British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"

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Title: British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"
Author: Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Language: English
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Transcriber’s Notes:

Underscores are used to enclose text in italics; the three words that
end this sentence _are in italics_.

Equals signs are used to enclose text in bold face; the four words
that end this sentence =are in bold face=.

The 291 footnotes in the source book have been changed into endnotes.
Each endnote is labelled by a copy of its marker which consists of a
number in square brackets.

There are 439 sidenotes. Sidenotes are enclosed by black diamond
symbols, for example, ◆July 24./Aug. 3.◆.

Many of the 439 sidenotes consist of two dates, separated by a dash;
the first date is taken from the Julian Calendar and the second from
the Gregorian Calendar. The dates in such a pair differ by 10 days
in the 17th century and by 11 days in the 18th century.

BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS

[Illustration]

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA · MADRAS
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO
DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO

BRITISH CAMPAIGNS
IN FLANDERS
1690–1794

BEING EXTRACTS FROM
“A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY”

BY
THE HON. J. W. FORTESCUE

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON
1918

PREFACE

This volume consists simply of extracts reprinted from my _History of
the British Army_. It is published in order that the troops at the
front may, if they wish it, study the experiences of their forerunners
in the Low Countries in a book which is fairly portable and fairly
inexpensive, though neither so cheap nor so compendious as _The British
Soldiers’ Guide to Northern France and Flanders_.

J. W. F.

CONTENTS

PAGE
WILLIAM III.’S CAMPAIGNS 1–37

MARLBOROUGH’S CAMPAIGNS—

1701–2 38

1705 51

1706 (RAMILLIES) 62

1707–8 (OUDENARDE) 77

1709 (MALPLAQUET) 103

1711 122

WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION—

CAMPAIGNS OF 1744–5 (FONTENOY) 133

CAMPAIGNS OF 1746–7 (LAUFFELD, ROUCOUX) 158

WAR OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 177

CAMPAIGN OF 1793 (LINSELLES) 207

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1794 261

CAMPAIGN OF 1794 (VILLERS-EN-CAUCHIES,
BEAUMONT, WILLEMS, TOURCOING) 295

CAMPAIGN OF 1794 (_Continued_) 343

END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1794 366

MAPS AND PLANS

PAGE
Steenkirk, 23rd July (3rd Aug.) 1692 13

Landen, 19th (29th) July 1693 27

Lines of the Geete, 7th (18th) July 1705 55

Ramillies, 12th (23rd) May 1706 67

Oudenarde, 30th June (11th July) 1708 85

Malplaquet, 31st Aug. (11th Sept.) 1709 111

The Campaign of 1711 125

Fontenoy, 30th April (11th May) 1745 143

Roucoux, 30th Sept, (11th Oct.) 1746 163

Lauffeld, 21st June (2nd July) 1747 171

Attack of the Allies on the Camp of Famars, 23rd May 1793 217

Dunkirk and Environs, showing the Position of the Allies
from 24th Aug. to 6th Sept. 1793 237

Campaign of April 1794 299

Avesnes-le-Sec, 12th Sept. 1793; Villers-en-Cauchies,
24th April 1794; Beaumont, 26th April 1794 303

Willems, 10th May 1794 319

The Netherlands in the 18th Century _At end_

VOL. I. BOOK V. CHAPTER II

I pass now to Flanders, which is about to become for the second time
the training ground of the British Army. The judicious help sent by
Lewis the Fourteenth to Ireland had practically diverted the entire
strength of William to that quarter for two whole campaigns; and
though, as has been seen, there were English in Flanders in 1689 and
1690, the contingents which they furnished were too small and the
operations too trifling to warrant description in detail. After the
battle of the Boyne the case was somewhat altered, for, though a large
force was still required in Ireland for Ginkell’s final pacification
of 1691, William was none the less at liberty to take the field in
Flanders in person. ◆1690. October.◆ Moreover, Parliament with great
good-will had voted seventy thousand men for the ensuing year, of which
fully fifty thousand were British,[1] so that England was about to
put forth her strength in Europe on a scale unknown since the loss of
Calais.

But first a short space must be devoted to the theatre of war, where
England was to meet and break down the overweening power of France.
Few studies are more difficult, even to the professed student, than
that of the old campaigns in Flanders, and still fewer more hopeless of
simplification to the ordinary reader. Nevertheless, however desperate
the task, an effort must be made once for all to give a broad idea of
the scene of innumerable great actions.

Taking his stand on the northern frontier of France and looking
northward, the reader will note three great rivers running through the
country before him in, roughly speaking, three parallel semicircles,
from south-east to north-west. These are, from east to west, the
Moselle, which is merged in the Rhine at Coblentz, the Meuse, and the
Scheldt, all three of which discharge themselves into the great delta
whereof the southern key is Antwerp. But for the present let the reader
narrow the field from the Meuse in the east to the sea in the west,
and let him devote his attention first to the Meuse. He will see that,
a little to the north of the French frontier, it picks up a large
tributary from the south-west, the Sambre, which runs past Maubeuge and
Charleroi and joins the Meuse at Namur. Thence the united rivers flow
on past the fortified towns of Huy, Liège, and Maestricht to the sea.
But let the reader’s northern boundary on the Meuse for the present be
Maestricht, and let him note another river which rises a little to the
west of Maestricht and runs almost due west past Arschot and Mechlin to
the sea at Antwerp. Let this river, the Demer, be his northern, and the
Meuse from Maestricht to Namur his eastern, boundary.

Returning to the south, let him note a river rising immediately to the
west of Charleroi, the Haine, which joins the Scheldt at Tournay, and
let him draw a line from Tournay westward through Lille and Ypres to
the sea at Dunkirk. Let this line from Dunkirk to Charleroi be carried
eastward to Namur; and there is his southern boundary. His western
boundary is, of course, the sea. Within this quadrilateral, Antwerp (or
more strictly speaking the mouth of the Scheldt), Dunkirk, Namur, and
Maestricht, lies the most famous fighting-ground of Europe.

Glancing at it on the map, the reader will see that this quadrilateral
is cut by a number of rivers running parallel to each other from south
to north, and flowing into the main streams of the Demer and the
Scheldt. The first of these, beginning from the east, are the Great and
Little Geete, which become one before they join the main stream. It is
worth while to pause for a moment over this little slip of land between
the Geete and the Meuse. We shall see much of Namur, Huy, Liège, and
Maestricht, which command the navigation of the greater river, but we
shall see still more of the Geete, and of two smaller streams, the
Jaar and the Mehaigne, which rise almost in the same table-land with
it. On the Lower Jaar, close to Maestricht, stands the village of
Lauffeld, which shall be better known to us fifty years hence. On the
Little Geete, just above its junction with its greater namesake, are
the villages of Neerwinden and Landen. In the small space between the
heads of the Geete and the Mehaigne lies the village of Ramillies. For
this network of streams is the protection against an enemy that would
threaten the navigation of the Meuse from the north and west, and the
barrier of Spanish Flanders against invasion from the east; and the
ground is rich with the corpses and fat with the blood of men.

The next stream to westward is the Dyle, which flows past Louvain to
the Demer, and gives its name, after the junction, to that river. The
next in order is the Senne, which flows past Park and Hal and Brussels
to the same main stream. At the head of the Senne stands the village of
Steenkirk; midway between the Dyle and Senne are the forest of Soignies
and the field of Waterloo.

Here the tributaries of the Demer come to an end, but the row of
parallel streams is continued by the tributaries of another system,
that of the Scheldt. Easternmost of these, and next in order to the
Senne, is the Dender, which rises near Leuse and flows past Ath and
Alost to the Scheldt at Dendermond. Next comes the Scheldt itself,
with the Scarpe and the Haine, its tributaries, which it carries past
Tournay and Oudenarde to Ghent, and to the sea at Antwerp. Westernmost
of all, the Lys runs past St. Venant, where in Cromwell’s time we
saw Sir Thomas Morgan and his immortal six thousand, past Menin and
Courtrai, and is merged in the Scheldt at Ghent.

The whole extent of the quadrilateral is about one hundred miles long
by fifty broad, with a great waterway to the west, a second to the
east, and a third, whereof the key is Ghent, roughly speaking midway
between them. The earth, fruitful by nature and enriched by art, bears
food for man and beast; the waterways provide transport for stores and
ammunition. It was a country where men could kill each other without
being starved, and hence for centuries the cockpit of Europe.

A glance at any old map of Flanders shows how thickly studded was this
country with walled towns of less or greater strength, and explains why
a war in Flanders should generally have been a war of sieges. Every one
of these little towns, of course, had its garrison; and the manœuvres
of contending forces were governed very greatly by the effort, on one
side, to release these garrisons for active service in the field, and,
on the other, to keep them confined within their walls for as long
as possible. Hence it is obvious that an invading army necessarily
enjoyed a great advantage, since it menaced the fortresses of the enemy
while its own were unthreatened. Thus ten thousand men on the Upper
Lys could paralyse thrice their number in Ghent and Bruges and the
adjacent towns. On the other hand, if an invading general contemplated
the siege of an important town, he manœuvred to entice the garrison
into the field before he laid siege in form. Still, once set down to a
great siege, an army was stationary, and the bare fact was sufficient
to liberate hostile garrisons all over the country; and hence arose the
necessity of a second army to cover the besieging force. The skill and
subtlety manifested by great generals to compass these different ends
is unfortunately only to be apprehended by closer study than can be
expected of any but the military student.

A second cause contributed not a little to increase the taste for a
war of sieges, namely, the example of France, then the first military
nation in Europe.[2] The Court of Versailles was particularly fond of
a siege, since it could attend the ceremony in state and take nominal
charge of the operations with much glory and little discomfort or
danger. The French passion for rule and formula also found a happy
outlet in the conduct of a siege, for, while there is no nation more
brilliant or more original, particularly in military affairs, there is
also none that is more conceited or pedantic. The craving for sieges
among the French was so great that the King took pains, by the grant of
extra pay and rations, to render this species of warfare popular with
his soldiers.[3]

Again, it must be remembered that the object of a campaign in those
days was not necessarily to seek out an enemy and beat him. There
were two alternatives prescribed by the best authorities, namely,
to fight at an advantage or to subsist comfortably.[4] Comfortable
subsistence meant at its best subsistence at an enemy’s expense. A
campaign wherein an army lived on the enemy’s country and destroyed
all that it could not consume was eminently successful, even though
not a shot was fired. To force an enemy to consume his own supplies
was much, to compel him to supply his opponent was more, to take up
winter-quarters in his territory was very much more. Thus to enter an
enemy’s borders and keep him marching backwards and forwards for weeks
without giving him a chance of striking a blow, was in itself no small
success, and success of a kind which galled inferior generals, such as
William of Orange, to desperation and so to disaster. The tendency to
these negative campaigns was heightened once more by French example.
The French ministry of war interfered with its generals to an extent
that was always dangerous, and eventually proved calamitous. Nominally
the marshal commanding-in-chief in the field was supreme; but the
intendant or head of the administrative service, though he received his
orders from the marshal, was instructed by the King to forward those
orders at once by special messenger to Louvois, and not to execute
them without the royal authority. Great commanders such as Luxemburg
had the strength from time to time to kick themselves free from this
bondage, but the rest, embarrassed by the surveillance of an inferior
officer, preferred to live as long as possible in an enemy’s country
without risking a general action. It was left to Marlborough to advance
triumphant in one magnificent campaign from the Meuse to the sea.

Next, a glance must be thrown at the contending parties. The defenders
of the Spanish Netherlands, for they cannot be called the assailants
of France, were confederate allies from a number of independent
states—England, Holland, Spain, the Empire, sundry states of Germany,
and Denmark, all somewhat selfish, few very efficient, and none, except
the first, very punctual. From such a heterogeneous collection swift,
secret, and united action was not to be expected. King William held the
command-in-chief, and, from his position as the soul of the alliance,
was undoubtedly the fittest for the post. But though he had carefully
studied the art of war, and though his phlegmatic temperament found its
only genuine pleasure in the excitement of the battlefield, he was not
a great general. He could form good plans, and up to a certain point
could execute them, but up to a certain point only. It should seem that
his physical weakness debarred him from steady and sustained effort.
He was strangely incapable of conducting a campaign with equal ability
throughout; he would manœuvre admirably for weeks, and forfeit all the
advantage that he had gained by the carelessness of a single day. In
a general action, of which he was fonder than most commanders of his
time, he never shone except in virtue of conspicuous personal bravery.
He lacked tactical instinct, and above all he lacked patience; in a
word, to use a modern phrase, he was a very clever amateur.

France, on the other hand, possessed the finest and strongest army in
Europe,—well equipped, well trained, well organised, and inured to
work by countless campaigns. She had a single man in supreme control
of affairs, King Lewis the Fourteenth; a great war-minister, Louvois;
one really great general, Luxemburg; and one with flashes of genius,
Boufflers. Moreover, she possessed a line of posts in Spanish Flanders
extending from Dunkirk to the Meuse. On the Lys she had Aire and
Menin; on the Scarpe, Douay; on the Upper Scheldt, Cambray, Bouchain,
Valenciennes, and Condé; on the Sambre, Maubeuge; between Sambre and
Meuse, Philippeville and Marienburg; and on the Meuse, Dinant. Further,
in the one space where the frontier was not covered by a friendly
river, between the sea and the Scheldt, the French had constructed
fortified lines from the sea to Menin and from thence to the Scheldt
at Espierre. Thus with their frontier covered, with a place of arms on
every river, with secrecy and with unity of purpose, the French enjoyed
the approximate certainty of being able to take the field in every
campaign before the Allies could be collected to oppose them.

◆1691.◆

The campaign of 1691 happily typifies the relative positions of the
combatants in almost every respect. The French concentrated ten
thousand men on the Lys. This was sufficient to paralyse all the
garrisons of the Allies on and about the river. They posted another
corps on the Moselle, which threatened the territory of Cleves. Now
Cleves was the property of the Elector of Brandenburg, and it was
not to be expected that he should allow his contingent of troops to
join King William at the general rendezvous at Brussels, and suffer
the French to play havoc among his possessions. Thus the Prussian
contingent likewise was paralysed. So while William was still ordering
his troops to concentrate at Brussels, Boufflers, who had been making
preparations all the winter, suddenly marched up from Maubeuge and,
before William was aware that he was in motion, had besieged Mons. The
fortress presently surrendered after a feeble resistance, and the line
of the Allies’ frontier between the Scheldt and Sambre was broken.
William moved down from Brussels across the Sambre in the hope of
recovering the lost town, outmanœuvred Luxemburg, who was opposed to
him, and for three days held the recapture of Mons in the hollow of
his hand. He wasted those three days in an aimless halt; Luxemburg
recovered himself by an extraordinary march; and William, finding that
there was no alternative before him but to retire to Brussels and
remain inactive, handed over the command to an incompetent officer and
returned to England. Luxemburg then closed the campaign by a brilliant
action of cavalry, which scattered the horse of the Allies to the four
winds. As no British troops except the Life Guards were present, and as
they at any rate did not disgrace themselves, it is unnecessary to say
more of the combat of Leuse. It had, however, one remarkable effect:
it increased William’s dread of the French cavalry, already morbidly
strong, to such a pitch as to lead him subsequently to a disastrous
military blunder.

The campaign of 1691 was therefore decidedly unfavourable to the
Allies, but there was ground for hope that all might be set right
in 1692. The Treasurer, Godolphin, was nervously apprehensive that
Parliament might be unwilling to vote money for an English army in
Flanders; but the Commons cheerfully granted a total of sixty-six
thousand men, British and foreign; which, after deduction of garrisons
for the safety of the British Isles, left forty thousand free to cross
the German Ocean.

◆1692.◆

Of these, twenty-three thousand were British, the most important
force that England had sent to the Continent since the days of King
Henry the Eighth. The organisation was remarkably like that of the
New Model. William was, of course, Commander-in-Chief, and under him
were a general of horse and a general of foot, with a due allowance
of lieutenant-generals, major-generals, and brigadiers. There is,
however, no sign of an officer in command of artillery or engineers,
nor any of a commissary in charge of the transport.[5] The one
strangely conspicuous functionary is the Secretary-at-War, who in
this and the following campaigns for the last time accompanied the
Commander-in-Chief on active service. But the most significant feature
in the list of the staff is the omission of the name of Marlborough.
Originally included among the generals for Flanders, he had been struck
off the roll, and dismissed from all public employment, in disgrace,
before the opening of the campaign. Though this dismissal did not want
justification, it was perhaps of all William’s blunders the greatest.

As usual, the French were beforehand with the Allies in opening the
campaign. They had already broken the line of the defending fortresses
by the capture of Mons; they now designed to make the breach still
wider. All through the winter a vast siege-train was collecting on the
Scheldt and Meuse, with Vauban, first of living engineers, in charge
of it. ◆May.◆ In May all was ready. Marshal Joyeuse, with one corps,
was on the Moselle, as in the previous year, to hold the Brandenburgers
in check. Boufflers, with eighteen thousand men, lay on the right bank
of the Meuse, near Dinant; Luxemburg, with one hundred and fifteen
thousand more, stood in rear of the river Haine. ◆May 10/20.◆ On the
20th of May, King Lewis in person reviewed the grand army; ◆May 13/23.◆
on the 23rd it marched for Namur; ◆May 16/26.◆ and on the 26th it had
wound itself round two sides of the town, while Boufflers, moving up
from Dinant, completed the circuit on the third side. Thus Namur was
completely invested; unless William could save it, the line of the
Sambre and one of the most important fortresses on the Meuse were lost
to the Allies.

William, to do him justice, had strained every nerve to spur his
indolent allies to be first in the field. The contingents, awaked
by the sudden stroke at Namur, came in fast to Brussels; but it was
too late. The French had destroyed all forage and supplies on the
direct route to Namur, and William’s only way to the city lay across
the Mehaigne. Behind the Mehaigne lay Luxemburg, the ablest of the
French generals. The best of luck was essential to William’s success,
and instead of the best came the worst. Heavy rain swelled the
narrow stream into a broad flood, and the building of bridges became
impossible. There was beautiful fencing, skilful feint, and more
skilful parry, between the two generals, but William could not get
under Luxemburg’s guard. ◆May 26./June 5.◆ On the 5th of June, after a
discreditably short defence, Namur fell, almost before William’s eyes,
into the hands of the French.

Then Luxemburg thought it time to draw the enemy away from the vicinity
of the captured city; so recrossing the Sambre, and keeping Boufflers
always between himself and that river, he marched for the Senne as if
to threaten Brussels. William followed, as in duty bound; and French
and Allies pursued a parallel course to the Senne, William on the north
and Luxemburg on the south. ◆July 23./Aug. 2.◆ The 2nd of August found
both armies across the Senne, William at Hal, facing west with the
river in his rear, and Luxemburg some five miles south of him with his
right at Steenkirk, and his centre between Hoves and Enghien, while
Boufflers lay at Manny St. Jean, seven miles in his rear.

The terrible state of the roads owing to heavy rain had induced
Luxemburg to leave most of his artillery at Mons; and, as he had
designed merely to tempt the Allies away from Namur, the principal
object left to him was to take up a strong position wherein his worn
and harassed army could watch the enemy without fear of attack. Such
a position he thought that he had found at Steenkirk.[6] The country
at this point is more broken and rugged than is usual in Belgium. The
camp lay on high ground, with its right resting on the river Sennette
and its fight front covered by a ravine, which gradually fades away
northward into a high plateau of about a mile in extent. Beyond the
ravine was a network of wooded defiles, through which Luxemburg seems
to have hoped that no enemy could fall upon him in force unawares. It
so happened, however, that one of his most useful spies was detected,
in his true character, in William’s camp at Hal; and this was an
opportunity not to be lost. A pistol was held to the spy’s head, and
he was ordered to write a letter to Luxemburg, announcing that large
bodies of the enemy would be in motion next morning, but that nothing
more serious was contemplated than a foraging expedition. This done,
William laid his plans to surprise his enemy on the morrow.

[Illustration:

STEENKIRK
July 24rd./Aug. 3rd. 1692.

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

◆July 24./Aug. 3.◆

An hour before daybreak the advanced guard of William’s army fell
silently into its ranks, together with a strong force of pioneers to
clear the way for a march through the woods. This force consisted of
the First Guards, the Royal Scots, the Twenty-first, Fitzpatrick’s
regiment of Fusiliers, and two Danish regiments of great reputation,
the whole under the command of the Duke of Würtemberg. Presently they
moved away, and, as the sun rose, the whole army followed them in two
columns, without sound of drum or trumpet, towards Steenkirk. French
patrols scouring the country in the direction of Tubise saw the two
long lines of scarlet and white and blue wind away into the woods, and
reported what they had witnessed at headquarters; but Luxemburg, sickly
of constitution, and, in spite of his occasional energy, indolent
of temperament, rejoiced to think that, as his spy had told him, it
was no more than a foraging party. Another patrol presently sent in
another message that a large force of cavalry was advancing towards the
Sennette. Once more Luxemburg lulled himself into security with the
same comfort.

Meanwhile the allied army was trailing through narrow defiles and
cramped close ground, till at last it emerged from the stifling woods
into an open space. Here it halted, as the straitness of the ground
demanded, in dense, heavy masses. But the advanced guard moved on
steadily till it reached the woods over against Steenkirk, where
Würtemberg disposed it for the coming attack. On his left the Bois de
Feuilly covered a spur of the same plateau as that occupied by the
French right, and there he stationed the English Guards and the two
battalions of Danes. To the right of these, but separated from them by
a ravine, he placed the three remaining British battalions in the Bois
de Zoulmont. His guns he posted, some between the two woods, and the
remainder on the right of his division. These dispositions complete,
the advanced party awaited orders to open the attack.

It was now eleven o’clock. Luxemburg had left his bed and had ridden
out to a commanding height on his extreme right, when a third letter
was brought to him that the Allies were certainly advancing in force.
He read it, and looking to his front, saw the red coats of the Guards
moving through the wood before him, while beyond them he caught a
glimpse of the dense masses of the main body. Instantly he saw the
danger, and divined that William’s attack was designed against his
right. His own camp was formed, according to rule, with the cavalry on
the wings; and there was nothing in position to check the Allies but
a single brigade of infantry, famous under the name of Bourbonnois,
which was quartered in advance of the cavalry’s camp on his extreme
right. Moreover, nothing was ready, not a horse was bridled, not a man
standing to his arms. He despatched a messenger to summon Boufflers
to his aid, and in a few minutes was flying through the camp with his
staff, energetic but perfectly self-possessed, to set his force in
order of battle. The two battalions of Bourbonnois fell in hastily
before their camp, with a battery of six guns before them. The dragoons
of the right wing dismounted and hastened to seal up the space between
Bourbonnois and the Sennette. The horse of the right was collected,
and some of it sent off in hot speed to the left to bring the infantry
up behind them on their horses’ croups. All along the line the alarm
was given, drums were beating, men snatching hastily at their arms and
falling into their ranks ready to file away to the right. Such was the
haste, that there was no time to think of regimental precedence, a very
serious matter in the French army, and each successive brigade hurried
into the place where it was most needed, as it happened to come up.

Meanwhile Würtemberg’s batteries had opened fire, and a cunning officer
of the Royal Scots was laying his guns with admirable precision. French
batteries hastened into position to reply to them with as deadly an
aim, and for an hour and a half the rival guns thundered against each
other unceasingly. All this time the French battalions kept massing
themselves thicker and thicker on Luxemburg’s right, and the front line
was working with desperate haste, felling trees, making breastworks,
and lining the hedges and copses while yet they might. But still
Würtemberg’s division remained unsupported, and the precious minutes
flew fast. William, or his staff for him, had made a serious blunder.
Intent though he was on fighting a battle with his infantry only, he
had put all the cavalry of one wing of his army before them on the
march, so that there was no room for the infantry to pass. Fortunately
six battalions had been intermixed with the squadrons of this wing,
and these were now with some difficulty disentangled and sent forward.
Cutts’s, Mackay’s, Lauder’s, and the Twenty-sixth formed up on
Würtemberg’s right, with the Sixth and Twenty-fifth in support; and at
last, at half-past twelve, Würtemberg gave the order to attack.

His little force shook itself up and pressed forward with eagerness.
The Guards and Danes on the extreme left, being on the same ridge with
the enemy, were the first that came into action. Pushing on under a
terrible fire at point-blank range from the French batteries, they fell
upon Bourbonnois and the dragoons, beat them back, captured their guns,
and turned them against the enemy. On their right the Royal Scots,
Twenty-first, and Fitzpatrick’s plunged down into the ravine into
closer and more difficult ground, past copses and hedges and thickets,
until a single thick fence alone divided them from the enemy. Through
this they fired at each other furiously for a time, till the Scots
burst through the fence with their Colonel at their head, and swept the
French before them. Still further to the right, the remaining regiments
came also into action; muzzle met muzzle among the branches, and the
slaughter was terrible. Young Angus, still not yet of age, dropped
dead at the head of the Cameronians, and the veteran Mackay found the
death which he had missed at Killiecrankie. He had before the attack
sent word to General Count Solmes, that the contemplated assault could
lead only to waste of life; and he had been answered with the order to
advance. “God’s will be done,” he said calmly, and he was among the
first that fell.

Still the British, in spite of all losses, pressed furiously on; and
famous French regiments, spoiled children of victory, wavered and gave
way before them. Bourbonnois, unable to face the Guards and Danes,
doubled its left battalion in rear of its right; Chartres, which
stood next to them, also gave way and doubled itself in rear of its
neighbour Orléans. A wide gap was thus torn in the first French line,
but not a regiment of the second line would step into it. The colonel
of the brigade in rear of it ordered, entreated, implored his men to
come forward, but they would not follow him into that terrible fire.
Suddenly the wild voice ceased, and the gesticulating figure fell in
a heap to the ground: the colonel had been shot dead, and the gap was
still unfilled.

The first French line was broken; the second and third were dismayed
and paralysed: a little more and the British would carry the French
camp. Luxemburg perceived that this was a moment when only his best
troops could save him. In the fourth line stood the flower of his
infantry, the seven battalions of French and Swiss Guards. These
were now ordered forward to the gap; the princes of the blood placed
themselves at their head, and without firing a shot they charged down
the slope upon the British and Danes. The English Guards, thinned to
half their numbers, faced the huge columns of the Swiss and stood
up to them undaunted, till by sheer weight they were slowly rolled
back. On their right the Royal Scots also were forced back, fighting
desperately from hedge to hedge and contesting every inch of ground.
Once, the French made a dash through a fence and carried off one of
their colours. The Colonel, Sir Robert Douglas, instantly turned back
alone through the fence, recaptured the colour, and was returning with
it when he was struck by a bullet. He flung the flag over to his men
and fell to the ground dead.

Slowly the twelve battalions retired, still fighting furiously at every
step. So fierce had been their onslaught that five lines of infantry
backed by two more of cavalry[7] had hardly sufficed to stop them,
and with but a little support they might have won the day. But that
support was not forthcoming. Message after message had been sent to
the Dutch general, Count Solmes, for reinforcements, but there came
not a man. The main body, as has been told, was all clubbed together
a mile and a half from the scene of action, with the infantry in the
rear; and Solmes, with almost criminal folly, instead of endeavouring
to extricate the foot, had ordered forward the horse. William rectified
the error as soon as he could; but the correction led to further delay
and to the increased confusion which is the inevitable result of
contradictory orders. The English infantry in rear, mad with impatience
to rescue their comrades, ran forward in disorder, probably with loud
curses on the Dutchman who had kept them back so long; and some time
was lost before they could be re-formed. Discipline was evidently a
little at fault. Solmes lost both his head and his temper. “Damn the
English,” he growled; “if they are so fond of fighting, let them have
a bellyful”; and he sent forward not a man. Fortunately junior officers
took matters into their own hands; and it was time, for Boufflers
had now arrived on the field to throw additional weight into the
French scale. The English Horse-grenadiers, the Fourth Dragoons, and
a regiment of Dutch dragoons rode forward and, dismounting, covered
the retreat of the Guards and Danes by a brilliant counter-attack. The
Buffs and Tenth advanced farther to the right, and holding their fire
till within point-blank range, poured in a volley which gave time for
the rest of Würtemberg’s division to withdraw. A demonstration against
the French left made a further diversion, and the shattered fragments
of the attacking force, grimed with sweat and smoke, fell back to the
open ground in rear of the woods, repulsed but unbeaten, and furious
with rage.

William, it is said, could not repress a cry of anguish when he
saw them; but there was no time for emotion. Some Dutch and Danish
infantry was sent forward to check further advance of the enemy, and
preparations were made for immediate retreat. Once again the hardest
of the work was entrusted to the British; and when the columns were
formed, the grenadiers of the British regiments brought up the rear,
halting and turning about continually, until failing light put an
end to what was at worst but a half-hearted pursuit. The retreat was
conducted with admirable order; but it was not until the chill, dead
hour that precedes the dawn that the Allies regained their camp, worn
out with the fatigue of the past four-and-twenty hours.

The action was set down at the time as the severest ever fought by
infantry, and the losses on both sides were very heavy. The Allies
lost about three thousand killed and the same number wounded, besides
thirteen hundred prisoners, nearly all of whom were wounded. Ten guns
were abandoned, the horses being too weary to draw them; the English
battalions lost two colours, and the foreign three or four more. The
British, having borne the brunt of the action, suffered most heavily of
all, the Guards, Cutts’s, and the Sixth being terribly punished. The
total French loss was about equal to that of the Allies, but the list
of the officers that fell tells a more significant tale. On the side
of the Allies four hundred and fifty officers were killed and wounded,
no fewer than seventy lieutenants in the ten battalions of Churchill’s
British brigade being killed outright. The French on their side lost
no fewer than six hundred and twenty officers killed and wounded, a
noble testimony to their self-sacrifice, but sad evidence of their
difficulty in making their men stand. In truth, with proper management
William must have won a brilliant victory; but he was a general by
book and not by instinct. Würtemberg’s advanced guard could almost
have done the work by itself but for the mistake of a long preliminary
cannonade; his attack could have been supported earlier but for the
pedantry that gave the horse precedence of the foot in the march to
the field; the foot could have pierced the French position in a dozen
different columns but for the pedantry which caused it to be first
deployed. Finally, William’s knowledge of the ground was imperfect, and
Solmes, his general of foot, was incompetent. The plan was admirably
designed and abominably executed. Nevertheless, British troops have
never fought a finer action than Steenkirk. Luxemburg thought himself
lucky to have escaped destruction; his troops were much shaken; and he
crossed the Scheldt and marched away to his winter-quarters as quietly
as possible. So ended the campaign of 1692.

VOL. I. BOOK V. CHAPTER III

◆1692. Nov.◆

In November the English Parliament met, heartened indeed by the naval
victory of La Hogue, but not a little grieved over the failure of
Steenkirk. Again, the financial aspect was extremely discouraging; and
Sir Stephen Fox announced that there was not another day’s subsistence
for the Army in the treasury. The prevailing discontent found vent in
furious denunciations of Count Solmes, and a cry that English soldiers
ought to be commanded by English officers. The debate waxed hot.
The hardest of hard words were used about the Dutch generals, and a
vast deal of nonsense was talked about military matters. There were,
however, a great number of officers in the House of Commons, many of
whom had been present at the action. With much modesty and good sense
they refused to join in the outcry against the Dutch, and contrived so
to compose matters that the House committed itself to no very foolish
resolution. The votes for the Army were passed; and no difficulty was
made over the preparations for the next campaign. Finally, two new
regiments of cavalry were raised—Lord Macclesfield’s Horse, which was
disbanded twenty years later; and Conyngham’s Irish Dragoons, which
still abides with us as the Eighth, King’s Royal Irish, Hussars.

◆1693.◆

Meanwhile the French military system had suffered an irreparable loss
in Louvois’s death, the source of woes unnumbered to France in the
years that were soon to come. Nevertheless, the traditions of his rule
were strong, and the French once more were first in the field, with,
as usual, a vast siege-train massed on the Meuse and on the Scheldt.
But a late spring and incessant rain delayed the opening of the
campaign till the beginning of May, when Luxemburg assembled seventy
thousand men in rear of the Haine by Mons, and Boufflers forty-eight
thousand more on the Scheldt at Tournay. The French king was with the
troops in person; and the original design was, as usual, to carry on
a war of sieges on the Meuse, Boufflers reducing the fortresses while
Luxemburg shielded him with a covering army. Lewis, however, finding
that the towns which he had intended to invest were likely to make an
inconveniently stubborn defence, presently returned home, and after
detaching thirty thousand men to the war in Germany, left Luxemburg to
do as he would. It had been better for William if the Grand Monarch had
remained in Flanders.

The English king, on his side, assembled sixty thousand men at Brussels
as soon as the French began to move, and led them with desperate
haste to the Senne, where he took up an impregnable position at Park.
Luxemburg marched up to a position over against him, and then came
one of those deadlocks which were so common in the old campaigns. The
two armies stood looking at each other for a whole month, neither
venturing to move, neither daring to attack, both ill-supplied,
both discontented, and as a natural consequence both losing scores,
hundreds, and even thousands of men through desertion.

◆June 26./July 6.◆

At last the position became insupportable, and on the 6th of
July Luxemburg moved eastward as if to resume the original plan
of operations on the Meuse. William thereupon resolved to create
a diversion by detaching a force to attack the French lines of
the Scheldt and Lys, a project which was brilliantly executed by
Würtemberg, thanks not a little to three British regiments—the Tenth,
Argyll’s, and Castleton’s—which formed part of his division. But
meanwhile Luxemburg, quite ignorant of the diversion, advanced to
the Meuse and laid siege to Huy, in the hope of forcing William to
come to its relief. He judged rightly. William left his impregnable
camp at Park and hurried to the rescue. But he came too late, and Huy
fell after a trifling resistance. Luxemburg then made great seeming
preparations for the siege of Liège, and William, trembling for the
safety of that city and of Maestricht, detached eight thousand men to
reinforce those garrisons, and then withdrew to the line of the Geete.
Luxemburg watched the whole proceeding with grim delight. Würtemberg’s
success was no doubt annoying, but William had weakened his army by
detaching this force to the Lys, and had been beguiled into weakening
it still further by reinforcing the garrison on the Meuse. This was
exactly what Luxemburg wanted. If he could bring the Allies to action
forthwith, he could reasonably hope for success.

The ground occupied by William was a triangular space enclosed between
the Little Geete and a stream called the Landen Beck, which joins
it at Leuw. The position was not without features of strength. The
camp, which faced almost due south, was pitched on a gentle ridge
rising out of a vast plain.[8] This ridge runs parallel to the Little
Geete and has that river in its rear. The left flank was protected by
marshy ground and by the Landen Beck itself, while the villages of
Neerlanden and Rumsdorp, one on either side of the Beck and the latter
well forward on the plain, offered the further security of advanced
posts. The right rested on a little stream which runs at right angles
to the Geete and joins it at Elixheim, and on the villages of Laer
and Neerwinden which stand on its banks. From Neerlanden on the left
to Neerwinden on the right the position measured close on four miles;
and to guard this extent, besides supplying strong garrisons for the
villages, William had little more than fifty thousand men. Here then
was one signal defect: the front was too long to permit troops to be
readily moved from flank to flank, or to be withdrawn without serious
risk from the centre. But this was not all. The depth of the position
was less than half of its frontage, and thus allowed no space for the
action of cavalry. This William ignored: he was afraid of the French
horse, and was anxious that the action should be fought by infantry
only. Finally, retreat was barred by the Geete, which was unfordable
and insufficiently bridged; and therefore the forcing of the allied
right must inevitably drive the whole army into a pinfold, as Leslie’s
had been driven at the battle of Dunbar.

Luxemburg, who knew every inch of the ground, was now anxious only lest
William should retire before he could catch him. ◆July 18/28.◆ On the
28th of July, by a great effort and a magnificent march, he brought the
whole of his army, eighty thousand strong, before William’s position.
He was now sure of his game, but he need not have been anxious, for
William, charmed with the notion of excluding the French cavalry from
all share in the action, was resolved to stand his ground Many officers
urged him to cross the Geete while yet he might; but he would not
listen. Fifteen hundred men were told off to entrench the open ground
between Neerwinden and Neerlanden. The hedges, mud-walls, and natural
defences of Neerwinden and Laer were improved to the uttermost, and the
ditches surrounding them were enlarged. Till late into the night the
King rode backward and forward, ordering matters under his own eyes,
and after a few hours’ rest began very early in the morning to make his
dispositions.

The key of the position was the village of Neerwinden with the
adjoining hamlet of Laer, and here accordingly he stationed the best
of his troops. The defence of Laer was entrusted to Brigadier Ramsey
with the Scots Brigade, namely, the Twenty-first, Twenty-fifth,
Twenty-sixth, Mackay’s and Lauder’s regiments, reinforced by the Buffs
and the Fourth Foot. Between Laer and Neerwinden stood six battalions
of Brandenburgers, troops already of great and deserved reputation,
of whom we shall see more in the years before us. Neerwinden itself
was committed to the Hanoverians, the Dutch Guards, a battalion of the
First and a battalion of the Scots Guards. Immediately to the north or
left of the village the entrenchment was lined by the two remaining
battalions of the First and Scots Guards, the Coldstream Guards, a
battalion of the Royal Scots, and the Seventh Fusiliers. On the extreme
left of the position Neerlanden was held by the other battalion of
the Royal Scots, the Second Queen’s, and two Danish regiments, while
Rumsdorp was occupied by the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, and
Collingwood’s regiments. In a word, every important post was committed
to the British. The remainder of the infantry, with one hundred guns,
was ranged along the entrenchment, and in rear of them stood the
cavalry, powerless to act outside the trench, and too much cramped for
space to manœuvre within it.

[Illustration:

LANDEN
July 19th/29th 1693

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

Luxemburg also was early astir, and was amazed to find how far the
front of the position had been strengthened during the night. His
centre he formed in eight lines over against the Allies’ entrenchments
between Oberwinden and Landen, every line except the second and fourth
being composed of cavalry. For the attack on Neerlanden and Rumsdorp he
detailed fifteen thousand foot and two thousand five hundred dismounted
dragoons. For the principal assault on Neerwinden he told off eighteen
thousand foot, supported by a reserve of two thousand more and by
eight thousand cavalry; while seventy guns were brought into position
to answer the artillery of the Allies.

◆July 19/29.◆

Shortly after sunrise William’s cannon opened fire against the heavy
masses of the French centre; and at eight o’clock Luxemburg moved the
whole of his left to the attack of Neerwinden. Six battalions, backed
by dragoons and cavalry, were directed against Laer, and three columns,
counting in all seven brigades, were launched against Neerwinden. The
centre column, under the Duke of Berwick, was the first to come into
action. Withholding their fire till they reached the village, the
French carried the outer defences with a rush, and then meeting the
Hanoverians and the First Guards, they began the fight in earnest. It
was hedge-fighting, as at Steenkirk, muzzle to muzzle and hand to hand.
Every step was contested; the combat swayed backwards and forwards
within the village; and the carnage was frightful. The remaining French
columns came up, met with the like resistance, and made little way.
Fresh regiments were poured by the French into the fight, and at last
the First Guards, completely broken by its losses, gave way. But it
was only for a moment. They rallied on the Scots Guards; the Dutch
and Hanoverians rallied behind them, and, though the enemy had been
again reinforced, they resumed the unequal fight, nine battalions
against twenty-six, with unshaken tenacity. At Laer, on the extreme
right, the fight was equally sharp. Ramsey for a time was driven out
of the village, and the French cavalry actually forced its way into
the Allies’ position. There, however, it was charged in flank by
the Elector of Bavaria, and driven out with great slaughter. Ramsey
seized the moment to rally his brigade. The French columns, despite
their success, still remained isolated and detached, and presented no
united front. The King placed himself at the head of the Guards and
Hanoverians, and with one charge British, Dutch, and Germans fell upon
the Frenchmen and swept them out of both villages.

The first attack on Neerwinden had failed, and a similar attack on the
allied left had been little more successful. At Neerlanden the First
and Second Foot had successfully held their own against four French
battalions until reinforcements enabled them to drive them back.
At Rumsdorp the British, being but three thousand against thirteen
thousand, were pushed out of the village, but being reinforced,
recovered a part of it and stood successfully at bay. Luxemburg,
however, was not easily discouraged. The broken troops in the left were
rallied, fresh regiments were brought forward, and a second effort was
made to carry Neerwinden. Again French impetuosity bore all before it,
and again the British and Germans, weakened and weary though they were,
rallied when all seemed lost, and hurled the enemy back, not merely
repulsed, but in confused and disorderly retreat.

On the failure of the second attack the majority of the French officers
urged Luxemburg to retire; but the marshal was not to be turned from
his purpose. The fourteen thousand men of the Allies in Laer and
Neerwinden had lost more than a third of their numbers, while he
himself had still a considerable force of infantry interlined with the
cavalry in the centre. Twelve thousand of them, including the French
and Swiss Guards, were now drawn off to the left for a third attack.
When they were clear of the cavalry, the whole six lines of horse,
which had stood heroically for hours motionless under a heavy fire,
moved forward at a trot to the edge of the entrenchments;[9] but the
demonstration, for such it seems to have been, cost them dear, for they
were very roughly handled and compelled to retire. But now the French
reinforcements, supported by the defeated battalions, drew near, and a
third attack was delivered on Neerwinden. British and Dutch still made
a gallant fight, but the odds against their weakened battalions were
too great, and ammunition began to fail. They fought on indomitably
till the last cartridge was expended before they gave way, but they
were forced back, and Neerwinden was lost. Five French brigades then
assailed the central entrenchment at its junction with Neerwinden,
where stood the Coldstream Guards and the Seventh Fusiliers. Wholly
unmoved by the overwhelming numbers in their front and the fire from
Neerwinden on their flank, the two regiments stood firm and drove their
assailants back over the breastwork. Even when the French Household
Cavalry came spurring through Neerwinden and fell upon their flank,
they fought on undismayed, and the Coldstreamers not only repelled the
charge but captured a colour.

Such fighting, however, could not continue for long. William, on
observing Luxemburg’s preparations for the final assault, had ordered
nine battalions from his left to reinforce his right. These never
reached their destination. The Marquis of Feuquières, an officer
even more celebrated for his acuteness as a military critic than for
his skill in the field, watched them as they moved, and suddenly led
his cavalry forward to the weakest point of the entrenchment. The
battalions hesitated, halted, and then turned about to meet this new
danger, but too late to save the forcing of the entrenchment. The
battle was now virtually over. Neerwinden was carried, Ramsey after
a superb defence had been driven out of Laer, the Brandenburgers had
perforce retreated with him, the infantry that lined the centre of the
entrenchment had forsaken it, and the French cavalry was pouring in and
cutting down the fugitives by scores. William, who had galloped away
in desperation to the left, now returned at headlong speed with six
regiments of English cavalry,[10] which delivered charge after charge
with splendid gallantry, to cover the retreat of the foot. On the left
Tolmach and Bellasys by great exertion brought off their infantry in
good order, but on the right the confusion was terrible. The rout
was complete, the few bridges were choked by a heaving mass of guns,
waggons, pack-animals, and men, and thousands of fugitives were cut
down, drowned, or trampled to death. William did all that a gallant
man could do to save the day, but in vain. His troops had done heroic
things to redeem his bad generalship; and against any living man but
Marlborough or Luxemburg they would probably have held their own. It
was the general, not the soldiers that failed.

The losses on both sides were very severe. That of the French was about
eight thousand men; that of the Allies about twelve thousand, killed,
wounded, and prisoners, and among the dead was Count Solmes, the hated
Solmes of Steenkirk. The nineteen British battalions present lost
one hundred and thirty-five officers killed, wounded, and taken. The
French captured eighty guns and a vast quantity of colours, but the
Allies, although beaten, could also show fifty-six French flags. And,
indeed, though Luxemburg won, and deserved to win a great victory, yet
the action was not such as to make the allied troops afraid to meet the
French. They had stood up, fifty thousand against eighty thousand, and
if they were beaten they had at any rate dismayed ever Frenchman on the
field but Luxemburg. In another ten years their turn was to come, and
they were to take a part of their revenge on the very ground over which
many of them had fled.

The campaign closed with the surrender of Charleroi, and the gain by
the French of the whole line of the Sambre. William came home to meet
the House of Commons and recommend an augmentation of the Army by
eight regiments of horse, four of dragoons, and twenty-five of foot.
The House reduced this list by the whole of the regiments of horse and
fifteen of foot, but even so it brought the total establishment up to
eighty-three thousand men. There is, however, but one new regiment of
which note need be taken in the campaign of 1694, namely, the Seventh
Dragoons, now known as the Seventh Hussars, which, raised in 1689–90
in Scotland, now for the first time took its place on the English
establishment and its turn of service in the war of Flanders.

◆1694.◆

I shall not dwell on the campaign of 1694, which is memorable only for
a marvellous march by which Luxemburg upset William’s entire plan of
campaign. Nor shall I speak at length of the abortive descent on Brest,
which is remembered mainly for the indelible stain which it has left on
the memory of Marlborough. It is only necessary to say that the French,
by Marlborough’s information, though not on Marlborough’s information
only, had full warning of an expedition which had been planned as a
surprise, and that Tolmach,[11] who was in command, unfortunately,
though most pardonably, lacked the moral courage to abandon an attack
which, unless executed as a surprise, had no chance of success. He was
repulsed with heavy loss, and died of wounds received in the action—a
hard fate for a good soldier and a gallant man. But it is unjust to
lay his death at Marlborough’s door. For the failure of the expedition
Marlborough was undoubtedly responsible, and that is quite bad enough;
but Tolmach alone was to blame for attempting an enterprise which he
knew to be hopeless. Marlborough cannot have calculated that he would
deliberately essay to do impossibilities and perish in the effort, so
cannot be held guilty of poor Tolmach’s blunders.

◆1695.◆

Before the new campaign could be opened there had come changes of vital
importance to France. The vast expense of the war had told heavily on
the country, and the King’s ministers were at their wit’s end to raise
money. Moreover, the War Department had deteriorated rapidly since the
death of Louvois; and ◆January.◆ to this misfortune was now added the
death of Luxemburg, a loss which was absolutely irreparable. Lastly,
with the object of maintaining the position which they had won on the
Sambre, the French had extended their system of fortified lines from
Namur to the sea. Works so important could not be left unguarded, so
that a considerable force was locked up behind these entrenchments,
and was for all offensive purposes useless. We shall see before long
how a really great commander could laugh at these lines, and how, in
consequence, it became an open question whether they were not rather
an encumbrance than an advantage. The subject is one which is still of
interest; and it is remarkable that the French still seem to cling to
their old principles, if they may be judged by the works which they
have constructed for defence against a German invasion.

His enemy being practically restricted to the defensive, William did
not neglect the opportunity of initiating aggressive operations.
Masking his design by a series of feints, he marched swiftly to the
Meuse and invested Namur. This fortress, more famous through its
connection with the immortal Uncle Toby even than as the masterpiece
of Cohorn, carried to yet higher perfection by Vauban, stands at the
junction of the Sambre and the Meuse, the citadel lying in the angle
between the two rivers, and the town with its defences on the left bank
of the Meuse. To the northward of the town outworks had been thrown up
on the heights of Bouge by both of these famous engineers; and it was
against these outworks that William directed his first attack.

◆June 23./July 3.◆

◆June 26./July 6.◆

Ground was broken on the 3rd of July, and three days later an assault
was delivered on the lines of Bouge. As usual, the hardest of the work
was given to the British, and the post of greatest danger was made
over, as their high reputation demanded, to the Brigade of Guards. On
this occasion the Guards surpassed themselves alike by the coolness
of their valour and by the ardour of their attack. They marched under
a heavy fire up to the French palisades, thrust their muskets between
them, poured in one terrible volley, the first shot that they had yet
fired, and charged forthwith. In spite of a stout resistance they
swept the French out of the first work, pursued them to the second,
swept them out of that, and gathering impetus with success, drove them
from stronghold to stronghold, far beyond the original design of the
engineers, and actually to the gates of the town. In another quarter
the Royal Scots and the Seventh Fusiliers gained not less brilliant
success; and in fact it was the most creditable action that William had
fought during the whole war. It cost the Allies two thousand men killed
and wounded, the three battalions of Guards alone losing thirty-two
officers. The British were to fight many such bloody combats during the
next twenty years—combats forgotten since they were merely incidents
in the history of a siege, and so frequent that they were hardly
chronicled, and are not to be restored to memory now. I mention this,
the first of such actions, only as a type of many more to come.

The outworks captured, the trenches were opened against the town
itself, and the next assault was directed against the counterguard of
St. Nicholas gate. This again was carried by the British, with a loss
of eight hundred men. Then came the famous attack on the counterscarp
before the gate itself, where Captain Tobias Shandy received his
memorable wound. This gave William the possession of the town. Then
came the siege of the citadel, wherein the British had the honour of
marching to the assault over half a mile of open ground, a trial which
proved too much even for them. Nevertheless, it was they who eventually
stormed a breach from which another of the assaulting columns had been
repulsed, and ensured the surrender of the citadel a few days later.
For their service on this occasion the Eighteenth Foot were made the
Royal Irish; and a Latin inscription on their colours still records
that this was the reward of their valour at Namur.

Thus William on his return to England could for the first time show
his Parliament a solid success due to the British red-coats; and the
House of Commons gladly voted once more a total force of eighty-seven
thousand men. But the war need be followed no further. The campaign
of 1696 was interrupted by a futile attempt of the French to invade
England, and in 1697 France, reduced to utter exhaustion, gladly
concluded the Peace of Ryswick. So ended, not without honour, the
first stage of the great conflict with King Lewis the Fourteenth. The
position of the two protagonists, England and France, was not wholly
unlike that which they occupied a century later at the Peace of Amiens.
The British, though they had not reaped great victories, had made
their presence felt, and terribly felt, on the battlefield; and, as
the French in the Peninsula remembered that the British had fought
them with a tenacity which they had not found in other nations, not
only in Egypt, but even earlier at Tournay and Linselles, so, too,
after Blenheim and Ramillies they looked back to the furious attack
at Steenkirk and the indomitable defence of Neerwinden. “Without the
concurrence of the valour and power of England,” said William to the
Parliament at the close of 1695, “it were impossible to put a stop to
the ambition and greatness of France.” So it was then, and so it was a
century later, for though none know better the superlative qualities
of the French as a fighting people, yet the English are the one nation
that has never been afraid to meet them. With the Peace of Ryswick the
’prentice years of the standing Army are ended, and within five years
the old spirit, which has carried it through the bitter schooling
under King William, will break forth with overwhelming power under the
guiding genius of Marlborough.

AUTHORITIES.—The leading authority for William’s campaigns on the
English side is D’Auvergne, and on the French side the compilation,
with its superb series of maps, by Beaurain. Supplementary on one
side are Tindal’s History, Carleton’s Memoirs, and Sterne’s _Tristram
Shandy_; and on the other the _Mémoires_ of Berwick and St. Simon,
Quincy’s _Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV_, and in particular the
_Mémoires_ of Feuquières. Many details as to Steenkirk, in particular,
respecting the casualties, are drawn from _Present State of Europe,
or Monthly Mercury_, August 1692, and as to Landen from the official
relation of the battle, published by authority, 1693. Beautiful
plans of both actions are in Beaurain, rougher plans in Quincy and
Feuquières. All details as to the establishment voted are from the
Journals of the House of Commons. Very elaborate details of the
operations are given in Colonel Clifford Walton’s _History of the
British Standing Army_.

VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER I

A European quarrel over the succession to the Spanish throne,[12]
on the death of the imbecile King Charles the Second, had long been
foreseen by William, and had been provided against, as he hoped, by a
Partition Treaty in the year 1698. The arrangement then made had been
upset by the death of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, and had been
superseded by a second Partition Treaty in March 1700. In November of
the same year King Charles the Second died, leaving a will wherein
Philip, Duke of Anjou, and second son of the Dauphin, was named heir
to the whole Empire of Spain. Hereupon the second Partition Treaty
went for naught. Lewis the Fourteenth, after a becoming interval of
hesitation, accepted the Spanish crown for the Duke of Anjou under the
title of King Philip the Fifth.

◆1701.◆

The Emperor at once entered a protest against the will, and Lewis
prepared without delay for a campaign in Italy. William, however, for
the present merely postponed his recognition of Philip the Fifth; and
his example was followed by the United Provinces. Lewis, ever ready
and prompt, at once took measures to quicken the States to a decision.
Several towns[13] in Spanish Flanders were garrisoned, under previous
treaties, by Dutch troops. Lewis by a swift movement surrounded the
whole of them, and, having thus secured fifteen thousand of the best
men in the Dutch army, could dictate what terms he pleased. William
expected that the House of Commons would be roused to indignation by
this aggressive step, but the House was far too busy with its own
factious quarrels. When, however, the States appealed to England for
the six thousand four hundred men, which under the treaty of 1668[14]
she was bound to furnish, both Houses prepared faithfully to fulfil the
obligation.

Then, as invariably happens in England, the work which Parliament
had undone required to be done again. Twelve battalions were ordered
to the Low Countries from Ireland, and directions were issued for
the levying of ten thousand recruits in England to take their place.
But, immediately after, came bad news from the West Indies, and
it was thought necessary to despatch thither four more battalions
from Ireland. Three regiments[15] were hastily brought up to a
joint strength of two thousand men, and shipped off. Thus, within
fifteen months of the disbandment of 1699, the garrison of Ireland
had been depleted by fifteen battalions out of twenty-one; and four
new battalions required to be raised immediately. Of these, two,
namely Brudenell’s and Mountjoy’s, were afterwards disbanded, but two
more, Lord Charlemont’s and Lord Donegal’s, are still with us as the
Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth of the Line.

In June the twelve battalions[16] were shipped off to Holland, under
the command of John, Earl of Marlborough. Since 1698 he had been
restored to the King’s favour and was to fill his place as head of
the European coalition and General of the confederate armies in a
fashion that no man had yet dreamed of. He was full fifty years of age;
so long had the ablest man in Europe waited for work that was worthy
of his powers; and now his time was come at last. His first duties,
however, were diplomatic; and during the summer and autumn of 1701 he
was engaged in negotiations with Sweden, Prussia, and the Empire for
the formation of a Grand Alliance against France and Spain. Needless to
say he brought all to a successful issue by his inexhaustible charm,
patience, and tact.

◆Sept.◆

Still the attitude of the English people towards the contest remained
doubtful, until, on the death of King James the Second, Lewis made
the fatal mistake of recognising and proclaiming his son as King
of England. Then the smouldering animosity against France leaped
instantly into flame. William seized the opportunity to dissolve
Parliament, and was rewarded by the election of a House of Commons
more nearly resembling that which had carried him through the first
war to the Peace of Ryswick. He did not fail to rouse its patriotism
and self-respect by a stirring speech from the throne, and obtained
the ratification of his agreement with the Allies, that England should
furnish a contingent of forty thousand men, eighteen thousand of
them to be British and the remainder foreigners. So the country was
committed to the War of the Spanish Succession.

It was soon decided that all regiments in pay must be increased at
once to war-strength, and that six more battalions, together with five
regiments of horse and three of dragoons, should be sent to join the
troops already in Holland. Then, as usual, there was a rush to do in
a hurry what should have been done at leisure; and it is significant
of the results of the late ill-treatment of the Army that, though the
country was full of unemployed soldiers, it was necessary to offer
three pounds, or thrice the usual amount of levy-money, to obtain
recruits. The next step was to raise fifteen new regiments—Meredith’s,
Coote’s, Huntingdon’s, Farrington’s, Gibson’s, Lucas’s, Mohun’s,
Temple’s, and Stringer’s of foot; Fox’s, Saunderson’s, Villiers’,
Shannon’s, Mordaunt’s and Holt’s of marines. Of the foot, Gibson’s and
Farrington’s had been raised in 1694, but the officers of Farrington’s,
if not of both regiments, had been retained on half-pay, and, returning
in a body, continued the life of the regiment without interruption.
Both are still with us as the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth of the
Line. Huntingdon’s and Lucas’s also survive as the Thirty-third and
Thirty-fourth, and Meredith’s and Coote’s, which were raised in
Ireland, as the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-ninth, while the remainder
were disbanded at the close of the war. Of the marines, Saunderson’s
had originally been raised in 1694, and eventually passed into the
Line as the Thirtieth Foot, followed by Fox’s and Villiers’ as the
Thirty-first and Thirty-second. Nothing now remained but to pass the
Mutiny Act, which was speedily done; and on the 5th of May, just two
months after the death of King William, the great work of his life was
continued by a formal declaration of war.

The field of operations, which will chiefly concern us, is mainly the
same as that wherein we followed the campaigns of King William. The
eastern boundary of the cock-pit must for a time be extended from
the Meuse to the Rhine, the northern from the Demer to the Waal,
and the southern limit must be carried from Dunkirk beyond Namur
to Bonn. But the reader should bear in mind that, in consequence of
the Spanish alliance, Spanish Flanders was no longer hostile, but
friendly, to France, so that the French frontier, for all practical
purposes, extended to the boundary of Dutch Brabant. Moreover, the
French, besides the seizure, already related, of the barrier-towns, had
contrived to occupy every stronghold on the Meuse except Maestricht,
from Namur to Venloo, so that practically they were masters so far of
the whole line of the river.

A few leagues below Venloo stands the fortified town of Grave, and
beyond Grave, on the parallel branch of the Waal, stands the fortified
city of Nimeguen. A little to the east of Nimeguen, at a point where
the Rhine formerly forked into two streams, stood Fort Schenck, a
stronghold famous in the wars of Morgan and of Vere. These three
fortresses were the three eastern gates of the Dutch Netherlands,
commanding the two great waterways, doubly important in those days of
bad roads, which lead into the heart of the United Provinces.

◆1702.◆

It is here that we must watch the opening of the campaign of 1702.
There were detachments of the French and of the Allies opposed to each
other on the Upper Rhine, on the Lower Rhine, and on the Lower Scheldt;
but the French grand army of sixty thousand men was designed to operate
on the Meuse, and the presence of a Prince of the blood, the Duke of
Burgundy, with old Marshal Boufflers to instruct him, sufficiently
showed that this was the quarter in which France designed to strike
her grand blow. Marlborough being still kept from the field by other
business, the command of the Allied army on the Meuse was entrusted
to Lord Athlone, better known as that Ginkell who had completed the
pacification of Ireland in 1691. His force consisted of twenty-five
thousand men, with which he lay near Cleve, in the centre of the
crescent formed by Grave, Nimeguen, and Fort Schenck, watching under
shelter of these three fortresses the army of Boufflers, which was
encamped some twenty miles to south-east of him at Uden and Xanten.
◆May 30./June 10.◆ On the 10th of June Boufflers made a sudden dash to
cut off Athlone from Nimeguen and Grave, a catastrophe which Athlone
barely averted by an almost discreditably precipitate retreat. Having
reached Nimeguen Athlone withdrew to the north of the Waal, while
all Holland trembled over the danger which had thus been so narrowly
escaped.

Such was the position when Marlborough at last took the field, after
long grappling at the Hague with the difficulties which were fated to
dog him throughout the war. In England his position was comparatively
easy, for though Prince George of Denmark, the consort of Queen
Anne, was nominally generalissimo of all forces by sea and land,
yet Marlborough was Captain-General of all the English forces at
home and in Holland, and in addition Master-General of the Ordnance.
But it was only after considerable dispute that he was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, and then not without provoking
much dissatisfaction among the Dutch generals, and much jealousy in
the Prince of Nassau-Saarbrück and in Athlone, both of whom aspired to
the office. These obstacles overcome, there came the question of the
plan of campaign. Here again endless obstruction was raised. The Dutch,
after their recent fright, were nervously apprehensive for the safety
of Nimeguen, the King of Prussia was much disturbed over his territory
of Cleve, and all parties who had not interests of their own to put
forward made it their business to thwart the Commander-in-Chief.
◆June 21./July 2.◆ With infinite patience Marlborough soothed them,
and at last, on the 2nd of July, he left the Hague for Nimeguen,
accompanied by two Dutch deputies, civilians, whose duty it was to see
that he did nothing imprudent. Arrived there he concentrated sixty
thousand men, of which twelve thousand were British,[17] recrossed
the Waal and encamped at Ober-Hasselt over against Grave, within two
leagues of the French. ◆July 15/26.◆ Then once more the obstruction of
his colleagues caused delay, and it was not until the 26th of July that
he could cross to the left bank of the Meuse. “Now,” he said to the
Dutch deputies, as he pointed to the French camp, “I shall soon rid you
of these troublesome neighbours.”

Five swift marches due south brought his army over the Spanish frontier
by Hamont. Boufflers thereupon in alarm broke up his camp, summoned
Marshal Tallard from the Rhine to his assistance, crossed the Meuse
with all haste at Venloo, and pushed on at nervous speed for the Demer.
◆July 22./Aug. 2.◆ On the 2nd of August he lay between Peer and Bray,
his camping-ground ill-chosen, and his army worn out by a week of
desperate marching. Within easy striking distance, a mile or two to the
northward, lay Marlborough, his army fresh, ready, and confident. He
held the game in his hand; for an immediate attack would have dealt the
French as rude a buffet as they were to receive later at Ramillies. But
the Dutch deputies interposed; these Dogberries were content to thank
God that they were rid of a rogue. So Boufflers was allowed to cross
the Demer safely at Diest, and a first great opportunity was lost.

Marlborough, having drawn the French away from the Meuse, was now at
liberty to add the garrison of Maestricht to his field-force, and to
besiege the fortresses on the river. Boufflers, however, emboldened
by his escape, again advanced north in the hope of cutting off a
convoy of stores that was on its way to join the Allies. Marlborough
therefore perforce moved back to Hamont and picked up his convoy.
Then, before Boufflers could divine his purpose, he had moved swiftly
south, and thrown himself across the line of the French retreat to
the Demer. ◆Aug. 11/22.◆ The French marshal hurried southward with
all possible haste, and came blundering through the defiles before
Hochtel on the road to Hasselt, only to find Marlborough waiting ready
for him at Helchteren. Once again the game was in the Englishman’s
hand. The French were in great disorder, their left in particular
being hopelessly entangled in marshy and difficult ground. Marlborough
instantly gave the order to advance, and by three o’clock the artillery
of the two armies was exchanging fire. At five Marlborough directed the
whole of his right to fall on the French left; but to his surprise and
dismay, the right did not move. A surly Dutchman, General Opdam, was
in command of the troops in question and, for no greater object than
to annoy the Commander-in-Chief, refused to execute his orders. So a
second great opportunity was lost.

◆Aug. 12/23.◆

Still much might yet be won by a general attack on the next day; and
for this accordingly Marlborough at once made his preparations. But,
when the time came, the Dutch deputies interposed, entreating him
to defer the attack till the morrow morning. “By to-morrow morning
they will be gone,” answered Marlborough; but all remonstrance was
unavailing. The attack was perforce deferred; the French slipped
away in the night; and, though it was still possible to cut up their
rearguard with cavalry, a third great opportunity was lost.

Marlborough was deeply chagrined; but although with unconquerable
patience and tact he excused Opdam’s conduct in his public despatches,
he could not deceive the troops, who were loud in their indignation
against both deputies and generals. There was now nothing left but
to reduce the fortresses on the Meuse, a part of the army being
detached for the siege while the remainder covered the operations
under the command of Marlborough. Even over their favourite pastime
of a siege, however, the Dutch were dilatory beyond measure. “England
is famous for negligence,” wrote Marlborough, “but if Englishmen were
half as negligent as the people here, they would be torn to pieces
by Parliament.”[18] ◆Aug. 18/29.◆ Venloo was at length invested on
the 29th of August,[19] and after a siege of eighteen days compelled
to capitulate. The English distinguished themselves after their own
peculiar fashion. In the assault on the principal defence General
Cutts, who from his love of a hot fire was known as the Salamander,
gave orders that the attacking force, if it carried the covered way,
should not stop there but rush forward and carry as much more as it
could. It was a mad design, criminally so in the opinion of officers
who took part in it,[20] but it was madly executed, with the result
that the whole fort was captured out of hand.

◆Sept. 26./Oct. 7.◆

The reduction of Stevenswaert, Maseyck, and Ruremond quickly followed;
and the French now became alarmed lest Marlborough should transfer
operations to the Rhine. Tallard was therefore sent back with a large
force to Cologne and Bonn, while Boufflers, much weakened by this and
by other detachments, lay helpless at Tongres. But the season was now
far advanced, and Marlborough had no intention of leaving Boufflers for
the winter in a position from which he might at any moment move out and
bombard Maestricht. No sooner, therefore, were his troops released by
the capture of Ruremond than he prepared to oust Boufflers. The French,
according to their usual practice, had barred the eastern entrance to
Brabant by fortified lines, which followed the line of the Geete to its
head-waters, and were thence carried across to that of the Mehaigne.
In his position at Tongres Boufflers lay midway between these lines
and Liège, in the hope of covering both; but after the fall of so many
fortresses on the Meuse he became specially anxious for Liège, and
resolved to post himself under its walls. ◆Oct. 1/12.◆ He accordingly
examined the defences, selected his camping-ground, and on the 12th of
October marched up with his army to occupy it. Quite unconscious of any
danger he arrived within cannon-shot of his chosen position; and there
stood Marlborough, calmly awaiting him with a superior force. For the
fourth time Marlborough held his enemy within his grasp, but the Dutch
deputies, as usual, interposed to forbid an attack; and Boufflers,
a fourth time delivered, hurried away in the night to his lines at
Landen. Had he thrown himself into Liège Marlborough would have made
him equally uncomfortable by marching on the lines; as things were, the
French marshal perforce left the city to its fate.

The town of Liège, which was unfortified, at once opened its gates to
the Allies; and within a week Marlborough’s batteries were playing
on the citadel. ◆Oct. 12/23.◆ On the 23rd of October the citadel was
stormed, the English being first in the breach, and a few days later
Liège, with the whole line of the Meuse, had passed into the hands of
the Allies. Thus brilliantly, in spite of four great opportunities
marred by the Dutch, ended Marlborough’s first campaign. Athlone, like
an honest man, confessed that as second in command he had opposed every
one of Marlborough’s projects, and that the success was due entirely to
his incomparable chief. He at any rate had an inkling that in Turenne’s
handsome Englishman there had arisen one of the great captains of all
time.

Nevertheless the French had not been without their consolations in
other quarters. Towards the end of the campaign the Elector of Bavaria
had declared himself for France against the Empire, and, surprising the
all-important position of Ulm on the Danube, had opened communication
with the French force on the Upper Rhine. Villars, who commanded in
that quarter, had seconded him by defeating his opponent, Prince
Lewis of Baden, at Friedlingen, and had cleared the passages of the
Black Forest; while Tallard had, almost without an effort, possessed
himself of Trèves and Trarbach on the Moselle. The rival competitors
for the crown of Spain were France and the Empire, and the centre of
the struggle, as no one saw more clearly than Marlborough, was for the
present moving steadily towards the territory of the Empire.

While Marlborough was engaged in his operations on the Meuse, ten
thousand English and Dutch, under the Duke of Ormonde and Admiral
Sir George Rooke, had been despatched to make a descent upon Cadiz.
The expedition was so complete a failure that there is no object in
dwelling on it. Rooke would not support Ormonde, and Ormonde was not
strong enough to master Rooke; landsmen quarrelled with seamen, and
English with Dutch. No discipline was maintained, and after some weeks
of feeble operations and shameful scenes of indiscipline and pillage,
the commanders found that they could do no more than return to England.
They were fortunate enough, however, on their way, to fall in with
the plate-fleet at Vigo, of which they captured twenty-five galleons
containing treasure worth a million sterling. Comforted by this good
fortune Rooke and Ormonde sailed homeward, and dropped anchor safely in
Portsmouth harbour.

Meanwhile a mishap, which Marlborough called an accident, had gone near
to neutralise all the success of the past campaign. At the close of
operations the Earl, together with the Dutch deputies, had taken ship
down the Meuse, with a guard of twenty-five men on board and an escort
of fifty horse on the bank. In the night the horse lost their way,
and the boat was surprised and overpowered by a French partisan with
a following of marauders. The Dutch deputies produced French passes,
but Marlborough had none and was therefore a prisoner. Fortunately
his servant slipped into his hand an old pass that had been made out
for his brother Charles Churchill. With perfect serenity Marlborough
presented it as genuine, and was allowed to go on his way, the French
contenting themselves with the capture of the guard and the plunder of
the vessel, and never dreaming of the prize that they had let slip. The
news of his escape reached the Hague, where on his arrival rich and
poor came out to welcome him, men and women weeping for joy over his
safety. So deep was the fascination exerted on all of his kind by this
extraordinary man.

A few days later he returned to England, where a new Parliament had
already congratulated Queen Anne on the retrieving of England’s honour
by the success of his arms. The word retrieving was warmly resented,
but though doubtless suggested by unworthy and factious animosity
against the memory of William, it was strictly true. The nation felt
that it was not in the fitness of things that Englishmen should be
beaten by Frenchmen, and they rejoiced to see the wrong set right.
Nevertheless party spirit found a still meaner level when Parliament
extended to Rooke and Ormonde the same vote of thanks that they
tendered to Marlborough. This precious pair owed even this honour
to the wisdom and good sense of their far greater comrade, for they
would have carried their quarrel over the expedition within the walls
of Parliament, had not Marlborough told them gently that the whole
of their operations were indefensible and that the less they called
attention to themselves the better. The Queen, with more discernment,
created Marlborough a Duke and settled on him a pension of £5000 a year.

VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER IV

◆1704.◆

Meanwhile Parliament had met on the 29th of the previous October, full
of congratulations to the Queen on the triumphs of the past campaign.
There were not wanting, of course, men who, in the madness of faction,
doubted whether Blenheim were really a victory, for the very remarkable
reason that Marlborough had won it, but they were soon silenced by
the retort that the King of France at any rate had no doubts on the
point.[21] The plans for the next campaign were designed on a large
scale, and were likely to strain the resources of the Army to the
uttermost. The West Indies demanded six battalions and Gibraltar three
battalions for garrison; Portugal claimed ten thousand men, Flanders
from twenty to twenty-five thousand; while besides this a design was on
foot, as shall presently be seen, for the further relief of Portugal by
a diversion in Catalonia. ◆1705.◆ Five millions were cheerfully voted
for the support of the war, and six new battalions were raised, namely,
Wynne’s, Bretton’s, Lepell’s, Saomes’s, Sir Charles Hotham’s, and
Lillingston’s, the last of which alone has survived to our day with the
rank of the Thirty-eighth of the Line.[22]

Marlborough’s plan of campaign had been sufficiently foreshadowed at
the close of the previous year, namely, to advance on the line of
the Moselle and carry the war into Lorraine. The Emperor and all the
German Princes promised to be in the field early, the Dutch were with
infinite difficulty persuaded to give their consent, and after much
vexatious delay Marlborough joined his army at Trèves on the 26th of
May. ◆May 15/26.◆ Here he waited until the 17th of June for the arrival
of the German and Imperial troops. ◆June 6/17.◆ Not a man nor a horse
appeared. In deep chagrin he broke up his camp and returned to the
Meuse, having lost, as he said, one of the fairest opportunities in the
world, through the faithlessness of his allies.[23]

His presence was sorely needed on the Meuse. Villeroy, who commanded
the French in Flanders, finding no occasion for his presence on the
Moselle, had moved out of his lines, captured Huy, and then marching
on to Liège had invested the citadel. ◆May 21.◆ The States-General
in a panic of fright urged Marlborough to return without delay, and
Overkirk, who commanded the Dutch on the Meuse, added his entreaties
to theirs. Marlborough, when once he had made up his mind to move,
never moved slowly, and by the 25th of June he was at Düren, to the
eastward of Aix-la-Chapelle. ◆June 14/25.◆ Here he was still the best
part of forty miles from the Meuse, but that distance was too near for
Villeroy, who at once abandoned Liège and fell back on Tongres.
◆June 21./July 2.◆ Marlborough, continuing his advance, crossed the
Meuse at Visé on the 2nd of July, and on the same day united his army
with Overkirk’s at Haneff on the Upper Jaar. Villeroy thereupon retired
ignominiously within his fortified lines.

These lines, which had been making during the past three years,
were now complete. They started from the Meuse a little to the east
of Namur, passed from thence to the Mehaigne and the Little Geete,
followed the Little Geete along its left bank to Leuw, the Great Geete
from Leuw to the Demer, and the Demer itself as far as Arschot, from
which point a new line of entrenchments carried the barrier through
Lierre to Antwerp. Near Antwerp Marlborough had already had to do with
these lines in 1703, but hitherto he had made no attempt to force them.
Villeroy and the Elector of Bavaria now lay before him with seventy
thousand men, a force superior to his own, but necessarily spread over
a wide front for the protection of the entrenchments. The marshal’s
headquarters were at Meerdorp, in the space between the Geete and the
Mehaigne, which he probably regarded as a weak point. Marlborough
posted himself over against him at Lens-les-Beguines, detaching a small
force to recapture Huy, while Overkirk with the Dutch army covered the
siege from Vignamont. Thus, as if daring the French to take advantage
of the dispersion of his troops, he quietly laid his plans for forcing
the lines.

