Sun Tzŭ on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World

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Title: Sun Tzŭ on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World
Author: Tzŭ, Sun
Language: English
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Transcriber’s Note:

This is a complete unabridged transcription of Lionel Gile’s translation
of The Art of War. See additional notes at the end of the book.

孫子兵法

Sun Tzŭ
on the
Art of War

THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD

Translated from the Chinese with introduction and critical notes

BY
LIONEL GILES, M.A.

Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS.
in the British Museum

London
LUZAC & C^o.
1910

Printed by E. J. Bbill, Leyden (Holland).

To my brother
Captain Valentine Giles, R.G.
in the hope that
a work 2400 years old
may yet contain lessons worth consideration
by the soldier of to-day
this translation
is affectionately dedicated

CONTENTS

Page
Preface vii
Introduction
Sun Wu and his Book xi
The Text of Sun Tzŭ xxx
The Commentators xxxiv
Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ xlii
Apologies for War xliii
Bibliography l
Chap. I. Laying plans 1
„ II. Waging War 9
„ III. Attack by Stratagem 17
„ IV. Tactical Dispositions 26
„ V. Energy 33
„ VI. Weak Points and Strong 42
„ VII. Manœuvring 55
„ VIII. Variation of Tactics 71
„ IX. The Army on the March 80
„ X. Terrain 100
„ XI. The Nine Situations 114
„ XII. The Attack by Fire 150
„ XIII. The Use of Spies 160
Chinese Concordance 176
Index 192

PREFACE

The seventh volume of “Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences,
les arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois”[1] is devoted to the
Art of War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles
de Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph
Amiot. Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a
sinologue in his day, and the field of his labours was certainly
extensive. But his so-called translation of Sun Tzŭ, if placed side
by side with the original, is seen at once to be little better than an
imposture. It contains a great deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and
very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair specimen, taken from
the opening sentences of chapter 5:—

_De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes._ Sun-tse dit:
Ayez les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes;
inscrivez-les dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents &
de la capacité de chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec
avantage lorsque l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que
tous ceux que vous devez commander soient persuadés que votre
principale attention est de les préserver de tout dommage. Les
troupes que vous ferez avancer contre l’ennemi doivent être comme
des pierres que vous lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à l’ennemi
il ne doit y avoir d’autre différence que celle du fort au foible,
du vuide au plein. Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en
secret. Voilà en peu de mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute
la perfection même du gouvernement des troupes.

Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development
in the study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle
Sun Tzŭ, although his work was known to be highly valued in China as
by far the oldest and best compendium of military science. It was not
until the year 1905 that the first English translation by Capt. E. F.
Calthrop, R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under the title “Sonshi” (the
Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ)[2]. Unfortunately, it was evident that the
translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty to fit him to
grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself plainly
acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the
accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only
wonder, then, that with their help it should have been so excessively
bad. It is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which
none can hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard
passages were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Such offences are
less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Greek
or Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to be
insisted upon in translations from Chinese.

From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present
translation is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate
of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a
better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I
could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors. Towards
the end of 1908, a new and revised edition of Capt. Calthrop’s
translation was published in London, this time, however, without any
allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three chapters were
then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms of Capt.
Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to
his earlier edition. In the subsequent chapters I have of course
transferred my attention to the second edition. This is on the whole an
improvement on the other, though there still remains much that cannot
pass muster. Some of the grosser blunders have been rectified and
lacunae filled up, but on the other hand a certain number of new
mistakes appear. The very first sentence of the introduction is
startlingly inaccurate; and later on, while mention is made of “an army
of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ (who are these, by the way?), not
a word is vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators, who nevertheless,
I venture to assert, form a much more numerous and infinitely more
important “army.”

A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In
the first place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs,
both in order to facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of
students generally. The division follows broadly that of Sun
Hsing-yen’s edition; but I have sometimes found it desirable to join
two or more of his paragraphs into one. In quoting from other works,
Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare title by way of
reference, and the task of research is apt to be seriously hampered in
consequence. With a view to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun
Tzŭ is concerned, I have also appended a complete concordance of
Chinese characters, following in this the admirable example of Legge,
though an alphabetical arrangement has been preferred to the
distribution under radicals which he adopted. Another feature borrowed
from “The Chinese Classics” is the printing of text, translation and
notes on the same page; the notes, however, are inserted, according to
the Chinese method, immediately after the passages to which they
refer. From the mass of native commentary my aim has been to extract
the cream only, adding the Chinese text here and there when it seemed
to present points of literary interest. Though constituting in itself
an important branch of Chinese literature, very little commentary of
this kind has hitherto been made directly accessible by translation.[3]

I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my
sheets as they were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a
final revision. On a review of the whole, without modifying the
substance of my criticisms, I might have been inclined in a few
instances to temper their asperity. Having chosen to wield a bludgeon,
however, I shall not cry out if in return I am visited with more than
a rap over the knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to put a
sword into the hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either
text or reference for every passage translated. A scathing review,
even from the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere
translations,” would not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome.
For, after all, the worst fate I shall have to dread is that which
befell the ingenious paradoxes of George in _The Vicar of Wakefield_.

INTRODUCTION

Sun Wu and his Book

Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ:[4]—

孫子武 Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch‘i State. His _Art of War_
brought him to the notice of 闔廬 Ho Lu,[5] King of 吳 Wu. Ho Lu said
to him: I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your
theory of managing soldiers to a slight test?

Sun Tzŭ replied: You may.

Ho Lu asked: May the test be applied to women?

The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made
to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into
two companies, and placed one of the King’s favourite concubines
at the head of each. He then bade them all take spears in their
hands, and addressed them thus: I presume you know the difference
between front and back, right hand and left hand?

The girls replied: Yes.

Sun Tzŭ went on: When I say “Eyes front,” you must look straight
ahead. When I say “Left turn,” you must face towards your left
hand. When I say “Right turn,” you must face towards your right
hand. When I say “About turn,” you must face right round towards
the back.

Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus
explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to
begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order
“Right turn.” But the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzŭ said:
If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not
thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame.

So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order
“Left turn,” whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of
laughter. Sun Tzŭ said: If words of command are not clear and
distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is
to blame. But if his orders _are_ clear, and the soldiers
nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers.

So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be
beheaded. Now the King of Wu was watching the scene from the top
of a raised pavilion; and when he saw that his favourite
concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly alarmed and
hurriedly sent down the following message: We are now quite
satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. If We are
bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their
savour. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded.

Sun Tzŭ replied: Having once received His Majesty’s commission to
be general of his forces, there are certain commands of His
Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept.

Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway
installed the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When
this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more;
and the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to the
right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or
standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing to
utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ sent a messenger to the King saying:
Your soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and
ready for Your Majesty’s inspection. They can be put to any use
that their sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and
water, and they will not disobey.

But the King replied: Let our general cease drilling and return to
camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the
troops.

Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: The King is only fond of words, and cannot
translate them into deeds.

After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was one who knew how to handle
an army, and finally appointed him general. In the West, he
defeated the Ch‘u State and forced his way into Ying, the capital;
to the north, he put fear into the States of Ch‘i and Chin, and
spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ
shared in the might of the King.

About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien has to tell us in
this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant,
孫臏 Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s
death, and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The
historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzŭ, and in his preface we read:
孫子臏脚而論兵法 “Sun Tzŭ had his feet cut off and yet continued to
discuss the art of war.”[6] It seems likely, then, that “Pin” was a
nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless indeed the story
was invented in order to account for the name. The crowning incident
of his career, the crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P‘ang
Chüan, will be found briefly related on p. 40.

To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages
of the _Shih Chi_:—

In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, King of Wu, took
the field with 子胥 Tzŭ-hsü [i.e. 伍員 Wu Yüan] and 伯嚭 Po P‘ei,
and attacked Ch‘u. He captured the town of 舒 Shu and slew the two
prince’s sons who had formerly been generals of Wu. He was then
meditating a descent on 郢 Ying [the capital]; but the general Sun
Wu said: “The army is exhausted.[7] It is not yet possible. We
must wait”....[8] [After further successful fighting,] in the
ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu of Wu addressed Wu Tzŭ-hsü and
Sun Wu, saying: “Formerly, you declared that it was not yet
possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?” The two men
replied: “Ch‘u’s general, 子常 Tzŭ-ch‘ang,[9] is grasping and
covetous, and the princes of 唐 T‘ang and 蔡 Ts‘ai both have a
grudge against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand
attack, you must win over T‘ang and Ts‘ai, and then you may
succeed.” Ho Lu followed this advice, [beat Ch‘u in five pitched
battles and marched into Ying].[10]

This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He
does not appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects
of a wound in 496.

In the chapter entitled 律書 (the earlier portion of which M. Chavannes
believes to be a fragment of a treatise on Military Weapons), there
occurs this passage:[11]

From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after
the other: 咎犯 Kao-fan,[12] who was employed by the Chin State;
Wang-tzŭ,[13] in the service of Ch‘i; and Sun Wu, in the service of
Wu. These men developed and threw light upon the principles of war
(申明軍約).

It is obvious that Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien at least had no doubt about the
reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception,
to be noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on
the period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say
much of such a work as the 吳越春秋 _Wu Yüeh Ch‘un Ch‘iu_, which is
supposed to have been written by 趙曄 Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D.
The attribution is somewhat doubtful; but even if it were otherwise,
his account would be of little value, based as it is on the _Shih Chi_
and expanded with romantic details. The story of Sun Tzŭ will be
found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it
worth noting are: 1) Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu
Tzŭ-hsü. 2) He is called a native of Wu.[14] 3) He had previously
lived a retired life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his
ability.[15]

The following passage occurs in 淮南子 Huai-nan Tzŭ: “When sovereign and
ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ
to encounter the foe.”[16] Assuming that this work is genuine (and
hitherto no doubt has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest
direct reference to Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many
years before the _Shih Chi_ was given to the world.

劉向 Liu Hsiang (B.C. 80–9) in his 新序 says: “The reason why Sun Wu at
the head of 30,000 men beat Ch‘u with 200,000 is that the latter were
undisciplined.”[17]

鄧名世 Têng Ming-shih in his 姓氏辨證書 (completed in 1134) informs us
that the surname 孫 was bestowed on Sun Wu’s grandfather by 景公 Duke
Ching of Ch‘i [547–490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father Sun 馮 P‘ing, rose to be
a Minister of State in Ch‘i, and Sun Wu himself, whose style was 長卿
Ch‘ang-ch‘ing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion which was being
fomented by the kindred of 田鮑 T‘ien Pao. He had three sons, of whom
the second, named 明 Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. According to this
account, then, Pin was the grandson of Wu,[18] which, considering that
Sun Pin’s victory over 魏 Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed
as chronologically impossible. Whence these data were obtained by Têng
Ming-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be
placed in them.

An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han
period is the short preface written by the great 曹操 Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, or
魏武帝 Wei Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:—

I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their
advantage.[19] The _Lun Yü_ says: “There must be a sufficiency of
military strength.”[20] The _Shu Ching_ mentions “the army” among
the “eight objects of government.”[21] The _I Ching_ says: “師
‘army’ indicates firmness and justice; the experienced leader will
have good fortune.”[22] The _Shih Ching_ says: “The King rose
majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his troops.”[23] The
Yellow Emperor, T‘ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears
and battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The _Ssŭ-ma
Fa_ says: “If one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may
rightfully be slain.”[24] He who relies solely on warlike measures
shall be exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful measures
shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch‘ai[25] on the one hand
and Yen Wang on the other.[26] In military matters, the Sage’s
rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only
when occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven
to it by necessity.[27]

Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the
work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ
was a native of the Ch‘i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote
the _Art of War_ in 13 chapters for Ho Lü, King of Wu. Its
principles were tested on women, and he was subsequently made a
general. He led an army westwards, crushed the Ch‘u State and
entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch‘i and Chin in
awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He
was a descendant of Wu].[28] In his treatment of deliberation and
planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the field,[29]
clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzŭ stands
beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, however,
have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and
while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work
abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the
motive which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the
whole.[30]

One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that
the 13 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is
supported by the internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear
that some ruler is addressed.

In the bibliographical section of the _Han Shu_,[31] there is an
entry which has given rise to much discussion: 吳孫子八十二篇圖九卷 “The
works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 _p‘ien_ (or chapters), with diagrams in 9
_chüan_.” It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters
known to Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien, or those we possess to-day. Chang Shou-chieh
in his 史記正義 refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s 兵法 of which the “13
chapters” formed the first _chüan_, adding that there were two other
_chüan_ besides.[32] This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk
of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should
call them apocryphal—similar to the 問答 _Wên Ta_, of which a specimen
dealing with the Nine Situations[33] is preserved in the 通典 _T‘ung
Tien_, and another in Ho Shih’s commentary. It is suggested that
before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzŭ had only written the 13
chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in the form of
question and answer between himself and the King. 畢以珣 Pi I-hsün,
author of the 孫子敘錄 _Sun Tzŭ Hsü Lu_, backs this up with a quotation
from the _Wu Yüeh Ch‘un Ch‘iu_: “The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzŭ, and
asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a
chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to praise
him.”[34] As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the
same scale as in the above-mentioned fragments, the total number of
chapters could not fail to be considerable.[35] Then the numerous
other treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ[36] might also be included. The
fact that the _Han Chih_ mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82
_p‘ien_, whereas the Sui and T‘ang bibliographies give the titles of
others in addition to the “13 chapters,” is good proof, Pi I-hsün
thinks, that all of these were contained in the 82 _p‘ien_. Without
pinning our faith to the accuracy of details supplied by the _Wu Yüeh
Ch‘un Ch‘iu_, or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises
cited by Pi I-hsün, we may see in this theory a probable solution of
the mystery. Between Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time
for a luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the magic
name of Sun Tzŭ, and the 82 _p‘ien_ may very well represent a
collected edition of these lumped together with the original work. It
is also possible, though less likely, that some of them existed in the
time of the earlier historian and were purposely ignored by him.[37]

Tu Mu, after Ts‘ao Kung the most important commentator on Sun Tzŭ,
composed the preface to his edition[38] about the middle of the ninth
century. After a somewhat lengthy defence of the military art,[39] he
comes at last to Sun Tzŭ himself, and makes one or two very startling
assertions:—“The writings of Sun Wu,” he says, “originally comprised
several hundred thousand words, but Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, the Emperor Wu Wei,
pruned away all redundancies and wrote out the essence of the whole,
so as to form a single book in 13 chapters.”[40] He goes on to remark
that Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ leaves a certain proportion
of difficulties unexplained. This, in Tu Mu’s opinion, does not
necessarily imply that he was unable to furnish a complete
commentary.[41] According to the _Wei Chih_, Ts‘ao himself wrote a
book on war in something over 100,000 words, known as the 新書. It
appears to have been of such exceptional merit that he suspects Ts‘ao
to have used for it the surplus material which he had found in Sun
Tzŭ. He concludes, however, by saying: “The _Hsin Shu_ is now lost, so
that the truth cannot be known for certain.”[42]

Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage in the 漢官解詁 “Wei
Wu Ti strung together Sun Wu’s Art of War,”[43] which in turn may have
resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Ts‘ao Kung’s
preface: 故撰爲略解焉. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points out,[44] is only a
modest way of saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase,[45] or in
other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the whole, the theory has
met with very little acceptance. Thus, the 四庫全書 says:[46] “The
mention of the 13 chapters in the _Shih Chi_ shows that they were in
existence before the _Han Chih_, and that later accretions are not to
be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can
certainly not be taken as proof.”[47]

There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed
in the time of Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien practically as we have them now. That the
work was then well known he tells us in so many words: “Sun Tzŭ’s 13
Chapters and Wu Ch‘i’s Art of War are the two books that people
commonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of then are
widely distributed, so I will not discuss them here.”[48] But as we go
further back, serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact
which has to be faced is that the _Tso Chuan_, the great contemporary
record, makes no mention whatever of Sun Wu, either as a general or as
a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, that
many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as
given in the _Shih Chi_, but even show themselves frankly sceptical as
to the existence of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of
this side of the case is to be found in the following disquisition by
葉水心 Yeh Shui-hsin:[49]—

It is stated in Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native
of the Ch‘i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho
Lü he crushed Ch‘u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in
Tso’s Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s
Commentary need not contain absolutely everything that other
histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar
plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K‘ao-shu,[50] Ts‘ao
Kuei,[51] Chu Chih-wu[52] and Chuan Shê-chu.[53] In the case of
Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the
omission is much more glaring. Again, details are given, in their
due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yüan and the Minister
P‘ei.[54] Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed
over?[55]

In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same
school as _Kuan Tzŭ_,[56] the _Liu T‘ao_,[57] and the _Yüeh Yü_,[58]
and may have been the production of some private scholar living
towards the end of the “Spring and Autumn” or the beginning of the
“Warring States” period.[59] The story that his precepts were
actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of big
talk on the part of his followers.[60]

From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty[61] down to the
time of the “Spring and Autumn,” all military commanders were
statesmen as well, and the class of professional generals, for
conducting external campaigns, did not then exist. It was not
until the period of the “Six States”[62] that this custom changed.
Now although Wu was an uncivilised State, is it conceivable that
Tso should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great
general and yet held no civil office? What we are told, therefore,
about Jang-chü[63] and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the
reckless fabrication of theorising pundits. The story of Ho Lü’s
experiment on the women, in particular, is utterly preposterous
and incredible.[64]

Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien as having said that Sun Wu
crushed Ch‘u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the
impression left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in
these exploits; but the actual subject of the verbs 破, 入, 威 and 顯
is certainly 闔廬, as is shown by the next words: 孫子與有力焉.[65]
The fact may or may not be significant; but it is nowhere explicitly
stated in the _Shih Chi_ either that Sun Tzŭ was general on the
occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went there at all.
Moreover, as we know that Wu Yüan and Po P‘ei both took part in the
expedition, and also that its success was largely due to the dash and
enterprise of 夫槩 Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it is not easy to
see how yet another general could have played a very prominent part in
the same campaign.

陳振孫 Ch‘ên Chên-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:[66]—

Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But
the fact that he does not appear in the _Tso Chuan_, although he
is said to have served under Ho Lü King of Wu, makes it uncertain
what period he really belonged to.[67]

He also says:—

The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch‘i may be of genuine antiquity.[68]

It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch‘ên Chên-sun, while
rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s
history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to
the work which passes under his name. The author of the _Hsü Lu_ fails
to appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack
on Ch‘ên Chên-sun really misses its mark. He makes one or two points,
however, which certainly tell in favour of the high antiquity of
our “13 chapters.” “Sun Tzŭ,” he says, “must have lived in the age
of Ching Wang [519–476], because he is frequently plagiarised in
subsequent works of the Chou, Ch‘in and Han dynasties.”[69] The two
most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch‘i and Huai-nan Tzŭ,
both of them important historical personages in their day. The former
lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death
is known to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to
Liu Hsiang, that 曾申 Tsêng Shên delivered the _Tso Chuan_, which had
been entrusted to him by its author.[70] Now the fact that quotations
from the _Art of War_, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found
in so many authors of different epochs, establishes a very strong
probability that there was some common source anterior to them all,—in
other words, that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards
the end of the 5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity
is furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to
a number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps
be extended, is given in the _Hsü Lu_; and though some of the
interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected
thereby.[71] Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a
scholar and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the
style of the 13 chapters to belong to the early part of the fifth
century. Seeing that he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove
the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not
have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he not honestly
believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that
the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other
internal evidence is not far to seek. Thus, in XIII. § 1, there is an
unmistakable allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had
already passed away by the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it
revived in a modified form.[72] The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that
carried on between the various feudal princes (諸侯), in which armoured
chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have entirely died out
before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state
which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch
presently.

But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the
chances of its being other than a _bonâ fide_ production are sensibly
diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come until long after.
That it should have been forged in the period immediately following
473 is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to
identify himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin’s theory,
that the author was a literary recluse,[73] that seems to me quite
untenable. If one thing is more apparent than another after reading
the maxims of Sun Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled
from a large store of personal observation and experience. They
reflect the mind not only of a born strategist, gifted with a rare
faculty of generalisation, but also of a practical soldier closely
acquainted with the military conditions of his time. To say nothing
of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all
the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination
of freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite
excludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in the study.
If we admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of
a military man living towards the end of the “Ch‘un Ch‘iu” period, are
we not bound, in spite of the silence of the _Tso Chuan_, to accept
Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s account in its entirety? In view of his high repute as
a sober historian, must we not hesitate to assume that the records he
drew upon for Sun Wu’s biography were false and untrustworthy? The
answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is still one grave, if
not fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the story as told
in the _Shih Chi_, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet
pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes
to contemporary affairs. The first is in VI. § 21:—

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our
own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of
victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.

The other is in XI. § 30:—

Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, I should
answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies;
yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught
by a storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the
left hand helps the right.

These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of
composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle
between Wu and Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsün. But what
has hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the
credibility of Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the
first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is
then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu,
so that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken
place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier
still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the
capture of Ying in 506, 楚 Ch‘u, and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary
enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch‘u and Wu, had been constantly at war
for over half a century,[74] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh
was waged only in 510,[75] and even then was no more than a short
interlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch‘u.
Now Ch‘u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural
inference is that they were written at a time when Yüeh had become the
prime antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch‘u had suffered the great
humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found useful.

B.C.

514 Accession of Ho Lu.

512 Ho Lu attacks Ch‘u, but is dissuaded from entering 郢 Ying, the
capital. _Shih Chi_ mentions Sun Wu as general.

511 Another attack on Ch‘u.

510 Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the first war
between the two states.

509 Ch‘u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at 豫章 Yü-chang.
or
508

506 Ho Lu attacks Ch‘u with the aid of T‘ang and Ts‘ai. Decisive
battle of 柏舉 Po-chü, and capture of Ying. Last mention
of Sun Wu in _Shih Chi_.

505 Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu is
beaten by Ch‘in and evacuates Ying.

504 Ho Lu sends 夫差 Fu Ch‘ai to attack Ch‘u.

497 勾踐 Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh.

496 Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at 檇李 Tsui-li.
Ho Lu is killed.

494 Fu Ch‘ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of 夫椒 Fu-chiao,
and enters the capital of Yüeh.

485 Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzŭ-hsü.
or
484

482 Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch‘ai.

478 Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu.
to
476

475 Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu.

473 Final defeat and extinction of Wu.

The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that
could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather
to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against
Wu, and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may
conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which
date Yüeh does not appear to have scored any notable success against
Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it
must have been during the period 505–496, when there was a lull in
the hostilities, Wu having presumably been exhausted by its supreme
effort against Ch‘u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the
tradition connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well
have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period
482–473, when Yüeh was once again becoming a very serious menace.[76]
We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been,
was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point
the negative testimony of the _Tso Chuan_ far outweighs any shred of
authority still attaching to the _Shih Chi_, if once its other facts
are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to
explain the omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu
Tzŭ-hsü, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because
the latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the
State.[77]

How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing
celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown
to its author. It was felt to be only right and proper that one so
well versed in the science of war should have solid achievements
to his credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was undoubtedly the
greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep and lasting
impression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the
short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time
went on, than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should
be popularly identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in
the sense that his brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it
was actually carried out by him in conjunction with Wu Yüan,[78] Po
P‘ei and Fu Kai?

It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun
Tzŭ’s life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this
necessary proviso, I should say that he probably entered the service
of Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s accession, and gathered experience,
though only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the
intense military activity which marked the first half of that prince’s
reign.[79] If he rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never
on an equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless
present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s
sudden collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical
juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have
convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against
whom every effort would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was
thus a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous
book, which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the
end, rather than the beginning, of Ho Lu’s reign. The story of the
women may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring
about the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any
source, he is hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have
taken part in the death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the
disaster at Tsui-li.

If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain
irony in the fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man
of peace should be contemporary with her greatest writer on war.

The Text of Sun Tzŭ.

I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s
text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the
“13 chapters” of which Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien speaks were essentially the same
as those now extant. We have his word for it that they were widely
circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from
discussing them on that account.[80] Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:—

During the Ch‘in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_ was in
general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have
treated it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to
expound it for the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that
Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary on it.[81]

As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that
Ts‘ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so
obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time
onward so great, especially during the T‘ang and Sung dynasties, that
it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to
creep in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all the
chief commentaries on Sun Tzŭ were in existence, a certain 吉天保 Chi
T‘ien-pao published a work in 15 _chüan_ entitled 十家孫子會注 “Sun Tzŭ
with the collected commentaries of ten writers.”[82] There was another
text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of 大興 Ta-hsing,[83]
which also had supporters among the scholars of that period; but in
the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for
some reason or other no longer put into circulation.[84] Thus, until
the end of the 18th century, the text in sole possession of the field
was one derived from Chi T‘ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy
of that important work was known to have survived. That, therefore,
is the text of Sun Tzŭ which appears in the War section of the great
Imperial encyclopaedia printed in 1726, the 古今圖書集成 _Ku Chin T‘u
Shu Chi Ch‘êng_. Another copy at my disposal of what is practically
the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in the
周秦十一子 “Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch‘in dynasties”
[1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition
is evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese
channels. So things remained until 孫星衍 Sun Hsing-yen [1752–1818], a
distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar,[85] who claimed to be
an actual descendant of Sun Wu,[86] accidentally discovered a copy of
Chi T‘ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of the
華陰 Hua-yin temple.[87] Appended to it was the 遺說 _I Shuo_ of 鄭友賢
Chêng Yu-hsien, mentioned in the _T‘ung Chih_, and also believed to
have perished.[88] This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the 古本
or 原本 “original edition (or text)”—a rather misleading name, for it
cannot by any means claim to set before us the text of Sun Tzŭ in
its pristine purity. Chi T‘ien-pao was a careless compiler,[89] and
appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat debased version
current in his day, without troubling to collate it with the earliest
editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzŭ, even
older than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried
in the _T‘ung Tien_, Tu Yu’s great treatise on the Constitution, the
other similarly enshrined in the _T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan_ encyclopaedia. In
both the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments,
intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of
different sections. Considering that the _Y‘ü Lan_ takes us back to
the year 983, and the _T‘ung Tien_ about 200 years further still, to
the middle of the T‘ang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts
of Sun Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilising them
does not seem to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting
under Government instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the
text. This is his own account:—

Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his
editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient
edition [of Chi T‘ien-pao] should be used, and that the text
should be revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu
Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second
degree, had all devoted themselves to this study, probably
surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut
on blocks as a text-book for military men.[90]

The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on
the text of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are
left in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate,
the new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of
Sun Hsing-yen and only one co-editor, 吳人驥 Wu Jên-chi. They took the
“original text” as their basis, and by careful comparison with the
older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and other sources
of information such as the _I Shuo_, succeeded in restoring a very
large number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what
must be accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to
get to Sun Tzŭ’s original work. This is what will hereafter be
denominated the “standard text.”

The copy which I have used belongs to a re-issue dated 1877. It is in
6 _pên_, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical
works in 83 _pên_.[91] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen
(largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating the traditional
view of Sun Tzŭ’s life and performances, and summing up in remarkably
concise fashion the evidence in its favour. This is followed by Ts‘ao
Kung’s preface to his edition, and the biography of Sun Tzŭ from
the _Shih Chi_, both translated above. Then come, firstly, Chêng
Yu-hsien’s _I Shuo_,[92] with author’s preface, and next, a short
miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled
孫子敘錄 _Sun Tzŭ Hsü Lu_, compiled by 畢以珣 Pi I-hsün. As regards the
body of the work, each separate sentence is followed by a note on the
text, if required, and then by the various commentaries appertaining
to it, arranged in chronological order. These we shall now proceed to
discuss briefly, one by one.

The Commentators.

Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long and distinguished roll of
commentators, which would do honour to any classic. 歐陽修 Ou-yang Hsiu
remarks on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was complete,
and rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the artifices of
war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment
in a great variety of ways.[93]

1. 曹操 Ts‘ao Ts‘ao or 曹公 Ts‘ao Kung, afterwards known as 魏武帝 Wei
Wu Ti [A.D. 155–220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the
earliest commentary on Sun Tzŭ actually came from the pen of this
extraordinary man, whose biography in the _San Kuo Chih_[94] reads
like a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses that the world
has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations, he was
especially famed for the marvellous rapidity of his marches, which has
found expression in the line 說曹操曹操就到 “Talk of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, and
Ts‘ao Ts‘ao will appear.” Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a great
captain who “measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lü Pu and the two
Yüan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon he divided
the Empire of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is
recorded that whenever a council of war was held by Wei on the eve
of a far-reaching campaign, he had all his calculations ready; those
generals who made use of them did not lose one battle in ten;
those who ran counter to them in any particular saw their armies
incontinently beaten and put to flight.”[95] Ts‘ao Kung’s notes on Sun
Tzŭ, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic
of the stern commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to
conceive of them as the work of a mere _littérateur_. Sometimes,
indeed, owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely intelligible
and stand no less in need of a commentary than the text itself.[96] As
we have seen, Ts‘ao Kung is the reputed author of the 新書, a book on
war in 100,000 odd words, now lost, but mentioned in the 魏志.[97]

2. 孟氏 Mêng Shih. The commentary which has come down to us under this
name is comparatively meagre, and nothing about the author is known.
Even his personal name has not been recorded. Chi T‘ien-pao’s edition
places him after Chia Lin, and 鼂公武 Ch‘ao Kung-wu also assigns him to
the T‘ang dynasty,[98] but this is obviously a mistake, as his work is
mentioned in the 隋書經籍志. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he appears as
Mêng Shih of the Liang dynasty [502–557]. Others would identify him
with 孟康 Mêng K‘ang of the 3rd century. In the 宋史藝文志,[99] he is
named last of the 五家 “Five Commentators,” the others being Wei Wu Ti,
Tu Mu, Ch‘ên Hao and Chia Lin.

3. 李筌 Li Ch‘üan of the 8th century was a well-known writer on
military tactics. His 太白陰經 has been in constant use down to the
present day. The 通志 mentions 閫外春秋 (lives of famous generals from
the Chou to the T‘ang dynasty) as written by him.[100] He is also
generally supposed to be the real author of the popular Taoist
tract, the 陰符經. According to Ch‘ao Kung-wu and the _T‘ien-i-ko_
catalogue,[101] he followed the 太乙遁甲 text of Sun Tzŭ, which differs
considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly short and to
the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes from
Chinese history.

4. 杜佑 Tu Yu (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun
Tzŭ, his notes being taken from the _T‘ung Tien_, the encyclopaedic
treatise on the Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely
repetitions of Ts‘ao Kung and Mêng Shih, besides which it is believed
that he drew on the ancient commentaries of 王凌 Wang Ling and others.
Owing to the peculiar arrangement of the _T‘ung Tien_, he has to explain
each passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his
own explanation does not agree with that of Ts‘ao Kung, whom he always
quotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the “Ten
Commentators,” he was added to their number by Chi T‘ien-pao, being
wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu.

5. 杜牧 Tu Mu (803–852) is perhaps best known as a poet—a bright star
even in the glorious galaxy of the T‘ang period. We learn from Ch‘ao
Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was
extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read
in the military history of the _Ch‘un Ch‘iu_ and _Chan Kuo_ eras.[102]
His notes, therefore, are well worth attention. They are very copious,
and replete with historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzŭ’s work is
thus summarised by him: “Practise benevolence and justice, but on the
other hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency.”[103]
He further declared that all the military triumphs and disasters of
the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Wu’s death would, upon
examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular,
the maxims contained in his book.[104] Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful
charge against Ts‘ao Kung has already been considered elsewhere.

6. 陳皥 Ch‘ên Hao appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch‘ao
Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ
because Ts‘ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and
that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse.[105] Ou-yang
Hsiu, writing in the middle of the 11th century, calls Ts‘ao Kung, Tu
Mu and Ch‘ên Hao the three chief commentators on Sun Tzŭ (三家), and
observes that Ch‘ên Hao is continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings.
His commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of
his predecessors.

7. 賈林 Chia Lin is known to have lived under the T‘ang dynasty, for
his commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the 唐書 and was afterwards
republished by 紀燮 Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those
of Mêng Shih and Tu Yu.[106] It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in
point of quality, too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven.

8. 梅堯臣 Mei Yao-ch‘ên (1002–1060), commonly known by his “style”
as Mei 聖兪 Shêng-yü, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His
commentary was published with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang
Hsiu, from which we may cull the following:—

Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and
trying to make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus,
though commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved
equal to the task. My friend Shêng-yü has not fallen into this
mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun
Tzŭ’s work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings
were intended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the
author is not concerned with the military conditions prevailing
under the sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties,[107] nor with
the nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister of War.[108]
Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is always
deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling
soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of
victory, it is always systematically treated; the sayings are
bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been
obscured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their
meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Shêng-yü has brushed aside all
the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring
out the true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds
of confusion have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am
convinced that the present work deserves to be handed down side by
side with the three great commentaries; and for a great deal that
they find in the sayings, coming generations will have constant
reason to thank my friend Shêng-yü.[109]

Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined
to endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him
above Ch‘ên Hao in order of merit.

9. 王晳 Wang Hsi, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original
in some of his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei
Yao-ch‘ên, and on the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond
of comparing his own commentary with that of Ts‘ao Kung, but the
comparison is not often flattering to him. We learn from Ch‘ao Kung-wu
that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae
and correcting mistakes.[110]

10. 何延錫 Ho Yen-hsi of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this
commentator is given as above by 鄭樵 Chêng Ch‘iao in the _T‘ung Chih_,
written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply
as 何氏 Ho Shih in the _Yü Hai_, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch‘ao Kung-wu
as saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no
reason to doubt Chêng Ch‘iao’s statement, otherwise I should have
been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one 何去非
Ho Ch‘ü-fei, the author of a short treatise on war entitled 備論,
who lived in the latter part of the 11th century.[111] Ho Shih’s
commentary, in the words of the _T‘ien-i-ko_ catalogue, 有所裨益
“contains helpful additions” here and there, but is chiefly remarkable
for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the dynastic
histories and other sources.

11. 張預 Chang Yü. The list closes with a commentator of no great
originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid
exposition. His commentary is based on that of Ts‘ao Kung, whose terse
sentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion.
Without Chang Yü, it is safe to say that much of Ts‘ao Kung’s
commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and
therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history,
the _T‘ung K‘ao_, or the _Yü Hai_, but it finds a niche in the _T‘ung
Chih_, which also names him as the author of the 百將傳 “Lives of
Famous Generals.”[112]

It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have
flourished within so short a space of time. Ch‘ao Kung-wu accounts for
it by saying: “During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire
enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practise the art
of war. But when [Chao] Yüan-hao’s rebellion came [1038–42] and the
frontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made
strenuous enquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became
the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the
commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that
period.”[113]

Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work
has not come down to us. The _Sui Shu_ mentions four, namely 王凌 Wang
Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu as 王子); 張子尙 Chang Tzŭ-shang; 賈詡 Chia
Hsü of 魏 Wei;[114] and 沈友 Shên Yu of 吳 Wu. The _T‘ang Shu_ adds
孫鎬 Sun Hao, and the _T‘ung Chih_ 蕭吉 Hsiao Chi, while the _T‘u Shu_
mentions a Ming commentator, 黃潤玉 Huang Jun-yü. It is possible that
some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other
commentaries, like Chi T‘ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above.
Certainly in the case of the latter, the entry 紀夑注孫子 in the _T‘ung
K‘ao_, without the following note, would give one to understand that
he had written an independent commentary of his own.

There are two works, described in the _Ssu K‘u Ch‘üan Shu_[115] and no
doubt extremely rare, which I should much like to have seen. One is
entitled 孫子參同, in 5 _chüan_. It gives selections from four new
commentators, probably of the Ming dynasty, as well as from the eleven
known to us. The names of the four are 解元 Hsieh Yüan; 張鏊 Chang Ao;
李村 Li Ts‘ai; and 黃治徵 Huang Chih-chêng. The other work is 孫子彚徵
in 4 _chüan_, compiled by 鄭端 Chêng Tuan of the present dynasty. It is
a compendium of information on ancient warfare, with special reference
to Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters.

Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ.

Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of
China’s greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have
studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned 韓信 Han Hsin (_d_.
B.C. 196),[116] 馮異 Fêng I (d. A.D. 34),[117] 呂蒙 Lü Mêng (_d_.
219),[118] and 岳飛 Yo Fei (1103–1141).[119] The opinion of Ts‘ao Kung,
who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese military
annals, has already been recorded.[120] Still more remarkable, in one
way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as 蘇洵 Su Hsün (the
father of Su Tung-p‘o), who wrote several essays on military topics,
all of which owe their chief inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following
short passage by him is preserved in the _Yü Hai:_[121]—

Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of
conquering,[122] is very different indeed from what other books
tell us.[123] Wu Ch‘i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they
both wrote books on war, and they are linked together in popular
speech as “Sun and Wu.” But Wu Ch‘i’s remarks on war are less
weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and there
is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the
style is terse, but the meaning fully brought out.[124]

The 性理彚要, ch. 17, contains the following extract from the 藝圃折衷
“Impartial Judgments in the Garden of Literature” by 鄭厚 Chêng Hou:—

Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all
military men’s training, but also compel the most careful
attention of scholars and men of letters. His sayings are terse
yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous and eminently
practical. Such works as the _Lun Yü_, the _I Ching_ and the great
Commentary,[125] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsün K‘uang
and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzŭ.[126]

Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the
criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with
the venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says,
“encourages a ruler’s bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless
militarism.”[127]

Apologies for War.

Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving
nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her
experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern
State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point
at which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great
Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier
centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube.
What with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States,
the grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the
centralisation of government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied
the overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions
and minor disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one
by one, it is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never
ceased to resound in one portion or another of the Empire.

No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom
China can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are
found emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po
Ch‘i stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch‘in was entering upon
her final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy
years which followed the break-up of the Ch‘in dynasty are illumined
by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn
is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao
dominates the scene. And in the establishment of the T‘ang dynasty,
one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of
Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T‘ai Tsung) was seconded by the
brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear
comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe.

In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao
Tzŭ downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature
of Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed
to militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of
the literati defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it
worth while to collect and translate a few passages in which the
unorthodox view is upheld. The following, by Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien, shows that
for all his ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of
peace at any price:—

Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish
violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove
difficulties and dangers, and to succour those who are in peril.
Every animal with blood in its veins and horns on its head will
fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who carries
in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger!
When he is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him;
when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the
natural law which governs his being.... What then shall be said of
those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and without
any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out their
stale formulas about “virtue” and “civilisation,” condemning the
use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to
impotence and dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or,
at the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion,
sacrifice of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they
obstinately refuse to modify the position they have taken up. The
truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare
the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so
military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance
in the Empire. All one can say is that this power will be
exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and that among
those who bear arms some will be loyal and others rebellious.[128]

The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on
Sun Tzŭ:—

War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of
government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch‘iu, both
disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and
hearing of litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their
execution by flogging in the market-place, are all done by
officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of
fortified cities, the haling of women and children into captivity,
and the beheading of traitors—this is also work which is done by
officials. The objects of the rack[129] and of military weapons
are essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference between
the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in war. For the
lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, only a
small amount of force need be employed: hence the institution of
torture and flogging. For more serious outbreaks of lawlessness,
which are hard to suppress, a greater amount of force is
necessary: hence the use of military weapons and wholesale
decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is to get
rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the
good....[130]

Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: “Have you, Sir, acquired your
military aptitude by study, or is it innate?” Jan Yu replied: “It
has been acquired by study.”[131] “How can that be so,” said
Chi-sun, “seeing that you are a disciple of Confucius?” “It is a
fact,” replied Jan Yu; “I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting
that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military
functions, though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting
has not yet gone very far.”

Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the
“civil” and the “military,” and the limitation of each to a
separate sphere of action, or in what year of which dynasty it
was first introduced, is more than I can say. But, at any rate,
it has come about that the members of the governing class are
quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a
shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject,
they are at once set down as eccentric individuals of coarse and
brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary instance of the way
in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose
sight of fundamental principles.[132]

When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch‘êng Wang, he
regulated ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of
scholarship and learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai
revolted,[133] he sallied forth and chastised them. When Confucius
held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at
Chia-ku,[134] he said: “If pacific negotiations are in progress,
warlike preparations should have been made beforehand.” He rebuked
and shamed the Marquis of Ch‘i, who cowered under him and dared
not proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great
Sages had no knowledge of military matters?[135]

We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He
also appeals to the authority of the Classics:—

Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: “I have
never studied matters connected with armies and battalions.”[136]
Replying to K‘ung Wên-tzŭ, he said: “I have not been instructed
about buff-coats and weapons.”[137] But if we turn to the meeting
at Chia-ku,[138] we find that he used armed force against the men
of Lai,[139] so that the marquis of Ch‘i was overawed. Again, when
the inhabitants of Pi revolted, he ordered his officers to attack
them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in confusion.[140]
He once uttered the words: “If I fight, I conquer.”[141] And
Jan Yu also said: “The Sage exercises both civil and military
functions.”[142] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or
received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he
did not specially choose matters connected with armies and
fighting to be the subject of his teaching.[143]

Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:—

Confucius said: “I am unversed in military matters.” He also
said: “If I fight, I conquer.”[144] Confucius ordered ceremonies
and regulated music. Now war constitutes one of the five
classes of State ceremonial,[145] and must not be treated as an
independent branch of study. Hence, the words “I am unversed in”
must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired
Teacher does not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise
stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if one can command the
services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, who was employed by Wu
Tzŭ-hsü, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the remark
added by Confucius: “If I fight, I conquer.”[146]

The men of the present day, however, wilfully interpret these
words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant
that books on the art of war were not worth reading. With blind
persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over
his father’s books to no purpose,[147] as a proof that all
military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have
to do with such things as opportunism in designing plans, and
the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral and
unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies
of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials
also require steady application and practice before efficiency is
reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere
novices to botch their work.[148] Weapons are baneful[149] and
fighting perilous; and unless a general is in constant practice,
he ought not to hazard other men’s lives in battle.[150] Hence it
is essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should be studied.[151]

Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi[152] in the art of
war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings,
but would not pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the
consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown. He
did not realise that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond
verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung[153] and King Yen of
Hsü[154] were brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity.
The treacherous and underhand nature of war necessitates the use
of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on
record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath,[155]
and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise.[156] Can
we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding truth and
honesty?[157]

Bibliography.

The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ.
The notes on each have been drawn principally from the 四庫全書簡明目錄
_Ssŭ k‘u ch‘üan shu chien ming mu lu_, ch. 9, fol. 22 _sqq_.

1. 吳子 Wu Tzŭ, in 1 _chüan_ or 6 篇 chapters. By 吳起 Wu Ch‘i (_d_.
B.C. 381). A genuine work. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 65.

2. 司馬法 Ssŭ-ma Fa, in 1 _chüan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to
司馬穰苴 Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must
be early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly
to be met with in its pages.[158] See _Shih chi_, ch. 64.

The _Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu_ (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three
treatises on war, _Sun Tzŭ_, _Wu Tzŭ_ and the _Ssŭ-ma Fa_, are,
generally speaking, only concerned with things strictly military—the
art of producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and the
correct theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans,
transport of goods and the handling of soldiers[159]—in strong contrast
to later works, in which the science of war is usually blended with
metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general.

3. 六韜 Liu T‘ao, in 6 _chüan_ or 60 chapters. Attributed to 呂望 Lü
Wang (or Lü 尙 Shang, also known as 太公 T‘ai Kung) of the 12th century
B.C.[160] But its style does not belong to the era of the Three
Dynasties.[161] 陸德明 Lu Tê-ming (550–625 A.D.) mentions the work, and
enumerates the headings of the six sections, 文, 武, 虎, 豹, 龍 and 犬,
so that the forgery cannot have been later than the Sui dynasty.

4. 尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ, in 5 _chüan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent.
B.C.), who studied under the famous 鬼谷子 Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The 漢志, under
兵家, mentions a book of Wei Liao in 31 chapters, whereas the text we
possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main,
though the strategical devices differ considerably from those of the
Warring States period.[162] It has been furnished with a commentary by
the well-known Sung philosopher 張載 Chang Tsai.

5. 三略 San Lüeh, in 3 _chüan_. Attributed to 黃石公 Huang-shih Kung, a
legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang
(_d_. B.C. 187) in an interview on a bridge.[163] But here again, the
style is not that of works dating from the Ch‘in or Han period. The
Han Emperor Kuang Wu [A.D. 25–57] apparently quotes from it in one of
his proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted
later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not
be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420–478 A.D.],
or somewhat earlier.[164]

6. 李衞公問對 Li Wei Kung Wên Tui, in 3 sections. Written in the form
of a dialogue between T‘ai Tsung and his great general 李靖 Li Ching,
it is usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider
it a forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art
of war.[165]

7. 李靖兵法 Li Ching Ping Fa (not to be confounded with the foregoing)
is a short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the _T‘ung Tien_, but
not published separately. This fact explains its omission from the
_Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu_.

8. 握奇經 Wu Ch‘i Ching,[166] in 1 _chüan_. Attributed to the legendary
minister 風后 Fêng Hou, with exegetical notes by 公孫宏 Kung-sun Hung
of the Han dynasty (_d_. B.C. 121), and said to have been eulogised by
the celebrated general 馬隆 Ma Lung (_d_. A.D. 300). Yet the earliest
mention of it is in the 宋志. Although a forgery, the work is well put
together.[167]

Considering the high popular estimation in which 諸葛亮 Chu-ko Liang
has always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one work
on war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the 十六策 Shih Liu Ts‘ê (1
_chüan_), preserved in the 永樂大典 _Yung Lo Ta Tien_; (2) 將苑 Chiang
Yüan (1 _ch_.); and (3) 心書 Hsin Shu (1 _ch_.), which steals wholesale
from Sun Tzŭ. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered
genuine.

Most of the large Chinese encyclopaedias contain extensive sections
devoted to the literature of war. The following references may be
found useful:—

通典 T‘ung Tien (_circâ_ 800 A.D.), ch. 148–162.

太平御覽 T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan (983), ch. 270–359.

文獻通考 Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (13th cent.), ch. 221.

玉海 Yü Hai (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.

三才圖會 San Ts‘ai T‘u Hui (16th cent.), 人事 ch. 7, 8.

廣博物志 Kuang Po Wu Chih (1607), ch. 31, 32.

潛確類書 Ch‘ien Ch‘io Lei Shu (1632), ch. 75.

淵鑑類函 Yüan Chien Lei Han (1710), ch. 206–229.

古今圖書集成 Ku Chin T‘u Shu Chi Ch‘êng (1726), section XXX,
_esp_. ch. 81–90.

續文獻通考 Hsü Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (1784), ch. 121–134.

皇朝經世文編 Huang Ch‘ao Ching Shih Wên Pien (1826), ch. 76, 77.

The bibliographical sections of certain historical works
also deserve mention:—

前漢書 Ch‘ien Han Shu, ch. 30.

隋書 Sui Shu, ch. 32–35.

舊唐書 Chiu T‘ang Shu, ch. 46, 47.

新唐書 Hsin T‘ang Shu, ch. 57–60.

宋史 Sung Shih, ch. 202–209.

通志 T‘ung Chih (_circâ_ 1150), ch. 68.

To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the
Imperial Library:—

四庫全書總目提要 Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu Tsung Mu T‘i Yao (1790), ch. 99, 100.

I. 計篇.

LAYING PLANS.

This is the only possible meaning of 計, which M. Amiot and Capt.
Calthrop wrongly translate “Fondements de l’art militaire” and
“First principles” respectively. Ts‘ao Kung says it refers to the
deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his
temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. See § 26.

1. 孫子曰兵者國之大事

Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.

2. 死生之地存亡之道不可不察也

It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.
Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.

3. 故經之以五校之以計而索其情

The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be
taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine
the conditions obtaining in the field.

The old text of the _T‘ung Tien_ has 故經之以五校之計, etc. Later
editors have inserted 事 after 五, and 以 before 計. The former
correction is perhaps superfluous, but the latter seems necessary
in order to make sense, and is supported by the accepted reading
in § 12, where the same words recur. I am inclined to think,
however, that the whole sentence from 校 to 情 is an interpolation
and has no business here at all. If it be retained, Wang Hsi must
be right in saying that 計 denotes the “seven considerations” in
§ 13. 情 are the circumstances or conditions likely to bring about
victory or defeat. The antecedent of the first 之 is 兵者; of the
second, 五. 校 contains the idea of “comparison with the enemy,”
which cannot well be brought out here, but will appear in § 12.
Altogether, difficult though it is, the passage is not so
hopelessly corrupt as to justify Capt. Calthrop in burking it
entirely.

4. 一曰道二曰天三曰地四曰將五曰法

These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The
Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by 道 a principle
of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral aspect. One
might be tempted to render it by “morale,” were it not considered
as an attribute of the _ruler_ in § 13.

