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Title: History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 2 of 6
Author: Napier, William Patrick Francis
Language: English
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PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR
1814, VOL. 2 OF 6 ***
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
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HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE,
FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.
BY
W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.
LT.-COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT.
VOL. II.
LONDON:
THOMAS AND WILLIAM BOONE, STRAND.
MDCCCXXIX.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
BOOK V.
CHAPTER I.
Slight effect produced in England by the result of the
campaign--Debates in parliament--Treaty with Spain--Napoleon
receives addresses at Valladolid--Joseph enters Madrid--Appointed
the emperor’s lieutenant--Distribution of the French army--The
duke of Dantzig forces the bridge of Almaraz--Toledo entered
by the first corps--Infantado and Palacios ordered to advance
upon Madrid--Cuesta appointed to the command of Galluzzo’s
troops--Florida Blanca dies at Seville--Succeeded in the
presidency by the marquis of Astorga--Money arrives at Cadiz from
Mexico--Bad conduct of the central junta--State of the Spanish
army--Constancy of the soldiers--Infantado moves on Tarancon--His
advanced guard defeated there--French retire towards
Toledo--Disputes in the Spanish army--Battle of Ucles--Retreat
of Infantado--Cartoajal supersedes him, and advances to Ciudad
Real--Cuesta takes post on the Tagus, and breaks down the bridge
of Almaraz _Page_ 1
CHAPTER II.
Operations in Aragon--Confusion in Zaragoza--The third and fifth
corps invest that city--Fortification described--Monte Torrero
taken--Attack on the suburb repulsed--Mortier takes post at
Calatayud--The convent of San Joseph taken--The bridge-head
carried--Huerba passed--Device of the Spanish leaders to
encourage the besieged--Marquis of Lazan takes post on the
Sierra de Alcubierre--Lasnes arrives in the French camp--Recalls
Mortier--Lazan defeated--Gallant exploit of Mariano Galindo--The
walls of the town taken by assault--General Lacoste and colonel
San Genis slain 18
CHAPTER III.
System of terror--The convent of St. Monica taken--Spaniards
attempt to retake it, but fail--St. Augustin taken--French
change their mode of attack--Spaniards change their mode of
defence--Terrible nature of the contest--Convent of Jesus taken
on the side of the suburb--Attack on the suburb repulsed--Convent
of Francisco taken--Mine exploded under the university fails,
and the besieged are repulsed--The Cosso passed--Fresh mines
worked under the university, and in six other places--French
soldiers dispirited--Lasnes encourages them--The houses
leading down to the quay carried by storm--An enormous mine
under the university being sprung, that building is carried
by assault--The suburb is taken--Baron Versage killed, and
two thousand Spaniards surrender--Successful attack on the
right bank of the Ebro--Palafox demands terms, which are
refused--Fire resumed--Miserable condition of the city--Terrible
pestilence, and horrible sufferings of the besieged--Zaragoza
surrenders--Observations 38
CHAPTER IV.
Operations in Catalonia--St. Cyr commands the seventh
corps--Passes the frontier--State of Catalonia--Palacios fixes
his head-quarters at Villa Franca--Duhesme forces the line of
the Llobregat--Returns to Barcelona--English army from Sicily
designed to act in Catalonia--Prevented by Murat--Duhesme forages
El Vallés--Action of San Culgat--General Vives supersedes
Palacios--Spanish army augments--Blockade of Barcelona--Siege
of Rosas--Folly and negligence of the junta--Entrenchments
in the town carried by the besiegers--Marquis of Lazan, with
six thousand men, reaches Gerona--Lord Cochrane enters the
Trinity--Repulses several assaults--Citadel surrenders 5th
December--St. Cyr marches on Barcelona--Crosses the Ter--Deceives
Lazan--Turns Hostalrich--Defeats Milans at San Celoni--Battle of
Cardadeu--Caldagues retires behind the Llobregat--Negligence of
Duhesme--Battle of Molino del Rey 54
CHAPTER V.
Tumult in Tarragona--Reding proclaimed general--Reinforcements
join the Spaniards--Actions at Bruch--Lazan advances, and
fights at Castel Ampurias--He quarrels with Reding, and marches
towards Zaragoza--Reding’s plans--St. Cyr breaks Reding’s
line at Llacuna--Actions at Capelades, Igualada, and St.
Magi--French general, unable to take the abbey of Creuz, turns
it, and reaches Villaradona--Joined by Souham’s division,
takes post at Valls and Pla--Reding rallies his centre and
left wing--Endeavours to reach Taragona--Battle of Valls--Weak
condition of Tortosa--St. Cyr blockades Taragona--Sickness
in that city--St. Cyr resolves to retire--Chabran forces the
bridge of Molino del Rey--Conspiracy in Barcelona fails--Colonel
Briche arrives with a detachment from Aragon--St. Cyr retires
behind the Llobregat--Pino defeats Wimpfen at Tarrasa--Reding
dies--His character--Blake is appointed captain-general of the
_Coronilla_--Changes the line of operations to Aragon--Events
in that province--Suchet takes the command of the French at
Zaragoza--Colonels Pereña and Baget oblige eight French companies
to surrender--Blake advances--Battle of Alcanitz--Suchet falls
back--Disorder in his army--Blake neglects Catalonia--St. Cyr
marches by the valley of Congosto upon Vich--Action at the defile
of Garriga--Lecchi conducts the prisoners to the Fluvia--St.
Cyr hears of the Austrian war--Barcelona victualled by a French
squadron--Observations 78
BOOK VI.
CHAPTER I.
Transactions in Portugal--State of that country--Neglected by
the English cabinet--Sir J. Cradock appointed to command the
British troops--Touches at Coruña--At Oporto--State of this
city--Lusitanian legion--State of Lisbon--Cradock endeavours to
reinforce Moore--Mr. Villiers arrives at Lisbon--Pikes given
to the populace--Destitute state of the army--Mr. Frere, and
others, urge Cradock to move into Spain--The reinforcements
for sir J. Moore halted at Castello Branco--General Cameron
sent to Almeida--French advanced guard reaches Merida--Cradock
relinquishes the design of reinforcing the army in Spain,
and concentrates his own troops at Saccavem--Discontents in
Lisbon--Defenceless state and danger of Portugal--Relieved by sir
J. Moore’s advance to Sahagun 112
CHAPTER II.
French retire from Merida--Send a force to Plasencia--The
direct intercourse between Portugal and sir J. Moore’s army
interrupted--Military description of Portugal--Situation of
the troops--Cradock again pressed, by Mr. Frere and others, to
move into Spain--The ministers ignorant of the real state of
affairs--Cradock hears of Moore’s advance to Sahagun--Embarks two
thousand men to reinforce him--Hears of the retreat to Coruña,
and re-lands them--Admiral Berkely arrives at Lisbon--Ministers
more anxious to get possession of Cadiz than to defend
Portugal--Five thousand men, under general Sherbrooke, embarked
at Portsmouth--Sir George Smith reaches Cadiz--State of that
city--He demands troops from Lisbon--General Mackenzie sails from
thence, with troops--Negotiations with the junta--Mr. Frere’s
weak proceedings--Tumult in Cadiz--The negotiation fails 127
CHAPTER III.
Weakness of the British army in Portugal--General Cameron
marches to Lisbon--Sir R. Wilson remains near Ciudad
Rodrigo--Sir J. Cradock prepares to take a defensive position
at Passo d’Arcos--Double dealing of the regency--The populace
murder foreigners, and insult the British troops--Anarchy in
Oporto--British government ready to abandon Portugal--Change
their intention--Military system of Portugal--the regency demand
an English general--Beresford is sent to them--Sherbrooke’s and
Mackenzie’s troops arrive at Lisbon--Beresford arrives there, and
takes the command of the native force--Change in the aspect of
affairs--Sir J. Cradock encamps at Lumiar--Relative positions of
the allied and French armies--Marshal Beresford desires sir J.
Cradock to march against Soult--Cradock refuses--Various unwise
projects broached by different persons 142
BOOK VII.
CHAPTER I.
Coruña and Ferrol surrender to Soult--He is ordered, by the
emperor, to invade Portugal--The first corps is directed to aid
this operation--Soult goes to St. Jago--Distressed state of the
second corps--Operations of Romana and state of Gallicia--Soult
commences his march--Arrives on the Minho--Occupies Tuy, Vigo,
and Guardia--Drags large boats over land from Guardia to Campo
Saucos--Attempt to pass the Minho--Is repulsed by the Portuguese
peasantry--Importance of this repulse--Soult changes his
plan--Marches on Orense--Defeats the insurgents at Franquera, at
Ribidavia, and in the valley of the Avia--Leaves his artillery
and stores in Tuy--Defeats the Spanish insurgents in several
places, and prepares to invade Portugal--Defenceless state of
the northern provinces of that kingdom--Bernadim Friere advances
to the Cavado river--Sylveira advances to Chaves--Concerts
operations with Romana--Disputes between the Portuguese and
Spanish troops--Ignorance of the generals 162
CHAPTER II.
Soult enters Portugal--Action at Monterey--Franceschi makes
great slaughter of the Spaniards--Portuguese retreat upon
Chaves--Romana flies to Puebla Senabria--Portuguese mutiny--Three
thousand throw themselves into Chaves--Soult takes that
town--Marches upon Braga--Forces the defiles of Ruivaens and
Venda Nova--Tumults and disorders in the Portuguese camp
at Braga--Murder of general Friere and others--Battle of
Braga--Soult marches against Oporto--Disturbed state of that
town--Sylveira retakes Chaves--The French force the passage of
the Ave--The Portuguese murder general Vallonga--French appear
in front of Oporto--Negotiate with the bishop--Violence of the
people--General Foy taken--Battle of Oporto--The city stormed
with great slaughter 183
CHAPTER III.
Operations of the first and fourth corps--General state of the
French army--Description of the valley of the Tagus--Inertness
of marshal Victor--Albuquerque and Cartoajal dispute--The
latter advance in La Mancha--General Sebastiani wins the battle
of Ciudad Real--Marshal Victor forces the passage of the
Tagus, and drives Cuesta’s army from all its positions--French
cavalry checked at Miajadas--Victor crosses the Guadiana
at Medellin--Albuquerque joins Cuesta’s army--Battle of
Medellin--Spaniards totally defeated--Victor ordered, by the
king, to invade Portugal--Opens a secret communication with some
persons in Badajos--The peasants of Albuera discover the plot,
which fails--Operations of general Lapisse--He drives back sir
R. Wilson’s posts, and makes a slight attempt to take Ciudad
Rodrigo--Marches suddenly towards the Tagus, and forces the
bridge of Alcantara--Joins Victor at Merida--General insurrection
along the Portuguese frontier--The central junta remove Cartoajal
from the command, and increase Cuesta’s authority, whose army is
reinforced--Joseph discontented with Lapisse’s movement--Orders
Victor to retake the bridge of Alcantara 208
CHAPTER IV.
The bishop of Oporto flies to Lisbon, and joins the
regency--Humanity of marshal Soult--The Anti-Braganza party
revives in the north of Portugal--The leaders make proposals
to Soult--He encourages them--Error arising out of this
proceeding--Effects of Soult’s policy--Assassination of
colonel Lameth--Execution at Arifana--Distribution of the
French troops--Franceschi opposed, on the Vouga, by colonel
Trant--Loison falls back behind the Souza--Heudelet marches to
the relief of Tuy--The Spaniards, aided by some English frigates,
oblige thirteen hundred French to capitulate at Vigo--Heudelet
returns to Braga--The insurrection in the Entre Minho e Douro
ceases--Sylveira menaces Oporto--Laborde reinforces Loison,
and drives Sylveira over the Tamega--Gallant conduct and death
of colonel Patrick at Amarante--Combats at Amarante--French
repulsed--Ingenious device of captain Brochard--The bridge of
Amarante carried by storm--Loison advances to the Douro--Is
suddenly checked--Observations 231
BOOK VIII.
CHAPTER I.
Anarchy in Portugal--Sir J. Cradock quits the command--Sir
A. Wellesley arrives at Lisbon--Happy effect of his
presence--Nominated captain-general--His military position
described--Resolves to march against Soult--Reaches
Coimbra--Conspiracy in the French army--D’Argenton’s
proceedings--Sir A. Wellesley’s situation compared with that of
Sir J. Cradock 262
CHAPTER II.
Campaign on the Douro--Relative position of the French and
English armies--Sir Arthur Wellesley marches to the Vouga--Sends
Beresford to the Douro--A division under general Hill passes
the lake of Ovar--Attempt to surprise Francheschi fails--Combat
of Grijon--The French re-cross the Douro and destroy the
bridge at Oporto--Passage of the Douro--Soult retreats upon
Amarante--Beresford reaches Amarante--Loison retreats from
that town--Sir Arthur marches upon Braga--Desperate situation
of Soult--His energy--He crosses the Sierra Catalina--Rejoins
Loison--Reaches Carvalho d’Esté--Falls back to Salamonde--Daring
action of major Dulong--The French pass the Ponte Nova
and the Saltador, and retreat by Montalegre--Soult enters
Orense--Observations 277
CHAPTER III.
Romana surprises Villa Franca--Ney advances to Lugo--Romana
retreats to the Asturias--Reforms the government there--Ney
invades the Asturias by the west--Bonnet and Kellerman enter
that province by the east and by the south--General Mahi flies
to the valley of the Syl--Romana embarks at Gihon--Ballasteros
takes St. Andero--Defeated by Bonnet--Kellerman returns to
Valladolid--Ney marches for Coruña--Carera defeats Maucune at
St. Jago Compostella--Mahi blockades Lugo--It is relieved by
Soult--Romana rejoins his army and marches to Orense--Lapisse
storms the bridge of Alcantara--Cuesta advances to the
Guadiana--Lapisse retires--Victor concentrates his army at
Torremocha--Effect of the war in Germany upon that of Spain--Sir
A. Wellesley encamps at Abrantes--The bridge of Alcantara
destroyed--Victor crosses the Tagus at Almaraz--Beresford returns
to the north of Portugal--Ney and Soult combine operations--Soult
scours the valleys of the Syl--Romana cut off from Castile and
thrown back upon Orense--Ney advances towards Vigo--Combat of
San Payo--Misunderstanding between him and Soult--Ney retreats
to Coruña--Soult marches to Zamora--Franceschi falls into the
hands of the Capuchino--His melancholy fate--Ney abandons
Gallicia--View of affairs in Aragon--Battles of Maria and
Belchite 308
CHAPTER IV.
State of the British army--Embarrassments of sir Arthur
Wellesley--State and numbers of the French armies--State and
numbers of the Spanish armies--Some account of the _partidas_,
commonly called _guerillas_--Intrigues of Mr. Frere--Conduct
of the central junta--Their inhuman treatment of the French
prisoners--Corruption and incapacity--State of the Portuguese
army--Impolicy of the British government--Expedition of
Walcheren--Expedition against Italy 334
BOOK IX.
CHAPTER I.
Campaign of Talavera--Choice of operations--Sir Arthur Wellesley
moves into Spain--Joseph marches against Venegas--Orders Victor
to return to Talavera--Cuesta arrives at Almaraz--Sir Arthur
reaches Plasencia--Interview with Cuesta--Plan of operation
arranged--Sir Arthur, embarrassed by the want of provisions,
detaches sir Robert Wilson up the Vera de Plasencia, passes
the Tietar, and unites with Cuesta at Oropesa--Skirmish at
Talavera--Bad conduct of the Spanish troops--Victor takes post
behind the Alberche--Cuesta’s absurdity--Victor retires from the
Alberche--Sir Arthur, in want of provisions, refuses to pass that
river--Intrigues of Mr. Frere--The junta secretly orders Venegas
not to execute his part of the operation 357
CHAPTER II.
Cuesta passes the Alberche--Sir Arthur Wellesley sends two
English divisions to support him--Soult is appointed to command
the second, fifth, and sixth corps--He proposes to besiege Ciudad
Rodrigo and threaten Lisbon--He enters Salamanca, and sends
general Foy to Madrid to concert the plan of operations--The king
quits Madrid--Unites his whole army--Crosses the Guadarama river,
and attacks Cuesta--Combat of Alcabon--Spaniards fall back in
confusion to the Alberche--Cuesta refuses to pass that river--His
dangerous position--The French advance--Cuesta re-crosses the
Tietar--Sir Arthur Wellesley draws up the combined forces on the
position of Talavera--The king crosses the Tietar--Skirmish at
Casa de Salinas--Combat on the evening of the 27th--Panic in the
Spanish army--Combat on the morning of the 28th--The king holds a
council of war--Jourdan and Victor propose different plans--The
king follows that of Victor--Battle of Talavera--The French
re-cross the Alberche--General Craufurd arrives in the English
camp--His extraordinary march--Observations 377
CHAPTER III.
The king goes to Illescas with the fourth corps and
reserve--Sir R. Wilson advances to Escalona--Victor retires
to Maqueda--Conduct of the Spaniards at Talavera--Cuesta’s
cruelty--The allied generals hear of Soult’s movement upon
Baños--Bassecour’s division marches towards that point--The
pass of Baños forced--Sir A. Wellesley marches against
Soult--Proceedings of that marshal--He crosses the Bejar, and
arrives at Plasencia with three _corps d’armée_--Cuesta abandons
the British hospitals, at Talavera, to the enemy, and retreats
upon Oropesa--Dangerous position of the allies--Sir Arthur
crosses the Tagus at Arzobispo--The French arrive near that
bridge--Cuesta passes the Tagus--Combat of Arzobispo--Soult’s
plans overruled by the king--Ney defeats sir R. Wilson at Baños,
and returns to France 410
CHAPTER IV.
Venegas advances to Aranjues--Skirmishes there--Sebastiani
crosses the Tagus at Toledo--Venegas concentrates his
army--Battle of Almonacid--Sir Arthur Wellesley contemplates
passing the Tagus at the Puente de Cardinal, is prevented
by the ill-conduct of the junta--His troops distressed for
provisions--He resolves to retire into Portugal--False charge
made by Cuesta against the British army refuted--Beresford’s
proceedings--Mr. Frere superseded by lord Wellesley--The English
army abandons its position at Jaraceijo and marches towards
Portugal--Consternation of the junta--Sir A. Wellesley defends
his conduct, and refuses to remain in Spain--Takes a position
within the Portuguese frontier--Sickness in the army 429
CHAPTER V.
General observations on the campaign--Comparison between the
operations of sir John Moore and sir A. Wellesley 447
APPENDIX.
_Page_
No. I. Six Sections, containing the returns of the French army 471
II. Three Sections; justificatory extracts from sir J. Moore’s
and sir J. Cradock’s papers, and from Parliamentary
documents, illustrating the state of Spain 475
III. Seven Sections; justificatory extracts from sir J. Cradock’s
papers, illustrating the state of Portugal 480
IV. Extracts from sir J. Cradock’s instructions 491
V. Ditto from sir J. Cradock’s papers relative to a deficiency
in the supply of his troops 492
VI. Three Sections; miscellaneous 495
VII. Extracts from Mr. Frere’s correspondence 497
VIII. Ditto from sir J. Cradock’s papers relating to Cadiz 499
IX. General Mackenzie’s narrative of his proceedings at Cadiz 500
X. Three Sections; extracts from sir J. Cradock’s papers,
shewing that Portugal was neglected by the English cabinet 506
XI. State and distribution of the English troops in Portugal
and Spain, January 6, April 6, April 22, May 1, June 25,
July 25, and September 25, 1809 509
XII. 1º. Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock--2º. Sir J. Cradock
to marshal Beresford 511
XIII. Justificatory extracts relating to the conduct of marshal
Soult 517
XIV. Sir A. Wellesley to sir J. Cradock 519
XV. Ditto to lord Castlereagh 520
XVI. Ditto Ditto 522
XVII. Ditto to the marquis of Wellesley 523
XVIII. 1º. General Hill to sir A. Wellesley--2º. Colonel Stopford
to general Sherbrooke 534
LIST OF PLATES.
No. 1. Siege of Zaragoza _to face page_ 48
2. Operations in Catalonia _to face page_ 102
3. Operations of Cuesta and Victor on the Tagus
and Guadiana _to face page_ 226
4. Passage of the Douro _to face page_ 290
5. Operations between the Mondego and the Mincio _to face page_ 300
6. Operations of marshals Soult and Ney in
Gallicia _to face page_ 326
7. Operations of the British, French & Spanish
armies _to face page_ 409
8. Battle of Talavera _to face page_ 416
NOTICE.
General Semelé’s journal, referred to in this volume, is only an
unattested copy; the rest of the manuscript authorities quoted or
consulted are original papers belonging to, and communications
received from, the duke of Wellington, marshal Soult, marshal
Jourdan, Mr. Stuart,[1] sir J. Cradock,[2] sir John Moore, and
other persons employed either in the British or French armies
during the Peninsular War.
The returns of the French army are taken from the emperor
Napoleon’s original Muster Rolls.
The letter S. marks those papers received from marshal Soult.
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
BOOK V.
CHAPTER I.
The effect produced in England by the unfortunate issue of sir John
Moore’s campaign, was not proportionable to the importance of the
subject. The people, trained to party politics, and possessing no
real power to rebuke the folly of the cabinet, regarded disasters
and triumphs with factious rather than with national feelings,
and it was alike easy to draw the public attention from affairs
of weight, and to fix it upon matters of little moment. In the
beginning of 1809, the duke of York’s conduct being impeached,
a parliamentary investigation followed; and to drag the private
frailties of that prince before the world, was thought essential to
the welfare of the country, when the incapacity which had caused
England and Spain to mourn in tears of blood, was left unprobed.
An insular people only, who are protected by their situation from
the worst evils of war, may suffer themselves to be thus deluded;
but if an unfortunate campaign were to bring a devastating enemy
into the heart of the country, the honour of a general, and the
whole military policy of the cabinet, would no longer be considered
as mere subjects for the exercise of a vile sophist’s talents for
misrepresentation.
It is true that the ill success of the British arms was a topic,
upon which many orators in both houses of parliament expatiated
with great eloquence, but the discussions were chiefly remarkable,
as examples of acute debating without any knowledge of facts. The
opposition speakers, eager to criminate the government, exaggerated
the loss and distress of the retreat, and comprehending neither
the movements nor the motives of sir John Moore, urged several
untenable accusations against their adversaries. The ministers,
disunited by personal feelings, did not all adopt the same ground
of defence. Lord Castlereagh and lord Liverpool, passing over the
errors of the cabinet by which the general had been left only a
choice of difficulties, asserted, and truly, that the advantages
derived from the advance to Sahagun more than compensated for the
losses in the subsequent retreat. Both those statesmen paid an
honourable tribute to the merits of the commander; but Mr. Canning,
unscrupulously resolute to screen Mr. Frere, assented to all the
erroneous statements of the opposition, and endeavoured with
malignant dexterity to convert them into charges against the fallen
general. Sir John Moore was, he said, answerable for the events of
the campaign, whether the operations were glorious or distressful,
whether to be admired or deplored, they were his own, for he had
kept the ministers ignorant of his proceedings. Being pressed
closely on that point by Mr. C. Hutchinson, Mr. Canning repeated
this assertion. Not long afterwards, sir John Moore’s letters,
written almost daily and furnishing exact and copious information
of all that was passing in the Peninsula, were laid before the
house.
The reverses experienced in Spain had somewhat damped the ardour
of the English people; but a cause so rightful in itself, was
still popular, and a treaty having been concluded with the junta,
by which the contracting powers bound themselves to make common
cause against France, and to agree to no peace except by mutual
consent, the ministers appeared resolute to support the contest.
But while professing unbounded confidence in the result of the
struggle, they already looked upon the Peninsula as a secondary
object; for the preparations of Austria, and the reputation of
the archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed
Napoleon’s, had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions. It was
more agreeable to the aristocratic feelings of the English cabinet,
that the French should be defeated by a monarch in Germany, than by
a plebeian insurrection in Spain. The obscure intrigues carried on
through the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies
of Germany emanating as they did from patrician sources, engaged
all the attention of the ministers, and exciting their sympathy,
nursed those distempered feelings, which led them to see weakness
and disaffection in France when, throughout that mighty empire, few
desired and none dared openly to oppose the emperor’s wishes, when
even secret discontent was confined to some royalist chiefs and
splenetic republicans, whose influence was never felt until after
Napoleon had suffered the direst reverses.
Unable to conceive the extent of that monarch’s views, and the
grandeur of his genius, the ministers attributed the results of
his profound calculations to a blind chance, his victories to
treason, to corruption, to any thing but that admirable skill,
with which he wielded the most powerful military force that ever
obeyed the orders of a single chief. And thus self-deluded, and
misjudging the difficulties to be encountered, they adopted every
idle project, and squandered their resources without any great
or decided effort. While negotiating with the Spanish Junta for
the occupation of Cadiz, they were also planning an expedition
against Sicily; and while loudly asserting their resolution to
defend Portugal, reserved their principal force for a blow against
Holland; their preparations for the last object being, however,
carried on with a pomp and publicity little suitable to war. With
what a mortal calamity that pageant closed, shall hereafter be
noticed; but at present it is fitting to describe the operations
that took place in Spain, coincident with and subsequent to the
retreat of sir John Moore.
[Sidenote: Nellerto.]
[Sidenote: Azanza and O’Farril.]
It has been already stated, that when the capital surrendered to
the Emperor, he refused to permit Joseph to return there, unless
the public bodies and the heads of families would unite to demand
his restoration, and swear, without any mental reservation, to
be true to him. Registers had consequently been opened in the
different quarters of the city, and twenty-eight thousand six
hundred heads of families inscribed their names, and voluntarily
swore, in presence of the host, that they were sincere in their
desire to receive Joseph. After this, deputations from all the
councils, from the junta of commerce and money, the hall of the
Alcaldes, and from the corporation, waited on the emperor at
Valladolid, and being there joined by the municipality of that
town, and by deputies from Astorga, Leon, and other places,
presented the oath, and prayed that Joseph might be king. Napoleon
thus entreated, consented that his brother should return to Madrid,
and reassume his kingly functions.
It would be idle to argue from this apparently voluntary submission
to the French emperor, that a change favourable to the usurpation
had been produced in the feelings of the Spanish people; but
it is evident that Napoleon’s victories and policy had been so
far effectual, that in the capital, and many other great towns,
the multitude as well as the notables were, either from fear or
conviction, submissive to his will; and it is but reasonable
to suppose, that if his conquests had not been interrupted by
extraneous circumstances, this example would have been generally
followed, in preference to the more glorious, but ineffectual,
resistance made by the inhabitants of those cities, whose fortitude
and whose calamities have forced from mankind a sorrowful
admiration. The cause of Spain at this moment was in truth lost;
if any cause depending upon war, which is but a succession of
violent and sudden changes, can be called so; for her armies were
dispersed, her government bewildered, and her people dismayed; the
cry of resistance had ceased, and in its stead the stern voice of
Napoleon, answered by the tread of three hundred thousand French
veterans was heard throughout the land. But the hostility of
Austria having arrested the emperor’s career in the Peninsula, the
energy of the Spaniards revived at the abrupt cessation of his
terrific warfare.
[Sidenote: King’s correspondence captured at Vittoria, MSS.]
Joseph, escorted by his French guards, in number between five
and six thousand, entered Madrid in state the 23d of January.
He was, however, a king without revenues, and he would have been
without even the semblance of authority, if he had not been
likewise nominated the emperor’s lieutenant in Spain, by virtue
of which title he was empowered to move the French army at his
will. This power was one extremely unacceptable to the marshals,
and he would have found it difficult to enforce it, even though
he had restrained the exercise to the limits prescribed by his
brother. But disdaining to separate the general from the monarch,
he conveyed his orders to the French army, through his Spanish
ministers, and the army in its turn disdained and resisted the
assumed authority of men, who, despised for their want of military
knowledge, were also suspected as favouring interests essentially
differing from those of the troops.
The iron grasp that had compressed the pride and the ambitious
jealousy of the marshals being thus relaxed, the passions that
had ruined the patriots began to work among their enemies,
producing indeed less fatal effects, because their scope was more
circumscribed, but sufficiently pernicious to stop the course of
conquest. The French army, no longer a compact body, terrible
alike from its massive strength, and its flexible activity,
became a collection of independent bands, each formidable in
itself, but, from the disunion of the generals, slow to combine
for any great object; and plainly discovering, by irregularities
and insubordination, that they knew when a warrior, and when a
voluptuous monarch was at their head; but these evils were only
felt at a later period; and the distribution of the troops, when
Napoleon quitted Valladolid, still bore the impress of his genius.
The first corps was quartered in La Mancha.
The second corps was destined to invade Portugal.
The third and fifth corps carried on the siege of Zaragoza.
The fourth corps remained in the valley of the Tagus.
The sixth corps, wanting its third division, was appointed to hold
Gallicia.
The seventh corps continued always in Catalonia.
The imperial guards, directed on Vittoria, contributed to the
security of the great communication with France until Zaragoza
should fall, and were yet ready to march when wanted for the
Austrian war.
General Dessolles, with the third division of the sixth corps,
returned to Madrid. General Bonnet, with the fifth division of the
second corps, remained in the Montagna St. Andero.
General Lapisse, with the second division of the first corps, was
sent to Salamanca, where he was joined by Maupetit’s brigade of
cavalry, which had crossed the Sierra de Bejar.
The reserve of heavy cavalry being broken up, was distributed, by
divisions, in the following order:--
Latour Maubourg’s joined the first corps. Lorge’s and Lahoussaye’s
were attached to the second corps. Lassalle’s was sent to the
fourth corps. The sixth corps was reinforced with two brigades.
Milhaud’s division remained at Madrid, and Kellerman’s guarded the
lines of communication between Tudela, Burgos, and Palencia.
Thus, Madrid being still the centre of operations, the French were
so distributed, that by a concentric movement on that capital,
they could crush every insurrection within the circle of their
positions; and the great masses, being kept upon the principal
roads diverging from Madrid to the extremities of the Peninsula,
intercepted all communication between the Provinces: while the
second corps, thrust out, as it were, beyond the circumference,
and destined, as the fourth corps had been, to sweep round from
point to point, was sure of finding a supporting army, and a good
line of retreat, at every great route leading from Madrid to the
yet unsubdued provinces of the Peninsula. The communication with
France was, at the same time, secured by the fortresses of Burgos,
Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian; and by the divisions posted at St.
Ander, Burgos, Bilbao, and Vittoria; and it was supported by a
reserve at Bayonne.
The northern provinces were parcelled out into military governments,
the chiefs of which corresponded with each other; and, by the
means of moveable columns, repressed every petty insurrection. The
third and fifth corps, also, having their base at Pampeluna, and
their line of operations directed against Zaragoza, served as an
additional covering force to the communication with France, and were
themselves exposed to no flank attacks, except from the side of
Cuença, where the duke of Infantado commanded; but that general was
himself watched by the first corps.
[Sidenote: Muster-rolls of the French army, MSS.]
All the lines of correspondence, not only from France but between
the different corps, were maintained by fortified posts, having
greater or lesser garrisons, according to their importance.
Between Bayonne and Burgos there were eleven military stations.
Between Burgos and Madrid, by the road of Aranda and Somosierra,
there were eight; and eleven others protected the more circuitous
route to the capital by Valladolid, Segovia, and the Guadarama.
Between Valladolid and Zaragoza the line was secured by fifteen
intermediate points. The communication between Valladolid and St.
Ander contained eight posts; and nine others connected the former
town with Villa Franca del Bierzo, by the route of Benevente and
Astorga; finally, two were established between Benevente and Leon.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1, section 1.]
At this period, the force of the army, exclusive of Joseph’s French
guards, was three hundred and twenty-four thousand four hundred and
eleven men, about thirty-nine thousand being cavalry.
Fifty-eight thousand men were in hospital.
The depôts, governments, garrisons, posts of correspondence,
prisoners, and “_battalions of march_,” composed of stragglers,
absorbed about twenty-five thousand men.
The remainder were under arms, with their regiments; and,
consequently, more than two hundred and forty thousand men were in
the field: while the great line of communication with France was
(and the military reader will do well to mark this, the key-stone
of Napoleon’s system) protected by above fifty thousand men, whose
positions were strengthened by three fortresses and sixty-four
posts of correspondence, each more or less fortified.
Having thus shewn to the reader the military state of the French,
I shall now proceed with the narrative of their operations;
following, as in the first volume, a local rather than a
chronological arrangement of events.
OPERATIONS IN ESTREMADURA AND LA MANCHA.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, sections 2 and 3.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
The defeat of Galluzzo has been incidentally touched upon before.
The duke of Dantzic having observed that the Spanish general, with
six thousand raw levies, pretended to defend a line of forty miles,
made a feint of crossing the Tagus, at Arzobispo, and then suddenly
descending to Almaraz, forced a passage over that bridge, on the
24th of December, killed and wounded many Spaniards, and captured
four guns: and so complete was the dispersion, that for a long time
after, not a man was to be found in arms throughout Estremadura.
The French cavalry were at first placed on the tracks of the
fugitives; but intelligence of sir John Moore’s advance to Sahagun
being received, the pursuit ceased at Merida, and the fourth corps,
which had left eight hundred and thirty men in garrison at Segovia,
took post between Talavera and Placentia. The duke of Dantzic
was then recalled to France, and general Sebastiani succeeded to
the command of the fourth corps. It was at this period that the
first corps (of which the division of Lapisse only had followed
the emperor to Astorga) moved against Toledo, and that town was
occupied without opposition. The French outposts were then pushed
towards Cuença on the one side, and towards the Sierra Morena on
the other.
Meanwhile, the central junta, changing its first design, retired
to Seville, instead of Badajos; and being continually urged, both
by Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere, to make some effort to lighten the
pressure on the English army, ordered Palafox and the duke of
Infantado to advance; the one from Zaragoza towards Tudela, the
other from Cuença towards Madrid. The marquis of Palacios, who had
been removed from Catalonia, and was now at the head of five or
six thousand levies in the Sierra Morena, was also directed to
advance into La Mancha; and Galluzzo, deprived of his command, was
constituted a prisoner, along with Cuesta, Castaños, and a number
of other culpable or unfortunate officers, who, vainly demanding a
judgement on their cases, were dragged from place to place by the
government.
Cuesta was, however, so popular in Estremadura, that the central
junta, although fearing and detesting him, consented to his being
placed at the head of Galluzzo’s fugitives, part of whom had,
when the pursuit ceased, rallied behind the Guadiana, and were
now, with the aid of fresh levies, again taking the form, rather
than the consistence, of an army. This appointment was an act
of deplorable weakness and incapacity. The moral effect was to
degrade the government by exposing its fears and weakness; and, in
a military view, it was destructive, because Cuesta was physically
and mentally incapable of command. Obstinate, jealous, and stricken
in years, he was heedless of time and circumstances, of disposition
and fitness. To punish with a barbarous severity, and to rush
headlong into battle, constituted, in his mind, all the functions
of a general.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 2d.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13. Vol. I.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 2.]
The president, Florida Blanca, being eighty-one years of age, died
at Seville, and the marquis of Astorga succeeded him; but the
character of the junta was in no manner affected by the change.
Some fleeting indications of vigour had been produced by the
imminence of the danger during the flight from Aranjuez, but a
large remittance of silver, from South America, having arrived
at Cadiz, the attention of the members was so absorbed, by this
object, that the public weal was blotted from their remembrance,
and even Mr. Frere, ashamed of their conduct, appeared to acquiesce
in the justness of sir John Moore’s estimate of the value of
Spanish co-operation.
The number of men to be enrolled for the defence of the country had
been early fixed at five hundred thousand, but scarcely one-third
had joined their colours; nevertheless, considerable bodies were
assembling at different points, because the people, especially
those of the southern provinces, although dismayed, were obedient,
and the local authorities, at a distance from the actual scene
of war, rigorously enforced the law of enrolment, and sent the
recruits to the armies, hoping thereby either to stave the war off
from their own districts, or to have the excuse of being without
fighting men, to plead for quiet submission.
The fugitive troops also readily collected again at any given
point, partly from patriotism, partly because the French were in
possession of their native provinces, partly that they attributed
their defeats to the treachery of their generals, and partly
that, being deceived by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the
government, they, with ready vanity, imagined that the enemy had
invariably suffered enormous losses. In fine, for the reasons
mentioned in the commencement of this history, men were to be had
in abundance; but, beyond assembling them and appointing some
incapable person to command, nothing was done for defence.
The officers who were not deceived had no confidence either in
their own troops or in the government, nor were they themselves
confided in or respected by their men. The latter were starved,
were misused, ill-handled, and they possessed neither the compact
strength of discipline nor the daring of enthusiasm. Under such
a system, it was impossible that the peasantry could be rendered
energetic soldiers; and they certainly were not active supporters
of their country’s cause; but, with a wonderful constancy, they
suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, nakedness and
famine, with patience, and displaying, in all their actions and in
all their sentiments, a distinct and powerful national character.
This constancy and the iniquity of the usurpation hallowed their
efforts in despite of their ferocity, and merits respect, though
the vices and folly of the juntas and the leading men rendered the
effect of those efforts nugatory.
Palacios, on the receipt of the orders above mentioned, advanced,
with five thousand men, to Vilharta, in La Mancha, and the duke of
Infantado, anticipating the instructions of the junta, was already
in motion from Cuença. His army, reinforced by the divisions of
Cartoajal and Lilli and by fresh levies, was about twenty thousand
men, of which two thousand were cavalry. To check the incursions
of the French horsemen, he had, a few days after the departure of
Napoleon from Madrid, detached general Senra and general Venegas
with eight thousand infantry and all the horse to scour the country
round Tarancon and Aranjuez; the former halted at Horcajada, and
the latter endeavoured to cut off a French detachment, but was
himself surprised and beaten by a very inferior force.
Marshal Victor, however, withdrew his advanced posts, and,
concentrating Ruffin’s and Villatte’s divisions of infantry and
Latour Maubourg’s cavalry, at Villa de Alorna, in the vicinity of
Toledo, left Venegas in possession of Tarancon. But, among the
Spanish generals, mutual recriminations succeeded this failure:
the duke of Infantado possessed neither authority nor talents to
repress their disputes, and in this untoward state of affairs
receiving the orders of the junta, he immediately projected a
movement on Toledo, intending to seize that place and Aranjuez, to
break down the bridges, and to maintain the line of the Tagus.
Quitting Cuença on the 10th, he reached Horcajada on the 12th, with
ten thousand men, the remainder of the army, commanded by Venegas,
being near Tarancon.
The 13th, the duke having moved to Carascosa, a town somewhat in
advance of Horcajada, met a crowd of fugitives, and heard, with
equal surprise and consternation, that the corps under Venegas was
already destroyed, and the pursuers close at hand.
ROUT OF UCLES.
It appeared that Victor, uneasy at the movements of the Spanish
generals, but ignorant of their situation and intentions, had
quitted Toledo also on the 10th, and marched to Ocaña, whereupon
Venegas, falling back from Tarancon, took a position at Ucles. The
12th, the French continued to advance in two columns, of which the
one, composed of Ruffin’s division and a brigade of cavalry, lost
its way, and arrived at Alcazar; but the other, commanded by Victor
himself, and composed of Villatte’s division, the remainder of the
cavalry, and the parc of artillery, took the road of Ucles, and
came upon the position of Venegas early in the morning of the 13th.
This meeting was unexpected by either party, but the French
attacked without hesitation, and the Spaniards, flying towards
Alcazar, fell in with Ruffin’s division, and were totally
discomfitted. Several thousands laid down their arms, and many,
dispersing, fled across the fields; some, however, keeping their
ranks, made towards Ocaña, where, coming suddenly upon the French
parc of artillery, they received a heavy discharge of grape-shot,
and dispersed. Of the whole force, a small party only, under
general Giron, succeeded in forcing its way by the road of
Carascosa, and so reached the duke of Infantado, who immediately
retreated to Cuença, and without further loss, as the French
cavalry were too fatigued to pursue briskly.
From Cuença the duke sent his artillery towards Valencia, by the
road of Tortola; but himself, with the infantry and cavalry,
marched by Chinchilla, and from thence to Tobarra, on the frontiers
of Murcia.
At Tobarra he turned to his right, and made for Santa Cruz de
Mudela, a town situated near the entrance to the defiles of the
Sierra Morena. There he halted in the beginning of February, after
a painful and circuitous retreat of more than two hundred miles, in
a bad season. But all his artillery had been captured at Tortola,
and his forces were, by desertion and straggling, reduced to a
handful of discontented officers and a few thousand dispirited men,
worn out with fatigue and misery.
[Sidenote: Rocca’s Memoirs.]
Meanwhile, Victor, after scouring a part of the province of Cuença
and disposing of his prisoners, made a sudden march upon Vilharta,
intending to surprise Palacios, but that officer apprized of the
retreat of Infantado had already effected his junction with the
latter at Santa Cruz de Mudela. Whereupon the French marshal
recalling his troops, again occupied his former position at Toledo.
The prisoners taken at Ucles were marched to Madrid, those who
were weak and unable to walk were (according to Mr. Rocca) shot by
the orders of Victor, because the Spaniards had hanged some French
prisoners. If so, it was a barbarous and a shameful retaliation,
unworthy of a soldier; for what justice or honour is there in
revenging the death of one innocent person by the murder of another.
When Victor withdrew his posts the duke of Infantado and Palacios
proceeded to re-organize their forces under the name of the
Carolina Army. The levies from Grenada and other parts were ordered
up, and the cavalry, commanded by the duke of Alburquerque,
endeavoured to surprise a French regiment of dragoons at Mora,
but the latter getting together quickly, made a bold resistance
and effected their retreat with scarcely any loss. Alburquerque
having failed in this attempt retired to Consuegra and was attacked
the next day by superior numbers, but retired fighting and got
safely off. The duke of Infantado was now displaced, and the junta
conferred the command on general Urbina Conde de Cartaojal, who
applied himself to restore discipline, and after a time finding no
enemy in front advanced to Ciudad Real, and taking post on the left
bank of the Upper Guadiana opened a communication with Cuesta. At
this period the latter’s force amounted to sixteen thousand men, of
which three thousand were cavalry; for, as the Spaniards generally
suffered more in their flights than in their battles, the horsemen
escaped with little damage and were easily rallied again in greater
relative numbers than the infantry.
The fourth corps having withdrawn, as I have already related, to
the right bank of the Tagus, Cuesta advanced from the Guadiana and
occupied the left bank of that river, on a line extending from the
mountains in front of Arzobispo to the Puerto de Mirabete. The
French, by fortifying an old tower, held the command of the bridge
of Arzobispo, but Cuesta immediately broke down that of Almaraz,
a magnificent structure, the centre arch of which was more than a
hundred and fifty feet in height.
In these positions the troops on either side remained tranquil both
in La Mancha and Estremadura, and so ended the exertions made to
lighten the pressure upon the English army. Two French divisions
of infantry and as many brigades of cavalry had more than sufficed
to baffle them, and hence the imminent danger that menaced the
south of Spain, when sir John Moore’s vigorous operations drew the
emperor’s forces to the north, may be justly estimated.
CHAPTER II.
CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGON.
From the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugitives of O’Neil’s,
and a great part of those from Castaños’s army, fled to Zaragoza
and with such speed as to bring the first news of their own
disaster. With the troops, also, came an immense number of
carriages and the military chests, for the roads were wide and
excellent and the pursuit was slack.
The citizens and the neighbouring peasantry were astounded at this
quick and unexpected calamity. They had, with a natural credulity,
relied on the vain and boasting promises of their chiefs, and being
necessarily ignorant of the true state of affairs never doubted
that their vengeance would be sated by a speedy and complete
destruction of the French. When their hopes were thus suddenly
blasted; when they beheld troops, from whom they expected nothing
but victory, come pouring into the town with all the tumult of
panic; when the peasants of all the villages through which the
fugitives passed, came rushing into the city along with the scared
multitude of flying soldiers and camp followers; every heart was
filled with consternation, and the date of Zaragoza’s glory would
have ended with the first siege, if the success at Tudela had been
followed up by the French with that celerity and vigour which the
occasion required.
[Sidenote: Appendix Vol. I.]
Napoleon, foreseeing that this moment of confusion and terror
would arrive, had with his usual prudence provided the means and
given directions for such an instantaneous and powerful attack
as would inevitably have overthrown the bulwark of the eastern
provinces. But the sickness of marshal Lasnes, the difficulty of
communication, the consequent false movements of Moncey and Ney,
in fine, the intervention of fortune, omnipotent as she is in war,
baffled the emperor’s long-sighted calculations, and permitted
the leaders in the city to introduce order among the multitude,
to complete the defensive works, to provide stores, and finally
by a ferocious exercise of power to insure implicit obedience to
their minutest orders. The danger of resisting the enemy appeared
light, when a suspicious word or even a discontented gesture was
instantaneously punished by a cruel death.
[Sidenote: Muster roll of the French Army, MSS.]
The third corps having thus missed the favourable moment for
a sudden assault, and being reduced by sickness, by losses in
battle, and by detachments to seventeen thousand four hundred men,
including the engineers and artillery, was too weak to invest
the city in form, and, therefore, remained in observation on the
Xalon river. Meanwhile, a battering train of sixty guns, with well
furnished parcs, which had been by Napoleon’s orders previously
collected in Pampeluna, were dragged by cattle to Tudela and
embarked upon the canal leading to Zaragoza.
[Sidenote: Cavalhero. Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.]
Marshal Mortier, with the fifth corps, was also directed to assist
in the siege, and he was in march to join Moncey, when his progress
also was arrested by sir John Moore’s advance towards Burgos. But
the utmost scope of that general’s operation being soon determined
by Napoleon’s counter-movement, Mortier resumed his march to
reinforce Moncey, and, on the 20th of December, their united corps,
forming an army of thirty-five thousand men of all arms, advanced
against Zaragoza. At this time, however, confidence had been
restored in that town, and all the preparations necessary for a
vigorous defence were completed.
The nature of the plain in which Zaragoza is situated, the course
of the rivers, the peculiar construction of the houses, and
the multitude of convents have been already described, but the
difficulties to be encountered by the French troops were no longer
the same as in the first siege. At that time but little assistance
had been derived from science, but now, instructed by experience
and inspired as it were by the greatness of their resolution,
neither the rules of art nor the resources of genius were neglected
by the defenders.
Zaragoza offered four irregular fronts, of which the first,
reckoning from the right of the town, extended from the Ebro to
a convent of barefooted Carmelites, and was about three hundred
yards wide.
The second, twelve hundred yards in extent, reached from the
Carmelites to a bridge over the Huerba.
The third, likewise of twelve hundred yards, stretched from this
bridge to an oil manufactory built beyond the walls.
The fourth, being on an opening of four hundred yards, reached from
the oil manufactory to the Ebro.
[Sidenote: Rogniat’s Seige of Zaragoza. Cavalhero’s Siege of
Zaragoza.]
The first front, fortified by an ancient wall and flanked by the
guns on the Carmelite, was strengthened by some new batteries and
ramparts, and by the Castle of Aljaferia, commonly called the
Castle of the Inquisition, which stood a little in advance. This
was a fort of a square form having a bastion and tower at each
corner, and a good stone ditch, and it was connected with the body
of the place by certain walls loop-holed for musketry.
The second front was defended by a double wall, the exterior
one being of recent erection, faced with sun-dried bricks, and
covered by a ditch with perpendicular sides fifteen feet deep
and twenty feet asunder. The flanks of this front were derived
from the convent of the Carmelites, from a large circular battery
standing in the centre of the line, from a fortified convent of
the Capuchins, called the Trinity, and from some earthen works
protecting the head of the bridge over the Huerba.
The third front was covered by the river Huerba, the deep bed of
which was close to the foot of the ramparts. Behind this stream a
double entrenchment was carried from the bridge-head to the large
projecting convent of Santa Engracia, a distance of two hundred
yards. Santa Engracia itself was very strongly fortified and armed;
and, from thence to the oil manufactory, the line of defence was
prolonged by an ancient Moorish wall, on which several terraced
batteries were raised, to sweep all the space between the rampart
and the Huerba. These batteries, and the guns in the convent of
Santa Engracia, likewise overlooked some works raised to protect a
second bridge that crossed the river, about cannot-shot below the
first.
Upon the right bank of the Huerba, and a little below the second
bridge, stood the convent of San Joseph, the walls of which had
been strengthened and protected by a deep ditch with a covered way
and pallisade. It was well placed to impede the enemy’s approaches,
and to facilitate sorties on the right bank of the river; and it
was, as I have said, open, in the rear, to the fire of the works at
the second bridge, and both were again overlooked by the terraced
batteries, and by the guns of Santa Engracia.
The fourth front was protected by the Huerba, by the continuation
of the old city wall, by new batteries and entrenchments, and by
several armed convents and large houses.
Beyond the walls the Monte Torrero, which commanded all the plain
of Zaragoza, was crowned by a large, ill-constructed fort, raised
at the distance of eighteen hundred yards from the convent of San
Joseph. This work was covered by the royal canal, the sluices of
which were defended by some field-works, open to the fire of the
fort itself.
[Sidenote: Cavalhero.]
On the left bank of the Ebro the suburb, built in a low marshy
plain, was protected by a chain of redoubts and fortified houses.
Finally, some gun-boats, manned by seamen from the naval arsenal
of Carthagena, completed the circuit of defence. The artillery of
the place was, however, of too small a calibre. There were only
sixty guns carrying more than twelve-pound balls; and there were
but eight large mortars. There was, however, no want of small arms,
many of which were English that had been supplied by colonel Doyle.
These were the regular external defences of Zaragoza, most of which
were constructed at the time, according to the skill and means of
the engineers; but the experience of the former siege had taught
the people not to trust to the ordinary resources of art, and, with
equal genius and resolution, they had prepared an internal system
of defence infinitely more efficacious.
It has been already observed that the houses of Zaragoza were
fire-proof, and, generally, of only two stories, and that, in
all the quarters of the city, the numerous massive convents and
churches rose like castles above the low buildings, and that the
greater streets, running into the broad-way called the Cosso,
divided the town into a variety of districts, unequal in size, but
each containing one or more large structures. Now, the citizens,
sacrificing all personal convenience, and resigning all idea of
private property, gave up their goods, their bodies, and their
houses to the war, and, being promiscuously mingled with the
peasantry and the regular soldiers, the whole formed one mighty
garrison, well suited to the vast fortress into which Zaragoza
was transformed: for, the doors and windows of the houses were
built up, and their fronts loop-holed; internal communications
were broken through the party-walls, and the streets were trenched
and crossed by earthen ramparts, mounted with cannon, and every
strong building was turned into a separate fortification. There
was no weak point, because there could be none in a town which
was all fortress, and where the space covered by the city was
the measurement for the thickness of the ramparts: nor in this
emergency were the leaders unmindful of moral force.
The people were cheered by a constant reference to the former
successful resistance; their confidence was raised by the
contemplation of the vast works that had been executed; and it
was recalled to their recollection that the wet, usual at that
season of the year, would spread disease among the enemy’s ranks,
and would impair, if not entirely frustrate, his efforts. Neither
was the aid of superstition neglected: processions imposed upon
the sight, false miracles bewildered the imagination, and terrible
denunciations of the divine wrath shook the minds of men, whose
former habits and present situation rendered them peculiarly
susceptible of such impressions. Finally, the leaders were
themselves so prompt and terrible in their punishments that the
greatest cowards were likely to show the boldest bearing in their
wish to escape suspicion.
To avoid the danger of any great explosion, the powder was made as
occasion required; and this was the more easily effected because
Zaragoza contained a royal depôt and refinery for salt-petre, and
there were powder-mills in the neighbourhood, which furnished
workmen familiar with the process of manufacturing that article.
The houses and trees beyond the walls were all demolished and cut
down, and the materials carried into the town. The public magazines
contained six months’ provisions; the convents were well stocked,
and the inhabitants had, likewise, laid up their own stores for
several months. General Doyle also sent a convoy into the town from
the side of Catalonia, and there was abundance of money, because,
in addition to the resources of the town, the military chest of
Castaños’s army, which had been supplied only the night before the
battle of Tudela, was, in the flight, carried to Zaragoza.
[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, M.S. Cavalhero, Siege of
Zaragoza.]
Companies of women, enrolled to attend the hospitals and to carry
provisions and ammunition to the combatants, were commanded by the
countess of Burita, a lady of an heroic disposition, who is said to
have displayed the greatest intelligence and the noblest character
during both sieges. There were thirteen engineer officers, and
eight hundred sappers and miners, composed of excavators formerly
employed on the canal, and there were from fifteen hundred to two
thousand cannoneers.
The regular troops that fled from Tudela, being joined by two small
divisions, which retreated, at the same time, from Sanguessa and
Caparosa, formed a garrison of thirty thousand men, and, together
with the inhabitants and peasantry, presented a mass of fifty
thousand combatants, who, with passions excited almost to phrensy,
awaited an assault amidst those mighty entrenchments, where each
man’s home was a fortress and his family a garrison. To besiege,
with only thirty-five thousand men, a city so prepared was truly a
gigantic undertaking!
SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.
[Sidenote: Rogniat.]
The 20th of December, the two marshals, Moncey and Mortier, having
established their hospitals and magazines at Alagon on the Xalon,
advanced in three columns against Zaragoza.
The first, composed of the infantry of the third corps, marched by
the right bank of the canal.
The second, composed of general Suchet’s division of the fifth
corps, marched between the canal and the Ebro.
The third, composed of general Gazan’s division of infantry,
crossed the Ebro opposite to Tauste, and from thence made an
oblique march to the Gallego river.
The right and centre columns arrived in front of the town that
evening. The latter, after driving back the Spanish advanced
guards, halted at a distance of a league from the Capuchin convent
of the Trinity; the former took post on both sides of the Huerba,
and, having seized the aqueduct by which the canal is carried
over that river, proceeded, in pursuance of Napoleon’s orders, to
raise batteries, and to make dispositions for an immediate assault
on Monte Torrero. Meanwhile general Gazan, with the left column,
marching by Cartejon and Zuera reached Villa Nueva, on the Gallego
river, without encountering an enemy.
[Sidenote: Cavalhero.]
The Monte Torrero was defended by five thousand Spaniards, under
the command of general St. Marc; but, at day-break on the 21st,
the French opened their fire against the fort, and one column of
infantry having attracted the attention of the Spaniards, a second,
unseen, crossed the canal under the aqueduct, and, penetrating
between the fort and the city, entered the former by the rear,
and, at the same time, a third column stormed the works protecting
the great sluices. These sudden attacks, and the loss of the fort,
threw the Spaniards into confusion, and they hastily retired to the
town, which so enraged the plebeian leaders that the life of St.
Marc was with difficulty saved by Palafox.
[Sidenote: Rogniat.]
It had been concerted among the French that general Gazan should
assault the suburb, simultaneously with the attack on the Torrero;
and that officer, having encountered a body of Spanish and Swiss
troops placed somewhat in advance, drove the former back so
quickly that the Swiss, unable to make good their retreat, were,
to the number of three or four hundred, killed or taken. But,
notwithstanding this fortunate commencement, Gazan did not attack
the suburb itself until after the affair at Monte Torrero was
over, and then only upon a single point, and without any previous
examination of the works. The Spaniards, recovering from their
first alarm, soon reinforced this point, and Gazan was forced to
desist, with the loss of four hundred men. This important failure
more than balanced the success against the Monte Torrero. It
restored the shaken confidence of the Spaniards at a most critical
moment, and checking in the French, at the outset, that impetuous
spirit, that impulse of victory, which great generals so carefully
watch and improve, threw them back upon the tedious and chilling
process of the engineer.
The 24th of December the investment of Zaragoza was completed on
both sides of the Ebro. General Gazan occupied the bridge over
the Gallego with his left, and covered his front from sorties by
inundations and cuts that the low, marshy plain where he was posted
enabled him to make without difficulty.
General Suchet occupied the space between the Upper Ebro and the
Huerba.
Morlot’s division of the 3d corps encamped in the broken hollow
that formed the bed of that stream.
General Meusnier’s division crowned the Monte Torrero, and general
Grandjean continuing the circuit to the Lower Ebro, communicated
with Gazan’s posts on the other side. Several Spanish detachments
that had been sent out to forage were thus cut off, and could never
re-enter the town; and a bridge of boats being constructed on the
Upper Ebro completed the circle of investment, and ensured a free
intercourse between the different quarters of the army.
General Lacoste, an engineer of reputation, and aide-de-camp to
the Emperor, directed the siege. His plan was, that one false and
two real attacks should be conducted by regular approaches on the
right bank of the Ebro, and he still hoped to take the suburb by
a sudden assault. The trenches being opened on the night of the
29th of December, the 30th the place was summoned, and the terms
dictated by Napoleon when he was at Aranda de Duero, were offered.
The example of Madrid was also cited to induce a surrender. Palafox
replied, that--If Madrid had surrendered, Madrid had been sold:
Zaragoza would neither be sold nor surrender! On the receipt of
this haughty answer the attacks were commenced; the right being
directed against the convent of San Joseph; the centre against the
upper bridge over the Huerba; the left, which was the false one,
against the castle of Aljaferia.
The 31st Palafox made sorties against all the three attacks. From
the right and centre he was beaten back with loss, and he was
likewise repulsed on the left at the trenches: but some of his
cavalry gliding between the French parallel and the Ebro surprised
and cut down a post of infantry stationed behind some ditches that
intersected the low ground on the bank of that river. This trifling
success exalted the enthusiasm of the besieged, and Palafox
gratified his personal vanity by boasting proclamations and orders
of the day, some of which bore the marks of genius, but the greater
part were ridiculous.
The 1st of January the second parallels of the true attacks were
commenced. The next day Palafox caused the attention of the
besiegers to be occupied on the right bank of the Ebro, by slight
skirmishes, while he made a serious attack from the side of the
suburb on general Gazan’s lines of contrevallation. This sally was
repulsed with loss, but, on the right bank, the Spaniards obtained
some success.
Marshal Moncey being called to Madrid, Junot assumed the command
of the third corps, and, about the same time, marshal Mortier was
directed to take post at Calatayud, with Suchet’s division of the
fifth corps, for the purpose of securing the communication with
Madrid. The gap in the circle of investment left by this draft of
eight thousand men, being but scantily stopped by extending general
Morlot’s division, a line of contrevallation was constructed at
that part to supply the place of numbers.
The besieged, hoping and expecting each day that the usual falls
of rain taking place would render the besiegers’ situation
intolerable, continued their fire briskly, and worked counter
approaches on to the right of the French attacks: but the season
was unusually dry, and a thick fog rising each morning covered the
besiegers’ advances and protected their workmen, both from the fire
and from the sorties of the Spaniards.
The 10th of January, thirty-two pieces of French artillery being
mounted and provisioned, the convent of San Joseph and the head of
the bridge over the Huerba, were battered in breach, and, at the
same time, the town was bombarded. San Joseph was so much injured
by this fire that the Spaniards, resolving to evacuate it, withdrew
their guns. Nevertheless, two hundred of their men made a vigorous
sortie at midnight, and were upon the point of entering one of the
French batteries, when they were taken in flank by two guns loaded
with grape, and were, finally, driven back, with loss of half their
number.
The 11th, the besiegers’ batteries continued to play on San Joseph
with such success that the breach became practicable, and, at
four o’clock in the evening, some companies of infantry, with two
field-pieces, attacked by the right, and a column was kept in
readiness to assail the front, when this attack should have shaken
the defence. Two other companies of chosen men were directed to
search for an entrance by the rear, between the fort and the river.
The defences of the convent were reduced to a ditch eighteen feet
deep, and a covered way which, falling back by both flanks to the
Huerba, was then extended along the banks of that river for some
distance. A considerable number of men still occupied this covered
way: but, when the French field-pieces on the right raked it with
a fire of grape, the Spaniards were thrown into confusion, and
crossing the bed of the river took shelter in the town. At that
moment the front of the convent was assaulted; but, while the depth
of the ditch and the Spanish fire checked the impetuosity of the
assailants at that point; the chosen companies passed round the
works, and finding a small bridge over the ditch crossed it, and
entered the convent by the rear. The front was carried by escalade,
almost at the same moment, and the few hundred Spaniards that
remained were killed or made prisoners.
The French, who had suffered but little in this assault,
immediately lodged themselves in the convent, raised a rampart
along the edge of the Huerba, and commenced batteries against the
body of the place and against the works at the head of the upper
bridge, from whence, as well as from the town, they were incommoded
by the fire that played into the convent.
The 15th, the bridge-head, in front of Santa Engracia, was carried
with the loss of only three men; but the Spaniards cut the bridge
itself, and sprung a mine under the works; the explosion, however,
occasioned no mischief, and the third parallels being soon
completed, and the trenches of the two attacks united, the defences
of the besieged were thus confined to the town itself. They could
no longer make sallies on the right bank of the Huerba without
overcoming the greatest difficulties. The passage of the Huerba was
then effected by the French, and breaching and counter-batteries,
mounting fifty pieces of artillery, were constructed against the
body of the place. The fire of these guns played also upon the
bridge over the Ebro, and interrupted the communication between the
suburb and the town.
Unshaken by this aspect of affairs, the Spanish leaders, with great
readiness of mind, immediately forged intelligence of the defeat of
the emperor, and, with the sound of music, and amidst the shouts
of the populace, proclaimed the names of the marshals who had been
killed; asserting, also, that Palafox’s brother, the marquis of
Lazan, was already wasting France. This intelligence, extravagant
as it was, met with implicit credence, for such was the disposition
of the Spaniards throughout this war, that the imaginations of the
chiefs were taxed to produce absurdities proportionable to the
credulity of their followers; hence the boasting of the leaders and
the confidence of the besieged augmented as the danger increased,
and their anticipations of victory seemed realized when the
night-fires of a succouring force were discerned blazing on the
hills behind Gazan’s troops.
The difficulties of the French were indeed fast increasing,
for while enclosing Zaragoza they were themselves encircled by
insurrections, and their supplies so straightened that famine was
felt in their camp. Disputes amongst the generals also diminished
the vigour of the operations, and the bonds of discipline being
relaxed, the military ardour of the troops naturally became
depressed. The soldiers reasoned openly upon the chances of
success, which, in times of danger, is only one degree removed from
mutiny.
The nature of the country about Zaragoza was exceedingly favourable
to the Spaniards. The town, although situated in a plain, was
surrounded, at the distance of some miles, by strong and high
mountains, and, to the south, the fortresses of Mequinenza and
Lerida afforded a double base of operations for any forces that
might come from Catalonia and Valencia. The besiegers drew all
their supplies from Pampeluna, and consequently their long line
of operations, running through Alagon, Tudela, and Caparosa, was
difficult to defend from the insurgents, who, being gathered
in considerable numbers in the Sierra de Muela and on the side
of Epila, threatened Alagon, while others, descending from the
mountain of Soria, menaced the important point of Tudela.
The marquis of Lazan, anxious to assist his brother, had drafted
five thousand men from the Catalonian army, and taking post in
the Sierra de Liciñena, or Alcubierre, on the left of the Ebro,
drew together all the armed peasantry of the valleys as high as
Sanguessa, and extending his line from Villa Franca on the Ebro to
Zuera on the Gallego, hemmed in the division of Gazan, and even
sent detachments as far as Caparosa to harass the French convoys
coming from Pampeluna.
To maintain their communications and to procure provisions
the besiegers had placed between two or three thousand men in
Tudela, Caparosa, and Tafalla, and some hundreds in Alagon and at
Montalbarra. Between the latter town and the investing army six
hundred and fifty cavalry were stationed: a like number were posted
at Santa Fé, to watch the openings of the Sierra de Muela, and
sixteen hundred cavalry with twelve hundred infantry, under the
command of general Wathier, were pushed towards the south as far
as Fuentes, Wathier, falling suddenly upon an assemblage of four
or five thousand insurgents that had taken post at Belchite, broke
and dispersed them, and then pursuing his victory took the town of
Alcanitz, and established himself there in observation for the rest
of the siege. But Lazan still maintained himself in the Alcubierre.
[Sidenote: Rogniat.]
In this state of affairs marshal Lasnes, having recovered from
his long sickness, arrived before Zaragoza, and took the supreme
command of both corps on the 22d of January. The influence of
his firm and vigorous character was immediately perceptible;
he recalled Suchets division from Calatayud, where it had been
lingering without necessity, and, sending it across the Ebro,
ordered Mortier to attack Lazan. At the same time a smaller
detachment was directed against the insurgents in Zuera, and,
meanwhile, Lasnes repressing all disputes, restored discipline in
the army, and pressed the siege with infinite resolution.
The detachment sent to Zuera defeated the insurgents and took
possession of that place and of the bridge over the Gallego.
Mortier encountered the Spanish advanced guard at Perdeguera, and
pushed it back to Nuestra Señora de Vagallar, where the main body,
several thousand strong, was posted. After a short resistance, the
whole fled, and the French cavalry took four guns; Mortier then
spreading his troops in a half circle, extending from Huesca to
Pina on the Ebro, awed all the country lying between those places
and Zaragoza, and prevented any further insurrections.
A few days before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, the besieged being
exceedingly galled by the fire from a mortar-battery, situated at
some distance behind the second parallel of the central attack,
eighty volunteers, under the command of Don Mariano Galindo,
endeavoured to silence it. They surprised and bayonetted the guard
in the nearest trenches, and passing on briskly to the battery,
entered it, and were proceeding to spike the artillery, when
unfortunately the reserve of the French arrived, and, the alarm
being given, the guards of the first trenches also assembled in
the rear of this gallant band, intercepting all retreat. Thus
surrounded, Galindo, fighting bravely, was wounded and taken, and
the greatest part of his comrades perished with as much honour as
simple soldiers can attain.
The armed vessels in the river now made an attempt to flank the
works raised against the castle of Aljaferia, but the French
batteries forced them to drop down the stream again; and between
the nights of the 21st and the 26th of January the besiegers’
works being carried across the Huerba, the third parallels of the
real attacks were completed. The oil manufactory and some other
advantageous posts, on the left bank of the above-named river,
were also taken possession of and included in the works, and at
the false attack a second parallel was commenced at the distance
of a hundred and fifty yards from the castle of Aljaferia; but
these advantages were not obtained without loss. The Spaniards made
sallies, in one of which they spiked two guns and burnt a French
post on the right.
The besiegers’ batteries had, however, broken the wall of the
town in several places. Two practicable breaches were made nearly
fronting the convent of San Joseph; a third was commenced in the
convent of Saint Augustin, facing the oil manufactory. The convent
of San Engracia was laid completely open to an assault; and, on
the 29th, at twelve o’clock, the whole army being under arms, four
chosen columns rushed out of the trenches, and burst upon the
ruined works of Zaragoza.
On the right, the assailants twice stormed an isolated stone house
that defended the breach of Saint Augustin, and twice they were
repulsed, and finally driven back with loss.
In the centre, the attacking column, regardless of two small mines
that exploded at the foot of the walls, carried the breach fronting
the oil manufactory, and then endeavoured to break into the town;
but the Spaniards retrenched within the place, opened such a fire
of grape and musquetry that the French were content to establish
themselves on the summit of the breach, and to connect their
lodgement with the trenches by new works.
The third column was more successful; the breach was carried, and
the neighbouring houses also, as far as the first large cross
street; beyond that, the assailants could not penetrate, but they
were enabled to establish themselves within the walls of the town,
and immediately brought forward their trenches, so as to comprehend
this lodgement within their works.
The assault of the fourth column, which was directed against San
Engracia, was made with such rapidity and vigour that the Polish
regiment of the Vistula not only carried that convent itself, but
the one adjoining to it; and the victorious troops, unchecked
by the fire from the houses, and undaunted by the simultaneous
explosion of six small mines planted in their path, swept the
ramparts to the left as far as the bridge over the Huerba; and, at
that moment, the guards of the trenches, excited by the success of
their comrades, broke forth, without orders, mounted the walls,
pushed along the ramparts to the left, bayonetted the artillery-men
at their guns in the Capuchin convent, and, continuing their
career, endeavoured some to reach the semicircular battery and the
Misericordia, and others to break into the town.
This wild assault was soon checked by grape from two guns planted
behind a traverse on the ramparts, and by a murderous fire from
the houses. As their ranks were thinned, the ardour of the French
sunk, and the courage of their adversaries increased. The former
were, after a little, driven back upon the Capuchins; and the
Spaniards were already breaking into that convent in pursuit, when
two battalions, detached by general Morlot from the trenches of
the false attack, arrived, and secured possession of that point,
which was moreover untenable by the Spaniards, inasmuch as the guns
of the convent of Santa Engracia saw it in reverse. The French
took, on this day, more than six hundred men. But general La
Coste immediately abandoned the false attack against the castle,
fortified the Capuchin convent and a house situated at an angle of
the wall abutting upon the bridge over the Huerba, and then joining
them by works to his trenches, the ramparts of the town became the
front line of the French.
The walls of Zaragoza thus went to the ground, but Zaragoza herself
remained erect; and, as the broken girdle fell from the heroic
city, the besiegers started at the view of her naked strength. The
regular defences had, indeed, crumbled before the skill of the
assailants; but the popular resistance was immediately called, with
all its terrors, into action; and, as if Fortune had resolved to
mark the exact moment when the ordinary calculations of science
should cease, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously
slain. The French general, La Coste, a young man, intrepid,
skilful, and endowed with genius, perished like a brave soldier;
but the Spanish colonel, San Genis, died not only with the honour
of a soldier, but the glory of a patriot; falling in the noblest
cause, his blood stained the ramparts which he had himself raised
for the protection of his native place.
CHAPTER III.
[Sidenote: Cavalhero.]
The war being now carried into the streets of Zaragoza, the sound
of the alarm-bell was heard over all the quarters of the city; and
the people, assembling in crowds, filled the houses nearest to the
lodgements made by the French. Additional traverses and barricadoes
were constructed across the principal streets; mines were prepared
in the more open spaces; and the communications from house to house
were multiplied, until they formed a vast labyrinth, of which the
intricate windings were only to be traced by the weapons and the
dead bodies of the defenders. The members of the junta, become more
powerful from the cessation of regular warfare, with redoubled
activity and energy urged the defence, but increased the horrors of
the siege by a ferocity pushed to the very verge of phrenzy. Every
person, without regard to rank or age, who excited the suspicions
of these furious men, or of those immediately about them, was
instantly put to death; and amidst the noble bulwarks of war, a
horrid array of gibbets was to be seen, on which crowds of wretches
were suspended each night, because their courage had sunk beneath
the accumulating dangers of their situation, or because some
doubtful expression or gesture of distress had been misconstrued by
their barbarous chiefs.
[Sidenote: Rogniat.]
From the heights of the walls which he had conquered, marshal
Lasnes contemplated this terrific scene; and, judging that men so
passionate, and so prepared, could not be prudently encountered
in open battle, he resolved to proceed by the slow, but certain
process of the mattock and the mine: and this was also in unison
with the emperor’s instructions. Hence from the 29th of January to
the 2d of February, the efforts of the French were directed to the
enlargement of their lodgements on the walls; and they succeeded,
after much severe fighting and several explosions, in working
forward through the nearest houses; but, at the same time, they had
to sustain many counter-assaults from the Spaniards; especially
one, exceedingly fierce, made by a friar on the Capuchins’ convent
of the Trinity.
It has been already observed that the crossing of the large streets
divided the town into certain small districts, or islands of
houses. To gain possession of these, it was necessary not only to
mine but to fight for each house. To cross the large intersecting
streets, it was indispensable to construct traverses above or to
work by underground galleries; because a battery raked each street,
and each house was defended by a garrison that, generally speaking,
had only the option of repelling the enemy in front or dying on the
gibbet erected behind. But, as long as the convents and churches
remained in possession of the Spaniards, the progress of the French
among the islands of small houses was of little advantage to them,
because the large garrisons in the greater buildings enabled the
defenders not only to make continual and successful sallies, but
also to countermine their enemies, whose superior skill in that
kind of warfare was often frustrated by the numbers and persevering
energy of the besieged.
To overcome these obstacles the breaching batteries opposite the
fourth front fired upon the convents of Saint Augustin and Saint
Monica, and the latter was assaulted on the 31st of January. At the
same time a part of the wall in another direction being thrown down
by a petard, a body of the besiegers poured in and taking the main
breach in rear, cleared not only the convent but several houses
around it. The Spaniards undismayed immediately opened a gallery
from St. Augustin and worked a mine under Saint Monica, but at the
moment of its being charged the French discovered and stifled the
miners.
The 1st of February the breach in Saint Augustin, also, became
practicable, and the attention of the besieged being drawn to that
side, the French sprung a mine which they had carried under the
wall from the side of Saint Monica and immediately entered by the
opening. The Spaniards thus unexpectedly taken in the rear, were
thrown into confusion and driven out with little difficulty. They,
however, rallied in a few hours after and attempted to retake the
structure, but without success, and the besiegers animated by this
advantage broke into the neighbouring houses and, at one push,
carried so many as to arrive at the point where the street called
the Quemada joined the Cosso, or public walk. The besieged rallied,
however, at the last house of the Quemada, and renewed the combat
with so much fury that the French were beaten from the greatest
part of the houses they had taken, and suffered a loss of above a
hundred men.
On the side of San Engracia a contest still more severe took place;
the houses in the vicinity were blown up, but the Spaniards fought
so obstinately for the ruins that the Polish troops were scarcely
able to make good their lodgement--although two successive and
powerful explosions had, with the buildings, destroyed a number of
the defenders.
The experience of these attacks induced a change in the mode of
fighting on both sides. Hitherto the play of the French mines
had reduced the houses to ruins, and thus the soldiers were
exposed completely to the fire from the next Spanish posts. The
engineers, therefore, diminished the quantity of powder that the
interior only might fall and the outward walls stand, and this
method was found successful. Hereupon the Spaniards, with ready
ingenuity, saturated the timbers and planks of the houses with
rosin and pitch, and setting fire to those which could no longer
be maintained, interposed a burning barrier which often delayed
the assailants for two days, and always prevented them from
pushing their successes during the confusion that necessarily
followed the bursting of the mines. The fighting was, however,
incessant, a constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the
crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and the continued
echo of musquetry deafened the ear, while volumes of smoke and
dust clouded the atmosphere and lowered continually over the heads
of the combatants, as hour by hour, the French with a terrible
perseverance pushed forward their approaches to the heart of the
miserable but glorious city.
Their efforts were chiefly directed against two points, namely
that of San Engracia, which may be denominated the left attack,
and that of Saint Augustin and Saint Monica which constituted the
right attack. At San Engracia they laboured on a line perpendicular
to the Cosso, from which they were only separated by the large
convent of the Daughters of Jerusalem, and by the hospital for
madmen, which was entrenched, although in ruins since the first
siege. The line of this attack was protected on the left by the
convent of the Capuchins, which La Coste had fortified to repel
the counter assaults of the Spaniards. The right attack was more
diffused, because the localities presented less prominent features
to determine the direction of the approaches; and the French
having mounted a number of light six-inch mortars, on peculiar
carriages, drew them from street to street, and house to house,
as occasion offered. On the other hand the Spaniards continually
plied their enemies with hand grenades, which seem to have produced
a surprising effect, and in this manner the never-ceasing combat
was prolonged until the 7th of February, when the besiegers, by
dint of alternate mines and assaults, had worked their perilous way
at either attack to the Cosso, but not without several changes of
fortune and considerable loss. They were, however, unable to obtain
a footing on that public walk, for the Spaniards still disputed
every house with undiminished resolution.
Meanwhile, Lasnes having caused trenches to be opened on the left
bank of the Ebro, a battery of twenty guns played against an
isolated structure called the Convent of Jesus, which covered the
right of the suburb line. On the 7th of February this convent was
carried by storm, and with so little difficulty that the French,
supposing the Spaniards to be panic stricken, assailed the suburb
itself, but were quickly driven back with loss; they, however, made
good their lodgement in the convent.
On the town side the 8th, 9th, and 10th were wasted by the
besiegers in vain attempts to pass the Cosso; they then extended
their flanks. On the right with a view to reach the quay, and so
connect this attack with that against the suburb, and on the left
to obtain possession of the large and strongly built convent of
Saint Francisco, in which after exploding an immense mine and
making two assaults they finally established themselves.
The 11th and 12th, mines were worked under the university, a
large building on the Spanish side of the Cosso, in the line of
the right attack; but their play was insufficient to open the
walls, and the storming party was beaten, with the loss of fifty
men. Nevertheless, the besiegers continuing their labours during
the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, passed the Cosso by means
of traverses, and prepared fresh mines under the university, but
deferred their explosion until a simultaneous effort could be
combined on the side of the suburb.
At the left attack also, a number of houses, bordering on the
Cosso being gained, a battery was established that raked that
great thoroughfare above ground, while under it six galleries were
carried, and six mines loaded to explode at the same moment; but
the spirit of the French army was now exhausted; they had laboured
and fought without intermission for fifty days; they had crumbled
the walls with their bullets, burst the convents with their mines,
and carried the breaches with their bayonets,--fighting above and
beneath the surface of the earth, they had spared neither fire nor
the sword, their bravest men were falling in the obscurity of a
subterranean warfare; famine pinched them, and Zaragoza was still
unconquered!
[Sidenote: Rogniat.]
“Before this siege,” they exclaimed, “was it ever heard of, that
twenty thousand men should besiege fifty thousand?” Scarcely a
fourth of the town was won, and they, themselves, were already
exhausted. “We must wait,” they said, “for reinforcements or we
shall all perish among their cursed ruins, which will become our
own tombs, before we can force the last of these fanatics from the
last of their dens.”
Marshal Lasnes, unshaken by these murmurs and obstinate to conquer,
endeavoured to raise the soldiers’ hopes. He pointed out to them
that the losses of the besieged so far exceeded their own, that
the Spaniards’ strength would soon be wasted and their courage
must sink, and that the fierceness of their defence was already
abated,--but if contrary to expectation they should renew the
example of Numantia, their utter destruction must quickly ensue
from the united effects of battle, misery, and pestilence.
These exhortations succeeded, and on the 18th, all the combinations
being complete, a general assault took place. The French at the
right attack, having opened a party-wall by the explosion of a
petard, made a sudden rush through some burning ruins, and carried,
without a check, the island of houses leading down to the quay,
with the exception of two buildings. The Spaniards were thus forced
to abandon all the external fortifications between Saint Augustin
and the Ebro, which they had preserved until that day. And while
this assault was in progress, the mines under the university
containing three thousand pounds of powder were sprung, and the
walls tumbling with a terrific crash,--a column of the besiegers
entered the place, and after one repulse secured a lodgement.
During this time fifty pieces of artillery thundered upon the
suburb and ploughed up the bridge over the Ebro, and by mid-day
opened a practicable breach in the great convent of Saint Lazar,
which was the principal defence on that side. Lasnes, observing
that the Spaniards seemed to be shaken by this overwhelming fire,
immediately ordered an assault, and Saint Lazar being carried
forthwith, all retreat to the bridge was thus intercepted, and
the besieged falling into confusion, and their commander, Baron
Versage, being killed, were all destroyed or taken, with the
exception of three hundred men, who braving the terrible fire to
which they were exposed, got back into the town. General Gazan
immediately occupied the abandoned works, and having thus cut off
above two thousand men that were stationed on the Ebro, above the
suburb, forced them also to surrender.
This important success being followed on the 19th by another
fortunate attack on the right bank of the Ebro, and by the
devastating explosion of sixteen hundred pounds of powder, the
constancy of the besieged was at last shaken. An aide-de-camp of
Palafox came forth to demand certain terms, before offered by
the marshal, adding thereto that the garrison should be allowed
to join the Spanish armies, and that a certain number of covered
carriages should follow them. Lasnes rejected these proposals,
and the fire continued, but the hour of surrender was come! Fifty
pieces of artillery on the left bank of the Ebro, laid the houses
on the quay in ruins. The church of Our Lady of the Pillar, under
whose especial protection the city was supposed to exist, was
nearly effaced by the bombardment, and the six mines under the
Cosso loaded with many thousand pounds of powder, were ready for
a simultaneous explosion, which would have laid a quarter of the
remaining houses in the dust. In fine, war had done its work, and
the misery of Zaragoza could no longer be endured.
The bombardment which had never ceased since the 10th of January,
had forced the women and children to take refuge in the vaults,
with which the city abounded. There the constant combustion of
oil, the closeness of the atmosphere, unusual diet, and fear and
restlessness of mind, had combined to produce a pestilence which
soon spread to the garrison. The strong and the weak, the daring
soldier and the shrinking child fell before it alike, and such
was the state of the atmosphere and the predisposition to disease
that the slightest wound gangrened and became incurable. In the
beginning of February the deaths were from four to five hundred
daily; the living were unable to bury the dead, and thousands of
carcases, scattered about the streets and court yards, or piled in
heaps at the doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their
own corruption, or to be licked up by the flames of the burning
houses as the defence became contracted.
[Sidenote: Cavalhero. Rogniat. Suchet.]
The suburb, the greatest part of the walls, and one-fourth of the
houses were in the hands of the French, sixteen thousand shells
thrown during the bombardment, and the explosion of forty-five
thousand pounds of powder in the mines had shaken the city to its
foundations, and the bones of more than forty thousand persons of
every age and sex, bore dreadful testimony to the constancy of the
besieged.
Palafox was sick, and of the plebeian chiefs, the curate of
St. Gil, the lemonade seller of the Cosso, and the Tios, Jorge,
and Marin, having been slain in battle, or swept away by the
pestilence, the obdurate violence of the remaining leaders was
so abated, that a fresh junta was formed, and after a stormy
consultation, the majority being for a surrender, a deputation
waited upon marshal Lasnes on the 20th of February, to negotiate a
capitulation.
They proposed that the garrison should march out with the honours
of war; that the peasantry should not be considered as prisoners;
and at the particular request of the clergy, they also demanded
that the latter should have their full revenues guaranteed to them,
and punctually paid. This article was rejected with indignation,
and, according to the French writers, the place surrendered at
discretion; but the Spanish writers assert, that Lasnes granted
certain terms, drawn up by the deputation at the moment, the name
of Ferdinand the 7th being purposely omitted in the instrument,
which in substance run thus:--
The garrison to march out with the honours of war; to be
constituted prisoners, and marched to France; the officers to
retain their swords, baggage, and horses, the men their knapsacks;
and persons of either class, wishing to serve Joseph, to be
immediately enrolled in his ranks. The peasants to be sent to their
homes. Property and religion to be guaranteed.
With this understanding the deputies returned to the city; but
fresh commotions had arisen during their absence. The party for
protracting the defence, although the least numerous, were the
most energetic; they had before seized all the boats on the
Ebro, fearing that Palafox and others, of whom they entertained
suspicions, would endeavour to quit the town; and they were still
so menacing and so powerful, that the deputies durst not pass
through the streets, but retired outside the walls to the castle
of Aljaferia, and from thence sent notice to the junta of their
proceedings. The dissentient party would, however, have fallen
upon the others the next day, if the junta had not taken prompt
measures to enforce the surrender. The officer in command of the
walls near the castle, by their orders, gave up his post to the
French during the night, and on the 21st of February, from twelve
to fifteen thousand sickly beings laid down those arms which they
were scarcely able to support; and this cruel and memorable siege
was finished.
OBSERVATIONS.--1º.--When the other events of the Spanish war shall
be lost in the obscurity of time, or only traced by disconnected
fragments, the story of Zaragoza, like some ancient triumphal
pillar standing amidst ruins, will tell a tale of past glory; and
already men point to the heroic city, and call her Spain, as if her
spirit were common to the whole nation; yet it was not so, nor was
the defence of Zaragoza itself the effect of unalloyed virtue. It
was not patriotism, nor was it courage, nor skill, nor fortitude,
nor a system of terror, but all these combined under peculiar
circumstances that upheld the defence; and this combination, and
how it was brought about, should be well considered; because it is
not so much by catching at the leading resemblances, as by studying
the differences of great affairs, that the exploits of one age can
be made to serve as models for another.
[Illustration: _Plate 1. to face Pa. 48._
_Explanatory Sketch_
of the
Seige of Zaragoza,
_1808, 1809_.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]
2º.--The defence of Zaragoza may be examined under two points of
view; as an isolated event, and as a transaction bearing on the
general struggle in the Peninsula. With respect to the latter,
it was a manifest proof, that neither the Spanish people, nor
the government, partook of the Zaragozan energy. For it would be
absurd to suppose that, in the midst of eleven millions of people,
animated by an ardent enthusiasm, fifty thousand armed men could
for two months be besieged, shut in, destroyed, they and their
works, houses, and bodies, mingled in one terrible ruin, by less
than thirty-five thousand adversaries, and that without one effort
being made to save them!
Deprive the transaction of its dazzling colours, and the simple
outline comes to this: Thirty-five thousand French, in the midst
of insurrections, in despite of a combination of circumstances
peculiarly favourable to the defence, reduced fifty thousand of
the bravest and most energetic men in Spain. It is true, the
latter suffered nobly; but was their example imitated? Gerona,
indeed, although less celebrated, rivalled, and perhaps more than
rivalled, the glory of Zaragoza; but elsewhere her fate spoke, not
trumpet-tongued to arouse, but with a wailing voice, that carried
dismay to the heart of the nation.
3d.--As an isolated transaction, the siege of Zaragoza is very
remarkable; but it would be a great error to suppose, that any
town, the inhabitants of which were equally resolute, might be
as well defended. Fortitude and bravery will do much; but the
combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity. There
are no miracles in war! If the houses of Zaragoza had not been
nearly incombustible, the bombardment alone would have caused the
besieged to surrender, or to perish with their flaming city.
4th.--That the advantage offered by the peculiar structure of
the houses, and the number of the convents and churches, was
ably seized by the Spaniards, is beyond doubt. General Rogniat,
Lacoste’s successor, indeed, treats his opponents’ skill in
fortification with contempt; but colonel San Genis’ talents are
not to be judged of by the faulty construction of a few out-works,
at a time when he was under the control of a disorderly and
ferocious mob. He knew how to adapt his system of defence to the
circumstances of the moment, and no stronger proof of real genius
can be given. “Do not consult me about a capitulation,” was his
common expression. “_I shall never be of opinion that Zaragoza can
make no further defence._” But neither the talents of San Genis,
nor the construction of the houses, would have availed, if the
people within had not been of a temper adequate to the occasion;
and to trace the passions by which they were animated to their true
causes is a proper subject for historical and military research.
5th.--That they did not possess any superior courage is evident
from the facts that the besieged, although twice the number of the
besiegers, never made any serious impression by their sallies, and
that they were unable to defend the breaches. In large masses,
the standard of courage which is established by discipline may
be often inferior to that produced by fanaticism, or any other
peculiar excitement; but the latter never lasts long, neither is
it equable, because men are of different susceptibility, following
their physical and mental conformation. Hence a system of terror
has always been the resource of those leaders who, engaged in great
undertakings, have been unable to recur to discipline. Enthusiasm
stalked in front of their bands, but punishment brought up the
rear; and Zaragoza was no exception to this practice.
6th.--It may be said that the majority of the besieged, not being
animated by any peculiar fury, a system of terror could not be
carried to any great length; but a close examination explains this
seeming mystery. The defenders were composed of three distinct
parties,--the regular troops, the peasantry from the country,
and the citizens; but the citizens, who had most to lose, were
naturally the fiercest, and, accordingly, amongst them, the system
of terror was generated. The peasantry followed the example, as
all ignorant men, under no regular control, will do; the soldiers
meddled but little in the interior arrangements, and the division
of the town into islands of posts rendered it perfectly feasible
for violent persons, already possessed of authority, to follow
the bent of their inclinations: there was no want of men, and the
garrison of each island found it their own interest to keep those
in front of them to their posts, that the danger might be the
longer staved off from themselves.
7th.--Palafox was only the nominal chief of Zaragoza, the laurels
gathered in both sieges should adorn plebeian brows, but those
laurels dripped with kindred as well as foreign blood. The energy
of the real chiefs, and the cause in which that energy was exerted,
may be admired; the acts perpetrated by this ruling band were,
in themselves, atrocious; and Palafox, although unable to arrest
their savage proceedings, can claim but little credit for his own
conduct. For more than a month preceeding the surrender, he never
came forth of a vaulted building, which was impervious to shells,
and in which, there is too much reason to believe, he and others,
of both sexes, lived in a state of sensuality, forming a disgusting
contrast to the wretchedness that surrounded them.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH OPERATIONS.
1º. Before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, the operations were
conducted with little vigour. The want of unity, as to time, in the
double attack of the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant
error, that was not redeemed by any subsequent activity; but, after
the arrival of that marshal, the siege was pursued with singular
intrepidity and firmness. General Rogniat appears to disapprove of
Suchet’s division having been sent to Calatayud, yet it seems to
have been a judicious measure, inasmuch as it was necessary,--
1st. To protect the line of correspondence with Madrid.
2d. To have a corps at hand, lest the duke of Infantado should quit
Cuença, and throw himself into the Guadalaxara district, a movement
that would have been extremely embarrassing to the king. Suchet’s
division, while at Calatayud, fulfilled these objects, without
losing the power of succouring Tudela, or, by a march on the side
of Daroca, of intercepting the duke of Infantado if he attempted
to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but, when the Spanish army at
Cuença was directed on Ucles, and that of the marquis of Lazan was
gathering strength on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly
proper to recall Suchet.
2º.--It may not be misplaced here to point out the errors of
Infantado’s operations. If, instead of bringing on a battle with
the first corps, he had marched to the Ebro, established his
depôts and places of arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a
communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and joined
the marquis of Lazan’s troops to his own, he might have formed an
entrenched camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence have
carried on a methodical war with, at least, twenty-five thousand
regular troops; the insurrections on the French flanks and line of
communication with Pampeluna would then have become formidable;
and, in this situation, having the fortresses of Catalonia behind
him, with activity and prudence he might have raised the siege.
[Sidenote: Rogniat.]
3º.--From a review of all the circumstances attending the siege of
Zaragoza, we may conclude that fortune was extremely favourable
to the French. They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and
they did not lose above four thousand men; but their success was
owing partly to the errors of their opponents, principally to the
destruction caused by the pestilence within the town; for, of all
that multitude said to have fallen, six thousand Spaniards only
were slain in battle. Thirteen convents and churches had been
taken; but, when the town surrendered, forty remained to be forced.
Such are the principal circumstances of this memorable siege. I
shall now relate the contemporary operations in Catalonia.
CHAPTER IV.
OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations.]
It will be remembered, that when the second siege of Gerona was
raised, in August, 1808, general Duhesme returned to Barcelona,
and general Reille to Figueras; after which, the state of affairs
obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. Napoleon’s
measures to aid them were as prompt as the occasion required. While
the siege of Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops
to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers, as to form with those
already in Catalonia, an army of more than forty thousand men,
to be called the “_7th corps_.” Then appointing general Gouvion
St. Cyr to command it, he gave him this short but emphatic order:
“_Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, I cannot retake
it with 80,000 men._”
The troops assembled at Perpignan were the greatest part but raw
levies; Neapolitans, Etruscans, Romans, and Swiss: there were,
however, some old regiments; but as the preparations for the grand
army under the emperor absorbed the principal attention of the
administration in France, general St. Cyr was straightened in the
means necessary to take the field; and his undisciplined troops,
suffering severe privations, were depressed in spirit, and inclined
to desert.
The 1st of November, Napoleon, who was at Bayonne, sent orders to
the “_7th corps_” to commence its operations; and St. Cyr, having
put his divisions in motion on the 3d, crossed the frontier, and
established his head-quarters at Figueras on the 5th.
[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.]
In Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain, lethargic vanity,
and abuses of the most fatal kind, had succeeded to the first
enthusiasm, and withered the energy of the people. The local junta
issued, indeed, abundance of decrees, and despatched agents to the
supreme junta, and to the English commanders in the Mediterranean,
and in Portugal, all charged with the same instructions, namely,
to demand arms, ammunition, and money. And although the central
junta treated their demands with contempt, the English authorities
answered them generously and freely. Lord Collingwood lent the
assistance of his fleet. From Malta and Sicily arms were obtained;
and sir Hew Dalrymple having completely equipped the Spanish
regiments released by the convention of Cintra, despatched them
to Catalonia in British transports. Yet it may be doubted if
the conduct of the central junta were not the wisest; for the
local government established at Tarragona had already become so
negligent, or so corrupt, that the arms thus supplied were, instead
of being used in defence of the country, sold to foreign merchants!
and such being the political state of Catalonia, it naturally
followed that the military affairs should be ill conducted.
