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Title: The Sixth Marine Division
Author: Stockman, James R.
Language: English
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DIVISION ***
The Sixth Marine Division
THE SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
James R. Stockman
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
[Illustration: Map 1. Movements of the 6th Marine Division.]
[Illustration: Map 2. Okinawa Shima. Area Captured by 6th Marine
Division. 1 April-21 June.]
1. ORIGIN
Last of the famous Marine divisions of World War II, the Sixth was
activated on 7 September 1944 on Guadalcanal, the same island that the
First Marine Division had landed on exactly twenty five months before.
Although the Sixth Marine Division was new in name, the elements that
composed it were, for the most part, as old as the war itself. From the
First Provisional Brigade that had fought so notably on Guam came two
regiments: the Fourth Marines and the Twenty Second Marines. The other
regiment of the new division came from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
where it was organized, with the exception of its First Battalion, by
Colonel Victor F. Bleasdale from handpicked officers and men.
In command of the new division was Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd,
USMC, who had had a varied and colorful career in this war. He had
trained the Ninth Marines, afterwards a part of the Third Marine
Division, and was later Assistant Division Commander of the First Marine
Division during the Gloucester operation in New Britain. When the
landings on Guam were made in July of 1944, General Shepherd (then a
Brigadier) was in command of the First Provisional Marine Brigade. His
Brigade, consisting of the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines plus
reinforcing elements, fought notably on Guam and received the Navy Unit
Commendation for its excellent record.
The Assistant Division Commander was Brigadier General William T.
Clement, USMC, another colorful figure. On the staff of Admiral Thomas
Hart in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war, General Clement
(then a Colonel) left Corregidor on a submarine. Later he served in
London, and for a while was Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools at
Quantico before returning to the Pacific.
Of the three regiments the Twenty Second Marines was the oldest. It was
formed at San Diego in June, 1942, and the following month left for
Samoa where it remained as a part of the defense force until the fall of
1943. After an extensive training period the regiment left Samoa and
sailed to the island of Hawaii to prepare for the Marshalls Campaign.
During the Kwajalein phase it acted as a reserve and after the rapid
capture of Roi and Namur by the Fourth Marine Division, the Twenty
Second Marines, in accordance with the resulting speed-up in the Central
Pacific timetable, went on to assault Eniwetok in the Western Marshalls.
After a brief but bloody fight for Eniwetok, the regiment seized and
occupied numerous adjoining islands. From Eniwetok the Twenty Second
Marines went to Guadalcanal and trained there for the Guam Campaign. On
21 July 1944, the regiment landed on Guam on W-Day as a part of the
First Provisional Brigade. It drove inland against heavy resistance and
then turned to seal off Orote Peninsula. In conjunction with the Fourth
Marines, the Twenty Second drove the length of the peninsula and
destroyed the enemy emplaced there.
Activated on 8 January 1944, the Fourth Marines was formed from veteran
units—the four Marine Raider Battalions. It took its name from the
famous Marine regiment that had been lost on Bataan. Its officers and
men had seen action at Tulagi, Guadalcanal, Makin, New Georgia,
Bougainville; later at Guam, and abreast of the Twenty Second Marines
the new regiment received as such, its baptism of fire, when it landed
on 21 July 1944. After fighting its way inland and seizing Mt. Alifan,
the regiment joined the Twenty Second to reduce heavily defended Orote
Peninsula. The Fourth Marines had been on one operation previous to
Guam; it had seized the island of Emirau in the St. Matthias Group, and
although the operation was bloodless, it was a triumph in planning and
execution.
On 1 May 1944, the major part of the Twenty Ninth Marines was activated
at Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina. Two battalions were formed
from the pick of officers and men in the eastern part of the United
States at that time. These battalions were composed of some veterans but
the greater part had no previous combat experience. With reinforcing
elements, the regiment (less its First Battalion) crossed the United
States by rail and sailed to Guadalcanal in August. The First Battalion
joined the regiment on Guadalcanal in early October. It had been
activated from Second Marine Division troops on Hawaii in February,
1944. First called the Second Separate Infantry Battalion, it trained
for a brief time on Hawaii and then went to Saipan for that operation,
attached to the Second Division. Landing on D-Day the battalion, now
called the First Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines, was attached to the
Eighth Marines and to it fell the task of capturing Mt. Tapotchau, the
commanding terrain on Saipan. Its losses were heavy—over 60%—and the
battalion therefore was not used in the Tinian operation, which
followed.
From the reinforcing elements of the First Provisional Brigade were
formed, in large part, the Sixth Tank Battalion, Sixth Pioneer
Battalion, the Sixth Engineer Battalion, and the division’s artillery
regiment, the Fifteenth Marines.
2. TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS
When the Sixth Marine Division began its training program for its
first—and only—operation, it had several initial advantages: Over two
thirds of its officers and men were veterans, well schooled in the ways
of the wily Japanese; it started off with the experience gained from
nearly four years of war; the structure of the entire division was
organized to benefit from this experience. Through October, 1944, and on
into February, 1945, the division trained vigorously. Special emphasis
was placed on individual marksmanship, combat firing exercises employing
all weapons and arms, night problems, flame-thrower-demolition teams,
tank-infantry problems, and air-ground problems. Training was concluded
with an eight day division problem illustrating tactical principles for
large unit employment. All through the training period General Shepherd
strove to indoctrinate his division with the spirit of attack; that it
was cheaper to drive ahead in unrelenting assault than to hesitate
trying to find easier ways of achieving the objective while troops
remained in contact with the enemy. This indoctrination was to pay
dividends on Okinawa when forward progress seemed impossible.
3. MOVEMENT TO TARGET
During the period 1-6 March 1945, the Sixth Marine Division was aboard
ship engaged in amphibious landing rehearsals for the Okinawa operation.
On the first day troops practiced debarkation and deployment of landing
craft; on the next two days the two assault regiments, the Fourth and
Twenty Second, landed on the beaches of Guadalcanal and practiced
limited maneuvers ashore. Then followed a critique and on the next day
there was a full-scale dress rehearsal. Although limited in their
extent, the rehearsals were quite satisfactory.
After breaking camp ashore, the division re-embarked to sail for the
staging area, Ulithi, on 15 March. At Ulithi, a little atoll in the
Caroline Islands, the division joined the enormous task force assembling
there for the invasion of Okinawa. Training was carried out aboard ship
and final preparations made for the target. By now the troops were aware
of their destination and the force designated to land there. They were
told that the Sixth Marine Division would land simultaneously with, and
on the left of, the First Marine Division, as a part of the III
Amphibious Corps. South of the Marines a corps of Army, the XXIV, would
land. Both of the corps were components of a larger force—the new Tenth
Army.
On the way to Ulithi, while there, and on the way to the target the men
were given a thorough briefing. General Shepherd made it plain that
every man should know not only his assigned task, but that of his own
unit, and of adjacent units, as well as the general scheme of maneuver.
In the briefing aboard ship the men learned that Okinawa had a
population of some 450,000 civilians; that there were roughly 70,000
Japanese soldiers on the island. They also learned something about its
geography, its towns, roads, rivers and terrain.
While at Ulithi the troops were taken ashore on the little island of Mog
Mog for rest and rehabilitation. During the staging period assault
troops were transferred to LST’s for the last part of the journey. On 27
March the Sixth Marine Division left Ulithi, loaded in 13 APA’s, 24
LST’s and one LSD, and encountered heavy rains and cooler weather as the
convoy moved north.
4. OKINAWA
Easter Sunday, 1 April 1945, was Love-Day for the Okinawa operation.
With the bright clear dawn came enemy planes but the invading
armada—over 1400 ships—drove off or destroyed the attacking planes. From
the transports the troops could only see small portions of the island;
the preliminary bombardment from the naval task force and the bombs from
our planes, diving through the clouds, raised a haze of smoke and dust
that covered most of the area behind the landing beaches.
Forming into long waves, the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines, loaded in
amphibious tractors, churned toward the beaches, over the coral reef,
and landed at 0837. Every man went in with the expectation that this
beachhead, like Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo, would be a bloody one; they
were surprised but not entirely relieved to find virtually no enemy
opposition to the landing. Rapidly, units organized and moved inland and
up across the terraced fields that led to Yontan Airfield. By noon the
Fourth Marines had seized Yontan and the Twenty Second Marines were
advancing as rapidly on the left. By late afternoon the two regiments
had reached a line tentatively set to be reached on the second day and
as yet had not found the enemy. To the left of the Twenty Second Marines
lay a little peninsula jutting out to the northwest, named Zampa Misaki.
It seemed likely that an enemy force might be there; General Shepherd
requested III Amphibious Corps to release from its reserve one battalion
of the Twenty Ninth Marines. The First Battalion was released to
division and placed to protect the division’s left flank. Troops dug in
for the night with mixed emotions. Everyone was extremely grateful that
the landing had not been a bloody one; still there was a certain
apprehension felt: Where was the enemy? When would he attack?
Love-Day had been successful beyond the wildest hopes; the division was
ashore safely, in a good position, and had already secured its first
objective. Yontan Airfield was firmly in our hands and had not been
badly damaged. The enemy defensive positions constructed to guard the
field were strangely empty. Casualties were negligible; the landing had
been easy.
Now the Sixth Marine Division moved rapidly to cut the island in two. In
conjunction with the First Marine Division which was making the main
effort, the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines drove quickly to the east
and, despite some opposition from small isolated enemy pockets, reached
the east coast on 4 April. Turning to the north, the division began to
seize the Ishikawa Isthmus. Averaging nearly 7000 yards each day the
troops pushed up the isthmus and by 7 April had reached Nago at the base
of Motobu Peninsula.
5. BATTLE FOR MOTOBU
It was General Shepherd’s plan to have the Twenty Second and Fourth
continue the drive up the mainland of Okinawa until Hedo Misaki was
seized. To destroy the enemy known to be on Motobu, the General
committed the Twenty Ninth Marines, which had been in Corps reserve
during the first four days of the operation. For the time being, the
Fourth Marines was held as a reserve near the base of the peninsula.
Patrolling continued.
