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Title: History of the 1/4th Battalion Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) Regiment, 1914-1919.
Author: Bales, P.G.
Language: English
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BATTALION DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S (WEST RIDING) REGIMENT, 1914-1919. ***
THE HISTORY OF THE
1/4TH BATTALION, DUKE OF
WELLINGTON’S (WEST RIDING)
REGIMENT.
1914–1919.
[Illustration: 1914.]
[Illustration: 1918.
THE CLOTH HALL, YPRES.]
THE HISTORY
OF
THE 1/4TH BATTALION
DUKE OF WELLINGTON’S
(WEST RIDING)
REGIMENT,
1914–1919.
BY
CAPT. P. G. BALES, M.C.
(Formerly Adjutant of the Battalion.)
PUBLISHED BY
HALIFAX:
EDWARD MORTIMER, LTD., REGENT STREET.
LONDON:
EDWARD MORTIMER, LTD., 34, PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C. 4.
1920.
STOTT BROTHERS LIMITED, PRINTERS, MOUNT STREET WORKS, HALIFAX.
TO
ALL RANKS
OF
THE 1/4TH BATTALION
WHO FELL IN ACTION.
PREFACE.
For more than two years I was responsible for keeping the War Diary of
the 1/4th Battalion, and it was this duty which first suggested to me
the idea of writing a History of the Battalion in the Great War. Soon
after the armistice was signed I submitted the idea to the Commanding
Officer, who expressed his strong approval and promised to assist in
every possible way. The present book is the result.
The “History” is based mainly on the official documents in the
Battalion’s possession. These have, on the whole, been well preserved,
particularly since the beginning of 1916. They have been supplemented
by the personal recollections of many officers and other ranks. Proofs
of each chapter have been submitted to at least two senior officers,
who were serving with the Battalion during the period covered therein,
and many alterations have been made as results of their criticisms and
suggestions.
My sincere thanks are due to Brig.-General R. E. Sugden, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., T.D.; Lieut.-Col. H. S. Atkinson, T.D.; Lieut.-Col. J. Walker,
D.S.O.; Major W. C. Fenton, M.C.; and Capt. E. N. Marshall, M.C., for
reading part, or the whole, of the proofs; for many valuable criticisms
and suggestions; and for much information. I desire also to acknowledge
my obligations to Major E. P. Chambers for much help with the earlier
period; to Sergt. E. Jones, particularly for his assistance with the
Itinerary; and to the many officers and other ranks, too numerous to
name, who have willingly placed their knowledge at my disposal. Most
important of all has been the help rendered by Lieut.-Col. A. L. Mowat,
D.S.O., M.C. Nothing has been too much trouble for him. He has read
through the whole of the proofs, and the book owes much to his kindly
criticism. He has relieved me of the whole of the business side of the
production. It is not too much to say that, without his constant help
and encouragement, this book would never have been published.
The book has been written primarily for the men who served with the
Battalion. If they experience as much pleasure in the reading, as I
have in the writing of it, its publication is more than justified.
P. G. BALES.
POSTSCRIPT.--Since this book went to press “The West Riding
Territorials in the Great War,” by Major L. Magnus, has been published.
Apart from three or four minor corrections, such as a date and the
number of a Division, I have seen no reason to alter anything set down
here.
P.G.B.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER PAGE
I. MOBILISATION AND TRAINING 1
II. FLEURBAIX 12
III. YPRES, 1915: JULY TO OCTOBER; OCTOBER 16TH; THE WET
MONTHS; DECEMBER 19TH 29
IV. JANUARY TO JUNE, 1916 59
V. THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: THIEPVAL WOOD; SEPTEMBER
3RD; LEIPSIG REDOUBT 69
VI. WITH THE THIRD ARMY: HANNESCAMPS; FONQUEVILLERS;
HALLOY; BERLES; RIVIERE 101
VII. WITH THE FIRST ARMY: FERME DU BOIS SECTOR;
CORDONNERIE SECTOR; ST. ELIE SECTOR 124
VIII. THE COAST: ST. POL AND GHYVELDE; LOMBARTZYDE SECTOR;
COAST DEFENCE AND TRAINING; EN ROUTE FOR YPRES 145
IX. THE BELLE VUE SPUR: OCTOBER 4TH–8TH; OCTOBER 9TH;
REST AND REORGANISATION 160
X. WINTER ON THE PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE: MOLENAARELSTHOEK
AND KEERSELAARHOEK; WORK AND TRAINING; REUTEL
SECTOR 176
XI. THE SPRING OFFENSIVE: ERQUINGHEM AND LE VEAU; NIEPPE;
BAILLEUL; ST. JANS CAPPEL; POPERINGHE; KEMMEL 203
XII. THE LAST OF YPRES: MAY, 1918; ZILLEBEKE SECTOR;
ZILLEBEKE RAID; QUIET DAYS IN THE YPRES SECTOR 237
XIII. THE LAST STAGE: MOVEMENTS AND TRAINING; OCTOBER 11TH
AND AFTER; REORGANISATION; NOVEMBER 1ST–2ND 254
XIV. DEMOBILISATION: AUBY AND DOUAI; THE RETURN OF THE
CADRE 276
APPENDIX
I. ITINERARY OF THE BATTALION 287
II. NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS 295
III. NOMINAL ROLL OF WARRANT OFFICERS AND COMPANY QUARTER
MASTER SERGEANTS 304
IV. SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES 307
V. LIST OF HONOURS AND AWARDS 308
VI. THE BATTALION CANTEEN 312
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
THE CLOTH HALL, YPRES: 1914; 1918 FRONTISPIECE
Facing Page
LIEUT.-COL. H. S. ATKINSON, T.D. 8
MAJOR E. P. CHAMBERS; LIEUT.-COL. H. A. S. STANTON, D.S.O.;
CAPT. H. N. WALLER 20
CAPT. M. P. ANDREWS; CAPT. E. E. SYKES, M.C.; CAPT. W. F.
DENNING; CAPT. T. D. PRATT 32
LIEUT.-COL. C. J. PICKERING, C.M.G., D.S.O.; LIEUT.-COL.
G. K. SULLIVAN, O.B.E., M.C. 44
BRIG.-GENERAL E. G. ST. AUBYN, D.S.O. 64
CAPT. W. N. EVERITT, M.C.; CAPT. C. HIRST; LIEUT. J. T.
RILEY; CAPT. S. S. GREAVES, D.S.O., M.C., R.A.M.C. 74
LIEUT.-COL. J. WALKER, D.S.O. 88
BRIG.-GENERAL R. E. SUGDEN, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D. 112
CAPT. A. E. MANDER; CAPT. J. G. MOWAT, M.C.; CAPT. E. N.
MARSHALL, M.C.; CAPT. N. GELDARD, D.S.O., M.C. 128
THE LOMBARTZYDE SECTOR: AEROPLANE MAP 148
R.S.M. F. P. STIRZAKER, M.C.; R.S.M. W. LEE, M.C.; C.S.M.
W. MEDLEY, M.C., M.M.; SERGT. A. LOOSEMORE, V.C., D.C.M. 164
THE YPRES SALIENT: WINTER, 1917–1918 184
MAJOR W. C. FENTON, M.C.; CAPT. N. T. FARRAR, M.C.; CAPT.
A. KIRK, M.C.; CAPT. P. G. BALES, M.C. 196
PRIVATE A. POULTER, V.C. 208
BAILLEUL CHURCH: AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT 218
CAPT. H. H. AYKROYD, M.C.; CAPT. W. N. BROOMHEAD, T.D.;
CAPT. W. GRANTHAM; CAPT. S. BALME 240
LIEUT.-COL. A. L. MOWAT, D.S.O., M.C. 256
WELLINGTON CEMETERY, NEAR ROEUX 270
THE CADRE AT HALIFAX: JUNE 18TH, 1919 284
LIST OF MAPS.
YPRES, 1915 facing page 58
THIEPVAL WOOD, 1916 „ „ 80
SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1916 „ „ 96
RAID NEAR FICHEUX, FEBRUARY, 1917 page 117
ST. ELIE RIGHT SUB-SECTOR, 1917 facing page 144
LOMBARTZYDE SECTOR, 1917 „ „ 156
BELLE VUE SPUR, OCTOBER 9TH, 1917 „ „ 172
RAID NEAR REUTEL, MARCH, 1918 page 195
ERQUINGHEM AND NIEPPE, APRIL, 1918 facing page 214
BAILLEUL, APRIL, 1918 „ „ 220
KEMMEL, APRIL, 1918 „ „ 234
RAID NEAR ZILLEBEKE, JUNE, 1918 „ „ 246
OCTOBER 11TH, 1918 „ „ 264
CAMBRAI AND VALENCIENNES „ „ 274
FLANDERS at end of book
FIFTH AND THIRD ARMY AREAS, 1916–1917 „ „
CHAPTER I.
MOBILISATION AND TRAINING.
At the outbreak of war with Germany, early in August, 1914, the West
Riding Territorial Division consisted of the following battalions:--
1st. West Riding Infantry Brigade: 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Battalions
West Yorkshire Regiment.
2nd. West Riding Infantry Brigade: 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Battalions
Duke of Wellington’s (W.R.) Regiment.
3rd. West Riding Infantry Brigade: 4th and 5th Battalions King’s
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry; 4th and 5th Battalions York and
Lancaster Regiment.
Major-General T. S. Baldock, C.B., was in command of the Division,
and Brigadier-General E. F. Brereton, D.S.O., of the 2nd West Riding
Infantry Brigade. No change of battalions took place in any of the
Infantry Brigades until the reorganisation of the British Expeditionary
Force at the beginning of 1918, when each was reduced to three
battalions; and even then no fresh battalion was added to the Division.
The 4th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s (W.R.) Regt, was under the
command of Lieut.-Colonel H. S. Atkinson, T.D., of Cleckheaton, and
Major E. P. Chambers, of Brighouse, was second in command. Capt. H. A.
S. Stanton, of the Royal Scots Regt., was Adjutant. Though the regular
army had recently been reorganised on a four-company basis, a similar
change had not yet been made in the Territorial Force, so that the
Battalion consisted of eight companies as follows:--
A Company (Halifax) commanded by Capt. V. A. Milligan.
B Company (Halifax) „ Capt. D. B. Winter.
C Company (Halifax) „ Capt. D. V. Fleming.
D Company (Brighouse) „ Capt. R. E. Sugden.
E Company (Cleckheaton) „ Capt. J. Walker.
F Company (Halifax) „ Lieut. E. P. Learoyd.
G Company (Elland) „ Capt. R. H. Goldthorp.
H Company (Sowerby Bridge) „ Capt. W. A. Laxton.
All the four companies from the out-lying districts were well up to
strength, but the Halifax companies were weak.
On July 26th, the Battalion went to camp at Marske-by-the-Sea for its
annual period of training. The time was one of intense anxiety and
excitement. On July 28th, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.
Three days later general mobilisation was ordered by Russia, which
produced an immediate ultimatum from Berlin. The next day mobilisation
was ordered in both France and Germany; the latter, as is now well
known, had been mobilising and concentrating secretly on its French
and Belgian frontiers for some days. On August 2nd, the German
armies entered Luxembourg, and violated French territory without
any declaration of war. Two days later Britain sent its ultimatum
to Germany and as, on the same day, German troops entered Belgian
territory, war broke out between the two countries at midnight, August
4/5th. Such was the atmosphere in which the Battalion carried out its
training at Marske.
The camp should have lasted a fortnight, but it broke up at the end
of a week. The Special Service Section of 100 other ranks, under the
command of Capt. R. E. Sugden, with Lieut. H. N. Waller as his second
in command, was the first to leave. Orders for it to proceed at once
to Grimsby arrived during the church parade on Sunday, August 2nd, and
it left the same day. It was employed guarding the Admiralty Wireless
Station at Waltham, and the water and electricity works. On August 3rd,
the men of the Battalion returned to their homes, where they waited in
hourly expectation of orders to mobilise. These came on the evening of
the following day, and the same night the Battalion was concentrated
at Halifax, the men sleeping in the Secondary Schools in Prescott
Street. The Battalion was about 650 strong. Scarcely a man had failed
to report.
About 1-30 p.m. on August 5th, the Battalion[1] marched down Horton
Street to the Railway Station, and there took train for Hull, its
allotted station. There was no public send-off. War had come so
suddenly that people seemed hardly to realise what was happening. On
arrival most of the men were billeted in a big concert hall in the
town, the remainder occupying a Working Boys’ Club in one of the poorer
quarters, and buildings near the docks. At Hull the men were variously
employed. Guards were provided on the docks and at the Naval Signal
Station. Working parties were sent out to dig trenches at Sutton, part
of the new system of coast defences which was being prepared. Perhaps
the most congenial duty was the rounding up of a number of Germans in
the district; these were searched--some of them were found to be in
possession of revolvers--and were then marched off to S.S. “Borodino,”
one of the new Wilson liners, on board of which they were confined. The
guard on the vessel was found by the Battalion and this was considered
to be a good job.
During these first days of war the ration question was extremely
difficult. The carefully planned pre-war scheme had broken down the
very first day. The Battalion had no transport, and neither the Quarter
Master nor the transport personnel had accompanied it to Hull. Taxis
had to be requisitioned to take the place of transport vehicles; food
had to be obtained as and where it could be found. Great credit was due
to R.Q.M.S. F. J. Cooke and his staff for the way in which they pulled
the Battalion through the difficulty. At this time the men were armed
with the C.L.L.E. rifle and were fairly well equipped; difficulties of
equipment only became serious when drafts began to arrive. About 100
National Reservists joined the Battalion at Hull.
On August 11th, the Battalion was relieved by a Special Reserve
Battalion of Lancashire Fusiliers and moved by water to Immingham,
where it was stationed at the docks. Here it had its first experience
of war conditions. There were no proper billets. The officers all slept
on the floor of a granary, a part of the same building doing duty as
a Battalion Mess. The men were even worse off, having nothing better
than a number of sheds with concrete floors. At Immingham the Special
Service Section and the transport personnel rejoined. There, too, the
whole of the 2nd West Riding Infantry Brigade, except one battalion,
was concentrated. A further draft of National Reservists also joined.
Only two days were spent at Immingham, and then the Battalion marched
to Great Coates, where it remained for nearly five weeks. This was
the beginning of the long period of intensive training which preceded
its departure overseas. The men were billeted in barns, granaries and
stables, thus getting an early taste of what was to become their normal
mode of life for long periods in France. Training consisted mostly of
route marches, and battalion and company schemes. Great attention was
paid to musketry. Newly-gazetted officers began to arrive, and further
drafts of men brought the Battalion up to full strength before it left
Great Coates, though a good many National Reservists were rejected at
the medical examination. The weather was perfect. Days of glorious
sunshine followed one another with monotonous regularity.
On September 15th, the Battalion went under canvas in Riby Park, where
training continued for another month. At first there had been few
volunteers for service overseas. Little information was available as to
the conditions of service, and few men had yet realised the greatness
of the crisis. But when the situation was properly understood they
responded to the call well. The Battalion became definitely a foreign
service unit. All officers and other ranks who had not volunteered
for general service left it, and joined the 2/4th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt., which was being formed at Halifax. About the middle
of October, the whole Battalion moved to the neighbourhood of Marsden,
in the Colne Valley, to fire the General Musketry Course. Several
ranges were used by different companies, but the shooting was much
interfered with by the atrocious weather which was experienced there.
Here most of the men were inoculated, and leave was plentiful.
On November 5th, Battalion H.Q. moved by train to Doncaster, at
which place the whole of the 2nd West Riding Infantry Brigade was
concentrated during the next few days. There it remained throughout the
winter and only left when the time came for it to move to France.
It was not until the middle of January, 1915, that the Battalion was
reorganised on a four-company basis, in accordance with the system
adopted shortly before the war by the Regular Army. The original
companies were then amalgamated as follows:--
A and D Companies joined to form No. 1 (afterwards A) Coy.
E and G „ „ No. 2 ( „ B) „
B and C „ „ No. 3 ( „ C) „
F and H „ „ No. 4 ( „ D) „[3]
Companies were billeted in schools in the town. On the whole these
billets were made pretty comfortable, for the men were fast learning
how to look after themselves.[4] Officers occupied rooms in various
hotels and private houses, but had a Battalion Mess, first at an hotel,
but later in a house which was rented in Regent Terrace.
All available time was occupied in training and organisation. With the
exception of a few small guards, the Battalion had no garrison duties
to find. During the earlier part of its stay at Doncaster most of the
training took the form of field days. Training areas were allotted near
the town, and these were frequently changed in order to give variety.
Many fierce “battles” were fought both by day and night. Usually
the Battalion worked out its own schemes, but occasionally there
were Brigade and Divisional days, when the officers and men learned
something of the co-operation of the different arms. The training
was very strenuous and involved a great deal of route marching. The
Battalion would parade about 7-0 a.m. and march out, often a distance
of seven or eight miles, to the training area. A scheme would then be
worked out, and after it was over the Battalion would be marched back.
Considerable distances were thus often covered in a day, and the men
got into splendid condition. After the Battalion had been reorganised
into four companies, the system of training was considerably changed
for a time, as a completely new drill had to be learned. So an ordinary
day’s training became much as follows. After about half-an-hour’s
physical training, the Battalion marched down to the Race Course where
the morning was spent at the new drill; an hour’s bayonet fighting
in the afternoon completed the work for the day. Much attention was
also paid to musketry. This was carried out under the supervision of
Major R. E. Sugden, who lived at Battalion H.Q. for that purpose, and
thus was not able to see much of his Company. Ranges at Cantley and
Scunthorpe were used. A little trench digging was done near Armthorpe
but, as it was still hoped that the war would soon become one of
movement again, this form of training was not taken very seriously.
On one occasion the Battalion was inspected on the Race Course by the
G.O.C., Northern Command; but otherwise, little attention was paid to
ceremonial drill. Lectures on various military subjects were given
by the officers and, in order to give variety to the men and lighten
the work of the lecturers, senior officers went round the different
companies giving the same lectures to each.
Alarms were not infrequent but, only once, was there any real reason
for them. That occasion was the day when a few fast German cruisers
slipped across the North Sea, and bombarded Scarborough for a short
time. That morning the Battalion had marched out about eight miles to
do a scheme. It had just arrived when urgent orders to return at once
were received. Without any rest the men fell in and marched straight
back to Doncaster without a halt. It was very hot for the time of
year, and the march was no mean performance. For the rest of that day
all troops were confined to billets; but they were not called upon to
do anything further and everything was normal the next day.
The time spent at Doncaster was very pleasant. The townsfolk were very
kind to all the men, many of whom made good friends. Long after they
had gone overseas several men were still corresponding with Doncaster
people, and most of the survivors have warm recollections of the
hospitality extended to them. Christmas was celebrated right royally.
Few were able to get home, but everything possible was done to make the
season an enjoyable one. Dinners were served at the principal hotels[5]
of the town and, thanks to the generosity of the Doncaster Tradesmen’s
Association, about half the Battalion was entertained in the Corn
Exchange on Christmas Day and Boxing Day.
But in spite of everything there was much discontent in the Battalion,
though one can hardly grumble at the cause of it. The men longed to
be at the “Front.” Most of them had expected to go overseas very soon
and, as the weeks dragged into months, some began to wonder whether
they ever would get there. This long delay was due mainly to shortage
of equipment. Practically everything was going to the New Armies, which
were in training, and there was little left over for the Territorial
Force. Furthermore, there was the ever-present fear of invasion, and it
was not deemed safe to send the Territorials overseas until new troops
were sufficiently trained to defend the country in case of need. But
few of the men understood these things. One man actually deserted in
order to enlist in another regiment, because he thought the Battalion
was not going out. Another wrote direct to the Secretary of State for
War to ask the reason for the delay and, of course, was well “told off”
for his pains. Rumours were plentiful, but, as nothing came of them,
they only served to increase the feeling of disappointment.
At length, one day early in April, definite news was received. A
tactical tour for the officers and senior N.C.O.’s of the Battalion had
been arranged, under the personal supervision of the Brigadier. When
the latter arrived he brought the news that the Battalion was to move
in a few days. Immediately there was a light-hearted feeling about that
party such as there had seldom been before.
The days which followed were full of excitement and activity. There
was an enormous amount of work to be done, and very little time to do
it. During the last few days there was little rest for officers and
N.C.O.’s. Up to that time it had been extremely difficult to obtain
articles of kit and equipment. Owing to the enormous demands of the
army already in France, and the fact that the productive power of the
British factories was scarcely a hundredth part of what it became
towards the end of the war, there was very little material available
for distribution to troops at home. But, now that the Battalion was
under orders for the Front, all kinds of stores were thrust upon it.
The miscellaneous collection of spring carts and vans, which had done
duty as transport vehicles, were replaced by the proper limbered
wagons; transport animals and harness arrived quicker than they
could be dealt with. Men were constantly being paraded to receive
some article of kit or equipment; one time it would be new winter
underclothing, another time new boots. These articles are particularly
worthy of notice. Why a Battalion should be fitted out with winter
underclothing early in April is a question which probably only the War
Office officials of the period could satisfactorily answer. While as
to the boots, it was not long before many a man was yearning for his
comfortable old pair. Right up to the end fresh stores were arriving
and being issued. Indeed, about midnight of the Battalion’s last night
in England--reveille was to be at 4-0 a.m.--A Company was hauled
out of bed by two enthusiastic subalterns to exchange its old web
pouches for new; the men of the company, it should be added, hardly
showed themselves so enthusiastic as their officers about the change,
particularly when they discovered in the morning that nearly all the
pouches received were for the left side. But, in spite of all, things
somehow got done.
[Illustration:
Lieut.-Col. H. S. ATKINSON, T.D.]
On April 12th, the transport men, with their animals and loaded
vehicles, entrained for Southampton. They were to move by a different
route from the rest of the Battalion. Major R. E. Sugden and Lieut.
C. Hirst, the Battalion Transport Officer, were in charge of the
party. Considering the men’s lack of experience, the embarkation went
very smoothly. On board elaborate drill in case of torpedo attack was
practised, but the voyage proved uneventful. They disembarked at Havre
and proceeded by train to Hesdigneul, where they rejoined the Battalion
on April 15th.
April 14th, the fateful day, arrived. Reveille was at 4-0 a.m., and,
after breakfast, preparations were soon complete and the Battalion
paraded ready to move off. The following is the complete list of
officers, warrant officers, and quartermaster sergeants who were to
accompany the Battalion overseas:--
_Battalion H.Q._
Lieut.-Col. H. S. Atkinson, T.D. (C.O.).
Major E. P. Chambers (Second in Command).
Capt. H. A. S. Stanton (Adjutant).
Hon. Lieut. T. Fielding (Q.M.).
Lieut. E. Lee (Machine Gun Officer).
Lieut. S. Balme (Signalling Officer).
Lieut. C. Hirst (Transport Officer).
Capt. A. T. Griffiths, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
R.S.M. J. McCormack.
R.Q.M.S. F. J. Cooke.
_A Company._
Major R. E. Sugden;
Capt. M. P. Andrews;
Lieut. G. W. I. Learoyd;
Lieut. E. N. Marshall;
Sec.-Lieut. E. Taylor;
Sec.-Lieut. G. P. McGuire.
C.S.M. E. Bottomley.
C.Q.M.S. C. Southern.
_B Company._
Capt. J. Walker;
Capt. H. N. Waller;
Lieut. J. T. Riley;
Lieut. B. A. Bell;
Sec.-Lieut. J. G. Mowat;
Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd.
C.S.M. A. Parkin.
C.Q.M.S. D. McKeand.
_C Company._
Capt. D. B. Winter;
Capt. E. E. Sykes;
Sec.-Lieut. W. C. Fenton;
Sec.-Lieut. F. Walker.
C.S.M. E. Lumb.
C.Q.M.S. W. Lee.
_D Company._
Capt. A. L. Mowat;
Capt. W. F. Denning;
Lieut. W. B. Yates;
Sec.-Lieut. T. D. Pratt;
Sec.-Lieut. W. L. Anderton.
C.S.M. C. C. MacKay.
C.Q.M.S. G. Jackson.
The 2/4th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. had come into Doncaster
a few days before and was encamped on the Race Course. Officers and men
turned out now to give their friends and townsmen a rousing send-off.
Their Band played the Battalion to the Railway Station, while their
men lined the streets. The townspeople also turned out in considerable
numbers to say farewell to their recently-made friends. A platoon of
A Company constituted the loading party, under the command of Lieut.
E. N. Marshall, who records that among the miscellaneous stores which
he helped to load upon the train was one coil of barbed wire. Even in
those early days he considered it unnecessary.
Two trains were provided for the journey. The first, under the command
of Lieut.-Col. H. S. Atkinson, T.D., carried A and B Companies. It was
due to depart at 12-0 noon. When all were entrained and everything
seemed ready, the driver, being a civilian, thought it was time to
start and began to move off. But, of course, that was all wrong. The
train was stopped, the “Advance” was blown on the bugle, and then off
they went. The other train, under the command of Major E. P. Chambers,
and carrying C and D Companies, started more quietly and with less
formality from a siding further down the line.
The journey was uneventful and slow. The trains circled round London,
and the first arrived at Folkestone Quay about 8-45 p.m. The men
immediately embarked on S.S. “Invicta,” which the Battalion had all
to itself, and were soon at sea. The night was quiet and the crossing
calm. Soon after 10-0 p.m. the vessel arrived at Boulogne, and the
Battalion had its first sight of the “promised land.” At last it was
really on active service, and was to take its place side by side with
the men who had made history at Mons, the Marne, Ypres, and a score of
other battles.
CHAPTER II.
FLEURBAIX.
The Battalion was in France. On arrival at Boulogne it disembarked at
once and marched to St. Martin’s Camp, which was on a hill a mile or
two outside the town. This camp had only recently been started and the
arrangements were far from ideal. A few tents for the officers, and
bivouacs for the men, were the only accommodation. No one had had a
proper meal since he left Doncaster, but no food was provided at the
camp until the following morning. One blanket per man--sewn up to form
a sort of cloak, with a hole in the top for the owner to put his head
through if he felt so inclined--was the only covering provided. Tired
and hungry the Battalion turned in, but not to sleep. It was a cold and
frosty night. After their comfortable billets at Doncaster the men were
not in good training for such rigorous conditions, and the memory of
that night still lives in the minds of some of the “old-timers” of the
Battalion. By a very early hour nearly everyone was out on the road,
stamping up and down in an attempt to get warm. Breakfast time was very
welcome.
After breakfast, rations for the day were drawn and iron rations
issued, and then the Battalion started on one of the hardest marches
it ever had to make. A late change in the orders had caused a delay
of more than two hours so that, when the men at length moved off, the
march was much more strenuous than it would otherwise have been. It was
a very hot day, with a blazing sun. Most of the men were tired before
they started. They had had a long railway journey and a sea crossing
the previous day, and few had been able to get any sleep during the
night. Clad in their thick winter underclothing, and with packs much
heavier than they had been used to in training, they were none too
suitably equipped for a long tramp. But, worst of all, were the new
boots with which everyone had been supplied before leaving Doncaster;
these had not yet become fitted to the feet, and before long many men
were suffering severely. Men who had never fallen out on a march before
were compelled to do so then, and there were soon many stragglers
on the road, gamely trying to struggle along. It was a very jaded
battalion which at length arrived at the little wayside station of
Hesdigneul.
The train, with transport vehicles, animals and personnel on board,
was already waiting in the station. Some tea was obtained from a
little wooden canteen near by and then the Battalion entrained, most
of the stragglers having come up by that time. Here the men were first
introduced to what would be called a cattle truck in England, but which
in France bears the mystic legend “Hommes 40, Chevaux 8”--the type of
compartment which was to be their customary means of conveyance on the
somewhat rare occasions when they travelled by rail. Many were the
speculations as to the Battalion’s destination, but no information
could be obtained from the railway officials. Wild rumours circulated,
the most popular being that a great battle was in progress and the
Battalion was being hurried up as a reinforcement. But, as usual,
rumour proved false. After a journey, uninteresting but for the fact
that it was the first most of the men had ever made on the Continent,
the train arrived at Merville about 6-0 p.m., and orders to detrain
were issued.
There followed another march, worse in some respects than the first.
Certainly it was not so hot, but the rest on the train had allowed
muscles to stiffen and sore feet to develop. Only their tremendous
keenness, and the novelty of active service, kept many of the men
going. One N.C.O. at least arrived at his destination carrying his
boots, having tramped the last part of the way in his stockinged feet.
It was long after dark before the Battalion reached Estaires where it
took over its first billets in France. These were on the edge of the
town, on the Neuf Berquin Road. They had previously been occupied by
Indian troops and were, almost without exception, filthy. Battalion
H.Q. was in the Chateau, but those who had looked for a fine,
castellated mansion were grievously disappointed. It was some time
before the place could be found, and when it was discovered, it turned
out to be a large, but quite uninteresting, building up a side street.
According to rumour, it had been occupied by all sorts of undesirables,
from Germans to typhoid patients; at any rate it was very dirty,
and much work was necessary before it could be put into a habitable
condition. For a day or two all officers messed at a large estaminet by
the Hotel de Ville, but then the system of company messes was started
and continued throughout the Battalion’s period of active service.
All now knew that they were near the Front. Ruined houses along the
road had borne silent testimony to the presence of war. In Estaires the
sound of the guns could be clearly heard, and there the first aeroplane
fight which anyone had seen was witnessed. The Division was now in the
IV. Corps of the First Army. A few days after landing it received its
new title of the 49th Division; the 2nd West Riding Infantry Brigade
became the 147th Infantry Brigade.
About a week was spent at Estaires and, during that time, practically
all the officers and many other ranks visited the front line trenches
for short periods of instruction. The first party, which comprised
about half the officers and a large number of N.C.O’s, went up on
April 19th for twenty-four hours. Old London omnibuses carried them
to beyond Bac St. Maur, and then they walked up to the section of the
line which they were soon to take over the defence of--No. 3 Section
of the Fleurbaix Sector. Here they came under the tutelage of the 2nd
Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment. On the return of this party, the
remainder of the officers and more N.C.O’s had their turn. Then the
Battalion began to send up whole platoons, each under its own platoon
commander, for twenty-four hours. It was during one of these tours
of instruction that the Battalion suffered its first casualties.
At that time movement to and from the front line, in the Fleurbaix
Sector, was almost entirely across the open, communication trenches
being practically non-existent. When coming out after their tour of
instruction on April 23rd, one man was killed and two were wounded by
stray bullets.
Meanwhile the Battalion was resting. Little work was done at Estaires.
Platoon commanders’ inspections and occasional short route marches
were all the military training that was attempted. The men were given
a chance to settle down in their new life. A surprise visit from
Lieut.-General Sir H. Rawlinson, G.O.C. IV. Corps, was the one exciting
event.
On April 22nd, the Battalion marched to billets at Doulieu. This move
caused some discomfort to the platoons which were then undergoing
instruction in the line, as they had considerable difficulty in
finding the Battalion when they returned. Guides had been left behind
for them, but these apparently got tired of waiting and departed. At
Doulieu the Battalion was visited by General Sir Douglas Haig, at
that time commanding the First Army, who surprised a luckless, though
well-meaning, subaltern in the very act of issuing rum to his platoon
at unauthorised hours.
Two days later the Battalion moved to the neighbourhood of La Croix
Lescornez, where it was in Brigade Reserve to the front line. The
following day, an order to provide 400 men for work under the
Royal Engineers was an indication of much of the future life of
the Battalion. The same day the whole of A Company went into the
line, being distributed along the front held by the 3rd Battalion
Worcestershire Regt., which had relieved the 2nd Battalion West
Yorkshire Regt.
On April 26th, the Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion Worcestershire
Regt. in No. 3 Section of the Fleurbaix Sector.
* * * * *
One relief is much like another, and all who know the Western Front can
picture the scene in the billet of No. -- Platoon of -- Company on the
morning of April 26th, 1915.
A dirty yard, with the usual midden in the middle, is surrounded by
buildings on all sides. Nearest to the road is the great barn, which
has been the platoon’s home for the last few days. It is not an ideal
billet. The floor is of trampled earth, with a little straw here and
there; a timber framework, filled in with clay and straw, forms the
walls; the roof is tiled. Many holes in the walls let in light and
air and allow the wind to whistle round the barn; many tiles are
missing from the roof and, at night, a sleepless man can lie gazing
at the stars, or feel the rain falling on his face, according to the
weather. Walls, four to five feet high, subdivide the barn into several
compartments.
On the opposite side of the yard lies the house--all ground floor. Its
kitchen is well known to the platoon, for the people have been good to
the men. Many of them have sat round that strange closed stove, which
will burn anything, and have drunk coffee, while they aired their
French with their hosts. Stables, pig-sties, and other farm buildings
form the other sides of the yard.
“Blankets, rolled in bundles of ten and labelled,” have been dumped
ready to be collected by the transport. Equipment has been made up and
packed, and is lying about the yard. Rifles lean against the walls. The
barn has been left “scrupulously clean” and passed as satisfactory.
For the moment there is nothing special to do. The men stand about
the yard in groups, smoking and talking. Some are drinking coffee
in the kitchen. Private X is carrying on a lively conversation with
“Mademoiselle.”
“Fall in!” Men leisurely don their equipment, pick up their rifles, and
obey. Private Y is the last as usual, and is rebuked by his section
commander. N.C.O’s glance at their men and report “All Correct” to the
platoon sergeant. “Platoon--’Shun!” The men come up to the position of
readiness, described in the Drill Book. “Right--Dress!” They dress.
“Platoon, by Sections--Number! Form--Fours! Form--Two-deep! Stand
at--Ease! Stand--Easy!” The platoon is ready to move.
“Platoon--’Shun!” The officer has arrived. “Platoon present and
correct, sir!” A rapid inspection, a word of criticism here and there,
and the men again stand easy.
“Platoon--’Shun! Slope--Arms! Move to the right in Fours, Form--Fours!
Right! Quick--March! Right--Wheel!” The platoon moves out of the yard.
“March Easy!” Rifle slings are loosened and the rifles slung; pipes
and cigarettes appear; the pace settles down to a steady hundred to
the minute. With a cheery greeting to “Madame” and an affectionate
farewell to “Mademoiselle,” they pass the estaminet. The roads are wet
and muddy, and boots soon lose their parade polish. Now the platoon is
leaving the village. A little ahead are the cross-roads, which mark the
Battalion starting point. The subaltern consults his watch. Good! He is
exactly on time.
“Platoon, March to Attention!” Pipes and cigarettes disappear; slings
are tightened; rifles are brought to the slope. “Left--Left--Left,
Right, Left!” The pace smartens up to the regulation hundred and twenty
to the minute. “Eyes--Right!” They are passing the cross-roads where
the C.O., with his Adjutant, is standing.
“Eyes--Front! March Easy!” Again rifles are slung and matches struck.
The pace soon settles down to the old hundred to the minute. The road
is muddier than ever now. Few vehicles, except the infantry transport,
use it beyond the village; and so it is seldom repaired. The country
grows more desolate; on all sides are ruined buildings, shattered
trees, and the countless signs of war. But jest and song help to
enliven the way, for the men are fresh after their few days’ rest.
At “ten minutes to the hour” the platoon falls out on the right of the
road. Equipment is taken off. The grass is wet, but some sit down; in
later days, in spite of all orders to the contrary, they will sit on
their “tin hats.” It seems hardly a minute before they are called on to
don their equipment and fall in again.
At length a communication trench is reached. The men are quieter now.
Over to the right an occasional shell is bursting. The crack of a rifle
is heard now and then. The trench is muddy, and, here and there, water
is over the duckboards. Private Z slips, and expresses his opinion of
the sandbag-full of charcoal, which he is carrying, in unmistakeable
terms.
The trench seems endless, but, at last, the front line is reached.
Other men, covered with mud and wearing equipment, are waiting there.
The relief goes smoothly. Sentries are changed, duties are handed over,
the latest intelligence about “Fritz” or “Jerry” is imparted. “Quiet
tour. Not a casualty in our company. He doesn’t fire if you lie doggo.”
With every sign of satisfaction the relieved troops withdraw. Men who
are not on sentry seek their shelters and grouse at the condition they
have been left in. The platoon commander inspects his line, swears that
the people he has relieved have done no work during the whole tour, and
goes off to air his grievances at Company H.Q. The Company Commander
wires “Hundred gallons of rum urgently needed,” “Love to Alice,” or
some such message, which has been agreed upon to signify “Relief
complete.”
The tour has begun.
* * * * *
For the first time, the Battalion was responsible for the defence of a
sector of the line, with no one between it and the enemy. There it was
to remain for about two months, inter-relieving every few days with the
6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., and spending its rest periods
in and near the village of Fleurbaix.
No. 3 Section was about a thousand yards in breadth. There was a
continuous front line but, apart from a few strong points with
all-round defence, there were no fortifications in rear of it. Those
were the days when artillery was scanty and shells few; when Lewis
guns were unheard of and the only machine guns available were the
two Maxims owned by each battalion. Hence it was to the rifle that
everyone looked for the defence of the line, and, in order to secure
the maximum of fire effect, as many men as possible were permanently
stationed in the front line. At that time there were practically no men
extra-regimentally employed, and the personnel of the Transport and
the Q.M. Stores was cut down to a minimum. No “trench strength” for
this first tour has been preserved, but the Battalion must have been at
least 900 other ranks strong. Thirteen out of the sixteen platoons were
stationed in the front line, so that, making due allowance for the men
attached to Battalion H.Q., there must have been nearly 700 men in that
1,000 yards of trench--in other words, well over a man to every yard of
fire bay. It can easily be imagined how crowded the line was. At stand
to men stood shoulder to shoulder on every fire step.
During the Battalion’s first tour in this Section, A Company was on the
right, D Company in the centre, and B Company on the left. C Company
lent one platoon to strengthen the garrison of the front line, the
remainder occupying Dead Dog Farm and another strong point in the
neighbourhood. In subsequent tours these positions were inter-changed
in order to give each company its turn in battalion reserve. The main
feature of the sector was the Convent Wall, which lay almost at right
angles to the front line, near the junction of B and D Companies. There
were no communication trenches up to the line. Reliefs were carried
out straight up the Rue des Bassiéres and then along the side of the
Convent Wall. From the front line the ground sloped gently up to the
crest of the Aubers Ridge. No Man’s Land was covered with thick grass
and rank weeds, and was intersected by many derelict trenches.
The country was so low-lying, and water lay so near the surface, that
digging was practically impossible. Hence the defences consisted almost
entirely of breast-works, built of sandbags. The line was of the
usual stereotyped kind--six yard fire bays alternating with four yard
traverses. Shelters were built into the parados. They were very flimsy
structures, affording protection against nothing but bullets and the
weather. It is doubtful whether there was a shelter on the whole sector
which would have stopped a “whizz-bang.” Such was the line in which the
Battalion served its apprenticeship.
From the G.O.C. to the latest-joined private, every man in the 49th
Division was new to trench warfare, and so had everything to learn.
Training in England had mostly taken the form of open warfare, and
practically no one in the Infantry had had any instruction in field
engineering, or in looking after his own comfort. So necessity became
the main teacher, and perhaps a better one could not have been found.
At first rations were carried up by the reserve company, but later
it was found possible to bring pack animals right up to the Convent
Wall; a light cart,--one of the many unauthorised vehicles owned by
the transport at one time or another on active service--was fitted
with axle and wheels, salved from a derelict motor car which was
found lying in a ditch, and was used for carrying ammunition and
R.E. material. All rations were sent up uncooked, and for a day or
two they were issued in that form to each man. But the waste and
futility of individuals cooking for themselves was so apparent that the
system was quickly given up and section messes were instituted, one
man in each being detailed as cook. The main source of water was the
Convent pump, but the reserve company sometimes sent men down to the
nearest inhabited houses to replenish, and it is rumoured that beer
occasionally came back instead of water.
About the time the Battalion reached France the enemy first made use
of poison gas in his second great attack on the Ypres Salient. This
caused great anxiety among the allied armies and measures were at once
taken to protect the men against it. The Battalion received its first
issue of respirators a few days after it arrived in the neighbourhood
of Fleurbaix. They were clumsy affairs--a piece of cotton waste,
saturated with a solution of hypo, and wrapped in black gauze. When
in use the cotton waste covered the mouth and nose and was gripped
in the teeth, the respirator being held in position by tying the
gauze at the back of the head. Old ammunition boxes, filled with hypo
solution, were installed in the front line, and the respirators were
often worn at stand to for practice. One awful wet night the Divisional
Commander visited the trenches to see the working of the respirators.
Most men were carrying them in their great coat pockets instead of
their haversacks, and when he ordered them to be put on there was
great confusion. The rain poured down; in the darkness men dropped
their respirators in the mud and the crepe became thoroughly soaked.
Altogether the practice was not a success. These first respirators
were very uncomfortable to wear, difficult to keep in position, and
practically useless against anything more dangerous than a weak
concentration of chlorine. Before long the P. helmet superseded them
but, though rather more effective, it was quite as uncomfortable.
Having no outlet valve, it was difficult to breath through, and made
the wearer terribly hot. Its single mica window was very fragile and
the least crack in it rendered the whole helmet useless. As helmets had
to be inspected at least three times a day at that time, the wastage
was very great.
[Illustration: Major E. P. CHAMBERS.]
[Illustration: Lieut.-Col. H. A. S. STANTON, D.S.O.]
[Illustration: Capt. H. N. WALLER.]
From the very beginning great stress was laid on two things--the
continual wearing of equipment and sentry duties. These were legacies
from the experienced troops with whom the Battalion had undergone its
brief course of instruction. Periods in the line were very strenuous.
Theoretically, 25 per cent. of the men were on duty by day and 50 per
cent. by night. But, owing to the accumulation of odd duties and the
provision of working parties, no man got much rest. At Fleurbaix the
Battalion laid the foundation of its reputation as a working battalion
which it held throughout the war. Breast-works, if they are to be
kept in good condition, require even more constant attention than
trenches. Few of the men possessed any of the necessary technical
knowledge, and visits from the Royal Engineers were rare; but all men
were willing and, though some of the earlier efforts were very crude,
the work quickly improved. Professional bricklayers were in great
demand for sand-bagging, and C.S.M. E. Bottomley in particular was
looked upon as a great theoretical authority on this subject in his
own company. Not only was the upkeep of the trenches taken seriously
in hand, but entirely new work was planned and executed. The route to
the front line, by the side of the Convent Wall, was made safer, first
by the erection of canvas screens to hide movement, and later by the
construction of sandbag walls at the more dangerous points. But the
most enduring monument of the Battalion in the Fleurbaix Sector was
Dead Dog Alley--a regular communication trench which was taped out, and
nearly completed, before the Battalion left the district.
The Fleurbaix Sector was a very quiet part of the line. In its
inexperience, the Battalion never properly appreciated this fact until
it learned real “liveliness” at Ypres. The early War Diaries are full
of references to heavy shelling; in reality, the enemy artillery did
little. Once a shell dropped right into the Battalion H.Q. Officers’
Mess, but, luckily, two “shorts” had given the occupants timely
warning, and they had withdrawn to a safer spot. A few salvoes were
fired on different parts of the sector daily, the neighbourhood of the
pump receiving most attention; but there is only one recorded instance
of the front line being hit. This was fortunate for, so crowded was
the line, that well-directed shell fire would have wrought fearful
havoc.
Unlike their artillery, the German machine gunners and riflemen were
extremely active. The Rue des Bassiéres and the Convent Wall were
always dangerous spots, while at night the enemy traversed the front
line parapet with great accuracy. His snipers were very wide-awake and
excellent shots; they had all the advantages of superior observation
and high command, and some of them were certainly equipped with
telescopic sights. It was almost as much as a man’s life was worth
for him to show his head above the parapet for a few seconds in the
daytime. Nearly all the casualties in the Fleurbaix Sector were from
bullet wounds.
As has already been said, the British positions were held at this time
almost entirely by rifle fire. Few heavy guns were in use then and,
though there were a fair number of field guns, no really effective
barrage could be put down owing to the scarcity of ammunition. A very
few rounds daily were all that the artillery could fire. Some of their
ammunition was of poor quality. “Prematures” were not uncommon and
caused much worry to Battalion H.Q. One day a 4.7 shell lodged in the
breast-work just outside the Orderly Room, but did not explode.
The two old Maxims which the Battalion had brought out with it were
disposed to the best advantage, but, both in attack and defence, the
main reliance had to be placed on the rifle. And the amount of rifle
fire on that front was colossal. This was particularly the case at
night. Often, somewhere far away and for no apparent reason, a perfect
storm of firing would open; company after company would take it up,
and so it would travel quickly along the line until, literally along
thousands of yards of front, every man would be working his bolt as
rapidly as possible. Sometimes this would go on for many minutes, and
then it would gradually die down. The good old custom of “Five rounds
rapid” at stand to was always encouraged in the Battalion. Occasionally
rapid fire, to harass enemy transport or carrying parties, would be
opened on some back area. In the daytime the use of the rifle was
restricted to sniping, but in this the enemy had most of the advantage
owing to his higher command and his greater experience in constructing
positions. Yet every man in the Battalion was immensely keen to “bag
a Bosch.” Often one man would hurl the most insulting remarks across
No Man’s Land, or even show himself above the parapet, in the hope
that some very simple-minded German would appear, and thus present a
target to another Britisher who was anxiously waiting his chance in
a neighbouring bay. But no successes have been recorded. The enemy
was much too cute and usually retaliated only in kind. Hand-grenades
too were just coming to the fore. When they were relieved the 3rd
Worcesters had left two men in the line to instruct the Battalion
in the manufacture of “jam-tin” and “hair-brush” bombs. About this
time the Brigade Grenadier Company was formed, one platoon from each
battalion being sent for instruction in bombing. Sec.-Lieut. W. L.
Anderton became the Battalion’s first Bombing Officer. But bombing was
not taken very seriously until some months later.
The Battalion was handicapped a good deal by the C.L.L.E. rifle, with
which it was armed. This weapon was much inferior to the short rifle
of the Regulars. It usually jammed before ten rounds “rapid” had been
fired, and was thus a source of much anxiety. Also, it could not be
used for firing rifle grenades as these were constructed to clip on to
the short rifle. As time went on short rifles were gradually obtained,
but the C.L.L.E. did not wholly disappear until 1916.
Patrolling had not yet become the highly organised feature of trench
warfare which it was to be later in the war. In spite of the excellent
facilities offered by No Man’s Land, very little was attempted by the
Battalion in those early days. B Company tried a few patrols with
no very definite result, Sec.-Lieut. J. G. Mowat being the first
officer of the Battalion to go out. Late in May, Lieut. B. A. Bell
was seriously wounded by an enemy machine gun when out on patrol,
and was brought in by Private W. Brown, who afterwards received the
Distinguished Conduct Medal for his gallantry on that occasion. There
was a good deal of unauthorised coming and going in No Man’s Land,
where the chance of securing souvenirs was an attraction to many.
Usually, six days were spent in the line and six in Brigade Reserve.
During the rest periods one company was stationed at Croix Blanche Farm
and, for tactical purposes, came under the orders of the battalion in
the line. The rest of the Battalion, with the exception of a few small
garrisons in scattered redoubts, was billeted in farm-buildings near
Fleurbaix. At first practically no training was attempted, though later
a little was begun. Time was mainly taken up with interior economy and
inspections. At night large working parties were found, mainly for
digging assembly trenches in connection with the operations which were
planning for May 9th; later on in the period work was concentrated
on Dead Dog Alley. The men wrote shoals of letters, rather to the
disgust of the officers whose duty it was to censor them. Many of these
epistles were conspicuous more for vivid imagination than for strict
adherence to truth. A little cricket was played, bathing in the ponds
of the neighbourhood was indulged in, and several company concerts were
held. A few officers and N.C.O’s were able to visit Armentières, then
a very pleasant town, in spite of its nearness to the front line. The
enemy caused very little trouble; five shells daily into Fleurbaix was
his standard “hate.”
Few events of importance marked this period of the Battalion’s
apprenticeship. Its first tour in the line only lasted three days, and
it was relieved on April 29th by the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s
Regt. C Company was stationed at Croix Blanche and, shortly before
midnight on April 30th, it was suddenly alarmed and ordered up to
support the battalion in the line. The company fell in with the
greatest alacrity, some without caps or jackets, but all with rifles
and equipment. Down the road they went at the double, No. 9 Platoon
leading. Occasional enemy shells were falling in the fields and a
British battery of 4.7’s was firing vigorously. Some way down the Rue
des Bassières machine gun bullets began to sweep the road, and the men
were ordered to get into the ditch. At this point Sec.-Lieut. W. C.
Fenton was hit in the knee and had to be carried to the Aid Post; he
was thus the first officer in the Battalion to be wounded. The company
remained in the ditch for some time and then received orders to return
to billets. It had been nothing but a false alarm.
Meanwhile, the big attack on the Aubers Ridge was preparing. This
operation was based on the experience gained in the recent fighting
about Neuve Chapelle, and it was commonly believed in the Battalion
that the 49th Division had been sent out from England in April
specially to take part. Another rumour current about this time was that
the G.O.C’s of the 49th and 50th Divisions had tossed up to decide
which of them should go to Ypres, and which to Fleurbaix. It is not
recorded who won. Originally the attack had been fixed for April 22nd.
But when the enemy made his gas attack on the Ypres Salient, some of
the troops, who had been detailed for the battle, had to be sent north
to relieve the Canadians. So the battle was put off until May 9th. No
attack was planned on the sector held by the 147th Infantry Brigade,
but as the 8th Division was going over on its immediate right it was
very probable that the 49th Division would become involved. Actually,
the part taken by the Battalion was a very minor one; but the event is
of importance as being the first occasion on which the men were engaged
in operations on a large scale.
In the normal course of events the Battalion should have relieved the
6th Battalion in the front line on May 8th. But these orders were
cancelled and, instead, the men found themselves in reserve for the
attack. Their role was as follows:--
1. With the exception of A Company, which was placed under the
orders of the O.C. No. 3 Section, the Battalion was to assemble
in slits in the ground, near Croix Blanche, on the evening of
May 8th.
2. If the attack of the Kensingtons on the extreme left proved
successful, the Battalion was to dig a trench across No Man’s
Land to connect up the old British front line with the old
German front line.
3. Later, if Fromelles were captured, a company was to be sent
forward to hold a line to the north-east of that village.
On the evening of May 8th the Battalion marched up to its assembly
positions. Every man was in full marching order and carried an extra
bandolier of ammunition and the usual miscellaneous assortment of
sandbags, extra rations, etc. On arrival, all set to work to improve
their accommodation. Battalion H.Q. occupied Croix Blanche Farm, from
which building a good view of part of the battle area was obtained
the following day. At 5-30 a.m. on May 9th, the British Artillery
opened fire, and, to the inexperienced soldiers of the Battalion, the
bombardment appeared to be terrific. “The bombardment was a fine sight
and (it was) difficult to realise that anyone could be alive after it
in that particular zone,” says the Battalion’s War Diary. Actually,
it was very thin, but none of the men had any conception at that time
of what massed artillery can do. The German reply was slight, and was
entirely confined to counter-battery work on that part of the front.
In their ignorance, some put this down to the enemy’s scarcity of
ammunition. This mistaken idea that the enemy was short of shells was
not uncommon then. For a long time nothing was learned of the progress
of the attack. At length wounded began to arrive, and rumours to
spread. Some of these latter were only too true. The attack had failed.
It is unnecessary to tell the details of that day as the Battalion
never became engaged. It is sufficient to say that British infantry,
who lacked nothing in gallantry but had little artillery support, were
ineffective in the face of countless German machine guns.
The Battalion remained at its battle stations all day, without
receiving any orders. Very few shells fell near its positions and its
only casualty was caused by a premature from one of the British guns.
There was little for the men to do. Some of them spent their time
making tea, which they served out to the wounded who were dribbling
down the road in large numbers. Few prisoners were seen. The British
artillery continued firing most of the time, but the attack was really
at an end, on that part of the front, quite early in the day.
In the evening orders came to carry out the relief which had been
postponed the previous night. This proved by far the most uncomfortable
part of the day’s proceedings. Though everything was quiet both at
Croix Blanche and in the front line trenches, the route between was
being fairly heavily shelled, and was swept by machine gun fire. It
was the Battalion’s first experience of heavy fire in the open and it
was not enjoyed, particularly when a hitch in the operation caused a
somewhat prolonged halt, and three companies were strung out along
the road without any cover. But luckily, and much to the surprise of
everyone, the relief was carried out without a single casualty to the
Battalion. This was the first and only time that a relief was carried
out by night in the Fleurbaix Sector.
Though the battle continued, on and off, for many days further to
the south, the Battalion was not again seriously affected by it.
Occasionally it received rather more than the usual attention from the
enemy’s artillery, particularly on May 10th, when a large hole was
blown in C Company’s parapet. It was then that Capt. E. E. Sykes had
his first chance of showing that absolute fearlessness and supreme
contempt for danger which later became a by-word in the Battalion. In
full view of the extremely accurate enemy snipers, who shot two of the
men who were helping him, he built up a rough barricade which served
until darkness allowed the breech to be properly repaired.
Towards the end of May the Battalion played a small part in a minor
operation on the 148th Infantry Brigade Sector. There a new front
line trench was in course of construction in No Man’s Land by the 4th
Battalion King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. They worked on it by
night, and withdrew by day. One night, on arriving to occupy it, they
found the Germans in possession. To assist in ejecting them, Lieut. E.
Lee, with part of the Battalion Machine Gun Section, was sent up. They
did not go into action, for the men of the 148th Infantry Brigade were
able to regain the trench without assistance, but a few casualties were
suffered by the party from enemy fire.
On May 24th, the Battalion suffered a serious loss. Lieut.-Col. H. S.
Atkinson, T.D., who had trained the Battalion in England and brought
it out to France, was invalided home. It was a great misfortune and
none felt it more than he. His health had been bad for three years,
following on a serious operation, but he had stuck very gamely to his
work in England, and hoped to be able to see the war through with the
Battalion. Had he undergone a proper army medical examination, he
would never have been allowed to leave England; but by keeping out of
the way of the doctors he had succeeded in getting to France. Major
E. P. Chambers assumed command of the Battalion, with the rank of
Lieut.-Colonel.
By the beginning of June, the Battalion had pretty well settled down
in its new life. Perhaps the men did not look quite so smart as in
Doncaster days, but they had become far more efficient soldiers. Trench
routine was no longer a hidden mystery, and enemy bullets had ceased
to be novelties. The Battalion had had to pay for its education. Much
discomfort was suffered before the men learned to fend for themselves;
much work had proved useless owing to the inexperience of the workers.
The toll of life had not been heavy, but the graves near Croix Blanche
still bear their testimony to the early work of the Battalion in France.
Early in June the Battalion suffered its third officer casualty. Capt.
A. L. Mowat, of D Company, was shot in the head while assisting in the
construction of a sandbag shelter.
The night before the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo great
preparations were made to annoy the enemy. When the sun rose the
following morning, it shone on a parapet gay with the flags of
Britain, France, Belgium, Russia and Italy. But the result was most
disappointing; the Germans did not show the least signs of annoyance.
Perhaps they remembered their own part in that battle exactly a
century before. So a stuffed dummy was placed on the parapet, and that
certainly did tempt their marksmen, who riddled it with bullets. But
they ceased fire when the dummy was decorated with an iron cross.
On the night of June 25/26th, the Battalion said good-bye to Fleurbaix
and moved to Doulieu. Thence it marched, by easy stages, halting a day
or two here and there, to a wood near St. Jans ter Biezen, which was
reached about 1-0 a.m. on July 1st.
The Battalion’s period of apprenticeship was over, and it was about to
learn what real war was in the very worst part of the British line--the
Ypres Salient.
CHAPTER III.
YPRES, 1915.
(_a_) July to October.
The Battalion was now in the VI. Corps of the Second Army. Several
days were spent in the wood near St. Jans ter Biezen and the men never
had any cover there, but, fortunately, it was early July and the
nights were not cold. No one was allowed outside the wood in daylight
except on duty. Some training was carried out, particularly bombing,
instruction in which was pushed on as fast as possible; occasionally
short route marches were made in the failing light and cool of the
evening. But more time was occupied in the inspection of gas helmets
than in anything else. Three inspections of these were held daily,
by the platoon commander, company commander, and battalion commander
respectively; it can easily be imagined how long a time it took the
Commanding Officer personally to inspect the helmets of a strong
battalion. On July 2nd, the Battalion was inspected by General Sir H.
Plumer, who had formerly been G.O.C. Northern Command, and was now
commanding the Second Army. The 49th was the first Territorial Division
to be detailed for a long spell in the Ypres Salient, and this probably
increased General Plumer’s interest in it, in addition to the fact
that much of its training in England had been carried out under his
supervision. Whether there is any truth in the rumour or not, it was
always an article of faith in the Battalion that Plumer had a “soft
spot in his heart” for the 49th Division. The next day it was again
reviewed, this time by Lieut.-General Sir J. Keir, G.O.C. VI. Corps.
The Ypres Salient bore a very evil reputation--not without cause.
Reconnaissance of the forward area began soon after the Battalion’s
arrival at St. Jans ter Biezen, and it was at once obvious that
Ypres was a very different proposition from Fleurbaix. The earliest
experience of A Company is worth quoting as an indication of what was
to be expected. One day Capt. M. P. Andrews, at that time commanding A
Company, spent a day in the line with the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin
Fusiliers. There he made the acquaintance of three officers of the
company which he was soon to relieve. Thirty-six hours later one of
his subalterns visited the same company, only to find that, during the
short intervening period, all the three had become casualties--one
was dead, a second had been lost on patrol, while the third had been
evacuated wounded. This was indeed a rude awakening after the quiet
life at Fleurbaix.
At scarcely any period of the war could the neighbourhood of Ypres
be called quiet. In the autumn of 1915 the British held only a small
bridge-head to the east of the Ypres-Commines Canal. Frequent attempts
were made to extend this, and the enemy was just as anxious to drive
the British out of the salient altogether. When the Battalion arrived
in the area things had barely settled down after the Second Battle
of Ypres, in which the enemy had won for himself all the commanding
ridges, except Mont Kemmel. Since then minor operations had kept the
front lively. One of these took place near Boesinghe only two days
before the 49th Division took over the line, and the 148th Infantry
Brigade in particular came in for a good share of the “liveliness”
which followed it.
On July 7th, the Battalion moved to Canada Wood, near Elverdinghe,
where one night was spent. The next evening it relieved the 2nd
Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the Lancashire Farm Sector. In
spite of the narrowness of many of the trenches, the relief passed off
very quickly. As the Battalion filed in the Dublins filed out, only too
glad to hand over their charge to someone else.
The 49th Division now held the extreme left sector of the British line.
Its left rested on the Ypres-Commines Canal near Boesinghe, abutting on
the French, whose line however was west of the canal. The 6th Division
was on the right. The dominating feature of the sector was the Pilkem
Ridge; this was entirely in the hands of the enemy, who thus possessed
every advantage of high command and superior observation. This sector
the 49th Division was destined to hold until the end of December--six
months of continuous trench duty in the very worst part of the British
line. Reliefs were so arranged that two brigades held the line while
the third was back in rest. Thus the Battalion found itself in several
different sub-sectors during its stay in the Ypres Salient. On every
sector the defence scheme was simplicity itself--the front line was to
be held at all costs; not an inch of ground was to be lost.
During the first tour in the Lancashire Farm Sector A and D Companies
held the front line, B Company was in support, and C Company in
reserve. One of the main features of the sub-sector, and indeed of the
whole divisional front, was the confusing network of old and disused
trenches. Many of these had been hastily dug in the heat of battle and
afterwards abandoned when they were found to be badly sited. Some,
however, were gradually being incorporated in the regular system. The
original notes on the sector, which were handed over by the Commanding
Officer of the Dublins, have been preserved; their outstanding feature
is the continual reference to “work to be done.” He was right. Never
did the Battalion find itself harder worked than during the next few
months.
The tour was a very anxious one. Away on the left the 148th Infantry
Brigade was having a very rough time of it, the enemy making frequent
counter-attacks to recover the ground which he had lost a few days
before. Not knowing when the enemy’s attention might be turned further
south, the Battalion had to be very much on the alert. No one slept
at night, and two officers per company were always on duty during the
day. The men in the front line trenches were fully occupied with sentry
duties and working parties, and it was deemed inadvisable for any of
them to go away from their positions. Thus, all carrying fell on the
reserve company, which had a very hard time of it. Trolley lines were
not yet in use, and all rations and R.E. material had to be carried
right up to the line from the Canal Bank--a distance of well over a
mile. But all ranks worked magnificently.
“This is a very noisy place after Fleurbaix” is the War Diary’s
comment on the day the line was taken over. It was! Though nothing
extraordinary for the Ypres Salient, the enemy artillery activity was
a great increase on anything the Battalion had experienced before.
Lacrimatory shells were much in evidence and these were, at that time,
rather an unknown quantity. The front line, at one spot, was only
about seventy yards from the enemy, but this did not procure for it
any immunity from shelling. There, too, the Battalion received its
first introduction to trench mortars, and it had nothing effective
to retaliate with. Machine gun and rifle fire were also severe. As
at Fleurbaix, there were many very accurate snipers among the enemy,
and these were always on the look-out for targets. So, from one cause
or another, the Battalion suffered a number of casualties before its
five days’ tour was over. The most important of these were Lieut. E.
Lee and C.S.M. A. Parkin of B Company. The former was shot through the
head while instructing some of his men of the Machine Gun Section how
to repair a weak spot in the parapet. He was the first officer of the
Battalion to be killed, and his loss was very deeply felt by all who
knew what a fine, keen and enthusiastic fellow he was. C.S.M. Parkin
had an arm blown off by an enemy shell.
On July 13th, the Battalion was relieved by the 5th Battalion Duke
of Wellington’s Regiment, and went into Brigade Reserve on the Canal
Bank. During the relief part of the area was heavily bombarded with
lacrimatory shells. This considerably interfered with the operation,
for the teaching at the time was that men should always remain as still
as possible when any form of gas was about. Such action was certainly
advisable when no better protection than the P. helmet was available,
for it was so stuffy that any movement became a torture to the wearer.
However, it proved an effective protection against the lacrimatory
shells of the period. About this time Major-General T. S. Baldock,
C.B., was wounded by shrapnel at Divisional H.Q. Major-General E. M.
Perceval, C.B., succeeded to the command of the 49th Division.
[Illustration: Capt. M. P. ANDREWS.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Capt. E. E. SYKES, M.C.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Capt. W. F. DENNING.]
[Illustration: Capt. T. D. PRATT.]
During its stay in the Ypres Salient, the Battalion occupied more
than one position on the banks of the Ypres-Commines Canal. All
were much alike. Officers and men were accommodated in shelters built
into the sunken banks. Things were not always any too quiet. The
enemy knew perfectly well that considerable numbers of troops lived
there, and naturally selected the canal as one of his barrage lines.
As a result, strict orders against loitering near certain points were
issued, much to the disappointment of some enthusiastic fishermen in
the Battalion. The outstanding feature of this, and all other periods
of Brigade Reserve--indeed, of every day of the latter months of
1915--was WORK. During the day men ate and slept. At night there was
no rest for officer or man. Many were employed on the construction
of communication trenches, sometimes only just in rear of the front
line. Great efforts were made to get the trench railways into going
order and, when this work was completed, the resting battalions had
to do a great deal of truck-pushing along them. One of the main
difficulties to be contended with was water. Even in July there was
a good deal of rain; it had rained while the Battalion was relieving
the Dublins--surely an indication of what the future held. Water lay
so near the surface that much digging was useless, and all work had to
be built up and revetted. Looked at in the light of later experience,
it seems a pity that no drainage scheme was instituted at the very
beginning. It was obvious that, as soon as the autumn rains began, the
trenches must become water-logged. Yet nothing was done. Perhaps the
higher authorities still hoped that an advance would be made ere the
wet weather came. Working parties were not free from danger. There was
little artillery fire at night, but machine guns were very active, and
rifle batteries frequently played on obvious places like the trench
tramways. Slowly, but steadily, the Battalion’s total of casualties
mounted up. Yet, in spite of all, the men worked magnificently. They
possessed almost boundless enthusiasm, and were now reaping the benefit
of their training near Fleurbaix. Without exception, officers who
served with them during this early period show the greatest enthusiasm
when they speak of the splendid spirit of the Battalion. The private
soldier, of course, had the hardest time of all; but his officers were
little better off. In order to obtain continuity of work a Brigade
Field Officer of the week was appointed from one of the battalions in
reserve, his duty being to supervise all work. The job was no sinecure.
He was as hard-worked as any honest, though grousing, private. And some
people called these spells in Brigade Reserve “rest” periods!
After five days on the Canal Bank, the Battalion did a second tour in
the Lancashire Farm Sector. Fears that the enemy was about to make
an attack on the French postponed the relief for a few hours, but
eventually it passed off smoothly. The only event of any interest
during this tour was a gas alarm practice. Shell cases and klaxon
horns had been plentifully distributed about the line, and one day a
highly successful, full-dress rehearsal was held by all companies.
It evidently puzzled the enemy, for he put down a protective barrage
along the canal. It also puzzled Battalion H.Q., which no one had
thought of warning, and numerous terse, though hardly polite, “chits”
circulated in consequence. It is worth while to note here that the
highly-organised system of reports, which in later days was a perpetual
worry to luckless company commanders and adjutants, had not yet
developed. If a company commander wanted to send out a patrol he simply
sent one; he never dreamed of informing Battalion H.Q., much less of
asking its permission or submitting a report after the event.
On July 24th, the Battalion moved back to the woods near Oosthoek for
its first spell in Divisional Reserve. This can hardly be called a
“rest” period, except that baths and clean clothing were available. A
little training was attempted, but it was seriously interfered with
by the large working parties which had to be found. Some of these
were employed in the forward area, moving up and returning daily by
motor bus. Others were set to work to convert Trois Tours into a
defended locality. The men worked well, but perhaps without quite their
earlier enthusiasm. The novelty of active service had worn off. They
never properly understood the necessity for all their work. Labour
companies and coloured units were then unknown; everything fell upon
the hard-worked infantrymen. The following official communication,
circulated by 49th Division “G” to Brigades about this time, shows
a certain appreciation of the situation on the part of the higher
authorities:--
“If all the troops with all the tools
Should dig for half a year,
Do you suppose,” our Captain asked,
“That then we should be clear?”
“I doubt it,” said the Adjutant,
Knowing the Brigadier.
It is not often that the General Staff stoops to such frivolity in
the transaction of business. But let no mistake be made. The hard
conditions under which the men lived were not the fault of dear old
General Brereton.
The Battalion returned to the Lancashire Farm Sector on July 30th.
Apart from considerable activity on the part of enemy trench mortars,
and a good deal of sniping, the tour which followed was an uneventful
one. A little patrolling was done, but nothing more important than
a dead Frenchman and a few rats was discovered. Further over to the
right, however, there was considerable activity. It was during this
tour that the Hooge mine went up, and the 14th Division was attacked
with flammenwerfer.
To regain the ground thus lost to the enemy, the 6th Division was
brought up. They attacked early on the morning of August 9th and
carried all their objectives, but suffered heavy casualties in doing
so. The 49th Division co-operated in this attack, though only in a
passive way. Gaps were cleared in the wire, dummy bridges were laid
over the canal, and artillery fired at intervals on the enemy front
line, in an endeavour to distract the attention of the Germans from
the real objective. The Battalion took no part in these activities,
being in reserve on the Canal Bank at the time; but it suffered some
casualties from the enemy barrage. Later in the day, Battalion H.Q.
and B and C Companies were ordered up at short notice to relieve a
corresponding portion of the 7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.
who were suffering from a sudden outbreak of ptomaine poisoning, which
was so severe that about a hundred of them were sent to hospital. Two
days later the other two companies of the 7th Battalion were also
relieved.
The sector now occupied by the Battalion was called the Glimpse
Cottage Sector, and was held with three companies in the front line
and one in support. Two months later it was to be the scene of the
Battalion’s first serious encounter with the enemy, and so a detailed
description of it is held over until then. But the tour in August
was also a very active one, and during it the Battalion suffered two
serious losses. The first was R.S.M. J. McCormack, who was killed on
August 12th. The second was even more serious, and is especially worthy
of attention as a conspicuous example of gallantry and self-sacrifice.
Late in the afternoon of August 14th, a dugout in A Company’s line was
blown in and a number of men were buried amid the wreckage. Capt. M. P.
Andrews immediately hurried to the spot and, under heavy artillery and
rifle fire, succeeded in extricating the men. Three were found to be
dead and three wounded, one so seriously that, unless he could receive
proper attention at once, there was little hope of his recovery. The
trenches were too narrow for the wounded man to be carried along them
on a stretcher. There was nothing for it but to carry him across the
open. Capt. Andrews did not hesitate. Getting out on the top himself,
he assisted to raise the wounded man, and then set out across the open
with the stretcher party. He paid for his devotion with his life. The
ground was swept by bullets and, before the party could reach the
shelter of a communication trench, he was hit in the head and died
almost at once. So perished one of the most gallant gentlemen and
conscientious officers who ever served with the Battalion. Word of
what had happened was despatched at once to Battalion H.Q., while the
stretcher-bearers, true to their duty, remained in the open, trying
in vain to stop the flow of blood. Lieut. B. Hughes, R.A.M.C., then
Medical Officer to the Battalion, at once hurried up the line. But he
was too late. Capt. Andrews was already dead. The event cast a gloom,
not only over A Company, but over the whole Battalion.
About this time the Battalion transport was having a very rough
passage, and they too soon recognised the difference between Ypres and
Fleurbaix. Almost nightly, heavy shelling of the roads used by the
ration convoys caused much inconvenience and some loss. On August
14th, in particular, two horses were hit and, for a time, the column
was much disorganised. Cpl. E. Ashworth was in charge and, by his own
gallantry and coolness under fire, he restored order and confidence,
and was able to deliver his charge. For this he was afterwards awarded
the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
When next the Battalion went into Brigade Reserve it occupied a number
of farms north-east of Brielen. Though not so safe as the shelters on
the Canal Bank, these farms were more comfortable, and they did not
suffer so much from enemy artillery fire. Work continued as before, a
new feature being the erection of “elephant” frames in the Battalion’s
new billets.
The next two tours in the front line were spent on the extreme left
sector--a part of the line which the Battalion was to know only too
well in later days, and to which the minds of most “old timers” turn
when Ypres in 1915 is mentioned. It bore an ominous reputation. The
trenches lay at the north of the Ypres bridge-head, where it flattened
out to join the canal. On the extreme left a tiny sap ran out to a
point only fifteen yards from the nearest enemy post. Nowhere was
No Man’s Land more than sixty yards across. There was very little
shelling of the front line by either side; the trenches were much too
near together for this to be carried on without serious danger of
injuring one’s own men; but the enemy used many trench mortars, some
of which were of the real “minnie” type. There was also an enormous
amount of bombing on both sides, for grenades could easily be lobbed
from one front line to the other in several places. The trenches were
very confusing--a result of the July attack which had taken place just
before the 49th Division moved into the line near Ypres--and so narrow
that in places a stout man could easily stick fast. Everywhere they
were dominated by the enemy’s positions.
The French were on the Battalion’s left, but their line was on the west
side of the canal and thus they were comparatively secure from sudden
attack. They proved themselves very helpful and sympathetic neighbours.
When they saw that the Battalion was having a bad time from enemy
trench mortars they were always only too ready to help. They did not
wait to be asked; they simply cleared all their men, save a skeleton
garrison, into deep dugouts or the British support line, and then
opened fire on the enemy with every type of infernal engine they had
available. It always amused them to see the enemy turn his wrath from
the British and start pounding their deserted lines. They were, at this
time, much better supplied with trench mortars than the British, not to
speak of their 75’s.
After two tours in this sector the Battalion went back for its second
spell in Divisional Reserve. Casualties had been a good deal heavier
than the Battalion had experienced previously, but the men had stuck
to their work splendidly, and many instances of gallantry and devotion
to duty brighten the otherwise sordid picture. The little sap on the
extreme left was the main centre of activity and there trench-mortaring
and bombing were almost continuous. It was constantly being damaged,
and as frequently repaired; on one occasion a heavy trench mortar
dropped right into it, causing six casualties. How near it was to the
Germans is shown by the fact that, on August 26th, they were able to
throw the following message from their lines into it:--
“Dear Tommy,--Brest Litovsk fallen to-day. Rippelin, Lieut.”
An hour or two after the arrival of this message loud cheering was
heard in the enemy lines, presumably rejoicing at the news. During this
tour Sec.-Lieut. W. L. Anderton was shot through the head and died
almost immediately.
On August 26th, the Battalion moved back to the woods near
Coppernollehoek for twelve days’ rest. A little more training was
done this time, but large working parties were still the order of the
day. Endeavours were made to smarten up the men; among other things
the cleaning of buttons was instituted for the first time since the
Battalion had left England. A somewhat novel duty was the rounding up
of spies in the neighbourhood of Proven; this was entrusted to Capt.
