj.-general; _b._ 1731, _d._ 1782.
first noticed, 36
his characteristics, 37
how regarded by Washington, 45
distrusts American troops, 56
opposes Washington’s plans, 56
is sent to Connecticut, 70
advises occupation of New York, 70
writes about “crushing serpents”, 70
ordered to New York, 71
fortifies Brooklyn Heights, 85
arrogates authority, and is reprimanded, 85
ordered to South Carolina, 85
his conduct at Charleston, 86
returns north for duty, 127
abuses Congress, 127
curious letter to Gates, 127
finally joins Washington, 128
in charge of reserve camp, 131
his grand division noticed, 135
withholds troops required by Washington, 135
finally enters New Jersey, 137
is taken prisoner, 137
writes Gates, insulting Washington, 138
writes Heath, insulting Washington, 138
writes James Bowdoin as to Washington, 139
mistakes the man addressed, 139
his capture noticed by Washington, 139
effect of his independent action, 141
his risks as prisoner of war, 164
Washington’s firmness in the matter, 164
unsoldierly conduct, 174
placed on parole, 217
reports for duty, 217
compared with Arnold, 218
letters to Congress, 218
letters to Washington, 218
Washington’s stinging reply, 218
conferences with Howe brought to light in 1872, 219
joins army at Valley Forge, 220
opposes Washington’s plans, 225
his theory noticed, 225
relations to Lafayette, 227
declines a special command, 227
his contemptuous reference to Washington’s plans, 227
begs for it, afterwards, 227
writes Lafayette, in great distress, 228
pretends to be satisfied, 228
commands the advance troops, 228
orders retreat against Lafayette’s protest, 229
never handled a command before, 230
never under fire during the war, 230
is rebuked by Washington, 232
the incident described, 232
his conduct during the day,, 233
his trial, suspension, and death, 234
vindication of Washington from traditions as to language upon meeting
Lee, 235
Notes of Lee’s Court-martial (Appendix G), 389–392

LEE, HENRY—colonel, _sub._ brig.-gen.; _b._ 1756, _d._ 1818.
at storming of Stony Point, 257
captures Paulus Hook, 259
joins General Greene, 303
opinion as to Battle of Guilford, 319

LEE, RICHARD HENRY—statesman; _b._ 1732, _d._ 1794.
in first Continental Congress,, 17
in March, 1775, urges Virginia to arm, 26

LEE, ROBERT EDWARD—eminent confederate general, 1861–5; _b._ 1810, _d._
1870;
shared peculiarities of Washington and Grant, 44

LEE, THOMAS S.—gov. Md.; addressed by Washington, 300

LESLIE, ALEXANDER—_Br._ maj.-general; _b._ 1740, _d._ 1794.
commands the assault at Chatterton Hill, 129
joins Cornwallis, 298
fortifies Norfolk, 301
at battle of Guilford, 320
in the Virginia campaign, 331

LINCOLN, BENJAMIN—maj.-gen.; _b._ 1733, _d._ 1810.
joins the army with Mass. troops, 122
reaches Peekskill, with four thousand New England militia, 157
threatens Fort Independence, 157
at Charleston, S.C., 253
has a fresh command, 334–5
commands a division, 337
receives sword of Cornwallis at Yorktown, 360

LIVINGSTON, HENRY B.—col.; _b._ 1757, _d._ 1823;
saves Fort Edward, 295

LIVINGSTON, PHILIP—signer of Declaration of Independence; _b._ 1716,
_d._ 1778;
in first Continental Congress, 17

Logistics defined, with note (Preface), x, xi

LOSSING, BENSON J.—historian, _b._ 1813, _d._ 1891;
gratefully noticed by the author (Preface), xiv

LOUIS XVI.—king of France; _b._ 1754, _d._ 1793.
officially supports America, 213
his purpose anti-British, 302
opposed occupation of New York, 352–3

LYNCH, THOMAS—patriot; _b._ 1720, _d._ 1776.
in first Continental Congress, 17
at Cambridge, 60

MAGAW—col.;
at Fort Washington, 130–2
betrayed by his adjutant, 133
casualties of the assault, 133

MANLY, JOHN—_Am._ captain;
makes valuable captures at sea, 60

MARIE ANTOINETTE—queen of France; _b._ 1755, _d._ 1793;
friend of Lafayette and of America, 356

MARION, FRANCIS—brig.-general; _b._ 1732, _d._ 1795.
addressed by Greene, 303
esteemed by Washington, 312

MARLBOROUGH, JOHN CHURCHILL, _Duke of_—gen., _sub._ field marshal; _b._
1650, _d._ 1722;
cited in comparison (Preface), viii

MARSHALL, JOHN—chief justice U.S., jurist and historian; _b._ 1755,
_d._ 1836.
as to Asst. Quartermaster-General Carrington, 301
as to American mutiny, 307
as to troops sent South, 327

Maryland troops always efficient, 277
gallantry at Camden, 202
at Rattle of Guilford, 320

Massachusetts leads resistance to Stamp Ac, 13
resolves its Assembly into a Provincial Congress, 17
elects John Hancock as its first president, 17
organizes a force of “Minute Men”, 17
organizes a Committee of Safety, 17
summons 30,000 men to instant duty, 22
drafts one-fifth of her able-bodied men, 116
orders a monument to Chevalier de Saint Sauveur, 247
liberal to troops during a mutiny, 308

MATTHEWS—_Br._ maj.-gen. in attack upon Fort Washington, 132
lays waste Portsmouth and Norfolk, 253
in Battle of Springfield, 278

MATTHEWS, JOHN—jurist; _b._ 1774, _d._ 1802;
on special War Committee. 73

MAXWELL, WILLIAM—brig.-gen.; _b._ in Ireland, _d._ 1798.
in command at Morristown, 141
on special duty, 147
stationed at Elizabethtown, 164
moves against Howe, 168
at Red Clay Creek, 185
accompanied by Lafayette, 185
gallantry at Chadd’s Ford, 186
active in New Jersey, 222
obstructs Clinton’s retreat, 224
in Battle of Springfield, 279
associated with Lafayette, 324

MCCLELLAN, GEORGE BRINTON—maj.-gen. U.S.A.; _b._ 1826, _d._ 1885;
his qualities cited in comparison, 162

MCCREA, JANE—her murder not chargeable to Burgoyne, 173

MCDOUGALL, ALEXANDER—brig.-gen.; _b._ 1750, _d._ 1786.
occupies Chatterton Hill, 128
fights the battle known as “White Plains”, 129
on special duty at Morristown, 147
succeeds Heath at Peekskill, 166
in Battle of Germantown, 195
established at Peekskill, 206
accompanies Kosciusko to West Point, 212
again in the Highlands, 248

MCDOWELL, CHARLES—colonel; _b._ 1743, _d._ 1815;
at King’s Mountain, his descendants honored, 293

Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence, 29
County, North Carolina, eminently patriotic, 293

MEIGS—_Am._ col.;
attacks Sag Harbor, 167
at storming of Stony Point, 257

MERCER, HUGH—brig.-general; _b._ 1721, _k._ at Battle of Princeton,
1777 154

MIFFLIN, THOMAS—brig.-general; _b._ 1744, _d._ 1800.
efficient before Boston, 72
provides barracks in New York, 83
in battle of Long Island, 106
skilful in the retreat, acting under confidential orders, of
Washington, 110
absence from Valley Forge disastrous, 206
rejoins camp, 217
criticised by Washington in letter to Gouverneur Morris, 217

Milton, Mass., where Rufus Putnam found fascine rods, 78

MINNIGERODE—_H._ col.; _k._ in attack upon Fort Mercer, 201

MONCKTON, HENRY—_Br._ lieut.-col.; _b._ 1740, _k._ 1778, at Monmouth,
233

Monmouth, Battle of, described (see map), 229–237

MONROE, JAMES—lieutenant, _sub._ pres.; _b._ 1758, _d._ 1831.
at battle of Trenton, 142
helps capture two guns, 145
wounded in battle, 145

MONTGOMERY, RICHARD—_Am._ brig.-gen.; _b._ 1737, _k._ before Quebec,
1775.
his military antecedents, 36
subsequent career outlined, 38
a comrade of Carleton when Wolfe fell, 38
in despair at condition of the troops, 38
starts for Canada, 55
reaches Ticonderoga, 61
receives imperative orders from Washington, 61
sympathetically sustained by Washington, 63
his Orderly Book, 63
occupies Montreal, 63
tries a forlorn-hope assault upon Quebec, 63
goes to Arnold’s relief, 65
is killed in battle, 65
buried with honors of war, 66

Montreal captured by British, 1760, 10
captured by Montgomery, 1775, 63

MOORE, GEORGE H.—sec. N.Y. His. Soc.;
brings to light Charles Lee’s papers, 219

MORGAN, DANIEL—brig.-general; _b._ 1737, _d._ 1802.
captured at Quebec, 65
attacks Hessians in New Jersey, 169
skirmishes with Cornwallis, 204
supports Maxwell in N.J., 225
serves under Lafayette, 225
reports to Gen. Greene, 303
fights Battle of Cowpens, 314
is visited by Greene, 315
retires from the army, 315

MORRIS, GOUVERNEUR—statesman; _b._ 1752, _d._ 1816;
his letter from Washington, 1778, 217

MORRIS, ROBERT—financier and statesman; _b._ 1734, _d._ 1806;
friend of Washington, 164

Morristown headquarters described, 265

MOSES—Hebrew deliverer of his people; model legislator; founder of
modern civil codes; _b._ about 1570 B.C., _d._ about 1450 B.C.
the Hebrew Commonwealth and its military system noticed (Preface),
viii
his decimal army organization (Preface), viii
his sanitary and police regulations (Preface), viii
patriotic instruction of Hebrew youth imperative by his laws
(Preface), viii
his general order, “Forward,” when he led his people to national
independence, quoted, as Washington marched through Philadelphia
for Brandywine, 184

MUHLENBURG, PETER—maj.-gen.; _b._ 1746, _d._ 1807.
at Battle of Brandywine (see map), 186
active in Virginia, 301

MURPHY—maj.;
leads N.C. troops at Stony Point, 257

MURRAY, LINDLEY—grammarian; _b._ 1745, _d._ 1826;
friend of Greene, 25

Mutiny of Connecticut troops, 277
of Pennsylvania troops, 306–7
a natural outbreak, 308

NAPOLEON I.—Bonaparte (Buonaparte), Emperor of France; _b._ 1769, _d._
1821.
his military maxims noticed (Preface), viii
his Italian campaign compared with the First New Jersey campaign in
the _Am._ Revolution (Preface), xiii
the basis of his success given by Jomini (Preface), xiii

NASH, ABNER—gov. N.C.; _b._ 1716, _d._ 1786;
addressed by Washington, 300

NASH, FRANCIS—brig.-general; _b_. 1720, _k._ at Battle of Germantown,
1777, 195–6

New England discriminated against by Great Britain, 18
experience in earlier wars, 21
her governors in conference with committee of Congress, 60
finally relieved from British hostilities, 262

New Hampshire liberality during the American mutiny, 308

New Haven, Conn., invaded by Tryon, 256

New Jersey seizes the Provincial treasury and raises troops, 28
the chief battleground, 161
more than meets her quota, 272
her noble women, 272, 285
a continuous battlefield and the strategic center, 285

Newport, R.I.; Howe’s strategic objective, 1776, 118
occupied by the British, 150
besieged by Franco-American forces, 241
abandoned by the British, 262
occupied by Rochambeau, 286

New York city as a British base, 94

New York Committee of Public Safety aroused, 27
its assembly becomes a Provincial Congress, 27

Nook’s Hill fortified, March 10, 1775, 60
evacuation of city a necessity, 60

Norfolk, Va., laid waste by Matthews, 253

North Carolina “will resist Stamp Act to the death”, 13
defies its Provincial governor, 28
adopts the cause of Boston, 28
a convention meets at Charlotte, May 20, 1775, 29
the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence, 29
sends Gen. Moore with two battalions to New York, 115
two companies in storming of Stony Point, 257

NORTH, FREDERICK, _Lord_—Earl of Guilford; _b._ 1733, _d._ 1792.
British Prime Minister, 1769, 15
abolishes all duties except on tea, 15
the consequences noted, 15

Norwalk, Conn., raided by Tryon, 256

OGDEN—_Am._ col.;
as to panic at Monmouth, 231

O’HARA, CHARLES—_Br._ maj.-gen.; _b._ 1756, _d._ 1791.
makes the surrender of army of Cornwallis, 360

Onondaga Indians near Syracuse, N.Y., punished, 252

“On to Philadelphia,” like the “On to Richmond” of 1861, ill-judged,
198

Panic at Brooklyn controlled by Washington, 112
at Kipp’s Bay, noticed, 119, 237
at Toulon, compared, 120
at Princeton, controlled by Washington, 154
at Monmouth, turned by Washington into victory, 231
at Camden, 292

Paoli, birthplace of Wayne, visited by British, 193

Paris, Treaty of, 1763, and its terms, 11

PARKER, _Sir_ PETER—_Br._ admiral; _b._ 1716, _d._ 1811.
sails from Ireland, 97
repulsed by Moultrie, 97
joins Howe in New York, 99

Parliament of Nations, 1892, noticed, 372

PARSONS, SAMUEL H.—brig.-gen.; _b._ 1737, _d._ 1789.
his brigade at Kipp’s Bay, 119
were trusted by Washington, 119
redeemed their good name, 119
a parallel case cited under Napoleon, 120
before Fort Independence, 157
on duty in Connecticut, 163
joins Washington, 168
in the Highlands, 179