Many captured enemy soldiers and civilians had stated that the main
Japanese defensive force was in southern Okinawa but that a force of
about 3000 men, commanded by a Colonel Udo, was somewhere up north,
probably on Motobu. Aerial observation and photo terrain studies
confirmed indications that there was a sizeable enemy force on the
peninsula. On 8 April the Twenty Ninth Marines moved out in three
columns, one along the south coast, one along the north coast and one up
the center toward the town of Itomi. At first progress was rapid and
there were few contacts made; it was noted, however, that all inland
trails were mined or blocked. The coast roads had numerous roadblocks
and tank traps. By 10 April the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, was at
Toguchi and had been hit by enemy artillery fire near Awa. Near Toguchi,
on the Manna road, it had contacted Udo’s force. West of Itomi the First
Battalion was also in contact with what was apparently the same force.
Meanwhile the Second Battalion had captured the enemy midget submarine
base at Unten Ko but had encountered no appreciable resistance.
During the next three days the battalions were in almost constant
contact with Udo’s forces. Ambushes were frequent but the enemy could
not be engaged in any decisive action. It was clear that he was engaged
in guerrilla-type warfare and wanted to harass our troops but was trying
to avoid a meeting engagement. By 13 April the enemy position was
definitely fixed as being in the Mt. Yaetake area; it was known that he
had considerable artillery, mortars, and a few naval guns emplaced in
hidden positions in the wild and rugged mountain mass.
Mt. Yaetake provided Colonel Udo with ideal ground for defensive
positions. Here he had unlimited observation in every direction; it was
impossible to attack him without warning. The rugged character of the
terrain prohibited the use of mechanized support in the reduction of his
positions.
While the Twenty Ninth Marines were fixing the enemy position and
determining its character and strength, General Shepherd saw that he
would need additional troops to destroy Udo’s force. His tactical
decision was to move the Fourth Marines, less the Third Battalion, to
Sakimotobu on the western side of the peninsula and attach to it the
Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines which was near by. Then he ordered
a coordinated attack for 14 April with the Fourth Marines driving into
Yaetake in an easterly direction while the Twenty Ninth Marines, with
two battalions, near Itomi, attacked to the west and southwest. Udo
would be hit from front and rear.
[Illustration: Map 3. 4th Marines Battle for Mt. Yaetake.]
On 14 April the Fourth Marines, commanded by Colonel Alan Shapley with
the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, attached, moved rapidly inland to
seize the first high ground from which to launch the attack on Mt.
Yaetake. The Twenty Ninth Marines found enemy dispositions to its front
in such strength and on such unfavorable ground, that it was virtually
impossible to attack in a southwesterly direction.
Resuming the attack on 15 April the Fourth Marines drove up the
approaches to Mt. Yaetake; fighting was bitter with one battalion
commander killed and several company commanders casualties. The First
Battalion, Fourth Marines, seized a key hill mass southwest of the
Yaetake peak against heavy resistance. Over rugged terrain the Twenty
Ninth Marines continued to advance into the rear of Udo’s position
against intermittent resistance.
[Illustration: Map 4. Battle for Mt. Yaetake.]
Next day, 16 April, the Sixth Marine Division prepared to attack the
enemy from three sides. The First Battalion, Twenty Second Marines,
which had been in immediate reserve near Awa, was ordered to advance to
the north to close the gap between the two attacking regiments. After a
day of extremely hard fighting the Fourth Marines seized Mt. Yaetake and
held it despite an all-out Banzai charge. Meanwhile, the Twenty Ninth
Marines, now under Colonel William J. Whaling, USMC, had swung its front
to the west and north, destroying fixed emplacements and enemy groups as
it moved.
With Udo’s force caught in the jaws of a giant nutcracker, and driven
from the commanding ground in its position, the Fourth Marines changed
its tactics. Colonel Shapley ordered his two left battalions, facing
east, to initiate a holding attack on 17 April, while the two right
battalions drove down from Mt. Yaetake to the north with the mission of
seizing the Manna Road. The situation on this day then, was for the two
battalions to sweep down a corridor formed by the First and Second
Battalions, Twenty Ninth, on the east and the Second Battalion, Fourth
Marines, and Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, on the west. Down from
Yaetake and through the corridor swept the First and Third Battalions,
Fourth Marines, mopping up enemy remnants as they went. Nightfall saw
both regiments on the first hills south of the Toguchi-Itomi road, the
road that ran through Manna.
On 19 April the Sixth Marine Division began a coordinated drive to
secure the high ground remaining between the Toguchi-Itomi road and the
north coast of the peninsula. On the left was the Fourth Marines; next
to it, the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Ninth Marines. From
Toguchi, the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth moved by truck to Itomi and
struck out through the hills toward the highest hill mass in the
northern part of Motobu, which was seized next morning. On 20 April, the
drive continued and both regiments reached the north coast without
difficulty. Little opposition had been found in this last sweep, but it
was known that several hundred enemy troops had escaped from Motobu and
were somewhere in northern Okinawa.
The battle for Motobu had challenged the Sixth Division with mountain
warfare of the most rugged sort. It was costly: the Sixth Marine
Division lost 207 men killed, 757 wounded and 6 missing in action. In
contrast, the enemy lost 2,014 men killed. Captured enemy material
included 11 field pieces of 75 and 150-mm. calibre, two six-inch naval
cannon and large numbers of mortars, machine guns and 20-mm. dual
purpose guns.
While the other two regiments were fighting on Motobu, the Twenty Second
Marines, commanded by Colonel Merlin F. Schneider, USMC, continued its
march up the northern part of the mainland. On 13 April the Second
Battalion moved by forced march to seize Hedo Misaki, the northern tip
of the island. Scattered resistance was encountered during the march.
Upon occupying Hedo Misaki, the regiment sent patrols down the east
coast and on 19 April, patrols from the north and south met on the east
coast at Aha. By 20 April all of Okinawa north of the original landing
beaches had been secured by the Sixth Marine Division; it was known,
however, that several small enemy groups still remained at large.
The first of these isolated enemy groups to be located was one
consisting of about 200 men. It was contacted by the First Battalion,
Twenty Second Marines, near Taniyo-take, a hill mass southeast of Motobu
Peninsula. After two days of heavy fighting most of the enemy band was
destroyed although a few escaped to join another remnant of the Motobu
action. By 27 April this group had been located and from Hentona two
battalions of the Twenty Second Marines advanced toward the suspected
area in a forced night march. Meanwhile from Kawada the Third Battalion,
Fourth Marines hurried inland and made contact by noon. After
considerable maneuvering, the battalion outflanked the enemy and forced
him to fight on unfavorable ground. Most of the group was destroyed; a
handful escaped.
6. BATTLE FOR NAHA
During the latter part of April the Tenth Army had found its XXIV Corps
heavily engaged in southern Okinawa. It was decided that the III
Amphibious Corps would be assigned the western half of the southern line
on about 7 May. It was further decided that on 1 May the First Marine
Division would be attached to the XXIV Corps and committed in the
vicinity of Machinato Airfield. Its mission was clear out the Jichaku
plateau area and then strike toward Shuri, the core of the Japanese
defensive position. The Sixth Marine Division would then be committed on
the right of the First Division.
All through the last week in April, the Sixth Division patrolled and
garrisoned northern Okinawa. Preparations were made for the move to the
south. The regiments rested, re-equipped themselves and received
replacements. During the month of April the division had traveled over
84 miles, seized 436 square miles of enemy territory, captured 46
prisoners and killed nearly 2,500 of the enemy. In the same period the
division had lost 236 men killed and 1,061 wounded in action.
On 2 May the division began to move southward to assembly areas near
Chibana, east of the original landing beaches. The responsibility for
the defense of northern Okinawa passed from the Sixth Marine Division to
the Twenty Seventh Infantry Division on 4 May.
According to Tenth Army order, the III Amphibious Corps was to assume
responsibility for the western portion of the southern front on 7 May.
The First Marine Division was already committed and was fighting to
secure the high ground north and northeast of the Asa River. The Sixth
Marine Division was ordered to commit one regimental combat team on the
right of the First Division on 8 May. General Shepherd chose the Twenty
Second Marines to be committed first. Its mission was to cross the Asa
and seize the first high ground to the south. From here, the division
could attack to carry out its mission, which was: To seize Naha and the
line of the Kokuba River in its zone of action, to assist the First
Marine Division by fire and maneuver, and to protect the Corps’ right
(west) flank.
[Illustration: Map 5. Final Drive. Motobu Peninsula.]
All during the fighting on Motobu, the men of the Sixth Marine Division
had heard stories of the fighting down south. They knew that the Tenth
Army had uncovered the main Japanese defensive positions; that the enemy
had chosen rough hilly ground across a narrow part of the island. The
enemy was well dug in on a high and broken hill mass which took its name
from its geographical center—Shuri. The line, or series of lines really,
ran from north of Naha through Shuri to Yonabaru on the east coast. They
had heard that the XXIV Corps had run into a virtual stalemate; that
some sixty thousand of the enemy were offering fierce resistance from
concealed positions; that the enemy was using mortars and artillery on
an unprecedented scale; and that the enemy troops in southern Okinawa
were excellent soldiers, well disciplined, and well prepared to fight a
long and costly campaign. Before the second week in May had passed the
men were certain that none of the stories were exaggerated.
In the new zone of action, the Sixth Marine Division launched its first
attack when it sent the Twenty Second Marines across the Asa River in
the early morning hours of 10 May. Patrols had crossed the river on the
previous day and reconnoitered the ground to its immediate south. The
only bridge across the river in this sector had been totally destroyed.
Through the night of 9-10 May, the Sixth Engineer Battalion worked to
construct a footbridge. Although the little bridge was finally completed
in time for the pre-dawn attack, a group of the enemy carrying
demolitions packs succeeded in destroying themselves and a section of
the bridge before many of the Marines got across.
At 0330, 10 May, the First and Third Battalions of the Twenty Second
Marines crossed the Asa; the First waded across upstream on the
regiment’s left, while the Third started to use the footbridge. When it
was destroyed, the battalion was forced to go upstream and wade across.
At first enemy resistance was light, but as the Japanese became aware of
this threat to their left flank, opposition became fierce. Despite heavy
artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, the troops moved on up the first
ridges. By nightfall, and after a day of heavy casualties, a bridgehead
1400 yards wide and about 400 yards deep had been established.