The point that he selected was on the Little Geete between Elixheim and
Neerhespen, exactly in rear of the battlefield of Landen. The abrupt
and slippery banks of the river, which the English knew but too well,
together with the entrenchments beyond it, presented extraordinary
difficulties; but the lines were on that account the less likely to be
well guarded at that particular point. Marlborough had already obtained
the leave of the States-General for the project, but he had now the far
more difficult task of gaining the consent of the Dutch generals at a
Council of War. Slangenberg and others opposed the scheme vehemently,
but were overruled; and the Duke was at length at liberty to fall to
work.

◆June 30./July 11.◆

Huy fell on the 11th of July, but to the general surprise the besieging
force was not recalled. Six days later Overkirk and the covering army
crossed the Mehaigne from Vignamont, and pushed forward detachments to
the very edge of the lines between Meffle and Namur. ◆July.◆ Villeroy
fell into the trap, withdrew troops from all parts of the lines and
concentrated forty thousand men at Meerdorp. Marlborough then recalled
the troops from Huy, and made them up to a total of about eight
thousand men, both cavalry and infantry,[24] the whole being under the
command of the Count of Noyelles. The utmost secrecy was observed in
every particular. The corps composing the detachment knew nothing of
each other, and nothing of the work before them; and, lest the sight
of fascines should suggest an attack on entrenchments, these were
dispensed with, the troopers only at the last moment receiving orders
to carry each a truss of forage on the saddle before them.

◆July 6/17.◆

At tattoo the detachment fell in silently before the camp of the right
wing, and at nine o’clock moved off without a sound in two columns,
the one upon Neerhespen, the other upon the Castle of Wanghe before
Elixheim. An hour later the rest of the army followed, while at the
same time Overkirk, under cover of the darkness, crossed the Mehaigne
at Tourines and joined his van to the rear of Marlborough’s army. The
distance to be traversed was from ten to fifteen miles; the night
though dry was dark; and the guides, frequently at fault, were fain to
direct themselves by the trusses dropped on the way by the advanced
detachment. ◆July 6–7/17–18.◆ Twelve years before to the very day, a
French army had toiled along the same route, wearied out and stifled by
the sun, and only kept to its task by an ugly little hunch-backed man
whom it had reverenced as Marshal Luxemburg. Now English and Dutch were
blundering on to take revenge for Luxemburg’s victory at the close of
that march. The hours fled on, the light began to break, and the army
found itself on the field of Landen, William’s entrenchment grass-grown
before it, Neerwinden and Laer lying silent to the left, and before the
villages the mound that hid the corpses of the dead. Then some at least
of the soldiers knew the work that lay before them.

[Illustration:

LINES OF THE
GEETE.
July 7/18 1705

Scale of 1/2 mile

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

◆July 7/18.◆

At four o’clock the heads of the columns halted within a mile of the
Geete, wrapped in a thick mist and hidden from the eye of the enemy.
The advanced detachment quickly cleared the villages by the river,
seized the bridge before the Castle of Wanghe, which had not been
broken down, and drove out the garrison of the Castle itself. Then the
pontoniers came forward to lay their bridges; but the infantry would
not wait for them. They scrambled impatiently through hedges and over
bogs, down one steep bank of the river and up the other, into the ditch
beyond, and finally, breathless and dripping, over the rampart into the
lines. So numerous were the hot-heads who thus went forward that they
forced three regiments of French dragoons to retire before them without
attempting resistance. Then the cavalry of the detachment began to
file rapidly over the pontoon-bridges; but meanwhile the alarm had been
given, and, before the main army could cross, the French came down in
force from the north, some twenty battalions and forty squadrons, in
all close upon fifteen thousand men, with a battery of eight guns.

The enemy advanced rapidly, their cavalry leading, until checked by a
hollow way which lay between them and the Allies, when they halted to
deploy. Marlborough took in the whole situation at a glance. Forming
his thirty-eight squadrons into two lines, with the first line composed
entirely of British, he led them across the hollow way and charged the
French sword in hand. They answered by a feeble fire from the saddle
and broke in confusion, but, presently rallying, fell in counter-attack
upon the British and broke them in their turn. Marlborough, who was
riding on the flank, was cut off and left isolated with his trumpeter
and groom. A Frenchman galloped up and aimed at him so furious a blow
that, striking the air, he fell from his horse and was captured by the
trumpeter. Then the allied squadrons rallied, and charging the French
once more broke them past all reforming, and captured the guns. The
French infantry now retired very steadily in square, and the Duke sent
urgent messages for his own foot. But by some mistake the battalions
had been halted after crossing the Geete, so that the French were able
to make good their retreat.

By this time Villeroy, who had spent the night in anxious expectation
of an attack at Meerdorp, had hurried up with his cavalry, only to
find that the Duke was master of the lines. Hastily giving orders
for his scattered troops to pass the Geete at Judoigne, he began his
retreat upon Louvain. Presently up came Marlborough’s infantry at an
extraordinary pace, the men as fresh and lively after fifteen hours
of fatigue as if they had just left camp. The Duke was anxious to
follow up his success forthwith, a movement which the French had good
reason to dread, but the Dutch generals opposed him, and Marlborough
was reluctantly constrained to yield. The loss of the French seems to
have been about two thousand men, most of them prisoners, a score of
standards and colours, of which the Fifth Dragoon Guards claimed four
as their own, and eighteen guns, eight of which were triple-barrelled
and were sent across the Channel to be copied in England.[25]

◆July 8/19.◆

The Allies halted for the night at Tirlemont, and advancing next day
upon Louvain struck against the rear of the French columns and captured
fifteen hundred prisoners. That night they encamped a mile to the east
of Louvain, while the French, once again distributing their force
along a wider front, lined the left bank of the Dyle from the Demer
to the Yssche, with their centre at Louvain. Marlborough had hoped to
push on at once, but was stopped by heavy rains that rendered the Dyle
impassable; and it was not until ten days later that, after infinite
trouble with the Dutch, he was able to pursue his design.

◆July 18/29.◆

The operations for the passage of the Dyle were conducted in much
the same way as in the forcing of the lines. An advanced detachment
was sent forward from each wing of the army, that from the right or
English[26] flank being appointed to cross the river under the Duke of
Würtemberg at Corbeek Dyle, that from the left under General Heukelom
to pass it at Neeryssche. The detachments fell in at five in the
evening, reached their appointed destination at ten, and effected their
passage with perfect success. The main bodies started at midnight,
and went somewhat astray in the darkness, though by three o’clock the
Dutch army was within supporting distance of its detachment and the
British rapidly approaching it. The river had been in fact forced, when
suddenly the Dutch generals halted their main body. Marlborough rode up
to inquire the cause, and was at once taken aside by Slangenberg. “For
God’s sake, my Lord—” began the Dutchman vehemently, and continued to
protest with violent gesticulations. No sooner was Marlborough’s back
turned than the Dutch generals, like a parcel of naughty schoolboys,
recalled Heukelom’s detachment. Thus the passage won with so much skill
was for no cause whatever abandoned, without loss indeed, but also not
without mischievous encouragement to the French, who boasted loudly
that they had repulsed their redoubtable adversary.

Deeply hurt and annoyed though he was, the Duke, with miraculous
patience, excused in his public despatches the treachery and imbecility
which had thwarted him, and prepared to effect his purpose in another
way. His movements were hastened by news that French reinforcements,
set free by the culpable inaction of Prince Lewis of Baden, were on
their way from Alsace. ◆Aug. 5/16.◆ Unable to pass the Dyle he turned
its head-waters at Genappe, and wheeling north towards the forest of
Soignies encamped between La Hulpe and Braine l’Alleud.[27] The French
promptly took the alarm and posted themselves behind the river Yssche,
with their left at Neeryssche, and their right at Overyssche resting
on the forest of Soignies. Marlborough at once resolved to force the
passage of the river. ◆Aug. 6/17.◆ On the evening of the 17th of
August he detached his brother Charles Churchill with ten thousand
foot and two thousand horse to advance through the forest and turn
the French right; while he himself marched away at daybreak with the
rest of the army and emerged into the plain between the Yssche and the
Lasne. ◆Aug. 7/18.◆ The Duke quickly found two assailable points, and
choosing that of Overyssche, halted the army pending the arrival of the
artillery. The guns were long in arriving, Slangenberg having insisted,
despite the Duke’s express instructions, on forcing his own baggage
into the column for the express purpose of causing delay. At last about
noon the artillery appeared, and Marlborough asked formal permission of
the Dutch deputies to attack. To his surprise, although Overkirk had
already consented, they claimed to consult their generals. Slangenberg
with every mark of insolence condemned the project as murder and
massacre, the rest solemnly debated the matter for another two hours,
the auspicious moment passed away exactly as they had intended, and
another great opportunity was lost. The French reinforcements arrived,
and having been the weaker became the stronger force. Nothing more
could be done for the rest of the campaign, but to level the French
lines from the Demer to the Mehaigne.

Thus for the third time a brilliant campaign was spoilt by the Dutch
generals and deputies. Fortunately the public indignation both in
England and in Holland was too strong for them, and Slangenberg, though
not indeed hanged as he deserved, was deprived of all further command.
Jealousy, timidity, ignorance, treachery, and flat imbecility seem
to have been the motives that inspired these men, whose conduct has
never been reprobated according to its demerit. It was they who were
responsible for the prolongation of the war, for the burden that it
laid on England, and for the untold misery that it wrought in France.
Left to himself Marlborough would have forced the French to peace in
three campaigns, and the war would not have been ended in shame and
disgrace by the Treaty of Utrecht.[28]

VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER V

◆1706.◆

It is now time to revert to England and to the preparations for the
campaign of 1706. Marlborough, as usual, directly that the military
operations were concluded, had been deputed to visit the courts of
Vienna and of sundry German states in order to keep the Allies up to
the necessary pitch of unity and energy. These duties detained him in
Germany and at the Hague until January 1706, when he was at last able
to return to England. There he encountered far less obstruction than in
former years, but found, nevertheless, an increasing burden of work.
The vast extension of operations in the Peninsula, and the general
sickliness of the troops in that quarter, demanded the enlistment of an
unusually large number of recruits. One new regiment of dragoons and
eleven new battalions of foot were formed in the course of the spring,
to which it was necessary to add yet another battalion before the
close of the year.[29] Again the epidemic sickness among the horses in
Flanders had caused an extraordinary demand for them. The Dutch, after
their wonted manner, had actually taken pains to prevent the supply
of these animals to the British,[30] though, even if they had not,
the Duke had a prejudice in favour of English horses, as of English
men, as superior to any other. Finally, the stores of the Ordnance
were unequal to the constant drain of small arms, and it was necessary
to make good the deficiency by purchases from abroad. All these
difficulties and a thousand more were of course referred for solution
to Marlborough.

◆April 14/25.◆

When in April he crossed once more to the Hague he found a most
discouraging state of affairs. The Dutch were backward in their
preparations; Prussia and Hanover were recalcitrant over the furnishing
of their contingents; Prince Lewis of Baden was sulking within his
lines, refusing to communicate a word of his intentions to any one; and
everybody was ready with a separate plan of campaign. The Emperor of
course desired further operations on the Moselle for his own relief;
but, after the experience of the last campaign, the Duke had wisely
resolved never again to move eastward to co-operate with the forces
of the Empire. The Dutch for their part wished to keep Marlborough in
Flanders, where he should be under the control of their deputies; but
the imbecile caprice of these worthies was little more to his taste
than the sullen jealousy of Baden. Marlborough himself was anxious
to lead a force to the help of Eugene in Italy, a scheme which, if
executed, would have carried the British to a great fighting ground
with which they are unfamiliar, the plains of Lombardy. He had almost
persuaded the States-General to approve of this plan, when all was
changed by Marshal Villars, who surprised Prince Lewis of Baden in his
lines on the Motter, and captured two important magazines. The Dutch at
once took fright and, in their anxiety to keep Marlborough for their
own defence, agreed to appoint deputies who should receive rather than
issue orders. So to the Duke’s great disappointment it was settled that
the main theatre of war should once again be Flanders.

Villeroy meanwhile lay safely entrenched in his position of the
preceding year behind the Dyle, from which Marlborough saw little
hope of enticing him. It is said that an agent was employed to rouse
Villeroy by telling him that the Duke, knowing that the French were
afraid to leave their entrenchments, would take advantage of their
inaction to capture Namur.[31] Be that as it may, Villeroy resolved to
quit the Dyle. He knew that the Prussian and Hanoverian contingents had
not yet joined Marlborough, and that the Danish cavalry had refused
to march to him until their wages were paid; so that interest as well
as injured pride prompted the hazard of a general action. ◆May 8/19.◆
On the 19th of May, therefore, he left his lines for Tirlemont on the
Great Geete. Marlborough, who was at Maestricht, saw with delight
that the end, for which he had not dared to hope, was accomplished.
Hastily making arrangements for the payment of the Danish troops, he
concentrated the Dutch and British at Bilsen on the Upper Demer, and
moved southward to Borchloen. ◆May 9/20.◆ Here the arrival of the Danes
raised his total force to sixty thousand men, a number but little
inferior to that of the enemy. ◆May 11/22.◆ On the very same day came
the intelligence that Villeroy had crossed the Great Geete and was
moving on Judoigne. The Duke resolved to advance forthwith and attack
him there.

◆May 12/23.◆

At one o’clock in the morning of Whitsunday the 23rd of May,
Quartermaster-general Cadogan rode forward from the headquarters at
Corswarem with six hundred horse and the camp-colours towards the head
of the Great Geete, to mark out a camp by the village of Ramillies. The
morning was wet and foggy, and it was not until eight o’clock that,
on ascending the heights of Merdorp, the party dimly descried troops
in motion on the rolling ground before them. The Allied army had not
marched until two hours later than Cadogan, but Marlborough, who had
ridden on in advance of it, presently came up and pushed the cavalry
forward through the mist. Then at ten o’clock the clouds rolled away,
revealing the whole of the French army in full march towards them.

Villeroy’s eyes were rudely opened, for he had not expected Marlborough
before the following day; but he knew the ground well, for he had been
over it before with Luxemburg, and he proceeded to take up a position
which he had seen Luxemburg deliberately reject. The table-land whereon
he stood is the highest point in the plains of Brabant. To his right
flowed the Mehaigne; in his rear ran the Great Geete; across his centre
and left the Little Geete rose and crept away sluggishly in marsh and
swamp.[32] In his front lay four villages: Taviers on the Mehaigne to
his right, Ramillies, less advanced than Taviers, on the source of the
Little Geete to his right centre, Offus, parallel to Ramillies but
lower down the stream, to his left centre, Autréglise or Anderkirch,
between two branches of the Little Geete and parallel to Taviers, to
his left. Along the concave line formed by these villages Villeroy drew
up his army in two lines facing due east.

The Mehaigne, on which his right rested, is at ordinary times a rapid
stream little more than twelve feet wide, with a muddy bottom, but is
bordered by swampy meadows on both sides, which are flooded after heavy
rain. From this stream the ground rises northward in a steady wave
for about half a mile, sinks gradually and rises into a higher wave
at Ramillies, sinks once more to northward of that village and rolls
downward in a gentler undulation to Autréglise. Between the Mehaigne
and Ramillies, a distance of about a mile and a half, the ground east
and west is broken by sundry hollows of sufficient inclination to offer
decided advantage or disadvantage in a combat of cavalry. A single
high knoll rises in the midst of these hollows, offering a place of
vantage from which Marlborough must almost certainly have reconnoitred
the disposition of the French right. The access to Ramillies itself is
steep and broken both to north and south; but on the eastern front the
ground rises to it for half a mile in a gentle, unbroken slope, which
modern rifles would make impassable by the bravest troops. In rear,
or to westward of the French position, the table-land is clear and
unbroken, and to the right rear or south-west stands a mound or barrow
called the tomb of Ottomond, still conspicuous and still valuable as a
key to the actions of the day.[33] The full extent of the French front
from Taviers to Autréglise covered something over four miles.

[Illustration:

RAMILLIES
May 12/23 1706.

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

Having chosen his position, Villeroy lost no time in setting his troops
in order. His left, consisting of infantry backed by cavalry,[34]
extended from Autréglise to Offus, both of which villages were strongly
occupied. His centre from Offus to Ramillies was likewise composed of
infantry. On his right, in the expanse of sound ground which stretches
for a mile and a half from the marshes of the Geete at Ramillies to
those of the Mehaigne, were massed more than one hundred and twenty
squadrons of cavalry with some battalions of infantry interlined with
them, the famous French Household Cavalry (Maison du Roi) being in the
first line. The left flank of this expanse was covered by the village
of Ramillies, which was surrounded by a ditch and defended by twenty
battalions and twenty-four guns. On the right flank not only Taviers
but Franquinay, a village still further in advance, were occupied by
detachments of infantry, while Taviers was further defended by cannon.

Marlborough quickly perceived the defects of Villeroy’s dispositions,
which were not unlike those of Tallard at Blenheim. Taviers was too
remote from Ramillies for the maintenance of a cross-fire of artillery.
Again, the cavalry of the French left was doubtless secure against
attack behind the marshes of the Geete, but for this very reason it was
incapable of aggressive action. The French right could therefore be
turned, provided that it were not further reinforced; and accordingly
the Duke opened his manœuvres by a demonstration against the French
left.

Presently the infantry of the Allied right moved forward in two lines
towards Offus and Autréglise, marching in all the pomp and circumstance
of war, Dutch, Germans, and British, with the red-coats conspicuous on
the extreme right flank. Striding forward to the river they halted and
seemed to be very busy in laying their pontoons. Villeroy marked the
mass of scarlet, and remembering its usual place in the battlefield,
instantly began to withdraw several battalions from his right and
centre to his left. Marlborough watched the white coats streaming
away to their new positions, and after a time ordered the infantry of
his right to fall back to some heights in their rear. The two lines
faced about and retired accordingly over the height until the first
line was out of sight. Then the second line halted and faced about once
more, crowning the ascent with the well-known scarlet, while the first
marched away with all speed, under cover of the hill and unseen by the
French, to the opposite flank. Many British battalions[35] stood on
that height all day without moving a step or firing a shot, but none
the less paralysing the French left wing.

About half-past one the guns of both armies opened fire, and shortly
afterwards four Dutch battalions were ordered forward to carry
Franquinay and Taviers, and twelve more to attack Ramillies, while
Overkirk advanced slowly on the left with the cavalry. Franquinay was
soon cleared; Taviers resisted stoutly for a time, but was carried;
and a strong reinforcement on its way to the village was intercepted
and cut to pieces. Then Overkirk, his left flank being now cleared,
pushed forward his horse and charged. The Dutch routed the first
French line, but were driven back in confusion by the second; and the
victorious French were only checked by the advance of fresh squadrons
under Marlborough himself. Even so the Allies were at a decided
disadvantage; and Marlborough, after despatching messengers to bring
up every squadron, except the British, to the left, plunged into the
thick of the mêlée to rally the broken horse. He was recognised by
some French dragoons, who left their ranks to surround him, and in the
general confusion he was borne to the ground and in imminent danger of
capture. His aide-de-camp, Captain Molesworth, dismounted at once, and
giving him his own horse enabled him to escape. The cavalry, however,
encouraged by the Duke’s example, recovered themselves, and Marlborough
took the opportunity to shift from Molesworth’s horse to his own.
Colonel Bringfield, his equerry, held the stirrup while he mounted,
but Marlborough was hardly in the saddle before the hand that held the
stirrup relaxed its grasp, and the equerry fell to the ground, his head
carried away by a round shot.[36]

Meanwhile the attack of the infantry on Ramillies was fully developed,
and relieved the horse from the fire of the village. Twenty fresh
squadrons came galloping up at the top of their speed and ranged
themselves in rear of the re-forming lines. But before they could come
into action the Duke of Würtemberg pushed his Danish horse along the
Mehaigne upon the right flank of the French, while the Dutch guards
advanced still further so as to fall upon their rear. These last now
emerged upon the table-land by the tomb of Ottomond, and the rest of
the Allied horse dashed themselves once against the French front. The
famous Maison du Roi after a hard fight was cut to pieces, and the
whole of the French horse, despite Villeroy’s efforts to stay them,
were driven in headlong flight across the rear of their line of battle,
leaving the battalions of infantry helpless and alone, to be ridden
over and trampled out of existence.

Villeroy made frantic efforts to bring forward the cavalry of his left
to cover their retreat, but the ground was encumbered by his baggage,
which he had carelessly posted too close in his rear. The French troops
in Ramillies now gave way, and Marlborough ordered the whole of the
infantry that was massed before the village to advance across the
morass upon Offus, with the Third and Sixth Dragoon Guards in support.
The French broke and fled at their approach; and meanwhile the Buffs
and Twenty-first, which had so far remained inactive on the right,
forced their way through the swamps before them, and taking Autréglise
in rear swept away the last vestige of the French line on the left.
Five British squadrons followed them up and captured the entire King’s
Regiment (Régiment du Roi). The Third and Sixth Dragoon Guards also
pressed on, and coming upon the Spanish and Bavarian horse-guards, who
were striving to cover the retreat of the French artillery, charged
them and swept them away, only narrowly missing the capture of the
Elector himself, who was at their head.[37] On this the whole French
army, which so far had struggled to effect an orderly retreat, broke up
in panic and fled in all directions.

The mass of the fugitives made for Judoigne; but the ways were blocked
by broken-down baggage-waggons and abandoned guns, and the crush and
confusion was appalling. The British cavalry, being quite fresh,
quickly took up the pursuit over the table-land. The guns and baggage
fell an easy prey, but these were left to others, while the red-coated
troopers, not without memories of Landen, pressed on, like hounds
running for blood, after the beaten enemy. The chase lay northwards
to Judoigne and beyond it towards the refuge of Louvain. Not until
two o’clock in the morning did the cavalry pause, having by that time
reached Meldert, fifteen miles from the battlefield; nay, even then
Lord Orkney with some few squadrons spurred on to Louvain itself,
rekindled the panic and set the unhappy French once more in flight
across the Dyle.

◆May 13/24.◆

Nor was the main army far behind the horse. Marching far into the
night, the men slept under arms for two or three hours, started again
at three o’clock, and before the next noon had also reached Meldert and
were preparing to force the passage of the Dyle. Marlborough, who had
been in the saddle with little intermission for nearly twenty-eight
hours, here wrote to the Queen that he intended to march again that
same night; but, through the desertion of the lines of the Dyle by the
French, the army gained some respite. ◆May 14/25.◆ The next day he
crossed the Dyle at Louvain and encamped at Betlehem, ◆May 15/26.◆ the
next he advanced to Dieghem, a few miles north of Brussels, the next he
passed the Senne at Vilvorde and encamped at Grimberghen, ◆May 16/27.◆
and here at last, after six days of incessant marching, the Duke
granted his weary troops a halt, while the French, hopelessly beaten
and demoralised, retired with all haste to Ghent.

So ended the fight and pursuit of Ramillies, which effectually
disposed of the taunt levelled at Marlborough after Blenheim, that
he did not know how to improve a victory. The loss of the French in
killed, wounded, and prisoners was thirteen thousand men, swelled by
desertion during the pursuit to full two thousand more. The trophies
of the victors were eighty standards and colours, fifty guns, and a
vast quantity of baggage. The loss of the Allies was from four to five
thousand killed and wounded, which fell almost entirely on the Dutch
and Danes, the British, owing to their position on the extreme right,
being but little engaged until the close of the day. The chief service
of the British, therefore, was rendered in the pursuit, which they
carried forward with relentless thoroughness and vigour. The Dutch were
delighted that their troops should have done the heaviest of the work
in such an action, and the British could console themselves with the
performance of their cavalry, and above all, with the reflection that
the whole of the success was due to their incomparable chief.

◆May–June.◆

The effect of the victory and of the rapid advance that followed
it was instantaneous. Louvain and the whole line of Dyle fell into
Marlborough’s hands on the day after the battle; Brussels, Malines,
and Lierre surrendered before the first halt, and gave him the line
of the Senne and the key of the French entrenchments about Antwerp;
and one day later, the surrender of Alost delivered to him one of the
strongholds on the Dender. Never pausing for a moment, he sent forward
a party to lay bridges on the Scheldt below Oudenarde in order to cut
off the French retreat into France, a movement which obliged Villeroy
forthwith to abandon the lines about Ghent and to retire up the Lys to
Courtrai. Ghent, Bruges, and Damme thereupon surrendered on the spot;
Oudenarde followed them, and after a few days Antwerp itself. Thus
within a fortnight after the victory the whole of Flanders and Brabant,
with the exception of Dendermond and one or two places of minor
importance, had succumbed to the Allies, and the French had fallen back
to their own frontier.

◆June.◆

Nor was even this all. A contribution of two million livres levied in
French Flanders brought home to the Grand Monarch that the war was
now knocking at his own gates. Villars, with the greater part of his
army, was recalled from the Rhine to the Lys, and a number of French
troops were withdrawn to the same quarter from Italy. Baden had thus
the game in his own hand on the Rhine, and though he was too sulky and
incapable to turn the advantage to account, yet his inaction was no
fault of Marlborough’s. We are hardly surprised to find that in the
middle of this fortnight the Duke made urgent request for fresh stores
of champagne; he may well have needed the stimulant amid such pressure
of work and fatigue.[38]

He now detached Overkirk to besiege Ostend and another party to
blockade Dendermond, at the same time sending off five British
battalions, which we shall presently meet again, for a descent on the
Charente which was then contemplated in England. This done he took post
with the rest of the Army at Roulers, to westward of the Lys, whence
he could at once cover the siege of Ostend and menace Menin and Ypres.
The operations at Ostend were delayed for some time through want of
artillery and the necessity of waiting for the co-operation of the
Fleet; ◆June 6/17.◆ but the trenches were finally opened on the 17th of
June, and a few weeks later the town surrendered.

◆June 27./July 8.◆

Three days after this the army was reassembled for the siege of Menin.
This fortress was of peculiar strength, being esteemed one of Vauban’s
masterpieces, and was garrisoned by five thousand men. Moreover,
the French, being in command of the upper sluices of the Lys, were
able greatly to impede the operations by cutting off the water from
the lower stream, and thus rendering it less useful for purposes of
transport, But all this availed it little; for three weeks after the
opening of the trenches Menin surrendered. ◆Aug. 11/22.◆ The British
battalions[39] which had been kept inactive at Ramillies took a leading
share in the work, and some of them suffered very heavily; but they had
the satisfaction of recapturing four of the British guns that had been
taken at Landen.

◆Aug. 25./Sept. 5.◆

A few days later Dendermond was attacked in earnest and was likewise
taken, after which Marlborough ◆Sept. 12/23.◆ fell back across the
Scheldt to secure the whole line of the Dender by the capture of
Ath. ◆Sept. 21./Oct. 2.◆ Ten days sufficed for the work, after which
Ath also fell into the hands of the Allies. The apathy of the French
throughout these operations sufficiently show their discouragement.
Owing to the supineness of Prince Lewis of Baden, Villars had been
able to bring up thirty-five thousand men to the assistance of
Marshal Vendôme, who had now superseded Villeroy; but even with this
reinforcement the two commanders only looked on helplessly while
Marlborough reduced fortress after fortress before their eyes. They
were, indeed, more anxious to strengthen the defences of Mons and
Charleroi, lest the Duke should break into France by that line, than
to approach him in the field. Nor were they not wholly unreasonable in
their anxiety, for Marlborough’s next move was upon the Sambre; but
incessant rain and tempestuous weather forbade any further operations,
so that Ath proved to be the last conquest of the year. Thus ended the
campaign of Ramillies, one of the most brilliant in the annals of war,
wherein Marlborough in a single month carried his arms triumphant from
the Meuse to the sea.

VOL. I BOOK VI. CHAPTER VII

◆1707.◆

Almanza was a bad opening for the new year, but worse was to follow.
Throughout the winter Marlborough had, as usual, been employed in
diplomatic negotiations, which nothing but his skill and fascination
could have carried to a successful issue. But on one most important
point the Duke was foiled by the treachery of the Emperor, who, to
further his own selfish designs on Naples, secretly concluded a treaty
with France for the neutrality of Italy, and thus enabled the whole of
the French garrisons in Italy to be withdrawn unmolested. The forces
thus liberated were at once brought up to the scene of action on the
Rhine and in Flanders, and the French were enabled to lead a superior
force in the field against Marlborough. Again, the Duke had hoped
to save Spain by an invasion of France from the side of Savoy, but
this project had been deferred until too late, owing to the Emperor’s
cupidity for the possession of Naples. Finally, though Prince Lewis of
Baden had died during the winter, he had been replaced on the Rhine by
a still more incompetent prince, the Margrave of Baireuth, who, far
from making any diversion in the Duke’s favour, never ceased pestering
him to come to his assistance. So flagrant was this deplorable person’s
incapacity that he too was superseded before the close of the campaign,
though too late for any effective purpose. His successor, however,
deserves particular notice, being none other than the Elector of
Hanover, afterwards our own King George the First, no genius in the
field, but, as shall be seen in due time, an extremely sensible and
clear-headed soldier.

The result of these complications was that Marlborough spent the
greater part of the summer encamped, in the face of a superior
French force, at Meldert, on a branch of the Great Geete, to cover
his conquests in Flanders and Brabant. At last the Emperor, having
accomplished his desires in Naples, made a diversion towards Provence,
which drew away a part of the French force to that quarter and
enabled the Duke to move. But then bad weather intervened to prevent
any successful operations. Twice Marlborough was within an ace of
surprising Vendôme, who had superseded Villeroy in Flanders, and twice
the marshal decamped in haste and confusion only just in time to save
his army. Even so the Duke would have struck one heavy blow but for the
intervention of the Dutch deputies. But fortune favoured the French;
the rain came down in torrents, and the country was poached into such a
quagmire by the cavalry that many of the infantry were fairly swallowed
up and lost.[40] Thus tamely ended the campaign which should have
continued the work of Ramillies.[41]

Returning home in November Marlborough found difficulties almost as
great as he had left behind him in Flanders. There were quarrels in
the Cabinet, already foreboding the time when the Queen and the people
should turn against him. The Court of France was reverting to its old
methods and endeavouring to divide England by providing the Pretender
with a force for invasion. Again the hardships of the campaign in
Flanders and the defeat of Almanza had not only created discontent, but
had enormously increased the demand for recruits. The evil work of the
Dutch deputies and the incorrigible selfishness and jealousy of the
Empire had already prolonged the war beyond the limit assigned by the
short patience of the English people.

Happily Parliament was for the present still loyal to the war, and
voted not only the usual supplies but money for an additional ten
thousand men. Five new battalions[42] were raised, and three more of
the old establishment were detailed for service in Flanders.[43] But
far more satisfactory was the fact that in 1708 all regiments took the
field with new colours, bearing the cross of St. Andrew blended with
that of St. George, pursuant to the first article of the Treaty of
Union, passed in the previous year, between England and Scotland.

◆1708.◆

The early spring of 1708 was wasted by the French in a futile endeavour
to set the Pretender afoot in Scotland with a French force at his
back; nor was it until the 9th of April that Marlborough sailed for
the Hague, where Eugene was already awaiting him. ◆Mar. 29./April 9.◆
There the two agreed that the Duke should as usual command in Flanders,
while Eugene should take charge of an army on the Moselle, nominally
for operations on that river, but in reality to unite with Marlborough
by a rapid march and give battle to the French before they could call
in their remoter detachments. There was a considerable difficulty with
the Elector of Hanover, who was to command on the Rhine, owing to
his jealousy of Eugene; but this trouble was satisfactorily settled,
as were all troubles of the time, by the intervention of Marlborough.
Thereupon the Electoral Prince, true to the quarrelsome traditions of
his family, at once insisted on taking service with Eugene, simply
for the sake of annoying his father; thus adding one more to the many
causes of friction which, but for Marlborough, would soon have brought
the Grand Alliance to a standstill. This Electoral Prince will become
better known to us as King George the Second.

The French on their part had made extraordinary exertions in the
hope of a successful campaign. Since Ramillies they had drawn troops
from all quarters to Flanders; and from thenceforth the tendency in
every succeeding year grew stronger for all operations to centre in
that familiar battle-ground. On the Rhine the Elector of Bavaria
held command, with Berwick, much exalted since Almanza, to help him.
The French main army in Flanders numbered little less than a hundred
thousand men, and was under the orders of Vendôme, with the Duke of
Burgundy in supreme command. The presence of the heir to the throne, of
his brother the Duke of Berry, and of the Chevalier de St. George, as
the Pretender called himself, all portended an unusual effort.

◆May.◆

Marching up at the end of May from their rendezvous on the south of
the Haine, the French army moved north to the forest of Soignies.
Marlborough thereupon at once concentrated at Hal and summoned Eugene
to him with all haste. His own army numbered but eighty thousand
men, and, though as usual he showed a bold front, he knew that such
disparity of numbers was serious. The French then manœuvred towards
Waterloo as if to threaten Louvain, a movement which the Duke met by
a forced march to Park on the Dyle. ◆May 24./June 4. to June 24./July
5.◆ Here he remained perforce inactive for a whole month, waiting for
Eugene, who was delayed by some petty formalities which were judged by
the Imperial Court to be far more important than military operations.
◆June 23./July 4.◆ Suddenly, on the night of the 4th of July, the
French broke up their camp, marched westward to cross the Senne at Hal
and detached small corps against Bruges and Ghent. Unable to meet the
Allies with the sword, the French had substituted gold for steel and
had for some time been tampering with the new authorities in these
towns. The gold had done its work. Within twenty-four hours Ghent and
Bruges had opened their gates, and the keys to the navigation of the
Scheldt and Lys were lost.

◆June 24./July 5.◆

Marlborough, who was quite ready for a march, was up and after the
French army immediately. At two o’clock in the morning his army was in
motion, streaming off to pass the Senne at Anderlecht. The march was
long and severe, the roads being in so bad a state that the right wing
did not reach its halting-ground until six o’clock in the evening, nor
the left wing till two o’clock on the following morning; but this great
effort brought the Allies almost within reach of the French army.
◆June 25./July 6.◆ In the night, intelligence was brought to
Marlborough that the enemy was turning back to fight him. He was in the
saddle at once, to form his line of battle; but the news was false.
The French in reality were making off as fast as they could; and,
before the truth could reach Marlborough, they were across the Dender.
Marlborough’s cavalry was instantly on their track, but could do no
more than capture a few hundred prisoners, together with most of the
French baggage. That same day came definite information of the loss
of Ghent and Bruges, and of the investment of the citadel of Ghent.
Brussels took the alarm at once. The French, as they feared, had for
once got the better of the Duke. The French army was encamped at Alost,
where, like a king between two pieces at draughts, it threatened both
the citadel of Ghent and Brussels; and all was panic in the capital.
The Duke was fain to move on to Assche, midway between Alost and
Brussels, to restore the confidence of the fearful city.

Here Eugene joined him. Finding it hopeless to arrive in time with
his army, the Prince had pushed on alone; nor could he have arrived
more opportunely, for Marlborough was so much weakened by an attack of
fever that he was hardly fit for duty. It was indeed a trying moment.
The next design of the French was evidently aimed at Oudenarde for
the recovery of the line of the Scheldt. They were already across
the Dender and ahead of Marlborough on the road to it, and moreover
had broken down the bridges behind them; yet the Duke dared not move
lest he should expose Brussels. He sent orders to the Governor of
Ath to collect as many troops as possible, and to throw himself into
Oudenarde, which that officer punctually did; and then there was
nothing to be done but to wait. Two days sufficed to place the citadel
of Ghent in the hands of the French, and to set their army free for
further operations. ◆June 28./July 9.◆ Accordingly on the 9th of July
Vendôme sent forward detachments to invest Oudenarde, and moved with
the main army up the Dender to Lessines, from which point he intended
to cover the siege. Great was his astonishment on approaching the town
on the following day to find that Marlborough had arrived there before
him, and was not only within reach of Oudenarde, but interposed between
him and his own frontier.

For at two o’clock on the morning of the 9th of July the Allied army
had marched off in beautiful order in five columns, and by noon had
covered fifteen miles to Herfelingen on the road to the Dender. Four
hours later Cadogan was sent forward with eight battalions and as many
squadrons to occupy Lessines and throw bridges over the Dender; and,
when tattoo beat that night, the army silently entered on a march of
thirteen further miles to the same point. ◆June 29./July 10.◆ Before
dawn came the welcome intelligence that Cadogan had reached his
destination at midnight, laid his bridges, and made his dispositions to
cover the passage of the troops. The army tramped on, always in perfect
order, crossed the river and was taking up its camping-ground, when the
heads of the enemy’s columns appeared on the distant heights and were
seen first to halt and then to retire. Marlborough on the curve of the
arc had outmarched Vendôme on the chord.

The French, finding the whole of their plans disconcerted, now
wheeled about north-westward towards Gavre on the Scheldt, to shelter
themselves behind the river and bar the advance of the Allies on
Bruges. But the Duke had no intention to let them off so easily.
Burgundy and Vendôme were not on good terms; their differences had
already caused considerable confusion in the army; and Marlborough was
fully aware of the fact. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ At dawn on the morning of
the 11th the unwearied Cadogan started off with some eleven thousand
men[44] and twenty-four guns, to prepare the roads, construct bridges,
and make dispositions to cover the passage of the Scheldt below
Oudenarde. By half-past ten he had reached the river, just above the
village of Eyne, and on ascending the low heights above the stream
and looking westward he saw before him a kind of shallow basin or
amphitheatre, seamed by little ditches and rivulets, and broken by
hedges and enclosures. To the south the rising ground on which he
stood swept round almost to the glacis of Oudenarde, thence curved
westward from the village of Bevere into another broad hill, called the
Boser Couter, to the village of Oycke and beyond, turned from thence
northward across the valley of the river Norken to Huysse, from which
point trending still to northward it died away in the marshes of the
Scheldt. Near Oycke two small streams rise which, after pursuing for
some way a parallel course, unite to run down into the Scheldt at Eyne;
beyond them the Norken flows beneath the heights of Huysse in a line
parallel to the Scheldt.

[Illustration:

OUDENARDE
June 30th/July 11th 1708

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

Presently parties of French horse appeared on the ground to the north.
Vendôme’s advanced-guard, under the Marquis of Biron, had crossed the
Scheldt leisurely at Gavre, six miles farther down the river, and was
now moving across his front with foragers out, in happy unconsciousness
of the presence of an enemy. A dash of Cadogan’s squadrons upon the
foragers quickly brought Biron to Eyne and beyond it, where he caught
sight of Cadogan’s detachment of scarlet and blue battalions guarding
the bridge, and presently of a body of cavalry in the act of crossing;
for Marlborough, uneasy while his advanced-guard was still in the air,
had caught up a column of Prussian horse and galloped forward with it
in all haste. Biron at once reported what he had seen to Vendôme, who,
perceiving that the mass of the Allied army was still on the wrong
side of the Scheldt, gave orders to take up a position parallel to the
river; the line to rest its left on the village of Heurne and extend
by Eyne and Beveren to Mooregem on the right. In pursuance of his
design he directed seven battalions to occupy Heurne forthwith; but
at this point the Duke of Burgundy interposed. The heights of Huysse
in rear of the Norken from Asper to Wannegem formed in his judgment a
preferable position; and there, two miles from the Scheldt, he should
form his line of battle, facing south-east. So the army was guided to
the left bank of the Norken, while the seven battalions, obeying what
they conceived to be their orders, marched down to the village not of
Heurne but of Eyne, and backed by a few squadrons, took up the position
assigned to them by Vendôme.

Meanwhile, responding to urgent messages from Marlborough, the main
body of the Allies was hurrying forward, and by two o’clock the head
of the infantry had reached the Scheldt. Part of the cavalry passed
through Oudenarde to take advantage of the town bridge; the foot began
to cross by the pontoons, and Cadogan, who had marked the march of the
French into Eyne, at once summoned the whole of his advanced-guard
across to the left bank. Sabine’s brigade, supported by the other two,
crossed the rivulet against Eyne, while the Hanoverian cavalry moved up
to the rear of the village and cut off all hope of retreat. Presently
Sabine’s British were hotly engaged; but the French made only a poor
resistance. It is the weakness of the French soldier that he apprehends
too quickly when his officers have not given him a fair chance. Three
battalions out of the seven were captured entire, the remaining four
were killed or taken piecemeal in their flight. The cavalry, flushed
by their success, then advanced under Prince George against the few
French squadrons in rear of the village, charged them, routed them, and
drove them across the Norken. The Prince had his horse shot under him
in this encounter, for his family has never wanted for courage, and he
remembered the day of Oudenarde to the end of his life.

The Duke of Burgundy now determined upon a general action, and made
every preparation for defence of the position behind the Norken.
But when four o’clock came and the Allied army was not yet in order
of battle, he changed his plan, pushed a body of cavalry from his
right across the stream, and set the whole of his centre and right
in motion to advance likewise. Marlborough, perceiving the movement,
judged that the attack would be directed against his left, in the
hope that Cadogan’s battalions about Eyne would be left isolated and
open to be crushed by an advance of the French left. Two of Cadogan’s
regiments, Prussians, which had been pushed forward half a mile beyond
Eyne to Groenewald, were at once reinforced by twelve more of the
advanced-guard; the British cavalry was formed up on the heights at
Bevere, and the Prussian horse further to the Allied right near Heurne.
No more could be done until the rest of the army should gradually cross
the river which divided it from the battlefield.

At length about five o’clock thirty French battalions debouched upon
Groenewald, which was as yet held only by Cadogan’s two advanced
regiments, and began the attack. The Prussians stuck to their post
gallantly and held their own among the hedges, until presently
Cadogan’s reinforcement, and later on twenty more battalions under the
Duke of Argyll,[45] came up to their assistance. Forming in succession
on the left of the Prussians as they reached the fighting line, these
regiments extended the field of action as far south as Schaerken; and
the combat was carried on with great spirit. The ground was so strongly
enclosed that the fight resolved itself into duels of battalions, the
cream of the infantry on both sides being engaged. At one moment the
French outflanked the left of the Allies and drove them back, but
fresh battalions of Marlborough’s army kept constantly streaming into
action, which recovered the lost ground and prolonged the line of fire
always further to the south.

Marlborough and Eugene, who had hitherto remained together, now parted,
and the Duke handing over eighteen battalions to the Prince entrusted
him with the command of the right. This accession of strength enabled
Eugene to relieve Cadogan’s corps, which had yielded ground somewhat
before Groenewald, and even to pierce through the first line of the
enemy’s infantry. General Natzmar thereupon seized the moment to throw
the Prussian cavalry against the second line. His squadrons were
received with a biting fire from the hedges as they advanced; and the
French Household Cavalry, watching the favourable moment for a charge,
drove back the Prussians with very heavy loss.

Meanwhile Marlborough with the Hanoverian and Dutch infantry was
pressing forward slowly on his left, the French fighting with great
stubbornness and gallantry, and contesting every inch of ground from
hedge to hedge. At last the enemy, being forced back to Diepenbeck,
a few hundred yards in rear of Schaerken, stood fast, and refused,
despite all the Duke’s efforts, to give way another foot. But
Marlborough had still twenty battalions of Dutch and Danes with almost
the entire cavalry of the left at his disposal, and he had noticed
that the French right flank rested on the air. He now directed Marshal
Overkirk to lead these troops under cover of the Boser Couter round the
French right and to fall with them upon the enemy’s rear. The gallant
old Dutchman, though infirm and sick unto death, joyfully obeyed. Two
brigades were thrown at once on the flank of the troops that were so
stoutly opposing Marlborough; while the cavalry advanced quickly on
the reverse slope of the Boser Couter,[46] and then wheeling to the
right, fell on the rear of the unsuspecting French. A part of the
Household Cavalry and some squadrons of dragoons tried bravely to stand
their ground, but they were borne back and swept away. Overkirk’s
troops pressed rapidly on; and the French right was fairly surrounded
on all sides.

Now at last an effort was made to bring forward the French left, which,
through Burgundy’s perversity or for some inscrutable reason, had
been left motionless on the other side of the Norken; but it was too
late. The infantry, though led by Vendôme himself, failed to make the
slightest impression, and the cavalry dared not advance. The ground
before them was intricate and swampy, and the whole of the British
cavalry, withdrawn from their first position by Eugene, stood waiting
to plunge down upon them directly they should move. The daylight faded
and the night came on, but the musketry flashed out incessantly in an
ever-narrowing girdle of fire, as the Allies wound themselves closer
and closer round the enveloped French right. At length at nine o’clock
Marlborough and Eugene, fearful lest their own troops should engage
each other in the darkness, with some difficulty enforced the order to
halt and cease firing. Vast numbers of the French seized the moment to
escape, but presently all the drums of the Allies began with one accord
to beat the French retreat, while the Huguenot officers shouted “À moi,
Picardie! À moi, Roussillon!” to gather the relics of the scattered
regiments of the enemy around them. In this way some thousands of
prisoners were gleaned, though the harvest which would have been reaped
in another hour of daylight was lost. In the French army all was
confusion. Vendôme tried in vain to keep the troops together till the
morning, but Burgundy gave the word for retreat; and the whole mass
ran off in disorder towards Ghent.

So ended the battle of Oudenarde, presenting on one side a feature
rare in these days, namely, a general engagement without an order
of battle.[47] It was undoubtedly the most hazardous action that
Marlborough ever fought. His troops were much harassed by forced
marches. They had started at two o’clock on Monday morning and had
covered fifty miles, including the passage of two rivers, when they
came into action at two o’clock on Wednesday afternoon. It would be
reckoned no small feat in these days to move eighty thousand men
over fifty miles in sixty hours, but in those days of bad roads and
heavy packs the effort must have been enormous. Finally, the army had
to pass the Scheldt in the face of the enemy, and ran no small risk
of being destroyed in detail. Yet the hazard was probably less than
it now seems to us, and generals in our own day have not hesitated
to risk similar peril with success. The French commanders were at
variance; the less competent of them, being heir-apparent, was likely
to be toadied by officers and supported by them against their better
judgment; and, finally, the entire French army was very much afraid
of Marlborough. Notwithstanding their slight success in Ghent and
Bruges, their elation had evaporated speedily when they found the
Duke before them at Lessines. All this Marlborough knew well; and
he knew also that, if an impromptu action (if one may use the term)
must be fought, there was not a man on the French side who had an
eye for a battlefield comparable to Eugene’s or his own. The event
justified his calculations; for the victory was one of men who knew
their own minds over men who did not. Another hour of daylight, so
Marlborough declared, would have enabled him to finish the war. The
total loss of the Allies in the battle was about three thousand killed
and wounded, the British infantry, though early engaged, suffering
but little, while the British cavalry, being employed to watch the
inactive French left, hardly suffered at all.[48] The French lost
six thousand killed and wounded and nine thousand prisoners only,
but they were thoroughly shaken and demoralised for the remainder of
the campaign. The wearied army of the Allies lay on its arms on the
battlefield, while Marlborough and Eugene waited impatiently for the
dawn. As soon as it was light, forty squadrons, for the most part
British, were sent forward in pursuit, while Eugene returned to his
own army to hasten its march and to collect material for a siege.
◆July 1/12.◆ The main army halted to rest for two days where it lay,
during which time the intelligence came that Berwick ad been summoned
with his army from the Moselle, and was marching with all haste to
occupy certain lines constructed by the French to cover their frontier
from Ypres to the Lys. ◆July 2–3/13–14.◆ At midnight fifty squadrons
and thirty battalions under Count Lottum, a distinguished Prussian
officer, started for these lines; the whole army followed at daybreak,
and, while on the march, the Duke received the satisfactory news that
Lottum had captured the lines without difficulty. Next day the whole of
Marlborough’s army was camped along the Lys between Menin and Commines,
within the actual territory of France.

Detached columns were at once sent out to forage and levy
contributions. The suburbs of Arras were burnt, and no effort was
spared to bring home to the French that war was hammering at their
own gates. But the Allies were still doubtful as to the operations
that they should next undertake. So long as the French held Bruges and
Ghent they held also the navigation of the Scheldt and Lys, so that
it was of vital importance to tempt Vendôme, if possible, to evacuate
those towns. The British Government was preparing a force[49] under
General Erle for a descent upon Normandy by sea, and Marlborough was
for co-operating with this expedition, masking the fortress of Lille,
and penetrating straight into France—a plan which the reader should, if
possible, bear in mind. But the proposal was too adventurous to meet
with the approval of the Dutch, and was judged impracticable even by
Eugene unless Lille were first captured as a place of arms. Ultimately
it was decided, notwithstanding the closing of the Scheldt and Lys,
to undertake the siege of Lille; and all the energies of the Allies
were turned to the collection of sixteen thousand horses to haul the
siege-train overland from Brussels.

During the enforced inaction of the army for the next few weeks, the
monotony was broken only by the arrival of a distinguished visitor,
Augustus the Strong, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, together
with one of his three hundred and sixty-four bastards, a little boy of
twelve named Maurice, who had run away from school to join the army.
We shall meet with this boy again as a man of fifty, under the name of
Marshal Saxe, at a village some twenty miles distant called Fontenoy.

At length the preparations for the siege were complete, and the huge
convoy set out from Brussels for its long march. Now, if ever, was
the time for the French to strike a blow. Vendôme in the north at
Ghent and Berwick in the south at Douay had, between them, one hundred
and ten thousand men: the distance to be traversed by the convoy
was seventy-five miles, and the way was barred by the Dender and
the Scheldt. Such, however, was the skill with which the march was
conducted that the French never succeeded even in threatening the vast,
unwieldy columns, which duly reached their destination without the
loss even of a single waggon. ◆Aug. 1/12.◆ Of all the achievements of
Marlborough and Eugene, this seems to have been judged by contemporary
military men to be the greatest.[50]

Lille, the capital of French Flanders, was one of the early conquests
of Lewis the Fourteenth, and, if the expression may be allowed, the
darling town of the Court of Versailles. Situated in a swampy plain
and watered by two rivers, the Deule and Marque, its natural position
presented difficulties of no ordinary kind to a besieging force; and,
in addition, it had been fortified by Vauban with his utmost skill. The
garrison, which had been strengthened by Berwick, amounted to fifteen
thousand men, under the command of brave old Marshal Boufflers, who
had solicited the honour of defending the fortress. To the north, as
we have seen, lay Vendôme, and to the south Berwick, with a joint
force now amounting to about ninety-four thousand men.[51] It was
for Marlborough and Eugene with an inferior strength of eighty-four
thousand men[52] to hold them at bay and to take one of the strongest
fortresses in the world before their eyes.

A detailed account even of so famous a siege would be wearisome, the
more so since the proportion of British troops detailed for regular
work in the trenches was but five battalions,[53] but there are a few
salient features which cannot be omitted. The point selected for attack
was the north side, the first advance to which was opened by a single
English soldier, Sergeant Littler of the First Guards,[54] who swam
across the Marquette to a French post, which commanded the passage
of the stream, and let down the drawbridge. ◆Aug. 2/13.◆ Two days
later the town was fully invested, and Marlborough took post with the
covering army at Helchin on the Scheldt.

The investment had not been accomplished for more than a fortnight,
when the Duke was informed that Berwick and Vendôme were advancing
towards the Dender to unite their forces at Lessines. After manœuvring
at first to hinder the junction Marlborough finally decided to let it
come to pass, being satisfied that, if the French designed to relieve
Lille, they could not penetrate to it in the face of his army on the
east side, but must go round and approach the city from the south.
In this case, as both armies would move in concentric circles around
Lille as a centre, Marlborough, being nearer to that centre, could be
certain of reaching any given point on the way to it before the French.
Moreover, the removal of the enemy from the east to the south would
free the convoys from Brussels from all annoyance on their march to the
siege.

◆Aug. 22./Sept. 2.◆

As he had expected, the French moved south to Tournay, and then
wheeling northward entered the plain of Lille, where they found
Marlborough and Eugene drawn up ready to receive them.[55] Vendôme
and Berwick had positive orders to risk a battle; and there had been
much big talk of annihilating the Allies. Yet face to face with their
redoubtable enemies they hesitated. Finally, after a week’s delay,
which enabled Marlborough greatly to strengthen his position by
entrenchment, they advanced as if to attack in earnest, but withdrew
ignominiously after a useless cannonade, without accepting battle. Had
not Marlborough and Eugene been restrained by the Dutch deputies, the
marshals would have had a battle forced on them whether they liked it
or not, but, as things were, they were permitted to retire. To such
depth of humiliation had Marlborough reduced the proud and gallant
French army.

◆Aug. 27–28./Sept. 7–8.◆

The retreat left Eugene free to press the siege with vigour; but a
great assault, which cost him three thousand men,[56] failed to give
him the advantage for which he had hoped; and a week later Marlborough
was called in from the covering army to give assistance. ◆Sept.
19–20./30–31.◆ For the next attack, on the counterscarp, the Duke lent
the Prince five thousand English, and it is said that English and
French never fought more worthily of their reputation than on that
day; but the assault was thrice repelled, and it was only through
the exertions of Eugene himself that a portion of the works was at
last captured, after a desperate effort and at frightful expense of
life. Altogether the siege was not going well. The engineers had made
blunders; a vast number of men had been thrown away to no purpose; and
ammunition and stores were beginning to run short. Lastly, Boufflers
maintained always a very grand and extremely able defence.

Vendôme and Berwick could now think of no better expedient than to
throw themselves into strong positions along the Scarpe and Scheldt,
from Douay to Ghent, in order to cut off all convoys from Brussels.
But Marlborough was prepared for this, and had not captured Ostend
after Ramillies for nothing. England held command of the sea; and
Erle’s expedition, which had effected little or nothing on the coast
of Normandy, was at hand to help in the transport of supplies from the
new base. Erle, who had considerable talent for organisation, soon
set Ostend in order, seized two passages over the Nieuport Canal at
Leffinghe and Oudenburg, and prepared to send off his first convoy. As
its arrival was of vital importance to the maintenance of the siege,
the French were as anxious ◆Sept. 16/27.◆ to intercept as the English
to forward it. Vendôme accordingly sent off Count de la Mothe with
twenty-two thousand men to attack it on its way, while Marlborough
despatched twelve battalions and fifteen hundred horse to Ostend
itself, twelve battalions more under General Webb to Thourout, and
eighteen squadrons under Cadogan to Roulers, at two different points on
the road, to help it to its destination.

◆Sept. 17/28.◆

The convoy started at night, and in the morning Cadogan sent forward
Count Lottum with a hundred and fifty horse to meet it. At noon Lottum
returned to Thourout with the intelligence that he had struck against
the advanced guard of a French force at Ichtegem, two miles beyond
Wynendale and some four miles from Thourout, on the road to Ostend.
Webb at once collected every battalion within his reach, twenty-two in
all, and marched with all speed for Ichtegem, with Lottum’s squadron in
advance. The horse, however, on emerging from the defile of Wynendale,
found the enemy advancing towards them into the plains that lay beyond
it. Lottum retired slowly, skirmishing, while Webb pushed on and
posted his men in two lines at the entrance to the defile. The strait
was bounded on either hand by a wood, and in each of these woods Webb
stationed a battalion of Germans to take the French in flank. The
dispositions were hardly complete when the enemy came up and opened
fire from nineteen pieces of artillery. Lottum and his handful of horse
then retired, while just in the nick of time three more battalions
reached Webb from the rear and formed his third line.

The French cannonade was prolonged for nearly two hours, but with
little effect, for Webb had ordered his men to lie down. At length at
five o’clock the French advanced in four lines of infantry, backed
by as many of horse and dragoons. They came on with great steadiness
and entered the space between the two woods, with their flanks almost
brushing the covert as they passed, serenely unconscious of the peril
that awaited them. Then from right and left a staggering volley crashed
into them from the battalions concealed among the trees. Both flanks
shrank back from the fire, and huddled themselves in confusion upon
their centre. De la Mothe sent forward some dragoons in support;
and the foot, recovering themselves, pressed on against the lines
before them. So vigorous was their attack that they broke through two
battalions of the first line; but, the gap being instantly filled
from the second, they were forced back. Again they struggled forward,
trusting by the sheer weight of eight lines against two to sweep their
enemy away. But the eternal fire on front and flank became unendurable,
and, notwithstanding the blows and entreaties of their officers, the
eight lines broke up in confusion, while Webb’s battalions, coolly
advancing by platoons “as if they were at exercise,” poured volley
after volley into them as they retired. Cadogan, who had hastened up
with a few squadrons to the sound of the firing, was anxious to charge
the broken troops, but his force was considered too weak; and thus
after two hours of hot conflict ended the combat of Wynendale. The
French engaged therein numbered almost double of the Allies, and lost
close on three thousand men, while the Allies lost rather less than a
thousand of all ranks. The signal incapacity displayed by the French
commander did not lessen the credit of Webb, and Wynendale was reckoned
one of the most brilliant little affairs of the whole war.[57]

The safe arrival of the convoy before Lille raised the hope of the
besiegers; and Vendôme, now fully alive to the importance of cutting
off communication with Ostend, marched towards that side with a
considerable force, and opening the dykes laid the whole country under
water. Marlborough went quickly after him, but the marshal would not
await his coming; and the Duke, by means of high-wheeled vehicles
and punts, contrived to overcome the difficulties caused by the
inundation. ◆Oct. 11/22.◆ At last, after a siege of sixty days the town
capitulated; and the garrison retired into the citadel, where Eugene
proceeded to beleaguer it anew.

While the new siege was going forward, the Elector of Bavaria arrived
on the scene from the Rhine, from whence the apathy of the Elector of
Hanover had most unpardonably allowed him to withdraw, and laid siege
to Brussels with fifteen thousand men. ◆Nov. 13/24.◆ This was an
entirely new complication; and, since the French held the line of the
Scheldt in force, it was difficult to see how Marlborough could parry
the blow. Fortunately the garrison defended itself with great spirit,
the English regiments[58] setting a fine example; and the Duke, in no
wise dismayed, laid his plans with his usual secrecy and decision.
◆Nov. 15/26.◆ Spreading reports, which he confirmed by feint
movements, that he was about to place his troops in cantonments, he
marched suddenly and silently eastward on the night of the 26th of
November, crossed the Scheldt at two different points before the enemy
knew that he was near them, took a thousand prisoners, and then
remitting the bulk of his force to the siege of Lille, pushed on with
a detachment of cavalry and two battalions of English Guards to
Alost. ◆Nov. 17/28.◆ On his arrival he learned that the Elector had
raised the siege of Brussels and marched off with precipitation. The
bare name of Marlborough had been sufficient to scare him away.

Meanwhile Eugene’s preparations before the citadel of Lille were in
rapid progress, and Marlborough was already maturing plans for a
further design before the close of the campaign. It had been the
earnest desire of both commanders to reduce Boufflers to unconditional
surrender; but time was an object, so on the 9th of December the
gallant old marshal and his heroic garrison marched out with the
honours of war. ◆Nov. 28./Dec. 9.◆ So ended the memorable siege of
Lille. It had cost the garrison eight thousand men, or more than half
of its numbers, and the Allies no fewer than fourteen thousand
men. The honours of the struggle rested decidedly with Boufflers, and
were paid to him by none more ungrudgingly than Marlborough and
Eugene. Yet as an operation of war, conducted under extraordinary
difficulties in respect of transport, under the eyes of a superior
force and subject to diversions, such as that of the Elector of
Bavaria, this siege remains one of the highest examples of consummate
military skill.

The fall of Lille was a heavy blow for France, but it was not the last
of the campaign. Within eight days Marlborough and Eugene had invested
Ghent, which after a brief resistance surrendered with the honours of
war. The capitulation of Bruges quickly followed, and the navigation of
the Scheldt and Lys having been regained, the two commanders at last
sent their troops into winter quarters.

But even this did not close the sum of English successes for 1708.
From the Mediterranean had come news of another conquest, due to the
far-seeing eye and far-reaching hand of Marlborough. Early in the year
Galway had withdrawn from Catalonia to Lisbon, and the command in
Catalonia had been given at Marlborough’s instance to Field-Marshal
von Staremberg, an Imperial officer of much experience and deservedly
high reputation. Staremberg, however, could do little with but ten
thousand men against the Bourbon’s army of twice his strength; so by
Marlborough’s advice the troops were used to second the operations of
the Mediterranean squadron. Sardinia, the first point aimed at, was
captured almost without resistance; and the fleet then sailed for
Minorca. Here somewhat more opposition was encountered; but after less
than a fortnight’s work, creditably managed by Major-general Stanhope,
the Island was taken at a trifling cost of life.[59] ◆Sept. 13/24.◆
Thus the English gained their first port in the Mediterranean; and the
news of the capture of Minorca reached London on the same day as that
of the fall of Lille.

NOTE.—I have been unable to discover any Order of Battle for the
campaign of 1708. The regiments that bear the name of Oudenarde on
their appointments are the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Dragoon Guards,
the 2nd Dragoons, 5th Lancers, Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards,
1st, 3rd, 8th, 10th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 26th, 37th
Foot.

VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER VIII

◆1708.◆

The successes of the past campaign were sufficient to put the British
Parliament in good humour, and to prompt it to vote a further increase
of ten thousand German mercenaries for the following year. Nevertheless
political troubles were increasing, and there were already signs that
the rule of Godolphin and Marlborough was in danger. The death of the
Prince Consort had been a heavy blow to the Duke. Prince George may
have deserved Lord Macaulay’s character for impenetrable stupidity, but
there can be little doubt that his heavy phlegmatic character was of
infinite service to steady the weak and unstable Queen Anne.

◆1709.◆

In the spring of 1709, however, it seemed reasonable to hope that
peace, which would have set all matters right, was well-nigh assured.
France, already at the last gasp through the exhaustion caused by the
war, was weakened still further by a severe winter which had added
famine to all her other troubles; and Lewis sought anxiously, even
at the price of humiliation, for peace. He approached Marlborough,
reputed the most avaricious and corruptible of men, with a gigantic
bribe to obtain good terms, but was unhesitatingly rebuffed. The Duke
stated the conditions which might be acceptable to England; and, had
the negotiations been trusted to him, there can be little doubt but
that he would have obtained the honourable peace which he above all
men most earnestly desired. He was, however, overruled by instructions
from home, imposing terms which Lewis could not be expected to grant;
the war was continued; and Marlborough, who had striven his hardest to
bring it to an end, was of course accused of prolonging it deliberately
for his own selfish ends.

The French, now menaced by an invasion and a march of the Allies to
Paris, had strengthened their army enormously by withdrawing troops
from all quarters to Flanders, and had set in command their only
fortunate general, that very able soldier and incomparable liar,
Marshal Villars. To cover Arras, the north-eastern gate of France,
Villars had thrown up a strong line of entrenchments from the Scarpe
at Douay to the Lys, which were generally known, after the name of his
headquarters, as the lines of La Bassée. There he lay, entrenched to
the teeth, while Marlborough and Eugene, after long delay owing to the
lateness of the spring, encamped with one hundred and ten thousand men
to the south-east of Lille,◆ between two villages, with which the
reader will in due time make closer acquaintance, called Linselles and
Fontenoy. ◆June. Thence they moved south straight upon Villars’s
lines, with every apparent preparation for a direct attack upon them
and for forcing their way into France at that point. The heavy
artillery was sent to Menin on the Lys; report was everywhere rife of
the coming assault, and Villars lost no time in summoning the garrison
of Tournay to his assistance. ◆June 15/26.◆ On the 26th of June, at
seven in the evening, Marlborough issued his orders to strike tents
and march; and the whole army made up its mind for a bloody action
before the lines at dawn. To the general surprise, after advancing
some time in the direction of the French, the columns received orders
to change direction to the left. After some hours’ march eastward they
crossed a river, but the men did not know that the bridge lay over the
Marque and that it led them towards the battlefield of Bouvines; nor
was it until dawn that they saw the gray walls and the four spires of
Tournay before them, and discovered that they had invested the city.

Tournay had been fortified by Vauban and was one of the strongest
fortresses in France,[60] but its garrison had been weakened by the
unsuspecting Villars, and there was little hope for it. The heavy
artillery of the Allies, which had been sent to Menin, went down the
Lys to Ghent and up the Scheldt to the besieged city, the trenches
were opened on the 7th of July, ◆June 26./July 7.◆ and after three
weeks, despite of the demonstrations of Villars and incessant heavy
rain, Tournay was reduced to surrender.[61] ◆July 19/28.◆ Then
followed the siege of the citadel, the most desperate enterprise yet
undertaken by the Allied troops, inasmuch as the subterraneous works
were more numerous and formidable than those above ground. The
operations were, therefore, conducted by mine and countermine, with
destructive explosions and confused combats in the darkness, which
tried the nerves of the soldiers almost beyond endurance. The men did
not object to be shot, but they dreaded to be buried alive by the
hundred together through the springing of a single mine.[62] Four
English regiments[63] bore their share in this work and suffered
heavily in the course of it, until on the 3rd of September the citadel
capitulated. ◆Aug. 23./Sept. 3.◆

Before the close of the siege Marlborough and Eugene, leaving a
sufficient force before Tournay, had moved back with the main army
before the lines at Douay. They had long decided that the lines were
far too formidable to be forced, but they saw no reason for
communicating this opinion to Villars. ◆Aug. 20/31.◆ On the 31st of
August Lord Orkney, with twenty squadrons and the whole of the
grenadiers of the army, marched away silently and swiftly eastward
towards St. Ghislain on the Haine. ◆Aug. 23./Sept. 3.◆ Three days
later, immediately after the capitulation of the citadel of Tournay,
the Prince of Hessen-Cassel started at four o’clock in the afternoon
in the same direction; at nine o’clock Cadogan followed him with forty
squadrons more, and at midnight the whole army broke up its camp and
marched after them. Twenty-six battalions alone were left before
Tournay to superintend the evacuation and to level the siege-works,
with orders to watch Villars carefully and not to move until he did.

The Prince of Hessen-Cassel soon overtook Orkney, from whom he learned
that St. Ghislain was too strongly held to be carried by his small
force. The Prince therefore at once pushed on. Rain was falling in
torrents, and the roads were like rivers, but he continued his advance
eastward, behind the woods that line the Haine, almost without a halt,
till at length at two o’clock on the morning of the 6th of September
he wheeled to the right and crossed the river at Obourg three miles to
the north-east of Mons. ◆Aug. 26./Sept. 6.◆ Before him lay the river
Trouille curving round to the south by Mons, and in rear of it a line
of entrenchments, thrown up during the last war, from Mons to the
Sambre, to cover the province of Hainault. A short survey showed him
that the lines were weakly guarded; and before noon he had passed them
without opposition. His force, notwithstanding the weather and the
state of the roads, had traversed the fifty miles to Obourg in
fifty-six hours.

Too late Villars discovered that for the second time he had been duped,
and that Marlborough had no intention of forcing his way into France
through the lines of La Bassée and the wet swampy country beyond them,
when he could pass the lines of the Trouille without loss of a man.
He was in a difficult position, for Mons was slenderly garrisoned
and difficult of access, though, if captured, it would be a valuable
acquisition to the Allies. The approach to it from the westward was
practically shut off by a kind of natural barrier of forest, running,
roughly speaking, from St. Ghislain on the Haine to the north to
Maubeuge on the Sambre to the south. In this barrier there were but
two openings, the Trouée de Boussut between the village of that name
and the Haine, and the Trouées d’Aulnois and de Louvière, which are
practically the same, some miles further to the south. These will be
more readily remembered, the northern entrance by the name of Jemappes,
the southern by the name of Malplaquet. ◆Aug. 27./Sept. 7.◆ Villars no
sooner knew what was going forward than he pushed forward a detachment
with all speed upon the northern entrance, which was the nearer to him.
The detachment came too late. The Prince of Hessen-Cassel was already
astride of the opening, his right at Jemappes, his left at Ciply. The
French thereupon fell back to await the approach of the main army of
the Allies.

◆Aug. 26./Sept. 6.◆

Meanwhile that army had toiled through a sea of mud on the northern
bank of the Haine, and crossing the river had by evening invested Mons
on the eastern side. ◆Aug. 27./Sept. 7.◆ On the following day Villars
and his whole army also arrived on the scene and encamped a couple of
miles to westward of the forest-barrier, from Montreuil to Athis.
Here he was joined by old Marshal Boufflers, who had volunteered his
services at a time of such peril to France. The arrival of the gallant
veteran caused such a tumult of rejoicing in the French camp that
Marlborough and Eugene, not knowing what the clamour might portend,
withdrew all but a fraction of the investing force from the town, and,
advancing westward into the plain of Mons, caused the army to bivouac
between Ciply and Quévy in order of battle.

◆Aug. 28./Sept. 8.◆

Villars meanwhile had not moved, being adroit enough to threaten
both passages and keep the Allies in doubt as to which he should
select. While, therefore, the mass of the Allied army was moved
towards the Trouée d’Aulnois, a strong detachment was sent up to watch
the Trouée de Boussut. ◆Aug. 29./Sept. 9.◆ That night Villars sent
detachments forward to occupy the southern passage, and by mid-day
of the morrow his whole army was taking up its position across the
opening. Marlborough at once moved his army forward, approaching so
close that his left wing exchanged cannon-shot with Villars’s right.
Everything pointed to an immediate attack on the French before they
should have time to entrench themselves. Whether the Dutch deputies
intervened to stay further movements is uncertain. All that is known
is that a council of war was held by the commanders of the Allies, and
that, after much debate, it was resolved to await the arrival of the
detachment from the Trouée de Boussut and of the troops that had been
left behind at Tournay, to turn the siege of Mons into a blockade,
and in the meanwhile to send eighteen battalions north to capture St.
Ghislain. Evidently in some quarter there was reluctance to hazard a
general action.

Villars now set himself with immense energy to strengthen his
position; and, when Marlborough and Eugene surveyed the defences at
daybreak of the following morning, they were astonished at the
formidable appearance of the entrenchments. ◆Aug. 30./Sept. 10.◆
Marlborough was once more for attacking without further delay, but he
was opposed by the Dutch deputies and even by Eugene. The attack was
therefore fixed for the morrow; and another day was lost which Villars
did not fail to turn to excellent account.

The entrance from the westward to the Trouée d’Aulnois or southern
entrance to the plain of Mons was marked by the two villages of Campe
du Hamlet on the north and Malplaquet on the south. About a mile in
advance of these villages the ground rose to its highest elevation, the
opening being about three thousand paces wide, and the ground broken
and hollowed to right and left by small rivulets. This was the point
selected by Villars for his position. It was bounded on his right by
the forest of Laignières, the greatest length of which ran parallel
to the Trouée, and on the left by a forest, known at different points
by the names of Taisnières, Sart and Blangies, the greatest length of
which ran at right angles to the Trouée. Villars occupied the forest
of Laignières with his extreme right, his battalions strengthening
the natural obstacles of a thick and tangled covert by means of
abatis. From the edge of the wood he constructed a triple line of
entrenchments, which ran across the opening for full a third of its
width, when they gave way to a line of nine redans. These redans in
turn yielded place to a swamp backed by more entrenchments, which
carried the defences across to the wood of Taisnières. Several cannon
were mounted on the entrenchments, and a battery of twenty guns before
the redans. On Villars’s left the forests of Taisnières and Sart
projected before the general front, forming a salient and re-entering
angle. Entrenchments and abatis were constructed in accordance with
this configuration, and two more batteries were erected on this side,
in addition to several guns at various points along the line, to
enfilade an advancing enemy. Feeling even thus insecure, Villars threw
up more entrenchments at the villages of Malplaquet and Chaussée du
Bois in rear of the wood of Sart, and was still hard at work on them
to the last possible moment before the action. Finally in rear of all
stood his cavalry, drawn up in several lines. The whole of his force
amounted to ninety-five thousand men.

[Illustration:

MALPLAQUET
Aug. 31st./Sept. 11th 1709

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

The position was most formidable, but it had its defects. In the first
place the open space before the entrenchments was broken at about
half a mile’s distance by a small coppice, called the wood of Tiry,
which could serve to mask the movements of the Allied centre. In the
second place the forest of Sart ran out beyond the fortified angle in a
long tongue, which would effectually conceal any troops that might be
directed against the extreme left flank. Finally the French cavalry,
being massed in rear of the entrenchments, could take no part in the
action until the defences were forced, and was therefore incapable
of delivering any counterstroke. Marlborough and Eugene accordingly
decided to make a feint attack on the French right and a true attack on
their left front and flank. Villars would then be obliged to reinforce
his left from his centre, which would enable the defences across the
open to be carried, and the whole of the allied cavalry to charge
forward and cut the French line in twain.