PEABODY, NATHANIEL—statesman; _b._ 1741, _d._ 1823;
on special War Commission, 273

PENN, WILLIAM—_b._ 1644, _d._ 1718;
urged a Colonial Union, 1697, 12

PENNINGTON, WILLIAM—gov. N.J., and speaker U.S. House; _b._ 1717, _d._
1791;
as to Washington’s language at Monmouth, on meeting Lee, 236

Pennsylvania appropriates money for troops, 28
her Assembly corresponds with Washington, 207

Penobscot, Me., a British post 270

PERCY, HUGH, _Earl_—_Br._ lieut.-gen., Duke of Northumberland; _b._
1742, _d._ 1817.
his soldierly qualities noticed, 35
fails to recapture Dorchester Heights, 80
at Battle of Long Island (see map), 105
joins Howe before White Plains, 128
in the attack upon Fort Washington, 132

Philadelphia takes action, April 24, 1775, 28
her citizens overawe the opposing element, 28
visited by Washington’s army, 183, 192
mighty ovation to the soldiers, 184
supplies the suffering army, 194
is occupied by Howe, 196
its winter experiences, 1778, 210
the Howe carnival and its magnificence, 215
evacuated by Clinton, 221–222
occupied by Arnold, 222
visited by Washington and Rochambeau, 348–9

PHILLIPS, WILLIAM—_Br._ maj.-gen.; _b._ 1731, _d._ 1781.
sent to Virginia, 326
destroys much property, 329
his relations to Arnold, 331
his death and its effects, 331

PIGOT, _Sir_ ROBERT—maj.-gen.; _b._ 1720, _d._ 1796;
at Newport, R.I., 241

POMEROY, SETH—brig.-general; _b._ 1706, _d._ 1777.
his military antecedents, 24
appointed brig.-gen., 36
declines further service, 38

Portsmouth, Va., laid waste by Matthews, 253

POWNALL, THOMAS E.—_Br._ gov. Mass.; _b._ 1722, _d._ 1805;
his prediction, 368

PRESCOTT, RICHARD—_Br._ maj.-general; _b._ 1725, _d._ 1788;
taken prisoner, and exchanged for Lee, 217
at Savannah, 267

PRESCOTT, WILLIAM—colonel; _b._ 1726, _d._ 1795.
conducts the Bunker Hill (Breed’s Hill) fight, 34
Governor’s Island, N.Y., 102
safely removes all stores, 112
repels Howe’s advance at Throgg’s Neck, 125

PREVOST, _Sir_ AUGUSTINE—_Br._ maj.-gen.; _b._ 1725, _d._ 1786;
outgenerals Lincoln but without substantial results on either hand,
253

PROCTOR, THOMAS—_Am._ capt. of artillery; _b._ in Ireland, 1739, _d._
1806.
with battery at Chadd’s Ford Brandywine, 186
in Indian expedition, 260

PULASKI, CASIMIR, _Count_—Polish maj.-gen.; _b._ 1747, _k._ 1779, in
siege of Savannah, 268
dear to Washington, 305

PUTNAM, ISRAEL—maj.-general; _b._ 1718, _d._ 1790.
his military antecedents, 23
conspicuous at Bunker Hill, 38
subsequent career outlined, 38
commands at New York, 87
succeeds Sullivan at Brooklyn, 104
instructed by Washington, 104–5
succeeded by Washington in person, 107
fortifies Hudson River shore, 115
favors retreat from New York, 115
his laconic utterance, 115
commands New York city, 115
a division at White Plains, 129
at Philadelphia, 153
located at Peekskill, 178
grants unwise furloughs, 178
outgeneraled by Clinton, 179
regains position, 180
on the Long Island shore, 206
returns to Peekskill, 206
at Danbury, Conn., 248
in command on the Hudson, 254

PUTNAM, RUFUS—col.; _b._ 1738, _d._ 1824;
his efficiency as civil engineer at Boston, 75

Quebec, captured in 1759, 10
assaulted by Montgomery and Arnold, 1776, 66
magnanimity of General Carleton at death of Montgomery, 66

Queen’s Rangers (Provincial), noticed, 204, 255, 279
Washington’s magnanimity toward them, reciprocating Carleton’s action
at Quebec, 363

RAHL (RALL), JOHN GOTTLIEB—_H._ col.; _b._ 1720, _d._ 1776.
storms Chatterton Hill, 129
commands at Trenton, 139
_k._ in battle, 146

RAWDON, FRANCIS, _Lord_—Marquis of Hastings, earl, _sub._ gov.-gen.
India; _b._ 1754, _d._ 1825.
gallantry at Bunker Hill, 35
reënforces Clinton at the South, 276
in battle of Hobkirk Hill, 321

REED, JOSEPH—adjt.-general, _sub._ gov. Penn.; _b._ 1741, _d._ 1785.
in Washington’s confidence before Boston, 71
describes the army at Harlem Heights, 123
in the secret of Washington’s attack upon Trenton, 141

Religious distinctions among the colonies harmonized, 266

Rhode Island sends 1,500 men to Boston, April 25, 1775, 22
her troops under Nathaniel Greene, 25
seizes British stores, 27
calls for protection of her ports, 87
two regiments in Continental pay, 87
sends additional troops to New York, 115

RICHMOND, CHARLES LENNOX, _Duke_—_Br._ Sec. of State; _b._ 1735, _d._
1806.
denounces hire of Hessian troops, 96
his prediction verified, 209

Ridgefield, Conn., invaded by Tryon, 166

RIEDESEL, FRIEDRICH ADOLPH, _Baron_—_H._ maj.-general; _b._ 1730, _d._
1800.
reaches Canada with troops, 89
in Burgoyne’s command, 387

ROBERTS, CHARLES G. D.—prof. King’s College, N.S.;
his history of Canada cited 63

ROCHAMBEAU, JEAN BAPTISTE DONATIEN DE VIMEUR DE—_Fr._ marshal; _b._
1725, _d._ 1807.
arrives in America, 286
appreciates Washington, 287
writes as to American conditions, 287
confers with Washington at Hartford, 297
sends his son to France, 298
again in conference at Wethersfield, 333
asks coöperation of Count de Grasse, 333
at West Point with Washington, 347
moves southward, 347
advances $20,000 in gold to American army, 347
parades in Philadelphia, 349
receives despatches from Washington, 350
entertained at Baltimore, 351
guest of Washington at Mt. Vernon, 351
opposed occupation of New York, 353
visits Count de Grasse with Washington, 353
signs articles of Cornwallis’ surrender, 360
honored by Congress, 361
remains with Washington, 361
visits New England, 361
sails for the West Indies, 361