Next morning the reserve battalion of the Twenty Second Marines, the
Second, was committed to cover the left flank of the First which was
fighting to reduce an enemy stronghold on a formidable coral hill
southeast of Asa village. When flanking action failed to secure the
hill, the troops withdrew so that naval gunfire from the USS
Indianapolis could be utilized. In the meantime the engineers labored
under sporadic enemy fire to construct a Bailey Bridge across the Asa,
where the footbridge had been. About noon the structure was completed
and tanks roared across to support the troops. With the added fire power
of the tanks, the First Battalion attacked the hill again, this time
successfully. Over on the right, the Third Battalion fought for three
hours before capturing the precipitous cliff area in its zone of action.
On 12 May the Twenty Second Marines, with all three battalions in the
line, continued to advance despite increasing enemy resistance. Not only
was the regiment receiving fire from its front, but also from the left
flank, where the enemy in his positions on Wana Ridge and the Shuri
heights could observe troop movements and bring fire to bear at an
instant’s notice. As it became apparent that the division’s left was
becoming open, General Shepherd ordered the Third Battalion, Twenty
Ninth Marines into the line to protect the east flank. It was quite
plain that another regiment would have to be committed if the momentum
of advance were to be maintained.
Next day, the Sixth Marine Division continued the attack with the Second
Battalion, Twenty Second Marines and the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth,
in assault. About three hundred yards was all that could be gained due
to heavy enemy resistance. In the late afternoon the other two
battalions of the Twenty Ninth Marines moved up behind the Third, and
prepared to go into the assault on 14 May.
By this time General Shepherd had discovered the following: (1) In
attempting to outflank the Shuri line, the Sixth Marine Division had
uncovered the western anchor of the enemy’s main defensive position; (2)
Three terrain features, heavily fortified and manned, and mutually
supporting formed this anchor; (3) Unprotected but heavily guarded
corridors led into each of these terrain features. (4) There was no
ground offering covered routes of approach, from which these terrain
features could be assaulted; (5) the three terrain features (later
called Horseshoe Ridge, Sugar Loaf Hill, and Half Moon Hill) would be
held by the enemy at all costs; if they were lost, the enemy’s main
position at Shuri would be outflanked; (6) The battle efficiency of the
Twenty Second Marines was seriously impaired; It had lost over 800 men
killed or wounded since crossing the Asa; (7) Naha, the capital city of
Okinawa, lay open in front of the Twenty Second Marines, but it could
not be seized until the Sugar Loaf defensive position, Horseshoe Ridge,
and the Half Moon were reduced and cleared of enemy.
[Illustration: Map 6. Attack of 2nd Bn., 22nd Marines.]
Commanding the surrounding countryside, Sugar Loaf Hill was the apex of
a triangle. All three elements of the triangle were mutually supporting:
Horseshoe Ridge and the Half Moon covered Sugar Loaf; from Sugar Loaf
the enemy could cover the other two with fire; all three terrain
features were, in turn, under observation and fire from Shuri. Troops
attacking any one of the three hills would be subjected immediately to
fire from the other two. There was no room for extended maneuver; on the
right of the division was the sea; on the left the zone of the First
Marine Division, which offered no protection or cover.
Late in the afternoon of 14 May the Second Battalion, Twenty Second,
attempted a tank-infantry assault, and despite heavy 47-mm. fire that
drove the tanks back, succeeded in getting a few men from “G” Company up
on the top of Sugar Loaf. The attack caught the Japanese by surprise,
but only momentarily; during the night, they reorganized to launch an
attack next morning that drove the Second Battalion back from the ground
immediately to the north of Sugar Loaf, and finally spread over into the
zone of the Twenty Ninth Marines. This counterattack, in approximately
battalion strength, started a day of the bitterest fighting yet seen by
the Twenty Second Marines. The desperate character that the fight now
assumed was indicative of the enemy’s resolve to hold the Sugar Loaf
system regardless of the cost. Two battalions of the Twenty Ninth, the
First and Third, encountered the same bitter fighting that was
experienced by the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Second. In the
corridor leading to the Half Moon, the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth,
finally reduced an enemy pocket that had been bypassed but had become so
troublesome as to prevent further advance. To the left, the First
Battalion was fighting in the low ground north of the Half Moon. During
the afternoon of this day, 15 May, the Third Battalion, Twenty Second
Marines, moved up to relieve the Second Battalion which had lost over
400 men in the last three days. Over on the division’s right, the First
Battalion of the Twenty Second drove down the long ridge overlooking the
Asato, but could advance no further due to heavy fire from the Horseshoe
and Sugar Loaf.
All during the night of 15-16 May the enemy used his mortars and
artillery to interdict the front lines, causing light casualties. Early
next morning the Sixth Marine Division, with the Twenty Second and
Twenty Ninth regiments in assault, again attacked to seize the Sugar
Loaf—Half Moon positions. Heavy enemy fire greeted the attack; from near
the town of Takamotoji the enemy commenced to fire, although that area
had been quiet previously. It was apparent that the enemy was moving in
replacements and additional troops to bolster the Sugar Loaf system.
Working its way into position on the left of the regimental front, the
Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines prepared to assault Sugar Loaf
Hill. Behind tanks, and after an intense artillery barrage, the
battalion advanced rapidly up the pitted north slope of the hill in the
face of extremely heavy fire from enemy mortars, grenades, and automatic
weapons. Several times the battalion reached the top of the hill and
closed with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting only to be driven back.
Finally, with losses steadily mounting, the battalion was forced to
withdraw.
Hope was held for a while on this day that the Twenty Ninth Marines
might seize Half Moon Hill. Closely supported by tanks, troops moved
forward slowly and reached the edge of the ridge by late afternoon.
Before they could organize defensive positions, or dig in, the enemy
poured so much fire in from Shuri, Sugar Loaf, and the reverse slopes of
the Half Moon, that the troops had to withdraw under the cover of smoke.
Casualties were extremely heavy.
This day, 16 May, was perhaps the bitterest day of the entire Okinawa
Campaign for the Sixth Marine Division. With all the strength at their
command, two regiments had attacked without apparent success. A week of
steady fighting had reduced the offensive capabilities of the Twenty
Second Marines so General Shepherd now shifted the burden of attack to
the Twenty Ninth, leaving the Twenty Second to hold where it was.
Before the Twenty Ninth Marines began the attack of 17 May, the enemy in
the Sugar Loaf area was subjected to a terrific bombardment which
included 16-inch shells from the main batteries of battleships, 8-inch
howitzer shells, and 1000-pound aerial bombs. With tanks in close
support and immediately behind a heavy and continuing artillery barrage,
the First and Third Battalions, Twenty Ninth Marines edged their way to
the northern edge of Half Moon Hill. Finally the Third Battalion seized
a slim foothold on the north-western edge of the hill but intense enemy
fire made the position untenable and the troops were forced to withdraw.
Meanwhile “E” Company of the Second Battalion was attempting a flanking
attack around the east side of Sugar Loaf Hill. Despite heavy enemy
mortar barrages and grenade fire, the company drove to the top of the
hill three times; each time the enemy counterattacked and drove the men
off. Finally at 1830 in the last vestige of light, the company mustered
strength enough to assault the hill again. This time when it reached the
top it beat off an enemy counterattack, but had so few men left, and so
many wounded to be evacuated, that it had to pull back to better ground
for the night.
At dusk, but while there was still enough light to be seen, the enemy
attempted to reinforce Sugar Loaf and began to move his troops in the
open. Almost immediately twelve battalions of our artillery took the
enemy troops under time-on-target fire and inflicted such heavy losses
that the reinforcement threat was broken up. While the Half Moon and
Sugar Loaf still remained in enemy hands, the division had made gains
that were not yet perceptible. There was no way of knowing as yet the
extent of the enemy’s losses. So far, he had been able to move in enough
reinforcements to counter our attacks, but his losses had reached the
point where he could no longer readily replace them. Meanwhile, the
Twenty Ninth Marines had got into position for the final attack, which
was to be launched next day.
[Illustration: Map 7. 29-Th Marines Secure Sugar Loaf.]
At 0830, 18 May, the First and Third Battalions, Twenty Ninth again
assaulted the enemy on the Half Moon. After a foothold was established
the fighting resolved itself into a slugging match, and this enabled the
Second Battalion to make its move. It first attempted to encircle Sugar
Loaf with tanks but enemy mines, 47-mm. fire, and artillery fire
disabled six tanks and drove the rest back.
[Illustration: Map 8. Attack of 4-Th Marines.]
Next, the Second Battalion launched a combined tank-infantry assault on
Sugar Loaf, working the tanks, closely supported by troops, around each
flank of the hill simultaneously. One tank accompanied by troops, edged
its way around the west side of the hill and commenced firing into the
enemy’s reverse slope defenses. Then, as the enemy moved to repel this
threat, another tank worked its way around the east side of the hill and
emptied its machine guns into the backs of the defenders of Sugar Loaf.
In the ensuing pandemonium troops swarmed all over the hill and, after
an hour of heavy fighting, the hill was firmly held by Marines. “F”
Company was sent to seize the Horseshoe and reduce the mortar positions
there that were firing on Sugar Loaf. The company moved rapidly across
the intervening ground, climbed up on the Horseshoe, and engaged the
enemy in a hand grenade battle. During the night the enemy
counterattacked and drove “F” Company back to Sugar Loaf but could not
regain the lost hill. Over on the left of the zone of action of the
Twenty Ninth Marines, the First and Third Battalions held their
positions at the base of the Half Moon, despite heavy enemy fire. For
the action during the period 14-19 May, the Twenty Ninth Marines, and
attached units, were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.
In order to exploit the recently won gains General Shepherd ordered the
Fourth Marines fresh after a two weeks’ rest, to relieve the Twenty
Ninth on 19 May. On the right of the division’s front, the Twenty Second
Marines remained in position, but were in no condition to continue the
attack. After relieving the Twenty Ninth Marines, the Fourth prepared to
attack next day to seize the upper reaches of the Asato River. The night
of 19 May saw the enemy making full use of his mortars and artillery but
casualties were light. Next morning the Fourth Marines attacked
Horseshoe Ridge and managed to seize a part of it. While the fighting
raged, the enemy on the Shuri Hill mass turned his weapons and hit the
flank of the Fourth with heavy fire. At 2130, following a terrific
90-mm. mortar barrage, the enemy commenced to counterattack with Sugar
Loaf as the objective. Centering on the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines,
the counterattack continued until midnight. During this time naval star
shells kept the critical area illuminated and six battalions of
artillery fired to break up the counterattack. Before the enemy was
driven back, it was necessary to commit part of the regimental reserve.
