Title: The American Navy
Author: Chadwick, French E.
Language: English
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THE AMERICAN BOOKS

A LIBRARY OF GOOD CITIZENSHIP


“The American Books” are designed as a series of authoritative manuals,
discussing problems of interest in America to-day.



THE AMERICAN BOOKS


  THE AMERICAN COLLEGE         BY ISAAC SHARPLESS
  THE INDIAN TO-DAY            BY CHARLES A. EASTMAN
  COST OF LIVING               BY FABIAN FRANKLIN
  THE AMERICAN NAVY            BY REAR-ADMIRAL FRENCH E. CHADWICK, U. S. N.
  MUNICIPAL FREEDOM            BY OSWALD RYAN
  AMERICAN LITERATURE          BY LEON KELLNER
        (TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY JULIA FRANKLIN)
  SOCIALISM IN AMERICA         BY JOHN MACY
  AMERICAN IDEALS              BY CLAYTON S. COOPER
  THE UNIVERSITY MOVEMENT      BY IRA REMSEN
  THE AMERICAN SCHOOL          BY WALTER S. HINCHMAN
  THE FEDERAL RESERVE          BY H. PARKER WILLIS

(_For more extended notice of the series, see the last pages of this
book._)



  _The American Books_


  The
  American Navy

  By
  Rear-Admiral French E. Chadwick
  (_U. S. N., Retired_)

  [Illustration]

  GARDEN CITY     NEW YORK
  DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
  1915



  _Copyright, 1915, by_
  DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

  _All rights reserved, including that of
  translation into foreign languages,
  including the Scandinavian_



  TO
  MY COMRADES OF THE NAVY
  PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE


Rear-Admiral French Ensor Chadwick was born at Morgantown, W. Va.,
February 29, 1844. He was appointed to the U. S. Naval Academy
from West Virginia (then part of Virginia) in 1861, and graduated
in November, 1864. In the summer of 1864 he was attached to the
_Marblehead_ in pursuit of the Confederate steamers _Florida_ and
_Tallahassee_. After the Civil War he served successively in a number
of vessels, and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Commander in
1869; was instructor at the Naval Academy; on sea service, and on
lighthouse duty (1870-1882); Naval Attaché at the American Embassy in
London (1882-1889); commanded the _Yorktown_ (1889-1891); was Chief
Intelligence Officer (1892-1893); and Chief of the Bureau of Equipment
(1893-1897).

During the war with Spain he was Admiral Sampson’s Chief of Staff, and
also commanded the flagship _New York_. He participated in all the more
important engagements in the Atlantic during the war; was advanced five
numbers in rank for conspicuous conduct in battle, and was presented
with a sword of honor by citizens of his native state.

From 1900 to 1903 he was President of the Naval War College at Newport;
was promoted Rear-Admiral October 11, 1903, and in 1904 became
commander-in-chief of the South Atlantic squadron. He retired February
28, 1906.

Rear-Admiral Chadwick is one of the most influential friends of the
United States navy; he has written extensively on diplomatic and naval
topics, and is the author of “Causes of the Civil War” in the “American
Nation Series.” He is also much interested in problems of municipal
government, is a member of the Newport Representative Council, a member
of the National Institute of Arts and Letters, corresponding member of
the Massachusetts Historical Society, member of the American Historical
Association, etc.



INTRODUCTION


The navy in all countries has ever been, and, as far as we can now
judge, ever will be, a preëminent instrument of government. It was
through her navy that Greece destroyed the power of Persia; Rome that
of Carthage; the allies at Lepanto that of the Turks; England that of
Holland and later that of France in America; the navy of France, in
turn, caused the relinquishment of Great Britain’s sovereignty over
the thirteen colonies which formed the United States, and a generation
later it was the British navy which made the efforts of the great
Napoleon the “baseless fabric of a vision.”

Coming to days within the ken of many still living, the navy was the
power which made possible the preservation of the Union in our great
Civil War by the cutting off of the Southern Confederacy from its
means of support by sea and reducing its forces thereby to practical
inanition. For had the Confederacy had free access to the sea and
control of the Mississippi River, no armies of the North could have
conquered well-supplied armies of the South. So, too, the control
of the sea decided the outcome of the Spanish War. When Sampson’s
fleet destroyed Spain’s only battle squadron off Santiago de Cuba,
Spain could no longer reinforce her army in Cuba, and surrender was a
necessity. Even as this is written Germany’s every sea outlet is closed
by the British fleet, so superior in number to the German, and German
commerce on the sea is for the time entirely swept away, leaving Great
Britain for the moment navally and commercially supreme upon the ocean.
As one attempts to look into the future the vastness of the possible
changes startles the imagination, but in it all is ever present the
power that goes with the ubiquitous warship, from whose threat no port
of the world is free. Military power fades to insignificance, through
its narrow limits of mobility, when compared with the meaning of a
great fleet. The present sketch of history is to show what the warship
has done for us.



THE AMERICAN NAVY



CHAPTER I


When Great Britain attempted to reduce to obedience the rebellious
colonies which were to form the United States of America she was
dealing with a people who in the North at least had long been
conversant with the building and sailing of ships. A New England built
ship entered the Thames in 1638, only eighteen years after the landing
of the Pilgrims at Plymouth, Massachusetts. The New England men, with a
sterile coast, with limitless fishing grounds and unsurpassed harbors,
turned as naturally to the sea for livelihood as did the South, more
kindly treated by nature, to agriculture. In 1670 it was estimated
that two thirds of the British shipping was employed in the American
trade. The Dutch, who had been great carriers on the sea, were excluded
from this trade by the navigation laws of the period. Scotland was not
admitted to the trade of the American plantations until her union with
England in 1707, and Ireland not until 1780, while in 1670 nothing
could be imported into the American colonies but what was laden in
England in English-built ships. But while none of their products could
be carried anywhere (except to other of the plantations) till they were
first landed in England, the ships built in America were reckoned as
English, and this fact gave great impetus to American shipbuilding.
American shipping prospered amazingly. But while thus prospering, it
was the attempted repression of our commerce afloat and ashore (which
included such things as forbidding the exportation of hats, restricting
the manufacture of iron, and forbidding commerce with the foreign-owned
islands of the West Indies) which did much more to develop the idea of
independence than did the Stamp Act. But the net result of conditions
was to foster shipping, and our competition had so increased by 1725
that in that year “the shipwrights of the river Thames came up to
Whitehall with a complaint that their business had declined and their
workmen emigrated because the plantations furnished England with ships.”

On the register of the underwriters at Lloyd’s for 1775, comprehending
the shipping of the three preceding years, there were 3,908
British-built vessels of 605,545 tons, and 2,311 of American build
with a tonnage of 373,618 tons. The average size of the ship of the
time was about 400 tons displacement. One 100 feet in length and 26
to 28 feet broad was a good-sized ship. They were but cockle boats in
comparison with the vast ships of to-day, many of which are full a
hundred times 400 tons displacement.

The foregoing will show that when there came a time to dispute the sea
with Great Britain there was no difficulty in supplying the ships,
and the many ironworks which had been established, particularly in
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, despite Great Britain’s restrictions,
could furnish guns in the manufacture of which our foundries were
adepts before the war.

The larger men-of-war of the period were greater in size than the
largest merchantmen. The greater ships-of-the-line (by which expression
is meant those which could take their place in the line of battle,
the formation of which was in a single extended column) varied from
4,000 to 3,000 tons displacement. The larger of these, which carried
guns on three main decks and some light guns on the upper deck, to the
number altogether of 100, or even 120, were 180 to 190 feet on the gun
deck, with about 53 feet beam. The most usual size, however, was the
“74,” carrying nominally that number of guns, but usually six or eight
more, on two main decks (and thus known as a two-decker). This class
was about 168 feet long on the gun deck and 47 feet broad. Below this
class there were many ships of sixty, fifty, or even forty-four guns,
with two gun decks. Such, for a long period, formed part of the line of
battle.

The frigates had but one covered gun deck. They varied in length from
115 to 130 feet on the gun deck, and were from 32 to 36 feet beam,
roughly a fourth of their length. They formed no part of a line of
battle, their duty when accompanying a fleet being to remain clear of
the line and repeat the admiral’s signals. There was also a small class
of ship called a sloop-of-war, which carried guns on only the upper,
or spar, deck as it came to be called. These vessels were ship-rigged;
that is, they had three masts with square sails on each. They were
usually about 100 feet long and about 27 feet beam.

The three-deckers, or 100-gun ships, carried about 900 men; the 74’s
about 600; the frigates about 160. The guns of the period were of
course all smooth-bores and muzzle-loaders. In the large ships, the
heavier guns, usually 32-pounders, were carried on the lower gun
decks to give stability to the ship; 18’s or 24’s were carried on the
middle deck, 9’s and 12’s on the upper, 9’s and 6’s on the quarter
deck, which was the part of the upper deck aft of the mainmast, and on
the forecastle, which was the part of the upper deck forward of the
foremast; the space between the two was called the waist. The larger
frigates usually carried 18’s on the gun deck; the smaller, 12’s or
9’s. The sloops carried 9’s or 6’s. The greatest range of even the
heavier guns was but little over 2,000 yards, as the ports rarely
allowed more than 8° or 9° elevation. Such guns were but toys compared
with modern ordnance, but they were common alike to all nations, and
all were thus on the same footing.

An immense difference between that day and this was in the motive power
which then and for two and a half generations later consisted of lofty
wooden masts, reaching skyward in the greater ships about 200 feet,
crossed by “yards,” the larger of which were about 100 feet long, the
former supported by a great mass of rigging known as shrouds and stays,
the latter moved by “braces” and the sails worked by a maze of running
rigging. All this, of course, was subject to being shot away, and ships
were thus frequently completely dismasted or disabled in action. The
same result was often, too, produced by a gale of wind, it being no
uncommon thing for a fleet to be thus completely incapacitated for the
continuance of a voyage.

Weeks or fortnights were spent in a voyage now done in days. Of
certainty as to time of reaching port, there was none. And amid all
there was the danger from enemies, legal or piratical, for the world
was only slowly ridding itself of the latter; and from the inherent
dangers of the sea itself to the clumsy ships which slowly worked their
way across it. How great these last were, through the ignorance at
that time of the law of storms, may be known by the fate of a great
fleet which in 1782 left the West Indies under Admiral Graves, with ten
line-of-battle ships convoying nearly a hundred merchantmen. Among the
former were six of the prizes taken in Rodney’s great naval battle of
April 12, 1782. Caught in a fierce gale southeast of Nova Scotia, five
of the battleships foundered with nearly all on board. One of those
which went down with every soul was the _Ville de Paris_, which had
been the flagship of the unfortunate Count de Grasse. The total loss
of men was estimated at 3,500.

Such was the setting of the period which saw the birth of the first
American navy, which was to have an existence of but eight short
years, to be succeeded, however, nine years after (1794) by the modest
beginnings which have grown into the great fleet of to-day, and whose
history is one of uninterrupted success and honor.



CHAPTER II


In September, 1744, there met at Philadelphia, then our foremost
city, representatives of each of the thirteen colonies, called
together on account of the increasing difficulties which had arisen
with the mother country. These difficulties arose mainly from the
tendency of parliament to govern the colonies as it would, say,
any county of England. This right the Americans denied. They were
good subjects of the King, but they objected to parliamentary rule.
The underlying idea which governed the action of the Americans was
thus that of a federalism which only in these latter days has laid
hold in any considerable degree of the minds of the English, who
now debate the possibility of England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa becoming states of a
federation somewhat akin to our own. But at the time of the outbreak
of our Revolution there was no widespread idea of separation. It
was, however, in the air, and by some openly advocated. Had there
been a complete renouncement of the right of parliament to make laws
governing the colonies there would, for the time at least, have been
a reconciliation. It was upon this principle we divided. Thus the war
began.

There was at this time on our coast a British naval force of four ships
of from seventy to fifty guns (these at Boston), and twenty from twenty
to six guns distributed from New Hampshire to Florida. The whole was a
very moderate force considering the long-standing discontent and the
difficulties of the existing situation. The British navy, in which, as
in the administration of every other department of the British public
service of the period, inefficiency and dishonesty reigned to an almost
unbelievable degree, had been allowed to run down sadly after the Seven
Years’ War which ended in 1763. The total number of ships was but 270
and the number of seamen but 18,000. Before the war closed the ships
were to number 468, of which 174 were ships-of-the-line (carrying from
sixty to one hundred guns), and the seamen were to number 110,000.

The situation of the United States was much akin to that of the
Southern Confederacy. Its resources were too meagre to carry on a war
without the importation of much that was necessary to keep an army in
efficiency. Thus the true plan of England was a strict blockade and the
reduction to inanition of our forces, such as we ourselves carried on
against the South in our Civil War. This action was advocated strongly
by Viscount Barrington, the Secretary for War, who urged that the navy
only should be employed, and that the ships should take possession of
all our ports and establish a complete blockade. Fortunately for the
revolutionists, his advice was not heeded.

On April 19, 1775, at Concord and Lexington, the long-prepared fagots
of revolution were lighted into flame. Two months later, June 17th,
came Bunker Hill and the immediate assembling near Boston (where lay
almost the whole of the British force in America) of a multitude of
country people ill-provided with everything that goes to make the
efficiency of an army but high determination and spirit. By a stroke of
prescience which would seem a providence, Washington was appointed the
commander-in-chief.

       *       *       *       *       *

There had been fights afloat between the Americans and the British
some years before the actual outbreak of the Revolution. In 1769 the
sloop _Liberty_, employed in revenue protection, had been seized and
burned by the people of Newport, Rhode Island; in 1772 a schooner,
the _Gaspee_, used for similar service in Narragansett Bay and which
had grounded while in chase of a suspected vessel near Providence,
was boarded by a party of men who burned her, and but a month after
the first fights ashore occurred there were attacks with some loss of
life upon an armed schooner and barges which attempted the seizure of
livestock on the islands of Boston Bay. The lively fights at Machias in
June, 1775, in which the inhabitants had captured the sloop _Unity_ and
another which had been sent to Machias for lumber and which were under
the escort of an armed tender, the _Margaretta_, were, however, the
first of the actual War of the Revolution. They are proud recollections
of local history and have caused the name of the town to appear on the
navy list as that of a small cruiser of to-day. On August 9, 1775, the
_Falcon_, sloop-of-war under Captain Linzee, pursued into Gloucester
harbor two schooners bound from the West Indies; one he seized, and the
other succeeding in getting into the harbor was attacked by boats from
the _Falcon_. The militia and inhabitants gathered, and the action
which came on and which lasted several hours resulted in the capture of
thirty-five of the _Falcon’s_ men who had come into the harbor in the
captured schooner and in their own boats, both schooners remaining in
the hands of the Americans.

To Washington himself was due the first organized force of the
Americans in the Revolution upon the sea. Throughout his career he
recognized the importance of its control, and immediately on his
arrival at Cambridge to take the command of the American army then
collected before Boston, he began to look into the question of a naval
force, with a view to capturing the enemy’s supplies. Such capture
would not only be a deprivation to the British forces, but a much
needed aid to the Americans who needed everything which goes to support
an army, excepting food, which the surrounding country supplied for the
moment plentifully enough. But arms, both small and great, clothing,
ammunition, and tentage were imperatively needed. Such in quantities
were on the ocean on their way to America for the British army, and
the first need was to bring them into American hands. Washington thus
established a little navy of his own, with a prize court necessary
to pass upon the propriety of the capture and commissioners to take
charge of captured material. He continued such efforts even after the
transfer of the army to New York, and did not cease from them until the
Continental Congress took the subject in hand.

The beginning of Washington’s fleet was the schooner _Hannah_, which
sailed under Captain Nicholas Broughton from Beverly, Massachusetts,
on September 5, 1775, and returned two days later with a prize.
Naturally many of the improvised army assembled at Cambridge, which was
mainly made up of New Englanders, were men of the sea, and thus soon
there were eight small vessels, officered and manned from the army in
service. The administration of this improvised navy was not an easy
task. Washington, writing to the President of the Congress on December
4, 1775, says: “The plague, trouble, and vexation I have had with the
crews of all the armed vessels is inexpressible. I do not believe there
is on earth a more disorderly set.” Successes came, however, and with
these greater contentment among the crews. Captain John Manley was
particularly successful, especially in the capture of the brigantine
_Nancy_, which carried ordnance stores of the highest value to our
poorly equipped army. The inventory of her cargo gives, among other
things, 2,000 muskets, thirty-one tons of musket shot, 3,000 round
shot, a considerable quantity of powder, and a thirteen-inch mortar,
which was promptly mounted in Cambridge and called the “Congress.”

The British evacuated Boston through want of food, on March 17,
1776, going first to Halifax and thence to New York. Washington had
already transferred his army thither and continued his navy, such as
it was, until he himself retreated from New York as the result of the
unfortunate battle of Long Island.

Rhode Island had, however, taken action toward a sea force several
months before Washington had formed his little fleet. The Rhode Island
Assembly had, on June 15, 1775, two days before the battle of Bunker
Hill, ordered the chartering of two sloops and had appointed Abraham
Whipple to the chief command. Whipple was prompt to act, for on the
same day he captured the tender to the frigate _Rose_, the first prize
of the war. His evident courage and vigor caused his appointment later
as captain in the regular navy which was soon to come.

Rhode Island has also the honor of being the first state to take
action toward the establishment of a national navy. Her delegates
were instructed on August 26, 1775, to bring the question of a fleet
before Congress. This was done on October 3d. The subject received an
almost immediate impetus through the arrival of information of two
brigs which had left England for Quebec with arms, powder, and stores.
A committee of three was proposed to prepare a plan to intercept
these, but the idea met with strong opposition as being initiatory
to a Continental navy, as in fact it was. It was declared by some
opposed to be the “most wild, visionary, mad project that had ever
been imagined. It was an infant taking a mad bull by the horns, ...
it would ruin the character and morals of our seamen; it would make
them selfish, piratical, mercenary, bent wholly upon plunder.” Much
of such criticism of the project might have been spared. Our seamen
had been living through an age of privateering, and one in which the
latter often recked but too little of legal capture, and they had too
long been accustomed to the general system of illicit commerce with the
islands of the West Indies belonging to France and Spain to have their
morals upset by fighting for their country. The better sense prevailed
and the three men who had urged most strongly the proposed action were,
on October 5, 1775, appointed a committee to report a scheme of action.
These were John Adams of Massachusetts, John Langdon of New Hampshire,
and Silas Deane of Connecticut.

The immediate advice of the committee which was to instruct Washington
to procure two cruisers in Massachusetts, one to carry ten, and the
other fourteen, guns, for the purpose of intercepting the two brigs
mentioned, was soon changed in a report of October 30, 1775, advising
to add two more vessels, one to mount not more than twenty, the other
not more than thirty-six, guns, to be employed “for the protection and
defence of the United Colonies.” The question of the capture of special
ships had been dropped; the subject had become national.

On December 14, 1775, the “Naval Committee” was replaced by a committee
of thirteen chosen by ballot. The membership was remarkably like that
of some naval committees of later times. Scarcely any on it were really
conversant with matters of the sea, but it held one man, Robert Morris
of Pennsylvania, whose energy, resource, and ability caused Congress
to put in his sole control, before the war ended, all the affairs
of the navy. Agents were employed to superintend construction, and
prize agents were appointed. On November 6, 1776, Paul Jones wrote in
his usual vigorous way to Robert Morris, declaring the necessity of
a Board of Admiralty, and on October 28, 1779, one was established.
Two of the members were to be members of Congress; the other three,
called commissioners, were to be men possessing knowledge of naval
matters. The Marine Committee then came to an end, but the navy boards
at Philadelphia and Boston, each of “three persons well-skilled in
maritime affairs,” appointed by Congress “to execute the business of
the navy under the direction of the Marine Committee,” in what became
known as the Middle and Eastern districts, and the navy agents were
retained under this reorganization. The Board of Admiralty, however,
never materialized. On February 7, 1781, Congress resolved that naval
affairs should be under a single person, to be called the Secretary of
Marine. The office was never filled. Naval matters had, as just said,
gradually drifted into the efficient hands of the Superintendent of
Finance, Robert Morris, and there they remained until the navy of the
Revolution disappeared in the sale of the last ship, the _Alliance_, in
August, 1785. The fact is that naval affairs in the Revolution suffered
equally with those of the army through the ineptitude and inefficiency
of a Congress which was rather a board of advice than a government,
even when the Articles of Confederation were adopted, which was not
finally done until March 2, 1781.

On November 2, 1775, $100,000 was voted for ships, and the committee
was authorized to select officers and seamen. On November 10th were
authorized two battalions of marines. The first intention was to take
them from the army, but Washington objecting to such weakening of
his force, they were to be raised independently and, with a curious
misunderstanding of their use, it was provided that they should be
“such as are good seamen.” Rules for the government of the navy were
passed November 28th, and the offices of Captain, Lieutenant, Master,
Master’s Mate, Surgeon, Chaplain, and Warrant Officer established. The
monthly pay of captain was $32; of able seaman $6.67, later raised to
$8. A prize court was established. The rules, naturally, were taken
from those of the British service, and throughout the whole existence
of our navy there has run a strong similarity, until of late years
when there have been many changes in the nomenclature of the ratings
of the enlisted men. Both services had the “Banyan day,” when no meat
was served,[1] though in the American navy this soon ceased to be an
actuality. Such phrases as “Chips” (the carpenter) and “Jimmy Legs”
(the master-at-arms) were among the many common to both services; but
one, “Jack-of-the-Dust” (an adjunct of the paymaster’s department),
which is to-day a rating in the American navy, is no longer a part of
British ratings.

On December 13, 1775, Congress authorized the building of thirteen
frigates, and next day, December 14th, a committee of thirteen was
chosen by ballot to superintend their construction and equipment;
five of these were to be of 32 guns; five of 28; and three of 24.
The _Raleigh_, of 32 guns, was built at Portsmouth, New Hampshire;
the _Hancock_, 32, and _Boston_, 24, at Salisbury and Newburyport,
Massachusetts; the _Warren_, 32, and _Providence_, 28, at Providence,
Rhode Island; the _Trumbull_, 28, at Chatham, on the Connecticut
River; the _Montgomery_, 24, and _Congress_, 28, at Poughkeepsie,
New York; the _Randolph_, 32, _Washington_, 32, _Effingham_, 28, and
_Delaware_, 24, at Philadelphia; the _Virginia_, 28, at Baltimore. Six
of these--the _Montgomery_, _Congress_, _Washington_, _Effingham_,
_Delaware_, and _Virginia_--never got to sea, all being destroyed to
prevent capture except the _Virginia_ which, having grounded and lost
her rudder in the Chesapeake, was taken by a British force in the bay.

These ships were to cost on the average but $66,666, and the whole were
expected to be ready by March, 1776. They varied from 121 to 132 feet
in length on the gun deck, with a breadth of from 32.6 to 34.5½. Their
armament was that of the frigates of the day: 12-pounders on the main
deck and 6-pounders on the quarter deck and forecastle. All should
have been ready by the time named, for the _Raleigh_ was launched at
Portsmouth but two months after her keel was laid. But ill-luck pursued
them throughout, and particularly in that the free life and greater
gains of the privateersman made it almost impossible to get crews.

Thus the four ships the purchase of which was authorized on October
30, 1775, were the first of our navy. These were the _Alfred_, of 24
guns; _Columbus_, 20; _Andrew Doria_, 14, and the _Cabot_, 16.

Such was the beginning of the Continental navy which was to have a
life of but ten years. A few words will complete our story of naval
construction. On November 20, 1776, Congress resolved to build
“immediately” a 74 in New Hampshire; a 74 and a 36 in Massachusetts;
a 74, a brig, 18, and a packet boat in Pennsylvania; two frigates,
36 each, in Virginia; and two frigates, 36 each, in Maryland. But
in July, 1777, on account of the high cost of wages and material,
Congress authorized stopping work on such as the committee might judge
proper, and the final result was the completion and getting to sea of
but three: the _Alliance_, 36, the _General Gates_, 18, both built in
Massachusetts, and the _Saratoga_, 16, in Pennsylvania. Only one 74 was
built. This was the _America_, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and she
was not launched until the war had practically ended.

During the early part of 1776 there were built on Lake Champlain, under
the direction of Benedict Arnold, two schooners with eight 6 and 4
pounders; a sloop with ten guns of like calibre; a cutter with one 12,
one 9, and two 6; one galley with two 18-pounders and eight 12, and
two others of nearly equal armament; eight gondolas with three 8 and 9
pounders, and two other small craft. These, as will be seen later, were
to fight a memorable action.



CHAPTER III


The ships put afloat by Congress and which may be taken as the regular
navy of the Revolution were, however, strongly supplemented by the
navies of the states (except New Jersey and Delaware), and by the
multitude of privateers which cruised under both state and Continental
commissions. Massachusetts led in the number of state ships; but South
Carolina in size and importance. Massachusetts had sixteen vessels, the
only one of any size being the _Protector_, a ship carrying 26 light
guns. All the others carried but from ten to twenty. This “navy” made
about seventy captures during the war. But the state made one most
unfortunate venture, the Penobscot Expedition, to be mentioned later.
New Hampshire had one small ship, the _Hampden_, of 22 guns; Georgia,
four galleys (vessels propelled by both sails and oars). Connecticut
had a navy of ten vessels, the largest of which were the _Oliver
Cromwell_, of 18 guns, and the _Defence_, of 14. All had disappeared
by loss or capture by July, 1779, after having made some thirty
captures. There was, however, throughout the war great activity in Long
Island Sound where there was a warfare of boats against the illicit
traffic carried on to supply the British at New York. As always, greed
frequently overcame patriotism, and smuggling in both directions was
rife throughout the war.

The situation of New York, with its one port in possession of the
enemy, precluded anything of a patriot naval force except a few
galleys on the Hudson. Pennsylvania, however, had in 1777 a total of
fifty-one vessels on the Delaware, the only important one in size
being the small purchased ship _Montgomery_; all the others were but
armed boats of the type known as galleys. In 1777 there were in the
state naval service (which was administered by a board of six, later
of ten) a total of about 700 officers and men. The activities of this
force were confined to the Delaware River and Bay, and when the British
army was transferred to Philadelphia in 1777 these activities were
very active indeed, including the burning of a British line-of-battle
ship, the _Augusta_, 64, and the sloop-of-war _Merlin_, 18, which had
grounded. All these vessels were finally driven up the Delaware by an
overpowering force, except the _Montgomery_ and several smaller craft,
which had to be burned to escape capture. What remained after the
British evacuation of Philadelphia in 1778, when the French fleet had
appeared on our coast under the alliance just made with France, were
sold in December of that year. This remainder consisted of ten galleys,
nine armed boats, the brig _Convention_, the sloops _Speedwell_,
_Sally_, _Industry_, and _Black Duck_, and the schooner _Lydia_.[2]

Maryland in 1776 invested in a ship called the _Defence_ carrying
twenty-two 6-pounders, the largest vessel of her coming small navy; two
schooners and seven row galleys formed the remainder. All except two
galleys and a schooner were sold in 1779, but British success in the
South renewed depredations in the Chesapeake, and four large barges
to carry twenty-five men each and 9 and 18 pounders and a schooner to
carry ten 4-pounders were ordered. In 1782, depredations continuing,
a ship and four additional barges were ordered, and in November of
that year such vessels fought a severe and most gallant action with
an overpowering British force of the same character, the _Protector_,
which bore the brunt of the action on the American side, losing
fifty-four killed and wounded out of her crew of sixty-five. “Except
when used for commercial purposes, Maryland’s vessels rarely passed
outside the capes at the mouth of the Chesapeake.” Virginia entered
upon the question of a navy with enthusiasm and a number of vessels
were authorized; the two frigates voted were, however, never built.
Actual construction was confined to galleys and schooners; the number
first and last, though very considerable, is indefinite. The state
established a navy yard on the Chickahominy, operated a ropewalk, and
established naval magazines. The whole force practically disappeared
during the raid by Phillips and Arnold when on April 27, 1780, a
few miles below Richmond, six ships, eight brigs, five sloops, two
schooners, and several smaller vessels and the ropewalk at Warwick were
destroyed; twelve were captured which had escaped destruction, and but
one vessel remained in the Virginia navy, the armed boat _Liberty_.
A small force later, in 1782, was gathered which operated in the
Chesapeake (within which the Virginia force remained almost entirely
during the war) until peace in 1783.

Almost foremost in naval activity and expenditure was South Carolina.
The state owned in all some fifteen vessels, of which the most
important was the _Bricole_, purchased in France, and mounting
forty-four 24’s and 18’s, though pierced for sixty. She, with nearly
all the other ships of the state, was sunk as an obstacle to the
British in the siege ending in the surrender of May 11, 1780. She was
the largest American ship of the Revolution in actual service. There
survived the _Indian_, “rented” by Alexander Gillon, who had been
commissioned as commodore and sent abroad to raise some £71,000 with
which to build three frigates. The only result was the renting of the
_Indian_, which had been built by Congress in Holland, but which, to
prevent international complications, had been sold to the King of
France and by him given to the Chevalier Luxembourg. The _Indian_ was
renamed the _South Carolina_ and given an armament of twenty-eight
32’s and twelve 12’s, an unusually heavy battery. It was not until
August, 1781, that she got to sea, cruised for a time in the North
Sea, but arrived at Havana on January 12, 1782, with five valuable
prizes. She formed one of a combined American and Spanish expedition in
May to the Bahamas, which was successful. On May 28th she arrived at
Philadelphia, where an agent of Luxembourg caused the removal of Gillon
and the appointment of a Captain Joyner; she refitted and left for sea
in December. Scarcely outside the Capes of the Delaware, she was chased
by a British squadron and taken after a two hours’ fight. Luxembourg
demanded under the contract an indemnity of 300,000 livres (francs).
This Gillon denied, claiming his removal to be a breach of contract.
The claims were unsettled until December, 1874, when the state of South
Carolina paid $28,894 to the heirs of Luxembourg as a final settlement.
South Carolina is still prosecuting her claims against the United
States for a reimbursement of her expenditures for this ship.[3]

The efforts at a state navy of North Carolina, Georgia, and Rhode
Island were of too moderate a character to need much comment. That of
the first consisted of three brigantines in 1778 and the addition of a
small ship, the _Caswell_, in 1778. By June, 1779, all had disappeared
by sale or (in the case of the _Caswell_) by sinking at Ocracoke.
Georgia had but four galleys. But two sloops and two galleys were the
extent of Rhode Island’s navy, though it was this state, as mentioned,
which took the first steps toward naval defence.

Of vastly greater importance than the state navies were the privateers,
a service congenial to the New England seamen from every point of view.
There was “more money in it”; there was the absence of a strict and
irksome discipline, and the cruises were short. The great number of
privateers fitting out made it a matter of extreme difficulty to find
men for the ships of the regular service, which thus not infrequently
had to lie idle and unemployed. Had a tithe of the effort expended upon
privateers been expended upon the building and equipment of a navy,
it is not unfair to say that the general results would probably have
been much better. But privateering had already been a much-indulged-in
occupation. The Seven Years’ War had ended only in 1763, and during
this period many American privateers were afloat. The slave trade also
was a favorite New England occupation, and piracy itself at the period
was not altogether disreputable if applied only to those “natural
enemies,” the French and Spanish. Nearly all the officers of the new
Continental navy had their first war training in privateers, and very
frequently during the Revolution officers took a hand at privateering
in the moments of enforced leisure when there was no naval ship to
which they could be assigned.

Congress authorized privateering on March 23, 1776, and a list printed
by the Library of Congress shows the number and kind of vessels
furnished with letters of marque by the Continental Congress. This
gives a total of such of 1,697. Of these there were ships 301; brigs
and brigantines, 541; schooners and sloops, 751; boats and galleys,
104. These are accredited to the several states as follows: New
Hampshire, 43; Massachusetts, 626; Rhode Island, 15; Connecticut, 218;
New York, 1; New Jersey, 4; Pennsylvania, 500; Maryland, 225; Virginia,
64; South Carolina, 1. Distributed by years there were afloat in 1776,
34; 1777, 69; 1778, 129; 1779, 209; 1780, 301; 1781, 550; 1783, 22.
These altogether carried 14,872 guns and 58,400 men. It is, of course,
almost a certainty that many of these vessels were duplicated in this
list, but such duplication is more than offset by the issuance of
letters of marque by the several states and in France and the West
Indies which, according to an excellent authority, would carry the
number to over 2,000, with 18,000 guns and 70,000 men. “Judging from
the scanty information at hand concerning British privateering, it
is probable that their vessels engaged in this form of warfare were
considerably less numerous but decidedly superior in force to the
Americans; the latter seem to have carried on an average between
eight and nine guns and less than thirty-five men; the British about
seventeen guns and seventy-five or more men.”[4]

The value of the captures of the privateers was about $18,000,000;
that of the captures of the navy, which had thirty-one ships afloat in
1776, thirty-four in 1777, and but seven in 1782, was, proportioned
to the number of ships employed, much greater, being some $6,000,000.
Altogether (i. e., by both services) some 800 vessels were captured.
Our own losses were also very great, but not nearly so great as those
of Britain. About 16,000 prisoners were taken afloat, only 6,000 less
than those taken by the army.

By July, 1776, the British fleet in the vicinity of New York, where
the attack was about to take place on the American army assembled
on Long Island near Brooklyn, which resulted in our defeat and
the occupancy of New York for the remainder of the war, consisted
of nine ships of from 50 to 64 guns; three of 44; twenty-seven of
from 28 to 32; fourteen of 20; eleven of 14 to 18; sixteen of from
8 to 10--a total of eighty ships of war. This fleet was under the
command of Richard Viscount Howe, whose brother, General Howe, was
commander-in-chief of the army of 34,614 men, of whom 13,167 were of
the 29,867 Hessians hired for the war by Great Britain. These two
brothers were for some two years to conduct the British main operations
in America. One, the admiral, was an officer of great ability and
rose to high distinction; the General was handicapped by a slothful
and unenterprising disposition with a character marred by an extreme
looseness in moral conduct. His want of enterprise may have been due
in part to the attitude of the Whig party in England, to which he was
attached, and which was opposed in general to the use of force against
America. In any case, his qualities were such that they went a long way
toward the establishment of American independence.

In addition to Howe’s fleet there were, under Commodore Sir Peter
Parker, two 50-gun ships, four of 28, two of 20, and three of 8 guns.
These were to be employed against Charleston, South Carolina.

On Lake Champlain the British were to have during 1776 a ship of
eighteen 12-pounders, a schooner of fourteen 6-pounders; another of 12;
three “Radeaux” (flat-bottomed craft), one carrying six 24-pounders,
one six 12-pounders, and one two howitzers. There were also a gondola
(with oars) carrying seven 9-pounders, and twenty gunboats, each with a
brass field piece of from 24 to 9 pounds.

The naval force here mentioned was at times reinforced by accessions of
line-of-battle ships, as many as twenty-one being at times available.
The British, however, with an unwise conception of the true strategy
of the situation, were constantly diverting these to the West Indies,
which, during our Revolution, after war was declared by France and
Spain, was the great field of naval action. It is within bounds to
say that they lost the United States for the sake of the West India
Islands.