Rowan county, N.C., eminently patriotic, 293

RUTLEDGE, EDWARD—statesman, signer of Declaration of Independence; _b._
1749, _d._ 1800;
commissioner with Adams and Franklin to meet Gen. and Admiral Howe,
1776, 118

RUTLEDGE, JOHN—_sub._ gov. and chief justice, S.C.; _b._ 1739, _d._
1800.
pres. Republic of South Carolina, 86
controls the conduct of Charles Lee, 86
his characteristics, 86
aids in siege of Savannah, 267

SAINT (ST.) CLAIR, ARTHUR—maj.-gen; _b._ 1734, _d._ 1818.
at Battle of Princeton, 154
writes a boastful letter, 175
abandons Ticonderoga, 175

Saint (St.) John, N.B., founded by British Provincials, 363
May 17th its natal day, 363
honors Washington, 363

Saint (St.) John’s, captured Nov. 3, 1775, 62
André among the prisoners, 62

SAINT (ST.) LEDGER, BARRY—_Br._ col.; _b._ 1737, _d._ 1789;
invades the Mohawk valley, 171

SAINT (ST.) LUC, LA CORNE DE—_b._ 1712, _d._ 1784.
as to hiring Indians, 173
is rebuked by Burgoyne, 173

SAINT (ST.) MEMIN, CHARLES BALTHAZAR JULIEN FAVRE DE—_Fr._ artist; _b._
1770, _d._ 1852;
his profile of Washington, by a crayon process of his own, the last
portrait of Washington taken, _frontispiece_

SAINT (ST.) SAUVEUR, _Chevalier_ DE—_Fr._; _k._ at Boston, 247
a monument to his memory ordered, 247

SAINT (ST.) SIMON, CLAUDE HENRI, _Count_ DE—_Fr._; _b._ 1760, _d._
1825.
arrives with De Grasse, 342
lands 3,000 French troops, 342
reports to Lafayette for duty, 342
waves seniority of rank, 343
urges immediate assault, 343
yields to Lafayette’s judgment, 343
sails for the West Indies, 362

Salem, Mass., declines benefits of Boston Fort Bill, 16

Savannah, Ga., responds to call from Lexington, 29
intercepts royal letters to governors, 30
Committee of Safety, acts promptly, 30
besieged without success, 267–8

SCHOVALHOFF, _Count_—Russian statesman; his prediction at the Berlin
Conference verified in 1898, 370

SCHUYLER, PHILIP—maj.-general; _sub._ U.S. senator; _b._ 1733, _d._
1804.
appointed maj.-gen., 36
his antecedents, 36
his career outlined, 37
honored by Kent and Webster, 37–8
ordered to Canada, 55
among the Six Nations, 61
urged forward by Washington and joins Montgomery, 61
advised as to Allen’s misadventure, 62
suspends resignation at Washington’s request, 63
his Orderly Book, 63
again advised by Washington,, 64
is to expect a bloody summer, 87
ridicules hiring Indians, 88
to resist Carleton’s advance, 163
is relieved by Gates, 173
is promptly restored, 173
offers Gates a command, 173
it is sneeringly declined, 173
his energetic action, 174
is absent, sick, without fault, 175
has a prophetic letter from Washington, 175
organizes a large army, 176
is superseded by Gates, 176
returns to Congress, 273
on committee to visit Washington, 273
is urged to be Secretary of War, 328
gives reasons for declining, 328

Second Continental Congress, May 10, 1775, 31
provides money and munitions, 31
delegates from Georgia make action unanimous, 31
rules and articles of war adopted, 31
denounces acts of Parliament as “unconstitutional, oppressive, and
cruel”, 31

Second New Jersey campaign, and its results, 167

SEVIER, JOHN—_Am._ col.; _b._ 1745, _d._ 1815;
at King’s Mountain, his descendants honored, 293

SHARPE, GRANVILLE—_Br._ philanthropist; _b._ 1734, _d._ 1813;
resigns rather than aid the war, 21

SHELBY, ISAAC—col., _sub._ gov. Kentucky; _b._ 1750, _d._ 1826.
at King’s Mountain, his descendants honored, 293
summoned to Virginia, 1780, 314

SHELDON, ELISHA—col.; attacked by Tarleton, 255
on expedition with Lauzun, 334
supports Washington, 334–5–6
has a spirited scout, 337

SHERIDAN, PHILIP HENRY—general U.S.A.; _b._ 1831, _d._ 1888;
his example cited, 162

SHERMAN, WILLIAM TECUMSEH—general; _b._ 1820, _d._ 1891;
his march to the sea cited by way of comparison, 162

SHIPPEN, Miss, belle of the Philadelphia fêtes, 216
becomes the wife of Arnold, 289
had no knowledge of Arnold’s treason, 291
highly esteemed by Washington and Lafayette, 291

SHULDHAM—_Br._ admiral;
relieves Graves at Boston, 68
comments on seizure of Dorchester Heights, 77

Siege of Quebec closed, 66
Boston, 80
Newport, 245
Savannah, 268
Yorktown, 268
Charleston, 275
New York, 347

Signal-fires in New Jersey, 280

SIMCOE, J. GRAVES—_Br._ lieut.-col., Queen’s Rangers; _sub._ gov.
Canada; _b._ 1752, _d._ 1806.
active in forays, 248
in the Battle of Springfield, 279
in Virginia with Arnold, 310
raids Virginia, 320
popular misconceptions of his character, 363

“Six Nations” (Iroquois) a model for Jefferson’s constitution, 12
as a confederacy, 13
invaded by Sullivan, 260
devastated by Sullivan, 260
their estimate of Washington, 260–1

SMALLWOOD, WILLIAM—brig.-gen.; _sub._ governor Md.; _b._ 1732, _d._
1792.
with Maryland troops at Long Island, 105
makes a gallant fight, 107
deplores ignorance of officers, 123
in Pennsylvania, later, 193
in battle of Germantown, 195
on duty near Philadelphia, 206
as governor, recruits for Greene’s army, 301

SMITH, SAMUEL—lieut.-colonel; _b._ 1752, _d._ 1839;
with Maryland troops at Fort Mifflin, 200

Sons of Liberty organized, 14

South Carolina denounces the Stamp Act, 13
seizes the colonial magazine, April 21, 1775, 29
first news from Lexington, 29
intercepts royal packages, 29
declares a Republic, with officers, congress, army, navy, and all the
accessories of an independent state, 86

Spain joins France against Great Britain, 1761, 11

SPENCER, JOSEPH N.—brig.-gen.; _b._ 1714, _d._ 1789.
his military antecedents, 36
his subsequent career, 39
attempts capture of Newport by Washington’s order, 163