In this unsuccessful counterattack, the enemy lost nearly 300 killed
while the Fourth Marines only lost 1 man killed and 19 wounded.
On 21 May the Fourth Marines made slight gains in the interior of
Horseshoe Ridge but the foothold on the Half Moon could not be expanded.
Until Shuri fell it would be virtually impossible to take the Half Moon
in its entirety. It was futile to attack on the left. Now the emphasis
was shifted to the regiment’s right and on the morning of 22 May the
front lines advanced slowly to the Asato.
Employing a holding attack on the extreme left of the division front,
General Shepherd was ready to exploit his gains. After a thorough
reconnaissance of the ground just across the Asato, the Fourth Marines
moved two battalions across the river during the afternoon of 23 May and
ran into determined enemy resistance. The position of the Fourth
Marines, while not precarious, was extremely difficult. Two attempts to
bridge the Asato had failed; all food, water and ammunition had to be
carried across by hand. The past three days had brought unusually heavy
rains and the entire division zone of action was a sea of mud. Wading
through mud ankle deep, stretcher bearers had a hard time getting the
wounded back to evacuation points north of the rear. Few vehicles could
negotiate the morass of mud that characterized the area. These rains
were to continue until the last of May.
[Illustration: Map 9. Attack of Fourth Marines. Asato River Area.]
On 25 May the Fourth Marines resumed the attack and seized most of the
north-south ridge line west of Machishi. About a company of the enemy
counterattacked during the night and spent its force in the sector of
the Third Battalion. While the Fourth Marines were moving into the
eastern outskirts of Naha, the Division Reconnaissance Company crossed
the Asato near its mouth and penetrated the urban portion of Naha west
of the north-south canal. Enemy resistance was very light; only a few
snipers harassed the company. Next day, with the heavy rain still
falling, the Fourth Marines confined its efforts to vigorous patrolling.
The reconnaissance company moved 300 yards further into Naha.
Unmistakable signs on 26 May pointed toward a Japanese withdrawal from
the Shuri position. In order to determine the extent of the withdrawal
to the front of the Sixth Marine Division, all units commenced
patrolling. Part of the Second Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, crossed
the Asato and passed through the Reconnaissance Company while pushing
farther into Naha. The city was almost a total wreck. Only a few
buildings around the outskirts remained standing and these were badly
damaged. During the day the Fourth Marines sent patrols over 300 yards
forward of the lines and found only light opposition.
Again General Shepherd reoriented his attack; he ordered the Twenty
Second Marines to complete the capture of Naha and be prepared to
advance through the hills that overlook the Kokuba River from the north.
At the same time, he ordered the Twenty Ninth Marines to relieve the
Fourth, and to be prepared to continue the attack to the southeast
toward the Shichina hills. On 28 May the Twenty Ninth Marines commenced
to relieve the Fourth Marines; at the same time, the Twenty Second
Marines completed the capture of urban Naha, the part that lies to the
west of the north-south canal.
Initially, the Twenty Ninth Marines were to carry out a holding attack
while supporting the Twenty Second Marines by fire. On 29 May, with the
Twenty Ninth Marines holding on its left, the Twenty Second Marines
crossed the north-south canal and commenced to fight through the low
hills that lead to Shichina, and parallel the Kokuba River. The attack
moved rapidly at first on the right but the enemy rear guard, stationed
in the hills to the front of the two regiments, began to resist more
fiercely, and it wasn’t until 1 June that the two regiments were able to
clean out the enemy in the Shichina area; now the division could look
down from its position above the Kokuba and see the Naha-Yonabaru
cross-island highway. Across the river, troops could see destroyed
materiel abandoned by the enemy in his hasty withdrawal to the south.
The Twenty Second Marines rested now for the first time since crossing
the Asa River on 10 May. For this period the regiment, and its attached
units, was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. In the drive from the
Asa to the Kokuba casualties had been heavy.
7. BATTLE FOR OROKU
After the seizure of Naha and the area to its east the Sixth Marine
Division prepared to continue its drive to the south by making an
amphibious landing on Oroku. General Shepherd ordered his Division
Reconnaissance Company, a flexible group that worked under G-2 or G-3 as
the situation demanded, to cross the estuary during the night of 1-2
June and reconnoiter possible landing beaches as well as explore the
area inland where the beachhead would be established. Using plastic
boats, the company made its reconnaissance and returned to Naha at 0300,
2 June, to report that the northern part of Oroku Peninsula was occupied
by the enemy but not in great strength.
The plan for the reduction of enemy forces on Oroku was simple and
complete; it left the Japanese no alternatives except to surrender or
die. The Fourth Marines were to make a dawn landing on 4 June and as the
beachhead expanded, the Twenty Ninth Marines were to go in on the left
of the Fourth. With two regiments attacking abreast, the plan called for
the other regiment, the Twenty Second Marines, to throw a cordon-like
line across the base of the peninsula in conjunction with the First
Marine Division as it crossed both forks of the Kokuba river and drove
south. Then with the Twenty Second facing northwest and preventing the
enemy from escaping, the two assault regiments would drive east and
southeast to exterminate the enemy defenders of Oroku.
After the rainy weather of the last week in May and the first few days
in June, the Sixth Marine Division faced a tremendous logistical
problem. Initially the assault regiments would have to be supplied by
amphibious craft over the same route used for the landing. As the attack
moved to the southeast, there was a chance that the Naha Estuary could
be bridged by using little Ona Yama island, which lay in the center of
the estuary, almost equidistant from Naha and Oroku. There were a few of
the enemy on Ono Yama; these would have to be killed before the
engineers could commence their bridging efforts. Simultaneously then,
with the landing of the Fourth Marines on Oroku, the Sixth
Reconnaissance Company was ordered to land on, and secure, Ono Yama. All
through 2-3 June amphibious trucks (DUKWS) and tractors carried supplies
and equipment over impassable roads to the beach at Naha where the
landing was to be launched.
[Illustration: Map 10. Beachhead On Oroku.]
Before dawn, 4 June, the preliminary bombardment commenced on Oroku and
Ono Yama. At 0551, the Fourth Marines landed two battalions without any
great difficulty. Early enemy resistance was light and the troops moved
rapidly inland. At 1000 the Twenty Ninth Marines commenced to load a
battalion to send across to join the Fourth. In the meantime, the
Division Reconnaissance Company had landed on Ono Yama and killed a
handful of Japanese.
Defending Oroku were mixed troops. There were some regular units, some
Okinawa Home Guardsmen, and some were naval and air personnel from units
stationed at Naha Port, and Naha Airfield. The rough character of the
terrain on Oroku, with the exception of the flat ground around the
airfield, lent itself to the defenders. From carefully prepared cave
positions they could use the machine guns, 40 and 20-mm. antiaircraft
guns that had been stripped from the defenses of the airfield. This
enemy group on Oroku, some 5000 strong, had resigned themselves to
making a last ditch stand on the peninsula. Initially, however, the
amphibious landing of the Fourth Marines caught them by surprise. With
the advance of the First Division across the Kokuba toward Itoman, the
enemy apparently decided that Oroku would be attacked from its base, not
its northwest tip, and was originally deployed to fight off any thrust
from the base.
[Illustration: Map 11. Front Lines On Oroku.]
It was indeed unfortunate then, that because of two factors beyond its
control, the Sixth Marine Division was not afforded the opportunity of
really capitalizing on its tactical surprise to the enemy. The rainy
weather through the latter part of May and early June had made Oroku
extremely muddy. What few roads there were that led inland from the
landing beaches were either mined or had sections blown out so that our
tanks could not use them. The rice paddies, fields and hills, ankle to
knee deep with mud, were heavily mined, precluding the possibility of
tank movement and causing the infantry to move with utmost caution. At a
time when speed could have meant rapid gains, the division found itself
forced to let the rifle companies fight as best they could and without
many of their supporting arms. The brief respite gained by the enemy
allowed him to redeploy his forces to resist the attack of the Fourth
and Twenty Ninth Marines.
[Illustration: Map 12. Last Pocket of Resistance on Oroku.]
It wasn’t until 13 June that the enemy forces on Oroku were destroyed.
The Fourth Marines, after landing on 4 June, had seized the first hills
inland and then as the Twenty Ninth came in on the left, the Fourth
secured Naha Airfield and drove to the southeast in an encircling
maneuver. Facing the enemy from the east, the Twenty Second Marines kept
him bottled up and harassed his rear. On the left, driving down the long
ridge that parallels the estuary, the Twenty Ninth moved slowly. In the
extreme broken terrain that characterized Oroku, the enemy resisted
fiercely using all the weapons at his command to prevent the advancing
Marines from crossing the numerous compartments, and denying them the
use of the corridors.
The advance was slow and the action costly. In addition to his automatic
weapons, small arms, grenade discharges and mortars, the enemy had
320-mm. spigot mortars and artillery. Cut off, surrounded, and assaulted
from all sides, the enemy was exacting a final price for the peninsula.
It was not until 12 June that the first real break in his carefully
coordinated defense became apparent. On this day, converging forces of
the Fourth Marines and the Twenty Ninth had the enemy completely
encircled. From his positions, the enemy could look to the northwest and
see the Twenty Ninth; turning to the south, he could see the Fourth
Marines driving in on his flank; behind him was the Twenty Second
Marines, moving in slowly to complete his doom.
During the afternoon of 12 June, some enemy groups came out waving white
surrender flags. Others refused to surrender and pressed grenades to
their stomachs. Still others allowed themselves to be killed while
offering only feeble resistance. In most, the will to live was gone;
they were resigned to their fate. Next day, 861 Japanese were killed and
73 taken prisoner.
Before the capture of Oroku could be called complete, there remained to
be taken the small island of Senaga Shima. After a heavy preliminary
bombardment, the Sixth Division’s Reconnaissance Company, with a company
from the Twenty Ninth Marines attached, landed on the island and quickly
seized it. Only two of the enemy were found and killed but many fine
coastal guns were captured. Now the battle for Oroku was over. The enemy
had resisted bitterly, 1,608 Marines were killed or wounded in the
capture of the peninsula, and thirty of our tanks were lost. During the
ten days of fighting the Sixth Marine Division had killed almost 5,000
Japanese and had captured nearly 200. For its excellent work in landing
on the peninsula, seizing the airdrome and then driving around the
enemy’s position to overwhelm him from the flank, the Fourth Marines was
awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.