5. 道者令民與上同意也

6. 故可與之死可與之生而民不畏危

_The Moral Law_ causes the people to be in complete accord with their
ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives,
undismayed by any danger.

The original text omits 令民, inserts an 以 after each 可, and
omits 民 after 而. Capt. Calthrop translates: “If the ruling
authority be upright, the people are united”—a very pretty
sentiment, but wholly out of place in what purports to be a
translation of Sun Tzŭ.

7. 天者陰陽寒暑時制也

_Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of 陰陽.
Thus Mêng Shih defines the words as 剛柔盈縮 “the hard and the
soft, waxing and waning,” which does not help us much. Wang Hsi,
however, may be right in saying that what is meant is 總天道 “the
general economy of Heaven,” including the five elements, the four
seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.

8. 地者遠近險易廣狹死生也

_Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security;
open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.

死生 (omitted by Capt. Calthrop) may have been included here
because the safety of an army depends largely on its quickness to
turn these geographical features to account.

9. 將者智信仁勇嚴也

_The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity,
benevolence, courage and strictness.

The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) 仁 humanity or
benevolence; (2) 義 uprightness of mind; (3) 禮 self-respect,
self-control, or “proper feeling;” (4) 智 wisdom; (5) 信 sincerity
or good faith. Here 智 and 信 are put before 仁, and the two
military virtues of “courage” and “strictness” substituted for 義
and 禮.

10. 法者曲制官道主用也

By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of the
army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the
officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the
army, and the control of military expenditure.

The Chinese of this sentence is so concise as to be practically
unintelligible without commentary. I have followed the
interpretation of Ts‘ao Kung, who joins 曲制 and again 主用. Others
take each of the six predicates separately. 曲 has the somewhat
uncommon sense of “cohort” or division of an army. Capt. Calthrop
translates: “Partition and ordering of troops,” which only covers
曲制.

11. 凡此五者將莫不聞知之者勝不知者不勝

These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows
them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

12. 故校之以計而索其情

Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the
military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in
this wise:—

The _Yü Lan_ has an interpolated 五 before 計. It is obvious,
however, that the 五者 just enumerated cannot be described as 計.
Capt. Calthrop, forced to give some rendering of the words which
he had omitted in § 3, shows himself decidedly hazy: “Further,
with regard to these and the following seven matters, the
condition of the enemy must be compared with our own.” He does not
appear to see that the seven queries or considerations which
follow arise directly out of the Five heads, instead of being
supplementary to them.

13. 曰主孰有道將孰有能天地孰得法令孰行兵衆孰强士卒孰練賞罰孰明

(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?

I.e., “is in harmony with his subjects.” Cf. § 5.

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?

(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?

See §§ 7, 8.

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao (A.D.
155–220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in
accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to
standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed
his horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of losing
his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by
cutting off his hair. Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s own comment on the present
passage is characteristically curt: 設而不犯犯而必誅 “when you lay
down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed, the
offender must be put to death.”

(5) Which army is the stronger?

Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch‘ên puts it, 內和外附,
which might be freely rendered “esprit de corps and ‘big
battalions.’”

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

Tu Yu quotes 王子 as saying: “Without constant practice, the
officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle;
without constant practice, the general will be wavering and
irresolute when the crisis is at hand.”

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and
punishment?

明, literally “clear;” that is, on which side is there the most
absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and
misdeeds summarily punished?

14. 吾以此知勝負矣

By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.

15. 將聽吾計用之必勝留之將不聽吾計用之必敗去之

The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will
conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that
hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let
such a one be dismissed!

The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was
composed expressly for the benefit of his patron 闔閭 Ho Lü, king of
the Wu State. It is not necessary, however, to understand 我 before
留之 (as some commentators do), or to take 將 as “generals under my
command.”

16. 計利以聽乃爲之勢以佐其外

While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any
helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

Capt. Calthrop blunders amazingly over this sentence: “Wherefore, with
regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage,
and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises
victory.” Mere logic should have kept him from penning such frothy
balderdash.

17. 勢者因利而制權也

According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s
plans.

Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the “bookish
theoric.” He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract
principles; “for,” as Chang Yü puts it, “while the main laws of
strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and
sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting
to secure a favourable position in actual warfare.” On the eve of the
battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the
Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations
were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find
himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a
critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: “Who will
attack the first to-morrow—I or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Lord
Uxbridge. “Well,” continued the Duke, “Bonaparte has not given me any
idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can
you expect me to tell you what mine are?”[168]

18. 兵者詭道也

All warfare is based on deception.

The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by
every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in
so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by “the
extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and
deceived both friend and foe.”

19. 故能而示之不能用而示之不用近而示之遠遠而示之近

Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our
forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the
enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe
we are near.

20. 利而誘之亂而取之

Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

取, as often in Sun Tzŭ, is used in the sense of 擊. It is rather
remarkable that all the commentators, with the exception of Chang
Yü, refer 亂 to the enemy: “when he is in disorder, crush him.” It
is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating the
uses of deception in war.

21. 實而備之强而避之

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in
superior strength, evade him.

The meaning of 實 is made clear from chap. VI, where it is opposed
to 虛 “weak or vulnerable spots.” 强, according to Tu Yu and other
commentators, has reference to the keenness of the men as well as
to numerical superiority. Capt. Calthrop evolves an
extraordinarily far-fetched translation: “If there are defects,
give an appearance of perfection, and awe the enemy. Pretend to be
strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you”!

22. 怒而撓之卑而驕之

If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend
to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

I follow Chang Yü in my interpretation of 怒. 卑 is expanded by Mei
Yao-ch‘ên into 示以卑弱. Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the
good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a
mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly
pouncing upon him.

23. 佚而勞之親而離之

If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch‘ên has the note:
以我之佚待彼之勞 “while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy
to tire himself out.” The _Yü Lan_ has 引而勞之 “Lure him on and
tire him out.” This would seem also to have been Ts‘ao Kung’s
text, judging by his comment 以利勞之.

If his forces are united, separate them.

Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the
commentators: “If sovereign and subject are in accord, put
division between them.”

24. 攻其無備出其不意

Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

25. 此兵家之勝不可先傳也

These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged
beforehand.

This seems to be the way in which Ts‘ao Kung understood the
passage, and is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text
as it stands. Most of the commentators give the following
explanation: “It is impossible to lay down rules for warfare
before you come into touch with the enemy.” This would be very
plausible if it did not ignore 此, which unmistakably refers to the
maxims which Sun Tzŭ has been laying down. It is possible, of
course, that 此 may be a later interpolation, in which case the
sentence would practically mean: “Success in warfare cannot be
taught.” As an alternative, however, I would venture to suggest
that a second 不 may have fallen out after 可, so that we get:
“These maxims for succeeding in war are the first that ought to be
imparted.”

26. 夫未戰而廟算勝者得算多也未戰而廟算不勝者得算少也多算勝少算不勝而況於無算
乎吾以此觀之勝負見矣

Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his
temple ere the battle is fought.

Chang Yü tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a
temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to
take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of
campaign. Capt. Calthrop misunderstands it as “the shrine of the
ancestors,” and gives a loose and inaccurate rendering of the
whole passage.

The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand.
Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to
defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to
this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II. 作戰篇.

WAGING WAR.

Ts‘ao Kung has the note: 欲戰必先算其費務 “He who wishes to fight
must first count the cost,” which prepares us for the discovery
that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from
the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法馳車千駟革車千乘帶甲十萬千里饋糧則內外之費賓客之用膠漆之材
車甲之奉日費千金然後十萬之師舉矣

Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a
thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred
thousand mail-clad soldiers,

The 馳車 were lightly built and, according to Chang Yü, used for
the attack; the 革車 were heavier, and designed for purposes of
defence. Li Ch‘üan, it is true, says that the latter were light,
but this seems hardly probable. Capt. Calthrop translates
“chariots” and “supply wagons” respectively, but is not supported
by any commentator. It is interesting to note the analogies
between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In
each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming as it
did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of
foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are
informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen,
and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would
be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two
chariots and a hundred men.

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand _li_,

2.78 modern _li_ go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly
since Sun Tzŭ’s time.

the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of
guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots
and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.

則, which follows 糧 in the _textus receptus_, is important as
indicating the apodosis. In the text adopted by Capt. Calthrop it
is omitted, so that he is led to give this meaningless translation
of the opening sentence: “Now the requirements of War are such
that we need 1,000 chariots,” etc. The second 費, which is
redundant, is omitted in the _Yü Lan_. 千金, like 千里 above, is
meant to suggest a large but indefinite number. As the Chinese
have never possessed gold coins, it is incorrect to translate it
“1000 pieces of gold.”

Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

Capt. Calthrop adds: “You have the instruments of victory,” which
he seems to get from the first five characters of the next sentence.

2. 其用戰也勝久則鈍兵挫銳攻城則力屈

When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the
men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped.

The _Yü Lan_ omits 勝; but though 勝久 is certainly a bold phrase,
it is more likely to be right than not. Both in this place and in
§ 4, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 頓 (in the sense of “to
injure”) instead of 鈍.

If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

As synonyms to 屈 are given 盡, 殫, 窮 and 困.

3. 久暴師則國用不足

Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will
not be equal to the strain.

久暴師 means literally, “If there is long exposure of the army.”
Of 暴 in this sense K‘ang Hsi cites an instance from the biography
of 竇融 Tou Jung in the _Hou Han Shu_ where the commentary defines
it by 露. Cf. also the following from the 戰國策: 將軍久暴露於外
“General, you have long been exposed to all weathers.”

4. 夫鈍兵挫銳屈力殫貨則諸侯乘其幣而起雖有智者不能善其後矣

Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength
exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to
take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be
able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

Following Tu Yu, I understand 善 in the sense of “to make good,”
i.e. to mend. But Tu Mu and Ho Shih explain it as “to make good
plans”—for the future.

5. 故兵聞拙速未睹巧之久也

Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has
never been seen associated with long delays.

This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any
of the commentators. Ts‘ao Kung, Li Ch‘üan, Mêng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu
Mu and Mei Yao-ch‘ên have notes to the effect that a general,
though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer
force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: “Haste may be stupid, but at any
rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted
operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in their
train.” Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: “Lengthy
operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an
empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness
insures against the occurrence of such calamities.” Chang Yü says:
“So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to
clever dilatoriness.” Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, except
possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better
than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is
something much more guarded, namely that, while speed may
sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but
foolish—if only because it means impoverishment to the nation.
Capt. Calthrop indulges his imagination with the following:
“Therefore it is acknowledged that war cannot be too short in
duration. But though conducted with the utmost art, if long
continuing, misfortunes do always appear.” It is hardly worth
while to note the total disappearance of 拙速 in this precious
concoction. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzŭ, the
classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the
mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome
against that of Hannibal’s isolated army, because it seemed to him
that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in
a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his
tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their
reversal, it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a
negative presumption in their favour.

6. 夫兵久而國利者未之有也

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged
warfare.

The _Yü Lan_ has 圖 instead of 國—evidently the mistake of a scribe.

7. 故不盡知用兵之害者則不能盡知用兵之利也

It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that
can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects
of a long war can realise the supreme importance of rapidity in
bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this
interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of the context,
whereas the rendering, “He who does not know the evils of war
cannot appreciate its benefits,” is distinctly pointless.

8. 善用兵者役不再籍糧不三載

The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his
supply-waggons loaded more than twice.

Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting
for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh
supplies, but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may
seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all great
strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Buonaparte, the value
of time—that is, being a little ahead of your opponent—has counted
for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest
calculations with regard to commissariat. 籍 is used in the sense
of 賦. The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have the inferior reading 藉.
The commentators explain 不三載 by saying that the waggons are
loaded once before passing the frontier, and that the army is met
by a further consignment of supplies on the homeward march. The
_Yü Lan_, however, reads 再 here as well.

9. 取用於國因糧於敵故軍食可足也

Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus
the army will have food enough for its needs.

用, “things to be used,” in the widest sense. It includes all the
impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.

10. 國之貧於師者遠輸遠輸則百姓貧

Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by
contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a
distance causes the people to be impoverished.

The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the
next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement,
moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some
corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese
commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense,
and we get no help from them here. Sun Tzŭ says that the cause of
the people’s impoverishment is 遠輸; it is clear, therefore, that
the words have reference to some system by which the husbandmen
sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why
should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except
because the State or Government is too poor to do so? Assuming
then that 貧 ought to stand first in the sentence in order to
balance 近 (the fact that the two words rhyme is significant), and
thus getting rid of 國之, we are still left with 於師, which latter
word seems to me an obvious mistake for 國. “Poverty in the army”
is an unlikely expression, especially as the general has just been
warned not to encumber his army with a large quantity of supplies.
If we suppose that 師 somehow got written here instead of 國 (a
very simple supposition, as we have 近於師 in the next sentence),
and that later on somebody, scenting a mistake, prefixed the gloss
國之 to 貧, without however erasing 於師, the whole muddle may be
explained. My emended text then would be 貧於國者, etc.

11. 近於師者貴賣貴賣則百姓財竭

On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up;
and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.

近, that is, as Wang Hsi says, before the army has left its own
territory. Ts‘ao Kung understands it of an army that has already
crossed the frontier. Capt. Calthrop drops the 於, reading 近師者,
but even so it is impossible to justify his translation “Repeated
wars cause high prices.”

12. 財竭則急於丘役

When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted
by heavy exactions.

Cf. Mencius VII. 2. xiv. 2, where 丘民 has the same meaning as
丘役. 丘 was an ancient measure of land. The full table, as given
by 司馬法, may not be out of place here: 6 尺 = 1 步; 100 步 = 1 畝;
100 畝 = 1 夫; 3 夫 = 1 屋; 3 屋 = 1 井; 4 井 = 1 邑; 4 邑 = 1 丘; 4
丘 = 1 甸. According to the _Chou Li_, there were nine husbandmen
to a 井, which would assign to each man the goodly allowance of
100 畝 (of which 6.6 now go to an acre). What the values of these
measures were in Sun Tzŭ’s time is not known with any certainty.
The lineal 尺, however, is supposed to have been about 20 cm. 急
may include levies of men, as well as other exactions.

13. 力屈財殫中原內虛於家百姓之費十去其七

14. 公家之費破車罷馬甲胄矢弩戟楯蔽櫓丘牛大車十去其六

With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of
the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes
will be dissipated;

The _Yü Lan_ omits 財殫. I would propose the emended reading
力屈則中, etc. In view of the fact that we have 財竭 in the two
preceding paragraphs, it seems probable that 財 is a scribe’s
mistake for 則, 殫 having been added afterwards to make sense.
中原內虛於家, literally: “Within the middle plains there is
emptiness in the homes.” For 中原 cf. _Shih Ching_ II. 3. vi. 3 and
II. 5. ii. 3. With regard to 十去其七, Tu Mu says: 家業十耗其七也,
and Wang Hsi: 民費大半矣; that is, the people are mulcted not of
3⁄10, but of 7⁄10, of their income. But this is hardly to be
extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag:
國以民爲本民以食爲天居人上者宜乎重惜 “The _people_ being regarded as
the essential part of the State, and _food_ as the people’s
heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and
be careful of both?”

while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,
breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,
protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to
four-tenths of its total revenue.

The _Yü Lan_ has several various readings here, the more important
of which are 疲 for the less common 罷 (read p‘i^2), 干 for 蔽,
and 兵牛 for 丘牛, which latter, if right, must mean “oxen from the
country districts” (cf. _supra_, § 12). For the meaning of 櫓, see
note on III, § 4. Capt. Calthrop omits to translate 丘牛大車.

15. 故智將務食於敵食敵一鍾當吾二十鍾𦮼秆一石當吾二十石

Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One
cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s
own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to
twenty from one’s own store.

Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of
transporting one cartload to the front. According to Ts‘ao Kung, a
鍾 = 6 斛 4 㪷, or 64 㪷, but according to Mêng Shih, 10 斛 make a
鍾. The 石 picul consisted of 70 斤 catties (Tu Mu and others say
120). 𦮼秆, literally, “beanstalks and straw.”

16. 故殺敵者怒也取敵之利者貨也

Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that
there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their
rewards.

These are two difficult sentences, which I have translated in
accordance with Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase. We may incontinently
reject Capt. Calthrop’s extraordinary translation of the first:
“Wantonly to kill and destroy the enemy must be forbidden.” Ts‘ao
Kung quotes a jingle current in his day: 軍無財士不來軍無賞士不往. Tu
Mu says: “Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see
the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils
from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men
may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account.” Chang Yü
takes 利 as the direct object of 取, which is not so good.

17. 故車戰得車十乘已上賞其先得者而更其旌旗車雜而乘之卒善而養之

Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been
taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.

Capt. Calthrop’s rendering is: “They who are the first to lay
their hands on more than ten of the enemy’s chariots, should be
encouraged.” We should have expected the gallant captain to see
that such Samson-like prowess deserved something more substantial
than mere encouragement. T. omits 故, and has 以上 in place of the
more archaic 已上.

Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the
chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured
soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. 是謂勝敵而益强

This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.

19. 故兵貴勝不貴久

In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

As Ho Shih remarks: 兵不可玩武不可黷 “War is not a thing to be
trifled with.” Sun Tzŭ here reiterates the main lesson which this
chapter is intended to enforce.

20. 故知兵之將民之司命國家安危之主也

Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the
people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be
in peace or in peril.

In the original text, there is a 生 before the 民.

III. 謀攻篇

ATTACK BY STRATAGEM.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法全國爲上破國次之全軍爲上破軍次之全旅爲上破旅次之全卒爲上破卒次
之全伍爲上破伍次之

Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to
take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it
is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than
to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire
than to destroy them.

A 軍 “army corps,” according to Ssŭ-ma Fa, consisted nominally of
12500 men; according to Ts‘ao Kung, a 旅 contained 500 men, a 卒
any number between 100 and 500, and a 伍 any number between 5 and
100. For the last two, however, Chang Yü gives the exact figures
of 100 and 5 respectively.

2. 是故百戰百勝非善之善者也不戰而屈人之兵善之善者也

Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme
excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s
resistance without fighting.

Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the
old Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation
of the huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without
bloodshed.

3. 故上兵伐謀其次伐交其次伐兵下政攻城

Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans;

I.e., as Li Ch‘üan says (伐其始謀也), in their very inception.
Perhaps the word “baulk” falls short of expressing the full force
of 伐, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might
be content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but
an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly
in his note: “When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us,
we must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first.”

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces;

Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in
speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or
principalities into which the China of his day was split up.

the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field;

When he is already in full strength.

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

The use of the word 政 is somewhat unusual, which may account for
the reading of the modern text: 其下攻城.

4. 攻城之法爲不得已修櫓轒轀具器械三月而後成距闉又三月而後已

The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.

Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon
it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before
Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable
that they would have been masters of the situation before the
British were ready seriously to oppose them.

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements
of war, will take up three whole months;

It is not quite clear what 櫓 were. Ts‘ao Kung simply defines them
as 大楯 “large shields,” but we get a better idea of them from Li
Ch‘üan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were
assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest
a sort of Roman _testudo_, ready made. Tu Mu says they were “what
are now termed 彭排” (wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks,
according to K‘ang Hsi), but this is denied by Ch‘ên Hao. See
_supra_, II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city
walls. Of 轒轀 (_fên yün_) we get a fairly clear description from
several commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on
four wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides,
and used in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls,
for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu
Mu adds that they are now called 木驢 “wooden donkeys.” Capt.
Calthrop wrongly translates the term, “battering-rams.” I follow
Ts‘ao Kung in taking 具 as a verb, co-ordinate and synonymous with
修. Those commentators who regard 修 as an adjective equivalent to
長 “long,” make 具 presumably into a noun.

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three
months more.

The 距闉 (or 堙, in the modern text) were great mounds or ramparts
of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy’s walls in order to
discover the weak points in the defence, and also to destroy the
樓櫓 fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note. Tu Yu
quotes the Tso Chuan: 楚司馬子反乘堙而窺宋城也.

5. 將不勝其忿而蟻附之殺士三分之一而城不拔者此攻之災

The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to
the assault like swarming ants,

Capt. Calthrop unaccountably omits this vivid simile, which, as
Ts‘ao Kung says, is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants
climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience
at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place
before his engines of war are ready.

with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town
still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port
Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record. The
_T‘ung Tien_ reads 不勝心之忿 ... 則殺士卒 ... 攻城之災. For 其忿 the
_Yü Lan_ has 心怒. Capt. Calthrop does not translate 而城不拔者, and
mistranslates 此攻之災.

6. 故善用兵者屈人之兵而非戰也拔人之城而非攻也毀人之國而非久也

Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any
fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he
overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the 國, that is, the
Government, but does no harm to individuals. The classical
instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin
dynasty was acclaimed “Father and mother of the people.”

7. 必以全爭於天下故兵不頓而利可全此謀攻之法也

With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire,
and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

Owing to the double meanings of 兵, 頓 [= 鈍] and 利, the latter
part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning:
“And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness
remains perfect.” Chang Yü says that 利 is “the advantage of a
prosperous kingdom and a strong army.”

This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. 故用兵之法十則圍之五則攻之倍則分之

It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to
surround him; if five to one, to attack him;

Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage.

if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

Note that 之 does not refer to the enemy, as in the two preceding
clauses. This sudden change of object is quite common in Chinese.
Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed,
it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts‘ao Kung,
however, gives a clue to Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: 以二敵一則一術爲正一術爲奇
“Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our army in
the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.” [For
explanation of 正 and 奇, see V. 3, note.] Chang Yü thus further
elucidates the point: “If our force is twice as numerous as that
of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to
meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he
replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if
to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front. This is what
is meant by saying that “one part may be used in the regular
way, and the other for some special diversion.” Tu Mu does not
understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just
as concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is
too hasty in calling this a mistake.”

9. 敵則能戰之少則能逃之不若則能避之

If equally matched, we can offer battle;

Li Ch‘üan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase:
主客力敵惟善者戰 “If attackers and attacked are equally matched in
strength, only the able general will fight.” He thus takes 能 as
though it were 能者, which is awkward.

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;

The _T‘u Shu_ has 守 instead of 逃, which is hardly distinguishable
in sense from 避 in the next clause. The meaning, “we can watch the
enemy,” is certainly a great improvement on the above; but
unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for the
variant. Chang Yü reminds us that the saying only applies if the
other factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often
more than counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. 故小敵之堅大敵之擒也

Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the
end it must be captured by the larger force.

In other words: “C’est magnifique; mais ce n’est pas la guerre.”

11. 夫將者國之輔也輔周則國必强輔𨻶則國必弱

Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is
complete at all points, the State will be strong; if the bulwark is
defective, the State will be weak.

𨻶 cannot be restricted to anything so particular as in Capt.
Calthrop’s translation, “divided in his allegiance.” It is simply
keeping up the metaphor suggested by 周. As Li Ch‘üan tersely puts
it: 𨻶缺也將才不備兵必弱 “_Ch‘i_, gap, indicates deficiency; if the
general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly
versed in his profession), his army will lack strength.”

12. 故君之所以患於軍者三

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his
army:—

13. 不知軍之不可以進而謂之進不知軍之不可以退而謂之退是謂縻軍

(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of
the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.

Ts‘ao Kung weakly defines 縻 as 御 “control,” “direct.” Cf. § 17
_ad fin_. But in reality it is one of those graphic metaphors
which from time to time illuminate Sun Tzŭ’s work, and is rightly
explained by Li Ch‘üan as = 絆. He adds the comment:
如絆驥足無馳驟也. “It is like tying together the legs of a
thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop.” One would naturally
think of “the ruler” in this passage as being at home, and trying
to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the
commentators understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of
T‘ai Kung: 國不可以從外治軍不可以從中御 “A kingdom should not be
governed from without, an army should not be directed from
within.” Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or when
in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the
thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise,
he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give
wrong orders.

14. 不知三軍之事而同三軍之政者則軍士惑矣

(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers
a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army.
This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds.

Ts‘ao Kung’s note is: 軍容不入國國容不入軍禮不可以治兵也, which may be
freely translated: “The military sphere and the civil sphere are
wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves.” And
Chang Yü says: “Humanity and justice (仁義) are the principles on
which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and
flexibility (權變), on the other hand, are military rather than
civic virtues.” 同三軍之政, “to assimilate the governing of an
army”—to that of a State, understood. The _T‘ung Tien_ has 欲
inserted before 同, here and in § 15.

15. 不知三軍之權而同三軍之任則軍士疑矣

(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,

That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.

through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

I follow Mei Yao-ch‘ên here. The other commentators make 不知 etc.
refer, not to the ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he
employs. Thus Tu Yu says: 將若不知權變不可付以勢位 “If a general is
ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be
entrusted with a position of authority.” Tu Mu quotes 黃石公: “The
skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man,
the covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in
establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in
action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the
stupid man has no fear of death.” The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 軍覆疑,
which Tu Yu explains as 覆敗 “is utterly defeated.” Capt. Calthrop
gives a very inaccurate rendering: “Ignorant of the situation of
the army, to interfere in its dispositions.”

16. 三軍既惑且疑則諸侯之難至矣是謂亂軍引勝

But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come
from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into
the army, and flinging victory away.

Most of the commentators take 引 in the sense of 奪, which it seems
to bear also in the _Li Chi_, 玉藻, I. 18. [卻 is there given as
its equivalent, but Legge tries notwithstanding to retain the more
usual sense, translating “draw ... back,” which is hardly
defensible.] Tu Mu and Wang Hsi, however, think 引勝 means “leading
up to the _enemy’s_ victory.”

17. 故知勝有五知可以戰與不可以戰者勝識衆寡之用者勝上下同欲者勝以虞待不虞者勝
將能而君不御者勝此五者知勝之道也

Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He
will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

Chang Yü says: “If he can fight, he advances and takes the
offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the
defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is
right to take the offensive or the defensive.”

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior
forces.

This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers
correctly, as Li Ch‘üan and others make out. Chang Yü expounds the
saying more satisfactorily: “By applying the art of war, it is
possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and _vice
versâ_. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting
the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior force,
make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult
ground.’”

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout
all its ranks.

Ts‘ao Kung refers 上下 less well to sovereign and subjects.

(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy
unprepared.

(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with
by the sovereign.

Tu Yu quotes 王子 as saying: 指授在君決戰在將也 “It is the
sovereign’s function to give broad instructions, but to decide on
battle is the function of the general.” It is needless to dilate
on the military disasters which have been caused by undue
interference with operations in the field on the part of the home
government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary
success to the fact that he was not hampered by any central
authority,—that he was, in fact, 將 and 君 in one.

Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points.

Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of
victory.”

18. 故曰知彼知己百戰不殆不知彼而知己一勝一負不知彼不知己每戰必殆

Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need
not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not
the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

Li Ch‘üan cites the case of 苻堅 Fu Chien, prince of 秦 Ch‘in, who
in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the 晉 Chin Emperor.
When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services
of such men as 謝安 Hsieh An and 桓沖 Huan Ch‘ung, he boastfully
replied: “I have the population of eight provinces at my back,
infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they
could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their
whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?” Nevertheless,
his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the 淝 Fei River,
and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every
battle.

The modern text, represented by the 北堂書鈔 and _T‘u Shu_, has
必敗, which I should be inclined to adopt in preference to 殆 here,
though the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ both have the latter. Chang
Yü offers the best commentary on 知彼知己. He says that these words
“have reference to attack and defence: knowing the enemy enables
you to take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand
on the defensive.” He adds: 攻是守之機守是攻之策 “Attack is the
secret of defence; defence is the planning of an attack.” It would
be hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.

IV. 形篇

TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS.

形 is a very comprehensive and somewhat vague term. Literally,
“form,” “body,” it comes to mean “appearance,” “attitude” or
“disposition;” and here it is best taken as something between, or
perhaps combining, “tactics” and “disposition of troops.” Ts‘ao
Kung explains it as 軍之形也、我動彼應兩敵相察情也 “marching and
counter-marching on the part of the two armies with a view to
discovering each other’s condition.” Tu Mu says: “It is through
the 形 dispositions of an army that its condition may be
discovered. Conceal your dispositions (無形), and your condition
will remain secret, which leads to victory; show your
dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads
to defeat.” Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can
變化其形因敵以制勝 “secure success by modifying his tactics to meet
those of the enemy.” In the modern text, the title of the chapter
appears as 軍形, which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates “the
order of battle.”

1. 孫子曰昔之善戰者先爲不可勝以待敵之可勝

Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the
possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating
the enemy.

2. 不可勝在己可勝在敵

To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the
opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

That is, of course, by a mistake on his part. Capt. Calthrop has:
“The causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the
enemy’s camp,” which, though certainly an improvement on his
previous attempt, is still incorrect.

3. 故善戰者能爲不可勝不能使敵必可勝

Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,

“By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his
tracks, and taking unremitting precautions” (Chang Yü).

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

The original text reads 使敵之可勝, which the modern text has
further modified into 使敵之必可勝. Capt. Calthrop makes out the
impossible meaning, “and further render the enemy incapable of
victory.”

4. 故曰勝可知而不可爲

Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able to
_do_ it.

Capt. Calthrop translates: “The conditions necessary for victory
may be present, but they cannot always be obtained,” which is more
or less unintelligible.

5. 不可勝者守也可勝者攻也

Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat
the enemy means taking the offensive.

For 不可勝 I retain the sense which it undoubtedly bears in §§ 1–3,
in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The
meaning they give, “He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,” is
plausible enough, but it is highly improbable that 勝 should
suddenly become active in this way. An incorrect variant in the
_Yü Lan_ is 不可勝則守可勝則攻.

6. 守則不足攻則有餘

Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking,
a superabundance of strength.

7. 善守者藏於九地之下善攻者動於九天之上故能自保而全勝也

The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret
recesses of the earth;

Literally, “hides under the ninth earth,” which is a metaphor
indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy
may not know his whereabouts. The 九地 of this passage have of
course no connection with the 九地 “Nine situations” of chap. XI.

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of
heaven.

Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a
thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is
the opinion of most of the commentators, though Ts‘ao Kung,
followed by Tu Yu, explains 地 as the hills, rivers, and other
natural features which will afford shelter or protection to the
attacked, and 天 as the phases of weather which may be turned to
account by the attacking party. Capt. Calthrop’s “The skilful in
attack push to the topmost heaven” conveys no meaning at all.

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the
other, a victory that is complete.

Capt. Calthrop draws on a fertile imagination for the following:
“If these precepts be observed, victory is certain.”

8. 見勝不過衆人之所知非善之善者也

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is
not the acme of excellence.

As Ts‘ao Kung remarks, 當見未萌 “the thing is to see the plant
before it has germinated,” to foresee the event before the action
has begun. Li Ch‘üan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when
about to attack the vastly superior army of 趙 Chao, which was
strongly entrenched in the city of 成安 Ch‘êng-an, said to his
officers: “Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and
shall meet again at dinner.” The officers hardly took his words
seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had
already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem,
whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and
inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary. For the full story,
see 前漢書, chap. 34, 韓信傳. Capt. Calthrop again blunders badly
with: “A victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the
common folk, may not be a true success.”

9. 戰勝而天下曰善非善之善者也

Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the
whole Empire says, “Well done!”

True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: 陰謀潛運攻心伐謀勝敵之日曾不血刃
“To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s
intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day may be
won without shedding a drop of blood.” Sun Tzŭ reserves his
approbation for things that

“the world’s coarse thumb
And finger fail to plumb.”

10. 故舉秋毫不爲多力見日月不爲明目聞雷霆不爲聰耳

To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

秋毫 is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn,
when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in
Chinese writers. Cf. Mencius, I. 1. vii. 10, and Chuang Tzŭ,
知北遊, _et al_.

to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of
thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick
hearing: 烏𫉬 Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone;
離朱 Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects
no bigger than a mustard seed; and 師曠 Shih K‘uang, a blind
musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.

11. 古之所謂善戰者勝勝易勝者也

What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins,
but excels in winning with ease.

The original text, followed by the _T‘u Shu_, has 勝於易勝者也. But
this is an alteration evidently intended to smooth the awkwardness
of 勝勝易勝者也, which means literally: “one who, conquering, excels
in easy conquering.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “He who only sees the
obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the
surface of things, wins with ease.”

12. 故善戰者之勝也無智名無勇功

Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit
for courage.

Tu Mu explains this very well: “Inasmuch as his victories are
gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world
at large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for
wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has
been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.”

13. 故其戰勝不忒不忒者其所措必勝勝已敗者也

He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

Ch‘ên Hao says: “He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no
futile attacks.” The connection of ideas is thus explained by
Chang Yü: “One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever
though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on
occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future
and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make
a blunder and therefore invariably win.” Li Ch‘üan thinks that the
character 忒 should be 貳 “to have doubts.” But it is better not to
tamper with the text, especially when no improvement in sense is
the result.

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for
it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

The T‘u Shu omits 必. 措 is here = 置. Chia Lin says it is put for
錯 in the sense of 雜; but this is far-fetched. Capt. Calthrop
altogether ignores the important word 忒.

14. 故善戰者立於不敗之地而不失敵之敗也

Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes
defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

A 不可爲之計 “counsel of perfection,” as Tu Mu truly observes. 地
need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the
troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a
wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.

15. 是故勝兵先勝而後求戰敗兵先戰而後求勝

Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle
after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat
first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: “In warfare, first lay plans
which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if
you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength
alone, victory will no longer be assured.”

16. 善用兵者修道而保法故能爲勝敗之政

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres
to method and discipline;

For 道 and 法, see _supra_, I. 4 sqq. I think that Chang Yü is
wrong in altering their signification here, and taking them as
爲戰之道 and 制敵之法 respectively.

thus it is in his power to control success.

17. 兵法一曰度二曰量三曰數四曰稱五曰勝

In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement;
secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly,
Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

18. 地生度度生量量生數數生稱稱生勝

Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to
Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of
chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

It is not easy to distinguish the four terms 度量數稱 very clearly.
The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground,
which enable us to 量 form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and
to 數 make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are
thus led to 稱 a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s
chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then 勝 victory
ensues. The chief difficulty lies in 數, which some commentators
take as a calculation of _numbers_, thereby making it nearly
synonymous with 量. Perhaps 量 is rather a consideration of the
enemy’s general position or condition (情 or 形勢), while 數 is
the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu
defines 數 as 機數, and adds: 强弱已定然後能用機變數也 “the question
of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the
varied resources of cunning into play.” Ho Shih seconds this
interpretation, which is weakened, however, by the fact that 稱 is
given as logically consequent on 數; this certainly points to the
latter being a calculation of numbers. Of Capt. Calthrop’s version
the less said the better.

19. 故勝兵若以鎰稱銖敗兵若以銖稱鎰

A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight
placed in the scale against a single grain.

Literally, “a victorious army is like an 鎰 _i_ (20 oz.) weighed
against a 銖 _shu_ (1⁄24 oz.); a routed army as a _shu_ weighed
against an _i_.” The point is simply the enormous advantage which
a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one
demoralised by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2,
makes the 鎰 to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi’s
statement that it equalled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch‘üan of the T‘ang
dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.

20. 勝者之戰民也若決積水於千仞之谿者形也

The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up
waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical
dispositions.

The construction here is slightly awkward and elliptical, but the
general sense is plain. The _T‘u Shu_ omits 民也. A 仞 = 8 尺 or
Chinese feet.

V. 埶篇

ENERGY.

埶 here is said to be an older form of 勢; Sun Tzŭ, however, would
seem to have used the former in the sense of “power,” and the latter
only in the sense of “circumstances.” The fuller title 兵勢 is found
in the _T‘u Shu_ and the modern text. Wang Hsi expands it into 積勢之變
“the application, in various ways, of accumulated power;” and Chang Yü
says: 兵勢以成然後任勢以取勝 “When the soldiers’ energy has reached its
height, it may be used to secure victory.”

1. 孫子曰凡治衆如治寡分數是也

Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same in principle as
the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their
numbers.

That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with
subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han
Hsin’s famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to
him: “How large an army do you think I could lead?” “Not more than
100,000 men, your Majesty.” “And you?” asked the Emperor. “Oh!” he
answered, “the more the better” (多多益辦耳). Chang Yü gives the
following curious table of the subdivisions of an army:—5 men make
a 列; 2 列 make a 火; 5 火 make a 隊; 2 隊 make a 官; 2 官 make a
曲; 2 曲 make a 部; 2 部 make a 校; 2 校 make a 裨; 2 裨 make a 軍.
A 軍 or army corps thus works out at 3200 men. But cf. III. § 1,
note. For 曲, see I. § 10. It is possible that 官 in that paragraph
may also be used in the above technical sense.

2. 鬥衆如鬥寡形名是也

Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from
fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting
signs and signals.

One must be careful to avoid translating 鬥衆 “fighting _against_ a
large number,” no reference to the enemy being intended. 形 is
explained by Ts‘ao Kung as denoting flags and banners, by means of
which every soldier may recognise his own particular regiment or
company, and thus confusion may be prevented. 名 he explains as
drums and gongs, which from the earliest times were used to sound
the advance and the retreat respectively. Tu Mu defines 形 as 陳形
“marshalling the troops in order,” and takes 名 as the flags and
banners. Wang Hsi also dissents from Ts‘ao Kung, referring 形 to
the ordering of the troops by means of banners, drums and gongs,
and 名 to the various names by which the regiments might be
distinguished. There is much to be said for this view.

3. 三軍之衆可使必受敵而無敗者奇正是也

To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s
attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvres direct and
indirect.

For 必, there is another reading 畢, “all together,” adopted by
Wang Hsi and Chang Yü. We now come to one of the most interesting
parts of Sun Tzŭ’s treatise, the discussion of the 正 and the 奇.
As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these
two terms, or to render them at all consistently by good English
equivalents, it may be as well to tabulate some of the
commentator’s remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li
Ch‘üan: 當敵爲正傍出爲奇 “Facing the enemy is _chêng_, making
lateral diversions is _ch‘i_.” Chia Lin: 當敵以正陳取勝以奇兵 “In
presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal
fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manœuvres must be
employed.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên: 動爲奇靜爲正靜以待之動以勝之 “_Ch‘i_ is
active, _chêng_ is passive; passivity means waiting for an
opportunity, activity brings the victory itself.” Ho Shih:
我之正使敵視之爲奇我之奇使敵視之爲正正亦爲奇奇亦爲正 “We must cause the
enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly
designed, and _vice versâ_; thus _chêng_ may also be _ch‘i_, and
_ch‘i_ may also be _chêng_.” He instances the famous exploit of
Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against 臨晉 Lin-chin (now
朝邑 Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the
Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent.
[_Ch‘ien Han Shu_, ch. 34.] Here, we are told, the march on
Lin-chin was 正, and the surprise manœuvre was 奇. Chang Yü gives
the following summary of opinions on the words: “Military writers
do not all agree with regard to the meaning of _ch‘i_ and _chêng_.
尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: 正兵貴先奇兵貴後 ‘Direct
warfare favours frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the
rear.’ Ts‘ao Kung says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a
direct operation; appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect
manœuvre.’ 李衛公 Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: ‘In
war, to march straight ahead is _chêng_; turning movements, on the
other hand, are _ch‘i_.’ These writers simply regard _chêng_ as
_chêng_, and _ch‘i_ as _ch‘i_; they do not note that the two are
mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two
sides of a circle [see _infra_, § 11]. A comment of the T‘ang
Emperor T‘ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A _ch‘i_
manœuvre may be _chêng_, if we make the enemy look upon it as
_chêng_; then our real attack will be _ch‘i_, and _vice versâ_.
The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot
fathom our real intent.’” To put it perhaps a little more clearly:
any attack or other operation is 正, on which the enemy has had his
attention fixed; whereas that is 奇, which takes him by surprise or
comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a
movement which is meant to be 奇, it immediately becomes 正.

4. 兵之所加如以碬投卵者虛實是也

That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against
an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

虛實, literally “the hollow and the solid,” is the title of chap.
VI. 碫 _tuan_ is the _T‘u Shu_ reading, 碬 _hsia_ that of the
standard text. It appears from K‘ang Hsi that there has been much
confusion between the two characters, and indeed, it is probable
that one of them has really crept into the language as a mistake
for the other.

5. 凡戰者以正合以奇勝

In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but
indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

Chang Yü says: 徐發奇兵或擣其旁或擊其後 “Steadily develop indirect
tactics, either by pounding the enemy’s flanks or falling on his
rear.” A brilliant example of “indirect tactics” which decided the
fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march round the
Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.[169]

6. 故善出奇者無窮如天地不竭如江河終而復始日月是也死而復生四時是也

Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and
Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;

奇 is the universally accepted emendation for 兵, the reading of
the 北堂書鈔.

like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four
seasons, they pass away but to return once more.

Tu Yu and Chang Yü understand this of the permutations of 奇 and
正. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of 正 at all, unless,
indeed, we suppose with 鄭友賢 Chêng Yu-hsien that a clause
relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has
already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven
in all military operations, that they cannot really be considered
apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative language,
of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.

7. 聲不過五五聲之變不可勝聽也

There are not more than five musical notes,

宮商角微羽.

yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can
ever be heard.

8. 色不過五五色之變不可勝觀也

There are not more than five primary colours,

靑黃赤白黑 blue, yellow, red, white and black.

yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.

9. 味不過五五味之變不可勝嘗也

There are not more than five cardinal tastes,

酸辛醎甘苦 sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter.

yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.

10. 戰埶不過奇正奇正之變不可勝窮也

In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct
and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless
series of manœuvres.

11. 奇正相生如循環之無端孰能窮之

The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like
moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the
possibilities of their combination?

The _T‘u Shu_ adds 哉. The final 之 may refer either to the circle
or, more probably, to the 奇正之變 understood. Capt. Calthrop is
wrong with: “They are a mystery that none can penetrate.”

12. 激水之疾至於漂石者埶也

The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll
stones along in its course.

13. 鷙鳥之疾至於毀折者節也

The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which
enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

For 疾 the _Yü Lan_ reads 擊, which is also supported by a
quotation in the 呂氏春秋 [3rd cent. B.C.]. 節 in this context is a
word which really defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu
Mu says that it is equivalent to 節量遠近 “the measurement or
estimation of distance.” But this meaning does not quite fit the
illustrative simile in § 15. As applied to the falcon, it seems to
me to denote that instinct of _self-restraint_ which keeps the
bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together
with the power of judging when the right moment has arrived. The
analogous quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being
able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it
will be most effective. When the “Victory” went into action at
Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several
minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with
a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close
range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc
on the enemy’s nearest ships. That was a case of 節.

14. 是故善戰者其埶險其節短

Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt
in his decision.

Tu Yu defines 節 here by the word 斷, which is very like “decision”
in English. 短 is certainly used in a very unusual sense, even if,
as the commentators say, it = 近. This would have reference to the
measurement of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get
near before striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzŭ
meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to our
own idiom “short and sharp.” Cf. Wang Hsi’s note, which after
describing the falcon’s mode of attack, proceeds: 兵之乘機當如是耳
“This is just how the ‘psychological moment’ should be seized in
war.” I do not care for Capt. Calthrop’s rendering: “The spirit of
the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions sudden.”

15. 埶如彍弩節如發機

Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross-bow; decision, to the
releasing of the trigger.

“Energy” seems to be the best equivalent here for 埶, because the
comparison implies that the force is potential, being stored up in
the bent cross-bow until released by the finger on the trigger.
None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile.

16. 紛紛紜紜鬥亂而不可亂也渾渾沌沌形圓而不可敗也

Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder
and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array
may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

形圓, literally “formation circular”, is explained by Li Ch‘üan as
無向背也 “without back or front.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “The
subdivisions of the army having been previously fixed, and the
various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the
dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a
battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder
is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your
dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite
out of the question.” It is a little difficult to decide whether
鬥亂 and 形圓 should not be taken as imperatives: “fight in
disorder (for the purpose of deceiving the enemy), and you will be
secure against real disorder.” Cf. I. § 20: 亂而取之.

17. 亂生於治怯生於勇弱生於彊

Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear
postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to
tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts‘ao Kung
throws out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: 皆毁形匿情也
“These things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one’s
condition.” But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly: “If
you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you
must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display
timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme
courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the
enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength.”

18. 治亂數也勇怯埶也彊弱形也

Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of
subdivision;

See _supra_, § 1.

concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of
latent energy;

It is passing strange that the commentators should understand 埶
here as “circumstances”—a totally different sense from that which
it has previously borne in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says:
見有利之勢而不動敵人以我爲實怯也 “seeing that we are favourably
circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we
are really afraid.”

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical
dispositions.

Chang Yü relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han
Emperor: “Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to
report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned,
carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses,
and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen.
The result was that the spies one and all recommended the Emperor
to deliver his attack.” 婁敬 Lou Ching alone opposed them, saying:
“When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make
an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen
nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some _ruse_ on
the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to attack.”
The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the trap
and found himself surrounded at 白登 Po-têng.”

19. 故善動敵者形之敵必從之予之敵必取之

Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains
deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act.

Ts‘ao Kung’s note is 見羸形也 “Make a display of weakness and
want,” but Tu Mu rightly points out that 形 does not refer only to
weakness: “If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s,
weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if
inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order
that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy’s movements should be
determined by the signs that we choose to give him.” The following
anecdote of 孫臏 Sun Pin, a descendant of Sun Wu, is related at
length in the 史記, chap. 65: In 341 B.C., the 齊 Ch‘i State being
at war with 魏 Wei, sent 田忌 T‘ien Chi and Sun Pin against the
general 龐涓 P‘ang Chüan, who happened to be a deadly personal
enemy of the latter. Sun Pin said: “The Ch‘i State has a
reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us.
Let us turn this circumstance to account.” Accordingly, when the
army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders to
show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the
night after only 20,000. P‘ang Chüan pursued them hotly, saying to
himself: “I knew these men of Ch‘i were cowards: their numbers
have already fallen away by more than half.” In his retreat, Sun
Pin came to a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers
would reach after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark,
and inscribed upon it the words: “Under this tree shall P‘ang
Chüan die.” Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body
of archers in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they
saw a light. Later on, P‘ang Chüan arrived at the spot, and
noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was
written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of
arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu
Mu’s version of the story; the _Shih Chi_, less dramatically but
probably with more historical truth, makes P‘ang Chüan cut his own
throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.]

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

予 here = 與.

20. 以利動之以卒待之

By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of
picked men he lies in wait for him.

This would appear to be the meaning if we retain 卒, which Mei
Yao-ch‘ên explains as 精卒 “men of spirit.” The _T‘u Shu_ reads 本,
an emendation suggested by 李靖 Li Ching. The meaning then would
be, “He lies in wait with the main body of his troops.”

21. 故善戰者求之於埶不責於人故能擇人而任埶

The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does
not require too much from individuals.

Tu Mu says: “He first of all considers the power of his army in
the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and
uses each man according to his capabilities. He does not demand
perfection from the untalented.”

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and to utilise combined
energy.

Another reading has 之 instead of 埶. It would be interesting if
Capt. Calthrop could tell us where the following occurs in the
Chinese: “yet, when an opening or advantage shows, he pushes it to
its limits.”

22. 任埶者其戰人也如轉木石木石之性安則靜危則動方則止圓則行

When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were
like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or
stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a
slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped,
to go rolling down.

Ts‘ao Kung calls this 任自然勢 “the use of natural or inherent
power.” Capt. Calthrop ignores the last part of the sentence
entirely. In its stead he has: “So await the opportunity, and so
act when the opportunity arrives”—another absolutely gratuitous
interpolation. The _T‘ung Tien_ omits 任.

23. 故善戰人之埶如轉圓石於千仞之山者埶也

Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a
round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So
much on the subject of energy.

The _T‘ung Tien_ omits 善. The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu
Mu’s opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid
evolutions and sudden rushes. “Great results,” he adds, “can thus
be achieved with small forces.”

VI. 虛實篇

WEAK POINTS AND STRONG.

Chang Yü attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows:
“Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive
and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and
indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself first with
the theory of attack and defence, and then turns his attention to
direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and
combining these two methods before proceeding to the subject of
weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods
arises out of attack and defence, and the perception of weak and
strong points depends again on the above methods. Hence the
present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on Energy.”

1. 孫子曰凡先處戰地而待敵者佚後處戰地而趨戰者勞

Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of
the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field
and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted.

Instead of 處, the _Yü Lan_ has in both clauses the stronger word
據. For the antithesis between 佚 and 勞, cf. I. § 23, where
however 勞 is used as a verb.

2. 故善戰者致人而不致於人

Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does
not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.

The next paragraph makes it clear that 致 does not merely mean, as
Tu Mu says, 令敵來就我 “to make the enemy approach me,” but rather
to make him go in any direction I please. It is thus practically
synonymous with 制. Cf. Tu Mu’s own note on V. § 19. One mark of a
great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or fights not at
all.[170]

3. 能使敵人自至者利之也能使敵人不得至者害之也

By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach
of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible
for the enemy to draw near.