“Spies,” says Greene, “are the eyes of an army”, 303

Springfield, Mass., selected by Knox for a gun-factory, 163

Springfield, N.J., Battle of, 278–9
its lesson emphasized, 283
its casualties noticed, 285
tested the Continental troops, 286

Stamp Act of 1755 noticed, 13
repealed in 1766, 14

STARK, JOHN—maj.-gen.; _b._ 1728, _d._ 1822.
in the Battle of Bunker Hill, 32
at the Battle of Trenton, 142
at the Battle of Springfield, 283

Statesmanship in war defined, with note (Preface), xii
as stated by Jesus (Preface), xii

STEDMAN, CHARLES—_Br._ staff officer and historian; _b._ 1745, _d._
1812.
as to Burgoyne campaign and Clinton, 180
as to loose _Br._ discipline, 210
as to Battles of Guilford and Hobkirk Hill, 321
as to _Br._ and _Am._ forces in 1776 and 1777 (Appendix D), 386

STEPHEN, ADAM—_Am._ maj.-gen.; _b._ 1730, _d._ 1791.
service at Brandywine, 189
at Battle of Germantown, 195
dismissed for drunkenness, 196

STEPHENS, EDWARD—brig.-general; _b._ 1745, _d._ 1820;
conducted prisoners, taken at Cowpens, northward, 316

STERLING—_Br._ col., _sub._ maj.-general. [Should not be confused with
Lord Stirling, in the _Am._ service, see below.]
along the Delaware, 194
_k._ in Battle of Springfield, 278

STEUBEN, FREDERICK WILLIAM AUGUSTUS, _Baron_—maj.-gen.; _b._ 1730, _d._
1794.
instructor at Valley Forge, 210
promoted maj.-gen, 212
acts in harmony with Washington and Lafayette, 213
at Battle of Monmouth, 233
ordered to the South, 300
in charge of powder and lead supplies, 302
in concert with Lafayette, 327
his depot at Elk Island attacked, 340
joins Lafayette’s division, 340
in the siege of Yorktown, 357

STEWART—_Br._ col.;
succeeds Rawdon at the South, 321
fights Green at Eutaw Springs, 321

STILES, EZRA—pres. Yale College; _b._ 1727, _d._ 1795;
friend of Greene’s youth, 25

STIRLING, WILLIAM ALEXANDER, _Lord_ [his claim to _Br._ title and
estates had been in dispute]—_Am._ col., _sub._ maj.-gen.; _b._
1726, _d._ 1783.
in Battle of Long Island, 105
his brigade of picked regiments, 105
fights both Grant and Cornwallis, 107
taken prisoner by superior numbers, 108
is exchanged and returns to duty, 122
reaches White Plains, 128
established at Princeton, 136
in Battle of Princeton, 154
engages Cornwallis, 169
in Battle of Brandywine, 186
his good conduct, 189
in Battle of Germantown, 195
at a Council of War, 217
in Battle of Monmouth, 233
threatens Staten Island, 271
president at Charles Lee’s court-martial (Appendix G), 389

Stony Point stormed by Wayne, 257–8
abandoned by Washington, 259

Strategy defined, with note (Preface), x

SULLIVAN, JOHN—maj.-general; _b._ 1740, _d._ 1795.
personal notice, 36
his career outlined, 39
sent to Canada, 87
succeeded by Gates, 88
ambitious letter to Washington, 89
Washington’s discreet reply, 89
his attitude defined, 89
succeeds Greene on Long Island, 104
succeeded by Putnam, 104
a peculiar letter, 104
his specious report, 107
taken prisoner, 108
on exchange, takes Lee’s division, 139
accompanies Washington to Trenton, 142
incident of the march, 144
enters the lower town, 145
frets about appointments, 166
Washington’s rejoinder, 166
again in New Jersey, 167
fails in the attack upon Staten Island, 184
joins Washington in time for Brandywine, 184–5
his position at Brandywine (as per map), 186
ordered to attack Cornwallis, 187
flanked by Cornwallis, 187
ordered to change position, 187
movement beyond his capacity, 188
difficult under best conditions, 188
loses control of his division, 188
personal valor undoubted, 189
treated justly by Washington, 190
surprised by Howe, 191
in Battle of Germantown, 195
his gallantry noticed, 196
urges attack upon Philadelphia, 207
attempts siege of Newport, 241
relations to the Count d’Estaing, 242–3
issues an intemperate order, 243
prudently modifies the same, 243
advised by Washington to retreat, 244
manly course of D’Estaing, 244
retires to Providence, 245
devastates the Six Nation region with unsparing desolation, 260
comments upon that invasion, 260–261
resigns and enters Congress, 297
laconic appeal to him by Washington, 297

SUMTER, THOMAS—col.; _b._ 1734, _d._ 1832;
honored by Washington, 312

SYMONDS, THOMAS—_Br._ royal navy.
led attack upon Fort Sullivan (Moultrie) in 1776, 359
signs terms of capitulation of Yorktown, 359

TARLETON, BANESTRE—_Br._ lieut.-col.; _b._ 1754, _d._ 1833.
attacks Sheldon’s cavalry quarters, 255
raids Westchester County, N.Y., 259
Washington’s counter-stroke, 259
makes no progress at the South, 293
pursues Morgan, 314
completely routed at Cowpens, 314
acknowledges the American success, 321
makes a raid upon Charlotte, 340
fails to capture Jefferson, 340
compliments Lafayette, 340
covers the retreat of Cornwallis, 341
joins him at Yorktown, 341
skirmishes with Lafayette, 341

TERNAY. (See De Ternay.)

Thanksgiving Proclamations of Washington—
at Valley Forge, 214
at White Plains, 246
at Yorktown, 360
at New York, 365

THAYER—_Am._ maj.;
in defence of Fort Mifflin, 203

THOMAS, GEORGE HENRY—maj.-gen. U.S.A.; _b._ 1815, _d._ 1870;
his example cited, 26

THOMAS, JOHN—major-general (Mass.), Continental brig.-gen.; _b._ 1725,
_d._ 1776.
military antecedents, 23, 36
subsequent career noticed, 39
efficient in the siege of Boston, 78
sent to Canada, 84, 86
a victim to small-pox in camp, 88

THOMPSON, CHARLES—Secretary of first Continental Congress, and his
correspondence with Franklin noticed, 13, 16

Ticonderoga taken by Ethan Allen, 30
retaken by Burgoyne, 182

TOWERS, ROBERT, of Philadelphia, to receive and pay for arms, 141

TRUMBULL, JONATHAN—gov. Conn.; statesman; the original Brother
Jonathan; _b._ 1710, _d._ 1788.
anxious about sea-coast exposure, 56
his correspondence with Washington, 56
always Washington’s fast friend, 56
furnishes troops for New York city, 83
sends nine more regiments to Washington, 102

TRUMBULL, JONATHAN JR.,—col., statesman; _b._ 1740, _d._ 1804.
commissary at Long Island, 110
becomes secretary to Washington, 300