8. END OF CAMPAIGN
On 15 June the III Amphibious Corps instructed the Sixth Marine Division
to be prepared to pass through the right of the First Marine Division on
Mezado Ridge on 17 June. The mission assigned the Sixth Marine Division
was to seize Kuwanga Ridge, part of Ibaru Ridge, and the Kiyamu Gusuku
hill mass. Although their plight was hopeless, the enemy still held out
in the southernmost part of Okinawa, evidently intent upon exacting as
stiff a price, in terms of lives, as possible before being destroyed.
Like a trapped animal, the Japanese were resisting bitterly and from
their positions on the hills and ridges, were delaying the attackers as
long as possible.
With its zone of action limited in width, the Sixth Division committed
the Twenty Second Marines at 0300, 17 June. To reach Mezado Ridge, the
regiment had to advance past Kunishi through open ground swept by enemy
fire. During the hours of daylight, the First Division, fighting on
Kunishi and Mezado Ridge, was forced to use tanks to supply the front
lines and evacuate the wounded. By moving before daylight the Twenty
Second Marines had little difficulty in reaching positions from which to
launch an attack to secure Mezado Ridge. After an intense preliminary
artillery, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment on Mezado Ridge, Hill
69 and Kuwanga Ridge, the First and Third Battalions attacked at 0730.
The advance was slow and difficult due to increasing enemy resistance.
With every weapon at his command the enemy brought fire to bear on the
assault battalions. By late afternoon the attack had moved up on the
western part of Mezado Ridge; the Third Battalion had captured the key
high ground around Hill 69, and could see Kuwanga Ridge to the south.
Next morning, 18 June, the Twenty Second Marines continued the attack,
passing the Second Battalion through the Third, which was left to mop up
in its immediate area. Against heavy resistance the Second Battalion
advanced to Kuwanga Ridge and by late afternoon had a firm hold on the
ridge. While moving through the Mezado Area to inspect his regiment’s
attack, Colonel H. C. Roberts, USMC, the Commanding Officer of the
Twenty Second Marines, was shot through the heart by a sniper.
Although the Second Battalion had a foothold on Kuwanga Ridge, it could
not hold the entire length of the ridge, some 1800 yards, and General
Shepherd decided to move up a battalion of the Fourth Marines on the
left in order to hold the ridge through the night. On the next day he
could continue the attack to the south with a fresh regiment.
Early in the morning of 19 June, the Fourth Marines with the First and
Third Battalions abreast, assaulted Ibaru Ridge and, after a brisk
fight, had seized the ridge by noon. After a hasty reorganization on the
ridge, the regiment attacked again, this time to capture the
Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass. Immediately upon leaving Ibaru the Fourth
Marines ran into heavy enemy fire from mortars emplaced behind the hill
mass and machine guns firing from concealed positions on it. Just before
dark the regiment succeeded in gaining a small foot hold on the high
plateau of the hill mass. During the afternoon the little island just
offshore from Nagasuku was seized by a quickly assembled task force
consisting of three amphibious tractors, two 37-mm. platoons and a War
Dog platoon. In the brief action 20 Japanese soldiers were killed and 8
taken prisoner.
On 19 June the Sixth Marine Division committed two battalions of the
Twenty Ninth Marines on the right of the Fourth Marines in preparation
for a final assault to seize the 5000 square yards of ground remaining.
Next day at 0700 both regiments attacked, the Twenty Ninth to drive to
the coast, and the Fourth to complete the seizure of the Kiyamu-Gusuku
Ridge. Against light opposition, the Twenty Ninth Marines advanced
rapidly and reached the southern coast. Harassing long range fire from
the regiment’s left caused few casualties. The enemy in this sector
began to surrender. An LCI, equipped with a loud-speaker, moved along
the coast calling to the remaining Japanese to give themselves up. Over
700 Japanese officers and men surrendered during the day.
[Illustration: Map 13. Battle for Ara-Saki Peninsula.]
Meanwhile over on the division’s left, the Fourth Marines were engaged
in a bloody fight to secure Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridge. From their positions in
the hill mass the Japanese resisted desperately with intense mortar and
small arms fire. After a day of bitter fighting the Second Battalion
captured Hill 80, the peak of the hill mass, but the remainder of the
ground was still held by the enemy.
Resuming its attack on 21 June the Fourth Marines turned from frontal
assaults and flanking attacks to a double envelopment from the rear.
Early in the morning the two flank battalions sent companies around
either extremity of the ridge and at 0800 struck the enemy’s rear in a
coordinated attack. For two hours the enemy fought back bitterly but
could not halt the assaulting Marines. With the fall of the
Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridge all organized resistance in the Sixth Marine
Division’s zone of action ceased.
During all but thirteen of the eighty two days that the Okinawa Campaign
lasted, the Sixth Marine Division was committed and actively engaged.
Credited to the division were 23,000 Japanese killed and over 3,500
captured. The division had captured over two thirds of Okinawa and had
repeatedly fought the enemy on his own terms, and his own ground. During
this operation the Sixth Marine Division had taken heavy losses; 400
officers and 7,822 enlisted men were either killed or wounded. In the
drive from the Asa River to the Kokuba, the division had lost the
equivalent of a regiment of men. Not included in the above figures are
men lost due to non-battle casualties, sickness, or combat fatigue.
After reaching the southern coast the Sixth Division turned to retrace
its steps back to the Kokuba, mopping up enemy remnants at it went.
The first week in July found the Sixth Marine Division busy with
preparations for the trip to the new base camp on Guam. On 4 July there
was an impressive ceremony held to dedicate the division cemetery.
Although the division was preparing to leave Okinawa, it paused briefly
to pay its respects to those of its members who would have to remain
forever behind. In the last paragraph of the special order of
dedication, General Shepherd admonished his men as follows:
“As this cemetery is dedicated to the dead and to the past that they
made glorious by their heroic sacrifices, let there be in the minds of
the members of this division the resolve to dedicate their future
efforts to speeding the impending final defeat of the enemy to the end
that there will no longer be occasion for the sacrifice that the honored
dead of our division were called upon to make on this island.”
9. GUAM
On 16 July General Shepherd and his staff arrived at Guam and set up his
new command post. By direction of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, a base
camp had been built for the Sixth Marine Division on Guam. As soon as
the units had moved into their new areas, construction was begun on
chapels and recreation facilities. A division training order was issued
on 23 July outlining a program to last from 6 August to 15 December
1945.
On 26 July General Shepherd published a letter of gratitude from the
people of Guam to the officers and men of the Sixth Marine Division.
Written on the occasion of “Guam Liberation Day”, 21 July, one year
after the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines had landed on the bloody
beaches near Agat, the letter, signed by several leading Guamanians said
in part:
“On behalf of the people of Guam we take this opportunity, as a token of
everlasting gratitude, to extend our greetings and felicitations to you,
the officers and men of the First Provisional Brigade which formed the
nucleus of the Sixth Marine Division, with its supporting arms and
services, on the first anniversary of D-Day.
“Through popular request, the twenty first of July has been designated
as ‘Guam Liberation Day’. It is fitting and proper that we renew and
reaffirm our loyalty and devotion to our mother country and the cause
for which she stands.”
With general preparations for future combat operations against the enemy
underway, the Sixth Marine Division launched an intensive training
program in August. The main effort of the division was diverted,
however, from 11-15 August to preparing and mounting out Task Group Able
for the forthcoming occupation of Yokosuka Naval Base. This task group
was a headquarters command headed by Brigadier General William T.
Clement which was superimposed over the Fourth Marines (Reinforced),
under the command of Lt. Col. Fred D. Beans. On 16 August, Task Group
Able departed from Guam and three days later joined the Third Fleet.
As a part of the Fleet Landing Force, Task Group Able landed at Yokosuka
Naval Base and Airfield on 30 August. There was no opposition to the
landing. Here it remained as a part of the Sixth Marine Division until
late in November when it passed from the administrative control of the
division to that of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Its general duties
consisted of demilitarizing the Naval area of responsibility, and in
providing security for the Naval Base and Airfield. On 20 September, all
reinforcing elements of the Fourth Marines and its superior command,
Task Force Able Headquarters, returned to Guam, leaving the regiment
under the operational control of the Eighth Army. By January the force
had been reduced to the Third Battalion; the other two battalions,
Weapons Company, and Headquarters and Service Company departed for the
U. S. to be disbanded. Later a reduced regimental headquarters group
left for Tsingtao to rejoin the division.
10. TSINGTAO
During the month of September the Sixth Marine Division prepared for an
operation, the forthcoming occupation of Tsingtao, China. From 2 October
until 11 October the division was aboard ship en route to China and
commenced unloading at Tsingtao on the latter date.
While aboard the division command ship en route to Tsingtao, General
Shepherd stated the general mission of his command:
“Our mission is to land and occupy Tsingtao and the adjacent Tsangkou
Airfield; to assist local authorities in maintaining order and in
preventing disease and starvation; to release, care for, and evacuate
Recovered Allied Military personnel and Allied internees; to cooperate
with Chinese Central Government forces; to accept, when necessary, local
surrender of Japanese forces, as authorized by higher authority, and to
assist the Chinese in effecting the disarming and confining of these
forces.”
The city of Tsingtao, with 1,300,000 inhabitants is situated on a
promontory on the southern coast of Shantung Peninsula. It is regarded
as one of the finest ports in China, and is second only to Shanghai as a
textile manufacturing center. When the division landed, it found the
citizens of Tsingtao to be a polyglot group: Communist agents, former
Nazis, White Russians, Koreans, Japanese civilians, Japanese military
personnel, Europeans, Eurasians, and Chinese.
Politically, Tsingtao, as the most coveted city on Shantung Peninsula,
was a hotbed of intrigue and strife. The Communists, with a stronghold
at Chefoo, hoped to gain control of the peninsula, and the city.
Resisting them were Japanese troops, protecting rail lines leading into
the city. Here too, were independent factions ostensibly aligned with
the Chungking government. Still in evidence, but ineffective, were
puppet groups. At large, but not easily identified with either Chungking
or Yennan, were small groups of brigands which terrorized Tsingtao
despite the Mayor and his poorly trained and discipined troops.