In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second,
he will strike at some important point which the enemy will have
to defend.

4. 故敵佚能勞之飽能飢之安能動之

If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;

This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-Ch‘ên’s
interpretation of I. § 23.

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;

飢 is probably an older form than 饑, the reading of the original
text. Both are given in the 說文.

if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

The subject to 能 is still 善戰者; but these clauses would read
better as direct admonitions, and in the next sentence we find Sun
Tzŭ dropping insensibly into the imperative.

5. 出其所必趨趨其所不意

Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly
to places where you are not expected.

The original text, adopted by the _T‘u Shu_, has 出其所不趨; it has
been altered to suit the context and the commentaries of Ts‘ao
Kung and Ho Shih, who evidently read 必趨. The other reading would
mean: “Appear at points to which the enemy cannot hasten;” but in
this case there is something awkward in the use of 趨. Capt.
Calthrop is wrong of course with “appearing where the enemy is not.”

6. 行千里而不勞者行於無人之地也

An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches
through country where the enemy is not.

We must beware of understanding 無人之地 as “uninhabited country.”
Sun Tzŭ habitually uses 人 in the sense of 敵, e.g. _supra_, § 2.
Ts‘ao Kung sums up very well: 出空擊虛避其所守擊其不意 “Emerge from
the void [_q.d._ like “a bolt from the blue”], strike at
vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in
unexpected quarters.” The difference of meaning between 空 and 虛
is worth noting.

7. 攻而必取者攻其所不守也守而必固者守其所不攻也

You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack
places which are undefended.

所不守 is of course hyperbolical; Wang Hsi rightly explains it as “weak
points; that is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or
the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the
precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or
provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst
themselves.”

You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions
that cannot be attacked.

_I.e._, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There
is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this latter
clause. Tu Mu, Ch‘ên Hao, and Mei Yao-ch‘ên assume the meaning to be:
“In order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend even those
places that are not likely to be attacked;” and Tu Mu adds: “How much
more, then, those that will be attacked.” Taken thus, however, the
clause balances less well with the preceding—always a consideration in
the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang
Yü, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: “He who is
skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven
[see IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against
him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those
that the enemy cannot defend ... He who is skilled in defence hides in
the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the
enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I
shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack.”

8. 故善攻者敵不知其所守善守者敵不知其所攻

Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know
what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not
know what to attack.

An aphorism which puts the whole art of war into a nutshell.

9. 微乎微乎至於無形神乎神乎至於無聲故能爲敵之司命

O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be
invisible, through you inaudible;

Literally, “without form or sound,” but it is said of course with
reference to the enemy. Chang Yü, whom I follow, draws no sharp
distinction between 微 and 神, but Tu Mu and others think that 微
indicates the secrecy to be observed on the defensive, and 神 the
rapidity to be displayed in attack. The _Yü Lan_ text differs
considerably from ours, reading: 微乎微乎故能隱於常形神乎神乎故能爲敵
司命.

and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.

The _T‘ung Tien_ has 故能爲變化司命. Capt. Calthrop’s version of
this paragraph is so remarkable that I cannot refrain from quoting
it in full: “Now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be
easily apprehended, as a certain shape or noise can be understood,
of the senses; but when these secrets are once learnt, the enemy
is mastered.”

10. 進而不可禦者衝其虛也退而不可追者速而不可及也

You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the
enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your
movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.

The second member of the sentence is weak, because 不可及 is nearly
tautologous with 不可追. The _Yü Lan_ reads 遠 for 速.

11. 故我欲戰敵雖高壘深溝不得不與我戰者攻其所必救也

If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even
though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we
need do is to attack some other place that he will be obliged to
relieve.

Tu Mu says: “If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his
line of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have
to return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack
against the sovereign himself.” It is clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike
certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal
attacks.

12. 我不欲戰畫地而守之敵不得與我戰者乖其所之也

If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us
even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the
ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in
his way.

In order to preserve the parallelism with § 11, I should prefer to
follow the _T‘u Shu_ text, which inserts 雖 before 畫地. This
extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia
Lin: 雖未修壘壍 “even though we have constructed neither wall nor
ditch.” The real crux of the passage lies in 乖其所之也. 之 of
course = 至. Ts‘ao Kung defines 乖 by the word 戾, which is perhaps
a case of _obscurum per obscurius_. Li Ch‘üan, however, says:
設奇異而疑之 “we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;”
and Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative
anecdotes—one of 諸葛亮 Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying 陽平
Yang-p‘ing and about to be attacked by 司馬懿 Ssŭ-ma I, suddenly
struck his colours, stopped the beating of the drums, and flung
open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping
and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the
intended effect; for Ssŭ-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew
off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating here,
therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of
“bluff.” Capt. Calthrop translates: “and prevent the enemy from
attacking by keeping him in suspense,” which shows that he has not
fully grasped the meaning of 乖.

13. 故形人而我無形則我專而敵分

By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible
ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must
be divided.

The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yü (after
Mei Yao-ch‘ên) rightly explains it thus: “If the enemy’s
dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body;
whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be
obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack from
every quarter.” 形 is here used as an active verb: “to make to
appear.” See IV, note on heading. Capt. Calthrop’s “making feints”
is quite wrong.

14. 我專爲一敵分爲十是以十共其一也則我衆而敵寡

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into
fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts
of a whole,

The original text has 以敵攻其一也, which in accordance with the
_T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ has been altered as above. I adopt the
more plausible reading of the _T‘u Shu_: 是以十攻其一也, in spite of
having to refer 十 to ourselves and not to the enemy. Thus Tu Yu
and Mei Yao-ch‘ên both regard 十 as the undivided force, consisting
of so many parts, and 一 as each of the isolated fractions of the
enemy. The alteration of 攻 into 共 can hardly be right, though the
true text might conceivably have been 是以十共攻其一也.

which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.

15. 能以衆擊寡者則吾之所與戰者約矣

And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior
one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

For 擊, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have 敵. Tu Yu, followed by
the other commentators, arbitrarily defines 約 as 少而易勝 “few and
easy to conquer,” but only succeeds thereby in making the sentence
absolutely pointless. As for Capt. Calthrop’s translation: “In
superiority of numbers there is economy of strength,” its meaning
is probably known to himself alone. In justification of my own
rendering of 約, I would refer to _Lun Yü_ IV. 2 and VII. 25 (3).

16. 吾所與戰之地不可知不可知則敵所備者多敵所備者多則吾所與戰者寡矣

The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the
enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several
different points;

Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by
saying that “while his opponents were kept fully employed
wondering what he was going to do, _he_ was thinking most of what
he was going to do himself.”

and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers
we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

17. 故備前則後寡備後則前寡備左則右寡備右則左寡無所不備則無所不寡

For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear;
should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he
strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen
his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements
everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

In Frederick the Great’s _Instructions to his Generals_ we read:
“A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment.
Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to
protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with
their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard
against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in smaller misfortunes to
avoid greater.”

18. 寡者備人者也衆者使人備己者也

Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible
attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make
these preparations against us.

The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is “to compel
the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior
force against each fraction in turn.”

19. 故知戰之地知戰之日則可千里而會戰

Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may
concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

There is nothing about “defeating” anybody in this sentence, as
Capt. Calthrop translates. What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is
that nice calculation of distances and that masterly employment of
strategy which enable a general to divide his army for the purpose
of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at
precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront
the enemy in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful
junctions which military history records, one of the most dramatic
and decisive was the appearance of Blücher just at the critical
moment on the field of Waterloo.

20. 不知戰地不知戰日則左不能救右右不能救左前不能救後後不能救前而況遠者
數十里近者數里乎

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be
impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour
the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support
the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are
anything under a hundred _li_ apart, and even the nearest are
separated by several _li_!

The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in
precision, but the mental picture we are required to draw is
probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in
separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed
date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed at
haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and place
of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in
detail. Chang Yü’s note may be worth quoting here: “If we do not
know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the
day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited
through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold
will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we
shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no
mutual support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear,
especially if there is any great distance between the foremost
and hindmost divisions of the army.”

21. 以吾度之越人之兵雖多亦奚益於勝敗哉故曰勝可爲也

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in
number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.

Capt. Calthrop omits 以吾度之, and his translation of the remainder
is flabby and inaccurate. As Sun Tzŭ was in the service of the 吳
Wu State, it has been proposed to read 吳 instead of 吾—a wholly
unnecessary tampering with the text. Yüeh coincided roughly with
the present province of Chehkiang. Li Ch‘üan very strangely takes
越 not as the proper name, but in the sense of 過 “to surpass.” No
other commentator follows him. 勝敗 belongs to the class of
expressions like 遠近 “distance,” 大小 “magnitude,” etc., to which
the Chinese have to resort in order to express abstract ideas of
degree. The _T‘u Shu_, however, omits 敗.

I say then that victory can be achieved.

Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states
ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by 勾踐 Kou Chien and
its incorporation in Yüeh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s
death. With his present assertion compare IV. § 4: 勝可知而不可爲
(which is the obviously mistaken reading of the _Yü Lan_ here).
Chang Yü is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy,
which he thus goes on to explain: “In the chapter on Tactical
Dispositions it is said, ‘One may _know_ how to conquer without
being able to _do_ it,’ whereas here we have the statement that
‘victory can be achieved.’ The explanation is, that in the former
chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under discussion,
it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make
certain of beating him. But the present passage refers
particularly to the soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s
calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of
the impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can
be achieved.”

22. 敵雖衆可使無鬥故策之而知得失之計

Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from
fighting.

Capt. Calthrop quite unwarrantably translates: “_If_ the enemy be
many in number, prevent him,” etc.

Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of
their success.

This is the first of four similarly constructed sentences, all of
which present decided difficulties. Chang Yü explains 知得失之計 as
知其計之得失. This is perhaps the best way of taking the words,
though Chia Lin, referring 計 to ourselves and not the enemy,
offers the alternative of 我得彼失之計皆先知也 “Know beforehand all
plans conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure.”

23. 作之而知動靜之理形之而知死生之地

Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.

Instead of 作, the _T‘ung Tien_, _Yü Lan_, and also Li Ch‘üan’s
text have 候, which the latter explains as “the observation of
omens,” and Chia Lin simply as “watching and waiting.” 作 is
defined by Tu Mu as 激作, and Chang Yü tells us that by noting the
joy or anger shown by the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall
be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low or the
reverse. He instances the action of Chu-ko Liang, who sent the
scornful present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssŭ-ma I, in order to
goad him out of his Fabian tactics.

Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

Two commentators, Li Ch‘üan and Chang Yü, take 形之 in the sense
of 示之 “put on specious appearances.” The former says: “You may
either deceive the enemy by a show of weakness—striking your
colours and silencing your drums; or by a show of strength—making
a hollow display of camp-fires and regimental banners.” And the
latter quotes V. 19, where 形之 certainly seems to bear this sense.
On the other hand, I would point to § 13 of this chapter, where 形
must with equal certainty be active. It is hard to choose between
the two interpretations, but the context here agrees better, I
think, with the one that I have adopted. Another difficulty arises
over 死生之地, which most of the commentators, thinking no doubt of
the 死地 in XI. § 1, refer to the actual _ground_ on which the
enemy is encamped. The notes of Chia Lin and Mei Yao-ch‘ên,
however, seem to favour my view. The same phrase has a somewhat
different meaning in I. § 2.

24. 角之而知有餘不足之處

Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,

Tu Yu is right, I think, in attributing this force to 角; Ts‘ao
Kung defines it simply as 量. Capt. Calthrop surpasses himself with
the staggering translation “Flap the wings”! Can the Latin _cornu_
(in its figurative sense) have been at the back of his mind?

so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is
deficient.

Cf. IV. § 6.

25. 故形兵之極至於無形無形則深閒不能窺知者不能謀

In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is
to conceal them;

The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. 無形 is
perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see _supra_, § 9) as
“showing no sign” of what you mean to do, of the plans that are
formed in your brain.

conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the
subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

深閒 is expanded by Tu Mu into 雖有閒者深來窺我. [For 閒, see XIII,
note on heading.] He explains 知者 in like fashion:
雖有智能之士亦不能謀我也 “though the enemy may have clever and
capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against
us.”

26. 因形而錯勝於衆衆不能知

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own
tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

All the commentators except Li Ch‘üan make 形 refer to the enemy.
So Ts‘ao Kung: 因敵形而立勝. 錯 is defined as 置. The _T‘u Shu_ has
措, with the same meaning. See IV. § 13. The _Yü Lan_ reads 作,
evidently a gloss.

27. 人皆知我所以勝之形而莫知吾所以制勝之形

All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see
is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.

_I.e._, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what
they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which
has preceded the battle. It seems justifiable, then, to render the
first 形 by “tactics” and the second by “strategy.”

28. 故其戰勝不復而應形於無窮

Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let
your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.

As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: “There is but one root-principle (理)
underlying victory, but the tactics (形) which lead up to it are
infinite in number.” With this compare Col. Henderson; “The rules
of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a week.
They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams.
But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like
Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like
Gibbon.”

29. 夫兵形象水水之行避高而趨下

Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course
runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

行 is 劉晝子 Liu Chou-tzŭ’s reading for 形 in the original text.

30. 兵之形避實而擊虛

So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is
weak.

Like water, taking the line of least resistance.

31. 水因地而制流兵因敵而制勝

Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over
which it flows;

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 制形,—the latter also 制行. The
present text is derived from Chêng Yu-hsien.

the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is
facing.

32. 故兵無常勢水無常形

Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare
there are no constant conditions.

33. 能因敵變化而取勝者謂之神

He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby
succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

34. 故五行無常勝四時無常位日有短長月有死生

The five elements

Water, fire, wood, metal, earth.

are not always equally predominant;

That is, as Wang Hsi says: 迭相克也 “they predominate alternately.”

the four seasons make way for each other in turn.

Literally, “have no invariable seat.”

There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and
waxing.

Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the
want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in
Nature. The comparison is not very happy, however, because the
regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzŭ mentions is by no means
paralleled in war.

VII. 軍爭篇

MANŒUVRING.

The commentators, as well as the subsequent text, make it clear
that this is the real meaning of 軍爭. Thus, Li Ch‘üan says that 爭
means 趨利 “marching rapidly to seize an advantage”; Wang Hsi
says: 爭者爭利得利則勝 “‘Striving’ means striving for an advantage;
this being obtained, victory will follow;” and Chang Yü:
兩軍相對而爭利也 “The two armies face to face, and each striving to
obtain a tactical advantage over the other.” According to the
latter commentator, then, the situation is analogous to that of
two wrestlers manœuvring for a “hold,” before coming to actual
grips. In any case, we must beware of translating 爭 by the word
“fighting” or “battle,” as if it were equivalent to 戰. Capt.
Calthrop falls into this mistake.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法將受命於君

Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign.

For 君 there is another reading 天, which Li Ch‘üan explains as
恭行天罰 “being the reverent instrument of Heaven’s chastisement.”

2. 合軍聚衆交和而舍

Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend
and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

Ts‘ao Kung takes 和 as referring to the 和門 or main gate of the
military camp. This, Tu Mu tells us, was formed with a couple of
flags hung across. [Cf. _Chou Li_, ch. xxvii. fol. 31 of the
Imperial edition: 直旌門.] 交和 would then mean “setting up his 和門
opposite that of the enemy.” But Chia Lin’s explanation, which has
been adopted above, is on the whole simpler and better. Chang Yü,
while following Ts‘ao Kung, adds that the words may also be taken
to mean “the establishment of harmony and confidence between the
higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;” and he
quotes a saying of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 _ad init._): “Without harmony
in the State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without
harmony in the army, no battle array can be formed.” In the
historical romance 東周列國, chap. 75, Sun Tzŭ himself is
represented as saying to 伍員 Wu Yüan: 大凡行兵之法先除內患然後方可外征
“As a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all
domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe.” 舍
is defined as 止. It here conveys the notion of encamping after
having taken the field.

3. 莫難於軍爭軍爭之難者以迂爲直以患爲利

After that, comes tactical manœuvring, than which there is nothing
more difficult.

I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of
Ts‘ao Kung, who says: 從始受命至於交和軍爭難也 “From the time of
receiving the sovereign’s instructions until our encampment over
against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult.”
It seems to me that the 軍爭 tactics or manœuvres can hardly be
said to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped,
and Ch‘ên Hao’s note gives colour to this view: “For levying,
concentrating, harmonising and intrenching an army, there are
plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes
when we engage in tactical operations.” Tu Yu also observes that
“the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in
seizing favourable positions.”

The difficulty of tactical manœuvring consists in turning the devious
into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

以迂爲直 is one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatical
expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is
explained by Ts‘ao Kung: 示以遠速其道里先敵至也 “Make it appear that
you are a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and arrive
on the scene before your opponent.” Tu Mu says: “Hoodwink the
enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are
dashing along with the utmost speed.” Ho Shih gives a slightly
different turn to the sentence: “Although you may have difficult
ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter, this is a
drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of
movement.” Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two
famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy
at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which
resulted in the great victory of Marengo.

4. 故迂其途而誘之以利後人發先人至此知迂直之計者也

Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy
out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach
the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of _deviation_.

Chia Lin understands 途 as the _enemy’s_ line of march, thus: “If
our adversary’s course is really a short one, and we can manage to
divert him from it (迂之) either by simulating weakness or by
holding out some small advantage, we shall be able to beat him in
the race for good positions.” This is quite a defensible view,
though not adopted by any other commentator. 人 of course = 敵,
and 後 and 先 are to be taken as verbs. Tu Mu cites the famous
march of 趙奢 Chao Shê in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of 閼與
O-yü, which was closely invested by a 秦 Ch‘in army. [It should be
noted that the above is the correct pronunciation of 閼與, as given
in the commentary on the _Ch‘ien Han Shu_, ch. 34. Giles’
dictionary gives “Yü-yü,” and Chavannes, I know not on what
authority, prefers to write “Yen-yü.” The name is omitted
altogether from Playfair’s “Cities and Towns.”] The King of Chao
first consulted 廉頗 Lien P‘o on the advisability of attempting a
relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the
intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then
turned to Chao Shê, who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the
march, but finally said: “We shall be like two rats fighting in a
hole—and the pluckier one will win!” So he left the capital with
his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 _li_ when he stopped
and began throwing up intrenchments. For 28 days he continued
strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should
carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch‘in general was
overjoyed, and attributed his adversary’s tardiness to the fact
that the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not
actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner
departed than Chao Shê began a forced march lasting for two days
and one night, and arrived on the scene of action with such
astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding
position on the 北山 “North hill” before the enemy had got wind of
his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch‘in forces,
who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yü in all haste and
retreat across the border. [See 史記, chap. 81.]

5. 故軍爭爲利衆爭爲危

Manœuvring with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined
multitude, most dangerous.

I here adopt the reading of the T‘ung Tien, Chêng Yu-hsien and the
_T‘u Shu_, where 衆 appears to supply the exact _nuance_ required
in order to make sense. The standard text, on the other hand, in
which 軍 is repeated, seems somewhat pointless. The commentators
take it to mean that manœuvres may be profitable, or they may be
dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general. Capt.
Calthrop translates 衆爭 “the wrangles of a multitude”!

6. 舉軍而爭利則不及委軍而爭利則輜重捐

If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an
advantage, the chances are that you will be too late.

The original text has 故 instead of 舉; but a verb is needed to
balance 委.

On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves
the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

委軍 is evidently unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who
paraphrase the sentence as though it began with 棄輜. Absolute
tautology in the apodosis can then only be avoided by drawing an
impossibly fine distinction between 棄 and 捐. I submit my own
rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is
some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear
that Sun Tzŭ does not approve of a lengthy march being undertaken
without supplies. Cf. _infra_, § 11.

7. 是故卷甲而趨日夜不處倍道兼行百里而爭利則擒三將軍

Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats,

卷甲 does not mean “to discard one’s armour,” as Capt. Calthrop
translates, but implies on the contrary that it is to be carried
with you. Chang Yü says: 猶悉甲也 “This means, in full panoply.”

and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double
the usual distance at a stretch,

The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 _li_; but on one
occasion, when pursuing 劉備 Liu Pei, Ts‘ao Ts‘ao is said to have
covered the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within twenty-four hours.

doing a hundred _li_ in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of
all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

8. 勁者先罷者後其法十一而至

The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind,
and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

For 罷, see II. § 14. The moral is, as Ts‘ao Kung and others point
out: Don’t march a hundred _li_ to gain a tactical advantage,
either with or without impedimenta. Manœuvres of this description
should be confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said:
“The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the
dangers of battle.” He did not often call upon his troops for
extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise,
or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed
everything to speed.[171]

9. 五十里而爭利則蹶上將軍其法半至

If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuvre the enemy, you will
lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will
reach the goal.

蹶 is explained as similar in meaning to 挫: literally, “the leader
of the first division will be _torn away_.” Cf. Tso Chuan, 襄 19th
year: 是謂蹶其本 “This is a case of [the falling tree] tearing up
its roots.”

10. 三十里而爭利則三分之二至

If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your army
will arrive.

In the _T‘ung Tien_ is added: 以是知軍爭之難 “From this we may know
the difficulty of manœuvring.”

11. 是故軍無輜重則亡無糧食則亡無委積則亡

We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost;
without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

委積 is explained by Tu Yu as 芻草之屬 “fodder and the like;” by Tu
Mu and Chang Yü as 財貨 “goods in general;” and by Wang Hsi as
薪鹽蔬材之屬 “fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc.” But I think what Sun Tzŭ
meant was “stores accumulated in dépôts,” as distinguished from
輜重 and 糧食, the various impedimenta accompanying an army on its
march. Cf. _Chou Li_, ch. xvi. fol. 10: 委人 ... 斂薪芻凡疏材木材凡
畜聚之物.

12. 故不知諸侯之謀者不能豫交

We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the
designs of our neighbours.

豫 = 先. Li Ch‘üan understands it as 備 “guard against,” which is
hardly so good. An original interpretation of 交 is given by Tu Mu,
who says it stands for 交兵 or 合戰 “join in battle.”

13. 不知山林險阻沮澤之形者不能行軍

We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar
with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls

險, defined as 坑塹 (Ts‘ao Kung) or 坑坎 (Chang Yü).

and precipices,

阻, defined as 一高一下.

its marshes

沮, defined as 水草漸洳者.

and swamps.

澤, defined as 衆水所歸而不流者.

14. 不用鄉導者不能得地利

We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we
make use of local guides.

§§ 12–14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.

15. 故兵以詐立以利動

In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed.

According to Tu Mu, 立 stands for 立勝. Cf. I. § 18. In the tactics
of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the numerical
strength of his troops, took a very prominent position.[172]

Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.

This is the interpretation of all the commentators except Wang
Hsi, who has the brief note 誘之也 “Entice out the enemy” (by
offering him some apparent advantage).

16. 以分合爲變者也

Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by
circumstances.

17. 故其疾如風其徐如林

Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only
swift but, as Mei Yao-ch‘ên points out, 無形跡 “invisible and
leaves no tracks.”

your compactness that of the forest.

It is hardly possible to take 徐 here in its ordinary sense of
“sedate,” as Tu Yu tries to do. Mêng Shih comes nearer the mark in
his note 緩行須有行列 “When slowly marching, order and ranks must be
preserved”—so as to guard against surprise attacks. But natural
forests do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the
quality of density or compactness. I think then that Mei Yao-ch‘ên
uses the right adjective in saying 如林之森然.

18. 侵掠如火不動如山

In raiding and plundering be like fire,

Cf. _Shih Ching_, IV. 3. iv. 6: 如火烈烈則莫我敢曷 “Fierce as a
blazing fire which no man can check.”

in immovability like a mountain.

That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to
dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to
entice you into a trap.

19. 難知如陰動如雷霆

Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move,
fall like a thunderbolt.

The original text has 震 instead of 霆. Cf. IV. § 7. Tu Yu quotes a
saying of T‘ai Kung which has passed into a proverb:
疾雷不及掩耳疾電不及瞑目 “You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or
your eyes to the lightning—so rapid are they.” Likewise, an attack
should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.

20. 掠鄉分衆廓地分利

When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your
men;

The reading of Tu Yu, Chia Lin, and apparently Ts‘ao Kung, is
指向分衆, which is explained as referring to the subdivision of the
army, mentioned in V. §§ 1, 2, by means of banners and flags,
serving to point out (指) to each man the way he should go (向).
But this is very forced, and the ellipsis is too great, even for
Sun Tzŭ. Luckily, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have the variant
嚮, which not only suggests the true reading 鄉, but affords some
clue to the way in which the corruption arose. Some early
commentator having inserted 向 as the sound of 鄉, the two may
afterwards have been read as one character; and this being
interchangeable with 向, 鄉 must finally have disappeared
altogether. Meanwhile, 掠 would have been altered to 指 in order to
make sense. As regards 分衆, I believe that Ho Shih alone has
grasped the real meaning, the other commentators understanding it
as “dividing the men into parties” to search for plunder. Sun Tzŭ
wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by
insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock,
which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.

when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the
benefit of the soldiery.

That this is the meaning, may be gathered from Tu Mu’s note:
開土拓境則分割與有功者. The 三略 gives the same advice: 𫉬地裂之. 廓
means “to enlarge” or “extend”—at the expense of the enemy,
understood. Cf. _Shih Ching_, III. 1. vii. 1: 憎其式廓 “hating all
the great States.” Ch‘ên Hao also says 屯兵種蒔 “quarter your
soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant it.” It is by
acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they invaded,
that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their most
memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of 班超 Pan
Ch‘ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years,
those of 福康安 Fu-k‘ang-an and 左宗棠 Tso Tsung-t‘ang.

21. 懸權而動

Ponder and deliberate

Note that both these words, like the Chinese 懸權, are really
metaphors derived from the use of scales.

before you make a move.

Chang Yü quotes 尉繚子 as saying that we must not break camp until
we have gauged the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness
of the opposing general. Cf. the “seven comparisons” in I. § 13.
Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.

22. 先知迂直之計者勝此軍爭之法也

He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.

See _supra_, §§ 3, 4.

Such is the art of manœuvring.

With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But
there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from
an earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the
time when Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of this fragment is not
noticeably different from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no
commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.

23. 軍政曰言不相聞故爲金鼓視不相見故爲旌旗

The Book of Army Management says:

It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators
give us any information about this work. Mei Yao-ch‘ên calls it
軍之舊典 “an ancient military classic,” and Wang Hsi, 古軍書 “an old
book on war.” Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had
gone on for centuries before Sun Tzŭ’s time between the various
kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself
improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been
made and written down at some earlier period.

On the field of battle,

Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of
gongs and drums.

I have retained the words 金鼓 of the original text, which recur in
the next paragraph, in preference to the other reading 鼓鐸 “drums
and bells,” which is found in the _T‘ung Tien_, _Pei T‘ang Shu
Ch‘ao_ and _Yü Lan_. 鐸 is a bell with a clapper. See _Lun Yü_ III.
24, _Chou Li_ XXIX. 15, 29. 金 of course would include both gongs
and bells of every kind. The _T‘u Shu_ inserts a 之 after each 爲.

Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution
of banners and flags.

24. 夫金鼓旌旗者所以一民之耳目也

Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and
eyes of the host

The original text, followed by the _T‘u Shu_, has 人 for 民 here
and in the next two paragraphs. But, as we have seen, 人 is
generally used in Sun Tzŭ for the enemy.

may be focussed on one particular point.

Note the use of 一 as a verb. Chang Yü says:
視聽均齊則雖百萬之衆進退如一矣 “If sight and hearing converge
simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a
million soldiers will be like those of a single man”!

25. 民既專一則勇者不得獨進怯者不得獨退此用衆之法也

The host thus forming a single united body, it is impossible either
for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.

Chang Yü quotes a saying: 令不進而進與令不退而退厥罪惟均 “Equally
guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat
against orders.” Tu Mu tells a story in this connection of 吳起 Wu
Ch‘i, when he was fighting against the Ch‘in State. Before the
battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring,
sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and
returned to camp. Wu Ch‘i had the man instantly executed,
whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: “This man
was a good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded.” Wu Ch‘i
replied: “I fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him
beheaded because he acted without orders.”

This is the art of handling large masses of men.

26. 故夜戰多火鼓晝戰多旌旗所以變民之耳目也

In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and
in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing
the ears and eyes of your army.

The _T‘ung Tien_ has the bad variant 便 for 變. With regard to the
latter word, I believe I have hit off the right meaning, the whole
phrase being slightly elliptical for “influencing the movements of
the army through their senses of sight and hearing.” Li Ch‘üan, Tu
Mu and Chia Lin certainly seem to understand it thus. The other
commentators, however, take 民 (or 人) as the enemy, and 變 as
equivalent to 變惑 or 變亂 “to perplex” or “confound.” This does
not agree so well with what has gone before, though on the other
hand it renders the transition to § 27 less abrupt. The whole
question, I think, hinges on the alternative readings 民 and 人.
The latter would almost certainly denote the enemy. Ch‘ên Hao
alludes to 李光弼 Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to 河陽 Ho-yang at the
head of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with
torches, that though the rebel leader 史思明 Shih Ssŭ-ming had a
large army, he did not dare to dispute their passage. [Ch‘ên Hao
gives the date as 天寳末 A.D. 756; but according to the 新唐書 New
T‘ang History, 列傳 61, it must have been later than this, probably
760.]

27. 故三軍可奪氣將軍可奪心

A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;

“In war,” says Chang Yü, “if a spirit of anger can be made to
pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset
will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will
be keenest when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is
therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait until their
ardour and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in
this way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit.” Li Ch‘üan
and others tell an anecdote (to be found in the _Tso Chuan_, 莊公
year 10, § 1) of 曹劌 Ts‘ao Kuei, a _protégé_ of Duke Chuang of Lu.
The latter State was attacked by Ch‘i, and the Duke was about to
join battle at 長勺 Ch‘ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy’s
drums, when Ts‘ao said: “Not just yet.” Only after their drums had
beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then
they fought, and the men of Ch‘i were utterly defeated. Questioned
afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts‘ao Kuei
replied: “In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the
first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the
second it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone
altogether. I attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at
its height. Hence our victory.” 吳子 (chap. 4) puts “spirit” first
among the “four important influences” in war, and continues:
三軍之衆百萬之師張設輕重在於一人是謂氣機 “The value of a whole army—a
mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: such
is the influence of spirit!”

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

Capt. Calthrop goes woefully astray with “defeat his general’s
ambition.” Chang Yü says: 心者將之所主也夫治亂勇怯皆主於心 “Presence
of mind is the general’s most important asset. It is the quality
which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage
into the panic-stricken.” The great general 李靖 Li Ching (A.D.
571–649) has a saying: 夫攻者不止攻其城擊其陳而已必有攻其心之術焉
“Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or
striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of
assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium.” [問對, pt. 3.]

28. 是故朝氣銳晝氣惰暮氣歸

Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning;

Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the
battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight
fasting, whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure.
See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent
only on returning to camp.

29. 故善用兵者避其銳氣擊其惰歸此治氣者也

A clever general, therefore,

The 故, which certainly seems to be wanted here, is omitted in the
_T‘u Shu_.

avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is
sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

The _T‘ung Tien_, for reasons of 避諱 “avoidance of personal names
of the reigning dynasty,” reads 理 for 治 in this and the two next
paragraphs.

30. 以治待亂以靜待譁此治心者也

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub
amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.

31. 以近待遠以佚待勞以飽待飢此治力者也

To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at
ease

The _T‘ung Tien_ has 逸 for 佚. The two characters are practically
synonymous, but according to the commentary, the latter is the
form always used in Sun Tzŭ.

while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the
enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.

32. 無要正正之旗勿擊堂堂之陳此治變者也

To refrain from intercepting

邀 is the reading of the original text. But the 兵書要訣 quotes the
passage with 要 yao^1 (also meaning “to intercept”), and this is
supported by the _Pei T‘ang Shu Ch‘ao_ the _Yü Lan_, and Wang
Hsi’s text.

an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking
an army drawn up in calm and confident array:

For this translation of 堂堂, I can appeal to the authority of Tu
Mu, who defines the phrase as 無懼. The other commentators mostly
follow Ts‘ao Kung, who says 大, probably meaning “grand and
imposing”. Li Ch‘üan, however, has 部分 “in subdivisions,” which is
somewhat strange.

—this is the art of studying circumstances.

I have not attempted a uniform rendering of the four phrases 治氣,
治心, 治力 and 治變, though 治 really bears the same meaning in each
case. It is to be taken, I think, not in the sense of “to govern”
or “control,” but rather, as K‘ang Hsi defines it, = 簡習 “to
examine and practise,” hence “look after,” “keep a watchful eye
upon.” We may find an example of this use in the _Chou Li_, XVIII.
fol. 46: 治其大禮. Sun Tzŭ has not told us to control or restrain
the quality which he calls 氣, but only to observe the time at
which it is strongest. As for 心, it is important to remember that
in the present context it can only mean “presence of mind.” To
speak of “controlling presence of mind” is absurd, and Capt.
Calthrop’s “to have the heart under control” is hardly less so.
The whole process recommended here is that of VI. § 2: 致人而不致於人.

33. 故用兵之法高陵勿向背邱勿逆

It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to
oppose him when he comes downhill.

The _Yü Lan_ reads 倍 for 背.

34. 佯北勿從銳卒勿攻

Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers
whose temper is keen.

35. 餌兵勿食歸師勿遏

Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.

Li Ch‘üan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a
metaphor, take these words quite literally of food and drink that
have been poisoned by the enemy. Ch‘ên Hao and Chang Yü carefully
point out that the saying has a wider application. The _T‘ung
Tien_ reads 貪 “to covet” instead of 食. The similarity of the two
characters sufficiently accounts for the mistake.

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by
saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight
to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore
too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yü quotes the words
of Han Hsin: 從思東歸之士何所不克 “Invincible is the soldier who
hath his desire and returneth homewards.” A marvellous tale is
told of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s courage and resource in ch. 1 of the _San
Kuo Chih_, 武帝紀: In 198 A.D., he was besieging 張繡 Chang Hsiu in
穰 Jang, when 劉表 Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to
cutting off Ts‘ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off
his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies,
who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had
engaged himself. In this desperate plight Ts‘ao waited until
nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid
an ambush in it. Then he marched on with his baggage-train, and
when it grew light, Chang Hsiu, finding that the bird had flown,
pressed after him in hot pursuit. As soon as the whole army had
passed by, the hidden troops fell on its rear, while Ts‘ao himself
turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown
into confusion and annihilated. Ts‘ao Ts‘ao said afterwards:
虜遏吾歸師而與吾死地戰吾是以知勝矣 “The brigands tried to check my
army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate
position: hence I knew how to overcome them.”

36. 圍師必闕窮宼勿迫

When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The
object, as Tu Mu puts it, is 示以生路令無必死之心 “to make him
believe that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his
fighting with the courage of despair.” Tu Mu adds pleasantly:
因而擊之 “After that, you may crush him.”

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

For 迫, the _T‘u Shu_ reads 追 “pursue.” Ch‘ên Hao quotes the
saying: 鳥窮則搏獸窮則噬 “Birds and beasts when brought to bay will
use their claws and teeth.” Chang Yü says: 敵若焚舟破釜決一戰則不可逼
迫來 “If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his
cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle,
he must not be pushed to extremities.” The phrase 窮宼 doubtless
originated with Sun Tzŭ. The _P‘ei Wên Yün Fu_ gives four examples
of its use, the earliest being from the _Ch‘ien Han Shu_, and
I have found another in chap. 34 of the same work. Ho Shih
illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of 符彥卿 Fu
Yen-ch‘ing in ch. 251 of the 宋史. That general, together with his
colleague 杜重威 Tu Chung-wei, was surrounded by a vastly superior
army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and
desert-like, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits
for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, and the men were
reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture.
Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch‘ing
exclaimed: “We are desperate men. Far better to die for our
country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!” A strong
gale happened to be blowing from the north-east and darkening the
air with dense clouds of sandy dust. Tu Chung-wei was for waiting
until this had abated before deciding on a final attack; but
luckily another officer, 李守貞 Li Shou-chêng by name, was quicker
to see an opportunity, and said: “They are many and we are few,
but in the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be
discernible; victory will go to the strenuous fighter, and the
wind will be our best ally.” Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch‘ing made a
sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his cavalry, routed
the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety.
[Certain details in the above account have been added from the
歴代紀事年表, ch. 78.]

37. 此用兵之法也

Such is the art of warfare.

Chêng Yu-hsien in his 遺說 inserts 妙 after 法. I take it that these
words conclude the extract from the 軍政 which began at § 23.

VIII. 九變篇

VARIATION OF TACTICS.

The heading means literally “The Nine Variations,” but as Sun Tzŭ
does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already
told us (V. §§ 6–11) that such deflections from the ordinary
course are practically innumerable, we have little option but to
follow Wang Hsi, who says that “Nine” stands for an indefinitely
large number. “All it means is that in warfare 當極其變 we ought to
vary our tactics to the utmost degree ... I do not know what Ts‘ao
Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be [the latter’s note is
變其正得其所用九也], but it has been suggested that they are
connected with the Nine Situations”—of chap. XI. This is the view
adopted by Chang Yü: see note on 死地, § 2. The only other
alternative is to suppose that something has been lost—a
supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends
some weight.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法將受命於君合軍聚衆

Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.

Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It
may have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a
beginning to the chapter.

2. 圮地無舍衢地合交絶地無留圍地則謀死地則戰

When in difficult country, do not encamp.

For explanation of 圮地, see XI. § 8.

In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.

See XI, §§ 6, 12. Capt. Calthrop omits 衢地.

Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.

絶地 is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning
of chap. XI, but occurs later on (_ibid_. § 43, _q.v._). We may
compare it with 重地 (XI. § 7). Chang Yü calls it a 危絶之地,
situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch‘üan says
it is “country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or
herds, vegetables or firewood;” Chia Lin, “one of gorges, chasms
and precipices, without a road by which to advance.”

In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem.

See XI. §§ 9, 14. Capt. Calthrop has “mountainous and wooded
country,” which is a quite inadequate translation of 圍.

In a desperate position, you must fight.

See XI. §§ 10, 14. Chang Yü has an important note here, which must
be given in full. “From 圮地無舍,” he says, “down to this point,
the Nine Variations are presented to us. The reason why only five
are given is that the subject is treated _en précis_ (舉其大略也).
So in chap. XI, where he discusses the variations of tactics
corresponding to the Nine Grounds, Sun Tzŭ mentions only six
variations; there again we have an abridgment. [I cannot
understand what Chang Yü means by this statement. He can only be
referring to §§ 11–14 or §§ 46–50 of chap. XI; but in both places
all the nine grounds are discussed. Perhaps he is confusing
these with the Six 地形 of chap. X.] All kinds of ground have
corresponding military positions, and also a variation of tactics
suitable to each (凡地有勢有變). In chap. XI, what we find
enumerated first [§§ 2–10] are the situations; afterwards
[§§ 11–14] the corresponding tactics. Now, how can we tell that
the 九變 “Nine Variations” are simply the 九地之變 “variations of
tactics corresponding to the Nine Grounds”? It is said further
on [§ 5] that ‘the general who does not understand the nine
variations of tactics may be well acquainted with the features
of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to
practical account.’ Again, in chap. XI [§ 41] we read: ‘The
different measures adapted to the nine varieties of ground
(九地之變) and the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics
must be carefully examined.’ From a consideration of these
passages the meaning is made clear. When later on the nine grounds
are enumerated, Sun Tzŭ recurs to these nine variations. He wishes
here to speak of the Five Advantages [see _infra_, § 6], so he
begins by setting forth the Nine Variations. These are inseparably
connected in practice, and therefore they are dealt with
together.” The weak point of this argument is the suggestion that
五事 “five things” can stand as a 大畧, that is, an abstract or
abridgment, of nine, when those that are omitted are not less
important than those that appear, and when one of the latter is
not included amongst the nine at all.

3. 塗有所不由軍有所不擊城有所不攻地有所不爭君命有所不受

There are roads which must not be followed,

“Especially those leading through narrow defiles,” says Li Ch‘üan,
“where an ambush is to be feared.”

armies which must not be attacked,

More correctly, perhaps, “there are times when an army must not be
attacked.” Ch‘ên Hao says: “When you see your way to obtain a
trivial advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat,
refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength.”

towns

Capt. Calthrop says “castles”—an unfortunate attempt to introduce
local colour.

which must not be besieged,

Cf. III. § 4. Ts‘ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from
his own experience. When invading the territory of 徐州 Hsü-chou,
he ignored the city of 華費 Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path,
and pressed on into the heart of the country. This excellent
strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer than
fourteen important district cities. Chang Yü says: “No town should
be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone,
will not cause any trouble.” 荀罃 Hsün Ying, when urged to attack
偪陽 Pi-yang, replied: “The city is small and well-fortified; even
if I succeed in taking it, ’t will be no great feat of arms;
whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock.” In the
seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of
war. It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of
marches, countermarches and manœuvres. He said: “It is a great
mistake to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of
soldiers will gain a province.”[173]

positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which
must not be obeyed.

This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for
authority, and Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:
兵者凶器也爭者逆德也將者死官也 “Weapons are baleful instruments,
strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the
negation of civil order!” The unpalatable fact remains, however,
that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military
necessity. Cf. III. § 17. (5), X. § 23. The _T‘ung Tien_ has 將在軍
before 君命, etc. This is a gloss on the words by Chu-ko Liang,
which being repeated by Tu Yu became incorporated with the text.
Chang Yü thinks that these five precepts are the 五利 referred
to in § 6. Another theory is that the mysterious 九變 are here
enumerated, starting with 圮地無舍 and ending at 地有所不爭, while
the final clause 君命有所不受 embraces and as it were sums up all
the nine. Thus Ho Shih says: “Even if it be your sovereign’s
command to encamp in difficult country, linger in isolated
positions, etc., you must not do so.” The theory is perhaps a
little too ingenious to be accepted with confidence.

4. 故將通於九變之利者知用兵矣

The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany
variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.

Before 利 in the original text there is a 地 which is obviously not
required.

5. 將不通於九變之利者雖知地形不能得地之利矣

The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with
the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his
knowledge to practical account.

Literally, “get the advantage of the ground,” which means not only
securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural
advantages in every possible way. Chang Yü says: “Every kind of
ground is characterised by certain natural features, and also
gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How is it possible
to turn these natural features to account unless topographical
knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?”

6. 治兵不知九變之術雖知五利不能得人之用矣

So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of varying his
plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will
fail to make the best use of his men.

Ts‘ao Kung says that the 五利 are 下五事也 “the five things that
follow;” but this cannot be right. We must rather look back to the
five “variations” contained in § 3. Chia Lin (who reads 五變 here
to balance the 五利) tells us that these imply five obvious and
generally advantageous lines of action, namely: “if a certain road
is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must
be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be
besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and
if consistent with military operations, the ruler’s commands must
be obeyed.” But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a
general to use these advantages. For instance, “a certain road may
be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds in
natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he
will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to attack,
but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with
desperation, he will refrain from striking,” and so on. Here the
變 comes in to modify the 利, and hence we see the uselessness of
knowing the one without the other—of having an eye for weaknesses
in the enemy’s armour without being clever enough to recast one’s
plans on the spur of the moment. Capt. Calthrop offers this
slovenly translation: “In the management of armies, if the art of
the Nine Changes be understood [_sic_], a knowledge of the Five
Advantages is of no avail.”

7. 是故智者之慮必雜於利害

Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of
disadvantage will be blended together.

“Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,”
says Ts‘ao Kung, “the opposite state should be always present to
your mind.”

8. 雜於利而務可信也

If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may
succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.

信, according to Tu Mu, is equivalent to 申, and 務可信也 is
paraphrased by Chang Yü as 可以伸己之事. Tu Mu goes on to say: “If
we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our
minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy
also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into
our calculations.”

9. 雜於害而患可解也

If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always
ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.

A translator cannot emulate the conciseness of 雜於害 “to blend
[thoughts of advantage] with disadvantage,” but the meaning is as
given. Tu Mu says: “If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous
position, I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure
me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy.
If in my counsels these two considerations are properly blended,
I shall succeed in liberating myself.... For instance, if I am
surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the
nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and
crush me; it would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a
bold counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained to free
myself from the enemy’s toils.” See the story of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, VII.
§ 35, note. In his first edition, Capt. Calthrop translated §§ 7–9
as follows: “The wise man perceives clearly wherein lies advantage
and disadvantage. While recognising an opportunity, he does not
overlook the risks, and saves future anxiety.” This has now been
altered into: “The wise man considers well both advantage and
disadvantage. He sees a way out of adversity, _and on the day of
victory to danger is not blind_.” Owing to a needless inversion of
the Chinese, the words which I have italicised are evidently
intended to represent § 8!

10. 是故屈諸侯者以害役諸侯者以業趨諸侯者以利

Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;

Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some
of which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—“Entice away the
enemy’s best and wisest men, so that he may be left without
counsellors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the
government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and
deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his
ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause
deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt
his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and
unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women.” Chang Yü
(after Wang Hsi) considers the 害 to be military chastisement: “Get
the enemy,” he says, “into a position where he must suffer injury,
and he will submit of his own accord.” Capt. Calthrop twists Sun
Tzŭ’s words into an absurdly barbarous precept: “In reducing an
enemy to submission, inflict all possible damage upon him.”

make trouble for them,

業 is defined by Ts‘ao Kung as 事, and his definition is generally
adopted by the commentators. Tu Mu, however, seems to take it in
the sense of “possessions,” or, as we might say, “assets,” which
he considers to be 兵衆國富人和令行 “a large army, a rich exchequer,
harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfilment of commands.”
These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.

and keep them constantly engaged;

役, literally, “make servants of them.” Tu Yu says 令不得安佚
“prevent them from having any rest.”

hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.

Mêng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic
use of 變: 令忘變而速至 “cause them to forget _pien_ (the reasons
for acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in
our direction.”

11. 故用兵之法無恃其不來恃吾有以待也無恃其不攻恃吾有所不可攻也

The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s
not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him;

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 有能以待之也, but the conciser
form is more likely to be right.

not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the
fact that we have made our position unassailable.

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ insert 吾也 after the first 攻, and
omit 有所.

12. 故將有五危必死可殺也必生可虜也忿速可侮也廉潔可辱也愛民可煩也

There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1)
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

勇而無慮 “Bravery without forethought,” as Ts‘ao Kung analyses it,
which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad
bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yü, “must not be encountered
with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain.” Cf.
Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV _ad init._: 凡人論將常觀於勇勇之於將乃數分之一耳夫勇者
必輕合輕合而不知利未可也 “In estimating the character of a general,
men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting
that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general
should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly;
and he who fights recklessly, without any perception of what is
expedient, must be condemned.” Ssŭ-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive
remark 上死不勝 “Simply going to one’s death does not bring about
victory.”

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;

必生 is explained by Ts‘ao Kung of the man “whom timidity prevents
from advancing to seize an advantage,” and Wang Hsi adds, “who is
quick to flee at the sight of danger.” Mêng Shih gives the closer
paraphrase 志必生反 “he who is bent on returning alive,” that is,
the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing
is to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks.
T‘ai Kung said: 失利後時反受其殃 “He who lets an advantage slip will
subsequently bring upon himself real disaster.” In 404 A.D., 劉裕
Liu Yü pursued the rebel 桓𤣥 Huan Hsüan up the Yangtsze and fought
a naval battle with him at 崢嶸洲 the island of Ch‘êng-hung. The
loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while their opponents
were in great force. But Huan Hsüan, fearing the fate which was in
store for him should he be overcome, had a light boat made fast to
the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary,
at a moment’s notice. The natural result was that the fighting
spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the
loyalists made an attack from windward with fireships, all
striving with the utmost ardour to be first in the fray, Huan
Hsüan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled
for two days and nights without stopping. [_See_ 晉書, chap. 99,
fol. 13.] Chang Yü tells a somewhat similar story of 趙嬰齊 Chao
Ying-ch‘i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with
the army of Ch‘u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him
on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get
across.

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;

I fail to see the meaning of Capt. Calthrop’s “which brings
insult.” Tu Mu tells us that 姚襄 Yao Hsiang, when opposed in 357
A.D. by 黃眉 Huang Mei, 鄧羌 Têng Ch‘iang and others, shut himself
up behind his walls and refused to fight. Têng Ch‘iang said: “Our
adversary is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make
constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry
and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed
to be our prey.” This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to
fight, was lured on as far as 三原 San-yuan by the enemy’s
pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.

(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;

This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really
a defect in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an
exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned
man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch‘ên
truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: 徇名不顧 “The seeker
after glory should be careless of public opinion.”

(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and
trouble.

Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be
careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasise
is the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to
the immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy,
because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the
defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be
the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce
a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a
hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts. It
is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve
Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical
blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief
came through the very man who started out with the distinct
resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to
sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our
generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I
remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always “so
good to his men.” By this plea, had he but known it, he was only
condemning him out of Sun Tzŭ’s mouth.

13. 凡此五者將之過也用兵之災也

These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct
of war.

14. 覆軍殺將必以五危不可不察也

When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely
be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of
meditation.

IX. 行軍篇

THE ARMY ON THE MARCH.

The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1
than by this heading.

1. 孫子曰凡處軍相敵絶山依谷

Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and
observing signs of the enemy.

The discussion of 處軍, as Chang Yü points out, extends from here
down to 伏姦之所藏處也 (§§ 1–17), and 相敵 from that point down to
必謹察之 (§§ 18–39). The rest of the chapter consists of a few
desultory remarks, chiefly on the subject of discipline.

Pass quickly over mountains,

For this use of 絶, cf. _infra_. § 3. See also 荀子, ch. 1. fol. 2
(standard edition of 1876): 絶江河; _Shih Chi_, ch. 27 _ad init._:
後六星絶漢.

and keep in the neighbourhood of valleys.

Tu Mu says that 依 here = 近. The idea is, not to linger among
barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water and grass.
Capt. Calthrop translates “camp in valleys,” heedless of the very
next sentence. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: 無當天竈 “Abide not in natural
ovens,” _i.e._ 大谷之口 “the openings of large valleys.” Chang Yü
tells the following anecdote: “武都羗 Wu-tu Ch‘iang was a robber
captain in the time of the Later Han, and 馬援 Ma Yuan was sent to
exterminate his gang. Ch‘iang having found a refuge in the hills,
Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the
favourable positions commanding supplies of water and forage.
Ch‘iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of provisions
that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not know the
advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood of valleys.”

2. 視生處高戰隆無登此處山之軍也

Camp in high places,

Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the
surrounding country.

facing the sun.

視生 = 面陽. Tu Mu takes this to mean “facing south,” and Ch‘ên Hao
“facing east.” Cf. _infra_, §§ 11, 13.

Do not climb heights in order to fight.

隆 is here simply equivalent to 高. The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_
read 降.

So much for mountain warfare.

After 山, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ insert 谷.

3. 絶水必遠水

After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.

“In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you,” according to
Ts‘ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yü, “in order not to be impeded
in your evolutions.” The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 敵若絶水 “If _the
enemy_ crosses a river,” etc. But in view of the next sentence,
this is almost certainly an interpolation.

4. 客絶水而來勿迎之於水內令半濟而擊之利

When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not
advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army
get across, and then deliver your attack.

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 度 for 濟, without change of
meaning. Wu Tzŭ plagiarises this passage twice over:—ch. II _ad
fin._, 涉水半渡可擊; ch. V, 敵若絶水半渡而擊. Li Ch‘üan alludes to
the great victory won by Han Hsin over 龍且 Lung Chü at the 濰 Wei
River. Turning to the _Ch‘ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, fol. 6 _verso_, we
find the battle described as follows: “The two armies were drawn
up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered
his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and
construct a dam a little higher up. Then, leading half his army
across, he attacked Lung Chü; but after a time, pretending to have
failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung
Chü was much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming:
“I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a coward!” he pursued him
and began crossing the river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a
party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume of
water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of Lung
Chü’s army from getting across. He then turned upon the force
which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chü himself being
amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further bank, also
scattered and fled in all directions.”

5. 欲戰者無附於水而迎客

If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader
near a river which he has to cross.

For fear of preventing his crossing. Capt. Calthrop makes the
injunction ridiculous by omitting 欲戰者.

6. 視生處高無迎水流此處水上之軍也

Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.

See _supra_, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with
water is very awkward. Chang Yü has the note: 或岸邊爲陳或水上泊舟皆
須面陽而居高 “Said either of troops marshalled on the river-bank,
or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is
essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun.” The
other commentators are not at all explicit. One is much tempted
to reject their explanation of 視生 altogether, and understand it
simply as “seeking safety.” [Cf. 必生 in VIII. § 12, and _infra_,
§ 9.] It is true that this involves taking 視 in an unusual, though
not, I think, an impossible sense. Of course the earlier passage
would then have to be translated in like manner.

Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.

Tu Mu says: “As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp
on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open
the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. This is implied above
in the words 視生處高. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that ‘in river
warfare we must not advance against the stream,’ which is as
much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of
the enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the
current and make short work of us.” There is also the danger,
noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on
the water to be carried down to us. Capt. Calthrop’s first version
was: “Do not cross rivers in the face of the stream”—a sapient
piece of advice, which made one curious to know what the correct
way of crossing rivers might be. He has now improved this into:
“Do not fight when the enemy is between the army and the source of
the river.”

So much for river warfare.

7. 絶斥澤惟亟去無留

In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them
quickly, without any delay.

Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the
herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and
exposed to attack.

8. 若交軍於斥澤之中必依水草而背衆樹此處斥澤之軍也

If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass
near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.

Li Ch‘üan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous
where there are trees, while Tu Yu says that they will serve to
protect the rear. Capt. Calthrop, with a perfect genius for going
wrong, says “in the neighbourhood of a marsh.” For 若 the _T‘ung
Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ wrongly read 爲, and the latter also has 倍
instead of 背.

So much for operations in salt-marshes.

9. 平陸處易而右背高前死後生此處平陸之軍也

In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position

This is doubtless the force of 易, its opposite being 險. Thus, Tu
Mu explains it as 坦易平穩之處 “ground that is smooth and firm,” and
therefore adapted for cavalry; Chang Yü as 坦易無坎陷之處 “level
ground, free from depressions and hollows.” He adds later on
that although Sun Tzŭ is discussing flat country, there will
nevertheless be slight elevations and hillocks.

with rising ground to your right and on your rear,

The Yü Lan again reads 倍 for 背. Tu Mu quotes T‘ai Kung as saying:
“An army should have a stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill
or tumulus on its right.”

so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind.

Wang Hsi thinks that 後生 contradicts the saying 視生 in § 2, and
therefore suspects a mistake in the text.

So much for campaigning in flat country.

10. 凡此四軍之利黃帝之所以勝四帝也

These are the four useful branches of military knowledge

Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3)
marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon’s “Military Maxims,” no.
1.

which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên asks, with some plausibility, whether 帝 is not a
mistake for 軍 “armies,” as nothing is known of Huang Ti having
conquered four other Emperors. The _Shih Chi_ (ch. I _ad init._)
speaks only of his victories over 炎帝 Yen Ti and 蚩尤 Ch‘ih Yu.
In the 六韜 it is mentioned that he “fought seventy battles and
pacified the Empire.” Ts‘ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow
Emperor was the first to institute the feudal system of vassal
princes, each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore
the title of Emperor. Li Ch‘üan tells us that the art of war
originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister 風后
Fêng Hou.

11. 凡軍喜高而惡下貴陽而賤陰

All armies prefer high ground to low,

“High ground,” says Mei Yao-ch‘ên, “is not only more agreeable and
salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low
ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous
for fighting.” The original text and the _T‘u Shu_ have 好 instead
of 喜.

and sunny places to dark.

12. 養生而處實軍無百疾是謂必勝

If you are careful of your men,

Ts‘ao Kung says: 向水草可放牧養畜 “Make for fresh water and pasture,
where you can turn out your animals to graze.” And the other
commentators follow him, apparently taking 生 as = 牲. Cf. Mencius,
V. 1. ix. 1, where 養牲者 means a cattle-keeper. But here 養生
surely has reference to the health of the troops. It is the title
of Chuang Tzŭ’s third chapter, where it denotes moral rather than
physical well-being.

and camp on hard ground,

實 must mean dry and solid, as opposed to damp and marshy, ground.
This is to be found as a rule in high places, so the commentators
explain 實 as practically equivalent to 高.

the army will be free from disease of every kind,

Chang Yü says: “The dryness of the climate will prevent the
outbreak of illness.”

and this will spell victory.

13. 邱陵隄防必處其陽而右背之此兵之利地之助也

When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the
slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of
your soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground.

14. 上雨水沫至欲涉者待其定也

When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you
wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it
subsides.

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have a superfluous 下 before 水.

15. 凡地有絶澗天井天牢天羅天陷天𨻶必亟去之勿近也

Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running
between,

絶澗, explained by Mei Yao-ch‘ên as 前後險峻水橫其中.

deep natural hollows,

天井, explained as 四面峻坂澗壑所歸 “places enclosed on every side
by steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom.”

confined places,

天牢 “natural pens or prisons,” explained as 三面環絶易入難出
“places surrounded by precipices on three sides—easy to get into,
but hard to get out of.”

tangled thickets,

天羅, explained as 草木蒙密鋒鏑莫施 “places covered with such dense
undergrowth that spears cannot be used.”

quagmires

天陷, explained as 卑下汙𣾈車騎不通 “low-lying places, so heavy with
mud as to be impassible for chariots and horsemen.”

and crevasses,

天𨻶 is explained by Mei Yao-ch‘ên as 兩山相向洞道狹惡 “a narrow
difficult way between beetling cliffs,” but Ts‘ao Kung says
山澗迫狹地形深數尺長數丈者, which seems to denote something on a much
smaller scale. Tu Mu’s note is 地多溝坑坎陷木石 “ground covered
with trees and rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and
pitfalls.” This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly
enough as a defile or narrow pass: 兩邊險絶形狹長而數里, and Chang
Yü takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the
commentators certainly inclines to the rendering “defile”. But the
ordinary meaning of 𨻶 (a crack or fissure) and the fact that 絶澗
above must be something in the nature of a defile, make me think
that Sun Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses. The _T‘ung Tien_ and
_Yü Lan_ read 郄 for 𨻶, with the same meaning; the latter also
has 大害 after 天郄—a palpable gloss.

should be left with all possible speed and not approached.

16. 吾遠之敵近之吾迎之敵背之

While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to
approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them
on his rear.

17. 軍旁有險阻蔣潢井生葭葦小林蘙薈必謹覆索之此伏姦之所藏處也

If in the neighbourhood of your camp

The original text has 軍行, but 旁 has been generally adopted as
yielding much better sense.

there should be any hilly country,

險阻 is 邱阜之地, according to Chang Yü.

ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds,

The original text omits 蔣 and 生, so that 潢 and 井 join to make a
pair: “ponds and basins.” This is plausible enough at first sight,
but there are several objections to the reading: (1) 蔣 is unlikely
to have got into the text as a gloss on 潢; (2) it is easy to
suppose, on the other hand, that 蔣 and afterwards 生 (to restore
the balance of the sentence) were omitted by a copyist who jumped
to the conclusion that 潢 and 井 must go together; (3) the sense,
when one comes to consider it, actually requires 蔣, for it is
absurd to talk of pools and ponds as in themselves suitable places
for an ambush; (4) Li Ching (571–649 A. D.) in his 兵法 “Art
of War” has the words: 蔣潢蘙薈則必索其伏. This is evidently a
reminiscence of Sun Tzŭ, so there can be little doubt that 蔣 stood
in the text at this early date. It may be added that the _T‘ung
Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ both have 蔣, and the latter also reads 并 for 井.

or woods with thick undergrowth,

I read 小林 with the _Yü Lan_ in preference to 山林, given in the
original text, which is accepted by the commentators without
question. The text of the _T‘u Shu_ up to this point runs as
follows: 潢井蒹葭林木蘙薈者.

they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places
where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.

The original text omits 藏, which has been restored from the _T‘ung
Tien_ and _Yü Lan_. The _T‘u Shu_ omits 處 as well, making 所 a
substantive. On 姦 Chang Yü has the note: 又慮姦細潛隱覘我虛實聽我號令
伏姦當爲兩事 “We must also be on our guard against traitors who may
lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and
overhearing our instructions. _Fu_ and _chien_ are to be taken
separately.”

18. 敵近而靜者恃其險也

When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on
the natural strength of his position.

Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of
which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern
manual like Gen. Baden-Powell’s “Aids to Scouting.”

19. 遠而挑戰者欲人之進也

When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for
the other side to advance.

Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes
to dislodge us. “If he came close up to us,” says Tu Mu, “and
tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there
would be less probability of our responding to the challenge.”

20. 其所居者易利也

If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.

易 is here the opposite of 險 in § 18. The reading of the _T‘ung
Tien_ and _Yü Lan_, 其所處者居易利也, is pretty obviously corrupt.
The original text, which transposes 易 and 者, may very possibly be
right. Tu Mu tells us that there is yet another reading:
士爭其所居者易利也.

21. 衆樹動者來也衆草多障者疑也

Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is
advancing.

Ts‘ao Kung explains this as “felling trees to clear a passage,”
and Chang Yü says: “Every army sends out scouts to climb high
places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a
forest are moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut
down to clear a passage for the enemy’s march.”

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass
means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.

Whenever the meaning of a passage happens to be somewhat elusive,
Capt. Calthrop seems to consider himself justified in giving free
rein to the imagination. Thus, though his text is here identical
with ours, he renders the above: “Broken branches and trodden
grass, as of the passing of a large host, must be regarded with
suspicion.” Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts‘ao Kung, is as
follows: “The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the
midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled
and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places in order
to make us suspect an ambush.” It appears that these “screens”
were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the
retreating enemy happened to come across.

22. 鳥起者伏也獸駭者覆也

The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade.

Chang Yü’s explanation is doubtless right: “When birds that are
flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means
that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath.”

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.

An example of 覆 _fou_^4 in the meaning of “ambuscade” may be found
in the _Tso Chuan_, 隱 9th year: 君爲三覆以待之. In the present
passage, however, it is to be distinguished from 伏 just above, in
that it implies onward motion on the part of the attacking force.
Thus, Li Ch‘üan defines it as 不意而至, and Tu Mu as 來襲我也.

23. 塵高而銳者車來也卑而廣者徒來也散而條達者樵採也少而往來者營軍也

When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots
advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it
betokens the approach of infantry.

高而銳 “high and sharp,” or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat
exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the
phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than
men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in the same
wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks,
many abreast. According to Chang Yü, “every army on the march must
have scouts (探候之人) some way in advance, who on sighting dust
raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the
commander-in-chief.” Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: “As you move along,
say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar for
the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting
up, glitter of arms, etc.”[174]

When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties
have been sent to collect firewood.

There is some doubt about the reading 樵採. The _T‘ung Tien_ and
_Yü Lan_ have 薪採, and Li Ch‘üan proposes 薪來.

A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is
encamping.

Chang Yü says: “In apportioning the defences for a cantonment,
light horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain
the weak and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the
small quantity of dust and its motion.”

24. 辭卑而益備者進也辭强而進驅者退也

Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is
about to advance.

“As though they stood in great fear of us,” says Tu Mu. “Their
object is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they
will attack us.” Chang Yü alludes to the story of 田單 T‘ien Tan of
the Ch‘i State, who in 279 B.C. was hard-pressed in his defence of
卽墨 Chi-mo against the Yen forces, led by 騎劫 Ch‘i Chieh. In ch.
82 of the _Shih Chi_ we read: “T‘ien Tan openly said: ‘My only
fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses of their Ch‘i
prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight against us;
that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other side being
informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion;
but those within the city were enraged at seeing their
fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they
should fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend
themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T‘ien Tan sent
back converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: ‘What
I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral
tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this indignity on our
forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.’ Forthwith the
besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in
them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from
the city-walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out
and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. T‘ien Tan knew then
that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. But instead of a
sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and ordered others
to be distributed amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were
filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served out all
the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular
soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned
with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were
despatched to the enemy’s camp to arrange terms of surrender,
whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T‘ien Tan also
collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the
wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the
prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would not allow their
homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch‘i Chieh,
in high good humour, granted their prayer; but his army now became
increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, T‘ien Tan got together
a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk, painted
their bodies, dragon-like, with coloured stripes, and fastened
sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on their
tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and
drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in
the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors.
The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the enemy’s
camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for their
tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their
bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with
whom they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had
crept up with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on
the enemy. At the same moment a frightful din arose in the city
itself, all those that remained behind making as much noise as
possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, until
heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar. Terror-stricken,
the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Ch‘i,
who succeeded in slaying their general Ch‘i Chieh.... The result
of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some seventy cities
which had belonged to the Ch‘i State.”

Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs
that he will retreat.

I follow the original text here, also adopted by the _T‘u Shu_.
The standard text reads 辭詭而强進驅者退也 on the strength of Ts‘ao
Kung’s commentary 詭詐也, which shows that his text included
the word 詭. Strong as this ground is, I do not think it can
counterbalance the obvious superiority of the other reading in
point of sense. 詭 not only provides no antithesis to 卑, but makes
the whole passage absurd; for if the language of the enemy is
calculated to deceive, it cannot be known as deceitful at the
time, and can therefore afford no “sign.” Moreover, the extra word
in 强進驅者 (an awkward locution, by the way) spoils the parallelism
with 益備者.

25. 輕車先出居其側者陳也

When the light chariots

The same, according to Tu Yu, as the 馳車 of II. § 1.

come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that
the enemy is forming for battle.

The T‘ung Tien omits 出.

26. 無約而請和者謀也

Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.

Tu Yu defines 約 as 要約, and Li Ch‘üan as 質盟之約 “a treaty
confirmed by oaths and hostages.” Wang Hsi and Chang Yü, on the
other hand, simply say 無故 “without reason,” “on a frivolous
pretext,” as though 約 bore the rather unusual sense of
“important.” Capt. Calthrop has “without consultation,” which is
too loose.

27. 奔走而陳兵者期也

When there is much running about

Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental
banner.

and the soldiers fall into rank,

I follow the _T‘u Shu_ in omitting 車 after 兵. Tu Mu quotes the
_Chou Li_, ch. xxix. fol. 31: 車驟徒趨及表乃止.

it means that the critical moment has come.

What Chia Lin calls 晷刻之期, as opposed to 尋常之期.

28. 半進半退者誘也

When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.

Capt. Calthrop is hardly right in translating: “An advance,
followed by sudden retirement.” It is rather a case of feigned
confusion. As Tu Mu says: 僞爲雜亂不整之狀.

29. 倚仗而立者飢也

When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from
want of food.

仗 is here probably not a synonym for 倚, but = 兵 “a weapon.” The
original text has 杖而立者, which has been corrected from the
_T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_.

30. 汲而先飮者渴也

If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the
army is suffering from thirst.

As Tu Mu remarks: 覩一人三軍可知也 “One may know the condition of a
whole army from the behaviour of a single man.” The 先 may mean
either that they drink before drawing water for the army, or before
they return to camp. Chang Yü takes the latter view. The _T‘ung
Tien_ has the faulty reading 汲役先飮者, and the _Yü Lan_, worse
still, 汲設飮者.

31. 見利而不進者勞也

If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained

Not necessarily “booty,” as Capt. Calthrop translates it. The
_T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 向人見利, etc.

and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.

32. 鳥集者虛也夜呼者恐也

If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.

A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch‘ên Hao
says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.

Clamour by night betokens nervousness.

Owing to false alarms; or, as Tu Mu explains it: 恐懼不安故夜呼以
自壯也 “Fear makes men restless; so they fall to shouting at night
in order to keep up their courage.” The _T‘ung Tien_ inserts 喧
before 呼.

33. 軍擾者將不重也旌旗動者亂也吏怒者倦也

If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is weak.
If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot.

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ omit 旌.

If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.

And therefore, as Capt. Calthrop says, slow to obey. Tu Yu
understands the sentence differently: “If all the officers of an
army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken
with fatigue” [owing to the exertions which he has demanded from
them].

34. 粟馬肉食軍無懸缻不返其舍者窮宼也

When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food,

粟馬肉食 is expanded by Mei Yao-ch‘ên (following Tu Mu) into
給糧以𥞊乎馬殺畜以饗乎士, which is the sense I have given above. In
the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and
the horses chiefly on grass.

and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots

The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 缶, which is much the same as 缻, and the _Yü
Lan_ 箠, which is manifestly wrong.

over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their tents,

For 返, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ both read 及.

you may know that they are determined to fight to the death.

For 窮宼, see VII. § 36. I may quote here the illustrative passage
from the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by
the _P‘ei Wên Yün Fu_: “The rebel 王國 Wang Kuo of 梁 Liang was
besieging the town of 陳倉 Ch‘ên-ts‘ang, and 皇甫嵩 Huang-fu Sung,
who was in supreme command, and 董卓 Tung Cho were sent out against
him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf
ear to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and
began to throw down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was
now for advancing to the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a principle
of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating
host.’ Sung answered: ‘That does not apply here. What I am about
to attack is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined
troops I am falling on a disorganised multitude, not a band of
desperate men.’ Thereupon he advanced to the attack unsupported by
his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being slain.” The
inferior reading of the _T‘u Shu_ for § 34 is as follows: 殺馬肉食者
軍無糧也懸缻不返其舍者窮宼也. The first clause strikes me as rather
shallow for Sun Tzŭ, and it is hard to make anything of 懸缻 in
the second without the negative. Capt. Calthrop, nothing daunted,
set down in his first edition: “When they _cast away_ their
cooking-pots.” He now has: “When the cooking-pots are hung up on
the wall.”

35. 諄諄翕翕徐言入入者失衆也

The sight of men whispering together

諄諄 is well explained by Tu Mu as 乏氣聲促 “speaking with bated
breath.”

in small knots

The _Shuo Wên_ rather strangely defines 翕 by the word 起, but the
_Êrh Ya_ says 合 “to join” or “contract,” which is undoubtedly its
primary meaning. Chang Yü is right, then, in explaining it here by
the word 聚. The other commentators are very much at sea: Ts‘ao
Kung says 失志貌, Tu Yu 不眞, Tu Mu 顚倒失次貌, Chia Lin 不安貌, Mei
Yao-ch‘ên 曠職事, Wang Hsi 患其上.

or speaking in subdued tones

入入 is said to be the same as 如如.

points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.

失衆 is equivalent to 失其衆心, the subject of course being “the
general,” understood. In the original text, which seems to be
followed by several commentators, the whole passage stands thus:
諄諄翕翕徐與人言者失衆也. Here it would be the general who is talking
to his men, not the men amongst themselves. For 翕, which is the
chief stumbling-block in the way of this reading, the _T‘u Shu_
gives the very plausible emendation 𧬈 (also read _hsi_, and
defined by K‘ang Hsi as 疾言 “to speak fast”). But this is
unnecessary if we keep to the standard text.

36. 屢賞者窘也數罰者困也

Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his
resources;

Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is
always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the
men in good temper.

too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.

Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted
severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.

37. 先暴而後畏其衆者不精之至也

To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s
numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.

I follow the interpretation of Ts‘ao Kung: 先輕敵後聞其衆則心惡之也,
also adopted by Li Ch‘üan, Tu Mu and Chang Yü. Another possible
meaning, set forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Wang Hsi,
is: “The general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then
in terror lest they should mutiny, etc.” This would connect the
sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments. The
_T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 情 “affection” instead of 精.

38. 來委謝者欲休息也

When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign
that the enemy wishes for a truce.

Tu Mu says: 所以委質來謝此乃勢已窮或有他故必欲休息也 “If the enemy
open friendly relations by sending hostages, it is a sign that
they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength
is exhausted or for some other reason.” But it hardly needs a Sun
Tzŭ to draw such an obvious inference; and although Tu Mu is
supported by Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Chang Yü, I cannot think that
hostages are indicated by the word 委.

39. 兵怒而相迎久而不合又不相去必謹察之

If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for
a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off
again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and
circumspection.

Capt. Calthrop falls into a trap which often lurks in the word 相.
He translates: “When both sides, eager for a fight, face each
other for a considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring,”
etc. Had he reflected a little, he would have seen that this is
meaningless as addressed to a commander who has control over the
movements of his own troops. 相迎, then, does not mean that the two
armies go to meet each other, but simply that the other side comes
up to us. Likewise with 相去. If this were not perfectly clear of
itself, Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase would make it so: 怒而來逆我,
etc. As Ts‘ao Kung points out, a manœuvre of this sort may be only
a _ruse_ to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying
of an ambush.

40. 兵非益多也惟無武進足以倂力料敵取人而已

If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply
sufficient;

Wang Hsi’s paraphrase, partly borrowed from Ts‘ao Kung, is
權力均足矣. Another reading, adopted by Chia Lin and the _T‘u Shu_,
is 兵非貴益多, which Capt. Calthrop renders, much too loosely:
“Numbers are no certain mark of strength.”

it only means that no direct attack can be made.

Literally, “no martial advance.” That is to say, 正 “_chêng_”
tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem
resorted to instead.

What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength,
keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.

This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed
in squeezing very good sense out of it. The difficulty lies
chiefly in the words 取人, which have been taken in every possible
way. I follow Li Ch‘üan, who appears to offer the simplest
explanation: 惟得人者勝也 “Only the side that gets more men will
win.” Ts‘ao Kung’s note, concise as usual to the verge of
incomprehensibility, is 厮養足也. Fortunately we have Chang Yü to
expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity itself:
兵力既均又未見便雖未足剛進足以取人於厮養之中以并兵合力察敵而取勝不必假他
兵以助己 “When the numbers are even, and no favourable opening
presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver
a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our
sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces
and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the
victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us.”
He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: 助卒名爲十萬其實不過數萬耳
“The nominal strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but
their real value will be not more than half that figure.”
According to this interpretation, 取人 means “to get recruits,” not
from outside, but from the tag-rag and bobtail which follows in
the wake of a large army. This does not sound a very soldierly
suggestion, and I feel convinced that it is not what Sun Tzŭ
meant. Chia Lin, on the other hand, takes the words in a different
sense altogether, namely “to conquer the enemy” [cf. I. § 20]. But
in that case they could hardly be followed by 而已. Better than
this would be the rendering “to make isolated captures,” as
opposed to 武進 “a general attack.”

41. 夫惟無慮而易敵者必擒於人

He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is
sure to be captured by them.

The force of 夫惟 is not easy to appreciate. Ch‘én Hao says 殊無遠慮
但輕敵者, thus referring 惟 to the second verb. He continues, quoting
from the _Tso Chuan_: 蜂蠆有毒而况國乎則小敵亦不可輕 “If bees and
scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! [僖公,
XXII. 3.] Even a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with
contempt.”

42. 卒未親附而罰之則不服不服則難用也卒已親附而罰不行則不可用也

If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they
will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, they will be
practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to
you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.

This is wrongly translated by Capt. Calthrop: “If the troops know
the general, but are not affected by his punishments, they are
useless.”

43. 故令之以文齊之以武是謂必取

Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with
humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline.

文 and 武, according to Ts‘ao Kung, are here equivalent to 仁 and
法 respectively. Compare our two uses of the word “civil.” 晏子 Yen
Tzŭ [✝ B.C. 493] said of 司馬穰苴 Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü: 文能附衆武能威敵也
“His civil virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess
kept his enemies in awe.” Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 _init_.: 夫總文武者軍之
將也兼剛柔者兵之事也 “The ideal commander unites culture with a
warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination
of hardness and tenderness.” Again I must find fault with Capt.
Calthrop’s translation: “By humane treatment we obtain obedience;
authority brings uniformity.”

This is a certain road to victory.

44. 令素行以教其民則民服令不素行以教其民則民不服

If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army
will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read: 令素行以教其人者也令素行則人服令素
不行則人不服.

45. 令素信著者與衆相得也

If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his
orders being obeyed,

The original text has 令素行者. 令素 is certainly awkward without
行, but on the other hand it is clear that Tu Mu accepted the
_T‘ung Tien_ text, which is identical with ours. He says: “A
general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his
men and also make his authority respected, so that when they
come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline
maintained, because they all trust and look up to him.” What Sun
Tzŭ has said in § 44, however, would lead one rather to expect
something like this: “If a general is always confident that his
orders will be carried out,” etc. Hence I am tempted to think that
he may have written 令素信行者. But this is perhaps too conjectural.

the gain will be mutual.

Chang Yü says: 上以信使民民以信服上是上下相得也 “The general has
confidence in the men under his command, and the men are docile,
having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual.” He quotes a
pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 4: 令之之法小過無更小疑無中
“The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders
and not to be swayed by petty doubts.” Vacillation and fussiness
are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army. Capt.
Calthrop winds up the chapter with a final mistranslation of a
more than usually heinous description: “Orders are always obeyed,
if general and soldiers are in sympathy.” Besides inventing the
latter half of the sentence, he has managed to invert protasis and
apodosis.

X. 地形篇

TERRAIN.

Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1–13, deals with
地形, the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The “six
calamities” are discussed in §§ 14–20, and the rest of the chapter
is again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less
interesting, perhaps, on that account.

1. 孫子曰地形有通者有挂者有支者有隘者有險者有遠者

Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit:
(1) Accessible ground;

Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: 道路交達 “plentifully provided with roads and
means of communication.”

(2) entangling ground;

The same commentator says: 網羅之地往必掛綴 “Net-like country, venturing
into which you become entangled.”

(3) temporising ground;

Tu Yu explains 支 as 久. This meaning is still retained in modern
phrases such as 支托, 支演 “stave off,” “delay.” I do not know why
Capt. Calthrop calls 支地 “suspended ground,” unless he is
confusing it with 挂地.

(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights;

The root idea in 隘 is narrowness; in 險, steepness.

(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.

It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this
classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in
the Chinaman’s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions
such as the above.

2. 我可以往彼可以來曰通

Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called
_accessible_.

Generally speaking, 平陸 “level country” is meant. Cf. IX. § 9: 處易.

3. 通形者先居高陽利糧道以戰則利

With regard to ground of this nature,

The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 居通地.

be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,

See IX. § 2. The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 先據其地.

and carefully guard your line of supplies.

A curious use of 利 as a verb, if our text is right. The general
meaning is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, 無使敵絶己糧道 “not to allow
the enemy to cut your communications.” Tu Mu, who was not a
soldier and can hardly have had any practical experience of
fighting, goes more into detail and speaks of protecting the line
of communications by a wall (壘), or enclosing it by embankments on
each side (作甬道)! In view of Napoleon’s dictum, “the secret of
war lies in the communications,”[175] we could wish that Sun Tzŭ
had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here
and in I. § 10, VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: “The line of
supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as
the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duellist who
finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and
his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s
movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so
the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds
himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has
not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more or
less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on
ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will
not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or the
surrender of his whole army.”[176]

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.

Omitted by Capt. Calthrop.

4. 可以往難以返曰挂

Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called
_entangling_.

Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating 返 “retreat from it.”

5. 挂形者敵無備出而勝之敵若有備出而不勝難以返不利

From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may
sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your
coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible,
disaster will ensue.

不利 (an example of litotes) is paraphrased by Mei Yao-ch‘ên as
必受制 “you will receive a check.”

6. 我出而不利彼出而不利曰支

When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the
first move, it is called _temporising_ ground.

俱不便久相持也 “Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the
situation remains at a deadlock” (Tu Yu).

7. 支形者敵雖利我我無出也引而去令敵半出而擊之利

In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an
attractive bait,

Tu Yu says 佯背我去 “turning their backs on us and pretending to
flee.” But this is only one of the lures which might induce us to
quit our position. Here again 利 is used as a verb, but this time
in a different sense: “to hold out an advantage to.”

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus
enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come
out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên paraphrases the passage in a curious jingle, the scheme
of rhymes being _abcbdd_: 各居所險、先出必敗、利而誘我、我不可愛、僞去引敵、半出而擊.

8. 隘形者我先居之必盈之以待敵

With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first,

Capt. Calthrop says: “Defiles, make haste to occupy.” But this is
a conditional clause, answering to 若敵先居之 in the next paragraph.

let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.

Because then, as Tu Yu observes, 皆制在我然後出奇以制敵 “the
initiative will lie with us, and by making sudden and unexpected
attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy.” The commentators
make a great pother about the precise meaning of 盈 which to the
foreign reader seems to present no difficulty whatever.

9. 若敵先居之盈而勿從不盈而從之

Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after
him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly
garrisoned.

10. 險形者我先居之必居高陽以待敵

With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with your
adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there
wait for him to come up.

Ts‘ao Kung says: 地形險隘尤不可致於人 “The particular advantage of
securing heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then
be dictated by the enemy.” [For the enunciation of the grand
principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yü tells the following
anecdote of 裴行儉 P‘ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619–682), who was sent
on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. “At nightfall
he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely
fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the
army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly
displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the
extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P‘ei Hsing-chien,
however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp
moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm
came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to the
depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed
at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did
you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P‘ei Hsing-chien
replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without
asking unnecessary questions.’ [See _Chiu T‘ang Shu_, ch. 84, fol.
12 _r_^o, and _Hsin T‘ang Shu_, ch. 108, fol. 5 _v_^o.] From this
it may be seen,” Chang Yü continues, “that high and sunny places
are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are
immune from disastrous floods.”

11. 若敵先居之引而去之勿從也

If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but
retreat and try to entice him away.

The turning-point of 李世民 Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D.
against the two rebels, 竇建德 Tou Chien-tê, King of 夏 Hsia, and
王世充 Wang Shih-ch‘ung, Prince of 鄭 Chêng, was his seizure of the
heights of 武牢 Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-tê persisted in
his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken
prisoner. [See _Chiu T‘ang Shu_, ch. 2, fol. 5 _v_^o and also ch.
54.]

12. 遠形者勢均難以挑戰戰而不利

If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the
strength of the two armies is equal,

The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 夫通形均勢.

it is not easy to provoke a battle,

Ts‘ao Kung says that 挑戰 means 延敵 “challenging the enemy.” But
the enemy being far away, that plainly involves, as Tu Yu says,
迎敵 “going to meet him.” The point of course is, that we must not
think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of
which 是我困敵銳 “we should, be exhausted and our adversary fresh
and keen.”

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

13. 凡此六者地之道也將之至任不可不察也

These six are the principles connected with Earth.

Or perhaps, “the principles relating to ground.” See, however, I.
§ 8.

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to
study them.

Capt. Calthrop omits 至任. Out of the foregoing six 地形, it will
be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to the
configuration of the country, and that only 4 and 5 can be said to
convey any definite geographical idea.

14. 故兵有走者有弛者有陷者有崩者有亂者有北者凡此六者非天之災將之過也

Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from
natural causes,

The _T‘u Shu_ reads 天地之災.

but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1)
Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5)
disorganisation; (6) rout.

I take exception to Capt. Calthrop’s rendering of 陷 and 崩 as
“distress” and “disorganisation,” respectively.

15. 夫勢均以一擊十曰走

Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another
ten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the former.

Cf. III. § 10. The general’s fault here is that of 不料力 “not
calculating the enemy’s strength.” It is obvious that 勢 cannot
have the same force as in § 12, where it was equivalent to 兵力. I
should not be inclined, however, to limit it, with Chang Yü, to
將之智勇兵之利銳 “the wisdom and valour of the general and the
sharpness of the weapons.” As Li Ch‘üan very justly remarks,
若得形便之地用奇伏之計則可矣 “Given a decided advantage in position,
or the help of some stratagem such as a flank attack or an
ambuscade, it would be quite possible [to fight in the ratio of
one to ten].”

16. 卒强吏弱曰弛吏强卒弱曰陷

When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak,
the result is _insubordination_.

弛 “laxity”—the metaphor being taken from an unstrung bow. Capt.
Calthrop’s “relaxation” is not good, on account of its ambiguity.
Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of 田布 T‘ien Pu [_Hsin T‘ang Shu_,
ch. 148], who was sent to 魏 Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an
army against 王廷湊 Wang T‘ing-ts‘ou. But the whole time he was in
command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and
openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys,
several thousands at a time. T‘ien Pu was powerless to put a stop
to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he made an
attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed
in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed
suicide by cutting his throat.

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the
result is _collapse_.

Ts‘ao Kung says: 吏强欲進卒弱輒陷 “The officers are energetic and
want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly
collapse.” Note that 弱 is to be taken literally of physical
weakness, whereas in the former clause it is figurative. Li Ch‘üan
makes 陷 equivalent to 敗, and Tu Mu explains it as 陷沒於死地
“stumbling into a death-trap.”

17. 大吏怒而不服遇敵懟而自戰將不知其能曰崩

When the higher officers

大吏, according to Ts‘ao Kung, are the 小將 “generals of inferior
rank.” But Li Ch‘üan, Ch‘ên Hao and Wang Hsi take the term as
simply convertible with 將 or 大將.

are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle
on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the
commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to
fight, the result is _ruin_.

Ts‘ao Kung makes 大將, understood, the subject of 怒, which seems
rather far-fetched. Wang Hsi’s note is: 謂將怒不以理且不知禆佐之才激致
其兇難如山之崩壞也 “This means, the general is angry without just
cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his
subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings
an avalanche of ruin upon his head.” He takes 能, therefore,
in the sense of 才; but I think that Ch‘ên Hao is right in his
paraphrase 不顧能否 “they don’t care if it be possible or no.” My
interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yao-ch‘ên and
Chang Yü. Tu Mu gives a long extract from the _Tso Chuan_, 宣公,
XII. 3, showing how the great battle of 邲 Pi [597 B.C.] was lost
for the 晉 Chin State through the contumacy of 先縠 Hsien Hu and
the resentful spite of 魏錡 Wei I and 趙旃 Chao Chan. Chang Yü also
alludes to the mutinous conduct of 欒黶 Luan Yen [_ibid_. 襄公,
XIV. 3].

18. 將弱不嚴教道不明吏卒無常陳兵縱橫曰亂

When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are
not clear and distinct;

Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: 上無疑令、則衆不二聽、動無疑事、則衆不二志 “If
the commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will not
wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without vacillation,
the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty.”
General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words: “The secret of
getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one
nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they receive.”[177]
Assuming that clear instructions beget confidence, this is very much
what Wei Liao Tzŭ (_loc. cit._) goes on to say: 未有不信其心而能得其
力者也. Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: 用兵之害猶豫最大三軍之災生於狐疑 “the
most fatal defect in a military leader is diffidence; the worst
calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation.”

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,

吏卒皆不拘常度 “Neither officers nor men have any regular routine”
[Tu Mu].

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is
utter _disorganisation_.

19. 將不能料敵以少合衆以弱擊强兵無選鋒曰北

When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an
inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment
against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the
front rank, the result must be a _rout_.

Chang Yü paraphrases the latter part of the sentence 不選驍勇之士使爲
先鋒兵必敗北也, and continues: 凡戰必用精銳爲前鋒者一則壯吾志一則挫敵威也
“Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits
should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to
strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralise the
enemy.” Cf. the _primi ordines_ of Caesar (“De Bello Gallico,”
V. 28, 44 _et al_.). There seems little to distinguish 北 from 走
in § 15, except that 北 is a more forcible word.

20. 凡此六者敗之道也將之至任不可不察也

These are six ways of courting defeat,

Ch‘ên Hao makes them out to be: (1) 不量寡衆 “neglect to estimate
the enemy’s strength;” (2) 本乏刑德 “want of authority;” (3)
失於訓練 “defective training;” (4) 非理興怒 “unjustifiable anger;”
(5) 法令不行 “non-observance of discipline;” (6) 不擇驍果 “failure
to use picked men.”

which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a
responsible post.

See _supra_, § 13.

21. 夫地形者兵之助也料敵制勝計險阨遠近上將之道也

The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally;

Chia Lin’s text has the reading 易 for 助. Ch‘ên Hao says: 天時不如
地利 “The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those
connected with ground.”

but a power of estimating the adversary,

The insertion of a “but” is necessary to show the connection of
thought here. A general should always utilise, but never rely
wholly on natural advantages of terrain.

of controlling the forces of victory,

制勝 is one of those condensed expressions which mean so much in
Chinese, and so little in an English translation. What it seems to
imply is complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.

and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances,

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 計極險易利害遠近. I am decidedly
puzzled by Capt. Calthrop’s translation: “an eye for steepness,
_command_ and distances.” Where did he find the word which I have
put in italics?

constitutes the test of a great general.

A somewhat free translation of 道. As Chang Yü remarks, these are
兵之本 “the essentials of soldiering,” ground being only a helpful
accessory.

22. 知此而用戰者必勝不知此而用戰者必敗

He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into
practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises
them, will surely be defeated.

23. 故戰道必勝主曰無戰必戰可也戰道不勝主曰必戰無戰可也

If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even
though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory,
then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding.

Cf. VIII. § 3 _fin_. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch‘in dynasty, who
is said to have been the patron of 張良 Chang Liang and to have
written the 三略, has these words attributed to him: 出軍行師將在自專
進退內御則功難成故聖主明王跪而推轂 “The responsibility of setting an
army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance and
retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will
hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened
monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their
country’s cause [_lit_., kneel down to push the chariot wheel].”
This means that 閫外之事將軍裁之 “in matters lying outside the
zenana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute.”
Chang Yü also quotes the saying: 軍中不聞天子之詔 “Decrees of the
Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp.” Napoleon, who
has been accused of allowing his generals too little independence
of action, speaks in the same sense: “Un général en chef n’est pas
à couvert de ses fautes à la guerre par un ordre de son souverain
ou du ministre, quand celui qui le donne est éloigné du champ
d’opération, et qu’il connaît mal, ou ne connaît pas du tout le
dernier état des choses.”[178]

24. 故進不求名退不避罪唯民是保而利合於主國之寳也

The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without
fearing disgrace,

It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all
for a soldier is to retreat.

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for
his sovereign,

合, which is omitted by the _T‘u Shu_, is said by Ch‘ên Hao to be
equivalent to 歸. If it had to be separately translated, it would
be something like our word “accrue.”

is the jewel of the kingdom.

A noble presentment, in few words, of the Chinese “happy warrior.”
Such a man, says Ho Shih, 罪及其身不悔也 “even if he had to suffer
punishment, would not regret his conduct.”

25. 視卒如嬰兒故可與之赴深谿視卒如愛子故可與之俱死

Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into
the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they
will stand by you even unto death.

Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging
picture of the famous general Wu Ch‘i, from whose treatise on war
I have frequently had occasion to quote: “He wore the same clothes
and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to
have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own
surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship
with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess,
and Wu Ch‘i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier’s mother,
hearing this, began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her,
saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and
yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his
sore.’ The woman replied: ‘Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a
similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and
finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he
has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not
where’.” Li Ch‘üan mentions 楚子 the Viscount of Ch‘u, who invaded
the small state of 蕭 Hsiao during the winter. 申公 The Duke of
Shên said to him: “Many of the soldiers are suffering severely
from the cold.” So he made a round of the whole army, comforting
and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they
were clothed in garments lined with floss silk. [_Tso Chuan_, 宣公,
XII. 5]. Chang Yü alludes to the same passage, saying: 温言一撫士同
挾纊.

26. 厚而不能使愛而不能令亂而不能治譬如驕子不可用也

If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority
felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and
incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder:

Capt. Calthrop has got these three clauses quite wrong. The last
he translates: “overindulgence may produce disorder.”

then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are
useless for any practical purpose.

Cf. IX. § 42. We read in the 陰符經, pt. 2: 害生于思 “Injury comes
out of kindness.” Li Ching once said that if you could make your
soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu
Mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred
in 219 A.D., when 呂蒙 Lü Mêng was occupying the town of 江陵
Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to
molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force.
Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who
happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo
hat (笠) belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over
his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lü Mêng
considered that the fact of his being also a native of 汝南 Ju-nan
should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline,
and accordingly he ordered his summary execution, the tears
rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of severity
filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even
articles dropped in the highway were not picked up. [_San Kuo
Chih_, ch. 54, f. 13 _r_^o. & _v_^o.].

27. 知吾卒之可以擊而不知敵之不可擊勝之半也

If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are
unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only
halfway towards victory.

That is, as Ts‘ao Kung says, “the issue in this case is uncertain.”

28. 知敵之可擊而不知吾卒之不可以擊勝之半也

If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our
own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway
towards victory.

Cf. III. § 13 (1).

29. 知敵之可擊知吾卒之可以擊而不知地形之不可以戰勝之半也

If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our
men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of
the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only
halfway towards victory.

I may take this opportunity of pointing out the rather nice
distinction in meaning between 擊 and 攻. The latter is simply “to
attack” without any further implication, whereas 擊 is a stronger
word which in nine cases out of ten means “to attack with
expectation of victory,” “to fall upon,” as we should say, or even
“to crush.” On the other hand, 擊 is not quite synonymous with 伐,
which is mostly used of operations on a larger scale, as of one
State _making war_ on another, often with the added idea of
invasion. 征, finally, has special reference to the subjugation of
rebels. See Mencius, VII. 2. ii. 2.

30. 故知兵者動而不迷舉而不窮

Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered;
once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.

The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his
measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. “He does
not move recklessly,” says Chang Yü, “so that when he does move,
he makes no mistakes.” Another reading substitutes 困 for 迷 and
頓 for 窮. The latter variant only is adopted by the _T‘ung Tien_
and _Yü Lan_. Note that 窮 here means “at the end of his _mental_
resources.”

31. 故曰知彼知己勝乃不殆知地知天勝乃可全

Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your
victory will not stand in doubt;

Capt. Calthrop makes the saying end here, which cannot be justified.

if you know Heaven and know Earth,

天 and 地 are transposed for the sake of the jingle between 天 and
全. The original text, however, has 知天知地, and the correction
has been made from the _T‘ung Tien_.

you may make your victory complete.

As opposed to 勝之半, above. The original text has 勝乃不窮, the
corruption being perhaps due to the occurrence of 不窮 in the
preceding sentence. Here, however 不窮 would not be synonymous
with 不困, but equivalent to 不可以窮 “inexhaustible,” “beyond
computation.” Cf. V. § 11. The _T‘ung Tien_ has again supplied the
true reading. Li Ch‘üan sums up as follows: 人事天時地利三者同知則
百戰百勝 “Given a knowledge of three things—the affairs of man, the
seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth—, victory
will invariably crown your battles.”

XI. 九地篇

THE NINE SITUATIONS.

Li Ch‘üan is not quite right in calling these 勝敵之地. As we shall
see, some of them are highly disadvantageous from the military
point of view. Wang Hsi more correctly says: 用兵之地利害有九也
“There are nine military situations, good and bad.” One would like
to distinguish the 九地 from the six 地形 of chap. X by saying that
the latter refer to the natural formation or geographical features
of the country, while the 九地 have more to do with the condition
of the army, being 地勢 “situations” as opposed to “grounds.” But
it is soon found impossible to carry out the distinction. Both are
cross-divisions, for among the 地形 we have “temporising ground”
side by side with “narrow passes,” while in the present chapter
there is even greater confusion.

1. 孫子曰用兵之法有散地有輕地有爭地有交地有衢地有重地有圮地有圍地有死地

Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1)
Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open
ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7)
difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.

2. 諸侯自戰其地者爲散地

When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive
ground.

So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and
anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the
opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction.
“In their advance,” observes Tu Mu, “they will lack the valour of
desperation, and when they retreat, they will find harbours of
refuge.” The 者, which appears in the _T‘u Shu_, seems to have been
accidentally omitted in my edition of the standard text.

3. 入人之地而不深者爲輕地

When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great
distance, it is facile ground.

Li Ch‘üan and Ho Shih say 輕於退也 “because of the facility for
retreating,” and the other commentators give similar explanations.
Tu Mu remarks: 師出越境必焚舟梁示民無返顧之心 “When your army has
crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in
order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering
after home.” I do not think that “disturbing ground,” Capt.
Calthrop’s rendering of 輕地, has anything to justify it. If an
idiomatic translation is out of the question, one should at least
attempt to be literal.

4. 我得則利彼得亦利者爲爭地

Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side,
is contentious ground.

I must apologise for using this word in a sense not known to the
dictionary, i.e. “to be contended for”—Tu Mu’s 必爭之地. Ts‘ao Kung
says: 可以少勝衆弱勝强 “ground on which the few and the weak can
defeat the many and the strong,” such as 阨喉 “the neck of a pass,”
instanced by Li Ch‘üan. Thus, Thermopylae was a 爭地, because the
possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the
entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time.
Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. _ad init._: 以一擊十莫善於阨 “For those who have
to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better
than a narrow pass.” When 呂光 Lü Kuang was returning from his
triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far
as 宜禾 I-ho, laden with spoils, 梁熙 Liang Hsi, administrator of
涼州 Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King
of Ch‘in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the
province. 楊翰 Yang Han, governor of 高昌 Kao-ch‘ang, counselled
him, saying: “Lü Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west,
and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in
the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him,
and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to
occupy the defile at the mouth of the 高梧 Kao-wu pass, thus
cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are
prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without
moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off,
we could make a stand against him at the 伊吾 I-wu pass, which is
nearer. The cunning and resource of 子房 Tzŭ-fang himself [i.e.
張良] would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of
these two positions.” Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice,
was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader. [See 晉書, ch. 122,
fol. 3 _r_^o, and 歴代紀事年表, ch. 43, fol. 26.]

5. 我可以往彼可以來者爲交地

Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.