◆Aug. 31./Sept. 11.◆

The dawn of the 11th of September broke in dense heavy mist which
completely veiled the combatants from each other. At three o’clock
prayers were said in the Allied camp, and then the artillery was
moved into position. Forty pieces were massed in a single battery
on the open ground against the French left, and were covered with
an epaulment for defence against enfilading fire; twenty-eight more
were stationed against the French right, and the lighter pieces were
distributed, as usual, among the different brigades. Then the columns
of attack were formed. Twenty-eight battalions under Count Lottum were
directed against the eastern face of the salient angle of the forest
of Taisnières, and forty battalions of Eugene’s army under General
Schulemberg against the northern face, while a little to the right of
Schulemberg two thousand men under General Gauvain were to press on the
French left flank in rear of their entrenchments. Behind Schulemberg
fifteen British battalions under Lord Orkney were drawn up in a single
line on the open ground, ready to advance against the centre as soon
as Schulemberg and Lottum should have done their work. Far away beyond
Gauvain, General Withers with five British and fourteen foreign
battalions and six squadrons was to turn the extreme French left at the
village of La Folie.

For the feint against the French right, thirty-one battalions, chiefly
Dutch, were massed together under the Prince of Orange. The cavalry was
detailed in different divisions to support the infantry. The Prince
of Orange was backed by twenty-one Dutch squadrons under the Prince
of Hesse, Orkney by thirty more under Auvergne, Lottum by the British
and Hanoverian cavalry, and Schulemberg by Eugene’s horse. The orders
given to the cavalry were to sustain the foot as closely as possible
without advancing into range of grape-shot, and, as soon as the
central entrenchments were forced, to press forward, form before the
entrenchments and drive the French army from the field. The whole force
of the Allies was, as near as may be, equal to that of the French.

At half-past seven the fog lifted, and the guns of both armies opened
fire. Eugene and Marlborough thereupon parted, the former taking
charge of the right, the latter of the left of the army. Then the
divisions of Orange and of Lottum advanced in two dense columns up the
glade. Presently the Dutch halted, just beyond range of grape-shot,
while Lottum’s column pushed on under a terrific fire to the rear
of the forty-gun battery and deployed to the right in three lines.
Then the fire of the cannon slackened for a time, till about nine
o’clock a salvo of the forty guns gave the signal for attack. Lottum’s
and Schulemberg’s divisions thereupon advanced perpendicularly to
each other, each in three lines, Gauvain’s men crept into the wood
unperceived, and Orkney extended his scarlet battalions across the
glade.

Entering the wood, Schulemberg’s Austrians made the best of their way
through marshes and streams and fallen trees, nearer and nearer to
the French entrenchments. The enemy suffered them to approach within
pistol-shot, only to deliver a volley which sent them staggering back;
and, though the Austrians extended their line till it joined Gauvain’s
detachment, yet they could make little way against the French fire.
Lottum’s attack was hardly more successful. Heedless of the tempest of
shot in their front and flank the Germans pressed steadily on, passed
a swamp and a stream under a galling fire, and fell fiercely upon the
breastwork beyond; but, being disordered by the ground and thinned by
heavy losses, they were forced to fall back. Schulemberg then resumed
the attack with his second line, but with all his exertions could
not carry the face of the angle opposed to him. Picardie, the senior
regiment of the French Line, held this post and would not yield it to
the fiercest assault. The utmost that Schulemberg could accomplish was
to sweep away the regiments in the wood, and so to uncover its flank.

Lottum, too, extended his front and attacked once more, Orkney
detaching three British battalions, the Buffs, Sixteenth, and
Temple’s, to his assistance, while Marlborough took personal command
of Auvergne’s cavalry in support. The Buffs on Lottum’s extreme
left found a swamp between them and the entrenchments, so deep as
to be almost impassable. In they plunged, notwithstanding, and were
struggling through it when a French officer drew out twelve battalions
and moved them down straight upon their left flank. The British brigade
would have been in a sorry plight had not Villars caught sight of
Marlborough at the head of Auvergne’s horse and instantly recalled
his troops. So the red-coats scrambled on, and, turning the flank of
the entrenchment while Lottum’s men attacked the front, at length with
desperate fighting and heavy loss forced the French back into the wood.
Thus exposed to the double attack of Lottum and Schulemberg, Picardie
at last fell back, but joined itself to Champagne, the next regiment
in seniority; and the two gallant corps, finding a rallying-point
behind an abatis, turned and stood once more. Their comrades gave way
in disorder, but the wood was so dense that the troops on both sides
became disjointed, and the opposing lines broke up into a succession of
small parties, fighting desperately from tree to tree with no further
guidance than their own fury.

The entrenchments on the French left had been forced; and Villars sent
urgent messages to his right for reinforcements. But Boufflers could
spare him none. After Schulemberg and Lottum had been engaged for half
an hour, the Prince of Orange lost patience and, without waiting for
orders, opened not a false but a real attack against the French right.
On the extreme left of Orange’s division were two Highland regiments of
the Dutch service, Tullibardine’s and Hepburn’s, and next to them King
William’s favourite Blue Guards. These were to attack the defences in
the forest of Laignières, while the rest fell upon the entrenchments
in the open; and it was at the head of the Highlanders and of the Blue
Guards that Orange took his place. A tremendous fire of grape and
musketry saluted them as they advanced, and within the first few yards
most of the Prince’s staff were struck dead by his side. His own horse
was killed beneath him, but he disentangled himself and continued to
lead the advance on foot. A few minutes more brought his battalions
under the fire of a French battery on their left flank. Whole ranks
were swept away, but still the Prince was to be seen waving his hat in
front of his troops; and Highlanders and Dutchmen pressing steadily on
carried the first entrenchment with a rush. They then halted to deploy,
but, before they could advance further, Boufflers had rallied his men,
and charging down upon his assailants drove them back headlong. On
Orange’s right, success as short-lived was bought at as dear a price.
The Prince still exerted himself with the utmost gallantry, but his
attack was beaten back at all points. The loss of the Dutch amounted to
six thousand killed and wounded; the Blue Guards had been annihilated,
and the Hanoverian battalions, which had supported them, had suffered
little less severely. In fact, the Prince’s precipitation had brought
about little less than a disaster.

The confusion in this part of the field called both Marlborough and
Eugene to the Allied left to restore order. Further useless sacrifice
of life was checked, for enough and more than enough had been done
to prevent Boufflers from detaching troops to Villars. But soon came
an urgent message requiring the presence of the Duke and the Prince
once more on the right. Schulemberg and Lottum had continued to push
their attack as best they could; and red-coated English, blue-coated
Prussians, and white-coated Austrians were struggling forward from tree
to tree, tripping over felled trunks, bursting through tangled foliage,
panting through quagmires, loading and firing and cursing, guided only
by the flashes before them in the cloud of foul blinding smoke. But now
on the extreme right Withers was steadily advancing; and his turning
movement, though the Duke and Eugene knew it not, was gradually forcing
the French out of the wood. Villars, seeing the danger, called the
Irish Brigade and other regiments from the centre, and launched them
full upon the British and Prussians. Such was the impetuosity of the
Irish that they forced their opponents back some way, until their own
formation was broken by the density of the forest. Eugene hastened
to the spot to rally the retreating battalions and, though struck by
a musket ball in the head, refused to leave the field. Then up came
Withers, just when he was wanted. The Eighteenth Royal Irish met the
French Royal Regiment of Ireland, crushed it with two volleys by sheer
superiority of fire, drove it back in disorder, and pressed on.[64]
Eugene also advanced and was met by Villars, who at this critical
moment was bringing forward his reinforcements in person. A musket
shot struck the Marshal above the knee. Totally unmoved, the gallant
man called for a chair from which to continue to direct his troops,
but presently fainting from pain was carried insensible from the
field. The French, notwithstanding his fall, still barred the advance
of the Allies, but they had been driven from their entrenchments and
from the wood on the left, and only held their own by the help of the
troops that had been withdrawn from the centre. The moment for which
Marlborough had waited was now come.

The forty-gun battery was moved forward, and Orkney leading his British
battalions against the redans captured them, though not without
considerable loss, at the first rush. Two Hanoverian battalions on
their left turned the flank of the adjoining entrenchments; and
Orange, renewing his attack, cleared the whole of the defences in
the glade. The Allied cavalry followed close behind him. Auvergne’s
Dutch were the first to pass the entrenchments, and, though charged
by the French while in the act of deploying, succeeded in repelling
the first attack. But now Boufflers came up at the head of the French
Gendarmerie, and drove Auvergne’s men back irresistibly to the edge of
the entrenchments. Here, however, the French were checked, for Orkney
had lined the parapet with his British; and, though the Gendarmerie
thrice strove gallantly to make an end of the Dutch, they were every
time driven back by the fire of the infantry. Meanwhile the central
battery, which had been parted right and left into two divisions,
advanced and supported the infantry by a cross-fire, and Marlborough,
coming up with the British and Prussian horse, charged the Gendarmerie
in their turn. Boufflers, however, was again ready with fresh troops,
and falling upon Marlborough with the French Household Cavalry crashed
through his two leading lines and threw even the third into disorder.
Then Eugene advancing at the head of the Imperial horse threw the last
reserves into the mêlée and drove the French back. Simultaneously the
Prince of Hesse hurled his squadrons against the infantry of the French
right, and, with the help of the Dutch foot, isolated it still further
from the centre. Boufflers now saw that the day was lost and ordered a
general retreat to Bavay, while he could yet keep his troops together.
The movement was conducted in admirable order, for the French, though
beaten, were not routed, while the Allies were too much exhausted to
pursue. So Boufflers retired unmolested, though it was not yet three
o’clock, honoured alike by friend and foe for his bravery and his skill.

Thus ended the battle of Malplaquet, one of the bloodiest ever fought
by mortal men. Little is known of the details of the fighting, these
being swallowed up in the shade of the forest of Taisnières, where
no man could see what was going forward. All that is certain is that
neither side gave quarter, and that the combat was not only fierce but
savage. The loss of the French was about twelve thousand men, and the
trophies taken from them, against which they could show trophies of
their own, were five hundred prisoners, fifty standards and colours and
sixteen guns. The loss of the Allies was not less than twenty thousand
men killed and wounded, due chiefly to the mad onset of the Prince of
Orange. The Dutch infantry out of thirty battalions lost eight thousand
men, or more than half of their number; the British out of twenty
battalions lost nineteen hundred men,[65] the heaviest sufferers being
the Coldstream Guards, Buffs, Orrery’s and Temple’s.[66]

The more closely the battle is studied, the more the conviction grows
that no action of Marlborough’s was fought less in accordance with his
own plans. We have seen that he would have preferred to fight it on
either of the two preceding days, and that he yielded to Eugene against
his own judgment in suffering it to be postponed. Then again there was
the almost criminal folly of the Prince of Orange, which upset all
preconcerted arrangements, threw away thousands of lives to no purpose,
and not only permitted the French to retreat unharmed at the close of
the day, but seriously imperilled the success of the action at its
beginning. Nevertheless there are still not wanting men to believe the
slanders of the contemptible faction then rising to power in England,
that Marlborough fought the battle from pure lust of slaughter.

Notwithstanding all blunders, which were none of Marlborough’s making,
Malplaquet was a very grand action. The French were equal in number to
the Allies, and occupied a position which was described at the time as
a fortified citadel. They were commanded by an able general, whom they
liked and trusted, they were in good heart, and they looked forward
confidently to victory. Yet they were driven back and obliged to leave
Mons to its fate; and though Villars with his usual bluster described
the victory as more disastrous than defeat, yet French officers could
not help asking themselves whether resistance to Marlborough and Eugene
were not hopeless. Luxemburg with seventy-five thousand men against
fifty thousand had only with difficulty succeeded in forcing the faulty
position of Landen; yet the French had failed to hold the far more
formidable lines of Malplaquet against an army no stronger than their
own. Say Villars what he might, and beyond all doubt he fought a fine
fight, the inference could not be encouraging to France.

It was not until the third day after the fight that the Allies
returned to the investment of Mons. Eugene was wounded, and
Marlborough not only worn out by fatigue but deeply distressed over
the enormous sacrifice of life. The siege was retarded by the marshy
nature of the ground and by heavy rain; but on the 9th of October the
garrison capitulated, and therewith the campaign came to an end.
◆Sept. 28./Oct. 9.◆ Tournay had given the Allies firm foothold on the
Upper Scheldt, and Mons was of great value to cover the captured towns
in Flanders and Brabant. The season’s operations had not been without
good fruit, despite the heavy losses at Malplaquet.

VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER X

◆1711.◆

The French, fully aware of the political changes in England, had during
the winter made extraordinary exertions to prolong the war for yet one
more campaign, and to that end had covered the northern frontier with
a fortified barrier on a gigantic scale. Starting from the coast of
Picardy the lines followed the course of the river Canche almost to its
source. From thence across to the Gy, or southern fork of the Upper
Scarpe, ran a line of earthworks, extending from Oppy to Montenancourt.
From the latter point the Gy and the Scarpe were dammed so as to form
inundations as far as Biache, at which place a canal led the line of
defence from the Scarpe to the Sensée. Here more inundations between
the two rivers carried the barrier to Bouchain, whence it followed
the Scheldt to Valenciennes. From thence more earthworks prolonged the
lines to the Sambre, which carried them at last to their end at Namur.

This was a formidable obstacle to the advance of the Allies, but no
lines had sufficed to stop Marlborough yet; and with Eugene by his
side the Duke did not despair. Before he could start for the campaign,
however, the news came that the Emperor Joseph was dead of smallpox,
an event which signified the almost certain accession of the Archduke
Charles to the Imperial crown and the consequent withdrawal of his
candidature for the throne of Spain. Eugene was consequently detained
at home; and, worse than this, a fine opportunity was afforded
for making a breach in the Grand Alliance. To render the Duke’s
difficulties still greater, though his force was already weakened
by the necessity of finding garrisons for the towns captured in the
previous year, the English Government had withdrawn from him five
battalions[67] for an useless expedition to Newfoundland under the
command of Mrs. Masham’s brother, General Hill; an expedition which may
be dismissed for the present without further mention than that it was
dogged by misfortune from first to last, suffered heavy loss through
shipwreck, and accomplished literally nothing.

Nevertheless the Imperial army was present, though without Eugene. The
whole of the forces were assembled a little to the south of Lille at
Orchies; ◆April 20./May 1.◆ and on the 1st of May Marlborough moved
forward to a position parallel to that of Villars, who lay in rear of
the river Sensée with his left at Oisy and his right at Bouchain.
There both armies remained stationary and inactive for six
weeks. Eugene came, but presently received orders to return and to
bring his troops with him. ◆June 3/14.◆ On the 14th of June
Marlborough moved away one march westward to the plain of Lens in
order to conceal this enforced diminution of his strength. The
position invited a battle, but Villars only moved down within his
lines, parallel to the Duke; and once more both armies remained
inactive for five weeks. After the departure of Eugene the French
commander detached a portion of his troops to the Rhine, but even so
he had one hundred and thirty-one battalions against ninety-four, and
one hundred and eighty-seven squadrons against one hundred and
forty-five of the Allies.

We now approach what is perhaps the most remarkable and certainly the
most entertaining feat of the Duke during the whole war. Villars,
bound by his instructions, would not come out and fight; his lines
could not be forced by an army of inferior strength, and they could
therefore be passed only by stratagem. The inundation on the Sensée
between Arras and Bouchain could be traversed only by two causeways,
the larger of which was defended by a strong fort at Arleux, while the
other was covered by a redoubt at Aubigny, half a mile below
it. Marlborough knew that he could take the fort at Arleux at any time
and demolish it, but he knew also that Villars would certainly retake
it and rebuild as soon as his back was turned. He therefore set
himself to induce Villars to demolish it himself. ◆June 25./July 6.◆
With this view he detached a strong force under General Rantzau to
capture the fort, which was done without difficulty. The Duke then
gave orders that the captured works should be greatly strengthened,
and, for their further protection, posted a large force under the
Prussian General Hompesch on the glacis of Douay, some six miles
distant from the fort.

[Illustration:

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1711.

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

As fate ordained it, Hompesch, thinking himself secure under the guns
of Douay, neglected his outposts and even his sentries, and was
surprised two days later by a sudden attack from Villars, which was
only repulsed with considerable difficulty and not a little
shame. ◆June 28./July 9.◆ Villars was in ecstasies over his success,
and Marlborough displayed considerable annoyance. However, the Duke
reinforced Hompesch, as if to show the value which he attached to
Arleux, and pushed forward the new works with the greatest vigour.
Finally, when all was completed, he threw a weak garrison into the
fort and led the rest of the army away two marches westward, encamping
opposite the lines between the Canche and the Scarpe. ◆July 10/21.◆
Villars likewise moved westward parallel to him, and took up a
position between Oppy and Montenancourt; but, before he started, he
detached a force to attack Arleux. The commander of the fort sent a
message to Marlborough that he could not possibly hold it, and the
Duke at once despatched Cadogan with a strong force to relieve it. It
was noticed, however, that Cadogan made no such haste as the urgency
of the occasion would have seemed to require; and indeed, before he
had gone half-way, he returned with the intelligence that Arleux had
surrendered.

Villars was elated beyond measure; and Marlborough for the first time
in his life seemed to be greatly distressed and cast down. Throwing
off his usual serenity, he proclaimed in public with much passion that
he would be even with Villars yet, and would attack him, come what
might of it, where he lay. Then came the news that Villars had razed
the entire works of Arleux, over which Marlborough had spent such
pains, entirely to the ground. This increased the Duke’s
ill-temper. He declared that he would avenge this insult to his army,
and renewed his menace of a direct attack on the entrenchments.
◆July 15/26.◆ Villars now detached a force to make a diversion in
Brabant; and this step seemed to drive Marlborough distracted. Vowing
that he would check the march of this detachment, he sent off ten
thousand men under Lord Albemarle to Béthune, and the whole of his
baggage and heavy artillery to Douay. ◆July 17/28.◆ Having thus
weakened an army already inferior to that of the French, he repaired
the roads that led towards the enemy’s entrenchments, and on the 1st
of August, with much display of vindictiveness, sulkiness, and general
vexation, advanced one march nearer to the lines, encamping between
Houdain and St. Pol. ◆July 21./Aug. 1.◆ His army watched his
proceedings with amazement, for it had never expected such behaviour
from Corporal John.

Villars meanwhile was in a transport of delight. He drew every man,
not only from all parts of the lines but also from the neighbouring
garrisons, towards the threatened point, and asked nothing better than
that Marlborough should attack. In the height of exultation he
actually wrote to Versailles that he had brought the Duke to his _ne
plus ultra_. Marlborough’s strange manner still remained the
same. ◆July 22./August 2.◆ On the 2nd of August he advanced to within
a league of the lines, his left being opposite to Aubigny on the Upper
Scarpe; and during that day and the next set the whole of his cavalry
to work to collect fascines. ◆July 23./August 3.◆ At nightfall of the
3rd he sent away all his light artillery, together with every wheeled
vehicle, under escort of a strong detachment, and next morning rode
forward with most of his generals to reconnoitre the eastern end of
the lines. ◆July 24./August 4.◆ Captain Parker of the Eighteenth Royal
Irish, who had obtained permission to ride with the Staff, was amazed
at the Duke’s demeanour. Marlborough had now thrown off all his
ill-temper and was calm and cool as usual, indicating this point and
that to his officers. “Your brigade, General, will attack here, such
and such brigades will be on your right and left, such another in
support, and you will be careful of this, that, and other.” The
generals listened and stared; they understood the instructions clearly
enough, but they could not help regarding them as madness. So the
reconnaissance proceeded, drearily enough, and was just concluding
when General Cadogan turned his horse, unnoticed, out of the crowd,
struck in his spurs and galloped back to camp at the top of his
speed. Presently the Duke also turned, and, riding back very slowly,
issued orders to prepare for a general attack on the morrow.

At this all ranks of the army, from the general to the drummer, fell
into the deepest depression. Not a man could fail to see that direct
assault of the lines was a hopeless enterprise at the best of times,
and doubly hopeless now that half of the army and the whole of the
artillery had been detached for other service. Again the violent and
unprecedented outburst of surliness and ill-temper was difficult to
explain; and the only possible explanation was that the Duke, rendered
desperate by failure and misfortunes, had thrown prudence to the winds
and cared not what he did. A few only clung faintly to the hope that
the chief, who had led them so often to victory, might still have some
surprise in store for them; but the most part gave themselves up for
lost, and lamented loudly that they should ever have lived to see such
a change come over the Old Corporal.

So passed the afternoon among the tents of the Allies; but meanwhile
Cadogan with forty hussars at his heels had long started from the camp
and was galloping hard across the plain of Lens to Douay, five leagues
away. There he found Hompesch ready with his garrison, now strengthened
by detachments from Béthune and elsewhere to twelve thousand foot and
two thousand horse, and told him that the time was come. Hompesch
thereupon issued his orders for the troops to be ready to march that
night. Still the main army under Marlborough knew nothing of this, and
passed the day in dismal apprehension till the sun went down, and the
drummers came forward to beat tattoo. Then a column of cavalry trotted
out westward, attracting every French eye and stirring every French
brain with curiosity as to the purport of the movement. The drums began
to roll; and the order ran quietly down the line to strike tents and
prepare to march immediately.

Never was command more welcome. Within an hour all was ready and the
army was formed into four columns. The cavalry, having done their work
of distracting French vigilance to the wrong quarter, returned unseen
by the enemy; and at nine o’clock the whole army faced to its left and
marched off eastward in utter silence, with Marlborough himself at the
head of the vanguard.

◆July 24–25./August 4–5.◆

The night was fine, and under the radiant moonlight the men swung
forward bravely hour after hour over the plain of Lens. The moon
paled; the dawn crept up into the east throwing its ghastly light on
the host of weary, sleepless faces; and presently the columns reached
the Scarpe at Vitry. So far the march had lasted eight hours, and
fifteen miles had been passed. Pontoon-bridges were already laid
across the river, and on the further bank, punctual to appointment,
stood Brigadier Sutton with the field-artillery. The river was passed,
and presently a messenger came spurring from the east with a despatch
for the Duke of Marlborough. ◆July 25./August 5.◆ He read it; and
words were passed down the columns of march which filled them with new
life. “Generals Cadogan and Hompesch” (such was their purport)
“crossed the causeway at Arleux unopposed at three o’clock this
morning, and are in possession of the enemy’s lines. The Duke desires
that the infantry will step out.” The right wing of horse halted to
form the rearguard and bring up stragglers, while a cloud of dust in
the van told that the Duke and fifty squadrons with him were pushing
forward at the trot. Then the infantry shook themselves up and stepped
out with a will.

◆July 25./August 5.◆

Villars had received intelligence of Marlborough’s march only two hours
after he had started, but he was so thoroughly bewildered by the Duke’s
intricate manœvres that he did not awake to the true position until
three hours later. Then, quite distracted, he put himself at the head
of the Household Cavalry and galloped off at full speed. So furiously
rode he that he wore down all but a hundred of his troopers and
pushed on with these alone. But even so Marlborough was before him.
At eight o’clock he crossed the lower causeway at Aubanchœuil-au-bac
and passing his cavalry over the Sensée barred the road from the west
by the village of Oisy. Presently Villars, advancing reckless of all
precautions, blundered into the middle of the outposts. Before he could
retire, his whole escort was captured, and he himself only by miracle
escaped the same fate.

The Marshal now looked anxiously for the arrival of his main body of
horse; but the Allied infantry had caught sight of the French on the
other side of the Sensée, and, weary though they were, had braced
themselves to race them for the goal. Nevertheless the severity of the
march and the burden of their packs began to tell heavily on the foot.
Hundreds dropped down unconscious, and many died there and then, but
they were left where they lay to await the arrival of the rearguard;
for no halt was called, and each regiment pushed on as cheerfully as
possible with such men as still survived. Thus they were still ahead
of the French when they turned off to the causeway at Arleux, and,
Marlborough having thrown additional bridges over the Sensée, they came
quickly into their positions. The right wing of infantry crossed the
river about four o’clock in the afternoon, having covered close upon
forty miles in eighteen hours; and by five o’clock the whole force
was drawn up between Oisy and the Scheldt within striking distance of
Arras, Cambrai, and Bouchain. So vanished the ne plus ultra of Villars,
a warning to all generals who put their sole trust in fortified lines.

Marlborough halted for the next day to give his troops rest and to
allow the stragglers to come in. Fully half the men of the infantry had
fallen out, and there were many who did not rejoin the army until the
third day. Villars on his side moved forward and offered Marlborough
battle under the walls of Cambrai; but the Duke would not accept it,
though the Dutch deputies, perverse and treacherous to the last, tried
hard to persuade him. Had the deputies marched in the ranks of the
infantry with muskets on their shoulders and a kit of fifty pounds’
weight on their backs, they would have been less eager for the fray.
Marlborough’s own design, long matured in his own mind, was the
capture of Bouchain, and his only fear was lest Villars should cross
the Scheldt before him and prevent it. The deputies, however, who
had been so anxious to hurry the army into an engagement under every
possible disadvantage, shrank from the peril of a siege carried on by
an inferior under the eyes of a superior force. But Marlborough, even
if he had not been able to adduce Lille as a precedent, was determined
to have his own way, and carried his point. ◆July 27./August 7.◆ At
noon on the 7th of August he marched down almost within cannon-shot
of Cambrai, ready to fall on Villars should he attempt to pass the
Scheldt, halted until his pontoon-bridges had been laid a few miles
further down the stream, and then gradually withdrawing his troops
threw the whole of them across the river unmolested.

It is hardly credible that a vast number of foolish civilians, Dutch,
Austrian, and even English, blamed Marlborough for declining battle
before Cambrai, and that he was actually obliged to explain why he
refused to sacrifice the fruit of his manœvres by attacking a superior
force in a strong position with an army not only smaller in numbers at
its best, but much thinned by a forced march and exhausted by fatigue.
“I despair of being ever able to please all men,” he wrote. “Those who
are capable of judging will be satisfied with my endeavours: others
I leave to their own reflections, and go on with the discharge of my
duty.”

It is possible that Villars only refrained from hindering
Marlborough’s passage of the Scheldt in deference to orders from
Versailles, of which the Duke was as well aware as himself; but it is
more than doubtful whether he ever intended the British to capture
Bouchain. Though inferior in numbers, however, Marlborough covered
himself so skilfully with entrenchments that Villars could not hinder
him, while all attempts at diversion were met so readily that not one
of them succeeded. ◆Sept. 2/13.◆ Finally, the garrison surrendered as
prisoners of war under the very eyes of Villars. The Duke would have
followed up his success by the siege of Quesnoi, the town before which
English troops first came under the fire of cannon in the year of
Crecy; but by this time Lewis, with the help of the contemptible
Harley, had succeeded in detaching England from the Grand Alliance.
Though, therefore, the English ministers continued to encourage
Marlborough in his operations, in order to conceal their own infamous
conduct from the Allies, yet they took good care that those operations
should proceed no further. So with the capture of Bouchain the last
and not the least remarkable of Marlborough’s campaigns came, always
victoriously, to an end.

CAMPAIGNS OF 1744–1748

VOL. II. BOOK VII. CHAPTER V

However fortunate might be the issue of Dettingen, it served at least
its purpose in preventing the despatch of French reinforcements to the
Danube and to Bohemia; and the campaign of 1743 closed with the utter
collapse of Belleisle’s great schemes and with the expulsion of the
French from Germany. It was now clear that the war would be carried on
in the familiar cockpit of the Austrian Netherlands. Such a theatre
was convenient for France, since it lay close to her own borders, and
convenient for the Allies, because the Dutch had at last been persuaded
to join them, and because the British would be brought nearer to their
base at Ostend. Marshal Saxe, whose fine talent had hitherto been
wasted under incompetent French Generals in Bohemia, was appointed to
the chief command of the French in Flanders; and every effort was made
to give him a numerous and well-equipped army, and to enable him to
open his campaign in good time.

◆1744.◆

In England the preparations by no means corresponded with the
necessities of the position. The estimates indeed provided for a force
of twenty-one thousand British in Flanders in 1744 as against sixteen
thousand in the previous year, but only at the cost of depleting the
weak garrison left in England; for the actual number of men voted
for the two years was the same. All British officers of experience
strongly urged upon the Government the importance of being first
in the field,[68] but, when an army was to be made up in different
proportions of English, Dutch, Germans and Austrians, it needed a
Marlborough to bring the discordant Courts into harmony as well as to
make ready the troops for an early campaign. By the beginning of April
eighty thousand French soldiers had marched from their winter quarters,
and were concentrated on the frontier between the Scheldt and the
Sambre, while the Allies were still scattered about in cantonments,
not exceeding even then a total strength of fifty-live thousand men.
Wade, the English commander, delayed first by confusion at home and
next by contrary winds, was still in England while the French were
concentrating, and not a single English recruit, to repair the losses
of the past campaign, had arrived in Flanders. Then arose disputes
as to the disposition of the Allied forces, both Austrians and Dutch
being nervously apprehensive of leaving their towns on the frontier
without garrisons. When in the second week in May the Allied Army was
at last collected close to Brussels, it was still weaker by twenty
thousand men than it should have been, and found itself confronted
with the task of holding Flanders, Brabant, Hainault, and the Sambre
against a superior force of French.[69] May passed away and June came,
but the Allies remained helpless and motionless in their camp, while
Saxe, after a short march westward, turned north and advanced steadily
between the Scheldt and the Lys. His principal object was not very
difficult to divine. By the middle of June his detachments had seized
Ypres and Fort Knock, which commanded the canal from Nieuport to Ypres,
thus cutting off the British from one of their bases on the coast. It
remained to be seen whether he would aim next at Ostend, where the
whole of the British stores of ordnance were accumulated, or whether he
would attempt Bruges and Ghent in order to secure the navigation of the
Bruges Canal as well as of the Scheldt and Lys. Again, it was always
open to him, if he pleased, to besiege Tournay, a fortress which the
Allies would not willingly lose. Thus the problem set to the Allies
was not easy of solution; but of all solutions they chose the worst.
The Dutch and Austrians could not bear the notion of forsaking any one
of their darling strongholds, and insisted that the strength of the
army should be frittered away in providing weak garrisons for the
defence of all.[70] Wade, to do him justice, was for keeping all the
troops together, crossing the Scheldt, and taking up a strong position
to cover Ghent; but the Austrians would not consent, lest they should
expose Brussels.[71] Wade was certainly not a strong man, but he must
not be too hardly judged. Marlborough had spent the most anxious days
of all his campaigns in distraction between the safety of Ghent and of
Brussels, and had only extricated himself by the march that preceded
the battle of Oudenarde.

Meanwhile King George had been exerting himself with great energy,
though two months too late, to provide Wade with additional troops,
both British and Dutch, and had begged that Prince Charles of Lorraine
might cross the Rhine with his whole army, and direct the operations
in Flanders as Commander-in-Chief of all the Allies. It was a wise
step in every way, since the Prince’s relationship to Queen Maria
Theresa assured to him the seniority in rank which was needed to hold
so heterogeneous a host in coherence. ◆July.◆ Prince Charles did his
share of the work admirably, forcing his passage across the Rhine with
great skill in the face of the French, and taking up a strong position
on the frontier of Alsace. A few days later the British reinforcements
reached Wade, and King George issued positive orders to him to take
the offensive and “commence hostilities of all kinds.”[72]

It seemed, indeed, as if the time were come for pressing home upon
the French; but just at this critical moment Frederick of Prussia
intervened in favour of France, and, by a threat to invade Bohemia,
brought Prince Charles back quickly over the Rhine. None the less
Wade and his fellows held a council of war and resolved to bring Saxe
to action if possible. ◆July 20/31.◆ King George gave his gracious
approval to their plan, and on the 31st of July the Allies turned
westward and crossed the Scheldt. It still remained to be seen,
however, whether Saxe would allow an action to be forced on him; for
he lay now, entrenched to the teeth, on the Lys between Menin and
Courtrai, which was a pretty clear indication that he would not. At
this moment Lord Stair, who had followed the course of operations
carefully from England, came forward, like a true pupil of Marlborough,
with a new plan of campaign. His advice was that the Allies should turn
Saxe’s tactics against himself. They should march south to Orchies,
between Lille and Tournay, and there encamp, where they would be within
reach of half-a-dozen French fortified towns. The French would not dare
to leave the fortresses defenceless; and the garrisons necessary to
render them secure would absorb the whole of their force in the field.
Then the Allies could send detachments into France and lay Picardy
under contribution, or possibly carry out the plan, rejected two years
before, of a march to the Seine. The King of Prussia’s action only made
some bold stroke of the kind the more imperative.[73]

Stair had gained over the Austrian general D’Arenberg to this project
in 1742; but it was hardly likely to be accepted by him now. Carteret,
in forwarding Stair’s memorandum to Wade, gave him no positive orders
except at least to do something; but poor Wade found it impossible to
make the Austrians do anything. The Allies having crossed the Scheldt
halted inactive for weeks, and no persuasion could induce D’Arenberg
to move. At last the army did march down to the plains of Lille, but
without its artillery, so that it could not be said seriously to
threaten the French fortresses. The Dutch and Austrians had undertaken
to furnish a siege-train, but had taken no step to procure one of the
ten thousand horses that were required to transport it. After a short
sojourn in the south the Allies marched helplessly northward once
more. August passed away and September came, but even in the fourth
month of the campaign the Dutch and Austrians were still without their
artillery.[74] Wade boldly proposed to force Saxe’s lines on the
Lys: the Austrians refused. He proposed to pounce on a detachment of
fourteen thousand men, which Saxe had imprudently isolated from his
main army: D’Arenberg carefully sent a weak body of cavalry to reveal
to the detachment the danger of its position. Finally, in the first
week of October the Allies retired into winter-quarters, which was
precisely the object for which D’Arenberg had been working from the
first. Despite of the English subsidies, he had no money with which to
pay his troops, and he wished to spare the Austrian Netherlands the
burden of furnishing forage and contributions. Wade, sick in body and
distressed in mind, at once resigned his command. He had had enough of
the Austrian alliance, and King George before long was to have enough
of it also.[75]

◆1745.◆

Once again, despite the endless length to which the war was dragging
on, the establishment of the British forces remained virtually
unaugmented for the year 1745. The troops allotted for service in
Flanders were indeed raised to a strength of twenty-five thousand men,
but this was effected only by reducing the garrison of Great
Britain to fifteen thousand, which, as events were to prove before the
year’s end, created a situation of perilous weakness. Moreover, the
past campaign had revealed a failing in one of the confederated powers
which was hardly less serious than the impecuniosity and selfishness
of Austria. The Dutch army, which under Marlborough had done such
brilliant service, was become hopelessly inefficient. The competition
of rival demagogues for popular favour had reduced it to such weakness
in numbers, that it hardly sufficed to find efficient garrisons for the
fortified towns. Concurrently its discipline had suffered; and General
Ligonier had already complained that the Dutch troops which served
with the Allies in 1744 were intolerably insubordinate and disorderly,
setting a bad example to the whole army.[76] In February 1745 Ligonier
again brought the matter to the notice of the English Government. The
Dutch, he said, would probably keep all their men in garrison, and, if
the Allies were so weak that they could only find garrisons for the
fortresses on the frontier, the French would be free to go where they
pleased. It would be far better, therefore, to make a great effort,
collect a hundred thousand men, take the offensive, and end the war
in a single campaign. Ten thousand men would be required to guard the
line of the Bruges Canal, and the remainder should besiege Maubeuge
and Landrecies and enter France by the line of the Sambre, making the
Meuse the main line of communication, as open alike to the passage
of reinforcements from England, from Holland, and from Germany.[77]
Such counsel was not likely to find acceptance with the men who had
mismanaged the war so far. One important change, however, was made by
the appointment of the Duke of Cumberland to be Commander-in-Chief in
Flanders, and also in Great Britain.[78] The Duke at the time of this
promotion still wanted a month to complete his twenty-fifth year, but
he had from his boyhood been an enthusiastic soldier, he had studied
his profession, he had shown bravery at Dettingen, and, young though
he might be, he was older than Condé had been when he first gained
military fame. Finally, it was an immense advantage that a Prince of
a reigning family should preside over so motley an army as that of
the Allies, since there would be the less disposition to cavil at his
authority.

Cumberland entered upon his work energetically enough, crossed over to
Flanders early in April, made all his arrangements for concentration at
Brussels on the 2nd of May, and actually began his march southward on
the following day.[79] ◆April 22./May 3.◆ Even so, however, Marshal Saxe
had taken the field before him, assembling his troops in Hainault, as in
the previous year, so that it was impossible to divine which of the
fortresses of the barrier he might intend to attack. After a feint which
pointed to the siege of Mons, he marched rapidly upon Tournay and
invested it on the 30th of April, ◆Apr. 19/30.◆ screening his movements
so skilfully with his cavalry that not a word as to his operations
reached Cumberland until nearly a week later. Cumberland, after leaving
Soignies on the 3rd of May, moved slowly south-westward by Cambron,
Maulbay, and Leuse, and arrived on the evening of the 9th at Brissoel,
within sight of Saxe’s army. ◆April 28./May 9.◆ The ground immediately
in front of the Allies was broken by little copses, woods, and
enclosures, all of them crammed with mercenary irregular
troops—Pandours, Grassins, and the like—which, imitated first from the
Austrians, had by this time become a necessary part of the French as of
every army. Beyond this broken ground a wide plain swept in a gentle,
almost unbroken slope to the village of Fontenoy, which formed the
centre of Saxe’s position. The advanced parties of irregulars, together
with twelve squadrons drawn up on the slope before Fontenoy, forbade
Cumberland’s further advance for that day, and the Allies encamped for
the night. Headquarters were fixed at Maubray, a village in full sight
of Fontenoy, and a bare mile and a half to the south-eastward of the
French camp.

◆April 29./May 10.◆

On the next day the French advanced posts were pushed out of the
copses, and Cumberland, together with the Prince of Waldeck and
the Count of Königseck, who commanded the Dutch and the Austrians
respectively, went forward to reconnoitre the position. Saxe’s army
occupied the crest of the slope, lying astride of the two roads that
lead from Condé and from Leuse to Tournay. His right rested on the
village of Anthoin and on the Scheldt, the tower of Anthoin Castle
marking the western boundary of his position with clearness enough.
From thence his line extended due east along the crest of the height
for about a mile to the village of Fontenoy. A few hundred yards
before Fontenoy stands the hamlet of Bourgeon, but this was now
veiled in smoke and flame, having been fired by the Pandours as they
retired. From Anthoin to Fontenoy Saxe’s front faced due south, but
eastward from Fontenoy it turned back almost at right angles to the
forest of Barry and the village of Ramecroix, fronting considerably
to eastward of south. The village of Vezon, however, which lies in
the same straight line with Fontenoy, due east of Anthoin, was also
occupied by the French as an advanced post. This was quickly cleared
by Cumberland’s troops, and the Allied Generals completed their
reconnaissance. Saxe’s position was undoubtedly strong by nature and
had been strengthened still further by art. Beyond Anthoin the French
right flank was secured by a battery erected on the western bank of
the Scheldt, while the village itself was entrenched, and held by
two brigades. Between Anthoin and Fontenoy three redoubts had been
constructed, and the space was defended by three brigades of infantry
backed by eight squadrons of horse. Fontenoy itself had been fortified
with works and cannon, and made as strong as possible; and from
Fontenoy to the forest of Barry ran a double line of entrenchments,
the first line held by nine and the second by eleven battalions of
infantry. At the edge of the forest of Barry were two more redoubts,
the foremost of them called the Redoubt d’Eu, both armed with cannon to
sweep the open space between the forest and Fontenoy; in rear of the
forest were posted nine more battalions, and in rear of all two strong
lines of cavalry. The flower of the French army, both horse and foot,
was stationed in this space on Saxe’s left, for the English had the
right of the line in the Allied Army, and Saxe knew the reputation of
the red-coats.

The Allied Generals decided to attack on the following day. Königseck,
it is said, was for harassing Saxe’s communications and compelling
him to raise the siege of Tournay; but, finding himself overruled
by Cumberland and by Waldeck, he gave way. Cumberland’s force was
decidedly inferior in numbers, being less than fifty thousand against
fifty-six thousand men, but he was young and impetuous, and had
been strongly impressed by the disastrous inaction of the preceding
campaign. It was agreed that the Dutch and Austrians should assail the
French centre and right, the Dutch in particular being responsible
for Fontenoy, while the British attacked the French left between that
village and the forest of Barry.

[Illustration:

FONTENOY
April 30th/May 11th 1745

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

◆April 30./May 11.◆

At two o’clock on the following morning the British began to move out
of their camp upon Vezon, the cavalry leading. The advance took much
time, for there were many narrow lanes to be traversed before the force
could debouch upon the slope, and, when the slope was passed, it was
still necessary to defile through the village of Vezon. Cumberland’s
order of attack was simple. Brigadier Ingoldsby, with the Twelfth and
Thirteenth Foot, the Forty-second Highlanders, a Hanoverian battalion,
and three six-pounder cannon, was to assault the Redoubt d’Eu on the
right flank of the line of the British advance, and to carry it with
the bayonet. The remainder of the infantry was simply to march up
across the thousand yards of open ground between it and Fontenoy and
sweep the enemy out of their entrenchments.

Before five o’clock the advanced squadrons of the British horse,
fifteen in all, under General Campbell, had passed through Vezon and
deployed in the plain beyond, to cover the formation of the infantry
for the attack. The French batteries in Fontenoy and the redoubt at
once opened fire on them, but the cavalry endured the fire for an
hour unmoved, until at length a shot carried away General Campbell’s
leg. The gallant veteran, who had fought at Malplaquet and was now
seventy-eight years of age, was carried dying from the field, full of
lamentation that he could take no further part in the action. No one
but himself seems to have known for what purpose his squadrons had been
brought forward, and accordingly after his fall they were withdrawn.
The infantry then moved up to the front, where General Ligonier
proceeded to form them in two lines, without further interruption,
to use his own simple words, than a lively and murderous cannonade
from the French. Cumberland meanwhile ordered up seven six-pounders
to the right of the British front, which quickly came into action.
Conspicuous before the French front rode an officer on a white horse,
and the English gunners at once began to lay wagers who should kill
him. The second or third shot brought the white charger to the ground,
and his rider was carried, shattered and dying, to the rear. He was
Count Grammont, the gallant but thoughtless officer who had spoiled
the combinations of Noailles at Dettingen. Then, turning to their more
legitimate work, the gunners quickly made their presence felt among
the French field-batteries; but the round shot never ceased to plough
into the scarlet ranks of the British from Fontenoy and from the
Redoubt d’Eu. Ligonier’s two lines of infantry were soon formed, with
the cavalry in two more lines in their rear; and the General presently
sent word to Cumberland that he was ready to advance as soon as Waldeck
should lead his Dutch against Fontenoy. The name of the aide-de-camp
who carried this message should not be omitted, for he was Captain
Jeffery Amherst of the First Guards.

Thereupon the Dutch and Austrians, in the centre and left, advanced
against Fontenoy and Anthoin, but flinching from the fire in front,
and above all from that in their flank from the battery on the other
side of the Scheldt, soon shrank back under cover and could not be
induced to move forward again.[80] Worst of all, the Dutch cavalry was
smitten with panic, galloped back on to the top of some of the British
squadrons, and fled away wildly to Hal crying out that all was lost.
Things therefore went ill on the Allied left; and meanwhile on the
right there was enacted a blunder still more fatal. For Ingoldsby,
misconceiving his instructions, hesitated to make his attack on the
Redoubt d’Eu, and despite repeated orders from Cumberland never
delivered it at all. Cumberland, however, was impatient. Without
further delay he placed himself at the head of the British, who were
standing as Ligonier had arrayed them, in most beautiful order. In the
first line, counting from right to left, stood a battalion of the First
Guards, another of the Scots Guards, and another of the Coldstream,
the First, Twenty-first, Thirty-first, Eighth, Twenty-fifth,
Thirty-third, and Nineteenth; in the second line the Buffs occupied the
post of honour on the right, and next to them came in succession the
Twenty-third, Thirty-second, Eleventh, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-fourth,
and Twentieth. Certain Hanoverian battalions joined them on the extreme
left. The drums beat, the men shouldered arms, and the detachments
harnessed themselves to the two light field-guns that accompanied
each battalion. Ingoldsby saw what was going forward and aligned his
battalions with them on the right. Then the word was given to advance,
and the two lines moved off with the slow and measured step for which
they were famous in Europe.

Forward tramped the ranks of scarlet, silent and stately as if
on parade. Full half a mile of ground was to be traversed before
they could close with the invisible enemy that awaited them in the
entrenchments over the crest of the slope, and the way was marked
clearly by the red flashes and puffs of white smoke that leaped from
Fontenoy and the Redoubt d’Eu on either flank. The shot plunged
fiercely and more fiercely into the serried lines as they advanced into
that murderous cross-fire, but the gaping ranks were quietly closed,
the perfect order was never lost, the stately step was never hurried.
Only the Hanoverians in the second line, finding that they were cramped
for space, dropped back quietly and decorously, and marched on in third
line behind the British. Silent and inexorable the scarlet lines strode
on. They came abreast of village and redoubt, and the shot which had
hitherto swept away files now swept away ranks. Then the first line
passed beyond redoubt and village, and the French cannon took it in
reverse. The gaps grew wider and more frequent, the front grew narrower
as the men closed up, but still the proud battalions advanced, strewing
the sward behind them with scarlet, like some mass of red blossom that
floats down a lazy stream and sheds its petals as it goes.

At last the crest of the ridge was gained and the ranks of the French
battalions came suddenly into view little more than a hundred yards
distant, their coats alone visible behind the breastwork. Next to the
forest of Barry, and exposed to the extreme right of the British, a
line of red showed the presence of the Swiss Guards; next to them stood
a line of blue, the four battalions of the French Guards, and next to
the Guards a line of white, the regiments of Courtin, Aubeterre, and of
the King, the choicest battalions of the French Army. Closer and closer
came the British, still with arms shouldered, always silent, always
with the same slow, measured tread, till they had advanced to within
fifty yards of the French. Then at length Lord Charles Hay of the First
Guards stepped forward with flask in hand, and doffing his hat drank
politely to his enemies. “I hope, gentlemen,” he shouted, “that you are
going to wait for us to-day and not swim the Scheldt as you swam the
Main at Dettingen. Men of the King’s company,” he continued, turning
round to his own people, “these are the French Guards, and I hope you
are going to beat them to-day”; and the English Guards answered with a
cheer. The French officers hurried to the front, for the appearance of
the British was a surprise to them, and called for a cheer in reply.
But only a half-hearted murmur came from the French ranks, which
quickly died away and gave place to a few sharp words of command;
for the British were now within thirty yards. “For what we are about
to receive may the Lord make us truly thankful,” murmured an English
Guardsman as he looked down the barrels of the French muskets, but
before his comrades round him had done laughing the French Guards had
fired; and the turn of the British had come at last.[81]

For despite of that deadly march through the cross-fire of the French
batteries to the muzzles of the French muskets, the scarlet ranks still
glared unbroken through the smoke; and now the British muskets, so
long shouldered, were levelled, and with crash upon crash the volleys
rang out from end to end of the line, first the First Guards, then the
Coldstreams, then the Scots, and so through brigade after brigade,
two battalions loading while the third fired, a ceaseless, rolling,
infernal fire. Down dropped the whole of the French front rank, blue
coats, red coats and white, before the storm. Nineteen officers and six
hundred men of the French and Swiss Guards fell at the first discharge;
regiment Courtin was crushed out of existence; regiment Aubeterre,
striving hard to stem the tide, was swept aside by a single imperious
volley which laid half of its men on the ground. The British infantry
were perfectly in hand; their officers could be seen coolly tapping
the muskets of the men with their canes so that every discharge might
be low and deadly; while the battalion-guns also poured in round after
round of grape with terrible effect. The first French line was utterly
shattered and broken. Even while the British were advancing, Saxe had
brought up additional troops to meet them and had posted regiments
Couronne and Soissonois in rear of the King’s regiment, and the Brigade
Royal in rear of the French Guards; but all alike went down before the
irresistible volleys. The red-coats continued their triumphant advance
for full three hundred yards into the heart of the French camp, and old
Ligonier’s heart leaped within him, for he thought that the battle was
won.

Saxe for his part thought little differently from Ligonier; but
though half dead with dropsy, reduced to suck a bullet to assuage his
intolerable thirst, so weak that he could not ride but was carried
about the field in a wicker litter, the gallant German never for a
moment lost his head. Sending a message to the French King, who with
the Dauphin was watching the action from a windmill in the rear,
to retire across the Scheldt without delay, he strove to gain time
to rally his infantry. On the first repulse of the French Guards
Cumberland had detached two battalions to help the Dutch by a flanking
attack on Fontenoy. Seeing that this movement must be checked at
all hazards, Saxe headed these troops back by a charge of cavalry;
whereupon one of the battalions extended itself along the left flank
of the British. Partly in this way, partly owing to the incessant
play of the French artillery on both flanks, the two British lines
assumed the form of two huge oblong columns which gradually became
welded into one. The change was not untimely, for now the first line
of the French cavalry, which had been posted in rear of the forest of
Barry, came down upon the British at full gallop, only to reel back
shivered to fragments by the same terrible fire. Then the second line
tried its fortune, but met with no better fate. Finally, the Household
Cavalry, the famous Maison du Roi, burning with all the ardour of
Dettingen unavenged, was launched against the scarlet columns, and
like its predecessors, came flying back, a mob of riderless horses
and uncontrollable men, decimated, shattered and repulsed by the
never-ending fire. “It was like charging two flaming fortresses rather
than two columns of infantry.”[82]

Nevertheless some time was hereby gained for the broken French infantry
to re-form. The British, once arrived within the French camp, came to
a halt, and looked at last to see how the Dutch were faring on their
left. As has already been told, Waldeck’s attack had been a total
failure, and the British, unsupported and always under a cross-fire of
artillery, fell back to the crest of the ridge and were re-formed for a
second attack. Waldeck undertook to make another attempt on Fontenoy,
and Cumberland, in reliance upon his help, again advanced at the head
of the British. But meanwhile Saxe had brought forward his reserves
from Ramecroix, and among them the Irish brigade, to meet him, while
artillery had also been brought up from the French right to play upon
the British front. The French Guards and the rest of the troops of the
French first line had also been rallied, and the task of the British
was well-nigh desperate. The Irish brigade, which consisted of six
battalions, was made up not of Irish only but of Scots and English
also, desperate characters who went into action with a rope round
their necks, and would fight like devils. Yet, even in this second
attack the British carried their advance as far as in the first, the
perfection of their fire-discipline enabling them to beat back even the
Irish brigade for a time. But their losses had been frightfully heavy;
the Dutch would not move one foot to the attack of Fontenoy, and the
cannonade in front added to that in the flanks became unendurable. The
French infantry likewise closed round on them in superior numbers on
both flanks, and it became apparent that there was nothing for it but a
retreat.

Ligonier sent back two battalions to secure the roads leading through
Vezon, and the retreat then began in perfectly good order. The French
Household Cavalry made a furious charge upon the rear of the column
as it faced about, but found to its cost that the infernal fire was
not yet quenched. The three battalions of Guards and a battalion of
Hanoverians turned sternly about to meet them, and gave them a few
parting volleys, which wholly extinguished one regiment and brought
down every officer of another. A few British squadrons, the Blues
conspicuous among them, pushed forward, in spite of heavy losses,
through the cross-fire to lend what help they could, and the remnant
of the heroic battalions retired, facing about in succession at every
hundred yards, as steadily and proudly as they had advanced.

Their losses in the action were terribly severe. Of the fifteen
thousand infantry, English and Hanoverian, for the Hanoverians bore
themselves not less nobly than their Allies, nearly six thousand were
killed or wounded, the casualties of the twenty English battalions just
exceeding four thousand men. The heaviest sufferers were the Twelfth
and Twenty-third regiments, both of which lost over three hundred men,
the Twenty-first and Thirty-first, which lost rather fewer than three
hundred men apiece, and the three battalions of Guards, which lost
each of them about two hundred and fifty. Of the Generals of Foot,
Cumberland, Ligonier, and Brigadier Skelton, though in the hottest of
the fire, alone came off unhurt; all of the rest were either killed
or wounded. Many regiments of cavalry also suffered not a little, in
particular the Blues and Royal Dragoons; and the total loss of the
British cavalry exceeded three hundred men and six hundred horses. The
loss of the French was never made public, but was certainly at least
equal to that of the Allies. Contemporary accounts set it down, with no
great improbability, at fully ten thousand men. As an example of the
prowess of British infantry, Fontenoy stands almost without a parallel
in its history. The battalions formed under a cross-fire of artillery,
remained halted under the same fire, advanced slowly for half a
mile in perfect order under the same fire, and marched up to within
pistol-shot of the French infantry to receive their volley before they
discharged a shot. They shattered the French battalions to pieces,
repulsed three separate attacks of cavalry, halted under a heavy
cannonade, retired for some distance and re-formed under a cross-fire,
advanced again with both artillery and musketry playing on front and
flanks, made the bravest brigade in the French service recoil, repelled
another desperate attack of cavalry, and retired slowly and orderly
under a cross-fire almost to the end. By consent of all the British
commanders it was Ingoldsby’s misunderstanding of his orders and his
failure to capture the Redoubt d’Eu that lost the battle; and Ingoldsby
was duly tried by court-martial for his behaviour. He was, however,
acquitted of all but an error in judgment; and indeed there was no
question of cowardice, for he accompanied the remainder of the infantry
in its advance with his own detachment and was severely wounded. It is
customary to blame Cumberland for dashing his head against a wall in
attempting such an attack; and no doubt he was guilty of a tactical
blunder in assaulting a re-entrant angle before the salient had been
carried. But he could hardly have been expected to count on such bad
luck as the failure of Ingoldsby on one flank and of the Dutch on
the other. The sheer audacity of his advance went near to give him
the victory. Saxe owned that he never dreamed that any General would
attempt such a stroke, or that any troops would execute it. Cumberland
is blamed also for not attacking either the Redoubt d’Eu or Fontenoy
after he had penetrated into the French camp. This charge is less
easy to rebut, for the French always know when they are beaten, and
seeing their left rolled up and troops advancing on Fontenoy in
flank and rear would probably have given up the game for lost, and
that the more readily since their ammunition in Fontenoy was for the
moment nearly exhausted. Even so, however, Saxe’s reserves were always
at hand at Ramecroix, and would have required to be held in check.
Another puzzling question, namely, why Cumberland did not make greater
use of his artillery in the action, is answered by the fact that the
contractors for the horsing of the guns ran off with the horses early
in the day. Such an occurrence was by no means unusual, and yet it
never happened to Marlborough, not even at Malplaquet. Altogether, the
conclusion seems to be that Cumberland stumbled on to a brilliant feat
of arms by mistake, and, though seconded by his troops with bravery
equal to his own, was not a General of sufficient capacity to turn his
success to account.

At the close of the action Cumberland retreated to Ath and encamped
under the guns of that fortress, leaving his wounded to the mercy of
the French, who, by a strange perversion of their usual chivalry,
treated them with shameful barbarity. Among the wounded, strangely
enough, were a few of the new sect of Methodists founded by John
Wesley, who faced death and wounds with the stern exultation that had
once inspired the troopers of Cromwell. One of them wrote to Wesley
that, even after a bullet in each arm had forced him to retire from the
field, he hardly knew whether he was on earth or in heaven, such was
the sweetness of the day. This man and a few more of his kind probably
helped their fellow-sufferers through the misery of the days following
the battle, until Cumberland’s furious remonstrances with Saxe procured
for them better treatment.

From Ath Cumberland fell back to Lessines and drew out such British
corps as were in garrison in Flanders, to replace those which had
suffered most heavily in the action. Meanwhile Tournay, very shortly
after the battle, fell by treachery into the hands of the French; and
Saxe’s field-army being thus raised to a force nearly double that of
the Allies, Cumberland was reduced to utter helplessness. The mischief
of Fontenoy lay not in the repulse and the loss of men, for the
British did not consider themselves to have been beaten, but in the
destruction of all confidence in the Dutch troops. The troubles which
had harassed Wade to despair now reappeared. Cumberland,
notwithstanding his inferiority in strength, was expected somehow to
defend Flanders, Brabant, and above all Brussels, and yet
simultaneously to keep an active army in the field. Worse than this,
he attempted to fulfil the expectation. Against his better judgment he
weakened his force still further by detaching a force for the garrison
of Mons,[83] after which, instead of taking up a strong position on
the Scheldt to cover Ghent at all hazards, he yielded to the pressure
of the Austrians and crossed the Dender to protect Brussels.[84]
Halting too long between two opinions he at last sent off a detachment
for the defence of Ghent, half of which was cut off and driven back
with heavy loss, while the other half, after enduring much rough usage
on the march, entered Ghent only to see the town surprised by the
French on the following day. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ Four British
regiments took part in this unlucky enterprise and suffered severely,
while the Royal Scots and the Twenty-third, which had been despatched
to Ghent after Fontenoy, of course became prisoners.[85] Moreover, a
vast quantity of British military stores were captured in Ghent,
although Cumberland had a week before ordered that they should be
removed.[86] After this blow Cumberland retired to Vilvorde, a little
to the north of Brussels, still hoping to cover both that city and
Antwerp, and so to preserve his communications both with Germany and
with the sea. Here again he sacrificed his better judgment to the
clamour of the Austrians, for he would much have preferred to secure
Antwerp only. His position was in fact most critical, and he was
keenly alive to it.[87] Just when his anxiety was greatest there came
a letter from the Secretary of State, announcing that invasion of
England was imminent, and hoping that troops could be spared from
Flanders without prejudice to his operations. “What!” answered
Ligonier indignantly; “are you aware that the enemy has seventy
thousand men against our thirty thousand, and that they can place a
superior force on the canal before us and send another army round
between us and Antwerp, to cut off our supplies and force us to fight
at a disadvantage? ◆August.◆ This is our position, and this is the
result of providing His Royal Highness with insufficient troops; and
yet you speak of our having a corps to spare to defend England!”[88]

Saxe’s plan for reducing the Allies was in fact uniformly the same
throughout the whole of the war, namely to cut off their
communications with the sea on one side and with Germany on the
other. Even before he began to press Cumberland northward toward
Antwerp, he had detached a force to lay siege to Ostend, which was the
English base. Cumberland, on his side, had advised that the dykes
should be broken down and the country inundated in order to preserve
it, and both Dutch and Austrians had promised that this should be
done; but as usual it was not done, and before the end of August
Ostend had surrendered to the French. ◆Aug. 13/24.◆ The English base
was then perforce shifted to Antwerp. But by this time the requests
for the return of troops to England had become urgent and imperative
orders. ◆Sept.–Oct.◆ First ten battalions were recalled, then the rest
of the foot, and at last practically the whole of the army, including
Cumberland himself.[89] The cause was the Jacobite rebellion which was
stamped out by the victory of Culloden in April 1746.

AUTHORITIES.—The official account of Fontenoy was drawn up by
Ligonier in French and translated into English, with some omissions,
for publication. The French version is far the better and will be
found in the State Papers. The account in the _Life of the Duke of
Cumberland_ is poor, though valuable as having been drawn up from the
reports of the English Generals. Of the French accounts Voltaire’s is
the best known, and, as might be expected from such a hand, admirably
spirited. More valuable are the accounts in the _Conquête des Pays
Bas_, in the _Mémoires du Maréchal de Saxe_, where Saxe’s own report
may be read, in the _Campagnes des Pays Bas_, and in Espagnac. The
newspapers furnish a few picturesque incidents of some value.

VOL. II BOOK VII. CHAPTER VII

◆1746.◆

The virtual evacuation of the Low Countries by the British, in
consequence of the Jacobite Rebellion, was an advantage too obvious to
be overlooked by the French. At the end of January, though
winter-quarters were not yet broken up, they severed the communication
between Antwerp and Brussels, and a week later took the town of
Brussels itself by escalade. The citadel, after defending itself for a
fortnight, went the way of the town, and the capital of the Spanish
Netherlands was turned into a French place of arms.[90] The
consternation in Holland was great, and was increased when the French
presently besieged and captured Antwerp. ◆May 20/31.◆ Meanwhile the
British Commander, Lord Dunmore, who had been left in the Netherlands
with a few squadrons of cavalry, could only look on in absolute
helplessness. It was not until June that the Hessian troops in British
pay and a few British battalions could be embarked, together with
General Ligonier to command them, from England; and it was not until
July, owing to foul winds, that they were finally landed at
Williamstadt. The change of base was significant in itself, for, since
the capture of Ostend and Antwerp, there was no haven for British
ships except in the United Provinces. Even after the disembarkation
these forces were found to be still unready to take the field. The
Hessians had not a grain of powder among them, and there were neither
horses for the artillery nor waggons for the baggage. Again, to add
small difficulties to great, the Austrian General, Batthyany, having
no British officer as his peer in command, denied to the British
troops the place of honour at the right of the line. It was a trifling
matter, but yet sufficient to embarrass counsel, destroy harmony, and
delay operations.[91]

While the Allies were thus painfully drawing their forces together, the
activity of the French never ceased. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ The Prince of
Conti was detached with a considerable force to the Haine, where he
quickly reduced Mons and St. Ghislain, thus throwing down almost the
last relics of the Austrian barrier in the south. ◆July 13/24.◆ Thence
moving to the Sambre, Conti laid siege to Charleroi. It was now
sufficiently clear that the plan of the French campaign was to operate
on the line of the Meuse for the invasion of Holland. Maestricht once
taken, the rest would be easy, for most of the Dutch army were prisoners
in the hands of the French; and, with the possession of the line of the
Meuse, communication between the Allied forces of England and of Austria
would be cut off. But before Maestricht could be touched, Namur must
first be captured; and the campaign of 1746 accordingly centred about
Namur.

For the first fortnight of July the Allies remained at Terheyden, a
little to the north of Breda, Saxe’s army lying some thirty miles
south-westward of them about Antwerp. ◆July 6/17.◆ On the 17th of July
the Allies at last got on the march, still with some faint hopes of
saving Charleroi, and proceeded south-eastward, a movement which Saxe at
once parried by marching parallel with them to the Dyle between Arschot
and Louvain. Pushing forward, despite endless difficulties of transport
and forage, through a wretched barren country, the Allies, now under
command of Prince Charles of Lorraine, reached Peer, turned southward
across the Denier at Hasselt, and by the 27th of July were at Borchloen.
◆July 16/27.◆ They were thus actually on the eastern side of the French
main army, within reach of the Mehaigne and not without good hope of
saving Namur if not Charleroi. ◆July 21./Aug. 1.◆ On the 1st of August
they crossed the Mehaigne, only to learn to their bitter disappointment
that Charleroi had surrendered that very morning. Saxe meanwhile, with
the principal part of his army, still lay entrenched at Louvain, with
detachments pushed forward to Tirlemont and Gembloux. The Allies
continued their march before the eyes of these detachments to Masy on
the Orneau, and there took up a position between that river and the
head-waters of the Mehaigne, fronting to the north-east. This was the
line approved through many generations of war as the best for the
protection of Namur.[92]

Saxe now drew nearer to them, and the two armies lay opposite to each
other, in many places not more than a musket-shot apart, both entrenched
to the teeth. The Allies so far had decidedly gained a success, but they
were outnumbered by the French by three to two, and they were confined
within a narrow space wherein subsistence was extremely difficult;
while, if they moved, Namur was lost. Ligonier, who was most uneasy over
the situation, longed for five thousand cavalry with which to make a
dash at Malines and so to call the enemy back in haste to defend
Brussels and Antwerp.[93] Prince Charles, however, was averse from
operations of such a nature. His hope was that Saxe would offer him
battle on the historic plain of Ramillies, where, notwithstanding the
disparity of numbers, he trusted that the quality of his troops and the
traditions of victory would enable him to prevail. But Saxe had no
intention of doing anything of the kind. He did indeed shift his
position farther to the north and east, with the field of Ramillies in
his rear, but it was not to offer battle. ◆Aug. 18/29.◆ Pushing out
detachments to eastward he captured Huy, and cutting off the Allies’
communications with Liège and Maestricht forced them to cross the Meuse
and to fall back on Maestricht from the other side of the river. Cross
the Meuse the Allies accordingly did, unmolested, to Ligonier’s great
relief, by twenty thousand French who were stationed on the eastern bank
of the stream. They then opened communication with Maestricht, five
leagues away, while Saxe extended his army comfortably with its face to
the eastward along the line of the Jaar from Warem to Tongres, waiting
till want of forage should compel the Allies to recross the Meuse.
◆Sept. 2/13.◆ Back they came over the river within a fortnight, as he
had expected, and the Marshal, without attempting to dispute the
passage, retreated quietly for a few miles, knowing full well that his
enemy could not follow him from lack of bread. Ligonier never in his
life longed so intensely for the end of a campaign.[94]

On the 17th of September the Allies advanced upon the French and
offered battle. ◆Sept. 6/17.◆ Saxe answered by retiring to an
impregnable position between Tongres and the Demer. There was no
occasion for him to fight, when his enemies were short of provisions
and their cavalry was going to ruin from want of forage. So there the
two armies remained once more, within sight of each other but
unwilling to fight, because an attack on the entrenchments of either
host would have led to the certain destruction of the attacking
force.◆Aug. 30./Sept. 10.◆ But meanwhile the trenches had been opened
before Namur by a French corps under the Prince of Clermont, and
within nine days the town had fallen. Ligonier again urged his design,
for which he had prepared the necessary magazines, to upset Saxe’s
plans by a dash upon Antwerp, but he could find no support in the
council of war; so there was nothing for the Allies to do but to wait
until some further French success should compel them to move. Such a
success was not long in coming. The castle of Namur surrendered after
a miserable defence of but eleven days; Clermont’s corps was released
for operations in the field, and the Allies were forced to fall back
for the protection of Liège. ◆Sept. 27./Oct. 7.◆ Accordingly, on the
7th of October they crossed the Jaar, not without annoyance from the
enemy, and took up a new position, which gave them indeed possession
of Liège, but placed them between the Meuse in their rear, and an army
of nearly twice their strength on the Jaar before their front.[95]

[Illustration:

ROUCOUX
Sep. 30th/Oct. 11th 1746
]

◆Sept. 29./Oct. 10.◆

Now at last Saxe resolved to strike a blow. On the 10th of October he
crossed the Jaar with evident intention of an attack, and the Allied
army received orders to be ready for action before the following dawn.
The Allies’ position faced very nearly due west, the army being drawn
up astride of the two paved roads leading into Liège from Tongres and
St. Trond. Their extreme right rested on the Jaar and was covered by
the villages of Slins, Fexhe, and Enick, all of which were strongly
entrenched and occupied by the Austrians. South of Enick extended an
open plain from that village to the village of Liers, and in this
plain was posted the Hanoverian infantry and four British battalions,
the Eighth, Nineteenth, Thirty-third, and Forty-third Foot, with the
Hessian infantry on their left, in rear of Liers. The Hanoverian
cavalry prolonged the line southward to the village of Varoux, and the
Sixth and Seventh Dragoons and Scots Greys continued it to the village
of Roucoux, from which point Dutch troops carried it on to the village
of Ance, which formed the extreme left of the position. Ligonier did
not like the situation, for he did not see how the turning of the left
flank could be prevented if, as would certainly be the case, the French
should seriously attempt it. Prince Charles, knowing that, if his right
were turned, his retreat to Maestricht would be cut off, had taken
care to hold the right flank in real strength and dared not weaken it;
but the position, with the Meuse in its rear, was perilously shallow,
while the convergence of two ravines from the Jaar and Mehaigne into
its centre allowed of but one narrow way of communication between the
right and the left of the army. The defects of the Allies’ dispositions
were in fact not unlike those which had proved fatal to King William
at Landen; and Ligonier’s anxiety was proved to rest on all too good
foundation.

◆Sept. 30./Oct. 11.◆

The morning of the 11th of October opened with bad news for the Allies.
The French had been admitted into Liège by the inhabitants behind the
backs of the Dutch, so that the Prince of Waldeck, who commanded on the
left, was obliged to withdraw eight battalions from Roucoux and post
them _en potence_ on his left flank, with his cavalry in support. Thus
the defence of Roucoux, as well as of Liers and Varoux, was left to
eight battalions of British, Hanoverians, and Hessians only. This made
the outlook for the Allied left the worse, since it was evident that
the brunt of the French attack would fall upon it. Saxe gave Prince
Charles little time for reflection. He had one hundred and twenty
thousand men against eighty thousand, and he knew that of the eighty
thousand at least one-third were tied to the Austrian entrenchments
about the Jaar. He opened the action by a furious assault upon the
Dutch on the left wing, his infantry being formed in dense columns,
so that the attack could be renewed continually by fresh troops.
Simultaneously fifty-five battalions in three similar columns were
launched upon Liers, Varoux, and Roucoux. Outmatched though they were,
Dutch, Germans, and British all fought splendidly and repelled more
than one attack. But, to use Ligonier’s words, as soon as two French
brigades had been repulsed in each village, a third brigade ran in;
and the eight battalions, though they still held Liers, were forced
to withdraw both from Roucoux and Varoux. Being rallied, however, by
Ligonier, they advanced again and recaptured both villages; and the
Nineteenth and Forty-third took up a position in a hollow road which
they held to the last. The Dutch now began to retire across the rear
of the position from the left, in good order despite of heavy losses,
while Ligonier checked the enemy in the plain with the British cavalry.
When the Dutch had passed, he ordered his own men to retreat in the
same direction, still covering the movement with the cavalry and with
the Thirteenth and Twenty-sixth Foot, which had been sent to the field
from the garrison of Maestricht. The Austrians formed a rear-guard in
turn when the British and their German comrades had passed; and thus
the whole army filed off, unpursued and in perfect order, and crossed
the Meuse in safety on the following morning.

The action may be looked upon as a fortunate escape for the Allies,
since it was impossible, humanly speaking, that it could have issued
favourably for them. Prince Charles, in seeking to cover both Liège
and Maestricht, had attempted too much. His army thus occupied too
wide a front, the villages in the centre were too weakly held, there
was hardly anywhere a second line of infantry, and the left flank
could not be sustained against so superior an enemy. The total loss of
the Allies was about five thousand men, which was sufficiently severe
considering that but a third of the army was engaged. The casualties of
the British were three hundred and fifty killed and wounded, of whom
no fewer than two hundred belonged to the Forty-third. The French lost
as many men as the Allies, or more, and gained little by the action
except eight guns captured from the British, Hanoverians, and Hessians.
Had not the Allied troops been far better in quality and discipline
than the French, they must have been lost during their retreat with
superior numbers both in flank and rear. Both armies presently retired
into winter-quarters, and the campaign ended far less disastrously than
might have been feared for the Allies.[96]

Unfortunately, however, it was not in Flanders only that discredit fell
upon the British arms. At the end of September a force of six
battalions[97] was sent, under command of General St. Clair, to the
coast of Brittany to attack Port L’Orient and destroy the stores of the
French East India Company there. ◆Sept. 20./Oct. 1.◆ The enterprise
was conducted with amazing feebleness. The troops landed at Ouimperle
Bay practically unopposed, but, being fired at on their march on the
following day, were turned loose to the plunder of a small town as a
punishment to the inhabitants for their resistance. On the following day
they reached L’Orient, which the Deputy Governor of the East India
Company offered to surrender on good terms. His overtures, however, were
rejected and a siege was begun in form; but, after a few days of firing
and the loss of about a hundred men killed and wounded, St. Clair
thought it prudent to retreat; and on the 12th of October the troops
re-embarked and returned to England. ◆Oct. 1/12.◆ Anything more
pointless than the design or more contemptible than the execution of
this project can hardly be conceived, for it simply employed regiments
which were badly needed in Flanders and America, in useless operations
which did not amount to a diversion.