CHAPTER IV


It was not until February, 1776, that what may be termed a strictly
naval event took form in the sailing of the little fleet in command of
Commodore Esek Hopkins, under orders which were sufficiently explicit
in primary meaning, viz.: to proceed to Chesapeake Bay and destroy the
powerful flotilla which the royal governor of Virginia had gathered
together and with which he was harassing the Chesapeake shores. Hopkins
was then to proceed to the Carolinas and act in like manner against
the enemy’s forces, after which he was to go to Rhode Island. A final
phrase, however, left a loophole for other action: “if bad winds or
stormy weather” or any other accident should prevent, he was to use his
own judgment.

Hopkins flew his broad-pennant in the _Alfred_, in which also was then
hoisted by the hands of Lieutenant John Paul Jones a Continental flag
which bore a rattlesnake and a motto, “Don’t tread on me,” on a yellow
ground. The exact date of this incident is unknown. The other vessels
of the squadron were the ship _Columbus_, 20; the brig _Andrew Doria_,
14; brig _Cabot_, 14; brig _Providence_, 12; sloop _Hornet_, 10;
schooner _Wasp_, 8; schooner _Fly_, 8. The number of men was about 880.

Hopkins, instead of going to the Chesapeake, directed his course,
on the plea of bad weather, to New Providence in the Bahamas, where
there were considerable stores of powder and cannon of which the newly
formed Continental army was in utmost need. Though blamed later by
enemies, Hopkins took the wiser course. His advent there on March 3d
was a complete surprise: 250 men were landed and possession taken of
the little town and forts without resistance. Two weeks was spent in
getting aboard the guns, of which there were seventy-one, from 9 to 32
pounders. There were also fifteen brass mortars and twenty-four barrels
of powder. The governor, unfortunately, had succeeded in sending away
150 of the latter. The guns, however, were an extremely important
prize, and to carry these and other public property seized, a sloop was
impressed. Hopkins sailed north on March 17th, carrying the governor,
lieutenant-governor, and another official. By this time Newport,
Rhode Island, was occupied by a British force, and New London was
selected instead as a port of return. When off Block Island the British
man-of-war _Glasgow_, of 20 guns and 150 men, was sighted, and a
running action took place, in which the _Glasgow_, though much injured,
escaped into Newport. The explanation of the American commander was
that the firing must bring aid from Newport to the _Glasgow’s_ rescue,
and in fact two vessels in the harbor did get under way to go out. The
force in Newport, however, which was only the small frigate _Rose_, of
20 guns, the _Nautilus_ and _Swan_, of 16 each, and several tenders,
was no more than an equal match for our own. As far as one can read
into this event, there was not the energy shown by our people which
should have been. Giving up the action, the American squadron reached
New London with all its prize intact. The Commodore’s practical
disobedience of orders was fully condoned by Congress, and he received
a letter of congratulation from President John Hancock.

The British squadron, suffering a good deal from fire from batteries on
shore, had left Newport on April 5th, and Hopkins entered Narragansett
Bay, going to Providence on April 25th. So many of his men had sickened
on the cruise from the poor food, bad water, and want of general
hygiene aboard ship at that period, that he had landed 200 at New
London. He now found it impossible to get men. Some soldiers who had
been temporarily lent from the army were demanded back by Washington,
and there ensued a painful period for the unhappy Commodore. Great
complaints of ill-treatment went to Congress. Hopkins’ manners to his
officers were severely criticised, and the whole ended in an official
inquiry which included his disobedience of orders, his allowing the
_Glasgow_ to escape, and his inactivity since his return. He was not
entirely cleared on the first two charges, but the prevalent sickness
among his men and the impossibility of getting new crews on account
of the active fitting out of privateers were certainly sufficient to
exonerate him from the third. Notwithstanding, and although he was
energetically defended by John Adams, he received a formal censure
from Congress, but was allowed for the moment to retain his command.
In regard to the question of roughness toward his subordinates which
was involved in the charges, it must be considered that all officers
of the period had entered the Continental service from the rough life
of the merchantman of the time; many had served in privateers; the
officers of the British navy itself were themselves not altogether
lamblike, if we are to believe Smollet, who had personal experience as
a surgeon’s mate. It was in many ways a rough age afloat and ashore
and in every society, and such charges as were brought against Hopkins
cannot justly be judged from our present standpoint. Certainly John
Paul Jones, his first lieutenant, wrote him at this time a kindly
and sympathetic letter regarding this trial. Though Hopkins remained
yet some time in the service, it was not for long. His enemies, and
apparently they were not few, again brought charges against him. As a
result, Congress on March 26, 1777, resolved that he be suspended from
his command, and on January 2, 1778, he was dismissed from the service.
That the service suffered thereby can hardly be said, as he was now
sixty years old, an old age for that period, and was scarcely equal
to the exercise of vigorous command, but the fact remains that he met
unduly harsh treatment.

Hopkins’s squadron was now broken up, though the several ships had
remained under his general orders until his dismissal. They cruised
chiefly “down East” off New England and Nova Scotia, making a number
of prizes, one of which, the _Mellish_, taken by the _Alfred_,
now commanded by Jones, carried a cargo of soldiers’ clothing for
Burgoyne’s army of 13,000 men now in Canada, intended to proceed by
Lake Champlain to New York and thus occupy a line which would separate
New England entirely from the rest of the country.

A considerable fleet chiefly of gunboats had, as mentioned, been built
by the British for service on Lake Champlain. The offset to this, by
the building of a flotilla under Arnold, has also already been noted.
The building of this little fleet was to change history.

The British naval preparations were so delayed that it was not until
October, 1776 (on the 11th and 13th), that the two forces came
together, with the result, after a most gallant contest, of a defeat
to the Americans, who retreated up the lake, destroying all their
vessels but one galley, a sloop, and two small schooners, and the
galley _Washington_, which last was captured. The gallantry of the
American force is all the more to be commended as it was one gathered
from raw material, most of which was unaccustomed to work of the kind
it was called upon to do; the British, on the other hand, were all
men-of-war’s men “detached from his Majesty’s ships and vessels in the
river St. Lawrence to serve on Lake Champlain,” to the number of 670.

As the Americans were about 700, the forces were almost equal in
numbers. It was far otherwise in strength, the British in numbers
of vessels, in size, and in armament far outclassing the Americans.
They were in numbers 29 to 15, and the ship _Inflexible_ alone, which
carried eighteen 12-pounders, was able to look after a large proportion
of the American squadron. The American loss was over eighty; that of
the British did not exceed forty. The former had lost all, but to good
purpose, for this little fleet had delayed the advance southward of
Burgoyne’s army another year, thus giving time to prepare resistance,
and what perhaps was equally to the purpose, so far as the fortunes of
America were concerned, affording time to General Howe to carry out, in
July, 1777, his views as to the necessity of occupying Philadelphia;
for had Burgoyne, as proposed, started from Canada in the summer of
1776, Howe, with his whole large army would have been at New York
within easy support of this movement of so vital moment to the British.
As it was, in 1777, the forces were widely separated, and Burgoyne,
instead of being aided as he had expected, went to his destruction.
Thus “Never,” says Clowes in the great history of “The Royal Navy,”
speaking of this action, “had any force, big or small, lived to better
purpose or died more gloriously.” “That the war spread from America
to Europe, from the English Channel to the Baltic, from the Bay of
Biscay to the Mediterranean, from the West Indies to the Mississippi,
and ultimately involved the remote waters of Hindostan, is traceable,
through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla which in 1776 anticipated its
enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain.”

It was as just mentioned when Burgoyne most needed support in his
advance south the next year (1777) that, Sir William Howe (the British
commander-in-chief in America) embarked 14,000 men, and escorted by
the fleet under command of his brother, Lord Howe, sailed from Sandy
Hook, the expedition numbering 280 ships, including the transports and
men-of-war. Eight thousand men were left at New York under Sir Henry
Clinton. Howe’s objective was Philadelphia. His first intention was to
go up the Delaware, but obstructions in the river being reported by
one of the naval captains, he changed to the very roundabout way of
the Chesapeake Bay. He was not able to land his troops at the head of
the bay until August 25th. He defeated Washington at the battle of the
Brandywine on September 11th, and on the 26th occupied Philadelphia.

The General’s brother, Lord Howe, in command of the fleet, was a good
month returning from the head of the Chesapeake round to and up the
Delaware as far as Chester, where he arrived on October 6th, so slow
and uncertain were the movements of sailing ships in those days. A
small squadron had been sent in advance to clear the channel. This move
on the part of the British to occupy the river was necessary to keep up
the supplies of their army. In this fleet there were eleven vessels,
two of which were 64’s, one 50, and three frigates of 28 to 44 guns.
The total of their armament was 364 guns, 74 of which were 24-pounders,
with somewhat over 2,000 men. To resist this powerful force there were
in the river the new Continental frigate _Delaware_, of twenty-four
12-pounders; the brig _Andrew Doria_, of fourteen 6-pounders; and the
sloop _Hornet_, with twelve 9-pounders; besides six smaller vessels
carrying from four to ten 9-pounders, and twelve galleys with one gun
each, of 18, 24, or 32 pounds. These were assisted by the whole of
the Pennsylvania navy, which consisted of the ship _Montgomery_, of
fourteen 14-pounders, and thirty-eight small craft carrying fifty-one
guns varying from 4 to 18 pounders. The total armament was 175 guns.
The combined Continental and state fleets were under the command
of Commodore John Hazelwood of the latter. To support these there
were Fort Mifflin on an island, with also two small batteries on the
mainland, just below the mouth of the Schuylkill and two miles from
League Island on the Pennsylvania side, and opposite, on the New Jersey
shore, at Red Bank, Fort Mercer; a battery opposite Hog Island, and
three and a half miles below this, another. Obstructions of heavy
timbers, shod at their points with iron, were placed opposite this last
battery and in the channel near Fort Mifflin.

The Delaware River has a somewhat tortuous, and in places a narrow,
channel. Its defensive advantages are thus very strong, and the
Americans had a fair chance of success. The most powerful of the naval
defence was lost in the beginning by the grounding of the _Delaware_
near a British battery on the city front.

Notwithstanding, the Americans made a fine defence of more than six
weeks. It was not until November 10th that the British succeeded in
clearing the river to Philadelphia and then with heavy loss in men and
in ships, two of which, a ship-of-the-line and a sloop-of-war, were
burned. Later, in May, 1778, they invaded the river above Philadelphia.
The frigates _Washington_ and _Effingham_, nearly ready for sea, had to
be burned, and besides these a ship of 18 guns, and brigs, schooners,
and small craft, some fifty-four in all, destroyed; a sad ending to a
long and gallant struggle.

It was in the Delaware that in December, 1777, David Bushnell made a
second trial of his torpedoes (the first having been in the Hudson).
He used kegs of powder fitted with a detonating fuse, which should
have succeeded. No damage was done through, as Bushnell claims, bad
management. The British fleet was alarmed enough, however, to justify
Francis Hopkinson, one of the signers of American Independence, in
producing the well-known poem of the “Battle of the Kegs,” once a
favorite with our fathers.

The _Randolph_, _Hancock_, _Raleigh_, and _Boston_ were the only
frigates at sea in this year. The _Hancock_, Captain Manley, was
captured July 7th, on this her first cruise, by a British forty-four;
the _Raleigh_, under Captain John Barry, during an action with two
British ships, one of which was of 50 guns, ran on a rocky islet near
Penobscot Bay, September 27, 1778. Her crew escaped ashore, but the
ship, though an effort had been made to burn her, was hauled off by the
British. Both the captured ships were taken into the British service.
The _Randolph_, which had been one of the earliest of the new frigates
to get to sea, had, in the period of her sea service, been actively
cruising in our southern waters under the command of Captain Biddle,
and was ordered to France in October, 1777. She remained there but a
short time owing to the protests of the British ambassador against our
ships remaining in French ports, and returned to Charleston, whence she
had sailed. Here a squadron was organized with four other small vessels
of the South Carolina navy, which went to sea February 12, 1778, and
cruised in the vicinity of the Windward Islands. On March 7th was met
the _Yarmouth_, 64. Biddle gallantly engaged the ship twice his force,
but the _Randolph_ after an action of about fifteen minutes blew up.
Only four men were saved, and these were picked up five days after the
explosion, on a piece of wreckage, by the _Yarmouth_, which meanwhile
had been actively cruising. The incident is certainly among the most
extraordinary of happenings even on the sea, so prolific in adventures.
Three hundred and eleven men were lost besides officers. The loss of
Captain Biddle, one of the most promising of our sea officers, was
specially deplored.



CHAPTER V


Silas Deane had been the first American agent abroad, reaching Europe
in July, 1776. Franklin and Arthur Lee arrived in France in December
of that year, the former in the brig _Reprisal_, which was the first
American man-of-war to visit the eastern hemisphere. Seldom has there
been a ship whose safety meant so much; for upon Franklin’s great
social and political influence was to depend the aid of France, and
upon this aid, American independence. The _Reprisal_ had taken several
prizes which she had carried into Nantes, and the reception of these
and the many to come later into French and Spanish ports caused strong
protests from England to which these governments had to give heed. The
commissioners were to purchase or hire eight line-of-battle ships as
well as a frigate and two cutters, but their endeavors fell far short
of such a program. Nevertheless, all things considered, aid in money,
and particularly in much needed army stores, was forthcoming to a
surprising degree, and the name of Beaumarchais in France and that of
Gardoqui in Spain, who acted at Bilbao as Beaumarchais’s agent, deserve
lasting remembrance by Americans. In 1778 Deane was replaced by John
Adams, who, accompanied by his son, John Quincy, then eleven years
old, sailed from Boston on February 15th in the frigate _Boston_, and
reached Bordeaux on April 1st. Naval interests, after Deane’s recall,
were taken over chiefly by Franklin.

The war had lasted three years, but now in this year of 1778 it was
to take a new development. The immediate cause was the surrender of
Burgoyne at Saratoga on October 17, 1777. The chain of causes was,
as already mentioned, the resistance offered on Lake Champlain the
previous year (1776) by the flotilla under Arnold, the transfer of the
main part of the British force from New York to Philadelphia when it
should have been employed to support Burgoyne, and the too leisurely
movement of Clinton up the Hudson with a large portion of the 8,000
men left at New York. Clinton captured the forts at the Highlands, but
he was too late to save Burgoyne, who surrendered the day after the
British army burned Kingston. The surrender was a fitting nemesis
for such an act. A greater strategic failure than was this campaign
on the part of the British is not recorded in history, nor has there
ever been one with more momentous consequences. It convinced the French
Government, smarting under its loss of Canada in the treaty of 1763,
that there was now a fair chance of American success, and on February
6, 1778, was signed the treaty of alliance which brought the ships
the aid of which was so vital to our success. Two months later, April
13, 1778, Vice-Admiral Charles Henri Theodat d’Estaing du Saillans,
generally known to us as the Count d’Estaing, sailed from Toulon with
twelve battleships and five frigates. Two of these ships were of 80
guns, six of 74, three of 64, and one of 50. The naval story of our
Revolution, though its greatest exploits in the cruise of Paul Jones
and the capture of the _Serapis_ were yet to come, must, henceforward,
be largely of French ships.

The French commander had one of the greatest chances in history. The
British fleet was in the Delaware awaiting the preparation of the
British army to return to New York from Philadelphia. Howe had but six
64’s, three 50’s, and six frigates. They had been a sure prey to the
French had there been in command a man of greater energy. But d’Estaing
had been transferred at the mature age of thirty-five from the army
to the navy, the profession of all others which requires a life-long
familiarity, and where the rigidity and formality of the army school of
the period were wholly out of place. There have been rare exceptions
to the general rule, Blake being a notable example, but d’Estaing was
not one of these. He was, says a French writer, “detested from the
first--the word is not too strong--by most of his officers.”[5]

Whether through bad luck or want of energy, he was more than a month
(thirty-three days) in even reaching the Straits of Gibraltar, 700
miles from Toulon, thus making an average of but twenty-one miles a day.

A British frigate was noted by the French in passing Gibraltar, which
“tranquilly and comfortably watched the French fleet defile by in
three columns.” But this same ship followed for ninety leagues into
the Atlantic, to make sure of the French course, and then hastened to
England. It arrived there on June 5th, fifty-three days after d’Estaing
had left Toulon and twenty after he had passed the Straits. This
knowledge, however, was not necessary to British action. A force equal
to d’Estaing’s and to be commanded by Vice-Admiral Byron had already
been in preparation, though it had been hampered as much by poor
dockyard administration and want of men as was d’Estaing by his own
want of push.

It was not until July 7, 1778, that the French fleet anchored at the
Capes of the Delaware. But the quarry had gotten away. The British army
had left Philadelphia on June 18th on its march to Sandy Hook. The
scores of transports carrying the army baggage and stores had started
down the Delaware next day. They did not get clear of the Capes until
June 28th, and, convoyed by the men-of-war, reached inside of Sandy
Hook on June 30th. Never was greater opportunity lost. A little earlier
and with Howe’s fleet captured, the fall of New York, practically
undefended, was a certainty. But for d’Estaing’s want of push the war
would have ended in 1778 instead of five years later.

Howe had heard of d’Estaing’s approach. He made admirable preparations
to resist the entry of New York Bay. D’Estaing arrived off Sandy
Hook, but though offering the large sum of 150,000 francs, pilots
were unobtainable, probably by reason of fearing the vengeance of
the British if they should be taken. On July 22d there was a fresh
northeast wind and a spring (a highest) tide. There was ample water for
any ship of his fleet, but d’Estaing and his officers were unacquainted
with the region and did not dare to venture. “At eight o’clock,” wrote
an eyewitness in the British fleet, “d’Estaing, with all his squadron,
appeared under way. He kept working to windward as if to gain a proper
position for crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The
wind ... blew from the exact point from which he could attack us to
the greatest advantage. The spring tides were at the highest.... We
consequently expected the hottest fray that had been fought between
the two nations. On our side all was at stake. Had the men-of-war
been defeated, the fleet of transports and victualers must have been
destroyed, and the army of course fallen with us. D’Estaing, however,
had not spirit equal to the risk; at three o’clock we saw him bear off
to the southward, and in a few hours he was out of sight.”[6]

Naturally Washington’s disappointment over d’Estaing’s failure was
great. The great prize had been lost. He had, however, arranged with
d’Estaing that should the latter not attack New York, he would go to
Newport, Rhode Island, and assist General John Sullivan in attacking
the British force of some 6,000, which, supported by six ships-of-war,
held Newport.

D’Estaing anchored off Newport (outside the bay) on July 29, 1778. The
next day Suffren, with two ships-of-the-line, went into the channel
west of Conanicut Island, and two frigates and a sloop-of-war entered
Sakonnet; whereupon the British burned the _Kingfisher_, of 16 guns,
and some galleys stationed there. The British general, Sir Robert
Pigot, withdrew 1,500 Hessians from Conanicut and concentrated his
forces about the town. Goat Island, where is now the United States
Torpedo Station and where for many years was a fort, was also occupied,
as this commanded the main channel and the entrances to the inner
harbor. On August 5th Suffren with his two ships went into the main
channel near the north end of Conanicut, two others taking his former
place. Captain John Brisbane, the senior British naval officer, now
destroyed four frigates, the _Flora_, _Juno_, _Lark_, and _Orpheus_, of
32 guns each, and the corvette _Falcon_, of 16 guns, two being sunk at
the south end of Goat Island. Five transports were sunk between Goat
and Coasters’ Harbor Island, thus closing both entrances to the inner
harbor. The guns, ammunition, and the thousand or so men of their crews
went to strengthen the forces of the batteries.

It was not until August 8th that d’Estaing with the eight remaining
ships-of-the-line ran the batteries and anchored between Coasters’
Harbor Island and Conanicut. He was now joined by the others except
one which remained as a lookout in the West Channel. The long delay of
ten days from the time of arrival had been at Sullivan’s request, who
was not yet ready. Two thousand men had been sent by Washington under
Lafayette, but the expected militia were slow to come in. Things now
looked very black for the British, but the delay had been fatal.

D’Estaing on August 9th landed on Conanicut such of his thousand
soldiers in the fleet as were fit for duty and some two thousand
seamen, in readiness for the morrow’s attack as arranged. Scarcely were
these landed when the lifting of the fog revealed the English fleet at
anchor off Point Judith, seven miles southwest of Narragansett Bay.
Though there were some thirty ships, there were but one 74, six 64’s,
and five 50’s, a force wholly inadequate to meet d’Estaing’s. Howe,
thus inferior, could not have ventured into the bay, but his presence
caused d’Estaing to lose his judgment. The latter had begun to get
his ships into position for defence, in the prevailing calm, but next
morning when the wind came out from the northeast, fair for leaving
port, but making it impossible for Howe to come in even had his force
allowed, d’Estaing in over haste cut his hemp cables and went to sea.
Howe, unable to meet him, did the same, and now the day and part of
the next were spent in maneuvering for position in face of a rising
storm. The wind had gradually increased and finally blew with such
force as to make action impossible. Next day (August 12th) it developed
into an “August storm,” a West India hurricane, which had taken its
usual course up our coast, scattering both fleets and inflicting heavy
damage, particularly upon the French, whose flagship, the _Languedoc_,
completely dismasted and with tiller broken, came near being taken on
the 13th by a much weaker but wholly manageable British 50-gun ship,
the _Renown_. Only night saved her. D’Estaing, with several ships
under jury masts, anchored east of Cape May and gradually collected
his damaged fleet. He was seen here by Howe, who had now but two of
his ships in company. By August 20th d’Estaing was again off Newport,
but only to hold a council of war at which were present Sullivan and
Lafayette. D’Estaing was willing to remain two days if the American
officers would guarantee the surrender of Newport in that time. This
they could not do, and the fleet left for Boston, which was mentioned
in the admiral’s orders as the place in which he was to refit in case
of need. It is of no use to dwell upon the bitter feeling aroused among
the Americans, who felt that the British army at Newport was, with the
aid of the fleet, in their power. In all fairness, however, the failure
was really due to Sullivan’s own delay, which changed completely naval
conditions. The siege was raised; the great effort had gone for nothing
but the destruction of a few unimportant British ships. The British
fleet, now heavily reinforced by the thirteen powerful ships under
Byron which had left England in June, had command of the sea.

D’Estaing spent two months refitting at Boston, and then following the
letter of his orders, left on November 4, 1778, for the West Indies,
where he was much more fortunate, but where we cannot follow him. His
departure left our coast open to invasion at every point, and thus
Savannah was occupied in December by a strong British force; it was the
beginning of the Southern invasion which was to cost us dear.

Pressed by our people, d’Estaing in the summer of 1779, though he had
received orders to return with his own particular squadron to France,
determined to attempt to dislodge the British at Savannah. He thus left
Santo Domingo with twenty ships-of-the-line and seven frigates, and
anchored, on August 31, 1779, off Tybee at the mouth of the Savannah
River, on which, eighteen miles from the sea, is Savannah, then but a
small village. Troops were landed by the French, an attack made, and
an expedition, expected to be completed in eight days, extended to
two months. It ended in disaster; gale after gale crippled the French
fleet here on an unprotected coast, until on October 28th it was wholly
dispersed. The flagship was driven to sea with the loss of both her
only remaining anchors, and it was not until well into December that
the main portions came together again in the West Indies. D’Estaing
himself, however, was driven so far to sea that he determined to return
alone to France. This he did, fortunately meeting the _Provence_ which
gave him an anchor, and reached Brest on December 7, 1779.

He returned, having accomplished nothing in aid of the United States
itself, however fortunate in the West Indies. He was severely judged by
naval officers of his service. One, however, need not go to the extent
of Captain La Clocheterie, whom the Vicomte de Charlus (who kept a
journal when crossing the Atlantic with Rochambeau’s expedition next
year) reports as saying: “He was a coward and a man of no talent.” His
failure is found rather in the _mot_ of a really great French sailor,
Suffren: “If he had only been as much of a seaman as he was brave----”

The whole conduct of d’Estaing’s campaign illustrates what superior
strength at sea might accomplish but, in this case, did not. If he had,
in going to America, pressed westward, even to the extent of towing
his slow sailers, he would have made one of the great successes of
history, and have ended the war in America. Failing this, he could,
at once on his arrival, have forced the surrender of Newport, upon
which he had but to close his hand and the place, with its 7,000
soldiers and sailors, and the bay would have been in possession of the
allies. His fault, militarily considered, was in acceding to Sullivan’s
request for delay. Reading into the psychics of the question, this
request had its basis in Sullivan’s desire to make as good a showing
as possible in the combined operations, and not from actual necessity,
as the powerful French fleet in itself commanded the situation, and
d’Estaing’s compliance came from a natural desire to meet the wishes of
the American commander. But on neither side was it war. His leaving the
bay at the crisis of events was an unfortunate want of judgment. His
later action was but part of the ill-judged strategy of the time which
ended in the fall of Charleston and the British occupancy of the whole
South, its wholesale devastation and well-nigh subjugation.

But neither side, British nor French, could understand how completely
the whole was a question of naval domination. Washington saw, but he
was powerless to do more than proclaim again and again the truth, until
finally in 1781 he was listened to, the result of which was one of the
decisive triumphs of all time.



CHAPTER VI


The new treaty with France was to bring into special prominence one
of the most remarkable characters of his time, John Paul Jones. On
October 10, 1776, he had been made the eighteenth captain on a list of
twenty-four then established. He considered himself ill-treated, and
justly so, as having been first on the list of lieutenants he should
have been placed higher. His animadversions on the subject, in a letter
to Robert Morris, are worth quoting. It showed along with some very
just criticisms that he had a high and fitting estimate of his duties
as a sea officer, and of the demands of his calling. He said:

  “I cannot but lament that so little delicacy hath been observed in
  the appointment and promotion of officers in the sea service, many
  of whom are not only grossly illiterate, but want even the capacity
  of commanding merchant vessels. I was lately on a court-martial
  where a captain of marines made his mark and where the president
  could not read the oath which he attempted to administer without
  spelling and making blunders. As the sea officers are so subject to
  be seen by foreigners, what conclusions must they draw of Americans
  in general, from characters so rude and contracted? In my judgment
  the abilities of sea officers ought to be as far superior to the
  abilities of officers in the army as the nature of a sea service is
  more complicated and admits of a greater number of cases than can
  possibly happen on the land; therefore the discipline by sea ought
  to be the more perfect and regular, were it compatible with short
  enlistments.”[7]

On June 14, 1777, Jones was assigned to the command of the little
cruiser _Ranger_, just completed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On the
same day Congress established the Stars and Stripes as the national
flag, and it is said, and is probable, that Jones was the first to
hoist this flag on a man-of-war. His ship was but 116 feet overall and
28 feet broad. She mounted eighteen 6-pounders.

The delay in fitting out is not to the credit of the energy of those
charged with providing the ship’s equipment. The sails were not ready
until late in October. With a crew of about one hundred and forty,
“nearly all full-blooded Yankees,” she sailed on November 1st, for
France, carrying dispatches from Congress and taking two prizes on the
way. Jones arrived at Nantes on December 2, 1777.

He had a long wait in France before he again got to sea, but his
frequent consultations with our commissioners, his always excellent
advice in naval matters, and his general activity were worth the delay.
It was not until April 10th that he got to sea, starting on his famous
cruise in the Irish Sea during which he took a number of prizes, among
them the _Drake_, a sloop-of-war carrying twenty 6-pounders. He landed
at Whitehaven, Scotland, and burned a ship, one of many which he had
hoped to destroy in this port, and made the famous descent upon Lord
Selkirk’s estate, where his men carried off the family silver. But
Jones had a mutinous crew, thirsting for booty, and his concession of
plunder was a case of _force majeure_. He later redeemed the silver,
giving to the crew several hundred pounds as its valuation as prize,
and returned it to the family. Jones had had much difficulty with
both officers and crew, partially no doubt through his own roughness
(mentioned in Fanning’s narrative) toward the former, and particularly
through the peculiar ideas of liberty prevalent, which sometimes went
so far as to claim that the movements of the ship should be put to a
vote.

Jones having arrived at Brest in May, 1778, with his prize, the
_Drake_, sought a larger command. He had to wait a year for it.
After many strivings, one was found in the _Duc de Duras_, a
fourteen-year-old East Indiaman, which was bought, fitted as a
man-of-war, and renamed the _Bonhomme Richard_ in compliment to
Franklin as being the nearest approach in French to the “Poor Richard”
of the famous almanac. The ship was far from meeting requirements,
being slow and weakly built, so that she finally carried twenty-eight
12 and 9 pounders instead of 18’s on the gun deck, eight 6’s on the
forecastle, and on the after part of the lower deck six 18’s, forty-two
guns in all. She was provided with a mixed crew of Americans, French,
English, a few Scandinavians, and eighty-three Irish and Scotch, Jones
himself being of the latter by birth. Of the first there were in
the beginning but seventy-nine, chiefly exchanged prisoners. Later,
owing to mutinous conduct of the British element, many of these were
discharged and replaced by forty-three newly arrived Americans just
released from prison, and thirty Portuguese. The total was 227 officers
and seamen, besides 130 French soldiers placed aboard to serve as
marines.

Jones’s ideas were large: they included the fitting out of a large
French squadron to act in concert and carrying a considerable number of
troops to make an attack upon the English coast. This, however, fell
through, and a squadron was organized of the _Bonhomme Richard_, 42;
the _Alliance_, 32; the _Pallas_, 32; the _Cerf_, cutter, 18, and the
_Vengeance_, brigantine, of 12 guns.

The _Alliance_ had arrived at Brest, twenty-three days from Boston,
carrying Lafayette, on February 6, 1779. She had an unreliable crew,
with many English and Irish, and a still more unreliable captain,
Landais, who had been an officer in the French navy. He had been
appointed a captain in the American service on the recommendation of
Silas Deane, who seemed to have a faculty for making errors of the
kind. Landais was to give much and continuous trouble.

The squadron did not finally get off until August 14, 1779. Its orders,
prepared by Franklin, with the advice of Sartine, the French Minister
of Marine, were to cruise to the north of the British islands and after
six weeks to go into the Texel, Holland. There were varying incidents
of capture of prizes, designs to attack Leith, insubordinations of the
French captains, etc., but on September 23d, when a convoy of forty
vessels accompanied by two men-of-war was discovered off Flamborough
Head, a prominent point a few miles south of Scarborough, England,
Jones’s moment had come.

It was not until seven o’clock in the evening that the _Bonhomme
Richard_ came within gunshot of the larger ship which turned out to be
the _Serapis_, Captain Richard Pearson, of 50 guns, 18 of which were
18-pounders. She carried 320 men. There then ensued the most remarkable
duel in naval history. Jones was left unsupported by his accompanying
subordinates, and he went into action short sixteen of his best men
and a lieutenant, Lunt, who had been sent to secure a prize. The story
of this remarkable battle must of necessity here be short; the full
details must be sought elsewhere. But short as it must be, there is
enough of it, however baldly told, to stir the blood.

Jones closed with his antagonist early in the action, and as they
came in contact the two ships were lashed together by Jones, the
stern of the _Serapis_ being at the bow of the _Bonhomme Richard_.
The latter’s main deck battery of 12-pounders was silenced, two of
the old six 18-pounders on the lower deck had burst, killing nearly
all the guns’ crews. Only three 9-pounders on the quarter deck could
be used, and one of these had to be shifted from the off side. The
guns of the _Serapis_ were still active, but her upper deck had been
cleared by the musketry fire from the tops of the _Bonhomme Richard_.
The latter’s prisoners (some 200) were released without orders, and in
their fright that the ship was sinking, willingly worked the pumps;
both ships were frequently afire. The men in the _Bonhomme Richard’s_
tops crawled along the yards into the tops of the _Serapis_ and dropped
hand grenades whenever any one appeared on deck; these grenades, at
times going down the hatches and exploding on the lower deck, finally
brought about an explosion of cartridges below which ran from gun to
gun. This went far toward determining the battle. Meantime the erratic
Landais fired three broad-sides, chiefly to the damage of the _Bonhomme
Richard_, as the shot holes were found in the latter’s unengaged side.
There can be little question that he hoped this ship would surrender
when, with his own unharmed, he would capture both. Jones’s doggedness
won the day: at half-past ten Captain Pearson, influenced no doubt
somewhat by the presence of the _Alliance_, surrendered. He stated
that an incomplete list of his killed and wounded were forty-nine of
the former and sixty-eight of the latter, or more than a third of the
whole 320. Jones estimated his loss at about 150, without stating the
proportions.

While this action was going on, the _Pallas_, 30, Captain Cottineau,
had engaged and taken the _Countess of Scarborough_, of 20 guns. The
Baltic fleet under convoy was not attacked, as it should have been by
the _Alliance_ or the _Vengeance_, a curious instance of inertia and
incapacity or worse, so long as neither chose to take part in the main
action.

Both the _Serapis_ and _Bonhomme Richard_ were terribly mauled. The
latter’s rudder, stern frame, and transoms were cut away, and the sides
between the ports were at points driven in. It was ten next morning
before the fires could be extinguished. On examination it was decided
that it would be impossible to keep the ship afloat if rough weather
should come on (which in fact was the case), and during the night and
next morning the wounded were removed. The men who had been brought
from the _Pallas_ to work the pumps were taken off the evening of the
25th (two days after the battle). Says Jones:

  “They did not abandon her until after nine o’clock; the water
  was then up to the lower deck, and a little after ten I saw with
  unexpressible grief the last of the _Bonhomme Richard_. No lives
  were lost with the ship, but it was impossible to save the stores of
  any sort whatever. I lost even the best part of my clothes, books
  and papers; and several of my officers lost all their clothes and
  effects.”

The masts of the _Serapis_ fell soon after the surrender, and jury
masts were rigged from spars furnished by the _Alliance_, all the
spare spars of the _Serapis_ being too badly cut by shot. On September
26th she was able to steer for Holland in company with the rest of the
squadron, and on October 3d entered the Texel after some demur on the
part of the Dutch. Though Jones’s instructions gave the Texel as the
port to be made at the end of his six weeks’ cruise, his own wish
was to go into Dunkirk and thus be under the shelter of an ally. The
other captains adhered to the letter of the instructions, and Jones
felt obliged to yield. Much trouble would have been saved had his
views prevailed. As an offset, however, to such disabilities as arose
from the inability of Jones to dispose of the _Serapis_, the anger of
the British Government against the Dutch as to the reception of the
squadron in Dutch waters went far to bringing later the declaration
of war by England against Holland. Jones was allowed to land his sick
and wounded, who were cared for on an island in the bay, as were the
prisoners, numbering 537, sufficient to release by exchange all the
American seamen who were prisoners in England.

For Jones’s further history, his having to put all his ships but the
_Alliance_ under the French flag to avoid the difficulties raised by
Great Britain with Holland; his going in the _Alliance_ to Lorient,
France; the arrival there and sale of the _Serapis_; the charges
against Landais; his short cruise in the _Alliance_; his unjust
treatment by Arthur Lee, by which Landais regained command of the
_Alliance_; Lee’s embarkation in the _Alliance_ for America and the
necessity during the voyage of depriving Landais of the command on
account of evident insanity; the dismissal of Landais from the service;
Jones’s arrival in command of the _Ariel_ at Philadelphia, February
18, 1781, after more than three years’ absence, and his reception of
the thanks of Congress; his appointment to the command of the new
line-of-battle ship _America_ which he lost through its presentation to
France; his return to Europe, and the rest of his adventurous career
must be read in the many books devoted to the history of his life, not
the least interesting part of which is to be found in Fanning’s graphic
narrative. He will always stand out boldly as one of the most fearless
spirits of the sea, and had he lived in the Napoleonic epoch he would
have been met by Napoleon as a kindred soul who might have saved him
the great misfortune of Trafalgar, which so changed the history of
Europe and the world.