This is only a makeshift translation of 交, which according to
Ts‘ao Kung stands for 交錯 “ground covered with a network of
roads,” like a chess-board. Another interpretation, suggested by
Ho Shih, is 交通 “ground on which intercommunication is easy.” In
either case, it must evidently be 平原 “flat country,” and
therefore 不可杜絶 “cannot be blocked.” Cf. 通形, X. § 2.

6. 諸侯之地三屬先至而得天下之衆者爲衢地

Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

我與敵相當而旁有他國也 “Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a third
country conterminous with both.” [Ts‘ao Kung.] Mêng Shih instances
the small principality of 鄭 Chêng, which was bounded on the
north-east by 齊 Ch‘i, on the west by 晉 Chin, and on the south by
楚 Ch‘u.

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,

天下 of course stands for the loose confederacy of states into
which China was divided under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent
who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to
become his allies. See _infra_, § 48. 衆 appears at first sight to
be “the masses” or “population” of the Empire, but it is more
probably, as Tu Yu says, 諸侯之衆.

is ground of intersecting highways.

Capt. Calthrop’s “path-ridden ground” might stand well enough for
交地 above, but it does not bring out the force of 衢地, which
clearly denotes the central position where important highways meet.

7. 入人之地深背城邑多者爲重地

When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country,
leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear,

After 多, the _T‘ung Tien_ intercalates the gloss 難以返.

it is serious ground.

Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that 兵至此者事勢重也 “when an
army has reached such a point, its situation is serious.” Li
Ch‘üan instances (1) the victorious march of 樂毅 Yo I into the
capital of Ch‘i in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch‘u, six years
later, by the Ch‘in general 白起 Po Ch‘i.

8. 山林險阻沮澤凡難行之道者爲圮地

Mountain forests,

Or simply, “forests.” I follow the _T‘u Shu_ in omitting the 行
before 山林, given in the standard text, which is not only otiose
but spoils the rhythm of the sentence.

rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse:
this is difficult ground.

圮 _p‘i_^3 (to be distinguished from 圯 i^4) is defined by K‘ang
Hsi (after the _Shuo Wên_) as 毁 “to destroy.” Hence Chia Lin
explains 圮地 as ground 經水所毀 “that has been ruined by water
passing over it,” and Tu Yu simply as 沮洳之地 “swampy ground.” But
Ch‘ên Hao says that the word is specially applied to deep
hollows—what Chu-ko Liang, he tells us, used to designate by the
expressive term 地獄 “earth-hells.” Compare the 天井 of IX. § 15.

9. 所由入者隘所從歸者迂彼寡可以擊吾之衆者爲圍地

Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can
only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy
would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed-in
ground.

10. 疾戰則存不疾戰則亡者爲死地

Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting
without delay, is desperate ground.

The situation, as pictured by Ts‘ao Kung, is very similar to the
圍地, except that here escape is no longer possible: 前有高山後有大水
進則不得退則有礙 “A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind,
advance impossible, retreat blocked.” Ch‘ên Hao says: 人在死地如
坐漏船伏燒屋 “to be on ‘desperate ground’, is like sitting in a
leaking boat or crouching in a burning house.” Tu Mu quotes
from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus
entrapped: “Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the
aid of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the
enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a
pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together
and the chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front,
retreat cut off behind, no choice but to proceed in single
file (鴈行魚貫之嚴). Then, before there is time to range our
soldiers in order of battle, the enemy in overwhelming strength
suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a
breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a
pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none
of us has a moment’s respite. If we simply maintain our ground,
whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we
have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country
is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the
necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out,
all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so
narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten
thousand; all means of offence in the hands of the enemy, all
points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this terrible
plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the
keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest
effect?” Students of Greek history may be reminded of the awful
close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians
under Nicias and Demosthenes. [_See_ Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].

11. 是故散地則無以戰輕地則無止爭地則無攻

On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt
not. On contentious ground, attack not.

But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the
advantageous position first. So Ts‘ao Kung. Li Ch‘üan and others,
however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already
forestalled us, so that it would be sheer madness to attack. In
the 孫子敘錄, when the King of Wu inquires what should be done in
this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: “The rule with regard to contentious
ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the
other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the
enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to
flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other
places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a
dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best troops,
and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally
forth to the rescue.”

12. 交地則無絶衢地則合交

On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way.

Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking
force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations of
無絶. I follow that of Chang Yü (不可以兵阻絶其路). The other
is indicated in Ts‘ao Kung’s brief note: 相及屬也 “Draw closer
together”—_i.e._, see that a portion of your own army is not cut
off. Wang Hsi points out that 交地 is only another name for the
通地 “accessible ground” of X. § 2, and says that the advice here
given is simply a variation of 利糧道 “keep a sharp eye on the line
of supplies,” be careful that your communications are not cut. The
_T‘ung Tien_ reads 無相絶.

On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your
allies.

Or perhaps, “form alliances with neighbouring states.” Thus Ts‘ao
Kung has: 結諸侯也. Capt. Calthrop’s “cultivate intercourse” is
much too timid and vague. The original text reads 交合.

13. 重地則掠圮地則行

On serious ground, gather in plunder.

On this, Li Ch‘üan has the following delicious note: 深入敵境不可
非義失人心如漢高祖入秦無犯婦女無取寳貨得人心也此筌以掠字爲無掠字 “When
an army penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be
taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow
the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch‘in
territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of
valuables. [_Nota bene_: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause
us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900
A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, then,
I think that the true reading must be, not 掠 ‘plunder’, but 無掠
‘do not plunder’.” Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy
commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least,
has no such illusions. He says: “When encamped on ‘serious
ground,’ there being no inducement as yet to advance further,
and no possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a
protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides,
and keep a close watch on the enemy.” Cf. also II. § 9: 因糧於敵.

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

Or, in the words of VIII. §2, 無舍 “do not encamp.”

14. 圍地則謀死地則戰

On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

Ts‘ao Kung says: 發奇謀 “Try the effect of some unusual artifice;”
and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: 居此則當權謀詐譎可以免難 “In
such a position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the
circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the
peril may be escaped.” This is exactly what happened on the famous
occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on
the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the
Dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle
his foes was remarkably like that which T‘ien Tan had also
employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24,
note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the
horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals
being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the
passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of
these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans
that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed
safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII.
16, 17.]

On desperate ground, fight.

For, as Chia Lin remarks: 力戰或生守隅則死 “if you fight with all
your might, there is a chance of life; whereas death is certain if
you cling to your corner.”

15. 所謂古之善用兵者能使敵人前後不相及衆寡不相恃貴賤不相救上下不相扶

Those who were called skilful leaders of old

所謂 is omitted in the _T‘u Shu_ text.

knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy’s front and rear;

More literally, “cause the front and rear to lose touch with each
other.”

to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to
hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad,

I doubt if 貴賤 can mean “officers and men,” as Capt. Calthrop
translates. This is wanted for 上下.

the officers from rallying their men.

The reading 扶, derived from the _Yü Lan_, must be considered very
doubtful. The original text has 救 and the _T‘u Shu_ 收.

16. 卒離而不集兵合而不齊

When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from
concentrating;

Capt. Calthrop translates 卒離 “they scattered the enemy,” which
cannot be right.

even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in
disorder.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s note makes the sense plain: 或已離而不能合或雖合而
不能齊. All these clauses, of course, down to 不齊, are dependent
on 使 in § 15.

17. 合於利而動不合於利而止

When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when
otherwise, they stopped still.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên connects this with the foregoing: 然能使敵若此當須有利則
動無利則止 “Having succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would
push forward in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there
was no advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were.”

18. 敢問敵衆整而將來待之若何曰先奪其所愛則聽矣

If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array
and on the point of marching to the attack,

敢問 is like 或問, introducing a supposed question.

I should say: “Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds
dear; then he will be amenable to your will.”

Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts‘ao Kung thinks
it is 其所恃之利 “some strategical advantage on which the enemy is
depending.” Tu Mu says: 據我便地畧我田野利其糧道斯三者敵人之所愛惜倚
恃者也 “The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on
the accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to
capture our favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated
land; (3) to guard his own communications.” Our object then must
be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render
him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] But this exegesis unduly strains the
meaning of 奪 and 愛, and I agree with Ch‘ên Hao, who says that
所愛 does not refer only to strategical advantages, but is any
person or thing that may happen to be of importance to the enemy.
By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw
the other side on the defensive.

19. 兵之情主速乘人之不及由不虞之道攻其所不戒也

Rapidity is the essence of war:

兵之情 means “the conditions of war,” not, as Capt. Calthrop says,
“the spirit of the troops.” According to Tu Mu, 此統言兵之情狀
“this is a summary of leading principles in warfare,” and he adds:
此乃兵之深情將之至事也 “These are the profoundest truths of military
science, and the chief business of the general.” The following
anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, show the importance attached to speed
by two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., 孟達 Mêng Ta,
governor of 新城 Hsin-ch‘êng under the Wei Emperor Wên Ti, was
meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into
correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State.
The Wei general Ssŭ-ma I was then military governor of 宛 Wan, and
getting wind of Mêng Ta’s treachery, he at once set off with an
army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a
specious message of friendly import. Ssŭ-ma’s officers came to him
and said: “If Mêng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the
matter should be thoroughly investigated before we make a move.”
Ssŭ-ma I replied: “Mêng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to
go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before
he has thrown off the mask.” Then, by a series of forced marches,
he brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch‘êng within the
space of eight days. Now Mêng Ta had previously said in a letter
to Chu-ko Liang: “Wan is 1200 _li_ from here. When the news of
my revolt reaches Ssŭ-ma I, he will at once inform his Imperial
Master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can be
taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides,
Ssŭ-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will
be sent against us are not worth troubling about.” The next
letter, however, was filled with consternation: “Though only eight
days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is
already at the city-gates. What miraculous rapidity is this!” A
fortnight later, Hsin-ch‘êng had fallen and Mêng Ta had lost his
head. [See _Chin Shu_, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was
sent from 夔州 K‘uei-chou in Ssŭ-ch‘uan to reduce the successful
rebel 蕭銑 Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern
荊州 Ching-chou Fu In Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being
then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would
venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no
preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time,
and was just about to start when the other generals implored him
to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous
state for navigation. Li Ching replied: “To the soldier,
overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never
miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien
even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the
present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before
his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is
heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [_See_
VII, § 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if he
gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in
such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full
fruits of victory will be ours.” All came about as he predicted,
and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that
his people should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of
death. [See _Hsin T‘ang Shu_, ch. 93, f. 1 _v_^o.]

take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected
routes, and attack unguarded spots.

20. 凡爲客之道深入則專主人不克

The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force:
The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the
solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail
against you.

21. 掠於饒野三軍足食

Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.

Cf. _supra_, § 13. Li Ch‘üan does not venture on a note here.

22. 謹養而勿勞併氣積力運兵計謀爲不可測

Carefully study the well-being of your men,

謹養, according to Wang Hsi, means: 撫循飮食周謹之 “Pet them, humour
them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them
generally.”

and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your
strength.

Tu Mu explains these words in a rhyming couplet: 氣全力盛一發取勝;
and Ch‘ên recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the
famous general 王翦 Wang Chien, whose military genius largely
contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded
the Ch‘u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him.
But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all
invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In
vain did the Ch‘u general try to force a battle: day after day
Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but
devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and
confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well fed,
sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for bathing,
and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them
into a loyal and homogeneous body. After some time had elapsed,
he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing
themselves. The answer was, that they were contending with one
another in putting the weight and long-jumping (投石超距). When
Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic
pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the
required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By this
time the Ch‘u army, after repeating their challenge again and
again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch‘in general
immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the
battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly
afterwards, the whole of Ch‘u was conquered by Ch‘in, and the king
負芻 Fu-ch‘u led into captivity. [See _Shih Chi_, ch. 73, f. 5 _r_^o.
It should be noted that, 楚 being a taboo character under the Ch‘in
dynasty, the name figures as 荆 throughout.]

Keep your army continually on the move,

In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It
has struck me, however, that the true reading might be, not 運兵,
but 連兵 “link your army together” [cf. _supra_ § 46, 吾將使之屬],
which would be more in keeping with 併氣積力, Capt. Calthrop cuts
the Gordian knot by omitting the words altogether.

and devise unfathomable plans.

Ch‘ang Yü’s paraphrase is: 常爲不可測度之計.

23. 投之無所往死且不北死焉不得士人盡力

Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they
will prefer death to flight.

Cf. Nicias’ speech to the Athenians: Τό τε ξύμπαν γνῶτε, ὦ ἄνδρες
στρατιῶται, ἀναγκαῖόν τε ὂν ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι ὡς μὴ
ὄντος χωρίου ἐγγὺς ὅποι ἂν μαλακισθέντες σωθείητε, etc. [Thuc.
VII. 77. vii.]

If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.

死 by itself constitutes the protasis, and 焉 is the interrogative
= 安. Capt. Calthrop makes the protasis end with 得: “If there be
no alternative but death.” But I do not see how this is to be got
out of the Chinese. Chang Yü gives a clear paraphrase: 士卒死戰安不得志,
and quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): 一夫仗劎擊於市萬人無不避之者
臣謂非一人之獨勇萬人皆不肖也何則必死與必生固不侔也 “If one man were to run
amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to
get out of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had
courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth
is, that a desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do
not meet on even terms.”

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.

士人 appears to stand for the more usual 士卒. Chang Yü says: 同在
難地安得不共竭其力 “If they are in an awkward place together, they
will surely exert their united strength to get out of it.”

24. 兵士甚陷則不懼無所往則固深入則拘不得已則鬥

Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is
no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of
a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front.

Capt. Calthrop weakly says: “there is unity,” as though the text
were 則專, as in § 20. But 拘 introduces quite a new idea—that of
_tenacity_—which Ts‘ao Kung tries to explain by the word 縛 “to
bind fast.”

If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.

25. 是故其兵不修而戒不求而得不約而親不令而信

Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be
constantly on the _qui vive_;

Tu Mu says: 不待修整而自戒懼. Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates 不修
“without warnings.”

without waiting to be asked, they will do your will;

Literally, “without asking, you will get.” Chang Yü’s paraphrase
is: 不求索而得情意.

without restrictions, they will be faithful;

Chang Yü says: 不約束而親上.

without giving orders, they can be trusted.

This last clause is very similar in sense to the one preceding,
except that 親 indicates the soldiers’ attachment to their leader,
and 信 the leader’s attitude towards them. I rather doubt if
信 can mean “they will have confidence in their leader,” as the
commentary seems to indicate. That way, the sense is not nearly
so good. On the other hand, it is just possible that here, as in
VIII. § 8 and _infra_, § 55, 信 may = 申: “without orders, they
will carry out [their leader’s plans].” The whole of this
paragraph, of course, has reference to “desperate ground.”

26. 禁祥去疑至死無所災

Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts.

祥 is amplified by Ts‘ao Kung into 妖祥之言, and 疑 into 疑惑之計.
Cf. the _Ssŭ-ma Fa_, ch. 3: 滅厲祥.

Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.

The superstitious, “bound in to saucy doubts and fears,”
degenerate into cowards and “die many times before their deaths.”
Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: 禁巫祝不得爲吏士卜問軍之吉凶恐亂軍士之心
“‘Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no
officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an
army, for fear the soldier’s minds should be seriously perturbed.’
The meaning is,” he continues, “that if all doubts and scruples
are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution
until they die.” The reading of the standard text is 無所之 “there
will be no refuge,” which does not fit in well here. I therefore
prefer to adopt the variant 災, which evidently stood in Li
Ch‘üan’s text.

27. 吾士無餘財非惡貨也無餘命非惡壽也

If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because
they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long,
it is not because they are disinclined to longevity.

Chang Yü has the best note on this passage: 貨與壽人之所愛也所以燒擲
財寳割棄性命者非憎惡之也不得已也 “Wealth and long life are things for
which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or
fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not
that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice.” Sun
Tzŭ is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is
for the general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow
rich are not thrown in their way. Capt. Calthrop, mistaking 惡 for
the adjective, has: “not because money is a bad thing ... not
because long life is evil.”

28. 令發之日士卒坐者涕霑襟偃臥者涕交頤投之無所往者諸劌之勇也

On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep,

The word in the Chinese is 涕 “snivel.” This is taken to indicate
more genuine grief than tears alone.

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting
the tears run down their cheeks.

Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts‘ao Kung says,
皆持必死之計 “all have embraced the firm resolution to do or
die.” We may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally
childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Yü alludes to the
mournful parting at the 易 I River between 荆軻 Ching K‘o and his
friends, when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King
of Ch‘in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all
flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the
following lines: 風蕭蕭兮、易水寒、壯士一去兮、不復還 “The shrill blast
is blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is going—Not to
return.”[179]

But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage
of a Chu or a Kuei.

諸 was the personal name of 專諸 Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu
State and contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by
公子光 Kung-tzŭ Kuang, better known as Ho Lü Wang, to assassinate
his sovereign 王僚 Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in
the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his
attempt, but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king’s
bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, 曹劌
Ts‘ao Kuei (or Ts‘ao 沫 Mo), performed the exploit which has made
his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been
thrice defeated by Ch‘i, and was just about to conclude a treaty
surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts‘ao Kuei suddenly
seized 桓公 Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch‘i, as he stood on the altar
steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of the Duke’s
retainers dared to move a muscle, and Ts‘ao Kuei proceeded to
demand full restitution, declaring that Lu was being unjustly
treated because she was a smaller and weaker state. Huan Kung, in
peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts‘ao Kuei
flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the
terrified assemblage without having so much as changed colour. As
was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the
bargain, but his wise old counsellor 管仲 Kuan Chung pointed out
to him the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that
this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost
in three pitched battles. [For another anecdote of Ts‘ao Kuei see
VII. § 27, note; and for the biographies of these three bravos,
Ts‘ao, Chuan and Ching, see _Shih Chi_ ch. 86.]

29. 故善用兵譬如率然率然者常山之虵也擊其首則尾至擊其尾則首至擊其中則首尾俱至

The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the
_shuai-jan_ is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains.

率然 means “suddenly” or “rapidly,” and the snake in question
was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements.
Through this passage, the term has now come to be used in the
sense of “military manœuvres.” The 常山 have apparently not been
identified.

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at
its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle,

Another reading in the _Yü Lan_ for 中 is 腹 “belly.”

and you will be attacked by head and tail both.

30. 敢問兵可使如率然乎曰可夫吳人與越人相惡也當其同舟而濟遇風其相救也如左右手

Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_,

That is, as Mei Yao-ch‘ên says, 可使兵首尾率然相應如一體乎 “Is it
possible to make the front and rear of an army each swiftly
responsive to attack on the other, just as though they were parts
of a single living body?”

I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies;

Cf. VI. § 21.

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a
storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand
helps the right.

The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time
of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same
army, bound together as they are by every tie of interest and
fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has been
ruined through lack of co-operation, especially in the case of
allied armies.

31. 是故方馬埋輪未足恃也

Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of horses,

方 is said here to be equivalent to 縛.

and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.

These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away
recall the Athenian hero Sôphanes, who carried an anchor with him
at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself
firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough,
says Sun Tzŭ, to render flight impossible by such mechanical
means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity and
unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic
co-operation. This is the lesson which can be learned from the
_shuai-jan_.

32. 齊勇若一政之道也

The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of
courage which all must reach.

Literally, “level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of]
one.” If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it
follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts
must be of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a
certain standard. Wellington’s seemingly ungrateful description of
his army at Waterloo as “the worst he had ever commanded” meant no
more than that it was deficient in this important particular—unity
of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections
and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost
certainly have lost the day.

33. 剛柔皆得地之理也

How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question
involving the proper use of ground.

This is rather a hard sentence on the first reading, but the key
to it will be found, firstly, in the pause after 得, and next, in
the meaning of 得 itself. The best equivalent for this that I
can think of is the German “zur Geltung kommen.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s
paraphrase is: 兵無强弱皆得用者是因地之勢也 “The way to eliminate the
differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to
utilise accidental features of the ground.” Less reliable troops,
if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as better
troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position
neutralises the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson
says: “With all respect to the text books, and to ordinary
tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of ground
is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance
is attached to the selection of positions ... and to the immense
advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or
attacking, from the proper utilisation of natural features.”[180]

34. 故善用兵者攜手若使一人不得已也

Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were
leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.

Tu Mu says: 喩易也 “The simile has reference to the ease with which
he does it.” 不得已 means that he makes it impossible for his
troops to do otherwise than obey. Chang Yü quotes a jingle, to be
found in Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4: 將之所揮、莫不從移、將之所指、莫不前死.

35. 將軍之事靜以幽正以治

It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy;
upright and just, and thus maintain order.

靜 seems to combine the meanings “noiseless” and “imperturbable,”
both of which attributes would of course conduce to secrecy. Tu Mu
explains 幽 as 幽深難測 “deep and inscrutable,” and 正 as 平正無偏
“fair and unbiassed.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên alone among the commentators
takes 治 in the sense of 自治 “self-controlled.” 幽 and 治 are
causally connected with 靜 and 正 respectively. This is not brought
out at all in Capt. Calthrop’s rendering: “The general should be
calm, inscrutable, just and prudent.” The last adjective,
moreover, can in no sense be said to represent 治.

36. 能愚士卒之耳目使之無知

He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and
appearances,

Literally, “to deceive their eyes and ears”—愚 being here used as
a verb in the sense of 誤.

and thus keep them in total ignorance.

Ts‘ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: 民可與樂成
不可與慮始 “The troops must not be allowed to share your schemes
in the beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their happy
outcome.” “To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy,” is one of
the first principles in war, as has been frequently pointed out.
But how about the other process—the mystification of one’s own
men? Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is over-emphatic on this
point would do well to read Col. Henderson’s remarks on Stonewall
Jackson’s Valley campaign: “The infinite pains,” he says, “with
which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff
officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a
commander less thorough would have pronounced useless”—etc.
etc.[181] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the _Hou
Han Shu_, “Pan Ch‘ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan
and other Central Asian states with the object of crushing
Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief
commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the
kingdoms of Wên-su, Ku-mo and Wei-t‘ou, totalling 50,000 men. Pan
Ch‘ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a
council of war, and said: ‘Our forces are now outnumbered and
unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is for
us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. The
King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I will
then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening
drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch‘ao now secretly released
the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha was
thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter
set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch‘ao’s
retreat in the west, while the King of Wên-su rode eastwards with
8000 horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as
Pan Ch‘ao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he called his
divisions together, got them well in hand, and at cock-crow
hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The
barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, and were closely
pursued by Pan Ch‘ao. Over 5000 heads were brought back as
trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle
and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating,
Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces.
From that time forward, Pan Ch‘ao’s prestige completely overawed
the countries of the west.” In this case, we see that the Chinese
general not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real
plans, but actually took the bold step of dividing his army in
order to deceive the enemy.

37. 易其事革其謀使人無識易其居迂其途使人不得慮

By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,

Wang Hsi thinks that this means, not using the same stratagem
twice. He says: 已行之事已施之謀當革易之不可再之.

he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.

Note that 人 denotes the _enemy_, as opposed to the 士卒 of § 36.
Capt. Calthrop, not perceiving this, joins the two paragraphs into
one. Chang Yü quotes 太白山人 as saying: 兵貴詭道者非止詭敵也抑詭我
士卒使由而不使知之也 “The axiom, that war is based on deception,
does not apply only to deception of the enemy. You must deceive
even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without letting
them know why.”

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the
enemy from anticipating his purpose.

Wang Hsi paraphrases 易其居 as 處易者 “camp on easy ground,” and
Chang Yü follows him, saying: 其居則去險而就易. But this is an
utterly untenable view. For 迂其途, cf. VII. 4. Chia Lin, retaining
his old interpretation of those words, is now obliged to explain
易其居 as “cause the enemy to shift his camp,” which is awkward in
the extreme.

38. 帥與之期如登高而去其梯帥與之深入諸侯之地而發其機

At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has
climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him.

I must candidly confess that I do not understand the syntax of
帥與之期, though the meaning is fairly plain. The difficulty has
evidently been felt, for Tu Mu tells us that one text omits 期如.
It is more likely, however, that a couple of characters have
dropped out.

He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.

發其機 literally, “releases the spring” (see V. § 15), that is,
takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to
return—like 項羽 Hsiang Yü, who sunk his ships after crossing a
river. Ch‘ên Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less
well as 發其心機 “puts forth every artifice at his command.” But 機
in this derived sense occurs nowhere else in Sun Tzŭ.

39. 焚舟破釜若驅羣羊而往驅而來莫知所之

He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots;

Omitted in the _T‘u Shu_.

like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way
and that, and none knows whither he is going.

The _T‘u Shu_ inserts another 驅 after 羊. Tu Mu says: 三軍但知進
退之命不知攻取之端也 “The army is only cognisant of orders to
advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of
attacking and conquering.”

40. 聚三軍之衆投之於險此謂將軍之事也

To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the
business of the general.

Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilisation there should be no delay in
aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. With 投之於險 cf. _supra_,
§ 23: 投之無所往. Note how he returns again and again to this point.
Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt
a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies
of to-day.

41. 九地之變屈伸之利人情之理不可不察也

The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground;

Chang Yü says: 九地之法不可拘泥 “One must not be hide-bound in
interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground.

the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics;

The use of 屈伸 “contraction and expansion” may be illustrated by
the saying 屈以求伸, which almost exactly corresponds to the French
“il faut reculer pour mieux sauter.”[182] Capt. Calthrop, _more
suo_, avoids a real translation and has: “the suiting of the means
to the occasion.”

and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must
most certainly be studied.

42. 凡爲客之道深則專淺則散

When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that
penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means
dispersion.

Cf. _supra_, § 20.

43. 去國越境而師者絶地也四達者衢地也

When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across
neighbouring territory,

Chang Yü’s paraphrase is 而用師者.

you find yourself on critical ground.

This “ground” is cursorily mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not
figure among the Nine 地 of this chapter or the Six 地形 in chap.
X. One’s first impulse would be to translate it “distant ground”
(絶域 is commonly used in the sense of “distant lands”), but this,
if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant
here. Mei Yao-ch‘ên says it is 進不及輕退不及散在二地之間也 “a position
not far enough advanced to be called ‘facile,’ and not near enough
to home to be called ‘dispersive,’ but something between the two.”
That, of course, does not explain the name 絶, which seems to imply
that the general has severed his communications and temporarily
cut himself off from his base. Thus, Wang Hsi says: “It is ground
separated from home by an interjacent state, whose territory we
have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence it is incumbent
on us to settle our business there quickly.” He adds that this
position is of rare occurrence, which is the reason why it is not
included among the 九地. Capt. Calthrop gives but a poor rendering
of this sentence: “To leave home and cross the borders is to be
free from interference.”

When there are means of communication

The _T‘u Shu_ reads 通 for 達.

on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.

From 四達 down to the end of § 45, we have some of the definitions
of the early part of the chapter repeated in slightly different
language. Capt. Calthrop omits these altogether.

44. 入深者重地也入淺者輕地也

When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When
you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.

45. 背固前隘者圍地也無所往者死地也

When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear,

固 = 險固.

and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no
place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.

46. 是故散地吾將一其志輕地吾將使之屬

Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of
purpose.

This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the
defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. _supra_, § 11.

On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between
all parts of my army.

The _T‘ung Tien_ has 其 instead of 之. The present reading is
supported by the 遺說 of Chêng Yu-hsien. As Tu Mu says, the object
is to guard against two possible contingencies: 一者備其逃逸二者恐
其敵至 “(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack
on the part of the enemy.” Cf. VII. § 17: 其徐如林. Mei Yao-ch‘ên
says: 行則隊校相繼止則營壘聯屬 “On the march, the regiments should be
in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity
between the fortifications.” He seems to have forgotten, by the
way, what Sun Tzŭ says above: 輕地則無止.

47. 爭地吾將趨其後

On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

This is Ts‘ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yü adopts it, saying:
當疾進其後使首尾俱至 “We must quickly bring up our rear, so that
head and tail may both reach the goal.” That is, they must not be
allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch‘ên offers
another equally plausible explanation: 敵未至其地我若在後則當疾趨以爭之
“Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and
we are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to
dispute its possession.” 其 would thus denote the enemy, 後 being
the preposition, and 趨 would retain its usual intransitive sense.
Cf. VII. § 4: 後人發先人至. Ch‘ên Hao, on the other hand, assuming
that the enemy has had time select his own ground, quotes VI. § 1,
where Sun Tzŭ warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His
own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: 若地利在前先
分精銳以據之彼若恃衆來爭我以大衆趨其後無不尅者 “If there is a favourable
position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to
occupy it; then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to
make a fight for it, _you may fall quickly their rear_ with your
main body, and victory will be assured.” It was thus, he adds,
that Chao Shê beat the army of Ch‘in. [See p. 57.] Li Ch‘üan would
read 多 for 趨, it is not easy to see why.

48. 交地吾將謹其守衢地吾將固其結

On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences.

As Wang Hsi says, 懼襲我也 “fearing a surprise attack.” The
_T‘ung Tien_ reads here 固其結 (see next sentence).

On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.

The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 謹其市, which Tu Yu explains as “watching
the market towns,” 變事之端 “the hotbeds of revolution.” Capt.
Calthrop translates 固其結 by the same words as 合交 in § 12:
“cultivate intercourse.”

49. 重地吾將繼其食圮地吾將進其塗

On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of
supplies.

The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder,
not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home
base. One text, indeed, gives the reading 掠其食. Cf. § 13. Capt.
Calthrop’s “be careful of supplies” fails to render the force of 繼.

On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.

Capt. Calthrop’s “do not linger” cannot be called a translation,
but only a paraphrase of the paraphrase offered by Ts‘ao Kung:
疾過去也 “Pass away from it in all haste.”

50. 圍地吾將塞其闕死地吾將示之以不活

On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.

意欲突圍示以守固 “To make it seem that I mean to defend the
position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through
the enemy’s lines” [Mêng Shih]; 使士卒必死戰也 “in order to make my
soldiers fight with desperation” [Mei Yao-ch‘ên]; 懼人有走心
“fearing lest my men be tempted to run away” [Wang Hsi]. Tu Mu
points out that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where it is the
enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., 高歡 Kao Huan, afterwards
Emperor and canonised as 神武 Shên-wu, was surrounded by a great
army under 爾朱兆 Êrh-chu Chao and others. His own force was
comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something
under 30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very
closely together, gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan,
instead of trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all
the remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of
oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men
saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their
spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they
charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke
and crumbled under their onslaught. [See Tu Mu’s commentary, and
北齊書 ch. 1, fol. 6.]

On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness
of saving their lives.

Tu Yu says: 焚輜重棄糧食塞井夷竈示之無活必殊死戰也 “Burn your baggage
and impedimenta, throw away your stores and provisions, choke up
the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your
men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death.” Mei
Yao-ch‘ên says epigrammatically: 必死可生 “The only chance of life
lies in giving up all hope of it.” This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has
to say about “grounds” and the “variations” corresponding to them.
Reviewing the passages which bear on this important subject, we
cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion
in which it is treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § 2 to
enumerate “variations” before touching on “grounds” at all, but
only mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent
list, and one that is not included in it. A few varieties of
ground are dealt with in the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then
chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six variations of plan
to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first
is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next
chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds _par
excellence_, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us
down to § 14. In §§ 43–45, fresh definitions are provided for nos.
5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth
ground noticed in chap VIII; and finally, the nine variations
are enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the
exception of 5, 6 and 7, being different from those previously
given. Though it is impossible to account for the present state
of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts may be brought into
prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal
with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an
abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine
Grounds. Several these are defined twice over, besides which there
are two distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The
length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of
any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any inferences from
these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work
cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his
hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective and probably out of
place, while XI seems to contain matter that has either been added
by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.

51. 故兵之情圍則禦不得已則鬥過則從

For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance
when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to
obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.

過則從 is rendered by Capt. Calthrop: “to pursue the enemy if he
retreat.” But 過 cannot mean “to retreat.” Its primary sense is
to pass over, hence to go too far, to exceed or to err. Here,
however, the word has lost all implication of censure, and appears
to mean “to pass the boundary line dividing safety from danger,”
or, as Chang Yü puts it, 深陷于危難之地 “to be deeply involved in a
perilous position.” The latter commentator alludes to the conduct
of Pan Ch‘ao’s devoted followers in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in
the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, fol. 1 _v_^o: “When Pan Ch‘ao arrived at
鄯善 Shan-shan, 廣 Kuang, the King of the country, received him at
first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards
his behaviour underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss
and negligent. Pan Ch‘ao spoke about this to the officers of his
suite: ‘Have you not noticed,’ he said, ‘that Kuang’s polite
intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have
come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in
a state of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his
lot. That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are told,
can perceive things before they have come to pass; how much more,
then, those that are already manifest!’ Thereupon he called one of
the natives who had been assigned to his service, and set a trap
for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who
arrived some days ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between
surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan
Ch‘ao, keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then
summoned a general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all,
and began drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their
heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by
addressing them thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an
isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some
great exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the
Hsiung-nu arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the
result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our
royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to
seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-nu, our bones will
become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?’ With
one accord, the officers replied: ‘_Standing as we do in peril of
our lives, we will follow our commander through life and death_’
(今在危亡之地死生從司馬).” For the sequel of this adventure, see
chap. XII. § 1, note.

52. 是故不知諸侯之謀者不能預交不知山林險阻沮澤之形者不能行軍不用鄉導者不能得地利

We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are
acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on
the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and
swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account
unless we make use of local guides.

These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12–14—in order
to emphasise their importance, the commentators seem to think. I
prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an
antecedent to the following words. With regard to local guides,
Sun Tzŭ might have added that there is always the risk of going
wrong, either through their treachery or some misunderstanding
such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, ordered a
guide to lead him into the neighbourhood of Casinum, where there
was an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent,
unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to
understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from his
proper route, he took the army in that direction, the mistake not
being discovered until they had almost arrived.

53. 四五者不知一非霸王之兵也

To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles

Referring, I think, to what is contained in §§ 54, 55. Ts‘ao Kung,
thinking perhaps of the 五利 in VIII. § 6, takes them to be 九地之
利害 “the advantages and disadvantages attendant on the nine
varieties of ground.” The _T‘u Shu_ reads 此五者.

does not befit a warlike prince.

霸王, “one who rules by force,” was a term specially used for those
princes who established their hegemony over other feudal states.
The famous 五霸 of the 7th century B.C. were (1) 齊桓公 Duke Huan
of Ch‘i, (2) 晉文公 Duke Wên of Chin, (3) 宋襄公 Duke Hsiang of Sung,
(4) 楚莊王 Prince Chuang of Ch‘u, (5) 秦穆公 Duke Mu of Ch‘in. Their
reigns covered the period 685–591 B.C.

54. 夫霸王之兵伐大國則其衆不得聚威加於敵則其交不得合

When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows
itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He
overawes his opponents,

Here and in the next sentence, the _Yü Lan_ inserts 家 after 敵.

and their allies are prevented from joining against him.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are
so much affected by the Chinese: “In attacking a powerful state,
if you can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in
strength; if you have a superiority in strength, you will overawe
the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will
be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the
enemy’s allies will be prevented from joining her.” The following
gives a stronger meaning to 威加: 若大國一敗則小國離而不聚矣 “If the
great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to
summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and
refrain from massing their forces.” Ch‘ên Hao and Chang Yü take
the sentence in quite another way. The former says: “Powerful
though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be
unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on
external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening
confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the
enemy, he will surely be defeated.” Chang Yü puts his view thus:
“If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be
discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our
display of military force is inferior by half to that of the
enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join
us.” According to this interpretation, 其 would refer, not to the
大國, but to the 霸王 himself.

55. 是故不爭天下之交不養天下之權信己之私威加於敵故其城可拔其國可隳

Hence he does not strive

For 爭 the _Yü Lan_ reads 事.

to ally himself with all and sundry,

天下, as in § 6, stands for 諸侯 “the feudal princes,” or the
states ruled by them.

nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own
secret designs,

For 信 (read _shên_^1) in the meaning of 伸, cf. VIII. § 8. The
commentators are unanimous on this point, and we must therefore
beware of translating 信己之私 by “secretly self-confident” or the
like. Capt. Calthrop (omitting 之私) has: “he has confidence in
himself.”

keeping his antagonists in awe.

The train of thought appears to be this: Secure against a
combination of his enemies. 能絶天下之交惟得伸己之私志威而無外交者 “he
can afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his
own secret designs, his prestige enabling him to dispense with
external friendships.” (Li Ch‘üan.)

Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.

This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch‘in State
became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by
which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her
final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yü, following up his
previous note, thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning this attitude of
cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation. He again refers 其
to the warlike prince, thus making it appear that in the end he is
bound to succumb.

56. 施無法之賞懸無政之令犯三軍之衆若使一人

Bestow rewards without regard to rule,

Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: 進有重賞退有重刑 “Let advance be
richly rewarded and retreat be heavily punished.”

issue orders

懸, literally, “hang” or “post up.”

without regard to previous arrangements;

杜姦媮 “In order to prevent treachery,” says Wang Hsi. The general
meaning is made clear by Ts‘ao Kung’s quotation from the _Ssŭ-ma
Fa:_ 見敵作誓瞻功作賞 “Give instructions only on sighting the enemy;
give rewards only when you see deserving deeds.” 無政, however,
presents some difficulty. Ts‘ao Kung’s paraphrase, 軍法令不應預施懸也,
I take to mean: “The final instructions you give to your army
should not correspond with those that have been previously posted
up.” Chang Yü simplifies this into 政不預告 “your arrangements
should not be divulged beforehand.” And Chia Lin says: 不守常法常政
“there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements.” Not
only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often
necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last moment.

and you will be able to handle a whole army

犯, according to Ts‘ao Kung, is here equal to 用. The exact meaning
is brought out more clearly in the next paragraph.

as though you had to do with but a single man.

Cf. supra, § 34.

57. 犯之以事勿告以言犯之以利勿告以害

Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your
design.

Literally, “do not tell them words;” _i.e._ do not give your
reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague
to “give no reasons” for his decisions, and the maxim is even more
applicable to a general than to a judge. Capt. Calthrop translates
this sentence with beautiful simplicity: “Orders should direct the
soldiers.” That is all.

When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them
nothing when the situation is gloomy.

58. 投之亡地然後存陷之死地然後生

Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into
desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.

Compare the paradoxical saying 亡者存之基死者生之木. These words of
Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of the tactics
he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already alluded
to on p. 28, In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao,
and halted ten miles from the mouth of the 井陘 Ching-hsing pass,
where the enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight,
he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was
furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their
way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy.
“When the men of Chao see me in full flight,” Han Hsin said, “they
will abandon their fortifications and give chase. This must be the
sign for you to rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set
up the red banners of 漢 Han in their stead.” Turning then to
his other officers, he remarked: “Our adversary holds a strong
position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he
sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear
I should turn back and escape through the mountains.” So saying,
he first of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and
ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to the
River 泜 Ti. Seeing this manœuvre, the whole army of Chao broke
into loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han
Hsin, displaying the generalissimo’s flag, marched out of the pass
with drums beating, and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A
great battle followed, lasting for some time; until at length Han
Hsin and his colleague 張耳 Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on
the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another
fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and
to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but
the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was
fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for
the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men
of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the
deserted walls, tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by
those of Han. When the Chao army turned back from the pursuit, the
sight of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that
the Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in
wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic
being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and
completed the rout, killing a great number and capturing the rest,
amongst whom was King 歇 Ya himself.... After the battle, some of
Han Hsin’s officers came to him and said: “In the _Art of War_ we
are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river
or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun Tzŭ
and T‘ai Kung. See IX. § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary,
ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under
these conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?” The
general replied: “I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of
War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘_Plunge your
army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place
it in deadly peril and it will survive_’? Had I taken the usual
course, I should never have been able to bring my colleagues
round. What says the Military Classic (經)?—‘swoop down on the
market-place and drive the men off to fight’ (毆市人而戰之). [This
passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzŭ.] If I had
not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to
fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own
discretion, there would have been a general _débandade_, and it
would have been impossible to do anything with them.” The officers
admitted the force of his argument, and said: “These are higher
tactics than we should have been capable of.” [See _Ch‘ien Han
Shu_, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.]

59. 夫衆陷於害然後能爲勝敗

For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that it is
capable of striking a blow for victory.

Danger has a bracing effect.

60. 故爲兵之事在於順詳敵之意

Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to
the enemy’s purpose.

Ts‘ao Kung says: 佯愚也 “Feign stupidity”—by an appearance of
yielding and falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yü’s note
makes the meaning clear: “If the enemy shows an inclination to
advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay
on purpose that he may carry out his intention.” The object is to
make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our attack.

61. 并敵一向千里殺將

By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank,

I understand the first four words to mean “accompanying the enemy
in one direction.” Ts‘ao Kung says: 幷兵向敵 “unite the soldiers
and make for the enemy.” But such a violent displacement of
characters is quite indefensible. Mei Yao-ch‘ên is the only
commentator who seems to have grasped the meaning: 隨敵一向然後發伏
出奇. The _T‘u Shu_ reads 并力.

we shall succeed in the long run

Literally, “after a thousand _li_.”

in killing the commander-in-chief.

Always a great point with the Chinese.

62. 此謂巧能成事者也

This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.

The _T‘u Shu_ has 是謂巧於成事, and yet another reading, mentioned
by Ts‘ao Kung, is 巧攻成事. Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence,
after having thus translated the two preceding: “Discover the
enemy’s intentions by conforming to his movements. When these are
discovered, then, with one stroke, the general may be killed, even
though he be one hundred leagues distant.”

63. 是故政舉之日夷關折符無通其使

On the day that you take up your command,

政舉 does not mean “when war is declared,” as Capt. Calthrop says,
nor yet exactly, as Ts‘ao Kung paraphrases it, 謀定 “when your
plans are fixed,” when you have mapped out your campaign. The
phrase is not given in the _P‘ei Wên Yün Fu_. There being no
causal connection discoverable between this and the preceding
sentence, 是故 must perforce be left untranslated.

block the frontier passes,

夷 is explained by Mei Yao-ch‘ên as 滅塞.

destroy the official tallies,

The _locus classicus_ for these tallies is _Chou Li_, XIV. fol. 40
(Imperial edition): 門關用符節貨賄星璽節道路用旌節. The generic term
thus appears to be 節, 符 being the special kind used at city-gates
and on the frontier. They were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half
of which was issued as a permit or passport by the official in
charge of a gate (司門 or 司關. Cf. the 封人 “border-warden” of _Lun
Yü_ III. 24, who may have had similar duties.) When this half was
returned to him, within a fixed period, he was authorised to open
the gate and let the traveller through.

and stop the passage of all emissaries.

Either to or from the enemy’s country.

64. 厲於廊廟之上以誅其事

Be stern in the council-chamber,

Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the
sovereign. 廊廟 indicates a hall or temple in the Palace. Cf. I.
§ 26. It is not clear if other officers would be present. Hardly
anything can be made of 勵, the reading of the standard text, so I
have adopted Tu Mu’s conjecture 厲, which appears in the _T‘u Shu_.

so that you may control the situation.

Ts‘ao Kung explains 誅 by 治, and Ho Shih by 責成. Another reading
is 謀, and Mei Yao-ch‘ên, adopting this, understands the whole
sentence to mean: Take the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy
in your deliberations. Capt. Calthrop glides rather too smoothly
over the rough places. His translation is: “conduct the business
of the government with vigilance.”

65. 敵人開闔必亟入之

If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.

This looks a very simple sentence, yet Ts‘ao Kung is the only
commentator who takes it as I have done. Mêng Shih, followed by
Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Chang Yü, defines 開闔 as 間者 “spies,” and
makes 入 an active verb: “If spies come from the enemy, we must
quickly let them in.” But I cannot find that the words 開闔 have
this meaning anywhere else. On the other hand, they may be taken
as two verbs, 或開或闔, expressing the enemy’s indecision whether
to advance or retreat, that being the best moment to attack him.
[Cf. _Tao Tê Ching_, chap. X: 天門開闔能爲雌乎; also _Li Chi_, 曲禮,
I. ii. 25.] It is not easy to choose between this and Ts‘ao Kung’s
explanation; the fact that 敵人開戸 occurs shortly afterwards, in
§ 68, might be adduced in support of either. 必 must be understood
in the sense of 宜 or 當. The only way to avoid this is to put 開闔
between commas and translate: “If we leave a door open, the enemy
is sure to rush in.”

66. 先其所愛微與之期

Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,

Cf. _supra_, § 18.

and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

Capt. Calthrop hardly attempts to translate this difficult
paragraph, but invents the following instead: “Discover what he
most values, and plan to seize it.” Ch‘ên Hao’s explanation,
however, is clear enough: 我若先奪便地而敵不至雖有其利亦奚用之是以欲取
其愛惜之處必先微與敵人相期誤之使必至 “If I manage to seize a favourable
position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the
advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical account.
He who intends, therefore, to occupy a position of importance
to the enemy, must begin by making an artful appointment, so to
speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going there as
well.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên explains that this “artful appointment” is
to be made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, who will
carry back just the amount of information that we choose to give
them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, 我後人發先人至
“we must manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before
him” (VII. § 4). We must start after him in order to ensure his
marching thither; we must arrive before him in order to capture
the place without trouble. Taken thus, the present passage lends
some support to Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s interpretation of § 47.

67. 踐墨隨敵以決戰事

Walk in the path defined by rule,

墨 stands 繩墨 “a marking-line,” hence a rule of conduct. See
Mencius VII. 1. xli. 2. Ts‘ao Kung explains it by the similar
metaphor 規矩 “square and compasses.” The baldness of the sentiment
rather inclines me to favour the reading 剗 adopted by Chia Lin in
place of 踐, which yields an exactly opposite sense, namely:
“Discard hard and fast rules.” Chia Lin says: 惟勝是利不可守以繩墨而爲
“Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be
achieved by adhering to conventional canons.” It is unfortunate
that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense
yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know,
according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won
his battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare.

and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive
battle.

The last four words of the Chinese are omitted by Capt. Calthrop.
Tu Mu says: 隨敵人之形若有可乘之勢則出而決戰 “Conform to the enemy’s
tactics until a favourable opportunity offers; then come forth and
engage in a battle that shall prove decisive.”

68. 是故始如處女敵人開戶後如脫兎敵不及拒

At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives
you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and
it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.

As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison
hardly appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only
of its speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee
from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly
rejected by Tu Mu. Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating 兎
“rabbit.” Rabbits are not indigenous to China, and were certainly
not known there in the 6th century B.C. The last sixteen
characters evidently form a sort of four-line jingle. Chap. X, it
may be remembered, closed in similar fashion.

XII. 火攻篇

THE ATTACK BY FIRE.

Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1–13) is devoted to the subject
of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.

1. 孫子曰凡火攻有五一曰火人二曰火積三曰火輜四曰火庫五曰火隊

Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first
is to burn soldiers in their camp;

So Tu Mu. Li Ch‘üan says: 焚其營殺其士卒也 “Set fire to the camp,
and kill the soldiers” (when they try to escape from the flames).
Pan Ch‘ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan
[see XI. § 51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by
the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal
enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his officers, he
exclaimed: “‘Never venture, never win![183] The only course open
to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under
cover of night, when they will not be able to discern our numbers.
Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them completely;
this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with glory, besides
ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all replied
that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the
Intendant (從事). Pan Ch‘ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is
to-day,’ he cried, ‘that our fortunes must be decided! The
Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our
project will certainly be afraid, and everything will be brought
to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant
warriors.’ All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as
soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made their
way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time.
Pan Ch‘ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind
the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames
shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their
might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he
posted in ambuscade at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to
the place from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of
drums and shouting arose on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu,
who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch‘ao slew three
of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads
of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a
hundred in all, perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan
Ch‘ao went back and informed 郭恂 Kuo Hsün [the Intendant] of what
he had done. The latter was greatly alarmed and turned pale.
But Pan Ch‘ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand:
‘Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think,
Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied Kuo
Hsün, and Pan Ch‘ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan,
showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was
seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch‘ao took steps to
allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king’s
son as hostage, he returned to make his report to 竇固 Tou Ku.”
[_Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.]

the second is to burn stores;

Tu Mu says: 糧食薪芻 “Provisions, fuel and fodder.” In order to
subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, 高潁 Kao Kêng
recommended Wên Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and
burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run proved
entirely successful. [隋書, ch. 41, fol. 2.]

the third is to burn baggage-trains;

An example given is the destruction of 袁紹 Yüan Shao’s waggons and
impedimenta by Ts‘ao Ts‘ao in 200 A.D.

the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;

Tu Mu says that the things contained in 輜 and 庫 are the same. He
specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and clothing. Cf.
VII. § 11.

the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.