◆1747.◆

If the cause of Queen Maria Theresa was to be saved, it was evident
that great efforts were imperative in the coming campaign of 1747.
To meet the vast numbers brought into the field by the French the
Austrians promised to have sixty thousand men at Maseyck on the Meuse
by April; the British contributed four regiments of cavalry and
fourteen battalions of infantry; and it was hoped that the Allies would
take the field with a total strength of one hundred and ten battalions,
one hundred and sixty squadrons, and two hundred and twenty guns,
besides irregular troops, the whole to be under command of the Duke
of Cumberland.[98] Unfortunately the weather was adverse to an early
opening of the campaign; and the French, by the seizure of Cadsand
and Sluys, which were shamefully surrendered by the Dutch, closed the
southern mouth of the Scheldt below Antwerp. This was a sad blow to the
arrangements for the transport of the Allies, since it brought about
the necessity of hauling all the forage for the British overland from
Breda. Had Cumberland been in a position to open the campaign before
the French, he meant to have laid siege to Antwerp; as things were, he
was compelled, thanks chiefly to the apathy of the Dutch, to attempt
to bring Saxe to a general action. His last letter before beginning
operations has, however, an interest of another kind. It contained a
recommendation that Major James Wolfe might be permitted to purchase
a vacant lieutenant-colonelcy in the Eighth Foot, that officer having
served constantly and well during the past two years as a major of
brigade, and proved himself capable and desirous to do his duty.[99]

The French being encamped between Malines and Louvain, Cumberland
collected his troops at Tilburg and advanced straight upon them,
encamping on the 26th of May on the Great Neth, a little to the east of
Antwerp, between Lierre and Herenthout. ◆May 15/26.◆ Saxe, entrenched as
usual to the teeth, remained immovable for three weeks, and Cumberland
despaired of bringing him to action. At length the news that a detached
corps of thirty thousand French, under the Prince of Clermont, was on
the old ground about Tongres, moved Cumberland to march to the Demer, in
the hope of overwhelming Clermont before Saxe could join him. ◆June
15/26.◆ Saxe, however, was on his guard, and on the 29th of June
prepared to concentrate the whole of his army at Tongres. ◆June 18/29.◆
Cumberland thereupon decided to take up Saxe’s camp of the previous
year, from Bilsen, on the head-waters of the Demer, to Tongres. ◆June
19/30.◆ So sending forward Count Daun, afterwards well known as an
antagonist of Frederick the Great, with a corps of Austrians to occupy
Bilsen, he ordered the rest of the army to follow as quickly as possible
on the next day. ◆June 20./July 1.◆ Riding forward at daybreak of the
morrow, Cumberland was dismayed to see the French advancing in two
columns from Tongres, as if to fall upon the head of his own army. This
was a surprise. Cumberland knew that Saxe was in motion but had not
expected him so soon; and indeed Saxe had made a notable march, for his
army had not left Louvain until the 29th of June and had traversed
little less than fifty miles in two days. The Duke lost no time in
setting such troops as were on the spot in order of battle, and hurried
away to see if those on the march could be brought up in time to force
back the French, and to secure the position of his choice. But the
French cavalry was too quick for him, and, before Ligonier could bring
up the English horse, had occupied the centre of the ground which
Cumberland had intended for himself. Ligonier drew up his squadrons
before them to bar their farther advance, and the Allied infantry, as it
came up, was formed in order of battle, fronting, however, not to
eastward, as had been originally designed, but almost due south. In
fact, owing to Saxe’s unexpected arrival and to deficient arrangements
by the staff of the Allies, there seems to have been considerable delay
in putting the Allied army into any formation at all, or the French
might certainly have been forced back to Tongres. Saxe’s rear had not
yet come up and the men were fatigued by a long and harassing march; but
Cumberland was not the man to fight an action of the type of Oudenarde,
and the opportunity was lost.[100]

The position now occupied by the Allies extended from some rising
ground known as the Commanderie, a little to the south-east of Bilsen,
along a chain of villages and low heights to the Jaar, a little to the
south of Maestricht. The Commanderie being the right of the line was
held by the Austrians, with a strong corps thrown back _en potence_
to Bilsen to protect the right flank; for it was as important on this
field as on that of Roucoux that the retreat into Holland should not
be cut off. The ground possessed natural features of strength which
were turned to good account, so good account indeed that the Allied
right, like the French left at Ramillies, could neither attack nor
be attacked. Eastward from the Commanderie the Austrians occupied
the heights of Spaeven, together with the villages of Gross and Klein
Spaeven; next to them the Dutch formed the centre of the line, while
the Hanoverians and British held the villages of Val, or Vlytingen, and
Lauffeld, and prolonged the line to its extreme left at the village of
Kesselt.

◆June 21./July 2.◆

There the Allies lay on their arms until nightfall, while Saxe’s weary
battalions tramped on till far into the night up to their bivouacs. At
daybreak the French were seen to be in motion, marching and
countermarching in a way that Cumberland did not quite understand; the
fact being that Saxe, as at Roucoux, was doubling the left wing of his
army in rear of the right, for the formation of those dense columns of
attack which he could handle with such consummate skill. After observing
them until nine o’clock, Cumberland came to the conclusion that the
Marshal meditated no immediate movement, and retired to the Commanderie
for breakfast. He had hardly sat down when an urgent message arrived
from Ligonier that the enemy was on the point of attacking. Cumberland
at once returned and moved the left of his line somewhat forward,
setting fire to the village of Vlytingen and occupying Lauffeld with
three British and two Hessian battalions. Lauffeld was a straggling
village a quarter of a mile long, covered by a multitude of small
enclosures with mud walls about six feet high, which were topped by
growing hedges. It was thus easily turned into a strong post for
infantry; and cannon were posted both in its front and flanks. The
remainder of the British were drawn up for the most part in rear of
Lauffeld in order to feed and relieve its garrison, the brigade of
Guards being posted in the hedges before Vlytingen. The British cavalry
stood on the right of the infantry and joined their line to that of the
Dutch.

[Illustration:

LAUFFELD
June 21st/July 2nd 1747

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

Meanwhile Saxe, sending forward a cloud of irregular troops to mask
his movements, had despatched Count d’Estrées and the Count of Ségur
with a strong force of infantry and cavalry to seize the villages of
Montenaken and Wilre on the left flank of the Allies. This service was
performed with little loss. At the same time he directed the Marquis
of Salières, with six brigades of foot and twenty guns, to attack
Vlytingen, and launched five brigades, with as many guns, backed by a
large force of cavalry, against Lauffeld. The assault of the French
infantry upon Lauffeld was met by a furious resistance. It was just
such another struggle as that of Neerwinden, from hedge to hedge
and from wall to wall; and the French, for all their superiority of
numbers, were driven back headlong from the village with terrible loss.
Salières met with little better success against the brigade of Guards
in the hedges of Vlytingen; but with great readiness he turned half
of his guns to his right against Lauffeld and the remainder against a
ravine on his left, with most destructive effect. Cumberland, observing
the fury with which Saxe had concentrated his attack against these two
villages, asked the Austrians to relieve him by a diversion upon his
right; but the Austrian troops could not face the fire of Salières’s
guns, and it became clear that Vlytingen and Lauffeld must be held by
the British and Hanoverians alone.

Saxe’s first attack had been brilliantly repulsed. He at once replaced
the beaten troops by two fresh brigades of infantry, with cavalry to
support them, and renewed the assault, but with no better success. The
British were driven back from the outer defences only to stand more
fiercely by those within, and Lauffeld remained unconquered. But Saxe
was not to be deterred from his purpose. Two more brigades, including
the six Irish battalions that had saved the day at Fontenoy, were
added to those already on the spot, and the whole of them launched
for a third attack against Lauffeld. They were met by the same
stubborn resistance and the same deadly fire; and the Irish brigade
lost no fewer than sixty officers in the struggle. Nevertheless Irish
impetuosity carried the rest of the troops forward; the British were
borne back to the rearmost edge of the village, and the French began
to swarm up the slope beyond it. Cumberland promptly ordered the whole
of his line of infantry to advance; and the French at once gave way
before them. The French cavalry was obliged to drive the foot forward
at the sword’s point, but Cumberland continued steadily to gain ground
despite their efforts. Then at an unlucky moment, some Dutch squadrons
in the centre were seized with panic and came galloping straight
into the British line, carried away the Hessians and one squadron of
the Greys and fell pell-mell upon the Twenty-first and Twenty-third
Fusiliers. The Twenty-first, anticipating the treatment of the Belgians
at Waterloo, gave the Dutchmen a volley and partly saved themselves,
but the Twenty-third suffered terribly, and the whole line was thrown
into confusion. Before order could be restored, Salières had thrown
three more brigades upon Lauffeld, which closed in round it, blocking
up a hollow road which formed the entrance into it from the rear, and
barring the way for all further reinforcements of the Allies. The few
troops that were left in the village were speedily overpowered, and
Lauffeld was lost.

Some of Daun’s Austrians now advanced to Cumberland’s help from the
right; but three French brigades of cavalry, which were waiting before
Vlytingen, at once moved forward to check them, and charging boldly
into them succeeded in turning them back, though themselves roughly
handled when retiring from the charge. Meanwhile Saxe had brought up
ten guns to right and left of Lauffeld, and reinforcing the cavalry
of D’Estrées and Ségur extended it in one long line from Lauffeld to
Wilre, for a final crushing attack on the Allied left. Order had been
restored among the British infantry, who were now retreating with great
steadiness; but they were wholly unsupported. Ligonier, determined
to save them at any cost, caught up the Greys, Inniskillings, and
Cumberland’s dragoons, and led them straight against the masses of the
French cavalry. The gallant brigade charged home, crashed headlong
through the horse, and fell upon the infantry beyond, but being galled
by their fire and attacked in all quarters by other French squadrons,
was broken past all rallying and very heavily punished. Ligonier
himself was overthrown and taken prisoner. Cumberland, who had plunged
into the broken ranks to try to rally the British troopers, was cut off
by the French dragoons, and only with difficulty contrived to join the
remainder of his cavalry on the left. With these he covered the retreat
of the army, which was successfully effected in good order and with
little further loss.

So ended the battle of Lauffeld, in which the British bore the brunt
with a firmness that extorted the praise even of Frenchmen, but of
which few Englishmen have ever heard. The troops, in Cumberland’s
words, behaved one and all so well that he could not commend any one
regiment without doing injustice to the rest. The total loss of the
five regiments of horse and fourteen battalions of foot was close upon
two thousand men.[101] The three devoted regiments which charged with
Ligonier were the worst sufferers, the Greys losing one hundred and
sixty men, the Inniskillings one hundred and twenty, and Cumberland’s
dragoons nearly one hundred. The loss of the whole of the Allies was
about six thousand men, that of the French decidedly greater, amounting
indeed, according to Saxe’s account, to not less than ten thousand
men. The British, moreover, had nine French colours and five French
standards as trophies for their consolation. Finally, the French failed
to accomplish the object of the action, which was to cut off the Allies
from Maestricht.

After the battle the Allies crossed the Meuse and encamped at Heer, a
little to the east of Maestricht, while Saxe returned to his quarters
at Tongres. The French then detached a corps for the capture of
Bergen-op-Zoom; but the most important transactions of the war still
went forward on the Meuse, where constant negotiations were carried
on between Saxe and Cumberland. The campaign closed with the fall of
Bergen-op-Zoom and with the capture of most of the strong places in
Dutch Brabant.

By this time King George and his people in England were thoroughly sick
of the war. The British had suffered severely in every action, but had
reaped no success except in the fortunate victory of Dettingen. The
Dutch had proved themselves useless and contemptible as Allies, their
Government feeble and corrupt in council, their troops unstable if not
dangerous in action. The Austrians, in spite of lavish subsidies, had
never furnished the troops that they had promised, and had invariably
obstructed operations through the obstinacy of their Generals and the
selfishness of their ends. ◆1748.◆ The opening of the campaign of 1748
was even more unpromising for the Allies. Saxe, strong in the possession
of a superior force, kept Cumberland in suspense between apprehensions
for Breda and for Maestricht, and, when finally he laid siege to
Maestricht, could match one hundred and fifteen thousand men against
Cumberland’s five-and-thirty thousand. War on such terms against such a
master as Saxe was ridiculous. Moreover, the Dutch, despite of a recent
revolution, were more supine than ever; the Prince of Orange, who was
the new ruler, actually keeping two thousand of his troops from the
field that they might adorn the baptism of one of his babies. In the
face of such facts Cumberland pressed earnestly for peace;[102] and on
the 30th of April preliminaries were signed, which six months later were
expanded into the definite treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. ◆Apr. 19/30.◆

◆October.◆

The peace left matters practically as they had stood before the war,
with the significant exception that Frederick the Great retained
Silesia. Not a word was said as to the regulation of trade between
England and Spain, which had been the original ground of quarrel;
and, as between England and France, it was agreed that there should
be mutual restitution of all captures. Yet this could not set the two
countries in the same position as before the war. The French were
utterly exhausted; but the British, though not a little harassed by
the cost of maintaining armies and producing subsidies, had received a
military training which was to stand them in good stead for the great
struggle that lay before them.

AUTHORITIES.—The official correspondence in the Record Office. _F.O.
Military Auxiliary Expeditions._ _Campagnes de Louis XV. Espagnac._
_Life of the Duke of Cumberland._ Some useful details as to Lauffeld are
to be found in the _Gentleman’s Magazine_.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793–1794

VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER III

◆1793.◆

War was declared by the French Convention on the 1st of February 1793,
and Dumouriez was ordered to invade Holland forthwith. The Convention,
thirsting for the wealth of the Bank of Amsterdam, was anxious to make
sure of it before the Allies could put their strength into the field.
Two months earlier, when his troops were heartened by the victory of
Jemappe, no order could have been more welcome to Dumouriez than this;
and even now, though he had few men upon whom he could depend, he
resolved if possible to make good the defects of his army by swift and
sudden action. The French troops on the northern frontier were very
widely scattered, their cantonments extending north and south on the
lower Meuse from Roermond to Maastricht, and east and west from the
upper Rhine through Aachen to Liège and Namur. His original plan had
been to turn all the waterways and fortresses that bar the entrance
into Holland from the south, and to invade it by way of Nimeguen; but
time was so precious that he resolved to collect a small force of but
seventeen thousand men at Antwerp, and to march from thence with all
secrecy direct upon Amsterdam. At the same time he directed thirty
thousand men from the east under General Miranda to take the Dutch
fortresses of Maastricht and Venloo, and then to make for Nimeguen.
Speed, in his view, was everything, for the Austrians had already forty
thousand men cantoned to the east of the Rhine, and were shortly to be
reinforced.

Meanwhile the Allies were still making up their plans for the next
campaign. Brunswick and Prince Frederick Josias of Coburg-Saalfeld,
who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army, met at
Frankfurt, and, after many conferences between the 6th and the 14th
of February, decided upon a scheme of operations, which by their own
showing required forty thousand more men than they had any expectation
of collecting. They saved themselves, however, by laying it down as a
cardinal principle that, until Mainz were recovered from the French,
the Allied forces must not attempt to pass from the east to the west
bank of the Meuse. Belgium (so argued the Austrians) had been eaten
up, and so long as the navigation of the Rhine was blocked at Mainz,
the subsistence of the Imperial troops on the west of the Meuse must
be difficult. Moreover, if the French should retire before an Austrian
advance, and mass all their forces on the Rhine, then they might beat
Brunswick, who, unless his retreat were assured by the possession of
Mainz, would be in danger of utter destruction. The reader should take
note of this decision, for not only is it the key to much that appears
puzzling in the coming campaign, but it is an excellent example of
the principle on which Coburg and Brunswick conducted war, namely, to
look at risks first and at objects afterwards. The immediate problem
of the defence of the Dutch provinces was left without so much as an
attempt at solution. Both Grenville in England and Auckland at the
Hague had long foreseen the certainty of a French attack upon them, and
had strained every nerve to stir the authorities to action. But the
Stadtholder was a man of almost inhuman dulness, apathy and stupidity;
and all popular energy was paralysed by the spirit of faction, which,
never inactive in Holland, had under the influence of French agents
become almost a spirit of revolution. The Dutch army was so defective
in training, equipment and discipline that it had ceased to exist as
an efficient force; and its few foreign corps, which alone deserved
the name of regiments, had been driven to mutiny by a reduction of
their pay below the rate fixed by their contract. Even in January and
February, Auckland wrote that the Stadtholder looked for British ships
and British troops to save him,[103] and that the French party was
derisively insinuating that England, nominally the faithful ally of
the Dutch Republic, was content to desert her in the hour of danger.
Finally, on the 15th of February he begged that the Duke of York might
be sent over with a few officers of experience, even if without troops,
to take command of the Dutch. “Men, commanders, ships and money,”
he wrote, “we could not ask for more if this country were a part of
Yorkshire, but I incline to think that it should be considered so for
the present; and if it is brought to a question whether we are to
conquer it and keep it, or whether Dumouriez is to do it, I have no
doubt as to the decision.”

Still the British Government hesitated, for, thanks to its neglect of
the Army, it possessed but a handful of troops, and was unwilling to
move them to the Continent. ◆Feb. 16.◆ Then suddenly, on the 16th of
February, Dumouriez dashed out from Antwerp with his tiny force in four
columns. One small body instantly pushed northward towards Moerdyk, to
collect boats for the passage of the arm of the sea called the
Hollandsdiep; another marched upon Klundert and Willemstadt, a third
north-eastward to attack Breda, and a fourth to the north-west to
blockade Bergen-op-Zoom and Steenbergen. Everywhere his coming was
welcomed by the Dutch. Breda, with large stores of munitions of war, was
disgracefully surrendered on the 26th of February; ◆Feb. 26.◆ Klundert
and Gertruydenberg fell in quick succession; Willemstadt was then
besieged with the captured cannon, and by the 9th of March Dumouriez was
prepared to essay the passage of the Hollandsdiep. ◆March 9.◆ But here
his course was stayed, for his activity had stirred his enemies on every
side.

◆Feb. 20.◆

On the 20th of February the seven battalions of British Guards were
suddenly paraded before the Horse Guards; and the Duke of York,
announcing that the first battalions of the three regiments were ordered
to proceed on active service, called for volunteers from the others to
bring them up to strength. The whole brigade thereupon stepped forward
as one man; and five days later three battalions, numbering under two
thousand men of all ranks and denominations, marched to Greenwich amid
the cheers, and something more than the cheers, of an enormous and
enthusiastic crowd.[104] By nightfall the whole were embarked upon
vessels too small to carry more than two-thirds of their number in
safety, without medicines or medical appliances, without the slightest
reserve of ammunition, and of course without transport of any
description. Their commander was Colonel Gerard Lake of the First
Guards, and he was ordered on no account to move his men above
twenty-four hours’ distance from Helvoetsluis, so as to be able to
return on the shortest notice. ◆March 1.◆ By the mercy of Heaven these
troops safely reached that port, narrowly escaping a gale which would
probably have condemned them either to drowning or asphyxiation; and
four days later they proceeded to Dort to oppose Dumouriez’s passage of
the Hollandsdiep. ◆March 5.◆ About the same time a flotilla of Dutch
gunboats arrived in the Meuse, many of them manned by British sailors
and flying British colours. Auckland, by threatening to take command in
Holland himself, had at last compelled the miserable Stadtholder to
issue orders for the defence of his country.[105]

But the obstacles which were multiplying in Dumouriez’s front were as
nothing to the storm that suddenly broke upon his flank. ◆Feb. 20.◆
Miranda had duly moved up to the siege of Maastricht with a force
inadequate to the task and, moreover, dangerously dispersed; but the
Austrians, declaring themselves too weak to move, still remained torpid
in their cantonments, perhaps the more stubbornly because the Prussian
Agent at the Austrian headquarters was perpetually urging them to
action. ◆Feb. 26.◆ At last, however, Coburg on the 26th began to
concentrate his forty thousand men and to pass them in five columns
across the river; ◆March 1.◆ and on the 1st of March, to the great
surprise of the French, he burst upon their cantonments on the Meuse,
and for four days drove them in utter rout before him. Coburg himself
and the left wing halted before Liège, but on the right the Archduke
Charles, with the impetuosity of twenty-one years and the instinct of a
born soldier, followed up the disorderly rabble from Maastricht
southward upon Tongres, boldly attacking wherever he met the enemy.
Such of the French as had been in action fled in all directions,
abandoning everything; ten thousand deserters hurried across the
frontier into France; and a small remnant took refuge behind the canal
at Louvain, where it was joined by such French divisions as had not been
engaged. Had Coburg pursued his advantage and advanced instantly with
all his forces, he could have ended the campaign at once, for the
people, furious at the exactions of the Jacobins, and, above all, at the
theft of the plate from their churches, had turned savagely upon the
retreating French. ◆March 5.◆ Instead of this he halted on the 5th, and
wasted ten whole days in cantonments between Maastricht and Tongres. The
Convention now ordered Dumouriez at once to proceed to Louvain and
◆March 9.◆ assume command, which he did with a very bad grace, leaving
General Flers to take his place in Holland. His presence did much to
restore confidence in the French army, and he was not a little helped by
Coburg’s inaction. Nevertheless the news that reached him was singularly
disquieting. Fresh regiments were embarking from England for
Helvoetsluis; two reinforcing columns of Austrians were advancing from
the Rhine upon Namur; ◆March 11.◆ and eight thousand Prussians, under
the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, had arrived at Bois-le-Duc on the 11th, and
were moving with five thousand British and Dutch upon Breda, to cut off
the troops on the Hollandsdiep from France and Dumouriez’s own soldiers
from Antwerp. In so desperate a situation there was no choice but to
take the offensive.

◆March 15.◆

On the 15th Coburg at last resumed his advance with forty-two thousand
men; and on the 16th Dumouriez marched with forty-eight thousand to meet
him. ◆March 18.◆ On the 18th the decisive action was fought at
Neerwinden, when the French were totally defeated, with a loss of five
thousand men and three guns. The volunteers and the National Guards were
the troops that failed in the battle; and after it the men broke up and
fled by whole battalions. Ten thousand deserted in the ten days
following the action, and Dumouriez was fain to form a rearguard out of
his artillery and his few battalions of the Line, and to fall back on
Louvain. Coburg, who had lost about three thousand men, made little
attempt at pursuit, keeping his main body halted at Tirlemont until the
22nd, but exhorting the Duke of Brunswick-Oels to hasten from
Bois-le-Duc to Malines to cut off Dumouriez’s retreat to Antwerp. The
Duke, who had already permitted Flers to withdraw with impunity the bulk
of his forces to Antwerp, was evidently not disposed to second Austrian
operations with Prussian troops, for he refused to move. ◆Mar. 23–24.◆
However, the advance of the Austrians compelled Dumouriez to evacuate
first Louvain and then Brussels; ◆March 25.◆ and on the 25th, finding
himself obliged to abandon Namur also, he opened negotiations with
Coburg. He had quarrelled with the Convention beyond hope of
reconciliation over the iniquity of its rule in Belgium; and he now
proposed that the French should retreat from the whole country, and that
he should march to Paris to re-establish the monarchy, the Allies
meanwhile halting on the frontier and receiving the fortress of Condé as
a guarantee. ◆March 27.◆ An agreement to this effect was duly made with
the Chief of the Austrian Staff on the 27th, and a circular was issued
from the Austrian headquarters, suggesting a conference of the
representatives of the powers to decide as to the measures to be next
taken.

There is no need to tell at length the story of Dumouriez’s adventures
during the following days. ◆April 5.◆ It must suffice that he was driven
from the midst of his army, and on the 5th of April was fain to take
refuge with the Austrians. Fragments of several corps and one complete
regiment of Hussars followed him, unwilling to part with their beloved
General; but several thousand French troops in Belgium and Holland,
which might have been cut off to a man, were allowed to retire in peace
to the frontier. None the less the fact remained that even a dilatory
commander at the head of a force of discordant Allies had sufficed to
drive the armies of the Revolution in shameful disorder from the
Austrian Netherlands.

VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER IV

◆1793.◆

◆March 5.◆

On the 5th of March it was resolved to send the Fourteenth,
Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third Foot, completed by drafts from the new
independent companies, to join the Duke as a brigade under Major-general
Ralph Abercromby. These regiments, however, were subject to the same
instructions as the Guards, namely, to remain within immediate reach of
their transports in case their services should be required elsewhere.
Their quality was such that the Adjutant-general felt constrained to
apologise for them both to Abercromby and to the Duke of York. “I am
afraid,” he wrote to the Duke, “that you will not reap the advantage
that you might have expected from the brigade of the Line just sent over
to you, as so considerable a part of it is composed of nothing but
undisciplined and raw recruits; and how they are to be disposed of until
they can be taught their business I am at a loss to imagine.... I was
not consulted upon the subject until it was too late to remedy the evil,
but I hope that my remonstrances will be of some use in the modelling of
troops for the Continent in future.” ◆April 1.◆ It need hardly be added
that, on their arrival in Holland, two out of the three battalions were
found utterly unfit for service, the new recruits being old men and
weakly boys, worse than the worst that had been accepted even at the
period of greatest exhaustion during the American War. To send them on
active service was, therefore, simply waste of money.[106]

But this was only one of the evils which ensued because an extremely
ignorant civilian was too vain to consult his military advisers before
giving military orders. Any soldier at the War Office could have
told him that the method of raising independent companies to recruit
existing regiments had been found wasteful and unsatisfactory in the
past; and, indeed, at this very time the Chief Secretary Cooke wrote
to him from Ireland a strong protest against the whole system. It
was expensive, because it meant the provision of half-pay for their
officers as soon as the men had been drafted out; it was unfair to old
subalterns, because they were passed over by boys who by good fortune
had raised recruits cheaply. It produced a bad class of recruit,
because these young officers were poor judges of men; and finally it
encouraged desertion, for the crimps, so long as they poured a certain
number of recruits into the depots by a certain time, cared not the
least whether they deserted afterwards. Nor was Cooke content only to
criticise, for he produced an alternative plan for allowing each of the
fourteen battalions in Ireland to raise two additional companies of one
hundred men apiece, and for granting to the commanding officers the
privilege of recommending officers for them. The scheme was approved
and was found to be most successful; but it was not introduced into
England, where, on the contrary, the number of independent companies
was still further increased.[107]

Again, the Adjutant-general, if consulted, could have warned Dundas
to be chary of his battalions, since some of them would certainly
be required for the Fleet. The King’s Navy was labouring under the
grievances which in four years were to drive the seamen to mutiny; and
as a natural consequence men were hardly to be obtained by any means.
◆Feb. 7.◆ On the very day when the declaration of war was received,
the Fleet swallowed up two battalions; and by the end of March it had
absorbed so many men that only three regiments of the Line were to be
found south of the Tweed. In fact the Horse Guards did not know where
to turn for another battalion. This, however, did not prevent Dundas
from presently sending another emissary to Jamaica, to commit England
still more deeply to operations in the most leeward sphere of the West
Indies. Yet he had no reserve of any description to rely upon, except
fourteen thousand Hanoverians and eight thousand Hessians, which,
pursuant to the time-honoured practice, were taken into British pay;
and of these the latter only, being mercenaries pure and simple, could
be counted upon for service beyond sea.[108]

Since the kingdom was thus stripped of regular troops, it was necessary
to raise other forces for its security; but this also was done as
foolishly as possible. Early in February it was rightly and wisely
decided to call out nineteen thousand additional Militia; but in the
execution precisely the same mistake was made as in France. Personal
service was not insisted upon; there arose a great demand for
substitutes; and the Militia, instead of gaining a substantial increase,
simply cut off from the Army the sources of its supply of recruits. In
Scotland, which as yet had no Militia, recourse was made to the raising
of Fencible regiments, that is to say, of regular troops enlisted for
home-service and for the duration of the war only. This system had so
far been applied only on a small scale, the regiments of Fencibles
during the Seven Years’ War and the American War of Independence having
been but few;[109] but it now received great and sudden expansion. On
the 2nd of March authority was issued for the raising of seven regiments
of Fencible Infantry in Scotland at a stroke; besides one already
authorised for the Isle of Man ◆Feb. 20.◆, and another, added in April,
for the Orkney Islands.[110] With the leading magnates of Scotland at
their head, these new corps were speedily completed; but there was one
Scottish nobleman who went further than his peers, and raised a regiment
in the Highlands for general service. This was Thomas Humberstone
Mackenzie, afterwards the last Earl of Seaforth; and his regiment
remains with us, still known by his name, but yet more famous under its
number of the Seventy-eighth. The reader should take note of the
Fencible regiments, for in the years before us we shall see them
increased and multiplied in all three kingdoms. Meanwhile, he should
remark that within a month of the declaration of war there were already
three distinct forces, the Army, the Fencibles, and the Militia, all
bidding against each other for the recruits which only the Regular Army
could turn to efficient account.

It is not difficult to perceive the lurking possibilities of disaster in
Dundas’s military policy; but until April it showed at any rate a
certain consistency. The despatch of troops to the Continent was treated
as a temporary measure, designed for the protection of Holland only;
and, though the Prince of Coburg had called upon the Duke of York to
co-operate in his great sweeping movement from north-east to south-west,
the Duke had complied only so far as his instructions and, it may be
added, his lack of transport permitted.[111] But much, besides the
expulsion of the French from Holland and Belgium, had occurred in March,
all tending to embarrass England in the principal object of her
Continental policy, the securing of a strong barrier between France and
Holland. The fatal question of indemnity, first brought forward by the
King of Prussia, had aroused the cupidity of his brother potentate in
Austria, who valued the recovery of Belgium chiefly in order that he
might exchange it for Bavaria. Pitt had for a moment been willing to
consent to the Bavarian exchange (as it was called) for the sake of
peace; but upon the outbreak of war he reverted to absolute rejection of
it; and, in an evil hour, ◆March 2.◆ the British Ambassador at Vienna,
Sir Morton Eden, put forward a suggestion that Austria should be bribed
to retain Belgium by the promise of an extension of her frontiers on the
side of France. ◆April 3.◆ Realising that Austria refused to act
disinterestedly, Grenville reluctantly accepted the proposal; and at the
same time the British Government seems to have taken it for granted that
it must give the Emperor some assistance towards the conquest of the new
barrier.[112]

◆March 21–April 2.◆

Accordingly, since no more infantry was to be spared from England,
eleven regiments of cavalry were ordered to prepare for service on
the Continent, though their numbers were so weak that they could not
between them muster more than twenty-three squadrons, or about two
thousand five hundred of all ranks, fit for service. But, at the same
time, the British Ministers shrank from supplying British troops for
the advantage of other nations without gaining some equivalent to
satisfy the electors of England; wherefore they decided, apparently
at the instance of Grenville’s elder brother, Lord Buckingham, to
claim Dunkirk as Great Britain’s indemnity for the war. The choice,
viewed from the standpoint of the party-politician, was a good one.
Dunkirk, having been taken by Cromwell, sold by Charles the Second, and
dismantled under the conditions imposed by the sword of Marlborough,
possessed sentimental attractions to the public at large and to the
Whigs in particular; while, as a nest of privateers, its extirpation
could not but be welcome not only to every merchant in England, but
especially to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. No scheme of operations
had yet been concerted with Austria, for, indeed, Coburg had advanced
from the Roer before nearly all his forces had been collected; but Pitt
seems to have thought that, while the Austrian reinforcements were
on their way to the front, the mixed force of British, Hanoverians,
Hessians, and Dutch might very well master Dunkirk in the course of
April, afterwards leaving the Austrians in sufficient strength to
pursue their operations in Flanders alone, while the British struck
at some other part of France. Thus Pitt was not true even to his own
plan of ruining his enemy by the destruction of her colonial trade.
Moreover, it is difficult to define what he meant by some other part
of France. The old Marquis of Bouillé, knowing that the heart of the
Revolution could be pierced at Paris, had suggested a descent upon
Havre with thirty thousand men; and there was by this time another
vulnerable point—namely, La Vendée—in the west of France. But why it
should have been necessary to seek out a new point of attack, when
troops were already massed or massing on the French frontier within
twelve days’ march of the capital, and with only a demoralised enemy
before them, was a question which seems never to have occurred either
to Pitt or to Dundas. There can be no doubt that they fell into a
common pitfall of the British politician. They gave so much thought to
the treaty which they should lay before Parliament at the close of the
war, that they omitted to consider the means of bringing the war itself
to a close.[113]

It was in such inauspicious circumstances that the representatives of
the various powers met in conference at Antwerp. ◆April 5.◆ Coburg, who
loathed the war and had hoped to end it by an agreement with Dumouriez,
had issued a proclamation declaring himself to be the ally of all
friends of order, and abjuring all projects of conquest in the Emperor’s
name. Instantly Austrians, Prussians, and English with one voice
required him to withdraw it, and to publish a new declaration that he
would prosecute the war vigorously. He did so, but with great
reluctance; indeed, so bitter was his opposition to the new policy that
he tried to open further negotiations with the Convention, and even
furnished it with information which he ought to have kept to
himself.[114] Meanwhile Lord Auckland announced that England, as well as
the other powers, would expect an indemnity for her share in the war;
whereupon the Dutch representative announced that, as every one else was
taking compensation, he hoped that Holland’s claims would not be
forgotten.[115] The sharing of the lion’s skin having thus been
determined, the next thing was to decide upon a plan of operations for
slaying the lion. A vague project was drawn out for the attack of the
frontier-fortresses, in which Coburg reckoned upon the co-operation of
over twenty thousand men, that is to say, of thirteen thousand
Hanoverians and seven thousand five hundred British, in British pay,
besides fifteen thousand Dutch. Dundas was staggered; for he had not yet
the slightest idea what were the ultimate designs of either of the
German powers, who, as he justly complained, were very backward to give
an explicit account of their views either as to the conduct of the war
or the termination of it. “We cannot advise the King,” he wrote, “to
give a blind co-operation to measures not distinctly explained.” But he
hinted that if the Austrians would spare a detachment to help the
British to capture Dunkirk at once, England might make fewer
difficulties about lending her troops for subsequent operations. The
English, he explained, were prejudiced against Continental enterprises;
wherefore it was important to convince the nation early that its troops
in Holland were employed for an object intimately connected with the
interests of Great Britain and the security of her commerce. “The early
capture of Dunkirk by a Prince of the blood,” he added, “would give much
éclat to the commencement of the war.” In other words, Dundas was ready
to employ British troops in the Low Countries only for a political
campaign, and not for the military purposes of the war—to use them, in
fact, primarily to win votes rather than battles. The attitude is but
too characteristic of British Ministers for War.[116]

Meanwhile the Allies on the frontiers of France remained inactive; the
Austrians, indeed, blockading Condé, where the French kept them engaged
with incessant affairs of outposts, but the British contingent still
awaiting the orders which Dundas hesitated to give. In the third week
of April the chief of the British staff reported that a considerable
force of French was entrenched about Dunkirk, too strong to be attacked
by the Duke of York’s troops, and that there was no operation on which
the latter could be employed except in support of the Austrians.[117]
We shall presently recognise the unseen hand which had been working
at Dunkirk. ◆May 1.◆ Ten days more of uncertainty passed away, and at
last, on the 1st of May, Coburg produced a plan of operations. By the
middle of May he hoped to have about ninety-two thousand men,[118] to
which by the beginning of June would be added thirteen thousand more.
He proposed, therefore, to hasten the fall of Condé by a bombardment,
and then to advance with fifty-two thousand men to the siege of
Valenciennes, leaving a cordon of some forty thousand to cover every
imaginable point along a front of some fifty miles from Maubeuge on the
Sambre to Ostend on the sea. Valenciennes might be expected to fall
at the end of July, and then ten thousand men could be left to mask
Lille, while fifty thousand marched to the siege of Dunkirk. If this
plan were accepted, Coburg pledged himself to the Duke of York to lend
his best good-will to the attack on Dunkirk. On this assurance the
Duke recommended the plan to which at last Dundas gave his consent,
on the understanding that the other powers in general and Austria in
particular should give an immediate explanation of their ulterior
views. England, he repeated, could not allow so large a force in her
pay to be employed on operations whose object was undefined; and he
emphasised the statement by an inquiry as to the security of Ostend,
which so far had been the British port of disembarkation, evidently as
a hint that England reserved her right to withdraw her troops at any
moment.

This is a good instance of the manner in which British Ministers evade
their responsibility. The British General had, nearly three weeks
before, laid before Dundas the following issue. “There is no use for
British troops in the Netherlands except to act in support of the
Austrians. Their commander has submitted a plan based on the active
co-operation of all our troops, present and expected. We think the plan
a good one. Are we to act with him, or are we not?” Upon this it was
for the Ministry to say at once to Austria, “Our Generals favour your
plan of campaign, but until we know your ultimate intentions we cannot
take part in it. Unless you come to a definite understanding with us by
a certain day, we shall order our troops on the spot to re-embark, and
meanwhile we have suspended the march of our reinforcements.” Instead
of this they said in effect, “We approve the plan of campaign, and
thereby commit our troops to it; but we reserve to ourselves the right
to withdraw them, or, in other words, to wreck the operations, whenever
we think proper.” If, therefore, the enemy should in the meantime
take the offensive and press the Austrians hard, which, as shall be
seen, was what actually happened, the responsibility for granting or
withholding British assistance was thrown entirely upon the General.

It remains to say a word of the plan itself, and of the troops and
commanders who were appointed to carry it out. The enormous front
along which Coburg proposed to disperse his force is an example of the
system known as the cordon-system, which was in particular favour with
the Austrians at this time. It consisted in covering every possible
access to a theatre of war with some small body of troops, and had
been formulated by Marshal Lacy upon the experience of the war of
the Bavarian Succession in 1778, when he had held a front of fifty
miles in the labyrinthine country of the Upper Elbe, and reduced the
campaign to a mere scuffle of foraging parties. Well calculated to
exclude the plague or contraband goods from a country, it was, of
course, ridiculous against the invasion of an enemy; for it meant
weakness at all points and strength at none, and in fact simply
invited the destruction of the army in detail by a force of inferior
strength. Nevertheless it was in high favour with all armies of Europe,
excepting the British, at that time; and it was a matter of rule that,
wherever the enemy stationed a battalion or a company, a countervailing
battalion or company must be posted over against it. The Austrians had
suffered much from this system in their recent war with the Turks; but
their commanders, of whom Coburg had been one, had learned little from
the experience. Apart from his adherence to this new and utterly false
fashion, which precluded the concentration of troops for a vigorous
offensive, Coburg was a sound, slow, cautious commander of the old
Austrian type, more intent upon preserving his own army than destroying
the enemy’s, and, perhaps, happiest when firmly set down to conduct a
siege in form according to the most scientific principles. Withal he
was a sensible and honourable gentleman, and extremely popular with
his troops. The chief of his staff, and, by common report, the virtual
Commander-in-Chief, was the unfortunate Mack, then a colonel forty
years of age, who enjoyed the reputation of being the most scientific
officer in Europe. The theory of war, as then understood in many
quarters, assigned as the first object not the annihilation of the
enemy’s force in the field, but the possession of certain geographical
points, which were called Strategic Objects. At this game of maps
and coloured labels Mack excelled; and, when called upon to fight an
action, he so elaborated his plans for the overwhelming of his enemies
by the simultaneous onslaught of a number of converging columns that,
if everything went right and every column reached exactly the appointed
place at exactly the appointed time, he assured to himself not only
victory but conquest. But, since he made no allowance for the possible
failure of any one of his combinations through unforeseen contingencies
or accidents of any description, Mack’s actions were rarely successful
and always unduly hazardous. He seems to have been an honest man, of
real though misdirected ability; while his character gained for him a
confidence and respect which the British in the field accorded to no
other foreign officer. But though, as shall be seen, his methods by no
means commended themselves to all British commanders, they nevertheless
made a fatally favourable impression upon the British Ministry.

To judge with the wisdom that comes after the event, it may be
said that the Allied Army was tactically deficient in two principal
respects, namely, in the numerical weakness of its light infantry and
in the faulty organisation of its artillery. Light infantry and light
cavalry at this time were still treated mainly as accessories, useful
for the “little war” (to use the French expression) of outposts and
reconnaissance, but as something apart from the “great war,” which was
reserved for the more solid squadrons and battalions that enjoyed the
dignity of a place in the formal Order of Battle. In fact, the work
of outposts was supposed to fall wholly upon the light corps, while
the regular troops husbanded their strength in security behind them.
Hostilities with any nation which is driven back on primitive methods
of self-defence, and which neither knows nor respects the contemporary
usage of civilised warfare, invariably upset any such arrangement; and
the British, after the experience of America, should have been awake to
this truth. Indeed, in justice to the officers, many of them were alive
to it; but Pitt, since 1783, had been more solicitous for the reduction
than the training of the Army. In the matter of artillery the practice
of all the nations was the same. Each battalion possessed its two guns,
three-pounders or six-pounders, and the remainder of the ordnance was
massed into a park, with or without an inner distribution into brigades
or batteries. The handling of the artillery by the Count of Bückeburg
at Minden had not yet found sufficient appreciation to be made the
foundation of a system.[119]

The Austrian troops, in spite of the exhaustion of the long Turkish
war, were for the most part worthy of their high reputation, and
aroused at first the greatest admiration among British officers. They
included, however, a certain number of irregular corps, both horse
and foot, chiefly Slavs, which were simply savage banditti of the
most dangerous type. They would murder or plunder any one, friend or
foe, even to the vedettes of their own army; and no Austrian general
would trust himself among them without an escort. The quality of the
higher officers was, however, unworthy of that of the men, many of
them being old, supine, and narrow-minded; and the corps of officers
at large was sharply divided between two factions, which espoused the
two opposite schools of Loudon and Lacy. The organisation also was
imperfect, for, though the army was indeed distributed into brigades
and divisions, these were not kept together, but all detachments were
formed of squadrons and battalions arbitrarily collected and entrusted
to a general as arbitrarily chosen, who knew no more of the men than
they knew of him. In the matter of tactics the Austrians had made no
progress since the Seven Years’ War. Cavalry and infantry alike were
still formed in three ranks, and the art of handling large bodies of
cavalry had been nearly, though not wholly, forgotten.

The Prussians still enjoyed the fame which they had won under Frederick
the Great, but they had not been improved by the false training
observed by Cornwallis at their manœuvres; while their commander, von
Knobelsdorf, though full of zeal, was also full of years, having
passed his seventieth birthday. Superior to them were the Hessians,
the majority of whom had served in America, where they had learned to
manœuvre rapidly and to fight in dispersed order, though the lesson
had never been practised since their return to their own land.[120]
The Hessian Jäger were particularly good light troops, and were
armed with rifles. The whole corps, moreover, was the more effective
since it was equipped with regimental transport upon a lavish scale,
and was therefore mobile and self-dependent.[121] On the whole, the
Hessians seem to have been the most valuable fighting men in the army,
though they were not exempt from the love of plunder, a failing which
mercenary veterans are apt to judge more leniently, at certain times,
than other troops. The Hanoverians were then, as always, fine soldiers,
but without the advantage of the Hessians in experience and training.
The Dutch, being hastily raised, were ill organised, disciplined,
trained, and equipped.

The British, with the exception of the Guards, were, in the opinion
of foreign critics, very deficient in training and discipline, for
precisely the same reason as the Dutch, namely, persistent neglect.
The cavalry was of better material than the infantry, and was very
well mounted; but both officers and men were so ignorant of their work
that, at first, they could not even throw out vedettes and outposts
without instruction from foreigners. The field-guns were inferior to
those of the rest of the Allies; the ammunition-waggons were heavy and
unwieldy; and the horses were harnessed one before the other instead
of abreast, which made them difficult to drive, and took up much room
on the road. The models of both harness and waggons were, in fact, of
Marlborough’s time; while the medical arrangements, or what passed for
such, were those of a still remoter age. Discipline for the most part
was bad, especially among the officers, who were subject rather to
political than military authority, and, though there were still among
their infantry good men who had learned their business in America, far
too many were absolutely ignorant as well as neglectful of their duty.
Hard drinking in all ranks accounted for much both of the indiscipline
and the neglect. To the men, of course, drunkenness brought a flogging
at the halberts, but to the officers, unfortunately, it did not
necessarily mean punishment; nor was it possible that it should, when
respectful consideration was shown to both Prime Minister and Secretary
of State for War if they appeared incapably drunk at the House of
Commons, because the leaders of the Opposition drank even harder than
they. This vice of drunkenness was the most formidable with which good
officers had to contend throughout the twenty years of the war, simply
because it was a fashion set in high places.[122]

It was no easy task to command such a force as the British, Hanoverians
and Hessians, under the orders of such a man as Dundas, and the
immediate direction of such generals as Coburg and Mack. Frederick,
Duke of York, second son of King George the Third, was in 1793 thirty
years old. At the age of sixteen he had been sent to Berlin to study
the profession of arms under the eye of Frederick the Great himself,
and had returned with a practical knowledge which made him later an
admirable Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, but also with an
undue preference for the weaker points of the stiff and formal Prussian
system. In 1791 he had become Colonel of the Coldstream Guards, in
which post he had at first shown himself enough of a martinet to
excite discontent;[123] and, though he had wisely changed his ways
after a year’s experience, he was not at this time popular with his
men, while his officers, who had been taught to look for preferment
from politicians, resented his authority whether for good or ill.
In this respect he was hampered by the same disadvantages as had
beset Lord Stair in 1743; and, unfortunately, he did not possess the
qualifications to gain the confidence of his troops in the field.
He had the cool personal bravery which belongs to his race, but
not the higher moral courage which gives constancy and patience in
difficulty or misfortune; and hence he was at once sanguine and easily
discouraged. He had learned his work, so far as it could be acquired by
the industry of a mediocre intellect, but he was slow of apprehension,
without sagacity, penetration or width of view, and with so little
imagination or resource that an unforeseen emergency confounded him.
On the other hand, his dutiful loyalty and submission, in most trying
circumstances, towards Coburg on the one hand, and the Cabinet on the
other, were beyond all praise. The Ministry had some just doubts as
to his fitness to command, but the King had set his heart upon the
appointment; and indeed, where so many Serene Highnesses were gathered
together, the superior rank of the Duke was a decided advantage. It was
hoped, therefore, to make good his deficiencies by joining to him Sir
James Murray, better known by the name which he afterwards assumed as
Sir James Pulteney, nominally as Adjutant-general, but really as Chief
of the Staff and something more; for it was to his correspondence that
the Government looked for information and advice.

Murray was a singular character. He had served in the Seven Years’
War; he had distinguished himself in the West Indies during the
American War of Independence; and he had trained an intellect, which
was of no common order, not only by shrewd observation of the world
but by solid and extensive study. His knowledge was great, his grasp
and outlook wide, his judgment cool and accurate, his indifference to
danger and hardship absolute; but he was shy, awkward and diffident,
with a dreamy indolence which led him too readily to surrender his
own correct opinion, and to amuse himself with speculation upon the
incorrect opinions of others.[124] When roused he could sum up a
situation with an insight, terseness and vigour which showed how close
was his hold upon facts; but he was not the helpmate who could make
good the defects of the Duke of York. The situation, indeed, demanded
a Marlborough, with the insight to see the one thing that was needed,
and the tact and ascendency to bring cautious commanders, intriguing
Ministers, narrow-minded potentates and irresolute Cabinets into line,
for the one true object,—an immediate march on Paris.

Such a march could undoubtedly not have been made without risk, owing to
the dearth of food in France; yet the opportunity was favourable, and
the hazard was slight compared with the certain danger of delay.
◆Feb. 19.◆ Already in February the Republic had wantonly made a fresh
enemy by declaring war upon Spain; and the campaign in Belgium had
produced results for which the most sanguine of her enemies could
hardly have hoped. ◆March 8.◆ On the first news of the Austrian
successes, the Convention instantly formed a special tribunal for the
trial of traitors and conspirators against France, and summoned two
of the defeated generals to appear before it. This done, it proceeded
to take measures for hastening the levy of the three hundred thousand
men, decreed a fortnight before. The scenes of ridiculous enthusiasm,
which had become usual in Paris, followed as a matter of course; but
the multitude of men who, for various reasons, claimed exemption, was
astonishing, and the rascality of many who were enrolled was flagrant.
A great many of these rogues made a trade of fraudulent enlistment,
receiving a bounty from several corps and selling the arms and clothing
received from each of them; while the number of women, who claimed
allowances for the removal of their husbands to the army, sufficed to
warrant the belief that every recruit was a polygamist. ◆March 10.◆ In
the provinces, both north and south, there was violent resistance to
the levy; and on the 10th of March, at Saint Florent le Vieil on the
Loire, the peasants turned upon the troops which had been brought up
to enforce the ballot, and, though armed only with cudgels, dispersed
them and drove them from the town. That evening the alarm-bell rang in
every church of the surrounding parishes; and five days later bands
of peasants drove the National Guards from Chollet, some twenty miles
south of Saint Florent, and took that town also. This was the first
manifestation of a great counter-revolutionary movement, famous in
history as the revolt of La Vendée.

The Convention, however, did not at first realise the importance of this
outbreak, in the critical state of things in the north. An attempt to
reinforce Dumouriez at Louvain, by calling out ten thousand of the
National Guards of the northern provinces, provided only a few worn-out
men and boys,[125] whom the General contemptuously dismissed to their
homes. Then came the defection of Dumouriez himself, which was well-nigh
fatal to all military improvement. The General had disparaged the
election of officers by their men; he had urged that the volunteers
should be incorporated in the Line; he had tried to enforce discipline
upon all; and, finally, he had turned traitor and taken some of his
regular troops with him. It was therefore plain that discipline was an
abomination, that all his recommendations were vicious, that the regular
troops were not to be trusted, and that volunteers only were to be
accounted faithful. Never was the regular army of France so near to
total dissolution at the hands of its countrymen as at this moment of
supreme military peril. ◆April 6.◆ Beurnonville, having tried to abolish
abuses, was driven from the War Office; a good Jacobin, Bouchotte, with
a still better Jacobin, Vincent, at his elbow, was installed in
Beurnonville’s place, and the whole of Pache’s vile following returned
with them to office.[126] A camp was ordered to be formed at Peronne,
and in it were assembled, not with disgrace but with honour, all the
soldiers who had been imprisoned by Dumouriez for misconduct, all the
deserters, the cowards and the skulkers, who had fled from the army of
Belgium. Further, it was resolved that representatives of the people,
with absolute powers, should be sent to rally and reorganise the
northern forces, and to set the fortresses in order. If ever a nation
seemed bent upon compassing its own destruction by piling madness upon
madness, it was the French at this moment.

Yet, amid all the confusion, there appeared the first sign of the
powers which by terrible means were to reduce France and, through
France, the whole Continent of Europe to discipline and order. On the
6th of April the Convention chose nine of its members, renewable by
monthly election, to wield the Dictatorship of France, with the title
of the Committee of Public Safety. ◆April 10.◆ On the 10th of April a
rough Alsatian officer, Kellerman by name, whose gallantry had raised
him from the ranks to a commission during the Seven Years’ War, came
forward with a scheme which preserved the famous regiments of the
French Line. Finally, among the six representatives despatched to
save the wreck of Dumouriez’s army was Captain Lazare Carnot of the
Engineers; by birth a younger son in a respectable family of Burgundy,
by repute well known in Europe as an original thinker upon military
matters in general, and upon the defence of fortresses in particular.
Though now forty years of age and of twenty years’ standing in the
army, he was still a captain, for his military opinions had given
offence in high quarters under the Monarchy; and it was as a simple
captain that he was to appoint generals, and to organise victory under
the Republic. Deeply read in theology and history, a passionate devotee
of mathematics and of science, he had framed for himself high ideals,
which, as he thought, the Revolution was appointed to fulfil; and he
upheld its principles through good report and evil report, not with the
Gallic effervescence that is bred of self-consciousness, but with the
austere fanaticism of a Scot who takes his stand upon the Covenant.
He believed; and in his faith he had buried all thought of self. Rank,
wealth, fame alike were indifferent to this spare, stern, ascetic
soldier. To give all that lay in him for the cause, to render faithful
account of every trust reposed in him for the cause, to forward all
that would further it, to combat all that could impede it—such were
the principles that governed his conduct. With these motives to
inspire him, with great natural gifts, and with every faculty of mind
and body trained to the highest point, it is not surprising that his
intellectual grasp was wide, his insight clear, his energy infectious,
his industry indefatigable. Such was the man who in the early days of
April hurried to the north, his brain teeming with thoughts, long since
conceived, as to the training best suited to the French soldier, with
his natural aptitude for attack. Five years before, while advocating
a scheme of short service, he had written that it is war and not a
lifetime in the barrack-yard that makes the old soldier.[127] To
General Dampierre, who had been appointed on his recommendation to
succeed Dumouriez, Carnot left it to apply this precept, while he
himself, with ominous directness, hastened northward to repair the
half-ruined fortress of Dunkirk.

VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER V

◆1793.◆

The effect of Carnot’s arrival at Dunkirk in overthrowing Pitt’s
original plan has already been told. There can be no doubt that the
French had full information of the Minister’s designs, for it became
a proverb that the most secret projects of the British War Office
were always well known to the enemy and to everybody in England.[128]
Nevertheless, if the British Cabinet had thereupon frankly abandoned
any attempt upon Dunkirk, Carnot’s labours might have been turned
to naught. The French army was only slowly assembled during April,
and even at the end of the month was of inferior force and scattered
over a wide front; for the French were not free from the vices of the
cordon-system, nor were likely to be, so long as civilians interfered
with their military dispositions. ◆April.◆ Apart from the garrisons of
Quesnoy, Valenciennes, Condé, Lille and Dunkirk, Dampierre kept ten
thousand men on his right, under General Harville, between Maubeuge and
Philippeville: ten thousand more, under General Lamarlière, lay on his
left, in an entrenched camp thrown up by Carnot at Cassel and at other
points between Lille and Dunkirk: and five thousand at Nomain, Orchies,
and Hasnon, covered the interval between Lille and the main army. This
last, consisting of thirty thousand men under Dampierre’s immediate
command, lay in an entrenched camp at Famars, a little to the south of
Valenciennes, with a detachment in another fortified position at Anzin,
to the north-west of that town. In all, therefore, he had about fifty
thousand men at hand for service in the field.

◆April 23.◆

Meanwhile the Allies, who were still below their full strength,
occupied the following positions. On their right, that is to say,
to westward, six thousand Dutch and about three thousand Imperial
troops, under the Hereditary Prince of Orange, lay at Furnes, Ypres
and Menin; next to them two thousand five hundred British and about
the same number of Austrians and Prussians, under the Duke of York,
occupied Tournai; next to the Duke of York, Knobelsdorf, with about
eight thousand Prussians, held the line of Maulde, Lecelles and Saint
Amand on the Scarpe; next to Knobelsdorf, Clerfaye, with about twelve
thousand men at Vicoigne and Raismes, and at Bruay and Fresnes, on
the Scheldt, encompassed Condé on the south, while the Prince of
Würtemberg with about five thousand men blockaded it on the north. At
Onnaing, due south of Condé, lay the principal army, about fifteen
thousand strong, with the advance guard at Saint Saulve; and to the
east of the main army General Latour with about six thousand men
occupied Bettignies, in observation of Maubeuge, with a detachment at
Bavai to preserve communication between Bettignies and Onnaing. The
total force of the Allies may thus be taken, roughly, at over sixty
thousand men, not including thirty thousand Imperial troops under the
Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirschberg, which were uselessly detained at Namur,
Trèves and Luxemburg. The English cavalry, the Hanoverians and the
Hessians, had not yet arrived, though the first detachments of the two
former were drawing near to the front; but none the less the Allies
were actually superior to the French in numbers, and very far superior
in quality. The whole of their multitudinous posts were strongly
entrenched; but it will be observed that, besides the essential defect
of the enormous extension of their front, their line was cut in two by
the river Scheldt, which gave the greater opportunity for a successful
attack upon one or other of their wings. The general distribution of
the Allies corresponded in the main with their lines of retreat, that
of the British lying west to the sea, that of the Dutch north-east upon
Antwerp, that of the Austrians east upon Namur; so that a successful
attack upon the British would probably lay bare the Austrian right,
and a decided defeat of the Austrians must certainly uncover the
British left. With their usual jealousy for supreme control, the
Austrians mixed a contingent of their own troops with the Allies in
every section of the army, an arrangement which gave rise to infinite
confusion, since it made even small detachments dependent on two or
three different sources of supply. For each nation made provision for
its own troops in its own way, and, owing to diversities of system and
of differences in calibre of muskets and cannon, it was impossible to
enforce any effort towards uniformity.

Still, the inactivity of Coburg during April was marvellous. It never
occurred to him to overwhelm any one of Dampierre’s isolated divisions
of untrained men by concentrating a superior force upon it. He never
reflected that, even if both sides adhered to the cordon-system, the
French could bring up the whole manhood of their country to make their
cordon stronger than his own at every point. He allowed Dampierre to
school his troops with impunity by perpetual affairs of outposts,
without remembering that the French could more easily replace two men
than he could replace one. Finally (but this may be pardoned to him) he
did not guess that, while he was wasting a campaign over formal sieges,
the French would evolve from the experience of many skirmishes a new
system of tactics—that they would abandon the old formal training, and,
turning to account the indiscipline which springs from the principle
of equality, would grant independence of action to the born fighting
men, and trust to the national impetuosity to carry the rest forward in
dense masses to the attack.

It is a shameful reproach to the Allies that, overmatched though he was
in every respect, the French General took the initiative and made the
first move of the campaign. ◆May 1.◆ On the 1st of May he assailed the
whole line of the Allies from Saint Saulve to St. Amand; but, the
attacks being unintelligent and incoherent, he was beaten back at every
point with a loss of two thousand men and several guns. ◆May 8.◆ Urged
by the Convention to save Condé, he on the 8th essayed a second attempt,
and on this occasion confined himself to demonstrations only upon the
flanks of the Allies, concentrating a larger proportion of his force
against Clerfaye’s position in the centre. These sounder principles
brought him within an ace of success. He himself directed a frontal
attack from Anzin against Raismes and Vicoigne, and after four
successive repulses carried the position of Raismes, excepting the
village. Lamarlière meanwhile with little difficulty made his way
towards St. Amand, while one of his divisions, crossing the Scarpe,
pressed on unseen through the forest of Vicoigne, nearly to the road
which leads from St. Amand to Valenciennes. There this division began to
throw up a redoubt and batteries to cannonade Clerfaye’s defences of
Vicoigne, so as to cut off communication between him and Knobelsdorf,
and to ensure a junction with the garrison of Valenciennes. The
situation was critical, for, if the French succeeded in holding
possession of the road, the post at Vicoigne was lost, and the whole
line of the Allies was broken. Fortunately the Duke of York had moved
three battalions of Guards to Nivelle, a little to the north of St.
Amand, having promised Knobelsdorf help in case of need; and at five
o’clock in the evening the brigade came upon the scene, just as the
French were gaining the upper hand of the Prussians. The country to
north and west of Valenciennes is a level plain, broken only by the
three forests which bear the names of Marchiennes, Vicoigne, and
Raismes, so that the Duke could see little or nothing of what was going
forward until his troops were actually on the scene of action. The
Coldstream, being first for duty, by Knobelsdorf’s order entered the
wood, and quickly driving the French back, followed them up to their
entrenchments. There, however, they were met by musketry in front and a
fierce fire of grape from a masked battery in flank; when, finding
themselves unsupported by the Prussians, they fell back in good order
with a loss of over seventy killed and wounded. Seeing, however, by the
appearance of the red coats, that Knobelsdorf had been reinforced,
Lamarlière’s division made no further effort to advance; and Dampierre,
while leading a last desperate assault upon Vicoigne from the front, was
mortally wounded by a cannon-shot. ◆May 9.◆ This decided the fate of the
day: his successor stopped the attack, and on the following morning
retreated. On the next day Clerfaye and Knobelsdorf stormed the enemy’s
newly-built batteries and captured their garrison of six hundred men,
but failed to take the guns, which, according to the French custom of
the time, had been withdrawn and kept limbered up for the night, in
readiness for escape.[129] The loss of Clerfaye’s and Knobelsdorf’s
corps in the two days was little short of eight hundred officers and
men; that of the French was far heavier, and was aggravated by the death
of Dampierre. It speaks highly for the man that with troops so raw he
should have made so fine a fight against some of the best soldiers in
Europe.

The losses suffered by the Coldstream Guards on the 8th were made the
subject of much complaint both against Knobelsdorf and the Duke of
York, and did not promote good feeling among the Allies in the field.
The battalion was, in fact, lucky to escape annihilation. Murray
blamed Lieutenant-colonel Pennington, who was in command; but it
seems that Knobelsdorf simply told him to enter the wood, which was
full of dense undergrowth, without saying a word of the batteries or
entrenchments hidden within it, though both an Austrian and a Prussian
battalion had already suffered severely in an attempt to carry them.
The Duke of York, who had never contemplated so foolhardy an attack,
wisely thought it best to make no complaint. The battalion itself, to
judge by a letter from one of the officers to Lord Buckingham, was
very indignant with the Duke; and there is every probability that its
complaints reached the ear of Pitt. I mention this, because, though the
matter is in itself a small one, it gives conclusive evidence of the
incessant friction which arose from the indiscipline of the British
officers and from the mistrust which the Allies felt for each other.
It is safe to conjecture that this uninformed criticism of generals
by their subordinate officers continued throughout the campaign; and
the preservation of the letter above mentioned among Lord Grenville’s
papers is proof that such criticism was not disregarded by their
powerful patrons at home. Unfortunately there is too much reason to
fear that this evil even now is not unknown in our Army.[130]

During the following days the Allies were considerably strengthened by
the arrival of successive detachments of Hanoverians and of one brigade
of British cavalry under General Ralph Dundas;[131] but already Murray,
with his American experience, had awoke to his weakness in light
troops, and was recommending the acceptance of two offers to raise
corps of foreign riflemen and Polish Uhlans.[132] The primitive tactics
of the French were beginning to tell. The raw levies understood war to
signify the killing of the enemy—even of one man rather than none at
all—and the saving of themselves. When therefore a mass of them was set
in motion, the bravest men advanced, taking advantage of every shelter
afforded by the ground, and did their utmost to shoot their opponents
down; while the rest ran away or remained at a safe distance, to return
in a fierce tumultuous swarm if the enemy showed signs of wavering, but
not otherwise. ◆May 21.◆ However, on the 21st, Coburg, much rejoiced
by the reinforcement of British and Hanoverians, judged himself strong
enough to pursue his plan of campaign, and decided to drive the
French from their camp at Famars preliminarily to the investment of
Valenciennes. Meanwhile, to the general regret, Mack resigned his post
on Coburg’s staff, owing partly to ill-health, partly to his sense
of Thugut’s antagonism to him;[133] and the Prince of Hohenlohe, a
veteran of seventy-one, was called from Luxemburg to take his place. It
was, however, enough at that time that the attack should be designed by
an Austrian General to ensure that it should be repugnant to all good
sense.

The entrenched camp of Famars embraced two broad parallel plateaux,
divided by the little river Rhonelle, which lie immediately to the
south of Valenciennes. The western plateau, that of Famars, has a
length of about four miles, and abuts on the village of Artres; the
eastern, which is broader and less clearly defined than the other, has
a length of about three and a half miles, and terminates at the village
of Préseau. Both are practically flat upon the summit, unenclosed, and
were covered with crops. The ascent to them is steepest from the west
and south, and the valley dug between them by the Rhonelle, though not
deep, plunges down so abruptly as to present sides of sharp though
short declivity. The ridge of Famars was protected by a series of
detached flêches and redoubts placed on every commanding point on the
northern, western, and southern sides. The passages over the Rhonelle
at Artres, and at Maresches, a mile and a half above it, were defended
by strong entrenchments and batteries, and all the fords on this narrow
but deep and sluggish stream had been destroyed. The eastern ridge was
fortified by a continuous entrenchment with three redoubts, which was
carried for nearly a mile along the length of the summit. The force at
hand for its defence was about twenty-five thousand men, besides which
five thousand men held the fortified position of Anzin; while a small
detachment due west of it at Aubry maintained communication with the
post of Hasnon, still further to north and west.

The attack of the main position was assigned to two principal columns,
of which the left or southern was placed under command of the Duke of
York, with orders to assemble his force on the heights between Préseau
and Maresches, and to assail the right flank of the position. This
column was made up of sixteen battalions, eighteen squadrons, and
thirty-eight reserve-guns,[134] of which the brigade of Guards[135]
and the eight squadrons of Dundas’s brigade were British. The second
principal column consisted of twelve battalions, of which three
were the English of Abercromby’s brigade,[136] twelve squadrons and
twenty-three reserve-guns, with five pontoons, under the Austrian
General Ferraris. His orders were to assemble between Saultain and
Curgies, a little to the north-east of Préseau, to drive the enemy from
their positions east of the Rhonelle, and to cross the river itself,
or at least feint to do so. Besides these, a third column under Count
Colloredo was to observe Valenciennes from between Estreux and Onnaing,
and to protect Ferraris’s right flank; a fourth, further to the right,
under Clerfaye, was to attack the entrenched camp of Anzin; a fifth
still further to the right under Knobelsdorf was to march from St.
Amand against Hasnon; and a sixth and seventh under the Crown Prince
and Prince Frederick of Orange were to move respectively from Tournai
upon Orchies, and from Menin upon Tourcoing. Finally, on the extreme
left or western flank, there were an eighth column, under General Otto,
to protect the Duke of York’s left by an advance by Villerspol upon
Quesnoy, and a ninth to disquiet the French on the Sambre from Bavai.
The scheme was typically Austrian; that is to say, too full of science
to leave room for sense.

[Illustration:

Attack of the Allies
on the
CAMP OF FAMARS
23 May, 1793.

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

◆May 23.◆

The morning broke in dense fog, so that the main attack did not begin
until near seven o’clock, when the Duke of York’s column, after marching
most of the night, made its way with little resistance to Artres. There
failing to force the passage of the river, which was defended by five
batteries, the Duke left his heavy guns with about a third of his force
to engage the French artillery, and proceeded with the rest higher up
the stream to Maresches, where a ford was found, and the passage was
with some trouble and delay accomplished. Meanwhile Ferraris attacked
the long entrenchment on the eastern ridge, opening fire from three
batteries, while Abercromby on the right and four Austrian battalions on
the left advanced to the assault, and carried the works with little
difficulty, capturing seven guns and over one hundred prisoners. Two
French regiments of cavalry, which tried to turn the scale against the
assaulting columns, were most gallantly charged by the Austrian Hussars
and the Hanoverian Life Guards, and actually defeated, notwithstanding
that the victorious troops had all the disadvantage of a steep ascent
against them. Coburg then halted Ferraris’s column, until further news
should come of the Duke of York’s advance. But the Duke, after making a
wide turning movement by Querenaing and driving the French from their
outlying defences, found himself at sunset at the foot of the most
formidable ascent in the whole position, crowned at different points by
four redoubts which flanked each other. Thereupon, since his men had
been on foot for eighteen hours, he decided to defer the attack till
next morning. Elsewhere, the success of the various columns was
indifferent. Knobelsdorf could win no more than the outworks of Hasnon;
Clerfaye failed to take the camp of Anzin; and, though the Prince of
Orange drove the French from Orchies, his brother, Prince Frederick of
Orange, was foiled before Tourcoing. ◆May 24.◆ Coburg gave orders for
renewal of the attack on the entrenchments of Famars and Anzin at
daybreak of the 24th; but it was found that the French, after
reinforcing the garrison of Valenciennes, had evacuated all their
positions and retired to Bouchain. The trophies of the Allies were
seventeen guns, captured at various points, and three hundred prisoners;
and the further loss of the French was set down, doubtless with
exaggeration, at three thousand killed and wounded. Even so the results
of the day were unsatisfactory. The Austrians, of course, blamed the
Duke of York; and Murray, without specifying who was in fault, wrote
privately that a great deal more might have been done.[137] But, in
truth, no one except an Austrian of that period could have looked for
great results from so feeble and faulty a plan of attack.

However, the ground was now clear for the siege of Valenciennes; and
Coburg, as a compliment to the Duke of York, offered him the command of
the besieging force, including fourteen thousand Austrians. There was
much division in the British Cabinet over this piece of politeness, for
Ministers were still in the dark as to Austria’s general intentions; and
some of them feared that the troops under the Duke of York might be so
much crippled by the siege of Valenciennes as to be unfit for the
subsequent siege of Dunkirk. However, notwithstanding their suspicions
of some sinister design on Austria’s part, the Duke received permission
to accept the command; though Coburg was careful to attach General
Ferraris to his staff with secret orders to take the entire direction of
the operations upon himself.[138] The chief of the English Engineers,
Colonel Moncrieff, was urgent for storming the town without further ado,
and was confident that, if his plans were followed, the place could be
taken within twelve days; but, though Murray was wholly of Moncrieffs
opinion, Ferraris would not hear of it. ◆June 13.◆ A fortnight was
therefore spent in collecting heavy artillery, after which ground was
duly broken on the 13th of June, before a greater and a lesser horn-work
on the east side of the town. About twenty-five thousand men were
actually employed on the siege, while the remainder, about thirty
thousand men, formed the covering army; and, practically speaking,
active operations upon both sides ceased except round the walls of the
beleaguered fortress.

Yet, far away to westward, there had been a movement disquieting to
the British. On the 29th of May forty transports, conveying the second
brigade of British cavalry,[139] came into Ostend; whereupon Captain
Carnot, knowing the slackness of the Dutch garrisons at Furnes and
Nieuport, which covered that place, determined to surprise them from
Dunkirk, and then by a swift march forward to seize and burn the
British shipping. ◆May 30.◆ Moving out accordingly on the night of the
30th, he reached Furnes at daybreak, drove the Dutch headlong from the
town, and was hoping to follow them up to Nieuport, when the whole of
his troops with one accord fell to the plunder of the town, heedless
of their officers, and in a short time were reeling or lying in all
directions, hopelessly drunk. Far from seizing Ostend, he was thankful
that the Dutch did not return and cut his helpless battalions to
pieces.[140]

Nevertheless, the movement fulfilled the useful purpose of frightening
the British Cabinet. Dundas was possessed by a kind of superstition
respecting Ostend, having apparently some idea that it might be held
as the gate of the Austrian Netherlands from the sea, even if the rest
of the country were evacuated. Though the place itself was part of the
Austrian dominions, the guardianship of the whole of the coast, and
indeed of the right flank of the Allied army, was entrusted to the
Dutch; and in spite of all protests the Dutch declined to do anything
for its defence. Ostend was in fact indefensible, being divided by
an unbridged estuary which cut it in two at every flood tide, and
was safe from a French attack only for so long as Menin, Ypres,
and Nieuport were held by the Allies. The Duke of York and Murray
therefore regarded it as of no military value, though of some temporary
convenience, looking upon Antwerp and the Scheldt as their true base
and channel of communication with England. Nothing, however, would
convince Dundas of Ostend’s insignificance. He took the place under
his own control, sent heavy ordnance to be mounted for its defence,
appointed a special officer, General Ainslie, to take command of it,
and plagued Murray so incessantly to fortify it that the Duke of York,
for the sake of peace, consented to raise a few entrenchments on a
small scale. The Duke had hardly done so, however, before he received
a rebuke from Dundas for spending too much money; whereupon he, of
course, suspended the work, being, as Murray said, at a loss to know
how to proceed. This was the beginning of a more minute and persistent
interference of Dundas with the conduct of the operations, with its
inevitable consequence of strained relations between him and the
General in the field.[141]

Meanwhile the siege of Valenciennes went forward slowly and
methodically, much more so, indeed, than seemed necessary either to
Murray or to Moncrieff, though bad weather was accountable in some
measure for the delay. ◆July 10.◆ At length, on the 10th of July, Condé
surrendered after a severe bombardment, and was occupied in the name of
the Emperor Francis. ◆July 22.◆ Twelve days later Mainz opened its gates
to the Prussians, though the garrison was twenty thousand strong, and
had still bread and wine to last for some days. ◆July 26.◆ Finally, on
the 26th, an assault was delivered in three columns upon the two
horn-works of Valenciennes, one column being led by a storming party of
the Guards, and supported by part of Abercromby’s brigade. The attacks
of all three succeeded with little loss, and Murray, after a strong
altercation with the Austrian engineer, insisted, in defiance of
Ferraris’s orders, upon making a lodgment in the greater horn-work.[142]
◆July 28.◆ Thereupon, on the 28th of July, the French General, Ferrand,
capitulated. The place was taken over, like Condé, in the Emperor’s
name, amid the loud applause not only of the citizens but of the
garrison, who trampled the tricolour under foot and hailed the Duke of
York as King of France. All three of the captured garrisons were
permitted to return to their own place, on condition that they should
not fight against the Allies during the remainder of the war.

Unfortunately, after the fall of Valenciennes the Allies in Flanders,
far from pressing their advantage, fell to debating what they should
do next. It had been already agreed that the Austrians should give
up ten thousand men to the Duke of York for the siege of Dunkirk;
but Coburg, seeing the danger of the plan, made a last effort to
avert it by submitting a new scheme for taking the offensive in
concert with Prussia; he himself to move south-east upon Maubeuge
from Valenciennes, while the Prussians should advance south-west from
Mainz upon Sarrelouis. King Frederick William gladly assented, but
the Duke of York protested, as under his instructions he was bound
to do; and he was upheld by a messenger who arrived from Vienna at
Coburg’s headquarters on the 6th of August. Thugut had been at work
on one of his usual subtilties. He had soothed Pitt by renouncing the
exchange of Belgium for Bavaria, but had begged that Prussia might not
be informed of the renunciation; for he was still secretly bent on
obtaining Bavaria by some means, and had resolved to purchase it by the
cession of Alsace. Hence it was his wish that the King of Prussia, and
particularly the Austrian troops under General Wurmser who were serving
with him, should move south into Alsace, and that Coburg should pursue
the plan, already agreed upon, of besieging Quesnoy, while the Duke of
York invested Dunkirk. Coburg thereupon gave way, though with no very
good grace; and it was resolved that, before his army was separated
from the Duke’s, a general action should be fought, as an essential
preliminary to the subsequent operations.[143]

The position of the French under General Kilmain was known as that
of Caesar’s Camp, which lies on the left bank of the Scheldt about
two miles above Bouchain; but in reality it formed an irregular
quadrilateral, of which a part of Villars’s famous lines of La Bassée
formed the northern side. Facing due east, Kilmain’s front was covered
by the Scheldt from Bouchain to Cambrai, his rear by the river Agache,
which runs into the Sensée a little to the south of Arleux, his right
by the Sensée, and his left by the wood and heights of Bourlon from
Cambrai to Marquion. All passages over the Scheldt were closed by
entrenchments, and the valley itself was flooded; all passages over
the Sensée were equally defended, while the right from Cambrai to
Agache was strengthened by field-works and abatis. Such a position,
held by sixty thousand men, was formidable, and Coburg accordingly
resolved to turn it by the south. The turning column, consisting of
fourteen thousand men under the Duke of York, was to assemble about
Villers-en-Cauchies and Saint Aubert, and to cross the Scheldt at
Masnières and Crevecœur, about five miles south of Cambrai. A second
column of about nine thousand men under the Austrian General Colloredo,
and a third of about twelve thousand under General Clerfaye, were to
force the passage of the Scheldt in the front of the position. The
remainder of the army, little less than half of it, was uselessly
frittered away in posts of observation.