TRYON, WILLIAM—gov. N.C.; _b._ 1725, _d._ 1788.
his relation to the British Stamp Act, 13
his career in North Carolina, New York, and Connecticut, 84
holds a conference with Gen. Howe, 98
invades Connecticut, 166
fights Worcester and Arnold at Ridgefield, 166
again invades Conn., 256
resisted by Yale College students at New Haven, 256
in the Battle of Springfield, 278

TULLY, _Monsieur_ DE—sails for the Chesapeake, 323
is obliged to return, 323
his reasons satisfactory to Washington, 326

Union of the Colonies advocated in 1697, 1722, 1754 by Penn, Coxe, and
Franklin, 12

United States of America, a “stupendous fabric of freedom and empire,”
as predicted by Washington, and the fulfilment, 365, 366, 368
“asylum for the poor and oppressed of all nations,” as predicted by
Washington, and comments, 365, 368
respect for law and religion the basis of Washington’s character, and
of the confidence he inspired in the American people, 367–8
shares with Great Britain bequests under Magna Charta, 371
harmony in that fruition, the possible future, 371
three hundred millions of treasure, her free-will offering to man,
374
her alms, recorded in the census of 1890, the gauge of her maturing
sympathy with humanity, 374

Valley Forge established as headquarters, 206
special Council of War noticed, respecting “On to Philadelphia!”, 212
French alliance announced in camp, 213
a grand parade ordered, 214
a Thanksgiving proclamation made, 214
special Council of War, April 20, 1777, 217
its ordeal made soldiers, 231

VARNUM, JAMES MITCHELL—brig.-gen.; _b._ 1749, _d._ 1789.
his brigade reports for duty, 203
in Battle of Monmouth, 233
enters Congress, 315

VAUGHAN, _Sir_ JOHN—_Br._ maj.-gen.; _b._ 1738, _d._ 1795;
burns Kingston, N.Y., 179

VERGENNES, CHARLES GRAVIER, _Count_ DE—_Fr._ minister of foreign
affairs; _b._ 1717, _d._ 1787.
comments on the Battle of Germantown, 197
proclaims the French alliance and the active support of American
Independence, 209
is advised by Rochambeau of American conditions, 287
regards the American Congress as too exacting, 308
guarantees a loan from Holland, 348

“Victory or Death” the countersign and alternative proclaimed by
Washington, 149

VIOMÉNIL, _Baron_ ANTOINE CHARLES DE HOUX—_Fr._ gen.; _b._ 1728, _d._
1792.
storms a redoubt at Yorktown, 357
pleasantry of Lafayette noticed, 358

Virginia aroused by the Stamp Act, 13
responds to Patrick Henry’s appeal, 14
includes Washington in her delegation to First Continental Congress,
17
catches the news from Lexington, 28
excited conflict with Lord Dunmore, 28
called upon for more troops, 115
her troops at Middlebrook, 247
receives Greene and other officers gladly, 301
invaded by Arnold, 310, 311
Lafayette in command, 326, 330
Cornwallis arrives, 331
adjournment of Assembly to Charlotte, 338
liberal in its enactments, 338
Lafayette’s gallantry at Williamsburg, 341
Jefferson sustained by Lafayette, 343
arrival of Washington, 351

WARD, ARTEMAS—maj.-general; _b._ 1727, _d._ 1800.
his antecedents, 23
appointed senior maj.-gen., 35
his brief career noticed, 37
occupies Boston, March 17, 1776, 80

WARNER, SETH—colonel; _b._ 1744, _d._ 1785.
a volunteer at Bunker Hill as well as at Ticonderoga, 35
accompanies Allen to Ticonderoga, 35
his subsequent career, 35

WASHINGTON, AUGUSTINE—father of the Soldier; _b._ 1694, _d._, in his
son’s eleventh year, 1743, 4