Most of the interior of the Shantung Peninsula was controlled by
Communists; their only access to the sea was at the port of Chefoo.
Early in the month of October an emissary from the Commander-in-Chief of
the Liberation Army of the Communists entered the harbor and sought an
audience with General Shepherd. Permission was granted and a letter was
presented which proposed, in essence, passive collaboration between the
Marines and the Communists. Offering to enter the city to “restore
order” by killing puppet troops, that is those troops who professed
allegiance to Chiang Kai-Shek’s Chinese Central Government, the
Communists promised not to disturb the Marines of the Sixth Division. To
this General Shepherd replied firmly that he would have no part in a
fratricidal war between factions in China, and that his combat veterans
could prevent any disorders in the city.
Obviously, the Communist forces had hoped to gain complete control of
the Shantung Peninsula at the cessation of hostilities through the
surrender of Japanese troops to them.
One of the earliest problems to confront the men of the Sixth Marine
Division in Tsingtao was a financial one, the fluctuating rate of
exchange. With inflation rampant, attempts to stabilize the exchange at
one American dollar to 2,000 Chinese Federal Reserve Bank dollars
failed. Black markets flourished for a while and speculation in local
currency helped to make that currency unstable. Food was plentiful but
there was a shortage of coal.
Law and order was more a matter of theory than practice. Throughout
October uniformed Chinese perpetrated many small crimes against both the
Japanese and German residents. These usually consisted of breaking into
houses, threatening the occupants with rifles or pistols, and stealing
jewelry, silver, or small valuables. Marine roving patrols remedied this
situation. It wasn’t long before the Sixth Marine Division found itself
regarded as the guardian of minority groups within the city.
The morning of 25 October found the Twenty Second Marines, the Twenty
Ninth Marines, the Sixth Tank Battalion, the Sixth Engineers, the Sixth
Marine Division Headquarters Battalion, and other troops, marching out
to the race track at the edge of Tsingtao to witness the surrender
ceremony of the Japanese to representatives of the United States and
Chinese Central Governments.
At 1100 the ceremony began. For the Japanese, Maj. General Eiji Nagano,
commanding officer of the Japanese 5th Independent Mixed Brigade,
stepped up on the platform and affixed his signature to copies of the
surrender document. After laying his sword on the table Nagano withdrew
to rejoin his staff, who immediately followed his example. On the
platform representing the United States was General Shepherd who signed
his name next. Lt. Gen. Yen Nien Li, deputy commander of the 11th War
Area and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek’s personal representative, signed
for the Chinese Central Government.
The surrender document stated that all Japanese forces in the Tsingtao
area were to surrender unconditionally to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek
and that all equipment and records were to be turned over to the Allies
in good condition. Civilian internees and prisoners of war were to be
released immediately. General Shepherd, as Commanding General of the
Sixth Marine Division, was named as Chiang’s authorized representative.
By the end of October, the division had settled to its routine duties.
Guards had been established over American properties and Japanese
warehouses; patrols were maintained throughout the non-Chinese sections
of the city. A new training program was started. Special Services
distributed athletic gear and arranged athletic events; in addition, an
education program had been started. The division began to make plans for
withdrawal as soon as the 8th Chinese National Army arrived. By 23
November, before a lapse occurred, 6,701 Japanese military personnel and
877 Japanese civilians had been evacuated to Japan. Along with the
repatriation of the Japanese, many members of the division were
“repatriated” to the United States through rotation as point scores
dropped.
During the month of December the Sixth Marine Division continued its
duties in Tsingtao; 7,827 military and 18,390 civilian Japanese were
repatriated. Near the end of the month Major General A. F. Howard, USMC,
arrived to relieve Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC, as
Commanding General of the Sixth Marine Division.
Gradually many of the functions of the division were absorbed by the 8th
Chinese National Army and the division turned to schools and training
prior to deactivation on 1 April, when from its units the Third Marine
Brigade was formed.
The career of the Sixth Marine Division had been relatively brief, a few
days less than nineteen months, but in that short time the division had
won a respected position among the fighting divisions of this war. For
its excellent work on Okinawa the division was warmly commended by both
Lt. General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, and
the late Lt. General Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General, Tenth Army.
To each of the three infantry regiments of the Sixth Marine Division,
the Twenty Second Marines, the Twenty-Ninth Marines and the Fourth
Marines, went the highly coveted Presidential Unit Citation. While it
lived, the division not only upheld all the proud traditions of the
Marine Corps, but added to the impressive record of brave deeds long
associated with the Corps.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX “A”
_Copy_
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
26 September 1944
From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commanding General, 6th Marine Division.
Subject: Services rendered by personnel of 1st Battalion, 29th
Marines.
1. I wish to express my appreciation of the heroic part played by the
officers and men of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines (Reinf), while
attached to the 2d Marine Division, in the defeat of the Japanese forces
on Saipan.
2. This battalion landed on the Japanese base of Saipan, Marianas
Islands, on D-day, 15 June 1944, and immediately upon landing was
attached to CT-8 and subsequently committed to front-line action on the
original beachhead. For a period of twenty days until the zone of action
of this division was completely secured, it occupied front-line
positions, participating in attacks against most determined resistance
over the most difficult terrain the island offered. During this entire
period, due to tactical considerations and the nature of enemy
resistance, it was at no time relieved from its front-line positions. In
its advance over very difficult terrain, including the main ridge of
Mount Tapotchau, the commanding terrain feature of the island, it
successfully repulsed numerous counter-attacks and overcame many pockets
of inordinately tenacious enemy resistance, including heavy machine gun
and mortar fire.
3. In its advance it suffered very heavy casualties. Despite these
losses, this battalion continued its attacks and advances with unabating
vigor and persistence.
4. It has been a pleasure to have under my command these officers and
men who were of inestimable value to the success of the operation as a
part of the 2d Marine Division, Reinforced. The parent organization of
the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines can well be proud of the accomplishments
of this battalion during the Saipan operation.
/s/ T. E. Watson
T. E. WATSON
First Endorsement 8 October 1944
HEADQUARTERS, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, IN THE FIELD
From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commanding Officer, Twenty-ninth Marines, Reinforced.
_Copy_
Subject: Services rendered by personnel of 1st Battalion, Twenty-ninth
Marines, Reinforced.
1. Forwarded.
2. This is a fine tribute to the 1st Battalion, Twenty-ninth Marines,
Reinforced, and will be an inspiration to the remainder of your
excellent regiment.
LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.
2d Endorsement 11 October 1944
HEADQUARTERS, 29th MARINES, REINF., SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, First Battalion, 29th
Marines, Reinf.
Subject: Services rendered by personnel of the First Battalion,
29th Marines, Reinf.
1. Forwarded with congratulations.
2. The Commanding Officer takes pleasure in forwarding this letter from
the Commanding General, Second Marine Division, In the Field, commending
you and your men for heroic and valiant services at Saipan.
3. It is a source of gratification for me to receive this report, and to
welcome your splendid unit to this regiment.
VICTOR F. BLEASDALE
_Copy_
HEADQUARTERS, TWENTY-NINTH MARINES REINFORCED,
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION, IN THE FIELD.
16 November 1944
REGIMENTAL MEMORANDUM
Combat Record of the First Battalion,
29th Marines.
_NUMBER 129 1944_
1. The article, “BATTALION ON SAIPAN” by War Correspondent Robert
Sherrod, appearing in the October 1944 issue of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE
describes the splendid part played in the conquest of Saipan during June
and July 1944, by the battalions of the Sixth Marine Regiment. However,
in addition to his description of the fighting done by the battalions of
the Sixth Marine Regiment, Mr. Sherrod includes the following reference
to the magnificent achievements of the First Battalion, Twenty-ninth
Marines:
“And none of them (battalions of the Sixth Marine Regiment)
approached the rather appalling losses incurred by an extra
battalion formed of detachments from each of the nine regular
battalions of the Second Division. This heroic battalion, the First
Battalion, Twenty-ninth Marine Regiment, commanded first by
Lieutenant Colonel Guy E. Tannyhill and later by Lieutenant Colonel
Rathvon McC. Tompkins (until he was also wounded near the end of the
battle), faced the fearsome task of taking the 1,554-foot peak of
Mount Tapotchau, the highest point on Saipan. Like good Marines,
Colonel Tompkins’ men never faltered in their assignment, but there
were only about 200 left in the battalion when the battle ended. The
United States can thank its lucky stars for such picked men who are
not afraid to die; without them it is difficult to see how the
Pacific war would even now be advanced as far as Tarawa, which is
2,000 miles to the rear.”
2. The officers and men of the 29th Marines are very proud of the
splendid reputation already established by our First Battalion.
VICTOR F. BLEASDALE,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the
FIRST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE
for service as follows:
“For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces, during
the invasion of Guam, Marianas Islands, from July 21 to August 10, 1944.
Functioning as a combat unit for the first time, the First Provisional
Marine Brigade forced a landing against strong hostile defenses and well
camouflaged positions, steadily advancing inland under the relentless
fury of the enemy’s heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire to
secure a firm beachhead by nightfall. Executing a difficult turning
movement to the north, this daring and courageous unit fought its way
ahead yard by yard through mangrove swamps, dense jungles and over
cliffs and, although terrifically reduced in strength under the enemy’s
fanatical counterattacks, hunted the Japanese in caves, pillboxes and
foxholes and exterminated them. By their individual acts of gallantry
and their indomitable fighting teamwork throughout this bitter and
costly struggle, the men of the First Provisional Marine Brigade aided
immeasurably in the restoration of Guam to our sovereignty.”
/S/ JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy.
All personnel serving in the First Provisional Marine Brigade, comprised
of: Headquarters Company; Brigade Signal Company; Brigade Military
Police Company; 4th Marines, Reinforced; 22nd Marines, Reinforced; Naval
Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 515, and 4th Platoon, 2nd Marine
Ammunition Company, during the above mentioned period are hereby
authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.
_COPY_
1990-10-10
018/159
HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD
22 April 1945.
S.O.—78-45:
1. The Commanding General takes pleasure in announcing that all
organized enemy resistance in the central and northern part of OKINAWA
was overcome on April 20, 1945.