E. E. Sykes, with a party of forty-five other ranks. He was away for
thirty-six hours, but no record has been preserved of what success,
if any, he had. While near Coppernollehoek the Battalion was again
inspected by General Plumer, who was accompanied by the Earl of
Scarborough and Brigadier-General Mends. Probably the G.O.C., Second
Army, noticed a change in the men whom he had reviewed about two
months before; they were no longer light-hearted and cheery novices,
but fully-blooded and hard-bitten veterans. A short time in the Ypres
Salient had worked wonders. A sad loss to the Battalion about this time
was Sergt. D. H. Fenton, who was accidentally killed by a bomb on the
very day his commission was announced.
When the Battalion again returned to the line it took over the Turco
Farm Sector, on the extreme right, abutting on the 6th Division. This
was the best and quietest sector on the divisional front. In places
No Man’s Land was several hundreds of yards across. Of course there
was plenty of work to be done, but the trenches were, on the whole,
good. After a quiet tour the Battalion came out to a new position on
the Canal Bank. Here there was little shelling and the opportunity was
seized to hold some swimming sports; D Company won the inter-company
team race. During this period in Brigade Reserve, Lieut.-Colonel E.
J. Pickering, formerly Brigade Major of the 148th Infantry Brigade,
arrived to take command of the Battalion.
On September 21st, the Battalion returned to the Turco Farm Sector.
The tour which followed is chiefly noteworthy for the events of
September 25th--the day on which the battle of Loos began. No very
serious operation was planned for the Ypres front, but a demonstration
was arranged in the hope of distracting the enemy’s attention and
drawing his reserves northwards. The 6th Division was to attack on
the right and capture Bellewaarde Farm and Lake. At the same time the
British artillery was to cut gaps in the German wire opposite the 4th
Battalion, while a smoke screen was to be put up on both its flanks.
It was hoped that this demonstration would cause the enemy to evacuate
his front line, in which case the Battalion was to advance and seize
the unoccupied trenches. At 4-30 a.m. the bombardment and smoke screen
began. The enemy retaliation was quick and heavy. Shells rained down
on the front line and the communication trenches; machine gun and
rifle fire swept the ground. It was soon obvious that the Germans had
no intention of evacuating any part of their trenches, and so no
advance was attempted on the front of the 49th Division. By 7-30 a.m.
the artillery fire on both sides had practically ceased. So far as the
Battalion was concerned, the only results of the day were a number of
casualties and much damage to the lines from the enemy bombardment.
The last days of September were spent at Elverdinghe, where Battalion
H.Q. occupied the Chateau and officers and men were accommodated in
tents in the grounds. Early in October a move was made to a camp by
the Poperinghe-Woesten Road, where another period, very similar to the
previous ones, was spent in Divisional Reserve. The Battalion had now
been about three months in the Ypres Salient. During that time, in
addition to the normal wastage through sickness, 120 casualties had
been incurred in action. But far worse was in store. Before, however,
entering on an account of the events of October 16th, and of the
terrible wet months which culminated in the gas attack of December
19th, there are one or two points which deserve fuller treatment than
they have yet received.
The high proficiency of the enemy in sniping has already been
mentioned on more than one occasion. Gradually the Battalion came
to realise that the most effective way of dealing with this form of
annoyance was to adopt similar tactics. Luckily, the very man was to
hand--Sergt. A. McNulty. A combination of all the qualities needed
by a first-class sniper is rarely to be found in one individual; but
this N.C.O. possessed them all to an exceptional degree. A magnificent
rifle shot and a first-class observer, he had the patience of a Job,
and was also an exceptionally good instructor. Before long there was
little that he did not know about marksmanship, telescopic sights,
the building of snipers’ posts, and observation. He constructed his
own posts and waited in them patiently, hour after hour, for suitable
targets. How many Germans he had to his credit, no one ever knew;
it is more than doubtful whether he knew himself. But certain it is
that the enemy had good reason to curse that Winchester of his, and
he did much to counteract the hostile sniping which was menacing the
Battalion so much. For a time he was taken away to be an instructor at
the newly-formed Divisional Technical School, where his energies were
not restricted to sniping. Among other things, he was one of the very
few men who mastered the intricacies of that awful invention--the West
Spring Gun. The Battalion had much to thank Sergt. McNulty for and,
later in the war, when he went to America as an instructor--how the
Americans ever understood his accent was beyond the Battalion--he was
greatly missed.
Another feature of the period was the appearance of trench mortars.
Almost from the very beginning of trench warfare the Germans had made
use of these weapons and, so effective did they prove, that the British
soon tried to imitate them. Their first attempts were very crude.
The earliest trench mortars to appear in the line had, apparently,
been dragged from the obscurity of some museum, and, needless to say,
were not to be compared with the “minnie.” The two-inch trench mortar
followed, firing its weird, round cannon-ball--affectionately known as
a “plum-pudding”--on the end of a rod. Stokes guns were unknown at that
early period.
(_b_) October 16th.
On October 14th, the Battalion relieved the 1/5th Battalion West
Yorkshire Regiment in the Glimpse Cottage Sector, C Company going in
on the right, A Company in the centre, and D Company on the left; B
Company was in support. The main feature of the sector was a sharp
salient in the enemy line, opposite the centre company front. From this
salient an old communication trench--a relic of the days when both
front lines had been part of the same system--crossed No Man’s Land to
the British line. Both sides had established bombing blocks in this
trench, and the locality was the main centre of activity on the front.
Owing to folds in the ground, it was impossible to cover the sap-head
by rifle fire; but machine guns fired into the dead ground and some
two-inch trench mortars, in emplacements near by, helped to protect it.
The sap-head itself was held by a squad of battalion bombers. It often
received attention from enemy trench mortars.
The story goes that, a few days before the Battalion took over the
sector, the enemy had started shelling the sap-head and the adjacent
front line, and most of the garrison had withdrawn into the supervision
trench, which ran about thirty yards in rear. Only a weak party had
been left in the sap. The bombardment had been followed by a small
daylight raid to secure a notice-board which had been hung out to
announce some allied success. Whether there was any truth in the story
cannot now be said.
The first two days of the tour were comparatively quiet. About 1-30
p.m. on October 16th, the enemy opened an intense artillery and trench
mortar bombardment on the greater part of the Battalion area. It was
soon apparent that something unusual was happening. Trench mortars
were raining down near the sap-head, 5.9’s were whistling overhead and
bursting in the supervision trench, shrapnel and high explosive were
falling on practically the whole area, as far back as Battalion H.Q.
Stand to was ordered at once. Two platoons of B Company were moved up
into close support, and were employed carrying up bombs and ammunition.
The garrison of the sap, on which point it was obvious that much of the
enemy’s attention was directed, was reinforced. The men crouched down
under their parapets--strict orders had been issued that there was to
be no firing until the word was given--and waited for the enemy’s next
move.
The situation was not a pleasant one. It is true that the majority
of the shells were bursting behind the front line, but there were
sufficient “shorts” to make things very uncomfortable. The wire was
torn to shreds, parapets were breached, and many casualties were
suffered, particularly by the two flank companies. It was the first
time that the Battalion had had to stand a really heavy bombardment in
the front line, and they came through it splendidly. For three hours
they waited, while the shells crashed around them, longing for the
moment when the enemy would appear and they would have the chance to
“get a bit of their own back.” About 4-30 p.m. their opportunity came.
A party of Germans, clad in fatigue dress, emerged from the trenches
opposite and began calmly to cut a passage through their own wire, near
the sap-head. This was too much for A Company. Perhaps it would have
been better had fire been withheld a little longer, until an actual
attack came. But no one thought of that at the time. Tired of his long
inactivity under heavy shelling, every man was at once on the fire step
working his bolt for all he was worth. Shells were still bursting all
around, but none paid attention to them. There was the enemy in the
open; nothing else mattered. And the wire-cutting part of the operation
came to an abrupt conclusion.
By this time, the sap-head had been blown in by a well-directed shell.
But the garrison, with whom the indefatigable company commander, Major
R. E. Sugden, spent most of his time that day, simply extricated
themselves from the debris and set to work to construct a fresh
bombing block. Shortly after, the enemy made his next move. A party of
Germans, about twenty in number, wearing bombing aprons filled with
stick grenades, crawled up in the folds of the ground and began to bomb
the sap-head. A brisk encounter ensued. Most of the German grenades
fell short and the British proved that they could easily out-throw
the enemy. With the assistance of a Maxim gun the attack was driven
off with comparative ease, as were two further attacks of a similar
character. About the time that the third was made, another party of the
enemy was seen moving along a hedge row in the direction of the British
line. Fortunately this move was detected early by the crew of a machine
gun, which soon drove them to cover. All this time the bombardment
continued.
About 6-0 p.m. the enemy apparently saw that success was impossible,
and gradually the shelling died down. The Battalion was then able to
review the situation and to count its casualties. These latter were
heavy enough. Sec.-Lieut. E. Taylor, C.S.M. V. S. Tolley and twelve
other ranks were killed, or died shortly after of wounds; Lieut. E.
N. Marshall, Sec.-Lieut. F. A. Innes and twenty-two other ranks were
wounded. Much damage had been done to the sap-head and to other parts
of the line. The night which followed passed quietly, but there was
much work to be done. To assist in this the 5th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. sent up a large working party, and also provided a
number of stretcher-bearers to remove the wounded and the dead.
Compared with many later events in the history of the Battalion,
this episode is of very minor importance. But, at the time, its
importance loomed large in the eyes of all. It was the Battalion’s
first real fight. After several months of passive warfare, the men
had at length come face to face with the enemy in active operations.
Nothing is harder than to maintain one’s morale when inactive under
a heavy bombardment. But this the men had succeeded in doing. Three
hours of intense shelling had only served to make them the more eager
when their chance came. All ranks came through the ordeal with the
greatest credit, and the hearty congratulations which were received
from Brigade and Division were thoroughly deserved. For their gallant
services on this occasion Sec.-Lieut. F. A. Innes--it was his first
trench tour as he had only recently joined the Battalion--received the
Military Cross, and Lance-Cpl. T. H. Clarke and Cpl. C. Landale were
both awarded Distinguished Conduct Medals. Lance-Cpl. Clarke had been
the N.C.O. in charge of the bombers in the sap-head, and had behaved
with the greatest gallantry throughout the day. Cpl. C. Landale had
worked untiringly on the telephone wires during the bombardment, and
it was mainly due to him that communication between the front line and
Battalion H.Q. was scarcely ever interrupted.
The object of the enemy in making this attack was never understood.
Perhaps he expected the intensity of his bombardment would induce the
Battalion to vacate its front line, and he would be able to occupy it
with comparative ease. If the story of his daylight raid, a few days
before, had any truth in it, he knew that the front line had been
practically evacuated on that occasion, and may have expected similar
tactics again. Certainly his heaviest shelling fell on the supervision
trench. But, whatever his object, he found the Battalion alert and only
too ready to meet him.
The next few days were very fully occupied in repairing the damage
done by the enemy’s shells. So well was this work carried out that,
at the end of the tour, the Battalion was able to hand over the line
in as good a condition as it had been before October 16th. On the
night of October 19/20th Lieut.-Col. E. J. Pickering was wounded. He
had gone up with Major Sugden to inspect the wire, which had been
put out by D Company. The enemy was only about 150 yards away at that
point and evidently saw the party. They opened fire and the Commanding
Officer was severely wounded in the right arm. He had only been with
the Battalion about a month, but during that time he had done a lot to
smarten it and he left a lasting impression on all ranks who served
under him.
[Illustration: Lieut.-Col. C. J. PICKERING, C.M.G., D.S.O.]
[Illustration: Lieut.-Col. G. K. SULLIVAN, O.B.E., M.C.]
On October 21st, after a heavy trench-mortaring which destroyed several
dugouts, the Battalion was relieved by the 1/4th Battalion King’s Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry, and went back to the Canal Bank.
(_c_) The Wet Months.
Towards the end of October His Majesty the King visited Abeele, and
there reviewed representatives of all the Divisions of the VI. Corps.
To this review the Battalion sent a contingent[6] of twenty-five other
ranks, under the command of Lieut. E. N. Marshall. Needless to say they
were a carefully picked body of men, and it is worthy of note that
the detachment from the 49th Division was specially commended by His
Majesty for its smart turn-out that day.
At the end of the month the weather completely broke up and heavy rain
became normal. The Battalion was in comparative comfort on the Canal
Bank, but ominous reports soon began to come in from the units holding
the line. Bad as these reports were, they were mild compared with the
actual conditions under which the men were to exist for the next two
months. On October 30th the Battalion relieved the 7th Battalion Duke
of Wellington’s Regt. in the extreme left sector; and then began for it
such a period of hardship and misery as it has never since been called
upon to endure for so long a time.
In one way the telling of this part of the Battalion’s history is
comparatively easy. During the earlier part of its stay in the Ypres
Salient it had seldom done more than two tours in the same sector. But
from the end of October, until it was finally relieved in December,
the Battalion held no sector of the line except the extreme left;
and, in every way, that sector was the worst on the divisional front.
Its proximity to the opposing trenches, and the commanding position
occupied by the Germans, have already been described. The trenches lay
very little above the water level of the Ypres-Commines Canal and, as
soon as the rains began, they naturally received much of the drainage
from the Pilkem Ridge. They were badly sited and badly constructed.
Consisting mainly of sandbag breast-works, they were the worst possible
type to inhabit in wet weather. They had been considered the worst on
the front during the fine weather; words cannot adequately describe
what they became early in November.
When the Battalion took over the sector on October 30th the trenches
were already in an appalling condition. The front line was in places
more than two feet deep in semi-liquid mud, and parts of it were
entirely isolated from neighbouring posts, except by cross-country
routes; stretches of the communication trenches were waist deep in
water. And this was the result of only about two days of steady rain!
For the next two months the conditions gradually became worse and
worse; occasional short frosts gave a little temporary relief, but
the thaws which followed them only made the trenches more awful than
before. Thoroughly undermined by water, the revetments bulged and caved
in, literally before the eyes of the men. In a few days, hundreds of
yards of trenches had become nothing but cavities filled with mud and
water. The shelters of the sector had never been protection against
anything but bullets and the weather. They ceased to be even that now.
Water from the trenches overflowed into them and flooded the floors,
their supports were undermined, and one by one they collapsed, often
causing casualties to the men who occupied them, until scarcely a
habitable one remained near the front line. The enemy made full use of
his higher position. Pumping the water out of his own line, he allowed
it to flow across No Man’s Land into the British line. Often the water
was so deep in the trenches that thigh-boots became useless. Had there
been a well-planned system of drainage, something might have been done.
But it was only the coming of the rain that opened the eyes of the
authorities to the condition of the sector, and the drainage scheme
which was then started was never far enough advanced to be of much use
while the 49th Division was there. What was to be done with the water?
Most of it had to stop where it was. Occasionally it was possible to
divert a little of it elsewhere--in some cases, it is feared, into
other people’s lines. Only in one small trench on the extreme left
could it be turned back into the enemy lines, and, in order to effect
that desirable operation, the whole had to flow right along the British
front line first.
The utter collapse, and consequent evacuation, of long stretches of the
line considerably altered the method of holding it. Many of the posts
were completely cut off from one another, except by movement across
the open. Such movement was extremely hazardous by day, for the enemy
snipers and machine gunners were only too ready to take advantage of
the many opportunities which the new state of affairs gave them. With
parapets sliding in and trenches filling, it was soon impossible for a
man to move about in daylight without exposing himself. By night there
was an additional danger. It required a man, with a very good sense of
direction, to move over that area of water-logged and derelict trenches
without losing his way. The case of Pte. T. Atkinson--the first
prisoner the enemy secured from the Battalion--was a good illustration
of this. In company with another man, he had successfully delivered
rations to an isolated front line post, but, on the way back, the two
disagreed about the direction of their own lines and separated, each
going his own way. The other man rejoined his platoon in safety; Pte.
Atkinson, apparently, walked straight across No Man’s Land into the
arms of the enemy.
The greatest hardships were suffered by men who were wounded in the
front line. If a man had the misfortune to be hit early in the day he
could seldom be got away until after dark; often in great pain, and
always under the most miserable conditions, he would have to wait for
many hours before he could receive proper attention. Even when dusk
came his lot was a most unenviable one. The journey to the Canal Bank
often took two or three hours, and there was a good chance that he
might be hit again before he arrived at the Aid Post, for machine gun
fire swept the ground intermittently all night.
One important result of the new conditions was a great increase in
patrolling. Now that large portions of the line were entirely deserted
and posts were isolated from one another, this was very necessary, for
at night the enemy could enter the trenches unseen almost as easily
as the British could leave them. Most of this patrolling was purely
defensive, but occasionally useful reconnaissances were made, one of
which will be described in detail later. There was little opportunity
for the men to show an offensive spirit. A little bombing was indulged
in, but soon the general policy became one of “live and let live.” Had
the enemy attempted an infantry advance the defence must have placed
its main reliance on the bayonet; in that waste of mud rifles could not
be kept properly clean, and few would have fired more than two or three
rounds rapid.
Each company held a section of the front line, with two platoons
in front and two in support. Usually these platoons inter-relieved
every forty-eight hours, but towards the end of the time reliefs were
sometimes carried out every twenty-four hours. The Battalion spent four
days in the line and four in brigade reserve; these latter periods were
sometimes passed on the Canal Bank and sometimes in the farm houses
further back. While in brigade reserve every available man was kept
hard at work in the forward area either on the new drainage scheme,
or trying to clear some of the mud and water from the communication
trenches. Only twice during the wet weather did the 147th Infantry
Brigade have a spell in divisional reserve, and even then there was
not much comfort. The prevailing bad weather had its effect on the
back area camps and they were soon deep in mud. Much work was done to
improve them. Early in November a number of wattle and mud huts were
put up in place of some of the tents; some wooden huts were also in
course of erection. When the Battalion came back to the same camp at
the end of the month they found things more comfortable, for the work
had been continued and accommodation improved. But, at the best, it
was a poor form of rest for men who had just spent sixteen days in the
forward area, and were looking forward to another spell of the same
kind.
Everything possible was done for the men’s comfort, but, at first, the
available supplies of suitable stores were quite inadequate. Until
the wet weather began, no one seems to have dreamed of the conditions
which would prevail during the winter. At the beginning of November
thigh-boots were almost non-existent, though, later, sufficient were
available to equip every man. However, the communication trenches
were so bad that frequently men lost their boots on the way up to the
line. It was no uncommon thing for a man to stick so fast in the mud
that he had to be dragged out by his companions, often leaving his
boots behind. He would then have to complete his journey in his socks;
sometimes he might find a spare pair of boots when he arrived in the
front line. Dry socks were always available for men in support, but
they could seldom be supplied to men in the front line. Foot grease was
provided and periodical foot-rubbing ordered; but how could the men
obey the order? Seldom could a man in the line find a dry spot to sit
down on while he removed his boots. The result was soon apparent in
the enormous number of trench feet which developed; during November,
1915, no less than 146 other ranks were sent to hospital for this cause
alone. Sheep-skin coats were provided and proved a great boon. There
was plenty of rum--more than during any subsequent winter. Every effort
was made to provide hot food and drink, but the difficulties of getting
it to the companies before it was cold were almost insuperable. Any
attempt to light a fire was bound to draw the attention of the hostile
artillery or trench mortars, and so only “Tommy’s Cookers” could be
used.
Such were the conditions under which the Battalion held the line in
the November and December of 1915. For utter misery they have only
been equalled once--on the Passchendaele Ridge in December, 1917--and
then for a much shorter period. A man had a ghastly prospect in front
of him when his turn came to form part of a front line garrison for
forty-eight hours. For all that time he would be thoroughly soaked and
terribly cold; his boots would be full of water, he would stand in
water and mud; physical pain, mental weariness and bodily fatigue would
be his constant burden. The chances were that he would not complete his
tour of duty--that before his time was up he would succumb to the enemy
snipers, or be on his way to hospital, a physical wreck. One example is
sufficient to show what appalling casualties were suffered during this
period. About the beginning of December, an officer of the Battalion
took up twenty-four other ranks for a forty-eight hour tour of duty in
the front line. At the end of that time he brought out with him one
signaller and three other ranks. Every other man had become a casualty.
But what of the spirit of the men of the Battalion during this time?
How did they bear their hardships? Many writers have paid tribute to
the gallantry of British troops in battle, but few have written of
the heroism of those who held the line under such conditions as the
4th Battalion did in the autumn of 1915. The soldier in battle has
excitement, and a good deal of exhilaration, to help him through; but
the Yorkshiremen who faced the enemy near Boesinghe in 1915 had neither
of these. Theirs was heroism of a far higher order--the heroism which,
with no excitement to buoy them up, can make men coolly and quietly
face horror and death in their worst forms. Such men as Kipling must
have been thinking of when he wrote,
“If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew
To serve your turn long after they are gone,
And so hold on when there is nothing in you
Except the will which says to them ‘Hold on’.”
They were MEN, were those of the 4th Battalion, who held the line
in 1915. Men of the quiet, tight-lipped and dogged type, who talked
little, though occasional flashes of humour brighten even this ghastly
picture, but simply obeyed orders without question and held on. Perhaps
their feelings can best be expressed by quoting the remark of one of
them, when on short leave from that hell. “Well, sir, we either have to
laugh or cry, and we prefer to laugh.”
Few specific events of this period need be recorded. On November 9th
Lieut.-Col. G. K. Sullivan, formerly Adjutant of the 1/5th Batt. King’s
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, assumed command of the Battalion. His
stay was a very brief one. Eleven days after his arrival he was wounded
by a shell splinter on the Canal Bank. As Major E. P. Chambers had
been sent to hospital with a sprained ankle the previous day, Major
R. E. Sugden assumed command of the Battalion until the arrival of
Lieut.-Col. E. G. St. Aubyn. The latter had been second in command of a
battalion of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps in the 14th Division. Though
always in weak health, he retained command of the Battalion for nearly
a year. He was a very quiet, but exceptionally competent, Commanding
Officer, who earned the respect of all, and the most sincere affection
of those who knew him best.
On the night of December 11/12th, Sec.-Lieut. W. N. Everitt, with
Sergt. Kitchen, carried out an extremely daring and highly successful
patrol. The glow of a light had been noticed at a particular point in
the enemy line, and they made straight towards it. No Man’s Land was
not more than sixty yards across but it was no mean obstacle, owing to
its water-logged condition. The enemy wire was very thick and difficult
to negotiate but, after much trouble, the two found themselves at the
foot of the enemy parapet. Leaving his companion at the bottom, Everitt
carefully crawled up the parapet and looked into the enemy trench. He
found it to be deeper, better revetted and much drier than the British
trenches were. Slowly he moved along the parapet, examining the trench
at different points. At length he reached the place where the glow had
been observed and suddenly found himself looking into the corner of a
bay, almost exactly at the point where an enemy sentry was standing. As
he looked the German raised his rifle, and Everitt slid gently down the
parapet. He had not been observed, but the chance shot of the sentry
passed only just over his head. He had now seen all he could. The light
was explained; it came from a brazier which evidently warmed a shelter
hollowed out of the traverse near which the sentry was posted. Two or
three Germans were warming themselves round it. There was nothing more
the patrol could do. With a thick wire obstacle behind and only one
man to support him, it would have been suicidal for Everitt to attempt
anything against the enemy post. Besides, his orders were to make a
reconnaissance, and the information he had gained would be useless if
he did not return to report it. So, regretfully, he turned his back
on the enemy, and succeeded in reaching his own line without being
discovered. This patrol caused a good deal of stir in the Brigade,
for no previous patrol had got so far. It had obtained very valuable
information about the condition of the enemy trenches, and had proved
that the Germans were very much on the alert. All agreed that the
Military Cross, which Sec.-Lieut. W. N. Everitt afterwards received for
his work that night, was thoroughly well earned.
On December 12th Major R. E. Sugden was severely wounded in the arm by
a bullet. The bridges over the Canal were always dangerous spots. Not
only were they well marked by the enemy artillery, but machine guns,
posted further to the north, could fire straight down the Canal in
enfilade. It was while he was crossing one of these bridges that Major
Sugden was hit. He had served continuously with the Battalion since it
had been mobilised and his loss was greatly felt.
(_d_) December 19th.
The enemy first made use of poison gas in the spring of 1915, about
the time the Battalion landed in France. On that occasion he employed
pure chlorine, but in so weak a concentration that the results were
not nearly so disastrous as they might have been. After this first
trial--it was probably more an experiment than anything else--he made
no use of gas on a large scale for several months. This was fortunate,
for it gave allied scientists time to study the whole problem and to
devise means of protection, not only against chlorine, but against
other harmful gases also. It is true that anti-gas measures were far
from perfect at the end of 1915. But the allied armies were better
prepared for that form of attack than they would have been had they had
no preliminary warning. In particular, the possibility of the enemy
using phosgene had been guarded against by the introduction of the P.H.
helmet. This was a considerable advance; its two stout glass eye-pieces
were a great improvement on the single mica window of the P. helmet,
and the outlet valve made it much less stuffy and more comfortable to
wear.
There is no doubt that, about the beginning of December, some rumour
that the enemy was soon to try a second gas attack on the Ypres Salient
had filtered through to the British. One of the reasons for the patrol
of Sec.-Lieut. W. N. Everitt, already described, was to discover
whether any gas cylinders were in position in the enemy lines. New P.H.
helmets had been issued to all the men in the Battalion, but, as the
available supply only admitted of one per man, a P. helmet was still
carried as a reserve. Much gas helmet drill had been done, and all
ranks were warned to be specially on the alert.
On December 17th, the Battalion relieved the 6th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. in the extreme left sector. All knew that this
was to be their last tour in the line for the time being and that,
on relief, they were to go back for a long period of rest. At night
patrols were very active on the Battalion front, on the look-out for
indications of the presence of gas cylinders. They reported much
hammering in the enemy lines and, on the night of December 18/19th, a
great deal of coughing. A raid was contemplated, but that never came
off. Much work was in progress, for attempts were being made to put the
trenches into better condition for the relieving unit. Working parties
from the 6th Division, which was then in Corps Reserve, came up nightly
to assist; and the Battalion was also engaged in putting out a great
deal of wire on its front.
A special artillery “shoot” had been arranged for the early morning
of December 18th. This, it was hoped, would not only damage the
enemy trenches, but would also destroy any gas cylinders which were
in position for an offensive. As the opposing trenches were so near
together, the enemy front line could not be bombarded without grave
risk to the British themselves. Hence, it was arranged that the
Battalion should evacuate its front line at 5-0 a.m. and not reoccupy
it until the next night. This was done, but the bombardment did not
come off as the morning was too misty for satisfactory observation. So
similar arrangements were made for the next day.
The night of December 18/19th was comparatively quiet. It was bright
and clear, with a gentle breeze blowing from the north-east--in every
way ideal weather for an enemy gas discharge. About 5-0 a.m. on the
morning of December 19th all front line platoons, except those of A
Company, began to withdraw according to plan. Many had actually reached
their positions for the day when, at 5-30 a.m., flares suddenly shot up
all along the enemy lines. Whether they were red or green is a matter
for dispute among those who saw them; but the point is not important.
They were evidently a signal for the attack to begin. Immediately,
what is described by survivors as a “sizzing” noise was heard, a
greenish-white cloud appeared over the enemy parapet and began to drift
towards the British lines, and a terrific bombardment with artillery
and trench mortars was opened on the Canal, the British communication
trenches and reserve positions. Within a few minutes every bridge,
except one, was shattered, great damage had been done to the trenches,
and every telephone line was broken. And over all drifted that deadly
cloud.
Many men were caught in their shelters and gassed before they could
be alarmed. Others were caught on their way back from the line and
suffered terribly. A Company just managed to get the one word “gas”
over the ’phone before the line to Battalion H.Q. broke. But soon
gongs and horns were crashing out their warning, while men frenziedly
adjusted their helmets, seized their arms, and rushed to their battle
positions. There was hurry and confusion almost everywhere, but panic
nowhere. Indeed, that day there was not a single case of straggling in
the 49th Division.
Fortunately, the British artillerymen were thoroughly on the alert.
They were standing to their guns ready for the pre-arranged shoot and,
probably for the first time in their experience, they had more shells
than they could fire. They saw the S.O.S., they heard the alarms, and
soon they themselves were surrounded by the gas. With helmets on they
worked their guns as they had never had the chance of working them
before. The storm of projectiles which descended on the German lines
must have taught the enemy that his age of artillery predominance
was near its end. Warning had been sent to the 6th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regiment, which was in Brigade Reserve, and before long it
appeared, moving up across the open. The enemy saw it too and put down
a barrage in its way. But the men came forward splendidly and were soon
manning their battle stations on the west bank of the canal.
Meanwhile, the Battalion was bearing the full force both of the gas
and of the enemy bombardment. The men who had been warned in time
were unharmed by the gas, for the P.H. helmet proved a very effective
protection. But many men had been gassed before they could do anything,
and among them the sights were ghastly. They lay in agony on the
ground, sickly greenish-white in colour; they foamed at the mouth
and gasped for breath; some even tore open their own throats in the
paroxysms of their pain. None who saw these sights can ever forget
them, and none will ever forgive the enemy who first made use of such
fiendish means of destruction. Among them moved Capt. S. S. Greaves,
the Battalion Medical Officer; none worked more devotedly that day than
he, and many a man owed his life to him.
Several distinct discharges of gas were made. They seemed to come about
once every twenty minutes. Probably the enemy hoped that some men,
thinking all was over, would have removed their helmets. About 7-0
a.m. the attack ended, but the air was not clear enough for helmets
to be removed with safety until half-an-hour later. Indeed, in some
parts of the trenches, the gas lay about the whole day and all through
the next night. Intermittent enemy shelling continued all day and the
British fire did not slacken for hours. After their terrible ordeal of
the early morning all the men were very “jumpy,” and false alarms were
frequent. But no more attacks came on the front of the 49th Division,
though a fresh discharge was made against the French further north,
about 9-0 a.m.
Some account must now be given of A Company, which was holding the
extreme left of the Battalion sector. Two platoons were in the front
line--in F34 and F35 respectively, as the trenches were commonly
called--one platoon near Company H.Q., and a fourth in dugouts on the
west side of the canal. Sec.-Lieut. W. N. Everitt was in command in
F34 and Sergt. A. Stirzaker in F35, each isolated from the other and
from Company H.Q. except by highly dangerous routes across the open.
Like the other front line troops they were to have withdrawn in the
early morning, but, as they had not so far to go, they had not moved
off so soon. Hence, they were still in their positions when the gas
discharge started, and helmets were adjusted so promptly that not a man
was gassed. It was obvious at once that their duty was to remain in
and defend the front line, and this each of the commanders decided to
do. Everitt succeeded in getting a message over the ’phone to Company
H.Q. just before the line was broken; he then stood to with his men and
opened rapid fire until their rifles were red hot. Sergt. Stirzaker
kept his men carefully in hand and allowed no firing; his numbers were
very small and he feared that, by opening fire, he would only be giving
away this fact to the enemy. Everitt’s message and the gas arrived at
Company H.Q. almost simultaneously, and many of the support platoon
were gassed before any warning could be given. Lieut. E. N. Marshall
immediately collected every available man and set off with them to
reinforce the garrison of the front line. Half he sent across to F34,
but most of these became casualties before they reached the comparative
safety of that position; the remainder he led himself up to F35.
Then followed a weary period of waiting. Harassed by enemy fire and
surrounded by gas, in almost complete ignorance of the situation but
expecting an enemy attack at any moment, they hung on.
It was long before they had any news from outside. At length Lieut.
Marshall decided to send a messenger to Battalion H.Q. The way lay
across ground which was swept by machine gun fire; only one bridge was
left over the canal and that was being heavily shelled. It required
no mean courage to volunteer for such a mission. Just then Pte. W.
Bancroft crawled into F35 with a report from Sec.-Lieut. W. N. Everitt.
This man knew well the dangers of the journey for he had been with
Sec.-Lieut. W. E. Hinton, when the latter had been wounded on that
very ground only a few days before. Yet, as soon as he heard what was
wanted, he offered to take the message. He reached Battalion H.Q.
unhurt, delivered his message, and supplemented it with a very clear
report of his own. He then returned to Lieut. Marshall with a cheery
message from the Commanding Officer, and afterwards crawled back to his
post in F34. Few Distinguished Conduct Medals have been better earned
than the one he received for his gallantry on this occasion.
The day came to an end at length and, with the darkness, came relief.
The 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. had volunteered to take
over A Company’s front, so that the latter might spend a night in
comparative peace near Battalion H.Q. The relieving troops were not
equipped for a tour in such a line; they had come up that morning in
fighting order, and they had no thigh-boots. Nevertheless, they carried
out the relief. The following night the rest of the Battalion was
relieved, and the whole moved back to near Elverdinghe.
On December 19th the enemy made practically no attempt to follow up
his gas discharge and bombardment by an infantry attack. Small patrols
were reported at one or two points further to the south, but no German
infantry was seen on the Battalion front. Probably, the heavy barrage
put down by the British artillery, and the resolute front shown by the
few men of A Company deterred the enemy from making an attack. The
gas he used that day was a mixture of chlorine and phosgene--far more
deadly than the plain chlorine of his earlier attack.
The casualties suffered by the Battalion on December 19th were very
heavy, particularly when it is remembered how low its fighting strength
was at the time. The majority were due to gas, but the bombardment also
claimed many victims. Sec.-Lieuts. J. A. Hartley and F. W. O. Fleming,
R.S.M. C. C. MacKay and thirty-seven other ranks were killed, or died
within the next few days. Lieut. E. N. Marshall, C.S.M. E. Walsh and
about forty other ranks were wounded, or suffering severely from gas
poisoning. It was a fitting climax to the ghastly months which had
preceded it.
The cool courage and the steadiness of the 49th Division on December
19th were fully appreciated by all who knew what the men had had to
endure. Congratulations from the higher authorities soon began to flow
in. “The coolness of the troops saved the Army from a disaster,” wrote
the G.O.C. VI. Corps. A few days later he expressed himself again, in
no uncertain terms, in a private letter to the Divisional Commander:--
“My dear Perceval,
Although I have already expressed to you and to your Brigade
Commanders the admiration I feel for the gallant stand made
by those under their command against the recent German gas
attack, I should like to place on record how very highly I
value the services rendered by all ranks. I do not think that
the importance of their success can be over-estimated. It has
re-established a complete confidence in our power of defence
which had been severely shaken by the German gas success gained
in the Spring, a confidence which however had never deserted the
6th Corps.
Yours very sincerely,
J. L. Keir.”
The Battalion may justly claim a considerable share of this praise.
And so the Battalion’s first stay in the Ypres Salient came to an end.
It had arrived at the beginning of July, inexperienced and practically
unknown. It left towards the end of December with a magnificent
reputation. But it had paid the price. There, in the vicinity of Ypres,
the original Battalion, which had mobilised, trained, and gone out to
fight, was disbanded. Its men were scattered in a dozen cemeteries and
scores of hospitals.
[Illustration: YPRES. 1915.]
CHAPTER IV.
JANUARY TO JUNE, 1916.
The earlier half of 1916 is the least eventful period of the
Battalion’s history. The months in the Ypres Salient had reduced its
strength to a very low figure, and reinforcements arrived very slowly,
until just before the Battle of the Somme. From January to June there
is not one dramatic incident to record. With the exception of one tour
in the trenches near Authuille, the Battalion never went into the line.
Instead, it was employed mainly on various forms of pioneer work which,
though very useful in themselves, are of little interest now.
When the Battalion was finally withdrawn from the Ypres front on
December 20th, 1915, it moved back to Elverdinghe Chateau for a few
days. There Christmas was spent. Everything possible was done to make
the occasion a successful one. Plenty of money was forthcoming and
supplies were obtained from Poperinghe--then a much better place for
shopping than in later years. Tables, with calico for table-cloths,
were set up in the canteen hut, and dinner was served in three
sittings. Everything went off splendidly. Plates and glass had been
borrowed in Poperinghe, and these were much appreciated by the men, few
of whom had had a meal for many months, except from a mess tin.
While at Elverdinghe the Battalion was in Brigade Reserve. On December
27th it was relieved and moved by short marches through Poperinghe,
where a night was spent in houses in and around the Square, to
Houtkerque, arriving there on New Year’s Day. The men were billeted in
farms about a mile out of the town and were fairly comfortably housed.
Practically no training was attempted. It was realised that the men
needed rest more than anything else, and so they were given little to
do during their fortnight’s stay at Houtkerque.
On January 15th the Battalion marched to Wormhoudt. A band, equipped
mainly with Italian horns, had recently been formed; this helped to
enliven the march, particularly when the Brigadier’s horse took fright
at the unusual sight and noise, and bolted. Near the entrance to the
town General Sir H. Plumer was waiting to see the Battalion march past.
Most of the men were lodged in farms just outside Wormhoudt. They had a
royal time. They thronged the estaminets. They enjoyed the Divisional
Band, which played in the Square. Officers’ messes vied with one
another in the elaborate dinners they gave. All did their best to make
up for the hard time they had had at Ypres. As at Houtkerque, very
little training was done. Officers’ classes in Lewis gun and bombing,
under Sec.-Lieuts. W. N. Everitt, M.C. and H. H. Aykroyd respectively,
were a feature. The latter, it is rumoured, often developed into
throwing contests between the instructor and his pupils. On January
23rd some Battalion sports were held, the most interesting item on the
programme being a mule race for officers. This race was of the usual
type, neither saddle nor stirrups being allowed. Within a few yards of
the starting point most of the mules were riderless, Sec.-Lieut. A. E.
Mander in particular taking a beautiful dive over his mule’s head and
landing on his own. The race was won by Sec.-Lieut. J. G. Mowat, with
Sec.-Lieut. E. C. Mee second; practically no one else finished.
About this time the 147th Infantry Brigade Machine Gun Company was
formed. Until then machine guns had been battalion weapons. In future
they were to be the arm of a separate unit. To form the Company certain
officers and other ranks were taken from each battalion of the Brigade.
Lieut. G. W. I. Learoyd, Sec.-Lieut. E. Chisnall, six N.C.O’s and
twenty privates were sent by the Battalion. To replace the machine guns
which were thus taken away, each battalion received four Lewis guns. It
was the first time any of these weapons had been issued but, in course
of time, the number was gradually increased until, by the summer of
1918, the Battalion was in possession of no less than 36.
Just before the Battalion left Wormhoudt the G.O.C. Second Army
presented medal ribbons to a number of officers and other ranks of the
49th Division, and he took the opportunity to say good-bye to the men
who were about to leave his army. His farewell speech shows clearly how
much the work of the 49th Division was appreciated in the Second Army,
and is worth quoting in full:--
“General Perceval, Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men
who are representatives of the 49th Division.
This is a very pleasant ceremony to me, and I hope to you, with
which to finish for the time being my connection, and that of
the Second Army, with this Division.
I have had the pleasure on two occasions lately--one some weeks
ago when you came out of the Line, and one the other day when I
gave ribbons representing decorations to Officers, N.C.O’s and
Men of the Division after the recent Gas Attack--and on those
two occasions I expressed briefly, but I hope quite distinctly,
my appreciation of the way in which the 49th Division has
carried out the duties entrusted to them during the last few
months; but now that it is settled for the time being the 49th
Division is to leave the Second Army, and go to another area,
while I have nothing to add as regards appreciation of the
work you have done, I should like to say to you how sorry I am
that you are leaving the Second Army. At the same time I fully
realise that when a Division or any other Unit has undergone
a long, arduous and strenuous time in a particular part of
the Line, as the 49th has done, it is very desirable that
they should have a change of scene, if the military situation
admits of it, and that is the sole reason why you are quitting
the Second Army. I cannot expect you to share my regret; no
one so far as I know has felt any deep regret at quitting the
Ypres Salient; but, while you will not regret your change of
scene, when you look back on the time you have spent here,
notwithstanding the arduous time that you have gone through,
notwithstanding the losses of your comrades--which we all
deplore--you will, I hope, have some pleasant recollections to
take away with you of the time you have spent up here, and at
any rate you will, I know, have some pleasant memories to carry
away with you of your comrades of the Second Army. We, I can
assure you, will follow your doings with the deepest interest;
we are quite confident that no matter where you go you will not
only sustain but add to the reputation that you have already
won, and we shall always feel a kind of reflected glory when we
hear of the gallant deeds which I am quite sure that you are
going to accomplish both individually and as a Unit.
On behalf of the Second Army, I say good-bye to you, and I wish
you all--Officers, N.C.O’s and Men--the very best of luck.
Good-bye.”
On February 2nd the Battalion left Wormhoudt and the Second Army,
and moved to the Somme Area. Transport and personnel entrained at
Esquelbecq in the morning and, after the usual tedious journey, arrived
late at night at Longueav, near Amiens. There one company was left
behind, to assist in unloading the transport, while the rest of the
Battalion set off on a long and weary march to Ailly, where motor buses
were waiting to convey it to billets at Camps en Amienois. The men were
very tired when they arrived about 3-0 a.m. After a few days they moved
by stages to Warloy Baillon.
About a fortnight was spent at Warloy. The rolling downs and open
country of the Somme district were a very welcome change from the flat
clay of Flanders. The men were billeted in barns which were moderately
comfortable, but the weather was very bad, snow falling frequently.
A little time was devoted to training, but more to organisation and
interior economy. Occasionally working parties had to be found. These
were employed digging shallow trenches for buried cables, to the west
of Martinsart Wood, and had a march of one and a half hours each way to
their work.
The Commanding Officer started an officers’ riding school. All officers
attended, and every available hack was turned out. Several officers
were thrown, much to the amusement of the transport sergeant, who
laughed uproariously. One inexperienced horseman was heard gravely to
explain that his “horse had pushed him in the face with its paw.”
On February 28th the Battalion relieved the 1/4th Battalion King’s
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, in the right sector of the Authuille
trenches. This sector is of some interest as being the most southerly
one ever held by the Battalion. At that time the British line, which
lay practically north and south from Thiepval Wood to near Authuille,
made a right-angled turn due east of the latter place, in order to
enclose Authuille Wood. The re-entrant thus formed was occupied, on
the enemy side, by the famous Leipsig Redoubt, the southern defence
of Thiepval village. The sector held by the Battalion was about six
hundred yards in length; it lay along the north side of Authuille Wood,
facing the Leipsig Redoubt, with its left on Campbell Avenue. This part
of the line had been taken over from the French not very long before.
The sector was in an appalling condition. The communication trenches
were full of water, which often reached to the top of one’s thigh
boots; they were not gridded and the hard lumps of chalk, which
littered the bottom, were very painful to men wearing gum-boots.
Everywhere, the line was very wet; some parts of D Company’s front
were quite impassable, and were left unoccupied. Pumps had to be kept
going night and day. The trenches were not revetted and were falling
in badly, so that all work had to be concentrated on the front line.
The awful weather that prevailed during the tour did not improve the
conditions. Snow fell frequently.
The enemy was fairly active. He was credited with a desire to
straighten out his line by cutting off the north-east corner of
Authuille Wood. Perhaps the similar designs of the British, on the
Leipsig Redoubt, suggested the idea. The front line was not much
annoyed by shelling, though on one occasion it was pretty heavily
“whizz-banged”; the hostile artillery fired mostly on the north-east
corner of the wood and the vicinity of Battalion H.Q. Medium trench
mortars were much in evidence, particularly during the afternoons;
but luckily, nearly all of them fell a few yards behind the front
line. There was no sniping--the conditions were too miserable--and
the machine guns were not very active. The Battalion did not adopt a
very offensive attitude. A fair amount of patrolling was done, and the
enemy was found to be rather active in No Man’s Land too; but no actual
encounters are recorded. This was the first time that Lewis guns had
been taken into the line, but they were not much used.
With its Ypres experience behind it, the Battalion naturally did
all that was possible for the comfort of the troops. There were,
unfortunately, several cases of trench feet, for the means of
prevention had not yet been reduced to the science which they became
later in the war. The method of cooking in the line was a great advance
on anything that had been in existence before. Each company had its own
trench kitchen; to it rations were sent up in bulk, and hot meals were
served regularly, being carried up to the front line by orderly men.
The tour came to an end on March 4th. It had been most uncomfortable,
but very few casualties had been suffered; the only one of importance
was Sec.-Lieut. F. H. Kelsall wounded. The condition of the
communication trenches was so bad that some companies went out over the
open. D Company lost its way in Authuille Wood and got nearly to Albert
before anyone discovered it was on the wrong road. One night was spent
in Bouzincourt and a second in Authuille village, in Brigade Reserve.
At the latter place the billets were awful, and the men had to rig up
their ground sheets to prevent the water pouring in through the roofs.
On March 6th the whole Battalion moved back to Mailly-Maillet.
With the move to Mailly-Maillet began a period of nearly four months,
during which the Battalion never went into the line. Instead, it
was employed on various forms of work, and had comparatively few
opportunities for training. It is the longest period it ever spent out
of action, while hostilities lasted. The billets at Mailly-Maillet
were not at all bad. The village had been very little shelled, though,
while the Battalion was there, enemy planes dropped some bombs on the
outskirts. Practically all the men were in houses; the rooms were often
quite bare but there were always fires. Training was impossible. Only
very small drafts were arriving and so the strength of the Battalion
was still very low. Practically every available man was required for
the large working parties which had to be provided.
[Illustration: Brig.-Genl. E. G. St. AUBYN, D.S.O.]
These working parties were in connection with mining operations to the
north-west of Beaumont Hamel, and were very strenuous. The Battalion
shared the duty with the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.,
each having twenty-four hours on and twenty-four hours off. During
the twenty-four hours of duty, three shifts, each consisting of two
officers and one hundred other ranks, had to be found. Each shift was
supposed to do eight hours’ continuous work, but it was not allowed
to stop until the next shift was ready to take its place; so late
arrivals became very unpopular. To take a typical shift, say one which
was due at the mines at 8-0 a.m. The party paraded at 6-15 a.m. and
marched to Auchonvillers. From that point it had to carry timber,
sandbags and other R.E. material, required in the mines, up a long
communication trench. Arriving at the mine at 8-0 a.m., the men had to
work continuously until 4-0 p.m. The work was very hard. The men were
formed into a chain from the mine face, along a tunnel, and then up the
steps of the shaft. Their work consisted of throwing or passing the
sandbags of “spoil” from the mine face up to the open, where a further
party disposed of them. It can be imagined how monotonous the work was,
and how tired the men were at the end of a shift. Then they had another
one and a half hours of marching back to billets.
This work was not entirely free from danger. The enemy was known to be
counter-mining and, at any time, he might explode his mine. Every now
and then all work would be stopped, and there would be absolute silence
while experts listened for sounds of the enemy working. Fortunately,
there was no untoward incident while the Battalion was engaged on
the work. But once some casualties were suffered, though from a very
different cause. The trenches, in which the mining was being carried
on, were held by a battalion of the Royal Irish Rifles. One night, the
enemy put down a heavy artillery and trench mortar barrage, and raided
the line. The working party had to cease work and stand to. It did
not come into action, but one man was killed and three wounded by the
barrage.
All were glad to leave Mailly-Maillet and the mines. On March 29th the
Battalion marched to Harponville, and the next day to Naours. This
second day’s march was a very long one, but the day was splendid, and a
hard frost had put the road in good condition. When the Battalion was
met by the Divisional Band near Naours, everyone freshened up, and the
last stage of the march was a great success. All who were there look
back on their stay at Naours with pleasure. The billets were good, the
surrounding country delightful, and beautiful spring weather continued
almost throughout. The “Tykes”--the recently-formed Divisional Concert
Party--were there the whole time. On April 14th, the first anniversary
of the Battalion’s landing in France, they gave a special performance
to the “old originals.” Of these, there were about 340 still serving
at that time. There was plenty of sport, particularly football. Above
all, there were no working parties. A good deal of training was done,
special attention being paid to instruction in the Lewis gun, and
to company and other close order drill. There was practice in the
assembly, the attack, and consolidation, over taped-out trenches;
for already preparations for the Somme Battle were in progress. But
all training was carried out during the morning; the afternoons were
entirely devoted to sport. Altogether, the Battalion had a “real good
time” at Naours, in spite of the Medical Officer, who insisted on
inoculating everyone.
On April 23rd the Battalion moved by motor bus to Hedauville, and then
followed two months of working parties in the area held by the 36th
Division. All this work was in preparation for the attack which was
soon to be launched, in conjunction with the French. The Battalion’s
first job was the digging of assembly trenches in Aveluy Wood. Daily
the men were taken up by motor bus as far as Bouzincourt, and marched
from thence to their work. It was all task work and the tasks were very
heavy. The ground was full of roots, which greatly hindered digging,
and, a foot or two below the surface, much flint was encountered. But
very good work was done in spite of these difficulties. There Capt.
C. Jones, C.F., first became prominent. He had not been long with the
Brigade, but he soon became very popular with the men, taking a shovel
himself and digging with the best of them, in all weathers.
The life in the woods was really quite enjoyable, in spite of
occasional spells of rain. Hedauville Wood was full of nightingales,
and many men sat out at night to listen to their song. Beetles also
abounded and were not so much appreciated; often it was necessary to
get up at night to catch enormous flying specimens of these insects.
Strange to say, the enemy artillery made little attempt to harass
troops in the area. The Germans must have had a good idea of the attack
which was impending. They had good ground observation and plenty of
aeroplanes. Martinsart village was crowded with troops and, in the
evenings, there were sometimes thousands in its streets. Yet it was
never shelled.
It is unnecessary to go into full details about this period. Most of
the work was much of the same type. Digging was done both in Aveluy and
Martinsart Woods; the Battalion was billeted first in one and then in
the other, in order to be near its work. Once it had to carry up gas
cylinders for an operation of the 32nd Division. Perhaps this job was
the indirect cause of a gas alarm which occurred two nights later. At
any rate, someone thought he heard a Strombos horn, and there was great
confusion for a time as few could find their gas helmets.
About the middle of June the Battalion started work in Thiepval Wood,
digging assembly trenches off Elgin Avenue. There it was sometimes
annoyed by shelling, and a few casualties were suffered. On June 24th
the work came to an end and the Battalion moved back, taking with it
the thanks and congratulations of the G.O.C., 36th Division, under whom
it had been working.
The time had almost come when the Battalion was again to take its
place in the line. For six months it had done little but pioneer
work, with occasional periods of training, and one trench tour.
During all that time its fighting, or perhaps it would be better to
say “working,” strength had been very low, for the wastage in the
Ypres Salient had never been made good. Now that it was destined
for battle, reinforcements were imperative. On June 24th a draft of
52 other ranks arrived; five days later a further draft, 258 other
ranks strong, joined. Many of these were experienced soldiers, who
had served earlier in the war with other regiments; among them was a
fair sprinkling of old Regulars, who had landed at St. Nazaire with
the 6th Division, during the Battle of the Marne. They were fine
material, but it was a pity they had not been sent earlier. Not only
would they have been of the greatest use in the pioneer work of the
last two months, but officers and N.C.O’s would not have had to lead
into battle so large a proportion of men of whose very names they were
ignorant. To incorporate such numbers of reinforcements, in the short
time available, meant much hard work. Thus, the two days which preceded
that fateful--and fatal--July 1st were very strenuous ones for the
Battalion.
CHAPTER V.
THE BATTLE Of THE SOMME.
(_a_) July and August, 1916.
The first half of the year 1916 was a period of comparative quiet for
the British Expeditionary Force. During those six months it attempted
no serious offensive, and the Germans were far too fully occupied in
the neighbourhood of Verdun to be able to expend much energy elsewhere.
The terrific attack on their eastern stronghold, caused the French much
anxiety, and it undoubtedly influenced their strategy. Nevertheless, it
did not prevent them making their preparations for the great offensive,
which had been planned for the summer, in conjunction with the British.
This attack was to take place on a wide front, where the allied lines
joined in the Somme district; and the battle which resulted takes its
name from that river.
The only part of the Somme battlefield which is of interest in a
history of the Fourth Battalion is the neighbourhood of the village
of Thiepval and the wood of the same name. From Albert the River
Ancre flows in a northerly direction to about St. Pierre Divion,
where it turns nearly east towards Miraumont. Its banks rise steeply
on both sides; its width is considerable; and the extensive marshes
and shallow lagoons, which fringe so much of its course, render it
a formidable obstacle. It is surprising that the enemy ever allowed
the French to establish themselves on the eastern bank in 1914. By
the summer of 1916, many military bridges had been built across the
river and its marshes; but the allied bridge-head, though wide, was
shallow, particularly at the northern end. Everywhere it was dominated
by the Germans, who occupied all the commanding positions on the
line of hills. To the north they held the village of Beaumont Hamel,
from which they could overlook the whole course of the river, as
far south as Albert. Their line crossed the Ancre near St. Pierre
Divion and then ran approximately south, including the village of
Thiepval, to La Boiselle. Few stronger defensive systems, than that
around Thiepval, have ever been constructed on the western front. To
the north the village was defended by the mighty Schwaben Redoubt, to
the south by the equally formidable Leipsig Redoubt and that network
of fortifications, well-styled the “Wonderwork.” Everywhere the line
was well supplied with deep dugouts, which were comparatively easy to
construct in the chalky soil of the district. The Germans thus had
many advantages over the British. Their commanding positions gave them
better opportunities for observation, and their machine guns could
sweep every inch of ground in No Man’s Land. The shallowness of the
bridge-head cramped the British, and hampered their assembly for the
attack, while it gave unrivalled opportunities to the enemy artillery.
Nevertheless, it was with the highest hopes that the allied armies
looked forward to “Z” day. Months of preparation had been necessary for
this offensive, and some account has already been given of the “spade
work” done by the Battalion in that connection. Towards the end of
June, much time was spent in reconnaissance. Before the battle began
all the officers, and most of the N.C.O’s in the Battalion, knew every
dump, aid post, ammunition store and source of water supply between the
Ancre and Authuille Wood.
The concentration of artillery on the British front was colossal, and
the reserves of ammunition seemed almost inexhaustible. A week before
the end of the month the guns opened fire, and, from that time, the
Germans can have had no doubt of what was coming, and which of their
positions were threatened. Day and night, for seven days, the rain of
shells poured down on the enemy line without ceasing. A good view of
much of the shelled area could be obtained from Senlis Mill, and many
officers of the Battalion visited the observation post there, to watch
the bombardment. All came away with the same opinion--that nothing
could live in the German lines. Their hopes of an early and decisive
victory were very high. They had yet to learn the strength of the
enemy’s deep dugouts.
The opening of the infantry attack was fixed for the morning of July
1st. The 49th Division formed part of the X. Corps, whose left rested
on the River Ancre and right near Authuille Wood. The Corps objectives,
including as they did the villages of Grandcourt and Thiepval, and all
their outworks, were second to none in difficulty on the British front.
The attack there was entrusted to the 32nd Division on the right, and
the 36th (Ulster) Division on the left. The 49th Division was held in
Corps reserve; it was to assemble in previously-selected positions and
there await orders. The Battalion’s assembly position was in Aveluy
Wood, where it was to occupy some of the very trenches it had dug
about two months before. Just before the battle, Lieut.-Col. E. G. St.
Aubyn was summoned to Corps H.Q. There he remained until nearly the
end of July, being held in reserve to take command of a brigade should
any Brigadier become a casualty during the battle. The command of the
Battalion thus devolved on Major J. Walker. “The Commanding Officer
wishes all ranks to remember that in the work in front of us we are
putting to the test our reputation as a Battalion and has absolute
confidence that Officers, N.C.O’s and men will worthily uphold the
honour of the Regiment to which we belong,” was his message to the
troops on the eve of battle.
About midnight on June 30/July 1st, the Battalion marched out of
Senlis. Though its role was still indefinite, everything had been
prepared so that it could move into battle at a moment’s notice. The
transport moved to lines near Hedauville. The Battalion itself marched
to B Assembly Trenches in Aveluy Wood, arriving long before dawn. There
was none too much room in the trenches, but all the men were got in
somewhere. The enemy was quiet. There can be no doubt that he knew
full well what was impending, but he reserved his fire for the better
targets which would soon present themselves. Few of the men even tried
to sleep; excitement was far too high for that.
At zero hour--7-30 a.m.--the British artillery fire lifted from the
enemy front line, and the British and French infantry “went over the
top.” Much has been written of that great assault, but nothing need
be noticed here, except what took place on the X. Corps front. There
the 36th and the 32nd Divisions went forward with a magnificent dash.
They swarmed over the first enemy lines; they over-ran Thiepval and
St. Pierre Divion, the Schwaben and the Leipsig Redoubts. Some of the
Ulstermen even reached Grandcourt Railway Station. But their casualties
were appalling. “Mopping-up” was then unheard of; counter-battery work
was in its infancy; creeping barrages were unknown. Down came the enemy
artillery barrage, and it was such as few had seen before. German
machine gunners and riflemen, emerging from the security of their
deep dugouts, took the attack in enfilade and in reverse. Men fell in
thousands. The survivors were too few to maintain the positions they
had reached. By an early hour the attack on the N. Corps front had
failed.
Of course, all this was only learned by the Battalion later. From
Aveluy Wood nothing could be seen of what was happening on the Corps
front. The men knew that the attack had opened; for a time they knew
nothing of its progress. They had nothing to do. They were not troubled
by enemy shelling, for the hostile artillery had far better targets
elsewhere. After some time, wounded began to pass, and also a number
of prisoners. The former were eagerly questioned, and some news of the
earliest stages of the attack was obtained; but it was not until much
later that authentic information was received.
Towards 11-0 a.m., orders to move across the River Ancre arrived.
The Battalion Intelligence Officer was immediately sent forward to
reconnoitre the bridges and report on the safest; none envied him his
job, but, as things turned out, it was simple enough. The enemy was
paying no attention to the bridges. About 11-30 a.m. the Battalion
moved off by platoons, at fifty yards’ interval, A Company leading.
Marching via Brooker’s Pass, it reached the Southern Dugouts near
Crucifix Corner, Aveluy, without incident. There it remained until
the evening of the next day. The 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s
Regt, was also there and accommodation was very crowded; but otherwise
the men were not uncomfortable. Aveluy was not shelled. Crowds of
stragglers from different battalions of the attacking divisions were
coming in to reorganise, and rumours of the failure of the attack were
increasing. Apart from carrying wounded to the neighbouring dressing
station, and helping men who came back from the line absolutely worn
out, the Battalion had nothing to do.
About 7-0 p.m. on July 2nd the Battalion left Aveluy and moved up to
relieve the 5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. in Johnstone’s Post.
This position was in the narrow and deep valley which lies along the
south-eastern edge of Thiepval Wood. Two large cemeteries now occupy a
great part of the valley, and the inscriptions on the weather-beaten
crosses bear eloquent testimony to the presence of the 49th Division
in that area. None who were there in July, 1916, will ever forget it.
It was a point at which many trenches met, but, apart from these and
a few shelters in the bluff along the edge of Thiepval Wood, there
was no cover. When the Battalion arrived that evening, the enemy was
putting down a terrific counter-preparation on Johnstone’s Post,
where he evidently suspected an assembly for the attack. A continual
stream of 15 cm. high explosive shells poured into the hollow from the
south-east. The cover of existing trenches was nothing like enough to
accommodate the Battalion, and all that could be done was to get the
men as close as possible to the steep south-eastern side of the valley,
which afforded a little protection.
Very early the next morning, orders were received for the Battalion to
support a fresh attack which the 32nd Division was about to make on
Thiepval. These orders did not arrive until about half-an-hour before
the attack was to begin. What was to be done? Very little was known of
the ground; there was no time for reconnaissance; there was not even
time to issue proper orders to companies. Fortunately, the instructions
were cancelled before zero hour. The 32nd Division, however, made its
attack. It had little success. One corner of the Leipsig Salient was
taken, and was very useful two months later as a starting point in the
operations which outflanked Thiepval on the south. It was also much
used as a “show ground” in the next few weeks, as there were many fine
enemy dugouts in the German line. Apart from this, the attack was a
failure.
The whole Battalion remained at Johnstone’s Post until the evening of
July 4th, when two companies moved to the Northern Dugouts, Authuille
Bluff. Throughout its stay it was never free from shelling, and
frequently the enemy put down counter-preparations of exceptional
intensity. Casualties were terrible. The Aid Post became frightfully
congested, not only with the Battalion’s own men, but with crowds
from other units; and it is no exaggeration to say that the dead lay
around it in heaps. None could have done more--few could have done
half as much--than Capt. S. S. Greaves, R.A.M.C., did. Day and night
he worked without ceasing. He might have been in a hospital, far from
the scene of action, for all the excitement he showed. Many a man owed
his life to the skill and care lavished on him by the 4th Battalion
Medical Officer at Johnstone’s Post. But the casualties of those first
days on the Somme were so appalling that the medical staffs were quite
inadequate to deal with them. Hour after hour the Battalion worked to
clear the wounded, but fresh cases streamed in far more quickly than
earlier ones could be evacuated. And all the time, into the midst of
that deadly valley, the 5.9’s screamed, taking their remorseless toll
of human life and limb. Without a chance of a fight, scores of the
Battalion went down. Chief among them was Capt. E. E. Sykes, M.C.,
an officer of magnificent physique and dauntless courage; one who
had gone to France with the original Battalion, and whose men would
have followed him “into the mouth of hell.” Fearfully wounded in the
abdomen, he died shortly after at the Aid Post, and his body rests in
Authuille Military Cemetery, not far from the scene of his death.
But enough has been said of these horrors. Men who were there will ever
remember them. Others who know what battle is can picture them, far
better than words can describe. To those who have been fortunate enough
never to see such things, no language can describe them.
[Illustration: Capt. W. N. EVERITT, M.C.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Capt. C. HIRST.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Lieut. J. T. RILEY.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Capt. S. S. GREAVES, D.S.O., M.C., R.A.M.C.]
On the evening of July 5th the Battalion relieved the 5th Battalion
Duke of Wellington’s Regt. in the front line, just in front of Thiepval
village. It was responsible for a sector about a thousand yards in
length, and all four companies held portions of the front line. These
trenches were the very ones from which the attack had been launched on
July 1st--no permanent advance had been made on that front, nor was
there to be any until late in September. No Man’s Land was thick
with dead; occasionally a wounded man, who had lain out for days,
succeeded in crawling into the British lines. Trenches and shelters
had been so terribly battered that all work had to be concentrated on
the necessary repairs. The enemy artillery was extremely active, and
many men were killed or wounded before the two days’ tour came to an
end. When the Battalion was relieved on July 7th, partly by the 6th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., and partly by the 5th Battalion
King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, it withdrew to the assembly
trenches in Aveluy Wood, which it had occupied on the morning of July
1st. The relief was very late, everything was sodden with rain, and the
one night which was spent there was little enough rest for anyone.
On the way back to Thiepval Wood the next night, a shell near
Lancashire Dump wounded several men and killed Sec.-Lieut. W. S. Booth.
He had been bombing officer for some time and was a tower of strength
to the Battalion.
Then began the longest continuous stretch of duty, under battle
conditions, which the men were ever called upon to perform.
Tucked away near the point of the angle, between the enemy front
line and the River Ancre, was Thiepval Wood. It was bordered on the
west by the marshes of the river, and on the south and south-east by
the Johnstone’s Post valley; on the east and north-east the ground
sloped steeply up to the German lines on the heights above. With its
trees, its thick undergrowth and numerous “rides,” it must have been
a pleasant spot in pre-war days. But, during the early weeks of the
Battle of the Somme, it rapidly became a desolation little better than
the woods in the Ypres Salient the following year. Such was the home
of the Battalion from July 8th to August 19th. Never, during the whole
of that time, did the men leave it. Reliefs were carried out every few
days with the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.; but periods in
Brigade Reserve were little improvement on those in the front line, for
both were passed in the wood.
With the exception of its first tour, the Battalion always held the
extreme left sector. Its left flank rested on the River Ancre and
its right on Union Street, the length of front being about a thousand
yards. All four companies held portions of the front line, and, tour
after tour, they returned to the same positions--A, B, C, D from right
to left. No Man’s Land varied from about 250 to 400 yards in width.
Along it, and roughly parallel to the opposing lines, lay the sunken
Thiepval Road. Crowded as it was with the bodies of the Ulstermen, who
had fallen or crawled there to die on July 1st, this road was a ghastly
place. The British front line lay along the north and north-eastern
edges of Thiepval Wood. Hewn out of the chalk, the trenches had been
comparatively good up to the opening of the battle; but the fearful
hammering they had since received had almost obliterated them in many
places. There were some good deep dugouts, but not nearly enough to
accommodate all the men. The communication trenches, which led back to
Battalion H.Q. and the crossings over the Ancre, were badly constructed
and sited; the main ones lay along, or just beside, the chief rides in
the wood, and they were so straight that they could easily be enfiladed
by the enemy artillery.
Battalion H.Q. was at Gordon Castle. There, too, accommodation was
scanty. Some attempts were made to improve it, but these were greatly
hampered by enemy shelling. In particular, a bath-house was planned
and, after a week’s hard work, was completed, only to be demolished the
following morning by a shell. Nothing daunted, Lieut. J. T. Riley set
to work to rebuild it. But the second attempt had no more success than
the first. The very night the building was pronounced ready for use,
another shell knocked off one of the corners. That was too much. The
yearning for cleanliness had to remain unsatisfied, while the remnants
of the building were used for the holding of the numerous courts of
enquiry which were so popular about that time.
Throughout this period, though the role of the Battalion was the purely
passive one of holding a portion of the line, that line was situated
right in the middle of a furious battle. The first attacks on Thiepval
had failed; but the very substantial successes, which were being
gained further to the south, were gradually turning the defences of
that village on the east. The enemy undoubtedly feared a repetition
of the attack, made by the X. Corps on July 1st. His artillery was
always active, and often regular barrages would fall on the wood. The
front line came in for a great deal of attention, and it was only by
much labour that posts at all fit for occupation could be maintained.
Elgin and Inniskilling Avenues, the two chief communication trenches
to Battalion H.Q., were often enfiladed by field guns. But the worst
shelled area of all was the Ancre, in the neighbourhood of which
ration-carrying parties had a very bad time. As the weeks dragged on
the wood became thinner and thinner, until all the trenches were easily
visible to aircraft and even to ground observers. Then artillery,
from the heights north of the river near Beaumont Hamel, began to
take the wood in enfilade, and caused much damage. But, apart from
artillery fire the enemy was not very aggressive. There was not much
rifle fire, and, except to repel a definite attack, machine guns were
little used. Taking everything into account, the casualties suffered by
the Battalion were not excessive. They were constant--it is doubtful
whether a day passed without some men being killed or wounded--but they
were not out of proportion to the enormous weight of artillery fire.
Since the early days of July, the direct attacks on Thiepval had been
discontinued, and a defensive policy had been adopted on that sector,
for the time being. Nevertheless, there was considerable activity,
every effort being made to pin the enemy to his ground, and to distract
his attention as much as possible from the operations of the Fourth
Army on the right. The British artillery fire never slackened; day
after day, and week after week, the deluge of shells was kept up. This
fire was supplemented by the trench mortars, with which the troops were
now much better supplied. Considerable use was made of the new Lewis
guns, especially at night; and C.S.M. McNulty was again to the fore
with his Winchester. Minor demonstrations were constantly being made,
with the object of deceiving the enemy and making him believe that an
attack was imminent. The following order, from 147th Infantry Brigade,
is an example of what the Battalion was frequently called upon to do:--
“The Army Commander wishes everything possible to be done to
keep the enemy in front of the Division on the alert, make him
man his parapets and get him under our shrapnel fire.
With this object the following demonstration will be made to
induce the enemy to man his parapets. At 1-0 p.m. to-day as
many bayonets as possible will be shown along the whole front
of the Brigade as if assault is imminent and timed for 1-0 p.m.
For five or ten minutes previous to this hour whistles should
be blown at intervals along the front as if signals were being
made. The tops of ladders or trench grids should be shown over
the parapets. The artillery immediately after 1-0 p.m. will open
bombardment on enemy front and support trenches, especially on
those trenches which can be taken in enfilade.
Any other device which can lead the enemy in front line to
expect an assault at 1-0 p.m. should also be employed and
Machine guns will fire during the artillery bombardment.”
On several occasions smoke barrages were put up by the Battalion.
For this purpose, special emplacements were constructed about every
twenty-five yards along the front line, and from these smoke bombs were
thrown out into No Man’s Land. Usually the wind changed just before
zero hour and Thiepval Wood was enveloped in a wonderful haze of smoke.
There can be no doubt that these activities met with a certain amount
of success. This was amply proved by the speed with which the enemy put
down his defensive barrages time after time.
Patrolling too was very active. It was mainly carried out by the
Battalion H.Q. Scouts, and much very useful, and often dangerous,
work was done by them. In particular, some extremely daring and
skilful patrols were done by Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd, the Battalion
Intelligence Officer, in the Ancre valley, for which he was awarded
the Military Cross. On one occasion, when visiting the neighbouring
battalion’s post at the Mill, he had the unpleasant experience of being
mistaken for an enemy patrol, and was heavily bombed.
Reliefs were carried out with the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s
Regiment every few days and soon became very simple, for companies
always occupied the same positions, both in the front line and in
reserve. Battalion H.Q. only had to move about two hundred yards from
Gordon Castle to Belfast City. When in Brigade Reserve, two companies
were in support to each of the battalions in the front line. During
the day there was little to do, but at night working parties had to
be found. It was a dreary life, though enlivened occasionally by the
exploits of the Intelligence Officer. He it was who, whilst engaged in
a scientific investigation of German flares, nearly burnt out Battalion
H.Q. To him also was due the wondrous camouflaging of Belfast City, the
remains of which may still be seen in Thiepval Wood.
The long and unbroken spell in Thiepval Wood caused much hardship to
the men. There were no facilities for cooking, and so all food had to
be sent up cooked from the transport lines. For six weeks, no one had
a decently-prepared dinner. Supplies of clean clothing were not often
available, and baths for the men were absolutely impossible. It can
be imagined what an awful state they got into, living as they were
under filthy conditions during the hottest season of the year, with
never a chance of a good wash. At first some men bathed in the Ancre,
but this was very dangerous owing to the thick weeds; after a man had
been accidentally drowned there about the middle of July, all bathing
was strictly forbidden. There can be no doubt that this long period of
harassing and filthy conditions seriously affected the men physically.
Towards the end of July, Lieut.-Col. E. G. St. Aubyn came back to the
Battalion. From that time, until August 19th, Major J. Walker and Capt.
A. L. Mowat shared the duties of second-in-command, taking turns in the
line and with the rear echelon.
During July work had consisted mainly of keeping the front line in
a habitable condition, and repairing the communication trenches,
which were continually being damaged by shell fire. Many bodies too
were recovered from No Man’s Land and decently buried. But, about
the beginning of August, the digging of the famous parallels began.
It had been decided to renew the frontal attack on the sector from
Thiepval to the River Ancre, but, after the experience of July 1st,
No Man’s Land in that area was considered too wide to attack across
successfully. Hence it was determined to push forward the British
front line by digging a series of trenches in No Man’s Land. These
“parallels” stretched from the Ancre to the top of Inniskilling Avenue,
the foremost being roughly along the line of the sunken road, though
on the extreme right it crossed the road. In other words, the front
on which they were dug corresponded almost exactly with the Battalion
sub-sector. Practically none of the actual digging was done by men of
the Battalion, but, whenever they were occupying the front line, they
had to find covering parties for the work. Every night, as soon as it
was dark enough to conceal movement, one platoon per company moved
out into No Man’s Land, and took up a line along the northern edge
of the sunken road. There they remained so long as the work was in
progress. Company Commanders took turns in charge of the whole covering
party. The actual working parties--nearly a thousand men nightly--were
provided by the 148th Infantry Brigade. Really this number was much too
big. Heavy shelling had reduced the communication trenches in Thiepval
Wood to a very derelict condition; the movement of large parties along
them became very slow, and much time was wasted in coming and going. No
Man’s Land too became very congested. As a result, the amount of work
done on the parallels was small compared with the number of men engaged.
The work of the covering parties proved tedious, but not particularly
dangerous. The enemy infantry made practically no attempt to interfere
with the digging, and only once was a party of Germans encountered.
It happened in this way. An officer of A Company was on the right of
the covering party one night. Following a not uncommon practice of
his, he was moving about alone, when he saw a party of men, a little
way off on the flank, who did not appear to be working. He went up and
gently exhorted them to get on with their job. A chorus of gutterals
was his answer, as an affrighted party of Germans made off. But though
the enemy infantry was comparatively inactive, this cannot be said of
his artillery. Even if the actual working parties were not observed
the first night, the results of their labours cannot have escaped the
German observers the next day, for the newly-turned chalk showed very
white on the ground. From that time the enemy made a practice of
putting down a barrage regularly soon after midnight, and there were
many casualties among the crowds of men in No Man’s Land. But the
barrage did not seriously affect the covering parties, which escaped
with very little loss. The parallels were nearly complete before the
Battalion left Thiepval Wood, and had been absorbed into the front line
system.
[Illustration: Thiepval Wood.
1916.]
All things considered, there was not much recognition of the good work
done by the men of the Battalion at this period. Mention has already
been made of the Military Cross awarded to Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd.
The only other officer to receive that decoration was Sec.-Lieut. F. V.