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
The count of Caldagues, who had relieved Gerona, returned by
Hostalrich, and resumed the line of the Llobregat; and fifteen
hundred men, drawn from the garrison of Carthagena, having reached
Taragona, the marquis of Palacios, accompanied by the junta,
quitted the latter town, and fixed his head-quarters at Villa
Franca, within twenty miles of Caldagues. The latter disposed his
troops, five thousand in number, at different points between
Martorel and San Boy, covering a line of eighteen miles, along the
left bank of the river.
General Duhesme rested a few days, and then marching from Barcelona
with six thousand men in the night, arrived the 2d of September at
day-break on the Llobregat, and immediately attacked Caldagues’
line in several points, but principally at San Boy and Molino
del Rey. The former fort was carried, some guns and stores were
captured, and the Spaniards were pursued to Vegas, a distance
of seven or eight miles; but at Molino del Rey the French were
repulsed, and Duhesme then returned to Barcelona.
It was the intention of the British ministers, that an auxiliary
force should have sailed from Sicily about this period, to aid
the Catalans; and doubtless it would have been a wise and timely
effort: but Napoleon’s foresight prevented the execution; for he
directed Murat to menace Sicily with a descent; and that prince,
feigning to collect forces on the coast of Calabria, spread many
reports of armaments being in preparation, and, as a preliminary
measure, attacked and carried the island of Capri; upon which
occasion sir Hudson Lowe first became known to history, by losing
in a few days a post that, without any pretensions to celebrity,
might have been defended for as many years. Murat’s demonstrations
sufficed to impose upon sir John Stuart, and from ten to twelve
thousand British troops were thus paralyzed at a most critical
period: but such will always be the result of a policy which has
no fixed and definite object in view. When statesmen cannot see
their own way clearly, the executive officers will seldom act with
vigour.
The Spanish army was now daily increasing; the tercios of
Migueletes were augmented in number, and a regiment of hussars,
that had been most absurdly kept in Majorca ever since the
beginning of the insurrection, arrived at Taragona.
Mariano Alvarez, the governor of Gerona, was appointed to the
command of the vanguard, composed of the garrisons of Gerona and
Rosas, and of the corps of Juan Claros, and other partizans.
Francisco Milans and Milans de Bosch, with their Migueletes, kept
the mountains to the northward and eastward of Barcelona; and while
the latter hemmed in the French right, the former covered the
district of El Vallés, and like a bird of prey watched the French
foragers in the plain surrounding Barcelona.
Palacios remained at Villa Franca, and the count of Caldagues
continued to guard the line of the Llobregat.
The little port of St. Felice de Quixols, near Palamos Bay, was
filled with privateers, and the English frigates off the coast not
only aided the Spaniards in all their enterprizes, but carried on a
littoral warfare in the gulf of Lyons with great spirit and success.
During the month of September several petty skirmishes happened
between the French marauding parties and the Migueletes about
Barcelona; but on the 10th of October, Duhesme attacked and
dislodged Francisco Milans from the mountains to the north of that
city; and designing to forage the district of El Vallés, sent on
the 11th a column of two thousand men along the sea coast towards
Mattaro, with orders to turn from thence to the left, clear the
heights beyond the Besos, of Migueletes, and push for Granollers
on the route to Vich: this column he supported by a second of
nearly equal strength, under general Millossewitz.
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
The first column reaching Granollers on the 12th, put the local
junta of that district to flight, captured some provisions and
other stores, and, finally, joined the second column, which was
posted at Mollet. Millossewitz, leaving a part of his force at the
pass of Moncada, then proceeded to San Culgat. Caldagues, hearing
of this excursion, drew together three thousand infantry, a hundred
and fifty cavalry, and six guns from his line on the Llobregat,
and was in full march by the back of the mountains for the pass
of Moncada, expecting to intercept the French in their return to
Barcelona: but, falling in with them at San Culgat, a confused
action ensued, and both sides claimed the victory; the French,
however, retreated across the mountains to Barcelona without
having foraged the district, and Caldagues returned to his former
position, justly proud of this vigorous and soldier-like movement.
The 28th of October, Palacios quitted Catalonia to command the
levies in the Sierra Morena. General Vives succeeded him, and
the army was again reinforced by some infantry from Majorca. The
Spanish regiments, released by the convention of Cintra, also
arrived at Villa Franca, and seven or eight thousand Granadian
levies were brought up to Tarragona by general Reding, and, at
the same time, six thousand men drafted from the army of Aragon,
reached Lerida, under the command of the marquis de Lazan.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr. Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The whole force, including the garrisons of Hostalrich, Gerona, and
Rosas, was now not less than thirty-six thousand men; of which
twenty-two thousand infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry, were in
the neighbourhood of Barcelona, or in march for the Llobregat.
This force, organized in six divisions, of which the troops in the
Ampurdan formed one, took the name of the _army of the right_, and
Vives seeing himself at the head of such a power, and in possession
of all the hills and rivers encircling Barcelona, resolved to
besiege that city.
The 3d of November, he transferred his head-quarters to Martorel;
the 8th he commenced a series of trifling skirmishes, to drive the
French posts back into the town: but they repulsed him; and, from
that time until the blockade was raised, a warfare of the most
contemptible nature was carried on by the Spaniards: the French,
who were about ten thousand strong, always maintaining their
outposts.
[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.]
Notwithstanding this appearance of strength, Catalonia was a prey
to innumerable disorders. Vives, a weak, indolent man, had been a
friend of Godoy, and was not popular; he it was that, commanding
in the islands, had retained the troops in them with such tenacity
as to create doubts of his attachment to the cause; but, although
the supreme junta privately expressed their suspicions, and
requested lord Collingwood to force Vives to an avowal of his
true sentiments, they, at the same time, wrote to the latter,
publicly, in the most flattering terms, and, finally, appointed
him captain-general of Catalonia. By the people, however, both he
and others were vehemently suspected, and, as the mob governed
throughout Spain, the authorities, civil and military, were more
careful to avoid giving offence to the multitude than anxious to
molest the enemy. Catalonia was full of strong places: but they
were neither armed nor provisioned, and, like all other Spaniards,
the Catalans were confident that the French only thought of
retreating.
[Sidenote: Muster rolls of the French army, MSS.]
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
Such was the state of the province and of the armies, when
Napoleon, being ready to break into the northern parts of Spain,
general St. Cyr commenced his operations. His force (including a
German division of six thousand men, not yet arrived at Perpignan)
amounted to more than thirty thousand men, ill-composed, however,
and badly provided; and St. Cyr himself was extremely discontented
with his situation. The Emperor had given him discretionary powers
to act as he judged fitting, only bearing in mind the importance of
relieving Barcelona; but marshal Berthier neglected the equipment
of the troops; and Duhesme declared that his magazines would not
hold out longer than December.
To march directly to Barcelona was neither an easy nor an
advantageous movement. That city could only be provisioned from
France; and, until the road was cleared, by the taking of Gerona
and Hostalrich, no convoys could pass except by sea, yet, to attack
these places with prudence, it was essential to get possession of
Rosas, not only to secure an intermediate port for French vessels
passing with supplies to Barcelona, but to deprive the English of
a secure harbour, and the Spaniards of a point from whence they
could, in concert with their allies, intercept the communications
of the French army: and even blockade Figueras, which, from the
want of transport, could not be provisioned at this period. These
considerations having determined St. Cyr to commence by the siege
of Rosas, he repaired to Figueras, in person, the 6th of November;
and, on the 7th, general Reille being charged to conduct the
operation, after a sharp action, drove in the Spaniards before the
place and completed the investment.
SIEGE OF ROSAS.
This town was but a narrow slip of houses built along the water’s
edge, at the head of the gulph of the same name.
The citadel, a large irregular pentagon, stood on one side of
the town, and, on the other, the mountains that skirt the flat
and swampy plain of the Ampurdan, rose, bluff and rocky, at the
distance of half a mile. An old redoubt was built at the foot of
these hills, and, from thence to the citadel, an entrenchment had
been drawn to cover the houses. Hence, Rosas, looking towards the
land, had the citadel on the left hand, the mountains on the right,
and the front covered by this entrenchment. The roadstead permitted
ships of the line to anchor within cannon-shot of the place; and,
on the right hand coming up the gulph, a star fort, called the
Trinity, crowned a rugged hill about a mile and a quarter distant
from the citadel, the communication between it and the town being
by a narrow road carried between the foot of the hills and the
water’s edge.
The garrison of Rosas consisted of nearly three thousand men, two
bomb-vessels, and an English seventy-four (the Excellent), were
anchored off the town, and captain West, the commodore, reinforced
the garrisons of the Trinity and the citadel with marines and
seamen from these vessels; but the damages sustained in a former
siege had been only partially repaired; both places were ill-found
in guns and stores, and the Trinity was commanded at the distance
of pistol-shot from a point of the mountains called the Puig Rom.
The force under Reille, consisting of his own and general Pino’s
Italian division, skirmished daily with the garrison; but the rain,
which fell in torrents, having flooded the Ampurdan, the roads
became impassable for the artillery, and delayed the opening of the
trenches. Meanwhile, Souham’s division took post between the Fluvia
and Figueras, to cover the operations of the siege on the side of
Gerona, and an Italian brigade, under general Chabot, was posted at
Rabos and Espollas, to keep the Somatenes down.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
But, before Chabot’s arrival, Reille had detached a battalion to
that side; and, being uneasy for its safety, sent three more to its
assistance: this saved the battalion, which was in great danger;
and two companies were actually cut off by the Somatenes. This
loss, however, proved beneficial, as it enraged the Italians, and
checked their disposition to desert; and St. Cyr, unwilling to
pursue the system of burning villages, and yet anxious to repress
the insidious hostility of the peasants, in reprizal for the loss
of his two companies, seized an equal number of villagers, and sent
them prisoners to France.
The inhabitants of Rosas having embarked or taken refuge in the
citadel, the houses, and the entrenchments covering them, were left
to the French; but the latter were prevented, by the fire of the
English ships, from effecting a permanent lodgement in the deserted
town; and, after a few days, a detachment from the garrison,
consisting of soldiers and townsmen, established a post there.
[Sidenote: Captain West’s despatch.]
The 8th captain West, in conjunction with the governor, made a
sally, but was repulsed; and, on the 9th several yards of the
citadel ramparts crumbled; but, with the assistance of the British
seamen, the breach was repaired in the night before the enemy
became aware of the accident.
The 15th an obstinate assault made on the Trinity was repulsed, the
English seamen bearing a principal share in the success.
The 16th the roads being passable, the French battering-train was
put in motion. The way leading up to the Puig Rom was repaired,
and two battalions were posted there, on the point commanding the
Trinity.
The 19th three guns were mounted against the Trinity, and the
trenches were opened at the distance of four hundred yards from the
citadel.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
The 20th the fire of some French mortars obliged the vessels of
war to anchor beyond the range of the shells. During this time,
Souham was harassed by the Migueletes from the side of Gerona. The
French cavalry, unable to find forage, were sent back to France;
and Napoleon, rendered uneasy by the reports of general Duhesme,
ordered the seventh corps to advance to Barcelona, so as to arrive
there by the 26th of November; but St. Cyr refused to abandon the
siege of Rosas without a positive order.
The assistance afforded to the besieged by captain West was
represented to the junta as an attempt of that officer to possess
himself of the place. The junta readily believed this tale, and
entered into an angry correspondence with don Pedro O’Daly, the
governor, relative to the supposed treachery; but no measures were
taken to raise the siege. During this correspondence, the Excellent
sailed from Rosas, and was succeeded by the Fame, captain Bennet.
This officer landed some men under the Trinity on the 23d, and
endeavoured, but ineffectually, to take the battery opposed to that
fort.
[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The 27th the besiegers assaulted the Spaniards, who, to the number
of five hundred, had entrenched themselves in the deserted houses
of the town. A hundred and sixty were taken, and fifty escaped
into the citadel; the rest were slain. Breaching batteries were
immediately commenced among the ruins of the houses, and the
communication with the shipping rendered so unsafe, that Lazan,
who had come from Lerida to Gerona with six thousand men, and had
collected provisions and stores at the mouth of the Fluvia, with
the intention of supplying Rosas by sea, abandoned his design.
The ruinous condition of the front, exposed to the fire of the
besiegers, now induced Reille to summon the place a second time;
but the governor refused to surrender.
The 30th of November, the engineers reported that the breach in
the Trinity was practicable, and an assault was ordered; although
an Italian officer, appointed to lead the storming party of fifty
men, and who had formerly served in the fort, asserted that the
breach was not a true one. The Spanish commandant thought his post
untenable; and two days before, the marines of the Fame had been
withdrawn by captain Bennet: but at this time, lord Cochrane, a
man of infinite talent in his profession, and of a courage and
enterprise that have seldom, if ever, been surpassed, arrived in
the Imperieuse frigate, and immediately threw himself, with eighty
men, into the fort.
The Italian’s representations being unheeded, he advanced to the
assault like a man of honour, and was killed, together with all
his followers, excepting four, two of whom escaped back to their
own side, the other two being spared by the English seamen, were
drawn up with cords into the fort. The breach had, however, been
practicable at first; but it was broken in an old gallery, which
lord Cochrane immediately filled with earth and hammocks, and so
cut off the opening. In the course of a few days, a second assault
was made, but the French were again repulsed with loss. Meanwhile
the breaching batteries opened against the citadel, and a false
attack was commenced on the opposite side.
The 4th December the garrison made a sally, in the night, from
the citadel, and with some success; but the walls were opened by
the enemy’s fire, and the next day O’Daly, hopeless of relief,
surrendered with about two thousand four hundred men, of which two
hundred were wounded. Lord Cochrane, also, blew up the magazine,
and abandoned Fort Trinity. General St. Cyr observes that the
garrison of Rosas might have been easily carried off, at night,
by the British shipping; but to embark two thousand five hundred
men, in the boats of two ships, and under a heavy fire, whether by
night or day, is not an easy operation; nevertheless, the censure
seems well founded, because sufficient preparation might have been
previously made.
[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The defence of Rosas (with the exception of lord Cochrane’s
efforts) cannot be deemed brilliant, whether with relation to
the importance of the place, the assistance that might have been
rendered from the sea, or the number of the garrison compared with
that of the besiegers. It held out, however, thirty days, and,
if that time had been well employed by the Spaniards, the loss
of the garrison would have been amply repaid; but Vives, wholly
occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to the fate of Rosas. A
fruitless attack on Souham’s posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the
only effort made to interrupt the siege, or to impede the farther
progress of the enemy. Lazan, although at the head of six or seven
thousand men, could not rely upon more than three thousand; and his
applications to Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded.
The fall of Rosas enabled St. Cyr to march to the relief of
Barcelona, and he resolved to do so: yet the project, at first
sight, would appear rather insane than hardy; for the roads, by
which Gerona and Hostalrich were to be turned, being mere paths
impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little ammunition,
could be carried, and the country was full of strong positions.
The Germans had not yet arrived at Perpignan; it was indispensable
to leave Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and Figueras;
and, these deductions being made, less than eighteen thousand
men, including the cavalry, which had been recalled from France,
remained disposable for the operation.
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
But, on the Spanish side, Reding having come up, there were
twenty-five thousand men in the camp before Barcelona, and ten
thousand others, under Lazan and Alvarez, were at Gerona. All
these troops were, however, exceedingly ill organized. Two-thirds
of the Migueletes only carried pikes, and many were without any
arms at all. There was no sound military system; the Spanish
generals were ignorant of the French movements and strength; and
their own indolence and want of vigilance drew upon them the
contempt and suspicion of the people.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
The 8th of December St. Cyr united his army on the left bank
of the Fluvia. The 9th he passed that river, and, driving the
Spaniards over the Ter, established his head-quarters at Mediñya,
ten miles from Gerona. He wished, before pursuing his own march,
to defeat Lazan, lest the latter should harass the rear of the
army; but, finding that the marquis would not engage in a serious
affair, he made a show of sitting down before Gerona on the 10th,
hoping thereby to mislead Vives, and render him slow to break up
the blockade of Barcelona: and this succeeded; for the Spaniard
remained in his camp, irresolute and helpless, while his enemy was
rapidly passing the defiles and rivers between Gerona and the Besos.
The nature of the country between Figueras and Barcelona has been
described in the first volume; referring to that description,
the reader will find that the only carriage-routes by which St.
Cyr could march were, one by the sea-coast, and one leading
through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first, exposed to the fire of
the English vessels, had also been broken up by lord Cochrane,
in August; and, to use the second, it was necessary to take the
fortresses, or to turn them by marching for three days through the
mountains. St. Cyr adopted the latter plan, trusting that rapidity
and superior knowledge of war would enable him to separate Lazan
and Alvarez from Vives, and so defeat them all in succession.
The 11th, he crossed the Ter and reached La Bisbal; here he left
the last of his carriages, delivered out four days’ biscuit
and fifty rounds of ammunition to the soldiers, and with this
provision, a drove of cattle, and a reserve of ten rounds of
ammunition for each man, he commenced his hardy march the 12th
of December, making for Palamos. On the route he encountered and
beat some Migueletes that Juan Claros had brought to oppose him,
and, when near Palamos, he suffered a little from the fire of the
English ships; but he had gained a first step, and his hopes were
high.
The 13th, he turned his back upon the coast, and, by a forced
march, reached Vidreras and Llagostera, and thus placed himself
between Vives and Lazan, for the latter had not yet passed the
heights of Casa de Selva.
The 14th, marching by Mazanet de Selva and Martorel, he reached
the heights above Hostalrich, and encamped at Grions and Masanas.
During this day’s journey, his rear was slightly harassed by Lazan
and Claros; but he was well content to find the strong banks of
the Tordera undefended by Vives. The situation of the army was,
however, extremely critical. Lazan and Claros had, the one on the
11th, the other on the 12th, informed Vives of the movement; hence
the bulk of the Spanish force before Barcelona might be expected,
at any moment, in some of the strong positions in which the country
abounded, and the troops from Gerona were, as we have seen, close
in the rear; the Somatenes were gathering thickly on the flanks,
Hostalrich was in front, and the French soldiers had only sixty
rounds of ammunition.
St. Cyr’s design was to turn Hostalrich, and get into the main road
again behind that fortress. The smugglers of Perpignan had affirmed
that there was no pathway, but a shepherd assured him that there
was a track by which it could be effected; and, when the efforts of
the staff-officers to trace it failed, St. Cyr himself discovered
it, but nearly fell into the hands of the Somatenes during the
search.
The 15th, at day-break, the troops being put in motion, turned
Hostalrich and gained the main road. The garrison of that place,
endeavouring to harass their rear, were repulsed; but the Somatenes
on the flanks, emboldened because the French, to save ammunition,
did not return their fire, became exceedingly troublesome; and,
near San Celoni, the head of the column encountered some battalions
of Migueletes, which Francisco Milans had brought up from Arenas de
Mar, by the pass of Villa Gorguin.
Milans, not being aware of St. Cyr’s approach, was soon beaten,
and his men fell back, part to Villa Gorguin, part to the heights
of Nuestra Señora de Cordera: the French thus gained the defile
of Treintapasos. But they were now so fatigued that all desired
to halt, save St. Cyr, who insisted upon the troops clearing the
defile, and reaching a plain on the other side: this was not
effected before ten o’clock. Lazan’s troops did not appear during
the day; but Vives’ army was in front, and its fires were seen on
the hills between Cardadeu and Llinas.
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MS.]
Information of St. Cyr’s march, as I have already observed, had
been transmitted to Vives on the 11th, and there was time for him
to have carried the bulk of his forces to the Tordera before the
French could pass that river; but intelligence of the battle of
Tudela, and of the appearance of the French near Zaragoza, arrived
at the same moment, and the Spanish general betrayed the greatest
weakness and indecision, at one moment resolving to continue before
Barcelona, at another designing to march against St. Cyr. He had,
on the 9th, sent Reding with six guns, six hundred cavalry, and one
thousand infantry, to take the command in the Ampurdan; but, the
12th, after receiving Lazan’s report, he reinforced Reding, who was
still at Granollers, and directed him upon Cardadeu.
The 14th, he ordered Francisco Milans to march by Mattaro and
Arenas de Mar, to examine the coast road, and, if the enemy was not
in that line, to repair also to Cardadeu.
The 15th, Milans, as we have seen, was beaten at St. Celoni; but,
in the night, he rallied his whole division on the heights of
Cordera, thus flanking the left of the French forces at Llinas.
A council of war was held on the 13th. Caldagues advised that four
thousand Migueletes should be left to observe Duhesme, and that the
rest of the army should march at once to fight St. Cyr. Good and
soldier-like advice; but Vives was loth to abandon the siege of
Barcelona, and, adopting half-measures, left Caldagues, with the
right wing of the army, to watch Duhesme, and carried the centre
and the left, by the route of Granollers, to the heights between
Cardadeu and Llinas, where (exclusive of Milan’s division) he
united, in the night of the 15th, about eight thousand regulars,
besides several thousand Somatenes. Duhesme immediately occupied
the posts abandoned by Vives, and thus separated him from Caldagues.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
St. Cyr’s position, on the morning of the 16th, would have been
dangerous, if he had been opposed by any but Spanish generals and
Spanish troops. Vives and those about him, irresolute and weak
as they were in action, were not deficient in boasting words;
they called the French army, in derision, “_the succour_;” and,
in allusion to the battle of Baylen, announced that a second
“_bull-fight_,” in which Reding was again the “_matador_,” would be
exhibited. But Dupont and St. Cyr were men of a different stamp:
the latter justly judging that the Spaniards were not troops to
stand the shock of a good column, united his army in one solid
mass, at day-break on the 16th, and marched straight against the
centre of the enemy, giving orders that the head of the column
should go headlong on, without either firing or forming line.
BATTLE OF CARDADEU.
The hills which the Spaniards occupied were high and wooded; the
right was formed by Reding’s division, the left by Vives, and
the Somatenes hung on the sides of a lofty ridge, which was only
separated from the right of the position by the little river
Mogent. The main road from Llinas led straight upon the centre, and
there was a second road conducting to Mataro, which, branching off
from the first, run between the Mogent and the right of Reding’s
ground.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
When the French commenced their march, the Somatenes galled their
left flank, and general Pino, whose division headed the column of
attack, instead of falling upon the centre, sent back for fresh
instructions, and meanwhile extended his first brigade in a line to
the left. St. Cyr, who had reiterated the order to fight in column,
was sorely troubled at Pino’s error, the ill effects of which were
instantly felt, because, Reding advancing against the front and
flank of the extended brigade, obliged it to commence a fire, which
it was impossible to sustain for want of ammunition.
In this difficulty the French general acted with great ability and
vigour: Pino’s second brigade was directed to do that which the
first should have done. Two companies were sent to menace the left
of the Spaniards, and St. Cyr, at the same time, rapidly carried
Souham’s division, by the Mataro road, against Reding’s extreme
right. The effect was instantaneous and complete, the Spaniards
overthrown on their centre and right, and charged by the cavalry,
were beaten and dispersed in every direction, leaving all their
artillery and ammunition, and two thousand prisoners behind.
Vives, escaping on foot across the mountain, reached Mataro, where
he was taken on board an English vessel. Reding fled on horseback
by the main road; and the next day, having rallied some of the
fugitives at Monmalo, retreated by the route of San Culgat to
Molino del Rey. The loss of the French was six hundred men; but
the battle, which lasted only one hour, was so complete, that St.
Cyr resolved to push on to Barcelona immediately, without seeking
to defeat Milans or Lazan, whom he judged too timid to venture an
action: moreover, he hoped that Duhesme, who had been informed, on
the 7th, of the intended march, and who could hear the sound of the
artillery, would intercept and turn back the flying troops.
The French army had scarcely quitted the field of battle when
Milans arrived; but, finding how matters stood, retired to Arenas
de Mar, and gave notice to Lazan, who retreated to Gerona. St.
Cyr’s rear was thus cleared; but Duhesme, heedless of what was
passing at Cardadeu, instead of intercepting the beaten army,
sent Lecchi to attack Caldagues. The latter general, however,
concentrated his division on the evening of the 16th, repulsed
Lecchi, and retired behind the Llobregat, but left behind some
artillery and the large magazines which Vives had collected for the
siege and accumulated in his camp.
St. Cyr reached Barcelona without encountering any of Duhesme’s
troops, and, in his Memoirs of this campaign, represents that
general as astonishingly negligent, seeking neither to molest the
enemy nor to meet the French army; treating everything belonging to
the service with indifference, making false returns, and conniving
at gross malversation in his generals.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
St. Cyr, now reflecting upon the facility with which his opponents
could be defeated, and the difficulty of pursuing them, resolved
to rest a few days at Barcelona, in hopes that the Spaniards, if
unmolested, would re-assemble in numbers behind the Llobregat,
and enable him to strike an effectual blow, for his design
was to disperse their forces so as they should not be able to
interrupt the sieges which he meditated; nor was he deceived in
his calculations. Reding joined Caldagues, and rallied from twelve
to fifteen thousand men behind the Llobregat, and Vives, having
relanded at Sitjes, sent orders to Lazan and Milans to march
likewise to that river by the district of Vallés. The arrival of
the latter was, however, so uncertain that the French general,
judging it better to attack Reding at once, united Chabran’s
division to his own, on the 20th, and advanced to St. Felieu de
Llobregat.
The Spaniards were drawn up on the heights behind the village of
San Vincente; their position was lofty and rugged, commanding a
free view of the approaches from Barcelona. The Llobregat covered
the front, and the left flank was secure from attack, except at the
bridge of Molino del Rey, which was entrenched, guarded by a strong
detachment, and protected by heavy guns. Reding’s cavalry amounted
to one thousand, and he had fifty pieces of artillery, the greatest
part of which were in battery at the bridge of Molino del Rey; but
his right was accessible, because the river was fordable in several
places. The main road to Villa Franca led through this position,
and, at the distance of ten or twelve miles in the rear, the pass
of Ordal offered another post of great strength.
Vives was at San Vincente on the 19th, but returned to Villa Franca
the same day; hence, when the French appeared on the 20th, the camp
was thrown into confusion.
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
A council of war being held, one party was for fighting, another
for retreating to Ordal: an officer was then sent to Vives for
orders, but he returned with a message, that Reding might retreat
if he could not defend his post. The latter, however, fearing
that he should be accused, and perhaps sacrificed for returning
without reason, resolved to fight, although he anticipated nothing
but disaster. The season was extremely severe; snow was falling,
and both armies suffered from the cold and wet. The Spanish
soldiers were dispirited by past defeats, and the despondency and
irresolution of their generals could not escape observation: but
the French and Italian troops were confident in their commander,
and flushed with success. In these dispositions the two armies
passed the night before
THE BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY.
St. Cyr observing that Reding’s attention was principally directed
to the bridge of Molino, ordered Chabran’s division to that side,
with instructions to create a diversion, by opening a fire from
some artillery, and then retiring, as if his guns could not resist
the weight of the Spanish metal; in short, to persuade the enemy
that a powerful effort would be made there; but when the centre and
right of the Spaniards should be attacked, Chabran was to force
the passage of the bridge, and assail the heights beyond it. This
stratagem succeeded; Reding massed his troops on the left, and
neglected his right, which was the real point of attack.
The 21st of December, Pino’s division crossed the Llobregat at
daylight, by a ford in front of St. Felieu, and marched against
the right of the Spanish position: Chabot’s division followed; and
Souham’s, which had passed at a ford lower down, and then ascended
by the right bank, covered Pino’s passage. The light cavalry
were held in reserve behind Chabot’s division, and a regiment of
cuirassiers was sent to support Chabran at Molino del Rey.
The Spanish position consisted of two mountain heads, separated
by a narrow ravine and a torrent; and as the troops of the right
wing were exceedingly weakened, they were immediately chased off
their headland by the leading brigade of Pino’s division. Reding
then seeing his error, changed his front, and drew up on the other
mountain, on a new line, nearly perpendicular to the Llobregat; but
he still kept a strong detachment at the bridge of Molino, which
was thus in rear of his left. The French divisions formed rapidly
for a fresh effort. Souham on the right, Pino in the centre, Chabot
on the left. The latter gained ground in the direction of Villa
Franca, and endeavoured to turn the Spaniards’ right, and cut off
their retreat; while the light cavalry making way between the
mountain and the river, sought to connect themselves with Chabran
at Molino.
St. Cyr’s columns, crossing the ravine that separated them from
the Spaniards, soon ascended the opposite mountain. The Catalans
had formed quickly, and opposed their enemies with an orderly, but
ill directed fire. Their front line then advanced, and offered to
charge with an appearance of great intrepidity; but their courage
sunk, and they turned as the hostile masses approached. The
reserves immediately opened a confused volley upon both parties;
and in this disorder, the road to Villa Franca being intercepted by
Chabot, the right was forced upon the centre, the centre upon the
left, and the whole pushed back in confusion upon Molino del Rey.
Meanwhile a detachment from Chabran’s division had passed the
Llobregat above Molino, and so blocked the road to Martorel; and
in this miserable situation the Spaniards were charged by the
light cavalry, and scarcely a man would have escaped if Chabran
had obeyed his orders, and pushing across the bridge of Molino
had come upon their rear; but that general, at all times feeble in
execution, remained a tranquil spectator of the action, until the
right of Souham’s division reached the bridge; and thus the routed
troops escaped, by dispersing, and throwing away every thing that
could impede their flight across the mountains. Vives reached the
field of battle just as the route was complete, and was forced to
fly with the rest. The victorious army pursued in three columns;
Chabran’s in the direction of Igualada, Chabot’s by the road of
San Sadurni, which turned the pass of Ordal, and Souham’s by the
royal route of Villa Franca, at which place the head-quarters were
established on the 22d. The posts of Villa Nueva and Sitjes were
immediately occupied by Pino, while Souham pushed the fugitives to
the gates of Tarragona.
The loss of the Spaniards, owing to their swiftness, was less than
might have been expected; not more than twelve hundred fell into
the hands of the French, but many superior officers were killed or
wounded; and, on the 22d, the count de Caldagues was taken, a man
apparently pedantic in military affairs, and wanting in modesty,
but evidently possessed of both courage and talent. The whole of
the artillery, and vast quantities of powder, were captured, and
with them a magazine of English muskets, quite new. Yet many of
the Migueletes were unarmed, and the junta were unceasing in their
demands for succours of this nature; but the history of any one
province was the history of all Spain.
CHAPTER V.
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
Barcelona was now completely relieved, and the captured magazines
supplied it for several months. There was no longer a Spanish
army in the field; and in Tarragona, where some eight or nine
thousand of the Spanish fugitives, from this and the former battle,
had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder. The people rose
tumultuously, broke open the public stores, and laying hands on
all the weapons they could find, rushed from place to place, as if
searching for something to vent their fury upon. The head of Vives
was called for; and to save his life, he was cast into prison by
Reding, who was proclaimed general-in-chief.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
The regular officers were insulted by the populace, and there was
as usual a general cry to defend the city, mixed with furious
menaces against traitors, but there were neither guns, nor
ammunition, nor provisions; and during the first moment of anarchy,
St. Cyr might certainly have rendered himself master of Tarragona
by a vigorous effort. But the opportunity soon passed away; the
French general sought only to procure subsistence, and occupied
himself in forming a train of field artillery; while Reding, who
had been almost without hope, proceeded to rally the army, and
place the town in a state of defence.
[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The 1st of January eleven thousand infantry and eight hundred
cavalry were re-assembled at Tarragona and Reus; and a Swiss
regiment from Majorca and two Spanish regiments from Granada,
increased this force. Three thousand four hundred men arrived from
Valencia on the 5th, and from thence also five thousand muskets,
ammunition in proportion, and ten thousand pikes which had just
been landed from England, were forwarded to Tarragona. A supply
of money, obtained from the British agents at Seville, completed
the number of fortuitous and fortunate events that combined to
remedy the disaster of Molino del Rey. These circumstances, and the
inactivity of St. Cyr, who seemed suddenly paralyzed, restored the
confidence of the Catalonians, but their system remained unchanged;
for confidence among the Spaniards always led to insubordination,
but never to victory.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
Meanwhile, a part of the troops flying from Molino had taken refuge
at Bruch, and being joined by the Somatenes, chose major Green,
one of the English military agents, for their general, thinking
to hold that strong country, which was considered as impregnable
ever since the defeats of Chabran and Swartz. St. Cyr, glad of this
opportunity to retrieve the honour of the French arms, detached
Chabran himself, on the 11th of January, to take his own revenge;
but that general was still depressed by the recollection of his
former defeat. To encourage him, Chabot was directed from San
Sadurni upon Igualada, by which the defile of Bruch was turned, and
a permanent defence rendered impossible. The Spaniards, however,
made little or no resistance; and eight guns were taken, and a
considerable number of men killed. The French pursued to Igualada;
and a detachment, without orders, even assailed and took Montserrat
itself, and afterwards rejoined the main body without loss. Chabot
was then recalled to San Sadurni, and Chabran was quartered at
Martorel.
While these events were passing beyond the Llobregat, the marquis
of Lazan was advancing, with seven or eight thousand men, towards
Castellon de Ampurias. The 1st of January he drove back a
battalion of infantry upon Rosas with considerable loss; but the
next day general Reille, having assembled about three thousand
men, intercepted Lazan’s communications, and attacked him in his
position behind the Muga. The victory seems to have been undecided;
but in the night, Lazan regained his communications, and returned
to Gerona.
The battle of Molino del Rey checked, for a time, the ardour of
the Catalans, and Reding at first avoided serious actions, leaving
the Somatenes to harass the enemy. This plan being followed during
the months of January and February, was exceedingly troublesome to
St. Cyr, because he was obliged to send small parties continually
to seek for subsistence, and the country people, hiding their
provisions with great care, strove hard to protect their scanty
stores. But in the beginning of February the country between the
Llobregat and Tarragona was almost exhausted of food. The English
ships continued to vex the coast-line; and the French, besides
deserters, lost many men, killed and wounded, in the innumerable
petty skirmishes sustained by the marauding parties. Still St.
Cyr maintained his positions; and the country people, tired of a
warfare in which they were the chief sufferers, clamoured against
Reding, that he, with a large regular force, should look calmly
on, until the last morsel of food was discovered, and torn from
their starving families. The townspeople, also feeling the burthen
of supporting the troops, impatiently urged the general to fight;
nor was this insubordination confined to the rude multitude.
Lazan, although at the head of nine thousand men, had remained
perfectly inactive after the skirmish at Castellon de Ampurias; but
when Reding required him to leave a suitable garrison in Gerona,
and bring the rest of his troops to Igualada, he would not obey;
and this difference was only terminated by Lazan’s marching, with
five thousand men, to the assistance of Zaragoza. The result of his
operations there has been already related in the narrative of that
siege.
The army immediately under Reding was, however, very considerable:
the Swiss battalions were numerous and good, and some of the most
experienced of the Spanish regiments were in Catalonia. Every fifth
man of the robust population had been called out after the defeat
of Molino del Rey; and, although the people, averse to serve as
regular soldiers, did not readily answer the call, the forces under
Reding were so augmented that, in the beginning of February, it
was not less than twenty-eight thousand men. The urban guards were
also put in activity, and above fifteen thousand Somatenes assisted
the regular troops; but there was more show than real power, for
Reding was incapable of wielding the regular troops skilfully; and
the Migueletes being ill armed, without clothing and insubordinate,
devastated the country equally with the enemy.
The Somatenes, who only took arms for local interests, would not
fight, except at the times and in the manner and place that suited
themselves; and not only neglected the advice of the regular
officers, but reviled all who would not adopt their own views;
causing many to be removed from their commands; and, with all
this, the Spanish generals never obtained good information of
the enemy’s movements, yet their own plans were immediately made
known to the French; because, at Reding’s head-quarters, as at
those of Castaños before the battle of Tudela, every project was
openly and ostentatiously discussed. Reding himself was a man of no
military talent; his activity was of body, not of mind, but he was
brave and honourable, and popular; because, being without system,
arrangement, or deep design, and easy in his nature, he thwarted no
man’s humours, and thus floated in the troubled waters until their
sudden reflux left him on the rocks.
The Catalonian army was now divided into four distinct corps.
Alvarez, with four thousand men, held Gerona and the Ampurdan.
Lazan, with five thousand, was near Zaragoza.
Don Juan Castro, an officer, accused by the Spaniards of treachery,
and who afterwards did attach himself to Joseph’s party, occupied,
with sixteen thousand men, a line extending from Olesa, on the
Upper Llobregat, to the pass of San Cristina, near Tarragona, and
this line running through Bruch, Igualada, and Llacuna, was above
sixty miles long. The remainder of the army, amounting to ten
or twelve thousand men under Reding himself, were quartered at
Tarragona, Reus, and the immediate vicinity of those places.
The Spaniards were fed from Valencia and Aragon, (the convoys
from the former being conveyed in vessels along the coast). Their
magazines were accumulated on one or two points of the line, and
those points being chosen without judgement fettered Reding’s
movements and regulated those of the French, whose only difficulty,
in fact, was to procure food.
[Sidenote: Appendix No. 1, section 6.]
Early in February, St. Cyr, having exhausted the country about
him, and having his communications much vexed by the Somatenes and
by descents from the English ships, closed his posts and kept his
divisions in masses at Vendril, Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and
Martorel. The seventh corps at this period having been reinforced
by the German division, and by some conscripts, amounted to
forty-eight thousand men, of which forty-one thousand were under
arms; but the force immediately commanded by St. Cyr did not exceed
twenty-three thousand of all arms.
The relative position of the two armies was, however, entirely in
favour of the French general, his line extending from Vendril,
by Villa Franca, to Martorel, was not more than thirty miles,
and he had a royal road by which to retreat on Barcelona. The
Spanish posts covering, as I have said, an extent of above
sixty miles, formed a half-circle round the French line, and
their communications were more rugged than those of St. Cyr.
Nevertheless, it is not to be doubted that, by avoiding any serious
action, the Catalans would have obliged the French to abandon
the country, between the Llobregat and Tarragona. Famine and
the continued drain of men, in a mountain warfare, would have
forced them away; nor could they have struck any formidable blow
to relieve themselves, seeing that all the important places were
fortified towns requiring a regular siege. The never-failing
arrogance of the Spanish character, and the unstable judgement of
Reding, induced him to forego these advantages. The closing of
the French posts and some success in a few petty skirmishes were
magnified, the last into victories and the first into a design on
the part of the enemy to fly.
An intercourse opened with some of the inhabitants of Barcelona
likewise gave hopes of regaining that city by means of a conspiracy
within the walls. The Catalans had before made proposals to general
Lecchi to deliver up the citadel of that place, nor is there any
thing that more strongly marks the absurd self-sufficiency of the
Spaniards, during this war, than the repeated attempts they made
to corrupt the French commanders. As late as the year 1810, Martin
Carrera, being at the head of about two thousand ragged peasants,
half-armed, and only existing under the protection of the English
outposts, offered to marshal Ney, then investing Ciudad Rodrigo,
rank and honours in the Spanish army if he would desert!
Reding, swayed by the popular clamour, resolved to attack, and in
this view he directed Castro to collect his sixteen thousand men
and fall upon the right flank and rear of St. Cyr, by the routes
of Llacuna and Igualada, and to send a detachment to seize the
pass of Ordal, and thus cut off the French line of retreat to
Barcelona. Meanwhile, advancing with eight thousand by the road
of Vendril and St. Cristina; Reding, himself, was to attack the
enemy in front. All the Migueletes and Somatenes between Gerona
and the Besos were to aid in these operations, the object being to
surround the French, a favourite project with the Spaniards at all
times; and as they publicly announced this intention, the joy was
universal, and the destruction of the hostile army was as usual
anticipated with the utmost confidence.
The Catalans were in motion on the 14th of February, but St. Cyr
kept his army well in hand until the Spaniards being ready to
break in upon him, he judged it politic to strike first. Souham’s
division remained at Vendril, to keep Reding in check, but on the
16th St. Cyr marched from Villa Franca, with Pino’s division, and
overthrew Castro’s advanced posts which were at Lacuña and Saint
Quinti. The Spanish centre thus pierced, and their wings completely
separated, Castro’s right was thrown back upon Capellades.
The 17th, St. Cyr, continuing his movement with Pino’s division,
reached Capellades, where he expected to unite with Chabot and
Chabran, who had orders to concentrate there,--the one from
San Sadurin, the other from Martorel. By this skilful movement
the French general avoided the pass of Bruch, and massed three
divisions on the extreme right of Castro’s left wing and close to
his magazines, which were at Igualada.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
Chabot arrived the first, and, being for a little time unsupported,
was attacked and driven back with loss, but when the other
divisions came up, the action was restored, and the Spaniards
put to flight; they rallied again at Pobla de Claramunt, between
Capellades and Igualada, a circumstance agreeable to St. Cyr,
because he had sent Mazzuchelli’s brigade from Llacuna direct upon
Igualada, and if Chabot had not been so hard pressed, the action
at Capellades was to have been delayed until Mazzuchelli had got
into the rear; but scarcely was the head of that general’s column
descried, when Castro, who was at Igualada with his reserves,
recalled the troops from Pobla de Claramunt. The French being close
at their heels, the whole passed through Igualada, fighting and in
disorder, after which, losing all courage, the Spaniards broke,
and, throwing away their arms, fled by the three routes of Cervera,
Calaf, and Manresa. They were pursued all the 17th, and the French
returned the next day, but with few prisoners, because, says St.
Cyr, “_the Catalans are endowed by nature with strong knees_.”
Having thus broken through the centre of the Spanish line, defeated
a part of the left wing and taken the magazines, St. Cyr posted
Chabot and Chabran, at Igualada, to keep the beaten troops in
check, but himself, with Pino’s division, marched the 18th to
fall upon Reding, whose extreme left was now at St. Magi. Souham
had been instructed, when by preconcerted signals he should know
that the attack at Igualada had succeeded, to force the pass of
Cristina, and push forward to Villa Radoña, upon which town St. Cyr
was now marching.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
The position of St. Magi was attacked at four o’clock in the
evening of the 18th, and carried without difficulty, but it was
impossible to find a single peasant to guide the troops, on the
next day’s march to the abbey of Santa Creus. In this perplexity,
a wounded Spanish captain, who was prisoner, demanded to be
allowed to go to Tarragona. St. Cyr assented and offered to carry
him to the Creus, and thus the prisoner unconsciously acted as a
guide to his enemies. The march being long and difficult, it was
late ere they reached the abbey. It was a strong point, and being
occupied in force by the troops that had been beaten from San Magi
the evening before, the French, after a fruitless demonstration of
assaulting it, took a position for the night. Meanwhile, Reding
hearing of Castro’s defeat, had made a draft of men and guns from
the right wing, and marched by Pla and the pass of Cabra, intending
to rally his left. His road being just behind St. Creus, he was
passing at the moment when the French appeared before that place,
but neither general was aware of the other’s presence, and each
continued his particular movement.
The 20th St. Cyr crossed the Gaya river under a fire from the
abbey, and continued his rapid march upon Villa Radoña, near which
place he dispersed a small corps; but finding that Souham was not
come up, he sent an officer, escorted by a battalion, to hasten
that general, whose non-arrival gave reason to believe that the
staff-officers and spies, sent with the previous instructions, had
all been intercepted. This caused the delay of a day and a half,
which would otherwise have sufficed to crush Reding’s right wing,
surprised as it would have been, without a chief, in the plain of
Tarragona.
While St. Cyr rested at Villa Radoña, Reding pursued his march to
St. Coloma de Querault, and having rallied many of Castro’s troops,
the aspect of affairs was totally changed; for the defile of San
Cristina being forced by Souham, he reached Villa Radoña on the
21st, and, at the same time, all the weakly men, who had been left
in charge of the head-quarters at Villa Franca, also arrived. Thus
more than two-thirds of the whole French army were concentrated at
that town at the moment when the Spanish commander, being joined by
the detachment beaten from San Cristina and by the battalion at the
abbey, also rallied the greatest part of his forces, at St. Coloma
de Querault. Each general could now, by a rapid march, overwhelm
his adversary’s right wing; but the troops left by Reding, in the
plain of Tarragona, might have retired upon that fortress, while
those left by St. Cyr, at Igualada, were without support. Hence,
when the latter commander, continuing his movement on Tarragona,
reached Valls the 22d, and heard of Reding’s march, he immediately
carried Pino’s division to Pla and the pass of Cabra, resolved, if
the Spanish general should advance towards Igualada, to follow him
with a sharp spur.
The 23d the French halted: Souham at Valls to watch the Spanish
troops in the plain of Tarragona; Pino’s division at Pla and Cabra,
sending, however, detachments to the abbey of Creus and towards
Santa Coloma to feel for Reding. In the evening these detachments
returned with some prisoners; the one from Creus reported that the
abbey was abandoned; the other that the Spanish general was making
his way back to Tarragona, by the route of Sarreal and Momblanch.
Hereupon St. Cyr, remaining in person with Pino’s division at Pla,
pushed his advanced posts on the right to the abbey of San Creus,
and in front to the defile of Cabra, designing to encounter the
Spaniards, if they returned by either of those roads. Souham’s
division took a position in front of Valls, with his left on the
Francoli river, his right towards Pla, and his advanced guard at
Pixa Moxons, watching for Reding by the road of Momblanch.
The 24th the Spanish general, being at St. Coloma, called a
council of war, at which colonel Doyle, the British military
agent, assisted. One party was for fighting St. Cyr, another for
retreating to Lerida, a third for attacking Chabran, at Igualada,
a fourth for regaining the plain of Tarragona. There were many
opinions, but neither wisdom nor resolution; and finally, Reding,
leaving general Wimpfen, with four thousand men, at San Coloma,
decided to regain Tarragona, and took the route of Momblanch with
ten thousand of his best troops, following the Spanish accounts,
but St. Cyr says with fifteen thousand. Reding knew that Valls
was occupied, and that the line of march was intercepted, but he
imagined the French to be only five or six thousand, for the exact
situation and strength of an enemy were particulars that seldom
troubled Spanish generals.
The 25th of February the head of Reding’s column was suddenly
fired upon, at daybreak, by Souham’s detachment, at Pixa Moxons.
The French were immediately driven back upon the main body, and,
the attack being continued, the whole division was forced to give
way. During the fight the Spanish baggage and artillery passed
the Francoli river; and the road to Tarragona being thus opened,
Reding might have effected his retreat without difficulty, but he
continued to press Souham until St. Cyr, who had received early
intelligence of the action, came down in all haste, from Pla, upon
the left flank of the Spaniards, and the latter seeing the French
dragoons, who preceded the infantry, enter in line, retired in good
order across the Francoli, and took a position behind that river.
From this ground Reding proposed to retreat in the evening; but St.
Cyr obliged him to fight there.
BATTLE OF VALLS.
It was three o’clock when, Pino’s division being come up, St. Cyr’s
recommenced the action. The banks of the Francoli were steep and
rugged, and the Spanish position strong and difficult of access;
but the French general, as he himself states, wishing to increase
the moral ascendancy of his soldiers, forbad the artillery,
although excellently placed for execution, to play upon Reding’s
battalions, fearing that otherwise the latter would fly before
they could be attained by the infantry, and, under this curious
arrangement, the action was begun by the light troops.
The French, or rather the Italians, were superior in numbers to
the Spaniards, and the columns, covered by the skirmishers, passed
the river with great alacrity, and ascended the heights under an
exceedingly regular fire, which was continued until the attacking
troops had nearly reached the summit of the position; but then both
Swiss and Catalans began to waver, and, ere the assailants could
close with them, broke, and were charged by the French cavalry.
Reding, after receiving several sabre wounds, saved himself at
Tarragona, where the greatest number of the vanquished also took
refuge, but the remainder fled in the greatest disorder on the
routes of Tortosa and Lerida.
The count of Castel d’Orius, general of the cavalry, many superior
officers, and the whole of the artillery and baggage were taken,
and four thousand men were killed or wounded; the loss of the
French was about a thousand; and, during all these movements and
actions, Reding received no assistance from the Somatenes; nor is
this surprising, for it may be taken as an axiom in war, that armed
peasants are only formidable to stragglers. When the regular forces
engage, the peasant, sensible of his own weakness, gladly quits the
field.
The 26th Souham’s division, descending into the plain of Tarragona,
took possession of the large and rich town of Reus, from which,
contrary to the general custom, the inhabitants had not fled.
Pino’s division occupied Pla, Alcover, and Valls; detachments were
sent to Salou and Villaseca, on the sea-coast, west of Tarragona;
and Chabot, being recalled from Igualada, was posted at the abbey
of Santa Creus, to watch the troops under Wimpfen, who was still at
St. Coloma de Querault.
The battle of Valls finished the regular warfare in Catalonia.
Those detachments, which by the previous movements had been cut off
from the main body of the army, joined the Somatenes, and, acting
as partizan corps, troubled the communications of the French; but
St. Cyr had no longer a regular army to deal with in the field;
and Tortosa, which was in a miserably defenceless condition, and
without provisions, must have fallen, if after the battle any
attempt had been made against it. But the whole country was filled
with confusion; nor was the disorder momentary; for although Lazan,
after his defeat near Zaragoza, carried a few men to Tortosa,
he declared himself independent of Reding’s command. The fall
of Zaragoza, also, had stricken terror far and wide; and the
neighbouring provinces feared and acted each for its own safety,
without regard to any general plan.
The fugitives from Valls, joined to the troops already in
Tarragona, crowded the latter place; and an infectious disorder
breaking out, a great mortality ensued.
St. Cyr, satisfied that sickness should do the work of the sword,
begirt the city, and resolved to hold his positions while food
could be procured. In this policy he remained stedfast until the
middle of March, although Wimpfen attacked and drove Chabran in
succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and St. Quinti, to Villa Franca;
and although the two Milans and Claros, acting between the Besos
and the Llobregat, cut the communication with Barcelona, and in
conjunction with the English squadron, renewed the blockade of that
city. This plan was injudicious; for notwithstanding the sickness
in Tarragona, the subjugation of Catalonia was retarded by the
cessation of active hostilities. The object of the French general
should have been, while the terror of his victories was fresh, to
gain secure posts, such as Tortosa, Tarragona, Gerona, or Lerida,
from whence he could issue out, and clear the country, from time to
time, of the bands that might be assembled. His inactivity after
the battle of Molino del Rey, and at this period, enabled the
Catalonians to recover from their fears, and to put these towns in
a state of defence.
Towards the middle of March the resources of the country being
all exhausted, St. Cyr at last determined to abandon the plains
of Tarragona, and take some position where he could feed his
troops, cover the projected seige of Gerona, and yet be at hand to
relieve Barcelona. The valleys about Vich alone offered all these
advantages; but as Claros and the Milans were in force at Molino
del Rey, he ordered Chabran to drive them from that point, that
the sick and wounded men might be first transferred from Valls to
Barcelona.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
The 10th of March, Chabran sent a battalion with one piece of
artillery on that service. The Migueletes thinking it was the
advanced guard of a greater force, abandoned the post; but being
undeceived, returned, beat the battalion, and took the gun. The
12th, Chabran having received orders to march with his whole
division, consisting of eight battalions and three squadrons,
reached the bridge, but returned without daring to attack. St. Cyr
repeated his orders, and on the 14th the troops, apparently ashamed
of their general’s irresolution, fell on vigorously, and, having
carried the bridge, established themselves on the heights on both
sides of the river.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
The communication thus opened, it was found that Duhesme,
pressed by the Migueletes without, was also extremely fearful of
conspiracies within the walls: that his fears, and the villainous
conduct of his police, had at last excited the inhabitants to
attempt that which their enemies seemed so much to dread; and
in March, an insurrection being planned in concert with the
Migueletes and with the English squadron, the latter came close in
and cannonaded the town on the 10th, expecting that Wimpfen, the
Milans, and Claros would have assaulted the gates, which was to
have been the signal for the insurrection within.
The inhabitants were the more sanguine of success, because there
were above two thousand Spanish prisoners in the city; and
outside the walls there were two tercios secretly recruited and
maintained by the citizens: these men being without uniforms,
constantly passed in and out of the town, and Duhesme was never
able to discover or to prevent them. This curious circumstance is
illustrative of the peculiar genius of the Spaniards, which in all
matters of surprise and stratagem is unrivalled. The project was,
however, baffled by Chabran’s action at Molino del Rey, on the
14th, which dispersed the partizan corps outside the walls; and the
British squadron being exposed to a heavy gale, and disappointed in
the co-operation from the land, sailed away on the 11th.
St. Cyr intended to commence his retrograde movement on the 18th;
but on the 17th a cannonade was heard on the side of Momblanch,
which was ascertained to proceed from a detachment of six hundred
men, with two guns, under the command of Colonel Briche. This
officer being sent by Mortier to open the communication with St.
Cyr, after the fall of Zaragoza, had forced his way through the
Spanish partizan corps. To favour his return the army halted two
days; but the enterprize, after a trial, appeared so dangerous,
that he relinquished it, and attached himself to the seventh corps.
The inactivity that succeeded the battle of Valls, and the timidity
displayed by Chabran in the subsequent skirmishes, having depressed
the spirits of the troops, they contemplated the approaching
retreat with great uneasiness; and many officers, infected with
panic doubt, advised the general to hide his movements from the
enemy: but he, anxious to restore their confidence, took the part
of giving the Spaniards a formal notice of his intentions; and
desired of Reding that he would send proper officers to take over
the hospitals which had been fitted up at Valls, as well as some of
the French, wounded, that could not be moved. This done, the army
commencing its retreat, reached Villa Franca the 21st of March; and
the 22d passed the Llobregat, followed, but not molested, by some
feeble Spanish detachments.
The 23d, general Pino attacked and defeated Wimpfen, who having
rallied the corps of Claros and the Milans, after the affair on
the 24th, had taken a position at Tarrasa. Pino pursued him to
the vicinity of Manresa, foraged that country, and returned with
sufficient provisions to feed the army, without drawing on the
magazines of Barcelona.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
During these proceedings, Reding died in Tarragona of his wounds.
He had been received there with great dissatisfaction after the
battle of Valls, and the interference of the British consul was
necessary to save him from the first fury of the populace, who were
always ready to attribute a defeat to the treachery of the general.
His military conduct was, by his own officers, generally and justly
condemned; but although his skill in war was slight, his courage
and honesty were unquestionable; and he was of distinguished
humanity; for, at this unhappy period, when the French prisoners
in every part of Spain were tortured with the most savage cruelty;
when to refrain from such deeds was to incur suspicion, Reding had
the manliness, not only to repress all barbarities within the range
of his command, but even to conclude a convention with St. Cyr,
under which the wounded men on both sides were to receive decent
treatment, and to be exchanged as soon as their hurts were cured.
In his last moments Reding complained that he had been ill-served
as a general; that the Somatenes had not supported him; that his
orders were neglected; his plans disclosed to the enemy; and
that he could never get true intelligence; complaints which the
experience of Moore, Baird, Cradock, Murray, and, above all, of
Wellington, proved to be applicable to every part of Spain, and
every period of the war.
Coupigny succeeded Reding, but he was soon superseded by general
Blake, who, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, was appointed
captain-general of the “_Coronilla_,” or Little Crown, a title
given to the three provinces of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia,
when united; and, as the warfare in Aragon thus became immediately
connected with that in Catalonia, I shall here give a short account
of what was passing in the former province.
When Zaragoza fell, marshal Lasnes was recalled to France; Mortier,
who succeeded him in the command, sent detachments against Jaca
and Monzon; and threatened Mequinenza and Lerida. The Fort of
Monzon, commanding a passage over the Cinca river, was abandoned
by the Spaniards, and the town and citadel of Jaca surrendered:
whereby the French opened a new and important communication with
France. But, Lerida being fruitlessly summoned, and some slight
demonstrations made against Mequinenza having failed, Mortier
cantoned his troops on both sides of the Ebro, from Barbastro to
Alcanitz, and despatched colonel Briche, as we have seen, to open
a communication with the seventh corps; but, in April, the fifth
corps marched for Castile, and general Junot was left with a part
only of the third corps to maintain Aragon.
[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]
Many of the French artillery-men and non-commissioned officers had
been withdrawn from Spain to serve in Germany. One brigade of the
third corps also was employed to protect the communications on the
side of Navarre, and another was detached to escort the prisoners
from Zaragoza to Bayonne. These drafts, added to the loss sustained
during the siege, reduced the number of troops in Aragon to about
twelve thousand disposable men under arms.
Junot, being sick, returned to France, and general Suchet succeeded
him. The weakness of the army gave great uneasiness to the new
general,--an uneasiness which was not allayed by finding that
men and officers were, from various causes, discontented and
dispirited. Suchet was, however, no ordinary man; and, with equal
prudence and vigour, he commenced a system of discipline in his
corps, and of order in his government, that afterwards carried
him, with scarcely a check, from one success to another, until he
obtained the rank of marshal for himself, and the honour for his
corps of being the only one in Spain that never suffered any signal
reverse.
Suchet hoped that the battle of Valls, and other defeats sustained
by the Spaniards at this period, would give him time to re-organize
his troops in tranquillity--but this hope soon vanished. The
peasantry, observing the weakness of the third corps, only waited
for a favourable opportunity to rise, and the Migueletes and
Somatenes of the mountains about Lerida and Mequenenza were,
under the command of colonel Pereña and colonel Baget, already in
activity.
While the duke of Abrantes yet held the command Blake’s appointment
took place; and that general drawing troops from Valencia and
Tarragona, and, being joined by Lazan, fixed his quarters at
Morella, on the frontier of Aragon. Designing to operate in that
province rather than in Catalonia, he endeavoured to re-kindle the
fire of insurrection; nor was fortune adverse to him. A part of the
garrison of Monzon having made an unsuccessful marauding excursion
beyond the Cinca, the citizens fell upon those who remained, and
obliged them to abandon that post, which was immediately occupied by
Pereña. The duke of Abrantes sent eight companies of infantry and
thirty cuirassiers to retake the place: but Baget having reinforced
Pereña, the French were repulsed, and the Cinca suddenly overflowing
behind them, cut off their retreat. The cavalry, plunging with
their horses into the river, escaped by swimming; but the infantry
finding the lower passages guarded by the garrison of Lerida, and
the upper cut off by the partizan corps, after three days’ marching
and skirmishing, surrendered to Pereña and Baget. The prisoners were
carried to Tarragona, and soon afterwards exchanged, in pursuance of
a convention made by Reding and St. Cyr.
This little success was, as usual, sufficient to excite the most
extravagant hopes, and the garrison of Mequinenza having, about the
same time, burnt a bridge of boats which the French had thrown over
the Ebro at Caspe, Blake immediately advanced, and, driving back
the French from Beceyta and Val de Ajorfa, entered Alcanitz. The
beaten troops retired in haste and with loss to Samper and Ixar;
and it was at this moment, when the French were harassed on both
banks of the Ebro, and their wings separated by the destruction
of the bridge at Caspe, that Suchet arrived to take the command of
the third corps. Seeing his divisions disseminated over a great
tract of country, and in danger of being beaten in detail, he
immediately ordered general Habert to abandon the left bank of the
Ebro, cross that river at Fuentes, and follow in reserve upon Ixar,
where Suchet himself rallied all the rest of the troops, with the
exception of a small garrison left in Zaragoza.
BATTLE OF ALCANITZ.
[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]
The French battalions were fearful and disorderly: but the general,
anxious to raise their spirits, marched towards Blake on the 23d of
May. The latter was in position in front of Alcanitz, a bridge over
the Guadalupe was immediately behind his centre, which was covered
by a hill; his left was well posted near some pools of water, but
his right was rather exposed. The French had about eight thousand
infantry and seven hundred cavalry in the field, and the Spaniards
about twelve thousand of all arms.
Suchet, observing Blake’s dispositions, judged that if he could
carry the hill in the centre, and so separate the Spanish wings,
the latter would be cut off from the bridge of Alcanitz, and
obliged to surrender. In this design he directed a column against
each wing, to draw Blake’s attention to his flanks: but, when the
skirmishers were well engaged, three thousand men, pushing rapidly
along the main road, attacked the hillock. A brisk fire of musketry
and artillery, however, checked their progress; the Spaniards stood
firm, and the French, after a feeble effort to ascend the hill,
began to waver, and, finally, fled outright. Suchet, who was
himself slightly wounded, rallied them in the plain, and remained
there for the rest of the day, but without daring to renew the
action. In the night, he retreated; and, although not pursued, his
troops were seized with panic, and, at day-light, came pouring
into Samper with all the tumult and disorder of a rout. Blake’s
inactivity enabled Suchet to restore order; he caused the man who
first commenced the alarm to be shot; and then, encouraging the
troops that they might not seem to fly, he rested in position two
whole days, after which he retreated to Zaragoza.
This action at Alcanitz was a subject of triumph and rejoicing
all over Spain. The supreme junta conferred an estate upon Blake;
the kingdom of Murcia was added to his command; his army rapidly
augmented; and he himself greatly elated and confirmed in a design
he had formed to retake Zaragoza, turned his whole attention to
Aragon, and totally neglected Catalonia, to which province it is
time to return.
St. Cyr remained in Barcelona for a considerable period, during
which he endeavoured to remedy the evils of Duhesme’s government,
and to make himself acquainted with the political disposition
of the inhabitants. He filled the magazines with three months’
provisions; and, as the prisoners within the walls were an
incumbrance, on account of their subsistence, and a source of
uneasiness from their numbers, he resolved to send them to France.
The 15th of April, having transferred his sick and weakly men
to the charge of Duhesme, and exchanged Chabran’s for Lecchi’s
division, he recommenced his march, and reached Granollers,
giving out that he was returning to the frontier of France, lest
the Catalans should remove their provisions from Vich, and thus
frustrate his principal object.
The Migueletes, under the two Milans and Claros, were, however, on
the watch to harass the army, and had taken post beyond Garriga
on each side of a long and narrow defile in the valley of the
Congosto. This pass of surprising natural strength was barricadoed
with trees and pieces of rock, and mined in several places; and
Wimpfen also held his corps at a little distance, ready to join
Claros at the first alarm. The 16th Lecchi’s division, escorting
two thousand prisoners, appeared at the head of this defile, and
an action commenced, but in an hour the Migueletes fled on all
sides; for St. Cyr, fully aware of the strength of the position,
had secretly detached Pino to attack Wimpfen; and, while Lecchi
was engaged at the entrance, Souham and Chabot, traversing the
mountain, arrived, the one upon the flank, and the other at the
further end of this formidable pass.
The 18th the army was established in the valley and town of Vich;
but the inhabitants, with the exception of the bishop and a few old
men, fled to the mountains with their effects, leaving, however,
their provisions behind. St. Cyr then posted Chabot’s and Pino’s
divisions at Centellas, San Martin, Tona, and Collespino, to guard
the entrance into the valley. Souham remained at Vich, his right
being at Roda and Manlieu on the Ter, and his advanced posts at
Gurp, St. Sebastian, and St. Eularia. The 24th Lecchi marched,
with the prisoners, by Filieu de Pallerols to Besalu on the
Fluvia; he was attacked several times on the route, but succeeded
in delivering his charge to general Reille, and then returned with
the first information received by St. Cyr of Napoleon’s arrival in
Paris, and the certainty of a war with Austria. To balance this,
a moveable column sent to Barcelona brought back the pleasing
intelligence that rear-admiral Comaso, with a French squadron,
having baffled the extreme vigilance of lord Collingwood, had
reached that city with ample supplies. Thus what may be called
the irregular movements in Catalonia terminated, and the more
methodical warfare of sieges commenced; but this part was committed
to other hands. General Verdier had succeeded Reille in the
Ampurdan, and marshal Augereau was on the road to supersede St. Cyr.
[Illustration: _Plate 2. to face Pa. 102._
_Sketch Explanatory_
of the
Operations in Catalonia
in
_1808 and 1809_.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]
OBSERVATIONS.--1º. General St. Cyr’s marches were hardy, his
battles vigorous and delivered in right time and place; but his
campaign, as a whole, may be characterised as one of great efforts
without corresponding advantages. He himself attributes this to the
condition of the seventh corps, destitute and neglected, because
_the emperor disliked and wished to ruin its chief_; a strange
accusation, and unsustained by reason or facts. What! Napoleon
wilfully destroy his own armies! sacrifice forty thousand men,
that a general, who he was not obliged to employ at all, might be
disgraced! General St. Cyr acknowledges, that when he received his
instructions from the emperor, he observed the affliction of the
latter at the recent loss of Dupont’s force; yet he would have it
believed, that, in the midst of this regret, that monarch, with
a singular malice, was preparing greater disasters for himself,
merely to disgrace the general commanding the seventh corps,
and why? because the latter had formerly served with the army of
the Rhine! Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Catalonia, and was
afterwards made a marshal by this implacable enemy.
2º.--That the seventh corps was not well supplied, and that its
commander was thereby placed in a difficult situation, is not to be
disputed in the face of the facts stated by general St. Cyr; but
if war were a state of ease and smoothness, the fame which attends
successful generals would be less. Napoleon selected general St.
Cyr because he thought him a capable commander; in feeble hands,
he knew the seventh corps would be weak, but, with St. Cyr at its
head, he judged it sufficient to overcome the Catalonians; nor was
he much mistaken. Barcelona, the great object of solicitude, was
saved; Rosas was taken; and if Tarragona and Tortosa did not also
fall, the one after the battle of Molino del Rey, the other after
that of Valls, it was because the French general did not choose to
attack them. Those towns were without the slightest preparation
for defence, moral or physical, and must have surrendered; nor
can the unexpected and stubborn resistance of Gerona, Zaragoza,
and Valencia be cited against this opinion. The latter cities
were previously prepared and expectant of a siege; and yet, in
every instance, except Valencia, there was a moment of dismay and
confusion, not fatal, only because the besieging generals wanted
that ready vigour which is the characteristic of great commanders.
3º.--General St. Cyr, aware that a mere calculation of numbers
and equipment is but a poor measure of the strength of armies,
exalts the enthusiasm and the courage of the Catalans, and seems to
tremble at the danger which, owing to Napoleon’s suicidal jealousy,
menaced, at that period, not only the seventh corps but even the
south of France. In answer to this, it may be observed that M. de
St. Cyr did not hesitate, with eighteen thousand men having no
artillery, and carrying only sixty rounds of musket-ammunition, to
plunge into the midst of those terrible armies, to march through
the mountains for whole weeks, to attack the strongest positions
with the bayonet alone, nay, even to dispense with the use of his
artillery, when he did bring it into action, lest his men should
not have a sufficient contempt for their enemies. And who were
these undaunted soldiers, so high in courage, so confident, so
regardless of the great weapon of modern warfare? Not the select of
the imperial guards, the conquerors in a hundred battles, but raw
levies, the dregs and scrapings of Italy, the refuse of Naples and
of Rome, states which to name as military was to ridicule.
4º.--With such soldiers, the battles of Cardadeu, Molino,
Igualada, and Valls, were gained; yet general St. Cyr does not
hesitate to call the Migueletes, who were beaten at those places,
the best light troops in the world. The best _light troops_ are
neither more nor less than the best troops in the world; but if,
instead of fifteen thousand Migueletes, the four thousand men
composing Wellington’s light division had been on the heights
of Cardadeu--general St. Cyr’s sixty rounds of ammunition would
scarcely have carried him to Barcelona. The injurious force with
which personal feelings act upon the judgement are well known, or
it might excite wonder that so good a writer and so able a soldier
should advance such fallacies.
5º.--General St. Cyr’s work, admirable in many respects, bears,
nevertheless, the stamp of carelessness. Thus, he affirms that
Dupont’s march to Andalusia encouraged the tumults of Aranjues;
but the tumults of Aranjues happened in the month of March, nearly
three months previous to Dupont’s movement, which took place in
May and June. Again, he says, that, Napoleon, to make a solid
conquest in the Peninsula, should have commenced with Catalonia,
instead of over-running Spain by the northern line of operations;
an opinion quite unsustainable. The progress of the seventh corps
was impeded by the want of provisions, not by the enemy’s force.
Twenty thousand men could beat the Spaniards in the field, but they
could not subsist. What could three hundred thousand men have done?
Would it have given a just idea of Napoleon’s power to employ the
strength of his empire against the fortified towns in Catalonia?
In what would the greater solidity of this plan have consisted?
While the French were thus engaged, the patriots would have been
organizing their armies; England would have had time to bring all
her troops into line, and two hundred thousand men placed between
Zaragoza and Tortosa, or breaking into France by the western
Pyrenees, while the Austrians were advancing to the Rhine, would
have sorely shaken the solidity of general St. Cyr’s plan.
6º.--The French emperor better understood what he was about; he
saw a nation intrinsically powerful and vehemently excited, yet
ignorant of war, and wanting the aid which England was eager to
give. All the elements of power existed in the Peninsula, and
they were fast approximating to a centre, when Napoleon burst upon
that country, and as the gathering of a water-spout is said to
be sometimes prevented by the explosion of a gun, so the rising
strength of Spain was dissipated by his sudden and dreadful
assault. If the war was not then finished, it was because his
lieutenants were tardy and jealous of each other.
7º.--St. Cyr appears to have fallen into an error, common enough
in all times, and one very prevalent among the French generals in
Spain. He considered his task as a whole in itself, instead of a
constituent part of a greater system. He judged very well what
was wanting for the seventh corps, to subjugate Catalonia in a
solid manner, but he did not discern that it was fitting that the
seventh corps should forget Catalonia, to aid the general plan
against the Peninsula. Rosas surrendered at the very moment when
Napoleon, after the victories of Baylen, Espinosa, Tudela, and
the Somosierra, was entering Madrid as a conqueror. The battles
of Cardadeu and Molino del Rey may, therefore, be said to have
completely prostrated Spain, because the English army was isolated,
the Spanish army destroyed, and Zaragoza invested. Was that a time
to calculate the weight of powder and the number of pick-axes
required for a formal siege of Tarragona? The whole Peninsula was
shaken to the centre, the proud hearts of the Spaniards sunk with
terror, and in that great consternation, to be daring, was, on
the part of the French generals, to be prudent. St. Cyr was not
in a condition to besiege Tarragona, formally, but he might have
assaulted it with less danger than he incurred by his march to
Barcelona. The battle of Valls was another epoch of the same kind;
the English army had re-embarked, and the route of Ucles had taken
place. Portugal was invaded and Zaragoza had just fallen. That was
a time to render victory fruitful, yet no attempt was made against
Tortoza.
8º.--St. Cyr, who justly blames Palacios and Vives for remaining
before Barcelona instead of carrying their army to the Ter and the
Fluvia, seems inclined to applaud Reding for conduct equally at
variance with the true principles of war. It was his own inactivity
after the battle of Molino that produced the army of Reding, and
the impatient folly of that army, and of the people, produced the
plan which led to the route of Igualada and the battle of Valls.
But, instead of disseminating his thirty thousand men on a line
of sixty miles, from Tarragona to the Upper Llobregat, Reding
should have put Tarragona and Tortosa into a state of defence, and,
leaving a small corps of observation near the former, have made
Lerida the base of his operations. In that position, and keeping
the bulk of his force in one mass, he might have acted on St. Cyr’s
flanks and rear effectually, by the road of Cervera--and without
danger to himself; nor could the French general have attempted
aught against Tarragona.
But it is not with reference to the seventh corps alone that Lerida
was the proper base of the Spanish army. Let us suppose that the
supreme junta had acted for a moment upon a rational system; that
the Valencian troops, instead of remaining at Morella, had been
directed on Mequinenza and that the duke of Infantado’s force
had been carried from Cuença to the same place instead of being
routed at Ucles. Thus, in the beginning of February, more than
fifty thousand regular troops would have been assembled at Lerida,
encircled by the fortresses of Monzon, Balaguer, Mequinenza,
Tarragona, and Tortoza. Its lines of operations would have been
as numerous as the roads. The Seu d’Urgel, called the granary of
Catalonia, would have supplied corn, and the communication with
Valencia would have been direct and open. On this central and
impregnable position such a force might have held the seventh corps
in check, and also raised the siege of Zaragoza; nor could the
first corps have followed Infantado’s movements without abandoning
the whole of the emperor’s plans against Portugal and Andalusia.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
9º.--St. Cyr praises Reding’s project for surrounding the French,
and very gravely observes that the _only method_ of defeating it
was by taking the offensive himself. Nothing can be juster; but he
should have added that it was a _certain method_; and, until we
find a great commander acting upon Reding’s principles, this praise
can only be taken as an expression of civility towards a brave
adversary. St. Cyr’s own movements were very different; he disliked
Napoleon personally, but he did not dislike his manner of making
war. Buonaparte’s campaign in the Alps against Beaulieu was not an
unheeded lesson. There is, however, one proceeding of St. Cyr’s for
which there has been no precedent, and which it is unlikely will
ever be imitated, namely, the stopping of the fire of the artillery
when it was doing infinite execution, that a moral ascendancy over
the enemy might be established. It is impossible to imagine a more
cutting sarcasm on the courage of the Catalans than this fact; yet,
general St. Cyr states that his adversaries were numerous, and
fought bravely. Surely he could not have commanded so long without
knowing that _there is in all battles a decisive moment, when every
weapon, every man, every combination of force that can be brought
to bear, is necessary to gain the victory_.
10º.--If general St. Cyr’s own marches and battles did not
sufficiently expose the fallacy of his opinions relative to the
vigour of the Catalans, lord Collingwood’s correspondence would
supply the deficiency. That able and sagacious man, writing at this
period says,--
“In Catalonia, every thing seems to have gone wrong since the
fall of Rosas. The Spaniards are in considerable force, yet are
dispersed and panic-struck whenever the enemy appears.”--“The
applications for supplies are unlimited; they want money, arms,
and ammunition, of which no use appears to be made when they get
them.”--“In the English papers, I see accounts of successes, and
convoys cut off, and waggons destroyed, which are not true. What
has been done in that way has been by the boats of our frigates,
which have, in two or three instances, landed men and attacked
the enemy with great gallantry. The Somatenes range the hills in
a disorderly way, and fire at a distance, but retire on being
approached.”--“The multitudes of men do not make a force.”
Add to this the Spanish historian Cabane’s statements that the
Migueletes were always insubordinate, detested the service of the
line, and were many of them armed only with staves, and we have the
full measure of the Catalans’ resistance.
11º.--It was not the vigour of the Catalans, but of the English,
that in this province, as in every part of the Peninsula, retarded
the progress of the French. Would St. Cyr have wasted a month
before Rosas? Would he have been hampered in his movements by his
fears for the safety of Barcelona? Would he have failed to besiege
and take Tarragona and Tortosa, if a French fleet had attended his
progress by the coast, or if it could even have made two runs in
safety? To lord Collingwood, who, like the Roman Bibulus, perished
of sickness on his decks rather than relax in his watching,--to his
keen judgement, his unceasing vigilance, the resistance made by the
Catalans was due. His fleet it was that interdicted the coast-line
to the French, protected the transport of the Spanish supplies from
Valencia, assisted in the defence of the towns, aided the retreat
of the beaten armies; in short, did that which the Spanish fleets
in Cadiz and Carthagena should have done. But the supreme junta,
equally disregarding the remonstrances of lord Collingwood, the
good of their own country, and the treaty with England, by which
they were bound to prevent their ships from falling into the hands
of the enemy, left their fleets to rot in harbour, although money
was advanced, and the assistance of the British seamen offered, to
fit them out for sea.
Having now related the principal operations that took place in the
eastern and central provinces of Spain, which were so suddenly
overrun by the French emperor; having shown that, however restless
the Spaniards were under the yoke imposed upon them, they were
unable to throw it off; I shall turn to Portugal, where the tide of
invasion still flowing onward, although with diminished volume, was
first stayed, and finally overpowered and forced back, by a counter
flood of mightier strength.
BOOK VI.
CHAPTER I.
TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 1.]
When sir John Moore marched from Portugal, the regency, established
by sir Hew Dalrymple, nominally governed that country; but the
weak characters of the members, the listless habits engendered
by the ancient system of misrule, the intrigues of the Oporto
faction, and the general turbulence of the people soon produced an
alarming state of anarchy. Private persons usurped the functions
of government, justice was disregarded, insubordination and murder
were hailed as indications of patriotism. War was the universal
cry, but military preparations were wholly neglected; for the
nation, in its foolish pride, believed that the French had neither
strength nor spirit for a second invasion.
In Lisbon there was a French faction. The merchants were
apprehensive, the regency was unpopular, the public mind unsettled;
and, in Oporto, the violence of both people and soldiers was such,
that sir Harry Burrard sent two British regiments there, by sea, to
preserve tranquillity; in fine, the seeds of disorder were widely
cast and sprouting vigorously before the English cabinet thought
fit to accredit a responsible diplomatist near the government,
or to place a permanent chief at the head of the forces left by
sir John Moore. The convention of Cintra was known in England in
September. The regency was established and the frontier fortresses
occupied by British troops in the same month; yet it was not until
the middle of December that Mr. Villiers and sir John Cradock,
charged with the conduct of the political and military proceedings
in Portugal, reached Lisbon, and thus the important interval,
between the departure of Junot and their arrival, was totally
neglected by the English cabinet.
Sir Hew Dalrymple, who had nominated the regency; sir Arthur
Wellesley, who, to local knowledge and powerful talents, added
the influence of a victorious commander; Burrard, Spencer, were
all removed from Portugal at the very moment when the presence of
persons acquainted with the real state of affairs was essential to
the well-being of the British interests in that country; and this
error was the offspring of passion and incapacity; for, if the
convention of Cintra had been rightly understood, the ministers,
appreciating the advantages of that treaty, would have resisted
the clamour of the moment, and the generals would not have been
withdrawn from the public service abroad to meet unjust and
groundless charges at home.
It may be disputed whether Portugal was the fittest theatre for
the first operations of a British army; but, when that country was
actually freed from the presence of an enemy; when the capital
and the frontier fortresses were occupied by English troops; when
sir John Moore leaving his hospitals, baggage, and magazines
there, as in a place of arms, had marched to Spain, the question
was no longer doubtful. The ancient relations between England
and Portugal, the greatness of the port of Lisbon, the warlike
disposition of the Portuguese, and, above all, the singularly-happy
circumstance that there was neither court nor monarch to balance
the English influence, and that even the nomination of the regency
was the work of an English general, offered such great and obvious
advantages as could no where else be obtained. It was a miserable
policy that, neglecting such an occasion, retained sir Arthur
Wellesley in England, while Portugal, like a drunken man, at once
weak and turbulent, was reeling on the edge of a precipice.
The 5th of December sir John Cradock, being on his voyage to
Lisbon, touched at Coruña. Fifteen hundred thousand dollars had
just arrived there in the Lavinia frigate; but, sir John Moore’s
intention to retreat upon Portugal being known, Cradock divided
this sum, and carried away eight hundred thousand dollars,
proposing to leave a portion at Oporto, and to take the remainder
to Lisbon, that Moore might find, on whatever line he retreated, a
supply of money.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 2.]
From Coruña he proceeded to Oporto, and landed to gather
information of the state of affairs. Here he found that sir
Robert Wilson had succeeded in organizing, under the title of the
Lusitanian Legion, about thirteen hundred men, and that others
were on their way to reinforce him; but, this excepted, nothing at
Oporto, civil or military, bespoke either arrangement or common
sense. The bishop, still intent upon acquiring supreme rule, was
deeply engaged with secret intrigues, and, under him, a number of
factious and designing persons instigated the populace to violent
actions, with a view to profit from their excesses.
The formation of the Lusitanian Legion was originally a project of
the chevalier da Souza, the Portuguese minister in London. Souza
was one of the bishop’s faction, and the prelate calculated upon
this force not so much to repel the enemy as to give weight to his
own party against the government. The men were promised higher pay
than any other Portuguese soldiers, to the great discontent of the
latter, and they were clad in uniforms differing in colour from
the national troops. The regency, who dreaded the machinations
of the turbulent priest, entertained the utmost jealousy of the
legion, which, in truth, was a most anomalous force, and, as might
be expected from its peculiar constitution, was productive of much
embarrassment.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 1.]
Sir John Cradock left three hundred thousand dollars at Oporto,
and having directed the two British battalions which were in
that neighbourhood to march to Almeida, he took on board a small
detachment of German troops, and set sail for Lisbon; but, before
his departure, he strongly advised sir Robert Wilson to move
such of his legionaries as were sufficiently organized to Villa
Real, in Tras os Montes, a place appointed by the regency for the
assembly of the forces in the north. Sir Robert, tired of the folly
and disgusted with the insolence and excesses of the ruling mob,
readily adopted this advice, so far as to quit Oporto, but, having
views of his own, took the direction of Almeida instead of Villa
Real.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 5.]
The state of the capital was little better than that of Oporto.
There was arrangement neither for present nor for future defence,
and the populace, albeit less openly encouraged to commit excesses,
were quite uncontrolled by the government. The regency had a keener
dread of domestic insurrection than of the return of the French,
whose operations they regarded with even less anxiety than the
bishop did, as being further removed than he was from the immediate
theatre of war. Their want of system and vigilance, evinced by
the following fact, was truly surprising. Sattaro and another
person, having contracted for the supply of the British troops,
demanded, in the name of the English general, all the provisions in
the public stores of Portugal, and then sold them to the English
commissaries for his own profit.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4, section 1.]
Sir John Cradock’s instructions directed him to reinforce sir
John Moore’s army, and, if the course of events should bring
that general back to Portugal, he was not to be interfered with.
In fact, Cradock’s operations were limited to the holding of
Elvas, Almeida, and the capital; for, although he was directed to
encourage the formation of a native army upon a good and regular
system, and even to act in concert with it on the frontier, he
was debarred from political interference; and even his relative
situation, as to rank, was left unsettled until the arrival of
Mr. Villiers, to whose direction all political and many military
arrangements were entrusted.
It is evident that the influence of a general thus fettered, and
commanding only a small force, which was moreover much scattered,
must be feeble and insufficient to produce any real amelioration
in the military situation of the country. But the English
ministers, attentive to the false information obtained from
interested agents, still imagined that not only the Spanish, but
the Portuguese armies were numerous, and to be relied upon; and
they confidently expected, that the latter would be able to take an
active part in the Spanish campaign.
[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
Cradock, feeling the danger of this illusion, made it his first
object to ascertain, and to transmit home, exact information of the
real strength and efficiency of the native regular troops. They
were nominally twenty thousand; but Miguel Percira Forjas, military
secretary to the regency, and the ablest public man Portugal
possessed, acknowledged that this force was a nullity, and that
there were not more than ten thousand stand of serviceable arms in
the kingdom, the greatest part of which were English. The troops
themselves were undisciplined and unruly; and the militia and the
“_ordenanza_,” or armed peasantry, animated rather by a spirit of
outrage than of enthusiasm, evinced no disposition to submit to
regulation, neither was there any branch of administration free
from the grossest disorder.
The Spanish dollar had a general acceptance in Portugal. The
regency, under the pretence that a debased foreign coin would
drive the Portuguese coin out of circulation, deprived the dollar
of its current value. This regulation, true in principle, and
applicable, as far as the Portuguese gold coin (which is of
peculiar fineness) was concerned, had, however, a most injurious
effect. The Spanish dollar was in reality finer than the Portuguese
silver cruzado-nova, and would finally have maintained its value,
notwithstanding this decree. But a slur being thus thrown upon it
by the government, the money changers contrived to run its value
down for the moment, a matter of infinite importance; for the
English soldiers and sailors being all paid in these dollars, at
four shillings and sixpence, which was the true value, were thus
suddenly mulcted four-pence in each, by the artificial depreciation
of the moment. The men attributed this to fraud in the shopkeepers;
the retail trade of Lisbon was interrupted, and quarrels between
the tradesmen and the soldiers took place hourly.
To calm this effervescence, a second decree was promulgated,
directing that the dollar should be received at the mint and in
the public offices at its real value. It then appeared that the
government could profit by coining the dollar of four shillings
and sixpence into cruzado-novas, a circumstance which gave the
whole affair the appearance of an unworthy trick to recruit the
treasury. This happened in October; and as the financial affairs
were ill managed, and the regency destitute of vigour or capacity,
the taxes were unpaid, the hard cash exhausted, and the treasury
paper at a heavy discount when Cradock arrived. Upon the scroll
thus unfolded he could only read confusion, danger, and misfortune;
for such being the fruits of victory, what could be expected from
disaster; and at this period (the middle of December) sir John
Moore was supposed to be in full retreat upon Portugal, followed by
the emperor with one French army, while another threatened Lisbon
by the line of the Tagus. The English troops in the kingdom did
not amount to ten thousand men, including the sick, and they were
ill equipped and scattered; moreover, the capital was crowded with
women and children, with baggage and non-combatants, belonging as
well to the army in Spain as to that in Portugal.
There were in the river three Portuguese ships of the line, two
frigates, and eight other smaller vessels of war; but none were in
a state for sea, and the whole likely to fall into the hands of
the enemy: for in the midst of this confusion sir Charles Cotton
was recalled, without a successor being appointed; and although
the zeal and talents of captain Halket, the senior officer on the
station, amply compensated for the departure of the admiral, as
far as professional duties were concerned, he could not aid the
general, nor deal with the regency as vigorously as an officer of
higher rank, and formally accredited, could have done.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Papers, MSS.]
Sir John Cradock, although fully sensible of his own difficulties,
with a very disinterested zeal, resolved to make the reinforcing of
sir John Moore’s army his first care; but his force at this time
was, as I have already said, less than ten thousand men of all
arms. It consisted of eight British and four German battalions of
infantry, four troops of dragoons, and thirty pieces of artillery,
of which, however, only six were horsed so as to take the field.
There was, also, a battalion of the 60th regiment, but it was
composed principally of Frenchmen, recruited from the prison ships,
and had been sent back from Spain, as the soldiers could not be
trusted near their countrymen.
Of these thirteen battalions two were in Abrantes, one in Elvas,
three at Lamego on the Duero, one in Almeida, and the remaining
six at Lisbon. Three of the four battalions in the north were
immediately directed to join sir John Moore by the route of
Salamanca; and of those in the south, two, accompanied by a
demi-brigade of artillery, were sent to him from Abrantes, by the
road of Castello Branco and Ciudad Rodrigo.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The 19th of December, Mr. Villiers having arrived, sir John
Cradock forwarded to the regency a strong representation of the
dangerous state of Portugal. He observed that there was neither
activity in the government nor enthusiasm among the people; that
the army, deficient in numbers, and still more so in discipline,
was scattered and neglected; and, notwithstanding that the aspect
of affairs was so threatening, the regency were apparently without
any system, or fixed principle of action. He proposed, therefore,
that a general enrolment of all the people should take place; and
from the British stores he offered a supply of a thousand muskets
and ten thousand pikes. This giving of pikes to the people appears
to have been in compliance with Mr. Villiers’ wishes, and betrayed
more zeal than prudence; for certainly a general levy and arming
with pikes of the turbulent populace of a capital city, at such a
conjuncture, was more likely to lead to confusion and mischief than
to any effectual defence. But the main objects pressing upon the
general’s attention were sufficiently numerous and contradictory to
render it difficult for him to avoid errors.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 1.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4, section 1.]
It was a part of his instructions, and of manifest importance, to
send reinforcements to sir John Moore. But it was equally necessary
to keep a force towards the frontier on the line of the Tagus,
seeing that the fourth French corps had just passed that river at
Almaraz, had defeated Galluzzo’s army and menaced Badajos, which
was without arms, ammunition, or provisions; and, moreover, the
populace there were in commotion, and slaying the chief persons.
Now, sir John Cradock’s instructions directed him to keep his
troops in a position that would enable him to abandon Portugal, if
a very superior force should press him; but as, in such a case,
he was to carry off not only the British army, but the Portuguese
navy and stores, to destroy what he could not remove, and to
receive on board his ships all the natives who might be desirous of
escaping, it was of pressing necessity to ship the women, children,
and baggage, in fine, all the encumbrances belonging to Moore’s
army, immediately, that his own rear might be clear for a sudden
embarkation. In short, he was to send his troops to Spain, and yet
defend Portugal; to excite confidence in the Portuguese, and yet
openly to carry on the preparations for abandoning that country.
The populace of Lisbon were, however, already uneasy at the rumours
of an embarkation, and it was doubtful if they would permit even
the British non-combatants to get on board quietly, much less
suffer the forts to be dismantled, and the ships of war to be
carried off, without a tumult, which, at such a conjuncture, would
have been fatal to all parties. Hence it was imperative to maintain
a strong garrison in Lisbon and in the forts commanding the mouth
of the river; and this draft, together with the troops absorbed by
the fortresses of Almeida and Elvas, reduced the fighting men in
the field to insignificance.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The regency, knowing the temper of the people and fearing to arm
them, were not very eager to enforce the levy; yet, anxious to hide
their weakness, they promised, at the urgent solicitations of the
English general, to send six thousand troops to Alcantara, on the
Spanish frontier, with a view to observe the march of the fourth
corps,--a promise which they never intended, and indeed were
unable, to perform. Forjas, who was supposed to be very inimical
to the British influence, frankly declared that they neither could
nor would move without an advance of money, and sir John Cradock,
although he recommended that this aid should be given, had no power
to grant it himself.
Letters from sir John Moore, dated at Salamanca, now reached
Lisbon: they increased the anxiety to reinforce the army in Spain;
but, as they clearly showed that reverses were to be expected,
Cradock, although resolved to maintain himself in Portugal as long
as it was possible to do so without a breach of his instructions,
felt more strongly that timely preparation for an embarkation
should be made, especially as the rainy season, in which south-west
winds prevail, had set in, and rendered the departure of vessels
from the Tagus very uncertain. Meanwhile the internal state of
Portugal was in no wise amended, or likely to amend.
The government had, indeed, issued a decree, on the 23d of
December, for organizing the population of Lisbon in sixteen
legions, but only one battalion each was to parade at the same
moment for exercise, and those only on Sundays, nor were the
legions, at any time, to assemble without the order of the general
commanding the province; and this regulation, which rendered the
whole measure absurd, was dictated by the fears of the regency.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 4.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 5.]
A proposal to prepare the Portuguese vessels for sea was acceded
to, without any apparent dissatisfaction; but the government,
secretly jealous of their allies, fomented or encouraged discontent
and suspicion among the people. No efforts were made to improve
the regular force, none to forward the march of troops to
Alcantara; and so inactive or so callous were the regency to the
rights of humanity, that a number of French prisoners, captured
at various periods by the Portuguese, and accumulated at Lisbon,
were denied subsistence. Sir John Cradock, after many fruitless
representations, was forced to charge himself with their supply, to
avert the horrors of seeing them starved to death. The provisions
necessary for Fort La Lippe were also withheld, and general Leite,
acting upon the authority of the regency, strenuously urged that
the British troops should evacuate that fortress.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The march of the reinforcements for sir John Moore left only three
hundred dragoons and seven battalions available for the defence
of Portugal, of which four were necessarily in garrison, and the
remainder were unable to take the field, in default of mules, of
which animal the country seemed bereft; yet, at this moment, as if
in derision, Mr. Frere, the central junta, the junta of Badajos,
and the regency of Portugal, were, with common and characteristic
foolishness, pressing sir John Cradock to march into the south of
Spain, although there was scarcely a Spanish soldier there in arms
to assist him; and such a movement, if it had been either prudent
or practicable, was directly against his instructions.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
Towards the end of December, the communication with sir John Moore
was suddenly interrupted, and the line of the Tagus acquired
greater importance. The troops going from Elvas to the army in
Spain were, therefore, directed to halt at Castello Branco, and
general Richard Stewart, who commanded them, being reinforced with
two hundred cavalry, was ordered, for the moment, to watch the
roads by Salvatierra and the two Idanhas, and to protect the flying
bridges at Abrantes and Vilha Velha from the enemy’s incursions.
At the same time, a promise was obtained from the regency that all
the Portuguese troops in the Alemtejo should be collected, at Campo
Mayor and Portalegre.
Sir John Cradock fixed upon Sacavem as the position in which his
main body should be concentrated, intending to defend that point
as long as he could with so few troops; and, as he knew that
Almeida, although full of British stores, and important in every
way, was, with respect to its own defence, utterly neglected by the
regency, and that even the presence of a British force there was
viewed with jealousy, he sent brigadier-general A. Cameron, with
instructions to collect the convalescents of Moore’s army, to unite
them with the two battalions still at Almeida, and then to make his
way to the army in Spain; but if the attempt should be judged too
dangerous, Cameron was to return to Lisbon. In either case, the
stores and the sick men lying at Almeida were to be directed upon
Oporto.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The paucity of cavalry was severely felt on the frontier. It
prevented the general from ascertaining the real strength and
objects of the enemy’s parties, and the Portuguese reports
were notoriously contradictory and false. The 14th dragoons,
seven hundred strong, commanded by major-general Cotton, had
been disembarked since the 22d of December, and were destined
for the army in Spain; but such was the penury of the country,
or the difficulty of drawing forth its resources, that the
commissary-general doubted if he could forward that small body,
even by detachments. Nor is this surprising, for many of the debts
left by Moore’s army were yet unpaid, and sufficient confidence was
not established among the peasantry to induce them to bring forward
the necessary supplies upon credit.