WASHINGTON, GEORGE—gen., _sub._ pres. twice; _b._ 1732, _d._ 1799.
his boyhood, tastes, and training as described by Irving, 1
physical appearance as described by Mercer, 2
physical accomplishments, 3
personal characteristics, 4
choice of a profession, 4
parentage, and mother’s influence, 4
first victory won, 4
surveyor, inspector, adjutant-general, 5
commissioner to the French, 6
frontier service, 6
with Braddock, 7
military studies and maxims, 8
marriage, and in House of Burgesses, 8
anticipates revolution, 14
in the First Continental Congress, 17
predicts a bloody future, 18
appointed Commander-in-Chief, 32
his associates in command, 35
starts for Cambridge, 40
assumes command, 41
his army noticed, 41
withholds some commissions, 44
his reticence compared with that of other generals, 44
his trust in Providence, 44
method of assignments, 44
his estimate of Arnold, 45
rebukes profanity, 46
enjoins observance of the Sabbath, 47
institutes courts-martial for “swearing, gambling,” etc., 47
skilled in logistics, 48
regard for private soldiers, 49
deserters rebuked, 49
games of chance prohibited, 49
invasion of Canada forced by Congress, 50
visited by Committee of Congress, 52
risks of Canadian invasion, 53
denounces religious bigotry, 53
after Boston, then New York, 54
expeditions to Canada urged by Congress, 55
attitude of Gen. Charles Lee, 56
ignores sea-coast raids, 56
writes Gov. Trumbull, 57
would burn Boston, 57
policy as to holding cities, 57
straggling rebuked, 58
appeals to Congress, 58
privateering regulated, 59
visited by Congressmen and secures a navy, 60
laconic letter to Congress, 61
writes Schuyler as to Northern expeditions, 63
writes Congress as to same, 63
begs Schuyler not to resign—for sake of “God and Country”, 63
writes Schuyler as to British action, 64
plans operations against New York, 69
sends Lee to New York, 70
would cross to Boston on the ice, but opposed by Council, 71
laconic letter to Joseph Reed, 72
preparations for assault, 72
his inflexibility of purpose, 72
preparations for future service, 72–3
experimental bombardment, 74
enforced silence in camp, 75
his confidential staff, 75
secret plan near execution, 76
second bombardment, 76
third bombardment and occupation of Dorchester Heights, 77
British criticism, 77
contingency of failure anticipated, 79
a general bombardment, 80
Nook’s hill fortified, 80
Boston evacuated, 80
his mission to Boston completed, 81
reorganization of the army, 82
movement to New York begun, 82
advises Congress and Governor Trumbull of his plans, 83
disciplines delinquent officers, 83
establishes a regular Pay System, 83
visits Connecticut to hasten troops forward, 84
reaches New York, 84
rebukes Lee and sends him South, 85
forced by Congress to send more troops to Canada, 86
details more troops to Canada under order of Congress, 86
compels citizens to choose between Britain and America, 86
deprecates detachment of troops to Canada, 87
predicts danger to both the armies, 87
warns soldiers not to right their own wrongs, 87
learns of British contracts for Hessians, 87
notes change in Canadian sentiment, 87
writes Schuyler predicting a bloody summer, 87
describes Sullivan’s characteristics, 89
apology of Congress for Canadian disaster, 90
strategic conditions at New York, 91
Declaration of Independence and its effect, 91
British plans noticed, 93
correspondence with Howe, 98
describes British commissioners, as dispensing pardon to repenting
sinners, 99
spreads Howe’s proclamation broadcast, 99
denounces gossip-mongers, 100
informs Gov. Trumbull that to trust Providence without effort is to
tempt Providence, 102
issues stringent orders as to discipline, 103
reënforces garrison at Brooklyn, 104
details Sullivan, _vice_ Greene, sick, 104
a remarkable letter from Sullivan, 104
Putnam supersedes Sullivan, 104
issues orders to Putnam as to wasteful firing, 105
skulkers must be shot down on the spot, 105
an “army” not a “mob”, 105
will make battle costly to enemy, 108
omnipresent in tent or trench, 108
plans to withdraw to New York, 109
consummate ruse to prevent demoralization of troops, 110
withdrawal consummated, 112
its incidents and success, 112
comment of historian Botta, 113
labors without sleep for forty-eight hours while assembling the
untrained army, 114
laconic notice of bad habits in officers and men, 114
describes the militia as “dismayed, intractable, and impatient to
return home”, 114
notices periodical homesickness, 115
its contagious virulence before battle, 115
again demands a sufficient regular army, 115
denounces robbing orchards and gardens, 115
orders three daily roll-calls, to stop straggling, 115
writes Congress as to vacating the city, 115
advises Gov. Trumbull to deal with deserters, 116
generous response of Mass. and Conn, 116
describes the situation, 117
initiates retirement from the city, 119
denounces a panic at Kipp’s Bay, 119
his personal exposure to rally fugitives, 119
a mournful letter to Congress, 120
Edward Everett Hale’s account of the execution of Nathan Hale as a
spy serving under Washington’s orders, 120
embezzlement by regimental surgeons, 123
offers reward for Hessian troopers and their horses, 126
his skirmishers successful, 126
outgenerals Howe and gains White Plains, 127
is joined by Greene and Lee 127
letter of Lee to Gates, censuring Washington, 127
operations at White Plains, 128
battle of Chatterton hill, 129
British preparations for attack, 129
retires to North Castle Heights, 129
advises Congress of Howe’s plans, 129
advises with Greene as to Fort Washington, 131
crosses into New Jersey, 131
orders Lee to follow, 131
so advises Gov. Trumbull, 131
writes forcibly to Congress, 131
judicious order in logistics, 131
boys or old men enlisted at officers’ risk, 131
warns Congress of certain invasion of New Jersey by Howe, 132
abandons Fort Lee, 133
enters upon his first New Jersey campaign, 133
a misnomer to call it simply a “masterly retreat”, 135
musters his army, 136
skirmishes with Cornwallis, 136
controls the Delaware river, 136
plans Dec. 5, to take the offensive, 137
notes the capture of Lee, 139
Sullivan takes Lee’s division, 139
other letters of Lee, 138–9
his powers enlarged by Congress, 140
places Philadelphia under military rule, 140
takes the aggressive, 143
battle of Trenton, with map, 144
“will drive the enemy from New Jersey”, 147
is clothed with dictatorial authority, 148
his response to Congress, 148
his motto, “Victory or death,” retained, 149
reoccupies Trenton, 152
awaits arrival of Cornwallis, 152
fights battle of Princeton (see map), 152
instructs officers having independent commands, 157
headquarters established at Morristown, 157
exercises with energy his enlarged powers, 157
his capacity for reprimand, 157
sternly rebukes Heath, 158
issues counter-proclamation to one by Howe, 158
review of his career by Botta, 160
base of operations established (see map), 161
appreciates Howe’s plans, 164
the second New Jersey campaign, 167
outgenerals Cornwallis, 169
learns of Burgoyne’s invasion, 171
replies to his proclamation, 172
tart correspondence with Gates, 174
prophetic letter to Schuyler, 175
detects Howe’s modified plan, 177
reaches Philadelphia, 183
triumphant march through the city, 184
takes position on the Brandywine, 185
battle of Brandywine, 187
its lesson, 191
reaches Philadelphia, 192
resumes the offensive, 194
attacks Germantown, 195
lesson from that battle, 197
operations along the Delaware, 200
sends Lafayette into New Jersey, 203
hostile attitude of Gates, 204
experience at Valley Forge, 206
pleads with Congress, 206
clock-work and army discipline similar, 206
sharply rebukes the Pennsylvania Assembly, 207
the Conway cabal, 207
French alliance proclaimed, 213
gives Lafayette an independent command, 215
a sharp letter to Lee, 217
follows Clinton, 224
increases Lafayette’s command, 225
advises Lafayette as to Lee, 228
advances to his support, 230
rallies the retreating army, 231
rebukes Lee on the field and takes command, 232
fights the battle of Monmouth, 233
European comments noticed, 234
Clinton escapes him to New York, 234
trial and sentence of Lee, 234
end of Lee’s career, 234
tradition as to profanity at Monmouth disproved, 235–7
at White Plains again, 237
watches D’Estaing, 240
“George Washington, Esqr.,” and Howe, 241
writes Sullivan at Newport, 242
warns him against Clinton, 244
suggests a timely retreat, 244
officially recognizes the hand of Providence, 246
removes to Fishkill, 247
assigns army divisions, 247–8
opinion of Bancroft cited, 250
visits Philadelphia, 250
writes Speaker Harrison as to corruption of the times, 250–1
social excesses of congressmen deplored, 251
opposes another expedition to Canada, 252
sacrifices his private fortune, 252
at New Windsor, 254
watches hostile demonstrations, 256
plans attack upon Stony Point, 257
its success as planned, 258
capture of Paulus Hook, 259
sends Sullivan to punish Indians, 259
honored by the Six Nations, 260–1
strengthens West Point, 261
his sublime faith, 264
his trials at Morristown, 265
postpones attack upon New York, 265
reorganization of the army imperatively necessary, 269
praises New Jersey promptness, 272
again appeals to Congress, 272–3
watches Clinton closely, 274
visited by Lafayette, just returned from France, 276
gives him a letter to President of Congress, 276
sends Southern troops southward, 277
the mutiny of troops gives him “infinite concern”, 277
outgenerals Knyphausen, 280
describes British movements, 280
new trials at hand, 281
outgenerals Clinton, 282
Battle of Springfield, 286
adroit appeal to governors at the North, 286
again threatens New York, 286
appreciated by Rochambeau, 287
assigns Arnold to West Point, 288
Arnold’s treason and the execution of André, 290
vindicates Mrs. Arnold, 291
takes post at Brakeness, 291
assigns Greene to West Point, 291
his outlook over the field, 294
his sympathy with the rank and file, 295
writes about American speculators in food, 296
appeals to Sullivan, then in Congress, 297
compares rolling small and large snowballs, 297
confers with Rochambeau, 297
writes Franklin of approaching victory, 298
reënforces Southern army, 299
temporary expedients denounced, 299
designates winter quarters, 300
addresses Southern governors, 301
places Greene in Gates’ place, 301
sends his best officers south, 303
his powers again enlarged, 304
as judged abroad, 305
“stay-at-homes” derided, 305
his “superhuman regard for man, as man”, 305
his relations to foreign officers, 305
treatment of Pennsylvania mutiny, 307
is judged by French generals, says Franklin, 308
individuality of the States, noticed, 308
keeps away from scene of mutiny, 309
elements of success in sight, and all plans matured, 313
his specific instructions to Greene, 313
his use of “pick and spade,” 313
writes Greene as to Cowpens, 316
is advised of Greene’s movements, 320
plans for capture of Arnold, 323
the war approaches its crisis, 324
writes Lafayette as to French support, 326
modifies Lafayette’s orders, 326
“never judges the past by after events”, 326
urges Schuyler to be Secretary of War, 328
startling extracts from his diary, 328
“chimney-corner patriots” denounced, 328
“venality, corruption and abuse of trust universal”, 329
indorses Lafayette’s strategy, 330
approves his action respecting Arnold, 332
confers again with Rochambeau at Wethersfield, 333
advances toward New York, 334
joined by French army, 335
sends out decoy letters and plans, 335
builds brick ovens in New Jersey, 336
reconnoitres Clinton’s outposts, 336–7
challenges Clinton to battle, 337
hears good news from Lafayette, 339
second report from Lafayette, 341
Lafayette ready for his arrival, 343
good news from Count de Grasse, 344
urges Northern governors to action, 345
swift messengers sent everywhere, 345
his finesse outwits Clinton, 346
visits West Point with Rochambeau, 347
abandons fixed headquarters, 347
allied armies in motion not missed by Clinton, 347
grand tidings from France, 348
enters Philadelphia, not yet missed by Clinton, 348
despatches from Lafayette received, 349
starts for Chesapeake Bay, 349
meets courier from Lafayette, 350
another courier arrives, 350
welcomed with Rochambeau at Baltimore, 351
visits Mt. Vernon with French officers as guests, 351
arrives at Lafayette’s headquarters, 351
his strategy noticed, 352–3
studies the position with care, 354
visits Count de Grasse, 356
fires the first gun before Yorktown, 357
siege pushed with vigor, 357
terms of surrender settled, 359
surrender consummated, 360
issues proclamation for Public Thanksgiving, 360
a grand parade of the entire army, 360
assigns Lafayette to a Southern expedition, 361
the expedition abandoned, 361
parts with Lafayette who returns to France, 361
retains Rochambeau in America until 1782, 361
his magnanimous treatment of the Queen’s Rangers, 362
still honored in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 362–3
triumphant entry into New York, 363
formally closes the war, 364
another Thanksgiving proclamation, 364
predicts a grand future for America, 365
his trust in Divine Providence emphasized, 366
tested by military art, 367
grounds of his faith in American destiny, 371
lessons from his career, 373
founds West Point Military Academy, 373
donates sites for National University, 374
his closing appeal to the American conscience, 374