CHAPTER VII


The activity of American privateers as well as Continental ships in
British waters during 1777-1779 was very great, that of the _Reprisal_,
_Lexington_, _Dolphin_, and _Revenge_ (the first two, Continental
brigs) being particularly notable.

France was at this period (1777) made a basis for the fitting out of
Continental vessels and privateers, and for the supply of men in a way
which would be far from possible to-day. Captain Lambert Wickes of the
Continental brig _Reprisal_ and Gustavus Conyngham of the Continental
lugger _Surprise_ and cutter _Revenge_, both of which latter were
bought and fitted out by our commissioners in France, were two of those
most active and prominent in the operations on the British coast. Their
names have come down to this day as specially brave and adventurous
men. The former had cruised very successfully on our own coast and
in the West Indies in 1776, and had been the first, as mentioned, to
carry a ship of the regular navy to Europe, December, 1776, though
privateers had preceded him. Two prizes taken into Nantes caused strong
protests from Great Britain. The treaty of Utrecht, 1713, expressly
closed the ports of either power to the enemies of the other, so that
the British case had a very sound basis. Vergennes unquestionably,
before our alliance, had to hold a course favoring the Americans which
was full of difficulties. The details of the diplomacy of the moment
cannot be entered upon. Suffice that the _Reprisal_ refitted went to
sea early in 1777, and brought in five prizes to add to Vergennes’s
difficulties. The British Ambassador, Stormont, demanded their release.
He was answered that both captor and captured had been ordered to leave
port and were probably already at sea, to which Stormont was later able
to make reply that the _Reprisal_ was undergoing repairs at Lorient,
and that the five prizes had been sold. The questions were bandied to
and fro between the American commissioners, the French Minister, and
the British Ambassador, with the result that the _Reprisal_ received
orders not to cruise near the French coast, but apparently the prizes
remained in the hands of the purchasers. On May 28th Wickes sailed in
the _Reprisal_ from St. Nazaire with the Continental brig _Lexington_,
Captain Henry Johnson, and the cutter _Dolphin_, Captain Nicholson, all
under Wickes as senior officer, for a cruise through the Irish Channel.
They were back in St. Malo on June 27th, having captured twenty prizes,
of which three were released and seven sunk. In July the commissioners
were obliged to give orders that the _Reprisal_ and _Lexington_ should
return directly to America, for which the _Dolphin_ had already sailed
as a packet, and to cruise no longer in Europe. They left in September;
when only two days out the _Lexington_ was captured. The _Reprisal_ was
lost on the Newfoundland Banks, but one man being saved. The loss of
her enterprising captain was keenly felt and deplored.

Gustavus Conyngham had been selected to command the lugger _Surprise_
fitting at Dunkirk, and was given one of the commissions, of which
a number had been sent out in blank signed by Hancock, President of
Congress, and dated March 1, 1777. He got to sea by May and, returning
almost at once with two prizes, was, on the demand of the British
Ambassador, with most of his crew, put in prison. His vessel was
seized and the prizes released. His commission was taken from him
and not returned. Released, he was at once put in command of a newly
purchased cutter, the _Revenge_, with a crew of 106 men. He was given
a new commission which was dated May 2, 1777. He cruised off the coast
of Spain with remarkable success and then went to the West Indies. He
was reported to have captured, by the time of his arrival there, sixty
vessels, twenty-seven of which had been sent into port and thirty-three
sunk or burned. After cruising successfully in the West Indies he
arrived at Philadelphia on February 21, 1779. The _Revenge_ was sold,
but the purchaser fitted her out as a privateer with Conyngham in
command, using his Continental commission, dated May 2, 1777; this
nearly caused Conyngham to lose his life, for he was captured by a
British frigate in April, taken to New York, confined in irons, and was
sent to England under an accusation of piracy in that his cruise and
captures in the _Revenge_ early in 1777 had been before the date of
this commission. In November, 1779, he escaped from Mill prison, where
he had been confined. His active career, however, was ended.[8]

In 1779 occurred one of the great naval disasters of the war. Some 800
British troops convoyed by ships-of-war had in June taken possession
of Penobscot Bay to establish there some of the many loyalists who had
gone to Halifax, their chief refuge during the war. Maine was then a
part of Massachusetts, and it was this state which took on the burden
of dislodging the enemy. The Navy Board at Boston lent the _Warren_,
32; the _Providence_ (sloop), 14; and the _Diligent_, 12. These and
three state brigantines, of 14 or 16 guns each, and thirteen privateers
(insured by the state) made up the naval part. In all they mounted 324
guns and were manned by over 2,000 men. Captain Dudley Saltonstall was
in chief command. There were about 1,000 militia commanded by General
Solomon Lovell. This carefully prepared effort was a complete failure
through the incompetency and want of push of Saltonstall. Arriving in
the bay on July 25, 1779, the attack on three British vessels present
and on the fort which was now ready was so dilatory and ineffective
that at length, on August 13th, a British fleet which had had time
to come from New York appeared and drove the American vessels up the
river, where all except two, which were captured, were burned. The
American loss was 474 men. The remainder had to find their way back
with great hardship through the Maine woods. This humiliating affair
cost Massachusetts a debt estimated at $7,000,000.

The year 1779, however, had been the most brilliant of the war for
the small American navy. The exploits of John Paul Jones, of Gustavus
Conyngham and Lambert Wickes in European waters made an undying page
of history; nor should those of our small frigates, the _Queen of
France_, _Deane_ (later the _Hague_), _Warren_, _Boston_, and _Ranger_
on our own coasts as well as of the swarms of privateers in this year
(289 of which were commissioned by Congress alone) and whose sweeping
captures of the enemy’s commerce went so far to supply the needs of our
ever-dwindling army, be forgotten.

       *       *       *       *       *

American affairs were now (at the beginning of 1780) at their lowest
ebb. The struggle had lasted nearly five years. It was with difficulty
that an army, nominally of 6,000 men, could be kept together. The men
were “half-starved, imperfectly clothed, riotous, and robbing the
country people ... from sheer necessity. Desertion was continual, from
one to two hundred men a month going over to the enemy.... Only a
miracle, thought Washington, could keep America from the humiliation
of seeing her cause upheld solely by foreign arms. Throughout the land
there was a weariness of war, a desire for peace at any price.”[9]

At least a third of our population is estimated to have been
loyalist, and another third lukewarm. At several periods there were
more loyalists in the British service than in our own. Nor was this
situation wholly confined to the army, for in 1779 there were fitted
out at New York one hundred and twenty-one privateers in British
employ, thirty-four of which carried from twenty to thirty-six guns.
The whole were manned by between 9,000 and 10,000 men.

The navy was reduced almost as much as the army. The _Boston_,
_Providence_, _Ranger_, and _Queen of France_ had arrived at Charleston
on December 23, 1779. The first three fell into the hands of the enemy
on the surrender of Charleston on May 11, 1780, and became part of the
British navy, the fourth along with the South Carolina ships _Bricole_,
44; the _Truite_, 26; _General Moultrie_, 20, and _Notre Dame_, 16,
had been sunk in the river, as also two small French ships-of-war
_L’Aventure_ and _Polacre_. There thus remained in the latter part of
1780 but one of the original thirteen frigates, the _Trumbull_, which
with the _Dean_, _Confederacy_, _Alliance_, and _Saratoga_ (the last
a sloop-of-war), formed in this year the entire Continental navy in
service. The _Deane_ (renamed the _Hague_) and the _Alliance_ were the
only two of these to survive the year.



CHAPTER VIII


The now unopposed command of the sea by the British navy and the
consequent invasion and overrunning of the South brought darkest gloom
and despondency to the American cause.

It was well that Providence had given America Washington who, when
all things seemed to fail, held firm and carried us to victory.
Without him the nation could not have survived the throes of birth.
Calm and undismayed, he made up for the inefficiency of Congress, the
lethargy of the states, the discontent of all. Whatever our national
shortcomings--past, present, or future--America can ever be proud of
having produced this king of men, the greatest character in history.
He was, in fact, the Revolution personified. The war was fought
without even the semblance of a government, for even the “Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union” reported on July 12, 1776, by a
committee appointed on June 10th (the same day as that on which the
committee was appointed to draft the Declaration of Independence), were
not agreed to by Congress until November 17, 1777, and a sufficient
number of states under the conditions of these articles did not ratify
the action of Congress until March 1, 1781. Thus nearly six years
of war passed before we had anything approaching a confederacy, and
even then, as Washington well said, it was “but a shade without a
substance.” “The organized and carefully barricaded impotence of this
scheme of government,” says an able authority, “is probably unequalled
in history, with any nation surviving.” Congress could only “request”
of the several states, and but too often these requests bore no fruit
whatever. Attendance in Congress lagged, interest dwindled, and by 1780
but for Washington, so far as mortal can judge, the Revolution would
have come to a dismal end.

But Washington’s time of cheer was at hand. From February, 1779, to
March, 1780, Lafayette was in France and unceasing in his efforts in
support of the American cause. It was chiefly due to his efforts that
on May 2, 1780, seven line-of-battle ships and three frigates left
Brest under the Chevalier de Ternay, convoying thirty-six transports
carrying 5,027 troops, officers and men, under Lieutenant-General Count
de Rochambeau. The enemy had, on October 25, 1779, withdrawn from
Narragansett Bay to New York fearing an attack by d’Estaing’s great
fleet after its operations against Savannah. The French fleet anchored
at Newport on July 11th.

The death of de Ternay in December, due, in Lafayette’s judgment, to
despondency caused by his hopeless view of things; the treason of
Arnold which came to light in September; the blockade for most of the
coming winter of the French squadron by, now, a superior British force;
the arrival in the West Indies at the end of April, 1781, of the Count
de Grasse with a powerful addition to the French fleet; the information
that he expected to come on to the American coast; the pressing
messages to him from Washington and Rochambeau to hasten his departure;
the reply received on August 14th that he would sail on August 13th
for the Chesapeake with 3,300 troops, artillery, and siege guns, and
1,200,000 livres (francs) in money, determined the move of the small
allied armies to Virginia, where Cornwallis, now some months in that
state, was finally to take up an entrenched position at Yorktown, his
move from Portsmouth being completed on August 22d.

The American and French armies, after a whole year’s inaction, joined
on July 6, 1781, taking position on a line from Dobbs’ Ferry to the
Bronx. The Fates were surely with America. Everything conspired for
the allies’ success; the position taken had convinced Clinton that New
York was to be attacked; he pressed Cornwallis to send him every man
he could spare, but Cornwallis could spare none. Rodney in the West
Indies, misinformed as to De Grasse’s intentions, and thinking he was
to take but half his fleet instead of the whole, detached but fourteen
of his own command to go north under Sir Samuel Hood to reinforce
Admiral Graves at New York. Rodney himself left for England on leave
of absence, carrying four ships with him. The two vessels dispatched
to Graves with information of British intentions never reached him. He
was east with his squadron when one, arriving at New York, was sent on
to him but was driven ashore on Long Island by a superior force and
destroyed; the other and more important one, giving word of Hood’s
departure, was captured. For this reason, though Graves returned to
New York on August 16th, he still remained in the dark as to Hood’s
movements. The whole was a marvel of good fortune for the Americans,
while every move of De Grasse’s fleet and of the allied armies were to
fit with the perfection of mechanism.

Hood left the West Indies on August 10th. On the 25th he looked into
the Chesapeake and, finding nothing, went on to Sandy Hook, where
he arrived August 28th. That same evening word was received that De
Barras (who had arrived from France as the successor of De Ternay) had
sailed from Newport with his whole division of eight of the line, four
frigates, and eighteen transports. It was now known to the British
general that the allied armies were on their way south and that De
Grasse was bound for the Chesapeake. Graves, with five of the line
and a 50-gun ship, all that could be got ready in the time, joined
Hood off Sandy Hook on August 31st and started south. He had nineteen
ships-of-the-line to De Grasse’s twenty-eight. But De Grasse was
already inside the capes, which he had reached on August 30th, and was
at anchor in Lynnhaven Bay, just within Cape Henry. He had at once
landed his troops and had stationed cruisers in James River to prevent
Cornwallis attempting to escape to North Carolina. His dispositions
reduced his available ships to twenty-four of the line. At this moment
Washington “was crossing the Delaware on his way south, with 6,000
regular troops, 2,000 American and 4,000 French, to join Lafayette,”
who now, with the 3,300 French from the fleet, had 8,000 regulars and
militia.

On September 5th Admiral Graves’s fleet was sighted by the French in
the northeast. It was at first thought to be that of De Barras, but,
on discovering the mistake, De Grasse took a course which risked all
by getting under way and going outside the capes to fight a battle. To
get twenty-four heavy sailing ships under way and attempt to get them
in any formation in a reasonable time, even with the ebb tide which was
running, was, with the wind north-northeast, a difficult operation.
Several had to tack in order to clear Cape Henry, and by the time they
reached the open sea the French ships must have been in very straggling
condition. Graves failed to take advantage of such an opportunity.
Instead of crowding sail, with a wind as fair as he could wish, and
pressing down for the French, whom he might have attacked in detail, he
formed a line heading out to sea, to fight a battle, partially under
the old rule of parallel columns with each ship engaging her opposite,
and partially under new ideas of tactics which Graves, just from
England, had imbibed but which most of his captains had scarcely heard
of.

The action began about four o’clock, signals were not understood, and,
taken all in all, the handling of the British fleet was badly botched.
Furthermore, Sir Samuel Hood, who commanded the rear division and was
an officer of highest reputation, showed no initiative such as, in the
circumstances, might have been expected, his division getting scarcely
into gunshot. Thus at sunset, when the battle ceased, the British
were in decidedly the worse plight, with a loss of 90 killed and 246
wounded, against about 200 killed and wounded of the French, and with
several ships very severely injured, one, the _Terrible_, 74, so much
so that she was in sinking condition, and five days later was burned.
Though the two fleets were yet in sight of each other for four days,
neither showed a wish to renew the action. On September 10th, when
morning broke, the French were out of sight. Next day they reëntered
the Chesapeake, capturing near the entrance two frigates sent by
Graves to reconnoitre, one of which was the _Iris_ which had been the
American _Hancock_. They found at anchor within the capes the division
of Barras which the day before had arrived from Newport with the siege
artillery intended for use at Yorktown. On the 13th the British fleet
stood in for the capes and sighted the French at anchor. There was
nothing to do but to return north. On the 19th it was again at Sandy
Hook, and American independence was won.

Washington had not heard until September 5th of De Grasse’s arrival.
“Standing on the river bank at Chester, he waved his hat in the air
as the Comte de Rochambeau approached, and with many demonstrations
of uncontrollable happiness he announced to him the good news.” Had
he known that at that moment De Grasse was under way to go to sea and
fight a battle, he would have been less joyous. For it was only the
want of initiative on the part of the British admiral that saved the
situation. For had the latter at any time in the six days which the
French spent at sea himself entered the Chesapeake, he could have held
the position, and De Grasse’s venture would have gone for nought. It
is highly improbable that in such circumstances de Grasse would have
shown such initiative as to attack New York. It is clear that neither
admiral had a clear sense of the strategy involved, for De Grasse
himself but a little later was again desirous of leaving the Chesapeake
to seek the British fleet, and was only held by the most earnest
remonstrances of Washington. As it was, the army was transported by
September 26th to Williamsburg, and on October 19th Lord Cornwallis
surrendered, thus, virtually, closing the war. De Grasse sailed
November 4th to the West Indies and to ruin; for on April 12, 1782, he
was signally defeated by Rodney and became a prisoner.

The French army was an aid to our success; the French navy was a
necessity. The result completely filled the dictum of Washington,
who foresaw by a hundred years that which is to-day an axiom and one
particularly applicable to our own country: “In any operation and under
all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered a
fundamental principle and the basis upon which every hope of success
must ultimately depend.”[10] He would have made a great admiral, a
career he narrowly escaped when it was proposed that he should go
as midshipman under Admiral Vernon. The Fates fortunately decreed
otherwise.

The operations of the Continental navy were now confined to very few
ships. The _Alliance_, under Captain Barry, had left Boston February
11, 1781, carrying Colonel John Laurens and Thomas Paine. The former
bore a letter which, addressed by Washington to Laurens, was to be
shown Vergennes, putting strongly the necessity of money and ships, and
giving the whole logic of the situation in the sentence: “Indeed, it is
not to be conceived how [the British] could subsist a large force in
this country if we had the command of the seas to interrupt the regular
transmission of supplies from Europe.”

The _Alliance_ was unhappy in the character of her crew, which
illustrated the exigencies to which we were now driven. A large number
were British prisoners. These on the return voyage formed a conspiracy
to carry the ship to Ireland, in the suppression of which Barry
exhibited courage and qualities for command of a high order. On the
way he captured two British cruisers, of 16 and 14 guns, the smaller
of which was made a cartel to carry his prisoners, now about 250, into
Halifax. The larger was retaken by a squadron near Cape Cod. The
_Marquis de Lafayette_, a French privateer which had left France at the
same time as the _Alliance_, with a valuable cargo of military stores,
suffered the same fate.

The _Deane_, _Confederacy_, and _Saratoga_ cruised this year in the
West Indies, with small fortune, which was turned into very bad, by the
capture of the _Confederacy_ by a British squadron on April 15th. The
_Trumbull_, at sea on her first cruise, with a mixed crew of wretched
quality, was dismasted in a gale and was taken on August 8th by the
_Iris_ and the _General Monk_, both of which were captured American
ships taken into the British service, one, as just said, being the
_Hancock_, and the latter a privateer, the _General Washington_. The
_Iris_, as but just mentioned above, was taken by the French only a
month later and the _General Monk_ on April 7th of the next year by
the _Hyder Ally_, under Captain Joshua Barney, in one of the notable
actions of the war.

Up to the peace signed September 3, 1783, privateering had continued
active, 383 letters of marque being granted by Congress in 1782, but
the Continental navy had practically disappeared. There were but five
ships remaining: the frigates _Alliance_, _Hague_, and _Bourbon_ (the
last not yet launched), and the ships _General Washington_ and _Duc de
Lauzun_. Only the first two were in commission. Our only line-of-battle
ship, the newly launched _America_, had been given to France to replace
the _Magnifique_, wrecked coming into Boston harbor. The few ships
mentioned gradually disappeared: the _Duc de Lauzun_ was sent to
France as a transport and sold; the _Bourbon_, launched at Middletown,
Connecticut, July 31, 1783, was advertised for sale two months later,
as was the _Hague_ in August; the _General Washington_ was sold the
next year. Sentiment preserved the _Alliance_ until August, 1785, when,
with her sale, the Continental navy passed into history.

       *       *       *       *       *

To recapitulate some data of the first chapter:

The British navy had at the beginning of the war 270 ships, of which
131 were of the line (from 100 to 60 guns), and but 18,000 seamen. At
the end, January 20, 1783, there were 468 ships, of which 174 were of
the line, and 110,000 seamen. They had lost (taken, destroyed, burned,
foundered, or wrecked) 202 ships carrying 5,130 guns. The Continental
and state navies had lost (taken, destroyed, burned, foundered, or
wrecked) 39 ships, carrying 876 guns. The French had lost (in all the
ways just mentioned) 72 ships, with 2,636 guns; the Spanish 24, with
960 guns; the Dutch 9, with 364 guns.

The British during the war lost 3,087 merchant vessels, taken by
Americans, French, Dutch, and Spanish; 879 of these were retaken
or ransomed. They lost 89 privateers, of which 14 were retaken or
ransomed. They captured 1,135 merchantmen, of which only 27 were
retaken or ransomed, and 216 privateers, of which only one was
retaken.[11] The net result was heavily against them.

The navy of the Revolution, however insufficient and ineffective as
an instrument of real war, served a good purpose. It kept up our
communication with Europe; made many captures of material in ordnance,
ammunition, and stores of utmost importance to our forces, and fought
many gallant actions. But actions between small cruisers and captures
of merchantmen are not the means which bring control of the sea.
The action of greatest moment was that of the little flotilla on
Lake Champlain in 1776, and this, even though defeated, was a main
instrument in gaining the French alliance and thus our independence.
It is the battleship, in that day known as the ship-of-the-line, which
decides the question of command of the world’s highway and thus decides
the outcome of war between powers separated by the ocean. The services
of the small Continental navy thus from the very nature of things could
effect comparatively little so long as the ship-of-the-line could go
and come as it pleased. It was the French battleship in larger numbers
than the English that completely changed the melancholy outlook of
1780 and 1781. In July of the latter year Rochambeau, in a letter to
De Grasse urging him to come north, could use the words: “General
Washington has but a handful of men.... This country has been driven
to bay and all its resources are giving out at once.” He told but the
painful fact. The presence of a dominating fleet gave us victory and
independence; without it the Revolution would have failed. It took us a
hundred years to realize the truth of the principle here stated, and we
have yet to frame a policy in accord with its meaning.

       *       *       *       *       *

With the passing of the ships passed all semblance of naval
organization. The Board of Admiralty had really consisted of Robert
Morris only, and the Congress of the loosely bound Confederation was
itself almost moribund. The United States found itself free, but it
was the freedom of disorganization, an atrophy of government. The
Revolution had been fought until March, 1781, without an established
government. This is a remarkable fact. We had yet to wait four years
from the peace for a real instrument of government, the Constitution of
1787. The adoption of this on September 13, 1787, was the true birthday
of the Republic rather than the 4th of July, 1776. The Revolution of
1787 was quite as momentous as that of the war just ended.


THE PRINCIPAL SHIPS OF THE CONTINENTAL NAVY


 =============+=========+====+===============+=============================
    NAME      |  CLASS  |GUNS|    ORIGIN     |          END
 -------------+---------+----+---------------+-----------------------------
 Alfred       |Ship     | 24 |Purchased,     |Captured, March 9, 1778,
              |         |    |  November,    |  off Senegal, in company
              |         |    |  1775         |  with the _Raleigh_, by
              |         |    |               |  an inferior force.
              |         |    |               |
 Columbus     |Ship     | 20 |Purchased,     |Chased ashore, March, 1778,
              |         |    |  November,    |  on Point Judith, and
              |         |    |  1775         |  burned.
              |         |    |               |
 Andrew Doria |Brig     | 14 |Purchased,     |Destroyed, October 7, 1777,
              |         |    |  November,    |  in Delaware River, to
              |         |    |  1775         |  prevent capture by
              |         |    |               |  greatly superior force.
              |         |    |               |
 Cabot        |Brig     | 14 |Purchased,     |Chased ashore, Nova Scotia,
              |         |    |  November,    |  March, 1777, by British
              |         |    |  1775         |  frigate; was got off, and
              |         |    |               |  taken into British service.
              |         |    |               |
 Providence   |Sloop    | 12 |Purchased      |Destroyed, August, 1779,
              |         |    |  early in     |  Penobscot Expedition, to
              |         |    |  1776         |  prevent capture by greatly
              |         |    |               |  superior force.
              |         |    |               |
 Lexington    |Brig     | 16 |Purchased in   |Captured, September 19, 1777,
              |         |    |  1776         |  by British cutter
              |         |    |               |  _Alert_, 10.
              |         |    |               |
 Reprisal     |Brig     | 16 |Purchased in   |Lost, October, 1777, banks of
              |         |    |  1776         |  Newfoundland, on
              |         |    |               |  return from Europe.
              |         |    |               |
 Raleigh      |Frigate  | 32 |Built at       |Chased ashore, September,
              |         |    |  Portsmouth,  |  1778, by greatly superior
              |         |    |  N. H., 1776  |  force, on Maine coast;
              |         |    |               |  hauled off, and taken into
              |         |    |               |  British service.
              |         |    |               |
 Hancock      |Frigate  | 32 |Built at       |Captured, July, 1777, off
              |         |    |  Salisbury,   |  Cape Sambro, by
              |         |    |  Mass., 1776  |  _Rainbow_, 44.
              |         |    |               |
 Washington   |Frigate  | 32 |Built on the   |Destroyed, May, 1778, in
              |         |    |  Delaware,    |  Delaware River, to prevent
              |         |    |  1776         |  capture, without getting to
              |         |    |               |  sea.
              |         |    |               |
 Randolph     |Frigate  | 32 |Built on the   |Blew up, March 17, 1778, in
              |         |    |  Delaware,    |  action with Yarmouth, 64.
              |         |    |  1776         |
              |         |    |               |
 Warren       |Frigate  | 28 |Built at       |Destroyed, August, 1779, in
              |         |    |  Providence,  |  Penobscot Bay Expedition.
              |         |    |  1776         |
              |         |    |               |
 Providence   |Frigate  | 28 |Built at       |Captured, May 11, 1780, on
              |         |    |  Providence,  |  surrender of Charleston.
              |         |    |  1776         |
              |         |    |               |
 Trumbull     |Frigate  | 28 |Built at       |Captured, August 9, 1781,
              |         |    |  Middletown,  |  by superior force.
              |         |    |  Conn., 1776  |
              |         |    |               |
 Congress     |Frigate  | 28 |Built at       |Destroyed, October, 1777, in
              |         |    |  Poughkeepsie,|  Hudson, to prevent capture.
              |         |    |  N. Y., 1776  |
              |         |    |               |
 Virginia     |Frigate  | 28 |Built at       |Captured, March 31, 1778, in
              |         |    |  Baltimore,   |  Chesapeake, through
              |         |    |  1776         |  grounding.
              |         |    |               |
 Effingham    |Frigate  | 28 |Built on the   |Destroyed, May, 1778, in the
              |         |    |  Delaware,    |  Delaware, without getting
              |         |    |  1776         |  to sea.
              |         |    |               |
 Boston       |Frigate  | 24 |Built at       |Captured, May 11, 1780, on
              |         |    |  Newburyport, |  surrender of Charleston.
              |         |    |  1776         |
              |         |    |               |
 Montgomery   |Frigate  | 24 |Built at       |Destroyed, October, 1777,
              |         |    |  Poughkeepsie,|  in Hudson, to prevent
              |         |    |  N. Y., 1776  |  capture; never got to sea.
              |         |    |               |
 Delaware     |Frigate  | 24 |Built on the   |Captured, September, 1777, at
              |         |    |  Delaware,    |  Philadelphia, by General
              |         |    |  1776         |  Howe.
              |         |    |               |
 Ranger       |Ship     | 18 |Built at       |Captured, May 11th, on
              |         |    |  Portsmouth,  |  surrender of Charleston; a
              |         |    |  N. H., 1777  |  very successful ship.
              |         |    |               |
 Confederacy  |Frigate  | 32 |Built at       |Surrendered, April 15, 1781,
              |         |    |  Norwich,     |  to British frigates
              |         |    |  Conn., 1778  |  _Roebuck_ and _Orpheus_.
              |         |    |               |
 Pallas       |Frigate  | 32 |Purchased in   |Later history unknown.
              |         |    |  France, 1779 |
              |         |    |               |
 General      |Ship     | 18 |Built 1778     |Sold.
   Gates      |         |    |               |
              |         |    |               |
 Bonhomme     |Frigate  | 42 |Purchased in   |Sunk, September 25, 1779,
   Richard    |         |    |  France,      |  after capturing the
              |         |    |  Jan., 1779   |  _Serapis_.
              |         |    |               |
 Serapis      |Frigate  | 44 |Captured,      |Sold at Lorient, France,
              |         |    |  September    |  date unknown.
              |         |    |  23, 1779     |
              |         |    |               |
 Deane        |Frigate  | 32 |Built in       |Sold, August, 1783.
   (renamed,  |         |    |  France, 1777 |
   in 1782,   |         |    |               |
   the Hague) |         |    |               |
              |         |    |               |
 Queen of     |Frigate  | 28 |Built in       |Sunk at Charleston, April,
   France     |         |    |  France, 1777 |  1780, as an obstruction to
              |         |    |               |  British fleet.
              |         |    |               |
 Revenge      |Cutter   | 14 |Purchased in   |Sold, March, 1779, after
              |         |    |  France, 1777 |  having great success as a
              |         |    |               |  cruiser; refitted as a
              |         |    |               |  privateer under same
              |         |    |               |  captain (Conyngham), and
              |         |    |               |  captured April, 1779.
              |         |    |               |
 Saratoga     |Cutter   | 18 |Built 1777     |Lost, 1781, at sea, and never
              |         |    |               |  heard of.
              |         |    |               |
 General      |Cutter   | 20 |Originally a   |Captured by British and named
   Washington |         |    |  privateer    |  _General Monk_; recaptured
              |         |    |               |  by Barney, in Hyder Ally,
              |         |    |               |  April 8, 1782; bought into
              |         |    |               |  the Continental service,
              |         |    |               |  resumed original name, and
              |         |    |               |  was sold in 1784.
              |         |    |               |
 Duc de       |Cutter   | 20 |Purchased 1782 |Sold in France, 1783.
   Lauzun     |         |    |               |
              |         |    |               |
 Bourbon      |Frigate  | 36 |Built at       |Sold, September, 1783.
              |         |    |  Middletown,  |
              |         |    |  Conn.,       |
              |         |    |  1782-1783    |
              |         |    |               |
 America      |Ship-of- | 74 |Laid down,     |Presented to France by
              |the-line |    |  May, 1777;   |  Resolution of Congress of
              |         |    |  launched,    |  September 3, 1782, to
              |         |    |  November 5,  |  replace the _Magnifique_,
              |         |    |  1782         |  wrecked, August 13, 1782,
              |         |    |               |  on Lovell’s Island, near
              |         |    |               |  Boston.
              |         |    |               |
 Indian       |Frigate  | 40 |Built by       |Sold to France to escape
              |         |    |  Congress in  |  diplomatic complications;
              |         |    |  Holland      |  hired to South Carolina;
              |         |    |               |  captured, December 19,
              |         |    |               |  1782, by a British
              |         |    |               |  squadron.
              |         |    |               |
 Alliance     |Frigate  | 32 |Built at       |Sold, August, 1785. With this
              |         |    |  Salisbury,   |  sale ended the navy of the
              |         |    |  Mass., 1778  |  Revolution.
 -------------+---------+----+---------------+-----------------------------



CHAPTER IX


Stretching along the southern shore of the Mediterranean some 1,800
miles, in the latitude, roughly speaking, of Cape Hatteras, are
the regions known to our forefathers as Barbary. The westernmost
was Morocco, then Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. The last three were
nominally appanages of the Turkish Empire. Anciently there had been
along these shores a high civilization. Carthage (now Tunis) had
disputed with Rome the empire of the Mediterranean; she failed through
Rome’s final dominancy at sea, and her power was utterly wrecked, as
was the city itself. Rome ruled and built thriving cities throughout
the coastline mentioned, the remains of which now mark but dimly the
footsteps of civilization and history.

With the rise of Mohammedanism, the Arab power swept westward over the
entire region. The antagonism of religion brought a continuous warfare
between the European and African shores which developed into a piracy
which lasted almost to our own days. A relic of the fear which Europe
had for these bold corsairs, who captured vessels of all nations and
carried crews and passengers into cruel slavery, is in the many towers
of refuge still along the French and Italian rivieras, and the memory
is yet in the Litany in the prayer-book of the Episcopal Church in
England and America, where we pray for “all prisoners and captives.”
Long after the writer entered our navy, the Saturday evening toast,
after “Sweethearts and Wives,” was, “Here’s to the downfall of the
barbarous Moor.” It was an echo of the epic period of the American
navy. For we once did great things in Barbary, of which the average
American to-day (and more’s the pity) is almost wholly ignorant. It is
in its earlier phase a tale of national humiliation in which all Europe
also had full share, but in which our navy had no part; its later phase
in which the navy came into action is a very proud story.

The depredations of the Barbary powers were not confined to the
Mediterranean, but extended into the North and Irish seas, many
inhabitants being carried from these coasts into slavery. There were
various efforts to punish these raiding powers in the seventeenth
century by Dutch, French, and English, and as late as 1775 a great
expedition was fitted out by Spain of nearly four hundred vessels,
against Algiers, which, however, ended in disaster. This has special
interest to us, as Joshua Barney, who was to act a conspicuous part
in our naval annals, was impressed, with the Baltimore ship which he
commanded, to assist in the transport of troops.

The Barbary vessels were in general large, narrow rowboats, carrying
usually two masts, with the lateen sail of the Mediterranean for use
in fair winds. The name “galley” was applied in Europe to the largest
of such in ordinary use. There was, however, a much larger development
in the galleasse, some few of which, used by the Neapolitans, carried
700 men, 300 of whom would be convicts at the oars. There was finally
the galleon, the precursor of the frigate, which had masts and sails
alone for propulsion. In the large galleys there might be as many as
six men at an oar. It may be said that in general the development of
the corsair ship followed slowly but fairly closely that of the ship of
Europe, and in later years they had a number of the usual square-rigged
vessels.[12]

The Christian slaves were employed not only in the galleys, but did
all kinds of labor; the crew of our frigate _Philadelphia_, which in
1803 grounded near Tripoli and thus was captured, was employed in
building one of the defences against our own ships, which took the name
of the American fort. In the main, however, the captivity was humane
and not oppressive.

The claim of the Barbary powers was expressed in a statement of their
envoy while in London in 1786, to our minister, John Adams: “That
Turkey, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco were the sovereigns of
the Mediterranean; and that no nation could navigate that sea without
a treaty of peace with them.”[13] Europe had practically accepted a
situation of the most degrading kind; every nautical power paid tribute
in money or presents and all had representatives among the Barbary
slaves. Even as late as 1816, when the English finally acted, there
were eighteen Englishmen among the slaves released by Lord Exmouth’s
expedition.

But England’s attitude had not been one of honor. There was no time
when she might not have ended the foul situation. Franklin could say
in a letter on July 25, 1783, to our secretary of foreign affairs: “I
think it not improbable that these rovers may be privately encouraged
by the English to fall upon us and to prevent our interfering in the
carrying trade; for I have in London heard it is a maxim among the
merchants, that if there were no Algiers it would be worth England’s
while to build one. I wonder, however, that the rest of Europe do not
combine to destroy those nests and secure commerce from their future
piracies.”[14] Three years later John Adams, our minister in London,
was writing Secretary Jay (February 17, 1786): “There are not wanting
persons in England who will find means to stimulate this African
[the Tripolitan envoy] to stir up his countrymen against American
vessels.”[15] British statesmanship, then as ever, was jealous of
rival commerce on the seas. Lord Sheffield, in a pamphlet on American
commerce, could say: “It will not be in the interest of any of the
great maritime powers to protect [Americans] from the Barbary States.
If they know their interests, they will not encourage the Americans to
be carriers--that the Barbary States are advantageous to the maritime
powers is obvious.”

It is odd that at this period two men whose lives were of a sort
that one would have supposed they would have advised each directly
otherwise, exchanged characters. Thus while Thomas Jefferson, our
minister to France, advised in 1785 force as the best protection, John
Adams in England, influenced perhaps by his surroundings, advised
following the usual plan of paying an annual tribute. Jefferson
later, most unhappily for his country, was violently antagonistic to
the establishment of a navy. Adams was, and always had been, quite
the reverse. But he now felt that the country was too poor and too
embarrassed by debt to use force. He wrote John Jay, Foreign Secretary,
December 15, 1784: “As long as France, England, Holland, the Emperor,
etc., will submit to be tributaries to these robbers and even encourage
them, to what purpose should we make war upon them? The resolution
might be heroic but would not be wise ... we cannot hurt them in the
smallest degree.... Unless it were possible, then, to persuade the
great maritime powers of Europe to unite in the suppression of these
piracies, it would be very imprudent for us to entertain any thoughts
of contending with them.”[16]

The two ministers had an extended correspondence, and though Adams
said: “I will go all lengths with you in promoting a navy, whether
it be applied to the Algerines or not,” he still doubted the economy
of dealing with Barbary by force. Jefferson’s tone was now, for him,
strangely combative. He wrote, August 20, 1785: “The question is
whether their peace or war will be cheapest? But it is a question which
should be addressed to our honor as well as our avarice, nor does it
respect us as to these pirates only, but as to the nations of Europe.
If we wish our commerce to be free and uninsulted, we must let these
nations see that we have an energy which at present they disbelieve.
The low opinion they entertain of our powers cannot fail to involve us
soon in a naval war.”