Blackwell, who was brought to notice by a daring daylight patrol, which
resulted in the recovery of several machine guns lost by the British
on July 1st. R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker was also awarded the Military
Cross, more for his continuous gallant work than for any specific
act; throughout all this period he earned a magnificent name for hard
work, devotion to duty and gallantry. But he was not the first warrant
officer of the Battalion to receive the Military Cross. That honour
had already been won by C.S.M. (now R.Q.M.S.) W. Lee, for conspicuous
gallantry while the Battalion was near Ypres in 1915, particularly for
his conduct on that never-to-be-forgotten December 19th.
The longest tour comes to an end at last. On August 19th the 9th
Battalion Loyal North Lancs. Regt. relieved the Battalion, which moved
back to billets near Raincheval. There it remained until August 27th.
The 49th Division was at last to be thrown into the attack, and the
time at Raincheval was mainly occupied with special assault training. A
facsimile of the enemy trenches, which formed the objectives, had been
taped out, and over this the men practised every morning. The rest of
each day was occupied with the thousand and one preparations essential
to the success of any operation.
When the Battalion first moved back to Raincheval, the operation was
expected to take place within a very few days. But, like so many of the
British attacks, it was postponed. It was a pity that the Battalion did
not know from the very first how long a time it would have out of the
line. The men were very run down after their long spell in Thiepval
Wood, and much might have been done to improve their condition.
Instead, they were kept for many days in that nervous state which must
precede every attack, and the period of rest could not be utilised
nearly so fully as it might have been. Even after a move had been made
to Forceville on August 27th, the exact date of zero day still remained
for a time in doubt. At length the attack was definitely fixed for
September 3rd.
Two days before the operation, the Battalion suffered a great loss.
Lieut.-Col. E. G. St. Aubyn became so seriously ill that he was
evacuated sick on September 1st, and soon afterwards was sent to
England. So ended his connection with the Battalion, for which he had
done so much. He returned to the 147th Infantry Brigade in the autumn,
but took command of the 7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. Thus
it fell to Major J. Walker to command the Battalion in its first big
attack.
(_b_) September 3rd, 1916.
The attack made on September 3rd, 1916, is one of the most important
events in the Battalion’s history. Never before had it been selected
for an operation of that kind. It is therefore very unfortunate that
the difficulties of writing a strictly accurate account are so great.
Yet, of all the operations in which the Battalion took part during the
war, none is so obscure in many of its details, and around none has
so much controversy raged. At the time, the higher commands certainly
did not understand clearly what had taken place. Nearly all the
officers and senior N.C.O’s, who took part in the assault, were killed.
Survivors’ narratives differ considerably in matters of detail. In
short, it is impossible to write an account which is absolutely exact
in such details as the precise times at which certain events took
place. The following account has been written after a careful study
of all the available official documents, supplemented by the personal
narratives of many of the survivors. Among the official papers, none
is of greater interest and importance than a German narrative, which
was captured two or three weeks after the event. This is the report
of the Officer Commanding the 1st Battalion 180th Infantry Regt.--the
unit which was holding the line south of the Ancre when the Battalion
attacked. In it are detailed the extent of the British success, the
dispositions made by the Germans to counter-attack, and the operations
which finally resulted in the recapture of the positions, which the
enemy had temporarily lost.
The operation was part of a big attack, which was to be made about
dawn, on both sides of the River Ancre. South of that river the 49th
Division was attacking, with the 147th Infantry Brigade on the right
and the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left. On the front of the 147th
Infantry Brigade, the 4th Battalion on the right, and the 5th Battalion
on the left, were detailed for the assault; the 6th and 7th Battalions
were in support and reserve respectively. The Battalion was thus on the
extreme flank of the divisional front, and, as no one was attacking
further to the south, had its right “in the air.” The following is a
brief summary of the Operation Orders:--
1. Companies were to assemble in the parallels before dawn, in
the positions shown on the map.
2. At zero hour A, B and D Companies were to advance
simultaneously. As soon as B Company had taken the First
Objective, A and D Companies were to go through it to the
assault of their respective objectives.
3. Company objectives were as follows:--
B Company. Enemy front line from point 84 to point 54.
A Company. Enemy support line from point 95 to point 66. One
platoon was to push up the Munster Gasse, and make a block in
that trench beyond the support line.
D Company. Enemy communication trench from point 84 to point
95. Blocks were to be made in the enemy front and support lines
towards the Schwaben Redoubt.
C Company was to remain in Battalion reserve.
4. A hurricane bombardment was to open at zero hour on the
objectives; it was to remain on the enemy front line for three
minutes, and on the enemy support line for eight minutes.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in the operation was the keeping of
direction. A glance at the map will show that A and B Companies had to
advance approximately half right on leaving the parallels--an extremely
difficult manœuvre to carry out in battle, in the half light of early
dawn, and in a country where there were no landmarks. The task of D
Company was even harder. Not only had the men to advance on an incline,
but, on reaching point 84, they had to “right form,” in order to
occupy the communication trench, with their front towards the Schwaben
Redoubt. Of course these manœuvres had been carefully practised
over the “tapes” at Raincheval, but the carrying of them out in the
excitement of battle, under heavy fire, was a very different matter.
The parallels, in which the Battalion was to assemble, were already
very well known to many of the men. They were rough and narrow, and
so deep that ladders had to be provided for the men to leave them
by. The first objective--the enemy front line--was about two hundred
and fifty yards from the foremost parallel. No Man’s Land was to be
crossed in quick time and three minutes were allowed for this, rather
a short period when it is remembered that the ground was one mass of
shell holes and debris, and that the advance was up a decidedly steep
slope. The enemy front line, owing to the shape of the ground, was
barely visible from the parallels. The Battalion’s objectives lay in a
re-entrant between the Schwaben Redoubt and the Pope’s Nose, from which
positions a deadly cross-fire could be brought to bear on the advance,
unless it were well protected by the British artillery. The slope and
condition of the ground, between the enemy first and second lines, was
very similar to No Man’s Land. The shelling of the past two months
had so battered the enemy defences that it was extremely difficult to
recognise definite points, or even stretches of trench.
During the afternoon of September 2nd, the Battalion marched from
Senlis to Martinsart Wood, where it halted until evening. A hot meal
was served at 8-0 p.m., and, about an hour later, the platoons began
to move off to their positions of assembly. No smoking was allowed,
and the strictest orders about silence had been issued. So, with no
noise save the squelch of boots in the mud and the occasional rattle
of equipment, the men passed through Aveluy Wood, along a specially
taped line, drew bombs and other battle equipment at the bottom of
Black Horse Road, and crossed the Ancre. During the crossing they
were somewhat harassed by enemy shelling, and D Company suffered some
casualties. But, apart from this, the march was not seriously hampered,
and all were in position by 3-25 a.m. on September 3rd. Then followed
two weary hours of waiting for the dawn and that hurricane burst of
artillery fire, which was to be the signal for the assault. High as
was the nervous tension, and great the excitement in those crowded
parallels, some of the men actually slept. How few realised that,
within the next few hours, scores would be sleeping for ever!
About 5-0 a.m. dawn was breaking. The enemy had been very quiet
during the night, but he now began to show traces of nervousness
and occasional bursts of machine gun fire clipped the parapets. The
Battalion[7] stood to, and bayonets were quietly fixed. At 5-10 a.m.
one great gun spoke, and then, to quote the words of one who took
part in the attack, “the whole sky seemed to light up suddenly.” The
hour had come. Up rose the three companies like one man. There was no
hesitation. Over the parapet they swarmed. The attack had begun.
The enemy was thoroughly on the alert. Flares went up all along the
front, and, in spite of the British barrage, which was very good, a
deadly cross fire of machine gun bullets opened from the directions of
the Schwaben Redoubt and the Pope’s Nose. There is some doubt as to the
exact time when many of the officers and senior N.C.O’s were hit; but
it is practically certain that Capt. C. Hirst, Sec.-Lieut. A. E. Hirst
and Sec.-Lieut. C. W. Tomlinson were all killed, and Sec.-Lieut. G. F.
Robertshaw wounded, before the first objective was reached. Many men
fell, but the lines went forward splendidly. Steadily they crossed No
Man’s Land, halted, and got down a few yards from the enemy front line,
waiting for the barrage to lift. But already there was apparent one
point, which seriously affected the success of the operation. Companies
were becoming mixed. Some of the men of A and D Companies were mingled
together; and many men of the 5th Battalion were in the ranks of the
4th Battalion. Also, in the half light, the rear waves of the attack
did not notice quickly enough that the first wave had halted, and
so they crowded up on it. The difficulties of keeping distance and
direction had been too great.
The enemy artillery barrage did not open properly until nearly ten
minutes after zero hour, but then it was very heavy. The old British
front line and the first parallel received most attention, and were
soon almost obliterated. Heavies rained down on the tunnel entrances;
shrapnel deluged the communication trenches. The barrage embraced the
whole of Thiepval Wood, and many casualties were suffered by the two
reserve battalions of the 147th Infantry Brigade. But the foremost
parallel and No Man’s Land were not heavily shelled at first, and thus
machine gun fire was the only serious danger to the men lying near the
enemy front line.
Immediately the British barrage lifted, B Company charged and captured
its objective without much difficulty. This line had been terribly
shattered by the bombardment of the previous two months and in places
had almost disappeared. It was so bad that most of the men did not
enter it at all, but remained in shell holes in the open, where they
began to consolidate. Their position was very exposed and, as time went
on, they lost heavily from machine gun fire. Others, among whom C.S.M.
W. Medley was most conspicuous, worked along the trench, bombing the
deep dugouts with which it abounded, and collecting prisoners. The
latter were sent back across No Man’s Land, but only one is known to
have arrived at Battalion H.Q. The rest probably perished under the
fire of their own artillery and machine guns. One part of B Company
worked a considerable distance along the enemy front line towards
the Pope’s Nose, bombing as it went. All that trench was thoroughly
cleared, but the company, and the men of the 5th Battalion who were
with it, were not strong enough to hold the whole, and it had to be
left unoccupied. Numbers of Germans, some without rifles, were seen
making off across the open on the left, and were heavily fired upon. It
seems probable that, for some time, the Pope’s Nose was evacuated by
the enemy; but it was never occupied by the British.
Meanwhile, A Company had advanced, hard on the heels of B Company.
Passing straight over the captured line, the men moved across the open
until about fifty yards from the enemy support trench. There they
halted, sheltering in shell holes, and waiting for their barrage to
lift. Already they had suffered very heavy casualties. Some, in their
over-eagerness, had advanced too far, and had been hit by their own
shells. Only one officer--Lieut. W. N. Everitt, M.C.--had survived;
C.S.M. A. Stirzaker, D.C.M., had fallen between the first and second
objectives; and scores of N.C.O’s and men had been killed or wounded.
But they had been reinforced by some men of B Company, who had gone
forward with them, and by Cpl. A. Denham’s Lewis gun team, which had
lost D Company and had advanced on the right of A Company. The men came
under a very heavy fire from the German support line. Numbers of the
enemy were seen making off across the open, and Cpl. Denham did some
execution with his Lewis gun; but the bulk of the German garrison held
its ground and fought well. For some time the Company lay in the open,
exchanging shots with the enemy in his line. The British barrage had
now lifted, and there was thus nothing to interfere with the German
marksmen and machine gunners. Casualties were piling up, but the second
objective was not yet taken. Lieut. Everitt, with Sergt. Bancroft, had
already reconnoitred right up to the line, and had thrown some bombs
among the enemy there. He now determined to try to rush the position,
after a short burst of Lewis gun fire. Assisted by Sergts. Haigh and
Bancroft, he crawled round and informed the men of his intention. They
were told to charge as soon as the Lewis gun ceased fire. The gun
opened, but stopped almost at once with a broken return spring; quite
coolly the N.C.O. on the gun--his name is now unknown--changed the
part, and reported to Lieut. Everitt that he was ready to reopen fire.
One magazine was fired, and then A Company charged. Everitt himself
was first in the trench, and was followed closely by Haigh. The bay
they entered was unoccupied, but the next was full of the enemy. These
were bombed, and either fled or dived into their deep dug outs. Parties
then moved to right and left along the trench, bombing dugouts and
collecting prisoners. The latter were sent back across the open, but
none appear to have arrived. Many Germans were killed in the second
objective. Of the parties which moved along the support line, that
to the right got well beyond point 95, towards the Schwaben Redoubt,
without encountering any of the enemy; but it could find no trace of
D Company, which should have had a post near that point. The other
party cleared and occupied the whole line to beyond point 66, where
Sergt. H. Haigh got in touch with a small party of the 5th Battalion.
Consolidation of the line, which was very wide and deep, then began.
Only about forty of the Battalion had reached the second objective.
These were organised in a line of posts from point 86, which was held
by Sergt. Bancroft and Cpl. Denham, to beyond point 66. The second
objective had been taken a little before 6-0 a.m. Soon after, the
Germans began to bombard it heavily with artillery and trench mortars,
and the discomfort of A Company was added to by some of the British
guns, which had not “lifted” sufficiently and were firing into its back.
[Illustration: Lieut.-Col. J. WALKER, D.S.O.]
Meanwhile, except for such men as Cpl. Denham’s Lewis gun team which
had become detached from its company, no one had seen or heard anything
of D Company since the opening of the attack. Like the rest it had
advanced at zero hour, and had crossed No Man’s Land on a right
incline. Its two waves had halted near the enemy front line, waiting
for the barrage to lift. Comparatively few casualties had been suffered
in the advance, but these included Sec.-Lieut. C. W. Tomlinson missing,
and Lieut. J. T. Riley and C.S.M. J. C. Walker wounded. Both of the
latter refused to go to the rear to have their wounds dressed, and
continued the advance with the rest of the company. When the barrage
lifted, the men stormed the enemy front line, and some of them extended
up a very battered communication trench, which they believed to be
their objective. All dugouts were bombed, and several prisoners were
taken; these apparently suffered the same fate as most of the other
prisoners that day. The men set to work to consolidate what had been
captured. They had not been long in their new position when the enemy
made a weak counter-attack, from the direction of the Schwaben Redoubt.
This was driven off without difficulty, but the men had very little
opportunity to carry on with the consolidation. Their position was
very exposed and the enemy defences, which had been captured, were so
shattered that they afforded little cover. Very heavy rifle and machine
gun fire, both from the Schwaben Redoubt and the east, was directed
on them; and shells were soon bursting in their midst. But where was
the Company? The exact position it reached that day has been a matter
for controversy ever since. No other company ever got into touch with
it, and the German report, already mentioned, sheds no light on the
mystery. It seems probable, indeed almost certain, that they inclined
too much to the right in crossing No Man’s Land, and entered the enemy
front line to the south-east of point 84; in fact, it would appear that
the Company actually captured, and held for some hours, the fringe
of the Schwaben Redoubt. But it is only fair to say that Sergt. (now
C.S.M.) W. Brooke, the only senior N.C.O. of D Company who got back to
the British lines, is still convinced that the Company reached point
84, its correct objective.
It is convenient, at this point, to interrupt the narrative for a short
time, in order to summarise the situation about 7-0 a.m. and to note
what steps had been taken by the enemy to deal with it.
About 7-0 a.m. the positions of companies were as follows:--
A Company held the German support line from point 86, where
there was an isolated post, to a little way beyond point
66. On both flanks the line was clear of the enemy for some
considerable distance.
B Company held the German front line, from about midway between
points 84 and 54, to beyond point 54. No enemy was in the line
between the Company and point 84, nor for some distance on the
left.
D Company held a position facing south-east, on the fringe of
the Schwaben Redoubt; exactly where cannot be said.
All companies were very weak and no reinforcements had arrived, for
reasons which will be indicated later. Only one officer per company
was left--Lieut. W. N. Everitt, M.C., with A Company, Sec.-Lieut. H.
E. Pohlmann with B Company, and Lieut. J. T. Riley with D Company.
Sec.-Lieut. V. A. Horsfall of B Company fell soon after the first
objective was taken. Sec.-Lieut E. C. Mee of D Company was lying dead
in the enemy wire. Supplies of S.A.A. were running very low, and bombs
were almost exhausted. No carrying parties had been able to get up to
the captured positions, and the only way to replenish was to collect
from the dead and wounded who dotted the ground. But the most serious
aspect of the situation was that the rest of the attack south of the
Ancre had failed. By 7-0 a.m. the only British troops maintaining their
positions in the enemy defences were those of the Battalion, with
elements of the 5th Battalion--all hopelessly mixed up. The enemy,
finding there were no British near the Pope’s Nose, was re-occupying
his front line there, and cautiously feeling his way along the trench
towards B Company.
Meanwhile, energetic measures had been taken from the start by the
German commander opposite. As soon as the situation began to develop
clearly, he directed part of his reserve troops to counter-attack
along, and parallel to, the Munster Gasse. The remainder were sent
to the Schwaben Redoubt to strengthen the garrison there, and to
counter-attack from that direction. There is no doubt that the enemy
attached more importance to the holding of the Schwaben Redoubt than to
anything else on that front. This is amply proved by the dispositions
of his reserve troops on September 3rd. It is also borne out by men of
the Battalion who were captured that day, and who have given accounts
of their examinations by the enemy. And the enemy was right. With the
Schwaben Redoubt still in his hands, he could dominate and enfilade
practically all the objectives of the 49th Division. It would also
appear, from their own account, that the Germans found it necessary to
utilise the whole of their regimental reserve that day, before they
succeeded in repelling the British; and that they even began to draw
reinforcements from another unit--the 66th Infantry Regt.
Soon after 8-0 a.m., serious enemy counter-attacks began on A Company’s
position. For some time the barrage had slackened, and even rifle and
machine gun fire had died down. What puzzled the men of A Company was
to see Germans in the neighbourhood of the Pope’s Nose, and in the
support line in rear of it; for it must be borne in mind that no one
knew anything of the situation on any other front than his own. These
Germans, as has already been said, were cautiously working their way
along the trenches towards the British, bombing as they went; but they
were still a long way off. The real counter-attack at length came from
enemy troops who advanced across the open, on both sides of the Munster
Gasse. The post at point 86 had, by this time, completely run out of
S.A.A. and bombs, and so was unable to offer any real resistance to
the advance. The Germans came cautiously forward; avoiding a frontal
attack, they worked round the right flank of the post until they
were in its rear. Bombing it from this position, they caused many
casualties. Sergt. Bancroft, Cpl. Payne and several men were killed;
Cpl. Denham and a number of others were wounded. Having thus prepared
the way for an assault, the enemy rushed the post, overwhelmed and made
prisoners of the few survivors. This happened unbeknown to the rest of
the men of A Company. The first indication they had of it was the enemy
bombing along the second objective from the right. The situation soon
became impossible. With no bombs and scarcely a round of S.A.A. left,
they were forced slowly to withdraw towards their left. On arriving
at point 66, they found themselves between two fires, for the enemy
bombing party from the west was also approaching along the trench. The
position was clearly untenable. Lieut. Everitt had only a handful of
men left. He gave orders to withdraw down the communication trench to
point 54. The withdrawal was conducted slowly and in good order, two or
three men waiting at each bend in the trench to cover it. At length the
front line was reached, but only a few isolated men of B Company could
be found there; the enemy artillery and machine guns had done their
work only too well. The party reconnoitred along the trench towards the
Pope’s Nose; another enemy bombing party was encountered. With so few
survivors, and almost without ammunition, Lieut. Everitt could do no
more. He gave the order to withdraw to the parallels. The men jumped
out of the trench and started across No Man’s Land, but they did not
scatter sufficiently. Few ever reached the comparative safety of their
own lines. A machine gun opened from the Pope’s Nose, and most of them
fell. Of the fate of Lieut. Everitt nothing certain is known. For
some time it was hoped that he was still alive. But nothing definite
was ever learned of what happened to him after he gave the order to
withdraw. One of the most gallant, competent and hardworking officers
the Battalion ever had, he probably fell when so many of his men went
down in that last crossing of No Man’s Land.
And what of D Company? Its fate was much the same as A Company’s.
Harassed by machine guns from the Schwaben Redoubt, and by rifle fire
from snipers to the east, it beat off several counter-attacks. S.A.A.
and bombs ran out, and the men searched the dead to replenish their
supplies. Rapidly their numbers dwindled. Severely wounded and in
great pain, Lieut. J. T. Riley fought fiercely until he was at length
killed. C.S.M. J. C. Walker, who had carried on though wounded early
in the action, was also killed. Yet, practically leaderless, the men
still fought on, until an officer of the 5th Battalion, who had become
mixed up with D Company, ordered a withdrawal. Then the remnants of
the company--they did not muster twenty, all told--withdrew to the
parallels.
Everything that had been gained was lost. Not a Britisher remained in
the enemy lines, save the few men who had been captured. The number of
these was very small. On the authority of the Germans themselves, only
seven unwounded prisoners from the 4th and 5th Battalions were taken
that day. Many men were still lying out in shell holes, and, during the
rest of the day and night that followed, some of these crawled back
into the lines. But there were far more lying out there who would never
crawl again.
Throughout the action Battalion H.Q. was located in a deep dugout, near
the junction of Inniskilling Avenue with Whitchurch Street; C Company
was in Battalion reserve, either in or near the old British front line.
All arrangements had been made for sending up stores soon after the
objectives were taken. East Koyli Sap was to be improved, and used as a
communication trench for that purpose. But this was never done. Early
in the action it became so crowded with casualties and others that
parties could not move along it. Even if they had been able to do so,
it entered the enemy front line at the Pope’s Nose, which was never
occupied by the British on September 3rd.
Lack of reliable information was the most serious difficulty with which
Battalion H.Q. had to contend dining the battle, and the 5th Battalion
was even worse off in that respect. Signallers had gone forward with
the assaulting companies, but no message ever came back from them. Cpl.
C. Landale, D.C.M. made gallant attempts to run a telephone line across
No Man’s Land, but it could not be maintained on account of the enemy
barrage. Most of the runners who left with messages were killed. No
information was ever received from the observation post. The result was
that, during the whole operation, Battalion H.Q. was almost completely
ignorant of what was happening.
For a long time the sole information obtained was from wounded men,
and was very indefinite. At 5-55 a.m. it was learned that the first
objective had been taken, that the second was being attacked, and that
the two assaulting battalions were badly mixed. Ten minutes later a
wounded man reported that A Company had taken its objective. Then there
was little news for more than an hour and a half. Two carrying parties
were sent forward, and it is believed that a few bombs did reach the
German front line and were used by the 5th Battalion. Runners were
twice sent out to get in touch with B Company, but none came back.
Information that the attack of the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left
had failed was received by the Battalion about 6-30 a.m. Knowing so
little of the situation, the Commanding Officer naturally hesitated to
throw any more troops into the battle; and, as events turned out, it is
well he did not use his reserves, for they could have done little real
good, and there would only have been more casualties.
At last a wounded runner arrived from B Company, bearing the following
message from Sec.-Lieut. H. E. Pohlmann:--
“To I.R.
Am holding point 54 and to left 100 yds. In touch with 5th. Only
remaining officer in B Coy. Bombs wanted. 6-40 a.m. 3.9.16.
H. E. Pohlmann, 2 Lt. B Coy.”
It had taken the runner two hours to come.
At once Major Walker ordered two platoons of C Company, and two of
the reserve bombing teams, to advance across the open and reinforce
B Company. But these orders were never issued. Before they could be
written out the advanced signal station reported that the men of the
147th Infantry Brigade were withdrawing.
C Company had not been engaged, but it had suffered many casualties
from shell fire. When it was clear that the attack had failed, Capt.
Marshall was ordered to man the parallels, in case the enemy tried to
counter-attack. But no such attempt was made.
At 11-50 a.m., more than four hours after it had been written, a
message was brought in from Lieut. Everitt, by a wounded runner.
Arriving so late, it was of no practical use; the situation had
entirely changed. But as evidence of the deeds of A Company that day,
it deserves to be quoted in full:--
“To the Adjt.
My right is only at the communication trench point 86. I am
partly in the fifth lines. I have only roughly 25 men including
six from B Coy. Have no bombers. Short of bombs and Lewis Gun
ammunition. Our artillery firing into our back especially on the
right.
Don’t know where D Coy. are.
W. N. Everitt, Lt.,
3.9.16. 7-40 a.m. O.C. A Coy.”
About 5-0 p.m. troops of the 148th Infantry Brigade relieved the
Battalion in the line. The weary men withdrew to Martinsart Wood to
reorganise, but a party of C Company was left in for the night, to
search No Man’s Land for wounded, and to help in the evacuation of
those who had already come in.
Only once--October 11th, 1918--has the Battalion had heavier casualties
than on September 3rd. It went into action 18 officers and 629 other
ranks strong; of these only three companies, each consisting of 3
officers and 127 other ranks, and a few Battalion H.Q. details, went
“over the top.” The total casualties that day were 11 officers and
336 other ranks. More than half were either known to be dead, or were
missing; and as the number of prisoners taken by the enemy was very
small, it may fairly be presumed that the Battalion lost, in killed
alone, at least 150 other ranks. Of the nine officers who went over
with the assaulting companies, only two, both wounded, returned; in
addition, Sec.-Lieut. F. A. Innes was killed at 147th Infantry Brigade
H.Q., and Sec.-Lieut. W. Smith was wounded with C Company. September
3rd is the blackest day in the Battalion’s history, for, unlike October
11th, 1918, it had no success to compensate for its casualties. To-day,
upon the very line of the first objective, which B Company carried
that eventful morning and was later forced to evacuate, there stands
a great cemetery. In it have been collected the remains of many men,
from scores of solitary graves; and on the crosses the legend “Unknown
soldier 1/4th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.” is one of the most
common. There rest many of the gallant men who fell that day.
It is not the purpose of this book to criticise as a general rule, but
some slight exception must be made in connection with the attack on
September 3rd. At the time there was a widespread belief, which was
certainly held by most of the higher authorities, that the Battalion
never gained its objectives. This was wrong. A and B Companies
reached, and cleared the enemy from the whole of the first and second
objectives; it is true they did not occupy the whole of them, but that
was due simply to lack of men. For more than two hours there were no
Germans in either of the lines which the Battalion was ordered to
capture. These facts are clearly proved, not only by the evidence of
the men who carried out the assault, but also by the German official
report on the action. The men of D Company, as has been stated, seem to
have got too far to the right; but even they fulfilled their role, for
they successfully defended the Battalion’s exposed right flank so long
as there were men enough to hold the ground which had been won. During
the next few weeks several divisions successively failed to carry the
objectives of September 3rd. Even after Thiepval itself had fallen, it
was some time before the Schwaben Redoubt and the defences north of it
passed into British hands.
(_c_) The Leipsig Redoubt.
The day after the Battalion’s unsuccessful attack on the German line,
Major R. E. Sugden, D.S.O., rejoined and assumed command, being
promoted Lieut.-Colonel a few days later. He had been in England for
nearly nine months, as the result of his wound received near Ypres the
previous December; but now, though he had not yet fully recovered the
use of his hand and arm, he had returned to France. For nearly two
years from this date he held command of the Battalion, only leaving it
when he was appointed G.O.C., 151st Infantry Brigade, in June, 1918.
After a few days in Martinsart Wood, the Battalion moved back to
bivouacs near Hedauville. Little work was done except reorganisation,
which was very necessary. Not only had an enormous number of officers
and N.C.O’s become casualties, but three whole companies had been
practically wiped out. Out of these companies no officers, only one
warrant officer--C.S.M. W. Medley--and very few N.C.O’s had survived.
The elaborate B Echelons of later days were only in their infancy, and
so little framework existed on which to rebuild. The only thing to do
was to make use of the personnel of C Company to provide the necessary
framework. Hence, many N.C.O’s and specialists were transferred to
other companies. Sec.-Lieut. F. Walker and Lieut. J. G. Mowat were
appointed to the command of A and B Companies respectively. C.S.M. A.
McNulty again became C.S.M. of A Company, and C.Q.M.S. A. L. Lord of C
Company was transferred to D Company as C.S.M. The supply of men was
simpler. Large drafts arrived within a few days, and, by the middle of
September, the Battalion’s fighting strength was practically the
same as it had been at the beginning of the month. On September 21st a
draft of eleven officers arrived, and several more joined a few days
later. Among them were three or four who had already served with the
Battalion abroad, either as officers or in the ranks, while others had
seen active service elsewhere.
[Illustration: Sept. 3rd. 1916.]
While the Battalion was at Hedauville, Brig.-General E. F. Brereton,
C.B., D.S.O., came over to say farewell. The men were drawn up in a
hollow square, and were first addressed by the Divisional Commander.
Then the Brigadier spoke. In a magnificent speech, which deeply
impressed all who heard it, he paid a glowing tribute to the dead and
said good-bye to the living. The parade was dismissed and all rushed
down to the road. Roar upon roar of cheering burst forth as the car
passed slowly through the lines of men and, at length, disappeared from
view. If he had ever doubted it, the demonstration must have proved to
the General how much he was beloved in his Brigade. Brig.-General C. G.
Lewes, D.S.O., assumed command of the 147th Infantry Brigade.
By September 15th the Battalion was considered ready for active service
again; it moved up to Martinsart Wood and from thence, the next day,
to Crucifix Corner, Aveluy. On September 17th it was in support to an
attack, made by the 1/7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., on part
of the Leipsig Redoubt. Unlike the bigger operation of September 3rd,
this attack was planned to take place in the evening, zero hour being
6-30 p.m. Thus the assaulting troops would have the whole night for
consolidation. The main duty of the Battalion was to provide a number
of carrying parties, no less than 7 officers and 215 other ranks being
detailed for that purpose. Of these, about half were to work with the
assaulting troops, while the remainder were responsible for keeping
the various dumps supplied. Profiting by the experience of September
3rd, Brigade H.Q. had decided that carrying parties should actually
accompany the assaulting troops when they attacked. It was hoped, in
this way, to get some supplies of ammunition up to the objectives
before the enemy barrage came down. The men for this duty were divided
into three separate parties, under Sec.-Lieuts. H. N. Taylor, E. W.
Flatow and E. Rawnsley respectively. A further party, under Sec.-Lieut.
G. Rawnsley, was to carry up water in petrol tins.
Half-an-hour before zero all parties were in their assembly positions.
Many of the men, who had only left England a few days, had never even
been in the line before, and it must have been a particularly nervous
time for them. The principal supplies to be carried up were Mills
bombs, and every man had a box under each arm. When the assaulting
troops went over, the carrying parties advanced immediately in rear of
them. The ground was not easy to cross, being one mass of shell holes,
and littered everywhere with the debris of shattered trenches and
wire entanglements. Nevertheless, the men went well, and most of them
succeeded in delivering their first load before the enemy barrage came
down. Back they went for a second load, and this time the crossing was
more dangerous. Though rather scattered, and not particularly heavy,
the enemy barrage was most uncomfortable; and machine guns did not
make the situation any pleasanter. But through it all the men worked
splendidly. Backwards and forwards they went, time after time, until at
length the unusual message came back “Enough bombs.” That message is
the best criticism that can be given of the way in which the carrying
parties did their work. By this time they had naturally become very
scattered. Many were being employed as messengers or guides; some had
lost their bearings, for it was now quite dark; and there were many
casualties. Altogether, the Battalion lost that day 12 other ranks,
including C.S.M. T. H. Greenwood of C Company, killed, 7 missing,
and 39 wounded. But the work had been well done. Officers collected
all they could find of their parties, and rejoined the rest of the
Battalion; but many men did not report back until long after dawn the
next day.
The day after the attack the Battalion moved up into close support to
the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., which had taken over the
captured trenches. Three days later it took over the defence of the new
line. D Company, with C Company in close support to it, held the whole
of the captured ground; the other companies occupied the old British
line. D Company’s sector was a ghastly place. Rain and shell-fire had
turned the ground into a mass of mud, littered with the awful debris of
battle. Never had the Battalion seen so many dead Germans; and there
were many British too. Bodies were lying all over the ground in the
open; many more were exposed by the shovel, and hastily recovered. A
hot September sun beat down in the daytime, and the air was filled with
the stench of decaying humanity. Water was scarce, as every drop of
it had to be carried up, and had to be used very economically. Ration
parties had a very hard task, for there were neither tracks nor proper
communication trenches. Almost the only real comfort was provided
by the excellent German tunnelled dugouts which abounded, and were
sufficient to accommodate the whole company. These were from twenty to
thirty feet down; they were splendidly built and, in some cases, quite
comfortably furnished; and they were proof against the heaviest shell.
This was as well, for the hostile artillery was very active. Though the
Germans probably had a very hazy idea of the British positions, they
knew where their own deep dugouts had been and persistently shelled
those localities. Practically all movement could be easily observed,
and there was much coming and going of staff officers and others in
connection with the new attack on Thiepval which was planning. D
Company came in for all the shelling, which was brought on by this
movement, and also for the not infrequent barrages put down by the
enemy. The other companies had an easier, though far from pleasant,
time.
Much work was done by the Battalion while it was in the Leipsig
Redoubt. Its role was to prepare the way for an attack on Thiepval by
the 18th Division. Assembly trenches had to be dug; the dead had to
be buried. Most of this work was done by the support companies, who
sent up large parties each night. D Company’s duty was restricted to
holding the line--quite a sufficient task for the new men of whom the
company was mainly composed. Casualties occurred almost hourly. It was
a nerve-racking time.
At length the relief came on September 24th. A heavy bombardment of 15
cm. shells about 5-0 p.m., which at one time seemed likely to hinder
the relief seriously, was stopped by the British retaliation. An
unusually quiet night followed. Soon after dark the 12th Battalion
Middlesex Regt. began to arrive; and when, about midnight, D Company’s
relief was complete, the Battalion turned its back on the Somme
battlefield for ever. B and C Companies had been relieved earlier and
they marched straight through to Lealvillers. A and D Companies were
to be met by buses at the bottom of Black Horse Road. The former got
away after a long wait, but there were no conveyances for the latter.
Wearily--few of them had had any sleep to speak of for three days or
nights--the men dragged themselves along to Martinsart Wood, where
they simply dropped down by the roadside and slept. About dawn buses
did arrive, and the company was quickly taken to Lealvillers, where
a halt was made for breakfast. Then it bussed straight through to
Halloy, while the rest of the Battalion had to march. The ride was some
satisfaction for the night spent on the road.
The day after its arrival at Halloy the Battalion learned of the fall
of Thiepval. In the midst of the satisfaction caused by this news,
there was naturally some little disappointment that, after so many
months of work and fighting, it had not been “in at the death.”
CHAPTER VI.
WITH THE THIRD ARMY.
(_a_) Hannescamps.
Many expected, and all hoped for, a fairly long period of rest when the
Battalion moved back to Halloy, after nearly three months of the Somme
Battle. But it was not to be. The 49th Division was transferred to the
Third Army, and, within five days of its relief in the Leipsig Redoubt,
the Battalion was holding a front line sector again. Two days of easy
marching, and a night each at Humbercamps and Bienvillers, had brought
it to the Hannescamps sector, where it relieved the 2nd Battalion Royal
Welsh Fusiliers, on September 29th.
The new sector lay astride the Hannescamps--Essarts Road, and was the
longest front the Battalion had held up to that time. It was outside
the area of the Somme Battle, had been quiet all the summer, and so
had suffered little from shell fire. At a first glance the trenches
appeared to be in splendid condition, and in places they really
were--Lulu Lane, the communication trench on the left, was about as
fine a piece of field engineering as the Battalion had seen. But the
greater part of the front line and most of the communication trenches
were far from good. The weather was dry when they were taken over and,
fortunately, there was practically no rain while the Battalion was
there. Very little of the work had been properly revetted, and it was
obvious that the trenches would slide in as soon as the wet weather
came. The front line was of the regulation type--six yard bays and
four yard traverses--with two or three long saps running out into No
Man’s Land. It was fairly well provided with shelters, B Company in
the centre being particularly well off with a number in the sunken
Hannescamps--Essarts Road. It was garrisoned by three companies; the
fourth was in reserve, with two platoons near Battalion H.Q. and two
about halfway up Lulu Lane. Battalion H.Q. lived in shelters along the
road, just south of the village of Hannescamps. These were moderately
comfortable, except for the rats; but few would have been any good
against shell fire.
The enemy was very quiet. Apart from a few light shells now and then,
his artillery was practically inactive. Trench mortar, machine gun and
rifle fire were almost unknown. This was due mainly to the extent of No
Man’s Land. On the extreme left, the opposing lines approached within
about 250 yards of one another; but on the greater part of the front
they were over 1,000 yards apart. The main activity of the Battalion
was patrolling. In that department Sec.-Lieut. G. Crowther, who had
succeeded Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd, M.C. as Battalion Intelligence
Officer, was extremely active. Night after night he penetrated deeply
into No Man’s Land in his efforts to secure an identification--but
without success. On one occasion he did encounter the enemy--near the
Osier Bed, which was his particular haunt--but he failed to make a
capture, though he certainly wounded one German. Apart from this, the
Battalion only came in contact with the enemy once. During their first
night in the sector, some men of C Company, who were holding a sap-head
on the left, were bombed, and suffered several casualties.
At Hannescamps, the Battalion had taken over the most elaborate and
well-organised system of cooking they had ever seen in a front line
sector. A good kitchen had been built in a sunken road not far from
the village, and there hot meals were regularly prepared for the whole
Battalion. These were carried up, in hot food containers, by the men of
the reserve company, and living was almost as good in the front line
as in rest billets. The only serious difficulties were the shortage
of water, and the rats. Rats! Everyone who has seen much of trench
warfare knows how prevalent rats are. But never, at any other time or
place, has the Battalion had to contend with such a pest as it found
at Hannescamps. Everywhere the trenches swarmed with them; but nowhere
were they so bad as among the shelters near Battalion H.Q. They ate
everything they could get their teeth into. The very first night the
Battalion was there, not only were nearly all iron rations spoiled, but
more than half the packs and haversacks of the men of D Company, who
were in reserve, were ruined. Nothing could be done to cope with them
and they had to be endured. The remaining packs and haversacks were
only saved by taking them out nightly and hanging them on thin wires,
which were stretched from tree to tree in a neighbouring orchard.
After four days in this sector, the Battalion was relieved by the 1/5th
Battalion King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and went to Souastre
for a rest. There all efforts were concentrated on smartening up. This
was very necessary. For practically three months there had been little
opportunity for a man to keep himself bodily clean, much less smart;
and there had been few proper parades. The result had been a distinct
falling off in smartness; but, after one or two periods in Brigade
Reserve, the improvement was very marked.
Only two tours were done in the Hannescamps Sector and then the 146th
Infantry Brigade took over the line. While the remainder of the
Battalion moved to Bienvillers for the night, D Company was sent to the
Bluff, south of Fonquevillers, where it came under the orders of the
5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. There it provided shifts for
work in the tunnels for two days, and then rejoined the Battalion at
Humbercamps. After two more short moves, the Battalion arrived again at
Souastre.
(_b_) Fonquevillers.
From the middle of October until the beginning of December, the
Battalion was inter-relieving with the 5th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. in the Y Sector, Fonquevillers. This sector had
a frontage of rather over a thousand yards, and extended from the
Fonquevillers-Gommecourt Road on the left, to the “Mousetrap,” an
unoccupied rectangle of ground opposite Gommecourt Park, on the right.
It had been the scene of one of the most costly failures of July
1st, for from it the men of the 46th Division had started when they
attempted to take Gommecourt in conjunction with the 31st Division.
When the Battalion first took over the sector, it was held with two
companies in the front line and two in support. But, before long, these
dispositions were altered. The front line system was divided into three
company sectors, each company finding its own immediate support; and
the fourth company became battalion reserve. The front line had been
continuous at one time, but now parts of it were practically derelict;
communication along it was still possible without much difficulty, but
there were unoccupied gaps between the three companies. The position
was a strong one, though it was not to be compared with the magnificent
defences which the enemy had constructed for himself round Gommecourt.
Battalion H.Q. occupied a line of shelters and dugouts along the
Fonquevillers--Hebuterne Road, commonly known as Thorpe Street. Chief
among these was the Bairnsfather Dugout, so-called because it had once
been occupied by the artist whose work is so well known to all readers
of the _Bystander_. It was a comfortable little place, like
several more in the vicinity. Its walls were lined with whitewashed
timber and adorned with many drawings by the creator of “Old Bill,”
some executed in pencil, some apparently with the end of a red-hot iron.
Things were not so quiet in the neighbourhood of Fonquevillers as they
had been at Hannescamps. The enemy did not make much use of heavy
artillery, but his field guns were often active. These did not harass
the front line troops greatly, but a good deal of shrapnel was fired
on Thorpe Street, and various parts of the village frequently received
attention. The most “unhealthy” spot was the Shrine, at the western
entrance; it was never advisable to loiter near there for long. Trench
mortars caused a lot of trouble. On the left in particular these often
fired, and, though actual “minnies” were uncommon, there were plenty
of “rum-jars.” On one occasion the Commanding Officer was confined for
some time in a dugout, the entrance to which had been blocked by one
of these trench mortar shells. The roof of this dugout was at least
fifteen feet thick, but it was bulged in by the force of the explosion.
As at Hannescamps, the offensive spirit of the Battalion was mainly
confined to patrolling. No Man’s Land varied from 200 to 400 yards in
width. With the exception of the ruins of the Sucherie, which were
really on the next battalion’s front, there was little of interest
between the lines. Sec.-Lieut. G. Crowther was again to the fore in
his efforts to capture a prisoner, but he had no success. The enemy
appeared to be quite willing to leave No Man’s Land to the British;
at any rate, few patrols of his were encountered. At length, when all
minor attempts to secure identification had proved unsuccessful, 147th
Infantry Brigade H.Q. determined to make a raid--the first operation
of that type to be carried out in the Brigade. It was undertaken by
the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., who made the attempt one
night through the 4th Battalion, which was then holding the line. The
operation was well planned and executed; the raiding party succeeded
in entering the enemy lines and did a great deal of damage; but they
failed to secure an identification. Apart from a few minor duties,
such as providing covering fire from Lewis guns and assisting in
the evacuation of the wounded, the Battalion took no part. But some
casualties were suffered from the defensive barrage which the enemy put
down.
While the Battalion was in this sector, the successful attack north
of the River Ancre, which resulted in the capture of Beaumont Hamel
and other positions, took place. The battle was too far off to have
any real effect on the Fonquevillers front, though, at one time, it
was intended that a smoke barrage should be put up by the Battalion
to distract attention from the real attack. Elaborate preparations
had been made for this, but eventually the orders were cancelled and
nothing was done.
At Fonquevillers, Battalion H.Q. once spent a very uncomfortable
half-hour. “Authentic” information had been received from Brigade that
the enemy had driven a mine right under H.Q. mess. The exact time at
which this was to be exploded was known, and it was found that it came
in the middle of a relief. This was most inconsiderate on the part of
the Germans, for the necessity of handing over correctly prevented
officers visiting their friends, or making expeditions “on duty” to
distant parts of the line. There was an anxious minute when the time
came to go into the air. Nothing happened.
Winter had begun soon after the Battalion came into the sector, and,
with its coming, conditions became very bad. The trenches were in no
condition to stand bad weather. Very little work had been done on them
for months, probably because everyone hoped that the British would have
advanced far beyond them ere winter set in. Now, when the rain came,
they immediately began to cave in. But the Battalion had behind it
the experience gained at Ypres the previous winter. There was indeed
more work to do than could possibly be done; so parts of the line were
allowed to become derelict, and one or two communication trenches fell
into disuse. Work was concentrated on what was most necessary, and
the battalion in the line had the assistance of large working parties
sent up by the battalion in reserve. Long hours had to be worked,
but excellent results were obtained. There was plenty of mud, but
no part of the trenches in use ever became really water-logged. How
well the men worked during one tour is shown by the following highly
complimentary letter, which was received from the Brigadier:--
“O.C. 4th W. Riding Regt.
I wish to express to the Battalion under your command my great
appreciation of the work done in your sector, and the excellent
spirit shown by your men during the past 6 day tour in the
trenches under circumstances of exceptional difficulty.
Your work was good, not shoddy, and when not working your men
were trying to shoot Bosches.
My only regret is, that owing to circumstances, I was unable to
spend more time with you, but it was a compliment that after
what I saw on Wednesday, I knew I could leave the Battalion to
do its best.
This excellent spirit of keenness and hard work in a Battalion
is worth a great deal to its Brigade Commander.
Please circulate my remarks to your officers and men.
C. Lewes, B.-General,
Commdg. 147 Brigade.”
Periods of Brigade Reserve were usually spent in Souastre, at which
village the Battalion transport was permanently billeted. Most of the
men occupied barns of the familiar French type, those timber and
clay structures so well known to all who have served with the British
Expeditionary Force. Generally speaking, the troops were fairly
comfortable. The barns were in fairly good condition. There were plenty
of civilians still living in the village, though it was not far from
the line. There were plenty of estaminets, and there was a Y.M.C.A.
hut. Little training was possible owing to the large working parties
which had to be found. Needless to say, the men groused at these, but,
as they worked mostly on the trenches which they occupied themselves
in the line, they realised that the work was for their own benefit.
Sometimes only half the Battalion went to Souastre, the rest stopping
in billets in Fonquevillers, under the command of Major A. L. Mowat.
This arrangement was made in order to have two companies on the spot to
work under the direction of the 57th Field Company, Royal Engineers.
For the greater part of this period the Battalion was very short of
officers. When it left the Somme area it was well over strength, but,
soon after its arrival in the Third Army, it had been called on to
transfer ten to other battalions of the Regiment. No further drafts
had been received, many officers were absent on courses, and the usual
wastage through sickness was going on. The result was that, during the
latter part of the time at Fonquevillers, there were seldom more than
two officers per company doing duty in the line.
On December 5th the Battalion was relieved in the Y Sector by the 1/5th
Battalion Sherwood Foresters--the battalion which had gone “over the
top” from those very same trenches on July 1st. As each platoon was
relieved it marched back to Souastre, where a halt was made in a field
for dinner, after which companies formed up and marched to Warlencourt.
The next day the Battalion marched to Halloy, where it was to stop
until early in the New Year.
(_c_) Halloy.
Halloy was one of the worst places for billeting in the whole of
France. The barns were mostly in a bad state of repair. The hutment
camps were exceptionally muddy. The inhabitants of the village were
far from sweet-tempered, as a general rule. To make matters worse, it
seemed to be the invariable custom of the British authorities to crowd
far more troops into the place than it could reasonably be expected to
hold. The weather was not particularly bad for the time of the year,
but December is never an ideal month. Hence the conditions, under which
the Christmas of 1916 was spent, were none of the best.
There was not a great deal of training. Occasional battalion route
marches were held, but the companies attempted little except specialist
training. No. 5 Platoon of B Company won the 147th Infantry Brigade
Platoon Competition; but it was not successful when it represented the
Brigade in the 49th Divisional Competition. Towards the end of the
time at Halloy, large working parties had to be provided for unloading
stores at Mondicourt Railhead. Several large drafts of men arrived to
replace the wastage of the previous autumn, and, by the beginning of
January, the Battalion’s “paper” strength was over 1,000 other ranks.
The chief event was Christmas Day. Great preparations were made as
usual. A motor lorry was obtained to fetch additional supplies from
Amiens. Cpl. F. Smith was, of course, very much to the fore; Sergt.
Lockwood rose to the occasion, as he always did at that season of the
year. Dinner accommodation was a difficulty. Only one suitable room, at
an estaminet, could be obtained, and that would only hold one company
at a time. So the dinners started at noon and ran on right through the
afternoon, the men sitting down in four company shifts. But everything
went off well, the usual smoking concerts helped to pass the time, and
the anniversary was thoroughly enjoyed by all.
(_d_) Berles.
On January 7th, the Battalion left Halloy, and, moving by march route,
relieved the 2nd Battalion Bedfordshire Regt. in Brigade Reserve to the
B1 Sub-sector. Battalion H.Q. and two companies were accommodated in
the village of Berles; the other two companies were at Humbercamps.
These were to be the dispositions of the Battalion for the rest of the
month, whenever it was out of the line, except on one occasion when
the whole went to Humbercamps. Though very much nearer the enemy--the
village was only about a mile from the British front line--the troops
at Berles were far more comfortable than those at Humbercamps. Parts
of the village had been very little shelled. Quite a number of French
civilians were still living there and a few small shops were open.
There were many very comfortable billets in private houses, some of
which still contained a good deal of furniture; and the men were not at
all crowded. Here and there extensive tunnels had been dug in the hard
chalk, and to these the men had orders to retire if the enemy started
shelling. Working parties had to be provided as usual, but these could
be borne with ease in such comfortable surroundings.
The Battalion first took over the B1 Sub-sector on January 10th. Its
dispositions were somewhat peculiar. The front line was divided into
three company sectors, but one platoon was drawn from each to form a
composite company, in reserve at Battalion H.Q. The fourth company
lived in extremely comfortable billets in the village, where it was
in reserve if needed; but it was mainly employed on working parties.
Seldom has part of a battalion in the line been more comfortably off.
The sector was in an awful state. Laterally, each company was
completely isolated from its neighbours by absolutely derelict trench.
Long stretches of the communication trenches were deep in water, while
portions of the front line fairly beggar description. It had been very
badly constructed; in some places the revetments had bulged so much
that there was scarcely room to force one’s way along the trench;
elsewhere, the sides had collapsed altogether, and the trench was
nothing but a cavity, filled with mud and debris. The pumps were kept
constantly at work, but were quite inadequate to deal with the water.
So bad was the front line on the left company front that, during the
moonless nights of the first tour, it took the subaltern on duty two
hours to walk once each way along the line--and yet the company sector
was only about two hundred yards in length. But the men stood it well.
Kitchens, similar to those at Hannescamps, provided plenty of hot
food; and thigh-boots were available for all.
Artillery was fairly active on both sides. The vicinity of Battalion
H.Q. received most attention and several casualties were suffered
near there, the chief being R.S.M. T. Glover, who was wounded in the
arm by a shell splinter. There was also a certain amount of trench
mortar fire, particularly on the right, where the lines were not
more than eighty yards apart; indeed, at one point, only about forty
yards separated the saps of the opposing troops. The British had a
heavy trench mortar which occasionally fired on the enemy defences,
opposite to the left company. Owing to doubts as to the accuracy of
this infernal machine, it was customary to clear a portion of the
front line while it was firing. Certainly it produced most terrific
explosions, and it provoked a good deal of retaliation until, one day,
a “premature” destroyed not only the gun but the whole of the team
which was working it.
Towards the end of the month an exceptionally hard frost began.
Quickly, all the mud and water froze hard, and sheets of ice covered
the bottoms of many trenches. Snow fell and the ground became white.
It froze on the trench grids, making them so slippery that it was
almost impossible to walk without sandbags tied over the boots. The
change in the weather had its advantages as well as its disadvantages,
and probably the former outweighed the latter. Iron-hard ground was
a great improvement on the awful mud; ice was better than water; and
the weather was dry. But the lot of the sentry was most unenviable. To
stand on the fire-step, in the face of a biting north-easterly wind,
with the thermometer registering as much as 28 degrees of frost, was
a terrible task. Everything possible was done. Hot drink and rum were
provided. Section commanders actually put their men through some of the
exercises in bayonet fighting and physical drill in the front line. But
the weather of early 1917 will not be forgotten by those who were in
the trenches at that time.
During the earlier part of the month patrolling had been very active,
in spite of the bad condition of No Man’s Land. Little had been
possible on the right company front, where the lines were so near
together; but, further north, they were as much as five hundred yards
apart in places. Sergt. J. Bancroft, of C Company, was particularly
energetic. Twice he reached the enemy wire, reconnoitred it for several
hundred yards, and brought back very valuable information as to its
strength, the enemy dispositions, defences and working parties. On
one occasion, finding his men rather “windy,” he fell them in in No
Man’s Land, put them through some bayonet fighting drill, and then
proceeded with the patrol. But the deed for which he won the Military
Medal happened after the cold weather had set in, when the snow-covered
ground shone white in the rays of the moon. Sec.-Lieut. G. Rawnsley,
with Bancroft and two men, was out on patrol. He had reached a point
about thirty yards from the enemy line when a flare revealed his
presence, and he was shot through the head. In spite of the heavy fire
maintained by the enemy, Bancroft remained with the body for some time,
trying to get it back. Finding the task beyond his power, he returned
to his own line, collected and led a party to the spot, and succeeded
in bringing the body in. All this was done in the face of heavy fire,
and his coolness and daring thoroughly merited the decoration which he
received.
Before the frost set in, all work had been concentrated on keeping
the trenches in a habitable condition. But, with the frost, such work
became temporarily unnecessary, even had it been possible. Meanwhile,
new theories of how a line should be held were developing. The gradual
increase of fire power, due to the introduction of Lewis guns and
the growth of the British artillery, made it unnecessary to keep so
many men in the front line; the increase in the strength of the enemy
artillery and trench mortars made it inadvisable to do so. Instead
of a line in which practically every fire-bay was manned, the system
of semi-isolated posts was coming in. To adapt the old trenches to
this new idea of defence, now became the chief form of work. Derelict
trenches had to be filled in; the trenches which were to be preserved
had to be adapted for all round defence by platoon or section posts.
This was mainly carried out by filling the disused trenches with wire,
so that they could not be occupied by the enemy.
Bombing too had had its day, and the utility of the numerous
saps, which covered most front lines, was discounted. Among other
improvements in the Battalion’s sector, it was decided to fill in the
T head sap which lay only about forty yards from the enemy, on the
right company front. This was a delicate task. The order was to fill it
in with earth; but it approached so near to the German line that the
least stroke of a pick on that iron-bound ground could easily be heard.
What was to be done? As luck would have it, the enemy was engaged in
wiring his sap just opposite; and so it became the nightly custom to
assemble a working party in the British front line and wait until the
enemy party was heard. Then the work of filling in the T head sap would
begin, for no fire was likely to come from the enemy while his own
party was out. This went on for several nights without incident; but
the work progressed very slowly, owing to the frozen condition of the
soil. On the last night the Battalion was in the line it changed its
tactics. Instead of sending out a working party, it trained a Lewis gun
on the enemy sap and opened fire as soon as the wiring party was heard.
Whether any casualties were caused cannot be said; but the wiring came
to an abrupt conclusion.
Had the Battalion remained longer in that sector, it would probably
have been called upon to do a raid on the enemy line. Much time had
been expended on reconnaissance for that purpose, and the order was
fully expected. Perhaps it was due to its own intentions that the
Brigade was so nervous about the enemy; whatever the cause, it seemed
most anxious to ascribe to the Germans designs on the British line. A
sign of this nervousness was the great interest taken in a gap in the
enemy wire near the Berles-Monchy Road. It is probable that the gap was
an old one, which had escaped notice up till then; but the amount of
paper that flew about on the subject was enormous. Of course, nothing
happened.
The Battalion’s departure from the B1 Sub-sector was the result of a
rearrangement of divisional fronts. The 46th Division was extending
north and taking over the whole of the 147th Infantry Brigade sector,
while the 49th Division was doing the same on its left. Hence, when the
Battalion was relieved on January 30th, and moved to Humbercamps, it
knew that it was not to return.
[Illustration: Brig.-Genl. R. E. SUGDEN, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.]
(_e_) Riviére.
On February 1st the Battalion moved to Riviére, where it relieved the
8th Battalion King’s Royal Rifle Corps, in Brigade Reserve to the F1
Sub-sector. The 1/5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. followed,
and, throughout the next month, the two were inter-relieving as they
had been at Berles. The accommodation in brigade reserve was very good,
considering its nearness to the line. Three companies lived in billets
in the village; the fourth garrisoned the Wailly Keeps, a reserve line
of platoon posts. This latter was an ideal duty for an enthusiastic
platoon commander. He had his own little command, nicely compact; he
lived with his platoon, looked after its food, and supervised its work
and training; and, except in one case, his company commander was not
too near. What could a keen young subaltern want better? The bulk of
the Battalion in Riviére found working parties, so there was little
chance for training. But the Battalion had a tour in the line to do
before it was really able to taste the joys of brigade reserve. On
February 2nd it took over the F1 Sub-sector from the 7th Battalion
King’s Royal Rifle Corps.
This sector was, in one respect, the most “perfect” the Battalion
ever occupied. Students of the many official handbooks on “Trench
Warfare,” which were produced in the first two years of the war, will
remember the excellent instruction on the planning of trenches--how
each system should have a continuous front line, supervision trench,
support line and reserve line, with numerous communication trenches
from front to rear. They will remember too how each of these, except
of course the supervision and communication trenches, was to consist
of alternate bays and traverses, etc., etc. And those of them who knew
the Western Front will remember how seldom, if ever, they saw these
theories put into practice. Well, the F1 Sub-sector was an exception.
The supervision trench did not, indeed, run the whole length of the
front; but there were the continuous front, support and reserve lines,
properly traversed and supplied with fire bays, and connected by
numerous communication trenches. In fact, an aeroplane photograph of
the sector might almost have been reproduced in one of the textbooks,
as a perfect example of what ought to be done. The bombing expert
had also been at work, and the protection of the main communication
trenches was “beautiful,”--but was it effective? Perhaps it was due to
this theoretical accuracy of the sector that the authorities selected
it as a training ground for embryo officers. At any rate, several
privates from the Artists’ Rifles were attached to the Battalion for
instruction while it was in that area. So much for theory!
In practice also the line was not at all bad. The trenches were deep
and narrow, and afforded good protection against shell fire. At the
beginning of February everything was frozen hard, and so there was
no trouble with the mud; but when a thaw set in, shortly before the
Battalion left the sector, the support line and several communication
trenches soon became impassable. Accommodation was adequate; most
of the dugouts were sufficiently deep to withstand any ordinary
bombardment and a few were really comfortable. In short, the line
had been carefully constructed, in accordance with ideas now quickly
becoming obsolete; it had been well looked after, and might have been
a pleasure to live in--but for the enemy. The archaic atmosphere was
rather heightened by the presence of such “prehistoric” appliances as
the West Spring Gun, and rifle batteries.
One of the most interesting features of the sector was a Russian sap,
near the boundary between the centre and left companies. About 75
yards out in No Man’s Land, and nearly parallel to the left company
front, was a bank, behind which patrols could move quite out of sight
of the enemy. The remains of a derelict sap ran out to its southern
end, but this had been replaced by a Russian sap--that is, a covered-in
passage--well revetted with timber. A listening post was permanently
established at the end of this sap; during the day it remained under
cover, but at night it occupied a shell hole in the open. It was in
touch with a second post, at the entrance to the sap, by means of a
bell worked by a string. This apparatus was tested frequently to make
sure that it was in working order. The existence of both listening post
and sap was supposed to be unknown to the enemy; probably he knew all
about them, but, at any rate, he was not supposed to.
The front system, embracing both front and support lines, was divided
into three company sectors. The fourth company was in battalion
reserve. Battalion H.Q. was, of course, in its “correct” position, a
little in rear of the reserve line. Companies did not always hold the
same sectors, for the right was generally considered to be the most
uncomfortable; but there was not much to choose between them.
The F1 Sub-sector was the “liveliest” the Battalion held while it was
with the Third Army, but it is not to be compared with such places as
Thiepval Wood or Nieuport. Heavy artillery was not much used by the
enemy, though the reserve company H.Q. had the reputation of being
the datum point for 5.9’s. But the German field guns were very active
on many parts of the front. The most frequently-shelled spot was the
top of Forest Street--the communication trench on the extreme right.
That point was constantly and very accurately “whizz-banged,” for the
enemy could easily detect any movement there. All parts of the front
line came in for attention. The enemy also used “rum-jars” and vane
bombs very freely. The latter probably caused far more annoyance than
casualties. However, Lieut.-Col. H. A. S. Stanton, D.S.O.,[8] was
severely wounded by one of them.
There was also a good deal of back area shelling, and the transport
was harassed more than once on its nightly journey with rations.
Near Basseux its route led through the position of a 6-inch howitzer
battery, which the enemy frequently shelled. There Pte. H. Bibby, while
driving a limber up to Riviére one night, had his ride horse killed
under him. He coolly cut it out of the traces and completed his journey
with one horse, himself walking by the side and supporting the pole
for a distance of a mile and a half. It was not the first time that he
had been brought to notice, and the award of a Military Medal, which
followed, was well deserved.
The British were not idle. Their artillery did plenty of work on that
front, and their trench mortars were always ready to fire. There were
some excellent and well-hidden Stokes mortar positions, and also some
2-inch in the line. Both of these were eager to retaliate, and it was
soon found that the former quickly stopped the enemy’s use of vane
bombs. Targets for Lewis guns or rifles were not common, but C.S.M. A.
McNulty did some excellent practice with his Winchester. His gory tale
of how, after more than four hours’ waiting, he saw the blood splash
from the forehead of a German officer, was much appreciated by all who
heard it. The snow made patrolling difficult at first, but it did not
stop it. The higher authorities were clamouring for identification, and
every possible means was tried. But enemy patrols were conspicuous by
their absence. Once a working party was located near the head of the
Russian sap, and a plan was made to secure a dead or wounded German. A
party was to lie in wait in the sap, and, when it heard the enemy, to
signal to the artillery, who would open a heavy burst of shrapnel fire;
the party was then to rush out, pick up the killed and wounded, and
return. But though Lieut. F. H. Kelsall waited in the sap for several
hours, on more than one occasion, the enemy party did not again appear.
So, when all other means of obtaining identification had been tried
without success, the Battalion was ordered to make a raid on the enemy
line.
Capt. J. G. Mowat was selected to command the raiders. Arrangements
were made for the whole party to stop out of the line during the next
tour, to rehearse the operation. Comfortable billets were provided for
the men, they were not worked too hard, and they enjoyed themselves
thoroughly. Once their billets were changed owing to a rumour about
a spy. There may have been some truth in the report. Certainly the
inhabitants of Riviére, in some unknown way, learned much about the
operation beforehand. They even knew zero hour, a point which had been
kept secret from nearly all the raiders themselves.
[Illustration: _Raid near Ficheux._
17.2.17.]
After careful consideration the enemy front line, immediately to the
west of the Wailly-Ficheux Road, was selected as the objective for
the raid. No Man’s Land was thoroughly reconnoitred by Battalion H.Q.
scouts. The operation was fixed for the evening of February 17th, and
was planned to take place as follows:--
1. Zero hour was fixed for 10-0 p.m. Fifteen minutes before zero the
raiders were to be assembled in No Man’s Land, along the bank by the
Russian sap, divided into the following parties:
(_a_) Right Flank Party. Sec.-Lieut. R. C. Purvis and 12
other ranks.
(_b_) Left Flank Party. Sergt. G. Moscrop and 12 other
ranks.
(_c_) Communication Trench Sec.-Lieut. E. V. Blakey and 12
Party. other ranks.
(_d_) Dugout Clearing Party. Sec.-Lieut. A. Butler and 15
other ranks. (Sub-divided into
two parties under the officer
and Sergt. F. Johnson respectively.)
(_e_) Parapet Party. Capt. J. G. Mowat and 14 other
ranks.
(_f_) Bangalore Torpedo Sec.-Lieut. W. L. Hirst and 5
Party. other ranks.
2. At 10-0 p.m. a heavy shrapnel barrage would open on the enemy
front line, from point A to point B (see map). After four minutes it
would gradually open out to form a box barrage round the objective.
Meanwhile, the enemy front line on both flanks, and all communication
trenches and ground in the vicinity, were to be swept by artillery,
trench-mortar, machine and Lewis gun fire.
3. The Bangalore Torpedo Party was to advance, immediately under the
barrage, and blow a gap in the wire at point C. The other parties were
to follow, in order as above, pass through the gap, and enter the enemy
line.
4. Parties (_a_) and (_b_) were to move along the trench
towards the right and left respectively, approach as near to the
barrage as possible, and cover the flanks of the operation. Party
(_c_) was to move down the enemy communication trench from point
C, and establish a block in it. Thus protected, party (_d_) was to
secure identification and do as much damage to the enemy trenches as
possible.
5. Capt. J. G. Mowat, with party (_e_), was to remain on the
parapet. Signallers were to run a telephone wire across No Man’s Land
so that he would be in direct communication with Battalion H.Q. When
he considered that nothing further could be done, he was to give the
recall signal and supervise the withdrawal.
6. The assembly was to be covered by fighting patrols, sent out by the
5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., then holding the line.
At length February 17th arrived, and, in the evening, the raiders began
to move up to their positions. All were assembled, according to plan,
before zero. Apart from an enemy searchlight, which swept No Man’s
Land during the assembly but did not reveal the men to the Germans,
the preliminaries passed off without incident. Just before the barrage
opened, Sec.-Lieut. W. L. Hirst advanced with his torpedo party. The
torpedo was a cumbersome affair, twenty-two feet long, which required
three men to carry it. As the party moved forward it laid out a tape,
to show the direction to the raiders. The barrage had now opened,
the enemy was thoroughly aroused, and the flares which he was firing
considerably helped the party, as it hurried forward. The barrage was
excellent. On reaching the enemy wire, the men pushed the torpedo
well in, though not without difficulty, for it was heavy and the wire
was very thick. They then withdrew, except the officer and one Royal
Engineer who remained to light the fuse. As soon as this had been done,
the two rushed back about thirty yards and threw themselves flat on the
ground. Almost at the same moment the torpedo exploded with a terrific
crash.
Meanwhile, the raiders, in column of parties, had advanced to a
position about forty yards from the enemy wire. Immediately the torpedo
exploded they rushed forward, only to find that much of the wire
still remained uncut. Capt. Mowat, Sergt. Moscrop and others flung
themselves upon it. Slashing at it with bill-hooks, and hurling great
chevaux-des-frises to one side, they forced a passage. Sergt. Moscrop
was the first to enter the trench, and he was quickly followed by all
the men of the flanking parties. By 10-6 p.m. every man was in the
trench and at work.
The left flank party came upon an enemy sentry post almost at once.
One unwounded prisoner was taken and was passed out of the trench to
Capt. Mowat, who was waiting on the parapet. The rest of the Germans
were killed. The party then began to work its way along the trench
to its left. A second enemy party was encountered, and, for a short
time, held up the advance. But half of the British party was working
on the parapet. Cpl. E. Jackson, who was in command of these, quickly
worked round the Germans, dropped into the trench behind them, and
attacked them from the rear. One was taken, the rest were killed. But
the prisoner, after his capture, fired at and wounded Moscrop; so he
was promptly killed. The party then continued its way towards the left,
where it became engaged with some German bombers. These it successfully
held at bay until the recall signal was heard.
The right flank party, under Sec.-Lieut. R. C. Purvis, moved along the
trench in a similar manner. It had barely started when word was passed
down that identification had been obtained. Sergt. J. S. Sheard led
the way, and himself accounted for the first three Germans who were
met. Moving further along, the party became heavily engaged with some
of the enemy, who were bombing from the parados. Several casualties
were suffered, including Sergt. Sheard severely wounded. But here, as
on the other flank, the advantage of having a party on the parapet was
apparent. This party, of whom Lance-Cpl. R. Knox shot two Germans, was
able to hold the enemy bombers at bay; and the right flank was well
covered until the end of the operation. When the recall signal was
sounded, all began to withdraw. Before leaving the trench, Cpl. S.
Jessop threw a petrol can, with Mills bombs attached, down a dugout
entrance; great sheets of flame shot up the stairway and “the results
appeared satisfactory,” says the official report.
It would appear that the Bangalore torpedo had not been exploded
exactly at the pre-arranged spot. As a result, the raiders entered
the trench more to the left than had been intended. Sec.-Lieut. E. V.
Blakey searched for the communication trench, which it was his duty
to block and hold, but was unable to find it. He was able, however,
to give assistance both to Sergt. Moscrop and to the dugout-clearing
party; and, as the enemy does not seem to have made any attempt to
counter-attack along the communication trench, the failure to find it
did not affect the operation.
Both flanking parties had received strict orders to ignore all dugouts.
These were left to Sec.-Lieut. A. Butler, Sergt. F. Johnson and their
men. The former worked to the right, the latter to the left. Each party
carried with it a plentiful supply of Mills bombs and short-fused
Stokes shells. Every dugout was bombed, and the crashing explosions
showed clearly how effective the Stokes shells were. No one can attempt
to estimate the number of casualties which were inflicted, but they
were certainly heavy. There is no doubt that many Germans were in the
dugouts. A light flashed down the entrance to one showed four bodies
lying on the steps. Lance-Cpl. H. Kane was particularly prominent in
this work. He shouted down the entrance to one dugout and was answered
by much talking; but as he did not understand the language he thought
it best to drop a bomb down. So he did.
Meanwhile, Capt. J. G. Mowat was hard at work on the parapet. He was
in communication with Battalion H.Q. by telephone the whole time. He
had to keep a careful watch on the operation, in order to be ready to
deal promptly with any unforeseen development. Also he was largely
occupied in improving the gap in the enemy wire, so that the return
of the raiders might be easier. By 10-18 p.m. he saw clearly that
enemy bombing attacks were becoming serious on the flanks, and, as
identification had been obtained early on, there was no reason to
remain longer in the enemy lines. He ordered the recall to be sounded.
Two buglers were with him for that purpose. Their notes rang out and
were heard by all. The pass-word “Mowat” was shouted everywhere. The
withdrawal began.
Everything went well. The parties of Sec.-Lieuts. E. V. Blakey and A.
Butler withdrew first, leaving the trench by means of light ladders
which they had carried forward with them in the first advance. Their
withdrawal was covered by the flank parties, who afterwards moved
towards the point of entry, covered by their own parapet men. By 10-20
p.m. every man had left the trench, and “All Clear” was sent back along
the wire. The artillery barrage again dropped on the enemy front line,
to cover the withdrawal across No Man’s Land. This was soon effected,
Capt. Mowat bringing up the rear. In a few minutes every man, including
all the wounded, was back in the British line. There were no “Missing.”
The raid had been an unqualified success, and was therefore a great
source of satisfaction to the Battalion. It was an example of what
careful and thorough training can do. With the exception of the
slight loss of direction in the first crossing of No Man’s Land,
which resulted in the trench being entered too much to the left and
Sec.-Lieut. Blakey failing to find his objective, everything had worked
like clockwork. Identification had been obtained, an enormous amount of
damage had been done to the enemy defences, and many Germans had been
killed or wounded--17 dead Germans were actually counted, and there
must have been many more in the dugouts which were bombed. All this had
been done at a cost of only seven wounded, of whom, however, Sergt. J.
S. Sheard died a few days later. All these casualties had been suffered
in the enemy trench; not a man had been hit either during the advance
or the withdrawal. There can be no doubt that the effect on the morale
of the Battalion was very great. The raiders themselves were most
enthusiastic and would have dearly liked to do another raid. Everyone
else in the Battalion envied them their good luck.
Capt. J. G. Mowat shortly after received the Military Cross which he
had thoroughly earned, both by his good work in training the party and
by his gallant leadership. Sergt. G. Moscrop received the Distinguished
Conduct Medal, and several Military Medals were awarded to the N.C.O’s
and men who had been most prominent in the operation.
The Battalion did two more tours in the same sector before it was
finally relieved. Little of special note happened. The enemy artillery
and trench mortars were rather more active than they had been earlier
in the month, probably as a result of the raid. About this time one
or two officers of the 62nd Division, which had only recently landed
in France, were attached to the Battalion for instruction. The only
event of real importance was a fire in the Assistant Adjutant’s dugout;
this consumed many “valuable” official documents, and was thus a great
source of satisfaction to the Orderly Room for many weeks to come.
On the last day of February the Battalion was relieved by the 2/9th
Battalion London Regt., and moved back to Bailleulval. As a parting
message of hate, the enemy shelled the village that night and caused
several casualties. But the Battalion had now finished with the Third
Army. For a few days it marched and counter-marched about the district,
never stopping more than a night at one place, except Halloy. None of
these places was of much interest, except perhaps Neuvillette, where
the billets were exceptionally good. On March 7th the Battalion marched
to Doullens, and, after waiting in the streets all day, entrained in
the evening. Soon after dark the train started on its slow northerly
journey, and so, without interest and unnoticed, the Battalion left the
Third Army.
CHAPTER VII.
WITH THE FIRST ARMY.
(_a_) Ferme du Bois Sector.
The Battalion arrived at Merville about 8-0 a.m. on March 8th. A very
cold night had been spent on the train, snow was falling on arrival,
and the hot tea which was served at the station was very welcome. A
short march brought the Battalion to the village of La Fosse, where
the next night was spent in fairly comfortable billets. Apart from a
little difference of opinion between the Commanding Officer and a very
ill-tempered Frenchman, who said he would rather have Germans than
British in his barn, the day was uneventful. The next day the Battalion
relieved the 12th Battalion London Regt, in Brigade Reserve to the
Ferme du Bois Sector. As the same billets were occupied on and off for
over two months, some description of them is necessary.
Battalion H.Q. and one company were lodged at Senechal Farm, near
Lacouture. This was one of the large moated farmhouses, so common in
the district, and consisted of the usual hollow rectangle of buildings,
surrounding a pond and a midden. It was supposed to accommodate 500
men, but never more than about half that number occupied it while the
Battalion was in the area. A second company was quartered in a similar,
but smaller, farm about half a mile distant; a third occupied billets
in the village of Lacouture; and the fourth was in houses on King’s
Road, on the way to the trenches. Considering how near the Battalion
was to the front line, these billets were quite comfortable. The
country around was very flat and intersected by ditches; much of it was
under cultivation, and the inhabitants hardly seemed to realise that
there was a war. The owner of Senechal Farm, who was a very important
man in the district, certainly did very well out of the troops; not
only did he receive considerable sums for billets, but an estaminet,
which he ran on the premises, was well patronised, and must have been
a very profitable concern. Dotted about the district were a number of
fortified posts, some in a very bad state of repair. The Battalion was
required to find “caretakers” for about ten of these posts, and the
“flat cart”--that cart which carried on so long with the transport, in
spite of its official “destruction” about once every three months--came
in very useful for taking rations to these men.