No fewer than four totally diverse explanations of this sentence
are given by the commentators, not one of which is quite
satisfactory. It is obvious, at any rate, that the ordinary
meaning of 隊 (“regiment” or “company”) is here inadmissible. In
spite of Tu Mu’s note, 焚其行伍因亂而擊之, I must regard “company
burning” (Capt. Calthrop’s rendering) as nonsense pure and simple.
We may also, I think, reject the very forced explanation given
by Li Ch‘üan, Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Chang Yü, of whom the last-named
says: 焚其隊仗使兵無戰具 “burning a regiment’s weapons, so that the
soldiers may have nothing to fight with.” That leaves only two
solutions open: one, favoured by Chia Lin and Ho Shih, is to take
隊 in the somewhat uncommon sense of “a road,” = 隧. The commentary
on a passage in the 穆天子傳, quoted in _K‘ang Hsi_, defines 隊
(read _sui_) as 谷中險阻道 “a difficult road leading through a
valley.” Here it would stand for the 糧道 “line of supplies,” which
might be effectually interrupted if the country roundabout was
laid waste with fire. Finally, the interpretation which I have
adopted is that given by Tu Yu in the _T‘ung Tien_. He reads 墜
(which is not absolutely necessary, 隊 _chui_ being sometimes used
in the same sense), with the following note: 以火墮敵營中也火墜之法
以鐵籠火着箭頭頸强弩射敵營中 “To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. The
method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows
alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from
powerful crossbows into the enemy’s lines.”

2. 行火必有因煙火必素具

In order to carry out an attack with fire, we must have means available.

Ts‘ao Kung thinks that 姦人 “traitors in the enemy’s camp” are
referred to. He thus takes 因 as the efficient cause only. But
Ch‘ên Hao is more likely to be right in saying: 須得其便不獨姦人 “We
must have favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors
to help us.” Chia Lin says: 因風燥 “We must avail ourselves of wind
and dry weather.”

The material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.

煙火 is explained by Ts‘ao Kung as 燒具 “appliances for making
fire.” Tu Mu suggests 艾蒿荻葦薪芻膏油之屬 “dry vegetable matter,
reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc.” Here we have the
material cause. Chang Yü says: 𫎓火之器燃火之物 “vessels for
hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires.”

3. 發火有時起火有日

There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special
days for starting a conflagration.

A fire must not be begun 妄 “recklessly” or 偶然 “at haphazard.”

4. 時者天之燥也日者宿在箕壁翼軫也凡此四宿者風起之日也

The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days
are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the
Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar;

These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the
二十八宮 Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly
to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus. The original text,
followed by the _T‘u Shu_, has 月 in place of 宿; the present
reading rests on the authority of the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_.
Tu Mu says: 宿者月之所宿也. For 箕壁, both _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_
give the more precise location 戊箕東壁. Mei Yao-ch‘ên tells us
that by 箕 is meant the tail of the 龍 Dragon; by 壁, the eastern
part of that constellation; by 翼 and 軫, the tail of the 鶉 Quail.

for these four are all days of rising wind.

此四宿者 is elliptical for 月在此四宿之日. 蕭繹 Hsiao I (afterwards
fourth Emperor of the Liang dynasty, A.D. 552–555) is quoted by Tu
Yu as saying that the days 丙丁 of spring, 戊已 of summer, 壬癸 of
autumn, and 甲乙 of winter bring fierce gales of wind and rain.

5. 凡火攻必因五火之變而應之

In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible
developments:

I take 五 as qualifying 變, not 火, and therefore think that Chang
Yü is wrong in referring 五火 to the five methods of attack set
forth in § 1. What follows has certainly nothing to do with these.

6. 火發於內則早應之於外

(1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once

The _Yü Lan_ incorrectly reads 軍 for 早.

with an attack from without.

7. 火發而其兵靜者待而勿攻

(2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain
quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

The original text omits 而其. The prime object of attacking with
fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. If this effect is not
produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence
the necessity for caution.

8. 極其火力可從而從之不可從而止

(3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up
with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.

Ts‘ao Kung says: 見可而進知難而退 “If you see a possible way,
advance; but if you find the difficulties too great, retire.”

9. 火可發於外無待於內以時發之

(4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do
not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a
favourable moment.

Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire
breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the
agency of incendiaries) inside the enemy’s camp. “But,” he
continues, 若敵居荒澤草穢或營栅可焚之地卽須及時發火不必更待內發作然後應之恐
敵人自燒野草我起火無益 “if the enemy is settled in a waste place
littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp
in a position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire
against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not wait on in
hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents
should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and thus
render our own attempts fruitless.” The famous 李陵 Li Ling once
baffled the 單于 leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter,
taking advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the
Chinese general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible
vegetation in the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On
the other hand, 波才 Po-ts‘ai, a general of the 黃巾賊 Yellow
Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect
of this simple precaution. “At the head of a large army he was
besieging 長社 Ch‘ang-shê, which was held by 皇甫嵩 Huang-fu Sung.
The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness
pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together
and said: ‘In war, there are various indirect methods of attack,
and numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here
quotes Sun Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched
their camp in the midst of thick grass (依草結營), which will
easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night,
they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and
attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement
of T‘ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze
sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds
together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after
which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their
way through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts
and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the
city-walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid
charge, which threw the rebels into confusion and put them to
headlong flight.” [_Hou Han Shu_, ch. 71, f. 2 _r_^o.]

10. 火發上風無攻下風

(5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from
the leeward.

Chang Yü, following Tu Yu, says: 燒之必退退而逆擊之必死戰則不便也 “When
you make a fire, the enemy will retreat away from it; if you
oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight desperately,
which will not conduce to your success.” A rather more obvious
explanation is given by Tu Mu: “If the wind is in the east, begin
burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack
yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side,
and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as
your enemy.”

11. 晝風久夜風止

A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon
falls.

Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: 飄風不終朝 “A violent wind does not last the
space of a morning.” (_Tao Tê Ching_, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch‘ên and
Wang Hsi say: “A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night
breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general rule.” The
phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this sense is
to be obtained is not apparent.

12. 凡軍必知有五火之變以數守之

In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be
known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the
proper days.

Tu Mu’s commentary shows what has to be supplied in order to make
sense out of 以數守之. He says: 須筭星𨇠之數守風起之日乃可發火 “We
must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, and watch for
the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack with
fire.” Chang Yü seems to take 守 in the sense of 防: “We must not
only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also be on
our guard against similar attacks from them.”

13. 故以火佐攻者明以水佐攻者强

Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence;

I have not the least hesitation in rejecting the commentators’
explanation of 明 as = 明白. Thus Chang Yü says: 灼然可以取勝 “...
will _clearly_ [i.e. obviously] be able to gain the victory.” This
is not only clumsy in itself, but does not balance 强 in the next
clause. For 明 “intelligent,” cf. _infra_, § 16, and _Lun Yü_ XII. 6.

those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of
strength.

Capt. Calthrop gives an extraordinary rendering of the paragraph:
“... if the attack is to be assisted, the fire must be
unquenchable. If water is to assist the attack, the flood must be
overwhelming.”

14. 水可以絶不可以奪

By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all
his belongings.

Ts‘ao Kung’s note is: 但可以絶敵道分敵軍不可以奪敵蓄積 “We can merely
obstruct the enemy’s road or divide his army, but not sweep away
all his accumulated stores.” Water can do useful service, but it
lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is the reason,
Chang Yü concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of
sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu
Tzŭ (ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements: 居軍下濕水無所通霖雨數至
可灌而沉居軍荒澤草楚幽穢風飆數至可焚而滅 “If an army is encamped on
low-lying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and
where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If an
army is encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with weeds
and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be
exterminated by fire.”

15. 夫戰勝攻取而不修其功者凶命曰費留

Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in
his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the
result is waste of time and general stagnation.

This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. The
difficulty lies mainly in 不修其功, of which two interpretations
appear possible. Most of the commentators understand 修 in the
sense (not known to _K‘ang Hsi_) of 賞 “reward” or 舉 “promote,”
and 其功 as referring to the merit of officers and men. Thus Ts‘ao
Kung says: 賞善不踰日 “Rewards for good service should not be
deferred a single day.” And Tu Mu: “If you do not take opportunity
to advance and reward the deserving, your subordinates will not
carry out your commands, and disaster will ensue.” 費留 would then
probably mean 留滯費耗 “stoppage of expenditure,” or as Chia Lin
puts it, 惜費 “the grudging of expenditure.” For several reasons,
however, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on the
other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch‘ên
alone, whose words I will quote: 欲戰必勝攻必取者在因時乘便能作爲功也作
爲功者修火攻水攻之類不可坐守其利也坐守其利者凶也 “Those who want to make
sure of succeeding in their battles and assaults must seize the
favourable moments when they come and not shrink on occasion from
heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort to such means of
attack as fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and
what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold on to the
advantages they have got.” This retains the more usual meaning of
修, and also brings out a clear connection of thought with the
previous part of the chapter. With regard to 費留, Wang Hsi
paraphrases it as 費財老師 “expending treasure and tiring out
[_lit_., ageing] the army.” 費 of course is expenditure or waste
in general, either of time, money or strength. But the soldier is
less concerned with the saving of money than of time. For the
metaphor expressed in “stagnation” I am indebted to Ts‘ao Kung,
who says: 若水之留不復還也. Capt. Calthrop gives a rendering which
bears but little relation to the Chinese text: “unless victory or
possession be obtained, the enemy quickly recovers, and
misfortunes arise. The war drags on, and money is spent.”

16. 故曰明主慮之良將修之

Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the
good general cultivates his resources.

As Sun Tzŭ quotes this jingle in support of his assertion in § 15,
we must suppose 修之 to stand for 修其功 or something analogous.
The meaning seems to be that the ruler lays plans which the
general must show resourcefulness in carrying out. It is now
plainer than ever that 修 cannot mean “to reward.” Nevertheless, Tu
Mu quotes the following from the 三略, ch. 2: 霸者制士以權結士以
信使士以賞信衰則士疏賞虧則士不用命 “The warlike prince controls his
soldiers by his authority, knits them together by good faith, and
by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be
disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not be
respected.”

17. 非利不動非得不用非危不戰

Move not unless you see an advantage;

起, the _Yü Lan’s_ variant for 動, is adopted by Li Ch‘üan and Tu Mu.

use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not
unless the position is critical.

Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes
so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the _Tao Tê
Ching_, ch. 69: 吾不敢爲主而爲客不敢進寸而退尺 “I dare not take the
initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance
an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot.”

18. 主不可以怒而興師將不可以愠而致戰

No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own
spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.

Again compare Lao Tzŭ, ch. 68: 善戰者不怒. Chang Yü says that 愠 is
a weaker word than 怒, and is therefore applied to the general as
opposed to the sovereign. The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 軍
for 師, and the latter 合 for 致.

19. 合於利而動不合於利而止

If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where
you are.

This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an
interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately
on § 18. For 動, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have 用. Capt. Calthrop
invents a sentence which he inserts before this one: “Do not make war
unless victory may be gained thereby.” While he was about it, he might
have credited Sun Tzŭ with something slightly less inane.

20. 怒可以復喜愠可以復悅

Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by
content.

According to Chang Yü, 喜 denotes joy outwardly manifested in the
countenance, 悅 the inward sensation of happiness.

21. 亡國不可以復存死者不可以復生

But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into
being;

The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this
saying. See p. 50.

nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.

22. 故明君愼之良將警之此安國全軍之道也

Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of
caution.

警, which usually means “to warn,” is here equal to 戒. This is a
good instance of how Chinese characters, which stand for ideas,
refuse to be fettered by dictionary-made definitions. The _T‘u
Shu_ reads 故曰, as in § 16.

This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.

It is odd that 全軍 should not have the same meaning here as in
III. § 1, _q.v._ This has led me to consider whether it might not
be possible to take the earlier passage thus: “to preserve your
own army (country, regiment, etc.) intact is better than to
destroy the enemy’s.” The two words do not appear in the _T‘ung
Tien_ or the _Yü Lan_. Capt. Calthrop misses the point by
translating: “then is the state secure, and the army victorious in
battle.”

XIII. 用間篇

THE USE OF SPIES.

間 is really a vulgar form of 閒; and does not appear in the _Shuo
Wên_. In practice, however, it has gradually become a distinct
character with special meanings of its own, and I have therefore
followed my edition of the standard text in retaining this form
throughout the chapter. In VI. § 25, on the other hand, the
correct form 閒 will be found. The evolution of the meaning “spy”
is worth considering for a moment, provided it be understood that
this is very doubtful ground, and that any dogmatism is out of
place. The _Shuo Wên_ defines 閒 as 隟 (the old form of 𨻶) “a
crack” or “chink,” and on the whole we may accept 徐鍇 Hsü Ch‘ieh’s
analysis as not unduly fanciful: 夫門夜閉閉而見月光是有閒隟也 “At
night, a _door_ is shut; if, when it is shut, the light of the
_moon_ is visible, it must come through a _chink_.” From this
it is an easy step to the meaning “space between,” or simply
“between,” as for example in the phrase 往來閒諜 “to act as a
secret spy between enemies.” Here 諜 is the word which means “spy;”
but we may suppose that constant association so affected the
original force of 閒, that 諜 could at last be dropped altogether,
leaving 閒 to stand alone with the same signification. Another
possible theory is that the word may first have come to mean 覗 “to
peep” (see 博雅, quoted in _K‘ang Hsi_) which would naturally be
suggested by “crack” or “crevice,” and afterwards the man who
peeps, or spy.

1. 孫子曰凡興師十萬出兵千里百姓之費公家之奉日費千金內外騷動怠於道路不得操事者
七十萬家

Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching
them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on
the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a
thousand ounces of silver.

Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.

There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down
exhausted on the highways.

怠於道路, which is omitted by the _Yü Lan_, appears at first sight
to be explained by the words immediately following, so that the
obvious translation would be “(enforced) idleness along the line
of march.” [Cf. _Tao Tê Ching_, ch. 30: 師之所處荆棘生焉 “Where
troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up.”] The
commentators, however, say that 怠 is here equivalent to 疲—a
meaning which is still retained in the phrase 倦怠. Tu Mu refers 怠
to those who are engaged in conveying provisions to the army. But
this can hardly be said to emerge clearly from Sun Tzŭ’s text.
Chang Yü has the note: “We may be reminded of the saying: ‘On
serious ground, gather in plunder’ [XI. § 13]. Why then should
carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the highways?—The
answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of
war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the injunction to
‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is deeply
engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided
against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for
corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted
flow of supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts
(磧鹵之地), where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home
cannot be dispensed with.”

As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their
labour.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: 廢於耒耜 “Men will be lacking at the
plough-tail.” The allusion is to 井田 the system of dividing land
into nine parts, as shown in the character 井, each consisting
of a 夫 or 頃 (about 15 acres), the plot in the centre being
cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other
eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages
were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II.
§ 12, note.] These groups of eight peasant proprietors were called
鄰. In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army,
while the other seven contributed to its support (一家從軍七家奉弓).
Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier
to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families would be affected.

2. 相守數年以爭一日之勝而愛爵祿百金不知敵之情者不仁之至也

Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the
victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain
in ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges
the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments,

“For spies” is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the
effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually
mentioned at this point.

is the height of inhumanity.

Sun Tzŭ’s argument is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting
to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure
which war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept
informed of the enemy’s condition, and are ready to strike at the
right moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get
this information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to
obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their
services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively
trifling amount for this purpose, when every day that the war
lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden
falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun Tzŭ concludes
that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a crime
against humanity.

3. 非人之將也非主之佐也非勝之主也

One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign,

An inferior reading for 主 is 仁, thus explained by Mei Yao-ch‘ên:
非以仁佐國者也.

no master of victory.

This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in
the national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597
B.C., these memorable words were uttered by Prince 莊 Chuang of the
Ch‘u State: 夫文止戈爲武 ... 夫武禁暴戢兵保大定功安民和衆豐財者也 “The
character for ‘prowess’ (武) is made up of 止 ‘to stay’ and 戈 ‘a
spear’ (cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the
repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation
of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the
bestowal of happiness on the people, putting harmony between the
princes, the diffusion of wealth.” [_Tso Chuan_, 宣公 XII. 3 _ad
fin_.]

4. 故明君賢將所以動而勝人成功出於衆者先知也

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike
and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is
_foreknowledge_.

That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means
to do.

5. 先知者不可取於鬼神不可象於事不可驗於度

Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;

以禱祀 “by prayers or sacrifices,” says Chang Yü. 鬼 are the
disembodied spirits of men, and 神 supernatural beings or “gods.”

it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,

Tu Mu’s note makes the meaning clear: 象, he says, is the same as
類 reasoning by analogy; 不可以他事比類而求 “[knowledge of the
enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from other analogous cases.”

nor by any deductive calculation.

Li Ch‘üan says: 夫長短闊狹遠近小大卽可驗之於度數人之情僞度不能知也
“Quantities like length, breadth, distance and magnitude, are
susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions
cannot be so calculated.”

6. 必取於人知敵之情者也

Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other
men.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên has rather an interesting note: 鬼神之情可以筮卜知形氣之
物可以象類求天地之理可以度數驗唯敵之情必由間者而後知也 “Knowledge of the
spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in
natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of
the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the
dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies
alone.”

7. 故用間有五有鄉間有內間有反間有死間有生間

Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local
spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5)
surviving spies.

8. 五間俱起莫知其道是謂神紀人君之寳也

When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the
secret system.

道 is explained by Tu Mu as 其情泄形露之道 “the way in which facts
leak out and dispositions are revealed.”

This is called

爲 is the reading of the standard text, but the _T‘ung Tien_, _Yü
Lan_ and _T‘u Shu_ all have 謂.

“divine manipulation of the threads.”

Capt. Calthrop translates 神紀 “the Mysterious Thread,” but Mei
Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase 神妙之綱紀 shows that what is meant is the
_control_ of a number of threads.

It is the sovereign’s most precious faculty.

“Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry
leaders, had officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it
was to collect all possible information regarding the enemy,
through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was
traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves thus
gained.”[184]

9. 鄉間者因其鄉人而用之

Having _local spies_

鄉間 is the emended reading of Chia Lin and the _T‘u Shu_ for the
unintelligible 因間, here and in § 7, of the standard text, which
nevertheless reads 鄉間 in § 22.

means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.

Tu Mu says: “In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind
treatment, and use them as spies.”

10. 內間者因其官人而用之

Having _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy.

官 includes both civil and military officials. Tu Mu enumerates the
following classes as likely to do good service in this respect:
“Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have
undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy
for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions,
or who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others
who are anxious that their side should be defeated in order that
they may have a chance of displaying their ability and talents,
fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each boat
(飜覆變詐常持兩端之心者). Officials of these several kinds,” he
continues, “should be secretly approached and bound to one’s
interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able
to find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, ascertain
the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb
the harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his
ministers.” The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing
with “inward spies,” appears from an historical incident related
by Ho Shih: “羅尙 Lo Shang, Governor of 益州 I-chou, sent his
general 隗伯 Wei Po to attack the rebel 李雄 Li Hsiung of 蜀 Shu in
his stronghold at 郫 P‘i. After each side had experienced a number
of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services
of a certain 朴泰 P‘o-t‘ai, a native of 武都 Wu-tu. He began by
having him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to
Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to co-operate with him
from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right
moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these
promises, marched out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and
others at their head with orders to attack at P‘o-t‘ai’s bidding.
Meanwhile, Li Hsiung’s general, 李驤 Li Hsiang, had prepared an
ambuscade on their line of march; and P‘o-t‘ai, having reared
long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the
beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the signal and began
climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were
drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo
Shang’s soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom
was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his
forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy
completely.” [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho
Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li
Hsiung or that of his father Li 特 T‘ê, _Chin Shu_, ch. 120, 121.]

11. 反間者因其敵間而用之

Having _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using
them for our own purposes.

By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them
from the enemy’s service, and inducing them to carry back false
information as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen.
Thus Tu Yu: 因厚賂重許反使爲我間也. On the other hand, 蕭世誠 Hsiao
Shih-hsien in defining the 反間 says that we pretend not to
have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false
impression of what is going on (敵使人來候我我佯不知而示以虚事).
Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative
definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively
proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy
generously (§ 21 _sqq_.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which
converted spies were used with conspicuous success: 1) by T‘ien
Tan in his defence of Chi-mo (see _supra_, p. 90); 2) by Chao Shê
on his march to O-yü (see p. 57); and by the wily 范雎 Fan Chü
in 260 B.C., when Lien P‘o was conducting a defensive campaign
against Ch‘in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P‘o’s
cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a
series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the
reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and
were already in Fan Chü’s pay. They said: “The only thing which
causes Ch‘in anxiety is lest 趙括 Chao Kua should be made general.
Lien P‘o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be
vanquished in the long run.” Now this Chao Kua was a son of the
famous Chao Shê. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed
in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came
to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who
could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this
overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of such
a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was
appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This
was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother
and the veteran statesman 藺相如 Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to
succeed Lien P‘o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the
redoubtable Po Ch‘i and the great military power of Ch‘in. He
fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and his
communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46
days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he
was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting,
it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword. [See
歷代紀事年表, ch. 19, ff. 48–50].

12. 死間者爲誑事於外令吾間知之而傳於敵

Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of
deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them
to the enemy.

傳 is Li Ch‘üan’s conjecture for 待, which is found in the _T‘ung
Tien_ and the _Yü Lan_. The _T‘u Shu_, unsupported by any good
authority, adds 間也 after 敵. In that case, the doomed spies would
be those of the enemy, to whom our own spies had conveyed false
information. But this is unnecessarily complicated. Tu Yu gives
the best exposition of the meaning: “We ostentatiously do things
calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe
that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies
are captured in the enemy’s lines, they will make an entirely
false report, and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only
to find that we do something quite different. The spies will
thereupon be put to death.” Capt. Calthrop makes a hopeless muddle
of the sentence. As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions
the prisoners released by Pan Ch‘ao in his campaign against
Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to 唐儉 T‘ang Chien, who
in 630 A.D. was sent by T‘ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Khan 頡利
Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was able to deliver
a crushing blow against him. Chang Yü says that the Turks revenged
themselves by killing T‘ang Chien, but this is a mistake, for we
read in both the Old and the New T‘ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and
ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on until
656. 酈食其 Li I-chi[185] played a somewhat similar part in 203
B.C., when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations
with Ch‘i. He has certainly more claim to be described as a 死間;
for the King of Ch‘i, being subsequently attacked without warning
by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he considered the treachery of
Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.

13. 生間者反報也

_Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the
enemy’s camp.

This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a
regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: 生間者必取內明外愚形劣心壯趫健勁勇
閑於鄙事能忍饑寒垢耻者爲之 “Your surviving spy must be a man of
keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby
exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust,
endowed with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed
to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to
put up with shame and ignominy.” Ho Shih tells the following story
of 達奚武 Ta-hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: “When he was governor of
Eastern Ch‘in, 神武 Shên-wu of Ch‘i made a hostile movement upon
沙苑 Sha-yüan. The Emperor T‘ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to
spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three
were on horseback and wore the enemy’s uniform. When it was dark,
they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy’s camp and
stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching
the passwords used by the army. Then they got on their horses
again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of
nightwatchmen (警夜者); and more than once, happening to come
across a soldier who was committing some breach of discipline,
they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound cudgelling! Thus
they managed to return with the fullest possible information about
the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm commendation from the
Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a
severe defeat on his adversary.” With the above classification it
is interesting to compare the remarks of Frederick the Great:[186]
“Es giebt vielerley Sorten von Spions: 1. Geringe Leute, welche
sich von diesem Handwerk meliren. 2. Doppelte Spions. 3. Spions
von Consequenz, und endlich 4. Diejenigen, welche man zu diesem
unglücklichen Hankwerk zwinget.” This of course is a bad
cross-division. The first class (“Bürgersleute, Bauern, Priesters,
etc.”) corresponds roughly to Sun Tzŭ’s “local spies,” and the
third to “inward spies.” Of “Doppelte Spions” it is broadly stated
that they are employed “um dem Feinde falsche Nachrichten
aufzubinden.” Thus they would include both converted and doomed
spies. Frederick’s last class of spies does not appear in Sun
Tzŭ’s list, perhaps because the risk in using them is too great.

14. 故三軍之親莫親於間賞莫厚於間事莫密於間

Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate
relations to be maintained than with spies.

The original text and the _T‘u Shu_ have 事 in place of the first
親. Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch‘ên point out that the spy is privileged to
enter even the general’s private sleeping-tent. Capt. Calthrop has
an inaccurate translation: “In connection with the armies, spies
should be treated with the greatest kindness.”

None should be more liberally rewarded.

Frederick concludes his chapter on spies with the words: “Zu allem
diesem füge ich noch hinzu, dass man in Bezahlung der Spions
freygebig, ja verschwenderisch seyn muss. Ein Mench, der um eures
Dienstes halber den Strick waget, verdienet dafür belohnet zu
werden.”

In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.

Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: 出口入耳也, that is to say, all
communications with spies should be carried on “mouth-to-ear.”
Capt. Calthrop has: “All matters relating to spies are secret,”
which is distinctly feeble. An inferior reading for 密 is 審. The
following remarks on spies may be quoted from Turenne, who made
perhaps larger use of them than any previous commander: “Spies
are attached to those who give them most, he who pays them ill is
never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor should
they know one another. When they propose anything very material,
secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives
and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate
anything to them but what it is absolutely necessary that they
should know.”[187]

15. 非聖智不能用間

Spies cannot be usefully employed

This is the _nuance_ of Tu Yu’s paraphrase 不能得間人之用.

without a certain intuitive sagacity.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: 知其情僞辨其邪正則能用 “In order to use them, one
must know fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between
honesty and double-dealing.” Wang Hsi takes 聖 and 智 separately,
defining the former as 通而先識 “intuitive perception” and the
latter as 明於事 “practical intelligence.” Tu Mu strangely refers
these attributes to the spies themselves: 先量間者之性誠實多智然後可用之
“Before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity
of character and the extent of their experience and skill.” But he
continues: 厚貌深情險於山川非聖人莫能知 “A brazen face and a crafty
disposition are more dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes
a man of genius to penetrate such.” So that we are left in some
doubt as to his real opinion on the passage.

16. 非仁義不能使間

They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and
straightforwardness.

Chang Yü says that 仁 means “not grudging them honours and pay;”
義, “showing no distrust of their honesty.” “When you have
attracted them by substantial offers, you must treat them with
absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with all their
might.”

17. 非微妙不能得間之實

Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth
of their reports.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “Be on your guard against the possibility of
spies going over to the service of the enemy.” The _T‘ung Tien_
and _Yü Lan_ read 密 for 妙.

18. 微哉微哉無所不用間也

Be subtle! be subtle!

Cf. VI. § 9: 微乎微乎. Capt. Calthrop translates: “Wonderful indeed
is the power of spies.”

and use your spies for every kind of business.

19. 間事未發而先聞者間與所告者皆死

If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is
ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret
was told.

The Chinese here is so concise and elliptical that some expansion
is necessary for the proper understanding of it. 間事 denotes
important information about the enemy obtained from a surviving
spy. The subject of 未發, however, is not this information itself,
but the secret stratagem built up on the strength of it. 聞者 means
“is heard”—by anybody else. Thus, word for word, we get: “If spy
matters are heard before [our plans] are carried out,” etc. Capt.
Calthrop, in translating 間與所告者 “the spy who told the matter,
and the man who repeated the same,” may appeal to the authority of
the commentators; but he surely misses the main point of Sun Tzŭ’s
injunction. For, whereas you kill the spy himself 惡其泄 “as a
punishment for letting out the secret,” the object of killing the
other man is only, as Ch‘ên Hao puts it, 以滅口 “to stop his mouth”
and prevent the news leaking any further. If it had already been
repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way,
Sun Tzŭ lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu
Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves to be put
to death, for the spy would certainly not have told the secret
unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him. The
_T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have the reading ... 先聞其間者與, etc.,
which, while not affecting the sense, strikes me as being better
than that of the standard text. The _T‘u Shu_ has ... 聞與所告者,
which I suppose would mean: “the man who heard the secret and the
man who told it to him.”

20. 凡軍之所欲擊城之所欲攻人之所欲殺必先知其守將左右謁者門者舍人之姓名令吾間
必索知之

Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to
assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding
out the names of the attendants,

左右 is a comprehensive term for those who wait on others, servants
and retainers generally. Capt. Calthrop is hardly happy in
rendering it “right-hand men.”

the aides-de-camp,

謁者, literally “visitors,” is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to
主告事者 “those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with
information,” which naturally necessitates frequent interviews
with him. Chang Yü goes too far afield for an explanation in
saying that they are 典賓客之將 “the leaders of mercenary troops.”.

the door-keepers and sentries

閽吏 and 守舍之人.

of the general in command.

守將, according to Chang Yü, is simply 守官任職之將 “a general on
active service.” Capt. Calthrop is wrong, I think, in making 守將
directly dependent on 姓名 (... “the names of the general in
charge,” etc.).

Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.

As the first step, no doubt, towards finding out if any of these
important functionaries can be won over by bribery. Capt. Calthrop
blunders badly with: “Then set the spies to watch them.”

21. 必索敵人之間來間我者因而利之導而舍之故反間可得而用也

The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out,

必索 is omitted by the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_. Its recurrence is
certainly suspicious, though the sense may seem to gain by it. The
_T‘u Shu_ has this variation: ... 敵間之來間吾者, etc.

tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed.

舍 is probably more than merely 居止 or 稽留 “detain.” Cf. § 25 _ad
fin._, where Sun Tzŭ insists that these converted spies shall be
treated well. Chang Yü’s paraphrase is 館舍.

Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service.

22. 因是而知之故鄉間內間可得而使也

It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are
able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.

Tu Yu expands 因是而知之 into 因反敵間而知敵情 “through conversion of
the enemy’s spies we learn the enemy’s condition.” And Chang Yü
says: 因是反間知彼鄉人之貪利者官人之有𨻶者誘而使之 “We must tempt the
converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows which
of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the
officials are open to corruption.” In the _T‘ung Tien_, 鄉 has been
altered to 因, doubtless for the sake of uniformity with § 9.

23. 因是而知之故死間爲誑事可使告敵

It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed
spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

“Because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be
deceived” (Chang Yü). The _T‘ung Tien_ text, followed by the _Yü
Lan_, has here the obviously interpolated sentence 因是可得而攻也.

24. 因是而知之故生間有使如期

Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on
appointed occasions.

Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.

25. 五間之事主必知之知之必在於反間故反間不可不厚也

The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of
the enemy;

I have ventured to differ in this place from those commentators—Tu
Yu and Chang Yü—who understand 主 as 人主, and make 五間之事 the
antecedent of 之 (the others ignoring the point altogether). It
is plausible enough that Sun Tzŭ should require the ruler to be
familiar with the methods of spying (though one would rather
expect 將 “general” in place of 主) But this involves taking 知之
here in quite a different way from the 知之 immediately following,
as also from those in the previous sentences. 之 there refers
vaguely to the enemy or the enemy’s condition, and in order to
retain the same meaning here, I make 主 a verb, governed by
五間之事. Cf. XI. § 19, where 主 is used in exactly the same
manner. The sole objection that I can see in the way of this
interpretation is the fact that the 死間, or fourth variety of spy,
does not add to our knowledge of the enemy, but only misinforms
the enemy about us. This would be, however, but a trivial
oversight on Sun Tzŭ’s part, inasmuch as the “doomed spy” is in
the strictest sense not to be reckoned as a spy at all. Capt.
Calthrop, it is hardly necessary to remark, slurs over the whole
difficulty.

and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from
the converted spy.

As explained in §§ 22–24. He not only brings information himself,
but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.

Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the
utmost liberality.

26. 昔殷之興也伊摯在夏周之興也呂牙在殷

Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty

Sun Tzŭ means the 商 Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name
was changed to Yin by 盤庚 P‘an Kêng in 1401.

was due to I Chih

Better known as 伊尹 I Yin, the famous general and statesman who
took part in Ch‘êng T‘ang’s campaign against 桀癸 Chieh Kuei.

who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty
was due to Lü Ya

呂尙 Lü Shang, whose “style” was 子牙, rose to high office
under the tyrant 紂辛 Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards helped to
overthrow. Popularly known as 太公, a title bestowed on him by Wên
Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously
identified with the 六韜.

who had served under the Yin.

There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to
introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are
by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly
doubt that Sun Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lü Ya as illustrious
examples of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His
suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the
intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcomings which these
former ministers were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch‘ên
appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: “I Yin
and Lü Ya,” he says, “were not rebels against the Government
(非叛於國也). Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him.
Yin could not employ the latter, hence Chou employed him. Their great
achievements were all for the good of the people.” Ho Shih is also
indignant: 伊呂聖人之耦豈爲人間哉今孫子引之者言五間之用須上智之人如伊呂之才智者
可以用間葢重之之辭耳 “How should two divinely inspired men such as I and
Lü have acted as common spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of them simply means
that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter which
requires men of the highest mental calibre like I and Lü, whose
wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task. The above words only
emphasise this point.” Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes are
mentioned on account of their supposed skill in the use of spies. But
this is very weak, as it leaves totally unexplained the significant
words 在夏 and 在殷. Capt. Calthrop speaks, rather strangely, of “the
province of Yin ... the country of Hsia ... the State of Chu ... the
people of Shang.”

27. 故惟明君賢將能以上智爲間者必成大功此兵之要三軍之所恃而動也

Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will
use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying,

Ch‘ên Hao compares § 15: 非聖智不能用間. He points out that 湯武之聖
伊呂宜用 “the god-like wisdom of Ch‘êng T‘ang and Wu Wang led them
to employ I Yin and Lü Shang.” The _T‘u Shu_ omits 惟.

and thereby they achieve great results.

Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: 夫水所以能濟舟亦有因水而覆沒者間
所以能成功亦有憑間而傾敗者 “Just as water, which carries a boat from
bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on
spies, while productive of great results, is oft-times the cause
of utter destruction.”

Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an
army’s ability to move.

The antecedent to 此 must be either 間者 or 用間者 understood from
the whole sentence. Chia Lin says that an army without spies is
like a man without ears or eyes.

CHINESE CONCORDANCE

[PROPER NAMES ARE INDICATED BY AN ASTERISK]

Ai 愛 VIII. 12; X. 25, 26; XI. 18, 66; XIII. 2.

„ 阨 X. 21.

an 安 II. 20; V. 22; VI. 4; XII. 22.

Cha 詐 VII. 15.

ch‘a 察 I. 2; VIII. 14; IX. 39; X. 13, 20; XI. 41.

chan 戰 _passim_.

„ 霑 XI. 28.

chang 障 IX. 21.

„ 仗 IX. 29.

ch‘ang 常 VI. 32, 34; X. 18; XI. 29.*

„ 長 VI. 34.

„ 嘗 V. 9.

chao 朝 VII. 28.

chê 者 _passim_.

„ 折 V. 13; XI. 63.

chên 軫 XII. 4.*

ch‘ên 陳 VII. 32; IX. 25, 27; X. 18.

„ 塵 IX. 23.

chêng 爭 III. 7; VII. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 22: VIII. 3; XI. 1, 4, 11, 47,
55; XIII. 2.

chêng 正 V. 3, 5, 10, 11; VII. 32; XI. 35.

„ 政 III. 3, 14; IV. 16; VII. 23; XI. 32, 56, 63.

„ 整 XI. 18.

ch‘êng 成 III. 4; XI. 62; XIII. 4, 27.

„ 城 II. 2; III. 3, 4, 5, 6; VIII. 3; XI. 7, 55; XIII. 20.

„ 乘^2 II. 4, 17; XI. 19.

„ 乘^4 II. 1, 17.

„ 稱 IV. 17, 18, 19.

chi 計 I. 3, 12, 15, 16; VI. 22; VII. 4, 22; X. 21; XI. 22.

„ 及 VI. 10; VII. 6; XI. 15, 19, 68.

„ 汲 IX. 30.

„ 急 II. 12.

„ 己 III. 18; IV. 2; VI. 18; X. 31; XI. 55.

„ 紀 XIII. 8.

„ 𦮼 II. 15.

„ 擊 VI. 15, 30; VII. 29, 32; VIII. 3; IX. 4; X. 7, 15, 19, 27, 28, 29;
XI. 9, 29; XIII. 20.

chi 亟 IX. 7, 15; XI. 65.

„ 極 VI. 25; XII. 8.

„ 集 IX. 32; XI. 16.

„ 激 V. 12.

„ 既 III. 16; VII. 25.

„ 疾 V. 12, 13; VII. 17; IX. 12; XI. 10.

„ 機 V. 15; XI. 38.

„ 飢 VI. 4; VII. 31; IX. 29.

„ 積 IV. 20; VII. 11; XI. 22; XII. 1.

„ 㦸 II. 14.

„ 籍 II. 8.

„ 箕 XII. 4.*

„ 濟 IX. 4; XI. 30.

„ 繼 XI. 49.

ch‘i 其 _passim_.

„ 期 IX. 27; XI. 38, 66; XIII. 24.

„ 旗 II. 17; VII. 23, 24, 26, 32; IX. 33.

„ 器 III. 4.

„ 漆 II. 1.

„ 起 II. 4; IX. 22; XII. 3, 4; XIII. 8.

„ 𨻶 III. 11; IX. 15.

„ 齊 IX. 43; XI. 16, 32.

„ 七 II. 13; XIII. 1.

„ 奇 V. 3, 5, 6, 10, 11.

„ 谿 IV. 20; X. 25.

„ 氣 VII. 27, 28, 29; XI. 22.

chia 家 I. 25; II. 13, 14, 20; XIII. 1.

„ 甲 II. 1, 14; VII. 7.

„ 加 V. 4; XI. 54, 55.

chia 葭 IX. 17.

chiang 江 V. 6.

„ 彊 V. 17, 18.

„ 將^1 XI. 18, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50.

„ 將^4 I. 4, 9, 11, 13, 15; II. 15, 20; III. 5, 11, 17; VII. 1, 7, 9,
27; VIII. 1, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14; IX. 33; X. 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21;
XI. 35, 40, 61; XII. 16, 18, 22; XIII. 3, 4, 20, 27.

„ 蔣 IX. 17.

ch‘iang 强 I. 13, 21; II. 18; III. 11; IX. 24; X. 16, 19; XII. 13.

chiao 交 III. 3; VII. 2, 12; VIII. 2; IX. 8; XI. 1, 5, 12, 28, 48, 52,
54, 55.

„ 校 I. 3, 12.

„ 教 IX. 44; X. 18.

„ 驕 I. 22; X. 26.

„ 膠 II. 1.

ch‘iao 巧 II. 5; XI. 62.

„ 樵 IX. 23.

chieh 竭 II. 11, 12; V. 6.

„ 皆 VI. 27; XI. 33; XIII. 19.

„ 戒 XI. 19, 25.

„ 潔 VIII. 12.

„ 節 V. 13, 14, 15.

„ 解 VIII. 9.

„ 結 XI. 48.

ch‘ieh 且 III. 16; XI. 23.

ch‘ieh 怯 V. 17, 18; VII. 25.

chien 閒 or 間 VI. 25; XIII. _passim_.

„ 澗 IX. 15.

„ 兼 VII. 7.

„ 姦 IX. 17.

„ 堅 III. 10.

„ 賤 IX. 11; XI. 15.

„ 踐 XI. 67.

„ 見 I. 26; IV. 8, 10; VII. 23; IX. 31.

ch‘ien 千 II. 1; IV. 20; V. 23; VI. 6, 19; XI. 61; XIII. 1.

„ 淺 XI. 42, 44.

„ 前 VI. 17, 20; IX. 9; XI. 15, 45.

chih 知 _passim_.

„ 智 I. 9; II. 4, 15; IV. 12; VIII. 7; XIII. 15, 27.

„ 之 _passim_.

„ 之 [=至] VI. 12; XI. 39.

„ 止 V. 22; XI. 11, 17; XII. 8, 11, 19.

„ 支 X. 1, 6, 7.

„ 直 VII. 3, 4, 22.

„ 制 I. 7, 10, 17; VI. 27, 31; X. 21.

„ 志 XI. 46.

„ 摯 XIII. 26.*

„ 鷙 V. 13.

„ 治 V. 1, 17, 18; VII. 29, 30, 31, 32; VIII. 6; X. 26; XI. 35.

„ 至 III. 16; V. 12, 13; VI. 3, 9, 25; VII. 4, 8, 9, 10; IX. 14, 37; X.
13, 20; XI. 6, 26, 29; XIII. 2.

chih 致 VI. 2; XII. 18.

ch‘ih 馳 II. 1.

„ 斥 IX. 7, 8.

chin 近 I. 8, 19; II. 11; VI. 20; VII. 31; IX. 15, 16, 18; X. 21.

„ 進 III. 13; VI. 10; VII. 25; IX. 19, 24, 28, 31, 40; X. 24; XI. 49.

„ 盡 II. 7; XI. 23.

„ 金 II. 1; VII. 23, 24; XIII. 1, 2.

„ 謹 IX. 17, 39; XL 22, 48.

„ 禁 XI. 26.

„ 襟 XI. 28.

ch‘in 親 I. 23; IX. 42; XI. 25; XIII. 14.

„ 擒 III. 10; VII. 7; IX. 41.

„ 侵 VII. 18.

„ 靜 V. 22; VI. 23; VII. 30; IX. 18; XI. 35; XII. 7.

„ 旌 II. 17: VII. 23, 24, 26; IX. 33.

„ 井 IX. 15, 17.

„ 勁 VII. 8.

„ 經 I. 3.

„ 精 IX. 37.

„ 警 XII. 22.

„ 境 XI. 43.

ch‘ing 情 I. 3, 12; XI. 19, 41, 51; XIII. 2, 6.

„ 請 IX. 26.

ch‘ing 輕 IX. 25; XI. 1, 3, 11, 44, 46.

chio 角 VI. 24.

„ 爵 XIII. 2.

chiu 九 IV. 7; VIII. 4, 5, 6; XI. 41.

„ 久 II. 2, 3, 5, 6, 19; III. 6; IX. 39; XII. 11.

„ 救 VI. 11, 20; XI. 15, 30.

ch‘iu 求 IV. 15; V. 21; X. 24; XI. 25.

„ 丘 II. 12, 14.

„ 邱 VII. 33; IX. 13.

„ 秋 IV. 10.

chiung 窘 IX. 36.

ch‘iung 窮 V. 6, 10, 11; VI. 28; VII. 36; IX. 34; X. 30.

cho 拙 II. 5.

chou 晝 VII. 26, 28; XII. 11.

„ 舟 XI. 30, 39.

„ 周 III. 11: XIII. 26.*

„ 胄 II. 14.

chu 主 I. 10, 13; II. 20; X. 23, 24; XI. 19, 20; XII. 16, 18; XIII. 3,
25.

„ 諸 II. 4; III. 16; VII. 12; VIII. 10; XI. 2, 6, 28,* 38, 52.

„ 著 IX. 45.

„ 助 IX. 13; X. 21.

„ 誅 XI. 64.

„ 屬 XI. 6, 46.

ch‘u 處^3 VI. 1, 24, 30; VII. 7; IX. 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13: XI. 68.

ch‘u 處^4 IX. 17.

„ 出 I. 24; V. 6; VI. 5; IX. 25; X. 5, 6, 7; XIII. 1, 4.

chuan 專 VI. 13, 14; VII. 25; XI. 20, 42.

„ 轉 V. 22, 23.

ch‘uan 傳 I. 25; XIII. 12.

chui 追 VI. 10.

„ 隊 XII. I.

chun 諄 IX. 35.

„ 衆 _passim_.

„ 重 VII. 6, 11; IX. 33; XI. 1, 7, 13, 44, 49.

„ 鍾 II. 15.

„ 終 V. 6.

„ 中 II. 13; IX. 8; XI. 29.

ch‘ung 衝 VI. 10.

chü 居 IX. 20, 25; X. 3, 8, 9, 10, 11; XI. 37.

„ 舉 II. 1; IV. 10; VII. 6; X. 30; XI. 63.

„ 聚 VII. 2; VIII. 1; XI. 40, 54.

„ 車 II. 1, 14, 17; IX. 23, 25.

„ 具 III. 4; XII. 2.

„ 俱 X. 25; XI. 29; XIII. 8.

„ 沮 VII. 13; XI. 8, 52.

„ 拒 XI. 68.

„ 距 III. 4.

„ 拘 XI. 24.

„ 懼 XI. 24.

ch‘ü 去 I. 15; II. 13, 14; IX. 7, 15, 39; X. 7, 11; XI. 26, 38, 43.

ch‘ü 取 I. 20; II. 9, 16; V. 19; VI. 7, 33; IX. 40, 43; XII. 15; XIII.
5, 6.

„ 屈 II. 2, 4, 13; III. 2, 6; VIII. 10; XI. 41.

„ 趨 VI. 1, 5, 29, 30; VII. 7: VIII. 10; XI. 47.

„ 驅 IX. 24; XI. 39.

„ 衢 VIII. 2; XI. 1, 6, 12, 43, 48.

„ 曲 I. 10.

chüan 卷 VII. 7.

„ 倦 IX. 33.

ch‘üan 全 III. 1, 7; IV. 7; X. 31; XII. 22.

„ 權 I. 17; III. 15; VII. 21; XI. 55.

chüeh 絶 VIII. 2; IX. 1, 3, 4, 7, 15; XI. 22, 43; XII. 14.

„ 決 IV. 20; XI. 67.

„ 蹶 VII. 9.

ch‘üeh 闕 VII. 36; XI. 50.

chün 君 III. 12, 17; VII. 1; VIII. 1, 3; XII. 22; XIII. 4, 8, 27.

„ 軍 _passim_.

„ 均 X. 12, 15.

ch‘ün 羣 XI. 39.

Êrh 二 I. 4; II. 15; IV. 17; VII. 10; XII. 1.

êrh 耳 IV. 10; VII. 24, 26; XI. 36.

„ 兒 X. 25.

„ 而 _passim_.

Fa 法 I. 4, 10, 13; II. 1; III. 1, 4, 7, 8; IV. 16, 17; VII. 1, 8, 9,
22, 25, 33, 37; VIII. 1, 11; XI. 1, 56.

Fa 發 V. 15; VII. 4; XI. 28, 38; XII. 3, 6, 7, 9, 10; XIII. 19.

„ 罰 I. 13; IX. 36, 42.

„ 伐 III. 3; XI. 54.

fan 反 XIII. 7, 11, 13, 21, 25.

„ 返 IX. 34; X. 4, 5.

„ 凡 _passim_.

„ 犯 XI. 56, 57.

„ 煩 VIII. 12.

fang 方 V. 22; XI. 31.

„ 防 IX. 13.

fei 費 II. 1, 13, 14; XII. 15; XIII. 1.

„ 非 III. 2, 6; IV. 8, 9; IX. 40; X. 14; XI. 27, 53; XII. 17; XIII. 3,
15, 16, 17.

fên 分 III. 5, 8; V. 1; VI. 13, 14; VII. 10, 16, 20.

„ 忿 III. 5; VIII. 12.

„ 紛 V. 16.

„ 焚 XI. 39.

„ 轒 III. 4.

fêng 風 VII. 17; XI. 30; XII. 4, 10, 11.

„ 奉 II. 1; XIII. 1.

„ 鋒 X. 19.

fou 缻 IX. 34.

„ 覆 IX. 22.

fu 符 XI. 63.

„ 附 III. 5; IX. 5, 42.

„ 夫 _passim_.

„ 扶 XI. 15.

„ 復 V. 6; VI. 28; XII. 20, 21.

„ 覆 VIII. 14; IX. 17.

„ 伏 IX. 17, 22.

„ 負 I. 14, 26; III. 18.

„ 服 IX. 42, 44; X. 17.

„ 釜 XI. 39.

„ 赴 X. 25.

„ 輔 III. 11.

Hai 害 II. 7; VI. 3; VIII. 7, 9, 10; XI. 57, 59.

han 寒 I. 7.

hao 亳 IV. 10.

hêng 橫 X. 18.

ho 合 V. 5; VII. 2, 16; VIII. 1, 2; IX. 39; X. 19, 24; XI. 12, 16, 17,
54; XII. 19.

„ 闔 XI. 65.

„ 何 XI. 18.

„ 河 V. 6.

„ 和 VII. 2; IX. 26.

hou 厚 X. 26; XIII. 14, 25.

„ 侯 II. 4; III. 16; VII. 12; VIII. 10; XI. 2, 6, 52.

„ 後 _passim_.

hsi 昔 IV. 1; XIII. 26.

„ 喜 IX. 11; XII. 20.

„ 奚 VI. 21.

„ 翕 IX. 35.

„ 息 IX. 38.

„ 攜 XI. 34.

hsia 下 III. 3, 7, 17; IV. 7, 9; VI. 29; IX. 11; XI. 6, 15, 55; XII. 10.