Murray, foreseeing that the French would retire as soon as they
perceived the turning movement, begged persistently that more cavalry
should be given to the Duke of York, in order to inflict some
punishment on them. His request was refused, and the result was
exactly that which he had expected. ◆Aug. 7.◆ The Duke, after a march
of eleven hours on a day of extraordinary heat, found his troops too
much exhausted to pass the river at Masnières; and Kilmain, withdrawing
quietly in the night, made good his retreat upon Arras with little
loss, though the British cavalry made a few prisoners. The Austrians,
of course, blamed the Duke of York, though Coburg had sent Hohenlohe
with him for the express purpose of superintending his operations; but
the arrangements of the day opened Murray’s eyes to the essential vices
of the Austrian tactics. “We were not in force to attack the enemy,”
he wrote; “the Duke’s column was a long way from support, and between
ourselves we were not sorry to see them go off.” It was only after long
schooling by disaster that the Austrians at last abandoned a system of
which the rottenness was clear to the much despised Briton.[144]

After the engagement, Coburg pressed the Duke of York to remain with him
for yet another fortnight, in order to renew the attack on the French
army or to take Cambrai, the last fortress that blocked the way into
France. But the Duke could only obey his instructions as to Dunkirk,
which had lately been reiterated by Dundas;[145] and the two armies
accordingly parted. Coburg, weakened by the withdrawal of nine thousand
Prussian troops, and not yet compensated by the restoration of fourteen
thousand Austrians from the Rhine, resolved to besiege Quesnoy, and
meanwhile spread his force in several detachments from Denain to
Bettignies. ◆Aug. 13.◆ The Duke assembled his whole force of about
thirty-seven thousand men[146] at Marchiennes on the Scarpe on the 13th
of August, and on the 15th marched in two columns north-west by Baisieux
and Tourcoing upon Menin. From Baisieux the route lay across the front
of the great fortress of Lille, and of the French fortified posts
extending from that city to Dunkirk; ◆Aug. 18.◆ and on the morning of
the 18th, soon after the advanced guard of the southern column had moved
from Tourcoing, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Linselles,
about two miles to the west of that place. The Prince of Orange, for
reasons best known to himself, had seized the opportunity to sally out
from Menin, and surprise the French posts of Blaton and Linselles, which
being accomplished, he left two weak battalions to hold them, and
retired. About mid-day the French returned with five thousand men and
drove out the Dutch; and an hour or two later an aide-de-camp came
galloping into Menin to ask for help. The Duke of York at once ordered
out the brigade of Guards, which had just arrived at Menin after a
severe march, with a few guns, under General Lake. The three battalions,
without their flank companies, and therefore little over eleven hundred
strong, at once turned out, and traversed the six miles to Linselles in
little more than an hour, but, on reaching it, found not a Dutchman
there. They were, however, saluted by a heavy fire of grape from
batteries which they had supposed to be in possession of the Dutch; and
thereupon Lake determined to attack at once.

The hill, on which the village of Linselles stands, is fairly steep on
its northern face, and was further strengthened by two redoubts before
the village itself and by a barrier of palisades on the road, while its
flanks were secured by woods and ditches. Lake at once deployed into
line under a heavy fire of grape, and, after firing three or four
volleys, charged with the bayonet and drove the French from the redoubts
and village. He then halted and re-formed on the southern side of the
hill, not without apprehensions lest the enemy should rally and make a
counter attack while he was still unsupported. Fortunately, however,
the French were not equal to the attempt, being still of the inferior
quality which was inevitable under the foolish administration of the
Jacobins, and so puny in stature that the Guards cuffed and jostled them
like a London mob, without condescending to kill them.[147] Lake was
therefore left unmolested on his ground, until at nightfall six
battalions of Hessians arrived, in reply to his urgent messages for
reinforcement, to relieve him. His trophies were twelve guns, seventy
prisoners, and a colour, but his losses amounted to one hundred and
eighty-seven officers and men killed and wounded; and no real object
whatever was gained. The action was undoubtedly most brilliant, and the
conduct of the men beyond all praise; while Lake’s swift decision to
escape from a most dangerous situation by an immediate attack stamps him
as a ready commander. But it is a grave reflection upon the Duke of York
that he should so thoughtlessly have exposed some of his best troops to
needless danger, leaving them isolated and unsupported for several
hours. It is still less to his credit that, when he finally relieved
them by a detachment of Hessians, he actually left these also isolated
and unsupported within striking distance of a superior enemy during the
whole night, for no better purpose than to rase some paltry French
earthworks which a few hours would suffice to throw up again. Because
the Prince of Orange was guilty of one act of signal foolishness, there
was no occasion to outdo him by another.

At Menin the army was parted into two divisions. The first, consisting
of the Hanoverians, ten British squadrons and foreign troops, or about
fourteen thousand five hundred men, under the Hanoverian Marshal
Freytag, was to form the covering army; the other, of nearly twenty-two
thousand men, including the rest of the British troops, under the Duke
in person, was appointed to besiege Dunkirk. ◆Aug. 19.◆ On the 19th,
Freytag marched from Menin by Ypres upon Poperinghe, which he occupied
with his main body on the ◆Aug. 20.◆ 20th, at the same time pushing his
advanced guard further north-west to Rousbrugge on the Yser. ◆Aug. 21.◆
On the following day a detachment of Hessians, with great skill and at
small cost to themselves, drove the French from Oost Capel and Rexpoede
into the fortress of Bergues, with the loss of eleven guns and some four
hundred men; and Freytag then took up his line of posts to cover the
besieging army. His left was stationed at Poperinghe, covered by the
fortress of Ypres; and from thence the chain ran north-west to Proven on
the Yser, and westward up that stream by Bambecque to Wylder, where it
turned north, and passing midway between Bergues and Rexpoede rested its
right on a point called the White House, hard by the canal that runs
from Bergues ◆Aug. 23, 24.◆ to Furnes. On the 23rd and 24th Freytag
drove the French from Wormhoudt and Esquelbecque with the loss of
nineteen guns, and surrounded Bergues by detachments at Warhem to east,
Coudekerque to north, Sainte Quaedypre to south, and Steene to
west. From this last an outer chain of posts was extended southward to
Esquelbecque, and thence east by Wormhoudt and Herzeele to the Upper
Yser at Houtkerque. The whole circuit thus embraced measured about
twenty-one miles; from which it will be concluded that Freytag was a
believer in the cordon-system.

◆Aug. 20.◆

Meanwhile the Duke of York marched on the 20th to Furnes; ◆Aug. 22.◆ and
on the 22nd, moving thence parallel with the strand, he drove in the
enemy’s advanced posts upon the entrenched camp of Ghyvelde, which the
French abandoned in the night. ◆Aug. 24.◆ On the 24th, after several
hours of sharp fighting, which cost the Allies nearly four hundred
men,[148] the French were forced back from the suburb of Rosendahl into
the town; whereupon the Duke entrenched himself in his chosen position,
with his right resting on the sea and his left at Tetteghem, facing full
upon the eastern side of the town and about two miles distant from the
walls.

The field of operations for the Duke’s army may be described roughly as
a quadrilateral, of which the sea forms the northern side, the canal
from Dunkirk to Bergues the west, the canal from Bergues to Furnes the
south, and a line drawn from Furnes to the sea the east. From east to
west the ground thus enclosed was divided roughly into two parallel
strips; the northern half consisting of the sandhills known as the
Dunes, together with a narrow plain of level sandy ground within them;
and the southern half of a huge morass called the Great Moor, which
consisted partly of standing water, partly of swamp, but was all open to
inundation by admitting the tidal water from the sluices of Dunkirk.
Tetteghem, which formed the left of the Duke’s position, rested upon
this swamp, and commanded the only road that led across it to the White
House, and so to Freytag’s army. The position itself was in many
respects disadvantageous. It was much broken up by innumerable little
ditches, hedges, and patches of brushwood, all of which the troops had
to clear away with their side-arms for want of better tools; it was
wholly destitute of drinking water, that in the canals being brackish,
and that found in the wells unpalatable; and, finally, it lay open to
the minutest inspection from the tower of Dunkirk Cathedral. But this
was not the worst. The Duke had looked for a fleet to cover his right
flank, which had suffered from the enemy’s gunboats during the march
upon Ghyvelde, and for transports bringing heavy artillery and other
materials for the siege; and so far there was not a sign of them. “The
principal object is to have what is wanted and to have it in time,”
Murray had written to Dundas in July; and Dundas had replied that he was
preparing artillery for Dunkirk, but was in great want of gunners.[149]
◆Aug. 27.◆ At last, on the 27th, the transports came with gunners, but
without guns; ◆Aug. 29.◆ on the 29th a frigate, the _Brilliant_, and a
few armed cutters appeared off the coast; ◆Aug. 30.◆ and on the 30th
Admiral Macbride arrived to concert operations, but without his fleet.

By an arrangement, which was repeated at least once more during the
war, Macbride’s squadron, being intended to act with the Army, had been
removed from the control of the Admiralty and placed under the orders
of Dundas, so that he alone was responsible for this miscarriage.[150]
“Why did you not earlier suggest to me naval co-operation at Dunkirk?”
he wrote angrily to Murray on the 29th. “I had always a conceit in
my own mind as to its usefulness, but I had no authority to quote
for it.” This is an instructive example of Dundas’s methods as a War
Minister. The project of besieging Dunkirk emanated from himself and
his colleagues in the Cabinet, and from them alone. No military man
approved it, though the Duke of York, out of loyalty to his masters,
dutifully upheld it; and Dundas never quoted any authority but his
own for undertaking it, nor for his constant interference with the
conduct of the operations that preceded it. He had indeed a good
many conceits in his own mind, the most fatal of which was that he
understood how to conduct a campaign; and he had privately made vague
inquiries of Murray, as to the need for naval co-operation, so far back
as in April.[151] But the point was not one to be decided off-hand by
a General, for the question was not whether a fleet would be useful,
but whether it would be able to act in all weathers; and this purely
naval matter appears never to have been considered at all. On the
15th of August, when the army was not yet committed to the siege,
General Ainslie, the commandant at Ostend, warned Dundas that he had
not realised the difficulties which might be raised by adverse weather
at Dunkirk; and, as a matter of fact, the _Brilliant_ and her little
flotilla had not been on the coast three days before they were blown
away from their station. It was doubtless owing to the uncertainty of
naval assistance that Murray gave the apparently astounding opinion,
that he regarded a squadron as useful though not very material to the
siege. But, apart from this, Dundas had so often pressed the Duke
of York to spare his eight thousand Hessians, which formed almost
one-third of the force under his command, for another service, that it
was impossible for the Duke to divine whether Ministers really intended
to pursue their design against Dunkirk or not. If they did, he had a
right to look to them for a siege-train and for the necessary naval
assistance, neither of which were forthcoming, partly because Dundas
did not know his own mind, partly because he had committed himself
to a multiplicity of operations beyond the power, after ten years of
steady neglect,[152] of either Army or Navy to execute. However, as
a substitute for the much-needed ships and guns, he sent to Murray a
plan for the siege of Dunkirk, drawn up by no less skilled a hand than
that of Lord Chancellor Loughborough, possibly with some hope that the
deficiencies of Downing Street might be made good by the wisdom of
the woolsack. There are times when the conceit of British politicians
becomes touchingly ridiculous.

Very different was the change that had come over military administration
in France during the same month of August. ◆Aug. 10.◆ Upon the
re-election of the Committee of Public Safety, which took place on the
10th, Barrère, who was a member, approached Prieur of the Côte d’Or with
the words, “We none of us understand military matters. You are an
officer of Engineers; will you join us?” “There is only one man in the
Convention for the place,” answered Prieur, “and that is Carnot; and I
will be his second.” ◆Aug. 14.◆ Accordingly, on the 14th of August two
new members were added to the Committee, namely, Carnot, who assumed
control of the formation, training, and movements of the armies, and
Prieur, who took charge of arms, ammunition, and hospitals. These,
together with Robert Lindet, formed the most remarkable group in one of
the most remarkable administrative bodies which has ever existed. Three
of the members, Barrère, Billaud Varennes, and Collot d’Herbois, were
known as the Revolutionaries, their business being to guide and inspire
political emotions; three more, Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint Just,
were concerned with legislative proposals, police, and the revolutionary
tribunal, and bore the ominous name of the High Hands; but the last
three, Carnot, Prieur, and Lindet, were known simply as the Workers, a
title which no men have ever more worthily earned.

Carnot’s advent showed itself in prompt and energetic action. ◆Aug. 16.◆
On the 16th of August a decree was passed for a levy _en masse_, which,
it was estimated, would add four hundred and fifty thousand men to the
army; and, since all exemptions and substitutes were disallowed, the
cream of the nation began for the first time to flow into the ranks.
◆Aug. 29.◆ Moreover, on the 29th of August, the old white coats of the
Monarchy were abolished and the blue coat of the National Guard made
uniform for the entire host, a significant hint that henceforth there
were to be no further distinctions between regular troops and
volunteers, but a single National Army. Prieur, on his side, set up
manufactories of arms and gunpowder in Paris, and stimulated the search
for saltpetre in all directions. The result of these measures lay hid in
the future; but immediate and important movements were made on the
northern frontier. Carnot, with true insight, had divined that England
was in reality the most dangerous member of the Coalition, and that to
foil her before Dunkirk would, from its political results, be the most
telling of all military operations.[153] ◆Aug. 24.◆ Withdrawing
therefore several thousand troops from Coburg’s front and from the army
of the Moselle, he massed them to westward, until, on the 24th of
August, there were, apart from the eight thousand men in Dunkirk itself,
some twenty-three thousand in the entrenched camp at Cassel, four
thousand about Lille, and twelve to fifteen thousand more from the
Moselle within a few days’ march. Kilmain had been recalled after the
retreat from Cæsar’s camp, and replaced by General Houchard in supreme
command. Among Houchard’s subordinate generals was Jourdan. Dunkirk
itself had for commandant General Souham, an energetic officer whose
fame was soon to spread wide; and one of Souham’s battalions was
commanded by Lazare Hoche.

Thus new men and a new principle of war, which were to crush the
cordon-system out of existence, hung like an angry cloud to the south of
Dunkirk; but the Generals of the Allies took no heed. Murray, indeed,
had heard with anxiety of the increase of the French force in his front,
and had begged Coburg for reinforcements, which, however, could not be
spared.[154] On the east Coburg was busy besieging Quesnoy, with corps
of observation thrown out to east and west. He had called up eight
thousand men under General Beaulieu from Namur to strengthen his weak
cordon about Bouvines and Orchies; but to west of Beaulieu the space
from Lannoy to Menin was guarded by some thirteen thousand
Dutch—spiritless, disaffected troops, whose leader, the Prince of
Orange, was half inclined to give up the contest because he could obtain
no assurance as to his indemnity. West of the Dutch was the gossamer
line of Freytag, and behind it lay the Duke of York, conscious, first,
that Souham had opened the sluices, and that the steady rise of the
inundation would shortly sever his communication with Freytag; secondly,
that his right flank was under perpetual menace from the French
gunboats; and thirdly, that his rear was insecure, since there was
nothing to hinder the French from moving troops by sea. In this
situation he was trying to take a fortress, which he was not strong
enough to invest and which the enemy could consequently reinforce at any
moment, by attacking it upon one side only without heavy artillery. He
endeavoured to protect his flanks by throwing up entrenchments in the
Dunes, but found that they filled with water at the depth of two feet;
and he was fain to disarm a frigate at Nieuport and bring up her heavy
guns to the front, in order to arm batteries, not only against the town,
but towards the sea, to drive away the French gunboats. Thus at the
beginning of September he was able to open fire; ◆Aug. 27.◆ but
meanwhile Houchard had not been idle, for on the 27th he fell in force
upon the posts of Beaulieu and the Prince of Orange at Cysoing and
Tourcoing. He was beaten back by Beaulieu with the loss of four guns;
but the Dutch abandoned Tourcoing with suspicious alacrity, and would
have retired to Tournai and Courtrai had not Murray sent a detachment to
support them. “There is ill-will and disinclination to favour our
present operations,” wrote Murray; and indeed the fact is hardly
surprising.[155] The marvel is that he and the Duke of York should have
remained in so dangerous a position, when a successful attack by the
enemy upon the Dutch and a bold push forward would have carried the
French to Furnes, and cut off the whole of the army about Dunkirk beyond
rescue. Indeed, though they knew it not, this operation had actually
been projected at the French headquarters.[156]

[Illustration:

DUNKIRK AND ENVIRONS
showing
THE POSITION OF THE ALLIES
from 24 Aug. to 6 Sept. 1793.

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

With the arrival of his last reinforcements from the Moselle, Houchard
resolved to attack the scattered posts of Freytag, the nearest of which
lay little more than five miles from Cassel. ◆Sept. 6.◆ Assembling
thirty thousand men, he led them forward early in the morning of the 6th
of September in five columns, under Generals Vandamme, Hédouville,
Colland, Jourdan, and himself, the three first against Poperinghe,
Proven, and Rousbrugge, the two last against Wormhoudt, Herzeele, and
Houtkerke. Though outnumbered by ten to one, the Hanoverians and
Hessians fought most obstinately, and the troops opposed to Houchard and
Jourdan would have held their own behind the Yser at Bambecque, had not
the French already penetrated to Rexpoede in their rear. The fighting
lasted all day, the garrison of Dunkirk at the same time keeping the
besieging army employed by a sortie; and at night Freytag retired upon
Hondschoote, ordering General Walmoden, who commanded the posts about
Bergues, to withdraw all his troops to the same place. Taking the road
by Rexpoede, in ignorance that it was actually occupied by the French,
Freytag blundered into the midst of a French picquet, and was, with the
young Prince Adolphus (afterwards Duke of Cambridge), wounded and taken.
The Prince was rescued, but the Field-Marshal was secured, and would
have remained a prisoner, had not General Walmoden, guessing that his
chief might have fallen into a trap, marched at once upon Rexpoede,
stormed it then and there, and delivered him. Walmoden then assumed
command, and, resuming the retreat, took up a convex position before
Hondschoote, with his right leaning on the Bergues canal, his centre
just in advance of Hondschoote itself, and his left resting on the
village of Leysele. The whole of his front was covered by a maze of
small ditches and hedges, through which the only access was a single
dyke leading into Hondschoote; but this broken ground, however valuable
for defence, deprived the Allies of the use of their cavalry, which was
the arm in which above all they overmatched the French. From thence
Walmoden sent urgent messages to the Duke of York for reinforcements;
and it is significant that, owing to the inundation, no troops could
reach him except by way of Bergues. There was therefore no reason why
Freytag’s corps should not have been concentrated about Hondschoote,
where it would have covered the besiegers quite as efficiently and with
infinitely less risk. The British Commander-in-Chief cannot be acquitted
of neglect herein, though Freytag must bear part of the blame for
extreme dispersion of his force.

◆Sept. 7.◆

Houchard tried to follow up his success on the following day by a
renewed attack, but his soldiers would not follow him; and Walmoden,
though he took the precaution to send his heavy baggage to Furnes,
repulsed him without difficulty. ◆Sept. 8.◆ On the 8th, however,
Houchard advanced with fresh troops to the assault, himself leading
twenty battalions, covered by several guns, to the principal attack by
the dyke; while a second column on his left, under General Leclerc,
tried to force its way along the canal, and a third, under Colland
and Hédouville, moved up from Rousbrugge against Leysele. The plan of
attack was faulty, for by holding Walmoden in front and pushing the
main force round his left flank, which stood in the air at Leysele,
Houchard must have compelled him to retire or to be driven into the
swamp of the Great Moor. The new French tactics, however, made good
the General’s shortcomings. Taking cover cunningly behind every hedge,
ditch, or bush, the French sharp-shooters poured a deadly fire into
the Hanoverians and Hessians, who stood exposed in their array of
three ranks deep, discharging their volleys by platoons with perfect
discipline, and pressing forward with the bayonet when the French
ventured too near to them. But the volleys did little injury to
dispersed and hidden skirmishers, and the charge with the bayonet was
hardly more effective over such intricate ground; for the French did
not await it, but ran back to the nearest hedge and resumed their fire
from behind it. For four hours Walmoden’s brave men held their own with
the greatest gallantry in spite of heavy losses, until at noon their
last reserves of ammunition were exhausted, when, their left flank
being seriously threatened by Hédouville, the General gave the order
to retire in two columns upon Furnes. A battalion of Hessians covered
the retreat with splendid tenacity; and the wreck of the force took
up a position between the two canals just to the south of Furnes. The
infantry had lost at least a third of its numbers, perhaps even more;
and the Hanoverians, by the confession of their own officers, were
no longer to be depended upon.[157] It was no reproach to them that
this should have been so, for no troops in the world can endure heavy
punishment during consecutive days of unsuccessful fighting, and remain
unshaken. Their losses had been very great, and their behaviour, by the
admission both of friend and foe, most admirable.

On this same day the garrison of Dunkirk made a sally against the
besiegers in the village of Rosendahl, but was repulsed, though not
without loss to the Allies; and in the afternoon came the news of
Walmoden’s defeat. At four o’clock orders were given for the heavy
baggage to be sent back to Fumes, and at eight a Council of War was
held. The Duke of York hoped to carry off his siege-guns, but the
French, having control of the sluices, had shut off the water from the
canal, so that it was no longer of use for transport; and it was
represented that delay might mean the overpowering of Walmoden’s army
and the cutting off of the Duke’s retreat by Furnes. At midnight
therefore the besieging army retired in two columns, with a confusion
which shows the inefficiency of the Duke’s staff. Transport being
scarce, the waggons were so much overloaded that the animals could
hardly drag them, and the troops were constantly checked by fallen
horses and overturned vehicles. Further, no orders for the retreat were
sent to the two battalions in Tetteghem, and the whole of one column was
delayed until they could join it. Sept. 9.◆ It was thus ten o’clock on
the morning of the 9th before the entire force reached the camp at
Furnes, fortunately without the least molestation from the enemy.[158]
There the Duke effected his junction with Walmoden, but took the
precaution to send his heavy baggage to Ostend. He had been fortunate in
escaping from a most dangerous position with no greater loss than that
of his thirty-two heavy guns; but incessant fighting, a swampy
encampment, bad drinking-water and fever had grievously thinned the
ranks of his army. It was reported at the time that the siege of Dunkirk
had cost the Allies from one cause and another nearly ten thousand
men;[159] and I am disposed to think that this estimate is not
exaggerated. “Our whole enterprise is defeated and our situation
embarrassing in the extreme,” wrote Murray. “It is uncertain whether we
can maintain ourselves behind Furnes; at all events I think we shall
hold good behind the canal at Nieuport.” ◆Sept. 11.◆ This letter reached
Downing Street on the 11th; and on that same day Macbride’s fleet
appeared before Nieuport, three weeks too late.

VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER VI

◆1793.◆

During August and the first week of September the results of the
Government’s incoherent enterprises began to crowd one upon another with
rapidity enough to bewilder a clearer head than that of Dundas. The
forces that he had set in motion in the Colonies seemed at first to
promise great results at small cost. ◆April 12.◆ On the 12th of April
General Cuyler, obedient to his instructions, embarked a force of about
five hundred men[160] at Barbados, and sailed under convoy of
Vice-admiral Sir John Laforey’s squadron to Tobago. The enemy was
prepared for his coming, for, as was usual with Dundas’s secret
expeditions, the whole island of Barbados was apprised of the project as
early as the General;[161] ◆April 14.◆ but none the less Cuyler landed
on the 14th at Courland Bay, stormed on the same night the French fort
that crowns the hill above Scarborough, and captured the island with
trifling loss. The news of this success reached London on the 1st of
June, and was followed a month later by that of the bloodless capture of
St. Pierre and Miquelon by a small force sent from Halifax; ◆May 14.◆
but the next intelligence from the west was less satisfactory. Though by
no means over-trustful of the representations of the refugees from
Martinique, whom Dundas had recommended to him, and who assured him that
eight hundred men would suffice to take the island, June 10.◆ General
Bruce embarked about eleven hundred troops at Barbados on the 10th of
June,[162] and sailed for the island with Admiral Gardner’s squadron.
◆June 16.◆ After concerting operations with the French Royalists, he
landed his troops on the 16th at Case Navire, for an attack on St.
Pierre; but a panic, which set in among the Royalist levies on the
morning fixed for the action, convinced him that it would be hopeless to
trust them, and he accordingly re-embarked on the 21st for Barbados,
carrying his pusillanimous allies away with him. ◆June 21.◆ Here,
therefore, was an initial failure on the part of the monarchical party,
which had promised such easy possession of the French West Indies; and
Bruce did not hesitate to add that, since the Republicans had admitted
all black men to rights of government in Martinique, any further attack
would be hopeless unless undertaken by a considerable force.

◆Aug. 13.◆

The news of this abortive expedition reached London on the 13th of
August; and shortly afterwards came a letter from a gentleman in Tobago,
warning the Government that French emissaries were busy all over the
West Indies, and that there was great danger of a general rising of the
negroes for the expulsion of the white proprietors from all the
islands.[163] Here was information important enough to make Pitt think
twice before he pursued his policy of cutting off the financial
resources of the Revolution by ruining French West Indian trade, to say
nothing of the fact that the said trade was already practically ruined
by civil war in the French islands. There were other weak points in the
French armour besides the West Indies, so many indeed that Ministers
might be excused for finding it difficult to determine which of them
they should assail. ◆Aug. 29.◆ The only method of overcoming that
difficulty was that they should clearly define to themselves their
object in making war.

First then, there was the counter-revolution in the south of France;
where Lyons still defied the forces of the Convention, and where it was
hoped that Sardinia, in return for the two hundred thousand pounds given
her by the recent treaty, would intervene effectively, with Austria at
her side. Next,[164] from this same quarter there came the very
important but unexpected news that commissioners from Toulon, after some
parley with Lord Hood, had agreed to declare for the Monarchy and the
Constitution of 1791, and to give up to him the shipping, forts and
arsenal, to be held in trust for King Lewis the Seventeenth until the
end of the war. In return for this, however, they made the natural but
very significant request that troops should be landed for their
protection. Here, therefore, was the Government committed, though by no
act of its own, to serious operations by land on the side of the
Mediterranean. The responsibility assumed by Hood was very grave; and
for a time he hesitated to incur it. “At present,” he wrote, two days
after issuing his public reply to the offers of the commissioners, “I
have not troops sufficient to defend the works. Had I five or six
thousand good troops I should soon end the war.”[165] He therefore
anchored at Hyères and, mindful of the British alliances with the
Mediterranean powers, wrote to the British Ambassador at Naples for such
forces as could be spared, at the same time asking help of the Spanish
Admiral, Don Juan de Langara, who was lying with his squadron off the
coast of Roussillon. ◆Aug. 28.◆ Before, however, these reinforcements
could arrive, he was so far satisfied by the assurances of the French
that he sailed into Toulon harbour and, landing fifteen hundred marines
and soldiers who were acting as such, occupied the principal forts that
defended the outer harbour. While thus engaged he was joined by Langara
with the greater part of his squadron, who announced that he had one
thousand troops ready to disembark at once, and had left four ships
behind to bring three thousand more from the army in Roussillon. Full of
gratitude, Hood gave Langara effusive thanks, and appointed Admiral
Gravina, the Spanish officer next senior to Langara, to be commandant of
Toulon.

All this was known to the Government by the 15th of September, by which
time, as shall presently be told, more reassuring news had arrived
from Flanders, to the effect that the French had been checked, and
that Coburg’s army had been liberated for action by the surrender
of Quesnoy. It therefore behoved Ministers seriously to reconsider
their military policy, and to make up their minds definitely whether
their object in the war was to be, as they professed, resistance to
unprovoked aggression and the overthrow of the Convention, or simple
annexation of French possessions. In Flanders their great enterprise,
undertaken with no military knowledge and for no military purpose,
had failed; they were as much as ever in the dark as to the ultimate
designs of Austria, and they could not but be sensible that remarkably
little had been accomplished by the Allies on the Rhine. As a matter
of fact Frederick William, having discovered a glaring instance of
Thugut’s duplicity in the matter of the Bavarian exchange, had at the
end of August practically decided to withdraw from the Coalition. This
was as yet unknown to the British Ministers, for their ambassador at
Vienna, Sir Morton Eden, was completely duped by Thugut; but they were
conscious of an increasing coolness on the part of Prussia towards
the war against the Revolution. In such circumstances, although
the northern frontier of France was, from its proximity, the most
convenient sphere of operations for a British army, they might well
consider the advisability of removing all their forces from that
quarter in order to concentrate them at Toulon, which Lord Hood’s
negotiations had already engaged them to protect. French successes
in the north could be only temporary and unprofitable if the Allies,
by assisting the counter-revolution in the south, should deprive
the Convention of the richest provinces of France. A French force at
Antwerp itself would signify little, if the Allies could rally the
party of order from Bordeaux to Marseilles to put down the tyranny at
Paris.

On the other hand, it was no light task to hold Toulon against all the
host that the Convention might turn upon it. Sir Charles Grey, when
consulted by Pitt as to the force that would be required, declared
that fifty thousand good soldiers would be no more than adequate; upon
which Pitt dismissed him with the remark that he hoped that a smaller
body would suffice.[166] Probably he rested his opinion on Lord Hood’s
phrase about ending the war with six thousand men, which was of course
nonsense, and nonsense of a kind which naval officers at that period
were far too ready to talk and Ministers to hear. Mallet du Pan, the
clearest head in Europe, was urgent for making the counter-revolution
in the south the centre of attack upon the Convention; but American
experience had shown that the support of a disloyal faction is the
most unstable of all foundations upon which to build the conduct of
a war. Men of the same nation will fight each other like devils,
but, when foreigners are called into the contest, all parties tend
to combine against them. Moreover, the southern provinces were by no
means unfavourable to the Revolution at large. On the contrary, they
had enthusiastically acclaimed and supported it, until threatened with
the massacre and pillage which had disgraced Paris in September 1792.
It was therefore essential that the Allies should enter France in such
strength as to be independent of all help from French forces in the
field. It was certain that the worthless brothers of King Lewis the
Sixteenth and their parasites would claim to place themselves at the
head of any counter-revolution; and their presence alone might suffice
first to paralyse and then to subvert it.

Again, it was doubtful whether any efficient force of the Allies, other
than British, could be collected in the south. Sardinia was perfectly
ready to advance at once to the rescue of Lyons if Austria would join
her; and the Austrian General De Vins, being of the school of Loudoun,
was anxious to show his superiority to his rivals Coburg and Clerfaye
of the school of Lacy. But here again the mischievous rapacity of
Thugut neutralised all action, for he would allow no Austrian troops
to move from Italy unless Sardinia consented to concede the Novarese
to Austria, indemnifying herself at the expense of France. The British
Ministers were aware of this dispute about the Novarese, for Mulgrave
had reported it,[167] and they had sufficient experience of the
Imperial Court to divine that it would not quickly be settled. Apart
from Austria and Sardinia, troops could be obtained from Naples and
from Spain; but the assistance of two courts so effete and so corrupt
was not likely to be efficient. In any case, it was certain that, if
any real advantage was to be gained from the possession of Toulon,
every British soldier must be withdrawn from other operations, and that
the whole of England’s military force must be assembled at that point.
If this were impossible, it were best to instruct Hood to make sure of
the French fleet, destroy the arsenal, and carry away the inhabitants
who had yielded the place into his hands.

Then, besides Flanders and Toulon, there was La Vendée, where the
contemptible ruffians whom the Jacobins had appointed to be generals
were suffering defeat upon defeat. If by the help of the insurgents
Nantes could be seized as a base, it was no very long march from Angers
or Tours or Orléans to Paris; but here again it was not a small force
that was required, but every British battalion that could be spared.

Lastly, if the Ministers wanted to secure indemnities only, the West
Indies lay open to them. No doubt it would be of advantage to possess
the famous harbour of St. Lucia, to deliver Dominica from the menace of
Martinique, her neighbour to windward, and to master Guadeloupe, with
the nest of privateers which preyed upon all British commerce in those
seas. Above all, the capture of Haiti would ensure at once the security
of Jamaica, the possession of a country whose wealth, though more than
half destroyed, was still appreciable, and the transfer to a British
garrison of St. Nicholas Mole, which, being the gate of the Windward
Passage and the Gibraltar of the West Indies, would give safe transit
for the trade of the archipelago to England. Such an enterprise,
however, would equally demand the entire land-force of the British
Isles. It would be necessary not only to take the islands but to hold
them, and to hold them not only, as heretofore, against the climate and
against the fleet and armies of France, but against the entire negro
population, which the Revolution had summoned to its aid. There was,
as there still is, abundance of records of former attacks upon all
those islands, showing that at the best of times each British battalion
in the West Indies required to be renewed in its entirety every two
years, and at the worst of times might be completely extinguished
by a single hot season. Of all plans, therefore, this would be the
most difficult, the most perilous, the most costly in execution and
maintenance, and the least damaging to France; not to mention the fact
that the overthrow of the Convention, which had authorised the equality
of the black man with the white, was really essential to its permanent
success. Thus it should at least have been obvious to the Government
that out of the four spheres of operations it could hope to act with
effect in one alone; and then only by throwing into the chosen sphere
every trained soldier that it could muster.

Blind to all such considerations, Ministers decided not to select one,
or at most two, of these spheres, but to fritter away their handful of
forces between all four. ◆Sept. 11.◆ Indeed, Dundas’s orders between the
11th and 18th of September form a notable specimen of his ideas of
carrying on war. The news of the failure at Dunkirk had at first
completely unnerved him; but, on realising how critical was the position
of affairs in that quarter, he directed eight battalions[168] to embark
for Ostend, as a temporary measure. Then he warned the Duke of York that
five thousand of his Hessians must be held ready to sail to Toulon as
soon as this reinforcement reached him, and that the eight battalions
themselves would be required elsewhere at the beginning of October. On
the same day he wrote to Lord Hood that everything must give way to the
importance of holding Toulon; that he had appealed to Austria for
troops; and that he would send Hood the five thousand Hessians
aforesaid, as well as two battalions out of the five stationed at
Gibraltar. Four days later he warned General Bruce to be ready to
receive at Barbados fifteen battalions, which were under orders for
active service in the West Indies. Lastly, at the same time or very
little later, he framed a design for a descent upon St. Malo and for the
occupation of the Isle D’Yeu, off the coast of La Vendée.[169] It is now
time to return to Flanders, and to follow in detail the reaction of
Dundas’s genius upon the operations in that quarter.

In the first peril of the retreat from Dunkirk the British commanders
seem to have entertained serious thoughts of re-embarkation;[170] but
were reassured when Houchard did not follow up his stroke upon the force
of Walmoden. For this the French general has been much blamed; and
indeed his failure to destroy the Duke of York’s army was made the
excuse for bringing him shortly afterwards to the guillotine. But in
truth Houchard had lost his true opportunity through the unskilfulness
of his attack upon Walmoden, wherein his troops, already half starved
and less than half disciplined, had been seriously shaken by their
losses. He therefore reinforced the garrisons of Bergues and Dunkirk,
and, in the hope of relieving Quesnoy, fell with thirty thousand men
upon the flank of the Dutch cordon from Poperinghe and upon its front
from Lille. ◆Sept. 12, 13.◆ His success was at first encouraging, for he
defeated his opponents completely with the loss of forty guns and three
thousand men, and captured Menin. General Beaulieu, who had been
despatched with over four thousand Austrians to the assistance of the
Dutch, for some reason refused to act with them, but checked the advance
of the French beyond Menin, and occupied Courtrai. The Dutch fled in
disorder to Bruges and Ghent; and for the moment it seemed as though
communication between the Duke of York and Coburg was hopelessly
severed. ◆Sept. 12.◆ The Duke, after leaving a detachment under
Abercromby at Furnes, had withdrawn to the rear of the canal between
Nieuport and Dixmuyde, in order to secure his retreat to Ostend; ◆Sept.
14.◆ but he now ordered Abercromby back to Nieuport, and marched with
the bulk of his force eastward to Thorout, where he was joined by two
battalions[171] from England. ◆Sept. 15.◆ From thence on the 15th he
moved southward to Roulers; and on that day the situation underwent a
total change.

Beaulieu, being attacked by Houchard before Courtrai, waited only for a
reinforcement which the Duke had hurried forward to him, when, taking
the offensive, he utterly routed the French, who fled in the wildest
confusion, and, pursuing them to Menin, recaptured the town. ◆Sept. 16.◆
The Duke entered Menin on the following day, where he received letters
from Coburg who was already at Cysoing, not more than eighteen miles to
the south, reporting that since the fall of Quesnoy he had gained a
brilliant victory over one of Houchard’s divisions at Avesnes-le-Sec.
◆Sept. 12.◆ This action, which, though almost unknown to Englishmen,
still remains one of the greatest achievements in the history of
cavalry, was not only most glorious to the Austrians in itself, but was
important as showing that the new tactics of the undisciplined French
army were inapplicable to any but a strongly enclosed country. Nine
Austrian squadrons, counting some two thousand men, without a single
gun, had utterly dispersed seven thousand French, chiefly infantry, cut
down two thousand of them, captured two thousand more, and taken twenty
guns, all with a loss to themselves of sixty-nine men. These successes
effectually checked the advance of the French. Houchard, after the
defeat at Menin, had already given the order to retreat; and the French
retired to their former positions before Cassel, Lille, and Maubeuge.

Then arose the question what should be done next. The season was
advancing, but events had marched rapidly in Paris since the revolt of
Toulon. Following hard upon the news of Houchard’s reverse came tidings
that the Duke of Brunswick had defeated the French with a loss of four
thousand men at Pirmasens, on the northern frontier of Alsace; and this
succession of disasters stirred the Jacobins to the ferocity of panic.
◆Sept. 17.◆ On the 17th two savage laws were passed, which practically
placed all lives and all property at the arbitrary disposal of the
reigning faction; and then the demagogues turned with fury upon the
generals. Loudest among them was Robespierre, who, profoundly jealous
of any man who could do what he could not, was suspicious above all of
soldiers. ◆Sept. 21.◆ Thanks to his denunciations, Houchard and his
staff were recalled under accusation of treason; and thereby another
blow was added to the many already struck at the army. The troops
were greatly demoralised by the continual change of commanders,[172]
whom the Commissioners of the Convention promoted or deposed at their
arbitrary pleasure; and the commanders themselves were not less
demoralised by the certain prospect of death if they failed to achieve
the impossible with troops that were neither fed, nor clothed, nor
paid, nor disciplined. The Allies, therefore, could still reasonably
look for success from a concentration of their whole army and a
vigorous offensive.

Dundas, since the failure at Dunkirk, had become suddenly an advocate
for keeping the whole of the forces together, and for making an attack
upon the enemy before undertaking any further enterprise;[173] but
with what precise object a general action was to be fought he did
not say, for the very sufficient reason that he did not know. The
British Ministers, so far as they favoured any operations at all in
Flanders, would have preferred a second attempt upon Dunkirk; but they
gave, or professed to give, a free hand to the commanders, flattering
themselves that, if the attempt were abandoned, the British troops
would be the sooner released for service at Toulon and, above all, in
the West Indies. Coburg, on the other hand, had already put forward
what was at any rate a definite plan, though upon the old lines. He
wished to besiege Maubeuge, which was certainly an important point,
since it formed the chief link in the communications between the
French armies of the north about Lille, and of the Ardennes about
Givet and Philippeville, while its entrenched camp made it a point for
a formidable concentration of the French forces at large. Moreover,
it obstructed the passage of the Austrian troops from east to west,
compelling all reinforcements from Luxemburg to fetch a compass by
Namur and Charleroi before they could join the army of Flanders. The
Dutch agreed to come forward again to further the operations; and
before the British Government, upon Murray’s representation, could
finally make up its mind to co-operate with the Austrians, Coburg had
crossed the Sambre with forty thousand men and invested Maubeuge.[174]

Thereupon there followed the usual distribution of troops into a
cordon. The besieging force numbered fourteen thousand, the covering
army, including twelve thousand Dutch, twenty-six thousand men; and to
the Duke of York was entrusted the task of protecting Flanders along
a front of some forty-five miles, from Cysoing to Nieuport. For this
purpose Coburg gave him about sixteen thousand Austrian troops in
addition to those in the pay of Britain; but, owing to the vagaries
of the British Minister for War, the corps was exposed to the most
dangerous risk. Hardly had the eight reinforcing battalions from
England joined the army in Flanders, before Dundas ordered four of them
to return at once, and the remainder as soon as possible. Further,
not content even with this, he gave Murray to understand that the
embarkation of the Hessian corps from Flanders was only deferred, and
hinted that a part of his artillerymen might also be spared for Toulon.
Now Dundas knew perfectly well that the troops had passed through a
very severe campaign, had fought several actions and had suffered
heavy losses; he knew perfectly well that no adequate steps had been
taken for filling up the gaps in the ranks; he could hardly have been
ignorant that winter was approaching; and Murray had twice warned him
that the French were rapidly increasing their forces between Lille and
the sea. Yet the Minister, though he had given the generals nominally
a free hand, calmly withdrew battalion after battalion, until at last
Murray told him plainly of the danger of the situation. The state of
the army was most distressing: the force in British pay was reduced
to twelve thousand fighting men, or less than half of its original
numbers; the sick and wounded of the whole army under the Duke’s
command numbered at least nine thousand, or more than one-fourth; the
troops were dangerously dispersed along a very wide front; and, though
Murray did not mention this, the Austrian Government had deprecated
all field-fortification, on account of the damage that might ensue to
meadows and the banks of canals.[175] Finally, he gave warning that, if
the enemy made an attack, the Duke would be obliged to abandon Ostend.
Dundas’s reply to this was very characteristic. Without a word to
Murray he ordered the Commandant at Ostend to retain the second batch
of four battalions which, by his own order, had been sent there for
re-embarkation to England; and he wrote an angry letter to Abercromby,
a subordinate officer, first expressing horror at the idea of
abandoning Ostend, and then regretting that attempts had been made to
keep those same four battalions in Flanders. “It would be impossible,”
he wrote, “to restrain the just indignation of the country, if, for the
sake of feeding an army under a Prince of the blood, so substantial an
interest to this country as that of the French West Indies had been
sacrificed.”[176]

Apart from the fact that such language, especially when addressed to a
subordinate concerning his chief, was utterly unbecoming a Minister and
a gentleman, it was not obvious why an army should be starved, whether
in the matter of empty ranks or of empty stomachs, simply because it
happened to be commanded by a Prince of the blood. If its presence in
Flanders were an embarrassment to the Government, the simple remedy
was to withdraw it altogether, rather than leave it so weak as to be
in peril of destruction; for there was no lack of employment for the
troops elsewhere. This amazing outburst is no solitary instance of
Dundas’s bad taste, much less an unique example of his incapacity.

Meanwhile Murray’s apprehensions increased; and events soon came to
justify them. Jourdan, on Carnot’s recommendation, had succeeded
Houchard in command of the army of the north; and, with Carnot himself
at his back, ◆Oct. 7.◆ he now concentrated forty-five thousand men at
Guise for the relief of Maubeuge, leaving the remainder of his troops,
some sixty thousand men, extended in a long line to the sea. Coburg
sent pressing entreaties for reinforcements to the Duke of York, who at
once moved about nine thousand men to Cysoing, ◆Oct. 10.◆ and leaving
half of them there, proceeded with the rest—chiefly the wreck of the
British troops—to join hands with the Austrian advanced corps a little
to the south of Quesnoy at Englefontaine. ◆Oct. 15, 16.◆ It was,
however, to no purpose, for Jourdan, having increased his force to sixty
thousand men, attacked Coburg furiously on the 15th and 16th at
Wattignies, and, despite very heavy loss to himself both in men and in
guns, compelled him to raise the siege of Maubeuge. The Dutch, who had
not behaved well in the action, retired to Mons; but Coburg moved his
headquarters to no greater distance than Bavai. He was there meditating
further attacks upon the French, when the Committee of Public Safety,
intoxicated with the success at Wattignies, ◆Oct. 18.◆ ordered Jourdan
peremptorily to take the offensive and to drive the hordes of the tyrant
into the Sambre, which river, it may be observed, at that moment flowed
between the opposing armies. ◆Oct. 22.◆ A second and still more
ludicrous order bade him keep his force together, menace several remote
points simultaneously, operate in two divisions against Mons and
Tournai, and withal act with prudence. Jourdan, however, not daring to
attempt the passage of the Sambre, sent on the 20th one division to
assail Marchiennes, and another under Souham against all the Allied
posts from Cysoing to Werwicq, which last was held by six thousand men
under Count Erbach. Both attacks were successful, though Marchiennes was
retaken on the 24th; ◆Oct. 22.◆ and on the 22nd Erbach was forced to
fall back to Tournai and Courtrai, abandoning even Menin. On the 22nd
likewise a division from Cassel attacked Ypres, while another from
Dunkirk under Vandamme captured Furnes, and, pressing northward with
twelve thousand men, ◆Oct. 24.◆ opened on the 24th the bombardment of
Nieuport. The town had been but hastily fortified, and the garrison
consisted of only two weak Hessian battalions, a few dragoons, and the
British Fifty-third Regiment, in all fewer than thirteen hundred men.
For the moment it seemed certain that the British would be cut off from
their base.

Murray, foreseeing this, had ordered all stores, beyond what was
necessary for the moment, to be removed from Ostend. The Commandant
disembarked some of the four battalions which, pursuant to Dundas’s
order, were about to sail to England; and Dundas, on hearing of the
situation, at once sent Major-general Grey, the appointed Commander
of the West Indian expedition, with four more battalions[177] to take
charge of the troops at Ostend, giving him full liberty to defend it
or to bring away the whole of the eight battalions, as he might think
best, without reference to the Duke of York. Meanwhile he clamoured
for reports as to the intentions of Coburg, and for explanation of the
reasons for the possible abandonment of Ostend; for it had not yet
occurred to him that the French, by attacking in overwhelming force,
might compel the Commander of the Allies to conform to their plan of
operations instead of pursuing his own.[178]

However, matters soon righted themselves. ◆Oct. 24.◆ The French were
driven back with heavy loss from Cysoing and Orchies. The garrison of
Nieuport held its own gallantly, being reinforced on the 27th by another
battalion of Hessians and by a few gunners from Ostend; and meanwhile
the Duke of York was hastening back from Englefontaine and Tournai,
while Coburg followed him westward with half of his army as far as
Solesmes, midway between Cambrai and Landrecies. ◆Oct. 28.◆ On the
evening of the 28th Grey arrived at Ostend, and at once sent the
Forty-second and four companies of Light Infantry to the help of
Nieuport. On the same evening the Duke of York having reached Camphin, a
few miles east of Cysoing, detached Abercromby with four battalions and
two squadrons[179] northward against the French post at Lannoy. The
place was captured with little loss, and the British Light Dragoons did
terrible execution in the pursuit of the flying enemy. ◆Oct. 29.◆ On the
following night another division, under the Austrian General Kray, made
a brilliant attack upon the post of Marchiennes, driving out the French
with a loss of nearly two thousand men and twelve guns, at a cost to
itself of fewer than one hundred casualties. ◆Oct. 30.◆ Meanwhile the
French, on hearing of the Duke of York’s advance upon their flank, had
retired from Menin and Ypres; and early on the next morning Vandamme,
fearing to be cut off, retreated from before Nieuport, leaving four guns
and a quantity of ammunition behind him. So easy was it to change the
whole face of affairs by concentrating a compact force against one point
and rolling up a cordon from end to end. It is almost comical to observe
how at first both sides used the cordon-system; how the French, after
abandoning it with success, relapsed into it once more; and finally how
the Allies, also abandoning it under British direction, in their turn
gained the upper hand.

Throughout this anxious period the interference of Dundas with the
operations had been incessant, and his tone by no means the most
courteous. The incoherence and folly of his orders may best be judged
from a summary of the reply which Murray at length found time to
write on the 20th of October. “Let me point out to you,” he wrote,
in effect, “that the same messenger brought to me from you, first,
advice to besiege St. Quentin; secondly, orders to keep a body of
troops at Ostend; and, thirdly, strong exhortations against division
or detachment of our force. As to Ostend, if Nieuport holds out, it is
safe for the winter; and I see no reason why Nieuport should not hold
out. As to St. Quentin, this means taking a train of artillery there
in the month of November. It means also that twenty thousand out of
Coburg’s twenty-five thousand men must be detached, while the remaining
five thousand remain quietly between three fortified towns and a
forest, from which fifty thousand men may attack them from all sides at
any time. Further, the detached force must draw its subsistence from
a distance of forty miles across the whole French army without any
other protection than that of those five thousand men.” “I beg pardon,”
he continued, “for taking up your time with this kind of argument,
which it was not your intention to enter into, but I think it is right
to show that, perhaps, people in England are not more infallible in
their judgments than those upon the Continent.” Irony so keen sped
home even through the dense armour of Dundas’s conceit. “You have
not sufficiently weighed the feeling of this country,” he answered,
taking refuge in bluster, “if you think that any successes could have
counterbalanced the loss of Ostend.” Murray hastened to soothe him by
pointing out that the Duke of York, though against his own military
judgment, had strictly obeyed the Cabinet’s instructions as to the
protection of Ostend, and that it was not Grey who had saved it but
the Duke himself, who, before he knew of Grey’s arrival, had forced
Vandamme to retire by threatening his communications.[180]

This sharp passage of arms silenced Dundas for the time, though, as
will be seen, it taught him little wisdom for the future. Meanwhile,
after a few small affairs of outposts, the campaign came to an end.
The Emperor of Austria sent orders to Coburg to fight a general
action, for no particular object; and the Committee of Public Safety
gave the like instructions to Jourdan, in the hope that he might be
able to advance to Namur and so to threaten the Austrian line of
communication. But neither was in a position to obey. The campaign had
been most arduous, as a war of posts must always be, not only from the
innumerable minor actions, but from the strain imposed on the troops
by constant vigilance and by endless marching to and fro to reinforce
the threatened points of the cordon. The losses on the side of the
Allies had been great: those of the French had been enormous, not only
in men but in material, for the Allies had taken from them over two
hundred guns. In brief, both armies were thoroughly exhausted; and
yet the Allies had accomplished comparatively little, owing partly to
the false plan imposed by England, partly to the false tactics of the
Austrian commanders, still more to the misunderstandings and jealousy
that make coherent action so difficult in an army composed of many
nations. On the Rhine likewise little had been effected. Soon after
the victory of Pirmasens the King of Prussia left his army for Posen;
◆Oct. 13.◆ and, though the Austrian General Wurmser drove the French
in utter confusion from the lines of Weissenburg, yet, in consequence
of faulty dispositions and of the half-hearted co-operation of the
Prussian troops, an advantage which might have been decisive was turned
to little account. Prussia, in truth, was not anxious to aid Austria
in gaining Alsace; while the Polish question, as always, kept the two
powers in an attitude of mutual suspicion and mistrust. There was
nothing, therefore, left to the Allies but to take up cantonments for
the winter, which they accordingly did, while Grey and the whole of the
eight battalions with him returned to England. The Allies had missed
their chance in Flanders; and the chance was gone for ever.

VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER IX

◆1793.◆

It is now necessary to sum up the relative conditions of France and the
Allies at the close of 1793. The British enterprises against the French
at Dunkirk, in La Vendée, and at Toulon had one and all failed; but the
tale of disaster was even then not fully told. Upon arrogating to itself
the appointment of Generals in the field, the Committee of Public Safety
had appointed ◆Oct.–Nov.◆ Pichegru and Hoche to command respectively the
armies of the Rhine and Moselle. Pichegru had been a non-commissioned
officer of artillery before the Revolution, had since obtained command
of a battalion of volunteers, and, by assiduous courting of the Jacobin
leaders, had become a Lieutenant-general without seeing a shot fired.
Hoche, as we have seen, had risen from the ranks of the French Guards,
had distinguished himself in high command at Dunkirk, and, above all,
had attracted Carnot’s attention by a memorandum condemning the
dispersion of troops after the Austrian manner, and advocating
everywhere concentration and a vigorous offensive. “This young fellow
will go far,” said Carnot, as he handed the document to Robespierre. “A
very dangerous man!” objected the other, who dreaded the success of any
man except himself. The task prescribed to Hoche was to relieve Landau,
then blockaded by the Prussians; but he found his army in such ill
condition that he hesitated to attempt anything until strengthened by
Pichegru, when he made a general attack upon the Prussians under the
Duke of Brunswick at Kaiserslautern, and was beaten back with heavy
loss. ◆Nov. 28–30.◆ Thanks to Carnot’s influence, however, his failure
was forgiven to him; and his new project, that he should reinforce
Pichegru with two-thirds of his troops and fall upon the Austrians under
General Wurmser at Hagenau, was approved. Wurmser perceived the
gathering storm, and appealed to Brunswick for help; but King Frederick
William had expressly forbidden the Duke to engage himself in any
important operations, and the Prussians did not move until too late.
◆Dec. 23.◆ On the 23rd of December Hoche opened his attack with great
skill and success, and would have annihilated Wurmser, had not Brunswick
interfered at the last moment to check the pursuit of the French.
◆Dec. 26.◆ The Austrian commander, furious because Brunswick had not
supported him from the first, then returned to the eastern bank of the
Rhine, thus uncovering the Prussian left, and obliging them likewise to
abandon the greater part of the Palatinate, and to content themselves
with protecting the neighbourhood of Mainz. Landau, therefore, was
recaptured by the French; the eastern frontier of France was purged of
the enemy; and, above all, the ill-feeling between Austria and Prussia
was more than ever embittered. Broadly speaking, the French by the close
of the year had contended successfully alike with the Coalition and with
internal foes, having lost ground only in the Eastern Pyrenees to Spain,
the enemy from which it could be most easily recovered.

Nevertheless the authority of the Committee of Public Safety was by no
means yet fully assured. The Commune of Paris, representing the most
infamous of the population, had been jealous of it from the first; and
the useful service of the little band of Workers had been accomplished
only with great difficulty and by constant concessions to the party of
violence. Representatives of the people vested with arbitrary powers
still accompanied the armies, interfering with the operations, punishing
by summary execution the slightest fault or failure, whether realised or
merely suspected, levying barbarous and oppressive requisitions, and
thus driving officers, men, and civil population alike to despair. In no
army was this policy of terror more ruthlessly pursued than in that of
the Rhine, where unlimited powers were exercised by the representatives
Lebas and St. Just, of whom the latter, a young man of twenty-six, gave
himself the airs of omnipotent Jove, with a guillotine for thunderbolt.
A campaign, however, cannot be won solely by decapitation of one’s own
troops; and in the winter of 1793–1794 this fact began to impress
itself, in respect not only of the army but of France at large, upon
some of the ruling men in Paris. But it was no easy matter to convince
the unspeakable rogues of the Commune of Paris that terror, which had
brought to them personally enormous profit, was, as a national policy, a
failure. Early in December 1793 the Committee of Public Safety took
several measures to abridge the powers of the Commune; and some of the
men who had in earlier days been most violent favoured the reaction
towards a milder rule; but none the less Collot d’Herbois, who had been
the author of most atrocious cruelties at Lyons since the recapture of
the city, continued to obtain official approval of his conduct. Dread of
summary restoration of order by some victorious General continually
haunted the minds of many of the leaders, and notably of Robespierre;
◆Dec. 25.◆ and, since the only idea of this last was to support
whichever party was at the moment the stronger, he upheld Collot, and
sought popularity by proposing the execution of another batch of
Generals. Thus the opening of the new year witnessed a complete revival
of the system of terror.

Immediate mischief was the inevitable result. Carnot had wished after
the victory of Savenay to institute a policy of conciliation in La
Vendée; but, on the contrary, a ruffianly soldier named Turreau was let
loose upon the district with his “infernal columns,” as if to
exterminate a herd of wild beasts. The country was laid waste, the
villages were burned, and such victims as could not escape the soldiery
were swept into Nantes, to be murdered after such manner as might please
the still greater ruffian, Carrier. Thereupon the people at once took up
arms again. A smuggler bearing the nickname of Chouan[181] organised a
band of his fellows for revenge, and was soon imitated by others.
Charette and Stofflet again came forward as leaders; and there began a
desultory guerilla war, fraught with constant disaster to the Republican
troops, which gnawed deeply into the heart of France. At the same time,
as if to increase the difficulties of its capable commanders in the
field, the Convention lent a ready ear to all complaints against them.
The Representatives attached to the armies, with the true instinct of
politicians of all times and nations, were careful to take to themselves
the credit for every victory, and to impute to the military the blame
for every reverse; ◆1794 Jan. 1.◆ and a savage decree was passed that
any General condemned to death should be executed in front of his own
troops. Successful commanders ran as great a risk as unsuccessful.
Kléber, Marceau, Lapoype, and Bonaparte were one and all denounced in
the spring of 1794 by the civilians who had aspired to direct them in
the field; and it was only by much labour and cunning that Carnot was
able to save their lives.

Nevertheless, despite all drawbacks, there was progress towards
improvement in the French army. True, there was still shameful rascality
on the part of contractors,[182] which was countenanced by Bouchotte
under the protection of Robespierre, and which caused much suffering and
desertion. The levy _en masse_ again had proved a failure; but, on the
other hand, compulsion to personal service, without exemption of any
kind, had forced a better class of recruit into the ranks;
◆1793 Nov. 22◆ and it was wisely determined to incorporate these new
levies with the battalions at the front, which possessed officers and
non-commissioned officers of experience to train them. Finally, the
reorganisation of the army into demi-brigades, consisting each of two
battalions of volunteers and one battalion of regulars, was, after long
delay, decreed and gradually brought about. ◆1794 Jan. 8.◆ Innumerable
useless corps were swept away; the establishments of existing corps were
increased; and the law as to election of officers was practically,
though tacitly, ignored.[183] ◆Feb. 12.◆ At the same time a succession
of decrees forbade the attendance of deputations from regiments upon the
Convention, strove to check abuses and waste in the matter of
requisitions, and made a new regulation that no soldier should rise to
any grade of command—from corporal to general—who could not read and
write. ◆Feb 15.◆ All this wrought for discipline and efficiency, for
many of the Colonels and Generals appointed by the Jacobins, being
unable to read a map or even a letter, had brought about great confusion
at the War Office and frequent disaster in the field.[184] At the same
time, strenuous efforts were made to improve the cavalry, which had
hitherto been absolutely useless; and its establishment was fixed at
twenty-nine regiments of heavy and fifty-four of light cavalry, or
ninety-six thousand men in all. The horse-artillery also, after but a
single year of existence, was augmented to eight thousand men, and the
field-artillery, including detachments for battalion guns, to twenty-six
thousand men. The whole force of France at the beginning of 1794 reached
six hundred thousand effective men, or about half of the figure which,
from motives of policy or conceit, was invariably assigned to it by the
orators of Paris.

Moreover, to turn military improvements to the best advantage, events
conspired to throw power more and more into the hands of the Committee
of Public Safety. ◆1793 Dec. 22.◆ By a clever decree, the Committee
contrived to disarm the hired ruffians who supported the Commune, and to
make over their weapons to the army; and this blow was followed three
months later by the accusation and execution of the leaders of the
Commune itself, including Hébert, the supreme ruffian, and Ronsin and
Vincent, two of the greatest scoundrels in the War Office.
◆1794 March 29.◆ The next attack was directed against Danton and others,
who had recognised the failure of the policy of terror, and wished to
end it; and accordingly he and his followers went to the guillotine on
the 5th of April. ◆April 5.◆ This was the work of Robespierre, who at
one time had been the firm ally of both of these factions, but was now
seeking supreme power in order to carry out certain ideas of his own for
the social regeneration of France. Being an absolutely mediocre man, of
the type which small provincial journals delight to honour with the
title of “our talented townsman,” he was wholly lacking in the ability
and experience required for the business of administration; and he seems
to have agreed, without knowing what he did, to the abolition of
Ministers for departments and the substitution of boards, responsible to
the Committee of Public Safety, in their place. Hereby the little knot
of Workers, who had real capacity as well as boundless industry, gained
an affluence of power, and the military service an increase of
efficiency; for their labours were too high for the control of a petty
lawyer who possessed no gift but that of composing bad essays, and knew
no resource but that of cutting off heads. Nor was the activity of the
Workers confined to France alone. Revolutionary agents had been busy all
over Europe with persuasive tongues and still more persuasive purses.
They had bribed high officials to second Carnot’s military projects by
conspiracies at Turin, Naples, Florence, and Genoa; they had met with
much encouragement in Holland, and counted on further success in
Switzerland; they had made some impression upon Denmark, had half gained
Sweden, and had spared no expense to rouse the Turk against Austria. The
cost of these negotiations was enormous, but the Government of France
was playing for high stakes, knowing well that without victory in all
quarters in the coming campaign, bankruptcy and starvation must
inevitably bring down the Revolution with a crash.

On the military side Carnot had decided to strike at important points
only, and elsewhere to stand on the defensive. In the south he
designed to invade Italy, hoping that treachery at Turin would make
the work easy; but the principal struggle, as he knew, must be fought
out in Belgium. He did not, however, confine his schemes of aggression
to that quarter only. He recognised with true insight that Britain
was France’s most formidable enemy; and he had actually projected
and prepared for an invasion of England, with the help of the Brest
fleet, and for a march upon London. The plan was bold, indeed wild
in its extravagance, being founded on a false idea that disaffection
in England was as deeply seated and as widely spread in action as it
was noisy and inflated in speech. None the less the bare menace of
invasion served a useful purpose—to scare and disconcert the British
Government.[185]

◆Jan. 21.◆ In truth it must have been with no very pleasant feelings
that Ministers met Parliament in January 1794, having no better news
to lay before the Houses than a tale of failure in all quarters. Pitt
had, at least, the consolation that a section of the Whigs, headed
by the Duke of Portland, in the same month announced to him their
intention of separating themselves from Fox, and of giving the Ministry
an independent support. It was, however, felt that such an arrangement
could neither be satisfactory nor of long continuance, since, as Sir
Gilbert Elliot put it, Portland’s party would be no more than “a
detached auxiliary force, to act on one occasion, to retire on another,
and to be a perpetual object of anxiety to those whom they meant to
serve, of hope to the enemy and of speculation to the rest of the
world.”[186] Moreover, there were members of it, most notably William
Windham, who were extremely dissatisfied with the military policy, or
want of policy, initiated by Dundas.[187] Negotiations were, therefore,
set on foot for the inclusion of Portland and some of his friends in
the Cabinet; and, after six full months spent in bargaining, it was
finally arranged, on the 11th of July 1794, that Portland should become
Second Secretary of State, Lord Fitzwilliam Lord President, and Lord
Spencer Lord Privy Seal, while Windham displaced the incompetent and
corrupt Sir George Yonge as Secretary at War. It may be well to add
at once that in December Lord Spencer exchanged the Privy Seal for
the Admiralty with the capable but indolent Lord Chatham, while Lord
Mansfield took over the Presidency of the Council, and Lord Fitzwilliam
accepted the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland.

But these changes were accompanied by a reform of the greatest
importance in the history of our military administration. Pitt was
resolute in refusing to permit the War Department to lie in the Duke of
Portland’s hands; wherein he was probably right, for the Duke, though
he carried with him votes in the House of Commons, brought nothing
to the Council Board beyond a certain ponderous irresolution. Pitt
thereupon arranged, though with some difficulty, that Portland should
administer the Home Department, including the Colonies, but should have
no authority over naval and military business, for control of which
he created a third and new Secretariat of State for War. In itself
this measure was valuable and sound, but it was absolutely vitiated
by the selection of Henry Dundas to fill the new post. In the face of
the shameful blunders of the past eighteen months this appointment
was almost criminal; but Pitt’s ignorance of war was unfortunately
surpassed only by his infatuated trust in his friend. Thus Henry Dundas
became the First Secretary of State for War, the very worst man that
could possibly have been chosen to found the traditions of such an
office. His methods have found faithful imitation by all too many of
his successors.[188]

So much may be said by anticipation of events which, though not
actually accomplished, were practically assured at the opening of the
session of 1794. But the secession of Portland’s following by no means
left the Opposition without keen critics of the conduct of military
affairs. Tarleton the guerilla-leader of the American war, though
a vain and shallow man, knew enough to hit the many weak points of
Henry Dundas’s enterprises, and he was backed by one abler and more
solid than himself, Major Thomas Maitland, of the Sixty-second Foot, a
brother of the extreme radical, Lord Lauderdale. We shall see more of
Maitland, who is still remembered at Malta as “King Tom,” in the years
before us. Fox also, though as usual guilty of opposition which was
purely factious, rightly pressed home upon the Government the duty of
defining to themselves what was their true object. If, he argued, the
purpose of the war were to substitute some form of government for the
present tyranny in France, then Toulon was worth more than the West
Indies; if on the other hand it was to obtain permanent possessions,
then the West Indies were worth more than Toulon. To this the
Government answered by the mouth of Jenkinson, that their end was to
destroy the existing government in France; but both he and Pitt added
that Toulon was not to be considered of such importance as to justify
a sacrifice of the opportunity for acquiring the French West Indies.
Plainer evidence could not have been given of the utter unfitness of
both to direct a formidable war.[189]

But the Government’s measures for the augmentation of the regular Army
at the close of 1793, though not yet criticised in Parliament, were
still more questionable than its military policy. In the first place,
from blind assurance of an easy triumph, no sufficient provision had
been made in time for raising additional men; and the result was
that in October 1793 it was a matter of the greatest difficulty to
furnish a draft of one hundred men to stop the gaps in Abercromby’s
brigade in Flanders.[190] In August, however, Alan Cameron of Erracht
after much importunity had received permission to raise a regiment of
Highlanders without levy-money, and with a special stipulation that the
men should not be drafted; and thus was created the Seventy-ninth or
Cameron Highlanders. In September 1793, new regiments began to follow
each other more rapidly. First came a battalion formed by Lord Paget,
whom we shall know better as a leader of cavalry under the successive
titles of Lord Uxbridge and Marquis of Anglesey. The commission
which he received to command it was the first that he ever held in
the Army; and the regiment took, and still keeps, the number of the
Eightieth. Then came in succession Colonel John Doyle’s regiment, now
the Eighty-seventh; Colonel Albemarle Bertie’s, now the Eighty-first;
Colonel Thomas De Burgh’s, recruited chiefly in Connaught and still
known as the Eighty-eighth Connaught Rangers; Major-general Leigh’s,
now the Eighty-second; and finally three Scottish battalions raised
by Colonels Ferrier, Halkett, and Cunninghame, who had left the Scots
Brigade of Holland during the American War and now tried to make a
new brigade for their own land. Thus after a separation of over a
century the old comrades of the Buffs rejoined them in Great Britain.
In November other regiments were added, namely, General Bernard’s,
now the Eighty-fourth; General Cuyler’s, now the Eighty-sixth;
Colonel Nugent’s, recruited by Lord Buckingham among his tenants
at Stowe, now the Eighty-fifth; Colonel Fitch’s, formed chiefly of
recruits from Dublin, now the Eighty-third; and Colonel Crosbie’s,
now the Eighty-ninth.[191] From January to October 1794, there was a
deluge of new battalions, of which it must suffice to mention here a
second battalion of the Seventy-eighth, and three which began life
in February, namely, that raised by Mr. Thomas Graham, the volunteer
of Toulon, which was and still is the Ninetieth, and two Highland
corps formed by Colonel Duncan Campbell and Lord Huntly, which though
originally distinguished by other numbers[192] are known to us as the
Ninety-first and Ninety-second Highlanders. Five regiments of Light
Dragoons raised in February and March must also be mentioned, since we
shall meet with them not unfrequently, namely, Beaumont’s, Fielding’s,
Fullarton’s, Loftus’s, and Gwyn’s, which were raised without expense to
the Government, and bore the numbers Twenty-one to Twenty-five. Lastly,
attention must be called to ◆March 7.◆ a notable new departure in the
formation of a Corps of Waggoners in five companies, with a total
strength of six hundred non-commissioned officers and men, one-tenth of
them artificers. This was the first attempt at a military organisation
of the transport-service.

It was reckoned that, in one way and another, at least thirty thousand
men were enlisted for the regular Army between November 1793 and March
1794,[193] and the number was the more astonishing since Fencibles and
substitutes for the Militia had absorbed a large number of recruits.
It would, however, be a fallacy to suppose that Ministers had yet
thought out any regular plan for continual filling of the ranks; on
the contrary, they had resorted to a variety of hasty expedients
founded upon no fixed principle, and therefore unfitted to meet more
than a temporary emergency. Such procedure is invariably wasteful
and extravagant in the highest degree; but Yonge and Dundas honestly
believed themselves to have found true economy in a clever and specious
scheme put forward by one of the Generals in Ireland, for defraying
the cost of new levies by the sale of commissions.[194] The experiment
was tried on a grand scale and with high hopes, not unmingled with
misgiving, on the part of officers; and indeed the prospect of raising
a large number of men without charge to the country was sufficiently
alluring. None the less the scheme failed completely,[195] as is the
common fate of all projects which aspire to obtain a costly article at
a trifling outlay.

Beyond this experiment the Government could think of no better plan
for augmenting the Army than to encourage young men of means to raise
men for rank, or in other words to offer them rank in the Army in
proportion to the number of recruits that they could produce. This
was an old system which hitherto had been confined chiefly to the
raising of independent companies, and had therefore led to no higher
rank than that of Captain. Even then it had been vicious and had been
repeatedly condemned; and it was no good sign that in 1793 a Lieutenant
had advertised in the London papers, offering two thousand guineas
to any one who could raise him one hundred recruits in six weeks,
and get them passed at Chatham.[196] But it was now extended to the
raising of a multitude of battalions, which, for the most part, were
no sooner formed than they were disbanded, and drafted into other
corps. Thereby of course the men were easily absorbed, but not so the
officers, to whom the Government had pledged itself to give half-pay;
and thus it was possible for a young man to obtain a pension for life
from his country on investing a sufficient sum to raise a few score of
recruits.[197] But this was the least of the evils of the system. There
was instantly a rush to obtain letters of service; and commissions
became a drug in the market. It was said that over one hundred
commissions were signed in a single day,[198] while the Gazette could
not keep pace with the incessant promotions. The Army-brokers, who in
the days of purchase negotiated for officers the sale of commissions,
exchanges, and the like, carried on openly a most scandalous traffic.
“In a few weeks,” to use the indignant language of an officer of the
Guards, “they would dance any beardless youth, who would come up to
their price, from one newly raised corps to another, and for a greater
douceur, by an exchange into an old regiment, would procure him a
permanent situation in the standing Army.” The evils that flowed from
this system were incredible. Officers who had been driven to sell out
of the Army by their debts or their misconduct, were able after a
lucky turn at play to purchase reinstatement for themselves with the
rank of Lieutenant-colonel. Undesirable characters, such as keepers
of gambling-houses, contrived to buy for their sons the command of
regiments; and mere children were exalted in the course of a few weeks
to the dignity of field-officers. One proud parent, indeed, requested
leave of absence for one of these infant Lieutenant-colonels, on the
ground that he was not yet fit to be taken from school. It must be
noted, too, that, thanks to the Army-brokers, these evils were not
confined to the new regiments, but were spread, by means of exchange,
all over the Army; and, since the great majority of the regiments were
abroad on active service, the old officers, who were daily facing
danger and death, suddenly found themselves inferior in rank to men
undistinguished by birth or intellect, and without the smallest
pretension to military ability.