Rumours of reverses in Spain were now rife, and acquired
importance, when it became known that four thousand infantry, and
two thousand cavalry, the advanced guard of thirty thousand French
troops, were actually at Merida, on the road to Badajos, which
town, as I have already said, was not only in a state of anarchy,
but destitute of provisions, arms, and ammunition. If, at this
time, the Portuguese force had been assembled at Alcantara, sir
John Cradock would have supported them with the British brigades,
at Abrantes and Castello Branco; but not a man had been put in
motion, and he, feeling no confidence either in the troops or in
the promises of the regency, resolved to concentrate his own army
near Lisbon. General Stewart was, therefore, directed to destroy
the bridges of Vilha Velha and Abrantes, and to fall back to
Sacavem.
Meanwhile, the Lisbon populace, supposing that the English general
designed to abandon them without necessity, were violently excited.
The regency, either from fear or folly, made no effort to preserve
tranquillity, and the people, feeling their own strength, proceeded
from one excess to another, until it become evident that, in a
forced embarkation, the British would have to fight their allies as
well as their enemies. At this gloomy period when ten marches would
have brought the French to Lisbon, when a stamp of Napoleon’s foot
would have extinguished that spark of war which afterwards blazed
over the Peninsula, sir John Moore made his daring movement upon
Sahagun; and Portugal, gasping as in a mortal agony, was instantly
relieved.
CHAPTER II.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, sections 1 and 2.]
It was the advanced guard of the fourth corps that had approached
Merida with the intention of proceeding to Badajos, and the emperor
was, as we have seen, preparing to follow: but, in the night of the
26th of December, an officer carrying the intelligence of Moore’s
movement, reached Merida, and, next morning, the French fell back,
and marching hastily to the Tagus, crossed it, and rejoined their
main body, from which another powerful detachment was immediately
directed upon Placentia. This retrograde movement obviated the
immediate danger; and sir John Cradock endeavoured to pacify the
people of Lisbon.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 5.]
He ordered general Stewart’s brigade, strengthened by two German
battalions, to halt at Santarem. He explained his own motives
to the Portuguese, and urged the regency to a more frank and
vigorous system than they had hitherto followed; for, like the
Spanish juntas, they promised every thing, and performed nothing;
neither would they, although consenting, verbally, to all the
measures proposed, ever commit themselves by writing, having the
despicable intention of afterwards disclaiming that which might
prove disagreeable to the populace, or even to the French. Sir John
Cradock, however, had no power beyond his own personal influence to
enforce attention to his wishes. No successor to sir Charles Cotton
had yet arrived, and Mr. Villiers seems to have wanted the decision
and judgement required to meet such a momentous crisis.
In the north general Cameron, having sent the sick men and part of
the stores from Almeida towards Oporto, gave up that fortress to
sir Robert Wilson; and, on the 5th of January, marched, with two
British battalions and a detachment of convalescents, by the Tras
os Montes to join the army in Spain. On the 9th, hearing of sir
John Moore’s retreat to Coruña, he would have returned to Almeida,
but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threatened to intercept the line
of march; wherefore, Cameron turned towards Lamego, giving notice
of his movement to sir Robert Wilson, and advising him also to
retire to the same place. Colonel Blunt, with seven companies of
the 3d regiment, escorting a convoy for sir John Moore’s army, was
likewise forced to abandon his route, and take the road to Oporto,
on which town every thing British in the north of Portugal was now
directed.
Notwithstanding the general dismay, sir Robert Wilson rejected
Cameron’s advice, and, being reinforced by some Spanish troops,
Portuguese volunteers, and straggling convalescents, belonging to
Moore’s army, proceeded to put in practice all the arts of an able
partizan. Issuing proclamations, enticing the French to desert,
spreading false reports of his numbers, and, by petty enterprizes
and great activity, arousing a spirit of resistance throughout the
Ciudad Rodrigo country.
The continued influx of sick and stores at Oporto, together with
the prospect of general Cameron’s arrival there, became a source
of uneasiness to sir John Cradock. Oporto, with a shifting-bar and
shoal water is the worst possible harbour for vessels to clear
out, and one of the most dangerous for vessels to lie off, at that
season of the year; hence, if the enemy advanced in force, a great
loss, both of men and stores, was to be anticipated.
[Sidenote: Sir John Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The departure of sir Charles Cotton had diminished the naval
means at captain Halket’s disposal, and, for seventeen successive
days, such was the state of the wind that no vessel could leave
the Tagus; he, however, contrived at last to send tonnage for
two thousand persons, and undertook to keep a sloop of war off
Oporto. Sir Samuel Hood also despatched some vessels from Vigo,
but the weather continued for a long time so unfavourable that
these transports could not enter the harbour of Oporto, and the
encumbrances hourly increasing, at last produced the most serious
embarrassments.
Sir John Moore having now relinquished his communications with
Portugal, sir John Cradock had to consider how, relying on his own
resources, he could best fulfil his instructions and maintain his
hold of that country, without risking the utter destruction of the
troops intrusted to his care.
For an inferior army Portugal has no defensible frontier. The
rivers, generally running east and west, are fordable in most
places, subject to sudden rises and falls, offering but weak lines
of resistance; and with the exception of the Zezere, presenting no
obstacles to the advance of an enemy penetrating by the eastern
frontier. The mountains, indeed, afford many fine and some
impregnable positions, but such is the length of the frontier line
and the difficulty of lateral communications, that a general who
should attempt to defend it against superior forces would risk to
be cut off from the capital, if he concentrated his troops; and if
he extended them his line would be immediately broken.
The possession of Lisbon constitutes, in fact, the possession of
Portugal, south of the Duero, and an inferior army can only protect
Lisbon by keeping close to that capital. Sensible of this truth,
sir John Cradock adopted the French colonel Vincente’s views for
the defence of Lisbon; and proceeded, on the 4th of January, with
seventeen hundred men to occupy the heights behind the creek of
Saccavem--leaving, however, three thousand men in the forts and
batteries at Lisbon.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
At the earnest request of the regency, who in return promised to
assemble the native troops at Thomar, Abrantes, and Vilha Velha,
general Stewart’s brigade, two thousand seven hundred strong, was
ordered to halt at Santarem. But it had been marching incessantly
for a month, and in the rain, the men’s clothes were worn out,
their accoutrements nearly destroyed, and in common with the rest
of the army, they were suffering severely from the want of shoes.
Thus, Cameron being on the Douro, the main body between Santarem
and Lisbon, and colonel Kemmis at Elvas, with the fortieth
regiment, an army of ten thousand men--with the encumbrances of
an army of forty thousand--was placed on the three points of a
triangle, the shortest side of which was above a hundred and fifty
miles. The general commanding could not bring into the field
above five thousand men; nor could that number be assembled in a
condition for service at any one point of the frontier, under three
weeks or a month; moreover, the uncertainty of remaining in the
country at all, rendered it difficult to feed the troops, for the
commissaries being unable to make large contracts for a fixed time,
were forced to carry on, as it were, a retail system of supply.
Mr. Frere, however, with indefatigable folly, was urging sir John
Cradock to make a diversion in Spain; and while Mr. Frere was
calling for troops in the south, Mr. Villiers was as earnest that
a force might be sent by sea to Vigo. The minister’s instructions
prescribed the preservation of Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida; the
assembling, in concert with the Portuguese government, a combined
force on the frontier, and the sending succours of men to Moore;
but although sir John Cradock’s means were so scanty that the
fulfilment of any one of these objects was scarcely possible,
Mr. Canning writing officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch,
as if a mighty and well supplied army was in Portugal, enforced
the “necessity of continuing to maintain possession of Portugal,
as long as could be done with the force intrusted to sir John
Cradock’s command, _remembering always that not the defence of
Portugal alone, but the employment of the enemy’s military force_,
and the diversion which would be thus created in favour of the
south of Spain, were objects not to be abandoned, except in case
of the most extreme necessity.” The enemy’s military force! It
was three hundred thousand men, and this despatch was a pompous
absurdity; but the ministers and their agents, eternally haunted by
the phantoms of Spanish and Portuguese armies, were incapable of
perceiving the palpable bulk and substance of the French hosts. The
whole system of the cabinet was one of shifts and expedients; every
week produced a fresh project,--minister and agent, alike, followed
his own views, without reference to any fixed principle: and the
generals were the only persons not empowered to arrange military
operations.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The number of officers despatched to seek information of the French
movements enabled sir John Cradock, notwithstanding the direct
communications were cut off, to obtain intelligence of Moore’s
advance towards Sahagun, and being still anxious to assist that
general, he again endeavoured to send a reinforcement into Spain,
by the route of Almeida; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies
finally induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers’ wishes, and he
shipped six hundred cavalry, and thirteen hundred infantry, on the
12th of January, meaning to send them to Vigo; the vessels were,
however, still in the river, when authentic intelligence of sir
John Moore’s retreat upon Coruña with the intention of embarking
there, was received, and rendered this project useless.
[Sidenote: Cradock’s Paper, MSS.]
The 14th of January the Conqueror line-of-battle-ship, having
admiral Berkeley on board, reached the Tagus, and for the first
time since sir John Cradock took the command of the troops in
Portugal, he received a communication from the ministers in England.
It now appeared that their thoughts were less intently fixed upon
the defence of Portugal, than upon getting possession of Cadiz.
Their anxiety upon this subject had somewhat subsided after the
battle of Vimeira, but it revived with greater vigour when sir
John Moore, contemplating a movement in the south, suggested the
propriety of securing Cadiz as a place of arms; and in January an
expedition was prepared to sail for that town, with the design of
establishing a new base of operations for the English army. The
project failed, but the transaction deserves notice, as affording
proof of the perplexed and unstable policy of the day.
NEGOTIATION FOR THE OCCUPATION OF CADIZ.
[Sidenote: Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.]
While it was still unknown in England that the supreme junta had
fled from Aranjuez, sir George Smith, who had conducted Spencer’s
negotiation in 1808, was sent to Cadiz to prepare the way for the
reception of an English garrison. Four thousand men destined for
that service were soon afterwards embarked at Portsmouth, under the
command of general Sherbrooke, but this officer’s instructions were
repeatedly altered. He was first directed to touch at Lisbon in his
way to Cadiz; he was afterwards commanded to make for Coruña, to
receive orders from sir John Moore, but, on the 14th of January,
his force being increased to five thousand men, he sailed under his
first instructions; and Mr. Frere was directed to negotiate for the
admission of these troops into Cadiz, as the only condition upon
which a British army could be employed to aid the Spanish cause in
that part of the Peninsula.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.]
When the reverses in the north of Spain became known, the
importance of Cadiz increased, and the importance of Portugal
decreased in the eyes of the English ministers. Sir John Cradock
was then made acquainted with Sherbrooke’s destination; he was
himself commanded to obey any requisition for troops that might be
made by the Spanish junta; and so independent of the real state
of affairs were the ministerial arrangements, that Cradock, whose
despatches had been one continued complaint of his inability to
procure horses for his own artillery, was directed to furnish them
for Sherbrooke’s.
Sir George Smith, a man somewhat hasty, but of remarkable zeal and
acuteness, left England about the middle of December; and, on his
arrival at Cadiz, at once discovered that there, as in every other
part of the Peninsula, all persons being engaged in theories or
intrigues, nothing useful for defence was executed. The ramparts
of the city were in tolerable condition, but scarcely any guns
were mounted; and yet, two miles in front of the town, an outwork
had been commenced upon such a scale that it could not possibly be
finished under four months; and, after the slow mode of Spanish
proceedings, would have taken as many years to complete.
For a solid defence of all the fortifications, sir George Smith
judged that twenty thousand good troops would be requisite, but
that ten thousand would suffice for the city. There were, however,
only five thousand militia and volunteers in the place, and not a
regular soldier under arms, neither any within reach. The number
of guns mounted and to be mounted exceeded four hundred; to serve
them, two hundred and fifty peasants and volunteers were enrolled,
and, being clothed in uniforms, were called artillery-men.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
Knowing nothing of sir John Moore’s march to Sahagun, sir George
Smith naturally calculated upon the immediate approach of the
French; and seeing the helpless state of Cadiz, and being assured
that the people would willingly admit an English garrison, he
wrote to sir John Cradock for troops. The latter, little thinking
that, at such a conjuncture, the supreme junta would be more
jealous of their allies than fearful of their enemies; and judging
also, from the tenor of his latest instructions, that obedience
to this requisition would be consonant to the minister’s wishes,
immediately ordered colonel Kemmis to proceed from Elvas with
the fortieth regiment, by the route of Seville, and, at the same
time, embarked about three thousand of the best troops at Lisbon,
and sent them to Cadiz. This force, commanded by major-general
Mackenzie, sailed the 2d February, and reached their destination
the 5th of the same month.
[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]
Meanwhile, Mr. Frere, although acquainted with the sailing of
Mackenzie’s armament, was ignorant that sir George Smith had
applied to the governor of Cadiz for permission to take military
possession of that town, for Smith had no instructions to
correspond with Mr. Frere; and the latter had opened a separate
negotiation with the central junta at Seville, in which he
endeavoured to pave the way for the occupation by proposing to have
the troops admitted as guests, and he sent Mr. Stuart to arrange
this with the local authorities.
[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.]
Mr. Frere had, however, meddled much with the personal intrigues of
the day: he was, moreover, of too slender a capacity to uphold the
dignity and just influence of a great power on such an occasion;
and the flimsy thread of his negotiation snapped under the hasty
touch of sir George Smith. The supreme junta, averse to every thing
that threatened to interrupt their course of sluggish indolence,
had sent the marquis de Villel, a member of their own body, to
Cadiz, avowedly to prepare the way for the admission of the troops,
but, in reality, to thwart that measure. The circumstance of
Mackenzie’s arrival, with an object different from that announced
by Mr. Frere, was instantly taken advantage of to charge England
with treachery. For the junta, knowing Mr. Frere to be their own
dupe, believed, or affected to believe, that he was also the dupe
of the English minister; and that the whole transaction was an
artifice, on the part of the latter, to get possession of the city
with a felonious intent.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]
The admission of the British troops was nevertheless earnestly
desired by the inhabitants of Cadiz, and of the neighbouring towns;
and this feeling was so well understood by Mr. Stuart and sir
George Smith, that they would, notwithstanding the reluctance of
the supreme junta, have brought the affair to a good conclusion;
but, at the most critical period of the negotiation, the former was
sent on a secret mission to Vienna, by the way of Trieste, and the
latter, who was in bad health, dying about the same period, the
negotiation failed for want of a head to conduct it.
General Mackenzie, like sir George Smith, thought that the object
might be attained: he observed, indeed, that the people, far
from suspecting any danger, were ignorant of, or incredulous of
the reverses in the north; that nothing had been done towards
equipping the fleet for sea; and that, notwithstanding the earnest
remonstrances of admiral Purvis and Mr. Stuart, the Spaniards would
neither work themselves nor permit the English sailors to work
for them. Still the general feeling was favourable to the British
army, and the good wishes of the inhabitants were openly avowed:
Mackenzie had, however, only a negative power, the affair being in
the hands of Mr. Frere.
In the course of the negotiations carried on by that minister, the
supreme junta proposed,
1º.--That the troops should land at Port St. Mary’s, and be
quartered there and in the neighbouring towns.
2º.--That they should join Cuesta’s army.
3º.--That they should go to Catalonia.
4º.--That they should be parcelled out in small divisions, and
attached to the different Spanish armies.
Nay, untaught by their repeated disasters, and pretending to hold
the English soldiery cheap, these self-sufficient men proposed that
the British should garrison the minor fortresses on the coast, in
order to release an equal number of Spaniards for the field.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]
Mr. Frere wished to accept the first of these proposals, but
general Mackenzie, sir George Smith, and Mr. Stuart agreed that it
would be injurious for many reasons; not the least urgent of which
was, that as the troops could not have been embarked again without
some national dishonour, they must have marched towards Cuesta,
and thus have been involved in the campaign without obtaining that
which was their sole object, _the possession of Cadiz as a place of
arms_.
Mr. Frere then suggested a modification of the second proposal,
namely, to leave a small garrison in Cadiz, and to join Cuesta with
the remainder of the troops. Sir G. Smith was dead; Mr. Stuart had
embarked for Trieste; and general Mackenzie, reluctant to oppose
Mr. Frere’s wishes, consented to march, if the necessary equipments
for his force could be procured; but he observed, that the plan
was contrary to his instructions, and to the known wishes of the
English government, and liable, in part, to the objections against
the first proposition.
His letter was written the 18th of February, and on the 22d a
popular tumult commenced in Cadiz.
The supreme junta, to prove that that city did not require an
English garrison, had ordered two regiments, composed of Poles,
Germans, and Swiss, prisoners or deserters from the French, to
march there. The people, aware that the junta disliked and intended
to disarm the volunteers, were offended that deserters should be
trusted in preference to themselves. They arose, and stopped the
courier, with despatches from Seville, and imprisoned the marquis
of Villel, who was obnoxious, because, while mild to persons
suspected of favouring the French, he had been harsh, or rather
brutal, in his conduct to some ladies of rank in Cadiz.
The populace, proceeding from one violence to another, endeavoured
to kill the state prisoners; and being prevented in this bloody
object, committed several excesses, and murdered don Joseph
Heredia, the collector of the public rents. During the tumult,
which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English troops was
repeatedly called for by the mob; and two British officers being
sent on shore as mediators, were received with enthusiasm, and
obeyed with respect, a manifest proof of the correct view taken by
sir George Smith.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]
The 24th, tranquillity was restored; and the 25th, general
Mackenzie, not having received from Mr. Frere an answer to his
letter of the 18th, suggested, that of the three English battalions
then in the harbour, two should be placed in Cadiz; and that the
third, proceeding to Seville, should there unite with the 40th
regiment, and both together march to join Cuesta.
Mr. Frere, however, instead of addressing the junta with an
authority and dignity becoming the representative of a great
nation, on whose support the independence of the whole Peninsula
rested, had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety. The
object was one that England had a right to seek, and the Spanish
rulers no right to refuse; for the people wished to further it,
and the threat of an appeal to them would soon have silenced the
feeble negative of such a despicable and suspected government; but
Mr. Frere, incapable of taking a single and enlarged view, was
pressing and discussing, with the secretary of the junta, a variety
of trifling points, as if to shew his epistolary dexterity; and,
finally, when his opponent had conceded the point of admitting
troops at all, broke off the negotiation, upon the question, as to
whether the number to be admitted should be one or two thousand
men, as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end foremost.
[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.]
Self baffled in that quarter, the British plenipotentiary, turning
towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy of the junta, and one much feared
by them, sought to secure his assistance by holding out the lure
of having a British force added to his command, but the sarcastic
old general derided the diplomatist. “Although I do not,” said
he, “discover any great difficulty in the actual state of things,
which should prevent his British majesty’s troops from garrisoning
Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which your excellency
proposes; I am far from supposing that the supreme junta, which is
fully persuaded of the importance of our union with England, is
not grounded in its objections; and your excellency knows that it
is sufficient that they should have them, to prevent my giving any
opinion on so important a measure, _unless they should consult
me_. With regard to the 4,300 men, which your excellency is pleased
to mention, there is no doubt that I stand in need of them; but I
flatter myself, England, sensible of the importance of Estremadura,
will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly if, from
any change of circumstances, the supreme junta should no longer
manifest the repugnance we speak of.”
This answer having frustrated the projected intrigue, Mr. Frere,
conscious perhaps of diplomatic incapacity, returned with renewed
ardour to the task of directing the military affairs, in every part
of the Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter of Soult’s,
addressed to the king, in which the project of penetrating into
Portugal was mentioned; and immediately concluding that general
Mackenzie’s troops would be wanted for the defence of that
kingdom, counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to Lisbon; but
the general, who knew that, even should he return, a successful
defence of Portugal with so few troops would be impossible, and
that every precaution was already taken for an embarkation in the
last extremity, observed, that “the danger of Lisbon rendered the
occupation of Cadiz more important.”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.]
General Mackenzie’s reply was written the 26th of February. On the
3d of March he received another despatch from Mr. Frere. Cadiz, and
the danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from the writer’s
mind, and were unnoticed; but entering into a minutely inaccurate
statement of the situation of the French and Spanish armies, he
observed, that Soult having failed in an attempt to penetrate
Portugal by the Minho, _it was impossible, from the position
of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the Portuguese,
that he could persevere in his plan_. Wherefore, he proposed that
the British force then in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed
immediately to Tarragona, to aid Reding; and this wild scheme was
only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from sir John Cradock,
recalling the troops to Lisbon.
They arrived there on the 12th of March; and thus ended a
transaction clearly indicating an unsettled policy, shallow
combinations, and a bad choice of agents on the part of the English
cabinet, and a most unwise and unworthy disposition in the supreme
junta. General Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the latter to
French influence; Mr. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of sir George
Smith, and to fear, lest the junta of Seville, who were continually
on the watch to recover their ancient power, should represent the
admission of the British troops as a treasonable proceeding on the
part of the supreme government. It is, however, evident that the
true cause was the false position in which the English ministers
had originally placed themselves, by inundating Spain with arms
and money, without at the same time asserting a just influence,
and making their assistance the price of good order and useful
exertion.
CHAPTER III.
The effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of disinterested zeal
on the part of sir John Cradock. The absence of his best troops
exposed him to the most galling peevishness from the regency, and
to the grossest insults from the populace. With his reduced force,
he could not expect to hold even a contracted position at the
extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely
to invade Portugal; and, as there was neither a native force nor
a government to be depended upon, there remained for him only the
prospect of a forced and, consequently, disgraceful embarkation,
and the undeserved obloquy that never fails to follow disaster.
In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Almeida no longer
contained British troops, the general’s attention was necessarily
fixed upon Lisbon and Oporto. The violence of the gales rendered
the latter a sealed port; but the hospitals and magazines of
Almeida, and even of Salamanca, being evacuated upon Lamego, that
town was crowded with fifteen hundred sick men, besides escorts,
and the hourly accumulating stores. The river had overflowed its
banks, the craft could not ply; and one large boat, attempting to
descend, was overset, and eighty persons, soldiers and others,
perished.
General Cameron, hearing of this confusion, relinquished the idea
of embarking his detachment at Oporto, and, re-crossing the Douro,
made for Lisbon, where he arrived the beginning of February with
about two thousand men; but they were worn down by fatigue, having
marched eight hundred miles under continued rains.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, sect. 1.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, sect. 1.]
Sir Robert Wilson sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road of
Idanha Nova; but, partly from a spirit of adventure, partly from
an erroneous idea that sir John Cradock wished him to defend the
frontier, he remained with his infantry in the neighbourhood
of Ciudad Rodrigo. His force had been increased by a Spanish
detachment under don Carlos d’España, and by some volunteers; but
it was still weak, and his operations were necessarily confined to
a few trifling skirmishes: yet, like many others, his imagination
so far outstripped his judgement that, when he had only felt the
advanced post of a single division, he expressed his conviction
that the French were going to abandon Spain altogether.
Sir John Cradock entertained no such false expectations; he was
informed of the battle of Coruña and the death of Moore; he knew
too well the vigour and talent of that general to doubt that he
had been oppressed by an overwhelming force; he knew that Zaragoza
had fallen, and that twenty-five thousand French troops were thus
free to act in other quarters; he knew that Soult, with at least
twenty thousand men, was on the Minho; that Romana was incapable
of making any head, that Portugal was one wide scene of helpless
confusion, and that a French army was again in the neighbourhood of
Merida, threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus; in fine, that
his own embarrassments were hourly increasing, and that the moment
was arrived when the safety of his troops must become the chief
consideration.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 10, sect. 1.]
The tenor of the few despatches he had received from England led
him to suppose that the ministers designed to abandon Portugal;
but, as their intentions on that head were never clearly explained,
he resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his first
instructions, and to keep his hold of the country as long as it
was possible to do so without risking the utter destruction of his
army. To avoid that danger, he put every incumbrance at Lisbon
on board the transports in the Tagus, proceeded to dismantle the
batteries at the mouth of the river, and, in concert with the
admiral, made preparations for carrying away or destroying the
military and naval stores in the arsenal. At the same time, he
renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto;
but the weather continued so unfavourable that he was finally
obliged to remove the invalids and many stores by land, yet he
could not procure carriages for the whole.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 11.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 10, sect. 2 and 3.]
After the arrival of Cameron’s detachment, the effective British
force under arms, including convalescents and fifteen hundred
stragglers from sir John Moore’s army, was about eight thousand
men; but, when the security of the forts and magazines, and the
tranquillity of Lisbon, was provided for, only five thousand
men, and those not in the best order, could be brought into the
field. As this force was infinitely too weak to cover such a town
as Lisbon, the general judged that it would be unwise to take up
a position in advance, whence he should be obliged to retreat
through the midst of a turbulent and excited population, which
had already given too many indications of ill-temper to leave any
doubt of its hostility under such circumstances. He, therefore,
came to the resolution of withdrawing from Saccavem and Lisbon,
and concentrating his whole force on a position at Passa D’Arcos,
near the mouth of the river, where he could embark with least
danger, and where he had the best chance of defending himself, if
necessary, against superior numbers.
This reasoning was sound, and Cradock’s intention was, undoubtedly,
not to abandon the country, unless driven from it by force, or in
pursuance of orders from England: but his arrangements seem to
have carried more the appearance of alarm than was either politic
or necessary; for the position of Passa D’Arcos might have been
prepared, and the means necessary for an embarkation secured, and
yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the last moment.
To display a bold and confident front in war is, of all things, the
most essential, as well to impose upon friends as upon enemies; and
sir John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of this maxim.
The population of Lisbon, alarmed by the reverses in Spain, and
yet, like all the people in the Peninsula, confident in their own
prowess and resolution until the very moment of attack, became
extremely exasperated; and the regency, partly from their natural
folly and insincerity, but more from the dread of the lower orders,
countenanced, if they did not instigate, the latter to commit
excesses, and to interrupt the proceedings of the British naval and
military authorities.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, sect. 5.]
Although the measures of precaution relative to the forts had
originated with the regency, they now formally protested against
them; and, with a view to hamper the general, encouraged their
subalterns to make many false and even ridiculous charges against
the British executive officers; and it would appear that the
remonstrances of the admiral and generals were but imperfectly
supported by Mr. Villiers.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.]
In this manner the people’s violence was nourished until the city
was filled with tumult; mobs, armed with English pikes and muskets,
collected night and day in the streets and on the high-roads,
and, under the pretext of seeking for, and killing, Frenchmen,
attacked, indiscriminately, all foreigners, even those in the
British service and wearing the British uniform. The guards, who
endeavoured to protect the victims of this ferocity, were insulted.
Couriers, passing with despatches, were intercepted and deprived
of their papers; English officers were outraged in the streets;
and such was the audacity of the people that the artillery was
placed in the squares, in expectation of an affray. In fine, the
state of Lisbon was similar to what it had been at the period of
Junot’s convention; and, if the British had abandoned the country
at this time, they would have been assailed with as much obloquy
by the Portuguese, for, such has been, and will be, the fate of
all unsuccessful auxiliaries: a reflection that should render
historians cautious of adopting accusations upon the authority of
native writers on the like occasions.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 2.]
This spirit was not confined to Lisbon. In Oporto the disposition
to insult the British was more openly encouraged than in the
capital, and the government of the multitude was more decidedly
pronounced. From the cities it spread to the villages. The people
of the Alemtejo frontier were, indeed, remarkably apathetic; but,
from the Minho to the Tagus, the country was in horrible confusion;
the soldiers were scattered, without regard to military system,
and, being unpaid, lived at free quarters; the peasantry of the
country assembling in bands, and the populace of the towns in mobs,
intercepted the communications, appointed or displaced the generals
at their pleasure, and massacred all persons of whom they were
suspicious. The ammunition which had been supplied from England
was wasted, by constant firing in token of insubordination; and,
as if the very genius of confusion was abroad, some of the British
troops, principally _malingerers_,[3] of sir John Moore’s army,
added their quota of misconduct, to increase the general distress.
The leading instigator of the excesses at Oporto was one Raymundo,
a coadjutor and creature of the bishop’s, a turbulent and cruel
fellow, who, by taking a share in the first insurrection against
the French, obtained a momentary influence, and has since been
elevated, by a very credulous writer, into a patriotic hero. He
was, however, a worthless coward, fitted for secret villany, but
incapable of a noble action.
This state of affairs, productive of so much misery and danger,
continuing, without intermission, caused many of the upper classes
to despair of their country’s safety by war, and increased the
number of those who, wishing to attach themselves to the fortune
of France, were ready to accept of a foreign prince for their
sovereign, if, with him, they could obtain tranquillity and an
ameliorated constitution; and when, soon afterwards, the edge of
the enemy’s sword, falling upon the senseless multitude, filled
the streets of Oporto with blood, there was a powerful French
party already established in Portugal. The bulk of the people
were, however, stanch in their country’s cause; they were furious
and disorderly, but imbued with hatred of the French; ready at the
call of honour; and susceptible of discipline, without any loss of
energy.
The turbulence of the citizens, the remonstrances of the regency,
and the representations of Mr. Villiers, who was in doubt for
the personal safety of the British subjects residing in Lisbon,
convinced sir John Cradock that political circumspection and
adroitness were as important as military arrangement, to prevent a
catastrophe at this critical period; and, as contrary to what might
have been expected, the enemy had not yet made any actual movement
across the frontier, he was induced to suspend his design of
falling back to Passa D’Arcos; and in this unsettled state affairs
remained until March, when intelligence arriving that the French
fleet was at sea, two of the line-of-battle ships in the Tagus were
despatched to reinforce sir Thomas Duckworth’s squadron, and the
batteries at the mouth of the river were again armed.
Meanwhile, Soult was making progress in the north; the anarchy at
Oporto was continually increasing, and the English government had
certainly come to the resolution of abandoning Portugal if the
enemy advanced; for, although sir John Cradock was not informed
of their views, an officer in England, well acquainted with
Portuguese customs, actually received orders, and was embarking,
to aid the execution of this measure, when, suddenly, the policy
of the cabinet once more changed, and it was resolved to reinforce
the army. This resolution, which may be attributed partly to the
Austrian war, partly to the failure at Cadiz, and partly to the
necessity of satisfying public opinion in England, was accompanied
by a measure judicious in principle and of infinite importance,
inasmuch as it formed the first solid basis on which to build a
reasonable hope of success.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]
The Portuguese government, whether spontaneously or brought thereto
by previous negotiation, had offered the command of all the native
troops to an English general,--with power to alter and amend the
military discipline, to appoint British officers to the command
of the regiments, and to act, without control, in any manner he
should judge fitting to ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese
army; and this was the more important, because the military polity
of Portugal, although fallen into neglect, was severe, precise,
and admirably calculated to draw forth the whole strength of the
kingdom, for the regular army could be completed by coercion, and
the militia were bound to assemble in regiments, numbered, clothed,
and armed like the regulars, but only liable to serve within the
frontier. The whole of the remaining population, capable of bearing
arms, were enrolled under the name of _ordenanças_, numbered
by battalions in their different districts and obliged, under
very severe punishments, to assemble at the order of the local
magistrates either to work, to fight, or to assist the operations
of the other forces.
The English government, accepting of this offer, agreed to supply
arms, ammunition, and other succours, granted a subsidy for the
payment of the regular forces, and thus obtained, for the first
time, a firm hold of the military resources of Portugal, and a
position in the Peninsula suitable to the dignity of England and
to the great contest in which she was engaged.
The Portuguese government wished that sir Arthur Wellesley should
be their general; and the English cabinet offered the situation
to him, but he refused it; and it is said, that sir John Doyle,
sir John Murray, (he who afterwards failed at Tarragona,) general
Beresford, and even the marquis of Hastings, then earl of Moira,
sought for the appointment. The last was, undoubtedly, a man well
fitted by his courtly manners, his high rank, and his real talents,
both in the cabinet and in the field, for such an office; but
powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, major-general Beresford
was appointed, to the great discontent of many officers of superior
rank, who were displeased that a man, without any visible claim to
superiority, should be placed over their heads.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.]
Information of this change was instantly conveyed to sir John
Cradock, and general Sherbrooke was ordered to put into Lisbon.
The latter was overtaken at the mouth of Cadiz harbour; and his
and general Mackenzie’s divisions arriving in the Tagus together,
on the 12th of March, gave a new turn to the affairs of Portugal.
But if Mr. Frere’s plan had been pursued--If general Sherbrooke’s
troops had not been detained by bad weather at sea--If the
first had proceeded to Tarragona, and nothing but a foul wind
prevented it--If the second sailing from port to port without
any artillery had, as was most probable, been engaged in some
other enterprise--If Victor, obeying his orders, had marched to
Abrantes--If any one of these events had happened, sir John Cradock
must have abandoned Portugal; and then how infinitely absurd these
proceedings of the English ministers would have appeared, and how
justly their puerile combinations would have been the scorn of
Europe.
Marshal Beresford arrived at Lisbon the beginning of March; and
having received the confirmation of his power from the regency,
fixed his head-quarters at Thomar, collected the Portuguese troops
in masses, and proceeded to recast their system on the model of
the British army; commencing, with stern but wholesome rigour, a
reform that, in process of time, raised out of chaos an obedient,
well disciplined, and gallant army, worthy of a high place among
the best in Europe; for the Portuguese people, though easily misled
and excited to wrath, are of a docile and orderly disposition, and
very sensible of a just and honourable conduct in their officers.
But this reform was not effected at once, nor without many crosses
and difficulties being raised by the higher orders and by the
government--difficulties that general Beresford could never have
overcome, if he had not been directed, sustained, and shielded, by
the master spirit under whom he was destined to work.
The plan of giving to English officers the command of the
Portuguese troops was at first proceeded on with caution; but
after a time, the ground being supposed safe, it was gradually
enlarged, until almost all the military situations of emolument and
importance were held by Englishmen; and this, combined with other
causes, gave rise to numerous intrigues, not entirely confined
to the natives, and as we shall find, in after times, seriously
threatening the power of the marshal, the existence of the British
influence, and the success of the war.
Sir John Cradock’s situation was now materially alleviated.
The certainty of the Austrian war produced a marked change in
the disposition of the regency. The arrival of Sherbrooke’s
and Mackenzie’s divisions having increased the British force
to fourteen thousand men, the populace became more cautious of
offering insults; and, about the middle of March, two thousand men
being left to maintain tranquillity in Lisbon, the remainder of the
army was encamped at Lumiar and Saccavem; and while these things
were passing at Lisbon, the aspect of affairs changed also in other
parts of the kingdom. For, the bulk of the Portuguese regular
troops, amounting to ten or twelve thousand men, was collected by
marshal Beresford, between the Tagus and the Mondego.
Beyond the valley of the Mondego, colonel Trant commanded a small
corps of volunteers, students from the university; and general
Vittoria was at the head of two regular battalions in Upper Beira.
The bishop of Oporto was preparing to defend that town, with a
mixed, but ferocious and insubordinate multitude. General Sylveira,
with four or five thousand men, had taken post in the Tras os
Montes; and Romana, who had collected seven or eight thousand at
Monterey, was in communication with him.
Sir Robert Wilson was at the head of about three thousand men; he
had withdrawn the legion from Almeida, sent a detachment to Bejar,
and remained himself on the Agueda, watching the advanced posts of
Lapisse. A few Portuguese regiments were extended from Salvatierra
and Idanha to Alcantara. There was a permanent bridge of boats over
the Tagus at Abrantes, and there were small garrisons in that town
and at Elvas.
But all these forces united would not, with the exception of the
British, have been capable of sustaining the shock of ten thousand
French soldiers for half an hour; and the whole mass of the latter,
then hanging on the frontier of Portugal, was above fifty thousand.
Gathering like clouds on the horizon, they threatened many points,
but gave no certain indication of where the storm would break.
Soult, indeed, with about twenty thousand men, was endeavouring to
pass the Minho; but Lapisse, although constantly menacing Ciudad
Rodrigo, kept his principal masses at Salamanca and Ledesma; while
Victor had concentrated his between the Alberche and the Tietar.
Thus Lapisse might join either Soult or Victor; and the latter
could march by Placentia against Ciudad Rodrigo, while Soult
attacked Oporto; or he might draw Lapisse to him, and penetrate
Portugal by Alcantara. He might pass the Tagus, attack Cuesta, and
pursue him to Seville; or, after defeating him, he might turn short
to the right, and enter the Alemtejo.
In this uncertainty, sir John Cradock, keeping the British
concentrated at Lumiar and Saccavem, waited for the enemy to
develop his plans, and, in the mean time, endeavoured to procure
the necessary equipments for an active campaign. He directed
magazines to be formed at Coimbra and Abrantes; urged the regency
to exertion; took measures to raise money, and despatched officers
to Barbary to procure mules. But while thus engaged, intelligence
arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at
Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida; that
Soult, having crossed the Minho, and defeated Romana and Sylveira,
was within a few leagues of Oporto; and that Lapisse had made a
demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the regency,
and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop’s party,
proposed that sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British
forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal Beresford, and
march to the succour of Oporto. Beresford was averse to trust
the Portuguese under his immediate command, among the mutinous
multitude in that city, but he thought the whole of the British
army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push
on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur
in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to
follow this plan.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12, section 1.]
It was doubtful, he said, if Victor and Soult intended to
co-operate in a single plan; but, on the supposition that it was
so, he considered it essential to drive back or to overcome one
before the other could come to his assistance. Victor was then in
pursuit of Cuesta; if he continued that pursuit, it must be to
enter Seville, or to cripple his opponent previous to the invasion
of Portugal; in either case he would be in the Sierra Morena before
he could hear of the march from Leiria, and, as Cradock had daily
intelligence of Victor’s movements, there would be full time to
relieve Oporto, and to return again to the defence of Lisbon. If,
however, Soult depended on the co-operation of Victor, he would
probably remain on the right of the Duero until the other was on
the Tagus, and Lapisse also would be contented for the present with
capturing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12, section 2.]
This reasoning, so evidently unsound, did not weigh with sir John
Cradock, who resolved to preserve his central position, covering
the capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being
cut off from it by one army while he was engaged with another.
Lisbon and Oporto, he observed, were the enemy’s objects; the
former was of incomparably greater importance than the latter.
Portugal was in a state of anarchy equally incompatible with firm
resistance and rapid movements. The peasantry were tumultuous
and formidable to everybody but the enemy; and Beresford himself
acknowledged that the regular forces were mutinous, disregarding
their officers, choosing when and where to rest; when to fight,
and when to remain in quarters; and altogether unfit to be trusted
within the circle of the Oporto mischief. The British troops,
therefore, were the only solid resource; but they were too few to
divide, and must act in a body, or not at all.
Was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto? The first was
near, the second two hundred miles off; and, although the utmost
exertions had been made, the army was not yet equipped for an
active campaign. The troops were ill-clothed, and wanted shoes; the
artillery was unhorsed; the commissariat possessed only a fourth
part of the transport necessary for the conveyance of provisions
and ammunition, and no activity could immediately supply these
deficiencies, inasmuch as some of the articles required were not
to be had in the country, and, to obtain others, the interference
of the regency was necessary, but hitherto all applications to
that quarter had been without any effect. Was it wise to commence
offensive operations in the north? Soult and Lapisse together were
estimated at thirty thousand men, of which above five thousand were
cavalry, and he himself could only bring fifteen guns and twelve
thousand men, of all arms, into the field; yet, if the British
army, marched with the avowed intention of relieving Oporto, it
must accomplish it, or be dishonoured!
Was it consistent with reason to march two hundred miles in search
of a combat, which the very state of Oporto would render it almost
impossible to gain, and for an object perhaps already lost?
Suspicion was alive all over the country: if Oporto was already
taken, the army must come back; that would be the signal for fresh
tumults--for renewed cries that the country was to be abandoned;
Lisbon would instantly be in a state of insurrection, and would be
even more formidable to the British than the enemy; besides, it was
impossible to reckon upon Cuesta’s aid in keeping Victor employed.
He was personally inimical to the English, and his principal object
was to gain time for the increase and discipline of his own force.
Victor was apparently pursuing Cuesta, but his parties had already
appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajos, and there was nothing but
a weak Portuguese garrison in Elvas to impede his march through
the Alemtejo. To cover Lisbon and the Tagus was the wisest plan:
fixed in some favourable position, at a prudent distance from that
capital, he could wait for the reinforcements he expected from
England. He invited the Portuguese troops to unite with him; a
short time would suffice to establish subordination, and then the
certainty that the capital could not be approached, except in the
face of a really-formidable army, would not only keep the enemy in
check, but, by obliging him to collect in greater numbers for the
attempt, would operate as a diversion in favour of Spain.
The general soundness of this reasoning is apparent, and it must
not be objected to sir John Cradock that he disregarded the value
of a central position, which might enable him to be beforehand
with the enemy in covering Lisbon, if the latter should march on
his flank. The difficulty of obtaining true intelligence from the
natives and his own want of cavalry rendered it utterly unsafe
for him to divide his army, or to trust it any distance from the
capital.
Marshal Beresford’s plan, founded on the supposition that Cradock
could engage Soult at Oporto, and yet quit him, and return at his
pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious;
the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive
data: it was conjectural that they could relieve Oporto; it was
positive that they would endanger Lisbon; the proposition was,
however, not made upon partial views. But, at this period, other
men, less qualified to advise, pestered sir John Cradock with
projects of a different stamp, yet deserving of notice, as showing
that the mania for grand operations, which I have before marked as
the malady of the time, was still raging.
[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
To make a suitable use of the British army was the object of all
these projectors, but there was a marvellous variety in their
plans. While the regency desired that the Portuguese and English
troops should, without unfurnishing Lisbon, co-operate for the
relief of Oporto, and while marshal Beresford recommended that the
latter only should march, the bishop was importunate to have a
detachment of the British army placed under his command, and he
recalled Sir Robert Wilson to the defence of Oporto. It appeared
reasonable that the legion should defend the city in which it was
raised; but Mr. Frere wrote from Seville that sir Robert could do
better where he was; and the latter dreading the anarchy in Oporto,
accepted Spanish rank, and refused obedience to the prelate’s
orders, yet retained his troops. The regency, however, adopted the
Lusitanian legion as a national corps, and approved of sir Robert’s
proceedings. Meanwhile Romana was earnest with sir John Cradock
for money, and that a thousand British soldiers might be sent
to aid the insurrection at Vigo; and at the same time Mr. Frere
and colonel D’Urban, a corresponding officer placed at Cuesta’s
head-quarters, proposed other plans of higher pretensions.
[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
Zaragoza, said the latter, has fallen; and ten thousand French
troops being thus released, are marching towards Toledo; this is
the moment to give a fatal blow to Marshal Victor! It is one of
those critical occasions that seldom recur in war! In a day or two
sir Robert Wilson will be on the Tietar with two thousand five
hundred men; augment his force with a like number of Portuguese,
who may be drawn from Sobreira, Idanha, and Salvatierra. He shall
thus turn the right and rear of Victor’s army, and his movement
cannot be interrupted by the French force now at Salamanca and
Alva; because the communication from thence to the Tagus by the
passes of Baños and Tornevecas is sealed up; and while sir Robert
Wilson thus gets in the rear of Victor with five thousand men,
Cuesta, with twelve thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry,
shall attack the latter in front, matter of easy execution;
because Cuesta can throw a pontoon bridge over the Tagus, near
Almaraz, in an hour and a half; and the Conde de Cartoajal, who
is at Manzanares in La Mancha, with ten thousand infantry and two
thousand horse, will keep Sebastiani in check. The hope is great,
the danger small; and if a few British troops can be added to the
force on the Tietar, the success will be infallible.
There were, however, some grave objections to this infallible plan.
General Cuesta was near Almaraz; sir John Cradock was at Lisbon,
and sir Robert Wilson was at Ciudad Rodrigo. This circuitous line
of correspondence being above four hundred miles long, it is
not very clear how the combination was to be effected with that
rapidity, which was said to be essential to the success. Neither is
it very evident, that operations to be combined at such a distance,
and executed by soldiers of different nations, would have been
successful at all. On the one side, twenty thousand Portuguese and
Spanish recruits were to act on double external lines of operation;
on the other, twenty-five thousand French veterans waited in a
central position, with their front and flanks covered by the Tagus
and the Tietar. In such a contest it is possible to conceive a
different result from that anticipated by colonel D’Urban.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 7.]
Mr. Frere’s plans were not less extensive, and he was equally
sanguine. When his project for assisting Catalonia had been
frustrated, by the recall of general Mackenzie from Cadiz, he
turned his attention to the north. Soult, he wrote to sir John
Cradock, tired of the resistance he has met with, will probably
desist from his “_unaccountable project of entering Portugal,
and occupying Gallicia at the same time_.” Let the British army,
therefore, make a push to drive the enemy out of Salamanca,
and the neighbouring towns; while the Asturians, on their side,
shall take possession of Leon and Astorga, and thus open the
communication between the northern and southern provinces.
Fearing, however, that if this proposal should not be adopted, the
English general might be at a loss for some enterprise, Mr. Frere
also recommended that the British army should march to Alcantara;
and that the fortieth regiment, which hitherto he had retained at
Seville, contrary to sir John Cradock’s wishes, should join it at
that place; and then, the whole operating by the northern bank of
the Tagus, might, in concert with Cuesta, “_beat the French out of
Toledo, and consequently out of Madrid_.”
[Sidenote: Muster Rolls of the French Army, MSS.]
Now, with respect to the first of these plans, Soult never had the
intention of holding Gallicia, which was Marshal Ney’s province;
but he did propose to penetrate into Portugal, and he was not
likely to abandon his purpose; because, the only army capable of
opposing him was quitting that kingdom, and making a “_push_” of
four hundred miles to drive Lapisse out of Salamanca; moreover, the
Asturians were watched by general Bonnet’s division on one side,
and by Kellerman on the other; and the fifth corps, not ten, but
fifteen thousand strong, having quitted Zaragoza, were at this time
in the Valladolid country, and therefore close to Leon and Astorga.
With respect to the operations by the line of the Tagus, which
were to drive Joseph out of Madrid, and consequently to attract
the attention of all the French corps, it is to be observed, that
sir John Cradock could command about twelve thousand men, Cuesta
sixteen thousand, Cartoajal twelve thousand, making a total of
forty thousand. Now, Soult had twenty-three thousand, Lapisse
nine thousand, Victor was at the head of twenty-five thousand,
Sebastiani could dispose of fifteen thousand, Mortier of a like
number, the King’s guards and the garrison of Madrid were twelve
thousand, making a total of nearly a hundred thousand men.
But while Mr. Frere and colonel D’Urban, confiding in Soult’s
inactivity, were thus plotting the destruction of Victor and
Sebastiani, the first marshal stormed Oporto; the second,
unconscious of his danger, crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta’s
army at Medellin, and at the same moment Sebastiani routed
Cartoajal’s at Ciudad Real.
BOOK VII.
CHAPTER I.
Having described the unhappy condition of Portugal and given a
general view of the transactions in Spain, I shall now resume the
narrative of Soult’s operations, thus following the main stream
of action, for the other marshals were appointed to tranquillize
the provinces already overrun by the emperor, or to war down the
remnants of the Spanish armies; but the duke of Dalmatia’s task was
to push onward in the course of conquest. Nor is it difficult to
trace him through the remainder of a campaign in which traversing
all the northern provinces, fighting in succession the armies of
three different nations, and enduring every vicissitude of war, he
left broad marks of his career and certain proofs that he was an
able commander, and of a haughty resolution in adversity.
It has been observed, in a former part of this work, that the
inhabitants of Coruña honourably maintained their town until the
safety of the fleet which carried sir John Moore’s army from the
Spanish shores was secure; but they were less faithful to their own
cause. Coruña, although weak against a regular siege, might have
defied irregular operations, and several weeks must have elapsed
before sufficient battering train could have been brought up to
that corner of the Peninsula. Yet, a short negotiation sufficed to
put the French in possession of the place on the 19th of January,
and the means of attacking Ferrol were immediately organized from
the resources of Coruña.
The harbour of Ferrol contained eight sail of the line, and some
smaller ships of war. The fortifications were regular, there was
an abundance of artillery and ammunition and a garrison of seven
or eight thousand men, composed of soldiers, sailors, citizens,
and armed countrymen, but their chiefs were treacherous. After
a commotion in which the admiral Obregon was arrested, his
successor Melgarejo surrendered the 26th upon somewhat better terms
than those granted to Coruña; and thus in ten days two regular
fortresses were reduced, that with more resolution might have
occupied thirty thousand men for several months.
[Sidenote: S. MSS.]
While yet before Ferrol the duke of Dalmatia received the following
despatch, prescribing the immediate invasion of Portugal:--
“Before his departure from this place, (Valladolid,) the
emperor foreseeing the embarkation of the English army, drew up
instructions for the ultimate operations of the duke of Elchingen
and yourself. He orders that when the English army shall be
embarked you will march upon Oporto with your four divisions, that
is to say, the division of Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet,
the dragoons of Lorge, and La Houssaye, and Franceschi’s light
cavalry, with the exception of two regiments that his majesty
desires you to turn over to the duke of Elchingen, in order to make
up his cavalry to four regiments.”
“Your ‘_corps d’armée_,’ composed of seventeen regiments of
infantry and ten regiments of cavalry, is destined for the
expedition of Portugal, in combination with a movement the duke
of Belluno is going to effect. General Loison, some engineers,
staff and commissiarat officers, and thirteen Portuguese, all of
whom belonged to the army formerly in Portugal, under the duke of
Abrantes, have received instructions to join you immediately, and
you can transmit your orders for them to Lugo. This is the 21st
of January, and it is supposed you cannot be at Oporto before the
5th of February, or at Lisbon before the 16th. Thus, at that time,
namely, when you shall be near Lisbon, the ‘_corps d’armée_’ of
the duke of Belluno, composed of his own three divisions, of the
division Leval, and of ten or twelve regiments of cavalry, forming
a body of thirty thousand men, will be at Merida to make a strong
diversion in favour of your movement, and in such a mode as that he
can push the head of a column upon Lisbon, if you find any great
obstacles to your entrance, which it is, however, presumed will not
be the case.”
“General Lapisse’s division of infantry, which is at this moment in
Salamanca, and general Maupetit’s brigade of cavalry, will, when
you shall be at Oporto, receive the duke of Istria’s orders to
march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, where this division will
again be under the command of the duke of Belluno, who will send it
instructions to join him at Merida, and I let you know this that
you may be aware of the march of Lapisse, on your left flank, as
far as Abrantes. Such are the last orders I am charged to give you
in the name of the emperor; you will have to report to the king and
to receive his orders for your ulterior operations. The emperor has
unlimited confidence in your talents for the fine expedition that
he has charged you with.”
ALEXANDER,
_Prince of Neufchatel, &c._
It was further intended, by Napoleon, that when Lisbon fell,
marshal Victor should invade Andalusia, upon the same line as
Dupont had moved the year before, and like him, also, he was to
have been assisted by a division of the second corps, which was
to cross the Guadiana and march on Seville. Meanwhile, the duke
of Elchingen, whose corps, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry
and the arrival of stragglers, amounted to near twenty thousand
men, was to maintain Gallicia, confine the Asturians within their
own frontier line, and keep open the communication with the second
corps.
Thus, nominally, eighty thousand, and in reality sixty thousand
men, were disposed for the conquest of Lisbon, and in such a manner
that forty thousand would, after that had been accomplished, have
poured down upon Seville and Cadiz, and at a time when neither
Portugal nor Andalusia were capable of making any resistance. It
remains to shew from what causes this mighty preparation failed.
[Sidenote: Muster-rolls of the French army, MSS.]
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations of the second corps, MSS.]
The gross numbers of the second corps amounted to forty-seven
thousand, but general Bonnet’s division remained always at
St. Ander, in observation of the eastern Asturian frontier;
eight thousand were detached for the service of the general
communications, and the remainder had, since the 9th of November,
been fighting and marching incessantly among barren and snowy
mountains; hence, stragglers were numerous, and twelve thousand men
were in hospital. The force, actually under arms, did not exceed
twenty-five thousand men, worn down with fatigue, barefooted, and
without ammunition. They had outstripped their commissariat, the
military chest was not come up, the draft animals were reduced in
number, and extenuated by fatigue, the gun-carriages were shaken
by continual usage, and the artillery parc was still in the rear;
and as the sixth corps had not yet passed Lugo, two divisions of
the second were required to hold Coruña and Ferrol. Literally to
obey the emperor’s orders was consequently impossible, and Soult
fixing his head-quarters at St. Jago di Compostella, proceeded to
re-organize his army.
Ammunition was fabricated from the loose powder found in Coruña;
shoes were obtained partly by requisition, partly from the Spanish
magazines, filled as they were with stores supplied by England.
The artillery was soon refitted, and, the greatest part of the
stragglers being rallied, in six days, the marshal thought himself
in a condition to obey his orders, and, although his troops were
still suffering from fatigue and privation, he marched, on the
1st of February, with nineteen thousand infantry, four thousand
cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery. But, before I narrate
his operations, it is necessary to give some account of the state
of Gallicia at this period, and to trace the movements of the
marquis de Romana.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]
When the Spanish army, on the 2d of January, crossed the
line of sir John Moore’s march, it was already in a state of
disorganization. Romana, with the cavalry, plunged at once into the
deep valleys of the Syl and the Minho; but the artillery and a part
of his infantry were overtaken and cut up by Franceschi’s cavalry.
The remainder wandered in bands from one place to another, or
dispersed to seek food and shelter among the villages in the
mountains. General Mendizabel, with a small body, halted in the
Val des Orres, and, placing guards at the Puente de Bibey, a point
of singular strength for defence, proposed to cover the approaches
to Orense on that side; but Romana himself, after wandering for a
time, collected two or three thousand men, and took post, on the
15th, at Toabado, a village about twenty miles from Lugo.
Marshal Ney, while following the route of the 2d corps to Lugo
with the main body of his troops, detached some cavalry from Villa
Franca to scour the valleys on his left, and ordered a division of
infantry to march by the road of Orense and St. Jago to Coruña.
General Marchand, who commanded it, overthrew and dispersed
Mendizabel’s troops on the 17th, and, having halted some days
at Orense, to patrole the neighbourhood for information and to
establish an hospital, continued his march to St. Jago.
The defeat of Mendizabel and the subsequent movements of Marchand’s
division completed the dispersion of Romana’s army; the greatest
part throwing away their arms, returned to their homes, and he
himself, with his cavalry, and the few infantry that would follow
him, crossed the Minho, passed the mountains, and, descending into
the valley of the Tamega, took refuge, on the 21st, at Oimbra, a
place on the frontier of Portugal, and close to Monterey, where
there was a small magazine, collected for the use of sir John
Moore’s army.
In this obscure situation, unheeded by the French, he entered
into communication with the Portuguese general, Sylveira, and,
with sir John Cradock, demanding money and arms from the latter,
and endeavouring to re-assemble a respectable body of troops. But
Blake and other officers deserted him, and these events and the
general want of patriotic spirit drew from Romana the following
observation:--“I know not wherein the patriotism, so loudly
vaunted, consists; any reverse, any mishap prostrates the minds of
these people, and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they
sacrifice their country and compromise their commander.”
The people of Gallicia, poor, scattered, living hardly, and, like
all mountaineers, very tenacious of the little property they
possess, disregarded political events which did not immediately and
visibly affect their interests, and were, with the exception of
those of the sea-port towns, but slightly moved by the aggression
of the French, as long as that aggression did not extend to their
valleys; hence, at first, they treated the English and French
armies alike.
Sir David Baird’s division, in its advance, paid for the necessary
supplies, and it was regarded with jealousy and defrauded. Soult’s
and Moore’s armies, passing like a whirlwind, were beheld with
terror, and the people fled from both. The British and German
troops that marched to Vigo were commanded without judgement,
and licentious, and their stragglers were often murdered; their
numbers were small, and the people showed their natural hatred of
strangers without disguise. On several occasions the parties, sent
to collect cars for the conveyance of the sick, had to sustain a
skirmish before the object could be obtained, and five officers,
misled by a treacherous guide, were scarcely saved from death by
the interference of an old man, whose exertions, however, were not
successful until one of the officers had been severely wounded in
the head. On the other hand, general Marchand discovered so little
symptoms of hostility, during his march to Orense, that he left his
hospital at that town without a guard, and under the joint care
of Spanish and French surgeons, and the duties of humanity were
faithfully discharged by the former without hindrance from the
people.
[Sidenote: Romana’s Manifesto.]
But this quiescence did not last long: the French generals were
obliged to subsist their troops by requisitions extremely onerous
to a people whose property chiefly consisted of cattle. The many
abuses and excesses which always attend this mode of supplying
an army soon created a spirit of hatred that Romana laboured
incessantly to increase, and he was successful; for, although a bad
general, he possessed intelligence and dexterity suited to the task
of exciting a population. Moreover, the monks and friars laboured
to the same purpose; and, while Romana denounced death to those who
refused to take arms, the clergy menaced eternal perdition; and all
this was necessary, for the authority of the supreme junta was only
acknowledged as a matter of necessity--not of liking.
Gallicia, although apparently calm, was, therefore, ripe for a
general insurrection, at the moment when the duke of Dalmatia
commenced his march from St. Jago di Compostella.
From that town several roads lead to the Minho, the principal one
running by the coast line and crossing the Ulla, the Umia, the
Vedra, and the Octaven, passes by Pontevedra and Redondela to Tuy,
a dilapidated fortress, situated on the Spanish side of the Minho.
The second, crossing the same rivers nearer to their sources,
passes by the Monte de Tenteyros, and, entering the valley of the
Avia, follows the course of that river to Ribidavia, a considerable
town, situated at the confluence of the Avia with the Minho, and
having a stone bridge over the former, and a barque ferry on the
latter river. The third, turning the sources of the Avia, connects
St. Jago with Orense, and from Orense another road passes along
the right bank of the Minho, and connects the towns of Ribidavia,
Salvatierra, and Tuy, ending at Guardia, a small fortress at the
mouth of the Minho.
As the shortest route to Oporto, and the only one convenient for
the artillery, was that leading by Redondela and Tuy, and from
thence by the coast, the duke of Dalmatia formed the plan of
passing the Minho between Salvatierra and Guardia.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MSS.]
On the 1st of February Franceschi, followed by the other divisions
in succession, took the Pontevedra road. At Redondela he
encountered and defeated a small body of insurgents, and captured
four pieces of cannon; after which Vigo surrendered to one of his
detachments, while he himself marched upon Tuy, and took possession
of that town and Guardia. During these operations La Houssaye’s
dragoons, quitting Mellid, had crossed the Monte de Tenteyro,
passed through Ribidavia, and taken possession of Salvatierra,
on the Minho; and general Soult, the marshal’s brother, who had
assembled three thousand stragglers and convalescents, between
Astorga and Carrion, received orders to enter Portugal by Puebla de
Senabria, and thus join the main body.
The rainy season was now in full torrent, and every stream and
river was overflowing its banks. The roads were deep, and the
difficulty of procuring provisions was great. These things, and the
delivering over to marshal Ney the administration of Ferrol and
Coruña, where the Spanish government and Spanish garrisons were
not only retained but paid by the French, delayed the rear of the
army so long that it was not until the 15th or 16th that the whole
of the divisions were assembled on the Minho, between Salvatierra,
Guardia, and Redondela.
The Minho, from Melgaço to the mouth, forms the frontier of
Portugal, the banks on both sides being guarded by a number of
fortresses, originally of considerable strength, but at this
time all in a dilapidated condition. The Spanish fort of Guardia
fronted the Portuguese fort of Caminha; Tuy was opposed by Valença;
and this last was garrisoned, and the works in somewhat a better
condition than the rest; Lapella, Moncao, and Melgaço, completed
the Portuguese line. But the best defence at this moment was the
Minho itself, which, at all times a considerable river, was now a
broad and raging flood, and the Portuguese _ordenanzas_ and militia
were in arms on the other side, and had removed all the boats.
Soult, after examining the banks with care, decided upon passing
at Campo Saucos, a little village where the ground was flatter,
more favourable, and so close to Caminha, that the army, once
across, could easily seize that place, and, the same day reach
Viana, on the Lima, from whence to Oporto was only three marches.
To attract the attention of the Portuguese; La Houssaye, who was at
Salvatierra, spread his dragoons along the Minho, and attempted to
push small parties across that river, above Melgaço, but the bulk
of the army was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Campo Saucos,
and a detachment seized the small sea-port of Bayona, in the rear.
A division of infantry, and three hundred French marines released
at Coruña, and attached to the second corps, were then employed to
transport some large fishing boats and some heavy guns from the
harbour and fort of Guardia overland to Campo Saucos. This was
effected by the help of rollers over more than two miles of rugged
and hilly ground. It was a work of infinite labour, and, from the
11th to the 15th, the troops toiled unceasingly; the craft was,
however, at last, launched in a small lake at the confluence of the
Tamuga river with the Minho.
The heavy guns being mounted in battery on the night of the 15th,
three hundred soldiers were embarked, and the boats, manned by
the marines, dropped silently down the Tamuga into the Minho, and
endeavoured to reach the Portuguese side of the latter river during
the darkness; but, whether from the violence of the flood, or want
of skill in the men, the landing was not effected at day-break,
and the _ordenanza_ fell with great fury upon the first who got on
shore: and now, the foremost being all slain, the others pulled
back, and regained their own side with great difficulty. This
action was infinitely creditable to the Portuguese, and it had a
surprising influence on the issue of the campaign.
It was a gallant action, because it might reasonably have been
expected that a tumultuous assemblage of half-armed peasants,
collected on the instant, would have been dismayed at the sight of
many boats filled with soldiers some pulling across, others landing
under the protection of a heavy battery that thundered from the
midst of a multitude of troops, clustering on the heights, and
thronging to the edge of the opposite bank in eager expectation.
It was an event of leading importance, inasmuch as it baffled an
attempt that, being successful, would have ensured the fall of
Oporto by the 21st of February, which was precisely the period when
general Mackenzie’s division being at Cadiz, sir John Cradock’s
troops were reduced to almost nothing; when the English ministers
only waited for an excuse to abandon Portugal; when the people
of that country were in the very extremity of disorder; when the
Portuguese army was a nullity; and when the regency was evidently
preparing to receive the French with submission. It was the period,
also, when Soult was expected to be at Lisbon, following the
Emperor’s orders, and, consequently, Lapisse and Victor could not
have avoided to fulfil their part of the plan for the subjugation
of Portugal.
[Sidenote: See Plan 4.]
The duke of Dalmatia’s situation was now, although not one of
imminent danger, extremely embarrassing, and more than ordinary
quickness and vigour were required to conduct the operations with
success. Posted in a narrow, contracted position, he was hemmed
in on the left by the Spanish insurgents, who had assembled
immediately after La Houssaye passed Orense, and who, being
possessed of a very rugged and difficult country, were, moreover,
supported by the army of Romana, which was said to be at Orense and
Ribidavia.
In the French general’s front was the Minho, broad, raging, and at
the moment impassable, while heavy rains forbad the hope that its
waters would decrease. To collect sufficient means for forcing a
passage would have required sixteen days, and, long before that
period, the subsistence for the army would have entirely failed,
and the Portuguese, being alarmed, would have greatly augmented
their forces on the opposite bank. There remained then only to
retrace his steps to St. Jago, or break through the Spanish
insurgents, and, ascending the Minho, to open a way into Portugal
by some other route.
The attempt to pass the river had been baffled on the 15th of
February; on the 16th the army was in full march towards Ribidavia,
upon a new line of operations, and this promptitude of decision
was supported by an equally prompt execution. La Houssaye, with
his dragoons, quitted Salvatierra, and, keeping the edge of the
Minho, was galled by the fire of the Portuguese from the opposite
bank; but, before evening, he twice broke the insurgent bands, and,
in revenge for some previous excesses of the peasantry, burnt the
villages of Morentan and Cobreira. Meanwhile the main body of the
army, passing the Tea river, at Salvatierra and Puente d’Arcos,
marched, by successive divisions, along the main road from Tuy to
Ribidavia.
Between Franquera and Canizar the route was cut by the streams of
the Morenta and Noguera rivers; and, behind those torrents, eight
hundred Gallicians, having barricadoed the bridges and repulsed the
advanced parties of cavalry, stood upon their defence. The 17th,
at daybreak, the leading brigade of Heudelet’s division forced the
passage, and pursued the Spaniards briskly; but, when within a
short distance of Ribidavia, the latter rallied upon eight or ten
thousand insurgents, arrayed in order of battle, on a strong hill,
covering the approaches to that town.
At this sight the advanced guard halted until the remainder of the
division and a brigade of cavalry were come up, and then, under the
personal direction of Soult, the French assailed, and drove the
Gallicians, fighting, through the town and across the Avia. The
loss of the vanquished was very considerable, and the bodies of
twenty priests were found amongst the slain; but, either from fear
or patriotism, every inhabitant had quitted Ribidavia.
The 18th one brigade of infantry scoured the valley of the Avia,
and dispersed three or four thousand of the insurgents, who were
disposed to make a second stand on that side. A second brigade,
pushing on to Barbantes, seized a ferry-boat on the Minho, close
to that place; they were joined, the same evening, by the infantry
who had scoured the valley of the Avia the day before, and by
Franceschi’s cavalry, and, on the 19th, they entered Orense in time
to prevent the bridge over the Minho from being cut. La Houssaye’s
dragoons then took post at Maside, and the same day the remainder
of the horse and Laborde’s infantry were united at Ribidavia;
but the artillery were still between Tuy and Salvatierra, under
the protection of Merle’s and Mermet’s divisions. Thus, in three
days, the duke of Dalmatia had, with an admirable celerity and
vigour, extricated his army from a contracted unfavourable country,
strangled a formidable insurrection in its birth, and at the same
time opened a fresh line of communication with St. Jago, and an
easy passage into Portugal.
The 20th a regiment being sent across the Minho, by the ferries
of Barbantes and Ribidavia, defeated the insurgents of the
left bank, advanced to the Arroyo river, and took post on the
heights of Merea. The army, with the exception of the division
guarding the guns, was the same day concentrated at Orense. But
the utmost efforts of the artillery-officers had been baffled
by the difficulties of the road between Tuy and Ribidavia; and
this circumstance, together with the precarious state of the
communications, the daily increasing sick-list, and the number of
petty detachments necessary to protect the rear of the army, seemed
to render the immediate invasion of Portugal hopeless.
To men of an ordinary stamp it would have been so; but the duke of
Dalmatia, with a ready boldness, resolved to throw the greatest
part of his artillery and the whole of his other incumbrances into
Tuy, as a place of arms, and then relinquishing all communication
with Gallicia, for the moment, to march in one mass directly
upon Oporto; from whence, if successful, he proposed to re-open
his communication with Tuy, by the line of the coast, and then,
recovering his artillery and parcs, to re-establish a regular
system of operations.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
In pursuance of this resolution, sixteen of the lightest guns and
six howitzers, together with a proportion of ammunition-waggons,
were, with infinite labour and difficulty, transported to
Ribidavia, but the remaining thirty-six pieces and a vast parc
of carriages, carrying ammunition and hospital and commissariat
stores, were put into Tuy. General La Martiniere was left there
with an establishment of artillery and engineer officers, a
garrison of five hundred men fit to carry arms, and nine hundred
sick. All the stragglers, convalescents, and detachments, coming
from St. Jago, and the military chest, which was still in the
rear, guarded by six hundred infantry, were directed upon Tuy, and
the gates being then shut, La Martiniere was abandoned to his own
resources.
The men in hospital at Ribidavia were now forwarded to Orense, and
the marshal’s quarters were established at the latter town on the
24th; but many obstacles were yet to be vanquished before the army
could commence the march into Portugal. The gun-carriages had been
so shaken in the transit from Tuy to Ribidavia that three days
were required to repair them. It was extremely difficult to obtain
provisions, and numerous bands of the peasants were still in arms;
nor were they quelled until combats had taken place at Gurzo, on
the Monte Blanco, in the Val d’Ornes, and up the valley of Avia,
by which the French wasted time, lost men, and expended ammunition
that could not be replaced.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.]
Marshal Soult endeavoured to soften the people’s feelings by
kindness and soothing proclamations; and as he enforced a strict
discipline among his troops, his humane and politic demeanour
joined to the activity of his moveable columns, soon abated the
fierceness of the peasantry. The inhabitants of Ribidavia returned
to their houses; those of Orense had never been very violent,
and now became even friendly, and lent assistance to procure
provisions. It was not, however, an easy task to restrain the
soldiers within the bounds of humanity: the frequent combats, the
assassination and torturing of isolated men, and the privations
endured, had so exasperated the French troops, that the utmost
exertions of their general’s authority could not always control
their revenge.
While the duke of Dalmatia was thus preparing for a formidable
inroad, his adversaries were a prey to the most horrible anarchy.
The bishop, always intent to increase his own power, had assembled
little short of fifty thousand armed persons in Oporto; and he
had also commenced a gigantic line of entrenchments on the hills
to the northward of that city. This worse than useless labour
so completely occupied all persons, that the defence of the
strong country lying between the Duero and the Minho was totally
neglected; and when the second corps appeared on the bank of the
latter river, the northern provinces were struck with terror. Then
it was that the people, for the first time, understood the extent
of their danger; and that the bishop, aroused from his intrigues,
became sensible that the French were more terrible enemies than the
regency. Once impressed with this truth, he became clamorous for
succour. He recalled sir Robert Wilson from the Agueda; he hurried
on the labours of the entrenchments; and he earnestly pressed sir
John Cradock for assistance, demanding arms, ammunition, and a
reinforcement of British soldiers.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.]
Sir Robert Wilson, as I have already related, disregarded his
orders; and the British general refused to furnish him with troops,
but supplied him with arms, very ample stores of powder, and sent
artillery and engineer officers to superintend the construction
of the defensive works, and to aid in the arrangements for a
reasonable system of operations. The people were, however, become
too headstrong and licentious to be controlled, or even advised,
and the soldiers being drawn into the vortex of insubordination,
universal and hopeless confusion prevailed.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 1.]
Don Bernadim Freire was the legal commander-in-chief of the
Entre Minho e Douro, but all the generals claimed an equal and
independent authority each over his own force; and this was,
perhaps, a matter of self-preservation, for general and traitor
were, at that period, almost synonymous; and to obey the orders
of a superior against the momentary wishes of the multitude was
to incur instant death: nor were there wanting men who found it
profitable to inflame the passions of the mob, and to direct
their blind vengeance against innocent persons; for the prelate’s
faction, although the most powerful, was not without opponents even
in Oporto.
Such was the unhappy state of affairs when the undisciplined
gallantry of the peasants, baffling the efforts of the French
to cross the Minho at Campo Saucos, obliged Soult to march by
Orense. A part of the regular troops were immediately sent forward
to the Cavado river, where they were joined by the _ordenanzas_
and the militia of the district, but all in a state of fearful
insubordination; and there were not any arrangements made for the
regular distribution of provisions, or of any one necessary supply.
Among the troops despatched from Oporto was the second battalion
of the Lusitanian legion, nine hundred strong, well armed and well
equipped; they were commanded by baron Eben, a native of Prussia,
who, without any known services to recommend him, had suddenly
attained the rank of major in the British service. This man,
destined to act a conspicuous part in Portuguese tragedy, had been
left by sir Robert Wilson in Oporto, when that officer marched to
Almeida. Eben’s orders were to follow with the second battalion
of the legion, when the men’s clothing and equipment should be
completed; but he, retaining the troops, remained, to push his own
fortune under the prelate’s auspices.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.]
General Freire having reached the Cavado, with a small body of
regular troops, was immediately joined by fourteen or fifteen
thousand militia and _ordenanzas_. Fixing his head-quarters at
Braga, he sent detachments to occupy the posts of Salamonde and
Ruivaens in his front; and, unfortunately for himself, endeavoured
to restrain his troops from wasting their ammunition by wanton
firing in the streets and on the roads. This exertion of command
was heinously resented; for Freire, being willing to uphold the
authority of the regency, had been for some time obnoxious to the
bishop’s faction, and already he was pointed to as a suspected
person; and the multitude were inimically disposed towards him.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.]
Meanwhile, general Sylveira, assuming the command of the Tras
os Montes, advanced to Chaves, and put himself in communication
with the marquis of Romana, who, having remained tranquil at
Oimbra and Monterey since the 21st of January, had been joined by
his dispersed troops, and was again at the head of nine or ten
thousand men. Sylveira’s force consisted of about two thousand
regulars and as many militia, and his army was accompanied by many
of the _ordenanzas_; but here, as elsewhere, the Portuguese were
licentious, insubordinate, and disdainful of their general; and
the national enmity between them and the Spaniards overcoming the
sense of a common cause and common danger, the latter were evilly
entreated, both officers and men; and a deadly feud subsisted
between the two armies.
The generals, however, agreed to act in concert, offensively and
defensively; but neither of them were the least acquainted with the
numbers, intention, or even the position of their antagonists: and
it is a proof of Romana’s unfitness for command that he, having the
whole population at his disposal, was yet ignorant of every thing
relating to his enemy that it behoved him to know. The whole of
the French force in Gallicia, at this period, was about forty-five
thousand men, Romana estimated it at twenty-one thousand. The
number under Soult was above twenty-four thousand, Romana supposed
it to be twelve thousand; and among these he included general
Marchand’s division of the sixth corps, which he always imagined to
be a part of the duke of Dalmatia’s army.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.]
[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The Spanish general was so elated at the spirit of the peasants
about Ribidavia, that he anticipated nothing but victory. He knew
that on the Arosa, an estuary, running up towards St. Jago de
Compostella, the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had also risen, and,
being joined by all the neighbouring districts, were preparing
to attack Vigo and Tuy; and partly from his Spanish temperament,
partly from his extreme ignorance of war, he was convinced that
the French only thought of making their escape out of Gallicia,
and that even in that they would be disappointed. But to effect
their destruction more certainly, he also, as we have seen,
pestered sir John Cradock for succours in money and ammunition, and
desired that, the insurgents on the Arosa might be assisted with
a thousand British soldiers. Cradock anxious to support the cause,
although he refused the troops, sent ammunition, and five thousand
pounds in money; but, before it arrived, Romana was beaten and in
flight.
The combined Spanish and Portuguese forces, amounting to sixteen
thousand regulars and militia, besides _ordenanzas_, were posted
in a straggling unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega,
and extended from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, to near Chaves, a
distance of more than fifteen miles. This was the first line of
defence for Portugal.
Freire and Eben, with fourteen guns and twenty-five thousand
men, were at Braga, in second line, their outposts being on the
Cavado, and at the strong passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova: but of
these twenty-five thousand men, only six thousand were armed with
muskets; and it is to be observed that the militia and troops of
the line differed from the armed peasantry only in name, save that
their faulty discipline and mutinous disposition rendered them less
active and intelligent as skirmishers, without making them fitter
for battle.
The bishop, with his disorderly and furious rabble, formed the
third line, occupying the entrenchments that covered Oporto.
Such was the state of affairs, and such were the dispositions made
to resist the duke of Dalmatia; but his army, although galled and
wearied by continual toil, and when halting, disturbed and vexed by
the multitude of insurrections, was, when in motion, of a power to
overthrow and disperse these numerous bands, even as a great ship
feeling the wind, breaks through and scatters the gun-boats that
have gathered round her in the calm.
CHAPTER II.
SECOND INVASION OF PORTUGAL.
The Entre Minho e Douro and the Tras os Montes lying together, form
the northern part of Portugal, the extreme breadth of either, when
measured from the frontier to the Douro, does not exceed seventy
miles.
The river Tamega, running north and south, and discharging itself
into the Douro, forms the boundary line between them; but there is,
to the west of this river, a succession of rugged mountain ridges,
which, under the names of Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, and
Sierra de Santa Catalina, form a second barrier, nearly parallel
to the Tamega; and across some part of these ridges any invader,
coming from the eastward, must pass to arrive at Oporto.
Other Sierras, running also in a parallel direction with the
Tamega, cut the Tras os Montes in such a manner, that all the
considerable rivers flowing north and south tumble into the Douro.
But as the western ramifications of the Sierras de Gerez and
Cabrera shoot down towards the sea, the rivers of the Entre Douro
e Minho discharge their waters into the ocean, and consequently
flow at right angles to those of Tras os Montes. Hence it follows,
that an enemy penetrating to Oporto, from the north, would have to
pass the Lima, the Cavado, and the Ave, to reach Oporto; and, if
coming from the east, he invaded the Tras os Montes, all the rivers
and intervening ridges of that province must be crossed before the
Entre Minho e Douro could be reached.
The duke of Dalmatia was, however, now in such a position, near
the sources of the Lima and the Tamega rivers, that he could
choose whether to penetrate by the valley of the first into the
Entre Minho e Douro, or by the valley of the second into the Tras
os Montes: and there was also a third road, leading between those
rivers through Montalegre upon Braga; but this latter route,
passing over the Sierra de Gerez, was impracticable for artillery.
The French general had, therefore, to consider--
1º. If, following the course of the Lima, he should attack and
disperse the insurgents between that river and the Minho, and then
recovering his artillery from Tuy, proceed against Oporto by the
main road leading along the sea coast.
2º. If he should descend the Tamega, take Chaves, and then decide
whether to continue his route to Villa Real, near the Douro, and so
take the defences of Tras os Montes in reverse, or, turning to his
right, and crossing the Sierra de Cabrera by the pass of Ruivaens,
enter Braga, and thus operate against Oporto.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MSS.]
The first project was irregular and hazardous, inasmuch as Romana
and Sylveira’s troops might have fallen upon the flank and rear of
the French during their march through a difficult country; but as
the position of those generals covered the road to Chaves, to beat
them was indispensable, as a preliminary measure to either plan;
and this was immediately executed.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Papers, MSS.]
The 4th of March the French movement commenced. The 5th, the van
being at Villa Real and Penaverde, Soult sent a flag of truce to
Romana, with a letter, in which, exposing fully the danger of the
latter’s situation, he advised him to submit: but no answer was
returned; nor would the bearer have been suffered to pass the
outposts, but that Romana himself was in the rear, for he dreaded
that such an occurrence would breed a jealousy of his conduct, and,
perhaps, cause his patriotism to be undervalued.
This failing, three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry
marched the next morning against Monterey; while La Houssaye’s
dragoons, taking the road of Laza, covered the left flank, and
pushed parties as far La Gudina, on the route to Puebla de
Senabria. The fourth division of infantry remained at Villa del
Rey, to cover the passage of the sick and wounded men from Orense;
for the duke of Dalmatia, having no base of operations, transported
his hospitals, and other incumbrances, from place to place as the
army moved, acting in this respect after the manner of the Roman
generals, when invading a barbarous country.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MSS.]
As the French advanced, the Spaniards abandoned their positions in
succession, spiked the guns in the dilapidated works of Monterey,
and after a slight skirmish at Verim, took the road to Puebla de
Senabria; but Franceschi followed close, and overtaking two or
three thousand as they were passing a rugged mountain, he assailed
their rear with a battalion of infantry, and at the same time
leading his horsemen round both flanks, headed the column, and
obliged it to halt.
The Spaniards, trusting to the rough ground, drew up in one large
square and awaited the charge. Franceschi had four regiments of
cavalry; each regiment settled itself against the face of a square,
and then the whole, with loud cries, bore down swiftly upon their
opponents; the latter unsteady and dismayed, shrunk together from
the fierce assault, and were instantly trampled down in heaps.
Those who escaped the horses’ hoofs and the edge of the sword
became prisoners, but twelve hundred bodies were stretched lifeless
on the field of battle, and Franceschi continued his movements on
La Gudina.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.]
Romana was at Semadems, several miles in the rear of Verim, when
his vanguard was attacked, and there was nothing to prevent him
from falling back to Chaves with his main body, according to a
plan before agreed upon between him and Sylveira, but either from
fear or indignation at the treatment his soldiers had received at
the hands of the Portuguese, he left Sylveira to his fate, and
made off with six or seven thousand men towards Bragança; from
thence passing by Puebla de Senabria, he regained the valley of the
Syl. Meanwhile, two thousand Portuguese infantry, with some guns,
issuing from the side of Villaza, cut the French line of march at
the moment when Franceschi and Heudelet having passed Monterey,
Laborde was approaching that place. In the slight combat that
ensued the Portuguese lost their guns and were driven, fighting,
down the valley of the Tamega as far as the village of Outeiro,
within their own frontier.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
The defeat and flight of Romana had such an effect upon the
surrounding districts that the Spanish insurgents returned in
crowds to their habitations and delivered up their arms. Some of
the clergy, also, changing their opinions, exhorted the people to
peace, and the prisoners taken on the 6th, being dissatisfied with
Romana’s conduct, and moved by their hatred of the Portuguese,
entered the French service. These affairs occupied Soult until the
9th, during which period his outposts were pushed towards Chaves,
Montalegre, and La Gudina, but the main body remained at Verim to
cover the arrival of the sick, at Monterey.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.]
Sylveira, thus beaten at Villaza, and deserted by Romana, fell back
on the 7th to a strong mountain position, one league behind Chaves,
from whence he could command a view of all the French movements
as far as Monterey. His ground was advantageous, but his military
talents were moderate, his men always insubordinate, were now
become mutinous, and many of the officers were disposed to join the
French. The general wished to abandon Chaves, the troops resolved
to defend it, and three thousand five hundred men actually did
throw themselves into that town, in defiance of Sylveira, who was
already, according to the custom of the day, pronounced a traitor
and declared worthy of that death which he would inevitably have
suffered, but that some of his troops still continued to respect
his orders.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
The 10th, the convoy of French sick was close to Monterey, and
as Romana’s movement was known to be a real flight, and not
made with a design to create fresh insurrections in the rear,
the French troops were again put in motion towards Chaves; but
Merle’s division remained at Verim to protect the hospital, and
Franceschi’s took the road of La Gudina, as if he had been going
towards Salamanca. A report that he had actually entered that
town reached Lisbon, and was taken as an indication that Soult
would not pass the Portuguese frontier at Chaves, but Franceschi
quickly returned, by Osonio and Feces de Abaxo, and being assisted
by Heudelet’s division, invested Chaves on the left bank of the
Tamega, while Laborde, Mermet, La Houssaye, and Lorge, descending
the right bank, beat the Portuguese outposts, and getting
possession of a fort close under the walls of Chaves completed the
investment of that town.
The place was immediately summoned to surrender, but no answer
was returned, and the garrison, like men bereft of their wits,
and fighting with the air, kept up a continual and heavy fire of
musketry and artillery until the 12th, when they surrendered on
receiving a second summons, more menacing than the first. The 13th
the French entered the town, and Sylveira retired to Villa Real.
The works of Chaves were in a bad state, and few of the fifty
guns mounted on the ramparts were fit for service; but there was
a stone-bridge, and the town being in many respects more suitable
for a place of arms than Monterey, the sick were brought down
from the latter place, and an hospital was established for twelve
hundred men, the number now unfit to carry arms. The fighting men
were reduced to twenty-one thousand, and Soult, partly from the
difficulty of guarding his prisoners, partly from a desire to
abate the hostility of the Portuguese, permitted the militia and
_ordenanza_ to return to their homes, after taking an oath not
to resume their arms. To some of the poorest he gave money and
clothes, and he enrolled, at their own request, the few regular
troops taken in Chaves.
[Sidenote: Noble’s Campaign de Galice.]
[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MSS.]
This wise and gentle proceeding was much blamed, by some of his
officers, especially by those who had served under Junot. They
desired that Chaves might be assaulted, and the garrison put to
the sword, for they were embued with a personal hatred of the
Portuguese, and being averse to serve in the present expedition
endeavoured, as it would appear, to thwart their general; but the
prudence of his conduct was immediately visible in the softened
feelings of the country people. The scouting parties being no
longer molested spread themselves, some on the side of Bragança and
Villa Real, others in the Entre Minho e Douro. The former reported
that there was no enemy in a condition to make head in the Tras os
Montes, but the latter fell in with the advanced guard of Freire’s
army at Ruivaens, on the road to Braga, and this determined the
further proceedings of the army.
[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MSS.]
The possession of Chaves enabled the duke of Dalmatia to operate
against Oporto, either by the Tras os Montes or the Entre Minho
e Douro. He decided on the latter; first, because the road,
though crossed by stronger positions, was more direct, and more
practicable for artillery, than that running through the valley
of the Tamega; secondly, because a numerous Portuguese army was
at Braga; and, thirdly, because he could the sooner remove his
communication with Tuy.
The road from Chaves to Braga enters a deep and dangerous defile,
or rather a succession of defiles, that extend from Venda Nova to
Ruivaens, and re-commence after passing the Cavado river. Friere’s
advanced guards, composed of _ordenanza_, occupied those places;
and he had also a detachment under Eben on the road of Montalegre;
but he recalled the latter on the 14th.
The 16th Franceschi forced the defile of Venda Nova, and the
remainder of the troops being formed in alternate masses of
cavalry and infantry, began to pass the Sierra de Cabrera. Lorge’s
dragoons, however, descending the Tamega, ordered rations for
the whole army along the road to Villa Real; and then, suddenly
retracing their steps, rejoined the main body.
The 17th, Franceschi, being reinforced with some infantry, won the
bridge of Ruivaens, and entered Salamonde. The Portuguese, covered
by Eben’s detachment, which had arrived at St. Joa de Campo, then
fell back on the Pico de Pugalados, close to Braga; and the French
took post at Carvalho Este, two leagues in front of that city.
Soult now expected to reach Braga without further opposition, and
caused his artillery, guarded by Laborde’s division, to enter
the pass of Venda Nova; but the _ordenanza_, reinforced by some
men from the side of Guimaraens, immediately re-assembled, and,
clustering on the mountains to the left of the column of march,
attacked it with great fierceness and subtlety.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
The peasants of the northern provinces of Portugal, unlike the
squalid miserable population of Lisbon and Oporto, are robust,
handsome, and exceedingly brave. Their natural disposition is open
and obliging; and they are, when rightly handled as soldiers,
docile, intelligent, and hardy. They are, however, vehement in
their anger; and being now excited by the exhortations and personal
example of their priests, they came rushing down the sides of
the hills; and many of them, like men deprived of reason, broke
furiously into the French battalions, and were there killed. The
others, finding their efforts unavailing, fled, and were pursued a
league up the mountain by some battalions sent out against them,
but they were not yet abashed; for, making a circuit behind the
hills, they fell upon the rear of the line of march, killed fifty
of the stragglers, and plundered the baggage; and, thus galled, the
French slowly, and with much trouble, passing the long defiles of
Venda Nova, Ruivaens, and Salamonde, gathered by degrees in front
of Freire’s position.
[Sidenote: Eben’s Report, MSS. Sir J. Cradock’s Paper.]
That general was no more; and his troops, reeking from the
slaughter of their commander, were raging, like savage beasts, at
one moment congregating near the prisons to murder some wretch
within, at another rushing tumultuously to the outposts, with
a design to engage the enemy. The _ordenanzas_ of the distant
districts also came pouring into the camp, dragging with them
suspected persons, and adding to the general distraction.
It appears that the unfortunate Friere, unable to establish order
in his army, had resolved to retreat; and, in pursuance of that
design, recalled Eben on the 14th, and gave directions to the
officers at the different outposts in front of Braga to retire at
the approach of the enemy. This, and his endeavour to prevent the
waste of ammunition, gave effect to a plan which had been long
prepared by the bishop’s faction for his destruction. In passing
through Braga, he was openly reviled in the streets by some of
the _ordenanzas_; and, as the latter plainly discovered their
murderous intention, he left the army; but he was seized on the
17th, at a village behind Braga, and brought back: what followed is
thus described by baron Eben, in his official report to sir John
Cradock:--
“I did not reach Braga until nine o’clock in the morning of the
17th. I found every thing in the greatest disorder; the houses
shut, the people flying in all directions, and part of the populace
armed with guns and pikes. Passing through the streets, I was
greeted with loud _vivas_. Though the people knew me, I could not
guess the meaning of this: at the market-place, I was detained by
the rapidly-increasing populace, who took the reins of my horse,
crying out loudly, that they were ready to do any thing to defend
the city; requesting me to assist them, and speaking in the lowest
terms of their general. I promised them to do all in my power to
aid their patriotic zeal; but said that I must first speak to him.
Upon this, they suffered me to proceed, accompanied by about a
hundred of them: but I had not got far on my way to his quarters,
when I saw him on foot, conducted by a great armed multitude, who
suffered no one to pass, and, on my attempting it, threatened to
fire. I was, therefore, obliged to turn my horse; and this the
people applauded. Two men had hold of the general’s arms, his sword
was taken from him, and the people abused him most vehemently. On
my way back to the market-place, they wanted to shoot me, taking
me for general Friere; but I was saved by a soldier of the legion,
who explained the mistake. When I reached the market-place, I
found about a thousand men drawn up: I communicated to them my
determination to assist them in their laudable endeavours to defend
themselves, provided they would first permit me to speak to the
general, for whose actions I promised to be answerable as long as
I should be with him. I had ordered a house to be got ready for my
reception, where the general arrived, accompanied as before; I
saluted him with respect, at which they plainly discovered their
disapprobation. I repeated my proposal, but they would not listen
to it. I perceived the danger of the general, and proposed to take
him to my quarters. My adjutant offered him his arm: when I spoke
to him, he only replied, ‘save me!’”
“At the entrance of my house, I was surrounded by thousands, and
heard the loud cry of ‘kill! kill!’ I now took hold of him, and
attempted to force my way into the house, and a gentleman slightly
wounded him with the point of his sword, under my arm. He collected
all his strength, and rushed through them, and hid himself behind
the door of the house. The people surrounded me, and forced me from
the house. To draw the attention of the people from the general, I
ordered the drummers to beat the alarm, and formed the _ordenanzas_
in ranks; but they kept a constant fire upon my house, where the
general still was. As a last attempt to save him, I now proposed
that he should be conducted to prison, in order to take a legal
trial; this was agreed to, and he was conducted there in safety.
I now hoped that I had succeeded, as the people demanded to be
led against the enemy, now rapidly advancing, in number about
two thousand. I again formed them, and advanced with them; but
soon after, I heard the firing again, and was informed that the
people had put the general to death with pikes and guns. I was now
proclaimed general.”
[Sidenote: Eben’s Reports, MS.]
When this murder was perpetrated, the people seemed satisfied, and
Eben announcing the approach of a British force from Oporto, sent
orders to the outposts to stand fast, as he intended to fight;
but another tumult arose, when it was discovered that an officer
of Freire’s staff, one Villaboas, was in Eben’s quarters. Several
thousand _ordenanzas_ instantly gathered about the house, and the
unhappy man was haled forth and stabbed to death at the door, the
mob all the time shouting and firing volleys in at the windows.
Yet, when their fury was somewhat abated, they obliged their new
general to come out and show that he had not been wounded, and
expressed great affection for him.
In the course of the night the legion marched in from Pico de
Pugalados, and the following morning a reinforcement of six
thousand _ordenanzas_ came up in one mass. Fifty thousand dollars
also arrived in the camp from Oporto; for the Portuguese, like the
Spaniards, commonly reversed the order of military arrangements,
leaving their weapons in store, and bringing their encumbrances to
the field of battle.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.]
In the evening the corregidor and two officers of rank, together
with many persons of a meaner class, were brought to the town as
prisoners and put in jail, the armed mob being with difficulty
restrained from slaying them on the way thither; and in this
distracted manner they were proceeding when Franceschi arrived at
Carvalho on the 17th, and, surely, if that bold and enterprising
soldier could have obtained a glimpse of what was passing, or known
the real state of affairs, he would have broke into the midst
of them with his cavalry; for, of the twenty-five thousand men
composing the whole of the Portuguese force, eighteen thousand were
only armed with pikes, the remainder had wasted the greatest part
of their ammunition, and the powder in store was not made up in
cartridges. But Braga, situated in a deep hollow, was hidden from
him, and the rocky and wooded hills surrounding it were occupied by
what appeared a formidable multitude. Hence Franceschi, although
reinforced by a brigade of infantry, was satisfied by feints and
slight skirmishes to alarm his opponents, and to keep them in play
until the other divisions of the French army could arrive.