„ 夏 XIII. 26.*

hsia 狹 I. 8.

hsiang 相^1 V. 11; VII. 23; IX. 39, 45; XI. 15, 30; XIII. 2.

„ 相^4 IX. 1.

„ 鄉 VII. 14, 20; XI. 52; XIII. 7, 9, 22.

„ 向 VII. 33; XI. 61.

„ 象 VI. 29; XIII. 5.

„ 祥 XI. 26.

„ 詳 XI. 60.

hsiao 小 III. 10; IX. 17.

hsieh 械 III. 4.

„ 駭 IX. 22.

„ 謝 IX. 38.

hsien 先 _passim_.

„ 險 I. 8; V. 14; VII. 13; IX. 17, 18; X. 1, 10, 21; XI. 8, 40, 52.

„ 陷 IX. 15; X. 14, 16; XI. 24, 58, 59.

hsien 賢 XIII. 4, 27.

hsin 信 I. 9; IX. 45; XI. 25.

„ 心 VII. 27, 30.

hsing 行 I. 13; V. 22; VI. 6, 29, 34; VII. 7, 13; IX. 42, 44; XI. 8, 13,
52; XII. 2.

„ 形 _passim_.

„ 興 XII. 18: XIII. 1, 26.

„ 性 V. 22.

hsing 姓 II. 10, 11, 13; XIII. 1, 20.

hsiu 修 III. 4; IV. 6; XI. 25; XII. 15, 16.

„ 休 IX. 38.

hsiung 凶 XII. 15.

hsü 虛 II. 13; V. 4; VI. 10; IX. 32.

„ 徐 VII. 17; IX. 35.

„ 宿 XII. 4.

hsüan 懸 VII. 21; IX. 34; XI. 56.

„ 選 X. 19.

hsün 循 V. 11.

hu 乎 I. 26; VI. 9; XI. 30.

„ 呼 IX. 32.

„ 戶 XI. 68.

hua 化 VI. 33.

„ 畫 VI. 12.

„ 譁 VII. 30.

huan 患 III. 12; VII. 3; VIII. 9.

„ 環 V. 11.

huang 黃 IX. 10.*

„ 潢 IX. 17.

hui 毀 III. 6; V. 13.

„ 隳 XI. 55.

„ 會 VI. 19.

hun 渾 V. 16.

huo 貨 II. 4, 16; XI. 27.

„ 火 VII. 18, 26; XII. _passim_.

„ 惑 III. 14, 16.

„ 活 XI. 50.

I 一 _passim_.

„ 已 II. 17; III. 4; IV. 13; IX. 40, 42; XI. 24, 34, 51.

I 易 I. 8; IV. 11; IX. 9, 20, 41; XI. 37.

„ 意 I. 5, 24; VI. 5; XI. 60.

„ 益 II. 18; VI. 21; IX. 24, 40.

„ 鎰 IV. 19.

„ 疑 III. 15, 16; IX. 21; XI. 26.

„ 佚 I. 23; VI. 1, 4; VII. 31.

„ 役 II. 8, 12; VIII. 10.

„ 亦 VI. 21; XI. 4.

„ 俅 IX. 1, 8.

„ 倚 IX. 29.

„ 伊 XIII. 26.*

„ 邑 XI. 7.

„ 頤 XI. 28.

„ 夷 XI. 63.

„ 義 XIII. 16.

„ 蟻 III. 5.

„ 翼 XII. 4.*

„ 蘙 IX. 17.

„ 以 _passim_.

„ 矣 _passim_.

Jan 然 II. 1; XI. 29, 30, 58, 59.

jao 擾 IX. 33.

„ 饒 XI. 21.

jên 人 _passim_.

„ 仁 I. 9; XIII. 2, 16.

„ 任 III. 15; V. 21, 22; X. 13, 20.

„ 仞 IV. 20; V. 23.

jih 日 II. 1; IV. 10; V. 6; VI. 19, 20, 34; VII. 7; XI. 28, 63; XII. 3,
4; XIII. 1, 2.

jo 若 III. 9; IV. 19, 20; IX. 8; X. 5, 9, 11; XI. 18, 32, 34, 39, 56.

„ 弱 III. 11; V. 17, 18; X. 16, 18, 19.

jou 肉 IX. 34.

„ 柔 XI. 33.

ju 辱 VIII. 12.

„ 入 IX. 35; XI. _passim_.

„ 如 V. _passim_; VII. 17, 18, 19; X. 25, 26; XI. 29, 30, 38, 68; XIII.
24.

jui 鋭 II. 2, 4; VII. 28, 29, 34; IX. 23.

K‘ai 開 XI. 65, 68.

kan 敢 XI. 18, 30.

„ 秆 II. 15.

kang 剛 XI. 33.

kao 高 VI. 11, 29; VII. 33; IX. 2, 6, 9, 11, 23: X. 3, 10; XI. 38.

„ 告 XI. 57; XIII. 19, 23.

kêng 更 II. 17.

ko 革 II. 1; XI. 37.

k‘o 渴 IX. 30.

„ 客 II. 1; IX. 4, 5; XI. 20, 42.

„ 克 XI. 20.

„ 可 _passim_.

kou 溝 VI. 11.

k‘ou 宼 VII. 36; IX. 34.

ku 古 IV. 11; XI. 15.

„ 固 VI. 7; XI. 24, 45, 48.

„ 故 _passim_.

„ 谷 IX. 1.

„ 鼓 VII. 23, 24, 26.

k‘u 庫 XII. 1.

kua 寡 III. 17; V. 1, 2; VI. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18; XI. 9, 15.

„ 挂 X. 1, 4, 5.

kuai 乖 VI. 12.

kuan 官 I. 10; XIII. 10.

„ 關 XI. 63.

„ 觀 I. 26; V. 8.

kuang 廣 I. 8; IX. 23.

k‘uang 況 I. 26; VI. 20.

„ 誑 XIII. 12, 23.

kuei 歸 VII. 28, 29, 35; XI. 9.

„ 鬼 XIII. 5.

„ 貴 II. 11, 19; IX. 11; XI. 15.

„ 劌 XI. 28.*

„ 詭 I. 18.

k‘uei 窺 VI. 25.

„ 饋 II. 1.

k‘un 困 IX. 36.

kung 公 II. 14; XIII. 1.

„ 功 IV. 12; XIII. 4, 27.

„ 攻 _passim_.

„ 共 VI. 14.

k‘ung 恐 IX. 32.

kuo 國 I. 1; II. 3, 6, 9, 10, 20; III. 1, 6, 11; X. 24; XI. 43, 54, 55;
XII. 21, 22.

„ 過 IV. 8; V. 7, 8, 9, 10; VIII. 13; X. 14; XI. 51.

„ 彍 V. 15.

k‘uo 廓 VII. 20.

Lai 來 VIII. 11; IX. 4, 21, 23, 38; X. 2; XI. 5, 18, 39; XIII. 21.

lang 廊 XI. 64.

lao 勞 I. 23; VI. 1, 4, 6; VII. 31; IX. 31; XI. 22.

„ 牢 IX. 15.

lei 壘 VI. 11.

„ 雷 IV. 10; VII. 19.

li 吏 IX. 33; X. 16, 17, 18.

„ 里 II. 1; VI. 6, 19, 20; VII. 7, 9, 10; XI. 61; XIII. 1.

„ 理 VI. 23; XI. 33, 41.

„ 力 II. 2, 4, 13; IV. 10; VII. 31; IX. 40; XI. 22, 23; XII. 8.

„ 立 IV. 14; VII. 15; IX. 29.

„ 離 I. 23; XI. 16.

„ 厲 XI. 64.

„ 利 _passim_.

liang 量 IV. 17, 18.

„ 糧 II. 1, 8, 9; VII. 11; X. 3.

„ 良 XII. 16, 22.

liao 料 IX. 40; X. 19, 21.

lien 廉 VIII. 12.

„ 練 I. 13.

lin 林 VII. 13, 17; IX. 17; XI. 8, 52.

ling 令 I. 5, 13; IX. 4, 43, 44, 45; X. 7, 26; XI. 25, 28, 56; XIII. 12,
20.

„ 陵 VII. 33; IX. 13.

liu 六 II. 14; X. 13, 14, 20.

„ 留 I. 15; VIII. 2; IX. 7; XII. 15.

„ 流 VI. 31; IX. 6.

lo 羅 IX. 15.

lu 虜 VIII. 12.

„ 櫓 II. 14; III. 4.

„ 路 XIII. 1.

„ 陸 IX. 9.

„ 祿 XIII. 2.

luan 亂 I. 20; III. 16; V. 16, 17, 18; VII. 30; IX. 33; X. 14, 18, 26.

„ 卵 V. 4.

lun 輪 XI. 31.

lung 隆 IX. 2.

lü 慮 VIII. 7; IX. 41; XI. 37; XII. 16.

„ 呂 XIII. 26.*

„ 旅 III. 1.

„ 屢 IX. 36.

lüeh 掠 VII. 18, 20; XI. 13, 21.

Ma 馬 II. 14; IX. 34; XI. 31.

mai 賣 II. 11.

„ 埋 XI. 31.

mei 每 III. 18.

mên 門 XIII. 20.

mi 縻 III. 13.

„ 迷 X. 30.

„ 密 XIII. 14.

miao 廟 I. 26; XI. 64.

„ 妙 XII. 17.

min 民 I. 5, 6; II. 20; IV. 20; VII. 24, 25, 26; VIII. 12: IX. 44; X. 24.

ming 命 II. 20; VI. 9; VII. 1; VIII. 1, 3; XI. 27; XII. 15.

„ 名 IV. 12; V. 2; X. 24; XIII. 20.

ming 明 I. 13; IV. 10; X. 18; XII. 13, 16, 22: XIII. 4, 27.

mo 沫 IX. 14.

„ 墨 XI. 67.

„ 莫 I. 11; VI. 27; VII. 3; XI. 39; XIII. 8, 14.

mou 謀 III. 3, 7; VI. 25; VII. 12; VIII. 2; IX. 26: XI. 14, 22, 37, 52.

mu 目 IV. 10: VII. 24, 26; XI. 36.

„ 木 V. 22.

„ 暮 VII. 28.

Nai 乃 I. 16; X. 31.

nan 難 III. 16; VII. 3, 19; IX. 42; X. 4, 5, 12; XI. 8.

nao 撓 I. 22.

nei 內 II. 1, 13; IX. 4; XII. 6, 9; XIII. 1, 7, 10, 22.

nêng 能 _passim_.

ni 餌 VII. 35.

„ 逆 VII. 33.

niao 鳥 V. 13; IX. 22, 32.

nien 年 XIII. 2.

niu 牛 II. 14.

nu 怒 I. 22; II. 16; IX. 33, 39; X. 17; XII. 18, 20.

„ 弩 II. 14; V. 15.

nü 女 XI. 68.

O 遏 VII. 35.

Pa 拔 III. 5, 6; XI. 55.

„ 霸 XI. 53, 54.

pai 敗 I. 15; IV. 13, 14, 15, 16, 19; V. 3, 16; VI. 21; X. 20, 22; XI.
59.

pan 半 VII. 9; IX. 4, 28; X. 7, 27, 28, 29.

p‘ang 旁 IX. 17.

pao 保 IV. 7, 16; X. 24.

„ 寳 X. 24; XIII. 8.

„ 報 XIII. 13.

„ 暴 II. 3; IX. 37.

„ 飽 VI. 4; VII. 31.

pei 倍 III. 8; VII. 7.

„ 北 VII. 34; X. 14, 19; XI. 23.

„ 背 VII. 33; IX. 8, 9, 13, 16; XI. 7, 45.

„ 卑 I. 22; IX. 23, 24.

„ 備 I. 21, 24; VI. 16, 17, 18; IX. 24; X. 5.

pên 奔 IX. 27.

p‘êng 崩 X. 14, 17.

pi 壁 XII. 4.*

„ 避 I. 21; III. 9; VI. 29; VII. 29; X. 24.

„ 弊 II. 4.

„ 蔽 II. 14.

„ 必 _passim_.

„ 彼 III. 18; X. 2, 6, 31; XI. 4, 5, 9.

p‘i 譬 X. 26; XI. 29.

„ 圮 VIII. 2; XI. 1, 8, 13, 49.

„ 罷 II. 14; VII. 8.

p‘iao 漂 V. 12.

pien 變 V. 7, 8, 9, 10; VI. 33; VII. 16, 26, 32; VIII. 4, 5, 6; XI. 41;
XII. 5, 12.

pin 賓 II. 1.

p‘in 貧 II. 10.

ping 并 XI. 61.

„ 併 IX. 40; XI. 22.

„ 兵 _passim_.

p‘ing 平 IX. 9.

po 百 II. 10, 11, 13; III. 2, 18; VII. 7; IX. 12; XIII. 1. 2.

„ 迫 VII. 36.

p‘o 破 II. 14; III. 1; XI. 39.

pu 不 _passim_.

Sai 塞 XI. 50.

san 三 I. 4; II. 8; III. _passim_; IV. 17; V. 2; VII. 7, 10, 27; XI. 6,
21, 40, 56; XII. 1; XIII. 14, 27.

„ 散 IX. 23; XI. 1, 2, 11, 42, 46.

sao 燥 XII. 4.

„ 騷 XIII. 1.

sê 色 V. 8.

sha 殺 II. 16; III. 5; VIII. 12, 14; XI. 6; XIII. 20.

shan 山 V. 23; VII. 13, 18; IX. 1, 2; XI. 8, 29, 52.

„ 善 _passim_.

shang 上 I. 5; III. 1, 3, 17; IV. 7; VII. 9; IX. 6, 14; X. 21; XI. 15,
64; XII. 10; XIII. 27.

„ 賞 I. 13; II. 17; IX. 36; XI. 56; XIII. 14.

shao 少 I. 26; III. 9; IX. 23; X. 19.

shê 舍 VII. 2; VIII. 2; IX. 34; XIII. 20, 21.

„ 虵 XI. 29.

„ 涉 IX. 14.

shên 深 VI. 11, 25; X. 25; XI. _passim_.

„ 信 VIII. 8; XI. 55. [See under _hsin_.]

„ 伸 XI. 41.

„ 神 VI. 9, 33; XIII. 5, 8.

„ 甚 XI. 24.

„ 愼 XII. 22.

shêng 勝 _passim_.

„ 生 I. 2, 6, 8; IV. 18; V. 6, 11, 17; VI. 23, 34; VIII. 12; IX. 2, 6, 9,
12, 17; XI. 58; XII. 21; XIII. 7, 13, 24.

„ 聲 V. 7; VI. 9.

„ 聖 XIII. 15.

shih 是 _passim_.

„ 矢 II. 14.

„ 失 IV. 14; VI. 22; IX. 35.

„ 石 II. 15; V. 12, 22, 23.

„ 始 V. 6; XI. 68.

„ 示 I. 19; XI. 50.

„ 施 XI. 56.

„ 弛 X. 14, 16.

„ 時 I. 7; V. 6; VI. 34; XII. 3, 4, 9.

„ 識 III. 17; XI. 37.

„ 埶 V. _passim_.

„ 勢 I. 16, 17; VI. 32; X. 12, 15.

shih 十 II. 1, 13, 14, 15, 17; III. 8; VI. 14, 20; VII. 8, 9, 10; X. 15;
XIII. 1.

„ 士 I. 13; III. 5, 14, 15; XI. 23, 24, 27, 28, 36.

„ 實 I. 21; V. 4; VI. 30; IX. 12; XIII. 17.

„ 使 IV. 3; V. 3; VI. 3, 18, 22; X. 26; XI. _passim_; XIII. 16, 22, 23,
24.

„ 事 I. 1; III. 14; XI, XIII. _passim_.

„ 恃 VIII. 11; IX. 18; XI. 15, 31; XIII. 27.

„ 師 II. 1, 3, 10, 11; VII. 36; XI. 43; XII. 18; XIII. 1.

„ 視 VII. 23; IX. 2, 6; X. 25.

„ 食 II. 9, 15; VII. 11, 35; IX. 34; XI. 21, 49.

shou 受 V. 3; VII. 1; VIII. 1, 3.

„ 守 IV. 5, 6, 7; VI. 7, 8, 12; XI. 48; XII. 12; XIII. 2, 20.

„ 手 XI. 30, 34.

„ 獸 IX. 22.

„ 首 XI. 29.

„ 壽 XI. 27.

shu 數 IV. 17, 18; V. 1, 18; VI. 20; IX. 36; XII. 12; XIII. 2.

„ 樹 IX. 8, 21.

„ 孰 I. 13; V. 11.

„ 銖 IV. 19.

„ 輸 II. 10.

„ 暑 I. 7.

„ 術 VIII. 6.

shuai 率 XI. 29, 30.

„ 帥 XI. 38.

shui 水 IV. 20; V. 12; VI. 29, 31, 32; IX. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 14; XII. 13,
14.

shun 楯 II. 14.

„ 順 XI. 60.

so 所 _passim_.

„ 索 I. 3, 12; IX. 17; XIII. 20, 21.

ssŭ 死 I. 2, 6, 8; V. 6; VI. 23, 34; VIII. 2, 12; IX. 9, 10; X. 25; XI.
_passim_; XII. 21; XIII. 7, 12, 19, 23.

„ 四 I. 4; IV. 17; V. 6; VI. 34; XI. 43, 53; XII. 1, 4.

„ 駟 II. 1.

„ 司 II. 20; VI. 9.

„ 私 XI. 55.

su 速 II. 5; VI. 10; VIII. 12; XI. 19.

„ 素 IX. 44, 45; XII. 2.

„ 粟 IX. 34.

suan 算 I. 26.

sui 雖 II. 4; VI. 11, 21, 22; VIII. 5, 6; X. 7.

„ 隨 XI. 67.

sun 孫 _passim_.

Ta 大 I. 1; II. 14; III. 10; X. 17; XI. 54; XIII. 27.

„ 達 IX. 23; XI. 43.

tai 待 III. 17; IV. 1; V. 20; VI. 1; VII. 30, 31; VIII. 11; IX. 14; X. 8,
10; XI. 18; XII. 7, 9.

tai 殆 III. 18; X. 31.

„ 怠 XIII. 1.

„ 帶 II. 1.

tan 殫 II. 4, 13.

tang 當 II. 15; XI. 30.

t‘ang 堂 VII. 32.

tao 道 I. _passim_; III. 17; IV. 16; VII. 7; X. _passim_; XI. 8, 19, 20,
32, 42; XII. 22; XIII. 1, 8.

„ 導 VII. 14; XI. 52; XIII. 21.

t‘ao 逃 III. 9.

tê 得 _passim_.

t‘ê 忒 IV. 13.

têng 登 IX. 2; XI. 38.

ti 地 I. 2, 4, 8, 13; IV. 7, 14, 18; V. 6; VI. _passim_; VII. 14, 20;
VIII. 2, 3, 5; IX. 13, 15; X. 1, 13, 21, 29, 31; XI. _passim_.

„ 敵 II. 9, 15, 16, 18; III. 9, 10; IV. 1, 2, 3, 14; V. 3, 19; VI, IX, X,
XI, XIII. passim.

„ 帝 IX. 10.

„ 隄 IX. 13.

t‘i 梯 XI. 38.

„ 涕 XI. 28.

t‘iao 挑 IX. 19; X. 12.

„ 條 IX. 23.

t‘ien 天 I. 4, 7, 13; III. 7; IV. 7, 9; V. 6; IX. 15; X. 14, 31; XI. 6,
55; XII. 4.

ting 定 IX. 14.

t‘ing 聽 I. 15, 16; V. 7; XI. 18.

„ 霆 IV. 10; VII. 19.

to 度 IV. 18; VI. 21; XIII. 5.

„ 惰 VII. 28, 29.

„ 奪 VII. 27; XI. 18; XII. 14.

„ 多 I. 26; IV. 10; VI. 16, 21; VII. 26; IX. 21, 40; XI. 7.

t‘o 脫 XI. 68.

tou 鬥 V. 2, 16; VI. 22; XI. 24, 51.

t‘ou 投 V. 4; XI. 23, 28, 40, 58.

tsa 雜 II. 17; VIII. 7, 8, 9.

tsai 在 _passim_.

„ 災 III. 5; VIII. 13; X. 14; XI. 26.

„ 哉 VI. 21; XIII. 18.

„ 再 II. 8.

„ 載 II. 8.

ts‘ai 財 II. 11, 12, 13; XI. 27.

„ 材 II. 1.

„ 採 IX. 23.

ts‘ang 藏 IV. 7; IX. 17.

tsao 早 XII. 6.

ts‘ao 草 IX. 8, 21.

„ 操 XIII. 1.

tsê 則 _passim_.

„ 擇 V. 21.

„ 澤 VII. 13; IX. 7, 8; XI. 8, 52.

„ 責 V. 21.

ts‘ê 側 IX. 25.

„ 測 XI. 22.

ts‘ê 策 VI. 22.

tso 左 VI. 17, 20; XI. 30; XIII. 20.

„ 佐 I. 16; XII. 13; XIII. 3.

„ 作 VI. 23.

„ 坐 XI. 28.

ts‘o 挫 II. 2, 4.

„ 措 IV. 13.

„ 錯 VI. 26.

tsou 走 IX. 27; X. 14, 15.

tsu 卒 I. 13; II. 17; III. 1; V. 20; VII. 34; IX. 42; X. 16, 18, 25, 27,
28, 29; XI. 16, 28, 36.

„ 足 II. 3, 9; IV. 6; VI. 24; IX. 40; XI. 21, 31.

„ 阻 VII. 13; IX. 17; XI. 8, 52.

tsui 罪 X. 24.

ts‘un 存 I. 2; XI. 10, 58; XII. 21.

tsung 縱 X. 18.

ts‘ung 從 V. 19; VII. 34; X. 9, 11; XI. 9, 51; XII. 8.

„ 聰 IV. 10.

tu 睹 II. 5.

„ 獨 VII. 25.

t‘u 徒 IX. 23.

„ 兎 XI. 68.

„ 途 VII. 4; XI. 37.

„ 塗 VIII. 3; XI. 49.

tuan 短 V. 14; VI. 34.

„ 端 V. 11.

„ 碫 V. 4.

tui 懟 X. 17.

t‘ui 退 III. 13; VI. 10; VII. 25; IX. 24, 28; X. 24.

tun 沌 V. 16.

„ 鈍 II. 2, 4.

„ 頓 III. 7.

tung 動 IV. 7; V. 19, 20, 22; VI. 4, 23; VII. 15, 18, 19, 21; IX. 21, 33;
X. 30; XI. 17; XII. 17, 19; XIII. 1, 4, 27.

t‘ung 通 VIII. 4, 5; X. 1, 2, 3; XI. 63.

„ 同 I. 5; III. 14, 15, 17; XI. 30.

tzŭ 子 I. 1; X. 25, 26; _et al_.

„ 自 IV. 7; VI. 3; X. 17; XI. 2.

„ 輜 VII. 6, 11; XII. 1.

tz‘ŭ 此 _passim_.

Wai 外 I. 16; II. 1; XII. 6, 9; XIII. 1, 12.

wan 萬 II. 1; XIII. 1.

wang 往 IX. 23; X. 2, 4; XI. 5, 23, 24, 28, 39, 45.

„ 亡 I. 2; VII. 11; XI. 10, 58; XII. 21.

„ 王 XI. 53, 54.

wei 爲 _passim_.

„ 謂 II. 18; III. 13, 16; IV. 11; VI. 33; IX. 12. 43; XI. 15, 40, 62;
XIII. 8.

„ 畏 I. 6; IX. 37.

„ 危 I. 6; II. 20; V. 22; VII. 5; VIII. 12, 14; XII. 17.

„ 唯 X. 24.

„ 惟 IX. 7, 40, 41; XIII. 27.

„ 尾 XI. 29.

wei 威 XI. 54, 55.

„ 未 _passim_.

„ 味 V. 9.

„ 位 VI. 34.

„ 薈 IX. 17.

„ 委 VII. 6, 11; IX. 38.

„ 微 VI. 9; XI. 66; XIII. 17, 18.

„ 圍 III. 8; VII. 36; VIII. 2; XI. 1, 9, 14, 45, 50, 51.

„ 葦 IX. 17.

wên 文 IX. 43.

„ 愠 XII. 18, 20.

„ 問 XI. 18, 30.

„ 聞 I. 11; II. 5; IV. 10; VII. 23; XIII. 19.

wo 我 VI. 11, 12, 13, 14, 27; X. 2, 6, 7, 8, 10; XI. 4, 5; XIII. 21.

„ 臥 XI. 28.

wu 無 _passim_.

„ 勿 VII. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36; IX. 4, 15; X. 9, 11; XI. 22, 57; XII. 7.

„ 五 _passim_.

„ 伍 III. 1.

„ 吾 _passim_.

„ 務 II. 15; VIII. 8.

„ 侮 VIII. 12.

„ 惡 IX. 11; XI. 27, 30.

„ 武 IX. 40, 43.

„ 吳 XI. 30.*

Ya 牙 XIII. 26.*

yai 隘 X. 1, 8; XI. 9, 45.

yang 羊 XI. 39.

„ 佯 VII. 34.

„ 養 II. 17; IX. 12; XI. 22, 55.

„ 陽 I. 7; IX. 11, 13; X. 3, 10.

yao 要 VII. 32; XIII. 27.

yeh 也 _passim_.

„ 業 VIII. 10.

„ 野 XI. 21.

„ 謁 XIII. 20.

„ 夜 VII. 7, 26; IX. 32: XII. 11.

yen 焉 XI. 23.

„ 言 VII. 23; IX. 35; XI. 57.

„ 嚴 I. 9; X. 18.

„ 驗 XIII. 5.

„ 煙 XII. 2.

„ 偃 XI. 28.

yin 引 III. 16; X. 7, 11.

„ 陰 I. 7; VII. 19; IX. 11.

„ 飮 IX. 30.

„ 闉 III. 4.

„ 殷 XIII. 26.*

„ 因 I. 17; II. 9; VI. 26, 31, 33; XII. 2, 5; XIII. _passim_.

ying 營 IX. 23.

„ 盈 X. 8, 9.

„ 嬰 X. 25.

„ 應 VI. 28; XII. 5, 6.

„ 迎 IX. 4, 5, 6, 16, 39.

yo 約 VI. 15; IX. 26; XI. 25.

yu 有 _passim_.

„ 右 VI. 17, 20; IX. 9, 13; XI. 30; XIII. 20.

yu 由 VIII. 3; XI. 9, 19.

„ 誘 I. 20; VII. 4; IX. 28.

„ 又 III. 4; IX. 39.

„ 幽 XI. 35.

yung 用 _passim_.

„ 勇 I. 9; IV. 12; V. 17, 18; VII. 25; XI. 28, 32.

yü 雨 IX. 14.

„ 於 _passim_.

„ 予 V. 19.

„ 御 III. 17.

„ 禦 VI. 10; XI. 51.

„ 愚 XI. 36.

„ 遇 X. 17; XI. 30.

„ 虞 III. 17; XI. 19.

„ 豫 VII. 12; XI. 52.

„ 迁 VII. 3, 4, 22; XI. 9, 37.

yü 餘 IV. 6; VI. 24; XI. 27.

„ 欲 III. 17; VI. 11, 12; IX. 5, 14, 19, 38; XIII. 20.

„ 與 _passim_.

yüan 遠 I. 8, 19; II. 10; VI. 20; VII. 31; IX. 3, 16, 19; X. 1, 12, 21.

„ 原 II. 13.

„ 捐 VII. 6.

„ 圓 V. 16, 22, 23.

yüeh 曰 _passim_.

„ 月 III. 4; IV. 10; V. 6; VI. 34.

„ 越 VI. 21*; XI. 30*, 43.

„ 悅 XII. 20.

yün 紜 V. 16.

„ 輪 III. 4.

„ 運 XI. 22.

INDEX

[The numerals refer to pages]

Abstract ideas of degree, 50.

Accessible ground, 100, 101, 119.

Accommodating oneself to the enemy, 145, 148.

Adaptation to circumstances, 23.

Aides-de-camp, 171.

“Aids to Scouting,” quoted, 88, 89, 107, 164.

Alliances, 60, 119, 140, 142.

Allotments of land, 62.

Alps, crossings of the, 57.

Amiot, Père, vii, 1.

Anger, succeeded by gladness, 159.

Army, divisions of the, 17, 33.

Army on the march, 140.

Arsenals, burning of, 151.

“Art of War,” quoted by Han Hsin, 144.

Art of war in a nutshell, 44.

Athletics, 124.

Attack, skill in, 28.

Attack and defence, 25, 44.

Autumn hair, 29.

Baden-Powell, General. _See_ “Aids to Scouting.”

Baggage, 58.

Baggage-train, 60.

Baggage-trains, burning of, 151.

Bait, offered by the enemy, 68.

Balancing of chances, 31.

Banners. _See_ Flags and banners.

Bases of supply, 60.

Beasts, startled, sign of surprise attack, 89.

Belgians at Waterloo, 130.

Benevolence to spies, 170.

Biot’s _Chou Li_, ix.

Birds rising, sign of ambuscade, 89.

Blücher, 48.

Bluster, 95.

Boers, 18.

“Book of Army Management,” 63.

Buff-coats, 58.

Burning one’s boats, 133.

Calamities, six, 105.

Calthrop, Capt.: his edition of Sun Tzŭ’s text, xxxii; his translation
of Sun Tzŭ, viii; quoted, _passim_.

Camp, shifting, 133.

Camping, 80 _sqq_.

Cannae, battle of, 11.

Casinum, 140.

“Catalogue of Chinese Books,” xxxiv.

_Chan Kuo Ts‘ê_, quoted, 10; referred to, xxiv.

_Chan Tou Ta Chia Ping Fa_, xviii.

Chang Ao, a commentator, xlii.

Chang Hsiu, 69.

Chang Liang, li, 109, 116.

Chang Ni, 144.

Chang Shang-ying, lii.

Chang Shou-chieh, xvi, xvii.

Chang Tsai, li.

Chang Tzŭ-shang, a commentator, xli.

Chang Yü’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xl; quoted, 5, 8, 9, 11, 20, 21, 22,
24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34, 35, 39, 42, 44, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 60,
63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85,
87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 97, 99, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 119, 124,
125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 139, 141, 142, 143, 145, 152,
155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 163, 167, 170, 171, 172; referred to, 6, 15,
17, 31, 36, 45, 71, 86, 95, 96, 106, 147, 153, 173.

Ch‘ang mountains, 128.

Ch‘ang-cho, battle of, 66.

Ch‘ang-shê, siege of, 154.

Chao State, army of, 28, 143; defeated by Ch‘in, 166; King of, 57.

Chao Chan, 106.

Chao Kua, xlviii, 166.

Chao Shê, famous march of, 57, 136; his use of spies, 166.

Chao Yeh, xiv.

Chao Ying-ch‘i, 78.

Chao Yüan-hao’s rebellion, xli.

Ch‘ao Kung-wu, quoted, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii, xl, xli.

Chariots, 9, 91.

Chariot fighting, 15, 16.

Chariot wheels, burying of, 129.

Chavannes, M.: his “Mémoires Historiques” referred to, xiii, xvi, xlvi,
57.

Ch‘ên Chên-sun, quoted, xxiii.

Ch‘ên Hao’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xxxvi, xxxviii; quoted, 30, 44, 56,
62, 65, 69, 73, 81, 93, 97, 106, 108, 110, 117, 118, 122, 124, 133, 136,
141, 147, 152, 170, 175; referred to, 18, 68.

Ch‘ên-ts‘ang, siege of 94.

Chêng, principality of, 104, 116.

_Chêng_ and _ch‘i_. See Tactics, direct and indirect.

Chêng Ch‘iao, xl.

Chêng Hou, quoted, xliii.

Chêng Hsüan’s commentary on the _Chou Li_, xviii.

Chêng Tuan, xlii.

Chêng Yu-hsien’s _I Shuo_, xxxii, xxxiv; referred to, 36, 53, 58, 70,
136.

Ch‘êng-an, city of, captured by Han Hsin, 28.

Ch‘êng-hung, battle of, 78.

Ch‘êng T‘ang, xvi, 173, 175.

Chi Hsieh, editor of commentaries on Sun Tzŭ, xxxviii, xli.

Chi-mo, siege of, 90.

Chi T‘ien-pao’s edition of Sun Tzŭ, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvi, xxxvii.

Ch‘i State, xii, xvi, 128.

Ch‘i Chieh, 90.

Chia Hsü, a commentator, xli.

Chia-ku, meeting at, xlvii.

Chia Lin’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xxxvi, xxxviii; quoted, 20, 30, 34,
46, 50, 57, 72, 75, 76, 86, 92, 94, 95, 97, 117, 120, 133, 143, 148,
152, 157, 175; referred to, 51, 55, 62, 65, 96, 108, 164.

_Chia Yü_, referred to, xlvii.

Chiang-ling, town of, 111.

_Chiang Yüan_, a spurious work, lii.

Chieh Kuei, the tyrant, 173.

Chieh-li, a Turkish Khan, 167.

_Ch‘ien Ch‘io Lei Shu_, liii.

_Ch‘ien Fu Lun_, referred to, xxiv.

_Ch‘ien Han Shu_, quoted 81, 145, 167; referred to, li, 28, 34, 57, 69;
bibliographical section of, quoted, xvii, xix, li; referred to, xviii,
xx, liii.

Ch‘ih Yu, 84.

Chin State, xii, xvi, 106.

_Chin Shu_, quoted, 78, 116; referred to, 123, 165.

Ch‘in State, 142.

China’s experience of war, xliv.

Chinese characters, elasticity of, 159.

Chinese sentiment opposed to militarism, xliv.

Ching, Duke of Ch‘i, xv.

Ching-chou Fu, 123.

Ching-hsing pass, battle of, 143.

Ching K‘o, 127.

Ching Wang, period of, xxiii.

_Chiu T‘ang Shu_, referred to, 104, 167; bibliographical section of,
referred to, liii.

_Chou Ch‘in Shih I Tzŭ_, text of Sun Tzŭ in, xxxi.

Chou dynasty, 174.

Chou Hsin, the tyrant, l, 174.

_Chou Li_, quoted, 14, 55, 60, 68, 92, 146; referred to, xxxix, xlviii,
64; Biot’s translation of, ix.

Chu Chih-wu, xxi.

Chu Fu’s edition of Sun Tzŭ, xvii, xxxi.

Chu Hsi, corrected by Legge, 32; quoted, xliii, xlvii.

Chu-ko Liang, 46, 51, 74, 82, 117, 122; supposititious works of, lii.

Chu-ko Wu-hou. _See_ Chu-ko Liang.

Ch‘u State, xii, xiii, xvi, 124; the hereditary enemy of Wu, xxvii;
Viscount of, 110.

Chuan Chu, xxi, 128.

Chuan Shê-chu. _See_ Chuan Chu.

Chuang, Duke of Lu, 66.

Chuang, Prince of Ch‘u, 141, 162.

_Chuang Tzŭ_, referred to, 29, 85.

_Chung Yung_, xix.

Circumstances, art of studying, 68.

Classics, compared with Sun Tzŭ, xliii.

Clearness of orders, 107.

Clever fighter, the, 29, 41, 42.

Cohesion, 134.

Collapse, one of the six calamities, 105, 106.

Columns, marching in, 49.

Commander, the, 2, 3. _See also_ General.

Commander-in-chief, killing the, 145; presence of mind of the, 66.

Commentary, native, on Sun Tzŭ, ix, xxxiv _sqq_.

Communications, line of, 101, 119.

Compactness, 61.

Confucius, and the art of war, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii; contemporary with
Sun Tzŭ, xxx; violates extorted oath, xlix.

Constellations, 153.

Contentious ground, 115, 118, 136.

Contraction and expansion, 134.

Conventional canons of warfare, 148.

Co-operation, 129.

Council-chamber, sternness in the, 146.

Country, natural features of, 60.

Courage, one standard of, 130.

Courant’s “Catalogue des Livres Chinois,” lii.

Cowardice, 78.

Critical ground, 134, 135.

Cromwell’s use of spies, 164.

Cross-divisions, 100.

Cunning, 145.

Danger, bracing effect of, 139, 145.

Dangerously isolated ground, 72.

Deception, war based on, 6, 132.

Decision, 37, 38.

Deductive calculation, 163.

Defence, skill in, 27.

Deliberation, 63.

Demosthenes, the Athenian general, 118.

Desertion, 134, 136.

Desperado, running amok, 125.

Desperate foe, not to be pressed, 69, 94.

Desperate ground, 72, 114, 117, 120, 125, 126, 135, 138, 143.

Deviation, artifice of, 57, 63.

Difficult ground, 71, 117, 120, 137.

Disaffection, signs of, 95.

Discipline, 2, 3, 4, 98, 111.

Disorder, seeming, 38.

Disorganisation, 105, 107.

Dispersive ground, 114, 118, 135.

Disposition of troops, 26.

Dispositions, concealment of, 51, 52; knowledge of the enemy’s, 163.

Dissimulation, 61.

Dividing the enemy, 47.

Divination, to be prohibited, 126.

“Divine manipulation of the threads,” 164.

Door, left open by the enemy, 147.

Doorkeepers, 171.

Drums, 34, 64, 65.

Dust, sign of the enemy, 89.

Earth, as opposed to Heaven, 2, 4, 27, 28, 113; six principles connected
with, 104.

Economy, false, 162.

Energy, 38, 39, 41; concentration of, 124.

Entangling ground, 100, 102.

Enterprise, the spirit of, 157.

Enticing the enemy, 102.

Êrh-chu Chao, 138.

_Êrh Ya_, quoted, 94.

Excellence, supreme, 17; the acme of, 28.

Expenditure on war, 9, 10, 160.

Fabius Cunctator, 11, 120.

Facile ground, 115, 118, 135, 136.

Fan Chü’s use of spies, 166.

Fei River, battle of the, 25.

Fêng Hou, lii, 84.

Fêng I, a student of Sun Tzŭ, xlii.

Fire, as an aid to the attack, 156; dropping, 151, 152; five ways of
attacking with, 150; material for, 152; proper seasons for attacking
with, 152, 153; to be started on the windward side, 155.

Five advantages, the, 72, 74, 75.

Five cardinal tastes, 36.

Five cardinal virtues, 3.

Five classes of State ceremonial, xlviii.

Five dangerous faults, 77.

Five developments in attacking with fire, 153 _sqq_.

Five elements, the, 53.

Five essentials for victory, 23, 24.

Five factors in war, 1.

Five musical notes, 36.

Five _Pa Wang_, xlix, 141.

Five primary colours, 36.

Flags and banners, 16, 34, 64, 65.

Flat country, campaigning in, 83, 84.

Flight, 105.

Foraging, 12, 15, 123, 161.

Foreknowledge, 163.

Forestalling the enemy, 147.

Forethought, want of, 97.

“Forty-one Years in India,” referred to, 35.

Four seasons, the, 54.

Frederick the Great, quoted, 48, 168, 169.

Frontier passes, 146.

Frontal attacks, 45.

Fu Ch‘ai, xvi.

Fu Chien, 25, 115.

Fu-ch‘u, King of Ch‘u, 124.

Fu Kai, xxiii, xxix.

Fu-k‘ang-an, 63.

Fu Yen-ch‘ing, 69, 70.

General, the, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 19, 21, 44, 55, 66, 77, 98, 107, 109,
110, 130, 131, 134, 157, 159, 163, 171, 174.

Generals, professional, xxii.

Generalship, degrees of, 17, 18; the highest, 48.

Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, quoted, 128.

Giles’ Chinese-English Dictionary, referred to, 57, 134.

Gongs, 34, 64.

Grant, General, 47.

Great Wall of China, xliv.

Greeks, Homeric, 9.

Grindstone and egg, 35.

Ground, high and low, 84; of intersecting highways, 71, 116, 119, 135,
137; proper use of, 130.

Grounds, the nine, 114, 134, 138.

Guides, local, 60, 140.

Han, red banners of, 144.

_Han Chih_. See _Ch‘ien Han Shu_, bibliographical section of.

_Han Kuan Chieh Ku_, quoted, xx.

Han Hsin, xliv, 28, 33, 34, 81, 143, 167; a student of Sun Tzŭ, xlii;
quoted, 68.

_Han Shu_. See _Ch‘ien Han Shu_.

Hannibal, 11, 57, 66, 120, 140.

Hasty temper, 78.

Hearing, quick, 29.

Heaven, 2, 4. 28, 113.

Heights, precipitous, 100, 103.

Hemmed-in ground, 72, 117, 120, 135, 137.

Henderson, Col., quoted, 6, 42, 48, 52, 59, 101, 130, 131.

Herodotus, referred to, 129.

Ho Ch‘ü-fei, xl.

_Ho Kuan Tzŭ_, referred to, xxiv.

Ho Lu (or Ho Lü), King of Wu, xi, xiii, xvi, xvii, xviii, xxvi, 5, 128.

Ho Shih. _See_ Ho Yen-hsi.

Ho-yang, night ride to, 65.

Ho Yen-hsi’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xl; quoted, 11, 14, 16, 18, 21, 29,
30, 34, 56, 69, 74, 110, 115, 116, 122, 147, 165, 166, 167, 168, 174;
referred to, xvii, 31, 43, 62, 152.

Horses, tethering of, 129.

_Hou Han Shu_, quoted, 10, 94, 132, 139, 151, 155; referred to, xlii.

Hsi, the graduate, xxxiii.

Hsia dynasty, 174.

Hsiang, Duke of Sung, xlix, 141.

Hsiang Chi, xlix, 133.

Hsiang Liang, xlix.

Hsiang Yü. _See_ Hsiang Chi.

Hsiao State, 110.

Hsiao Chi, a commentator, xli.

Hsiao Hsien, 123.

Hsiao I, 153, 166.

Hsiao Shih-hsien. _See_ Hsiao I.

Hsieh An, 25.

Hsieh Yüan, a commentator, xlii.

Hsien Hu, 106.

Hsin-ch‘êng, town of, 122.

_Hsin Hsü_, xiv.

_Hsin Shu_ (by Ts‘ao Kung), xix, xxxvi.

_Hsin Shu_ (a work attributed to Chu-ko Liang), lii.

_Hsin T‘ang Shu_, referred to, 65, 104, 105, 123, 167; bibliographical
section of, referred to, xviii, liii.

_Hsing Li Hui Yao_, quoted, xliii, xlviii.

_Hsing Shih Pien Chêng Shu_, xv.

Hsiung-nu, 39, 139, 150.

Hsü Ch‘ieh, quoted, 160.

Hsü-chou, invaded by Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, 73.

_Hsü Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao_, liii.

Hsüan Tsung, T‘ang Emperor, xxxii.

_Hsün Tzŭ_, quoted, 80.

Hsün Ying, 73.

Hu Yen, xiii.

Hua-pi, city of, 73.

Hua-yin temple, xxxii.

Huai-nan Tzŭ, plagiary of Sun Tzŭ, xxiv; quoted, xiv.

Huan, Duke of Ch‘i, 128, 141.

Huan Ch‘ung, 25.

Huan Hsüan, 78.

Huang Ch‘ao Ching Shih Wên Pien, liii.

Huang Chih-chêng, a commentator, xlii.

Huang Jun-yü, a commentator, xli.

Huang Mei, 78.

Huang-shih Kung, li; quoted, 109, 126.

Huang Ti. _See_ Yellow Emperor.

Huang-fu Sung, 94, 154, 155.

Human nature, to be studied, 134.

Humanity, misplaced, xlix; soldiers to be treated with, 98.

Husbanding one’s strength, 67.

Husbandry, impeded by war, 161.

I river, 127.

I Chih, 173, 174, 175.

_I Ching_, quoted, xv.

I-chou, 165.

I-ho, 115.

_I Pu Chê Chung_, xliii.

_I Shuo_. _See_ Chêng Yu-hsien.

I-wu pass, 115.

I Yin. _See_ I Chih.

Iliad, heroes of the, 127.

Impoverishment of the people, 13, 14.

Induction from experience, 163.

Inhumanity, the height of, 162.

Insubordination, 105.

Intuition necessary in dealing with spies, 169.

Invading force, principles to be observed by an, 123.

Jackson, Stonewall, 59, 131.

Jan Yu, disciple of Confucius, xlvi, xlviii.

Jang, siege of, 69.

Jingles, 149, 158.

Ju-nan, 111.

Julius Caesar, 12; his “De Bello Gallico” referred to, 108.

Junction of forces, 48.

K‘ang Hsi’s dictionary, referred to, 10, 18, 35, 68, 95, 117, 152, 157,
160.

Kao-ch‘ang, 115.

Kao-fan. _See_ Hu Yen.

Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor, 137.

Kao Kêng, 151.

Kao Tsu, first Han Emperor, 33, 39, 119.

Kao Tsu, Sui Emperor, 168.

Kao-wu pass, 115.

Khitans, 69.

Khotan, 132.

Kiangnan rebels under Sui dynasty, 151.

Kindness to the soldiers, 110, 111.

Kou Chien, King of Yüeh, xvi, 50.

_Ku Chin T‘u Shu Chi Ch‘êng_, quoted, xvi, xxxvii, xxxix; referred to,
xix, xli, li, liii. _See also_ Sun Tzŭ, _T‘u Shu_ text of.

Kuan Chung, 128.

_Kuan Tzŭ_, xxi.

Kuang, King of Shan-shan, 139, 151.

_Kuang Po Wu Chih_, liii.

Kuang Wu, Han Emperor, li.

Kuei-ku Tzŭ, li.

K‘uei-chou, 123.

_K‘un Wai Ch‘un Ch‘iu_, xxxvi.

Kung-sun Hung, lii.

_Kuo Ch‘ao Shih Jên Chêng Lüeh_, xxxii.

Kuo Hsün, 151.

Kutcha, King of, 132.

Ladder, kicking away the, 133.

Ladysmith, relief of, 79.

Land-tenure, ancient system of, xxv, 161.

Lao Tzŭ, the Tao of, 2; quoted, 155, 158. See also _Tao Tê Ching_.

Legge’s “Chinese Classics,” referred to, ix, xxiv, 23, 32.

Lengthy operations, 10, 11.

_Li_, length of the, 9.

_Li Chi_, referred to, 23, 147.

Li Ching, the general, xliv, 41, 123, 167; quoted, 35, 66, 87, 111, 118;
supposed author of a work on war, lii.

_Li Ching Ping Fa_, lii.

Li Chu, 29.

Li Ch‘üan’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xxxvi; quoted, 9, 11, 18, 21, 22, 24,
25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 38, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 60, 65, 67, 68, 72, 73, 81,
83, 84, 89, 92, 97, 105, 106, 110, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 136,
142, 150, 158, 163, 167; referred to, 52, 95, 123, 127, 151.

Li Hsiang, 165.

Li Hsiung, 165.

Li I-chi, 167.

Li Kuang-pi, 65.

Li Ling, 154.

Li Shih-min, afterwards the Emperor T‘ai Tsung, xliv, lii, 35, 104, 167.

Li Shou-chêng, 70.

_Li Tai Chi Shih Nien Piao_, quoted, 70, 116, 166.

Li T‘ê, 165.

Li Ts‘ai, a commentator, xlii.

Li Wei-kung. _See_ Li Ching.

_Li Wei Kung Wên Tui_, lii.

Liang, kingdom of, 94.

Liang-chou, 115.

Liang Hsi, 115.

Lien P‘o, 57, 166.

Lin-chin, in Shensi, 34.

Lin Hsiang-ju, 166.

Line of least resistance, 53.

Liu Chou-tzŭ, 53.

Liu Hsiang, quoted, xiv, xxiv.

Liu Pei, 59.

Liu Piao, 69.

_Liu T‘ao_ (attributed to T‘ai Kung), xxi, l, li, 144, 174; quoted, 22,
62, 78, 84.

Liu Yü, 78.

Livy, quoted, 66, 120, 140.

Lo Shang, 165.

Lo-yang, 104.

Logs and stones, rolling, 41.

Longevity, 127.

Lou Ching, 39.

Lu State, 128.

Lu Tê-ming, quoted, li.

Lü Kuang, 115.

Lü Mêng, a disciplinarian, 111; a student of Sun Tzŭ, xlii.

Lü Pu, xxxv.

Lü Shang, known as T‘ai Kung, l, 174, 175. See also _Liu T‘ao_.

_Lü Shih Ch‘un Ch‘iu_, referred to, xxiv, 37.

Lü Wang (or Lii Ya). _See_ Lü Shang.

Luan Yen, 106.

_Lun Yü_, quoted, xv, 146; referred to, xlvii, xlix, 47, 64, 156.

Lung Chü, 81.

Ma Lung, lii.

Ma Tuan-lin, xl. See also _Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao_.

Ma Yüan, 80.

Maiden, coyness of a, 148.

Mansfield, Lord, 143.

Mantlets, 14, 18.

Marches, forced, 59.

Marengo, battle of, 57.

“Marshal Turenne,” quoted, 73, 169; referred to, 61.

Marshes, 60.