2. Within a period of twenty days, the Sixth Marine Division effected a
landing on a hostile shore, captured an important airdrome, and fought
its way over rugged terrain against enemy resistance a distance of 84
miles securing an area of 436 square miles of Japanese territory. Over
2200 enemy dead have been counted in addition to the capture of large
numbers of assorted weapons and quantities of military stores.
3. The Sixth Marine Division may well be proud of its achievements. Its
units have operated in combat with distinction. The attack and seizure
of precipitous Mt. YAETAKE on MOTOBU Peninsula will stand out in our
history as an example of courage and determination of the individual
Marine to surmount impassable terrain defended by a well organized and
fanatical foe. Your accomplishments have demonstrated a standard of
proficiency in battle equal to any unit in the Fleet Marine Force.
4. In addition to the fighting ability of the assault troops, the
Commanding General commends the supporting units for their untiring and
efficient operation which enabled the attack to maintain its momentum
throughout the operation. Artillery, Tanks, Engineers, Shore Party,
Medical and Service elements of the division all contributed their share
to bring the campaign to a successful and rapid conclusion.
5. The Sixth Marine Division has lived up to the highest traditions of
the Marine Corps and can proudly take its place among the other famous
Marine organizations which have brought glory and honor to our
illustrious Corps.
6. In rejoicing over our recently achieved victory, we should not forget
to honor our fallen comrades and those who have suffered wounds in
battle. The loss of those who made the supreme sacrifice is deeply
mourned by all who survived. The memory of their sacrifice will remain
with us always.
/S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding, Sixth Marine Division.
_COPY_
_COPY_
1990-10-10
018/125 17 May 1945.
HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD
SO: 120-45
1. The Commanding General wishes to commend the Twenty-second Marines
for their outstanding performance of duty during the period from 8 May
1945 to the present date.
2. On 8 May 1945, the Twenty-second Marines was assigned the extreme
right flank of the Third Amphibious Corps zone of action. At that time
the forward line in this sector ran from the west coast inland just
south of Machinato airfield. The enemy positions facing them were
recognized to be of an extremely formidable nature and had withstood
attack for many days.
Undeterred by the grim prospects confronting them the Twenty-second
Marines upon receiving the order to attack, immediately began a
determined skillful advance to the south.
The regiment rapidly forced its way to the Asa-Kwan estuary and upon
reaching that formidable natural barrier, unhesitatingly forded the fire
swept water course and established a firm bridgehead on the southern
side.
The following day, the attack was resumed, this time against the enemy
main line of resistance lodged on commanding ground honeycombed with
tunnels, caves, and pillboxes. In the face of devastating artillery,
mortar and machine gun fire, the regiment unhesitatingly hammered its
way up the fanatically defended slopes and by its persistent, dogged
determination breached the enemy defenses and seized the tactically
important high ground overlooking Naha.
Since the seizure of this important area, the regiment has demonstrated
its tenacity in holding ground gained against repeated enemy
counter-attacks and counter-landings.
3. The Sixth Marine Division looks with pride on the accomplishments of
the Twenty-second Marines. The esprit de corps, courageous
determination, and outstanding fighting ability of this regiment is
worthy of the greatest praise.
4. Let us not forget that these achievements have not been without cost.
The glory gained belongs equally to those who so unsparingly gave their
lives in the performance of their duty. The battle is not yet won, and
hard fighting lies ahead, but it behooves those who remain to resolve to
maintain the inspired standards established by the recent
accomplishments of this regiment.
/S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding, Sixth Marine Division.
_COPY_
_COPY_
1990-10-10
018/125
HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD
19 May 1945
SO: 125-45
Reference: (a) ComTransronTwelve ltr to CG, 6th Mar Div.
serial #318, dated 15 April 1945.
1. Reference (a) is quoted below for the information of all members of
this command:
“1. During the period from 1 to 10 April 1945 inclusive the Shore
Party of the SIXTH Marine Division worked in closest cooperation and
harmony with Transport Squadron TWELVE (Transport Group ABLE), ships
under its operational control, and with all elements of the Navy
beach and control parties of the squadron. During this period some
51,920 tons of cargo were landed on and handled over the reef and
sent to dumps and dispersal areas in the rear. At no time were the
beaches allowed to become congested with cargo to the detriment of
progress in general cargo unloading. At the end of the unloading
period all cargo was clear of the beach areas, beaches were clean
and free of wreckage, cargo nets and life preservers had been
salvaged and returned to ships, and Garrison Shore and Beach Parties
were completely stationed, well instructed in their duties and fully
functioning.
“2. At no time, night or day, did unloading operations completely
cease on RED and GREEN Beaches. Upon ‘all clear’ after RED alert,
work was resumed promptly. At all times men were made available over
and beyond the normal demands whenever an emergency of one type or
another arose. At no time was there any complaint that the men were
too tired to work:—that they were tired goes without question, but
that they carried on is a tribute to their physical stamina, the
morale of the individual marine, and to the quality of their
leadership.
“3. Commander Transport Squadron TWELVE (Commander Transport Group
ABLE) strongly urges that the Commanding General, SIXTH Marine
Division publish this appreciation of the superb work done by his
Shore Party to all hands in his division so that all may know that
their Shore Party contributed very materially to their recent
success. It can be said in all truth that the SIXTH Marine Division
Shore Party is the best in every respect so far seen in this war,
and its organization, equipment and functioning deserve close study
as a model for future operations.
“4. ——
“5. ——
“6. In conclusion may we in Transport Squadron TWELVE express the
hope that at some future date we may be so fortunate as to serve
with the SIXTH Marine Division again. Everywhere we found splendid
cooperation, a thorough knowledge of what you wanted to do and a
keen appreciation of our own problems which enabled us to solve
often vexing details in a highly satisfactory manner. We know that
we have seen the best examples of the ship-to-shore movement to
date, and we leave you with highest regards and best wishes for your
continued success.
H. B. KNOWLES”
_COPY_
OFFICERS AND MEN
OF THE SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
(Message read to all troops the day before landing on Okinawa)
“Within the next few hours our division will land on Japanese soil—the
doorway to the enemy’s country. It is an honor to be among the first to
bring the war to the Japanese homeland.
“The Sixth Marine Division is ready for the task to which it is
assigned. During the past months of training, we have perfected our
technique and forged our battle-seasoned regiments and battalions into a
hard-hitting offensive team, inbued with the will to win.
“When the day of battle comes, I have every confidence that you will
strike with the force of a crusader, symbolized by the sword emblazoned
on our shield, and bring victory and glory to our Corps and Country.
“I extend to each of you my sincere good wishes. May God in His infinite
mercy bless our cause and protect us all.”
(Signed) LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding Sixth Marine Division
_COPY_
1990-10-10
015/210
HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD
13 June 1945.
SO: 146-45
1. The Commanding General takes pleasure in transmitting to all units of
the Sixth Marine Division the following dispatch from the Commanding
General, III Amphibious Corps:
“THE CORPS COMMANDER COMMENDS THE 6TH MARDIV ON THE CAPTURE OF OROKU
PENINSULA X CONTINUING OPERATIONS AFTER THE HARD FOUGHT BATTLES IN
WHICH THE DIVISION PENETRATED THE WESTERN DEFENSES OF SHURI AND
CAPTURED THE CITY OF NAHA IT QUICKLY EXECUTED AN AMPHIBIOUS
OPERATION ORGANIZED AND MOUNTED UNDER THE HANDICAP OF ADVERSE
WEATHER AND DIFFICULT LOGISTIC CONDITIONS X FIGHTING ITS WAY INLAND
OVER VERY UNFAVORABLE AND RUGGED TERRAIN IT WRESTED STRONGLY
FORTIFIED HILL AND CAVE POSITIONS FROM AN ENEMY DETERMINED TO FIGHT
TO THE BITTER END AND WELL EQUIPPED WITH AUTOMATIC AND SUPPORTING
WEAPONS X THE INDOMITABLE SPIRIT AND PROFESSIONAL SKILL DISPLAYED BY
THE 6TH MARDIV WILL BE A SOURCE OF PRIDE AND GRATIFICATION TO ALL
MARINES”
2. Every officer and man in the Sixth Marine Division may be justly
proud of the accomplishments attained during the past ten days fighting
on the OROKU PENINSULA. Through your indomitable courage and
determination to overcome all obstacles, you have again demonstrated the
superior fighting qualities for which this division has become famous.
/S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding, Sixth Marine Division.
_COPY_
1990-10-15
015/210
HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD
14 June 1945.
MEMO: 126-45
1. The Commanding General takes pleasure in transmitting to all units of
the Sixth Marine Division the following dispatch from Lieutenant General
Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., U. S. Army, Commanding General, 10th Army:
“MY COMPLIMENTS TO YOU AND ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMAND FOR A WELL
CONDUCTED AND SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN SECURING THE OROKU PENINSULA
AND DESTROYING A LARGE ENEMY GARRISON THEN IN STRONG AND WELL
FORTIFIED POSITIONS, THUS CONTRIBUTING MATERIALLY TO THE SUCCESS OF
THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN”
2. The above message is truly indicative of the wide recognition and
admiration gained by every officer and man of the Sixth Marine Division.
The esprit de corps, persistent, dogged determination, and outstanding
fighting ability demonstrated during the seizure of Oroku Peninsula are
worthy of the greatest praise. The Commanding General congratulates each
individual for his accomplishments.
/S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.,
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding, Sixth Marine Division.
_COPY_
_COPY_
1990-10-10
046/171
HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD
21 June 1945.
SO: 155-45
1. Organized resistance within the Sixth Marine Division zone of action
ended today. In the 82 days which have passed since the division landed
on the YONTAN beaches much ground has been gained, many Japs killed and
numerous localities of great importance to our nation have been
captured. These continuing successes have only been realized through the
superb performance of duty on the part of every unit throughout the
division. The aggressive conduct of units in contact with the enemy
coupled with the tireless support rendered by units behind the lines,
both tactical and logistical, are in keeping with the indomitable
fighting spirit of which this division is so justly proud. Every officer
and man may look upon the activities of the past three months as a hard
job superbly accomplished.
/S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.,
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding, Sixth Marine Division.
_COPY_
_COPY_
1355
015-214
HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD
23 June 1945.
SO: 158-45.