While these events were passing at Braga, Sylveira had again
collected a considerable force of militia and _ordenanzas_ in the
Tras os Montes, and captain Arentchild, one of the officers sent by
sir John Cradock to aid the bishop, rallied a number of fugitives
at Guimaraens and Amarante. In Oporto, however, the multitude,
obeying no command, were more intent upon murder than upon defence.
Eben’s posts extended from Falperra, on the route of Guimaraens
to the Ponte Porto, on the Cavado river; but the principal force
was stationed on a lofty ridge called the Monte Adaufé, which, at
the distance of six or seven miles from Braga, crossed the road to
Chaves.
The left, or western, end, which overhangs the river Cavado,
covered the detachment guarding the Ponte Porto.
The right rested on a wood and on the head of a deep ravine, and
beyond this wood the ridge, taking a curved and forward direction,
was called the Monte Vallonga, and a second mass of men was posted
there, but separated from those on the Monte Adaufé by an interval
of two miles, and by the ravine and wood before mentioned.
A third body, being pushed still more in advance, crowned an
isolated hill, flanking the Chaves road, being prepared to take
the French in rear when the latter should attack the Monte Adaufé.
Behind the Monte Vallonga, and separated from it by a valley three
miles wide, the ridge of Falperra was guarded by detachments sent
both from Guimaraens and from Braga.
The road to Braga, leading directly over the centre of the Monte
Adaufé, was flanked on the left by a ridge shooting perpendicularly
out from that mountain, and ending in a lofty mass of rocks which
overhangs Carvalho Esté. The Portuguese neglected to occupy either
these rocks or the connecting ridge, and Franceschi seized the
former on the 17th.
The 18th, Soult arrived in person, and, wishing to prevent a
battle, released twenty prisoners, and sent them in with a
proclamation couched in conciliatory language, and offering a
capitulation; but the trumpeter who accompanied them was detained,
and the prisoners were immediately slain.
The 19th, Eben brought up all his reserves to the Adaufé, and
the Portuguese on the isolated hill in front of Monte Vallonga
took possession of Lanhoza, a village half way between that hill
and the rocky height occupied by Franceschi on the 17th. But two
divisions of French infantry being now up, Soult caused one of them
and the cavalry to attack Lanhoza, from whence the Portuguese were
immediately driven, and, being followed closely, lost their own
hill also. The other French division took post, part in Carvalho,
part on the rocky headland, and six guns were carried to the latter
during the night. In this position the French columns were close to
the centre of the Portuguese, and could, by a slight movement in
advance, separate Eben’s wings. The rest of the army was at hand,
and a general attack was arranged for the next morning.
BATTLE OF BRAGA.
The 20th, at nine o’clock, the French were in motion: Franceschi
and Mermet, leaving a detachment on the hill they had carried the
night before, endeavoured to turn the right of the people on the
Monte Vallonga.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
Laborde, supported by La Houssaye’s dragoons, advanced against the
centre by the ridge connecting Carvalho with the Monte Adaufé.
Heudelet, with a part of his division and a squadron of cavalry,
attacked the left, and made for the Ponte Porto.
[Sidenote: Eben’s Report, MS.]
The Portuguese immediately opened a straggling fire of musketry and
artillery in the centre; but, after a few rounds, the bursting of a
gun created some confusion, from which Laborde’s rapidly-advancing
masses gave them no time to recover; and by ten o’clock the whole
of the centre was flying in disorder down a narrow wooded valley
leading from the Adaufé to Braga.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.]
The French followed hard, and in the pursuit, discovering one of
their _voltigeurs_, who had been a prisoner, still alive, but
mutilated in the most horrible manner, they gave little or no
quarter. Braga was abandoned, and the victorious infantry passing
through, took post on the other side; but the cavalry continued the
havoc for some distance 011 the road to Oporto; yet, so savage was
the temper of the fugitives that, in passing through Braga, they
stopped to murder the corregidor and other prisoners in the jail,
then, casting the mangled bodies into the street, continued the
flight. Meanwhile, Heudelet, breaking over the left of the Monte
Adaufé descended upon Ponte Porto, and, after a sharp skirmish,
carried that bridge and the village on the other side of the Cavado.
Franceschi and Mermet found considerable difficulty in ascending
the rugged sides of the Monte Vallonga, but having, at last,
attained the crest, the whole of their enemies fled. The two
generals then crossed the valley to gain the road of Guimaraens,
and cut off that line of retreat, but fell in with the three
thousand Portuguese posted above Falperra. These men, seeing the
cavalry approach, drew up with their backs to some high rocks, and
opened a fire of artillery. But Franceschi, placing his horsemen on
either flank, and a brigade of infantry against the front, as at
Verim, made all charge together, and strewed the ground with the
dead. Nevertheless, the Portuguese fought valiantly at this point,
and Franceschi acknowledged it.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s papers, MSS.]
The vanquished lost all their artillery and above four thousand
men, of which four hundred only were made prisoners. Some of the
fugitives crossing the Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima,
others retired to Oporto, but the greatest number took the road of
Guimaraens, during the fight at Falperra. Eben appears, by his own
official report, to have been at Braga when the action commenced,
and to have fled among the first; for he makes no mention of the
fight at Falperra, nor of the skirmish at Ponte Porto, and his
narrative bears every mark of inaccuracy.
When the French outposts were established in front of Braga,
general Lorge crossed the Cavado and entered Bacellos; and the
corregidor received him well, for which he was a few days after
put to death by the Portuguese general, Bonteilho, who commanded
between the Lima and the Minho.
Braga itself had been at first abandoned by the inhabitants, but
they were induced to return the next day; and some provisions and a
large store of powder being found in the magazines, the latter was
immediately made up into cartridges, for the use of the troops. The
gun-carriages and ammunition-waggons were again repaired, and an
hospital was established for eight hundred sick and wounded: from
whence it may be judged that the loss sustained in action, since
the 15th, was not less than six hundred men.
The French general, having thus broken through the second
Portuguese line of defence, was in a situation either to march
directly against Oporto, or to recover his communication with the
depôt at Tuy. He knew, through the medium of his spies and by
intercepted letters, that general La Martiniere, although besieged,
was in no distress; that he made successful sorties; and that his
artillery commanded that in the fortress of Valença. On the other
hand, information was received that sixty thousand troops of the
line, militia, and _ordenanza_, were assembled at the entrenched
camp covering Oporto, and the scouts reported that the Portuguese
were also in force at Guimaraens, and had cut the bridges along the
whole course of the Ave.
Meanwhile, Sylveira struck a great blow; for, being reinforced from
the side of Beira, he remounted the Tamega, invested the French
in Chaves on the 20th, and, in eight days, obliged the garrison,
consisting of a hundred fighting men, and twelve hundred sick,
to capitulate; after which he took post at Amarante. But Soult,
ignorant of this event, left Heudelet’s division at Braga, to
protect the hospitals from Bonteilho, and then continued his own
movement against Oporto in three columns.
The first, composed of Franceschi’s and Mermet’s divisions, marched
by the road of Guimaraens and San Justo, with orders to force the
passage of the Upper Ave, and scour the country towards Pombeiro.
The second, which consisted of Merle’s, Laborde’s and La Houssaye’s
divisions, was commanded by Soult, in person, and moved upon Barca
de Trofa, while general Lorge, quitting Bacellos, made way by the
Ponte d’Ave.
The passage of the Ave was fiercely disputed. The left column was
fought with in front of Guimaraens, and at Pombeiro, and again at
Puente Negrellos. The last combat was rough, and the French general
Jardon was killed.
The march of the centre column was arrested at Barca de Trofa, by
the cutting of the bridge, and the marshal, observing the numbers
of the enemy, ascended the right bank, and forced the passage at
San Justo: but not without the help of Franceschi, who came down
the opposite side of the river, after the fight at Ponte Negrellos.
When the left and centre had thus crossed, colonel Lallemand was
detached with a regiment of dragoons to assist Lorge, who was still
held in check at the Ponte d’Ave; Lallemand was at first beaten
back, but, being reinforced with some infantry, finally succeeded;
and the Portuguese, enraged at their defeat, brutally murdered
their commander, general Vallonga, and then dispersed.
The whole French army was now in communication on the left bank of
the Ave; the way to Oporto was opened, and, on the 27th, the troops
were finally concentrated in front of the entrenchments covering
that city.
The action of Monterey, the taking of Chaves, and the defeat at
Braga, had so damped the bishop’s ardour that he was, at one
time, inclined to abandon the defence of Oporto; but this idea
was relinquished when he considered the multitudes he had drawn
together, and that the English army was stronger than it had been
at any previous period since Cradock’s arrival; Beresford, also,
was at the head of a considerable native force behind the Mondego;
and, with the hope of their support, the bishop resolved to stand
the brunt.
He had collected, in the entrenched camp, little short of forty
thousand men; and among them were many regular troops, of which two
thousand had lately arrived under the command of general Vittoria.
This general was sent by Beresford to aid Sylveira: but when Chaves
surrendered, he entered Oporto.
The hopes of the people, also, were high, for they could not
believe that the French were a match for them; the preceding
defeats were attributed each to its particular case of treason, and
the murder of some innocent persons had followed as an expiation.
No man but the bishop durst thwart the slightest caprice of the
mob; and he was little disposed to do so, while Raymundo, and
others of his stamp, fomented their fury, and directed it to
gratify personal enmities. Thus, the defeat of Braga being known in
Oporto, caused a tumult on the 22d; and Louis D’Olivera, a man of
high rank, who had been cast into prison, was, with fourteen other
persons, haled forth, and despatched with many stabs; the bodies
were then mutilated, and dragged in triumph through the streets.
[Sidenote: See Plan 5.]
The entrenchments extending, as I have said, from the Douro to
the coast, were complete, and armed with two hundred guns. They
consisted of a number of forts of different sizes, placed on the
top of a succession of rounded hills; and where the hills failed,
the defences were continued by earthen ramparts, loop-holed houses,
ditches, and felled trees. Oporto itself is built in a hollow; a
bridge of boats, nearly three hundred yards in length, formed the
only communication between the city and the suburb of Villa Nova;
and this bridge was completely commanded by batteries, mounting
fifty guns, planted on the bluff and craggy heights that overhang
the river above Villa Nova, and overlooked, not only the city, but
a great part of the entrenched camp beyond it. Within the lines,
tents were pitched for even greater numbers than were assembled;
and the people ran to arms, and quickly manned their works with
great noise and tumult, when the French columns, gathering like
heavy thunder clouds, settled in front of the camp.
The duke of Dalmatia arrived on the 27th. While at Braga he
had written to the bishop, calling on him to calm the popular
effervescence; and now, beholding the extended works in his front,
and reading their weakness even in the multitudes that guarded
them, he renewed his call upon the prelate, to spare this great
and commercial city the horrors of a storm. A prisoner, employed
to carry the summons, would have been killed, but that it was
pretended he came with an offer from Soult to surrender his army;
and notwithstanding this ingenious device, and that the bishop
commenced a negotiation, which was prolonged until evening, the
firing from the entrenchments was constant and general during the
whole of the 28th.
The parley being finally broken off, Soult made dispositions for a
general action on the 29th. To facilitate this, he caused Merle’s
division to approach the left of the entrenchments in the evening
of the 28th, intending thereby to divert attention from the true
point of attack: a prodigious fire was immediately opened from the
works; but Merle, having pushed close up, got into some hollow
roads and enclosures, and maintained his ground. At another part
of the line, however, some of the Portuguese pretending a wish
to surrender, general Foy, with a single companion, imprudently
approached them; the latter was killed, and Foy himself made
prisoner, and carried into the town. He was mistaken for Loison,
and the people called out to kill “_Maneta_,” but with great
presence of mind he held up his hands; and the crowd, convinced of
their error, suffered him to be cast into the jail.
The bishop, having brought affairs to this awful crisis, had not
resolution to brave the danger himself. Leaving generals Lima and
Pareiras to command the army, he, with an escort of troops, quitted
the city, and, crossing the river, took his station in Sarea, a
convent, built on the top of the rugged hill which overhangs the
suburb of Villa Nova, from whence he beheld in safety the horrors
of the next day.
The bells in Oporto continued to ring all night; and about twelve
o’clock a violent thunder storm arising, the sound of the winds
was mistaken in the camp for the approach of enemies. At once the
whole line blazed with a fire of musketry; the roar of two hundred
pieces of artillery was heard above the noise of the tempest,
and the Portuguese calling to one another with loud cries, were
agitated at once with fury and with terror. The morning, however,
broke serenely; and a little before seven o’clock the sound of the
Frenchmen’s trumpets and drums, and the glitter of their arms, gave
notice that the whole army was in motion for the attack.
BATTLE AND STORMING OF OPORTO.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.]
The feint made the evening before against the left, which was
the weakest part of the line, had perfectly succeeded, and the
Portuguese generals placed their principal masses on that side; but
the duke of Dalmatia was intent upon the strongest points of the
works, being resolved to force his way through the town, and to
seize the bridge during the fight, that he might secure the passage
of the river.
His army was divided into three columns; of which the first, under
Merle, attacked the left of the Portuguese centre; the second,
under Franceschi and Laborde, assailed their extreme right; the
third, composed of Mermet’s division, sustained by a brigade of
dragoons, was in the centre. General Lorge was appointed to cut off
and attack a body of ordenanza, who were posted with some guns in
front of the Portuguese left, and beyond the works on the road of
Villa de Conde.
The battle was commenced by the wings; for Mermet’s division was
withheld, until the enemy’s generals believing the whole of the
attack was developed, had weakened their centre to strengthen
their flanks. Then the French held in reserve, rushing violently
forwards, broke through the entrenchments, and took the two
principal forts, entering by the embrasures, and killing or
dispersing all within them. Soult instantly rallied this division,
and sent two battalions to take the Portuguese left wing in the
rear; while two other battalions were ordered to march straight
into the town, and make for the bridge.
The Portuguese army, thus cut in two, was soon beaten on all
points. Laborde carried in succession a number of forts, took fifty
pieces of artillery, and reaching the edge of the city, halted
until Franceschi, who was engaged still more to the left, could
join him. By this movement a large body of Portuguese were driven
off from the town, and forced back to the Douro, being followed
by a brigade under general Arnaud. And now Merle, seeing that the
success of the centre was complete, brought up his left flank,
and carrying all the forts to his right in succession, killed a
great number of the defenders, and drove the rest towards the sea.
These last dividing, fled for refuge, one part to the fort of St.
Joa, the other towards the mouth of the Douro; where, maddened by
terror, as the French came pouring down upon them, they strove,
some to swim across, others to get over in small boats; and when
their general, Lima, called out against this hopeless attempt, they
turned and murdered him, within musket shot of the approaching
enemy; and then renewing the attempt to cross, nearly the whole
perished.
The victory was now certain, for Lorge had dispersed the people on
the side of Villa de Conde and general Arnaud had hemmed in those
above the town and prevented them from plunging into the river
also, as in their desperate mood they were going to do. But the
battle continued within Oporto, for the two battalions sent from
the centre having burst the barricadoes at the entrance of the
streets, had penetrated, fighting, to the bridge, and here all
the horrid circumstances of war seemed to be accumulated, and the
calamities of an age compressed into one doleful hour.
More than four thousand persons, old and young and of both sexes,
were seen pressing forward with wild tumult, some already on the
bridge, others striving to gain it, and all in a state of phrenzy.
The batteries on the opposite bank opened their fire when the
French appeared, and at that moment a troop of Portuguese cavalry
flying from the fight came down one of the streets, and remorseless
in their fears, bore, at full gallop, into the midst of the
miserable helpless crowd, and trampled a bloody pathway to the
river. Suddenly the nearest boats, unable to sustain the increasing
weight, sunk and the foremost wretches still tumbling into the
river, as they were pressed from behind, perished, until the heaped
bodies rising above the surface of the waters, filled all the space
left by the sinking of the boats.
The first of the French that arrived, amazed at this fearful
spectacle, forgot the battle, and hastened to save those who still
struggled for life--and while some were thus nobly employed, others
by the help of planks, getting on to the firmer parts of the
bridge, crossed the river and carried the batteries on the heights
of Villa Nova. The passage was thus secured.
But this terrible destruction did not complete the measure of the
city’s calamities; two hundred men, who occupied the bishop’s
palace, fired from the windows and maintained that post until
the French, gathering round them in strength, burst the doors,
and put all to the sword. Every street and house now rung with
the noise of the combatants and the shrieks of distress; for the
French soldiers, exasperated by long hardships, and prone like all
soldiers to ferocity and violence during an assault, became frantic
with fury, when, in one of the principal squares, they found
several of their comrades who had been made prisoners, fastened
upright, and living, but with their eyes bursted, their tongues
torn out, and their other members mutilated and gashed. Those that
beheld the sight spared none who fell in their way.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.]
It was in vain that Soult strove with all his power to stop the
slaughter; it was in vain that hundreds of officers and soldiers
opposed, at the risk of their lives, the vengeance of their
comrades, and by their generous exertions rescued vast numbers that
would otherwise have fallen victims to the anger and brutality
of the moment. The frightful scene of rape, pillage, and murder,
closed not for many hours, and what with those who fell in battle,
those who were drowned, and those sacrificed to revenge, it is said
that ten thousand Portuguese died in that unhappy day! The loss of
the French did not exceed five hundred men.
CHAPTER III.
The dire slaughter at Oporto was followed up by a variety of
important operations, but before these are treated of, it is
essential to narrate the contemporaneous events on the Tagus
and the Guadiana, for the war was wide and complicated, and the
result depended more upon the general combinations than upon any
particular movements.
OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH CORPS.
It has been already related that marshal Victor, after making a
futile attempt to surprize the marquis of Palacios, had retired to
his former quarters at Toledo, and that the conde de Cartoajal,
who succeeded the duke of Infantado, had advanced to Ciudad Real
with about fourteen thousand men. Cuesta, also, having rallied
the remainder of Galluzzo’s army, and reinforced it by levies
from Grenada, and regular troops from Seville, had fixed his
head-quarters at Deleytosa, broken down the bridge of Almaraz,
and with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred
cavalry, guarded the line of the Tagus. The fourth corps remained
at Talavera and Placentia, but still holding the bridge of
Arzobispo.
[Sidenote: Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.]
The reserve of heavy cavalry was now suppressed, and the regiments
were dispersed among the _corps d’armée_, but the whole army,
exclusive of the king’s guards, did not exceed two hundred and
seventy thousand men, and forty thousand horses, shewing a
decrease of sixty-five thousand men since the 15th of November. But
this number includes the imperial guards, the reserve of infantry,
and many detachments drafted from the corps;--in all forty thousand
men, who had been struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, with
a view to the war in Germany; hence the real loss of the French
by sword, sickness, and captivity, in the four months succeeding
Napoleon’s arrival in the Peninsula, was about twenty-five
thousand--a vast number, but not incredible, when it is considered
that two sieges, twelve pitched battles, and innumerable combats
had taken place during that period.
Such was the state of affairs when the duke of Belluno, having
received orders to aid Soult in the invasion of Portugal, changed
places with the fourth corps. Sebastiani was then opposed to
Cartoajal, and Victor stood against Cuesta. The former fixed his
head-quarters at Toledo, the latter at Talavera de la Reyna, the
communication between them being kept up by Montbrun’s division
of cavalry, while the garrison of Madrid, composed of the king’s
guards, and Dessolle’s division, equally supported both. But to
understand the connection between the first, second, and fourth
corps, and Lapisse’s division, it is necessary to have a clear idea
of the nature of the country on both sides of the Tagus.
That river, after passing Toledo, runs through a deep and long
valley, walled up on either hand by lofty mountains. Those on
the right bank are always capped with snow, and, ranging nearly
parallel with the course of the stream, divide the valley of the
Tagus from Old Castile and the Salamanca country. The highest parts
are known by the names of the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de Bejar,
and Sierra de Gata; and in these sierras the Alberche, the Tietar,
and the Alagon, take their rise, and, ploughing the valley in a
slanting direction, fall into the Tagus.
The principal mountain on the left bank is called the Sierra de
Guadalupe; it extends in a southward direction from the river, and
divides the upper part of La Mancha from Spanish Estremadura. The
communications leading from the Salamanca country into the valley
of the Tagus are neither many nor good; the principal passes are--
1st. The rout of Horcajada, an old Roman road, which, running
through Pedrahita and Villa Franca, crosses the Sierra de Gredos at
Puerto de Pico, and then descends by Montbeltran to Talavera.
2d. The pass of Arenas, leading nearly parallel to, and at a short
distance from, the first.
3d. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon Placentia.
4th. The route of Bejar, which, crossing the Sierra de Bejar at the
pass of Baños, descends likewise upon Placentia.
5th. The route of Payo or Gata, which crosses the Sierra de Gata
by the pass of Perales, and afterwards dividing, sends one branch
to Alcantara, the other to Coria and Placentia. Of these five
passes the two last only are, generally speaking, practicable for
artillery.
The royal roads, from Toledo and Madrid to Badajos, unite near
Talavera, and follow the course of the Tagus by the right bank as
far Naval Moral, but then, turning to the left, cross the river at
the bridge of Almaraz. Now, from Toledo, westward, to the bridge
of Almaraz, a distance of above fifty miles, the left bank of
the Tagus is so crowded by the rugged shoots of the Sierra de
Guadalupe, that it may be broadly stated as impassable for an army,
and this peculiarity of ground gives the key to the operations on
both sides. For, Cuesta and Cartoajal, by reason of this impassable
Sierra de Guadalupe, had no direct military communication: but
Victor and Sebastiani, occupying Toledo and Talavera, could, by the
royal roads above mentioned, concentrate their masses, at pleasure,
on either line of operations.
The rallying point of the French was Madrid, and their parallel
lines of defence were the Tagus, the Alberche, and the Guadarama.
The base of Cartoajal’s operations was the Sierra de Morena.
Cuesta’s first line was the Tagus, and his second the Guadiana,
from whence he could retreat by a flank march to Badajos, or by a
direct one to the defiles of Monasterio in the Sierra Morena.
The two Spanish armies, if they had been united, would have
furnished about twenty-six thousand infantry, and five thousand
cavalry, and they had no reserve. The two French corps, united,
would have exceeded thirty-five thousand fighting-men, supported
by the reserve under the king. The French, therefore, had the
advantage of numbers, position, and discipline.
Following the orders of Napoleon, marshal Victor should have
been at Merida before the middle of February. In that position
he would have confined Cuesta to the Sierra Morena; and with his
twelve regiments of cavalry he could easily have kept all the flat
country, as far as Badajos, in subjection. That fortress itself
had no means of resistance, and, certainly, there was no Spanish
force in the field capable of impeding the full execution of the
emperor’s instructions, which were also reiterated by the king.
Nevertheless, the duke of Belluno remained inert at this critical
period, and the Spaniards, attributing his inactivity to weakness,
endeavoured to provoke the blow so unaccountably withheld; for
Cuesta was projecting offensive movements against Victor, and the
duke of Albuquerque was extremely anxious to attack Toledo from the
side of La Mancha.
Cartoajal opposed Albuquerque’s plans, but offered him a small
force with which to act independently. The duke complained to the
junta of Cartoajal’s proceedings, and Mr. Frere, whose traces are
to be found in every intrigue, and every absurd project broached at
this period, having supported Albuquerque’s complaints, Cartoajal
was directed by the junta to follow the duke’s plans: but the
latter was himself ordered to join Cuesta, with a detachment of
four or five thousand men.
ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL.
Cartoajal, in pursuance of his instructions, marched with
about twelve thousand men, and twenty guns, towards Toledo;
and his advanced guard attacked a regiment of Polish lancers,
near Consuegra: but the latter retired without loss. Hereupon,
Sebastiani, with about ten thousand men, came up against him, and
the leading divisions encountering at Yebenes, the Spaniards were
pushed back to Ciudad Real, where they halted, leaving guards on
the river in front of that town. The French, however, forced the
passage, and a tumultuary action ensuing, Cartoajal was totally
routed, with the loss of all his guns, a thousand slain, and
several thousand prisoners. The vanquished fled by Almagro; and
the French cavalry pursued even to the foot of the Sierra Morena.
This action, fought on the 27th of March, and commonly called the
battle of Ciudad Real, was not followed up with any great profit to
the victors. Sebastiani gathered up the spoils, sent his prisoners
to the rear, and, holding his troops concentrated on the Upper
Guadiana, awaited the result of Victor’s operations: thus enabling
the Spanish fugitives to rally at Carolina, where they were
reinforced by levies from Grenada and Cordova.
While these events were passing in La Mancha, Estremadura was also
invaded; for the king having received a despatch from Soult, dated
Orense and giving notice that the second corps would be at Oporto
about the 15th of March, had reiterated the orders that Lapisse
should move to Abrantes, and that the duke of Belluno should pass
the Tagus, and drive Cuesta beyond the Guadiana.
Victor, who appears for some reason to have been averse to aiding
the operations of the second corps, remonstrated, and especially
urged that the order to Lapisse should be withdrawn, lest his
division should arrive too soon, and without support, at Abrantes.
This time, however, the king was firm, and, on the 14th of March,
the duke of Belluno, having collected five days’ provisions, made
the necessary dispositions to pass the Tagus.
[Sidenote: General Semelé’s Journal of Operations, MS.]
The amount of the Spanish force immediately on that river was
about sixteen thousand men; but Cuesta had several detachments
and irregular bands in his rear, which may be calculated at eight
thousand more. The Duke of Belluno, however, estimated the troops
in position before him at thirty thousand, a great error for so
experienced a commander to make.
But, on the other hand, Cuesta was as ill informed; for this was
the moment when, with his approbation, colonel D’Urban proposed to
sir John Cradock, that curiously combined attack against Victor,
already noticed; in which, the Spaniards were to cross the Tagus,
and sir Robert Wilson was to come down upon the Tietar. This, also,
was the period that Mr. Frere, apparently ignorant that there
were at least twenty-five thousand fighting men in the valley of
the Tagus, without reckoning the king’s or Sebastiani’s troops,
proposed that the twelve thousand British, under sir John Cradock,
should march from Lisbon to “drive the fourth French corps from
Toledo,” and “consequently,” as he phrased it, “from Madrid.” The
first movement of marshal Victor awakened Cuesta from these dreams.
The bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo were, as we have seen, held
by the French; and their advanced posts were pushed into the valley
of the Tagus, as far as the Barca de Bazagona.
Cuesta’s position extended from Garbin, near the bridge of
Arzobispo, to the bridge of Almaraz. His centre being at Meza
d’Ibor, a position of surprising strength, running at right angles
from the Tagus to the Guadalupe. The head-quarters and reserves
were at Deleytosa; and a road, cut by the troops, afforded a
communication between that place and Meza d’Ibor.
On the right bank of the Tagus there was easy access to the bridges
of Talavera, Arzobispo, and Almaraz; but on the left bank no road
existed, except from Almaraz, by which artillery could pass the
mountains, and even that was crossed by the ridge of Mirabete,
which stretching on a line parallel to the river, and at the
distance of four or five miles, affords an almost impregnable
position.
[Sidenote: Journal of Operations of the First Corps MS.]
The duke of Belluno’s plan was, to pass the Tagus at the bridges
of Talavera and Arzobispo, with his infantry and a part of his
cavalry, and to operate in the Sierra de Guadalupe against the
Spanish right; while the artillery and grand parc, protected by
the remainder of the cavalry, were united opposite Almaraz, having
with them a raft bridge to throw across at that point, a project
scarcely to be reconciled with the estimate made of Cuesta’s
force; for surely nothing could be more rash than to expose the
whole of the guns and field stores of the army, with no other
guard than some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, close to a
powerful enemy, who possessed a good pontoon train, and who might,
consequently, pass the river at pleasure.
The 15th, Laval’s division of German infantry, and Lasalle’s
cavalry, crossed at Talavera, and, turning to the right, worked a
march through the rocky hills; the infantry to Aldea Nueva, on a
line somewhat short of the bridge of Arzobispo; the cavalry higher
up the mountain towards Estrella.
The 16th, when those troops had advanced a few miles to the front,
the head-quarters, and the other divisions of infantry, passed the
bridge of Arzobispo; while the artillery and the parcs, accompanied
by a battalion of grenadiers, and the escorting cavalry, moved
to Almaraz, with orders to watch, on the 17th and 18th, for the
appearance of the army on the heights at the other side, and then
to move down to the point before indicated, for launching the raft
bridge.
Alarmed by these movements, Cuesta hastened in person to Mirabete;
and directing general Henestrosa, with eight thousand men, to
defend the bridge of Almaraz, sent a detachment to reinforce his
right wing, which was posted behind the Ibor, a small river, but
at this season running with a full torrent from the Guadalupe to
the Tagus.
The 17th, the Spanish advanced guards were driven, with some loss,
across the Ibor. They attempted to re-form on the high rocky banks
of that river; but, being closely followed, retreated to the camp
of Meza d’Ibor, the great natural strength of which was increased
by some field works.
Their position could only be attacked in front; and, this being
apparent at the first glance, Laval’s division was instantly formed
in columns of attack, which pushed rapidly up the mountain; the
inequalities of ground covering them in some sort from the effects
of the enemy’s artillery. As they arrived near the summit, the
fire of musketry and grape became murderous; but, at the instant
when the Spaniards should have displayed all their vigour, they
broke and fled to Campillo, leaving behind them baggage, magazines,
seven guns, and a thousand prisoners, besides eight hundred killed
and wounded. The French had seventy killed, and near five hundred
wounded.
While this action was taking place at Meza d’Ibor, Villatte’s
division, being higher up the Sierra, to the left, overthrew a
smaller body of Spaniards at Frenedoso, making three hundred
prisoners, and capturing a large store of arms.
The 18th, at day-break, the duke of Belluno, who had superintended
in person the attack at Meza d’Ibor, examined from that high ground
all the remaining position of the Spaniards. Cuesta, he observed,
was in full retreat to Truxillo; but Henestrosa was still posted
in front of Almaraz. Hereupon Villatte’s division was detached
after Cuesta, to Deleytosa; but Laval’s Germans were led against
Henestrosa; and the latter, aware of his danger, and already
preparing to retire, was driven hastily over the ridge of Mirabete.
In the course of the night, the raft bridge was thrown across the
Tagus; and the next day the dragoons passed to the left bank, the
artillery followed, and the cavalry immediately pushed forward to
Truxillo, from which town Cuesta had already fallen back to Santa
Cruz, leaving Henestrosa to cover the retreat.
The 20th, after a slight skirmish, the latter was forced over
the Mazarna; and the whole French army, with the exception of a
regiment of dragoons (left to guard the raft bridge) was poured
along the road to Merida.
The advanced guard, consisting of a regiment of light cavalry,
under general Bordesoult, arrived in front of Miajadas on the 21st.
Here the road dividing, sends one branch to Merida, the other to
Medellin. A party of Spanish horsemen were posted near the town;
they appeared in great alarm, and by their hesitating movements
invited a charge. The French incautiously galloped forward; and,
in a moment, twelve or fourteen hundred Spanish cavalry, placed in
ambush, came up at speed on both flanks. General Lasalle, who from
a distance had observed the movements of both sides, immediately
rode forward with a second regiment; and arrived just as Bordesoult
had extricated himself from a great peril, by his own valour, but
with the loss of seventy killed and a hundred wounded.
[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MSS.]
After this well-managed combat, Cuesta retired to Medellin without
being molested, and Victor spreading his cavalry posts on the
different routes to gain intelligence and to collect provisions,
established his own quarters at Truxillo, a town of some trade and
advantageously situated for a place of arms. It had been deserted
by the inhabitants and pillaged by the first French troops that
entered it, but it still offered great resources for the army, and
there was an ancient citadel, capable of being rendered defensible,
which was immediately armed with the Spanish guns, and provisioned
from the magazines taken at Meza d’Ibor.
The flooding of the Tagus and the rocky nature of its bed had
injured the raft-bridge near Almaraz, and delayed the passage of
the artillery and stores; to remedy this inconvenience the marshal
issued directions to have a boat-bridge prepared, and caused a
field-fort to be constructed on the left bank of the Tagus, which
he armed with three guns, and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty
men to protect his bridge. These arrangements and the establishment
of an hospital for two thousand men at Truxillo, delayed the first
corps until the 24th of March.
Meanwhile, the light cavalry reinforced by twelve hundred
_voltigeurs_ were posted at Miajadas, and having covered all
the roads branching from that central point with their scouting
parties, reported that a few of Cuesta’s people had retired to
Medellin, that from five to six thousand men were thrown into the
Sierra de Guadalupe, on the left of the French; that four thousand
infantry and two thousand cavalry were behind the river Guadiana,
in front of Medellin, but that every thing else was over the
Guadiana.
The line of retreat chosen by Cuesta uncovered Merida, and,
consequently, the great road between Badajos and Seville was open
to the French; but Victor was not disposed to profit from this,
for he was aware that Albuquerque was coming from La Mancha to
Cuesta, and believing that he brought nine thousand infantry and
two thousand cavalry--feared that Cuesta’s intention was either
to draw him into a difficult country, by making a flank march to
join Cartoajal in La Mancha, or by crossing the Guadiana, above
Naval Villar, where the fords are always practicable, to rejoin his
detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe, and so establish a new base
of operations on the left flank of the French army.
This reasoning was misplaced; neither Cuesta nor his army were
capable of such operations, his line of retreat was solely directed
by a desire to join Albuquerque, and to save his troops, by
taking to a rugged instead of an open country, and the duke of
Belluno lost the fruits of his previous success, by over rating
his adversary’s skill; for, instead of following Cuesta with a
resolution to break up the Spanish army, he, after leaving a
brigade at Truxillo and Almaraz, to protect the communications, was
contented to advance a few leagues on the road to Medellin with
his main body, sending his light cavalry to Merida, and pushing
on detachments towards Badajos and Seville, while other parties
explored the roads leading into the Guadalupe.
The 27th, however, he marched in person to Medellin, at the head of
two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of heavy cavalry. Eight
hundred Spanish horse posted on the right bank of the Guadiana,
retired at his approach, and crossing that river, halted at Don
Benito, where they were reinforced by other squadrons, but no
infantry were to be discovered. The duke of Belluno then passed
the river and took post on the road leading to Mengabril and Don
Benito; hence, the situation of the French army in the evening was
as follows:--
The main body, consisting of two divisions of infantry, and one
incomplete brigade of heavy cavalry in position, on the road
leading from Medellin to Don Benito and Mingabril.
The remainder of the dragoons, under Latour Maubourg, were at
Zorita, fifteen miles on the left, watching the Spaniards in the
Guadalupe.
The light cavalry was at Merida, eighteen miles to the right,
having patrolled all that day on the roads to Badajos, Seville, and
Medellin.
Ruffin’s division was at Miajadas eighteen miles in the rear.
In the course of the evening Victor received intelligence, that
Albuquerque was just come up with eight thousand men, that the
combined troops, amounting to twenty-eight thousand infantry and
seven thousand cavalry, were in position on the table land of Don
Benito, and that Cuesta, aware of the scattered state of the French
army, was preparing to attack the two divisions on their march the
next day.
Upon this, the duke of Belluno, notwithstanding the strength of
the Spanish army, resolved to fight, and immediately sent orders
to Lasalle, to Ruffin, and to Latour Maubourg, to bring their
divisions down to Medellin; but the latter was directed to leave
a detachment at Miajadas to protect the route of Merida, and a
brigade at Zorita, to observe the Spaniards in the Sierra de
Guadalupe.
Cuesta’s numbers were, however, greatly exaggerated; that general
blaming every body but himself for his failure on the Tagus--had
fallen back to Campanarios--rallied all his scattered detachments,
and then returned to Villa Nueva de Serena, where he was joined,
on the 27th, by Albuquerque, who brought up not a great body of
infantry and cavalry as supposed, but less than three thousand
infantry and a few hundred horse. This reinforcement, added to some
battalions drawn from Andalusia, increased Cuesta’s army to about
twenty-five thousand foot, four thousand horse, and eighteen or
twenty pieces of artillery; and, with this force, he, fearing for
the safety of Badajos, retraced his steps and rushed headlong to
destruction.
Medellin, possessing a fine stone-bridge, is situated in a hollow
on the left bank of the Guadiana, and just beyond the town is a
vast plain or table land, the edge of which, breaking abruptly
down, forms the bed of the river. The Ortigosa, a rapid torrent,
rushing perpendicularly to the Guadiana, and having steep and
rugged banks, yet in parts passable for artillery, cuts their
plain, which is also traversed by two roads, the one leading to
Mingrabil on the right, the other to Don Benito on the left, those
places being about five miles apart, and forming with Medellin an
irregular triangle.
The French army, with the exception of the troops left to cover the
communications and those at Zorita, was concentrated in the town
at ten o’clock; and, at one, about fourteen thousand infantry, two
thousand five hundred cavalry, and forty-two pieces of artillery,
went forth to fight the
BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.
The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a high ridge
of land, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed,
showing only his cavalry and some guns in advance. To make him
display his lines of infantry the French general sent Lasalle’s
light cavalry, with a battery of six guns and two battalions of
German infantry, towards Don Benito, while Latour Maubourg, with
five squadrons of dragoons, eight guns, and two other battalions,
keeping close to the Ortigosa, advanced towards the point of the
enemy’s ridge called the Retamosa. The rest of the army was kept in
reserve; the division of Villatte and the remainder of the Germans,
being one-half on the road of Don Benito, the other half on the
road of Mengabril. Ruffin’s division was a little way in rear of
the other, and a battalion was left to guard the baggage at the
bridge of Medellin.
As the French squadrons advanced, the artillery on both sides
opened, and the Spanish cavalry guards in the plain retired slowly
to the higher ground. Lasalle and Latour Maubourg then pressed
forward; but as the latter, who had the shortest distance to
traverse, approached the enemy’s position, the whole Spanish line
of battle was suddenly descried in full march over the edge of the
ridge, and stretching from the Ortijos to within a mile of the
Guadiana,--a menacing but glorious apparition.
Cuesta, Henestrosa, and the duke del Parque, with the mass of
cavalry, were on the left; Francisco Frias, with the main body of
infantry, in the centre; Equia and the marquis of Portazzo on the
right; and, from thence to the bank of the Guadiana, Albuquerque,
with some scattered squadrons, flanked the march of the whole host
as it descended, with a rapid pace, into the plain. Cuesta’s plan
was now disclosed; his line overlapped the French left, and he was
hastening to cut their army off from Medellin, but his order of
battle was on a front of three miles, and he had no reserve.
The Duke of Belluno, seeing this, instantly brought his centre a
little forward, and then, reinforcing Latour Maubourg with ten guns
and a battalion of grenadiers, and detaching a brigade of infantry
as a support, ordered him to fall boldly in on the advancing enemy.
But at the same time Lasalle, who was giving way under the pressure
of his antagonists, was directed to retire towards Medellin, always
refusing his left.
The Spaniards marched briskly forward into the plain, and a special
body of cavalry, with three thousand infantry, advancing from their
left, met Latour Maubourg in front, while a regiment of hussars
fell upon the French columns of grenadiers and guns in his rear.
The hussars, received with grape and a pelting fire of musketry,
and charged in flank by some dragoons, were beaten at once, but
the Spanish infantry, closely followed by the rest of their own
cavalry, came boldly up to Latour Maubourg’s horsemen, and, with a
rough discharge, forced them back in disorder. The French, however,
soon rallied, and smashing the Spanish ranks with artillery, and
fighting all together, broke in and overthrew their enemies,
man and horse. Cuesta was wounded and fell, but, being quickly
remounted, escaped.
While this was passing on the French right, Lasalle’s cavalry,
continually refusing their left, were brought fighting close up to
the main body of the French infantry, which was now disposed on a
new front, having a reserve behind the centre. Meanwhile Latour
Maubourg’s division was being re-formed on the ridge from whence
the Spaniards had first descended, and the whole face of the battle
was changed; for the Spanish left being put to flight, the French
right wing overlapped the centre of their antagonists, and the long
attenuated line of the latter wavering, disjointed, and disclosing
wide chasms, was still advancing without an object.
The duke of Belluno, aware that the decisive moment of the battle
had arrived, was on the point of commanding a general attack, when
his attention was arrested by the appearance of a column coming
down on the rear of his right wing from the side of Mingabril. A
brigade from the reserve, with four guns, was immediately sent to
keep this body in check, and then Lasalle’s cavalry, taking ground
to its left, unmasked the infantry in the centre, and the latter,
immediately advancing, poured a heavy fire into the Spanish ranks;
Latour Maubourg, sweeping round their left flank, fell on the rear,
and, at the same moment, Lasalle also galloped in upon the dismayed
and broken bands. A horrible carnage ensued, for the French
soldiers, while their strength would permit, continued to follow
and strike, until three-fifths of the whole Spanish army wallowed
in blood.
Six guns and several thousand prisoners were taken. General Frias,
deeply wounded, fell into the hands of the victors; and so utter
was the discomfiture that, for several days after, Cuesta could
not rally a single battalion of infantry, and his cavalry was only
saved by the speed of the horses.
Following general Semelé’s journal,[4] the French loss did not
exceed three hundred men, a number so utterly disproportionate to
that of the vanquished as to be scarcely credible, and, if correct,
discovering a savage rigour in the pursuit by no means commendable;
for it does not appear that any previous cruelties were perpetrated
by the Spaniards to irritate the French soldiers. The right to
slaughter an enemy in battle can neither be disputed nor limited;
but a brave soldier should always have regard to the character of
his country, and be sparing of the sword towards beaten men.
The main body of the French army passed the night of the 28th near
the field of battle; but Latour Maubourg marched with the dragoons
by the left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving a detachment at
Torre Mexia to watch the roads of Almendralego and Villa Franca,
and to give notice if the remains of Cuesta’s army should attempt
to gain Badajos, in which case the dragoons had orders to intercept
them at Loboa.
The 29th, Villatte’s division advanced as far as Villa Nueva de
Serena, and the light cavalry were pushed on to Campanarios. But,
as all the reports agreed that Cuesta, with a few horsemen, had
taken refuge in the Sierra Morena, and that the remnants of his
army were dispersed and wandering through the fields and along the
bye-roads, without any power of re-uniting, the duke of Belluno
relinquished the pursuit. Having fixed his head-quarters at
Merida, and occupied that place and Medellin with his infantry, he
formed with his cavalry a belt extending from Loboa on the right
to Mingrabil on the left; but the people had all fled from the
country, and even the great towns were deserted.
Merida, situated in a richly-cultivated basin, possesses a fine
bridge and many magnificent remains of antiquity, Roman and
Moorish; amongst others, a castle built on the right bank of the
river, close to the bridge, and so perfect that, in eight days,
it was rendered capable of resisting any sudden assault; and six
guns being mounted on the walls, and an hospital for a thousand men
established there, a garrison of three hundred men, with stores and
provisions for eight hundred, during two months, was put into it.
The king now repeated his orders that the duke of Belluno should
enter Portugal, and that general Lapisse should march upon
Abrantes; but the former again remonstrated, on the ground that
he could not make such a movement and defend his communications
with Almaraz, unless the division of Lapisse was permitted to
join him by the route of Alcantara. But as Badajos, although more
capable of defence than it had been in December, when the fourth
corps was at Merida, was still far from being secure; and that
many of the richer inhabitants, disgusted and fatigued with the
violence of the mob government, were more inclined to betray the
gates to the French than to risk a siege; Victor, whose battering
train (composed of only twelve pieces, badly horsed and provided)
was still at Truxillo, opened a secret communication with the
malcontents.
[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MS.]
The parties met at the village of Albuera, and everything was
arranged for the surrender, when the peasants giving notice to the
junta that some treason was in progress, the latter arrested all
the persons supposed to be implicated, and the project was baffled.
The duke of Belluno then resigned all further thoughts of Badajos,
and contented himself with sending detachments to Alcantara, to get
intelligence of general Lapisse, of whose proceedings it is now
time to give some account.
[Illustration: _Plate 3. to face Pa. 226._
_Sketch Explanatory_
of
M^L. VICTOR’S OPERATIONS
AGAINST CUESTA
_in March 1809_.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]
OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAPISSE.
This general, after taking Zamora in January, occupied Ledesma
and Salamanca, where he was joined by general Maupetit’s brigade
of cavalry, and as sir Robert Wilson’s legion and the feeble
garrisons in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the only bodies in his
front, universal terror prevailed. Yet he, although at the head
of at least ten thousand men, with a powerful artillery, remained
inactive from January to the end of March, and suffered sir Robert,
with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his outposts, to intercept
his provisions, to restrain his patroles, and even to disturb his
infantry in their quarters. This conduct brought him into contempt,
and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people which they
were far from feeling when the enemy first appeared.
Don Carlos d’España, with a small Spanish force, being after a
time placed under sir Robert’s command, the latter detached two
battalions to occupy the pass of Baños, and Lapisse was thus
deprived of any direct communication with Victor. In this situation
the French general remained without making any vigorous effort
either to clear his front or to get intelligence of the duke of
Dalmatia’s march upon Oporto until the beginning of April, when he
advanced towards Bejar, but, finding the passes occupied, turned
suddenly to his right, dissipated Wilson’s posts on the Ecla,
and forced the legion, then commanded by colonel Grant, to take
refuge under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. He summoned that town to
surrender on the 6th, and, after a slight skirmish close to the
walls, took a position between the Agueda and Ledesma.
This event was followed by a general insurrection from Ciudad
Rodrigo to Alcantara and from Tamames to Bejar. For Lapisse,
who had been again ordered by the king to fulfil the emperor’s
instructions, and advance to Abrantes, instead of obeying, suddenly
quitted his positions on the Agueda, and, without regarding his
connexion with the second corps, abandoned Leon, and made a rapid
march, through the pass of Perales, upon Alcantara, followed
closely by sir Robert Wilson, don Carlos d’España, the two
battalions from Bejar, and a multitude of peasants, both Portuguese
and Spanish.
At Alcantara, a corps of Spanish insurgents endeavoured to defend
the passage of the river, but the French broke through the
entrenchments on the bridge, and, with a full encounter carried the
town, and pillaged it, after which they abandoned the place, and
joined the first corps, at Merida, on the 19th of April.
This false movement greatly injured the French cause. From that
moment the conquering impulse given by Napoleon was at an end, and
his armies, ceasing to act on the offensive, became stationary
or retrograded, and the British, Spanish, and Portuguese once
more assumed the lead. The duke of Dalmatia, abandoned to his own
resources, and in total ignorance of the situation of the corps
by which his movements should have been supported, was forced to
remain in Oporto; and at the moment, when the French combinations
were thus paralyzed, the arrival of English reinforcements at
Lisbon and the advance of sir John Cradock towards Leiria gave a
sudden and violent impetus both to the Spaniards and Portuguese
along the Beira frontier. Thus the insurrection, no longer kept
down by the presence of an intermediate French corps, connecting
Victor’s and Soult’s forces, was established in full activity from
Alcantara, on the Tagus, to Amarante, on the Tamega.
Meanwhile Cuesta was gathering another host in the Morena; for,
although the simultaneous defeat of the armies in Estremadura and
La Mancha had at first produced the greatest dismay in Andalusia,
the Spaniards, when they found such victories as Ciudad Real and
Medellin only leading to a stagnant inactivity on the part of the
French, concluded that extreme weakness was the cause, and that the
Austrian war had or would oblige Napoleon to abandon his projects
against the Peninsula. This idea was general, and upheld not only
the people’s spirit but the central junta’s authority, which could
not otherwise have been maintained after such a succession of
follies and disasters.
The misfortunes of the two Spanish generals had been equal; but
Cartoajal, having no popular influence, was dismissed, while Cuesta
was appointed to command what remained of both armies; and the
junta, stimulated for a moment by the imminent danger in which they
were placed, drew together all the scattered troops and levies in
Andalusia. To cover Seville, Cuesta took post in the defiles of
Monasterio, and was there joined by eight hundred horse and two
thousand three hundred infantry, drafted from the garrison of
Seville; these were followed by thirteen hundred old troops from
Cadiz; and finally, three thousand five hundred Grenadian levies,
and eight thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horsemen,
taken from the army of La Mancha, contributed to swell his numbers,
until, in the latter end of April, they amounted to twenty-five
thousand infantry, and about six thousand cavalry. General Venegas,
also, being recalled from Valencia, repaired to La Carolina, and
proceeded to organize another army of La Mancha.
King Joseph, justly displeased at the false disposition made of
Lapisse’s division, directed that Alcantara should be immediately
re-occupied; but as this was not done without an action, which
belongs to another combination, it shall be noticed hereafter.
It is now proper to return to the operations on the Douro, so
intimately connected with those on the Guadiana, and yet so
differently conducted.
CHAPTER IV.
When the bishop of Oporto beheld, from his station at Sarea, the
final overthrow of his ambitious schemes in the north of Portugal,
he fled to Lisbon. There he reconciled himself to the regency,
became a member of that body, and was soon after created patriarch;
and, as I shall have occasion to shew, used his great influence in
the most mischievous manner; discovering, on every occasion, the
untamed violence and inherent falseness of his disposition.
Meanwhile, the fall of Oporto enabled marshal Soult to establish
a solid base of operations, and to commence a regular system of
warfare. The immediate fruit of his victory was the capture of
immense magazines of powder, and a hundred and ninety-seven pieces
of artillery, every gun of which had been used in the action.
Thirty English vessels, wind-bound in the river, and loaded with
wine and provisions for a month, also fell into his hands.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.]
Having repressed the disorders attendant on the battle, he adopted
the same conciliatory policy which had marked his conduct at
Chaves and Braga; and endeavoured to remedy, as far as it was
possible, the deplorable results of the soldiers’ fury. Recovering
and restoring a part of the plunder, he caused the inhabitants
remaining in the town to be treated with respect; and invited, by
proclamation, all those who had fled to return. He demanded no
contribution; and, restraining with a firm hand the violence of his
men, contrived, from the captured public property, to support the
army, and even to succour the poorest and most distressed of the
population.
Soult’s ability in the civil and political administration of
the Entre Minho e Douro produced an effect which he was not
prepared for. The prince regent’s desertion of the country was
not forgotten. The national feeling was as adverse to Portugal
being a dependency on the Brazils as it was to the usurpation of
the French, and the comparison between Soult’s government and the
horrible anarchy which preceded it was all in favour of the former.
His victories, and the evident vigour of his character, contrasted
with the apparent supineness of the English, promised permanency
for the French power; and the party, formerly noticed as being
inimical to the house of Braganza, revived.
The leaders, thinking this a favourable opportunity to execute
their intention, waited upon the duke of Dalmatia, and expressed
their desire for a French prince and an independent government.
They even intimated their good wishes towards the duke himself, and
demanded his concurrence and protection; while, in the name of the
people, they declared that the Braganza dynasty was at an end.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.]
Although unauthorized by the emperor to accede to this proposition,
Soult was yet unwilling to reject a plan from which he could draw
such immediate and important military advantages. Napoleon was
not a man to be lightly dealt with on such an occasion; but the
marshal, trusting that circumstances would justify him, encouraged
the design, and, appointing men to civil employments, raised
a Portuguese legion of five battalions. He acted with so much
dexterity that, in fifteen days, the cities of Oporto and Braga,
and the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Povoa de Barcim,
Feira, and Ovar, sent addresses, containing the expression of their
sentiments, and bearing the signatures of thirty thousand persons,
as well of the nobles, clergy, and merchants, as of the people.
These addresses were burnt when the French retreated from Oporto;
but the fact that such a project was in agitation has never been
denied. The regency even caused inquest to be made on the matter;
and it was then asserted that very few persons were found to be
implicated. That many of the signatures were forged by the leaders
may readily be believed; but the policy of lessening the importance
of the affair is also evident; and the inquisitors, if willing,
could not have probed it to the bottom.
[Sidenote: Rovigo’s Memoirs.]
This transaction formed the ground-work of a tale generally
credited, even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed
at an independent crown; and the circumstances were certainly such
as might create suspicion. That the conclusion was false, is,
however, proved, by the mode in which Napoleon treated both the
rumour and the subject of it. Slighting the former, he yet made
known to his lieutenant that it had reached his ears, adding, “_I
remember nothing but Austerlitz_,”[5] and at the same time largely
increased the duke of Dalmatia’s command.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
The policy of Soult’s conduct on this occasion, and the great
influence, if not the numbers of the Portuguese malcontents, were
abundantly proved by the ameliorated relations between the army
and the peasantry. The fierceness of the latter subsided; and even
the priests abated of their hostility in the Entre Minho e Douro.
The French soldiers were no longer assassinated in that province;
whereas, previous to this intrigue, that cruel species of warfare
had been carried on with infinite activity, and the most malignant
passions called forth on both sides.
Among other instances of Portuguese ferocity, and of the truculent
violence of the French soldiers, the death of colonel Lameth, and
the retaliation which followed, may be cited. That young officer,
when returning from the marshal’s quarters to his own, was waylaid,
near the village of Arrifana, and murdered; his body was then
stripped, and mutilated in a shocking manner. This assassination,
committed within the French lines, and at a time when Soult
enforced the strictest discipline, was justifiable neither by the
laws of war nor by those of humanity. No general could neglect
to punish such a proceeding. The protection due to the army, and
even the welfare of the Portuguese within the French jurisdiction,
demanded a severe example, for the violence of the troops had
hitherto been with difficulty restrained by their commander;
and if, at such a moment, he had appeared indifferent to their
individual safety; his authority would have been set at naught, and
the unmeasured and indiscriminating vengeance of an insubordinate
army executed.
Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the unhappy death
of a personal friend, Soult directed general Thomieres to march,
with a brigade of infantry, to Arrifana, and punish the criminals.
Thomieres was accompanied by a Portuguese civilian; and, after a
judicial inquiry, he shot five or six persons whose guilt was said
to have been proved; but it is also certain that the principal
actor, a Portuguese major of militia, and some of his accomplices,
escaped across the Vouga to colonel Trant; and the latter,
disgusted at their conduct, sent them to marshal Beresford. It
would also appear, from the statement of a peasant, that Thomieres,
or those under him, exceeded Soult’s orders; for, in that
statement, attested by oath, it is said that twenty-four innocent
persons were killed, and that the soldiers, after committing many
atrocious excesses, burnt the village.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.]
These details have been related partly because they throw a light
upon the direful nature of this contest, but chiefly because the
transaction has been adduced by other writers as proof of cruelty
in Soult, a charge not sustained by the facts of this case, and
belied by the general tenor of his conduct, which even his enemies,
while they attributed it to an insidious policy, acknowledged, at
the time, to be mild and humane. And now, having finished this
political digression, in which the chronological order of events
has been anticipated, I shall resume the narrative of military
operations at that part where the disorders attendant on the battle
of Oporto having been repressed, a fresh series of combinations
were commenced, not less important than those which brought the
French army down to the Douro.
The heavy blow struck on the 29th of March was followed up with
activity. The boat-bridge was restored during the night; and
the next day, the forts of Mazinho and St. Joa de Foz having
surrendered, Franceschi’s cavalry crossed the Douro, took post ten
miles in advance on the Coimbra road, and pushed patroles as far as
the Vouga river. To support this cavalry, general Mermet occupied
a position somewhat beyond the suburb of Villa Nova. Oporto itself
was held by three brigades. The dragoons of Lorge were sent to
Villa da Conde, a walled town, situated at the mouth of the Ave;
and general Caulaincourt was detached up the Douro to Penafiel,
with a brigade of cavalry, having orders to clear the valley of the
Tamega. Another brigade of cavalry was posted on the road leading
to Barca de Trofa, to protect the rear of the army; and general
Heudelet was directed to forward the hospitals from Braga to
Oporto, but to hold himself in readiness to open the communication
with Tuy.
These dispositions made, Soult had leisure to consider his general
position. The flight of the bishop had not much abated the hostility
of the people, nor relieved the French from their difficulties. The
communication with the Minho was still intercepted; the Tras os
Montes was again in a state of insurrection; and Sylveira, with a
corps of eight thousand men, not only commanded the valley of the
Tamega, but had advanced, after re-taking Chaves, into the Entre
Minho e Douro, and was posted between the Sierra de Catalina and the
Douro.
Lisbon, the ultimate object of the campaign, was two hundred miles
distant, and covered by a British army, whose valour was to be
dreaded, and whose numbers were daily increasing. A considerable
body of natives were with Trant upon the Vouga, and Beresford’s
force between the Tagus and the Mondego: its disorderly and weak
condition being unknown, appeared formidable at a distance.
The day on which the second corps, following the emperor’s
instructions, should have reached Lisbon was overpassed by
six weeks; and, as the line of correspondence with Victor was
uncertain, his co-operation could scarcely be calculated upon.
Lapisse’s division was yet unfelt as an aiding force; nor was it
even known to Soult that he still remained at Salamanca: finally,
the three thousand men expected from the Astorga country, under the
conduct of the marshal’s brother, had not yet been heard of.
On the other hand, the duke of Dalmatia had conquered a large and
rich city: he had gained the military command of a very fertile
country, from whence the principal supplies of the British army and
of Lisbon were derived: he had obtained a secure base of operations
and a prominent station in the kingdom; and if the people’s
fierceness was not yet quelled, they had learned to dread his
talents, and to be sensible of their own inferiority in battle.
In this state of affairs, judging that the most important objects
were to relieve the garrison of Tuy and to obtain intelligence of
Lapisse’s division, Soult entrusted the first to Heudelet and the
second to Franceschi. The last-named general had occupied Feira and
Oliveira, and spread his posts along the Vouga; but the inhabitants
fled to the other side of that river, and the rich valleys beyond
were protected by colonel Trant.
This officer, well known to the Portuguese as having commanded their
troops at Roriça and Vimiero, was at Coimbra when intelligence of
the defeat at Braga arrived, and he immediately took the command
of all the armed men in that town, among which was a small body of
volunteers, students at the university. The general dismay and
confusion being greatly increased by the subsequent catastrophe at
Oporto, the fugitives from that town and other places, accustomed
to violence, and attributing every misfortune to treachery in the
generals, flocked to Trant’s standard; and he, as a foreigner, was
enabled to assume an authority that no native of rank durst either
have accepted or refused without imminent danger.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.]
He advanced, at first, with about eight hundred men to Sardao
and Aveiro, where he was joined by the conde Barbaceña with some
Portuguese cavalry, and by generals Victoria and Eben; but the
people regarded these officers with suspicion, and Trant continued
in the command, his force daily increasing by the arrival of
_ordenanzas_, and even by regular troops, who, quitting their
quarters, abandoned Beresford’s army to join him.
When Franceschi advanced, Trant sent a detachment by Castanheira
to occupy the bridge of the Vouga; but the men, seized with a
panic, dispersed, and this was followed by the desertion of many
thousand _ordenanzas_,--a happy circumstance, for the numbers that
had at first collected behind the Vouga exceeded twelve thousand
men, and their extreme violence and insubordination excited the
utmost terror, and impeded the measures necessary for defence.
Trant, finally, retained about four thousand men, with which he
imposed upon the French, and preserved a fruitful country from
their incursions; but he was greatly distressed for money, because
the bishop of Oporto, in his flight, laid hands on all that was at
Coimbra and carried it to Lisbon.
Franceschi, although reinforced with a brigade of infantry,
contented himself with chasing some insurgents that infested his
left flank, while his patroles and scouts, sent forward on the side
of Viseu, endeavoured to obtain information of Lapisse’s division;
but that general, as we have seen, was still beyond the Agueda, and
while Franceschi was thus employed in front of the French army,
Caulaincourt’s cavalry on the Tamega was pressed by the Portuguese,
and Loison marched with a brigade of infantry to his assistance on
the 9th of April.
Sylveira, however, was too strong for both; and, on the 12th,
advancing from Canavezes, obliged Loison, after a slight action, to
take post behind the Souza.
Meanwhile, Heudelet was hastening towards Tuy to recover the
artillery and depôts, from which the army had now been separated
forty days.
The 6th of April, general Lorge, who had taken Villa de Conde
and cleared the coast, joined Heudelet at Bacellos. The 7th they
marched to Ponte de Lima; but the Portuguese resisted the passage
vigourously, and it was not forced until the 8th.
The 10th the French arrived in front of Valença, on the Minho;
this fortress had been maltreated by the fire from Tuy, and the
garrison, amounting to two hundred men, having only two days’
provisions, capitulated, on condition of being allowed to retire
to their homes; but, before the French could take possession, the
capitulating troops disbanded and the town was deserted.
The garrison in Tuy, never having received the slightest
intelligence of the army since the separation at Ribidavia,
marvelled that the fire from Valença was discontinued; and their
surprise was extreme when they beheld the French colours flying
in that fort, and observed French videttes on the left bank of the
Minho.
La Martiniere’s garrison, by the arrival of stragglers and a
battalion of detachments that followed the army from St. Jago,
had been increased to three thousand four hundred men; but twelve
hundred were in hospital, and two-thirds of the artillery-horses
had been eaten in default of other food. The Portuguese had passed
the Minho, and, in conjunction with the Spaniards, attacked the
place on the 15th of March; but the French general, by frequent
sallies, obliged them to keep up a distant blockade, and his fire
mastered that from Valença.
The 22d of March, the defeat at Braga being known, the Portuguese
repassed the Minho, the Spaniards dispersed, and La Martiniere
immediately sent three hundred men to bring off the garrison of
Vigo; but it was too late, that place was taken, and the detachment
with difficulty regained Tuy.
The peasants on the Arosa Estuary had, as I have before noticed,
risen, the 27th of February, while Soult was still at Orense; they
were headed, at first, by general Silva and by the count de Mezeda,
and, finally, a colonel Barrois, sent by the central junta, took
the command. As their numbers were very considerable, Barrois with
one part attacked Tuy; and Silva assisted by the Lively and Venus,
British frigates on that station, invested Vigo.
The garrison of the latter place was at first small; but the
paymaster-general of the second corps, instead of proceeding to
Tuy, entered Vigo, with the military chest and an escort of eight
hundred men, and was blockaded there. After some slight attacks had
been repulsed, the French governor negotiated for a capitulation
on the 23d of March; but, distrustful of the peasantry, he was
still undecided on the 26th. Meanwhile, some of Romana’s stragglers
coming from the Val des Orres, collected between Tuy and Vigo; and
don Pablo Murillo, a regular officer, assembling fifteen hundred
retired soldiers, joined the blockading force, and, in concert with
Captain Mackinley, of the Lively, obliged the garrison to surrender
on terms.
[Sidenote: Captain Mackinley’s Despatch.]
The 27th, thirteen hundred men and officers, including three
hundred sick, marched out with the honours of war; and, having laid
down their arms on the glacis, were embarked for an English port,
according to the articles agreed upon. Four hundred and forty-seven
horses, sixty-two covered waggons, some stores, and the military
chest, containing five thousand pounds, fell into the victor’s
hands; and this affair being happily terminated, the Spaniards
renewed their attack on Tuy: the Portuguese once more crossed the
Minho, and the siege continued until the 10th of April, when the
place was relieved by Heudelet. The depôts and the artillery were
immediately transported across the river, and directed upon Oporto.
The 12th, general Maucune, with a division of the sixth corps,
arrived at Tuy, with the intention of carrying off the garrison,
but seeing that the place was relieved, returned the next day.
Heudelet, having taken Viana, and the fort of Insoa, at the mouth
of the Minho, placed a small garrison in the former; and then
blowing up the works of Valença, retired to Braga and Bacellos,
sending Lorge again to Villa de Conde.
The sick men were transported in boats along shore, from the mouth
of the Minho to Viana, Villa de Conde, and thence to Oporto;
and while these transactions were taking place on the Minho, La
Houssaye, with a brigade of dragoons and one of infantry, scoured
the country between the Lima and the Cavado, and so protected the
rear of Heudelet.
All resistance in the Entre Minho e Douro now ceased; for, at this
period, the influence of the _Anti-Braganza_ party was exerted in
favour of the French. But on the Tras os Montes side, Sylveira
being joined by general Boteilho, from the Lima, was advancing,
and boasted that he would be in Oporto the 15th: and now, also,
intelligence of the recapture of Chaves reaching Soult, not only
explained Sylveira’s boldness, but shewed, that, while the latter
was in arms, the tranquillity of the Entre Minho e Douro could be
only momentary. Wherefore, Laborde, with a brigade of infantry,
was ordered to join Loison, and attack Amarante; while La Houssaye
pushed through Guimaraens upon the same point.
The 15th, Laborde reached Penafiel; and Sylveira, hearing of La
Houssaye’s march, retired to Villamea. The 18th, Laborde drove back
the Portuguese without difficulty; and their retreat soon became
a flight. Sylveira himself passed the Tamega at Amarante, and was
making for the mountains, without a thought of defending that town;
but colonel Patrick, a British officer in the Portuguese service,
encouraging his battalion, faced about, and rallying the fugitives,
beat back the foremost of the enemy. This becoming act obliged
Sylveira to return; and while Patrick defended the approaches to
the bridge on the right bank with obstinate valour, the former
took a position, with five or six thousand men, on the heights
overhanging the suburb of Villa Real, on the left bank of the river.
The 19th, La Houssaye arrived; and the French renewing their attack
on the town, Patrick again baffled their efforts; but when that
gallant man fell mortally wounded, and was carried across the
bridge, the defence slackened, and the Portuguese went over the
Tamega: the passage of the river was, however, still to be effected.
The bridges of Mondin and Cavez above, and that of Canavezas below
Amarante, were destroyed: the Tamega was in full flood, and running
in a deep rocky bed; and the bridge in front of the French was
mined, barred with three rows of pallisades, and commanded by a
battery of ten guns. The Portuguese were in position on the heights
behind; from whence they could discern all that was passing at the
bridge, and could reinforce at will the advanced guard, which was
posted in the suburb.
PASSAGE OF THE TAMEGA, AT AMARANTE.
The 20th, the first barricade was reached by the flying sap; but
the fire of the Portuguese was so deadly, that Laborde abandoned
the attack, and endeavoured to construct a bridge on tressels
half a mile below: this failed, and the efforts against the stone
bridge were of necessity renewed. The mine at the other side
was ingeniously formed; the muzzle of a loaded musket entered
the chamber, and a string being tied at one end to the trigger,
the other end was brought behind the entrenchments, so that an
explosion could be managed with the greatest precision as to time.
[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.]
The 27th, the centre barricade was burnt by captain Brochard, an
engineer officer, who devised a method of forcing the passage, so
singularly bold, that all the generals, and especially general Foy,
were opposed to it. The plan was, however, transmitted to Oporto;
and Soult sent general Hulot, his first aide-de-camp, to report if
the project was feasible. Hulot approved of Brochard’s proposal,
and the latter commenced his operations on the 2d of May.
The troops were under arms, and disposed in the most convenient
manner, as near the head of the bridge as the necessity of keeping
them hidden would permit; and at eight o’clock, all being prepared,
and the moon shining bright, twenty men were sent a little below
the bridge, and directed to open an oblique fire of musketry
against the entrenchments. This being replied to, and the attention
of the Portuguese attracted, a sapper, dressed in dark grey,
crawled out, and pushed with his head a barrel of powder, which was
likewise enveloped in grey cloth to deaden the sound, along that
side of the bridge which was darkened by the shadow of the parapet:
when he had placed his barrel against the entrenchment covering the
Portuguese mine, he retired in the same manner. Two others followed
in succession, and retired without being discovered; but the
fourth, after placing the barrel, rose on his feet and ran back,
but was immediately shot at and wounded.
The fire of the Portuguese was now directed on the bridge itself;
but as the barrels were not discovered, after a time it ceased;
and a fifth sapper advancing like the others, attached a sausage
seventy yards long to the barrels. At two o’clock in the morning
the whole was completed; and as the French kept very quiet, the
Portuguese remained tranquil and unsuspicious.
Brochard had calculated that the effect of four barrels exploding
together would destroy the Portuguese entrenchments, and burn the
cord attached to their mine. The event proved that he was right;
for a thick fog arising about three o’clock, the sausage was fired,
and the explosion made a large breach. Brochard, with his sappers,
instantly jumped on to the bridge, threw water into the mine, cut
away all obstacles, and, followed by a column of grenadiers, was at
the other side before the smoke cleared away. The grenadiers being
supported by other troops, not only the suburb, but the camp on
the height behind were carried without a check, and the Portuguese
dispersing, fled over the mountains.
The execution of captain Brochard’s bold, ingenious, and successful
project, cost only seven or eight men killed; while in the former
futile attempts above a hundred and eighty men, besides many
engineer and artillery officers, had fallen. It is, however, a
singular fact that there was a practicable ford near the bridge,
unguarded, and apparently unknown to both sides.
A short time after the passage of the Tamega, general Heudelet,
marching from Braga by Guimaraens, entered Amarante. Laborde
occupied the position abandoned by Sylveira, and detachments were
sent up the left bank of the river to Mondin: but Loison pursued
the fugitives to the heights of Villa Real and Mezamfrio. The
Portuguese guarding the passage at Canavezas, hearing of the
action, destroyed their ammunition, and retired across the Douro
without being overtaken.
The 6th of May, the French were near Villa Real and Mezamfrio,
but all the inhabitants had crossed the Douro. This being made
known to Soult, he reinforced Loison, and directed him to scour
the right bank of the Douro as high as Pezo de Ragoa; to complete
the destruction of Sylveira’s army, and to send patroles towards
Braganza, with the view of subduing the Tras os Montes, and of
ascertaining if any French troops had made their appearance there;
for Bessieres had been requested to make a diversion on that side.
Bessieres himself had returned to France, but the reply of his
successor Kellerman being intercepted, it appeared that he was
unable or unwilling to afford any aid.
General Laborde was now recalled, with two regiments of infantry,
to Oporto; and the communication between that town and Amarante
was guarded by a brigade of dragoons, and a regiment of infantry.
Meanwhile, Loison felt the Portuguese at Pezo de Ragoa, on the
7th of May; but, meeting resistance, and observing a considerable
movement on the opposite bank of the Douro, he became alarmed, and
fell back the same day to Mezamfrio. The next morning he returned
to Amarante, his march being harassed by the peasantry, who came
on with a boldness shewing that some extraordinary support was at
hand; and, in truth, a new actor had appeared upon the scene; the
whole country was in commotion; and Soult, suddenly checked in his
career, was pushed backward by a strong and eager hand.
OBSERVATIONS.--SPANISH OPERATION.
1º.--The great pervading error of the Spaniards in this campaign
was the notion that their armies were capable of taking the lead in
offensive movements, and fighting the French in open countries;
whereas, to avoid general actions should have been a vital
principle.
2º.--The resolution to fight the French having, however, been
adopted, the second great error was the attaching equal importance
to the lines of operation in La Mancha and Estremadura; the one
should have been considered only as an accessory; and it is evident
that the first rank belonged to La Mancha, because it was in a more
open country; because it more immediately threatened Madrid; and
because a defeat there endangered Seville more than a defeat in
Estremadura would have done. In La Mancha the beaten army must have
fallen back upon Seville: but in Estremadura it might retire upon
Badajos. But, the latter place being to the Spaniards of infinitely
less importance than Madrid was to their opponents, the lead in the
campaign must always have belonged to the army of La Mancha, which
could, at any time, have obliged the French to fight a battle in
defence of the capital.
The army of Estremadura might, therefore, have been safely reduced
to fifteen thousand men, provided the army of La Mancha had been
increased to forty or fifty thousand: and it would appear that,
with a very little energy, the junta could have provided a larger
force. It is true that they would have been beaten just the same:
but that is an argument against fighting great battles, which was,
certainly, the worst possible plan for the Spaniards to pursue.
3º.--The third great error was the inertness of Valencia and
Murcia, or rather their hostility: for they were upon the verge
of civil war with the supreme junta. Those provinces, so rich
and populous, had been unmolested for eight months; they had
suffered nothing from Moncey’s irruption; and they had received
large succours from the English government. Valencia had written
her pretensions to patriotism in the bloody characters of
assassination; but, were it not for the force under Llamas which,
after the defeat of Tudela, helped to defend Zaragoza, Valencia
and Murcia might have been swallowed up by the ocean without any
sensible effect upon the general cause. Those countries were,
however, admirably situated to serve as a support to Aragon,
Catalonia, Andalusia, and La Mancha, and they could, at this time,
have paralyzed a large French force, by marching an army to San
Clemente.
[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.]
It was the dread of their doing so that made the king restrain
Sebastiani from pursuing his victory at Ciudad Real; and,
assuredly, the Valencians should have moved; for, it is not so much
in their numbers as in the variety of their lines of operation that
a whole people find their advantage in opposing regular armies.
This, the observation of that profound and original writer, general
Lloyd, was confirmed by the practice of Napoleon, in Spain.
FRENCH OPERATIONS.
1º.--To get possession of Seville and Cadiz was certainly as great
an object to Napoleon as to seize Lisbon: but the truth of the
maxim quoted above regulated the emperor’s proceedings. If Victor
had been directed at once upon Andalusia, the Portuguese and
Valencians could have carried their lines of operations directly
upon his flanks and rear. If Badajos and Lisbon had been the
objects of his march, the Andalusians could have fallen on his
left flank and cut his communications. But all such dangers were
avoided by the march of Soult and Lapisse; their direction was not
only concentric, but a regular prolongation of the great line of
communication with France. Ney protected the rear of one; Bessieres
the rear of the other; and those two marshals, at the same time,
separated and cut off the Asturias from the rest of Spain; thus,
all that was formidable was confined to the south of the Tagus.
For the same reason the course of conquest was to have proceeded
from Portugal to Andalusia, which would then have been assailed
in front and flank at one moment, while the fourth corps held the
Valencians in check. By this plan the French would never have
lost their central position, nor exposed their grand line of
communication to an attack.
2º.--That this plan, so wisely conceived in its general bearing,
should fail without any of the different corps employed having
suffered a defeat, nay, when they were victorious in all quarters
is surprising, but not inexplicable. It is clear that Napoleon’s
orders were given at a time when he did not expect that a battle
would have been fought at Coruña, or that the second corps would
have suffered so much from the severity of the weather, and the
length of the marches, neither did he anticipate the resistance
that was made by the Portuguese, between the Minho and the Douro.
The last error was a consequence of the first, for his plans were
calculated upon the supposition that the rapidity of Soult’s
movements would forestall all defence; yet the delay cannot be
charged as a fault to that marshal whose energy was conspicuous.
3º.--Napoleon’s attention, divided between Austria and Spain, must
have been somewhat distracted by the multiplicity of his affairs.
He does not seem to have made allowance for the very rugged country
through which Soult had to march, at a time when all the rivers
and streams were overflowing, from the constant rains; and as
the combinations of war are continually changing, the delay thus
occasioned rendered Lapisse’s instructions faulty: for, although it
be true, that if the latter had marched by Guardia, upon Abrantes,
while Soult advanced to Lisbon, by Coimbra, and that Victor
entered the Alemtejo, Portugal would have been conquered without
difficulty; yet the combination was so wide, and the communications
so uncertain, that unity of action could not be insured. Soult,
weakened by the obstacles he encountered, required reinforcements
after the taking of Oporto; and Lapisse should have considered
himself as rather belonging to Soult than Victor, and have marched
upon Viseu; the duke of Dalmatia would then have been strong enough
to fight his own battle without regard to the operations in the
Alemtejo.
4º.--The first error of the French, if the facts are correctly
shewn, must, therefore, be attributed to Napoleon, because he
overlooked the probable chances of delay, combined the operations
on too wide a scale, and gave Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, instead
of Lamego and Viseu, for the direction of Lapisse’s march. I say,
if the facts are correctly shewn, for it is scarcely discreet to
censure Napoleon’s military dispositions, however erroneous they
may _appear_ to have been, and it is certain that, in this case,
his errors, if errors they were, although sufficient to embarrass
his lieutenants, will not account for their entire failure. Above
sixty thousand men were put in motion by him, upon good general
principles, for the subjugation of Lisbon; and we must search
in the particular conduct of the generals for the reason why _a
project of Napoleon’s, to be executed by sixty thousand French
veterans, should have ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had
been concocted by the Spanish junta_.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPARATE OPERATIONS OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT,
ROMANA, SYLVEIRA, AND CUESTA.
LAPISSE.
1º.--An intercepted letter of general Maupetit, shews the small
pains taken by Lapisse to communicate with Soult. He directs that
_even so many_ as three hundred men should patrole towards Tras os
Montes, to obtain information of the second corps, at a time when
the object was so important that his whole force should have moved
in mass rather than have failed of intelligence.
2º.--The manner in which he suffered sir Robert Wilson to gather
strength and to insult his outposts was inexcusable. He might have
marched straight upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and dispersed
every thing in his front; one of those fortresses would probably
have fallen, if not both, and from thence a strong detachment
pushed towards Lamego would not only have ascertained the situation
of the second corps, but would have greatly aided its progress by
threatening Oporto and Braga. It cannot be urged that Salamanca
required the presence of a large force, because, in that open
country, the people were at the mercy of Bessiere’s cavalry; and
so sensible were the local junta of this, that both Salamanca
and Ledesma refused assistance from Ciudad Rodrigo, when it was
offered, and preferred a quiet submission.
3º.--When, at last, the king’s reiterated orders obliged Lapisse to
put his troops in motion, he made a demonstration against Ciudad
Rodrigo, so feeble that it scarcely called the garrison to the
ramparts, and then as if all chance of success in Portugal was at
an end, breaking through the pass of Perales, he reached Alcantara
and rejoined the first corps; a movement equally at variance with
Napoleon’s orders and with good military discretion; for the first
directed him upon Abrantes, and the second would have carried him
upon Viseu. The march to the latter place, while it insured a
junction with Soult, would not have prevented an after movement
upon Abrantes: the obstacles were by no means so great as those
which awaited him on the march to Alcantara, and the great error of
abandoning the whole country, between the Tagus and the Douro, to
the insurgents would have been avoided.
Here then was one direct cause of failure; but the error, although
great, was not irreparable. If Soult was abandoned to his own
resources, he had also obtained a firm and important position
in the north, while Victor, reinforced by ten thousand men,
was enabled to operate against Lisbon, by the Alemtejo, more
efficaciously than before. But Victor seems to have been less
disposed than Lapisse to execute his instructions.
VICTOR.
1º.--The inactivity of this marshal after the rout of Ucles has
been already mentioned. It is certain that if the fourth and first
corps had been well handled, neither Cuesta nor Cartoajal could
have ventured beyond the defiles of the Sierra Morena, much
less have bearded the French generals and established a line of
defence along the Tagus. Fifty thousand French troops should, in
two months, have done something more than maintain fifty miles of
country on one side of Madrid.
2º.--The passage of the Tagus was successful, but can hardly be
called a skilful operation, unless the duke of Belluno calculated
upon the ignorance of his adversary. Before an able general and a
moveable army, possessing a pontoon train, it would have scarcely
answered to separate the troops in three divisions on an extent
of fifty miles, leaving the artillery and parc of ammunition,
protected only by some cavalry and one battalion of infantry,
within two hours march of the enemy, for three days. If Cuesta had
brought up all his detachments, the Meza d’Ibor might have been
effectually manned, and yet ten thousand infantry, and all the
Spanish cavalry, spared to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, on the 17th;
in this case Victor’s artillery would probably have been captured,
and his project certainly baffled.
3º.--The passage of the Tagus being, however, effected, Victor
not only permitted Cuesta to escape, but actually lost all traces
of his army, an evident fault not to be excused by pleading
the impediments arising from the swelling of the river, the
necessity of securing the communications, &c. If Cuesta’s power
was despised before the passage of the river, when his army was
whole and his position strong, there could be no reason for such
great circumspection after his defeat, a circumspection, too, not
supported by skill, as the dispersed state of the French army, the
evening before the battle of Medellin, proves.
4º.--That Victor was enabled to fight Cuesta, on the morning of
the 28th, with any prospect of success, must be attributed rather
to fortune than to talent. It was a fault to permit the Spaniards
to retake the offensive after the defeat on the Tagus; nor can the
first movement of the duke of Belluno in the action be praised. He
should have marched into the plain in a compact order of battle.
The danger of sending Lassalle and Latour Maubourg to such a
distance from the main body I shall have occasion to show in my
observations on Cuesta’s operations; but, the after-movements
of the French in this battle were well and rapidly combined and
vigorously executed, and the success was proportionate to the
ability displayed.
5º.--The battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, which utterly
destroyed the Spanish armies and laid Seville and Badajos open;
those battles, in which blood was spilt like water, produced no
result to the victors, for the French generals, as if they had
struck a torpedo, never stretched forth their hands a second time.
Sebastiani, indeed, wished to penetrate the Sierra Morena; but the
king, fearful of the Valencians, restrained him. On the other hand,
Joseph urged Victor to invade the Alemtejo, yet the latter would
not obey, even when reinforced by Lapisse’s division. This was the
great and fatal error of the whole campaign, for nearly all the
disposable British and Portuguese troops were thus enabled to move
against the duke of Dalmatia, while the duke of Belluno contrived
neither to fulfil the instructions of Napoleon, nor the orders of
the king, nor yet to perform any useful achievement himself.
He did not assist the invasion of Portugal, he did not maintain
Estremadura, he did not take Seville, nor even prevent Cuesta
from twice renewing the offensive; yet he remained in an
unhealthy situation until he lost more men, by sickness, than
would have furnished three such battles as Medellin. Two months
so unprofitably wasted by a general, at the head of thirty
thousand good troops, can scarcely be cited. The duke of Belluno’s
reputation has been too hardly earned to attribute this inactivity
to want of talent. That he was averse to aid the operations of
marshal Soult is evident, and, most happily for Portugal, it was
so; but, whether this aversion arose from personal jealousy, from
indisposition to obey the king, or from a mistaken view of affairs,
I have no means of judging.
CUESTA.
Cuesta’s peculiar unfitness for the lead of an army has been
remarked more than once. It remains to show that his proceedings,
on this occasion, continued to justify those remarks.
1º.--To defend a river, on a long line, is generally hopeless, and
especially when the defenders have not the means of passing freely,
in several places, to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal,
Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, and hundreds of
others have shown how the passage of rivers may be won. Umenes, who
prevented Antigonus from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps, the
only example of a general baffling the efforts of a skilful and
enterprising enemy in such an attempt.
2º.--The defence of rivers having always proved fruitless, it
follows that no general should calculate upon success, and that he
should exert the greatest energy, activity, and vigilance to avoid
a heavy disaster; that all his lines of retreat should be kept
free and open, and be concentric; and that to bring his magazines
and depôts close up to the army, in such a situation, is rashness
itself. Now Cuesta was inactive, and, disregarding the maxim
which forbids the establishment of magazines in the first line of
defence, brought up the whole of his to Deleyton and Truxillo.
His combinations were ill-arranged; he abandoned Mirabete without
an effort, his depôts fell into the hands of the enemy, and his
retreat was confused and eccentric, inasmuch as part of his army
retired into the Guadalupe, while others went to Merida, and he
himself to Medellin.
3º.--The line of retreat upon Medellin and Campanarios, instead
of Badajos, being determined by the necessity of uniting with
Albuquerque, cannot be blamed, and the immediate return to
Medellin was bold and worthy of praise, but its merit consisted in
recovering the offensive immediately after a defeat; wherefore,
Cuesta should not have halted at Medellin, thus giving the lead
again to the French general; he should have continued to advance,
and have fallen upon the scattered divisions of the French
army, endeavouring to beat them in detail, and to rally his own
detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe. The error of stopping
short at Medellin would have been apparent, if Victor, placing a
rear-guard to amuse the Spanish general, had taken the road to
Seville by Almendralejos and Zafra.
4º. Cuesta’s general design for the battle of Medellin was well
imagined, that is, it was right to hide his army behind the ridge,
and to defer the attack until the enemy had developed his force and
order of battle in the plain, but the execution was on the lowest
scale. If, instead of advancing in one long and weak line, without
a reserve, Cuesta had held the greatest part of his troops in solid
columns, and thrust them between Lassalle and Latour Maubourg’s
divisions, which were pushed out like horns from the main body
of the French, those generals would have been cut off, and the
battle commenced by dividing the French army into three unconnected
masses, while the Spaniards would have been compact, well in hand,
and masters of the general movements. Nothing could then have saved
Victor, except hard fighting; but Cuesta’s actual dispositions
rendered it impossible for the Spaniards to win the battle by
courage, or to escape the pursuit by swiftness.
5º. It is remarkable that the Spanish general seems never to have
thought of putting Truxillo, Guadalupe, Merida, Estrella, or
Medellin in a state of defence, although most if not all those
places had some castle or walls capable of resisting a sudden
assault. There was time to do it, for Cuesta remained unmolested,
on the Tagus, from January to the middle of March; and every
additional point of support thus obtained for an undisciplined army
would have diminished the advantages derived by the French from
their superior facility of movement. The places themselves might
have been garrisoned by the citizens and peasantry, and a week’s,
a day’s, nay, even an hour’s, delay was of importance to a force
like Cuesta’s, which, from its inexperience, must have always been
liable to confusion.
SOULT.
1º. The march of this general in one column, upon Tuy, was made
under the impression that resistance would not be offered;
otherwise, it is probable that a division of infantry and a brigade
of cavalry would have been sent from St. Jago or Mellid direct upon
Orense, to insure the passage of the Minho; and it seems to have
been an error in Ney, arising, probably, from the same cause, not
to have kept Marchand’s division of the sixth corps at Orense until
the second corps had effected an entrance into Portugal.
2º. Soult’s resolution to place the artillery and stores in Tuy,
and march into Portugal, trusting to victory for re-opening the
communication, would increase the reputation of any general. Three
times before he reached Oporto he was obliged to halt, in order to
fabricate cartridges for the infantry, from the powder taken in
battle; and his whole progress from Tuy to that city was energetic
and able in the extreme.
3º. The military proceedings, after the taking of Oporto, do not
all bear the same stamp. The administration of the civil affairs
appears to have engrossed the marshal’s attention; and his
absence from the immediate scene of action sensibly affected the
operations. Franceschi shewed too much respect for Trant’s corps.
Loison’s movements were timid and slow; and even Laborde’s genius
seems to have been asleep. The importance of crushing Sylveira
was obvious. Now, there is nothing more necessary in war than to
strike with all the force you can at once; but here Caulaincourt
was first sent, and being too weak, Loison reinforced him, and
Laborde reinforced Loison; and all were scarcely sufficient at
last to do that which half would have done at first; but the whole
of these transactions are obscure. The great delay that took
place before the bridge of Amarante; the hesitation and frequent
recurrence for orders to the marshal, indicate want of zeal, and a
desire to procrastinate, in opposition to Soult’s wishes. Judging
from Mr. Noble’s history of the campaign, this must be traced
to a conspiracy in the French army, which shall be touched upon
hereafter.
4º. The resistance made by the Portuguese peasantry was infinitely
creditable to their courage; but there cannot be a stronger proof
of the inefficacy of a like defence, when unsupported by good
troops. No country is more favourable to such a warfare than the
northern provinces of Portugal; the people were brave, and they
had the assistance of the organized forces under Romana, Sylveira,
Eben, and the bishop: yet we find, that Soult, in the very worst
season of the year, overcame all resistance, and penetrated to
Oporto, without an actual loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
of more than two thousand five hundred men, including the twelve
hundred sick, captured at Chaves.
ROMANA.
1º. Romana remained at Oimbra and Monterey, unmolested, from the
21st of January to the 6th of March; he had, therefore, time to
reorganise his forces, and he had, in fact, ten thousand regular
troops in tolerable order. He knew, on the 11th or 12th, that
Soult was preparing to pass the Minho, between Tuy and Guardia.
He knew, also, that the people of Ribidavia and Orense were in
arms; that those on the Arosa were preparing to rise; and that,
consequently, the French must, were it only from want of food,
break out of the contracted position they occupied, either by
Ribidavia and Orense, or by crossing the Minho, or by retreating to
St. Jago.
With these guides, the path of the Spanish general was as plain as
the writing on the wall; he was at the head of ten thousand regular
troops; two marches would have brought him to Ribidavia, in front
of which town he might have occupied a position close on the left
flank of the French, rallied all the insurgents about him, and have
organized a formidable warfare. The French durst not have attempted
the passage of the Minho while he was in front of Ribidavia; and if
they turned against him, the place was favourable for battle, and
the retreat open by Orense and Monterey; while the difficulty of
bringing up artillery would hamper the pursuit. On the other hand,
if Soult had retreated, that alone would have been tantamount to a
victory; and Romana would have been well placed to follow upon the
rear of the French, connecting himself with the English vessels of
war upon that coast as he advanced.
2º. So far from contemplating operations of this nature, Romana
did not even concentrate his force; but keeping it extended, in
small parties, along fifteen miles of country, indulged himself
in speculations about his enemy’s weakness, and the prospect of
their retreating altogether from the Peninsula; until he was roused
from his reveries, by finding his divisions beaten in detail,
and himself forced either to join the Portuguese with whom he
was quarrelling, or to break his promises to Sylveira and fly by
cross roads over the mountain on his right: he adopted the latter,
thus proving, that whatever might be his resources for raising an
insurrection, he could not direct one; and that he was, although
brave and active, totally destitute of military talent. At a
later period of the war, the duke of Wellington, after a long and
fruitless military discussion, drily observed, that either Romana
or himself had mistaken their profession. Time has since shewn
which.
SYLVEIRA.
1º. This Portuguese general’s first operations were as ill
conducted as Romana’s; his posts were too extended; he made no
attempt to repair the works of Chaves, none to aid the important
insurrection of Ribidavia; but these errors cannot be fairly
charged upon him, as his officers were so unruly, that they held
a council of war per force, where thirty voted for fighting at
Chaves, and twenty-nine against it; the casting voice being given
by the voter calling on the troops to follow him.
2º. The after-movement, by which Chaves was recaptured, whether
devised by Sylveira himself, or directed by marshal Beresford,
was bold and skilful; but the advance to Penafiel, while La
Houssaye and Heudelet could from Braga pass by Guimaraens, and
cut him off from Amarante, was as rash as his subsequent flight
was disgraceful. Yet, thanks to the heroic courage of colonel
Patrick, Sylveira’s reputation as a general was established among
his countrymen, by the very action which should have ruined him in
their estimation.
BOOK VIII.
CHAPTER I.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.]
It will be remembered that the narrative of sir John Cradock’s
proceedings was discontinued at the moment when that general,
nothing shaken by the importunities of the regency, the
representations of marshal Beresford, or the advice of Mr. Frere,
resolved to await at Lumiar for the arrival of the promised
reinforcements from England. While in this position, he made every
exertion to obtain transport for the supplies, remounts for the
cavalry, and draught animals for the artillery; but the Portuguese
government gave him no assistance, and an attempt to procure horses
and mules in Morocco proving unsuccessful, the army was so scantily
furnished that, other reasons failing, this alone would have
prevented any advance towards the frontier.
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The singular inactivity of Victor surprised Cradock, but did
not alter his resolution; yet, being continually importuned to
advance, he, when assured that five thousand men of the promised
reinforcements were actually off the rock of Lisbon, held a council
of war. All the generals were averse to marching on Oporto, except
Beresford, and he admitted that its propriety depended on Victor’s
movements. Meanwhile, that marshal approached Badajos; Lapisse came
down upon the Agueda, and Soult, having stormed Oporto, pushed his
advanced posts to the Vouga.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4, section 1.]
[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.]
A cry of treason then became general in Portugal, and both the
people and the soldiers evinced a spirit truly alarming. The
latter, disregarding the authority of Beresford, and menacing their
own officers, declared that it was necessary to slay a thousand
traitors in Lisbon; and the regiments in Abrantes even abandoned
that post, and marched to join Trant upon the Vouga. But, when
these disorders were at the worst, and when a vigorous movement
of Victor and Lapisse would have produced fatal consequences,
general Hill landed with about five thousand men and three hundred
artillery horses. Cradock, then, resolved to advance, moved thereto
chiefly by the representations of Beresford, who thought such a
measure absolutely necessary to restore confidence, to ensure the
obedience of the native troops, and to enable him to take measures
for the safety of Abrantes.
Thus, about the time that Tuy was relieved by the French, and that
Sylveira was attacked at Penafiel by Laborde, the English army was
put in motion, part upon Caldas and Obidos, part upon Rio Mayor;
and the campaign was actually commenced by Cradock, when that
general, although his measures had been all approved of by his
government, was suddenly and unexpectedly required to surrender
his command to sir Arthur Wellesley, and to proceed himself to
Gibraltar.