On March 13th the Battalion relieved the 1/5th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. in the Right Sub-sector of the Ferme du Bois Sector.
Here it remained, inter-relieving with the same battalion, usually
every six days, until the latter part of May. This period was very
uneventful. The line was exceptionally quiet--almost the quietest the
Battalion ever held. Casualties were very slight; in fact, on occasion,
a six-day tour in the line was carried through without a man being
injured.
Owing to the low-lying and damp condition of the country trenches could
not be dug, and the defences consisted entirely of breast-works. The
material for these had been obtained from “borrow-pits,” which quickly
filled with water and so became additional obstacles to the enemy.
Millions of sandbags must have been used in the building of this line.
The shelters occupied by officers and men were built into the parados,
and were comparatively comfortable. Such a line was quite satisfactory,
indeed almost luxurious, in quiet times. But it was the worst type
possible to occupy in a bombardment, for none of the shelters were more
than splinter-proof, and breast-works are poor protection against shell
fire.
The Battalion front was well over 2,000 yards in length--by far
the longest it had held up to that time. Two continuous lines of
breast-works, each garrisoned by two companies, formed the main
defences. The front line was held by seven platoon posts, three on the
right company front and four on the left. Each post was complete in
itself, was well wired front and rear, and was only in communication
with neighbouring posts by means of patrols, which moved along the
unoccupied parts of the line at stated times. At night the entrances
to these posts were blocked by chevaux de frise, and sentries
challenged everyone who approached along the front line. Between the
two companies there was an unoccupied gap, 500 yards long.
The support line was held rather more continuously, but long stretches
were quite unoccupied. Three communication trenches connected the front
line with the Rue du Bois--Rope Street, Cadbury Street and Cockspur
Street. When the Battalion first took over the sector the hard winter
weather was just breaking. The whole country-side was very wet and
many of the trenches, particularly the communication trenches, were
deep in water. But, before the Battalion left, the sector had dried up
considerably.
Battalion H.Q. was in a nameless farm on the Rue du Bois. This farm
had suffered little from enemy shelling and there were several quite
comfortable rooms in it. All headquarter personnel lived either in the
farm buildings or in shelters which had been erected in the orchard.
Few of the latter were even splinter-proof, but the locality was never
shelled. It was one of the most comfortable H.Q. ever occupied by the
Battalion and much work was done to improve it. It was customary for
the resting battalion to provide a platoon each day to work under the
orders of the battalion in the line. During one of his tour’s, the
Adjutant of the 1/5th Battalion made use of this working party to build
a new sandbag dugout for himself. Apparently he was pleased with the
work for he named the dugout “Deodar House,” after the secret nomme
de guerre of his own battalion, quite overlooking the fact that the
work had been done by men of another unit. But the men of the 1/4th
Battalion had their revenge. When they were next in the line they
painted every scrap of the woodwork outside the Farmhouse red--their
battalion colour--much to the disgust of the other battalion which
preferred its own colour--green. At this time there was a perfect mania
for naming places and nailing up notice boards so that there should
be no mistakes. An energetic police corporal, having a prisoner for
whom he wanted to find a job of work, built a small sandbag ammunition
store, and was so pleased with the finished article that he placed upon
it a big notice-board--“The Binns Redoubt.”
The Transport Lines were at Vieille Chapelle and everything was so
quiet that ration limbers were brought up nightly along the Rue du
Bois, as far as Battalion H.Q. Each company had its trench kitchen
in the support line and hot meals were provided for all men with
little more difficulty than if the Battalion had been back in rest.
The canteen was set up at Battalion H.Q., and a “hawker” went round
the front line daily to sell cigarettes, etc. to the men, within two
hundred yards of the enemy.
From the British front line the ground sloped very gently up to the
Aubers Ridge, from which the Germans had good observation. But they
made little use of this. Their artillery was very quiet, except on
rare occasions. Canadian Orchard and the posts on the right got most
attention; Sec.-Lieut. S. P. Stansfield was killed near Shetland Post.
But, compared with what the Battalion had experienced elsewhere and
was to encounter later, the shelling was almost negligible. Occasional
salvoes would be fired on one of the communication trenches or some
other part of the line, but these caused very little inconvenience.
Rarely was anything of heavier calibre than the 10.5 cm. howitzer used.
One noteworthy exception to this was the afternoon of May 12th, when
the junction of Cadbury Street with the Rue du Bois was heavily shelled
with what appeared to be 21 cm. armour-piercing shells. Though there
were no casualties this caused great inconvenience, for the pump, which
supplied all water for the companies, was seriously damaged, and it
took about two days to get it into working order again. The reason for
this bombardment was never understood, but, as it was the only occasion
on which shells of such heavy calibre were used, it was probably only
a visit from a “travelling circus.” Occasionally the 15 cm. howitzer
appeared; one day it heavily shelled the Rue du Bois near Sandbag
Corner; on another occasion it wrecked the officers’ mess of the A246
Battery, which lay about 1,000 yards behind Battalion H.Q.
In other ways too the enemy seemed quite willing to “live and let
live,” if he were not interfered with. He had both medium and light
trench mortars in his lines, but seldom fired more than a few rounds at
a time from them. His machine guns did little and sniping was almost
unknown. Undoubtedly he held his front line thinly, though movement
was observed almost daily in the vicinity of the Boar’s Head, where
much work was in progress. One day he gave very clear evidence that
he was awake. An energetic platoon commander, who was trying to make
things uncomfortable for the “Hun” with rifle grenades, unfortunately
had a premature, and the loud cheering that was heard from the opposite
side of No Man’s Land showed that the enemy was on the watch and fully
appreciated the incident.
The Battalion had two excellent observation posts on the Rue du
Bois, which boasted the grandiloquent names of the “Savoy” and the
“Trocadero.” From these, and from smaller ones in the front line,
excellent observation could be obtained of the whole enemy system and
of much of the country in rear. The enemy seemed to make very little
effort to conceal himself and so the sector was a regular “promised
land” for the Battalion Intelligence Officer. The Sugar Factory at
Marquillies, with its prominent chimney, was of particular interest,
both for the large amount of enemy transport which moved about near
it, and for the careful record which was kept of the times when the
chimney smoked. This chimney also exercised a great fascination on the
Commanding Officer, and the first thing that had to be done when the
Battalion moved to neighbouring sectors was to identify this landmark
from the new position. Indeed, it was almost a relief to some when the
Battalion went to the coast and was quite out of view of Marquillies.
During the whole time the Battalion was on the Ferme du Bois Sector
patrolling was very active. At first this was very uncomfortable, for
the greater part of No Man’s Land was badly water-logged. For a long
time no brilliant success was gained. No Man’s Land was thoroughly
mapped, but practically all attempts to enter the enemy front line were
unsuccessful. Until about the middle of April, the Battalion was faced
by the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division--the Quinque Rue was one of its
inter-regimental boundaries--which did practically no patrolling. With
the exception of a patrol encounter on the night of April 18/19th, no
enemy patrol was ever seen in No Man’s Land. On the same night C.S.M.
W. Medley, M.M., of B Company, entered the enemy front line south of
the Quinque Rue, and made some valuable observations, but failed to
secure an identification.
[Illustration: Capt. A. E. MANDER.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Capt. J. G. MOWAT, M.C.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Capt. E. N. MARSHALL, M.C.]
[Illustration: Capt. N. GELDARD, D.S.O., M.C.]
Much permanent work was done while the Battalion was in this sector.
The trenches were put into a thorough state of repair and were much
improved, mainly by the construction of new shelters. A good deal of
wire was put out. A series of concrete machine gun posts in front
of the support line was begun. Front line and support companies
inter-relieved in the middle of each tour, and, as tours were spent by
companies on the right and left alternately, all officers and N.C.O’s
got a thorough knowledge of the whole line.
Reliefs were all carried out by daylight and with greater ease than in
almost any sector the Battalion has occupied. The distance to billets
was short, and a relief which began about mid-day would be complete,
with the relieved troops settled in billets, by about tea-time. Periods
of rest were taken up mainly with training, though a certain number of
working parties had to be found. The training area was near Richebourg
St. Vaast, less than two miles from the front line, but it was very
rarely a shell dropped there. Platoon exercises were generally carried
out in the neighbourhood of billets. While in rest many football
matches were played, both within the Battalion and against neighbouring
units. An excellent recreation room at Senechal Farm was used for
smoking concerts and lectures, as well as for reading and writing.
April 14th--the second anniversary of the Battalion’s landing in
France--was celebrated at Vieille Chapelle. A dinner for all surviving
officers of the original Battalion was held at the estaminet, best
known for its associations with a lady named Alice. A smoking concert
for the men who had come out with the Battalion was held in the
Y.M.C.A. hut at Vieille Chapelle, the 49th Divisional Band coming over
to assist in the programme. It was found that there were nearly two
hundred survivors still serving with their old Battalion.
On April 27th Lieut.-General R. Haking, G.O.C. XI. Corps, presented
medal brooches to a number of officers and other ranks of the 49th
Division, including Major A. L. Mowat, M.C., Capt. J. G. Mowat, M.C.,
and ten other ranks of the Battalion. The ceremony took place at
Merville and a guard of honour of 20 other ranks, under the command of
Sec.-Lieut. A. J. Robb, was furnished by the Battalion.
Meanwhile, the first British offensive of 1917--the Battle of
Vimy-Arras--had opened on April 9th. Lying only a few miles to the
north of the battle area, the Battalion could clearly hear the roar
of the artillery, and at night could see the glare of burning dumps
and the flashes of the guns. Before long a current from the battle
began to affect it; the demand for identifications became more and
more persistent. Early in May signs began to point to the presence of
a different division on the Ferme du Bois front, and the Intelligence
Department was most anxious to secure a prisoner. On the afternoon of
May 10th, a particularly urgent memo. on this subject was received.
Very early the following morning a Battalion runner arrived at 147th
Infantry Brigade H.Q. and insisted on seeing an officer at once. When
told that all were asleep he still insisted, saying that the officer
would not mind having been awakened when he saw his message. This is
what had happened.
About 10-30 p.m. on May 10th, C.S.M. W. Medley, M.M., with eleven
other ranks of B Company, left the front line, crossed No Man’s Land,
and reached the enemy wire. There he left six men to form a covering
party, and, cutting a passage through the wire, entered the enemy
front line with the remainder of his patrol. About seventy yards to
his right was an enemy sentry post, but he decided to attempt nothing
against it as it was difficult for anyone to approach without being
observed. He crossed over to the enemy second line, passed that also,
and continued straight across country until he reached the third
line. The patrol was now about six hundred yards in rear of the enemy
outposts. Leaving the rest of his party in an old shelter, the patrol
leader went forward alone to reconnoitre. He reached a communication
trench, known as Serpent Trench, and saw a man walk along it. He
returned and brought up his men, getting into the trench with two of
them, and leaving the rest on the parapet. They were barely in position
when three Germans--afterwards found to be a water-carrying party--came
along the trench. C.S.M. Medley called on them to surrender and they at
first laughed, probably thinking it was a joke of their own men; but,
presently realising that they really were face to face with a British
party, they turned and ran. The parapet party immediately opened fire
and killed one German; Medley pursued and captured a second; but the
fate of the third is unknown. The prisoner was promptly hoisted out of
the trench and the patrol returned by the way it had come, reaching the
British line without loss after an absence of more than four hours. The
prisoner turned out to be a machine gunner of the 3rd Bavarian R.I.R.
(1st Bavarian Reserve Division), a most valuable identification, since
it proved that a relief had taken place opposite the Battalion front,
and that one of the German divisions which had been shattered at Vimy
was now holding the sector. It was to receive this news that Brigade
H.Q. had been disturbed in the early morning.
Needless to say, this particularly daring enterprise--the enemy front
had been penetrated to a depth of 700 yards--caused considerable stir,
and C.S.M. W. Medley and the Battalion received many congratulations.
Lieut.-General R. Haking, in forwarding the report to the Army
Commander, wrote: “It is one of the best examples of good patrol work
that I have ever heard of.... I am of the opinion that the whole
operation was a model of how to carry out an enterprise of this
nature.” The Army Commander fully agreed, and spoke of it as “a very
fine example of an offensive patrol.” The G.O.C., 147th Infantry
Brigade, in congratulating the Battalion on its success after so many
disappointments, said “The skilful handling of the commander, and the
courage of all ranks was only excelled by their spirit of determination
to succeed in their task before returning. Men who have such a spirit
cannot be beaten.” For his work on this occasion C.S.M. W. Medley
received the Military Cross, and the Military Medal was awarded to four
other members of the patrol.
During the latter part of the Battalion’s stay in the area the
main feature was the arrival of two divisions of the Portuguese
Expeditionary Force, which were to take over that part of the line.
They had been excellently equipped by the British Government, but
lacked the experience of trench warfare necessary before they could be
trusted with the defence of a sector. The front between the River Lys
and the La Bassée Canal had always been considered a suitable one for
the training of new troops, and so a number of Portuguese units were
attached to the 49th Division for instruction. At first, only some
officers and N.C.O’s came up to the line for a few days at a time. But,
towards the end of April, a whole company was sent up for 48 hours,
and from that time, until the Battalion left the sector, there were
usually some Portuguese in the line with it. As is usual with troops
sent in for instruction, the Portuguese were not entrusted with the
actual holding of any part of the line. When a company came up, one
of its platoons would be sent to each of the four British companies;
the company commander would attach a section to each of his platoons;
while the platoon commander would arrange that every Portuguese
soldier should be attached to a British soldier, should work with
him everywhere, and thus get an idea of the routine of trench life.
Language was a difficulty and interpreters were not always available;
but, as many of the Portuguese officers and a few of the men had a
knowledge of French, this was used whenever possible. Yet, on the
whole, though they had no common language, the private soldiers seemed
to be able to make themselves better understood than their officers.
Another difficulty was accommodation--there was not room for two or
three hundred additional men in the shelters; however, as the weather
was fine and warm for the time of the year, this was overcome.
Some Portuguese transport men were also sent to the Battalion for
instruction, but they learned little. Love of their animals and a high
standard in turn-out were strong points with Sergt. Crossley’s men.
But the Portuguese were very different. Few of them cared anything
for their animals and the majority were deliberately cruel; they knew
nothing of “eye-wash” and the appearance of their transport on the road
was a standing joke among the British. Their “A” and “Q” departments
were also far from efficient. They never seemed to know how many men
they had, nor what rations they ought to receive. Certain it was that
the Battalion was better off for rations while the Portuguese were in
the line with it than it had been before.
When the 147th Infantry Brigade finally left the sector it was taken
over by the Portuguese and was held by them until the German offensive
in April of the following year.
On May 16th the Battalion was relieved in the Ferme du Bois Sector for
the last time and went back into Brigade Reserve.
(_b_) The Cordonnerie Sector.
Towards the end of May the whole of the 147th Infantry Brigade had
been withdrawn from the line, but, as the relief of the other Brigades
of the 49th Division by the Portuguese was not complete, the Division
could not yet be made use of in any other sector. Just north of the
49th Division was the 57th Division--a Lancashire Territorial Division,
recently out from England. The attack on the Messines Ridge by the
Second Army was timed to begin early in June, and the 57th Division had
to send two battalions to support the flank of that attack. To replace
these in the line, the 1/4th and 1/5th Battalions, Duke of Wellington’s
Regiment were lent by the 147th Infantry Brigade.
On May 25th the Battalion marched to Estaires, where it remained for
one night. The next day it moved to Sailly-sur-la-Lys, and on May 27th
it took over the Cordonnerie Sector from the 2/5th Battalion Loyal
North Lancashire Regt. Here it came temporarily under the orders of the
170th Infantry Brigade, 57th Division.
The Battalion sector was a very long one--about 2,800 yards--and the
front line was very thinly held. It was divided into three company
fronts, but each company had only one platoon in the front line,
scattered in small posts. At night a second platoon was sent up to
patrol between the posts on the company front. The other two platoons
were in the support line for garrison and counter-attack. The fourth
company also lived in the support line but was held in Battalion
Reserve. The defences of this sector were very similar to those which
the Battalion had just left, but were in better condition. The New
Zealand Division had held the front recently and had done a great
deal of work there; the support line was well supplied in parts with
concrete dugouts, and two very large dugouts, each of which would
easily hold a company, had been constructed by the Maori Pioneer
Battalion. There were many communication trenches between the front and
support lines, and there was an exceptionally comfortable Battalion
H.Q. in a farmhouse which had been knocked about very little. There
was a bath-house on the premises, and also a bakery--the pride of the
2/5th Battalion Loyal North Lancs.; but the latter was not used by the
Battalion.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the sector was that it included
about half of the old No. 3 Section, Fleurbaix--the very first sector
the Battalion had held on coming to France. Its present left extended
almost as far as the Convent Wall, and the left communication trench
was that very Dead Dog Alley which had been dug by it two years before.
There, too, were the graves of the men who had been the first to lay
down their lives; these were sought out and put in good repair, for
it was always the practice of the Battalion to pay this tribute to
its lost ones whenever it had the opportunity. Officers were able to
revisit some of their old haunts, particularly Capt. W. C. Fenton who
stood again on the Rue des Bassiéres, happily without stopping another
machine gun bullet. But how changed were the conditions in other ways!
In 1915 the Battalion held a 1,000 yard front with something like 700
men in the front line; in 1917 it was holding a front nearly three
times that length with only about 100 men permanently posted in the
front line. In 1915 troops depended almost entirely on their rifles
to maintain their position; in 1917 they had Lewis and machine guns,
artillery and trench mortars, and they preferred to defend their
positions by counter-attack rather than by original fire effect.
On taking over the sector the Battalion learned from the outgoing unit
that the enemy front line was practically unoccupied, and that patrols
found little difficulty in entering it by night, or even in penetrating
to the second line. Acting on the assumption that this information was
correct, very vigorous patrolling was begun. It was gradually found,
however, that the inactivity of the enemy had been much exaggerated.
The boundary between two enemy divisions--the 38th Landwehr and the
79th Reserve--was opposite the Battalion’s front. The morale of the
former was low, its men kept an indifferent watch, and C Company’s
patrols had little difficulty in entering its line. But the front of
the latter was always covered at night by a strong fighting patrol
which effectually prevented the British approaching, though they made
several attempts. It was there that a patrol experienced the effects
of the gas which British projectors were throwing into Biez Wood, and
had to beat a hasty retreat. Gas masks had to be worn. The officer in
charge of the patrol, following his usual custom, had gone out with
nothing but a P.H. helmet, and that had not been out of its satchel
for many weeks. When he came to put it on, he found the eye-pieces so
dirty that he was practically blind, and had to be led by his men. The
incident caused a good deal of amusement in the Battalion at the time.
One day there was a most unfortunate accident on C Company’s front. A
trench mortar battery had arranged for a big “shoot,” and, for this
purpose, two large dumps of shells had been made in the front line.
For some cause, which was never satisfactorily explained, as soon as
the guns opened fire both dumps exploded, wiping out the gun crews.
The Battalion was fortunate in having only one casualty, but two great
holes were blown in the parapet, and, though C Company worked very hard
to repair the damage, the task was not finished when they were relieved.
On the last day of the tour a very successful piece of work was carried
out by a small patrol. Owing to the lie of the land and the height
of the enemy parapet, it was very difficult to obtain observation of
places immediately in rear of the enemy front line. To remedy this, it
was determined to establish a temporary observation post on the front
of the enemy parapet one morning. Such an operation would hardly have
been possible in any ordinary line, but the Battalion was still working
on the assumption that the enemy front line was practically deserted.
The party chosen consisted of Cpl. E. Jackson, M.M. and two men of B
Company, one H.Q. observer, with glasses and telescopic periscope, and
two signallers, whose duty it was to lay a telephone line across No
Man’s Land and maintain communication with the British front line. As a
precaution, arrangements were made for a box barrage to be put down by
the artillery and Stokes mortars if called for, and for Lewis guns to
provide cross fire.
About 3-30 a.m., just as dawn was breaking, the party started. They
crawled slowly through the long grass which covered No Man’s Land,
got through the enemy wire after much trouble, and Cpl. Jackson
and the observer established themselves on the enemy parapet. The
signallers succeeded in getting into telephonic communication with
the British front line. After lying on the parapet for about an hour
and a quarter, the N.C.O. and the observer entered the enemy trench
and moved along it. Almost immediately they came upon a deserted, but
recently occupied, sentry post. Continuing along the trench, they
turned a corner and saw six rifles leaning just outside a dugout, from
which very obvious snores were issuing. They immediately returned and
summoned two more men to their assistance. The last--one had been sent
back some time before--was posted on the parapet. The four proceeded
along the trench and arrived just in time to find the Germans coming
out of the dugout. One German fired, missing completely, and the
British at once closed, calling on them to surrender. Without further
resistance all the Germans--there were seven of them, including two
N.C.O’s--put up their hands. They were got over the parapet at once and
hurried across No Man’s Land. A few shots were fired by a neighbouring
German post, but the whole party, including prisoners, reached the
British lines unhurt.
It is recorded that a certain Company Sergeant-Major of the Battalion
was walking quietly up towards the front line when he saw a number of
Germans come rushing over the parapet. Thinking it was an attack, he
dashed across the open, only to find on his arrival that the men he had
seen were prisoners. His disappointment was great, but he revived his
drooping spirits by clouting one of them over the head to put him in a
proper frame of mind. The Commanding Officer was in his morning bath
when the party arrived. So delighted was he that he rushed out in the
somewhat scanty attire of a towel and a pair of slippers, and, in this
garb, interviewed the seven well-drilled Germans, who stood stiffly
to attention throughout. Physically the prisoners were a well-built
lot of men, but their morale was very poor. They were very willing to
talk, and one of them said they had been talking recently of giving
themselves up. At any rate, they were saved that trouble.
The prisoners were despatched to Brigade H.Q. in charge of the men
who had captured them. Later, the Battalion received some highly
complimentary messages from the higher authorities, particularly from
the G.O.C., XI. Corps. He was so pleased with the operation that he not
only strongly recommended Cpl. E. Jackson, M.M., for the Distinguished
Conduct Medal, an honour which was awarded in due course, but bestowed
Military Medals on all the other members of the patrol. It should be
mentioned also that a congratulatory message was received by O.C. B
Company, addressed to “The Body-snatching Company,” from “The Working
Company” (i.e. C Company--self-styled).
The next night the Battalion was relieved by the 5th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. and went back into Brigade Reserve at Rouge de Bout.
Here a very pleasant time was spent. The weather continued gloriously
fine, as it had been in the line, and the billets were good. Each
company provided one platoon to man a line of defensive posts; the
others carried on training. There was great competition in turning out
smart guards, B Company winning with a D.C.M., M.M., corporal and three
M.M. men. Here news arrived that Capt. W. C. Fenton and Capt. C. Jones,
the padre, had each been awarded the Military Cross, and the occasion
was suitably celebrated. Plans were also completed for an operation
which the Battalion was to carry out during its next tour in the line.
This operation was founded on the supposition that the enemy front
line was practically unoccupied--a supposition which the Battalion had
already begun to shake. The XI. Corps wished to impress the enemy with
the idea that active operations were in preparation on the Corps front,
and so hinder his sending troops away to the real battle areas. With
this idea in view a scheme was drawn up for seizing the German front
line and establishing a number of posts in it. The main points of the
scheme were these:--
1. In conjunction with the 146th Infantry Brigade, which was
still in its old sector on the right, and a Brigade of the 57th
Division on the left, a stretch of the enemy front line was to
be seized at night, and a number of fortified posts were to be
established in it.
2. Each of the three companies in the front line was to
establish one platoon post.
3. For purposes of this operation the four platoons of each
company were known as W, X, Y, Z. Their respective duties were
as follows:--“W” platoon was to seize the position in the enemy
front line and cover it during consolidation; “X” platoon was
to consolidate and garrison the post; “Y” platoon was to carry
the necessary ammunition and stores across No Man’s Land; “Z”
platoon was to garrison the old British front line during the
operation.
4. Additional parties, provided by the 5th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt., were to dig three communication trenches
across No Man’s Land to connect the new posts with the old front
line. These trenches were to be named “Halifax,” “Brighouse” and
“Hull.” “Cleckheaton” had been suggested as one of the names,
but was vetoed on the ground that the artillery would never
understand it; hence the introduction of “Hull,” which was not
thought to be beyond the intellect of the gunners.
5. The whole operation was to be carried out in one night.
When the Battalion took over the Cordonnerie Sector a second time the
necessary preparations were started at once. One of the most important
of these preliminary arrangements was the preparation of dumps of all
necessary stores in the front line. To carry this out Capt. H. Hanson
was attached to Battalion H.Q., and very hard he worked, perspiring
freely in the sweltering weather, and often pushing trucks on the light
railway, and carrying stores himself.
The night of June 15/16th had been fixed for the operation, and all was
ready. But, in the early morning of June 15th, the orders were suddenly
cancelled and the Battalion was warned to be ready for relief that
night. What would have been the success of the operation, had it been
carried out, can hardly be said. Judging from previous reconnaissance
of the front, it is probable that C Company would have established its
post without difficulty, and that B Company would also have succeeded
though it might have had to fight; A Company’s task would, almost
certainly, have proved the hardest, and it is doubtful whether its post
could have been founded at all.
The Battalion was relieved on the night of June 15/16th by the 2/4th
Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regt., which had returned from the
fighting near Messines, and marched straight through to billets at
Estaires. A very pleasant three weeks had been spent in the sector,
there had been very few casualties, and the Battalion took away with
it the best of wishes from the 170th Infantry Brigade as the following
letter from the G.O.C. shows:--
H.Q., 170th Inf. Bde.,
June 15th, 1917.
My Dear Sugden,
I should like you and all your battalion to know how sorry
we are to part with you. I have not met a better organised
battalion nor one in which work was more thoroughly and quietly
done. You gave us a taste of your fighting qualities on Trinity
Sunday and I am disappointed indeed that circumstances prevent
you gaining the honourable distinction that your proposed
operations would undoubtedly have conferred on you and your
gallant fellows. At any rate your very complete preparations for
them will give us valuable assistance in the future.
The 1/4th West Riding Regiment takes with it the heartiest good
wishes of my brigade.
Yours sincerely,
F. G. Guggisberg.
(_c_) St. Elie Sector.
The Battalion spent three nights in Estaires and then moved by
motor bus to Sailly Labourse. The next day it marched to billets
in Philosophe, a mining village north-west of Lens. Here the 147th
Infantry Brigade came temporarily under the orders of the G.O.C., 6th
Division, relieving a Brigade of that division which was required for
an operation near Lens. The first days were spent in Brigade Reserve
at Philosophe, time being occupied in training and in reconnaissance
of the sector which the Battalion was soon to take over. The country
was typical of the Lens mining district and not unlike the Barnsley
coalfield. An excellent view of it was obtained from the top of a
neighbouring slag-heap.
On the night of June 25/26th the Battalion relieved the 6th Batt. Duke
of Wellington’s Regt, in the St. Elie Right Sub-Sector, where its
right rested on the Hulluch-Vermelles Road. This sector was a most
peculiar one, and quite different from any the Battalion had previously
occupied. The country-side was all chalk, so that the trenches were
comparatively easy to keep in order and were, on the whole, dry.
The sector was approached from Vermelles by Chapel Alley, one of
the longest communication trenches the men had ever seen, which ran
alongside the road to Hulluch; but most people preferred to use the
road or a cross-country route until they were about half way up to the
line. The trenches lay entirely on the ground which had been captured
from the enemy in the Battle of Loos. Battalion H.Q. was an old German
dugout, just off the old German front line. From this point the route
to the front line was up Devon Lane as far as St. George’s Trench, and
then along one or other of the tunnels. These tunnels were wonderful
works of engineering. Cut out of solid chalk, lit up by electric light,
ventilated by electric fans, and lying thirty to forty feet below the
surface, they gave one a feeling of absolute security, except against
gas. Indeed, this feeling was so strong that they exercised rather a
demoralising influence--once inside, one hardly liked to leave them,
for the heaviest shell or trench mortar could scarcely shake them.
Here and there stair-cases led up to posts, the parapets of which were
constructed from the sandbags of “spoil” obtained in the excavation of
the tunnels. Except on the centre company front, nearly every post was
reached in this way. Most of the old front line was derelict, little
being held except the posts at the tunnel exits, and a few great mine
craters.
A Company was on the right, B Company in the centre, and D Company
on the left. C Company was in Battalion Reserve, in deep dugouts off
St. George’s Trench. Both the right and left companies lived almost
entirely in the tunnels, but B Company had its H.Q. in a deep dugout,
which was approached by the half-derelict Grimwood Trench, and its
principal post in Newport Sap, a great mine crater garrisoned by one
platoon by day and two platoons by night.
Fosse 8, an enormous slag-heap a little to the north of the St. Elie
Sector, was the dominating feature of the district. Machine guns from
this mound had been one of the main obstacles to the British advance in
the Battle of Loos. Its possession gave the enemy excellent observation
over a large area and was probably the main reason for his great
artillery and trench mortar activity.
Never had the Battalion experienced such trench mortar activity. The
Stokes mortar battery, which had been left in the line by the 6th
Division, fired until its guns were red-hot. A heavy trench mortar,
which had its home thirty to forty feet below the surface and fired
up a sort of chimney, made things very lively for the Germans in Cité
St. Elie with its “flying pigs.” The enemy too was very active in this
department. Opposite the Battalion’s left were the St. Elie quarries
and these were packed with trench mortars of all descriptions, which
were able to carry on their deadly work in almost complete security.
The enemy, when he thought fit, could put down such a trench mortar
barrage as the Battalion had never known before. Deservedly, the sector
bore a very bad reputation.
However, the first day passed quietly, and the night of June 26/27th
was one of those glorious nights, with an almost full moon, which one
sometimes gets at Midsummer. Dawn had almost come before the silence
was broken. The Battalion was already standing to, and the additional
platoon had just been withdrawn from Newport Sap, when, at 3-10 a.m.,
without any warning, the enemy opened a terrific bombardment. Trench
mortar shells of all calibres rained down on the posts at Boyau 78,
Newport Sap, “K” Dump and Devon Dump, and on the centre company H.Q.
A heavy barrage of high explosive and shrapnel fell on St. George’s
Trench and Devon Lane. At the centre company H.Q. Capt. J. G. Mowat,
M.C., Sec.-Lieut. I. C. Denby and four other ranks were instantly
killed by a heavy trench mortar shell, just after the first had
sent up the S.O.S. signal. The entrance to “K” Dump was blown in and
Sec.-Lieut. H. Pollard wounded. All quickly realised that an enemy raid
on a large scale was in progress.
At Newport Sap Sec.-Lieut. G. Crowther, in spite of the terrific
bombardment which blew in the trenches in several places, got his
men standing to and beat off a party of the enemy which appeared,
with rifle and Lewis gun fire. The men at Devon Dump, which post was
fortunately not hit, opened rapid fire to their front, but it was
purely blind fire for they could not see more than twenty yards owing
to the dust and smoke raised by the bombardment. Machine guns at
Dudley Dump fired on a party of Germans who were seen in the vicinity
of “K” Dump, and drove them off. But a third enemy party succeeded in
entering Boyau 78. Here the platoon commander had withdrawn his men
into the tunnels, as soon as the bombardment opened, in order to avoid
casualties. Unfortunately, two men took a wrong turning and were come
upon by the raiding party. One managed to escape into an old shelter,
but the other was captured. The raiders then blew in the main tunnel
exit with a mobile charge, and returned to their own lines, harassed
in their retreat by the machine guns at Dudley Dump, and the excellent
shrapnel barrage which the British artillery was putting down. By about
3-30 a.m. the raid was over and the barrage had ceased.
The total casualties in this raid were 2 officers and 4 other ranks
killed, 1 officer and 12 other ranks wounded, and one other rank a
prisoner. To the surprise of everyone the G.O.C., 6th Division, was
pleased when he heard that a prisoner had been taken. It suited him
well that the enemy should think his division had been relieved on that
sector by the 49th Division. But this was little satisfaction to the
Battalion which had suffered so seriously, particularly in the death of
Capt. J. G. Mowat, M.C., one of the most gallant and competent officers
in the Battalion. Its only real satisfaction was the knowledge that
heavy casualties had been inflicted on the enemy. Early in the morning
several German ambulances had left, crowded with wounded, and observers
had seen a number of bodies laid out for burial in the cemetery near
Cité St. Elie.
Early the following morning the Battalion was heavily bombarded
with gas shells, the right company and Battalion H.Q. receiving
most attention. Some of the gas got into the tunnels, but they were
quickly cleared by the ventilating apparatus. This was the first real
experience of enemy gas which the Battalion had had since the days
of the Somme, and about twelve casualties, including Sec.-Lieut. C.
E. Binns, were sustained. Many of these did not report sick until
some hours after the bombardment, the gas poisoning apparently taking
time to develop. The Commanding Officer had a slight touch of it, but
remained in the line.
To assist more active operations, which were in progress further south,
efforts were being made to attract the enemy’s attention to the St.
Elie Sector. The capture of a prisoner from the Battalion had already
assisted this object. The next night, a patrol of the 6th Battalion
exploded a Bangalore torpedo in the enemy wire opposite Boyau 78, and
left marks of identification near the spot, in the hope that they
would be found by the enemy. On June 28th companies had orders that
unusual movement was to be shown in their lines, and arrangements were
made for a smoke screen to be put up along the fronts of the two flank
companies that evening. At the same time the artillery was to put down
a heavy barrage. Actually, the smoke was not discharged, for the wind
was in the wrong direction, but the artillery part of the programme
was carried out. To save casualties all men, except a few sentries,
had been withdrawn to the tunnel entrances before zero hour. The enemy
replied to the barrage, shelling posts and communication trenches
for the most part, but no casualties resulted except at Newport Sap.
There the platoon commander had his men drawn up on the two stairways
leading to the deep dugout which they occupied. He remained at the top
of one stairway himself, with his platoon sergeant immediately behind
him. During the enemy retaliation a shell burst on the parapet just in
front, killing him and wounding the sergeant. Sec.-Lieut G. Crowther
was a great loss to the Battalion; he was a most competent officer and
very popular with everyone.
The remainder of the tour was fairly quiet. A good deal of rain fell,
flooding part of Devon Lane temporarily, but the water soon cleared.
No one was sorry when the 9th Battalion Suffolk Regiment returned from
the neighbourhood of Lens, and relieved the Battalion on the night
of July 1st/2nd. The heavy casualties at the beginning of the tour
had depressed everyone, especially after the quiet times which the
Battalion had had for some months. The tunnels too exerted a depressing
influence.
After two days in Brigade Reserve near Vermelles, the Battalion
was relieved by the 9th Battalion Norfolk Regt., and, embussing at
Philosophe, moved to L’Epinette, near Lestrem. Everyone was glad to
leave, and the “Hulluch” sector, as it is known to most, represents a
black page in the Battalion history. A little row of graves, in the
military cemetery at Sailly Labourse, is the only lasting memorial of
the Battalion’s sojourn there.
[Illustration: St. Elie Right Sub-sector.
June–July. 1917.]
CHAPTER VIII.
THE COAST.
(_a_) St. Pol and Ghyvelde.
The Battalion arrived at L’Epinette early in the morning of July 4th,
and there it remained for more than a week. After the recent depressing
time which had been spent near Hulluch, the comfortable billets and
the pleasant and highly-cultivated surroundings were indeed a welcome
change. Some training was done, but the main feature of the stay was
the Brigade Sports, which were held near Paradis. On the whole, the
Battalion was not very successful in the events, but its canteen, the
only one on the ground, did a roaring trade.
On July 13th the Battalion marched to Merville where it entrained.
After a much quicker journey than was usual in France, it arrived at
Dunkerque, and marched thence to a camping ground just outside St.
Pol. Here tents had been pitched by the advanced party. The conditions
were rather primitive, it being an entirely new site, and the number
of tents was so small that about twenty-two men had to be crowded into
each. The camp was pitched among the sand dunes which made an excellent
training area, in view of the operations in which the Battalion
expected soon to be engaged. Large tracts of these sand hills were
covered with furze and other undergrowth, growing in places as high
as six feet, and a highly interesting night march on compass bearing
was carried out there. At first bathing was largely indulged in, but
a particularly obnoxious variety of jelly fish infested the sea and
caused so many casualties that it was practically given up, except by
the few who patronised the deep ditch round Fort Mardyck.
At the end of five days the Battalion marched to Bray Dunes, where it
was accommodated in a former Belgian camp. A further move into one of
the front line sectors near the coast was expected, and an advanced
billeting party actually went forward to Oost Dunkerque. But these
orders were cancelled and the Battalion moved a mile or two inland to
Ghyvelde, and settled down to hard attack training there.
When the Battalion first received orders to move up to the coast, the
49th Division was intended to take part in a big attack on the Dunes
Sector, with its flank resting on the sea. This operation had been
prevented by an enemy attack on July 11th, which had captured the whole
of the Dunes Sector and pushed back the British line to the south side
of the Yser Canal. Now the Division was detailed to make a frontal
attack on the village of Lombartzyde. The 147th Infantry Brigade was to
operate on the left, with its right on the Nieuport-Lombartzyde Road
and its left on the Galeide Brook. The Battalion was to lead the attack
on the right of the Brigade. The operation was a very complicated and
difficult one. A large number of men had to be assembled on a very
narrow front, and, after taking a series of objectives, which included
the western half of the village of Lombartzyde, the Battalion was to
consolidate a line on the light railway N.N.W. of the village, with
another battalion of the Brigade on its left, facing nearly due west
along the Galeide. With the enemy very much on the alert on that front,
the assembly alone would have been fraught with great danger and
difficulty.
A facsimile of the enemy trenches had been dug near at hand by another
division, and this was used by the 147th Infantry Brigade. In order to
approximate to the actual conditions of the operation, the Battalion
used to fall in at 1-0 a.m. and march off to its assembly positions.
All had to be assembled by half-an-hour before dawn. At dawn the
“attack” would begin, and the Battalion would be back in camp about 8-0
a.m. Little was done during the rest of the day.
But this attack never took place. The Battalion never learned
definitely why this was. Perhaps it was due to the severe casualties
inflicted on the other Brigades of the Division by the enemy’s first
use of “mustard” gas. On the last day of July the Battalion moved to
La Panne Bains, and took over coast defence duties from a Belgian
battalion. In those days La Panne was a delightful place, and the
three days spent there were much enjoyed by all. The town had suffered
little from shell fire or bombing, and everything was going on much the
same as in peace time. The coast defence duties were not heavy. Billets
were mostly on the sea front, in good houses or hotels. The “Terlynk”
and the “Continental” were well patronised. It was a regular seaside
holiday for everyone.
(_b_) The Lombartzyde Sector.
On the night of August 3rd/4th the Battalion relieved the 1/5th
Battalion King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in the Lombartzyde Right
Sub-sector. Motor buses conveyed them to a point about midway between
Oost Dunkerque and Nieuport, and from there they marched up to the
line. The night was unusually quiet for that sector, but pouring rain
hampered the relief and caused much discomfort.
The Lombartzyde Sector was a position of supreme importance. Since
the enemy attack on July 11th had driven the British out of the
Dunes Sector to a line on the south side of the Yser Canal, it had
become the only British position north of the canal. It was simply
a bridge-head, about 1,500 yards wide and 1,000 yards deep, bounded
on the right by the flooded Bamburgh Polder, and on the left by the
canal and the flooded Galeide Brook. Like the Dunes Sector it had been
attacked on July 11th, but the enemy had only succeeded in maintaining
a footing in the front, and part of the support, lines to the west
of the Nieuport-Lombartzyde Road. To maintain this bridge-head as a
“jumping-off” place for attack was of the utmost importance, and its
capture was as much to be desired by the enemy. Hence, since July 11th,
an enormous weight of artillery had been concentrated there by the
British, and the Germans had been equally active on their side.
The 147th Infantry Brigade took over the defence of the sector from the
148th Infantry Brigade and had two battalions in the front line--the
boundary being the road to Lombartzyde--one in support in the Redan,
and one in reserve on the Nieuport side of the canal. The Battalion
held the sub-sector east of the road, and never in its previous history
had it held a front in such depth. The sector is of such interest that
the Battalion dispositions are given in detail:--
1. A Company garrisoned all the three most forward lines; one
platoon held Nose Trench, a second held Nose Support, and two
platoons were posted in Nasal Trench where the Company H.Q. was
situated. To strengthen the defence, a Lewis gun team from other
companies was attached to each of the two front platoons of A
Company.
2. C Company garrisoned Nasal Support, where the Company H.Q.
was, with two platoons; the other two were in Nasal Walk, a
trench between the two most northerly arms of the Yser Canal.
3. B Company had two platoons in Nasal Lane, but its other two
platoons lived in the town of Nieuport, where they worked under
the Royal Engineers.
4. The whole of D Company was in Battalion Reserve in the Redan.
It will thus be seen that the Battalion had garrisons in five
successive lines of trench north of the canal, and a sixth line was
held south of one of the branches of the canal.
The condition of the sector was appalling. Water lay so near the
surface of the ground that only breast-works could be constructed, and
the borrow-pits quickly filled. The heavy rains of the preceding days
had made matters worse. The enormous volume of shell fire had damaged
the trenches beyond hope of repair. There were only two communication
trenches on the front--Nasal Avenue, which was dug by the side of the
road right up to the front line, and Petit Boyau, better known as
“Toute Suite Alley” from the general habits of people using it, between
Nasal Support and Nose Support. Neither of these could be used for
more than a few yards at a stretch as they had been so badly knocked
about, and most people preferred to walk straight up the road as far
as Nasal Support and then along the top of the ruins of Petit Boyau.
Of course they could be observed from the enemy lines, but so also
could they be if they tried to move along the trenches; and one could
move six times faster in the open, which was always considered an
advantage. The defensive lines were in equally bad condition, and
practically all movement was under observation. Except in A Company’s
area, accommodation was very scanty, especially in Nasal Support where
it became worse almost daily, owing to the shattering of dugouts
and shelters. The foremost lines, which had been the scene of heavy
fighting on July 11th, were littered with dead and all the debris of
battle. To crown all, the whole place was a mass of mud and the stench
everywhere was sickening. Perhaps it was this last characteristic of
the sector which suggested the very confusing system of trench names in
use there.
[Illustration:
German Front Line(dashed line)
British Front Line(solid line)
THE LOMBARTZYDE SECTOR.
Aeroplane Map.]
Just north of the canal was an old fort, the former bridge-head of
Nieuport; on the official maps it is called the “Palingbrug,” but
it was always known as the “Redan.” The ramparts of this fort had
been tunnelled into to provide accommodation for reserve troops, and
these tunnels were fairly safe from ordinary shell fire. There were
also a few pill-boxes scattered about the Redan and one of these,
which contained about six rooms, was occupied by Battalion H.Q. In
dry weather it was fairly comfortable, but, as it had been cracked
in numerous places by shell fire, the water fairly poured in when it
rained. Just over the room which was occupied by the Commanding Officer
was a great shell hole; a working party filled this in with much labour
and it was lucky they did so, for, the very next night, another shell
burst on the exact spot. Had the hole not been filled in, it would have
been a bad look out for the Colonel.
The approaches to the sector were almost worse than the sector itself.
To reach the south side of the canal one must pass through Nieuport,
which was always a most “unhealthy” place. On arriving at the canal
one had the choice of four bridges--perhaps! To the east was a series
of six bridges, one after the other, crossing the different branches
of the canal and called, for some unknown reason, the Cinq Ponts. All
these were very heavily-built structures of masonry which could hardly
be demolished by shell fire. Then, from east to west, came Vauxhall
Bridge, Crowder Bridge and Putney Bridge. These were wooden structures,
four to six feet wide, floating on the water of the canal. Parties of
Royal Engineers were permanently stationed by these bridges to repair
them as soon as they were shot away. The crossing of the canal was
always an adventure. The man who wanted to get to the other side first
noted the areas of enemy shelling, and, when he had decided which was
the quietest bridge, rushed across it as fast as he could go. No one
ever loitered on or near a bridge. At night things were even more
uncertain. In the dark, the middle of a bridge might be missing without
one knowing it, and several men had duckings as a result. Somewhere at
the bottom of the Yser Canal lie the remains of a bottle of whisky and
a dozen eggs, abandoned by a Battalion runner when he had to swim for
it. When the tide was up the bridges lay level on the water; but at low
tide the ends sloped at an angle of about forty-five degrees, and the
quickest method was to sit down and slide to the bottom.
Whilst the Battalion was holding the sector its transport lines were at
Coxyde Bains. It was quite impossible to do any cooking in the line.
Apart from the fact that smoke would be almost certain to draw enemy
fire, the men were far too short of accommodation for themselves to
think of building trench kitchens. So all food was sent up ready cooked.
By far the worst feature of the sector was the great activity of the
enemy artillery. This was mainly the result of two factors. In the
first place, the weight of fire which could be brought to bear was
exceptionally great. All the following artillery groups could be
concentrated on Nieuport:--
1. The coast defence batteries between the line and Ostend.
In the normal way these had little to do, and often they were
switched round to fire into Nieuport.
2. The batteries on the Dunes Sector, which had little to do
unless the British attempted an attack across the Canal.
3. The artillery on the Lombartzyde Sector itself, which was
exceptionally powerful.
4. The guns covering the inundated Belgian front, where an
attack by either side was practically impossible.
Also, the bridge-head was so small, and movement so restricted, that
the enemy could hardly go wrong in his shelling. What was called “a
quiet day” in the neighbourhood of Nieuport would have been described
by some such phrase as “great activity on the part of the enemy
artillery” on most other fronts.
It is hard to say which parts of the sector were most heavily shelled.
No part was free from shelling. Even the transport lines at Coxyde
Bains had their share on more than one occasion. Probably the worst
localities were Nasal Support, the Redan, and the bridges. The quietest
time of the day was the early morning, between 4-0 a.m. and 8-0 a.m.
Just before dawn it was the enemy’s general custom to put down a heavy
barrage on Nasal Support, probably intended to overwhelm any troops
who might be assembled for an attack. After that, most of the German
gunners apparently took time off for breakfast and an hour or two’s
rest. About 8-0 a.m. things would begin to liven up, and there would
be plenty of activity throughout the rest of the day. But the nights
were the worst. Practically every night was one inferno, from dusk
until dawn. High explosive rained down all over the sector, shrapnel
burst above the bridges and the Lombartzyde Road, the neighbourhood of
Battalion H.Q. and the Redan were deluged with gas shells, both mustard
and diphosgene. Shells of every calibre were used, from the giant
15-inch, which came over with a roar like that of an express train
into Nieuport, down to the “whizz-bang,” which harassed one in the
neighbourhood of the Aid Post. No attempt was made to keep telephone
lines going except to Brigade H.Q. and to the Nasal Lane company, and
these were continually broken. Practically all communication had to
be done by the runners, who had a very hard time and suffered many
casualties. There had been a long-standing discussion, between those
who had been near Ypres in 1915 and those who had been at Johnstone’s
Post in the following year, as to which of these places was the worse
shelled. But the Battalion had not been long in front of Nieuport
before it was mutually agreed that the argument might be dropped.
Nieuport beat all previous records.
But, with the exception of artillery fire, the enemy showed little
activity. Machine guns were quiet; sniping was almost unknown. There
was some trench-mortaring of the two front lines, but this was
negligible compared with the artillery fire. The enemy front line was
very lightly held, but on two occasions his patrols were seen in No
Man’s Land, though no encounter took place.
Heavy as was the enemy artillery fire, the activity of the British
gunners was greater. The German attack of July 11th had caused great
anxiety to the higher commands, and an enormous weight of artillery
had been brought up. Behind Nieuport, the country was packed with
guns of all calibres, and firing programmes were so arranged that
some batteries would always be in action. As many as 18,000 shells
were sometimes fired on that front in a single twenty-four hours. The
protective barrage which could be put down by the eighteen-pounders
was thicker than the Battalion had ever dreamed of; where it had
been used to a single gun, there was here, not a battery, but a
brigade. On one occasion, when a S.O.S. was sent up on the sector, the
eighteen-pounders alone fired over 8,500 rounds in about half-an-hour.
And on that sector every available gun fired on S.O.S.
Such was the Lombartzyde Sector in which the Battalion spent the first
half of August, 1917.
As has already been said, the night the Battalion took over the line
was particularly quiet. But a very clear warning was given by the
outgoing battalion that this was not the normal state of affairs. The
only casualty of importance that night was Capt. N. Geldard, O.C. D
Company, who was wounded in the Redan. But the first complete day that
the Battalion spent in the sector it had a taste of what was in store
for it, suffering heavier casualties[9] than on any previous day since
it left the Somme battle in September, 1916.
One of the main features of this tour in the line was the great patrol
activity. Nightly, four standing patrols--one to every two hundred
yards of front--were pushed out into No Man’s Land, to give early
warning of any attempt by the enemy to assemble for the attack. The
whole of the enemy wire, or rather what remained of it for the British
artillery had done its work well, was reconnoitred. But the main point
of interest was a post[10] in the old British front line, which had
been retained by the enemy after his abortive attack on July 11th. This
post lay just to the west of the Nieuport-Lombartzyde Road, and it was
hoped to regain it in connection with a raid which was pending. The
position was carefully reconnoitred by Sec.-Lieut. A. J. Robb, of A
Company, the officer detailed to carry out the operation.
The raid was to be carried out by a company of the 1/6th Battalion
Duke of Wellington’s Regt., and was to penetrate as far as the enemy
second line, on the west of the Nieuport-Lombartzyde Road. It was
arranged that Sec.-Lieut. Robb’s platoon should form up and advance
in rear of the raiding party. When the latter had captured the enemy
post and advanced to its second objective, Robb was to occupy the post,
consolidate and garrison it. Zero hour was fixed for 1-0 a.m. on August
8th, and, by 3-30 a.m., the whole platoon was to be withdrawn, with
the exception of 1 N.C.O. and 6 men, who were to form the permanent
garrison of the post. Thus only two hours and a half were allowed for
the capture of the post and its consolidation, the carrying up of
stores, and the opening up of communication with the left of A Company
along Nose Trench.
At zero hour the raiders went over under a fine barrage. They captured
the enemy post, penetrated to their second objective, and returned with
a light machine gun and several prisoners of the 199th German Division.
The 4th Battalion party was not so successful. Advancing in rear of the
raiding party, most of them lost direction and did not arrive at the
post at all; some of them went forward as far as the German second line
and started consolidation there, thinking they had reached the right
spot. Eventually, they discovered their mistake and withdrew with the
6th Battalion. The result was that Sec.-Lieut. A. J. Robb, on reaching
his objective, found that he had only one N.C.O. (Cpl. J. Yates) and
about six men with him. These he at once set to work, while he went
out to seek the rest of his platoon. He failed to find any of them.
Not long after the raiders had withdrawn an enemy party advanced to
reoccupy its post. A bombing fight ensued in which Cpl. Yates succeeded
in driving off the enemy; but when the fight was over he found he
had only four unwounded men left. About 2-25 a.m. Sec.-Lieut. Robb
returned to the post, and, as the number of men he had available was
quite inadequate even for the defence of the post, and still more so
for all the necessary work of carrying and consolidation, he ordered
a withdrawal. Soon after, the enemy reoccupied the post. Dawn was
now so near that there was no time to organise and carry out another
operation, so the enemy was left in possession.
The following night a combined operation by artillery and gas
projectors was carried out on the Lombartzyde Sector with no other
result, from the Battalion’s point of view, than to bring down heavier
fire than usual. Then, on the night of August 9/10th, the 1/6th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. took over the line, and the
Battalion went into Brigade Reserve, in what were known as the Presque
L’Isle Defences.
In the Presque L’Isle Defences a comparatively quiet and quite pleasant
time was spent. A and C Companies lived in Nieuport, B Company had one
platoon on Presque L’Isle itself--an island at high tide, a peninsula
at low--while the rest of the Battalion occupied dugouts in the railway
embankment, south-west of the Yser Canal. About 220 men were found
daily for work in Nieuport or the trenches, but, apart from this, the
Battalion had a complete rest. A number of men, who had remained out of
the line for training, returned and were replaced by an equal number
who had been through the recent tour. The only important drawback to
the position was the almost continual roar of artillery on both sides.
It was during this period that the Battalion witnessed the protective
barrage which has already been mentioned. Suddenly one night, almost
like a terrific clap of thunder, the whole of the British artillery
opened fire. Men rushed out to see what was happening and found
themselves standing in the middle of a half circle of light, caused by
the flashes of the guns. This continued for about half-an-hour, and,
in the rare seconds when one was not almost deafened by the roar, the
screech of the “heavies,” which were flying over from further back,
could be heard. The officer who had sent up the S.O.S. signal believed
he had seen the enemy massing for the attack. It is to be hoped he
was correct, for troops in close order in the open must have been
annihilated by such a storm of projectiles.
After four days’ rest the Battalion returned to the same front as
before, D Company occupying the forward positions, and B Company being
in Nasal Support this time. The conditions were much the same as in
the previous tour. Much time and labour were spent in wiring the front
line, and, by the time the Battalion was relieved, an almost continuous
double-apron fence had been put out along the whole front.
Throughout the time that the Battalion was in the Lombartzyde Sector
the 147th Infantry Brigade was working under the orders of the G.O.C.,
32nd Division. On the night of August 16/17th, the 20th Battalion
Royal Fusiliers of that division took over the line. It was a night
which will remain vivid in the minds of many, particularly certain
officers and men of Battalion H.Q. Fortunately, the full volume of
enemy artillery fire did not open until rather later than usual, and
the majority of the troops were well on their way out before it reached
its worst. But, long before relief was complete, high explosive and
gas shells were raining down on the Redan, the vicinity of Battalion
H.Q., and the bottom of the road to Lombartzyde. It was during this
bombardment that Pte. H. J. Louth, of C Company, earned the high
commendations of the Royal Fusiliers. Detailed as a guide to the
incoming troops, he was wounded early on in the chest, but he remained
at duty and did not report at the Aid Post until he had seen the troops
he was responsible for safely into position.
When relief was complete, a small party of officers and runners left
Battalion H.Q. The air was thick with diphosgene, but the night was so
dark that movement in respirators was extremely slow and precarious.
Hence, everything was risked, and the party rushed through numerous gas
pockets to the Cinq Ponts. The first two bridges were passed without
difficulty, but over the remainder the enemy was putting an intense
barrage of shrapnel and high explosive. The trenches between these
bridges were crowded with men awaiting opportunities to cross. Never
before that night did some realise how fast a man can run when carrying
a “tin” box of Lewis gun magazines, in addition to his ordinary
equipment. One by one the bridges were rushed until the last had been
crossed--and the party was still intact. Then the town of Nieuport had
to be crossed, and, in the streets, one shrapnel shell burst so close
on the top of everyone that all “ought” to have been hit; yet, in some
strange way, everyone escaped. At length Nieuport was left behind and
a long dreary walk brought the party to Queensland Camp, near Oost
Dunkerque, where the rest of the night was spent.
No one wept when he saw the last of Nieuport and the Lombartzyde Right
Sub-sector.
(_c_) Coast Defence and Training.
For more than a month the Battalion remained on the coast under the XV.
Corps, but it did not go into the front line again. The day after its
relief in the Lombartzyde Sector it marched to Oost Dunkerque Bains,
where coast defence duties were taken over from the 2nd Battalion
Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders (33rd Division). It was the first
time the two battalions had met, but they were destined to come in
contact again on several occasions. The coast defence duties were not
burdensome, two companies at a time providing all garrisons. The sector
extended nearly up to Nieuport Bains, and one or two casualties were
sustained from shell fire. Much amusement was provided by a number
of French 37 mm. revolver guns which had been taken over as part of
the defences. The men had never seen these weapons before and felt
compelled to perfect themselves in the handling of them by frequent
practice out to sea. The result showed itself in a few days in a
scarcity of ammunition, and indents for more began to come in from
companies, one Company Commander asking for a large supply of 37 cm.
shells. As he was not known to have on his charge any guns of such high
calibre, the indent was ignored. The shell cases also formed desirable
souvenirs.
Many of the Battalion billets were in good houses or hotels along the
sea front. On a clear day a good view could be obtained from the top
storeys as far as Ostend. But this had its disadvantages, for the enemy
also had the shore under observation, and so no movement was allowed
on the sea front, nor bathing in the sea. While in this area, the
Battalion was working under the orders of the 66th Division, who had
quite a good concert party within easy reach.
[Illustration: Lombartzyde Sector. Aug. 1917.]
Nearly a fortnight was spent at Oost Dunkerque Bains, the last two days
at Surrey Camp just outside the town, and then the Battalion returned
to La Panne. This time the billets were not nearly so good as they had
been a month before. Since then, XV. Corps H.Q. had moved into the
town and had appropriated all the good billets on the sea front, so
the Battalion had to be content with greatly inferior billets about a
mile inland. But the town was the same as ever, though occasionally
visited by bombing planes; bathing was again possible; and there were
now no coast defence duties to perform. Instead, some hard training was
carried out, and several fierce “battles” were fought amongst the sand
dunes. While at La Panne, the whole Brigade was one day reviewed on the
sands by the G.O.C., XV. Corps, who presented medal ribbons to a number
of officers and other ranks, and afterwards took the salute in the
march past.
The most important event of the stay at La Panne was a visit from
the G.O.C., 2nd Army, Gen. Sir H. Plumer. By this time, though the
Battalion was still in the XV. Corps area, it had been transferred
to the 2nd Anzac Corps, Second Army. There was no ceremonial parade.
Instead, the Battalion paraded in fighting order, just on the French
side of the frontier, and carried out a practice attack for the
General’s inspection. It was a time when many ideas on tactics were
changing, owing to the experiences of the early part of the Third
Battle of Ypres; in particular, the old practice of mopping-up by lines
was giving way to the newer idea of mopping-up by areas. It was this
point, more than any other, that the General insisted on when he spoke
to the officers after the scheme was over. Incidentally, he gave the
Battalion the first definite news of what it was destined for in the
near future--to take part in the attack on the Passchendaele Ridge. It
was the first time that most of the officers had heard the name--one
now so well known to everyone, and conjuring up so many memories.
The Battalion left La Panne on the 13th of September, but only moved
as far as Bray Dunes, where a camp was pitched among the sand hills.
Training continued though the district was not so suitable as the last
had been. Two night marches on compass bearings, which took place here,
are worthy of record. The first was for platoon sergeants, and was
easily won by C Company, who received drinks round as their reward.
The other was for officers and produced more amusement, though there
was no prize. One Company, led by an experienced and fully-qualified
surveyor in civil life, never got near its objective. A second company,
trying to steal a march on the others, started from the wrong point and
soon got into difficulty; after negotiating a precipitous cliff, at
least two hundred feet high, and a mass of barbed wire, they threw up
the sponge and retired to rest, calling down curses on the head of the
unfortunate officer who had planned the march. It wasn’t his fault, but
perhaps it was fortunate for him that he was far away. It was at Bray
Dunes too that Capt. N. T. Farrar celebrated his promotion, and rumour
has it that a combination of A Company and the Q.M. Stores is not the
best for a night march without a compass.
(_d_) En Route for Ypres.
Not until the latter end of September did the Battalion start on its
march to Ypres. When it did take to the road its wanderings were so
confusing that many wondered what really was to be done with it in
the near future. Bray Dunes to Ypres should be marched with comfort
in three days, or even two, for the distance is only about 25 miles.
Actually the Battalion marched further than that in the first three
days. Yet, it was not until the night of the twelfth day from starting
that it passed through Ypres. In the intervening time it had marched
about 75 miles, and had halted at various places for five complete days
of rest. But the march had this advantage--it got the men into splendid
condition.
The march was very uneventful. During the whole period up to the last
day--October 4th--the weather was fine. The first few days were very
hot, and the second day in particular, when the Battalion moved from
Coudekerque to Wormhoudt, the march was extremely trying. A rather
late start had been made so that the whole of the march took place in
the heat of the day, and many men fell out. In the neighbourhood of
Buysscheure, where the Battalion remained for three nights, a football
match between Battalion H.Q. and A Company resulted in a win for the
former. As every officer who was qualified to play for either side
turned out, the match provoked an unusual amount of interest. All who
saw the match will remember the roar of cheers which went up when Capt.
A. E. Mander--“Old Man”--headed a goal for his company.
About a week after leaving Bray Dunes the Battalion arrived in the
Second Army training area, some miles to the west of St. Omer. This
naturally fostered the idea that a period of intensive training was to
be carried out before the men moved into battle. But, the very next
day, advanced billeting parties were sent forward, and on the 30th of
September the Battalion was again on the move.
On October 3rd the frontier was passed, the night being spent at Clyde
Camp, not far from Watou. An early start was made the next morning,
and, as the distance was short, it was still early when the Battalion
arrived at Red Rose Camp near Vlamertinghe. That day the weather broke;
it rained pretty steadily throughout the march, and was the beginning
of a long spell of wet. The men were fairly comfortably housed in the
camp, but accommodation for officers was very bad. As things turned
out this mattered little, for only B Echelon and the Transport spent a
night there. At last the Battalion was to be rushed into battle at the
shortest possible notice.
CHAPTER IX.
THE BELLE VUE SPUR.
(_a_) October 4th–8th.
The Third Battle of Ypres opened on July 31st, 1917, with an attack by
two British Armies--the Second Army on the right and the Fifth Army on
the left--supported by a French Army Corps to the north. At first a
considerable advance was made, but the unusually wet weather of August
greatly hampered operations. During September the weather improved and
progress continued, but the fighting was exceptionally severe, the
enemy stubbornly defending every inch of the ground. Notwithstanding
all difficulties, by the beginning of October the Second Army was in
touch with the Passchendaele Ridge, which was the last natural barrier
between the British and the fertile, low-lying plains of Belgium.
Though this ridge proved so serious an obstacle to the British advance,
it is by no means conspicuous. At no point is it as much as sixty
metres above sea level, and its average height is little more than
fifty metres.
Some description of the battlefield, which the Battalion entered
early in October, is necessary. For nearly three years the enemy had
been fortifying the area east of Ypres, making use of every method
and device known to modern warfare--and throughout the war the
Germans were unsurpassed as field engineers. The result was a mighty
fortress, covering many square miles of ground, second to none on
the Western Front, or, for that matter, in the world. The ground was
covered with trenches, constructed according to the latest ideas of
fortification, and crammed with every device for offence and defence.
Thousands of miles of barbed wire had been used in the construction of
obstacles. Hundreds of “pill-boxes”--massive but low-lying structures
of reinforced concrete, invulnerable unless they received direct hits
from at least an 8-inch shell--covered the country-side and sheltered
thousands of machine guns. The German artillery was extremely powerful
and magnificently handled; and as every ridge, up to the battle of
Messines, was in enemy hands, his gunners had all the advantages of
superior observation. Such was the country that the British had been
attacking, and slowly penetrating, during the last two months.
This country the British and German artillery had turned into a
desolation unparalleled even on the Somme battlefield in the previous
year. Literally, every inch of ground had been torn up by shell fire.
The whole appearance of the country-side had changed--most of the roads
had almost disappeared, thick woods had become nothing but collections
of broken and distorted tree-stumps, of some villages there was
scarcely a trace. Everywhere the ground was littered with the awful
debris of war--dead bodies of men and animals, derelict tanks and guns,
shattered wagons and every conceivable form of what was known to the
men as “salvage.” To crown all, the heavy rains of the late summer
and early autumn had converted the whole area into a quagmire, the
drainage system having been completely destroyed by artillery fire.
Cross-country travelling was extremely difficult for a man on foot,
for even when he picked his way carefully he was often bogged well
above the knees; transport and animals could not move at all except by
the newly-made roads and tracks. Every effort had been made to deal
with the situation by the construction of plank roads, gridded tracks
and light railways, but transport difficulties and the activity of
the enemy artillery seriously interfered. Could the prophetic eye of
Dante have looked so far forward into the future, he might readily have
introduced this desolation as the setting to one of the lowest circles
of Hell.
* * * * *
The Battalion was about to settle down for the night in Red Rose
Camp when an urgent order from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. altered
everything. In spite of the rain that day, a particularly successful
attack had been made on a wide front; all objectives had been
reached, and, in some cases, passed. Luck had been on the side of the
British for once, for that same morning the enemy had planned a big
counter-attack. Unfortunately for him his zero hour had been fixed
a few minutes later than the British, whose barrage, 1,000 yards in
depth, had passed slowly over three enemy divisions, assembled in close
order in the open, and had almost annihilated them. So promising had
been the situation at one time that the 147th Infantry Brigade was
within an ace of being thrown into the battle that very day, to exploit
it. This, however, had not been done, but the Battalion now received
orders to move up and relieve the 1st Battalion Canterbury Regt., in
reserve to the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade. At once all was bustle
and excitement, and, soon after 11-0 p.m. the Battalion, in battle
order and at battle strength, marched out of camp to play its part in
the battle for the Passchendaele Ridge.
The night was very dark and wet, and great difficulty was found in
carrying out the relief. The route to Pommern Castle, where Battalion
H.Q. was located and round which the whole Battalion was posted,
lay along No. 5 Track--a single line of grids, in particularly evil
condition, with fearsome mud on both sides. Relief was not complete
until after dawn. Some anxiety was felt as to what should be done in
case the enemy attacked, for not a man of the Battalion had any clear
idea where he was, or where the front line lay. Accommodation was
very bad. One or two low-lying, very wet, and extremely uncomfortable
pill-boxes were occupied by Battalion H.Q.; but nearly everyone had to
be content with a shell-hole over which he could spread his waterproof
sheet. October 5th was spent mainly in trying to build habitable
shelters.
On the night of October 5/6th the Battalion moved up to the line, where
it relieved two New Zealand battalions. D and C Companies held the
front line--D Company to the south of, and C Company along, the eastern
edge of Berlin Wood; A Company was in support on Abraham Heights, and B
Company in reserve near Otto Farm, where Battalion H.Q. was situated.
Abraham Heights were rather heavily shelled at intervals, but, apart
from this, nothing of importance happened during the twenty-four
hours that were spent in the sector. The enemy was undoubtedly very
disorganised after the attack of two days before, and was in no
condition to be aggressive.
The night of October 5/6th was a particularly bad one for the Battalion
transport men. Owing to the appalling condition of the ground, supplies
could only be taken up on pack animals, and that night, for the first
and last time, Texas packs were used. These proved most unsatisfactory,
the loads could not be properly secured, and constant halts were
necessary to readjust them. The amount of traffic on the roads was
amazing. From Vlamertinghe to Ypres, and up beyond Wieltje, the whole
road was packed with every conceivable form of vehicle and pack animal.
Blocks were constantly occurring and causing wearisome halts. Soon
after the convoy started it became split up, owing to vehicles pushing
in between the animals. Beyond Ypres the conditions became even worse,
and eventually the convoy returned to Red Rose Camp without having
reached the Battalion. But soon after dawn a fresh convoy set out and
succeeded in delivering the rations.
The next night the Battalion was relieved by the 2/5th Battalion
Manchester Regt. (66th Division) and returned to Pommern Castle. The
next two days were spent in active preparation for the attack which was
to take place on October 9th. Large carrying parties were found for
establishing forward dumps, and all officers reconnoitred routes up to
the line and assembly positions for the attack.
This operation was on a very big scale. The 49th Division was to attack
on the extreme left of the Second Army, with the Fifth Army attacking
on its left and the 66th Division on its right. The main details of the
attack were as follows:--
1. The 49th Division was to advance straight towards the point
of the Belle Vue Spur, an offshoot of the main Passchendaele
Ridge, on a frontage of about 1,500 yards.
2. Two objectives were to be captured and consolidated, the
second objective being about 1,250 yards from the British Front
Line.
3. The attack was to be made by the 148th Infantry Brigade on
the right and the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left, each
having two battalions in the front line. The 147th Infantry
Brigade was to be in Divisional Reserve.
It was thus very uncertain what the role of the Battalion would be.
Its orders were to be assembled at Pommern Castle by zero hour (5-20
a.m.) ready to move at a moment’s notice. There it was to remain until
further orders were received from Brigade H.Q., and, as it was the
reserve battalion of the Brigade, these orders were not expected very
early.
The morning of October 8th was bright and sunny, and the ground was
drying up splendidly. But about the middle of the afternoon very heavy
rain began to fall which continued, almost without a break, right
through the night. The ground, already in very bad condition, was thus
rendered almost impassable in many places, and the assembly of the
attacking Brigades was seriously hampered.
(_b_) October 9th.
By 5-0 a.m. on October 9th the Battalion,[11] with the exception
of most of B Company, who had not yet returned from a carrying
party, was assembled at Pommern Castle ready to move. At 5-20 a.m.
the barrage opened, several batteries near where the Battalion was
assembled being in action, and all knew that the attack had begun.
For about two hours nothing happened; save for the noise of the
guns, everything was quiet, and no news of the attack came through.
About 7-30 a.m., orders were received for the Battalion to advance
to the vicinity of Aisne Farm, some six or seven hundred yards west
of Kansas Cross. B Company’s carrying party had not yet returned, so
guides were left behind for them, and the rest of the Battalion moved
off in artillery formation, with platoons at fifty yards’ interval.
The ground was very wet after the heavy rain of the night before, and
movement was slow and laborious. The Battalion had scarcely reached
its destination when fresh orders arrived, directing it to proceed
forthwith to the neighbourhood of Korek, where it would come under the
orders of the 146th Infantry Brigade, whose advanced H.Q. was there.
The route followed was along No. 6 Track, a single line of grids in
none too good condition. Platoons had to move in single file, and, as
they drew near to Korek, came under heavy artillery fire which caused
several casualties--the first suffered that day. On arrival there
the Battalion halted and began to dig in as the artillery fire was
still heavy. While it was thus engaged, the remainder of B Company
came up, so that the Battalion was again concentrated. The Commanding
Officer went personally to the 146th Infantry Brigade H.Q. for orders
and information as to the situation. The latter, he found, was very
obscure. It was not definitely known where any of the Battalion H.Q.
were situated; the 1/5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. was believed
to be at or near Peter Pan, the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt.
somewhere between Kronprinz Farm and Yetta Houses. The only definite
information was that both were in need of reinforcements, and the
Commanding Officer was accordingly ordered to send up two companies
in support of each. He returned to his Battalion H.Q. and orders, as
definite as the situation would admit, were issued at 10-50 a.m. A and
B Companies were placed under the command of Capt. A. E. Mander, whose
instructions were to report to the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt.
and place himself under its orders. C and D Companies the Commanding
Officer decided to lead in person to the assistance of the 1/5th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt.
[Illustration: R.S.M. F. P. STIRZAKER, M.C.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: R.S.M. W. LEE, M.C.]
[Illustration: C.S.M. W. MEDLEY, M.C., M.M.]
[Illustration: Sergt. A. LOOSEMORE, V.C., D.C.M.]
At 10-55 a.m. Battalion H.Q. moved off, followed by C Company, with D
Company bringing up the rear--all in artillery formation. Near Calgary
Grange they came across Capt. Ablitt, of the 1/5th Battalion West
Yorkshire Regt., who stated that his Commanding Officer was wounded
and he was now in command. Most of his H.Q. personnel were casualties,
he had no proper Headquarters and knew very little of the situation.
The Commanding Officer informed Capt. Ablitt that he was moving up to
Peter Pan with two companies, and then continued on his way. There was
no protective barrage to cover the advance of the Battalion, and, as it
came down the slope past Calgary Grange, very heavy machine gun fire
was encountered from the pill-boxes on the Belle Vue Spur. The enemy
artillery was also active, and, though the companies extended, many
casualties were suffered before the old British front line was reached.
Here a halt was made for about fifteen minutes to give companies an
opportunity to reorganise, and to allow time for the reconnaissance of
the crossings over the Ravebeke. In normal times this stream would have
been a very slight obstacle, but the devastating fire of the British
artillery and the recent heavy rains had converted its course into a
formidable morass. Sec.-Lieut. A. M. Luty went forward to reconnoitre
for practicable crossings. Under a heavy artillery and machine gun fire
he carried out this duty, marked the possible places with sticks, and
then returned to his own lines.
Lieut. H. S. Wilkinson, the Battalion Intelligence Officer, was also
sent forward, not only to reconnoitre the crossings of the stream,
but to try to get into touch with men of the 146th Infantry Brigade.
Running from one shell-hole to another, he soon lost touch with the two
men who had started out with him, and went on alone. Near the Ravebeke,
a bullet lodged in his steel helmet, fortunately without wounding him.
As he could find no other means of crossing, he waded through the
stream, the water coming above his waist. He then advanced straight
towards Peter Pan, across awful mud, and with machine gun bullets
whistling all round. Soon he met a party of the 1/6th Battalion West
Yorkshire Regiment, but they could tell him nothing of the situation.