Jefferson’s views involved an association which would furnish one or
more cruisers each to act against piracy in the Mediterranean. It
included Portugal, Naples, the two Sicilies, Venice, Malta, Denmark,
and Sweden, an extremely difficult combination; but he doubted the
good faith of others. In a letter to Monroe, August 11, 1786, he says:
“I think every power in Europe would soon fall into it except France,
England, and perhaps Spain and Holland. Of these there is only England
who would give any real aid to the Algerines....” He added: “Were the
honor and advantage of establishing such a confederacy out of the
question, yet the necessity that the United States should have some
marine force, and the happiness of this, as the ostensible cause of
beginning it, would decide on its propriety. It will be said there is
no money in the treasury. There never will be money in the treasury
till the confederacy shows its teeth.... Every rational citizen must
wish to see an effective instrument of coercion and should fear to
see it on any other element than the water. A naval force can never
endanger our liberties nor occasion bloodshed; a land force would do
both.”[17]

This was Jefferson at his best. It is extraordinary that when the time
came to really assert ourselves against the seizure of our seamen and
property by other powers than those of Barbary, he should have so
completely failed. But in any case, at the time he was proposing his
floating confederacy, our inchoate system of government of the period,
which required each state to be solicited by Congress for funds,
would no doubt, as Adams thought, have made it impossible to provide
the needed ships. Our vessels continued to be seized and their crews
enslaved.

It would be unjust to the memory of John Adams, to whom the Continental
navy chiefly owed its beginnings, and who was ever the vigorous
supporter of the newer navy, not to record his life-long views as
expressed to the House of Representatives in November, 1800: “I
confidently believe that few persons can be found within the United
States who do not admit that a navy, well-organized, must constitute
the natural and efficient defence of this country against all foreign
hostility.” To this he was consistent through the whole of his long
life. In 1785 he was simply doubtful of the travesty of government
which then existed and was to have two more years of its ineffective
life.

In January, 1791, the United States, having now through its newly
formed Constitution of 1787 crystallized into a real nationality, the
Senate Committee on Mediterranean Trade agreed that our trade could “be
protected but by a naval force, and that it will be proper to resort to
the same as soon as the state of the public finances will admit.” But
a year later the Senate was stating its “readiness to ratify treaties
with Algiers providing for peace at a cost of forty thousand dollars
at the outset and annual tribute of twenty-five thousand; and also
for the ransom of the captives, then thirteen in number, for forty
thousand.”

Fifty thousand dollars was appropriated to begin with, and Paul Jones
was appointed consul at Algiers and as our envoy to make a peace. But
Jones died at Paris, July 18, 1792. Thomas Barclay, our consul in
Morocco, was appointed; he also died very shortly, and David Humphreys,
our minister to Portugal, succeeded him. But the Dey of Algiers refused
to receive him. The seizures continued, and in 1793 eleven vessels
were captured and the crews enslaved. There were now in Algiers over a
hundred American captives. The English consul, who of course was acting
on orders from home, was blamed by Humphreys for the situation. Finally
the House resolved on January 2, 1792, but only by a majority of two,
that a naval force should be provided. A bill providing for six ships
at a cost of $600,000 was finally passed with a proviso that if peace
could be arranged with Algiers work on these should stop. There had
been much opposition, many arguing “that we should follow the example
of Europe by buying peace, or should hire a European navy to protect
our trade; that a navy was a menace to liberty....” Madison opposed
the bill, partly on the ground that a navy would lead to international
complications, particularly with England, and this opinion was shared
by others. The opposition was chiefly from the South, the New England
members, who represented a constituency which was suffering from the
depredations, naturally favored the action. The bill provided for
four ships to carry forty-four guns and two to carry thirty-six each,
with full complements, pay, and rations, and $688,888.82 was finally
voted. The date of the approval of this bill, March 27, 1794, marks the
establishment of the American navy. Joshua Humphreys of Philadelphia
was the fortunate selection as naval architect. His view was that these
ships should be the most powerful of their class afloat, and this
was finally supported by General Knox, the Secretary of War, whose
department was for some years to control the navy.

But notwithstanding this action, we continued the negotiation of a
treaty with Algiers, Thomas Humphreys being authorized July 19, 1794,
to spend $800,000 (the cost of two ships-of-the-line) to effect it.
Washington was at this time President, and Jefferson Secretary of
State. The treaty was concluded after much insulting conduct on the
part of the Dey, on September 5, 1795, and only on the offer, as
an additional present, of a 36-gun frigate. It was ratified by the
Senate on March 6, 1796, and had “cost up to January, 1797, nearly a
million dollars, including $525,000 for ransom of the captives, various
presents, and miscellaneous expenses; this was exclusive of the annuity
in naval stores valued at something over $21,000, according to the
estimate, which afterward proved far too low.”[18] Truly weakness came
high.

Notwithstanding the proviso of cessation of building in case a treaty
should be made, Washington’s advice to continue the building of the
ships was accepted by Congress, and in 1797 there were launched the
_United States_, the _Constitution_, and _Constellation_, all to become
famous in our country’s history. The last two are still afloat and
their old age proudly cared for.

In his annual message of December, 1796, Washington urged a naval
force as indispensable, saying: “To secure respect to a neutral flag
requires a naval force, organized and ready to vindicate it from insult
or aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to war
by discouraging belligerent powers from committing such violations of
the rights of the neutral party as may, first or last, leave no other
option.”

The following, which illustrates the result of the meanness of spirit
in Congress, is scarcely pleasant reading for an American to-day. Says
the Portsmouth newspaper of January 20, 1798: “On Thursday morning,
about sunrise, a gun was discharged from the _Crescent_ frigate as a
signal for getting under way, and at 10 A.M. she cleared the harbor
with a fine leading breeze. Our best wishes follow Captain Newman,
his officers and men. May they arrive in safety at the place of their
destination and present to the Dey of Algiers one of the finest
specimens of naval architecture which was ever borne upon Piscataqua’s
waters.

  “Blow all ye winds that fill the prosperous sail,
  And hush’d in peace be every adverse gale.

“The _Crescent_ is a present from the United States to the Dey as a
compensation for delay in not fulfilling our treaty stipulations in
proper time[!]...

“The _Crescent_ has many valuable presents on board for the Dey, and
when she sailed was supposed to be worth at least three hundred
thousand dollars. Twenty-six barrels of dollars constituted a part
of her cargo. It is worthy of remark that the captain, chief of the
officers, and many of the privates of the _Crescent_ frigate have been
prisoners at Algiers.”[19]

There must be few Americans who do not blush for the want of public
spirit which in this ship was so concretely exhibited.

A treaty had been concluded with Tripoli in November, 1796, at a cost
of nearly fifty-six thousand dollars, and one arranged with Tunis
in August, 1797, at an estimated expense of one hundred and seven
thousand dollars, but these estimates were much increased by our
yielding to later demands. This treaty, finally concluded March 26,
1797, was ratified by our Senate on January 10, 1800. Its conclusion
was due largely to the efforts of William Eaton, who had been appointed
consul to Tunis in July, 1797. He held true views of the situation.
“The United States set out wrongly and has proceeded so. Too many
concessions have been made to Algiers. There is but one language which
can be held to these people and this is _terror_.”

Eaton, born in Connecticut in 1764, was a Revolutionary soldier at
sixteen, a graduate later of Dartmouth College, and in 1792 a captain
in the army. He was a most interesting character whom it would have
been well, on account of his bold and active spirit, to have put in
entire control of our diplomatic affairs in Barbary. We shall hear of
him later.



CHAPTER X


The depredations of the new French Republic had come to give an impetus
to our new navy, and on April 27, 1798, $950,000 was appropriated for
its increase, and a regular navy department created. Benjamin Stoddart,
of Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, was the first secretary.
War against France was formally declared, in so far as authorizing,
on July 9, 1798, the capture of French ships, and authorizing the
President to issue commissions for privateers. On the same day a marine
corps of 881 of all ranks was established, to be commanded by a major.
By July 16th the total force authorized then and previously was twelve
frigates, twelve sloops-of-war from 20 to 24 guns, six smaller sloops,
besides galleys and revenue cutters; a total of thirty.

The first ship to get to sea under the new organization was the
_Ganges_, a purchased Indiaman, which sailed under command of Captain
Richard Dale on May 22, 1798, on a coasting cruise with orders to
capture all French cruisers on our coast with hostile intent. The
_Constellation_, 38, Captain Truxton, and _Delaware_, 20, Captain
Decatur, followed in June. The last made the first capture, a French
privateer of 14 guns and 70 men. She was condemned and bought into
the navy under the name of _Retaliation_, with Lieutenant Bainbridge
in command. The _United States_, 44, Captain Barry, went to sea early
in July, followed by the _Constitution_, 44, on the 20th, with four
revenue brigs of from 10 to 14 guns each. There were at sea in all,
in 1798, fifteen ships of the navy and eight revenue vessels, many of
which latter were finally taken into the navy. It is worthy of note
that one of these, the _Pickering_, was Preble’s first command.

All of these vessels except the _George Washington_, _Merrimack_,
and _Ganges_, the _Montezuma_, _Baltimore_, and _Delaware_, and
the _Herald_, _Richmond_, and _Retaliation_ were built by the
Government.[20]

One of the first affairs of the new navy was a notable case of
impressment of British seamen from the _Baltimore_, acting as convoy
to a number of merchantmen. Meeting a powerful British squadron off
Havana, Captain Phillips of the _Baltimore_ was informed by the British
commodore of his intention to remove all British seamen from his ship.
Phillips announced his intention of surrendering his ship rather than
to submit to the outrage. Unfortunately there was a lawyer on board
as passenger, and Phillips asked his judgment as to the legality of
the British commander’s procedure. Had Phillips acted as he at first
intended, viz.: to resist to the utmost, short of an engagement which
would have been folly against three line-of-battle ships, he would
have done well, but his legal friend found reasons for yielding,
which was done. Five men were taken, and three ships of the convoy
seized, for what actual reason Cooper, who gives this case in great
detail, does not say. Phillips was handicapped by his inexperience
as a naval officer, having been only just appointed into the navy
from the merchant service. There were, too, dissentient opinions even
among patriotic Americans of standing as to the justice of the British
claims, many upholding the, then, British doctrine of inalienable
allegiance. Even so considerable a person as Gouverneur Morris, one
of the ablest men America has produced and of large diplomatic and
political experience, maintained the view. It was the first of many
cases which had so large a part in bringing on the War of 1812.

In November the _Retaliation_ was captured by a French squadron, and
Bainbridge was a prisoner for the first, though not for the last, time
in his career. By the good fortune of the release of his schooner as a
cartel he was enabled to return home.

During 1799 we had twenty-eight vessels in active service. Most of
the captains and many of the officers of lesser rank were men who had
seen service during the Revolution, which, it must be remembered, had
ended but sixteen years before; many of them of course were men with
no experience of naval life, which differs from that of the merchant
service much as does that of the raw militiaman from that of the
seasoned soldier.

There was a squadron of ten ships under Commodore Barry, with his
broad-pennant in the _United States_; a second of five under Captain
Truxton in the _Constellation_; and a third of three under Captain
Tingey. A number of French privateers were captured by each, but on
February 8, 1799, the _Constellation_ sighted near the island of Nevis
the French frigate _L’Insurgente_, of forty 12-pounders and 409 men,
which, after a hot action of an hour, surrendered. The _Constellation_
carried 38 guns, those on her main deck being 24-pounders, and a
crew of only 309. She was, however, distinctly superior in weight of
gunfire. Among her midshipmen was David Porter of future fame, who
was to be the father of an even more famous son. The _Insurgente_ was
carried into St. Kitts under very difficult circumstances by Lieutenant
Rodgers, later one of the navy’s worthies, and the progenitor of a
famous family with now its sixth successive generation in the naval
service.

It was now, in 1799, that Preble, promoted to be a captain and in
command of the _Essex_, 32, carried the first American man-of-war east
of the Cape of Good Hope. By the beginning of 1800 France was disposed
to peace, and on November 3d the _United States_ sailed with the
American envoys.

The victory of the _Constellation_ had warmed the American blood, and
Congress in 1800 appropriated $2,482,593.90 for the naval service. This
strictly naval war had now lasted a year and a half, and during 1800 we
had thirty-five ships in the West Indies. Again the _Constellation_,
and under the same captain, was the lucky ship. On February 1, 1800,
she sighted off Guadaloupe a French frigate, _La Vengeance_, of 52
guns, which, deep with valuables which she was transporting to France,
tried to avoid action. This, however, after a chase extending into the
evening of the next day, was brought on, and lasted until 1:00 A.M. of
the 3d, when the French frigate hauled by the wind. In the endeavor to
follow, the _Constellation’s_ mainmast, every shroud of which had been
shot away, went by the board despite the efforts to repair damages,
carrying with it midshipman Jarvis and the topmen aloft, all but one
of whom were lost. The _Constellation_ had fourteen men killed and
twenty-five wounded, eleven of whom died later of their wounds. Her
quarry got into Curaçao dismasted and in a sinking condition with fifty
killed and one hundred and ten wounded. The engagement had lasted five
hours within pistol shot.

These brilliant actions not only brought Truxton a gold medal from
Congress and a great name, but greatly increased the popularity of the
navy, service in which was now sought by the best young manhood of the
country.

There were many other successes in this year which included the
capture of nearly fifty privateers, for the detail of which there
is no space; but one of these actions, the cutting out of a French
privateer, the _Sandwich_, in Puerto Plata, Santo Domingo, is notable
as being brilliantly carried out by Isaac Hull, the first lieutenant of
the _Constitution_, and who, as captain of the same ship twelve years
later, was to capture the _Guerrière_.

The only other capture of special note was that of the French cruiser
_Le Berceau_, “a singularly fine vessel of her class,” by the _Boston_,
on October 12, 1800, which was returned to France under the treaty of
peace which had already been signed on September 30th.

The year involved some sea losses. The _Insurgente_, which had been
taken into the service, sailed in July and was never again heard of;
the _Pickering_ sailed in August to a like fate.



CHAPTER XI


The ending of the war with France was but to find, shortly, another on
our hands, for which the former, however, was an admirable preparation
at a minimum cost; for it had caused provision of the absolute
essentials to meet the new emergency: ships, officers, and men. The
lesson to be learned was, however, largely to be disregarded by those
now to come into political power.

Fenimore Cooper began the seventeenth chapter of his classic history
of the navy by some words of political wisdom which are applicable to
this day, and apparently always will be: “Every form of government,”
he says, “has evils peculiar to itself. In a democracy there
exists a standing necessity for reducing everything to the average
comprehension, the high intelligence of a nation usually conceding as
much to its ignorance as it imparts. One of the worst consequences in
a practical sense, of this compromise of knowledge, is to be found in
the want of establishments that require foresight and liberality to be
well managed, for the history of every democracy has shown that it has
been deficient in the wisdom which is dependent on those expenditures
that foster true economy, by anticipating evils and avoiding the waste
of precipitation, want of system, and a want of knowledge.” In every
epoch of difficulty--the French spoliations, the British impressments,
the War of 1812, the Mexican War, our Civil War, and the Spanish
War--this truth has been painfully apparent in the want of foresight
and preparation of an adequate army and navy. It has cost us dear.

In 1801 came into power a new political school of which Jefferson
was the great exponent. With strong French sympathies, he had not
favored the naval war with France, and his party was bent upon naval
economy. Thus an early act of his administration, which began March 4,
1801, was to carry into effect a law passed toward the close of the
Congress which had just expired, it is true, but which had been elected
under the new political inspiration. The law referred to empowered
the President to sell all or any of the vessels of the navy with the
exception of thirteen frigates, and obliged him to reduce the list
of officers to nine captains, thirty-six lieutenants, and one hundred
and fifty midshipmen. The selling of twenty of the smaller ships was
not so great an evil in itself, as new ordnance was coming into use
and small guns of light calibre, carrying balls from six to nine and
twelve pounds, were being superseded by carronades--short guns with
thin walls and very small charges. They were of two calibres, 32 and 24
pounders. The former with a powder charge of two pounds had a range of
about 300 yards. It is evident that at long range the long gun with a
much heavier charge had a great advantage. The carronade was only fit
for close quarters. This change required vessels of much stouter build
than the light sloops-of-war such as most of those sold were. But the
mistake was that they were not replaced. The law of 1798 had authorized
the building of six ships-of-the-line to carry 74 guns each. This was
now unhappily suspended; an error bitterly to be repented.

It was a period of utmost world unrest when we were to be ground
between the upper and nether millstones of Napoleonic authority and
British arrogance. Depredations upon our commerce were constant, not
only by Barbary corsairs but by highly civilized France and England
which latter also for years impressed our seamen at will. It was
a period when true statesmanship demanded a powerful naval force;
when but a mere fraction of the losses by seizure of our merchant
marine and of the cost of the War of 1812 would have built a fleet
of ships-of-the-line and would have saved us both the spoliation and
the war. But Jefferson, though he had taken the finer stand as to the
Barbary outrages, seemed incapable of understanding that his views as
to these were of universal application, and that they held good against
Britain and France as well as against Algiers and Tripoli. He seemed
obsessed with an enmity to any naval force. He expressed the view that
a navy was “a ruinous folly.”[21] And in his annual message of December
15, 1802, advised “to add to our navy yard at Washington a dock within
which our vessels may be laid up dry and under cover from the sun.”
Perhaps no more extraordinary views as to national defence ever came
from any one with a claim to be a statesman.

Jefferson’s election had only just been preceded by one of the most
extraordinary incidents of our naval history: the impressment in 1800
of the frigate _George Washington_ by the Dey of Algiers to carry a
shipload of tribute to the Sultan of Turkey. This ship, commanded
by Captain William Bainbridge, one of the most capable officers of
our service, had been sent with our own tribute to Algiers, where he
arrived September, 1800. The Dey had got into disfavor by making peace
with France while Turkey was at war with that country on account of
the occupancy of Egypt by Bonaparte. Hence the desire of the Dey for
restoration to favor. He threatened instant war against the United
States in case of Bainbridge’s refusal. The _George Washington_ lay
under the guns of the port and escape was extremely doubtful; there was
the strong probability of the seizure of the ship, the slavery of the
officers and crew, and the consequent subjection of our large commerce
in the Mediterranean to destruction. Bainbridge, gallant man as he was,
esteemed it his duty to sacrifice, possibly, his good name and comply.
Our consul advised his so doing and he finally yielded, though in
bitterness of spirit, aggravated by the attitude of the Dey, who said:
“You pay me tribute by which you become my slaves. I have therefore a
right to order you as I please.” The situation was but the outcome of
years of compliance with such a system.

Bainbridge sailed on October 19, 1800, for Constantinople with a mixed
cargo: an ambassador and suite of a hundred, a hundred negro women and
children, four horses, a hundred and fifty sheep, twenty-five cattle,
four lions, four tigers, four antelopes, twelve parrots, and funds and
specie and presents amounting to nearly a million dollars; all this in
a small ship with accommodations for a crew of 131. An element of humor
in the situation was the necessity of laying the ship’s head to point
to Mecca at the frequent times of prayer, one being stationed at the
compass to insure correctness of direction. The fact that the ship was
named _George Washington_ added to the incongruity of the situation.
Death had saved Washington himself from the pain of knowledge. The
cruise, however, had one benefit, in making known our flag and country
to the Turks. During his stay in Constantinople, Bainbridge’s personal
qualities and the excellent order of his ship made a deep impression
and were of lasting benefit to his country.

Throughout the year 1800 the attitude of the Dey of Tripoli had become
steadily more threatening, and by February, 1801, he was demanding
a new treaty with a payment of $250,000 and an annual tribute of
$20,000. On May 10, 1801, he declared war, and about June 1st Captain
Richard Dale (Paul Jones’s first lieutenant in the _Bonhomme Richard_)
sailed from Hampton Roads with three frigates: the _President_,
_Philadelphia_, and _Essex_, and the schooner _Enterprise_, to
protect our commerce by blockade of Tripoli and Tunis if necessary. A
humiliating element of the situation was the carrying of $30,000 which
it was hoped the Dey of Tripoli would accept as a compensation for the
annuity of naval stores.

Dale’s arrival off Tripoli caused much disturbance in the mind of the
Dey, but nothing occurred until on August 1st, when the _Enterprise_
captured a Tripolitan vessel of 14 guns and 80 men, after an action of
three hours, which was returned to Tripoli an empty hulk, Dale’s orders
not allowing him to take prizes, but to sink, burn, or destroy. This
curious phase of things arose from the extraordinary views of President
Jefferson as to his constitutional powers. War, as he saw things, could
not exist except by declaration of Congress, however active the enemy
in seizing American ships and making slaves of American citizens and
seamen. The situation was remedied by Congress on February 6, 1802,
which gave the President full powers to act, and was practically a
declaration of war.

Dale had orders to sail for home in October if things should become
peaceful, and was to leave the Mediterranean in any case by December
1st. For this there were two reasons: it was deemed unsafe to cruise in
the Mediterranean in winter, and the crews were enlisted for but one
year. Meanwhile, however, and despite the extraordinary views of the
President, Dale carried out his semi-peaceful, semi-warlike orders, so
far as to blockade Tripoli and capture ingoing vessels. In one of these
were twenty Tripolitan soldiers and an officer, who were exchanged
for three American prisoners. Dale completed his orders so far as to
return in December with two ships only, leaving the _Philadelphia_ and
_Essex_; the first to watch Tripoli from Syracuse as a base, the second
to observe two Tripolitan vessels blockaded at Gibraltar.

A new squadron was now formed with crews enlisted for two years.
Commodore Morris was ordered to the command with his broad-pennant in
the _Chesapeake_ of such later ill-fortune. The other ships were the
_Constellation_, _New York_, _John Adams_, _Adams_, and _Enterprise_.
It is not often that a family finds itself so honored as was the
Adams family in this instance, with two ships of the name in the same
squadron. Isaac Chauncey commanded the _Chesapeake_, John Rodgers the
_John Adams_, Isaac Hull was first lieutenant of the _New York_, and
Oliver Hazard Perry was a midshipman in the _Adams_. All of these were
to rise to high distinction.

The ships of the new squadron sailed as they could be got ready, the
_Chesapeake_ on April 27, 1802, the _John Adams_ not until September
19th. There is no special need to follow the blockade of Tripoli by
Morris’s squadron: the many attacks upon the galleys, generally so
close in shore as to make it difficult to absolutely destroy them; the
rough experiences and dangers on such a coast from heavy weather. There
were conspicuous cases of gallantry and of conduct which went far to
form the character of the service yet in its infancy. Lieutenant David
Porter particularly gave evidence of his coming fame. Morris, relieved
temporarily by Commodore Rodgers, went home in October, 1803, to meet
undeserved charges of want of vigor in his command, which ended in
wrongful dismissal from the service.

By the middle of 1803 a new squadron was formed of the _Constitution_,
_Philadelphia_, and of five brigs and schooners, the _Argus_, _Siren_,
_Nautilus_, _Vixen_, and _Enterprise_. Edward Preble was the commodore
in command.

It is a habit with some to call Paul Jones or John Barry the “father
of the navy” as race sentiment or particular inclination may rule,
but neither has a claim of the sort. Jones never served in the newly
established service or had anything to do with its organization.
The ephemeral navy of the Revolution had entirely passed away; the
navy of 1794 was not a reconstitution; it was a new birth, and with
this Barry’s connection was without special distinction. Jones was a
Scot by birth; Barry was an Irishman. Both are in the first rank as
naval officers, but neither did anything to form the new navy. This
was the work of Edward Preble, American by long descent, tradition,
and training. Born in Portland, Maine, August 15, 1761, he ran away
when seventeen to go to sea in a privateer; he was shortly made a
midshipman in the _Protector_, the largest ship of the Massachusetts
state navy; was in several actions, and when the _Protector_ was
captured became a prisoner in the prison ship _Jersey_, at New York.
When released he was immediately again at sea, this time in the state
privateer _Winthrop_, and was of the party which cut out an armed
British brig from under the British fort in Penobscot Bay. When the
United States navy came to life again he was commissioned one of the
first five lieutenants. In 1799 he was promoted to captain and in
command of the _Essex_ convoyed fourteen valuable merchantmen to China.
His high temper and strict discipline were, in the early part of his
Mediterranean service, to make him somewhat unpopular, but his great
qualities soon brought an admiration and regard which have come down
as a cherished tradition of the service, as warm to-day as a hundred
years since. It is to him should be given the credit of establishing
the character of the little navy which fought the War of 1812, covering
itself with fame, and bringing a new respect to our country which owes
his memory every honor, and continues to owe it in much greater measure
than ever paid.

The _Philadelphia_ was one of the first of the new squadron to arrive
abroad. Her haste brought good fortune. Hearing at Gibraltar of
Tripolitan vessels off Cape de Gatt, the southeastern corner of Spain,
Captain Bainbridge at once left, and, on the night of August 26th,
came in contact not with Tripolitans but with a Moorish ship, the
_Meshboha_, of twenty-two guns with a crew of 120 men, and a captured
brig from Boston, the _Celia_. We were not at war with Morocco, but the
Moorish captain said that he had made the capture anticipating war. The
_Philadelphia_ secured her prizes at Gibraltar and went to her station
off Tripoli.

When the _Constitution_ reached Gibraltar, Preble of course learned at
once of the occurrence mentioned, and with his flagship and three other
vessels, one of which was the _John Adams_, flying the broad-pennant of
Commodore Rodgers, who, though the senior officer, cheerfully gave his
services to the new commander-in-chief, went to Tangier and demanded
satisfaction. The result was the complete disavowal by Morocco of the
hostile action.



CHAPTER XII


We now come to the other and vastly more honorable phase of our
relations with the Barbary powers and to a series of actions which
form one of the most dramatic chapters of American naval history.
The _Philadelphia_ and schooner _Vixen_ were the only two vessels
blockading Tripoli. It was October, with much rough weather. Carried
by the gales well to the eastward of Tripoli, the _Philadelphia_ on
October 31st was returning, with the wind now shifted into the east,
to her station. Sighting a vessel inshore, she gave chase and pursued
until the soundings decreased to a danger point and the ship was hauled
off shore. The coast was practically uncharted. The depth increased and
then again suddenly decreased and the ship drove on to a reef which
was one of several to the eastward of the port, and between which, as
in most coral formations, was deep water. The chase, knowing well the
water, reached the harbor in safety. The firing had brought out nine
gunboats and no time was to be lost if the ship were to be saved. She
had driven up the smooth eastern slope of the reef her entire length.
Guns were thrown overboard, a few only being reserved for defence,
anchors cut from the bows, the foremast cut away, and every means taken
to lighten the ship without avail. The hostile gunboats took positions
from which they could safely fire; night was at hand; the _Vixen_
was unfortunately absent in search of a Tripolitan cruiser, and the
situation became such that it was imperative to surrender to save the
lives of the ship’s company. The magazine was “drowned,” holes bored
in the ship’s bottom, and all done which it was thought would insure
the loss of the ship. The colors were then lowered. The Tripolitan
crews acted in their usual manner, stripping the men of their clothing
and seizing everything valuable, snatching even from Bainbridge his
epaulets, gloves, watch, and money when in the boat of his captors.
It was ten at night when the 307 prisoners were landed at the town.
The officers were very civilly received in state by the Pacha, given
supper, and at one o’clock of the morning taken to the former American
consulate, a house good enough in itself but almost destitute of
furniture and other comforts. But for the kindness then shown by Mr.
Nicholas C. Nissen, the Danish consul, then as ever an unswerving
friend of American prisoners, their condition would have been greatly
more trying. His name should be held in grateful remembrance. He did
indeed receive the thanks of Congress and had the lasting gratitude of
the officers of the _Philadelphia_, who, after their release, presented
him in grateful recognition of his kindness with a handsome testimonial
of silver.

The men were confined in a warehouse much too small but were later
transferred to a larger. They were set to various kinds of work, even
to the building, as mentioned, of a fort which came to be known as the
American fort and received much maltreatment, particularly after the
burning of the _Philadelphia_ in the harbor, which soon came to pass.

The ship had been floated largely through the influence of a northerly
gale which had raised the water-level on the coast and had on November
5th been brought into the harbor. Her guns and anchors were weighed,
the former mounted, and work begun to put the ship in order. It is
seldom that the soul of man is more sorely tried than was that of her
gallant captain when he became conscious of this success of the enemy.

It was not until November 27th that Preble on his arrival at Malta
received news confirming rumors of the _Philadelphia’s_ loss in letters
from Bainbridge. In one of December 5, 1803, Bainbridge had suggested
the destruction of the _Philadelphia_, an idea which naturally had
already occurred to Preble. On December 17th the latter sailed for
Tripoli, taking with him the _Enterprise_, commanded by Decatur, who
captured on the way a ketch (or topsail schooner) named the _Mastico_,
with a crew of seventy. It was this captured vessel, renamed the
_Intrepid_, which was finally used in the coming adventure and has thus
come down through more than a century in the list of famous ships.

There was no trouble in finding officers or men for the duty, but the
whole was finally turned over to the commander of the _Enterprise_
to arrange, and her crew only was to be employed except that five
midshipmen of the _Constitution_ were detailed to assist. Sixty-two men
of the _Enterprise_ were taken. The officers were Decatur, commanding;
Lieutenants Lawrence, Bainbridge, and Thorn, and Midshipman
Macdonough, all of the _Enterprise_; Midshipmen Izard, Morris, Laws,
Davis, and Rowe of the _Constitution_, and Salvador Catalano as pilot.
Nearly two months from the inception had been spent in maturing the
plans, and on the evening of February 3d the _Intrepid_ and _Siren_
sailed together from Syracuse and were off Tripoli on the 7th. A gale
of wind drove them to sea, and it was not until the 16th that they
were again off Tripoli. At dark the _Intrepid_ was two miles from the
entrance, and here Midshipman T. O. Anderson, with a boat and nine men
from the _Siren_ (which was disguised as a merchantman), was taken on
board. This made a total of eighty-four in the _Intrepid_. A careful
division of duties had been made. Decatur, two midshipmen, and fifteen
men were to hold the spar (or upper) deck; the others were to look
after the lower decks except a midshipman and his boat’s crew who were
to secure the _Philadelphia’s_ boats and prevent the escape ashore of
the Tripolitan crew. The watchword was “Philadelphia.”

The captured ship had her main and mizzen topmasts housed (partially
lowered), the foremast which had been cut away was not yet replaced;
the sails were unbent and her lower yards lying across the bulwarks.
Her forty guns were all loaded. She was lying in front of the castle
well inshore.

The night was almost calm with a smooth sea and a young moon, and the
_Intrepid_ crept slowly in, apparently exciting no distrust. The main
part of her crew was kept concealed, only some ten or twelve being
visible. She was steered straight for the _Philadelphia’s_ bow.

When still some distance off, a hail from the _Philadelphia_ was
answered by the pilot, who stated the vessel to be from Malta, and
that her anchors having been lost in a gale, permission was asked to
make fast to the ship. A sudden shift of wind brought the _Intrepid_
under the frigate’s broadside and she drifted slowly astern, exposed
to the _Philadelphia’s_ port broadside at a distance of about forty
yards. So completely were the Tripolitans deceived that they lowered a
boat and sent a line. Some of the _Intrepid’s_ men had meanwhile got
into her boat and taken one to the frigate’s fore chains (supports
to the shrouds). They then took the line from the frigate’s boat
which had been run from the after part of the ship and made it fast
aboard the _Intrepid_. Both lines were hauled upon by the men lying
down concealed on her deck. On getting near the _Philadelphia_ the
_Intrepid’s_ anchors were discovered. On this, the Tripolitans prepared
to cut the fasts, passing the cry of “Americanos.” A strong pull
brought the _Intrepid_ alongside, “where she was secured quick as
thought.”

The ship was immediately boarded. The Tripolitans crowded over to the
starboard side and forward, offering practically no resistance, and
large numbers jumped overboard. There was some struggle below, “but in
less than ten minutes Decatur was on the quarter deck in undisturbed
possession of his prize.”

The orders to destroy the ship and not attempt to get her away, which
in the circumstances of not a sail bent or a yard aloft would have been
almost impossible, were imperative. The arrangements for firing her
were so complete that the combustibles prepared were alight in a few
minutes, and in some twenty-five minutes from boarding the Americans
were hastening out of the ship to escape the flames. Their movements
were none too quick to escape; the fasts were cut and the _Intrepid_
shoved clear only just in time herself to escape burning. The sixteen
sweeps were manned, and, aided by a light breeze, the little vessel
with her brave crew intact swept out of the harbor under the fire of
the batteries and the thunder of the _Philadelphia’s_ own guns as they
heated and discharged themselves, one broadside toward the town, the
other toward the English fort. The only shot striking the _Intrepid_
was one passing through her topgallantsail. She was met outside the
harbor by the _Siren’s_ boats. The _Siren’s_ commander had seen the
rocket-signal, agreed upon, from the _Philadelphia_, and in the calm
had used his sweeps to close in and protect the _Intrepid_ should
she be attacked. Before the signal could be answered the flames were
running aloft in the _Philadelphia_. “Presently a boat was seen coming
alongside and a man in a sailor’s jacket sprang over the gangway of the
brig. It was Decatur to announce his victory!”[22] On the 19th both
vessels were again at Syracuse. This brilliant exploit made Decatur
a captain at the age of twenty-five and promoted most of those who
accompanied him. It remains as one of the most gallant and successful
adventures of the sea, remarkable particularly for the coolness of its
procedure and calm courage of execution. It was worthy of all the
praise given it at the time and which has continued undimmed.

       *       *       *       *       *

The loss of the _Philadelphia_ and Decatur’s exploit gave an impetus
to naval affairs, which struggled then, as ever since, under
conditions of want of knowledge in our legislators and a poor system
of administration. There was, for example, not a drydock in the whole
country. “Facts,” as Fenimore Cooper expresses it, “were still leading
opinion, and the gallant men who were slowly fighting themselves into
favor were merely performing an office that would seem inseparable from
the advancement of every free people in civilization.”

Preble’s whole force before Tripoli in July, 1804, was the frigate
_Constitution_, six small vessels of from 12 to 16 guns each, six
gunboats, and two bomb-vessels; an excellent force for blockading and
for attacking the Tripolitan gunboats, which hugged the shores, but not
for bombarding the batteries in which were 115 guns.