[Sidenote: Lord Londonderry’s Narrative.]
It would appear that this arrangement was adopted after a struggle
in the cabinet, and, certainly, neither the particular choice nor
the general principle of employing men of talent without regard
to seniority can be censured; nevertheless, sir John Cradock was
used unworthily. A general of his rank would never have accepted
a command on such terms; and it was neither just nor decent to
expose him to an unmerited mortification.
Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock assembled the army at
Leiria, and established his magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and
Peniché; but as the admiral fearing the difficult navigation at
that season, would not send victuallers to the latter place, the
magazines there were but scantily supplied. Meanwhile Lapisse made
way by Alcantara to Merida, the re-capture of Chaves became known,
and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os Montes took its full
spring. Trant’s force also increased on the Vouga, and Beresford,
who had succeeded in restoring order among the Portuguese
battalions, was more than ever urgent for an attack upon Soult; but
Cradock, unprovided with a due proportion of cavalry, unable to
procure provisions or forage, and fearful for the safety of Lisbon,
refused; and the 24th of April, hearing that his successor had
arrived, he resigned the command and repaired to Gibraltar.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 15.]
Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22d of April, and, on the 24th,
signified to the British ministers that, affairs being in the
condition contemplated by them, it was his intention to assume
the command of the army; a circumstance worthy of attention, as
indicating that the defence of Portugal was even then considered a
secondary object, and of uncertain promise. The deliverance of the
Peninsula was never due to the foresight and perseverance of the
English ministers, but to the firmness and skill of the British
generals, and to the courage of troops whom no dangers could daunt
and no hardships dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors
of the cabinet.
The unexpected arrival of a man known only as a victorious
commander created the greatest enthusiasm in Portugal. The regency
immediately nominated him marshal-general of their troops.
The people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence with
enthusiasm; and all those persons, whether Portuguese or British,
who had blamed sir John Cradock’s prudent caution, now anticipating
a change of system, spake largely and confidently of the future
operations: in truth, all classes were greatly excited, and an
undefined yet powerful sentiment that something great would soon be
achieved pervaded the public mind.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.]
Sir Arthur’s plans were, however, neither hastily adopted nor
recklessly hurried forward; like Cradock, he felt the danger
of removing far from Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo
frontier, and he anxiously weighed his own resources against those
at the enemy’s disposal. Not that he wavered between offensive
and defensive movements, for a general of his discernment could
not fail to perceive that, if the French were acting upon any
concerted plan, the false march of Lapisse to Merida had marred
their combinations, by placing a whole nation, with all its
fortresses and all its forces, whether insurgents, regular troops,
or auxiliaries, between the armies of Victor and Soult, and that
neither concert nor communication could longer exist between those
marshals.
Soult’s offensive strength, also, was evidently exhausted; he might
establish himself firmly in the provinces beyond the Douro, but
he could not, alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two
hundred miles, in a season when the waters were full, and through
a country tangled with rivers, mountains, and defiles. He could
not hope, with twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people
in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high reputation,
and nearly as numerous as his own; and, moreover, there were
discontents and conspiracy in his camp; and of this sir Arthur was
aware.
Soult alone, then, was no longer formidable to the capital; but
that which weakened him increased the offensive power of Victor,
who was now at the head of thirty thousand men, and might march
straight upon Lisbon, and through an open country, the only barrier
being the Tagus, a river fordable in almost all seasons. Such a
movement, or even the semblance of it, must perforce draw the
British and native armies to that side; and then Soult, coming down
to the Mondego, might, from thence, connect his operations with
Victor’s by the line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as
occasion offered.
Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign, the military resources
of the English general were,--
1º. His central position.
2º. His own British and German troops, about twenty-six thousand in
number; of which the present under arms, including sergeants,[6]
amounted to twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven hundred
horses and mules.
3º. The Portuguese troops of the line; of which there might be
organised and armed about sixteen thousand.
Nearly all these troops were already collected, or capable of
being collected in a short time, between the Tagus and Mondego;
and beyond the latter river, Trant and Sylveira commanded separate
corps; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the Tamega.
4º. The militia and the _ordenanzas_, which may be denominated the
insurgent force.
5º. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes,
Peniché, and Badajos.
6º. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and the free use of
the coast and river navigation for his supplies.
7º. The assistance of Cuesta’s army, which amounted to thirty
thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry; of which twenty-five
thousand were actually at or in front of the defile of Monasterio,
close to Victor’s posts. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s moral resources
were the high courage of his own troops; his personal popularity;
the energy of an excited people; a favourable moment; the
presentiment of victory; and a mind equal to the occasion.
In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor was best, because
he was the most dangerous neighbour to Portugal; because his defeat
would prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to
the Spaniards; and because the greatest body of troops could be
brought to bear against him.
On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, from whence the
chief supply of cattle for the army was derived; he was in
possession of the second city in the kingdom, where he was forming
a French party; the feelings of the regency and the people were
greatly troubled by the loss of Oporto; and their desire to regain
it was strongly expressed.
To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert operations with
Cuesta; but that general was ill disposed towards the British, and
to insure his co-operation would have required time, which could be
better employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, sir Arthur
Wellesley determined to attack the last-named marshal without
delay; intending, if successful, to establish a good system of
defence in the northern provinces: and then, in conjunction with
Cuesta, to turn his arms against Victor, hoping thus to relieve
Gallicia more effectually than by following the French into that
province.
The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the operations against
Soult, time was the principal object to be gained. If Victor came
fiercely on, he could not be stopped, but his course might be
impeded; his path could not be blocked, but it might be planted
with thorns: and to effect this, eight or ten thousand Portuguese
troops were immediately directed upon Abrantes and Santarem,
and two British battalions and two regiments of cavalry just
disembarked, marched to the same places, where they were joined by
three other battalions drafted from the army at Leiria.
A body of two thousand men, composed of a militia regiment and of
the Lusitanian legion, which remained near Castello Branco after
Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, were placed under the command
of colonel Mayne, and directed to take post at the bridge of
Alcantara, having orders to defend the passage of the river, and,
if necessary, to blow up the structure. At the same time, the
flying bridges at Villa Velha and Abrantes were removed, the
garrison of the latter place was reinforced, and general Mackenzie
was appointed to command all the troops, whether Portuguese or
British, thus distributed along the right bank of the Tagus.
These precautions appeared sufficient, especially as there was a
general disposition to believe the French weaker than they really
were. Victor could not, by a mere demonstration, shake the line
of defence. If he forced the bridge of Alcantara, and penetrated
by the sterile and difficult route formerly followed by Junot, it
would bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes; but Abrantes was
already capable of a short resistance, and Mackenzie would have had
time to line the rugged banks of the Zezere.
If, leaving Badajos and Elvas behind him, Victor should pass
through the Alemtejo, and cross the Tagus between Abrantes and
Lisbon, he was to be feared; but Cuesta had promised to follow
closely in the French general’s rear, and it was reasonable to
suppose that Mackenzie, although he might be unable to prevent the
passage of the river, would not suffer himself to be cut off from
the capital, where, having the assistance of the fleet, the aid of
the citizens, and the chance of reinforcements from England, he
might defend himself until the army could return from the Douro.
Moreover, Victor was eighteen marches from Lisbon; it was only by
accident that he and Soult could act in concert, while the allied
army, having a sure and rapid mode of correspondence with Cuesta,
was already within four marches of Oporto.
The main body of the allies was now directed upon Coimbra; and
four of the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated in the
British brigades. Marshal Beresford retained, under his personal
command, about six thousand native troops; Trant remained stedfast
on the Vouga; Sylveira on the Tamega; and sir Robert Wilson,
quitting the command of the legion, was detached, with a small
Portuguese force, to Viseu, where, hanging upon Franceschi’s left
flank, he also communicated with Sylveira’s corps by the way of
Lamego.
The difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions, which had
pressed so sorely on sir John Cradock, was now somewhat lessened.
The land transport was still scanty; and the admiral, dreading
the long shore navigation for large vessels, was without the
small craft necessary for victualling the troops by the coast;
but the magazines at Caldas were partly filled, and twenty large
country-boats being loaded with provisions, and the owners induced,
by premiums, to make the run, had put safely into Peniché and the
Mondego. In short, the obstacles to a forward movement, although
great, were not insurmountable.
Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coimbra the 2d of May. His army was
concentrated there on the 5th, in number about twenty-five thousand
sabres and bayonets; of which nine thousand were Portuguese, three
thousand Germans, and the remainder British. The duke of Dalmatia
was ignorant that the allies were thus assembled in force upon the
Mondego, but many French officers knew it, and were silent, being
engaged in a plot of a very extraordinary nature, and which was
probably a part of the conspiracy alluded to in the first volume
of this work, as being conducted through the medium of the princess
of Tour and Taxis.
The French soldiers were impatient and murmuring; their attachment
to Napoleon himself was deep and unshaken, but human nature shrinks
from perpetual contact with death; and they were tired of war. This
feeling induced some officers of high rank, serving in Spain, to
form a plan for changing the French government. Generally speaking,
these men were friendly to Napoleon personally; but they were
republicans in their politics, and earnest to reduce the power of
the emperor. Their project, founded upon the discontent of the
troops in the Peninsula, was to make a truce with the English
army, to elect a chief, and march into France with the resolution
to abate the pride of Napoleon, or to pull him from his throne.
The conspirators at first turned their eyes upon marshal Ney, but
finally resolved to choose Gouvion St. Cyr for their leader. Yet
it was easier to resolve than to execute. Napoleon’s ascendancy,
supported by the love and admiration of millions, was not to be
shaken by the conspiracy of a few discontented men: and, although
their hopes were not entirely relinquished until after Massena’s
retreat from Portugal in 1810, long before that period they
discovered that the soldiers, tired as they were of war, were
faithful to their great monarch, and would have slain any who
openly stirred against him.
The foregoing facts are stated on the authority of a principal
mover of the sedition; but many minor plots had cotemporary
existence, for this was the spring time of folly. In the second
corps, the conspirators were numerous, and, by their discourses
and their slow and sullen execution of orders, had continually
thwarted the operations of marshal Soult, yet without exciting
his suspicions; but, as he penetrated into Portugal, their
counteractions increased, and, by the time he arrived at Oporto,
their design was ripe for execution.
In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an Oporto merchant,
appeared at marshal Beresford’s head-quarters, with proposals from
the French malcontents. The latter desired to have an English
officer sent to them, to arrange the execution of a plan, which was
to be commenced by seizing their general, and giving him over to
the British outposts: a detestable project, for it is not in the
field, and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should concert the
overthrow of their country’s institutions, and although it would
be idle and impertinent in a foreigner to say how much and how
long men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive government,
there is a distinct and especial loyalty due from a soldier to his
general in the field; a compact of honour, which it is singularly
base to violate; and so it has in all ages been considered. When
the Argyraspides, or silver-shields of the Macedonians, delivered
their general, Eumenes, in bonds, to Antigonus, the latter,
although he had tempted them to the deed, and scrupled not to slay
the hero, reproached the treacherous soldiers for their conduct,
and, with the approbation of all men, destroyed them. Yet Antigonus
was not a foreign enemy, but of their own kin and blood.
An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the Portuguese service
reluctantly undertook the duty of meeting the conspirators, and
penetrated, by night, but in uniform, behind the French outposts,
by the lake of Aveiro or Ovar. He had previously arranged that
one of the malcontents should meet him on the water; the boats
unknowingly passed each other in the dark, and the Englishman
returned to Aveiro; but he there found John Viana, in company with
the adjutant-major, D’Argenton. The latter confirmed what Viana
had declared at Thomar; he expressed great respect for Soult, but
dwelt upon the necessity of removing him before an appeal could be
made to the soldiers; and he readily agreed to wait, in person,
upon Beresford, saying he was himself too strongly supported in the
French army to be afraid.
Marshal Beresford was then at Lisbon, and thither D’Argenton
followed; and, having seen him and sir Arthur Wellesley, and
remained five days in that capital, returned to Oporto. While at
Lisbon, he, in addition to his former reasons for this conspiracy,
stated that Soult wished to make himself king of Portugal; an error
into which he and many others naturally fell, from circumstances
that I have already noticed.
When sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra, D’Argenton appeared
again at the English head-quarters; but this time, by the order
of sir Arthur, he was conducted through bye-paths, and returned
convinced, from what he had seen and heard, that although the
allies were in force on the Mondego, many days must elapse
before they could be in a condition to attack Oporto. During his
absence, D’Argenton was denounced by general Lefebre, who was
falsely imagined to be favourable to the conspiracy; passports,
signed by admiral Berkely, which this unfortunate man, contrary
to sir A. Wellesley’s urgent recommendation, had insisted upon
having, completely proved his guilt; and Soult, until that moment,
without suspicion, beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned
beneath his feet: his firmness, however, did not desert him. He
offered D’Argenton pardon, and even reward, if he would disclose
the names of the other conspirators and relate truly what he
had seen of the English and Portuguese armies. The prisoner, to
save his life, readily told all that he knew of the British, but
sir A. Wellesley’s foresight had rendered that tale useless;
and with respect to his accomplices D’Argenton was immoveable.
Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, he even defied the
marshal’s power, and advised him, as the safest course, to adopt
the conspirators’ sentiments; nor was this boldness fatal to him
at the moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain the extent of the
danger, delayed executing him, and he effected his escape during
the subsequent operations.
He was not the only person who communicated secretly with the
British general; colonel Donadieu and colonel Lafitte were engaged
in the conspiracy. The latter is said to have had an interview with
sir Arthur, between the outposts of the two armies, and from the
first the malcontents were urgent that the movements of the allied
forces should be so regulated as to favour their proceedings; but
sir Arthur Wellesley, having little dependence upon intrigue,
sternly intimated that his operations could not be regulated by
their plots, and hastened his military measures.
Under the impression that Sylveira was successfully defending
the line of the Tamega, the British general at first resolved to
reinforce him by sending Beresford’s and sir Robert Wilson’s corps
across the Douro at Lamego, by which he hoped to cut Soult off from
Tras os Montes, intending, when their junction was effected, to
march with his own army direct upon Oporto, and to cross the Douro
near that town, by the aid of Beresford’s corps, which would then
be on the right bank. This measure, if executed, would, including
Trant’s, Wilson’s, and Sylveira’s people, have placed a mass of
thirty thousand troops, regulars and irregulars, between the Tras
os Montes and Soult, and the latter must have fought a battle under
very unfavourable circumstances, or have fallen back on the Minho,
which he could scarcely have passed at that season while pressed
by the pursuing army. But the plan was necessarily abandoned when
intelligence arrived that the bridge of Amarante was forced, and
that Sylveira, pursued by the enemy, was driven over the Douro.
The news of this disaster only reached Coimbra the 4th of May;
on the 6th, a part of the army was already in motion to execute
a fresh project, adapted to the change of affairs; and as this
eagerness to fall on Soult may appear to justify those who censured
sir J. Cradock’s caution, it may here be well to shew how far the
circumstances were changed.
When Cradock refused to advance, the Portuguese troops were
insubordinate and disorganized; they were now obedient and improved
in discipline.
Sir John Cradock had scarcely any cavalry; four regiments had since
been added.
In the middle of April, Cuesta was only gathering the wrecks of
his forces after Medellin; he was now at the head of thirty-five
thousand men.
The intentions of the British government had been doubtful;
they were no longer so. Sir John Cradock’s influence had been
restricted; but the new general came out with enlarged powers, the
full confidence of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank. His
reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind always
prone to magnify the future, whether for good or bad, combined
to give an unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him to
dictate at once to the regency, the diplomatists, the generals,
and the people; to disregard all petty jealousies and intrigues,
and to calculate upon resources from which his predecessor was
debarred. Sir Arthur Wellesley, habituated to the command of
armies, was moreover endowed by nature with a lofty genius, and a
mind capacious of warlike affairs.
CHAPTER II.
CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO.
After the victory at Amarante, Laborde was recalled to Oporto, but
a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry were left to keep
up the communication with Loison; and as the insurgent general
Bonthielo had reappeared on the Lima, general Lorge’s dragoons were
directed on that side. Mermet’s division was then pushed towards
the Vouga, and thus the French army was extended by detachments
from that river to the Tamega; and the wings separated by the Douro
and occupying two sides of a triangle, were without communication,
except by the boat-bridge of Oporto. It required three days,
therefore, to unite the army on its centre, and five days to
concentrate it on either extremity.
The situation of the allies was very different;--sir Arthur
Wellesley having, unknown to Soult, assembled the bulk of the
troops at Coimbra, commanded the choice of two lines of operation;
the one through Viseu and Lamego, by which, in four or five
marches, he could turn the French left, and cut them off from Tras
os Montes; the other by the roads leading upon Oporto, by which,
in two marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly, and in very
superior numbers, upon the enemy’s right, with a fair prospect of
crushing it between the Vouga and the Douro.
In taking the first of these two lines, which were separated
by the lofty ridges of the Sierra de Caramula, the march could
be covered by Wilson’s corps, at Viseu, and by Sylveira’s, near
Lamego. Along the second the movement could be screened by Trant’s
corps on the Vouga.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
The duke of Dalmatia’s dispositions were made in ignorance of sir
Arthur Wellesley’s position, numbers, and intentions. He was not
even aware of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible
that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond his own strength,
he already meditated to cross the Tamega, and then covered by that
river and the Douro, to follow the great route of Bragança, and so
enter the Salamanca country. It was in this view that Loison had
been directed to get possession of Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa,
and the march of Mermet was only intended to support Franceschi’s
retreat, when the army should commence its movement towards the
Tamega.
The 9th of May, D’Argenton was arrested; the film fell from
Soult’s eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at once
upon his view. Treason in his camp, which he could not probe, a
powerful enemy close in his front, the insurgents again active in
his rear, and the French troops scattered from the Vouga to the
Tamega, and from the Douro to the Lima, and commanded by officers,
whose fidelity was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the
conspiracy was unknown.
Appalling as this prospect was, the duke of Dalmatia did not quail
at the view. The general officers assured him of the fidelity of
the troops; and Loison was immediately ordered to keep Mezamfrio
and Ragoa, if he could, but, under any circumstances, to hold
Amarante fast. The greatest part of the guns and stores at
Oporto were at the same time directed upon the Tamega, and the
ammunition that could not be removed was destroyed. General Lorge
was commanded to withdraw the garrison from Viana, and to proceed
likewise to Amarante, and, while D’Argenton was closely, although
vainly, pressed to discover the names of the conspirators, Soult
prepared to execute his intended movement through the Tras os
Montes. But the war was coming on with a full and swift tide;
Loison, upon whose vigour the success of the operation depended,
was already giving way; sir Arthur Wellesley was across the Vouga,
and Franceschi and Mermet were struggling in his grasp.
The English general resolved to operate along both the routes
before spoken of, but the greater facility of supplying the troops
by the coast-line, and, above all, the exposed position of the
French right wing, so near the allies and so distant from succour,
induced him to make the principal attack by the high road leading
to Oporto.
The army was formed in one division of cavalry and three of
infantry, exclusive of Beresford’s separate corps.
The first division, consisting of two brigades of infantry and
twelve guns, was commanded by lieut.-general Paget.
The second, consisting of three brigades of infantry and six guns,
by lieut.-general Sherbrooke.
The third, consisting of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by
major-general Hill.
The cavalry by lieut.-general Payne.
The whole amounted to about fourteen thousand five hundred
infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns, of which
six were only three-pounders.
The 6th of May, Beresford, with six thousand Portuguese, two
British battalions, five companies of riflemen, and a squadron of
heavy cavalry, marched upon Lamego by the road of Viseu.
The 7th, the light cavalry and Paget’s division advanced towards
the Vouga by the Oporto road, but halted, on the 8th, to give
Beresford time to reach the Upper Douro, before the attack on the
French right should commence.
The 9th, they resumed their march for the bridge of Vouga, and, at
the same time, Hill’s division, taking the Aveiro road, the whole
reached the line of the Vouga river that evening; but Paget’s
division was not brought up until after dark, and then with
caution, to prevent the enemy’s guards from seeing the columns, the
intent being to surprise Franceschi the next morning.
That general, with all his cavalry, a regiment of Mermet’s
division, and six guns, occupied a village, about eight miles
beyond Vouga bridge, called Albergaria Nova; the remainder of
Mermet’s infantry were at Grijon, one march in the rear, and on the
main road to Oporto. Franceschi had that day informed Soult that
the allied forces were collecting on the Mondego, and that Trant’s
posts had closed upon the Vouga; but he was far from suspecting
that the whole army was upon the last river, although, from the
imprudent conversation of an English officer, bearing a flag of
truce, he had reason to expect an attack of some kind.
Sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan was partly arranged upon the suggestion
of the field-officer who had met D’Argenton. He had observed,
during his intercourse with the conspirators, that the lake of Ovar
was unguarded by the French, although it extended twenty miles
behind their outposts, and that all the boats were at Aveiro, which
was in possession of the allies. On his information it was decided
to turn the enemy’s right by the lake.
Accordingly, general Hill embarked, the evening of the 9th,
with one brigade, the other being to follow him as quickly as
possible. The fishermen looked on at first with surprise; but,
soon comprehending the object, they voluntarily rushed in crowds
to the boats, and worked with such a will that the whole flotilla
arrived at Ovar precisely at sunrise on the 10th, and the troops
immediately disembarked. That day, also, marshal Beresford, having
rallied Wilson’s corps upon his own, reached Pezo de Ragoa, and he
it was that had repulsed Loison, and pursued him to Amarante.
Both flanks of the French army were now turned, and at the same
moment sir Arthur, with the main body, fell upon Franceschi, for,
while the flotilla was navigating the lake of Ovar, the attempt
to surprise that general, at Albergaria Nova, was in progress.
Sherbrooke’s division was still in the rear; but general Cotton,
with the light cavalry, crossing the Vouga, a little after
midnight, endeavoured to turn the enemy’s left, and to get into his
rear; the head of Paget’s division, marching a little later, was to
pass through the defiles of Vouga, directly upon Albergaria, and
Trant’s corps was to make way between Paget’s division and the lake
of Aveiro.
This enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by petty events,
such as always abound in war. Sir Arthur Wellesley did not
perfectly know the ground beyond the Vouga; and, late in the
evening of the 9th, colonel Trant, having ascertained that an
impracticable ravine, extending from the lake to Oliveira de
Azemis, would prevent him from obeying his orders, passed the
bridge of Vouga, and carried his own guns beyond the defiles, in
order to leave the bridge clear for the British artillery and for
general Richard Stewart’s brigade.
Stewart was charged to conduct the guns through the defile; but
the task was difficult, several carriages broke down, and Trant’s
corps thus took the lead of Paget’s column, the march of which was
impeded by the broken gun-carriages. Meanwhile the cavalry, under
Cotton, were misled by the guides, and came, in broad daylight,
upon Franceschi, who, with his flank resting upon a wood, garnished
with infantry, boldly offered a battle that Cotton durst not, under
such circumstances, accept. Thus, an hour’s delay, produced by a
few trifling accidents, marred a combination that would have shorn
Soult of a third of his infantry and all his light cavalry, for it
is not to be supposed that, when Franceschi’s horsemen were cut
off, and general Hill at Ovar, Mermet’s division could have escaped
across the Douro.
When sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Albergaria with Paget’s
infantry, Franceschi was still in position, skirmishing with
Trant’s corps, and evidently ignorant of what a force was advancing
against him. Being immediately attacked, and his foot dislodged
from the wood, he retreated along the road to Oliveira de Azemis,
and was briskly pursued by the allied infantry; but, extricating
himself valiantly from his perilous situation, he reached Oliveira
without any serious loss; and continuing his march during the
night, by Feria, joined Mermet the next morning at Grijon.
Franceschi, in the course of the 10th, could see the whole of the
English army, including the troops with Hill; and it may create
surprise that he should pass so near the latter general without
being attacked: but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders, which
forbade him to act on the enemy’s rear; and those orders were wise
and prudent, because the principle of operating with small bodies
on the flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious; and, while the
number of men on the left of the Douro was unknown, it would have
been rash to interpose a single brigade between the advanced-guard
and the main body of the French. General Hill was sent to Ovar,
that the line of march might be eased, and the enemy’s attention
distracted, and that a division of fresh soldiers might be at hand
to follow the pursuit, so as to arrive on the bridge of Oporto pell
mell with the flying enemy. The soldier-like retreat of Franceschi
prevented the last object from being attained.
General Paget’s division and the cavalry halted the night of the
10th at Oliveira; Sherbrooke’s division passed the Vouga later
in the day, and remained in Albergaria. But the next morning the
pursuit was renewed, and the men, marching strongly, came up with
the enemy at Grijon, about eight o’clock in the morning.
COMBAT OF GRIJON.
The French were drawn up on a range of steep hills across the
road. A wood, occupied with infantry, covered their right flank;
their front was protected by villages and broken ground, but their
left was ill placed. The British troops came on briskly in one
column, and the head was instantly and sharply engaged. The 16th
Portuguese regiment, then quitting the line of march, gallantly
drove the enemy out of the wood covering his right, and, at the
same time, the Germans, who were in the rear, bringing their left
shoulders forward, without any halt or check, turned the other
flank of the French. The latter immediately abandoned the position,
and, being pressed in the rear by two squadrons of cavalry, lost a
few killed and about a hundred prisoners. The heights of Carvalho
gave them an opportunity to turn and check the pursuing squadrons;
yet, when the British infantry, with an impetuous pace, drew near,
they again fell back; and thus, fighting and retreating, a blow and
a race, wore the day away.
During this combat, Hill was to have marched by the coast-road
towards Oporto, to intercept the enemy’s retreat; but, by some
error in the transmission of orders, that general, taking the route
of Feria, crossed Trant’s line of march, and the time lost could
not be regained.
The British halted at dark, but the French, continuing their
retreat, passed the Douro in the night, and at two o’clock in the
morning the bridge was destroyed. All the artillery and baggage
still in Oporto were immediately directed along the road to
Amarante, and Mermet’s division without halting at Oporto followed
the same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having instructions
to secure all the boats, and vigilantly to patrole the right bank
of the Douro. Loison, also, whose retreat from Pezo de Ragoa was
still unknown, once more received warning to hold on by the Tamega
without fail, as he valued the safety of the army. Meanwhile the
duke of Dalmatia commanded all the craft in the river to be
secured, and, having placed guards at the most convenient points,
proposed to remain at Oporto during the 12th, to give time for
Lorge’s dragoons and the different detachments of the army to
concentrate at Amarante.
Soult’s personal attention was principally directed to the river
in its course _below_ the city; for the reports of his cavalry
led him to believe that Hill’s division had been disembarked at
Ovar from the ocean, and he expected that the vessels would come
round, and the passage be attempted at the mouth of the Douro.
Nevertheless, thinking that Loison still held Mesamfrio and Pezo
with six thousand men, and knowing that three brigades occupied
intermediate posts between Amarante and Oporto, he was satisfied
that his retreat was secured, and thought there was no rashness in
maintaining his position for another day.
The conspirators, however, were also busy; his orders were
neglected, or only half obeyed, and false reports of their
execution transmitted to him; and, in this state of affairs, the
head of the British columns arrived at Villa Nova, and, before
eight o’clock in the morning of the 12th, they were concentrated in
one mass, but covered from the view of the enemy by the height on
which the convent of Sarea stands.
The Douro rolled between the hostile forces. Soult had suffered
nothing by the previous operations, and in two days he could take
post behind the Tamega, from whence his retreat upon Bragança would
be certain, and he might, in passing, defeat Beresford, for that
general’s force was feeble as to numbers, and in infancy as to
organization; and the utmost that sir Arthur expected from it was
that, vexing the French line of march, and infesting the road of
Villa Real, it would oblige Soult to take the less accessible route
of Chaves, and so retire to Gallicia instead of Leon; but this
could not be, unless the main body of the allied troops followed
the French closely. Now, Soult, at Salamanca, would be more
formidable than Soult at Oporto, and hence the ultimate object of
the campaign, and the immediate safety of Beresford’s corps, alike
demanded that the Douro should be quickly passed. But, how force
the passage of a river, deep, swift, and more than three hundred
yards wide, while ten thousand veterans guarded the opposite bank?
Alexander the Great might have turned from it without shame!
The height of Sarea, round which the Douro came with a sharp elbow,
prevented any view of the upper river from the town; but the duke
of Dalmatia, confident that all above the city was secure, took
his station in a house westward of Oporto, whence he could discern
the whole course of the lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from
the summit of Sarea, the English general, with an eagle’s glance,
searched all the opposite bank and the city and country beyond it.
He observed horses and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and
the dust of columns as if in retreat, and no large body of troops
was to be seen under arms near the river. The French guards were
few, and distant from each other, and the patroles were neither
many nor vigilant; but a large unfinished building standing alone,
yet with a short and easy access to it from the river, soon fixed
sir Arthur’s attention.
This building, called the Seminary, was surrounded by a high stone
wall, which coming down to the water on either side, enclosed
an area sufficient to contain at least two battalions in order
of battle; the only egress being by an iron gate opening on the
Vallonga road. The structure itself commanded every thing in its
neighbourhood, except a mound, within cannon-shot, but too pointed
to hold a gun. There were no French posts near, and the direct
line of passage from the height of Sarea, across the river to the
building, being to the right hand, was of course hidden from the
troops in the town. Here, then, with a marvellous hardihood, sir
Arthur resolved, if he could find but one boat, to make his way, in
the face of a veteran army and a renowned general.
PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.
A boat was soon obtained; for a poor barber of Oporto, evading
the French patroles, had, during the night, come over the water
in a small skiff; this being discovered by colonel Waters, a
staff officer, of a quick and daring temper, he and the barber,
and the prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his aid, crossed
the river, and in half an hour returned, unperceived, with three
or four large barges. Meanwhile, eighteen or twenty pieces of
artillery were got up to the convent of Sarea; and major-general
John Murray, with the German brigade, some squadrons of the 14th
dragoons, and two guns, reached the Barca de Avintas, three miles
higher up the river, his orders being to search for boats, and to
effect a passage there also, if possible.
Some of the British troops were now sent towards Avintas, to
support Murray; while others came cautiously forwards to the brink
of the river. It was ten o’clock; the enemy were tranquil and
unsuspicious; and an officer reported to sir Arthur Wellesley that
one boat was brought up to the point of passage, “_Well, let the
men cross_,” was the reply; and upon this simple order, an officer
and twenty-five soldiers, of the Buffs, entered the vessel, and in
a quarter of an hour were in the midst of the French army.
The Seminary was thus gained without any alarm being given, and
every thing was still quiet in Oporto: not a movement was to be
seen; not a hostile sound was to be heard: a second boat followed
the first, and then a third passed a little higher up the river;
but scarcely had the men from the last landed, when a tumultuous
noise of drums and shouts arose in the city; confused masses of the
enemy were seen hurrying forth in all directions, and throwing out
clouds of skirmishers, who came furiously down upon the Seminary.
The citizens were descried gesticulating vehemently, and making
signals from their houses; and the British troops instantly crowded
to the bank of the river; Paget’s and Hill’s divisions at the point
of embarkation, and Sherbrooke’s where the old boat-bridge had been
cut away from Villa Nova.
Paget himself passed in the third boat, and, mounting the roof of
the Seminary, was immediately struck down, severely wounded. Hill
took Paget’s place; the musketry was sharp, voluble, and increasing
every moment as the number accumulated on both sides. The enemy’s
attack was fierce and constant; his fire augmented faster than
that of the British, and his artillery, also, began to play on
the building. But the English guns, from the convent of Sarea,
commanded the whole enclosure round the Seminary, and swept the
left of the wall in such a manner as to confine the French assault
to the side of the iron gate. Murray, however, did not appear;
and the struggle was so violent, and the moment so critical,
that sir Arthur would himself have crossed, but for the earnest
representations of those about him, and the just confidence he had
in general Hill.
Some of the citizens now pushed over to Villa Nova with several
great boats; Sherbrooke’s people begun to cross in large bodies;
and, at the same moment, a loud shout in the town, and the waving
of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave notice that the enemy
had abandoned the lower part of the city; and now, also, Murray’s
troops were seen descending the right bank from Avintas. By this
time three battalions were in the Seminary; and Hill, advancing
to the enclosure wall, opened a destructive fire upon the French
columns as they passed, in haste and confusion, by the Vallonga
road. Five pieces of French artillery were coming out from the town
on the left; but, appalled by the line of musketry to be passed,
the drivers suddenly pulled up, and while thus hesitating, a volley
from behind stretched most of the artillery-men on the ground; the
rest, dispersing among the enclosures, left their guns on the road.
This volley was given by a part of Sherbrooke’s people, who, having
forced their way through the streets, thus came upon the rear. In
fine, the passage was won; and the allies were in considerable
force on the French side of the river.
To the left, general Sherbrooke, with the brigade of guards, and
the 29th regiment, was in the town, and pressing the rear of
the enemy, who were quitting it. In the centre, general Hill,
holding the Seminary and the wall of the enclosure, with the
Buffs, the 48th, the 66th, the 16th Portuguese, and a battalion
of detachments, sent a damaging fire into the masses as they
passed him; and his line was prolonged on the right, although with
a considerable interval, by general Murray’s Germans, and two
squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder of the army kept
passing the river at different points; and the artillery, from the
height of Sarea, still searched the enemy’s columns as they hurried
along the line of retreat.
If general Murray had then fallen boldly in upon the disordered
crowds, their discomfiture would have been complete; but he
suffered column after column to pass him, without even a cannon
shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into
the river. General Charles Stewart and major Hervey, however,
impatient of this inactivity, charged with the two squadrons of
dragoons, and rode over the enemy’s rear-guard, as it was pushing
through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond. Laborde was
unhorsed, Foy badly wounded; and, on the English side, major Hervey
lost an arm; and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from
Murray, were obliged to fight their way back with loss.
This finished the action; the French continued their retreat, and
the British remained on the ground they had gained. The latter lost
twenty killed, a general and ninety-five men wounded; the former
had about five hundred men killed and wounded, and five pieces
of artillery were taken in the fight; a considerable quantity of
ammunition, and fifty guns (of which the carriages had been burnt)
were afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred men were
captured in the hospitals.
[Illustration: _Plate 4. to face Pa. 290._
_Sketch Explanatory_
OF THE PASSAGE OF THE RIVER DOURO,
by
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
_May 12^{th}, 1809_,
AND OF THE STORMING OF OPORTO,
by
_MARSHAL SOULT_,
_March 1809_.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]
Napoleon’s veterans were so experienced, so inured to warfare
that no troops in the world could more readily recover from such a
surprise, and before they reached Vallonga their columns were again
in order, with a regular rear guard covering the retreat. A small
garrison at the mouth of the Douro was cut off, but, guided by some
friendly Portuguese, it rejoined the army in the night; and Soult,
believing that Loison was at Amarante, thought he had happily
escaped a great danger and was still formidable to his enemies.
Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of the 12th, and the
next day, in bringing over the rear of the army, together with the
baggage, the stores, and the artillery. General Murray’s Germans,
however, pursued, on the morning of the 13th, but not further than
about two leagues on the road of Amarante. This delay has been
blamed as an error in sir Arthur; it is argued that an enemy once
surprised should never be allowed to recover, and that Soult should
have been followed up, even while a single regiment was left to
pursue. But the reasons for halting were, first, that a part of the
army was still on the left bank of the Douro;--secondly, that the
troops had out marched provisions, baggage, and ammunition, and
having passed over above eighty miles of difficult country in four
days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, both
men and animals required rest; thirdly, that nothing was known of
Beresford, whose contemporary operations it is time to relate.
The moment of his arrival on the Douro was marked by the repulse
of Loison’s division, which immediately fell back, as I have
already related, to Mezamfrio, followed by the Portuguese patroles
only, for Beresford halted on the left bank of the river, because
the British regiments were still in the rear. This was on the
10th. Sylveira, who was at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards
Mezamfrio for the enemy, and the marshal’s force was thus, with the
assistance of the insurgents, in readiness to turn Soult from the
route of Villa Real to Bragança.
The 11th, Loison continued his retreat, and Beresford finding him
so timid, followed, skirmishing with his rear guard, and at the
same time Sylveira advanced from Villa Real. On the 12th, the
French outposts, in front of Amarante were driven in, and the 13th
Loison abandoned that town, and took the route of Guimaraens.
These events were unknown to sir Arthur Wellesley on the evening of
the 13th, but he heard that Soult, after destroying his artillery
and ammunition, near Penafiel, had passed over the mountain towards
Braga; and judging this to arise from Beresford’s operations on the
Tamega, he reinforced Murray with some cavalry, ordering him to
proceed by Penafiel, and if Loison still lingered near Amarante,
to open a communication with Beresford. The latter was at the same
time directed to ascend the Tamega, and intercept the enemy at
Chaves.
Meanwhile, the main body of the army marched in two columns upon
the Minho, the one by the route of Barca de Troffa and Braga, the
other by the Ponte d’Ave and Bacellos. But, on the evening of the
14th, the movements of the enemy about Braga gave certain proofs
that not Valença and Tuy, but Chaves or Montalegre, would be the
point of his retreat. Hereupon, the left column was drawn off
from the Bacellos road and directed upon Braga, and Beresford was
instructed to move by Monterey, upon Villa del Rey, if Soult took
the line of Montalegre.
The 15th, sir Arthur reached Braga. Murray was at Guimaraens
on his right, and Beresford, who had anticipated his orders,
was near Chaves, having sent Sylveira towards Salamonde, with
instructions to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and Melgassy. But
at this time Soult was fifteen miles in advance of Braga, having,
by a surprising effort, extricated himself from one of the
most dangerous situations that a general ever escaped from. To
understand this, it is necessary to describe the country through
which his retreat was effected.
I have already observed that the Sierra de Cabreira and the Sierra
de Catalina line the right bank of the Tamega; but, in approaching
the Douro, the latter slants off towards Oporto, thus opening a
rough but practicable slip of land, through which the road leads
from Oporto to Amarante. Hence, the French in retreating to the
latter town had the Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de
Catalina on their left.
Between Amarante, and Braga which is on the other side of the
Catalina, a route practicable for artillery, runs through
Guimaraens, but it is necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this
road. Thus, Soult, as he advanced along the narrow pass between
the mountains and the Douro, rested his hopes of safety entirely
upon Loison’s holding Amarante. Several days, however, had elapsed
since that general had communicated, and an aide-de-camp was sent
on the morning of the 12th to ascertain his exact position. Colonel
Tholosé, the officer employed, found Loison at Amarante, but
neither his remonstrances, nor the after coming intelligence that
Oporto was evacuated, and the army in full retreat upon the Tamega,
could induce that general to remain there, and, as we have seen, he
marched towards Guimaraens, on the 13th, abandoning the bridge of
Amarante, without a blow, and leaving his commander and two-thirds
of the army to what must have appeared inevitable destruction.
The news of this unexpected calamity reached Soult at one o’clock
on the morning of the 13th, just as he had passed the rugged banks
of the Souza river, the weather was boisterous, the men were
fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, and the
whole army was stricken with dismay. Then it was that the duke of
Dalmatia justified, by his energy, that fortune which had raised
him to his high rank in the world. Being, by a Spanish pedlar,
informed of a path that, mounting the right bank of the Souza, led
over the Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant,
silenced the murmurs of the treacherous or fearful in the ranks,
destroyed the artillery, abandoned the military chest and baggage,
and loading the animals with sick men and musket ammunition,
repassed the Souza, and followed his Spanish guide with a hardy
resolution.
The rain was falling in torrents, and the path was such as might
be expected in those wild regions, but the troops made good their
passage over the mountains to Pombeira, and, at Guimaraens, happily
fell in with Loison. During the night they were joined by Lorge’s
dragoons from Braga, and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole army
was concentrated.
[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.]
If Soult’s energy in command was conspicuous on this occasion, his
sagacity and judgement were not less remarkably displayed in what
followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route upon
Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a long reach of mind, calculated,
from the slackness of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the
bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be
there before him; or that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat
fighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison’s and
Lorge’s corps in the face of an enemy--a circumstance that might
operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly
give opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the
generals (apparently Loison) was recommending a convention like
Cintra.
But, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, Soult
destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and
ammunition of Loison’s and Lorge’s divisions; then, leaving the
high road to Braga on his left, and once more taking to the
mountain paths, he made for the heights of Carvalho d’Este, where
he arrived late in the evening of the 14th, thus gaining a day’s
march, in point of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up his
troops in the position he had occupied just two months before at
the battle of Braga; and this spectacle, where twenty thousand men
were collected upon the theatre of a former victory, and disposed
so as to produce the greatest effect, roused all the sinking pride
of the French soldiers. It was a happy stroke of generalship, an
inspiration of real genius!
Soult now re-organised his army; taking the command of the
rear-guard himself, and giving that of the advanced guard to
general Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says
“_the whole army was astonished_;” as if it was not a stroke of
consummate policy that the rear, which was pursued by the British,
should be under the general-in-chief, and that the front, which
was to fight its way through the native forces, should have a
commander whose very name called up all the revengeful passions
of the Portuguese. _Maneta durst not surrender_; and the duke of
Dalmatia dextrously forced those to act with most zeal who were
least inclined to serve him: and, in sooth, such was his perilous
situation, that all the resources of his mind and all the energy of
his character were needed to save the army.
From Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from whence there were two
lines of retreat. The one through Ruivaens and Venda Nova, by which
the army had marched when coming from Chaves two months before;
the other, shorter, although more impracticable, leading by the
Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road running from Ruivaens
to Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence that the bridge
of Ruivaens, on the little river of that name, was broken, and
defended by twelve hundred Portuguese, with artillery; and that
another party had been, since the morning, destroying the Ponte
Nova on the Cavado river.
The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves; the
second, if completed, and the passage well defended, would have
cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the
soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and starving; the ammunition
was damp with the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and
which was now increasing in violence, accompanied with storms of
wind. The British army would certainly fall upon the rear in the
morning; and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was reported to
be weak, could not be secured, the hour of surrender was surely
arrived.
In this extremity, Soult sent for major Dulong, an officer justly
reputed for one of the most daring in the French ranks. Addressing
himself to this brave man, he said, “I have chosen you from the
whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the
enemy. Do you choose a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen;
endeavour to surprise the guards, and secure the passage of the
bridge. If you succeed, say so, but send no other report; your
silence will suffice.” Thus exhorted, Dulong selected his men, and
departed.
Favoured by the storm, he reached the bridge unperceived of the
Portuguese, killed the centinel before any alarm was given, and
then, followed by twelve grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow
slip of masonry, which was the only part of the bridge undestroyed.
The Cavado river was in full flood, and roaring in a deep channel;
one of the grenadiers fell into the gulph, but the noise of the
storm and the river was louder than his cry; Dulong, with the
eleven, still creeping onwards, reached the other side, and falling
briskly on the first posts of the peasants, killed or dispersed
the whole. At that moment, the remainder of his men advanced close
to the bridge; and some crossing, others mounting the heights,
shouting and firing, scared the Portuguese supporting-posts, who
imagined the whole army was upon them; and thus the passage was
gallantly won.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.]
At four o’clock, the bridge being repaired, the advanced guards
of the French commenced crossing; but as the column of march was
long, and the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed over slowly;
and beyond the Ponte Nova there was a second obstacle still more
formidable. For the pass in which the troops were moving being cut
in the side of a mountain, open on the left for several miles, at
last came upon a torrent called the Misarella, which, breaking down
a deep ravine, or rather gulph, was only to be crossed by a bridge,
constructed with a single lofty arch, called the _Saltador_, or
leaper; and so narrow that only three persons could pass abreast.
Fortunately for the French, the _Saltador_ was not cut, but
entrenched and defended by a few hundred Portuguese peasants,
who occupied the rocks on the farther side; and here the good
soldier Dulong again saved the army: for, when a first and second
attempt had been repulsed with loss, he carried the entrenchments
by a third effort; but, at the same instant, fell deeply wounded
himself. The head of the column now poured over, and it was full
time, for the English guns were thundering in the rear, and the
Ponte Nova was choked with dead.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga on the morning of the 16th,
had come, about four o’clock, upon Soult’s rear-guard, which
remained at Salamonde to cover the passage of the army over the
bridges. The right was strongly protected by a ravine, the left
occupied a steep hill; and a stout battle might have been made,
but men thus circumstanced, and momentarily expecting an order to
retreat, will seldom stand firmly; and, on this occasion, when some
light troops turned the left, and general Sherbrooke, with the
guards, mounting the steep hill, attacked the front, the French
made but one discharge, and fled in confusion to the Ponte Nova. As
this bridge was not on the direct line of retreat, they were for
some time unperceived, and gaining ground of their pursuers, formed
a rear-guard; but, after a time, being discovered, some guns were
brought to bear on them; and then man and horse, crushed together,
went over into the gulph; and the bridge, and the rocks, and the
defile beyond were strewed with mangled bodies.
This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword upon the French
army in this retreat; a retreat attended by many horrid as well as
glorious events; for the peasants in their fury, with an atrocious
cruelty, tortured and mutilated every sick man and straggler that
fell into their power; and on the other hand, the soldiers, who
held together in their turn, shot the peasants; while the track
of the columns might be discovered from afar by the smoke of the
burning houses.
The French reached Montalegre on the 17th; and an English
staff-officer, with some cavalry, being upon their rear, as far
as Villella, picked up some stragglers; but sir Arthur, with the
main body of the army, halted that day at Ruivaens. The 18th he
renewed the pursuit, and a part of his cavalry passed Montalegre,
followed by the guards; the enemy was, however, drawn up behind the
Salas in force, and no action took place. Sylveira, indeed, had
entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, before the British
came up from Ruivaens; but instead of pursuing, he put his men
into quarters; and a Portuguese officer of his division, who was
despatched to marshal Beresford with orders to move from Villa
Perdrices upon Villa del Rey, loitered on the road so long, that
all chance of intercepting the French line of march was at an end;
for though Beresford, on the 19th, pushed colonel Talbot with the
14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi turned in force, and
obliged that officer to retire; and thus the pursuit terminated,
with the capture of a few stragglers on the Salas.
Soult himself crossed the frontier by Allaritz on the 18th; and on
the 19th entered Orense, but without guns, stores, ammunition, or
baggage; his men exhausted with fatigue and misery, the greatest
part being without shoes, many without accoutrements, and in some
instances even without muskets. He had quitted Orense seventy-six
days before, with about twenty-two thousand men, and three thousand
five hundred had afterwards joined him from Tuy. He returned with
nineteen thousand five hundred, having lost by the sword and
sickness, by assassination and capture, six thousand good soldiers;
of which number above three thousand were taken in hospitals,[7]
and about a thousand were killed by the Portuguese, or had died of
sickness, previous to the retreat. The remainder were captured, or
had perished within the last eight days. He had carried fifty-eight
pieces of artillery into Portugal, and he returned without a
gun; yet was his reputation as a stout and able soldier no wise
diminished.
[Illustration: _Plate 5. to face Pa. 300._
_Sketch Explanatory_
of the
OPERATIONS
between the
MINHO & DOURO,
_1809_.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]
OBSERVATIONS.
The duke of Dalmatia’s arrangements being continually thwarted
by the conspirators, his military conduct cannot be fairly
judged of. Nevertheless, the errors of the campaign may, without
injustice, be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing
them to their true sources.
1º. The disposition of the army, on both sides of the Douro, and
upon such extended lines, when no certain advice of the movements
and strength of the English force had been received, was rash. It
was, doubtless, right, that to clear the front of the army, and
to gather information, Franceschi should advance to the Vouga;
but he remained too long in the same position, and he should
have felt Trant’s force more positively. Had the latter officer
(whose boldness in maintaining the line of the Vouga was extremely
creditable) been beaten, as he easily might have been, the anarchy
in the country would have increased; and as Beresford’s troops at
Thomar wanted but an excuse to disband themselves, the Portuguese
and British preparations must have been greatly retarded.
[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.]
2º. That Soult, when he had secured, as he thought, all the boats
on an unfordable river three hundred yards wide, should think
himself safe from an attack for one day, is not wonderful. The
improbability that such a barrier could be forced in half an
hour might have rendered Fabius careless; but there were some
peculiar circumstances attending the surprise of the French army
which indicate great negligence. The commanding officer of one
regiment reported, as early as six o’clock, that the English were
crossing the river; the report was certainly premature, because
no man passed before ten o’clock; but it reached Soult, and he
sent general Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, to verify the fact.
Quesnel stated, on his return, and truly, that it was an error,
and Soult took no further precaution. The patroles were not
increased; no staff-officers appear to have been employed to watch
the river, and no signals were established; yet it was but three
days since D’Argenton’s conspiracy had been discovered, and the
extent of it was still unknown. This circumstance alone should have
induced the duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of his guards
and posts of observation, that the multiplicity of the reports
might render it impossible for the malcontents to deceive him. The
surprise at Oporto must, therefore, be considered as a fault in the
general, which could only be atoned for by the high resolution and
commanding energy with which he saved his army in the subsequent
retreat.
3º. When general Loison suffered marshal Beresford to drive him
from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a grave military
error; but when he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim
to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts will prove.
The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had
easily repulsed the whole of the enemy’s forces; yet he, although
at the head of six thousand men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery,
that night and without another shot being fired, abandoned the only
passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could
escape from its perilous situation with honour. It was not general
Loison’s fault if England did not triumph a second time for the
capture of a French marshal.
MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL.
1º. If sir Arthur Wellesley’s operation be looked at as a whole, it
is impossible to deny his sagacity in planning, his decision and
celerity in execution. When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was
dismayed by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and menaced
on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was already in
possession of the second city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days
he had restored public confidence; provided a defence against one
adversary; and having marched two hundred miles through a rugged
country, and forced the passage of a great river--caused his other
opponent to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage.
2º.--Such being the result, it is necessary to show that the
success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the talents
of the general; that he was quick to see, and active to strike;
and, first, the secresy and despatch with which the army was
collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; for, there were
many obstacles to overcome; and D’Argenton, as the sequel proved,
would, by his disclosures, have ruined sir Arthur’s combinations,
if the latter had not providently given him a false view of
affairs. The subsequent march from the Vouga to the Douro was, in
itself, no mean effort, for, it must be recollected, that this
rapid advance against an eminent commander, and a veteran army of
above twenty thousand men, was made with a heterogeneous force,
of which only sixteen thousand men were approved soldiers, the
remainder being totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle,
and, only three weeks before, were in a state of open mutiny.
3º.--The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, would, at first sight,
seem a rash undertaking; but, when examined closely, it proves to
be an example of consummate generalship, both in the conception
and the execution. The careless watch maintained by the French
may, indeed, be called fortunate, because it permitted the
English general to get a few men over unperceived; but it was not
twenty-five, nor twenty-five hundred, soldiers that could have
maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on the other side. Sir
Arthur, when he so coolly said--“_let them pass_,” was prepared
to protect them when they had passed. He did not give that order
until he knew that Murray had found boats at Avintas, to ferry
over a considerable number of troops, and, consequently, that
that general, descending the Douro, could cover the right flank
of the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights of Sarea
could sweep the left flank, and search all the ground enclosed by
the wall round the building. If general Murray’s troops only had
passed, they would have been compromised; if the whole army had
made the attempt at Avintas, its march would have been discovered;
but in the double passage all was secured: the men in the Seminary
by the guns, by the strength of the building, and by Murray’s
troops; the latter by the surprise on the town, which drew the
enemy’s attention away from them. Hence, it was only necessary
to throw a few brave men into the Seminary unperceived, and then
the success was almost certain; because, while that building was
maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither be
prevented nor harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by
simple means is the highest effort of genius!
4º.--If general Murray had attacked vigorously, the ruin of the
French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would
have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want
of military talent and of military hardihood; and how would it
have appeared if Loison had not abandoned Amarante? If Soult,
effecting his retreat in safety, and reaching Zamora or Salamanca
in good order, had turned on Ciudad Rodrigo, he would have found
full occupation for sir Arthur Wellesley in the north; and he would
have opened a free communication with the duke of Belluno. The
latter must, then, have marched either against Seville or Lisbon;
and thus the boldness and excellent conduct of the English general,
producing no adequate results, would have been overlooked, or,
perhaps, have formed a subject for the abuse of some ignorant,
declamatory writer.
5º.--Sir Arthur Wellesley’s reasons for halting at Oporto, the
13th, have been already noticed, but they require further remarks.
Had he followed Soult headlong, there is no doubt that the latter
would have been overtaken on the Souza river, and destroyed;
but this chance, arising from Loison’s wretched movements,
was not to be foreseen. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew nothing of
Beresford’s situation; but he naturally supposed that, following
his instructions, the latter was about Villa Real; and that,
consequently, the French would, from Amarante, either ascend the
Tamega to Chaves, or taking the road to Guimaraens and Braga, make
for the Minho. Hence, he remained where he could command the main
roads to that river, in order to intercept Soult’s retreat and
force him to a battle; whereas, if he had once entered the defile
formed by the Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, he could only have
followed his enemy in one column by a difficult route, a process
promising little advantage. Nevertheless, seeing that he detached
general Murray by that route at last, it would appear that he
should have ordered him to press the enemy closer than he did; but
there a political difficulty occurred.
[Sidenote: King Joseph’s captured Correspondence, MS.]
The English cabinet, although improvident in its preparations,
was very fearful of misfortune, and the general durst not risk
the safety of a single brigade, except for a great object, lest
a slight disaster should cause the army to be recalled. Thus, he
was obliged to curb his naturally enterprising disposition, and to
this burthen of ministerial incapacity, which he bore even to the
battle of Salamanca, may be traced that over-caution which has been
so often censured as a fault, not only by military writers, but by
Napoleon, who, judging from appearances, erroneously supposed it to
be a characteristic of the man, and often rebuked his generals for
not taking advantage thereof.
6º.--The marches and encounters, from the 14th to the 17th, were
excellent on both sides. Like the wheelings and buffeting of two
vultures in the air, the generals contended, the one for safety,
the other for triumph; but there was evidently a failure in the
operations of marshal Beresford. Soult did not reach Salamonde
until the evening of the 15th, and his rear guard was still there
on the evening of the 16th. Beresford was in person at Chaves on
the 16th, and his troops reached that place early on the morning of
the 17th. Soult passed Montalegre on the 18th, but from Chaves to
that place is only one march.
Again, marshal Beresford was in possession of Amarante on the 13th,
and as there was an excellent map of the province in existence, he
must have known the importance of Salamonde, and that there were
roads to it through Mondin and Cavez, shorter than by Guimaraens
and Chaves. It is true that Sylveira was sent to occupy Ruivaens
and Melgacy; but he executed his orders slowly, and Misarella
was neglected. Major Warre, an officer of the marshal’s staff,
endeavoured, indeed, to break down the bridges of Ponte Nova and
Ruivaens; and it was by his exertions that the peasants, surprised
at the former, had been collected; but he had only a single dragoon
with him, and was without powder to execute this important task.
The peasantry, glad to be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop
their retreat, and still more to destroy the bridge of Misarella,
which was the key of all the communications, and all the great
markets of the Entre Minho e Douro; and therefore sure to be built
up again, in which case the people knew well that their labour and
time would be called for without payment. It is undoubted that
Soult owed his safety to the failure in breaking those bridges;
and it does appear that if major Warre had been supplied with the
necessary escort and materials he would have effectually destroyed
them.
Sylveira did not move either in the direction or with the
celerity required of him by Beresford, there seems to have been a
misunderstanding between them; but allowance must be made for the
numerous mistakes necessarily arising in the transmission of orders
by officers speaking different languages; and for the difficulty of
moving troops not accustomed, or perfectly willing to act together.
CHAPTER III.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.]
The duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, but on the 21st
put his troops in motion upon Lugo, where general Fournier, of the
6th corps, with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of
dragoons, was besieged by twelve or fifteen thousand Spaniards,
under the command of general Mahi. But to explain this it is
necessary to relate Romana’s operations, after his defeat at
Monterey on the 6th of March.
Having re-assembled the fugitives at Puebla de Senabria, on the
borders of Leon, he repaired his losses by fresh levies, and was
soon after joined by three thousand men from Castile, and thus,
unknown to Ney, he had, as it were, gained the rear of the sixth
corps. Villa Franca del Bierzo was, at this time, occupied by
two weak French battalions, and their nearest support was at
Lugo: Romana resolved to surprise them, and, dividing his forces,
sent Mendizabel with one division by the valley of the Syl to
take the French in rear, and marched himself by the route of
Calcabellos. The French, thus surrounded in Villa Franca, after a
short skirmish, in which the Spaniards lost about a hundred men,
surrendered, and were sent into the Asturias.
[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.]
Romana then detached a part of his forces to Orense and Ponte
Vedra, to assist Morillo and the insurrection in the western parts
of Gallicia, where, with the aid of the English ships of war, and
notwithstanding the shameful neglect of the supreme central junta,
the patriots were proceeding vigorously. The moveable columns of
the sixth corps daily lost a number of men; some in open battle,
but a still greater number by assassinations, which were rigorously
visited upon the districts where they took place; and thus, in
Gallicia, as in every other part of Spain, the war hourly assumed
a more horrid character. Referring to this period, colonel Barios
afterwards told Mr. Frere that, to repress the excesses of marshal
Ney’s troops, he, himself, had, in cold blood, caused seven hundred
French prisoners to be drowned in the Minho; an avowal recorded by
Mr. Frere, without animadversion, but which, happily for the cause
of humanity, there is good reason to believe was as false as it was
disgraceful.
After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force on the coast increased
rapidly. Barios returned to Seville; Martin Carrera assumed the
command of the troops near Orense, and the Conde Noroña of those
near Vigo. General Maucune returned to St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney,
apprized of the loss at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo. Romana
immediately abandoned Gallicia, and, entering the Asturias by
the pass of Cienfuegos, marched along the line of the Gallician
frontier, until he reached Navia de Suarna. Here he left Mahi, with
the army, to observe Ney, but repaired, himself, to Oviedo, to
redress the crying wrongs of the Asturians.
It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evil doings of the Asturian
junta, which was notoriously corrupt and incapable. Romana, after
a short inquiry, dismissed the members in virtue of his supreme
authority, and appointed new men; but this act of justice gave
great offence to Jovellanos and others. It appeared too close an
approximation to Cuesta’s manner, in Leon, the year before; and
as the central government, always selfish and jealous, abhorred
any indication of vigour or probity in a general, Romana was soon
afterwards deprived of his command. Meanwhile, he was resolutely
reforming abuses, when his proceedings were suddenly arrested by an
unexpected event.
As soon as Ney understood that the Spanish army was posted on the
Gallician side of the Asturian frontier, and that Romana was likely
to excite the energy of the Asturian people, he planned a combined
movement, to surround and destroy, not only Romana and his army,
but also the Asturian forces, which then amounted to about fifteen
thousand men, including the _partida_ of Porlier, commonly called
the Marquisetto. This force, commanded by general Ballasteros and
general Voster, occupied Infiesta, on the eastern side of Oviedo,
and Castropol on the coast. Ney, with the consent of Joseph,
arranged that Kellerman, who was at Astorga, with six guns and
eight thousand seven hundred men, composed of detachments, drawn
together from the different corps, should penetrate the Asturias
from the south east by the pass of Pajares; that Bonnet, who always
remained at the town of St. Andero, should break in, from the north
east, by the coast road; and that the sixth corps should make an
irruption by the Concejo de Ibias, a short but difficult route
leading directly from Lugo.
When the period for these combined movements was determined, Ney,
appointing general Marchand to command in Gallicia during his
own absence, left three battalions under Maucune at St. Jago,
three others in garrison at Coruña under general D’Armagnac, one
at Ferrol, and three with a regiment of cavalry under Fournier
at Lugo; and then marched himself, with twelve battalions of
infantry and three regiments of cavalry, against Mahi. The latter
immediately abandoned his position at Navia de Suarna, and drawing
off by his left, without giving notice to Romana, returned to
Gallicia and again entered the valley of the Syl. Ney, either
thinking that the greatest force was near Oviedo, or that it was
more important to capture Romana than to disperse Mahi’s troops,
continued his route by the valley of the Nareca, and with such
diligence that he reached Cornellana and Grado, one march from
Oviedo, before Romana knew of his approach. The Spanish general,
thus surprized, made a feeble and fruitless endeavour to check the
French at the bridge of Peñaflor, after which, sending the single
regiment he had with him to Infiesta, he embarked on board an
English vessel at Gihon, and so escaped.
The 18th of May, Ney entered Oviedo, where he was joined by
Kellerman, and the next day pursued Romana to Gihon. Bonnet,
likewise, executed his part, but somewhat later; and thus Vorster,
being unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps on the
coast. Meanwhile Ballasteros, finding that Bonnet had passed
between him and Vorster, boldly marched upon St. Andero and retook
it, making the garrison and sick men (in all eleven hundred)
prisoners. The Amelia and Statira, British frigates, arrived off
the harbour at the same moment, and captured three French corvettes
and two luggers, on board of which some staff-officers were
endeavouring to escape.
Bonnet, however, followed hard upon Ballasteros, and, the 11th of
June, routed him so completely that he, also, was forced to save
himself on board an English vessel, and the French recovered all
the prisoners, and, amongst them, the men taken at Villa Franca, by
Romana. But, before this, Ney, uneasy for his posts in Gallicia,
had returned to Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol, and
Kellerman, after several trifling skirmishes with Vorster, had also
retired to Valladolid. This expedition proved that Asturia was not
calculated for defence, although, with the aid of English ships, it
might become extremely troublesome to the French.
While Ney was in Asturia, Carrera, advancing from the side of
Orense, appeared in front of St. Jago di Compostella at the moment
that colonel D’Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the marshal to
give notice of his return to Coruña, arrived with an escort of
dragoons in Maucune’s camp. This escort was magnified by the
Spaniards into a reinforcement of eight hundred men; but Carrera,
who had been joined by Morillo, commanded eight thousand, and, on
the 23d, having attacked Maucune, at a place called “_Campo de
Estrella_,” totally defeated him, with a loss of six hundred men
and several guns. The Spaniards did not pursue, but the French
retreated in confusion to Coruña. Nor was this the only check
suffered by the 6th corps; for Mahi, having united a great body of
peasants to his army, drove back Fournier’s outposts, and closely
invested him in Lugo on the 19th.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.]
Such was the state of affairs in Gallicia when Soult arrived at
Orense; and as the inhabitants of that town, from whom he got
intelligence of these events, rather exaggerated the success of
their countrymen, the French marshal immediately sent forward an
advanced guard of his stoutest men to relieve Lugo, and followed
himself, by the route of Monforte, with as much speed as the
exhausted state of his troops would permit. The 22d, he reached
Gutin, and, the same day, his van being descried on the mountains
above Lugo, Mahi broke up his camp, and fell back to Mondenedo.
The 23d, Soult entered Lugo, where he heard of the emperor’s
first successes in Austria, and, with renewed energy, prepared
for fresh exertions himself. The 30th, he was joined by Ney, who,
uninformed of Mahi’s position at Mondenedo, had missed a favourable
opportunity of revenging the loss at St. Jago. Meanwhile Romana,
disembarking at Ribadeo, joined Mahi at Mondenedo, and immediately
marched along the line of the Asturias frontier, until he arrived
at the sources of the Neyra, then, crossing the royal road, a
little above Lugo, plunged, once more, into the valley of the Syl;
and, having gained Orense, the 6th of June, opened a communication
with Carrera at St. Jago, and with the insurgents at Vigo. This
movement of Romana’s was able, energetic, and worthy of every
praise.
In pursuance of an order from the emperor, Soult now sent eleven
hundred men, composed of dismounted dragoons and skeletons of
cavalry regiments, to France; and, having partially restored the
artillery and equipments of the second corps, from the arsenals
of Coruña and Ferrol, he, in concert with the duke of Elchingen,
arranged a fresh plan for the destruction of Romana, the execution
of which failed, as shall be hereafter noticed; but, at present, it
is necessary to resume the narrative of
VICTOR’S OPERATIONS.
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.]
After the abortive effort to gain Badajos, the duke of Belluno, in
obedience to the king’s orders, proceeded to recover Alcantara. His
rear was still within two marches of Merida when the head of his
columns, under Lapisse, drove back some cavalry posts, entered the
town of Alcantara, and the next day attempted the passage of the
bridge.
The Portuguese force consisted of two thousand infantry, fifty
cavalry, and six guns; and some works of defence were constructed
on the right bank of the river; but, on the 14th of May, Lapisse
lining the rocks on the left bank of the river, skirmished so
sharply that the militia regiment of Idanha gave way. Colonel Mayne
then sprung a mine, but the explosion doing little injury to the
bridge, the French made good the passage. The Portuguese, who had
suffered considerably, retired to the Puente de Segura, and Lapisse
immediately sent patroles towards Castello Branco, Salvatierra, and
Idanha Nova.
Intelligence of this attack having reached general Mackenzie, he
directed preparations to be made for destroying the boat-bridge at
Abrantes, and marched, in person, by Cortiçada to Sobreira Formosa;
this movement, and a rumour that Soult had retreated from Oporto,
afforded an excuse to Victor for again abandoning Alcantara, and
resuming his former camp. During his absence, Cuesta, true to the
promise he had given, attacked the fort of Merida; but, on the
return of the French advanced guard, re-crossed the Guadiana, and
fell back to Zafra, having first ravaged all the flat country, and
obliged the inhabitants to withdraw into the mountains.
Some time before this, king Joseph had received a despatch from
the French minister of war, giving notice that reinforcements had
sailed from England, and warning him to lose no time in marching
against Lisbon, to create a useful diversion in favour of Soult.
It might be supposed that the original plan of the emperor would
then have been acted upon, and this was the first thought of Joseph
himself; but other circumstances created doubt and hesitation in
his councils, and, finally, induced him to abandon all thoughts of
Portugal.
When Napoleon returned to Paris, he imagined hostilities with
Austria, although certain, would not break out so suddenly, but
that he should have time to organise a sufficient army in Germany,
without drawing his veteran troops from Spain. Hence, he still
left the imperial guards at Vittoria, and sending the prince of
Neufchatel to command the troops on the Danube, he himself remained
at Paris, to superintend the preparations for opening the campaign.
The Austrians were, however, not inattentive observers of the
perfidy which accompanied the invasion of Spain; and, aptly taking
the hint, attacked the French outposts and published their own
declaration of war at the same moment.
Berthier, incapable of acting a principal part, was surprised, and
made a succession of false movements that would have been fatal
to the French army, if the emperor, journeying day and night, had
not arrived at the very hour when his lieutenant was on the point
of consummating the ruin of the army. Then, indeed, was seen the
supernatural force of Napoleon’s genius: in a few hours he changed
the aspect of affairs, in a few days, maugre their immense number,
his enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed
his mastery in an art which, up to that moment, was imperfect;
for never, since troops first trod a field of battle, was such a
display of military skill made by man.
But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the aspect
of affairs in Germany, that the imperial guards had been recalled
from Vittoria, and hurried to the Danube, the great reserve of
infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls of the army in
Spain, and the skeletons of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry
regiment were ordered to return to their depôts in France. Even
the fifth corps, under Mortier, then on its way to Valladolid from
Zaragoza, was directed to halt, and hold itself in readiness to
march for Germany; and thus, while Victor was reluctant to move,
while Ney was demanding more troops to preserve Gallicia, and
while the fate of the second corps was unknown, the whole army was
actually diminished by forty thousand men, and fifteen thousand
more were paralysed with regard to offensive operations.
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.]
These things rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his
councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon. Soult might be
already at the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate himself
from his difficulties, for the capital of Spain must be covered. In
pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward
movement; and the duke of Belluno, whose army was daily wasting
with the Guadiana fever, took a position at Torre-Mocha, a central
point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry posts
watched all the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus; and his
communications with Madrid, between the Tietar and the Tagus, were
protected by twelve hundred men, detached for that purpose by the
king.
But one timid measure in war generally produces another. The
neighbourhood of the English force at Castel Branco increased
the energy of the Spanish insurgents, who infested the valley of
the Tagus, and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra de
Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a
division there the 22d of May; and, as from that period until the
10th of June, he remained quiet: his campaign, which had opened
so brilliantly, was annulled. He had neither assisted Soult, nor
crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos nor Seville; yet he had wasted
and lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed to reduce
both Lisbon and Seville. The Spaniards were daily recovering
strength and confidence; and sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating
Soult, had full leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine his
future operations with the Spanish armies in the south.
Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge of Alcantara reached
the English general on the night of the 17th. That part of the
army which was still behind Salamonde received immediate orders
to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when the retreat of Soult
by Orense was ascertained, the remainder of the troops, including
three Portuguese brigades under Beresford, followed the same route.
Colonel Trant was then appointed military governor of Oporto; and
it was thought sufficient to leave Sylveira with some regular
battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces; for
Soult’s army was considered a crippled force, which could not for
a long time appear again in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we
shall see, from false data, and without due allowance being made
for the energy of that chief.
As the army proceeded southward, the contracted scope of Lapisse’s
movements was ascertained. Colonel Mayne was directed again to take
post at Alcantara; and a reinforcement of five thousand men having
landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the march slackened. Passing by
easy journeys through Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops
reached Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the left bank
of the Tagus; but there was sickness and a great mortality in his
ranks.
[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.]
From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, sir Arthur Wellesley
had looked to the defeat of Victor as the principal, and the
operation against Soult as the secondary, object of the campaign;
and the English government, acceding to his views, now gave him a
discretionary power to enter the nearest provinces of Spain, if
Portugal should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence
with the junta and with Cuesta, he had strongly urged the necessity
of avoiding any serious collision with the enemy until the British
troops could act in concert with the Spanish armies. This advice,
approved of by the junta, was attended to by Cuesta; insomuch
that he did not seek a battle, but he exposed his advanced posts,
as if in derision of the counsel; and, disdainful of the English
general’s abilities, expressed his belief that the latter had no
desire to act heartily, “because,” said he, “the system of the
British appears to be never to expose their troops; owing to which,
they never gain decisive actions by land.”
Cuesta’s knowledge of the enemy’s strength and positions was always
inaccurate, and his judgement false; hence he himself not only
never gained any decisive action, but lost every army entrusted to
his command. He was discontented with the movement against Soult,
asserting that his hold of Gallicia would only be strengthened
thereby, unless that favourite folly of all Spanish generals were
adopted, namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding whether
the troops to be surrounded were more or less numerous than the
surrounders. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult
were first driven over the Minho, a combined attack afterwards made
upon Victor would permanently deliver Gallicia; and this plan being
followed, Gallicia was abandoned by the French, and they never
returned to that province.
When the English army was again free to act, Cuesta was importunate
that a joint offensive operation against Victor should be
undertaken; but, obstinately attached to his own opinions, he
insisted upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. Yet his views
were so opposed to all sound military principles, that sir Arthur,
although anxious to conciliate his humour, could scarcely concede
the smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow.
Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions which might have
been employed in useful action; for the return of the British army
from the Douro had falsified Victor’s position at Torremocha.
That marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one division
guarding the bridge at Almaraz; and it was difficult for him
to ascertain the movements of sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as
they were, by the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie’s corps
of observation: hence, by rapid marches, it was possible for the
English general, while Victor was still at Torremocha, to reach the
valley of the Tagus, and cutting the first corps off from Madrid,
to place it between two fires.
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.]
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.]
This did not escape the penetration of either commander; but sir
Arthur was forced to renounce the attempt, partly because of the
sick and harassed condition of his troops, the want of shoes
and money, and the difficulty of getting supplies; but chiefly
that Cuesta’s army was scattered over the open country, between
the defiles of Monasterio and the Guadiana, and, as he refused
to concentrate or retire, Victor might have marched against and
crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British on the Tietar.
Early in June, however, marshal Beresford was, with three brigades,
directed upon Castello Branco, and the duke of Belluno, immediately
taking the alarm, and being also assured, by despatches from
Madrid, of Soult’s retreat, resolved to re-cross the Tagus. But,
previous to commencing this movement, he resolved to secure his
flank, by causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed.
Colonel Mayne, as I have already observed, had been again entrusted
with that post; but, unfortunately, his first orders to blow up
the bridge, if the enemy advanced, were not rescinded, although
the return of the army from the north rendered such a proceeding
unnecessary. Mayne did not keep his instructions secret; and
Victor, hearing of them, sent a detachment to the bridge with no
other view than to cause its destruction. He succeeded; and this
noble monument of Trajan’s genius was overturned. But such is
the nature of war that, not long afterwards, each army found its
fall injurious to their interests, and, as a matter of taste and
of military advantage, both sides alike sighed over the ruins of
Alcantara.
Having completed this operation, Victor passed the Tagus, at
Almaraz, on the 19th, without being molested by Cuesta, and,
removing his boat-bridge, proceeded to take post at Plasencia.
Meanwhile Beresford was obliged to return to the defence of the
northern provinces of Portugal, which Soult was again menacing,
for, during the forced inactivity of the British, at Abrantes, the
cause of which I shall explain in another place, changes in the
relative positions of the hostile armies were taking place; and it
is important that these changes should be well understood, because
on them the fate of the succeeding campaign hinged.
When Ney and Soult met at Lugo, they, although still on bad terms,
agreed, after some discussion, that the first should march from
Coruña, by the route of St. Jago and Vigo, against Carrera and the
Conde de Noroña; and that the second, entering the valley of the
Syl, should attack Romana, and drive him upon Orense, at which
place it was expected that Ney, after taking or blocking Vigo,
would be able to reach him, and thus the whole force of Gallicia
be crushed at once. Soult was then to menace the Tras os Montes,
by the side of Bragança, with the view of obliging sir Arthur
Wellesley to remain in that province, while the second corps opened
a direct communication with Madrid and with the first corps.
Ney returned to Coruña; and, on the 1st of June, two divisions of
infantry and a brigade of dragoons, of the second corps, marched
upon Monforte: they were followed, the next day, by two other
divisions of infantry; and, at the same time, Franceschi, who was
on the Fereira river, supported by La Houssaye’s dragoons, was
directed, after scouring the road to St. Jago, to fall down the
right bank of the Tambuga, towards Orense.
From the 2d to the 9th the main body halted at Monforte, to get
up stores from Lugo, and to scour the country on the flanks; for
Romana, in his passage, had again raised the peasantry of all the
valleys. Loison also, with a division, entered the Val des Orres,
having orders to feign a movement towards Villa Franca and Puente
Ferrada, as if for the purpose of meeting a French column in that
direction.
The 10th, Loison passed the Syl, and took post at the Puente de
Bibey.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
The 12th, Franceschi, reinforced with a division of infantry,
arrived at Monte Furada on the Syl, and, sending a detachment to
Laronco, connected his division with Loison’s. The remainder of
the infantry followed this movement, and detachments were sent up
the course of the Syl, and towards Dancos, on the road from Villa
Franca to Lugo. Loison also forced the passage of the Puente de
Bibey, and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes. The French
army thus cleared all the valleys opening on the course of the
Upper Minho, and Romana was confined to the lower part of that
river.
The 13th, Franceschi, ascending the valley of the Bibey, took post
at Bollo and the bridge of the Hermitage, and then pushed his
patroles even to Gudina and Monterey on one side, and into the
Sierra de Porto on the other, as far as the sources of the Bibey,
with a view of ascertaining, first, the exact direction which
Romana would take to avoid Loison’s column; secondly, to prevent
the Spanish general from passing the left of the French army, and
gaining the Asturias by the route of Puebla de Senabria. These
precautions occupied the duke of Dalmatia till the 19th, when,
being assured that Romana had fallen back to Monterey, he judged
that the latter would attempt the same march towards Puebla de
Senabria, by which he had escaped after the action in the month
of March. The French army was therefore directed up the valley of
the Bibey, upon Viana, where there was a bridge, and where many of
the mountain roads united. The same day Franceschi fell in with
the head of Romana’s army, and repulsed it; and the evening of the
20th the whole of the French troops were concentrated near Viana,
intending to give battle to the Spaniards the next morning; but the
latter retreated precipitately during the night, and many of the
men dispersed.
Soult continued his movement by the left until he reached the
great road running from Castile to Orense, and from thence, having
sent Heudelet’s division to Villa Vieja to threaten the Tras os
Montes frontier, and Mermet’s division and Lorge’s dragoons towards
La Canda to observe the road of Puebla de Senabria, he marched
himself, with an advanced guard, to La Gudina, leaving Laborde and
La Houssaye in reserve between Gudina and Villa Vieja. These divers
movements, through the rugged passes of Gallicia, led to a variety
of slight skirmishes, the most important of which took place at
the Puente de Bibey, a place of such prodigious strength that it
is scarcely conceivable how men, with arms, could be brought to
abandon such a post.
Romana’s situation was now nearly hopeless, but he was saved by
a misunderstanding between the French marshals. It appears that
Ney, having marched from Coruña, entered St. Jago with about ten
thousand men, and Carrera fell back upon Ponte Vedra, where the
Conde de Noroña joined him with some fresh troops, and, assuming
the command, continued the retreat to the Octavem river, behind
which he took post, placing his main body at the bridge of San
Payo, and sending detachments to guard some secondary points. On
the 7th of June, the French came up. The Spaniards had thirteen
thousand men, two eighteen-pounders, and nine field-pieces. Of
these forces, seven thousand men armed, three thousand unarmed, and
the whole of the artillery, were in position to defend the passage
at San Payo; the bridge was cut, and overlooked by a battery of two
eighteen-pounders. Three thousand were in reserve at Redondela;
and, at Vigo, about sixty stragglers, from sir John Moore’s army,
were landed, and, in conjunction with a detachment of seamen and
marines, occupied the forts. Some Spanish gun-boats, one of which
was manned by English seamen, under captain Winter, also proceeded
up the river to the bridge of San Payo.
During the 7th, a desultory and useless fire took place on both
sides; but, on the 8th, the French were repulsed in some feeble
attempts made to force a passage at San Payo and at Soto Mayor,
higher up the river, the loss on either side being about a hundred
men. These attacks were merely to keep the Spaniards employed until
the reports of the officers, sent by Ney to ascertain the situation
and projects of Soult’s army, were received, and, in the evening
of the 8th, those officers returned with information, obtained from
the peasants, that the second corps was retreating upon Castile.
I have been assured by persons, then on marshal Ney’s staff, that
he, amazed at these tidings, rashly concluded that Soult, swayed
by personal feelings, wished to endanger the sixth corps, and
filled with indignation, immediately retired to Coruña; while
Soult, on the other hand, viewed this retreat as a breach of their
engagements, and an underhand policy to oblige him to remain in
Gallicia. Certain it is that by these ebullitions of temper, both
Romana and Noroña were saved; for there was nothing to prevent Ney
from sending a column against Orense, whilst he himself occupied
Noroña, on the Octavem; and, however spirited the conduct of the
Spaniards was at San Payo, it would be ridiculous to imagine that
ten thousand of the best soldiers of France, led by an officer so
quick and resolute as Ney, could have been resisted by an equal
number of raw troops and peasants, one-third of whom were without
arms. But the history of the quarrel between these marshals is
involved in mystery, the clearing of which must be left to those
who shall write the memoirs of the men. For the purposes of this
history it is sufficient to know that there was ill-blood, and that
therein the Gallicians found safety.
Soult, informed of Ney’s retreat and of sir Arthur Wellesley’s
arrival on the Tagus, ceased to pursue Romana, and marched to
Zamora, where his sick had been before sent, and where his brother,
general Soult, had conducted three or four thousand stragglers
and convalescents. Here, also, he requested the king to send the
artillery and stores necessary to re-equip the second corps; and
here he proposed to give his harassed troops some rest, for they
had now been for eight months incessantly marching and fighting,
and men and officers were alike dispirited by the privations they
had endured, and by the terrible nature of a war in which the most
horrid scenes were daily enacted.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
To put the king in possession of his views, Soult sent general
Franceschi to Madrid; but this celebrated officer, refusing an
escort, fell into the hands of the _Capuchino_. Being transferred
to Seville, the central junta, with infamous cruelty, treated
him as if he had been a criminal instead of a brave soldier, and
confined him in a dungeon at Carthagena. The citizens there,
ashamed of their government, endeavoured to effect his escape; but
he perished at the moment when his liberation was certain. When his
young wife, a daughter of count Mathieu Dumas, heard of his fate,
she refused all nourishment; and, in a few days, by her death,
added one more to the thousand instances of the strength of woman’s
affections.
The 25th of June, Soult reached Puebla de Senabria.
The 28th, he marched to Mombuey.
The 29th and 30th, he crossed the Esla, by the bridges of San
Pelayo and Castro Gonzales.
The 2d of July, he entered Zamora, having previously rejected a
proposition of Ney’s, that the two corps should jointly maintain
Gallicia, a rejection which induced the duke of Elchingen to
evacuate that province.
[Illustration: _Plate 6. to face Pa. 326._
_Sketch Explanatory of
NEY & SOULT’S_,
OPERATIONS IN GALLICIA,
in June 1809.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]
To effect this, Ney formed a camp near Betanzos; and, on the 22d
of July, withdrew his garrisons from Coruña and Ferrol, having
previously destroyed all the stores and arsenals and disabled the
land defences. Nevertheless, his influence was still so powerful
that captain Hotham, commanding the English squadron, off Coruña,
seeing the hostile attitude maintained by the inhabitants, landed
his seamen on the 24th, and spiked the guns on the sea-line; and,
in like manner, compelled a Spanish garrison, left by Ney in the
forts of Ferrol, to surrender on the 26th. The marshal, however,
marched, unmolested, by the high road to Astorga, where he arrived
on the 30th, having brought off all his own sick and those of the
second corps also, who had been left in Lugo. Thus Gallicia was
finally delivered.
This important event has been erroneously attributed to the
exertions of the Spaniards. Those exertions were creditable to the
Gallicians, although the most powerful motive of action was to
protect their personal property; and, when the French withdrew,
this same motive led them to repair their losses by resisting the
payment of tithes and rents, a compensation by no means relished by
the proprietors or the church. But it is certain that their efforts
were only secondary causes in themselves, and chiefly supported
by the aid of England, whose ships, and arms, and stores were
constantly on the coast.
[Sidenote: Intercepted Despatches, Parl. Pap. 1810.]
How can the operations of the Spaniards be said to have driven the
sixth corps from Gallicia, when Ney retained every important post
in that province to the last; when single divisions of his army,
at two different periods, traversed the country, from Coruña to
Tuy, without let or hindrance; and when the Spaniards could not
prevent him from over-running the Asturias without losing his
hold of Gallicia? It is true, Soult, writing to Joseph, affirmed
that the Gallicians would wear out the strongest army; that is, if
a wrong system was pursued by the French, but he pointed out the
right method of subduing them, namely, in pursuance of Napoleon’s
views, to fortify some principal central points, from whence the
moveable columns could overrun the country; and this, he estimated,
would only require fifty thousand pounds and six weeks’ labour.
It is plain the real causes of the deliverance were--First, The
quarrels between the marshals, which saved Romana and Noroña from
destruction.--Secondly, The movements of sir Arthur Wellesley on
the Tagus; for, in an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph, that
marshal expressly assigns the danger hanging over Madrid and the
first corps as the reason of his refusing to remain in Gallicia.
Now, although Soult’s views were undoubtedly just, and his march
provident, the latter necessarily drew after it the evacuation of
Gallicia; because, it would have been absurd to keep the sixth
corps cooped up in that corner of the Peninsula, deprived of
communication, and estranged from the general operations.
The movement of the second corps, after quitting Monforte,
being along the edge of the Portuguese frontier, and constantly
threatening the northern provinces, drew marshal Beresford, as
I have before stated, from Castello Branco; and all the regular
Portuguese forces capable of taking the field were immediately
collected by him round Almeida. The duke del Parque was at Ciudad
Rodrigo; and as that part of Romana’s force, which had been cut off
by Soult’s movement upon Gudina, fell back upon Ciudad Rodrigo,
not less than twenty-five thousand men, Portuguese and Spaniards,
were assembled, or assembling, round those two fortresses: and
the change of situation thus brought about in the armies on the
northern line was rendered more important by the events which
were simultaneously taking place in other parts, especially in
Aragon, where general Blake, whose army had been augmented to more
than twenty thousand men, inflated with his success at Alcanitz,
advanced to Ixar and Samper.
Suchet, himself, remained close to Zaragoza, but kept a detachment,
under general Faber, at Longares and Villa Muel, near the mountains
on the side of Daroca. Blake, hoping to cut off this detachment,
marched, himself, through Carineña, and sent general Arisaga, with
a column, to Bottorita; the latter captured a convoy of provisions
on the Huerba; but Faber retired to Plasencia, on the Xalon.
The 14th of June, the advanced guards skirmished at Bottorita; and
Blake, endeavouring to surround the enemy, pushed a detachment to
Maria, in the plain of Zaragoza.
The excitement produced in that city, and in Aragon generally, by
this march, was so great, that Suchet doubted if he should not
abandon Zaragoza, and return towards Navarre. The peasantry had
assembled on many points in the mountains around, and it required
great vigilance to keep down the spirit of insurrection in the city
itself. The importance of that place, however, made him resolve
to fight a battle, for which the near approach of Blake, who came
on in the full confidence that the French general would retreat,
furnished an opportunity which was not neglected.
BATTLE OF MARIA.
The 14th, after some skirmishing, the Spanish army was concentrated
at Bottorita.
[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]
The 15th, Blake slowly and unskilfully formed his troops in order
of battle, near the village of Maria, and perpendicular to the
Huerba, of which he occupied both banks. Towards two o’clock in
the day, he extended his left wing to outflank the right of the
French; but Suchet, who had just then been rejoined by Faber, and
by a brigade from Tudela, immediately stopped this evolution,
by attacking the wing with some cavalry and light troops. The
Spaniards then fell back to their line of battle; and Blake,
drawing men from his right to reinforce his centre and left, was
immediately engaged in a severe conflict. He repulsed the foremost
of the enemy’s columns; but so violent a storm arose at the moment,
that neither army could see the other, although close together,
and the action ceased for a time. Blake’s position was so ill
chosen, that he was surrounded by ravines, and had only one line
of retreat, by the bridge of Maria, which was on the extremity of
his right flank. Suchet, observing this error, when the storm had
cleared off a little, briskly engaged the centre and left of the
Spaniards, and forming his cavalry and two regiments of infantry
in column, by one vigorous effort broke quite through the Spanish
horse, and seized the bridge of Maria. Notwithstanding this, Blake,
who was at all times intrepid, collected the infantry of his centre
and left wing in a mass, and stood for the victory; but the French
troops overthrew his with a great slaughter. A general, twenty-five
guns, and many stands of colours were taken; yet few prisoners,
for the darkness enabled the dispersed Spaniards to escape by the
ravines; and Blake rallied them the next day at Bottorita. The
French lost nearly a thousand men, and general Harispé was wounded.
During this action, a French brigade held the position of Monte
Torrero, without mixing in the fight, lest the citizens of
Zaragoza, being released from their presence, should rise against
the garrison; but after the victory, this brigade marched down the
Ebro to cut off Blake’s retreat. General Laval, who commanded it,
did not, however, execute his orders; and the Spanish army retired
on the night of the 16th.
The 17th, the rear guard suffered some loss at Torrecilla; and on
the 18th, the two armies were again in presence at Belchite. Blake,
reinforced by some detachments, was about fourteen thousand strong;
but he had lost the greatest part of his artillery, and his men
were dispirited. Suchet, on the contrary, having by the success at
Maria awed the Aragonese, was able to bring twenty-two battalions
and seven squadrons, or about fifteen thousand men, flushed with
victory, into action.
BATTLE OF BELCHITE.
[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]
[Sidenote: Blake’s Despatch.]
The Spaniards were drawn up on a range of hills half enclosing
the town; their right, resting on a hermitage and some buildings,
was inaccessible to cavalry; the left was also well covered; and
behind the right, a hill with a building on it, overtopping all the
position and occupied by a reserve, served as a rallying point,
because there was an easy line of communication between it and the
left wing. The centre, being on rough ground containing the town of
Belchite which had a wall and gates, was also very strong; and the
whole position was so compact, that Blake, after completely filling
his line, had yet a considerable reserve in hand. His dispositions
were made to fight by his centre and right, his left being rather
in the nature of an advanced post.
A French battalion commenced the action, by skirmishing with the
Spanish centre; but, at the same time, two columns of attack
marched, the one against the right, the other against the left.
The latter, which was the principal one, preceded by a fire of
artillery, soon closed upon the Spanish troops, and Blake’s guns
opened from his centre and right; but an ammunition-waggon blowing
up was the signal for a panic, which, commencing on the left,
reached to all parts of the line. The Spanish general then made a
charge of cavalry, to retrieve the day, but it was easily repulsed,
and the confusion that followed is thus described by himself:--“One
regiment fled without firing a shot; it was followed by another,
and a third, all flying without having discharged a gun; and, in
a few moments, the whole position was abandoned.”--“Thus we, the
generals and officers, were left alone, without being able to rally
a body which could make any opposition; and I had the mortification
to see our army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and throwing
away its arms, and even its clothes, before a single corps of the
enemy; nor were we able to avail ourselves of the defence of any
strong place, as it was impossible to collect two hundred men to
make head against the enemy.”
Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real courage: stung
to the quick by this disgrace, he reproached his troops with
bitterness, demanded an inquiry into his own conduct, and, with
a strong and sincere feeling of honour, restored to the junta
the estate which had been conferred upon him for the success at
Alcanitz.
This battle and the pursuit, in which Suchet took about four
thousand prisoners, and all the artillery, ammunition, and baggage
of the Spaniards, not only made him master of the operations in
Aragon, but also rendered the fifth corps, under Mortier, who were
now at Valladolid, completely disposable for offensive operations.
Thus, on the 1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellerman’s and
Bonnet’s divisions, three complete _corps d’armée_, furnishing six
thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry, collected between
Astorga, Zamora, and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed,
and the loss of Gallicia followed; but Napoleon’s admirable system
of invasion was unbroken. His troops, deprived of his presiding
genius, had been stricken severely and shrunk from further
aggression; they had been too widely spread for a secure grasp, but
the reaction disclosed all the innate strength of his arrangements.
CHAPTER IV.
The British army remained in the camp of Abrantes until the latter
end of June. During this period, sir Arthur Wellesley, although
burning to enter Spain, was kept back by a variety of difficulties.
He had been reinforced with five thousand men immediately after
his return from the Douro; and, in the preceding operations, the
killed and hurt in battle did not exceed three hundred men, but the
deaths by sickness were numerous. Four thousand men in hospital,
and fifteen hundred employed in escort and depôt duties, being
deducted, the gross amount of the present under arms, as late
even as the 25th of June, did not exceed twenty-two thousand men;
and these were, at any moment, liable to be seriously diminished,
because the ministers, still intent upon Cadiz, had authorized
Mr. Frere, whenever the junta should consent to the measure, to
draw a garrison for that town from sir Arthur’s force. As an army,
therefore, it was weak in every thing but spirit. The commissariat
was without sufficient means of transport; the soldiers nearly
barefooted, and totally without pay; the military chest was empty,
and the hospitals were full.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.]
[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.]
The expense, at a low estimation, was about two hundred thousand
pounds a month, and, with the most strenuous exertions, a hundred
and sixty thousand pounds only had been procured in the two months
of May and June; and of this, thirteen thousand had been obtained
as a temporary loan in Oporto. The rate of exchange in Lisbon
was high, and, notwithstanding the increased value given to the
government paper by the successes on the Douro, this rate was daily
rising. The Spanish dollar was at five shillings, while Spanish
gold sunk so much in value that the commissary-general sent all
that he received from England, or could collect in Lisbon, to
Cadiz, and other parts, to truck for dollars; but, in all places
of commerce, the exchange was rising against England, a natural
consequence of her enormous and increasing issues of paper. Those
issues, the extravagant succours given to Spain, together with
subsidies to Austria, made it impossible to supply the army in
Portugal with specie, otherwise than by raising cash, in every
quarter of the globe, on treasury-bills, and at a most enormous
loss; an evil great in itself, opening a wide door to fraud and
villany, and rendered the war between France and England not so
much a glorious contest of arms as a struggle between public credit
and military force, in which even victory was sure to be fatal to
the former.
The want of money, sickness, Cuesta’s impracticable temper, and
a variety of minor difficulties, too tedious to mention, kept
the army in a state of inactivity until the end of June; but,
at that period, the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha,
and the consequent advance of Cuesta, removed one obstacle to
offensive operations, and sir Arthur, having the certainty that
eight thousand additional troops were off the rock of Lisbon, then
commenced his march into Spain by the northern banks of the Tagus,
meaning to unite with Cuesta on the Tietar, and to arrange, if
possible, a plan of operations against Madrid.