1. The Commanding General takes pleasure in quoting to all officers and
men of the Sixth Marine Division the following message from the
Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps:
“UPON THE COMPLETION OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN OKINAWA I COMMEND
ALL UNITS OF THE III PHIB CORPS FOR THEIR INDOMITABLE SPIRIT IN
OVERCOMING ENEMY RESISTANCE AND FURNISHING SERVICES AND SUPPORT TO
THE FIGHTING MEN X AS A TEAM YOU ALL WERE SUPERB AND DISPLAYED THE
SPIRIT AND PROFESSIONAL SKILL WHICH WILL CARRY US TO TOKYO X”
2. The outstanding fighting ability demonstrated by combat troops of
this division, together with the excellent performance of duty by
supporting units during the past three months, will stand out as an
example of courage and determination of the individual Marine to
surmount all obstacles and defeat a well-organized and fanatical foe.
The Sixth Marine Division has lived up to the highest traditions of the
Marine Corps and may well be proud of its outstanding achievements.
/S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.,
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding, Sixth Marine Division.
_COPY_
1990-10-50
048-214
HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD
27 June 1945.
SO: 164-45.
1. The Commanding General proudly quotes to all units of the Sixth
Marine Division the following message from the Commanding General, Tenth
Army:
“THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 10TH ARMY, TAKES GREAT PLEASURE IN
FORWARDING THE FOLLOWING DISPATCH DTG 221645 JUNE 45 QUOTE FROM:
COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS TO: COMGENTEN X OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE
MARINE CORPS PROUDLY SEND CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND THE FORCES
UNDER YOUR COMMAND FOR YOUR SPLENDID VICTORY AT OKINAWA X THE 10TH
ARMY IN COMPLETING THE INITIAL CHAPTER OF ITS HISTORY CARRIED THE
WAR TO THE THRESHOLD OF THE EMPIRE X WE EXTEND OUR BEST WISHES FOR
YOUR CONTINUED SUCCESS AND THE GALLANT TROOPS AT OKINAWA WE SAY WELL
DONE”
2. In addition to the above official dispatch, the Commanding General
takes pleasure in quoting the following excerpt from a personal letter
recently received from the Commandant of the Marine Corps:
“I wish to write you personally to say what marvelous work your
division has done.——
“I want you, your officers and men, to know how deeply grateful we
at home here are that we belong to the same outfit that has been
doing the fighting out there.
A. A. VANDEGRIFT”
3. Every officer and man of the Sixth Marine Division may justly be
proud of these words of praise from our Commandant. To have been a
member of the Sixth Marine Division on Okinawa is an honor which cannot
be excelled. You have all lived up to the highest traditions of the
Marine Corps.
/S/ LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.,
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding, Sixth Marine Division.
_COPY_
APPENDIX “B”
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION COMMAND LIST
From 7Sep44 to 31Mar46
=Division Commander=:
Brig. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC
7-11Sept44.
Maj. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. USMC
12Sept44 to 23Dec45.
Maj. Gen. Archie F. Howard, USMC
24Dec45 to 31Mar46.
=Assistant Division Commander=:
Brig. Gen. William T. Clement, USMC
11Nov44 to 31Mar46.
=Chief of Staff=:
Col. John T. Walker, USMC
7Sept to 16Nov44.
Col. John C. McQueen, USMC
17Nov44 to 16Feb46.
Col. Harry E. Dunkelberger, USMC
17Feb to 31Mar46.
=Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1=:
Major Addison B. Overstreet, USMCR
7Sept44 to 22Jul45.
Col. Karl K. Louther, USMC
23Jul to 17Nov45.
Lt. Col. Frederick Belton, USMC
18Nov45 to 31Mar46.
=Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2=:
Lt. Col. August Larson, USMC
7Sept to 30Sept44.
Major William R. Watson, Jr., USMCR
1Oct to 9Nov44.
Lt. Col. Thomas E. Williams, USMCR
10Nov44 to 16Feb46.
Lt. Col. Carl V. Larsen, USMC
17Feb to 31Mar46.
=Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3=:
Lt. Col. Thomas A. Culhane, Jr., USMC
7Sept to 10Nov44.
Lt. Col. Victor H. Krulak, USMC
11Nov44 to 26Oct45.
Lt. Col. Wayne H. Adams, USMC
27Oct to 31Dec45.
Lt. Col. George W. Killen, USMC
1Jan to 31Mar46.
=Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4=:
Lt. Col. August Larson, USMC
1Oct44 to 17May45.
Lt. Col. Wayne H. Adams, USMC
18May45 to 31Dec45.
Lt. Col. Samuel R. Shaw, USMC
1Jan to 31Mar46.
=CO Hq Bn=:
Lt. Col. Floyd A. Stephenson, USMC
(Activated 25Sept44)
25Sept44 to 31Mar46.
=CO Service Troops=:
Lt. Col. Floyd A. Stephenson, USMC
(Activated 24Oct44)
24Oct to 11Nov44.
Col. William W. Orr, USMC
12Nov44 to 3Dec45.
=CO 6th Motor Transport Bn=:
Major Ernest H. Gould, USMCR
(Activated 23Sept44)
23Sept44 to 30Mar45.
Lt. Col. Ernest H. Gould, USMCR
30Mar to 24Jul45.
Lt. Col. Robert E. McCook, USMC
25Jul45 to 31Mar46.
=CO 6th Service Bn=:
Lt. Col. Floyd A. Stephenson, USMC
(Activated 24Oct44)
24Oct to 12Nov44.
Major Charles N. Hulvey, Jr., USMCR
13Nov to 17Dec44.
Lt. Col. Erma A. Wright, USMC
18Dec44 to 26Jan45.
Lt. Col. George B. Bell, USMC
27Jan to 26Mar45.
Lt. Col. Alexander N. Entringer, USMC
27Mar45 to 19Mar46.
Lt. Col. Robert E. McCook, USMC
20-31Mar46.
=CO 6th Medical Bn=:
Lt. Comdr. John S. Cowan, USN(MC)
(Activated 24Nov44)
24Nov44 to 18Jun45.
Commander John S. Cowan, USN(MC)
19Jun45 to 27Jan46.
Lt. Comdr. Rich H. Pembroke, USNR(MC)
28Jan to 26Mar46.
=CO 6th Engineer Bn=:
Capt. Wm. C. McLaughlin, USMC
(Activated 1Nov44)
1-13Nov44.
Major Elliot B. Robertson, USMC
14Nov to 28Dec44.
Major Paul F. Sackett, USMCR
29Dec44 to 23Jul45.
Major Robert S. Mayo, USMC
24-31Jul45.
Major Paul F. Sackett, USMCR
1Aug to 22Sept45.
Lt. Col. Orin C. Bjornsrud, USMC
23Sept45 to 25Mar46.
=CO 6th Pioneer Bn=:
Lt. Col. Samuel R. Shaw, USMC
(Activated 10Nov44)
10Nov44 to 10May45.
Major John G. Dibble, USMC
11May to 22Jun45.
Lt. Col. Samuel R. Shaw, USMC
23Jun to 21Oct45.
Lt. Col. Harry A. Schmitz, USMC
22Oct45 to 31Mar46.
=CO 6th Tank Bn=:
Major Harry T. Milne, USMC
29Sept to 16Oct44.
Lt. Col. Robert L. Denig, Jr., USMC
17Oct44 to 26Mar46.
=CO 15th Marines=:
Col. Wilburt S. Brown, USMC
(Activated 23Oct44)
23Oct to 17Nov44.
Lt. Col. Robert B. Luckey, USMC
18Nov to 23Dec44.
Col. Robert B. Luckey, USMC
24Dec44 to 15Mar46.
=CO 4th Marines=:
Col. Alan Shapley, USMC
7Sept44 to 3Jul45.
Lt. Col. Fred D. Beans, USMC
4Jul45 to 28Jan46.
=CO 22d Marines=:
Col. Merlin F. Schneider, USMC
(Activated Jun42)
7Sept44 to 16May45.
Col. Harold C. Roberts, USMC
17May to 18Jun45.
Lt. Col. August Larson, USMC
19-24Jun45.
Col. John D. Blanchard, USMC
25Jun45 to 31Mar46.
=CO 29th Marines=:
Col. Victor F. Bleasdale, USMC
(Activated 1May44)
7Sept44 to 14Apr45.
Col. William J. Whaling, USMC
15Apr45 to 31Mar46.
APPENDIX “C”
Sixth Marine Division Insignia
The basic design for the shoulder patch of the Sixth Marine Division was
submitted by Colonel Victor Bleasdale of the Twenty Ninth Marines. The
design as finally adopted, incorporated ideas of Corporal Michael W.
Pawl and Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. The artist who actually
drew and colored the design was Lieutenant George Thompson.
The outside diameter of the patch is three inches and the diameter of
the inner circle is two and one fourth inches. Embroidered on the red
outer border are the words Melanesia—Micronesia—Orient. Superimposed
upon a crusader sword in the center of the patch is a one and a quarter
inch block numeral “6”, two inches long. The shading of the “6” is in
the same color as the outer border. The “6” and the lettering of the
words on the border is golden yellow. Cobalt blue is the color of the
center background and the crusader sword is silver white.
To commemorate the fighting in the Solomons of the Raider Battalions,
from which the Fourth Regiment was formed, the word Melanesia was
chosen. Similarly, the word Micronesia commemorates the fighting of the
Twenty Second Marines at Eniwetok, the First Provisional Brigade on
Guam, and the First Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines, at Saipan.
The board of officers, representing all units of the division, which
adopted the patch selected the word Orient for two reasons: First,
because China was the home of the old Fourth Marine Regiment, lost in
the early days of the war on Bataan. The Raider Battalions were the
units used to reactivate the Fourth Marines. The second reason advanced
by the board was, that it was their belief that in its final stages, the
war against Japan would have to be fought in the Orient. It is
significant that the division took part in the last campaign, which was
fought on Okinawa, and, as predicted, in the Orient.
The crusader’s sword was chosen as a symbol of the Sixth Marine
Division’s crusade against the tyrannical principles of the axis powers.
In a special order, dated 17 October 1944, General Shepherd brought the
insignia into official existence.
● Transcriber’s Notes:
○ Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).
○ Footnotes have been moved to follow the lectures in which they are
referenced.
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