From now on many brilliant actions between the smaller craft took
place, in one of which was a famous incident of the general attack of
August 4, 1804, when Decatur, having already boarded and taken one
gunboat, boarded another. The captain of the second was a large and
powerful Turk who seized the pike with which Decatur attacked him and
used it against the latter, who parried with his sword which broke at
the hilt. The pike entered the fleshy part of Decatur’s breast. Decatur
succeeded in tearing it out and grappled with the Turk. Both fell, the
Turk uppermost. He felt for his poniard, but Decatur, grasping his
arm with one hand, was able to take a small pistol from his waistcoat
pocket and passing his arm around the Turk fired it into his back. The
ball passed entirely through his foe and lodged in Decatur’s clothes.
While this was going on, another raised a sabre to cleave Decatur,
but a young seaman, named Daniel Fraisher,[23] interposed his arm,
which was nearly severed at the wrist. Lieutenant Trippe of Gunboat
No. 6 had an equally desperate encounter. His own and the enemy’s
gunboat separated with the shock, leaving only nine Americans aboard
the Tripolitan. Trippe was attacked by a powerful young Turk, who
inflicted eight sabre wounds in the head and two in the breast. Trippe
was brought to his knees, but he was able to give his adversary a
final thrust with his short pike, which ended the struggle. When the
captain thus fell, the others surrendered. The desperate nature of the
struggle undertaken by the six gunboats in the action may be understood
when it is known that the two boats captured by Decatur carried about
eighty men; of these fifty-two were known to be killed and wounded,
many jumped overboard, and only eight unwounded prisoners were taken.
Stephen Decatur’s brother James had command of Gunboat No. 2. In
boarding, he was shot through the forehead and died that evening.

The details of the many sanguinary actions during Preble’s blockade
cannot be given. Three captured gunboats, numbered 7, 8, and 9, were
changed in rig and added to the fleet. On August 7th No. 7 blew up
in action and of her crew of twenty-eight, ten, including Lieutenant
Caldwell, her commander, and Midshipman Dorsey, were killed, and six
wounded.

The arrival of the _John Adams_ on August 8th brought the unwelcome
word to Preble of the coming of a new and more powerful force under
Commodore Samuel Barron, his senior. This, as it was arranged, was
an unfortunate necessity, as a new squadron could not be organized
without putting in command some of Preble’s seniors, and it was
deplored by the Secretary of the Navy in a letter to Preble. It is
not, however, readily seen why the crews with Preble, the times of
which had expired, could not have been replaced by new crews, and
only the two captains junior to him sent. It was an act which showed
feeble unaccustomedness to administration. Preble wrote in his private
journal: “How much my feelings are lacerated by this supersedure at
the moment of victory cannot be described and can be felt only by an
officer placed in my mortifying situation.” He kept up his attacks,
however, while awaiting his relief, and on the night of August 24th,
after being much delayed by heavy weather, a night attack was made
by bombardment with little reply. This was renewed on the 28th; one
Tripolitan gunboat was sunk, two ran ashore, and the rest retreated.
The town was subjected to a heavy bombardment during which a 24-pound
shot entered the quarters of the captive Americans, covering Bainbridge
in the débris.

On September 3d came Preble’s fifth and last attack by bombardment. The
next evening the _Intrepid_ was sent in with the intent of blowing
her up in the midst of the Tripolitan fleet. A compartment was built
in which was placed 15,000 pounds of powder connected with a slow
match expected to take fifteen minutes in burning. Over the powder was
placed one hundred 13-inch and fifty 9-inch shells, with a quantity of
solid shot and pig-iron ballast. She was commanded by Commander Richard
Somers, who volunteered for the work and took with him, as the only
other officer, Lieutenant Wadsworth of the _Constitution_. Ten men
were taken. At the last moment, before parting company with the three
vessels which accompanied the _Intrepid_ to a point near the entrance
and stood by to receive the boats when they should return, Lieutenant
Joseph Israel of the _Constitution_ went aboard the _Intrepid_ to carry
a message from the commodore and begged so to stay that Somers allowed
him to do so.

The night was dark and the _Intrepid_ was soon lost in the gloom,
when at 9:47, as marked in the log of the _Constitution_, there was a
terrific explosion, followed by cries of terror and beating of drums
in the town and then silence. The boats which were to return never
came. The bodies of the three officers and ten men were from time to
time recovered by the Tripolitans, but the explosion, which evidently
occurred before intended, has ever remained a mystery.

Among the six names which appear on the monument now at the Naval
Academy, erected by their brother officers to those killed at Tripoli,
are those of the three then lost, the three other names being Caldwell,
James Decatur, and Dorsey. The total loss in Preble’s squadron in these
eleven months at Tripoli was thirty-two killed and twenty-two wounded.



CHAPTER XIII


Preble left for home without having come to terms with the Pacha
of Tripoli. He was not willing to rise above $500 for each of the
captives, and would offer nothing for peace or for tribute. Had he
remained, it is very possible that he would have forced a peace without
a ransom. Peace, however, was to come under his successor largely
through one of the extraordinary adventures of our history.

Yusuf Karamanli, the Pacha of Tripoli, was the youngest of three
brothers. In 1790 at the age of twenty he murdered the eldest, and when
his father died in 1796, and the second brother, Hamet, was absent,
he proclaimed himself Pacha. Hamet, rather a weakling, took refuge in
Tunis, leaving his family at Tripoli. He had taken up arms against
his brother, using Derne, some 500 miles east of Tripoli, as a base,
but he was unsuccessful, and in 1804 fled to Egypt. The government in
Washington, influenced largely by ex-Consul Eaton, had decided to use
Hamet as an asset in the war against Yusuf, and thus placed at the
disposition of the commodore a moderate amount of money and military
supplies. Eaton was appointed a navy agent under Commodore Barron,
with a recommendation from the Secretary of the Navy to use him in
connection with an effort to establish Hamet at Tripoli in place of his
brother Yusuf. It was a scheme in full accord with Eaton’s adventurous
spirit and worthy his real ability.

The _Argus_, Captain Hull, thus left Malta in September, 1804, for
Alexandria, nominally to convoy thence any vessels desiring protection,
but really to carry Eaton to find Hamet and convey him to whatever
should be decided as the most convenient point from which to act
against Tripoli. Hamet was up the Nile. Eaton explained frankly his
intentions to the Viceroy and passports were obtained for himself and
Hamet out of Egypt. Hamet was finally reached, but such obstacles to
leaving by sea were raised through the influence of the French consul
that it was decided to go by land, it being feared that the few Arabs
whom Hamet had raised might otherwise disappear. The _Argus_ sailed for
Malta with a letter from Eaton to the commodore requesting “that the
expedition be met at Bomba Bay sixty miles east of Derne, with two
more small vessels, a bomb-ketch, two field pieces, a hundred muskets,
a hundred marines, and ten thousand dollars.” A convention was made
with Hamet, the United States promising to do all that was proper and
right to reinstate him, reimbursement of expenses to come from tribute
paid by other nations. Eaton was to be recognized as commander-in-chief
of the land forces operating against the usurping brother.

The army was a motley array of some four hundred, though Eaton
says many thousands could have been had had there been money and
subsistence. There were besides Eaton nine Americans: Lieutenant
O’Bannon, Midshipman Peck, and seven marines; an English volunteer;
forty Greeks; some Arab horsemen, etc., and a caravan of 107 camels
and a few asses. These began on March 8th a march across 500 and
more miles to Derne. Bomba was reached after immense difficulties on
April 15th. Signal-fires were built on a high hill which were sighted
by the _Argus_. She brought a cheering letter from the commodore
announcing aid. Two days later the _Hornet_ arrived with an abundance
of provisions, and on the 23d, after a rest of a week, the march of
sixty miles to Derne was resumed. This was made in two days. Derne
was attacked on the 27th from land and from sea by the _Hornet_ and
_Nautilus_ (which had also arrived). The town was occupied after a
strong resistance and some loss. A Tripolitan force now appeared, and
there were unsuccessful efforts to dislodge Eaton’s forces. After May
18th the attacks ceased. Dispatches were sent to the commodore, and
only the _Argus_ remained at Derne. On May 19th there came dispatches
from the commodore announcing peace negotiations, and on June 11th came
the _Constellation_ announcing peace and with orders to evacuate Derne.
There was nothing for the Americans to do but to embark, taking with
them Hamet and his suite, twenty-five foreign cannoniers with their
artillery, and the small party of Greeks. It was a pitiful abandonment
of men who were our allies, brought about through the influence of
Consul-General Lear, who, as previously mentioned, had been invested
with full authority to negotiate a peace.

Lear had spent the winter of 1804-1805 with Commodore Barron at
Malta, over whom he acquired, in Barron’s weakened condition of mind
and health, a great influence. He was strongly opposed to Eaton’s
expedition, and was the main factor in causing it to collapse; the aim
of the expedition, which was the capture of Tripoli and dethronement
of the Pacha, was not in accord with his views. On May 26th Lear
arrived off Tripoli from Malta in the _Essex_, which delivered to
Captain Rodgers of the _Constitution_ a letter from Barron announcing
the necessity of the relinquishment by the latter of the command. Lear
had already been informed by a letter written by the Danish consul
at Tripoli of the probability of the Pacha’s willingness to treat,
and at once on his arrival began negotiations. The preliminaries,
after parleys of more than a week, were signed on June 3d. Prisoners
were to be exchanged, the United States paying a balance of $60,000.
A year was allowed to settle disputes before action; prisoners were
no longer to be enslaved, and were at the conclusion of peace to be
restored without ransom. No tribute was to be paid in future. Hamet
was to be “persuaded” to withdraw from Derne, and his family was to be
restored to him. There was, however, a secret article which allowed
the Pacha four years in which to make this restoration. The unwisdom
of placing the negotiations wholly in the hands of Lear had resulted
in an unsatisfactory peace, and attacks ensued which must have
caused him much bitterness; for General Eaton, as he was now called,
pursued him violently in the press and before Congress to the end,
in 1811, of Eaton’s life. Lear was strongly criticised in Congress
itself, Senator Timothy Pickering declaring his conduct inexcusable.
Madison’s instructions as Secretary of State anticipated that peace
would be made “without any price or pecuniary compensation whatever”;
and so undoubtedly it would have been had negotiations been put in
the hands of the commodore of the now powerful force before Tripoli.
Nor would Eaton’s wonderful action have gone for nought, nor would
Hamet, whom we had made our ally, been thrown overboard with so little
consideration. Commodore Rodgers allowed him two hundred dollars
monthly to support himself and some fifteen dependents at Syracuse (the
winter headquarters of the fleet) until twenty-four hundred dollars
was voted him by Congress in 1806. His family, through pressure of our
consul, was restored to him in October, 1807, and though his brother
gave him residence in Morocco and a pension, and later the governorship
of Derne, he had, two years later, to flee with his family to Egypt,
where he died.

Eaton was received on his return with honor. Massachusetts granted him
ten thousand acres in Maine (then a part of Massachusetts) and Congress
met his disbursements. The expedition to Derne had cost forty thousand
dollars but Eaton declined everything for himself but his personal
expenses. He died in 1811 at the age of fifty-seven, ending, too early,
a life of picturesque adventure, patriotic effort, and undaunted
courage. He is worthy of memory.

       *       *       *       *       *

Commodore Rodgers now turned his attention to Tunis, where threatening
conditions had arisen from the capture of two Tunis vessels which had
attempted to run the blockade of Tripoli. He appeared on August 1st
with nearly his whole force. A fortnight later, on an appearance of
delay, Rodgers informed Lear officially that the Dey “must do one of
three things by simple request or must do all three by force. He must
give [a guarantee for the maintenance of peace to be witnessed by the
English and French consuls], or he must give sufficient security for
peace and send a minister to the United States, or he must make such
alterations in the [existing] treaty as you may require and as may
satisfy you that there is confidence to be placed in what he does. I
have only to repeat that if he does not do all that is necessary and
proper, at the risk of my conduct being disapproved by my country, he
shall feel the vengeance of the squadron now in this bay.”

Rodgers now in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy of August 21,
1805, laid down the honorable dictum which has ever been a rule of
conduct with the navy that: “Peace on honorable terms is always
preferable to war.” If chastisement were to be inflicted he begged the
honor of being the instrument, pledging that if he should be instructed
by March, 1806, that he would obtain an honorable peace before
September, making the Dey to pay all the expenses of the war, and that,
too, without any increase of force. The Dey had, however, already
accepted the proposal of sending a minister to the United States, and
had agreed to keep the peace until the result of the mission should be
known.

Our Barbary difficulties were, with occasional troubles of a moderate
nature, ended for nearly ten years. We continued, under the treaty
with Algiers, to send an annual tribute of marine stores to the value
of twenty-one thousand dollars. This, however, was but a remnant of
our early weakness and an honorable carrying out of a treaty. The
spectacle of the treatment of our commerce by France and England
roused the envy of the Dey of Algiers, and finally the War of 1812
overcame any good resolutions the then Dey had, and spoliation began
anew. Thus, immediately after the peace, a powerful fleet was sent
into the Mediterranean under Decatur, followed by another under
Bainbridge, whose flagship, the _Independence_, 74, was the first
American ship-of-the-line in foreign waters. Farragut, who had already
seen three years of most stirring service and was then but fourteen,
was a midshipman aboard. But before Bainbridge had arrived Decatur had
appeared before Algiers and “at the mouths of our cannon,” as Decatur
expressed in his dispatch to the Navy Department, dictated a peace
which abolished tribute in any form forever, released all Americans,
and forced compensation for, and restoration of, all American property
seized or in the Dey’s hands. This was within six weeks of the sailing
of the fleet from home. Decatur then visited Tunis and Tripoli, and
forced the instant payment at each place of indemnities for British
prizes which, taken into port by an American privateer, had been seized
later by the British. Of course the British consul protested, but
without avail. He also caused the release of two Danes in remembrance
of the unceasing kindness to Americans, through many years, of
the Danish consul, Nissen, and of a Sicilian family of eight, in
consideration of aid given to Preble by the king of the two Sicilies.
It was a fine instance of gratitude acknowledged.

Thus, practically, ended our troubles with Barbary. “It was not
to be endured,” said the English naval historian, Brenton, “that
England should tolerate what America had resented and punished,” and
thus after one abortive threat, when he paid heavy ransom for 1,200
Neapolitans and Sicilians, during the negotiations for which he was
grossly insulted, and the British consul and his family treated “in a
manner the most scandalous and insulting,”[24] Lord Exmouth was sent
in August, 1816, with a powerful fleet, which, combined with a Dutch
force, bombarded Algiers to subjection, and Christian slavery was at
an end. The Dey shortly before this having shown signs of regretting
having made the American treaty, another powerful American fleet
appeared shortly after Lord Exmouth’s bombardment, which removed the
intention of renewal of hostile acts.

Thus ended, practically, the extraordinary career of piracy and slavery
which through so many generations had been submitted to by Europe.
It was not, however, until 1824, when the demand for continuance of
tribute from Holland was successfully resisted, that Algiers finally
dismissed the idea of return to her ancient ways.

It should be a proud memory to Americans that it was the American navy
which first resisted and brought to terms the barbarous corsairs, so
long the scourge of commerce and enslavers of white men. The Frenchman
Dupuy, at the end of his admirable history of our Barbary wars, pays
us a fine tribute, saying: “The statesmen [of America], breaking
loose from the unworthy yielding of Europe to the Barbary States, had
in hardly thirty years broken the abominable traditions which the
Christian powers had shamefully respected for ages.”[25]



CHAPTER XIV


While we were fighting the Algerines, we were suffering from
depredations on our commerce by France and England a hundredfold more
serious than all we had undergone from the African corsairs. The story
is as shameful to the statesmanship of the period as our stand with
regard to Barbary was honorable.

Napoleon dominated Europe by land; England by sea. The former’s great
aim after subjecting the Continental states, rotten with the decaying
feudalism of the past centuries, was to destroy English supremacy by
closing all Europe to English commerce, an effort which was to fail
through one of the greatest instincts of man, that of trade. Almost
universal war thus made neutral America the great carrier; our shipping
increased by amazing bounds and covered every sea. But between the
two great antagonists it was to be heavily ground. Our losses were in
many millions, our ships for a considerable period being seized at an
average of three a day. It would take a book much larger than this
to go into the details of this question which looms so large even to
this day. Added to the question of ships was that of impressment of
our seamen who were taken out of our merchantmen, and in two cases
from men-of-war, to man those of the British navy, on the claim that
a British subject was always a subject. In carrying out this dictum,
a vast number of Americans were claimed as such from mere appearance
or other characteristic or for no reason whatever except that he was a
likely man. Over 11,000 were to be so taken before, in 1812, we went to
war.

Jefferson was President for the eight years beginning March 4, 1801.
His residence as minister in France from 1785 to 1788 had given him
as mentioned leanings which affected all his later views, despite the
monstrous excesses of the French Revolution. He had very peculiar
ideas of the ocean-carrying trade, mentioning it as: “this protuberant
navigation which has kept us in hot water from the commencement
of the government.” He would “an’ he could,” have made of America
a rural community, apparently not being able to comprehend that
man is, by nature, a trader; that trade is the real civilizer and
missioner beyond all other endeavors combined. Linked with this was a
willingness to submit the country to unparalleled insult and injury
in the seizure of ships and impressment of our seamen without taking
any efficient or reasonable steps to resist such outrages. The extent
of our Government’s submission is well shown by Captain Basil Hall in
his most interesting reminiscences as a seaman. Describing his life
as a midshipman in the _Leander_, in the middle years of Jefferson’s
administration, he says: “Every morning at daybreak during our stay off
New York we set about arresting the progress of all vessels we saw,
firing off guns to the right and left, to make every ship that was
running in heave to, or wait until we had leisure to send a boat on
board ‘to see,’ in our lingo, ‘what she was made of.’ I have frequently
known a dozen, and sometimes a couple of dozen ships, lying to, a
league or two off the port, losing their fair wind, their tide and,
worse than all, their market, for many hours, sometimes the whole day,
before our search was completed.”

A crowning outrage came in 1807 when the frigate _Chesapeake_ flying
the broad-pennant of Commodore Samuel Barron was leaving for the
Mediterranean. She had been preparing for some time for sea, but
finally was hurried off in a state wholly unfit to go suddenly into
action with any vessel of moderate force, and certainly not with the
much more powerful ship which was about to attack her. This ship, the
_Leopard_, of 54 guns, had been lying, along with several other British
men-of-war, in Lynnhaven Bay, just within the Capes of the Chesapeake.
They were watching for two French frigates then lying off Annapolis.
This occupancy, for such a purpose, of our waters, was in itself an
insulting abuse of our neutrality, though Jefferson could speak of it
as “enjoying our hospitality.”

The _Chesapeake_ passed out of the capes about noon on June 22, 1807.
When about ten miles outside the _Leopard_ hailed saying she had a
dispatch for Commodore Barron. This “dispatch” proved to be a copy of
an order from the British admiral, Berkeley, to search the _Chesapeake_
for deserters from certain British ships, the order to be first
shown to her captain. On Barron’s refusal to submit to such outrage
the _Chesapeake_ was fired into by the _Leopard_, without, in the
unprepared state of the ship, being able to return a gun. Twenty-one
men were killed and wounded, the ship searched and four of the crew,
claimed as British deserters, were taken away. “Of these, one was
hanged, one died, and the other two, after prolonged disputation, were
returned five years later to the deck of the _Chesapeake_ in formal
reparation.” A deeper insult to a nation could scarcely have been
offered. All the same, it ended only on the part of the administration
in what may be called a fit of sulks known as the embargo, which from
December, 1807, to March, 1809, took American commerce by the throat
and forbade our merchant ships to go to sea. It was much as if a man
should reduce himself to bread and water as a revenge against an enemy.

Jefferson, meanwhile, with the British practically blockading our ports
and taking men from vessels entering New York and other harbors, was
seized with a passion for gunboats, and shortly after the _Chesapeake_
incident, which cried aloud for ships-of-the-line instead of the two
hundred petty toys he devised and caused to be built, and which could
not go to sea without striking their one gun into the hold, we find
him saying: “Believing, myself, that gunboats are the only water
defence which can be useful to us, and protect us from the ruinous
folly of a navy, I am pleased with everything which promises to
improve them.”[26] It was a mind far better fitted to deal with the
manipulations of a political party than with the care of a nation
which he was not so very far from wrecking by an insensate policy of
peace at any price. Peace, however, cannot be kept by one only of
the interested parties declaring such a preference. One must be in
a position to command peace, and this failure was Jefferson’s great
mistake, a mistake which from every point of view was to cost us dear.
“Whether with or without a war, a navy would have saved us the six
years of humiliation which were to intervene between 1806 and 1812; it
would have saved the embargo which was to tie to the wharves in rotting
idleness more than a million tons of shipping which had been engaged in
foreign trade; to bring grass-grown streets to our greatest ports, and
strain the sentiment of the several sections of the Union to the point
of separation. It would have saved the War of 1812, the capture and
burning of Washington, and the shameful ineptitude, with one brilliant
exception, of our army commanders in that contest.... There would have
been a cessation of British impressment and there would have been no
such orders in council as those directed to the destruction of American
commerce; or had these come before America was ready with her navy
there would have been quick renunciation.”[27]

Gallatin, Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury, pressed to apply the
surplus of two millions a year (“and,” said he, “it is a very low
calculation”), which he considered would be lost in case of war, wholly
“to the building of ships of the line.”[28] Said Gouverneur Morris in
the Senate (and it was the expression of one of the ablest minds of
the country): “When we have twenty ships-of-the-line at sea, and there
is no good reason why we should not have them, we shall be respected
by all Europe.... The expense compared with the benefit is moderate,
nay, trifling. Whatever sums are necessary to secure the national
independence must be paid.... If we will not pay to be defended, we
must pay for being conquered.”[29]

Instead of a fleet which would have commanded respect, the United
States had built in the years 1801-1811 “two sloops of 18 guns and
two brigs of 16, and out of twelve frigates had permitted three to rot
at their moorings”; and this while 917 American ships had been seized
by the British, many more than this number by the French, and our men
taken from our vessels by the thousand and impressed into the British
service. There is an official record of 6,257 of these, but it is known
that the number ran to over 11,000. Such things, if we were to survive
as a nation, could only bring war, whether Jefferson and Madison wished
war or not. The instigators of such conditions had not long to wait to
repent their folly.

The affair of the _Chesapeake_ had stirred the soul of the little navy,
at least, to its depth. There were now, in 1810, in commission, the
_President_, 44; _Constitution_, 44; _United States_, 44; _Essex_, 32;
_John Adams_, 24; _Wasp_, 18; _Hornet_, 18; _Argus_, 16; _Siren_, 16;
_Nautilus_, 12; _Enterprise_, 12, _Vixen_, 12. The whole list is given,
as nearly all these were to make names for themselves. Attention, too,
began to be turned to the lakes, for war was now foreseen by all naval
officers and at least some of the administration. The British had a
considerable force upon the American coast, but they were now more
chary of giving offence. The danger was emphasized on May 16, 1811,
when the _President_, carrying Commodore Rodgers’s broad-pennant,
and at sea on account of having heard of the impressment of a seaman
near Sandy Hook, sighted a strange man-of-war which stood away. The
_President_ gave chase but did not come near until about 8:30 in the
evening when, on a hail from the _President_, the stranger fired a gun
which struck the _President’s_ mainmast. The latter at once fired a
broadside, and recognizing shortly that her antagonist was disabled
ceased fire. The other began anew but was soon silenced. At daylight
the _President_ sent a boat and found that the ship was the British
sloop-of-war, _Little Belt_, of 18 guns. She had suffered severely and
thirty-one of her people had been killed and wounded. Offers of aid
were given but declined, and the British cruiser stood for Halifax.

Naturally the strong tension already existing was increased and matters
moved rapidly. On June 18, 1812, the United States declared war.

At the moment of America’s declaration of war against England Napoleon
was on his way to Russia with an army destined never to return. Spain
was being desolated by the struggle of the French and British in
the peninsula; all the Spanish provinces in South America were in
revolution. With the entry of the United States the whole western
world was at war.

Our population at this time, excluding negroes, was about 7,500,000;
that of Great Britain was about 15,000,000. We had a navy of three
large and one small frigate, one sloop-of-war, and seven smaller
vessels, with 500 officers, of whom twelve were captains. There were
5,230 men in the enlisted force, of whom 2,436 were destined for the
cruising ships, “the remainder being for service at the forts and navy
yards, in the gunboats, and on the lakes.” In the British navy were
over a thousand ships.

There can of course be no comparison between such forces; nor could
there in the long run be any doubt as to the result, but the American
navy was to achieve, in the unequal struggle, a series of victories
which brought results psychically the equal of victories of great
fleets. It is not that we were continuously victorious, but in the main
our success was so great and of a character to which the British navy
and public were so unaccustomed that our victories were a staggering
blow to Britain’s self-sufficiency. It must be remembered that the
French navy of Louis XVI’s time had been, so far as officers and morale
were concerned, swept out of existence by the French Revolution. The
French fleet of the Consular and Napoleonic period was now not only
ill-officered, but through the constant blockades of the British had
but little of the sea habit by which only a navy can be efficient. The
Spanish navy had no real organization or other qualities of success
under circumstances of even much worse neglect. The British ships,
well officered, well manned, and with constant sea practice, had no
real antagonists, for it is absurd to compare in efficiency such
organizations as that which fought under Nelson at Trafalgar and those
under Villeneuve and Gravina in the same battle. The American navy was
to show a different standard.



CHAPTER XV


There were three important and epoch-making events in the war: the
victory of the _Constitution_ over the _Guerrière_, the battle of Lake
Erie, and the battle of Lake Champlain. Each of these was of such
immense importance that they overshadow all others, picturesque and
striking as others were.

The administration had at first only considered the laying up of our
ships, but the indignant protests of our naval officers caused another
course. The first ships to get to sea were those at New York: the
_President_, 44, Commodore Rodgers; the _Essex_, 32, Captain David
Porter; and the _Hornet_, 18, Master Commandant Lawrence. These were
joined down the bay on June 21st by the _United States_, 44, Commodore
Decatur; and the _Congress_, 36, Lieutenant Commandant Sinclair from
Norfolk. All except the _Essex_, which was overhauling her rigging, got
to sea on the 21st, immediately after the reception of the declaration
of war, and stood southeast to intercept a reported fleet of West
Indiamen. On June 23d, however, a frigate, later known to be the
_Belvidera_, was sighted and chased. On nearing her, Rodgers himself
went forward to direct the firing, and at 4:30 he fired the starboard
forecastle gun, the first shot of the war. The next gun was fired from
the main deck by the officer of the division, and a third was fired
by Rodgers. The three shots had all struck the chase, killing and
wounding seven men. A fourth was now fired from the main deck. This
gun burst, lifting the forecastle deck, killing and wounding sixteen
men. Among the latter was Rodgers, who was thrown into the air and in
falling broke his leg. The forward guns being thrown out of action, the
_President_ was obliged to yaw from time to time to bring her broadside
guns to bear. This gave the chase an advantage which was added to by
her throwing overboard boats and anchors and fourteen tons of water. By
midnight she was out of danger. The _President_ does not seem to have
been handled as well as she might have been, but account must be taken
of the very serious accident aboard and of the injury to the commodore.
The _Belvidera’s_ fire killed and wounded six of the _President’s_
crew. She was well handled and her captain, Richard Byron, deserves
marked credit for his escape. Rodgers continued his cruise in pursuit
of the West Indiaman as far as the entrance to the English Channel,
but by August 31st was in Boston, having made but seven prizes and one
recapture.

The _Essex_ did not leave New York until June 23d. The ship carried,
mostly, only carronades which were totally inefficient except at close
quarters. This fact placed her at a great disadvantage when in meeting
a convoy of troops she was unable to bring to action the convoying
frigate. She cut out, however, one ship with 197 soldiers aboard.
But on August 13th she captured the sloop-of-war, _Alert_, of twenty
18-pounder carronades, the first man-of-war prize of the war. The
_Essex_ returned to New York on September 7th, having taken ten prizes
and 423 prisoners.

The _Constitution_, Captain Hull, had returned, just before the
outbreak of the war, from Europe where she had been sent to pay the
interest on our Dutch loan. She shipped a new crew, and on July 12th
sailed from Annapolis. On the 17th when off the Virginia coast, and
barely out of sight of land, six vessels were discovered, one of which,
as it turned out, and much the nearest, being the _Guerrière_. The
next morning, the weather almost calm, there were four frigates, a
ship-of-the-line, and a brig and a schooner just out of gunshot; the
two last were prizes. There then ensued a chase famous in American
naval annals for the admirable way in which the _Constitution_ was
handled, and for her success. She hoisted out her boats in the calm
and towed; the enemy put the boats of two ships to tow the headmost.
Their advantage was overcome by Hull’s using all the cordage of the
ship available for such a purpose in running a kedge ahead nearly
half a mile and hauling in upon the hawser. The kedges thus employed
caused the _Constitution_ to gain largely until the enemy discovered
the method and himself applied it. For two days this most exciting and
exhausting chase continued. On the evening of the 20th there was a
heavy squall, which was utilized by Hull with the utmost judgment and
during which a large gain in distance was made. On its clearing away
all apprehension ended; all but two of the frigates were far distant
and most of the fleet hull down. At 8:15 next morning the English gave
up the chase, thus ending as exciting three days and nights as any of
the war. The admirable manner in which the _Constitution_ was handled
has ever been the admiration of seamen.

The _Constitution_ went into Boston, but Hull, fearing orders for
detachment, which in fact were on the way from Washington, hurried
to sea again on August 2d. On the 19th, at a point some 400 miles
southeast of Halifax, he met the British frigate, _Guerrière_, Captain
Dacres. The latter on the _Constitution’s_ near approach lay-to with
her maintopsail to the mast, showing her willingness to engage. The
battle began a little after 6:00 P.M., and before seven the _Guerrière_
was dismasted and in a sinking condition. Her crew was taken off; she
was set afire, and in a quarter of an hour blew up. The _Constitution_
was practically uninjured and in a few hours could have gone into
action again. She was, it is true, the heavier ship, with thirty
24-pounders against the _Guerrière’s_ thirty 18’s, and twenty-four
32-pounder carronades against the _Guerrière’s_ sixteen; and a total
of 55 guns and 468 men against the _Guerrière’s_ 49 guns and 272 men,
but the injury was entirely disproportionate. The _Guerrière_ had
seventy-nine men killed and wounded. The _Constitution_ had seven
killed and seven wounded. The _Guerrière_ lost every mast and her hull
was so riddled that she could not be carried into port. So little was
the _Constitution_ injured that in the same evening all damage was
repaired and another ship, supposedly an enemy, which appeared at 2:00
A.M., sheered off.

The ships were not markedly different in size, the _Constitution_ being
1,576 tons American measurement, the _Guerrière_ 1,338 British. But by
the latter the _Constitution_ would have been but 1,426. The difference
in size and force, however, was a small matter considering the fact
that before the outbreak of the war it was confidently affirmed that
British sloops-of-war would lie alongside American frigates with
impunity.

The capture of the _Guerrière_ by the _Constitution_ is a great
landmark in our history--a second “shot heard round the world.” It was
not simply the taking of a British frigate; it was a second declaration
of American independence. We had so long been called spaniels and curs
in the British press; we had so long submitted basely (the word is none
too strong to describe our administration of the Jeffersonian period);
there had become so strongly entrenched in the British and French mind
that we would submit to any insult so long as our ships might sail,
even at the cost of the immense toll they took of them, that our going
to war was considered impossible. New England, the chief sufferer, was
in a dangerous spirit which threatened secession. All this changed
instantly when the news spread from town to town, from farm to farm.
The Americans became another people. It revived the dormant spirit
of nationality and gave a deathblow to the disunionist spirit of
the period. How it permeated the soul of the country was shown in a
remarkable way at the death of a lady of the Adams family in 1903.
Born in 1808, she was but four years old at the time of the battle,
but so vividly had the exultation of her elders been impressed upon
the child’s mind, that on the day of her death, more than ninety years
after, her mind reverted to but one thought, the most deeply impressed
of her childhood. In tremulous tones, though otherwise apparently
unconscious, she kept repeating through this last day of her life the
expression of her elders in 1812: “Thank God for Hull’s victory.”[30]
Nothing could show more strongly the immensity of exultation and
relief. The _Constitution_ was to have other victories, was to come
unscathed through the war, and was for many years to carry our flag
in honor in many seas; but this victory alone should enshrine the ship
in the hearts of all true Americans as an instrument which went far to
preserve this Union and its government. Fortunately, through Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s noble poem, she still remains, honored in her old age,
a glorious memory of victory in a noble cause.

       *       *       *       *       *

On October 18th the sloop-of-war _Wasp_, of 18 guns and 135 men,
commanded by Captain Jacob Jones, captured the British brig _Frolic_,
of 19 guns and 110 men. The first lieutenant, Biddle, who had gallantly
led the boarders, hauled down the _Frolic’s_ flag at 12:15, forty-three
minutes after the beginning of the action. Almost at once afterward
both of the _Frolic’s_ masts went by the board. Not twenty of her men
had escaped unhurt. Every officer was wounded, and the first lieutenant
and master died soon after. Her total loss was thus ninety killed and
wounded. Says the distinguished French Admiral Jurien de la Gravière,
commenting on this action: “On occasions when the roughness of the
sea would seem to render all aim excessively uncertain the effects
of [the American] artillery were not less murderous than under more
advantageous conditions.” Unfortunately, a little later, the British
_Poictiers_, 74, came in sight, and the _Wasp_ not only had to yield
her capture but was herself carried a prize into Bermuda, where Jones
and his men were later exchanged. Captain Jones was promoted to the
command of the _Macedonian_, which had been captured by the _United
States_ only a week after the _Wasp’s_ own brilliant action.

The _United States_ and _Argus_, under Commodore Decatur, had left
Boston on October 8th in company with Commodore Rodgers, commanding
the _President_ and the _Congress_. The latter was successful in
making one valuable prize and eight others of but small value, and
reëntered Boston on December 31st. Decatur had separated from Rodgers’s
command on October 12th, and on the 18th, about 500 miles south by
west of the Azores, he met the frigate _Macedonian_, of 49 guns and
301 men, commanded by Captain Richard Carden. There was about the same
difference in force as between the _Constitution_ and _Guerrière_ and
about the same in destruction. The _Macedonian_ had forty-three killed
and mortally wounded, and sixty-one wounded; the _United States_ had
a lieutenant and six seamen killed or mortally wounded, and five
wounded. The action lasted an hour and a half. The _Macedonian_ had
received over a hundred shot in the hull, her mizzenmast had gone by
the board, and her fore and maintopmasts at the cap. Her rigging was
badly cut and many of her guns had been dismounted. On the other hand,
the _United States_ had suffered no injuries which could not at once
be repaired. It was clear that the American gunnery was immensely
superior, though the _Macedonian_ had been regarded a crack ship. The
British ship had on board eight impressed Americans. These, though
objecting to fighting their countrymen, were obliged to stay at the
guns, and three were killed.

Fortunately the damages to the _Macedonian_ were not so severe that she
had to be destroyed; convoyed by the _United States_, she was carried
into New London, reaching there on December 4th.

On October 26, 1812, Commodore Bainbridge sailed from Boston with the
_Constitution_, which he personally commanded, and the _Hornet_, 18,
Captain Lawrence. The _Essex_, under Captain David Porter, was also
to be part of Bainbridge’s squadron, but she was in the Delaware and
did not get to sea until two days after Bainbridge left Boston. In
anticipation of a long cruise, the ship carried an unusual number of
both officers and men. Very unfortunately, she had to retain, against
Porter’s protest, a battery of short-range carronades with but six
long 12-pounders. She was given the island of Fernando de Noronha, off
Brazil, as a rendezvous. She was not to meet her consorts, but to have
adventures of her own of a very remarkable character.