But, before I embark on the full and broad stream into which
the surges and eddies of the complicated warfare that succeeded
Napoleon’s departure from the Peninsula settled, I must give
a general view of the state of affairs, that the reader,
comprehending exactly what strength each party brought to the
encounter, may judge more truly of the result.
FRENCH POWER.
Men. Horses.
The French, having received some reinforcements
of conscripts, amounted, in the beginning
of July, including the king’s guards,
to about 275,000
In hospital 61,000 }
Stragglers and prisoners borne on } 68,000
the states 7,000 }
-------
Total under arms 207,000 36,000
The military governments, lines of correspondence,
garrisons, and detachments, absorbed 32,000 3,000
------- -------
_Present under arms_ with the _corps d’armée_ 175,000 33,000
The actual strength and situation of each _corps d’armée_ was as
follows:--
[Sidenote: Muster roll of the French Army, MSS.]
_Under the King, covering Madrid._
Inf. & Art. Cavalry.
First corps, in the valley of the Tagus 20,881 4,200
Fourth corps, La Mancha 17,490 3,200
Division of Dessolles, Madrid 6,864
King’s French guards, Madrid, about 4,000 1,500
------ ------
Total 49,235 8,900
------ ------
_In Old Castile, under Marshal Soult._
Inf. & Art. Cavalry.
Second corps, Zamora, Tora, and Salamanca 17,707 2,883
Fifth corps, Valladolid 16,042 874
Sixth corps, Astorga, and its vicinity 14,913 1,446
------ ------
Total 48,662 5,203
------ ------
_In Aragon, under General Suchet._
Inf. & Art. Cavalry.
Third corps, Zaragoza, Alcanitz, &c. 15,226 2,604
------ ------
_In Catalonia, under Marshal Augereau._
Inf. & Art. Cavalry.
Seventh corps, Vich, Gerona, and Barcelona 30,593 2,500
------ ------
In addition to these corps there were twelve hundred men belonging
to the battering train, four thousand infantry under Bonnet, at St.
Andero, and two thousand two hundred cavalry under Kellerman, in
the Valladolid country.
The fortresses and armed places in possession of the French army
were--St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilbao, Santona, St. Andero,
Burgos, Leon, Astorga, on the northern line;
Jacca, Zaragoza, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Segovia, and Zamora, on the
central line;
Figueras, Rosas, and Barcelona, on the southern line.
It needs but a glance at these dispositions and numbers to
understand with what a power Napoleon had fastened upon the
Peninsula, during his six weeks’ campaign. Much had been lost since
his departure, but his army still pressed the Spaniards down, and,
like a stone cast upon a brood of snakes, was immoveable to their
writhings. Nevertheless, the situation of Spain, at this epoch, was
an ameliorated one compared to that which, four months before, the
vehemence of Napoleon’s personal warfare had reduced it to. The
elements of resistance were again accumulated in masses, and the
hope, or rather confidence, of success was again in full vigour;
for, it was in the character of this people, while grovelling on
the earth, to suppose themselves standing firm; and, when creeping
in the gloom of defeat, to imagine they were soaring in the full
blaze of victory.
The momentary cessation of offensive operations on the part of the
French, instead of being traced to its true sources, the personal
jealousies of the marshals, and the king’s want of vigour, was,
as usual, attributed, first--to fear and weakness; secondly--to
the pressure of the Austrian war. It was not considered that the
want of unity, checking the course of conquest, would cease when
the French army was driven to the defensive; neither was the might
of France duly weighed, while the strength of Austria was unduly
exalted. The disasters at Ucles, at Almaraz, at Zaragoza, Rosas,
Cardadeu, Valls, at Ciudad Real, Medellin, Braga, and Oporto, and
in the Asturias, were all forgotten. The French had been repulsed
from Portugal, and they had not taken Seville. This, to the
Spaniards, was sufficient evidence of their weakness; and, when the
French were supposed to be weak, the others, by a curious reasoning
process, always came to the conclusion that they were themselves
strong. Hence, the fore-boasting at this period was little inferior
to what it had been after the battle of Baylen; and the statement
of the relative numbers was almost as absurd. The utmost amount
of the French force was not calculated higher than a hundred and
fifteen, or a hundred and twenty, thousand men, of which about
fifty thousand were supposed to be on the French side of the Ebro,
and the whole only waiting for an excuse to abandon the Peninsula.
SPANISH POWER.
The Spanish armies, on paper, were, as usual, numerous; and the
real amount of the regular force was certainly considerable,
although very inadequate to the exigencies or the resources of the
country. Before the battle of Belchite had broken Blake’s strength,
there were, organized and under arms, twelve thousand cavalry,
and about one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, exclusive
of irregular bands and armed peasantry, who were available for
particular defensive operations. After that defeat the number of
regular forces, capable of taking the field in the south-eastern
provinces, was not above twenty thousand men, of which about ten
thousand, under Coupigny, were watching Barcelona, or, again,
rallying under Blake; the remainder were in Valencia, where Caro,
Romana’s brother, had taken the command.
In the north-western provinces there were about twenty-five
thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were in Gallicia; some
thousands in the Asturias, under Voster and Ballasteros, and the
remainder, under the duke del Parque, who was directed to organize
a new army in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.
In Andalusia, or covering it, there were about seventy thousand
men. Of these twenty-three thousand infantry, and two thousand five
hundred cavalry, were assembled in the Morena, near St. Elena and
Carolina, under the command of general Venegas; and thirty-eight
thousand, including seven thousand cavalry, were in Estremadura,
under the orders of Cuesta, who was nominally commander-in-chief of
both armies.
The troops, thus divided into three grand divisions, were called
the armies of _the right_, _the centre_, _the left_. The fortresses
were--Gerona, Hostalrich, Lerida, Maquinenza, Tarragona, Tortosa,
Valencia, Carthegena, and Alicant, for the army of the right; Cadiz
and Badajos for that of the centre; Ciudad Rodrigo, Coruña, and
Ferrol, for the army of the left.
The Spanish troops were, however, far from being serviceable, in
proportion to their numbers; most of them were new levies, and
the rest were ill-trained. The generals had lost nothing of their
presumption, learnt nothing of war, and their mutual jealousies
were as strong as ever. Cuesta still hating the junta, was feared
and hated by that body in return; and Venegas was placed at the
head of the Carolina army as a counterpoise to him. Romana, also,
was obnoxious to the junta; and, in return, with more reason, the
junta was despised and disliked by him. In Valencia and Murcia
generals and juntas appeared alike indifferent to the public
welfare, and satisfied if the war was kept from their own doors. In
Catalonia there never was any unanimity.
Blake, who had abandoned Romana in Gallicia, and who was still at
enmity with Cuesta, had been, for these very reasons, invested with
supreme power in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; and, moreover,
there were factions and bickerings among the inferior officers
in the armies of Venegas and Cuesta. Albuquerque was ambitious
of commanding in chief, and Mr. Frere warmly intrigued in his
cause, for that gentleman still laboured under the delusion that
he was appointed to direct the military instead of conducting the
political service in the Peninsula.
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.]
In April, he had proposed to the junta that a force of five
thousand cavalry and some infantry, taken from the armies of
Cuesta and Venegas, should, under the command of the duke of
Albuquerque, commence offensive operations in La Mancha; this, he
said, would, “_if the enemy refused to take notice of it_,” become
“a very serious and perhaps a decisive movement;” and he was so
earnest that, without communicating upon the subject with sir
Arthur Wellesley, without waiting for the result of the operations
against Soult, he pretended to the junta that the co-operation of
the English army with Cuesta (that co-operation which it was sir
Arthur’s most anxious wish to bring about) could only be obtained,
as the price of the Spanish government’s acceding to his own
proposal. The plenipotentiary’s greatest efforts were, however,
directed to procure the appointment of Albuquerque to the command
of an army; but that nobleman was under the orders of Cuesta, who
was not willing to part with him, and, moreover, Frere wished to
displace Venegas, not that any fault was attributed to the latter,
but merely to make way for Albuquerque; a scheme so indecorous that
both the junta and Cuesta peremptorily rejected it.
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.]
Mr. Frere did not hesitate to attribute this rejection to a mean
jealousy of Albuquerque’s high birth and talents; but the junta had
sufficient reason for their conduct, not only on this occasion,
but afterwards, when they refused to give him any independent
command. The duke, although a brave and patriotic and even an able
soldier, was the dupe of a woman who corresponded with the French.
The junta, in the fear of offending him, forbore to punish her, at
first, yet, finally, they were obliged to shut her up, and they
could not entrust him with a command while her dangerous influence
lasted. Hence, Mr. Frere’s intrigue failed to serve Albuquerque,
and his military project for La Mancha fell to the ground, when
sir Arthur Wellesley, unable to perceive its advantages, strongly
advised the junta, not to weaken but to reinforce Cuesta’s army;
not to meddle with the French either in La Mancha or Estremadura,
but to preserve a strict defensive in all quarters.
The _supreme junta_ was itself in fear of the old _junta of
Seville_, and the folly and arrogance of the first and its neglect
of the public weal furnished ample grounds of attack, as a slight
sketch of its administrative proceedings will suffice to prove.
The king, after the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, had,
through the medium of don Joachim Sotelo, a Spanish minister in his
service, made an attempt to negotiate for the submission of the
junta, which was spurned at by the latter, in suitable terms, for
dignified sentiments and lofty expressions were never wanting to
the Spanish, although, taken with their deeds, they were but as a
strong wind and a few shrivelled leaves.
The junta did not fail to make the nation observe their patriotism
upon this occasion, and, indeed, took every opportunity to praise
their own proceedings. Nevertheless, men were not wanting in Spain
most anxious, not only to check the actual abuses of power, but
to lay bare all the ancient oppressions of the country, and recur
to first principles, both for present reform and future permanent
good government; in short, to make public avowal of the misrule
which had led to their misfortunes, and, if possible, to amend
it. Knowing that although national independence may co-exist with
tyranny, it is inseparable from civil and religious freedom,--they
desired to assemble the cortez, and to give the people an earnest
that national independence was worth having; to convince them that
their sufferings and their exertions would lead to a sensible good,
instead of a mere choice between an old and a new despotism; and
this party was powerful enough to have a manifesto to their purpose
drawn up by the junta, and it would have been published, if the
English ministers had not interposed; for, as I have before said,
their object was not Spain, but Napoleon.
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, printed 1810.]
Mr. Frere vigorously opposed the promulgation of this manifesto,
and not ambiguously hinted that the displeasure of England, and
the wrath of the partizans of despotism in Spain, would be vented
on the junta, if any such approach to real liberty was made. In
his despatches to his cabinet he wrote that, from his knowledge
of the members of the junta, he felt assured they would “_shrink
from the idea of giving permanent effect to the measures which
they held out_;” and this expression he meant in their praise! but
still he thought it necessary to check the tendency to freedom in
the outset; and it would be injustice not to give his sentiments
in his own words, sentiments which were at this time perfectly
agreeable to his immediate superior, Mr. Canning, but offering a
curious contrast to the political liberality which that politician
afterwards thought it his interest to affect.
Writing as a Spaniard, Mr. Frere thus addressed don Martin Garay:--
[Sidenote: Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.]
“If we have indeed passed three centuries under an arbitrary
government, let us not forget that it is a price which we pay for
having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of the globe;
that the integrity of this immense power rests solely on these
two words, religion and the king. If the old constitution has been
lost by the conquest of America, our first object should be to
recover it, but in such a manner as not to lose what has cost us so
much in the acquisition. From this consideration, it appears to me
that we ought to avoid, as _political poison, any annunciation of
general principles, the application of which it would be impossible
to limit or qualify, even when the negroes and Indians should
quote them in favour of themselves_. But let us allow that we have
made a _bad exchange in bartering our ancient national liberty
for the glory and extension of the Spanish name_. Let us allow
that the nation has been deceived for three centuries, and that
this error should, at all hazards, be immediately done away. Even
though it were so, it does not appear _very becoming the character
of a well educated person to pass censures upon the conduct of
his forefathers_, or to complain of what he has lost by their
negligence or prodigality; and still less so, if it is done in the
face of all the world: and what shall we say of a nation who should
do this publicly, and after mature deliberation?”
The manifesto was suppressed, a new one more consonant to Mr.
Frere’s notions was published, and a promise to convoke the cortez
given, but without naming any specific time for that event. The
junta, who, as Mr. Frere truly stated, were not at all disposed
to give any effect to free institutions, now proceeded to prop
up their own tottering power by severity: they had, previous to
the manifesto, issued a menacing proclamation, in which they
endeavoured to confound their political opponents with the spies
and tools of the French; and having before established a tribunal
of public security, they caused it to publish an edict, in which
all men, who endeavoured to raise distrust of the junta, or who
tried to overturn the government, by popular commotions, or other
means that had, by the junta, been reprobated, were declared
guilty of high treason, undeserving the name of Spaniards and
sold to Napoleon, their punishment to be death, and confiscation
of property. Any person propagating rumours, tending to weaken or
soften the hatred of the people against the French, was instantly
to be arrested and punished without remission; lastly, rewards were
offered for secret information upon these heads.
This decree was not a dead letter. Many persons were seized,
imprisoned, and executed, without trial, or knowing their accusers.
But the deepest stain upon the Spanish character, at this period,
was the treatment experienced by prisoners of war. Thousands, and
amongst them part of Dupont’s troops, who were only prisoners by
a breach of faith, were sent to the Balearic Isles, but no order
was taken for their subsistence. When remonstrated with, the junta
cast seven thousand ashore on the little desert rock of Cabrera.
At Majorca, numbers had been massacred by the inhabitants, in the
most cowardly and brutal manner, but those left on Cabrera suffered
miseries that can scarcely be described. The supply of food, always
scanty, was often neglected altogether: there was but one spring
on the rock, which dried up in summer; clothes were never given
to them except by the English seamen, who, compassionating their
sufferings, often assisted them, in passing the island. Thus,
afflicted with hunger, thirst, and nakedness, they lived like
wild beasts while they could live, but perished in such numbers,
that less than two thousand remained to tell the tale of this
inhumanity; and surely, it was no slight disgrace that the English
government failed to interfere on such an occasion.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]
[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.]
[Sidenote: General Miller’s Memoirs.]
But what were the efforts made for the defence of the country
by this inhuman junta, which, having been originally assembled
to discuss the form of establishing a central government, had,
unlawfully, retained their delegated power, and used it so
shamefully? There was a Spanish fleet, and a sufficient number
of sailors to man it, in Carthagena. There was another fleet,
and abundance of seamen, in Cadiz. Lord Collingwood, and others,
pressed the junta, constantly and earnestly, to fit these vessels
out, and to make use of them, or at least to place them beyond the
reach of the enemy. His remonstrances were unheeded; the sailors
were rendered mutinous for want of pay, and even of subsistence,
and the government would neither fit out ships themselves, nor
suffer the English seamen to do it for them; and at the very period
when the marquis of Romana and the insurgents in Gallicia were
praying for a few stands of arms and five thousand pounds, from
sir John Cradock, the junta possessed many millions of money, and
their magazines, in Cadiz, were unable to contain the continually
increasing quantity of stores and arms arriving from England, which
were left to rot as they arrived, while, from every quarter of the
country not yet subdued, the demand for these things was incessant.
The fleet in Cadiz harbour might have been at sea in the beginning
of February. In a week it might have been at Vigo, with money and
succours of all kinds for the insurgents in Gallicia; after which,
by skilful operations along the coast from Vigo to St. Sebastian,
it might have occupied an enormous French force on that line of
country. But instead of a fleet, the junta sent colonel Barios, an
obscure person, to steal through by-ways, and to take the command
of men who were not in want of leaders. In the same manner, the
fleet in Carthagena might have been employed on the Catalonian and
French coasts; but, far from using their means, which were really
enormous, with energy and judgement, the junta carried on the
war by encouraging virulent publications against the French, and
confined their real exertions to the assembling of the unfortunate
peasants in masses, to starve for a while, and then to be cut to
pieces by their more experienced opponents.
The system of false reports, also, was persevered in without any
relaxation: the French were beaten on all points; the marshals
were slain or taken; their soldiers were deserting, or flying
in terror at the sight of a Spaniard; Joseph had plundered and
abandoned Madrid; and Zaragoza had not fallen. Castro, the envoy
to the Portuguese regency, so late as April, anxiously endeavoured
to persuade that government and the English general, that Zaragoza
had never been subdued, and that the story of its fall was a French
falsehood. In June, official letters were written to marshal
Beresford, from the neighbourhood of Lugo, dated the very day upon
which Soult’s army relieved that town, not to give intelligence
of the event, but to announce the utter defeat of that marshal,
and the capture of Lugo itself; the amount of the killed and
wounded, and the prisoners taken, being very exactly stated; and
this, with such an appearance of truth, as to deceive Beresford,
notwithstanding his previous experience of the people he had to
deal with.
But the proofs of corruption and incapacity in the junta are
innumerable, and not confined to the records of events kept by
British officers. Romana, a few months later, upon the question of
appointing a regency, thus describes their conduct: “He himself,”
he said, “had doubted if the central junta was a lawful government,
and this doubt was general in the provinces through which he had
passed; yet he had, to preserve the nation from anarchy, not only
yielded obedience to it, but he had, likewise, forced the provinces
of Gallicia, Leon, and Asturias to do the same; because he thought
that an illegal government might be useful if it deserved the
confidence of the people, and that they respected its authority.
The central junta, however, was not thus situated: the people,
judging of measures by their effects, complained that the armies
were weak, the government without energy; that there were no
supplies; that the promised accounts of the public expenditure
were withheld; and yet, all the sums drawn from America, all the
succours granted by England, the rents of the crown, and the
voluntary contributions were expended. The public employments were
not given to men of merit and true lovers of their country. Some
of the members of the junta rendered their power subservient to
their own advantage; others conferred lucrative appointments on
their relations and dependents. Ecclesiastical offices had been
filled up to enable individuals to seize those rents for themselves
which ought to be appropriated for the public service. There was no
unity to be found: many of the junta cared only for the interest
of their particular province, as if they were not members of the
Spanish monarchy; confirming the appointments of the local juntas,
without regard to fitness; and even assigning recompenses to men
destitute of military knowledge, who had neither seen service nor
performed the duties assigned to them.”
“The junta, divided into sections, undertook to manage affairs
in which they were unversed, and which were altogether foreign
to their professions. Horses, taken from their owners under
pretence of supplying the armies, were left to die of hunger
in the sea-marshes: and, finally, many important branches of
administration were in the hands of men, suspected, both from their
own conduct and from their having been creatures of that infamous
favourite who was the author of the general misery.”
It was at this period that the celebrated _Partidas_ first
commenced the _guerilla_, or petty warfare, which has been so
lauded, as if that had been the cause of Napoleon’s discomfiture.
Those bands were infinitely numerous, because, every robber, that
feared a jail, or that could break from one; every smuggler,[8]
whose trade had been interrupted; every friar, disliking the
trammels of his convent; and every idler, that wished to avoid
the ranks of the regular army, was to be found either as chief or
associate in the _partidas_.
The French, although harassed by the constant and cruel murders of
isolated soldiers, or followers of the army, and sometimes by the
loss of convoys, were never thwarted in any great object by these
bands; but the necessity of providing subsistence, and attaching
his followers to his fortunes, generally obliged the guerilla chief
to rob his countrymen; and, indeed, one of the principal causes
of the sudden growth of this system was the hope of intercepting
the public and private plate, which, under a decree of Joseph, was
bringing in from all parts to be coined in Madrid; for that monarch
was obliged to have recourse to forced loans, and the property of
the proscribed nobles, and suppressed convents, to maintain even
the appearance of a court.
This description will apply to the mass of the _partidas_; but
there were certainly some who were actuated by nobler motives;
by revenge; by a gallant enterprising spirit; or, by an honest
ambition, thinking to serve their country better than by joining
the regular forces. Among the principal chiefs may be placed,
Renovales, and the two Minas, in Navarre and Arragon; Porlier
named the _marquisetto_, and Longa, in the Asturias and Biscay;
Juan Martin, or _El Empecinado_, who vexed the neighbourhood of
Madrid; Julian Sanchez, in the Gata and Salamanca country; doctor
Rovera, Pereña, and some others, in Catalonia; Juan Paladea, or
_El Medico_, between the Moreno and Toledo; the curate Merino, _El
Principe_, and Saornil, in Castile; the friar Sapia, in Soria, and
Juan Abril, near Segovia.
But these men were of very different merit. Renovales, a regular
officer, raised the peasantry of the valleys between Pampeluna
and Zaragoza, after the fall of the latter city; but he was soon
subdued. Juan Martin, Rovera, Julian Sanchez, and the student Mina,
discovered most military talent, and Sanchez was certainly a very
bold and honest man; but Espoz y Mina, the uncle and successor of
the student, far outstripped his contemporaries in fame. He shed
the blood of his prisoners freely, but rather from false principle,
and under peculiar circumstances, than from any real ferocity,
his natural disposition being manly and generous; and, although
not possessed of any peculiar military genius, he had a sound
judgement, surprising energy, and a constant spirit.
By birth a peasant, he despised the higher orders of his own
country, and never would suffer any _hidalgo_, or gentleman, to
join his band. From 1809, until the end of the war, he maintained
himself in the provinces bordering on the Ebro; often defeated,
and chased from place to place, he gradually increased his forces;
until, in 1812, he yet was at the head of more than ten thousand
men, whom he paid regularly, and supplied from resources chiefly
created by himself; one of which was remarkable:--He established
a treaty with the French generals, by which articles, not being
warlike stores, coming from France, had safe conduct from his
_partida_, on paying a duty, which Mina appropriated to the
subsistence of his followers.
That the guerilla system could never seriously affect the progress
of the French, is proved by the fact, that the constant aim of the
principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops;
and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their
progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than
fifty thousand of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain;
and so severely did they press upon the country that it may be
assumed as a truth that if the English army had abandoned the
contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have
gained the good will of the nation would have been the extirpating
of the _partidas_. Nevertheless, one great and unquestionable
advantage was derived by the regular armies, and especially by the
British, from the existence of these bands. The French corps could
never communicate with each other, nor combine their movements,
except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts;
whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by
telegraph, an advantage equal to a reinforcement of thirty thousand
men.
PORTUGUESE POWER.
The Portuguese military system has been already explained. The
ranks of the regular army, and of the militia, were filling; the
arms and equipments were supplied by England; and means were taking
to give effect to the authority of the _captans mor_, or chiefs
of districts, under whom the _ordenanzas_ were to be gathered
for the defence of the country. The people having been a second
time relieved from an invasion, by the intervention of a British
army, were disposed to submit implicitly to the guidance of their
deliverers; but the effect of former misgovernment pervaded every
branch of administration, political and municipal, and impeded
the efforts made to draw forth the military resources of the
kingdom. It is a curious fact that, not only at this period, but
until the end of the war, such was the reluctance of the people to
become soldiers, that, notwithstanding their undoubted hatred of
the French, their natural docility, and the visible superiority
of the soldiers’ condition over that of the peasant or artisan,
the recruiting was always difficult; and the odious spectacle was
constantly exhibited, of men marched in chains, to reinforce
armies, which were fighting in what was a popular, and ought to
have been a sacred cause.
The actual number of regular troops, armed and organized, was not
above fifteen thousand, and, notwithstanding the courage displayed
by those employed in the late operations, marshal Beresford
was doubtful of their military qualities, and reluctant to act
separately from the British troops. The most important fortresses
in a condition for defence were Elvas, Albuquerque, and Almeida, in
the first line; Abrantes and Peniché, in the second; the citadel,
and forts of Lisbon and Palmela, in the third. But there were many
other walled places, capable, if armed, of standing a siege, and
presenting a variety of strong points for the irregular force of
the country to assemble upon; and hence, Portugal offered, not
only great resources in men, but a base of operations solid in
itself; central with respect to the French armies, and enabling the
English general to act, without reference to the Spanish government
or Spanish commanders; an advantage more justly appreciated at
the end of the campaign than at the commencement. Such were the
relative situations of the contending hosts in the Peninsula;
yet, to take an enlarged view of affairs, it is necessary to look
beyond the actual field of battle; for the contest in Spain, no
longer isolated, was become an integral part of the great European
struggle against France.
Napoleon, after his first successes near Ratisbon, entered Vienna,
and attempted to carry the war to the left bank of the Danube;
but a severe check, received at the battle of Esling on the 21st
of May, so shook his moral ascendancy in Europe, that he deemed
it necessary to concentrate all the disposable strength of his
empire for one gigantic effort, which should restore the terror of
his name. The appearance of inactivity assumed by him, while thus
mightily gathering his forces, deceived his enemies; and, as their
hopes rose, their boasts became extravagant, more especially in
England, where, to express a doubt of his immediate overthrow was
regarded as a heinous offence; and where the government, buoyed
up with foolish expectations, thought less of supporting a noble
and effectual warfare in Portugal than of nourishing and aiding
the secondary and rather degrading hostility of conspirators,
malcontents, and military adventurers in Germany.
[Sidenote: Adjutant-general’s Returns.]
While sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently on the Tagus
for the scanty reinforcements afforded him, two other armies were
simultaneously preparing to act against the extremities of the
French empire; the one, consisting of about twelve thousand men,
drawn from Sicily, was destined to invade Italy, the southern parts
of which had been denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on
the Tagliamento. The other was assembled on the coast of England,
where above forty thousand of the finest troops the nation could
boast of, and a fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies
of the world combined, composed an armament, intended to destroy
the great marine establishment which the French emperor had so
suddenly and so portentously created at Antwerp. So vast an
expedition had never before left the British shores; neither any
one so meanly conceived, so improvidently arranged, so calamitously
conducted, for the marine and land forces, combined, numbered more
than eighty thousand fighting men, and those of the bravest; yet
the object in view was comparatively insignificant, and even that
was not obtained. Delivered over to the leading of a man, whose
military incapacity has caused the glorious title of Chatham to be
scorned, this ill-fated army, with spirit, and strength, and zeal
to have spread the fame of England to the extremities of the earth,
perished, without a blow, in the pestilent marshes of Walcheren!
And so utterly had party spirit stifled the feeling of national
honour that public men were found base enough to reprobate the
convention of Cintra, to sneer at sir John Moore’s operations, and
yet to declare the Walcheren expedition wise, profitable, and even
glorious!
The operation against Italy was less unfortunate rather than
more ably conducted, and it was equally abortive. What with slow
preparations, the voyage, and the taking of the petty islands of
Ischia and Procida, thirteen weeks were wasted; and yet, during
that period, Murat, conscious of his inability to resist, was only
restrained from abandoning Naples by the firmness of his queen,
and the energy of Sallicetti, the minister of police. We have
seen that it was the wish of the ministers to have the troops
in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, but, yielding to the
representations of sir John Stuart, they permitted him to make
this display of military foolery: yet it is not with the bad or
good success of these expeditions that this history has to deal,
but with that palpable and direful ministerial incapacity which
suffered two men, notoriously unfitted for war, to waste and
dissipate the military strength of England on secondary objects,
while a renowned commander, placed at the most important point, was
left without an adequate force.
For the first time since the commencement of the Peninsula war,
sixty thousand Spanish troops, well armed and clothed, were
collected in a mass, and in the right place, communicating with a
British force. For the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny
of France, the principal army of that country had met with an
important check: the great conqueror’s fortune seemed to waver, and
the moment had arrived when the British government was called to
display all its wisdom and energy. The duke of York had performed
his duty; he had placed above ninety thousand superb soldiers, all
disposable for offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers;
but the latter knew not their value, and, instead of concentrating
them upon one, scattered them upon many points. Sir Arthur
Wellesley might have had above eighty thousand British troops on
the frontiers of Portugal, and he was a general capable of wielding
them. He was forced to commence a campaign, upon which the fate of
the Peninsula, a quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of twelve
millions of people depended, with only twenty-two thousand; while
sixty thousand fighting men, and ships numerous enough to darken
all the coasts of Spain, were waiting, in Sicily and England, for
orders which were to doom them, one part to scorn, and the other
to an inglorious and miserable fate. Shall the deliverance of the
Peninsula, then, be attributed to the firmness and long-sighted
policy of ministers who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence,
or shall the glory of that great exploit lighten round the head of
him who so manfully maintained the fierce struggle, even under the
burden of their folly?
BOOK IX.
CHAPTER I.
CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA.
In the foregoing book the real state of affairs in the Peninsula
has been described; but it appeared with a somewhat different
aspect to the English general, because false informations,
egregious boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been employed to
mislead sir John Moore, were renewed at this period; and the allied
nations were influenced by a riotous rather than a reasonable
confidence of victory. The English newspapers teemed with letters,
describing the enemy’s misery and fears: nor was the camp free
from these inflated feelings. Marshal Beresford was so credulous
of French weakness as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajos
that Soult’s force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks,
was reduced to eight or ten thousand distressed soldiers. Nay,
sir Arthur Wellesley himself, swayed by the pertinacity of the
tale-makers, the unhesitating assurances of the junta, perhaps,
also, a little excited by a sense of his own great talents, was not
free from the impression that the hour of complete triumph was come.
The Spanish government and the Spanish generals were importunate
for offensive movements, and lavish in their promises of support;
and the English general was as eager, for he was at the head of
gallant troops, his foot was on the path of victory, and he felt
that, if the duke of Belluno was not quickly disabled, the British
army, threatened on both flanks, would, as in the case of sir John
Cradock, be obliged to remain in some defensive position, near
Lisbon, until it became the scorn of the French, and an object of
suspicion and hatred to the Spanish and Portuguese people.
There were three lines of offensive operations open:--
1º. _To cross the Tagus, join Cuesta’s army, and, making Elvas and
Badajos the base of movements, attack Victor in front._ This line
was circuitous. It permitted the enemy to cover his front by the
Tagus; the operations of the allies would have been cramped by the
Sierra de Guadalupe on one side, and the mountains lying between
Albuquerque and Alcantara on the other; and strong detachments must
have been left to cover the roads to Lisbon, on the right bank of
the Tagus. Finally, the communication between the duke of Belluno
and Soult being free, Beresford’s corps would have been endangered.
2º. _To adopt Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as the base of movements,
and to operate in conjunction with Beresford, the duke del Parque,
and Romana, by the line of Salamanca, while Cuesta and Venegas
occupied the attention of the first and fourth corps on the Tagus._
The objections to this line were, that it separated the British
troops from the most efficient and most numerous, and obliged them
to act with the weakest and most irregular of the Spanish armies;
that it abandoned Cuesta to the ruin which his headstrong humour
would certainly provoke; and as the loss of Seville or of Lisbon
would inevitably follow; the instructions of the English ministers,
(which enjoined the defence of the latter city as paramount to
every object, save the military possession of Cadiz,) would have
been neglected.
3º. _To march upon Plasencia and Almaraz, form a junction with
Cuesta, and advance against Madrid, while Venegas operated in the
same view, by the line of La Mancha._ The obstacles in the way of
this plan were--1º. That it exposed Cuesta to be defeated by Victor
before the junction; and that, after the junction, the combinations
would still be dependent upon the accuracy of Venegas’s movements.
2º. That sir Arthur Wellesley’s march, with reference to Soult’s
corps, would be a flank march: an unsafe operation at all times,
but, on this occasion, when the troops must move through the long
and narrow valley of the Tagus, peculiarly dangerous. Nevertheless,
this line was adopted, nor were the reasons in favour of it devoid
of force.
The number of French immediately protecting Madrid was estimated
at fifty thousand; but confidential officers, sent to the
head-quarters of Cuesta and Venegas, had ascertained that their
strength was not overstated at thirty-eight thousand, for the
first, and twenty-five thousand for the second, all well armed
and equipped, and the last certainly the best and most efficient
army that the Spaniards had yet brought into the field. Now
the English force in Portugal amounted to thirty thousand men,
exclusive of the sick, twenty-two thousand being under arms on the
frontier, and eight thousand at Lisbon: here, then, was a mass
of ninety thousand regular troops that could be brought to bear
on fifty thousand; besides which there were sir Robert Wilson’s
legion, about a thousand strong, and the Spanish _partidas_ of the
Guadalupe and the Sierra de Bejar.
The ridge of mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from
Castile and Leon being, as has been already related, impracticable
for artillery, except at the passes of Baños and Perales, it was
supposed that the twenty thousand men under Beresford and the duke
del Parque would be sufficient to block those lines of march, and
that Romana, moving by the Tras os Montes, might join the duke del
Parque, and thus thirty thousand men, supported by two fortresses,
would be ready to protect the flank of the British army in its
march from Plasencia towards Madrid. A vain calculation, for Romana
remained ostentatiously idle at Coruña, and sir Arthur Wellesley,
never having seen the Spanish troops in action, thought too well of
them; and having had no experience of Spanish promises he trusted
them too far; and, at the same time, made a false judgement of the
force and position of his adversaries. The arrival of the sixth
corps at Astorga and of the fifth at Valladolid were unknown to
him: the strength of the second corps, and, perhaps, the activity
of its chief, were also underrated. Instead of fifteen or twenty
thousand harassed French troops, without artillery, there were
seventy thousand fighting-men behind the mountains!
The 27th of June, the English army, breaking up from the camp of
Abrantes, and, being organized in the following manner, marched
into Spain:--
_Artillery._
Six brigades, 30 guns, com^d. by maj.-gen. Howorth.
_Cavalry._
Three brigades, 3047 sabres, com^d. by lt.-gen. Payne.
_Infantry._
1st div. of 4 brigades, 6023 bayonets, com^d. by lt.-gen. Sherbrooke.
2d do. 2 do. 3947 do. do. maj.-gen. Hill.
3d do. 2 do. 3736 do. do. m.-gen. Mackenzie.
4th do. 2 do. 2957 do. do. br.-gen. Campbell.
--- -- -----
5 divs. 13 brigades, 19710 sabres and bayonets.
--- -- 1287 Engineers, artillery, and waggon-train.
-----
Grand total 20997 men, and 30 pieces of artillery.
-----
Besides this force, the 40th regiment, so long detained at Seville
by Mr. Frere, had arrived in Lisbon, and the troops on their march
from that city, being somewhat less than eight thousand bayonets,
were organized in three brigades, commanded by major-general
Lightfoot and brigadier-generals Robert and Catlin Craufurd. But
the leading brigade, under Robert Craufurd, only quitted Lisbon on
the 28th of June.
The army moved by both banks of the Tagus; one column proceeding
through Sobreira Formosa, the other by Villa Velha, where a
boat-bridge was established. The 1st of July the head-quarters
were at Castello Branco, and from thence the troops continued
their route, in one column, by Moralejo and Coria; but a flanking
brigade, under general Donkin, was directed through Ceclaven and
Torijoncillos, and explored the country between Zarza Mayor and the
Tagus. The 8th, the head-quarters were established at Plasencia.
The 10th, the army arrived at that place, and was, soon after,
joined by a regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry from
Lisbon.
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.]
At this period Cuesta was at Almaraz, and Victor, of whose
intermediate movements it is time to take notice, was at Talavera
de la Reyna. When that marshal had retired from Torremocha, the
valley of the Tagus was exhausted by the long sojourn of the fourth
and first corps; but the valley of Plasencia was extremely fertile,
and untouched, and the duke of Belluno, whose troops, weakened
by the tertian sickness, required good nourishment, resolved to
take post there, and keep a bridge at Bazagona, on the Tietar, by
which he could, in two marches, fall upon Cuesta, if he ventured
to pass the Tagus at Almaraz. At Plasencia, also, he could open a
communication with the second and fifth corps, and observe closely
the movements of the English army on the frontier of Portugal. The
bridge at Bazagona was finished on the 21st of June, and the French
light troops were scouring the country towards Plasencia, when the
king, who had already withdrawn a division of infantry and a large
part of the cavalry of the first corps to reinforce the fourth,
ordered the duke of Belluno to retire instantly to Talavera,
leaving rear-guards on the Tietar and at Almaraz. This order,
which arrived the 22d of June, was the result of that indecision
which none but truly great men, or fools, are free from; the
first, because they can see their way clearly through the thousand
difficulties that encumber and bewilder the mind in war; the last,
because they see nothing.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
On the present occasion, general Sebastiani had reported that
Venegas was reinforced, and ready to penetrate by La Mancha; and
the king, swayed by this false information, disturbed by the march
of Cuesta, and still more by Blake’s advance against Zaragoza
(the result of which was then unknown), became so alarmed that he
commanded St. Cyr to move into Aragon, repaired himself to Toledo,
with his guards and reserve, withdrew the light cavalry and a
division of infantry from Victor, obliged that marshal to fall back
on Talavera; and even commanded Mortier to bring up the fifth corps
from Valladolid to Villa Castin, near Avila, although, following
Napoleon’s orders, it should have gone to Salamanca.
In the hope of meeting Venegas, Joseph penetrated as far as the
Jabalon river, in La Mancha; and as the Spaniard, fearful of the
tempest approaching him, took shelter in the Morena, the king,
leaving some posts of the 4th corps at Toledo, restored the light
cavalry to the first corps, and, with his guards and reserve,
returned to Madrid. But, while he had been pursuing a shadow,
Victor was exposed to great danger; for the Jabalon is six long
marches from Madrid, and hence, for ten days, the duke of Belluno,
with only two divisions of infantry and two thousand cavalry, in
all about fourteen thousand men, had remained at Talavera without
any support, although sixty thousand men were marching against him
from different points.
Victor did not suffer as he might have done; but his numerical
weakness was certainly the safety of Cuesta. For that general,
having followed the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha,
crossed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 23d of June, and pushed
an advanced guard towards Oropesa. He had thirty-eight thousand
men, yet he remained tranquil while (at a distance of only twelve
miles) fourteen thousand French made a flank movement that lasted
three days; and his careless method of acting, and his unskilful
dispositions, were so evident, that the French cavalry, far from
fearing, were preparing to punish him, when he suddenly took the
alarm, and, withdrawing to Almaraz, occupied himself in finishing
his bridges over the Tagus.
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations First Corps MSS.]
The 28th, Victor, having removed his hospitals and depôts from
Arzobispo, took a position behind the Alberche, keeping, however,
three battalions and the cavalry at Talavera, with advanced posts
at Calera and Gamonal. A small detachment, also, watched the
course of the Tagus from the mouth of the Alberche to that of the
Guadarama, and a moveable column was sent to Escalona, to observe
the Vera de Plasencia and passes leading upon Avila. In executing
this retrograde movement, Victor, having no means of transport,
burnt ten out of the fifteen pontoons supporting his bridge over
the Tietar, and, for the same reason, he threw a considerable
quantity of powder and shot into the river. His troops had been for
four days on quarter rations, and were suffering from sickness and
hunger; and the Tagus was fordable in several places. The danger
of his position is evident. The British were, however, still at
Abrantes, and Cuesta knew not how to profit by this opportunity
before the king returned from La Mancha.
[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, printed
in 1810.]
Such was the position of the different armies when the British
general arrived at Plasencia. He had seen Soult’s letters, found
upon general Franceschi, and thus ascertained that the second
corps was at Zamora, and from Franceschi himself, who passed
as a prisoner, at the same time, he learned the arrival of the
fifth corps at Valladolid; but the march of Ney’s corps was not
suspected, and the tenor of Soult’s letters led to the notion that
Gallicia was to be retained. A letter of Victor’s to Joseph, dated
the 23d of June, and written in the most desponding language,
had been likewise intercepted; and, as Soult’s correspondence
also gave a strong picture of _his_ difficulties, the general
impression that the French armies were not only weak but utterly
dismayed was rather augmented than lessened by this information.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, could not but have some distrust,
when he knew that _two corps_ were beyond the mountains, on his
left; and, though far from suspecting the extent of his danger, he
took additional precautions to protect that flank, and renewed his
instructions to Beresford to watch the enemy’s movements, and to
look carefully to the defence of the _Puerto Perales_. But the pass
of Baños was still to be guarded, and for this purpose sir Arthur
applied to Cuesta.
The Spanish general was at first unwilling to detach any men to
that quarter, but he finally agreed that two battalions from his
army and two others from the town of Bejar, at the other side of
the pass, should unite to defend Baños, and that the duke del
Parque should also send a detachment to the pass of Perales.
Although these measures appeared sufficient to obviate danger
from Soult’s corps, weakened as it was supposed to be, they were
evidently futile to check the real force under that marshal; and
they were rendered absolutely ridiculous by Cuesta, who sent two
weak battalions, of three hundred men each, and with only twenty
rounds of ammunition per man: and yet this was only a part of a
system which already weighed heavily on the English general.
The 10th, sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to Cuesta’s
head-quarters, near the Col de Mirabete, to confer with him on
their future operations. Ever since the affair of Valdez, in 1808,
the junta had been sorely afraid of Cuesta, and, suspecting that
he was meditating some signal vengeance, they endeavoured to raise
up rivals to his power. In this view they had lavished honours and
authority upon Blake; but the defeat at Belchite having crushed
their hopes in that quarter, they turned their eyes upon Venegas,
and increased his forces, taking care to give him the best troops.
Still Cuesta’s force was formidable, and to reduce it was the
object both of Mr. Frere and the junta: the motive of the first
being to elevate the duke of Albuquerque; the intention of the
others being merely to reduce the power of Cuesta.
[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.]
Whatever might have been the latter’s ultimate intention, with
respect to the junta, it is certain that his natural obstinacy
and violence were greatly increased by a knowledge of these
proceedings, and that he was ill-disposed towards the English
general, as thinking him a party concerned in these intrigues.
When, therefore, sir Arthur, at the instigation of Mr. Frere,
proposed that a draft of ten thousand Spanish troops should be
detached towards Avila and Segovia, Cuesta replied that it should
be done by the British, and absolutely refused to furnish more than
two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to strengthen sir
Robert Wilson’s partizan corps, which was destined to act on the
enemy’s right. This determination again baffled Mr. Frere’s project
of placing the duke of Albuquerque at the head of an independent
force, and obliged the supreme junta to fall upon some other
expedient for reducing Cuesta’s power; and it was fortunate that
the old Spaniard resisted the proposal, because the ten thousand
men would have gone straight into the midst of the fifth corps,
which, in expectation of such a movement, was then at Villa Castin,
and, having been rejoined by the detachment of colonel Briche,
from Catalonia, was eighteen thousand strong, and supported by
Kellerman’s division of cavalry at Valladolid.
The discussion between the generals lasted two days; but, with the
approbation of the supreme junta, it was finally agreed that the
British and Spanish armies, under sir Arthur and Cuesta, should
march, on the 18th, against Victor; and that Venegas, advancing, at
the same time, through La Mancha, should leave Toledo and Aranjues
to his left, and push for Fuente Duenas and Villa Maurique on the
Upper Tagus. If this movement should draw Sebastiani, with the
fourth corps, to that side, Venegas was to keep him in play while
the allied forces defeated Victor. If Sebastiani disregarded it,
Venegas was to cross the Tagus and march upon Madrid, from the
south east, while sir Robert Wilson, reinforced by some Spanish
battalions, menaced that capital from the opposite quarter.
Previous to entering Spain, sir Arthur had ascertained that the
valleys of the Alagon and the Arago and those between Bejar and
Ciudad Rodrigo were fertile and capable of nourishing the army, and
he had sent commissaries to all these points to purchase mules,
and to arrange with the alcaldes of the different districts for
the supply of the troops. He had obtained the warmest assurances,
from the supreme junta, that every needful article should be
forthcoming, and the latter had also sent the intendant-general,
don Lonzano de Torres, to the British head-quarters, with full
powers to forward all arrangements for the supply of the English
troops. Relying upon these preparations, sir Arthur had crossed the
frontier with few means of transport and without magazines, for
Portugal could not furnish what was required, and, moreover, the
Portuguese peasants had an insuperable objection to quitting their
own country; a matter apparently of little consequence, because
Mr. Frere, writing officially at the time, described the people of
Estremadura as viewing “_the war in the light of a crusade, and
carrying it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause!_”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.]
From Castello Branco to Plasencia is but seven days’ march, yet
that short time was sufficient to prove the bad faith of the junta,
and the illusion under which Mr. Frere laboured. Neither mules for
the transport of ammunition and provisions, nor the promised help
of the authorities, nor aid of any kind could be procured; and don
Lonzano de Torres, although, to sir Arthur, he freely acknowledged
the extent of the evil, the ill-will of the inhabitants, and the
shameful conduct of the supreme junta, afterwards, without shame,
asserted that the British troops had always received and consumed
double rations, and were in want of nothing; an assertion in which
he was supported by don Martin de Garay, the Spanish secretary of
state; the whole proceeding being a concerted plan, to afford the
junta a pretext for justifying their own and casting a slur upon
the English general’s conduct, if any disasters should happen.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, seriously alarmed for the subsistence of his
army, wrote, upon the 16th, to Mr. Frere and to general O’Donoghue,
the chief of Cuesta’s staff; representing to both the distress of
his army, and intimating his resolution _not to proceed beyond the
Alberche_, unless his wants were immediately supplied; faithful,
however, to his agreement with Cuesta, he prepared to put the army
in motion for that river. It was known at Plasencia, on the 15th,
that Ney had retreated from Coruña; but it was believed, that his
corps had been recalled to France; and no change took place in the
plan of campaign. It was not suspected that the sixth corps had
then been sixteen days at Astorga!
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.]
The valley of the Tagus, into which the army was about to plunge,
is intersected by several rivers, with rugged banks and deep
channels; but their courses being very little out of the parallel
of the Tagus, the Alberche is in a manner enclosed by the Tietar.
Now, sir Robert Wilson, with four thousand Portuguese and Spanish
troops, had ascended the right bank of the latter river, and gained
possession of the passes of Arenas, which lead upon Avila, and of
the pass of San Pedro Bernardo, which leads upon Madrid. In this
position he covered the Vera de Plasencia, and threatened Victor’s
communications with the capital. The French marshal was alarmed;
and a movement of the whole army in the same direction would have
obliged him to abandon the Lower Alberche, because, two marches
from Arenas, in the direction of Escalona and Macqueda, would have
placed sir Arthur Wellesley between the first corps and Madrid.
But, on the other hand, the line of country was too rugged for
rapid movements with a large body; and it was necessary first to
secure a junction with Cuesta, because Victor, having recovered
his third division on the 7th of July, was again at the head of
twenty-five thousand men. With such a force he could not be
trusted near the Spaniards; and the British general resolved to
cross the Tietar at the Venta de Bazagona, and march by Miajadas
upon Oropesa.
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of the First Corps’ Operations.]
The 16th, two companies of the _staff corps_, with a working party
of five hundred men, marched from Plasencia to Bazagona, to throw
a bridge over the Tietar. The duke of Belluno had wasted many days
in dragging up fifteen pontoons from the Tagus, to form his bridge
at that place; and when he retired upon Talavera, he destroyed the
greatest part of the equipage; but the English officer employed
on this occasion pulled down an old house in the neighbourhood,
felled some pine trees in a wood three miles distant; and, uniting
intelligence with labour, contrived, without other aid than a few
hatchets and saws, in one day, to throw a solid bridge over the
Tietar.
The 18th, the army crossed that river, and taking the route of
Miajadas, reached Talayuela.
The 19th, the main body halted at Centinello and Casa de Somas. The
advanced posts at Venta de St. Juliens.
The 20th, the troops reached Oropesa; but as their marches had been
long, and conducted through a difficult country, they halted the
21st; on which day, Cuesta, who had moved from Almaraz by Naval
Moral and Arzobispo, passed Oropesa, and united his whole force at
Velada, except a small detachment, which marched along the south
bank of the Tagus, to threaten the French by the bridge of Talavera.
The duke of Belluno, aware of these movements, had supported his
posts at Talavera with a division of infantry, which was disposed
in successive detachments behind that town. His situation
appeared critical; because the allies, covered by the Alberche,
might still gain a march and reach Escalona before him; and from
thence either push for Madrid, by the pass of Brunete, or, taking
post at Maqueda, cut him off from the capital. But his sources
of information were sure; and he contented himself with sending
a regiment of hussars to Cazar de Escalona, to watch the Upper
Alberche, and to support the moveable column opposed to sir Robert
Wilson.
The 21st, the allies being between Oropesa and Velada, Victor
recalled all his foraging parties, altered his line of retreat from
the Madrid to the Toledo road, removed his parc from St. Ollalla
to Cevolla, and concentrated two divisions of infantry behind the
Alberche.
The 22d, the allies moved in two columns, to drive the French posts
from Talavera; and Cuesta, marching by the high road, came first
up with the enemy’s rear-guard, near the village of Gamonal; but
then commenced a display of ignorance, timidity, and absurdity,
that has seldom been equalled in war; the past defeats of the
Spanish army were rendered quite explicable; the little fruit
derived from them by marshal Victor quite inexplicable. General
Latour Maubourg, with two thousand dragoons, came boldly on to
the table-land of Gamonal, and sustaining a cannonade, not only
checked the head of the Spanish leading column, but actually
obliged general Zayas, who commanded it, to display his whole
line, consisting of fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand
cavalry; nor did the French horsemen give back at all, until the
appearance of the red uniforms on their right informed them that
it was time to retire. Then, and not till then, Latour Maubourg,
supported by some infantry, retreated behind the Alberche, and
without loss, although many batteries, and at least six thousand
Spanish horse, were close on his rear; but the latter could never
be induced to make even a partial charge, however favourable the
opportunity, and by two o’clock the whole French army was safely
concentrated on its position. Ruffin’s division on the left touched
the Tagus, and protected the bridge over the Alberche, which was
more immediately defended by a regiment of infantry and fourteen
pieces of artillery. Villatte’s and Lapisse’s divisions, drawn
up in successive lines, on some high ground that overlooked the
surrounding country, formed the right; the heavy cavalry were in
second line near the bridge; and in this situation Victor rested
the 22d and 23d.
It was at all times difficult to obtain accurate information from
the Spaniards by gentle means; hence, the French were usually
better supplied with intelligence than the British; while the
native generals never knew any thing about the enemy, until they
felt the weight of his blows. Up to this period, sir Arthur’s best
sources of information had been the intercepted letters of the
French; and now, although the latter had been in the same position,
and without any change of numbers since the 7th, the inhabitants
of Talavera could not, or would not, give any information of their
strength or situation; nor could any reasonable calculation be
formed of either, until some English officers crossed the Tagus,
and, from the mountains on the left bank of that river, saw the
French position in reverse.
The general outline of an attack was, however, agreed upon for the
next morning, but the details were unsettled; and when the English
commander came to arrange these with Cuesta, the latter was gone to
bed. The British troops were under arms at three o’clock the next
morning, but Cuesta’s staff were not aroused from slumber until
seven o’clock; and the old man finally objected to fight that day,
alleging, among other absurd reasons, that it was Sunday. But there
was something more than absurdity in these proceedings. Victor, who
was not ignorant of the weak points of his own position, remained
tranquil the 23d, being well assured that no attack would take
place, for it is certain that he had a correspondence with some of
the Spanish staff; and the secret discussions between sir Arthur
Wellesley and Cuesta, at which only one staff officer of each party
was present, became known to the enemy in twenty-four hours after;
indeed, Cuesta was himself suspected of treachery by many, yet
apparently without reason.
In the course of the 23d, the Spanish officer commanding the
advanced posts reported that the French guns were withdrawn, and
that it was evident they meant to retreat; Cuesta then became
willing to attack, and proposed, in concert with sir Arthur
Wellesley, to examine Victor’s position; but, to the surprise of
the English commander, the Spaniard arrived in a coach, drawn by
six horses, to perform this duty; and when the inequalities of the
ground obliged him to descend from his vehicle, he cast himself
at the foot of a tree, and in a few moments went to sleep. Yet he
was always ready to censure and to thwart every proposal of his
able coadjutor. This time, however, he consented to fall upon the
enemy; and the troops were in motion early in the morning of the
24th; but the duke of Belluno was again duly informed of their
intention; and having withdrawn his moveable column from Escalona,
and relinquished the road to Madrid, retreated during the night to
Torijos. Thus, the first combination of the allies failed entirely;
and each hour the troops of the enemy were accumulating round them;
for Venegas, who should have been at Fuente Duenas, high up on the
Tagus, had not even passed Damyel; and the king was collecting his
whole strength in front, between Toledo and Talavera; while Soult
was fast gathering his more formidable power behind the mountains
of Bejar.
[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.]
The English general was indeed still ignorant of the danger which
threatened him from the Salamanca country, or he would, doubtless,
have withdrawn at once to Plasencia, and secured his communications
with Lisbon, and with Beresford’s troops; but other powerful
reasons were not wanting to prevent his further advance. Before he
quitted Plasencia he had completed contracts with the alcaldes,
in the Vera de Plasencia, for two hundred and fifty thousand
rations of forage and provisions; and this, together with what he
had before collected, would have furnished supplies for ten or
twelve days, a sufficient time to beat Victor, and carry the army
into a fresh country; but, distrustful, as he had reason to be,
of the Spaniards, he again gave notice to Cuesta and the junta,
that BEYOND THE ALBERCHE he would not move, unless his wants were
immediately supplied; for, hitherto the rations contracted for
had not been delivered; and his representations to the junta and
to Cuesta were, by both, equally disregarded; there were no means
of transport provided; the troops were already on less than half
allowance, and absolute famine approached; and when the general
demanded food for his soldiers, at the hands of those whose cause
he came to defend, he was answered with false excuses, and insulted
by false statements. Under any circumstances this would have forced
him to halt; but the advance having been made in the exercise of
his own discretion, and not at the command of his government, there
could be no room for hesitation: wherefore, remonstrating warmly,
but manfully, with the supreme junta, he announced his resolution
to go no farther, nay, even _to withdraw from Spain altogether_.
It is evident that without these well-founded reasons for pausing,
Cuesta’s conduct, and the state of his army, offered no solid
ground for expecting success by continuing the forward movement;
but the faithless and perverse conduct of the supreme junta,
although hidden as yet from sir Arthur Wellesley, far exceeded the
measure even of Cuesta’s obdurate folly. That body, after having
agreed to the plan upon which the armies were acting, concluded,
in the fulness of their ignorance, that the combined troops in
the valley of the Tagus would be sufficient to overthrow Joseph;
and, therefore, secretly ordered Venegas not to fulfil his part,
arguing to themselves, with a cunning stupidity, that it would be
a master stroke of policy to save him from any chance of a defeat;
hoping thus to preserve a powerful force, under one of their own
creatures, to maintain their own power. This was the cause why the
army of La Mancha had failed to appear on the Tagus: and thus, the
welfare of millions was made the sport of men, who yet were never
tired of praising themselves, and have not failed to find admirers
elsewhere.
As the Spaniards are perfect masters of the art of saying every
thing and doing nothing, sir Arthur’s remonstrances drew forth many
official statements, plausible replies, and pompous assertions,
after their manner, but produced no amelioration of the evils
complained of. Mr. Frere, also, thought it necessary to make some
apology for himself, asserting that the evil was deep rooted, and
that he had had neither time nor power to arrange any regular plan
for the subsistence of the English armies. But all the evils that
blighted the Spanish cause were deep seated; and yet Mr. Frere, who
could not arrange a plan for the subsistence of the troops, that
indispensable preliminary to military operations, and which was
really within his province, thought himself competent to direct
all the operations themselves which were in the province of the
generals. He had found leisure to meddle in all the intrigues of
the day; to aim at making and unmaking Spanish commanders; to
insult sir John Moore; to pester sir John Cradock with warlike
advice; and to arrange the plan of campaign for sir Arthur
Wellesley’s army, without that officer’s concurrence.
CHAPTER II.
The English general’s resolution to halt at Talavera made little
impression upon Cuesta. A French corps had retreated before him,
and Madrid, nay, the Pyrennees themselves, instantly rose on the
view of the sanguine Spaniard: he was resolved to be the first in
the capital, and he pushed forward in pursuit, reckless alike of
military discipline and of the friendly warnings of sir Arthur;
who vainly admonished him to open his communications as quickly as
possible with Venegas, and to beware how he let the enemy know that
the British and Spanish armies were separated. In the fulness of
his arrogant vanity, Cuesta crossed the Alberche on the 24th, and
being unable to ascertain the exact route of the French, pursued
them, by the road of Toledo, as far as Cebolla, and, by the road
of Madrid, as far as El Bravo. On the 25th, still inflated with
pride, he caused the troops at Cebolla to move on to Torrijos, and
marched himself to St. Ollalla. The 26th he discovered that he had
been pursuing a tiger. Meanwhile sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing
the consequence of this imprudence, had sent general Sherbrooke,
with two divisions of British infantry and all the cavalry, across
the Alberche, to Cazalegas, where, being centrically situated with
respect to Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support
the Spaniards, and, at the same time, hold communication with sir
Robert Wilson, who had been at the latter town since the 23d.
But a great and signal crisis was at hand, the full importance
of which cannot be well understood without an exact knowledge of
the situation and proceedings of all the armies involved in this
complicated campaign.
The 30th of June, Soult, when at Zamora, received a despatch
from the emperor, dated near Ratisbon, conferring on him the
supreme command of the second, fifth, and sixth corps, with orders
to concentrate them, and act decisively against the English.
“_Wellesley_,” said Napoleon, “_will probably advance, by the
Tagus, against Madrid: in that case, pass the mountains, fall on
his flank and rear, and crush him_;” for, at that distance, and
without other information than what his own sagacity supplied, this
allknowing soldier foresaw the leading operations even as soon and
as certainly as those who projected them.
The duke of Dalmatia immediately imparted these instructions to
the king, and, at the same time, made known his own opinions and
designs with respect to the probable projects of the allies. He
was ignorant of the precise object and exact position of sir
Arthur Wellesley, but, judging from the cessation of hostility
in the north, that the English were in march with the design of
joining Cuesta, and acting by the line of the Tagus, he proposed to
concentrate the third corps at Salamanca, besiege Ciudad Rodrigo,
and menace Lisbon, which, he justly observed, would bring the
English army back to the northern provinces of Portugal; and if,
as some supposed, the intention of sir Arthur was to unite, at
Bragança, with Romana, and open the campaign to the north of the
Douro, the French army would still be in a suitable position to
oppose them.
In pursuance of this opinion, Soult ordered Mortier to approach
Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double view of preparing for the siege
and covering the quarters of refreshment so much needed by the
second corps after its fatigues. Ney also was directed to march
with the sixth corps, by the left bank of the Esla, to Zamora; but
the spirit of discord was strong, and it was at this moment that
the king, alarmed by Sebastiani’s report, drew the fifth corps to
Villa Castin; while marshal Ney, holding it imprudent to uncover
Astorga and Leon, mortified, also, at being placed under the orders
of another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. Soult, crossed by
these untoward circumstances, sent the division of light cavalry,
under his brother, and one of infantry, commanded by Heudelet, from
Zamora and Toro to Salamanca, with orders to explore the course of
the Tormes, to observe Alba and Ledesma, and especially to scour
the roads leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Plasencia: these troops
relieved a division of dragoons belonging to Kellerman, who was
still charged with the general government of the province.
The 10th of July, the march of the British upon Plasencia became
known, and it was manifest that sir Arthur had no design to act
north of the Douro; wherefore the duke of Dalmatia resolved to
advance, with the remainder of the second corps, to Salamanca,
and, partly by authority, partly by address, he obliged Ney to
put the sixth corps in movement for Zamora, leaving Fournier’s
dragoons to cover Astorga and Leon. Meanwhile, king Joseph, having
returned from his fruitless excursion against Venegas, was at first
incredulous of the advance of sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, but
he agreed to Soult’s project against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered
Mortier to return to Valladolid, where that marshal arrived, with
his first division, on the 16th of July: his second division, under
general Gazan, halted, however, at Medina del Campo and Nava del
Rey, on the route from Salamanca to Valladolid, and an advanced
guard was sent forward to Alba de Tormes.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]
The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the British army
was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and that considerable
reinforcements had been disembarked at Lisbon, became certain that
sir Arthur meant to operate by the line of the Tagus; wherefore,
he again addressed the king to move him to an immediate siege of
Ciudad Rodrigo, promising to have the three corps under his own
command in full activity in fifteen days, provided his demands
were complied with, the most important being--1º. The formation of
a battering-train;--2º. The concentration of an immense number of
detachments, which weakened the active corps;--3º. A reinforcement
of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts, drawn from France, to
enable the old troops, employed on the line of communication, to
join the _corps d’armée_. The first corps should, he said, continue
to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, and be prepared either
to prevent it from uniting with the English to disturb the siege,
or to join the first, second, and sixth corps, and give battle,
if that should become necessary. The siege might thus be pressed
vigourously, Ciudad would fall, Almeida be next invested, and the
communications of the English army, with Lisbon, threatened.
The 17th, the king replied, through marshal Jourdan, that he
approved of the plan, but had not means to meet several of Soult’s
demands, and he proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellerman
and Bonnet, with ten thousand men, to enable them to seize the
Asturias, and thus strengthen the communications with France. This
drew from the duke of Dalmatia the following remonstrance:--“_Under
present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory.
Let us prepare, first, by concentrating, on a few points capable
of defence and covering the hospitals and depôts which may be
on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so
distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and
dispersed the enemy’s masses we shall recover all our ground._”
Then reiterating his own advice, he concluded thus:--“_I conceive
it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses
only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed._” It is
remarkable that sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at this time, says,
“_I conceive that the French are dangerous only when in large
masses_.”
Meanwhile, Heudelet’s division, having pushed back the advanced
guards of the duke del Parque upon Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that
a great movement of troops was taking place near that city, and
that sir Arthur Wellesley, advancing quicker than was expected, had
already reached Plasencia; wherefore, on the 18th, Soult directed
Mortier to march upon Salamanca with the fifth corps, and, at
the same time, reinforced Heudelet’s division with Merle’s; the
latter’s place, at Zamora, being supplied by a division of the
sixth corps, the remainder of which continued on the Esla, fronting
the Tras os Montes. Thus, not less than fifty thousand men were at
or close to Salamanca, with their cavalry-posts pointing to the
passes of Baños, on the very day that sir Arthur Wellesley crossed
the Tietar to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither through
the duke del Parque, nor Beresford, nor the guerillas, nor the
peasantry, did intelligence of this formidable fact reach him!
Having put the three corps in motion, Soult despatched general Foy
to Madrid, with information of sir Arthur’s march, and to arrange
the future combinations of the two armies. “_It is probable_,”
he said, “_that the concentration of my army at Salamanca will
oblige the English general to change his plan; but, if he shall
already have advanced on the road to Madrid, we should assemble
all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side, fall upon him
altogether, and crush him. Thus, his campaign will be finished, and
our operations may go on with advantage._”
Foy arrived, the 22d, at Madrid; and, a few hours afterwards,
intelligence reached the king that the allies were at Talavera,
in front of the first corps, and that sir Robert Wilson (whose
strength was much exaggerated) was at Escalona. The die was now
cast; Joseph directed Soult to march immediately upon Plasencia,
then, leaving general Belliard, with only three thousand men, in
the Retiro, set out himself, with his guards and reserve, by the
road of Mostoles, to join Victor at Talavera. The 23d, being at
Naval-Carneiro, he received notice that the first corps would
retreat that night to Torrijos, and, in two days, would be behind
the Guadarama river; whereupon, turning to the left, Joseph
descended the Guadarama to Vargas, and effected his junction with
the duke of Belluno on the 25th.
During this time, Sebastiani, who had been watching Venegas
near Damyel, deceived that general, and, returning to Toledo by
forced marches, left three thousand men there, with the design of
obliging him to cross the Tagus, at Aranjues. With the remainder
of the fourth corps Sebastiani joined the king: and thus nearly
fifty thousand fighting men and ninety pieces of artillery were
concentrated, on the morning of the 26th, behind the Guadarama, and
within a few miles of Cuesta’s advanced guard. But, on the side
of the allies, the main body of the Spaniards was at St. Ollalla;
Sherbrooke with two divisions and the cavalry, at Casalegas; and
the rest of the English in Talavera. So that, while the French were
concentrated and in full march to attack; the allies were separated
in four nearly equal and unconnected parts, of which three were
enclosed, as it were, in a net, between the Alberche and the Tagus!
On such an occasion Napoleon would have been swift and deadly.
In retiring upon Toledo, instead of Madrid, the duke of Belluno
showed himself an able commander. Toledo was the strategic pivot
upon which every movement turned. It was the central point, by
holding which the army of Venegas was separated from the allies on
the Alberche. If the latter advanced, Soult’s operations rendered
every forward step a stride towards ruin. If, leaving Venegas
to his fate, they retired, it must be rapidly, or there would
be neither wisdom nor safety in the measure. The king knew that
Foy would reach Soult the 24th, and as that marshal had already
assembled his army about Salamanca, which was only four days’ march
from Plasencia, he might be in the valley of the Tagus by the 30th;
hence, to insure complete success, the royal army needed only
to keep the allies in check for four or five days. This was the
plan that Soult had recommended, that the king promised to follow,
and that marshal Jourdan strenuously supported. The unskilful
proceedings of Cuesta and Venegas, the separation of the allies,
the distressed state of the English army, actually on the verge of
famine, (a circumstance that could hardly be unknown to Victor,)
greatly facilitated the execution of this project, which did not
preclude the king from punishing the folly of the Spanish general,
whose army, scattered and without order, discipline, or plan, so
strongly invited an attack.
I have said that Cuesta was playing with a tiger: he had some faint
perception of his danger on the 25th, and he gave orders to retreat
on the 26th; but the French, suddenly passing the Guadarama, at
two o’clock in the morning of that day, quickly drove the Spanish
cavalry out of Torrijos, and pursued them to Alcabon. Here general
Zayas had drawn up four thousand infantry, two thousand horsemen,
and eight guns, on a plain, and offered battle.
COMBAT OF ALCABON.
The Spanish right rested on the road of Domingo Perez, and the left
on a chapel of the same name. The French cavalry, under Latour
Maubourg, advanced in a parallel line against the Spaniards,
and a cannonade commenced; but, at that moment, the head of the
French infantry appearing in sight, the Spaniards broke, and fled
in disorder towards St. Ollalla, followed, at full gallop, by
the horsemen, who pressed them so sorely that the panic would,
doubtless, have spread through the whole army, but for the courage
of Albuquerque, who, coming up with a division of three thousand
fresh cavalry, held the enemy in play, while Cuesta retreated, in
the greatest disorder, towards the Alberche.
After reaching St. Ollalla, the French slackened their efforts;
the main body halted there, and the advanced guards, save a few
cavalry-posts, did not pass El Bravo, and no attempt was made
to profit from the unconnected position of the allies--a gross
and palpable error; for, either by the sword or dispersion, the
Spaniards lost, on that day, not less than four thousand men; and
such was their fear and haste that it required but a little more
perseverance in the pursuit to cause a general rout. Albuquerque,
alone, showed any front; but his efforts were unavailing, and the
disorder continued to increase until general Sherbrooke, marching
out of Cazalegas, placed his divisions between the scared troops
and the enemy. Still the danger was imminent; there was no concert
between the commanders, the ground on the left of the Alberche was
unfavourable to a retiring party, and, as yet, no position upon
which the combined forces could retire had been agreed upon! What,
then, would have been the consequence if the whole French army had
borne down, compact and strong, into the midst of the disordered
masses?
Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, at the first alarm, had hastened to
the front, seeing the confusion beyond the Alberche, knew that a
battle was at hand; and, being persuaded that in a strong defensive
position only could the Spaniards be brought to stand a shock,
earnestly endeavoured to persuade Cuesta, while Sherbrooke’s people
could yet cover the movement, to withdraw to Talavera, where
there was ground suited for defence; but Cuesta’s uncouth nature
again broke forth; his people were beaten, dispirited, fatigued,
bewildered; clustered on a narrow slip of low, flat land, between
the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas; and the first
shot fired by the enemy must have been the signal of defeat; yet it
was in vain that sir Arthur Wellesley pointed out those things, and
entreated of him to avoid the fall of the rock that trembled over
his head; he replied, that his troops would be disheartened by any
further retreat, that he would fight where he stood: and in this
mood he passed the night.
The 27th, at day-light, the British general renewed his
solicitations, at first, fruitlessly, but when the enemy’s cavalry
came in sight, and Sherbrooke prepared to retire, Cuesta sullenly
yielded, yet, turning to his staff with frantic pride, observed
that “_He had first made the Englishman go down on his knees_.”
Sir Arthur Wellesley, by virtue of his genius, now assumed the
direction of both armies. General Mackenzie’s division and a
brigade of light cavalry were left on the Alberche, to cover the
retrograde movement: but the rest of the allied troops was soon in
full march for the position, which was about six miles in the rear.
Sir Robert Wilson, who had reached Naval Carneiro on the 25th,
and opened a communication with Madrid, and who would certainly
have entered that capital but for the approaching battle, was also
recalled. He returned, on the 28th, to Escalona, and hung on the
enemy’s rear, but did not attempt to join the army.
Between the Alberche and the town of Talavera, the country was
flat, and covered with olives and cork-trees; and, on the north,
nearly parallel to the Tagus, and at a distance of about two or
three miles, a chain of round but steep hills bounded the woody
plain. Beyond these hills, but separated from them by a deep and
rugged valley, something less than half a mile wide, was the high
mountain-ridge which divides the bed of the Alberche from that of
the Tietar. Hence, a line drawn perpendicularly from the Tagus
would cross the first chain of hills at the distance of two miles,
and at two miles and a half would fall on the mountains.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, taking the town of Talavera, which was
built close to the river, as his fixed point, placed the right
of the Spaniards there, drawing their army up in two lines, with
the left resting upon a mound, where a large field-redoubt was
constructed, and behind which a brigade of British light cavalry
was posted. The front was covered by a convent, by ditches, mud
walls, breast-works, and felled trees. The cavalry was posted
behind the infantry; and the rear was supported by a large house
in the wood, well placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat on
to the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa.
In this position they could not be attacked seriously, nor their
disposition be even seen; and, thus, one-half of the line necessary
to be occupied by the allies was rendered nearly impregnable, and
yet held by the worst troops.
The front of battle was prolonged by the British infantry. General
Campbell’s division, formed in two lines, touched the Spanish
left; general Sherbrooke’s division stood next to Campbell’s, but
arranged on one line only, because general Mackenzie’s division,
destined to form the second, was then near the Alberche. It was
intended that general Hill’s division should close the left of the
British, by taking post on the highest hill, in the chain before
mentioned, as bounding the flat and woody country; but, by some
accident, the summit of this height was not immediately occupied.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 11.]
The whole line, thus displayed, was about two miles in length, the
left being covered by the valley between the hill and the mountain;
and from this valley a ravine, or water-course, opened, deeply, in
the front of the British left, but being gradually obliterated in
the flat ground about the centre of the line. Part of the British
cavalry was with general Mackenzie, and in the plain in front of
the left, and part behind the great redoubt, at the junction of
the allied troops. The British and Germans under arms that day
were somewhat above nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets, with
thirty guns. The Spaniards, after their previous defeat, could only
produce from thirty-three to thirty-four thousand men; but they had
seventy guns. The combined army, therefore, offered battle with
forty-four thousand infantry, nearly ten thousand cavalry, and a
hundred pieces of artillery; and the French were coming on with at
least eighty guns, and, including the king’s guards, nearly fifty
thousand men, of which above seven thousand were cavalry. But what
a difference in the quality of the troops! The French were all
hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of the allied army did
not exceed nineteen thousand.
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.]
The king, having passed the night of the 26th at St. Ollalla,
put his troops in motion again before day-light, on the 27th.
Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, preceeded the column, and the
first and fourth corps, the royal guards, and reserve, followed
in succession. The appearance of the leading squadrons, near
Cazalegas, hastened, as we have seen, Cuesta’s decision, and, about
one o’clock in the afternoon, the first corps reached the heights
of Salinas, from whence the dust of the allies, as they took up
their position, could be perceived; but neither their situation nor
disposition could be made out, on account of the forest, which,
clothing the country from the Tagus nearly to the foot of the first
range of hills, masked all their evolutions. The duke of Belluno,
however, being well acquainted with the ground, instantly guessed
their true position; and, in pursuance of his advice, the king
ordered the fourth corps to march against the left of the allies;
the cavalry against the centre, and Victor himself, with the first
corps, against the right: the guards and the reserve supported the
fourth corps.
Two good routes, suitable to artillery, led from the Alberche
to the position; the one, being the royal road to Talavera, was
followed by the fourth corps and the reserve; the other, passing
through a place called the _Casa des Salinas_, led directly upon
sir Arthur Wellesley’s extreme left, and was followed by the first
corps: but to reach this Casa, which was situated near the plain
in front of the British left wing, it was necessary to ford the
Alberche, and to march for a mile or two through the woods. A dust,
which was observed to rise near the Casa itself indicated the
presence of troops at that place; and, in fact, general Mackenzie’s
division, and a brigade of light cavalry, were there posted: the
infantry in the forest, the cavalry on the plain; but no patroles
were sent to the front; and this negligence gave rise to the
COMBAT OF SALINAS.
For, about three o’clock, Lapisse and Ruffin’s division having
crossed the Alberche, marched in two columns towards the _Casa de
Salinas_, and their light infantry came so suddenly on the British
outposts that the latter were surprised, and sir Arthur Wellesley,
who was in the _Casa_, nearly fell into the enemy’s hands. The
French columns followed briskly, and charged so hotly, that the
English brigades were separated; and being composed principally
of young battalions, got into confusion, one part fired upon
another, and the whole were driven into the plain. But, in the
midst of the disorder, the forty-fifth, a stubborn old regiment,
and some companies of the fifth battalion of the sixtieth, were
seen in perfect array; and when sir Arthur rode up to the spot,
the fight was restored, and maintained so steadily, that the enemy
was checked. The infantry, supported by two brigades of cavalry,
then crossed the plain, and regained the left and centre of the
position, having lost about four hundred men. General Mackenzie,
with one brigade, immediately took post in second line behind the
guards; the other, commanded by colonel Donkin, finding the hill on
the left unoccupied, drew up there, and so completed the position.
The cavalry was formed in column behind the left of the line.
Victor, animated by the success of this first operation, brought
up Villatte’s division, together with all the artillery and light
cavalry, to the Casa de Salinas; then, issuing from the forest,
rapidly crossed the plain; and advancing, with a fine military
display, close up to the left of the position, occupied an isolated
hill directly in front of colonel Donkin’s ground, and immediately
opened a heavy cannonade upon that officer’s brigade. Meanwhile,
the fourth corps and the reserve approaching the right more slowly,
and being unable to discover the true situation of Cuesta’s
troops, sent their light cavalry forward to make that general
shew his lines. The French horsemen rode boldly up to the front,
and commenced skirmishing with their pistols, and the Spaniards
answered them with a general discharge of small arms; but then, ten
thousand infantry, and all the artillery, breaking their ranks,
fled to the rear: the artillery-men carried off their horses; the
infantry threw away their arms, and the adjutant-general O’Donoghue
was amongst the foremost of the fugitives. Nay, Cuesta himself was
in movement towards the rear. The panic spread, and the French
would fain have charged; but sir Arthur Wellesley, who was at hand,
immediately flanked the main road with some English squadrons: the
ditches on the other side rendered the country impracticable; and
the fire of musketry being renewed by those Spaniards who remained,
the enemy lost some men, and finally retreated in disorder.
The greatest part of Cuesta’s runaways fled as far as Oropesa,
giving out that the allies were totally defeated, and the French
army in hot pursuit; thus, the rear became a scene of incredible
disorder: the commissaries went off with their animals; the
paymasters carried away their money chests; the baggage was
scattered; and the alarm spread far and wide; nor is it to be
concealed, that some English officers disgraced their uniform on
this occasion. Cuesta, however, having recovered from his first
alarm, sent many of his cavalry regiments to head the fugitives,
and drive them back; and a part of the artillery, and some
thousands of the infantry, were thus recovered during the night;
but, in the next day’s fight, the Spanish army was less by six
thousand men than it should have been, and the great redoubt in the
centre was silent for want of guns.
COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH.
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.]
The hill on the left of the British army was the key of the whole
position. It was steep and rugged on the side towards the French,
and it was rendered more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom;
but towards the English side it was of a smoother ascent. Victor,
however, observing that the extreme summit was unoccupied, and
that Donkin’s brigade was feeble, conceived the design of seizing
it by a sudden assault. The sun was sinking; and the twilight
and the confusion among the Spaniards on the right, appeared so
favourable to his project that, without communicating with the
king, he immediately directed Ruffin’s division to attack, Villatte
to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the German legion, so
as to create a diversion for Ruffin, but without engaging seriously
himself. The assault was quick and vigorous: colonel Donkin beat
back the enemy in his front, but his force was too weak to defend
every part; and many of the French turned his left, and mounted to
the summit behind him. At this moment, general Hill was ordered to
reinforce him; and it was not yet dark, when that officer, while
giving orders to the colonel of the 48th regiment, was fired at by
some troops from the highest point. Thinking they were stragglers
from his own ranks, firing at the enemy, he rode quickly up to
them, followed by his brigade-major, Fordyce; and in a moment found
himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed; and Hill’s
own horse was wounded by a grenadier, who immediately seized the
bridle; but the general, spurring the animal hard, broke the man’s
hold, and galloping down the descent met the 29th regiment, and,
without an instant’s delay, led them up with such a fierce charge,
that the enemy could not sustain the shock.
The summit was thus recovered; and the 48th regiment and the first
battalion of detachments were immediately brought forward, and, in
conjunction with the 29th and colonel Donkin’s brigade, presented a
formidable front of defence; and in good time, for the troops thus
beaten back were only a part of the 9th French regiment, forming
the advance of Ruffin’s division; but the two other regiments of
that division had lost their way in the ravine; hence the attack
had not ceased, but only subsided for a time. Lapisse was in
motion, and soon after opened his fire against the German legion;
and all the battalions of the 9th, being re-formed in one mass,
again advanced up the face of the hill with redoubled vigour. The
fighting then became vehement; and, in the darkness, the opposing
flashes of the musketry shewed with what a resolute spirit the
struggle was maintained, for the combatants were scarcely twenty
yards asunder, and for a time the event seemed doubtful; but soon
the well known shout of the British soldier was heard, rising above
the din of arms, and the enemy’s broken troops were driven once
more into the ravine below. Lapisse, who had made some impression
on the German legion, immediately abandoned his false attack, and
the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost about eight
hundred men, and the French about a thousand on that day. The
bivouac fires now blazed up on both sides, and the French and
British soldiers became quiet; but, about twelve o’clock, the
Spaniards on the right being alarmed at some horse in their front,
opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which continued
for twenty minutes without any object; and during the night, the
whole line was frequently disturbed by desultory firing from both
the Spanish and English troops, by which several men and officers
were unfortunately slain.
The duke of Belluno, who had learned, from the prisoners, the
exact position of the Spaniards, until then unknown to the French
generals, now reported his own failure to the king, and proposed
that a second attempt should be made in the morning, at day-light;
but marshal Jourdan opposed this, as being a partial enterprize,
which could not lead to any great result. Victor, however, was
earnest for a trial, and, resting his representation on his
intimate knowledge of the ground, pressed the matter so home,
that he won Joseph’s assent, and immediately made dispositions
for the attack. The guns of the first corps, being formed in one
mass, on the height corresponding to that on which the English
left was posted, were enabled to command the great valley on their
own right, to range the summit of the hill in their front, and
obliquely to search the whole of the British line to the left, as
far as the great redoubt between the allied armies.
Ruffin’s division was placed in advance, and Villatte’s in rear, of
the artillery; but the former kept one regiment close to the ravine.
Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite to Sherbrooke’s
division.
Latour Maubourg’s cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse; and general
Beaumont’s cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin.
On the English side, general Hill’s division was concentrated; the
cavalry was massed behind the left, and the parc of artillery and
hospitals established under cover of the hill, between the cavalry
and Hill’s division.
COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH.
About daybreak, Ruffin’s troops were drawn up, two regiments
abreast, supported by a third, in columns of battalions; and, in
this order, went forth against the left of the British, a part
directly against the front, and a part from the valley on the
right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid
and steady; they were followed by Villatte’s division, and their
assault was preceded by a burst of artillery, that rattled round
the height, and swept away the English ranks by whole sections. The
sharp chattering of the musketry succeeded, the French guns were
then pointed towards the British centre and right, the grenadiers
instantly closed upon general Hill’s division, and the height
sparkled with fire. The inequalities of the ground broke the
compact formation of the troops on both sides, and small bodies
were seen here and there struggling for the mastery with all the
virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grenadiers
were overthrown at once, in others they would not be denied, and
reached the summit; but the reserves were always ready to vindicate
their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained. Still the
conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy; Hill himself was
wounded, and his men were falling fast; but the enemy suffered
more, and gave back, step by step at first, and slowly, to cover
the retreat of their wounded; but, finally, unable to sustain the
increasing fury of the English, and having lost above fifteen
hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke
away in disorder, and returned to their own position, covered by
the renewed play of their powerful artillery.
To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the
English guns were few, and of small calibre; and when sir Arthur
Wellesley desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him
only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, and the Spanish
gunners fought them gallantly. The principal line of the enemy’s
retreat was by the great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a
charge of horse occurred; but the English cavalry, having retired,
during the night, for water and forage, were yet too distant to be
of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against
the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the
mountain, beyond the left, taught the English general that he had
committed a fault in not prolonging his flank across the valley;
and he hastened to rectify it. For this purpose, he placed the
principal mass of his cavalry there, with the leading squadrons
looking into the valley, and, having obtained, from Cuesta, general
Bassecour’s division of infantry, posted it on the mountain
itself, in observation of the French light troops. Meanwhile, the
duke of Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta’s arrangements, came,
with his division, to sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind
the British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen, six
lines in depth.
[Sidenote: Marshal Jourdan.]
Immediately after the failure of Ruffin’s attack, king Joseph,
having, in person, examined the whole position of the allies, from
left to right, demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver
a general battle. The former replied that the great valley and the
mountain being unoccupied, on the 27th, sir Arthur Wellesley’s
attention should have been drawn to the right by a feint on the
Spaniards; that, during the night, the whole army should have been
silently placed in column, at the entrance of the great valley,
ready, at daybreak, to form a line of battle, on the left, to a new
front, and so have attacked the hill from whence Victor had been
twice repulsed. Such a movement, he said, would have obliged the
allies to change their front also, and, during this operation, they
might have been assailed with hopes of success. But this project
could not now be executed; the English, aware of their mistake, had
secured their left flank, by occupying the valley; and the mountain
and their front was inattackable. _Hence, the only prudent line
was to take up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of
Soult’s operations on the English rear._
Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged to carry the hill
on the English left, notwithstanding his former failures, provided
the fourth corps would attack the right and centre at the same
moment; and he finished his argument by declaring that, if such a
combination failed, “_It was time to renounce making war_.”
The king was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided with Jourdan’s;
but he feared that Victor would cause the emperor to believe a
great opportunity had been lost; and, while thus wavering, a
despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared that his force
could only reach Plasencia between the 3d and 5th of August.
Now, a detachment from the army of Venegas had already appeared
near Toledo, and that general’s advanced guard was approaching
Aranjuez. The king was troubled by the danger thus threatening
Madrid, because all the stores, the reserve artillery, and the
general hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited there;
and, moreover, the tolls received at the gates of that town formed
almost the only pecuniary resource of his court, so narrowly did
Napoleon reduce the expenditure of the war.
These considerations overpowered his judgement, and, adopting the
worse and rejecting the better counsel, he resolved to succour the
capital; but, before separating the army, he determined to try the
chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in war: Joseph should
have adhered to the plan arranged with Soult; the advantages were
obvious, the ultimate success sure, and the loss of Madrid was
nothing in the scale, because it could only be temporary; but, if
the king thought otherwise, he should have decided to fight for it
at once; he should have drawn the fifth corps to him, prepared his
plan, and fallen, with the utmost rapidity, upon Cuesta, the 26th;
his advanced guard should have been on the Alberche that evening,
and, before twelve o’clock on the 27th, the English army would
have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier. But, after
neglecting the most favourable opportunity when his army was full
of ardour, he now, with singular inconsistency, resolved to give
battle, when his enemies were completely prepared, strongly posted,
and in the pride of success, and when the confidence of his own
troops was shaken by the partial action of the morning.
While the French generals were engaged in council, the troops on
both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to
the rear; but the soldiers were suffering from hunger; the regular
service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces
of wheat, in the grain, formed the whole subsistence of men who
had fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly. The Spanish camp
was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired terror, but no
confidence; and Albuquerque, whether from conviction or instigated
by momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the final
attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander that
Cuesta was betraying him. The aide-de-camp, charged with this
message, delivered it to colonel Donkin, and that officer carried
it to sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter, seated on the summit of the
hill which had been so gallantly contested, was intently watching
the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened to this somewhat
startling message without so much as turning his head, and then
drily answering--“_Very well, you may return to your brigade_,”
continued his survey of the French. Donkin retired, filled with
admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetration of
the man; and, indeed, sir Arthur’s conduct was, throughout that
day, such as became a general upon whose vigilance and intrepidity
the fate of fifty thousand men depended.
BATTLE OF TALAVERA.
The dispositions of the French were soon completed. Ruffin’s
division, on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley,
and, moving by the foot of the mountain, to turn the British left.
Villatte’s orders were to menace the contested height with one
brigade, and to guard the valley with another, which, being
strengthened by a battalion of grenadiers, connected Ruffin’s
movement with the main attack.
Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, and by the king’s
reserve, was instructed to pass the ravine in front of the English
centre, and to fall, with half his infantry, upon Sherbrooke’s
division, while the other half, connecting its attack with
Villatte’s brigade, mounted the hill, and made a third effort to
master that important point.
Milhaud’s dragoons were left on the main road, opposite Talavera,
to keep the Spaniards in check; but the rest of the heavy cavalry
was brought into the centre, behind general Sebastiani, who, with
the fourth corps, was to assail the right of the British army. A
part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte’s brigade in
the valley, and a part remained in reserve.
A number of guns were distributed among the divisions, but the
principal mass remained on the hill, with the reserve of light
cavalry; where, also, the duke of Belluno stationed himself, to
direct the movements of the first corps.
From nine o’clock in the morning until mid-day the field of battle
offered no appearance of hostility; the weather was intensely hot,
and the troops, on both sides, descended and mingled, without fear
or suspicion, to quench their thirst at the little brook which
divided the positions; but, at one o’clock in the afternoon, the
French soldiers were seen to gather round their eagles, and the
rolling of drums was heard along the whole line. Half an hour
later, the king’s guards, the reserve, and the fourth corps were
descried, near the centre of the enemy’s position, marching to
join the first corps; and, at two o’clock, the table-land and
the height on the French right, even to the valley, were covered
with the dark and lowering masses. At this moment some hundreds
of English soldiers, employed to carry the wounded to the rear,
returned in one body, and were, by the French, supposed to be sir
Robert Wilson’s corps joining the army; nevertheless, the duke of
Belluno, whose arrangements were now completed, gave the signal for
battle: and eighty pieces of artillery immediately sent a tempest
of bullets before the light troops, who, coming on swiftly and with
the violence of a hail-storm, were closely followed by the broad,
black columns, in all the majesty of war.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the hill, had a clear
view of the whole field of battle; and first he saw the fourth
corps rush forwards, with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers,
and clearing the intersected ground in their front, fall upon
Campbell’s division with infinite fury; but that general, assisted
by Mackenzie’s brigade, and by two Spanish battalions, withstood
their utmost efforts. The English regiments, putting the French
skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with loud shouts, and,
breaking in on their front, and lapping their flanks with fire,
and giving no respite, pushed them back with a terrible carnage.
Ten guns were taken; but, as general Campbell prudently forbore
pursuit, the French rallied on their supports, and made a show of
attacking again: vain attempt! The British artillery and musketry
played too vehemently upon their masses, and a Spanish regiment of
cavalry charging on their flank at the same time, the whole retired
in disorder, and the victory was secured in that quarter.
But, while this was passing on the right, Villatte’s division,
preceded by the grenadiers, and supported by two regiments of light
cavalry, was seen advancing up the great valley against the left,
and, beyond Villatte’s, Ruffin was discovered marching towards the
mountain. Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately ordered Anson’s brigade
of cavalry, composed of the twenty-third light dragoons and the
first German hussars, to charge the head of these columns; and this
brigade, coming on at a canter, and increasing its speed as it
advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but, in a few moments,
came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at
a distance. The French, throwing themselves into squares, opened
their fire; and colonel Arenstchild, commanding the hussars, an
officer whom forty years’ experience had made a master in his art,
promptly reined up at the brink, exclaiming, in his broken phrase,
“_I will not kill my young mens!_”
The English blood was hotter! The twenty-third, under colonel
Seymour, rode wildly down into the hollow, and men and horses
fell over each other in dreadful confusion. The survivors, still
untamed, mounted the opposite bank by two’s and three’s; Seymour
was wounded; but major Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier,
rallying all who came up, passed through the midst of Villatte’s
columns, and, reckless of the musketry, from each side, fell, with
inexpressible violence, upon a brigade of French _chasseurs_ in
the rear. The combat was fierce but short; Victor had perceived
the first advance of the English, and detached his Polish lancers,
and Westphalian light-horse, to the support of Villatte; and these
fresh troops coming up when the twenty-third, already overmatched,
could scarcely hold up against the chasseurs, entirely broke them.
Those who were not killed or taken made for Bassecour’s Spanish
division, and so escaped, leaving behind two hundred and seven men
and officers, or about half the number that went into action.
During this time the hill, the key of the position, was again
attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, pressed hard upon the
English centre; his own artillery, aided by the great battery on
his right, opened large gaps in Sherbrooke’s ranks, and the French
columns came close up to the British line in the resolution to win;
but they were received with a general discharge of all arms, and
so vigorously encountered, that they gave back in disorder; and,
in the excitement of the moment, the brigade of English guards,
quitting the line, followed up their success with inconsiderate
ardour. The enemy’s supporting columns and dragoons advanced, the
men who had been repulsed turned again, and the French batteries
pounded the flank and front of the guards.
Thus maltreated, the latter drew back, and, at the same moment, the
German legion, being sorely pressed, got into confusion. Hill’s
and Campbell’s divisions, on the extremities of the line, still
held fast; but the centre of the British was absolutely broken,
and the fate of the day seemed to incline in favour of the French,
when, suddenly, colonel Donellan, with the forty-eighth regiment,
was seen advancing through the midst of the disordered masses. At
first, it seemed as if this regiment must be carried away by the
retiring crowds, but, wheeling back by companies, it let them pass
through the intervals, and then, resuming its proud and beautiful
line, marched against the right of the pursuing columns, and plied
them with such a destructive musketry, and closed upon them with
such a firm and regular pace, that the forward movement of the
French was checked. The guards and the Germans immediately rallied;
a brigade of light cavalry came up from the second line at a trot;
the artillery battered the enemy’s flanks without intermission, and
the French, beginning to waver, soon lost their advantage, and the
battle was restored.
In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment which will
give the victory to the general who knows how to seize it. When
the guards first made their rash charge, sir Arthur Wellesley,
foreseeing the issue of it, had ordered the forty-eighth down from
the hill, although a rough battle was going on there; and, at the
same time, he directed Cotton’s light cavalry to advance. These
dispositions gained the day. The French relaxed their efforts by
degrees; the fire of the English grew hotter; and their loud and
confident shouts--sure augury of success--were heard along the
whole line.
In the hands of a great general, Joseph’s guards and the reserve,
which were yet entire, might have restored the combat: but
all combination was at an end on the French side. The fourth
corps, beaten back on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in
confusion; the troops in the great valley on the right, amazed
at the furious charge of the twenty-third, and awed by the sight
of four distinct lines of cavalry, still in reserve, remained
stationary. No impression had been made on the hill; Lapisse
himself was mortally wounded, and, at last, his division giving
way, the whole army retired to its position, from whence it had
descended to the attack. This retrograde movement was covered by
skirmishers and an increasing fire of artillery; and the British,
reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, and
exhausted by toil, and the want of food, could not pursue. The
Spanish army was incapable of any evolution, and about six o’clock
all hostility ceased, each army holding the position of the
morning. But the battle was scarcely over when, the dry grass and
shrubs taking fire, a volume of flames passed with inconceivable
rapidity across a part of the field, scorching, in its course, both
the dead and the wounded.