Measures, of land, 14; of length, 32; of weight, 15, 32.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xxxviii; quoted, 4, 6, 7, 11, 29,
34, 38, 40, 44, 47, 61, 63, 79, 84, 85, 86, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 102,
121, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 145, 147, 148, 153, 155,
157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 169, 170, 174; referred to, 15, 23, 43,
46, 51, 106, 151.

“Mémoires concernant les Chinois,” quoted, vii.

“Mémoires Historiques,” referred to, xvi. _See also_ Chavannes.

_Mencius_, quoted, xxv, xliii, 14, 85; referred to, 29, 32, 112, 148.

Mêng K‘ang, xxxvi.

Mêng Shih’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xxxvi; quoted, 2, 11, 15, 61, 77, 78,
116, 137, 147.

Mêng Ta, 122.

Method, 2, 3, 31.

“Military Classic,” 144.

Military tactics like water, 53.

Military virtues, 22.

Misfortune, three ways in which a ruler can cause, 21 _sqq_.

Mistakes, making no, 30.

Modern text of Sun Tzŭ. _See_ Sun Tzŭ.

Modification of plans, 5.

Moltke, 17.

Moods, art of studying, 67.

Moral Law, the, 2, 4, 31.

Mounds, used in sieges, 19.

Mountains, 80.

Movable shelters, 18.

Mu, Duke of Ch‘in, 141.

_Mu-so_, an instrument of torture, xlvi.

_Mu T‘ien Tzŭ Chuan_, 152.

Mystification of one’s men, 131.

Nang Wa, xiii.

Napoleon Bonaparte, 5, 12, 148; his passage across Alps, 57; not
hampered by central authority, 24; his “Maximes de Guerre,” quoted, 84,
109; his “Pensées,” quoted, 101.

Nelson, at Trafalgar, 37.

Nervousness, a sign of, 93.

Nicias, the Athenian general, 118; speech of, quoted, 125.

Night-fighting, 65.

Nine grounds (or situations), the, 72, 114.

Nine punitive measures, the, xxxix.

Nine variations, the, 71, 72, 74, 138.

“North hill”, battle of the, 57.

O-yü, town of, 57.

Omens, not to be regarded, 126.

Onset of troops, 37, 38.

Open ground, 116, 119, 137.

Opportunism, xlix.

Orders, not to be divulged, 142, 143.

Original text of Sun Tzŭ. _See_ Sun Tzŭ.

Ou-yang Hsiu, quoted, xxxiv, xxxv, xxxviii.

Overawing the enemy, 141.

Over-caution, 158.

Over-solicitude for one’s men, 79.

_Pa Chên T‘u_, xviii.

_Pa Wang_, the five, 141.

Pan Ch‘ao, 63; at Shan-shan, 139, 150; his attack on Yarkand, 132, 167.

P‘an Kêng, 173.

P‘ang Chüan, xii, 40.

Passes, narrow, 100, 103.

Peace, the true object of war, 162.

_Pei Ch‘i Shu_, referred to, 138.

_Pei Lun_, xl.

_Pei T‘ang Shu Ch‘ao_, 25, 36, 64, 67.

P‘ei Hsing-chien, 103.

_P‘ei Wên Yün Fu_, quoted, 94; referred to, xlvi, 69, 146.

Pelliot, M., xxxvi.

Pi, battle of, 106.

Pi I-hsün, xviii, xxvi, xxxiv. See also _Sun Tzŭ Hsü Lu_.

Pi Kua, xxxiii.

Pi-yang, city of, 73.

P‘i, siege of, 165.

Picked soldiers in front rank, 107, 108.

_Ping Fa Tsa Chan_, xviii.

Ping Shu Yao Chüeh, 67.

Pique, battles not to be fought out of, 158.

Pitfalls, 60.

Plagiaries of Sun Tzŭ, xxiii, xxiv.

Plans, baulking the enemy’s, 17; change of, 5, 132.

Plataea, battle of, 129.

Playfair’s “Cities and Towns of China”, referred to. 57.

Plunder, 62.

Po Ch‘i xliv, 117, 166.

_Po Chiang Chuan_, xli.

Po P‘ei, xiii, xxiii, xxix.

Po-têng, battle of, 39.

Po-ts‘ai, a leader of the Yellow Turban rebels, 154.

_Po Ya_, referred to, 160.

P‘o-t‘ai, a spy, 165.

Polybius, referred to, 120.

Port Arthur, siege of, 19.

Presence of mind, 66.

Punishment, 95, 97, 98.

Rabbits, not indigenous to China, 149.

Rapidity, 12, 61; the essence of war, 122.

Rewards, 15, 95, 142.

Reward and punishment, constancy in, 4.

Riches, soldiers not to acquire, 127.

River, crossing a, 129.

River warfare, 81, 82.

Roberts, Lord, night march of, 35; on Sun Tzŭ, xlii.

Rout, 105, 107.

Ruin, one of the six calamities, 105, 106.

Ruler, military commander independent of the, 109; the enlightened, 157,
159, 174.

Rules of warfare, conventional, 148.

Salt-marshes, 83.

_San Kuo Chih_, quoted, 69, 111; referred to, xxxv, xli, xlii. See also
_Wei Chih_.

_San Lüeh_, li; quoted, 62, 158.

_San Shih Êrh Lei Ching_, xviii.

_San Ts‘ai T‘u Hui_, liii.

San-yüan, 79.

“Science of War,” quoted, 101, 130.

Scouts, 88, 89.

Screens, grass, 88.

Secrecy, 45, 131.

Secrets, divulged by a spy, 170.

Sedan, capitulation of, 17.

Self-possession, 67.

Sensitiveness in a general, 79.

Sentries, 171.

Serious ground, 117, 119, 135, 137.

Seven considerations, 1, 4.

Sha-yüan, 168.

Shan-shan, 139; King of, 150, 151.

Shang dynasty, 173.

Shên, Duke of, 110.

Shên-wu of Ch‘i, 168.

Shên Yu, a commentator, xli.

Shepherd driving sheep, 133.

Sheridan, General, 47.

_Shih Chi_, objection to the chronology of, xxvi; quoted, xi, xiii, xv,
xx, xlv, 40, 58, 80, 84, 90, 124, 128; referred to, xvi, xxii, xxiv,
xxxiv, xlvi, xlvii, xlix, 1. _See also_ Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien.

_Shih Ching_, quoted, xvi, 61, 62; referred to, 14.

Shih Huang Ti, 127, 142.

Shih K‘uang, 29.

_Shih L‘iu Ts‘ê_, lii.

Shih Ssŭ-ming, the rebel leader, 65.

_Shu Ching_, quoted, xv; referred to, xlvii, xlviii.

_Shu Lu Chieh T‘i_, xxiii.

_Shuai-jan_, the, xxvi, 128, 129.

Shuo Wên, quoted, 94, 117, 160.

Sicilian expedition, 118.

Sieges, 10, 18, 19, 73.

Sight, sharp, 29.

Signal-fires, 65.

Signals, 33.

Signs, observation of, 88.

Situations, the nine. _See_ Nine grounds.

Six Chancellors of the Ch‘in State, 142.

“Six States” period, xxii.

Skilful fighter, the, 30.

Skilful leaders of old, 120.

Solidarity of troops, 123.

Sôphanes at Plataea, 129.

Sovereign, the, 55; the wise, 163.

Spies, xlix, 52, 147, 148; converted, 90, 166, 172, 173; doomed, 167,
172, 173; five classes of, 164; Frederick’s classification of, 168;
importance of, 175; intimate relations to be maintained with, 168;
inward, 165, 172; local, 164, 172; surviving, 167, 172; to be properly
paid, 162, 169.

Spirit, an army’s, 65, 66.

Spirits, 163.

“Spy,” evolution of the character meaning, 160.

Spying, end and aim of, 173.

_Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu Chien Ming Mu Lu_, quoted, l, li, lii.

_Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Tsung Mu T‘i Yao_, quoted, xx, xli, l; referred to, xl,
lii, liii.

Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien, xiv, xx; quoted, xi, xii, xlv; credibility of his
narrative, xxvi; his letter to Jên An, referred to, xlvi; his mention
of the 13 chapters, xxx. See also _Shih Chi_.

_Ssŭ-ma Fa_, l; quoted, xvi, 14, 17, 78, 126, 143.

Ssŭ-ma I, 46, 51, 122.

Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü, xxii, 1, 98.

Stagnation, 157.

Standard text of Sun Tzŭ. _See_ Sun Tzŭ.

Stellar Mansions, the twenty-eight, 153.

Stonewall Jackson, biography of, quoted, 42, 59, 131.

Strategy and tactics, 52.

Strength, great, 29.

Stupidity, to be feigned, 145.

Su Hsün, quoted, xlii.

_Su Shu_, an ethical treatise, li.

Subdivisions of an army. 17, 33, 39.

_Sui Shu_, quoted, 151; bibliographical section of, quoted, xviii, xli;
referred to, xxxvi, liii.

Sun Hao, a commentator, xli.

Sun Hsing-yen, xxxii; his edition of Sun Tzŭ, ix; his preface, xxxiv;
quoted, xvi, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvi, xlviii.

Sun Pin, xii, xv, xvi, 40.

_Sun Tzŭ_, archaic words in, xxiv; bibliographical description of
edition used, xxxiv; corruptions in the text of, xxxi; difficult
passages in, xxxiv; state of the text, 138; probable date of the work,
xxviii.

—Modern text, 25, 26, 27, 33.

—Original text, xxxii, xxxiii, 2, 16, 27, 29, 43, 47, 53, 58, 62, 64,
67, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 95, 98, 113, 119, 121, 153, 154, 168.

—Standard text, xxxiv, 10, 58, 91, 95, 117, 127, 164.

—_T‘ai I Tun Chia_ text, xxxvi.

—_T‘u Shu_ text, xxxi, 16, 21, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 40, 43, 46,
47, 50, 52, 58, 64, 67, 69, 84, 87, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96 105, 110, 114,
117, 120, 121, 133, 135, 140, 145, 146, 153, 159, 164, 167, 168, 171,
172, 175.

—_T‘ung Tien_ text, xxxiii, 1, 10, 12, 19, 22, 23, 25, 41, 45, 47, 50,
53, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 74, 77, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91,
92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 101, 104, 108, 112, 113, 117, 119, 136, 137, 152,
153, 158, 159, 164, 167, 170, 171, 172.

—Yü Lan text, xxxiii, 3, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 27, 37, 42, 45, 47,
50, 52, 53, 62, 64, 67, 68, 77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93,
94, 95, 98, 108, 112, 121, 129, 141, 153, 158, 159, 161, 164, 167, 170,
171, 172.

_Sun Tzŭ Hsü Lu_, xviii, xxxiv; quoted, xxiii, xxiv, 118.

_Sun Tzŭ Hui Chêng_, xlii.

_Sun Tzŭ Ts‘an T‘ung_, xlii.

_Sun Tzŭ Wên Ta_, xvii.

Sun Wu, a practical soldier, xxv; conjectural outline of his life, xxix;
not a man of eminent position, xxviii; probable origin of the legend
connected with, xxix; Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s biography of, xi; supposititious
works of, xvii, xviii. See also _Sun Tzŭ_.

_Sun Wu Sun Tzŭ_, xvii.

_Sung Shih_, referred to, xlii; bibliographical section of, xvii, xxxi,
xxxvi, lii, liii.

Superstitious doubts, 126.

Supplies, 137, 161: line of, 101.

Ta-hsi Wu, 168.

_Ta Ming I T‘ung Chih_, quoted, xxxii.

Taboo character, 124.

Tactical manœuvring, 56.

Tactician, the skilful, 128.

Tactics, direct and indirect, 20, 34 _sqq_.; modification of, 52, 53;
not to be repeated, 52; variation of, 26, 71, 74.

T‘ai Kung. _See_ Lü Shang.

_T‘ai Kung Ping Fa_, li.

_T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan_, xvi, xxxiii, liii. See also Sun Tzŭ, _Yü Lan_ text.

T‘ai-po Shan-jên, quoted, 132.

_T‘ai Po Yin Ching_, xxxvi.

T‘ai Tsung, the Emperor. _See_ Li Shih-min.

_T‘ai Yüan Ching_, referred to, xxiv.

Tallies, official, 146.

T‘ang, prince of, xiii.

T‘ang, the Completer. _See_ Ch‘êng T’ang.

T‘ang Chien, 167.

_T‘ang Shu_, bibliographical section of, referred to, xxxviii, xli. See
also _Hsin T‘ang Shu_ and _Chiu T‘ang Shu_.

_Tao Tê Ching_, quoted, xlix, 147, 155, 158, 161.

Temple, used for deliberations, 7, 8.

Temporising ground, 100, 102.

Tenacity, 125.

Têng Ch‘iang, 78.

Têng Ming-shih, quoted, xv.

Terrain, natural advantages of, 108; six kinds of, 100.

Textual criticism and emendations, 1, 7, 13, 14, 25, 29, 30, 36, 41, 43,
46, 47, 49, 71, 74, 86, 87, 91, 94, 99, 113, 117, 121, 124, 127, 133,
158, 167.

Thermopylae, 115.

Three ancient dynasties, the, xxxix.

Thucydides, quoted, 125; referred to, 118.

Ti river, 144.

T‘ien Chi, 40.

_T‘ien-i-ko_ catalogue, quoted, xxxvi, xl.

T‘ien Pao, xv.

T‘ien Pu, 105.

T‘ien Tan, defender of Chi-mo, 90, 120, 155; his use of spies, 166.

Time, value of, 12; waste of, 157.

Tou Chien-tê, King of Hsia, 104.

Tou Ku, 151.

Trafalgar, battle of, 37.

Training of officers and men, 4.

Trebia, battle of the, 66.

Ts‘ai, prince of, xiii.

Ts‘ao Kuei, mentioned in the _Tso Chuan_, xxi; on the advantage of
spirit, 66; threatens Huan Kung, 128.

Ts‘ao Kung or Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, xix, xxxi, xxxvi, xlii, xliv, 4, 59, 69, 76,
151; his commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxviii, xl; quoted, 1,
7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 44,
46, 51, 52, 55, 56, 59, 60, 67, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 84, 86, 88,
91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 103, 104, 106, 111, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120,
122, 125, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 152,
154, 156, 157; referred to, 19, 43, 62, 136; his preface, xx, xxxiv;
translated, xv _sqq_.

Tsêng Shên, xxiv.

_Tso Chuan_, delivered to Wu Ch‘i, xxiv; has no mention of Sun Tzŭ, xx,
xxvi, xxviii; quoted, xxvii, xxix, xlix, 19, 59, 65, 89, 97, 106, 111,
162; referred to, xxi, xlvii.

Tso Tsung-t‘ang, 63.

Tsui-li, battle of, xxx.

Tu Chung-wei, 69, 70.

Tu Mu’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii; quoted, 4, 11,
14, 15, 18, 19, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44,
45, 46, 50, 52, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77,
78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 101,
105, 106, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 122, 124, 126, 131,
133, 136, 137, 138, 146, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157,
158, 161, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 171, 175; referred to, 20, 65,
73, 150; his preface, quoted, xix, xxxvii, xxxviii, xlv.

_Tu Shu Chih_, lii.

Tu Yu, xxxiii; his notes on Sun Tzŭ in the _T‘ung Tien_, xxxvii; quoted,
4, 6, 11, 19, 23, 24, 36, 38, 47, 56, 60, 61, 62, 77, 83, 88, 91, 92,
93, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 116, 117, 120, 137, 138, 152, 153,
166, 167, 169, 171, 172; referred to, 28, 51, 74, 155, 173.

_T‘u Shu_ encyclopaedia. See _Ku Chin T‘u Shu Chi Ch‘êng_.

—Text of Sun Tzŭ in the. See _Sun Tzŭ_.

Tung Cho, xxxv, 94.

_T‘ung Chou Lieh Kuo_, quoted, 56.

_T‘ung Chih_, referred to, xxxii, xxxvi, xl, xli, liii.

_T‘ung Tien_, xvii, xxxiii, xxxvii, lii, liii. _See also_ Tu Yu.

—Text of Sun Tzŭ in the. See _Sun Tzŭ_.

Turenne, Marshal, on deceiving the enemy, 61; on sieges, 73; on spies,
169.

Tzŭ-ch‘an, saying of, xlix.

Tzŭ-ch‘ang. _See_ Nang Wa.

“Unterricht des Königs von Preussen,” quoted, 168, 169.

Uxbridge, Lord, 5.

Valleys, 80.

Victory, halfway towards, 111, 112; without fighting, 17.

Virtues, the five cardinal, 3.

Wan, town of, 122.

Wang Chien, 124.

Wang Hsi’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ, xl; quoted, 1, 2, 11, 13, 14, 23, 26,
33, 34, 38, 44, 52, 53, 55, 60, 61, 63, 71, 78, 84, 92, 94, 95, 96, 106,
114, 117, 119, 124, 132, 133, 135, 137, 142, 155, 157, 169; referred to,
67, 76.

Wang Kuo, the rebel, 94.

Wang Liao, 128.

Wang Ling, a commentator, xxxvii, xli. _See also_ Wang Tzŭ.

Wang Shih-ch‘ung, 104.

Wang T‘ing-ts‘ou, 105.

Wang Tzŭ, quoted, 4, 6, 24.

Wang-tzŭ Ch‘eng-fu, xiii.

War, want of fixity in, 54.

Warlike prince, 141, 158.

Water, an aid to the attack, 156.

Waterloo, battle of, 5, 48, 130.

Weapons, 14.

Weeping, 127.

Wei, kingdom of, xxxv; province of, 105.

Wei river, 81.

_Wei Chih_ (in the _San Kuo Chih_), xix, xxxvi.

Wei I, 106.

_Wei Liao Tzŭ_, li; quoted, 35, 73, 97, 99, 107, 125; referred to, xxiv.

Wei Po, 165.

Wei Wu Ti. _See_ Ts‘ao Kung.

Well-being of one’s men, to be studied, 123.

Wellington, his description of his army at Waterloo, 130; on the eve of
Waterloo, 5; saying, of, 110; skilful in dissimulation, 6.

Wên, Duke of Chin, 141.

_Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao_, quoted, xxxvii, xxxviii, xl, xli; referred to,
xxi, xxiii, xxxvi, liii.

Wên-su, King of, 132.

Wên Ti, Emperor of Sui dynasty, 151.

Wên Wang, l, 174.

Western Sacred Mountain, xxxii.

Wind, days of, 153; duration of, 155.

“Words on Wellington,” quoted, 5.

Wu, city of, xiv; king of, 118. _See also_ Ho Lu.

Wu State, xxv, 49, 50, 129, 159; dates in the history of, xxvii, xxviii;
first mentioned in history, xxvii.

Wu Ch‘i, l, 64, 65, 110; compared with Sun Wu, xliii; plagiary of Sun
Tzŭ, xxiv. See also _Wu Tzŭ_.

_Wu Ch‘i Ching_, lii.

Wu Huo, 29.

Wu Jên-chi, xxxiii.

Wu-lao, heights of, 104.

Wu Nien-hu, xxxiii.

Wu-tu, town of, 165.

Wu-tu Ch‘iang, 80.

_Wu Tzŭ_, xix, l; quoted, 24, 56, 66, 77, 80, 81, 98, 107, 115, 131,
142, 156; referred to, xxiv.

Wu Tzŭ-Hsü, xxix, xlviii. _See also_ Wu Yüan.

Wu Wang, xvi, 20, 175.

Wu Yüan, xiii, xxiii, 56; a spurious treatise fathered on, xxix.

_Wu Yüeh Ch‘un Ch‘iu_, quoted, xiv, xviii.

Wylie’s “Notes,” referred to, xli, lii.

Ya, King of Chao, 144.

Yang Han, 115.

Yang-p‘ing, city of, 46.

Yangtsze river, 123.

Yao Hsiang, 78.

Yarkand, battle of, 132.

Yeh Shih or Yeh Shui-hsin, his theory about Sun Tzŭ, xxi, xxiii, xxv;
on Sun Tzŭ’s style, xxiv.

Yellow Emperor, the, xvi, 84.

Yellow Turban rebels, 154.

Yen, King of Hsü, xvi, xlix.

Yen Shih-ku, 167.

Yen Ti, 84.

Yen Tzŭ, quoted, 98.

_Yin_ and _Yang_, 2.

Yin dynasty, 173, 174.

_Yin Fu Ching_, xxxvi, 111.

Ying, capital of Ch‘u, xii, xiii, xvi, xxix.

Ying K‘ao-shu, xxi.

Yo Fei, a student of Sun Tzŭ, xlii.

Yo I, 117.

_Yü Hai_, quoted, xlii; referred to, xxxvi, xl, lii, liii.

Yü Lan encyclopaedia. See _T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan_.

—Text of Sun Tzŭ in the. See _Sun Tzŭ_.

Yüan, the two, opponents of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, xxxv.

_Yüan Chien Lei Han_, liii.

Yüan Shao, 151.

Yüeh State, 129; compared with Wu, xxvi, 49, 50; first mentioned in
history, xxvii.

_Yüeh Chüeh Shu_, quoted, xiv.

_Yüeh Yü_, xxi.

_Yung Lo Ta Tien_, lii.

CORRIGENDA

P. ix, _note_: For “edition” read “translation.”

„ 14, line 3: For “by” read “in the.”

„ 16, line 5: For “T.” read “_T‘u Shu_.”

„ „ § 19, _note_: Before “War” insert “Soldiers are not to be used as
playthings.”

„ 17, § 1: 全軍, etc. The more I think about it, the more I prefer the
rendering suggested on p. 159, § 22, _note_.

„ „ § 1 _note_, and p. 78, line 6: Insert “the” before “Ssŭ-ma Fa.”

„ 33, note on heading: Cf. X. § 12, where 勢 is translated “strength,”
though it might also be “conditions.” The three words 執, 埶 and 勢 have
been much confused. It appears from the _Shuo Wên_ that the last
character is post-classical, so that Sun Tzŭ must have used either 執
or 埶 in all senses.

„ 45, line 1: For “sublety” read “subtlety.”

„ 63, line 4: M. Chavannes writes in the _T‘oung Pao_, 1906, p. 210:
“Le général Pan Tch‘ao n’a jamais porté les armes chinoises jusque sur
les bords de la mer Caspienne.” I hasten to correct my statement on this
authority.

„ 80, 9th line from the bottom: For 囗 read 口.

„ 109, § 23, _note_, and p. 126, 5th line from bottom: For “Huang
Shih-kung” read “Huang-shih Kung.”

„ 124, line 7: For “Ch‘ên” read “Ch‘ên Hao.”

„ 136, 11th line from bottom: Insert “to” before “select.”

„ 152, § 2: Substitute semi-colon for full stop after “available.”

Footnotes

[1] Published at Paris in 1782.

[2] A rather distressing Japanese flavour pervades the work throughout.
Thus, King Ho Lu masquerades as “Katsuryo,” Wu and Yüeh become “Go” and
“Etsu,” etc. etc.

[3] A notable exception is to be found in Biot’s edition of the
_Chou Li_.

[4] _Shih Chi_, ch. 65.

[5] Also written 闔閭 Ho Lü. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C.

[6] _Shih Chi_, ch. 130, f. 6 _r_^o.

[7] I note that M. Chavannes translates 民勞 “le peuple est épuisé.”
Sun Tzŭ’s own book (see especially VII §§ 24–26) the ordinary meaning
of 民 is “army,” and this, I think, is more suitable here.

[8] These words are given also in Wu Tzŭ-hsü’s biography, ch. 66, fol.
3 _r_^o.

[9] The appellation of 囊瓦 Nang Wa.

[10] _Shih Chi_, ch. 31, fol. 6 _r_^o.

[11] _Ibid_. ch. 25, fol. 1 _r_^o.

[12] The appellation of 狐偃 Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year
637.

[13] 王子城父 Wang-Tzŭ Ch‘êng-fu, ch. 32, year 607.

[14] The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to the 越絶書,
a work of the Han dynasty, which says (ch. 2, fol. _3_^o of my edition):
巫門外大冢吳王客齊孫武冢也去縣十里善爲兵法 “Ten _li_ outside the Wu gate [of the
city of 吳 Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised
to commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch‘i who excelled in the
art of war, by the King of Wu.”

[15] 孫子者吳人也善爲兵法辟幽居世人莫知其能.

[16] 君臣乖心則孫子不能以應敵.

[17] 孫武以三萬破楚二十萬者楚無法故也.

[18] The _Shih Chi_, on the other hand, says: 臏亦孫武之後世子孫也.
I may remark in passing that the name 武 for one who was a great
warrior is just as suspicious as 臏 for a man who had his feet cut
off.

[19] An allusion to 易經, 繫辭, II. 2: 弦木爲弧剡木爲矢弧矢之利以威天下 “They
attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to make
arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe.”

[20] 論語 XII. 7.

[21] 書經 V. iv. 7.

[22] 易經, 7th diagram (師).

[23] 詩經 III. 1. vii. 5.

[24] 司馬法 ch. 1 (仁本) _ad init_. The text of the passage in the 圖書
_T‘u Shu_ (戎政典, ch. 85) is: 是故殺人安人殺之可也.

[25] The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and
overthrown by 勾踐 Kou Chien, King of Yüeh, in 473 B.C. See _post_.

[26] King Yen of 徐 Hsü, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in
his preface: 仁而敗 “His humanity brought him to destruction.” See _Shih
chi_ ch. 5, f. 1 _v_^o and M. Chavannes’ note, _Mémoires Historiques_,
tom. II p. 8.

[27] _T‘u Shu_, _ibid_. ch. 90: 操聞上古有弧矢之利論語曰足兵尙書八政曰師易曰師
貞丈人吉詩曰王赫斯怒爰征其旅黃帝 湯武咸用干戚以濟世也司馬法曰人故殺人殺之可也恃武
者滅恃文者亡夫差偃王是也聖人之用兵戢而時動不得已而用之.

[28] The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the _T‘u Shu_, and
may be an interpolation. It was known, however, to 張守節 Chang Shou-chieh
of the T‘ang dynasty, and appears in the _T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan_.

[29] Ts‘ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II,
perhaps especially of § 8.

[30] 吾觀兵書戰策多矣孫武所著深矣孫子者齊人也名武爲吳王闔閭作兵法一十三篇試之
婦人卒以爲將西破强楚入郢北威齊晉後百歲餘有孫臏是武之後也審計重舉明畫深圖不可相誣
而但世人未之深亮訓說況文煩富行於世者失其旨要故撰爲略解焉.

[31] 漢書藝文志、兵權謀.

[32] The 宋藝文志 mentions two editions of Sun Tzŭ in 3 _chüan_, namely
孫武孫子 and 朱服校定孫子.

[33] See chap. XI.

[34] 吳王召孫子問以兵法每陳一篇王不知口之稱善.

[35] 按此皆釋九地篇義辭意甚詳故其篇帙不能不多也.

[36] Such as the 八陣圖, quoted in 鄭玄 Chêng Hsüan’s commentary on the
_Chou Li_, the 戰鬭大甲兵法 and 兵法雜占, mentioned in the 隋志 _Sui Chih_,
and the 三十二壘經, in the _Hsin T‘ang Chih_.

[37] On the other hand, it is noteworthy that 吳子 _Wu Tzŭ_, which is now
in 6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the _Han Chih_. Likewise, the 中庸
_Chung Yung_ is credited with 49 chapters, though now in one only. In
the case of such very short works, one is tempted to think that 篇 might
simply mean “leaves.”

[38] See _T‘u Shu_, 經籍典, ch. 442, 彚考 2.

[39] An extract will be found on p. xlv.

[40] 武所著書凡數十萬言曹魏武帝削其繁剩筆其精切凡十三篇成爲一編.

[41] 其所爲注解十不釋一此蓋非曹不能盡注解也.

[42] 予尋魏志見曹自作兵書十餘萬言諸將征戰皆以新書從事從令者克捷違教者負敗意曹自於
新書中馳驟其說自成一家事業不欲隨孫武後盡解其書不然者曹其不能耶今新書已亡不可復知.

[43] 魏氏瑣連孫武之法.

[44] See 孫子兵法序.

[45] 謙言解其觕略.

[46] Ch. 99, fol. 5 _r_^o.

[47] 然史記稱十三篇在漢志之前不得以後來附益者爲本書牧之言固未可以爲據也.

[48] _Shih chi_, 65 _ad fin:_ 世俗所稱師旅皆道孫子十三篇吳起兵法世多有故弗論.

[49] 葉適 Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151–1223]. See 文獻通考,
ch. 221, ff. 7, 8.

[50] See _Tso Chuan_ 隱公, I. 3 _ad fin_. and XI. 3 _ad init_. He hardly
deserves to be bracketed with assassins.

[51] See pp. 66, 128.

[52] See _Tso Chuan_, 僖公, XXX. 5.

[53] See p. 128. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name.

[54] _I.e._ Po P‘ei. See _ante_.

[55] 遷載孫武齊人而用於吳在闔閭時破楚入郢爲大將按左氏無孫武他書所有左氏不必
盡有然穎考叔曹劌燭之武鱄設諸之流微賤暴用事左氏未嘗遺而武功名章灼如此乃更闕又
同時伍員宰嚭一一銓次乃獨不及武邪.

[56] The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large
additions have been made by later hands. Kuan Chung died in 645 B.C.

[57] See _Infra_, p. 1.

[58] I do not know what work this is, unless it be the last chapter of
the 國語. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not clear.

[59] About 480 B.C.

[60] 詳味孫子與管子六韜越語相出入春秋末戰國初山林處士所爲其言得用於吳者其徒
夸大之說也.

[61] That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung.

[62] In the 3rd century B.C.

[63] Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü, whose family name was 田 T‘ien, lived in the
latter half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have
written a work on war. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64, and _infra_, p. 1.

[64] 自周之盛至春秋凡將兵者必與聞國政未有特將於外者六國時此制始改吳雖蠻夷而孫武爲
大將乃不爲命卿而左氏無傳焉可乎故凡謂穰苴孫武者皆辯士妄相標指非事實其言闔閭試以婦
人尤爲奇險不足信.

[65] See the end of the passage quoted from the _Shih Chi_ on p. xii.

[66] In the 書錄解題, a classified catalogue of his family library.

[67] See _Wen Hsien T‘ung K‘ao_, ch. 221, f. 9 _r_^o: 世之言兵者祖孫武然
孫武事吳闔閭而不見於左傳不知果何時人也.

[68] See _Hsü Lu_, f. 14 _r_^o: 孫吳或是古書.

[69] 按孫子生於敬王之代故周秦兩漢諸書皆多襲用其文. Here is a list of the
passages in Sun Tzŭ from which either the substance or the actual words
have been appropriated by early authors: VII. 9; IX. 17; I. 24 (戰國策).
IX. 23; IX. 1, 3, 7; V. 1; III. 18; XI. 58; VII. 31; VII. 24; VII. 26;
IX. 15; IX. 4 (_bis_) (吳子). III. 8; IV. 7 (尉繚子). VII. 19; V. 14;
III. 2 (鶡冠子). III. 8; XI. 2; I. 19; XI. 58; X. 10 & VI. 1 (史記. Two
of the above are given as quotations). V. 13; IV. 2 (呂氏春秋). IX. 11,
12; XI. 30; I. 13; VII. 19 & IV. 7; VII. 32; VII. 25; IV. 20 & V. 23;
IX. 43; V. 15; VII. 26; V. 4 & XI. 39; VIII. 11; VI. 4 (淮南子). V. 4
(太元經). II. 20; X. 14 (潛夫論).

[70] See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that
the _Tso Chuan_ must have been written in the 5th century, but not
before 424 B.C.

[71] The instances quoted are:—III. 14, 15: 同 is said to be equivalent
to 昌; II. 15: 𦮼 = 萁; VII. 28: 歸 = 息; XI. 60: 詳 = 佯; XI. 24: the use
of 鬥 instead of 鬭 (the later form); XI. 64: 誅 = 治; IX. 3: 絶 = 越;
III. 11: 周 and 𨻶 antithetically opposed in the sense of 無缺 and 有缺;
XI. 56: 犯 = 動; XI. 31: 方 = 縛.

[72] See _Mencius_ III. 1. iii. 13–20.

[73] 山林處士 need not be pressed to mean an actual dweller in the
mountains. I think it simply denotes a person living a retired life
and standing aloof from public affairs.

[74] When Wu first appears in the _Ch‘un Ch‘iu_ in 584, it is already at
variance with its powerful neighbour. The _Ch‘un Ch‘iu_ first mentions
Yüeh in 537, the _Tso Chuan_ in 601.

[75] This is explicitly stated in the _Tso Chuan_, 昭公 XXXII, 2:
夏吳伐越始用師於越也.

[76] There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would
tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully
justify the language used in XI. § 30.

[77] See his preface to Sun Tzŭ:—入郢威齊晉之功歸之子胥故春秋傳不載其名葢功成不
受官.

[78] With Wu Yüan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious
treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a
great general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun
Wu, on the other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in the
5th century.

[79] See _Tso Chuan_, 定公, 4th year (506), § 14: 自昭王卽位無歲不有吳師
“From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] there was no year in
which Ch‘u was not attacked by Wu.”

[80] See _supra_, p. xx.

[81] 秦漢已來用兵皆用其法而或祕其書不肯注以傳世魏武始爲之注.

[82] See 宋藝文志.

[83] Alluded to on p. xvii, note 3.

[84] _Loc. cit._: 葢宋人又從大興朱氏處見明人刻本餘則世無傳者.

[85] A good biographical notice, with a list of his works, will be found
in the 國朝詩人徵略, ch. 48, fol. 18 _sqq_.

[86] Preface _ad fin_.: 吾家出樂安眞孫子之後媿余徒讀祖書考証文字不通方略亦享承
平之福者久也 “My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended
from Sun Tzŭ. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestor’s work
from a literary point of view, without comprehending the military
technique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings of peace!”

[87] Hua-yin is about 14 miles from 潼關 T‘ung-kuan on the eastern
border of Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those
about to make the ascent of the 華山 or Western Sacred Mountain. It
is mentioned in the 大明一統志 [A.D. 1461], ch. 32, f. 22, as the 西嶽廟:—在
華陰縣東五里廟有唐𤣥宗所製華山碑 “Situated five _li_ east of the district
city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the Hua-shan tablet inscribed by
the T‘ang Emperor Hsüan Tsung [713–755].”

[88] 曩予游𨵿中讀華陰嶽廟道藏見有此書後有鄭友賢遺說一卷.

[89] Cf. Sun Hsing-yen’s remark _à propos_ of his mistakes in the names
and order of the commentators: 吉天保之不深究此書可知.

[90] 國家令甲以孫子校士所傳本或多錯謬當用古本是正其文適吳念湖太守畢恬溪孝廉皆爲此
學所得或過于予遂刋一編以課武士.

[91] _See_ my “Catalogue of Chinese Books” (Luzac and Co., 1908),
no. 40.

[92] This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzŭ, namely:
I. 2; 26; 16; II. 9 & 10; III. 3; III & VII; III. 17; IV. 4; 6; V. 3;
10 & 11; 14; the headings of the 13 chapters, with special reference to
chap. VII; VII. 5; 15 & 16; 27; 33, &c.; VIII. 1–6; IX. 11; X. 1–20;
XI. 23; 31; 19; 43; VII. 12–14 & XI. 52; XI. 56; XIII. 15 & 16; 26;
XIII in general.

[93] Preface to Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s edition: 孫子注者尤多武之書本於兵兵之術非
一而以不窮爲奇宜其說者之多也.

[94] See 魏書, ch. 1.

[95] _Loc. cit.:_ 然前世言善用兵稱曹公曹公嘗與董呂諸袁角其力而勝之遂與吳蜀分漢而
王傳言魏之將出兵千里每坐計勝敗授其成算諸將用之十不失一一有違者兵輒敗北.

[96] Cf. 天一閣藏書總目 Catalogue of the library of the 范 Fan family at
Ningpo, 子部, fol. 12 _v_^o: 其註多隱辭引而不發 “His commentary is frequently
obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not fully develop the meaning.”

[97] See 玉海, ch. 141 _ad init_.

[98] _Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao_, ch. 221, f. 9 _v_^o.

[99] Ch. 207, f. 5 _r_^o.

[100] It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently
discovered chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the “Grottos of
the Thousand Buddhas.” _See_ B. E. F. E. O, t. VIII, nos. 3–4, p. 525.

[101] _Loc. cit._

[102] _Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao_, ch. 221, f. 9: 世謂牧慨然最喜論兵欲試而不得者
其學能道春秋戰國時事甚博而詳知兵者有取焉.

[103] Preface to his commentary (_T‘u Shu_, 經籍典, ch. 442): 武之所論大約
用仁義使機權也.

[104] _Ibid_.: 自武死後凡千歲將兵者有成者有敗者勘其事跡皆與武所著書一一相抵當.

[105] _T‘ung K‘ao, loc. cit._: 皥以曹公注隱微杜牧注闊踈重爲之注云.

[106] _Ibid_.

[107] The Hsia, the Shang, and the Chou. Although the last-named was
nominally existent in Sun Tzŭ’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of
power, and the old military organisation had practically gone by the
board. I can suggest no other explanation of the passage.

[108] See _Chou Li_, XXIX. 6–10.

[109] See _T‘u Shu_, 戎政典, ch. 90, f. 2 _v_^o: 後之學者徒見其書又各牽於己
見是以注者雖多而少當也獨吾友聖兪不然嘗評武之書曰此戰國相傾之說也三代王者之師司馬
九伐之法武不及也然亦愛其文略而意深其行師用兵料敵制勝亦皆有法其言甚有序次而注者汨
之或失其意乃自爲注凡膠于偏見者皆抉去傅以已意而發之然後武之說不汨而明吾知此書當與三
家並傳而後世取其說者往往于吾聖兪多焉.

[110] _T‘ung K‘ao_, ch. 221, f. 11 _r_^o: 晳以古本校正闕誤.

[111] See 四庫全書, ch. 99, f. 16 _v_^o.

[112] This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s “Notes,” p. 91
(new edition).

[113] _T‘ung K‘ao, loc. cit._: 仁廟時天下久承平人不習兵元昊既叛邊將數敗朝廷頗
訪知兵者士大夫人人言兵矣故本朝注解孫武書者大扺皆其時人也.

[114] A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the
_San Kuo Chih_, ch. 10.

[115] Ch. 100, ff. 2, 3.

[116] _See_ p. 144.

[117] _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 17 _ad init_.

[118] _San Kuo Chih_, ch. 54, f. 10 _v_^o (commentary).

[119] _Sung Shih_, ch. 365 _ad init_.

[120] The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting
themselves with Sun Tzŭ are not behindhand in their praise. In this
connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from
Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work were submitted
previous to publication: “Many of Sun Wu’s maxims are perfectly
applicable to the present day, and no. 11 on page 77 is one that the
people of this country would do well to take to heart.”

[121] Ch. 140, f. 13 _r_^o.

[122] _See_ IV. § 3.

[123] The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2: 戰必克.

[124] 武用兵不能必克與書所言遠甚吳起與武一體之人皆著書言兵世稱之曰孫吳然而起之言
兵也輕法制草略無所統紀不若武之書詞約而義盡.

[125] The _Tso Chuan_.

[126] 孫子十三篇不惟武人之根本文士亦當盡心焉其詞約而縟易而深暢而可用論語易大傳之
流孟荀楊著書皆不及也.

[127] 是啟人君窮兵黷武之心.

[128] _Shih Chi_, ch. 25, fol. 1: 兵者聖人所以討彊暴平亂世夷險阻救危殆自含血戴
角之獸見犯則校而况於人懷好惡喜怒之氣喜則愛心生怒則毒螫加情性之理也...豈與世儒闇於
大較不權輕重猥云德化不當用兵大至窘辱失守小乃侵犯削弱遂執不移等哉故教笞不可廢於家刑
罰不可捐於國誅伐不可偃於天下用之有巧拙行之有逆順耳.

[129] The first instance of 木索 given in the _P‘ei Wên Yün Fu_ is from
Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s letter to 任安 Jên An (see 文選, ch. 41, f. 9 _r_^o),
where M. Chavannes translates it “la cangue et la chaîne.” But in the
present passage it seems rather to indicate some single instrument of
torture.

[130] 兵者刑也刑者政事也爲夫子之徒實仲由冉求之事也今者據案聽訟械繫罪人笞死于市者
吏之所爲也驅兵數萬撅其城郭纍其妻子斬其罪人亦吏之所爲也木索兵刃無異意也笞之與斬無
異刑也小而易制用力少者木索笞也大而難治用力多者兵刃斬也俱期於除去惡民安活善民.

[131] Cf. _Shih Chi_, ch. 47, f. 11 _v_^o.

[132] 季孫問于冉有曰子之戰學之乎性達之乎對曰學之季孫曰事孔子惡乎學冉有曰卽學之於
孔子者大聖兼該文武並用適聞其戰法實未之詳也夫不知自何代何年何人分爲二道曰文曰武離而
俱行因使縉紳之士不敢言兵甚或恥言之苟有言者世以爲麤暴異人人不比𢿙嗚呼亡失根本斯爲最
甚.

[133] See _Shu Ching_, preface § 55.

[134] See _Tso Chuan_, 定公 X. 2; _Shih Chi_, ch. 47, f. 4 _r_^o.

[135] 周公相成王制禮作樂尊大儒術有淮夷叛則出征之夫子相魯公會于夾谷曰有文事者必有
武備叱辱齊侯伏不敢動是二大聖人豈不知兵乎.

[136] _Lun Yü_, XV. 1.

[137] _Tso Chuan_, 哀公, XI. 7.

[138] See _supra_.

[139] _Tso Chuan_, 定公, X. 2.

[140] _Ibid_. XII. 5; _Chia Yü_, ch. 1 _ad fin._

[141] I have failed to trace this utterance. See note 2 on p. xliii.

[142] See _supra_.

[143] 性理彙要, _loc. cit._: 昔吾夫子對衛靈公以軍旅之事未之學答孔文子以甲兵之事
未之聞及觀夾谷之會則以兵加萊人而齊侯懼費人之亂則命將士以伐之而費人北嘗曰我戰則克而
冉有亦曰聖人文武並用孔子豈有眞未學未聞哉特以軍旅甲兵之事非所以爲訓也.

[144] See _supra_.

[145] _Viz_. 軍禮, the other four being 吉, 凶, 賓 and 嘉 “worship,
mourning, entertainment of guests and festive rites.” See _Shu Ching_,
II. 1. iii. 8, and _Chou Li_, IX. fol. 49.

[146] Preface to Sun Tzŭ: 孔子曰軍旅之事未之學又曰我戰則克孔子定禮正樂兵則五禮
之一不必以爲專門之學故云未學所爲聖人有所不知或行軍好謀則學之或善將將如伍子胥之用
孫子又何必自學之故又曰我戰則克也.

[147] See p. 166.

[148] This is a rather obscure allusion to _Tso Chuan_, 襄公, XXXI. 4,
where Tzŭ-ch‘an says: 子有美錦不使人學製焉 “If you have a piece of
beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere learner to make it up.”

[149] Cf. _Tao Tê Ching_, ch. 31: 兵者不祥之器.

[150] Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See _Lun Yü_,
XIII. 29, 30.

[151] 今世泥孔子之言以爲兵書不足觀又泥趙括徒能讀父書之言以爲成法不足用又見兵書有
權謀有反間以爲非聖人之法皆不知吾儒之學者吏之治事可習而能然古人猶有學製之懼兵凶戰危
將不素習未可以人命爲嘗試則十三篇之不可不觀也.

[152] Better known as Hsiang 羽 Yü [B.C. 233–202].

[153] The third among the 五伯 (or 霸) enumerated on p. 141. For the
incident referred to, see _Tso Chuan_, 僖公, XXII. 4.

[154] See _supra_, p. xvi, note 4.

[155] _Shih Chi_, ch. 47, f. 7 _r_^o.

[156] _Ibid_., ch. 38, f. 8 _v_^o.

[157] 項梁教籍兵法籍略知其意不肯竟學卒以傾覆不知兵法之弊可勝言哉宋襄徐偃仁而敗兵
者危機當用權謀孔子猶有要盟勿信微服過宋之時安得妄責孫子以言之不純哉.

[158] 其時去古未遠三代遺規往往於此書見之.

[159] 其最古者當以孫子吳子司馬法爲本大抵生聚訓練之術權謀運用之宜而已.

[160] See p. 174. Further details on T‘ai Kung will be found in the
_Shih Chi_, ch. 32 _ad init._ Besides the tradition which makes him a
former minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there
given, according to which he would appear to have been first raised
from a humble private station by Wên Wang.

[161] 其文義不類三代.

[162] 其言多近於正與戰國權謀頗殊.

[163] See _Han Shu_, 張良傳, ch. 40. The work is there called 太公兵法.
Hence it has been confused with the _Liu T‘ao_. The _T‘u Shu_
attributes both the _Liu T‘ao_ and the _San Lüeh_ to T‘ai Kung.

[164] 其文不類秦漢間書漢光武帝詔雖嘗引之安知非反摭詔中所引二語以證實其書謂之北宋
以前舊本則可矣. Another work said to have been written by Huang-shih
Kung, and also included in the military section of the Imperial
Catalogue, is the 素書 _Su Shu_ in 1 _chüan_. A short ethical treatise
of Taoist savour, having no reference whatever to war, it is
pronounced a forgery from the hand of 張商英 Chang Shang-ying
(_d_. 1121), who edited it with commentary. Correct Wylie’s “Notes,”
new edition, p. 90, and Courant’s “Catalogue des Livres Chinois,”
no. 5056.

[165] 其書雖僞亦出於有學識謀略者之手也. We are told in the 讀書志 that the
above six works, together with Sun Tzŭ, were those prescribed for
military training in the 元豐 period (1078–85). See _Yü Hai_, ch. 140,
f. 4 _r_^o.

[166] Also written 握機經 and 幄機經 _Wu Chi Ching_.

[167] 其言具有條理.

[168] “Words on Wellington,” by Sir W. Fraser.

[169] “Forty-one Years in India,” chap. 46.

[170] See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed.,
vol. II, p. 490.

[171] _See_ Col. Henderson, _op. cit._ vol. I. p. 426.

[172] For a number of maxims on this head, see “Marshal Turenne”
(Longmans, 1907), p. 29.

[173] “Marshal Turenne,” p. 50.

[174] “Aids to Scouting,” p. 26.

[175] See “Pensées de Napoléon I^{er},” no. 47.

[176] “The Science of War,” chap. 2.

[177] “Aids to Scouting,” p. xii.

[178] “Maximes de Guerre,” no. 72.

[179] Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.

[180] “The Science of War,” p. 333.

[181] “Stonewall Jackson,” vol. I, p. 421.

[182] See Giles’ Dictionary, no. 9817.

[183] 不入虎穴不得虎子 “Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get
hold of the tiger’s cubs.”

[184] “Aids to Scouting,” p. 2.

[185] _Ch‘ien Han Shu_ ch. 43, fol. 1. 顔師古 Yen Shih-ku _in loc._ says:
食音異其音基.

[186] “Unterricht des Königs von Preussen an die Generale seiner
Armeen,” cap. 12 (edition of 1794).

[187] “Marshal Turenne,” p. 311.

Transcriber’s Note:

Text Notes:
1. The text contains Chinese characters. Character variants matching
the printed text are used whenever possible rather than more
common versions. For best results, insure that the eReader has the
latest Chinese font packages.

2. Italicized text is indicated with leading and trailing underscores.
(_)

3. Superscript text is indicated with a leading caret (^). If more
than one character, the text is wrapped in braces({}). Ordinal
numbers with superscripts (i.e. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.) are printed
without the caret.

4. Smaller font text blocks such as contained in block quotes and
annotation text is indented. The original printed text did not
indent this text.

5. In the Introduction pages xi and xii, sentence groups in the
quotation from Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s biography of Sun Tzŭ separated by
em-dashes are now separated into paragraphs for clarity.

6. In the original book, several Chinese text lines were placed in the
top quarter of a page and the translation in the bottom three
quarters of the page. This transcription places each Chinese text
line above its corresponding translation.

7. Footnotes have been renumbered and placed at the end of each
chapter.

8. Missing quotation marks, capitalization, punctuation, and spaces
silently corrected.

9. Except as mentioned above and in the Change List that follows,
every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as
possible, including non-standard punctuation, inconsistently
hyphenated words, etc.

Change List (page numbers from original printed book):

Page x
befel changed to
befell

Page xxv
abready changed to
already

Page xxxi
surrived changed to
survived

Page xlviii footnote #1
have changed to
I have

Page xlviii
combine 2 instances of footnote #4

Page 39
meaniug changed to
meaning

Page 44
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succeeding

Page 45
sublety changed to
subtlety
Note: This was mentioned in corrigenda above.

Page 70
exclained changed to
exclaimed

Page 125
σωθεῖτε changed to
σωθείητε

Page 136
Chang Yü adopts its, changed to
Chang Yü adopts it,

Page 154 and 156
Using variant 荒 in place of 𮎰 (U+2E3B0, ⿱艹㠩) since the latter
glyph is rare in fonts.

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accompained changed to
accompanied

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