Little less dangerous was the enormous encouragement given to crimping
by the sudden demand from all quarters for recruits. The Navy, as has
been seen, was unable to find its complement of men for the fleet,
despite the fact that the Common Council of London in January 1793
had offered an additional bounty of two pounds to seamen;[199] and
now there was thrown into competition with the press-gang a race of
greedy, unscrupulous scoundrels, some of them holding and disgracing
the King’s commission, who made profit out of every boy or man that
they could lay hold of by fair means or foul. Thus the ranks were
filled, as Tarleton phrased it, with infancy and dotage; recruiting
became a mere matter of gambling; and the price of men rose to thirty
pounds a head.[200] So large a sum set a premium on every description
of rascality in the trepanning of recruits by violence or by guile;
and the ordinary Englishman does not lightly bear with oppression of
this kind. At length, on one day in August, an unfortunate lunatic, who
had been enlisted by a sergeant and locked up in a brothel—the synonym
for a recruiting-house—in London, hurled himself out of a window in
the third story, into the street. Instantly a mob assembled, which
delivered a succession of riotous attacks upon all houses of this
description, and was only suppressed, after several days of disorder,
by the calling out of the Guards and six regiments of cavalry.[201]
Pitt defended the system on the ground that the Navy as well as the
Army would be manned, by the turning over of soldiers to reinforce the
marines; but this is only another instance of Pitt’s callous ignorance
and self-deception. The truth is that while doing nothing, and probably
worse than nothing, for the Navy, it destroyed the efficiency of the
Army for a time, and but for the timely interposition of a capable
soldier would have destroyed it permanently. Who was responsible for
the introduction of the system it is not easy to say, for there were
so many disgraceful circumstances attending it that the whole subject
was hushed up, and is now extremely obscure; but assuredly it was not
Lord Amherst, nor is it credible that it can have been any soldier. It
is safe to assert that it was the work of civilians; and if we seek
among the civilians at the War Office for the two men of tried conceit,
unwisdom, and incapacity, we can find them at once in Sir George Yonge
and Henry Dundas.[202]

Meanwhile new levies, even when raised under these false conditions,
were not to be produced in a moment; and thirty thousand recruits
were not to be reckoned, even by the most sanguine of Ministers,
as equivalent to the same number of old soldiers. The Government,
therefore, renewed its contract for the hire of Hanoverians and
Hessians on a greater scale, raising the total number of them to
close upon thirty-four thousand men. To these were added five foreign
corps, which were intended to supplement the dearth of light troops
from which the British contingent had suffered so much during the
campaign of 1793. As early as in May of that year, one Captain George
Ramsay had offered to raise a small body of foreign riflemen, and had
after some delay been permitted to enlist also a corps of Uhlans. Thus
originated three corps which, in honour of the Commander-in-Chief in
Flanders, were called by the name of York Chasseurs, York Rangers,
and York Hussars. The formation of the remaining two, the Prince of
Salm’s Hussars and Hompesch’s Hussars, was only authorised in February
1794, and consequently they were not ready for service at the opening
of the campaign. No effort had been made to provide British soldiers
for the work of light infantry, except by raising eight additional
light companies for the Brigade of Guards, the men of which were
distinguished by round hats with large green feathers, trousers instead
of breeches and gaiters, and fusils instead of muskets. But with these
details of dress their qualifications as light troops were exhausted;
for they received no sufficient instruction in their peculiar duty.[203]

The Light Dragoons likewise continued to belie their name, being
trained in reality simply as cavalry of the line of battle; but for
this, probably, the civil rather than the military authorities of the
Army were responsible, for at this period it was literally impossible
to obtain officers for the mounted troops. It will be remembered that
before the outbreak of the war the Adjutant-general had constantly, but
in vain, endeavoured to obtain an increase of the wholly inadequate
pittance of pay meted out to subalterns of dragoons. Even in peace
the burdens laid upon them were too heavy to be borne, and to these
were now added inadequate compensation for losses in the field, only
eighteen pounds being granted to replace a charger which had cost
thirty-five. The consequences became immediately apparent. The Duke of
York was obliged to beg that the cornetcies of regiments serving in the
Low Countries might be given away, since purchasers for them could not
be found.[204] Thus the Light Dragoons were untaught, because there
were no officers to teach them; patrols and advanced detachments lacked
the daring and adventurous leading of youth; and one of the highest
schools for the training of subalterns was wholly neglected. It is
hardly possible to estimate the evil consequences of Pitt’s misdirected
parsimony, in devoting to the hire of mercenaries the money which
should have been spent in the improvement of the British Army.

So much must be said of the regular forces; but the year 1794 was not
less remarkable for an enormous increase in the number of the Fencible
regiments, Militia and Volunteers, all due to Carnot’s menace of
invasion. The estimate for the Fencible Cavalry provided in March 1794
for forty troops; by May this figure had already risen to ninety-two
troops, and was still rising. Next, the number of the embodied Militia
for England was augmented to thirty-six thousand; while by an Act of the
Irish Parliament, passed in 1793, sixteen thousand additional Militia
were levied in Ireland. This latter was an entirely new departure; and
it need hardly be said that the first ballots drawn on the west of St.
George’s Channel led to serious rioting.[205] Provision was also made in
the estimates, and a Bill was introduced for the raising of six thousand
Militia in Scotland; but this measure was for the moment deferred, in
order that familiarity might ultimately facilitate its passing. The
formation of the Scottish Militia, however, appears to have been begun
in anticipation,[206] and men were enlisted who, later in the year,
◆Oct. 15–Nov. 20.◆ were formed into over twenty battalions of Fencible
infantry. The extension of the ballot throughout the three kingdoms,
though not actually completed until the passing of the Scottish Militia
Act in 1797, must be regarded as the most important military step taken
since the passing of the Militia Act of 1757 by the elder Pitt; and due
credit should be allowed to the Government for it.

Meanwhile, to augment the English Militia to the prescribed figure,
an Act was passed, after the model of that of 1778, empowering the
Lord-Lieutenants to enrol volunteers, to be added to the Militia,
and to be entitled to the same bounty, subsistence, and clothing.
Finally, in April, was passed an Act, limited to the duration of the
war, authorising the formation of district corps or companies of
Volunteers, to be entitled to pay and subject to military discipline
if called out for invasion or in aid of the civil power. This was the
first attempt to summon the manhood of the kingdom to arms; for though
Shelburne in the peril of 1782 had sent a circular to all the Mayors
and Lord-Lieutenants in England with the object of forming a levy _en
masse_, yet the hastening of the peace, by Rodney’s victory of the
Saints and by the relief of Gibraltar, had rendered any elaboration
of the plan unnecessary. Now, however, there sprang up an infinity
of Volunteer corps, infantry, artillery, and light horse or Yeomanry
Cavalry, first in single companies and troops, but very soon in
battalions and regiments. The first of the Volunteer corps appears
to have been the five Associated Companies of St. George’s, Hanover
Square, which was formed in anticipation of the Act;[207] the first
of the Yeomanry was Lord Winchelsea’s three troops of “Gentlemen and
Yeomanry,” raised by the County of Rutland.[208] The rapidity with
which these Volunteers were raised would be flattering to the national
vanity were it not susceptible of a commonplace explanation. By a
certain clause in the Act Volunteers were exempted from service in the
Militia, upon producing a certificate that they had attended exercise
punctually during six weeks previously to the hearing of appeals
against the Militia list. This dissociation of the Volunteers from
the Militia was a great and disastrous blunder, which has never yet
been thoroughly repaired. It is, however, sufficient to note for the
present that the Government had deliberately set up three different
descriptions of auxiliary forces, Militia, Fencibles, and Volunteers,
all competing with each other and with the regular Army. The number
of regular troops provided for in the estimates of 1794 (reckoning
the Irish establishment at fourteen thousand) was one hundred and
seventy-five thousand men, besides thirty-four thousand foreign
troops, four thousand Fencibles, and fifty-two thousand Militia; or,
say, two hundred and sixty-five thousand men in all.

Simultaneously with these efforts at home, Pitt worked strenuously
to restore unity and vigour to the Coalition. The relations of the
coalesced powers at the close of 1793 were in the highest degree
unsatisfactory. The Empress Catherine, still insatiable, despite
the deterioration of her forces and the exhaustion of her treasury,
had resumed her old designs upon Turkey, and had set a large force
in motion towards Constantinople. The Emperor Francis, still under
the guidance of Thugut and full of vague plans for increasing his
territory, was drawing closer to the Empress in the hope of obtaining
her countenance to the annexation of Venice by Austria, if indemnity in
France should fail, and of sharing with her the ultimate partition of
Turkey. Both were bitterly incensed against Prussia: Catherine because
King Frederick William had diverted his troops from the invasion of
France to the strengthening of his position in Poland; Francis from
jealousy that his rival should have enlarged his boundaries, when he
himself had not. Frederick William, as has been seen, had practically
withdrawn his forces from active operations on the Rhine; and
accordingly in December 1793 Pitt had sent Lord Malmesbury to Berlin to
ascertain (if, indeed, anything could be ascertained in such a centre
of intrigue and falsehood) what might be Prussia’s motive for retiring
from the struggle. In reply to Malmesbury, Frederick William, having
obtained his desire in Poland, declared himself eager to continue the
contest against the Jacobins, but absolutely prevented by lack of
money. ◆Feb. 5.◆ Thereupon Pitt proposed to give Prussia a subsidy of
two millions sterling, of which England should pay three-fifths, and
Holland and Austria each one-fifth. This was a liberal offer; and,
since it was certain that Holland would raise no objection, it lay
practically with Austria to give effect to it. It was well known that
Austria was in financial straits, that Hungary was full of unrest and
the Belgic Provinces much cooled in their loyalty, and that, apart
from these troubles at home, the Emperor had contrived to quarrel
with Sardinia abroad. Hence it was beyond question that Austria could
not carry on the war without Prussia’s assistance; and, forasmuch as
Francis had already despatched emissaries to Berlin to discuss the
operations to be undertaken in the spring, the natural presumption was
that he would gladly close with Pitt’s proposal.

The British Government thereupon bestirred itself to frame its projects
for the coming campaign. The Duke of York left Belgium for London on the
6th of February; ◆Feb. 12.◆ and a few days later Mack, now advanced to
the rank of Major-general, arrived there likewise to concert plans with
the Ministers. The Austrian genius had shortly before submitted[209] a
scheme calculated for a force of three hundred and forty thousand men,
which had been received with great satisfaction by the British Cabinet
and the Duke of York; but, since there was no earthly possibility that
the Coalition could put that number of men into the field, the whole of
this elaborate creation was valueless. Both Mack and Coburg, however,
pressed for a concentration of forces and a march on Paris, though
neither of them could conceive the feasibility of taking the offensive
without leaving one hundred and twenty thousand men behind them to guard
the frontier from the Meuse to the sea. The prime question, therefore,
was one of men, and Pitt on his side promised his utmost endeavour to
increase the British contingent to a figure which should ensure a
genuine total of forty thousand fighting soldiers. As to the means
whereby this force should be produced, Pitt was remarkably vague, being
clear only that he could not spare the few thousand men under Lord
Moira’s command, since he wished to hold them ready to sail to any part
of the British coast which might be threatened by a French invasion.
Moira, therefore, though one of the ablest officers in the Army and
adored by the men, was kept inactive, while his troops sickened and died
of gaol-fever in overcrowded transports at Jersey.[210] However, Pitt
made up his forty thousand men to his own satisfaction by naming various
reinforcements, which he hoped to pour into Flanders during the summer
and autumn; for it was one of the delusions of this gifted man, as also
of his friend Dundas, that an army of twenty thousand men, supplemented
by monthly driblets of two thousand men during ten months, is the same
thing as an army of forty thousand men ready for the field at the
opening of the campaign.

The next requisite was that the Austrian, Prussian, and British
contingents should each of them possess a siege-train, since, according
to Mack, it was essential for the Allies to master every fortress on
the French frontier from the Meuse to the sea. Pitt promised this also,
on behalf of the British; and then arose the question of commanders.
Though well aware that the King’s assent would be wrung from him only
by extreme pressure, the Ministers were for recalling the Duke of York
and appointing Lord Cornwallis, who had just returned from India, in
his place. Herein they were undoubtedly right, for, after all allowance
made for the extreme difficulty of his position, the Duke did not shine
in the field. The Ministers, however, blamed him especially for the
failure before Dunkirk, wherein they themselves were chiefly in fault;
and Mack, prompted apparently by the King, found little difficulty in
making excuses for the Duke, who from the first had condemned the idea
of attacking Dunkirk at all. It was finally arranged that he should
retain command of the British contingent, but that he should be kept
always in the neighbourhood of the principal army, with a few thousand
Austrians attached to his own corps, so as to subordinate him the more
completely to the Austrian Commander-in-Chief. This compromise bears
so clearly the mark of the British politician that its origin cannot
be doubtful. It is of a kind that may serve for the construction
of a Cabinet, but it is not suitable for war, and was particularly
ill-fitted to the projected campaign. For the rest, Pitt declared
himself satisfied that the command should remain with Coburg, who was
deservedly most popular among the Austrian troops; and Mack rejoiced
the heart of the British Cabinet by announcing that the Emperor would
direct the operations as Generalissimo in person. Altogether the
results of the conference were considered to be so satisfactory that
the King presented Mack with a jewelled sword as a reward for his good
service.[211]

The British Government’s satisfaction was soon proved to be premature.
The discussion of future operations with the Court of Berlin was, in
fact, only a trick of Thugut to keep as many Prussian troops as possible
on the French frontier; and the whole intent of the Emperor’s taking
personal command was that Coburg and other honest men in his army, who
profoundly distrusted his chief adviser, should be kept under proper
restraint. Thugut now declared, in answer to Pitt’s proposals, that
Austria would not advance a penny towards the subsidies for the Prussian
army, being well able to dispense with every part of it beyond the
twenty thousand men which formed its contribution towards the forces of
the Empire. ◆March 11.◆ In fact, he was so madly jealous and fearful of
Prussia at this time that he secretly proposed to Russia a scheme for a
joint attack upon her. On learning the Emperor’s decision, King
Frederick William ordered Marshal Möllendorf to begin the withdrawal of
his troops from the Rhine. Coburg was in consternation, for he knew
that, without Prussian help, the execution of the approved plan of
campaign would be impossible. He therefore asked the Duke of York to
join him in requesting Möllendorf to delay his retirement, and
despatched letter after letter to Vienna, adjuring the Emperor in terms
of touching devotion and patriotism to send every man that he could
raise to Flanders, and to work loyally with Prussia to crush the
terrible power of the Revolution while there was yet time. Möllendorf
courteously acceded to his desire; but the Prince’s protests fell on
deaf ears in the Imperial capital. There were over sixty thousand men
ready for service at Vienna, but from his insane dread of Prussian
aggression, Thugut would not part with one of them; and Coburg’s only
reward for his faithful and disinterested counsel was rude and
ungracious rebuke. Just at the critical moment, however, Lord Malmesbury
checked the further withdrawal of the Prussian troops, by threatening to
break off all negotiation for a subsidy unless they remained on the
Rhine until he could receive further instructions from London. This
brought the impecunious King to reason, for without English money he was
lost. Shortly afterwards the parley was, with Pitt’s sanction, resumed;
and there was much haggling over the sphere wherein the Prussian troops
should be employed, Frederick William declaring that for operations on
the Rhine he would furnish eighty thousand men, but for Belgium not more
than fifty thousand. ◆April 19.◆ Finally, Malmesbury succeeded in
compromising matters; and a treaty was signed at the Hague on the 19th
of April, whereby Prussia, in consideration of a lump sum of £300,000
and a subsidy of £50,000 a month, engaged herself to provide sixty-two
thousand men, to be employed wherever Great Britain and Holland, their
paymasters, should think fit. ◆April 30.◆ Ten days later Fox in the
House of Commons predicted that this would be a useless waste of money;
and it will be seen that he was a true prophet.[212]

Meanwhile Coburg was doing his utmost to prepare his army for the heavy
work that lay before it; but the Austrian forces had not improved since
the previous year. Heavy losses had brought many young soldiers into the
ranks; and, owing to the extreme extension of his line of cantonments,
the troops had gained little rest during the winter. The French
delivered as many as forty-five petty attacks between the 6th of January
and the 26th of March, each one of which meant the setting of many
detachments in motion for long and harassing matches. Moreover, owing to
the decay of the Emperor’s popularity in Belgium, the people would do
little or nothing for the troops; and, Coburg being unwilling to take
from the inhabitants what they refused to give, the men suffered greatly
from want of food, fuel, and shelter. Money would, of course, have
overcome all difficulties, but, though the Prince begged piteously for
it, he could obtain none from Vienna; and the consequences were most
cruel. “Some regiments,” he wrote in February, “have been without bread
for several days, and two contractors have been driven to suicide.” On
the other hand, taking a true measure of his enemy, Coburg had issued
instructions that the French must be attacked at all times and in all
circumstances, and that, even in the defence of a position, at least a
third of the men should be kept ready for a counter-attack. But there
was one clause in his orders which seems to give the key to many an
Austrian defeat. “Men defending entrenchments will sit in the banquette,
arms in hand, until the enemy comes within three hundred paces, or even
somewhat nearer, and then open a heavy fire.” British troops were
accustomed to hold their fire until the enemy was within thirty paces;
and hence it was that the French Army of Italy, when they met them in
Egypt, found the red coats tougher adversaries than the white.[213]

Among the rest of the Allies matters were little better than with
the Austrians. The Hessians in Flanders were far below their proper
strength, sickness and constant skirmishes having swallowed up the
additional recruits furnished during the winter; while the brigade
which had been attached to Moira’s force left one hundred dead and
two hundred and fifty invalided in the Isle of Wight, over and above
five hundred sick men whom they carried with them to Ostend.[214] As
to the British, everything was, as usual, behindhand, though the Duke
of York had now a more energetic Chief of Staff than Murray in Colonel
James Craig, whom we saw last at Wilmington in 1781. Recognising from
his American experience how serious was the Duke’s deficiency in light
troops, Craig tried to hire some from Prussia, but without success.
There was a difficulty about the British siege-train, for it was
discovered, some weeks after the Duke had made requisition for it, that
the application had been mislaid at the Office of Ordnance. Though
Dundas made profuse promises of British drafts and reinforcements, to
the number of five thousand men, not one thousand of these had arrived
by the middle of March, and Abercromby’s brigade was quite unfit to
take the field. The remount-horses were discovered to be very bad.
Artillery-drivers, moreover, the dearth of which had been represented
by the Duke for quite six months, were found to be so scarce in England
that the Master-General was fain to seek them, though without success,
in Hanover. A fresh disappointment arose in the matter of foreign
troops, for it proved impossible to obtain three thousand Brunswickers,
whom Dundas had counted upon taking over from the Dutch into the
British service. Rapidly the forty thousand soldiers promised by Pitt
dwindled away; and Craig resigned himself to the inevitable fact that
the deficiency would amount to at least ten thousand men. But this
was not, to his thinking, the most formidable danger. With a boldness
which must have shocked Pitt and Dundas, he wrote to the War Office a
very strong and damaging criticism of the cordon-system, and predicted
that nothing but misfortune could attend Generals who upon principle
preferred dispersion to concentration.[215]

So the month of March passed away, the unhappy Coburg waiting in
anxious suspense to know first, when the troops that composed his
heterogeneous army would be ready; secondly, what their numbers might
be when they were ready; and thirdly, what the Emperor would expect
him to do with them when it should please him to honour headquarters
with his presence. Meanwhile Coburg had even in February given orders
for the contraction of his cantonments; and at the beginning of April,
after much shifting, his force occupied the following positions.

The Right or western Wing of the Allied Army, covering maritime
Flanders, was entrusted to Clerfaye with a force of Austrians,
Hessians, and Hanoverians, who thus occupied the ground formerly
entrusted to the British and Dutch. His headquarters were at Tournai,
where an entrenched camp had been thrown up. In his front also Orchies
and Marchiennes had been strengthened by field-works; and on his right
efforts had been made to restore the defences of Menin, Ypres, and
Nieuport, though, except in the case of Ypres, with little result. The
effective strength of Clerfaye’s army in the field, after deduction of
garrisons for the strong places, was about twenty-four thousand men.

On Clerfaye’s left, and connected with it by a detachment of five
thousand men under General Wurmb at Denain on the Scheldt, stood the
Centre or principal army, consisting of about twenty-two thousand men
under the Duke of York, about forty-three thousand men under Coburg
himself, and of about nineteen thousand Dutch under the Prince of
Orange. The Duke occupied the right with headquarters at St. Amand,
Coburg the centre with headquarters at Valenciennes, and the Prince of
Orange the left with headquarters at Bavai. It was reckoned that, after
providing for garrisons, Coburg could spare sixty-five thousand men for
active operations.

The Left Wing consisted of twenty-seven thousand Dutch and Austrians
under Count Kaunitz, which were stretched over the space from
Bettignies, a little to the north of Maubeuge, to Dinant on the Meuse.

To these must be added fifteen thousand more Austrians under General
Beaulieu, cantoned between Namur and Tréves, bringing the grand total
of the Allied force to something over one hundred and sixty thousand
men, of which at the very most one hundred and twenty thousand were
free for work in the field.[216]

It will be noticed that the corps of Clerfaye and of the Duke of York
had exchanged the places which they had occupied during the previous
year, pursuant to the design of the British Ministers that the Duke of
York should be kept under the immediate eye of Coburg. The first result
of this interference was to spoil Clerfaye’s temper for the whole
campaign; for he judged his force too weak for its task of defending
the maritime provinces; and indeed it was only by the positive orders
of Coburg that he consented to hold the command.[217] The whole
arrangement, in fact, was calculated to cause confusion. It was bad
enough that the lines of retreat for the British and Austrians should
be in exactly opposite directions; and the obvious course, upon the
change of the Duke of York’s station, would have been to have shifted
his base to Antwerp. But far from this, not only was his base continued
at Ostend, but, to make matters worse, a brigade of British was placed
under Clerfaye’s command, and a respectable number of Austrians under
the Duke of York’s; so that in case of mishap, not only must the lines
of retreat for the right and right centre intersect each other, but
neither corps could retire upon its base without leading several of its
regiments in the wrong direction.

Meanwhile on the French side Carnot had girded himself for a supreme
effort. “We must finish matters this year,” he wrote to Pichegru on the
11th of February; “unless we make rapid progress and annihilate the
enemy to the last man within three months, all is lost. To begin again
next year would mean for us to perish of hunger and exhaustion.” He
therefore decided to combine the armies of the North, of the Ardennes
and of the Moselle, and to mass two hundred and fifty thousand men
along the line from Dunkirk to the Meuse. Of these about one hundred
thousand were to move upon Ypres, march thence upon Ghent, master
maritime Flanders, and then wheel eastward upon Brussels; while at
the same time another hundred thousand were to advance upon Namur and
Liège, and sever communication with Luxemburg. In other words, he
designed to turn and envelop both flanks of the Allied Army, leaving
about fifty thousand men to stand on the defensive in the intermediate
space between Bouchain and Maubeuge.

Of the many eminent critics who have passed judgment upon this
plan, there is not one who has failed to point out and condemn its
defects; and indeed it is obvious that if the Allies, neglecting small
detachments, should fall with their full strength upon either wing
of the enemy, they might annihilate it. An advance of the French in
overwhelming strength upon the communications of the Allies about Namur
would have been equally effective and far less hazardous. Yet Carnot
prescribed the invasion of the maritime provinces as the first object,
partly no doubt with a view to the ultimate invasion of England, but
chiefly, as I conceive, with the political object of threatening the
retreat of the British and thus overawing the most formidable power
in the Coalition. It is worth while to recall that in 1815 Wellington
looked for Napoleon to turn the western flank of the Allies and cut
the British off from the sea, and that he dreaded such a movement so
much that he made his dispositions at Waterloo with a view to prevent
it. Wellington’s action has been as sharply criticised as Carnot’s;
and yet, when two such men agree upon such a point, their opinion is
at least worth serious consideration. In any case, the threatening of
the lines of communication both east and west was quite sufficient
to distract the councils of the Allies, to set them quarrelling as
to which among themselves should be sacrificed to the others, and
so perhaps to bring about political discord and the rupture of the
Coalition.

At the end of March Pichegru gave the strength of the army of the
North at two hundred and six thousand, and of the army of the Ardennes
at thirty-seven thousand men, making a total of two hundred and
forty-three thousand present under arms, of which one hundred and
eighty-three thousand were free for service in the field. The army of
the North at the beginning of April was thus distributed. The Left
Wing, seventy-one thousand men, extended from Dunkirk by Cassel and
Lille to Pont-à-Marque; the Centre, forty-seven thousand men, from
Arleux (near Douai) by Cambrai, Bouchain, and Bohain to Étreux, a
little to the north of Guise; the Right Wing, thirty-six thousand men,
from Avesnes by Cerfontaine, St. Rémy, and St. Waast to Maubeuge. This
made a total of one hundred and fifty-four thousand men ready for the
field; one half of them, under such leaders as Moreau and Souham,
standing on the frontier of maritime Flanders. As early as on the 11th
of March Carnot ordered Pichegru to begin the advance on Ypres; but the
General, though willing to train his troops by countless skirmishes,
made no movement until the 29th of March, when he attacked the Austrian
advanced posts at Le Cateau with thirty thousand men, and was beaten
back with the loss of twelve hundred killed and wounded and four guns.
“It is dangerous,” he reported, “to match our young troops against the
enemy so soon”; and therewith his operations incontinently ceased.

Meanwhile Coburg, still awaiting his orders, made no attempt to
overwhelm any one of the scattered French divisions. ◆April 2.◆ At last
on the 2nd of April the Emperor quitted Vienna, reached Brussels in
company with his brothers, the Archdukes Charles and Joseph on the 9th,
and on the 14th joined Coburg at Valenciennes. ◆April 14.◆ The Prince
then laid before him the danger of the Allied position, with both wings
too weak to take the offensive against an enemy which was reported to be
three hundred thousand strong; and followed this up by recommending the
advance of the centre to the siege of Landrecies, for which Mack had
prepared one of his usual elaborate schemes. Thus the Austrians reverted
once more to a war of petty sieges, which could produce no decisive
result. Indeed the only thing to be said for operations in the selected
quarter was that the country was open and well suited to cavalry, in
which arm the Allies were far superior both in quantity and quality to
the French. The Emperor approved the plan; and the troops were set in
motion forthwith, nominally for a great review to be held in the
Emperor’s honour near Le Cateau. Thus, despite all Carnot’s efforts to
take the initiative, it fell to the Allies to open the new campaign.

VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER X

◆1794.◆

◆April 16.◆

On the 16th of April, as had been arranged, the whole of the main army
was inspected by the Emperor on the heights of Cateau. The British
infantry was represented, as in the last campaign, by three battalions
of Guards, with a fourth battalion formed out of their flank-companies,
and by Abercromby’s brigade of the Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and
Fifty-third. These last had at length received their first instalment
of recruits to make good their losses during 1793, in the shape of a
draft which was described as “much resembling Falstaff’s men, and as
lightly clad as any Carmagnole battalion”[218] of the French Army.
The cavalry numbered twenty-eight squadrons, drawn from fourteen
regiments[219] and organised into four brigades, three of heavy and one
of light dragoons, the last being supplemented by a picked squadron
of the Carbineers under the command of Captain Stapleton Cotton, a
lad of twenty, who in later years was to earn the title of Viscount
Combermere. The review over, the Emperor took up his quarters in Le
Cateau, whither the commanders forthwith repaired to him for orders.

◆April 17.◆

The French troops under Pichegru in the immediate front of the Emperor
consisted of three divisions, with an average strength of twelve
thousand men each, extended along an entrenched position some eighteen
miles long, on the wooded heights of Bohain and Nouvion. Of these
Fromentin’s division held Catillon on the Sambre, a village rather
over four miles east and south of Le Cateau; westward of Fromentin,
Ballaud’s division lay astride the road from Le Cateau to Guise, at
Arbre de Guise and Ribeauville; and, still further to west and south,
Goguet’s division held the ground about Vaux, Prémont, and Bohain. The
nearest French troops beyond these to westward were fifteen thousand
men under Chappuis about Cambrai; while to eastward three divisions of
the French right wing, numbering some thirty thousand men, lined the
Sambre from St. Waast to Maubeuge.

There was therefore an opportunity of overwhelming one or other of
these isolated bodies; but the Austrians clung religiously to their
old methods. The force was divided into eight columns, three of which
were directed to move north-westward toward Cambrai, so as to check
any movement from that side. These need trouble us no more. Of the
remaining five, two on the left were ordered to drive the enemy out of
Catillon, cross the Sambre, and after clearing the forest of Nouvion
to push forward their light troops. One column in the centre, under
Coburg’s personal command, was designed to move by Ribeauville upon
Wassigny to master the heights further to southward; while two more
on the right, under the Duke of York and Sir William Erskine, were
to advance, the former upon Vaux, the latter upon Prémont, to drive
the enemy from their entrenched positions there and at Bohain, and
to press their light troops forward upon Le Catelet. All commanders
were expressly ordered to halt the main portion of their troops on the
captured ground, so that there was no intention of pursuing the enemy
in the event of success.

It would be tedious to describe so feeble an operation. The scene of
the engagement is a country much broken by ravines and hollow roads,
so that the heavy artillery of some of the columns was with difficulty
brought forward; but the French, being in a manner surprised, were
manœuvred out of their positions with little trouble or loss. The
Duke of York’s and Erskine’s columns alone encountered resistance
worth mentioning, but they found little difficulty in turning the
French entrenchments, while the Austrian Hussars and a squadron of
the Sixteenth Light Dragoons succeeded in cutting down great numbers
of the retreating enemy. Altogether the Allies lost fewer than seven
hundred killed and wounded, while the action was reckoned to have cost
the French over two thousand men, besides from twenty to thirty guns,
of which eleven were captured by the British columns. Beyond this the
French were little molested in their retreat to Guise, and the trifling
success of the day was marred by disgraceful plundering and burning on
the part of the Allied troops after the engagement. The British had
already shown tendencies in this direction, but had been checked by the
Duke of York, who had hanged two offenders, caught red-handed, on the
spot, without even the form of a drumhead court-martial. Now, however,
the Austrians led the way in misconduct, either led astray by some of
their savage auxiliaries, or in aimless revenge for their starvation
during the winter; and the British were only too ready to follow the
example.[220]

[Illustration:

CAMPAIGN OF APRIL, 1794.

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

◆April 18.◆

On the following day the army halted between Nouvion and Prémont,
pushing its outposts further to southward, while detachments of
Austrians were posted also at Prisches, a few miles north of Nouvion,
and at La Capelle, Fontenelle, and Garmouset to eastward, so as to
cover the left flank and rear of the army. Thereupon the Prince of
Orange, whose troops had been advanced towards Cambrai on the 17th,
countermarched to Le Cateau, and assembling his force at Forest, about
three miles to the north of it, ◆April 20.◆ on the 20th fell upon the
enemy’s posts over against Landrecies on the left bank of the Sambre.
After a hard struggle, which cost him one thousand men and the French
twice as many, he carried the French position, and at once opened the
trenches before the town. ◆April 21.◆ On the following day Pichegru
delivered feeble and incoherent assaults upon the positions of Prisches
and Nouvion, and upon the heights to the south of Wassigny, all of
which were beaten off with the loss to him of many men and four guns.
◆April 22.◆ Further desultory fighting at the advanced posts on the
next day was equally unfavourable to Pichegru, as indeed he deserved
for his folly in not concentrating the thirty thousand men, who lay
ready to his hand at Maubeuge, for an overwhelming attack.

Coburg then judged it safe to proceed with the siege in earnest,
and, withdrawing the covering army to the north, formed it in a huge
semicircle around the besieging force. His left wing curved round from
the heights that lie to eastward of Landrecies, and between it and the
village of Maroilles, southward to Prisches, thence south-east across
the Rivierette to Le Sart, and thence by Fesmy to the Sambre, the
whole line being strongly entrenched, with several bridges thrown over
the Rivierette. The force allotted for the defence of this tract was
thirty-two battalions, fifty squadrons, and twenty-six light companies,
the left under General Alvintzy, the right under General Kinsky. On the
western bank of the Sambre the right wing completed the semicircle,
with a total of twenty-six battalions and seventy-six squadrons. The
first section of the defences on this side ran westward of Catillon
to the Selle, from which stream the Duke of York’s army carried the
line north-westward to the road from Le Cateau to Cambrai. This, a
broad paved way, runs straight as an arrow over the long waves of
rolling ground that lie between the two towns, the undulations rising
to their highest at the village of Inchy, upon which the Duke rested
his right. The position thus occupied by the Allies was over twenty
miles in extent, following a chain of hills of easy slope but seamed to
east of Catillon by deep watercourses and hollows, and broken by small
copses and enclosures in the neighbourhood of the villages. Westward
from Catillon, however, towards Cambrai the hills subside into a broad
plain, not unlike Salisbury Plain, except that the undulations are far
longer and the acclivities therefore less severe. Covered with crops
but unenclosed, its gentle slopes and unseen folds present an ideal
field for the action and manœuvres of cavalry.

◆April 23.◆

On the 23rd intelligence reached the Allies that fifteen thousand
of the enemy had moved out from Cambrai in three columns towards
the north-east, were driving in the outposts along the lower Selle,
and had even crossed that river, apparently with the object of
intercepting the Emperor Francis, who was returning from a visit to
Brussels, to rejoin the headquarters of the army. The Austrian General
Otto, receiving information of these movements from Major-general
Sentheresky at St. Hilaire, between four and five miles north-west
of Inchy, at once joined him there; and reconnoitring further north
he found the enemy, apparently about ten thousand strong, near the
village of Villers-en-Cauchies. Having with him only two squadrons
of the Fifteenth Light Dragoons and as many of the Austrian Leopold
Hussars, making together little more than three hundred sabres, Otto
fell back to St. Hilaire, and sent a message to the Duke of York for
reinforcements. Late at night he was joined by the Eleventh Light
Dragoons, two squadrons of the Austrian Zeschwitz Cuirassiers, and
Mansel’s brigade of the Blues, Royals, and Third Dragoon Guards, the
whole numbering ten squadrons.

◆April 24.◆

Early on the following morning he again moved northward down the valley
of the Selle, keeping the Fifteenth and Leopold Hussars in advance and
the remainder in support; and at about seven o’clock the four advanced
squadrons came upon a force of French light cavalry of twice or thrice
their strength in a long belt of dwarf coppice, near the village of
Montrecourt, and about two miles east of Villers-en-Cauchies. Being
attacked on their left flank the French horsemen at once retreated with
precipitation for a quarter of a mile, when they rallied, and then
retired steadily westward, covered by a cloud of skirmishers. Finally
they re-formed between Villers-en-Cauchies and Avesnes-le-Sec, fronting
to eastward, and masking a force of unknown strength in their rear.
Otto appears to have followed up this cavalry with great speed, for,
on looking round for his supports, he could nowhere discover them. He
halted the advanced squadrons, but, perceiving that he had already
committed them too deeply, he assembled the officers and told them
briefly that there was nothing for it but to attack. The English and
Austrian officers then crossed swords in pledge that they would charge
home; and it was agreed that the British should attack in front, and
the Austrians on the enemy’s left flank towards Avesnes-le-Sec, which
was already a name of good omen in the annals of the Austrian cavalry.

[Illustration:

AVESNES-LE-SEC, 12 Sep, 1793

VILLERS-EN-CAUCHIES
24 April, 1794

BEAUMONT, 26 April, 1794.

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

The Fifteenth led by Captain Aylett now advanced at a rapid trot,
breaking into a gallop at one hundred and fifty yards from the French
cavalry. These did not await the shock but wheeled outwards, right and
left, and retired at speed, unmasking a line of French skirmishers
and guns, which opened fire before their front was clear and killed
several of their own soldiers. In rear of the artillery six French
battalions, or about three thousand men, were massed together in
quadrate formation of oblong shape,[221] with the front rank kneeling.
A volley from the eastern face of this square, together with a
discharge of grape from the guns, checked the attack for a moment; but,
cheered on by their officers, the Fifteenth swept through the battery
and dashed straight upon the bayonets. The French infantry seems to
have stood till the last moment, for Aylett fell with a deep thrust
through the body, and four other officers had their horses wounded
under them; but the onset of the Dragoons was irresistible. One half of
the square was dispersed instantly; and the other half, after firing a
volley, broke up likewise before the charge of the Fifteenth, and fled
in wild disorder. In rear of the square were more French squadrons,
upon which those that retired from the front had been re-formed;
but these had given way before the impetuous attack of the Austrian
Hussars, and for half a mile the sabres of both Austrians and British
dealt terrible havoc among the flying Frenchmen.[222]

Leaving, however, the Austrians to pursue the infantry towards
Cambrai, the Fifteenth, now commanded by Captain Pocklington, passed
on to the road from Villers-en-Cauchies to Bouchain, dispersed a long
line of fifty guns and ammunition-waggons, which were retiring to
the north-west, and continued the chase until the guns of Bouchain
itself opened fire upon them, and a relieving force came out to save
the convoy. Meanwhile not a sign appeared of the supporting squadrons
which might have ensured the capture of the artillery; and Pocklington,
observing other forces of the enemy closing in upon him from every
side, rallied his men and retired at a trot. The blue uniform of the
Light Dragoons, however, caused the French to mistake them for friends;
and it was not until they were close to Villers-en-Cauchies that
Pocklington perceived that he was cut off. The enemy was, in fact,
established in his front, blocking the road with infantry and artillery
at a point where a causeway carried it across a valley, though to the
south of the village there were visible the scarlet coats of Mansel’s
brigade. Wheeling about, therefore, for a short time, Pocklington
checked the pursuers that were following him from Bouchain, and then,
wheeling once more to his proper front, he galloped through the French
amid a heavy fire of grape and musketry with little loss, and safely
rejoined his comrades.

Things, however, had not gone well with Mansel and his brigade. Whether
it was by Otto’s fault or by his own that he had gone astray, and
whether he attempted and failed in an attack upon the French who were
obstructing Pocklington’s retreat, is a mystery. We know only that
Craig reported, with great regret, that the brigade had behaved ill;
that he attributed the fault mainly to Mansel, whom after the action
of the 17th he had already reported as an incompetent officer; but
that the troops also were to blame, though the Royals had immediately
recovered themselves and protected the retreat of the other two
regiments. More curious still, the list of casualties shows that the
Third Dragoon Guards suffered the very heavy loss of thirty-eight men
and forty-six horses killed, besides nine more men wounded and missing,
though the casualties of the Royals and the Blues were trifling.[223]
From this I infer that Mansel led his brigade to the sound of the guns,
and, being ordered to attack the fresh division of the enemy that had
come upon the ground, contrived by irresolution and mismanagement to
bring the Third Dragoon Guards under enfilading fire of the French
cannon, and to throw the whole of the six squadrons into confusion. In
any case it is certain that the brilliant attack of the Fifteenth was
insufficiently supported, and that Mansel and his brigade, justly or
unjustly, lay under reproach, until two days later they redeemed their
good name beyond all chance of cavil. The casualties of the French in
this action were eight hundred men killed and four hundred wounded,
besides three guns taken; while the Fifteenth escaped with a loss of
thirty-one men and thirty-seven horses killed and wounded, and the
Leopold Hussars with a loss of ten men and eleven horses killed and
wounded and the same number missing. The Emperor of Austria conferred
on the officers of the Fifteenth a gold medal and the much-coveted
order of Maria Theresa; and the regiment still bears on its
appointments the name of Villers-en-Cauchies. With a little more luck,
or, it may be, a little better management, Otto would have achieved one
of the greatest successes ever recorded of cavalry against infantry,
and annihilated the whole of the force that had moved out from Cambrai.

As matters stood, however, the reverse to the French produced little
effect on Pichegru. Successive reinforcements had more than made good
his losses; and on the 24th of April the combined strength of the
armies of the North and of the Ardennes, not counting fifty thousand
men employed as garrisons, was little short of two hundred thousand men
free for service in the field, or nearly two to one of Coburg’s force.
Relying upon this numerical superiority the French General started for
Lille, in order from thence to direct operations against Clerfaye. At
the same time, however, he set his troops in motion to raise the siege
of Landrecies, directing General Charbonnier with thirty thousand men
of the army of the Ardennes to attack Kaunitz on the extreme left wing
of the Allies, while at the same time General Ferrand with forty-five
thousand from Guise should fall on the covering army on the east and
south, and General Chappuis with thirty thousand men from Cambrai
should assail the Duke of York on the west.

◆April 26.◆

Accordingly, early in the morning of the 26th the French engaged
the covering army simultaneously at all points. On the east General
Fromentin with twenty-two thousand men assailed Maroilles and Prisches,
and after a long and severe struggle captured the latter position,
severing for the time communications between Alvintzy and Kinsky.
Alvintzy himself was disabled by two wounds, and the situation was
for a time most critical until the Archduke Charles, who had succeeded
to the command of Alvintzy’s troops, by a final and skilful effort
recovered the lost ground and drove the French over the Little Helpe.
This enabled him to reinforce the centre under General Bellegarde,
who with some difficulty was defending the line from Oisy to Nouvion
against twenty-three thousand men. Thereupon Bellegarde instantly took
the offensive, completely defeated the French, and captured from them
nine guns.

But far more brilliant was the success of the Allies on the west, where
Chappuis led one column along the high-road from Cambrai to Le Cateau,
while a second column of four thousand men advanced upon the same
point by a parallel course through the villages of Ligny and Bertry, a
little farther to the south. Favoured by a dense fog the two columns
succeeded in driving the advanced posts of the Allies from the villages
of Inchy and Beaumont on the high-road, and of Troisvilles, Bertry,
and Maurois immediately to south of them; which done, they proceeded
to form behind the ridge on which these villages stand, for the main
attack. Before the formation was complete the fog cleared; and the
Duke, observing that Chappuis’s left flank was in the air, made a great
demonstration with his artillery against the French front, sent a few
light troops to engage their right, and calling all his cavalry to his
own right, formed them unseen in a fold in the ground between Inchy and
Bethencourt, a village a little to westward of it.[224] The squadrons
were drawn up in three lines, the six squadrons of the Austrian
Cuirassiers of Zeschwitz forming the first line under Colonel Prince
Schwarzenberg, Mansel’s brigade the second line, and the First and
Fifth Dragoon Guards and Sixteenth Light Dragoons the third, the whole
of the nineteen squadrons being under command of General Otto.[225]

In this order they moved off, Otto advancing with great caution,
and skilfully taking advantage of every dip and hollow to conceal
his movements. A body of French cavalry was first encountered and
immediately overthrown, General Chappuis, who was with them, being
taken prisoner. Then the last ridge was passed and the squadrons saw
their prey before them—over twenty thousand French infantry drawn
up with their guns in order of battle, serenely facing eastward
without thought of the storm that was bursting on them from the
north. There was no hesitation, for Schwarzenberg was an impetuous
leader, and the Cuirassiers had been disappointed of distinction at
Villers-en-Cauchies; the Blues, Royals, and Third Dragoon Guards had a
stain to wipe away; the King’s and Fifth Dragoon Guards were eager for
opportunity to show their mettle; and the Sixteenth Light Dragoons,
being the only Light Dragoons present, were anxious to prove that they
could do as well as the Fifteenth. The trumpets rang out, and with
wild cheering white coats, red coats, and blue coats whirled down
upon the left flank and rear of the French. The French guns, hastily
wheeled round, opened a furious fire of grape, while the infantry
began as furious a fire of musketry; but the charging squadrons took
no heed. Mansel, stung by the imputation of cowardice, which had been
thrown out to account for his mishap on the 24th, had vowed that he
would not come back alive, and dashing far ahead of his men into the
thick of the enemy went down at once; but Colonel Vyse, of the King’s
Dragoon Guards, taking command of both brigades, led them as straight
as Mansel. In a very few minutes the whole mass of the French was
broken up and flying southward in wild disorder, with the sabres hewing
mercilessly among them.

The misfortunes of the enemy did not end here, for one of their
detachments, which had been pushed forward to Troisvilles, was driven
back by a couple of British guns under Colonel Congreve, and joined
the rest in flight. Meanwhile Chappuis’s second column had advanced
a little beyond Maurois with its guns, when the appearance of the
fugitives warned them to retire; but in this quarter, too, there was
a vigilant Austrian officer, Major Stepheicz, with two squadrons of
the Archduke Ferdinand’s Hussars and four of the Seventh and Eleventh
British Light Dragoons. Following up the French column he drove its
rearguard in upon the main body a little to westward of Maretz, and
a few miles further on fell upon the main body also, dispersed it
utterly, and captured ten guns. Twelve hundred Frenchmen were killed
in this part of the field alone, so terrible was the Austrian hussar
in pursuit; two thousand more had fallen under the sabres of Otto’s
division, which likewise captured twenty-two guns and three hundred and
fifty prisoners. The shattered fragments of the French infantry fled by
a wide detour to Cambrai; and Pichegru’s attack on this side was not
merely beaten off, but his troops were literally hunted from the field.

So ended the greatest day in the annals of the British horse, perhaps
the greater since the glory of it was shared with the most renowned
cavalry in Europe. The loss of the Austrians was nine officers, two
hundred and twenty-eight men, and two hundred and eight horses; that
of the British, six officers, one hundred and fifty-six men, and two
hundred and eighty-nine horses, killed, wounded, and missing. The
British regiments that suffered most heavily were the Blues and the
Third Dragoon Guards, each of which had sixteen men and twenty-five
horses killed outright; and the determination of the Third to prove
that the harsh criticism of their comrades on the 24th was unjust, is
shown by the fact that five out of the six officers injured in the
charge belonged to them. Mansel, the Brigadier, who was also their
Colonel, died as has been told. Of the Captains one, his own son, was
overpowered and taken in a desperate effort to extricate his father,
and another was wounded. Of the Lieutenants one was killed and another,
if not two more, wounded. The Major in command, however, had the good
fortune not only to escape unhurt but to receive the sword of General
Chappuis. The total loss of the covering army was just under fifteen
hundred men; that of the French was reckoned, probably with less
exaggeration than usual, at seven thousand, while the guns taken from
them numbered forty-one.

◆April 27.◆

On the following day the Emperor ordered his army to devote itself to
singing a _Te Deum_ and to solemn thanksgiving, which was very right
and proper, but might well have been deferred for forty-eight hours
until the full fruits of the victory had been gathered. For although
there were four fortresses, Avesnes, Guise, Cambrai, and Maubeuge,
within easy distance as a refuge for fugitives, another day’s pursuit
would assuredly have swept up many hundred stragglers, while the mere
sight of the Allied troops would probably have sufficed to set the
French levies running once more. There was, however, better excuse than
usual for inaction, for among General Chappuis’s papers had been found
evidence that a most formidable stroke was about to fall, if it had
not already fallen, upon Flanders. It is now necessary to narrate the
course of events in that quarter, namely, on the right or western wing
of the Allies.

◆April 23.◆

On the 23rd of April a force from Cambrai, acting in concert with that
which was beaten on the 24th at Villers-en-Cauchies, had moved northward
against Wurmb’s corps of communication at Denain, and, but for the
arrival of Clerfaye with some eight thousand men from Tournai, would
have driven it across the Scheldt. ◆April 24.◆ On the 24th, 26th, and
27th the harassing of the advanced posts of the Allies about Denain
continued, and meanwhile the true attack was developed, pursuant to
Carnot’s plans, on the extreme left of the French line. On the 24th
Michaud’s division of twelve thousand men marched from Dunkirk, part of
it towards Nieuport on the north, the rest upon Ypres to south-east,
sweeping back the feeble posts between the two places. Simultaneously
Moreau’s division of twenty-one thousand men moved eastward from Cassel
upon Ypres, and drove all the outlying detachments on that side to take
shelter under the ramparts. ◆April 25–27.◆ Then, leaving some of
Michaud’s division at Messines to watch the fortress from the south,
Moreau pursued his way eastward against Menin, and surrounded that
fortress upon all sides. At the same time Souham’s division of thirty
thousand men, under the personal direction of Pichegru, advanced from
Lille north-eastward upon Mouscron, drove back upon Dottignies the weak
detachment that defended it, and captured Courtrai, ◆April 26.◆ which
was practically without a garrison. ◆April 28.◆ General Oynhausen,
however, restored matters somewhat by collecting troops from Tournai at
Dottignies and retaking the position of Mouscron, where reinforcements
arrived in the nick of time to strengthen him.

The papers found upon Chappuis gave Coburg the key to all these
movements; and on the evening of the 26th he sent twelve battalions
and ten squadrons under General Erskine from his own army to St.
Amand, bidding Clerfaye to recall at once to their proper stations the
reinforcements which he had imprudently hurried to Denain. Clerfaye
accordingly hastened by forced marches through Tournai to Mouscron,
which he reached on the 28th, raising the garrison of that place to
ten thousand men, exclusive of about two thousand more in the detached
posts of Coyghem and Dottignies. The relief of Menin was his first
and most urgent object, and he had fully resolved to attempt it on
the 30th; but Pichegru was too quick for him. ◆April 29.◆ On the 29th
the two columns under Generals Souham and Bertin fell, the one upon
Clerfaye’s front, the other upon his left flank and rear, with a
superiority of three to one, and after a hard struggle forced him from
his position. The Austrian General seems to have begun his retreat in
good order, but the movement speedily degenerated into a flight; and
when he rallied his beaten troops at Dottignies he was the weaker by
two thousand men killed and wounded and twenty-three guns. Happily six
of the battalions sent from the army before Landrecies had by that time
reached Dottignies, and, with these to hearten his demoralised force,
he retired eastward to Espierres, on the western bank of the Scheldt.

This defeat decided the fate of Menin. The garrison consisted of
rather more than two thousand men, chiefly Hanoverians, but in part
French Emigrants, which latter if captured could expect nothing but
the guillotine. The commandant, Count Hammerstein, therefore decided
to cut his way out through the besiegers, and with the fortune that
favours the brave, ◆April 30.◆ succeeded during the night of the 30th
in forcing his passage northward to Thourout and thence to Bruges.
Thus Menin and Courtrai, the two gates of the Lys, were lost, and a
gap was broken in the long cordon of the Allies. Along the whole of
the right wing there was something like a panic, and the roads were
choked with long trains of supplies and stores flying northward to
Brussels and Ghent. At Ostend there had lately arrived the Eighth Light
Dragoons and the Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fifth Foot, sadly belated,
since the infantry, with Dundas’s usual wisdom, had been embarked at
Bristol; but General Stewart, the commandant at Ostend, did not think
it prudent after Clerfaye’s defeat to send them down country.[226]
Happily Pichegru did not pursue his advantage as he ought. ◆May 3.◆ He
did indeed push a detachment northward from Menin upon Roulers, which
was attacked and defeated with a loss of two hundred men and three
guns by three squadrons of the Allied cavalry;[227] but there his
activity ceased; and he solemnly sat himself down about Moorseele on
the left bank of the Lys, with one flank resting on Menin and the other
on Courtrai, as if to allow time for Coburg’s army to come up in his
front.[228]

Coburg meanwhile had passed through no enviable days. ◆April 28.◆ On the
28th news reached him that Kaunitz on his left wing had been forced back
by overwhelming numbers to the Sambre, while on his right wing Pichegru
had made his way to Courtrai; but, however serious the outlook, he was
still tied for the present to the miserable and useless fortress of
Landrecies. By a strange irony Mack on that very day submitted a plan of
future operations, whereby Bouchain, Cambrai, Avesnes, and Maubeuge were
in succession to be besieged;[229] but circumstances on the occasion
were too strong for pedantry. ◆April 30.◆ Landrecies fortunately fell on
the 30th, and Coburg on the same day ordered the Duke of York to lead
the rest of his force with all speed to Clerfaye’s assistance, and to
drive the French from Flanders.

Heavy rain, however, delayed the Duke’s progress; ◆May 3.◆ and it was
not until the 3rd of May that he reached Tournai, where he reunited
Erskine’s force with his own and pushed forward a strong detachment
three miles westward to Marquain and Lamain, releasing five thousand
men, which had hitherto held those points, to join Clerfaye. The front
thus occupied by the Allies, from Tournai in the south to Espierres in
the north, was from seven to eight miles long and faced due west, their
objective being the right flank and communications of the French left
wing. The British brigade at Ostend, namely the Twelfth, Thirty-eighth,
and Fifty-fifth under Major-general Whyte, and the Eighth Light
Dragoons, were by this time on their way to Clerfaye’s army; and the
united force of Clerfaye and the Duke of York was now reckoned at about
forty thousand men.[230] Pichegru, on the other hand, had from forty to
fifty thousand between Menin and Courtrai, and twenty thousand more
under General Bonnaud (who had succeeded Chappuis) at Sainghin, about
five miles south-east of Lille, to act as a reserve. At Clerfaye’s
proposal it was agreed that on the 5th of May he himself should cross
the Lys a little below Courtrai and fall upon that place from the north,
while simultaneously the Duke of York should move eastward to cut it off
from Lille. After all, however, Clerfaye, whether from diffidence or
mere frowardness, would not venture on the attempt. ◆May 8–9.◆ Appeal
was made to the Emperor Francis to give him positive orders to attack,
but meanwhile Bonnaud concentrated over twenty-five thousand men between
Bouvines and Anstaing, a little to the west of Marquain, as if to
threaten the Duke’s left. When the Emperor’s orders at last reached
Clerfaye, he first wasted four days in reconnoitring, and at last made
but a feeble attack on the 10th, contenting himself with the capture of
the outermost fringe of Courtrai.

◆May 10.◆

Pichegru seems to have had good information of Clerfaye’s movements and
possibly even of his intentions, for he left Moreau’s division alone
to deal with him; and, having moved Souham’s division to the
east bank of the Lys, himself on the same day attacked the line of the
Allies in force. Souham advanced against the Hanoverians on the Allied
right, but, though he forced the posts of Dottignies and Coyghem, was
repulsed from Espierres. On the left of the Allies thirty thousand
French moved out in two columns against the Duke of York’s entrenched
position between Lamain and Hertain; the stronger column of the two,
which included five thousand cavalry, following the main road from
Lille to Tournai, the other turning south-east from Bouvines by Cysoing
upon Bachy, as if to turn the Duke’s left flank. This latter column was
checked by a couple of battalions and three squadrons under command of
an Austrian officer at Bachy, and was unable to penetrate further. The
other and more formidable body carried the advanced posts of Baisieux
upon the main road, and of Camphin about a mile to south of it, and
forming on the plain between these two villages opened a furious
cannonade from howitzers and heavy guns. Thereupon the Duke, perceiving
a gap in the enemy’s line, whereby the right of their main body was
uncovered, ordered sixteen squadrons of British Dragoons and two of
Austrian Hussars to advance into the plain of Cysoing by the low ground
that lies south of the heights of Lamain, and from thence to attack.

The cavalry obeyed with alacrity; but the ground on the plain,
though perfectly level and unenclosed, was much broken by patches of
cole-seed, grown in trenches after the manner of celery, which checked
the progress of the heavy dragoons. Moreover the French infantry, for
the first time since the Revolution, threw themselves into squares and
faced the galloping horsemen with admirable firmness. Nine regiments of
cavalry in succession charged up to the bayonets, but with insufficient
speed, and fell back baffled.[231] Nevertheless they followed the
French up the plain from south to north, until, a little to westward of
Camphin, their left came under the fire of some French heavy batteries,
established on the gently rising ground before the village of Gruson.
The Duke then ordered a brigade of British infantry to move forward
between that village and Baisieux, at the same time sending down four
battalions along the track which the cavalry had taken, to support
their attack. The French infantry thereupon retreated from Camphin in
a northerly direction towards the village of Willems, their cavalry
covering the movement; while the British cavalry, now reinforced by six
more squadrons, hovered about them watching for their opportunity to
attack. At length they fell upon the French horsemen on both flanks,
and utterly overthrew them, after which they renewed their attempt upon
the infantry, but again without success. At last, however, a little to
the south of Willems, the battalion-guns of the British infantry came
up and opened fire, when the French, after receiving a few shots, began
to waver. The squadrons again charged, and an officer of the Greys,
galloping straight at the largest of the squares, knocked down three
men as he rode into it, wheeled his horse round and overthrew six more,
and thus made a gap for the entry of his men. The sight of one square
broken and dispersed demoralised the remainder of the French. Two more
squares were ridden down, and for the third time the British sabres had
free play among the French infantry. Over four hundred prisoners were
taken, thirteen guns were captured, and it was reckoned that from one
to two thousand men were cut down. The loss of the British was thirty
men killed, six officers and seventy-seven men wounded, ninety horses
killed and one hundred and forty wounded and missing, the Sixth Dragoon
Guards being the regiment that suffered most heavily. It is hardly
necessary to call attention to the arm which was lacking on this day,
or to point out that a single battery of horse-artillery would have
enabled the cavalry to break the squares at the first onset, would
greatly have increased the enemy’s losses, and would have made the
day’s operations more decisive. Not for eighteen years was the British
cavalry destined again to ride over French battalions as they rode on
this day; and then Stapleton Cotton was fated once more to be present,
leading not a squadron of Carbineers, but a whole division of horse to
the charge at Salamanca. But the 10th of May 1794 is chiefly memorable
as marking the date on which the new French infantry showed itself not
unworthy of the old.[232]

[Illustration:

WILLEMS
10 May 1794.

_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._
]

◆May 11.◆ After the action the French main body retired once more across
the Lys to its old camp between Menin and Courtrai; ◆May 12.◆ but on the
11th Souham attacked Clerfaye in his position at Lendelede, about four
miles north of Courtrai, and after an obstinate engagement forced him to
retire still further northward to Thielt, with the loss of fifteen
hundred men and two guns. Meanwhile the Duke of York, in spite of his
success on the 10th, became anxious as to his position in presence of
numbers so overwhelmingly superior, and pressed Coburg to send him
reinforcements. At the Emperor’s headquarters, however, there was some
hesitation whether the principal army should move eastward to the
assistance of Kaunitz on the Sambre, or westward for the salvation of
Flanders. The first idea was to make a demonstration towards Cambrai
with a part of the force; the next to make a rapid march and invest
Avesnes, also with only a part of the force, in order to take pressure
off Kaunitz. The idea of moving with the whole army to any given point
seems to have occurred to none of the Austrian Generals. ◆May 11.◆ Then
came the Duke of York’s application for help, whereupon General Kinsky
was ordered with some six thousand horse and foot to Denain, to enable
Wurmb’s detachment at that place to join the Duke of York at Tournai.
◆May 12.◆ One day later arrived news from Kaunitz that he had been
compelled to fall back still further northward from the Sambre, and was
attacked on all sides; the fact being that Carnot on the 30th of April
had directed fifteen thousand men from the army of the Rhine to join the
army of the Ardennes, so as to ensure decisive superiority on the
Sambre. Upon this, Coburg determined that the subdivision of the army
into fragments must cease, and called upon the Emperor to choose between
the Sambre and Flanders, as the sphere of action for the entire force.
Intelligence of a successful engagement fought by Kaunitz and of
Clerfaye’s retreat to Thielt inclined the Emperor to Flanders; and
though, even then, Austrian pedantry insisted that some eight thousand
men under the Prince of Orange must remain in the vicinity of
Landrecies, ◆May 14.◆ yet the bulk of the army on the 14th commenced its
march westward.

This movement, however, was by no means to the taste of some of the
Emperor’s advisers; and it becomes necessary at this point to turn for a
moment from the western to the eastern centre of European disturbance,
and to glance at the influence which events in Poland had exerted upon
the Imperial Cabinet. It has already been said that Thugut’s only object
in persuading the Emperor to take personal command in the field, was
that the operations might subserve his own policy. With this view the
Minister prepared to remove to Valenciennes, which was to be the
political headquarters of the Empire during the Emperor’s stay in the
Netherlands; but before he could leave Vienna he was startled by the
news of a general rising in Poland. ◆March 25.◆ This insurrection under
the leadership of Kosciusko broke out on the 25th of March, and spread
with a rapidity and success which left the Russians absolutely helpless.
Catherine, greedy for the partition of Turkey, had already moved the
best of her troops southwards; and the only force of any kind upon the
spot was that of Prussia, which fact in itself was enough to kindle
Thugut’s jealousy. ◆April 20.◆ On the 20th of April Kosciusko, after two
days’ fighting, captured Warsaw; ◆April 25.◆ and five days later
Catherine, while asking the Emperor for the troops due to her by treaty,
mentioned also how greatly she needed the help of the Prussians, from
whom likewise she had claimed assistance. Meanwhile King Frederick
William, growing nervous lest the rebellion should infect also his own
Polish provinces, after some hesitation decided to throw the Treaty of
the Hague to the winds; wherefore, withdrawing twenty thousand of his
troops from the Rhine, he left Berlin on the 14th of May to take
personal command of his army in Poland.

All this was gall and wormwood to Thugut, and the more so because
Kosciusko had expressed a wish to place Austrian troops in occupation
of Poland rather than yield it to the Prussians. He became more and
more anxious to have done with France, if possible by a separate
peace with the Republic, and to devote all Austria’s energies to the
thwarting of Prussia in the East. The embitterment of his hostility
towards Prussia brought him more than ever in conflict with Coburg
and Mack, who desired above all things a good understanding with
the second great power of Germany; but, unfortunately, he found two
officers of like sentiments with himself in the Prince of Waldeck, who
held a high position on the Staff, and General Rollin, who of all men
possessed greatest influence with the Emperor. It was therefore with
profound dissatisfaction that Thugut’s ignoble clique saw the mass of
the Austrian troops drawn nearer to France and further from Poland;
and though outwardly they swallowed their ill-humour, yet they had
every intention of compassing their own ends, even by means the most
infamous.[233]

◆May 15.◆

On the 15th of May the Emperor joined the Duke of York at Tournai,
and the Archduke Charles brought the Austrian army from Landrecies
to St. Amand, eleven miles to south of it. The field, on which the
decisive action was to be fought, was one that had drunk deep of human
blood. It may be described as the parallelogram enclosed by a line
drawn south-eastward from Courtrai to Tournai, thence south-westward
to Pont-à-Marque, thence north-westward through Lille to Wervicq, and
thence north-eastward back to Courtrai. To east it is bounded by the
Scheldt, to north by the Lys; and through the midst of it, flowing
first from south to north past Pont-à-Marque and Cysoing to Lannoy, and
thence westward into the Deule and so to the Lys, runs the Marque, a
stream impassable except by bridges, owing to soft bottom and swampy
banks. The principal bridges were those of Pont-à-Marque on the great
road to Paris, and Pont-à-Tressin on the road from Tournai to Lille;
but there were others on by-roads at Louvil, Bouvines, Gruson, Tressin,
L’Hempenpont, Pont-à-Breug and Marque, most of them fortified and
strongly held by the French. Two smaller streams of the same character
as the Marque, but running from west to east, form also important
obstacles within this arena, namely, the Espierres brook, which has
its source close to Roubaix and flows into the Scheldt at Espierres,
and the Baisieux brook, which rising near Hertain joins the Scheldt
at Pont-à-Chin. The ground is mostly level, with the exception of the
undulating heights that rise from the Lys, the low ridge upon which
stood the villages of Roubaix and Lannoy, and the group of hills about
Tournai itself; but it was thickly studded with villages, linked
together by chains of innumerable cottages and farm-houses, which were
all of them enclosed by hedges. The fields were cut up by swampy brooks
and by a ramification of wide drains, which, with other enclosures,
practically forbade the movements of troops except by road. The roads,
however, even then were many; and the principal highways were nearly
broad enough to permit an advance in column of half-companies;[234] but
all of them, as well as the waterways, were lined with trees, making
it extremely difficult to see the movements of troops from a distance.
Thus it was and is a country unfit for cavalry, and far better
adapted in that day to the tactics of the French than of the Allied
infantry.[235]

Within the parallelogram the French were somewhat widely scattered.
Osten’s division of ten thousand men lay at Pont-à-Marque. To the
left or northward of it the bulk of Bonnaud’s division of twenty
thousand men was encamped at Sainghin, with detachments occupying also
Pont-à-Tressin and Lannoy, further north upon the Marque. Souham’s
division of twenty-eight thousand, and Moreau’s of twenty-two thousand
men lay on the south bank of the Lys between Courtrai and Aelbeke,
a village nearly four miles south of it, with Thierry’s brigade at
Mouscron, and Compère’s brigade at Tourcoing to preserve communication
with Bonnaud. In all, the French army numbered eighty-two thousand men.

Against this force Coburg could pit sixty-two thousand, twelve
thousand of them cavalry. Of the Allied army, fourteen thousand under
the Archduke Charles were at St. Amand; seventeen thousand under the
Duke of York at Tournai; nine thousand under Kinsky at Marquain; four
thousand Hanoverians under General von dem Bussche at Warcoing, on
the Scheldt; and, lastly, sixteen thousand men under Clerfaye were at
Oyghem, about five miles north and east of Courtrai on the north bank
of the Lys. The whole of these troops, excepting Clerfaye’s corps,
could easily be concentrated within twelve hours at Tournai, from
which a swift and resolute attack upon the southern flank of Souham
and Moreau, by Roubaix, Mouveaux and Bondues, might have cut them off
from Lille, driven them into the arms of Clerfaye and overwhelmed them.
The Austrians, however, were not to be weaned from their own methods,
and accordingly on the 16th Mack prepared an elaborate plan, which he
designed, and even declared, to be a plan of annihilation.

◆May 16.◆

The army was as usual to be divided. The first column, of four
thousand Hanoverians under Bussche, was to march by Dottignies upon
Mouscron, detaching a third of its strength northward on the high
road from Tournai to Courtrai, and, having captured Mouscron, was
to open communication with the second column. The second column,
of twelve battalions and ten squadrons, or about ten thousand men,
under Field-Marshal Otto, was to advance by Leers and Wattrelos upon
Tourcoing. The third column, of twelve battalions and ten squadrons
under the Duke of York, was to move by Lannoy against Mouveaux, sixteen
British squadrons being held in reserve at Hertain under General
Erskine. The fourth column, of ten battalions and sixteen squadrons
under Count Kinsky, was to be employed partly in covering the Duke’s
left flank; but the bulk of it was to advance on Bouvines and there
force the passage of the Marque. The fifth column, of seventeen
battalions and thirty-two squadrons under the Archduke Charles, was
to march to Pont-à-Marque, sending a small detachment northward by
Templeuve to preserve communication with the fourth column. Having
gained the passage of the Marque the Archduke was to attack the enemy
on the western side of the river, and, after leaving detachments to
guard the bridges, to wheel northward, unite forces with Kinsky and
move up with him to join the Duke of York at Mouveaux. Finally the
sixth column under Clerfaye was to march from Oyghem on the left bank
of the Lys, force the passage of the river above Menin on the morning
of the 17th, and manœuvre in rear of the enemy about Mouscron and
Tourcoing. Thus the design was to attack the enemy’s front with half
the army, turn both their flanks with the remainder, and destroy the
French irremediably; but whether the surest way of attaining this
object was to disperse the troops in isolated columns over a front
of twenty miles in a blind and strongly enclosed country—this was a
question over which Craig, at any rate, shook his head.

◆May 17.◆

Miscarriages of the great plan began early. Clerfaye did not receive
his orders for the movement towards Menin until late on the morning
of the 16th, and did not march until the evening. His progress was
much delayed by the heavy sandy roads, and, consequently, it was the
afternoon of the 17th before his corps reached Wervicq, and attempted
to cross the Lys by the bridge. The French, however, had covered it
by entrenchments which blocked his passage; and, when the pontoons
were asked for, it was found that by some mistake they had been left
behind. Several hours were wasted while they were coming up, and the
pontoon-bridge was consequently not laid until late at night, when
a few battalions only crossed the river, the remainder of the force
bivouacking on the left bank. The general result was that Clerfaye’s
corps, one-fourth of the whole army, counted for nothing in the first
day’s operations.[236]

The march of the remaining columns was begun in a thick fog which
rendered concerted movements difficult, and the Austrian Staff seems
to have made no allowance for the varying distances to be covered by
the columns; Kinsky having little more than seven miles to traverse
from Froidmont to Bouvines, whereas the Archduke Charles had fully
fifteen miles from St. Amand to Pont-à-Marque. Bussche concentrated
at St. Leger, a little to west of Warcoing, in the night, advanced
upon Mouscron, and captured it, but was driven out again with very
heavy loss, and forced back to Dottignies. For this misfortune Mack
was chiefly responsible, by directing the detachment of so large
a proportion of this column on a perfectly aimless errand towards
Courtrai. Otto, on Bussche’s left, fared better, driving Compère’s
troops from Leers, Wattrelos, and Tourcoing; but, unfortunately,
with no further result than to join them to Thierry’s brigade behind
Mouscron, to the greater discomfiture of the unfortunate Hanoverians.

To the left and south of Otto the Duke of York with about ten thousand
men[237] advanced by Templeuve upon Lannoy which, after a sharp
cannonade, he attacked with the brigade of Guards in front while the
Light Dragoons turned it by the left; but the enemy beat so hasty
a retreat that they escaped with little loss. Leaving two Hessian
battalions in Lannoy, the Duke pushed on to Roubaix, where the enemy
stood, with greater force both of infantry and artillery, in an
entrenched position; but, in spite of a very obstinate resistance, the
Guards carried this post also with the bayonet. Having no intelligence
of the columns on his right and left, the Duke rightly decided to
leave his advanced guard at Roubaix, and to fall back with his main
body to Lannoy; when to his dismay he received a positive command from
the Emperor himself, who with the Headquarters Staff had accompanied
the rear of his column, to push on to the attack of Mouveaux. This
order was sheer folly, unless indeed it were dictated by wanton and
deliberate wickedness;[238] but it was reiterated in spite of all
protests, and though the evening was falling and the troops were weary
with a long and harassing day’s work under a burning sun, the Duke
reluctantly obeyed. The French position at Mouveaux was enclosed by
palisades and entrenchments and flanked by redoubts; but for the third
time the brigade of Guards drove the enemy out brilliantly with the
bayonet. The Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons under Abercromby’s
personal direction at once pressed forward in pursuit, and galloping
round the village, which had been kindled by the flying French,
overtook the fugitives, and cut down three hundred of them. Three guns
were captured; and one small party of the Fifteenth actually rode into
the French camp at Bondues,[239] nearly two miles to west of Mouveaux,
and set the troops there running in every direction. The main body of
the Duke’s column then bivouacked astride of the road between Mouveaux
and Roubaix.

With the two columns south of the Duke, however, affairs had gone but
indifferently. Kinsky’s advance from Froidmont was delayed by a message
from the Archduke Charles, to the effect that his force could not
possibly reach the Marque at the appointed hour of six in the morning;
but in due time Kinsky moved forward to Bouvines, and drove the French
from their entrenchments. The enemy, however, broke down the bridge
over the Marque as they retired, and, until the advance of the Archduke
began to make itself felt, Kinsky was unable to repair it, since the
passage was commanded by a battery of heavy guns. The Archduke’s column
had meanwhile left St. Amand at ten o’clock on the evening of the 16th,
and after driving back the French advanced posts at Templeuve[240] and
Cappelle, a little to east of Pont-à-Marque, finally succeeded in
forcing the passage of the river at that point. But it was not till
two o’clock in the afternoon, instead of six in the morning of the
17th, that his army had passed to the west bank of the Marque; and his
soldiers were too much exhausted to move further than Lesquin, a little
east of the road between Pont-à-Marque and Lille. There he bivouacked
on the heights between Lesquin and Peronne, a village about three miles
to south-east of it; his men having been on foot for twenty-two hours,
marched more than twenty miles over bad roads, and fought a sharp
action for the passage of the river. His advance, however, had forced
the enemy to evacuate Sainghin, and thus enabled Kinsky to repair the
bridge at Bouvines; but none the less Kinsky, with excess of caution,
would not cross the river, and encamped for the night on the right
bank, which was for him the wrong bank, of the Marque.

At the beginning of this day the French commanders had no information
of any movements of the Allies beyond the march of Clerfaye; and,
accordingly, the divisions of Souham and Moreau, together with
Vandamme’s brigade, had crossed to the left bank of the Lys. The
advance of the Allies from the east and the combats about Tourcoing,
however, soon undeceived them. Pichegru being, as Soult said,
fortunately absent, Generals Souham, Moreau, Macdonald, and Reynier
met in council at Menin; and on the evening of the 17th they decided
to make new dispositions and to set their troops at once in motion.
Vandamme’s brigade alone was left on the north bank of the Lys to
watch Clerfaye, and the remainder of the troops on that site crossed
the river to take up their appointed stations. Malbrancq’s brigade
was posted between Roncq and Blancfour, villages lying from three to
four miles due south from Menin on the road to Lille; to the left of
Malbrancq, Macdonald’s brigade crowned the heights of Mount Halluin;
the rest of Souham’s division, under Generals Daendels and Jardon,
lay some three miles away to the east of Macdonald, occupying a line
between Aelbeke and Belleghem, a village lying a little to the south
of Courtrai; and the gap between Macdonald and these troops was filled
by the brigades of Compère and Thierry about Mouscron. Thus the
formation of the French left wing was that of a double echelon; the
three divisions being arranged at the three angles of an isosceles
triangle, with the van at the apex, Mouscron, and the rear before Menin
and Courtrai. The right wing, consisting of Bonnaud’s and Osten’s
divisions, some thirty thousand strong, was assembled about Flers, two
miles and a half to the east of Lille; where orders arrived on the
evening of the 17th from Souham that a general attack was designed for
the morrow, in which the duty of Bonnaud’s division would be to march
upon Lannoy and Roubaix.