So he determined to reconnoitre as far as Peter Pan itself before
returning to report. Not a dozen yards from the ruined building he
was severely wounded. One bullet shattered his jaw; another went right
through his left shoulder and fractured the arm. That was the end of
his reconnaissance. He had established the very important fact that
the enemy did not hold Peter Pan, but he was unable to return to give
the information. In great pain and half covered with water, he lay in
a shell-hole until the advance of the Battalion swept past him, and he
was found and carried back.
Meanwhile, the Battalion was again advancing. C Company led the way,
with D Company in close support. Under a hail of machine gun bullets,
in the face of accurate sniping, and with shells bursting all round,
they steadily advanced by section rushes, in extended order. The rear
company gave covering fire to the leading one, and machine guns also
assisted in keeping down the hostile fire. But many men went down,
killed or wounded, in the mud, before the stream was reached. Then
followed the crossing of the Ravebeke. Some of C Company had carried
saplings with them which they threw across, others crossed on the
fallen trees which were already lying there, yet others literally
forced their way through the mud and water. On the far side of the
Ravebeke the fire was, if anything, heavier; but the men pressed on to
Peter Pan where many of them gained some temporary protection among
the ruined buildings. It was in this crossing of the Ravebeke, and
the advance to Peter Pan, that the Battalion suffered its heaviest
casualties that day. Among others, Capt. N. Geldard, O.C. D Company,
went down with a bullet wound in the ankle--his second wound in less
than three months. Lieut. W. L. Hirst assumed command of D Company.
Had the Battalion carried out its advance under a proper barrage the
casualties would not have been nearly so heavy. But the Ravebeke had
been crossed, which was, at the moment, the really important thing.
Battalion H.Q. was established in a newly-made shell hole, just in rear
of the ruins of Peter Pan. C Company was pushed forward at once to
get in touch with the West Yorks, and to gain contact with the enemy.
Following a line slightly to the right of the direction of Wolf Copse,
they came upon a number of West Yorks, who had dug themselves in,
from two to three hundred yards in front of Peter Pan. Reconnoitring
to their flanks, they also gained touch with a platoon of the 1/6th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. So they set to work to consolidate on
that line. There were rumours of other troops of the 146th Infantry
Brigade still further out in front, but, apart from a few advanced men
in shell holes, none were seen, and it is unlikely that any existed. D
Company was also sent forward to prolong C Company’s line to the left.
Lieut. W. L. Hirst, with his C.S.M., first reconnoitred the ground,
and, finding a company of the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.
already in position there, brought up his company to prolong the line
on its left. With the exception of the platoons found by C Company,
no formed body of the 146th Infantry Brigade was ever found by the
Battalion, though various isolated groups and stragglers were taken
charge of by different companies. Meanwhile, machine gun fire from the
Belle Vue Spur and from Wolf Copse was still sweeping the Battalion
front, and extremely accurate sniping from the latter direction made
individual movement very hazardous. Companies were doing what they
could to keep this down with Lewis gun and rifle fire, but casualties
were frequent. Two signallers, attached to C Company, were shot through
the head as they were moving along a shallow trench. The Adjutant,
Capt. W. C. Fenton, M.C., while reconnoitring the positions, was
also wounded in the head. As Lieut. H. S. Wilkinson had already been
wounded, only the Commanding Officer and Lieut. W. T Scholes were left
at Battalion H.Q. Such was the situation on the right about 3-0 p.m.
Meanwhile, A and B Companies had not moved with the rest of the
Battalion. On receiving his orders to reinforce the 1/7th Battalion
West Yorkshire Regt., Capt. A. E. Mander had sent out scouts to try
to find out the location of the Battalion H.Q.; but, after some
time, these had returned without any information. The companies were
therefore kept in shell holes in the vicinity of Calgary Grange until
something definite could be discovered. It was not until 12-20 p.m.
that they got into touch with the Commanding Officer of the 1/7th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt., who was found moving his H.Q. back to
Calgary Grange. He simply told them to stand fast for the present. They
remained where they were until about 3-0 p.m., when they received
orders to move up to Yetta Houses, and fill a gap in the line there.
With A Company leading and B Company in support, they moved off in
artillery formation, until they reached the swamps of the Ravebeke.
Here heavy machine gun fire, and the same accurate sniping which had
harassed the rest of the Battalion, forced them to extend. Capt. A. E.
Mander was hit in the head by a sniper during the advance, and killed
instantly. His death was a great loss to the Battalion, for he was not
only a most conscientious officer, but a general favourite with all
ranks; nothing was ever too much trouble for him if he thought it would
benefit his men, and his only ambitions in life seemed to be to work
hard and make others happy. On his fall, Lieut. A. Kirk assumed command
of A Company.
A and B Companies reached their objective about 5-30 p.m. Like the rest
of the Battalion, they found only stragglers of the 146th Infantry
Brigade. A Company began to dig in to the right front of Yetta Houses,
with B Company in support in an old trench in rear. Patrols sent out to
the left failed to gain touch with any troops, save a few stragglers
in shell holes, so Lieut. Kirk ordered the flank of his trench to be
thrown back to protect his left. About dusk, patrols sent out by all
companies succeeded in gaining touch with one another, and the line
which was held for the night was as follows:--
Right:--C Company, facing N.E., and about 200 yards from Wolf
Copse. It was in touch on the right with a platoon of the 1/6th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt., and had scattered men of the
same battalion in shell holes in front of its position.
Right Centre:--A Company of the 6th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt., under Capt. Buxton.
Left Centre:--D Company, N. of Peter Pan, and facing Wolf Farm.
Left:--A Company, just to the right front of Yetta Houses, with
its left flank thrown back as no touch had been obtained there.
B Company was behind Yetta Houses, in support to A Company.
Battalion H.Q. was behind Peter Pan, still occupying its shell hole,
“and very uncomfortable at that,” according to the situation report
sent in by the Commanding Officer. This line remained unchanged until
the Battalion was relieved the following night.
Darkness brought a welcome relief from the harassing machine gun fire
and the accurate sniping which had caused so many casualties during
the day. Though heavy, casualties had not been sufficiently high to
interfere seriously with the efficiency of the Battalion. C and D
Companies combined had lost nearly 30 per cent. of their men, and A and
B Companies about 20 per cent. These losses were, to a certain extent,
made good by the temporary incorporation of numbers of stragglers.
The men settled down for the night as best they could, tired out with
their efforts of the day. Every officer and man was covered with mud
from head to foot, and his clothes were thoroughly soaked with water.
In these circumstances little comfort could be hoped for, especially
as the Battalion failed to get in touch with the ration convoy. The
night was very cold. Patrols were pushed out to maintain contact with
the enemy, and these found the pill-boxes on Belle Vue Spur and the
neighbourhood of Wolf Copse still held. One H.Q. scout unfortunately
was captured by the enemy while out on patrol; he had become separated
from the man he was working with, owing to the darkness and the very
broken nature of the country. Suddenly he found himself right on the
top of an enemy post; a bullet shattered one of his arms and paralysed
his power of resistance, and, though he tried to run for it, he was
easily taken.[12]
Throughout the day the enemy made no attempt to counter-attack,
contenting himself by harassing the exposed British troops with his
fire. About 7-0 p.m., a report that the Germans were massing for the
attack caused some excitement, but it turned out to be incorrect.
Towards midnight the Battalion was surprised by the opening of a heavy
shrapnel barrage on its front. As everything was quiet at the time,
no call for help had been sent back, and no operation was known to be
in progress, the cause of this remained a mystery for some time. It
was cleared up about 1-45 a.m. by the arrival of an order, from the
146th Infantry Brigade, to mop up a considerable area of ground on the
front. The barrage had been intended to cover this operation, but so
late did the order arrive, that it had long been over and nothing could
be done.
The dawn of October 10th was ushered in by the customary German “hate,”
but after that things became fairly quiet for a time. A change was
made in the Battalion dispositions at dawn. B Company was moved back
to the vicinity of 146th Infantry Brigade H.Q. where it became Brigade
Reserve. A Company thereupon withdrew one platoon from the line to form
a company reserve.
Little of importance happened during October 10th. Very accurate
sniping from Wolf Copse, as on the previous day, caused much
inconvenience and several casualties. At various times during the day
numbers of the enemy were seen on the Belle Vue Spur, and artillery
fire was directed on them. About 4-0 p.m., Battalion H.Q. was subjected
to a heavy and very accurate shelling. This was believed to be a result
of the laying out of the Battalion ground sign, which had been called
for by a contact aeroplane; it was thought that this had been seen by
enemy planes which were also up at the time.
Word had been received during the day that the Battalion was to be
relieved that night by a New Zealand Battalion. About 10-0 p.m., these
troops began to arrive. They did not take over in the ordinary way, but
preferred to select their own position and dig an entirely new line
for themselves. So, as the New Zealanders marched in and took up their
position, the Battalion marched out. Relief was complete about midnight.
The orders issued to companies were that they should make for the
Wieltje Road and follow it until they met the guides who were being
sent up from the transport lines. All that night these guides were out
on the road, directing men to X Camp, St. Jean, where they were to rest
and where hot tea and rum awaited them. From about midnight until long
after dawn, the troops of the 49th Division streamed down the road,
some singly, some in groups of two or three, others in formed bodies.
It is doubtful whether, before or since, the Battalion has been more
thoroughly done up. After living in that waste of mud and water, with
practically no shelter, for nearly a week, it had carried out an attack
over the same appalling ground, and then consolidated and held its
position in the face of violent artillery and machine gun fire.
The attack of October 9th had not been a complete success, but a very
important advance had been made. The first objective had been carried
practically in its entirety, and, in front of Peter Pan, a new line had
been established some distance beyond it. But the second objective had
not been reached. The most important success was the establishment of a
line, well beyond the Ravebeke, along the whole front. This stream was
a most serious obstacle, and the consolidation of a line to the east of
it provided a good jumping-off ground for the troops who were to attack
later on the same front. The difficulty of the operation may be judged
from the fact that an attack launched from the new line a few days
later by the New Zealanders failed to gain an inch of ground, and that
the second objective of the 49th Division on October 9th was only just
reached three weeks later by the Canadians, who had come up quite fresh
to make the attack. The operation of October 9th was one of the first
of that awful series of attacks on the Passchendaele Ridge which failed
to obtain a full measure of success owing, not to the opposition of the
enemy, but to the appalling condition of the ground.
That the work done by the 49th Division was appreciated by the higher
commands is shown by the following message from the G.O.C., 2nd Anzac
Corps, under whom the Division had fought:--
“Following message has been received by me from Army Commander,
begins:--
‘Please accept and convey to all your troops engaged to-day my
heartiest congratulations on success achieved.
General Plumer.’
The Commander-in-Chief also called here to-day and wished
specially to congratulate you and your Division.
I wish also to add my high appreciation and thanks to you
personally and to all ranks of your Division on having done so
much under such arduous and trying conditions.
General Godley.”
The G.O.C., 49th Division, in a Special Order of the Day, wrote
“Nothing could be finer than what the Division accomplished.” The
G.O.C., 146th Infantry Brigade, in a personal letter to the Commanding
Officer, said “I cannot thank you enough for the cheerful and thorough
way in which all my orders were carried out.” While the Battalion’s
own Brigadier, referring to the response of his troops when ordered up
to support the other Brigades of the Division, said “Officers and men,
though thoroughly exhausted, at once forgot their fatigue and advanced
through the enemy barrage in the most gallant style worthy of the best
traditions of the Army.”
[Illustration: _Belle Vue Spur 9.10.17._]
(_c_) Rest and Reorganisation.
Though a welcome change after the hardships of the Belle Vue Spur, X
Camp, St. Jean, was far from a paradise. There were very few tents,
and most of the men had to be content with small bivouacs or covered
holes in the ground. The camp had been pitched hurriedly by a New
Zealand battalion only a day or two before, and there had not been time
to perfect it. It was not shelled, though the enemy paid attention to
some neighbouring areas, and on several occasions his bombing planes
were not far off at night. But the camp was made something like a home,
and great regret was felt, and expressed, when a neighbouring Corps
found that the Battalion was on the wrong side of the road and orders
to move were issued. There was no other suitable camping site in the
district. The best that could be found was a small field, pitted with
shell holes, and covered with very long grass and rank weeds, all
absolutely sodden by the rain. Into this field the tents and bivouacs
were moved and repitched in the pouring rain, the men freely expressing
their opinions, in language more forcible than polite, and the officers
thoroughly sympathising.
On October 12th the New Zealand Division made its attack on the Belle
Vue Spur, with the result already mentioned. One of the worst features
of October 9th had been the difficulty of getting the wounded away;
there had been far too few stretcher-bearers, and many of the wounded
had suffered greatly by their long exposure. For the New Zealand attack
each battalion of the 147th Infantry Brigade was asked to provide
200 men to assist in evacuating the wounded, and volunteers were
readily forthcoming from among the men who had themselves learned the
awful conditions. For two days these men worked in the battle area,
fortunately with practically no casualties, and the gratitude of the
New Zealand Division is shown by the following letter, written by its
Divisional Commander to the G.O.C., 147th Infantry Brigade:--
“My Dear General,
Please express to the officers and men of your Brigade who came
forward to assist in getting in the wounded, the very hearty
thanks of myself and Staff, and the whole Division.
I have heard the warmest expressions of praise for the way in
which your men volunteered to come forward and undertake what
was certainly a very exhausting and maybe dangerous task.
I hope they did not suffer casualties, or if so, that they were
light. The New Zealand Division will not forget the debt they
owe to the officers and men of the 147th Brigade.
A. W. Russell, Major-General.”
On October 16th the Battalion moved back to a hutment camp south-east
of Vlamertinghe and here there was more comfort, though the huts were
very crowded. In fact, at this time, there was not nearly enough
accommodation, around and behind Ypres, for the enormous number
of troops which had been brought up to take part in the battle of
Passchendaele. Some training was done during the week the Battalion
was there, particularly of specialists, the loss of whom had been very
heavy in the recent battle. There, too, Major-General E. M. Perceval,
C.B., D.S.O., said farewell to the 147th Infantry Brigade. He had
commanded the 49th Division for more than two years, but was now
returning to England to take up a home command. The Brigade paraded in
hollow square and was inspected by the General, who afterwards thanked
the men for all they had done and wished them farewell. The Brigade
then marched past. Major-General N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., who
had formerly commanded an infantry brigade of the 50th Division,
succeeded to the command of the 49th Division.
The Battalion was now sent well back for a period of rest and
reorganisation. On October 24th it moved by motor bus to tents near
Winnizeele, a village famous for a restaurant which catered specially
for officers. The camp site was not a good one, but three days later
the Battalion moved to billets near Steenvoorde, where it remained for
about a fortnight. Time was spent in reorganisation and training. Some
interesting tactical schemes were worked out, one of which was attended
by the new Divisional Commander. This was the first time the men had
met him, though they were to see much of him in the future. He turned
out to be a man of exceptional energy, who spent much of his time in
the line, and seemed to have a peculiar preference for visiting the
hottest places he could find. Here some drafts, both of officers and
other ranks, joined the Battalion; but the heavy casualties sustained
at Nieuport and the Belle Vue Spur were not made good until the
reorganisation of the British Expeditionary Force at the beginning
of the next year. The arrangement of billets did not allow of much
social relaxation being organised. B Company, who occupied a large and
comfortable barn, held a very successful concert, chiefly noteworthy
for the dancing of a certain “Miss” Hey, who there made her début in
that role. Another feature was the lecturing of the Area Commandant
of Steenvoorde, whose comments on the strategy of the war were most
interesting, even though his prophecies were sometimes rather wide of
the mark.
On November 9th the Battalion moved by motor bus to the neighbourhood
of Ypres where it was to remain, save for one period of rest, until the
last great enemy offensive was launched in the following spring.
CHAPTER X.
WINTER ON THE PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE.
(_a_) Molenaarelsthoek and Keerselaarhoek.
The battle for the Passchendaele Ridge was still raging when the
Battalion returned to the neighbourhood of Ypres in November. To
the south of the Zonnebeke Road the crest of the ridge was almost
everywhere in British hands, but round the village of Passchendaele
itself heavy fighting was to continue into December. The Battalion was
not destined to carry out any further attacks; its role was the far
more tedious, and almost equally difficult one of assisting to hold the
ground which had been gained.
Ten days were spent in hutment camps at the back of Ypres. Winter was
setting in and off the gridded walks, which ran round the huts, the
camping areas were simply wastes of foul mud. About 200 men were found
daily for work on light railways in the district. While the Battalion
was encamped there news was received that the Commanding Officer had
been awarded a Bar to his Distinguished Service Order, for good work
during the attack on the Belle Vue Spur, and the occasion was suitably
celebrated. Capt. W. C. Fenton, M.C., who had recovered from his wound,
rejoined the Battalion here. About this time the allotment of leave
improved considerably, so much so that, at the end of November, no less
than 150 all ranks were away from the Battalion for that reason.
About the middle of November Lieut.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O., assumed
temporary command of the 147th Infantry Brigade, during the absence of
the G.O.C. on leave. As soon as the Brigadier returned, he went on a
month’s leave himself, so that Major A. L. Mowat, M.C., was in command
of the Battalion until the latter part of January. On November 19th
the 147th Infantry Brigade took over the defence of the Broodseinde
Sector, and the Battalion moved up into brigade right support on Anzac
Ridge. Accommodation in this position was particularly poor. The
tiniest of pill-boxes was all that was available for Battalion H.Q.,
and the same table had to serve for meals and office work by day, and
as a bed for all H.Q. officers by night. On the night the Battalion
took over, some gas shells burst just outside the shelters occupied by
H.Q. details. C.S.M. A. Day, of A Company, who was Acting R.S.M., all
the runners, and several others were so severely gassed that they had
to be evacuated. A number of Battalion scouts, who had been left out of
the line for training, had to be sent for to act as runners.
Four days later the Battalion relieved the 1/6th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. in the Molenaarelsthoek Sector, which extended
from opposite Justice Wood to about Flinte Wood. The relief was a
stormy one. The tracks were heavily shelled and one platoon had eight
casualties going into the line. The front was rather a long one and
required three companies in the line. As it lay on the forward slope
of the Broodseinde Ridge, which was under observation from the Keiberg
Spur opposite, no movement was allowed by day. Accommodation was poor
and there were no continuous trenches. At night much work was done,
joining up front line posts, constructing supporting posts to the
west of the ridge, digging a defensive communication trench on the
right, and wiring. The influence of the battle further north made the
front a lively one. Army barrages were continually being put down in
the vicinity, in an endeavour to distract the enemy’s attention from
the real point of attack. Judging from the Battalion’s experiences,
these had a fair amount of success, for the enemy artillery was
very active; frequently parts of the line were heavily shelled, and
barrages on No Man’s Land during the night were common. These latter
greatly interfered with the work of patrols, which were out nightly.
Fortunately, casualties were not heavy; but it was during this tour
that Sec.-Lieut. J. S. Watson, a most promising young officer of B
Company, was killed.
The Battalion transport too had a very rough time. The enemy was doing
a great deal of back area shelling, and night after night the ration
convoys had to pass through it. During this tour the transport lost
the first of its number killed in action. But all ranks behaved with
great gallantry, and, in spite of casualties to men and animals,
rations were invariably delivered nightly.
There is no doubt that, by this time, the enemy had settled down to a
defensive policy for the winter. The collapse of Russia had come too
late to prevent the British gaining the Passchendaele Ridge, though
German reinforcements from the Eastern Front had made that task far
more difficult. For the next few months the enemy was content to leave
things as they were, and quietly to perfect his plans for a great
offensive the following spring.
On November 27th the Battalion was relieved by the 1/5th Battalion
King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and, after a night spent near
Gordon House, moved to Vancouver Camp The day after its arrival Capt.
H. Hanson, O.C. D Company, was so seriously wounded by a shell, just
outside Vlamertinghe, that he died two days later in hospital. His
death was a great blow to everyone. He was one of those men whom no one
can help liking, possessing a most equable temper, and, though unsuited
by age to the rigours of trench warfare, always trying to remain
cheerful and to make the best of things. Sec.-Lieut. P. Donkersley was
also severely wounded by the same shell.
In the next camp was a New Zealand Cyclist Battalion against whom
a very vigorous “rugger” match was played. The result was one
casualty--Sec.-Lieut. F. Irish with a dislocated elbow--and a win for
the Battalion by two tries to a try. Little training was possible for,
a few days after arrival at the camp, practically every available man
was moved to Lancer Camp, near Potijze, for working parties. Little
more than Battalion H.Q. remained at Vancouver Camp. Three days later
the Battalion was again concentrated in Dragoon Camp, and the next
night took over the Keerselaarhoek Sector from the 4th Battalion
Suffolk Regt. (33rd Division).
This sector deserves more than a passing mention as it was one of the
worst, if not the worst, ever held by the Battalion. The usual route
to the line lay along a gridded track which seemed endless to the
weary and heavily-laden soldier. The track was far from “healthy,”
particularly where it wound round Abraham Heights; at this point
several casualties were suffered by the advanced party, when the
Battalion was first taking over the sector. But it was after Seine
that the real trouble began. Just beyond that point the grids came to
an end,[13] and for the rest of the way, over a mile in distance even
if a direct line were followed, the troops simply wallowed among mud
and shell holes, appalling even in that country. The front line posts
were on either side of the Ypres-Roulers Railway, and their condition
beggars description. Originally shell holes, attempts had been made to
improve them by digging; but so water-logged was the ground that all
excavations filled with water almost at once, while the sides caved in
as quickly as they were dug out. To the south of the railway another
difficulty presented itself; as often as digging was started anywhere,
dead bodies, in a state of decomposition, were uncovered, and the hole
had to be filled in quickly. It was extremely difficult to get R.E.
material up to the front line at all. Owing to enemy observation no
movement was possible by day, and the nights were so black, and usually
wet, that a man could hardly see a yard in front of him. The man who
had carried up one trench grid or revetting frame from Battalion
H.Q. to the front line, had done a really hard night’s work. The
Ypres-Roulers Railway, which ran through a deep cutting and should have
been an easy and direct route to the line, was absolutely impassable
owing to the thick mud which covered it. No fires could be lit, and the
only hot food or drink that could ever be obtained was that heated over
Tommy’s cookers. In short, the state of discomfort and misery in which
the men lived had never been equalled in the history of the Battalion,
except possibly in those ghastly days on the extreme left sector in
December, 1915. An American officer, who was attached to the Battalion
at this time, expressed amazement that men could exist at all under
such conditions.
The front system was held by two companies, one on each side of
the railway. A third company was in support round Hillside Farm, a
prominent pill-box just below the crest on the west side of the ridge.
The other company was in reserve in a number of shelters not far from
Tyne Cottage. Battalion H.Q. was near Seine.
Fortunately the enemy was not very active on this front. His artillery
made good practice on and around the village of Passchendaele, a little
further to the north, but comparatively little attention was paid to
the Keerselaarhoek Sector. Probably he realised that an attack there
was practically impossible for either side. Patrols which pushed out in
the direction of Tiber Copse and along the Railway reported the ground
impassable; sheets of water covered much of No Man’s Land, and where
there was no water the mud was almost bottomless. The only route by
which the opposing forces could come in contact was in the direction
of Assyria, on the Keiberg Spur, and even there the ground was in an
appalling condition. Only in the event of hard frost would an attack
be possible anywhere. So, apart from harassing fire, there was little
activity.
Three days were considered a long enough spell for any troops to hold
that line, so, on the night of December 10/11th, the 1/5th Battalion
Duke of Wellington’s Regt. came up to relieve, and the Battalion
returned to Dragoon Camp. It was not much of a rest. The camp was,
on the whole, comfortable, considering that it was to the east of
Ypres. But nearly every man was required for working parties daily,
and these were often in badly shelled areas. Rather to the surprise of
everyone, the Battalion remained at Dragoon Camp for five days. The
1/5th Battalion had asked and been allowed to remain in the line for an
extra two days, preferring to do this rather than have the fatigue and
discomfort of going out and then coming in again for another tour. But
every man was heartily sick of it by the time his five days were over.
One point in connection with the relief is worthy of note. The
advantages of the Zonnebeke Road, as a route to the line, had been
so much praised by one officer of the Battalion that the Commanding
Officer determined to try it. All went well until he was nearing
Zonnebeke, and then, without any warning, a 5.9 burst in the middle of
the road about seventy yards away. It was almost immediately followed
by a second, which burst within ten yards of the party, luckily just
off the road. That was enough! With one accord everyone made off
straight across country as fast as he could go. This was not very fast,
for all were heavily laden and often sank up to the knees in mud. But
they got away from the road, over country which no one would have
dreamed of attempting in ordinary circumstances. And none of them ever
tried the Zonnebeke Road again.
Little need be said of the second tour in this sector except that it
only lasted 48 hours. If such a thing were possible, the conditions
were even worse than before. Some snow fell during the tour, but
it melted almost as it fell and simply helped to make things more
miserable. When the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. came in to
relieve, it was with the greatest joy that the Battalion bade farewell
to the Keerselaarhoek Sector.
The next rest period was spent at Halifax Camp, which adjoined
Vancouver Camp. About this time the weather changed and bright days,
with hard frost, supplanted the constant rain which had helped to make
things so miserable of late. Though much colder, the change in the
weather was a great improvement. On December 23rd, when the time came
for another tour in the front line, the Battalion was taken up in the
morning by broad gauge railway as far as Hellfire Corner, and halted
there until the middle of the afternoon. Cook kitchens had been brought
up to this point and hot dinners were served before the men started
again. Shortly before dusk the Battalion marched off, via Mole and
Jabber Tracks, to the Molenaarelsthoek Sector, where it relieved the
1/5th Battalion King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
Since the Battalion had held this part of the line a month before,
the length of the front had been reduced by the New Zealanders taking
over part on the right flank. It was now only necessary to have two
companies in the front line. Of the other two, one garrisoned a line
of posts on the western slope of the ridge, and the other lived in
shelters and pill-boxes near Battalion H.Q. Companies inter-relieved
after three days in the front line.
This tour was the pleasantest the Battalion had on the Passchendaele
Ridge. The frost, which continued throughout, had made the ground
everywhere passable. Though colder, it was quite dry, and so far more
comfortable than the damp had been. Snow covered the ground, but not to
any great depth. Except for some further snow occasionally, the weather
was bright. The nights were wonderful. The moon was at the full, and,
assisted by the reflection from the snow, the light was so bright at
midnight that observers on the crest of the ridge were able to use
ordinary glasses for observing the Keiberg Spur, more than 2,000 yards
away. The days were often misty, which made it possible to move about
freely to the east of the ridge where, before, all movement had been
forbidden in daylight.
Advantage was taken of the bright nights to do a great deal of work.
Much wire was put out in front, posts were improved and shelters
built therein, and a lot of work was done on the support posts west
of the ridge. Since the Battalion had last occupied the sector, two
communication trenches had been cut through the ridge nearly up to
the front line, and these made movement both safer and easier. Enemy
artillery was not very active, and, with one important exception, most
of the shelling was very scattered. It was one of these scattered
shells that wounded Capt. E. V. Blakey, M.C., and C.S.M. J. Parkinson,
as they were going the round of their company posts in the support
line. The exception was a small but prominent pill-box on the crest of
the ridge, which the Battalion used as an observation post, and the
enemy apparently as a registration point. Fortunately this pill-box
was very strong and had a cellar, to which the observers retired when
things became too lively. The nearest enemy posts were a long way off;
indeed, later information goes to show that the nearest post was at
least a thousand yards east of Celtic Wood.
Christmas Day, for the first and only time during the war, was spent by
the Battalion in the front line. In the circumstances, little could be
done to celebrate the occasion. Messages of goodwill were telephoned
to the Brigadier and the Divisional Commander. One Company Commander,
after laboriously putting a message of seasonable greetings into B.A.B.
code, sent it over the wire to another company. The O.C. that company,
delighted with his success in deciphering the first few letters of it,
repeated it to Battalion H.Q. and to the remaining companies, in his
own name. Rumour has it that one company, not very expert in B.A.B.
code, spent a dreadful night wondering what operation was to take
place; perhaps the mistakes which had been made in encoding the message
accounted for the inability of these officers to read it. Many visitors
called at Battalion H.Q. and visits were exchanged with the 1/6th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., which was holding the sector on
the left. Apart from a present of shells, despatched to the enemy on
the stroke of midnight, there was little activity on either side.
The nights were so bright, and movement over the snow visible at so
great a distance, that special white overalls were worn by men when
patrolling. Unfortunately, no change was made in the colour of the
equipment which had to be worn over them. The result was that, though
the men of a patrol were practically invisible at no great distance,
sets of equipment could be seen moving about in No Man’s Land. There
was much patrol activity on both sides, rendered necessary by the
hard frost which had made No Man’s Land easily passable. There is
also no doubt that the enemy was as anxious to secure identification
as the British were. So patrols, both defensive and offensive, were
out practically the whole of every night. On the night of December
23rd/24th Sec.-Lieut. J. W. Lumb, while reconnoitring in the
neighbourhood of Flinte Farm, narrowly escaped being surrounded by a
large enemy patrol. After that, nothing further was seen of the enemy
in No Man’s Land for several nights. About 11-0 p.m. on December 28th,
a small defensive patrol of one N.C.O. (Cpl. Aspin) and three men left
the right company front. They had not been out very long, and were
near the north-west corner of Celtic Wood, when they saw a party,
about twenty strong, moving towards them along the northern edge of
the wood. At first they believed this to be a New Zealand patrol from
the battalion on the right, but soon they found it was a party of the
enemy. All were clad in long white coats and a few were wearing belts
filled with bombs; most were armed with revolvers. The German party
tried to surround the small British patrol, and succeeded in cutting
off one man and capturing him. The other three broke through the cordon
and made for their own line, with the enemy in pursuit. On reaching
the wire there was a scuffle in which one man was killed, but Cpl.
Aspin and the other succeeded in forcing their way through the wire
and gaining one of their own posts. The garrison of this post, warned
by the noise, was standing to, but had hesitated to fire for fear of
hitting its own men. It now opened a heavy fire with Lewis guns and
rifles, and the enemy immediately made off. As soon as one could be
organised, a strong fighting patrol was sent out; but the enemy had
disappeared. It is probable that the German party was on its way to
raid the British line and that the patrol had served its object, though
it had been unfortunate enough to lose one man killed and another
captured. This mishap was undoubtedly due to the carelessness which had
developed owing to previous immunity, and was a salutary lesson to many
in the Battalion.
The next night the Battalion was relieved and went back into Brigade
Reserve. The relief did not pass off without casualties. A shell
exploded among a party of H.Q. scouts, as they were crossing the
Hanebeek Valley on their way to Westhoek Ridge, killing one and
wounding six. In Brigade Reserve the Battalion was very scattered,
dispositions being as follows:--
Battn. H.Q.: Garter Point.
A Company: Tokio.
B Company: Westhoek Ridge.
C Company: Tunnels near Moulin Farm.
D Company: Distributed between Anzac Ridge, Tokio and Retaliation
Farm.
About this time the lessons learned in the recent battle of Cambrai
were beginning to take effect, and an elaborate system of defensive
lines was in course of construction in the Ypres Salient. While in
Brigade Reserve, all men were kept hard at work on these rear lines
of defence, and on tunnels which were being made near Moulin Farm.
The birth of the New Year passed almost unnoticed at Garter Point. On
January 4th, 1918, the Battalion was relieved by the 1/8th Battalion
West Yorkshire Regt. and moved to Infantry Barracks, Ypres. Several
casualties were suffered during the relief. So ended the first period
of the Battalion’s defence of the Passchendaele Ridge.
[Illustration: THE YPRES SALIENT, WINTER, 1917–18.]
(_b_) Work and Training.
In pre-war days Infantry Barracks had been one of the permanent
barracks of the Belgian Army. It must have been rather a bleak
building, but it had been built on such solid lines that, in spite of
heavy shelling, parts of it were still habitable. It was not an ideal
billet for troops to occupy in January, being extremely draughty.
Several of the rooms had been fitted up with wire beds and there was
ample accommodation for the whole Battalion. There was also quite a
good little concert room on the premises. During the time the Battalion
was at Infantry Barracks it was engaged in work on the Corps Line,
particulars of which are given later.
After four days, the Battalion was relieved by the 2/6th Battalion
Lancashire Fusiliers (66th Division), and moved back to Devonshire
Camp, between Busseboom and Ouderdom. This camp was in very poor
condition and had actually been condemned some time previously. But
the number of troops in the Ypres Salient was so great that its use
could not be dispensed with. The weather had again turned to rain and
the huts leaked badly. At Devonshire Camp the 147th Infantry Brigade
Concert Party--the “Ducks”--began its activities. The Battalion
contributed several performers, chief amongst whom was the “low
comedian,” commonly known as “Jenks.”
While at Infantry Barracks and Devonshire Camp, nearly all available
men were working on the Corps Line. This was part of the new defensive
system which was being constructed all over the Ypres Salient, and
consisted of a line of strongly fortified posts on the Westhoek Ridge.
Three of these were allotted to the Battalion, which re-allotted them
to companies as follows:--
Frezenberg Post: D Company.
Kit and Kat Post: A and B Companies.
Sexton Post: C Company.
By this means, the same company always worked at the same post, and
soon men began to take a great pride in making their particular post
better than anyone else’s. The work was very hard. Sixty men per
company were sent up daily; the company commanders took turns in
charge of the party; and either the Commanding Officer or the Second
in Command went up daily. The men had to rise long before daybreak in
order to get breakfast and catch the train at Brandhoek Station. At
first they marched to the station, but, shortly before the Battalion
left Devonshire Camp, the system of conveying them by motor bus was
started. The train took them as far as Hellfire Corner, from which
point they marched up to their work. Only haversack rations were
taken, but tea was made on the spot. Hot dinners were ready on their
return to camp, which was not until fairly late in the afternoon. The
working parties were occasionally troubled by enemy shelling and on one
occasion C Company suffered casualties. Most men were ready for bed
very early in those days.
The divisional arrangement was that one Infantry Brigade should remain
up near Ypres for this work, while the other two were back for rest and
training. The 147th Infantry Brigade had been the first for work. On
January 26th the 148th Infantry Brigade came up to take over the work
and the Battalion, which had already done its day’s work on the Corps
Line, moved by train direct from Hellfire Corner to Caestre, whence it
marched to the billets that awaited it at St. Sylvestre Cappel. Here it
remained, except for a few days spent on the rifle ranges near Moulle,
for nearly a month.
Only the billets occupied by Battalion H.Q. and the officers of C
Company were in the village itself. All the rest were in scattered
houses and farm-buildings, some well over a mile away. But the billets
were comfortable, and the troops found the French inhabitants well
disposed towards them. Many still look back on the time spent there
as one of their happiest times in France. Training was entirely
by companies; the men were too scattered, and there was no ground
available, for Battalion training. Much of the training was in
connection with a divisional competition scheme, but the Battalion was
very unlucky in its results. As companies were so scattered they kept
mostly to themselves, and there was little opportunity to organise
social functions. Towards the end of the stay, a highly successful
“convivial” was held by the warrant officers and sergeants at the
“Brown Cow” in the village. Most of the officers were present, and,
among them, Capt. Allen, V.C., M.C., particularly distinguished himself.
In January a big reorganisation of the British Expeditionary Force took
place, the strength of each Infantry Brigade being reduced to three
battalions. In the 147th Infantry Brigade the 1/5th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. was broken up, and a draft of 10 officers and 250
other ranks was posted to the Battalion from it, late in January. A
few days later, a further draft of two officers and about 80 other
ranks arrived from the 8th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. (11th
Division), which had also been dissolved. These reinforcements brought
the Battalion to full strength again, for the first time since the
beginning of August, 1917. Both the officers and men of these drafts
quickly settled down, and many of them soon rendered very valuable
services to their new battalion. It has always been a matter of pride
in the Battalion that new officers and men, from wherever they came,
were quickly assimilated, and in a short time regarded the Battalion as
their own.
Early in February the Battalion moved by train to Moulle for four days’
shooting. All day was spent on the Second Army ranges, and the training
culminated in a big Battalion field practice. A special “bullet and
bayonet” competition was held there for the best platoon from each
company in the 147th Infantry Brigade, and this the Battalion was very
unlucky to lose. D Company’s platoon was at first placed top, but
afterwards was defeated when it had to compete again against the best
platoon of the 1/7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. In spite of
rather unsettled weather, the time at Moulle passed very pleasantly,
musketry at long ranges being quite new to the Battalion since it came
to France. At the end of the time, the return to St. Sylvestre Cappel
was made by road, two days being taken on the journey.
On February 20th the G.O.C., XXII. Corps (the new title of the old “2nd
Anzac Corps”) inspected the Battalion at training. Great preparations
were made for his arrival and a scout, posted at a useful point of
observation along the road, gave early warning of his approach. His
entry upon the training field was greeted with a volley of rifle
grenades (not at him); Lewis guns and rifles opened rapid fire on the
miniature rifle range, the marksmen all being arrayed in small box
respirators; while a platoon, with many lurid epithets and a most
unusual amount of energy, attacked a row of sacks with the bayonet. It
is hoped that the G.O.C. was suitably impressed. At any rate he ought
to have been. But his only comment after this great display of the
Battalion’s offensive spirit was “How are the men’s boots?” Later in
the day he presented medal ribbons, at a ceremonial parade, to a number
of officers and other ranks of the 147th Infantry Brigade.
This was the end of the Battalion’s period of rest. The next day it
marched to Caestre, entrained there for Ypres, and spent the night at
Infantry Barracks. A very strenuous time was in store for it, and much
was to happen, ere it went back into rest again.
(_c_) Reutel Sector.
This was the first time the 49th Division had held a part of the
front line since the strength of a brigade had been reduced to three
battalions, and naturally, defence schemes and systems of relief
required revision. The Divisional Sector was divided into two Brigade
Sectors; the left, which was much the narrower front, was held always
by the 146th Infantry Brigade with only one battalion in the front
line at a time. On the right, the 147th and 148th Infantry Brigades
inter-relieved every eight days. Here, all three battalions of the
brigade held sub-sectors of the front line. The Reutel Sector, which
was on the extreme right of the Division, abutting on the 33rd
Division, was allotted to the Battalion, which, throughout the time it
was there, inter-relieved with the 1/5th Battalion York and Lancs. Regt.
When in Divisional Reserve, the Battalion usually lived at Maida Camp,
near Belgian Chateau. To reach the Reutel Sector the men were taken
by light railway trains as far as Birr Cross Roads, and from thence
marched straight up the Menin Road as far as Hooge Crater. At this
point they bore to the left, through the desolate remnants of Chateau
Wood, and then moved along Jargon Track to the vicinity of Polygon
Butte; companies then followed separate routes to their respective
positions. Although this route had its fair share of shelling, the
Battalion was generally fortunate in its reliefs.
The front line was rather over a thousand yards in length, and the
sector was held as follows:--
Front Line: Two Companies, each having two platoons in the front
line, one in the support line, and one available for immediate
counter-attack. The front line was the main line of defence.
Support Company: One platoon in Patu Support and the remainder
of the Company in the reserve line near Battalion H.Q. In the
event of enemy attack the whole company was to move up into Patu
Support.
Reserve Company: In pill-boxes and dugouts to the north of the
Polygon de Zonnebeke. In the event of enemy attack this company
was to move up into the reserve line, vacated by the support
company.
Battalion H.Q. was in a pill-box about two hundred yards from the
Butte. Inter-company reliefs were carried out in the middle of each
tour.
The sector was one of the most varied and interesting that the
Battalion had ever occupied. It was taken over from the 1st Battalion
Otago Regt. (New Zealand Division) on February 22nd. This division
had occupied it for a long while and had done an extraordinary amount
of work there. Like all the sectors on the Passchendaele Ridge, it
was very wet, and the Battalion found it quite impossible to drain
certain parts of the trench system, particularly Plumer Trench, the
communication trench on the left. Except for one gap in the middle,
where all attempts to get the water away had failed, there was
continuous communication along the front line. This line had been well
and deeply dug, and was well provided with fire bays, shelters, and all
the necessary provisions for trench life. The right rested upon the
valley of the Polygonbeke which, like all streams in the district, was
an impassable morass. The centre ran through the ruins of the village
of Reutel, whose existence would probably have been overlooked had not
the trenches in places been cut through the actual foundations of the
houses. Near the centre of the front line, the parapet had been built
over the village well; this provided the water supply for both front
line companies. There had once been a continuous support line, but the
centre was now derelict, and only the two flanks were occupied. Each
Company H.Q. was comfortably housed in a pill-box which gave practical
immunity from shell fire. The front line faced roughly south-east, the
ground, except on the extreme left, falling away to the Reutelbeke. On
the left a spur ran out from the main ridge, near the point of which
had been the village of Becelaere, now marked only by some prominent
pill-boxes.
Behind the front system of defences lay Jetty Warren, once a tributary
of the Polygonbeke, but now a filthy, noisome and impassable quagmire.
It was crossed in two[14] places by gridded bridges, and these were
the only means of communication with the front line, except a very
roundabout route through the area of the next battalion. This fact
was well known to the enemy, who swept them with machine gun fire at
frequent intervals during the night. On the forward slope of the hill,
overlooking Jetty Warren, was Patu Support Line, a well-constructed
fire trench but rather short of accommodation for men. About five
hundred yards further back lay the reserve line and Battalion H.Q., the
latter in a small but very strong pill-box, the chief drawback to which
was the lowness of the roof. When the Battalion first took over the
sector all communication with the front line companies was across the
open; but before it left a good communication trench had been dug from
Patu Support to the right company H.Q., and a second had been started
from the reserve line to Patu Support.
The main feature of the country-side was Polygon Butte, popularly
supposed to be the ruins of the race course stand. This stood out so
prominently that it naturally became a registration point for the enemy
artillery, and people did not generally linger near it. Here Capt. A.
J. Robb, of D Company, was wounded, when returning from his inspection
of the line before the Battalion took over.
All the ground behind Jetty Warren was overlooked from Polderhoek
Chateau. That commanding position lay about 1,000 yards due north of
Gheluvelt and an equal distance from the Battalion’s right. It had been
the scene of terrific fighting the previous autumn and had changed
hands more than once; but finally the enemy had kept possession of it.
From the Reutel Sector nothing but a great pill-box could be seen. This
was a favourite mark for the British artillery. Guns of the heaviest
calibre were constantly firing at it, and sometimes splinters from the
explosions were hurled right into the Battalion’s lines. Attempts were
even made to smash it in with 12-inch “duds.” But apparently no serious
damage was done to it. Occasionally enemy snipers from that position
fired on men moving to and fro between Patu Support and the Butte; but
the range was too great for this to be really dangerous.
Like all sectors which had been occupied by the New Zealanders, the
Reutel Sector was a very active one. It was not so much the hostile
artillery. This was certainly not quiet, especially round the Butte,
on Patu Support, and near the well in the front line. But most of the
activity came from the infantry. The Germans had posts much nearer the
British line than the Battalion had been used to of late. Although the
crest of the ridge was in British hands, the enemy had retained a hold
on the slope instead of withdrawing to the far side of the valley.
Some of his posts were only about a hundred yards from the British
line. When advanced parties from the Battalion first visited the line
they were surprised at the amount of firing which was going on; and
when the New Zealanders finally handed over they were most anxious
that their old front should be kept lively. The Battalion did its best
to oblige, and not without success. At night the amount of Lewis gun
and rifle fire was extraordinary. Capt. A. M. Luty was particularly
energetic in this respect, and C Company got through more ammunition
in a night than the average battalion in the line fired in a month.
The enemy retaliated with plenty of machine gun fire, sometimes making
it very uncomfortable for parties working on the top. Some patrolling
was done, but the enemy was so close, and his positions were so well
known, that this was not a very important feature. Most active of all
was the sniping by day. The enemy had no continuous line and he seemed
to take comparatively little trouble to hide himself. Men could be seen
at almost any hour of the day, and the front line garrisons became
tremendously keen on sniping. Not many hits were made, so far as is
known, but this caused no slackening of the fire. A low pill-box near
Juniper Wood, little more than a hundred yards from the British front
line and opposite to the right company, was the main centre of the
sniping. Here there was one little German who became very well-known
to everyone. He was bald-headed, and something of a sportsman. Many
men spent hours trying to snipe him, and he was only too ready to
retaliate. He fired over the top of the pill-box, but was careful not
to show himself too often in the same spot. A man watching for him
would see a rifle barrel slowly appear over the top, followed by a bald
head. Sometimes he might succeed in getting in a shot; at other times,
the bald head would disappear too quickly. Then the situation would be
reversed; the little German would be up first, and it would be the turn
of the Britisher to duck quickly. And so things went on day after day,
with little execution on either side, and “honours easy.”
The enemy made considerable use of vane bombs, and it was by one of
these that Sec.-Lieut. R. B. Atkinson was wounded. Stokes shells
were the ordinary form of retaliation. Gas shells too were used,
though in no great number, except in the neighbourhood of the Butte.
In this sector the Battalion first met with the enemy Blue Cross
Gas--comparatively harmless, but causing violent sneezing.
Needless to say, much work was done in the sector. The wire in No
Man’s Land was much improved, a good deal of revetting was done in the
front line, and great efforts were made to drain Plumer Trench, though
without much success. Most important was the work further back. This
was carried out under the supervision of Major E. Jackson, M.C., of the
458th Field Company, Royal Engineers, a very competent officer with
whom the Battalion was on excellent terms. It was under his direction
that the new communication trench was dug from Patu Support to the
Right Company H.Q.
The period too was one of fads which, though they sometimes irritated,
often provided a certain amount of amusement. Chief among these were
the “Silent Days,” and the wearing of small box respirators. At first
the term “silent day” was not very well understood. One company, it
is said, suspended all firing, and did not even retaliate when fired
upon. But the real purpose was to compel battalions to use means of
communication other than the telephone. For twenty-four hours the
use of the telephone, either for speaking or buzzing, was forbidden,
except in cases of emergency. So pigeons, power buzzers, Lucas lamps,
and all the other devices, which had formerly been looked upon as
things for signallers to learn but never to use, were pressed into
service. The increased use of the power buzzer and wireless speedily
showed up the ignorance of certain ciphers, which all officers were
supposed to be acquainted with. The wearing of small box respirators
was another fad, intended to familiarise all with their use. About
every other day, orders would be received that they were to be worn
continuously by all ranks during certain hours, and that work was to
be continued as if nothing unusual were happening. The practice was
mildly resented by some, who thought they had to wear them quite enough
when there actually was gas about, without being put to the discomfort
of wearing them needlessly. Elaborate precautions were taken to ensure
that everyone did wear them at the times stated, and there was unholy
delight in the Battalion when two Brigade runners were caught one day
not complying with the orders.
During the time the Battalion was holding the Reutel Sector the weather
was, on the whole, good. Though trench strength was high, accommodation
was not very crowded. All companies had their trench cook-houses, and
hot meals were as regular as if the Battalion had been in rest. The
transport men were having an easy time, for rations were brought up to
Crucifix Dump, not far from the Butte, by light railway. The Quarter
Masters of the Brigade took it in turns to come up in charge of the
ration train.
The first tour of duty in the Reutel Sector was not a specially
eventful one. On February 25th the enemy heavily shelled the front
line near the well, blowing in the parapet, causing several casualties,
and burying the garrison of a machine gun post. C.S.M. W. Brooke was
among the wounded. On this occasion Cpl. H. Kane, M.M., of D Company,
behaved with the greatest gallantry. Going to the assistance of the
buried men, he quietly set to work to dig them out, and succeeded in
doing this, in spite of the heavy bombardment which continued round
him, and the fact that he was in full view of an enemy pill-box only
about a hundred yards away. For this gallant act he was awarded the
Distinguished Conduct Medal. Early on the morning of February 28th a
heavy counter-preparation was put down in front of the line, the higher
commands fearing an enemy attack from the direction of Polderhoek
Chateau. Except for a certain amount of enemy retaliation, nothing
happened. Much attention was paid to the enemy pill-box in front of the
Right Company, which has already been mentioned. The Battalion had been
detailed to carry out a raid during its next tour, and this pill-box
had been selected as the objective.
On March 2nd the Battalion was relieved by the 1/5th Battalion York and
Lancs. Regt., and moved to Maida Camp. Here training was carried on as
well as possible, but was much hampered by lack of suitable ground. The
platoon which had been selected to carry out the raid was sent to the
147th Infantry Brigade School to train, as it was to be left out of
the line until the night before the raid. When the Battalion returned
to the line, after its six days’ rest, preparations for the raid were
completed. The plan was as follows:--
1. The objective was the enemy pill-box already described, which
lay rather more than a hundred yards from the line. To the right
of it lay an old British tank, stranded and abandoned in one of
the attacks of the previous autumn, and known to be occupied by
the enemy sometimes.
2. The raiding party was to consist of Sec.-Lieut. L. Gumby and
31 other ranks (one complete platoon) of D Company. Two men of
the 147th Light Trench Mortar Battery accompanied the party,
carrying with them short-fused Stokes mortar shells, to damage
the pill-box.
3. At zero hour (7-0 a.m.) the party was to advance in four
sections, one on each flank of the pill-box, one towards it, and
one towards the tank.
4. A creeping barrage was to cover the advance, while enemy
positions in the vicinity were to be engaged by artillery and
trench mortars.
Zero hour had been fixed after dawn as the broken nature of the ground
made an advance in the dark extremely difficult.
[Illustration: _Raid near Reutel._
13.3.18.]
On the evening of March 12th the raiding party came up by light
railway, and was accommodated with the reserve company for the night.
During the night final preparations were made; steps for each of the
four sections were cut in the parapet of the front line trench opposite
the pill-box, and four gaps were cut in the wire. By dawn on March
13th the whole party was assembled in the front line, waiting for the
barrage to open. There too was the Commanding Officer, in communication
with Battalion H.Q. by a telephone wire, laid specially for the
occasion.
At 7-0 a.m. the barrage opened, and the raiding party went over in line
of sections in file. From the start, the flanking sections went well
and reached their positions without difficulty; but the section under
the direct command of the platoon commander, whose special objective
was the pill-box, was delayed by the short firing of one of the barrage
guns. In the meantime, about twenty of the enemy got out of a trench
in rear of the pill-box and tried to escape. They were heavily fired
on by the flanking sections, and many were brought down. As soon as
the barrage lifted off the pill-box, two of the enemy mounted a light
machine gun on the top; but both were shot down before they could open
fire. By this time the centre section had got forward, worked round
the pill-box, and captured one or two prisoners in rear of it. The
pill-box itself was then attacked. A Mills bomb was inserted through a
loophole and a M.S.K. grenade was dropped down the ventilating shaft.
The latter immediately had its effect, about thirty Germans coming out
with their hands up. How so many had been able to crowd into so small a
space cannot be conceived. They were immediately directed to run across
to the British line, where now the greatest excitement prevailed;
everywhere men were standing on the parapet waving to them to come in.
A Stokes shell was thrown into the pill-box and then, about 7-20 a.m.,
the withdrawal was ordered. A few minutes later the raiding party, with
the exception of two dead near the pill-box and some wounded still in
No Man’s Land, was back in its own lines.
When the captures came to be totalled up it was found that there were
no less than 37 prisoners, and, in addition, three enemy machine guns
had been brought back by the raiding party. Among the prisoners was the
little bald-headed man, who had been the source of so much amusement to
the front line troops the previous tour. Also, many dead and wounded
were lying about round the pill-box, not counting a number who had
certainly been wounded in escaping to the rear. All this had been
accomplished by a total force of one officer and thirty-three other
ranks--less than the total number of prisoners--with a loss of only two
killed and eight wounded. Unfortunately, two of the wounded afterwards
died. The greatest loss to the Battalion was Cpl. H. Kane, D.C.M.,
M.M., who was severely wounded in the back and, after dragging on for
several weeks in hospital, died. He was one of the most gallant N.C.O’s
the Battalion ever had--the sort of man who would have won the Victoria
Cross had the chance come his way.
[Illustration: Major W. C. FENTON, M.C.]
[Illustration: Capt. N. T. FARRAR, M.C.]
[Illustration: Capt. A. KIRK, M.C.]
[Illustration: Capt. P. G. BALES, M.C.]
So great had been the success of the raid that, when the first estimate
of prisoners--30--was telephoned through to Brigade H.Q., they were
too sceptical to forward the news to the Division. When the prisoners
began to appear over the crest line, they were seen by some artillery
observers who, never dreaming that such success had been gained, sent
frantic messages through that the enemy was counter-attacking. When
this was denied they declared that they could see the enemy in crowds
coming down the hill.
But much still remained to be done. A number of wounded were lying
out in No Man’s Land and these had to be brought in. This business
was taken in hand by Major A. L. Mowat, M.C., who had gone up to the
line immediately the Commanding Officer returned. Some of the enemy
meanwhile had hoisted a white flag, and, under its protection which
had not been violated by the British, were collecting their wounded.
Seeing this, Major Mowat ordered a white flag to be put out, and
stretcher-bearers to go over and bring back the wounded. This was done
but, no sooner did they appear on the top of the parapet than every
enemy machine gun in the district opened fire on them. It was a typical
“Hun” trick--to make use of the white flag to collect their own wounded
and then to open fire at once when it was used by their opponents. The
flag was quickly hoisted down and fire was opened in retaliation. It
is unlikely that any man in the Battalion ever respected a German flag
again. In spite of this failure, it was not long before every wounded
man was brought in. Lce.-Cpl. A. Moon, of D Company, particularly
distinguished himself in this work. He had already done yeoman service
during the raid; though not himself one of the party, he had taken a
Lewis Gun out into No Man’s Land on his own initiative, and with it
had provided covering fire during both the advance and the withdrawal.
Now he twice went out, and on each occasion succeeded in bringing in a
wounded man. For these actions he afterwards received the Distinguished
Conduct Medal.
Later in the morning, a large party of the enemy was seen advancing
to reoccupy the empty pill-box. Attempts to bring artillery fire to
bear on them failed, but a heavy fire was opened with rifles and Lewis
guns. Eventually the enemy artillery put down a protective barrage,
under cover of which the Germans were able to rush forward and enter
the pill-box. Apart from artillery activity, the rest of the day passed
quietly, but during the night Patu Support was heavily shelled and
several men of B Company were killed or wounded.
Needless to say, the Battalion received many messages of congratulation
and commendation, for the raid had been one of the most successful on
record. The Commander-in-Chief sent his congratulations, an unusual
thing in connection with a minor operation, while the following wire
was received from Second Army H.Q.:--
“General Plumer was delighted on his arrival to hear of the
successful raid this morning of West Riding, 49th Division, and
wishes to convey his congratulations to all concerned.”
This was the first intimation the Battalion had that General Plumer
had returned from Italy. Perhaps the most delighted people, though
no message came from them officially, were the New Zealanders, who
realised that their wishes were being carried out and that their old
front had been left in good hands. For this operation, Sec.-Lieut. L.
Gumby was awarded the Military Cross, Sergt. H. Binns and Lance-Cpl.
R. A. Hudson the Distinguished Conduct Medal; Cpl. H. Kane, D.C.M.,
M.M., received a bar to his Military Medal, and eleven other ranks the
Military Medal.
The remainder of the tour was marked by a considerable increase in the
volume of enemy artillery fire. This was probably partly a result of
the raid, but it may also have been an attempt to pin British troops
to that area while the enemy concentrated for his attack elsewhere.
The areas chiefly affected were the usual ones, with the addition of
Peter Trench; this trench had been named after the Commanding Officer’s
youthful son, the father later expressing the hope that his son would
have better fortune than his trench had had.
On the night of March 17/18th a S.O.S. test was arranged which had a
rather amusing sequel. In order to ensure that S.O.S. signals should
be seen by the artillery if they were sent up, a chain of repeating
stations had been arranged. A S.O.S. sent up in the front line was
to be repeated from the left company H.Q., then from Battalion H.Q.,
and thence further back. To test the efficiency of this chain, green
Very lights were supplied by Brigade, and it was arranged that, at
9-0 p.m., two of these should be fired from the front line, and
repeated backwards as ordered. Everything went off well; the signals
were seen, promptly repeated and--down came an enemy barrage. Brigade
had overlooked the important point that a double green was the enemy
S.O.S. Capt. N. T. Farrar who, as O.C. Left Company, was responsible
for repeating the signal, in order not to give away the location of
his Company H.Q., had gone down to Jetty Warren to fire his lights.
Now Jetty Warren happened to be one of the enemy barrage lines, and
Capt. Farrar soon found matters so lively there that he decided to
run for it. As the scheme was only a test the British artillery was
not intended to fire, but frantic appeals for retaliation soon got
them going. Similar tests should have been carried out by the other
battalions of the Brigade later in the night, but these orders were
cancelled owing to the result of the first test.
On the night of March 18/19th the Battalion was relieved. Instead of
going back to Maida Camp, two companies moved to Westhoek Dugouts
and two to Railway Wood Dugouts on Cambridge Road. The relief was
much hampered by heavy gas shelling, but the Battalion escaped with
practically no casualties.
The period which followed was one of anxious expectation. For the
last month signs had been accumulating of the imminence of a great
enemy offensive. It was known that many of his best divisions had been
brought over from the Russian Front, and that his armies had never
been so strong in the West before. In the early months of the year
attack training had been carried out on an unusually large scale. And
now the information obtained from almost every prisoner pointed to a
great attack in the very near future. Every possible precaution had
been taken in the Second Army to meet an attack, should it come on that
front, and all were anxiously waiting for the enemy to make his first
move. One minor attack had been made on the 33rd Division north of the
Menin Road, about a fortnight before. But as the enemy had made no
further attempt there, it was probably only a “blind.”
On March 21st the storm broke, though far away to the south. Never
since stationary warfare had taken the place of movement, had a single
attack been made on so wide a front in the West. From the neighbourhood
of Arras to far south of St. Quentin, the whole front was ablaze. The
news which reached the Battalion during the first few days was brief,
but it was enough to make clear to everyone that practically the whole
force of the enemy’s offensive was directed against the British,
and that the situation was desperate to a degree. On March 24th the
Commander-in-Chief published his, now famous, Special Order of the Day;
and in forwarding it to Battalions the G.O.C., 49th Division, himself
issued an Order which is so characteristic of the man that it is worth
repeating in full:--
“In forwarding the attached copy of a Special Order of the Day
by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, I wish to say at once that I
have complete confidence that the 49th (West Riding) Division
will acquit itself gloriously in whatever circumstances it may
be placed.
Remember that other Divisions elsewhere are at this moment
holding up splendidly the most strenuous efforts of the enemy to
force a decision.
Remember also that if we are called upon to fight here, we shall
be fighting on the historic ground where the ‘contemptible
little British Army’ fought and defeated the enemy’s first great
effort to destroy it in 1914. In that year we defeated him with
the rifle. With the rifle we can and will defeat him again--the
more thoroughly this time, as we have our wire to give our
rifles a better opportunity than they had in 1914.
Go on improving your wire, look carefully to your rifles,
Machine Guns, and Lewis Guns, and ammunition, exercise vigilance
every moment of the day, to see that every yard of your front is
watched and can be shot into. We can then beat off any attack.
So much for the defensive.
We must also be aggressive. Every front line company must
send out at least one fighting patrol every night to look for
opportunities for killing or capturing enemy patrols or posts.
Identifications are of great importance, but more important
still is the object of making ourselves masters of No Man’s
Land, and inducing the enemy to increase his strength against
us on this portion of the front, thus helping to reduce the
pressure against our comrades further South.
N. G. Cameron, Major-General,
March 24th, 1918. Commanding 49th (W.R.) Division.”
The Battalion chafed at its inactivity. It was well up to strength
and in magnificent condition. After a month’s rest and training,
it had spent another month in a line where, though it had suffered
comparatively few casualties, things had been sufficiently active to
keep it in good condition. Furthermore, the highly successful raid of
little more than a week before had raised its morale to such an extent
that it felt fit to tackle anything. All leave had been stopped and
officers, who were in England, recalled. The news that the New Zealand
Division was moving south rather added to the excitement. On March 27th
a warning order was received to be prepared to move at the shortest
notice; but that very night the Battalion again took over the defence
of the Reutel Sector.
The tour which followed--the last the Battalion was to do in that
sector--was wonderfully, almost uncannily, quiet. It was rarely a shell
fell at all, and the standing joke of the tour was that, if the enemy
division opposite wanted a concentration of fire on its front, it would
have to ring up the neighbouring divisions and ask each to switch its
“gun” round. This was not so correct of the enemy machine guns; wiring
was the main work carried out that tour, and several casualties were
caused to men working on the top.
On April 3rd the tour came to an end, the Battalion being relieved by
the 1st Battalion Leicestershire Regt. (6th Division). This division
had just come up from the south-east of Arras, where it had been in
the line when the enemy first launched his offensive. It had acquitted
itself well, as it always did, but had been terribly cut up. From the
men of this battalion something was learned of the battle in the south.
The Battalion said farewell to the Reutel Sector and moved back to
Maida Camp again. Here several days passed quietly and nothing was
heard of an early move. Indeed, so far did the Battalion seem from
battle, that orders were received to relieve the 146th Infantry Brigade
on April 9th. That Brigade was now holding the sector astride the Menin
Road, facing Gheluvelt and Polderhoek Chateau, where it had relieved
part of the 33rd Division. It was a disappointed party of officers and
N.C.O’s who went up to inspect the line on April 8th. But the Battalion
was never to hold that sector. The same night orders for the relief
were cancelled, and fresh orders were received to move the following
day to a camp near Reninghelst.
The next day was crowded with incident. In the morning the G.O.C.,
Second Army, presented medal ribbons to a number of officers and
other ranks, the Battalion providing three officers and 150 other
ranks for the guard of honour. During the parade the General received
several telegrams, and when he addressed the troops he referred to
the probability that they would soon be in battle. In the afternoon
the Battalion marched to the neighbourhood of Reninghelst, where it
expected to remain for two or three days, and then to move to the
southern battle. As the column wound its way along the road that bright
spring afternoon, the dull but continuous roar of guns was such as
had never been heard in that area since the battle of Passchendaele.
Something was happening much nearer than the Somme, but none knew what.
On arrival at the camp everyone quickly settled down, and arrangements
were made for the night. But no night was to be spent by the Battalion
there. The time had come when it was to write what is probably the
finest page of its history.
CHAPTER XI.
THE ENEMY SPRING OFFENSIVE.
(_a_) Erquinghem and Le Veau.
On April 9th the enemy launched his great offensive between the
La Bassée Canal and Armentiéres. Preceded by an intense artillery
bombardment, the German infantry broke right through the centre of the
line which was held by the Portuguese; and all was confusion there. It
was the sound of this battle that the Battalion had heard as it marched
along the road towards Reninghelst.
At the moment the 49th Division was too scattered for immediate
combined action. Divisional H.Q. was still at Chateau Ségard, and in
the same area the 148th Infantry Brigade was concentrated. The 147th
Infantry Brigade had all arrived in the neighbourhood of Reninghelst
by the evening of April 9th. But the 146th Infantry Brigade was still
holding the line astride the Menin Road. It was due to this that,
during the first fortnight of the operations which followed, the
Division was not able to act as a unit.
When the Battalion arrived in camp, on the evening of April 9th,
everyone expected to remain there for two or three days. It was the
general idea that the Division would concentrate in that area, and
then move down to the Somme battlefield. Hence, preparations were
made for spending the night. The Commanding Officer was dining with
Lieut.-General A. J. Godley, at Corps H.Q., and was not expected back
until late. The Battalion was turning in for the night when he suddenly
returned, bringing early information of an immediate move. He had heard
of the disaster on the Portuguese front, and brought the news that
the 147th Infantry Brigade was to be pushed into the battle at once.
Immediately, all was bustle and excitement in the camp, and never had
the men been in better spirits than when they heard that the Battalion
was for battle at last. Little time was needed for preparation. Soon
after midnight all were in motor buses hurrying south. At Neuve
Eglise, through which the buses passed, the gravity of the situation
was apparent. Transport vehicles and guns were being hurried back,
while already enemy shells were dropping in the village. At La Crèche,
which was reached at 3-15 a.m., the Battalion debussed, and marched
through the darkness to Le Veau, arriving at 4-30 a.m. Here some empty
huts and stables were found, and into these the men were put to get
what rest they could. Picquets were posted, for the situation was so
obscure that no one knew how soon the enemy might be upon him. And the
Battalion waited for orders.
About 6-30 a.m. orders were received from 147th Infantry Brigade
H.Q., to move up to a position of readiness near the cross-roads at
L’Epinette. Packs were dumped in a hut at Le Veau, a hurried selection
was made of the personnel of B Echelon who were not to go into battle,
and about 7-0 a.m. the Battalion[15] moved off. All along the road was
witnessed one of the most pitiful sights of warfare, common enough
in the early days of 1914, but never before seen by the Battalion.
Everywhere civilians were leaving their homes and flocking to the rear;
old people, women, and young children, some driving an odd cow or two,
others pushing a few of their most valued household goods in barrows,
plodded wearily along. Fortunately the enemy was not shelling the
road, so the troops were able to advance without hindrance, except
from one low-flying aeroplane. L’Epinette was reached before 8-30 a.m.
and the men began to dig in. Little was known of the situation, but
from observation it appeared that the British were withdrawing to the
north bank of the River Lys, particularly about the loop to the west of
Erquinghem.
The Battalion had been placed at the disposal of the 101st Infantry
Brigade (34th Division), and about 9-30 a.m. the G.O.C., Brig.-General
B. C. Gore, came up, explained the situation, and issued his orders as
follows:--
1. The 101st Infantry Brigade was holding a line south of the
Bac St. Maur-Armentiéres Railway, with the 16th Battalion Royal
Scots on the right and the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt. on the
left. This line the enemy had penetrated near the Rue Delpierre,
between the two battalions.
2. The Battalion was ordered to send up two companies to close
this gap in the line, and to place its remaining companies in
positions north of the railway, in support of the Royal Scots
and Suffolks respectively.
Company commanders were immediately summoned and the situation was
explained to them. C Company, with D Company in support, was ordered
to move up by the Rue Delpierre and close the gap. B Company, with A
Company in support, was to assemble near the Rue du Moulin and advance
to the assistance of the Royal Scots.
About 10-0 a.m. all companies moved off and Battalion H.Q. went forward
to Wigan Post, some 500 yards north of the river. Enemy shells were
already bursting around, and several direct hits were made on the road.
The numbers of wounded who were streaming back showed only too clearly
how severe the fighting was. Yet, quietly and in perfect order, the
companies marched down to the River Lys by platoons. The main bridge
was destroyed, but B Company, which was leading, succeeded in crossing
by a wooden bridge near by, though this was also badly broken and only
possible for men in single file. All the other companies crossed by a
wooden bridge near the church. From this time, except A and B Companies
which were in close touch throughout the day, companies were separated
and their doings must be told individually.
On arriving in Erquinghem, B Company marched along the main street of
the village, and took cover at the west end, while Capt. N. T. Farrar
and Sergt. R. G. Brunt went forward to reconnoitre. They soon found
that the situation was very different from what had been reported. Not
only was the enemy to the north of the railway, near the Rue du Moulin,
but he also appeared to be occupying the whole of the ground in the
loop which the river makes to the west of Erquinghem. His outposts
were in farms, only about 200 yards west of the village, and there was
no sign of any formed body of Royal Scots. In these circumstances any
attempt to advance south would almost certainly have led to disaster,
so Capt. Farrar decided to take up a position covering the west end
of the village. Between the river and the Rue du Moulin was an R.E.
yard, with piles of trench grids and other stores; this B Company
garrisoned with three platoons, pushing out its fourth platoon about
a hundred yards in front. Its left was covered by a Lewis gun section
which could fire, either along the road to the west, or down the Rue
du Moulin; to protect its right and cover a bridge over the Lys, which
was its main line of retreat, A Company sent up a platoon and a half,
under Sec.-Lieut. E. Clarke, between the R.E. yard and the river. These
dispositions opposed an enemy advance either from the west or up the
Rue du Moulin, and remained unchanged for five hours--until the order
to withdraw was received. During that time, two separate attacks were
made by the enemy on the village; but so heavy was the fire kept up by
A and B Companies that these had no success. Parts of Erquinghem were
heavily shelled, and many buildings were set on fire; but the R.E. yard
escaped the attentions of the hostile artillery. The men were much
harassed by machine gun and rifle fire. In particular, A Company’s
platoon was heavily fired on from a farm house, only about a hundred
yards away. Careful observation of this place through glasses revealed
the fact that a large store of Mills bombs and Stokes shells was in
an outhouse against the wall of the farm. Lewis guns were trained on
this dump and fired for some minutes without success; but, suddenly,
the whole dump blew up, completely destroying the farmhouse. As the
place was packed with Germans, there is no doubt that they suffered
very heavily. The British had excellent cover behind the piles of R.E.
material, and, as a result, comparatively few casualties were suffered;
but heavy losses were certainly inflicted on the enemy.
Late in the morning, an officer of the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt.
asked for reinforcements to close a gap in the line near the Rue du
Moulin. In response, A Company sent up a platoon, which Sec.-Lieut.
B. H. Huggard saw into position. This platoon was never seen again,
and its fate was a mystery until after the armistice. Then, returned
prisoners told how it had been surrounded by the enemy, and, after
suffering heavily, the few survivors had been captured.
Meanwhile, what was happening to C and D Companies? After crossing
the Lys, C Company assembled near the top of the Rue Delpierre, while
Capt. A. M. Luty, with Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy, C.S.M. N. Hobson
and two N.C.O’s, went forward to reconnoitre. The ground was swept
by machine gun fire, and it was only by crawling that the party was
able to reach the point where the road crosses the railway. Capt.
Luty at once realised that it was impossible for him to get to his
objective, and decided to hold the line of the railway. He returned to
his company which, by this time, had suffered several casualties from
enemy artillery fire. The company moved down the road by platoons and
took up a position along the railway line, with its right turned back
to face south-west. The position was a bad one as the straight line
of the railway was heavily enfiladed by machine guns near the Rue du
Moulin. Losses were heavy from the very first. Sec.-Lieut. M. C. O’Dowd
and several men had been hit coming down the road. C.S.M. N. Hobson was
wounded soon after the line of the railway had been taken up. After
a short time, one platoon was sent across the railway to take up a
more advanced position. Here, except for sniping, this platoon was not
much worried for some time, but the rest of the company was suffering
appalling casualties. The numbers of wounded were soon far greater than
the company stretcher-bearers could deal with. It was then that Pte.
A. Poulter earned the highest decoration that a soldier can win--the
Victoria Cross. Hour after hour he toiled, in the greatest danger,
tending the wounded and carrying them into safety.[16]
About 1-0 p.m. the situation became even worse. The enemy brought up
a field gun which enfiladed C Company’s position at a range of only a
few hundred yards. Within half-an-hour scarcely twenty men were left
unwounded. The position on the railway was clearly untenable, and
soon it was decided that a move was necessary, if any were to escape
unhurt. The few survivors crossed the railway and took up a position
a little to the south of it. Here they suffered much less. About the
middle of the afternoon the men of the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt.,
who had been on the left of C Company all day, withdrew, having written
orders to do so. As he had received no orders, Capt. Luty remained.
It should be mentioned that orders to withdraw had been sent to him
from Battalion H.Q. some time before, but the runners had become
casualties and the orders never arrived. But before long the enemy
was seen to be advancing rapidly, both from the south and west, and
the position became hopeless. A withdrawal was ordered. Sec.-Lieut.
F. D. Chippindale went forward to warn No. 9 Platoon, which was lying
out in front; a hail of machine gun bullets was sweeping the ground,
and he had barely given the order when he was struck down. The few
survivors of this platoon were surrounded and captured. The rest of C
Company made a dash for the railway, but only about twelve ever reached
it. One by one they rushed across, suffering two more casualties
before all were over, and then made for Erquinghem. Many wounded were
collected on the way, practically every man of the party assisting one
along. They found the bridge near the church destroyed, and, before
another crossing could be found, enemy skirmishers were already
in the village. At last another bridge was discovered, about half a
mile towards Armentiéres, and over this the miserable remnants of the
company crossed, remaining on the northern bank until the bridge had
been demolished. Of the Company, 5 officers and 139 other ranks strong,
which had crossed the Lys about six hours before, little more than the
strength of a section remained.
[Illustration: Private A. POULTER, V.C.]
D Company had crossed the Lys in rear of C Company in the morning, and
had taken up a position in support, south of Erquinghem and astride the
Rue Delpierre. Here they had come under heavy artillery and machine
gun fire, and had suffered considerably. About 1-30 p.m. they received
orders to support the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt., and moved up to
a position in rear of La Rolanderie Farm, where the H.Q. of that
battalion was situated. They had not been there long when they received
their orders to withdraw, and so returned to the north of the river.
Throughout the day Battalion H.Q. was at Wigan. It had originally been
intended to move across the river, but, owing to the uncertainty of the
situation, this was never done. The position had not been occupied long
before it was realised that the enemy had crossed the Lys, away to the
right. Indeed, it is very possible that German troops were actually
across, a little to the west of Erquinghem, before any of the Battalion
entered the village. By the middle of the morning the situation on
that flank was rapidly becoming serious, and the Commanding Officer
recommended that troops should be sent up to the neighbourhood of the
line Lancashire--Jesus Farm. By 12-20 p.m. A Company’s signallers had
established communication by means of a visual station in one of the
houses, and throughout the day they and B Company remained in touch
with Battalion H.Q. But no reports were received from C and D Companies
until the afternoon. About mid-day the neighbourhood of Wigan began to
receive attention from the enemy artillery, and, though few casualties
were suffered, great inconvenience was caused by the destruction of the
officers’ rations. At 12-40 p.m. orders were sent to D Company to move
up in support of the 11th Suffolks, these orders anticipating a very
urgent appeal from the Commanding Officer of that unit which arrived a
little later. The first report from C Company, timed 1-7 p.m., arrived
about 2-0 p.m., but gave no idea of Capt. Luty’s desperate situation.