WASHINGTON, LAWRENCE—brother of the Soldier; _b._ 1718, _d._ 1752.
educated in England, 1
in the British army, 1
his example and influence, 1, 4

WASHINGTON, MARTHA—wife of the Soldier; _b._ 1732, _d._ 1802;
her marriage (see also Custis), 8

WASHINGTON, MARY—mother of the Soldier; _b._ 1706, _d._ 1789.
her will-power, 4
her moral training, 5
their permanent effect in her son’s character, 5

WASHINGTON, WILLIAM—colonel; _b._ 1752, _d._ 1810.
at Battle of Trenton, 142
captures two guns at Trenton, 145
wounded in the attempt, 145
at Cowpens, 314

Washington’s “Invincibles”, 105

WAYNE, ANTHONY—maj.-gen.; _b._ Paoli, Pennsylvania, 1745, _d._ 1796.
attacks Hessian rear-guard in N.J., 169
at Battle of Brandywine, 186, 189
surprised at Paoli, 193
at Battle of Germantown, 195
with Lafayette at Monmouth, 226
powerless at time of mutiny, 307
joins Lafayette in Virginia, 341
makes a brilliant charge at Williamsburg, 341

WEBSTER, DANIEL—statesman and orator; _b._ 1782, _d._ 1852.
his opinion of General Schuyler, 37
his sublime ideal, “Union,” in prospect, 266

WELLINGTON, ARTHUR WELLESLEY—_Br._ gen., _sub._ field marshal; _b._
1769, _d._ 1852;
cited for comparison (Preface), viii

WESLEY, JOHN—eminent divine; _b._ 1703, _d._ 1791;
had visited America, 21

WHIPPLE, ABRAHAM—_Am._ naval officer; _b._ 1731, _d._ 1819;
cited as to Charleston, 274

WILKINSON, JAMES—maj.-gen.; _b._ 1757, _d._ 1825.
with Lee at his capture, 138
at Battle of Trenton, 142
his interview with Washington, 142

WILLETT, MARINUS—col.; _b._ 1744, _d._ 1826;
operates against the Onondagas near Syracuse, 252

WILLIAMS, JAMES—_Am._ col.;
at King’s Mountain, and descendants honored, 293

Wilmington, N.C., visited by Sir Peter Parker, Cornwallis and Clinton,
May 3, 1776, 97

WINTHROP, ROBERT CHARLES—scholar, historian, statesman; _b._ 1809, _d._
1894;
gratefully remembered by the author (Preface), xiv
_Note._—Mr. Winthrop delivered the oration at laying the
corner-stone of the national Washington monument, at Washington,
D.C., and also at its dedication.

Woman’s heroism in the Revolution, 285

WOOSTER, DANIEL—maj.-gen.; _b._ 1711, _d._ 1777.
his military antecedents, 23
his subsequent career outlined, 38
in movement against Fort Independence, 157
at home with the Connecticut militia, 165
resigns his commission, 165
is mortally wounded, 166

WRIGHT, _Sir_ JAMES—royal governor of Georgia; _b._ 1714, _d._ 1785,
noticed, 29, 30

Wyoming Valley invaded by Indians, 249
summarily avenged, 252, 260

Yale College students resist Tryon’s invasion of New Haven, 256

------------------------------------------------------------------------

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.
2. Archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings retained as printed.
3. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
4. Enclosed bold font in =equals=.

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