It was not without anxiety that the reports from the various columns
of the Allies were awaited on the evening of the 17th at the Austrian
headquarters at Templeuve. The failures of Bussche to capture Mouscron,
and of the Archduke Charles to reach the point assigned to him, had
sufficed to mar Mack’s plans; and of Clerfaye there was no news
whatever. ◆May 17–18.◆ Orders were therefore sent at three o’clock
next morning to the Archduke Charles to march at once with his own
and Kinsky’s corps upon Lannoy; while the Duke of York and Otto were
directed to attack Mouscron at noon, in the hope that before that time
something would have been heard of Clerfaye. But it seems to have
occurred to none of the Austrian Staff that the disposition of the
Allied army, as prescribed by Mack, positively invited the French to
take the offensive. On this night Bussche lay at Dottignies and Coyghem
with his weakened corps of Hanoverians. On his left the main body of
Otto’s column, seven and a half battalions and three squadrons, was
at Tourcoing, with detachments of two battalions at Wattrelos, and
of three battalions and three squadrons at Leers, on the line of his
retreat. Thus his force was distributed in isolated patches along a
length of five miles, with its right flank not only unprotected, but
actually threatened by a superior force of the enemy, lying within
three miles both of Tourcoing and Wattrelos.

On Otto’s left the Duke of York’s column was as dangerously
dispersed. The Guards, with the Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons,
under Abercromby, were at Mouveaux; four Austrian battalions and
the Sixteenth Light Dragoons were at Roubaix; the Fourteenth,
Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third were on the road between Roubaix and
Lille, in order to repel any attack from the garrison of the latter
place; two Hessian battalions lay at Lannoy, and four squadrons of
Austrian hussars were engaged in patrolling. The Duke’s right was
indeed covered, but his left was exposed to attack not only by the
garrison of Lille but by Bonnaud’s superior force about Flers; and
thus both his column and Otto’s practically passed the night pent in
on three sides by forces of thrice their strength. To the left, or
southward, there was a gap of four miles between the Duke’s troops and
the nearest of Kinsky’s detachments, which lay at Pont-à-Tressin and
Chereng, with the main body still further south at Bouvines; while the
Archduke Charles, with nearly one-fourth of the whole army, lay over
against him at Sainghin on the other side of the Marque, with advanced
detachments pushed far to the south-west at Seclin. Finally, Clerfaye,
with rather more than a fourth of the entire Allied force, was still on
the western side of the Lys at Wervicq. Certainly the dispositions lent
themselves to a plan of annihilation.

◆May 18.◆

At three o’clock on the morning of the 18th, while Coburg was signing
the orders for his troops, the French army began its march to the
attack. On the south Osten’s division was left about Flers and
Lezennes, to watch the Archduke Charles and Kinsky; while Bonnaud,
dividing his eighteen thousand men into two columns, directed
them northward, the one by L’Hempenpont upon Lannoy, the other by
Pont-à-Breug upon Roubaix. Simultaneously Malbrancq’s brigade marched
south from Roncq upon Mouveaux; Macdonald’s from Mount Halluin upon the
western front of Turcoing; Compère’s from Mouscron upon the northern
front; Thierry’s, also from Mouscron, together with Daendels’s from
Aelbeke, upon Wattrelos; while Jardon’s brigade moved from Belleghem
towards Dottignies to hold the Hanoverians in check. Excluding this
last brigade, sixty thousand men in all were thus turned upon the six
posts in which the eighteen thousand men under Otto and the Duke of
York were dispersed.

Otto’s force, being nearer to the enemy, was the first to feel
the weight of the attack. General Montfrault, who commanded at
Tourcoing, perceiving the overwhelming strength of the enemy, begged
reinforcements from the Duke of York, who sent him two Austrian
battalions from Roubaix, but with strict orders that they should return
in the event of their arriving too late to save the town. As a matter
of fact they did arrive too late, for the garrison had already been
driven from Tourcoing; but none the less they attached themselves,
as was perhaps natural, to Montfrault, who stood fast on the eastern
skirts of the town and held back the enemy for a time, until a
French battery unlimbering on ground to the north of him, forced him
to retire. Seeing himself threatened by large bodies of cavalry,
Montfrault formed his troops into a large square, with four battalions
and light artillery in front, one battalion on each flank, and the
cavalry in the rear. In this order he fell back, his heavy artillery
and waggons being enclosed in the centre of the square, and his light
troops skirmishing on all four sides. It was about half-past eight when
he began his retrograde movement; but already Wattrelos, the first
post on his rear, was in possession of the enemy. The garrison, two
Hessian battalions, had manfully resisted an attack of six times their
number until eight o’clock, when, finding themselves in danger of being
surrounded, they retired, and, with the help of two companies sent
forward by General Otto, withdrew successfully to Leers. Montfrault
thereupon found himself compelled to leave the main road for a by-way,
which ran between Wattrelos and Roubaix, in order to continue his
retreat.

Between six and seven o’clock, rather later than the opening of the
attack on Tourcoing and Wattrelos, Bonnaud’s two columns came up from
the south upon Lannoy and Roubaix; and shortly afterwards Malbrancq’s
brigade from the north fell upon Mouveaux, while a part of the French
force that had captured Tourcoing appeared also on the north of
Roubaix. The Duke of York despatched urgent messages to recall the
two Austrian battalions which he had sent to Otto, but of course in
vain; and meanwhile he made such head as he could with his handful of
troops against overwhelming odds. The troops at Mouveaux were disposed
in two sides of a square, the left showing a front towards the east
at Mouveaux, the guns stationed in the angle at the northern end of
the village, and the right thrown back to the hamlet of Le Fresnoy. To
the south, the British brigade of the Line under Major-general Fox,
near Croix, sought to bar the way against part of Bonnaud’s division
from Lille; but to defend the rest of the ground there were but three
Austrian battalions. Of these half a battalion was stationed in Roubaix
itself, and the remainder echeloned to the right rear of Fox’s brigade
behind the sources of the Espierres brook, which ran along the southern
skirts of the village. These Austrian battalions seem to have been
the first to give way, and one of them, by Craig’s account, did not
behave as it ought; but they were pressed hard both in front and on
their right flank, which, owing to the absence of the two battalions
sent to Otto, was wholly uncovered. One brigade of Bonnaud’s division
therefore succeeded in forcing its way between Mouveaux and Roubaix
to Le Fresnoy; and the Duke thus saw Abercromby and the brigade of
Guards absolutely cut off from him. Moreover, though he knew it not,
the victorious French of Thierry’s and Daendels’s brigades were coming
down from Wattrelos upon his rear. Seldom has a General found himself,
through no fault of his own, in a more extraordinary position. He had
been assured that the Archduke Charles would join him from the south,
and he had therefore ordered Abercromby to defend Mouveaux to the
last extremity; but not a sign of an Austrian was to be seen whether
to south or north. His first instinct was to ride to the Guards at
Mouveaux; but this was seen to be out of the question. He then tried
to make his way to Fox’s brigade, but found that the French were in
possession of the suburbs of Roubaix, and that he was cut off from
this brigade also. Realising then that, his Austrian battalions being
dispersed, he had not a man left to him except two squadrons of the
Sixteenth Light Dragoons, he took a small escort from them and rode to
Wattrelos, hoping to obtain from Otto the means for extricating the
Guards. Meanwhile he sent orders to Abercromby to retire to the heights
on the east side of Roubaix.

Montfrault, however, had fared ill in his attempt to withdraw. Until he
reached the ground between Wattrelos and Roubaix, his square preserved
good order; but being attacked at that point by overpowering numbers
from the south as well as from north and west, it was broken up, and
fled in disorder towards Leers. Meanwhile General Fox, finding himself
absolutely isolated, at length gave the order for his brigade, which so
far had held its own, to retire. The retreat began in perfect order,
and the brigade, having successfully fought its way to the road at
Lannoy, followed it for some distance, under incessant fire from all
sides, until checked by a battery covered by an abatis, which the
French had thrown up on the road. The first shots from this battery
struck down several men, and Fox for the moment feared that surrender
would be inevitable; but fortunately in the ranks of the Fourteenth was
a French emigrant who knew the district well, and undertook to lead the
brigade across country. It pursued its retreat therefore under constant
fire of artillery and musketry in front and on both flanks, and with
cavalry constantly threatening its rear; but it kept its assailants
at bay, and at one moment made so sharp a counter-attack as to take
temporary possession of some French guns. Thus partly by good luck,
partly by good conduct, partly by the misconduct and mismanagement of
the enemy, the three battalions contrived to reach Leers, with the loss
of all their battalion-guns excepting one, and of nine officers and
five hundred and twenty-five men out of eleven hundred and twenty. The
greatest credit was given to General Fox for the coolness, skill, and
patience with which he extricated his brigade.

Abercromby appears to have begun his retreat from Mouveaux at about
nine o’clock, but of necessity very slowly, having with him a
considerable number of guns. The retirement was conducted in perfect
order as far as Roubaix, the Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons
covering the rear with great gallantry. At Roubaix the French, though
in occupation of the suburbs, were not in possession of the little
walled town, which was still held by a dismounted squadron of the
Sixteenth Light Dragoons. The place consisted of a single long street,
the direct continuation of which led to Wattrelos, while, just outside
the eastern gate, the road to Lannoy turned sharply to the right, being
bordered on one side by a deep ditch and on the other by the Espierres
brook. To defile through the town took necessarily much time, but the
guns emerged safely and the Guards also. Next to the Guards were the
Austrian Hussars, still in the street; then in rear of them a party of
the Fifteenth; next to this party were the Sixteenth, who were formed
up in the market-place; and in rear of all were the remainder of the
Fifteenth, holding the pursuing French in check. All was still in order
when a French gun posted on the Wattrelos branch of the street suddenly
opened fire from the edge of the town, sending shot after shot among
the Austrian Hussars. The ordeal would have been a severe one for any
troops, and presently the Hussars dismounted and tried to find a way
out among the houses, but in vain. The trial became unendurable as the
French pressed on and opened fire on all sides upon the horsemen thus
pent in for slaughter; and at last the whole body remounted, galloped
wildly down the road, swung round the corner, where the French infantry
thrust vainly at them with their bayonets, and raced onward for three
or four hundred yards, when the foremost troopers suddenly found
the way blocked by horseless guns. The French had brought a second
gun to enfilade the road to Lannoy, and the drivers of the British
cannon had fled. The shock of this mass of galloping horsemen suddenly
checked was appalling. In an instant the ground was strewn with men
and horses, kicking and struggling in frantic confusion, while a
number of bât-horses dashed into the ranks of the Guards, plunging
and lashing out, with their loads hanging under their bellies. For
a short time the disorder appears to have been beyond remedy, for a
belt of wood surrounding the town gave excellent shelter to the French
sharpshooters, who had a very easy target in the mass of struggling
men and animals. Very soon, however, the Guards recovered themselves,
and cleared a way for the cavalry to pass on beyond the wood to open
ground. There the Light Dragoons rallied, the rear-guard was re-formed,
and the retreat, always under heavy fire, was resumed towards Lannoy.

That village, which was enclosed by a low earthen rampart and a shallow
ditch, had likewise been attacked early by one of Bonnaud’s brigades
from Lille, but had been defended with the greatest gallantry by
two battalions of Hessians, who were apparently still in possession
when the British troops approached it, though surrounded on the
west side, and indeed nearly on all sides, by the French.[241] The
British officers, however, could see no sign of a friendly garrison,
and Colonel Congreve was actually wheeling his cannon round to open
fire on the place, when there galloped up to them some blue-coated
horsemen, who, being mistaken for Hessians, were allowed to approach
without molestation, and succeeded in cutting the traces of some of
the guns before they were discovered. The Guards then perceiving
their retreat to be cut off, faced about against their pursuers, and,
leaving the high road, made their way across country as best they could
south-eastward to Marquain. The Hessians in Lannoy, either before or
shortly after this, were forced to evacuate the village, and, finding
the road to Leers blocked by the enemy, were likewise obliged to make
their way across country in disorder, losing out of nine hundred
officers and men some three hundred and thirty, of whom two hundred
were cut off and captured in Lannoy itself.

Meanwhile the Duke of York, conspicuous by the star on his breast,
had been hunted all over the country by the enemy’s dragoons, and
had escaped, as he frankly owned, only by the speed of his horse. On
reaching Wattrelos he found it in the hands of the French, but passing
beyond it under constant fire he came upon a gallant little party of
Hessians still holding the bridge of the Espierres brook. These by a
final attack with the bayonet gained a little respite for him, but
were presently swept away from the bridge, and escaped only by fording
the brook neck-deep. The Duke, thinking apparently that the bridge
was lost, or not knowing of its existence, spurred his horse into the
brook; but the animal rearing up and refusing to enter the water, he
dismounted, scrambled over on foot, and taking a horse from one of
his aide-de-camps, at last succeeded in finding Otto. About Leers and
Nechin the fragments of Otto’s force, together with some of the Duke
of York’s men, rallied upon the few battalions that held these places.
The French did not press their advantage, and at half-past four the
action came to an end. The loss of the Allies was about three thousand
men killed, wounded, and missing, which was relatively slight, for,
with proper management and conduct on the part of the French, not a man
of the Duke’s and Otto’s columns would have escaped alive. The Brigade
of Guards lost one hundred and ninety-six officers and men killed,
wounded, and missing, the flank-companies being the heaviest sufferers;
while the Seventh, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Light Dragoons, who by
general admission behaved admirably, lost fifty-two men and ninety-two
horses. The total loss of the British of all ranks was nine hundred
and thirty, besides which nineteen out of their twenty-eight guns were
captured.

It may be asked what the rest of the army was doing on this day, while
these two columns, together less than one-third of the whole, were
in process of annihilation. The answer is that, for some reason, it
observed a conspiracy of inaction. Bussche sat still at Dottignies
exchanging occasional shots with Jardon’s brigade. Clerfaye crossed
the Lys near Wervicq at seven o’clock in the morning, and turning
eastward advanced between Bousbecque and Linselles, where he was met
by Vandamme’s brigade, which numbered eight thousand men against his
sixteen thousand. He engaged the French, overthrew their right wing,
took eight guns, and then remained stationary; until, being informed
of the approach of more French troops about Bondues, he withdrew to
the Lys, which he recrossed on the next day, and thence retreated
northward. The behaviour of Kinsky and of the Archduke Charles was
still more extraordinary. Kinsky, on being asked by one of his officers
for orders at six o’clock in the morning, replied that he was sick
and no longer in command. The Archduke Charles received at five in
the morning the order to move at once upon Lannoy, a distance of six
miles, so that his troops might well have come upon the scene of action
between eight and nine. He did not march till noon, though within sound
of the guns, nor did he strike the road from Tournai to Lille until
three, when he received orders to return to Tournai. The military
renown justly earned later by the Archduke forbids us to believe that
this delay was due to ignorance; and the fact that, though the Duke of
York had early informed the Emperor of his danger, not a word was sent
to hasten the Archduke or Kinsky, shows clearly that their torpidity
was not unexpected nor disapproved at headquarters. Jealousy of the
Duke of York and of Mack are among the reasons assigned to account
for the general paralysis of the Austrian commanders; but possibly
the true reason was that Thugut was sick of the war in Belgium, and
wished the English to sicken of it also. Why he should have chosen the
slaughter of several hundred British and Austrians as the best means
of forwarding his purpose, and how he persuaded Austrian officers to
second him therein, are matters which only an Austrian can determine.
For us it must suffice that the decisive battle of the campaign was
lost by the deliberate design of the Imperial Generals. Before long
they were to learn that those who court defeat for dishonest ends may,
when they least desire it, find defeat thrust upon them.[242]

VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER XI

◆1794.◆

◆May 19.◆

The entire army of the Allies, with the exception of Clerfaye’s corps,
was gathered into camp about Tournai in the course of the 19th, the
Emperor being received in silence when he rode into the town, while the
Duke of York was loudly cheered by the inhabitants.[243] The condition
of the army was very far from satisfactory. The troops themselves, or at
any rate the British, were not seriously shaken by the rout of the
previous day; but the Emperor and the Austrian commanders were much
discouraged, and the animosity of the various nations towards each other
was dangerously embittered. The British, above all, were furious against
the Austrians for leaving them to be overwhelmed without so much as an
attempt to assist them. “It is impossible,” wrote Craig to the War
Office, “to bring the Austrians to act except in small corps. I lament
that we should be destined as victims of their folly and ignorance. Do
not be surprised at the word ignorance: I am every day more and more
convinced that they have not an officer among them.” These were hard
words, but they were true and just, though the Archduke Charles in later
days redeemed himself from this reproach. ◆May 20.◆ However, for the
moment the commanders laid aside their differences and agreed that the
attack should be renewed, this time with united forces, upon Mouscron;
and meanwhile Coburg dispersed the whole army in a semicircle around
Tournai; the advanced posts running from Camphin on the south by
Baisieux, Willems, Nechin, Leers, Estaimpuis, and St. Legers to
Espierres, while the inner circle of entrenchments ran from the Scheldt
on the north by Froyennes, Marquain, and Lamain to the suburb of St.
Martin and the citadel of Tournai itself.

The French Generals, as already narrated, made no effort to follow up
their victory of the 18th, but awaited the return of Pichegru, who,
on the news of the victory, hastened from the Sambre to turn it to
account. On the 22nd, after a consultation with his officers, Pichegru
decided to make a general attack upon Coburg’s position, and directed
that Souham with four brigades,[244] numbering from thirty to forty
thousand men, should assail it on the right or northern half of its
front from Espierres to Leers, while Bonnaud’s division should fall
upon its left about Templeuve, and Osten’s division should make a
demonstration still further to the south about Baisieux. May 23.◆ On
the following day between six and seven o’clock in the morning the
action began; and after long and hard fighting the Allies were finally
driven from three important points, namely, Blandain and the hill of La
Croisette immediately adjacent to it, a little to the west of Tournai,
and Pont-à-Chin upon the Scheldt, a little below the city. To abandon
to the enemy these posts, particularly Pont-à-Chin, which lay on the
direct road from Courtrai to Tournai and commanded the navigation of
the Scheldt, was impossible; and Coburg decided that they must be
recovered at any cost. Throughout this long day’s fighting the troops
that had borne the brunt of the work on the 18th had been held in
reserve; but at about six o’clock in the evening Fox’s brigade of the
British Line was called out to recover Pont-à-Chin which had already
been taken and retaken three or four times. The brigade went into
this action with fewer than six hundred men, having lost half of its
numbers just four days before; but the three gallant regiments, though
unsupported, carried the village unhesitatingly with the bayonet,
pressed on to the low heights to south of it, swept everything before
them, so far as their front extended, and captured seven cannon.
◆ May 22.◆ The day ended, after a severe struggle of fifteen hours,
in the retreat of the French, with the loss of some six thousand men
and seven guns; the fire, both of musketry and artillery, having been
the heaviest ever remembered by the oldest soldiers present. Both
sides, however, fought for the most part in dispersed formation, and
inflicted, comparatively speaking, little damage upon each other. The
one exception was Fox’s brigade. “Had their order of attack,” wrote
Calvert, “been adopted by the Allies in general, the day would probably
have ended in the ruin of the French.” But the losses of the brigade
amounted to one hundred and twenty killed, wounded, and missing; and
there are few troops that can be trusted, after losing half their
numbers on Sunday, to storm a position held by a superior force and
lose one-fifth of their remnant on Thursday. Some indeed claim that
but for this handful of British soldiers the day would have been lost
to the Allies;[245] but whether this be true or not, the 22nd of May
should be a great anniversary for the Fourteenth, Thirty-Seventh, and
Fifty-Third.

It was directly after this action that the course of events in Poland
began to tell upon the councils of the Imperial Headquarters at Tournai.
◆May 23.◆ On the 23rd, Mack, disgusted by the failure of his elaborate
plans, resigned his post as Chief of the Staff, and, having first
expressed his opinion that the reconquest of Belgium was hopeless,
retired for the time into private life. His successor, Waldeck, being a
fellow-conspirator with Thugut, was still more eager for the evacuation
of the Netherlands; and the Emperor was easily tempted to share their
views. ◆May 24.◆ On the 24th a Council of War was held for form’s sake,
wherein the Emperor set forth the situation in such a light as to gain a
ready vote from his Generals that further efforts in the Netherlands
were useless. The Duke of York alone pleaded earnestly for a renewal of
the attack upon Flanders; and, as fate ordained it, his representations
were seconded by unexpected successes of the Allies on the Sambre and in
the Palatinate. On the 24th Marshal Möllendorf and the Prussians
surprised the French about Kaiserslautern and drove them back with a
loss of three thousand men and twenty guns; and on the same day Count
Kaunitz gained a still more important victory on the Sambre. The fact
was that serious differences had arisen at Paris between Carnot on the
one side and Robespierre and St. Just on the other, because Carnot
insisted on keeping the direction of the military operations in his own
hands. Robespierre, to whom the art of war was as incomprehensible as a
Chinese manuscript, was furious with jealousy and rage. “At the first
reverse, Carnot’s head shall fall,” cried the despicable creature,
galled by the cold contempt with which his inflexible colleague rebuffed
his attempts at interference; and to re-establish civil influence at the
seat of war, St. Just, Lebas, and five more Commissioners set out on the
2nd of May for the army of the Sambre. There they introduced the rule of
terror in its worst form, and with it, of course, confusion unspeakable.
They fought with the Generals, they fought among themselves; and in the
midst of this chaos St. Just took upon himself the supreme direction of
the operations whereby the Austrians were to be crushed. ◆May 18, 20,
22, 24.◆ Four several times he ordered the army to pass the Sambre,
wasting the lives of his troops with obstinate imbecility. ◆May 24.◆
Finally he gave Kaunitz the opportunity for a counter-attack, in which,
with inconsiderable loss to themselves, the Austrians routed the French
completely, killing and wounding two thousand men, and capturing three
thousand more, besides fifty pieces of cannon.

This heavy blow to the French right wing offered a fair occasion for
the Allies to renew the offensive in Western Flanders; and the Duke
of York urged this step upon his colleagues with all his might. The
British Government too, reckoning that the troops, promised by Prussia
in return for a British subsidy, must be nearly ready, decided to
send out Lord Cornwallis to concert operations with Möllendorf, and
directed him also to consult the Emperor and the Duke of York on his
way to the Prussian Headquarters. But, as has already been told, King
Frederick William was occupied rather with Poland than France at the
moment; and he had also been much irritated by certain dispositions
which had been proposed for his army by Mack in the middle of May. “I
am astonished at the fashion in which Mack thinks to make use of my
troops,” wrote the King. “Does Mack imagine that we can live on air?”
echoed Möllendorf;[246] both of them being secretly delighted with so
good an excuse for remaining inactive. ◆May 29.◆ Then suddenly, on the
29th of May, the Allied Camp at Tournai was thrown into consternation
by the announcement that the Emperor was about to return to Vienna.
Aided by the defeat of the 18th, Thugut had succeeded in persuading his
imperial master to abandon the Austrian Netherlands; and even Mack, the
unpopular Quartermaster-general, had supported him by recommending not
only the evacuation of the country but the conclusion of peace with
France.

The truth was that jealousy of Prussia had prevailed over all other
considerations, and that the Emperor had decided to offer help to
the Empress Catherine in quelling the Polish insurrection. He hoped,
however, at the same time to delude Prussia into keeping thirty
thousand men upon the Rhine, and England into furnishing a subsidy for
the ostensible prosecution of the war with France; and it was therefore
imperative upon him to conceal his intentions. He accordingly gave
out that the object of his departure was to hasten the recruiting of
his forces; and in his final letter to Coburg, who very unwillingly
retained the command, he gave him only vague instructions to adapt his
action to the exigencies of the campaign and to save his troops as much
as possible. But this duplicity deceived no one, and the less because
Waldeck, before he had succeeded Mack as Chief of the Staff, had openly
declared that the war in Belgium must be ended. The Austrian troops
were profoundly discouraged, and two-thirds of the officers asked
permission to retire. They can hardly be blamed, for the succession
of murderous actions fought by the Allies against the French on the
northern frontier of France, between the 17th of April and the 22nd
of May 1794, has few parallels in the history of war. For a month
Austrians, British, and Germans had contended almost unceasingly
against superior numbers, slaying or taking, not without heavy loss to
themselves, French soldiers by the ten thousand, and capturing French
cannon by the score. Yet all had been to no purpose, partly because
the leaders had deliberately chosen a foolish plan of operations,
partly because they had steadily refused to follow up their successes,
partly because on the 18th of May they had held two-thirds of the
army inactive within sound of the guns which were overwhelming their
comrades. The bravest men will not fight upon such terms. They will not
be butchered to serve the intrigues of politicians whose dishonesty
would disgrace a sergeant, and of potentates whose incapacity would
disqualify a corporal. In days to come Austria ◆May 29.◆ was to pay
dearly in Italy for the 29th of May 1794.[247]

Immediately before the Emperor’s departure came news from Kaunitz that
the French had again crossed the Sambre in force; which compelled
Coburg to send him large reinforcements, and thus to weaken the right
and centre of the Allies in order to strengthen their left. At the
same time, for the sake of keeping the Dutch in good humour, Coburg
was obliged to give the supreme command in that quarter to the Crown
Prince of Orange, to the natural disgust of Kaunitz, who had shown much
ability and achieved great successes. The great safeguard, however,
to eastward was that St. Just insisted upon controlling the French
operations; and it need not be said that against such an adversary
even the Prince of Orange was victorious. But far more serious were
the movements of the French on the western flank. Apprised of Coburg’s
detachment of troops to the Sambre, hoping still to further Carnot’s
projects for invasion of England, and above all conscious of the
advantage offered to French tactics by the enclosed country of Western
Flanders, Pichegru determined to prosecute his operations on that
side. Accordingly, leaving between thirty and forty thousand men in
positions about Mouscron and Menin to hold Coburg in check, he marched
with about the same number on Ypres. ◆June 1.◆ On the 1st of June
about fifteen thousand men surrounded the fortress on the west and
south, and opened their first parallel; while some twenty thousand
more under Souham took post about Passchendaele, about six miles to
the north-east, to cover the siege from Clerfaye, who was lying at
Thielt. On that same day, by a curious irony, Lord Howe defeated the
Brest fleet, taking eight French ships and sinking two more. This
action, in which the regiments on the fleet, and particularly the
Sixty-Ninth,[248] played no inconspicuous part, closed for the present
all Carnot’s projects of an invasion.

The event, however, in no way disturbed the plans of Pichegru. ◆June 4.◆
On the 4th of June Clerfaye contrived to pass two battalions into Ypres
to strengthen the garrison; but he declared himself unable, with the
fifteen thousand men that remained to him, to relieve the place unless
he were reinforced. By express command of the Emperor, who had lingered
at Brussels on his homeward journey, Coburg sent him some ten thousand
men in two detachments, reckoning that, after the recent victory on the
Sambre, he could safely draw a few troops from that quarter. Clerfaye,
however, continued to display the sluggishness which had characterised
his conduct from the beginning of the campaign. ◆June 6.◆ On the 6th,
before his reinforcements had reached him, he made a feeble advance
against Souham in four columns, and was of course unsuccessful; ◆June
10.◆ and on the 10th, when his force had been raised to over twenty
thousand men, he was assailed and defeated with loss by Souham before he
could make up his mind to act. On that same day Coburg had designed to
make a diversion in Clerfaye’s favour, by an attack on Mouscron, upon a
plan calculated so exactly to expose the Duke of York’s column to
destruction, as on the 18th of May, that the Duke refused to accept it
until it was altered. This, however, was of small importance, for the
French, having perfect information of the intended movements, appeared
in every direction in such force that the enterprise was abandoned. The
state of things at the Austrian headquarters was indeed almost beyond
belief. Insensible to all ideas of duty and discipline, the young
staff-officers, described by Craig as “in general the most contemptible
of puppies,” had talked openly of the projected movement in the
coffee-houses at noon, though the Duke of York received no information
of it until ten hours later, nor any orders until four o’clock on the
next morning. “Mack used to keep these gentry in order,” wrote Craig,
“and, had he been here, the prison would have been full of them next
day; but indeed it would never have happened.” ◆June 12.◆ Meanwhile
Clerfaye remained so incurably supine that the Duke of York more than
once entreated Coburg to entrust the relief of Ypres to himself, but in
vain. ◆June 13.◆ Roused by repeated orders to attack, Clerfaye at last
moved against Souham in five columns, gained some advantage at first,
captured ten guns, and then as usual sat still until Souham had gathered
troops sufficient for a counter attack, when he immediately retired to
his old position at Thielt.

This sealed the fate of Ypres, the key of maritime Flanders, the chief
support of the right flank of the Allies, the bulwark which protected
the British communications with Ostend. The Duke of York pleaded hard
for a last effort to save it, by a march of the whole army to join
Clerfaye; but without success. “The truth is,” wrote Craig, “that the
Austrian army is incapable of further action. The men are disheartened
and the officers disgusted and disunited.” It was finally decided that,
to cover Ostend and the Dutch frontier, Clerfaye should take up a
position between the Lys and the Scheldt about Deynse, some ten miles
to the south-west of Ghent; keeping half of his force between Bruges
and Ostend, and sending the Eighth Light Dragoons, Thirty-eighth and
Fifty-fifth, which had formed part of his force, to Ostend. “We are
too weak by ten thousand men to hold this defensive position,” wrote
Craig; “if the French see their chance and push Clerfaye, they will
force us to abandon this position about Tournai and will pass the
Scheldt in spite of us; and then ten to one we shall find ourselves
separated from him and beaten in detail.... Sooner than hold the
defensive position I would concentrate the whole army, eighty thousand
men, march to the Sambre, attack them at any risk and march back
again.... You may expect to hear from us soon in Holland.” Clearly
there was one among the despised British officers who could have taught
the Austrians a lesson.[249]

The situation was indeed a desperate one. The Austrians, having taken no
pains to restore the fortifications of Tournai, had thrown up an
entrenched camp for its protection on the western side. These lines
extended from the city southward along the Scheldt to Maulde, and
required so many men for their defence that few could be spared for
active operations. Some seven thousand Frenchmen at Mons-en-Pévèle kept
the left of the Allies in continual alarm for the safety of Orchies,
which was the key of Maulde and of the passage of the Scheldt at
Mortagne; for if that passage were forced, the communication between
Coburg and the army of the Sambre would be endangered. A little to the
north of Mons-en-Pévèle was the entire garrison of Lille, and still
further to the north, between Lille and Menin, stood from twenty to
thirty thousand more French troops. Behind this screen to westward, from
fifty thousand to sixty thousand of the enemy were engaged as the
besieging and covering armies at Ypres; and far beyond them to the north
lay the right wing of the Allies under Clerfaye, stretched in a weak
attenuated line from Ostend to the Lys, and only maintaining
communication with Tournai by the circuitous route of the Scheldt. On
the eastern flank the French had now some seventy-five thousand men on
the Sambre, with a capable leader in Jourdan, albeit one still hampered
by the interference of St. Just; and this was the only quarter in which
recent events had gone favourably for the Allies. Such a situation could
not last long, and the strain upon Coburg must have been cruelly severe.
◆June 16.◆ On the 16th, however, there came a gleam of hope. The French
on that day again passed the Sambre, but for the fifth time were driven
back with heavy loss; ◆June 18.◆ and Coburg, having summoned four
battalions from that quarter, determined on the 18th to march and join
with Clerfaye in a final attempt to relieve Ypres. The troops were
already in motion, when in the evening the news came that the French had
crossed the Sambre for the sixth time, and successfully invested
Charleroi. Thereupon the enterprise was abandoned. ◆June 19.◆ On the
following day Ypres surrendered, and thus Carnot’s original plan of
turning both flanks of the Allies began, after two months of murderous
fighting, to accomplish itself.

Enabled by the fall of Ypres to turn the whole of his attention to
eastward, Coburg at once proposed that he should march with all the
Austrian troops to Charleroi, and leave the Duke of York to guard the
line of the Scheldt from Tournai to Condé. The Duke answered that
his instructions were to keep the whole of the troops in British pay
together, but that, if ordered, he would gladly lead the whole of them
with Coburg to the Sambre. Since, however, his force was absolutely
inadequate to guard the line of the Scheldt, he insisted that, if it
were left behind, an Austrian garrison should remain at Tournai, and
that he himself should take up a position on the eastern bank of the
Scheldt between that city and Oudenarde, so as to ensure his retreat in
case of mishap.

The offer to march to the Sambre was fair, and it is difficult to
understand why Coburg did not embrace it; for, if the battle on the
Sambre were lost, it would obviously be impossible for the Duke’s
troops to remain isolated in Flanders. Coburg did, however, reject
it, though he consented to station about five thousand Austrians
under General Kray between Denain and Orchies, promising that, if he
succeeded in forcing back the enemy on the Sambre, he would return
without delay, but that, in the event of his failure, he should not
expect the Duke of York to maintain his position on the Scheldt. He
also took the significant step of transferring the Austrian hospitals
and stores at Valenciennes, as well as the magazines about Tournai,
to Brussels and Antwerp; the removal of the stores at Brussels having
begun some time ◆June 21.◆ before.[250] Finally, on the 21st, he
marched away; and the Duke, since the corps in British pay had now
shrunk to seven thousand men, contracted his quarters, and took up a
new position closer to Tournai.

But meanwhile the news that Ostend was in danger had, as usual, stirred
Dundas to unwonted exertion in England. He still made a fetish of the
place, and his original intention seems to have been to defend it,
without any particular reference to the Duke of York’s operations. On
the 17th of June, therefore, he ordered Lord Moira’s force in the Isle
of Wight and the Channel Islands to sail for Ostend at once, together
with drafts of recruits and three fresh regiments from Ireland, making
in all a reinforcement of about ten thousand men. On the 20th Moira’s
troops embarked, and on the 21st the Eighth, the Forty-fourth, and the
recruits arrived at Ostend. The drafts, it must be remarked, arrived
without arms or military appointments of any kind; and it was only a fog
at sea that prevented a whole regiment, the Ninetieth, from being also
landed there without either arms or clothing, Dundas having ordered it
to embark without enquiry as to these details.[251] But Pichegru
meanwhile did not remain idle, and leaving Ypres on the 20th marched
upon Clerfaye’s position at Deynse. ◆June 23.◆ The Austrian General,
after a short defence of his entrenchments, retired, with the loss of
not a few men and three guns, first to Ghent, and then beyond it,
finally taking up a position on the north side of the canal that runs
from Ghent to Sluys, ◆June 24.◆ where he was presently joined by his
detachments from Bruges. ◆June 25.◆ On the 25th of June there arrived at
Ostend, after a voyage of nineteen days from Cork, one squadron of the
Fourteenth Light Dragoons and the Thirty-third regiment, the latter
under the command of an officer whose name it still bears, but who was
then an impecunious younger son of five-and-twenty, possessed indeed of
some skill in playing the violin, but still distinguished by no higher
title than that of Colonel Arthur Wellesley. ◆June 26.◆ On the morrow
Moira with the last of the reinforcements[252] also reached Ostend,
where he found an advanced guard of the French within four miles of the
town, a large force of several thousand men close behind it, and the
Commandant very wisely embarking his garrison with a view to retreat.
The whole district was in a state of panic; but Moira promptly landed
the whole of his men, and having observed the difficulties of defending
Ostend, and the military worthlessness of the place, quietly selected
his fighting ground outside it. “I am not at all satisfied with my
position,” he wrote calmly to Dundas, “but since you appear to attach
importance to the town I will do my best to maintain it.” “The defences
are so detestable,” he added cheerfully to Nepean, “that I shall go into
the open field if we must come to blows. If you are to lose everything
it does not signify if you are beaten into the bargain.”[253] It is
dangerous for a General, be he even so able as Moira, to address an
English Minister of War in this strain; for, in the event of mishap, the
words may be brought up as evidence against him in Parliament to prove
that he was reckless, careless, neglectful, or despondent.

During these days the Duke of York remained in painful suspense at
Tournai, until the news of Clerfaye’s defeat on the 23rd warned him to
move northward without delay. As Craig had perceived, the French by
crossing the Scheldt at Oudenarde could prevent the Duke of York from
joining Clerfaye, crush both armies in detail, and then, passing
eastward, could annihilate Coburg. ◆June 24.◆ The Duke therefore called
in Kray’s Austrians for the defence of Tournai, and marched
north-eastward on the right bank of the Scheldt to Renaix, where he
learned that on the same day a French corps had summoned Oudenarde.
◆June 25.◆ On the morrow Pichegru crossed the Lys at Deynse with the
main body of his army, and striking south from thence encamped on the
27th at Huysse, ◆June 27.◆ between four and five miles north of
Oudenarde. On that same night came a message from Coburg to the Duke of
York that on the previous day he had made his attack on the French about
Charleroi and had failed. ◆June 26.◆ This was the battle of Fleurus,
which had been suddenly broken off by the Austrian commander before
decisive advantage had been gained by either side; and it is still a
question whether Coburg’s action was dictated by the requirements of
Thugut’s policy or by his own military judgment. ◆June 27.◆ However that
may be, he retreated in good order upon Brussels, halting on the 27th in
a position running from Soignies on the west through Braine L’Alleud to
Gembloux on the east. This movement uncovered the Duke of York’s left
rear, and placed him in a most dangerous position. He had with him
barely ten thousand men, nearly half of them cavalry, which in so close
a country were of little service; and from the church-tower at Oudenarde
he could see thirty thousand of the enemy in his front. The French, by
passing the Scheldt, could at any time cut off his retreat to the north,
in which case his only line of safety lay eastward towards Grammont; and
this in its turn would be closed if Coburg should continue his
retrograde movement towards Namur, which was his first stage on the road
to Vienna.

◆June 28.◆

On the morning of the 28th the enemy appeared in force before
Oudenarde, showing every sign of making the dreaded movement across
the river; and the Duke despatched orders to Moira to join Clerfaye
immediately. For two days Pichegru continued his menaces on the
Scheldt, and then suddenly on the evening of the 30th he retired,
having received orders from Paris to occupy Nieuport, Ostend, and the
island of Walcheren in force, with a view to the invasion of England.
◆June 30.◆ Ostend, which, together with Nieuport, Henry Dundas had kept
under his own orders, was evacuated in good time, while directions to
that purport were still on their way from England. Moira’s instructions
extended no further than to the defence of Ostend, but, in the critical
circumstances of the case, he proposed to join his force to Clerfaye,
and to act with him against the French left. Clerfaye at first welcomed
the offer, but, on hearing of the misfortune of Fleurus, declared
that he could make no engagement with the British whatever. This was
unpleasant for Moira, who had counted on the help of the Austrians in
protecting the transport of his camp-equipage on the canal from Bruges
to Ghent. The situation was dangerous, for the French were in force at
three different places within two hours’ march of the canal, bent upon
preventing his junction with Clerfaye. Without a moment’s hesitation
Moira sent his baggage northward to Sluys, and by a rapid march made
his way to Ghent, just in time to anticipate a movement made by the
French to intercept him. Thus a valuable reinforcement was secured to
the Allies; and three more perilous days were passed without mishap,
thanks rather to the Committee of Safety at Paris than to the Austrian
commanders in the field.[254]

◆June 30.◆

On the evening of the 30th the Duke of York rode over from Renaix to
Braine L’Alleud to consult Coburg; and it was then agreed that
Clerfaye’s force should change places with the Duke’s, so as to bring
the Austrian corps nearer to its own main army, and the British
contingent nearer to the sea. At the actual conference both Coburg and
the Archduke Charles declared that, having no orders from the Emperor to
evacuate the Austrian Netherlands, they felt bound in honour to defend
them. Waldeck indeed opposed even a withdrawal from the line of the
Scheldt. ◆July 2.◆ All this, however, was mere trifling, for two days
later Coburg wrote that his right wing had been driven back from
Soignies, and that the Duke would do well to retire to a position
appointed him between Brussels and Antwerp. The fall of Mons on the 1st
of July having also laid bare the Duke’s left flank and rear, he took
the hint, and while protesting against the desertion of the country,
gave his orders for retreat in the morning by way of Grammont and thence
upon Alost. Tournai, through the courtesy of the French, was peaceably
evacuated by the Austrians, though Condé, Valenciennes, Landrecies, and
Quesnoy were held. The line of the Scheldt was abandoned, and the Duke
of York’s troops were withdrawn from every garrison except Nieuport.
◆July 2.◆ As to this last the Duke, as in duty bound, asked for Dundas’s
orders, saying that, if the Government wished to reconquer Flanders, the
place should be kept; otherwise the garrison, which included five
hundred French emigrants, should not for pity’s sake be exposed to the
risk of capture.

Then followed a miserable tragedy. Dundas, apparently before
the receipt of this letter, wrote on the 3rd of July to General
Diepenbrock, the Commandant at Nieuport, promising to send transports
for the embarkation of the garrison, if necessary, but adding that the
Government attached great importance to the retention of the place.
Within two days the French had broken ground before the miserable
little port, where the water was so shallow that ships could not
come near the shore; ◆July 16.◆ and less than a fortnight later
the unfortunate garrison, which included a few British troops, was
compelled to surrender. Forthwith the French massed the emigrants
in the ditch of the fort and played upon them with grape-shot until
the whole of them were destroyed. It was well known that this would
inevitably be the fate of those unhappy men if they fell into the hands
of the Republicans; and German authors have not hesitated to censure
the Duke of York because, according to the current, though unjust,
opinion, he neglected to order the evacuation of Nieuport while there
was yet time. It were, indeed, devoutly to be wished that the Duke
had respected Dundas less, and had withdrawn the garrison without
consulting him, though it is manifest that he would thereby have drawn
upon himself the censure of the Government. The blame, therefore, for
this shameful business must remain with Dundas; and it was a very great
misfortune for England that he was not called to account for it.[255]

Meanwhile the Duke continued his retreat northward down the river
Dendre, reaching Lombeek Ste. Catherine, about eight miles west of
Brussels, on the ◆July 5.◆ 4th of July. On the morrow the leaders of the
coalesced armies again met in conference at Waterloo, when it was
decided that Clerfaye’s force should pass eastwards towards Brussels,
and that the army of the Allies should ultimately occupy a line from
Antwerp, by Louvain, Wavre, and Gembloux, to Namur, but that until the
7th, at any rate, the line in advance of Brussels, extending from Alost
by Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles to Sombref, should be maintained. Ghent
had already been evacuated; and accordingly on the next day Clerfaye’s
force began its march to join Coburg, while Moira moved to Alost and
brought his troops for the first time under the Duke’s personal command.
◆July 6.◆ But Jourdan meanwhile was not inactive. On the 6th he attacked
the whole line of the Austrians from Braine-le-Comte to Gembloux; and,
though repulsed after hard fighting on the east, where a concentrated
attack might have given him possession of the Austrian line of
communications, he succeeded in pushing Coburg’s right wing back from
Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles to Waterloo. Thereupon Coburg warned the
Duke of York that he must retire eastward and cancel the agreement made
on the 5th. The Duke answered with cold sarcasm that it was a new thing
for the Austrians to retire before thirty thousand Frenchmen, and
appealed to the Archduke Charles to keep Coburg to his engagements; but
received from him only a sad reply that orders must be obeyed. On the
7th and 8th Jourdan renewed his attacks, directing the best of his
strength against the Austrian left, which he forced back to the
battlefield of Ramillies. ◆July 7.◆ He then immediately invested Namur;
upon which Coburg, fearing to be cut off from the Meuse, ordered the
whole of his army to retire upon Tirlemont.

The Duke meanwhile, since his left was uncovered by the retreat of the
Austrians, withdrew, at Coburg’s request, very slowly northward to
Assche, and thence struck north-eastward to the Dyle, which he crossed
at Malines, fixing his headquarters at Contich, some eight miles north
of that city. A new line of defence was then taken up, which
sufficiently showed the divided counsels of the Allies. ◆July.◆ On the
right the British contingent, now numbering some thirty thousand men,
was posted on the Dyle from Antwerp to Malines. On its left the Prince
of Orange with the Dutch troops and from two to three thousand Austrians
covered the line from Malines to Louvain; and from Louvain the rest of
the Austrian army, between forty-five and fifty thousand men, was
extended in a south-easterly direction by Tirlemont, Landen, and Waremme
to the Meuse, with a detachment of four thousand more on the eastern
bank of that river, and between it and the Ourthe. Thus the British and
Dutch, who desired to defend Holland, could be deserted at any moment
which the Emperor should select for the pursuit of his own particular
object, namely, to carry his army away to share the plunder of Poland.
Craig, for his part, felt no doubt whatever that the British and Dutch
would very soon be left to their own resources.[256]

The reader may have felt surprised that, with a force of nearly one
hundred and fifty thousand men, the French should not have pressed the
Allies harder, and made an end of them long before. The fact was that
the Committee of Public Safety had interfered with the Generals on the
4th of July, by an order that the recapture of Valenciennes, Condé,
Landrecies, and Quesnoy should take precedence of any further
operations; and accordingly the army in Belgium had been weakened to
provide for this service. This was the work of Robespierre, who at the
time was inclined towards peace; and indeed peace appears to have been a
common topic of conversation between the French and Austrian outposts
from the beginning of July.[257] Thirty thousand French soldiers were
accordingly withdrawn to Valenciennes, as many more were wasted in
occupying ports of embarkation for England, and the remainder were
ordered to push the Allies completely out of Belgium, and then to occupy
a cordon from Antwerp to Namur. ◆July 12.◆ Pichegru, therefore, took
command in person of the left wing, and on the 12th moved with eighteen
thousand men against Malines, while Jourdan on the right simultaneously
advanced against Louvain, Jodoigne, and Huy on the Meuse. On the evening
of the 12th Pichegru drove the Duke of York’s advanced posts into
Malines, where they were promptly reinforced; ◆July 15.◆ but the
fortifications of the town were in ruins, and, on renewing the attack on
the 15th, the French captured the place with little difficulty. The
troops charged with the defence were Hessians and Dutch; and it appears
certain that the conduct of one or the other of them was not
irreproachable, though there are indications also that the Duke himself
was partly responsible for the mishap.

The Duke then threw his left back along the line of the Nethe from
Lierre to Duffel; ◆July 15.◆ but meanwhile Jourdan had on the same day
mastered Louvain, and in the course of the two following days Jodoigne
and Namur also. The Dutch troops about Louvain, upon the loss of that
town, fell back northward across the Demer, while the Austrians retired
eastward; and thus the line of the Allies was fairly broken owing to
their own divergent plans. ◆July 18.◆ The Duke of York had already in
these days concerted operations with the Prince of Orange for the
recapture of Malines on the 18th,[258] when he received a letter from
Coburg saying that, owing to the loss of that place and of Louvain, he
had ordered the troops formerly stationed at the latter city to fall
back to Diest, and was himself withdrawing from Tirlemont to Landen. The
Duke begged him before doing so to essay a general forward movement, but
received only a vague and unsatisfactory reply; ◆July 20.◆ and on the
morning of the 20th a staff-officer, while inspecting the left of the
Dutch position, discovered that the Austrians at Diest were already
retreating south-eastward on Hasselt, Coburg having given them orders to
this effect without saying a word of his intentions to the Duke of York.
◆July 22.◆ With his left flank thus again laid bare, the Duke was
obliged to evacuate Antwerp and retire due north from it across the
Dutch frontier to Rozendahl. ◆July 24.◆ Coburg likewise fell back to
eastward, crossed the Meuse at Maastricht, and took up a position about
seven miles south and east of that fortress at Fouron le Comte. Thus the
British and Austrians were finally parted.

It cannot be said that either of them was sorry to take leave of the
other. Even in 1793 their relations had not been too cordial, for the
Austrians, in their jealousy, would never allow foreign troops to
pass through their fortified towns, even during a forced march; and
thus the British were frequently condemned to make long and fatiguing
detours.[259] But the betrayal of the Duke of York’s column on the
18th of May, and the subsequent operations, deliberately contrived to
hasten the evacuation of the Netherlands, converted the dislike of
the British for the Austrians into the bitterest hatred and contempt.
At headquarters, again, the presence of a soldier such as Craig, with
ideas far more enlightened than those of the Austrians, and with some
means of insisting upon them through the medium of the Duke of York,
can hardly have contributed to harmony. It may be added that the
Austrian troops were as severe in their criticism of their chiefs,
and particularly of Waldeck, as were any of the British, proclaiming
loudly that the abandonment of Belgium was due to French gold.[260] In
fact the Austrian army, between heavy losses and deep distrust of its
leaders, was utterly demoralised; nor is it surprising that this should
have been so. It is indeed more than probable that, if Coburg had
wished to make a stand after the action of Fleurus, his men would not
have supported him. Of course Coburg had to bear the responsibility for
all this, and to digest as best he might some very bitter reproaches
from the Duke of York; yet it seems that in truth he was the person
the least to blame. Though as a commander in the field he was slow,
unenterprising, enamoured of vicious methods, and possessed of no
military quality except that of looking carefully to the wants of
his troops, yet he did not lack insight, sound sense, imperturbable
calm, and the instinct of honesty and straightforwardness. His name is
forgotten in England, though his portrait is still occasionally to be
found in English print-shops, showing that at one time he had gained
a certain fame, which was destined speedily to perish. It can only be
said of him that he was beloved by his men, that he bore the sins of
others without complaining, and that he was a loyal servant to an
unfaithful master.

VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER XII

◆1794.◆

While the Allies in the Netherlands were thus giving way on all sides
during the months of June and July, the British Government naturally
bethought itself of the sixty thousand men which it had agreed to hire
from Prussia for operations in that quarter. The Ministers had reckoned
that these troops would be ready by the end of May; and accordingly,
as has been told, Lord Cornwallis was sent from England to arrange
with Marshal Möllendorf as to the part to be taken by the Prussians in
the campaign. Visiting the Duke of York on the way, Cornwallis agreed
with him that the protection of West Flanders, and, if possible, the
siege of Lille, were the matters of most urgent importance; and he
formulated his request to Möllendorf accordingly. ◆June 20.◆ He soon
discovered that he had been sent upon a fool’s errand. Möllendorf,
instead of sixty thousand, had but forty thousand men, deficient in
stores and supplies and absolutely wanting in transport, which he
declared himself unable to furnish without ready money from England.
The real difficulty was that the Allies were all at variance as to the
use that should be made of the Prussian troops. England wanted them to
aid in recovering West Flanders. Holland would at first have preferred
them to remain upon the Rhine, but presently yielded to the demands of
England. The Emperor of Austria not only raised strong objections to
the march of Prussian troops to Belgium, but claimed thirty thousand
of the sixty thousand men for the protection of the Empire, declaring
that their removal from the Rhine would expose all Germany to the
ravages of the French. Between these conflicting claims Möllendorf
found little difficulty in sitting still and doing nothing, which was
precisely what the advisers of King Frederick William most desired. By
the 18th of June Cornwallis had made up his mind that scanty help was
to be expected from Prussia, at any rate during the present campaign;
and neither he nor Lord Malmesbury was slow to express very decided
opinions as to the ill-faith of the Prussian Court.[261]

This was the situation when the failure of the Austrian attack
at Fleurus determined the Emperor to evacuate the Low Countries.
That potentate thereupon reversed his language as to the Prussian
contingent, and urged that Möllendorf should advance into Belgium;
nor did he hesitate, on the 15th of July, to order Coburg still to
defend the Austrian Netherlands, though he said nothing about sending
reinforcements to enable him to do so. This despicable lying and
trickery had, of course, but one object, that of drawing more money
from England under false pretences. The English Government, however,
though it had learned that no reliance was to be placed on Thugut’s
statements or promises, ◆July 19.◆ decided in the middle of July to
send Lord Spencer and Thomas Grenville to Vienna, to urge once more the
renewal of the offensive in Belgium. So far, therefore, the Emperor
seemed likely to gain his point; and since the King of Prussia had
shown remarkable weakness in dealing with the insurrection in Poland,
Francis had every reason to hope that decisive action in that country
would be delayed, until his own and the Russian armies could appear
there in sufficient force to dictate the final settlement according to
their own desires. The Prussian Ministers, on the other hand, when they
learned of the despatch of Spencer and Grenville to Vienna, became
nervous lest England should transfer the promised subsidy from her to
Austria; and they began to turn their thoughts to the negotiations of a
separate peace with France.[262]

◆July 2–13.◆

Meanwhile, through the energy of Carnot, reinforcements had been found
for the French army of the Rhine, which, after a fortnight’s hard
fighting on the heights about Kaiserslautern, forced Möllendorf to
retire under the cannon of Mainz with a loss of two thousand men and
sixteen guns. The Austrian troops on the Rhine thereupon withdrew from
the left bank of the river; and the miscarriage of a plan, concerted a
fortnight later for recovery of the lost ground, set the Generals of the
two nations quarrelling more bitterly than ever. ◆July 28.◆ The end of
July brought yet another stroke of good luck to France in the overthrow
of Robespierre and the execution of himself, St. Just, and other of his
principal colleagues. Robespierre’s latest achievement as a military
administrator had been to decree that no quarter should be shown to
British or Hanoverians in the field, an order which was disobeyed by the
French troops and laughed at by the British. The supreme imbecility,
apart from all other faults, of his rule had brought France to the last
stage of exhaustion; and, indeed, if the Allies had succeeded in keeping
the French armies out of Belgium, the latter must have perished of
starvation.[263] Robespierre’s death marked the close of the Terror and
the beginning of a return to common sense in the matter of
administration. The man, however, had lived long enough to waste the
energies of the armies of the North in the recovery of the four captured
fortresses in the frontier, when they should have been scattering the
Allies to the four winds; and thus it came about that the Duke of York
enjoyed a few weeks’ respite for the formation of new plans.

It was fortunate for him that it was so, for he now found himself
in serious trouble with his army. This was the result of the insane
system, allowed by Dundas, of raising men for rank. The regiments
despatched to Holland contained only a very few old soldiers mixed
with great numbers of recruits, who were utterly without training
and discipline. “Many of them do not know one end of a fire-lock
from the other,” wrote Craig, “and will never know it.” Six of the
battalions had been deprived of their flank-companies, that is to
say, of their best men, to make up General Grey’s force in the West
Indies; and no sooner did the new levies find themselves released from
the crimping-house and the gaol for active service, than they fell to
plundering in all directions. The Duke was obliged to issue a very
severe order on the 27th of July[264] to call the army to its senses;
but, with such officers as had been obtained under Dundas’s scheme,
it was impossible to expect the slightest obedience. In the first
place the army was lamentably deficient in Brigadiers and Generals
of division. Moira had only accepted the command of his force on
the condition that he should not serve in Flanders; and though, in
view of the perilous condition of the Allies when he landed, he had
waived his objections for the time, yet there was another obstacle
not so easily to be overcome. Albeit enjoying an independent command
of eight thousand men, Moira was almost the junior Major-general of
the army. Major-general Crosbie, who was with him, also held a more
important command than his seniors, such as Ralph Abercromby and David
Dundas, the latter of whom joined the Duke of York at the end of July.
Both Moira and Crosbie, therefore, went home, from delicacy towards
the feelings of their superiors; and the loss of Moira was bitterly
regretted as that of a very able officer who was idolised by his men.

The British troops now consisted of four brigades of cavalry and seven
of infantry,[265] making altogether some twenty-five thousand men; but
for all these there were, after the departure of Moira and Crosbie,
only four Generals—David Dundas, Stewart, Abercromby, and Fox, the
last of whom was fully employed as Quartermaster-general. This was the
more serious because the commanders of the new battalions, who had
been juggled into seniority by the Government and the army-brokers,
were not fit to command a company, much less a brigade. Some of them
were boys of twenty-one who knew nothing of their simplest duties.
Though they went cheerfully into action, they looked upon the whole
campaign as an elaborate picnic, for which they did not fail to provide
themselves with abundance of comforts; and thus the baggage-columns
were filled with private waggons under the charge of insubordinate
drivers. The junior officers, who were so scarce that few regiments
had as many subalterns as companies, appear in many cases to have been
worse than the senior, as is always to be expected when commissions
are to be obtained for the asking; nor with bad examples before them
were they likely to improve. Thrust into the Army to satisfy the claims
of dependents, constituents, importunate creditors, and discarded
concubines, many of these young men were at once a disgrace and an
encumbrance to the force. Hard drinking, which was the fashion then
in all classes from highest to lowest, was, of course, sedulously
cultivated by these aspirants to the rank of gentleman; and it was no
uncommon thing for regiments to start on the march under charge of the
Adjutant and Sergeant-major only, while the officers stayed behind,
to come galloping up several hours later, full of wine, careless
where they rode, careless of the confusion into which they threw the
columns, careless of everything but the place appointed for the end of
the march, if by chance they were sober enough to have remembered it.
These evils, too, were extremely difficult to check, for in 1794, as
in 1744, political interest rather than meritorious service was the
road to promotion. While the shameful traffic of the army-brokers and
the raising of endless new regiments continued, every officer who could
command money or interest was sure of obtaining advancement at home
without the knowledge of his chief in the field, and had, therefore,
not only no encouragement to do his duty, but an actual reason for
avoiding it. Thus the men were very imperfectly disciplined; there
were no efficient company-officers to look after them; no efficient
Colonels to look after the company-officers; no Generals to look after
the Colonels. Craig sought a remedy in begging for more Generals. “We
cannot get on,” he wrote, on the 5th of August, “without a good supply
and a supply of good. The evil to the discipline of the army increases
every day, and is likely to become very serious.”[267]

But the Duke’s difficulties did not end with the defects of his
officers and men. It had lately become the practice in time of peace
to issue to each regiment the materials for its clothing, to be made
up by the regiment itself, a system which had probably been designed
to obtain for the Colonels the largest possible profit. Nor must the
Colonels be blamed herein, for they were expected to make that profit,
which in those days was practically the only emolument open to general
officers. It was, of course, impossible for troops in the field to
spend three or four months in making up their clothes; and the result
was that; the Duke’s army was left almost naked. Moreover, in the hurry
of raising innumerable new corps, the responsibility for such details
as clothing, accounts, musters, and so forth had been overlooked; the
new officers knew nothing of the extremely complex methods of military
finance;[268] and the sudden vast increase of business thrown upon
agents and officials was greater than they could immediately bear.
Finally, quite apart from these failings in respect of the raiment of
entire battalions, no effort whatever was made to clothe the recruits
who were sent out to fill up the gaps in the various corps. These
unfortunate men, on being drafted into the depots in England, received
what was called slop-clothing, which signified a linen jacket and
trousers; and it is an actual fact that many of them were sent on
active service in this dress, without waistcoat, drawers, or stockings.
The result was that the Duke of York’s corps was in a worse state in
respect of clothing than had been hitherto recorded of any British
army.[269]

Another great difficulty, of which Craig had complained again and
again, was the want of drivers for the artillery. Lord Moira had
brought with him guns but no drivers; and there were but two captains
(not enough, as Craig said, to do a fortieth part of the work) at
disposal for the superintendence of a huge mass of horses. Thus a new
train of artillery, which had been sent out to replace the cannon
lost at Tourcoing, became a positive embarrassment. The Commissariat
also, as used so often to happen with British armies, was in a very
bad state. The men of the new corps of Royal Waggoners had been
recruited in London, and were the worst refuse of the population.
They were known, in fact, as the “Newgate Blues.” “A greater set of
scoundrels never disgraced an army,” wrote Craig, in his usual pithy
style. “I believe it to be true that half of them, if not taken from
the hulks, have at times visited them.... They have committed every
species of villainy, and treat their horses badly.” But the very worst
department of all was that of the hospitals, wherein the abuses were
so terrible that men hardly liked to speak of them. In December 1793
the inhabitants of one of the English ports had been stupefied by the
arrival of one hundred invalid soldiers from Ostend in indescribable
distress. They had been on board ship for a week in the bitter wintry
weather, without so much as straw to lie upon. Some of them were
dead; others died on being carried ashore. No provision had been made
for their comfort on landing, and, but for the compassion of the
gentry who subscribed money for their relief, the poor fellows might
well have perished.[270] Nothing was done to amend this state of
things. Dundas’s idea of putting an army in the field was to land raw
men on a foreign shore, and to expect discipline, arms, ammunition,
clothing, victuals, medical stores, and medical treatment to descend
on them from Heaven. Some kind of a medical staff was improvised out
of drunken apothecaries, broken-down practitioners, and rogues of
every description, who were provided under some cheap contract; the
charges of respectable members of the medical profession being deemed
exorbitant. “The dreadful mismanagement of the hospital is beyond
description,” wrote Craig, “and the remedy beyond my power. Every
branch and every fibre of every branch draws a contrary way. I really
doubt if there will be any way to get any good from this department but
by tying them all together and sending them to you to be changed for a
new set.”[271]

Such was the composition of the force with which the Duke of York
now undertook, in concert with the Dutch, to protect Holland,
or, in other words, to conduct that most delicate and trying of
operations—manœuvring with inferior numbers over a wide front to hold
a superior force in check. The first difficulty arose with the Dutch,
for the Prince of Orange, apparently enamoured of the Austrian methods,
was eager to scatter the troops over a multitude of different points;
but this the Duke, with Craig at his back, steadily refused to do. The
Prince then urged that the Dutch fortresses should be garrisoned by
British troops; but the said fortresses were all in bad condition, and
were repairing only with that incredible slowness which was peculiar
to the Dutch Government. The Duke, therefore, refused this also;
feeling tolerably sure that, if he consented, his battalions would
be sacrificed piecemeal for the defence of Holland, while the Dutch
looked on without raising a man to help them. The two gates of Holland
on the south were Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, and on the east Grave and
Nimeguen, with the fortress of Bois-le-Duc midway between Breda and
Nimeguen. The two eastern gates were safe so long as the Austrians
retained Maastricht and their position on the Meuse; but the Austrians
were not to be trusted. Accordingly, the Duke resolved to garrison
Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, and, if possible, Bois-le-Duc with Dutch troops;
himself taking up a position on the north bank of the river Aa, with
his right resting on Bois-le-Duc and his left on the great morass
called the Peel. From this central point he judged that he could move
to the help of any of the Dutch fortresses to southward, cover the
province of Gelderland, and keep Grave and Nimeguen within reach in
case of mishap on that side.

He was about to march thither from Rozendahl when the news came that
Moreau, who was advancing northward along the coast after the capture of
Nieuport, had driven back the Dutch posts and had besieged Sluys. The
Prince of Orange thereupon besought the Duke to stand fast, producing a
letter from Coburg which contained not only an assurance of his ability
to hold the passage of the Meuse, but even a hint of possible offensive
movements. After some hesitation the Duke consented to a compromise by
moving to Osterhout, a little to the north-east of Breda, so as to give
some countenance both to Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. ◆July 31.◆ He
marched, accordingly, on the 31st of July, unmolested by the enemy, who
were in force around Antwerp; and the Prince of Orange then came to the
wise but rather belated decision to evacuate all the Dutch fortresses to
the south of the Scheldt. ◆Aug. 8.◆ The Duke, therefore, lent him a
strong detachment of his men to hold the communications between Breda
and Bergen-op-Zoom, so as to release Dutch troops to cover the retreat
of these garrisons and to relieve Sluys.[272]

Just at this moment Henry Dundas, hearing of Moreau’s advance, and
having by chance a few troops unemployed, decided to send a naval
armament to Flushing, together with five battalions under Lord Mulgrave,
for the defence of the Dutch territories in that quarter. As was his
rule in such cases, Dundas kept Mulgrave under his own immediate
command, but withal instructed him not to go against any order of the
Duke of York,—an arrangement admirably calculated to paralyse the force
and to raise discord between the commanders. ◆Aug. 17.◆ Mulgrave, who
had started apart from his troops, reached Flushing on the 17th, and
finding that none of them had arrived, occupied himself in examining the
situation. He was soon satisfied that the French had no further designs
for the campaign than to take Sluys and Flushing, as ports from which to
ship the harvest of the Austrian Netherlands to France. Meanwhile, the
Dutch no sooner heard of his coming than they suspended their operations
for the relief of Sluys, in the hope that Mulgrave would do the work for
them; and the French, having also full intelligence of everything,
increased their force at Sluys to twenty-five thousand men, which made
the relief practically impossible. Dundas, meanwhile, wrote with the
greatest confidence of the success of that operation, which his own
interference had condemned to failure; announcing also that Mulgrave’s
force, which had not yet even arrived at Flushing, would be required
elsewhere in a month. ◆Aug. 26.◆ At length the five battalions sailed
into Flushing on the 26th, nominally thirty-two hundred strong, and
actually with the following qualifications for immediate service in the
field. The Thirty-first[273] was composed chiefly of recruits, of whom
two hundred and forty were unarmed. The Seventy-ninth had but one
officer to each company, and but eight rounds of ball-ammunition a man.
The Eighty-fourth had twenty rounds a man, but, the regiment having
never ceased marching from quarter to quarter ever since it had been
raised, the men were wholly untrained. The Eighty-fifth had thirty
rounds a man, but half of the soldiers had never had arms in their
hands. The Thirty-fourth alone appears to have been fit and ready for
work. Fortunately there was no work for them to do, for Sluys
surrendered on the very day of their arrival; and Mulgrave, after
landing them at Flushing to learn the elements of their business,
suggested that at least two of the battalions had better remain there
and be made into soldiers, instead of sailing to certain annihilation in
the West Indies. To this Dundas agreed, for he purposed to take from the
Duke of York ten of Moira’s battalions, and was well content to leave
him inferior troops in their place. Meanwhile, as a specimen of utter
imbecility, this despatch of Mulgrave’s detachment has few equals even
in English military annals. The mere promise of help was sufficient to
relax the exertions of the Dutch. The troops were embarked so late as to
miss the object of the expedition, and, even if they had been embarked
in time, they were of quality too poor to have accomplished it. In
brief, the whole enterprise bears the unmistakable mark of Henry
Dundas.[274]

Meanwhile Spencer and Grenville had throughout August pursued their
negotiations at Vienna with very indifferent success. One point Thugut
was ready to concede, namely, the recall of Coburg, who indeed resigned
on the 9th of August, being worn down in body and mind, and thoroughly
disgusted with his command. But Thugut absolutely refused to order
troops from the Rhine to Belgium, and demanded the guarantee of a loan
of three millions for the present campaign besides a new subsidy for the
next. It was necessary to refer these pretensions to the Cabinet in
London; ◆Aug. 12, 14.◆ and long before the reference had even been made,
the Austrian Council of War ordered Clerfaye, who was to succeed Coburg,
to devote all his efforts to the defence not of Belgium but of
Luxemburg, Mainz, and Mannheim. But though the Allies were idle, the
French were not; and, thanks in part to a threat of the Committee of
Public Safety to massacre the garrisons unless the fortresses were
delivered, they had recovered both Quesnoy and Landrecies by the 15th of
August. ◆Aug. 27.◆ The fall of Sluys, and the recall of the troops
detached to Walcheren also enabled Pichegru to begin a forward movement,
and on the 27th he advanced from Antwerp north-eastward to Hoogstraeten,
driving in all the Dutch posts, and seeming to threaten the turning of
the Duke of York’s left. ◆Aug. 30.◆ The Duke, thereupon, on the advice
of a Council of War, retired on the 30th to his chosen position between
Bois-le-Duc and the Peel, while Pichegru sent a strong detachment
eastward to occupy Einhoven in force.[275]

Meanwhile a message had reached the Duke of York from Clerfaye,
suggesting a general forward movement to save the beleaguered cities of
Valenciennes and Condé; ◆Sept. 1.◆ and on the 1st of September a
conference was held between the Allied commanders at Bois-le-Duc to
consider the proposal. It was not yet known to them, apparently, that
Valenciennes had already surrendered to the French on the 29th of
August, and that Condé was at the last gasp; and there was some talk
among them of an advance of the British to recapture Antwerp, while the
Austrians on the Meuse protected their rear. The news that both
fortresses had fallen, and that the French forces thus liberated for the
field were hastening to the front, naturally deranged this plan; and
though the Duke was anxious still to make the attempt, Craig perceived
little hope of success, chiefly because he could not trust the Austrians
to give hearty co-operation. In truth, the Allies had let slip the
favourable moment through their own dissensions, and the opportunity was
not to recur again. ◆Sept. 4.◆ On the 4th of September Pichegru marched
northward from Hoogstraeten to Meerle, as if to threaten Breda, but on
the 10th turned eastward, after leaving a detachment before that place,
and on the 12th reached Oosterwyk. ◆Sept. 13.◆ On the following day he
attacked the Duke’s advanced posts at Bokstel, and on the 14th captured
them, making two battalions of Darmstadt-Hessians prisoners. This was an
unpleasant mishap, for these troops had hitherto always behaved
admirably; but, though they complained of the Duke for not supporting
them, the Duke in his secret report declared them to have been
panic-stricken. ◆Sept. 15.◆ Alive, however, to the importance of
regaining this post and the line of the Dommel, the Duke ordered
Abercromby forward next day with ten battalions and as many squadrons of
British, to recover the lost ground. The movement was very nearly
disastrous, for Abercromby only just missed falling into the midst of
Pichegru’s main army, which was on march to the eastward; but quickly
apprehending the situation, he withdrew his troops in excellent order
with the loss of about ninety men, two-thirds of them prisoners. This
skirmish is notable both because it brought Colonel Arthur Wellesley of
the Thirty-third under fire for the first time, and because it led to
the trial of four officers, three of them belonging to a most
distinguished regiment, for cowardice. This was a healthy sign, for it
showed that the older officers were bent on ridding the Army at the
earliest possible moment of the worthless comrades imposed on them by
Dundas.[276]

On the same day the Duke received information that this demonstration
against Bokstel was but a feint, the main force of the enemy, reported
to be eighty thousand strong, being in motion to turn his left. His
intelligence seems to have been extremely vague and imperfect at this
time; but being dissatisfied with his position, to which, owing to dry
weather, neither the Peel nor the Aa afforded adequate protection, he
decided that the retention of it was not worth the risk of being cut
off from his retreat to the Maas. ◆Sept. 16.◆ He therefore retired on
the next day to that river, crossed it at Grave and took up a position
on the north bank, with his headquarters at Wychen, a few miles to the
north of Grave. It then remained for him to make his dispositions to
defend the line of the river, the unprotected portion of which extended
for some seventy-five miles from Fort Loevestein, at the western end
of the Bommeler Waert[277] on to the west, to Venloo on the east. Any
effective defence with the forces at his disposal was impossible, and
the Duke therefore arranged that all troops in British pay should be
sent to him from West Flanders, and that the Dutch, who were sitting
inactive behind their fortresses, should send men to repair and to
defend Crevecoeur and Bommel.

The Duke’s next effort was to concert offensive operations with
Clerfaye, who lay on his left; and he had the greater hopes of a
favourable issue, since the new Secretary at War, William Windham,
was already on his way to that officer on a mission from London. But
the Austrian Commander also had been unfortunate. ◆Sept. 17–18.◆
On the 17th and 18th General Latour’s corps of seven thousand men,
which guarded his left on the Ourthe, was driven back by a greatly
superior force of Jourdan’s right wing under General Schérer; whereupon
Clerfaye, who had watched the whole process without moving one soldier
of his forty thousand to save Latour, immediately retired behind the
Roer, leaving eight thousand men as a garrison for Maastricht. The
Austrian General therefore rejected all idea of the offensive as
impossible, but consented to maintain communication with the Duke if he
would extend his left to Venloo, which, like all the Dutch fortresses,
was in miserable repair and without a sufficient garrison. The Duke
agreed, and so the matter was arranged; Clerfaye, however, giving the
Duke clearly to understand that if his right were turned he should
cross the Rhine.[278]

The Duke thereupon made his plans for protecting a line of from
seventy-five to ninety-five miles of river with a force of thirty
thousand soldiers of all ranks, the sick list having by this time
claimed close upon seven thousand men of his army. His right from the
Bommeler Waert to Grave was held by about five thousand Hessians, their
main body being stationed at Alfen, a little to the east of the island;
Grave was held by two Dutch battalions; east of Grave four brigades of
infantry and two of cavalry lay about Mook; Abercromby, with two more
brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, stood higher up the river at
Gennep; and six thousand Hanoverians under Walmoden prolonged the line
from Gennep to Venloo, with their main body at Well. Craig, however,
did not deceive himself as to the inevitable issue, being firmly
convinced that there was an understanding between the Austrians and
French; wherein he appears to have been correct.[279] “We shall have to
fall back behind the Waal,” he wrote; “depend on it, this will happen in
a few days ... and in a fortnight the Austrians will be behind the
Rhine.” Jourdan followed up the Austrians, leaving Kléber to invest
Maastricht; whereupon Clerfaye, who had sixty thousand men behind the
Roer, forthwith called loudly on the Duke of York to relieve that
fortress. Grenville at the Foreign Office, anticipating something of the
kind, had already despatched urgent representations to Vienna requiring
the concurrence of the Austrians in this operation, but of course to no
purpose. The Duke, by advice of Abercromby and Walmoden, sent Craig to
stir up Clerfaye, and, that the Austrians might have no pretext for
complaint, moved sixteen thousand men at great risk towards Venloo.
◆Oct. 2.◆ But all was perfectly useless, for Clerfaye declined to budge.
An attack of the French on his position on the 2nd of October gave him
the excuse that he wanted; and he immediately retreated across the
Rhine.[280]

◆Sept. 22.◆

Pichegru meanwhile, on the 22nd of September, had completely invested
Bois-le-Duc, and sent two divisions forward to line the Maas over
against the Duke of York’s position. The French were now in the greatest
distress from want of provisions, which had to be brought from Antwerp
in waggons, and that by long detours in order to circumvent the Dutch
fortresses. It was therefore imperative for Pichegru to possess
Bois-le-Duc as an advanced base; and the place was the more difficult
for him to master since he had no siege-artillery. Unfortunately the
cowardice of the Dutch delivered to him all that he wanted. ◆Sept. 24.◆
On the 24th he opened a feeble bombardment with his fieldpieces upon
Fort Crevecoeur, which guarded the passage into the Isle of Bommel from
the south; ◆Sept. 28.◆ and on the 28th, the place, though amply
provisioned and in a good state of defence, was yielded up by the Dutch
Commandant. Thereby Pichegru gained not only forty-two heavy guns, but
the command of the sluices whereby the inundation of Bois-le-Duc could
be let flow or drawn off. ◆Sept. 30.◆ The loss of Crevecoeur did not
improve the good feeling of the British towards the Dutch, who, from the
first entry of the Duke of York into their country, had showed the
bitterest animosity against his men. ◆Oct. 3.◆ Intelligence now reached
the Duke that a general insurrection of the French party in the United
Provinces was imminent; and three days later the retreat of Clerfaye
compelled him to retire northward across the Waal, over which he had
already thrown a bridge of boats. The movement was conducted with some
confusion owing to the mismanagement of the Duke’s Staff; but Pichegru
suffered the Allies to shuffle themselves without the slightest
molestation into their appointed positions. The Hessians held the
Bommeler Waert on the south bank of the Waal, and the line of the Linge
over against it on the north bank. At the village of Geldermalsen on the
Linge the right of the British joined the left of the Hessians,
extending from thence eastward along the Waal to the road from Nimeguen
to Arnheim; where the Hanoverians carried the line to its end at the
parting of the Waal and the Leek, maintaining communication with
Clerfaye’s Austrians at Emmerick. Nimeguen, though ill fortified and
provided for, was also held on the southern bank of the Waal.