On the British side two generals (Mackenzie and Langworth),
thirty-one officers of inferior rank, and seven hundred and
sixty-seven serjeants and soldiers were killed upon the spot; and
three generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, three thousand
seven hundred and eighteen serjeants and privates wounded. Nine
officers, six hundred and forty-three serjeants and soldiers were
missing; thus making a total loss of six thousand two hundred and
sixty-eight, in the two days’ fighting, of which five thousand four
hundred and twenty-two fell on the 28th.
[Sidenote: Marshal Jourdan, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations of the First Corps, MSS.]
The French suffered more severely. Two generals and nine hundred
and forty-four killed; six thousand two hundred and ninety-four
wounded, and a hundred and fifty-six prisoners; furnishing a total
of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine men and officers,
of which four thousand were of the first corps. Of seventeen guns
captured, ten were taken by general Campbell’s division, and seven
were left in the woods by the French.
The Spaniards returned above twelve hundred men, killed and
wounded, but the correctness of the report was very much doubted at
the time.
The 29th, at day-break, the French army quitted its position,
and, before six o’clock, was in order of battle on the heights
of Salinas, behind the Alberche. That day, also, general Robert
Craufurd reached the English camp, with the forty-third,
fifty-second, and ninety-fifth or rifle regiment, and immediately
took charge of the outposts. These troops, after a march of
twenty miles, were in bivouac near Malpartida de Plasencia, when
the alarm, caused by the fugitive Spanish, spread to that part.
Craufurd allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then,
withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, commenced
his march with the resolution not to halt until he reached the
field of battle. As the brigade advanced, crowds of the runaways
were met with; and those not all Spaniards, propagating the vilest
falsehoods: “_the army was defeated_,”--“_Sir Arthur Wellesley was
killed_,”--“_the French were only a few miles distant_;” and some,
blinded by their fears, affected even to point out the enemy’s
advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful
scene, the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity
of their pace; and, leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in
twenty-six hours they had crossed the field of battle in a close
and compact body, having, in that time, passed over sixty-two
English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man
carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had
the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared
his sneer about the “delicacy of modern soldiers!”
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. The moral courage evinced by sir Arthur Wellesley, when, with
such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less
remarkable than the judicious disposition which, finally, rendered
him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he could have
maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their
strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on
isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and the morning of
the 28th. A pitched battle is a great affair. A good general will
endeavour to bring all the moral, as well as the physical, force of
his army into play at the same time, if he means to win, and all
may be too little.
Marshal Jourdan’s project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy
of his reputation; and it is possible, that he might have placed
his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and by a sudden
and general attack have carried the key of the position, and so
commenced his battle well: but sir Arthur Wellesley’s resources
would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such a
movement, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy
in check with his left wing and cavalry; while the right, marching
upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter
off from the Alberche. In this movement the allies would have been
reinforced by Wilson’s corps, which was near Cazalegas, and the
contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation.
The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a
complete victory; but the allies would, even though defeated, have
ensured their junction with Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would have
fallen; and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of
operations, through the fertile country of La Mancha, would have
been obtained. But these matters are only speculative.
2º. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack
cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a
single division was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be
seen in the valley; how, then, could a single division hope to
develop its attack upon the hill, when five thousand horsemen were
hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin’s, and
the half of Villatte’s division, were paralyzed by the charge of
a single regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, the
principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march
of the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all, before
Soult reached Plasencia.
3º. It has been said, that to complete the victory sir Arthur
Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards to advance; but this
would, more probably, have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta, nor
his troops, were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry of
the first and the fourth corps were still above twenty thousand
strong; and, although a repulsed, by no means a discomfited
force. The cavalry, the king’s guards, and Dessolle’s division,
had not been engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat
the Spaniards. A second panic, such as that of the 27th, would
have led to the most deplorable consequences, as those, who know
with what facility French soldiers recover from a repulse, will
readily acknowledge. This battle was one of hard honest fighting,
and the exceeding gallantry of the troops honoured the nations
to which they belonged. The English owed much to the general’s
dispositions and something to fortune. The French owed nothing to
their commander; but when it is considered that only the reserve
of their infantry were withheld from the great attack on the 28th,
and that, consequently, above thirty thousand men were closely
and unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with sixteen thousand
British, it must be confessed that the latter proved themselves
to be truly formidable soldiers; yet the greatest part were raw
men, so lately drafted from the militia regiments that many of
them still bore the number of their former regiments on their
accoutrements.
[Illustration: _Plate 7. to face Pa. 409_
Operations of the
BRITISH, FRENCH & SPANISH ARMIES,
in July & August 1809.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]
CHAPTER III.
The French rested the 29th at Salinas; but, in the night, the king
marched with the 4th corps and the reserve to St. Ollalla, from
whence he sent a division to relieve Toledo. The 31st, he halted.
The 1st of August he marched to Illescas, a central position, from
whence he could interpose between Venegas and the capital. The
duke of Belluno, with the first corps, remained on the Alberche,
having orders to fall upon the rear-guard of the allies, when
the latter should be forced to retire, in consequence of Soult’s
operations. Meantime, sir Robert Wilson, who, during the action
was near Cazalegas, returned to Escalona; and Victor, displaying
an unaccountable dread of this small body, which he supposed to be
the precursor of the allied army, immediately retired, first to
Maqueda, then to Santa Cruz del Retamar, and was even proceeding to
Mostoles, when a retrograde movement of the allies recalled him to
the Alberche.
The British army was so weak, and had suffered so much, that the
29th and 30th were passed, by sir Arthur, in establishing his
hospitals at Talavera, and in fruitless endeavours to procure
provisions, and the necessary assistance to prevent the wounded men
from perishing. Neither Cuesta nor the inhabitants of Talavera,
although possessing ample means, would render the slightest aid,
nor would they even assist to bury the dead. The corn secreted in
Talavera was alone sufficient to support the army for a month;
but the troops were starving, although the inhabitants, who had
fled across the Tagus with their portable effects at the beginning
of the battle, had now returned. It is not surprising that, in
such circumstances, men should endeavour to save their property,
especially provisions; yet the apathy with which they beheld the
wounded men dying for want of aid, and those who were found sinking
from hunger, did in no wise answer Mr. Frere’s description of them,
as men who “_looked upon the war in the light of a crusade, and
carried it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause_.”
This conduct left an indelible impression on the minds of the
English soldiers. From that period to the end of the war their
contempt and dislike of the Spaniards were never effaced; and long
afterwards, Badajos and St. Sebastian suffered for the churlish
behaviour of the people of Talavera. The principal motive of action
with the Spaniards was always personal rancour: hence, those troops
who had behaved so ill in action, and the inhabitants, who withheld
alike their sympathy and their aid from the English soldiers to
whose bravery they owed the existence of their town, were busily
engaged after the battle, in beating out the brains of the wounded
French as they lay upon the field; and they were only checked
by the English soldiers, who, in some instances, fired upon the
perpetrators of this horrible iniquity.
Cuesta also gave proofs of his ferocious character; he, who had
shown himself alike devoid of talent and real patriotism, whose
indolence and ignorance of his profession had banished all order
and discipline from his army, and whose stupid pride had all
but caused its destruction, now assumed the Roman general, and
proceeded to decimate the regiments that had fled in the panic
on the 27th. Above fifty men he slew in this manner; and if his
cruelty, so contrary to reason and the morals of the age, had not
been mitigated by the earnest intercession of sir Arthur Wellesley,
more men would have been destroyed in cold blood, by this savage
old man, than had fallen in the battle.
[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.]
Hitherto the allied generals had thought little of the duke of
Dalmatia’s movements, and their eyes were still fixed on Madrid;
but, the 30th, information was received at Talavera, that twelve
thousand rations had been ordered, for the 28th, at Fuente Dueña
by that marshal, and twenty-four thousand at Los Santos, a town
situated between Alba de Tormes and the pass of Baños. Cuesta,
conscious of the defenceless state of the latter post, suggested
that sir Robert Wilson should be sent there; but sir Arthur
Wellesley wished Wilson to remain at Escalona, to renew his
intercourse with Madrid, and proposed that a Spanish corps should
go. Indeed, he still slighted the idea of danger from that quarter,
and hoped that the result of the battle would suffice to check
Soult’s march. Cuesta rejected this proposal at the moment, and
again, on the 31st, when sir Arthur renewed his application; but,
on the 1st of August, it was known that Soult had entered Bejar;
and then, on the 2d, general Bassecour was detached by Cuesta to
defend the Puerto de Baños, from which he was absent four long
marches, while the enemy had been, on the 31st, within one march.
The day that Bassecour marched, intelligence arrived that Soult had
entered Plasencia. Baños had been abandoned to the enemy without
a shot; for the battalions from Bejar had dispersed, and those
sent by Cuesta had been withdrawn to Almaraz by their general the
marquis de la Reyna, who also proclaimed that he would destroy the
boat-bridge at that place. This news roused Cuesta; he proposed
that half the allied army should march to the rear, and attack
Soult. Sir Arthur Wellesley refused to divide the English army, but
offered to go or stay with the whole; and, when the other desired
him to choose, he answered that he would go, and Cuesta appeared
satisfied.
On the night of the 2d August, letters were received from Wilson,
announcing the appearance of the French near Nombella, whither he,
unconscious of the effect produced by his presence at Escalona,
had retreated with his infantry, sending his artillery to St.
Roman, near Talavera. As sir Arthur Wellesley could not suppose
that sir Robert Wilson’s corps alone would cause the first corps to
retire, he naturally concluded that Victor’s design was to cross
the Alberche at Escalona, crush Wilson, and operate a communication
with Soult by the valley of the Tietar. As such a movement, if
persisted in, would necessarily dislodge Cuesta from Talavera,
sir Arthur, before he commenced his march, obtained the Spanish
general’s promise that he would collect cars, for the purpose of
transporting as many of the English wounded as were in a condition
to be moved, from Talavera, to some more suitable place. This
promise, like all the others, was shamefully violated; but the
British general had not yet learned the full extent of Cuesta’s bad
faith, and thinking that a few days would suffice to drive back
Soult, marched, on the 3d of August, with seventeen thousand men,
to Oropesa, intending to unite with Bassecour’s division, and to
fight Soult, whose force he estimated at fifteen thousand.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations 2d corps, MS.]
Meanwhile, Soult being, by the return of general Foy, on the
24th of July, assured of the king’s concurrence in the combined
movements to be executed, ordered Laborde, Merle, and La Houssaye
to march from Zamora and Toro upon Salamanca and Ledesma, and to
scour the banks of the Tormes. The sixth corps was also directed
upon the same place; and, the 25th, Soult repaired to Salamanca
in person, intending to unite the three corps there. Hearing,
however, of Victor’s retrograde movement from the Alberche to the
Guadarama, he desired marshal Mortier to march, on the 28th, to
Plasencia, by Fuente Roble and Bejar, and he placed La Houssaye’s
and Lorge’s dragoons under his command: the remainder of the second
corps and the light cavalry were to follow when the sixth corps
should be in motion. This done, Soult wrote to the king, saying,
“_My urgent desire is that your majesty may not fight a general
battle before you are certain of the concentration of all my forces
near Plasencia. The most important results will be obtained if
your majesty will abstain from attacking until the moment when a
knowledge of my march causes the enemy to retrace his steps, which
he must do, or he is lost._”
The 29th, the fifth corps was at Fuente Roble; but information
being received that Beresford, with an army, had reached Almeida
on the 27th, the march was covered by strong detachments on the
side of Ciudad Rodrigo. The long-expected convoy of artillery and
ammunition for the second corps had, however, arrived in Salamanca
the 29th; and Ney wrote, from Toro, that he also would be there
the 31st.
The 30th, the fifth corps drove the marquis de la Reyna from the
pass of Baños, and took post at Aldea Neuva del Camina and Herbas;
and the second corps, quitting Salamanca, arrived, the same day, at
Siete Carrera.
The 31st, the fifth corps entered Plasencia; the second corps
reached Fuente la Casa, Fuente Roble, San Estevan, and Los Santos.
Plasencia was full of convalescents, detachments, and
non-combatants; and when the French arrived, about two thousand
men, including five hundred of the Lusitanian legion, evacuated the
town, taking the road to Moraleja and Zarza Mayor; but four hundred
sick men, following the enemy’s accounts, were captured, together
with a few stores. During these rapid marches, the French were
daily harassed by the Spanish peasantry: the villages were also
deserted; the cavalry wandered far and near to procure subsistence;
and several slight skirmishes and some pillage took place.
The 1st of August, the second corps passed the Col de Baños, and
the head of the column entered Plasencia, which was, like other
places, deserted by the greatest part of the inhabitants. Vague
reports that a battle had been fought between the 26th and 29th was
the only intelligence that could be procured of the situation of
the allies; and, on the 2d, the advanced guard of the army marched
to the Venta de Bazagona, while scouting parties were, at the same
time, directed towards Coria, to acquire news of marshal Beresford,
who was now said to be moving along the Portuguese frontier.
The 3d of August, the fifth corps and the dragoons, passing the
Tietar, reached Toril, the outposts were pushed to Cazatejada and
Sierra de Requemada; but the second corps remained at Plasencia,
awaiting the arrival of the sixth corps, the head of which was now
at Baños. Hence, on the 3d of August, the king and Sebastiani being
at Illescas and Valdemoro, Victor at Maqueda, Cuesta at Talavera,
sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa, and Soult on the Tietar; the
narrow valley of the Tagus was crowded in its whole length by the
contending troops.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1, section 4.]
The allies held the centre, being only one day’s march asunder;
but their force, when concentrated, was not more than forty-seven
thousand men. The French could not unite in under three days,
but their combined forces exceeded ninety thousand men, of which
fifty-three thousand were under Soult; and this singular situation
was rendered more remarkable by the ignorance in which all parties
were as to the strength and movements of their adversaries. Victor
and the king, frightened by Wilson’s partizan corps of four
thousand men, were preparing to unite at Mostoles, while Cuesta,
equally alarmed at Victor, was retiring from Talavera. Sir Arthur
Wellesley was supposed, by Joseph, to be at the head of twenty-five
thousand British; and the former, calculating on Soult’s weakness,
was marching, with twenty-three thousand Spanish and English,
to engage fifty-three thousand French; while Soult, unable to
ascertain the exact situation of either friends or enemies, little
suspected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. At this moment
the fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not bear
the weight for twenty-four hours; yet fortune so ordained that no
irreparable disaster ensued.
[Illustration: _Plate 8._
_The Battle of_
TALAVERA,
_at the period of the final Attack_
on the 28^{th} July 1809.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]
At five o’clock in the evening of the third, it was known at the
English head-quarters that the French were near Naval Moral, and,
consequently, between the allies and the bridge of Almaraz.
At six o’clock, letters from Cuesta advised sir Arthur that the
king was again advancing, and that, from intercepted despatches
addressed to Soult, it appeared that the latter must be stronger
than was supposed; hence, Cuesta said that, wishing to aid the
English, he would quit Talavera that evening: in other words,
abandon the British hospitals!
To this unexpected communication sir Arthur replied that the king
was still some marches off, and that Venegas should be directed
to occupy him on the Upper Tagus; that Soult’s strength was
exceedingly overrated, and Victor’s movements not decided enough to
oblige the Spanish army to quit Talavera. Hence he required that
Cuesta should at least wait until the next morning, to cover the
evacuation of the English hospitals. But, before this communication
reached Cuesta, the latter was in full march; and, at day-break on
the 4th, the Spanish army was descried moving, in several columns,
down the valley towards Oropesa, where Bassecour’s division soon
after joined it from Centinello, and, at the same time, the cavalry
patroles found the French near Naval Moral.
Sir Arthur Wellesley having, by this time, seen the intercepted
letters himself, became convinced that Soult’s force was not
overrated at thirty thousand; and the duke of Dalmatia, who had
also intercepted some English letters, learned that, on the first
of August, the allies were still at Talavera, and ill-informed of
his march. Thus, the one general perceived his danger and the
other his advantage at the same moment.
Mortier was immediately ordered, by the duke of Dalmatia, to
take a position with the fifth corps at Cazatejada, to seize the
boat-bridge at Almaraz, if it was not destroyed, and to patrole
towards Arzobispo. The second corps was, likewise, directed upon
the same place; and the head of the sixth entered Plasencia. The
further progress of the allies was thus barred in front; the Tagus
was on their left; impassable mountains on their right; and it was
certain that Cuesta’s retreat would immediately bring the king
and Victor down upon their rear. The peril of this situation was
apparent to every soldier in the British ranks, and produced a
general inquietude. No man felt the slightest confidence in the
Spaniards, and the recollection of the stern conflict at Talavera,
aided by a sense of exhaustion from long abstinence, depressed the
spirits of men and officers. The army was, indeed, ready to fight,
but all persons felt that it must be for safety, not for glory.
In this trying moment, sir Arthur Wellesley abated nothing of his
usual calmness and fortitude. He knew not the full extent of the
danger; but, assuming the enemy in his front to be thirty thousand
men, and Victor to have twenty-five thousand others in his rear,
he judged that to continue the offensive would be rash, because
he must fight and beat those two marshals separately within three
days, which, with starving and tired troops, inferior in number,
was scarcely to be accomplished. But, to remain where he was on the
defensive was equally unpromising, because the road from Talavera
to Arzobispo led through Calera, in the rear of Oropesa; and thus
Victor could intercept the only line of retreat, and a battle must
then be fought, in an unfavourable position, against the united
forces of the enemy, estimated, as we have seen, to be above
fifty thousand men. One resource remained: to pass the bridge of
Arzobispo immediately, and take up a line of defence behind that
river, before the French could seize the Col de Mirabete, and so
cut off the road to Truxillo and Merida--a hard alternative; but
the long-cherished error relative to Soult’s weakness had dried
up the springs of success, and left the campaign, like a withered
stem, without fruit or foliage.
Cuesta doggedly opposed this project; asserting that Oropesa was
a position suitable for a battle, and that he would fight there.
Further concession to his humours would have been folly, and sir
Arthur sternly declared that he would move forthwith, leaving the
Spanish general to do that which should seem meet to him; and,
assuredly, this decided conduct saved the Peninsula, for not fifty,
but ninety thousand enemies were at hand.
It was now six o’clock in the morning, the baggage and ammunition
were already in motion for the bridge of Arzobispo; but the army,
which had been reinforced by a troop of horse-artillery, and some
convalescents that escaped from Plasencia, remained in position for
several hours, to cover the passage of the stores and the wounded
men from Talavera; the latter having just arrived at Calera in
the most pitiable condition. About noon, the road being clear,
the columns marched to the bridge; and, at two o’clock, the whole
army was in position at the other side, the present danger was
averted, and the combinations of the enemy were baffled. During the
passage, several herds of swine, which, following the custom of the
country, were feeding in the woods, under charge of the swineherds,
were fallen in with; and the soldiers, instigated by hunger, broke
their ranks, and ran in upon the animals as in a charge, shooting,
stabbing, and, like men possessed, cutting off the flesh while the
beasts were yet alive; nor can this conduct be much censured under
the circumstances of the moment; yet it was a severe misfortune to
the poor peasants, whose property was thus destroyed.
From Arzobispo, the army moved towards Deleytoza; but general
Craufurd’s brigade, with six pieces of artillery, was directed
to gain the bridge of Almaraz by a forced march, lest the enemy,
discovering the ford below that place, should cross the river,
and seize the Puerto de Mirabete. The roads were exceedingly
rugged, and the guns could only be dragged up the Meza d’Ibor by
the force of men. Nevertheless, Craufurd reached his destination
on the evening of the 5th, and the head-quarters were established
at Deleytoza, on the 7th, the artillery being at Campillo, the
rear guard occupying the Meza d’Ibor. The sick and wounded were
then forwarded to Merida; but the paucity of transport was such,
that sir Arthur Wellesley was obliged to unload both ammunition
and treasure carts for the conveyance of these unfortunate men.
Meanwhile Soult, little thinking that his object was already
frustrated, continued his march on the 5th, and Mortier took post
at Naval Moral; the advanced guard entered Puebla de Naciada, and
the patroles, scouring the roads to Oropesa and the bridge of
Arzobispo, fell in with and were chased by the Spanish cavalry
from Arzobispo; for Cuesta would not retire on the 4th, and was in
the act of passing the bridge when the French came in view. The
movements were now hurried on both sides; before dark, the Spanish
army was across the Tagus, with the exception of a rear guard,
which remained on the right bank that evening, but it was driven
across the river, on the morning of the 6th, by the fifth corps,
which afterwards took post at Valdeveja and Puebla de Naciada. Ney
also reached Naval Moral, and the second corps entered Gordo.
The 7th, Mortier examined the Spanish position, and reported that
Cuesta, having thrown up entrenchments, and placed twenty guns in
battery, to rake the bridge, which was also barricadoed, had left
two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to hold the post, and
withdrawn the rest of his army towards Meza d’Ibor. Hereupon, Soult
detached his light cavalry towards Talavera, to communicate with
the king, and brought up the second corps to Arzobispo. Meanwhile,
the duke of Belluno having, on the 5th, ascertained the retreat
of the allies from Talavera, retraced his steps, and entered that
town on the 6th. Thus the English wounded, left there, fell into
his hands, and their treatment was such as might be expected from
a gallant and courteous nation, for, between the British soldiers
and the French, there was no rancour, and the generous usages of a
civilized and honourable warfare were cherished.
The 7th, Victor crossed the Tagus, at the bridge of Talavera, and
pushed his advanced guard to Aldea Nueva de Balbaroya, on the left
bank, within a few leagues of the Spanish position, which Soult
was preparing to attack in front, for he had observed that, at a
certain point, the Spanish horses, when brought to drink, came far
into the stream, and, the place being sounded in the night of the
7th, a deep but practicable ford was discovered, about half a mile
above the bridge.
The fifth and second corps and a division of the sixth were
concentrated to force this passage, early on the morning of the
8th; but Soult being just then informed of Victor’s movement, and
perceiving that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry,
leaving only a rear guard in the works, judged that the allies
were retreating; wherefore, without relinquishing the attack at
Arzobispo, he immediately sent the division of the sixth corps
back to Naval Moral, and, at the same time, transmitted a plan of
the ford below Almaraz, directed Ney to cross the Tagus there,
seize the Puerto de Mirabete, and be in readiness to fall upon the
allies, as they came out from the defiles between Deleytoza and
Truxillo.
Meanwhile, the heat of the day had induced Albuquerque to seek
shelter for his horsemen in a wood, near Azutan, a village about
five miles from the bridge; and the Spanish infantry, keeping a bad
guard, were sleeping or loitering about without care or thought,
when Mortier, who was charged with the direction of the attack,
taking advantage of their want of vigilance, commenced the passage
of the river.
COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO.
The French cavalry, about six thousand in number, were secretly
assembled near the ford, and, about two o’clock in the day, general
Caulaincourt’s brigade suddenly entered the stream. The Spaniards,
running to their arms, manned the batteries, and opened upon the
leading squadrons; but Mortier, with a powerful concentric fire
of artillery, immediately overwhelmed the Spanish gunners; and
Caulaincourt, having reached the other side of the river, turned
to his right, and, taking the batteries in reverse, cut down the
artillerymen, and dispersed the infantry who attempted to form. The
duke of Albuquerque, who had mounted at the first alarm, now came
down with all his horsemen in one mass, but without order, upon
Caulaincourt, and the latter was, for a few moments, in imminent
danger; but the rest of the French cavalry, passing rapidly, soon
joined in the combat; one brigade of infantry followed at the ford,
another burst the barriers on the bridge itself, and, by this time,
the Spanish foot were flying to the mountains. Albuquerque’s effort
was thus frustrated, a general route ensued, and five guns and
about four hundred prisoners were taken.
Soult’s intention being to follow up this success, he directed
that the first corps should move, in two columns, upon Guadalupe
and Deleytoza, intending to support it with the second and fifth,
while the sixth corps crossed at Almaraz, and seized the pass of
Mirabete. This would undoubtedly have completed the ruin of the
Spanish army, and forced sir Arthur to make a rapid and disastrous
retreat; for so complete was the surprise and so sudden the
overthrow that some of the English foragers also fell into the
hands of the enemy; and that Cuesta’s army was in no condition to
have made any resistance, if the pursuit had been continued with
vigour, is clear, from the following facts:--
1º. When he withdrew his main body from the bridge of Arzobispo to
Peralada de Garbin, on the 7th, he left fifteen pieces of artillery
by the road-side, without a guard. The defeat of Albuquerque placed
these guns at the mercy of the enemy, who were, however, ignorant
of their situation, until a trumpeter attending an English flag
of truce, either treacherously or foolishly, mentioned it in the
French camp, from whence a detachment of cavalry was sent to fetch
them off. 2º. The British military agent, placed at the Spanish
head-quarters, was kept in ignorance of the action; and it was
only by the arrival of the duke of Albuquerque, at Deleytoza, on
the evening of the 9th, that sir Arthur Wellesley knew the bridge
was lost. He had before advised Cuesta to withdraw behind the Ibor
river, and even now contemplated a partial attack to keep the enemy
in check; but when he repaired in person to that general’s quarter,
on the 10th, he found the country covered with fugitives and
stragglers, and Cuesta as helpless and yet as haughty as ever. All
his ammunition and guns (forty pieces) were at the right bank of
the Ibor, and, of course, at the foot of the Meza, and within sight
and cannon-shot of the enemy, on the right bank of the Tagus. They
would have been taken by the first French patroles that approached,
but that sir Arthur Wellesley persuaded the Spanish staff-officers
to have them dragged up the hill, in the course of the 10th,
without Cuesta’s knowledge.
In this state of affairs, the impending fate of the Peninsula was
again averted by the king, who recalled the first corps to the
support of the fourth, then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also,
was unable to discover the ford below the bridge of Almaraz; and,
by the 11th, the allies had re-established their line of defence.
The head-quarters of the British were at Jaraicejo, and those
of the Spaniards at Deleytoza: the former, guarding the ford of
Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying the Meza d’Ibor
and Campillo, were on the right. The 12th, Cuesta having resigned,
general Equia succeeded to the command, and gave hopes of a better
co-operation; but the evil was in the character of the people.
The position of the allies was, however, compact and central; the
reserves could easily support the advanced posts; the communication
to the rear was open; and, if defended with courage, the Meza
d’Ibor is impregnable. To pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself a
difficult operation, would be of no avail to the enemy, while the
Mirabete and Meza d’Ibor were occupied, because his troops would be
enclosed in the narrow space between those ridges and the river.
The duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived that sir Arthur
Wellesley would endeavour to re-pass the Tagus by Alcantara, and
so rejoin Beresford and the five thousand British troops under
Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn, which were, by this time, near the
frontier of Portugal. To prevent this he resolved to march at once
upon Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps, to menace
the communications both of sir Arthur and Beresford with Lisbon,
and, at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo;
but marshal Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation:
he observed that sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet in march for
Alcantara; that it was exceedingly dangerous to invade Portugal in
a hasty manner; and that the army could not be fed between Coria,
Plasencia, and the Tagus; finally, that Salamanca, being again in
possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting that the sixth
corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to
cover Castile.
This reasoning was approved by Joseph; he dreaded the further
fatigue and privations that would attend a continuance of the
operations during the excessive heats, and in a wasted country; and
he was strengthened in his opinion by the receipt of a despatch
from the emperor, dated Schoenbrun, the 29th of July, in which any
further offensive operations were forbad, until the reinforcements
which the recent victory of Wagram enabled him to send should
arrive in Spain. The second corps was, consequently, directed to
take post at Plasencia. The fifth corps relieved the first at
Talavera; and the English wounded being, by Victor, given over to
marshal Mortier, the latter, with a chivalrous sense of honour,
would not permit his own soldiers, although suffering severe
privations themselves, to receive rations until the hospitals were
first supplied. The sixth corps was now directed upon Valladolid,
for Joseph was alarmed lest fresh insurrection, excited and
supported by the duke del Parque, should spread over the whole of
Leon and Castile. Ney marched, on the 11th, from Plasencia; but,
to his surprise, found that sir Robert Wilson, with about four
thousand men, part Spaniards, part Portuguese, was in possession of
the pass of Baños. To explain this, it must be observed, that when
the British army marched from Talavera, on the 3d, Wilson, being
at Nombella, was put in communication with Cuesta. He had sent his
artillery to the army on the 3d, and on the 4th, finding that the
Spaniards had abandoned Talavera, he fell back with his infantry
to Vellada, a few miles north of Talavera. He was then twenty-four
miles from Arzobispo; and, as Cuesta did not quit Oropesa until the
5th, a junction with sir Arthur Wellesley might have been effected:
but it was impossible to know this at the time; and Wilson, very
prudently, crossing the Tietar, made for the mountains, trusting to
his activity and local knowledge to escape the enemy. Villatte’s
division pursued him, on the 5th, to Nombella; a detachment from
the garrison of Avila was watching for him in the passes of Arenas
and Monbeltran, and general Foy waited for him in the Vera de
Plasencia. Nevertheless, he baffled his opponents, broke through
their circle at Viandar, passed the Gredos at a ridge called the
Sierra de Lanes, and, getting into the valley of the Tormes,
reached Bejar: from thence, thinking to recover his communications
with the army, he marched towards Plasencia, by the pass of Baños,
and thus, on the morning of the 12th, met with Ney, returning to
the Salamanca country.
The dust of the French column being seen from afar, and a retreat
to Ciudad Rodrigo open, it is not easy to comprehend why sir Robert
Wilson should have given battle to the sixth corps. His position,
although difficult of approach, and strengthened by the piling of
large stones in the narrowest parts, was not one in which he could
hope to stop a whole army; and, accordingly, when the French,
overcoming the local obstacles, got close upon his left, the fight
was at an end. The first charge broke both the legion and the
Spanish auxiliaries, and the whole dispersed. Ney then continued
his march, and, having recovered the line of the Tormes, resigned
the command of the sixth corps to general Marchand, and returned to
France. But, while these things happened in Estremadura, La Mancha
was the theatre of more important operations.
CHAPTER IV.
When the duke of Belluno retired from Salinas to Maqueda, the
king, fearing that the allies were moving up the right bank of the
Alberche, carried his reserve, in the night of the 3d, to Mostoles;
but the fourth corps remained at Illescas, and sent strong patroles
to Valdemoro. Wilson, however, retired, as we have seen, from
Nombella on the 4th; and the king, no longer expecting the allies
in that quarter, marched in the night to Valdemoro, where he was
joined by the fourth corps from Illescas.
The 5th, the duke of Belluno returned to St. Ollalla; and the king
marched against general Venegas, who, in pursuance of the secret
orders of the junta, before mentioned, had loitered about Daymiel
and Tembleque until the 27th of July. The 29th, however, Venegas
reached Ocaña, his advanced posts being at Aranjuez, his rear-guard
at Yepes, and one division, under Lacy, in front of Toledo. The
same day, one of the _partidas_, attending the army, surprised
a small French post on the other side of the Tagus; and Lacy’s
division skirmished with the garrison of Toledo.
The 30th, Venegas heard of the battle of Talavera; and at the same
time Lacy reported that the head of the enemy’s columns were to be
seen on the road beyond Toledo. Hereupon, the Spanish commander
reinforced Lacy, and gave him Mora as a point of retreat; but, on
the 2d of August, being falsely informed by Cuesta that the allied
troops would immediately march upon Madrid, Venegas recalled
his divisions from Toledo, pretending to concentrate his army at
Aranjuez, in order to march also upon the capital; but he had no
intention of doing so; for the junta did not desire to see Cuesta,
at the head of sixty thousand men, in that city; and, previous to
the battle of Talavera, had not only forbidden him to enter Madrid,
but appointed another man governor. This prohibition would, no
doubt, have been disregarded by Cuesta; but Venegas was obedient
to their secret instructions, and under pretence of danger to his
flanks, if he marched on the capital, remained at Aranjuez, where
his flank being equally exposed to an enemy coming from Toledo, he
yet performed no service to the general cause.
The 3d, he pushed an advanced guard to Puente Largo; and leaving
six hundred infantry, and some cavalry, near Toledo, concentrated
his army between Aranjuez and Ocaña; and in this position he
remained until the 5th, when his advanced guard was driven from
the Puente Largo, and across the Tagus. His line of posts on that
river was then attacked by the French skirmishers, and, under
cover of a heavy cannonade, his position was examined by the
enemy’s generals; but when the latter found that all the bridges
above and below Aranjuez were broken down, they resolved to pass
the Tagus at Toledo. With this intent, the French army re-crossed
the Xarama river, and marched in the direction of that city; but
Venegas still keeping his posts at Aranjuez, foolishly dispersed
his other divisions at Tembleque, Ocaña, and Guardia. He himself
was desirous of defending La Mancha. The central junta, with more
prudence, wished him to retreat into the Sierra Morena; but Mr.
Frere proposed that his army should be divided; one part to enter
the Morena, and the other to march by Cuença, upon Aragon, and so
to menace the communications with France! The admirable absurdity
of this proposal would probably have caused it to be adopted, if
Sebastiani’s movements had not put an end to the discussion. That
general, crossing the Tagus at Toledo, and at a ford higher up,
drove the Spaniards’ left back upon the Guazalate. This was on the
9th of August; on the 10th, Venegas concentrated his whole army
at Almonacid, and, holding a council of war, resolved to attack
the French on the 12th; but the time was miscalculated. Sebastiani
advanced on the 11th, and commenced
THE BATTLE OF ALMONACID.
The army of Venegas, including two thousand cavalry, was somewhat
more than twenty-five thousand strong, with forty pieces of
artillery. It was the most efficient Spanish force that had yet
taken the field; it was composed of the best regiments in Spain,
well armed and clothed; and the generals of division were neither
incapacitated by age, nor destitute of experience, most of them
having been employed in the previous campaign. The village of
Almonacid was in the centre of the Spanish position; and, together
with some table-land in front of it, was occupied by two divisions
of infantry under general Castejon. The left wing, under general
Lacy, rested on a hill which covered the main road to Consuegra.
The right wing, commanded by general Vigodet, was drawn up on some
rising ground covering the road to Tembleque. A reserve, under
general Giron, and the greatest part of the artillery, were posted
behind the centre, on a rugged hill, crowned by an old castle. The
cavalry were placed at the extremity of each wing.
General Dessolles, with the French reserve, was still some hours’
march behind, but Sebastiani, after observing the dispositions
made by Venegas, resolved to attack him with the fourth corps
only. The Polish division immediately marched against the front;
Leval’s Germans turned the flank of the hill, on which the Spanish
left was posted; and two French brigades were directed upon the
centre. After a sharp fight, the Spanish left was put to flight;
but Venegas, outflanking the victorious troops with his cavalry,
charged and threw them into disorder. At this moment, the head of
Dessolles’s column arrived, and enabled Sabastiani’s reserves to
restore the combat; and then the Spanish cavalry, shattered by
musketry, and by the fire of four pieces of artillery, was, in
turn, charged by a French regiment of horse, and broken. Venegas
rallied his troops again on the castle-hill, behind the village;
but the king came up with the remainder of the reserve, and the
attack was renewed. The Poles and Germans continued their march
against the left flank of the Spaniards; nine fresh battalions fell
upon their centre, and a column of six battalions forced the right.
The height and the castle were thus carried at the first effort.
Venegas attempted to cover his retreat, by making a stand in the
plain behind; but two divisions of dragoons charged his troops
before they could re-form, and the disorder became irremediable.
The Spaniards, throwing away their arms, dispersed in every
direction, and were pursued and slaughtered by the horsemen for
several hours.
Following the French account, three thousand of the vanquished
were slain, and four thousand taken prisoners; and all the
guns, baggage, ammunition, and carriages fell into the hands of
the victors, whose loss did not exceed fifteen hundred men. The
remnants of the defeated army took shelter in the Sierra Morena.
The head-quarters of the fourth corps were then established at
Aranjuez; those of the first at Toledo; and the king returned in
triumph to the capital.
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.]
The allied troops, however, still held their position at
Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, and sir Arthur Wellesley was not, at
the first, without hopes to maintain himself there, or even to
resume offensive operations; for he knew that Ney had returned
to Salamanca, and he erroneously believed that Mortier commanded
only a part of the first corps, and that the remainder were at
Toledo. On the other hand, his own strength was about seventeen
thousand men; Beresford had reached Moraleja, with from twelve to
fourteen thousand Portuguese; and between the frontier of Portugal
and Lisbon there were at least five thousand British troops,
composing the brigades of Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn. If Soult
invaded Portugal, the intention of the English general was to have
followed him. If the French remained in their present position, he
meant to re-cross the Tagus, and, in conjunction with Beresford’s
troops, to fall upon their right at Plasencia. For his own front
he had no fear; and he was taking measures to restore the broken
arch of the Cardinal’s bridge over the Tagus, with a view to his
operation against Plasencia, when the misconduct of the Spanish
government and its generals again obliged him to look solely to the
preservation of his own army.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 7.]
From the 23d of July, when the bad faith of the junta, the apathy
of the people in Estremadura, and the wayward folly of Cuesta, had
checked the forward movements of the British, the privations of the
latter, which had commenced at Plasencia, daily increased. It was
in vain that sir Arthur, remonstrating with Cuesta and the junta,
had warned them of the consequences; it was in vain that he refused
to pass the Alberche until the necessary supplies were secured. His
reasonings, his representations, and even the fact of his having
halted at Talavera, were alike disregarded by men who, judging
from their own habits, concluded that his actions would also be at
variance with his professions.
If he demanded food for his troops, he was answered by false
statements of what had been supplied, and falser promises of what
would be done; and the glorious services rendered at Talavera, far
from exciting the gratitude or calling forth the activity of the
Spanish authorities, seemed only to render them the more perverse.
The soldiers in the ranks were weakened by hunger, the sick were
dying for want of necessary succours, the commissaries were without
the means of transport; and when sir Arthur Wellesley applied for
only ninety artillery horses to supply the place of those killed
in the action, Cuesta, on the very field of battle, and with the
steam of the English blood still reeking in his nostrils, refused
this request, and, two days after, abandoned the wounded men to an
enemy that he and his countrymen were hourly describing as the most
ferocious and dishonourable of mankind.
The retreat of the allies across the Tagus increased the sufferings
of the troops, and the warmth of their general’s remonstrances
rose in proportion to the ill-treatment they experienced; but
the replies, nothing abating in falseness as to fact, now became
insulting both to the general and his army: “_The British were
not only well but over supplied_:”--“_they robbed the peasantry,
pillaged the villages, intercepted the Spanish convoys, and openly
sold the provisions thus shamefully acquired_:”--“_the retreat of
the army across the Tagus was unnecessary; Soult ought to have been
destroyed; and the English general must have secret motives for his
conduct, which he dare not avouch_:”--and other calumnies of the
like nature.
Now, from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, although the
Spaniards were generally well fed, the English soldiers had not
received ten full rations. Half a pound of wheat in the grain, and,
twice a week, a few ounces of flour, with a quarter of a pound of
goat’s flesh, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers; and
this scanty supply was procured with much labour, for the goats
were to be caught and killed by the troops; and it was, perhaps,
upon this additional hardship that the accusation of selling
provisions was founded, for, in such cases, it is in all armies the
custom that the offal belongs to the men who slaughter the animals.
But the famine in the camp was plainly proved by this very fact;
for a goat’s offal sold, at this time, for three and even four
dollars, or about double the usual price of the whole animal; and
men and officers strove to outbid each other for the wretched food.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 18.]
It has been said that the British soldiers are less intelligent
in providing for themselves, and less able to sustain privations
of food than the soldiers of any other nation. This is one of
many vulgar errors which have been promulgated respecting them.
How they should be constantly victorious, and yet inferior to all
other nations in military qualification, does not, at first sight,
appear a very logical conclusion; but the truth is, that, with the
exception of the Spanish and Portuguese, who are, undoubtedly, more
sober, the English soldiers possess all the most valuable military
qualities in as high, and many in a much higher degree than any
other nation. They are as rapid and as intelligent as the French,
as obedient as the German, as enduring as the Russian, and more
robust than any; and, with respect to food, this is sure, that no
man, of any nation, with less than two pounds of solid food of some
kind daily, can do his work well for any length of time. A general
charge of pillaging is easily made and hard to be disproved; but
it is certain that the Spanish troops themselves did not only
pillage, but wantonly devastate the country, and that without any
excuse; for, with the exception of the three days succeeding the
defeat of Arzobispo, their rations were regular and sufficient:
and, with respect to the interruption of their convoys, by the
British soldiers, the reverse was the fact. _The Spanish cavalry
intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English
army, and fired upon the foragers, as if they had been enemies._
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.]
Before the middle of August there were, in the six regiments of
English cavalry, a thousand men completely dismounted, and the
horses of seven hundred others were unserviceable. The baggage
animals died in greater numbers; the artillery cattle were scarcely
able to drag the guns; and one-third of the reserve ammunition was
given over to the Spaniards, because the ammunition carts were
required for the conveyance of sick men, of which the number daily
increased.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.]
Marshal Beresford experienced the same difficulties in the
neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. The numerous desertions that took
place in the Portuguese army, when it became known that the troops
were to enter Spain, prevented him from taking the field so soon
as he had expected; but, in the last days of July, being prepared
to act, he crossed the Portuguese frontier, and, from that moment,
the usual vexatious system of the Spaniards commenced. Romana
still continued at Coruña; but the duke del Parque was full of
mighty projects, and indignant that Beresford would not blindly
adopt his recommendations. Both generals were ignorant of the
real strength of the French; but the Spaniard was confident, and
insisted upon offensive movements, while Beresford, a general by
no means of an enterprising disposition when in the sole command
of an army, contented himself with taking up a defensive line
behind the Agueda. In this, however, he was justified; first, by
his instructions, which obliged him to look to the pass of Perales
and the defence of the frontier line; secondly, by the state of
his army, which was not half organized, and without horsemen or
artillery; and, thirdly, by the conduct of the Spanish authorities.
The Portuguese troops were not only refused provisions, but
those which had been collected by sir Arthur Wellesley, and put
into the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view to operate in
that quarter, were seized by the cabildo, as security for a debt
pretended to be due for the supply of sir John Moore’s army. The
claim itself was of doubtful character, for Cradock had before
offered to pay it if the cabildo would produce the voucher for its
being due, a preliminary which had not been complied with. There
was also an English commissary at Ciudad Rodrigo, empowered to
liquidate that and any other just claim upon the British military
chest; but the cabildo, like all Spaniards, mistaking violence for
energy, preferred this display of petty power to the interests of
the common cause. Meanwhile, Soult having passed the Sierra de
Gredos, by the Baños, Beresford, moving in a parallel direction,
crossed the Sierra de Gata, at Perales; reached Moraleja about the
12th of August, and having rallied the troops and convalescents cut
off from Talavera, marched to Salvatierra, where he arrived the
17th, and took post behind the Elga, covering the road to Abrantes.
The supreme junta now offered sir Arthur Wellesley the rank of
captain-general, and sent him a present of horses; and when he,
accepting the rank, refused the pay, as he had before refused that
of the Portuguese government, they pressed him to renew offensive
operations; but, acting as if they thought the honours conferred
upon the general would amply compensate for the sufferings of
the troops, the junta made no change in their system. These
things convinced sir Arthur Wellesley that Spain was no longer
the place for a British army, and he relinquished the idea of
further operations in that country. Sending his cavalry to the
neighbourhood of Caceres, he broke down another arch of the
Cardinal’s bridge, to prevent the enemy from troubling him, and,
through the British ambassador, informed the junta that he would
immediately retire into Portugal.
This information created the wildest consternation; for, in
their swollen self-sufficiency, the members of the government had
hitherto disregarded all warnings upon this subject, and now acting
as, in the like case, they had acted, the year before, with sir
John Moore, they endeavoured to avert the consequences of their
own evil doings, by vehement remonstrances and the most absurd
statements:--“_The French were weak and the moment most propitious
for driving them beyond the Pyrenees_:” “THE UNCALLED-FOR RETREAT
OF THE ENGLISH WOULD RUIN THE CAUSE:” and so forth. But they had to
deal with a general as firm as sir John Moore; and, in the British
ambassador, they no longer found an instrument suited to their
purposes.
Lord Wellesley, a man with too many weaknesses to be called
great, but of an expanded capacity, and a genius at once subtle
and imperious, had come out on a special mission,--and Mr. Frere,
whose last communication with the junta had been to recommend
another military project, was happily displaced; yet, even in his
private capacity, he made an effort to have some of the generals
superseded; and the junta, with a refined irony, truly Spanish,
created him _marquis of_ UNION.
At Cadiz, the honours paid to lord Wellesley were extravagant and
unbecoming, and his journey from thence to Seville was a scene
of triumph; but these outward demonstrations of feeling did not
impose upon him beyond the moment. His brother’s correspondence and
his own penetration soon enabled him to make a just estimate of
the junta’s protestations. Disdaining their intrigues, and fully
appreciating a general’s right to direct the operations of his own
army, he seconded sir Arthur’s remonstrances with firmness, and
wisely taking the latter’s statements as a guide and basis for his
own views, urged them upon the Spanish government with becoming
dignity.
The junta, on their part, always protesting that the welfare of
the British army was the principal object of their care, did not
fail to prove, very clearly upon paper, that the troops, ever
since their entry into Spain, had been amply supplied: and that
no measure might be wanting to satisfy the English general, they
invested don Lorenzo Calvo, a member of their body, with full
powers to draw forth and apply all the resources of the country
to the nourishment of both armies. This gentleman’s promises and
assurances, relative to the supply, were more full and formal than
M. de Garay’s, and equally false. He declared that provisions and
forage, in vast quantities, were actually being delivered into
the magazines at Truxillo, when, in fact, there was not even an
effort making to collect any. He promised that the British should
be served, although the Spanish troops should thereby suffer; and,
at the very time of making this promise, he obliged the alcaldes
of a distant town to send, into the Spanish camp, provisions which
had been already purchased by an English commissary. In fine, lord
Wellesley had arrived too late; all the mischief that petulance,
folly, bad faith, violence, and ignorance united, could inflict,
was already accomplished, and, while he was vainly urging a vile,
if not a treacherous government, to provide sustenance for the
soldiers, sir Arthur withdrew the latter from a post where the
vultures, in their prescience of death, were already congregating.
The 20th, the main body of the British army quitted Jaraicejo,
and marched by Truxillo upon Merida. The light brigade, under
Craufurd, being relieved at Almaraz by the Spaniards, took the
road of Caceres to Valencia de Alcantara. But the pass of Mirabete
bore ample testimony to the previous sufferings of the troops;
Craufurd’s brigade, which, only three weeks before, had traversed
sixty miles in a single march, were now with difficulty, and after
many halts, able to reach the summit of the Mirabete, although
only four miles from their camp; and the side of that mountain was
covered with baggage, and the carcases of many hundred animals that
died in the ascent.
The retreat being thus commenced, the junta, with the malevolence
of anger engendered by fear, calumniated the man to whom, only ten
days before, they had addressed the most fulsome compliments, and
to whose courage and skill they owed their own existence. “_It was
not the want of provisions_,” they said, “_but some other motive
that caused the English general to retreat_.” This was openly and
insultingly stated by Garray, by Eguia, and by Calvo, in their
correspondence with lord Wellesley and sir Arthur; and at the same
time the junta industriously spread a report that the true reason
was their own firm resistance to the ungenerous demands of the
English ministers, who had required the cession of Cadiz and the
island of Cuba, as the price of furthur assistance.
At Talavera, sir Arthur Wellesley had been forced to give over
to the Spaniards the artillery taken from the enemy. At Meza
d’Ibor, he had sacrificed a part of his ammunition, to obtain
conveyance for the wounded men, and to effect the present movement
from Jaraicejo, without leaving his sick behind, he was obliged
to abandon all his parc of ammunition, and stores, and then the
Spanish generals, who had refused the slightest aid to convey the
sick and wounded men, immediately found ample means to carry off
all these stores to their own magazines. In this manner, almost
bereft of baggage and ammunition, those soldiers, who had withstood
the fiercest efforts of the enemy, were driven, as it were,
ignominiously from the country they had protected to their loss.
The 24th, the head-quarters being at Merida, a despatch from lord
Wellesley was received. He painted in strong colours the terror
of the junta, the distraction of the people, and the universal
confusion; and with a natural anxiety to mitigate their distress,
he proposed that the British army should, notwithstanding the
past, endeavour to cover Andalusia, by taking, in conjunction with
the Spanish army, a defensive post behind the Guadiana, in such
manner that the left should rest on the frontier of Portugal: to
facilitate this he had, he said, presented a plan to the junta for
the future supply of provisions, and the vicinity of the frontier
and of Seville would, he hoped, obviate any difficulty on that
point. But he rested his project entirely upon political grounds;
and it is worthy of observation that he who, for many years had,
with despotic power, controlled the movements of immense armies
in India, carefully avoided any appearance of meddling with the
general’s province. “I am,” said he, “fully sensible not only of
the _indelicacy_, but of the inutility of attempting to offer to
you any opinion of mine in a situation where your own judgement
must be your best guide.”--“Viewing, however, so nearly, the
painful consequences of your immediate retreat into Portugal, I
have deemed it to be my duty to submit it to your consideration the
possibility of adopting an intermediate plan.”
On the receipt of this despatch, sir Arthur Wellesley halted
at Merida for some days. He was able in that country to obtain
provisions, and he wished, if possible, to allay the excitement
occasioned by his retreat; but he refused to co-operate again with
the Spaniards. Want, he said, had driven him to separate from
them, but their shameful flight at Arzobispo would alone have
justified him for doing so. To take up a defensive position behind
the Guadiana would be useless, because that river was fordable,
and the ground behind it weak. The line of the Tagus, occupied at
the moment by Eguia, was so strong, that if the Spaniards could
defend any thing they might defend that. His advice then was that
they should send the pontoon-bridge to Badajos, and remain on the
defensive at Deleytoza and Almaraz. But, it might be asked, was
there no chance of renewing the offensive? To what purpose? The
French were as numerous, if not more so, than the allies; and, with
respect to the Spaniards at least, superior in discipline and every
military quality. To advance again was only to play the same losing
game as before. Baños and Perales must be guarded, or the bands in
Castile would again pour through upon the rear of the allied army;
but who was to guard these passes? The British were too few to
detach, and the Spaniards could not be trusted; and if they could,
Avila and the Guadarama passes remained, by which the enemy could
reinforce the army in front,--for there were no Spanish troops in
the north of Spain capable of making a diversion.
“But there was a more serious consideration, namely, the constant
and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the
enemy. We, in England,” said sir Arthur, “never hear of their
defeats and flights, but I have heard Spanish officers telling
of nineteen or twenty actions of the description of that at the
bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of which, I believe, have never
been published.” “In the battle of Talavera,” he continued, “in
which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not
engaged,--whole corps threw away their arms, and run off, when they
were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack. When these
dastardly soldiers run away they plunder every thing they meet.
In their flight from Talavera they plundered the baggage of the
British army, which was, at that moment, bravely engaged in their
cause.”
For these reasons he would not, he said, again co-operate with the
Spaniards; yet, by taking post on the Portuguese frontier, he would
hang upon the enemy’s flank, and thus, unless the latter came with
very great forces, prevent him from crossing the Guadiana. This
reasoning was conclusive; but, ere it reached lord Wellesley, the
latter found that so far from his plans, relative to the supply,
having been adopted, he could not even get an answer from the
junta; and that miserable body, at one moment stupified with fear,
at the next bursting with folly, now talked of the enemy’s being
about to retire to the Pyrenees, or even to the interior of France:
and assuming the right to dispose of the Portuguese army as well
as of their own, importunately pressed for an immediate, combined,
offensive operation, by the troops of the three nations, to harass
the enemy in his retreat; but, at the same time, they ordered Eguia
to withdraw from Deleytoza, behind the Guadiana.
The 31st, Eguia reached La Serena; and Venegas having rallied his
fugitives in the Morena, and being reinforced from the depôts
in Andalusia, the two armies amounted to about fifty thousand
men, of which eight or ten thousand were horse: for, as I have
before observed, the Spanish cavalry seldom suffered much. But
the tide of popular discontent was now setting full against the
central government. The members of the ancient junta of Seville
worked incessantly for their overthrow. Romana, Castaños, Cuesta,
Albuquerque, all, and they were many, who had suffered dishonour at
their hands, were against them; and the local junta of Estremadura
insisted that Albuquerque should command in that province.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.]
Thus pressed, the supreme junta, considering Venegas as a man
devoted to their wishes, resolved to increase his forces. For this
purpose they gave Albuquerque the command in Estremadura, but
furnished him with only twelve thousand men, sending the remainder
of Eguia’s army to Venegas; and, at the same time, making a last
effort to engage the British general in their proceedings, they
offered to place Albuquerque under his orders, provided he would
undertake an offensive movement. By these means, they maintained
their tottering power: but their plans, being founded upon vile
political intrigues, could in no wise alter sir Arthur Wellesley’s
determination, which was the result of enlarged military views. He
refused their offers; and, the 4th of September, his head-quarters
were established at Badajos. Meanwhile, Romana delivered over his
army to the duke del Parque, and repaired to Seville. Venegas again
advanced into La Mancha, but at the approach of a very inferior
force of the enemy, retired, with all the haste and confusion of a
rout, to the Morena. The English troops were then distributed in
Badajos, Elvas, Campo Mayor, and other places, on both banks of the
Guadiana. The brigades already in Portugal were brought up to the
army, and the lost ammunition and equipments were replaced from the
magazines at Lisbon, Abrantes, and Santarem. Beresford, leaving
some light troops and militia on the frontier, retired to Thomar,
and this eventful campaign, of two months, terminated.
The loss of the army was considerable; above three thousand five
hundred men had been killed, or had died of sickness, or fallen
into the enemy’s hands. Fifteen hundred horses had perished from
want of food, exclusive of those lost in battle; the spirits of
the soldiers were depressed; and a heart-burning hatred of the
Spaniards was engendered by the treatment endured. To fill the cup,
the pestilent fever of the Guadiana, assailing bodies which fatigue
and bad nourishment had already predisposed to disease, made
frightful ravages. Dysentry, that scourge of armies, raged; and, in
a short time, above five thousand men died in the hospitals.
CHAPTER V.
OBSERVATIONS.
During this short, but important campaign, the armies on both sides
acted in violation of that maxim which condemns “_double external
lines of operation_,” but the results vindicated the soundness of
the rule. Nothing permanent or great, nothing proportionate to
the number of the troops, the vastness of the combinations, or
the reputation of the commanders, was achieved; yet, neither sir
Arthur Wellesley nor the duke of Dalmatia can be justly censured,
seeing that the last was controlled by the king, and the first by
circumstances of a peculiar nature. The French marshal was thwarted
by superior authority; and the English general, commanding an
auxiliary force, was obliged to regulate his movements, not by
his own military views, but by the actual state of the Spaniards’
operations, and with reference to the politics and temper of that
people.
La Mancha was the true line by which to act against Madrid, but
the British army was on the frontier of Portugal. The junta
refused Cadiz as a place of arms; and without Cadiz, or some other
fortified sea-port, neither prudence, nor his instructions, would
permit sir Arthur to hazard a great operation on that side. Hence
he adopted, not what was most fitting, in a military sense, but
what was least objectionable among the few plans that could be
concerted at all with the Spanish generals and government. Now,
the latter being resolved to act with strong armies, both in
Estremadura and La Mancha, the English general had but to remain on
a miserable defensive system in Portugal, or to unite with Cuesta
in the valley of the Tagus. His territorial line of operations was
therefore a matter of necessity, and any fair criticism must be
founded on the management of his masses after it was chosen. That
he did not greatly err in his conception of the campaign, is to be
inferred from the fact, that Napoleon, Soult, Victor, and Jourdan,
simultaneously expected him upon the very line he followed. He was
thwarted by Cuesta at every step, Venegas failed to aid him, and
the fatal error relative to Soult’s forces, under which he laboured
throughout, vitiated all his operations; yet he shook the intrusive
monarch roughly, in the midst of fifty thousand men.
Let the project be judged, not by what did happen, but by what
would have happened, if Cuesta had been active, and if Venegas had
performed his part loyally. The junction of the British and Spanish
forces was made at Naval Moral, on the 22d of July. The duke of
Belluno, with twenty-one thousand men, was then in position behind
the Alberche, the fourth corps near Madrilejos in La Mancha, and
Joseph at Madrid, where general Foy had just arrived, to concert
Soult’s movement upon Plasencia.
It is evident that the king and Sebastiani could not reach the
scene of action before the 25th or 26th of July, nor could Soult
influence the operations before the 1st or 2d of August. If then,
the allied army, being sixty thousand strong, with a hundred
pieces of artillery, had attacked Victor on the morning of the
23d, it is to be presumed that the latter would have been beaten,
and obliged to retreat, either upon Madrid or Toledo; but the
country immediately in his rear was open, and ten thousand horsemen
could have been launched in the pursuit. Sir Robert Wilson, also,
would have been on Victor’s flank, if, neglecting a junction with
the fourth corps, that marshal had taken the road to Madrid; and
if that of Toledo, the first and fourth corps would have been
separated from the king, who did not reach Vargas until the evening
of the 25th, but who would not, in this case, have been able to
advance at all beyond Naval Carneiro.
Now, admitting that, by superior discipline and experience, the
French troops had effected their retreat on either line without any
serious calamity, what would have followed?
1º. If Victor joined the king, the latter could only have retired,
by Guadalaxara, upon the third corps, or have gone by the Guadarama
towards Soult.
2º. If Victor joined Sebastiani, the two corps must have retreated
to Guadalaxara, and the king would have joined them there, or, as
before said, have pushed for the Guadarama to join Soult.
No doubt, that marshal, having so powerful an army, would, in
either case, have restored Joseph to his capital, and have cut
off sir Arthur’s communication with Portugal by the valley of the
Tagus. Nevertheless, a great moral impression would have been
produced by the temporary loss of Madrid, which was, moreover, the
general depôt of all the French armies; and, meanwhile, Venegas,
Cuesta, and sir Arthur Wellesley would have been united, and on
one line of operations (that of La Mancha), which, under such
circumstances, would have forced the junta to consent to the
occupation of Cadiz. In this view it must be admitted that the
plan was conceived with genius.
Victor’s position on the Alberche was, however, strong; he
commanded twenty-five thousand veterans; and, as the Spaniards
were very incapable in the field, it may be argued that a general
movement of the whole army to Escalona, and from thence to Maqueda,
would have been preferable to a direct attack at Salinas; because
the allies, if thus suddenly placed in the midst of the French
corps, might have beaten them in detail, and would certainly have
cut the king off from the Guadarama, and forced him back upon
the Guadalaxara. But, with Cuesta for a colleague, how could a
general undertake an operation requiring celerity and the nicest
calculation?
The false dealing of the junta no prudence could guard against;
but experience proves that, without extraordinary good fortune,
some accident will always happen to mar the combinations of armies
acting upon “_double external lines_.” And so it was with respect
to Venegas; for that general, with a force of twenty-six thousand
men, suffered himself to be held in check for five days by three
thousand French, and at the battle of Almonacid shewed that he knew
neither when to advance nor when to retreat.
The patience with which sir Arthur Wellesley bore the foolish
insults of Cuesta, and the undaunted firmness with which he fought
to protect the Spanish army, require no illustration. When the
latter fell back from St. Ollalla on the 26th, it was impossible
for the British to retreat with honour; and there is nothing more
memorable in the history of this war, nothing more creditable to
the personal character of the English chief, than the battle of
Talavera, considered as an isolated event. Nevertheless, that
contest proved that the allies were unable to attain their object;
for, notwithstanding Victor’s ill-judged partial attacks on the
night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, and notwithstanding the
final repulse of the French, all the advantages of the movements,
as a whole, were with the latter. They were, on the 31st of July,
including the garrison of Toledo, still above forty thousand men;
and they maintained their central position, although it was not
until the 1st of August that Soult’s approach caused any change
in the views of the allied generals; and this brings us to the
fundamental error of sir Arthur Wellesley’s operations.
That so able a commander should engage himself in the narrow valley
of the Tagus with twenty thousand British and forty thousand
Spanish troops, when fifty thousand French were waiting for him at
the further end, and above fifty thousand more were hanging on his
flank and rear, shews that the greatest masters of the art may err.
He who wars walks in a mist through which the keenest eyes cannot
always discern the right path. “_Speak to me of a general who has
made no mistakes in war_,” said Turenne, “_and you speak of one who
has seldom made war_.”
Sir Arthur Wellesley thus excused his error:--“When I entered Spain
I had reason to believe that I should be joined by a Spanish army
in such a respectable state of discipline and efficiency, as that
it had kept in check, during nearly three months after a defeat, a
French army, at one time superior, and at no time much inferior.”
“I had likewise reason to believe that the French corps, in the
north of Spain, were fully employed; and although I had heard of
the arrival of marshal Soult at Zamora, on the 29th of June, with a
view to equip the remains of his corps, I did not think it possible
that three French corps, consisting of thirty-four thousand men,
under three marshals, could have been assembled at Salamanca
without the knowledge of the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of the
junta of Castile; that these corps could have been moved from their
stations in Gallicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, without setting
free, for general operations, any Spanish troops which had been
opposed to them, or without any other inconvenience to the enemy
than that of protracting, to a later period, the settlement of his
government in those provinces;--and that they could have penetrated
into Estremadura, without a shot being fired at them by the troops
deemed sufficient to defend the passes by the Spanish generals.”
But thus it was that, like the figures in a phantasmagoria, the
military preparations of Spain, however menacing in appearance,
were invariably found to be vain and illusory.
That sir Arthur Wellesley’s error was not fatal is to be attributed
to three causes:--
1º. The reluctance of marshal Ney to quit Astorga;--2º. The march
of the fifth corps upon Villa Castin instead of Salamanca;--3º.
The vehemence with which Victor advised the battle of Talavera: in
short, jealousy among the marshals, and the undecided temper of the
king.
If Soult had not been thwarted, he would have concentrated the
three corps near Salamanca before the 20th, and he would have
reached Plasencia before the 28th of July. The allies must then
have forced their way into La Mancha, or been crushed; but could
they have done the former without another battle? without the
loss of all the wounded men? could they have done it at all? The
British, including Robert Craufurd’s brigade, were seventeen
thousand fighting men on the 29th, but wasted with fatigue and
hunger. The Spaniards were above thirty thousand: but in them no
trust could be placed for an effort requiring fine discipline and
courage of the highest order. The intrusive king was at the head of
forty thousand good troops. Venegas, at once ignorant and hampered
by the intrigues of the junta, was as nought in the operations;
but Soult’s step, stealthy while the situation of affairs was
obscure, would have been impetuous when a light broke on the field
of battle; and it is scarcely possible to conceive that the allies
could have forced their way in front before that marshal would have
fallen on their rear.
FRENCH OPERATIONS.
The intrusive monarch was finally successful; yet it may be safely
affirmed that, with the exception of uniting his three corps behind
the Guadarama, on the evening of the 25th, his proceedings were an
uninterrupted series of errors. First, he would not suffer Soult
to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo with seventy thousand men, in the end
of July. To protect Madrid from the army of Venegas overbalanced,
in his mind, the advantages of this bold and grand project,
which would inevitably have drawn sir Arthur Wellesley from the
Tagus, and which, interrupting all military communication between
the northern and southern provinces, and ensuring possession of
Castile and Leon, would, by its success, have opened a broad way
to Lisbon. But Cuesta and Venegas, meanwhile, would have marched
against Madrid! Cuesta and Venegas, acting on external lines, and
whose united force did not exceed sixty-five thousand men! And
the king, holding a central position, with fifty thousand French
veterans, was alarmed at this prospect, and, rejecting Soult’s
plan, drew Mortier, with the fifth corps, to Villa Castin. Truly,
this was to neglect the bearing fruit-tree from fear of the nettle
at its stem!
Sir Arthur Wellesley’s advance to Talavera was the result of this
great error; but he having thus incautiously afforded Soult an
opportunity of striking a fatal blow, a fresh combination was
concerted. The king, with equal judgement and activity, then united
all his own forces near Toledo, separated Venegas from Cuesta,
pushed back the latter upon the English army, and obliged both to
stand on the defensive, with eyes attentively directed to their
front, when the real point of danger was in the rear. This was
skilful; but the battle of Talavera which followed was a palpable,
an enormous, fault. The allies could neither move forward nor
backward, without being infinitely worse situated for success than
in that strong position, which seemed marked out by fortune herself
for their security. Until the 31st, the operations of Venegas were
not even felt; hence, till the 31st, the position on the Alberche
might have been maintained without danger; and, on the first of
August, the head of Soult’s column was at Plasencia.
Let us suppose that the French had merely made demonstrations on
the 28th, and had retired behind the Alberche the 29th, would the
allies have dared to attack them in that position? The conduct
of the Spaniards, on the evening of the 27th, answers the
question; and, moreover, Joseph, with an army compact, active,
and experienced, could, with ease, have baffled any efforts of
the combined forces to bring him to action; he might have covered
himself by the Guadarama and by the Tagus, in succession, and the
farther he led his opponents from Talavera, without uncovering
the line of La Mancha, the more certain the effect of Soult’s
operation: but here we have another proof that double external
lines are essentially vicious.
The combined movement of the French was desirable, from the
greatness of the object to be gained, and safe, from the powerful
force on each point. The occasion was so favourable that,
notwithstanding the imprudent heat of Victor, the reluctance of
Ney, and the unsteady temper of the king, the fate of the allies
was, up to the evening of the 3d, heavy in the scale. Nevertheless,
as the central position held by the allies, cut the line of
correspondence between Joseph and Soult, the king’s despatches
were intercepted, and the whole operation, even at the last hour,
was baffled. The first element of success in war is, that every
thing should emanate from a single head; and it would have been
preferable that the king, drawing the second and fifth corps to him
by the pass of the Guadarama, or by that of Avila, should, with the
eighty thousand men thus united, have fallen upon the allies in
front. Such a combination, although of less brilliant promise than
the one adopted, would have been more sure; and the less a general
trusts to fortune the better:--she is capricious!
When one Spanish army was surprised at Arzobispo, another
completely beaten at Almonacid, and when Wilson’s Portuguese corps
was dispersed at Baños, the junta had just completed the measure
of their folly by quarrelling with the only force left that could
protect them. The French were, in truth, therefore, the masters of
the Peninsula; but they terminated their operations at the very
moment when they should have pursued them with redoubled activity;
for the general aspect of affairs and the particular circumstances
of the campaign were alike favourable.
Napoleon was victorious in Germany; and of the British expeditions
against Italy and Holland, the former had scarcely struggled into
life,--the latter was already corrupting in death. Hence, Joseph
might have been assured that he would receive reinforcements, but
that none, of any consequence, could reach his adversaries; and, in
the Peninsula, there was nothing to oppose him. Navarre, Biscay,
Aragon, and the Castiles were subdued; Gerona closely beleaguered;
and the rest of Catalonia, if not quiescent, totally unable to
succour that noble city. Valencia was inert; the Asturias still
trembling; and in Gallicia there was nothing but confusion. Romana,
commanding fifteen thousand infantry, but neither cavalry nor
artillery, was still at Coruña, and durst not quit the mountains.
The duke del Parque held Ciudad Rodrigo, but was in no condition
to make head against more than a French division. The battle
of Almonacid had cleared La Mancha of troops. Estremadura and
Andalusia were, as we have seen, weak, distracted, and incapable of
solid resistance. There remained only the English and Portuguese
armies, the one being at Jaraceijo, the other at Moraleja.
The line of resistance may, therefore, be said to have extended
from the Sierra Morena to Coruña--weak from its length; weaker,
that the allied corps, being separated by mountains, by rivers,
and by vast tracts of country, and having different bases of
operation, such as Lisbon, Seville, and Ciudad Rodrigo, could not
act in concert, except offensively; and with how little effect in
that way the campaign of Talavera had proved. But the French were
concentrated in a narrow space, and, having only Madrid to cover,
were advantageously situated for offensive or defensive movements.
The allied forces were, for the most part, imperfectly organized,
and would not, altogether, have amounted to ninety thousand
fighting men. The French were above one hundred thousand, dangerous
from their discipline and experience, more dangerous that they held
a central position, and that their numbers were unknown to their
opponents; and, moreover, having, in four days, gained one general
and two minor battles, their courage was high and eager.
[Sidenote: See Calvo Garray and Lord Wellesley’s Correspondence,
Parl. Papers, 1810.]
At this period, by the acknowledgement of the Spaniards themselves,
the fate of the country depended entirely upon the British troops,
and, doubtless, the latter were soldiers of no ordinary stamp;
but there is a limit to human power, in war as well as in other
matters. Sir Arthur Wellesley was at the head of some seventeen
thousand men, of all arms, and about five thousand were somewhere
between Lisbon and Alcantara: but the whole French army could, in
two days, have been concentrated in the valley of the Tagus. Soult,
alone, of all the associated generals, appears to have viewed this
crisis with the eye of a great commander. Had he been permitted
to follow up the attack at Arzobispo, on the 8th of August, what
could the seventeen thousand starving British troops, encumbered
with the terror-stricken Spaniards, have effected against the
seventy thousand French that would have stormed their positions on
three sides at once? The hardy, enduring English infantry might,
indeed, have held their ground in one battle, but could they
have fought a second? Would not a movement of the first corps by
Guadalupe, would not famine alone, have forced the ten or twelve
thousand men remaining (if, indeed, so many were left) to abandon
the banks of the Tagus, to abandon, also, their parcs of ammunition
and their wounded men, and to retreat towards Portugal; and to
retreat, also, with little hope, harassed, as they would have been,
by six thousand horsemen, for Soult had eighteen regiments of
cavalry?
[Sidenote: Parl. Pap. 1810.]
Let it be supposed, however, that the strength of the Meza d’Ibor
and the Mirabete had baffled all the enemy’s efforts, and that,
seeing the allies fixed in those positions, the sixth corps, in
pursuance of Soult’s second proposal, had crossed the frontier
of Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley, contemplating such an event,
affirmed that he meant to follow them in any movement they might
make against Lisbon; but there were two ways of following, the one
by the south and the other by the north bank of the Tagus. Now, if
he designed to cross the Tagus at the Cardinal’s bridge, and so,
connecting his right with Beresford, to hang on the enemy’s rear,
it could only have been while he was ignorant of Venegas’ defeat,
and when he imagined the French to have but thirty thousand men in
the valley of the Tagus; but they had above seventy thousand; and,
without endangering Madrid, they could have invaded Portugal with,
at least, fifty thousand men under arms.
If, on the other hand, he designed to move by the south side of
the Tagus, the French line of march upon Abrantes and Lisbon was
shorter than his; and Beresford, who only reached Moraleja on the
12th, would have been cut off, and thrown back upon Almeida. It
is true that marshal Ney alleged the difficulty of feeding the
troops in the country about Plasencia and Coria, and the prudence
of Soult’s project might, in that respect, have been somewhat
questionable. But the duke of Elchingen was averse to _any_
invasion of Portugal; and, to an unwilling mind, difficulties
are enlarged beyond their due proportion. Moreover, his talents
were more remarkable in a battle than in the dispositions for a
campaign; and Soult’s opinion must, on this occasion, be allowed
greater weight, because the Vera de Plasencia and the valleys
of the Bejar and the Gata mountains were certainly exceedingly
fertile, they had been little injured, and the object was, not to
fix a base of operations, but to obtain a momentary subsistence
until a richer country could be opened.
Admitting, however, that a march on Lisbon was not feasible at that
moment, there could have been no well-founded objection to the
siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult again proposed. The emperor’s
instructions were indeed pleaded; but those were general, founded
upon the past errors of the campaign, which made him doubtful of
the future; they were not applicable to the peculiar circumstances
of the moment, and would have been disregarded by a general with a
tithe of his own genius. Fortunately for Spain, the intrusive king
was not a great commander. When he might have entered the temple of
victory with banners flying, he stretched himself at the threshold
and slept.
The departure of the English army was a remarkable epoch in the
Peninsular war. The policy of combining operations with the Spanish
armies, and of striking directly at the great masses of the French,
had been fairly acted upon, and had failed; and the long-cherished
delusion, relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency,
was at last dissipated. The transactions of the campaign of 1809
form a series of practical comments upon the campaign of 1808. All
the objections which had been made to sir John Moore’s conduct,
being put to the test of experience, proved illusory, while
the soundness of that general’s views were confirmed in every
particular. The leading events of the two campaigns bear a striking
resemblance to each other.
Both sir Arthur Wellesley and sir John Moore advanced from
Portugal to _aid the Spanish armies_. The first general commanded
twenty-five thousand, the last twenty thousand men; but there was
this difference: that, in 1808, Portugal was so disorganised as to
require a British force to keep down anarchy; whereas, in 1809,
Portugal formed a good base of operations, and a Portuguese army
was acting in conjunction with the British.
Sir John Moore was joined by six thousand men, under Romana, and
there was no other Spanish army in existence to aid him.
Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by thirty-eight thousand Spaniards,
under Cuesta, and he calculated upon twenty-six thousand, under
Venegas; while from twenty to twenty-five thousand others were
acting in Gallicia and Leon.
Sir John Moore was urged to throw himself into the heart of Spain,
to aid a people represented as abounding in courage and every other
military virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that which was
within his view, he doubted the truth of these representations, and
thinking that a powerful army, commanded by a man of the greatest
military genius, was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling
to commit his own small force in an unequal contest. Nevertheless,
feeling that some practicable demonstration of the difficulties to
be encountered was required by the temper of the times, he made a
movement, too delicate and dangerous to be adopted, unless for a
great political as well as military purpose.
To relieve the southern provinces, and to convince the English
government and the English public that they had taken a false view
of affairs, were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river;
but, although he carried his army forward with a boldness that
marked the consciousness of superior talents, he never lost sight
of the danger he was incurring by exposing his flank to the French
emperor. To obviate this danger as much as possible, he established
a second line of retreat upon Gallicia, and he kept a watchful eye
upon the cloud gathering at Madrid. Arrived in front of Soult’s
corps, and being upon the point of attacking him, the expected
storm burst, but, by a rapid march to Benevente, Moore saved
himself from being taken in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente
was, however, untenable against the forces brought up by Napoleon,
and, the retreat being continued to Coruña, the army, after a
battle, embarked.
It was objected--1º. That Moore should have gone to Madrid;--2º.
That he should have fought at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at
Lugo, instead of at Coruña;--3º. That he overrated the strength
of the enemy, and undervalued the strength and enthusiasm of the
Spaniards; and that, being of a desponding temper, he lost the
opportunity of driving the French beyond the Ebro, for, that a
battle gained (and it was assumed that a battle must have been
gained had he attacked) would have assuredly broken the enemy’s
power, and called forth all the energies of Spain.
Sir John Moore reasoned that the Spanish enthusiasm was not great,
that it evaporated in boasting and promises, which could not be
relied upon; that the British army was sent as an auxiliary, not as
a principal force; and that the native armies being all dispersed
before he could come to their assistance, the enemy was far too
strong to contend with single handed; wherefore, it was prudent
to re-embark, and to choose some other base of operations, to be
conducted upon sounder views of the actual state of affairs, or to
give up the contest altogether; for that little or no hope of final
success could be entertained, unless the councils and dispositions
of the Spaniards changed for the better. He died; and the English
ministers, adopting the reasoning of his detractors, once more sent
an auxiliary army to Spain; although the system still existed which
he had denounced as incompatible with success.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general of their own choice, and assuredly
a better could not have been made, was placed at the head of this
army; and, after giving Soult a heavy blow on the Douro, he also
advanced to deliver Spain. Like sir John Moore, he was cramped for
want of money; and, like sir John Moore, he was pestered with
false representations, and a variety of plans, founded upon short
sighted views, and displaying great ignorance of the art of war;
but, finally, he adopted, and, as far as the inveterate nature of
the people he had to deal with would permit, executed a project,
which, like sir John Moore’s, had for its object to overpower the
French in his front, and, by forcing them to concentrate, relieve
the distant provinces; and give full play to the enthusiasm of the
Spaniards.
When sir John Moore advanced, there were no Spanish armies to
assist him; the French were above three hundred and twenty thousand
strong, and of these two hundred and fifty thousand were disposable
to move against any point; moreover, they were commanded in person
by Napoleon, of whom it has been said by the duke of Wellington,
that his presence, alone, was equal to forty thousand good troops.
When sir Arthur Wellesley advanced, the French forces in the
Peninsula did not exceed two hundred and sixty thousand men, of
which only one hundred thousand could be brought to bear on his
operations; and he was assisted by sixty thousand Spaniards, well
armed, and tolerably disciplined. His plans were certainly laid
with great ability upon the data furnished to him; but he trusted
to Spanish promises and to Spanish energy, and he did not fail to
repent his credulity; nevertheless, he delivered and gained that
battle which sir John Moore had been reproached for not essaying;
but it was found that a veteran French army, even of inferior
numbers, was not to be destroyed, or even much dispirited, by one
defeat; and while this battle was fighting, Soult, with fifty
thousand men, came down upon the flank and rear of the English, a
movement precisely similar to that which Napoleon had made from
Madrid upon the flank and rear of sir John Moore. This last general
saved himself by crossing the Esla, in the presence of the French
patroles; and in like manner, sir Arthur evaded destruction by
crossing the Tagus, within view of the enemy’s scouts, so closely
timed was the escape of both.
When sir John Moore retreated, the Spanish government, reproaching
him, asserted that the French were on the point of ruin, and
Romana, even at Astorga, continued to urge offensive operations.
When sir Arthur Wellesley retired from Jaraceijo, the junta in
the same manner asserted that the French were upon the point
of retiring from Spain, and general Equia proposed offensive
operations. In explaining his motives, and discussing the treatment
he had met with, sir John Moore wrote thus to his own government:
“_The British were sent to aid the Spanish armies, but they are not
equal to encounter the French, who have at least eighty thousand
men_, and we have nothing to expect from the Spaniards, who are not
to be trusted; they are apathetic, lethargic, quick to promise,
backward to act, improvident, insensible to the shame of flying
before the enemy, they refuse all assistance, and I am obliged to
leave ammunition, stores, and money, behind. The Spanish armies
have shewn no resolution, the people no enthusiasm nor daring
spirit, and that which has not been shown hitherto, I know not why
it should be expected to be displayed hereafter.” Such were his
expressions.
When sir Arthur Wellesley had proved the Spaniards, he, also,
writing to his government, says:--“We are here worse off than in
a hostile country;--never was an army so ill used;--the Spaniards
have made all sorts of promises;--we had absolutely no assistance
from the Spanish army; on the contrary, we were obliged to lay
down our ammunition, to unload the treasure, and to employ the
cars in the removal of our sick and wounded. The common dictates
of humanity have been disregarded by them, and I have been obliged
to leave ammunition, stores, and money behind. _Whatever is to
be done must be done by the British army, but that is certainly
not capable, singly, to resist a French army of at least seventy
thousand men._”
The last advice given to the government, by sir John Moore, was
against sending an auxiliary force to Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley,
in the same spirit, withdrew his troops; and, from that moment,
to the end of the struggle, he warred, indeed, for Spain, and
in Spain, but never with Spain. “I have fished in many troubled
waters, but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again,” was
his expression, when speaking of this campaign; and he kept his
word. That country became, indeed, a field, on which the French and
English armies contended for the destiny of Europe; but the defeats
or victories, the promises or the performances of the Spaniards
scarcely influenced the movements. Spain, being left to her own
devices, was beaten in every encounter, foiled in every project,
yet made no change in her policy; and while Portugal endeavoured to
raise her energy on a level with that of her ally, Spain sought to
drag down England to the depth of folly and weakness, in which she
herself was plunged. The one would not sacrifice an atom of false
pride to obtain the greatest benefits; the other submitted, not
with abject dependence, but with a magnanimous humility, to every
mortification, rather than be conquered; and the effects of their
different modes were such as might be expected. Portugal, although
assaulted by an infinitely greater number of enemies, in proportion
to her strength, overthrew the oppressors the moment they set foot
upon her soil; while in Spain, town after town was taken, army
after army dispersed, every battle a defeat, and every defeat
sensibly diminished the heat of resistance. Napoleon once declared
that a nation resolved to be free could not be conquered; and the
Spaniards re-echoed the sentiment in their manifestos, as if to say
it was all that was necessary. But Napoleon contemplated a nation,
like the Portuguese, making use of every means of defence, whether
derived from themselves or their alliances; not a people puffed
with conceit, and lavish of sounding-phrases, such as “perishing
under the ruins of the last wall,” yet beaten with a facility that
rendered them the derision of the world; a people unable to guide
themselves yet arrogantly refusing all advice. Such a nation is
ripe for destruction, and such a nation was Spain.
The campaign of 1809 finished the third epoch of the war, and it
was prolific of instruction. The jealousy of the French marshals,
the evils of disunion, the folly of the Spanish government, and
the absurdity of the Spanish character, with respect to public
affairs, were placed in the strongest light; while the vast
combinations, the sanguinary battles, the singular changes of
fortune, the result so little suitable to the greatness of the
efforts, amply demonstrated the difficulty and the uncertainty of
military affairs. It was a campaign replete with interest; a great
lesson from which a great commander profited. Sir Arthur Wellesley
had now experienced the weakness of his friends and the strength
of his enemies, and he felt all the emptiness of public boasting.
Foreseeing that if the contest was to be carried on, it must be in
Portugal, and that unless he himself could support the cause of
the Peninsula, it must fall, his manner of making war changed. His
caution increased tenfold; yet, abating nothing of his boldness,
he met and baffled the best of the French legions in the fulness
of their strength. He was alike unmoved by the intrigues of the
Portuguese regency, and by the undisguised hatred of the Spanish
government; and when some of his own generals, and one of them on
his personal staff, denouncing his rashness and predicting the ruin
of the army, caused the puny energy of the English ministers to
quail as the crisis approached, he, with gigantic vigour, pushed
aside these impediments, and, steadily holding on his own course,
proved himself a sufficient man, whether to uphold or to conquer
kingdoms.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
No. I.
SECTION I.--GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, EXTRACTED
FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS, SIGNED BY THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL.
Commanded by the Emperor Napoleon, in person, 15th Jan. 1809.
Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Prisoners. Total.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Horses.
241,010 48,821 24,549 3,521 58,026 826 324,411 52,342
King Joseph, commanding--15th Feb. 1809.
Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Prisoners. Total Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Horses.
193,416 3,339 36,326 9,523 56,404 1,843 288,219 43,704
_Note._--The imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and several
thousand non-commissioned officers and old soldiers, wanted for the
war in Austria, in all above 40,000 men, were struck off the rolls
since the last returns.
1st July, 1809.
Prisoners
Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. and Total Effective.
Stragglers.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Horses.
24,082 31,537 19,596 4,513 60,785 7,301 288,766 36,050
Deduct detached men comprised in governments 19,596 4,513
-------- ------
Real total 269,170 31,537
-------- ------
15th July, 1809.
196,144 31,131 19,122 4,608 58,230 8,089 281,585 35,739
Deduct detached in governments 19,122 4,608
-------- ------
Real total 262,463 31,131
-------- ------
15th August, 1809.
187,560 30,319 12,697 3,930 58,588 7,403 266,248 34,880
Deduct for governments 12,697 3,930
-------- ------
Real total 253,551 30,950
-------- ------
SECTION II.--RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY CORPS.
Troops immediately under the king--1st June, 1809.
The king’s guards, about 5000 men, of all arms,
are never borne on the rolls.
First corps, marshal Victor commanding.
Head-quarters, Torremocha.
Present under arms. Total.
Men. Men.
4 divisions of infantry 41 battalions 21,268 32,819
2 ditto cavalry 27 squadrons 5,232 7,344
Artillery and equipage 40 companies 2,984 3,610
Number of guns, 48 ------ ------
Total present under arms 29,484 Grand total 43,773
------ ------
First Corps--21st June, 1809. Head-quarters, Almaraz.
Present under arms. Total.
Men. Men.
3 divisions of infantry 33 battalions 18,367 25,633
2 ditto cavalry 20 squadrons 4,259 5,762
Artillery and equipage ” 2,535 2,860
------ ------
Total present under arms 25,161 Grand total 34,255
------ ------
First Corps--15th July, 1809.
Head-quarters, Cazalegas.
3 divisions of infantry 33 battalions 18,890 26,373
2 ditto cavalry 18 squadrons 3,781 5,080
Artillery and equipage ” 2,586 3,005
------ ------
Total present under arms 25,257 Grand total 34,458
------ ------
First Corps--1st August, 1809.
Head-quarters, Maqueda.
3 divisions of infantry 33 battalions 15,066 25,068
2 ditto cavalry 18 squadrons 4,987 4,983
Artillery and equipage ” 2,362 2,873
------ ------
Total present under arms 22,415 Grand total 32,924
------ ------
Fourth Corps, General Sebastiani--10th July, 1809.
Head-quarters, Alcala.
Present under arms. Total.
Men. Men.
3 divisions of infantry 27 battalions 17,100 25,960
2 ditto cavalry 25 squadrons 3,670 5,859
Number of artillerymen omitted in
the returns ” ”
30 guns ------ ------
Total present under arms 20,770 Grand total 31,819
------ ------
15th August, 1809.
3 divisions of infantry 27 battalions 14,259 25,801
2 ditto cavalry 25 squadrons 3,420 5,801
------ ------
Total present under arms 17,679 Grand total 31,602
------ ------
Division of Reserve, General Dessolles--15th July, 1809.
Head-quarters, Madrid.
Present under arms. Total.
Men. Men.
1 division of infantry 10 battalions 7,681 10,254
Number of guns unknown.
Kellerman’s division--21st April, 1809.
Head-quarters, Astorga.
Men. Horses. Guns.
Total, composed of detachments 8,753 805 8
10th June, 1809.
Head-quarters, Oviedo.
Under arms. Total.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses.
Total, composed of detachments 7,423 2,549 7,681 2,690
15th July, 1809.
Head-quarters, Valladolid.
8 squadrons 2,291 2,360 2,469 2,393
6 guns
SECTION III.
1st February, 1809.
Under arms.
Men.
Division Lapisse infantry 12 battalions 7,692
Brigade Maupetit cavalry 6 squadrons 910
------
Total under general Lapisse at Salamanca 8,602 sabres and bayonets.
Number of guns and artillerymen unknown.
SECTION IV.--RETURN OF TROOPS UNDER THE IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF
MARSHAL SOULT.
Second Corps, Soult--15th July, 1809.
Head-quarters, Toro.
Present under arms. Total.
Men. Men.
4 divisions of infantry 47 battalions 16,626 35,188
3 ditto cavalry 19 squadrons 2,883 4,540
Artillery ” 1,081 1,620
40 guns ------ ------
Total present under arms 20,590 Grand total 41,348
------ ------
Fifth Corps, Mortier.
Head-quarters, Valladolid.
2 divisions of infantry 24 battalions 15,036 19,541
1 brigade of cavalry 6 squadrons 896 1,491
Artillery ” 648 803
30 guns ------ ------
Total present under arms 16,580 Grand total 21,835
------ ------
Sixth Corps, Ney.
Head-quarters, Benevente.
Present under arms. Total.
Men. Men.
2 divisions of infantry 24 battalions 13,700 17,587
1 ditto cavalry 10 squadrons 1,446 2,092
Artillery ” 1,113 1,293
37 guns ----- ------
Total present under arms 16,259 Grand total 20,972
------ ------
General total under Soult, 15th July, 1809.
Under arms. Total.
Men. Men.
95 battalions--35 squadrons 53,529 84,155
107 guns
SECTION V.--TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THE SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA, UNDER MARSHAL
LASNES.
15th January, 1809.
Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Total effective.
Men. Men. Men. Men.
Third corps 17,406 5,789 13,668 36,863
Fifth corps 18,284 ” 4,189 22,473
------ ----- ------ ------
Total 35,690 5,789 17,857 59,336
------ ----- ------ ------
15th February, 1809.
Third corps 16,035 5,891 13,259 35,269
Fifth corps 17,933 1,735 3,859 23,626
------ ----- ------ ------
Total 33,968 7,526 17,118 58,895
------ ----- ------ ------
SECTION VI.--RETURN OF THE SEVENTH CORPS, GENERAL ST. CYR.
15th January, 1809.
Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Prisoners. Total.
Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. Horses.
41,386 ” 6,589 543 48,518 5,403
15th May, 1809.
42,246 2,341 10,243 435 55,265 5,537
15th June, 1809.
42,146 1,699 10,222 406 54,473 5,365
* * * * *
No. II.
SECTION I.--STATE OF SPAIN.
_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, December 17, 1808._
“In consequence of the unfavourable news from Spain, yesterday, the
populace, in Badajos, murdered a Spanish colonel, and one or two
more of note.”
_Lieutenant Ellis (an officer employed to gain intelligence) to
colonel Kemmis, Loboa, December 27._
“The French entered Truxillo, yesterday, at eleven o’clock; and,
from the circumstance of their having reconnoitred the intermediate
villages, might be expected to arrive at Merida in two hours after
we left it.”
_Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 28._
“Badajos cannot make resistance in any degree, either to check or
to stop the progress of the enemy. From the statement made to me,
last night, by the governor, they want _arms_, _ammunition_, and
_provisions_.”--“The enemy marched into Truxillo, on the 26th, at
half-past twelve o’clock in the day; but, at two, on the following
morning, a French officer arrived there, and they fell back four
leagues.”
_Lieutenant Ellis to colonel Kemmis, December 28._
“I proceeded cautiously to Truxillo. The main body of the enemy,
six thousand in number, had retired across the bridge of Almaraz,
and had not taken the road to Madrid, but had proceeded to
Plasencia, leaving behind more than half the requisition for money
which had been imposed on the town of Truxillo.”
_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Seville, January 2, 1809._
“The corps of four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry,
which had marched from Talavera, and had actually passed the bridge
of Almaraz, has fallen back, and is already near Plasencia, on its
way northward.”--“The extreme attention of Buonaparte being at
this moment directed to the English army, everything which can be
collected is opposed to you alone.”
SECTION II.
_Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, December 27, 1808._
“You will receive, together with this, several letters from Doyle,
which describe events in Catalonia _no way differing from what
we have witnessed in other parts of Spain_!”--“The junta have
established themselves here, and, whatever may have been the
expectation which their alarm on the road may have induced Mr.
Frere to form of their future proceedings, _a culpable relapse
into their former apathy_ seems susceptible of no other remedies
but such as will be much stronger than any Spaniard is likely to
adopt.”--“Although Caro promised to write every particular of his
conversation with you to the junta, I have hitherto been unable
to see his letter. I therefore thought it expedient to put the
whole to writing, and, at _the same time, to express my conviction
both of the justice and propriety of your whole conduct during the
late events, when it was impossible, under any circumstances, to
have adopted other determination consistently with the safety of
the army committed to your charge_. Though I doubt if this will
stop the clamour which has been raised on the subject; and, though
events have probably since taken place, which may materially change
the state of affairs, it may be satisfactory to tell you that Mr.
Frere _appears_ to enter into the reasons alleged by you, and to
feel, in their full force, the motives which induced you to act so
cautiously, and to ground no operation on the hope of any effectual
support from the Spaniards.”
_Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 2._
“The president, Florida Blanca, died two days since, and I was in
hopes that the junta would have availed themselves of this event
to make some change in their government.”--“I see, however, little
but good disposition, and _am still to look for that_ energy in
rewarding service and punishing treachery which can alone mend
matters.”
_Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 10._
“Reding is at _Tarragona_, expecting to be attacked, and possessing
a force composed chiefly of peasantry, but of which he certainly
cannot command above ten thousand men in a situation to face
his opponents at any given point.”--“Whittingham arrived here
yesterday, last from the duke of Infantados’ head-quarters. He
assures me the duke had already twenty thousand men when he _left
Cuença_.”--“_On the side of Estremadura_, matters are not going on
well: Galluzzo, who allowed the enemy to pass the bridges, is here
prisoner, and his corps is placed under the command of Cuesta. I
cannot say, however, that I see much activity since the change;
parties of the enemy cover the country between Madrid and Almaraz,
while the corps of six thousand men, which had been pushed forward
from Madrid, have, I understand, already passed Plasencia, and
probably are on the other side of the Puerto, for the purpose of
falling on the Salamanca country, and, if possible, cutting off
your communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.”
SECTION III.
_Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, May 8._
“Besides the advantages which may be looked for from placing
so extensive a command under a person of such tried abilities
as general Blake, it is to be hoped that it will put an end to
the distractions arising from the contracted views of those who
directed the provincial junta, particularly that of Valencia, which
have been so embarrassing to his predecessors.”
_Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, July 10, 1809._
“As the devastations which have been committed have, in many
instances, deprived the peasants of the means of paying what is
due to the proprietors and to the church, a general spirit of
resistance to all claims of this kind has begun to show itself.”
_Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808._
“I much fear that alarm and despondency has gained ground about
Badajos and that part of Spain, and that there is so little
co-operation in the acts of their several juntas, and such a want
of subordination and common consent among the armed bodies, to
which the defence of the country is entrusted, against such an
united force as that of the French, that extreme confusion prevails
everywhere.”
_Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 30._
“He (lieutenant Ellis) has been living with general Cuesta for the
last two days,”--“who has assured him that the Spanish troops, in
Madrid, forced their way through the French army; and he expressed
great sorrow in adding that, though a Spanish force is often
collected, the smallest check disperses them; that in few instances
depôts were provided, and those ill supplied,” &c.--“that, such was
the dispersion and flight of the Spanish armies, between Badajos
and Madrid, there did not remain a single man.”
_Colonel Kemmis to lieut.-colonel Reynel, military secretary to sir
John Cradock, Seville, February 7, 1809._
“In passing through the Sierra Morena mountains, where Nature has
done much for the defence of this province, it was painful to
observe the pitiful works they were about to throw up. In this
whole direction there is but one body that has anything like the
appearance of a soldier, viz. dismounted cavalry.”
_General Mackenzie to sir John Cradock, Cadiz, February 9, 1809._
“The Spaniards here seem lulled in the most fatal security. They
are ignorant of the events in the north of Spain, or will not give
credit when they do hear them. Vague reports of the emperor of
Austria’s having declared war, and Buonaparte’s return to France
gains unlimited credit.”--“The equipment of the fleet goes on very
slowly, though there is no want of exertion now on the part of
admiral Purvis or Mr. Stuart; offers of every assistance are daily
made, but they will neither work themselves nor permit our people
to work for them. The preparations of the ships for carrying off
the French prisoners goes on equally ill.”
_Duc de Albuquerque to Mr. Frere, Talavera, July 31, 1809._
“During our marches we stop to repose, like flocks of sheep,
without taking up any position, so that, if the enemy knew the
condition we were in, they would defeat us wherever they attacked
us. If, in the evening of the 26th, I had not gone out directly
with my division, and succeeded in checking the enemy, the whole
army would have dispersed, and all the artillery and baggage,
which were in the streets of St. Ollalla, would have been lost;
and as a proof of what would have happened, had not the enemy, who
was within musket-shot, been checked, for many had already thrown
away their arms, &c. the commissaries abandoning more than fifteen
hundred rations of bread, the carts occupying and blocking up the
streets of the town; and to this, I repeat, we are daily exposed,
as we march, as if it were on a pilgrimage, without any regard to
distance, order, or method, and with the whole parc of artillery,
which ought always to remain at the distance of two, three, or more
leagues.”
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Wellesley, Merida, September 1, 1809._
“I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the
central junta, that, in the distribution of their forces, they do
not consider military defence and military operations so much as
they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political
objects.”
_Lord Wellesley to Mr. Canning, Seville, September 2, 1809._
“While the intelligence received from sir Arthur Wellesley, to
the date of the 24th instant, continued to furnish irresistible
proofs of the failure of every promise or effort made by this
government for the immediate relief of our troops, no satisfaction
was afforded to me respecting any permanent plan for their future
supply.”--“The troops of Portugal, which entered Spain, under
general Beresford, suffered similar distress, and experienced
similar ill-treatment; although the efforts of Portugal, in the
cause of Spain, have been as gratuitous as those of Great Britain;
and although Spain possesses no claim, of any description, to the
aid of a Portuguese army.”--“In this calamity, the people of Spain
cannot fail to acknowledge the natural consequences of their own
weakness, nor to discover the urgent necessity of enforcing a more
steady, pure, and vigorous system, both of council and action. A
relaxed state of domestic government and an indolent reliance on
the activity of foreign assistance have endangered all the high and
virtuous objects for which Spain has armed and bled. It must now
be evident that no alliance can protect her from the inevitable
result of internal disorder and national infirmity. She must amend
and strengthen her government; she must improve the administration
of her resources, and the structure and discipline of her armies,
before she can become capable of deriving benefit from foreign
aid. Spain has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is not
true to herself.”--“Until some great change shall be effected in
the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of
her armies, no British army can safely attempt to co-operate with
the Spanish troops in the territory of Spain.”
* * * * *
No. III.
JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’s CORRESPONDENCE, MSS.
SECTION I.--STATE OF PORTUGAL.
_Sir J. Cradock to sir R. Wilson, Oporto, December 8, 1808._
“I press this measure” (to move the legion from Oporto to Villa
Real) “upon your adoption, for many reasons, &c. &c.; but the more
especially that it will give an impulse to military preparation
in general, and tend to eradicate _the notion that, since the
evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect of a future war
is at an end_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore, December 9, 1808._
“I have pressed the adoption of such measures as appeared most
likely _to revive some notion of danger_, and the necessity of
activity and energy.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 14, 1808, Lisbon._
“The inaction of the regency was apparent at Oporto to a lamentable
degree; and, though I saw general Bernadim Friere, I could not
gain from him any information as to the state or numbers of the
Portuguese troops, where they were stationed, or who commanded
them. I apprehend, from his conversation, that the general officers
are all of equal authority; and that even seniority had not its
usual effect. He concluded his observations to me with the strong
expression, ‘_That, from the evacuation of Portugal by the French,
the nation had thought all war at an end_.’”
_Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 28, 1808._
“Mr. Villiers and myself have both concurred upon the _absolute
necessity to arouse and animate the Portuguese to some sense of
their situation_.”
_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 30, 1808._
“_The apathy of the Portuguese is not to be expressed._ Their
general, Leite, is a most excellent character: a theorist, and,
like his countrymen, _supine_.”
_Extract from the Report of lieutenant Brotherton, (an officer
employed to obtain intelligence in the north of Portugal,) February
11, 1809. Head-quarters of Romana’s army._
“From the totally defenceless state in which the two northern
provinces are left, it will require at least eight days (I speak
from authority) to prepare any thing like adequate means of
defence.”
SECTION II.--LUSITANIAN LEGION.
_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 27, 1808._
“Its formation was proposed by the chevalier de Souza.”--“The pay,
allowances, and clothing were settled by the chevalier de Souza.
The former regulated, as I understood, upon the scale _of increased
pay, which the provisional government of Oporto had adopted for all
the troops they were in progress of levying_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808._
“I have considerable doubt if ever they” (the legion) “can be
incorporated, with effect and conciliation, with the body of the
Portuguese army.”--“They are viewed with _extreme jealousy by the
regency_; and the _commanding officers of the Portuguese battalion
resisted, universally, the allowing of volunteers from their
regiments to enter into the legion_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 19, 1809._
“The Lusitanian legion continues to give considerable uneasiness,
from its peculiar state, under present circumstances.”
_Captain Morgan (Lusitanian legion) to sir J. Cradock, January 19,
1809._
“Should a retreat be adopted, sir Robert would not retire to
Oporto. _It is the government of a mob, of which he has had too
much experience._”
SECTION III.--PORTUGUESE ARMY.
_Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 9, 1808._
“I am sorry to state that I find, as far as my limited observation
reaches, the Portuguese army, and every other military concern, _in
the worst possible state_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 18, 1809._
“I am sure that the state of the Portuguese army is quite
misunderstood in England; _and that a reliance is placed upon
it for the defence of the country that is entirely without
foundation_. Their” (Portuguese) “ministers will avow this to you
after ten minutes’ conversation.”--“Even of the reduced numbers
of their men enrolled, (not amounting to twenty thousand, at the
very highest computation,) to make any thing out of them, it is
necessary to recur to first principles, and give them _officers_,
_arms_, _clothing_, _accoutrements_, _horses_, &c.; and I need
not say that money is wanting to effect this: and the ministers
positively declare that they have none; and that no collection of
their forces can take place, much less a movement to the frontier,
without a supply.”--“M. Forjas, secretary to the government, in
answer to a strong question from me, stated that _their army have
not in possession ten thousand firelocks fit for use_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808._
“I am exerting myself to bring to account ‘the _supposed_
Portuguese army.’”--“Your lordship will perceive that _I talk
of the regulars as if it were a regular force_; but I should be
guilty of a deceit, that might lead to bad consequences, if I did
not fairly state that _I conceive them to be of no moment at this
time_.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 8, 1809.
“I am ready to go to the utmost verge of prudence; but _Mr. Frere,
when he talks of Portuguese troops and arrangements, really_ (as I
believe you will allow) _fait bâtir les châteaux_.”
_Major-general Cotton to sir J. Cradock, April 7, 1809._
“I yesterday inspected the Portuguese cavalry.”--“This cavalry is
unformed, and totally unfit for any sort of service.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 12._
“It appears that a report has reached your lordship that a
conscription for horses in this country had been attended with
great effect, and that above three thousand had been collected.
It is, indeed, a matter of serious concern that such _serious
misrepresentations_ should be transmitted; for it is a well-known
fact that many of the Portuguese regiments of cavalry _are without
horses_; and, if I am to pursue the subject, their _battalions of
infantry are one-half without arms or clothing_! But the total want
of all means of regulations for subsistence from so deplorable a
view, in the event of co-operation, that the result, in my opinion,
cannot be attended with success. _It is, however, but justice to
say, that the disposition of the Portuguese seems well-inclined and
faithful to the common cause; and that a very efficient soldiery
may be formed under more favourable circumstances._”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, February 27, 1809._
“I fear that your excellency is led to entertain a more favourable
notion of the efficacy of the Portuguese army than, in any shape,
it is entitled. In short, my opinion is that they want every thing
that constitutes a respectable force, except about ten thousand
English arms. I believe they have no others. Many of their _cavalry
regiments are without horses, without swords, pistols, &c. Their
battalions are not clothed; and, as to subsistence, they live at
free quarters upon the villages where they are stationed._ To take
the field with effect, or an assurance of food, seems to me out of
the question. Since the first moment of my arrival, I wished to
procure the advance of a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but
it has been impossible. It is a matter of serious lamentation that
such mis-representations of the Portuguese force should go home, or
reach your excellency.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 3._
“No reliance whatever can be placed upon the Portuguese troops
in their present state. _If I said that the whole were ready to
mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford’s sentiments.
They will not be commanded by their own officers and they do just
as they please._”
SECTION IV.--CONDUCT OF THE REGENCY--TREATMENT OF FRENCH PRISONERS.
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 26, 1809._
“I have hitherto directed that these prisoners should be subsisted
at our charge, but I have no authority in this measure; they are
_in a most deplorable state_, and really are _a disgrace to all
concerned_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 5, 1809._
“It is absolutely necessary that the regency should give in an
answer about the French prisoners. The whole is an unauthorised
heavy charge, for which I give my warrant; and I see no end to the
case: and, added to this, _their situation is a reflection upon
humanity_.”
SECTION V.--NEGLECT, DUPLICITY, AND TIMIDITY.
_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 17._
“Lalippe, on which the very existence of Elvas depends, has not
been supplied with provisions as I have been taught to expect.”
_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 25._
“The great importance of this fort” (Lalippe) “is well known to the
Portuguese; and, therefore, they are jealous, notwithstanding the
miserable condition of their troops, and total incapacity to defend
the fort, if attacked.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 26, 1808._
“_The promises and apparently satisfactory language of the
Portuguese government_ are, in my opinion, by no means sufficient
to meet the case. _I want to see_ some steps actually taken before
my mind is decided that the nation will defend itself.”--“Indeed,
I am told, on good authority, that _the government are afraid to
allow the people to arm_.”--“The moment I see any materials to
work upon, it will be my most anxious duty to give every effect,
&c.”--“But, under the present _inactivity and indifference_, it is,
&c.”
_Reports of colonel Donkin (quarter-master-general) to Sir J.
Cradock, March 21._
“I cannot, however, order officers of my department to check this
irregularity” (forcing quarters) “_when it originates solely in the
neglect of the Portuguese civil magistrates_; for troops will not
obey orders, which expose them wantonly to great privations.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 25._
“I have repeately urged this subject” (quarters of troops) “to the
regency, in the strongest manner, but, as you perceive, without
effect.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 17._
“Whatever suits the momentary purpose, upon the most superficial
view, seems to be the guide in the Portuguese councils. Ultimate
objects, which, in the course of things, must arrive, are never
brought into the calculation.”
_Cradock to Berkely, January 17._
“The regency seem to decline giving any specific directions
relative to the guns in fort St. Julian and the river batteries,
and, _above all, not to write any thing_; but they are very willing
to acquiesce in any thing we shall do, only anxious that, on a
future day, it _shall appear to be our act, not theirs_.”
_Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 19, 1809._
“I imagine Mr. Villiers has transmitted a copy of the extraordinary
note sent him by the regency; in which they complain of the conduct
of the artillery-officer who dismantled the Bugio fort, and
intimate their intention of sending for all the guns and powder
from fort St. Julian; and add many particulars, as novel as they
are suspicious.”--“Whether the language of this note arises from
duplicity, or any other cause, it is equally to be resisted; and,
therefore, stated some facts which may be retorted upon them, and
which will not place their conduct in the _most favourable point of
view towards either their own sovereign or Great Britain_.”
_Extract from an official note, drawn up by sir John Cradock,
Lisbon, February 20, 1809._
“It was told me, two or three times, by Mr. Villiers, that M.
Forjas, or some other member of the regency, had expressed extreme
solicitude about the forts on the Tagus, &c.”--“I always urged Mr.
Villiers to get from M. Forjas, or any other member, a declaration
of what they wished, that we might exactly conform to it; for
they seemed to be anxious to go beyond what we should venture to
propose. Mr. Villiers, after some time, told me that the Portuguese
government were _unwilling to put down any thing upon paper_, or
give any specific instruction; but they would willingly leave
all the arrangement to us.”--“After the above statement, which I
declare, upon my honour, to be the accurate description of what has
passed, I must express my surprise, and even indignation, at the
protest now made by the regency; and when it is considered that the
Bugio fort is often inaccessible for a week together, this part of
their complaint is shameful to the highest degree. _Their general
object is, however, to be distinguished._”
SECTION VI.--ANARCHY IN PORTUGAL.
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 20, 1809._
“_Northern parts._--It may be difficult to manage any
money-transactions in Oporto, for the populace in that town have
been suffered to become the masters; and it was by an exchange of
public and private property that the commissariat money has been
lately secured.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February, 1809._
“To gratify a mob, the other day, at Oporto, a guard of the
sixtieth regiment was given up, and disarmed by baron Eben.”
_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March 17, 1809, Lamego._
“Considering the tumults, and the state of effervescence of the
public mind, and the blind fury of the populace--it will neither be
useful nor safe to remain amongst them.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26, 1809._
“The disposition is good, but the proceedings are those of an
ungovernable mob, _exposed to the evil effects of designing
persons_.”--“I confine myself to the north of Portugal and Oporto,
for the same excesses have not taken place at this side the Douro;
but the principles of insubordination, I should fear, would
prevail.”--“If the confusion and anarchy that prevail at Oporto
will permit a defence some exertion may be expected.”--“Ammunition
has been abundantly supplied, _but no quantity would meet the
consumption expended in the manner it has been in the Tras os
Montes_; an attempt to save which was, I believe, the occasion of
Bernadim Friere’s death.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 30, 1809._
“The anarchy that prevails at Oporto must, I fear, render every
exertion unavailable for defence; and such is the ungovernable
spirit of the populace, _that it is very difficult to say what part
they might take if the proceedings of the British did not suit
their views_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._
“Oporto and all its concerns, with the bishop, nominally, at its
head, is in the hands of a wild ungovernable populace, _that has
already committed the most cruel excesses_. I fear the same spirit
exists in what is called the Portuguese army.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29, Lisbon._
“Without a British force in Lisbon, the authority of the regency
would pass away, and the scenes of Oporto would take place here.”
_Report of captain Lawson, January 30, Lisbon._
“Last night, my servant returning from the post-office was
attacked by a party of Portuguese pike-men, headed by one of their
own officers, who severely wounded the horse in two places, and
slightly in several places, and obliged him, the servant, to put
himself under the protection of the guard at the town-major’s
office, to save his own life: the outrage was committed without the
slightest provocation.”
_General Langwerth to sir J. Cradock, February 1, Lisbon._
“The orderly, with the general orders, on his way to St. Julian’s,
was stopped by a Portuguese sergeant and twenty men with pikes; the
sergeant forced the orderly to deliver the letter containing the
orders, broke it open, read the contents, and returned the enclosed
receipt; the same guard stopped captain Clives, Royal Grenadier
army, and lieutenants Beurman and Liners; these officers were in
full uniform.”
_General Sontag’s Official Report, February 3._
“Mr. Usher, deputy purveyor, and Mr. M’Carty, interpreter, both
British subjects, arrived this day from Oporto, went to Moore’s
Hotel, where they were arrested and brought to the minister of
police. Mr. Usher was in his British uniform.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 30._
“Some unpleasant incidents have lately occurred on the part
of the Portuguese armed inhabitants of Lisbon towards British
individuals, but I cannot persuade myself that they have proceeded
from any fixed evil disposition.”--“The British army has not,
in any instance, departed from the most regular discipline, and
continues to manifest the greatest temper and moderation.”--“The
excesses on the part of the Portuguese commence by an _uncontrolled
pursuit, without any authority from the police, after all persons
whom they please to call Frenchmen_, and, in their indiscriminate
career, they _often attack every foreigner, and will not even
abstain from_ those in our service. Those _persons seek refuge in
our guard-room_, and though the guards and patroles have positive
orders not to interfere under any pretext with the police, yet it
is very difficult to smother the feelings of humanity when the
wretched persons are flying from a furious and unauthorised rabble.
_Mr. Villiers has exerted himself much with the Regency to check
this disorder, and prevent the assembly of armed persons in the
streets at night, who beat drums and discharge their pieces at
all hours; but as yet his remonstrances have not had the desired
effect._”
_Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, January 30._
“Finding the people beat to arms, and paraded about the streets
after dark, _on the very evening after the regency had settled
that these irregularities should be restrained_, I addressed the
ministers of the home department upon the subject; and as other
excesses came to my knowledge, I followed up my complaint.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 30._
“I have, this morning, been taking such steps as appear necessary
to secure our general situation from insult; and, at the same
time, if practicable, not to manifest a distrust in the Portuguese
nation, which, if sanctioned from head-quarters, would destroy any
reason for our being here. I can assure you, every officer and
soldier has received impressions that it is most difficult to act
against, but I am determined to persevere in keeping the army from
aggression to the last moment.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February._
“When I reflect upon the frequent declarations of individual
members of the regency, that they cannot control the populace;
that there are at least seventy thousand armed inhabitants in
Lisbon; that the regency dare not let them parade (their exercise
has been at an end for some time, and the regency, at this moment,
say they cannot look upon themselves as responsible,) it appears
impossible that I should depart from the reasoning of my own mind,
to meet a sensation of _I do not know whom_, and lessen the proper
military appearance of our only guard. We are now beyond the power
of surprise or insult, and I cannot, as my own individual act,
alter the state of things. However, I never am devoted to my own
way of thinking, and if you recommend the measure (the political
reasoning, when the enemy is at a distance, may always be weighed
against military regulation), or see any good consequences, I will
immediately _order back the guns_ to their former station in the
artillery barracks.”
_Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock, April 7, Santarem._
“I, this morning, met no less than _three expresses_, communicating
to me the _horrible state of mutiny, for I can call it no less,
in which the troops every where are, and the inhabitants are in
equal insubordination, and they encourage each other. I find two
or three regiments have marched away (to what they call to oppose
the enemy)_ where they pleased, in despite of their officers and
generals, who are entirely commanded by them. This you will say is
a pleasing state to be in; however, we must face it, and I hope for
the best result, and I am sanguine enough to look for such. Colonel
Trant will shortly have a pretty strong corps, if the regiments
continue thus to volunteer for him.”
_Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, February 15._
“I should almost doubt whether the British subjects _could be left
in safety in Lisbon_.”
SECTION VII.--FALSE INTELLIGENCE.
_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Donkin._
“I believe it is certain that we cannot depend upon the activity of
the Portuguese government upon this head,” (intelligence,) “either
as to promptitude or security.”
_Colonel Donkin to sir J. Cradock, January 1, Lisbon._
“Experience has _shewn how utterly impossible it is to get correct
intelligence here_; an enemy may be within four or five days march
of this city before it is known, unless he attacks on the very line
our troops occupy.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._
“It is singular how imperfectly all intelligence, though of such
important events, reaches this, and we have not had, for two days,
any account from Oporto.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26._
“Yesterday the chevalier de Castro stated, from authority, a
movement on the part of the French, quite different from a _direct
report_ from the junta of Badajos.”
* * * * *
No. IV.
SECTION I.--EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN CRADOCK’S INSTRUCTIONS.
_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, December 24, 1808._
“Upon the actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon, in such
strength as may render further resistance ineffectual, you will
take care that measures be taken, in due time, for withdrawing
both the British army and _such Portuguese as may be desirous of
accompanying it_.”--“The British admiral will be directed to take
effectual measures, with your assistance, for depriving the enemy
of all the resources, more especially those of a naval description,
which the Tagus contains. Every thing of a naval and military
description, that cannot be brought away, must, in the last
extremity, be destroyed.”
_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 25, 1808._
“I am to signify his majesty’s pleasure that, in the event of any
application being made to you from the regency of Portugal, on the
subject of the occupation of the fortresses with his majesty’s
troops, you do _refer the subject to Mr. Villiers_, who has
received instruction, &c. and you will not make any alteration as
to the mode prescribed for garrisoning the fortresses _without
directions from Mr. Villiers_.”
_Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12, 1809._
“Sir J. Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition you
may make _for horses for your guns_, or any other species of supply
the service may require.”
_Extracts from certain queries put to lord Castlereagh by sir J.
Cradock, with the answers thereto._
QUERY. ANSWER.
“What may be the situation “The relations with the government
of my command?” of Portugal will be arranged when
Mr. Villiers arrives.”
“In what light is the force “Ditto.”
under my command to be
considered?” &c. &c.
“May any Portuguese battalions “The taking of Portuguese battalions
be levied for English pay?” into English pay will, if adopted,
be managed _through Mr. Villiers_.”
“If any want of provisions “The general measures of supplying
should appear in Portugal, may Portugal with provisions will be
I be allowed to adopt measures, _referred to Mr. Villiers_.”
in conjunction with the regency,
for obtaining a supply?”
“If any Portuguese corps can “_Mr. Villiers will be authorised_
be got into such forwardness to enter upon the discussion of this
as to be fit to enter Spain, and subject with the regency, availing
they should be willing to join himself of your assistance,” &c.
sir J. Moore, are they to be put
on British pay?”
* * * * *
No. V.
JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’S PAPERS.
WANT OF SUPPLIES.
_Commissary Rawlings, deputy-commissary-general, to Cradock,
December 22._
“Your excellency is aware of the exhausted state of this country.
The difficulties encountered by sir J. Moore were of the most
serious nature, even before the sources of supply were so much
drained as they now are.”
WANT OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES.
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 17th March._
“I have been obliged to send officers of the artillery and
commissariat department to Gibraltar to attempt the supply of
horses from the Barbary coast; and, such is our actual want,
that the proper movement of even the force we have is nearly
impracticable.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26._
“The means of transport are so confined that I must not expose
any thing to loss; and the artillery must be preserved with the
greatest care, for I cannot equip more than two brigades of
six-pounders, and one light brigade of three-pounders, the latter
being of a very inferior description.”
_Commissary Rawlings to sir John Cradock, March._
“The precarious tenure of this country by British troops has
hitherto precluded the possibility of establishing such an
advantageous contract for the public as, in more permanent cases,
might necessarily be expected: we have literally been supplied from
hand to mouth.”
_Colonel Robe to sir J. Cradock, March 20_.
“It is necessary for me to add that every exertion has been
made to supply the artillery with horses and mules by the
deputy-commissary-general, but, from the exhausted state of the
country, and the demands upon it for the Portuguese army, no more
than two brigades have been furnished with those animals, and these
are much too slight for the general service of the artillery.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 20._
“From the first moment of my arrival in this country, unceasing
exertion has been employed to purchase and procure them” (horses
and mules) “at any price or by any means, but the adequate supply
for even the former small number of the British army could not be
obtained. I have also made repeated representations to England.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._
“I want eight hundred horses and mules for the common conveyance of
provision and the equipment of the artillery.”
_Commissary Rawlings to sir J. Cradock, April 9._
“Some of the persons employed to provide cattle for the troops have
returned without effecting their mission. This disappointment must
be attributed to the movements of the enemy in the north, from
whence our supply has hitherto been obtained.”
_Sir J. Cradock to marshal Beresford, Caldas, April 18._
“You can form no adequate idea of the difficulty to procure
supplies. The subject of forage for the cavalry keeps me in alarm
without intermission, and there is no certainty for a single
day. The country appears to be without the ability to furnish
straw.”--“In short, the supply is just for the day, and barely
sufficient.”--“I have begged of Mr. Villiers to desire the regency
would send a person, in special authority, to this district to
furnish supplies, if they are to be found. I shall act like the
French, and make requisition, with this difference, that we are
ready to pay for every thing to the utmost.”
_Cradock to Berkely, Caldas, April 17._
“Such is the dearth of supply in this part of the country, and
even in advance as far as we could go, that, unless victuallers
are sent (or some other arrangement to the same effect) to Peniché
and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position. We cannot
advance, for all our means of transport are gone back to Lisbon;
and even in a retreat the cavalry could not be fed.”--“If there
is insurmountable risk in sending the victuallers to Peniché,
I request your declaration to this effect; for I must, in that
case, retire the army to a station close to Lisbon, to fed be from
thence.”
_Cradock to Villiers, April 17._
“This letter is plainly to state that, unless some victuallers are
sent, even at risk, to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot
maintain our position, and must retreat.”--“If the articles are in
the country we must have them, and all ceremony must be dispensed
with. The enemy would have them without paying for them: we must
equally exact and pay.”
_Cradock to Beresford, April 20._
“All the recommendation you point out upon the assistance to be
derived from the coast have been long since acted upon to the
utmost of my exertions; but the difficulties started by the admiral
and the commissary were so great, that I cannot say I have much
dependence upon immediate aid.”
_General Cotton to Cradock, April 21._
“I wish I could once see the cavalry together; but I much fear that
before that happens they will be very much out of condition. The
fourteenth have already fallen off very much, owing to the frequent
want of straw and their being supplied with Indian corn, which they
will not eat: added to these circumstances, the commissary obliges
the cavalry to carry (on the horses) three days’ forage.”
_G. Harrison to Mr. Rawlings, Treasury-chambers, February 25._
“It having been represented to the lords commissioners of his
majesty’s treasury that the troops at Lisbon are experiencing the
greatest hardships from the want of shoes, I have received their
lordships commands,” &c. &c.
_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Willoughby Gordon, military secretary,
February 11._
“I trust that the importance of the subject will plead my excuse
for thus repeating my representations of the wretched state of the
clothing and the great coats in particular of his majesty’s troops
serving in this country.”
_Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12._
“Sir John Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition
you make for horses for your guns, or any other species of supply
the service may, from time to time, require.”
* * * * *
No. VI.
SECTION I.--MISCELLANEOUS.
_Captain Morgan, Lusitanian Legion, to sir J. Cradock, Lisbon,
January 19, 1809._
“I left sir R. Wilson very critically situated, occupying a pass
on the Agueda. Sir Robert is wholly unsupported; he has been
advised by colonel Guard to fall back; and, from his information,
he imagines that sir John Moore is withdrawing his troops through
Gallicia. On the other hand, he has received _positive orders from
you_[9] _to defend the frontiers_, and pressing letters to that
effect from the bishop of Oporto.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 30th January._
“The regency and the bishop of Oporto are not pleased at his” (sir
R. Wilson) “quitting the bounds of Portugal.”
_Ditto to Ditto, 6th March._
“I had a letter from sir R. Wilson, from Ciudad Rodrigo (24th
February), wherein he says, that many French prisoners state their
expectations that the French army will retire behind the Ebro. Sir
Robert’s own persuasion is _that the French will retire altogether
from Spain_.”
SECTION II.
_General Cameron to sir J. Cradock, Lamego, January 16._
“I have collected several detachments of recovered men belonging
to sir J. Moore’s army, whom I found scattered in all directions,
without necessaries, and some of them committing every possible
excess that could render the name of a British soldier odious to
the nation.”
_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, March 16._
“There are about one hundred and twenty persons confined on board
the _Rosina_, whose conduct has rendered them a disgrace to the
army.”
SECTION III.
_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, Oimbra, Head-Quarters of
Romana, February 21._
“The marquis of Romana seems to think that the serious _intention
of the enemy is to retreat from Gallicia_ altogether; and even
that he will find much difficulty _in extricating himself_. I must
confess that _I am not so sanguine_; and I judge that the present
retrograde movement from the Minho is more with an intent to
advance from Orense on Montalegre, and in this direction.”
_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March._
“I still believe Romana had intention to fall back on Chaves, and
join himself to the Portuguese army. _His troops had been much
vexed by the unfriendly conduct of the Portuguese_, and a cordial
co-operation was not to be expected; but that he should separate
altogether is what I neither could expect nor conceive. He
suddenly informed me of his resolution to retreat to Bragança. He
had just received a letter from Sylveira, which he also answered
to that effect, and which created no small surprise, as a plan of
operations had already been settled between them.”
_Major Victor Arentchild to sir J. Cradock, Oporto, March 16._
“General Sylveira has only one regiment with him; and his conduct
has been such, that the people have lost all confidence in him, and
consider him a traitor. I merely mention this to your excellency
as the opinion of the public.... The marquis of Romana’s army is
retreating to Orres, in Gallicia, and is, I fear, in a wretched
condition. The opinion entertained of him is far from good.”
_Mr. commissary Boys to Mr. commissary Rawlings, Almeida, January
13._
“Sir John Moore, with his army, was retreating, and ten thousand
men had deserted from the marquis of Romana, and were pillaging the
country.”
_Lord Castlereagh to marshal Beresford, February 15._
“The Portuguese government having solicited that a British general
officer should be appointed to command and organize their army,
his majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for this
important trust.”
_Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, January 23._
“No effort appears to have been made by the Spaniards, either to
second the British operations, or even to defend Ferrol, or save
the naval means (whatever they may be) in that harbour.”
* * * * *
No. VII.
EXTRACTS FROM MR FRERE’S CORRESPONDENCE.
(N. B. The Italics are not in the original.)
_Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, Seville, March 14._
“Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished
by the defeat of general Reding, that I should much doubt whether
any reinforcements, such as we could now send there, would enable
us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of success, such
as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to arise from
the derangement of calculations which may have been formed at
home.”--“On the other hand, there seems reason to _apprehend_,
that general Soult may at last, in consequence of the resistance
he has experienced, _desist from his unaccountable project, of
entering Portugal and occupying Gallicia_. His return would, of
course, add largely to the disposable and moveable force of the
enemy, while it would not increase ours by any force of that
description.”--“In this view of the subject there are two points
for the employment of a British force; one, _by making a push
to drive the enemy from Salamanca, and the neighbouring towns_,
while the Asturians should make an effort on their side to occupy
Leon and Astorga, thus re-establishing the communications between
the northern and southern provinces. The other, by moving from
the bridge of Alcantara along the northern bank of the Tagus, in
concert with general Cuesta, to attack and _drive the enemy from
Toledo, and consequently from Madrid_. In the latter alternative,
the British could have the advantage of acting in concert with a
disciplined army. They would, likewise, have immediately the start
of any reinforcement from the army of general Soult, supposing him
to abandon Gallicia for the sake of moving southward; and these
movements would not tend in the same degree to draw him from his
present position, in which, for so many reasons, _it is desirable
he should continue_. It would, I should imagine, at the same time,
cover Andalusia, and the points of the greatest interest and
importance in this province, more effectually than the same force
employed in any other manner.”
_Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, March 22._
“The fortieth remains here: under the present circumstances I could
not think of their removal, unless to meet a British force from
Elvas.”
_Mr. Frere to sir A. Wellesley, Seville, May 4._
Extracted from Parliamentary Papers, 1810.
“As it was my object to obtain _a diversion in La Mancha as the
price of co-operation_ on your part, and the impression which they
(the junta) received from colonel Alava’s report was, that your
intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Gallicia, to
come down upon Estremadura to attack general Victor, I was under
some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined, that the point which
I wanted to make a condition was already conceded.”
* * * * *
No. VIII.
EXTRACTS RELATIVE TO CADIZ.
_Sir John Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 16._
“The troops from England for Cadiz may or may not arrive, at
least we may expect delay; but I think the subject of sending a
force from this requires immediate deliberation and settlement. I
am prepared to appropriate for this service any number that may
be deemed proper under existing circumstances. It is only upon
the political part of the subject I can have any hesitation, and
whether the Spaniards will receive the force as they ought. The
orders from England are to send it if the supreme junta shall make
the requisition. The question is, whether we shall anticipate the
demand or not?”
_Sir John Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29._
“This measure (sending troops to Cadiz) is certainly one of
considerable responsibility to those concerned; but upon its
adoption, Mr. Villiers, Admiral Berkely, and myself, could not
well hesitate, after the despatches that were communicated to us,
as addressed to you, as well as those directed to ourselves, which
placed Cadiz in so prominent a point of view, upon the unfavourable
termination of the campaign in the north of Spain.”--“The force in
Portugal is weakened to a degree, especially in British regiments,
that reduces it to almost nothing; but I may look to the arrival
of the force of five thousand men, announced to be on their way;
and if it is intended to maintain Portugal, it will be but fair to
replace the present detachment from them.”
_Sir John Cradock to general Mackenzie, March 9._
“I yesterday received orders from his majesty’s government to
press, in the most expeditious manner, the immediate return of the
forces under your command to the Tagus.”
_Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 9._
“Your lordship will find, by the present communication, that
major-general Mackenzie, at the express desire and advice of
Mr. Frere, has actually left Cadiz with his whole force, (the
fortieth regiment, from Seville, will be united,) and proceeded
to Tarragona, unless your lordship’s orders may have overtaken
major-general Sherbrooke, who passed this port four days ago
(without any communication). It may be presumed that he will follow
the same course, upon the same motives that influenced general
Mackenzie; and at present a new scene of operations is entered upon
in that part of Spain.”
* * * * *
No. IX.
NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL MACKENZIE’S
DETACHMENT FROM LISBON TO CADIZ.
“The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2d February, 1809, and
arrived in Cadiz harbour on the 5th, at night. I immediately
waited on rear-admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt there are
some difficulties started by the marquis Villel (the commissioner
from the central junta, as well as a member of it) to our landing
and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on sir George Smith, on shore,
where this intelligence was, in some degree, confirmed; but sir
George still expressed an expectation that the objections would be
got over. These objections had been, it seems, but lately started.
Next morning I saw Mr. Charles Stuart, who was acting under a
diplomatic authority from Mr. Frere, and had a conference with
him and sir G. Smith, when I explained the nature of my orders,
and it was determined to wait on the marquis Villel. Mr. Stuart
explained to the marquis that the object of my coming was to offer
our assistance in the occupation and defence of Cadiz, and in
making the necessary preparations for such an event; that we were
only the advance of a larger corps coming from England, to act
from this side against the common enemy. The marquis hesitated,
and, after some speeches of compliment, said his authority did not
extend so far; that he must wait for instructions from the central
government; and, in the mean time, said he could permit our landing
at Port St. Mary’s. This I declined, as an unnecessary loss of
time, and contrary to my orders; and it was then agreed to wait for
the decision of the central junta from Seville. I thereupon wrote
to Mr. Frere, and sent him a copy of my instructions from sir J.
Cradock.
The decision of the junta was received on the 8th; and I received
a letter from Mr. Frere, which put an end, for the moment, to our
hope of occupying Cadiz. The reason assigned by the junta was of
the most flimsy nature, viz. “That they had ordered two of their
own battalions to occupy Cadiz;” a measure which was evidently the
thought of the moment, and a mere pretext.
Although I cannot presume to judge of the evil political
consequences which might arise from such a measure, as alluded
to in Mr. Frere’s, yet I had every reason to believe, as well
from the opinion of sir G. Smith, as of all others conversant
in the sentiments of the people of Cadiz, that our landing and
occupying the place would be a very popular measure. Mr. Frere’s
letter expressed a great desire that we should not appear to have
made an offer that was refused; and was desirous that we should
not immediately depart, but that we should land and occupy the
cantonments offered to us. On consulting with sir G. Smith and Mr.
Stuart, this appeared to be contrary to the grounds on which we had
set out; but as we were equally desirous not to appear at variance
with the Spanish government, we agreed to submit to Mr. Frere,
whether it would not be better for the troops to remain for the
present in their transports, as we had already stated that we were
in expectation of being immediately joined by a force from England,
the scene of whose operations was uncertain; and our remaining in
the harbour under this idea would answer every purpose Mr. Frere
proposed by a landing.
I had, besides, some military objections to a landing; for, without
reckoning the uncertainty of an embarkation from Port St. Mary’s,
I knew how dilatory all proceedings are in Spain. That if we were
once placed in the scattered cantonments proposed, and we had a
sudden call for embarkation, above a week would have been lost in
effecting it; and from former experience, the effects of a certain
disorder would, probably, have thrown a large number of our men
into the hospitals. It is further evident that the detachment
could not have been re-embarked without some stain on the national
honour. It must have very soon marched into the interior of Spain,
and thus have involved our country in its support, without having
obtained the object for which it was detached,--the possession of
Cadiz. On all these considerations I thought it right to defer
landing, until we should hear further from Mr. Frere, to whom both
Mr. Stuart and myself wrote, and I presume he was satisfied with
the reasons given. In all these proceedings I had the cordial
approbation of sir G. Smith, who, notwithstanding unfavourable
appearances, seemed sanguine to the last that the point would
be carried. I therefore wrote to sir J. Cradock, by the Hope
brig, on the 9th, stating what had been done, and that we should
remain in Cadiz harbour (with Mr. Frere’s approbation) until we
received orders from him or from England. And I wrote, by the same
conveyance, to the same purport, to Lord Castlereagh.
On the 15th, we had the misfortune to lose sir G. Smith, who died
that morning; and on the 18th, I received a letter from Mr. Frere,
in which he seemed to have altered his opinion as to the propriety
of our occupying Cadiz, and stating that the only mode which
appeared to him likely to succeed in obtaining the possession was
my leaving a small part of my detachment there, and proceeding with
the rest to join Cuesta’s army; that, as a force was expected from
England for the same purpose for which my detachment came, what I
left behind might follow me on their arrival.
I confess I was much disappointed at this proposal, the whole of
my detachment not appearing more than equal to the charge of the
place; but as it had not been laid before the junta, I considered
it my duty to state the objections to it, as they arose out of
my instructions. Such a measure would have completely committed
our country, in a particular point, in the interior, with a very
small detachment, a thing which I was instructed his majesty’s
ministers wished to avoid; whilst the admittance of a handful of
men could not be considered as any possession of the place, where
there were about four thousand volunteers well drilled. I therefore
submitted to Mr. Frere, to defer the proposition of this measure
until the arrival of troops from England, which might be looked
for, according to his statement, every hour. We should be, then, in
a condition to take possession of Cadiz effectually, and advance,
in some point, respectably, towards the enemy. If, however, Mr.
Frere should determine to bring forward the measure immediately,
I further informed him, that I was ready to move on, as soon as we
could obtain the necessary equipments.
Mr. Stuart embarked on the 21st, on board the Ambuscade, on a
secret mission. On the 22d, and before I received any further
communication from Mr. Frere, a popular commotion broke out
suddenly at Cadiz, in consequence of the measure which the junta
had adopted, of marching some of their own troops into the town,
as the reason (or rather pretext) for declining to receive us. The
regiment now on its march in, was composed of Poles, Swiss, and
other foreigners, deserters from the French army, whose entrance
the people were determined to resist. The utmost care was taken to
prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any part whatever on
this occasion; and, except in some cases where I was applied to
by the governor, for the interference of some British officers as
mediators, we steered perfectly clear. It was now evident that the
people were favourable to our landing and occupying the town, for
it was frequently called for during the tumult.
As soon as I could safely send an account of this commotion to
Mr. Frere, I despatched an officer (captain Kelly, assistant
quarter-master-general) with a detail. The Fisguard sailed on the
24th, for Lisbon and England, by which ship I informed sir J.
Cradock, as well as lord Castlereagh, of all that had passed since
my last; and just at that time colonel Roche arrived from Seville.
He was sent down, by Mr. Frere, to Cadiz, in consequence of Mr.
Stuart’s mission. I had till now expected Mr. Frere’s decision,
on the subject of the proposition in his letter of the 18th; but
as so much time had elapsed, I conjectured he might have dropped
it for the present; and conceiving that something favourable to
the object of my mission might be drawn from the present state
of things, I had a full conversation with colonel Roche on the
subject. He told me the junta were dissatisfied with our not having
accepted the cantonments offered to us; but he did not seem to
think our views unattainable, particularly at the present moment.
I asked his opinion as to the practicability of general Stuart’s
being admitted, with two of my three battalions, into Cadiz, if I
advanced with the third to Seville to join the fortieth regiment,
thus making an equal division of my force. Colonel Roche was of
opinion that this would be acceded to; and I, therefore, despatched
him, as soon as possible, with a proposal to this effect to Mr.
Frere. Though two battalions could not be considered a sufficient
garrison, yet, from the evident popularity of our troops, and
the speedy expectation of a reinforcement from England, I thought
it would be extremely proper to make the trial. It also appeared
to me that by advancing to Seville I should not run much risk of
involving those two battalions in any operations before the arrival
of general Sherbrooke, which could embarrass him in the execution
of the orders he might bring from home.
This proposition certainly exceeded any thing authorised by my
instructions, but, I trust, the circumstances will be found to
warrant it.
After colonel Roche’s departure for Seville, captain Kelly returned
from thence, on the 26th, with a verbal confidential message from
Mr. Frere, stating that marshal Soult was marching from Gallicia
into Portugal, in three columns, and that Mr. Frere would write
to me by express, or by next post. On the 27th, I received this
promised letter, enclosing the copy of an intercepted letter from
Soult to Joseph Buonaparte; and Mr. Frere expresses his opinion
that my detachment may now be more useful in Portugal than at Cadiz.
Knowing, as I did before I left Lisbon, that every proper step was
taking for evacuating Portugal, in case of necessity, and that
nothing else than succours from home could enable sir John Cradock
to hold his ground there, it became more than ever necessary to
ascertain whether his army will be received into Cadiz, in case
of the evacuation of Portugal. In case the present negotiation
succeeded, I had arranged with admiral Purvis to send a frigate
with the intelligence to Lisbon immediately. If it failed, every
thing was in readiness to sail with the detachment thither; for,
although the assistance I should bring might not be sufficient of
itself to make any alteration in the resolutions already taken,
yet, if reinforcements arrived from England, we should be a welcome
addition.
On the morning of the 2d of March I received a letter from colonel
Roche, dated February 28, stating that my proposition had not yet
been decided on, but that it would be taken into consideration
that day. He expressed much apprehension of a party in the French
interest.
The morning of the 3d having passed without any letter from Mr.
Frere or colonel Roche, as I had been assured by the latter
I should receive, at furthest by the post of that morning, I
despatched another courier, dreading some accident. In the
afternoon, however, I received a long and important letter from
Mr. Frere, from which I concluded the negotiation had failed
(although he did not say so in terms); and a letter I received
shortly afterwards from colonel Roche confirmed this failure.
Mr. Frere’s letter entered very minutely into the state of the
Spanish and French armies; mentioned the failure of Soult’s attempt
to penetrate into Portugal by the Minho, and the improbability
of his persisting in it, from the position of the Spanish army,
assisted by the Portuguese. He then points out, in strong terms,
the essential use my detachment could be of at Tarragona, in giving
spirit and vigour to the cause in that country, where it is most in
need of support.
As the return of my detachment to Portugal, except in the case
of resisting the enemy, would not have a favourable appearance;
and the proceeding to Tarragona would so evidently shew our
determination to support the general cause, and leave the Spanish
government without an excuse afterwards for refusing to admit our
troops into Cadiz, it was my intention to have complied with Mr.
Frere’s solicitations, as the employment of my detachment on the
sea-coast would easily admit of its being afterwards withdrawn,
without committing any other British force for its support; and the
motives urged by Mr. Frere were so strong, that I scarcely thought
myself vindicable in hesitating to comply.
I accordingly wrote on the night of the 3d March to this effect
to Mr. Frere, sir J. Cradock, and lord Castlereagh. But on the
4th, in the evening, captain Cooke, of the Coldstream guards,
arrived from England with despatches for general Sherbrooke, who
had not yet arrived. Captain Cooke came in the Eclair brig of war,
and had stopped at Lisbon, which he left again on the evening of
the 2d, and brought me a message to the following purport from
sir J. Cradock, viz. ‘That he was determined to defend Portugal
to the utmost of his power; that in this situation he considered
my detachment as the choice part of his little army; that the
enemy were actually on the borders, though there was not yet any
intelligence of their having entered Portugal; and that unless
some extraordinary circumstance, of which he could form no idea,
prevented it, he should look for my immediate return to Lisbon.’
This order, of course, put an end to all further deliberation. The
idea of proceeding to Tarragona was abandoned. I wrote to this
effect to Mr. Frere, and embarked at midnight on the 4th. Contrary
winds detained in Cadiz harbour the whole of the 5th, but on the
6th the fleet sailed, and arrived in the Tagus on the 12th.
I trust, in the whole of these proceedings, in a very intricate
and delicate situation, an honest and anxious desire has been
evinced on my part, to accomplish the object of my mission; the
failure of which, I am persuaded, will be found to arise from the
apprehensions and disunion of the central junta, and not from the
inclinations of the people of Cadiz.
(Signed) J. R. MACKENZIE,
_Major-general._
_Lisbon, March 13, 1809._”
* * * * *
No. X.
COMMUNICATIONS WITH MINISTERS--NEGLECT OF PORTUGAL.
SECTION I.
_Mr. Canning to Mr. Villiers, January 24, 1809._
“You are aware, by my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th of December,
enclosing copies, &c. &c. _that, in the event of the evacuation of
Portugal, by the force under sir J. Cradock’s command, an event
rendered the more probable by the transactions in Gallicia_.”
_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, February 6._
“_Should you be compelled to evacuate Portugal_,” _&c._
_Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 6._
“The period of the British army’s stay in this place _appearing to
draw near to its conclusion_.”
SECTION II.
_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Guard, January 3._
“The garrisons of Elvas and Almeida have engaged my most serious
thoughts.”--“But, as they were occupied by the command of his
majesty’s ministers, and _we remain without any fresh instructions
under the present critical circumstances_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 10._
“I feel what a risk I run in thus leaving Lisbon defenceless, but
_I obey the original orders of government_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 12._
“_We are still without any instructions whatever from England._”
_Sir J. Cradock to captain Halket, January 13._
“Though we cannot say _when_ it may take place, and it shall be
deferred to the last moment, _in hopes of hearing from England_,
yet I believe it to be our duty to prepare every thing for the
event of an embarkation.”
_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, January 17._
“I lament to say that there appears nothing before us but the
resolution _to remain in Portugal to the last proper moment,
awaiting orders from England_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 19._
“With our force inferior and ill-composed, as it is, _we are
determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of
receiving orders from England_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely_, _February 9_.
“The orders we daily expect may be either for _immediate
embarkation, or to maintain Portugal_.”--“I am pursuaded we have
but this one wish, which is to act for the credit of our country,
and endeavour, under the _want of all information, to discover what
may be the object of the government we serve_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to general Mackenzie, February 26._
“Since the 14th of January _we are without instructions from
England_.”
SECTION III.
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 15._
“What appears to be my duty is to keep the fixed idea that the
_army in Portugal should remain to the last moment_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 15._
“I am just favoured with your communication about the dangerous
effects likely to be produced by the measure of withdrawing the
troops from Lisbon to occupy the military position of Oyeras,
Passo d’Arcos, &c. I fear (though the contrary was intended to be
expressly stated) that you are led into the idea that the position
in question was solely intended for embarkation. My avowed design
was to await (in a military post suited to our force) orders
from England, or to defend ourselves with reasonable prospect of
success against any attempt from the enemy, or even from thence
to make a forward movement, should future events lead to such
a proceeding.”--“What I must object to is to take up a false
position, say Alcantara, or other heights about the town, which
would only defend a certain position and leave the remainder to
the power of the enemy, one which we must leave upon his approach
and seek another bearing the appearance of flight and yet not
securing our retreat. The whole having announced the intention to
defend Lisbon, but giving up that idea upon the appearance of the
enemy: for positions liable to be turned on every side cannot be
persevered in by an inferior force.”--“My political reasoning upon
this subject was contained in the letter I wrote the admiral, and,
I must repeat, it continues unweakened,” &c.--“After your strong
representations of this morning, I shall certainly not persevere;
and, as there is no instant necessity for the measure, will await
the progress of events.”
* * * * *
No. XI.
STATE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCE UNDER SIR J. CRADDOCK, JANUARY
6, 1809, EXTRACTED FROM THE HEAD-QUARTER STATES.
Disposable for the Field.
Garrisons. Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry.
Men. Men. Men.
Santarem 68 190 2,492 General Richard Stewart.
Saccavem 97 169 1,450 General M’Kenzie.
Lisbon .. 519 .... General Cotton.
.. .. 236 attached to different
--- --- ----- battalions.
165 879 4,178
--- --- -----
Total 5,222
Garrisons. Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry.
Men. Men. Men.
Almeida 38 .. 1,440
Elvas 33 .. 679
Oporto .. .. 379
Lisbon and Forts 315 .. 2,682
--- -- -----
Total 486 .. 5,170
-----
General total 10,392
------
Note.--Every man capable of bearing arms is included in this
state.
ORDER OF BATTLE, APRIL 6, 1809, CALDAS.
Sir J. Cradock, commander-in-chief.
Major-general Sherbrooke, second in command.
Artillery.--Major-general Howarth. Cavalry.--Major-general Cotton.
Under arms.
Men.
First line, five brigades 10,418
Second line, three brigades 3,810
Reserve, one brigade 1,858
Cavalry 800
------
Total 16,886
------
STATE OF THE ARMY UNDER SIR A. WELLESLEY, APRIL 22.
Head-quarters, Leyria.
Under arms. Sick. Command. Effective.
Men. Men. Men. Men.
Artillery 441 88 408 937
Cavalry 1,439 13 418 1,870
Infantry 16,539 1,937 314 18,790
------ ----- ----- ------
Total 18,419 2,038 1,140 21,597
------ ----- ----- ------
6lb. 3lb. Howitzers.
Number of guns 20 6 4
Total 30
STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, MAY 1, 1809.
Head-quarters, Coimbra.
Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file.
Men. Men. Men. Men. Men.
1,413 3,074 19,510 230 24,227
Deduct { Hospital 2,357
{ Absent 1,217
------
Total present under arms 20,653
------
STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JUNE 25, 1809.
Head-quarters, Abrantes.
Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file.
Men. Men. Men. Men. Men.
1,586 3,736 21,267 406 26,995
Deduct { Hospital 3,246
{ Commands 1,396
30 Pieces of artillery. ------
Total present under arms 22,353
------
STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JULY 25, 1809.
Head-quarters, Talavera.
Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file.
Men. Men. Men. Men. Men.
1,584 3,734 29,694 398 35,410
Deduct { Hospital 4,827
{ Commands 1,596
------
Total present under arms 28,987
Deduct regiments on march 9,141
30 Pieces of artillery. ------
Real present under arms 19,846
------
STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1809.
Head-quarters, Badajos.
Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file.
Men. Men. Men. Men. Men.
1,947 4,273 28,409 389 35,018
In Hospital 8,827 }
Command and missing 2,526 } Total absent 11,353
------
Total present under arms 23,765
------
* * * * *
No. XII.
SECTION I.
MARSHAL BERESFORD TO SIR J. CRADOCK.
_March 29, 1809._
SIR,
I have the honour to annex your excellency a copy of requisitions,
from their excellencies the government of this kingdom, for the
speedy succouring of Oporto, which your excellency is informed is
so immediately in danger, from the approach of the French army,
whose advance posts are now within four leagues of that town.
I annex, for the information of your excellency, the instructions
which, under the existing circumstances, I had issued to the
general, commanding beyond the Douro; but the object of which has
been frustrated by events, at once unfortunate and melancholy.
The corps of brigadier-general Victoria, consisting of two
battalions of the line, which, on the appearance of the urgent
danger in the north, I had directed to cross the Douro, are now
in Oporto, as is the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion,
part of the regiment of Valença, and some regiments of militia;
but I cannot get any return of the troops there, though, I
understand, the number is considerable; and to this must be added
a considerable number of ordenanza from without, and the armed
population which will, I understand, amount to eight or ten
thousand men, and of the arms come from England, three thousand
stand that were sent to the army north of the Douro, are probably
now in Oporto, with a proportion of ammunition. I have thought
it right to give this statement of the actual state of things at
Oporto, as far as I can get information of, that your excellency
may be aware of it; and it is with regret that I farther add
that there prevails, in the town, the greatest anarchy and
insubordination,--and that, in short, by the latest accounts, the
populace entirely govern the law, civil and military.
Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under
the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the
various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we
had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary
for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me
to submit to your excellency’s consideration the propriety of
advancing the British force to Leyria, to be then pushed on to
Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts
may render expedient. But my principal reason was that, as there
appeared an intention of co-operation (of which, however, there is
no certainty) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be
most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one before the
other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their plan, and if
we should, or not, be able. To do this would be merely a matter
of calculation of time, as, supposing, on our arrival at Leyria,
Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it,
and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would
get so distant from us, as to permit the army, pushing from Leyria
to Oporto, without apprehension from the army of Victor, who, by
the time he could possibly hear of our movement, would be in the
Sierra Morena, which would clearly show that his principle object,
and from which he did not seem willing to be diverted, was either
the destruction of Cuesta’s army, to enter more securely into
Portugal, or to push to Seville; but, at all events, he would be
too distant to give us apprehensions of any surprise upon this
capital, as we have daily information of his movements, and which
would enable us, wherever we were in Portugal, even to reach it
before him. If, however, the final co-operation of these two
armies is intended for the conquest of this kingdom, and that
Soult does not think that of his army from Gallicia and that from
Salamanca sufficient, then he will satisfy himself, until Victor
is ready to act with him, in the possession of the country beyond
the Douro, where he will refresh and rest his troops, re-equip
them, and otherwise provide them, to be ready for the projected
co-operation,--whilst the army from Salamanca will, probably,
satisfy itself with the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and
act and wait in conjunction with Soult, both waiting till Victor
has settled his present objects, and then all co-operating.
It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances,
of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto, not only for
the British troops, but, also, of those of the allies, as, by my
instructions, I must consider you as commanding the allied armies;
and the time is now certainly arrived, for what efforts they can
make being combined: undoubtedly, their being employed in separate
projects will cause each falling separately, and without advantage
to the common cause.
I would, however, certainly, under present circumstances, be
unwilling to send the few troops I could spare from the army,
between the Tagus and the Mondego, to Oporto, as, unsupported by
British, I fear it would be losing so many men, that on a future
occasion, with such support, may weigh in the scale; and indeed,
the very insubordinate state of the troops, of which I have just
received a second report and complaint, from general Miranda, would
render it highly unwise to send them to a town in the state that
Oporto now is, where the best disposed troops, except a great body
went there, if they were not debauched to insubordination, would be
borne down by the multitude; and it is to be feared that whatever
Portuguese troops enter the town will fall with it, as the temper
of the people prevents the possibility of even any preparations for
retreat, in case of misfortune, to the outward and very extended
lines of defence. Having stated so much, I must leave the question
to your excellency, &c.
I have the honour, &c.
W. C. BERESFORD.
SIR J. CRADOCK TO MARSHAL BERESFORD.
_Lisbon, March 29, 1809._
DEAR SIR,
I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your
excellency’s letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the
request from the regency, &c. that I should move the British troops
to the succour of Oporto, at this moment menaced, &c.
Upon a subject of such importance, I experience considerable
relief, that the general view of approaching circumstances has
been, for a length of time, within my reflection, and that all
my reasoning (whatever it may be) has been transmitted to the
government in England, and the part I am now called upon to act
is simply but the execution of those measures I have long thought
it prudent to pursue, and which the present critical and involved
state of affairs seem to confirm and give no reason to alter in any
part.
It has always appeared, to my judgement, that the enemy has but
two objects to attain in this kingdom. The possession of Lisbon
and Oporto, I believe it to be universally admitted, and I need
not point out to your discrimination the infinitely superior
value of the former above the latter. There are such positive
local disadvantages attached to Oporto, independent of its remote
position, that no military disposition, in which a small English
army is to bear part, can apply. It pains me, therefore, to decline
obedience to an application from so high an authority as the
governors of the kingdom. It may be their duty to make the request,
though I much doubt if their judgement goes along with it; but it
appears to be mine not to transfer the small British force, under
my command, (totally inadequate to separate objects,) from the
defence of this part of the kingdom to the very doubtful succour of
a place two hundred miles distant, and by a movement to the north
with this professed view, feel myself engaged in a war that leaves
Lisbon and the Tagus defenceless and unprotected from the inroads
of other bodies of the enemy that may be prepared to combine in a
general invasion.
I shall hasten, therefore, from all general observation, to the
exact case before us, and state, in a concise manner, our actual
situation, leaving to your judgement, how far it may be necessary
to communicate some particulars that relate to the British army,
and lay before the governors and your excellency the best ideas
I can form for the employment of the British auxiliary force, in
conjunction with the Portuguese, for the ultimate protection of
Portugal under the pressure of all existing circumstances.
It may be granted that the enemy, with a force from seventeen
to twenty thousand, a considerable portion of which (it is said
five thousand) is cavalry, is directly menacing Oporto, there is
reason to believe that the division at Salamanca, estimated from
nine to twelve thousand, with a powerful force of artillery, is
moving to Ciudad Rodrigo, either for the investment of that place,
or to act in conjunction with general Soult, by an advance into
the Upper Beira. In the present view it is necessary to state,
with the weight it so well deserves, that the united forces of
generals Victor and Sebastiani are, apparently, pursuing general
Cuesta, just retiring before them; but it appears that a part
of the enemies had diverged to Merida, and had spread alarm and
dismay, even to the town of Badajos, on the frontiers of Portugal,
from whence, to the heights of Almeida, or the opposite of Lisbon,
through the whole of the Alemtejo: except the weak garrison of
Elvas, there is nothing to interrupt the immediate passage.
Against such an attempt from the enemy I derive no security from
the contiguity of general Cuesta’s army; for, besides the general
disinclination he has so strongly marked to the British character,
he has other objects to pursue, and his principal wish is to gain
time for the organization of his own force. To a person so well
acquainted with Portugal, and the circumstances of the present
hour, as your excellency is, it is quite superfluous to enter upon
further details, &c. It is only required to lay before you, in
confidence, the exact amount of the British forces, as the real
point upon which the whole subject depends: I may state it at
twelve thousand effective men, to take the field, if the necessary
garrison to maintain Lisbon in some tranquillity, and retain
possession of the maritime forts is left. It may be increased to
fourteen thousand, if these points are risked; but even to gain
the advantage of numbers to so limited a force, I cannot recommend
the measure, for the anarchy that prevails at Oporto, and would
be, perhaps, worse at Lisbon, is more to be dreaded than the
presence of an enemy, and may render all exertion useless. The
necessary means of transport for our army, notwithstanding every
effort, from the earliest moment, are quite inadequate, and not
more than two and a half brigades of artillery (fifteen guns) can
be equipped. To adventure upon an advance to Oporto, two hundred
miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this
moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings
of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the
understanding, and the ultimate view of things. If the British
army sets out with the declared object to succour Oporto, or expel
the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same; nothing
but the accomplishment will suit the English character; and I
confess that the best reasoning of my judgement, upon every public
and private principle, for the credit of the British army, and the
hope of any effectual assistance from the Portuguese nation is,
that the British troops should never make one retrograde step:
from that moment I will date the extinction of all Portuguese aid,
military as well as civil. The British army, from its description,
may disregard this common occurrence in war, but I am persuaded, in
the present state of the Portuguese army, and with the sentiments
of suspicion now alive, all explanation would be vain, and that it
would be left to the small body of English, alone, to sustain the
whole future conflict.
I have now only to state what my inferior judgement points out;
and as the arduous situation of command is allotted to me, I must
try to execute to the best of my power. I shall remain faithful
to my first principles, and persevere in the defence of Lisbon
and the Tagus. I invite the co-operation of the Portuguese force,
and, under your guidance and auspicious control, I look to a very
powerful accession of strength. I am convinced nothing will be
done by them in detached parties or in any isolated situation.
They will acquire confidence by number, and emulation will arise,
a rapid discipline will ensue from their connection with us, and
the whole, animated by your presence, will give the best promise of
success. Until we have consulted again I shall not say whether our
general position should be at Lumiar, extending the whole right to
Saccavem, or any other station more in advance. At this moment I
have only to express the indispensable circumstance of some fixed
basis, upon which the allied army will act, and by our united
strength try to counteract the peculiar disadvantages that attends
the defence of Portugal from positions that cannot be properly
embraced, and always leave some part exposed.
Allow me to conclude, with the solemn expression of my own
conviction, that nothing will give so much chance of a prosperous
result to the arduous scene in which we are engaged (either as
to reality or view) as the knowledge to the enemy, that, before
he conquers Portugal, he must defeat an army of some magnitude,
determined to fight him, and awaiting his approach, unbroken and
not exposed to the danger of a false movement. Such a conquest
cannot be an easy one, and must prove, if he pursue it, a powerful
diversion in favour of Spain.
It will gain me the sincerest pleasure, &c.
JOHN CRADOCK.
* * * * *
No. XIII.
JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF MARSHAL SOULT.
_Captain Brotherton to colonel Donkin, (quarter-master-general,)
Lamego, March 17, 1809._
“The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those arts
which Frenchmen are so expert in--circulating proclamations and
insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of terror,
plunder, and desolation, _treating the inhabitants with feigned
moderation and kindness_.”
_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 20, 1809, Caldas._
“It also appears to be the object of the enemy to ingratiate
himself with the populace of Oporto, _by even feeding them_ and
granting other indulgences.”--“It is also said that a Portuguese
legion, to consist of _six thousand_ men, has been instituted.”
_Extract from Soult’s Official Report of the expedition to
Portugal._
“Dans, quinze jours. Les villes de _Braga_, _Oporto_, _Bacellos_,
_Viana_, _Villa de Conde_, _Povoa de Barcim_, _Feira_, et
_Ovar_, eurent exprimé leurs vœux, des nombreuses deputations
se rendirent à Oporto pour les remettre au marechal Soult et
le prier de le faire parvenir à l’empereur. Des adresses qui
renfermaient l’expression de ce vœu étaient couverts de plus de
trente mille signatures du clergé, de la noblesse, des négocians,
et du peuple.”--“Pendant son séjour à Oporto. Le M. Soult fit des
proclamations et rendit divers arrêtés sur l’administration et la
police de la province _Entre Minho e Douro_. Il nomma au nom de
l’empereur aux emplois qui étaient vacans et apres avoir reçu la
manifestation politique des habitants il organiza la garde national
ainsi qu’une légion de cinq bataillons.”--“_Aucume contribution ne
fût frappé_ les fonds trouvés dans les caisses royales suffirent
pour fournir aux besoins des troupes, _et même pour donner de
secours aux Portugais_.”
_Intercepted letter of the duke of Dalmatia’s to general La
Martiniere, Orense, March 2, 1809._
“J’ai reçu vôtre lettre du 27 Jan. j’éprouve toutes les
dispositions que vous avez faites je vous ai deja dit que vous
pouviez disposer pour le service des fonds qui sont dans la caisse
royale de Tuy. Faites entrer en ville le plus de subsistance que
vous pourriez. Si de valence on vous tire de coups de canon envoyez
leurs des bombes. Bientôt vous pourrez mettre les chevaux au vert,
mais faites les garder. Dans les equipages qui sont à Tuy. Il y’a
douze cent pair de souliers, de cuir pour un égal nombre et un
peu de drap, vous pouvez en disposer pour vôtre troupe. Ralliez
au depôt général tout ce qui appartient au corps d’armée et qui
étoit resté en arrière, ainsi vous auriez bientôt une petite armée
qui se soutiendra d’elle même et faire la police dans le province
dont vous devez tirer de quoi vivre, soignez bien les hospitaux et
n’envoiez personne sur Ribidavia. J’espère que sous peu je vous
aurai ouvert une autre communication, le province d’Orence est en
très grande partie pacifié, je marche sur les débris du corps de
Romana pour en finir avec eux, ils sont du côté de Monterey. Si
apres cet expédition il y avoit encore en Gallice des troubles,
je reviendrai avec toute mon armée pour les appaiser et alors
malheur à ceux qui les auroient occasionné: _je veux la paix et
la tranquilité, que les habitans se livrent aux travaux de la
campagne, qu’ils soient protegés et que la troupe se conduise bien.
Les mutins et les malintentionés François et Espagnols, doivent
être sevèrement punies._ Il faut de tems en tems des examples. Je
crois que vous pourriez correspondre avec moi par des gens du pays.
Mais il faut bien leur payer ou leur promettre, qu’en arrivant
pres de moi ils le seront généreusement et prendre de gages pour
repondre de leur fidelité, donnez de vos nouvelles au général
Marchand. Pour le même moyen dite au colonel l’Abbeville de bien
mettre en état son artillerie.
“MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.”
* * * * *
No. XIV.
SIR A. WELLESLEY TO SIR J. CRADOCK.
_Lisbon, April 23._
Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday,
and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to
entertain in respect to the further movements to the northward. I
conclude that you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria.
I think that, before any further steps are taken in respect to
Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor;
how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the
means of defence of the east of Portugal while the British will be
to the northward, and, eventually, the means of defence of Lisbon
and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon the country.
All these subjects must have been considered by you; and, I fear,
in no very satisfactory light, as you appear to have moved to the
northward unwillingly: and I should be glad to talk them over with
you.
In order to consider of some of them, and to make various
arrangements, which can be made only here, I have requested
marshal Beresford to come here, if he should not deem his absence
from the Portuguese troops, in the present state, likely to be
disadvantageous to the public service; and I have directed him to
let you know whether he will come or not.
It might, probably, also be more agreeable and convenient to you
to see me here than with the army; and if this should be the case,
it would be a most convenient arrangement to me to meet you here.
I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a
view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should, however,
choose to come, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will
bring with you the adjutant-general and quarter-master-general, the
chief engineer and the commanding officer of the artillery, and the
commissary.
Ever yours, &c.
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
N.B. Some paragraphs of a private nature are omitted.
* * * * *
No. XV.
_Extracts of a Letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord
Castlereagh, Lisbon, April 24, 1809._
“I arrived here on Saturday, and found that sir John Cradock and
general Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward,
with the troops under their command respectively; the former to
Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, however, does
not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving
forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by his letters to
Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no further till he should
hear that Victor’s movements were decided, and, therefore, I
consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state in
which, if I found them, it was the intention of the king’s minister
that I should assume the command; and, accordingly, I propose to
assume it as soon as I shall communicate with sir John Cradock.
I have written to him, and to general Beresford, to apprize him
that I conceive advantage will result from our meeting here, and
I expect them both here as soon as possible. In respect to the
enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his posts
to the southward further than the river Vouga. He has nothing in
Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, of which you have been
most probably apprized; but he has some posts on the river Tamega,
which divides that province from Minho, and it is supposed that
he wishes to reserve for himself the option of retreating through
Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find it necessary. General
Sylveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in Tras os Montes, but I
am not acquainted with its strength or its composition. General
Lapisse, who commands the French corps which, it was supposed,
when I left England, was marching from Salamanca into Portugal,
has turned off to his left, and has marched along the Portuguese
frontier to Alcantara, where he crossed the Tagus, and thence he
went to Merida, on the Guadiana, where he is in communication with,
indeed I may say, part of the army of Victor; he has an advanced
post at Montejo, nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida.
Victor has continued at Medellin since the action with Cuesta; he
is either fortifying that post, or making an entrenched camp there.
Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which, it is
said, will soon be twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand
cavalry, a part of them good troops; I know nothing of the marquis
de la Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal. I intend
to move upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangements upon
which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to impede
or delay Victor’s progress, in case he should come in while I am
absent. I should prefer an attack upon Victor, in concert with
Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of
this kingdom and of the favourite town of Oporto, of which it is
most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon Victor,
connected with Cuesta’s movements, did not require time to concert
it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the
north of Portugal. If Soult should go, I think it most advisable,
for many reasons, in which I need not enter at present, to act upon
the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to bring the British
army to the eastern frontier. If the light brigade should not have
left England, when you receive this letter, I trust that you will
send them off without loss of time; and I request you to desire
the officer commanding them to endeavour to get intelligence, as
he will go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro and the mouth
of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop at the latter place
for orders, if he should find that the British army is engaged in
operations to the northward, and if he should not already have
received orders at Aveiro. The twenty-third dragoons might also
receive directions to a similar purport. The hussars, I conclude,
have sailed before this time. We are much in want of craft here;
now that we are going to carry on an operation to the northward
constant convoys will be necessary, and the admiral does not appear
to have the means in his power of supplying all that is required of
him. The twenty-fourth regiment arrived this day, &c. &c.
(Signed) “ARTHUR WELLESLEY.”
* * * * *
No. XVI.
LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.
_Abrantes, June 22, 1809._
MY LORD,
When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have marched
before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are
in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The
French are continuing their retreat. Sebastiani has also fallen
back towards Toledo, and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his
head-quarters at Truxillo, on the 19th. I am apprehensive that
you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my
arrival upon the Tagus. But it was, and is, quite impossible to
move without money. Not only were the officers and soldiers in the
greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the
disorders of which I have had occasion to complain; but we can no
longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources
for the transport of our own supplies either by land or by water.
Besides this, the army required rest, after their expedition to
the frontiers of Gallicia, and shoes, and to be furbished up in
different ways; and I was well aware that, if necessity had not
obliged me to halt at the present moment, I should have been
compelled to make a longer halt some time hence. To all this add,
that, for some time after I came here, I believed that the French
were retiring, (as appears by my letters to your lordship,) and
that I should have no opportunity of striking a blow against them,
even if I could have marched. I hope that you will attend to my
requisitions for money; not only am I in want, but the Portuguese
government, to whom Mr. Villiers says that we owe £125,000. I
repeat, that we must have £200,000 a month, from England, till
I write you that I can do without it; in which sum I include
£40,000 a month for the Portuguese government, to pay for twenty
thousand men. If the Portuguese government are to receive a larger
sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be
proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay
the Portuguese debt and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides,
debts of sir John Moore’s army still due in Spain, which I am
called upon to pay. In short, we must have £125,000, and £200,000 a
month, reckoning from the beginning of May, &c. &c.
(Signed) “ARTHUR WELLESLEY.”
* * * * *
No. XVII.
LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY.
_Badajos, October 30, 1809._
MY LORD,
I have had the honour of receiving your excellency’s despatch,
(marked 1.) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to
M. de Garay, of the 8th of September, and a copy of his note, in
answer to your excellency, of the 3d of October.
I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavour to attribute
to the irregularities of the English commissariat the deficiencies
of supplies and means of transport experienced by the British army
in its late service in Spain; I am not disposed to justify the
English commissariat where they deserve blame; but I must think it
but justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to
their exertions for the scanty supplies it received.
From some of the statements contained in M. de Garay’s note it
would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during
the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great
distress was suffered, at a very early period, by both armies;
particularly the quotation of a letter from general Cuesta, of
the 1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed
to have made, that the Spanish troops and _their prisoners_ were
better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these
statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great
distress for want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment;
and, although that distress might have been aggravated, it could
not have been occasioned by the inexperience or irregularity of the
English commissariat.
I know nothing of the orders which M. de Garay states were sent
by the government to the different provincial juntas, to provide
provisions and means of transport for the British army on its
passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such
orders were sent, it was obvious that the central junta, as a
government, have no power or influence over the provincial juntas
and magistrates, to whom their orders were addressed, as they
produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were
procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English
commissaries. But it is obvious, from M. de Garay’s account of
these orders, that the central junta had taken a very erroneous
view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of
the provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those
operations. The government provided, by their orders, for the
troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying upon
their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection
of one body, of not less than fifty thousand men, even for one
day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable
omission, which paralyzed all our efforts, they rendered that
success doubtful, by countermanding the orders given to general
Venegas by general Cuesta, and thus exposing the combined armies to
a general action with the enemy’s concentrated force. The effect of
their orders will appear more fully in the following detail:--
As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent
a commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, to endeavour to procure mules to
attend the army, in concert with don Lozano des Torres, that city
and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army commanded
by the late sir John Moore had been most largely supplied. M.
de Garay expresses the astonishment of the government that the
British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means
of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding
this expression of astonishment, he informs your excellency, in
the name of the government, that they had given orders to the
provincial juntas of Badajos and Castile (at Ciudad Rodrigo) and
the magistrates, to provide and supply us with the means which, of
course, they must have been aware that we should require. No army
can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport;
and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want
at that moment.
The means of transport, commonly used in Portugal, are carts, drawn
by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to move
more than twelve miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that
which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on
operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige
the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to
bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and
there were none to carry provisions.
Having failed in procuring, at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the
neighbourhood, the means of transport which I required, I wrote to
general O’Donaghue, on the 16th of July, a letter, in which, after
stating our wants and the failure of the country in supplying them,
I gave notice that if they were not supplied I should discontinue
my co-operation with general Cuesta, after I should have performed
my part in the first operation which we had concerted, viz. the
removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and, if not supplied as I
required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From
this letter of the 16th July, it will appear that I called for
the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain
if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat
across the Tagus of the 4th of August, but even previous to the
commencement of the operations of the campaign.
Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was
communicated to the central junta, both by Mr. Frere and general
Cuesta, the British army has, to this day, received no assistance
of this description from Spain, excepting twenty carts, which
joined at Merida, ten on the 30th of August, and ten on the 2d of
September; and about three hundred mules of about five hundred
which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None
of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to the army
from Seville, or by Igea or Cevallos, or the two brigades of forty
each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I
conclude that they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are
the remainder of the (one hundred) ten brigades of carts which were
intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these
mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for
our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st of August, the day
on which, after five weeks’ notice, I was obliged to separate from
the Spanish army.
It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from
Spain, as then carried into execution, was “sudden,” or ought to
have surprised the government: nor does it appear to have been
perilous from what has since appeared in this part of Spain.
I ought, probably, on the 16th of July, to have determined to
suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the
means required; but having, on the 11th of July, settled with
general Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by
the armies under the command of general Venegas, general Cuesta,
and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint
general Cuesta. I believed that general Venegas would have carried
into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his
army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation;
and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience
than that general Venegas’s corps should be exposed alone to the
attack of the enemy; and, above all, I was induced to hope that I
should be supplied.
Accordingly, I marched, on the 18th of July, from Plasencia, the
soldiers carrying on their backs their provisions to the 21st, on
which day a junction was formed with general Cuesta’s army; and,
from that day to the 24th of August, the troops or their horses did
not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency,
both in quality and quantity, were so great that I considered it
a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during that
period, half of the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations.
The forage for the horses was picked up for them by their riders
wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which
are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was that,
exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army lost,
in the short period of five weeks, not less than one thousand five
hundred horses.
I have no knowledge of what passed between general Cuesta and don
Lozano des Torres and the intendant of provisions of the Spanish
army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first
time on the 22d of July, when he waited upon me to claim, for the
Spanish army, sixteen thousand rations of bread which had been
brought into Talavera, and had been sent to my quarters, and which
were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops
were in want; and the second time, on the 25th of July, when he
waited upon me, also at Talavera, to desire that the ovens of that
town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army, they
having moved to St. Ollalla, and the British army being still at
Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example
of the preference which was given to the British troops while they
were in Spain.
The orders stated to have been given by the central to the
provincial juntas and magistrates, were not more effectual in
procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In
the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British
commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates in the
different villages of the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in
resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on
different days before the 24th of July, of two hundred and fifty
thousand rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed;
the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the
enemy when he retired on that day; and, I conclude, that the French
army have since subsisted on these resources.
The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice
or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their
use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men
were only prevented from starving during the period to which I have
adverted; nor was it attended by the troop of biscuit bakers, nor
did it enjoy any of the advantages of their labours, nor was the
supposed magazine of four hundred thousand pounds of biscuit ever
performed. These are notorious facts, which cannot be disputed,
of the truth of which every officer and soldier in the army can
bear testimony. I assure your excellency, that not only have the
supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for
whenever the bills for them could be got in, but the old debts due
to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army, under the
command of the late sir John Moore, have been discharged; and I
have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with
the army, and the different juntas with which I have communicated,
to let the people know that all demands upon the British
government, which could be substantiated, would be discharged.
I beg to refer your excellency to my despatches of the 21st of
August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at
Truxillo, on the 20th of August. Of the state of supplies and
provisions at that period, lieutenant-colonel Walters had, by
my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish commissariat
for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two
armies; and he as well as I was satisfied with the principle and
detail of that arrangement. But if the British army received only
one-third of a ration on the 18th of August, and only one-half of
a ration on the 19th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses
of the army received nothing; and if the state of the magazine
at Truxillo was such, at that time, as to hold out no hope, not
of improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement,)
but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all
descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point
of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement
made by lieutenant-colonel Waters was to be the sole source of the
supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, a
sufficiency to supply one day’s demand upon it.
But it is said that M. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the
British army; upon which I have only to observe that I had trusted
too long to the promises of the Spanish agents, and that I had
particular reason for want of confidence in M. de Calvo; as, at
the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have
all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and
to the exclusion of the Spanish army, I had in my possession an
order from him, (of which your excellency has a copy,) addressed
to the magistrates of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the
head-quarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British
commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazines
at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity
to the agreement entered into with the Spanish commissaries by
lieutenant-colonel Waters.
As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause
(as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from
Spain, I beg to observe to your excellency that I was not mistaken
in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed,
general Equia’s army suffered the greatest distress in the
neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and
the magazines had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the
British army.
In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the Spanish
general officers, many things were done of which I did not approve;
some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive
agreements.
M. de Garay has stated that the orders of the marquis de Romana
were framed in conformity with suggestions from marshal Beresford;
and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were
approved of by me.
The marquis de Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I believe
as late as the 9th of August; and the armies of Estramadura retired
across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This reference to dates
shews that there was, and could have been no connexion in the
operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing of
the marquis of Romana’s operations; and till I heard, on the 3d of
August, that marshal Ney’s corps had passed through the mountains
of Estramadura at Baños, and was at Naval Moral, I did not believe
that that part of the enemy’s army had quitted Astorga, or that the
marquis was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Gallicia.
Marshal Beresford’s corps was collected upon the frontiers of
Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming
the troops; and it was hoped he would keep in check the enemy’s
corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal;
that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on
the left of the British army; and I particularly requested marshal
Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended,
and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers that the corps
under marshal Beresford could effect any operation at that period
of the campaign, and never was a party to any arrangement of an
operation in which that corps was to be concerned.
In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which
I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to the
positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have
been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were
aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note, that the
operations were carried on with my concurrence, is unfounded.
I expected, from the communications I had with general Cuesta,
through sir Robert Wilson and colonel Roche, that the Puerto de
Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; and, at all
events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I
was aware that all the operations, nay, the security, of the army
depended, would not have retired without firing a shot.
It was agreed, between general Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July,
that general Venegas, who was under his command, should march
by Trembleque, Ocaña, Puerte Dueños, to Arganda, near Madrid;
where he was to be on the 22d and 23d of July, when the combined
armies should be at Talavera and Escola. This agreement was not
performed, and the consequence of its non-performance (which had
been foreseen) occurred; viz. that the combined armies were engaged
with the enemy’s concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of
the non-performance of this agreement was that the central junta
had countermanded the orders which general Venegas had received
from general Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I
shall make no observation upon this proceeding, excepting that the
plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into
execution, by general Venegas, in this instance.
It was agreed, by general Cuesta, on the 2d of August, that when I
marched against Soult on the 3d, he would remain at Talavera. That
agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion,
without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion that he ought
not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the
charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive that
if general Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made
any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added
thirty-four thousand to the numbers already opposed to the combined
armies in Estremadura, the enemy was too strong for us; and it was
necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if general
Cuesta had held the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I
should have been able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know
the exact situation of every individual left there; and I think
that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.
When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to
observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting
the assistance afforded by general Cuesta to remove the hospital
from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts on the 4th of
August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and
of the men subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance
from the Spanish army or the country. We were obliged to lay down
our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army,
and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal
of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance
which could have been afforded was withheld, on the 22d and 23d of
August, M. de Calvo and don Lozano des Torres being in the town.
In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I
am of opinion that if general Bassecourt had been detached towards
Plasencia on the 30th of July, when I recommended that movement,
and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been
stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to
enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and here
again the hospital would have been saved.
He was not detached, however, till the 2d; and then I understood,
from M. de Garay’s note, that it was general Cuesta’s opinion that
the movement was useless.
It could not have been considered as useless by general Cuesta on
the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the
combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could
not have been considered as useless even on the morning of the 2d,
as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence
of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A reference to the date of
the period at which the general considered this detachment as
useless would have been desirable.
I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by
general Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the
morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on the
morning of the 3d, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, or
twenty-four miles, on that day; which I conceive a sufficient
distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days
before. The accounts received, on the evening of the 3d, of
the enemy’s position at Naval Moral, and of his strength, and
of general Cuesta’s intended march on that evening, leaving my
hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and
consider our situation, and, at least, not to move before daylight
on the 4th; shortly after which time, general Cuesta arrived at
Oropesa.
Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me
that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and that
every moment’s delay must expose them to the risk of being cut
off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if
it had been successful, could not have improved our situation;
two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained
before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of
the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the
British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that moment.
It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army;
but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days afterwards, shewed
that they were not equal to any great contest.
M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our
operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our
marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies,
which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the
British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the
plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was
occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred.
When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy
at Plasencia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps
appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move
towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy’s corps which had passed
through the Puerto. That intention was altered, only when I heard
of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found
that, by general Cuesta’s movement from Talavera, the rear of the
army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut
off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option,
to join or to attack us in separate bodies.
It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement
was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier
intelligence of their approach.
The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the
Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the junta of Castile,
if they knew of the collection of the enemy’s troops at Salamanca,
sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the
accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Noble
and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the
enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in such strength, and
the post of Talavera was abandoned, the central junta will find it
difficult to convince this country and the world that it was not
expedient to alter the plan of our operations and the direction of
our march.
But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of
our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any
measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army,
in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was
from the offensive to the defensive; the march was retrograde; and
if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met
them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly,
we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for the Spanish
army; and although our troops were starving at the time, they were
forwarded, untouched, to their destination.
I have sent to marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de
Garay’s note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army
under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which
I propose to forward to your excellency. I shall here, therefore,
only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy and
disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish
supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that
the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great
distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier.
Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are
remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of
the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled,
and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by
officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations
which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter
upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not
think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to shew the
fallacy of M. de Garay’s calculations of the relative numerical
strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; if the
fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be of the
same opinion, respecting the expediency of co-operating with the
Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should
not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no
injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is,
in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in
the state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and
which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the deficiency
of thirty-six thousand men, which the British and Portuguese
armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their
undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay is of
opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those
blessings for which they are contending.
I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) WELLINGTON.
* * * * *
No. XVIII.
COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
_Camp, August 17, 1809._
SIR,
I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the
officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in
more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following
circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of
repeating them for your excellency’s information.
My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in
order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule loads,
a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to
them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave the corn
they had collected. My servants told me, that the same party fired
two shots towards other British men employed in getting forage. The
assistant-commissary of my division, likewise, states to me, that
the men he sent out for forage were fired at by the Spaniards.
I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) R. HILL, major-general.
COPY OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL STOPFORD TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SHERBROOKE.
_Jaraceijo, August 16, 1809._
SIR,
I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations of
some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking some
forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, I wish to
know what I am to do, in order to get some for the horses.
(Signed) E. STOPFORD, second brigade of guards.
END OF VOL. II.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Now lord Stuart de Rothesay.
[2] Now lord Howden.
[3] An appellation given among soldiers to men who, under pretence
of sickness, shrink from the performance of their duties in the
field.
[4] It is necessary again to remark that I possess only an
unauthenticated copy of general Semelé’s Journal.
[5] Soult distinguished himself in that battle.
[6] In the British army, when speaking of the number present
under arms, the corporals and privates only are understood. In
the French army, the present under arms includes every military
person, whether officers, non-commissioned officers, or soldiers; a
distinction which should be borne in mind.
[7] Viz. 1800 left in Viana and Braga.
500 including the wounded taken in Oporto.
1300 taken at Chaves, by Sylveira.
[8] The bands formed of smugglers were called Quadrillas.
[9] Note by sir J. Cradock. This is not a correct statement, but
quite the contrary; it must have been the bishop.
* * * * *
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to establish, and the plan of the Author receive a perfect
developement, he is sanguine enough to hope that his Work will
not be found undeserving of the title under which he purposes the
detached parts of it should be combined:--“THE DIVINE VOCATION OF
ABRAHAM _demonstrated, from the Expectation, formed by all Nations,
that a_ GREAT DELIVERER _would appear about the time of_ OUR LORD’S
_Advent_.”
As an explanation of the views and objects of the Author, the
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cannot be effected without entering fully into details, he is
obliged to defer the undertaking to the appearance of a Preliminary
Dissertation, by which he purposes his Work shall be preceded. Of
the feasibility of his plan, a perfect estimate may be formed from
the experiment which is made in the Volume now submitted to the
Public; the remote antiquity of the period to which his researches
were confined, and the paucity of the materials which are supplied
by history or tradition, having thrown obstacles in the way of
inquiry which must proportionably disappear as the subject is
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It is necessary to add, that the subject of THE DIVINE VOCATION OF
ABRAHAM has been treated, in a general and succinct form, in the
Course of LECTURES, delivered by the Author, on the foundation of
the Hon. Robert Boyle. In one of those discourses, the argument,
deduced from prophecy, in the Volume now submitted to the Public,
was originally produced. Since that time, the Author having noted
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extensive, whatever appeared to bear upon his subject; the leisure
and retirement which he has long enjoyed have enabled him to work
it up in its present form, in which the formality of the discourse
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WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
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Cæsarea, on the Instauration of the Scriptures; and on the First
IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION, in favour of Christianity, issued from
Milan; with--
A PENNY POSTSCRIPT, exhibiting the competence and honesty
displayed by Dr. Falconer in a recent Tract, entitled “The Absurd
Hypothesis,” that Eusebius of Cæsarea, Bishop and Historian, was an
Editor or Corrupter of the Holy Scripture exposed.
A HARMONICAL GRAMMAR of the Latin Language. 8vo. price 4_s._
Ditto of the French. 8vo. price 4_s._
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_In the Press._--ALSO BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
HARMONICAL GRAMMARS of the Principal Ancient and Modern Languages,
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German, and Modern Greek. 8vo.
OCCASIONAL TRACTS, in Vindication of the Truth, Integrity, and
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The EXPECTATIONS formed by the PERSIANS, that a GREAT DELIVERER
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The EXPECTATIONS formed by the ROMANS, on the same subject, will
follow in continuation; and it is the Author’s intention to extend
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The Author is engaged in printing a uniform edition of his works,
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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.
Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
when a predominant preference was found in the original book.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Table of Contents:
Pg v: ‘Recals Mortier’ replaced by ‘Recalls Mortier’.
Pg ix: ‘Berresford reaches’ replaced by ‘Beresford reaches’.
Pg ix: ‘Ney abandous Gallicia’ replaced by ‘Ney abandons Gallicia’.
Pg xi: ‘7. Battle of Talavera ... 406’ replaced by
‘7. Operations of the British, French & Spanish armies ... 409’.
Pg xi: ‘8. Operations in the valley of the Tagus ... 416’ replaced by
‘8. Battle of Talavera ... 416’.
Main text:
Pg 22: ‘eighteen hunded yards’ replaced by ‘eighteen hundred yards’.
Pg 28: ‘aid-de-camp to the’ replaced by ‘aide-de-camp to the’.
Pg 45: ‘An aid-de-camp of’ replaced by ‘An aide-de-camp of’.
Pg 60: ‘not be be provisioned’ replaced by ‘not be provisioned’.
Pg 63: ‘on the the 9th’ replaced by ‘on the 9th’.
Pg 83: ‘their cummunications’ replaced by ‘their communications’.
Pg 144: ‘literal interpetation’ replaced by ‘literal interpretation’.
Pg 146: ‘unsuccessful auxilliaries’ replaced by
‘unsuccessful auxiliaries’.
Pg 152: ‘Silviera’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’.
Pg 153: ‘develope his plans’ replaced by ‘develop his plans’.
Pg 154: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’.
Pg 159: ‘recal of general’ replaced by ‘recall of general’.
Pg 167: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’.
Pg 170: ‘river to Ribadavia’ replaced by ‘river to Ribidavia’.
Pg 179: ‘the inflame the’ replaced by ‘to inflame the’.
Pg 189: ‘the Cabado river’ replaced by ‘the Cavado river’.
Pg 200: ‘at the Ponte Ave’ replaced by ‘at the Ponte d’Ave’.
Pg 211: ‘and the Guadaramo’ replaced by ‘and the Guadarama’.
Pg 211: ‘second the Guardiana’ replaced by ‘second the Guadiana’.
Pg 218: ‘the river Garganza’ replaced by ‘the river Guadiana’.
Pg 226: (in caption) ‘AGAINST GUESTA’ replaced by ‘AGAINST CUESTA’.
Pg 229: ‘were thus paralized’ replaced by ‘were thus paralyzed’.
Pg 235: ‘charge not be sustained’ replaced by ‘charge not sustained’.
Pg 240: ‘The garison of the’ replaced by ‘The garrison of the’.
Pg 244: ‘and run back’ replaced by ‘and ran back’.
Pg 248: ‘paralized a large’ replaced by ‘paralyzed a large’.
Pg 250: ‘marched by Guarda’ replaced by ‘marched by Guardia’.
Pg 263: (in Sidenote) ‘Lord LonLondonderry’ replaced by
‘Lord Londonderry’.
Pg 266: ‘The Portugese troops’ replaced by ‘The Portuguese troops’.
Pg 282: ‘Olivera de Azemiz’ replaced by ‘Oliveira de Azemis’.
Pg 308: ‘CHAP. III’ replaced by ‘CHAPTER III’.
Pg 309: ‘every other other part’ replaced by ‘every other part’.
Pg 369: ‘Porguese and Spanish’ replaced by ‘Portuguese and Spanish’.
Pg 408: ‘develope its attack’ replaced by ‘develop its attack’.
Pg 409: (in caption) ‘Plate 7. to face Pa.’ replaced by
‘Plate 7. to face Pa. 409’.
Pg 416: ‘unite under three’ replaced by ‘unite in under three’.
Pg 427: ‘and strenghened by’ replaced by ‘and strengthened by’.
Pg 427: ‘Spanish auxilliaries’ replaced by ‘Spanish auxiliaries’.
Pg 453: ‘Crauford’s brigade’ replaced by ‘Craufurd’s brigade’.
Pg 456: ‘by quarelling with’ replaced by ‘by quarrelling with’.
Appendix:
Pg 471: some numbers in these tables are clearly incorrect (eg 3,339
and 24,082) but none have been changed.
Pg 482: ‘bâtir les chateux’ replaced by ‘bâtir les châteaux’.
Pg 486: ‘I always nrged’ replaced by ‘I always urged’.
Pg 486: ‘of effervenscence of’ replaced by ‘of effervescence of’.
Pg 491: ‘The taking Portuguese’ replaced by ‘The taking of Portuguese’.
Pg 492: ‘proper movoment of’ replaced by ‘proper movement of’.
Pg 495: ‘to Mr. Rawlins’ replaced by ‘to Mr. Rawlings’.
Pg 527: ‘pounds of buiscuit’ replaced by ‘pounds of biscuit’.
Pg 527: ‘ever officer’ replaced by ‘every officer’.
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