However, it was rapidly becoming clear that Erquinghem was untenable,
though the real gravity of the situation was not known at the time.
As a matter of fact, while the Battalion was still fighting in and to
the south of Erquinghem, the enemy was right in its rear at Le Veau,
looting the packs which had been dumped there in the morning, and
fighting with the men of B Echelon who had been left behind. Early in
the afternoon, machine gun bullets from the west began to fall about
Wigan. But, by this time, the order to withdraw to Nieppe had been
received, and had been passed on to companies. B Company and part of A
Company withdrew by the bridge which they had been covering all day;
the others crossed by bridges further to the east. Battalion H.Q.
remained at Wigan until the early evening. Many buildings in Erquinghem
were burning furiously, and numbers of the enemy could be seen moving
about in the village.
All the companies had passed long before Battalion H.Q. moved. About
6-0 p.m. the line at Wigan was left in the hands of a very mixed
garrison of Royal Scots, Suffolks, Australian tunnellers and others,
and the Commanding Officer started for Nieppe. It was only then that
the full gravity of the situation was realised. Enemy machine gun
bullets were whistling across the road as the party moved along, and,
when the level crossing by Nieppe Station was reached, it was found
that an enemy machine gun was on the railway line to the north-west,
shooting straight down the line. One or two casualties were suffered
by H.Q. details in crossing the line. Near the entrance to Nieppe, the
whole of D Company was met marching out towards the Station, and Lieut.
B. M. Machin stated that he had received orders from the G.O.C. himself
to seize and hold that point. Away to the north troops could be seen
in extended order attacking towards Le Veau. These troops were A and B
Companies, though this was not known at the time. From what he knew of
the enemy’s position on the railway, near the station, it was obvious
to the Commanding Officer that the left flank of this attack was in
danger. To cope with the difficulty H.Q. details, organised in two
platoons under Sec.-Lieut. H. A. Loudoun, and one platoon of D Company,
were sent down the road to the Station. Two platoons of D Company were
directed to prolong the left flank of the attack on Le Veau, and the
other platoon was kept in reserve.
It is now necessary to return to A and B Companies. On reporting at
147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. in Nieppe they had been told to occupy
some old trenches at Les Trois Arbres. They had not been there long
before they were ordered to fall in and move along the Nieppe-Bailleul
Road towards Pont d’Achelles. Here they were drawn up by Maj. A.
L. Mowat[17] and directed to attack and expel the enemy, who was
established in the farmhouses and enclosures at Le Veau. A Company was
on the extreme left with B Company on its right; beyond B Company were
some Royal Engineers and other troops, mainly Northumberland Fusiliers.
Neither side had any artillery to support it.
The advance started and at first progress was easy; but, when the
attacking force was about six hundred yards from the enemy, very heavy
machine gun and rifle fire opened on it. Progress could now only
be made by section rushes with covering fire, and even this became
impossible when the line had got to about three hundred yards from the
enemy. It was at this point that the arrival of the two platoons of D
Company on the left restored the situation. These did not meet with
strong opposition, and were able to push forward and gain a footing
on the railway. Taken now in flank the Germans began to withdraw, and
this enabled A Company to continue its advance and reach the railway
on its whole front. Meanwhile B Company had met with strong resistance
from the farms and enclosures of Le Veau. A sniper, firing from an
attic window, had been particularly obnoxious. For a short time they
too had been held up, but Sec.-Lieut. F. Akroyd, supported by heavy
covering fire from the rest of the company, managed to push forward on
the right and establish a footing, with his platoon, in the enclosures.
The enemy then withdrew on this front too, and B Company advanced to
the railway. As the H.Q. details had established themselves firmly in
the neighbourhood of the Station, the Battalion now held the whole of
the railway line from that point nearly up to the Steenwerck Road. The
men dug in a few yards in front of the railway line and there settled
down for the night, after a most strenuous and exciting day. During
this attack A Company had suffered heavy casualties, but both B and D
Companies had come through comparatively lightly. In all, the Battalion
had lost nearly two hundred men since it had left Le Veau early that
morning.
(_b_) Nieppe.
During the night of April 10/11th Battalion H.Q. was established in the
Hospice at the south-west end of Nieppe, and here it remained until
the following evening. With the exception of the pitiful remnants of C
Company, and one platoon of D Company, the whole Battalion was manning
the line which had been established in front of the railway, between
Nieppe Station and the Steenwerck Road. In spite of the uncertainty of
the situation, everyone whose duties would allow of it slept soundly,
tired out with the activities of the previous day and night. The night
passed quietly, the enemy, after his set-back at Le Veau, making no
further attack.
Early the next morning, the Commanding Officer made a personal
reconnaissance towards L’Epinette, and nearly reached the village
before he saw anything of the enemy. He was then heavily fired on by
a party of Germans and forced to withdraw. Other patrols were pushed
out well to the west of the railway without encountering the enemy.
From French civilians, who had remained in their homes all through the
fighting, they learned that large numbers of Germans had been there,
but had withdrawn towards the south-west after the successful attack
of the Battalion at Le Veau. The only actual encounter that took place
near the railway was with a German artillery officer, who rode nearly
up to the line with a mounted orderly about 8-30 a.m. He was shot and
fell from his horse dead, but his companion escaped. The numbers of
German dead littering the ground in front of the railway showed that,
in spite of its own heavy losses, the Battalion had made the enemy pay
even more heavily. About 9-0 a.m., units of the 101st Infantry Brigade
relieved the Battalion, and the men were concentrated in houses near
the Hospice.
The Battalion was now in Brigade Reserve, the other battalions of the
Brigade manning the Nieppe System to the east of the town. The day
was a very confused one. Continually the situation was being reported
obscure at some part of the front, and frequently a company, or two
platoons, or some other force, had to be sent off to clear it up. The
only part of the front where the situation was never reported obscure
was that held by the 147th Infantry Brigade. Such duties proved very
tiring, though for some time no serious fighting resulted. By now the
enemy was everywhere well across the Lys, the entrenched line of which
Wigan formed a part had been entirely given up, and the railway and the
Nieppe System were the outpost lines of the British. Incidentally, it
should be mentioned here that the 1/5th Battalion York and Lancaster
Regt. did the 147th Infantry Brigade a very good turn that day. By a
highly successful counter-attack in the neighbourhood of Steenwerck,
they held up the enemy’s advance, and barred his approach to the main
line of retreat from Nieppe--the road to Bailleul.
Nothing serious, so far as the Battalion was concerned, happened until
after mid-day. But about 12-30 p.m., a message arrived from Brigade
H.Q. stating that the situation was very obscure on the left of the 6th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., near Bruna Gaye; the remnants of
C Company were already on their way there; and an additional company
was to be despatched at once. A Company was detailed for this duty, and
the Commanding Officer himself accompanied it, leaving Capt. Fenton in
charge at Battalion H.Q. Lieut.-Col. Sugden found matters in a very
critical state; artillery and machine gun fire were very heavy, and
a strong German attack was being directed against a battalion of the
Cheshires. The arrival of the 4th Battalion detachment restored the
situation, but hard fighting continued there until the evening. One
Lewis gun of A Company did great execution; it was concealed in the
upper storey of a house, found excellent targets among the masses of
the enemy, and was apparently never discovered by them. The Commanding
Officer remained at Bruna Gaye to direct operations.
Late in the afternoon there was again trouble on the right, and two
platoons of B Company were sent to the neighbourhood of Nieppe Station.
Here they had hard fighting for two hours, but held their ground
successfully.
About 7-0 p.m. the Commanding Officer returned from Bruna Gaye. He had
called at Brigade H.Q. on his way back, and had received orders for a
further withdrawal, which was to be made that night. This withdrawal
was rendered necessary by a fresh attack which the enemy had launched
at Wytschaete that day, for there was now great danger that, unless
all the troops in and around Nieppe withdrew at once, they would be
surrounded. The withdrawal was to start at 7-30 p.m. and the difficulty
was to get orders through to A and C Companies. Runners managed to
reach them just in time, when they were in imminent danger of being cut
off.
At 7-30 p.m. B and D Companies, followed by Battalion H.Q., left the
Hospice and started towards Bailleul. Enemy machine gun bullets were
sweeping the ground, and, before he had gone more than a hundred yards,
R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker, M.C., was hit in the throat, and died within
five minutes. His death was a great blow to the Battalion which he had
fought with continuously for three years; he was a most hardworking,
conscientious and gallant man, whose place could never be filled. It
was impossible to remove the body, and he would have been the last to
wish any risks to be run by others on his account. So he was left like
a soldier on the spot where he had died, and the remainder of the party
continued sorrowfully on its way.
The sight on the Nieppe-Bailleul Road that night was such as none of
the Battalion had seen before, nor any wished to see again. Of vehicles
there were practically none, but the whole road was crowded with men
hastening to the rear. It was an army in retreat. But the crowd of
men was not disorderly; there was no panic. As each one reached his
allotted station he quietly fell in, ready to hold a fresh line.
Mercifully the enemy, for some unknown reason, scarcely attempted to
shell the road. Had he done so the casualties must have been awful, for
no shell dropped among those masses of men could have failed to hit
many. One gruesome spot, where a 15 cm. shell had burst among a number
of Royal Engineers, gave the passer-by an idea of what might have been.
All along the left of the road the enemy flares, approaching nearer and
nearer, showed how near the British troops were to utter disaster. But
they escaped. And never again had the enemy such an opportunity. By
about 11-0 p.m. the Battalion was again concentrated in a position near
Bailleul.
[Illustration: _April 10–11, 1918._]
(_c_) Bailleul.
About a mile from Bailleul the road to Armentiéres almost touches the
railway. It was at this point that 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. was
established, the battalions occupying positions in the fields just to
the south of the railway. The position was not really intended to be a
defensive one, for other troops were well out in front of the Brigade.
Nevertheless, the men dug in, and patrols were pushed out down the
roads. The rest of the night passed quietly.
On April 12th, though there were some mild alarms during the morning,
nothing special happened until after mid-day. Occasional shells burst
near the Battalion’s positions, one of which wounded Sec.-Lieut. F.
Akroyd. But about 1-0 p.m. a heavy bombardment opened, and quickly
drove Battalion H.Q. from its cottage to seek a hole in the ground,
among the slits which had been dug the previous night. Intermittent
shelling went on for the whole afternoon and caused several casualties,
among them being Lieut. B. M. Machin and Sergt. F. Firth, the pioneer
sergeant.
About 4-0 p.m. the Commanding Officer, who had been to Brigade H.Q.,
returned with the alarming news that the enemy had entered Bailleul
from the west. The Battalion was ordered to move at once and expel
him. Company commanders were summoned, and columns were detailed to
enter the town by different roads. The operation was carried out with
unexpected ease. The report was found to be incorrect. Nothing of the
enemy could be seen in Bailleul; in fact, the town was deserted,
except for an Australian corporal who had just set fire to the
Australian Comforts Store, much to the disgust of the Battalion which
could have done with many of the articles thus destroyed. The companies
moved through the deserted town and established a picquet line in the
fields to the west of it, roughly along the line of the Becque de la
Flanche, and covering all the roads in that direction.
Up to this time there had been little activity in the area occupied
by battalions of the 147th Infantry Brigade. But early in the evening
the advanced troops began rapidly to retire through them. Numbers of
stragglers of different units entered Bailleul from the south, and the
situation began to look serious. It was restored by Capt. Fenton, who
took charge of a number of stragglers and posted them with D Company,
in and around Bailleul Station. About this time the enemy began to
shell the town, possibly attracted by the fire at the Australian
Comforts Store, which was now burning furiously. One shell burst near
a group of H.Q. details, as they were marching up the Station Road,
killing one and wounding about fifteen of them.
When darkness fell the dispositions of the Battalion were as follows:--
D Company, with a number of stragglers of other units, was
holding the railway line on both sides of the Station. The 6th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. was holding a line in front
of it.
A Company had a line of posts along the Becque de la Flanche,
from the railway west of the Station, where it was in touch with
the right of the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., to
Steam Mill.
B Company continued this line due north as far as the Meteren
Road.
Battalion H.Q. and C Company, which was in Battalion Reserve,
occupied houses on the Station Road.
Reconnaissance soon showed that a composite force, which had been
organised at the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Camp and went by the name of
the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion, was holding a line of posts
from Steam Mill towards Meteren. Beyond these troops was the 19th
Infantry Brigade (33rd Division) covering Meteren itself. Thus, only A
Company was actually in the front line.
The night passed quietly. A patrol of A Company, from Steam Mill along
the Oultersteene Road, did not gain touch with the enemy until more
than a mile down the road. During the night A Company was relieved by
the 9th Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, so that, by dawn, both A
and C Companies were in Battalion Reserve in the town.
The morning of the 13th was also uneventful. A well-stocked Y.M.C.A.
canteen was found in Bailleul, and a guard was placed over it to stop
looting; the supplies there were taken charge of, and many were issued
to the troops to supplement rations. Early in the afternoon the enemy
began to shell the town heavily, and continued to do so for about two
hours. Buildings proved a very bad protection against high explosive.
The house occupied by Battalion H.Q. did not receive a direct hit, but
windows were smashed and considerable damage caused by shells bursting
just outside. Here Sec.-Lieut. H. A. Loudoun, the Signalling Officer,
was wounded in the arm; and Cpl. A. R. Mitchell, the stout and popular
N.C.O. in charge of the Battalion runners, was so badly hit in the body
that he died shortly afterwards in hospital. It was deemed advisable
to move Battalion H.Q. to a neighbouring house which had a small but
substantial cellar.
Meanwhile, the other units of the Brigade were having serious fighting
to the south of Bailleul. About dusk, the Battalion received orders to
send up two companies to hold the line of the railway on either side
of the Station, as it was feared the enemy might break through. A and
C Companies were sent up, under the command of Capt. Fenton. These
occupied a line to the south of the railway, covering the Station, on
a frontage of about half a mile. During the night another withdrawal
took place, contracting the defences to the south and south-east of
the town. The 6th Battalion took over the defence of the railway line
and Bailleul Station, while the 7th Battalion was brought back into
the town in Brigade Reserve. D Company relieved the 9th Battalion
Northumberland Fusiliers between the railway and Steam Mill. Its
left should have been in touch with the right of the 6th Battalion,
but there was found to be a considerable gap which it could not fill
without dangerously weakening its front. A Company was moved up to
close this gap. The withdrawal had, of course, automatically brought
about the relief of the two companies south of the railway. At dawn the
Battalion was disposed as follows:--
A Company was astride the railway, west of Bailleul Station, and
in touch with the right of the 6th Battalion.
D Company held the line of the Becque de la Flanche from the
right of A Company to Steam Mill, where it was in touch with the
left of the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion.
B Company was still in its old position behind the 22nd Corps
Reinforcement Battalion.
C Company was in Battalion Reserve in houses on the Station Road.
Two days had now passed without the Battalion being drawn into any
really serious fighting. There had been plenty of anxiety and much
changing of dispositions, but, compared with the activities of April
10th and 11th, it had been a rest period. The attacks which the enemy
had made to the south of Bailleul on April 13th had not been very
successful for him, and he now determined to try his luck to the west
of the town. Already, on the night of the 13th, his troops had been
seen dribbling up towards Steam Mill.
The night of April 13/14th passed quietly, as did also the following
morning. But early in the afternoon a bombardment, far heavier than on
the previous day, opened on the town and on the positions along the
Becque de la Flanche. B and D Companies were both shelled out of their
H.Q. and forced to take to the fields; in this shelling Sec.-Lieut.
W. Oldfield, M.M., of D Company, was severely wounded, and had the
grave misfortune to lose the sight of both eyes. Meanwhile, observers
reported that large numbers of the enemy were dribbling forward and
massing about three hundred yards from the Battalion’s outpost line.
It was obvious that a heavy attack was impending. Fire was opened
upon all movement, but did not appear to interfere much with the
assembly. Little could be done but wait. As a precautionary measure,
all available reserves of A Company were placed at the disposal of D
Company.
[Illustration: BAILLEUL CHURCH AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.]
Bailleul was still being heavily bombarded, and about six big fires
were raging in the Station Road alone, without anyone to check them,
when, about 4-0 p.m., the attack came. Masses of the enemy advanced
against the fronts held by D Company and the 22nd Corps Reinforcement
Battalion. The latter gave way without much resistance, and the enemy
was able to occupy Steam Mill. This seriously threatened the right
flank of D Company, along the whole of whose front heavy fighting
was going on. For a time its centre was pressed back, but the men
soon regained the ground without assistance. Unfortunately, in this
fighting, Sec.-Lieut. J. H. Kitson was killed.
The whole situation was extremely critical. The 22nd Corps
Reinforcement Battalion had ceased to exist as a fighting unit though,
luckily, B Company was in its rear, and held up the further advance of
the enemy on that front. The loss of Steam Mill seriously threatened
the right flank of D Company, who had only just been able to beat
off the attack on its immediate front. The only battalion reserves
available were the few survivors of C Company and the Battalion H.Q.
details. Fortunately, something of the state of affairs was quickly
known at 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., and the G.O.C. promptly placed
two companies of the 7th Battalion at the disposal of the Commanding
Officer of the 4th Battalion. Battalion H.Q. details were assembled
ready for any eventuality near the huts of the Officers’ Rest Camp,
while C Company and the companies of the 7th Battalion were warned to
be prepared to counter-attack.
About 5-30 p.m. a heavy counter-attack was launched from the north-east
towards Steam Mill, by Capt. Fenton with one and a half companies of
the 7th Battalion, and Capt. Luty with C Company. The attack met with
almost complete success. With the single exception of Steam Mill, the
whole of the ground which had been lost by the 22nd Corps Reinforcement
Battalion was regained. But Steam Mill itself was firmly held by the
enemy, and could not be retaken. Everywhere else the enemy withdrew in
confusion. During this fighting Capt. A. M. Luty was twice wounded,
once while leading his men near Steam Mill, and a second time while he
was being carried away on a stretcher. About 7-30 p.m., the Commanding
Officer was able to report to Brigade H.Q. that the situation was again
quiet.
Had the enemy been able to make a second attack, the situation would
have been serious indeed. Save for the H.Q. details, the Battalion now
had absolutely no reserves, while the companies of the 7th Battalion
which had counter-attacked had to be used to man the line formerly
held by the 22nd Corps Reinforcement Battalion. But, after the failure
of their attack, the Germans attempted nothing further that day. In
all, on April 14th, the Battalion lost one officer and 14 other ranks
killed, two officers and 51 other ranks wounded, and two other ranks
missing.
The occasional crashes of burning buildings were almost the only sounds
which disturbed the night. It was not free from alarms, but nothing
came of any of them. Towards midnight, the joyful news arrived that the
Battalion was to be relieved by troops of the 59th Division, who were
already on their way. The whole of both the 4th and 6th Battalions were
to be relieved by the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt., but as
this Battalion was about 900 fighting strength, and the total effective
strength of the battalions to be relieved was only about 600, no great
difficulty was anticipated by 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. There was,
however, considerable difficulty in handing over the line, owing to
the great extension of front which the dispersal of the 22nd Corps
Reinforcement Battalion had rendered necessary. As a result, relief
was not complete until some time after daybreak. Then the Battalion,
delighted at the prospect of a rest, moved back to a position about
half a mile south of St. Jans Cappel, where the site of a new line had
been taped out the previous day.
(_d_) St. Jans Cappel.
On being relieved in Bailleul, the 147th Infantry Brigade passed into
IX. Corps Reserve, but was to be prepared to move at half-an-hour’s
notice. The 7th Battalion was in reserve in or near St. Jans Cappel;
the 4th and 6th Battalions bivouaced in the open about a thousand yards
south of the village, where the new line had been taped. Everyone was
tired out with the exertions of the past week, and the opportunity for
a sound and unbroken sleep was welcomed. No one guessed how short
the period of rest would be.
[Illustration: _Bailleul. 12-15. 4. 18._]
A few alarming rumours came through during the day, but little was
thought of them at first. Then, about 4-30 p.m., came the order from
Brigade which disillusioned all--the Battalion was to stand to at once,
and work on the taped-out line was to be pressed on with as hard as
possible. It was hinted that this line would probably be the front
line before morning. Everyone responded with the greatest readiness
and cheerfulness. Few shovels were available, but farm implements were
seized and many of the men set to work with the long-handled spades of
the district. The Battalion was responsible for a line, about half a
mile in length, on the western side of the Bailleul--St. Jans Cappel
Road. The 6th Battalion held a similar front on the opposite side of
the road, but, apart from some Lewis guns manned by a battalion of
the Tank Corps, there appeared to be no one for several hundred yards
on the right. “When positions are taken up all ranks must definitely
understand that no withdrawal is to take place excepting under written
orders” was the Commanding Officer’s message to companies. The strength
of the Battalion was very low--only 19 officers and 307 other ranks
all told--little enough to hold half a mile of front. It was then that
the Commanding Officer, thinking the extreme urgency of the situation
warranted the step, ordered up practically the whole of B Echelon.
The night which followed was one of the most depressing in the whole
history of the Battalion. About 8-30 p.m. a message had arrived from
Brigade H.Q. to warn everyone that the 59th Division would probably
withdraw through the new line. But the message was unnecessary. The men
of the 176th Infantry Brigade were already coming along the road, and
it was clear that Bailleul, the town which the Battalion had helped to
defend for three days in spite of heavy losses, had fallen. Many of the
men of the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt. stopped to assist in
the defence of the new line; but most of their Brigade passed through
to Locre to reorganise. The Battalion was again holding the front line.
Picquets were pushed out well in front, a wiring party under the 57th
Field Company, Royal Engineers, did valuable work, while through the
night the men dug hard, and by dawn there was quite a good line.
The chief anxiety was the gap in the line, on the Battalion’s right.
This was eventually filled by the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire
Regt. About 350 men of this battalion had remained in the line when the
rest of their Brigade passed through, and these were now transferred to
the right, where they took over the front under their own Commanding
Officer. But, in accordance with the instructions of the G.O.C., 147th
Infantry Brigade, Lieut.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O., retained supreme
command of that part of the front, as well as of his own battalion.
The night passed without any enemy action. At dawn the next day,
patrols pushed out well in front of the line, and located the enemy
on the Becque de la Flanche. It was certain that he would soon make
an attempt to continue his advance, but the Battalion now felt ready
for him. Quite a respectable line had been dug during the night. This
was held by B Company on the right and C Company on the left; D and
A Companies were in support on the right and left respectively; B
Echelon, which had arrived during the night, was kept at Battalion
H.Q. in reserve. As time went on movement among the enemy became more
and more pronounced, and early in the afternoon it was obvious that
an attack was imminent. Large numbers of Germans were seen dribbling
down the hedge-rows, from the direction of Bailleul, and massing about
500 or 600 yards from the Battalion front. Two companies of the 7th
Battalion had been placed at the disposal of the Commanding Officer, to
strengthen his right flank, and all ranks quietly awaited the enemy’s
move.
About 4-0 p.m. the storm burst. The desultory shelling of the earlier
part of the afternoon changed to a barrage, and large numbers of the
enemy advanced to the attack. The Battalion settled down to fight. On
the right such a hail of bullets was poured into the advancing masses
by B Company that the attack scarcely succeeded in debouching from the
hedge, behind which the assembly had been carried out. On the left C
Company, whose line was packed with Lewis guns, brought the advance
to a complete standstill 300 yards from the line. A detachment of
the 176th Light Trench Mortar Battery, which was covering the road
to Bailleul, was able to burst shell after shell in the midst of the
enemy. The attack had hardly opened before it had failed. Nowhere did
a German get within 300 yards of the British line. To the east of
the road it was much the same tale; there the 6th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. first held up the attack by Lewis gun and rifle
fire, and then, issuing from its trenches, collected a number of
prisoners. Within half-an-hour, of the whole German regiment which
had made the attack, nothing was to be seen but the little group of
prisoners moving to the rear, and the scores of dead who littered
the battlefield. “Well done all ranks” was the message received from
the Brigadier; and “Well done old 147 Brigade” was the affectionate
greeting of Major-General N. J. G. Cameron when he received the news.
Though the men of the Battalion knew it not, this was the last attack
they were to sustain on that front. After eight days of almost
continuous fighting, they had at length succeeded in bringing the
enemy’s advance to a full stop. The line which they had started to dig
late in the afternoon of April 15th, and which they had defended so
successfully the following day, was to remain the front line until the
beginning of the victorious British advance in the late summer. Through
it the enemy was never to penetrate; and while the Battalion was in
the neighbourhood he never again tried. For the time being the Germans
had had enough of the 147th Infantry Brigade. But, at the time, the
Battalion knew nothing of all this.
The days that followed were very anxious ones. So weak was the
Battalion that it could not be expected to withstand many more attacks.
Time after time reports came in that reinforcements were coming up,
that French troops would soon be there. But as the days went by, and
the Battalion still remained in that all-important part of the line,
some began to doubt whether relief ever would come. At length one day
a French cavalry officer arrived at Battalion H.Q., and informed the
Commanding Officer that he had come for liaison purposes. His regiment
was the advanced guard of considerable numbers of French troops, and
was already bivouacing in the neighbourhood. He was authorised by his
Commanding Officer to say that, although the regiment was not intended
to take part in any fighting without orders from higher authority, if
help were needed the Battalion need only let him know and the regiment
would come.
Meanwhile the Battalion was hard at work improving the line. Patrols
were active on the front, and were seldom interfered with. Two days
after his unsuccessful attempt towards St. Jans Cappel, the enemy
launched an attack further to the west, on the front which had been
occupied by the men of the 5th Battalion North Staffordshire Regt. As
luck would have it, these had been relieved the previous night by the
2nd Battalion Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, who gave the enemy so
warm a reception that afterwards he left that front severely alone.
During these days the Battalion was not much troubled, except by
intermittent artillery fire.
On the night of April 18/19th the Battalion was relieved by the 7th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., and went into Brigade Reserve.
Battalion H.Q. was situated in the Convent at St. Jans Cappel which
had large, though not very strongly built cellars. The Aid Post was in
a brewery on the opposite side of the road, where considerable stocks
of beer, rather better in quality than the normal French variety, were
much appreciated. Most of the men held a new switch line, which had
been dug to the south-west of the village.
Only twenty-four hours were spent in the new location, for the next
night the whole Brigade was withdrawn into Divisional Reserve. The
Battalion was relieved by the 1st Queens and withdrew to Mont Noir;
here the only billets available, with the exception of one estaminet
occupied by Battalion H.Q., were slits in the ground.
By this time the French were coming up in force and were taking over
the whole sector. Long before dawn on the morning of April 21st, the
Battalion marched out and proceeded in the darkness, through batteries
of French 75’s which were already in action, to a hutment camp on
the top of Mont des Cats. Here the men slept until the middle of the
afternoon. It was the first real piece of comfort they had had since
they were hurried into battle nearly two weeks before.
(_e_) Poperinghe.
The Battalion only stopped on Mont des Cats for a few hours and then it
moved off to Poperinghe. On the way, it passed the G.O.C., IX. Corps,
who had come to take a last look at the men who had served him so
well. Though a sorry remnant of the Battalion, which had embussed so
cheerfully at Reninghelst only twelve days before, they were well worth
a second glance. Ragged, unshaven and unkempt, with nothing clean about
them but their rifles, bayonets and ammunition, they were yet a body
of veterans whom anyone would have been proud to command. Thrown into
the battle when the enemy was flushed with success, they had fought and
beaten him time after time. It was the proud boast of the Battalion
that it had never withdrawn without definite orders to do so, and that
the enemy had never won from it an inch of ground.
Messages of thanks and congratulations had poured in to the Brigade
from all quarters--from the Commander-in-Chief, from General Plumer,
and from the IX. Corps. The G.O.C., 34th Division, on parting with the
147th Infantry Brigade, wrote to the G.O.C., 49th Division, in the
following terms:--
“The G.O.C., 34th Division, wishes to place on record his great
appreciation of the services rendered by 147th Infantry Brigade
during the period it has been attached to the Division under his
command. The action of the 4th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s
South of the Lys on 10th April, the skilful rearguard fighting
under cover of which the Division withdrew from the Nieppe
position, the stubborn defence of the right of the Division at
Steam Mill (S. of Bailleul) and the complete defeat of a whole
German Regiment on the 16th April, are exploits of which the
Brigade may well be proud.
Throughout the period the steadiness, gallantry and endurance of
all ranks has been worthy of the highest traditions of British
Infantry and the G.O.C., 34th Division, is proud to have had
such troops under his command.”
At Poperinghe the Battalion was housed in the Rest Camp by the Railway
Station, but most of the officers slept in the Convent not far away. No
training was attempted. The men were given as much rest as possible.
Time was spent in reorganisation, of which every company stood much in
need. A draft, about two hundred strong, joined the Battalion; but this
was not sufficient to bring it to full strength, for over four hundred
casualties had been suffered during the past fortnight. Here the 147th
Infantry Brigade came again under the 49th Division, as did also the
148th Infantry Brigade.
The days were fairly peaceful, but the nights were rather disturbed by
high velocity guns, which fired into the town. During the last night,
several bombing planes visited Poperinghe and caused great excitement.
Some bombs were dropped very near the camp, one in particular narrowly
missing the Battalion Transport and stampeding some of the animals.
It was fully realised that the period of rest would almost certainly be
short. The Germans had already captured the low range of hills about
Neuve Eglise, and it was certain they would make a bid for the chain,
of which Mont Kemmel is the highest point. Hence, there was little
surprise when, early in the morning of April 25th, the Battalion was
put on half-an-hour’s notice to move.
(_f_) Kemmel.[18]
About 8-45 a.m. on April 25th, the order to move arrived. The Brigade
was proceeding at once to Ouderdom in support of the 9th Division. The
Battalion was to move by march route as it was to remain in Brigade
Reserve, but motor buses were provided for all the rest of the Brigade.
However, so quickly did the Battalion fall in and move off that it
arrived at Ouderdom long before the buses appeared.
The situation was very obscure. A great battle was in progress to the
south and it was believed that the enemy had captured Mont Kemmel; but
nothing was definitely known. The 6th and 7th Battalions were moved
forward to form a defensive flank from Beaver Corner to Millekruisse,
as the Cheapside Line was thought still to be in British hands; but
touch had been completely lost with the troops on the right. All that
day the Battalion remained inactive in the fields near Ouderdom. They
were little troubled, except by an occasional aeroplane. One of these
dropped a bomb which caused one or two casualties, but otherwise the
Battalion escaped unscathed.
In the evening the Battalion moved up to positions in some old trenches
a little to the north of Millekruisse, and here it settled down for
the night. But it was not to rest for long. About 2-30 a.m., Major A.
L. Mowat arrived from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. with orders for an
immediate attack. The situation and details were as follows:--
1. A big counter-attack was to be launched, by French troops on
the right and the 25th Division on the left, to recapture Mont
Kemmel and establish a line to the south of it.
2. The Battalion was to co-operate on the left of the 25th
Division. It was to assemble on the Cheapside Line and attack
in a south-easterly direction, on a front of about six hundred
yards, with the trench system on the York Road as its objective.
3. In the event of the 25th Division not being able to advance,
the Battalion was to conform to its line.
4. Zero hour was fixed for 4-25 a.m., when a creeping barrage
would come down.
From the Battalion point of view, this operation was extremely
difficult. No one had any knowledge of the ground, and the assembly was
to take place and the attack to open before dawn. As the companies were
much below full strength, the Commanding Officer decided to attack on a
three-company frontage--B Company was to attack on the right, D Company
in the centre, and A Company on the left. C Company was in support,
and was to advance about two hundred yards in rear of the assaulting
troops.
At once the Battalion fell in and marched off. Owing to the darkness
of the night and the fact that everyone was completely ignorant of the
ground, companies did not quite reach their assembly positions by zero
hour, but were drawn up about the line of the Kemmelbeke. At 4-25 a.m.
the barrage--a very thin one--opened, and the Battalion advanced. It
passed through a deserted camp and came to a road, along the line of
which were some old trenches. These had been occupied by the enemy, but
he retired when the British advanced. The trenches were occupied and a
halt was made there. This was due to the failure of the next battalion
to advance.
The 74th Infantry Brigade of the 25th Division was attacking on the
Battalion’s right. One of its battalions did extremely well, forcing
its way right into Kemmel village, and taking about 150 prisoners
there. But the battalion on the immediate right of B Company failed
to get forward. The 4th Battalion had met with very little resistance
up to that time. Enemy machine gun fire was extremely heavy, but, as
the morning was misty, very few casualties were caused by it at first.
There is no doubt that the Battalion could have advanced further
without much difficulty, but its orders were to conform to the 25th
Division, and, as the men on its right were not advancing, it halted.
For several hours it was believed that the line of Sackville Street had
been reached, and this was the situation reported by the Commanding
Officer to Brigade H.Q. at 5.5 a.m. Later it was found that the men had
only got as far as Cheapside.
For about an hour things were comparatively quiet, except for enemy
machine gun fire. Soon after 6-0 a.m. the battalion on the right began
to withdraw, and before long the situation was becoming serious on that
flank. The mist had cleared considerably, and the enemy was making
better use of his machine guns. Taking advantage of the weakness of the
troops there, he began to work round the Battalion’s right flank, by
Beaver Corner and R.E. Farm. To cope with this menace, first half, and
later the whole, of C Company had to be sent over to the right to form
a defensive flank, facing south-west. On the rest of the Battalion
front there was little anxiety. All three companies were well in touch,
and A Company was connected up with the 9th Battalion King’s Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry (21st Division) on its left. Enemy machine gun
fire was heavy, but the troops had good cover.
As time went on, the situation on the right became more and more
serious. Here enemy machine gun fire was particularly heavy, and his
sniping very accurate. He was making determined attempts to advance to
the west of the Milky Way, and there was great danger that he might
get across the Battalion’s line of retreat. The whole of C Company
had been committed to the defence of this flank, and later, two guns
of the Machine Gun Company and a detachment of the 147th Light Trench
Mortar Battery had also been sent up. Thus, the whole available
battalion reserve, except a few H.Q. details, was engaged. C Company
had done some very useful work. They had driven the enemy from R.E.
Farm, though they were unable to occupy it themselves; but they were
suffering heavily from the enemy’s very accurate sniping. At 9-25 a.m.
a message was sent to the 6th Battalion asking it to send up a company
to reinforce the right.
By about 11-0 a.m. the strength of C Company had been very much
reduced. Man after man had been shot in the head by enemy snipers,
among the casualties being Pte. A. Poulter, the stretcher-bearer who
had so greatly distinguished himself two weeks before at Erquinghem.
Lieut. W. G. Mackie, who was commanding C Company, was also wounded,
and Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy assumed command. Soon after noon, two
platoons of the 6th Battalion arrived and were sent up to strengthen
C Company. This helped to restore the situation on the right flank,
and, for a time, things were much quieter, though the enemy sniping and
machine gun fire continued.
It was hoped that the 25th Division would take action to restore the
situation on its left, and about 1-30 p.m. a message was received that
a battalion of the South Lancashire Regt. was coming up to get in touch
there. Meanwhile, there was great difficulty in supplying the forward
troops with ammunition, owing to the heavy fire kept up by the enemy.
Everything had to be carried across the open, and there was very little
cover. In this connection, splendid work was done by some of the H.Q.
batmen, who crawled up to the line with bandoliers slung over their
backs.
During the afternoon the enemy made a further attempt to work round the
right flank. Considerable numbers of them were seen moving along the
side of a hedge, but the situation was satisfactorily dealt with by C
Company. Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy had seen them himself. He quickly got
two Vickers guns into position, and, when the enemy appeared at a gap
in the hedge, so heavy a fire was opened at close range that the party
was almost wiped out. This was the last attempt to advance that the
enemy made that day.
By this time the discovery had been made that the Battalion was
not in Sackville Street at all, but in Cheapside. This was at once
reported to 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., as it altered the situation
considerably. The battalion of South Lancashires had come up, but was
halted by the Milky Way and did not go into action. It was now night.
Arrangements were made for wiring and other work to be done on the
front; but this was not to be. The higher authorities had realised
that the counter-attack had failed, and had decided to withdraw the
troops, who had carried it out, from their advanced positions. About
11-0 p.m., the order for the withdrawal was received, and the operation
began at 12-30 a.m. All went smoothly. The night was dark and the enemy
remained inactive. A Company withdrew first, and was followed by the
others in order from left to right, C Company moving last and bringing
out with them the few men who were left of the next battalion. All the
ammunition, which had been sent up during the day, was got away. The
Battalion moved back along the Milky Way, through the line held by the
6th Battalion, and reoccupied the same positions near Millekruisse
which it had left in the early morning of April 26th.
For the next two days the enemy made no further infantry attack,
but his artillery was often active, particularly round Millekruisse
cross roads. Not far from this spot Sec.-Lieut J. C. Whitaker, of A
Company, was killed by a shell on April 28th. There can be no doubt
that, between April 25th and 29th, the Germans were replenishing their
ammunition dumps, and making preparations for their next big attack.
During this time the Battalion was in Brigade Reserve. Much work was
done on a new line a little to the south of Millekruisse, and A Company
moved up to garrison it. Otherwise, there was no change in dispositions.
On April 28th the enemy put down a heavy barrage on the British front,
from 7-30 p.m. to 9-0 p.m., and desultory shelling continued through
the night. About 3-0 a.m. on the morning of April 29th this suddenly
changed to a barrage, the intensity and depth of which can seldom have
been equalled. From Mont Vidaigne on the right to Zillebeke Lake on
the left, the whole front was ablaze. On the sector held by the 147th
Infantry Brigade the whole country, from the front line to beyond
Ouderdom, was deluged with shells. High explosive and gas literally
rained down everywhere. Practically the first shell of the bombardment
burst in the roof of the farm house, which was occupied by Battalion
H.Q., and mortally wounded both the orderly room clerks; the R.S.M.,
who was in the same room, had a wonderful escape, and fragments
actually penetrated the roof of the cellar, in which the Commanding
Officer was sleeping at the time. By a great stroke of luck the barrage
almost entirely missed the front line, so that its garrison, though
extremely uncomfortable, was practically unharmed. No one doubted that
this was the prelude to another mighty attack.
After about two hours of this bombardment, the German infantry advanced
in great numbers to the attack. They gained nothing. Caught by the
British barrage, mown down by Lewis gun and rifle fire, they suffered
enormous casualties. It is said that, on one part of the front, they
were so demoralised that they put out a white flag and tried to come
in, but could not pass through the barrage. On the whole front attacked
they only gained a footing in the allied line in two places, and from
both of these they were ejected almost immediately by counter-attacks.
All this time the barrage continued.
Meanwhile, the Battalion was in Brigade Reserve, anxiously awaiting
information which could be acted upon. The Millekruisse Line had
been strengthened by the addition of D Company, but B and C Companies
were both available for any action. All telephone lines had been
broken within a few minutes of the opening of the bombardment, and it
was extremely difficult to obtain any news. Lieut. J. C. Walton, the
Battalion Intelligence Officer, was sent up to get in touch with the
H.Q. of the 7th Battalion, which was in the line; but he was blown to
pieces by a shell before he had gone more than two hundred yards. About
7-0 a.m. it was learned from wounded men who had come down, that the
7th Battalion had been heavily attacked, but that they had held their
ground and still had a company in reserve. On receipt of this news,
the Commanding Officer immediately communicated with Brigade H.Q.,
asking whether he should send a company to assist them. About 9-0 a.m.
a wounded N.C.O. of the 7th Battalion reported a fresh massing of the
enemy for the attack. Lieut.-Col. Sugden waited no longer, but at once
ordered up B Company to reinforce. Though the barrage was almost as
thick as ever, the company succeeded in finding a route by which it
reached its objective with very few casualties. It arrived just in
time to stop an urgent message which was being sent, asking for the
assistance of a company. But the reinforcements were never required.
The worst of the battle was over. After two violent attacks all along
the front, the enemy made only local and spasmodic efforts for the rest
of the day. His force was broken; he had been beaten to a standstill;
and he had gained--nothing. As the Divisional Commander wrote shortly
after--“It was a great day for British Arms.”
The battle of April 29th was far more than an ordinary defeat for the
enemy. It was the final collapse of his offensive. During the next
three months he was to launch other great attacks against the French,
further to the south. But never again was he to try conclusions with
the British in a great battle, until they took the initiative into
their own hands, and, after driving him headlong from position after
position, forced him to sue for an armistice from the men he had
professed to despise. For the second time in less than three weeks the
147th Infantry Brigade had assisted in bringing the German attack to a
standstill, and had consolidated and held a line which was to remain
unbroken until all lines were left behind in the victorious advance of
the autumn.
The following days were uneventful. Work continued on the Millekruisse
Line, in which two companies were now permanently stationed. B Company
remained under the orders of the 7th Battalion. Enemy artillery was
active, but was as nothing compared with the barrage of April 29th. The
147th Infantry Brigade was strengthened by the temporary addition of
a composite battalion, made up of the remnants of the 146th Infantry
Brigade and the 19th Lancashire Fusiliers, each battalion furnishing
one company. Among the many congratulatory messages, which poured in
after the victory of April 29th, not the least appreciated was one from
the G.O.C., IX. Corps, who had not forgotten the work of the 147th
Infantry Brigade while serving under his command so recently.
On the night of May 1/2nd the Battalion relieved the 7th Battalion Duke
of Wellington’s Regt. on the left of the Brigade Sector. The front
held was a peculiar one, and lay almost at right angles to the general
line. Its left rested almost on Cheapside, where A Company had been on
April 26th. From that point it ran nearly due north to and across the
Kemmelbeke, and then turned at right angles across the Milky Way. Three
companies held this line, the men occupying small slits in the ground;
the fourth and a company of the 6th Battalion, which had been relieved
by the 146th Composite Battalion, were in support. There was still
plenty of hostile shelling but it was very scattered, and the little
slits in the ground were difficult targets to hit.
The labours and troubles of the Battalion were now nearly over for
the time being. A French Army had come up and was gradually taking
over the front, along the chain of hills. On the night of May 3/4th
the Battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 80th Infantry Regt.,
of the 32nd French Division. This Battalion, which was very strong,
took over the whole front of the 147th Infantry Brigade. They were a
magnificent body of men, and the British were much struck with their
fine appearance. While the relief was in progress some anxiety was
caused by a heavy enemy bombardment, but, apart from this, everything
went smoothly. Capt. Fenton, with a few N.C.O’s, was left in the line
for twenty-four hours to assist the French; and the Battalion started
on its march through the night to a well-earned rest.
It was daylight before the first halting-place was reached. This was a
camp which, it was rumoured, had recently been occupied by a Chinese
Labour Company. This fact did not altogether commend itself to the
Battalion, but all men were so weary that it scarcely disturbed their
sleep. In the afternoon a short march brought the Battalion to a
hutment camp at St. Jans ter Biezen, where the rest period was to be
spent.
* * * * *
The part taken by the Battalion, in what is generally known as the
Battle of the Lys, is the most glorious chapter in its history. Never
before nor since did the men fight so long continuously, nor against
such overwhelming odds. They faced the enemy in the full flush of his
successes on the Somme, when his morale was at its highest. They fought
him again and again, and never yielded an inch of ground in battle.
They taught him that he was no match for a British soldier, either in
attack or in defence. They helped to pave the way for his crushing
defeat a few months later.
And the men learned many things too. They learned that the German
will never push home an assault in the face of a really determined
resistance; that infantry fire alone is sufficient to stop his most
violent attacks. In the many engagements that they fought during April,
1918, no man of them ever used a bayonet, for never did the enemy reach
their lines. They learned too--those of them who did not know it well
before--that the spade, almost as much as the rifle, is the infantry
man’s weapon. And, perhaps most valuable lesson of all, they learned
that what appear to be the blackest and most hopeless situations can be
restored by men, if only they possess the necessary determination.
Throughout the most trying and uncomfortable conditions all ranks
continued cheerful, and morale never declined. In spite of appalling
casualties, the Battalion never became in the least disorganised.
Camaraderie and good-fellowship were never more conspicuous. Though
the Battalion was only about three hundred strong, a draft of two
hundred was incorporated so thoroughly that the men of it fought, only
two or three days later, as if they had never served with any other
unit.
[Illustration: _Kemmel_
26. 4. 18.]
The Transport and Stores too did magnificent work. Frequently shelled,
and on one occasion at least under machine gun fire, constantly on the
move and often surrounded by disorder, they carried on their work in
a way which earned the admiration of everyone. At a time when one was
continually hearing of battalions who had had no rations for days,
the 4th Battalion had never lived in such plenty. There is no doubt
that this happy state of affairs increased the fighting efficiency of
everyone enormously.
The work of the 49th Division, in which the Battalion had played no
inconsiderable a part, was recognised on all sides. On the night of
April 29th, the Commander-in-Chief expressed himself in the following
terms:--
“I desire to express my appreciation of the very valuable and
gallant services performed by troops of the 49th (West Riding)
Division since the entry of the 147th Infantry Brigade into the
battle of Armentiéres. The courage and determination showed by
this Division has played no small part in checking the enemy’s
advance, and I wish to convey to General Cameron and to all
officers and men under his command my thanks for all that they
have done.”
Among the many other messages, too numerous for reproduction, which
were received, the following, expressed in the inimitable manner of the
French, deserves special notice:--
“The G.O.C., 2nd Cavalry Corps, warmly congratulates the brave
British troops who have heroically assisted in the defence of
the chain of hills, and who, by their admirable resistance have
broken down the enemy’s effort and barred the way to Dunkerque.
Shelterless under a bombardment of the heaviest description,
surrounded by poisonous gases of various description, stubbornly
disputing every foot of ground, they have held their own against
repeated attacks by greatly superior numbers, and though at
first overwhelmed by weight of numbers they were obliged to
give ground, they have inflicted such heavy losses on the enemy
that his forces have been exhausted.
Once more the Germans have seen their hopes dashed to the
ground. France will remember that.
Robillot.”
It was a matter of the deepest regret to all that the 49th Division
could not work as a whole during a great part of the operations; and
none felt it more than General Cameron. In the confidential summary
of operations, which he circulated a few days after the Division was
withdrawn from the battle, one can clearly see his disappointment that
this should have been so. One can also distinguish clearly his pride
in the record of his men on so many different fronts. The concluding
paragraph of that summary, as looking to the future, may fittingly end
this chapter:--
“The reputation which you have won for courage, determination
and efficiency, during recent operations, has its very joyous
aspect, and it is deeply precious to us all.
It has also a serious aspect for us.
It lays on each one of us a great responsibility--a personal
responsibility for doing all he can to ensure that the next time
the Division is engaged it will perform even better service than
it has in the past.
We shall shortly, we hope, be filling up with new men.
Let every old hand put his shoulder to the wheel in the task
of instilling into our new blood the spirit of courage,
determination and efficiency which has carried you through your
recent trial so successfully.
Never fail to impress on all new hands what the rifle and
bayonet can do in the hands of a determined British soldier who
knows how to look after them and use them.
N. G. Cameron, Major-General.”
CHAPTER XII.
THE LAST OF YPRES.
(_a_) May, 1918.
For nearly a month the Battalion was out of the line, and most of
this time was spent at Road Camp, St. Jans ter Biezen. At first the
accommodation was adequate, but, towards the end of May, the huts were
becoming very crowded. This was due to the arrival of new drafts,
and the return of a number of lightly wounded men. By the time the
Battalion went into the line again nearly 200 had joined. Many of these
were young soldiers, who had been hurriedly despatched from England to
make good the very heavy losses suffered during the enemy’s violent
attacks in March and April. They were splendid material and quickly
developed into fine soldiers. A large draft of officers also arrived
towards the end of April. Here, too, Sergt. A. Loosemore, V.C., joined
the Battalion.
The first days were spent almost entirely in reorganisation. This was
very necessary after the enormous casualties of the last few weeks. But
the organisation of the Battalion had never broken down, and there was
a solid framework on which to build. New officers and men were quickly
assimilated; new specialists were trained. Long before the rest period
came to an end, the Battalion was almost as efficient a fighting unit
as it had been at the beginning of April.
On May 14th the 147th Infantry Brigade moved by bus to St. Martin au
Laert for four days’ shooting. Tents were pitched about a mile from the
town, and, as the weather was gloriously fine, a very enjoyable time
was spent there. St. Omer was within easy walking distance of the camp,
and the rather unusual experience of having a large town near at hand
was thoroughly enjoyed. Enemy bombing planes were common at night, but
they restricted their activities mainly to Arques, and never troubled
the camp.
Soon after its return to Road Camp, the Brigade moved to Penton Camp,
near Proven, for four days’ work on the East Poperinghe Line. At
this time an immense amount of labour and material was being used in
the construction of defences between Ypres and Poperinghe. Everyone
expected that the enemy would make a further attack in that direction,
and no less than four defensive systems were in course of construction
or improvement between the two towns. The East Poperinghe Line was the
most westerly of these systems. A definite sector was allotted to each
battalion, and every available man was sent to work on it. Parties
paraded early in the morning and were taken up to the work by light
railway trains. They did not return until late in the afternoon, so
there was not much time for recreation. At Proven, officers met an old
friend. Francois, well known to most officers who have seen much of
Poperinghe, had transferred his restaurant business to Proven, when the
German advance made Poperinghe too warm. As always, dinner at Francois’
was very popular.
The Battalion returned to Road Camp on May 26th, and another week
was spent there. At the end of May Lieut.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O.,
went on leave. He had scarcely arrived in England when an urgent wire
recalled him, to take command of the 151st Infantry Brigade, 50th
Division. He had no time to return to the Battalion, but went straight
down to the neighbourhood of the Marne, where his Brigade awaited him.
Everyone was delighted to hear of his promotion, for it was looked
upon as an honour to the Battalion--few Territorial officers attained
such high rank during the war. Another source of great satisfaction to
everyone was that Major A. L. Mowat, M.C., was appointed to the command
of the Battalion; few had seen more service with it, and none had done
more for its good than he.
While at St. Jans ter Biezen, permission was given for a photograph to
be taken of all the “old originals” still serving with the Battalion.
Four officers and 114 other ranks were included in the group. This
should have been done on April 14th--the anniversary of the Battalion’s
landing in France. But circumstances over which the Battalion had
little control--the battle of Steam Mill was fought on that day--had
prevented any celebrations.
(_b_) Zillebeke Sector.
When the enemy broke through to the south of Armentiéres, and, still
more, when he captured the Messines Ridge, the situation of the British
troops in the Ypres Salient became very critical. Their whole right
flank was laid bare, and they were in imminent danger of being cut off.
The whole line was therefore withdrawn to a position a little in front
of Ypres. With the exception of the Pilkem Ridge, all the ground gained
in the terrific fighting of 1917 was thus given up. Indeed, astride and
south of the Menin Road, the line was further back than it had been in
1915.
Early in June the 49th Division took over the line, from a point a
little north of the Zonnebeke Road, to Zillebeke Lake. This line was
divided into two brigade sectors, the third brigade being in divisional
reserve. Thus brigades had sixteen days in the front line and eight
days in rest. Each brigade had two battalions in the front line so
that, now there were only three battalions to a brigade, one battalion
had to do a continuous tour of sixteen days.
On the afternoon of June 3rd the Battalion moved by light railway
to near Vlamertinghe Chateau, where it detrained. As soon as it was
getting dusk, the men marched off to carry out the relief. That
night the enemy artillery was extremely active; in fact, it was the
“liveliest” night the Battalion had near Ypres the whole summer. Rome
Farm was being very heavily shelled as the men went past towards the
Menin Road, and when they reached Kruisstraat they passed into an area
thick with mustard gas. A heavy bombardment of Warrington Road and the
vicinity of the Lille Gate, with 8-inch gas shells, was in progress.
This greatly hampered the relief, as respirators had to be worn for
considerable distances; but, luckily, the Battalion got in with
practically no casualties.
The front line was about a line in length and was held by three
companies, disposed as follows:--
Right: B Company, from Zillebeke Lake to the Warrington Road.
Only one platoon occupied the front line posts, the remainder
living in the dugouts along the western edge of the Lake.
Centre: D Company, from the Warrington Road to a point
north-west of Moated Grange.
Left: A Company, from the flank of D Company to the
Ypres-Roulers Railway, about 300 yards west of Hellfire Corner.
C Company was in reserve in a line about 500 yards in rear of the front
line.
Battalion H.Q. was in the Ramparts of Ypres, not far from the Lille
Gate. Never had such a commodious place been occupied before. When
preparations were in progress for the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917,
two divisional H.Q. had been constructed in the Ramparts, one near
the Lille Gate and one near the Menin Gate. Now that the line had
been withdrawn so far, these had come into use for battalions. There
were rooms and to spare, lit up with electric light and comfortably
furnished. Every H.Q. officer had his separate room, and there were
also a fine large mess and a good office.
The front line was not very satisfactory. On the left it was continuous
and good, but on the right posts were completely isolated. It was
fortunate too that the weather was fine, for the ground was very low
and would quickly have become water-logged. The dugouts on the west
side of Zillebeke Lake provided any amount of good accommodation for B
Company, but the other companies were not nearly so well off in that
respect. The reserve line occupied by C Company was also inferior.
When the Battalion took over the line there were no communication
trenches, and all movement was across the open. The outgoing unit--the
15th Battalion King’s Royal Rifle Corps--stated that no movement in
the open was advisable by day as enemy sniping was very accurate. This
did not suit the Battalion at all, and, right from the start, officers
began to make the usual tours of inspection. At first these were
carried out with extreme care, all movement being done by crawling; but
soon it was found that the enemy was very inactive, and, even before
communication trenches were dug, movement in ones and twos became
general.
[Illustration: Capt. H. H. AYKROYD, M.C.]
[Illustration: Capt. W. N. BROOMHEAD, T.D.]
[Illustration: Capt. W. GRANTHAM.
(Died of Wounds).]
[Illustration: Capt. S. BALME.]
The sector turned out to be a very quiet one. The 1st Landwehr
Division was holding the line opposite, and these troops were of poor
discipline and low morale. If left alone they remained very quiet, and
there was little machine gun or rifle fire. The enemy artillery was
rarely active. Nothing approaching the bombardment, which had taken
place on the night of June 3rd/4th, ever occurred again. The chief
feature of the artillery fire was the use of Blue Cross gas shells,
which caused violent sneezing but were practically harmless.
From the Ramparts good observation could be obtained of much of the
area occupied by the enemy. It was very tantalising to see Germans
moving about in the neighbourhood of Kit and Kat Post, upon which A and
B Companies had expended so much labour the previous January. All this
ground, which was under observation, was well known to the Battalion,
from its experiences of the previous winter. Very little movement was
observed near the front line.
No Man’s Land was covered with thick grass and was ideal for
patrolling, either by night or day. In this department there was great
activity. It was not that identifications were needed, for these were
well known; but the more activity the Battalion could display, the less
likely the enemy would be to weaken the front. Before long, the whole
of No Man’s Land, to a depth of several hundred yards, was well known.
Several patrols were seriously interfered with by Blue Cross gas.
The first tour was not without excitement. On the night of June
10/11th a strong patrol, consisting of two officers (Sec.-Lieut. F.
Woodward and Sec.-Lieut. A. Charlesworth) and 12 other ranks, moved out
towards Hill 40. As they drew near to it, they thought they detected
movement behind a hedge. They halted and, soon after, were challenged
by a sentry in German. Sec.-Lieut. F. Woodward fired at him with his
revolver, and at once the whole patrol opened rapid fire. The enemy,
who was evidently there in strength, retaliated with a shower of
bombs, wounding Sec.-Lieut. Woodward and three of his men. The action
continued for some minutes, but at length Sec.-Lieut. Charlesworth,
finding he could make no impression on the hostile position, withdrew
the patrol. It was afterwards found that the enemy had a very strong
post on Hill 40, from which good observation was obtained of the
British line.
The next night the Battalion was relieved and went back into Brigade
Reserve. Two companies garrisoned part of the Brielen Line, astride
the Ypres-Poperinghe Road. The other two companies held a reserve line
south of Ypres, from Kruisstraat to near the Lille Gate. At this time
the Battalion was somewhat depleted in strength, owing to a mild form
of influenza, commonly known as “Chink Fever.”
(_c_) The Zillebeke Raid.
The one absorbing interest of this period of Brigade Reserve was the
raid, which eventually came off on the night of June 19/20th. There was
little opportunity for rehearsal or training, as the companies were
scattered, and many men were tied down to certain posts. But the plan
was worked out most carefully, down to the minutest detail, by the
Commanding Officer, who made nearly all the arrangements and wrote the
orders himself. The plan was as follows:--
1. The object of the operation was to secure identification and
to do as much damage to the enemy as possible.
2. Twelve platoons of the Battalion[19] were to take part, and
these were divided into three parties:--
(_a_) Two platoons of C Company, whose task was to seize
and hold Hill 40, thus guarding the left flank of the main
operation.
(_b_) A Company, operating north of the Warrington Road.
(_c_) B Company, operating south of the Warrington Road.
A and B Companies were each reinforced by a platoon from D
Company.
3. Objectives:--
(_a_) B Company: The line Hellblast
Corner--Tuilerie--Tuilerie Chimney.
(_b_) A Company: 1st Objective: Enemy posts about 100 yards east
of Cavalry Road.
2nd Objective: Halfway House.
4. All platoons were to be assembled in No Man’s Land by 11-30 p.m. At
12-0 midnight the advance was to begin. First objectives were to be
taken by the front platoons of companies. When B Company had gained
all its objectives, Capt. N. T. Farrar was to fire a red light as a
signal to A Company, the support platoons of which would then advance
on Halfway House.
5. The whole were to withdraw at 1-30 a.m.
6. The artillery was to open fire at 12-15 a.m. and put down a standing
barrage along the line of Leinster Road. If the wind were favourable,
it was also to put down a smoke barrage to cover the advance. But there
was to be no creeping barrage.
Late in the evening of June 19th, the troops who were to take part
marched into Ypres. As soon as it was dark enough to conceal movement
they assembled in the British front line, and, about 11-0 p.m., moved
out into No Man’s Land. The night was very bright, the moon being
almost at the full, and there was some anxiety that the enemy might
detect the assembly and put down a barrage. But everything went well
and not a shot was fired. All were in position by 11-45 p.m. Battalion
H.Q. was established in a dugout in the British front line, and from
there the Commanding Officer was in telephonic communication with Major
Fenton, who was in the Ramparts. At 12-0 midnight the advance began,
and, by a great stroke of luck, almost at the same moment, the moon
disappeared behind a thick bank of clouds.
About 12-10 a.m. the left flank of C Company made contact with the
enemy. As they were approaching the post on Hill 40, they encountered
a working party, about thirty strong. Shots were exchanged, and the
Germans retired a short distance; but the post had, unfortunately,
been warned. The flank party was heavily fired on, and Sec.-Lieut.
H. E. Burgoyne was wounded. Sergt. R. Wilson was also wounded in the
left arm, but remained at duty for some time, until the pain and
loss of blood from his wound weakened him so much that he was forced
to give up. Long grass and the broken nature of the ground impeded
the advance, and, by the time the post was reached, its garrison had
withdrawn. Sec.-Lieut. B. Crickmer, who had now assumed command of both
the platoons, took up a position facing north-east, about fifty yards
beyond the post. Here he became heavily engaged with large numbers
of the enemy. All attempts to advance were met by heavy machine gun
and rifle fire, and by bombs; and although several casualties were
undoubtedly inflicted, he was unable to secure an identification. About
1-0 a.m. artillery fire began to harass the party, but the men held
on to their position until it was time to withdraw, and successfully
carried out their duty of covering the left flank of the raid. At 1-30
a.m. they withdrew, covered by a small rearguard, and regained their
lines.
Meanwhile, the major part of the operation was going extremely well.
At 12-15 a.m. the British barrage opened, the bursting shells showing
up splendidly against the thick wall of smoke, which was soon built
up. It was a picture. Apparently this was the first warning the enemy
artillery had, that anything unusual was happening. Shortly after, the
enemy barrage came down, and then the wisdom of starting to advance
fifteen minutes before zero hour was clearly proved. By the time the
German guns got into action all the raiders were beyond the barrage
lines, and, that night, the Battalion did not suffer a single casualty
from shell fire.
On the extreme right, Sergt. F. J. Field’s platoon reached its
objective with very little opposition; Vickers and Lewis guns were
then brought into action, effectually guarding the right flank of the
attack. In the centre Sec.-Lieut. H. R. Newman, with No. 5 Platoon,
advanced along the C3 Line and became engaged about fifty yards in
front of the Tuilerie. This post was strongly held and wired; but
the men cut through two belts of wire, crept up to within ten yards,
and rushed the position. Four prisoners and a light machine gun were
captured, several casualties were inflicted, and the remainder of the
garrison made off. A little later, Sec.-Lieut. R. E. Jones came up
south of the Tuilerie, and the line from that point to Hellblast Corner
was firmly held until the end of the operation.
But the left platoon of B Company--No. 8 under Sec.-Lieut. W. G.
Bradley--had a very rough time. When about 150 yards from its
objective, the Tuilerie Chimney, three machine guns opened on the
leading section at only a few yards’ range. So heavy were the
casualties that only two unwounded men were left in the section after
the first burst. The other sections were also heavily engaged by an
enemy post further to the left. Three attempts were made to rush the
position, but without success. The platoon was harassed by machine guns
and trench mortars, and had become so reduced in strength, owing to
casualties, that Sec.-Lieut. Bradley was forced to break off the action
and simply hold on to the position already reached.
Capt. N. T. Farrar was anxiously awaiting the signals from his platoon
commanders, which would show that their objectives had been reached.
These were received from his right and centre platoons, but not from
his left, for the reasons already given. However, from his own position
well forward in No Man’s Land, he judged that the right flank was
sufficiently secure for A Company to advance; and so, at 1-0 a.m., he
fired his red signal light.
Meanwhile, A Company in the centre had been even more successful. The
earlier part of its advance had been quite uneventful, and contact with
the enemy had not been made until near Cavalry Road. Here a few bombs
had been thrown, but the Germans had quickly withdrawn. The two leading
platoons, under Sec.-Lieuts. R. M. Leddra and J. E. Bentley, crossed
the road and occupied a line of trenches, about 200 yards beyond. Near
the road Sec.-Lieut. Leddra came across a large dugout, which he bombed
with M.S.K. grenades; three Germans came out and were promptly made
prisoners. The Company Commander, Sec.-Lieut. B. H. Huggard, had gone
well forward to keep in touch with the situation; with the assistance
of no one but his runner, he himself rounded up four of the enemy who
were trying to escape. Considerable numbers of Germans were seen making
off to the rear, and some were shot while doing so. But at this point
the smoke screen, which had been of great assistance in covering the
earlier stages of the advance, helped the enemy. Many, who otherwise
would almost certainly have been captured, were completely lost sight
of in the smoke.
By 12-45 a.m. all five platoons of A Company had crossed Cavalry Road
and were drawn up ready to advance on Halfway House, as soon as the
signal should be fired by B Company. As has already been said, this
signal was sent up at 1-0 a.m. But it was not seen owing to the smoke.
This was very unfortunate for A Company was quite ready, and there was
ample time for the second part of the operation to be carried out.
So, no further advance was attempted, but the positions reached were
maintained by all parties until the withdrawal.
At 1-30 a.m. the withdrawal began, and was carried out very
successfully. White tapes marked the gaps which had been cut in the
wire, and rockets were sent up from the Ramparts at Ypres, to direct
any who had lost their direction. About 2-0 a.m. patrols went out to
search for wounded, the Commanding Officer personally assisting in this
work. Several wounded were brought in and the work was certainly well
done, for the Battalion had only one man missing out of over 350 who
had gone “over the top.” Platoons moved back to their former stations
in Brigade Reserve, where a well-earned sleep awaited them.
Though the second part of the operation--the attack on Halfway
House--was not attempted, the raid was a great success. Eleven
prisoners and a light machine gun had been captured, and considerable
casualties had undoubtedly been inflicted on the enemy. The total
casualties of the Battalion were 3 other ranks killed, one officer and
16 other ranks wounded, and one other rank missing. This was extremely
light, considering that three quarters of the Battalion had spent one
and a half hours in the enemy’s lines. But by far the most satisfactory
result of the raid was its effect on morale. Many of the officers and
men who took part had only been with the Battalion a very short
time, and a large number of the latter were very young and had seen
no fighting before. The old soldier has learned to take things as they
come, but success or failure have great effect on inexperienced and
young soldiers. So it was with this raid. They went into action boys;
they came out almost veterans.
[Illustration: _Raid near Zillebeke._
_19/20. 6. 18._]
For their services in connection with this raid, Sec.-Lieuts. B. H.
Huggard and H. R. Newman were each awarded the Military Cross. Sergts.
A. Loosemore, V.C., R. Wilson and F. J. Field received Distinguished
Conduct Medals; and sixteen other ranks gained the Military Medal.
(_d_) Quiet Days in the Ypres Salient.
The night after the raid the Battalion was relieved in Brigade Reserve,
and went to Siege Camp for rest. This camp lay on the east side of
the Vlamertinghe-Elverdinghe Road. It consisted mainly of Nissen
huts, but there were also a number of sandbag shelters and one or two
pill-boxes. The surroundings were very pleasant. All the time the 49th
Division remained in the Ypres Salient, the Battalion’s rest periods
were spent at Siege Camp. One period was much like another. Of the
seven complete days out of the line, the first was devoted to baths and
interior economy, and then three days were occupied with training and
three were spent at work on one or other of the defensive lines in the
neighbourhood.
All the work, of whatever nature, was allotted by tasks. If the men
could finish in two days, they had a day off. But the tasks were heavy.
Some very good work indeed was done by the Battalion during these rest
periods, and, looking back now, it seems a pity that all this work
was unnecessary; for none of the lines, so carefully constructed and
strongly fortified, ever had to be held against an enemy attack.
Training was carried out mainly under company arrangements, but, on
one or two occasions, battalion schemes were worked out, particularly
one in which the Vlamertinghe Line was used as an objective. The
Battalion had its own miniature rifle range and its own football field.
The latter was much used. Not many hundred yards away was a Belgian
detention camp, with the officers and N.C.O’s of which the Battalion
was on very good terms. Enemy shelling was not serious. There was a
good deal of searching for the many gun positions which covered the
area, but it was seldom that shells dropped dangerously near Siege
Camp. One unlucky shot severely wounded Sec.-Lieut. A. Charlesworth
during a tactical tour.
The main form of relaxation was dancing. For this the Battalion band
was in nightly demand, and the absence of ladies did not interfere
with the enjoyment. The first dance hall was an old ammunition store,
the floor being covered with a large tarpaulin. When this store was
pulled down, the band was ejected from a wooden platform which had been
built for it near the orderly room, and had to perform on the bare
earth while the dancers monopolised the floor. All ranks took part;
the Regimental Sergeant-Major could usually be seen affectionately
encircling the waist of a signaller, while the Medical Officer and
others have been known to grace the floor.
Gradually the nightmare of the enemy offensive was passing away. At
first the days were full of rumours and alarms. Most elaborate defence
schemes had been worked out, and heavy artillery counter-preparations
were common at night, and in the early morning. Reports came through
of the attacks on the French down south, but it gradually became clear
that the enemy’s power of attack was being worn out. From the first
news of his attack on July 15th, it was obvious that little success
had been gained. Then, three days later, came word of Marshal Foch’s
great counter-stroke on the flank, which not only robbed the Germans of
the little ground they had gained south of the Marne, but drove them
headlong to the Vesle. Almost at once everyone realised that the danger
was past, and that soon it would be the turn of the British to attack.
But this is anticipating.
On June 29th the Battalion returned to the line, relieving the 1/7th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. This time it was holding the right of
the Left Brigade Sector. The front extended from near White Chateau
to the vicinity of Dragoon Farm. It was held by three companies, each
having its platoons distributed in depth in three lines. The fourth
company was in battalion reserve, occupying a line in front of the
civilian cemetery near the Menin Gate--the cemetery in which lie the
remains of Prince Maurice of Battenberg. Battalion H.Q. occupied the
old divisional H.Q. near the Menin Gate.
For sixteen continuous days the Battalion held this front. It was the
longest unbroken trench tour that it had ever done, and most men were
heartily sick of it by the time it came to an end. The tour was not
particularly exciting. The enemy remained quiet, and, until the last
few days, little but defensive patrolling was done. Almost nightly
raids by the 148th Infantry Brigade had put the enemy so much on the
alert that there was little hope of success for minor enterprises.
During the last few days patrols became more active. Early one morning
Sec.-Lieut. J. W. Entwhistle penetrated deeply into No Man’s Land and
located some enemy posts, which he believed were held at night. The
following evening he took out a fighting patrol, hoping to occupy
these posts before the enemy arrived. But he was not early enough. The
Germans were there first, were thoroughly alert, and received him with
a hail of machine gun bullets. Fortunately he succeeded in withdrawing
without casualties. It was afterwards thought that the enemy might have
discovered the visit paid to his posts in the early morning, owing
to the removal of “souvenirs” by members of the British patrol. On
another occasion Sec.-Lieut. J. A. Steele occupied West Farm, a ruined
building about 500 yards out in No Man’s Land, for a whole day, with
no result, except that his party suffered torments from the bites of
the horse flies which swarmed in the long grass. On the night of July
9/10th there was a terrific thunderstorm, with drenching rain. One
platoon, which was carrying R.E. material up to the front line along
F Track--the left boundary of the Battalion sub-sector--was struck by
lightning. Two men were killed instantly, but the rest, though thrown
violently to the ground, escaped with a severe shaking.
Messenger dogs were in use on this sector and some were even stationed
at Company H.Q. This gave an opportunity to the sporting spirits among
the officers, who backed their dogs to arrive with messages first. For
some time the same dog always won, and by so big a margin that no
one could understand the reason. At length the mystery was solved. A
sentry had made friends with the losing dog, which was in the habit of
stopping daily to see him when it passed his post.
The most important feature of this long tour was the appearance of
American troops. The 30th Division of the American Expeditionary Force
had been attached to the 49th and 33rd Divisions for instruction.
This division was recruited entirely from North and South Carolina
and Tennessee. Some of its companies boasted continuity from units
of the Confederate Army in the American Civil War, and many of the
officers and men were descendants of those who had fought under Lee
and Jackson; indeed, the Intelligence Officer of one of the regiments
of this division was a grandson of General Robert E. Lee. Physically
the men were very fine, and the standard of education among them was
very high. They were mostly recruited from agricultural districts,
and were magnificent rifle shots. During the tour many officers and
other ranks--or, as they are called in the American Army, “enlisted
men”--were attached to the Battalion for instruction in trench duties.
They proved themselves very keen to learn, and the Battalion got on
well with them.
On July 15th the Battalion went back for its second period of rest at
Siege Camp. After eight days it went into brigade reserve to the Right
Sector. But the same night, before the relief was carried out, the men
were engaged in an operation of, to them, an entirely new type. This
operation was always known as Scheme B. It was a cloud gas discharge,
and was to be carried out as follows:--
1. Nine light railway trains, each consisting of seven trucks,
all loaded with gas cylinders, were to be brought up to Austral
Dump by light engines. Here they were to be taken over by the
Battalion, six men to a truck, and pushed out into No Man’s Land
in front of White Chateau, along an old light railway which ran
there.
2. The men were then to withdraw into the support line, and the
gas from all the cylinders was to be discharged simultaneously
by a system of detonators, exploded electrically.
3. When sufficient time had been allowed for the gas to clear,
the men were to go out again and push the trucks back to Austral
Dump, where they would be taken charge of by the light railway
men again.
The Battalion’s part in the operation sounded simple, but it was to
prove far otherwise.
On the night of July 23/24th the Battalion was brought up by light
railway trains to near Ypres, and marched from there to Austral Dump.
The first part of the operation went off smoothly. Apart from one burst
of enemy machine gun fire, which wounded two men at Austral Dump,
nothing exciting happened. The trains were pushed into position in No
Man’s Land without great difficulty, and the men withdrew according
to plan. The gas was liberated and a dense white cloud floated slowly
across No Man’s Land. The enemy made no sign. Fifteen minutes after
the discharge, the men went out again to remove the trucks. Then the
trouble began. The trucks should have been much lighter after the
discharge, but they were undoubtedly much harder to push. The air was
thick with the gas, but so hard was the work that respirators could not
be worn properly, and most men simply had the nose-clip and mouth piece
adjusted. The oil of the wheels was clogged by the gas, the ground was
slippery from the recent rains and afforded little foothold, and there
was not sufficient room to move properly between the railway line and
the barbed wire fences beside it. The first part of the way was up an
incline, and trucks were continually derailed. To get these latter
on to the lines again, the cylinders had to be unloaded, and then
replaced. It was found impossible to move whole trains, and trucks had
to be uncoupled, and pushed in twos and threes. Even then they could
only be moved by officers and N.C.O’s shouting to the men to “heave,”
as in a tug-of-war. It was almost daylight before the last trucks
crossed the British front line. Every man was thoroughly exhausted,
and many were suffering more or less from the effects of the gas. It
had been a terribly anxious time for the Commanding Officer, who had
himself been working as hard as anyone.