Bainbridge, touching at Fernando de Noronha, went into Bahia, Brazil,
and found there a British sloop-of-war of the same force as the
_Hornet_. Lawrence challenged her captain to a fight, pledging that
the _Constitution_ would not interfere. The challenge, however, was
not accepted, among the reasons being that the _Bonne Citoyenne_
had on board £500,000 in species. Bainbridge, leaving the _Hornet_
to watch the British ship, went to sea. December 29th, being still
near Bahia, he sighted two ships: one turned out to be the frigate
_Java_; the other a captured ship, the _William_, in company. The
latter was directed to go into Bahia and the _Java_ stood toward the
_Constitution_. The latter stood off to get clear of the land, in
plain view, and thus get out of neutral waters. There was a mutual
readiness to engage. The _Java_ came down with a light free wind,
furling her mainsail and royals. The _Constitution_, with royal yards
aloft, and which she carried throughout the battle, was under about
the same canvas. The firing began at 2:00 P.M., with a shot at long
range from the _Constitution_, but the two ships quickly neared to
pistol range. They approached so near that they were less than 600
feet apart. The _Java_ was being so much cut up aloft that an attempt
was made to board, but during this the _Constitution_ poured in a most
destructive raking fire (i. e., lengthwise of the enemy), bringing down
the _Java’s_ maintopmast and cutting away the foremast just under the
foretop. The attempt to board failed, the ships fell apart and began
anew as furiously as ever. Captain Lambert of the _Java_ was killed
and the ship continued to be fought gallantly by her first lieutenant,
Chads, who was already wounded. But the British, with the wreck of the
maintopmast with its hamper over the side, the foretopmast gone, and a
little later the mizzenmast and what remained of the foremast, could
do no more; the _Java’s_ guns were completely silenced. At 4:05, the
_Java’s_ flag being shot away, Bainbridge thought she had struck. He
then hauled by the wind and crossed the _Java’s_ bows. The latter’s
mainmast fell, leaving her a complete wreck. The _Constitution_ went
to windward, spent an hour in repairing the very moderate damages to
her rigging, and then again stood down for her enemy, whose flag had
again been shown. This, of course, meant nothing in such circumstances,
and as soon as the _Constitution_ stood across her bows it was struck.

The _Constitution_, after her repairs of an hour, was now again, in
naval language, all ataunto. Her loss had been eight seamen and one
marine killed; the fifth lieutenant, John C. Aylwin, and two seamen
mortally wounded; Commodore Bainbridge and twelve seamen severely
wounded; seven seamen and two marines slightly wounded; a total killed
and wounded of thirty-four.

The _Java_ had been cut to pieces; “she was a riddled and entirely
dismasted hulk.” She lost her captain and five midshipmen killed or
mortally wounded, and six officers and four midshipmen wounded. Her
total loss was forty-eight killed and one hundred and two wounded.[31]

The two ships were not very unequal in force, the _Constitution_ being
about 10 per cent. stronger in weight of gunfire and with about 10
per cent. more men. The larger number of men aboard the _Java_ than
she usually carried was due to her having on board men for some other
ships. Both ships were handled with remarkable skill and coolness, but
the American gunnery had shown itself enormously superior. It had so
wrecked the _Java_ that Bainbridge, now 5,000 miles from home and on
an unfriendly coast, gave up the idea of attempting to save the ship.
He lay by for several days removing the wounded and saving the effects
of the crew. The _Java_ was then blown up, and the _Constitution_ went
into Bahia and paroled the _Java’s_ officers and crew.

“Our gallant enemy,” reported Lieutenant Chads, “has treated us most
generously,” and Lieutenant-General Hislop who with his staff were
passengers in the _Java_ for the East, presented Commodore Bainbridge
with a very handsome sword as a token of gratitude for the kindness
with which he had treated the prisoners.[32]

Bainbridge, his ship needing repairs after a long period of service
which had begun before the war, sailed from Bahia on January 6, 1813,
and reached Boston February 27th, having been absent 119 days. The
_Hornet_ had been left at Bahia observing the _Bonne Citoyenne_, but
the arrival of the _Montagu_, 74, relieved the captain of the British
sloop-of-war from risking his ship and treasure. The _Hornet_, on the
_Montagu’s_ arrival, put to sea late in the evening unmolested.

The war had now lasted six months, and instead of the little American
navy being swept from the sea, it had been a David to smite a Goliath.
The capture of three British frigates in the three successive combats
stirred Britain to the quick. Said the _Pilot_ of London: “Five hundred
merchantmen [taken] and three frigates! Can this be true? Will the
English people read this unmoved? Any man who foretold such disasters
this day last year would have been treated as a madman or a traitor. He
would have been told that ere seven months had gone the American flag
would have been swept from the ocean, the American navy destroyed, and
the maritime arsenals of the United States reduced to ashes. Yet not
one of the American frigates has struck. They leave their ports when
they choose, and return when it suits their convenience. They cross the
Atlantic, they visit the West Indies, they come to the chops of the
Channel, they parade along the coast of South America. Nothing chases
them; nothing intercepts them--nay, nothing engages them but to yield
in triumph.”[33]



CHAPTER XVI


The British force on our own coast was now, in 1813, much increased.
Particular attention was paid to the approaches of New York and to the
Chesapeake, which latter region was devastated. Destruction was carried
on under the general orders of the British Admiralty to “destroy and
lay waste all towns and districts of the United States found accessive
to the attacks of the British armaments.” Hampton, in Virginia, was
thus sacked with a brutality which even the very prejudiced British
historian, James, called “revolting to human nature.”

On February 24th the _Hornet_, which we left taking leave of the
_Montagu_, 74, at Bahia, was on January 24th off Demarara. A brig, the
_Espiegle_, was inside the bar; another, standing in for the port, was
the _Peacock_. She was ready to engage, and at 5:25 P.M. action opened;
fourteen minutes later the _Peacock_ was a prize and sinking. The two
vessels were equal in size and nearly equal in men, the _Hornet_ having
aboard 135 to the _Peacock’s_ 122. The _Hornet_ was superior in so far
as carrying 32-pound carronades to the _Peacock’s_ 24’s; but weight
of shot made no difference for the _Peacock’s_ guns did scarcely any
damage. Lawrence, overcrowded with prisoners, returned to the United
States, anchoring at Holmes Hole on March 19th. Less than three months
later he was to die a defeated man, aboard the _Chesapeake_, the victim
of rashness and over-confidence.

The _Chesapeake_, throughout her career an ill-omened ship, had made
a cruise under Captain Evans, leaving Boston December 13, 1812, and
returning there April 9, 1813, having captured five merchantmen. The
term of enlistment of the crew was up, and there being a difficulty
over prize money, most of the men refused to enlist. Captain Evans on
account of ill-health gave up the command, and Lawrence was appointed
in his stead. He joined about the middle of May; he left Boston Harbor
to fight the _Shannon_ a fortnight later. Thus in two weeks he had
to get new officers and a new crew together and prepare for sea. As
for target practice, or for even the ordinary “shaking down,” there
was no opportunity whatever. So new were some of the men to their
ship “that the last draft that arrived still had their hammocks
and bags lying in the boats stowed over the booms when the ship was
captured.”[34] Privateering had now risen to such prominence that
the same difficulties were experienced as to men as in the times of
the Revolution, when it was often impossible to man the ships of the
navy on account of the attractions which the other and freer service
offered. As a consequence a large number of foreigners had to be
taken, including some forty British and a number of Portuguese, these
latter in the best circumstances being what one would not select from
choice. In this case they were particularly troublesome, a Portuguese
boatswain’s mate being the ringleader in what became almost a mutiny
on account of a question of prize money. The first lieutenant, Page,
was ill ashore; he was replaced by a young lieutenant, Ludlow, who had
been third on the _Chesapeake’s_ last cruise; the third and fourth were
only midshipmen with acting appointments. To go to sea thus and fight a
battle with a ship which had been in commission six and a half years,
under a particularly able captain, was simple madness. But this, driven
by over-confidence and perhaps an over-desire for distinction, is what
Lawrence did.

Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, to give him his full name, had
commissioned the _Shannon_, a new ship, on September 14, 1806. He was
_sui generis_ in his own service, for he carried on target practice
twice a week, whereas the usual custom in the British navy of the time
was once a year; his guns were furnished with sights, which was also
unusual, and he was a kindly captain with the good-will of his crew,
likewise unusual in those days of free use of the cat.

The two ships, without going into detail, were practically of equal
force, each carrying 52 guns. The _Chesapeake_ had 379 men; the
_Shannon_ 330, 30 of whom were new hands. The _Shannon_ had been off
Boston for some time, when on June 1st Broke sent a letter to Lawrence
challenging him to meet the _Shannon_ later at a given point. It is a
great pity that this failed to reach Lawrence in time.

On May 31st the _Chesapeake_ dropped down to the lower bay; the men
were stationed at the guns and were exercised at the battery. On June
1st, a little after midday, she stood to sea under all sails, even to
studding sails. The _Shannon_ stood off shore under easy sail until
about eighteen miles from Boston Light, where she awaited her foe,
which had now also reduced her canvas.

There is no need to go into the manœuvres, which can be found in many
books. Lawrence brought his ship so close that both vessels suffered
severely. He was soon mortally wounded and the sailing master (who
looked after the handling of the ship under the captain’s orders) was
killed. The two most important officers were thus removed early in the
action. A heavy explosion occurred in the _Chesapeake_, probably by
the ignition of cartridges lying on the deck. At six o’clock the two
ships came together, the _Shannon’s_ anchor catching in one of the
after ports of the _Chesapeake_. Broke now ordered “away boarders.”
The _Chesapeake’s_ first lieutenant, Ludlow, received a wound of which
later he died. Cox, the third lieutenant, coming up from the main deck,
was so unmanned by the conditions of things that he turned and ran
below, an act for which he was later court-martialled and dismissed
from the service. As Broke came aboard heading some twenty men, the
only opposition that could be offered at the moment came from the nine
marines, all that were left unhurt of forty-four. Their commander,
Broom, and a corporal, were dead, and both sergeants were wounded.
The only officer there at the moment was the chaplain, Livermore, who
fired his pistol at Broke, and himself was severely wounded, in return,
by a sword cut from Broke. The large number of mercenaries aboard
had run below. Lieutenant George Budd, stationed on the main deck,
now ran up, followed by some dozen men, and attacked the boarders,
killing the purser, Aldham, and the captain’s clerk, Drum, but Budd was
soon wounded and knocked down the main hatchway. The wounded Ludlow
struggled to the spar deck, and received another wound. Broke himself
showed brilliant courage in leading his men and was severely wounded.
Just fifteen minutes after the action began, the _Chesapeake’s_
colors were hauled down. “Of her 379 men, 61 were killed or mortally
wounded, including her captain, first and fourth lieutenants, the
lieutenant commanding the marines, the master, boatswain, and three
midshipmen; 85 were wounded more or less severely, including both her
other lieutenants, five midshipmen, and the chaplain; total, 148; the
loss falling entirely upon the American portion of the crew. Of the
_Shannon’s_ men, 33 were killed outright or died of their wounds,
including her first lieutenant, purser, captain’s clerk, and one
midshipman, and 50 were wounded, including the captain and boatswain;
total, 83.”[35]

The _Chesapeake_ was taken to Halifax. Lawrence and Ludlow were buried
there with every honor. The remains of the former were later taken
to New York, where in the churchyard of old Trinity they now lie.
Lawrence’s dying words: “Don’t give up the ship,” were later blazoned
on a flag flown by Perry on Lake Erie, where the dead hero was to have
his revenge, for hero he was, however mistaken in judgment. His fatal
action was the ignoring of the value of preparation in war. Discipline
and training are as necessary as valor, an axiom which our people are
only too slow to learn.

The result caused immense rejoicing in England. It is the only naval
action of the war which to-day receives recognition there, and I doubt
if the British people in general, of the present, know of any other.
And while treating of it, there is a persistent unfairness in ignoring
conditions of the _Chesapeake_; even in articles which were written in
1913, the hundredth year later, by historians from whom fairness might
be expected, no mention was made of them. It is left to another and
fairer foreigner, a Frenchman, Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, the most
distinguished writer on naval affairs of his nation, to tell the truth,
when he said: “Fortune was not fickle, she was merely logical.”

A little later there was an action which was really discreditable
to us: that of the _Argus_, a brig of 298 tons and 10 guns, against
the British _Pelican_, of 467 tons and 11 guns. The _Argus_ had been
cruising in the English Channel “capturing and burning ship after ship
and creating the greatest consternation among the London merchants.”
On August 13th she had captured a brig laden with wine from Oporto,
a success which was to be apparently her undoing. Next day she met
the _Pelican_. The _Argus’s_ captain, Allen, was killed early in the
action, as were also two midshipmen; her first lieutenant was wounded.
The odds were against her, but not to such degree as to account for
the too slight resistance later in the action. It is not unlikely, as
has been said by competent historians, that the captured port had much
to do with this. The results of such actions had previously been so
markedly different that there is reason to suspect this. The capture
of the _Argus_ was soon offset by that of the British brig _Boxer_,
of 66 men and 14 guns, by the _Enterprise_, of 104 men and 16 guns.
Captain Blyth of the _Boxer_ was killed early in the action, as was
also Lieutenant Burrows of the _Enterprise_. The few remaining American
brigs disappeared by capture by much superior forces, most of them by
squadrons from which there was no escape.

There had undoubtedly by this time been a falling off in the character
of the American crews. The Atlantic now swarmed with privateers which,
as in our Revolution, attracted the best men; the navy thus labored
under a severe handicap. The privateers did immense damage to British
commerce and caused the British merchant to long for peace, but they
damaged our real naval interests. This damage would have been more real
had not the British naval power now begun to tell in blockade, which
became one of absolute strictness. The _United States_ and the captured
_Macedonian_, which had been repaired and commissioned at New York,
got to New London by way of Hell Gate, but were so strictly watched
that they remained there for the rest of the war. Naval action was now,
perforce, to be confined almost entirely to the lakes, where it was
momentous in character. The fights on the ocean were but exhibitions of
ability and prowess; those on the lakes were vital to the outcome of
the war.



CHAPTER XVII


Our army efforts on the frontier of Canada had been great failures.
In the very beginning of the war General William Hull, Governor of
Michigan, had been obliged to surrender his small army at Detroit
for the simple reason that he was faced by starvation. He was tried
and sentenced to death, but was reprieved by President Madison. But
the fault was not wholly Hull’s. It was, along with Hull’s age and
inefficiency, the ineptitude of our own administrative and legislative
authorities in Washington. Our northern defence was thus to fall upon
the navy.

There was in 1813 no vessel of war on Lake Erie, and but one, the
_Oneida_, of 116 tons, built four years before the war, on Ontario.
The British had long had a force on this lake, and in 1812 there were
six vessels, carrying in all about 80 guns; the largest was the _Royal
George_, of 22. Had the British commander been competent he could
easily have controlled the lake. He attacked Sackett’s Harbor in July,
but Lieutenant Woolsey, commanding the _Oneida_, landed his guns, and
with the batteries thus formed beat him off. Commodore Isaac Chauncey
was now, in August, 1812, sent to command both lakes. Guns, officers,
shipwrights, and stores were transported from New York, and by November
a small fleet was ready. Before this, however, Lieutenant L. D. Elliot,
who had been sent to Buffalo to look after Lake Erie, had made a
brilliant expedition against the _Detroit_, which had been surrendered
at the time of Hull’s disaster, and another vessel, the _Caledonia_.
Both were captured on the Canada side of the lake at Fort Erie by
boarding, a small army detachment assisting. The _Detroit_ was burned.

On November 8th Chauncey made a spirited attack on the harbor of
Kingston, and kept up his activities until navigation was closed by
ice early in December. The winter was spent in building. A new ship,
however, named the _Madison_, had already (November 24th) been launched
at Sackett’s Harbor. Nine weeks before her timber had stood in the
forest.

By the opening of navigation in 1813 each combatant had a considerable
fleet on Lake Ontario, though nearly all were but mere gunboats.
The British, recognizing the immense importance of control of the
lakes, had selected an able officer, Sir James L. Yeo, to command. The
outcome of the season’s operations, however, for the detail of which
one should look to larger books, was that the Americans were left in
naval control. In the course of the summer the hostile squadrons were
three times engaged. Chauncey’s courage and spirit have received,
and deserved, high praise for “the rapidity and decision with which
he created a force, as it might be in a wilderness, the professional
resources which he discovered in attaining this great end, and the
combined gallantry and prudence with which he manœuvred before the
enemy ... while the intrepidity with which he carried his own ship
into action off York has always been a subject of honest exultation in
the service to which he belongs.” This high praise from one so able to
judge as Fenimore Cooper, himself in early life a naval officer, holds
to this day.

What Chauncey did on Lake Ontario, Perry was to do, and much more, on
Erie. He had been reared in Preble’s school at Tripoli, but by 1806
he was at Newport superintending the building of some of Jefferson’s
absurd gunboats, and to duty such as this he was kept for six years,
an inglorious inaction for such a spirit. No attention was paid by
a nerveless Secretary of the Navy for his application for the lakes
until it was pressed by Chauncey, on which he was ordered to report at
Sackett’s Harbor with his best men. Receiving his orders on February
17th, fifty men were on their way before sunset; a hundred more
followed, and Perry himself on the 22d. He reached Sackett’s Harbor on
March 3d, and, after two weeks, was ordered to Erie. Sailing-master
Dobbins and Noah Brown, master shipwright, already had three gunboats
well under way and keels laid for two brigs. The timber for their
construction had been but a few days before trees in the forest.[36]
But nothing had been provided in the way of armament, cordage, stores,
men, or officers. These dribbled in through the appeals and constant
personal work of Perry. In five months he had his little fleet fairly
ready. On August 10th he went in search of the British. He had the
brigs _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_, of 20 guns each, and eight schooners
carrying, one three, the others two and one guns each. The British
commodore, Barclay, had the ship _Detroit_, of 19 guns; the _Queen
Charlotte_, of 17; the _Lady Prevost_, a schooner of 13, and three
small craft of 10, 3, and 1. Perry had in all 416 men fit for duty;
Barclay 440. On September 10th they met.

The action began at 11:45. How Perry fought his ship unsupported by the
_Niagara_ until the _Lawrence_ was a wreck and but 20 of his 100 men
were left unhurt; how he fired himself the last heavy gun from his ship
with the help of the purser and chaplain, and then jumped into a small
boat, pulled by his brother and four seamen, boarded the _Niagara_,
took personal command, and carried her to victory, make a story of
courage and resource unsurpassed in any of the sea fights of history.
Never did one man more personify a victory.

The British flag was struck at 3:00 P.M., after a most gallant
struggle. Twenty-nine Americans were killed or mortally wounded and
94 wounded. The British lost 41 killed and 94 wounded. The moral
effect throughout the country, which covered itself with bonfires
and rejoicings, was almost equal to that of the victory of the
_Constitution_. But besides this there was the great concrete result
of the evacuation of Detroit and Michigan by the British and their
occupancy by the Americans. To Perry’s victory and Chauncey’s success
on Lake Ontario is due that we preserved our northwestern frontier in
the coming peace.

The winter of 1813-1814 was passed on Lake Ontario by both antagonists
in building ships for the next campaign. The largest put afloat at
Sackett’s Harbor by the Americans, the arming and equipping of which
was under enormous difficulties of transportation through the then
almost roadless forest, was the _Superior_, of 62 guns; but the British
built a much larger, the _St. Lawrence_, of 112 guns. But it was not
until October 15th that she was in service, too late in the season to
affect the situation. Had the war continued, the lakes would have been
the scene of naval operations greater than any carried on by us upon
the sea, aided curiously enough by the British blockade of our coast,
which caused the transfer to the lakes of the crews of the blockaded
frigates. We shall hear a little later of still another momentous
battle on our inland waters. For the moment we turn again to the ocean.

       *       *       *       *       *

It may be remembered that the _Essex_, under Captain David Porter,
was to form part of Bainbridge’s command when the latter left Boston
October 26, 1812, with the _Hornet_. Porter was then in Delaware River.
He left on October 28th, but when he reached the rendezvous appointed
his consorts had gone. On his way thither a British brig transport,
the _Nocton_, was captured, with $55,000 in specie, which in the
circumstances to come was to be a most valuable aid. The prize was sent
with a crew of seventeen men to the United States, but was overhauled
by a frigate and captured after passing Bermuda. Porter continued on to
the second rendezvous off Cape Frio, where he arrived December 25th,
four days before the capture of the _Java_. Porter remained on the
Brazilian coast until near the end of January, 1813, when, hearing no
news of his consorts, he started for the Pacific, where for a full year
he was to cruise at will, capturing nearly every British whaler in that
ocean, arming some, destroying others, and recapturing and protecting
our own. British commerce was swept from what was then called the South
Sea. The story of this cruise in which the captain of the _Essex_
showed a surpassing boldness, energy, and resource is one of the most
romantic in history.

After nearly a year of continuous success in crippling the enemy’s
commerce, during which the _Essex_ supported herself and armed her
consorts entirely from her prizes, Porter was desirous of meeting
a British man-of-war, and hearing of the dispatch of the frigate
_Phoebe_, of 36 guns, to the Pacific, he went to Valparaiso to await
her coming. But instead of one ship came two, the _Cherub_ accompanying
the former. This cruising in couples was the outcome of one of the most
remarkable orders ever issued by the British Admiralty; its issuance
was the highest compliment ever paid any navy. The order in full cannot
be omitted, it read:

  “My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having received intelligence
  that several American ships-of-war are now at sea, I have their
  lordships’ commands to acquaint you therewith, and that they do not
  conceive that any of his Majesty’s frigates should attempt to engage,
  single-handed, the larger class of American ships, which, though
  maybe called frigates, are of a size, complement, and weight of metal
  much beyond that class and more resembling line-of-battle ships.

  “In the event of one of his Majesty’s frigates under your orders
  falling in with one of these ships, his captain should endeavor in
  the first instance to secure the retreat of his Majesty’s ship; but
  if he finds that he has an advantage in sailing, he should endeavor
  to manœuvre, and keeping company with her, without coming to action,
  in the hope of falling in with some other of his Majesty’s ships,
  with whose assistance the enemy might be attacked with a reasonable
  hope of success.

  “It is their lordships’ further directions that you make this known
  as soon as possible to the several captains commanding his Majesty’s
  ships.”[37]

There is a delightfully ingenuous recognition of the alarm that had
been inspired by our victories in the hope that we might be attacked
by two together, “with a reasonable hope of success.” It was absurd to
compare our frigates with line-of-battle ships. They were undoubtedly
heavier than the usual frigate, though some then in the British navy
were quite as powerful. But the fact that our ships were as good as any
of their class and better than most was all the more to the credit of
their designers. But the _Constitution_, one of our best, was “but very
little more than _one half_ the force of one of the smallest _true_
liners England possessed!”[38]

The _Essex_ thus anchored at Valparaiso on January 12, 1814. She had
in company one of her captured merchantmen, renamed the _Essex Junior_
with 60 men, ten long 6’s, and ten 18-pound carronades. She was of
course wholly unfit to meet a regular cruiser. On February 8th the
_Phoebe_, 36, Captain Hillyar, and the _Cherub_, 18, Captain Tucker,
appeared. There was an evident design on the part of Hillyar to run
aboard the _Essex_, but a very near approach revealed the latter’s
crew at her guns, and he backed his yards, inquiring, meanwhile, of
Captain Porter’s health. Porter politely replied, but warned Hillyar
not to fall foul, adding later, “You have no business where you are;
if you touch a rope-yarn of this ship I shall board instantly.” It
had been well had the two ships fought then and there, for later
the _Essex_ was to be taken at a much greater disadvantage. The two
British ships established a blockade, and on Porter’s endeavor to
fight the _Phoebe_ singly on February 27th she ran down and joined
her consort. On March 28th, however, Porter, who had already decided
to go to sea, parted his port cable in a gale of wind and dragged
his other anchor in the deep roadstead and very difficult anchorage,
under the best of circumstances, at Valparaiso. He had, by several
trials, assured himself of the superior speed of the _Essex_, and now,
under way, was sure of getting clear of his enemies. In rounding the
outermost headland of the bay, his ship was struck by a heavy squall,
which careened her to the gunwale and carried away the maintopmast.
The _Essex_ attempted to regain the harbor, but an adverse wind and
her crippled condition prevented this. She thus stood northward and
anchored three miles north of the town and half a mile from a small
Chilean battery. She was within pistol shot of the shore and far within
neutral waters. But our British kindred have never recked of such small
matters as neutrality unless such stickling served their purpose. Both
British ships thus stood in with flags and mottoes at every masthead,
deliberately took position out of range of the short-range carronades
of the _Essex_ (which carried but about 300 yards), and opened fire.
The time was 4:00 P.M. Now was made apparent the justice of Porter’s
demand for a battery of long-range guns which he had made before
leaving the United States, but which was refused him. He thus had to
fight the action with but his six long 12-pounders. The result was
the loss of the ship, but never was ship more gallantly fought. Near
the end she caught fire and a quantity of powder exploded below. Many
men were knocked overboard and some, jumping into the water to swim
ashore when the ship had become a total wreck, succeeded. At 6:20 the
ship was surrendered. Of the 255 of the crew 58 had been killed, 66
wounded, and 31 drowned; 24 reached the shore. The _Phoebe_ had lost
4 killed, including her first lieutenant, and 7 wounded; the _Cherub_
1 killed and 3 wounded. Such were the benefits of being able to fight
at long taw. Captain Hillyar is not to be blamed for so doing; his
business was to capture the _Essex_, and he did this with as little
loss to himself and consort as might be. But all the honors were with
the American. Hillyar’s flagrant violation of the neutrality of Chile
was in British eyes but an easily condoned incident, and he received
all the praise and regard which would have been due for taking the
_Essex_ in fairest fight. He gave at least every credit to the brave
defenders of our ship. As usual in modern British accounts of this
notable battle, no reference is made to the crippled state of the
_Essex_, nor to her being in neutral waters, nor to the fact that she
had a battery incomparably inferior in range, nor that two ships were
employed against one to do the work. The “American frigate _Essex_ was
captured by the British frigate _Phoebe_,” and British self-respect
thereby saved.

One officer who did his duty bravely and well in the _Essex_, as did
all, was later to achieve fame as the most brilliant naval officer of
his time: David Glasgow Farragut, then aged twelve years and eight
months. Farragut continued his battle even after the surrender in a
stand-up fight aboard the _Phoebe_ for the preservation of his pet
young pig, Murphy, an animal always a favorite of sailors. He won.

The _Constellation_, of noble record, was a victim of the blockade,
and, beyond aiding in the defence of Norfolk, had to remain passive.
The _Adams_, after a successful cruise so far as affecting the enemy’s
trade very seriously, had to be burned while careened in the Penobscot
to escape capture by an overwhelming force. The _Peacock_, of 11 guns,
captured the British brig _Epervier_, of 9, with $118,000 in specie
aboard, on April 29, 1814. The _Wasp_, 22, in a daring and successful
cruise of destruction in the English Channel, met and captured on June
28th the British _Reindeer_, 18, of considerably less force, in an
action which was honorable to the captains and crews of both ships. On
September 1st, after a brilliant night action, she captured the _Avon_,
of 18 guns. The _Wasp_ was driven off by the approach of three new
antagonists, who had to go to the assistance of the _Avon_, which sank
after the removal of several of her crew. The _Wasp_, after taking a
number of prizes, spoke on October 4th a Swedish brig and received from
her Lieutenant McKnight and Master’s Mate Lyman, both on their way home
from the _Essex_. This was the last ever heard of her and her brilliant
and lamented captain. The last memento of her, besides that of October
9th in the journal of the Swedish brig, the _Adonis_, was a prize,
the _Atlanta_, which reached Savannah November 4th under Midshipman
Geisinger.



CHAPTER XVIII


There was to be one other battle on the lakes, that of Lake Champlain,
which was to have momentous consequences quite equal to that of Lake
Erie, and place the name of young Thomas MacDonough high on the list
of benefactors of his country. MacDonough, on September 28, 1812, had
been directed to proceed immediately and take command on the lake, the
control having previously been under a young lieutenant, Sydney Smith.
There was, however, little to command. The Americans had three armed
sloops and a few small gunboats and galleys (the latter propelled only
by oars). But this was larger than that of the British, until on June
3, 1813, two of the sloops, the _Growler_ and the _Eagle_, in pursuit
of some of the British flotilla which had ventured into the American
part of the lake, found themselves in the narrow reaches of the north
end with a south wind against which it was impossible to work back.
Here they were attacked both by gunboats and by troops on both shores
of the narrow waters, and had to surrender. Thenceforward, until May,
1814, the British by the addition of the captured American sloops were
in control. Manned temporarily by seamen from the sloop-of-war _Wasp_
at Quebec, the British flotilla raided Plattsburgh on June 30, 1813,
destroyed the public buildings there and at Swanton in Vermont, and
threatened the destruction of the new vessels building by MacDonough.
On April 11, 1814, he launched the ship _Saratoga_. By the end of May
he was afloat with the _Saratoga_, of 26 guns, 8 of which were long
24-pounders, the remainder being 32 and 42 pounder carronades; the
schooner _Ticonderoga_, the sloop _Preble_, and ten galleys. Once
more the Americans were in control. The British, however, were urging
forward with all haste, to assist in the coming invasion, a ship much
more than the _Saratoga’s_ equal. This was the _Confiance_, of 37 guns,
27 of which were long 24-pounders and the others carronades of 24 and
32 pounds. On August 25th she was launched. With her tonnage of over
1,200 against the 734 of the _Saratoga_ and with her great superiority
in long guns, she was an enemy to be reckoned with.

The European wars had now closed. Four brigades of Wellington’s army
had been sent to Canada from Bordeaux. They came with orders to “give
immediate protection to his Majesty’s possessions in America,” by the
entire destruction of Sackett’s Harbor and of the naval establishments
on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain.[39]

The governor-general of Canada, Sir George Prevost, who also was in
command of the army, now had, exclusive of officers, 29,437 men,
nearly all of whom were regulars seasoned by years of service under
Wellington. He decided to advance by the west side of the lake
reporting that as “Vermont has shown a disinclination to the war, and,
as it is sending in specie and provisions, I will confine offensive
operations to the west side of Lake Champlain.”[40]

On August 31st Prevost moved south with an army variously estimated at
from 11,000 to 14,000 men. The American army under General Alexander
Macomb was less than 2,000, but by September 4th came in 700 militia
from the neighborhood, and by the 11th “other militia from New York
and volunteers from Vermont ... in encouraging contrast to their
fellow-citizens who were making money by abetting the enemy.” The
British entered Plattsburgh on the 6th. Macomb retreated across
the Saranac, a small, fordable river on which the town stands, and
entrenched. Had Prevost had the courage to attack Macomb with his large
and seasoned army, Macdonough would have had either to withdraw up the
lake or risk a battle in the open lake, where the _Confiance_ would
have been more than a match for his whole squadron. He had anchored
under Cumberland Head, somewhat over a mile from the west shore with
the _Eagle_, _Saratoga_, _Ticonderoga_, and _Preble_ in a line from
north to south in the order named. West of this line were his ten
gunboats. His fourteen vessels totalled but 2,244 tons, with 86 guns
and 882 men. The British commodore, Downie, had sixteen vessels,
amounting in all to 2,402 tons, with 92 guns and 937 men, but his
flagship, as mentioned, was nearly twice the size and force of the
_Saratoga_.

But now came to the aid of the Americans the nervousness of the
incapable British general who insisted upon immediate action by the
British squadron in his support. The _Confiance_ had only been
launched on August 25th; to make her ready for action in seventeen
days was a task of Hercules, and that she was, in a way, made ready,
reflects the highest credit upon the energy and ability of those in
charge. Commodore Downie had joined only on September 2d; the crew had
been hastily gathered from ships at Quebec, the last detachment coming
aboard only the night but one before the battle. The men were thus
largely unknown to the officers and to one another. The ship hauled
into the stream on September 7th with the artificers still hard at
work on the hundreds of fittings so necessary in the equipment of a
man-of-war. They did not leave her until two hours before the beginning
of battle. The situation of unpreparedness was very comparable to that
of the _Chesapeake_ in like circumstances, except that Macdonough’s own
ship had been launched but four months earlier.

Prevost, by the fact of his position as governor-general, was in a
position to command obedience, and his peremptory insistence caused
Downie to move earlier than he should, undoubtedly against the latter’s
better judgment. He thus on the morning of September 11, 1814, stood
up the narrow reaches of the northern part of the lake, with a fair
wind from the northeast. He had every reason to expect a simultaneous
attack by Prevost on the American troops, but none came. Having passed
Cumberland Head, it was too late to await any action by Prevost.

Macdonough had so admirably chosen his position that the British in
rounding Cumberland Head were forced to stand nearly northwest and
almost head on to the American line. They were thus subjected to a
raking fire (lengthwise of the ship). The _Confiance_, being in the
lead and having thus a concentration upon her of the American fire,
suffered severely before anchoring within five hundred yards of
the line. Within fifteen minutes her captain was dead. The day was
finally won by “winding” the _Saratoga_ (turning her end for end),
for which excellent previous arrangements had been made. A new and,
in great degree, uninjured broadside was thus brought into use, and
shortly after, about 11, the _Confiance_ hauled down her colors. The
whole action lasted, by Macdonough’s report, two hours and twenty
minutes.[41]

The immediate effect of the victory was Prevost’s retreat without delay
into Canada. The general result was the end of the war, of which it was
really the “decisive” battle. No longer could Castlereagh, the British
foreign minister, hold Great Britain “entitled to claim the use of the
lakes as a military barrier.”[42]

To Macdonough and Perry, the former under thirty-one, the latter but
twenty-eight years old at the time of their victories, our country owes
the preservation of its northern boundaries at the coming peace. It is
a great debt.



CHAPTER XIX


The war had no more than begun when the question of peace was being
considered. The United States had gone to war for two causes: the
“Orders in Council” which bore so heavily upon our shipping; and the
impressment of our seamen. The former were revoked on June 23d, five
days after the declaration of war by Congress; peace was to be made
without even a mention of the latter.

Actual steps toward peace were taken through Russia even as early as
September, 1812. The whole is a long story, but on November 4th a
direct negotiation was offered by England which was accepted by the
United States on January 5, 1814, and commissioners were appointed,
with Ghent as the place of meeting. It is well that action was thus
early, for by April Great Britain’s hands were largely free in Europe,
and she could turn her efforts more freely upon America, and this
she did in the expedition against Louisiana (which was to end in
almost unequalled disaster), and in the abortive invasion turned back
by Macdonough’s victory. The British state of mind was expressed in
a letter from Gallatin, then in London, to Monroe, the Secretary of
State: “You may rest assured,” he said, “of the general hostile spirit
of this nation, and of its wish to inflict serious injury upon the
United States; that no resistance can be expected from Europe; and that
no better terms will be obtained than the _status ante bellum_.” And
so it turned out. On Christmas Eve, 1814, peace was signed, and though
impressment was ignored, it was never again to be attempted. Nor was
there cause, for there was not to be a naval war upon the ocean in
which Britain was to be engaged for a hundred years.