By this time even the long-suffering Cabinet in England was growing
weary of paying subsidies to Austria and Prussia for service which
they never rendered. ◆Oct. 4.◆ On the 4th of October Dundas advised
the Duke of York that the Government had resolved to give them no
more money, and ordered him to cut off the allowance hitherto paid to
Clerfaye unless he agreed to active concert of operations. Thugut,
however, had in many respects gained his point. The British Government,
thinking that a bad ally was better than none, had consented on the
14th of September to guarantee to Austria a loan of three millions
in consideration of her services during the first campaign; at the
same time renouncing a project which had been put forward for placing
Clerfaye’s force, together with the Duke of York’s, under the supreme
command of Cornwallis. Thugut was jubilant; for everything was
going as he wished. In Poland, Suvorof was rapidly putting down the
insurrection, in stemming which the Prussian Generals had shown the
greatest feebleness; Belgium was already abandoned, as he had desired;
and the Cabinet of London had rewarded Austria for her treachery by
financial assistance. In the circumstances he could not do less than
give promises of effectual help in the defence of Holland, though of
course without the slightest intention to fulfil them.

Meanwhile the behaviour of the Dutch grew more and more suspicious.
◆Oct. 10.◆ Bois-le-Duc was disgracefully surrendered on the 10th of
October by the Commandant; and a regiment of French emigrants, which
formed part of the garrison, having been denied permission to cut its
way through the besiegers, was massacred in cold blood. On the same day,
by a curious coincidence, the British Government warned the Dutch that,
unless they exerted themselves, the British army should be withdrawn; at
the same time proposing to put the Duke of Brunswick in command of the
British and Dutch forces in order to keep them together. ◆Oct. 18.◆ Then
a week later, as if to bribe the Stadtholder to compliance, Dundas
authorised the payment of one hundred thousand pounds to the Dutch,
which was simply so much money wasted; for the Prince of Orange would do
nothing for the defence of the country, and wished to employ the British
for the repression of his own rebellious subjects. How, in the face of
the Duke of York’s letters, the British Ministers in London hesitated to
order the immediate withdrawal of the army is incomprehensible, except
on the supposition that they still trusted to the proved ill-faith of
the Emperor Francis.[281]

The French, meanwhile, continued to follow up their advantages.
◆Oct. 6.◆ Jourdan, on the east, after leaving detachments to besiege
Venloo and Maastricht, had occupied Cologne on the 6th of October, and
drawn up his army in face of Clerfaye’s main body, which was extended
along the Rhine from Duisburg to Bonn and beyond. Moreau, who had taken
over the command owing to Pichegru’s illness, also pushed forward seven
thousand men in front of Grave, posted thirty thousand between Ravestein
(a little to west of Grave) and Bois-le-Duc, and ten thousand men
opposite the Bommeler Waert. ◆Oct. 18.◆ On the 18th he began to lay a
bridge of boats over the Meuse at Alfen, and, being allowed by
scandalous carelessness on the part of the Allies to complete it, passed
a considerable force over the river. ◆Oct. 19.◆ On the 19th he attacked
the posts at Apeltern and Druten, to east and north-east of Alfen,
carried them after a very obstinate resistance from the Thirty-seventh
and Rohan’s Emigrants, and succeeded in capturing the greater number of
the Thirty-seventh,[282] who had mistaken a party of French Hussars for
the Emigrant cavalry in the British service. At the same time
intelligence came that a strong French detachment had passed the Meuse
between Roermond and Venloo, and was heading for Cleve, thus threatening
to turn the Duke’s left. Accordingly, in his public despatch, the Duke
announced that he was about to draw the whole army to the north of the
Waal; but privately he reported that he could not do so, since the
Dutch, in spite of many promises, had made no effort to put Nimeguen in
a state of defence. ◆Oct. 20.◆ On the 20th the French threw a permanent
bridge across the Meuse a little to the north-west of Ravestein at
Batenburg, and two days later began a new series of attacks upon the
advanced posts, at the same time making demonstrations about St. Andries
on the Bommeler Waert. ◆Oct. 27.◆ By the 27th the troops round Nimeguen
had been driven into the outskirts of the town, and the Duke, who had
transferred his headquarters to Arnheim, called all of them except
fourteen battalions to the north bank of the Waal. The French main body
then took up a position between Grave and Nimeguen, threatening to seize
the two eastern keys of Holland.

◆Oct. 28.◆

At this critical moment Clerfaye paid a visit to the Duke at Arnheim,
and promised that by the 3rd of November a corps of some seven thousand
Austrians under General Werneck should arrive to assist in an offensive
movement from Nimeguen. At the same time some effort was made to
persuade Möllendorf to move to the Rhine about Bonn, and to support
Clerfaye’s left. But the British Government had recently, though none
too soon, cut off the subsidy to the Prussians; and Möllendorf’s answer
was that his orders were to send twenty thousand of his men to South
Prussia and fifteen thousand men to Westphalia, so that evidently
nothing was to be expected from that quarter. ◆Nov. 1.◆ On the 1st
of November the French broke ground before Nimeguen, and on the same
day Werneck announced that his corps could not arrive before the 7th.
Meanwhile the French erected batteries a little above Nimeguen at Ooi,
which, though silenced for a time by the guns of the Allies on the
opposite bank, so seriously damaged the bridge of boats that General
Walmoden, who was in command, thought it prudent to withdraw the
greater part of the garrison to the northern bank. ◆Nov. 4.◆ On the
4th, however, he made a sortie with the troops that remained, including
six British battalions, supported by seventeen squadrons of British
and Hanoverian cavalry.[283] The British, advancing under a very heavy
fire, swept the enemy out of their trenches without drawing a trigger,
and the cavalry pursuing the fugitives inflicted on them heavy loss.
The casualties of the Allies in this affair were over three hundred
killed and wounded; but, though the sortie checked the progress of
the French for the time, yet by the 7th they had not only repaired
the batteries destroyed by the Allies, but had erected another which
brought a cross fire to bear on the bridge of boats. Moreover, a letter
arrived from Werneck that his arrival at Nimeguen, which he had fixed
for the 7th, would be impossible until the 16th—a message which the
Duke rightly interpreted to signify that he would not come at all.

◆Nov. 7.◆

On the night of the 7th, therefore, the bridge was repaired
sufficiently to enable the garrison to evacuate the place; and the
troops filed across the river. Two Dutch battalions were the last to
leave the place under the Dutch General Haak, who, most improperly,
was the first man of his nation to set foot on the bridge. As he did
so, a shot struck one of the pontoons with some effect, whereupon he
immediately ran across the bridge crying out that all was lost, and
reported with shameless mendacity that all his troops had passed over
except the rear-guard. Upon this the pontoon-bridge was immediately
fired, since a flying bridge had already been prepared for the passage
of the rear-guard. As luck would have it, however, a shot from the
French batteries cut the hawser; the flying bridge began to swing
round; and, to save it from running foul of the kindled boats, the
sailors dropped the anchor and so brought it up. When the burning
pontoons had floated away, some British seamen, who were employed on
the bridge, were for cutting it adrift, but the Dutchmen would not
allow them to do so, preferring certain capture to the risk of a few
cannon-shot. Thus eleven hundred of them were taken, either through
their own cowardice or through that of Haak—a lamentable occurrence in
an army which in the past had approved itself to be of incomparable
steadfastness and valour.[284]

The Duke, therefore, now held the line of the Waal including the
Bommeler Waert, and might well hope to hold it, if the Dutch did their
duty, until the army went into winter quarters. He had already put
most of his cavalry into cantonments across the Yssel, but the Dutch
threw every possible obstacle in the way of providing for the comfort
of the troops. The weather too grew wintry, and the men, miserably
clothed and housed in open barns, began to fall down very fast from
cold and typhus fever. None of them had greatcoats except some of the
Guards, Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third, who had received
those which had been provided by public subscription in 1793, and
which were now worn out. Flannel waistcoats had been supplied to the
rest by their officers, who had subscribed over a thousand pounds
for the purpose; and it appears that, without exaggeration, they had
little other clothing. Sheer nakedness, in fact, had been the cause
of much, though not of all, of the plundering that had disgraced the
army; and this evil had been aggravated by the bitter hostility of
the inhabitants towards the British. Not content with resenting real
outrages, which were far too abundant, they never ceased flying to
the Duke with frivolous and groundless complaints; and so disobliging
were the authorities that Lord St. Helens, Ambassador at the Hague,
tried for two months in vain to find places where the British might be
allowed to establish additional hospitals. ◆Nov. 27.◆ On the 27th of
November the infantry in British pay numbered twenty-one thousand and
the sick nearly eleven thousand; and when a man was ordered to hospital
his comrades would exclaim, “Ah, poor fellow, we shall see thee no
more, for thou art under orders for the shambles.” On one occasion five
hundred invalids were embarked from Arnheim in barges under charge of
a single surgeon’s mate, without sufficient provisions, without even
sufficient straw, and brought to Rhenen, where they were left on board
for want of sufficient space to admit them to the hospital. A Dutch
gentleman counted at one time the bodies of forty-two men who had thus
perished of neglect in the barges and had been thrown out dead on to
the bank. Meanwhile the rascals who bore the name of surgeon’s mates
charged forty thousand pounds for wine for the sick, and, not content
with robbing the State by themselves drinking what was supplied,
actually plundered the helpless patients committed to their care. Such
was the economy of Dundas’s military administration—to obtain recruits
by the offer of lavish bounties, to break down their health by giving
them insufficient clothing, and to contract with scoundrels so to
maltreat them, medically, that they should not recover.[285]

Fortunately for himself the Duke of York was summoned home on the 27th
of November to hold personal communication[286] with Ministers; and
indeed it seemed as if the campaign were ended. Upon his departure
he placed the British troops under Lieutenant-general Harcourt, and
the foreign troops in British pay under Lieutenant-general Walmoden,
apparently dividing the supreme command between the two. This
arrangement was evidently due to the Duke’s unwillingness to subject
the British to the Hanoverian Walmoden, who was senior to Harcourt;
but, even so, it seems to be absolutely indefensible. The French, being
exhausted by the campaign, went into temporary cantonments, Moreau’s
division on the west bank of the Rhine over against the line from
Wesel to Emmerick, Souham’s in and about Nimeguen, Bonnaud’s between
the Meuse and the Waal, and the remainder about Bois-le-Duc and Grave.
The Allies were distributed along the north bank of the Waal from Tiel
eastward to the Pannarden Canal, which connects the Waal with the Leck
(as the Rhine from Arnheim downward is called), the Dutch taking charge
of the Bommeler Waert. Eastward from the Pannarden Canal to Wesel
the Allied left was to be covered by thirty thousand Austrians under
General Alvintzy, which Clerfaye, on the instance of Henry Dundas,
agreed to furnish for a payment of one hundred thousand pounds a month.

The Allies’ line of defence seems to have been wrongly chosen, for,
owing to the Pannarden Canal, the mass of the waters of the Waal was
returned into the Leck, from which cause the Leck was less liable to
be frozen. Harcourt had endeavoured to establish a second bridge over
the Rhine besides that of the Arnheim, but the Dutch, from malice or
negligence, obstructed the forwarding of the materials, as indeed
they obstructed everything that might help the British. Altogether the
situation was not a happy one, for, though rain had fallen continuously
from the beginning of November, there was no saying when a frost might
set in and turn the rivers into stable ice. Moreover, Moreau, roused
by orders from Paris, became active again. ◆Dec. 11.◆ On the 11th of
December the French crossed the Waal in boats at several different
points to the attack of the Allied posts, and, though beaten back, left
behind them an unpleasant sense of insecurity.[287]

On the 16th Pichegru returned and resumed the command, ◆Dec. 18.◆ and
on the 18th the weather changed from rain to a severe frost. In a very
few days the Maas and Waal were full of floating ice, which began to
pack together, threatening to cover the whole breadth of their streams;
while on the Leck the rapidity of the current swept away the bridge of
boats at Arnheim. Harcourt, foreseeing that before long the ice on the
Waal would become passable by the enemy, prepared to retreat northward.
Just at this most critical moment, moreover, there arrived orders from
Dundas that seven British battalions of his army were required for
service elsewhere; that of these seven the Fortieth, Forty-fourth, and
Sixty-third must march to Helvoetsluys at once; and that Alvintzy, who
so far had thrown every possible difficulty in the way of co-operation
with the Allies, must find troops to take their place. Further, it
was now ascertained that the Dutch had gone far in negotiation with
the French, and there were strong rumours that an armistice had been
concluded between them. Meanwhile the cold increased; sentries were
frozen at their posts; and the ice on the Waal, in front of the Allies,
became strong enough to give passage to the French, while that on
the Leck in their rear, though thick enough to prevent the passage
of boats, was too thin to bear cavalry or artillery. Harcourt’s
anxiety was extreme; and he begged Dundas urgently for some further
instructions as to the duty expected of him, since the order to weaken
the force by sending home seven battalions was not in itself of any
great assistance.

◆Dec. 27.◆

Affairs were in this condition when, on the 27th, the French crossed the
Meuse on the ice to the Bommeler Waert, surprised the Dutch posts there,
and pushed on by Bommel over the frozen Waal to Tuil. The Dutch at this
place fled instantly without firing a shot, some of the fugitives
running on even to Utrecht. At Meteren, a few miles north of Tuil, the
French were checked by the Hessians; but, with their right flank exposed
by the flight of the Dutch, it was doubtful whether these could maintain
their position. ◆Dec. 28.◆ Their commander, however, General Dalwig,
decided to stand fast, and ascertained by reconnaissance next day that
the French did not exceed two thousand men; whereupon Walmoden ordered
ten battalions and six squadrons of British and Emigrants under David
Dundas to Geldermalsen, a short distance north of Meteren, in the hope
of annihilating this foolhardy French detachment. ◆Dec. 30.◆
Accordingly, at one o’clock on the morning of the 30th, the force moved
out from Meteren in three columns, two of them to move direct upon Tuil
from the north and north-east, while the third, under Lord Cathcart,
fetched a compass to close in upon the enemy from the west. Cathcart’s
column unfortunately found the roads impassable and never came into
action; but Dundas nevertheless attacked without him, and drove the
French, after a sharp fight, from their entrenchments and across the
Waal, with the loss of four guns and many killed and wounded, while his
own casualties did not exceed fifty. This checked the ardour of the
enemy for the moment, and during a few days there was peace upon the
Waal.[288]

Walmoden now reinforced his right about Tuil, for the news had reached
him that the fortresses of Gertruydenburg ◆1795.◆ and Heusden, on the
extreme right of the Allied line, were in serious danger; ◆Jan. 3.◆ and
on the 3rd of January 1795 he shifted his quarters to Amerongen, due
north of Tiel, and on the north bank of the Leck. Grave at this same
time capitulated, and released a large number of French troops for the
field. Moreau’s division therefore took up cantonments over against
Alvintzy’s corps from Xanten down the Rhine to the Pannarden Canal.
Souham’s division, now transferred to Macdonald, occupied the space
between the Meuse and Waal as far as the point opposite to Tiel; two
more divisions were in the Bommeler Waert, and yet two more about
Gertruydenburg and Breda. On the 3rd of January the weather again became
intensely cold, Jan. 4.◆ and at noon on the 4th two French detachments
from the Bommeler Waert marched over the ice, drove in the posts before
Tuil and at Hesselt, a little to the east of it, after hard fighting,
and thus gained a passage by which they could move westward on the north
bank of the Waal. ◆Jan. 5.◆ On the following day the French attacked
Tuil itself, whereupon the Dutch gunners at once fled from their
batteries on the river; but, advancing from thence against Geldermalsen,
the enemy was repulsed with some loss by the Thirty-third, Forty-second,
and Seventy-eighth, under the direction of General David Dundas. It was,
however, plain that these posts could not be held against a strong
attack so long as frost practically neutralised their natural defences;
and Walmoden recalled Dundas and all the troops in that quarter to the
north side of the Leck, in order to take up a new line of cantonments
extending from Arnheim on the east by Wageningen, Reenen, Amerongen, and
Wyk-by-Duurstede to Honswyk.

◆Jan. 6.◆

A sudden thaw on the 6th offered hopes of re-establishing the old
position on the Waal, and orders were issued on the 7th for a
reconnaissance in force of the whole line of the French posts on the
following day; ◆Jan. 8.◆ but on the morning of the 8th the frost
abruptly set in again, though not before the troops were already in
motion beyond power of recall. On the right, Dundas succeeded in driving
the enemy from their posts on the Linge to the Waal, and in recovering
Buren and Tiel. The brunt of the work fell upon the Fourteenth,
Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth under Lord Cathcart; and these drove
the enemy in succession from the villages of Buurmalsen and Geldermalsen
and captured a gun, not, however, without a loss of one hundred and
thirty men to themselves. On the left the orders seem to have
miscarried, probably through the confusion due to divided command.
◆Jan. 10.◆ Before the operation could be carried any further, Pichegru,
finding that the ice on the Waal was stronger than ever, on the 10th
fell upon the Allied line in great force at three different points
between the Pannarden Canal and Tiel. The attack was repulsed upon the
right, but the Austrians were forced back on the left flank, and
Walmoden ordered the whole force to withdraw once more behind the Leck.
This was effected with little loss; Colonel Coote’s brigade of the
Fortieth, Fiftieth, and Seventy-ninth being the only British forces
severely engaged. Walmoden had fully intended to continue the retreat
eastward across the Yssel; but Lord St. Helens, at the Hague,
unfortunately protested against this, and another thaw enabled Walmoden
to acquiesce. On the night of the 12th frost again set in more severely
than ever, and on the 14th the French attacked along the whole line from
Arnheim to Reenen. ◆Jan. 15.◆ They were beaten back with heavy loss; but
Walmoden, feeling that he was unable to hold his ground, on the
following morning gave the order for a further retreat.

The days that followed are amongst the most tragical in the history of
the Army. During November and December the discipline of the troops in
Holland had greatly improved, but with the coming of the frost and the
hardships that attended the constant alarms and marches on the Waal,
it had once more broken down completely. Certain regiments of French
emigrants, which had joined the army late in the year, were the worst
offenders; but it seems certain that some of the British were not
far behind them. The country to the north of Arnheim is at the best
of times an inhospitable waste, and there were few dwellings and few
trees to give shelter or fuel after a dreary march through dense and
chilling mist over snow twice thawed and refrozen. Marauders from the
regiments of every nationality swarmed round the columns; the drivers
of the waggons freed themselves from all control, and the line of march
was disorderly beyond description. When the day was ended, the troops
of different nations fought for such scanty comforts as were to be
found; and once there was a pitched battle between the Guards and the
Hessians, who had been on bad terms with each other from the beginning
of the campaign. Day after day the cold steadily increased; and those
of the army that woke on the morning of the 17th of January saw about
them such a sight as they never forgot. Far as the eye could reach over
the whitened plain were scattered gun-limbers, waggons full of baggage,
of stores, or of sick men, sutlers’ carts and private carriages.
Beside them lay the horses, dead; around them scores and hundreds of
soldiers, dead; here a straggler who had staggered on to the bivouac
and dropped to sleep in the arms of the frost; there a group of British
and Germans round an empty rum-cask; here forty English Guardsmen
huddled together about a plundered waggon; there a pack-horse with a
woman lying alongside it, and a baby, swathed in rags, peeping out of
the pack, with its mother’s milk turned to ice upon its lips,—one and
all stark, frozen, dead. Had the retreat lasted but three or four days
longer, not a man would have escaped; and the catastrophe would have
found a place in history side by side with the destruction of the host
of Sennacherib and with the still more terrible disaster of the retreat
from Moscow.[289]

◆Jan. 19.◆

By the 19th the surviving fragments of the battalions reached their
destination on the Yssel, where they were cantoned on the west side of
the river from Zutphen to the sea. But there was no hope of long repose
for them there. Harcourt perceived clearly that the re-embarkation of
his force was now the only resource left to him, and that the place
of embarkation must be on the Weser, since the lack of supplies and
the incapacity of his commissariat-officers would inevitably forbid
him to remain long on the Ems. Within a week, want of victuals and the
hostility of the inhabitants compelled him to continue his retreat
from the Yssel; ◆Jan. 27–29.◆ and on the 27th the march eastward was
resumed, the main body of the British retiring towards Osnabrück, the
Germans upon Münster. One detachment of British,[290] however, was sent
northward under Lord Cathcart’s command to fetch a compass through West
Friesland and along the borders of Groningen, in order to ascertain
whether the people of these provinces were as ill-affected as their
fellows towards the House of Orange. By whose orders this isolated
force was despatched upon such an errand is uncertain; it is only
known that the column was followed up and incessantly harassed by the
enemy, and that it was not very successful in discovering friendly
sentiments among the Dutch. Upon reaching the Ems, the army halted,
and on the 5th February took up cantonments on the western bank of
the river, Cathcart on the extreme north guarding the passes of the
Bourtanger Moor from the Dollart southward, while Abercromby fixed his
headquarters further to south and west of the river at Bentheim, and
the Hanoverians retired to Münster.

The state of the troops by this time was worse than ever, for thousands
of sick had perforce been left behind on the Yssel. “Your army is
destroyed,” wrote Walmoden to the Duke of York; “the officers, their
carriages, and a large train are safe, but the men are destroyed.
The army has now no more than six thousand fighting men, but it has
all the drawbacks of thirty-three battalions, and consumes a vast
quantity of forage.” A more terrible reproach was never yet levelled
against any force; nevertheless it was rather the politicians than the
military commanders who had made such a reproach possible, by flinging
commissions broadcast to any man or even child who could afford to
satisfy the crimps. Upon entering German territory the men met with
kindlier treatment from the inhabitants; but the infamous conduct of
the French Emigrant Corps threatened to turn the Germans also into
enemies. It now became abundantly clear that most of these regiments
were simply frauds, imposed upon the English Ministers by a band of
unscrupulous adventurers. But the English army, of course, had to bear
the burden of their sins; and the Hanoverians and Hessians, naturally
espousing the cause of their countrymen, turned upon the British with
a bitterness which destroyed all cohesion between the nations of the
Allies.[291]

Meanwhile the French, after leaving their opponents to retreat
unmolested from the Leck, resumed their advance, and at the end of
January occupied Kampen and Zwolle on the Yssel. They made, however, no
attempt to hinder the further retirement of the Allies; and their
movements for the next fortnight were of the most leisurely description.
Then arrived rumours of a French understanding with Prussia, of the
neutralisation of North Germany, and of a line of demarcation to be
drawn according to the actual territory occupied by the opposing armies.
The French at once woke to the importance of gaining immediate
possession of Groningen and East Friesland, and General Macdonald’s
corps was detached to invade Groningen, while those of Moreau and
Vandamme remained in observation on the Yssel. ◆Feb. 27.◆ On the 19th of
February Macdonald occupied the town of Groningen, and thence turning
eastward he, on the 27th, attacked Cathcart’s fortified posts at
Winschoten. He was repulsed; ◆March 1.◆ but two days later the attack
was renewed with success by General Reynier, and Cathcart was forced to
retreat, which he did with great dexterity, crossing the Ems upon the
3rd. ◆March 3.◆ The entire British force then fell back to the east bank
of the Ems to hold the line from Emden to Rheine, headquarters being
fixed at Osnabrück.

Five days later the British Cabinet at last decided to withdraw its
troops from the Continent, ◆March 11.◆ and on the 11th Harcourt, to his
infinite relief, received intimation that transports for twenty-three
thousand men were on their way to him. The Hanoverians were in
consternation over the danger to which Hanover was exposed by this
measure, but there was no help for it. ◆March 16.◆ A few days later
Prussian troops arrived to hold the line of the Ems, and on the 22nd the
British began their march to Bremen for embarkation. The Prussians did
their utmost by obstruction, discourtesy, and insolence to disoblige
them on their passage through the country; but this was natural, for
they had always professed contempt for the British as a nation of
traders, and a tradesman is never so despicable to a dishonest customer
as when he refuses to grant him further credit. ◆April 14.◆ Finally, on
the 14th of April, the infantry and part of the artillery took ship for
England, leaving the remainder of the artillery and the whole of the
cavalry behind them under Lord Cathcart and David Dundas. The number
embarked was nearly fifteen thousand, some proportion of the sick having
been recovered; so that the losses after the retreat from the Leck must
have amounted to about six thousand men, of which not a tithe were
killed or wounded in action. Thus disgracefully ended the first
expedition of Pitt and Dundas to the Low Countries.

AUTHORITIES.—The British despatches relating to the expeditions
to Flanders will be found in _W.O. Orig. Corresp._ 46–48, and in
Entry Book No. 11. The number of private letters included in this
collection makes it of unusual value. For the campaigns at large
the best accounts known to me are in Ditfurth’s _Die Hessen in den
Feldzügen, 1793, 1794, und 1795_ (Kassel, 1839), and in Witzleben’s
_Prinz Friedrich Josias von Coburg-Saalfeld_ (Berlin, 1859), which is
not a little built upon Ditfurth, but contains much that is valuable
of its own and a superb atlas of maps. On the French side the short
memoir of David and the life of Pichegru are of little worth compared
with the narrative of Jomini. Marshal Macdonald’s _Mémoires_ are
disappointing at this period. Of English printed accounts the most
important is Jones’s _Historical Journal of the British Campaign
in 1794_. The _Journal_ of Corporal James Brown of the Coldstream
Guards supplies a few interesting details. Sir H. Calvert’s _Journal
and Correspondence_ is often of value; and there is a great deal of
most useful information in the foot-notes to the miserable doggerel
called the _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_. Unfortunately the
author, like Brown and Calvert, was a Coldstreamer, for which reason
all three confine themselves chiefly to the doings of the brigade of
Guards. The regimental histories of the 14th Foot and 15th Hussars
have occasionally interesting material, but, taken altogether, the
regimental records are disappointing.

THE END

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Four troops of life guards, ten regiments of horse, five of
dragoons, forty-seven battalions of foot.

[2] I had almost written that France was then, as always, the first
military nation; and though Prussia wrested the position from her under
Frederick the Great and again in 1870, the lesson of history seems to
teach that she is as truly the first military, as England is the first
naval, nation.

[3] Belhomme, p. 153.

[4] Feuquières.

[5] That is to say, of land-transport. After the sad experience of the
Irish war the marine transport was entrusted to an officer specially
established for the purpose.—_Commons Journals._

[6] I spell the village according to the popular fashion in England,
and according to the Flemish pronunciation. So many names in Flanders
seem to halt between the Flemish and the French that it is difficult to
know how to set them down.

[7] Fifty-three battalions of infantry and seven regiments of
dragoons.—_Beaurain._

[8] No battlefield can be taken in more readily at a glance than that
of Landen. On the path alongside the railway from Landen Station is a
mound formed of earth thrown out of a cutting, from the top of which
the whole position can be seen.

[9] St. Simon. With the exception of one hollow, which might hold three
or four squadrons in double rank in line, there is not the slightest
shelter in the plain wherein the French horse could find protection.

[10] Life Guards, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th Dragoon Guards, Galway’s Horse.

[11] This is, of course, the Talmash of _Tristram Shandy_ and of
Macaulay’s History. He signed his name, however, as I spell it here,
and I use his own spelling the more readily since it is more easily
identified with the Tollemache of to-day.

[13] Namur, Luxemburg, Mons, Charleroi, Ath, Oudenarde, Nieuport,
Ostend.

[14] By the defensive alliance concluded between England and Holland
early in 1668, it was laid down that either party, on being attacked,
had the right to require from the other the aid of a fixed proportion
of forces both naval and military. This treaty was arranged by Sir
William Temple shortly after the Treaty of Breda had brought to a close
the Dutch War of 1665–1667; it was known as the Triple Alliance, Sweden
being the third signatory.

[15] 12th, 22nd, 27th.

[16] 1st batt. First Guards, 1st Royals (2 batts.), 8th, 9th, 10th,
13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 23rd, 24th. The Guards had been
substituted (after careful explanation to Parliament) by William’s own
direction for the 9th Foot.

[17] Seven regiments of horse and dragoons, fourteen battalions of
foot, fifty-six guns.

[18] Coxe, vol. i. p. 182.

[19] So Quincy. Coxe gives August 25–September 5 as the date, but the
difference depends merely on the interpretation of the word investment.

[20] See the description in Kane.

[21] St. Simon gives a curious account of Lewis’s difficulty in
arriving at the truth, owing to the general unwillingness to tell him
bad news.

[22] It is stated in _Records and Badges of the Army_ that
Lillingston’s was formed in 1702. But Narcissus Luttrell, Millar, and
the Military Entry Books all give the date as 25th March (New Year’s
Day) 1705.

[23] Quincy’s account of this portion of the campaign is, so far as
concerns Marlborough, full of falsehoods.

[24] Four British regiments were of this detachment. Two battalions of
the 1st Royals, the 3rd Buffs, and the 10th Foot.

[25] Narcissus Luttrell.

[26] It is worth noting that this was the first campaign in which
Marlborough and the British took the post of honour at the extreme
right of the Allied order of battle.

[27] His camp thus lay across the whole of Wellington’s position at
Waterloo, from east to west and considerably beyond it to westward, but
fronted in the reverse direction.

[28] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1705.

Right.
RIGHT WING ONLY.
1st Line.
Scots Greys, 3 squadrons.
5th Dragoons, 3 squadrons.

1st Dragoon Guards, 3 squadrons.
5th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.
7th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.
6th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.
3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.

1 Batt. 1st Guards.
1 Batt. Royal Scots.
18th Royal Irish.
23rd Royal Welsh.
28th Foot.
Stringer’s Foot.
26th Cameronians.
16th Foot.

3rd Buffs.
21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
37th Foot.
Macartney’s Foot.
Evans’s Foot.
24th Foot.
15th Foot.

Foreign Troops.

2nd Line.
Foreign Troops.

Extreme Right of Centre.
2nd Batt. Royal Scots.
10th Foot.
Temple’s Foot.
29th Foot.
8th Foot
Left.
_Newspaper._

[29] Peterborough’s Dragoons; Mark Kerr’s, Stanwix’s, Lovelace’s,
Townsend’s, Tunbridge’s, Bradshaw’s, Sybourg’s, Price’s Foot. Sybourg’s
was made up of Huguenots.

[30] Marlborough’s _Despatches_, vol. ii. p. 262.

[31] This is the story told in Lamberti.

[32] The ground, though now drained, is still very wet.

[33] I have described the field at some length, since the map given by
Coxe is most misleading.

[34] Coxe, by a singular error, makes the left consist exclusively of
infantry, in face of Quincy, Feuquières, the _London Gazette_ and other
authorities, thereby missing almost unaccountably an important feature
in the action.

[35] Apparently the whole of Meredith’s brigade, viz.: 1st, 18th, 29th,
37th, 24th, and 10th regiments. The place is still easily identifiable.

[36] Molesworth escaped and was rewarded four years later, at the age
of twenty-two, with a regiment of foot.

[37] ORDER OF BATTLE. RAMILLIES, 12TH–23RD MAY 1706.

Right.
RIGHT WING ONLY.
1st Line.
Scots Greys.
5th Royal Irish Dragoons.

1st Dragoon Guards.
5th Dragoon Guards.
7th Dragoon Guards.
6th Dragoon Guards.
3rd Dragoon Guards.
Eighteen Dutch Squadrons.

1 Batt. 1st Guards.
1 Batt. Royal Scots.
16th Foot.
26th Cameronians.
28th Foot.
23rd Royal Welsh.
8th Foot.

3rd Buffs.
21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Evans’s Foot.
Macartney’s Foot.
Stringer’s Foot.
15th Foot.

Foreign Infantry.

2nd Line.
Foreign Cavalry.

2nd Batt. Royal Scots.
18th Royal Irish.
29th Foot.
37th Foot.
24th Foot.
10th Foot.

Foreign Infantry.
Left.

From Kane’s _Campaigns_.

[38] _Despatches_, vol. ii. p. 554.

[39] The British regiments regularly employed in the besieging army
were the 8th, 10th, and 18th, and Evans’s Foot; the Scots Greys, 3rd
and 6th Dragoon Guards. The total loss of the Allies was 32 officers
and 551 men killed, 83 officers and 1941 men wounded. The 18th Royal
Irish alone lost 15 officers, and in one attack over 100 men in half an
hour.

[40] Parker.

[41] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1707.

Right.
RIGHT WING ONLY
1st Line.
Stair’s Brigade.
Scots Greys.
5th Royal Irish Dragoons.

Palmer’s Brigade
1st Dragoon Guards.
5th Dragoon Guards.
7th Dragoon Guards.
6st Dragoon Guards.
3rd Dragoon Guards.

Orrery’s Foot.
Evans’s Foot.

Foreign horse.

Meredith’s Brigade.
1 Batt. 1st Guards.
1 Batt. Royal Scots.
16th Foot.
23rd Royal Welsh.
8th Foot.

Temple’s Brigade
2nd Batt. Royal Scots.
18th Royal Irish.
Temple’s Foot.
24th Foot.
10th Foot.

Lord North and Grey’s Brigade.
3rd Buffs.
21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
37th Foot.
26th Cameronians.
15th Foot.
Gore’s Foot.

No British in the Second Line.
Left.

_Postboy_ 26th June 1707.

[42] Slane’s, Brazier’s, Delaune’s, Jones’s, Carles’s, all raised in
September.

[43] Mixed battalion of Guards, 19th Foot, Prendergast’s (late
Orrery’s).

[44] 16 battalions and 30 squadrons. In these were included the
brigades of Sabine, viz., 8th, 18th, 23rd, 37th; of Evans, viz.,
Orrery’s, Evans’s, and two foreign battalions; and of Plattenberg,
which included the Scottish regiments in the Dutch service.

[45] Among them the Royal Scots and Buffs.

[46] That is to say, on the western side of the road from Oudenarde to
Deynze.

[47] The ground, though drained and built over about Bevere, seems to
have lost little of its original character, and is worth a visit.

[48] British losses: 4 officers and 49 men killed, 17 officers and 160
men wounded.

[49] The force consisted of detachments of the 3rd and 4th Dragoons
(now Hussars), 12th, 29th, Hamilton’s, Dormer’s, Johnson’s, Moore’s,
Caulfield’s, Townsend’s, Wynne’s Foot.

[50] See, for instance, the commendations of Feuquières.

[51] 135 battalions, 260 squadrons.

[52] 122 battalions, 230 squadrons.

[53] These were, according to a contemporary plan (Fricx), the 16th,
18th, 21st, 23rd, 24th Foot.

[54] He is claimed as a Guardsman by General Hamilton (_Hist. Grenadier
Guards_), though Millner assigns him to the 16th Foot. This is the
only name of a man below the rank of a commissioned officer that I
have encountered in any of the books on the wars of Marlborough,
not excluding the works of Sergeants Deane and Millner. Littler was
deservedly rewarded with a commission.

[55] The Allied order of battle was peculiar. The artillery was all
drawn up in front, in rear of it came a first line of 100 squadrons,
then a second line of 80 squadrons, then a third line of 104
battalions, with wings of 14 squadrons more thrown out to the right and
left rear. _Daily Courant_, 6th September 1708.

[56] The five English regiments lost about 350 killed and wounded in
this assault. This would mean probably from a fifth to a sixth of their
numbers. _Daily Courant_, 6th September 1708.

[57] I have failed, in spite of much search, to identify the British
regiments present, excepting one battalion of the 1st Royals.
Marlborough, as Thackeray has reminded us by a famous scene in
_Esmond_, attributed the credit of the action in his first despatch
to Cadogan. Another letter, however, which appeared in the _Gazette_
three days later (23rd September), does full justice to Webb, as does
also a letter from the Duke to Lord Sunderland of 18th–29th September
(_Despatches_, vol. iv. p. 243). Webb’s own version of the affair
appeared in the _Gazette_ of 9th October, but does not mention the
regiments engaged. Webb became a celebrated bore with his stories of
Wynendale, but the story of his grievance against Marlborough would
have been forgotten but for Thackeray, who either ignored or was
unaware of the second despatch.

[58] Notably Prendergast’s. _Gazette_, 25th November.

[59] The British troops employed were the 6th Foot, 600 marines, and a
battalion of seamen.

[60] There are still some remains of the old walls of Tournay on the
south side of the town, and the ruins of Vauban’s citadel close by,
from which the extent of the works may be judged.

[61] The British regiments employed in the siege were the 1st Royals (2
battalions), 3rd Buffs, 37th, Temple’s, Evans’s and Prendergast’s Foot.

[62] The following description written from the trenches gives some
idea of the work: “Now as to our fighting underground, blowing up like
kites in the air, not being sure of a foot of ground we stand on while
in the trenches. Our miners and the enemy very often meet each other,
when they have sharp combats till one side gives way. We have got into
three or four of the enemy’s great galleries, which are thirty or
forty feet underground and lead to several of their chambers; and in
these we fight in armour by lanthorn and candle, they disputing every
inch of the gallery with us to hinder our finding out their great
mines. Yesternight we found one which was placed just under our bomb
batteries, in which were eighteen hundredweight of powder besides many
bombs: and if we had not been so lucky as to find it, in a very few
hours our batteries and some hundreds of men had taken a flight into
the air.”—_Daily Courant_, 20th August.

[63] 8th, 10th, 15th, 16th.

[64] Parker.

[65] A nominal list in the _Postboy_ of 1st October gives 36 officers
killed and 46 wounded. An earlier list of 17th September gives 40
officers and 511 men killed, 66 officers and 1020 men wounded; but this
is admittedly imperfect.

[66] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1709.

RIGHT WING ONLY
Right.
1st Line
Sybourg’s Brigade.
Scots Greys, 3 squadrons.
5th Royal Irish Dragoons, 2 squadrons.

Kelburn’s Brigade
1st Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.
5th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.
7th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.
6th Dragoon Guards, 1 Squadron.
3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.

Orrery’s Brigade
26th Cameronians.
Two foreign battalions.
Prendergast’s Foot.

Two Foreign Brigadiers.
Twenty-seven squadrons of foreign dragoons.

1 Batt. 1st Guards.
1 Batt. Coldstream Guards.
1 Batt. Royal Scots.
37th Foot.
10th Foot.

2nd Batt. Royal Scots.
23rd Royal Welsh.
Orrery’s Foot.

3rd Buffs.
Temple’s Foot
Evans’s Foot.
16th Foot.

8th Foot.
24th Foot.
21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
18th Royal Irish.

No British troops in the second line; but the 15th and 19th Foot
were also present at the action of Malplaquet.
Left.

[67] 11th, 37th, Kane’s, Clayton’s, and one foreign battalion of foot.
The losses of the expedition were 29 officers and 676 men drowned.

[68] Honey wood to Carteret, Jan. 7/18; Ligonier to Carteret, March
21/April 1, 1744.

[69] Ligonier to Carteret, April 29/May 10.

[70] Wade to Carteret, May 30/June 10, June 25/July 6.

[71] Carteret to Wade, May 25/June 5.

[72] Carteret to Wade, July 13/24, 17/28.

[73] Carteret to Wade, July 31/Aug. 11, Aug. 14/25, 17/28.

[74] Wade to Carteret, Aug. 26/Sept. 6.

[75] _Ibid._, Aug. 19/30, Aug. 25/Sept. 5, Sept. 16/27, Sept. 22/Oct.
3, Oct. 1/12, 10/21

[76] Ligonier to Carteret, July 31/Aug. 11, 1744.

[77] Ligonier to Harrington, Jan. 29/Feb. 9, Feb. 6/17, 1745.

[78] _Gazette_, Feb. 23/March 6, March 1/12, 1745.

[79] Cumberland to Harrington, April 1/12, 12/23.

[80] The ground immediately before Fontenoy presents for fully eight
hundred yards a gentle and unbroken slope. An officer, who went over
the ground with me, assured me that St. Privat itself does not offer a
more perfect natural glacis for modern rifle-fire.

[81] Every one knows the legend of “Messieurs les Gardes Françaises,
tirez les premiers.” “Non, messieurs, nous ne tirons jamais les
premiers.” But every English account agrees that the French fired
first, long before the question had been raised, and I take the
authority of Ligonier (who drew up the official account) as final. He
says distinctly, “We received their fire.”

[82] _Campagnes des Pays Bas._

[83] Ligonier to Harrington, May 5/16. Cumberland to Harrington, May
11/22.

[84] Fawkener to Harrington, July 19/30.

[85] General Bligh to Cumberland, June 28/July 9.

[86] Cumberland to Harrington, July 2/13.

[87] Cumberland to Harrington, July 14/25.

[88] Ligonier to Harrington, July 14/25.

[89] Harrington to Cumberland, Sept. 4/15; Oct. 1/12, 19/30.

[90] Dunmore to Harrington, Jan. 20/31, Jan. 27/Feb. 7, Feb. 12/23.

[91] Ligonier to Harrington, July 1/12, 1746.

[92] Ligonier to Harrington, July 9/20, 13/24, 16/27.

[93] _Ibid._, July 23/Aug. 3, Aug. 2/13.

[94] Ligonier to Harrington, Aug. 9/20, 19/30, Aug. 26/Sept. 6, Sept.
4/15.

[95] Ligomer to Harrington, Sept. 24/Oct. 5, Sept. 28/Oct. 9.

[96] Ligonier to Harrington, Sept. 28/Oct. 9, Oct. 20/31.

[97] 1st, 15th, 28th, 30th, 39th, and 42nd Foot.

[98] Cumberland to Harrington, Feb. 6/17, March 20/31, March 24/April 4.

[99] Cumberland to Chesterfield, May 1/12, 9/20.

[100] Cumberland blamed the Austrian General, Baroney, and his
irregulars for supine negligence on the march. Cumberland to
Chesterfield, July 6/17, 1747.

[101] The regiments present at Lauffeld were the Greys, 4th Hussars,
Inniskillings, 7th Hussars, and Cumberland’s dragoons, one battalion
each of the 1st and 3rd Guards, 3rd, 4th, 13th, 19th, 21st, 23rd, 25th,
32nd, 33rd, 36th, 37th, 48th Foot. The two last had no casualties.

[102] Cumberland to Newcastle, March 18/29, March 22/April 2, March
26/April 6.

[103] _Dropmore Papers_, Auckland to Grenville, 21st and 25th January;
14th and 15th February. _F.O. Holland_, 16th February 1793. And see
_Auckland Correspondence_ and _Dropmore Papers_ generally, November
1792 to February 1793.

[104] The head of the column was able to keep sober; the rear, under
the endearments of the populace, subsided dead drunk on the road and
was brought on in carts. _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards._

[105] Lake to Dundas, 2nd March 1793. Lake’s Instructions, 23rd
February. Grenville to Auckland, 20th February 1793. _F.O. Holland_,
Auckland to Grenville, 4th March 1793.

[106] _Dropmore Papers_, Auckland to Grenville, 5th and 13th March
1793. _S.C.L.B._ 5th March; Abercromby’s instructions, 9th March;
Dundas to York, 15th March 1793; _C.C.L.B._ 2nd March; Adj.-gen. to
York, 27th March, 12th April 1793. Calvert, pp. 53, 67.

[107] _S.P. Ireland_, Cooke to Hobart, 23rd April; Westmoreland to
Hobart, 27th April; Dundas to Westmoreland, 16th May, 31st July 1793;
_S.C.L.B._ 18th May 1793.

[108] _S.C.L.B._ 7th February. _C.C.L.B._ Adj.-gen. to Duke of York,
2nd and 12th April 1793. Dundas to Williamson, 4th April 1793.

[109] Duke of Argyll’s and Earl of Sutherland’s, 1759; Lord Fred.
Campbell’s, 1778; Earl of Sutherland’s, Fauconberg’s (Yorkshire),
North’s (Cinque Ports), 1779.

[110] Athol’s or the Manx, Sir J. Grant’s, Gower’s (or Wemyss’s),
Eglinton’s (or Montgomery’s), Breadalbane’s, Argyll’s, Duke of
Gordon’s, Hopetoun’s, Balfour’s (Orkney). Their strength was 650 of all
ranks, except the Manx, which were 323 strong.

[111] Murray to Dundas, 26th March 1793.

[112] Sybel, ii. 230; Grenville to Auckland, 3rd April 1793.

[113] _S.C.L.B._ 21st March, 2nd April; _C.C.L.B._ 25th March 1793.
_Dropmore Papers_, ii. 360, 387–89. Buckingham to Grenville, 20th
January; the King to Grenville, 29th March; Pitt to Grenville, 1st
April 1793. Auckland to Grenville, 31st May 1793.

[114] Sybel, ii. 142.

[115] The insisting upon an indemnity must have been the work of Pitt,
probably under the influence of Dundas. Grenville trembled at the word
indemnity. _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 392.

[116] Protocol of conference of 7th April. Dundas to Auckland and to
Murray, 16th April Auckland to Grenville, 19th April 1793.

[117] Murray to Dundas, 22nd April 1793.

[118] Prussians, 8000, of which 1800 cavalry; Austrians, 55,000,
of which 10,000 cavalry; Dutch, 15,000, of which 2500 cavalry;
Hanoverians, 12,000, of which 3000 cavalry; Hessians, 8000, of which
1500 cavalry; British, 7200, of which 3000 cavalry. Total, 105,200, of
which 27,200 in the pay of England. About 5000 of the Austrians and the
8000 Hessians were not expected till June. Witzleben, ii. 117, 181–186.
Coburg to York, 1st and 3rd May; Murray to Dundas, 5th May; Dundas to
Murray, 10th May 1793.

[119] The authorities for this and the next paragraph are Ditfurth, i.
29, 35, 36; Witzleben, ii. 59; Calvert, p. 83; Sybel, ii. 154.

[120] Ditfurth, i. 48.

[121] 231 horses, draught and pack, and 116 drivers, etc., per
battalion of 1100 men, of which 82 horses and 34 men were for the
officers. Each company had one four-horse waggon, and each battalion
one pair-horse hospital-waggon.

[122] Ditfurth, i. 33; Witzleben, ii. 66. York to Dundas, 25th January
1794. Vol. iii. of this _History_, pp. 524, 525.

[123] _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 349.

[124] Bunbury, _Great War with France_, p. 46.

[125] Poisson, ii. 239, 240.

[126] Rousset, p. 183.

[127] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 138.

[128] “The squadron of men of war and transports was collected, the
commodore’s flag hoisted, and the expedition sailed with _most secret_
orders, which as usual were as well known to the enemy and everybody
in England as to those by whom they were given” (Marryat, _The King’s
Own_, ch. vii. _ad init._). Marryat attributes this failing to the
multitude of counsellors that compose a Cabinet. He may be right, but
those who are acquainted with the scandalous carelessness with which
Ministers treat confidential military documents, find no difficulty
in accounting for it otherwise. This evil still continues, and will
continue until Cabinet Ministers are subjected to the same penalties
for abuse of trust as other servants of the King.

[129] Calvert, p. 72.

[130] _Dropmore MSS._ Lieut.-colonel Freemantle to Buckingham, 13th
May 1793. Calvert, p. 79. _Narrative by an Officer of the Guards_,
i. 29–31. Murray to Dundas, 10th May (private) 1793. There are some
significant omissions from his public letter of the same date as
published in the Gazette. _Auckland Correspondence_, iii. 58.

[131] 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons.

[132] Murray to Dundas, 15th and 17th May 1793.

[133] Witzleben, ii. 194.

[134] That is to say, guns not allotted to the infantry as
battalion-guns.

[135] The brigade was reckoned at four battalions, the flank companies
being massed into a fourth battalion.

[136] The Fourteenth and Fifty-third, with the flank companies of these
two regiments and of the Thirty-seventh, massed into a third battalion.
Witzleben (ii. 199) gives a larger number of British troops, calling
all squadrons and battalions in British pay by the name English.

[137] Murray to Dundas, 24th May 1793.

[138] Witzleben, ii. 210–211. This author states that the Duke of York
asked for the command of the siege, which I believe to be absolutely
incorrect, and indeed incredible. See Murray to Dundas, 26th and 29th
May; Dundas to Murray, 30th and 31st May 1793.

[139] Blues, Royals, Greys, Inniskillings.

[140] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 321, _sq._

[141] Dundas to Murray, 29th May, 14th June, 12th July; Murray to
Dundas, 18th June and 16th July 1793.

[142] Murray to Dundas, 25th July.

[143] Sybel, ii. 370–373.

[144] Ditfurth, i. 69. Witzleben, ii. 263–64. Murray to Dundas
(private), 9th August 1793.

[145] Witzleben, ii. 264, 370. Dundas to Murray, 1st August 1793.

[146] Ditfurth, i. 73. 47½ battalions, 58 squadrons. British, 5200
infantry, 1300 cavalry; Austrians, 10,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry;
Hanoverians, 9000 infantry, 1600 cavalry; Hessians, 5500 infantry, 1500
cavalry. Total, 29,700 infantry, 5400 cavalry, 1900 artillery.

[147] Hamilton, _History of the Grenadier Guards_, ii. 285.

[148] The British engaged were the flank companies of the Guards and
Line, and Royal Artillery. Casualties, seventy-eight killed and wounded.

[149] Murray to Dundas, 16th July; Dundas to Murray, 19th July 1793.

[150] _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 444. Dundas to Grenville, 12th October
1793.

[151] Dundas to Murray, 16th April 1793.

[152] Calvert, vi. 118; Murray to Dundas, 3rd September.

[153] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 394.

[154] Murray to Dundas, 28th and 31st August 1793.

[155] Murray to Dundas, 31st August 1793.

[156] Sybel, ii. 417.

[157] Murray to Dundas (private), 9th September 1793.

[158] _Narrative of an Officer_, pp. 91–92; Ditfurth, i. 127–128.

[159] _Ibid._ pp. 91–93, and see Ditfurth, i. 126.

[160] Flank companies 9th, nine companies 4/60th, 50 artillery.

[161] Cuyler to Dundas, 22nd March 1793.

[162] Battalion companies of the 21st; flank companies (apparently) of
the 9th, 15th, 21st, 45th, 48th, 3/60th, 4/60th, 67th. Bruce speaks of
eighteen flank companies, perhaps including details of the 25th and
29th, which were serving on the fleet as marines.

[163] Mr. Balfour to Dundas, 20th July 1793.

[164] The official despatch reached the Government on 13th September,
but the fact was known to Pitt on the 7th. _Dropmore Papers_, i. 422.

[165] Hood to Dundas, 25th August 1793.

[166] Brenton’s _Naval History_, i. 101.

[167] Mulgrave to Dundas, 1st September 1793.

[168] 3rd, 19th, 27th, 28th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th.

[169] Dundas to Murray, 11th, 14th September; to Hood, 14th September;
to Bruce, 18th September 1793; Pitt to Grenville, _Dropmore Papers_,
ii. 43 (the conjectural date of September attached to this last is
wrong, and should be changed to October).

[170] _Narrative of an Officer_, i. 92.

[171] 19th, 57th, three companies of the 42nd.

[172] Poisson, ii. 525–526.

[173] Dundas to Murray, 13th September 1793.

[174] Dundas to Murray, 13th, 14th, and 28th September; 14th October.
Murray to Dundas, 14th and 15th October 1793.

[175] Ditfurth, i. 147.

[176] Murray to Dundas, 6th October. Dundas to Ainslie, 12th October;
to Abercromby, 13th October 1793.

[177] 3rd, 28th, 54th, 59th. They had already made one voyage to Ostend
and back.

[178] Murray to Dundas, 18th October; Ainslie to Dundas, 23rd October;
Dundas to Grey, 26th October; to Murray, 27th October 1793.

[179] Two Austrian battalions, 3rd Guards, flank battalion of Guards,
one squadron 7th L.D., and one squadron 15th L.D.

[180] Murray to Dundas, 30th October and 12th November; Dundas to
Murray, 8th November 1793.

[181] _Chat huant._

[182] Poisson, iii. 139 _seq._

[183] _Ibid._ 239–248; Rousset, pp. 293, 299.

[184] Rousset, 123–124, 236, 249; also generally, pp. 78–148.

[185] Sybel, iii. 26–27; _Vie de Carnot_, i. 470; _Dropmore Papers_,
ii. 501.

[186] _Life of Lord Minto_, ii. 383.

[187] “I think, if you see Dundas, it may not be amiss to urge the
danger of running after distant objects while the great object lies
still—of hunting the sheep till you have killed the dog. The most fatal
error will be, I apprehend, the seeking to preserve the popularity of
the war by feeding the avarice of the nation with conquests.”—Windham
to Mr. Elliot, December 1793. _Life of Lord Minto_, ii. 196.

[188] Pitt to Grenville, 5th and 7th July 1794. _Dropmore Papers_, ii.
595, 597.

[189] _Parliamentary History_, vol. xxxi.; Debates of 21st January, 3rd
February, 10th April 1794.

[190] Adj.-gen. to the Duke of York, _C.C.L.B._ 31st October 1793.

[191] These regiments are arranged according to the dates of their
letters of service.

[192] Campbell’s was originally numbered 98th; Huntly’s 100th.

[193] Adj.-gen. to Prince Edward, _C.C.L.B._ 17th March 1794.

[194] _C.C.L.B._, Adj.-gen. to Lieut.-gen. Cunninghame, 8th October
1793.

Here is an example of the scheme as used for raising a regiment of 10
companies each of 60 men.

Proceeds of sale of 1 Lieut.-colonelcy, 1 Majority,
1 Company, 1 Lieutenancy, 1 Ensigncy,
amount to £9250
Cost of 600 men at £15 9000
----
Balance £250
====

Another scheme for augmenting battalions of infantry. As soon as 450
approved recruits have been raised, there shall be added to it a
Lieutenant-colonel, and a Major.

The Major will pay for his Lieut.-colonelcy £600
The senior Captain will pay for his senior Majority 700
Another Captain will pay for his junior Majority 550
Two Companies thus vacated will sell for 2800
Levy-money of £5 granted by Government for 450 men 2250
----
Total £6900

Cost of 450 men at £15 (£10 bounty and £5 levy-money)
would be 6750
----
Balance £150
====

Thus the country is saved all expense but £5 a man levy-money.
_S.C.L.B._ 15th April, 1st and 12th November 1793; 20th January 1794.

[195] _S.C.L.B._ 9th July 1794.

[196] _Star_, 13th April 1793.

[197] One Lieutenant drew half-pay for 80 years after the drafting
of the 104th (Royal Manchester Volunteers), which was one of these
ephemeral corps. _Records and Badges of the British Army_, p. 833.

[198] _St. James’s Chronicle_, 26th April 1794.

[199] _Public Advertiser_, 2nd February 1793.

[200] _St. James’s Chronicle_, 19th July 1794.

[201] _Ibid._ 19th August 1794.

[202] _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 76–79; Bunbury,
_Great War with France_, Introd. p. xx.; _St. James’s Chronicle_, 27th
January 1795 (debate on Army Estimates of 21st January); _Journal of
Sir Henry Calvert_, pp. 360, 384–85. The letters of Lady Sarah Lennox
(the mother of the Napiers) throw a curious light on the scramble for
promotion through the enlistment of recruits at this period. “Think
of my bad luck about recruits. If I had seen an officer one fortnight
sooner who is here, he would have sold me 20 at 11 guineas per man.
Is not that unfortunate; but they are now gone. My Dublin stock too,
which was 40, has been reduced to 26,” ii. 109, _and see also_ ii.
101. “Is there any chance of recruiting men of five feet four inches
for 10 guineas, and as much under as possible, in your neighbourhood.”
Evidently the wives of poor officers plunged into speculation to help
their husbands with recruits.

[203] _S.C.L.B._ 15th April 1793. _Daily Chronicle_, 16th April 1793.

[204] York to Dundas, January 1794.

[205] _Chronicle_, June 1793.

[206] _St. James’s Chronicle_, 24th and 26th July 1793.

[207] _S.C.L.B._ 26th March 1794.

[208] _Ibid._ 29th April 1794.

[209] York to Dundas, 2nd February 1794 (with enclosures).

[210] Dr. Hayes to Lord Cathcart, 1st February 1794; Monthly returns,
1st February to 1st May; Ditfurth, ii. 32.

[211] Witzleben, iii. 64 _seq._

[212] Sybel, iii. 49–65; York to Dundas, 22nd March, 3rd April 1794;
Witzleben, iii. 70–84.

[213] Witzleben, iii. 91, 62, 29; Ditfurth, ii. 10 _sqq._, 28.

[214] Ditfurth, ii. 30, 31.

[215] Craig to Nepean, 7th, 22nd, 31st March, 11th April; to York, 7th,
15th, 16th March; York to Dundas, 9th, 22nd, 26th March, 1794.

[216] Ditfurth (ii. 43) reckons the field force at from 120,000 to
130,000, but he includes British troops which were not on the spot, and
reckons the strength of those present at too high a rate.

[217] Witzleben, iii. 94.

[218] Calvert, p. 187.

[219] Three squadrons of the 1st Dragoon Guards, two squadrons each of
the Blues, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th Dragoon Guards, 1st Royals, 2nd Greys,
6th Inniskilling Dragoons, 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons. The
8th and 14th Light Dragoons were embarked or embarking to join the
army. It has been a matter of much difficulty to discover how these
regiments were brigaded.

_Harcourt’s Brigade._ (?) 1st, 5th, 6th D.G. = 7 squadrons.

_Mansel’s Brigade._ (?) Blues, 3rd D.G., Royals = 6 squadrons.

_Laurie’s Brigade._ (certainly), Bays, Greys, Inniskillings = 6
squadrons.

_Ralph Dundas’s Brigade._ 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons, 1st
squadron of the Carbineers = 9 squadrons.

After the death of Mansel on the 26th of April, Dundas took over his
brigade, and Colonel Vyse took Dundas’s. But the regiments seem to have
been much shifted from one brigade to another.

Calvert, pp. 197, 204. _Cannon’s Records_, Royal Horse Guards, p. 102.

[220] Ditfurth, ii. 54. Craig to Nepean, 18th April 1794.

[221] So say the records of the 15th Hussars. I suspect that there were
two squares with the guns between them, as at Avesnes-le-Sec on 12th
September 1793. Two squares side by side would give an appearance of
oblong shape to the formation.

[222] The records of the 15th Hussars for some reason seek to excuse
the slaughter of the fugitives, by mentioning that the National
Convention had decreed that no quarter should be given to the English;
and this mistake has been copied by Sir Evelyn Wood in his excellent
account of the action in _Achievements of Cavalry_. As a matter of fact
the decree was not made until the 26th of May; and three hundred men
need no excuse for taking no prisoners when attacking five thousand.

[223] In _Cannon’s Records_ of the 3rd Dragoon guards these casualties
are ascribed to the action of the 26th of April. Whether the mistake be
due to accident or to design, it is to be regretted.

[224] Going over the ground, my companion and myself fixed upon a
hollow about half a mile to west of Inchy, and on the north side of the
road, as the spot where Otto concentrated his squadrons out of sight
of the French. The left flank of the French infantry, upon which the
attack was opened, we reckoned to have stood in a hollow about half a
mile south-east of Inchy. After very careful study of the ground, I put
forward these conjectures with some confidence.

[225] The establishment of an Austrian Cuirassier Regiment was six
squadrons; the British regiments, as originally organised in 1793,
should have made thirteen squadrons; but I imagine that losses had
reduced one or other of them to a single squadron, for both Witzleben
(iii. 132) and Ditfurth (ii. 57) give the number as six Austrian and
twelve British squadrons.

[226] Stewart to Dundas, 30th April; Craig to Nepean, 25th April;
Adjutant-general to Duke of York, 22nd April, 1794. These two
unfortunate battalions spent three weeks on the passage.

[227] York to Dundas, 6th May 1794.

[228] It is curious to note that Jomini’s account makes the French
force front to the south, whereas Craig conceived of it as facing to
the north; so that evidently it was prepared to face either way.

[229] Witzleben, ii. 167. Memorandum of the 28th of April in _W.O.
Corres._

[230] Clerfaye (including the reinforcements from Ostend), nineteen
thousand; Walmoden at Warcoing, six thousand; Duke of York at Tournai,
eighteen thousand (Craig to Dundas, 6th May 1794). Witzleben, however,
reckons the united force at thirty thousand men only (iii. 143), and
Ditfurth gives but four thousand men to Walmoden.

[231] _Life of Lord Combermere_, i. 38.

[232] The regiments engaged were the Blues, Second, Third, Sixth
Dragoon Guards; First, Second, Sixth Dragoons; Seventh, Eleventh,
Fifteenth, Sixteenth Light Dragoons. Which were engaged throughout and
which came up as reinforcements, I have been unable to discover. The
account of the action is drawn chiefly from Calvert, _Journal_, pp.
203–205. _Narrative of an Officer_, ii. 41. Ditfurth, ii. 75. _Life of
Lord Combermere_, i. 38–39. The first is the most important.

[233] Sybel, iii. 118–120. Witzleben, iii. 157–167.

[234] Ditfurth, ii. 90. He says actually that there was nearly room for
the full width of a company, of course in triple rank.

[235] Great part of the battle-field is now built over. Lille alone
covers a vast extent of it, and Roubaix and Lannoy are to all intent
part and parcel of Lille. But the general character of the ground, and
in particular its blindness, remains unchanged.

[236] Witzleben (iii. 197–198) considers the slowness both of Clerfaye
and the Archduke Charles on this day to have been inexcusable.

[237] Brigade of Guards (4 battalions); 14th, 37th, 53rd Foot, 2
Hessian and 5 Austrian battalions; 7th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons (6
squadrons); 4 squadrons of Austrian Hussars.

[238] Hamilton (_History of the Grenadier Guards_, ii. 304) says,
I know not on what authority, that the pretext for this order was
that Clerfaye required assistance. It is certain that the Austrian
Headquarters had heard nothing and knew nothing of Clerfaye’s situation
at this time, so that, if General Hamilton’s story be more than mere
gossip, the order was probably urged by Waldeck or some other of
Mack’s enemies, with the object of bringing his elaborate combinations
into contempt. The fact that the British would be the chief sufferers
in case of mishap, would rather have encouraged this faction in the
Austrian Staff to the measure.

[239] The _Gazette_ prints this place as Bouderes; and the mistake
has been copied into many regimental histories. It is only one among
innumerable instances of the slovenliness of the clerks of the War
Office at that time.

[240] Not to be confounded with the village of the same name further
north, on the road from Tournai to Lannoy.

[241] The evidence upon this point is very conflicting. All the
English accounts state that, when the British reached Lannoy on their
retreat, the place was in possession of the French. Ditfurth, on the
other hand (ii. 133, 137 _seq._), is very positive that it was held by
the Hessians until 1 p.m., which, in his opinion, was long after the
British would have reached it; and the evidence which he adduces is
very strong. Against this, it is certain that the British would have
been only too thankful to rally at Lannoy if they could, and that they
were greatly disappointed to find themselves cut off from it. It is
also to be noted that Ditfurth rakes up everything that he can to the
discredit of the English, but was not at the pains to read a single
English account of the action, except the Duke of York’s letter as
published in the _Gazette_, and that his account of their movements is
consequently full of errors. I incline to the opinion that the Hessians
were still in Lannoy, but that the French around them were so numerous
as to cut the British off from it—in fact, that the French practically
held it invested, with a covering force powerful enough to keep the
British at a distance. The same was the case at Roubaix, which the
Sixteenth Light Dragoons contrived to hold till Abercromby retreated,
though the Austrians, the Duke of York, and Abercromby himself all
believed it to be in the hands of the French. It still remains to
be explained why the Hessians made no sign of their presence when
Abercromby’s column approached, for the British artillerymen actually
began to lay their guns upon it in the assurance that it was in the
enemy’s hands.

[242] There are few actions which I have found so difficult to describe
as this of the 18th of May. I have drawn my account from Witzleben,
iii. 201–230; Ditfurth, ii. 130–157; Jomini; _Narrative of an Officer_,
ii. 47–51; Cannon’s _Records of the Seventh and Fifteenth Hussars and
Sixteenth Lancers_; Calvert’s _Journal_; and Craig’s letters to Nepean
of 19th May 1794 (Record Office).

[243] Calvert, p. 269.

[244] The French brigades at this period were of the strength of
divisions.

[245] Jones, _Campaign of 1794_. The author was a captain in the
Fourteenth.

[246] Witzleben, iii. 168–169.

[247] Sybel, iii. 120–125. York to Dundas, 26th May 1794 (with
enclosures).

[248] Captain William Parker to the Admiralty, 3rd June 1794.

[249] Duke of York to Dundas, 10th, 13th, 14th June 1794. Craig to
Nepean, 10th, 13th, 14th June 1794. Calvert, pp. 238–253.

[250] Duke of York to Dundas, 28th June 1794. Ditfurth, ii. 171–172.

[251] Calvert, 277. _Life of Lord Lynedoch_, 91.

[252] 3rd, 19th, 27th, 28th, 40th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th, 63rd, 87th,
89th.

[253] Moira to Dundas and to Nepean, 26th June 1794.

[254] Duke of York to Dundas, 28th June, 2nd July; Craig to Nepean,
27th June; Moira to Dundas, 28th and 29th June, 1st July 1794.

[255] York to Dundas, 2nd and 3rd July; Dundas to Diepenbrock, 3rd and
7th July; Diepenbrock to Dundas, 5th July 1794.

[256] Coburg to York, 7th and 8th July; York to Coburg, 7th July; to
Dundas, 7th and 10th July; Craig to Nepean, 11th July 1794.

[257] Sybel, iii. 150–152, 171. Craig to Nepean, 4th July 1794.

[258] York to Dundas, 15th, 19th, 20th, 23rd July 1794.

[259] _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 35.

[260] Craig to Nepean, 11th July 1794.

[261] Cornwallis to Dundas, 8th and 18th June 1794, and see _Cornwallis
Correspondence_, ii. 239–255; _Malmesbury Correspondence_; _Dropmore
Papers_, ii. 564–566, 577, 592, 594.

[262] Sybel, iii. 240–243.

[263] Poisson, iv. 262.

[264] Ditfurth, iii. 217.

[265]

CAVALRY—
_David Dundas’s Brigade_—2nd, 6th D.G.; 2nd, 6th D.
_Ralph Dundas’s Brigade_—Blues; 3rd, 5th D.G.; 1st D.
_Laurie’s Brigade_—7th, 11th, 15th, 16th L.D.
_Vyse’s Brigade_—1st D.G.; 8th, 14th L.D.
_Foreign Troops_—
Uhlans Britanniques, Irving’s Hussars, Choiseul’s Hussars.

INFANTRY—
_First Brigade_—3rd, 88th, 63rd.
_Second Brigade_—8th,[266] 44th,[266] 33rd.[266]
_Third Brigade_—12th,[266] 55th,[266] 38th.
_Fourth Brigade_—14th, 53rd, 37th.
_Fifth Brigade_—19th, 54th, 42nd.
_Sixth Brigade_—27th, 89th, 28th.
_Seventh Brigade_—40th,[266] 57th, 59th, 87th.
_Foreign Troops_—
Loyal Emigrants, York Rangers, Rohan’s Regiment.

[266] The flank companies of these battalions were in the West Indies.

Officers N.C.O.’s and men.
British Cavalry, 165 4,350
Hanoverians }
and Hessians } 168 2,939
--- -----
Total Cavalry 333 7,289
British Infantry, 583 21,170
Hanoverians }
and Hessians } 322 8,722
---- ------
Total 1,238 37,181
===== ======

Total of all arms, including artillery, etc., say, 1300 officers,
40,000 N.C.O.’s and men.

[267] Craig to Nepean, 5th August 1794; Ditfurth, ii. 213 _seq._;
Memorandum of the Duke of York, 23rd December 1794; Calvert, pp.
385–386; see vol. ii. of this _History_, p. 88.

[268] No officer could hope to master these mysteries without the help
of two fat little duodecimo volumes called _The Regimental Companion_,
and a third and slighter volume entitled _Military Finance_.

[269] Craig to Nepean, 31st August; Craig’s Memorandum of 23rd December
1794.

[270] _Sunday Reformer_, 29th December 1793.

[271] Craig to Nepean, 12th and 31st August, 5th and 8th September
1794. The class of medical officer obtained by Government is described
in _Autobiography of Sir J. M’Grigor_, pp. 93, 94.

[272] York to Dundas, 25th, 27th, 30th July, 1st and 6th August; Craig
to Nepean, 25th July 1794.

[273] Its flank companies, and those of the 34th, were detained for the
West Indies.

[274] Dundas to Mulgrave, 7th and 13th August; Mulgrave to Dundas,
17th, 19th, 26th, 30th August, 3rd September; Dundas to York, 22nd
August 1794.

[275] On the 29th of August the Duke reorganised his force as follows:

_First Brigade_—Maj.-gen. Stewart, 3rd, 40th, 55th, 59th, 89th.
_Second Brigade_— 8th, 27th, 28th, 57th.
_Third Brigade_— 12th, 33rd, 42nd, 44th.
_Fourth Brigade_—Maj.-gen. Fox, 14th, 37th, 38th, 63rd.
_Fifth Brigade_— 19th, 53rd, 54th, 88th.

[276] Craig to Dundas, 19th September 1794.

[277] The Bommeler Waert is the triangular tongue of land enclosed
between the Waal and the Meuse immediately to the east of Gorkum. It
is very nearly an island, the entrance to it from the east being very
narrow and defended by a fort, then, as now, called Fort St. Andries.

[278] York to Dundas, 19th, 21st, 22nd September (enclosing
correspondence with Clerfaye); Craig to Dundas, 19th September 1794.

[279] Craig to Nepean, 20th September 1794. Sybel, iii. 432 _note_.
From this it appears that all documentary evidence of the agreement
has been carefully destroyed, but that there is a hint of secret
negotiations actually proceeding on the 18th of September 1794.

[280] York to Dundas, 25th and 29th September, 1st and 3rd October;
Craig to Nepean, 1st October; Grenville to York, 25th September 1794.

[281] Dundas to York, 10th, 12th, 16th, 18th October; York to Dundas,
16th, 18th, 23rd October 1794.

[282] Craig explained that this was owing chiefly to the inexperience
of a young Colonel. Thus the army-brokers had contrived to lift
children to the command even of regiments that had been eighteen months
on active service.

[283] The troops engaged were the 15th Light Dragoons, 8th, 27th, 28th,
55th, 63rd, 78th. The last-named regiment, together with the 80th, had
arrived at Flushing at the end of September, when Dundas intended to
withdraw some of the older regiments for service in the West Indies.

[284] York to Dundas, 7th and 11th November; Craig to Nepean, 10th
November 1794.

[285] _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 89–91; York to
Dundas, 27th November 1794; Harcourt to York, 15th December 1794.

[286] Ditfurth, who never loses an opportunity of abusing the English,
of course puts a discreditable construction upon the Duke’s departure,
not knowing that he was sent for by Ministers (ii. 313).

[287] York to Dundas, 27th and 29th November; Harcourt to York 11th and
15th December 1794. Ditfurth, ii. 310.

[288] Dundas to Harcourt, 13th and 24th December; Harcourt to Dundas,
23rd December; to York, 25th and 29th December; Walmoden to York, 22nd,
25th, 29th December 1794, 1st January 1795. The regiments engaged in
the action were the 19th, 33rd, 42nd, 78th, 80th.

[289] Jones, _Campaign of 1794_, pp. 171–175; Ditfurth, ii. 362 _sq._;
_Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 100–104.

[290] 15th Light Dragoons; 27th, 28th, 80th, and 84th Foot.

[291] Walmoden to York, 3rd February; Harcourt to York (three letters),
11th February 1795.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"" ***

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