Strange to say, through it all the enemy remained completely inactive.
The moon was very bright, and the noise must have been audible several
hundreds of yards away. Yet, not a shot was fired; not a shell burst
anywhere near. Could the gas have had so deadly an effect? Little was
ever heard of the result of the operation. Patrols reported many dead
rats in No Man’s Land. Later, prisoners from the 6th Cavalry Division,
which relieved the 1st Landwehr Division, spoke vaguely of the latter
having been withdrawn owing to the use of a new gas by the British. But
nothing more definite was ever learned by the Battalion.
After nine days in Brigade Reserve, the Battalion again took over the
Zillebeke Sector, this time relieving the 2nd Battalion, 118th Regiment
of the 30th American Division. This Division was now undergoing the
last stage of its instruction, and during the whole tour the Battalion
had an American company in the line with it. Each company came in for
three days, the system of instruction being as follows:--
1st Day: Every American officer and other rank was attached to
his British “opposite number,” went with him everywhere, and
shared all his duties.
2nd Day: An American platoon, under its own officer, relieved
one British platoon in each company, and for twenty-four hours
worked under the orders of the British company commander. The
American platoons, during this time, carried out exactly the
same duties as the British would have done had they been there.
3rd Day: The four American platoons were again concentrated
under their own company commander, and relieved one of the
British companies in the front line. For twenty-four hours the
American company was responsible for its sector, and carried on
the usual work, patrols, sentry duties, etc.
It will thus be seen that, quite early, American troops were placed
in more responsible positions than the Portuguese had been, when they
were undergoing similar training. Throughout this tour Major Callen,
the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 117th Regiment, whose
companies were in the line, lived at the 4th Battalion H.Q.
Several minor events marked the tour. On August 3rd the dugouts along
the west side of Zillebeke Lake were heavily shelled, and B Company
H.Q. was demolished. This was believed to be a result of the unusual
movement caused by the American troops. It was the custom at this time
for all front line troops to move about two hundred yards into No
Man’s Land early in the morning, and remain there until nearly dawn.
This was done to avoid the enemy barrage, which would be put down on
the British front line if an attack were intended. But apparently the
enemy discovered this manœuvre, for he began to shell No Man’s Land
in the early morning, and several casualties were suffered. A relief
too had taken place opposite. The 1st Landwehr Division had gone and
the 6th Cavalry Division, which had been dismounted for some time and
had seen service as infantry in Alsace, was holding the front. These
troops proved to be of much higher morale, and stubbornly resisted all
attempts to secure prisoners. But, the last morning the Battalion was
in the line, a young Dragoon was captured near Moated Grange, by two
officers of A Company.
On the night of August 7/8th the 3rd Battalion, 117th American Infantry
Regt., relieved the Battalion, taking over the line completely for
forty-eight hours. After one night in the Brielen Line the Battalion
went back to Siege Camp for the third and last time. Its stay in the
Ypres Salient was nearly over. It again held the line from August
16th to August 20th, but, on the latter date, it was relieved by the
5th Battalion Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders (34th Division), and,
moving back to a camp near Oosthoek, said good-bye to the Ypres Salient
for ever.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE LAST STAGE.
(_a_) Movements and Training.
On the 23rd of August the Battalion moved by light railway to Proven,
and from thence by train to Audruicq. From there it marched to billets
in Nielles-lez-Ardres--some of the finest it had ever occupied. The
weather was glorious, the country delightful, and a pleasant spell of
rest and training was anticipated. But great events were happening in
the south. On August 8th the Fourth Army, with a French army on its
right, had started a brilliant offensive south of the Somme; when the
situation became more or less stationary there, the Third Army had
taken up the attack further north; and now it was time for the First
Army to play its part. Fresh troops were needed and the 49th Division
was ordered south. Moving from Nortkerque to Wavrans by train, the
Battalion went into billets at Siracourt and Beauvois. There it had its
first experience of training with tanks. A few days later it bussed
to Camblain L’Abbé, where it occupied a hutment camp for nearly a
fortnight.
At Camblain L’Abbé Brig.-General C. G. Lewes, C.M.G., D.S.O., left
the Brigade which he had commanded for almost exactly two years. He
had come to it in the latter days of the Somme battle, but was now
appointed to a home command. He had been a good friend to the Battalion
and there were many regrets when it paraded to say farewell. The men
were drawn up in a hollow square and addressed by the G.O.C., who
thanked them for their loyal support in the past and wished them the
best of luck in the future. He left amid ringing cheers. Brig.-General
H. H. S. Morant, D.S.O., who had formerly commanded a Brigade of the
1st Division, assumed command of the 147th Infantry Brigade.
The time at Camblain L’Abbé was well and pleasantly spent. Much
training in the attack was carried out under the supervision of the
new Brigadier. Various divisional concert parties at the Corps Theatre
provided welcome relaxation; and the excellent Officers’ Club, under
the management of the Canadian E.F.C., was well patronised. Perhaps the
most criticised part of the local arrangements was the exceptionally
hard type of wire bed in use in the camp; all who slept there will
remember these.
On September 13th the 49th Division took over the line immediately
north of the River Scarpe, and the Battalion moved to Roclincourt,
where it was in divisional reserve. Time still passed pleasantly. Tanks
were again to the fore in training. An inter-company Rugby football
competition was played, and provoked much enthusiasm. The 147th
Infantry Brigade never went into the front line here. After about ten
days, the 49th Division was relieved by the 51st Division, and the
Battalion moved to Feuchy.
“Old timers” saw in Feuchy some resemblance to the Johnstone’s Post of
Somme memory--but without the shelling. There was the same chalk soil,
and similar shelters and dugouts were built on the sides of a similar
valley. Accommodation was not of the best. Feuchy was in the middle of
the country over which the battle of Arras had been fought in 1917, and
the Battalion area was almost where the British front line had been for
about five months of the summer of 1918; so good billets could hardly
be expected. On the whole the weather was good, and the neighbourhood
ideal for training. The River Scarpe, with its surrounding marshes, was
useful, not only for swimming, but more than once for the working out
of bridge-head schemes. One night all officers and platoon sergeants
carried out a rather intricate compass march which will not soon be
forgotten, particularly by those who, at one point, found themselves
sitting on horses’ backs in a wide trench. Altogether the time at
Feuchy passed very happily.
Meanwhile, things were moving so quickly that, almost daily, one
looked for fresh victories. On August 26th the First Army had attacked
on both sides of the Scarpe and on that, and the following days, the
British line had been pushed forward some miles, particularly south
of the river. On September 2nd the Canadian Corps had broken right
through the famous Drocourt--Queant Line, south of the river, and had
pushed on almost to the Canal du Nord. On September 27th the passage
of that great obstacle was forced, and, during the next few days, the
high ground to the north of Cambrai was seized and held after terrific
fighting.
The time had come for the 49th Division to play its part in the final
adventure. On October 6th came the orders to move. When, late in the
afternoon, B Echelon, under the command of Major W. C. Fenton, M.C.,
marched out en route for the Divisional Reception Camp at Mont St.
Eloi, the Battalion knew that at last it was for battle; and perhaps,
during all its years of active service, it had never been fitter.
An hour or two later the Battalion,[20] over 650 strong, moved off
and, in the darkness, bussed through the historic Queant--the pivotal
point of the Hindenburg Line--to the neighbourhood of Buissy, where
it bivouaced. For two days it lay idle. Its exact role had not yet
been definitely settled. So unlikely did a move seem on the morning of
October 9th that the adjutant, and most of the company commanders, rode
up to reconnoitre the forward area. They rode on and on, until they
came to the point where they expected to find the front line; it was
occupied by a battery of 6-inch howitzers. Then they heard the news.
Cambrai had fallen that morning, and the Canadians were already well
beyond it. In haste they returned, only to meet the Battalion already
two miles forward on the road. Beyond the Canal du Nord was a sight to
be remembered by anyone who had seen the same ground on the previous
day. Then the country had been covered with transport lines, the camps
of ammunition columns, and all the details to be found immediately
behind the line. Now it was deserted, save for the few odd men left
behind to clear up. While over the hill in front, in that rolling
grass-covered country, line after line and column after column could be
seen moving slowly towards the east. The whole B.E.F. seemed to be on
the march.
[Illustration: Lieut.-Col. A. L. MOWAT, D.S.O., M.C.]
The night was spent in some deserted enemy shelters and dugouts, in a
sunken road to the west of Sancourt. Arriving after dark, there was
little opportunity to make oneself comfortable. The following morning
passed quietly but, about 1-0 p.m., came the orders to move again.
Early in the afternoon the Battalion started. It crossed the Canal de
l’Escaut at Escaudœuvres--the bridge had been in enemy hands barely
twenty-four hours before, but he had left too hurriedly to destroy it.
Yet he had found time wantonly to destroy in his usual manner; the
houses were full of furniture senselessly damaged--chairs broken to
bits, feather beds ripped open, crockery and glass lying smashed on the
floors. An occasional shell was still falling as the Battalion marched
through the village.
A halt was made by the railway embankment to the east of the village.
Rifles were piled, hot tea was served, and the men lay down to get
what rest they could. As darkness fell the scene was one never to be
forgotten--the long rows of piled arms, the hundreds of men lying
around sleeping or talking in whispers, the occasional glimmer of a
light. It was a scene such as one sees in pictures of old-time warfare,
and perhaps nothing showed more plainly that the long wearisome days
of trench warfare were past. The stars shone brightly overhead and, to
complete the picture, a small group of Canadian machine gunners sang
song after song in the gloom.
(_b_) October 11th and After.
About 8-0 p.m. the Commanding Officer was summoned to Brigade H.Q. He
was away for about two hours and, on his return, all officers were
summoned. By the light of three candles stuck in the ground, he marked
upon each officer’s map the objectives and boundaries of the attack
which was to be delivered the next morning, and then explained the plan
of operations:--
1. The Battalion was to assemble and dig in before dawn on the
line of the Iwuy--Rieux Road, on a frontage of about 500 yards.
The 7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., with its right
on the Naves--Villers-en-Cauchies Road, would attack on the
Battalion’s right; the 146th Infantry Brigade on its left.
2. A Company was to be on the right and D Company on the left.
B and C Companies were to be in support on the right and left
respectively.
3. It was believed that the enemy was too shaken to put up a
vigorous resistance. Hence it had been decided to attack without
any artillery support.
4. At 9-0 a.m. the attack was to begin, the first objective
being the railway line midway between Avesnes-le-Sec and
Villers-en-Cauchies, and the second objective the high ground
east of the La Selle River.
The attack was part of a very big operation on a wide front and the
task of the 49th Division was a most important one. Opposite to the
Battalion’s front, with its crest line about a mile from the assembly
position, lay a long ridge. This was held by the enemy. The Canadians
were to make an attack on the ridge that very night. If they succeeded,
the Battalion would advance through them the next morning, and the
first part of its task would be easy. But if they failed, the ridge
must be captured by the Battalion, on its way to the first objective.
_The ridge must be taken at all costs._ This was the definite
order of the Divisional Commander. It was a point of extreme tactical
importance, and its possession by the enemy was holding up the whole
flank of the attack. Such were the orders issued by the Commanding
Officer.
An advanced party was sent forward to reconnoitre routes to the
assembly positions. Tea was served out and the Battalion waited only
for rations to arrive. Time passed, there was no sign of the convoy,
and the Commanding Officer became very anxious. It was imperative for
the men to reach their assembly positions and dig in before dawn.
The Battalion was on the point of moving off rationless when the
limbers were announced. The delay had been no fault of the transport.
Throughout the operations they always served the Battalion well. But
the roads were crowded with vehicles of all kinds, and they had had
to fetch the rations from a great distance. It was simply one of the
difficulties which had to be faced in the new warfare of movement.
Shortly after midnight the Battalion moved off. It passed through
Naves, which was thick with mustard gas, and was met about a thousand
yards beyond by Battalion scouts, who had gone forward to reconnoitre
the routes. Leaving the roads, companies crossed the Erclin River
at points where the bed was dry, and moved independently to their
positions of assembly. These were not reached without difficulty.
The night was very dark and the ground strange. Troops of the 146th
Infantry Brigade were using the same route, and there was some
confusion. To make matters worse, the enemy put down a fairly heavy
counter-preparation on the field which the companies were crossing, and
about ten men were wounded. But, by 4-0 a.m., all were up and digging
in. Everything was quiet when daylight came, and the hours dragged
slowly on.
From the road on which the Battalion was assembled, the ground sloped
gently upwards to the ridge, already mentioned. The land between was
mostly under cultivation and afforded no cover to attacking troops.
Near the top of the ridge was a stack of bean straw which formed a
very useful landmark, as it was almost on the boundary between the two
companies. The night attack of the Canadians had been unsuccessful
and the enemy still held the all-important position. It was therefore
decided that the first hour of the attack should be supported by a
thick barrage. For half-an-hour this was to fall on the crest of the
ridge; after that, it would move forward at the rate of 100 yards in
three minutes for a further half hour. This information did not arrive
at Battalion H.Q. until about 8-20 a.m., and there was barely time to
inform the attacking troops before zero hour.
At 9-0 a.m., prompt to the second, the British artillery opened fire
and the Battalion went “over the top.” The advance was magnificent.
Never, either in action or at training, had it been done better.
In artillery formation, with sections in file and keeping perfect
intervals, the men went quietly and steadily forward. If there were
a fault, it was that of over-eagerness. The leading troops advanced
rather faster than had been expected, and they were on the top of the
ridge before their barrage had lifted.
Almost immediately the enemy barrage came down, consisting mainly
of high explosive. Fortunately, the bulk of it fell just behind the
assembly position and did little harm. Then the enemy machine guns
opened, and these caused more trouble than the artillery. Sections
were forced to extend in order to minimise casualties, but the rate of
advance was scarcely affected. Near the straw stack on the hill, Sergt.
A. Loosemore, V.C., D.C.M., of A Company, went down, shot through both
legs; and the Battalion thus lost a magnificent leader who was liked
by every one and almost worshipped by the men of his platoon. By 9-45
a.m. all four companies had disappeared from view over the crest line.
The enemy’s artillery fire had weakened considerably, many prisoners
were coming in, in charge of lightly wounded men, and everything
seemed to be going well. Battalion H.Q. moved up from the position it
had occupied in the dried-up bed of the River Erclin, and temporarily
established itself on the road where the Battalion had assembled. The
Commanding Officer immediately went forward to the crest of the ridge
to see for himself how the attack was progressing.
The Battalion was now meeting with much stiffer resistance and the
advance had become slower. The British barrage had ceased and the enemy
was better able to get his machine guns into action. Ground could now
only be gained by infiltration, and by manœuvring sections round the
flanks of enemy posts. Casualties were becoming heavier. At one point
the attacking infantry came up against field guns, firing point blank
at them. The 7th Battalion on the right was also meeting with strong
opposition from the enemy in the village of Villers-en-Cauchies. But
the advance still went on. The field guns were captured. It seemed as
if the resistance would gradually be worn down.
Then, about 10-45 a.m., came the great enemy counter-attack. Appearing
from the low ground to the south of Avesnes-le-Sec enemy tanks, eight
in number, advanced against the attacking troops. All men of the
Battalion agree that these tanks were of German pattern, and not
captured British ones. The main force of their first attack fell upon
the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left, which gave way before them and
began to retire. Capt. R. B. Broster of C Company and Sec.-Lieut. H.
Rosendale of D Company were shot down by machine gun fire from a tank,
whilst trying to rally the left flank. Sec.-Lieut. T. E. Jessop of A
Company, with the greatest gallantry, collected several Lewis guns and,
by a concentration of their fire, actually forced one tank to withdraw.
He was seriously wounded a little later and was carried to safety by
the men of his platoon. An unknown man of C Company was seen running
behind another tank, bomb in hand, trying to find an opening into which
to throw it; he too was shot down. Capt. W. Grantham of B Company
was so seriously wounded that he died a few weeks later--a prisoner
in enemy hands. But all was of no avail. With its left flank “in the
air,” heavily pressed by the tanks in front, with no artillery--almost
the only weapon which would have been effective--to support it, the
Battalion began to withdraw. The withdrawal was slow and there was no
panic. But all the hard-won ground, with its killed and wounded, its
field guns and other trophies, was lost.
The Battalion halted a little in front of the road from which it had
started little more than two hours before. All companies had become
hopelessly mixed; the 6th Battalion, which had advanced in rear of the
attacking troops, had become engaged, and its men were mingled with the
men of the 4th Battalion. Furthermore, men from the battalions on the
flanks had also wandered into the area in the confusion. The enemy,
following hard on the rear of his tanks, had reoccupied the ridge, and
was getting his machine guns again into action. His tanks, however, did
not appear over the crest of the ridge; perhaps they were satisfied
with the success gained, and feared to come into view of the British
artillery. There was intense disappointment and not a little confusion
everywhere.
Into the midst of this confusion the Commanding Officer threw himself.
By his presence, personal energy, and utter disregard for danger, he
quickly restored order. Time did not allow of separating the men into
their proper companies, but officers and N.C.O’s, assuming command
of whatever men were near them, including men of other battalions,
resolved confusion into order, disappointment into hope; and the
Battalion was a fighting force again. Then it advanced to the attack
once more.
This second advance was not so orderly as the first had been, but, in
some ways it was, perhaps, finer. Without a gun to support it, through
a hail of machine gun bullets, with men falling in scores, the line
went forward. The Colonel led, his Battalion followed. “_The ridge
must be taken at all costs._” Those had been the words of the
Divisional Commander the night before. And Lieut.-Col. Mowat and his
men meant to take that ridge. Slowly, at first by section rushes and
later, when casualties became heavier and heavier, by infiltration,
they pressed on towards the crest. Conditions were much worse, in every
way, than they had been earlier in the day. Losses were appalling.
Sec.-Lieuts. J. E. Bentley and H. M. Marsden, both of A Company, with
many N.C.O’s and men, went down. But the advance never stopped. For a
time the enemy maintained his position well, but, as the attack came
nearer and nearer, his resistance began to weaken, and at length he
gave way and retired. For the second time that day, about 1-0 p.m., the
ridge was won. But at what a cost! Of the Battalion, over 650 strong,
which had bivouaced by the railway at Escaudœuvres on the previous
evening, little more than 250 remained.
The rest of the day passed comparatively quietly. The enemy made no
further attempt to restore the situation, but any movement on the
ridge was promptly shelled. There was much work to be done. During the
afternoon the 6th Battalion was withdrawn to reorganise as Brigade
Reserve. Companies were reorganised, their own men returning to them,
and rectifications were made in the line. For a time there was some
anxiety about the left flank, the next Brigade not being so far forward
as the Battalion; this was, to some extent, met by sending up two H.Q.
Lewis gun teams to strengthen that flank. In all this reorganisation
Capt. A. Kirk, M.C., of A Company, was the right-hand man of the
Commanding Officer. He established his Company H.Q. by the, now
famous, straw stack, and exercised a general supervision over the whole
of the front line.
When darkness fell the new line had been firmly established. Rain had
fallen during the afternoon, all were thoroughly weary, and a deep
sense of disappointment oppressed everyone. No one yet understood
how great a success had really been gained; this it remained for the
morning to show.
During the night active preparations were in progress for the advance
to be continued the next day. The 6th Battalion relieved the 7th
Battalion on the right, the latter becoming Brigade Reserve. Guns were
pushed forward in the most daring fashion--some actually into No Man’s
Land--ready to deal with hostile tanks should they again appear. The
advance was to start at 12-0 noon, under cover of a heavy barrage.
In the early hours of the morning the enemy heavily shelled the
neighbourhood of Battalion H.Q. with “whizz-bangs,” but the meaning of
this was not realised until the next morning. Actually, he was shooting
away the ammunition before withdrawing his guns to the east of the La
Selle River.
Next morning everyone was about early, though there was plenty of time
before zero hour. The damp and cold of the night, and the discomfort
of the narrow slits, which were the only cover available, were no
inducement to late rising. The sun rose bright, but a thin mist hung
about the ground. Preparations for the attack were leisurely made and
the quietness of the enemy was commented on. But it was not until an
officer’s patrol had pushed far out in front of the line, and the
Brigadier himself had ridden nearly to Villers-en-Cauchies, that the
situation was realised. The capture of the ridge on the previous day
had made the enemy’s position untenable; he had withdrawn during
the night, and all touch with him had been lost. Fresh orders were
immediately issued--the Brigade was to advance at once, without any
barrage, and make good the line of the railway which had been its first
objective the day before. On the right the 24th Division had already
started, and was well forward.
By 10-15 a.m. the Battalion was on the move. Covered by an advanced
guard, consisting of the H.Q. scouts and the remnants of a platoon of
B Company, it moved forward in artillery formation, two companies in
front and two in support. The 6th Battalion maintained the alignment
on the right, but some difficulty and delay were caused by the 146th
Infantry Brigade, which did not move on the left until some time
later. At first the advance led over the ground that had been won and
lost on the previous day. Everywhere was evidence of the stern fight
that had been made. The tracks of the tanks were clear in the grass,
and the ground was strewn with the bodies of those who had fought and
died. Only then was it realised how far the advance had, at one time,
reached. The fate of many a man was cleared up. At one point a German
machine gunner was found sitting behind his gun, dead; by his side lay
the man who had killed him, also dead, with his bayonet right through
the German’s body. The inevitable “booby trap” was also in evidence--a
brand new German machine gun, with a wire running from it to a spot a
few yards away; but there was no time to examine the appliance.
On went the Battalion, across valleys and over ridges--and never a
shell nor a bullet from the enemy. By noon the advanced guard was
almost on the railway, but here the advance was again delayed for
about half-an-hour. During the night the 51st Division had relieved
the Canadians on the left, and was to have taken part in the attack
timed for noon. Unlike the 49th Division its orders were not
cancelled, and down came its barrage, promptly to time, a number of
4.5 inch howitzer shells falling about the area which the Battalion
advanced guard had reached. However, about 12-30 p.m., the advance
was resumed. The Battalion reached its objective, the line of the
Avesnes-le-Sec--Villers-en-Cauchies Railway, without further incident
about 1-30 p.m. Orders were issued for three companies to dig in on
that line, with the fourth in reserve in a sunken road west of the
railway.
Meanwhile, the advanced guard had pushed forward more than a thousand
yards beyond the railway and had, at length, gained touch with the
enemy. On approaching Vordon Wood, near the La Selle River, it was met
by rifle and machine gun fire, not only from the wood in front but also
from a small copse on the left flank. Numbers of the enemy were seen
on the high ground south-west of Haspres. It was obvious from the
volume of fire that the enemy was present in some strength, and that,
without support, further progress by the advanced guard was impossible.
[Illustration: _Oct. 11th. 1918._]
About 4 p.m. orders to advance and capture Vordon Wood were received.
Half-an-hour later the Battalion, preceded by an advanced guard as
before, moved forward. As the leading troops approached the wood they
were again held up by hostile fire, and had to halt until two companies
of the Battalion came up. The 146th Infantry Brigade had occupied
Avesnes-le-Sec, but had not pushed far beyond it. As a result the small
copse on the left was still held by the enemy, and seriously menaced
the attack on Vordon Wood. To counteract this the reserve company, C
Company, was moved up to form a defensive flank, facing north.
By this time darkness had fallen. The right of the wood was attacked,
and was taken without much difficulty. The enemy rearguard did not
put up much of a fight, but withdrew as soon as the situation looked
serious, leaving two prisoners in the Battalion’s hands. The wood,
though narrow, was very thick with undergrowth, and provided excellent
cover. Had they been willing to put up a better fight, the Germans
might have caused far more trouble there than they did. The left, or
northern, end of the wood lay outside the Battalion boundary, and no
attempt was made to enter it until the next day. Dispositions for the
night were taken up as follows:--
B and D Companies dug in on the eastern edge of the wood.
A Company was in support on the western edge.
C Company formed a defensive flank, facing north, from the wood
to the railway.
Battalion H.Q. dug in on the railway.
During the night a strong fighting patrol reached the La Selle River
and reconnoitred its banks for more than half a mile, without gaining
touch with the enemy.
Early the next morning it was found that the enemy had been occupying
the northern end of the wood during the night. A small party was seen
to leave it in the morning and retire towards Haspres. About 7-0 a.m.
another party of Germans approached D Company’s posts, but was driven
off by rifle and Lewis gun fire.
October 13th was, more or less, an “off” day for the Battalion. At 9-0
a.m. the 19th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, with the 6th Battalion
Duke of Wellington’s Regt. on its right and the 148th Infantry
Brigade on its left, attacked through the Battalion. The attack was
unsuccessful. It came under heavy artillery and machine gun fire from
the high ground east of the river, which was strongly held by the
enemy, and was unable to make any progress. Throughout the day the
Battalion maintained the positions it had won on the previous night.
Several casualties were suffered from the defensive barrage put down
by the enemy, among them being Capt. F. C. Harrison, the popular and
cheery little Medical Officer. His slit in the railway cutting was hit
by a shell, and he was so severely wounded that he died before he could
be got to the advanced dressing station. Apart from this the day was
uneventful, though there was one false alarm of tanks.
That night the ration convoy met with serious misfortune. Coming into
the village of Villers-en-Cauchies, it was heavily shelled. Company
Quartermaster Sergts. E. Walsh and B. Little, of A and B Companies
respectively, were killed. Two horses were also killed, and the rations
were scattered. Lieut. F. Irish, the Transport Officer, though himself
wounded in two places, acted with great gallantry and coolness,
and succeeded in collecting the rations and delivering them at his
destination.
The next day was warm and sunny. Not long after dawn Sec.-Lieut. E.
Maley, of C Company, was killed by a chance shell, in the rear of
the wood, while he was taking round rum to his men. Since the 148th
Infantry Brigade had come into the line it had pushed forward and
secured the Battalion’s left flank; but a gap still existed between
the two Brigades, the north end of the wood being held by no one. As
C Company was no longer necessary to form a defensive flank, it was
moved up at dusk to occupy that part of the wood and fill the gap. The
wood was very thick and tangled and bore evident signs of recent enemy
occupation; among other things, a tank had been hidden there not many
days before.
During the day, Major-General Lipsett, G.O.C. 4th Division, came up to
make a personal reconnaissance of the front, as it was expected his
division would soon relieve the 49th Division. He went right out in
front of Vordon Wood, in full view of the German posts south-west of
Haspres, was shot through the mouth by the enemy and instantly killed.
His body was brought into the British lines by Lieut. J. Spencer,
Intelligence Officer of the 147th Infantry Brigade, assisted by men of
the Battalion.
On the night of October 14/15th the Battalion was relieved by the
1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. While waiting for the completion
of the relief, Battalion H.Q. was surprised by the arrival of numbers
of French civilians on the railway. They had escaped from the village
of Saulzoir, had found their way through the lines, and were only
too pleased to be at liberty again. What to do with them was the
difficulty, and, in the midst of the excitement, the enemy opened up
on the railway with mustard gas shells. This caused much anxiety for a
time, but eventually they were got to the rear, apparently unharmed.
When the line had finally been taken over the Battalion withdrew into
divisional reserve, in the fields south-west of Avesnes-le-Sec, where
there were some old enemy shelters and dugouts.
For two days the Battalion rested. Accommodation was very poor, but
at such a time no one was particularly fanciful. What all wanted
was rest--the chance of lying down without the probability of being
awakened in a few minutes to stand to. For five days and nights there
had been little rest for anyone, and all were thoroughly done up. There
were no parades and no working parties. Sometimes the enemy shelled the
locality, and a few casualties were suffered.
On the night of October 16/17th the Battalion went back into the line,
taking over the front which it had previously held, with the addition
of some three or four hundred yards on the right. Three companies
were needed to hold this line, and even then it was very thinly held.
Battalion H.Q. lived in the cellars of some houses at the east end of
Villers-en-Cauchies. These were far more comfortable than the slits in
the railway cutting had been, but they had disadvantages too, as the
next night was to show.
Compared with the strenuous activity of the past week, the two-day
tour which followed was quiet. Both the wood and the village were
frequently shelled, and there were several casualties. But worst of all
was the gas shelling. The night after the relief Villers-en-Cauchies
was deluged with mustard gas. All the 6th Battalion H.Q. officers and
details were gassed, and Major Clarkson, M.C., had to be summoned
from the Divisional Reception Camp to take command. Over forty of the
4th Battalion H.Q. details were also so seriously gassed that they
had to be sent down. The cellars occupied by the officers and the Aid
Post were saved only by the lighting of great fires of straw at the
entrance. Box respirators had to be worn for a great part of the night.
Nightly, the enemy was expected to fall back to a fresh rearguard
position. Everyone was very much on the alert for signs of a
withdrawal, in order that the operation might be harassed by a rapid
British advance. The early morning of October 17th was very misty, the
enemy was exceptionally quiet, and the Commanding Officer, who was
up in the line at the time, began to fear that a withdrawal actually
had taken place. About four hundred yards in front of Vordon Wood,
and lying roughly parallel to it, was a sunken road, from which the
ground sloped gently to the river. This Lieut.-Col. Mowat determined
to reconnoitre in person, with the object of locating the enemy if
possible. Setting out from the right flank of the Battalion with
four others, he reached the road and proceeded along it. The mist
had lifted considerably by this time, and, as the patrol came round
a slight bend, it almost ran into an enemy post. Not more than fifty
yards away was a German sentry. With rifle slung over his shoulder,
and wearing greatcoat and soft cap, he was pacing up and down the road
like a sentry in front of the guard-room. Fortunately, when first
seen, he had his back turned, which gave the patrol a moment’s grace.
Withdrawing a few yards down the road, the men climbed the bank and
made off towards the wood. The Germans, who proved to be about twelve
strong with a light machine gun, opened fire, but their shooting was
very bad. Retiring by bounds and covered by the fire of individual men,
the patrol reached the wood without loss. Machine and Lewis guns were
immediately brought to bear on the German post, its garrison was driven
from its position and retired towards the river. The encounter had
established the fact that the enemy had not yet withdrawn.
Next day the Battalion was visited by Major-General N. J. G. Cameron.
Usually sparing of words, he was, on this occasion, profuse in his
congratulations on the success which had been gained. Particularly
was he anxious that the men should realise how much they had done on
October 11th--that their fearful losses had not been in vain, but had
made possible a great British success. His views cannot be better
expressed than by quoting his own words when he forwarded to battalions
the congratulations of the Corps Commander, on October 13th:--
“It is with feelings of great pride and pleasure that I forward
to you the attached copy of a message received from the XXII.
Corps Commander. Evidence accumulates to show that your attack
on the 11th October was a very real success. It cost the enemy
heavily and dealt him a severe and much needed blow. It entirely
turned the enemy’s position at Iwuy, the possession of which was
necessary to the further advance of the right wing of the First
Army in the required direction. My heartiest congratulations to
you all.
N. G. Cameron, Major-General,
Commanding 49th (W.R.) Division.”
The Divisional Commander had only just left when the Battalion suffered
another serious loss. The experience of the previous night had shown
the danger of cellar accommodation, and it had been decided to return
to the open. The few available men at Battalion H.Q. set to work
digging slits in an enclosure not far from the building. Foremost among
them was R.S.M. W. Lee, M.C., whose gallantry, tireless energy and
exceptional strength had been conspicuous during the operations. While
at work he was seriously wounded by a chance shell which burst near.
That night the Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion Royal
Warwickshire Regt. (4th Division), and withdrew to billets at Naves.
The relief was not carried out without loss. One party of D Company,
while on its way out of the line, was caught by enemy gas shelling.
Both Sec.-Lieut. J. W. Lumb and Sec.-Lieut. A. H. W. Mallalieu were
hit by fragments, the former so badly that he died in hospital about
ten days later, while the latter lost a leg.
During the night the enemy carried out his long-expected withdrawal, so
that the next day the 4th Division was able to push forward almost to
the River Ecaillon. From one point of view this was very disappointing
to the Battalion. After the hard work of the last week, and the gradual
wearing down of the enemy’s power of resistance, the men would have
liked to reap the benefits themselves. Yet, by that time, all were so
fatigued that probably they could not have taken such full advantage of
the enemy’s retirement as a fresh division was able to do.
While the Battalion had been in the neighbourhood of
Villers-en-Cauchies the transport lines had been established near
Rieux. Capt. H. N. Taylor who, though left out of the battle, had
not gone to the Divisional Reception Camp, organised a party of men,
consisting mainly of the Battalion Band, to search the battlefield of
October 11th. The ground was gone over systematically, the dead were
collected and were properly buried in a cemetery by the cross roads
near Rieux. The cemetery is called the “Wellington Cemetery,” and
there lie the remains of most of those who perished in this series of
actions. Their graves are well tended. French women of the neighbouring
village have taken upon themselves the duty of paying this tribute to
the men who sleep in their midst.
(_c_) Reorganisation.
For three days the Battalion lived in fairly comfortable billets
at Naves. The village had not suffered very severely in the recent
fighting and, since the enemy had fallen back to the River Ecaillon,
was out of range of anything but long distance artillery fire. While
the Battalion was resting there it was never shelled. The urgent
business was reorganisation, for it was probable that the 49th
Division would soon be back in the fighting line. Casualties could
not be replaced, so each company was reorganised on a two-platoon
basis. The loss of the many specialists, who had been gassed in
Villers-en-Cauchies, was very serious. To a certain extent these could
be replaced by the men who were at the Divisional Reception Camp, but
even then the deficiency was great. However, what could be done was
done.
[Illustration: WELLINGTON CEMETERY, Near ROEUX.
In the background is the ridge which the Battalion captured on Oct.
11th, 1918.]
On the 21st of October the Battalion marched to Le Bassin Rond, a small
village at the junction of the Canal de l’Escaut with the Canal de la
Sensée. Its appearance was not at first inviting. No one had lived
there since the Germans had left it a few days before. The houses
were all filthy and full of debris. However, a few hours’ work made a
wonderful improvement. The material structure of most of the houses had
not been injured, and many wire beds and stoves had been left behind
by the previous occupants. Before long the Battalion was comfortably
settled, and a very pleasant week was spent there. The canals were full
of fish, and one of the most popular forms of amusement was “fishing.”
The Germans had been good enough to leave behind them a large dump of
hand grenades, and many of their “potato-mashers” came in very useful
for this purpose. All the sportsman had to do was to drop a bomb into
the canal and then select what he desired in the way of fish from those
which came to the surface, stunned by the explosion. A fleet of small
boats was collected, and, in the delightful autumn weather which lasted
the whole time, many hours were spent on the water. A ferry was rigged
up across the canal between Battalion H.Q. and the companies, and it
became customary, when company commanders were due to attend at Orderly
Room, for the adjutant and his understudy to defend the crossing. It
was seldom that one arrived without a splashing. The Germans had also
left behind them a plentiful supply of fuel, and “colliers” regularly
plied on the deep, between the local “Newcastle” and the consumers on
the other side of the water.
At the same time, much solid work was done. Everyone knew that, at
any moment, the Battalion might be ordered to take its place in the
fighting line. Already the 51st and the 4th Divisions had forced the
passage of the River Ecaillon, and they were now facing the enemy near
the left bank of the La Rhonelle River. Further north the Canadians, on
both banks of the Canal de l’Escaut, had pushed forward nearly to the
western outskirts of Valenciennes, where they were held up temporarily
by the extensive floods. These floods made a direct attack on the
town from the west extremely difficult, and it was therefore decided
to outflank it on the south. To assist in this the 49th Division was
ordered forward.
(_d_) November 1st–2nd.
On October 27th the 147th Infantry Brigade marched to Douchy, where
it was billeted for the night. The next day it moved on, marching
straight across the open country, to take over the line which had been
established by part of the 51st Division. Here it was disposed very
much in depth. The 6th Battalion held the front line to the south-east
of the village of Famers, about a thousand yards west of the La
Rhonelle River. The 7th Battalion was in support among the sunken roads
to the south of Maing. The 4th Battalion was in reserve, occupying
slits in the sunken road between Thiant and Monchaux-sur-Ecaillon, just
east of the river. There was only one house on this road between the
villages, but it had quite a good cellar. Of course this was allotted
to Battalion H.Q., and, with the help of two large trusses of straw,
it was soon made very comfortable. Round about were the wagon lines of
several batteries, all camping in the open. During the first evening
Major W. C. Fenton, M.C., who was commanding the Battalion in the
absence of Lieut.-Col. A. L. Mowat on leave, had an unusual number of
callers from the gunners. Each would drop in in the ordinary way, and,
after a few minutes’ general conversation of the usual type, would
casually ask when the Battalion was going. Before long it dawned on the
occupants that it was not so much their company that was sought after
as their cellar. There were so many applicants for the first refusal
that the Battalion decided, when the next move did come, to slip
quietly away and leave them to fight it out among themselves. As events
turned out, most of them moved before the Battalion.
The next attack, which was in preparation, was delayed for some days.
Originally planned for October 28th, it was three times postponed for
a period of twenty-four hours, and eventually came off on November 1st.
The main plan of attack was as follows:--
1. The 49th Division, with a Canadian division on its left and
the 4th Division on its right, was to attack in the direction
of Saultain, force the passage of the La Rhonelle River, and
outflank the defences of Valenciennes on the south.
2. On the 147th Infantry Brigade front, the 6th Battalion was
to attack from a position south of Famers straight towards
Saultain, with the 7th Battalion in support. The final objective
for the first day was the line of the Marly--Préseau Road,
south-west of Saultain.
For a time the role of the 4th Battalion was uncertain. At first
it was feared the men would have to dump all arms and act as
stretcher-bearers. But in the end, it was decided to keep them in
Brigade Reserve, ready to exploit the situation should the attack
go well. Preparations for this operation, and reconnaissance of the
forward area, kept everyone fully occupied for the next few days. Only
an occasional shell fell near, and no casualties were suffered.
Zero hour for the attack was 5-15 a.m. on November 1st. The evening
before, as soon as it was dark, the Battalion moved up into the area
south of Maing, where it occupied slits in the sunken roads. These had
just been vacated by the 7th Battalion, which had gone forward to the
neighbourhood of Caumont Farm, in support to the attack. Here the night
was spent, the Battalion having orders not to move without direct word
from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q.
At zero hour the men of the 6th Battalion went forward under a
splendid barrage. They crossed the river, partly on fallen trees,
and partly over light bridges, which were carried forward with the
assaulting troops by parties from the 19th Battalion Lancashire
Fusiliers. They captured and held the Aulnoy--Préseau Road, which was
their intermediate objective, and some of them even reached their
final objective. But the 4th Division on their right had not been
so successful; after getting into the village of Préseau, it was
heavily counter-attacked by two regiments of a fresh enemy division
from reserve, and was driven out again. Thus, with its right flank
uncovered, and having suffered heavy casualties, the 6th Battalion
could not hold its final objective. Instead, it dug in on a line in
front of the intermediate objective.
But the success gained was very great. Several hundreds of prisoners
had been taken by the 6th Battalion; indeed, the number of prisoners
captured was almost double the total number of assaulting troops, on
that part of the front. The first party to arrive at Battalion H.Q. was
about 200 strong, and its size caused some uneasiness to the corporal
and five men of the 4th Battalion, who were the only escort available.
Really they had no cause to worry, for the prisoners were only too glad
to be out of it, and all they wanted at the moment was to get well
away from the fighting. As soon as they were marched off they started
running at such a rate that the escort had hard work to keep up with
them. These prisoners were a very mixed lot. Some were fine-looking
men, but the majority were of poor physique, and the proportion of
quite young boys was considerable. Perhaps nothing showed more clearly
the straits to which German man-power had been reduced than the poor
specimens who were captured from the 6th (German) Division--one of the
active divisions which had invaded Belgium at the beginning of August,
1914, and which had been, throughout the war, one of the enemy’s most
famous assault divisions.
The 4th Battalion did not take any real part in the fighting on
November 1st. Soon after 8-0 a.m. it moved up to positions of readiness
near Caumont Farm, which then became Battalion H.Q. About the middle
of the afternoon, when an enemy counter-attack was expected, two
companies were moved further forward. But none ever came into action.
A weak counter-attack did develop in the afternoon, but it was easily
repulsed by the front line troops, who actually advanced their line
some hundreds of yards as a result of it. The enemy indulged in some
scattered shelling, mainly about the river, but no casualties were
suffered by the Battalion.
[Illustration: CAMBRAI--VALENCIENNES.]
It was expected that the Brigade would be relieved that night by the
148th Infantry Brigade. In fact, not only had all preparations been
made for the relief, but practically the whole of the relieving
troops had come up, and some details of the Battalion were on their way
out. Then a sudden alteration was made, and a fresh attack was arranged
for the next morning. During the night the 7th Battalion relieved the
6th Battalion in the front line, and the 4th Battalion moved up into
support. A and C Companies occupied the intermediate objective; B and D
Companies were on the road just east of the river. The 148th Infantry
Brigade relieved the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left. The objective
was the final objective of the previous day.
At 5-30 a.m. on November 2nd the 7th Battalion attacked and easily
gained its objective, which was not a distant one. Nevertheless, nearly
one hundred prisoners were captured during the operation. As soon as
news of the success arrived, D Company was pushed forward into some old
rifle pits behind the intermediate objective, to be ready to assist
should the enemy counter-attack. About 1-30 p.m. an urgent warning
arrived--the R.A.F. had reported that the Mons-Valenciennes Road was
packed with transport and guns moving west, and that masses of troops
could be seen in the neighbourhood of Saultain; a heavy counter-attack
was expected. But nothing happened. The Mons-Valenciennes Road was
crowded with columns; but the R.A.F. had mistaken their direction. They
were moving eastward, not westward. The enemy was in full retreat.
That night the Brigade was relieved by units of the 56th Division. As
these intended to attack at daybreak, exact dispositions were not taken
over, but troops were considered to be relieved as soon as others had
arrived. For the second time within a fortnight the Brigade had just
missed reaping the full reward of its efforts. That night the enemy
retired well behind Saultain, and the “attack” of the 56th Division the
next morning was little more than a promenade.
Perhaps, as the Battalion marched slowly through the night towards
Haulchin, where comfortable billets awaited it, no one realised that he
had seen his last fight--that so far as he was concerned the war was
finished.
CHAPTER XIV.
DEMOBILISATION.
(_a_) Auby and Douai.
After a night at Haulchin and a second at Douchy, the Battalion
embussed for Auby. The road lay entirely through the country which had
recently been evacuated by the enemy. Everywhere were signs of his
occupation and departure. The route was necessarily a circuitous one,
for there were many canals in the district and every bridge had been
destroyed by the enemy during his withdrawal. Only a few temporary
military bridges were in existence, the bare minimum necessary to
supply the advancing British armies. Auby was almost deserted when the
Battalion arrived, and, as it was a large village and the Battalion was
small, there were ample billets. Like all villages recently vacated by
the Germans, it was in a filthy condition; but the actual billets were
fairly clean, having been occupied for a few days by troops of the 63rd
Division. The church was in ruins, as was also the chemical works which
was the mainstay of the place. But, otherwise, not much damage had been
done, for there had been no protracted fighting in the district.
Reorganisation and training were begun at once. Though the Battalion
was very low in strength, it might soon be called on to fight again.
For fighting was still in progress, and, though the enemy retreat
was quickly becoming a rout, few realised before the armistice how
thoroughly beaten the Germans were. Only two platoons per company could
be organised, but large drafts were hoped for soon. On November 8th
the Battalion was inspected by the G.O.C., 147th Infantry Brigade, who
commended it on its good turn-out, and also on its recent fighting
record.
On the morning of November 11th came news of the armistice, which had
been concluded with the enemy. Hostilities were to cease at 11-0
a.m., and all troops were to remain in the positions occupied at that
hour. The news came rather as a surprise to most. Sweep-stakes on the
date of the cessation of hostilities had been got up in the last few
days by both the 4th and 7th Battalions; officers of the former netted
the proceeds of both. There was little time to make preparations for
celebrating the occasion. At 11-0 a.m. the Battalion Band turned out
and paraded the streets. A Battalion concert was hurriedly arranged
for the evening and went off very well, in spite of the total absence
of beer, which could not be procured in time. Brigadier-General H. H.
S. Morant, D.S.O., was present, and said a few words to the men; his
pious wish that the armistice had been postponed a little, in order
that he might have seen the Battalion again in action, was greeted with
many cries of dissent. Though, of course, everyone was glad that the
war was over, there were undoubtedly some who viewed the event with
rather mixed feelings. To those who had lived for more than four years
with the one great purpose of defeating the enemy, it seemed almost
that the object of their lives had been taken away. And there is also a
spirit of camaraderie and good-fellowship on the battlefield and in the
trenches which no peacetime conditions can wholly reproduce.
The Battalion had come to Auby expecting to remain for, at most, a week
or two. As events turned out it spent four months and a half there--by
far the longest period it ever spent at one place abroad. The time
was marked by few events of importance. Towards the end of November
a draft, about 200 strong, arrived. This was rather a surprise,
particularly as many of the men were farmers who, it was expected,
would be in one of the earliest classes for demobilisation. Early in
December it was decided to bring the Battalion Colours out to France,
and a colour party[21] was sent to England to fetch them. The Colours
had been deposited in the Parish Church of Halifax since the summer of
1915. On December 8th they were handed over to the colour party by the
Rev. Canon A. E. Burn, D.D., after the morning service, and were safely
conveyed to France.
During the earlier part of December, ceremonial drill was the main
occupation. On December 16th the 49th Division was inspected by the
G.O.C., XXII. Corps, under whom it had served so long, though, at the
time of the review, it was in the VIII. Corps. This was the first and
only time that the whole division paraded together in France.
Christmas was celebrated with due honours. As was the general custom,
the officers’ dinner was held on Christmas Eve and the sergeants’
dinner on Boxing Day, in order that Christmas Day itself might be
wholly devoted to the men. A Rugby match between the officers and
sergeants of the Battalion was played during the afternoon. The “form”
of the officers was not very convincing; possibly this was the result
of the festivities of the previous night. Altogether, the festive
season passed very happily.
A few days after Christmas the 147th Infantry Brigade gave a “treat”
to the children of Auby, and never until then was it realised how many
youngsters there were in the village. Indeed, it was suspected that
many had come in specially from the neighbourhood. A cinematograph
show in the afternoon was followed by a tea, after which a real Father
Christmas--the Medical Officer’s store of cotton wool had been heavily
drawn upon, and few would have recognised Sergt. E. Jones in the
benevolent-looking old man--helped to hand out a present to each child.
But the most striking event of the entertainment was the wonderful
enthusiasm of the children as they joined in the singing when the band
struck up the “Marseillaise.”
Meanwhile, the Battalion had not been idle. Some work was carried out,
trying to restore the damage done by the enemy in the district. Much
of the country had been flooded and attempts were made to reduce the
water, though without much success. Trenches were filled in, barbed
wire entanglements were removed, and roads were improved. An area was
allotted to the Battalion for salvage work, and a certain amount of
useful material was collected. In connection with this work, a most
unfortunate accident occurred early in December. During their removal
to the salvage dump some trench mortar shells exploded, killing two men
of A Company and wounding several more. About once a week one whole
company moved into Douai, which was about four miles away, to provide
guards at the station there for forty-eight hours.
Some training was carried out every morning, and the afternoons
were entirely devoted to games. The Battalion had a fairly good
football field at its disposal, and this was in use every fine day.
Much of both the training and recreation was in connection with the
Divisional Competition, for the shield presented by Major-General N.
J. G. Cameron. In these competitions the Battalion finished second,
and was very unlucky not to do even better. Its greatest triumph was
the winning of the competition for the best platoon in the Division.
The Battalion was represented by No. 5 Platoon of B Company, under
Sec.-Lieut. W. G. Bradley, with Sergt. F. B. Birtwhistle as platoon
sergeant. After winning the Brigade eliminating competition with ease,
this platoon came up against the platoons of the 1/5th Battalion West
Yorkshire Regt. and 1/4th Battalion York and Lancaster Regt., winners
in their respective brigades. The competition was most comprehensive
and occupied three whole days. The platoons were inspected in drill
order and fighting order; they had competitions in marching, firing
with rifle, Lewis gun and revolver, close and extended order drill,
ceremonial, and guard mounting. The competition ended with a small
tactical scheme. Right from the start good shooting put No. 5 Platoon
ahead, and it never lost this position, winning comfortably.
A Company won the Brigade inter-company Association football
competition, but came down rather badly when it played a company
of the D.A.C. in the divisional competition. Both Battalion teams
reached the finals in the tug-of-war, but neither won. In the Brigade
boxing championships the Battalion had two firsts and a second,
but its representatives did little afterwards. About the middle of
January several successes[22] were gained in the 147th Infantry
Brigade Gymkhana. An officers’ Rugby XV. was started and had great
success, though most of the players had had no experience of the game
before. The Battalion Rugby XV. was the best in the Brigade, but,
unfortunately, the divisional Rugby competition was never played.
Altogether, the Battalion was well to the fore both in military
training and in sports.
With the armistice, the army education scheme was taken up strongly.
The lack of trained teachers and the deficiency in books and stationery
were serious obstacles, but they did not prevent a great deal of
useful work being done. At least one hour a day was set apart for
education, and classes were attended by everyone. General subjects
were taught by platoon commanders, with the help of any competent
N.C.O’s or privates they could discover. Special classes were started
in French and Spanish, mathematics and commercial subjects. Many
lectures were given, mainly by outside lecturers; in particular,
three lectures on the recent history of Egypt, which were given by
the Brigadier and were largely based on his personal experiences,
were much enjoyed. A Battalion debating society was started and had
several successful evenings, the chief being a mock court-martial
of “William Hohenzollern,” carried out by the officers. Major W. C.
Fenton’s rendering of the title part, and Sec.-Lieut. R. M. Leddra’s
impersonation of “Little Willie,” fairly brought down the house.
Reading and recreation rooms were opened in the village. The Battalion
canteen continued its activities, but found the competition of the
numerous estaminets which were being opened very strong. Whist drives
were introduced and proved very popular; the Battalion was particularly
fortunate in the receipt of large numbers of splendid prizes from the
_Halifax Courier_ Fund. For a short time an officers’ club was in
being, but it was not a great success.
The Battalion had not been long at Auby before the civilian inhabitants
began to return. This had its advantages, but it had disadvantages too.
On the whole the men got on very well with the natives, and the opening
of shops and estaminets was very much appreciated. But, as more and
more people returned, the billeting question for a time became rather
serious.
Early in January demobilisation on a large scale began. Though much
desired by most, this had also its melancholy aspect. It was sad to
see the men, who had been so much to the Battalion, gradually melting
away. Especially was this realised when a farewell whist drive was
held on January 20th, in honour of Major W. C. Fenton, M.C., Sergt.
F. Smith, and many men, who were to leave the next morning. Day after
day, as one saw the lorry-loads of friends leaving for the Corps
Concentration Camp, one realised how quickly a chapter of one’s life
was drawing to its close. By the end of February over 270 had left,
besides a large number who had been demobilised on leave. Towards the
end of February a draft of 8 officers and 169 other ranks left to
join the 13th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. at Dunkerque. By
the middle of March the Battalion was but a skeleton, its effective
strength being below 100.
On March 20th, what remained of the Battalion was moved to Douai, where
the cadres of the 49th Division were being concentrated. Here the
Battalion was soon reduced to cadre strength--4 officers and 46 other
ranks. Before the cadre started for England it had been reduced still
lower. Time hung very heavily on the hands of the few people who were
still left. There were not enough to do any training, the necessary
duties did not occupy much time, and there was practically nothing to
do in Douai. Apart from one or two cinemas, and the estaminets, there
were few forms of amusement. Even the strongest adherents of military
life began to long for demobilisation. Almost daily there were rumours
that the Battalion was to leave at some early date. But the weeks
dragged on until May was past before the first move was made.
(_b_) The Return of the Cadre.[23]
On June 7th, after many false rumours and one lot of cancelled orders,
the cadre at last left Douai. For the past month the weather had been
very hot and dry, and it was a broiling morning when the Battalion
vehicles and stores were entrained. The officers, with the loose
baggage, occupied one of the well-known cattle trucks, which was made
quite comfortable with a table, some forms and chairs; the men occupied
third-class compartments. Early in the afternoon the train started. On
the way to Arras a glimpse was obtained of the old camping ground at
Feuchy. Then, circling round the ruins of Lens and passing Bethune and
Hazebrouck, the cadre arrived at a siding near Dunkerque, just before
dusk. The night was spent at what was known as the “dirty” camp--the
blankets provided certainly deserved the name. The next morning the
Battalion moved to No. 3 Camp where it remained for nine days.
No. 3 Camp was the centre through which passed all men and cadres on
their way for demobilisation by the Dunkerque route. It was managed
entirely by the 13th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., so the
cadre found itself in the midst of friends. Officers’ and Sergeants’
Messes were thrown open; everything that was wanted was immediately
forthcoming, if available. Two very pleasant officers’ reunion dinners
were held in Dunkerque, and the Officers’ Mess of the 13th Batt. Duke
of Wellington’s Regt. held a special guest night for the officers of
the 147th Infantry Brigade. Altogether, the tedium of the stay on the
coast was very much relieved. Strange to say, No. 3 Camp was pitched on
the exact site which the Battalion had occupied in July, 1917. But how
changed was the country! Then the Battalion had seen nothing but a flat
grass patch and a waste of sand hills, on which to pitch its tents.
Now the whole area was covered by immense camps, mostly of huts, which
would accommodate many thousands of men. The time near Dunkerque passed
uneventfully. The cadre remained there rather longer than was usual,
partly as a result of a violent wind storm which delayed sailings for
two or three days.
On June 16th the cadre sailed. The morning was spent in loading the
vehicles on to the cargo vessel--S.S. “Clutha”--which was to carry them
to Southampton. Among the loading party were several transport men
who had assisted in a similar operation at Southampton, more than four
years before, when the Battalion sailed for France. In the afternoon
the cadre embarked on S.S. “St. George,” and, about 3-0 p.m., the
vessel moved away from the quay. Among her passengers was Capt. W. B.
B. Yates, who had that morning arrived at Dunkerque on leave from the
Murman Coast. Slowly the ship passed out of Dunkerque harbour and moved
along the French coast, until opposite Calais. The day was perfect. A
bright sun blazed down upon the deck, and there was scarcely a ripple
on the water. Every now and then a fountain of water would rise at
some miles’ distance, followed by the sound of a deep ‘boom,’ as some
mine was destroyed. Opposite Calais the ship turned north towards the
English coast, and, in the early evening, the coast of France dipped
from view, and all said good-bye to the land which held for them so
many memories. A run along the English coast brought the “St. George,”
in the early morning, into Southampton Water, where it anchored off
Netley until about 8-0 a.m.
Soon after breakfast the cadre landed at Southampton Docks and the work
of unloading began. As the vehicles were slung by the great cranes
out of the ship, they were run by the men into a large covered shed
to await entrainment. A change had been made in the programme. When
it left France, the cadre had expected to go to a camp at Fovant and
remain there until stores had been checked over. But on arrival in
England, it was found that only the stores were to go to Fovant, while
the cadre was to proceed direct to Halifax. As soon as the vehicles
were loaded the cadre might leave. Everyone worked with a will, and, by
tea time, everything was on the train. Then all marched to Southampton
West Station to entrain for London. While the cadre was waiting there,
the train carrying the battalion’s vehicles passed through the station
on its way to Fovant, and a shout of unholy glee was the farewell of
the transport men to their beloved (?) limbers. An uneventful journey
brought the party to London where all spent the night at the Buckingham
Palace Hotel.
Shortly after 3-0 p.m. on June 18th, the cadre reached Halifax.
On the platform Brigadier-General R. E. Sugden, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Lieut.-Colonel H. S. Atkinson, T.D., Lieut.-Colonel J. Walker, D.S.O.,
and many other old officers of the Battalion were waiting to meet
the party and give it a rousing welcome. Outside the station was
Sergt.-Drummer H. Deane, with a band which he had collected. A colour
escort had been sent down from the depot of the 3rd Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. But, best of all, hundreds of demobilised men of
the Battalion--the men who had made its history--had paraded there
to welcome their old comrades. “Demobilised men of the 1/4th Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. rally round their old Battalion” was the inscription
on the banner which they carried.
The cadre was photographed at the Station, and then it fell in and
moved off. Notice of its coming had been very short, but the streets
were gay with flags and packed with cheering crowds. Preceded by
the band, and followed by the Colours with their escort and the
demobilised “Dukes,” who once again “moved to the right in fours,”
the cadre marched up Horton Street and round to the Town Hall, where
it was welcomed home by the Mayor. The Commanding Officer thanked the
Mayor for all the town and district had done for the Battalion while
overseas, and for the day’s welcome home. Then, turning to the men, he
said farewell to them in words which all will remember:--
“The Battalion will now pass to another command, and I take this
opportunity of thanking the men for their loyalty to me, to the
regiment, and to the town and district they have represented.
Those of us who have been spared to come through this great
conflict hold a very sacred trust. We must ever remember the
comrades we have left lying on the battle-fields of France and
Flanders. Let us try to prove worthy of their sacrifice. They
have died that we might live; and on our return to civilian
life we must continue to serve our country, our town, and our
homes in the same spirit of loyalty, cheerfulness and trust that
pulled us through four years of war. If you do that you can look
to the future with happiness, certain that your great efforts of
the last few years have not been made in vain.”
[Illustration: Illustration: THE CADRE AT HALIFAX, JUNE 18th, 1919.]
The cadre was then entertained by the Mayor at the Drill Hall, and
afterwards the men dispersed to their homes for the night.
The next day the men paraded for the last time and went to Ripon for
dispersal. And when the time came to say the last good-bye there were
many who regretted that, henceforward, their paths would lie apart.
With the warmest of handshakes, and the deepest feelings of friendship
and respect, we parted one from another, and the history of the 1/4th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s (West Riding) Regiment in the Great War
came to an end.
APPENDIX I.
ITINERARY OF THE BATTALION.
Date of
Move. Move to.
4.8.14. Halifax Mobilisation of the Battalion.
5.8.14. Hull By train
11.8.14. Immingham By boat.
13.8.14. Great Coates By march route.
15.9.14. Riby Park By march route.
17.10.14. Marsden By train.
5.11.14. Doncaster By train.
14.4.15. St. Martin’s Camp, By train to Folkestone; by
Boulogne S.S. “Invicta” to Boulogne.
15.4.15. Estaires By march route to Hesdigneul;
by train to Merville;
by march route to Estaires.
22.4.15. Doulieu By march route.
24.4.15. La Croix Lescornez By march route.
26.4.15. No. 3 Section, Fleurbaix Relieved 3rd Bn. Worcestershire
Sector Regt.
29.4.15. La Croix Lescornez }
2.6.15. No. 3 Section } Inter-relieving with 1/6th Bn.
5.5.15. La Croix Lescornez } D. of W. Regt.
8.5.15. Croix Blanche By march route.
9.5.15. No. 3 Section }
13.5.15. La Croix Lescornez }
17.5.15. No. 3 Section }
21.5.15. La Croix Lescornez }
25.5.15. No. 3 Section } Inter-relieving with 1/6th Bn.
29.5.15. La Croix Lescornez } D. of W. Regt.
2.6.15. No. 3 Section }
6.6.15. La Croix Lescornez }
12.6.15. No. 3 Section }
18.6.15. La Croix Lescornez }
25.6.15. Sailly-sur-la-Lys }
26.6.15. Doulieu }
27.6.15. Farms near Bailleul }
29.6.15. Flêtre }
30.6.15. Wood near St. Jans ter } By march route.
Biezen }
7.7.15. Canada Wood, near }
Elverdinghe }
8.7.15. Lancashire Farm Sector Relieved 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin
Fusiliers.
13.7.15. Canal Bank (Bde. Res.) }
18.7.15. Lancashire Farm Sector }
24.7.15. Wood near Oosthoek } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
(Divl. Res.) } D. of W. Regt.
30.7.15. Lancashire Farm Sector }
5.8.15. Canal Bank (Bde. Res.) }
11.8.15. Glimpse Cottage Sector } Inter-relieving with 1/7th Bn.
16.8.15. Saragossa Farm (Bde. } D. of W. Regt.
Res.)
18.8.15. Ypres Left Sector } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
21.8.15. Malakoff Farm (Bde. Res.)} D. of W. Regt.
24.8.15. Ypres Left Sector }
26.8.15. Coppernollehoek (Divl. Relieved by 1/4th Bn. Y. and
Res.) L. Regt.
8.9.15. Turco Farm Sector Relieved 1/6th Bn. W. Yorks.
Regt.
15.9.15. Canal Bank (Bde. Res.) } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
21.9.15. Turco Farm Sector } D. of W. Regt.
27.9.15. Elverdinghe (Bde. Res.) }
2.10.15. Camp near
Woesten-Poperinghe
Road.
14.10.15. Glimpse Cottage Sector Relieved 1/5th Bn. W. Yorks.
Regt.
21.10.15. Canal Bank (Bde. Res.) Relieved by 1/4th Bn.
K.O.Y.L.I.
30.10.15. Ypres Left Sector Relieved 1/7th Bn. D. of W.
Regt.
3.11.15. Coppernollehoek (Divl. By motor bus. Relieved by
Res.) 1/6th Bn. D. of W. Regt.
11.11.15. Ypres Left Sector } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
15.11.15. Malakoff Farm (Bde. Res.)} D. of W. Regt.
19.11.15. Ypres Left Sector }
23.11.15. Malakoff Farm (Bde. Res.) Relieved by 1/6th Bn. D. of W.
Regt.
27.11.15. Coppernollehoek (Divl.
Res.)
5.12.15. Malakoff Farm (Bde. Res.)
9.12.15. Ypres Left Sector Relieved 1/5th Bn. D of W. Regt.
13.12.15. Malakoff Farm (Bde. Res.)} Inter-relieving with 1/6th Bn.
17.12.15. Ypres Left Sector } D. of W. Regt.
20.12.15. Elverdinghe }
27.12.15. Coppernollehoek }
30.12.15. Poperinghe }
31.12.15. Camp near St. Jans ter } By march route.
Biezen }
1.1.16. Houtkerque }
15.1.16. Wormhoudt }
2/3.2.16. Camps En Amienois By march route to Esquelbecq;
by train to Longueau; by
march route to Ailly; by
motor bus to Camps En
Amienois.
11.2.16. Picquigny }
12.2.16. Molliens-au-Bois } By march route.
13.2.16. Warloy Baillon }
28.2.16. Right Section, Authuille Relieved 1/4th Bn. K.O.Y.L.I.
Trenches
4.3.16. Bouzincourt }
5.3.16. Authuille Defences }
6.3.16. Mailly-Maillet } By march route.
29.3.16. Harponville }
30.3.16. Naours }
23.4.16. Hedauville By motor bus.
12.5.16. Aveluy Wood }
1.6.16. Martinsart Wood }
15.6.16. Aveluy Wood }
20.6.16. Vadencourt Wood } By march route.
27.6.16. Senlis }
28.6.16. Vadencourt Wood }
30.6.16. B Assembly Trenches, By march route, via Senlis.
Aveluy Wood
1.7.16. Crucifix Corner, Aveluy By march route.
2.7.16. Johnstone’s Post Relieved 1/5th Bn. W. Yorks.
Regt.
5.7.16. Right Sub-sector, Relieved 1/5th Bn. D. of W.
Thiepval Wood Regt.
7.7.16. B Assembly Trenches, Relieved by 1/6th Bn. D. of W.
Aveluy Wood Regt. and 1/5th Bn.
K.O.Y.L.I.
8.7.16. Thiepval Wood, Relieved 1/6th Bn. D. of W.
Right Sub-sector Regt. and 1/5th Bn.
K.O.Y.L.I.
11.7.16. „ Bde. Res. Relieved by 1/5th and 1/7th
Bns. D. of W. Regt.
14.7.16. „ Left Sub-sector }
17.7.16. „ Bde. Res. }
21.7.16. „ Left Sub-sector }
25.7.16. „ Bde. Res. } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
31.7.16. „ Left Sub-sector } D. of W. Regt.
6.8.16. „ Bde. Res. }
12.8.16. „ Left Sub-sector }
19.8.16. Raincheval Relieved by 9th Bn. Loyal
North Lancs. Regt.
27.8.16. Forceville By march route.
2.9.16. Martinsart Wood By march route.
2/3.9.16. Thiepval Wood, Assembly For attack on German line.
Parallels
3.9.16. Martinsart Wood By march route.
7.9.16. Hedauville }
15.9.16. Martinsart Wood } By march route.
16.9.16. Crucifix Corner, Aveluy }
18.9.16. Leipsig Redoubt (Support).
21.9.16. Leipsig Redoubt (Front Relieved 1/5th Bn. D. of W.
Line) Regt.
24.9.16. Lealvillers By march route. Relieved by
12th Bn. Middlesex Regt.
25.9.16. Halloy }
27.9.16. Humbercamps } By march route.
28.9.16. Bienvillers-au-Bois }
29.9.16. Hannescamps, Left Relieved 2nd Bn. Royal Welsh
Sub-sector Fusiliers.
3.10.16. Souastre } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
9.10.16. Hannescamps, Left } K.O.Y.L.I.
Sub-sector
16.10.16. Bienvillers-au-Bois Relieved by 1/6th Bn. D. of W.
Regt.
18.10.16. Humbercamps }
19.10.16. St. Amand } By march route.
21.10.16. Souastre (Bde. Res.) }
24.10.16. Y Sector, Fonquevillers Relieved 1/6th Bn. W. Yorks.
Regt.
30.10.16. Souastre }
5.11.16. Y Sector }
11.11.16. Souastre }
17.11.16. Y Sector } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
23.11.16. Souastre } D. of W. Regt.
29.11.16. Y Sector }
5.12.16. Warlincourt By march route. Relieved by
1/5th Bn. Sherwood Foresters.
6.12.16. Halloy By march route.
7.1.17. Berles-au-Bois and By march route. Relieved 2nd
Humbercamps Bn. Bedfordshire Regt.
10.1.17. B1 Sub-sector, }
Berles-au-Bois }
14.1.17. Humbercamps }
18.1.17. B1 Sub-sector } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
22.1.17. Berles-au-Bois and } D. of W. Regt.
Humbercamps }
26.1.17. B1 Sub-sector }
30.1.17. Humbercamps }
1.2.17. Rivière (Bde. Res.) By march route. Relieved 8th
Bn. K.R.R.C.
2.2.17. F1 Sub-sector, Rivière Relieved 7th Bn. K.R.R.C.
7.2.17. Rivière }
11.2.17 F1 Sub-sector }
16.2.17 Rivière } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
20.2.17. F1 Sub-sector } D. of W. Regt.
22.2.17. Bailleulval }
26.2.17. F1 Sub-sector }
28.2.17. Bailleulval Relieved by 2/9th Bn. London
Regt.
1.3.17. Souastre }
2.3.17. Halloy } By march route.
6.3.17. Neuvillette }
7/8.3.17. La Fosse By march route to Doullens;
by train to Merville; by
march route to La Fosse.
9.3.17. Senechal Farm (Bde. Res.) By march route. Relieved
12th Bn. London Regt.
13.3.17. Ferme du Bois Sector }
17.3.17. Senechal Farm }
23.3.17. Ferme du Bois Sector }
29.3.17. Senechal Farm }
4.4.17. Ferme du Bois Sector }
10.4.17. Senechal Farm } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
16.4.17. Ferme du Bois Sector } D. of W. Regt.
22.4.17. Senechal Farm }
28.4.17. Ferme du Bois Sector }
4.5.17. Senechal Farm }
10.5.17. Ferme du Bois Sector }
16.5.17. Senechal Farm }
25.5.17. Estaires By march route.
26.5.17. Sailly-sur-la-Lys By march route.
27.5.17. Cordonnerie Sector Relieved 2/5th Bn. Loyal North
Lancs. Regt.
3.6.17. Rouge de Bout (Bde. Res.)} Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
11.6.17. Cordonnerie Sector } D. of W. Regt.
15.6.17. Estaires Relieved by 2/4th Bn. Loyal
North Lancs. Regt.
18.6.17. Sailly Labourse By motor bus.
19.6.17. Philosophe (Bde. Res.) Relieved 1st Bn. Leicestershire
Regt.
25.6.17. St. Elie Sector Relieved 1/6th Bn. D. of W.
Regt.
1.7.17. Tower Keep, Vermelles Relieved by 9th Bn. Suffolk
Regt.
3.7.17. L’Epinette By march route to Philosophe;
by motor bus to L’Epinette.
13.7.17. Mardyck Camp, St. Pol By march route to Merville;
by train to Dunkerque; by
march route to St. Pol.
18.7.17. Bray Dunes }
20.7.17. Ghyvelde } By march route.
31.7.17. La Panne Bains }
3.8.17. Lombartzyde Right By motor bus to beyond Oost
Sub-sector Dunkerque; by march route
to trenches. Relieved 1/5th
Bn. K.O.Y.L.I.
9.8.17. Presque L’Isle Defences } Inter-relieving with 1/6th Bn.
13.8.17. Lombartzyde Right } D. of W. Regt.
Sub-sector
16.8.17. Oost Dunkerque By march route. Relieved by
20th Bn. Royal Fusiliers.
17.8.17. Oost Dunkerque Bains By march route. Relieved 2nd
Bn. Argyle and Sutherland
Highlanders on coast defence.
27.8.17. Surrey Camp }
29.8.17. La Panne }
13.9.17. Bray Dunes }
23.9.17. Coudekerque }
24.9.17. Wormhoudt }
25.9.17. Buysscheure } By march route.
28.9.17. Audenthun Area }
30.9.17. Longue Croix (Staple }
Area) }
3.10.17. Clyde Camp, near Watou }
4.10.17. Red Rose Camp, }
Vlamertinghe }
4.10.17. Pommern Castle (Bde. Relieved 1st Bn. Canterbury
Res.) Regt.
5.10.17. Front Line near Abraham Relieved 3rd Bn. Canterbury
Heights and 3rd Bn. Auckland Regts.
6.10.17. Pommern Castle Relieved by 2/5th Bn. Manchester
Regt.
9.10.17. Peter Pan Attacked in support of 146th
Infantry Brigade.
10.10.17. X Camp, St. Jean Relieved by New Zealand Div.
16.10.17. No. 3 Area, Vlamertinghe }
24.10.17. A Camp, Winnezeele } By march route.
27.10.17. Farms near Steenvoorde }
9.11.17. Canal Area, near Ypres By motor bus.
12.11.17. Swan Area, near Ypres By march route.
19.11.17. Anzac Ridge (Bde. Res.) Relieved 1/7th Bn. W. Yorks
Regt.
23.11.17. Molenaarelsthoek Sector Relieved 1/6th Bn. D. of W.
Regt.
27.11.17. Gordon House Area Relieved by 1/5th Bn.
K.O.Y.L.I.
28.11.17. Vancouver Camp By march route.
6.12.17. Dragoon Camp By march route.
7.12.17. Keerselaarhoek Sector Relieved 4th Bn. Suffolk Regt.
10.12.17. Dragoon Camp } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
15.12.17. Keerselaarhoek Sector } D. of W. Regt.
17.12.17. Argyle Camp Relieved by 1/7th Bn. W.
Yorks. Regt.
18.12.17. Halifax Camp By march route.
23.12.17. Molenaarelsthoek Sector By train to Hellfire Corner; by
march route to trenches.
Relieved 1/5th Bn.
K.O.Y.L.I.
29.12.17. Garter Point (Bde. Res.) Relieved by 1/5th Bn. D. of W.
Regt.
4.1.18. Infantry Barracks, Ypres Relieved by 1/8th Bn. W.
Yorks. Regt.
12.1.18. Devonshire Camp By march route.
26.1.18. St. Silvestre Cappel By train from Brandhoek to
Caestre; by march route to
billets.
5.2.18. Moulle By march route to Ebblinghem;
by train to Watten;
by march route to billets.
10.2.18. Buysscheure By march route.
11.2.18. St. Silvestre Cappel By march route.
21.2.18. Infantry Barracks, Ypres By march route to Caestre;
by train to Ypres.
22.2.18. Reutel Sector Relieved 1st Bn. Otago Regt.
2.3.18. Maida Camp }
10.3.18. Reutel Sector } Inter-relieving with 1/5th Bn.
18.3.18. Westhoek and Railway Wood} Y. and L. Regt.
Dugouts }
27.3.18. Reutel Sector }
3.4.18. Maida Camp Relieved by 1st Bn. Leicestershire
Regt.
9.4.18. Camp near Reninghelst By march route.
10.4.18. Erquinghem By motor bus to La Crèche;
by march route, via Le
Veau, to Erquinghem.