Before hostilities on the water came to an end there were, however, to
be several notable naval events, one of the most remarkable being the
defence on September 26, 1814, of the privateer _General Armstrong_,
Captain Reid, at Fayal, Azores, against a boat attack from three
British ships, the _Plantagenet_, 74; _Rota_, 38; and _Carnation_, 18.
The British were repulsed with the loss of 34 killed and 86 wounded.
The next day the _Carnation_ stood in to attack alone, and was driven
off; but with a 74 present besides two other ships, the question of
saving the little vessel was hopeless, and she was scuttled, the crew
escaping ashore.

In those days news travelled slowly, and thus it was that after the
peace the _President_, one of a squadron under Commodore Decatur,
separated from her consorts, was captured, after she had driven off
the _Endymion_ frigate, by the squadron accompanying the latter.
On February 20, 1815, the _Cyane_ and _Levant_, sloops-of-war,
were captured in a night action, 300 miles from Madeira, by the
_Constitution_, Captain Stewart, who was to be the instrument of
trouble many years after to Britain, through his grandfatherhood of
Charles Stewart Parnell.

This action was remarkable for the brilliant handling of Stewart’s
ship. The _Levant_ was recaptured by a British squadron at Porto Praya,
in the Cape Verdes, where she had taken refuge against the British
squadron, which had vainly chased the _Constitution_. It was another
instance, added to those of the _Essex_ and the _General Armstrong_,
of the disregard of the English of a neutrality so highly esteemed in
these latter days.

The capture, on March 23d, of the British _Penguin_ by the _Hornet_,
Captain Biddle, of equal force, was the last real action of the war,
that of the _Peacock_ and British _Nautilus_ in the Indian Ocean on
June 30th, on account of the former’s superiority in force, not calling
for any but mere mention.

But the history of the War of 1812 cannot close without mention of
the crowning victory on land, New Orleans, on January 8, 1815. In
this, perhaps the severest and completest repulse ever suffered by a
British army, the navy bore a most important part, for by its efforts
was prevented the flanking of General Jackson’s force from the river.
The naval vessels, the _Louisiana_, with Commodore Patterson, and the
_Caroline_, Lieutenant J. D. Henley, controlled the river situation on
the British left flank until the latter was burned by hot shot from
the British trenches. The _Louisiana_ then shifted to cover Jackson’s
right. The situation forced the British to transport siege pieces from
the fleet, seventy miles away; this gave time for Jackson to strengthen
his position and time for reinforcements to join him. The _Louisiana’s_
guns were now landed and a battery established which would flank the
newly established British battery as well as their attacking columns;
the result was the destruction of the British battery soon after it
had opened fire. The British move, on the day of the main attack, to
capture the _Louisiana’s_ battery on the right bank of the river, was
finally successful through the flight of the supporting militia, but
it was too late; the naval battery had already assisted in the bloody
repulse of the main body, and there was nothing left to the capturing
party but withdrawal.[43]

The war was now ended. It had been a second War of Independence, which
had released America from the strong British influence which had
still obtained and had established a real national spirit. The world
recognized the birth of a new power upon the ocean, which the future
was to reckon with, though America herself was slow to accept her new
situation. We had, however, afloat in 1815, three line-of-battle ships,
the _Washington_, _Independence_, and _Franklin_, and in this year
we were to end, as has already been mentioned, our Barbary troubles
forever by the action of Decatur in command of the largest fleet
we were to have at sea for many years. We began a new life with a
self-respect which had needed a war for its revival.

There was one note at least of dissatisfaction over the peace. The
London _Times_, commenting in its issue of December 30, 1814, said:
“We have retired from the combat with the stripes yet bleeding on our
backs. Even yet, however, if we could but close the war with some
great naval triumph, the reputation of our maritime greatness might be
partially restored. But to say that it has not hitherto suffered in the
estimation of all Europe, and, what is worse, of America herself, is to
belie common sense and universal experience. ‘Two or three of our ships
have struck to a force vastly inferior!’ No; not two or three, but many
on the ocean and whole squadrons on the lakes; and the numbers are to
be viewed with relation to the comparative magnitude of the two navies.
Scarcely is there an American ship-of-war which has not to boast a
victory over the British flag; scarcely one British ship in thirty or
forty that has beaten an American. With the bravest seamen and the most
powerful navy in the world, we retire from the contest when the balance
of defeat is so heavily against us.”[44] And more defeats were yet to
come. Perhaps yet more would have come, for just as the war closed,
the first war-steamer to be built for over ten years, the _Fulton_,
was ready for sea. With a double hull of such thickness as to be
impervious to harm from any but the heaviest guns, moved by a wheel in
the middle which was protected from shot, it seems almost a pity that
she should not have been tried with her two 100-pound guns upon the
ships blockading New York. But even as it was America had good reason
to be well satisfied with the work of her navy.



CHAPTER XX


Though thirty-one years was to pass before the United States was again
to be at war with a foreign power, and then with Mexico--which had
no navy--they were far from being years of idleness or want of deeds
accomplished.

Our flag was now shown in every sea and with the weight and authority
which success always carries. Thus N. P. Willis, who in the early
thirties was the guest of wardroom officers of the flagship in the
Mediterranean, says in his “Pencilings by the Way”:

  “From the comparisons I have made between our own ships and the
  ships-of-war of other nations, I think we may well be proud of our
  navy. I had learned in Europe long before joining the _United States_
  that the respect we exact from foreigners is paid more to America
  afloat than to a continent they think as far off at least as the
  moon. They see our men-of-war and they know very well what they have
  done and, from the appearance and character of our officers, what
  they might do again--and there is a tangibility in the deductions
  from knowledge and eyesight which beats books and statistics. I have
  heard Englishmen deny one by one every claim we have to political and
  moral superiority, but I have found none illiberal enough to refuse a
  compliment--and a handsome one--to Yankee ships.”[45]

The world was yet a world of piracy, and the extirpation of these
wolves of the sea was a work which, when finished in the Mediterranean
and in the West Indies, was to continue in the Far East to our own day.
The situation, however, in the Caribbean Sea and its adjacent waters
was particularly serious from the anarchic conditions arising through
the revolt of Spain’s American dominions, with the exception of Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and Mexico, and this last was to join in the upheaval
in 1821. But all became nests of piracy. The fault in the beginning
was with our own Government, which had allowed too freely the fitting
out of vessels, usually schooners, in our ports which sailed away
for Venezuela or Argentina and there took out letters of marque and
flew the insurgent flags. They captured not only Spanish vessels, but
whatever seemed likely prize, and our own ships suffered as well as
others. Galveston and Matagorda had also for years after the peace of
1815 been bases of piracy under the claim of patriotism. Our war with
England had in fact so developed the greed in privateering that the
more adventurous kept it up in the new form. Florida, Louisiana, Texas,
and Mexico at the time thus bred pirates much as ill-conditioned ponds
breed mosquitoes. When Mexico declared independence in 1821 and there
was nothing left to Spain but Cuba and Puerto Rico, numerous privateers
were fitted out from there against the privateers of the patriots, and
the former became in turn as bad as the latter. Havana itself was one
of the strongholds of these villains, the captain-general sharing in
the profits, and each of the many curiously formed, deep, bottlelike
harbors of Cuba was a pirate refuge. For nine years, from 1817 to 1826,
the navy was busily engaged in suppressing these marauders, and it was
on such duty, in 1819, that Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, in command
of a squadron in the Caribbean, lost his life through yellow fever
caught in the Orinoco. He was but thirty-four years old.

But while this work had its losses, it had also great uses, besides
protecting the commercial world, in serving as a school for the
greatest admiral of his or any time in fact, and for another great
officer who was bound to him by peculiarly romantic ties. These were
Farragut and Porter, who forty or more years later were to come to such
distinguished fame. The story needs a telling.

The first Porter, a merchant captain, born in Massachusetts in 1727,
had two sons, of whom David was the later admiral’s grandfather.
This grandfather served as a privateersman, was a captain in the
Massachusetts state navy in the Revolution, was captured and confined
in the Jersey prison ship, escaped, and served at sea for the rest of
the war. Becoming again a merchant captain, his bold and successful
resistance to the impressment of his men by a British man-of-war
in Santo Domingo led, when the navy came to life in 1794, to his
appointment as a sailing master. He was in command of the naval station
at New Orleans when in 1808, having had a sunstroke while fishing on
Lake Ponchartrian, he was found and cared for by George Farragut, a
sailing master in the navy who lived on the borders of the lake. Porter
died, and Mrs. Farragut dying of yellow fever, both were buried on the
same day, June 22, 1808.

Some time after, the late Porter’s son David, whom we have met herein
as the captain of the famous _Essex_, took charge of the New Orleans
station, and in recognition of the great kindness of the Farragut
family offered to adopt one of the motherless boys and train him for
the navy. It was thus that the future victor at New Orleans and at
Mobile Bay had his start in life. Farragut, born July 5, 1801, was
taken into Porter’s family, and on December 17, 1810, received his
appointment as midshipman. He was then just nine years five months and
twelve days old.[46] In 1811 he was at sea with Porter in the _Essex_
and took a very active and valorous part in the famous battle in 1814
in which she was overcome by great odds. It was in the year before
this (1813) that the youngest David Porter was born. The careers of
the two men were to be curiously linked through life, and the period
of piracy mentioned was one which was to be largely formative of their
characters. Both were to rise to the highest honors in their profession
and leave great and worthy names. Their stories make books which all
boys, young or old, should read and thereby stir their blood.

By 1822 it had become necessary to employ a large force on the
Caribbean, and Commodore Porter (he of the _Essex_) was selected for
the command. By 1826 piracy in those waters was at an end, but the
righteous punishment given some of the depredators at Cape Fajardo
at the eastern end of Puerto Rico, though not at all excessive, was,
as an invasion of Spanish territory, made a cause of investigation,
and Porter’s conduct was found “censurable” by the court-martial
before which the matter was brought. This was too much for Porter’s
high spirit, and he at once resigned from the navy and never
thereafter would speak to a member of the court. In 1826 he became
commander-in-chief of the then somewhat considerable Mexican navy,
Mexico now being at war with Spain, and it was as a midshipman in this
service that the younger Porter, now thirteen, began his sea-going
life. He was, in 1828, in one of the severest and bloodiest battles
of his career, that of the brig _Guerréro_, in which he was serving,
with the Spanish frigate _Lealtad_, west of Havana. His career as a
Mexican midshipman ended in imprisonment, a quick release, and an
appointment as midshipman in our own navy, his father, the commodore,
having thrown up his Mexican appointment. The latter was to end his
career as our first minister to Turkey, to which post he was appointed
by President Jackson, to whom Porter was a man after his own heart. He
ended his life, than which there have been few of such romantic and
gallant exploit, at Constantinople on March 28, 1843, at the age of
sixty-three, and after fourteen years’ service as minister.

       *       *       *       *       *

The following years of the navy until the Mexican War were thus years
of commerce-protecting and of the usual routine of naval duty varied
by punitive expeditions in the East and in the Pacific. There was the
well-known exploring expedition of Lieutenant Wilkes in the years
1838-1842, the discoveries of which were for years to be minimized by
British jealousy, but which are now recognized at their full value; the
establishment of the Naval Observatory, 1842; of the Naval Academy in
1845; and the introduction of steam vessels, the first to see actual
service in our navy being a small purchased vessel, the _Sea Gull_,
used against the pirates of Cuba in 1823.[47] Throughout the period,
too, of the Seminole War in Florida the navy did its share in a not
overglorious but most trying duty.

War was declared with Mexico on May 12, 1846. The share of the navy in
the occupancy of the east coast of the country, apart from its landing
a very efficient battery of heavy guns at Vera Cruz, which assisted
materially in a quick surrender of the place, was not of very great
importance beyond occupying all the other towns of the coast, a duty
in every case gallantly performed. The importance of naval action in
the Pacific was far different, for it secured to us California, then a
part of Mexico. Whatever the later official statements as to British
intent, or non-intent, it was well that our ships were on the ground
first and in possession; in any case our action on the California coast
forestalled any question.

There was from the treaty of peace with Mexico, February 2, 1848, to
our next and greatest war, an interval of but thirteen years. This was
one of the periods of greatest transition in which the ships and guns
which had existed for over two hundred years with but moderate change
were to take a long step to complete transformation, from sail to
steam, and from the smooth-bore to the rifle. In the matter of guns,
though, we were much slower to change than was Europe. We were to
carry aboard our ships, during the Civil War and for long after, the
smooth-bore Dahlgren gun, so called from the bottlelike form given it
by the inventor, Commander (later Rear-Admiral) J. A. Dahlgren.

One by one, or at most by occasional twos, the new-fangled idea--the
steamship--had made its way. In 1837 had been built the _Fulton_,
of 4 guns; in 1841, the _Missouri_, which was to perish by fire at
Gibraltar but two years later, 1843; and the _Mississippi_, a sister
ship, which after many years of honorable service was to find her grave
in the river of her name at Port Hudson on March 14, 1863; in 1843 was
built our first screw steamer, the _Princeton_; in 1844 at Erie our
first iron steamer, the _Michigan_, for service on the lakes, where
she cruised for many years and became in lapse of time a curiosity; in
1848, the _Saranac_; and in 1850 the two fine old side-wheel frigates,
the _Susquehanna_ and the _Powhatan_. By 1855 we were building the five
frigates, _Wabash_, _Roanoke_, _Colorado_, _Merrimac_, and _Minnesota_,
the finest of their time, but which except the _Merrimac_, transformed
into an ironclad, were to cut no figure in the coming Civil War on
account of their deep draft. Their time had passed even by 1861.



CHAPTER XXI


Though there were many mutterings of the coming tempest in the decade
1850-1860, the navy, whose duty, unaffected by internal politics,
lay abroad, went its even tenor. We had come to the verge of war
with Spain in 1852 over the case of the _Black Warrior_. There had
been filibustering expeditions and the slave trade to look after;
threatenings of difficulties with England; a successful expedition to
Paraguay in 1858 and 1859 to demand reparation for the firing upon
the United States steamer _Water Witch_; and most notable and most
momentous of all, the expedition, 1852-1854, resulting in the opening
of Japan.

Meanwhile was swiftly gathering the storm of secession. Despite the
Kansas war, the John Brown raid, and fierce political antagonisms,
the illimitable optimism of the American people would not admit the
idea of danger until the convulsion was upon them. So little could
our people in 1860 recognize that they were rapidly being carried
into the abyss of war, that in the last days of the Congress which
closed on June 25th of that year, “at the instance of Sherman, of
Ohio, the estimate for repairs and equipment of the navy was cut down
a million.... Senator Pugh, of the same state, could say: ‘I think we
have spent enough money on the navy, certainly for the service it has
rendered, and for one I shall vote against building a single ship under
any pretence at all.’ The blatant Lovejoy, in the face of the rising
storm, said: ‘I am tired of appropriating money for the army and navy
when absolutely they are of no use whatever ... I want to strike a blow
at this whole navy expenditure and let the navy go out of existence....
Let us blow the whole thing up! Let these vessels rot, and when we
want vessels to fight, we can get mercantile vessels and arm them
with our citizens.’... The whole existing steam navy consisted of but
twenty-three vessels which could be called efficient and thirteen which
were worthless, and while there was a willingness and effort on the
part of the Northern senators and representatives to add to the force,
it was put wholly upon the ground of the suppression of the slave
trade. Morse, of Maine, the chairman of the Naval Committee in the
House, urged that the increase should take the form of a purchase of
small steamers of six to nine feet draught for African service. There
appears no glimmering in the mind of any one of the speakers of the
coming of a great war, then but nine months distant, and in which the
North could not have been successful had it not been for the throttling
of the blockade and the occupancy of the Mississippi.”[48]

Besides the legislative incapacity just mentioned, and the equally
inept legislation which for ten years or more had quarrelled over
carrying slavery into impossible regions, our administrative
departments were absurdly inefficient and, in the case of the War
Department, corrupt, in that the Secretary of War had steadily been
distributing arms, such as they were, in the South. Never did the
government of a great country go to war under such conditions of
ineptitude as did ours. Buchanan’s effort to reinforce Fort Sumter
had come to grief through the folly of General Scott, who had caused
the change from the heavily armed war-steamer, _Brooklyn_, lying at
Fort Monroe, to the merchant steamer, _Star of the West_. Had the
_Brooklyn_ gone, as was intended, the Confederates would not have dared
to fire upon her. Had they done so, the raw militia which had never
before fired a cannon would have been driven from their improvised
battery, and Charleston harbor would have been ours permanently. It was
the same when Mr. Lincoln made the second effort and the _Powhatan_
was diverted to Pensacola through the officiousness of the Secretary
of State, who meddled with affairs with which he had nothing to do and
caused orders to be sent to the _Powhatan_ without the knowledge of the
Secretary of the Navy.

Our officers from the South resigned by scores, and our Southern
navy yards, Norfolk and Pensacola, left under the command of aged
officers, were surrendered with enormous loss, particularly in cannon,
many hundreds of which thus went to arm the Southern batteries on
the coast and more particularly on the Mississippi. The following
ships were burned and scuttled at Norfolk on April 20, 1861: the
_Pennsylvania_, 120; _Columbus_, 74; _Delaware_, 74; _Raritan_, 44;
_Columbia_, 44; _Merrimac_, 40; _Germantown_, 20; _Plymouth_, 20, and
_Dolphin_, 10. All but the _Merrimac_ were sailing ships and thus,
with this exception, no great loss. General Scott, weakened by age,
was still commander-in-chief, and failed to man the Southern forts,
which, properly, should have been done in the first days of secession,
and every port of the South thus held by the Federal Government. In
such case there could have been no war. As it was, a few militia
marched in and took possession against what was only, in most cases, a
sergeant-in-charge. Never was any government so thoroughly inefficient,
and it was the inefficiency of years of ineptitude, not of a day.

But the South occupied every fort and began war. To the trained
strategist the action to be taken so far as the navy was concerned
was simple: to blockade every port and to occupy the Mississippi. The
former would cut off the importation of military supplies, in which
the South was terribly deficient; the latter would cut the Confederacy
in twain and isolate the great food supply of her armies. The former
of course to be effective was a matter of ships, and it took time to
supply these; the latter could and should have been done at once,
before the defences of the Mississippi were thoroughly established and
organized as they were to be.

The magnitude of the work of blockade is evident in the fact “that
there were 185 harbor and river openings in the Confederate
coastline.... This coastline extended from Alexandria, Virginia, to the
Mexican port of Matamoros, which lies forty miles up the Rio Grande.
The Continental line so measured was 3,549 miles long.”[49] Our few
ships were scattered over the world. There were but three instantly
available. During the war these were increased to 600 by building
and by purchasing everything which could steam and carry a gun, down
to ferry-boats. We improvised a great navy--of a kind. It could not,
however, until our ironclad fleet of turreted vessels were built, have
stood for a moment before a great regular force. Fortunately, foreign
complications were avoided and we had to do with a government which
itself had to improvise such vessels as it could or get them from
England and France, and the former was full willing until she came
herself to the verge of war on that account. She launched the _Alabama_
and _Shenandoah_ which, though officered by Southerners, were manned by
Englishmen, and built blockade runners by the hundreds, which kept the
Confederacy alive.

By great good fortune the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles,
himself a civilian of fine mind and good hard sense, though with
no initiative and with no knowledge of war, was supplemented by an
Assistant-Secretary, Gustavus V. Fox, a former officer of the navy,
of strong character and great energy. He was to become practically a
chief-of-staff. There had been no plan of operations, no laying down
of a broad scheme such as, had there been any real organization of
the services, there would have been by a general staff. Congress has
resisted such an organization in the navy to this day. Even the Civil
War has not been able to teach it the wisdom of this. Thus, admits
Mr. Welles himself, “but for some redeeming successes at Hatteras and
Port Royal the whole belligerent operations of 1861 would have been
pronounced weak and imbecile failures.”

The work of strengthening the blockade was carried on with great
energy. By building and purchasing every available steam vessel in the
country which could carry a gun, there were by December, 1864, 559
steam vessels in the service, carrying 3,760 guns and about 51,000 men.
Fortunately there had been enough freedom from prejudice to accept the
plans of Ericsson for building the _Monitor_, which appeared in the
very nick of time, to save our wooden fleet from total destruction
in Hampton Roads by the _Virginia_, so much better known under her
original name of the _Merrimac_, which had been one of the frigates so
ignominiously sunk at Norfolk on the surrender of that yard, raised,
and with immense energy converted by the Confederates into a formidable
ironclad. The story of the _Monitor’s_ battle, on March 9, 1862, under
Worden; his almost fatal wounding; and the continuance of the fight
to victory by Dana Greene, her young first lieutenant, a mere boy, is
among the stories which will last forever.[50]

Hatteras inlet had been taken and occupied on August 28, 1861; Port
Royal on November 7th.

There was one man at least, David D. Porter, yet only a lieutenant at
the age of forty-nine, who, when blockading, July, 1861, the passes
of the river in the _Powhatan_, saw the importance and feasibility of
occupying the Mississippi. Porter, north again in November, brought
the subject before the Navy Department, and urged as commander of the
expedition his adopted brother, Farragut, senior to Porter in age by
thirteen years, and far his superior in rank.

Farragut had left Norfolk declaring, it is reported, at a meeting of
Southern naval officers, some of whom were bound to him by his marriage
to a Norfolk wife: “Gentlemen, I would see every man of you damned
before I would raise my arm against the flag.”[51] The expression
is not exactly in consonance with Farragut’s calm and restrained
nature, but it fits so well with his later one from the shrouds of the
_Hartford_ in Mobile Bay, that it may be taken as true. In any case,
Farragut left Norfolk on April 18th, with his wife and son, Loyall.
He found Baltimore, on his arrival there in the Bay Line steamer,
in possession of the mob which had attacked the Sixth Massachusetts
Regiment passing through that morning, April 19th. He went to
Hastings-on-the-Hudson and awaited orders.

Every Southern officer was then suspected, and it required Porter’s
utmost powers to convince the Secretary of the Navy that Farragut was
the man for the great effort which was to be made. On Porter’s going
to Hastings, he found Farragut thoroughly in accord with the plan and
eager for the work. He reached Washington on December 12, 1861, and
on January 9, 1862, was appointed commander-in-chief of the West Gulf
Blockading Squadron, with his flag in the _Hartford_, a sister ship to
the _Brooklyn_, each carrying twenty-two 9-inch smooth-bore guns and
two 20-pounder rifles. It is far from the least of Porter’s services to
his country that he should have been the instrument of this selection.

We all know the story of the passage of the forts by the fleet
(numbering seventeen ships, with 179 guns) with the rising of the moon,
early in the morning of April 24, 1862; of the fire rafts (one of which
set the _Hartford_ afire); of the fight with the eleven Confederate
steamers (one an ironclad ram) above the forts; the arrival off New
Orleans. Says George W. Cable: “I went to the riverside; there far
into the night I saw hundreds of drays carrying cotton out of the
presses and yards to the wharves, where it was fired. The glare of
these sinuous miles of flame set men and women weeping and wailing
thirty miles away on the farther shore of Lake Pontchartrain. But the
next day was a day of terrors.... The firemen were out, but they cast
fire upon the waters, putting the torch to the empty ships and cutting
them loose to float down the river. Whoever could go was going.... My
employer left the city. I closed the doors and ran to the river to
see the sights.... ‘Are the Yankee ships in sight?’ I asked an idler.
He pointed to the tops of their naked masts as they showed up across
the huge bend of the river. They were engaging the batteries at Camp
Chalmette--the old field of Jackson’s renown. Presently that was over.
Ah me! I see them now as they came slowly round Slaughter House Point
into full view, silent, so grim and terrible, black with men, heavy
with deadly portent, the long-banished Stars and Stripes flying against
the frowning sky. Oh, for the _Mississippi_, the _Mississippi_! Just
then she came down upon them. But now drifting helplessly--a mass of
flames.

“The crowds on the levee howled and screamed with rage. The swarming
decks answered never a word; but one old tar on the _Hartford_,
standing with a lanyard in his hand beside a great pivot gun, so plain
in view you could see him smile, silently patted its big black breech
and blandly grinned.”[52]

The ships anchored, and now came as bold an act as any of these
stirring hours. Captain Theodorus Bailey, Farragut’s flag captain, and
Lieutenant George Perkins, of beloved memory in the navy, landed and
calmly walked through a howling mob crying “Hang them! hang them!”
to the city hall and demanded the hauling down of the state flag and
surrender of the city.

It was not until the 28th that everything was settled by the surrender
of the forts to Commander Porter, who had remained below with his
mortar flotilla, which had done such good service. Mention should be
made of the very improper action of the British ship _Mersey_, which,
following Farragut’s fleet up the river, anchored near the _Hartford_,
where the men aboard sang Confederate songs and acted otherwise in
a way so offensive that Farragut was obliged to call the English
captain’s attention to their conduct. Farragut should, in fact, have
ordered the ship out of the river.

The first step only had been taken. There were yet to come great and
ever-memorable battles before Port Hudson and Vicksburg; fights with
ironclads, and expeditions up the rivers by squadrons of improvised
men-of-war under Flag Officers Davis and Foote, both of gallant
memory. Finally the command of the navy, extending over the whole of
the vast river system of which the Mississippi was the main artery,
fell gradually to Porter, who on the fall of Vicksburg, in which his
fleet played so great a part, was made a rear-admiral. His command was
now extended down to New Orleans. He had over 150 vessels under his
flag, and on August 7, 1863, he was able to write from New Orleans
that the “river is entirely free from guerrillas, and merchant vessels
can travel it without danger.” But there was plenty of fighting yet
for the navy in the affluents of the Mississippi, and the Red River
expedition of March 12 to May 16, 1864, in aid of General Banks’s
ill-advised campaign, came near to causing the destruction of the most
important part of Porter’s fleet through the falling of the water. The
building of the famous dam by Colonel Bailey of the volunteers, and the
successful passage thereby of the fleet into deeper water, is one of
the great dramatic events of the war.

While such things were happening on the western rivers, scores of
actions were taking place in Atlantic waters. The siege of Charleston
was a continuous operation and was to remain such to the end of the
war; the ironclad had come into extended use; the Confederate ironclad
_Atlanta_ had been captured in Wassaw Sound in Georgia by the monitor
_Weehawken_, under Captain John Rodgers. There were in all, during the
year 1863, 145 engagements by the navy, great and small.

       *       *       *       *       *

The year 1864 was to bring the Civil War well toward a close. The
blockade had become one of extreme rigor; the region west of the
Mississippi had been entirely cut off, and the whole South was now
reduced to a poverty of arms, equipment, food, clothing, and medical
supplies, the want of all of which was gradually reducing its armies
to a state of inanition. Before the end of the war every port had
been closed, Wilmington, in North Carolina, being the last. Between
November, 1861, and March, 1864, eighty-four different steamers were
running between Nassau and Confederate ports, of which thirty-seven
were captured and twenty-four wrecked or otherwise destroyed.[53] These
vessels were built in Great Britain especially for the service, were
laden with British cargoes, and used the British Bahamas and Bermudas
as ports of call and supply. Nassau bloomed into one of the greatest
and most active ports of the world.

In addition to the remarkable episode of Red River already mentioned,
which resulted in saving Porter’s fleet, the last year of the war
was to include some of its most important and striking events: the
appearance in April of the powerful ironclad _Albemarle_; her career,
and her final destruction by a torpedo through the heroic bravery
of Lieutenant Cushing on the night of October 27-28; the fight of
the _Kearsarge_ and _Alabama_ on June 19th; the battle of Mobile Bay
on August 5th; the appearance of the ironclad _Stonewall_ and the
bombardments of Fort Fisher at the end of December and in the beginning
of the new year.

The destruction of the _Alabama_ on a Sunday morning off Cherbourg
brought to an end the career of a ship built in England and manned by
an English crew, which for more than two years had sunk or burned our
merchantmen. Her captain escaped being taken, as the English yacht
_Deerhound_, which had accompanied the _Alabama_ out of the harbor to
the point seven miles out where the _Kearsarge_ awaited her, took him
aboard before he could be reached by the boats from the _Kearsarge_.
That this aid, if it should be necessary, was prearranged, is shown
by the statement of Winslow of the _Kearsarge_, that the _Deerhound_
had received aboard Captain Semmes’s valuables the night before. It
was a notable victory and went far to set aright the British mind, so
susceptible to “success.”

Mobile, which so soon followed, was the crown of Farragut’s career, and
fixes his place as the greatest of naval commanders. His daring, his
consummate decision, his perfect self-reliance in situations such as
never before fell to an admiral to face, and his thorough command of
such, justify every praise. And in character--simplicity, kindliness,
and uprightness, and in every quality which we are apt to assign to
the best breeding of the sea--he was among the very first. Of but one
other, so far as I have known men, can so much be said--Sampson his
successor of thirty-three years after.

Farragut’s climbing aloft in the main shrouds, where his
flag-lieutenant, John Crittenden Watson (who still survives him, an
honored admiral), lashed him to prevent his falling; his anger with the
slowing of the _Brooklyn_ when her captain saw the monitor _Tecumseh_
go down before him from the explosion of a mine; Farragut’s order,
shouted from aloft: “Damn the torpedoes. Full speed ahead!”; the more
than Sydneyan courtesy of Tunis Craven, the captain of the unfortunate
_Tecumseh_, in stepping aside from the port of the turret and saying
to the pilot: “After you, sir,” and going down with his ship; the
final magnificent grappling of the _Hartford_, _Monongahela_, and
_Lackawanna_ with the ironclad _Tennessee_, make a story which it needs
a poet to tell and which should be enshrined in the heart of every
lover of complete courage and genius in action, and in no man were
these more personified than in Farragut. America would seem to have
lost that genius for praise in poetry of her heroes and heroic actions
which has remained in full vigor in England, whose poets seem to rise
ever to the occasion, even if at times soaring somewhat above it. But
better the latter than none at all. Still, whether sung or not (for
Brownell’s fine poem was but a taste of what should be), Mobile Bay
remains one of the finest dramas ever enacted upon the salt flood of
ocean.

The great bombardments of Fort Fisher on December 24th, 25th, and 27th,
and again on January 11th-15th by the fleet of fifty-eight ships under
Admiral Porter, during which the fort was assaulted by 2,000 seamen
and marines which, though unsuccessful in itself, greatly assisted that
of the army, were the last naval events of high importance of the war.
During this bombardment, in which the most powerful ships of the navy
assisted, 16,682 projectiles were fired, weighing 1,652,638 pounds. All
of the nineteen guns on the sea face of the fort were dismounted.

On April 9th came the surrender of Lee at Appomattox, and peace.



CHAPTER XXII


The end of the “Brothers’ War” had made of the United States a nation.
Our country took its place in the world, and its fleets again reached
into every sea. But the lessons of the navy had not touched the dull
minds which in June, 1860, had voted down the supplies of the little
navy which was to expand so greatly in the four succeeding years. To
such, the whole work of defeating the Confederacy appeared to be the
more spectacular work of the army. The constriction of the blockade
was not of the dramatic character of Gettysburg or the battles of
the Wilderness. Its meaning was to filter but slowly into even the
more thoughtful. Thus for years, while immense changes were going on
elsewhere, we were at a standstill in naval matters, or rather slowly
sinking to absolute nonentity. By 1882 the shameful condition of
neglect began to be remedied. That year may be taken as the birth-year
of our navy of to-day. For seven years we had to go abroad for such
material--gun-forgings, shafting, and armor--as we wanted, until our
naval demands forced upon our steel establishments the work of putting
themselves in order. The story of this work has never been told, but
the country can be assured that it was to the navy that the initial
great development of steel manufacture in this country was due. In 1882
we could make only a forged iron shaft for the little _Dolphin_, which
promptly broke on her trial trip. It was through arrangements made by
the Navy Department that our steel works, beginning with Bethlehem,
established modern conditions.

The story of the building of the new navy is outside the scope of
this book. It suffices to say that by 1898 we had in service four
battleships, the _Iowa_, _Indiana_, _Oregon_, and _Massachusetts_, of
the first class; the _Texas_, of the second; two armored cruisers, the
_New York_ and _Brooklyn_; eleven protected cruisers of from 3,000 to
7,735 tons, and twenty unprotected cruisers of from 839 to 2,089 tons.
We also had eight torpedo boats, a dynamite vessel, the _Vesuvius_, and
six ships of the monitor type, from 4,000 to 6,060 tons. It was with
this fleet we fought the war with Spain.

The causes of this war stretch back through generations. Their
foundation was, essentially, a difference in race. The American is
mainly an Anglo-Saxon, direct and practical in his way; the Spaniard an
oriental, courteous, kindly in the relations of friendship and family,
with much that is lovable, but impracticable, tribal in his tendencies,
knowing little of the modern phases of government by a constitution,
and bloodthirsty and devastating in putting down revolt or in settling
political differences. An anarchic century in Spain produced like
conditions in Cuba. Our proximity to Cuba and our many commercial
interests there were very strong elements in the situation.

A great impetus was given to feeling for Cuba and against Spain by the
explosion of the _Maine_ in Havana Harbor about 9:30 P.M., February
15th. Two months, however, were yet to pass before war was declared,
though at the last moment Spain had acceded to all our demands. While
our diplomacy may thus be said to have been not entirely “correct,”
President McKinley may be ruled to have been wise in cutting the
Gordian knot by war, which his message of April 11, 1898, practically
did in referring the whole subject to Congress. The joint resolution
passed and signed on April 20th, demanding that Spain should
relinquish her authority in Cuba, was of course taken as a declaration
of war by Spain, and April 21st was declared by Congress a few days
later as the official date of its beginning.

On the afternoon of May 21st Captain William T. Sampson, who was now
in command of the North Atlantic station, and was with the flagship
_New York_ off the reef at Key West where well-nigh all the available
ships in the Atlantic were collected, received a telegram announcing
his assignment to the command, with the rank of rear-admiral, an
advancement only possible by selection by the President in time of
war. This was the first indication of actual hostilities, but it was
soon followed by another ordering to blockade immediately the coast of
Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda (a little west of Havana). Gathering
during the night outside the reef (distant six miles from Key West) all
the ships ready to move, the fleet early next morning was on its way,
and by evening was off Havana, the searchlights of which were sweeping
the sea in expectancy of the American fleet. Powerfully armed as were
its batteries, they were, curiously enough, so disposed that they
were open to attack from the southwest, with little possibility of
return. It was Sampson’s eager wish to make this attack at once, and a
battle-order had been drawn in anticipation of war, early in April, but
the Navy Department in a letter of April 6th set its face so decidedly
against the attempt, that Sampson had to yield. The department from
the view of the necessity of preserving the fleet to meet Cervera was
justified, but Sampson’s view, as later analysis of the situation
showed, was correct. Had action been allowed, Havana would have been
ours, without loss, on April 23d.

In addition to Sampson’s command, a squadron made up of the _Brooklyn_,
_Massachusetts_, and _Texas_ was stationed at Hampton Roads under
Commodore Schley; and several others, among them the fast _Columbia_
and _Minneapolis_ and the cruiser _San Francisco_, were kept north to
meet the clamor of the seacoast in general for protection. The public
could not understand that the only real protection was concentration
against, and the destruction of, the enemy’s fleet.

As the joint resolution of Congress of April 20th declared the aim
of the United States to be relinquishment of Spanish authority in
the island of Cuba, our main sphere of action was naturally the
Caribbean. As soon as Spain should have yielded the island, the war
would naturally end unless Spain should choose to continue it. There
were in the island, by official statement, 159,297 regular troops and
119,160 volunteers. The American regular army, distributed from Maine
to Alaska, was but 28,183. Of course it was necessary to call for a
large number of volunteers.

To preserve Cuba it was necessary for Spain to preserve communication
with the island. This could be done only by obtaining and keeping
command of the Atlantic. To do this she had an effective force of only
four armored cruisers: the _Infanta Maria Teresa_, _Almirante Oquendo_,
_Vizcaya_ (Biscay), and _Cristóbal Colón_, each of about 7,000 tons. A
battleship, the _Pelayo_, and a large armored cruiser, the _Carlos V_,
were not yet ready for service. This was of course a hopeless disparity
of fighting force as compared with Admiral Sampson’s fleet of five
powerful battleships and two armored cruisers. Admiral Cervera, who had
been placed in command of the Spanish squadron, saw this clearly and
protested, without avail, against sending it across the Atlantic. On
April 29, 1898, he left the Cape Verde Islands with the four armored
cruisers first mentioned and with three torpedo-boat destroyers, with
orders to go to San Juan, Puerto Rico.

       *       *       *       *       *

Commodore George Dewey, commanding our naval forces in Asia, had, under
the orders of the department, collected his whole force at Hong Kong in
anticipation of the war, and had made ready for the eventuality. The
_Baltimore_, a large cruiser for the period, had fortunately reached
him in time with a precious supply of extra ammunition. The British
Declaration of Neutrality had obliged him to withdraw on April 24th his
force consisting of the _Olympia_, _Baltimore_, _Boston_, _Raleigh_,
_Concord_, _Petrel_, and the revenue cutter _McCulloch_, from Hong Kong
to Mirs Bay, thirty miles away on the China coast. Here, on April 26th,
he received a telegram informing him officially of the declaration of
war and adding: “Commence operations at once, particularly against
the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost
endeavors.” The last three words were certainly unnecessary. He left
as soon as possible, this being the afternoon of May 27th. It was 620
miles to Manila.

It must be confessed that the outlook for the Spanish at Manila was
not cheerful. They had but two vessels of any considerable size, the
_Reina Cristina_ and the _Castilla_, of 3,100 and 3,300 tons, and the
latter, which had been in use as a receiving ship, had no motive power.
In addition there were available two small cruisers of 1,152 tons, two
of 1,040, and a gunboat of 500. Three other small vessels, one the
_Velasco_, of 1,139 tons, were under repairs, with some of their guns
in the batteries at the entrance of the bay, twenty-five miles away.
Dewey had the _Olympia_, of 5,870 tons; _Baltimore_, 4,413; _Raleigh_,
3,183; _Boston_, 3,000; _Concord_, 1,710; and _Petrel_, 892. The guns,
besides a number of 3 and 6 pounders, were:

        AMERICAN               SPANISH

  Ten           8-inch    Seven   6.3-inch
  Twenty-three  6-inch    Four    5.9-inch
  Twenty        5-inch    Twenty  4.7-inch
                          Eleven  3.4-inch
                                 2.24-inch

The complements of the two squadrons were: American, 1,707 men;
Spanish, 1,664.

It was a ten-mile stretch across the entrance to the bay, divided into
two deep channels by islands upon which had been hastily established
batteries mounted with seventeen guns varying in calibre from 7 to 4.3
inch; nine of these were muzzle-loaders and thus could not be fired
nearly so rapidly as the 4.3-inch, which were quick-firers. At Manila
were mounted 226 guns of all kinds, most of which were inefficient; but
there were twelve good breech-loaders of from 9.45-inch to 4.7-inch,
with much less range, however, than the modern 8-inch carried by the
_Olympia_. The Manila defences, however, were such that it would have
been much wiser for Montojo to have anchored close as possible to the
fortifications and thus obtain such support as was available. As it
was, he was out of their protection, supported by only eight guns,
mostly ineffective weapons, in battery at Sangley Point and Cavite;
three of these, two 6.3-inch and one 4.7-inch, were of value.

Dewey was off Subig Bay on Saturday, April 30th. After examining the
bay for the Spanish ships he stood for Manila, fifty-seven miles away.
At midnight he passed the rock El Fraile in Boca Grande, the battery on
which fired upon the squadron, which answered with a few shots. At five
o’clock the squadron was near the mouth of the river, on both sides of
which Manila is built, when the Spanish squadron was sighted at anchor
off Cavite, six miles to the southward, and our ships at once turned in
that direction. Fire was opened at 5:41 by the _Olympia_. The American
squadron stood down slowly to the westward, turned and turned again,
passing thus five times before the anchored Spanish ships, thrice to
the west, twice to the east. After an action of two hours, on a report
of shortness of ammunition (which proved incorrect) the squadron
hauled off for a count of its supply and to give the men breakfast,
the captains being called aboard to report damages. None of these were
serious, and no men had been killed, though several were wounded.
During this time the Spanish squadron was seen to be in flames, and the
American squadron then stood in and completed its work. The victory was
complete. The Americans had fired in all 5,859 shots, 1,414 of which
were 5, 6, and 8 inch; there remained 2,861 of the heavier shell and
over 30,000 of the 6, 3, and 1 pounders.

The result of the action depended upon gunnery efficiency, as there
was no ship on either side which was not thoroughly vulnerable to the
guns used. And though our gunnery was (as also at Santiago) far below
the present high standard, the result was positive proof of great
superiority to that of the Spanish.

The Americans had two officers and six men wounded in the _Baltimore_.
Otherwise they were scathless. The Spanish loss, as reckoned by
“painstaking inquiry” by an American officer, was 167 killed and 214
wounded. Admiral Montojo’s own statement, which puts his whole force at
but 1,134, was 75 killed and 281 wounded.

Dewey cut and buoyed the cable on May 2d, took position in the bay,
and awaited the coming of troops which were soon to be on their way.
He sent the revenue cutter _McCulloch_, which had taken no part in the
action, to telegraph his victory home. Before he had cut the cable,
however, the news had been telegraphed to Madrid, and it was thence
received on May 2d with great enthusiasm in the United States. On May
10th Dewey received the thanks of Congress and was raised to the rank
of Admiral of the Navy.

While the victory was to have great results in determining our attitude
toward the Philippines, it could in no sense determine the result of
the war; this could only be attained by the destruction of one or the
other battle fleets now in the Atlantic. The event, however, put a
very different complexion upon the attitude of Europe. There was to be
no further European talk of putting limitations upon our conduct of the
struggle.



CHAPTER XXIII


Naval action now shifts almost entirely to the Caribbean. Until in the
last days of the war there was to be in the Pacific no further special
naval movement beyond the seizure of Guam by the _Charleston_ on June
11th and the sending to Manila the monitors _Monterey_ and _Monadnock_
to reinforce Dewey. The first of the army sailed from San Francisco on
May 28th.

The departure of Cervera from the Cape Verdes caused Admiral Sampson
to move from Havana east 970 miles to San Juan, Puerto Rico, with the
expectancy of finding there the Spanish fleet. This move was based
upon the view that as it was but from 1,200 to 1,400 miles from San
Juan to important points on our coast, it was an absolute necessity to
make sure that if the Spanish squadron arrived there it should not be
allowed to leave and be free to raid our seaboard. Sampson’s prescience
was right. Cervera’s orders were to go there and then do as he thought
best. Had he not himself been so slow in crossing the Atlantic, Sampson
would have found him at San Juan, and the Spanish fleet would have been
destroyed on May 12th instead of July 3d.

Continuous breakdowns of the two monitors accompanying Sampson caused
such delay that his squadron was not off San Juan until May 12th. An
attack on the fortifications began at 5 A.M., and continued for three
hours, when Sampson withdrew with no damage to the ships and with the
loss of one man killed and four wounded aboard the _New York_. As
Cervera was clearly not in port, and as it was necessary not to risk
overmuch the American ships before he could be met, it was thought
inadvisable to continue the action, though as known later the place
was ready to surrender to another attack. As Cervera was much overdue
and no word had as yet been received of his whereabouts, the American
squadron stood west (with a view to covering Havana), sending into St.
Thomas, only sixty miles to the east, for news.

It was not until in the early morning of May 15th, off Puerto Plata,
that word came of Cervera’s having reached Curaçao. At the same time a
dispatch from Washington was received by Sampson informing him that
the Flying Squadron was en route to Key West and directing Sampson
himself to proceed there with all possible dispatch.

       *       *       *       *       *

Cervera had arrived off Martinique on the evening of May 11th and had
sent in a destroyer for news, which brought next morning the word
of Sampson’s being off Puerto Rico. Unable now to go to San Juan
without meeting the American fleet, a council of war was called, and
on its decision Cervera shaped his course for Curaçao in search of
coal, leaving the destroyer _Terror_, whose boilers had given out, at
Martinique. Leaving Curaçao in the evening of May 15th, he entered the
harbor of Santiago de Cuba at dawn on May 19th.

Sampson was now, as mentioned, standing at full speed for Key West. It
is very remarkable that he had the same instinct as to Cervera’s second
destination as to his first; as in a telegram to the scout _Harvard_
(the _New York_ of the American line of steamers) he mentioned Santiago
or San Juan as the ports likely to be entered. The peremptory orders
from Washington left no freedom of action, however, and on May 18th Key
West was reached. There were found the ships of the Flying Squadron,
the _Brooklyn_, _Massachusetts_, and _Texas_, just arrived from Hampton
Roads and coaling.

On May 11th, the day before Sampson’s attack at San Juan, there
were two affairs of great gallantry: the one the cable-cutting at
Cienfuegos; the other an action at Cardenas. The former was carried
out by two sailing launches for lifting and cutting the cables and
two steam launches carrying marines to “stand off” the Spaniards.
The _Marblehead_ and _Nashville_ kept up a fire against the forces
entrenched on the edge of the low bluff which finally had to be
approached within 150 feet before the work was accomplished. Grappling
for the cables was long and tedious, and the operation of sawing
through each took nearly half an hour. To perform such work under a
constant fire from the Spaniards in trenches not more than 200 yards
away showed a cool courage of which Americans can be proud. The boats
were back to their ships in a little over three hours, with two killed
and seven wounded, one of the latter being Lieutenant Winslow in
command.

The action on the same day at Cardenas on the north side of Cuba,
but seventy-five miles from Cienfuegos by land, but 500 by sea, was
between the _Wilmington_, the _Machias_, the revenue cutter _Hudson_,
and the torpedo boat _Winslow_ against three Spanish gunboats which
lay well within the harbor in water which could not be entered by
our heavier draft vessels. The torpedo boat, which of course was
never intended for such service, ventured in too far and was severely
handled. Ensign Bagley and four of the men were killed, and three, one
being Lieutenant Bernadou in command, were wounded. The _Winslow_,
wholly disabled, was towed out of her dangerous position by the
intrepid handling of the _Hudson_.

We return to Key West, where all was movement to take measures to
intercept Cervera.

The Navy Department had become convinced from information received that
Cervera had imperative orders to go either to Cienfuegos or Havana
to land material necessary for the defence of Havana, and urged the
utmost dispatch in blockading both ports. Thus next morning, May 19th,
Commodore Schley sailed with the three ships of his squadron mentioned,
to be followed next day by the _Iowa_, our newest battleship of the
time, and which reached Cienfuegos only seven hours after Commodore
Schley. There followed the torpedo boat _Dupont_, the collier
_Merrimac_, the cruisers _Marblehead_, _Castine_, and two auxiliary
vessels; an ample force, should Cervera be met.

Events were now following one another with the utmost rapidity. To
deal with these in detail is quite beyond our scope. One must look to
the larger histories of the war for the full account of the happenings
of this stirring time.[54] One can give here but a running mention
of the reception on the late afternoon of May 19th of the news by
the way of Havana of Cervera’s arrival that morning at Santiago de
Cuba; the repetition of this news with an expression of doubt in the
telegram from Washington to Sampson during that night; its verification
next day, the 20th; the dispatch of the news to Schley with orders,
if convinced that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos Bay,[55] to go to
Santiago and blockade; Sampson’s movement 300 miles east with the rest
of the fleet available into the narrow waters of Nicholas Channel, to
intercept Cervera should he leave Santiago and attempt to reach Havana;
the delay of Schley at Cienfuegos, not being satisfied that Cervera
was not there; the final assurance that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos
received from insurgents on May 24th, and the departure that evening of
Commodore Schley’s squadron for Santiago; his arrival twenty-two miles
south of the entrance on May 26th; Cervera’s intention (but given up
through vacillation) to leave Santiago that evening at almost the same
moment when Schley started with intention to return to Key West on the
plea of inability to coal his ships; his change of mind on May 28th and
arrival that evening off Santiago; the arrival of the _Oregon_ at Key
West on May 26th, completing her remarkable journey of 14,000 miles
from the west coast; Sampson’s finally determining to go to Santiago
on account of Schley’s dispatch that he could not blockade for want
of coal; the recognition of the _Colón_ in the harbor entrance on May
29th; the ineffectual attack on the _Colón_ on May 30th; the arrival
of Sampson on June 1st with the _New York_, _Oregon_, _Mayflower_,
and torpedo boat _Porter_; the establishment of a close blockade; the
sinking of the _Merrimac_ in the entrance channel; the stationing every
evening of a battleship with searchlights upon the harbor entrance;
the occupancy of Guantánamo Bay; the driving off, by the battalion
of marines established there in camp, of the Spanish troops in the
vicinity; the frequent bombardment of the Spanish batteries at Santiago
entrance; the arrival on June 20th of the army under General Shafter;
its debarkation and movement against Santiago; the attack of July 1st
on El Caney and San Juan Hill; the sortie of Cervera’s squadron; its
destruction: these are but the chief events of the many which happened
between May 18th and July 3d. On the forenoon of Sunday, this latter
date, was decided the fate of Spain in America.

More than half the crews of the Spanish ships had been used ashore
on July 1st in the defence of Santiago, and the commander of these,
Captain Bustamante, Cervera’s chief-of-staff, had, to the great grief
of all who knew him both in the Spanish and American services, been
mortally wounded. Cervera had, after the battle of July 1st, received
orders to leave the harbor and endeavor to save his squadron. He and
his captains accepted the situation with calm courage and prepared to
leave the evening of July 2d. The slow work of returning the crews
aboard ship caused delay until the next morning.

At 9:30 the crews of the American ships were just falling in for the
usual Sunday “inspection.” The admiral had started a little before nine
in the _New York_ under easy steam to arrange with General Shafter a
plan of combined attack. The _New York_ had gone about five miles when
a shot was heard from the battery at the entrance and a ship almost
immediately after seen coming out. The _New York_ at once turned.

In accord with the admiral’s standing order, all the ships immediately
started to close in on the entrance. The flagship _Infanta Maria
Teresa_, which was the ship first sighted, was naturally exposed for
some little time to the fire of all, and was quickly a mass of flames
and heading in for the land. She was run ashore about six miles west
of the harbor entrance; the _Oquendo_, though she was the last of the
large ships to come out, was beached, also burning, soon after the
_Maria Teresa_, about a quarter of a mile west of the latter; the
_Vizcaya_, afire, went on to the reef fifteen miles west of Santiago
about 11:30, shortly after which her forward magazine exploded. The
destroyer _Furor_ had been sunk, and the _Pluton_ was ashore destroyed,
having made only three miles to the west. The _Colón_ only was left,
in full flight and practically uninjured, pursued by the _Oregon_,
_Brooklyn_, _New York_, and _Texas_. At 1:15 she turned ashore, the
13-inch shell of the _Oregon_, fired at 9,000 yards, going over her.
Her sea-valves had been opened, and though she was pushed on to the
beach stern foremost by the _New York_, her bow overhung into deep
water and as she filled she turned on her side. She was never raised.
The heroic efforts of the American crews in saving life from the
burning ships are deserving every praise.

The Spanish loss may be taken as about 264 killed and drowned and
151 wounded; the prisoners, including officers, numbered 1,813. The
Americans lost 1 killed, 1 wounded, both in the _Brooklyn_.

The Spanish could not have expected to escape, nor did they. They went
to their death like heroes. There has been nothing finer than the calm
bravery of their exit from the narrow harbor entrance without accident
or delay on the part of any ship. We had against them six heavy ships
to four; fourteen 12-inch and 13-inch guns against six 11-inch; thirty
8-inch against none of that calibre; forty-four 6, 5, and 4 inch
against thirty-six 5.5 and 4.7 inch, and ninety-six 6-pounders against
thirty-eight Spanish. We had a like superiority in armor. In one
point, speed, the Spanish were, nominally at least, decidedly superior,
all their ships being of twenty knots. Only two of the Americans: the
_New York_ and _Brooklyn_, had such.

There remained now only the question of reducing the city of Santiago,
in which the navy took an active part in bombardment of the city from
the sea. On July 17th it surrendered.

The success of the navy at Santiago was due to the circular blockade
instituted by Admiral Sampson on his arrival, and to the lighting up
the harbor entrance nightly with the searchlights of the battleships,
which were relieved every two hours. Escape at night was thus, by
Cervera’s own report, made impossible. The circular form of Sampson’s
blockade during the day and night left no such chance of finding an
extensive unguarded space, such as existed in steaming in column to
and fro across the entrance. The whole is summed up in the report of
Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Clark of the _Oregon_ to Admiral Sampson:
“We went ahead at full speed with the determination of carrying out to
the utmost your order: ‘If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must
close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels
or force them to run ashore.’”

       *       *       *       *       *

With their only battle fleet destroyed, the preservation by the Spanish
of communication with Cuba was now impossible and the fall of the
island certain. Thus an expedition under the command of Admiral Cámara
left Cadiz on June 17th for the Philippines. It reached Port Said on
June 25th. A strong force was detailed from Admiral Sampson’s fleet
to go to the Philippines under Commodore Watson, to be accompanied
through the Mediterranean by the rest of the available ships of the
fleet under Sampson himself. The news of the 3d of July, and also of
the preparation of this fleet, caused Spain to recall Cámara’s force
before it had left the vicinity of Suez. Meanwhile a large number of
ships had taken a prominent part in the convoying of part of General
Miles’s force to Puerto Rico and in the seizure of the south coast of
that island.

Spain, with full recognition of the meaning of her loss, opened
negotiations for peace, and on August 12, 1898, the protocol was
signed by which she relinquished all sovereignty over Cuba, ceded to
the United States Puerto Rico and an island in the Ladrones to be
selected, and agreed to our occupancy of the city of Manila pending the
conclusion of a treaty of peace which would determine the future of the
Philippines.

At the moment of the signing of the protocol our fleet and troops were
preparing for the assault at Manila. By noon the city had surrendered
and was in our possession. The date at Manila, owing to difference in
time, was August 13th. Thus there were but a few hours between the
surrender and the signing, but the latter had preceded the surrender
and Manila could not be claimed as ours by right of conquest.
Although the claim was put forward, it was soon withdrawn, and we
now possess the archipelago by right of purchase, though indeed it
must be said that the sale by Spain was an enforced one. The war thus
ended with Puerto Rico and Guam as possessions by conquest, with the
Hawaiian Islands a United States territory by annexation, with Cuba a
protectorate, and the Philippines a purchased possession. We had gone
far afield and had incurred heavy responsibilities which stretched
eight thousand miles westward from California, and had taken up a naval
base adjacent to what is sure to be one of the great fields of future
world action--Eastern Asia.

It is difficult to leave the subject of the Philippines without a word
as to the continuation of naval action among the islands and the share
taken by the navy in the release of Spaniards held by the natives,
in frequent punitive expeditions, and in the general pacification of
the region. For several years our ships were active equally with the
army in this work. In February, 1899, the important point of Ilo-Ilo
was bombarded and captured by the small cruiser _Petrel_. Constant
work of patrol and blockade was carried out, not always without loss.
Throughout there was active coöperation with the army in transporting
troops and in attack and defence, with for some years separate
expeditions by the marines of great hardship and courage.



CHAPTER XXIV


The losses of the navy in the war with Spain were extraordinarily
small. There were but sixteen killed and sixty-eight wounded, of whom
two died later. But even more remarkable, and it reflects the highest
praise upon the service, was the state of health of the 26,102 men
during this war of 114 days (April 21st to August 12th, inclusive).
There were but fifty-six deaths in this period from disease, or at the
rate of 6.85 per thousand a year. There were but thirteen cases of
typhoid fever, and no death aboard ship from this disease and but one
in hospital. There were but eighteen cases of dysentery. The marine
battalion at Guantánamo numbered 588--21 officers and 567 men. There
was no death from disease; only nineteen cases of malaria and no
typhoid.

The whole was a very remarkable showing; one never equalled elsewhere.
And it should be remembered that it was in a climate, and indeed very
largely in the same region, where, a century and a half before, the
crews of some British ships were so swept by disease that they had
in some cases to be renewed three times in but a moderate period
of service. The health conditions of the American fleet showed an
enlightened care which reflects honor upon all concerned.

       *       *       *       *       *

The situation left us by the Spanish War is one which can be maintained
only by a powerful fleet, though our acquisitions in themselves
scarcely add to the necessity of such a fleet, for meanwhile we have
built the Panama Canal. And while the canal has lightened our strategic
difficulties in that our battle fleet can now reach San Francisco from
the Caribbean in a fourth of the time it took the _Oregon_ to make
her celebrated passage from San Francisco to Key West, there is upon
us the heavy burden of the defence of the isthmus, its position being
in effect insular. It can only remain in our hands by our controlling
the sea. Fortifications assist in its defence for the time being, but
should we go to war it must finally go into the hands of the power
with a superior navy. And being thus isolated and having this insular
character, the canal and its fortifications should be in naval control
in order that there should be complete unanimity of effort in its
defence.

It is safe to say that however anti-imperialist one may be, there
is no American who would see the canal go into foreign control with
equanimity. The most pronounced would halt at such a danger. Thus
whatever one’s attitude may be toward the Monroe Doctrine, there are
few who would not uphold the contention that we shall not permit any
further extension of foreign influence in the Caribbean or in any part
of the neighboring Pacific littoral, or in neighboring islands such as
the Galapagos. This is not a question of extension of influence, but of
safety.

A word must be said as to the navy’s diplomatic work. International
law is mostly both made and administered by navies. The navy is thus
a great and constant school of diplomacy, the right hand of the
Department of State. We have had a notable instance, almost as I write,
in the events in Mexico, and from none have naval officers received
higher praise for their work than from the late lamented Secretary
of State, John Hay. It is duty such as this which gives the naval
profession its breadth and importance in peace, as great in its way, as
in war. And the diplomacy of naval officers is always in the direction
of peace, though it may sometimes be peace with a strong hand, as in
Admiral Benham’s most admirable handling of the situation in the harbor
of Rio de Janeiro during the revolt of 1895. He brought instantaneous
peace between the revolutionary forces and the Government; he upheld
international law, stood by the rights of our merchant captains, and
rendered a service beyond price to Brazil.

Such international uses of the navy accentuate the value of the Marine
Corps, now a naval army of 10,267 men and officers. Little has been
said heretofore in this book of this valuable, indeed invaluable,
force, as its duties are merged largely in the general duties of
the navy. It differs from the army proper in its mobility and
ever-readiness for foreign service. Its mobility is that of the navy
itself; its transport is ever ready; its supply train is the fleet.

It is an international understanding that seamen or marines may
be landed in any part of the world for the protection of life and
property, and that such action may even extend to the use of force
without being regarded as an act of war. There is no need to expand the
value of such a convention which gives the navy such an extension of
its field of forceful, and at the same time peaceable, action.

We speak much of our development into a world power through the war of
1898. We were such a power potentially as soon as we had a navy of a
strength to enable us to say to another power, “I forbid.” And we can
only remain a world power through a navy which can command safety and
peace. Linked to such power there must be political good sense and just
dealing. Long habit in obedience and in command, a life-long study of
international relations, a knowledge of the races of men such as no
other great profession can offer, an ideal which puts duty as its first
law; these enable the navy to furnish its just quota of both the high
qualifications mentioned. To it the country can securely trust its
honor and safety. It will ever do its duty.



A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY


It would take a great many pages to give a complete bibliography of the
subject of the American navy. I must content myself with mentioning
only a few of the more prominent works.

There were two navies: that of the Revolution, which disappeared
wholly in 1785; and that of to-day, which had its origin in 1794. The
two most complete works regarding the former are those of Gardner W.
Allen, “A Naval History of the Revolution,” 2 vols., Boston and New
York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913, and Oscar Charles Paullin, “The
Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, Its Policy, and
Its Achievements,” Cleveland, The Burrows Brothers Company, 1906. This
latter deals chiefly with the legislative action respecting the navy
and its administration; it is the only one of its class. To these two
authors, Dr. Allen and Dr. Paullin, I desire to express my special
obligations.

The naval classic, J. Fenimore Cooper, “The Navy of the United States
of America,” a book which fascinated the author of the present volume
as a boy, carries one from 1775 through the War of 1812 only.

The publications of the Naval History Society, Vol. 1, being the
logs of the _Serapis_, _Alliance_, and _Ariel_ under the command of
John Paul Jones, ed. by John S. Barnes, 1911. Vol. 2 is “Fanning’s
Narrative,” also edited by Mr. Barnes, 1912. Fanning’s account of
the capture of the _Serapis_ by the _Bonhomme Richard_ is the best
existent. There are other volumes, all of much interest.

Robert Beatson, “Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain from 1727
to 1783,” by far the best work of its period on the subject.

Wm. Laird Clowes, “The Royal Navy,” a monumental work in which Admiral
Mahan, U. S. N., and Colonel Theodore Roosevelt had part, covers in
vols. 3-6 our Revolution and the War of 1812. It is a work of the
highest value.

The same should be said of Admiral Mahan’s books, “The Influence of
Sea Power upon History,” and “Sea Power in its Relations to the War
of 1812,” Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1905. All his works are
important.

G. Lacour-Gayet, “La Marine Militaire de la France sous le Règne de
Louis XVI,” Paris, Honorè Champion, 9 Quai Voltaire, 1905, is the best
French history of the naval events of the time.

Henri Doniol, “Histoire de la Participation de la France à
l’Établissement des États-Unis d’Amérique,” 6 vols., Paris, Imprimerie
Nationale, 1892. This monumental work was prepared for the universal
exhibition of 1889 and is of highest value to the student.

Charlemagne Tower, “The Marquis de la Fayette in the American
Revolution.” A valuable work.

Henry Adams, “The History of the United States, 1800-1817,” 9 vols.,
New York, C. Scribner’s Sons, 1891. A book of the first rank and
importance.

Edgar Stanton Maclay, “A History of the United States Navy,” from 1775
to 1902, 3 vols., New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1902. One of our
best and completest histories on the subject.

Gardner W. Allen, “Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs,” New York, etc.,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1905. An excellent book and a complete
account.

E. Dupuy, “Americains et Barbaresques,” Paris, R. Roger et F.
Chernoviz, 99 Boulevard Raspail, 1910. A book very highly to be praised.

Robert W. Neeser, “Statistical and Chronological History of the United
States Navy,” New York, the Macmillan Company, 1909, 2 vols. folio. An
invaluable work for the student.

Robert W. Neeser, “Our Many Sided Navy,” Yale University Press, 1914.
Well done.

Theodore Roosevelt, “The Naval War of 1812,” New York, G. P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1882. A good and fair book.

The literature of the Civil War is so vast that barest mention can be
made of a few works only.

Loyall Farragut, “Life and Letters of Admiral D. G. Farragut,” New
York, D. Appleton & Company, 1891.

A. T. Mahan, “Admiral Farragut,” New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1903.

James Russel Soley, “Admiral Porter,” New York, D. Appleton & Company.

John Randolph Spears, “David G. Farragut,” Philadelphia, Geo. W. Jacobs
& Company, 1905.

James Russel Soley, “The Blockade and the Cruisers,” New York, Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1890.

A. T. Mahan, “The Gulf and Inland Waters,” New York, Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1883.

Daniel Ammen (Rear-Admiral), “The Atlantic Coast,” New York, Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1883.

“Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,” New York, The Century Company,
1888.

All these are very interesting and valuable.

For the Spanish War, John D. Long (ex-Secretary of the Navy), “The New
American Navy,” 2 vols., New York, The Outlook Company, 1903.

F. E. Chadwick, “The Relations of the United States and Spain,” vols. 2
and 3 being “The Spanish War,” New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911.

There are admirable bibliographies in the works of Dr. Paullin and Dr.
Allen covering the periods of which their books treat. The reader is
referred to these and other general bibliographies for more complete
information than can be given here.



A WORD ABOUT THE AMERICAN BOOKS



The American Books

_A Library of Good Citizenship_


To vote regularly and conscientiously and never to have been arrested
for disorder is not the be-all and end-all of good citizenship. The
good citizen is he or she who bears an active hand in cleansing and
making merry the black spots of the neighborhood; who cherishes a home
however small; who takes an increasingly intelligent interest in all
that contributes to the country’s welfare, and feels a keenly patriotic
hope for the future of the nation.

For such citizens THE AMERICAN BOOKS are designed--a series of small
volumes on current American problems. The keynote of the series will
be the discussion of distinctively American movements and questions
connected with the future prosperity of the United States.

The series was planned long before the great war, but it has derived
added importance from the position which that great struggle has given
America on the face of the globe. The United States, standing aloof
from the suicidal bloodshed of the Old World, has necessarily become
the peaceful arbiter of the earth’s destinies and the flywheel to keep
the world’s industry revolving.

An inquiry into the meaning and tendency of American civilization
to-day is thus not only a matter of interest but of patriotic duty.
The publishers wish THE AMERICAN BOOKS to be a series of brief,
authoritative manuals which will attempt to lay bare some of the
problems that confront us to-day; written in popular terms that will
inspire rather than discourage the casual reader. The series should
prove not only of great interest to all American citizens who wish
to aid in solving their country’s pressing problems, but to every
foreigner visiting this country who seeks an interpretation of the
American point of view.

The publishers wish THE AMERICAN BOOKS to be written by the best men,
and to this end they seek the widest publicity for the plan. They will
be glad to receive suggestions as to appropriate titles for inclusion
in the series and will welcome authoritative MSS submitted from any
quarter. In particular they submit the plan to the consideration of the
American colleges where the problems of the country are being studied.
In science, literature, business, politics, in the arts of war and the
arts of peace, the publishers will seek writers who have stood for
fearless achievement or equally fearless failure, who will build up A
LIBRARY OF GOOD CITIZENSHIP.

  (_For complete list of volumes in this series see opposite title
  page._)



  [Illustration]

  THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS
  GARDEN CITY, N. Y.



FOOTNOTES:


[1] This phrase had its origin in the advocacy, by a Dr. Banyan, of a
purely vegetable diet.

[2] Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, XI, quoted by Paullin, 389.

[3] See Paullin, “The Navy of the American Revolution.”

[4] Allen, 1, 47.

[5] Lacour-Gayet, “La Marine Militaire de la France sous le Règne de
Louis XVI,” 142.

[6] Clowes, “The Royal Navy,” III, 401.

[7] Jones Mss., July 28, 1777, quoted by Allen, 1, 183.

[8] The identical commission for which Conyngham came near suffering
was found a few years since in a Paris bookshop and is now in the
collection of Navalia formed by the late Captain John S. Barnes of New
York.

[9] Van Tyne, “The American Revolution,” 305, referring to Washington
Writings (Spark’s ed.) VI, 441 and VII, 159. N. Y. Docs. Rel. to Col.
Hist., VIII, 800.

[10] Memorandum dated July 15, 1780, sent by the hands of Lafayette to
Rochambeau.

[11] Clowes, “The Royal Navy,” III, 396.

[12] For a full description of vessels of the galley period, see
Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, “Deniers Jours de la Marine à Rames,”
and Lane-Poole, “Barbary Corsairs,” Chap. XII.

[13] Adams, “Works,” VIII, 373.

[14] “Dip. Corres. of the Revolution,” IV, pp. 95, 149.

[15] “Works,” VIII, 372.

[16] Adams, “Works,” VIII, 218.

[17] Jefferson’s Correspondence “Definitive Ed.,” V, 88 and 386.

[18] Allen, 56.

[19] Cooper, I, 240.

[20] The following is the full list: _United States_, 44; the
_Constitution_, 44; _Constellation_, 38; _George Washington_, 24;
_Portsmouth_, 24; _Merrimack_, 24; _Ganges_, 24; _Montezuma_, 20;
_Baltimore_, 20; _Delaware_, 20; _Herald_, 18; _Norfolk_, 18;
_Pinckney_, 18; _Retaliation_ (captured), 14; and eight revenue vessels
of from 10 to 14 guns.

[21] Letter to Paine, September 6, 1807, “Writings,” IX, 136.

[22] Condensed from Cooper chiefly and from Allen.

[23] See Allen, “Barbary Corsairs,” 192.

[24] William Shaler (many years consul at Algiers), 133.

[25] E. Dupuy, “Americains et Barbaresques,” Paris, R. Roger et F
Chernoviz, 99 Boulevard Raspail, 1910.

[26] Jefferson, “Works,” V, 189.

[27] Chadwick, “Relations of U. S. and Spain,” I (Diplomacy), 106.

[28] Gallatin to Jefferson, September 15, 1805, “Writings,” I, 241-254.

[29] Annals of Congress, 1802, 1803, 255.

[30] Told the author by General C. F. Adams. See also “American Histor.
Rev.,” April, 1913, p. 521.

[31] The British accounts were often so inaccurate and garbled, and
in James’s “Naval History” so frequently glaringly untrue that only
little dependence, in some instances, can be placed upon them. For a
discussion of this phase, see Roosevelt’s “Naval War of 1812” passim.
Part of this account is condensed from this latter.

[32] Roosevelt, 129.

[33] Cited by McMaster, “History of the United States,” IV, 901.

[34] Roosevelt, 178.

[35] Roosevelt, 187.

[36] Condensed from McMaster, IV, 33.

[37] “The Croker Papers,” I, 44.

[38] Roosevelt, 71, where a careful analysis of several pages is given
to this subject.

[39] “The Public Life of Sir George Prevost,” 136, quoted by Mahan, 362.

[40] Report in Canadian Archives, 1896, Lower Canada, p. 31. For some
mortifying details in this subject see Mahan, “The War of 1812,”
363-365.

[41] The most complete account of this battle and events connected with
it is in Mahan, 377-381, largely drawn on in this account.

[42] Instructions to Peace Commissioners, August 14, 1814.

[43] For a complete account see Mahan, “War of 1812,” II, 391, 396.

[44] Quoted by Maclay, “History of the Navy,” II, 82.

[45] Quoted by Soley, “Admiral Porter,” 41.

[46] Not so young, however, as was, when appointed midshipman, an
admiral under whom the author served in 1865, S. W. Godon. He told me
that he was appointed at so early an age that for some years he was
taken by a servant on quarter day to the navy yard to draw his pay.

[47] Spears, 112.

[48] Chadwick, “The Causes of the Civil War,” American Nation Series,
Vol. XIX, 124, 125.

[49] Spears, “Farragut,” 159, 160.

[50] The inventor of the revolving turret was Mr. T. R. Timby, who took
out a patent in 1841 and received a royalty of $5,000 for each turret
built by Ericsson.

[51] Spears, 152.

[52] Cable, _Century Magazine_, April, 1885, p. 922.

[53] Spears, 166.

[54] See Long, “Our New Navy,” Chadwick, “Relations of the United
States and Spain,” I, “Diplomacy,” II and III. “The Spanish War.”

[55] By standing close in and going aloft, the usual anchorage in
the bay is visible. (Commander Dayton’s report, “Report of Bureau of
Navigation,” 1898, 219.)



TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES:


  Italicized text is surrounded by underscores: _italics_.

  Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.

  Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been standardized.




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