10.4.18. Nieppe }
11.4.18. S.E. of Bailleul }
12.4.18. Bailleul } By march route. (Battle of
15.4.18. S. of St. Jans Cappel } the Lys).
18.4.18. St. Jans Cappel }
20.4.18. Mont Noir }
21.4.18. Mont des Cats By march route.
21.4.18. Poperinghe By march route.
25.4.18. Ouderdom }
25.4.18. Millekruisse (Bde. Res.) } By march route. (Battle of
1.5.18. Millekruisse (Front Line)} Kemmel.)
3.5.18. Camp S. of Poperinghe }
4.5.18. Road Camp, St. Jans ter By march route.
Biezen
14.5.18. Camp near St. By motor bus.
Martin-au-Laert
19.5.18. Road Camp, St. Jans ter By motor bus.
Biezen
22.5.18. Penton Camp, Proven By march route.
26.5.18. Road Camp, St. Jans ter By march route.
Biezen
3.6.18. Zillebeke Sector By light railway to Vlamertinghe;
by march route to
trenches. Relieved 15th Bn.
K.R.R.C.
11.6.18. Bde. Res. near Goldfish Relieved by 1/7th Bn. D. of W.
Chateau Regt.
20.6.18. Siege Camp (Divl. Res.) Relieved by 1/5th Bn. Y. and
L. Regt.
29.6.18. Sector N. of Menin Road Relieved 1/7th Bn. W. Yorks.
Regt.
15.7.18. Siege Camp Relieved by 1/5th Bn. Y. and
L. Regt.
23.7.18. Bde. Res. near Goldfish Relieved 1/6th Bn. W. Yorks.
Chateau Regt.
1.8.18. Zillebeke Sector Relieved 2nd Bn. 118th American
Inf. Regt.
7.8.18. Brielen Line Relieved by 3rd Bn. 117th
American Inf. Regt.
8.8.18. Siege Camp Relieved by 1/4th Bn.
K.O.Y.L.I.
16.8.18. Menin Road Sector Relieved 1/5th Bn. Y. and L.
Regt.
20.8.18. Wood near Oosthoek Relieved by 5th Bn. Argyle
and Sutherland Highlanders.
23.8.18. Nielles-lez-Ardres By light railway to Proven;
by train to Audruicq; by
march route to billets.
28.8.18. Siracourt and Beauvois By march route to Nortkerque;
by train to Wavrans;
by march route to
billets.
1.9.18. Camblain L’Abbé By motor bus.
13.9.18. Wakefield Camp, near By march route.
Roclincourt
23.9.18. Feuchy By march route.
6.10.18. Bivouacs near Buissy By motor bus.
9.10.18. Sunken road S. of }
Haynecourt }
10.10.18. Railway embankment near } By march route.
Escaudœuvres }
11.10.18. Assembly positions on }
Iwuy--Rieux Road }
11.10.18. Ridge S.E. of Iwuy Captured in battle.
12.10.18. Vordon Wood, W. of La Following up retreating
Selle River enemy.
14.10.18. Area S.W. of Relieved by 1/7th Bn. W.
Avesnes-le-Sec Yorks. Regt.
16.10.18. Vordon Wood Relieved 1/7th Bn. W. Yorks.
Regt.
18.10.18. Naves Relieved by 1st Bn. Warwickshire
Regt.
21.10.18. Le Bassin Rond }
27.10.18. Douchy }
28.10.18. Thiant--Moncheaux Road }
31.10.18. Sunken Road S. of Maing } By march route.
1.11.18. Bde. Support near La }
Rhonelle River }
2.11.18. Haulchin Relieved by units of 169th
Inf. Bde.
3.11.18. Douchy By march route.
4.11.18. Auby By motor bus.
20.3.19. Douai By march route.
7.6.19. A Camp, near Dunkerque By train.
8.6.19. No. 3 Camp, near Dunkerque By march route.
16/17.6.19. Southampton By S.S. “St. George”; transport
on S.S. “Clutha.”
17.6.19. London }
18.6.19. Halifax } By train.
19.6.19. Ripon Dispersal Camp }
APPENDIX II.
NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO SERVED WITH THE BATTALION ABROAD.
In compiling the list of officers, the following rules have been
adhered to:--
1. In the case of officers who went out with the original
Battalion, the rank stated was that held on April 14th, 1915.
2. In the case of officers who joined the Battalion after April
14th, 1915, the rank stated was that held at the date the
officer reported for duty.
3. Decorations, a list of which will be found in Appendix V.,
have been omitted, except the following:--
(_a_) Territorial Decoration.
(_b_) Decorations won by officers before they joined the Battalion.
4. This record is a Battalion record. Hence, only service with
the Battalion is shown.
5. The names of the officers of the original Battalion are
marked *.
AKROYD, F., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.11.17. Wounded near Bailleul,
12.4.18.
* ANDERTON, W. L., Sec.-Lieut. Bn. Bombing Officer (May–August, 1915).
Killed in action near Ypres, 21.8.15.
ANDERTON, R., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 14.8.16. Transferred to 2nd Bn. D. of
W. Regt., 23.10.16.
* ANDREWS, M. P., Capt. O.C. A Coy. (May–August, 1915). Killed in
action near Ypres, 14.8.15.
APPLEWHAITE, C. T., Sec.-Lieut. (6th Bn. Norfolk Regt.). Joined,
20.8.17. To hospital sick, 16.6.18.
* ATKINSON, H. S., Lieut.-Col. (T.D.). O.C. Bn. (August, 1914–May,
1915). To hospital sick, 24.5.15.
ATKINSON, R. B., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.1.18. Wounded near Reutel,
16.3.18.
* AYKROYD, H. H., Sec.-Lieut. Bn. I.O. (January–September, 1916). 147th
Inf. Bde. I.O. (September, 1916–July, 1917). To hospital sick, 12.7.17.
Rejoined, 24.6.18. Adjt. (June, 1918–January, 1919). Second in Command
(January–February, 1919). Left Bn. for demobilisation, 6.2.19.
Lieut., 30.5.16. Capt., 1.6.16. A/Major, 22.1.19.
BALDWIN, S., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 21.9.16. Transferred to 8th
Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.10.16.
BALES, P. G., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 21.9.16. Bn. I.O. (March–September,
1917 and May–November, 1918). A/Adjt. (September, 1917–May, 1918).
Adjt. (January–June, 1919). Demobilised with Cadre of Bn., 19.6.19.
Lieut., 1.6.16. A/Capt., 22.1.19.
BALME, S., Lieut. Bn. Signalling Officer (1915). O.C. D Coy.
(February–November, 1918). Left Bn. for demobilisation, 29.1.19.
Capt., 10.4.17.
BAMFORTH, H., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Demobilised on
leave, 3.12.18.
*BELL, B. A., Lieut. Wounded near Fleurbaix, 26.5.15.
BENSON, G. W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 4.1.16. Transferred to
R.F.C., 10.7.16.
BENTLEY, J. E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Killed in action
near Roeux, 11.10.18.
BESWICK, N.S., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 22.6.15. Bn. M.G.O. To
hospital sick, 15.8.15.
BIDDLE, V., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 16.10.18. Transferred to 13th
Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.2.19.
BINNS, C. E., Sec.-Lieut. Promoted from the ranks; joined as
an officer, 16.2.17. Wounded (gas) near Hulluch, 28.6.17. Rejoined,
9.10.18. Left Bn. for demobilisation, 7.2.19.
Lieut., 16.8.18.
BLACKWELL, F. V., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 7.1.16. Transferred to
147th T.M.B., 12.8.16.
BLAKEY, E. V., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.5.17. Wounded at Johnstone’s
Post, 4.7.16. Rejoined, 21.9.16. O.C. C Company (October–December,
1917). Wounded near Molenaarelsthoek, 27.12.17.
Lieut., 1.6.16. A/Capt., 20.7.17.
BOOTH, W. S., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.5.15. Bn. Bombing Officer
(1916). Killed in action near Thiepval, 8.7.16.
BRABHAM, J. R. S., Sec.-Lieut. (6th Bn. Norfolk Regt.). Joined,
20.8.17. Struck off strength of Bn. (sick in England), 27.1.18.
BRADLEY, W. G., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Left Bn. for
demobilisation, 21.3.19.
BRICE, A. E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 16.10.18. Transferred to
13th Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.2.19.
BROOMHEAD, W. N., Hon. Lieut. and Q.M. (T.D.). Joined Bn. from
6th Bn. Sherwood Foresters, 15.2.17. Demobilised with Cadre of Bn.,
19.6.19.
Capt., 23.12.17.
BROSTER, R. B., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 1.3.17. O.C. C Coy.
(May–October, 1918). Killed in action near Roeux, 11.10.18.
A/Capt., 30.12.17. Lieut., 19.6.18.
BURGOYNE, H. E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.1.18. Wounded near
Zillebeke, 20.6.18.
BUTLER, A., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 8.8.16. Bn. and 147th Inf.
Bde. Bombing Officer. Wounded (gas) near Nieuport, 10.8.17.
CAMPBELL, G., Sec.-Lieut. (4th Bn. East Yorks, Regt.). Joined,
18.9.17. Struck off strength of Bn. (sick in England), 30.8.18.
*CHAMBERS, E. P., Major. Second in Command (August, 1914–May,
1915 and September, 1915–April, 1916). O.C. Bn. (May–September, 1915).
Appointed Claims Officer, 49th Div., 3.4.16.
T/Lieut.-Col., 24.6.15.–15.9.15.
CHARLESWORTH, A., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Wounded near
Vlamertinghe, 26.6.18.
CHIPPINDALE, F. D., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 19.5.17. Killed in
action near Erquinghem, 10.4.18.
CHISNALL, F., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 13.1.16. Transferred to
147th M.G. Coy., 4.2.16.
CLARKE, E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.1.18. Left Bn. for
demobilisation, 18.3.19.
COPELAND, J., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 21.9.16. To hospital sick,
19.11.16.
COURT, G. B., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.12.15. Shell shock,
5.7.16.
CRICKMER, B., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Transferred to 13th
Bn. D. of W. Regt., 22.4.19.
CROWTHER, G., Sec.-Lieut. Promoted from the ranks; joined as
an officer, 14.3.16. Bn. I.O. and A/Adjt. (September, 1916–Mch. 1917).
Killed in action near Hulluch, 28.6.17.
DENBY, I. C., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.9.16. Killed in action
near Hulluch, 27.6.17.
*DENNING, W. F., Capt. O.C. D Coy. (June–December, 1915). To
hospital sick, 9.12.15.
DONKERSLEY, P., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 19.5.17. Wounded near
Vlamertinghe, 29.11.17.
DREW, E. B., Hon. Lieut, and Q.M. Joined, 25.11.16. To
hospital sick, 31.1.17.
EADE, W. M., Hon. Capt. and Q.M. (6th Bn. Suffolk Regt.).
Joined, 18.5.18. Transferred to 1/4th Bn. Seaforth Highlanders, 20.7.18.
EDWARDS, A. C., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.10.17. Attached to
147th T.M.B., 6.5.18.
ENTWHISTLE, J. W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. To hospital
sick, 25.9.18.
EVERITT, W. N., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 13.9.15. O.C. A Coy.
(December, 1915–September, 1916). Killed in action N. of Thiepval,
3.9.16.
T/Lieut., 31.12.15. T/Capt., 24.6.16.
FARRAR, N. T., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 17.2.16. O.C. B Coy. (June,
1917–February, 1919). Second in Command (February–April, 1919). Left
Bn. for demobilisation, 3.4.19.
Lieut., 1.6.16. A/Capt., 12.7.17. A/Major, 7.2.19.
*FENTON, W. C., Sec.-Lieut. Wounded near Fleurbaix, 30.4.15.
Rejoined, 8.1.16. Adjutant (February, 1916–June, 1918). Wounded on
Belle Vue Spur, 9.10.17. Rejoined, 23.10.17. Second in Command (June,
1918–January, 1919). Left Bn. for demobilisation, 21.1.19.
T/Lieut., 10.2.16. Capt., 1.6.16. A/Major, 4.6.18.
FENTON, D. H., Sec.-Lieut. Promoted from the ranks;
accidentally killed before commission announced, 8.9.15.
*FIELDING, T., Hon. Lieut, and Q.M. To hospital sick, 21.8.16.
FLATOW, E. W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 15.11.15. Wounded near
Nieuport, 9.8.17.
Lieut., 1.6.16.
FLEMING, F. W. O., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.9.15. Gassed near
Ypres and died in hospital, 19.12.15.
FLETCHER, J., Lieut. Joined, 25.11.18. Transferred to 13th Bn.
D. of W. Regt., 26.2.19.
GELDARD, N., Sec.-Lieut. (6th Bn. D. of W. Regt.). Joined,
25.9.16. O.C. D Coy. (October, 1916–October, 1917). Wounded at
Nieuport, 4.8.17. Rejoined, 11.9.17. Wounded on Belle Vue Spur,
9.10.17. Capt., 30.11.16.
GILROY, T. T., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 15.10.17. Wounded (at duty)
near Kemmel, 25.4.18. Transferred to 13th Bn. D. of W. Regt., 22.4.19.
Lieut., 1.2.19. A/Capt., 13.2.19.
GRANTHAM, W., Lieut. Joined, 9.12.17. Wounded and missing near
Roeux, 11.10.18. Died of wounds, a prisoner in enemy hands.
A/Capt., 29.4.18.
GUMBY, L., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 9.9.17. A/Adjt. (May–September,
1918). Attached to 147th Inf. Bde. H.Q., 13.9.18.
HANSON, H., Capt. (5th Bn. D. of W. Regt.). Joined, 23.5.17.
Wounded near Vlamertinghe and died of wounds, 1.12.17.
HARTLEY, J. A., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 22.6.15. Gassed near Ypres
and died in hospital, 19.12.15.
HATCH, H. S., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 8.8.16. To hospital sick,
3.12.17. Rejoined, November, 1918. Left Bn. for demobilisation, 3.4.19.
Lieut., July, 1918.
HILL, G.M., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 21.9.16. Transferred to 2nd
Bn. D. of W. Regt., 23.10.16.
HINTON, W. E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 20.11.15. Wounded near
Ypres, 11.12.15. Rejoined, 8.6.16. To hospital sick, 24.7.16.
* HIRST, C., Lieut. Bn. T.O. (April–August, 1915). O.C. B Coy.
(December, 1915–September, 1916). Killed in action N. of Thiepval,
3.9.16.
T/Capt., 22.1.16.
HIRST, A. E., Sec.-Lieut. Promoted from the ranks; joined as
an officer, 26.3.16. Killed in action N. of Thiepval, 3.9.16.
HIRST, W. L., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.11.16. Left Bn. for
demobilisation, 1.2.19.
Lieut., 1.7.17.
HOLME, R. E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Transferred to
147th T.M.B., 18.7.18.
HOLT, J. W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.9.16. Transferred to 8th
Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.10.16.
HORSFALL, V. A., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 15.7.16. Killed in action
N. of Thiepval, 3.9.16.
HOTHERSALL, T., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 16.10.18. Left Bn. for
demobilisation, 28.1.19.
HUGGARD, B. H., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 2.11.17. Wounded near
Nieppe, 11.4.18. Rejoined, 4.5.18. Left Bn. for demobilisation, 2.3.19.
Lieut., February, 1919. A/Capt., February, 1919.
HUTTON, T., Lieut. (M.C.). Joined, 19.8.18. O.C. D Coy.
(November, 1918–February, 1919). Re-posted to 2nd Bn. D. of W. Regt.,
12.2.19. A/Capt., 26.10.18.
HYLAND, J. L., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Transferred to
R.O.D., 31.12.18.
ILLINGWORTH, A. C., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 14.4.16. To hospital
sick, 26.10.16.
INNES, F. A., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.9.15. Wounded near Ypres,
16.10.15. Rejoined, 23.10.15. Attached to 147th Inf. Bde. H.Q., 9.8.16.
Killed in action in Thiepval Wood, 3.9.16.
IRISH, F., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.3.17. Bn. T.O. (October,
1917–May, 1919). Left Bn. for demobilisation, 5.5.19.
Lieut., 25.7.18.
JESSOP, T. E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.5.18. Wounded in action
near Roeux, 11.10.18.
JOHNSON, L. L., Sec.-Lieut. (6th Bn. Norfolk Regt.). Joined,
20.8.17. Wounded near St. Jans Cappel, 17.4.18.
JONES, R. E., Sec.-Lieut. (6th Bn. Manchester Regt.). Joined,
15.5.18. Transferred to 13th Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.2.19.
JURY, R., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 19.5.17. Wounded by enemy bomb
at Dunkerque and died of wounds, 6.10.17.
KELSALL, F. H., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 7.12.15. Wounded near
Authuille, 29.2.16. Rejoined, 28.5.16. To hospital sick, 22.7.17.
Lieut., 25.6.16.
* KING, M. H., Lieut. Went to France as 147th Inf. Bde. I.O.
and was extra-regimentally employed continuously from that time.
KIRK, A., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 21.9.16. A/Adjt.
(September–December, 1916). O.C. A Coy. (October, 1917–January, 1919).
Demobilised on leave, March, 1919.
Lieut., 1.6.16. A/Capt., 28.10.17.
KITSON, J. H., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.1.18. Killed in action
near Bailleul, 14.4.18.
* LEAROYD, G. W. I., Lieut. Bn. M.G.O. (July, 1915–February,
1916). Transferred to 147th M.G. Coy., 4.2.16.
LEDDRA, R. M., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Transferred to
13th Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.2.19.
* LEE, E., Lieut. Bn. M.G.O. (April–July, 1915). Killed in
action near Ypres, 10.7.15.
LOUDOUN, H. A., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 8.2.18. Wounded at
Bailleul, 13.4.18. Rejoined, 24.5.18. Bn. Signalling Officer (June,
1918–February, 1919). Transferred to 13th Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.2.19.
Lieut., 28.9.18. A/Capt., 6.2.19.
LUMB, J. W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 2.11.17. Wounded near
Bailleul, 14.4.18. Rejoined, 27.4.18. Wounded near Villers-en-Cauchies,
18.10.18. Died of wounds, 30.10.18.
LUTY, A.M., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 8.1.17. O.C. C Coy. (December,
1917–April, 1918). Wounded near Bailleul, 14.4.18.
Lieut., 25.4.18. A/Capt., 20.3.18.
MACHIN, B. M., Lieut. Joined, 29.1.18. Wounded near Bailleul,
12.4.18.
MACKIE, W. G., Lieut. Joined, 8.2.18. Wounded near Kemmel,
26.4.18.
MACKINTOSH, J. D. V., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.5.16. Transferred
to 2nd Bn. D. of W. Regt., 23.10.16.
MALEY, F., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 30.4.18. Killed in action near
Villers-en-Cauchies, 14.10.18.
MALLALIEU, A. H. W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 30.8.18. Wounded near
Villers-en-Cauchies, 18.10.18.
MANDER, A. E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.12.15. Wounded near
Thiepval, 11.7.16. Rejoined, 8.8.16. Bn. T.O. (September–November,
1916). O.C. A Coy. (June–October, 1917). Killed in action on Belle Vue
Spur, 9.10.17.
Lieut., 1.6.16. A/Capt., 10.7.17.
MANDER, P. G., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 8.11.15. To hospital sick,
12.12.15. Rejoined, 16.6.16. Wounded near Thiepval, 17.8.16.
MARSDEN, H. M., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Killed in action
near Roeux, 11.10.18.
* MARSHALL, E. N., Lieut. Wounded (at duty) near Ypres,
16.10.15. O.C. A Coy. (October–December, 1915). Wounded (gas) near
Ypres, 19.12.15. Rejoined, 14.8.16. O.C. C Coy. (August, 1916–December,
1917). Appointed Chief Instructor XXII. Corps Lewis Gun School,
15.12.17.
T/Capt., 20.11.15. Capt., 1.6.16.
* MCGUIRE, G. P., Sec.-Lieut. Adjt. (August, 1915–February,
1916). Attached 147th Inf. Bde. H.Q., 9.2.16. Returned to duty, 2.8.17.
Attached Second Army H.Q., 19.11.17.
T/Lieut., 18.12.15. Lieut., 1.6.16. Capt., 12.9.17.
MEE, E. C., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.12.15. Killed in action N.
of Thiepval, 3.9.16.
MELLOR, N., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.5.16. Transferred to
R.F.C., 7.12.16.
MILLIGAN, V. A., Capt. Joined, 14.4.16. Returned to England,
24.6.16.
MORRISON, J., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 30.9.17. To hospital sick,
25.4.18.
* MOWAT, A. L., Capt. O.C. D Coy. (April–June, 1915). Wounded
near Fleurbaix, 3.6.15. Rejoined, 28.12.15. O.C. D Coy. (December,
1915–October, 1916). Second in Command (October, 1916–June, 1918). O.C.
Bn. (June, 1918–June, 1919). Demobilised with Cadre of Bn., 19.6.19.
A/Major, 13.11.16. A/Lieut.-Col., 18.6.18.
* MOWAT, J. G., Sec.-Lieut. Bn. T.O. (August, 1915–September,
1916). O.C. B Coy. (September, 1916–June, 1917). Killed in action near
Hulluch, 27.6.17.
Lieut., 14.8.15. Capt., 1.6.16.
NEVILE, A. W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 17.9.17. Transferred to
147th T.M.B., 29.10.17.
NEWMAN, H. R., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 2.11.17. Transferred to
13th Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.2.19.
NORTON, S. R., Sec.-Lieut. Joined 29.10.17. To hospital sick,
16.6.18.
O’DOWD, M. C., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.1.18. Wounded near
Erquinghem, 10.4.18.
OLDFIELD, W., Sec.-Lieut. (M.M.). Joined, 20.9.17. Wounded
near Bailleul, 14.4.18.
OLDROYD, W. L., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.9.16. Transferred to
8th Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.10.16.
PICKERING, E. J., Lieut.-Col. O.C. Bn. (September–October,
1915). Wounded near Ypres, 20.10.15.
POHLMANN, H. E., Sec.-Lieut. Promoted from the ranks; joined
as an officer, 26.3.16. Wounded N. of Thiepval, 3.9.16.
POLLARD, H., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.5.16. Wounded in Thiepval
Wood, 14.7.16. Rejoined, 14.11.16. Wounded near Hulluch, 27.6.17.
PRATT, L. W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 9.9.15. Wounded near
Thiepval, 25.7.16.
*PRATT, T. D., Sec.-Lieut. O.C. D Coy. (June–August, 1916).
Wounded near Thiepval, 18.8.16.
T/Lieut., 10.7.15. T/Capt., 29.12.15.
PURVIS, R. C., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 6.9.16. Transferred to
R.F.C., 30.4.17.
RAWNSLEY, E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 3.8.16. Transferred to 2nd
Bn. D. of W. Regt., 23.10.16. Rejoined, 9.12.17. Appointed Instructor,
XXII. Corps Bombing School, 15.2.18.
RAWNSLEY, G., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 9.9.16. Killed in action
near Berles-au-Bois, 22.1.17.
RHODES, C. N., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 21.9.16. Bn. Signalling
Officer (September–October, 1916). To hospital sick, 20.10.16.
*RILEY, J. T., Lieut. Accidentally wounded, 11.10.15.
Rejoined, 29.5.16. Killed in action N. of Thiepval, 3.9.16.
ROBB, A. J., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 1.3.17. Wounded (gas)
near Nieuport, 17.8.17. Rejoined, 14.10.17. O.C. D Coy. (October,
1917–February, 1918). Wounded near Reutel, 19.2.18.
A/Capt., 14.12.17.
ROBERTSHAW, G. F., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.5.16. Wounded N. of
Thiepval, 3.9.16.
ROBINS, P. E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 2.11.17. Wounded near
Ypres, 15.11.17.
ROBINSON, J. H., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.11.18. Left Bn. for
demobilisation, 21.4.19.
ROBINSON, O., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Wounded near
Zillebeke, 5.8.18. Rejoined, 21.11.18. Transferred to 147th T.M.B.,
27.1.19.
RODGERS, G., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.9.16. Transferred to 2nd.
Bn. D. of W. Regt., 23.10.16.
ROSENDALE, H., Sec.-Lieut. (4th Bn. East Yorks. Regt.).
Joined, 18.9.17. Wounded (at duty) in Bailleul, 12.4.18. Killed in
action near Roeux, 11.10.18.
SCHOLES, W. T., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 21.9.16. Left Bn., for
demobilisation, 25.1.19.
Lieut., 1.7.17.
SHAW, A., Lieut. Joined, 19.8.18. O.C. C Coy. (October,
1918–January, 1919). Demobilised on leave, February, 1919.
A/Capt., 10.11.18.
SHERLOCK, S. P., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 21.11.15. To hospital
sick, 1.12.15.
SIEMSSEN, G. H., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 2.11.17. Wounded near
Berthen, 17.4.18.
SKELSEY, R. M., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.9.16. Accidentally
wounded, 5.11.16.
SMETS, L. J., Lieut. Joined, 9.12.17. Bn. Signalling Officer
(February–June, 1918). Certified unfit for service while on a course in
England, June, 1918.
SMITH, W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.5.16. Wounded near Thiepval,
3.9.16.
SOMERVELL, A., Capt. (M.C.) (6th Bn. D. of W. Regt.).
Joined, 29.11.18. O.C. C Coy. (January–March, 1919). Left Bn. for
demobilisation, 20.3.19.
ST. AUBYN, E. G., Lieut.-Col. Joined, 22.11.15. O.C. Bn.
(November, 1915–September, 1916). To hospital sick, 1.9.16.
STANSFIELD, S. P., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 26.3.17. Killed in
action near Richebourg L’Avoue, 30.4.17.
* STANTON, H. A. S., Capt. (Royal Scots Regt.). Adjt. (August,
1914–August, 1915). Appointed Brigade Major, 147th Inf. Bde., 19.8.15.
STARKEY, T. P., Lieut. Joined, 28.11.18. Transferred to 1/7th
Bn. D. of W. Regt., 5.12.18.
STEELE, J. A., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.4.18. Demobilised with
Cadre of Bn., 19.6.19.
STUBINGTON, R. E., Sec.-Lieut. (6th Bn. Norfolk Regt.).
Joined, 20.8.17. Wounded on Belle Vue Spur, 9.10.17.
* SUGDEN, R. E., Major. O.C. A Coy. (April–May, 1915 and
September–November, 1915). Second in Command (May–September and
November–December, 1915). Wounded near Ypres, 12.12.15. Rejoined,
5.9.16. O.C. Bn. (September, 1916–June, 1918). Appointed G.O.C., 151st
Inf. Bde., 7.6.18.
Lieut.-Col., 1.6.16. T/Brig.-Genl., 7.6.18.
SULLIVAN, G. K., Lieut.-Col. Joined, 9.11.15. O.C. Bn.
(November, 1915). Wounded near Ypres, 20.11.15.
* SYKES, E. E., Capt. O.C. C Coy. (April–November, 1915 and
May–July, 1916). To hospital sick, 26.11.15. Rejoined, 23.5.16. Killed
in action at Johnstone’s Post, 4.7.16.
SYKES, B., Lieut. Joined, 28.11.18. Left Bn. for
demobilisation, 21.3.19.
* TAYLOR, E., Sec.-Lieut. Wounded near Ypres and died of
wounds, 16.10.15.
TAYLOR, H. N., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 11.10.15. O.C. A Coy.
(January–June, 1917). Certified medically unfit for service, July,
1917. Rejoined 9.12.17. Bn. L.G.O. (December, 1917–January, 1919). Left
Bn. for demobilisation, 22.1.19.
Lieut., 1.6.16. Capt., 29.8.17.
TOMLINSON, C. W., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 28.5.16. Killed in
action N. of Thiepval, 3.9.16.
TURNER, J., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.1.18. To hospital sick,
1.8.18.
TURNER, J., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, October, 1918. Transferred to
13th Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.2.19.
* WALKER, J., Capt. O.C. B Coy. (April, 1915–April, 1916).
Second in Command (April–October, 1916). Appointed Second in Command
of 1/5th Bn. D. of W. Regt., January, 1917. T/Major, 22.1.16. Major,
1.6.16. A/Lieut.-Col. (1/5th Bn.), 26.9.17.
* WALKER, F., Sec.-Lieut. To hospital sick, 6.9.15. Rejoined,
15.2.16. O.C. A Coy. (September–October, 1916). To hospital sick,
19.10.16. Lieut., 26.1.16. A/Capt., 4.10.16.
WALKER, E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 1.3.17. Bn. Signalling Officer
(April, 1917–January, 1918). Transferred to R.F.C., 15.1.18.
* WALLER, H. N., Capt. To hospital sick, 7.6.15.
WALTON, P. B., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 13.3.16. Wounded in
Thiepval Wood, 7.7.16.
WALTON, J. C., Lieut. Joined, 29.1.18. Bn. I.O.
(February–April, 1918). Killed in action near Kemmel, 29.4.18.
WATSON, J. S., Sec.-Lieut. (4th Bn. East Yorks. Regt.).
Joined, 18.9.17. Killed in action near Molenaarelsthoek, 26.11.17.
WENHAM-GOODE, A. F., Sec.-Lieut. (6th Bn. Manchester Regt.).
Joined, 15.5.18. Left Bn. for demobilisation, 3.2.19.
WHITTAKER, J. C., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 29.1.18. Killed in
action near Kemmel, 28.5.18.
WILKINSON, H. S., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 21.9.16. Instructor
Third Army S.O.S. School (December, 1916–May, 1917). Rejoined, 16.5.17.
Bn. I.O. (September–October, 1917). Wounded on Belle Vue Spur, 9.10.17.
Lieut., 1.7.17.
WILLIAMS, H. E., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 15.4.16. Transferred to
2nd Bn. D. of W. Regt., 23.10.16.
WILLIAMSON, R. J., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 19.10.18. Transferred
to 13th Bn. D. of W. Regt., 26.2.19.
WIMBUSH, R. M., Lieut. Joined, 29.11.18. Left Bn. for
demobilisation, 24.4.19.
* WINTER, D. B., Capt. O.C. C Coy. (April, 1915). To hospital
sick, 24.4.15.
WOODWARD, F., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 25.5.18. Wounded near
Zillebeke, 11.6.18.
* YATES, W. B. B., Lieut. To England as Instructor at Cadet
School, 16.9.16.
YELLAND, E. J., Sec.-Lieut. Joined, 6.9.16. Transferred to 2nd
Bn. D. of W. Regt., 23.10.16.
YOUNG, E. M., Lieut. Joined, 3.11.16. Bn. T.O. (November,
1916–October, 1917). Transferred to A.S.C., 13.10.17.
_Medical Officers._
* GRIFFITHS, A. T., April–May, 1915.
GREAVES, S. S., June, 1915–December, 1916.
SCOTT, D. C., December, 1916–July, 1917.
ANDERSON, J. M., July–October, 1917.
FARIE, J. G., October, 1917–January, 1918.
ALLEN, W. B. (V.C., M.C.), January–March, 1918.
HARRISON, F. C., March–October, 1918.
WRIGHT, A., November, 1918–March, 1919.
APPENDIX III.
NOMINAL ROLL OF WARRANT OFFICERS AND COMPANY QUARTER
MASTER SERGEANTS.
_Regimental Sergeant Majors_:--
J. MCCORMACK. Killed in action, 12.8.15.
E. BOTTOMLEY. Reverted to C.S.M. on return to the Battalion of
C.S.M. C. C. MacKay who had been wounded,
18.10.15.
C. C. MACKAY. Killed in action, 19.12.15.
W. LEE. Reverted to C.S.M. on arrival from England of
R.S.M. J. Graham, 30.1.16.
J. GRAHAM. Evacuated sick, 25.5.16.
F. P. STIRZAKER. Reverted to C.S.M. on arrival from England of
R.S.M. T. Glover, 16.11.16.
T. GLOVER. Wounded in action, 27.1.17.
F. P. STIRZAKER. Killed in action, 11.4.18.
T. S. SHERWOOD. Transferred to 1/7th Bn. Duke of Wellington’s
(W.R.) Regt., 17.9.18.
W. LEE. Wounded in action, 18.10.18.
B. HARRISON. Left the Battalion for demobilisation, 14.2.19.
S. FLITCROFT. Demobilised with the Cadre of the Battalion,
19.6.19.
_Regimental Quarter Master Sergeants_:--
F. J. COOKE. Returned to England time-expired, 31.3.16.
W. LEE. Promoted R.S.M., 17.9.18.
B. HARRISON. Promoted R.S.M., 19.10.18.
P. BARKER. Demobilised with the Cadre of the Battalion,
19.6.19.
_Company Sergeant Majors_ (_A Company_):--
E. BOTTOMLEY. Promoted R.S.M., 13.8.15.
A. MCNULTY. Appointed Sergt. Instructor at the 49th
Divisional Technical School, 20.8.15.
E. WALSH. Wounded in action (Gas), 19.12.15.
A. STIRZAKER. Killed in action, 3.9.16.
A. MCNULTY. Appointed Instructor at the 147th Infantry
Brigade School, 11.2.17.
A. DAY. Wounded in action (Gas), 20.11.17.
T. S. SHERWOOD. Promoted R.S.M., 11.4.18.
F. GLEDHILL. Left the Battalion for demobilisation, 8.2.19.
_Company Sergeant Majors_ (_B Company_):--
A. PARKIN. Wounded in action, 10.7.15.
W. LEE. Promoted R.S.M., 20.12.15.
L. GREENWOOD. Reverted to Sergeant when C.S.M. W. Lee returned
to the Company, 30.1.16.
W. LEE. Promoted R.Q.M.S., 1.4.16.
W. MEDLEY. Evacuated sick, 20.7.17.
H. HAIGH. Demobilised while on leave in England, 22.1.19.
F. BIRTWHISTLE. Left the Battalion for demobilisation, 3.4.19.
_Company Sergeant Majors_ (_C Company_):--
E. LUMB. Evacuated sick, 8.8.15.
V. S. TOLLEY. Killed in action, 16.10.15.
E. BOTTOMLEY. Evacuated sick, 12.11.15.
T. H. GREENWOOD. Killed in action, 17.9.16.
J. PARKINSON. Reverted to Sergeant on the transfer of C.S.M.
A. L. Lord from D Company, 16.11.16.
A. L. LORD. Proceeded to G.H.Q. Cadet School for a
commission, 6.3.17.
J. PARKINSON. Wounded in action, 27.12.17.
C. NAYLOR. Reverted to Sergeant on the arrival from England
of C.S.M. N. Hobson, 29.1.18.
N. HOBSON. Wounded in action, 10.4.18.
J. E. YATES. Proceeded to England for a commission, 1.6.18.
B. HARRISON. Promoted R.Q.M.S., 17.9.18.
S. FLITCROFT. Promoted R.S.M., 14.2.19.
J. WIDDOP. Left the Battalion for demobilisation, 7.3.19.
_Company Sergeant Majors_ (_D Company_):--
C. C. MACKAY. Wounded in action, 7.8.15.
T. S. SHERWOOD. Wounded in action, 30.10.15.
F. P. STIRZAKER. Promoted R.S.M., 26.5.16.
A. HOWARTH. Killed in action, 13.7.16.
J. N. FLATHER. Wounded in action, 27.7.16.
J. C. WALKER. Killed in action, 3.9.16.
A. L. LORD. Transferred to C Company, 15.11.16.
F. P. STIRZAKER. Promoted R.S.M., 27.1.17.
L. GREENWOOD. Proceeded to England for a commission, 21.5.17.
T. S. SHERWOOD. Transferred to A Company, 20.11.17.
W. BROOKE. Wounded in action, 25.2.18.
C. NAYLOR. Wounded in action, 11.10.18.
F. WOOD. Left the Battalion for demobilisation, 2.2.19.
_Supernumerary Warrant Officers_:--
F. SPENCER. Joined the Battalion in France with the first
reinforcement and was posted to A Company.
Evacuated sick, 22.9.15.
H. J. WYLDE. Orderly Room Sergeant. Promoted Warrant Officer,
Class II., 22.6.18.
_Company Quarter Master Sergeants_ (_A Company_):--
C. SOUTHERN. Returned to England time-expired, 12.3.16.
J. C. WALKER. Promoted C.S.M. D Company, 28.7.16.
S. MACKENZIE. Wounded in action (Gas), 14.8.17.
H. HAIGH. Promoted C.S.M. B Company, 16.9.17.
E. WALSH. Killed in action, 13.10.18.
P. J. DAVENPORT. Demobilised while on leave in England, 22.1.19.
_Company Quarter Master Sergeants_ (_B Company_):--
D. MCKEAND. Proceeded to England for a commission, 10.11.15.
E. MIDGLEY. Returned to England time-expired, 17.3.16.
C. L. JOHNSON. Evacuated sick, 21.1.17.
A. HODGSON. Wounded in action (Gas), 14.8.17.
B. LITTLE. Killed in action, 13.10.18.
F. WOOD. Demobilised while on leave in England, 26.1.19.
L. RODGERS. Transferred to 13th Bn. Duke of Wellington’s
(W.R.) Regt., 26.2.19.
_Company Quarter Master Sergeants_ (_C Company_):--
W. LEE. Promoted C.S.M. B Company, 11.7.15.
A. L. LORD. Promoted C.S.M. D Company, 4.9.16.
H. FITTON. Evacuated (accidental injury), 23.2.17.
E. MIDGLEY. Reverted to Sergeant on return from England of
C.Q.M.S. H. Fitton, 4.7.17.
H. FITTON. Evacuated sick, 1.8.17.
E. MIDGLEY. Left the Battalion for demobilisation, 28.1.19.
_Company Quarter Master Sergeants_ (_D Company_):--
G. JACKSON. Evacuated sick, 3.7.15.
J. W. SIDDALL. Returned to England time-expired, 17.3.16.
G. EDMONSON. Transferred to England, 20.9.16.
P. BARKER. Promoted R.Q.M.S., 19.10.18.
A. WHITAKER. Evacuated sick, 14.11.18.
E. ELSEY. Demobilised with the Cadre of the Battalion,
19.6.19.
APPENDIX IV.
SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES.
----------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------
| | Officers. | Other Ranks.
Period. | Sector. |K. W. M. | K. W. M.
----------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------
1915. | | |
April 18-June 25|Fleurbaix |-- 3 -- | 14 38 --
July 8-Dec. 20 |Ypres | 7 7 -- |116 206 4
1916. | | |
Feb. 28-Mch. 6 |Authuille |-- 1 -- | -- 1 --
Mch. 7-Mch. 29 |Mailly-Maillet |-- -- -- | 1 4 --
June |Aveluy Wood |-- -- -- | 2 7 --
July 1-Sept. 24 |Battle of the Somme|10[24] 10 -- | 91 453 155
Sept. 29-Oct. 16|Hannescamps |-- -- -- | 3 13 --
Oct. 24-Dec. 5 |Fonquevillers |-- -- -- | 10 12 --
1917. | | |
Jan. 7-Jan. 30 |Berles-au-Bois | 1 -- -- | -- 18 --
Feb. 2-Feb. 28 |Riviére |-- -- -- | 6 27 --
Mch. 13-May 16 |Ferme du Bois | 1 1 -- | 4 22 --
May 27-June 15 |Cordonnerie |-- -- -- | 1 1 --
June 25-July 3 |Hulluch | 3 2 -- | 7 24 1
Aug. 3-Aug. 16 |Nieuport | 1[25] 4 -- | 19 84 1
Oct. 4-Oct. 10 |Belle Vue Spur | 1 4 -- | 20 117 2
Nov. 19-Jan. 4 |Keerselaarhoek and | 2 3 -- | 16 75 1
1918 | Molenaarelsthoek | |
1918. | | |
Feb. 22-April 3 |Reutel |-- 3 -- | 18 60 --
April 9-April 20|Battle of the Lys | 2 13 -- | 47 261 83
April 25-May 3 |Battle of Kemmel | 2 2 -- | 32 121 4
June 3-Aug. 20 |Ypres |-- 4 -- | 9 77 1
Oct. 11-Oct. 18 |Villers-en-Cauchies| 7 3 1[26]| 55 377 12
| +----------------+-----------------
| Totals |37 60 1 |471 1998 264[27]
----------------+-------------------+----------------+-----------------
K.--Killed. W.--Wounded (includes Gassed). M.--Missing.
APPENDIX V.
LIST OF HONOURS AND AWARDS.
In compiling this list of Honours and Awards the following rules have
been adhered to:--
1. The Rank and Regimental Number given are those held by the
individual at the time the decoration was won. It thus follows
that, in several cases, the same name occurs more than once but
with a different rank and sometimes with a different regimental
number.
2. Only Honours and Awards conferred on officers, warrant
officers, non-commissioned officers and men for services
rendered _while actually serving with the Battalion_ have
been included.
The length of the list might be considerably increased by including
such names as Brig.-General R. E. Sugden, who was awarded the C.M.G.
while he was G.O.C., 151st Infantry Brigade; Lieut.-Col. J. Walker,
who received the D.S.O. and Bar and the French Legion d’Honneur while
he was in command of the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.; and
several other officers. Many N.C.O.’s and men, such as Sergt. F. E.
Lumb, D.C.M., also won decorations whilst attached to such units as the
147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., the 147th Machine Gun Company, and the
147th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
VICTORIA CROSS (1).
24066 Pte. A. Poulter.
DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER (2).
Capt. (A/Lt.-Col.) A. L. Mowat, M.C. Major R. E. Sugden.
BAR TO DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER (1).
Lt.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O.
MILITARY CROSS (27).
Sec.-Lt. H. H. Aykroyd
Lt. P. G. Bales
Sec.-Lt. F. V. Blackwell
Sec.-Lt. E. V. Blakey
Sec.-Lt. W. N. Everitt
Lt. (A/Capt.) N. T. Farrar
Lt. (A/Capt.) W. C. Fenton
Capt. N. Geldard
Lt. T. T. Gilroy
Capt. S. S. Greaves (R.A.M.C.)
Sec.-Lt. L. Gumby
Sec.-Lt. B. H. Huggard
Sec.-Lt. F. A. Innes
Lt. F. Irish
Sec.-Lt. T. E. Jessop
Lt. (A/Capt.) A. Kirk
83 C.S.M. W. Lee
Sec.-Lt. J. W. Lumb
Lt. (A/Capt.) A. M. Luty
Lt. W. G. Mackie
Capt. E. N. Marshall
200441 C.S.M. W. Medley, M.M.
Capt. A. L. Mowat
Lt. (A/Capt.) J. G. Mowat
Sec.-Lt. H. R. Newman
2353 R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker
Lt. (T/Capt.) E. E. Sykes
BAR TO MILITARY CROSS (2).
Capt. W. C. Fenton, M.C. Capt. (A/Major) A. L. Mowat, M.C.
DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL (28).
355 Cpl. E. Ashworth
200453 Sgt. J. Bancroft, M.M.
3060 Cpl. W. Bancroft
235519 Sgt. W. H. Binns
235227 Sgt. (A/C.S.M.) W. Brooke
200298 Sgt. F. J. Brown
1597 Pte. W. Brown
2040 Pte. (L/Cpl.) T. H. Clarke
203129 Sgt. F. Constable
200143 Sgt. N. Downes
203340 L/Sgt. F. J. Field
200055 Sgt. S. Flitcroft, M.M.
203252 Sgt. W. D. Foster
200135 C.Q.M.S. H. Haigh
202936 Pte. (A/Cpl.) R. A. Hudson
200352 Cpl. E. Jackson, M.M.
203285 Pte. (L/Cpl.) H. Kane, M.M.
1495 Cpl. C. Landale
15805 Sgt. A. Loosemore, V.C.
203229 Sgt. J. Mann
203351 Pte. (L/Cpl.) A. Moon
6750 Sgt. G. Moscrop
200598 C.S.M. J. Parkinson
242274 Sgt. J. Redpath, M.M.
2353 C.S.M. A. Stirzaker
3406 Pte. H. Sykes
203305 Sgt. R. Wilson
201191 Sgt. F. Wood, M.M.
MILITARY MEDAL (132).
200471 Pte. C. Andrews
203501 Pte. (L/Cpl.) J. T. N. Atkinson
203414 Pte. J. H. Atkinson
1605 Cpl. G. A. Bailey
1995 Sgt. J. Bancroft
26498 Pte. (L/Cpl.) G. W. Barber
200096 Pte. S. Barker
306365 Sgt. W. Barnes
203178 Pte. J. T. Berridge
200053 Pte. (L/Cpl.) A. Beverley
200331 Pte. H. Bibby
16465 Pte. H. G. Binns
201886 Cpl. G. Birkinshaw
26010 Pte. A. Bishop
203336 Sgt. A. A. Bolt
201893 Pte. (L/Cpl.) C. Bolton
202042 Pte. (L/Cpl.) E. Booth
6596 Pte. (L/Cpl.) J. Bowers
203177 Pte. S. R. Brabben
1775 Pte. E. Braithwaite
202787 Pte. (L/Cpl.) G. Broadbent
202410 Pte. J. W. Brookes
202579 Pte. N. W. Brooksbank
200298 Sgt. F. J. Brown, D.C.M.
242271 Sgt. W. Brown
24960 Pte. S. Brummit
200653 Sgt. R. G. Brunt
203595 Pte. W. Buckley
203217 Cpl. A. Buie
203433 Pte. T. Burfoot
201125 L/Sgt. T. Chilton
5792 Sgt. F. Johnson
33014 Pte. J. E. Johnson
200920 Pte. A. G. Jones
203285 Pte. (L/Cpl.) H. Kane
10737 Sgt. S. Kay
201783 Sgt. T. Knowles
1645 Pte. (L/Cpl.) R. Knox
200139 Pte. J. Lancaster
200488 Pte. O. Lee
200504 Pte. J. Limb
203188 Pte. H. Louth
238181 Pte. W. Lowe
201012 Sgt. P. McHugh
601 Sgt. (A/C.S.M.) A. McNulty
1967 Cpl. W. Medley
201923 Pte. T. Meneghan
200396 Sgt. A. Meskimmon
6520 Pte. W. Metcalfe
201013 Pte. (L/Cpl.) A. R. Mitchell
200681 Cpl. W. H. Mitchell
73 Sgt. P. Moran
200153 Pte. (L/Cpl.) C. Mortimer
1603 Pte. W. H. Murray
201689 Pte. J. H. Naylor
203352 Pte. T. Nicholls
203371 Cpl. G. North
202669 Pte. T. North
203193 Pte. G. Pearson
201336 Pte. F. F. Pettit
306873 Pte. T. Proctor
242274 Pte. J. Redpath
202120 Pte. T. Conroy
26815 Pte. (L/Cpl.) A. Cresswell
30 Sgt. J. W. Crossley
26524 Pte. H. S. Davies
203647 Pte. H. B. Dawson
203650 Pte. A. Denham
200172 Pte. N. Dennis
203649 Pte. J. Dewar
203451 Pte. V. T. Dobson
267198 Pte. (L/Cpl.) H. Driver
201437 Pte. (L/Cpl.) J. A. Ellis
242874 Pte. R. Emmett
200146 Pte. J. Ennis
201535 Pte. C. Firth
242821 Pte. P. Firth
1002 Sgt. (A/C.S.M.) J. N. Flather
200055 Sgt. S. Flitcroft
203513 Pte. G. A. Foster
201879 Pte. J. Galloway
200127 Pte. R. Gledhill
235253 Pte. G. Green
203728 Pte. E. Haggas
200135 C.S.M. H. Haigh, D.C.M.
203517 Pte. T. Hartley
12682 Pte. H. Henderson
203315 Pte. B. Hinchcliffe
1485 Sgt. A. Hodgson
2108 Pte. (L/Cpl.) G. H. Holt
203480 Pte. F. A. Hookham
201687 Pte. F. Howarth
203551 Pte. W. Howker
203072 Pte. W. Inman
1747 Cpl. E. Jackson
202664 Pte. (L/Cpl.) B. Jennings
201219 Cpl. (L/Sgt.) S. Jessop
202746 Pte. (L/Cpl.) F. Rhodes
1889 Pte. S. Royals
242202 Pte. G. Ryder
200134 Pte. (L/Cpl.) J. W. Ryder
32897 Pte. E. Sambrookes
203390 Pte. F. Scales
202888 Pte. W. A. Scruton
2481 Cpl. H. Shackleton
2413 L/Sgt. J. S. Sheard
242567 Sgt. A. Smith
200192 Sgt. H. Smith
2716 Pte. L. Stead
201883 Pte. A. Sutcliffe
6606 Pte. R. Swinburne
202142 Pte. J. W. Taylor
201186 Cpl. (A/Sgt.) V. Taylor
242371 Pte. J. Tebb
13014 Sgt. W. P. Thompson
1455 Cpl. A. L. Thornton
200101 Sgt. E. Turner
238031 Cpl. J. W. Varley
200204 Cpl. H. Wainwright
2164 Sgt. (A/C.S.M.) J. C. Walker
34005 Cpl. A. Wall
200320 Pte. C. Walsh
34007 Pte. M. Webster
200753 Sgt. A. Whitaker
200529 Pte. (L/Cpl.) H. Whiteley
16075 Sgt. J. Widdop
201295 Cpl. B. Wilson
2346 Sgt. J. Wilson
235120 Pte. W. F. Witts
201191 Sgt. F. Wood
235524 Sgt. (A/C.S.M.) J. E. Yates
26271 Pte. J. Young
BAR TO MILITARY MEDAL (5).
200096 Pte. (L/Cpl.) S. Barker, M.M.
200146 Pte. (L/Cpl.) J. Ennis, M.M.
34005 Pte. (L/Cpl.) A. Wall, M.M.
200529 Pte. (L/C.) H. Whiteley, M.M.
203285 Pte. (A/Cpl.) H. Kane, D.C.M., M.M.
MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL (4).
200264 Sgt. H. Deane
200483 Sgt. F. Firth
200688 Sgt. E. Jones
242695 Sgt. F. Smith
ITALIAN BRONZE MEDAL FOR MILITARY VALOUR (1).
1535 Cpl. J. Walker.
MEDAILLE MILITAIRE (1).
200441 C.S.M. W. Medley, M.M.
BELGIAN CROIX DE GUERRE (1).
200064 Sgt. C. Naylor.
MENTIONS IN DESPATCHES (39).
Lt. (T/Capt.) M. P. Andrews
Lt. P. G. Bales
202027 C.Q.M.S. P. Barker
Sec.-Lt. E. V. Blakey
235227 Sgt. W. Brooke
Capt. & Q.M. W. N. Broomhead
2492 Pte. (L/Cpl.) D. Dow
Lt. & Q.M. T. Fielding
Capt. S. S. Greaves (R.A.M.C.)
200036 R.S.M. B. Harrison
2108 Pte. (L/Cpl.) G. H. Holt
Sec.-Lt. F. A. Innes, M.C.
1687 C.S.M. A. L. Lord
Sec.-Lt. (T/Capt.) E. N. Marshall
Lt. G. P. McGuire (twice)
601 C.S.M. A. McNulty
200441 C.S.M. W. Medley, M.M.
204733 C.Q.M.S. E. Midgley
Lt.-Col. A. L. Mowat, D.S.O., M.C.
200598 C.S.M. J. Parkinson
Major (T/Lt.-Col.) C. J. Pickering
Sec.-Lt. T. D. Pratt
2481 Cpl. H. Shackleton
2400 Pte. J. Shelley
2716 Pte. L. Stead
2353 Sgt. (A/C.S.M.) F. P. Stirzaker
Lt.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O. (5 times)
Lt. (T/Capt.) E. E. Sykes
Major J. Walker (3 times)
2164 Sgt. J. C. Walker
2346 Sgt. J. Wilson
1234 Pte. (L/Cpl.) C. Wood
APPENDIX VI.
THE BATTALION CANTEEN.
A thoughtful enemy provided the Battalion with most of its excitement,
and a deal of its amusement, during the Great War. An equally
thoughtful War Office arranged for rations, and a limited supply of
such luxuries as tobacco and cigarettes for the men. But it was left
to the Battalion to supply itself with a canteen. And it was Sergt. F.
Smith who made that institution such a great success.
The Canteen had its beginning in a small affair, started for the
benefit of the transport men, in August, 1915. Lieut. J. G. Mowat, who
was Transport Officer at the time, provided the necessary capital. Pte.
F. Smith, then employed in the Q.M. Stores, managed the Canteen in his
spare time. From the very first, the new departure was a great success.
Goods were sold out almost as soon as they were displayed, and the
small library which was opened was also very popular.
Early in its history, this first Canteen nearly came to an untimely
end. One night the roof was found to be in flames, which rapidly spread
to the wooden supports of the building. The “proprietor” alone knew
that a store of petrol and bombs was lying in the hut. But, largely
through the energy of that trained fireman, Cpl. E. Ashworth, the fire
was put out before it reached them.
In September, 1915, the transport canteen developed into a battalion
institution. Plenty of money was forthcoming to start it, and it soon
“set up shop” in a dugout on the Canal Bank. This was not an ideal spot
for business, and there is no doubt that it was the first canteen to be
set up in that area. When the Battalion went back into rest the Canteen
accompanied it, and, before long, it was looked upon as a permanent
institution.
In the spring of 1916, the Canteen closed down for a time. Lance-Cpl.
F. Smith had been evacuated sick, and no one else was deemed suitable
to carry on the business. He returned to the 147th Infantry Brigade
late in the Battle of the Somme, but was posted to the 1/5th Battalion
Duke of Wellington’s Regt. However, shortly after, through the courtesy
of that battalion, he returned to his old unit, and the Canteen was
immediately restarted.
At Fonquevillers it did excellent service. Stationed in a broken-down
building in the village, and frequently annoyed by enemy shelling, it
soon became the admiration of all units in the neighbourhood. At first
it had only been intended for the use of men of the Battalion, but
it was now thrown open to all comers. Within less than a mile of the
firing line, it provided such luxuries as fresh fish, eggs, butter,
fruit and vegetables. Needless to say, it did a “roaring” trade.
During the rest at Halloy, it was much to the fore, and its activities
were greatly extended. In addition to an enormous retail business, it
catered for all the Christmas dinners and for many smaller parties. It
also became a buying agency, through which officers and other ranks
could obtain goods which they required but which were not ordinarily
kept in stock.
When the Battalion went into the line near Berles-au-Bois, the Canteen
was set up as usual. There it narrowly escaped a violent death. A
shell entered by the roof one day and blew out a side of the shelter,
wounding a man who was there, and scattering the cash which was being
counted at the time. During the terribly cold weather of that period,
hot coffee and rum were supplied free to many a half-frozen man.
Senechal Farm and the Ferme du Bois Sector provided plenty of scope for
the Canteen’s initiative. Good shopping centres were plentiful in the
district, and supplies easily procurable. “Hawking” goods in the front
line became quite an institution there, and it was continued in the
Cordonnerie Sector. In the line near Hulluch the facilities were not so
good. A Canteen was set up near Battalion H.Q., but it was difficult to
get goods up to it; and twice the staff was gassed out.
Little could be done in the Nieuport Sector, though the Canteen still
acted as a buying agency. But while the Battalion was training on the
coast it was very active. There, whole-day training schemes were not
uncommon, and it became customary for a limber to accompany the troops
and set up a stall on the ground.
The winter of 1917–18 was a very difficult period. There was never
accommodation for a canteen when the Battalion was in the front line;
but it was always at work during rest periods. Its presence in the
Westhoek Dugouts was a great success; beer was never lacking during
that rest period.
The sudden order to move from Maida Camp, early in April, 1918, caused
much consternation, for the Canteen was particularly well stocked at
the time. However, the stock was somehow cleared, and the takings on
the last day in that area amounted to 4,500 francs--a Battalion record.
Little business was possible during the Battles of the Lys and Mont
Kemmel, but an increase in trade followed the Battalion’s return to the
neighbourhood of Ypres. Trade again declined when the Battalion went
into battle in the autumn; but the indefatigable Sergt. Smith succeeded
in getting a large supply of cigarettes up to the Battalion in Vordon
Wood--at a time when there was not a cigarette to be had for miles
around.
During the Armistice, trade was good at Auby, in spite of the
competition of a number of estaminets and shops which were soon opened
in the village. There Sergt. F. Smith laid down his duties and devoted
himself to education for the short period before he was demobilised.
Yet, right up to the end, the Canteen survived at Douai.
In its long and chequered history the Canteen had many homes. Dugouts
and shelters, within easy range of the front line, were occupied on
many occasions. Barns, stables, even a pig-sty, did duty in various
places when the Battalion was in rest. But, whatever its surroundings
might be, it always proved a source of much comfort to the men. There
were many rumours of the “row of houses” which was being built in
Halifax, for few people were well acquainted with current prices. But
actually, the profit was never more than 5 per cent. Out of this profit
all expenses had to be paid; the whole of the balance was then spent
on the men of the Battalion, who were the chief customers. When the
demobilisation of the Battalion was complete, the surplus funds were
handed over to the Old Comrades’ Association.
The Canteen staff had many duties besides those of buying and selling.
The Battalion library, which was run almost continuously for about
three and a half years, was in its charge. When billets were available,
reading and recreation rooms were organised. Sports material was looked
after. Concerts, whist drives, and other social functions were catered
for. In all these activities, the efforts of Sergt. Smith were ably
seconded by his faithful henchmen, “Jack” Baines and “Johnny” Jackson.
The Battalion was particularly fortunate in having so many good friends
at home. Chief among these should be mentioned Mr. W. E. Denison and
the _Halifax Courier_ Fund. Books, periodicals, whist drive
prizes, lamps, and countless other articles, which helped to make life
happier for the men at the “Front,” were provided by them.
The Battalion had several different Seconds-in-Command and all took
great interest in, and spent much time over, the Canteen. But it had
only one Sergt. F. Smith. To him was mainly due the reputation of the
4th Battalion Canteen as the most successful institution of its kind in
the 49th Division. Everyone was delighted when the Meritorious Service
Medal rewarded his great services.
STOTT BROTHERS LIMITED, Printers, Mount Street Works, Halifax.
[Illustration: ~Flanders.~]
[Illustration: FIFTH AND THIRD ARMY AREAS.
1916–1917
--·--·--Approximate Front Line 1.7.16.]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The following Officers mobilised with the Battalion on August 4th:--
Lieut.-Col. H. S. Atkinson, T.D. (C.O.).
Major E. P. Chambers (Second in Command).
Capt. H. A. S. Stanton (Adjutant).
Capt. A. T. Griffiths, R.A.M.C. (Medical Officer).
Lieut. T. Fielding (Quartermaster).
Captains
W. A. Laxton,
D. V. Fleming,
J. Walker,
V. A. Milligan,
D. B. Winter,
R. H. Goldthorp,
C. E. Kirby.[2]
Lieutenants
E. P. Learoyd,
E. E. Sykes,[2]
A. H. Helliwell,
A. L. Mowat,
A. H. Richardson,
D. A. Sutcliffe,
M. P. Andrews, W.
F. Denning.[2]
Second-Lieutenants
J. T. Riley,
C. Hirst,
S. Balme.
Capt. R. E. Sugden and Lieut. H. N. Waller had gone away with
the Special Service Section two days previously.
[2] From the T.F. Reserve.
[3] Company Commanders and Seconds-in-Command were as follows:--
A Company:
Major R. E. Sugden;
Capt. M. P. Andrews.
B Company:
Capt. J. Walker;
Capt. H. N. Waller.
C Company:
Capt. D. B. Winter;
Capt. E. E. Sykes.
D Company:
Capt. R. H. Goldthorp;
Capt. A. L. Mowat.
[4] The following were the billets occupied in Doncaster:--
Battn. H.Q. and Q.M. Stores: Oxford Place Schools.
A Company: Hexthorpe Schools.
B Company: Wheatley Road and St. James’ Schools.
C and D Companies: Hyde Park Schools.
Transport: Turf Hotel Stables and Wood Street
Hotel.
[5] The hotels used were:--
Nos. 1 and 7 Companies: Red Lion Hotel.
No. 2 Company: Salutation Hotel.
No. 3 Company: Thatched House Hotel.
Nos. 4 and 8 Companies: Burns Hotel.
Nos. 5 and 6 Companies: Danum Hotel.
Battalion H.Q. Details: Good Woman Hotel.
Transport: Wood Street Hotel.
[6] The names of the men who made up this party, representing as they
did the pick of the “original” Battalion, are worth recording. They
were:--
Lieut. E. N. Marshall.
A Company:
C.S.M. Walsh,
Sergts. Stirzaker and Green,
Cpl. Harrison,
Lance-Cpl. Payne,
Pte. Pamment.
B Company:
C.S.M. Lee,
Lance-Cpl. Brown,
Ptes. Brown, Helliwell, Whiteley and Harkness.
C Company:
C.S.M. Greenwood,
Sergts. Flather, Robertshaw and Moran,
Cpls. Hoyle and Barraclough.
D Company:
C.S.M. Sherwood,
Lance-Cpls. Asquith and Walsh,
Ptes. Sykes, Bentley and Braithwaite.
Transport:
Sergt. Crossley.
[7] The following Officers and Warrant Officers went into action with
the Battalion on September 3rd, 1916:--
Battalion H.Q.:
Major J. Walker (C.O.);
Lieut. W. C. Fenton (Adjt.);
Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd, M.C. (I.O.);
Sec.-Lieut. H. N. Taylor (L.G.O.);
Sec.-Lieut. N. Mellor (Bombing O.);
Capt. S. S. Greaves, R.A.M.C. (M.O.).
R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker, M.C.
A Company:
Lieut. W. N. Everitt, M.C.;
Sec.-Lieut. A. E. Hirst;
Sec.-Lieut. G. F. Robertshaw.
C.S.M. A. Stirzaker, D.C.M.
B Company:
Capt. C. Hirst;
Sec.-Lieut. V. A. Horsfall;
Sec.-Lieut. H. E. Pohlmann.
C.S.M. W. Medley.
C Company:
Capt. E. N. Marshall;
Sec.-Lieut. F. Walker;
Sec.-Lieut. W. Smith.
C.S.M. T. H. Greenwood.
D Company:
Lieut. J. T. Riley;
Sec.-Lieut. E. C. Mee;
Sec.-Lieut. C. W. Tomlinson.
C.S.M. J. C. Walker.
Fighting strength of the Battalion on the afternoon of September 2nd:--
Battalion H.Q. Officers (including M.O.) 6 Other ranks 121
A Company „ 3 „ 127
B Company „ 3 „ 127
C Company „ 3 „ 127
D Company „ 3 „ 127
-- ---
Total 18 629
[8] At that time O.C., 1/5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.;
formerly Adjutant of the 1/4th Battalion.
[9] 7 killed, 24 wounded.
[10] Marked X on map.
[11] The following Officers and Warrant Officers went into action with
the Battalion on October 9th, 1917:--
Battn. H.Q.:
Lieut.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O. (C.O.);
Capt. W. C. Fenton, M.C. (Adjt.);
Lieut. H. S. Wilkinson (I.O.);
Lieut. W. T. Scholes;
Capt. J. M. Anderson, R.A.M.C. (M.O.).
R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker, M.C.
Lieut. G. P. McGuire (Liaison Officer at 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q.).
A Company:
Capt. A. E. Mander;
Lieut. A. Kirk;
Sec.-Lieut. J. R. S. Brabham.
Sergt. H. Gidley (A/C.S.M.)
B Company:
Capt. S. Balme;
Sec.-Lieut. L. L. Johnson;
Sec.-Lieut. J. S. Watson;
Sec.-Lieut. R. E. Stubington.
C.S.M. H. Haigh.
C Company:
Lieut. E. V. Blakey;
Sec.-Lieut. A. M. Luty;
Sec.-Lieut. A. W. Nevile.
C.S.M. J. Parkinson.
D Company:
Capt. N. Geldard;
Lieut. W. L. Hirst;
Sec.-Lieut. L. Gumby;
Sec.-Lieut. W. Oldfield, M.M.
Sergt. W. Brooke (A/C.S.M.)
Fighting Strength of the Battalion on the morning of October 9th:--
Battn. H.Q. 5 officers 59 other ranks.
A Company 3 „ 101 „
B Company 4 „ 86 „
C Company 3 „ 106 „
D Company 4 „ 108 „
-- ---
Total 19 „ 460 „
-- ---
[12] This man did not long remain a prisoner. Certified by a combined
board of Dutch and German medical men as unfit for further service, he
was repatriated through Holland.
[13] While the Battalion was holding the Keerselaarhoek Sector the
gridded track was continued as far as the crest of the Passchendaele
Ridge.
[14] Before the Battalion left the sector, a third had been built.
[15] The following Officers and Warrant Officers went into action with
the Battalion on April 10th, 1918:--
Battn. H.Q.:
Lieut.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O. (C.O.);
Capt. W. C. Fenton, M.C. (Second in Command);
Lieut. P. G. Bales (A/Adjt.);
Lieut. J. C. Walton (I.O.);
Sec.-Lieut. H. A. Loudoun (Sig. O.);
Capt. F. C. Harrison, R.A.M.C. (M.O.).
R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker, M.C.
Sec.-Lieut. H. Rosendale (Liaison Officer at 147th Infantry Bde. H.Q.).
A Company:
Capt. A. Kirk;
Sec.-Lieut. B. H. Huggard;
Sec.-Lieut. E. Clarke;
Sec.-Lieut. J. C. Whitaker.
C.S.M. T. S. Sherwood.
B Company:
Capt. N. T. Farrar;
Sec.-Lieut. L. L. Johnson;
Sec.-Lieut. S. R. Norton;
Sec.-Lieut. F. Akroyd.
Sergt. A. Smith (A/C.S.M.).
C Company:
Capt. A. M. Luty;
Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy;
Sec.-Lieut. F. D. Chippindale;
Sec.-Lieut. M. C. O’Dowd;
Sec.-Lieut. H. E. Burgoyne.
C.S.M. N. Hobson.
D Company:
Lieut. B. M. Machin;
Sec.-Lieut. J. W. Lumb;
Sec.-Lieut. J. Turner;
Sec.-Lieut. J. H. Kitson;
Sec.-Lieut. W. Oldfield, M.M.
C.S.M. C. Naylor.
Owing to casualties and fresh officers coming up from B Echelon, many
changes took place in the personnel during the next ten days. The
Battalion went into battle so hurriedly that no record of the exact
strength was made, but it was approximately 650 other ranks.
[16] Extract from the 6th Supplement to the “London Gazette,” dated
June 25th, 1918:--“24066 Pte. Arthur Poulter awarded Victoria Cross.
For most conspicuous bravery when acting as a stretcher-bearer. On
ten occasions Pte. Poulter carried badly wounded men on his back to
a safer locality, through a particularly heavy artillery and machine
gun barrage. Two of these were hit a second time whilst on his back.
Again, after a withdrawal over the river had been ordered, Pte. Poulter
returned in full view of the enemy who were advancing, and carried
back another man who had been left behind wounded. He bandaged up over
forty men under fire, and his conduct throughout the whole day was a
magnificent example to all ranks.
This very gallant soldier was subsequently seriously wounded when
attempting another rescue in the face of the enemy.”
[17] Throughout the operations in April, 1918, Major A. L. Mowat, M.C,
was attached to 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. as Assistant Brigade Major.
[18] The following Officers and Warrant Officers went into action with
the Battalion on April 25th, 1918:--
Battn. H.Q.:
Lieut.-Col. R. E. Sugden, D.S.O. (C.O.);
Capt. W. C. Fenton, M.C. (Second in Command);
Lieut. P. G. Bales (A/Adjt.);
Lieut. J. C. Walton (I.O.);
Lieut. L. J. Smets (Sig. O.);
Capt. F. C. Harrison, R.A.M.C. (M.O.).
R.S.M. T. S. Sherwood.
Capt. H. N. Taylor (Liaison Officer at 147th Infantry Brigade
H.Q.).
A Company:
Capt. A. Kirk (O.C.);
Sec.-Lieut. E. Clarke;
Sec.-Lieut. J. C. Whitaker;
Sec.-Lieut. G. Campbell.
Sergt. W. D. Foster (A/C.S.M.).
B Company:
Sec.-Lieut. R. B. Broster (O.C.);
Sec.-Lieut. C. T. Applewhaite;
Sec.-Lieut. S. R. Norton.
C.S.M. B. Haigh, D.C.M.
C Company:
Lieut. W. G. Mackie (O.C.);
Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy;
Sec.-Lieut. A. C. Edwards.
C.S.M. J. E. Yates.
D Company:
Capt. S. Balme (O.C.);
Sec.-Lieut. H. Rosendale;
Sec.-Lieut. E. Turner;
Sec.-Lieut. L. Gumby, M.C.
C.S.M. C. Naylor.
[19] The following Officers and Warrant Officers took part in the
raid:--
Advanced Battn. H.Q.:
Lieut.-Col. A. L. Mowat, M.C. (C.O.);
Lieut. P. G. Bales.
Rear Battn. H.Q.:
Major W. C. Fenton, M.C.;
Sec.-Lieut. L. Gumby, M.C.
A Company:
Sec.-Lieut. B. H. Huggard (O.C. Company).
C.S.M. P. Gledhill.
Sec.-Lieut. A. Charlesworth (No. 1 Platoon).
Sec.-Lieut. J. E. Bentley (No. 2 Platoon).
Sec.-Lieut. R. M. Leddra (No. 3 Platoon).
Sec.-Lieut. H. M. Marsden (No. 4 Platoon).
Sec.-Lieut. J. W. Entwhistle (No. 14 Platoon).
B Company:
Capt. N. T. Farrar, M.C. (O.C. Company).
C.S.M. H. Haigh, D.C.M.
Sec.-Lieut. H. R. Newman (No. 5 Platoon).
Sec.-Lieut. R. E. Jones (No. 6 Platoon).
Sergt. F. J. Field (No. 7 Platoon).
Sec.-Lieut. W. G. Bradley (No. 8 Platoon).
Sec.-Lieut. H. Rosendale (No. 16 Platoon).
C Company:
Sec.-Lieut. B. Crickmer (No. 10 Platoon).
Sec.-Lieut. H. E. Burgoyne (No. 12 Platoon).
[20] The following Officers and Warrant Officers went into action with
the Battalion in October, 1918:--
Battn. H.Q.:
Lieut.-Col. A. L. Mowat, M.C. (C.O.);
Capt. H. H. Aykroyd, M.C. (Adjt.);
Lieut. P. G. Bales (I.O.);
Lieut. H. A. Loudoun (Sig. O.);
Capt. F. C. Harrison, R.A.M.C. (M.O.).
R.S.M. W. Lee, M.C.
A Company:
Capt. A. Kirk, M.C. (O.C. Company);
Sec.-Lieut. J. E. Bentley;
Sec.-Lieut. T. E. Jessop;
Sec.-Lieut. H. M. Marsden.
Sergt. W. D. Foster (A/C.S.M.).
B Company:
Capt. W. Grantham (O.C. Company);
Sec.-Lieut. H. Bamforth;
Sec.-Lieut. R. E. Jones;
Sec.-Lieut. A. F. Wenham-Goode.
C.S.M. H. Haigh, D.C.M.
C Company:
Capt. R. B. Broster (O.C. Company);
Sec.-Lieut. H. R. Newman, M.C.;
Sec.-Lieut. F. Maley;
Sec.-Lieut J. L. Hyland.
D Company:
Capt. T. Hutton, M.C. (O.C. Company);
Sec.-Lieut. J. W. Lumb;
Sec.-Lieut. A. H. W. Mallalieu;
Sec.-Lieut. H. Rosendale.
C.S.M. C. Naylor.
[21] The Colour Party consisted of
Lieut. P. G. Bales;
Sec.-Lieut. T. T. Gilroy;
C.S.M. H. Haigh, D.C.M., M.M.;
Sergt. A. Meskimmon, M.M.;
Sergt. T. Chilton, M.M.
[22] 4 Firsts; 1 Second; 1 Third.
[23] The cadre of the Battalion consisted of the following officers and
other ranks:.--
Lieut.-Col. A. L. Mowat, D.S.O., M.C. (C.O.).
Capt. W. N. Broomhead, T.D. (Q.M.).
Capt. P. G. Bales, M.C. (Adjt.).
Sec.-Lieut. J. A. Steele.
R.S.M. S. Flitcroft, D.C.M., M.M.
R.Q.M.S. P. Barker.
C.Q.M.S. E. Elsey.
Sergts.
E. Ashworth, D.C.M.;
E. L. Collinson;
C. H. Shaw.
Cpls.
J. W. Rider, M.M.;
S. Barker, M.M.
Lance-Cpls.
C. Walsh, M.M.;
F. E. Thompson;
A. Cobbold.
Privates
N. Crowther;
T. Langan;
C. Charnock;
C. Hipwood;
H. B. Nelson;
H. Pope;
A. Tordoff;
W. Steele;
T. Walton;
H. Wilkinson;
H. Whiteley;
W. H. Redman;
F. Wade;
F. Everett;
E. Newsome;
J. E. Walker;
N. Rawson;
S. J. Hawkes;
H. Waite;
C. Andrews.
[24] Includes several, at first reported “Missing,” since “Assumed to
be Dead.”
[25] Sec.-Lieut. R. Jury, mortally wounded by an enemy bomb at
Dunkerque.
[26] Includes all since reported “Prisoners of War.”
[27] Capt. W. Grantham, since reported “Died of wounds a Prisoner in
Enemy Hands.”
Transcriber’s Notes:
1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been
corrected silently.
2. Underlined text is shown as ~xxx~.
3. Italics are shown as _xxx_.
4. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have
been retained as in the original.
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